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POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AND U.S. ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE

Office of Program Coordination
Agency for International Development
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A. I. D.
HISTORICAL
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Introduction

In the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the Congress called for an "historic demonstration that economic growth and political democracy go hand in hand...". The function of the economic assistance program that the Act established, in short, was to promote political as well as economic development.

The Marshall Plan was not only spectacularly successful in bringing about economic recovery and rapid growth, but also helped to reverse the Communist gains which threatened several European countries shortly after World War II. Just as we have had to learn that promoting self-sustaining growth in the less-developed world is a much more complex and long run task than restoring war-torn Europe, so we have had to learn that the connection between economic progress and democratic political trends is much more tenuous in Asia, Africa and Latin America than in Western Europe.

We continue to believe that prospects for democratic evolution are much better in an expanding than a stagnant economy, and that the very process of growth creates groups and interests working toward a pluralistic open society. But it is also obvious that rapid change creates tensions that strain the political system and may lead to breakdown or authoritarian rule. Equally clearly, the groups and interests created by development are not necessarily responsible in their behavior or democratic in their outlook. While it is artificial to establish a political development goal separate from our goals of accelerated economic growth and social change, it is equally unwise to assume that if we take care of economic growth, political development will take care of itself.

This paper defines a problem, sketches some of its causes and results, and proposes measures to improve the situation. The problem is that although political development is clearly a major U.S. foreign policy goal in many or most developing countries, neither the Department of State nor A.I.D. makes more than a superficial effort to analyze the barriers to and prospects for political development in specific countries or to assess the political development implications of U.S. activities in them. A.I.D.'s bias is strongly economic and technical. The Department of State concentrates on short-run trends and on attitudes toward the U.S. and toward specific international issues. There are a number of reasons for this, including the belief that direct attention to political development is risky, the lack of useful theory and good data on political development problems, and (in A.I.D.'s case) the lack of independent analytic capacity.

As a result, although A.I.D. engages in a variety of activities with the primary or secondary goal of influencing political development, these activities are seldom based on systematic analysis or integrated into country assistance strategies. Rather, they respond to specific threats or unusual opportunities, or reflect the special support of important

private U.S. groups. Certain aspects of political development are not addressed at all. And the long run political implications of the bulk of A.I.D.'s activities remain unexamined.

The concluding section of this paper recommends some steps A.I.D. can take to promote political development more effectively. Annex I briefly sketches the research on which this paper is based. It should be noted here, however, that we have examined attitudes and activities only within the Agency for International Development and, to a very limited extent, five U.S. embassies abroad. We have not considered other U.S. government programs such as Peace Corps, USIS, and military assistance, all of which undoubtedly have some impact on long run political evolution and to differing degrees are intended to do so. Nor have we tried to assess the actual effect of A.I.D.'s programs upon political development in specific countries. Such an assessment is a major undertaking, and could not be adequately dealt with as part of a broad initial survey.

I. U.S. Political Development Objectives and Activities

Political Development Objectives

Political development objectives have a central place among overall U.S. goals in almost every developing country where we conduct a sizeable economic assistance program. A.I.D., in cooperation with State and other departments, draws up and revises annually a concise "country assistance strategy statement" for each aided country. These statements typically summarize long-run U.S. goals like this:

"The U.S. objective is to maintain an independent country X, stable but not static, able and willing to prevent significant inroads by the Bloc, friendly to Free World principles, and responsive to the aspirations of the people of X for economic, social and political progress."

Clearly, such statements are far too broad to be operationally useful; but their frequency does indicate a real concern for political development.

The cliches in statements of this type also indicate a lack of sharpness in our definition of U.S. political development objectives. It is possible, however, to obtain a clearer picture of the nature of our objectives if one approaches the problem indirectly. From conversation and documents, one can distill what thoughtful State Department and AID staff mean when they say that Country X is making good progress in political development. The following are widely agreed to be indications of progress and therefore legitimate U.S. objectives.

Progress on the Part of Political Leadership and Administrative Personnel Toward:

1. Ability to maintain law and order with minimum repression, while observing due process.
2. Development of attitudes, institutions, and procedures--a working party system or the functional equivalent--that will permit orderly transfers of power, terms of office sufficiently long to allow program development, and reasonable freedom to dissent.
3. Establishment of a body of reasonably honest and competent civil servants--selected, trained, and rewarded under a merit system and possessing a sense of public service.
4. Active leadership in designing and creating support for rational development policies and programs.
5. Responsiveness to rational public aspirations and preferences, within the limits imposed by finances and staff.

