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Engineering and Planning for Rural Reconstruction in Afghanistan

A Feasibility Study Prepared by the
Reconstruction Group of the Center for International Studies
of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology

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Prologue: The Abandonment of Afghanistan:
War, Reconstruction, and the International Community

There is currently a political and military stalemate in Afghanistan. The anticipated collapse of the Communist government of Afghanistan, led by Najibullah, following the withdrawal of Soviet troops in early 1989, has not materialized. An unsuccessful military assault by the mujahideen against the Kabul-controlled town of Jalalabad revealed the unexpected cohesion and military strength of the Kabul regime as well as the divisiveness among the mujahideen and their inability to move from guerilla warfare tactics to main force combat. By the end of 1989 it became apparent that the war in Afghanistan no longer engaged the interests of the major powers but was now primarily a civil conflict. The subsequent disintegration of the Soviet state, and U.S. concerns with developments in Eastern Europe and in the Gulf, further removed Afghanistan from the agenda of the two countries.

In anticipation of an early end of the war even before Soviet forces withdrew, the major national donors, the United Nations and its specialized agencies, and the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) functioning in the region, initiated cross-border programs intended to facilitate the return of millions of Afghan refugees and to begin the process of reconstruction. Substantial financial pledges were made by the Japanese government and other donors to the Office for the Coordination of United Nations Humanitarian and Economic Programmes relating to Afghanistan (UNOCA). The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) readied itself for what was expected to be one of the world's largest repatriation efforts. The

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United States, whose cross-border programs were among the first and largest, geared itself for a program of reconstruction in Afghanistan.

The US Agency for International Development (USAID) devised a strategy. It provided for the development of Afghanistan's private sector, especially its historically well-established trading networks. The reconstruction of rural roads, bridges, and irrigation works would be undertaken primarily by non-governmental organizations, preferably by Afghan-managed NGOs. Efforts would be made to promote community participation in rural reconstruction, making use where possible of *shuras* or local councils.

It was in this context that the Reconstruction Group of the Center for International Studies of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology was asked by USAID and one of its largest NGOs, Volunteers in Technical Assistance (VITA) to explore the feasibility of converting the VITA Peshawar-based multi-million dollar rural reconstruction program into a wholly independent Afghan non governmental organization. For the MIT team this feasibility study also offered the exciting opportunity to explore more broadly the questions of strategy and institutional structures for the reconstruction and development of rural Afghanistan.

The team arrived in Pakistan in early August 1991, completed its work by the end of the month, and submitted its report in October 1991. In November two members of the team, Professors Thomas Barfield and Myron Weiner, returned to Islamabad and Peshawar to review the report's recommendations with USAID and to familiarize themselves with the latest policies and programs of USAID and other agencies concerned with reconstruction.

The MIT team visit came at a time when USAID was reformulating its policies toward Afghanistan. Following the taking of two Americans as hostages by mujahideen commanders in July, USAID had suspended its cross-border programs. The movement of personnel, commodities, and equipment was officially halted, though in practice some of the cross border programs continued. Subsequently, after the MIT team left Pakistan, USAID also terminated the cross-border commodity program managed by Development Alternatives Incorporation (DAI), an American NGO contracted to build a network of Afghan private distributors for agricultural equipment, seeds, fertilizers, saplings, etc. Within a few weeks after the MIT team submitted its preliminary recommendations for how an independent Afghan NGO could be created out of the VITA organization in Peshawar, USAID informed MIT that it was suspending its plans to Afghanize its programs. Finally, USAID cancelled a contracted conference at MIT which would have brought together international donors engaged in Afghanistan's reconstruction to discuss an MIT proposal for establishing an international commission on rural reconstruction.

The Barfield/Weiner visit to Pakistan thus came at a time when, in a view expressed by the Director of the O/AID/Rep for Afghanistan Affairs, US policy was one of waiting until an interim government is created in Kabul, at which time the United States would then establish a bilateral program with the new government. US policies on reconstruction, including the roles of the private sector, NGOs, and local authorities, would be guided by the wishes of the interim government. It was the Director's view that USAID should not engage in any programs, including the Afghanization of NGOs, that might be viewed unfavorably by an interim Afghan government. If, moreover, by the middle of 1992 no interim government is in place, US

cross border programs would come to an end and, for all practical purposes, the US would withdraw from Afghanistan.

Barfield and Weiner met with USAID officials in Peshawar and Islamabad, with Soviet, Pakistan, and AIG (Afghan Interim Government) officials, the chief officers of UNOCA, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the World Food Program (WFP), the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), and with staff of VITA, CARE, and DAI. What follows is a brief report of our findings, and a discussion of the implications for the future role of the international community in the post-war reconstruction and development of Afghanistan.

In November a delegation of Afghan mujahideen, led by Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani, the acting foreign minister of the AIG and its minister for reconstruction, met with Soviet officials in Moscow. A joint communique called for the handing over of all power in Afghanistan to an Islamic interim government, elections two years after the interim government assumes power, an agreement by the mujahideen to release the first batch of Soviet POWs by 1st January 1992, a reaffirmation by the Soviets of their intention to stop supplying military hardware and fuel for military vehicles to the Kabul government from 1st January 1992, the establishment of a joint Soviet-mujahideen commission, and the opening of a Soviet mission in Peshawar to facilitate a continuation of the Soviet-mujahideen dialogue toward a final political settlement. What paved the way for these negotiations was a Soviet offer to drop President Najibullah, and a joint agreement with the United States that the two countries would end all shipments of military supplies to their respective allies (what is known as "negative symmetry"). The Soviet deputy foreign minister also indicated that

they intended to play a role in Afghanistan's postwar reconstruction once a government was in place.

The Soviet official with whom we met emphasized that the primary concern of the Soviet government is the release of several hundred POWs and information on MIAs. He also emphasized, as the communique indicated, that the composition of an interim government is a matter for the Afghans to decide, and therefore dependent upon negotiations between the mujahideen and the Kabul government. The optimistic statements issued by Professor Rabbani, following his return from Moscow, that the mujahideen and the Soviets would soon find a solution to the twelve-year-old conflict without an intra-Afghan dialogue, implied (questionably) that the Soviets have the power to dictate a settlement to the Kabul government and to remove Najibullah. A "Soviet" role in reconstruction also seems unlikely, given the disintegration of the Soviet state itself, and the deteriorating state of its economy and finances. The successor states to the Soviet Union are not in a position to provide grain to Kabul this winter as in the past. At best, we were informed, the government of Uzbekistan might be able to provide some grain to Afghanistan in return for a barter agreement with India for the supply of tea.

With the geopolitical reconfiguration taking place within the former Soviet Union, Afghanistan is now regarded as a marginal region bordering not on the Soviet Union but on the Central Asian republics of Uzbekistan, Tadzhikistan and Turkmenia. Older Russian concerns over Afghanistan — the dangers of instability and conflict in a border country, fears of Islamic fundamentalism, and anxieties over the fall of a communist-run government — are now outdated.

For Pakistan too, Afghanistan has declined in importance. With the withdrawal of military assistance to the mujahideen, the Pakistan military is no longer the conduit for military equipment, a portion of which was reportedly siphoned off by the Pakistan military. The Soviet withdrawal ended Pakistan's position as a frontline state, enabling Washington to suspend its military and economic assistance in order to deter Pakistan from its nuclear weapons program. And the government of Pakistan is itself engrossed in its quarrels with India over Kashmir and nuclear weapons.

The Pakistan government supports efforts to establish an interim government in Kabul, though some sections of the Pakistan military continue to hope that the proposed Islamic government will be dominated by the fundamentalist groups they supported. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is prepared to see a more broad-based regime with the expectation that it would be friendly to Pakistan. With an end to the war Pakistan will not be in a financial position to provide resources for reconstruction, but it is prepared to facilitate the work of foreign donors and international agencies and to encourage participation in reconstruction by its private sector. Pakistan has a long-term interest in establishing political and commercial relations with the emerging independent republics of Central Asia and regards Afghanistan as an important linkage in that relationship, especially if all-weather roads and railway links can be put in place. However, a free trade zone between Afghanistan and Pakistan is unlikely, since Pakistanis believe that an unregulated free market in Afghanistan would undercut their policies of import controls and subsidies.

Like the US, the UN agencies anticipate that the cross border programs will end shortly after an interim government is formed in Kabul.

UNOCA is expected to close down and its coordinating functions to be taken over by UNDP. But UN officials are concerned that once they provide assistance through Kabul, the NGOs will fade away, most of the successful rural programs in the mujahideen-controlled regions will end, and Afghans presently engaged in reconstruction will move from the field to desk positions in Kabul. As one UN official put it, "years from now we may look back upon this period as a golden age of rural reconstruction and development when Afghans were rebuilding roads, delivering veterinarian services to farmers, developing seed multiplication programs, and UN funds were being used for these purposes rather than financing the salaries of officials in the ministries." His hope, however, and that of other UN officials, is that the efforts to build Afghan NGOs and private free markets will continue even after an interim government is in place. UN officials are also concerned that if the war does not end soon bilateral donors, including the United States, will walk away, that donations to the UN will continue to decline, that the Japanese who initially were prepared to provide large sums of money are turning their attention (and resources) to Southeast Asia, and that the Germans who had had a significant program in pre-war Afghanistan are now concerned with Eastern Europe. The UN operations will then be further reduced, notwithstanding the needs for refugee repatriation and post-war reconstruction.

For the past several years UN agencies have worked closely with NGOs, whom they regard as playing a positive role in rural reconstruction. Though UN officials expect to work closely with an interim government and assume that the government will take on the responsibilities of road construction, the management of the health delivery system, schools, etc, they recognize that the central government will be weak and that the NGOs

will continue to have a major role to play. Some of the NGOs will be converted to private engineering firms that will be under contract from the government, others (especially those in the social services) will continue to be nonprofit organizations, and in some instances the NGOs will become government departments. UN officials, aware of the limitations of any future government in Kabul, especially one with so few resources and so many internal differences, see a large role for the private sector in transportation and in handling the sale and distribution of agricultural inputs and commodities.

For the near future the role of the UN agencies remains uncertain. UNOCA's mandate expires on December 31, 1991 and its financial future is unclear. The World Food Program estimates that there have been substantial shortfalls in agricultural production in Afghanistan this year (2.3 million tons of wheat in 1987, 1.9 million in 1989, and 1.65 million in 1991), that Afghanistan will need 400,000 tons this winter of which at best 65,000 tons will come from Uzbekistan. WFP can only provide a small quantity of grain to Afghanistan, since it must continue to provide food for the refugee camps and it does not anticipate any increase in resources to meet Afghanistan's grain shortage. UNHCR's budget for the camps is down and food rations to the refugees are declining. Much of the grain shortfall this winter will come from private suppliers in Pakistan, a matter of some concern to Pakistan since it has imported 2 million tons of grain paid for in hard currency and sells grain in Pakistan at subsidized prices.

There is a weariness among UN officials as there is within USAID, other bilateral donors, and among the foreign NGOs. They are frustrated at their inability to create full-scale bilateral programs with the Kabul government; they are faced with an unsatisfactory security environment

within Afghanistan as mujahideen fight with one another as well as against Kabul; they are hampered by military commanders who confiscate UN and USAID vehicles, and bargain for assistance in order to sustain their patronage networks. It is an environment which mitigates against long-term planning and project coordination.

Many of the donors have come to the conclusion that their cross border programs and assistance to the refugees serve to sustain the war. With their wives and children protected and sustained in the refugee camps, mujahideen are able to wage their armed struggles within Afghanistan. Local commanders manipulate foreign donors, seeking assistance in return for allowing them to work. So long as assistance continues, many donors have concluded, the Afghans can continue with their civil war.

Our late-evening meeting with Professor Rabbani at his guest house in Peshawar was particularly instructive. Our questions focused on issues of reconstruction. Professor Rabbani said that the urgent needs of an interim government would be to arrange the repatriation of refugees, to rehabilitate destroyed and damaged facilities, and to undertake a program of development. His view of NGOs is that they should be controlled by the government and that donors should provide funds directly to the Kabul government which would then decide what funds should be given to NGOs and for what purposes. Professor Rabbani also indicated that it was the government, not the private sector, that should take responsibility for the distribution of fertilizers, seeds, and other agricultural inputs. He saw the Ministry of Reconstruction drawing up the plans and envisaged a "Marshall Plan" ("as in Germany and Japan"), funded from abroad, with Afghan intellectuals in exile returning to work for his ministry. *Shuras* might

choose the provincial governor (in the past governors were appointed by Kabul), but the provinces would carry out plans prepared by the Ministry of Reconstruction. Notwithstanding the fact that Professor Rabbani is a Tajik, a community that historically has been resentful of Kabul's centralized control under Durrani leadership, and that his military commander, Masood, has successfully built an administrative structure in northern Afghanistan, his vision of the future is of a centralized Afghan state similar to what existed before the war.

The disparity between Professor Rabbani's views and that of the donors is apparent. While the donors expect central authority to be weak, Professor Rabbani sees a strong center sustained by foreign aid. While donors expect to rely heavily upon NGOs, the private sector, and local authorities for rural development, Professor Rabbani dismisses these institutions as central actors in the repatriation and reconstruction process. Donors see aid declining, but Rabbani believes that the Soviet, Western, and Japanese donors will provide large quantities of resources for reconstruction (a "Marshall Plan"). And while donors see the clock ticking away, and external interest in Afghanistan declining, the mujahideen feel no urgent need to end the war. When asked about the military option at a press conference, Professor Rabbani said, "We will continue fighting till the end of Najib's rule in Afghanistan. The fighting will stop when Najib leaves."

The Implications of International Withdrawal for Afghanistan's Reconstruction.

The United States and other donors have been faced with an all too common moral dilemma: whether to provide humanitarian assistance to the refugees and support reconstruction efforts even though the aid may

enable the mujahideen to continue the war rather than seek a negotiated settlement with the Kabul regime. By mid-1991 many governments, including the United States, concluded that phasing down and ultimately terminating the aid programs would hasten the end of the war. The military disengagement from Afghanistan by the Soviet Union and the United States has now been followed by a gradual disengagement of economic assistance to the mujahideen and to the people of Afghanistan. If the Afghans choose to fight they will have to do so on own.

The downside is that donors will be unprepared to deal with reconstruction when the war does come to an end. Qualified personnel with experience in Afghanistan are leaving. Plans for creating private sector networks and establishing Afghan NGOs have been halted. No institutional mechanisms are in place for developing a strategy of reconstruction or for coordinating the many agencies working in Afghanistan that are likely to play a role in post-war reconstruction. When the war ends, national donors and international agencies will scramble to create *ad hoc* programs for repatriation and reconstruction, as they presently are doing in Cambodia. The opportunity for advanced planning will have been lost.

The MIT report calls for proceeding with the conversion of ARR/VITA into an independent Afghan NGO, and for creating in postwar Afghanistan an International Commission on Rural Reconstruction to serve the donors and the interim government. Such a commission would provide information, identify needs, establish priorities, facilitate linkages among donor-funded projects, and provide planning guidelines for reconstruction. The report also calls for holding a donors' conference to discuss strategies and institutional arrangements for planning Afghanistan's post war reconstruction.

Planning for reconstruction is not incompatible with a policy that reduces expenditures so long as the war continues. Indeed, strategic planning without large-scale expenditures would be an incentive to those Afghan leaders who wish to end the war and a signal to refugees, those who remain within the country, and Afghanistan's leaders that the reduction in assistance does not mean that the industrial countries intend to abandon Afghanistan.

Thomas Barfield and
Myron Weiner, Project Director
December 9, 1991

1. INTRODUCTION

This report was prepared in response to a request from Volunteers in Technical Assistance (VITA) to the Reconstruction Group of the Center for International Studies of the Massachusetts Institute for Technology. The purpose is to examine "the possibility of establishing an independent, sustainable, Afghan-managed rural-works entity that would continue the work of AID's contractor, VITA, in implementing an Agricultural and Rural Rehabilitation (ARR) project, and other AID supported activities and appropriate NGO/PVO rehabilitation endeavors" in Afghanistan. VITA and USAID are concerned with how this program for agricultural and rural rehabilitation in Afghanistan, functioning out of Peshawar and Quetta with field offices working with local communities within Afghanistan to repair and rehabilitate irrigation systems, roads, and bridges, can be evolved into an Afghan entity "capable of broadening its funding base and expanding its impact on rural infrastructure." This report assesses the feasibility of this objective by considering the local, national, and international environment within which such an entity would function, and provides a set of recommendations for the establishment of such an entity. It also addresses the more general problem of planning, coordination, and monitoring among the various donor organizations involved in the rehabilitation of the rural sector within Afghanistan.

The task is to create an effective organization which can work with local authorities to carry out reconstruction and development activities, whose activities can be effectively monitored by donor agencies, and which has the standing to warrant support from a variety of bilateral and multi-

lateral donors. This task is made unusually difficult by the special political circumstances under which such an entity must function. Afghanistan's war has not yet ended, although the ARR/VITA program is within provinces considered relatively peaceful. More fundamentally, the Agricultural Rehabilitation and Reconstruction schemes function without the approval of Afghanistan's central government, and the proposed Afghan entity must be able to function independent of any central authority. Moreover, the tasks of the field offices are currently limited primarily to the rehabilitation of irrigation systems, roads, and bridges and have been intentionally kept small so as to minimize the possibility of military attack. ARRs have not attempted to develop national or provincial plans for rural reconstruction and development, but rather have been responsive to individual local requests for designing and funding projects. Thus, in our examination of the feasibility of creating an independent Afghan entity out of the existing ARR/VITA organization, attention has been given to the following issues:

What responsibilities should be assigned to the proposed Afghan entity? Should it continue to be primarily concerned with rural public works, or should it take on broader functions to enhance agricultural productivity and nurture small-scale enterprises including agro-businesses? Given the present political situation and possible future scenarios within Afghanistan as well as the managerial and technical capabilities of the existing staff, what would be a realistic set of tasks for the proposed entity?

Should the mandate of the proposed Afghan entity be limited to the reconstruction of war-torn areas to which large numbers of refugees are or will be returning, or should it also focus on the development of regions where there has been little destruction but which have a higher potential

for agricultural productivity? What criteria should be used for sites selected for assistance?

Can the proposed entity engage in province-wide planning in the present or likely future political contexts, or should the interactions be primarily, if not exclusively, with local institutions? How can the proposed entity most effectively interact with local and provincial authorities? If the entity is not engaged in province-wide planning, who should do such planning?

What alternative institutional arrangements are possible? A private construction firm contracted to do public works? A non-profit quasi-public entity designed to work with local and provincial authorities? Would donor organizations work directly with the proposed entity, reviewing accounts, evaluating performance, etc. or would an intermediary institution (e.g., an expatriate NGO) be necessary?

Which of the various alternatives are most likely to attract support from bilateral and multilateral donors? Who are the potential donors to the proposed entity and what are their requirements?

