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DECENTRALIZATION: FINANCE AND MANAGEMENT PROJECT

Associates in Rural Development, Inc.

in collaboration with

Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University

Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University

ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT IN THE SAHEL --

A STUDY OF POLICY ADVOCACY IN MALI

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Acronyms and Abbreviations

ABB	Association des Banques et Etablissements Bancaires (banks and financial institutions)
ADEMA	Association pour la Démocratie au Mali/Parti Africain pour la Solidarité et la Justice
ADIDE	Association des Diplômés Initiateurs d'Emplois (unemployed graduates)
ADO	Agricultural Development Office, USAID Mission
AFE	Association des Femmes Entrepreneurs (women entrepreneurs)
APEP	Association pour la Promotion de l'Entreprise Privée
ARD	Associates in Rural Development, Inc.
ASARED	Association pour la Sauvegarde et le Renforcement de la Démocratie
ASCOMA	Association des Consommateurs Maliens (Malian consumers' association)
ATVR	Association des Travailleurs Partants Volontaires à la Retraite (early retirees)
AV	Association Villageoise
BNDA	Banque Nationale pour le Développement Agricole
BSI	Budget Spécial d'Investissement
CAFO	Coordination des Associations et ONG féminines
CCAM	Comité des Compagnies d'Assurances du Mali (insurance companies)
CCIM	The Malian Chamber of Commerce
CFAF	CFA franc
CFDT	Compagnie Française pour le Développement des Fibres Textiles
CFI	Canal France International
CMDT	Compagnie Malienne pour le Développement des Fibres Textiles
CNID	Comité National d'Initiative Démocratique
CNN	Cable News Network
CNPF	Centre National du Patronnat Français
COFEM	Collectif des Femmes du Mali (loose federation of women's associations)
COPACO	the <i>Compagnie Cotonnière</i>
CP	Contrat Plan
DFM	Decentralization: Finance and Management project
DNAE	Direction National des Affaires Economiques
EDM	Energie du Mali
EEC	European Economic Community
FNEM	Fédération Nationale des Employeurs du Mali
GCM	Groupement des Commerçants Maliens

GDO	USAID's General Development Office
GMM	Grands Moulins du Mali
GPP	Groupement des Professionnels du Pétrole
HUICOMA	Mali's cottonseed oil company
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IMRAD	Institut Malien de Recherches Appliquées pour le Développement
MSU	Michigan State University
MTV	Music Television channel
OHVN	Office de la Haute Vallée du Niger
OPAM	Office des Produits Agricoles du Mali
OPIM	The council of industrial manufacturers
ORTM	Office de la Radio/Télévision du Mali
PRMC	Programme de Restructuration du Marché Céréaliier
PVO	private voluntary organization
RFI	Radio France Internationale (retransmitted French TV)
SAP	Structural Adjustment Program
SMPC	Société Malienne de Produits Chimiques
SONATAM	Société Nationale de Transports du Mali
SYCOV	Syndicat des Producteurs de Coton et Vivriers
SYNABAT	Syndicat National des Entreprises du Bâtiment et des Travaux Publics
SYNAPPO	Syndicat National des Pharmaciens d'Officines Privées (private pharmacies)
SYNAPRO	Syndicat National de la Production (oldest and largest farmers' association)
SYNTRUI	Syndicat des Transporteurs Urbains et Interurbains
UDD	Union pour la Démocratie et le Développement
UMOA	Union Monétaire Ouest Africaine
UNAJOM	Union Nationale des Journalistes du Mali
UNCTRM	Union Nationale des Chargeurs et Transporteurs Routiers du Mali
UNTM	Union Nationale des Travailleurs du Mali
URTL	Union des Radios et Télévisions Libres
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development
USIA	U.S. Information Agency
VOA	Voice of America

FOREWORD

In 1988 Associates in Rural Development, Inc. (ARD), in collaboration with Indiana University's Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis and the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University, began a research and development effort focused on decentralized public service provision. The Decentralization: Finance and Management Project (DFM), sponsored by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), was designed to study problems associated with the failure of many development projects to achieve sustainable impacts--particularly those in rural areas managed by central government agencies. The project's research agenda has analyzed a variety of institutional arrangements and resource mobilization strategies to determine their effects on the sustainable provision of rural roads, irrigation infrastructure, health and education services, and the management of renewable natural resources. Field investigations and desk studies have also analyzed broader decentralization policies and issues relating to local government operations and finance.

In the initial years of the project, a series of state-of-the-art papers were prepared on the principal sectors of inquiry. These reports included a thorough review of the relevant literature and established a framework for field-level analysis. These early studies were the basis for two published books, several journal articles, and numerous conference papers dealing with the problems of rural infrastructure and irrigation management. In addition to these core research products, numerous policy studies, field research initiatives, and project designs and evaluations were conducted at the request of USAID missions in Asia and Africa and the central bureaus of USAID/Washington. These efforts provided project research staff the opportunity to test and refine analytic methods and to demonstrate the utility of institutional analysis to a variety of development problems.

At the conclusion of this major effort covering seven years and 15 different countries, a series of final papers has been prepared that synthesize the cumulative research findings and lessons learned from the project. These include a report summarizing four years of research and analysis on governance and management of irrigation systems in Nepal; a synthesis of several years of research on economic and institutional policy reform in Cameroon; an analysis of DFM research on decentralized public service provision in Africa; a research synthesis on local governance and management of renewable natural resources; a paper on the concept of social capital and its implications for development; and a synthesis of research on rural road maintenance. In addition, the DFM legacy includes two papers providing practical project design guidelines in the areas of rural infrastructure and natural resources and a final report summarizing the project's principal research and development accomplishments.

The DFM project staff from ARL, the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, and the Maxwell School extend their sincere appreciation for the sponsorship of this project by USAID. The Agency's research programs aimed at improving our understanding

of the development process and thereby the effectiveness of financial and technical assistance represent a significant contribution to the donor community and its partners in the developing world. We would also like to acknowledge and thank the dozens of colleagues from the academic and development assistance communities as well as the citizens and representatives of host countries who have participated in our enterprise. Our group has learned a great deal from this project, much of which is reflected in this final series of documents. We hope that this learning experience has also benefitted our collaborators in the U.S. and abroad.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A. Purpose of the Study and Approach

The purpose of this one-year, pilot phase study was to examine the relationship between political liberalization and economic policy reforms in the Sahel. More specifically, the study was designed to examine how USAID, a host country government and other actors in civil society could collaborate to improve the transparency, political support, feasibility and effectiveness of far-reaching economic policy changes. Specific objectives of this pilot study were to:

- Develop a methodology to better understand the role of urban and rural interest groups in economic policy reform;
- Identify methods enabling such groups to become more effective participants in the policy process; and
- Suggest means to promote further openness and transparency in the ways Sahelian Governments design, negotiate, and implement economic policies.

Mali was chosen for this research because its government has made considerable progress in assuring sustained political and economic liberalization since 1991. Moreover, a wide range of political parties and interest groups participate actively in the country's political and economic life. The cotton subsector, in particular, was selected because of its significant place in the national economy. It also provides, through the union of cotton producers (*Syndicat des Producteurs de Coton et Vivriers, SYCOV*), an uncommon example of a farmers' union in Sub-Saharan Africa.

This research activity applied a multi-disciplinary approach to several related fronts: the economic policy process, the role of the bureaucracy, the structure and dynamics of interest groups in urban and rural areas, and the functions of the media and of the National Assembly. All aspects of this work, including urban and rural interviews, were carried out in close collaboration with the *Institut Malien de Recherches Appliquées pour le Développement* (IMRAD) and a number of Malian individuals.

B. Overview of the Policy Process and of its Main Actors

An understanding of Mali's economic policy process requires an assessment of complex interactions between the bureaucracy, interest groups, the National Assembly, the media, and political parties. None of these actors can be analyzed separately from the others, but some important characteristics, and their respective roles in the policy process may be summarized as follows:

- **The bureaucracy**, itself composed of a diverse set of interests, resists, tolerates or welcomes interaction on policy issues with various actors, including donor agencies;
- **Interest groups** interact at various levels and in different ways, depending on the nature of the group, the policy issue, and other factors. Different interest groups choose a variety of strategies, from independent to collaborative relationships. In addition, some groups may take direct policy action, while others may use one or several channels, including the media.
- The **media** are an integral part of the policy process. First, they measure its degree of openness and transparency. Secondly, they provide an information channel from the bureaucracy towards interest groups, or vice-versa. They also constitute an identifiable interest group.
- The **National Assembly** also appears to play several roles in the policy process. It has some oversight over policy making and implementation and, to a limited extent, holds ministerial agencies accountable. In addition, some *Députés* act as channels or intermediaries for specific interest groups. Finally, through its open and public debates on policy issues, the National Assembly does contribute, with the help of the media, to improved transparency in the policy process and to public information.
- Finally, **political parties** intervene indirectly, and in multiple ways, in the economic policy process. A principal channel is the National Assembly, where all parties are organized into six *groupements parlementaires*. Political parties also speak through the media. Interest groups, however, rarely mobilize political parties to help settle policy issues. A major reason is that in the past, parties have tried to divide, infiltrate or control various interest groups. Conversely, some political parties are as eager to stay away from "radical" interest groups as the latter are to keep their distances from political parties.

C. Main Findings

1. *The Bureaucracy*

Foreign interests continue to exert a very strong influence on most aspects of Mali's economic policy process. In spite of this common feature, there are significant differences in the openness toward, and type of relationship with, interest groups in Malian society, depending on the economic policy area concerned. More specifically, relations on policy issues between the bureaucracy and interest groups depend on two major factors:

- i) the extent to which the national bureaucracy has ownership of, and control over certain policy areas, and;

- ii) the extent to which policies in these areas are coherent with each other, and effective.

The first factor reflects the fact that the Government cannot really engage interest groups into a substantial policy dialogue and negotiation unless the bureaucracy itself has some degree of control over policy choices. The second one is linked to the fact that the type of policy dialogue with interest groups, and the level at which it takes place, partly depend on the coherence and effectiveness of policies.

With respect to the above factors, there are important differences between:

- Development policies and programs financed under the national investment budget (*Budget Spécial d'Investissements*, BSI);
- Policies and programs directly related to the implementation of the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP), and;
- Other policy areas where donors are directly and actively involved (in the Malian case, national cereal policy and the cotton subsector are good examples).

The results can be summarized as follows:

	Control	Coherence/Effectiv.	Openness/Style
B.S.I	Potentially high, but low	Low	Average (very broad or Implementation)
S.A.P.	Average	Average/High	Good, at higher policy level
Donor- "Intensive"	Low	High	Good, but selective

One implication from this analysis is that the approach used by USAID to strengthen the Malian bureaucracy's ability to manage economic policy, and to engage interest groups in a constructive dialogue over policy issues is not necessarily the same for each type of policy area, as described above.

2. *The National Assembly*

The National Assembly fulfills several functions:

- i) *Députés* participate in the legislative aspects of the policy process by reviewing and amending key legislation, such as the budget bill or the Prime Minister's statement of development strategy:

- ii) they provide urban and rural interest groups with a voice and channel for action on various macroeconomic or subsectoral issues;
- iii) they contribute to a more open policy debate by requesting testimony on policy issues from various interested parties, and through public access and media coverage of plenary sessions.

The National Assembly, however, shows severe limitations, and labors under considerable constraints. It remains critically under-equipped, and has very little technical support and parliamentary staff. Draft bills submitted by the Government are often incomplete or unclear. Representatives themselves admit that parliamentary commissions tend to request testimony on a rather selective basis. Many *députés* are unprepared to deal with complex technical issues and resent their lack of understanding of, or control over, economic policy. However, providing representatives with technical information or training has proved to be a delicate issue.

The National Assembly does play a role in the areas of policy oversight, rural and urban interest group representation, and public policy debate, but this role is very imperfect. The Government of Mali may not be eager to have a policy watchdog acquire keener senses. It may also feel that there are already too many channels for the expression of popular discontent. However, a dysfunctional or strongly biased parliament may be worse than nothing, as it might heighten social tensions and popular frustrations. In other words, if Mali is to have a parliament it can live with and keep in the long run, it has to become more functional. A number of specific suggestions on further support to the National Assembly are presented in the last chapter.

3. *The Media*

Since 1991, the Malian media, a unique phenomenon in West Africa, have played a critical role, both in the new democratic process, and in opening up the economic policy debate. Several newspapers or magazines cover policy issues on a regular basis. The best coverage comes from "*Les Cauris*," an independent bi-monthly which specializes in political economy and policy issues. Others include "*L'Aurore*," the ADEMA-supported "*Mali Entreprise*," and the Government-controlled "*L'Essor*."

Overall, coverage of economic policy and issues in the printed media remains limited. Few journalists have more than a basic understanding of economic issues; well-argued feature articles and investigative reports are scarce. The number of interviews with high-ranking administration officials on economic matters is similarly low, and so is the sum of articles contributed by local specialists and academics. The need for better economic journalism is, however, getting increasing attention; several economic journalism seminars on structural adjustment and on the CFAF devaluation have been organized in the past two years.

Mali's unique radio network includes Government-controlled network, private Malian broadcasters, and foreign radio stations. Most are operating in Bamako, although a good number of them are now established in small towns throughout the country. Because of the dominance of oral communication, and of their reliance on vernacular languages, radio stations have reached unprecedented numbers of people with many kinds of information.

Independent radio stations have been at least as active as the written press in their coverage of economic issues and have reached larger and more diverse audiences. Broadcasters play a basic information role by providing daily price information, and announcements of specific activities and events. All stations have also organized and broadcast round-table discussions and conferences on such issues as structural adjustment, trade policy, and other economic policy reforms.

Most interest groups use the media in some way to further their objectives. The radio have been very useful to groups eager to publicize their claims and use popular opinion to force the Government to enter into a real dialogue and negotiation process. For the vast majority of rural groups, radio stations constitute the only source of information and the sole opportunity for popular expression and communication. Most Bamako broadcasters are actually very eager to establish transmitters in small towns, and to develop rural programs, but very few have the financial means to do so.

4. Urban Interest Groups

Since 1991, many interest groups have emerged, representing a great variety of interests, along multiple organizational and operational modes. Some reflect corporatist interests and practices, while others gather a more disparate membership around specific policy issues. Certain groups clearly focus on economic issues while others deal with different types of social questions, such as the place and role of religion in society, human rights, and gender issues (there are over 60 women's associations).

To explore the links between the characteristics of interest groups and their degree of success in the policy process, the team carried out a cross-sectional study of about twenty groups, all of which are functional and, as it turns out, rather influent. "Structural" characteristics were first examined: urban vs. rural-orientation, size, extent of association with other groups, relative endowment in resources, access to relevant information and capacity to carry out pertinent economic analysis. The team then summarized the groups' strategies and methods of operations. Their most common "points of entry" into the policy process were also identified. Finally, their degree of success in terms of effectiveness and political power was assessed.

This analysis revealed that five interest group characteristics are most closely associated with successful participation in the policy process. In decreasing order of significance, they are: resource endowment, association with parliamentary groups, access to high levels of the policy process, access to information, and capacity to analyze it.

Corporatist groups, usually better endowed with resources, have tended to do better than single-issue oriented ones. Not surprisingly, having resources is also positively correlated with another important characteristic: access to information and capacity to carry out policy analysis. The actual size of groups, however, does not necessarily determine their degree of success. Confrontational strategies and a capacity to mobilize large numbers of people do go together, but a confrontational approach does not seem to guarantee influence in the long run.

In addition to this analysis on about twenty interest groups, four mini-case studies, or vignettes, illustrate various aspects of intra- and inter-group dynamics, and of the overall economic policy process. These vignettes first underscore the importance of a historical perspective on the dynamics of interest groups. They also illustrate the crucial role of external actors: business partners abroad, donors acting as mediators or as active participants in the policy process.

The vignettes further emphasize important differences between groups in their nature and orientation, in their leadership, strategies and degree of effectiveness in policy activism. Finally, they reveal the ebb-and-flow of alliances and conflicts among groups, and differences in the degree of publicity given to various policy-related controversies.

5. The Cotton Subsector

Cotton represents over 50 percent of Mali's export earnings. Faced with falling international prices, and as part of a broader structural adjustment program, the Government and parastatal agencies active in the subsector have taken measures to reduce management and operational costs. These measures have included the retrenchment of Malian parastatal enterprises from various input supply, credit, transport and extension activities, and the establishment of a multi-year program agreement (*Contrat-Plan*) between the Government, the Malian Company for Textile Development (*Compagnie Malienne pour le Développement des Textiles*, CMDT), donors, and more recently the SYCOV.

The cotton producers' union, SYCOV, has its origins in a barely averted 1991 strike by cotton farmers, mostly from the Koutiala area. Producers had to apply unusual pressure to have the Government and the CMDT consider a list of twelve grievances concerning long-standing pricing and marketing issues. Nine out of twelve were rapidly worked out; the remainder ushered in a long process of negotiation between the CMDT and cotton producers, which resulted, among other things, in the formal establishment of SYCOV as a producer organization.

However, because of the strategic nature of the subsector, several donor agencies supported both the emergence of SYCOV as an interlocutor to CMDT, and the pursuit of negotiations between the two parties. Consequently, in the eyes of many producers and the minds of many who follow Malian agricultural policy, SYCOV has appeared beholden to, if not captured by, some international donors and the CMDT. The situation is made more

complex by the fact that the CMDT fulfills two important roles. It is first a private sector actor managing various aspects of the "*filière*:" production, collection, processing and marketing. Secondly, it acts as a public agent of the Ministry of Rural Development with responsibility for a wide variety of rural development activities in the cotton zones. Although some policy makers welcome the emergence of SYCOV as a "corporatist" partner to the CMDT in the cotton subsector, most are doubtful about the union's capacity to assume the management (at lower cost) for the provision of inputs, and for village-level extension responsibilities.

In negotiations with the Government and the CMDT, SYCOV has, with support from donors and the Malian Assembly of Chambers of Agriculture, reached several of its major goals: it has become a full-fledged signatory party to the *Contrat-Plan*, and has secured, in the fall of 1994, a higher producer price for cotton than was proposed by the Government. On the other hand, it has failed to obtain satisfaction on the removal of production quotas determined by *Compagnie Française pour le Développement des Fibres Textiles* (CFDT), and on village-based cotton classification.

SYCOV leaders as well as outside supporters agree that the union's main challenge is to strengthen its base by increasing the number of members and solidifying the grounds of membership. SYCOV is less than five years old, but it remains more an organization of its leaders rather than of its members. The union also faces a series of deep problems linked to the history of village-level organization and rural political mobilization in Mali. While many public and nongovernmental programs still consider the *Associations Villageoises* (AVs) as their main points of entry for the implementation of their programs, the AV system appears to have reached its limits.

Whether as a union defending its members' interests, or as a "loyal" corporatist partner to the CMDT and the Government, SYCOV's continued success and viability may hinge on an often overlooked factor: literacy. Most of its leaders have had some schooling, and quite a few are retired civil servants. Many of SYCOV's village-level leaders emerged from the once powerful CMDT literacy program. This program now receives much less attention than it used to, and to the extent that this narrow educated base further erodes, it undercuts the chances of renewal of village leadership.

This chapter of the report concludes by examining what, if any, opportunities could be available for the emergence of wider farmer solidarity in Mali. In particular, the team examined SYCOV's relations with political parties, the National Assembly, the Chamber of Agriculture and other farmers' unions to shed some light on prospects for continued political and economic liberalization in rural Mali.

D. Research and Programmatic Implications

Research and programmatic implications include, but are not limited to, the following:

1. Strengthening Governmental Democratic Performance

As Mali continues to move along the path toward political and economic liberalization, the findings of this report suggest a number of ways for the Government to move from its 'control orientation' in policy making to a facilitating and public service role.

2. Strengthening Economic Policy Analysis

A broader and more constructive dialogue between the Government and a variety of interest groups will depend in part upon the capacity of public agencies to carry out more informed policy assessments and evaluations. There is, however, no reason why a capacity for economic analysis should be a Government monopoly. This report highlights opportunities to support independent institutes or associations doing political and economic analysis of their own.

3. Strengthening the National Assembly's Role in Democratic Development

Based on a fuller understanding of the National Assembly's role, one could consider effective ways for 'training' *députés* to serve as representatives. Providing some parliamentary staff, communications and other logistical support required to improve the effectiveness of the National Assembly should also be considered a priority.

4. Supporting the Media

The media have probably contributed more to opening up the policy debate, and to promoting the democratic process in Mali than any other single group. Logistical support to both the written press and the radio (newsprint, printing equipment, communications and broadcasting equipment) would provide extremely high democracy and development "returns", both in urban and rural areas. This could be accomplished by supporting station programming, providing transportation and recording equipment to journalists, and helping private voluntary organizations (PVOs) operating in rural areas bring their "clients" into the media channels.

5. Strengthening Farmers' Organizations

The various issues raised by SYCOV are illustrative of the problems confronting most farmers' organizations in Mali. Emerging farm leaders need to acquire basic skills to strengthen the structure of their organizations, establish a more solid financial base and improve (or create) an independent policy analysis capacity. Representatives from US farmer groups may contribute to this process.

The Government's program for administrative decentralization will shift the locus of development policy and political action to the regions. If implemented as planned, however, this program will have profound implications for the organization of farmer groups. For example, the *commune rurale* will replace the village as the basic organizational unit. This raises questions about the type of organizational structure to replace the *association villageoise*, as the current unit for development program implementation, and as the basic constituent unit for most farmer organizations.

6. Promoting More Effective Donor Coordination

It is difficult for a national bureaucracy, beset by a lack of human and other resources, to assert effective control over economic policies largely financed and oriented by donors. This study confirms that, in addition to the sheer "weight" of donor influence, Malian civil servants have to reckon with complex patterns of donor influence, not only upon the government or the bureaucracy, but on many interest groups as well. Greater coherence in donor policies will not, in itself, guarantee a higher level of national control and "ownership" of economic policies, but it will very likely be a prerequisite. As a major donor, USAID can take a lead in both areas.

7. The Rule of Law

In many ways, this research and the Mali democracy and governance assessment are complementary. The two exercises independently concluded that one should ensure that the rule of law continues to prevail. Under a dictatorial regime, the rules of the game, however biased, are well understood and enforced. If unconstrained by acceptable and enforceable rules, however, rapid gains in political and economic liberalization can bring about new kinds of excesses contributing to renewed social tensions in several areas. One should not take it for granted that Mali's imperfect judicial and court system, already strained, will always provide adequate safeguards under the new order.

I. RESEARCH SETTING AND ORIENTATIONS

A. Introduction and Rationale

In late 1993, the Sahel/West Africa Office of USAID's Africa Bureau asked Associates in Rural Development, Inc. and Michigan State University to carry out a one-year, pilot phase study to examine the relationship between political liberalization and economic policy reforms in the Sahel. The rationale for this request owed much to previous inquiries into the process of economic policy reform in sub-saharan Africa. These suggested that, since the early 1980's, the lack of transparency and popular participation in the policy reform process, especially among rural and marginalized groups, had weighed heavily in the generally poor performance of structural adjustment and other macroeconomic and sectoral reforms.

With the increasing likelihood of a CFA franc devaluation, USAID felt that a better understanding of the links between political liberalization and economic policy reform in the Sahel, would help increase the transparency, political backing and feasibility of far-reaching economic policies. More specifically, the objectives of this pilot study were to:

- Develop a methodology to better understand the role of rural communities and interest groups in economic policy reform;
- Identify methods enabling communities and groups to become more effective participants in the policy process;
- Strengthen the capacity of Sahelian governments in the design, negotiation, and implementation of policy reforms, and;
- Improve the openness of these governments to a greater role for the civil society in economic policy reform process.

The work carried out in Mali during 1994 by ARD, Inc., Michigan State University (MSU), and their Malian associates provides an understanding of these issues, presents methodological approaches and tools, draws general conclusions, and suggests specific operational steps. While this research was done under the DFM project, an African Democracy and Governance assessment of the socio-political situation in Mali was being carried out. The two research teams were thus able to exchange information and to coordinate activities. Several Malian participants worked under both research projects, which further facilitated the synergy between the two.

B. Mali as a Suitable Case for a Pilot Study

After consultations with several USAID missions, the team elected to carry out this research in Mali, using the cotton subsector as an illustration. Mali was selected because,

since 1991, its Government appeared to be making considerable progress in assuring sustained political and economic liberalization. Under a civilian, executive-parliamentary form of government, a wide range of political parties and interest groups seemed to be actively participating in the country's political life. This was confirmed both by the team's work, and by the findings of the USAID-funded Democracy and Governance Assessment. The cotton subsector was chosen because of its significant place in the national economy, raising and diversifying the incomes of many thousands of rural families, and adding up to over half of the nation's export earnings. The subsector also had high political visibility, and its union of cotton producers SYCOV, provided an uncommon example of organized and powerful rural labor association in sub-saharan Africa. Finally, this area offered much empirical material for the study of rural-urban interactions.

C. Study Approach

This prototype study was designed by an economist and a political scientist to be fully multidisciplinary, collaborative, and based on multiple visits. Working links were established with a Malian research and policy activism organization, the *Institut Malien de Recherches Appliquées au Développement*, IMRAD. The study also established working relationships with key researchers, former Government officials, business and labor personalities. Thus, Malian team members included two widely respected experts on national economic and political affairs, a former high-ranking official of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, and a rural sociologist, knowledgeable in the issues confronting various rural interest groups in the cotton subsector. Collaborative links were maintained through several visits to Mali, joint interviews, commissioned work and organization or participation in several workshops held in Bamako. Commissioned work included a number of interviews and short case studies, two of which are appended to this report as working papers¹.

The full team carried out the research during three separate, short phases in January, March and June-July 1994, Malian team members continuing with various components of the research program throughout the period. This approach had several advantages: time to reconsider and redirect lines of enquiry, time for the main researchers to reflect on issues, building a stronger sense of involvement and "ownership" over time among Malian researchers and other associates. Finally, this allowed the team to track the evolution of policies, policy positions and interests among various actors, especially in light of the January 12, 1994 devaluation of the CFA franc.

To further publicize this research within Mali, the final workshop has been taped and to produce a two-hour radio broadcast on Radio Klédu, a Bamako station specializing in economic policy debates and conferences. On the U.S. side, the team has made every effort to inform, and collaborate with interest parties: the GDO and ADO offices at USAID, the Embassy, and at the U.S. Information Agency (USIA). Finally, the main research team

¹ "The 1990-1994 Chronology of Economic and Political Events", and "The Media and Economic Information in Mali."

organized a small donors' roundtable consultation on the extent to which donors support specific interest groups and promote a more open and participatory economic policy process.

D. Research Approach and Instruments

The conceptual approach used in designing the field research combined two types of studies: those dealing with policy reform and those dealing with the organization and influence of interest groups in the development process. More specifically, the field team carried out simultaneous research activities in four areas:

- the economic policy process;
- the structure and dynamics of a sample of interest groups;
- policy issues and actors in the cotton sub-sector; and
- the structure and dynamics of groups in the cotton sub-sector.

1. Understanding the Policy Process

The team's goal here was to gain an understanding of how the economic policy process actually "works"; to identify the mechanisms, main actors, and issues. The team wanted to explore certain specific questions; for instance:

- To what extent does the bureaucracy feel it has adequate control over major aspects of economic policy in Mali?
- Are the necessary mechanisms and dynamics in place to ensure that reasonably cohesive policy orientations and choices emerge from the central bureaucracy?
- Is the bureaucracy willing to work with various interest groups on policy analysis and implementation? If so, which areas and issues are "open for negotiation" and which ones are not?
- On which mechanisms does the bureaucracy rely to send this message to interest groups; how does negotiation take place, and at which levels of the policy process?
- What is the role of "linkage" or intermediary institutions such as the media, parliamentary groups, political parties, in the interaction between the bureaucracy and interest groups?
- Regarding the above points, is there a willingness to make the process more efficient; what are some reasonable options?

The team tried to answer these questions on the basis of documentary evidence, structured interviews with current and past members of the bureaucracy, group discussions with Malian colleagues, and in two workshops. Results are found in Chapter II of the paper.

2. Cross-sectional Analysis of Interest Groups

In terms of policy issues and interactions between the policy process and interest groups, this paper emphasizes the cotton subsector. However, the team felt that it would be useful to draw on a broader sample of groups to complement sub-sectoral analysis with a study of interest groups characteristics and determinants of success in policy activism. Typical questions included:

- Intra-group dynamics -- Can one draw up a typology of interest groups according to structure, strategies, and mode of operation? How do these factors relate to success, in terms of the ability to inflect policy choices or implementation?
- "Point of Entry" -- What is the range of points of entry used by interest groups in their interaction with the policy process; and is there a relationship with their degree of success?
- Inter-group dynamics -- What are the kinds of relationships between groups, and how do they affect the groups' degree of success?
- Other actors -- What role do the media, parliamentary groups, political parties, donors, play in the policy process, and in the interaction between groups and the policy process?
- Regarding the above points, what measures might be taken to promote a more open, balanced and constructive interaction between groups and the policy process?

The team tried to answer such questions through single and repeat interviews with constituents from a varied sample of interest groups, members of the bureaucracy, of the media, of the National Assembly, of political parties, and representatives from donor agencies. Results are illustrated through "mini-case studies", or vignettes, in Chapter II of the report.

3. Policy Issues and Actors in the Cotton Subsector

This aspect of the research was designed to provide a more detailed description of policies, actors in interactions in the cotton subsector. The questions addressed included:

- What is the linkage between macroeconomic policy areas, and policies more specific to the cotton subsector?

- Who are the main stakeholders and actors in the cotton subsector; which policy area is of concern to them, or the object of interaction (collaboration, interdependence, conflict) with other groups or the bureaucracy?

In this case, the research instrument consisted of several overlaid "mappings" of the cotton subsector. On the basis of documentary research and interviews with a wide range of actors from the central bureaucracy, parastatal enterprise, transporters, textile manufacturers, cotton producers, and donor agencies, the team derived a series of schematic illustrations. These showed: i) relevant areas of macroeconomic policy, ii) the mapping of functional relationships between major actors in the cotton subsector, and iii) policy issues specific to the subsector. The overlaid mapping showed which set of actors was affected by main subsectoral or macroeconomic policy areas. The rationale for this mapping was that it helped visualize which actors are likely to intervene on each major policy area. It also helped understand the political calculus of subsectoral policy choices, since affected stakeholders were identified by main policy area.

4. Longitudinal Analysis of Interest Groups in the Cotton Subsector

Here the team tried to answer similar questions as in the second research area, above, but with a narrower policy focus, in greater detail, and with a much expanded historical perspective. This required an examination of the following questions:

- There is no doubt that the SYCOV cotton farmers' union has gained influence, to the point where they now participate in *Contrat-Plan* negotiations with the central bureaucracy, the CMDT and donors. However, the viability and representativeness of SYCOV remain debatable. For example, many observers question the real extent of SYCOV's base in the rural areas. The union's legitimacy and influence have also benefitted from financial and technical support by donors or NGOs. The question is, therefore, at what point does external support begin to create a "dependency relationship" and a handicap to creating a viable farmers' union?
- Do parastatal experience and training among SYCOV leaders influence the union's effectiveness? In other words, could an interest group whose leaders have no previous government experience become an accepted and viable interlocutor in policy discussions?
- At the village level, what would SYCOV need to do in order to convince farmers that it represents an attractive and profitable option to the current role played by the CMDT and its village-level agents?
- What developmental role can political parties play, especially in the countryside?

- How will the Government's program for administrative decentralization influence the effectiveness of SYCOV?
- Are there any opportunities for the emergence of wider, or nation-wide, farmer solidarity movements in Mali?

Findings in this area of research were obtained mostly through individual and group interviews with members of the central bureaucracy, of the CMDT parastatal, the SYCOV leadership and members, and a set of field surveys in Mali's cotton areas (CMDT as well as the *Office de la Haute Vallée du Niger*, OHVN). Results are presented in Chapter IV.

II. THE ECONOMIC POLICY PROCESS -- ACTORS AND DYNAMICS

This chapter presents a general description of the economic policy process, and of the major actors taking part in it. Subsequent chapters provide a more detailed analysis of interest groups and of dynamics within the cotton subsector.

Most African and foreign experts recognize that many of the economic policy reform programs of the 1980's have failed, not only economically, but also politically and socially. Some observers invoke the over-eagerness of donors, the lack of host country commitment, or limited institutional resources as likely reasons. Others point to failures in communications between aid agencies and African governments, or between these governments and their own people, as the real cause. Indeed, partly out of customary arbitrariness, and partly because they were largely unconvinced themselves, many African governments failed to build broad popular support behind the reforms they agreed to undertake. This had two major consequences. First, their counter-arguments to planned measures were less convincing² than if such opposition had been aired through wider public debate. Secondly, by the time the reforms had to be carried out, popular reaction was often uncontrollable. Governments, caught between the "rock" of donor pressure, and the "hard place" of popular discontent, either retreated into brutal oppression, or fell.

For the purposes of this study, the economic policy process refers to the results from the interaction between the policy domain proper, and various societal actors. The policy domain includes high-level members of the polity and the state bureaucracy in charge of policy orientations, policy making (policy design or analysis, choice of policy instruments) and policy implementation. Relevant societal actors include popular masses, specific interest groups or associations, the media, the National Assembly, and political parties.

A. The Basic Model

In this study, the policy process has been analyzed by main component stage. The first stage applies to the level where policy orientations are chosen in order to reach overall societal goals. Broad orientations are then translated into specific sectoral and other policies, to be applied by various government agencies (usually ministries). In the next stage, instruments are chosen for each main policy to reach intended results, subject to a number of constraints on financial and institutional resources, and with respect to the impact of available policy instruments on various social or interest groups. The last stage applies to policy implementation.

In its analysis of Malian interest groups, the team paid particular attention to the degree of transparency of the policy process, especially through the availability of relevant information, and to the capacity of groups to gather and analyze policy related information.

² At least until the first bread or rice price riots erupted.

The groups' strategies and resources were also examined, as potential determinants of the level, or stage, at which groups interact with the policy process. In addition, channels of action, direct and indirect, were investigated.

B. Overview of the Main Actors and Dynamics

The discussion below presents groups considered to be major actors. They are: the state bureaucracy, interest groups, the media, the national assembly, and political parties. One should be mindful that the lines between main actors are not always clearly drawn: the state bureaucracy is itself akin to a set of institutional interest groups; political parties are influential both in parliament and in the media. In addition, each major actor can play a variety of roles. However, the main actors and dynamics in the policy process may be described as follows:

- As a set of sometimes allied, sometimes competing interest groups, the **bureaucracy** avoids, tolerates, or welcomes interaction on policy issues with various parties, including donor agencies;
- **Interest groups** interact with the policy domain at various stages, and in different ways, depending on various factors, including the nature of the group and the policy issue. Interest groups act singly, or in alliance with, or against other groups. In some instances interest groups interact directly with the policy domain, while in others they use one or several channels: the media, the National Assembly, or political parties;
- The **media** play several roles in the policy process. They contribute to transparency in the interactions between the bureaucracy and interest groups, and provide a measure of openness in the policy process. They supply a channel for information flowing from the bureaucracy towards interest groups, or vice-versa, and give a voice to all parties. They also constitute a corporatist interest group in their own right;
- Likewise, the **National Assembly** fulfills various functions. It has some oversight over policy making and implementation and, to a limited extent, can call on the bureaucracy to account for its actions. It can act as a channel or intermediary in representing specific interest groups. By holding widely open debates on policy issues, it contributes, with the help of the media, to transparency and public information.
- **Political parties** intervene indirectly, and in multiple ways, into the economic policy process. One common channel is the National Assembly, where all parties are organized into six *groupements parlementaires*. As mentioned above, all parties are represented in each parliamentary commission, and its members vote or introduce motions in the National Assembly's general sessions. Political parties or, rather, political figures, also intervene through the media: several newspapers or radio stations are owned or controlled by powerful individuals. Although people directly contact political parties to help settle personal problems, interest groups rarely do so. A chief

reason is that political parties, especially the *Association pour la Démocratie au Mali/Parti Africain pour la Solidarité et la Justice* (ADEMA), have a history of trying to divide, infiltrate or control various associations and interest groups. Conversely, some political parties are as eager to stay away from "radical" interest groups as the latter are to keep their distances from political parties.