6. Efforts to reduce inequities among classes, ethnic and religious groups, and regions.
7. Willingness to decentralize authority and control of resources in fields suitable for regional/local control, as rapidly as competent regional/local institutions are created.
8. Promotion of foreign policies not in conflict with fundamental U.S. interests.

Progress On the Part of the Public Toward:

9. Increasing participation in local government and other institutions designed to deal with local problems.
10. A growing sense of national identity and acceptance of the idea that different ethnic, religious, linguistic, and other groups have a legitimate claim to citizenship and equal treatment.
11. Increasing reliance on non-violent procedures for making needs and desires known to all levels of government and for mediating conflicts at all levels from local to international.

This list does not constitute a definition of political development. It is, rather, an enumeration of objectives. Moreover, it is heavily value-laden, though it does not specify particular institutional or constitutional forms. We think it fair to say that today there is widespread recognition in the State Department and A.I.D. that the institutions and procedures which permit stability and progress in underdeveloped countries may depart radically from North America and Western European patterns.

Political Development Activities

In practice, A.I.D. activities address some of the above political development objectives directly, some indirectly and others superficially or not at all. In general, we take action in respect to those objectives that appear to have fairly obvious institutional or program handles. A few examples: We try to increase ability to maintain law and order by training and equipping police forces. We sponsor and staff public administration institutes to increase the competence and sense of service of the public service. We assist in establishing or strengthening local and municipal government institutions. We help in many countries to establish cooperatives or community development programs which are consciously intended to increase both the local population's ability to participate in local affairs and the central government's willingness to permit and encourage such participation. In several countries we are supporting host government efforts to narrow regional disparities (usually, however, where we fear subversive exploitation of poverty and neglect, as in Northeast Thailand, Northeast Brazil, and the Peruvian Altiplano). We have pressed for and provided technical advice on tax reform not only to increase

revenues but also to reduce inequity. Where we have pushed hard for land reform, concern for equity--and for unrest that might result without reform--has usually been our primary concern, since land reform is usually expected in its early years to reduce production.

As one would expect, all of the above A.I.D. activities relate to political development objectives that can be addressed directly through institutional change or government action. A.I.D. does not, in contrast, usually make a direct approach to those objectives that relate to the content and pattern of politics per se. Though, for example, we back sound economic planning, A.I.D. does not give governing parties financial resources or technical advice in promoting public support for plans and development policies. And while A.I.D. tools have been used with varying success to prolong the tenure of particular governments, we have done little to try to build organizations, including political parties, which will directly increase the country's capacity to avoid revolving door governments and violent transfers of power.

II. Political Development and A.I.D. Program Planning

The Economic Focus of A.I.D. Program Planning

Although its ultimate objectives are political and a number of its activities are intended to affect political development, A.I.D. is basically organized for and oriented toward promoting economic growth. Proposed activities are closely examined for their technical adequacy and usually for their economic potency. But rarely is attention paid to their political development impact. Annual program submissions include a section on the country's "political and social situation," but these sections are usually descriptive rather than analytic and have little connection with the remainder of the submission. When political considerations are seriously analyzed, it is usually in terms of blocks to economic progress. With few exceptions, A.I.D. does not attempt to establish operational political development objectives and to devise a coherent strategy for achieving them. Nor does it try to anticipate the effect upon political evolution of programs undertaken for economic reasons. There is, in short, a strong tendency to act as if we believed that if we take care of economic development, political development will take care of itself.

There are several reasons for this economic outlook. Some of these reasons are essentially misconceptions.