These questions are addressed in sections 2 - 6 and the basic recommendations of the Reconstruction Group are then outlined in sections 6 and 7. Section 6 deals with the specific problem of how ARR/VITA could be converted into an independent Afghan entity, possible alternative strategies for its conversion, proposals for changes in the existing organization to expand its present activities, a review of potential funding sources, and a description of the specific steps (including legal procedures, the establishment of a Board of Directors, changes in its contractual relations to USAID, etc.) for creating an independent Afghan organization devoted to rural

reconstruction. We have called the proposed entity Afghan Engineering for Rural Reconstruction (AERR).

A second set of recommendations, to be found in section 7, calls upon national donors to create an International Commission for Rural Reconstruction in Afghanistan (ICRR), with a professional staff charged with the responsibility of initiating a planning process for reconstruction and development, setting priorities for local and regional programs, and monitoring for evaluation and future planning. This section is considerably less detailed than section 6, for it focuses not on the structure of the proposed commission but rather why such a body needs to be created to deal with the present uncoordinated activities by donors, and what tasks it might perform.

Methodology

Members of the Reconstruction Group visited Islamabad and Peshawar from August 1 to August 23, 1991. A list of the organizations they visited and the individuals they interviewed is provided in appendices A and B, respectively.

The team conducted its study by proceeding as follows:

1. An on-site review of the ARR/VITA program in Peshawar was conducted by all seven members of the team, followed by more detailed meetings and interviews by Professors Moavenzadeh, Gakenheimer, and Rothenberg (hereafter, the engineering group). This entailed examining its organizational structure, reviewing the work of its various departments, and examining its financial structure, engineering, and project management capabilities, and the character of its training program. The team was unable to visit any of the field stations in Afghanistan or observe any of

ARR/VITA's cross-border projects because of current restrictions placed on cross-border travel by US policy.

2. The team also studied other engineering organizations engaged in rural public works. These were predominantly engineering organizations, or those multi-purpose NGOs combining public works with rural development activities. Professors Gakenheimer, Moavenzadeh, and Rothenberg focused on predominantly engineering organizations, while Professors Weiner, Barfield, and Banuazizi looked at multi-purpose NGOs, exploring how these organizations choose their priorities, and how they relate to one another.

3. The team, first as a whole, then in greater detail by the engineering group, met with senior staff members of Development Alternatives, Inc. (DAI) in an effort to understand how the breakup of the original ARR/VITA program affected rural reconstruction programs, and to examine the efforts by DAI to develop strategic planning for rural reconstruction and agribusiness.

4. Professors Banuazizi, Barfield, Choucri, and Weiner met with officials of major donor organizations, both national and international, in an effort to assess their strategies, future funding plans, and how they determined their priorities. Interviews were conducted with officials of UNOCA, UNDP, UNHCR, the World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank, and with representatives from the Swedish, German, Japanese, and Canadian embassies in Islamabad. Attention was also given to the way in which the International Rescue Committee, through its USAID program, determines eligibility of NGOs and allocates grants.

While the refugee situation in Pakistan was not a focus of the team's work, meetings were held with officials of UNHCR and with the Pakistani

Commissionerate for Afghan Refugees, N.W.F.P., focusing on the impact of cross-border programs on repatriation.

5. Members of the team also met with officials at the Agency Coordinating Body for Afghanistan Relief (ACBAR) and the Islamic Coordination Council (ICC) to assess the role they play in data-gathering and in coordinating their member organizations.

6. Finally, there were a number of briefings with the Office of the US Agency for International Development Representative (O/AID/Rep) staff in Islamabad and in Peshawar.

2. THE PRESENT POLITICAL CONTEXT AND DONOR STRATEGIES

a. The Evolution of Donor Strategies

The Geneva Agreement of 1988 and the subsequent withdrawal of Soviet troops, the end of the Cold War, and the change in the character of the conflict within Afghanistan from a global issue to a civil war, have dramatically changed the context within which the international community has addressed the problems of relief, rehabilitation, and reconstruction. International donors were prepared to play a substantial role in Afghanistan's reconstruction in 1988 when the Geneva agreement was signed providing for the withdrawal of Soviet troops. For the West the agreement represented a major victory for the Afghan resistance and its anti-Soviet allies. There was in the West a strong sense of gratitude and an inclination to reward the resistance movement by providing substantial aid for rehabilitation and reconstruction. The unexpected survival of the Kabul government after Soviet troops withdrew, and the failure of the resistance movement to achieve a military victory, created a political stalemate. Conflicts within the resistance movement and the inability of the PDPA

government and the resistance to agree on a process for creating a consensual government soon disillusioned aid donors. The mujahideen were no longer viewed idealistically as heroic freedom fighters, but more negatively as Islamic fundamentalists, warlord commanders, smugglers, or clients in search of resources. When the conflict within Afghanistan was no longer seen by the West as a struggle against Soviet expansion but rather as a civil war, funding for rehabilitation and reconstruction began to decline.

Donor strategies have therefore changed in several stages. In the period following the Soviet invasion, the main international actors in the region, the United States, China, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan, provided military assistance to the resistance movement. As refugees flowed into Pakistan and Iran, a second phase of donor involvement emerged as the United Nations and other international organizations provided emergency relief in camps along the Pakistan/Afghanistan border. They were assisted by non-governmental international refugee relief organizations (NGOs) from various countries. A third phase was initiated in 1985-86 when the United States government pioneered in establishing cross-border humanitarian programs to provide relief inside Afghanistan, reduce the flow of refugees, and generally backstop the resistance effort. Other countries soon joined in these efforts. In this phase scores of international non-governmental humanitarian organizations turned their attention to rehabilitation and reconstruction within Afghanistan. A fourth phase began after the Geneva accords were signed. There was a gearing up of activities and an expansion of resources (and pledges) in anticipation of massive repatriation of refugees and the commencement of large-scale rehabilitation and reconstruction within Afghanistan. But when it became apparent that the

war would continue, donors responded by scaling down their activities and reconsidering their objectives.

In this fifth and present phase, the sentiment among many of the international donors is that (1) assistance to refugees within Pakistan should be reduced in an effort to induce their return to Afghanistan; (2) whenever possible, rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts within Afghanistan should continue in order to induce and facilitate the resettlement of refugees; (3) more substantial large-scale rehabilitation, reconstruction, and development programs should be delayed until there is an internationally recognized government in Afghanistan with whom donors can establish bilateral agreements; and (4) even when a new government is formed in Afghanistan, its control over much of the countryside will be limited, necessitating a continued direct involvement by donors in reconstruction programs at the regional and local levels.

Through each of these phases, international donors have sought appropriate Afghan interlocutors through which funds and material assistance could be funneled and coordinated in the pursuit of donor objectives. The US government, the largest of the donors, initially worked with individual Afghan political parties (*tanzeems*) located in Peshawar and through local military commanders inside Afghanistan. Subsequently, seven *tanzeems* were consolidated into the Afghan Interim Government (AIG) with the expectation that the AIG would consolidate the mujahideen as a military force and would become a vehicle for cross-border rehabilitation and reconstruction activities. In both respects the AIG proved wanting. It failed to develop a consolidated military strategy, and it failed to provide a satisfactory program for cross-border activities that could

meet the international requirements for implementation, performance, monitoring, and financial accountability.

USAID and other international donors searched for institutions that could effectively carry out cross-border programs. One option was to work with existing expatriate NGOs. Many of these NGOs had an international track record for carrying out humanitarian and rehabilitation programs, and, as expatriate organizations, they could be more sensitive to the humanitarian and political objectives of the donors. The expatriate NGOs, however, had the disadvantage of not being Afghan organizations, although many of them had recruited Afghan personnel for program implementation. The international NGOs and their sponsoring donor countries also recognized that they could not engage in cross-border work unless there were local groups or institutions inside Afghanistan with whom they could work. They therefore turned their attention to searching for and working with "institutions" at the local level—including military commanders and new local-level political bodies such as *shuras* (councils). Shuras include locally prominent villagers, commanders, religious figures, and politically significant individuals in a district. Although informal bodies of tribal elders have always played a consultative role in local village life, the shura as an institution has developed during the present war with the collapse of state power.

These new Afghan "institutions" had their problems. Military commanders were hardly representative of the community and were not always reputable; shuras were not traditional or representative institutions, but were often created by or for the purpose of dealing with the international NGOs. The more broadbased the shuras—with representatives of the commanders, *tanzeems*, and local notables—the more likely they were

to be fractious. The shuras were not easy to sustain unless there was a continued flow of foreign resources, and they were hardly local planning bodies that could prioritize requests. They did provide NGOs, however, with lists of desired projects, the guarantee of physical security, and legitimacy in the form of "people's participation" and local contributions.

Some international agencies sought to encourage the development of Afghan NGOs capable of working in the Afghan environment and in a position to continue after the end of the war and the formation of a new Afghan government. Encouraged by the United Nations, a number of Afghan NGOs were organized and received funding, but few were capable of initiating credible programs inside Afghanistan. Soon, many enterprising Afghans—including military commanders and even ministers within the Afghan Interim Government (AIG)—formed their own NGOs. Faced with a plethora of Afghan NGOs, donor organizations, including USAID (through the International Rescue Committee), UNOCA, and UNDP, created guidelines for registering and recognizing these NGOs, without necessarily committing themselves to funding them.

It was against the above background that, in 1990, the O/USAID/Rep decided to explore the possibility of converting one of the largest recipients of its funds, the Agricultural Rehabilitation and Reconstitution Program managed by Volunteers in Technical Assistance (ARR/VITA) in Pakistan and Afghanistan, into an independent Afghan "entity," that is, either a non-profit, non-governmental organization that could compete for contracts from donors, or a commercial venture, or a "foundation," an endowed institution with independent core resources. The MIT Reconstruction Team was asked to look into the feasibility of creating such an entity, and to recommend the form it might take and its mandate.

b. The Reconstruction Tasks

Two major tasks confront USAID and other international donors as they address the issues of rural rehabilitation and reconstruction in Afghanistan. The first is to Afghanize reconstruction efforts, that is, to place responsibility for the implementation and management of external resources into the hands of Afghan nationals and Afghan institutions. The second is to develop a strategy and a process for the efficient use of scarce donor resources. Institutions, strategies, and processes must be both routinized and flexible enough to withstand the volatility of Afghan politics.

It is generally assumed that, even with a political settlement and the formation of an internationally acceptable government in Kabul, a future Afghan state will be heavily dependent on the international community in undertaking large-scale programs of rural rehabilitation and development throughout the country. For this reason "Afghanization" has taken on a special meaning: the development of autonomous, non-governmental organizations, managed and staffed by Afghans, which can carry out rural programs independently of the administrative structure of the Afghan state. USAID's consideration of how its largest rural works program, the Peshawar-based ARR/VITA, can be Afghanized is an example of this trend. It seems likely that other donors will follow suit by encouraging their own expatriate NGOs to Afghanize themselves.

There are problems associated with developing Afghan NGOs. While there are a number of Afghans with the requisite technical skills, there is a shortage of people with managerial experience for running large, complex organizations. There is also concern that Afghan managers making decisions about the allocation of funds for rural projects may favor the

regions from which they come, the ethnic communities to which they belong, or the tanzeems with whom they have political ties. Would Afghan managers be in a position to resist pressures to allocate resources through these networks rather than by formulating optimally efficient projects? Donors are also concerned that some Afghan organizations are not financially accountable and that funded projects might not materialize. Moreover, favoritism (regional, ethnic, or political—and a normal procedure in Afghanistan) becomes particularly acute in an environment in which donor aid is largely NGO-driven, that is, when the major donors are responsive to requests made by NGOs, the primary concern being whether they are in physically secure regions and there is a local “consensus” (a euphemism, at times, for approval by one or more local commanders). The NGOs, in turn, are driven by local requests—for karez cleaning, expanding donkey paths into motorable roads, repairing bridges, building dispensaries and schools, and providing agricultural inputs, e.g. seeds, fertilizers, and water.

In some respects the expatriate NGOs encounter the same problems and are subject to the same pressures as their Afghan counterparts. Expatriate NGOs are also often tied to specific tanzeems, or function in areas where they have built up a strong local network; they are responsive to local requests and justify their own requests for resources on the grounds that these are local “felt needs,” though it is not always clear that what local commanders and shuras request is necessarily in the best interests of all the people who live in the community. Moreover, under wartime conditions, the criteria for site selection have often included non-economic considerations. For example, a road may be repaired by an NGO in a remote and underpopulated area because the local commander will not

otherwise permit access to a region where there are more substantial needs.

Developing a more comprehensive and integrated strategy and a process for the efficient use of resources could hardly be given serious attention as long as the war continued and in the absence of an internationally acceptable government in Kabul. For this reason, some governments and international agencies have chosen not to work in Afghanistan. The World Bank and the Asian Development Bank have no cross-border programs; the Japanese government has been unwilling to allow funds that it had committed to UNOCA to be used until repatriation is under way and there are accountable institutions capable of using resources in a reasonably efficient manner. As the war winds down, and donors turn their attention and resources to rehabilitation, reconstruction, and development, the need for more efficient mechanisms to utilize existing resources becomes important. The number of requests from shuras and NGOs for cleaning karezes, repairing bridges, repairing and developing roads, etc. is already greater than can be satisfied, given the limitations of both technical and financial resources.

As cost/benefit criteria replace community demands and NGO capabilities as the basis for allocating resources, donors are in need of strategies that would enable them to set priorities, to measure the effectiveness of projects and programs against one another, to assess the impact of projects on the economy and ecology, and to monitor these projects effectively. No such mechanisms are now in place. It is not clear how and by whom these functions can be performed in a country with a long tradition of weak governments, but it is clear that some mechanisms must be created if there is to be any large-scale donor support.

c. Major International Donors

What follows is a brief review of some of the major present or potential donors in Afghanistan's reconstruction, both international organizations and the principal national donors. International organizations reviewed here include UNOCA, UNDP, the World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank. National donors include the governments of Japan, Germany, Canada, Sweden, and the United States.

Office for the Co-ordination of the United Nations Humanitarian and Economic Assistance Programmes Relating to Afghanistan (UNOCA)

UNOCA was established by the UN as part of the agreement that led to the Soviet withdrawal in 1989. Initially headed by Mr. Saddrudin Aga Khan with its headquarters in Geneva, at the beginning of 1991 it was reorganized under the leadership of Mr. Benon Sevan, the program's center was moved to the region, and the Geneva staff was cut back. UNOCA has regional offices in Islamabad, Kabul, Teheran, and Termez. At present, Mr. Martin Barber heads the UNOCA organization in Islamabad.

It was expected by donors that UNOCA would become the lead agency to coordinate all UN and other international donor activities for the reconstruction of Afghanistan. It is widely believed to have failed in this task; consequently many donors have frozen their support or failed to make requested contributions. This appears to have resulted both from poor organization in Geneva and an attempt by UNOCA to become an implementing agency with projects in Afghanistan rather than a planning and coordinating agency. The pursuit of the latter objective put UNOCA in

conflict with other UN and international agencies with competing agendas and who saw no reason to follow UNOCA's lead. Its mandate is due to expire in 1992; if not extended, its function will probably be assumed by UNDP.

UNOCA-sponsored projects for 1991 amount to about \$80 million:

Priority sectors

1. Agriculture	\$20 million
2. Mine clearance	10
3. Health	13
4. Repatriation	11
Other sectors	26

The UN system also in 1991 provides about \$62 million in food aid and \$34 million in in-kind assistance for Afghan relief. For 1992 UNOCA projects an expenditure of \$170 million, but only \$106 million appears to be certain. A substantial portion will be spent in mine clearance. Although security concerns, particularly within the Pashtun region of Afghanistan, have increased, UNOCA staff believes that security is adequate for establishing new projects. Other donors are less confident and would prefer to see a more stable situation created before allocating funds.

UNOCA has been largely reactive to requests for reconstruction rather than proactive in initiating programs and projects. UNOCA gives priority to projects involving agriculture, irrigation, food aid, mine clearance, health, and repatriation. Their programs give little or no attention to road repairs, the construction of housing, or education. These priorities reflect the view of UNOCA that relief and reconstruction work should be focused on those activities that will be most likely to induce the

return of refugees to Afghanistan. Initially UNOCA asked UN agencies (such as WHO and UNICEF) for a list of projects to be funded, but there has been considerable disagreement among the UN agencies and among the NGOs as to what sectors should be given priority. As a UN institution UNOCA has had, as part of its cross-border program (known as "Operation Salam"), a unique opportunity to work within Afghanistan. Unlike other donors it has been able to receive formal access to sites in which it has projects, whether they are in Kabul-controlled or mujahideen-controlled areas.

UNOCA is particularly interested in fostering the development of Afghan NGOs to facilitate work within Afghanistan, and has a registration procedure for them which includes soliciting basic information on membership and organization. UNOCA does not attempt to evaluate their staff qualifications or their capacities as organizations. UNOCA believes that Afghan NGOs are likely to be more acceptable for work in post-war Afghanistan and have the advantage of being more knowledgeable about local conditions than expatriate NGOs. In a situation in which the central government is weak and poorly organized, the UNOCA staff hopes that Afghan NGOs will nonetheless be able to carry out reconstruction activities with a modicum of efficiency and accountability. To prevent tanzeems and commanders from exercising pressure on Afghan NGOs for projects and funds, UNOCA would like to move to a contract system in which Afghan NGOs carry out projects initiated by the UN. The largest single new project currently planned is the Helmand Valley Rehabilitation Scheme, intended to rehabilitate the damaged irrigation system of the valley. It is UNOCA's intention to provide funds for this project to NGOs (see below).

To assure donors that Afghan NGOs are capable of carrying out their responsibilities and can properly account for expenditures, UNOCA encourages the use of expatriate staff in such areas as finance and monitoring. Recognizing the need of Afghan NGOs to develop a stable base, the UN is willing to pay overhead to support office and planning costs. The exact rate would be subject to negotiation with individual Afghan NGOs.

The desire to move to a contract system, to pay overhead, and to encourage the participation of Afghan NGOs has direct implications for the timing and viability of "Afghanizing" the current ARR/VITA program. Mr. Barber rated ARR/VITA's work quite highly and said he would have liked to employ it on projects in the past but could not because it was a wholly USAID-administered organization. He stressed the importance of finding contractors to repair the massive flood damage to irrigation inlets in the Helmand region caused by this year's severe floods. Without such work many hundreds of thousands of people may be forced to abandon the land because it cannot be irrigated. For the near future Barber noted that \$1-2 million was available for immediate use, and a two-year contract was planned to follow up on the emergency work. He stated that the ARR/VITA engineering team under Mr. Sediq was highly qualified to undertake such an activity should it become an independent organization.

Other United Nations agencies working on Afghanistan include: the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), World Food Programme (WFP), World Health Organization (WHO), United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNL'DAC), Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

UNDP maintains a cross-border program out of Peshawar and a cross-line program out of Kabul. UNDP has been functioning in Afghanistan since the 1950s and is therefore among the most experienced of the UN agencies working in the country. Since UNDP regards itself as the leading agency with traditional responsibility for coordinating the activities of UN agencies, relations between UNDP and UNOCA have often been strained. There have been open clashes between UNDP and UNOCA over both funding and policy.

