

PN-ABS-476

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT'S
POLICY AND STRATEGY
FOR REFUGEE AFFAIRS IN SOMALIA

Report by a Joint STATE/AID Team

January 5-29, 1982

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I. SUMMARY

The refugee crisis in Somalia has passed. The tide began to turn in September 1981 and now refugee health and nutritional status approximates that of the local Somali population. This success is a tribute to the international relief effort, but it remains a fragile achievement. The relief participants need to protect their enormous investment in refugee lives through measures designed to make the care and maintenance effort both more effective and less costly.

The preferred solution to the problem -- voluntary repatriation -- may be months or years away for most of the up to 650,000 living in refugee camps. In the meantime, it is important to provide self-reliance activities which can reduce the degrading dependency mentality.

The Refugee Policy Team's January 7-23 visit to Somalia was concerned with developing U.S. policy guidelines for refugee support over the next 3-5 years. Special emphasis was placed on self-reliance projects administered through USG contributions to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), or funded under the FY 1982 \$30 million special appropriation for Resettlement Services and Facilities for Refugees and Displaced Persons in Africa.

The team's conclusions and recommendations cover four major policy areas:

1. Contingency Care and Maintenance

Delivery of food and medical care has arrested the emergency. CARE is performing commendably in the relief distribution role, but there is practically no possibility of the Somalis taking over this task in the foreseeable future. The Somali Government insists that the refugees are an international problem and that credibility requires that relief logistics be implemented by the international community. Shortage of qualified Somali management trainees is a further deterrent. In only a few areas, such as training of refugee health workers, is there promise for significant reduction in expatriate personnel. Thus, the UNHCR is left with management of a very operational effort, and CARE with a continuing implementation role.

The prospect of decreasing international attention and funding for Somali refugees requires tightened management of fewer resources on the part of the UNHCR and the World Food Program (WFP). The U.S. devotes substantial resources to assuring the effectiveness of its own relief contributions. Similarly, monitorship of commodity scheduling, arrival

quantities, and arrival condition is an urgent requirement for the other donors, particularly in the European Economic Community (EEC). Excessive and preventable waste and spoilage of certain EEC contributions places additional financial burdens on CARE, and indirectly on the USG.

There appear to be port infrastructure improvements which could sharply reduce relief handling costs and provide a sound return on investment over the expected life of the care and maintenance effort. Feasibility needs to be confirmed on an urgent basis, and funding provided for appropriate improvements.

2. Voluntary Repatriation

Voluntary repatriation to Ethiopia is the preferred solution to the refugee problem. Efforts in the meantime -- both continued care and maintenance and refugee self-reliance activities -- must emphasize this preference with the Somali Government and serve to preserve it in the minds of the refugees themselves. To succeed, these efforts must provide an increasing push from the Somali side, and be ready to exploit appropriate opportunities for pulls from the Ethiopian side. The push component will require, for example, that the refugee families supply labor for subsistence received, and that refugees begin to absorb the same economic risks borne by the surrounding Somali population in agricultural activities. Pull possibilities must await clarification and stabilization of the physical and security environment in the Ogaden. Drought relief in 1981 helped, but is likely to be transitory. The UNHCR resettlement program team visiting Ethiopia in February 1982 may provide some answers concerning reception conditions for returnees.

3. Refugee Self-Reliance Activities

The Policy Team was principally concerned with opportunities for constructive activities on the part of the refugees which could contribute to the following objectives:

- a. Reduce the refugees' dependency mentality engendered by months or years of subsistence on donated commodities.
- b. Provide at least partial self-support for some refugees and reduce costs to the international donors.
- c. Compensate for some environmental damage caused by the refugees, especially through reforestation, and maintain refugee-related infrastructure such as access roads.
- d. Provide skills useful to the refugees in their future activities.

The most promising prospect for addressing all of these objectives is in the agriculture and forestry sectors. Additional possibilities exist based in the categories of vocational training, infrastructure maintenance and continuation of community health worker training.

The Somali Government endorses in principle refugee self-reliance activities, short of permanent resettlement and integration into Somali society. The international and private voluntary organizations are starting to shift their support strategies to emphasize self-help projects. Regional agricultural seminars completed in January 1982 revealed that many of the refugees themselves are ready to work, and a higher percentage than previously assumed have some agricultural background.

In addition to its support of UNHCR-sponsored self-reliance projects, the U.S. will fund additional projects bilaterally from a portion of the FY 1982 \$30 million special appropriation for refugee assistance in Africa. State and AID in Washington will provide criteria and guidelines for these expenditures.

Three recommended categories for U.S. funding are:

1. Expatriate experts to staff a planning, coordination and monitoring unit in the National Refugee Commission.
2. Research needed for design of appropriate self-reliance projects.
3. Grants for self-reliance projects.

It is expected that the AID Mission in Mogadishu will solicit proposals, and grant funds for specific projects after coordination with other donors and appropriate Somali Government authorities. The Private Voluntary Organizations (PVOs) will be the principal project implementers.

4. Implementing Institutions and Procedures

The Government of the Somali Democratic Republic (GSDR) has vested its overall coordination of refugee activities in a National Refugee Commission (NRC). Both the GSDR and international participants have an interest in a strengthened NRC. The question, however, is "How, and in what direction should it be strengthened?" The most feasible model appears to be the development of a small planning and coordination unit in the NRC with close linkages to appropriate ministries, e.g., Health, Agriculture, Livestock and Range Management. The Refugee Health Unit, located in the Ministry of Health, exemplifies such a model in its implementation of health/nutritional programs under

the overall surveillance of the NRC. This approach avoids the undesirable alternative of drawing down scarce talent in the other ministries, and creating a "mini-government" in the NRC. While the Extraordinary Commissioner for Refugees may prefer the mini-government approach, there appears to be sufficient flexibility for the U.S. and other donors to influence the NRC's growth in ways which best contribute, both to the refugees' current needs and to Somalia's future development.

II. INTRODUCTION

Beginning early in 1979, drought and military conflict prompted an exodus of ethnic Somalis and other tribal groups out of southern and eastern Ethiopia into Somalia. The President of Somalia declared a state of emergency and appealed for international assistance in October 1979. After the UN Secretary General issued an appeal in March, 1980, the UNHCR took the lead in coordinating an international response of food and medical assistance. The UNHCR/Somalia program was budgeted at the \$41 million level in 1980 and 1981; the World Food Program had received nearly \$90 million in food from international donors for refugees in Somalia; and more than thirty voluntary agencies were providing relief services in the field. While this massive international effort was being mounted, starvation and disease took their toll on the refugee population.

The USG has been involved from the beginning of the emergency. In keeping with its policy of acting through international organizations to the extent possible, the U.S. worked closely with the World Food Program, attempting to achieve effective delivery of adequate food. Similarly, there were intensive efforts to support and strengthen UNHCR's overall coordination role.

By September 1981, the international assistance effort had succeeded in overcoming refugee starvation and severe malnutrition. Acute disease had been arrested. By the end of 1981, refugee health and nutritional status approximated, and in some respects exceeded, that of local Somali citizens.

While there are presently very few people leaving the Ogaden, root causes for sizeable movement of affected people (i.e., drought and military conflict) may be only temporarily suspended.

Because there are no feasible alternatives, e.g. the Somali Government's funding the subsistence burden or early widespread success in refugee self-reliance activities, the international donors should plan to provide significant food assistance for several years to come.