With respect to the rural sector, discussions with representatives from several political parties suggest that the extent to which they embrace a rural strategy, or have taken a position vis-a-vis the interests of rural producers, is questionable. Most parties have relatively localized sources of support, either in Bamako or in certain regions. There is some evidence, however, that some parties, like the *Union pour la Démocratie et le Développement* (UDD) are gradually broadening their political base with a network of regional and local offices. Various rural groups frequently present grievances or requests through the representatives of parliamentary parties. At the same time, however, SYCOV and the OHV *Comité de Coordination* publicly dissociate their organizations from any partisan affiliations. Both groups feel strongly that they have more to lose than to gain from clear partisan connections. Moreover, this 'anti-partisanism' seems to reflect a widespread cynicism of party politics in the countryside. Shortly after the presidential elections, for example, farmers interviewed in the CMDT zone reported that party activity was basically divisive, and possibly anti-developmental, in most villages.

C. The Bureaucracy and the Policy Process

The Malian state bureaucracy represents a varied set of institutional interest groups and factions. Structural adjustment pressures have drawn more clearly yet the lines between the Finance Ministry, for instance, and other institutions. The restructuring or privatization of parastatal enterprises have also been very divisive issues. Interaction between the bureaucracy and the political élite on the one hand, and with other interest groups has been all the more laborious. In addition, many interest groups include early-retired former members of the bureaucracy.

In their relations with civil society interest groups, members of the bureaucracy also have to manage "political interference," whereby a policy outcome is often presented to them as a *fait accompli*. In some instances, the Government yields to popular pressure, while in other cases, interest groups directly lobby a Minister, who may elect not to rely on his staff for policy analysis.

Finally, the bureaucracy is quite ambivalent on "donor interference" into the policy process. On the one hand, donors can provide the means by which interest groups collaborate with the bureaucracy on policy analysis, as has been the case in the transport sector. Donors have also helped interest groups reach a consensus position on important policy issues as a preamble to negotiations with the Government. On the other hand, when donors assume a

predominant role, there can be important implications for the participatory quality of the policy process.

The study results also suggest a relationship between i) the extent of control by the Malian bureaucracy over certain types of policies, ii) the intra-sectoral coherence and effectiveness of these policies, and iii) the degree of openness toward, and type of relationship with, interest groups in Malian society. Three broad types of economic policies may be analyzed to illustrate the point:

1. The Policy Process and Policies Financed under the BSI

These are the investment-oriented policies whereby national orientations and the sundry interests of donors are reconciled through the BSI and its rolling three-year investment plan. The process involves the Ministry of Plan, the Ministry of Finance's national budget directorate, and the statistical and planning units of the various ministries. As in other Sahel countries, however, the proportion of donor funds in the BSI is around 80-85 percent, and these funds come from a large number of donors who have different --and sometimes changing-- development approaches and emphases. A national bureaucracy thus finds it hard to relate programs to a national mandate, and to maintain policy consistency over time. The temptation is also great to rely on a strategy designed to maximize the overall size of the BSI and the number of individual projects, and to minimize the national contribution. This invariably drives down the rate of spending on budgeted funds; in Mali it is currently on the order of 50 to 55 percent. Although the efficiency of such spending is expected to be quite low, it's difficult to make an overall assessment since the Ministry of Plan does not have the resources to verify the physical implementation of budgeted activities; it only works on the basis of reimbursed project expenditures. This is the reason why the summary table below indicates that while control over the BSI by the Malian bureaucracy can be high in principle, the coherence among policies, and their overall effectiveness, are low.

The policy process, however, is not merely driven by a combination of donors' orientations and institutional interests. Over the last few years, the translation of broad national orientations into specific policies and programs has increasingly relied on the conclusions of rather popular fora, and on technical input from the ranks of the administration (as in the forestry subsector, for instance). Non-institutional stakeholders do not intervene at the intermediate stages of the policy process. The interests of specific groups are expressed through parliamentary action at a higher policy level through the review of the *lettre de politique de développement, loi de finances*, and at a lower level through *questions orales* in plenary sessions. Consequently, the degree of openness is thought to be average, and the popular participation takes place on very broad policy orientations, or at the implementation level.

Also, these types of policies lend themselves best to the Government's proposed decentralization policy, which may significantly alter the relationships and dynamics within government agencies, between levels of government, and between government and rural

interest groups. The Ministry of Rural Development's *Plan d'Action* provides an example of a government document specifically addressing the issue of a more decentralized organization that would respond more effectively and appropriately to rural needs and interests. This approach would involve more privatization of activities as well as specific measures so that regional offices would be less hierarchically dependent on Bamako, and more demand-driven by local constituencies. As the Plan states: "The point is no longer to control or regiment producers, but to establish a relation of true partnership within which their individual interests, as well as the public good, can be both safeguarded and allowed to interact harmoniously³." It is, however, only fair to point out that decentralization remains very much a top-down process, and that there are many in the national bureaucracy who actively resist it.

2. The Policy Process and Structural Adjustment Policies

This process is driven by a much smaller number of donors, working closely with each other and the Government. Many Malians still consider that such policy reforms are imposed by the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund (IMF), but in reality things are less clear-cut. For one thing, part of the bureaucracy has gradually taken ownership of and responsibility for many of the adjustment policies. The framework document is now prepared by the Malian bureaucracy in a fairly open and participatory process. The Structural Adjustment Committee gathers eight national analysts and representatives from each ministry. It has a design as well as a monitoring function, and meets once a month on the average. The committee discusses program implementation, and sends its conclusions to the World Bank and to the IMF. Still, most civil servants complain that the process of communication and consultation within the administration remains far from perfect⁴.

Consultations with corporate interest groups on technical issues in structural adjustment policy areas (e.g., energy, transport, health) have been numerous. In some cases, the bureaucracy has sought the collaboration of trade groups, in others, the latter have taken the initiative. In the transport sector, for instance, donors have facilitated the participation of trade associations in the analysis of policy reforms. The national labor union federation, UNTM, has also been kept regularly informed of planned structural adjustment measures.

The bureaucracy increasingly relies on the press to gauge the interpretation and reaction of various groups to policy decisions, especially in the area of structural adjustment. The Ministry of Finance plans to carry out a systematic monthly polling of public opinion, to see how people perceive government decisions, in terms of efficiency or equity. This activity will cover rural as well as urban areas, and will not be donor-supported. The polling is to be

³ "Il ne s'agit plus d'encadrer, voire enrégimenter ... mais d'entretenir... des relations de partenariat vrai pour une forme de développement dans laquelle ses intérêts particuliers, aussi bien que ceux de la collectivité nationale seraient préservés et s'articuleraient harmonieusement."

⁴ See for instance, Deme, M. et al, "Ajustement Structurel et Communication", 1994.

carried out by a private consulting firm, with results to be presented in the Council of Ministers.

In spite of such efforts, the quality of communication, and the nature of collaboration between the bureaucracy and important interest groups on specific issues leave much to be desired. Both sides are aware of this and readily recognize it. Even donors intervening in critical areas have had to allow for this. In some cases, a donor designing policy reforms has consulted certain interest groups, in addition to the bureaucracy. In other instances, the bureaucracy itself has turned to donors to facilitated collaboration or mediation among interest groups to ensure a more productive dialogue between them and the public agencies. In conclusion, on structural adjustment-related policies, the degree of control by the national institutions is average, policies tend to be relatively coherent and effective, and participation by various interest groups is rather good, and improving.

3. The Policy Process in Policy Areas where Donors are Actively Involved

The third type of policy area is strongly influenced by a smaller group of donors, who not only provide financing, but also take an active part in policy design and implementation. Examples include cereal policy, with the long-standing multi-donor *Programme de Restructuration du Marché Céréaliier* (PRMC) project, and the cotton subsector. In such cases, the degree of control over the policy area by the bureaucracy is low, while intra-sectoral coherence and effectiveness tend to be high. It is also in this type of policy area that donor involvement with corporatist interest groups has been the greatest, through technical or financial support to producers' or traders' associations, or intermediation between producers and policy makers.

The results can be summarized in the table below:

	Control by the Bureaucracy	Coherence/Effectiv.	Openness/Style
B.S.I	Potentially high, but low	Low	Average (very broad or Implementation)
S.A.P.	Average	Average/High	Good, at higher policy level
Donor- "Intensive"	Low	High	Good, but selective

To summarize, overall control of policies by the Malian bureaucracy remains partial. In the BSI case, policy coherence and effectiveness suffer, while in the case of "donor-management intensive" policy areas, outside influence provides greater policy coherence and effectiveness. The extent of openness in the policy process, and the type of relations with

interest groups seem to be determined by the combined effects of policy control and coherence. In the case of BSI-financed policies, the process is open, but opportunities for significant policy influence by interest groups are few. In the policy areas where donors take a very active role, the high coherence and effectiveness of policies should facilitate policy dialogue. However, the involvement of the national bureaucracy in such areas is relatively limited. Consequently, interest groups either gain access to the policy process through donors, or find their interlocutors in the national administration rather passive. It is, rather, in the structural adjustment-related policy areas that the combination is most favorable to a relatively wide and constructive policy dialogue: a satisfactory degree of control by the national bureaucracy, and of coherence and effectiveness in policies.

D. Interest Groups and the Policy Process

This study has examined Malian interest groups from various viewpoints. The following four mini-case studies or "vignettes" provide some insights into the interactions among interest groups, and between groups and other actors in the economic policy process. Chapter IV presents a more complete analysis of the structure and dynamics of Malian interest groups, of their effectiveness in policy activism, and of the relationships between group characteristics and the degree of success. Finally, Chapter V looks in detail at interest groups in the cotton subsector.

Vignette 1 - The Malian Chamber of Commerce (CCIM)

As in most countries, the Chamber of Commerce tries to represent two kinds of business interests: the manufacturing and industrial interests, and trading interests. As usual, the interests of such business groups are quite different, and often opposed. For instance, the traders are in favor of lower custom duties, whereas manufacturers are aiming for the opposite. Relations between traders and manufacturers within the CCIM thus take various turns; they are sometimes opposed, sometimes allied. The CCIM occasionally relies on mediation by outsiders, it is also closely tied to foreign business interests.

The CCIM regroups large and small manufacturers, wholesale traders operating both on domestic and international markets, and a large number of small retailers. Even though such groups are often at odds with each other, the CCIM could play a useful role in at least two areas. First, it could be looking after the general interests of constituent groups, for instance, making sure that regulations apply fairly to all, helping monitor the application of business law, promoting Mali's export products, etc. Secondly, it could provide a forum for discussions or negotiations between various interest groups. In fact, the CCIM does not assume these tasks very well, unless there is a serious crisis, such as the 1991 aftermath of the overthrow of the Traoré régime, when rioters had torched or looted many businesses. Another recent example is the January 12, 1994 CFA franc devaluation, where all parties worked closely for about three weeks to reach agreements acceptable to the business community (fiscal measures, compensation on unpaid orders from foreign suppliers) to the government (in terms of anticipated revenues) and to consumers (limits on price increases). The CCIM did help provide, for this period, one of the forums or mechanisms for the exchange of ideas and decision-making, but this role should not be overemphasized; discussions and negotiations would have taken place anyway.

In certain cases, trade and industry interests have accepted mediation because they perceived that a mutually beneficial consensus was reachable in a specific policy area. At the conclusion of the *Etats-Généraux* on Commerce and Industry, for instance, all parties had agreed on the principle of reviewing custom duties. However, neither import/export wholesalers, who wanted lower duties, nor manufacturers, who requested higher ones, could reach an agreement. The Ministry of Finance, not wanting to "take sides", nor able to convince either group to reach an agreement, relied on an independent mediator to work with the two sides to reach a solution, in this case, a foreign consultant, provided under World Bank financing.

On balance, then, deep discontent with the Chamber of Commerce is widespread. Many Malian observers, including some members of the bureaucracy, feel that "industrial development in Mali cannot move forward as long as the CCIM maintains the status-quo." They would like, with help from the World Bank, to privatize the CCIM, and have a number of more independent trade associations emerge, somewhat in the *Fédération Nationale des Employeurs du Mali* (FNEM) style. In fact, the principle of CCIM/FNEM separation had been agreed on by all parties during the *Etats-Généraux* on Trade and Industry, and was to be announced in a presidential speech. However, the Chamber of Commerce has so far managed to foil such measures.

There are several related reasons why the CCIM has been able to remain a powerful institution. The first stems from continued (although sometimes reluctant) support by the government, which still appoints the Chamber's Secretary-General. The second reason has to do with the political power of its elected president. Although many member groups have been trying to get rid of this well known, visible and controversial figure, and to restructure the Chamber of Commerce, its president manages to hang on. He owes part of his support to a small group of powerful traders, but also, and mostly, to a particular constituency: the small, informal or petty traders. Along with students and employees of state enterprises, petty traders are one of the most feared groups by the government. They can organize economic strikes, and take to the streets in riotous ways.

The "fraude", or smuggling issue is very symptomatic of relations between groups within the CCIM. During the transition period, the government had decided, under manufacturers' pressure, to crack down on smuggled imports. Various groups had worked on special measures to reduce this phenomenon, including the *Etats-Generaux* mandated *Cellule de Répression contre la Fraude*, whose hands were tied for socio-political reasons. In 1992 some manufacturers and traders organized and raised funds to address the problem. They created joint brigades including army or police officers and representatives from the business community. Fuel and vehicles were provided by concerned businesses. They had some successes, but the movement died down after a time. In 1993, a Bamako neighborhood where many small retailers specializing in smuggled goods was searched. The traders response turned into serious riots, and the government backed off. Although the Malian administration has succeeded in increasing revenues, there is no doubt that most commodities still come into Mali with no custom duties being collected⁵.

The Chamber of Commerce leadership has played another card to retain influence: support from foreign, mostly French, business groups, such as the Chambers of Commerce of Bordeaux

⁵ A 1993 study estimated the malian government's losses to smuggling and other types of tax evasion to 130-165 billion FCFA/year (official development assistance to Mali is on the order of 65 billion FCFA per annum).

or Paris. The CCIM strategy appears tied to the post-devaluation wave of re-investment in west Africa. Since the late 1980s, many firms had been taking mitigating measures, or leaving the region. Individual members of the local elites had placed their funds into shelter currencies. Now that the devaluation has taken place, a fair amount of money is coming back. Sheltered savings are buying back twice their old value in CFA. Some of this money finds its way to productive investments, while most goes into residential housing. However, foreign capital tends to go into export-oriented or import-substituting manufacturing. In several countries, French firms are reinvested in such sub-sectors as chemicals, pharmaceuticals, etc. West African Chambers of Commerce are involved in this process, and the Mali CCIM undoubtedly finds it opportune to be part of it.

Vignette 2 - The Union Nationale des Travailleurs du Mali (UNTM)

The UNTM is Mali's largest and oldest federation of labor unions, having been very active in the independence-related labor struggles of the 1950s. Today, it appears as an old-fashioned socialist-style labor group, concerned primarily with working conditions and salaries, but its political clout remains considerable.

The UNTM has become increasingly involved in the policy process, but with very limited effectiveness. Since the early days of the structural adjustment program, UNTM has been part of the process, being the first group the Malian government consulted outside of the bureaucracy. Some of its officers even went to Washington to negotiate a program with the World Bank, but the experience turned short, and has not been repeated.

As a representative of interest groups, the UNTM is systematically consulted by the government when important policy changes are being considered. It is the only Malian non-governmental group to systematically receive a copy of the complete agreements between the World Bank and the government of Mali, but of their own admission, no one there really understands the agreements, just as very few people in the Malian administration fully comprehend it.

However, UNTM's social and political importance are acknowledged, in the sense that donors undertaking major policy reforms, especially the World Bank, hold discussions with them. The UNTM is thus a party to such agreements both through discussions with the government, and through consultations with foreign sponsors of policy change. The problem is that the UNTM, as a federation of labor unions, and as an institution, is extremely poorly equipped to deal with structural adjustment issues. Its leadership is concerned with classic labor union matters: salaries, working conditions, benefits and job security. They are much less interested in policy analysis. They sometimes rely on outside expertise for advice, but have none of their own, although they have received offers from international labor federations. There is some computer equipment at UNTM, for instance, but no one uses it. Neither did the federation take up offers of technical assistance in economic policy analysis. In conclusion, although the UNTM has been included in policy discussions, their style of operations does not make full-fledged or effective partners of them. A possible reason is that the classic, old-style UNTM leadership may feel threatened by a *modus operandi* granting younger and more policy-oriented staff additional influence.

Vignette 3 - Trade Associations in the Transport Sector

There are only two trade associations in the transport sector, *Union Nationale des Chargeurs et Transporteurs Routiers du Mali* (UNCTRM) and *Syndicat des Transporteurs Urbains et Interurbains* (SYNTRUI). UNCTRM is the older, more traditional organization, which was, in fact, the only one

allowed under the Moussa Traoré régime. SYNTRUI was created shortly before the 1991 *événements*. It is today the largest (by far), most modern, dynamic, and best-endowed of the two trade associations. Both operate under increasingly competitive conditions: freight rates have fallen by at least one-third since 1991, and Mali is one of the handful of countries in all of Africa where fuel prices have been fully liberalized. This, by the way, is said to result from strong and effective pressure from import-export trade groups in Mali. The two unions tend to operate in different areas of the transport sector, and on very different scales; UNCTRM, for example, includes most of the small intra and peri-urban mass transit transporters, while SYNTRUI puts the emphasis on inter-urban and long distance (to Abidjan and Dakar) transport. They are definitely strong rivals, but do collaborate on the African transporters main and universal problems: ransoming at road blocks. They also join in yearly negotiations with the CMDT on the cost of transporting cotton fiber for export (mostly through Abidjan).

The experience of the SYNTRUI union illustrates several interesting features of organized groups dynamics. Its creation is a direct result of *in extremis* political liberalization steps taken in the very last days of the Traoré administration. The laws enabling the creation of such trade unions had been passed since the late 1950's and early 1960's⁶ but were not applied until early 1991. Even then, political liberalization *à la* Traoré did not extend to all, or apply randomly: the president of SYNTRUI is a well-known, popular personality, and a close relative of the former head of state. In fact, this close association with the mali's former ruling family nearly cost the new union dearly during the 1991 uprisings. Trucks and staff had to be quickly removed from Bamako until things quieted down.

Partly for this reason, the union has adopted a particularly conciliatory and conservative approach in its relations with the transition and Third Republic governments. It has refused to join two important strikes, the 1992 *grève générale des opérateurs économiques*, and the February/March 1994 *ville morte* action. Shortly after the CFAF devaluation, the SYNTRUI proposed a 30 percent increase in freight charges, which was extremely well received by an administration expecting to have to put up with an increase of over 50 percent.

This does not, however, mean that the SYNTRUI fails to look after its members' interests. It has considerable resources (as shown below) and is one of the very best organized and managed trade associations in Mali. Representatives from the union have frequent meetings with the administration on a number of technical issues, and are routinely consulted by National Assembly representatives on transportation matters. SYNTRUI has also actively participated in, and contributed to a World Bank sectoral review of the transport sector. The organization also maintains an office in Abidjan, which works closely with the Ivoirian administration, and with transporters from Côte d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso. It has been able to influence the agenda setting and negotiations during the regularly scheduled meetings of transport ministers from Mali, Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire. Through collaboration with other transporters' associations and applying pressure on the Ivoirian administration, they have succeeded in reducing freight taxes in Côte d'Ivoire from 35,000 to 14,000 FCFA/truck, and hope to have this tax removed entirely. They have also obtained the removal of the *carte de séjour* requirement for truckers operating in Côte d'Ivoire.

In Mali itself, they have obtained the removal of a tax on road freight, and have been organizing joint missions with members of the bureaucracy to substantiate the biggest and most common transporters' problem in Africa: ransoming at road blocks. This is a very difficult

⁶ Executive order No. 41, art. 293, and law 62/67 AN/RM.

area. Everyone knows that road transporters pay more in illegal taxes and bribes than in fuel or any other cost category. Road blocks disappear briefly after occasional crackdowns, but never fail to reappear. In Mali, toll taxes are supposed to be levied from transporters to pay for a variety of municipal and state public services. Both the government, through revenue agents, and the transporters' unions, through vouchers or receipts collected from transporters, try to keep track of amounts paid, and to reconcile their numbers. Proceeds are then divided according to the following proportions:

- 60 percent goes to the Government (some of it for redistribution to decentralized authorities);
- 25 percent goes to the transporters' union, to be used for the improvement of efficiency and safety in the profession (a lot of it is applied to training programs for drivers and operators);
- 15 percent goes to the uniformed services in charge of collecting the taxes.

Another interesting aspect of the transporters' union is the nature of their relationship with interest groups in the energy sector, particularly the *Groupement des Professionnels du Pétrole* (GPP). The GPP is made up of representatives from Total/Texaco, Elf, Shell and Mobil. In the early 1990s, transporters and fuel companies joined forces to lean on the government to reduce the inflows of fuel from Nigeria. At that time, illegal but widespread Nigerian exports of fuel were in full swing. The very low price of fuel in Nigeria, rapidly falling exchange rate of the Naira, and proximity of potential buyers paying in convertible currency (the CFAF) combined to drive so much fuel out of Nigeria that major shortages resulted in the Federation. Of course, the same principle applied to fertilizer, cars, spare parts, textiles and a multitude of manufactured goods made in Nigeria or imported from Asia. Benin, Niger and Cameroon were hit especially hard, but even Mali felt some of the effects of this strategy. Malian transporters could not go to Nigeria to join this kind of trade, and fuel companies, legally bringing gasoline with the help of Malian transporters, from Côte d'Ivoire refineries, found they had a common interest. After some time, fuel flows from Nigeria dried up.

The smuggling problem has not entirely been solved, however. Taxes on gasoline imported from Ivorian refineries amount to about 165 FCFA/liter, out of a retail price of just under 300 FCFA/liter. There is a strong incentive for many operators to smuggle gasoline into Mali and set up roadside barrel-and-pump retail operations. Tax paying fuel companies and transporters have reached agreements on long-term rates allowing them to weather lean times, but they would like the government to crack down more actively on the illegal fuel trade. The administration, however, is trying to balance the cost of lost fuel tax revenues against the price it would have to pay, in terms of business and consumer reaction, if smuggled fuel flows dried up.

Vignette 4 - The Malian Miller's Tale: Grands Moulins vs. Bakers

This final case on the flour import tax law illustrates several important aspects of the policy debate in Mali. It has pitted various protagonists against each other: the milling company, bakers, the Ministry of Finance, the Customs Service, and foreign interests. Uncharacteristically, the dispute has been carried over into relatively open fora: National Assembly commissions, and the media.

The main protagonists have been the milling company and the Bamako bakers. The milling company, *Grands Moulins du Mali* (GMM), was established in 1982 by the government with Malian and French credits. The mill has been operated under license by a member of a

leading Lebanese business dynasty, Mr. Achcar. Although wheat milling capacity is about 60,000 tons/year, production reaches 23,000 tons of flour, out of approximately 35,000 tons consumed annually in the country. The mill employs about 80 regular staff and 70 daily laborers. It generates about FCFA 300 million/year in taxes for the government of Mali.

On the other side of the fence are about 35 "industrial" and over 100 "artisanal" bakeries in Bamako. They buy flour either from the GMM, from wholesale importers, or from resellers.

Wheat and wheat flour are relatively inexpensive on the world market, due to production and export subsidies. Strictly speaking, the "protection" argument in Mali is specious since Mali produces no wheat to speak of, and other cereals are hardly ever milled as wheat flour substitute. The real question is "who is to capture the world market subsidies: bread consumers, bakers, millers, or the treasury?". The answers to seemingly straightforward policy questions are often complicated; this case is no exception. For instance, varying rates of import taxation have been applied over time. As a result, smuggled flour has found its way to Malian bakeries⁷. Thus "protection" in the GMM sense really means protection from smuggling. As a compensation for its inability to control flour imports, the government has made low-cost Canadian food aid available to the GMM (in either wheat or wheat flour).

In early 1991 the Minister of Finance sponsored a law raising the import tax rate on flour to 99.1 percent. Even with rising EEC export subsidies this would have resulted in a large retail price increase in Bamako. In response, bakers organized a 3-day strike, which became part of the long chain of events leading to the fall of Moussa Traoré. Under the transition government, the law remained on the books, but from 1991 through 1993 less stringent fiscal controls led to sharp increases in untaxed flour imports; the market price of flour went from 11,000 to 8,000 FCFA/bag.

In January 1993 the government, acting on recommendations from the 1992 *Etats-Généraux* for Trade and Industry, decided to redraft overall tax legislation. As the draft bills were sent to the Chamber of Commerce for review, the bakers introduced a request⁸ to reclassify wheat flour as an intermediate good or input, rather than as a product directly competing with national production (thereby halving the import tax rate).

This request was first rejected by the government, which sent the draft bill to the National Assembly. Undaunted, the bakers' union took its case directly to the parliamentary commission in charge of reviewing the draft bill (finance, industry and plan), and submitted several economic and legal arguments to limit the tax rate.

In addition to the GMM, several parties opposed the bakers' viewpoint. For instance, the Ministry of Finance argued that strong compensatory taxation was justified, given the large export subsidies granted by the EEC. More generally, the government tried to balance the need for flour import tax receipts against the risk of damage to a debtor state enterprise which provided employment, paid taxes, and involved some of Mali's partners (France and Canada).

⁷ Mauritanian traders have gladly acted as intermediaries, any profit on such operations being earned in hard (overvalued) currency.

⁸ The leader of the bakers' trade union (*Syndicat des Boulangers*) is also vice-president of the Chamber of Commerce...

Yet, the parliamentary commission sided with the bakers' arguments. Its members, invoking economic liberalization principles, argued that the post-1991 competition and lower flour prices had not unduly jeopardized the GMM, and that Mali's industries had to do their share to remain competitive.

On January 21, 1993, the National Assembly voted not on the specific issue of imported flour taxation, but on the overall fiscal legislation (*code des impôts*). Against objections from the GMM and from the Government, *députés* sided with the commission's conclusions, which implied that the tax rate fell from 99.1 to 46 percent.

Two reasons are often given to explain the majority agreement with the commission's opinion: (i) *députés* were more sensitive to the interests of bakers and urban bread consumers than to budgetary or industrial arguments, and (ii) the GMM has been operated by a prominent Lebanese family, with extensive ties to the Moussa Traoré régime...

Once the National Assembly votes on a bill, it has to be signed by the president to become law (*promulgation*). According to the Malian constitution, the president may veto it, and send it back to the Assembly for review (*deuxième lecture*). In this case, there appears to have been a rather long interval between the vote on the bill and its *promulgation* into law, during which various groups applied pressure on the president's office:

- The French national council of business owners (*Centre National du Patronnat Français*, CNPF) pointed out in a letter to the Malian president the potential consequences on the Malian economy of lower import taxes on flour;
- The Malian directorate for economic affairs, *Direction Nationale des Affaires Economiques* (DNAE), followed suit, emphasizing the impact of a GMM failure, in terms of employment;
- The Customs Service argued that such a law would contradict current customs legislation;
- The council of industrial manufacturers, OPIM, complained that they had not been called to testify before the parliamentary commission.

Facing a very real risk that this pressure would lead to a rejection or major amendment of the bill, the bakers' union took their case to the public. They held a press conference at the Chamber of Commerce to publicize the potential benefits of the law on bread consumers. Although the law was signed and published on February 15, the debate raged on; a week later, a direct confrontation (the word is apt) between the president of the bakers' union, and the GMM operator was broadcast on television and radio stations.

The GMM further counter-attacked on several fronts. The mill operator first arranged for participation in a prime time call-in radio program. One of the Bamako weekly papers, *Le Républicain*, then published a first-page editorial on the impact of Canada's flour food aid and of lower import taxes on the financial viability of the GMM. At the National Assembly, pressure was maintained on the commission responsible for the original decision. The GMM's lobbying led to the establishment of a special commission to monitor the implementation and impact of the law. Meanwhile, the Malian Government had reduced the price at which Canadian flour was being sold to the mill...

The January 12, 1994 FCFA devaluation put a damper on things. Import tax rates on flour and most other intermediate goods fell from 46 to 33.4 percent. Further negotiations with Canada led to an agreement that food aid would more likely involve wheat than wheat flour, providing low-cost grist to the GMM mill.

Several features are common to the above vignettes, including:

- The importance of a historical perspective in the analysis of the dynamics of interest groups;
- Reliance on external actors by interest groups. This was the case for the CCIM leadership as well as that of the UNTM, and for the Malian transporters' valuable links with similar west African trade associations, and with foreign oil companies operating in Mali. Another example is the role of French business interests in the dispute opposing the Bamako mill operator and bakers, while Canada, as a donor, has been mobilized to help reach a settlement.
- Another common feature was the divergent position of Government agencies, as illustrated by the differences among competing state institutions (Custom Service, DNAE, Ministry of Finance, etc.) in the search for negotiated settlements with interest groups.

On the other hand, the vignettes underline important differences in the nature and orientation of interest groups, in their strategies and degree of effectiveness in policy activism. Some were differences in the kind of leadership. In some groups, such as the CCIM, the leadership pursued its own political and institutional objectives, even when these were not consistent with those of constituent member groups. Leadership among most other groups was more in step with a consensus among the membership. There were also differences in the extent of influence and effectiveness in policy activism. The UNTM is a good example of a federation of interest groups brought into the policy process because of its historical socio-political standing, rather than because of its policy-oriented activism. SYNTRUI's effectiveness, on the other hand has been achieved through financial and human resources, political connections, leadership and management techniques, and through links with similar professional groups in the region.

Relations among groups were also varied. Given the high stakes involved, opposition among groups tended to be more common than the kind of collaboration which took place among manufacturers against smuggled imports, or between transporters and oil companies.

Finally, there were differences in the degree of openness of the policy process. Most lobbying takes place behind the scenes. When a policy choice implies gains and losses for various interest groups, the natural tendency of most governments is to devise specific measures mitigating the negative impact of the policy upon influential groups. While such a strategy may be economically questionable, it is favored for political reasons because it

allows the government to retain as much control over policy choice as possible, and to nurture important alliances.

The last vignette, however, illustrates an exception to this rule. The *Etats-Généraux* process provided an opportunity to bring the debate into the open since legislative change was being considered. However, the degree to which various interest groups could participate in this legislative review was obviously very uneven. In addition, the media provided very little unbiased background information. Only two newspapers provided a useful analysis of the issues.

E. The National Assembly and the Policy Process

As pointed out earlier in this Chapter, the National Assembly fulfills several functions: oversight of the policy process, providing a channel for interest groups⁹, and helping open up the policy debate. The following discussion provides a closer look at its relative effectiveness, limitations and constraints.

In Mali's presidential-parliamentary system, the National Assembly plays a very different role from that of a congress in a system built around a clear separation of executive and legislative powers. Thus, one would not expect to find a "strong" committee system in the National Assembly. Still, with respect to overall or macroeconomic policy orientations, the National Assembly reviews the Prime Minister's *lettre d'orientation de politique économique*, and the *loi de finances*. The National Assembly requested and obtained reductions in defense and parastatal radio/television agency appropriations in the 1994 national budget. The Prime Minister also outlines every major agreement with the World Bank or IMF before the Assembly. Oversight on specific economic issues, on the other hand, takes place through the reviewing of and voting on legislation, and hearing testimony from institutions, groups or individuals on policy implementation. An important tool available to National Assembly representatives and parliamentary groups is the "*questions orales*" process (these are actually written, and submitted ahead of time to the president of the National Assembly). Such questions¹⁰ can address very specific policy issues and be rather pointed, as seen below from questions directed to the Minister of Rural Development:

"Mr. Minister, cotton is Mali's main export product. During your interviews with the media you have emphasized the advantages of the CFA devaluation for the rural areas. We would, therefore, expect that these advantages would be felt especially strongly by cotton producers. However, Mr. Minister, as you well know, cotton producers are constantly frustrated by the issue of cotton classification... could you tell us whether there are objective criteria for cotton

⁹ From our analysis of a sample of interest groups, we saw that over half have systematically relied on parliamentary groups at some point.

¹⁰ Excerpts from questions raised by the ADEMA/PASJ Parliamentary Group (ref. 94/10 GPA).

classification? If so, what can you say about plans to have the producers truly participate in cotton classification?...

... We know that compared to a 35 percent increase in the price of first choice cotton, the price of inputs went up 100 percent. Given this situation, is the government ready to consider subsidizing cotton inputs? If so, how is the government to proceed, and when will it do so?"

There are seven parliamentary commissions, including finance, rural development, public works, defense, social affairs. When a draft bill is sent to the National Assembly, the "conference of commission presidents" assigns the bill to one or several of the commissions. The commission then has up to 15 days to review the draft legislation, hear expert testimony, and prepare an opinion for the general assembly. The commission president then names a *rapporteur* who is put in charge of the draft bill review. In most parliamentary systems, the *rapporteur* works with several members of his commission, and legislative aides to review the draft bill, organize and hear testimony, review previous legislation relevant to the case, and prepare an opinion. In some cases, the Malian *rapporteur* works closely with his commission colleagues, in others, he is left pretty much to his own devices.

Each commission can call on the civil service to provide expert testimony, or a written explanation or analysis on specific points. They can also call on business or trade union representatives, or other individuals. Individuals or interest group representatives may themselves request a meeting with a commission to present their views. Fishermen or farmer groups have sent delegations to the rural development commission. The same commission has also heard SYCOV representatives on the cotton subsector¹¹. Another commission has received a labor union delegation from one of the state enterprise being privatized; the personnel were opposed to a buy-out offer from a French business concern.

In certain cases, commission members feel that a 15-day period is insufficient to review a draft bill; they can ask for a postponement to the next parliamentary session. This has been the case for legislation on decentralization. Otherwise, the *rapporteur* and commission members present their report in plenary session. At that time, any representative may introduce a motion to postpone the vote on the draft bill. A majority parliamentary group can thus prevent vote on, and passage of a bill, while a minority group may hope to delay it, or at least to generate a wider public debate on its content. Plenary sessions are wide open, the Government and independent media always cover the sessions. Some background documents are available to journalists; businessmen, students, attend the sessions.

The National Assembly, however, labors under considerable constraints. Representatives fail to settle many issues; after six months' deliberations, for example, the *députés* had not been able to agree on a legislation regarding the requirements for and status

¹¹ We found, during our own interview with the president and vice-president of the rural development commission, that they were very well informed of cotton subsector issues.

of attorneys. Representatives also readily admit that in many cases, testimony presented before commissions is partial, biased, and should be much more diversified. In the case opposing the *Grands Moulins du Mali* and Bamako bakers, the vote on the tax bill involved all *députés* and parliamentary groups, so that there was opportunity for a number of voices to be heard, but the fact remains that the relevant parliamentary commission only heard a select number of arguments before making its recommendations. Interestingly, political parties were neither openly enlisted by the bakers or the GMM, nor particularly eager to take sides on the issue.

Many representatives, unprepared to deal with complex technical issues, resent their lack of understanding of or control over economic policy. They feel entitled to ask for clarifications, and may be able to modify budget items "at the margin," but consider that all major decisions are already made. Yet, providing representatives with technical information or training can be a delicate issue. The *Association pour la Promotion de l'Entreprise Privée* (APEP) organized a seminar on public finances for *députés* with the help of a Malian businessmen's network, including a well-connected local accounting firm. A public finance expert from France was also to participate. However, this initiative faced strong resistance from some National Assembly officers.

As an organization, the National Assembly is critically under-equipped. Although there are about 100 parliamentary staff members, many positions are unfilled and quite a few staffers are working on a voluntary basis, hoping for a salaried opening. Certain resources or services mandated by law are not available: transcripts of session records do not appear in the *Journal Officiel*, which makes it almost impossible to track proceedings and record votes.

The National Assembly has received books on law, economics and politics, and some computer equipment. The books are adequately archived and the equipment is running, but their usefulness remains limited; few *députés* are likely to refer to books on local administration or public finance. Such resources are usually meant for research staff, who have the skills required to find, analyze and present information in a form usable by individual representatives or commissions. The National Assembly has no such staff. Parliamentary officers have suggested that each commission should be able to rely on a parliamentary administrator well versed in the commission's area of responsibility. Another option would be to form a "studies and analysis" group accessible to the various commissions.