UNDP is primarily a funding, not an implementing agency. Most (\$12 million) of its \$15 million budget is used for contracting NGOs. UNDP is NGO-driven. Its program is reactive, dependent upon proposals submitted by NGOs. It provides grants to NGOs for work on irrigation, agriculture, crop production, livestock, bridge and road repair, and housing.

UNDP officials are aware of the problems that arise out of their uncoordinated grants to NGOs. At present funds are provided to NGOs to repair karezes* in areas where there are no NGO programs for increasing crop production. Integrated projects could be conducted by a single NGO or by a consortium of NGOs. Moreover, UNDP does not have any area priorities and therefore has no policy as to whether projects should be located in areas with the highest potential for increasing agricultural productivity, or areas that produced the largest number of refugees. At present its policy is to be responsive to areas making the largest number of requests. UNDP officials would like to move from individual projects to more coordinated rural reconstruction and programs and set their own priorities rather than remain so dependent upon proposals submitted by NGOs.

* Sub-terranean irrigation systems gravity-fed from upland wells.

When the war ends a significant increase in UNDP activities is expected. The United Nations allocates funds to each country on the basis of an Indicative Planning Figure (IPF) based largely on per capita income. Since UNDP programs in Afghanistan have been restricted since 1979, substantial unspent funds have accumulated, more than \$50 million in the current 5-year IPF plan, with an additional \$70 million due for the next plan starting in 1992. UNDP's Kabul office is currently funding several NGOs and anticipates that with the end of the war more of the NGOs will shift to the capital. UNDP in Kabul has been allowed by the government to spend money in areas outside government control and to work directly with NGOs rather than with ministries. Whether these arrangements will continue when a new government is formed remains uncertain.

World Bank.

The World Bank has no current program in Afghanistan and does not propose to establish one until the war ends. The World Bank office in Islamabad periodically sends reports to Washington to update their sectoral perspectives. After a political settlement, the Bank will send a mission to enter into a dialogue with the Afghan government to establish a program. The mission would spend a month or two in Afghanistan, develop sectoral plans for agriculture, industry, etc, and would look at some of the infrastructural needs. The Bank's mission would be to devise a strategy for sectoral adjustment—their major policy instrument for formal intervention—and, if the government of Afghanistan agrees, to undertake to finance sectoral reconstruction and development programs. The Bank would then form a consortium of donors and formulate a three- or five-year program for reconstruction with an emphasis on macro-economic policies.

The World Bank would emphasize co-financing with other donors, preferably with one or two other donors.

The World Bank's interlocutor is the central government. It is not Bank policy to work directly with NGOs, to engage in areal planning, or to invest in the kinds of local-level projects that are the mainstay of NGOs, although it does sometimes sponsor planning to support specific loans, e.g., in water and sewerage. The World Bank does not lend to NGOs, though it can do so indirectly through the host government. This would be unusual, since NGOs want and need non-returnable grants, while the World Bank is primarily a lending agency. The International Development Association (IDA), the soft-loan program of the World Bank, would be the Bank's primary instrument in Afghanistan, but it too is a lending agency (at lower rates), not a grant-making body.

Asian Development Bank (ADB)

The Asian Development Bank made its first loan to Afghanistan in 1971 and by 1979 had funded nine projects for \$95 million. After 1979 it abandoned these projects because of the war and since then has had no contact with Kabul, although the Afghan Finance Minister has regularly attended its annual meetings to request a restoration of the previous relationship.

At present the Asian Development Bank has no plans for a program in Afghanistan, but it is likely to resume operations when the war ends and stability is restored. The ADB would give priority to restoring the projects abandoned in 1979.

While the Asian Development Bank is a project bank that works primarily with governments, it has begun experimenting with loans to the

private sector. To this end it has established the Asia Finance Investment Corporation to make loans to individuals investors. However, it is unlikely to fund NGOs directly; as with the World Bank, it sees NGOs as agencies through which governments might choose to work, not as direct recipients of loans.

Canada

The Canadian government had a program in Kabul before the war, which operated out of Islamabad, and has an interest in continuing its aid efforts. Canada commits about \$20 million per year, mostly in food aid (\$14 million last year) through FAO and UNICEF. Most Canadian funds are used for refugees in Pakistan. There is also the Canadian Fund for Afghanistan (\$1 million), a cross-border program managed by an Afghan professional. Some funds are provided to one Canadian NGO, and some to the International Red Cross. All Canadian aid is delivered through NGOs or through multilateral organizations. The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) is not involved in program delivery.

It is the intention of the Canadian government to establish a small bilateral program with the government of Afghanistan when the war ends. While no budget has been established, it is likely to be in the \$5 million to \$10 million range, or about one-tenth the size of the USAID program. The Canadian government is currently giving priority to Latin America, Africa, and Bangladesh.

The issue of coordinating aid among the donors is of particular concern to the Canadian government. In its view coordination among the donors will be needed to establish both sectoral and regional priorities, the most important being de-mining and in rebuilding and repairing infras-

structures. The task will be difficult because in the Canadian view the Kabul government and its ministries are likely to be weak; for this reason there will be continued reliance upon NGOs. The Canadian government would prefer to work with Afghan NGOs, but to have non-Afghan advisors and administrators working within these organizations. The role of expatriates in relation to Afghan NGOs is a delicate one, especially with regard to the question of who manages these organizations.

The issue of coordination and setting priorities has yet to be resolved. ACBAR has been useful as a coordinating body for work at the provincial and local levels, but it does not set priorities. UNDP and the World Bank are useful for establishing sectoral priorities, but do not get down to the level of provincial planning. A particularly pressing need in Afghanistan, according to the Canadians, will be to create a national system of education, a matter that has been of little concern to the mujahideen, who are particularly uninterested in the question of educating women which Canadians see as critical, especially training women health workers and primary school teachers.

The Canadians, like other donors, have begun to believe that aid to the mujahideen and the Afghan refugees is prolonging the conflict. The mujahideen and the Pakistani government, in their view, gain by continuing the conflict and have no incentive to end it. The incentives should be (a) a reduction in funds for refugees and arms by donors and (b) indications that the western countries are preparing to establish relations with the existing Kabul government if there is not more progress toward a negotiated settlement.

Germany

At present, Germany has no significant program in Afghanistan, though some assistance is provided to UNOCA and to the International Red Cross. Germany is prepared to initiate a program once the refugees return, but believes that the refugees will not return so long as the mujahideen tell them not to. It is their view that opponents of the Kabul government have regarded refugees as leverage for influencing Afghanistan's political development. The European Community has a working group in Brussels that is having discussions concerning future relations with the Kabul government.

Germany is prepared to be a significant player in Afghanistan's reconstruction once the war ends. Germany would then establish a direct aid program with the government of Afghanistan. Germany had a program in Afghanistan before the war, built the major power station in Khost, established links between German and Afghan universities, and trained the police (who drove BMWs!). In a postwar Afghanistan the German government would probably operate a small program in the 30 to 50 million DM range. In its various aid programs, Germany has worked directly with NGOs, and currently does so in its aid program to Pakistan. It is not inconceivable that even now the German government would be prepared to work with Afghan NGOs, were it persuaded that the funds could be effectively utilized and monitored; of special interest to the German government is human resource development and the technical training of Afghan personnel to work on reconstruction.

Japan

Japan's primary concern in the postwar Afghanistan is with repatriation. The Japanese government pledged \$120 million to UNOCA in 1988 with the expectation that large-scale repatriation would soon begin. The Japanese have been disappointed, however, partly because repatriation has not taken place, but also because they believe that UNOCA lacks a proper monitoring system. In their judgment many of the projects funded by UNOCA have been useless. Japan's criteria for effectiveness are simple: whether the clinic or road was built, whether draft animals were delivered in time to be used for plowing, etc.; and too often the answer has been no.

Elsewhere in the world, the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) has signed bilateral agreements. Until such time as JICA can deal directly with the Kabul government, it is the policy of the Japanese government to funnel its assistance exclusively through the United Nations. In addition to contributing to UNOCA, Japan provides assistance to UNHCR. JICA does not give grants directly to NGOs, though they have a very small grant assistance program for a few NGOs. There is one major Japanese NGO working in Afghanistan, the Japan Afghan Medical Service, which works in Afghanistan (directed by Dr. Shah Wali, an Afghan physician), but it is privately funded. As a matter of policy a JICA program in Afghanistan would be funded through the government of Afghanistan or through the UN agencies. They would expect NGOs, expatriate or Afghan, to be funded through UN agencies, rather than directly by JICA.

Sweden

The Swedish government has been a significant donor for cross-border programs. Over the past two years its budget has been between \$30-45 million annually, split equally among NGOs and United Nations organizations. It is the second largest supplier of unearmarked money for UNOCA and the primary source of funds for the Swedish Committee, a major NGO engaged in cross-border rural reconstruction.

This level of funding is rapidly declining, however, because the Swedish government believes that money donated to UNOCA has not been used well. Moreover, in the absence of large-scale repatriation from Pakistan and Iran and continued fighting in Afghanistan there is a reluctance to sustain the present funding level because money for Afghan projects comes out of an emergency fund, not from regular appropriations to Sweden's development agency. With other pressing needs in Africa and South Asia, there is reason to direct these funds elsewhere. Should peace come to Afghanistan, however, Sweden expects to provide aid through the UN system. In the past Sweden has not had a bilateral program in Afghanistan, nor has it established an embassy in Kabul, and it has no plans to do either.

US Agency for International Development (USAID)

USAID assistance to Afghanistan, as described in its May 1990 strategy document, is directed at strengthening human capital development, maximizing the use of the Afghan private sector, and utilizing non-governmental organizations, all with the intent of creating a policy environment in Afghanistan which "encourages reliance on markets and a representative political process."

USAID initiated its cross-border program in 1985 (with \$8 million dollars), and substantially increased its funding after the withdrawal of Soviet troops in anticipation of the fall of the PDPA regime, the large scale repatriation of refugees, and the evolution of the Afghan Interim Government into an effective interim administrative body. Since 1985, funding for the Cross-Border Humanitarian Assistance program (CBHA) has totalled over a third of a billion dollars.

USAID's present concerns are, specifically:

--to strengthen Afghan NGOs by enabling US private voluntary organizations to "Afghanize" themselves or to form partnerships with Afghan entities;

--to improve the capacity of the private sector to provide needed agricultural inputs;

--to support the adoption of "a professional, nonpartisan approach" in the selection and implementation of road and bridge repair activities;

--to locate more project activities, (e.g. training sites, staging areas, and warehouses) within Afghanistan;

--to increase the use of the competitive process for the awards of grants and contracts to NGOs and private contractors;

--to improve USAID's independent monitoring capability by using third-country nationals to verify monitoring reports;

--to improve human resource development through training programs;

--to generate maximum local community participation in rehabilitation projects.

USAID regards the rehabilitation of damaged roads and bridges and the building of secondary and tertiary roads as a critical priority to facilitate repatriation and resettlement and to increase trade between regions.

For the near future, USAID continues to anticipate a political settlement, the emergence of a transitional government, and the repatriation of refugees. At that time USAID proposes to initiate its planning for reconstruction, to review its support for Afghan entities, to continue its work in agriculture, and to take steps to attract other donors to undertake physical infrastructure projects. In the longer term, when a central government is functioning, USAID sees itself as a modest participant in Afghanistan's reconstruction, with other donors playing an increasing role in providing financial assistance.

3. LOCAL POLITICAL STRUCTURES AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO A FUTURE GOVERNMENT

USAID stresses the importance of local participation and cooperation in the operation of cross-border development projects. One of its key tasks, currently applied primarily to projects implemented in small communities or districts, is to determine the nature of local level political structures and their relation to a future central government. As USAID moves to programs and projects at the provincial and regional levels, this type of consensus-based decision-making will be increasingly difficult to achieve. The following are what we consider some of the structural impediments to local participation in the context of Afghanistan's historical and political development, and some of the ways in which these impediments have been overcome.

a. Provincial Organization

Before the time of Amir Abdur Rahman (1880-1901) Afghanistan was divided into five or six autonomous provinces: Qataghan and Badakhshan in the northeast, Afghan Turkestan in the north, Herat in the west, Kandahar in the south, an eastern province which straddled the tribal belt along the present Pakistan frontier, and the central province of Kabul which included the Hazarajat. Each province was ruled by a powerful governor, usually a close relative (brother or uncle) of the king, who derived revenue and military support from his region. Abdur Rahman, after crushing revolts by these governors and autonomous tribes, broke the provinces up into smaller units without the resources to support powerful rivals. Succeeding Afghan governments have further subdivided these provinces for similar reasons so that by historical standards contemporary

Afghan provinces are relatively small. For these reasons the modern provincial organization is somewhat artificial, and people tend to define themselves regionally along the older larger provincial lines under which they shared a common ethnic identity and were economically integrated.

Local government administration in Afghanistan has traditionally been ordered from the top down rather than from the bottom up. Local officials were responsible to their respective ministries in Kabul rather than to the local population and, particularly in Daud's republic (1973-78), were normally strangers to the areas they administered. Provinces and districts were deliberately restricted in size and officials were transferred often in order to prevent them from developing local power bases. Reflecting the ethnic bias of the central government, most officials were Pashtuns, particularly in the non-Pashtun areas of the north and west. These officials had few responsibilities beyond maintaining peace and order, and used the police or army to enforce government orders. However, until the establishment of the PDPA regime in 1978, they generally attempted to avoid conflict whenever possible, made few demands in the way of taxes, and rarely interfered in village affairs.

Village and tribal organizations were, by contrast, highly localized and depended on developing a consensus in making decisions. Political ideology was less important than ties of kinship or locality. Institutions at this level were responsible for maintaining local irrigation systems, supporting local mosques and mullas, and defending the village against outside interference. In terms of social organization, the family and the local tribal group took political primacy. The degree to which people could be mobilized beyond the local village depended on the severity of the problem and the cohesiveness of the tribe or ethnic group. However, these social

groups played only an indirect role in regional politics; the government was concerned with the reaction of villagers but did not consider it necessary to involve them in planning. If resistance to any given plan proved too great it was quietly dropped. National politics was the sphere of the national elite in Kabul and unless a policy had a direct impact on their lives, villagers expressed little interest.

The current war in Afghanistan has altered the political balance of power and destroyed the legitimacy of the central government. Mujahideen fighters have organized around local commanders with strong ties to the regions in which they operate. While the commanders are nominally affiliated with political parties in Pakistan or Iran, none of these parties has the capacity to command the obedience of its commanders. This lack of national leadership has meant that organizations working inside Afghanistan have had to coordinate their work with those in charge at a given site. Partly out of necessity, and partly because of a demand for popular participation, most USAID projects in Afghanistan seek to develop grassroots support. However, while Afghan society is egalitarian, resting on the belief that no individual is innately superior to another, it is far from democratic. Women, for example, do not participate in public affairs and kinship ties are often more important than ability in promotion to office.

Shuras seem to provide the necessary local-level support, although experience in working with shuras has shown them to be fragile and ad hoc, as people gather together to deal with a particular problem and then adjourn until another arises. A shura represents the collective will of its members, not necessarily all of the local population. It is not a decision-making body. When there is a major disagreement the solution is usually to have each faction form its own shura.

There are also regional differences in political organization. The Pashtuns of the south and east rely on their strong tribal structure composed of patrilineal kinship groups known as *khel*. It is extremely difficult to gain the cooperation of rival tribes, so they often turn to religious figures as mediators. In the north and west the Persian-speaking Tajiks lack a tribal structure and identify themselves with their home regions. In contrast to the Pashtuns, the Tajiks have been able to create pan-provincial administrations, such as the Council of the North, which effectively coordinate military and civilian activities. Hence in any planning one must assume there is no single "Afghan" political structure, but rather a set of multiple structures that often have very different and at times conflicting interests.

b. Center-Periphery Relations in Afghanistan

The question of the role of a new Afghan central government is of obvious importance in planning national reconstruction. It is generally assumed that such a government will have a weak center with local power in the hands of former commanders. Unlike in previous Afghan governments these local leaders will have their own authority and not be appointees from Kabul. The central government will likely be incapable of implementing its own policies for many years. This may well be, though there are reasons to think that a central government could have more authority than is presently expected. First, most Afghans, inside and out of the country, are tired of war. There would be little local support for continued fighting against a regime that is widely regarded as legitimate, even if some political parties wanted it. Second, a new central government will have access to international donors, lending institutions, and national

sources of wealth, which it can use to create a patronage system that attracts the provincial support it cannot win militarily.

A Kabul government will therefore oppose attempts to fund regional leaders directly and will insist that donor money pass through its hands. However, this may prove to be a bureaucratic formality, since it needs the support of provincial leaders it will not be in a position to ignore them. Provincial and regional leaders may even prefer to work with the central government, since they can put more leverage on a regime in Kabul than they can on international donors, and they may ultimately gain more by playing within the system than by confronting it. Before the war, many regions felt they were not getting their fair share but had no way to influence national policy. Now the reverse is the case: local leaders potentially have more influence than their political base would normally warrant. Since foreign donors have a preference for dealing with central government institutions, it then becomes the main collection center for the nation's redistributive system and extends its influence, first financially and then administratively. Politically, money flowing from donors to the central government, and from the central government to its provincial supporters, may have a positive political impact, although the government will not have the capacity to implement many projects itself through the traditional ministerial structure..

In such a situation, however, where the central authority is weak and the center is under pressure to be responsive to provincial authorities, planning by international donors becomes critical if reconstruction aid is to be effectively used; a certain amount of external pressure may avoid allowing assistance policy to become a free-for-all of provincial influence.

c. Community Relations

Currently the ARR/VITA program requires the cooperation of local shuras and community contributions to the proposed work before accepting a project. This has proven quite successful as a means to involve small communities in projects that directly affect their welfare and has distinguished the program from those of similar engineering NGOs. However, as a successor organization moves toward more ambitious projects and begins to locate its staff in district or provincial centers rather than at the community worksite, it needs to consider whether these local means to guarantee participation and cooperation are viable for projects planned on a larger scale.

At the district or provincial level it may be impossible to achieve an acceptable measure of consensus and, unless there are the means to break a deadlock, minority factions may use their opposition to hold the entire project for ransom by withholding their consent. This is more likely to be the case as donors move away from a request-based system, in which they simply choose to fund projects proposed by local communities, to a system whereby the donors themselves set priorities, propose projects, and then seek to implement them. While grassroots cooperation is an absolute necessity in a situation where governmental authority is lacking, the extent of that cooperation may not meet the high standard of shura consensus and willingness to make a community contribution.

Political consensus at a district or provincial level may require a different set of criteria. In the northeast, for example, where the Council of the North has established the rudiments of a civil administration, permission and cooperation may be obtained from a quasi-governmental body that then handles local village cooperation. In the Pashtun belt, on the other

hand, tribal factions, rather than regional associations, make kinship groups the primary cooperative political body, and in other regions power may lie in the hands of powerful commanders. The key element should be engaging the most appropriate individuals and institutions, not demanding that each region form a shura for the sake of meeting a foreign donor's idea of what indigenous Afghan institutions must be like. In those areas where, because of the war, shuras have developed into governmental bodies, they will not hesitate to make their presence known.