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However, progress from an emergency to a maintenance stage has necessitated an assessment of requirements and objectives for U.S. involvement with the refugee effort over the next 3-5 years. A State/AID Refugee Policy Team was dispatched to Somalia during the period January 5-23, 1982, consisting of:

Mr. Arthur E. Dewey	State/RP, DAS	Team Leader
Mr. James Kelley	State/RP	
Mr. Brian Kline	AID/AFR/EA	
Ms. Carole Scherrer	AID/AFR/DR	
Ms. Peggy Sheehan	AID/Food for Peace	
Dr. Jason Weisfeld	Centers for Disease Control	

In Somalia, the team visited 24 of the 33 refugee camps in the 4 principal regions -- Northwest, Hiran, Gedo and lower Shabelli. In addition to discussions with the U.S. country team, the Policy Team consulted in the field and in Mogadishu with the principal participants in the relief effort, including the GSDR, IO's, major donors, and the PVO's. The return trip to Washington included headquarters' visits with the World Food Program (Rome); UNHCR (Geneva); EEC (Brussels); and UNDP (New York).

The team was concerned with the requirements for appropriate support in the continuing care and maintenance phase, but more particularly with near to mid-term opportunities for some measure of refugee self-reliance. While cost savings are one of the objectives for these efforts, there were no illusions about realizing early or major reductions through refugee self-help projects. It was hoped that some projects would be identified, however, that could make at least a beginning in some reduction of care and maintenance costs to the U.S. and other international donors.

There are other objectives implicit in programs for refugee self-reliance. These include: restoration of the environment damaged by the refugee presence; assistance in reversing the dependency mentality stemming from prolonged camp existence (and perhaps, through a requirement to perform work in exchange for subsistence, encourage some refugees to attempt to return to their homeland earlier than they might otherwise); and transfer of skills appropriate to the refugees' future.

The preferred future is voluntary repatriation. A few refugees seem to have exercised this option following the favorable rains of 1981. These may have fled initially for reasons of the drought. For those who fled for combined economic/security reasons, or primarily for security reasons, it is hoped that reduced military activity in the Ogaden may permit increasing numbers to return. Uncertainties are likely to persist, however, and lead the majority of refugees to conclude

for the foreseeable future that the risks of repatriation outweigh the incentives. Realistically, we must also expect that some refugees will choose to abandon their traditional nomadic patterns in the Ogaden, or patterns of criss-crossing the border, and remain in Somalia.

While the international community needs to remain alert to measures on both sides of the border which could increase incentives for voluntary repatriation, there are no illusions concerning early exercise of the repatriation option by large numbers of people. This team's mission is, therefore, predicated on the prospect of a relatively large refugee population remaining in Somali camps for the near to mid-term. The U.S. assistance strategy is conditioned by the need to protect the gratifying health and nutritional gains in the refugee population and to pursue clear opportunities for cost savings in this continuing maintenance effort; concurrently, it is essential to exercise opportunities for constructive refugee activities.

III. REFUGEE RELIEF -- CURRENT SITUATION AND TRENDS

A. Administrative and Institutional Arrangements.

The GSDR views refugee assistance as an international responsibility, with the GSDR exercising general oversight through the NRC. Internationalization of relief delivery is important, in the Government's view, to satisfy accountability requirements of the international donors. In practice, the magnitude of the logistics effort and Somalia's own limited resources to cope with such a complex undertaking leave little alternative to the operational role played by an outside agency for relief distribution. The private voluntary organization CARE performs its operating function through the NRC's Emergency Logistics Unit (ELU).

UNHCR is charged with overall management of the international contributions. The UNHCR serves as program coordinator, resource channel, and information clearing-house. It funds the logistics operator, CARE, and provides selected funding and coordination for the PVO's which have been assigned specific camp and/or sector responsibilities.

The World Food Program mobilizes most of the international food donations, it exercises this responsibility up to and including delivery at the ports of Mogadishu and Berbera, at which point CARE/ELU takes over distribution to the refugee camps.

The following observations are keyed to the responsibilities of the principal participants in the refugee relief operation.



NRC, lacking both budget and staff, is largely dependent on seconded personnel from the government ministries. While the NRC clearly needs strengthening to carry out its centralized refugee responsibilities, it does not appear wise to create within the NRC a mini-government, replicating the sectoral capabilities that should more logically remain with the permanent government ministries. Strengthening NRC in the direction of building up a small Programming and Coordination Unit, with linkages to the appropriate ministries, is a wiser course. (Discussion and recommendations concerning USG-sponsored future involvement of the Experiment in International Living (EIL) and Africare with the NRC and of CDC with the Refugee Health Unit (RHU) are set out in Annexes A-C.)

UNHCR -- The UNHCR is in a period of leadership and programmatic transition. Both senior positions in Mogadishu will have changed hands by mid-1982. Filling the long vacant senior program officer position is critical, as emphasis shifts to highly programmatic refugee self-reliance activities. The demands of this new phase in refugee assistance will test the UNHCR assertion that it is not operational. Effective evaluation and monitoring of PVO-sponsored projects, while continuing the effectiveness of the current care and maintenance effort, will require an activist management role on the part of the new program officers and senior UNHCR officials in Mogadishu.

WFP - WFP problems with arrival scheduling, content, and conditions of donor-supplied commodities were serious enough to warrant extensive discussions on the team's return through Rome (WFP), Geneva (UNHCR and selected donors) and Brussels (EEC). The WFP and CARE representatives in Mogadishu are calling for help to correct those problems, but will need reinforcement and back-up by the appropriate officials outside Somalia.

CARE -- Logistics performance received uniformly high marks in the Gedo, Hiran and lower Shabelli regions. CARE has assumed control of distribution and monitoring more slowly in the Northwest, but has a good grasp of the problems along with feasible plans for solutions.

PVO's -- Major responsibility for self-reliance project implementation (both UNHCR and U.S.-sponsored) will fall on the PVOs which are unevenly equipped to take on this task, both in terms of operational philosophy and managerial/technical depth. The large number -- 30 -- of PVO's in-country, along with their separate overhead support requirements, detract from their efficiency. Numbers may be reduced by some PVO's withdrawing (those wedded to the more traditional clinical medicine or supplementary feeding roles); consortium arrangements may also be appropriate in some cases (e.g., along the lines of the Inter-Church Response Consortium comprised of Catholic Relief Service, Church World Service, and Lutheran World Relief).



Careful PVO coordination will be required by NRC working with UNHCR, to rationalize participation and spread the responsibilities. Similarly, procedures must be established for monitorship of PVO performance in administering self-reliance projects.

UNDP -- Consistent with what it understands to be GSDR policy, the UN Development Program Plan for 1982-86 makes no mention of refugees and in no way compensates for the drain on resources and/or delays in national development caused by the refugees' presence. Discussions with UNDP representatives in Mogadishu and New York revealed little interest in asserting a UNDP role in the threshold area leading from refugee care and maintenance to a self-reliance emphasis.

Discussion and recommendations for further USG support of the UN Volunteer Program to assist staffing various elements of both relief and self-reliance activities are included in Annex D.

B. Food Management.

1. Planning Food Aid Requirements

Commodity requirements are estimated by WFP in collaboration with the GSDR, CARE, USAID, EEC and other donors. Import schedules are prepared based on total needs. Since these requirements were based on a higher refugee population than actually existed, food aid requirements for 1982 can be readily met if pledges are delivered on a timely basis and if distribution is made based upon a 650,000 average population figure. CARE is presently authorized to distribute 841,000 rations while WFP is planning on a 700,000 figure. This issue must be resolved immediately to preclude a food deficit later in the year.

Problem Areas

Too much food aid could act as a disincentive to local production; therefore ration issues should be limited to actual camp population as far as practicable.