In conclusion, the National Assembly does play a role in the areas of policy oversight, interest group representation, and public policy debate, but this role, especially in oversight and representation, remains very imperfect. The Government may not be eager to have a policy watchdog acquire keener senses. It may also feel that there are already too many channels for the expression of popular discontent. However, a dysfunctional or strongly biased parliament may be worse than nothing, as it might heighten social tensions and popular frustrations.

F. The Media and the Policy Process

The downfall of the Traoré regime opened wide the gates of free speech and freedom of the press in Mali. There are now over 80 daily or weekly newspapers and magazines in Bamako and a few other cities. Several are published in vernacular languages, such as Jekabaara, Kibaru and Kabaru, with a circulation of about 16,000 each. Shortly after the 1991 *événements*, a relatively large number of independent radio stations sprang up in Bamako and in several provincial towns. This section looks at the role of the media in the post-1991 democratic process, and as part of the national economic policy debate. Two short vignettes provide additional insights.

1. The Media and the Post-1991 Democratic Process in Mali

It is quite clear that the Malian media are a unique phenomenon in West Africa, and that they have played critical roles in the new democratic process and in opening up the economic policy debate. According to the president of the national union of independent radio stations (*Union des Radios et Télévisions Libres*, URTL):

"The radio phenomenon in Mali is not an outgrowth of the national media, it is a direct result of the democratic dynamics set in motion on March 26, 1991... We are a young democracy, many associations were created, including cooperative radios, in Mali to facilitate relations between population groups and the government and state institutions".

A few months after their creation, two radio stations (Radio Liberté and Bamakan) had to deal with a new phenomenon: the 1992 presidential, legislative and municipal elections. Presidential candidates were given equal air-time to present their programs. The radio stations also took the initiative to educate the population on the electoral process. It is because of this progressive attitude on the part of broadcasters that the 1993 Colloquium on Radio Pluralism in West Africa was held in Bamako by the West African Journalists Association and the Panos Institute rather than in Nigeria, as originally planned. Some of the principles from the ensuing Bamako Declaration on Radio Pluralism¹² are worth mentioning:

1. Radio is a priority means of social communication, in Africa in particular;
2. Radio pluralism is an essential component in the deepening of the democratic process now under way: it gives people access to more diverse sources of information, and guarantees increased popular participation in sustainable human development;

¹² The complete text is provided in the Appendix.

3. Information pluralism requires the complete elimination of radio monopolies, and the existence of a range of radio stations able to express the diverse viewpoints and aspirations of different segments of society.

After 1991, freedom of association and political liberalization allowed for the creation of a large number of latent or new interest groups, associations, and political parties. By then, most could rapidly identify their potential membership and make their purpose known. However, many smaller special interest groups or public service associations had to find efficient and inexpensive means to reach a large number of people to present their association and its objectives. Since 1992 Transition Government, the role of radio stations has been essential; in the beginning, 20 to 30 different associations were created everyday, none of them able to publicize their creation and objectives. Radio Liberté, therefore, produced a special program for new associations and political parties; demand for the weekly program was such that it became daily one. Most other independent radio stations made periods of air time available at no (or minimal) charge to interest groups and associations, as a public service, and to widen the stations' circles of listeners.

Most groups and associations use the media in some way to further their objectives. The radio has been one of the most useful media for groups wanting to publicize their demands, and to rely on popular pressure to force the Government to enter into a real negotiation process. Examples include the Association of Early Retirees, and the Association of Civil Servants.

Currently, many interest groups, such as ASCOMA, FNEM, OPIM, CCIM, use radio stations to broadcast announcements. However, most radio stations are disappointed in the limited extent to which small and medium-size enterprises, virtually all in the informal sector, avail themselves of their services. Small businesses do listen to the news and economic bulletins, but rarely react by calling the stations to ask for more information or to comment on various issues. Still, several debate programs in Bamanan have been organized with small traders on topics of interest to the small business community, such as smuggling. On the contrary, larger firms, private or formerly state enterprises (*Société Nationale de Transports du Mali* (SONATAM), Sada Diallo Enterprises), do not hesitate to call the radio stations to comment on ongoing broadcasts or current issues.

2. *The Media and the Economic Policy Debate*

a. Newspapers

Few publications offer policy-oriented articles on a regular basis. The best coverage of economic issues is provided by "*Les Cauris*," an independent bi-monthly which specializes in political economy and policy issues, by "*L'Aurore*," and by the ADEMA-sponsored "*Mali Enterprise*." The Government-controlled "*L'Essor*" also publishes articles on cereal policy, which are mostly rewrites of special studies from the *Office des Produits Agricoles du Mali* (OPAM)-based Market Information System.

The January 1994 CFA Franc devaluation revitalized the media coverage of economic issues; all newspapers and radio stations carried the news, emphasizing its impact in various areas: retail prices, wages, macroeconomic policy, international relations. The number of articles on economic issues in Malian newspapers has sharply increased after the devaluation. The list of newspapers surveyed during the first six months of 1994 is as follows:

Newspapers Included in the
Survey of Economic Articles

L'Aurore	Le Messenger
L'Employeur	Le Républicain
L'Essor	Le Scorpion
L'Observateur	Le Tambour
La Cigale Muselée	Le Temps
La Gazette	Les Cauris
La Griffes	Les Echos
La Roue	Nouvel Horizon
Le Démocrate Malien	Yeko
Le Malien	Zanke

Over 300 articles were reviewed; they fell into the following categories: economic policy, business economics, monetary policy, international economics, etc. Most articles deal with topics of immediate and local interest rather than with in-depth analyses or investigative reporting. Among daily papers, the official "*L'Essor*" ranked first in number of articles (72) directly related to economic issues, followed by the independent "*Nouvel Horizon*" (47). Of weekly papers "*Le Républicain*" published 45; various other publications reached 25-30 economic articles each during the same period ("*L'Aurore*", "*L'Observateur*"). Finally, the bi-monthly "*Le Malien*" and "*Les Cauris*" have each published about 30 articles over the same period. Most of these papers (this is a recent phenomenon) are beginning to reprint items on economic issues from various wire or press services¹³. If one were to award a prize for best all-around coverage of economic news, analysis and investigative reporting, it would clearly go to "*Les Cauris*", which provides the steadiest and highest quality fare in each category.

A sample of Cauris articles over a six-month period is included in the Appendix. Of 45 articles surveyed, the categories of topics were as follows:

General economic policy issues	18
Monetary policy	12
International economics	6
Agricultural economics/rural	
Development	5
Business economics	4

¹³ Especially from MFI (Media France Intercontinent) and SYFIA (Système Français d'Informations Agricoles).

The main reason why "*Les Cauris*" provides broader, and higher quality coverage is that this newspaper is the only one where the editorial staff has received university training in economics and rural sociology, respectively. Another reason is that it relies extensively on carefully selected reprints from other sources: newspapers, but also books, reports, and contributed analyses¹⁴.

The overall performance of the printed media, however, is rather poor. Very few journalists have more than a basic understanding of economic issues, the number of interviews with high-ranking administration officials on economic matters is very small, and so is the number of articles contributed by local specialists and academics. This is clearly due to a lack of professional training¹⁵ and of resources. All the newspapers (including "*L'Essor*") operate on incredibly thin budgets, with poorly trained, low-paid, and under-equipped staff. None of the newspapers, including "*Les Cauris*", has the means to carry out any but the simplest analysis on economic data. "*Les Cauris*" does have computer equipment, but it is used only for word processing. Aside from the central bureaucracy, the only groups who have detailed, processed information are certain trade associations, (SYNTRUI, GPP, CCAM, FNEM) which do keep detailed information on their own subsectors. However, since this information is used by these groups to argue their cases within the policy process, sometimes against competing groups in the same sector, they are not eager to share it for other uses.

The need for better economic journalism has begun to get some attention. Two economic journalism seminars on structural adjustment have been organized by the World Bank in 1993, one in Dakar, and one in Yaoundé, with some participation by Malian journalists. In February 1994, USIA organized a workshop in Bamako, in collaboration with the National Union of Malian Journalists, (*Union Nationale des Journalistes du Mali*, UNAJOM). The topic "economic journalism" had been requested by UNAJOM. Unfortunately, radio station reporters were not included. In April 1994, France also financed a workshop in Dakar, on the devaluation of the CFA Franc.

b. Radio stations

Mali's radio network includes both national (Government-controlled and private) and foreign radio stations. Most are operating in Bamako, although a sizeable and increasing number of them are now established in small towns throughout the country. Independent radio stations themselves fall into two categories: there are private commercial radio stations, such as Radio Klédu, and private cooperative stations ("*radios associatives*") such as Bamakan, Kayira, Liberté, etc. In addition, the government plans to provide commercial access to various international television networks such as Canal France International (CFI), WorldNet, and Cable News Network (CNN) in Bamako.

¹⁴ A list of authors of "*Les Cauris*" articles, by category of economic issue, is in the Appendix.

¹⁵ There are two schools of journalism in west Africa, one in Dakar, and one in Yaoundé.

BAMAKO STATIONS

ORTM (Nationwide)

Radio Amifi

Radio Bamakan

Radio Kayira

Radio Klédu

Radio Liberté

Radio Tabalé

Fréquence 3

RFI (Radio France Internationale)

PROVINCIAL STATIONS

Radio Douentza

Kayes: Radio rurale de Kayes

Koutiala: Radio Jamana, Radio Kayira

Ségou: Radio Jamana (Foko) , Radio

Kayira (Sido)

Sikasso: Radio Kéné, Radio Badegnan

Independent radio stations belong to a professional association, URTL, *Union des Radios et Télévisions Libres*. They have --and use-- complete freedom of expression. They are, however, bound to respect Malian laws, and are fairly tightly regulated. Some radio stations are definite thorns in the Government's side, and there have been several instances of temporary closures of Radio Kayira, in Bamako, and in secondary towns. "Accidental" power and telephone disconnections are not uncommon.

All stations are limited to 1 Kilowatt transmitters and pay a 100,000 FCFA annual license fee to the government. All but one operate on incredibly thin budgets: station operating expenses ranging from \$200 - \$2,000 per month¹⁶. Bamanan, Liberté, and Kayira keep only technicians on their regular payroll, other staff are paid on a part-time basis, work as volunteers, or earn a commission on advertising contracts with firms, Government agencies, donors, or PVOs. Various stations have also explored the option of paying part of the annual fee in-kind, through public service announcements and civic education programs. Since the emphasis in Malian culture is on oral communication, and because of their ability to use vernacular languages, radio stations have reached unprecedented numbers of people with new kinds of information. Popular reaction has ranged from strong to riotous. Although most Bamako stations are very eager to establish transmitters in small towns, and to develop rural programs, their shaky financial status is a major obstacle. Sponsored programs and advertising are scant, and will not suffice to develop a national network of independent stations. In fact, URTL officials expect some stations to disappear in 1995. Although some "natural selection" is bound to occur, a complete loss of radio pluralism in Mali would be tragic. For many people, especially rural groups, they constitute the only source of information and the sole opportunity for popular expression and communication. By relying on a combination of news from the government-controlled *Office de la Radio/Télévision du Mali* (ORTM) and independent stations, people can have access to a considerable range of news, analysis and public debates on economic issues. The table below presents ORTM economy-related programs during 1994. Coverage of economic issues by various other stations is provided below.

¹⁶ In 1993, URTL member stations received a \$23,000 grant from USIA for civic education.

NATIONAL RADIO (ORTM) BROADCASTS
(Economic Topics, by date)

Date	Program Name	Title	Duration	Journalist's Name
2/5/94	Magazine d'Actualité	The impact of devaluation on the rural sector (<i>impacts de la dévaluation sur le monde rural</i>)	33 min	Seydou Guindo
2/12/94	Point de Rencontre	Livestock and devaluation (<i>l'élevage face à la dévaluation</i>)	60 min	Asmara Condé
3/28/94	Questions d'Afrique	What are NGOs for? (<i>A quoi servent les ONG?</i>)	52 min	RFI Production
7/9/94	Point de Rencontre	Business Management (<i>La gestion dans l'entreprise</i>)	60 min	Moussa Hary Maïga
7/23/94	Questions d'Afrique	Political conditions for development (<i>les conditions politiques du développement</i>)	45 min	RFI Production
7/27/94	Vulgarisation Rurale	Problems in the fishing sector (<i>les problèmes relatifs à la pêche au Mali</i>)		Rural extension
8/28/94	Questions d'Afrique	Development agents (<i>les acteurs du développement</i>)		
8/29/94	Mémoire d'un Continent	An economist's research on informal savings associations in Africa (<i>recherches d'un économiste sur les tontines en Afrique</i>)	45 min	RFI
9/26/94	Vulgarisation Rurale	Cotton harvesting and storage (<i>la récolte du coton et son stockage</i>)	15 min	Butia Kanté
10/23/94	Vulgarisation Rurale	Resource management in the inner delta (<i>la gestion des ressources du delta intérieur</i>)	16 min	Samba Sidébé
11/20/94	Femmes et Développement	Kita women's soap factory (<i>la savonnerie des femmes de Kita</i>)	25 min	Fanta Saugaré
11/22/94	Le Magazine Economique	Problems in Mali's industrial sector (<i>les problèmes d'industriels au Mali</i>)	30 min	Cheickna Cissé
11/26/94	Questions d'Afrique	Jacques Diouf (FAO) answers the questions of African journalists (<i>Jacques Diouf répond aux questions des journalistes africains</i>)		RFI

Independent radio stations have been at least as active as the written press in their coverage of economic issues and, unconstrained by literacy and language requirements, have reached larger and more diverse audiences. Broadcasters play a basic information role by providing daily price information, and announcements of specific activities and events. However, most stations have also organized and broadcast round-table discussions and conferences on key economic issues: structural adjustment, trade policy, various economic reforms. Other popular programs deal with such issues as AIDS, taxi fares, corruption in government¹⁷, etc.

All stations have also organized public debates with officials from some of the government agencies in touch with the public: the *Energie du Mali* power utility, the *Direction des Impots*, and *Direction des Douanes*. According to station managers, the general (Bamako) public and the administration have appreciated this type of programming¹⁸. Radio Kayira, the "*enfant terrible*" of Malian radio in the capital and smaller towns) has produced many economy-related programs, including roundtables gathering business leaders, members of the Chamber of Commerce, representatives from the association of retailers, the association of women entrepreneurs, the national tax directorate (*Impots*), and from the UNTM.

This study included a survey of economic policy debate programs from various radio stations. Such programs are archived on cassette tapes and are readily available. In this case, about fifteen hours of programs on economic and political issues broadcast in 1993 and 1994 were listened to; some of which being fully transcribed. Programs produced in French are listed below, many more are available in Bamanan.

¹⁷ Samples of weekly programming grids are included in the Appendix.

¹⁸ In one case, a call-in show scheduled from 8:30 pm to 10:30 (regular end of day's programs) went on till 12:30 am.

RADIO	DATE	TITLE
Radio Liberté	Sept. 93	Emission co-réalisée par l'Institut Panos et la Confédération Nationale des Radios Libres
		<p>Guests: Belco Tamboura, Editor-in-Chief "L'Observateur"</p> <p>Iyes Zouman, Représentant de la Recherche de RSF</p> <p>Moustapha LEYE, <i>Messenger</i> journalist</p>
	11-30-92	<p>Guests: Boubacar Kassé (RAT)</p> <p>Madoni Diallo (ADEMA)</p> <p>Ibréhim Diakité (National Fund)</p> <p>Denis Baudouin (Canadian Consulate in Mali)</p> <p>Jean Guillemette (Club Sahel)</p>
Radio Kayira	April 93	<i>Nouveau Visage du Pouvoir Malien : Changement ou Statut Quo</i> (the new look of Malian power: change or status quo?)
	07-08-93	Structural Adjustment Program (SAP)--Volume 1
		SAP--Volume 2
		SAP--Volume 3
	09-06-93	<i>Point de Vue du Comité National d'Initiative Démocratique (CNID) sur les Mesures de Redressement des Finances Publiques Proposées par le Gouvernement</i> (CNID's opinion on the government's proposed financial measures)
		Guests: Konimba Sidibé, N'Diaye Bah
	11-11-93	<i>La Coordination des Victimes du Programme d'Ajustement Structurel</i> (coordination of Structural Adjustment's Program's victims)
	03-02-94	<i>Emission avec la Commission de Décentralisation</i> (Broadcast with the decentralization task force).

This review of radio programs led the team to the following conclusions:

- Most radio stations perceive an interest on the part of the public in basic economic issues, and try to respond by organizing programs;
- They use various program formats to do so: group discussion, coverage of roundtable or workshop, expert or man-in-the-street interviews, and call-in programs;
- The range of economic topics is appropriately broad, while still relevant to the concerns of most listeners (the response to call-in programs is very good).
- Participation by members of the bureaucracy is limited and rather timid. In Mali as elsewhere, civil servants are often accused of providing information on policy choices after the fact, and of shunning an open debate on key issues. However, much progress is still politically feasible in the areas of information on policy options and choices and, especially, on procedures for more efficient interaction between the public and government agencies.
- Depending on the radio station, type of program, intended audience, and participants, the technical level and quality of programs varies greatly. As in the case of the written press, however, the quality and clarity of debates are rather poor. Most speakers have limited information and understanding of economic issues. Among the few experts speaking on radio, few have a capacity to make economic concepts and problems easily understandable to listeners. Those individuals, and there are quite a few, who combine a good grasp of issues and an ability to explain them clearly to non-specialists are very much sought after by local consulting firms, the government, interest groups, or donors. Speaking on radio stations provides few rewards and is low on their list of priorities. In this respect, the team's own experience is illustrative. In addition to very close collaborators, the team worked with a number of resource persons who are ideal candidates for a radio program. In fact quite a few of them have been on the radio or on television before. Several radio stations were very eager to organize a program on the links between political and economic liberalization. However, the team could never meet with all five persons together in Bamako at any one time. The team had to resort to mixing a two-hour program on this topic at Radio Kledu from individual interviews, and from a journalist's recording of a day-long workshop held to discuss the findings and implications of the study.

Vignette 1 - Radio Kledu, a special case

This station, which belongs to a Mallan businessman, specializes in economic issues. Unlike all other independent stations, it has state-of-the-art equipment, and well trained and paid staff. The station, which re-broadcasts of Voice of America programs, is on the air from 06:00 through midnight every day, with a daily program on economic issues "Magazine Economie" from 4:00-4:30 p.m. Topics include the World Bank and the IMF, monetary issues, conditionality in donor financing, the resettlement of displaced populations. The radio station also produces a weekly program on economic conferences, seminars or debates.

Radio Kledu has produced programs for political parties, public enterprises (Mali-Lait) and for the government and interest groups. In addition, the station has offered to broadcast on behalf of SONATAM, OPAM, and the Revenue Service (*Direction des Impots*). Large PVOs (Care, Africare, Oxfam, etc.) are also among its clients. Fees are on the order of 100,000 CFA/hour of air time, and 200,000 for a 15-minute publicity spot.

In December 1993, Radio Kledu broadcast most of the proceedings of a three-day public debate on "The Economic Crisis in Mali". In 1994, Kledu's programs on economic issues included:

- The compensation of businesses which suffered losses as a result of the 1991 riots;
- The prices of medicines and the role of the informal sector in the health sector (a debate with Government representatives);
- The social impact of structural adjustment (an interview with Mali's Minister of Finance);
- The effects of smuggling on economic activity in Mali, the cases of SOMAPILE and SONATAM (dry cell batteries, cigarettes);
- Land tenure rights and problems in the Mopti region;
- The state of the economy 9 months after the devaluation (with VOA journalists and a Mallan reporter).

More recently, Radio Kledu has taken a hard look at its programs and audience. Its managers are preparing a wide urban and rural survey to better understand the public's interest for the media in general, and radio in particular. The questionnaire (included in the Appendix) will also try to elicit responses on listeners' preferences among current stations and programs, language of broadcast and programming. There is a definite sense at Kledu that their programs should become closer to Mallan traditional and popular culture. However, Radio Kledu still intends to break the government monopoly on television broadcasting by installing a satellite receiver/retransmitter for local distribution of CFI, CNN, MTV, TV5, Worldnet channels. The government has approved the project, although frequencies have not yet been assigned.

By all accounts, rural listeners appreciate diversity in radio stations and programming at least as much as urban dwellers. The following vignette, on Radio Sido (Radio Kayira branch in Ségou) is typical of comments on independent rural radios¹⁹.

Vignette 2, Radio Sido -- "Country-Style Kayira"

"The radio station was created in August 1993 following the request from Segou residents to belong to the Kayira radio network. We set up the station with equipment retired from the Bamako broadcasting studio. Radio Sido broadcasts daily from 7 a.m. through 11 p.m. or 3 a.m. 80 percent of programs are vernacular languages (10 languages). The station currently has technical problems, but normally, we should be reaching 500,000 listeners. On Segou's weekly market day, the station opens its doors to all visitors, and many rural dwellers in town for the day come in and suggest topics for information or debate radio programs (e.g. the CFAF devaluation, the Ganda Khoy movement, etc.)."

"Radio Sido's resources are limited to paid announcements and advertisements; we don't raise enough resources to pay for the repairs of their amplifier equipment."

On the impact of independent radio stations:

"Compared to the previous silence, there is a major impact; people are now informed of everything happening, in Mali and elsewhere, even when the government keeps silent on certain subjects. On our daily 5 p.m. newscast, we broadcast more news about more topics than does the government-controlled radio station. We can spend 30 minutes or more on whatever is going on in Europe, America, Asia and Africa, news being broadcast in different vernacular languages. Radio stations are essential to give a country a democratic culture. Previously, people could not speak, whereas now, even if there are obstacles or pressures, we can now speak of things which used to be off-limits. Widespread free speech is not yet a reality, but at least, people are more informed. We know what problems people have in the rural areas, and we can speak to these, but it's a very different story when a farmer or herder takes the microphone and speaks for himself."

¹⁹ Based on an interview with attorney Sekou Aliou Diallo, president of the board of directors of Radio Kayira/Segou (Radio Sido).

In conclusion, the media have probably made a greater contribution to the democratic process than any other single group. They are important actors in information dissemination, and in the opening up of the economic policy debate. Both the written press and the radio have tried to reach rural groups, with some limited success. However, the radio, free of literacy and language constraints has a huge potential advantage.

The quality of coverage of, and debate on, economic policy issues is poor by professional standards, but is far superior to what is available in other West African countries. As far as the written press is concerned, a number of rather obvious measures can be taken to improve its performance, although they will not be easy, and will take time to produce significant change.

For the radio, the best prospects for further improvements seem to be in the areas of: information on policy choices, public announcements on the services provided by the Government, radio as a communication device for interest groups, and, especially in the rural areas, as a means to participate more fully in the political and economic policy processes.

III. INTEREST GROUPS AND THE POLICY PROCESS

A. Overview

The team carried out this research on Malian interest groups on several simultaneous fronts. Chapter VI looks at the evolution of the SYCOV over time, to see what transformations in its structure and operations have enabled it to acquire an increasing capacity to participate more actively in the policy process. One might call this a focussed, or "longitudinal", approach. At the same time, the team identified and studied a number of other, mostly urban-oriented, interest groups. The purpose was to better understand the relationships between the degree of success of an interest group and certain structural or strategic characteristics, such as the group's relative endowment in resources, its capacity to obtain and analyze relevant economic data, the group's point of entry into the policy process, etc. Another goal was to analyze inter-group dynamics.

Since 1991, many common interest associations have emerged. They represent a great variety of interests, and follow many different types of organizational and operational modes. Some reflect corporatist interests and practices (in the banking or construction subsectors, for instance) while others gather a more disparate membership around specific policy issues. The majority are urban based and oriented, with a few representing rural interests. Some clearly focus on economic issues while others deal with other types of social questions, such as the place and role of religion in society, human rights, and gender issues (there are over 60 women's associations). Many, perhaps most, of these interest groups are not really functional. Some, on the other hand, are quite powerful.

This profusion and diversity of interest groups should not, however, eclipse an important fact: few truly "new" groups acceded to legal status in 1991. During the Traoré years, the few formal associations allowed were completely controlled by the president or by his wife. A few groups circumvented this constraint by creating informal and quasi clandestine associations, especially in the last years of the Traoré administration. From the spring of 1990, however, some of these associations became instrumental in the political process leading to the fall of the régime²⁰. The tumultuous demonstrations by retail traders in November 1990, and the strikes organized by the UNTM (National federation of labor unions) and the UNCTRM (a transporters' union) in January 1991 are good examples. Some of the more politically oriented "*associations démocratiques*" (thinly disguised political parties pressing for pluralism) also played a significant role (e.g., the ADEMA and CNID), and emerged as *bona fide* political parties after the fall of Moussa Traoré. The determinant factor in the political struggle was the AEEM student union which, with support from the ADEMA, CNID, UNTM and others, organized demonstrations and confronted all symbols of the state (parastatal enterprises, police and army). The ensuing chaos precipitated the removal, *manu militari*, of Moussa Traoré.

²⁰ Important events included the UDPM-sponsored national conference on the democratization of the party, which turned into a widely publicized debate on multiparty politics (March 1990), the May 1990 national seminar on decentralization, etc.

Malian interest groups of the post-1991 era should thus be viewed from a historical perspective as well as from their current strength and stance on today's issues. Although this study could by no means do full justice to such an approach, the team tried to interpret group dynamics in the light of past experience. In the transport sector, for instance, there are two professional associations. The UNCTRM (the only one allowed until 1991) is very different, in terms of membership, resources, strategy, methods, and effectiveness from the SYNTRUI, established in February 1991. Today, the SYNTRUI is clearly the most effective and powerful of the two professional associations. Yet, relations between SYNTRUI and the government (and with the UNCTRM) must be gauged in view of the close kinship and business ties between the former dictator and today's SYNTRUI leader.

Table 3.1: The Sample of Interest Groups

Single- and repeat-interviews allowed us to analyze a sample of 19 groups:

<p>ABB - Association des Banques et Établissements Bancaires (banks and financial institutions).</p>	<p>Small, well endowed urban interest group. Has good access to information and excellent analytical capacity. Quite effective and powerful.</p>
<p>ADIDE - Association des Diplômés Initiateurs d'Emplois (unemployed graduates).</p>	<p>Large group created in 1988 in opposition to official employment policy and practices. Has accomplished a great deal and could do much more, but has not been able to maintain an effective dialogue with the government.</p>
<p>AFE - Association des Femmes Entrepreneurs (women entrepreneurs).</p>	<p>Very small urban group; has very few resources and is not effective in its own right. Must rely on its membership into larger groups (FNEM, COFEM) to have any influence. Broke away from <i>femmes commerçantes</i>.</p>
<p>ASCOMA - Association des Consommateurs Maliens (Malian consumers' association).</p>	<p>Large issues-oriented group created in 1991 for Bamako and major towns. Not well endowed with resources but has been active and effective (receives occasional support from Canada).</p>
<p>ATVR - Assoc. des Travailleurs Partants Volontaires à la Retraite (early retirees)</p>	<p>This is one of several relatively large urban groups. In their case, the policy dialogue consists of claims for financial compensation. Has been somewhat effective and powerful by resorting to mass pressure and sharp, open confrontation with the government.</p>
<p>CAFO - Coordination des Associations et ONG féminines.</p>	<p>Since 1991, this quasi-institutional group gathers about 50 women's organizations. Replaces the Traoré-controlled and monopolistic UNFM. CAFO member organizations have been reluctant to establish close links with the government or political parties. Has sought and received support from donors on behalf of member associations.</p>

CCAM - Comité des Compagnies d'Assurances du Mali (insurance companies).	Small urban group created in 1981. Well endowed and highly effective. Includes several foreign-owned insurance companies.
CCIM - Chambre de Commerce et d'Industrie du Mali (Chamber of commerce and industry).	This is probably the oldest quasi-private interest group in Mali. This complex institution is described further in the section on inter-group dynamics.
COFEM - Collectif des Femmes du Mali (loose federation of women's associations).	Also created in 1991 on the basis of a semi-clandestine association, this is a major "competitor" to the more institutional CAFO women's organization. Orientations are similar, but styles and philosophies are quite different. COFEM is effective in many different areas.
FNEM - Fédération Nationale des Employeurs du Mali ("big business" group).	Created in 1980, FNEM furthers the interests of 18 professional business associations. FNEM has adequate access to resources, information and analytical capacity, and is highly effective. It is actively seeking ways to be more powerful.
GCM - Groupement des Commerçants Maliens (association of retailers and wholesalers).	Created in 1960, this large group is member of both FNEM and CCIM, and has been directly embroiled in the controversy surrounding the CCIM/FNEM opposition. On its own, or through CCIM, this group has several times demonstrated its effectiveness and power.
GPP - Groupement des Professionnels Pétroliers (oil companies).	Created in the early 1980s, this is a very unusual group in the sense that its members (Mali's "four sisters") are all foreign oil companies. This effective and powerful group has a complex history of relations with the government, and with other interest groups (transporters, national fuel distributors).
SYCOV - Syndicat des Producteurs Cotonniers et Vivriers (producers of cotton and other agricultural goods).	Mali's rural labor union <i>par excellence</i> , the SYCOV has become effective. Chapter III provides a detailed description of this group and its policy activism.
SYNAPPO - Syndicat National des Pharmaciens d'Officines Privées (private pharmacies).	This recent (late 1992) trade association meets all criteria to be effective and powerful. It maintains close links with the government, the national assembly, and donors (including the World Bank).
SYNAPRO - Syndicat National de la Production (oldest and largest farmers' association).	Created as a branch of UNTM in 1963, and still very much part of this centralized federation of labor unions. Through UNTM representation, SYNAPRO is effective but not powerful. Interestingly, SYNAPRO includes CMDT workers, which implies direct conflicts of interest with the more producer-oriented and independent SYCOV (not UNTM affiliated).

SYNABAT - Syndicat National des Entreprises du Bâtiment et des Travaux Publics (construction and public works).

This older (1970) trade association has been operating in a subsector dominated by large and powerful foreign companies. Has been successful in relations with the government and the national assembly, but the "younger" and more dynamic Malian member companies are pressing for an increasing share of the local market.

SYNTRUI - Syndicat des Transporteurs Urbains et Interurbains (transporters' union).

Created in February 1991, this is the most effective and powerful of the two transporters' unions. SYNTRUI's links to the previous régime being a definite liability, the union has tried to balance the pursuit of its objectives with socio-political rehabilitation through "responsible practices".

UNCTRM - Union Nationale des Chargeurs et Transporteurs Routiers du Mali (transporters' union).

This is the oldest (previously only) transporters' union. It is less effective than SYNTRUI, and relations between the two organizations are rather difficult. UNCTRM tends to gather the smaller, more "traditional" transporters, and most of the organized providers of low-cost mass transit services. Their large and vocal membership has openly confronted successive governments.

UNTM - Union Nationale des Travailleurs du Mali (Mali's oldest federation of labor unions).

This *centrale syndicale* is the most centralized federation of labor unions (12 affiliated member unions, and 4 associated ones). UNTM has a long history of strong political involvement (either for or against Malian governments through time). In spite of its rather "old-fashioned" style of operation, it remains a major interlocutor on social and political issues for the government, and even donor agencies. UNTM is also associated with similar unions in west Africa, and with the international labor movement.

In order to test hypotheses on the relationship between interest groups characteristics and degree of success, the information was organized on each of these groups as follows:

First, the team identified "structural" characteristics: urban vs. rural-orientation, size, extent of association with other groups, relative endowment in resources, access to relevant information, and capacity to carry out pertinent economic analysis.

The groups' strategies and methods of operations were then summarized through a number of indicators, including the dominant "style" of operation (i.e., confrontational vs. collaborative), methods used, e.g., working through the media, or parliamentary groups. The team also looked at the groups' most common "point of entry" in their interaction with the policy process, i.e., whether they intervene at the overall policy analysis level or in more specific discussions on the choice of policy instruments.

Finally, the team assessed the degree of success in terms of two indicators, effectiveness and political power. For the purposes of this analysis, "effectiveness" is the capacity of a group to deflect the course of the policy process, i.e., having an impact on policy orientations, legislation, the choice of policy instruments or actual implementation. Examples of specific instances of effectiveness are provided in the results. A group is considered to be particularly

effective, or "powerful", when its effectiveness in policy advocacy has given it a role or place significantly greater than its relative place in society and the economy would normally warrant, (e.g., a single-family business dynasty directly influencing import tax legislation).

Before proceeding to the overview of the data (16 characteristics pertaining to 19 interest groups; complete data tables are in the Appendix), and to the relationships between certain characteristics and the degree of success, a few remarks are in order.

First, the proportion of groups found to be "effective" is high. This may be due to a self-selection phenomenon: relatively successful groups are more likely to survive and be visible and available for study than ineffective ones. It would have taken a much more systematic search to come up with a more "balanced" set of groups.

Second, most groups interact with the policy process either directly, or through one or several channels: the media, parliamentary groups, and political parties. Although the team was able to elicit enough information on the first two channels, information about the role of political parties was either lacking or so inconclusive that it could not be used in the analysis. Perhaps a more focussed and detailed study could have clarified the issue. One should keep in mind, however, that as interest groups mobilize the media (especially newspapers) or parliamentary groups, political party involvement is already sizeable²¹.

Finally, the presentation of data on group characteristics and degree of success implies that they tend to act alone, or independently of others. Such is not the case. This report devotes a special section to alliances and rivalries among interest groups with respect to certain policy issues.

B. Descriptive Overview of the Data

1. Structural Characteristics

a. Urban vs. rural

The report sample includes only two groups with predominantly rural bases and orientations (SYCOV²² and SYNAPRO). Although most other groups have sizeable and active branches in various regions of Mali, they are mostly urban-oriented.

²¹ Political parties intervene through the National Assembly's *groupes parlementaires*. Parties (or political personalities) are also said to control certain newspapers or radio stations.

²² See Chapter VI.

b. Single vs. federated

The majority of groups (12/19) are independent rather than affiliated or federated with other groupings, such as FNEM or UNTM. The team tested the significance of this characteristic in terms of a group's access to resources, relevant information and analytic capacity. UNTM for instance, federates twelve national labor unions, and maintains ties with another four independent ones. As members of one group commented: "*le pluralisme associatif est une bonne chose, mais la solidarité est essentielle pour faire face au gouvernement*"²³.

c. Corporatist vs. issue-oriented

Another structural characteristic hinges on the type of organization and objectives; the majority (12/19) act along corporatist lines (transport, energy, banking) on a variety of relevant policy issues, while the rest gather more disparate memberships around wages, working conditions, prices and retirement conditions (UNTM, ASCOMA, ADIDE, ATVR) or women's issues (COFEM, CAFO, AFE).

d. Relative endowment in resources

The sample is divided among groups relatively well endowed with resources (10) and groups with few resources. This report defines "adequate resource endowment" as significant dues collected from a relatively large membership, the ability to acquire or rely on some business infrastructure (office space, telephone, fax, secretary, etc.). Groups with low levels of resource endowment typically have no permanent headquarters or office, no telephone, and have an uncertain ability to stay in touch with their membership by mail or other direct means of communication. Every group characterized as relatively well endowed (except the UNTM) is business-related and corporatist in nature.

Most interest groups raise their own resources, but there are important exceptions. The Chamber of Commerce has always had an "in-kind contribution" from the government, its *Secrétaire-Général* being a civil servant appointed upon approval in *conseil des ministres*. In addition to its own sizeable funds, the Chamber of Commerce has received aid (e.g., from Germany for business publications) and considerable financial support from the French network of Chambers of Commerce. The UNTM labor union federation has maintained collaborative links with similar bodies in Africa, and has received support from the International labor movement. Finally, the SYCOV leadership have received technical assistance and financial backing for seminars and workshops from various donors.

²³ "freedom of association is a good thing, but one may have to join forces to take on the government".

e. Group size

Given the Malian context, this report ascribes the values of **large** to groups (14) having over 150 active members, and **small** for the other ones (5).

f. Access to information relevant to the group's objectives

From interviews with various groups and a review of some of their products (open letters, position papers, statements in the media), a value was assigned to measure their access to general and policy specific information on relevant economic issues. It was found that slightly over half (11) of the groups had reasonably good access to information.