The requirement of a community contribution serves as a distinguishing feature of the current ARR/VITA program. By demanding that at least 30 percent of the costs be met by the local beneficiaries (usually supplied in the form of labor) the program effectively links the specific project to the local population. Those communities unwilling to provide this contribution are not eligible for funding. Again, as there is movement to larger scale projects over larger areas, such an ironclad rule may create difficulties. As donors begin to contract work out on the basis of their own criteria rather than relying only on community requests, local involvement in terms of cost-sharing may be more difficult to obtain. It is relatively simple to make the case that the projects of which local communities themselves are the direct beneficiaries should include cost sharing; it is difficult to gain this level of cooperation where benefits are only indirect or serve a series of villages, each viewing the project somewhat differently. (An example would be a transportation project, which would involve many beneficiaries profiting at different levels from the project, and with different views on those benefits.) For this reason governments have always relied on taxation, not contributions, to support public works.

The future relationship between the provinces and the central government, between local and provincial authorities, and between non-governmental organizations and local shuras remains uncertain. The war has given greater authority to commanders and political leaders with pan-provincial, provincial, or simply local power, all at the expense of the central government. New shuras have emerged, but they are not always well institutionalized. In this complex and unstable mix, non-governmental organizations have become intermediaries for international donors, strengthening one or another local leader or council, dealing with local communities, and engaging in activities that before the war were the responsibility of state authorities.

d. Concluding Observations

Historians of wars and their aftermath have reminded us that wars are both destructive and constructive. Wars kill and maim, decimate families, villages, and towns, force people from their homes, destroy roads, bridges, dams, power plants, schools, hospitals, and private property. Wars have destroyed empires, brought down regimes, and weakened traditional dominant elites. Historians have also noted that wars have strengthened the capacity of states to tax their citizens, provided an impetus for creating the welfare state, stirred patriotism, replaced local ethnic with national identities, and stimulated states to promote the advancement of technologies and to play a more active role in development. The historian Charles Tilly, in an eloquent epigram, said that states create wars and wars create states.

But history provides us with no clear guidelines for assessing the impact of the war on Afghanistan's state, polity, society, and economy. Afghanistan has been engaged in two wars: a war between the people of

Afghanistan and a foreign power; and a civil war among the elites of Afghanistan. The first war is over; the second continues. Afghanistan's conflict has been more like that of wartime China, contemporary Lebanon, or perhaps Zaire than wartime Europe, or the Iran-Iraq conflict. The task of sorting out internal political relationships is far more complicated in the former than in the latter cases, and the role of external powers in helping to heal the wounds of war far more complex.

In this and in the previous sections we sought to recount some of the ways in which the institutions of Afghanistan have been shaped and transformed by the war and the challenges that Afghanistan has created for the international community concerned with ending the war and facilitating the country's reconstruction. As we have noted earlier, the instinct of bureaucrats in donor states and international institutions is to want to deal with fellow bureaucrats in countries that receive assistance. They seek bureaucratic counterparts who are accountable and honest, people with whom they can negotiate and who can deliver what they promise.

For the past several years donors have had little choice but to deal with groups outside the state—expatriate and Afghan NGOs, shuras, local commanders, tanzeems, and private traders and merchants. Without intending to do so, donors have strengthened non-state institutions. When a new government is formed with whom donors can directly interact, bureaucrats within donor institutions will instinctively turn their attention to the ministries and the country's new political leaders. Such a development is both inevitable and desirable. But it also creates dangers.

The outcome of the present conflict is, to say the least, uncertain. But it is not difficult to predict what would happen if donors turned over substantial resources to a central authority that is politically divided, whose admin-

istrative structure has little control over much of the country's territory, where managerial talents are scarce, familial and ethnic ties remain strong, and accountability of governing elites to their citizens is weak. In this environment donors will soon despair and withdraw.

Most of the donors have sought creative alternatives, by initiating a process of working with non-state institutions, namely non-governmental organizations, local councils and local governments, and with the private sector. None of this has been easy and in any event the process has only just begun. When the war finally ends and a new government is formed donors will have to decide whether to continue this process or revert to familiar and more traditional state-state relationships. In our judgment, the USAID strategy of seeking to strengthen non-state institutions is an appropriate one that should continue when the war ends, even as it begins the process of establishing a working relationship with a new government. Such a strategy also calls for more innovative ways in which donors can deal with one another and with non-state institutions without unduly threatening the central government.

In the two sections that follow we will describe and assess ARR/VITA as one of the largest non-governmental organizations now working in Afghanistan, then compare it with other NGOs, both engineering and multi-purpose ones. It is important to emphasize that we are looking at institutions which did not exist in pre-war Afghanistan but which are now the dominant institutions engaged in reconstruction. They are new, most are staffed by Afghans but under foreign control, and they are all fragile in their dependence upon external support. In section six of this report we will turn to how ARR/VITA could become a wholly Afghan institution capable of functioning in a post-war Afghanistan, and how it could serve as a model

for other NGOs. Then in the concluding section we turn to the larger question of how the international community might organize itself to deal with the issues of reconstruction in such a way as to nurture non-state institutions.

4. REVIEW OF AGRICULTURAL AND RURAL
RECONSTRUCTION/VOLUNTEERS IN TECHNICAL
ASSISTANCE (ARR/VITA)

a. The Evolution of ARR/VITA

In 1986 the Office of the USAID Representative for Afghanistan (O/AID/Rep) issued a grant to Volunteers in Technical Assistance (VITA) to design a project for assisting the agricultural sector of Afghanistan which evolved into the Afghanistan Agricultural Sector Support Program (AASSP). At that time it was believed that the relief mission directed at refugees in Pakistan needed to be expanded into Afghanistan itself, both to reduce the flow of refugees out of the country and to begin to lay the groundwork for the future return of those who were refugees. While Soviet troops still occupied the country and battles continued to be fought in many regions, mujahideen control of a number of localities and their access routes made such a strategy feasible. Project implementation began in March 1987, and in less than three years the AASSP grew from a small staff to an organization of 250 by 1989. This rapid growth made it one of the largest trans-border programs and one of the most complex, with a wide range of projects in many provinces of Afghanistan. After a review of the progress of AASSP the program was reorganized in 1990 and the management was split between VITA and DAI (Development Alternatives, Inc.). As of 1991 the program was focused primarily on rural infrastructure rehabilitation on the one side (VITA), and private sector agribusiness, agricultural development and training, and planning on the other (DAI). The VITA share of the AASSP is budgeted at approximately \$12 million

over two years and currently employs 220 people in Peshawar and Quetta and 180 people in Afghanistan.

The Afghanistan Agricultural Sector Support Program was designed to provide resources to increase agricultural productivity in Afghanistan in selected regions and to support the growth of institutional mechanisms to use the resources provided. However, the military situation in the country in 1986 made the planning of such a cross-border program difficult and imposed some severe handicaps. These included Kabul's and the Soviet's hostility to such aid, which precluded large-scale operations that would by their very presence become targets for destruction; difficulties in transporting people and materials to project sites; poor communications; the necessity of negotiating agreements with a variety of political parties and military groups that were dominant in each region; and the inability of American personnel to directly supervise or monitor activities inside Afghanistan. Flexibility was therefore a necessity and a "rolling design" approach was employed so that successful elements could be expanded and those projects that did not live up to initial expectations could be redesigned or terminated.

The original design included three tracks:

Track 1: Afghan Agricultural Project

This program was designed to be set up in areas controlled by the mujahideen and to focus on regional agricultural development. Initially it was expected that this cross-border program would be conducted in cooperation with the Agricultural Council of the Islamic Unity of Afghan Mujahideen, a seven-party alliance which was supposed to coordinate resistance in Afghanistan. This proved impracticable because the Agricultural Council was plagued with the same problems of factionalism and lack

of a coordinated structure that typified the political parties themselves. Agricultural planning was also not at the top of the agenda for political parties primarily devoted to a military *jihad*. The other difficulty was that although the seven parties had agreed to form a nominal alliance under pressure from donor groups, they still competed for resources as independent organizations and cooperation with one often engendered hostility from its rivals. Faced with these problems the agricultural sector program of the Agricultural Council never came to fruition and VITA eventually assigned most of its responsibilities to a newly developed Track 3 (see below).

Track 2: Private Sector Agricultural Support

Throughout the war both trans-border and internal trade had been quite active. Indeed, of all of Afghanistan's economic institutions, its network of private traders seemed to be the most intact. The Track 2 program was designed to explore the possibility that this network could be used to supply regions of Afghanistan far from the border where agricultural potential was high but direct aid was impracticable and, by providing a subsidized price, make agricultural equipment affordable for local farmers. By the end of 1987 this program had shipped more than \$600,000 in agricultural equipment such as threshers, tractors, pumps, and machine parts to 16 provinces using existing networks of trade between Afghanistan and Pakistan for sale in provincial bazaars. VITA arranged for many of these commodities to be sold at subsidized prices by paying rebates to the manufacturers, who then sold goods to traders at a discount. This preliminary attempt was so successful that the program was expanded the next year. Over \$2 million worth of goods were shipped into Afghanistan and \$400,000 was provided in indirect subsidies, reducing the

cost to the ultimate consumer by between ten and thirty percent. It was estimated that the resulting lower prices and increased supply of goods were responsible for doubling the flow of agriculturally related commodities and supplies. In 1990, Track 2 was reorganized into the Private Sector Agribusiness (PSI) under the management of DAI. The program has been expanded to include the organization of trans-border trade centers, planning for the use of bazaars inside Afghanistan, and facilitating merchant trade in needed commodities (especially wheat, fertilizer, and machines). As part of DAI's organization there is also a group concerned with strategic planning, with a considerable capacity for the collection and analysis of data relevant to rural reconstruction and development.

Track 3: Rural Works

The Rural Works program was added to AASSP in early 1987, when Eng. M. Sediq joined the VITA staff to set up a third track devoted primarily to reconstruction projects focusing chiefly on irrigation and road construction. Because of the failure of Track 1 he also took responsibility for adding the agricultural development aspect to the design of Area Development Schemes (ADS), which along with horticultural programs under the management of Dr. Abdul Wakil were returned to Track 1 in late 1988.

Initially, these schemes focused on cleaning or reconstructing karez and canal systems because these operations could be carried out with little or no equipment by specialized personnel available locally, with little supervision and no need for engineering design. By 1988 there were 12 schemes in operation located in 8 provinces inside Afghanistan. In 1989 this had expanded to 16 schemes in 12 provinces. The VITA organization added more planning and monitoring capacity in an attempt to ensure quality control and to evaluate the impact of their work. Each ADS was located in a

rural district and employed a team of about ten to sixteen people, with a mix of agricultural and engineering specialists. The engineering projects provided the credibility needed in the project areas to initiate agricultural extension services. The ADS managers also experimented with the distribution of threshers, other mechanical farm implements, and bullocks in each area. In 1989 the Area Development Schemes were renamed Agricultural Rehabilitation Schemes (ARS) more accurately to reflect the nature of their work.

The ARR/VITA cross-border ADS program had an impact upon other NGOs. With the Soviet withdrawal in 1989 many NGOs decided that working within Afghanistan should have a higher priority. As one of the first and largest programs, ARR/VITA provided a model for such work, and projects focusing on karez and canal cleaning, road building, and small-scale agricultural aid proliferated. ARR/VITA's use of cooperative local councils, shuras, has proved popular with other donors. While many organizations saw these developments as temporary, i.e. part of a short interim period before the fall of the Kabul government would allow them to do larger projects, the stalemate in the civil war has given many of these projects a much longer life than anticipated, to the point that there has been competition among NGOs even for such low-level endeavors as cleaning karezes.

In March 1990 the contract between the Afghan O/AID/Rep and VITA was due to expire and competitive proposals for the trans-border programs were sought. A three-year contract for the entire AASSP was won by DAI. However, after the contract was awarded USAID decided that the Rural Works Division and the horticultural programs would be kept under VITA's management. The existing organization was then split in

two, the engineering portions remaining with ARR/VITA while the agricultural program (ARS) was taken on by DAI. This division had a particularly damaging impact on the ARS management within Afghanistan, where groups of engineers and agriculturalists had always formed integrated teams able to assist one another on a regular basis and to share scarce administrative personnel. The impact of splitting the organization was particularly destructive to the role of horticulture, because the horticultural section had been initially moved from DAI to VITA, but within a few months was transferred back to DAI. In the end ARR/VITA became an organization devoted almost exclusively to engineering projects, with no formal connections to related activities in horticulture, agriculture, or trade.

Surprisingly, justification for this important decision is not found in any of the documentation. It appears to have been subjected to no formal debate or independent analysis before its implementation. Such a division was neither recommended in any of the several advisory reports nor was a provisional plan prepared to carry it out.

b. Overview of the Functions of ARR/VITA

ARR/VITA is an organization presently devoted to rebuilding the rural infrastructure of Afghanistan in order both to rehabilitate agriculture for the remaining residents of Afghanistan and to encourage wartime refugees to return and work the land. It operates in 16 of the 28 provinces of Afghanistan, ranging over the entire country, but especially the eastern part, which is within the easiest reach. Services range from the repair of facilities to major reconstruction, and sometimes to building entirely new facilities. ARR/VITA has cleaned and rebuilt karezes, has repaired

tertiary roads (including repair of washouts, culvert construction, and laying sub-base and unsealed surfaces), and has rebuilt or newly built parts of agricultural irrigation systems (including intake structures, retaining walls, and canals).

As a rural development group, ARR/VITA specializes in the relatively simple task of the design, repair, and building of these infrastructure facilities. ARR/VITA started in 1986 with the simplest of them, hiring local labor to clean karezes. As time went on it moved to the surface irrigation works, the more complex facilities of this group, and to road repair and construction. ARR/VITA works primarily with labor-intensive, pick-and-shovel, technologies. It has trucks, but only a few pieces of mechanized construction equipment.

ARR/VITA, with 366 employees, is the second-largest of the NGOs working in rural rehabilitation. It is half the size of the largest, ACLU, but about four times the size of any of the others. Except for a few Pakistanis and two Americans, the staff is entirely Afghan. Of ARR/VITA personnel about 220 (55%) spend most of their time in the Peshawar office and 180 in the field. About twenty percent of the ARR/VITA staff are professionals, of whom the vast majority are civil engineers. The field staff is distributed among 16 provincial field offices each with an average of 10 or 11 permanent staff members. This makes ARR/VITA's personnel by far the most widely distributed of the participating NGOs; other NGOs have between four and seven field offices. The professionals within ARR/VITA have a common background from their engineering education at the university and the polytechnic school in Kabul, and from subsequent service in Kabul and with the Afghan government before 1979. ARR/VITA staff come originally from many parts of Afghanistan and are personally

affiliated with various different tanzeems. This is the most experienced NGO in rural public works, founded in 1986, whereas none of the others dates from before 1988.

ARR/VITA is financed entirely by USAID through VITA of Arlington, Virginia. Its budget last fiscal year was 5.2 million dollars. VITA headquarters collects some staff salary support from this budget plus a 34 percent overhead on "technical assistance" and "program support" (but not on field operations). VITA overhead thus accounts for 13 percent of the total budget. ARR/VITA's field expenditures on rural rehabilitation are 55 percent of its total budget.

ARR/VITA, compared with other organizations in the sector, can be described as a "grantee" NGO; that is, it receives an annual budget, rather than competing for contracts by making individual project proposals to funding agencies. It can also be characterized as a "single-" rather than a "multi-purpose" organization, since it builds only infrastructure, rather than pursuing other kinds of projects such as income-generating projects or agricultural assistance.

c. The Project Development Process in ARR/VITA

Project proposals are identified by local notables, shuras, or commanders who bring them to the attention of ARR/VITA professionals in the field or who pursue them at the Peshawar office. A total of 48,207 projects have been requested during the five-year life of ARR/VITA, mostly individual karez repair requests.

Only about fifteen percent of these proposals can be implemented. (As of March 1991 a total of 2,366 projects were completed, 998 were under construction, and another 3,908 were approved.) The selection of those to be

examined by survey teams is chosen by ARR/VITA department heads and the director. The survey team completes an evaluation form with a number of criteria to be scored, such as the number of potential beneficiaries, availability of local contributions, and engineering feasibility. The evaluation form serves as a checklist and a simple guide to project choice. On the basis of evidence collected by the survey team, the department heads and director make a final selection of projects. All projects must be in secure areas with a functioning shura to represent the local community. ARR/VITA requires a contribution to the project from the beneficiary community, ideally 35 percent of the project cost. Much of this contribution is received in kind, usually in the form of labor.

The next step is design. Road rehabilitation and other simple projects are undertaken through the local field staff, but irrigation works projects require design by the design section of the Engineering Services staff. The project is then put in the hands of Field Coordination for implementation. During implementation the project is monitored to assure proper completion of the specifications.

d. Contributions of ARR/VITA to Rural Rehabilitation

To summarize, rural rehabilitation and reconstruction in Afghanistan has hardly begun. Roads and bridges have been destroyed; irrigation systems damaged, both by neglect and by military actions. Areas once cultivated are now neglected as the result of the exodus of much of the male population. Until recently donors and NGOs assumed that the task of reconstruction would have to await the end of the conflict and the return of the refugees. ARR/VITA was the first major organization to demonstrate that cross-border rehabilitation and reconstruction activities could be

initiated in relatively peaceful regions of the country. ARR/VITA demonstrated that local communities were ready to begin reconstruction, and that they were prepared to make good-faith contributions to the cost of projects. ARR/VITA began by rehabilitating karezes, then moved on toward the construction of roads, bridges, and more complicated irrigation works, projects of increasing technical complexity. ARR/VITA demonstrated that it was possible to work with local shuras and commanders without being forced into confining relations with a particular tanzeem. ARR/VITA also demonstrated that local shuras could help to identify local needs and to propose projects.

In these respects, ARR/VITA played a leadership role in demonstrating both to international donor agencies and to NGOs that cross-border programs were possible, and that local communities were willing and able to take part in the reconstruction process. It also demonstrated that non-governmental institutions could take on responsibilities for rural public works at least as efficiently—and some would say more efficiently and with more public participation—than that of previous governments in Afghanistan.

5. THE INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT: NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS (NGOs)

Since the early 1980s, the principal mechanism through which the international community and, more recently, Afghan nationals themselves have provided humanitarian assistance to the Afghan people, has been the non-governmental organization (NGO). At present, well over one hundred NGOs are involved in work with Afghan refugees in Pakistan or in relief, rehabilitation, and reconstruction projects inside Afghanistan. The vast majority of these NGOs are members of one of the following three coordinating organizations: (1) Agency Coordinating Body for Afghanistan Relief (ACBAR), with 58 members;* (2) Southern and Western Afghanistan and Baluchistan Association for Coordination (SWABAC), with 25 members; and (3) Islamic Coordination Council (ICC), with 15 members.

The majority of the NGOs are involved in both refugee and cross-border activities. Of 56 agencies listed in ACBAR's 1991-92 directory, 16 work exclusively in Pakistan, 13 are involved in cross-border activities inside Afghanistan, and 28 are engaged in both types of activities.