WFP and donors need to improve delivery of commodities. This area has improved significantly but still needs refinement. For example, WFP ordered first quarter delivery when all requirements were met. Because other donor shipments have been unpredictable, USAID has had to act as an "adjustor" to fill gaps or speed up deliveries.

Adding additional items to the food basket has been and will be disruptive to total planning and management. Managing the program down to a target of 650,000 rations will be subverted if donors respond to requests beyond the WFP planned rations. Donors and UNHCR must coordinate with WFP.

Recommendations:

1. The donor community, both in Mogadishu and in their respective capitals, should continue to be apprised of planning levels, stocks on hand, expected deliveries, etc. Donors should be asked to provide an annual shipping schedule with detailed information 2-3 months in advance of arrival.

2. WFP/Rome should actively pursue information on donor deliveries and identify problem areas.

3. USG food aid commitment to Somalia for refugee care and maintenance should be phased over to WFP Project 1207 to facilitate WFP planning and management.

4. USAID/Somalia should continue to review all shipping requests against WFP Project 1207 to ensure optimum commodity availability and timeliness of delivery.

2. Internal Commodity Management

Internal commodity management responsibility is placed with CARE. CARE attempts to effect timely delivery of the appropriate commodities to the camps. They substitute available commodities for missing items to maintain the nutritional integrity of the ration. CARE has done an excellent job in the southern regions and is improving in the Northwest with respect to dispatches to the camps.

The management of camp level distribution from point of dispatch to the time of arrival to the refugees themselves is also improving. In most camps, distribution is still decentralized to section and sub-section leaders, with consequent opportunities for diversions. An answer to this appears to be centralized food distribution in the camps directly to family heads. In one camp the team observed refugee leaders keeping tallies of food distributed to family heads. The accuracy varies from camp to camp but during one on-site visit a refugee leader was observed with a list of eligible recipients and the number of family rations allowed. The new system of opening bags and counting out rations seems to have improved accountability.

Problems:

The greatest single constraint to internal food commodity management is the lack of relatively accurate camp population figures. Of concern also is the lack of capacity to monitor changing camp populations and to ensure equitable distribution to each family unit based on actual family size.

Recommendations:

1. Determine refugee population figure to which donors will provide assistance. Support CARE and WFP's efforts to establish a more realistic figure and gain GSDR approval to new delivery level.

2. Encourage the UNHCR, in collaboration with WFP and CARE, to analyze the feasibility of a system of camp population registration for multipurpose functions, especially food and material distribution and activities. Include in the registration mechanism a capability for continuous up-date of demographic data. This is an immense task which may incur both UNHCR and NRC resistance.

3. Ensure a continuing USAID oversight capability down to camp level to assess the progress made in improving the overall system.

4. A food utilization survey should be conducted to determine actual consumption of commodities provided with the view toward reduction or elimination of high value commodities that are in any case subsequently sold. Nutritional balance of ration must be considered.

3. Port Handling/Clearing

Port handling and clearing practices still require major improvement. The Food Aid (GSDR) Department is responsible for clearing from the ports and CARE takes delivery and responsibility ex-port gate and not ex-tackle. Reconstitution and salvage practices are weak. Both Berbera and Mogadishu ports have physical constraints, with Berbera being by far the worst.

Problems:

-- The Food Aid Department continues to be the GSDR-designated clearing agent for food assistance. Its response to identified problems is slow.

-- Ports lack certain essential commodity infrastructure and handling equipment.

Recommendations:

1. USAID/Somalia in cooperation with WFP/Rome and Mogadishu propose that the clearance of refugee food commodities be part of the CARE/ELU operation.

2. WFP develop a proposal to improve port capability in terms of both management practices and material infrastructure for review and possible funding by major donors.

3. USG should fund a feasibility study concerning the use of vacuators and silos for bulk grain handling.

4. Food Commodity Accountability

Accountability of food commodities has improved dramatically with the introduction of the CARE-designed and GSDR-approved Commodity Management Plan. The plan directs activities at all levels from arrival to ultimate donor receipt.

Problems:

-- Accountability at camp level is still weak, although improving at the first tier of receipt and initial distribution to sections.

Recommendations:

1. That CARE be encouraged to request the optimum number of its own monitors from both its own resources and the UNV program (see Annex D) to ensure continued training of NRC regional and camp level counterparts and adequate commodity accountability and oversight practices.

2. The use of food as a wage for off-loading trucks and other services should be banned. If funds are required for this purpose they should be budgeted by UNHCR.

5. Refugee Self-Reliance through a Food-for-Work Project

Several activities have been suggested, e.g. forestry, road repair, and water management. These ideas need to be explored.

Problems:

If delivering food to camp sites is not managed by CARE, PVOs will spend too much time delivering food rather than implementing projects.

Coordination and guidelines are essential. The Food-for-Work Committee could play a key role in this area.

Too much food in camps, which then is sold or traded for non-food items, could limit numbers of refugees motivated to work.

Any attempt to reduce rations or exclude certain commodities from the food basket (which might be an ultimate goal) may be resisted by refugees.

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Recommendations:

1. That the Food for Work Committee be transferred to the NRC.
2. That the NRC Advisory Committee develop guidelines for work projects and performance for sub-project submission from PVOs.
3. That USAID undertake small pilot projects to be immediately implemented to test guidelines, explore problem areas, etc. USAID staff, i.e. Refugee Officer, Food for Peace Officer and monitors, should assume more of an oversight role on work projects as CARE systematizes commodity management.

C. Management of Drugs and Medical Supplies.

Steady improvements in the availability and supply of drugs and medical supplies have occurred since the organization of the RHU in mid-1980 with adequate funding from UNHCR and UNICEF. Although individual medical teams initially provided their own unstandardized therapeutic agents, the adoption of a uniform drug list with periodic revisions after discussion at the National Workshops has greatly improved the equity of treatment being provided in all camps. Early problems in availability, storage, and delivery have been addressed by the recruitment of an expatriate chief pharmacist within the RHU and the utilization of the improved distribution system of CARE/ELU. A newly constructed Central Medical Store for the RHU was opened in mid-October, 1981, and expanded Regional Medical Stores are now operational in Qoryoley, Luuq, Belet Weyn, Hargeisa, and Boroma. Expatriate pharmacists on long-term assignments are located at Luuq and Hargeisa. Another is being recruited for Belet Weyn. Somali counterparts are taking an increasingly active role in inventory management as well as planning. A short course on drugs has been developed by the pharmacist in Hargeisa and will be translated into Somali for further training of those RHU personnel involved.

The RHU 1982 planning exercise identified current problems and approaches for resolution. Attention will be given to improving the operation of Regional Medical Stores and a workshop for Regional pharmacy personnel is being considered. Increased emphasis will be placed on non-drug items such as kits for traditional birth attendants. Laboratory supplies such as reagents have been ordered. A great deal of discussion addressed the problem of excessive drug utilization. Provision of a limited list of drugs, e.g., aspirin, chloroquine, oral rehydration solution and oral antibiotics, to Community Health Workers (CHWs) in some camps has greatly increased utilization. CHWs report an increase in the expectations on the part of the

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refugees for drug therapy. Attempts will be made to re-emphasize the importance of health education to limit the unnecessary utilization of drugs. In addition, recommendations on average seasonal drug utilization are being considered and improved procedures for monitoring drug use within the camps are being explored.