- i. There is a strong feeling in A.I.D. and elsewhere that direct pursuit of political development is risky. Obviously, prudence is essential. But several points need to be made clear. First, political development activities do not have to be identified as such--which is demonstrated by the wide range of these activities that we now undertake. Second, not all aspects of political development are particularly sensitive. Sometimes fairly open consultation and cooperation are possible, as when our goals coincide with the host government's and the topic is not extremely touchy (for example, there may be mutual interest in strengthening local government institutions or promoting

regional integration). Third, if an objective is important, it is probably worth some risk. After all, we are becoming more willing to intervene in delicate economic decisions e.g., on devaluation when we think there is a reasonable chance of influencing host government action.

ii. Some A.I.D. officials confuse "political development" with short-run political or diplomatic uses of aid. The Agency has long tried to minimize the latter, for long-run development is its primary goal and other uses of aid tend to undercut that goal as well as to stir up unwelcome criticism at home and abroad.

Yet development is not always easy to distinguish from short-run aims. Not all differences are as clear as the contrast between improving local government institutions and financing a prime minister's airplane. For example, labor leadership training programs are accepted as legitimate A.I.D. activities; low-cost housing programs in areas of urban unrest are accepted as legitimate by the Latin American Bureau but are thought dubious by the African Bureau; providing sports equipment for youth groups is generally considered even more questionable. Although there are no clear Agency standards distinguishing "political development" activities from "slush fund" projects, one assumed distinction seems to be the degree to which our economic input will be channelled through a permanent institution (local government, education system, labor union) rather than being scattered among individuals or groups.

iii. Although not many A.I.D. officials would express it this way, there may be some feeling that it is morally wrong to try to influence another country's political institutions. But the dilemma is a false one, for it is now widely recognized that except in extremely limited programs we cannot choose not to exert political influence. The volume, content and administration of our aid will in some measure fortify or undermine the distribution of political power and affect the content of political pressures and the extent of political participation. Deliberate intervention, therefore, is not an alternative to no intervention; it is an alternative to inadvertent intervention which may be adverse. The only question is how we are to direct the political influence which we will inevitably have.

Other reasons for A.I.D.'s economic and technical outlook relate to organization and the state of the discipline.

iv. A.I.D. has no independent capacity for political analysis. The State Department in Washington and the embassies in the field are responsible for analyzing political problems and setting political targets, including political development targets. Unfortunately, most of the State Department's political analysis centers on current events and problems: a time horizon longer than a year or eighteen months is rare. Moreover, much analysis focusses on attitudes toward the U.S. and foreign policy issues of concern to the U.S., rather than on attitudes and trends affecting the country's internal political

evolution. Finally, even where analysis does focus on long-run problems of internal political development, the analysis usually does not go on to spell out implications for concrete U.S. action.

v. Both the State Department and A.I.D. lack useful theory and relevant data about political development. There is much less agreement and understanding about this process than about the process of economic development. Moreover, some are skeptical of our ability to promote political development directly. Since we know more about affecting economic than political change, many A.I.D. officials feel we should concentrate on the job we can do relatively well.

vi. Finally, many A.I.D. field personnel are disinclined to get involved in politics or with politicians. A.I.D. is an executive agency and its field staff are predominantly technicians. The professional activity and temperament of field personnel, therefore, tends to limit their contacts to host country executive agencies. There is a touch of the technocratic outlook that politics is an unfortunate and perhaps even unnecessary hinderance to the constructive work of development.

How AID Gets Into Political Development Activities

Since AID is primarily organized for promoting economic growth, its political development efforts are usually semi-accidental or the result of special circumstances.

i. If questioned, an AID officer responsible for a certain country will usually mention a number of projects which he believes contribute to political development. Frequent examples are labor leadership training, police training and equipment, education, public administration, cooperatives, and community development. However, if pressed as to whether political development objectives played a major part in determining project selection and design, he will probably admit that with the exception of labor and police activities (treated in iii below), we had other objectives in mind when we commenced the activity. For example, in designing an education project, we will usually be guided by manpower requirements in the country concerned rather than by the political development effects which our aid may have. Sometimes we anticipate a political "bonus" in addition to economic benefits from the project, but our interest in the political development effects is usually secondary and is almost always non-operational. That is, it has no effect on the design of the project.

ii. A.I.D. often undertakes programs aimed at reducing clear and pressing threats to a country's political evolution. Our activities in Vietnam and Laos, and much of the program in Thailand, may be seen in this light. Sometimes we engage in concentrated rural development efforts intended to head off subversion or extremism, as in Northeast Thailand and Brazil and the Peruvian Altiplano. Or aid may be used to "buy time" for a government (either because the U.S. feels it is a good government or because it is the best we are likely to get) by

desk. This arrangement is not used for any other region. However, it is difficult to sort out the effects of this organizational structure from the other special reasons for more adequate attention to problems of political development in Latin America.