Some typical sources of information included the national media as well as foreign newspapers, magazines and radio stations, and contacts in the bureaucracy. Other sources included Malians residing abroad and contacts in donor agencies. With the notable exception of the UNTM, interest groups stated that very little economic information is provided directly by the government.

g. Capacity to carry out some degree of policy analysis

Using the same type of information as for (d) above, this report identifies groups demonstrating a capacity to carry out some degree of policy analysis (14/19). It is worth noting that more groups show a capacity for analysis than claim, or show, to have adequate access to relevant policy information. At the analytical stage, the team tested for relationships between group resources, access to information, policy analysis capacity, methods chosen, and degree of success.

In the case of federated groups (UNTM, FNEM), results from this type of analysis must be interpreted cautiously. For instance, the relatively powerful UNTM has no real analytical capacity of its own. In some cases, it can muster some through one of its constituent unions, in others, depending on the policy issue and the respective positions of constituent groups, it needs to turn to independent advisers. FNEM, on the contrary, demonstrates a solid analytical capacity, reinforced by most of its constituent members.

2. Group Strategies and Methods Used

Over the past four years, Malian interest groups have used a wide range of methods to express their positions and exert influence. They have also chosen among several possible "channels" and "entry points." The analysis is made somewhat more difficult by the fact that a group may use several methods in combination, over time, or according to the "entry point" chosen. In a cross-sectional approach such as this, the team had to ascribe characteristics to groups on the basis of a **dominant**, rather than single strategy, method, or point of entry into the policy process.

First, the range of policy advocacy methods was divided into the following categories:

- open confrontation or threat (ranging from violent demonstrations to "economic strike") vs. more collaborative and dialogue-oriented strategies;
- mass mobilization (marches, demonstrations) vs. acting through the group's leadership; or
- use of a consultative/participative mode, as when a group is actively involved in policy design/review exercises with part of the government bureaucracy, vs. a less interactive representation of group objectives, e.g., submitting letters or position papers.

a. Strategy: confrontational or collaborative?

None of the nineteen groups surveyed rely on open confrontation or credible threat as the sole or main policy advocacy strategy. However, six of them have demonstrated a capacity to resort to confrontation or credible threat as a last (and successful) recourse, including the two rural-based groups.

b. Style of intervention

A relatively large number (11/19) of the interest groups rely partly on broad popular mobilization to be heard and convey their messages. Not surprisingly, all such groups have large memberships. Mass mobilization, however, is usually a measure of last resort, Mali's recent history of mass demonstrations showing that they easily turn into confrontations with opposing groups, government forces, or both.

c. Type of interaction with the policy process

The majority of groups surveyed (15/19) were able to establish such an interaction with the policy process that they felt they were somewhat consulted on, or participated in some policy decisions.

3. Channels and Points of Entry into the Policy Process

Once overall policy orientations have been chosen and announced at the highest political level, they are first translated into operational guidelines at the ministerial level. Single interest groups are rarely able to intervene at this level, although the central bureaucracy, as a major stakeholder group, begins to exert influence. Interest groups are more likely to intervene at the stages where policies are designed or redesigned, when policy impact analysis is carried out, and when the choice of specific policy instruments is considered.

The policy process is generally assumed to be rather iterative; popular reaction to a policy reaches the bureaucracy, then percolates horizontally and vertically through it until a decision is reached to react (not always explicitly). There are obvious limitations to this way of modelling political interactions; this report uses several examples in the discussion of central bureaucracy to refine it somewhat, as it pertains to Mali. However, the team tests the hypothesis that the point of entry used by a group to interact with the policy process depends partly on the group's characteristics²⁴. To the extent that some groups are also using channels other than the central bureaucracy to exert influence, this report investigates the relationship between group types and methods on one hand, and entry points and channels on the other.

a. Interaction at the policy analysis level

Over half of the groups (10/19) were considered to have access, at least occasionally, to levels of the policy process where overall policy analysis takes place, usually on the anticipated impact of various policy options.

A demonstrated capacity to carry out policy analysis and make valid policy suggestions does not automatically make a group influential. Although some groups seem to have had an impact at the policy analysis level, the central bureaucracy has often been reluctant to recognize or acknowledge their contribution. ADIDE is a good example of such a group, which initiated or assisted with major ideas and initiatives (establishment of an AGETYPE agency in Mali, the third Republic's employment policies, anti-smuggling measures).

b. Working on policy instruments

A greater proportion of groups (14/19) accedes to a slightly lower level of the policy process, where policy instruments are being considered and debated on the basis of a policy already chosen. The data are consistent in the sense that all groups able to gain access to the policy analysis level are also involved in discussions on instruments, whereas the reverse does not necessarily hold true. In certain areas (e.g., health, transport, energy) the government may not be eager to see interest groups play an active role at the policy orientation, or policy analysis stages, but welcomes the groups' involvement to discuss policy instruments and specific issues. Institutional mechanisms have been established over time to facilitate regular interaction.

In addition to direct interaction with the government and its bureaucracy, Malian interest groups have relied on two channels of action, sometimes simultaneously: the media and the National Assembly.

²⁴ We hypothesize that it also depends on the nature of the policy issue addressed.

c. The media

The vast majority (14/19) of groups regularly use the media as a means to argue their case or rally support for their cause. This phenomenon really "took off" when the number of radio stations sharply increased²⁵; whereas the printed press reaches only the literate and francophone population, news, information, and programs of general interest are broadcast in national languages. It's fair to say that no other phenomenon has come close to this "democratization" of information and public debate. The section of this report on the role of the media describes this in greater detail.

d. The National Assembly

Issues affecting interest groups are often discussed at the National Assembly. It is difficult to establish a link between such discussions and an interest group's systematic "lobbying" efforts. Nevertheless, it seems that 9/19 groups have systematically relied on parliamentary groups at some point. There are only two groups which clearly did not want to do so. GPP, given its other powerful means of action, does not believe that additional public exposure would serve a useful purpose, while the CAFO has not been eager to strengthen real or perceived ties with any kind of political institution.

4. Measures of Success: Extent of Effectiveness/Political Power

The non-parametric dependent variable is the extent to which an interest group has been able to inflect or to jointly determine the course of the policy process. This includes instances where a group has:

- influenced agenda setting, whereby the government has opened a public debate about specific policy issues to be considered and acted on;
- influenced policy analysis or the choice of policy instruments, typically by pointing out the anticipated impact on certain groups, or on the budget; or
- influenced policy implementation; either by pointing out how policy implementation departs from plan, or how a fully implemented policy has a negative impact to be mitigated through policy change or compensation.

a. Effectiveness

The assessment this report makes of a group's policy advocacy **effectiveness** is relative, in the sense that the team compares what the group has accomplished with the group's stated

²⁵ There are about a dozen independent local FM radio stations in Bamako. Most secondary towns (Kayes, Koutiala, Mopti, Nioro, Sikasso, Ségou) also have one or several local independent stations.

objectives. This has the drawback of ascribing a greater degree of success to a group fulfilling very modest objectives, than to another which has made significant absolute gains, while falling short of its set mandate.

Probably because of the self-selection phenomenon mentioned above, a majority of interest groups surveyed (16/19) appears to have been effective²⁶. As described in Chapter III, the SYCOV has been effective in bringing the government (and the CMDT) around to entering into a real dialogue with cotton producers, and in gaining a seat at the Contrat-Plan bargaining table. The COFEM, after a complete review of the Malian civil code, identified discriminatory laws and practices; some of these have then been changed through a formal legislative process. For instance, women no longer need an authorization from their husbands to run a business, consult a family planning clinic, or to travel abroad. The ASCOMA has been able to push through a number of important changes in the energy sector, following a widely publicized ASCOMA/Energie du Mali (EDM) conference. In addition, ASCOMA attends meetings of all hospital management boards. More detailed descriptions of interest group accomplishments are presented below.

The groups judged "ineffective", on the other hand, share several characteristics: they have relatively low resources, tend to act singly rather than within a federation of groups, and demonstrate no capacity to have access to the policy process, either at the level of policy analysis, or regarding discussions on policy instruments.

b. Power

By definition, an organized and active interest group occupies a greater place in the public arena, and is likely to secure more advantages than unorganized or ineffective stakeholders. So, all effective groups are successful in some absolute sense. Quite a few groups (10/19), however, have managed to play a role and gain advantages which appear greater than their relative places in society and the economy might warrant. This report classifies them as being especially successful, or relatively powerful.

C. Relationship Between Group Characteristics and Their Degree of Success

In the next few pages, data is presented on the overall sample, and on effective and powerful groups. A value of 1 indicates the group meets the criteria in the appropriate column, while a 2 and a 0 indicate "no" or "undetermined", respectively. Summary results are then provided on the hypothesized relationships between the degree of success of interest groups and several factors seen as key determinants. The reader is reminded that a correlative approach cannot fully take inter-group dynamics into account.

²⁶ Some groups, unable to achieve some type of change through interaction with the government policy process, have decided to act more directly (COFEM: list of projects to be financed by donors, ADIDE: supporting employment creation) --neither of which is well endowed with resources...

1. "Having adequate resources doesn't hurt..."

Ten groups are relatively well endowed with resources, every one of them is effective, and all but one (SYNABAT) are powerful as well. A hypothesis for the reason why SYNABAT is not powerful is that they intervene in a subsector still dominated by powerful foreign construction and public works firms.

Well endowed groups are not necessarily large (6/10). However, all but one had relatively adequate analytical capacity and interacted with the policy process at the policy analysis level. Most (8/10) relied on some form of media.

TABLE 3.2: GROUPS WITH ADEQUATE RESOURCES

Group	Corp.	Resourc	Large	Capa.	Media	Polic	Eff	Power
ABB	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1
CCAM	1	1	2	1	0	1	1	1
CCIM	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
FNEM	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
GCM	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1
GPP	1	1	2	1	2	1	1	1
SYNABAT	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	2
SYNAPPO	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
SYNTRUI	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
UNTM	2	1	1	2	1	1	1	1

2. "It pays to know your stuff..."

Eleven groups had relatively good access to information, and although they were not all well endowed with resources (low resources=3), all but one were found to be effective. The correlation between capacity to do policy analysis and access to information is good: all ten groups with analytical capacity also had good access to information. Only one group had good information but no endogenous analytical capacity (UNTM). Being well informed and able to do policy analysis does not, however, necessarily translate into power (see ADIDE, for instance); the proportion of powerful groups was 8/11. Finally, it's important to note that all groups, including the ones which have relatively good information and analytical capacity, would like more, or are actively seeking ways to improve their standing in both areas²⁷.

²⁷ This issue is more fully addressed in the section on the media, and in Tiemoko Diallo's working paper on the media and economic information in Mali (Annex).

TABLE 3.3: GROUPS WITH ADEQUATE ACCESS TO INFORMATION

Group	Resourc	Large	Info	Analyt	PolAn	Effect	Power
ABB	1	2	1	1	1	1	1
ADIDE	2	1	1	1	2	2	2
ASCOMA	2	1	1	1	2	1	0
CCAM	1	2	1	1	1	1	1
CCIM	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
COFEM	2	1	1	1	1	1	2
FNEM	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
GPP	1	2	1	1	1	1	1
SYNAPPO	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
SYNTRUI	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
UNTM	1	1	1	2	1	1	1

3. "Strength in numbers..."

Six groups had relied on open confrontation or credible threat, backed up by the fact that all six are able to mobilize large numbers of people (all are large). The strategy was rather successful since 5/6 are considered effective, even though half of them are relatively well endowed with resources. However, only 3/6 could be called powerful. Not surprisingly, only half of these groups put much emphasis on the media. Finally, compared to the overall sample average, these groups score very low on access to information and analytical capacity.

TABLE 3.4: GROUPS RELYING PARTLY ON CONFRONTATION

Group	Urban	Resourc	Info	Confr	Mass	Media	Eff	Power
CCIM	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
GCM	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1
SYCOV	2	2	2	1	1	2	1	2
SYNAPRO	2	2	2	1	1	2	1	2
UNCTRM	1	2	2	1	1	2	2	2
UNTM	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1

4. "Hearing you loud and clear..."

The vast majority of groups (14/19) used some form of media. Particularly noteworthy is the fact that the two rural groups (both effective, but not powerful) could not mobilize this

channel to further their interests. Large groups tended to use the media more than small ones (11 vs. 3) although this may not be a matter of resources, some small groups being well endowed. Media use is closely associated with effectiveness (12/14 were effective), but not so closely with power. This is because regular use of the media appears worthwhile mostly to groups with low or "average" power. Really powerful groups tend to rely on the media as a last resort. There are several reasons for this. First, past experience showed them that the media are not equipped to convincingly present technically complex policy arguments²⁸. Secondly, powerful groups feel they have adequate access to decision makers and need no intermediary. Finally, they don't wish to publicize their policy objectives through the media: no point in stirring up potentially competing interest groups...

TABLE 3.5: GROUPS RELYING ON THE MEDIA AS AN INSTRUMENT

Groups	Urb.	Res.	Large	Capa	Med	PolA	Eff	Power
ABB	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1
ADIDE	1	2	1	1	1	2	2	2
AFE	1	2	2	2	1	2	2	2
ASCOMA	1	2	1	1	1	2	1	0
ATVR	1	2	1	1	1	2	1	1
CAFO	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2
CCIM	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
COFEM	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	2
FNEM	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
GCM	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1
SYNABAT	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	2
SYNAPPO	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
SYNTRUI	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
UNTM	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1

5. "Meet me in the lobby..."

Interaction with parliamentary groups seems to be part of the strategy for 9/19 interest groups. It does not seem to hurt, since all 9 of them appear effective, and 7/9 powerful. Most of the same groups (7/9) rely on the media as well. The extent to which action through the National Assembly is determinant is hard to gauge, however, since 8/9 of these groups turn out to be relatively well endowed with resources. As discussed below, causality is unclear.

²⁸ Typical comment "We've been very disappointed in the ability of local reporters to put together a valid and convincing article from information we supplied to them."

TABLE 3.6: GROUPS RELYING PARTLY ON THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

Groups	Urban	Corpo	Resourc	Anly	Media	NAssm	Eff	Power
CCAM	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1
CCIM	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
FNEM	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
GCM	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
SYCOV	2	1	2	2	2	1	1	2
SYNABAT	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2
SYNAPPO	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
SYNTRUI	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
UNTM	1	2	1	2	1	1	1	1

6. "Best tickets in the house..."

Interacting with the policy process at the higher levels (policy analysis AND policy instruments) is the way to effectiveness, a proof of it, or both. Out of 10 interest groups intervening at this level, all were effective, and 8/10 were deemed powerful. There are significant preconditions: 9/10 had to muster adequate access to information, analytical capacity, and good resource endowment... Provided the group had these, however, size was not a factor (4/10 being small).

It is worth noting that most of the trade associations intervening at the policy level are members of CCIM and/or FNEM, also active at this level. Interviews with interest groups suggest that each plays a complex combination of independent actions, alliances, and oppositions, according to circumstances. For instance, a group may act singly on a given policy issue, and in alliance with others (e.g., through FNEM) on others. Conversely, there are cases where the CCIM (or, less often, FNEM) stand before a very divided membership as they wage a policy battle with the bureaucracy. This point is also addressed in the section on inter-group dynamics.

TABLE 3.7: GROUPS INTERVENING AT THE POLICY ANALYSIS LEVEL

Groups	Resou	Info	Anly	PolAn	Inst	Eff	Power
ABB	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
CCAM	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
CCIM	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
COFEM	2	1	1	1	1	1	2
FNEM	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
GPP	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
SYNABAT	1	2	1	1	1	1	2
SYNAPPO	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
SYNTRUI	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
UNTM	1	1	2	1	1	1	1

D. Comments on Key Determinants of Success

As noted above, the number of unsuccessful interest groups --in an overall small sample-- does not allow for a definitive analysis of what makes a group effective rather than powerless. However, enough information was collected to comment on determinants of degree of success, there being 16/19 effective groups, and 10/19 powerful ones. Among the various group characteristics identified, five emerge as most likely related to the degree of success; in decreasing order of significance: resource endowment, association with parliamentary groups, interaction with the policy process at the higher levels, access to information, and capacity to analyze it.

As the summary tables (pp. **.**) indicate, the proportion of groups with adequate resources increases from 56 percent in the overall sample to 90 percent among powerful groups. Whereas 47 percent of all groups have some interaction with parliamentary groups, the percentage rises to 70 percent among powerful ones. 80 percent of powerful groups intervene at the higher level of the policy process, compared to 53 percent of all groups. Adequate access to information is typical among 58 percent of all groups, and a characteristic for 80 percent of powerful ones. Finally, at a lower level of significance, adequate analytical capacity goes from 74 percent among all groups to 90 percent for the powerful ones.

The data suggest a few additional comments. First, the direction of causality is most often ambiguous. It's rather safe to hypothesize causal links between resource endowment and access to information, and assume that adequate information is a prerequisite for carrying out policy analysis. However, there is no telling whether groups are in general effective because they have access to a high entry point into the policy process, or whether their own success and

influence makes it possible for them to reach this point. It's also impossible to say whether, in general, groups gain influence by way of parliamentary interaction, or whether the National Assembly becomes a factor only beyond a certain level of success. Information from the various groups surveyed suggests, in fact, that the causality can run either or both ways.

This sample neither confirms nor refutes the hypothesis that the media play a key role in policy activism, since three-quarters of the groups in the overall sample reportedly use the media anyway. Secondly, corporatist groups tend to do better than single-issue oriented ones. Given the suggested importance of resource endowment, this is not surprising. Three-quarters of corporatist groups are adequately endowed, versus 1/6 of issue-oriented ones... The actual size of groups, however, does not seem to contribute to their degree of success. Related to size, the data show that a confrontational strategy and a capacity to mobilize large numbers of people go together (in 14/19 cases). However, reliance on this strategy does not seem to have lasting positive effects: the percentage of powerful groups fall as one goes from the whole sample to confrontational ones.

The relationship between resource endowment and access to information is also rather clear; resources/information and no-resources/no-information are correlated in 14/19 cases. Looking at the relationship between access to information and capacity to carry out policy analysis, in the overall sample, 50 percent of groups with access to information complement it with analysis, whereas 40 percent fail to do so. On the other hand, among powerful groups, nearly 90 percent of groups with access to information are also characterized by a capacity to analyze it.

IV. POLICY ISSUES AND ACTORS IN THE COTTON SUBSECTOR

A. Overview of the Cotton Subsector

While cotton represents over 50 percent of Mali's export earnings, and is similarly significant in several other countries in the subregion, West Africa ranks only third in world cotton exports. Moreover, according to the CFDT, the perceived quality of West African cotton has declined on the world market - a new and disturbing trend (Estur, 1992).

Cotton production in Mali, and throughout West and Central Africa, is based on rainfall rather than irrigated production technology. Given the uncertainties and economic risk associated with rainfall agriculture, each cotton producing country like Mali can find clear economic advantages in associating with some type of regional production and marketing system. The CFDT-led cotton family offers such an integrated arrangement. At the same time, each country must balance this advantage with the fact that the CFDT places its relationship with any one country in the larger context of its West and Central African operations.

Its 'protection' as a member of the CFDT cotton family has not, however, shielded Mali from the effects of low world market cotton prices that fell precipitously from 1983 to 1986 and again in 1992. From 1985 through 1992, net losses amounted to approximately 241 billion CFA francs and net income on cotton production was positive in only two out of eight years. Throughout the 1980s, Mali, in particular, confronted a series of additional crises related to its re-entry into the West African Monetary Union (UMOA) and the associated currency devaluation.

In response, and as part of a broader structural adjustment program, the government began to take several institutional steps designed to improve the efficiency of the subsector: reducing the number of parastatal enterprises in the subsector and reducing the management and operational costs of the CMDT. In addition to these changes, many of which are still in progress, the recent upswing on the world cotton market and the CFA franc devaluation may provide additional relief, at least in the short-term.

B. Introduction

In June 1994, less than three years after its explosive emergence into the Malian political arena, the National Union of Cotton Producers (*Syndicat des Producteurs de Coton et Vivriers*, SYCOV) sat at the bargaining table as a full partner with the Government and with the Malian Company for Textile Development (*Compagnie Malienne pour le Développement des Textiles*, CMDT) to negotiate a new four-year *Contrat Plan* governing the production and marketing of cotton through 1998. With SYCOV's participation in these negotiations, Malian cotton producers, for the first time in Malian history, had a direct voice in influencing agricultural policy. A renegotiated *Contrat Plan*, with SYCOV as a signatory, had been the major item on the SYCOV agenda for almost two years, and it appears that most cotton producers are pleased with the outcome of the negotiations.

SYCOV's policy success came just after representatives from about 10 Malian farmers' organizations met in Kati for two days to examine how to assure and expand their role in the country's democratic political process (see Coulibaly, 1994). Based on this meeting and series of regional discussions that started in late 1994, the *Association pour la Sauvegarde et le Renforcement de la Démocratie (ASARED)* and the *Institut Malien de Recherches Appliquées au Développement (IMRAD)* will host a national seminar on farmer unionism and democracy in Mali during the early part of 1995.

Hopefully, the following observations about SYCOV can contribute to the discussions in this national seminar and to the deliberations of others concerned about a greater role for farmers' organizations in economic policy-making in Mali. More broadly, it is hoped this case study will improve the understanding of multiple relationships between democratization and economic policy-making, and the kinds of governmental and political reforms that might be designed to complement economic reform policies and programs. Finally, this case study offers information to advance the understanding of how a more open political situation and opportunities for a more open policy debate might lead to greater measures of political and economic development.

Following a brief review of the origins of SYCOV, this case study examines the major issues surrounding the negotiations of the new, four-year *Contrat Plan*, including a description of the key features of the cotton subsector. Second, it assesses the political and economic conditions related to SYCOV's role and its legitimacy vis-à-vis Malian cotton producers. Third, this case study identifies the organizational conditions in SYCOV that affect its viability as a significant actor in the process of political and economic liberalization in Mali. Finally, it identifies the opportunities for, and constraints on, the emergence of greater nation-wide farmer solidarity in Mali. In conclusion, several suggestions or lessons are offered for consideration by those interested in promoting a greater role for farmer organizations in democracy and governance in Mali.

C. Origins

If the Director of the Regional CMDT Office in Koutiala had initially received the small delegation of cotton producers who came to present their 12 grievances (*doléances*) in May 1991 with even a small measure of courtesy and consideration, it is highly likely that the story of SYCOV's role in Malian agricultural development policy would have taken another path. Despite the CMDT's efforts to deal with some of these demands, the producers felt deeply insulted and they declared a cotton strike, just as planting was to begin. What started as a discussion quickly erupted into a public confrontation that was finally defused only with the personal intervention and assurances of the Minister of Rural Development.

The cotton producers, who came together largely from the Koutiala region, were neither extremists nor revolutionaries. Most had produced and marketed their cotton with the CMDT for over 20 years. Several practiced large-scale, mechanized production, and many had completed at least eight or nine years of formal schooling in French and/or had participated in the CMDT

Bambara literacy program. While the farmers were angry (Bingen, 1994), they saw themselves primarily as unfairly treated partners rather than an agrarian revolutionary vanguard. Moreover, their decision to 'strike' was not taken suddenly. Their concerns about their role vis-à-vis the CMDT had been growing for several years.

D. Background

As the Malian economy worsened in the late 1980s, cotton producers found themselves increasingly squeezed. The prices received for their cotton were not keeping up with the increased costs for equipment and supplies. For many producers, cotton production, their principal source of income, was becoming less and less profitable. Consequently, when the CMDT decided in late 1989 to transfer its responsibility for agricultural credit to the National Agricultural Development Bank, BNDA, and its more restrictive repayment policies, a small group of producer-leaders from the Koutiala region came together as the *Coordination des AV et Tons* to lobby against this decision, which they saw as imposing a further financial hardship on their already stressed production operations. The group's initial, short-term successes with the CMDT encouraged it to broaden its lobbying effort to deal, among other issues, with the apparent shortages of, and high prices for animal (cotton cake) feed on the open market, as well as with the CMDT's decision to classify and price cotton at the central processing plant instead of with the producers at the village-level collection points. The producers were less successful in these broader discussions, but with the overthrow of the Traoré regime, they found political room to go public with their growing frustrations.

The producers' 12 demands or grievances dealt with specific and some long-standing pricing and marketing issues. They neither challenged the authority of the CMDT nor at the time, considered the establishment of a producers' union. But the political conditions during the first months of the transition that allowed the producers a measure of previously unavailable political freedom were also the source of considerable political apprehension and uncertainty. It wasn't altogether clear to regional CMDT and government officials, for example, that the producers' strike did not represent a grassroots effort by Traoré sympathizers to reinstall the previous regime. The international attention given to the confrontation also heightened tensions between producers and the CMDT (Marchant, 1991; Barrot and Ouattara, 1992).

With the intervention of the Minister of Rural Development, the CMDT and the producers were able to reach agreement on nine of the 12 grievances. On the remaining three points - the availability of animal feed, fertilizer prices and cotton prices - the CMDT and the producers agreed to continue their negotiations. Based on these initial steps toward reconciliation, and as the political air cleared, in July the CMDT proposed a two phase program to restore a spirit of trust between the CMDT and producers

In the short term, the CMDT proposed to carry-out a broad-based training and information program on the cotton subsector (*filière*) for the producers' representatives as well as a region-by-region identification of the producers' cotton marketing problems and concerns. In addition, the CMDT agreed to host a public roundtable discussion of subsector issues between

representatives from the Ministry of Rural Development, the producers and the CMDT. In the medium term, the CMDT proposed two major activities: to host a 'study trip' of the *la filière coton* from Bamako to Paris and Havres; and, to support information-discussion sessions in Bambara for producers of the *Contrat-Plan* and the CMDT's rural development program.

The roundtable discussion, with 84 attendees, including representatives from the French Ministry of Coopération, the *Caisse Française de Développement*, the European Development Fund and the World Bank, was held in Ségou in September 1991. The participants reached five major recommendations concerning the organization of producers, cotton production practices and marketing, the supply of animal feed and the integration of the OHVN cotton producers into the 'CMDT system.'

First, the participants approved the establishment of a producer organization that would represent producers from the village to the national level. While it was agreed that this organization would be allowed to identify and define the grounds upon which it would establish its own legal identity, it was also agreed that the organization would collaborate closely with the CMDT, the Chamber of Agriculture, the government administration and other technical services to guarantee the widest possible diffusion of information to all cotton producers. In addition, the participants recommended that the producers' organization should be represented in all the decision-making units, such as the CMDT Management Board (*Conseil d'Administration*) and the Stabilization Fund Management Committee, and that the CMDT would study a proposal to allow such an organization to become a CMDT shareholder.

Second, the roundtable participants approved efforts to establish cotton production quotas in order to achieve two separate objectives: to control land degradation and to keep within the CMDT processing capacity. Third, it was agreed that producer prices would be announced before planting and that producer representatives would be allowed to participate at the village level in the classification of cotton harvested. Fourth, producers were advised to diversify their sources of animal feed, while the national commission for the distribution of feed was advised to earmark at least 50 percent of the annual stock of feed to cotton producers.

Finally, the participants recommended that the *Contrat Plan* effectively include cotton producers in the OHVN zone. In addition, the CMDT was invited to examine the possibility of extending its advantages in input supply and cotton purchasing to OHVN producers.

With the roundtable's endorsement of the legitimacy of a producers' organization, several international agencies, notably the French Ministry of Coopération through the *Agriculteurs Français pour le Développement International* and the *Fondation pour le Progrès de l'Homme*, began to provide financial and technical support to help establish a professional national cotton producers' organization. At the same time, many of those involved in the Koutiala events sought legal assistance through the Chamber of Agriculture to establish an officially recognized union of cotton producers. With this level of both national and international backing, the outspoken leadership of the still-nascent SYCOV held off offers at the national rural

development estates-general in December to affiliate with the National Union of Malian Labor (UNTM) or to adopt a partisan association with any of the country's new political parties.

Its political autonomy thus asserted, the newly invested Congress of the *Syndicat des Producteurs de Coton et Vivriers* in September 1992 agreed that SYCOV needed to focus on three types of activities: 1) those that would improve the technical production and marketing capacity of its constitutive village-level units; 2) participation in the regular meetings of the CMDT *services d'encadrement*; and, 3) the establishment of a partnership relationship with the principal development actors throughout the CMDT and OHVN cotton producing zones. Even though the CMDT had made very little, if any progress in taking action on most of the September 1991 roundtable recommendations (see Traoré, 1992), as the newly elected President of SYCOV, Antoine Baba Berthé, a year later would assure the members and the Managing Director of the CMDT,

"à partir de ce jour SYCOV sera aux côtés de la CMDT dans un rapport de partenariat que nous souhaitons fécond. .. SYCOV marque avant tout la reconnaissance pour tout ce que la CMDT, et avant elle la CFDT ont fait pour que nous arrivions à ce niveau. .. Ainsi la main dans la main, sans complexe aucun, souhaitons l'avenir avec confiance malgré les difficultés conjoncturelles que connaît la filière coton."

This brief overview of the origins of SYCOV highlights several significant, policy-relevant observations for interested government and donor agencies and for SYCOV leaders and members. In the eyes of many producers, as well as the minds of many who follow Malian agricultural development policy, SYCOV appears beholden, if not captured, by some international donors and/or the CMDT. The CMDT initiative following the May 1991 confrontation in Koutiala and the subsequent financial support from the international community are perceived by many 'from the outside' as compromising SYCOV's policy independence. In some CMDT areas, especially where it is reported that CMDT village agents 'chose' the SYCOV representatives or where union representatives (mistakenly) tell farmers that SYCOV membership is required to receive production credit and market cotton, producers express ambivalent feelings about SYCOV's relationship with the CMDT. At the same time, SYCOV's multiple links with the international community and its international profile did considerably enhance its bargaining position vis-à-vis the Government and the CMDT.

Second, while the CMDT has been described as "overbureaucratized" (Flotté, et al., 1993), it did respond quickly to the producers' challenges in mid-1991. For the lessons it might provide to other governmental agencies during a period of political liberalization, it would be useful to identify how those organizational and/or political factors enabled this adaptive response.

Third, SYCOV's history clearly indicates the significance of understanding both the origins of a farmers' organization and the various relationships among its members. It is clear that successful farmers' movements do not emerge overnight. It is also clear that such organizations are built around a complex set of both customary and more 'contractual' relations

among members. Relations of trust and confidence, built on family and village-level relations, are as important, and sometimes more important, than solidary relations forged from an expression of shared grievances as cotton producers.

E. The *Contrat Plan*

Despite the long history of cotton production throughout West Africa, it was not until 1952, and close to the end of the colonial period that the parastatal (*société mixte*) French Company for Textile Development, CFDT, extended its improved production, processing and marketing operations from Central Africa into Mali (the Soudan). At independence, the new government permitted continued CFDT investments through an agreement that gave monopoly control over cotton production and processing. Based on the success of the 'CFDT model,' and as a means for attracting additional external financial support to achieve broader rural development objectives, in 1974 Mali created the Malian Company for Textile Development, CMDT, with 60 percent Malian government capital and 40 percent CFDT capital.

With continued support from the World Bank, and other donors, since the mid-1970s, the CMDT has established itself as a key actor in what might be one of the most successful agricultural and rural development programs in West Africa. Following a brief discussion of the institutional structure of the cotton subsector, this section reviews some of the background to the *Contrat Plan*, including the CMDT and SYCOV positions going into the June negotiations. The section concludes with a preliminary assessment of the results of the negotiations, with an emphasis on the political implications for SYCOV, including its political viability and organizational dynamics.

1. The Cotton Success Story.

Since 1960, cotton production in Mali has increased by a factor of 50 and thereby has made southern Mali among the richest areas in the country. The estimated average annual income throughout the CMDT zone prior to the January 1994 devaluation was 100,000 CFA, or 5 times the national average. It is widely accepted as well that cotton production technology has helped to increase production of cereal crops, turning the cotton zone into "le grenier à céréales du Mali."

The CMDT zone may also be the most technologically advanced in terms of agricultural production technology. It is estimated that 75 percent of the almost 100,000 cotton producing households have plows, seeders and oxen. This is also the one area in Mali with tractor farming. In the Koutiala area, tractors are used on 142 farms. The CMDT contribution to this level of technological development is clear. In 1974/75 only 58 percent of the cotton fields plowed. By 1990/91, this figure had jumped over 90 percent. Similarly, while seeders were not at all used in 1974/75, by 1990/91, and estimated 70 percent of the fields were mechanically seeded. The total area under production has tripled from 68,059 ha to 194,423 ha and productivity has almost doubled from 883 kg/ha to 1,359 kg/ha.

This Malian success story of agricultural and rural development is due in no small measure to the multinational integration of all components of cotton production, processing and marketing (*filière*) operating through a series of private and parastatal actors. Within a well-defined policy and regulatory framework, this CFDT-led *famille cotonnière*, includes several French governmental actors, the international donor community and the Malian government. The following overview of the principal actors in the *filière* helps improve understanding of some current issues in agricultural development policy-making, and especially the role of SYCOV in this process.

The CMDT is responsible for 98 percent of the country's cotton production, with the OHVN responsible for the remaining 2 percent. In its role as the country's largest generator of export earnings, the CMDT benefits from several types of special arrangements and agreements. First, the CMDT technical package is based on over 50 years of French investment in cotton research throughout West and Central Africa. In recent years, varietal breeding priorities have switched from production per hectare to improved fiber quality and ginning productivity. Second, in its role as an input supplier, the CMDT profits from being able to order large quantities, from tax and duty advantages on imported agricultural equipment, and from donor grants that have helped with the purchase of inputs on concessional terms. Finally, the CMDT has agreed to purchase pesticides from the government monopoly, (*Société Malienne de Produits Chimiques*, SMPC).

In addition to its role in cotton production, the CMDT holds a monopoly on cotton processing and, since 1988, on cotton export marketing. With the direct participation of the CFDT, the CMDT operates 12 cotton processing facilities located throughout the southern region of the country. The processing capacities of these gins range from 5,000 MT per processing cycle (151 days) for the oldest, to more than 40,000 MT per cycle for the newest facilities. This available processing capacity, plus an interest in controlling transportation costs, is the primary reason why the CMDT is interested in setting and controlling cotton production quotas throughout the region.

Finally, with its almost 7 percent interest, CMDT joins CFDT and other West and Central African cotton producing companies as shareholders in COPACO, the *Compagnie Cotonnière*. COPACO is the exclusive buying agent of the CFDT and for a .05 percent commission on total sales, receives over 90 percent of Mali's cotton production. While COPACO handles less than 10 percent of the world market, it specializes in marketing West African cotton and it offers an assured market for Malian cotton.

As the majority shareholder in HUICOMA, CMDT also seeks to protect the country's monopoly on commercial cotton seed oil processing for oil, soap and animal feed. The company has started testing the use of (glandless) cotton seed flour for both food and chicken feed and expects that, if successful, these new uses for cotton will quickly diminish the availability of animal feed.

Clearly, the level of institutional integration or structure of the cotton subsector is unmatched in other commodity subsectors in Mali. Nevertheless, this 'model' highlights pivotal and common features that are relevant to policymaking that affects other agricultural subsectors. Moreover, if *Contrat Plan* is seen as a document that is illustrative of subsector policy management, then an examination of the discussions leading to June 1994 renegotiations of the *Contrat Plan* offers an excellent opportunity to examine several dimensions of the roles of various groups in the economic policy process.

2. Background to the Contrat Plan Negotiations.

In the wake of a period of crisis in the world cotton markets, and as part of a series of structural adjustment measures being negotiated between the World Bank and the Government of Mali, the Selingué Seminar on the Future of Cotton in Mali was held in May 1988 to identify and approve several legal and economic reforms designed to assure and improve the competitive position of Malian cotton.

The key agreements at Selingué included the following principal recommendations: change the statute of the CMDT from that of a government agency to an essentially privatized *société à caractère industriel et commercial* in which the Malian government is part owner with the CFDT; examine how producers might join as shareholders; the establishment of a floor price for cotton and of a price stabilization fund; examine how producers would be represented in its management; and, invite the OHVN to become part of the CMDT dominated subsector.