D. Health, Nutrition, and Water Supply.

Continued stabilization of the health and nutritional status of the refugee population has occurred over the past five months to a level at which there is currently little evidence that an acute situation exists any longer. The timely provision of supplementary feeding, drugs and staff has resulted in camp populations whose current health status is not predominated by factors directly related to their status as refugees. Although epidemiologic surveys in mid-1980 revealed alarming rates of childhood mortality and under-nutrition, it is now generally accepted that the refugees are receiving a higher standard of health care than the resident Somali nation.

Dramatic improvements in the overall health and nutritional status of the refugees have allowed a more coordinated and preventive approach to the delivery of health care services in recent months. The RHU has matured considerably in its ability to coordinate actively, evaluate and plan health and nutrition programs within the camps. Assisted by its independent status within the Ministry of Health as well as by substantial donor and PVO contributions, the RHU has institutionalized accomplishments generally regarded in-country as the standard by which progress in other sectors is measured.

Rapid measurement of the importance of perceived priority areas by means of population-based sample surveys, analysis of the data gathered, and implementation of appropriate interventions were stressed early on. A monthly surveillance system was initiated in September of 1980.

Based on analysis of data, significant preventive efforts have been taken, including immunization programs; chloroquine prophylaxis and DDT residual spraying initiatives against malaria; case identification and follow-up for active tuberculosis; continued emphasis on health education in the training of refugee CHWs and Traditional Birth Attendants (TBAs). Camp Health Service Committees, where operational, have begun to assume coordinating responsibilities and have provided essential motivation for immunization, malaria, and sanitation efforts. Such Committees have a tremendous potential to assist in the transition towards refugee self-reliance in health as donors and PVOs appropriately reduce the intensity of their assistance.

Improved staffing since the spring of 1981 has allowed the RHU to increase its emphasis on field visits to monitor compliance with its recommendations, to develop its regional staff, and to standardize camp practices. Considerable emphasis on improved communications, including weekly coordinating meetings in Mogadishu, bi-weekly or monthly regional meetings, a monthly RHU Newsletter, and regular bi-annual National Workshops have greatly contributed to the success of efforts within the health and nutrition sector. Briefing sessions are now scheduled with all newly arriving camp health personnel and debriefing sessions are conducted to learn from the experiences of expatriate staff with the objective of continually improving camp health initiatives. The RHU has conducted a three-day planning session for 1982 which outlined its priorities and indicates a phased commitment to the "Somalification" of its programs. Attention is being placed on a smooth transition towards Primary Health Care within the camps and appropriate channels for the institutionalization of the RHU's capabilities within the Ministry of Health are being explored.

The availability of potable water supplies to all camps, especially in the Northwest Region, has been a continual concern. Significant achievements have been made by the installation and maintenance of surface water treatment systems by Malteser Hilfs Dienst (MHD) in the Lower Shabelli, Gedo, and Hiran Regions, but there has been relatively little assumption of responsibility for the operation and maintenance of these systems by national or refugee personnel. The abundant rainfall in March-April, 1981 has provided adequate water supplies in these three regions, but the need to identify more reliable sources of potable water for the indefinite future of the camps in these areas remains a critical requirement. In West Galbeed PVOs have assumed primary responsibility for shallow ground water systems where feasible and supplementary tanker deliveries are being continued and where no alternative water sources exist.

The UNHCR financed a UNICEF well-drilling project in 1981, but substantial problems have limited the potential impact of this major investment. Africare has proposed a two-year plan to assume overall responsibilities concerning water supply including installation of pumps at usable UNICEF boreholes, maintenance of the existing MHD water treatment systems, training of national and refugee personnel to operate and maintain essential systems, and monitoring of ground water levels and quality of water in all camps. A comprehensive hydrogeological survey is felt to be required in the Northwest and Gedo regions. Although substantial investments have been made in this area during the past two years, it is anticipated that considerable additional attention will be required to approach the objective of providing a minimum supply of 10 liters of potable water per person per day in all camps.

A

IV. TRANSITION TO INCREASED REFUGEE SELF-RELIANCE

A. Evolving GSDR Policy.

Left in the wake of the food and nutrition crisis is a large refugee population existing in camps in an almost totally dependent status. Lacking special externally applied incentives, most of these people are not likely any time soon to change their status or risk the uncertainties of return to their homeland. The implication for the international donors is an almost open-ended period of costly subsistence for approximately half a million people. Donor contributions are by no means assured at the current level. There is growing skepticism of the need, due to the grossly exaggerated claims for refugee numbers. Commodity diversion, though reduced through the efforts of food monitors, still feeds on the difference between food rations delivered to refugee camps and actual numbers of people in the camps.

Refugee needs in other countries, and the risk of additional refugee disasters can further divert the attention and contributions of the international community.

These factors heighten the need, both to achieve maximum savings in the continuing refugee care and maintenance phase, and to shift some of the burden of refugee support to the refugees themselves. In attempting economies in both areas, one must not lose sight of the need to encourage, and not stand in the way of, voluntary repatriation.

Most refugee relief participants understand that the shift in emphasis to self-reliance will set the pattern for the next 3-5 years. As the lead international organization in Somalia, UNHCR reflects this emphasis in its proposed Plan of Operations for 1982 through provisions for funding PVO self-reliance projects.

The refugees themselves have expressed a growing interest in agricultural activities. Six regional workshops in agriculture completed on January 14 showed a marked shift in refugee attitude towards work. A higher proportion than expected have had previous farming experience and from these the demand for agricultural inputs (land, water, etc.) is likely to exceed the supply.

GSDR response on the self-reliance question differs from level to level. Regional governors or regional refugee commissioners chaired the agricultural workshops and joined the other participants in a positive reaction. At senior levels in Mogadishu there seems to have been little dialogue which would point to a definitive self-reliance policy.

A national agricultural workshop in March will confront some of these officials in more detail with the self-reliance question and a clearer indication of government policy in that sector may emerge.

While the GSDR has yet to come to grips with an overall policy, there are individual official opinions on policy guidelines. Extraordinary Commissioner Tarrah of the NRC has expressed the most explicit views. He sees the need for refugees to be employed, otherwise they will die morally as a people. He believes it is important to provide opportunities, first in education, and also in development; he notes the need for self-reliance activities for those outside the camps. With respect to one of the most difficult issues -- land allocation for agriculture -- he favors first developing unused fertile land where it exists in the immediate vicinity of the camps. Only after project feasibility in this phase has been demonstrated should refugees be relocated to arable land elsewhere. As to the risk of permanent resettlement, Tarrah does not part with the general government line that total integration is ruled out, but he believes it is possible for some refugees to remain permanently in Somalia.

Acting Agriculture Minister, Dr. Abdi Nur, expressed the strongest views with respect to participation of sector ministers in refugee self-reliance projects. Essentially, he views these projects as high risks on the order of previous crash schemes (e.g. drought resettlement projects). He wants no responsibility for something with such a high possibility of failure, preferring to apply his own limited resources where they could help the most, i.e. with the traditional Somali farmer. He would provide only limited advice and assistance for refugee activities. He favors refugee projects which will restore or improve the environment. He sees the refugees' future in a return to their nomadic existence. Meanwhile, the refugees should be assisted with their livestock which they will keep anyway; they should be encouraged to plant trees and to depart eventually with their livestock, leaving an improved environment behind them.