The overall tendency among many donor countries and international agencies over the past two years has been to cut back budget and personnel in their Afghan programs. As Table 5.1 shows, of the 13 countries that sponsor or support NGOs that are members of ACBAR, only five (the United States, Sweden, Norway, Belgium, and Pakistan) increased their contributions to Peshawar-based NGOs in 1991. Such reductions, when combined with the prospects of even deeper future cuts, make it difficult for

* The 1991-92 ACBAR Directory lists 56 members, but two additional NGOs had joined ACBAR as of August 1991.

the NGOs to initiate activities that require a greater gestation period and longer-term commitment of staff and resources.

TABLE 5.1. Sponsorship and Budget of NGOs Affiliated with ACBAR, 1991

Sponsoring country % change	No. of NGOs	1991 Budget (mil. US \$)	1991 Budget from
<u>1990</u>			
Austria	1	2.01	-28.2
Belgium	2	1.65	+27.7
Canada	2	1.03	-
Denmark	1	3.58	-12.7
France	6	5.91	-62.8
Germany	4	2.53	-62.7
Netherlands	2	0.84	-46.3
Norway	2	8.97	+18.8
Pakistan	2	0.95	+6.1
Sudan	1	1.73	-3.3
Sweden	2	16.06	+8.7
United Kingdom	8	10.85	-9.8
USA	12	49.57	+10.7
Afghan NGOs	12	2.09	+31.7
Total	<u>57</u>		

Source: Based on *ACBAR Directory of Members 1991-92*, p. iv.

Notes: (a) An Australian NGO with a 1990 budget of \$1.68 million and a Japanese NGO with a 1990 budget of \$93,000 discontinued their activities in 1991; (b) the Netherlands and Belgium run a combined program, involving 2 NGOs.

With the relative improvement in security conditions inside Afghanistan and the prospect for large-scale repatriation, more NGOs and their sponsors have sought to initiate new programs, or to expand their existing ones, inside Afghanistan. The rationale for this shift has less to do with the diminishing numbers and needs of the Afghan refugees outside of their homeland than with the widely shared view that the ultimate goal of all humanitarian aid must be repatriation and resettlement. What needs to

be emphasized, however, is that at least so far efforts to encourage Afghan refugees to return to their homeland have had very limited success. According to Pakistani relief officials, as of May 1991 only about 90,000 Afghan refugees had taken advantage of the UNHCR encashment program, which provides cash grants (Rs 3,300) and a three-month supply of wheat (300 Kgs) per refugee family in return for its ration card. This number represents less than four per cent of *registered* refugees in Pakistan. It should also be noted that the encashment of a ration card does not necessarily indicate that a family has returned to Afghanistan.

The need to shift aid to inside Afghanistan itself has been accompanied by a movement toward the indigenization of aid-related activities. Nearly all donors and international agencies involved with Afghanistan place a high premium on "Afghanization." For most NGOs, Afghanization—in the sense of having a predominantly or even exclusively Afghan staff—is already a *fait accompli*. Thus, of 17,678 employees of the NGOs listed with ACBAR in 1991, only 266 (1.5 percent) were expatriates, while 92.9 percent were Afghans and the remaining 5.6 percent were Pakistanis. For the previous year (1990), the corresponding distribution of 7,551 NGO employees was as follows: 4.7 percent expatriates, 84.2 percent Afghans, and 11.1 percent Pakistanis. However, the expatriates are often in key managerial positions and that few expatriate NGOs are under Afghan management.

The current emphasis on the Afghanization of aid has led to the emergence of a large number of Afghan entities eager to participate in the task of reconstruction inside Afghanistan. As of July 1991 there were over 50 such organizations active in Pakistan (see Appendix E). Of these, 34 were involved in rural rehabilitation, eight in medical services, seven in

women's issues, and four in mine clearing and mine awareness programs inside Afghanistan. The effectiveness of many of the Afghan NGOs is uncertain, and since some are closely associated with particular tanzeems it is not clear how many will be able to continue to work in Afghanistan in their present form after a settlement is reached. However, the mushrooming of Afghan entities can be taken as an indication that over a decade of exile and refugee status has not sapped the vitality of Afghan refugee professionals, who remain eager actively to participate in the reconstruction of their homeland.

a. NGOs and Cross-Border Reconstruction Programs

This section examines the institutional environment of ARR/VITA by comparing it with seven other NGOs engaged in rural public works. We shall compare two types of organizations, those like ARR/VITA, that are engaged exclusively in the construction of rural infrastructure, and those that build infrastructure as one part of a broader rural development program. The eight are: ARR/VITA, RAFA, CBR, ACLU, ESAR, CARE, Save the Children USA, and DACAAR. Of these ARR/VITA, CBR, RAFA, ESAR, and ACLU are exclusively engineering NGOS, while Save the Children, CARE, and DACAAR are multi-purpose NGOs.

The purpose of reviewing these entities and their performance is to determine whether certain organizational types or strategies are more effective than others in cross-border reconstruction assistance. Are there advantages or disadvantages associated with an exclusive focus on rural public works? What is the relationship between the size of an organization and its functions? Table 5.2 provides a brief characterization of the eight NGOs.

Table 5.2 NGOs in Rural Rehabilitation

	VITA	ACLU	RAFA	ESAR	CBR	DACAAR	SAVE THE CHILDREN	CARE
Total Annual Expenditure	5,220	12,500 ³	1,250	600	500	978 ⁴	360 ⁴	1,386
Total Personnel	400	825	75	100	100	212 ²	85 ²	80
Peshawar	220			15	25		42	12
Field	180			80	75		42	68
Engineers	67	17 ⁵	20		60(?)	10	6	20
Number Regions Served	16	5	4	4	7	6		
Date of Start	1987	1989	1988	1989	1988		1989	1990
Project Types	Rural infra-structure	Roads and Bridges	Irrigation	Rural infra-structure	Rural infra-structure	Multi purpose	Multi purpose	Multi purpose (Rural inf' structure)

- ¹Thousands of US dollars
- ²For all program elements
- ³Includes CCSC expenditures
- ⁴Infrastructure only
- ⁵Excludes CCSC staff

We are concerned with both the output and input sides of operation. As indicated, some NGOs deal only with rural infrastructure, such as irrigation works and transportation facilities, while others deal in addition with agricultural extension and income-generating projects. We should note first that all the engineering NGOs, with the exception of ARR/VITA and ACLU (which is linked to CCSC, an American NGO), are Afghan entities, while the multi-purpose organizations are all expatriate NGOs. The idea of multi-purpose integrated services is primarily confined to the expatriate organizations who have had experience managing such activities elsewhere in the world. In pre-war Afghanistan rural public works were not well integrated with agricultural extension programs; moreover, both then and now Afghanistan has had a stronger cadre of engineers than of agronomists, horticulturalists, or rural extension workers. Without prejudging the question of whether it is possible to create an effective Afghan organization committed to multi-purpose rural development, it is noteworthy that there is at present no existing prototype.

NGOs differ in the level of complexity of their output. All these NGOs started with considerable attention to karez cleaning and repair projects, but after a few years some have taken on more ambitious projects. The engineering NGOs are engaged in more complex projects (especially ARR/VITA and ACLU), such as road and bridge construction, while the multipurpose NGOs, though reducing their work on karezes, continue to do simple construction projects. The multipurpose NGOs, like Save the Children, are making only minor repairs on roads, such as the installation of culverts at wash-out locations. This is reasonable, of course, since engineering-based NGOs, with a substantial design and construction supervision capability, are underutilized when they confine their efforts to

the repair of karezes. Karez cleaning consists largely of simply paying local karez cleaners to do the job, a specialized but low-technology activity to which an NGO can make little technical contribution. This may explain why the NGOs are getting away from karez cleaning.

The two types of NGOs also differ with respect to input. The engineering NGOs are staffed almost exclusively by Afghans, since Afghanistan has had a number of quality engineering schools. Engineering-based NGOs, as suggested earlier, are more likely to have Afghan professionals than the multi-purpose NGOs.

Another aspect of input is equipment. In general, the multipurpose NGOs have little mechanized equipment for infrastructure-building. By far the most mechanized NGO is ACLU, which has 140 to 150 pieces of equipment received from U.S. government sources. This enables it to focus on higher-standard secondary roads, rather than the tertiary roads rebuilt by other NGOs. ACLU has also lately installed Bailey bridges of considerable length. It is more active in bridge construction than the other engineering NGOs.

Each of the participating NGOs is comprehensive in the sense that it covers all functions from planning through design to construction. In much of the world design and construction are done by different organizations. In Afghanistan, however, (1) most projects have been rather simple, not requiring advanced design or construction skills, and (2) the context is so turbulent that it is necessary to avoid dependencies among organizations. In time, as the institutional environment becomes more stable and projects become more complex, this simplified practice may end.

As regards funding, there are two types of NGOs, largely though not entirely matching the distinction between engineering and multipurpose

NGOs. Those in a group we could call "grantee NGOs" receive block grants from donors and then choose projects to undertake. These include ARR/VITA, ACLU, DACAAR, CARE, and most of the smaller multi-purpose NGOs. The other NGOs seek funds competitively through project proposals. These we call "contract NGOs." They include RAFA, ESAR, CBR, and Save the Children. While it is not clear that grantee NGOs as a group are more experimental than those that seek contracts for specific projects, it is clear that grantee NGOs are better able to decide what they want to do and where, while contract NGOs must be more responsive to the interests of funding organizations.

Differences of NGO performance by staff or budget size have not shown any clear pattern. It seems reasonable to expect that the largest organizations would have the greatest variety of capabilities and the largest span of service offerings. In fact, the reverse seems to be the case. The multipurpose agencies (e.g., Save the Children and CARE) are among the smallest of the NGOs, while the largest of them, ACLU, is devoted exclusively to building transportation facilities. ARR/VITA is the next-to-largest, with only a somewhat more ample repertory. Perhaps this is not as strange as it at first seems. Large organizations are often better able to specialize, for they have the institutional strength to get the project they want while small organizations sometimes have to do a bit of everything in order to survive. In any event the management of an organization made up of widely differing kinds of professionals (e.g. engineers, agronomists, horticulturalists, planners) is notoriously difficult. One only finds in the small multi-purpose NGOs such an array of expertise.

In sum, NGOs differ substantially with respect to their functions, size, and relationship with funding institutions. There is, of course, no

"market test" of their efficiency. They are all dependent on donors, bilateral or multilateral, and they are responsive to whatever it is that donors want. Since donors are keen on involving shuras in project development, NGOs work with shuras. Since donors often want local beneficiaries to pay part of the costs, NGOs typically seek a local contribution. And since some of the donors are committed to multi-purpose "integrated" rural development, many of the NGOs, especially the expatriate NGOs, are multi-purpose.

In general, most of the donors are attracted to the idea of multi-purpose NGOs, with their promise of "integrated" rural development. Is there any evidence to suggest that these function well, and that USAID (which has tended to support more single-purpose NGOs, in rural public works, health, and education) should move in this direction? The evidence for dealing with this question is limited, especially since there is now no effective monitoring system for evaluating any individual or group of NGOs. We do know that doing integrated development with planning and designing units, divisions dealing with public works, rural extension, etc, and monitoring units, all within a single organization, is very difficult; USAID's experience with attempting to build all these functions within ARR/VITA (prior to the ARR/VITA-DAI split) are indicative of these difficulties.

It is also noteworthy that the multipurpose NGOs are all funded by donors with annual budgets. It seems reasonable to assert that integrated development needs more financial flexibility than may be available through single-project contract arrangements. The intricacies of complementarity among the parts of an integrated project are difficult to foresee when drafting a single contract. In any event, as we shall have an opportunity to explain later, donors that offer project contracts provide no incentive for

multi-purpose integrated development schemes. Moreover, since many of the bilateral donors are small (the USAID program being the notable exception, with an annual budget nearly equal to that of all other bilateral donors put together), they are not in a position to put large sums of money into a costly single-function organization.

One important conclusion can be drawn from this brief review of the NGOs. The large scale of such specialized NGOs as ARR/VITA, ACLU, ESAR, CBR, and RAFA, while conducive to effectiveness, is consistent with the objective of integrated development only when integrated development is undertaken by consortia of organizations, rather than by individual organizations. Though some of the smaller multipurpose NGOs come the closest to doing "integrated development," in fact none of the several efforts to achieve it has been successful. Such integration requires a planning entity to organize and manage a group of collaborating specialized organizations. In this way the advantages of a full repertory of specialized services could be combined with those of a large scale of operation. This is, of course, the way complex, integrated projects are normally undertaken throughout the world.

Large scale permits good depth of services in all aspects of a technical undertaking—the kind of departmental depth offered now at ARR/VITA. It offers efficiency of task specialization. Large scale can better absorb risk of failure; it enables experiment and chance-taking. At the same time, a consortium would formalize the rules of collaboration, creating synergy among project components. Such an arrangement, of course, would lean heavily on the competence of the planning organization directing the consortium, or that of the funding organization nurturing the collaboration through the terms of its contracts.

The crucial perspective on the problem is a view from outside the individual participating organizations. The actual form of the individual NGOs may be less important than the interactive process among the different types of participants involved—governments, international agencies, private donors, local and provincial institutions and power brokers, prospective beneficiaries, planning agencies, and the NGOs themselves, whether Afghan or expatriate, and whether single purpose or multi-purpose. No participant is independent of the others. All these actors send out and react to signals concerning what they want and what they are willing to do; together they form a kind of “market system,” having of course very special forms of information flows and adjustments. It is this interactive system, not the individual participants alone, that is the best predictor of outcomes, and interventions to influence those outcomes are best made at this level.

b. Engineering NGOs

What follows is a brief review of the major engineering NGOs engaged in cross-border activities involving the development of rural public works.

Consultant Bureau of Reconstruction (CBR)

CBR is an Afghan NGO which began its operations in 1988 with comprehensive highway development in Panjshir, where it de-mined and rebuilt 80 kms of road and reconstructed bridges and culverts. It also built medical clinics and carried out assistance in horticulture and field crops for the farmers of Panjshir. Though this initial large-scale project was

fully multipurpose, subsequent work of CBR has tended toward a more single-focussed effort to get contracts in infrastructure building.

Founded in close association with Eng. Ahmad Shah Masood, CBR transferred its headquarters to Peshawar in April 1989 to seek international support for its work. Its sponsors have included WHO, for 17 medical clinics, and CCSC, for a substantial highway project. The highway is their largest current contract at Rps 17 million. CBR has trained 96 land surveyors. Its annual volume is about \$500,000.

For the future, CBR has undertaken several initiatives, mostly surveys and building and infrastructure construction projects. Much of the time of the senior staff is devoted to seeking contracts for specific projects; senior staff complain about the limited contracts presently available to pursue reconstruction projects.

Engineering Services for Afghanistan Reconstruction (ESAR)

ESAR, an all-Afghan organization with 80 to 100 employees, is an engineering NGO that constructs roads, buildings, and irrigation/water works. One unusual project was a precast concrete factory for making beams and slabs in Paktia, at \$225,000. It has no single donor covering its budget; it competes for contracts from the sponsoring donors, and from NGOs that subcontract. While about 15 of the staff are permanently assigned to Peshawar, ESAR has no permanent delegations or branch offices at specific locations in the field. It has worked in six provinces; its total volume since it was founded is \$1.5 million.

ESAR clients have been principally the UN agencies, including UNDP, UNHCR, and UNOCA. It has had repeat contracts with them since it was founded in 1989. For USAID, ESAR has done an irrigation survey in

Kandehar. ESAR's general approach has been to watch the priorities of the international agencies, bid for projects of special interest to it, and consult the respective shuras to be sure of their willingness to collaborate.

Reconstruction Authority for Afghanistan (RAFA)

RAFA, founded in 1988, has a staff of 72 to 75, plus some temporary personnel. It received a grant of \$280,000 from USAID for office expenditures, but otherwise it simply competes for projects. It has four branch offices in Afghanistan: in Kandahar, Paktia, the Kabul region, and in the extreme northeast.

Although among the 15 projects RAFA has so far completed there are a number of emergency food supply projects, it focuses on irrigation and water supply projects, including intakes, aqueducts, and flumes. RAFA's volume is about \$140,000 per year, less than a third of which is spent in the Peshawar office. A good deal of their payment for past projects has been in wheat. The firm spends much of its energy preparing proposals to seek project funding.

Construction Control and Services Corporation (CCSC) and Afghan Construction and Logistic Unit (ACLU)

ACLU is an Afghan NGO engaged in rebuilding roads and bridges. CCSC is a US firm that provides oversight, advice, and linkage of ACLU with its funding source, USAID. When Soviet troops left Afghanistan ACLU was formed as a transport firm, anticipating an immediate need to reach regions of Afghanistan with food and supplies. It soon became clear, however, that there was a greater need for repairing and building road-

ways, so ACLU turned from food transportation to road construction. Recently the transportation aspect of its services was terminated.

ACLU is the largest NGO in the rural rehabilitation sector, with 800 employees (including 50 engineers, 20 of them in Peshawar). It is also the most mechanized NGO, owning 140 to 150 pieces of heavy construction equipment including bulldozers, cranes, concrete mixers, trucks, etc. While other participating NGOs tend to concentrate on the tertiary road system, ACLU focuses on secondary roads. Its cross-border personnel are organized in 4 teams, three road construction crews and a bridge crew, with one divided to work at a fifth location in consortium with CBR. Its annual budget is about \$7 million.

ACLU has an advisory board consisting of three professional engineers, a military commander, and a representative of ACBAR. The ACLU general manager and USAID are non-voting members. Project proposals arise from many sources, including USAID, CCSC, military commanders, field teams, and shuras. The criteria for selection of projects include (1) preference for secondary roads, (2) largest numbers of beneficiaries, (3) locations accessible to equipment, (4) locations controlled by mujahideen, (5) political neutrality among commanders, (6) development impact, (7) availability of beneficiary contribution, and (8) technical and financial feasibility.

ACLU is beginning an Afghan Road Condition Survey, starting with a pilot project in one province, probably Kunar. The survey will then be continued by increments to all areas accessible to ACLU staff. There is no completion date programmed.

ACLU's joint venture with CBR is a USAID-funded project for 25 to 30 kilometers of road. It is apparently the only joint venture for either organization.

c. Multi-Purpose NGOs

The three multi-purpose NGOs reviewed here, the Danish Committee for Aid to Afghan Refugees (DACAAR), Save the Children USA, and CARE, are among the largest of the many NGOs that build rural infrastructure, maintain agricultural extension and income generation projects, and more broadly are involved in a number of services in rural Afghanistan.

The Danish Committee for Aid to Afghan Refugees (DACAAR).