These important recommendations, which became part of the first *Contrat Plan* between the Government and the CMDT, are based on the assumption that the CMDT plays two complementary, but significantly separate roles as both a private and a public actor in economic development. The first role identifies the CMDT as a commercial, private sector actor in which the CMDT is responsible for the management of all aspects of the cotton subsector - production, collection, processing and marketing. In its second role, the CMDT acts as a public agent of the Ministry of Rural Development with responsibility for a wide variety of rural development activities throughout its zone of cotton production operations. This distinction between a public and private role for the same agency is not uniformly accepted by Malian policy-makers, but it presumably does represent one way for the Government to be more fully responsive to its structural adjustment agreement with the World Bank. At the same time, however, it represents an important source of the ambivalence which many policymakers feel in response to at least two of SYCOV's principal concerns: lowering the costs of, and/or assuming management for the provision of inputs; and, taking over village-level extension responsibilities.

Input supply, for example, is defined as a "rural development" activity. While input supply is as much a private sector economic activity as transport or processing, its designation as a rural development function, and thereby governmental, activity, enables the CMDT to receive foreign assistance in support of its input supply program (e.g., the Dutch fertilizer program). This type of assistance, in turn, is one way for the CMDT to ease its cashflow problems over the long (15-18 month) period in which it has to carry the high financial charges related to ordering

and distributing agricultural inputs. In reality, however, one of CMDT's great strengths derives from its successful record as a significant commercial actor in assuring the timely provision of equipment and supplies for the production season. Consequently, given the economic and financial complexity of input supply, many government and donor agency policymakers, who might otherwise support SYCOV, find that its demand to take over input supply quite implausible.

On the other hand, most of the costs for CMDT *encadrement*, or its extension system, are allocated to its role as a private sector actor. As Macrae (1992) indicated, "La solution du contrat-plan est une solution opérationnelle à un problème concret qui s'est posé à court terme: par qui et comment financer la fonction d'encadrement? C'est la même question qui est posée dans le cadre du débat sur le rôle de l'Etat dans l'économie:...". For SYCOV, this raises a significant and immediate problem that is directly related to their demands to increase the producer price of cotton. According to SYCOV, the estimated 13-15 CFA francs per kilo (before devaluation) that supported the *encadrement* could more profitably serve two purposes: increase the producer price of cotton and replace many of the village-level agents by SYCOV members.

3. *Contrat Plan Negotiation Issues*

Just prior to negotiations, the membership and leadership of SYCOV reported that there were five principal issues on their negotiation agenda. With devaluation, *producer pricing* has become more of an issue than it was in 1991. Most producers felt that prices were declining before devaluation, especially in comparison with other West Africa countries. There was a strong feeling by many that the CMDT had not adjusted its price upward sufficiently to compensate for the increased costs of production due to inflation. Some even expressed interest in raising the price for 1st choice cotton to 170 CFA per kilo.

Neither the membership nor the leadership of SYCOV were willing to accept *production quotas*. From the farmers' perspective, if CMDT doesn't purchase all of the cotton, then the government should permit another agency to purchase the rest. Such an option would decouple the producers' income from CMDT's ginning capacity.

Third, farmers asked for *village-level classification* of their cotton harvest, or for representatives at the factory. Like farmers throughout history, Malian cotton producers feel quite strongly that they are not being treated honestly and openly when the CMDT is allowed to classify the quality of cotton harvested when the producers are not present.

Fourth, farmers still do not understand the *rebate* policy or concept. Even though CMDT agreed to a 33 1/3 percent rebate, an increase of over 8 percent from its proposal of 25 percent, it remains an area that has not been successfully explained to producers. Specifically, producers do not understand how payment of rebate for year one tied to price and sales of cotton in year two.

And finally, SYCOV expressed concern over the *cost of agricultural inputs*. In discussions prior to the *Contrat Plan* negotiations, the CMDT had not honored the producers

request to be associated in the negotiations of input prices. In particular, SYCOV has asked government to remove or decrease some of the taxes and tariffs that appear to be largely responsible for the significant increase in the costs of insecticides. But the union has also asked that CMDT examine how input distribution organized and managed so that cost savings could be turned into lower costs for input costs for farmers;

SYCOV also sought to place several other issues on the negotiating table, including the use of a percentage of the rebate to finance its activities, ways to reduce processing costs and thereby generate savings that could be turned into higher farmgate prices, more frequent reporting on cotton marketing and sale. By June 1994, the cotton producers, CMDT and HUICOMA had reached at least a temporarily satisfactory agreement. One-half of HUICOMA's production is allocated to CMDT and OHVN cotton producers. Joint CMDT-SYCOV local-level committees establish quotas of animal feed based on estimates of pasture availability and numbers of work animals per household and CMDT distributes the animal feed allocation to its cotton pick-up points. Consequently, some villagers must arrange their own transportation to pick up their allocation from the drop-off point.

4. Observations

Following the June negotiations, SYCOV distributed several thousand copies of a *Contrat Plan* summary, translated into Bambara, and held review and discussion meetings with its regional leadership. Based on these discussions, SYCOV's leaders and members feel extremely satisfied with the outcome of the June *Contrat Plan* negotiations, largely because they agreed upon a cotton price higher than that proposed by government. On two other issues that were critical for SYCOV, namely the removal of production quotas and the establishment of village-based cotton classification, SYCOV's positions were not accepted.

With respect to production quotas, the *Plan* stipulates that the CMDT will establish an overall production quota "en fonction de la capacité d'égrenage de ses usines et de la situation des prix du coton fibre sur les marchés internationaux." Moreover, "la CMDT se réserve le droit de refuser l'achat de la production excédentaire de coton graine." Similarly, the *Plan* specifically indicates that "le paiement du coton graine .. se fera sur la base du classement industriel." In response to SYCOV's concerns, the CMDT offers to assure "une meilleure circulation de l'information et une transparence au tour du classement industriel entre les différents partenaires de la filière coton." In addition, and in partial response to several of SYCOV's other related concerns, the CMDT agrees to undertake several organizational cost-saving measures, including a reduction-in-force of extension personnel.

The producers agree to the following: to accept the production quotas established as a function of CMDT's processing capacity; to follow the CMDT recommended technical practices, including the exclusive use of CMDT seed and CMDT's suggested insecticide applications; to accept the factory-based cotton classification system; and, to assure a regular supply of cotton to the processing facilities.

Given the importance that SYCOV attached to a 'no-quota' policy and to village-level classification, these specific stipulations would appear to present a serious threat to SYCOV's credibility. Member satisfaction with the immediate and concrete price gains, however, appears to have offset their concerns with production quotas and classification. Moreover, SYCOV can emphasize and draw the attention of cotton producers to several more fundamental agreements that could have significant long-term implications for the structure of the *filière* in Mali.

First, CMDT has agreed to study the ways in which cotton producers might become CMDT shareholders. The results of this study are to be presented to the CMDT Management Committee (*Conseil d'Administration*) no later than June 1996. Second, SYCOV, as the representative of cotton producers, now fully participates in policy-making with the CMDT and the Government. As one of four permanent members of the Oversight Committee (*Comité de suivi et de gestion*) of the *Contrat Plan*, SYCOV will be able to participate in the annual audit of the *filière*, in decisions to review the producers' costs of production, and in the review of CMDT's annual performance report. SYCOV also sits on the management committee for the Stabilization Fund. Finally, the *Contrat Plan* stipulates that SYCOV ("les producteurs") and the CMDT will meet regularly "dans le cadre d'un partenariat actif" in order to: review each year's production and marketing; plan for the coming year and agree upon the producers' price; and, establish the production quotas. The outstanding challenge for SYCOV now is whether it can develop the organizational capacity to participate as an equal partner at these different policy-making levels.

F. Organizational Dynamics

This section focuses on the organizational conditions related to SYCOV's capacity and continued legitimacy to act as a significant representative of cotton producers in economic policy-making. Following a brief review of SYCOV's organizational structure, this section examines several membership and leadership issues, including questions related to the role of the *Associations Villageoises* and to SYCOV's operational, village-level relations with the CMDT.

1. Organizational Structure

SYCOV's organizational structure and membership requirements are defined in its statutes that were approved by the first SYCOV Congress held in September 1992. These statutes state that membership in SYCOV is open to any producers whose production activities are in some way related to cotton production and who agree with the organization's goals to support "la formation syndicale indispensable" and to intervene "auprès de l'Etat, des organismes nationaux, extra-nationaux et des services d'encadrement pour la défense des intérêts professionnels, économiques, sociaux et moraux des exploitants membres." Salaried employees in public or private sector are specifically excluded from membership in the union.

The organizational structure of SYCOV and its constituent units parallel that of the CMDT. *Assemblée Générales* at the village and *secteur de base* levels serve as the primary organizational units; representatives from these levels are elected to successively higher levels of

decision-making, from *conférences* at the inter-village level, depending upon the area (ZER, ZAER or *Sous-Secteur*), or *coordination secondaire*, to the *Secteur*, Regional and to the *Conseil Central* and *Congrés* at the national level. Meetings at the village and inter-village levels appear to be quite variable. The *Conseil National* is a consultative body, while the *Congrés*, with 10-15 delegates from each regional bureau, meets every 5 years as the *instance supreme* of the union. A Central Bureau meets formally every 2 months on a rotating basis in each region and is responsible for the operational and day-to-day responsibilities tasks of the union. SYCOV has no paid or professional staff. Members of the Central Bureau are reimbursed only for their expenses.

Membership dues have been set at 1000 FCFA per year (prior to devaluation) and the Union records indicate about 9,000 on the membership list. SYCOV membership varies widely across the CMDT and OHVN zones: Sikasso reports 3,000 and Koutiala shows 2,300 members. Membership in the other CMDT regions is significantly lower with 1,100 in Fana 910 in Bougouni and 420 in San. There are an estimated 1,800 SYCOV members throughout the OHVN zone.

There is fairly widespread agreement among SYCOV's leaders and its outside supporters, that one of SYCOV's major challenges involves strengthening its membership base by both increasing number of members and solidifying grounds of membership. SYCOV is less than five years old, but it is still more an organization of its leaders rather than its members. This challenge is not unlike that faced historically by other farmer organizations throughout the world, but in this early period of political liberalization in Mali this challenge raises a broader concern with the longer term viability of rural-based organizations and their role in economic policy-making.

As a rural (or farmers') organization, SYCOV confronts a universal set of problems in attracting and strengthening its membership. Its (potential) members are dispersed throughout often inaccessible villages. Furthermore, other communication difficulties that are linked to both the lack of road and communication infrastructure and continued high levels of illiteracy, make it extremely difficult to 'sell the SYCOV message' to new members and to assure the 'fence mending' required to maintain a strong rural-based organization. These difficulties are, in turn, exacerbated by the lack of financial and technical (transportation) resources required to maintain contact with a rural constituency. Given these constraints, membership mobilization depends more than ever on SYCOV's ability to offset the classic 'freerider' problem by showing evidence of concrete results and benefits to joining and maintaining membership in the union. From this perspective, SYCOV's participation in itself in the CP negotiations and its 'win' with cotton prices represent very useful and concrete illustrations of SYCOV's ability defend its members' interests. Moreover, as long as SYCOV is accepted as the 'representative of the producers,' its membership on several policymaking bodies, and thereby its ability to seek specific advantages for its members, should help strengthen its case in attracting new members.

While SYCOV may be able to use some of its initial 'successes' in the *Contrat Plan* negotiations to deal in the short-run with some of the classic organizational problems that arise in

trying to mobilize farmers, it also faces a series of deeper problems that are linked to the history of village-level organizations and rural political mobilization in Mali. Cotton producers who know about SYCOV, or who are members, tend to feel positively about its possible contribution to improving their livelihoods. Nevertheless, Mali's long history of rural mobilization since independence creates a high level of skepticism, if not cynicism, among the country's producers. In the last 40-plus years, they have seen a lot of promises with various types of *sociétés*, *groupements*, *coopératives* come and go in the countryside. For many, there is no reason to believe that this experience with SYCOV will be significantly different from the other, largely failed, experiments in rural organization.

Second, many of SYCOV's village-level membership and leadership issues are inextricably tied to a wide range of problems related to the specific history and role of the *Associations Villageoises* which are the village-level base for SYCOV's leaders and members. Since the mid-1970s, these village-based groups have been indispensable to the successes of agricultural development efforts throughout the CMDT and OHVN zones. For example, the AVs are an integral part of the CMDT "dispositif d'encadrement." For several years, a selected number of AVs have had the responsibility to carry-out several critical data collection tasks, including field measurements (used to calculate estimated production and thereby set quotas) management of equipment, supplies and credit, cotton marketing, the collection of various statistics, and serving as the base for *vulgarisation* demonstrations. In the OHVN zone, the AVs have been equally indispensable, especially in the successful privatization of rural credit and input distribution. Furthermore, many governmental and nongovernmental programs still look to AVs as their principal point of entry into villages for implementation of their programs.

Nevertheless, problems, such as embezzlement and inter-village conflicts within the AVs are now so widespread and well-known that the AV is recognized as "un modèle bloqué" for development programs. In part, many of the AV problems stem from continued high illiteracy levels and the perception that oral tradition does not offer a solid basis for overcoming the fundamental ambiguities between the AV as an economic actor in development and the continued use of customary principles as basis for defining roles of villagers as members and leaders. These ambiguities are manifested in at least two ways. First, in most of the AVs, customary village leaders tend to accumulate responsibilities or positions within the AV, thereby reproducing the village power structure. Second, membership in the AVs is largely restricted to founding families of village, even though 'stranger' families may have been resident for several generations. At same time some village *notables* may not be members or do not pay dues when they are members. As a result of these two factors, many AVs reflect a high degree of immobilization.

Given these problems, the CMDT for several years has been trying to establish a more appropriate village-level structure that might help carry-out its development activities more effectively. The problematic nature of the AVs also poses profound problems for viability of SYCOV as an open, representative and democratic organization. As long as SYCOV's leaders and members continue to be drawn from the AVs and as long as the CMDT continues to rely on these village organizations for its production and development program, the whole range of AV

problems risk being carried into SYCOV. In full recognition of such problems, SYCOV has publically taken a stand of 'non-involvement' or 'disengagement' from any village-level problems related to the AVs. In fact, the SYCOV feels strongly that the organization has much to gain by staying 'above the fray.'

In addition to this structural issue, SYCOV's leaders also confront the hard work of building a farmers' union without having the training or expertise required to undertake this task. While their previous experience, often governmental, and training, has been indispensable in gaining a legitimate policy voice, it does not help in the tough work of union organizing. At the same time, the union's leaders recognize that they face a real dilemma in trying to resolve two, absolutely critical, but quite separate issues: attracting outside financial and technical resources and building the union's membership base. As (potential) members perceive the leadership as spending more time seeking financial support, especially when this (necessarily) involves trips to Europe, etc., they remain skeptical of the leaders' motives, despite the organization's successes. Moreover, many feel that such 'foreign aid' also may compel them to be beholden to foreign interests. Similarly, while SYCOV may be successful in soliciting outside support, the case can be made that this success also keeps the leadership from dealing with hard issues of how to resolve its financial issues internally.

The relationship between SYCOV and the CMDT frames a second set of issues confronted by SYCOV's leaders. Throughout most of the CMDT zone, SYCOV representatives depend upon CMDT agents for transportation and for communications. Even at the national level, most of SYCOV's information about the cotton subsector comes through various CMDT offices. The efficacy of this relationship varies widely, ranging from SYCOV charging CMDT agents with deliberate sabotage to apparently very cooperative working relationships at the village level. The extreme variability in the CMDT-SYCOV relationships at the local level suggests some degree of personalized conflict. At the same time, some village-level CMDT agents may feel genuinely threatened by SYCOV's stated objective to assume local-level extension responsibilities. Many may even see SYCOV's hand behind the *Contrat Plan* agreement to seek a reduction-in-force. Similarly, other village-level agents may be challenged by SYCOV's objective to take over input supply, since this would impinge directly on their often profitable relationships with AVs in the equipment and supply distribution. In response, many CMDT village agents play to the farmers' knowledge and long history with CMDT and contrast it with the 'unknown' nature and risks associated with SYCOV.

Given the extent to which Mali's agricultural success with cotton is directly related to the highly integrated nature of the subsector, it is difficult at this early stage in the evolution of SYCOV to assess the longer term implications of its emergence. While SYCOV initially was perceived as a threat to the success of the subsector, in the long run its demands for a greater role in input and extension may be consistent with the CMDT (and CFDT) plans for the organizational division of responsibilities within the subsector. Consequently, the recently negotiated tripartite *Contrat Plan* may represent the beginning of new corporatist structure in the cotton subsector.

Whether as a union defending its members' interests or as a loyal corporatist partner with the CMDT and the Government, SYCOV's continued success and viability may hinge on one commonly overlooked factor: literacy. Most of SYCOV's key leaders have some schooling, and many are retired government employees. As government services continue to downsize under structural adjustment, it is possible that this pool of leaders may continue to grow. On the other hand, many of SYCOV's village-level leaders emerged from the once powerful CMDT functional literacy program. This program receives nowhere near the investment and attention that it once received and to the extent that this educational base erodes, it undercuts the foundation for a renewal of village leadership.

G. The Farmers' Movement in Mali

This section examines what, if any, opportunities might be available for the emergence of greater, nation-wide, farmer solidarity in Mali. In particular, the report explores how some of SYCOV's relations with political parties, the National Assembly, the Chamber of Agriculture and other farmers' unions might improve our understanding of the prospects for continued political and economic liberalization in Mali.

1. Unions and Parties

SYCOV's statutes specifically state that the union is nonpartisan, a position also held by the membership. While SYCOV's members may hold varying views of SYCOV's goals, they are unified in their opposition to an affiliation with any political party. Similarly, most political parties indicate that would not be appropriate to establish a formal political relationship with SYCOV. Government regulations prohibit formal relationships between unions and political parties, but the intensity of the nonpartisanship opinion may also be reflective of this period of political action in Mali. In other words, the intensity and consistency with which this view is expressed may represent an effort to make a clean break with the past 35 years of Malian politics that have been characterized by various top-down efforts to impose links among all associational activities. The opinion also reflects a certain cynicism that partisan affiliations, *per se*, are inherently and unnecessarily conflictual. Shortly after the elections, for example, many villagers reported that efforts by parties to solicit electoral support were seen to disrupt relations among villagers. That is, for villagers, Malian political parties are a long way from serving as mechanisms for aggregating and articulating political interests.

It is widely recognized that the parties did not have time to establish strong organizational bases in the countryside for the last elections. Thus, it should be instructive to try to track the rural organizational initiatives of several parties as they prepare for the next series of elections, and to see if rural perceptions of the parties change accordingly. SYCOV's statutes are clear about formally defined relationships, but they do allow for support and relations with parties when such relations are consistent with "l'amélioration des conditions d'existence et de travail du Monde Rural en général et des producteurs de coton et vivriers en particulier." Consequently, SYCOV has room for some partisan maneuver and it may be useful to watch how this is used.

2. National Assembly Representatives

Some of SYCOV's members have already take the first steps in this direction in contacting their National Assembly *députés*. SYCOV members do not hesitate to contact their deputies on an individual basis to deal with issues that SYCOV is also trying to address. As indicated earlier, however, both the organization of the National Assembly and the meager resources available to deputies weigh against the possibility of having deputies bring these individualized demands together in a broader policy context.

3. Chamber of Agriculture

The Chamber of Agriculture continues to be SYCOV's closest organizational ally in the economic policy process. As noted earlier, local level Chamber representatives played key roles during the confrontation at Koutiala, and the Bamako office (now the *assemblée permanente*) was instrumental in helping to establish SYCOV as a union. The President of SYCOV is an elected member of the Chamber's national *Assemblée Permanente* and the Bamako office continues to be a point of contact logistically and for political and policy support. For example, SYCOV leaders discussed and reviewed their concerns related to the *Contrat Plan* negotiations with the paid staff in this office

SYCOV will need to confront some of the ambiguities in its relationship with the Chamber. First, despite the recent reorganization and decentralization of the Chamber, it is still widely perceived as a semi-governmental organization. In part, this perception is linked to the history of the Chamber and in part, it is linked to the fact that the Chamber's paid, permanent professional staff are seconded civil servants. Consequently, a close relationship with the Chamber raises questions about SYCOV's independence as a political actor.

4. Union Solidarity

The Kati meeting of representatives from several farmers' organizations is illustrative of a relatively new phenomena during the early years of this new era of political liberalization. Namely, many types of farmers' groups are taking advantage of the opportunities for open contact and discussion among themselves. Such contacts should be helpful for SYCOV in defining its role and as a basis for broadening the farmers' movement in Mali. It is interesting, nevertheless, that an emerging and vibrant farmers' movement is still not part of debate either on decentralization or more specifically, within the Ministry of Rural Development as it considers the implementation of the *Schéma Directeur* through its *Plan d'Action*. Despite Mali's important steps toward political liberalization, the state and civil society are still disconnected.

V. RESEARCH AND PROGRAMMATIC IMPLICATIONS

The following suggested research and program implications are consistent with the Agency's strategy for "Building Democracy"²⁹ and its focus on: continued strengthening of the national bureaucracy's capacity to carry out and publicize economic policy analysis; improvements in the material, technical, and decision-making capability of the National Assembly; strengthening trade unions, professional associations, and women's groups; improving media outlets; and support for institutions and organizations, such as the Chamber of Agriculture, that increase Government responsiveness and accountability at the national, state, and local levels.

Consistent with this overall strategy, the team feels that the type of participatory and semi-longitudinal research approach followed in this project recommends itself highly as a means for USAID (and USAID/Bamako) to assess the results of individual democracy programs that might be supported in Mali or elsewhere in West Africa. Specifically, the insights into the process of democratization in Mali gained through the collaboration among Malian social scientists, journalists, consultants, and American Africanist social scientists offers an effective and accurate way to evaluate the performance of democracy programs. This approach could also be seen as a modest contribution to the policy debate process, since several workshops were covered by the press ("*Les Cauris*") and radio (Radio Kledu).

Research and programmatic implications arising from this work include, but are not limited to, the following:

A. Strengthening Governmental Democratic Performance

As Mali continues to move along the path toward political and economic liberalization, the Government bureaucracy must find ways to move from its 'control orientation' in policy making to a facilitative and service role. In order to support this type of evolution it might be useful to consider 1) a selective, but more in-depth assessment of current 'bureaucratic' views of the civil society by current civil servants at different Governmental levels, including current approaches to working with interest groups; and 2) an examination of the ways in which the curriculum at the National Administration School (*Ecole Nationale d'Administration*), and other major training institutions for civil servants, could be modified to deal with issues of Government administration in a democratic society.

B. Strengthening Economic Policy Analysis

A broader and more constructive dialogue between the Government and a variety of interest groups will depend in part upon the capacity of Government agency staff to carry out more informed policy assessment and evaluation. Thus, continued support to the administration's

²⁹ USAID/Washington: "Strategies for Sustainable Development", January 1994.

policy analysis and management capacity, in addition to the type of activities now undertaken under the PRED³⁰ project, could be considered.

Our contacts with various groups, however, show that most people feel that a capacity for economic analysis should not be a Government monopoly. In fact, there are ample opportunities to support independent institutes or associations doing political and economic analysis of their own. Such groups as the Malian branch of the West African Business Association, the *Club des Journalistes Economiques*, and the *Association des Economistes du Mali*, for example, appear to offer new opportunities for informing the public policy debate and educating policymakers via their informal communication networks, and through the media.

C. Strengthening the National Assembly's Role in Democratic Development

Based on a more in-depth understanding of the role assigned to the National Assembly in Mali's presidential-parliamentary system, future programs could consider the most effective ways for 'training' *députés* to serve as representatives. Providing some parliamentary staff, communications and other logistical support required to improve the effectiveness of the National Assembly should also be considered a priority.

D. Supporting the Media

The media have probably contributed more to opening up the policy debate, and to promoting the democratic process than any other single group in Mali. Logistical support to both the written press and the radio (newsprint, printing equipment, communications and broadcasting equipment) would provide extremely high democracy and development "returns". The professional level of journalists needs to be raised, including through the kinds of workshops organized in 1994 and referred to in this report.

In addition, access by both urban and rural populations to the media should also be facilitated. This could be accomplished through support to urban and rural station programming, providing transportation and recording equipment to journalists, and helping PVOs operating in rural areas develop a capacity to bring their clients into the media streams.

E. Strengthening Farmers' Organizations

The organizational issues raised by SYCOV are illustrative of the more common problems confronted by most farmers' organizations in Mali. Simply put, the emerging farmer leaders need to acquire basic skills for building and managing their organizations. Representatives from US farmer groups have something to contribute to this process.

³⁰ USAID/Mali's Policy Reform for Economic Development project.

More specifically, if Mali's farmers' organizations are to continue to exercise a voice in the economic policy process, then ways must be found to help them strengthen their organizational structure, establish a more solid financial base and improve (create) an independent policy analysis capacity.

Based on the Government's program for administrative decentralization, it seems clear that the locus of development policy and political action will be shifting to the regions. Through the *Plan d'Action*, the Ministry of Rural Development appears to be taking the leadership in the implementation of a decentralization program. For example, the Rural Economy Institute has already established regional users' commissions to help reorient and regionalize its research programming. In a related move, the recent reorganization of the Chamber of Agriculture included the renewal and establishment of elected regional chambers. The effort by several farmer groups to organize a national farmers' seminar based on a series of preparatory regional seminars is also indicative of the changing face of development policy making and politics.

If implemented as planned, however, the Government's decentralization program will have profound implications for the organization of farmer groups. For example, the *commune rurale* will replace the village as the basic organizational unit. At a very minimum this raises questions about the type of organizational structure to replace the *association villageoise*, as the current unit for development program implementation, and as the basic constituent unit for most farmer organizations. More generally, what is the future of village-based organizational units that currently play such a critical role in a wide variety of Malian development programs?

F. Promoting More Effective Donor Coordination

As noted above, it is difficult for a national bureaucracy--beset by a lack of human and other resources--to manage economic policies that are largely financed and oriented by donors. This study confirms that, in addition to the sheer "weight" of donor influence, Malian civil servants have to reckon with complex patterns of donor influence, not only upon the Government or the bureaucracy, but on many interest groups as well. Greater coherence in donor policies will not, in itself, guarantee a higher level of national control and "ownership" of economic policies, but it will very likely be a prerequisite. As a major donor, AID can take a lead in both processes.

G. A Final Note

In many ways, the work done in Mali throughout 1994 has paralleled the concerns and research undertaken under the Mali Democracy and Governance assessment. These two exercises seem to converge on a number of conclusions. Perhaps the most important is that in cases where there are significant and rapid gains in both political and economic liberalization, it is important to ensure that the rule of law continues to prevail. Under an authoritarian regime, the rules of the game, however biased, are well understood and usually enforced, even if the people only reluctantly accept them. After so many years of 'sitting on the sidelines,' the average Malian citizen, and especially the vast majority in the rural villages are deeply cynical of the rhetoric of

democracy. For most Malians, 'democracy' is just another slogan. Some use it to rationalize a disregard for the rule of law. But for most, the 'proof is in the pudding.' Thus, the enduring dilemma of development and democratization. This study begins to indicate that Mali has found a way to address this dilemma - a free and open press, a policy role for various interest groups, etc. Nevertheless, it is also clear that much more needs to be done. At a minimum, the Government must begin to 'reach out' to Malian citizens to introduce them to their political, not necessarily partisan role, in the country's development. Mali now serves as a model of the process of democratization and development in West Africa, but clearly, much remains to be done.

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APPENDICES

Appendix A. Chronology of Political and Economic Events

CHRONOLOGY OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC EVENTS

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June 1994**

**Document prepared as part of the ARD/IMRAD/MSU study
of economy policy and civil society in Mali
AID Contract No. DFM 625-0975-3613506**

Chronology of Events in 1990

January 18: The Minister of Agriculture published 1989-90 agricultural production statistics. According to these figures, a grain surplus of nearly 600,000 tons was recorded, to which public and private stocks, estimated to be 300,000 tons, must be added. This surplus occurred after three consecutive years of shortfall resulting from inadequate rainfall. To manage this surplus, the ministry decided on a series of measures, in particular the suspension of rice imports for the entire 1990 marketing year, the elimination of export taxes on millet and sorghum, the reduction of transport prices, especially for public transportation, etc.

January 24: One week after these statistics were published, the opposition newspapers (Les Echos, etc.), basing their contentions on the damage caused by migratory locusts, dispute the 600,000 ton figure. This marked the start of a wide-ranging controversy about economic statistics, which prompted the Minister of Agriculture, Mr. Moulaye Haïdara, to meet with the statisticians from the Planning Ministry for a final revision. Ultimately, the grain surplus was lowered to 200,000 tons. For the first time, economic statistics had given rise to controversy.

February 8-9: Ninth Conference of the CILSS Heads of State in Guinea-Bissau. During the summit, the Malian experience in rural organization (village association system) was treated in great detail. Accordingly, the recommendations emanating from the Ségou seminar on the management of village lands, held in Ségou in May 1989, were approved. This seminar was intended to assign to the farmers and decision-makers their specific responsibilities, so as to institute a movement in the Sahel supporting the fight against drought and desertification. To this end, major recommendations advocating decentralization in general were proposed to the participating countries.

February 28: The President of the Republic opened the Donors' Employment Round Table in Bamako, Mali. The basic objective of this discussion group was to initiate a medium-term strategy for employment promotion. A number of countries and institutions were represented, including, most notably, the African Development Bank, the Production Development Fund Association (APDF), BID, World Bank, BIT, BOAD, CDI, the EEC, the Council of Negro Women (CNW) of Washington, DC, ENDA-Third World, FOSSIDEC, OPEP, PMA, UNDP, USAID, and others. Following the deliberations, the donors approved a financial package including investments worth nearly 50 billion over 15 years.

February 28: One year after its founding, SOMISY (the Mining Company of Syama, an American firm) presented the first ingots to the President of the Republic at Koulouba Palace. Gold production was estimated at 2 tons per year for a 15-year period. We should note that BHP-UTA Mineral is one of the first American companies to

become established in Mali; SOMISY (second plant to be established, following SOGEMORK), the largest gold-production firm in the country.

March 6: A national seminar on the integration of Malian women into business and commerce was opened at CRES. Organized by the association of businesswomen and entrepreneurs, with the financial assistance of USAID, this seminar sought for ways and means to achieve the massive integration of women into the various business sectors. The seminar recommendations included revision of the marriage code, which, in the articles sanctioning male oversight of women's activities, does not encourage free enterprise among women.

March 19: Signing of a four-billion financing agreement between Mali and the Caisse Centrale de Coopération Française on behalf of the Mali Textile Company (CMDT), as part of the execution of the Government-CMDT performance contract, which stipulated greater CMDT managerial autonomy from the government (as would be the case with many other state-owned enterprises). This agreement allowed the CMDT to purchase its buildings, infrastructure and equipment, which were assessed at more than 9.5 billion francs.

March 21: Opening of a national seminar on stock accounting. Organized by the National Budget Authority with the technical assistance of the Sahel Regional Financial Management Project (PRGFS) and USAID, this seminar (intended for Malian accountants) was designed to introduce participants to stock accounting as part of the effort to systematize the accounting of governmental tangible assets and real property which, according to the Finance Ministry, had for years been subject to waste.

March 31: During the period devoted to celebrating the anniversary of the single political party, the UDPM, its political secretary, Mr. Djibril Diallo, led a conference-debate on democracy within the party. Participants included government managers gathered at the all-sports stadium in Bamako. The conference became a forum for demands for a multiparty system. 14 of the 27 speeches focused on the establishment of a multi-party system. The meeting represented the start of a national debate on a multiparty system, a debate to which the press devoted significant coverage.

May 4: Opening of a national seminar on decentralization, presided over by the President of the Republic. Participants included 400 delegates from Mali's seven regions. The meeting studied the possibilities for extending the system of administration, within which non-central elected officials would be given decision-making authority within the framework of their relations with the central government.

May 21: National seminar on the topic: journalism and the fight against fraud and unfair competition, held at the Grand Hotel in Bamako (a first?). The purpose of the seminar was to promote

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media dissemination of high-quality economic information, in order to educate journalists in the techniques specific to the collection and processing of economic information. The journalists would then be responsible for sensitizing the people to the harmful consequences of fraud for the economy.

May 15: A significant first-time occurrence: Since the advent of an independent press in Mali in 1989, a private newspaper (the Aurore) was legally attacked for defamation by the Malian Battery Company (SOMAPIL). The paper had published an article asserting that SOMAPIL was not adhering to collective labor agreements in Mali, and was paying employees below the legal minimum wage. The information proved false, and the Bamako District Court sentenced the paper to pay 25,000 CFA francs in fines and 5 million in damages to SOMAPIL.

June 20: La Baule (France) Summit bringing together 22 heads of state, including the President of the Mali. France decided to tie its economic aid to freedom and democratization in the developing countries. A number of heads of state, including those of Mali and Chad, revolted against this policy, which they characterized as meddling in the internal affairs of the countries.

June 25: Ninth Session of the National Council of the UDPM (the single party in Mali). Multipartyism was brought up for the first time, but was termed a cause of disunity, a matter of concern for intellectuals, and the expression of external pressure.

July 12: Opening of the facilities of the General Surveillance Company (SGS) in Bamako. The founding of this company met a requirement set down by PAS for an import-inspection program intended to select imports based on the most advantageous prices charged on the world market. Participants at the founding ceremonies included the Minister of the Economy and Finance, the vice-president of SGS-Geneva, Mr. Muller, the director of SGS-Mali, Mr. Raymond, the national directors of Customs and Economic Affairs, and the SGS representatives from Togo, Senegal, and Ivory Coast.

August 15: Swearing in of the new governing boards of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry. Mr. Drahamane Hamidou Touré, aka Darhat, elected following the August 12 vote with more than 94% of the votes, was officially installed. A 12-member board, including a vice-president and one delegate per region, began its tenure.

August 21: Following increasingly murderous attacks on several communities in the north by "armed bandits," the Minister of Defense broke the silence and called a press conference in Bamako on the northern disturbances. He emphasized that these attacks had been perpetrated by groups of our fellow citizens who had served in the armed forces of Libya, Chad, and other countries, and who, upon their return, had engaged in acts of looting in the Sixth and

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Seventh regions. He added that the army would take all necessary steps to guarantee the peace and tranquility of the people.

August 23: Opening of an extraordinary session of the National Council of the UDPM, the supreme authority of the party. Major decisions were expected regarding the establishment of a multi-party system, but this issue was postponed to the March 1990 Party Congress.

September 10: Meeting of JANET (?) (Algeria) bringing together the heads of state of Mali, Algeria, Niger, Libya, and other countries to discuss border-security problems. On his return, President Moussa Traoré made a stop-over in Gao. During the conference of managerial personnel he led on that occasion, he affirmed that there was no Tuareg problem, and that the attacks on the communities had been launched by misguided fellow Malians.

September 18: The French secretary of state charged with humanitarian activities, Mr. Bernard Kouchner, paid a visit to Mali, during which he met with various Tuareg groups in the Sixth and Seventh Regions.

September 29-30: President Moussa Traoré was co-president of the World Children's Summit in New York, which brought together 77 heads of state and government.

October 1: President Moussa Traoré made a trip to the United States (San Francisco and Washington), basically for economic purposes. In San Francisco, he led a conference on investment opportunities in Mali attended by representatives of the business world. In Washington, he also met with the Secretary of State for Trade and representatives of development institutions and Mali's partners, including the IMF, the World Bank, USAID, etc. The purpose of the visit was to inform and educate American businessmen about investment opportunities in Mali. The president was accompanied by the presidents of the Chambers of Commerce and Agriculture.

October 15: France canceled 65 billion of its outstanding credit extended to Mali. This cancellation meant a reduction of about 2.5 billion of the debt burden, and allowed national enterprises, including the Railway Company (RCFM), SOTELMA, EDM, the Niger Bureau, and National Bank for Agricultural Development (BNDA) to continue to honor their commitments.

October 5: Beginning of a national seminar on implementation of the VAT and TPS. 150 tax agents, accountants, auditors, and tax advisers took part in this seminar. This event was in anticipation of the implementation of the VAT scheduled for January 1991. The seminar was organized by the National Tax Authority and the Administration and Management Improvement Entity (CEPAG).