Vice Minister of Plans Omar Jiama favors refugee self-help projects, given the expectation that the international community cannot continue support for the camps indefinitely. Somalia itself cannot fully integrate the refugees because it cannot fund even its current population. Jiama believes much can be done to provide constructive activities. With Tarrah, he believes general and vocational education are the key to the refugees' future and should have top priority. He cites agriculture, forestry, and infrastructure maintenance as additional examples. In the context of assisting refugees towards self-reliance, he notes the growing perception that

refugees in camps are already better off than their Somali neighbors. He agrees with Tarrah on giving priority to farming in the immediate vicinity of camps. More cautious on relocation, he states that he expected the GDSR would not in principal favor such movement, but would probably agree to some relocation in exceptional circumstances. His caution is based principally on the resentment of local Somalis, subsisting on the margin, to providing refugees essentially no-risk economic opportunities. As to integration of refugee contributions into Somalia's overall plan for economic development, Jiama noted that there is not yet an approved national plan.

Coming from the Ministry of Plans perspective, Jiama's views on policy are especially instructive. It is clear that Ministers have yet to work out these policy issues among themselves, thus the need for Jiama to qualify his statement repeatedly as personal views. With policy thinking at such a preliminary stage, ideas for institutional and procedural arrangements to deal with refugees over the near and mid-term are even more tentative. Policy and process formulation may take a long time due to centralized decision-making and uncertainties in the near term over which personalities will be in place to play the key roles.

Rather than waiting for more definitive guidance from the top, the current situation points to the value of building the guidelines empirically through pilot self-reliance projects. Since little, short of total refugee integration, seems currently to be ruled out, concrete initiatives seem to be the best way to determine what can be ruled in.

B. Donor Assistance and Coordination.

Donor assistance during the emergency care and maintenance phase has been coordinated primarily by UNHCR and WFP. The major international donors have looked to these organizations to address the immediate needs for food, water and health services. For the most part the help provided by the donors was separate from their on-going development assistance programs.

The Team met with representatives of principal donors, the UK, France, Germany, Italy, and the EEC, as well as UNDP, to ascertain what planning has taken place to date for increasing refugee self-reliance. Although the donors agree that a turning point has been reached, little has been done to plan for or implement activities beyond emergency support. While maintaining its level of food aid, the EEC is eliminating its cash contribution for 1982. Each donor has provided small amounts of money to various PVOs for pilot or small scale projects in one or two camps. These projects include some agriculture, water (potable and irrigation) and education schemes. Planning in forestry, as described below, has received the most attention.

A USAID contractor has recently prepared a survey of these other donor development activities. From the information available, it would appear that few activities would impact directly on refugee self-reliance efforts, although some research on crop & livestock varieties, land/water use and socio-economic aspects of the population surveys could be utilized in planning for refugee self-reliance. This conclusion was corroborated during the Team's interviews with the various donor representatives. More detailed examination of these programs by NRC and the Ministry of Planning should be carried out in order to take maximum advantage of on-going efforts which relate to refugee self-reliance.

USAID/Mogadishu's non-refugee program portfolio covers a range of activities in agriculture, livestock and health. None of these could be effectively modified to graft on a refugee component, although some of the research and technology improvements being investigated could have applicability. Additionally, the Bay Region project may identify some techniques and planning priorities for relocation of portions of camps to potentially more productive agriculture sites.

Now that the assistance requirements are entering a new phase, it is necessary to look for appropriate future donor coordination mechanisms. In the area of forestry, donor countries have established a coordinating committee under the leadership of the Ministry of Planning. Specific activities are being planned to carry out the afforestation program called for in the Cooperation for Development in Africa (CDA) initiative. At a periodic committee meeting held January 21, the US, the UK and France each offered funding for specific aspects of an overall afforestation program.

Recommendation:

It is recommended that a Refugee Program Coordination Committee (RPCC), headed by NRC and including the Ministry of Planning, various donors, international organizations and PVOs, be established to review and coordinate assistance efforts. The RPCC should work in collaboration with the CDA Coordination Committee to achieve greater refugee self-reliance. Food for Work programs would be reviewed by the RPCC and administered through PVOs in each camp. Continued care and maintenance efforts would continue to be coordinated by NRC and UNHCR.

Recommendation:

A Planning and Coordination Unit should be established within NRC to:

-- serve as executive secretariat to the RPCC;

-- review proposals submitted by donors and PVOs for refugee self-reliance projects on behalf of NRC and recommend concurrence or non-concurrence;

-- develop specific self-reliance projects for which donor or GSDR funding would be sought; and

-- monitor project implementation on behalf of the GSDR. The unit is to be staffed primarily by expatriate personnel who operate as regular members of NRC staff. The line ministries of the GSDR will be called upon by NRC to participate in the review and monitoring process. Through participation in the RPCC the Ministry of Planning will retain responsibility for overall coordination and planning of assistance efforts.

C. Sector Programs for Refugee Participation.

1. Agriculture/Livestock

In his 1980 report on refugee agricultural activities in Somalia, the UNHCR Agricultural Economist, A.P. Jinadasa, indicated that, given the limitations of suitable land, sufficient water, available labor, and competent farm managers, the UNHCR could not foresee any immediate prospects for the refugees to be self-sufficient in food grown in refugee camps. He noted, however, that it was important to expand refugee agricultural activity in order to improve agricultural skills and contribute to their own maintenance.

Preliminary reports from PVOs working on refugee agricultural projects in all four regions support the UNHCR self-reliance position. Furthermore, farm surveys in some camps have shown that, if done properly, agricultural activities can contribute to the well-being of the refugee and the country more than was previously imagined.

Different regions and individual camps vary with respect to the land, labor, and water resources available for agriculture. Some are estimated to have considerable land available which is suitable for refugee cultivation while others are more constrained in increasing the amount of arable land due to the presence of local populations. Similarly, some have potential for irrigation while others would have to rely solely on rainfed agriculture. Because of the preponderance of women and children as stable members of the refugee camps, it is not clear, in fact, whether there is sufficient labor to expand agricultural production. This variation between regions and camps, combined with the lack of soil, water, and socio-economic surveys makes it difficult to generalize about production potential.

Though a limited number of refugees have undertaken small-scale farming activities on their own initiative, the large majority of them seem frustrated due to minimal availability of arable land around the refugee camps. Recently the UNHCR sponsored six regional refugee agricultural workshops to gather further information on potentials and constraints in each region. These workshops underlined the fact that there is no single solution for all refugee agriculture activities. In general all workshops indicated the need to:

1. Provide appropriate technical assistance to refugee farmers.
2. Increase managerial capacity in agriculture projects.
3. Relocate selected refugees to areas with suitable land for farming.

A brief outline of the present situation, constraints and possible projects by region is set out in Annex E.

2. Forestry

Present Situation -- Somalia had been plagued with serious deforestation and desertification problems long before the refugees' arrival. The depletion of forests has been exacerbated by the influx of refugees who have denuded areas surrounding the camps in search of wood for fuel, hut construction and bush fencing. In three out of four camps visited in the Northwest Region, women were gathering fuelwood from a distance ranging from 2-10 K away from the camps. In the three other regions, large areas of open ground have been subject to wind erosion, compaction by livestock and extremely high levels of dust pollution during all but the wettest times of the year. Given the constant and continuing search for cooking fuel, population densities appear far too high to forestall profound environmental damage. Unless emergency measures are taken soon, almost all areas surrounding refugee camps will be reduced to desert-like conditions.

Constraints:

There will be a constant and continuing need for fuelwood due to normal population growth in refugee camps. It is still not clear how much refugee labor will be available for labor-intensive reforestation programs, especially woodlot initiatives. Moreover, problems in protection of woodlots and windbreaks against human and animal destruction especially during initial stages of plant growth are yet to be resolved.