III. A.I.D.'s Assumptions About Political Development

One basic assumption underlies, to some extent, all of the others. That, of course, is the view that economic growth is a sine qua non for "desirable" political development--desirable in the sense of the objectives outlined in Part I. In practice, A.I.D. has manifested an even greater faith in economic growth.

A.I.D. program documents, viewed in the aggregate, imply that economic growth is the best medicine for many specific political development problems--that economic growth will resolve urban unrest by creating employment; that it will alleviate tribal and ethnic conflict and develop new national loyalties through the leveling process and mutuality of interest implicit in quickened economic activity; and, most important, that growth will pave the way for the emergence of broadly based "democratic" political systems by removing the wellsprings of extremism--poverty and frustration--and by developing groups which have a stake in society, particularly an entrepreneurial middle class and a land-owning peasantry.

The following outline is an attempt to go beyond these general views to the assumptions that A.I.D. officials make about specific political development objectives. Of course, none of these assumptions is universally held; they are portrayed here because they represent prevailing thinking. The list of six objectives, it should also be noted, is intended to be illustrative and not exhaustive. Following the enumeration of assumptions made about each objective, we have given examples of projects based on them.

(i) Broadening Political Participation

Assumptions 1

- (a) All people, inherently, want to have a voice in their own affairs and will respond to opportunity and encouragement to do so.
- (b) Involvement in local institutions gives the voter a feeling of political efficacy.

Projects 1

- (a) Local government development
- (b) Cooperatives; credit unions, community development

Assumptions 2

- (a) Illiterates make poor democrats. Education, even a limited amount of it, materially improves the capacity to vote intelligently.
- (b) An "intelligent" voter will determine that his interests lie in supporting relatively moderate governments or political movements.

Projects 2

- (a) Primary school development; adult education; and--related in the broadest sense--a wide range of other projects in education.

(ii) Creating a Pluralistic Society

Assumptions 1

- (a) Development of a number of strong, well-organized interest groups independent of the government and of political parties and concentrating on promoting their members' bread-and-butter interests will pave the way for political process focussed on practical issues and characterized by bargaining and compromise.

Projects 1

- (a) Labor union leadership training
- (b) Cooperatives
- (c) Measures to strengthen the business community: investment banks, information centers, schools of business administration.

(iii) Influencing Attitudes of Key Groups

Assumptions 1

- (a) Individuals with a highly developed sense of professionalism or commitment to their studies or work will devote their energies to their job or studies and eschew political activity--particularly radical activity.
- (b) As a corollary to the above, improved facilities and equipment serve to develop a sense of professionalism.
- (c) These groups will also be diverted from radical political activity if amenities connected with their jobs or studies are improved.

Projects 1

- (a) A.I.D. offers equipment and facilities to key groups: books, laboratory equipment to universities; communications equipment, weapons, buildings to police forces; typewriters and printing machinery to journalists; union headquarters facilities to labor unions.
- (b) A.I.D. helps to improve the amenities of these groups: dormitories for students, housing for individual police officers, etc.

Assumptions 2

- (a) Training by and association with foreign advisors will result not only in a transfer of technical skills but will also inculcate foreign political values and approaches to political problems.
- (b) Bringing individuals to another country will have the same effect.

Projects 2

- (a) A.I.D. conducts or finances training for and supplies advisors to key groups in their own countries and brings a large number of representatives of these groups to the United States for study and tours.

(iv) Alleviating or Avoiding Urban Unrest

Assumptions 1

- (a) The major source of urban discontent is (1) unemployment -- particularly among newly arrived migrants from rural areas, or (2) poor living conditions.
- (b) As a corollary to the above, discontent occasioned by economic conditions leads to support for extremist movements. The worse such conditions are, the greater the support for extremist political activity.

Projects 1

- (a) Industrial development in urban areas.
- (b) Agricultural training in public schools and general rural development projects intended to slow migration to the cities.

- (c) Housing (relatively rare).
- (d) Urban amenities: water, sewage systems, street improvements.
- (e) CCC type organizations to absorb unemployed youth (rare).