November 2: Visit by an IMF-World Bank mission, which expressed its satisfaction at the good economic results obtained by Mali under its economic reform program. The mission underscored the need for energetic support for the private sector, so that it could become the driving force for recovery in accordance with PAS principles.

November 4: Following the violent march led by retail merchants, which produced the destruction of a number of public buildings in the downtown area as the result of a decision of the governorship of the Bamako District to clear way retail merchants from the sidewalks, the president of the Chamber of Commerce, the Malian Businessmen's Group, and the Governor of Bamako [...], it was decided to postpone these measures until January 31.

November 27: Opening of the CEDEAO Summit in Bamako on the Liberian crisis, attended by eight heads of state and representatives of the groups involved in the conflict, including Charles Taylor, Colonel R. Diggs representing the Liberian armed forces, and Mr. Nohh A. Bordilo representing the provisional government of Liberia. The parties signed a cease-fire agreement and agreed to a peace plan calling for free and democratic elections.

December 25: The President of the Republic opened the budget session at the Hall of the People. The main issues for this session were tax reform (expansion of the tax base through establishment of the VAT), payroll streamlining, incorporation of special funds into the budget, and improved programming of public investments.

December 29: ADEMA and CNLD organized a peaceful march to demand the establishment of a multiparty system and democracy. However, en route the procession formed by the two associations met UDPM militants from Commune II, who had spontaneously organized a counter-march. The latter were dispersed by stones thrown by the former.

December 30: UDPM militants from the six communes composing the Bamako District organized a march to show their unconditional support for the Party. The President of the Republic (and General Secretary of the Party) welcomed the group at the Hall of the People. During the meeting which then took place, the president denounced what he termed imitative behavior and outside pressures.

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1991 Chronology

January 6: Ministerial reorganization, which saw the appointment of Sekou Ly (formerly Minister of Education) to the Ministry of the Interior, and Mr. Sambou Soumaré to Justice. Both were considered government hard-liners. Hardly had he been appointed when the Minister of the Interior sent a letter to the democratic associations, i.e., CNID, ADEMA, AEEM, and JLD, asking that they end their political activities. The private newspapers also received letters advising that they comply with press laws, in particular legal filing two days prior to publication. The newspapers in question met several days thereafter and decided not to comply with these measures.

January 8-9: The National Union of Malian Workers began a general 48-hour strike in support of the claims submitted to the government in August for a 50% increase in salaries, elimination of organic higher-level staff in state service, payment of salaries at their updated rate for 1987, 1988, and 1989, payment of advancement arrears, and consultation with the trade union leadership before any decision to sell off or privatize state companies or enterprises.

January 16: Crisis at the National Union of Cooperatives and Highways Carriers of Mali (UNCTRM). Taxis and "Douroudourouni" (covered Peugeot 404s) invaded the courtyard of the Bamako District's Governor's Office. They were protesting the decision affecting them which, with the support of the UNCTRM, called for the payment of rebates to the UNCTRM, along with a 9,000 franc fine for refusal to pay these obligatory sums. It should be noted that these rebates were collected from transport orders for departures from Bamako. The refusal to pay by the carriers resulted from the fact that the latter were protesting the management of the cooperative, which, it was rumored, had recorded a deficit of nearly 100 million CFA francs.

January 18-19: ADEMA and CNID decided to organize a peaceful march to demand the establishment of a multiparty system. Authorization for the march was refused by the Governor of the Bamako District, on the grounds that it would constitute a public nuisance. Despite this decision, a number of militants from the two associations marched together in the downtown area. The march was dispersed by police and followed by a number of arrests, including two students from the National School of Administration and Mrs. Bâ Konaré, currently the wife of the President of the Republic, who was released several hours later.

January 21: To protest the arrests of two of their comrades during the January 19 march, students led violent demonstrations leading to the pillaging of public buildings in the Bamako District.

January 22: Judges launched a general strike to protest the handling of the "Ismail Kallé affair." The latter, a relative of the Great Imam of the Bamako Mosque and a confidant of Moussa Traoré, had been accused of swindling in connection with a land deal in Kati. He was arrested but released immediately, and the judge charged with the case replaced and punished.

January 23: The students returned to the attack by staging a strike that was more violent than the one on January 22. They broke and damaged vehicles, public buildings, and state-owned enterprises, including the Tobacco and Matches Company (SONATAM) and the People's Pharmacy, of which a number of dispensaries were looted in Bamako and a number of cities in the interior. Following this strike, the government decided to close all educational institutions throughout the country. We should note that this strike produce two deaths, one in Sikasso and one in Bamako, and more than 35 wounded. The People's Pharmacy suffered losses of more than 500 million francs. For the first time, armored vehicles (BRDM) were used to maintain order. After these events, a mediation commission was formed under the auspices of the Chamber of Commerce; it was composed of religious figures, businessmen, and the Malian Human Rights Association (AMDH). A 16-member commission presided over by Mr. Sidy Konaté of the Malian Association for the Unity and Progress of Islam (AMUPI) was formed.

February 2: End of the budget session in the National Assembly. The budget bill calling for revenues of 224.9 million francs and expenditures of 230.7 million francs, or a forecasted deficit of 5.8 billion francs, was approved. The increased figures resulted from the incorporation of special accounts into the overall budget; previously, they had been covered by special accounting procedures. Accordingly, the figures increased from 100 (previous budget) to more than 200 billion francs. During this session, the legislators offered recommendations, in particular as regards the elimination of the minimum tax (per capita tax) and the creation of other resources to cover its counter-value. They encouraged the government to organize information campaigns and efforts to educate the population about the VAT and TPS.

February 8: The National Federation of Malian Employers organized a general meeting at the Caisse Autonome d'Amortissement, in order to study measures intended to prevent any possible destruction in the event of political disorders.

February 15: The government decided to reopen classes throughout the country.

February 19: After signing the Tamanrasset agreements on January 6, the President travelled to the northern regions to inform the population about the content of these accords. Economic and social problems, as well as those relating to decentralization and the accountability of the people with respect to the management

of the decentralized communities, gave rise to extensive deliberations.

March 1: A four billion franc financing agreement was signed between the government and the Caisse Centrale de Coopération Economique under the heading of reorganization of postal checks and the savings bank, restructuring measures that had the support of the IMF and the World Bank. A new structure, the Postal Check and Savings Bank Company (SCPCE) was established to operate as a bank, since it was empowered to issue checks. Was this the first step of its kind in the subregion?

March 22-26: Following the break-off of negotiations between the Mali Student Association (AEEM) and the government concerning demands for a 50% increase in scholarships, the opening of boarding schools, and dining halls in educational institutions, AEEM launched a general strike using barricades and causing destruction throughout the country. Police opened fire, resulting in 27 deaths and an incalculable number of wounded in Bamako during the day of March 22. It was Black Friday. On the evening of March 22, President Moussa Traoré addressed the nation to express his condolences to the victims' families, but remain adamant with regard to the demands. The next day, March 23, the democratic associations (ADEMA, CNID, JLD) coordinated their efforts to support AEEM. Confrontations continued and officials stopped counting the dead. In the light of killings of children, a group of women joined AEEM and decided to march on the president's office, but the group was dispersed. AEEM formed a crisis committee at Gabriel Touré Hospital to evacuate the dead and wounded. On Sunday, March 24, the National Union of Malian Workers (UNTM), the trade-union leadership, called a general meeting at the Trade Union Center, following which it decreed an open-ended general strike, which was to continue until the resignation of Moussa Traoré and his government, the dissolution of the National Assembly, and the formation of a government of national welfare. The president rejected these demands, but agreed to all of the AEEM demands. However, the latter henceforth refused to negotiate with "murderers." Chaos reigned. Finally, in the night of March 25 to 26, a group of officers led by Amadou Toumani Touré and Oumar Diallo, the former aide-de-camp of the president, seized power and proposed the creation of an integral multiparty system, free and democratic elections, and the army's withdrawal from the political arena.

April 2: Creation of the CTSP (Transition Committee for the Popular Welfare). This entity replaced the CRN (National Reconciliation Committee) composed of the officers who had carried out the putsch. The CTSP was made up of 25 members representing all of the democratic associations that had taken part in the fall of the dictatorship.

April 4: Appointment of Soumana Sacko to the post of prime

minister and head of government. He had formerly been a fiery Minister of Finance who had resigned in 1987 following a gold-trafficking scheme that he had broken up at the Bamako Airport.

April 7: Formation of a 23-member government (composed mainly of technocrats) charged with instituting confidence, state authority, and the resumption of economic activity, which had been significantly damaged by the looting and destruction of a major part of the productive fabric as a result of events.

April 23: In the presence of the accredited diplomats in Bamako, the Minister of International Cooperation gave a first account of the events of March 26. Damage of more than 22 billion CFA francs was ascertained.

April 27: Peaceful march by the police, the Gendarmerie, and the Republican Guard, in order to make a public account of their living conditions. Students at Askia High School attempted to disperse the demonstrators by throwing stones. In reaction, demonstrators in uniform stormed into the Askia High School, burning motorbikes and vehicles belonging to the students. AEEM reacted by pillaging all of the police stations in Bamako.

May 18: A law modified the operation of the EPICs (public industrial and commercial establishments). The law was designed to lower the operating costs of the EPICs by reducing the number of meetings of the boards of directors, eliminating the position of government commissioner, reducing salaries for CEOs, etc. Henceforth, CEOs were to be recruited by notice of calls for competing bids, according to the new law.

May 26: Congress of the CNID Party (the association remained intact). Mr. Mountaga Tall, Esq., was elected party chairman.

May 25-26: Congress of the ADEMA Party. Mr. Alpha Omar Konaré was elected party chairman.

June 9: From their high positions, the Ministers of Finance and Budget explained the situation regarding the union demands. Responding to the specific demand for a 50% salary increase (which had been within his competence since the Moussa Traoré regime), the Budget Minister stated that "in order to hand out the pie, there must be a pie to begin with." This statement gave gray hairs to the ranks of the UNTM, which responded by a speech broadcast over radio and television, wondering "where were these two men during the wild days of March 1991." This was the first engagement between the UNTM and the government since the political change.

June 16: Peaceful march by ADIDE. The demonstrators invaded government headquarters and presented a list of complaints to the prime minister, which included an unemployment allowance equal to 80% of the base salary depending on category, a government

statement regarding all of the complaints, and the approval of a program of short- and medium-term employment. Among the slogans it was possible to read "our share of the pie."

June 24: Arrest of Oumar Diallo, aka Birus (former aide-de-camp of Moussa Traoré and one of the instigators of the March 1991 coup d'etat). He was placed at the disposal of the commission of inquiry charged with shedding light on the crimes and misappropriation of funds committed by the Traoré regime. This arrest was greeted favorably by the entire democratic movement.

July 2: Extraordinary meeting of the Central Committee of the UNTM. The union leadership demanded an immediate 50% salary increase for civil servants.

July 9: Visit of the chairman of the CTSP (Amadou T. Touré) to the Chamber of Commerce and Industry. This visit took place following the grumblings of businessmen concerning the arrests of some of their number, as a result of a hydrocrabon-trafficking affair. At the time of this visit, the issue was holding general meetings of the business and industry entities. The chairman of the CTSP encouraged the businessmen to invest in the housing, transport, industrial, and trade sectors.

July 15: Failed coup d'etat. According to a statement by the CTSP chairman, the Minister of Internal Security, Mr. Diabira, and other officers allegedly attempted a coup d'etat. Believing that an ATT arrest had taken place, some soldiers arrested and dismissed a number of senior officers. This mutiny ceased only after a visit of the CTSP chairman to the military garrisons in Bamako. During the evening of July 15, the prime minister and head of state, Mr. Soumana Sacko, in a televised address announced social relief measures, i.e., regular payment of salaries at their updated 1988-89-90 index, a 5% increase in lower salaries, etc.

July 16: The coordinating group of democratic associations organized a solidarity march at the CTSP following the failed coup.

July 26: Start of the national conference. Several hundred delegates representing various societal viewpoints examined the proposed constitution, the party charter, etc. The Prime Minister spoke about the state of the nation. The proposed constitution called for a power-sharing arrangement mid-way between a parliamentary and a presidential system. A number of political institutions were created: the Office of the President, the Government, the National Assembly, the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Court, the High Court of Justice, the Council of Territorial Communities, the High Council of Malians Abroad, and the Economic and Social Council.

September 5: The Association of Workers Dismissed from State-Owned Companies and Enterprises organized a peaceful march on

government headquarters and the CTSP, to demand that the banks finance their projects for reintegration into professional life. However, the group encountered the opposition of the police forces.

September 14: Opening of a national debate on education. More than 700 participants took part: parents of students, political parties, democratic associations, teachers, students, etc. Recommendations were based on the need to reverse the school pyramid by giving increased importance to basic education.

October 24: Opening at the trade union center of a seminar on trade union democracy, organized by the International Confederation of Free Unions (CISL). This seminar was designed to inculcate the principles of democratization into the Malian trade union movement following the political changes of March 1991.

November 1: The chairman of the CTSP opened the meeting of commerce, industry, and small-scale business entities in Bamako. The purpose of these meetings was to eliminate the legal and institutional obstacles thwarting the effective progress of economic life, burdened by administrative inertia, insufficient financing, an unsuitable tax system, and the lack of basic infrastructure. Following the seminar, a so-called joint commission (government and businessmen) was formed to follow up on the resolutions of the meeting. The recommendations were based mainly on the need to alleviate tax pressure.

November 25: Opening in Segou of a so-called preparatory conference on the northern disturbances (rebellion). This meeting of the rebel side and the government was intended to inaugurate a negotiation strategy leading to a national conference on the north.

November 25: Opening of a seminar on the land problem and decentralization. Organized by the CILSS and the Sahel Club, this seminar studied the problem of the participation and accountability of the rural population in the decentralization process, access to natural and renewable resources, the management of village lands, etc. As regards this last point, recommendations included a contractual approach, a rereading of the various codes, the adaptation of the laws to the political-social context, the drafting of simple charters appropriate for each locality, and the creation of data-banks to facilitate the implementation and follow-up of the measures taken.

December 9: Opening in Bamako of the Meeting of Rural Entities. More than 400 farmer-delegates met in Bamako to redefine rural development objectives in a concrete manner in the context of a strengthened macroeconomic policy, by separating short-, medium-, and long-term objectives. The problem posed by the withdrawal of development firms, decentralization, and the management of natural resources were exhaustively debated.

December 10: Joint ADEM-ADVR march (association composed of victims of the March 1991 repression) to demand justice for the victims of March 1991. The march was a prelude to the "blood crimes" trial (former officials).

December 14: In Bamako, the coordinating group of democratic associations and organizations staged a large, peaceful march for peace in the north. This event was in response to the many rebel attacks in the northern regions of Mali.

December 16: Opening in Mopti of a meeting to consider the problems in the north (following the Ségou meeting). This meeting, which the political authorities and rebel leaders attended in the presence of the ambassadors of Algeria, Burkina Faso, and Mauritania, was intended to approve a number of documents bearing on proposals for settlement of the Northern question. The rebels were to make a decision about these proposals. The parties agreed on the principle of a negotiated settlement, a halt to violence (thefts, looting, etc.), and the establishment of a commission of inquiry to investigate acts of vandalism.

December 19: Inauguration in Bamako of the national days of communication. This seminar was organized by the PANOS Institute and the Research Center for International Development (CRDI) (Canada) to increase deliberations on media and information systems and to outline draft texts on legislation, ethics, and the professional organization of the information and communication professions.

1992 Chronology

January 2: The Union of Private Carriers, bringing together taxis and the "Douroudourouni" (covered Peugeot 404s), began a strike with a peaceful march to CTSP headquarters to protest police harassment (inappropriate inspections). The demonstrators were met by the vice-chairman of the CTSP and General Secretary of the UNTM, Mr. Bakary Karambé. Following the talks, the parties agreed on the principle of monthly meetings between the carriers and authorities, in order to solve problems as they arise.

January 4: Closing of the AEEM Congress, presided over by the chairman of the CTSP, Lieutenant-Colonel Amadou Toumani Touré. A new board was formed, headed by Issa Mariko (student at the ENA who succeeded Oumar Mariko). His task was to achieve as rapidly as possible the demands specified in the memorandum signed in conjunction with the government. The chairman encouraged the students to find the proper equation between their demands and the government's financial resources.

January 11: Send-off for the work of AGETIPE (Agency for Execution of Public Interest Activities for Employment) under the chairmanship of Prime Minister Soumana Sacko. This was a subregional project intended to combat the social effects of structural adjustment. The purpose was to fight unemployment and under-employment by means of major employment-generating urban development projects. The first three-year program for the city of Bamako called for a financial package of 6.5 billion francs, of which 4.5 billion was funded by the World Bank. Nearly 2,000 jobs were expected.

January 12: Constitutional referendum. More than 2.3 voters were asked to give their judgment on the new constitution, which enshrined integral multipartyism. Official results: 43% voting rate and 98.35% of the votes were in favor. No incidents occurred.

January 12: Submission of the 1992 budget. This budget had to include rebuilding expenses following the destruction perpetrated in March 1991. To make up for the lowered revenues resulting from this destruction, it was decided to initiate a fee on private television sets and a tax on parabolic antennas. The overall budget showed revenues in the amount of 214 billion francs and expenditures of 215.4 billion for 1991. The decrease resulted mainly from a reduction of the special investment budget.

January 19: Municipal elections. ADEMA won in various districts with 214 council members, followed by the US-RDA with 130, and the CNID, with 96 city council members.

January 23: AEEM staged a peaceful march to government headquarters to demand that its memorandum be implemented, that the blood crimes trial of former officials be held before the end of

the transition period, the granting of scholarships on the basis of an average of 11.50 (instead of 12, as contemplated by the government), the construction of its headquarters, the extension of the academic cycles in certain institutions, including the Center for Professional Training, the National School of Posts and Telecommunications, EHEP, etc.

January 22-24: Meeting in Algiers between the northern rebel movements and the government, during which a truce was signed, to take effect on February 8. The principle of a negotiated settlement to the conflict was agreed to. However, the Popular Front for the Liberation of the AZAWAD did not take part in the meeting, because, it was said, the new constitution did not give voice to the Tuareg demands, in particular the autonomy of the northern areas.

January 30: Altercation between customs officers and traffickers in Yanfolila (Bougouni), as a result of which a trafficker was killed by customs officer Diego Keïta. Some of the people rose up against the killer and organized a violent march to the customs office. Keïta was burned alive. A commission of inquiry named by the authorities led to the arrest of twenty demonstrators. The chairman of the CTSP went to the site to denounce this popular practice.

February 11: End of an IMF-World Bank mission, which had come to assess the economic reform program and to draft a new economic policy framework paper for 1992-1994 and a memorandum in order to establish the activity-implementation schedule. During this mission, the 1992 budget was much discussed, in particular the academic scholarships, which required expenditures of 4.8 billion francs, or nearly 80% of the health-care budget. The mission judged this figure to be abnormal. Other subjects discussed: the slowness with which the program for privatization of state-owned enterprises was being implemented, revision of the business code (to definitively deregulate domestic and foreign trade), and potential liberalization of the price of hydrocarbons.

February 20: Joint ADIDE, AJDP, and JLD march on the seat of government to denounce the anti-social measures decreed by the government, in particular the competition for entry into state service (limited to 35 years), the low level of the recruitment quota (250/year), etc. The prime minister refused to receive the demonstrators. Arrests took place, most notably that of the General Secretary of ADIDE, who was released several hours later.

February 23: Legislative elections: 55 electoral districts, 22 competing parties. ADEMA gained an absolute majority with 82 deputies, followed by CNID with nine deputies and USRDA with 8. The Supreme Court rejected 36 appeals for invalidation.

February 28: Verdict in the Diogo Keita case (Yanfolila) by the Bamako Court of Assizes: 14 death sentences, four sentenced to

forced labor in perpetuity, 10 persons sentenced to five years forced labor, and one person sentenced to three years in prison.

March 9: In Bamako, the Prime Minister opened the meeting of transport groups. Several hundred delegates from various communities studied the problems of the transport sector and delineated the short- and medium-term strategic orientations. The statutory or administrative problems (associated with competition, international in particular) and those relating to rate and safety were intensively debated. We should note that the transport industry adds more than 38% to the price of hydrocarbons and from 30 to 38% to the price of construction materials.

March 14: The Prime Minister closed a seminar on government neutrality, which was called into question by a number of political parties during the recent elections. The seminar recommended the recognition of, and respect for, the independence and specific character of the government with respect to the political parties, and the need to protect the government and its representatives from the intercessions and pressures of the political parties.

March 26: Celebration honoring the anniversary of the Revolution of March 1991. The chairman of the CTSP pardoned those sentenced to death in the Yanfolila affair. The 14 persons sentenced had their punishment commuted to forced labor in perpetuity.

April 11: In Bamako, signing of a national pact between the northern rebels and the government, with the mediation of Algeria. Employing the decentralization mechanism, this agreement, which sealed a final peace, called for more regional autonomy, the dismantling of rebel and military bases, the integration of the combatants into the national army, the return of more than 140,000 refugees, and economic investment programs. All of the measures were to cost nearly 75 billion CFA francs.

April 12: First round of the presidential elections. The ADEMA candidate, Alpha Omar Konaré, led with 44.9% of the votes. Tiéoulé Konaté received 14.51%; Mountaga Tall (CNID), 11.4%; Almamy Sylla, 9%; Baba H. Haïdara, 7.33%; Idrissa Traoré, 4.10%; Niangado, 4.01%; Maribatrou Diaby, 2.67%, and Demba Diallo, 2.04%.

April 22: Signing of the protocol stipulating membership of Mali in Air Afrique. Air Mali had been sold off in 1986.

April 26: Second round of the presidential elections. Alpha O. Konaré was elected with 69.01% of the vote, as against 30.99% for Tiéoulé Konaté.

May 6: Judges' strike to protest the new Ministry of Justice provisions giving the head of state the ability to sanction judges. After several days of negotiation, a compromise was achieved

calling for a rereading of these provisions within the shortest possible time-frame.

May 4: National seminar on economic journalism. Organized by the World Bank, this seminar was intended to sensitize journalists to economic issues (PAS), in order to deal with the increasingly pronounced communications gap between the Bank and the Fund, on the one hand, and the African peoples, on the other. Both institutions were still being presented by the media as managing partners.

May 6: Signing of a social pact between the National Workers Union of Mali (UNTM: member of CTSP) and the government. This pact was signed following a three-day advance strike notice (May 6 to 8) filed by the union leadership in support of its demands. This pact stipulated a multi-year program to increase salaries by 50% and the payment of salaries at their 1990 rate beginning as of September 1, 1992.

May 13: The Minister of Communication opened a national seminar on the rural press. The purpose of this gathering was to combat the communications gap between state institutions and the countryside (i.e., over 80% of the population) through the sensitization and advanced training of journalists in the techniques of writing, photographic reporting, and interviews in rural areas.

May 14: Governmental crisis leading to the departure of the Minister of Social Action and the Promotion of Women, Dr. J. Brien de Lisle. For weeks, a dispute pitted the latter against the Prime Minister; thereafter, Dr. de Lisle filed a complaint with the Supreme Court. It was reported that Dr. de Lisle had agreed to become minister on the condition that, at the end of the transition period, he would occupy his former post as national health director. He was upset to learn that the Prime Minister had appointed Mrs. Bocum Suzane to this position during the transition period. In his capacity as arbiter, the chairman of the CTSP intervened and dismissed both the Minister and the National Director.

May 19: The Minister of the Economy and Finance published the 1991 economic accounts. The GDP had risen to 702 billion francs, as compared with 666.2 billion, or an increase of 5.5%. Private consumption had increased from 534 to 587.5 billion francs, or an increase of about 10%, and public consumption had fallen from 100.1 billion to 96 billion, or a 4.2% decrease. Gross capital asset formation (investments) had decreased by 20% from 139.4 to 110.9 billion. Exports had increased slightly from 114.8 to 120 billion, and imports, from 218.3 to 215.9 billion. A deterioration of the economic accounts was thus recorded. The political happenings during 1991 contributed to these figures.

May 30: Opening of the general meetings on for youth and

employment. More than 300 participants from various associations and youth groups studied the problems of the employment of young persons. During this forum, much attention was devoted to the training-employment equation, the revival of productive investments through the creation of a climate favorable to investment, and incentive measures for the hiring of young persons, such as tax exemption for firms employing young people, etc.

June 4: Start of the trial of former officials. The former president, Moussa Traoré, his government, and the members of his political council (UDPM) had to answer accusation of blood crimes, blows and purposeful injury leading to the deaths of more than 106 persons. However, the trial was very quickly postponed following an incident that occurred when former president Traoré and his Minister of the Interior, Sékou Ly, embraced each other, thus causing an outcry among the audience composed of students and victims. This upheaval nearly degenerated into confrontations. The trial was postponed to a later date.

June 8: The Supreme Court swore in the first president of the Third Republic, Alpha O. Konaré, who listed his property in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.

June 9: Appointment of a new prime minister, Younouso Touré, director of the Central Bank, who formed a government of 19 persons (as compared with 23 during the transition) representing diverse political leanings, and in particular the parties who had signed the PSPR Republican Pact (the coalition which had supported candidate Konaré), i.e., the US-RDA, the RDP, the UFDP, etc.

June 23: Break-off of relations between Mali and the IMF following acknowledged lags in the implementation of the economic reform programs, including a financial gap of about 18 billion francs resulting from 6 billion less in tax receipts, non-payment of debt amounting to a little more than 5.5 billion, and budget overexpenditures of more than 6 billion.

July 1: Liberalization of hydrocarbon prices. This measure signified the complete liberalization of all prices in Mali.

July 5: A financial scandal exploded in the Treasury following the visit of the IMF-World Bank visit in June. This scandal involved abuses of in the system of tax credits "extended to some traders in order to allow them to retrieve their goods from customs." The abuse stemmed from the fact that not only were the quotas stipulated for that purpose in the budget exceeded, but also a number of traders enjoying these advantages disappeared, some of whom had given false identities. The sums involved amounted to more than 6 billion francs.

July 30: The Prime Minister made a statement of general policy before the legislators at the National Assembly. The outlines of

this statement dealt with freedom of the press, the reestablishment of government authority, the prompt, effective resolution of the northern problem, administrative decentralization, the reorganization of the army, the independence of the legal system, and the indemnification of the victims of the 1991 repression.

August 27: Conflict between the National Assembly and the National Workers' Union regarding the new labor code. The union leadership maintained it had not been consulted prior to the vote on the law, adding that it had offered amendments to the Supreme Labor Council (composed of government and union representatives) advocating that the check-off system (withholding of union dues) be retained. The Assembly responded by stating that it had been consulted during the bill-drafting phase, and that the check-off system was not appropriate in a system of union pluralism.

September 8: The Ministry of the Economy published the New Code of Commerce. The emergence of the single-person limited-liability company having minimum capital of 1 million CFA francs should be pointed out. The limited-liability company was reduced from three to two partners, and its minimum capital declined from 3.5 to 1.5 million francs. The joint-stock company was reduced from seven to five partners, and minimum capital, from 12.5 to 5 million francs. The approval time-frame was set at 15 days.

September 23: Meeting of the head of state and the NGOs. The president reaffirmed his support for decentralized cooperation, then underscored the role played by the NGOs in the economic development of Mali: investments totalling 27.5 billion francs and 5,000 jobs created by 346 NGOs. He added, however, that it was incumbent upon these organizations to obey the law regarding, in particular, the submission of their annual activities reports, a document which a number of NGOs do not submit to authorities.

September 26: Violent march organized by the victims of the ABC tontine. The latter, which had offered to pay 45,000 CFA francs to its members in return for a beginning deposit of 3,000 francs, had been able to attract thousands of savers. Once this system turned sour, the depositors joined together in associations (e.g., associations of the victims of the ABC tontine) to demand compensation. The September 26 march was intended to force political authorities to break the silence they had previously maintained regarding this affair.

November 13: The National Assembly approved the press law. The journalists' associations, including UNAJOM and ASSIPRP (Interprofessional Association for the Private Press) denounced this law, focusing on the punishments provided for certain infractions (e.g., flagrantly insulting the President of the Republic and his family, the punishment for which increased from three to five years in prison), and the procedure used to appoint members of the High Council on Communications. The journalists

advocated the independence of this institution from the government; but the legally-stipulated procedure for nomination to this board gave the majority of appointments to the political institutions.

November 26: Reopening of the "crimes of blood" trial of former officials, following its postponement from June 5.

December 28: General businessmen's strike to protest the refusal to deal with the demands of the meetings of business, industry, and small-scale commerce groups. A compromise was reached at the end of the day, entailing the implementation of certain short-term measures regarding tax relief and outstanding bank debt.

1993 Chronology

February 12: End of the crimes of blood trial. Moussa Traoré, Sékou Ly, and Mamadou Coulibaly (former Minister of the Interior and Defense) were sentenced to death. The members of the BEC and the government were acquitted. The defense counsels decided to appeal to the Court of Appeals.

February 16: Strike, followed by a march staged by students from the Katibougou IPR, in order to protest the decision of school administrators to reduce scholarships by 2,500 francs to permit operation of the institute's health services. Major damage occurred, including the burning of the Koulikoro governor's office and the governor's residence and the ransacking of the institute's administrative offices and some central departments. Following this march, institute administrators raised disciplinary sanctions (expulsions and suspensions) against some of the striking students.

February 24: To protest these sanctions, AEEM launched a general strike and a march with barricades. All activity in Bamako was brought to a halt. Police intervened, and one death and a number of injuries resulted.

March 26: Second anniversary of the fall of the dictatorship. RFI and Africa 1 inaugurated frequency-modulated antennae in Bamako.

April 5: Black Monday. Strike and violent march by AEEM. The National Assembly was set on fire, as were the Jamana Cultural Center and the residences of a number of senior ADEMA officials and other signatories to the Republican Pact.

April 9: Prime Minister Younoussi Touré resigned following these events.

April 12: Abdoulaye Sekou Sow, Minister of the Defense, was named prime minister.

April 16: Formation of a new 22-member government (as compared with 19 members of the previous administration). The RDP and CNID (considered to be the hard-line wing of the opposition) became part of the government.

April 26: In Bamako, the President of the Republic opened an international conference on the social aspects of adjustment. Organized by UNTM, the International Confederation of Free Unions, and the World Bank, this seminar sensitized the social partners to structural adjustment and deliberated on its adverse social repercussions, as part of the search for a national consensus on economic policy.

May 13-16: Visit of the President of the Republic to the Koulikoro region. During this visit, President Alpha Omar Konaré lashed out at the non-payment of taxes by the people, who, he said, had acted somewhat too quickly by confusing elimination of the minimum tax with the elimination of any form of tax.

June 7: The National Education Federation (FEN) decided on a one-week strike to protest the lack of safety in schools and threats and attacks on teachers in some establishments. It also demanded the institution of a hierarchical system for the different teachers' groups. A compromise to the crisis was reached after the government agreed to institute a hierarchical system by the year 1994.

June 14: Meeting of the UNTM Board. The union leadership demanded that the government make late worker-promotion payments, frozen since 1987. It also sought concrete on-the-job worker-safety measures. With respect to the increased salaries, the union stated "that it didn't care where the government looked for the money."

June 21: The Prime Minister opened deliberating sessions on modernization of the government financial departments. Computerization was much discussed during these deliberations.

July 8-11: ADEMA National Conference. The militants insisted that the party take new positions regarding the exercise of authority and more precise specification of the relationships between the party, the President of the Republic, and the government. It should be noted that this situation was the end result of altercations between the party's Steering Committee and the various Prime Ministers. The Steering Committee had continuously demanded periodic meetings with the different Prime Ministers, who refused to do so, stating that, in accordance with the terms of the Constitution, they were accountable only to the President of the Republic.

End of June - Beginning of July: Visit by an IMF-World Bank mission, as part of a schedule of periodic evaluations of the structural adjustment program. The mission noted a gap of 30 billion francs, including a 16-billion reduction in revenues for 1993 and overexpenditures of 14 billion francs. Because of these gaps, the IMF decided to suspend its aid to Mali. The government's laxity with respect to tax collection was emphasized, as was its lack of rigor in managing public expenditures.

August 2: The ministers of the different UMOA (West African Monetary Union) countries decided that, beginning in August, the BCEAO would no longer repurchase CFA banknotes held by the rest of the world, i.e., outside of the Franc Zone. According to sources, the purpose was to stop increasingly persistent outflows of notes because of devaluation rumors.

August 17: Strike with 24-hour advance warning decreed by UNTM to demand salary increases and to support other demands contained in the social agreement signed by the government and union leadership. SYNCAB, which asserted its independence through UNTM and which included the banks, insurance companies, and trade, withdrew its support of the strike. Nevertheless, BMCD did take part.

August 20: Extraordinary meeting of the Council of Ministers concerning the deficiencies which had emerged in the management of PAS. These deficiencies had, at the end of July, produced a break in relations between Mali and the IMF. A recovery plan containing 37 measures was drawn up and proposed to the various social partners. This plan stipulated a drastic reduction in the government's lifestyle: reduction or simple elimination of certain allowances, mission and housing expenses, and carry-over of some expenditures already committed under the 1994 budget, including the institution of a hierarchical system for teachers (1.5 billion), certain tax breaks granted to firms, the institution of scholarship criteria, and even the elimination of vacation scholarships for students, etc. The plan submitted for the approval of Mali's social partners caused some concern, in particular in the UNTM which, while it agreed to exchange late worker-promotion payments for housing plots, stated that it was not persuaded that reduced compensation (source of motivation) could contribute to economic recovery. The same skepticism was shown by AEEM, which rejected all of the measures pertaining to scholarship criteria.

August 28: Burning of the Great Market of Bamako. An electrical short-circuit was reportedly the cause of this disaster. Damage was estimated at several billions of CFA francs. This was a severe blow to businessmen, who were already suffering from the disastrous consequences of the destruction of March 1991.

September 14-18: Subregional conference on radio pluralism in West Africa. More than 70 press representatives and donors spoke of the legislative and financial obstacles to the development of radio in West Africa. Following the seminar, the so-called Bamako Declaration, which stressed the need to liberalize the air waves, was promulgated.

September 15: Televised speech by the Prime Minister, who presented the plan for recovery from the economic crisis. The plan included 37 recovery measures decided upon at the end of the extraordinary Council of Ministers meeting of August 20.

September 30: Three senior officers belonging to the Paratrooper Company were declared to have disappeared during a parachuting operation over the Niger River in Bamako. After a four-day search, the drowned officers were found. This incident caused consternation among the public, especially since the three officers were from the commando unit that had arrested Moussa Traoré at his

palace in Kouloba during the night of March 25 to 26, 1991.

October 6: Under pressure from the AMUPI (Malian Association for the Unity and Progress of Islam), the government refused the projected visit to Mali of the German preacher-pastor Mr. Bonke. The government was criticized by a portion of public opinion, which saw in its refusal an infringement on the secularism of the country and threats of strict religious conservatism.

October 8: Six former officials of the Moussa Traoré regime charged with economic crimes (misappropriation of public monies) were provisionally released by the Bamako Supreme Court. They were: Amara Danfaga, M'Bouillé Siby, Monzon Keïta, Sidiki Diarra (former president of the Assembly), Amadou B. Diarra, and Bayes AG Mohamed.

October 10: In Bamako, opening of a national seminar on development-communications policy. Organized by the Minister of Communications, FAO, and UNDP, this seminar made major recommendations at the end of its deliberations: among others, assigning a priority to the development-communications policy within the government's program of activities; the establishment of a training center for the written media, and the incorporation of traditional communications media into communications strategies, to be given their full importance by professionals.

October 15: Beginning of a meeting of the Inter-Sectoral Technical Committee on Rural Radio. This meeting was intended to describe the current circumstances governing rural access to information within the framework of the farmer self-development policy. It established a plan of action, which was intended to lead to a limited committee for the establishment of a unit for monitoring and evaluating radio broadcasts.

October 27: AEEM (Association of Malian Students) celebrated its third anniversary. During a press conference called to mark the occasion, the General Secretary of the association, Mr. Zarawana, asserted the need to draft the memorandum listing academic demands. He rejected in their entirety the scholarship selection criteria proposed by the government.