3. Non-Farm Employment

The recent end of the food, nutrition and health crisis in the camps has permitted the refugees to turn their efforts from mere survival activities to a variety of self-supporting endeavors. Just a few months after a period of rapid refugee influxes and mass hunger and endemic disease, there now exists an active private commercial sector. It was apparent that trade is a nucleus around which many of the refugees are rebuilding their previous standards of living and engaging in productive use of their time.

In each camp visited, the Team observed several small markets offering basic commodities: soap, matches, cigarettes, tinned tomato paste, pasta, salt and spices. In many of the camps the Team found evidence of the sale of firewood and water. Transactions take place by cash and barter. To some extent this trade has been facilitated by international assistance. Once hunger was alleviated, a marketing system arose among the refugees to trade surplus or less desirable rations for more desired foodstuffs and other commodities. This can be assessed as a positive impact of the emergency aid on the individual refugee's means of improving his own well being.

The Team was less impressed, however, by the success of the efforts of the government, donors and PVO's in fostering off-farm employment opportunities. Efforts have been limited to small-scale manufacturing and handicrafts, e.g., basket weaving, grass mats and sewing. Refugees were being trained in various skills, but there seemed to be limited motivation to undertake such activities and even less market for the goods once they are produced. Better assessments of marketing opportunities and existing skill patterns are clearly required.

Recommendation:

That USG provide no funds for non-farm employment activities (particularly manufacturing/handicrafts) until each activity has been carefully examined for need, economic feasibility and sustainability. Implementation of other recommendations in this report will facilitate expansion of the existing trade network and contribute to the private entrepreneurial efforts already underway.

4. Health and Nutrition

Most recently, emphasis has been placed on the formation of Camp Health Services Committees (CHSCs). These Committees are composed of refugee leaders, Ministry of Health staff, expatriate health staff representatives, CHWs and TBAs. In some camps, camp commanders or section leaders have also participated. It

is the responsibility of these Committees to facilitate communications between the refugees and the health staff and to identify the concerns of the community in terms of improved environmental sanitation, appropriate delivery of health care services and resolution of misunderstandings. These Committees have already played a major role in motivating refugee support for the immunization and malaria spraying programs. In selected camps, volunteer refugee labor has been mobilized for the construction of latrines and maintenance of general camp cleanliness. As more experience is gained, it is hoped that these Committees will fulfill their potential towards achieving self-reliance in health within the camps.

Recommendations:

That the USG insure that the health component of the UNHCR 1982 Plan of Operation be fully funded so as to permit consolidation of efforts at refugee self-reliance in the field of health.

5. Education and Training

Koranic schools sprang up in the camps very early on, along with mosques, markets and other indicators of a movement to typical poor African rural life. Primary schools have also begun to appear on the scene, but their organization, facilities, equipment and supplies and staff are problematic. Significant improvements in the quality and quantity of primary schools, which are envisioned and encouraged by some donors and GSDR officials (notably Tarrah) will have the effect of further institutionalizing the camps and will involve significant future recurrent budget expenses for the GSDR. The Ministry of Education has assigned teachers to camp schools. The International Institute for Teacher Training is preparing refugee teachers ultimately to replace Somali government teachers.

Opportunities for training both refugees and nationals have multiplied. The training has ranged from the formalized CHW and TBA training to OJT in storekeeping, mechanics (ELU), agricultural techniques and non-formal education in family life centers.

Recommendations: (also see EIL Annex D)

-- that the USG self-reliance project not support proposals for primary and secondary education, but rather support adult training in vocational skills (e.g., mechanical, agricultural and other low level technology.)

6. Shelter

The team observed that the general living conditions in the refugee camps were good. Families have built traditional "aqls" -- small wood frame huts covered with tarpaulins or surplus materials such as cloth bags or plastic sheets. These have been constructed by the refugees themselves on land assigned by camp authorities. Except for the high density concentration of families within the confines of the camps, this shelter is comparable to accustomed living arrangements and is adequate for the refugees' present needs.

Recommendation:

-- That the USG self-reliance project not support any proposals for refugee shelter.

D. Institutional Arrangements -- Procedures for Implementation.

1. Additional Survey and Research Requirements

a. Socio-economic

Present situation -- There is very little reliable socio-economic data on the refugees found in and outside the camps. At least six independent studies have been proposed or are in process. There are, in all probability, other studies being conducted which are unknown to the Team. Each of the six proposals varies in topic of investigation and location. For example, while some propose to examine pre-flight history, others are concerned with adaptive subsistence strategies since arrival. Yet another hopes to examine relationships between refugees and nearby local communities. To date there has been no coordination of these activities by ministries or donors, no systematic review of proposals, nor plans by government to review, monitor or apply results.

Specific and reliable socio-economic data is essential given the increasing emphasis on self-reliance activities. This information, if applied, can lead to enormous savings (financial and human) by being able to determine which activities would be socially and economically feasible for investment.

Most voluntary agencies have now or are planning to shift from care and maintenance operations to agricultural development-type activities. For example, a total of 34 agricultural positions in 24 camps has been identified by PVOs and are due to be filled by June 1982. Many on-going development activities are now facing problems which could have been foreseen if data had been available.

Areas of Inquiry

Research is required on the following populations. Some data can be obtained from short-term study while others will require longer-term study.

1. Refugee camps

The make-up and internal dynamics of the refugee and non-refugee population must be understood to determine the social, economic and environmental impact of proposed projects. This is a complex task. There has been no aggregation of data about the place of origin of many of the people, ethnic affiliations and languages they speak. Moreover there is very little data on the social and economic antecedents of the refugees. Little or nothing is known of household economic subsistence strategies within the camps, including access to resources and marketing techniques.

Because agriculture and reforestation activities are proposing women as implementors we must know more about allocation and division of labor. Exactly how much time is devoted to various activities? What sorts of cooperative arrangements already exist? What are the family ties? This data will provide the basis for understanding the strategies employed by the refugees in making decisions which will in turn determine their participation in projects.

2. Host/Local Population in Immediate Vicinity of Camps

Minimal information is available concerning the Somali herders and farmers who use the land surrounding refugee camps. For example what claims does this population have on the land they use? Where do they live? What are their major sources of income? What is their relationship to the refugee population with regard to allocation and use of arable land, water, forests and other resources?

3. Refugees Outside Camps

Practically no information exists on those refugees that have decided to live outside camps. Basic information should include: estimated number, sex, age, origins, health and nutritional status, level of skill and education, support/relationship to kin, degree of exploitation, income and future plans.

Recommendations:

1. The USG should fund refugee-related research on the above populations.

2. Select data should be monitored periodically and serve as a basis to determine feasibility of proposed activities.

3. Impact studies should begin immediately on a sample of those self-reliance projects already being implemented. The purpose would be to assess positive/negative economic, environmental and social impact and provide recommendations to mitigate negative effects.

b. Health and Nutrition

Although a great deal of emphasis has been given to data collection in health, selected additional requirements continue to exist. Now that health and nutritional status has stabilized, attention can be focused on unresolved issues.

Recommendations:

-- that improvements in the collection of vital statistics such as age-specific mortality and fertility rates be pursued through CHSCs, CHWs and TBAs;

-- that further clarification of disease priorities such as tuberculosis, neonatal tetanus, diarrhea, trachoma and anemia be made;

-- that utilization of the CHSCs in identifying the perceived needs of the refugees themselves be emphasized;

-- comparative studies on the relative impact of chloroquine prophylaxis and residual spraying on malaria incidence and mortality to determine the appropriate allocation of RHU and camp resources be conducted;

-- that monitoring the utilization of Oral Rehydration Solution (ORS) to enable investigation into the critical factors associated with reductions in childhood mortality from dehydration secondary to diarrhea and improper feeding practices be initiated;

-- that comparisons of latrine availability with regard to incidence and severity of diarrhea or water availability to incidence of trachoma to serve as catalyst to community efforts to upgrade their camp environment be explored;

-- that periodic monitoring of nutritional status amongst general camp populations be maintained;

-- that nutrition education be coordinated with agricultural projects;

-- that the impact of nutritional deficiencies in the general ration, specifically iron and Vitamin C, be addressed;

-- that, with the advent of work schemes, attention be given to the need for additional calories and to the preferential feeding patterns within families.