Assumptions 2

- (a) Labor unions may become a focal point for urban discontent.

Projects 2

- (a) Various projects to focus interests of unions on industrial rather than political action, e.g., cooperative housing schemes, training in bargaining and grievance procedures.

(v) Integrating Currently or Potentially Disaffected Regions

Assumptions 1

- (a) Physical isolation from the center sustains traditional fears of central government actions and feelings that the government exploits the region.
- (b) These attitudes often create a receptivity to subversive influences within or outside the region.
- (c) Uneven economic development creates resentment in regions where development is lagging. Moreover, individuals with no stake in a society are not likely to have much loyalty to it.

Projects 1

- (a) Construction of roads, telecommunications and other physical links from the center or other regions to the region concerned.
- (b) Projects to raise family cash incomes rapidly, e.g., poultry raising, pig farming.
- (c) Projects likely to give people a sense that the central government is interested in their welfare, e.g., primary education, community development.
- (d) Public works to provide temporary employment (often remunerated in kind through Food for Peace commodities).

(vi) Improving Public Administration and Services

Assumptions 1

- (a) The quality of public administration is a major factor in the pace of economic development.
- (b) Corruption and arrogance on the part of civil servants and inefficiency in the public service will breed resentment of the prevailing political system (the extent to which this is believed is questionable).
- (c) Western methods and mores of public service -- including a sense of duty to the public, honesty, non-involvement in politics -- can be imparted through instruction.

Projects 1

- (a) Public administration institutes.
- (b) Training in the United States for present or potential administrators.

A number of these assumptions may appear -- and undoubtedly are -- crude; consequently the activities we base on them may seem either irrelevant or likely to produce unwanted results. Many A.I.D. officials are aware of this. But they and the Agency face the dilemma of all operational government bodies: the need to act now rather than waiting until the last word has been said about the problem to be dealt with. Given the importance of these particular problems, the challenge now is to broaden our understanding and refine our techniques as rapidly as possible.

IV. Expansion of A.I.D. Capacity to Influence Political Development

A.I.D. should act in six areas to expand its capacity to influence and promote favorable political development. These are:

- (i) New Institutional Arrangements. A.I.D. should assign responsibility for Agency efforts in the political development area to a specific office.
- (ii) Awareness. A.I.D. should take steps to heighten, within the Agency, awareness of political development as an A.I.D. goal and techniques to influence such development.
- (iii) Analytic Competence. A.I.D. should act to increase Agency ability to analyze political development problems.

- (iv) Programming Requirements. A.I.D. should require explicit consideration of political development factors at different stages of the programming process.
- (v) Program Activities. A.I.D. should consider new types of activities, or modify existing projects to better promote political development.
- (vi) Research. A.I.D. should encourage and, if appropriate, sponsor or carry out external research into aspects of political development that are directly relevant to A.I.D. activities. Simultaneously, A.I.D. should ensure that the results of this research are fully utilized.

Institutional Arrangements

We believe that A.I.D., in order to carry out any of the ideas that will be discussed here, should have a small central staff which would have a continuing, though not necessarily an exclusive, concern for political development problems. We recommend that the Policy Planning Division of the Office of Program Coordination be the locus for such a staff. One of the division's assistant chiefs should be assigned responsibility for political development, while the division should be expanded so that at least one political scientist has political development as his primary, near-full-time responsibility. At present, three political scientists in the division are assigned a residual, as opposed to a primary, responsibility for political development, totalling at most a third of a man-year.

There is also a need for increased capacity in the regional planning or institutional development offices and in major missions to deal with political development problems. This point is discussed below.

Awareness

We recommend:

- i. A summer seminar on political development along the lines of the Rural Development Conference held at MIT in 1964. Participants should include officials of A.I.D., State, and possibly Defense Department military assistance programs, as well as academic specialists.
- ii. A discussion paper, based on the paper presented at this meeting and revised to reflect comments and suggestions, to be circulated in Washington and in the field. Preferably, such a paper should be sent under cover of a message from the Administrator.