DACAAR initiated its Rehabilitation Programme in 1988, in the wake of the Geneva agreement. It was launched with the expectation that there would be large-scale refugee repatriation following the withdrawal of Soviet troops. The assumption was—and remains—that the better the rehabilitation of the infrastructure and the recovery of the rural economy can be accomplished before the refugees return, the more likely will be a successful resettlement. The budget of the Rehabilitation Programme for 1990 was \$950,000 and for 1991 \$1.75 million; these figures are exclusive of the costs of the main office which manages both the refugee and rehabilitation programs. The Peshawar staff totalled 584, including 43 engineers and 11 agronomists. Eleven members of the staff are expatriates* , 99 are Pakistanis, and 474 are Afghans. At the end of 1990 the Rehabilitation Programme had 22 engineers and assistant engineers and 11 agronomists

* Here our use of the term means non-Afghan and non-Pakistani.

and assistant agronomists. There is an expatriate director of the program, with sections (Agriculture, Irrigation, Water Supply, Roads and Buildings) headed by Afghans. DACAAR's overall budget increased from Rs 65 million in 1990 to Rs 94 million in 1991.

DACAAR's assistance program focuses on the implementation of integrated projects in selected geographic areas of Afghanistan. The criteria for choosing project areas include considerations of security, a consensus among local leaders regarding project implementation, access, assurance that members of different ethnic groups are beneficiaries, and agreement among representations of all political groups within the area. In choosing sites, DACAAR does not have as its criteria the identification of areas from which refugees have come or to which refugees have returned, but is as likely to choose areas where there has been internal displacement or which have remained demographically relatively stable.

DACAAR employs local labor and attempts to develop skills for project planning and implementation among its own Afghan staff. To ensure local participation and consensus, DACAAR searches for—or creates—local shuras comprising representatives of all political groups within the area. In DACAAR's experience, these shuras are unstable forms of organization, "which are more likely than not to break up sooner or later as a result of political rivalry between the groups represented in them." They are often formed by local commanders who may not fully represent the political groups within the area. At times competing leaders representing different political groups are unwilling to form a joint shura. The result may be the creation of competing shuras, each making claims upon the resources of DACAAR and other donor agencies. Commanders,

and representatives of the various tanzeems, view donor organization resources as necessary to enhance their own local authority.

DACAAR first tries to create a single shura representing diverse interests and failing that to work with several shuras if each, in effect, accepts the legitimacy of the other to work within the community. DACAAR attempts to create an integrated plan and field organization for each area within which it operates. Activities may include any or all of the following: agriculture (distribution and multiplication of seeds, delivery of fertilizers, extension work); irrigation, water supply, road repair and construction, and building (mainly schools and administrative buildings).

In 1990, the Rehabilitation Programme implemented projects in three provinces, Kunar, Ghazni, and Paktia, and made preparations for new projects in Nangarhar, Samangan, and Baghlan. A review of DACAAR's own description of these projects suggests that these are not integrated, but rather multiple-purpose projects, with each division of the Rehabilitation unit developing its own projects. Thus in Kunar there are programs for the distribution of seeds and fertilizers, the construction of a 31 km dirt road, the repair of two school buildings (in another part of the province), and the repair of a 23-km canal.

Save the Children USA

Save the Children is concerned with the evolution of its multi-purpose activities into integrated rural development. Save the Children has an office in Islamabad and four branch offices, of which only the one in Peshawar is the subject of this review. It engages in three activity areas: engineering, agriculture, and income generation for women. Its staff of 85 people (half in Peshawar, half in Afghanistan), as well as its annual

budget of about \$1 million, is divided about equally among these program elements. About \$360,000 is annually spent for rural public works.

The road work is concentrated on tertiary, sometimes secondary, roads and emphasizes bottleneck repairs, such as culverts and washout problems. The field staff does not do soft surfacing and pothole repair, since these can be done by local residents. They repair 10 to 12 kms of roads a year. They also build water supply systems (there is a program emphasis on sanitation), karez repair, irrigation intakes, and flood control facilities. The agriculture program includes cleaning of water supply facilities, extension services, and providing improved seed.

The program of income generation for women operates in three of the five areas where the other program components take place. It includes craft instruction, in which women are taught embroidery and provided with patterns and supplies to make pieces that are bought by intermediaries and sold to tailors who sew them into clothing. There is also a womens' poultry program.

Save the Children has often succeeded in having all three of these program elements taking place in the same villages. It also tries to maintain a continuous presence by housing its staff in the villages. The field staff works closely with villagers, local notables, and the shuras. Since the engineering rural works program of Save the Children is limited, and since as an organization it is committed to integrated rural development, it is the kind of organization that has the capacity to work with larger engineering NGOs in joint programs.

Though Save the Children undertakes different kinds of projects in the same localities, it is not engaged in integrated rural development, since projects are linked only through their proximity, not through planning for

interrelated benefits. Save the Children does, however, come the closest to doing integrated rural development among the organizations whose officials we interviewed, none of which appears to have succeeded. For this reason we have argued for integrated development through consortia rather than by single organizations.

Save the Children receives its financial support roughly equally from USAID and from the UN, particularly the UNDP, WFP, and FAO.

CARE

CARE-Afghanistan also works in the field of rural rehabilitation, rebuilding irrigation systems (including rebuilding, but not cleaning, karezes), tertiary roads, donkey tracks, and warehouses. With a staff of 80, of whom about 20 are engineers and 12 are in its Peshawar office, it has had 60 projects since its beginning in April 1990, some of which are still under way. Field work is primarily in Konar and Paktika. Since it is funded through USAID and by the United Nations Food for Work Program, local workers receive a combination of wheat and money for their labor. Consistent with the food-for-work objective, the work is primarily labor-intensive, using hand tools. CARE's budget for the last fiscal year was \$1.4 million.

The International Rescue Committee.

The International Rescue Committee (IRC) is currently the largest Peshawar-based NGO. Its program for Afghanistan, which started in 1980, provides a wide range of health and education services for over a quarter of a million refugees in Pakistan, as well as cross border programs inside Afghanistan. For the current year (1991) its budget is approximately

\$16 million, of which 60 percent is contributed by the U.S. Government, 30 percent by private foundations, and 10 percent by the UN.

Since 1988, the IRC has been involved in two types of cross-border programs. The first, the Rehabilitation Program for Afghanistan (RPA), assists in the revitalization of "sustainable food systems" in the province of Paktya. It provides technical advice and initial inputs into the agricultural sector, including the establishment of seed multiplication farms for wheat and maize, district fruit nurseries, and demonstration farms for fruits, vegetables, wheat and maize; small scale irrigation and construction projects; and a variety of medical training, sanitation and immunization programs. Each project is carried out under the supervision of a local shura. To promote the managerial capability of the shura members, IRC requires that at least one representative from each shura responsible for the implementation of an RPA project attend classes at its Shura Management Training Units (SMTU) in Darsamand. The training includes such management skills as need assessment, proposal writing, project implementation monitoring, and evaluation. By the end of 1990, some 24 shura representatives had received such training. Similar training seminars are conducted by IRC for administrators from other NGOs. Twenty VITA field workers were among some 70 administrators from other NGOs who participated in IRC's administrative training workshops in 1990.

The second component of IRC's cross-border activities is the Rural Assistance Program (RAP). Inaugurated in 1988 and funded entirely by USAID, RAP is essentially a pass-through mechanism for assisting North American, European, and Afghan NGOs with the aim of increasing food production and rural income in Afghanistan. By the end of 1990, RAP had support 43 projects with a total funding of over \$10 million. These projects

were implemented by ten different NGOs, including three all-Afghan NGOs, in 18 different provinces in Afghanistan. To date, the principal recipients of RAP grants have been Afghanaid, AFRANE, Coordination of Afghan Relief (CAR), Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (CHA), CARE International, The Mercy Fund, Reconstruction Authority for Afghanistan (RAFA), Save the Children Federation, US (SCF), and Solidarites Afghanistan. For the current year (1991) \$7-8 million have been allocated to various NGOs by RAP.

While RAP does not execute projects itself, it provides advice and assistance to potential grantees in such areas as proposal development, administration, monitoring, and evaluation. Sustainability and demonstrable benefits to the disadvantaged groups and neglected regions are the key criteria used by RAP in its evaluation of proposed projects. Starting in 1991 IRC began to require that an applicant NGO be a member of ACBAR or a similar coordinating body, have at least 20 percent funding from other sources (preferably one of the UN organizations), and have a successful track record in the field of its proposed project.

6. PROPOSAL FOR AN INDEPENDENT AFGHAN ENGINEERING ENTITY FOR RURAL RECONSTRUCTION (AERR)

a. Assumptions

The recommendations of the Reconstruction Group rest upon a number of assumptions concerning the context within which our proposals for the Afghanization of ARR/VITA are made. One critical assumption is that the development of independent non-governmental organizations concerned with rehabilitation, reconstruction, and development is desirable. This assumption, which now guides US policy toward developing countries, rests on the broader belief that the creation of development-oriented institutions outside the framework of state authority is both desirable and necessary if one is committed, as is the United States, to the creation of politically pluralistic societies in which there are democratic constraints upon government. The presence of private institutions—private firms, non-governmental organizations, cooperatives, political parties, etc.—is a necessary condition for democracy and for encouraging and legitimizing participation. This condition has a special poignancy in Afghanistan, where for more than a decade a Soviet-style regime has sought to impose its will on Afghan society.

A second assumption is that when a new regime is formed it will not be in a strong position to carry out rehabilitation and reconstruction activities on its own; Afghanistan's pre-war ministries had a poor record for carrying out development activities, many of which were done on contract by foreign engineering firms. Moreover, given the intensity of conflict in the country between the mujahideen and Kabul and among the mujahideen, one should expect that a post-war Afghan government will

continue to have internal divisions. Both short-term reconstruction and long-term development could best be served in Afghanistan if many of these activities can be undertaken by institutions outside the government. Fortunately, Afghanistan is a society with a long history of private initiative and independence, and traditions of private trade, self-help, and community initiative are well established. What is often lacking, however, are the modern institutions and the skilled manpower to run them that are required for larger tasks. From this perspective, international donors would be wise to nurture the development of human resources, non-governmental institutions (both private and non-profit), and market systems within which these institutions can work.

A third assumption is that international donors will be unwilling—or unable—to undertake development activities or work through non-governmental institutions without the approval of Afghanistan's government. While at present cross-border rehabilitation programs are carried out without the concurrence of Kabul, international agencies and foreign government donors will be reluctant to continue such programs over the objections of a post-war government with whom they have bilateral relations. Moreover, a new government is likely to be overwhelmingly dependent upon foreign aid and donors will therefore be in a position to exercise considerable influence over what strategies should be adopted and through whom reconstruction and development programs should be implemented.

In large part because of the cross-border program initiated by the United States and several other governments and international agencies, there are now numerous NGOs working in Afghanistan, organizations largely under foreign control but staffed by Afghans. The opportunity exists

for devolving control over these NGOs to Afghans and thereby for taking a major step toward the creation of independent Afghan-run institutions that can participate in the country's postwar reconstruction and development. The ARR/VITA operation is a prime example of a U.S.-run NGO that has the capacity to be transformed into an independent Afghan non-governmental organization.

Our review of the ARR/VITA operation has led us to conclude that it has an effective Afghan management and engineering capabilities, and an impressive track record in implementing rural works projects within Afghanistan, including cleaning karezes, repairing other irrigation works, repairing and constructing roads, and rebuilding bridges. It has a well-known and respected leadership, with both managerial and engineering capacities, and a high-quality second-tier staff with professional skills. It has a record of financial accountability, and of monitoring its own projects to ensure that they meet design standards. Its sixteen field offices have worked with local shuras to repair and rehabilitate irrigation systems, rural roads, bridges, and other small-scale projects. It conducts engineering surveys, designs projects, and makes cost estimates. It is responsive to local requests and implements local projects by recruiting local labor and obtaining local contributions. It maintains a program for training its own staff. All this is done within a Peshawar- and Quetta-based institution that is Afghan-operated and managed with only marginal involvement of non-Afghans and limited dependence upon the VITA office in Arlington, Virginia. There are virtually no other Afghan engineering organizations with a comparable scale of operations and competence. It is, in our judgment, capable of standing alone although, as we shall specify, certain services currently performed by its American-based parent organization, or

from which it benefits because it is part of an American institution, need to be examined if ARR/VITA is to be redesigned into an independent Afghan-managed rural works entity.

b. Options

What kind of entity? What should be its tasks? How should it be financed? To each of these questions, there are alternative options.

What kind of entity? The proposed organization could be a private profit-making institution or a non-governmental organization. Its tasks? These could continue to be the same as those performed by ARR/VITA, or its mission could be expanded. Funding? The proposed entity could continue with its exclusive financial relationship with USAID or it could seek contracts and grants from other donors.

Of these various options the least disruptive is to convert ARR/VITA into a new organization, Afghan Engineering for Rural Reconstruction (AERR), as a non-profit, professional, politically nonpartisan engineering organization committed to the design, rehabilitation, and reconstruction of rural infrastructures within Afghanistan and funded, as before, by USAID. If this option is adopted, the major task would be to decouple ARR/VITA from VITA/Arlington, prepare Articles of Organization for AERR so that it can be registered in the United States as a non-profit, Afghan-run organization with its own Board of Directors and Afghan CEO, and sign a new contract with USAID to continue, more or less, what it has been doing. While AERR would be encouraged to seek contracts from other donors for the construction of public works in Afghanistan, its operations would not be dependent upon such contracts. The advantage of this option is that the conversion would be relatively painless, and the risks for AERR and for USAID would be relatively low. Moreover, AERR could function

even after a new government is formed, complementing the work of the Ministry of Rural Works since, given the enormity of the construction tasks that lie ahead, there is room for both governmental and non-governmental institutions.

A second option, a variant of the first, is that AERR, while still under contract with USAID, more aggressively engage in competitive bidding for grants and contracts. USAID would continue to provide AERR with funding for rural public works, but the scale of support might over time be reduced as AERR takes on projects for other donors. AERR's capacity to obtain grants and contracts would depend upon the quality and range of services it offered and, of course, the availability of funding opportunities from other donors. These services could be:

1. Those presently provided by ARR/VITA, with some modifications, i.e., a variety of civil engineering tasks required for rural reconstruction. The main functions of AERR would continue to be the design and construction of transportation facilities and irrigation works, including semi-skilled or low-technology services that AERR subcontracts, such as karez cleaning. It would continue to be involved in many aspects of road construction, including alignment planning and geometric design as well as sub-base and surface drainage structures. AERR would also continue to construct and repair small bridges. For irrigation projects, AERR should be prepared to do local hydrological studies as well as to design or redesign intakes, water transport aqueducts, water distribution facilities, and flow control devices. AERR would also be prepared to design and erect buildings associated with rural development programs, such as buildings to house project-related functions, food warehouses, and health and education facilities.

2

In the preparation of these facilities, AERR should be capable of project identification surveys, project appraisal at different points in the development process, the design of facilities, including the preparation of engineering and construction drawings and the final completion of as-built drawings. AERR should also educate local residents in the operation and maintenance of the facilities it builds.

2. Services that ARR/VITA currently performs for itself but which AERR would make available to others on a contractual basis. The most important of these are its engineering services. AERR's present Engineering Design group has substantial skills which can be made available to other NGOs whose capability is exceeded by the demands of the projects they are undertaking. In particular, AERR could offer its engineering design services to other NGOs and, if called upon, to provide project management and technical assistance to other NGOs.

Similarly, AERR could market its existing training program, currently intended primarily for its own staff. AERR could take in individuals from other NGOs for its courses and for in-service training on field sites. In this way AERR could play a role in enhancing the strength of the entire rural rehabilitation sector. Training might be especially aimed at mid-level professionals, both technical and managerial, for these are among the scarcest in Afghan organizations.

3. Coordinate AERR rural works projects with rural development projects of other NGOs in an effort to ensure that projects are part of broader, integrated rural development programs to increase agricultural productivity. This would require that AERR be pro-active rather than reactive in designing projects, that a planning unit work with other NGOs in preparing joint proposals, and that the AERR director remain in close

touch with donor institutions so as to be responsive to opportunities for developing bids for contracts .

Even a modest replacement of USAID program funding to AERR by contracts and grants from other donors has substantial implications for the way in which the present organization now functions and is perceived. The existing field operations would be most affected, since field staff would have to move from one location to another according to the needs of specific projects. Geographic distribution of field offices and an equal distribution of personnel among them would not be given preference over project priorities. The Field Coordination unit would be responsible for both the start-up of new field branches and the breakdown of terminating ones.

This second option, while more complicated for AERR, has the merit of reducing its dependence upon USAID, linking AERR to a variety of international donors, and providing AERR with a broader role in reconstruction than it now performs. Such an arrangement would have the added advantage of changing the public image of the organization from an exclusively American operation to an independent and professionally-managed Afghan entity supported by a variety of donors, including USAID. It would require some reorganization and some additional components to be added to the organization (planning, contract writing, liaison, etc.). But the feasibility of this option depends entirely upon the availability of funding from sources other than USAID.

c. Funding

As indicated in part 2c of this report, only a handful of donors provide financial support to NGOs and many primarily fund their own national NGOs. In addition, funding is provided to NGOs by UNOCA, UNDP, and other agencies in the UN system. As an independent Afghan NGO, AERR would need to seek contracts and grants primarily from UN agencies and from its current contractor, USAID, rarely from other national donors. However, there is reason to believe that when the war ends and repatriation is under way, a number of aid donors will develop or expand their programs for Afghanistan, particularly the governments of Japan, Canada, and Germany, and these programs may provide opportunities for funding Afghan NGOs.

At present funding opportunities are available from UNOCA and UNDP. Both agencies are currently preparing for emergency construction work to repair major damage to the irrigation system of the Helmand Valley caused by last winter's severe flooding. UNOCA officials specifically cited the capacity of ARR/VITA to take on this work and would seek to contract with it should it become an independent Afghan entity. This judgment was confirmed in the report by Abdul Tawab Assifi to the O/AID/Rep in his assessment of the Helmand Valley Water Control System. He recommended that ARR/VITA be contracted to repair the Darweshan Canal Intake, "a big job by any standard." UNOCA officials estimate that \$1-2 million will be available for immediate use, and a two-year contract to follow up on the emergency work is planned.

The UNDP is a source of funding for projects which combine rural works with agricultural development. UNDP officials are particularly

eager to encourage collaborative projects involving two or more NGOs working within a single district or province.

Though the German government does not currently have any significant cross-border programs, its officials indicated a willingness to support qualified and professional Afghan NGOs, particularly in the area of human resource development and vocational training. AERR, therefore, might be in a position to obtain German funding for an expansion of its training program, focusing on training technical and managerial personnel for other Afghan NGOs. After a new government is installed in Kabul, the FRG is likely to contribute \$20-\$35 million annually for reconstruction.