Lastly, there appears to be an overriding necessity to review comprehensively the recent relief effort in Somalia with regard to health and nutrition. A professional multidisciplinary approach to the detailed analysis of the lessons to be learned would potentially serve the national governments, the UNHCR, the donors involved, as well as PVOs in avoiding errors during future refugee disaster situations.

2. Use of USG Funding Mechanisms

In providing assistance aimed at increasing the self-reliance of the refugees, the U.S. has five principal funding mechanism options:

- PL 480
- the special FY-1982 Refugee Relief and Rehabilitation appropriation;
- Development Assistance
- Economic Support Funds
- Grants to UNHCR and PVO's from the Refugee and Migration Account

The Team has concluded that the development assistance and ESF are not practical at this time for use in assistance for refugees in Somalia because on-going activities require funds available in both categories. Therefore, no recommendation for their use is made. It should be re-emphasized, nonetheless, that on-going USAID activities be examined for spin-off possibilities which might be used in projects aimed at the refugees.

Use of PL-480 is recommended and specific plans are outlined elsewhere in this paper.

Recommendation:

That a project be developed for funding through the special appropriation. This project would finance technical assistance, operating personnel, commodities and a limited amount of in-country training for activities which would help the refugees become more self-reliant. This project would provide funds for five major sub-elements:

- operating personnel (OPEX) in NRC's Planning and Coordination unit;

-- studies, data collection and analysis of specific socio-economic, agriculture, energy, forestry and health issues needed to design projects which would directly benefit refugees and increase their self-reliance;

-- specific sub-projects in refugee camps to be implemented primarily by PVO's but also by contractors or PASA teams, which meet a clearly specified set of criteria;

-- supplementary non-food requirements of Food for Work activities; and

-- establishment of a Contingency Planning Office responsible for managing all information which relates in any way to monitoring camp conditions and providing early warning for emergencies, especially with respect to the health and nutrition status of the refugee population.

The overall project would be authorized through AID/AFR review and approval procedures, with the participation and concurrence of STATE/RP. Implementation management would be vested in USAID/Mogadishu. Approval of the specific sub-projects and other sub-fundings would be delegated to the USAID Mission Director. These sub-projects will be selected from those types of activities recommended for U.S. assistance elsewhere in this paper. The Project Paper will provide specific guidelines and criteria for selection of the sub-projects, including maximum funding levels, technical assistance and commodity procurement limitations and use of project funds to pay counterpart salaries. To minimize the review and monitoring workload on USAID/Mogadishu, no more than fifteen sub-projects should be authorized (See Annex-F for a notional project budget).

Recommendation:

That USAID/Mogadishu, to facilitate prompt implementation of the above recommendation, submit a PID for this project.

Recommendation:

That, following Washington approval of the PID, a design team be fielded to prepare a Project Paper. Actual team composition and scope of work will be refined during the PID development process.

Because of the short time available for approving this project using the special FY-1982 appropriation and the necessity to increase self-reliance activities as soon as possible, USAID/Mogadishu should begin selecting, scheduling and arranging for the participation of the various individuals required even before formal approval of these recommendations.

Recommendation:

That funding from the special appropriation be used for the CDA forestry project which has been developed by USAID/Mogadishu to finance that part of the project which relies on refugee labor and addresses deforestation caused by the refugees' presence.

Recommendation:

That the 1982 USG pledge of about \$16 million to the UNHCR/Somalia program be earmarked to insure adequate and timely funding of certain care and maintenance costs, namely, health, transport/logistics and water and to signal USG support for self-reliance activities proposed by UNHCR, especially agriculture and forestry.

3. PVO'S as Implementing Agencies

The PVO's operating in Somalia are stratified into three general groups:

-- those few which have already made the transition from the relief to the self-reliance phase;

-- those few whose mandate is clearly emergency oriented only or who have not considered the relief to self-reliance transition; and

-- those which are straddling the fence awaiting clearer signals from the GSDR and/or the donors that the time has arrived and funding is available for the transition.

The Team's assessment is that, with the elaboration of project proposal guidelines and criteria, PVOs will come forward quickly to implement self-reliance activities. PVOs appear the most appropriate partners for rapid implementation of the refugee self-reliance project described above. The presence of the PVOs in country which have already executed tripartite agreements, lower administrative overhead costs, the manifest readiness of many PVOs to collaborate - all argue heavy reliance on PVOs as implementing agencies. The team does not, however, exclude the possibility that contractors or other arrangements could be used for implementation purposes.

An unresolved issue is PVO country offices' having to defer grant negotiations to their headquarters which would undermine the team's effort to expedite the entire process by recommending that sub-project approval and sub-fundings should be delegated to the USAID/Mogadishu Director.

4. USAID Increased Responsibilities

The continued care and maintenance activities funded by the US must be monitored by the US to ensure compliance with regulations and effective utilization. As the USG entity most closely involved with the planning, distribution and accounting of US donated commodities, USAID/Mogadishu is the agency best suited for this role in the field. Within Washington, State/RP allocates funds and negotiates agreements with UNHCR and various PVOs to implement the US contribution. An effective exchange of information is required to ensure proper and timely monitoring in the field and feedback to Washington for use in further negotiating with the international and private voluntary organizations.

Recommendations:

-- That USAID/Mogadishu and State/RP prepare a 1982 monitoring plan which sets out the responsibilities of the Mission to provide the necessary monitoring and follow-up of US care and maintenance assistance.

The proposed set of self-reliance activities, including Food-for-Work, implies an increased workload on Mission staff:

- Representation on various donor/GSDR coordinating committees;
- Subproject design, approval, monitoring and evaluation;
- Planning and oversight of data/information collection land analysis, and
- Information reporting to Washington.

Recommendation:

That AID/W and the Ambassador authorize and fill a project officer position within the Mission Refugee Office to manage the self-reliance project described in this report.

Recommendation:

a. Current contracts for Food Monitors be extended through June 30, 1982, with duties expanded to include monitorship of the complete refugee commodity delivery system.

b. That the Project Design Team coordinate what additional monitoring requirements, if any, are necessary and develop modified job descriptions to reflect any new responsibilities for the monitors.

5. Information/Reporting/Monitoring

The USG country team in Mogadishu is unique in its attention to the refugee situation. Staff resources devoted to refugees correctly reflect the importance of refugees in the U.S.-Somalia bilateral relationship.

Recommendations:

-- that future requirements be categorized as follows:

-- Political reporting including, but not limited to: the level of activity, hostile or friendly, within the Ogaden and along the border which affect the flow of people; the opportunities for a durable solution and the levels of relief and/or self-reliance which are required and appropriate; the shifting centers of political power within Somalia as they relate to the administrative and institutional arrangements for refugees affairs, GSDR treatment of refugees, etc.

-- Reporting on all essential aspects of food, including forward planning, availabilities, port conditions, Food-for-Work, other donor contributions, WFP performance, etc.