- iii. A series of case studies of current or recent past A.I.D. efforts to influence political development, preferably comparative studies. Missions would probably find such a series more useful than a general discussion paper. Such studies could be done in-house, but this could strain already over-extended resources. We suggest that A.I.D. have the studies done under contract. A combined approach is also possible.
- iv. Placing political development--and what A.I.D. can do about it--on the agenda of Mission Directors' or program officers' conferences. The case studies mentioned in point iii above would be useful here.
- v. Arranging evening seminars on political development for selected A.I.D. and State Department staff, perhaps under the aegis of a local research institution. Such seminars would be useful but are no substitute for the recommended summer conference.
- vi. Making brief discussion of political development an element of orientation lectures. We do not recommend, however, setting aside a full orientation lecture for consideration of the subject.

Capacity to Analyze Political Development Problems

Steps to heighten awareness merge into measures to increase analytic competence. The problem of upgrading A.I.D.'s competence to analyze political development problems is similar to that of increasing any other kind of analytic competence: A.I.D. should train current staff. It should recruit better qualified new staff. And it should make fuller use of consultants and other talent outside the Agency.

Specifically, we recommend:

- i. Recruiting persons trained in social science fields other than economics. The Agency now hires only a few such persons and, having hired them, uses them as generalists. There are a few exceptions to this rule (e.g., a small political development staff in the Far East Program Office).

If analysis of political development problems were recognized as a continuing element of program analysis and planning (by adopting some of the measures discussed below), AID/W program planning offices and larger missions would have to make such analysis a formal part or full-time assignment to one or more persons. As a result, there would be more interest in hiring qualified social scientists and using their special expertise. On the other side of the coin,

the more talented young social scientists interested in political development, who do not now consider A.I.D. at all as a possible short or long-run employer, might come to have more interest in the Agency.

- ii. Attempting special staffing arrangements on a pilot or trial basis in AID/Washington and in interested missions. A number of posts probably would welcome such an arrangement. The responsibilities of a field officer of this kind and his relation to the embassy would have to be defined in close consultation with the latter.
- iii. Encouraging mid-career graduate study in political science and related fields as study of economics is now encouraged. (We considered but rejected the possibility of in-house training courses.)
- iv. Making fuller use of consultants to augment the analytic ability available to the Agency. There have been a few attempts to use consultants to examine political development problems; for example, in the summer of 1965 the Africa Bureau planned to send a team of social scientists to one or more selected African countries, and in fact sent an outstanding anthropologist to Liberia to examine the role and structure of local government and prospects for its development. However, such efforts have been few and far between, reflecting the Agency's general failure to identify political development problems and to regard them as legitimate subjects for analysis and possible action. Fuller use of consultants would probably result naturally from heightened awareness among A.I.D. staff of political development problems.

Two points should be mentioned in connection with using consultants. The first is obvious, but critical: consultants should be given terms of reference that will maximize the prospects of their obtaining results of operational utility to the Agency. Second, wherever possible, consultants should be used in conjunction with specialized A.I.D. staff. Experience indicates that best results are obtained when the mission has done some prior analysis and where at least one mission staff member has the competence and responsibility to follow up the consultant's recommendations.

As a low priority but possibly useful device to encourage use of consultants, we recommend developing and making available to missions a roster of social scientists who are interested in specific types of political development problems or have done research on particular problems in specific countries. The State Department Office of External Research would be very helpful in developing such a roster.

New Activities and New Dimensions to Existing Activities

There is a tremendous range of possible new activities or new dimensions to old activities which might promote specific aspects of political development effectively under particular country circumstances. This discussion can merely sketch a few possibilities, with special attention to activities designed to reach groups or serve goals which A.I.D.'s current programs neglect.

We should also note at the outset that undertaking new activities or modifying old ones to better address political development goals should be undertaken within the framework of basic A.I.D. country programming principles. In particular, the principles of tailoring goals and programs to the specific country situation and of concentrating A.I.D.'s efforts on a limited number of high priority goals apply as much to political development efforts as to any other A.I.D. activities. However, some of the activities discussed below merely call for marginal redesign of existing activities, and would not at all affect the existing distribution of A.I.D. activities. Some of the suggestions, such as "retreats" or conferences for host country leaders, are ad hoc efforts involving small amounts of money plus a brief though intensive input of time and attention from top-level Country Team members. Other suggestions would indeed add new activities, and would have to compete with other activities in the context of over-all program goals. Political development activities should not be given any special cross-the-board priority. However, we feel that in the past, they have not been given the attention they deserve.

i. Activities focussed on key groups.