It should be noted that virtually all donor institutions are dissatisfied with their present relationship to NGOs, since they believe they have too little control over what NGOs do, projects are scattered and often unrelated to one another, and monitoring is viewed as either absent or grossly inadequate.

d. Project Priorities and Field Operations

Currently ARR/VITA receives requests from local communities for projects which it evaluates and then selects for funding. This procedure would have to change if donor organizations move toward a new policy of demanding that individual projects contribute to larger objectives such as providing the greatest district or regional benefit, encouraging the return of refugees, or being components of a larger integrated plan of rural reconstruction. Such a policy could be achieved either by applying additional criteria to evaluate the stream of locally-proposed requests, or by the donors producing their own plans for regional reconstruction and creating their own list of priority projects which they would contract to be done. In the present, rapidly changing donor environment the ability of

AERR to incorporate these criteria into its own project proposals would be a key factor in its capacity to win contracts

There are three ways in which donor policies in the distribution of funds would affect the AERR:

1. Donors provide bloc grants for public works so that AERR receives funds that enable it to choose projects from among those proposed by local communities and its own field offices. Should donors function in this manner, AERR would be able to follow the same procedures currently utilized by ARR/VITA. Under the present system project proposals are ranked by a point system based on such criteria as number of beneficiaries, willingness of the community to contribute, overall cost in relation to benefits, security, etc.

2. Donors distribute funds on the basis of proposed plans for reconstruction submitted by NGOs. Many donors who wish to see more effective use of their funds will demand that individual projects be part of a larger integrated scheme for rural reconstruction. In this process proposals that are able to link irrigation repair with farm-to-market roads and agricultural extension would receive higher priority than isolated requests for a single canal system or small stretch of road. Such a change would force NGOs to combine the individual requests they receive into an integrated package. This would in turn require the cooperation of groups with different specialties—an engineering NGO, for example, teaming up with an NGO that specializes in agriculture to create a single proposal.

In this situation the AERR field offices would play a key role in identifying local needs and combining local requests into a single larger project. The Peshawar office would then transform this information into a proposal that could be evaluated by possible donors. Conversely, a donor

might express interest in a particular set of activities or localities and the Peshawar office would then coordinate with the field to produce an acceptable plan of action. In either case AERR would no longer be a donor organization itself (as a donor to the local community) but an intermediary in the process, since it could no longer make the final decision on which projects or areas would be funded.

3. Donors set their own priorities and select projects to be accomplished by contracting the work out to NGOs. In this situation the AERR would take on only an implementing role and would not concern itself with site selection or project evaluation. For an NGO specializing in engineering projects, over time such contract work might well constitute the bulk of its activities and income.

It is possible the AERR will be engaged in all three types of activities in the future, using its own funds to implement a limited set of projects, combining with other NGOs to develop integrated proposals demanded by donors, and seeking contract work from international agencies where it has a competitive advantage. It should be prepared to work in all three contexts.

e. Training

ARR/VITA currently maintains an in-house training program for its staff, primarily at a subprofessional level for technical personnel. For its present needs, the program appears to be quite satisfactory. Should AERR undertake technically more complex and sophisticated engineering projects, then there will be a need for providing in-house training for the upper-level professional staff. Such training would require consulting agreements with expatriate engineering firms or university departments.

AERR could, however, position itself to market its training program to donor organizations. Donors are aware of the need for training competent and experienced personnel with professional and technical expertise if Afghanization is to be pursued. Even when—indeed, especially when—a new government is formed, the need for training Afghans will increase. AERR could provide a variety of training services. Particularly useful would be a relatively structured on-the-job internship program for young Afghans who have recently completed their technical training at the local engineering schools. One potential pool for such interns would be the graduates of the International Rescue Committee's Construction Engineering Program, which offers a three-year university-level civil engineering course for Afghan refugees. This course, which is equivalent to the civil engineering program that existed at Kabul University before the war, is designed to qualify the students to build roads, canals, bridges, and public buildings. The demand for this IRC program has been overwhelming: 531 young Afghan refugees participated in the entrance examination for a two-month preparatory course in October 1990 for 39 openings; only 33 of those who successfully completed the two-month course were able to commence their three-year engineering program in January of 1991. Supervised internship opportunities at the AERR for the graduates from IRC's Construction Engineering Program and other similar programs, with a reasonable stipend for the duration, would provide a professionally sound and rewarding trajectory for a critically needed cadre of young Afghans engineers who could serve in a variety of Afghan NGOs, and, in a post-war Afghanistan, in private firms and in the government of Afghanistan. Such a program would have obvious benefits for the AERR as well as augmenting its impact on future reconstruction activities.

f. The Process of Afghanization

The process of transferring authority and responsibility from VITA, Arlington, to the proposed AERR is substantially less difficult than for other expatriate NGOs, since ARR/VITA Peshawar is already a predominantly Afghan institution, with an Afghan as its Chief of Party, and Afghans serving as directors of its various departments. (At present, aside from some Pakistani staff, there are only two non-Afghan expatriates, the chief financial officer and the deputy chief of party, both of whom serve under the Chief of Party and are directly accountable to him.) What follows are the main steps that need to be taken in order to convert the exist ARR/VITA organization into the proposed Afghan entity, AERR:

Step 1. Incorporation as an NGO. Ordinarily, one would expect AERR to register with the government of Afghanistan as an Afghan organization. Under present circumstances that is not possible, nor is it clear when such a legal step will be possible. Alternatively, AERR could seek legal registration within Pakistan, but at present the Pakistan government has no procedure for giving legal status to non-Pakistan organizations other than granting No Objection Certificates (NOCs). AERR will, therefore, have to obtain legal standing in some other country. One obvious option would be to seek incorporation as a non-governmental organization in the United States. The procedure in the United States is to seek legal recognition by a state government, followed by a formal request to the Internal Revenue Service for tax-exemption. In Massachusetts an organization must submit a document to the Office of the Secretary of State entitled "Articles of Organization," indicating its name, purpose, proposed activities, categories of membership, procedures for electing officers, a list

of members of the board of directors, a description of the decision-making process of the boards and its officers, and a statement on how the corporation will solicit funds. In addition to the Articles of Organization, a set of by-laws should be submitted. These documents are prepared with the assistance of an attorney experienced in non-profit corporate law.

To apply for tax-exempt status, these two documents (the Articles of Organization and By-laws), along with Form 1023, are submitted to the Internal Revenue Service Exemptions Office in Boston. After the corporation is granted tax-exempt status it submits an Annual Form PC to the Division of Public Charities of the Office of the Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. The organization may function entirely abroad, but some individual, with an American office or post box, will have to be available to provide annual financial reports to both state and federal authorities.

Step 2. Governance. As part of the process of seeking incorporation, AERR will need to create a Board of Directors. The function of the Board is to appoint all officers of AERR, including its director, secretary, and treasurer. The director is accountable to the Board. The Board should be able to meet with some regularity to review reports from the Director and to set policies. It is essential that the Board be a functioning body to provide the Director with policy guidance and to serve as a critical review forum for him. Procedures for appointments to the Board, its authority, and by-laws would be those followed by most NGOs, and would be detailed in the Articles of Organization and By-laws.

A majority of the Board members should consist of individuals located in Pakistan, or, following the end of the conflict, inside Afghanistan itself, so that the Board can meet with some regularity. As a non-profit

NGO, its board members would not be compensated (except for per diems when they meet), and it would be a self-perpetuating body with the authority to replace board members as necessary. The Board should contain both Afghans and non-Afghans. Its independence in relation to any Afghan government would be strengthened if the Board had an international membership of individuals who have standing with donor governments. The Board might include the chief agricultural development officer of USAID's Office of Afghan Affairs, designated individuals from other donor institutions, officials from other NGOs, Afghan professionals, and internationally recognized experts. The board would elect its own chairman.

Step 3. Relations with O/AID/Rep. As a legally new entity, AERR would need to sign a new contract with USAID. This could be done at the termination of the present contract with VITA, or at a later date depending upon when the entity is legally created. Even if AERR is seeking contracts and grants from other donors, many of the existing features of the USAID Cooperative Agreement with VITA can and should be maintained. Core funding will continue to be needed to maintain the existing administrative structure of ARR/VITA and much of its present field operations and programs and to enable the new organization to create a capacity to compete for contracts with other donors. AERR will continue to need contractual arrangements with USAID for procurement services that will enable it to maintain its present tax-free status with the government of Pakistan. (At present ARR/VITA procures equipment either through the VITA office in Arlington or directly through USAID's subcontractor for procurement, RONCO, under a contractual arrangement with VITA.) AERR will also need to continue to employ technical consultants for its engineering and monitoring activities and for its expanded training

programs as proposed above (see 2.c). ARR/VITA has utilized a number of technical consultants recruited through its Virginia office or through a subcontractor, Louis Berger, Inc. The need for technical consultants will not diminish, particularly if AERR creates a planning unit, enhances its engineering capabilities, and augments its training program. USAID will need to make arrangements for providing AERR with necessary technical services.

Finally, and perhaps most important, new financial accounting arrangements between AERR and USAID will need to be made. Financial management currently handled by VITA/Arlington will need to be transferred to AERR in Peshawar; the AERR fiscal officer will need to take on larger responsibilities so as to report directly to USAID in Islamabad. The new fiscal officer should be someone with sufficient prior experience in both financial and fiscal fields and one with a recognized professional standing.

Step 4. Legal Status within Pakistan. VITA presently operates under the U.S.-Pakistan bilateral agreement which enables it to deal with the Pakistan government on a variety of matters, including obtaining visas for expatriate consultants and staff, getting permission to cross the border, receiving duty-free imports of equipment, tax exemptions, etc. NGOs that do not function under bilateral agreements must seek a No Objection Certificate (NOC) from the Government of Pakistan. Many Afghan NGOs have not been granted NOCs, but it is our understanding that this has not created difficulties for them in their day-to-day functioning. Moreover, the Government of Pakistan has indicated its willingness to facilitate the work of donors in reconstruction programs and seems unlikely to obstruct the work of Afghan NGOs that are acceptable to the donors.

Step 5. Creating a Contracting Capacity. If AERR is to reduce its dependence upon USAID, it will need to seek contracts from other donors. As already suggested, AERR might seek the following kinds of contracts:

a) contracts to design and implement rural reconstruction projects, including secondary and tertiary roads, small irrigation works, bridge rehabilitation and construction, and buildings. While at this time the projects are relatively small in scale, AERR may at a later date improve its capacity for more complex engineering projects.

b) joint projects with other NGOs in which AERR contracts to do rural works as part of a larger integrated project of rural development. For example, a consortium of several NGOs, including AERR, might design a district or subdistrict development program in which the components include a repaired irrigation facility, a project for horticultural development, the construction of storage facilities, and improvement or construction of a village-to-town marketing road.

c) contracts to design and manage (but not to construct) rural works projects for other NGOs which lack a design or project-management capacity but have the manpower to implement projects.

d) contracts to provide training for other NGOs, both course training and on-site internships for graduates of RAP and other training programs.

Seeking contracts is a time-consuming exercise requiring the participation of the professional engineering and training staff, and by the chief fiscal officer who will need to develop new accounting procedures to meet the requirements of potential contracts. AERR's fiscal officer will also need to develop estimates of administrative costs and equipment depreciation so that the organization has the documentation to justify its overhead charges. Most importantly, the director of AERR will have to take on a more proactive

relationship with other NGOs for developing joint projects and negotiating for contracts and grants from international donors. Additional staff support may be necessary. Moreover, once the present ARR/VITA becomes an independent Afghan institution, steps must be taken to publicize the change and to make donors and other NGOs aware that the new organization is an Afghan entity no longer exclusively tied to USAID. AERR must aggressively market itself through an expanded public relations effort in order to strengthen the efforts of the director and other officers to seek contracts and grants.

Step 6. Creating a Relationship with the Government of Afghanistan.

As indicated earlier (see Section 2) the major national donors are eager to establish direct bilateral aid relations with an acceptable regime in Kabul. Similarly, the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and the various UN agencies are holding back on assistance and on loans until they can deal directly with a new government. The relationship between AERR and a new Kabul government will have a critical bearing on whether AERR can function effectively as an independent NGO. Donors are likely to seek government approval before providing funds to NGOs, and in some instances may funnel funds for NGOs through government ministries. The present relationship between the Chief of Party and other staff members of ARR/VITA and many of Afghanistan's political leaders and bureaucrats augurs well for creating a working relationship between the proposed AERR and a new government. Indeed, it is even possible that the government in Kabul would seek to recruit staff of AERR into one of its ministries.

The viability of AERR—indeed of other Afghan NGOs—will depend primarily on its capacity to perform effectively in the countryside and to demonstrate to donors that it can carry out rural public works projects at

least as effectively as the Ministry of Public Works. So long as donors are persuaded that AERR has a useful task to perform and that they are prepared to continue to fund Afghan NGOs, the Kabul government will find it difficult to demand that all reconstruction and development assistance be given exclusively to the ministries. Nor, given the magnitude of the reconstruction task, is there any reason why a working relationship could not be established between AERR (and other Afghan NGOs) and the relevant ministries. However, the nature of that relationship will depend on whether donors are prepared to insist to the government that some of the resources for reconstruction and development be made available to non-governmental non-profit organizations as well as to private contractors and government ministries.

Step 7. The Chief of Party and other staff members of ARR/VITA have expressed a concern for having an "umbrella" foreign institution with whom they could continue to be associated. They regard such an association as necessary for maintaining autonomy from a Kabul government which might otherwise seek to place it under its control. An office in the United States, located within an American institution, or a contractual tie with an American institution which would provide AERR with consulting services as needed, are possible umbrella arrangements. While such an association, combined with legal registration in the United States, might appear to compromise the Afghan character of AERR, it is important to note that AERR will be wholly Afghan managed, with its own board of directors, will eventually maintain its central offices within Afghanistan, and that it will seek funding from a variety of international sources. Most importantly, it is an arrangement that best suits the needs and desires of ARR/VITA.

g. AERR as a Model

The creation of AERR is part of a process of institution-building that is essential for future success in the reconstruction of Afghanistan. While this report has focused largely on the technical aspects of the work accomplished by ARR/VITA, it is important to recognize that the organization's greatest impact has been its pioneering role in demonstrating the feasibility of cross-border reconstruction. Other NGOs have followed its lead both in undertaking similar projects in Afghanistan and in copying the AAR/VITA model of local level management. Similarly, as a highly competent organization managed almost exclusively by Afghan professionals, it has served as an example for other expatriate NGOs to emulate in recruiting Afghan managers and other technical professionals. And, unlike many other NGOs, ARR/VITA has remained non-partisan and professional in its relationships with all political parties.

The importance of establishing AERR as an independent Afghan organization is therefore both symbolic and practical. Symbolically, it marks an important new stage in the developing relationship between donor organizations and their Afghan counterparts. Practically, it will serve as a critical test for the concept of "Afghanization," for AERR will be the first large-scale Afghan organization to become fully autonomous. In this respect AERR will continue its pioneering role by providing leadership to the emerging community of Afghan NGOs and will serve as a model for other international organizations seeking to move more responsibility for post-war planning and reconstruction into Afghan hands. Finally, as an independent organization AERR will be able to expand its base of donors in order to more fully utilize its current capacity and take on more complex projects. Only by fostering the growth of such Afghan professional organi-

zations can the immense job of post-war reconstruction be sustained over the long time-frame needed for maximum effectiveness in an environment in which the authority and capacity of the state is likely to be weak. And only by supporting such developments now can Afghan organizations develop the organizational strength and technical capacity that will allow them to be successfully transplanted back into Afghanistan itself.

7. THE PROBLEM OF PLANNING AND COORDINATION: THE
NEED FOR AN INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON RURAL
RECONSTRUCTION (ICRR)

The changing international environment since the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan, the continuing stalemate in the war between the Kabul regime and the mujahideen, and the persistent fractiousness within the resistance forces have led the international donor community to search for new and more effective modalities for their rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts inside Afghanistan. Donors have worked with expatriate and Afghan NGOs; they have worked with, even created, local shuras. They have worked with local military commanders, tanzeems, and nascent ministries within the Peshawar-based Afghan Interim Government. They have developed cross-line projects from Kabul as well as cross-border projects from Peshawar and Quetta. The overall strategy has been to respond to local requests for aid insofar as they could have some assurance that projects would be completed, that there would be a modicum of financial accountability, and that resources used would yield beneficial effects. In the absence of independent monitoring, donors have had little assurance than these minimum conditions have been met. Moreover, projects have rarely been evaluated in terms of their longer-term economic impact and efficiency. Yet realistically, given the conditions within Afghanistan, it would have been exceedingly difficult to create effective mechanisms for project and program development and evaluation.

More recently, however, with new limitations on aid and the prospects of even greater cutbacks, the donors and international organizations have become more concerned that their investments achieve demonstrable benefits for the recipient communities. Circumstances in

Afghanistan may remain turbulent, but the assistance sector has been going through a process of maturation. Several surveys of needs at the district and regional levels have been undertaken by the NGOs. Under a contract with USAID, Development Alternatives Inc. (DAI) has created a unit that is engaged in strategic planning for the agricultural sector. To facilitate such planning it is developing a geographic information system (GIS) for Afghanistan using satellite imaging. It also tracks market prices and has developed a consumer price index. With these surveys DAI expects to be able to assess soil capabilities for agricultural production, estimate crop yields, and identify food deficit and food surplus areas. UNHCR has had a unit preparing survey reports assessing the economy and providing basic demographic information for each of ten provinces. A similar unit within UNOCA (UNIDATA) has prepared comparable surveys of several of the other provinces. ACBAR has created a data base which provides information on donor-funded projects at the district and village level based on partial data received from its own member NGOs. The Rural Assistance Program (RAP) of the International Rescue Committee, which allocates USAID project funds to NGOs, is developing a computerized data bank for its own project grants.

Data collection is thus dispersed among a variety of agencies, and donors have no effective mechanism for sharing information and for coordinating their activities. None of the data-collecting agencies appears to make use of ethnographic surveys or government reports from pre-war Afghanistan that would provide baseline information for assessing damages, changes in crop patterns, trade flows, marketing systems, etc. None of the data-collecting units, to the best of our knowledge, has developed a comprehensive computer-based information system, though DAI

has created a partial one with its GIS system using satellite imagery. In short, information-gathering is highly fragmented, is not shared effectively and often jealously guarded, and is not used as an instrument for systematic need assessment and project planning.

The term "coordination" is often used among donors simply to refer to the need to check out specific projects to ensure that they have not already been done, or to ensure that two or more NGOs are aware of one another's activities within the same community. While several of the multipurpose agencies, such as Save the Children (USA) have established some measure of coordination with respect to their own projects, "coordination" rarely takes place in the broader sense of program planning for the purpose of linking projects among several NGOs within a community and achieving synergistic effects.

Coordination is even more essential when aid moves from the reconstruction of war-created damages to development. So long as there are many damaged facilities that can be repaired at small cost with large economic benefits, this distinction is not important. But as development becomes the objective, projects are likely to be larger, require greater coordination, and, most importantly, to require more rigorous criteria for the allocation of resources. The creation of consortia by NGOs for integrated projects is more likely if a planning body shapes priorities and actively participates in efforts to engage in areal planning than if NGOs are simply left to negotiate among themselves.