November 7: Ministerial reorganization. The major event was the departure of the Minister of the Economy and Finance, Mr. Oumar Maïga. The major deficiencies found in the management of PAS, which caused the IMF agreements to be broken, played a role in this shuffling.

November 9: ADIDE (Association of Job-Creating Graduates) denounced the temporary/free-lance worker system. In fact, asserted the association, this system allows the government to over-employ and underpay young graduates, without giving them a status in conformity with the Labor Code. The association demanded revision of the Labor Code.

November 14: The President of the Republic opened Febac 1993, the first international trade show. Thirty African, European, American, and Asian nations took part. According to the president of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the purpose was to reinvigorate national production by showing off the value of these products abroad.

November 15: Lifting of the parliamentary immunity of the PMD deputy from Sikasso, Mr. N'Golo Sanogo, who had been accused of embezzlement of 30 million francs belonging to the CMDT.

November 16: As part of the war on tax evasion, nearly 600 security forces agents, guided by forty customs/economic affairs agents, launched a vast inspection operation at the "Dabanani" market in Bamako. Tons of cigarettes and batteries which had entered Mali illegally were seized. The situation took a bad turn when the merchants whose merchandise had been seized joined in a group and tried to stone the police forces, who quickly left the scene.

December 9: The government spokesman confirmed rumors of a coup d'etat planned by Oumar Diallo, aka Birus, the former aide-de-camp of Moussa Traore. The spokesmen said that arrests were made within the army. Public opinion cast doubt on the accuracy of this information, especially since the former aide-de-camp was no longer a soldier, but had resigned from the army much earlier.

December 12: Rebellion of highway carriers in Sikasso. Drivers and apprentices of more than 100 trucks coming from Ivory Coast refused to comply with customs inspections in Sikasso. The outnumbered customs officers withdrew to avoid a bloody confrontation.

1994 Chronology

January 3: The Hospital Workers' union called for a 48-hour strike to protest the new status given to hospitals, i.e., their status as EPAs (public administrative establishments), which, it is claimed, in Articles 11 and 21 does not specify that salaries will be provided for under the national budget.

January 6: Bamako had no telephone or fax services from 4:00 am to 2:00 pm. A failure in the SOTELMA converters reportedly caused this crisis.

January 11: The UMOA heads of state gathered at an extraordinary summit in Dakar. The devaluation of the CFA franc was on the agenda.

January 11: The Minister of Health met with the health unions following the January 3 strike. The parties agreed to a revision of Articles 11 and 12.

January 12: The heads of state of the Franc Zone decided on a 50% devaluation of the CFA franc, after nearly 48 years of fixed parity. According to the official communique which made the announcement, the basic objective was to revive imports in order to stabilize the foreign balances of payments.

January 14: The government announced a series of protective measures (prior to the end of negotiations on the attendant measures) in order to limit the explosion of prices following devaluation. These measures included a tax exemption on sugar and rice, freezing of the prices hydrocarbons, flour, oil, soap, rice, sugar, tea, and medicines made in Mali, and freezing of electricity, water, and telephone prices.

January 24: Following the devaluation of the CFA franc, UNTM became more recalcitrant and demanded immediate 50% salary increases and the payment of all outstanding promotion payments in cash (contrary to a previous agreement stipulating the exchange of these outstanding payments for housing plots). Moreover, in the absence of a CFA franc unpegged to the French franc, the UNTM encouraged the government to create a national currency.

February 3: Michel Roussin, the French Minister of Cooperation, visited Mali. He confirmed that French commitments would be honored as part of the measures accompanying devaluation.

February 4: Following the devaluation of the CFA franc, AEEM again took action, staging a violent march accompanied by the pillaging of public and private buildings to demand a 50% adjustment of academic scholarships.

February 5: Immediately after the AEEM strike, the Prime

Minister, Abdoulaye Sékou Sow, Esq., resigned. In his letter of resignation submitted to the President of the Republic, he accused the Steering Committee of ADEMA (the party in power) of being the instigator of the plot organized against him and his government.

February 7: Mr. Ibrahim Keïta, Minister of Foreign Affairs, was named prime minister. Following this appointment, the CNID and the other parties making up the governing coalition left the government, denouncing ADEMA's management methods.

February 7: Formation of a new government composed, one could say, completely of ADEMA members. One noted appointment: Mrs. Sy, the former governor of the Bamako District, became Minister of Foreign Affairs.

February 8: The president of the Chamber of Commerce, Dr. Darahamane Touré, aka Darhat, proposed to mediate in the academic crisis.

February 10: The Council of Minister studied the 1984 budget in the light of the devaluation. A deficit of more than 80 billion francs had to be made up.

February 10: After agreement concerning the measures accompanying devaluation, the IMF signed the letter of intent.

February 15: AEEM returned to the attack with a violent march with barricades and pillaging of public and private buildings, including the residence of an ORTM journalist, Daouda Tékété, who had become technical adviser to the Ministry of Basic Education, and his wife's clinic).

February 16: The government decided to close all public and private academic establishments throughout the country.

February 18: Radio Kayira, a free opposition radio station accused of inciting to violence, was closed by decision of the Minister of the Interior.

February 19-20: Arrests of three officials of the AEEM board by the police departments. These persons were to respond to accusations of attacks on the security of public and private property, violence, public disorder, etc.

February 24: Reopening of Radio Kayira.

February 28: The Prime Minister appealed to the national press to stop, as he said, giving legitimacy to the violence. He was addressing the newspapers which tended to support AEEM's actions.

February 29: Colonel Bilal Saloum, one of the leaders of the rebel movement, was killed in Gao. Bilal was one of the rare black

men to hold such a high rank in the Tuareg rebel movement. He had rejoined the regular army following the re-entry of the Tuareg fighters into the army. This assassination was badly received by the MFUA, which suspected other rebel factions. An inquiry was opened by the Northern Commissioner's Office.

March 3: Arrest of the General Secretary of AEEM, Ould Zarawana. He was to reply to the same accusations as those made against his comrades arrested on February 19.

March 11: The Constitutional Court was sworn in by the President of the Republic.

March 17: Extraordinary UMOA Summit Meeting in Ouagadougou. The head of state gave vent to their concerns about the delays with which the partners were fulfilling their commitments. The Summit would sign the instrument terminating the CEAO, whose assets were to be transferred to CEDEAO.

March 21: Seminar bringing together in Bamako the Chambers of Commerce of the subregion in order to analyze the devaluation and to set forth the current situation regarding the effects of devaluation on the private sectors. Recommendations were made tending toward the strengthening of the productive sectors and subregional integration, in order to reinvigorate trade within Africa.

April 1: Young persons pillaged the residence of the French Consul General in Bamako. A number of persons were questioned. Robbery was suspected.

April 11: Partial reopening of the schools, affecting primary and basic education establishments.

April 18: The Prime Minister opened a governmental seminar on harmonizing the policies of the different ministries and on selecting the priorities for governmental action in 1994-1995. Organizational and communications issues were discussed at length during this seminar.

April 26: Six former officials of the Moussa Traoré regime were released on bail: Driss Traoré, Diango Sissoko, Morifing Koné, Cheikna O. Doumbia, Amadou Deme, and Amadou Sy.

April 29: At the National Assembly, opening of the debate on the Prime Minister's statement of general policy.

May 12: Confrontation between police and guards in N'Tomikorobougou. This was an incredible affair. Two camps were set up adjoining each other. Each side, concerned to find a short cut, got into the habit of climbing the high wall separating the two camps. On that day, a guard got into trouble. After jumping from

the wall, he was pushed around by young police officers. The other guards reacted, and a confrontation ensued. Result: several wounded and significant physical damage on each side.

May 12: Oumar Mariko, former General Secretary of AEEM, which had instigated the events ending in the fall of Moussa Traoré, was expelled from Abidjan. He flew from Ouagadougou in the company of Laurent Gbagbo, chairman of the main opposition party in Ivory Coast, the Front Populaire Ivoirien, or FPI. He was reportedly seen at his hotel in Abidjan in the company of the leaders of the Federation of Ivory Coast Students.

June 2: Dismissal of nearly 61 agents at the Meridien BIAO-Mali. These dismissals were reportedly the result of severe financial problems assailing that institution.

June 6: The Social and Cultural Economic Council of Mali was sworn in by the President of the Republic.

June 6: The Workers' Union of the Mali Development Bank (BDM) launched an indefinite strike to protest the nomination of an outside executive to the post of DGA. The appointee was Dr. Dafé, the director of the Operating Division of the BMCD, who was suspected of having close ties to the government.

June 9: The government decided to send 150 men to Rwanda in answer to an appeal from the United Nations Security Council. This contingent raised the number of United Nations troops in Rwanda to 5,500.

June 10: Rumors of the existence of a self-defense movement in opposition to the rebels in the northern part of Mali were made explicit in the press. This was the Gandha Koye (Landowners') movement, which planned to organize itself against the Tuareg rebels.

June 12: A communique from the Ministry of Defense cited several rebel attacks in the north, including Tombouctou Amdera boucane, Rharous. These attacks led to 22 deaths and a number of severely-injured persons.

June 26: Tamanrasset III. The rebels movements and the government met in Algiers to elucidate the situation regarding implementation of the national agreement signed in April 1992 between the two parties, and to analyze the causes of the renewed outbreak of the northern violence.

June 29: Four former officials of the Moussa Traoré regime were provisionally released: Abdoulaye Diallo, Moulaye Haïdara, Tiéna Coulibally, and Dianka K. Diakité.

Appendix B. Les Medias et L'Information Economique au Mali

**LES MEDIAS ET
L'INFORMATION ECONOMIQUE AU MALI**

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Juillet 1994

**Etude ARD/IMRAD/MSU sur l'ouverture du
processus de politique économique au Mali,
financement USAID**

1) INTRODUCTION:

A la lumière du programme d'ajustement structurel initié par le gouvernement et les partenaires tels que le FMI et la Banque Mondiale, on assiste de plus en plus à une ouverture de l'activité économique au Mali, ouverture marquée par la libéralisation de l'économie et le désengagement de l'état au profit de la société civile dans divers secteurs.

La démocratisation de la vie politique amorcée à partir de Mars 1991 a initié une nouvelle dynamique d'expression et de revendication socio-politiques issue du pluralisme politique, syndical, et de la liberté d'association et de presse.

Ces nouvelles données induisent une nouvelle relation sociale caractéristique d'une société ouverte dont le point focal est l'instauration d'un processus permanent de concertation, de dialogue ou de négociation entre les institutions publiques et les groupes organisés de la société civile.

Or, il apparaît que les partenaires économiques de ce dialogue ne disposent pas d'éléments d'informations pour analyser ou appréhender efficacement le fonctionnement et les orientations économiques, alors que tout le processus en dépend désormais.

La situation peut paraître paradoxale dans la mesure où les sources d'information économique, qu'elles soient officielles ou privées, se densifient de plus en plus, ainsi il existe présentement une pléthore de médias tant dans le domaine de l'écrit que de l'audio-visuel.

Le problème c'est que l'information économique n'est pas diffusée, ou si elle l'est, les supports sont mal adaptés, les données sont le plus souvent présentées à l'état brut, sans aucune dimension analytique, critique ou contradictoire pour cerner la valeur des différentes options.

Cette situation pose le défi du transfert, du traitement ou de la diffusion de l'information économique, et interpelle les médias dans leur mission qui consiste à entretenir ou stimuler l'analyse ou le débat d'idées nécessaires non seulement à la définition et formulation des choix et options politiques mais aussi à leur exécution et contrôle.

Le but de la présente réflexion est d'analyser les contraintes et obstacles liés au traitement et à la diffusion de l'information économique par les médias et de proposer des choix et stratégies médiatiques permettant une meilleure circulation de l'information dans le cadre d'une bonne gouvernance économique. Cette réflexion est basée sur une recherche documentaire appuyée d'interviews auprès d'un échantillon d'organes de presse dans le district de Bamako: Les Cauris, Mali-Entreprise, l'Observateur, Aurore, L'Essor, Radio Klédu, Radio Bamakan, l'ORTM.

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2) LES MEDIAS ET L'EVOLUTION DU DIALOGUE ECONOMIQUE

Le rôle des médias dans le dialogue économique au Mali a longtemps souffert de l'approche monolithique, unidirectionnelle ou verticale de l'information dans le processus économique.

Cette approche a consisté à consacrer d'énormes efforts aux institutions publiques d'autant plus que la société civile constituée à près de 85% d'analphabètes était considérée à tort ou à raison, comme incapable d'initiatives et d'analyses pour proposer des choix raisonnés.

L'inexistence de structures d'analyse en dehors des institutions du parti unique et de l'exécutif a donc porté ombrage au dialogue économique et au rôle d'interface des médias. Ainsi durant les deux premières Républiques (1960-68: régime socialiste à parti état, et 1968-1991: parti unique à régime militaire direct) le dialogue économique au Mali a ressemblé à un monologue.

L'analyse et la formulation des choix ou décisions économiques relevaient de la compétence des institutions du parti unique à travers sa commission économique et sociale. Cette commission se saisissait de toutes les questions économiques nécessitant l'attention du parti. Elle en faisait l'analyse qu'elle soumettait à l'instance suprême, le BEC (Bureau Exécutif Central) qui à son tour transmettait aux structures techniques de l'exécutif pour la traduction en actes administratifs (décrets, lois) à soumettre au vote de l'assemblée nationale.

Cependant, des dispositions statutaires prévoyaient au niveau des départements chargés de l'économie, des concertations avec la société civile à travers des commissions au demeurant largement court-circuitées. Il s'agissait le plus souvent de commissions interministérielles élargies dans le meilleur des cas à des groupes constitués de la société civile entretenant des liens organiques avec l'état: la Chambre de Commerce et d'Industrie dont le secrétaire-général était nommé en conseil des ministres, et l'UNTM (union nationale des travailleurs du Mali) dont le secrétaire-général était membre de droit du bureau exécutif central. La mission des médias pour peu qu'elle s'exerçât à travers les deux organes de presse nationaux (La RTM et l'Essor) se limitait à diffuser les mots d'ordre du parti, à travers communiqués de presse, compte-rendus de conseils d'administration de sociétés et entreprise d'état, avec leur cortège de censure, d'auto-censure et de langue de bois. Dans le meilleur des cas, des campagnes d'information ou de sensibilisation des populations avaient lieu autour d'une décision économique.

Il faut attendre le changement politique de Mars 1991 pour voir se dessiner une évolution satisfaisante dans le dialogue économique et le rôle de la presse. L'avènement de la démocratie initie une nouvelle dynamique de concertation à travers deux grands fora: la Conférence Nationale (largement élargie à la société civile) et les Etats Généraux du commerce, de l'industrie et de l'artisanat, du monde rural, du transport, etc. Une

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structure permanente de concertation et de négociation est aussi mise en place entre les instituts publics et la société civile à travers la commission de suivi des états généraux du commerce et de l'industrie.

Le monolithisme cédant à l'expression plurielle des opinions, le rôle d'interface des médias dans le processus est sollicité et consacré par la mise en place des conseillers à la communication dans les départements ministériels sur circulaire du Premier Ministre de la transition mandant les services administratifs de lever toute rétention d'information sur la gestion des affaires publiques. La tenue de ce qu'on a appelé "briefing" hebdomadaire de la presse par le porte-parole du gouvernement sur les décisions prises en Conseil des Ministres est également à souligner.

Le virage vers la participation démocratique est donc amorcé mais des problèmes demeurent. Parmi ceux-ci, les attentes de la société civile au travers de revendications socio-économiques jugées excessives par rapport aux possibilités économiques de l'état, et contradictoires par rapport à la politique économique du pays. Quoi que les conflits soient assumés de part et d'autre (le pouvoir en place ayant cautionné ces revendications pendant qu'il était encore dans l'opposition) il n'est guère besoin de s'interroger sur ces conflits pour se rendre compte qu'ils sont la conséquence d'un déficit d'informations sur la situation économique du pays.

C'est la grande fausse note du processus, un processus dont l'harmonie suppose que des gens biens informés et formés puissent discuter des orientations économiques de la nation. La nécessité de promouvoir la collecte, l'analyse et la diffusion des données économiques requises par l'instauration d'un débat public bien informé pour aider les uns et les autres à jouer pleinement dans le processus avec plus de responsabilité est donc à l'ordre du jour.

3) LE PAYSAGE MEDIATIQUE MALIEN

La position clé des médias dans leur mission de sensibilisation ou de conscientisation des masses conduisant à la chute du régime dictatorial à parti unique de Moussa Traoré, leur a octroyé une place royale dans le processus démocratique au point que la nouvelle constitution du 12 Janvier 1992 en son article 5 consacre la liberté de la presse au Mali. Plus qu'une simple consécration cette constitution en son article 9 ira jusqu'à poser le devoir d'assistance de l'état à la liberté de la presse.

De la loi de Février 1988 (qui consacre la création de journaux privés) à fin 1993 on dénombrait près de 82 titres de journaux agréés pour la presse écrite toute tendances confondues. On y trouve de tout: des journaux indépendants d'informations aux journaux d'opinions, satiriques, de faits divers, etc. A cet ensemble de journaux il faut ajouter près de 14 stations de radio libre émettant pour la plupart en modulation de fréquence (FM) dans les centres urbains: Radio Bamakan, Liberté, Kayira, Klédu, Tabalé,

Fréquence 3 et la chaîne 2 de l'ORTM pour Bamako. A Mopti: radio Douentza; à Kayes: radio Rurale de Kayes; à Sikasso: Radio Kéné pour la ville de Sikasso, et à Koutiala: Radio Jamana et Radio Kayira; à Ségou: Radio Jamana et Radio Kayira.

A côté de ces radios libres, la station nationale de l'ORTM émet en ondes courtes sur toute l'étendue du territoire. La Télévision nationale couvre quatre capitales régionales (Bamako, Sikasso, Ségou, Kayes). Quatre demandes d'agrément de télévisions privées sont en gestation auprès du ministère de la communication.

La presse parlée étrangère n'est pas en reste, notamment avec RFI et Africa No. 1 qui émettent depuis 1993 en modulation de fréquence sur Bamako. TV5, une télévision Franco-canadienne, négocie également une antenne à Bamako.

Mais ce dynamisme et cette diversité ne doivent pas occulter les caractéristiques négatives de cette presse, notamment son extrême concentration dans la capitale (70% des titres) si bien qu'elle a du mal à se faire l'écho de la société, civile dans son ensemble. Cette extrême concentration se double d'une autre caractéristique tout aussi négative, l'homogénéisation, selon laquelle la plupart des journaux se répètent, les contenus changeant peu d'un journal à l'autre. On note aussi le manque d'enquêtes et de grands reportages.

Enfin la presse est confrontée à un problème de mutation: une presse combative née et consolidée dans le combat pour la démocratie et qui après instauration de cette démocratie a du mal à se défaire de cette combativité et s'adapter à l'évolution nouvelle. Toutes choses qui expliquent les multiples procès auprès des tribunaux. Ce qu'il faut retenir c'est que les supports médiatiques sont assez importants et diversifiés pour atteindre les publics ciblés. Ce qui manque surtout c'est une stratégie de communication permettant de pousser les médias vers des actions spécifiques, l'analyse et le débat économiques, par exemple.

4) LA PRESSE ECONOMIQUE

On ne peut pas parler véritablement d'une presse économique spécialisée au Mali, soit parce que cette presse est disparate, soit parce que l'information économique est traitée de façon irrégulière et dans le cadre général de l'actualité. Cependant, depuis quelques années on assiste à la publication d'un certain nombre de titres dont le journal "Les Cauris", la revue Mali-Entreprise, l'Observateur (qui à ses débuts se donnait une vocation essentiellement économique mais qui s'est rétracté faute d'animateur) et, si l'on ose dire, le Bulletin d'information de la Chambre de Commerce et d'Industrie. On citera également le journal Jekabaara, spécialisé dans l'économie agricole et édité en langue nationale bambara.

Ces quelques expériences récentes ont succédé à la revue trimestrielle du Ministère

de l'Economie et des Finances, publiée au milieu des années 1980. Il s'agissait pour le département de l'économie de l'époque, de parer à un déficit en communication par la publication d'un certain nombre d'articles d'informations et d'analyses de spécialistes du département sur la politique économique de l'état. Quoique l'expérience n'ait duré que le temps d'une législature, cette revue avait servi de support aux décisions, avis et propositions du département auprès des partenaires de l'Etat. Malheureusement, le manque de motivation des responsables et les difficultés de diffusion et d'impression ont eu raison de cette revue. Sa reprise est aujourd'hui salutaire car à la lumière du défi économique actuel, le pire des choix pour un département économique serait le silence. Renouer avec la parution de cette revue permettra de briser le mutisme et la gestion frileuse du Ministère de l'Economie.

LES TITRES REGULIERS DANS L'INFORMATION ECONOMIQUE

Les Cauris: (5.000 exemplaires)

Créé en Juin 1990 sous l'impulsion d'un bureau d'étude spécialisé en socio-économie, l'IMRAD(institut malien de recherches appliquées au développement) ce journal est le principal titre économique malien. Originellement publié sous forme de revue-magazine mensuel d'une trentaine de pages dont près de 70% sur l'économie, le journal connaîtra une expérience hebdomadaire avant de devenir un bimensuel de 8 pages, avec 5 pages sur l'économie. Une rubrique centrale "chronique économique" analyse les questions économiques d'actualité. Elle est suivie d'une rubrique "entreprise- entrepreneurs", de deux pages d'économie agricole, et d'une page sur la coopération et l'intégration économiques. Le journal est le seul à publier des articles d'analyse de fond sur des questions économiques majeures telles que l'ajustement structurel, et des dossiers de fond sur les filières économique (filières céréalières ou coton, par exemple) l'industrie, le commerce et les banques. Le journal est confronté à des problèmes d'animation (personnel réduit), de diffusion (distribution difficile), et d'étroitesse de son lectorat.

Mali-Entreprise

Créée en 1992, cette revue mensuelle d'une trentaine de pages publiée principalement à Bamako s'est hissée au centre de l'information d'entreprise. On y trouve des articles d'analyse de fond sur les problèmes généraux d'entreprises dont les problèmes fiscaux, bancaires, commerciaux (dont le partenariat commercial et industriel). Le tout est émaillé de commentaires et témoignages de spécialistes de terrain.

La revue a largement couvert les Etats-Généraux du commerce, de l'industrie, du monde rural des transports par une série de commentaires et d'analyses contradictoires sur les différentes résolutions et recommandations. Tout comme le journal Cauris, la revue Mali-Entreprise est confrontée à l'étroitesse du lectorat et à la rétention d'informations, d'autant plus qu'un nombre important d'opérateurs économiques

évoluent dans le secteur informel et n'entendent pas paraître à la une des journaux.

Le Bulletin de la Chambre de Commerce

Vu l'appui financier dont il bénéficie de la part d'autres chambres consulaires, ce bulletin devrait surmonter les difficultés auxquelles sont confrontés les journaux mentionnés ci-dessus et de devenir un véritable journal d'information et d'analyse des questions économiques et commerciales. Malheureusement les articles du bulletin ne vont guère au delà des avis d'appel d'offre à la concurrence. Le bulletin souffre surtout d'une périodicité quotidienne difficile à gérer, et d'un personnel réduit et peu motivé.

Jekabaara (16.000 exemplaires)

Créé en 1986 sous l'impulsion des ODR (Office de développement rural) CMDT, OHVN avec le soutien de bailleurs de fonds, le journal Jekabaara publié en langue nationale bambara, est une référence dans le domaine de la presse économique rurale; il est largement diffusé dans les zones CMDT, OHVN, ODIMO etc.

On y trouve en plus de l'actualité, des articles sur les techniques culturales sur l'analyse des avantages comparatifs des productions ou sur les filières d'activités. Tout comme le journal Kibaru (cet autre mensuel de la presse rurale tiré à 16.000 exemplaires) Jekabaara est confronté à un problème d'animation et de distribution. Les difficultés d'animation proviennent du fait qu'on a grand peine à stabiliser les rubriques du journal par les articles cibles.

Les retards dans la distribution sont également préoccupants du fait que certains abonnés des villages et hameaux de culture le reçoivent avec près de trois semaines de retard, perdant ainsi tout intérêt auprès des lecteurs.

Radio Kledu

Créée en 1993 par un opérateur économique de Bamako, cette radio libre émettant en FM s'est donnée une vocation économique. En conséquence, elle anime régulièrement des émissions sur l'activité économique et commerciale et jouit d'une grande expérience dans les débats publics en direct, avec reportages de rue.

Elle a à son palmarès deux grandes enquêtes suivies de débats, notamment celle sur le secteur informel des produits pharmaceutiques, qui s'est étalée sur plusieurs émissions, et sur les origines de la crise économique au Mali organisée en collaboration avec la fondation Fredrich Hibbert et mettant aux prises des invités du gouvernements, des partis politiques, syndicats et associations, notamment l'association des victimes de l'ajustement structurel.

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En outre elle anime des campagnes de commercialisation sous forme de publi-reportage avec les entreprises locales dont Mali-Lait. Des actions sont en cours avec la SONATAM, l'OPAM, pour le marché céréalier. Un contrat est en cours de négociation avec le Ministère de l'économie portant sur les déclarations d'impôts.

L'expérience de cette radio est à saluer d'autant plus que dans un pays à grande tradition orale comme le Mali, le débat public l'emporte sur les habitudes de lecture.

La radio souffre cependant de la rétention d'informations qui porte ombrage à l'animation des débats, notamment à cause des refus de participation. Il arrive aussi que des invités veuillent monnayer leur participation.

Les Titres Irréguliers

A côté de ces quelques organes qui ont fait de l'économie leur terrain de prédilection et qui ne détiennent qu'une petite partie du lectorat, l'information économique est diffusée de façon irrégulière par la presse d'information générale. Parmi les titres les plus courants on peut citer:

Aurore

Bien que n'étant pas spécialisé dans l'économie, le journal Aurore (tiré à 10.000 exemplaires) s'est distingué par la pertinence de ses analyses en matière économique. Notamment sur le dossier des privatisations et restructurations des entreprises publiques dont celle d'EDM (Energie du Mali) à propos de laquelle il a publié beaucoup d'enquêtes sur la filière électricité. Ceci lui permettra de décrocher un contrat avec le projet Procelos du CILSS, en collaboration avec un bureau d'études économiques malien. Il s'agit d'un supplément mensuel de deux pages (pour une période de 18 mois) sur l'analyse de la filière agro-alimentaire dans le domaine des PME/PMI. Cette expérience est à consolider, d'autant plus que l'analyse des filières qui, précisément est à l'épicentre des besoins d'information du public, coûte cher à la presse. Cependant, le journal souffre d'un problème d'animation en matière économique, qu'il a essayé de surmonter en faisant appel à un jeune diplômé en économie, et un spécialiste consultant en promotion économique.

L'Observateur :

Créé en 1992 par de jeunes journalistes démissionnaires de l'Aurore (une référence pour la presse indépendante au Mali), l'expérience de ce journal est assez révélatrice des contraintes de la presse économique. Se donnant dès le départ une vocation économique (sans pour autant perdre de vue l'analyse politique) le journal va déchanter très tôt à cause de la rétention d'information. L'un des objectifs fondamentaux était de publier des dossiers d'enquêtes sur les grandes unités économiques, surtout privées. Ceci dans



le cadre de l'échange ou du partage d'expériences en vue d'une promotion du secteur privé. Mais rien ne fut et le journal a du changer son fusil d'épaule.

L'ORTM : la station nationale, après avoir abandonné ses magazines économiques à la radio anime, en fonction de l'actualité, des débats économiques à travers ses émissions grand public dont "devoir d'informer" et "point de rencontre". La fausse note ici, c'est que la plupart de ces débats sont postérieurs à une décision déjà prise, ou font suite à un avis de grève. Il s'agit donc de débats d'arrière-garde. Finalement, le choix des participants (généralement des politiques) et le devoir de réserve dont ils font preuve, impriment une certaine partialité à ces débats.

Des publications sporadiques ont lieu dans la presse d'information générale. Parmi celles-ci on peut citer "Le Républicain" qui se distingue par des dossiers d'enquêtes sur l'industrie, la fraude et la concurrence déloyale, "l'Observateur", "Nouvel Horizon", "les Echos", "le Messenger" etc. Mais il s'agit pour la plupart d'informations ponctuelles à caractère sensationnel ayant trait aux scandales économiques et financiers, ou d'analyses des aspects négatifs de la politique économique, qui ne rendent pas compte de la dimension contradictoire des sujets.

Ce qui ressort surtout de l'opinion des organes contactés, ce n'est pas que la presse ne soit pas disposée à faire de l'analyse économique. Au contraire, nombre d'organes reconnaissent que s'il y a un défi à relever aujourd'hui, c'est celui de l'information économique. D'abord parce que les problèmes économiques sont aujourd'hui à l'épicentre de la crise de confiance généralisée entre les institutions publiques et la société civile, crise caractérisée par des grèves ou des manifestations de rue accompagnées de violence. Ensuite parce que l'analyse et le débat politiques ont largement monopolisé la scène médiatique ces dernières années. Ceci a créé un déséquilibre au niveau de la communication. Les conflits engendrés par la politique économique proviennent du fait --de l'avis des uns et des autres-- que l'information a été viciée ou manipulée. Celle-ci a consisté, par exemple, à mobiliser les couches les plus combattantes dans une lutte politique où les revendications dont elles se prévalaient étaient hors des possibilités de l'état.

Ainsi a-t-on soutenu qu'une augmentation de 100% des bourses scolaires était possible (50% dans le mémorandum des étudiants), qu'une augmentation de 50% des salaires des fonctionnaires était possible de l'avis dit-on d'un expert commis en la circonstance par la centrale syndicale (UNTM), que des possibilités d'embauche des jeunes diplômés sans emplois suivraient une relance d'investissements productifs, etc. Soutenir de telles revendications dans une économie où le paiement régulier des salaires des fonctionnaires se négocie comme du papier à musique, une économie en plein ajustement structurel basé sur la rigueur et la compression des dépenses, relève de la fantaisie ou du sabotage délibéré.

Si cette ignorance persiste encore aujourd'hui c'est parce l'information économique ne circule toujours pas assez. C'est aussi parce que les grands forums organisés par le passé n'ont pas permis de recentrer le débat. Le contexte socio-économique est celui d'un état écartelé entre un déficit économique devenu structurel, et des revendications économiques maximalistes de la part de partenaires sociaux prêts à tout pour rendre la vie impossible à leur allié d'antan, aujourd'hui au pouvoir.

Ainsi l'idée d'un débat national faisant table rase des possibilités financières de l'état et des stratégies à mettre en place est au centre de l'analyse de la plupart des observateurs. Ce débat pour être efficace ne doit pas faire l'objet d'un forum de plus (les précédents ayant cerné leurs limites du fait qu'ils se soient transformés en tribune de revendications plutôt qu'en confrontation d'idées). La crise de confiance étant bien réelle, les médias, à la lumière de leur mission d'éducation, de neutralité et d'impartialité peuvent représenter une perche à saisir. En outre, l'opportunité des médias reflète un souci de mutation, du fait que les problèmes sociaux prennent de plus en plus la forme de débats entre institutions publiques et médias.

La société civile semble donc s'en remettre de plus en plus aux médias, en gardant certes sa participation au débat, mais davantage comme figurant dans un spectacle plus vaste élargi aux journalistes. Mais pour parvenir à cette fin encore faudrait-il relaxer certaines des contraintes auxquelles sont confrontés les médias dans le cadre du traitement de l'information économique. Parmi celles-ci le problème de la rationalisation des sources d'une information économique parfois contradictoires selon qu'on se situe du côté des statistiques officielles (Ministères du Plan ou de l'Economie) ou du côté des organismes internationaux (FMI, Banque mondiale), des bureaux d'études et autres institutions. De plus, les données économiques sont le plus souvent présentées à l'état brut, ce qui ne facilite pas leur traitement par la presse. C'est le cas par exemple de l'OPAM (Office des produits agricoles du Mali) qui publie les variations des prix des céréales sans indication sur les causes de ces variations. L'incurie des informations statistiques sur les secteurs d'activités autres que l'agriculture est aussi un élément de préoccupation. Nombre d'organes de presse disent donc avoir du mal à sécuriser leur analyse auprès des sources d'informations. La difficulté de sécurisation de l'information se double d'une autre: celle de l'absence de programmes économiques au niveau de la plupart des partis politiques. Ou alors si ces programmes existent, ce sont généralement les mêmes options et stratégies, les différences ne tenant pour l'essentiel qu'à des affinités d'ordre procédural. On assiste donc à une sorte de monolithisme qui ne favorise pas l'éclosion chez les organes de presse d'une dynamique d'analyses ou de critiques contradictoires, d'autant plus que les journalistes économiques dignes de ce nom soient assez rares au Mali. Or la critique réfléchie, c'est à dire, celle qui consiste en un jugement de valeur raisonné, suppose d'avoir quelques rudiments d'économie et de disposer du discernement nécessaire pour parvenir à une opinion équilibrée sur un sujet économique, ce qui est lié au problème de la formation des journalistes.

La rétention d'information qui s'est beaucoup développée au niveau de la société civile économique avec l'expansion du secteur informel (60% des activités économiques) est également un sujet majeur de préoccupation. Une triste réalité intensifiée par les événements du 26 mars qui ont entraîné la casse ou destruction d'unités économiques privées. Ceci ne milite pas en faveur d'une collaboration entre les opérateurs économiques et les médias.

Tous ces anachronismes ont amené bien des organes de presse à se démarquer du champ d'analyse économique au profit des faits divers, en la matière engendrés par la recherche de la "petite bête", les scandales, la critique négative (ou l'analyse se résume en une énumération de défauts), le négativisme cynique, parfois apocalyptique tel que celui à travers duquel nombre d'organes ont traité de la dévaluation du FCFA, dont l'aspect solution de sortie de la crise n'a guère été abordé.

6) VERS UN PLAN D'ACTION MEDIATIQUE

A la lumière des préoccupations soulignées ci-dessus, la nécessité d'une plus grande implication des médias dans le débat économique milite pour un plan d'action s'inscrivant dans le cadre d'une dynamique globale de promotion de l'information économique.

Celle-ci doit partir de l'idée que l'heure est au partage, au transfert de l'information, et à la correction des facteurs de rétention par une plus grande harmonisation des sources mais aussi par une augmentation de la production d'informations économiques, notamment sur les filières. Ceci est d'autant plus vrai que les besoins d'information du public se posent davantage en ces termes car l'analyse des filières touche au vécu quotidien de l'économie et favorise davantage une perception concrète des questions économiques, alors qu'une analyse macroéconomique se transforme bien souvent en un débat d'initiés.

On se souvient que le dossier d'enquête sur le BTP publié par un journal indépendant de la place et soulignant bien des incohérences de la politique économique de l'état dans ce secteur a eu tellement d'échos auprès de l'opinion qu'un débat informel sur la question a eu lieu entre parlementaires à l'Assemblée Nationale.

Mais si ces enquêtes sont un instrument d'approche privilégié, il faut aussi noter qu'elles coûtent cher. Des actions d'appui ou de soutien sont donc à solliciter dans ce domaine, comme le contrat "Procelos-Aurore" sur la filière agro-industrielle, comme celui signé entre la CMDT et "Radio Kené" de Sikasso sur une analyse des enjeux de la filière coton, ou celui entre Radio Klédu et Mali-Lait sur la filière lait.

La lenteur de la production d'information liée à un étalement dans le temps des évaluations économiques est aussi un obstacle majeur, car il faut bien souvent attendre

la visite des missions FMI-Banque Mondiale (généralement annuelles) pour que la presse entre en possession des données économiques. Ceci tend à densifier l'analyse autour de cette période de l'année. Or, des évaluations d'une durée plus courte (qui existent dans les départements chargés de l'économie, mais ne sont pas communiquées à la presse) pourraient favoriser des analyses périodiques et une animation permanente du débat économique.