Certain groups--students, labor, military leaders, legislators, among others--are politically important in most developing countries. A.I.D. now conducts activities designed to influence some of these groups. Others are contacted only in connection with their potential contribution to economic growth, or not at all. For example:

- (a) Legislators are obviously a critical group. At present A.I.D. has hardly any systematic contact with legislators as individuals or groups. We recommend:
 - (i) Encouraging country teams to consider making direct contact with legislators in connection with specific development problems or projects. For example, A.I.D. might arrange a study tour to the U.S. or Puerto Rico for legislators working on a bill to authorize and regulate credit unions. Such tours could have effects going far beyond the bill in question.

- (ii) Exploring the possibility of helping to establish a center in the U.S. which could act as a focal point for contacts between legislators from developing countries and American politicians, national, state and local. Such a center, as conceived by its proposer, Congressman Ronald Fraser, could also act as a clearing house for a broad range of activities relating to political development, e.g., campesino training. In our view, such a center should be privately operated and largely privately financed in order that the maximum number of doors remain open to it. A.I.D. could offer financial assistance and technical advice. The experience of the privately financed and operated training center in Costa Rica for young Latin American politicians might offer some useful guidelines.
- (iii) Including young politicians in programs like that now conducted by Loyola University under contract with A.I.D. Loyola offers seminars for young leaders from Central American countries, Panama, and (recently) the Dominican Republic, covering a core program in development economics, social and psychological aspects of change, political problems of development and the responsibilities of political leadership, plus courses and exercises in small group leadership. The participants also visit homes and take field trips to observe civic groups and federal, state and local government organizations in action. The program lasts six weeks, and six such series are offered each year. Participants are usually selected from a particular occupational or social group--for example, teachers, young political leaders, young administrative leaders. The approach obviously can be used to reach many different groups. Eventually it is hoped that private U.S. foundations and civic groups will contribute to the program, but now it is wholly A.I.D. financed. If the program is as successful as preliminary inquiry suggests, similar programs to serve other regions should be set up.
- (b) Students. A.I.D. directs substantial capital and technical assistance to secondary and university education. But it largely ignores the discipline from which many politicians and other civic leaders are drawn--law and the social sciences other than economics.

Within the past year, A.I.D. has initiated efforts to improve the quality of legal education in the countries we assist (as part of a larger effort to strengthen the legal framework in these countries). We recommend expanding this effort and considering extending it to the non-economic social sciences.

We also recommend exploring ways A.I.D. can expand contacts with student organizations in developing countries. In cooperation with other U.S. agencies working in the youth field, A.I.D. might support expanded activities by American student groups and appropriate international student organizations in the developing countries, e.g., seminars, conferences, or study tours. Major university contracts might include provision for a program of contacts (exchanges, conferences, visits) between student government organizations in the U.S. universities and the host country universities.

- (c) The Business Community. A.I.D. should do more to use its extensive contacts with business communities to affect political development. For example, we finance schools of business administration. A.I.D. should as a matter of policy require that these schools offer courses on general problems of development (political as well as economic) and the role of the business community in the development process. A.I.D. could also assist business schools, investment centers and other institutions in giving seminars or conferences on major policy issues or development problems confronting the country. An example of this approach was a retreat sponsored by the U.S. Ambassador and the A.I.D. Mission Director in Colombia in late summer 1965. Roughly thirty-five leading Colombians from business, government, education and journalism came together to discuss problems of agricultural development and land reform. The participants have urged the Ambassador to hold another session.
- (d) Journalists. A.I.D. makes only tenuous contacts with this pivotal group. We have helped build radio stations in a few countries, and have provided training and advice on repair and maintenance. In a few countries, for example, Liberia, communications media specialists have promoted the growth of local newspapers outside the capital city. But we direct little attention to those who determine what is to be communicated. A.I.D. should finance more training for leading journalists. This training, however, should focus on the content of journalism--political, economic and social problems--and not on the techniques. Our concern is not how good the headlines look, but what they say.

ii. Other Activities.