Each donor has developed its own monitoring system. Most have combined teams of Afghans and expatriates. Several have formal, though usually small, monitoring units. The aid director of one Asian donor country relies exclusively upon personal Afghan friends. For most donors

monitoring is a quasi-police function—to ensure that projects promised are in fact completed, and specifications more or less met. Monitoring is donor-specific, with monitoring units examining only those projects sponsored by their own agency or government. Monitoring units are rarely, if ever, in a position to assess the effectiveness of projects, to measure the costs and benefits of one project against another, or to assess whether there has been coordination among projects so as to maximize benefits for the community. In short, monitoring is not used as an instrument for planning.

To recapitulate, donors—both international agencies and national aid agencies—recognize that the present situation is chaotic: data gathering is incomplete and fragmented; there is no effective program planning; donor agencies do little in the way of coordination; and monitoring is unsystematic and fragmented among the different donors. There is no planning process, even at a rudimentary level, that links information, strategies for program development and project selection, and monitoring for evaluation and future planning.

There have been several unsuccessful attempts to create a program and project planning mechanism by donors for the tasks of rehabilitation, reconstruction, and development in Afghanistan. The efforts of UNOCA to create a less ambitious mechanism to coordinate the work of the UN agencies fell under the weight of inter-bureaucratic conflicts. UNDP, which itself funds a variety of NGOs, has not developed a mechanism for program and project planning and for coordinating its own grantees, nor has USAID adequate mechanisms for coordinating rural public works programs with its own agricultural extension and rural development program; for example, not all rural works programs have been under the

control of the Chief Agricultural Development Officer. At best the planning unit it has funded within DAI may prove useful for bringing together some of the activities within the USAID agricultural development program.

While donors agree that planning for rural reconstruction is a necessity for the effective use of resources, governments and international agencies are waiting until a new government is formed. At that time bilateral agreements will be signed and donors will negotiate with the various ministries on how assistance can best be used. In this respect US policy is no different than that of other donors. At present the USAID has no strategy for reconstruction and its major strategy document notes that such plans should await the formation of a post-war government. Indeed, O/AID/Rep has indicated that even the process of creating an independent Afghan NGO should await the creation (and approval) of a peacetime government.

There are a number of reasons, however, to believe that a new government of Afghanistan will not be in a position to effectively carry out reconstruction activities or rural integrated planning, even with substantial donor support. Prior to the war Afghan ministries had a limited capacity for development activities and lacked an effective planning agency. A new government created after an extended period of conflict is unlikely to be capable of planning or implementing reconstruction and development programs in rural areas, particularly since there may well be conflicts within the new government and between the government, local commanders, shuras, and recalcitrant tanzeems. Ministries will also be faced with a lack of skilled personnel since many educated Afghans have migrated to the United States and Western Europe and have lived abroad with their families for so many years that they are unlikely to return. Moreover,

when the war ends the need for rapid action will be urgent if a large proportion of the five million refugees return home. The immediate needs will be de-mining, transportation, provision for agricultural inputs, and emergency food aid, health facilities, and housing.

Post-war Afghanistan will need an international agency which works with the Afghan government in planning for rural reconstruction and development. The option which we strongly recommend is the creation of an International Commission for Rural Reconstruction (ICRR). Such a multi-national commission needs to be a professional organization capable of dealing with short-term reconstruction needs as well as devising local and regional development programs, monitoring them, and assessing their economic impact. The staff serving the Commission would recommend programs for specific district and provincial reconstruction of interest to participating donors so that donors would have a framework for determining priorities in their allocation of funds both to the ministries and to NGOs. Donors would then be capable of initiating programs rather than being heavily dependent as they currently are upon NGOs requests and community demands without regard for comparative costs and benefits. Drawing upon proposals prepared by the staff of the Commission, donors would also be able to induce NGOs to create implementing partnerships in which several projects within a locality or region could be fit together into an effective reconstruction program. Another unit within the Commission would have responsibility for monitoring and evaluation.

There are a number of historical precedents for creating international commissions that work with host governments in dealing with issues of reconstruction. Shortly after World War II, the United States joined with the Republic of China in creating the Joint Commission for

Rural Reconstruction, which played a major role in the development of rural Taiwan. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development played a similar role in working with European governments after the war. While no post-war situation is like another, these experiences point to the utility of and need for creating international professional technical bodies that can play a role in the planning process during a period of reconstruction. While the creation of an International Commission for Rural Reconstruction in Afghanistan could await the formation of a new government, there are obvious advantages in having such a Commission in place before large-scale repatriation gets under way.

As the largest single national donor, USAID has a particularly compelling need for a coordinating and planning mechanism in order effectively to utilize its own resources. Such a body, by developing a strategy and establishing reconstruction priorities, would facilitate linkages among USAID programs for Afghanistan that have a rural impact, such as the work of CCSC/ACLU, and would provide priorities for allocating USAID funds under IRC's RAP program. More broadly, an International Commission on Rural Reconstruction would serve the needs of all donors by enabling them to integrate rural public works programs, agricultural extension and rural development efforts, and private sector agribusiness programs. The Commission could provide information, identify needs, establish priorities, facilitate linkages, and provide planning guidelines without usurping the autonomy of existing implementing organizations. Such an arrangement would be particularly important for AERR as a newly-created Afghan NGO.

An International Commission for Rural Reconstruction would meet the needs of the donor community now, but even more so when a govern-

ment is in place and the scale of international contributions to Afghanistan is increased. Indeed, it seems likely that donors, frustrated by UNOCA's efforts at coordination, and skeptical of the capacity of the government of Afghanistan to take sole responsibility for rural reconstruction, would find such an international commission an attractive mechanism. The strength of the commission is that it could work with the government of Afghanistan but also be in a position to work with NGOs. In our interviews with representatives of various donor countries and international organizations, including Germany, Japan, and the UNDP, the need for a mechanism for effective planning coordination and monitoring was strongly emphasized. It is also possible that the Soviet Union and Saudi Arabia, each currently engaged in Afghanistan, might be prepared to support the work of the proposed commission.

Finally, it needs to be emphasized that the future of Afghanistan's NGOs, dependent as they are upon external funding, will be determined by whether donors work exclusively with the central government, or whether donors are prepared to insist that assistance not be limited to the state apparatus. An International Commission, working with the government but with its own planning capacity, would be in a strong position to pursue the present policies of nurturing NGOs, local authorities, and the private sector.

O/USAID/Rep is positioned to play an initiating and innovating role in creating an International Commission on Rural Reconstruction. USAID might well take the lead in initiating discussions among the donors, defining the responsibilities and organization of such a commission, and exploring funding sources. Since the commission would be a planning, not an implementing, body, financial needs would be modest.

Funding and advice should also be sought from US-based foundations with strong international interests in rural development, including the Ford Foundation and the Rockefeller Foundation, and from European-based foundations as well.

A conference of donors would be an appropriate first step, focusing on whether such an international commission should be created, its functions, its relationship to the future government of Afghanistan, and how it should be financed and staffed. Professional assistance for the creation of an International Commission on Rural Reconstruction could be provided by a university, research, or consulting organization.

Appendix A Institutions Visited

Members of the Reconstruction Group visited Islamabad and Peshawar from August 1 to August 23, 1991. They met with officials at the following institutions:

Afghan Construction and Logistical Unit (ACLU)
Afghan Technical Consultants (ATC)
Afghanaid
Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief (ACBAR)
Asian Development Bank
Canadian High Commission
CARE International
Construction Control Services Corporation (CCSC)
Consultant Bureau for Reconstruction (CBR)
Danish Committee for Aid to Afghan Refugees (DACAAR)
Development Alternatives Inc (DAI)
Embassy of Germany
Embassy of Japan
Embassy of Sweden
Engineering Services for Afghanistan Reconstruction (ESAR)
Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI)
International Rescue Committee
Islamic Coordination Council
Management Services for Health (MSH)
Ministry of Agriculture, Afghan Interim Government (AIG)

Office for the Coordination of United Nations Humanitarian and
Economic Assistance Programmes relating to Afghanistan
(UNOCA)

Office of USAID Representative for Afghanistan (O/AID/Rep)

Pakistan Commissionerate for Afghan Refugees

Reconstruction Authority for Afghanistan (RAFA)

Save the Children, USA

Swedish Committee for Afghanistan

The Asia Foundation

United Nations Development Program (UNDP)

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)

University of Nebraska, Omaha

Volunteers in Technical Assistance (VITA)

World Bank

Writers Union of Free Afghanistan (WUFA)

Appendix B

Persons Interviewed

ACBAR—Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief

Mohammad Fahim Rahimyar, ACBAR Resource and Information
Centre

Mohd Ismail Shakir

Afghanaid

John Humphrey, Field Director

Afghan Construction and Logistic Unit (ACLU)

Engineer Karim, President

Engineer Rahimi

Afghan Interim Government,

Dr Hashmatullah Mojadidi, Deputy Minister of Agriculture and
Chairman, Jihad Consulting Engineers

Afghan Refugees Commissionerate, N.W.F.P.

Lt. Col. (Retd) Abdul Hafeez

Asia Foundation

Dr. Elizabeth White, Director, Afghan Program

Asian Development Bank

Jahed-Ur Rahman, Senior Project Implementation Officer

Association of University Professors of Afghanistan

Hakim Taniwal, Acting Director

Canadian High Commission

Donald Boblash, Vice Consul

CARE International

Dale Harrison, Chief of Mission

William Huth, Program Manager

Construction Control Services Corporation (CCSC)

George Scott, Chief of Party

Consultant Bureau for Reconstruction (CBR)

Eng. Kamaluddi Nezami, chief executive

Eng. M. Saddiq, Technical Board Member

Eng. Sh. M. Kamin, Tech Bd Member

Danish Committee for Aid to Afghan Refugees (DACAAR)

Dr. Bernt Glatzer, Socio-Economic Advisor

Development Alternatives Inc. (DAI)

John Soden, Acting Chief of Party

David Garner, director of research and planning

Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany

Peter Rondorft, Counsellor, Economic and Commercial Affairs

Embassy of Japan

Hiroshi Takahashi, Second Secretary

Embassy of Sweden

Ulf Hakansson, Counsellor

Embassy of the USSR

Mikhail G. Karpov, Counsellor

Alexandre I. Diaguilev, Third Secretary

Engineering Services for Afghanistan Reconstruction (ESAR)

Eng. Hakim Gul Ahmadi, co-director

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations

Anthony R. Fitzherbert, Programme Coordinator

International Rescue Committee (IRC) Program for Afghans

Randolph B. Martin, Country Director

Andrew Wilder, Coordinator, Rural Assistance Program (RAP)

Islamic Coordination Council

Attia Badawi, Director of Public Relations

Management Services for Health (MSH)

William Oldham, MD, Team Leader

O/AID/Rep

Gary E. Lewis, Chief Agriculture Development Officer

Robert Bakely, O/USAID Afghan Representative

Frederick W. Smith, Agriculture Projects Manager

Thomas H. Eighmy, Supervisory General Development Officer, Health
and Education

Beverly B. Eighmy, Project Manager, Narcotics Awareness and Control;
Mission Environmental Officer

Al Nehoda

Roger Helms

Hank B. Cushing, Regional Affairs Officer

Philip Church

Office for the Coordination of United Nations Humanitarian and Economic
Assistance Programmes relation to Afghanistan (UNOCA)

Martin Barber

Mohammed Ahmed Mao

Save the Children, USA

Mark P. Williams, Program Manager

Swedish Committee for Afghanistan (SCA)

Lars Nopp, Administrative Coordinator

Azam Gul, SCA Agricultural Director

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

Robert W. Eaton, Programme Manager

Michael Mesereau

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)

Ebrima O. Camara, Deputy Head of Sub Office Peshawar

Mark E. Ice, Senior Repatriation Officer

Reinout Wanrooy, Repatriation Officer

United Nations World Food Programme

Allen Jones, Director of Operations

University of Nebraska Omaha

Moqim Rahmanzai

Mohammad Nazir Roshan, Coordinator, Institutional Materials
Development Centre

Volunteers in Technical Assistance (VITA)

Eng. Mohammed Sediq, Chief of Party

Robert MacMakin, Deputy Chief of Party

Maj. Masood Ahmed Khan, Liaison Officer

Mir Ayub, Monitoring & Evaluation

Eng Bahrami, Rural Development Division

Eng. Farook, Engineering Services

Eng Imam, Field Coordination

Russell Wallace, Finance and Control

Mr Omar, Inter Service Intelligence (ISI) Liaison Officer

World Bank

Rashed-ul-Gayyum, Projects Advisor (Agriculture)

Writers Union of Free Afghanistan (WUFA)

Rasul Amin

Appendix C

List of Documents Consulted

Reports

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Appendix D: ABBREVIATIONS

AASSP	Afghanistan Agricultural Sector Support Program
ACBAR	Agency Coordinating Body for Afghanistan Relief
ACLU	Afghan Construction and Logistics Unit
ACRR	AfghanAsian Development Bank
AERR	Afghan Engineering for Rural Reconstruction
AIG	Afghan Interim Government
ARC	Afghan Refugee Commissionerate (Government of Pakistan)
ARC	Austrian Relief Committee for Afghan Refugees
ARR	Agriculture and Rural Reconstruction
ARS	Agricultural Rehabilitation Scheme
ATC	Afghan Technical Consultants
CAR	Coordination of Afghan Relief
CBR	Consultant Bureau for Reconstruction
CCSC	Construction Control Services Corporation
CHA	Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CRTA	Construction Related Training For Afghanistan (IRC)
DACAAR	Danish Committee for Aid to Afghan Refugees
DAI	Development Alternatives Incorporated
ESAR	Engineering Services for Afghanistan
FAO	Food Aid Organization
GIS	Geographical Information System
ICC	Islamic Coordination Council
IRC	International Rescue Committee
ISI	Inter-Service Intelligence (Government of Pakistan)
JICA	Japan International Cooperation Agency
MSH	Management Services for Health
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NOC	No Objection Certificate (Government of Pakistan)
PDPA	People's Democratic Republic of Afghanistan
PSI	Private Sector Agribusiness (DAI)
PVO	Private Voluntary Organization
RAFA	Reconstruction Authority for Afghanistan
RAP	IRC's Rural Assistance Program
RPA	IRC's Rehabilitation Program for Afghanistan
SCA	Swedish Committee for Afghanistan
SCF	Save the Children Foundation, USA
SMTU	Shura Management Training Unit
SWABAC	Southern and Western Afghanistan and Baluchistan Association for Coordination
UNDP	UN Development Programme
UNHCR	UN High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	UN Children's Fund
UNO/ESSP	University of Nebraska at Omaha/Educational Support Services Program

UNOCA Office for the Coordination of United Nations Humanitarian
and Economic Programmes relating to Afghanistan
USAID US Agency for International Development
VITA Volunteers in Technical Assistance
WFP World Food Programme
WUFA Writers Union of Free Afghanistan

**Appendix E. List of Afghan NGOs
(July 1991)**

Rural Rehabilitation

AAA	Afghan Aid Association
ACRD	Afghan Center for Rural Development
ADA	Afghan Development Agency
APA	Afghan Planning Agency
ARAA	Aryana Reconstruction Agency for Afghanistan
ARF	Afghan Relief Foundation
ARO	Afghan Rehabilitation Organization
ARR	Afghan Relief and Rehabilitation
BCBMO	Bana Construction & Building Material Organization
BRC	Badghis Reconstruction Company
CAR	Coordination of Afghan Relief
CBR	Consultants Bureau for Reconstruction
CCA	Cooperation Center for Afghanistan
CHA	Coordination for Humanitarian Assistance
ESAR	Engineering Services for Afghan Reconstruction
FRF	Farah Reconstruction Foundation
GRC	Gharjestan Reconstruction Council
HAFD	Helping Afghan Farmers Organization
HRC	Herat Reconstruction Committee
IMIA	Ittehad Mujahideen Islami
JCE	Jehad Consulting Engineers
KAG	Khorasan Assistance Group
KNF	Kohi Noor Foundation
KMA	Kandahar Momenyar Agency
MRC	Maruf Reconstruction Committee
PRB	Pamir Reconstruction Bureau
RAFA	Reconstruction Authority for Afghanistan
RRDA	Reconstruction and Rural Development of Afghanistan
RDW	Rural Development of Wardak
RRC	Resalat Relief Committee
START	Short Term Assistance for Rehabilitation
SJAWD	Sayed Jamaluddin Afghani Welfare Organization
SWFAO	Southern Farmers Assistance Organization
WRC	Welfare and Relief Committee

Medical

AHDS	Afghan Health & Development Services
AHSAO	Afghan Health & Social Assistance Organization
AMA	Afghan Medical Aid
DCAR	Dental Clinic for Afghan Refugees
HCNP	Health Committee for Northern Provinces
IAHC	Islamic Aid Health Center
PSA	Psychiatry Center for Afghans
UMCA	United Medical Center for Afghans

Women

AWRC Afghan Women's Resource Center
DAWA Development Agency for Women of Afghanistan
MAARW Muslim Association of Afghan Refugee Women
MSOA Muslim Sisters Organization of Afghanistan
OB/GYN Afghan Obstetrics & Gynecology Hospital
MH Malalai Hospital
SC Shuhada Clinic

Mine Clearing

ATC Afghan Technical Consultants
MCPA Mine Clearance Planning Agency
OMA Organization for Mine Awareness
SWAAD South West Afghanistan Agency for Demining

Appendix F.
List of NGOs Operating from Quetta (SWABAC)

Bagdis Reconstruction Committee
Quetta

Haji Mohd Ali
Kandahar Momenyar Agency
Quetta
Tel: 40321/44790

Eng. Mirz Hussain Abdullahai
Khorasan Assistance Group
7066/23 (3613) Alamdar Road
Mirabad
P. O. Box 411 GPO
Quetta
Tel: 76616 c/o Mohd Ali

Jan Karpowicz
Experiment in International Living
203/204 Sarlach Road
Block 5
Sattelite Town
Quetta

Mr. Nasrullah Khan Barakzai
Maruf Reconstruction Committee
Mohd Nadir
House 812-10 x Noor Masjed Shaidara
Quetta
Tel: 71507

Haji Abdul Khalik
Farah Reconstruction Foundation
House 414-U Block 3
P. O. Box 36
Sattelite Town
Quetta

Mr. Maksoudi
Itehadai Mujahideen Islami
Afghanistan
Quetta

Abdul Salam or Abdul Naser
Coordination of Humanitarian
Assistance
138/G Block 3
New Quetta Sattelite Town
Near Police Station
Quetta

Dr. Sima Samar
Shuhada Clinic
Alamdar Road
Naser Abad
Quetta
Tel: 76934

Eng. Saddiqi
Malalai Hospital
Fatima Jinah Road
Quetta
Tel: 77869

Ali Amin
Islamic Relief Agency
310 M Block 4
Satellite Town
Quetta
Tel: 40022

Dr. Haqqani
Islamic Aid Health Center
90E Block 5
P. O. Box 293
Sattelite Town
Quetta
Tel: 44780/44790

Mohd Sarwar Toofan
Gharjestan Reconstruction Council
House 35-F Hazara Housing Society
Alamdar Road
Quetta
Tel: 73786

Eng. Mohd Ali Haideri
Organization for Mine Awareness
B-37 Chaman Housing Scheme
Quetta
Tel: 76616 Fax: 78289