La diffusion permanente des résultats permettrait également d'éviter bien des effets de surprise (constatés ces derniers temps avec les dérapages dans le programme) et favoriser des débats préalables sur les mesures d'accompagnement. Ceci réduirait les précipitations telles que les 37 mesures décidées dans le feu de la crise en Août dernier. Dans ce contexte, la commission nationale de suivi du programme d'ajustement structurel mise en place en Octobre dernier pour rendre compte en permanence au gouvernement, devrait collaborer avec les médias.

L'initiative engagée par le réseau d'opérateurs économiques de l'Afrique de l'Ouest, qui a consisté à animer un séminaire d'initiation des parlementaires aux techniques et choix budgétaires pour permettre à ces derniers de s'investir dans le débat économique, mérite d'être soulignée et consolidée, d'autant plus que le Conseil Economique et Social, l'organe consultatif d'étude et d'analyse économique auprès des institutions publiques, a du mal à prendre le large. Enfin, la participation des journalistes ne doit plus se limiter à de simples "briefings". Elle doit s'intégrer dans une stratégie plus vaste incluant leur formation à la politique économique. L'occasion est bonne pour souligner les expériences engagées ces dernières années par la Banque Mondiale qui fait désormais de la circulation de l'information économique une priorité dans ses programmes. On citera en exemple deux séminaires de formation sur le journalisme économique, en décembre 1992 à Yaoundé, et en Mai 1993 à Dakar (regroupant 8 journalistes maliens). Ils ont été suivis en Février 1994 par celui organisé par le centre culturel Américain à Bamako; ce sont des expériences à consolider.

D'une manière générale le constat est que les choses peuvent aller de mieux en mieux, si l'on se convainc de part et d'autre que, dans le cadre de l'ouverture ou du transfert des compétences économiques, la circulation de l'information adéquate et à temps est une donnée endogène du processus. Plus les gens seront informés sur les enjeux, avantages et contraintes de la politique économique, mieux on les aidera à acquérir une maturité d'analyse, de jugement ou de choix raisonné, point de départ de la responsabilité dans le partenariat. En ces périodes de mutations économiques doublées de démocratisation, l'harmonie politique suppose d'emprunter les voies de la compréhension mutuelle. Nul doute que les médias, de par leur rôle d'éducation sur la base de l'analyse et de la critique réfléchies, sont un instrument privilégié de facilitation de cette compréhension mutuelle. L'importance et la diversité du capital médiatique Malien (une référence dans la sous-région) est une opportunité royale à saisir. Il faut rompre avec la rétention d'information et la discrétion handicapante, et faire vibrer ce capital médiatique vers la culture économique.

Appendix C. The Bamako Declaration on Radio Pluralism

THE
*BAMA**KO*
DECLARATION
ON RADIO
PLURALISM

(14-18 september 1993)

Recalling the International Declaration on Human Rights

(Article 19),

Recalling the African Charter on Human and People's Rights (Chapter I, Articles 8,9),

Recalling the declaration of political principles and the information measures contained in the new ECOWAS treaty (Article 65),

Considering the Montreal action plan for education on the rights of man and on democracy,

Noting with appreciation the statements made at the opening ceremony of this colloquium by His Excellency Alpha Oumar Konaré, President of the Republic of Mali, on the need to liberalise the air waves and to encourage rural radio,

Considering the decisive role played by radio in human development, in the process of democratisation and in mass participation (especially by vulnerable groups such as women and children),

We, the participants in the Colloquium on Radio Pluralism in West Africa, co-organised in Bamako on 14-18 September by the West African Journalists Association and the Panos Institute, together welcoming the beginnings of the liberalisation under way in many African countries,

Declare the following :

1 Radio is a priority means of social communication, in Africa in particular;

2 Radio pluralism is an essential component in the deepening of the democratic process now under way : it allows people greater access to a diversity of information, and guarantees increased popular participation in sustainable human development;

3 Information pluralism requires the complete elimination of radio monopolies, and the existence of a range of radio stations able to express the diverse viewpoints and aspirations of different segments of society;

4 The possibility of being informed by and expressing oneself on radio remains unequal between urban and rural areas, and between different social groups (especially between men and women);

5 Initiatives aimed at creating private and community radio stations must be encouraged, so as to foster the multiplication, diversification and decentralisation of such stations, whether they be commercial or community-based. In particular, village radio initiatives must be supported by easier arrangements for their official authorisation;

6 African states must speed up the ending of monopoly over the air waves, and give priority to national proponents of independent radio when allocating broadcasting frequencies. They must also take urgent measures to draw up and effectively implement new legal frameworks, to create genuinely independent regulatory agencies, and to identify and implement effective measures (eg through tax and customs) to encourage a

flowering of independent radio stations;

7 State controlled radio must be transformed into genuine public service radio, with all the legal, administrative, editorial and management changes that this implies;

8 African organisations with responsibilities in communications must make more effort to involve professionals from the independent media in their activities;

9 International aid agencies must develop the institutional and financial means to respond effectively to the liberalisation of radio in West Africa, especially through effective support (finance, management, human resources...) to the viability of independent radio stations;

10 Professional organisations must strengthen and mobilise themselves to address the challenges of radio pluralism : it is important that they should be represented on regulatory bodies and that they should participate in the reform of legal and administrative frameworks for radio;

11 Radio pluralism cannot be effectively guaranteed without the active vigilance of all citizens, and of pressure groups specially created for this purpose;

12 Radio stations will benefit from forming professional organisations, from organising themselves into networks, and from collaborating at the national, sub-regional and international levels;

13 International radio stations, in their relationships with public and independent radio in Africa, must work within a context of plurality for the listener, and of complementarity;

14 While remaining open to the free international flow of information, West Africa must acquire the means to

become a growth centre for production, creativity and innovation in radio.

We, the participants of the Bamako colloquium, make the following recommendations :

To independent radio proprietors, and to the participants of the colloquium :

- 1 The creation of national associations of radio-broadcasters, able to defend the interests of radio proprietors and radio professionals, and to act as an interface between their members and international development agencies. In order to create a regional union, a constituent meeting should be called fairly soon;
- 2 The official transmission of the Declaration of Bamako to the President of Mali, so that he may play an advocacy role for the declaration among his fellow heads of state, and within the ECOWAS, the OAU and the United Nations;
- 3 National and regional lobbying to promote radio pluralism, the distribution of the documents produced at this colloquium, and the implementation of their recommendations;
- 4 The establishment of an information and networking bulletin aimed at West African radio broadcasters and their partners;
- 5 The organisation of study and exchange visits among the actors in radio pluralism;
- 6 South-South and North-South twinning arrangements among radio stations and their federations;
- 7 The adoption of codes of conduct by radio professionals and their organisations;

8 The establishment of purchasing centres, and of a data bank on available equipment;

9 The creation of maintenance and repair units for radio equipment;

10 The establishment of sound banks, responsible for the regional distribution of radio programmes, especially in the languages most commonly used in the region. These sound banks should be established within institutions which are capable of ensuring the monitoring and management of distribution.

To the states of West Africa :

11 The drafting, adoption and effective implementation of the legislative and administrative frameworks for information pluralism, and especially for radio pluralism;

12 The establishment of independent regulatory authorities to oversee the implementation of the legal framework and to organise the allocation of radio frequencies.

To the appropriate national and regional authorities :

13 The strengthening of existing training centres, and changes in their structures to reflect the new situation in radio;

14 The creation of new arrangements in these training centres to strengthen the skills of radio broadcasters in management, motivation, radio research, and better journalistic specialisation in socially-useful themes.

To donor agencies :

15 The creation of a fund to support the production

of programmes by various types of radio station, especially local radio, aimed at promoting information on sustainable development themes;

16 The search for institutional and financial mechanisms by which donors may respond effectively to the liberalisation of the air waves in West Africa, and especially by which they may support the recommendations of the Bamako colloquium.

To the organisers of the colloquium :

17 The establishment of a coordination committee to ensure the national and regional follow-up of the Bamako colloquium's proposals. This coordination committee shall also be responsible for examining how to implement, in the medium term, a radio pluralism monitoring centre as proposed by the President of Mali during the colloquium's opening session.

To all the Malian actors in radio pluralism :

18 The organisation of a biennial regional event (festival, forum ?) to promote radio pluralism at the African level, as also suggested by the President of Mali during the opening session of the Bamako colloquium.

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Appendix E. Broadcast Schedules of Selected Radio Stations

PROGRAMME DE RADIO JAMANA / KOUTIALA - MALI

HORAIRES	LUNDI	MARDI	MERCREDI	JEUDI	VENDREDI	SAMEDI	DIMANCHE
9 heures	BONNES BRIGITTE	IDEES BRIGITTE	BONNES BRIGITTE	IDEES BRIGITTE	BONNES BRIGITTE	REVEIL-MAT L. DOUMBIA	EDUCATION KONIBA
10 heures	MICRO	TROTTOIR	MICRO	TROTTOIR	MICRO	TROTTOIR	SAGAYOGO
	HUICOMA	LES FEMMES sur LE PLATEAU Maï OUATT	KENEYA B. SOGOBA	CIRCULATION B. SOGOBA	DABA KALA L. DOUMBIA	O N G	DISQUES DES AUDITEURS DANIEL MARIAM
11 heures	MERES ET ENFANTS MARIAM	NINKUNKA PIYA MARIAM	FEMMES DE CAMPAGNE MARIAM	SUGU Maï OUATT	KOLON BADA MARIAM-DANIEL	VARIETES MUSICALES	
12 heures	OUATTARA	OUATTARA	OUATTARA			AMADOU OUATT	
13 heures	MUSIQUES	MALIENNES	SELECTIONNEES	MUSIQUES	MALIENNES	SELECTIONNEES	INVITE DE LA SEMAINE
	BONNE SIESTE DJIM	BONNE SIESTE DJIM	BONNE SIESTE DJIM	BONNE SIESTE DJIM	BONNE SIESTE DJIM	BONNE SIESTE DJIM	BONNE SIESTE DJIM
14 heures	FLASH	FLASH	FLASH	FLASH	FLASH	FLASH	FLASH
	BONNES ADRESSES AVIS COMMUNIQUEES PUBLICITES AMADOU OUATT	B. ADRESSES AVIS COMMUNIQUEES PUBLICITES AMADOU OUATT					
15 heures	SPECIAL REGGAE BRUNO	CMDT	EMISSION SENOFO A. SANOGO	JEUX CONCOURS BAMANAN	EMISSION RELIGIEUSE ISLAM	TRIBUNE DES ENFANTS Maï/LASSINE	JEUX CONCOURS Française
16 heures	JAMA BULO K.TRAORE	MUSIQUES D'ORCHESTRE AMADOU OUATT	Folklore du Terroir	DANIEL / MARIAM	KUNA FOL	COTONNIER A. DJIM	BRUNO
17 heures	MUSIQUES DOGON METEO LASSINE	DUNDUN-BA TOP DANIEL	DANIEL	SCIENCES ET CULTURE DAVID DIARRA	N'PALAN	PROTESTANTS Marché céréa-lier Maï Ouatt	CATHOLIQUES MUSIQUE MINIANKA
18h-15mn	FLASH	FLASH	FLASH	FLASH	FLASH	FLASH	FLASH
	JAMANA BARO	EMISSION SPORTIVE	HISTOIRE	Rencontre avec les Artistes	HISTOIRE	Revu de presse BRUNO	Sport-Bambara Mariam Ouatt
19 HEURES	DANIEL D.	BRUNO	DAVID	Mariam Ouatt	DAVID	MUSIQUE PEUL	Musique Bobo BRIGITTE
20 HEURES	SURAFANA DAMU A. SANOGO	SURAFANA DAMU A. SANOGO	SURAFANA DAMU A. SANOGO	SURAFANA DAMU A. SANOGO	SURAFANA DAMU A. SANOGO	SURAFANA DAMU A. SANOGO	SURAFANA DAMU A. SANOGO
20 h-15mn	FLASH	FLASH	FLASH	FLASH	FLASH	FLASH	FLASH
	BOGO JENNEN K. BAGAYOGO	REVES K. BAGAYOGO	YEE	MEMOIRE D'UN PAYS	MINIANKALA DAMBE K. TRAORE	Flons un peu SALSA	CONTES MIXTES L. DOUMBIA
21 heures	MUSIQUE JAZZ	RAISON DE COEUR BRUNO	DANIEL / DJIM	KONIBA BAGAYOGO	R -V ASTRES A. DJIM	ROITS ET DEVOIRS DJIM	KOUTIALA PROFIL BRUNO
22 heures						GALABU SHOW DANIEL	
					23h-0h		

Date d'entrée en service
Lundi 19 Juin 1984



Handwritten signature and scribbles over the logo.

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GRILLE ASSOCIATION RADIO LIBRE KAYIRA

Tél : 22 87 82 Fax (223) 22 87 82 BP 3140 BAMAKO

HEURE	LUNDI	MARDI	MERCREDI	JEUDI	VENDREDI	SAMEDI	DIMANCHE
05 H 55-06 H	Indicatif	Indicatif	Indicatif	Indicatif	Indicatif	Indicatif	6H55-7H: Indicatif
06 H 10 - 6 H 30	Réveil sportif	Réveil sportif	Réveil sportif	Réveil sportif	Réveil sportif	Réveil sportif	7H10-7H30 : Réveil sportif
6 H 30 - 7 H 00	Musique	Musique	Musique	Musique	Musique	Musique	
7 H - 7 H 30	Circulation	Circulation	Circulation	Circulation	Circulation	Circulation	
7 H 30 - 8 H 00	Musique	Musique	Musique	Musique	Musique	Musique	Musique
8 H - 8 H 45	Spots publicit.	Spots publicit.	Spots publicit.	Spots publicit.	Spots publicit.	Spots publicit.	Spots publicit.
8 H 45 - 9 H 00	Avis et Comm.	Avis et Comm.	Avis et Comm.	Avis et Comm.	Avis et Comm.	Avis et Comm.	Avis et Comm.
9 H 00 - 10 H 00	Assainissement	Assainissement	Assainissement	Histoire LAWALE	Assainissement	Rencontre avec artistes	-
10 H - 11 H	DUBASIKI	KAYIRA GRIN	KOLOSEKOROLA	-	SEKO-NI DUKO	Environnement	-
11 H - 12 H	Santé en général	-	-	Santé/Femme	-	Revue de Presse	Tribune de la Femme
12 H - 12 H 30	Musique-Flash	Musique-Flash	Musique-Flash	Musique-Flash	Musique-Flash	Musique-Flash	Musique-Flash
12 H 30 - 12H40	Spots publicit.	Spots publicit.	Spots publicit.	Spots publicit.	Spots publicit.	Spots publicit.	Spots publicit.
12 H 40 - 13 H	Avis et Comm.	Avis et Comm.	Avis et Comm.	Avis et Comm.	Avis et Comm.	Avis et Comm.	Avis et Comm.
13 H - 14 H	Musique	Musique	Musique	Musique	Musique	Musique	Musique
14 H - 15 H	Soninké	Songhoï	Soninké	Songhoï	Soninké 30 mn Songhoï 30 mn	JAZZ	-
COULOIR DES JEUNES							
15 H - 16 H	Musique	Musique	Musique	Musique	Arabe	Musique	Echange de Programmes
16 H - 17 H	Musique	Musique	Musique	Musique	Musique	Les enfants	

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HEURE	LUNDI	MARDI	MERCREDI	JEUDI	VENDREDI	SAMEDI	DIMANCHE
17 H - 18 H	Peulh	Musique	Peulh	Musique	17H00 - 17H30 Peulh	Reggae	17 H - 17 H 30 Musique classic
18 H - 18 H 30	Avis et comm.	Avis et comm.	Avis et comm.	Avis et comm.	Avis et comm.	Avis et comm.	Avis et comm.
18 H 30 - 19 H	Musique	Sariya bulon	Musique	Musique	Sariya bulon	Musique	Musique
19 H - 19 H 30	Musique	Sariya bulon	Musique	Musique	Sariya bulon	Musique	Musique
19 H 30 - 20 H	Journal	Journal	Journal	Journal	Journal	Journal	Journal
20 H - 20 H 30	Retrobal contes et devinettes d'enf.	Retrobal contes- devinettes d'enf.	Retrobal contes- devinettes d'enf.	Retrobal contes- devinettes d'enf.	Retrobal contes- devinettes d'enf.	Musique	Musique
20 H 30 - 21 H	-"	Sport	-"	-"	-"	-"	Sport
21 H - 22 H	ba fo pian	Musique avec 15 mn de lecture/roman	Musique avec 15 mn de lecture/roman	Musique avec 15 mn de lecture/roman	Musique avec 15 mn lecture de roman	Musique	Le Mali un Marché pour les cadres
22 H - 23 H		Mana	Fenêtre sur la littérature	Afrique en question	Radio trottoir		
GINGIN GRIN (G.G.G.)							
23 H - 23 H 30	Musique indicat.	Musique indicat.	Musique indicat.	23 H 15 - 00H15 Santé au bout de la nuit	Musique indicat.	Musique indicat.	Musique
23 H 30 - 00 H	Avis et comm.	Avis et comm.	Avis et comm.				Fermeture
00 H - 00 H 30	G.G.G.	G.G.G.	G.G.G.	00H15: Avis- Com.	G.G.G.	G.G.G.	
00 H 30 - 01 H	-"	-"	-"	-"	-"	-"	
1 H 00 - 2 H 00	-"	-"	-"	-"	-"	-"	
2 H 00 - 3 H 00	-"	-"	-"	-"	-"	-"	
3 H 00	Fermeture	Fermeture	Fermeture	Fermeture	Fermeture	-"	
4 H 00	-	-	-	-	-	-	Fermeture

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PROGRAMME BAMAKAN FM 100 MHZ

Septembre 1993

LUNDI			MARDI			MERCREDI			JEUDI			VENDREDI			SAMEDI		
10h00	Connais-tu mon beau pays?	10h00	Connais-tu mon beau pays?	10h00	Connais-tu mon beau pays?	10h00	Connais-tu mon beau pays?	10h00	Connais-tu mon beau pays?	10h00	Pêle-mêle variété	08H00	Sam' mat' gym	08h00			
12h00	Kafo flash	12h00	Kafo flash	12h00	Kafo flash	12h00	Kafo flash	12h00	Kafo flash	12h00	Kafo flash	08h30	Siraba shariya				
12h05	Aw ni Gwa	12h05	Aw ni Gwa	12h05	Aw ni Gwa	12h05	Aw ni Gwa	12h05	Aw ni Gwa	12h05	Aw ni Gwa	09h00	Musique du terroir	10h00			
14h00	Aérophilie	14h00	Pêle-Mêle variétés	14h00	Aérophilie	14h00	Aérophilie	14h00	Aérophilie	14h00	Aérophilie	10h00	Kafo School				
14h30	Lebeau ani Labelle			14h30	Kafo blon	14h30	Kafo blon	14h30	Kafo blon	14h30	Kafo blon	12h00	Kafo flash	12h00			
15h00	Emission soninké			15h00	Emission bobo	15h00	Emission sonrai	15h00	Emission sonrai	15h00	Kafo blon	12h05	Aw ni Gwa	12h05			
15h30	Kafo blon			15h30	Kafo blon	15h30	Kafo blon	15h30	Kafo blon	15h30	Kafo flash	14h00	L'invité de la semaine	14h00			
16h00	Kafo flash	16h00	Kafo flash	16h00	Kafo flash	16h00	Kafo flash	16h00	Kafo flash	16h00	Kafo flash	15h00	Pêle-mêle	15h00			
16h05	Mini ambiance	16h05	Mélo die du monde	16h05	Mélo die du monde	16h05	Mélo die du monde	16h05	Mélo die du monde	16h05	Mélo die du monde	16h00	Kafo flash	16h00			
17h00	Kafo sport	17h00	Vos droits et devoirs	17h00	Commun. & Dév.	17h00	Bamakan Show	17h00	Bamakan Show	18h00	Kunna fonl mpalan	16h30	Mélo die du monde				
18h00	Animat. libre/cqués	18h00	Animat. libre/cqués	18h00	Animat. libre/cqués	18h00	Animat. libre/cqués	18h00	Animat. libre/cqués	18h00	Plateau des associat.	18h00	Animat. libre/cqués	18h00			
19h00	Dinnez en douceur	19h00	Dinnez en douceur	19h00	Dinnez en douceur	19h00	Dinnez en douceur	19h00	Dinnez en douceur	19h00	Dinnez en douceur	18h00	Dinnez en douceur	18h00			
20h00	Orchestres du Mail	20h00	Pêle-Mêle	20h00	Le Grin	20h00	Kibaru la nouvelle	20h00	Kibaru la nouvelle	20h00	Podium musical	19h00	Voyage sur les ondes	20h00			
21h00		21h00	Soko n'a koro									20h00		21h30			
22h00	Fin	22h00	Fin	22h00	Fin	22h00	Fin	22h00	Fin	22h00	Fin	22h00	La fête de l'Archange	22h00			
												00h00	Fin				

EMISSIONS

CONTENUS

EMISSIONS

CONTENUS

Aérophilie
Afo Top
Aw ni Gwa
Bamakan show
Cèslri jala
Classic laser
Communication & développmt
Connais-tu mon beau pays?
Dinner en douceur
Fête de l'Archange (la)
Grin (le)
Invité de la semaine
Kafo astroflash
Kafo blon
Kafo flash
Kafo school
Kafo sport
Kafo telekun

Animation libre (fr. ; bam)
Actualité de la musique africaine (fr)
Magazine Femme /Santé (bam)
Musique RAPP (fr)
Initiatives féminines
Musique classique(fr)
Communication sociale (fr)
Histoire du Mali (bam; fr)
Musique de détente
Animation musicale (bam; fr)
Débat avec téléphone (bam; fr)
Interview (fr)
Horoscope (fr)
Tribune (bam; fr)
Flash d'information (fr)
Encyclopédie radiophon. (fr)
Sport (jun. : fr; dim. : bam)
Animation libre (bam)

Kibaru la nouvelle
Kafo astroflash
Kunna fonl mpalan
Lebeau ani Labelle
Mélo die du monde
Mini ambiance
Musique du terroir
Orchestres du Mail
Pêle-mêle
Plateau des associations
Podium musical
Sam' mat' gym
Siraba shariya
Soko n'a kòrò
Sounds of martyrs
Top génération
Vos droits & devoirs
Voyage sur les ondes
Yèrèdòn

Infos pêle-mêle (bam; fr)
Horoscope (fr)
Revue de la semaine (bam)
Radioscopie du couple : sketch (bam)
Variétés musicales
Musique Zouk
Musique traditionnelle
Promotion des orchestres (bam; fr)
Animation libre (bam; fr)
Tribune pour ass. & ONG (bam; fr)
Rock, Soul, jazz, Country music
Gymnastique (fr)
Circulation routière (bam)
Interprétation des rêves (bam)
Musique Reggae
Succès des années 80 et 70
Information & éducation juridiques (fr)
Musique/jeux/concours (bam; fr)
Connaissance de la cult. mallee (bam)

1
50
Lebeau ani Labelle; Radioscopie du menège (comédie)
Langues : bam = bambara; fr = français
bam.

GRILLE DES PROGRAMMES LUNDI / VENDREDI

- 6:00 à 09:00 KLEDU MATIN avec Mahamoud Camara et Sékou Koné
- 09:00 à 09:30 CHRONIQUE FAITS ET HISTOIRES avec Diadjé Kinta
- 09:30 à 10:00 MAGAZINE SCIENTIFIQUE avec Téophile Sangaré
- 10:00 à 12:30 EMISSION BAMBARA avec Sokona Diallo
- 12:30 à 14:30 GRAFFITI COULEUR avec Mahamoud Camara
- 14:30 à 16:00 POINT FOCAL avec Saaba Sissoko et Jacky
- 16:00 à 16:30 MAGAZINE ECONOMIE avec Sékou Koné
- 16:30 à 17:30 MAGAZINE CULTUREL avec Joseph Konaté
- 17:30 à 18:30 AFFAIRES PUBLIQUES avec Téophile Sangaré
- 18:30 à 19:30 ANTENNE USA avec la VOA
- 19:30 à 20:00 INFORMATION avec la VOA
- 20:00 à 20:30 LE DISQUE DES AUDITEURS avec Roger-Guy Folly
- 20:30 à 21:00 INFORMATION avec l'équipe info et FARAFINA DAMBE ** avec Dossé Traoré
- 21:00 à 21:30 INFORMATION avec la VOA
- 21:30 à 00:00 KLEDU'S NIGHT avec l'équipe de nuit

** émission bi-hebdomadaire

Appendix F. Media Survey Questionnaire

				M	F		
	01 - SEXE			<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		
<input type="checkbox"/>	IDENTITE	02 - AGE	10-15	15-30	30-45	+ 45	
			<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
	03 - SITUATION FAMILLE			C	m		
				<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		
	04 - NOMBRE D'ENFANTS		1	2	3	4	+4
			<input type="checkbox"/>				
	11 - MOBILITE		1	2	3		
			<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		
<input type="checkbox"/>	ACTIVITE	12 - OCCUPATION	Eleve			SE	
			<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
	13- REVENU		1	2	3		
			<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
	14 - SECTEUR		1	2	3	4	+4
			<input type="checkbox"/>				

INTERET POUR LES MEDIAS

• Préférences médias		1	2	3
		legèrement	Moyen	Fort
• 1011 Radio		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
• 10111 - combien de postes	<input type="checkbox"/>			
• 1012 Télé		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
• 10121 - (« «)	<input type="checkbox"/>			
• 1013 Presse écrite		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
• 10131 - Fréquent achat	<input type="checkbox"/>			
• 910 De façon générale les programmes ou articles sont-ils intéressants ?		oui	non	sans avis
• 9101 Radio		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
• 9102 Télé		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
• 9103 Presse écrite		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
• 9104 Causes du manque d'intérêt :				
• 91041 Diversité		<input type="checkbox"/>		
• 91043 Qualité		<input type="checkbox"/>		
• 91042 Liberté		<input type="checkbox"/>		
• 910431 Sonorité		<input type="checkbox"/>		
• 910432 Emission		<input type="checkbox"/>		

102 Vos préférences programmes :

	1	2	3	4		
	scientifiques	variétés	politique social culturel	Autre		
• 1021 - Radio	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
• 1022 - Télé	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
• 1023 - Presse écrite	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

20 INTERET POUR L'ECOUTE RADIO

	oui	non	SA
• 201 - Aimez-vous la Radio ?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
• 202 - Avez-vous une Radio ?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
• 203 - Ecoutez-vous la Radio ?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

• 204 - Disponibilité d'écoute ?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---

• 205 - Ecoute week-end

Matin 12-19 Soirée

• 205 ₁ - Radio	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
• 205 ₂ - Télé	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

•206 - Intéret pour les émissions :

Vif Moyen Nul

• 2061 - Théâtre-radio	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
• 2062 - Jeux concours	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
• 2063 - Emission Jeunes	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
• 2064 - Morale et traditions (voix des sages)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

• 207 - Langue

Fr	B	Autre			
<input type="checkbox"/>					

•220 -Quelles sont les contributions de la radio sur la société :

Total Moyen Négatif

• 2201 - Sécurité	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
• 2202 - Education	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
• 2203 - Affaires	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
• 2204 - Loisirs	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
• 2205 - Culture	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

• 207 -Heures d'écoute souhaitées :

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
• 2071 - Infos	<input type="checkbox"/>								
• 2072 - Variétés (musique, détente)	<input type="checkbox"/>								
• 2073 - Culture	<input type="checkbox"/>								
• 2074 - Sport	<input type="checkbox"/>								
• 2075 - Langues locales	<input type="checkbox"/>								
• 2076 - Sciences	<input type="checkbox"/>								

•208 - Lieu d'écoute :

		uniquement	souvent	temps à autre
• 2081 - Domicile		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
• 2082 - Grin		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
• 2083 - Travail		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
• 2084 -Ailleurs		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
• 2085 - Condition	groupe	<input type="checkbox"/>	seul	<input type="checkbox"/>

•209 -Vos stations préférées :

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
<input type="checkbox"/>												

• 2091 - Programme

variétés	infos	science	culture	sport	bambara
<input type="checkbox"/>					

• 2092 - Pourquoi ?

	Bon	Passable	Excellent
• 20921 - Qualité émission	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
• 20922 - Valeur émission	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
• 20923 - Heure émission	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
• 20924 - Langue	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

• 930 - Quel pensez-vous du nombre de stations au Mali ?

• 9301 -Excessif	<input type="checkbox"/>	1
• 9302 - Normal	<input type="checkbox"/>	2
• 9303 - Insuffisant	<input type="checkbox"/>	3

COCHEZ LES STATIONS QUE VOUS CONNAISSEZ

	FR3	RFI	BAMAKAN	KLEDU	TABALE	KAYIRA	CHAINE 2	LIBERTE	AFRICA N° 1
Qualité générale									
Heure de									
Langue									
valeur									
Animation									
Confiance									
Le sérieux									

- 10 Bon
- 20 Moyen
- 30 Nul
- 40 Sans avis

Appendix G. Interest Group Survey

ETUDE ARD/MSU/IMRAD --
GUIDE D'INTERVIEW AVEC
DES GROUPES ORGANISES DE LA SOCIETE CIVILE AU MALI

Date: ____/____/1994

A. INFORMATIONS STRUCTURELLES

Nom du Groupe ou Association: _____

Type de Groupe ou Association : _____

Le Groupe est-il indépendant ou fait-il partie d'un regroupement plus large (coordination, union, etc.)? _____

Personnes Rencontrées, et Position: _____

Objectif ou raison sociale: _____

Les objectifs du groupe sont-ils largement connus et partagés par les membres?

Que la réponse soit positive ou négative, expliquer pourquoi:

Quelles sont la structure et l'organisation internes (type de hiérarchie, distribution géographique, mode de mise en place des responsables, etc.):

Nombre d'adhérents/membres: _____

Quelles sont la taille, l'organisation, la structure interne, et les moyens financiers et humains (y compris niveau de formation) du groupe? De quelles ressources internes et externes dispose-t-il? (y compris d'un appui éventuel de l'extérieur): _____

Le groupe passe-t-il plutôt par des moyens légaux, ou par une stratégie conflictuelle? (grève, "casse", pression sur l'opinion publique par les médias, protestations, etc): _____

Le groupe fonctionne-t-il de façon indépendante, ou a-t-il établi des relations --et de quel type-- avec le Gouvernement, les partis, la classe politique, et les autres groupes constitués?

B. CRITERES D'EVALUATION DE LA CAPACITE DU GROUPE

Le groupe a-t-il accès aux informations sur la situation économique, sur les politiques en cours ou envisagées? Par quel mécanisme?

Le groupe dispose-t-il de mécanismes et de ressources nécessaires pour procéder à une analyse des informations obtenues, à travers son bureau, un ensemble de spécialistes du groupe, en ou en faisant appel à des compétences externes?

Le groupe s'organise-t-il pour examiner l'analyse et décider de sa position par rapport à cette analyse et aux objectifs du groupe (ne rien faire, appuyer ou opposer une politique, proposer d'autres options, etc) ? _____

Le groupe a-t-il la capacité d'exercer une influence par rapport au choix qui a été fait? _____

Dans l'expérience passée du Groupe, citer les cas où il a pu procéder à des délibérations, faire des choix, exercer une influence: participation à un processus de décision gouvernementale, consultation par les autorités, rôle joué dans certaines crises passées: _____

Appendix H. Characteristics of Selected Interest Groups

ANALYSIS OF THE CHARACTERISTICS OF SELECTED INTEREST GROUPS-MALI

BASIC CHARACTERISTICS									
IntGroup	Urban	Single	Corpor	Resource	Large	Info	Analyt	Confr	Massmob
ABB	1	2	1	1	2	1	1	2	2
ADIDE	1	1	2	2	1	1	1	2	1
AFE	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
ASCOMA	1	1	2	2	1	1	1	2	1
ATVR	1	2	2	2	1	2	1	2	1
CAFO	1	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	1
CCIM	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
FNEM	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	2	2
GPP	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	2	2
SYCOV	2	1	1	2	1	2	2	1	1
SYNTRUI	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2
UNCTRM	1	1	1	2	1	2	2	1	1
UNTM	1	2	2	1	1	1	2	1	1
SYNABAT	1	1	1	1	2	2	1	2	2
SYNAPRO	2	2	1	2	1	2	1	1	1
GCM	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1
CCAM	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	2	2
COFEM	1	1	2	2	1	1	1	2	1
SYNAPPO	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2
YES (1)	17	12	12	10	14	11	14	6	11
NO (2)	2	7	7	9	5	8	5	13	8
% YES		63%	63%	53%	74%	58%	74%	32%	58%


IntGroup	Consult	Media	NatAssm	PolAn	PolInst	Effect	Power
ABB	1	1	0	1	1	1	1
ADIDE	2	1	0	2	2	2	2
AFE	2	1	0	2	2	2	2
ASCOMA	1	1	0	2	1	1	0
ATVR	2	1	0	2	1	1	1
CAFO2	2	1	2	2	2	1	2
CCIM	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
FNEM	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
GPP	1	2	2	1	1	1	1
SYCOV	1	2	1	2	1	1	2
SYNTRUI	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
UNCTRM	1	2	0	2	2	2	2
UNTM	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
SYNABAT	1	1	1	1	1	1	2
SYNAPRO	1	2	0	2	2	1	2
GCM	1	1	1	2	1	1	1
CCAM	1	0	1	1	1	1	1
COFEM	1	1	0	1	1	1	2
SYNAPPO	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
YES (1)	15	19	9	10	14	16	10
NO (2)	4	4	2	9	5	3	8
% YES	79%	74%	47%	53%	74%	84%	53%

GROUPS DEMONSTRATING EFFECTIVENESS									
IntGroup	Urban	Single	Corpor	Resource	Large	Info	Analyt	Confr	Massmob
ABB	1	2	1	1	2	1	1	2	2
ASCOMA	1	1	2	2	1	1	1	2	1
ATVR	1	2	2	2	1	2	1	2	1
CAFO	1	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	1
CCAM	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	2	2
CCIM	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
COFEM	1	1	2	2	1	1	1	2	1
FNEM	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	2
GCM	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1
GPP	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	2	2
SYCOV	2	1	1	2	1	2	2	1	1
SYNABAT	1	1	1	1	2	2	1	2	2
SYNAPPO	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2
SYNAPRO	2	2	1	2	1	2	1	1	1
SYNTRUI	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2
UNTM	1	2	2	1	1	1	2	1	1
POWERFUL GROUPS									
ABB	1	2	1	1	2	1	1	2	2
ATVR	1	2	2	2	1	2	1	2	1
CCAM	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	2	2
CCIM	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
FNEM	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	2	2
GCM	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1
GPP	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	2	2
SYNAPPO	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2
SYNTRUI	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2
UNTM	1	2	2	1	1	1	2	1	1

IntGroup	Consult	Media	NatAssm	PolAn	Pollnst	Effect	Power
ABB	1	1	0	1	1	1	1
ASCOMA	1	1	0	2	1	1	0
ATVR	2	1	0	2	1	1	1
CAFO	2	1	2	2	2	1	2
CCAM	1	0	1	1	1	1	1
CCIM	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
COFEM	1	1	0	1	1	1	2
FNEM	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
GCM	1	1	1	2	1	1	1
GPP	1	2	2	1	1	1	1
SYCOV	1	2	1	2	1	1	2
SYNABAT	1	1	1	1	1	1	2
SYNAPPO	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
SYNAPRO	1	2	0	2	2	1	2
SYNTRUI	1	2	0	2	2	1	2
UNTM	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
ABB	1	1	0	1	1	1	1
ATVR	2	1	0	2	1	1	1
CCAM	1	0	1	1	1	1	1
CCIM	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
FNEM	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
GCM	1	1	1	2	1	1	1
GPP	1	2	2	1	1	1	1
SYNAPPO	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
SYNTRUI	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
UNTM	1	1	1	1	1	1	1


Appendix I. Schematic Illustrations of the Cotton Sub-Sector in Mali

Schematic Illustration of the Cotton Sub-Sector in Mali



Schematic Illustration of Cotton Sub-Sector Policy Areas

Inputs



Fiscal

Budget

Fiscal/Budget

Rural Development

Fiscal

Budget

Industry

Trade

Fiscal

Industry/Trade

Fiscal

Schematic Illustration of Cotton Sub-Sector Policy Areas