Obviously, a great many other kinds of activities can make a direct and substantial contribution to political development. Under appropriate country circumstances, strengthened local or municipal government cooperatives, land reform, community development, urban self-help housing, or judicial reform might be as or more important to political development than the kinds of activities discussed above. But country

circumstances vary so widely that it is difficult to identify "neglected problems" or suggest expanded or new activities outside of a country context.

There is one fairly general problem, however, to which A.I.D. probably gives too little systematic attention. Urban growth in many developing countries is proceeding at a rate and along lines that will create (or have already created) serious political as well as social and economic difficulties. A.I.D. is certainly aware of many facets of the problem and engages in a variety of activities to address them. However, A.I.D. has not made any effort to consider "urban development" in an integrated manner, as we have tried to consider "rural development". Activities such as self-help housing, urban community development, and planning assistance might be far more effective in the context of a more focussed consideration of rapid urban growth.

Better Focussed and Better Utilized Research

1. Better Communication with the Research Community.

Much research is being conducted in the field of political development. However, little of this research is brought to bear on problems of direct concern to A.I.D. This situation contrasts with the quite active communication between A.I.D. and the research community with respect to economic development problems. It reflects much more limited and sporadic efforts to analyze problems of political development and to define the questions on which further research is needed. The lack of communication also suggests that most of those doing research on political development have done relatively little to spell out the policy implications of their work for the governments of the developing countries themselves or for the U.S. government. The lack of policy oriented research and failure to try to apply the results of research are of course a vicious circle.

We recommend a series of follow-up conferences to the present session in order to break this circle. The conferences might be focussed on different types of political development problems: broadening popular political participation, coping with urban unrest, breaking the power of a conservative traditional elite, national integration. A half-dozen political and other social scientists who have done work on these problems should be invited to participate with selected A.I.D. staff members in a day-long session at which A.I.D. would present two or three country situations and the ways in which we are trying to address the problem in these countries, and the academic participants would set out their ideas on how to approach the problem. The purpose of these sessions would be to test the extent to which research already underway or completed can be drawn upon to suggest ways to approach different types of political development problems and goals. The Far East Bureau has already experimented with a slightly different version of this approach, through its South East Asia Development Advisory Group (SEADAG).

The summer seminar on political development recommended above should also contribute to improved understanding of policy problems by political development researchers, and to broader acquaintance with existing research results on the part of State Department and A.I.D. officials.

ii. New Research

In addition to drawing out the policy implications of research already underway or completed, A.I.D. should also sponsor new research on political development problems. We hope that spelling out the assumptions on which the Agency now acts, conducting follow-up conferences, and taking other measures suggested in this paper will lead to sharpened questions for research.

The developing countries are more sensitive about research into their political trends and forces influencing political evolution than research on economic or technical matters. No one wants another Camelot incident. However, as mentioned earlier in another context, not all aspects of political development are sensitive in all countries. Research into factors promoting national integration might be completely acceptable in some countries where such integration is an important problem. Moreover, there is a great deal of leeway for approaching more sensitive topics obliquely.

We know that many research organizations find A.I.D.'s research contract procedures and requirements cumbersome and confining. These problems have been discussed in earlier sessions of the Administrator's Advisory Committee, and the Agency has taken and continues to take steps to streamline its procedures.

Conclusion

We would close with an observation. The recommendations made here, we hope, have merit. But they are not enough. Taken as a group these recommendations have the purpose of making political development a matter for systematic concern and action by A.I.D. This would constitute a radical departure for the Agency. For this reason, the priority given the subject as a whole is more important than any individual action. The central problem is not one of changing procedures and systems but of giving A.I.D.'s overall approach a new dimension.



A. I. D.

Annex I HISTORICAL
COLLECTION

The foregoing paper is based on research conducted between June and December 1965. There were three phases to the research:

1. A study of Country Assistance Strategy Statements, CAPs, and project descriptions in Els and in the "shadow books" prepared for Congressional Presentation, to assess the extent to which political development objectives were explicitly addressed.
2. Discussions with approximately 30 A.I.D. desk officers and division chiefs regarding the major political development problems in the countries for which they were responsible and the activities which they viewed as contributing to political development.
3. Field trips to Kenya and Nigeria, and to Guatemala, Colombia and Bolivia, to discuss the same questions with mission and embassy staff. Field officers were also asked their views on various programming and staffing changes which might lead to more systematic attention to political development problems.

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