-- Monitoring of all essential aspects of refugee care and maintenance and self-reliance. This should include troubleshooting and recommendations for solutions to problems in camp conditions, nutritional/health surveillance, performance of NRC and UNHCR, submission of grantees' quarterly reports along with comments of the Mission, opportunities for cost reductions on the relief side, etc.

-- Reporting on activities, performance and levels of support by other donors. To ensure maximum degree of burden sharing by the entire international community, relevant USG offices in Geneva, Rome, Brussels, New York and Washington need to be current on other donor support. Regular reporting should help the Country Team to identify areas and ways in which other donors can be persuaded to increase their support and/or improve their performance.

V. PROTECTION/RESETTLEMENT OUTSIDE SOMALIA

The first mandate of the UNHCR is to ensure compliance with human rights and refugee protection conventions and protocols to which the asylum country is a signator. On an exceptional basis, UNHCR may ask a friendly donor country to assist on protection matters. Sometimes, there is sufficient reason for UNHCR to seek resettlement for some refugees outside the country of first asylum.

Several months ago the GSDR informed UNHCR that 160 refugees who have been imprisoned for as long as five years in some cases would be released if UNHCR arranged for resettlement outside the country. More recently UNHCR was notified about another 120 imprisoned refugees. UNHCR is now pressing the GSDR to determine exactly the total universe of this group of refugees, the correctness of their claims to refugee status and the reasons why these refugees cannot be provided asylum in Somalia. UNHCR has requested resettlement opportunities from several Western donors, including the U.S. France, Germany and the U.K. have already replied negatively; Canada, like the U.S., has not yet responded.

If UNHCR determines that there are some people in Somali prisons who have a valid claim to refugee status and for whom resettlement outside Somalia is necessary and appropriate, the U.S. should be prepared to accept some of these refugees. In furtherance of the policy of fair burden sharing, however, the U.S. should not be the sole resettling nation, but should accept only a percentage (perhaps 25%) for admission to the U.S.

In the interim, it is incumbent on the Country Team to insure that the processing of refugees for admission to the U.S. is handled as expeditiously as possible. The Team noted that little action has been taken on the required processing steps (submission of biodata to ACVA, medical clearance) after the last INS visit in September 1981.

Recommendations:

-- Embassy/Mogadishu should monitor refugee protection issues and report on them in its periodic political reporting and in the annual human rights report.

-- Embassy/Mogadishu should process some applications for U.S. admission by the imprisoned if UNHCR confirms their refugee status and the need for resettlement outside Somalia.

-- Embassy/Mogadishu should process INS-approved refugee cases expeditiously and should report to RP if there are constraints which go beyond its ability to handle, so that RP can find alternative mechanisms.

AFRICARE

RP extended grants to Africare in FY '80 and '81 to provide technical assistance to the NRC. The second grant was to have expired Dec. 31, 1981. Unexpended grant funds permitted an extension of the grant until Feb. 28, 1982 to give the refugee policy team an opportunity to make its recommendations.

Five positions were funded under the grant; contracts with individuals expire on different dates as follows:

<u>Position</u>	<u>Benefitting Ministry</u>	<u>Incumbent</u>	<u>Personal contract Expiration Date</u>
Senior Advisor	NRC	D. Puffenburger	July, 1982
Construction Advisor	NRC	A. Sadeq	August, 1982
Water/Sanitation Advisor	NRC	M. McGovern	August, 1982
Pharmacist	MOH/RHU	S. Mann	October, 1982
Community Development Advisor	NRC	I. Chambliss	November 1982

In the transition from a relief to a self-reliance phase it no longer appears appropriate for RP to be funding a single American PVO to provide technical assistance to the NRC.

Whatever technical assistance the USG wishes to provide the NRC in the transition to self-reliance should be funded as a part of the proposed refugee self-reliance project.

Because the four advisors with specific technical skills are in the midst of projects, it would not be wise to withdraw support precipitately. Adequate lead time is required so that NRC, UNHCR and Africare can negotiate new arrangements for the provision of whatever technical assistance is required.

Recommendations:

-- That RP provide a further grant to Africare which would permit their personnel to complete their personal contracts with Africare and which would permit the NRC and UNHCR lead time to provide for whatever technical assistance is required.

CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL (CDC)

RP/AF support for the CDC to assist in the refugee program in Somalia was in response to a direct request for CDC epidemiological assistance from the Ministry of Health in April 1980.

Initial technical assistance included a Public Health Advisor for six months and two teams of two Medical Epidemiologists, each team for three months. Three vehicles and in-country expenses were also provided. Primary activities included organization of the Refugee Health Unit within the Ministry of Health; conduct of demographic, nutritional and health surveys in all regions; formulation of guidelines for feeding programs and health teams; design of a simple surveillance system; assistance with organization of the first national workshop; and design of the Community Health Worker training program.

In November, 1980, the RHU requested a one-year extension for CDC assistance. RP/AF funded this request in January, 1981 and it was agreed to assign a Public Health Advisor for one year and four Medical Epidemiologists for three months each. The Public Health Advisor has assumed responsibility for headquarter's administration within the RHU and has played an important supervisory role in the implementation of immunization programs and malaria spraying programs in camps. The Medical Epidemiologists have continued to utilize surveys to monitor nutritional status and priority health problems including tuberculosis, malaria, trachoma and anemia. Emphasis in 1981 has been placed on the transfer of administrative and epidemiologic skills to the appropriate nationals.

There has been general praise for the contribution CDC has made towards the development of the RHU. However, the short-term nature of the assignments for Medical Epidemiologists has been a significant limitation. In January 1982, three-month extensions of both the Public Health Advisor and the Medical Epidemiologist positions were funded pending the findings of the Refugee Policy Team visit.

Recommendations:

That the Medical Epidemiologist should complete his assignment as scheduled on April 15; that the assignment of the Public Health Advisor be extended until June 15 to allow for the institutionalization of maintenance immunization programs and malaria spraying programs in all regions; that CDC be prepared to respond to additional requests for both short-term or long-term technical assistance from the Ministry of Health.

EXPERIMENT IN INTERNATIONAL LIVING (EIL)

RP provided a grant to EIL in September 1981 to strengthen NRC through English as a second language (ESL) and office skills' training. Four instructors were to have been assigned. In November, three ESL instructors arrived in Somalia; they claim not to have known about the office skills component of the project.

EIL staff believe that NRC has not determined its priorities in terms of utilizing this training resource. Lower level staff form the majority of the trainees. It is not certain that NRC leadership understands the objectives and methodology of this USG-funded effort. Attendance is very poor, perhaps 50%. The drop-out rate is high.

The conflict over hours of instruction was resolved by scheduling some classes in the morning during office hours and other classes after office hours. Attendance at the latter classes is especially poor.

EIL has only just begun to discuss with RHU and ELU similar classes. They anticipate better cooperation at those two units.

Recommendations:

-- That the AID/Mogadishu Refugee Officer take the following immediate steps:

-- meet with senior NRC leadership and EIL to discuss problems of class hours, attendance, NRC priorities for training and to remind that this project was approved by GSDR and UNHCR prior to funding and that this project is USG-funded.

-- establish a time table for beginning classes at RHU and ELU and a minimum standard for class attendance at NRC.

-- that the Refugee Officer advise RP in 90 days whether or not to cancel the grant based on EIL results and performance.

-- that RF/AF advise EIL/US of actions being taken and the necessity to delay sending the fourth instructor, pending results.

UNITED NATIONS VOLUNTEERS (UNV)

RP support for UNVs to assist in the refugee program in Somalia was a partial response to a late 1979 UN request for teams of technical assistants. Start-up of this program was delayed by:

- (1) confusion about number and types of technicians required;
- (2) poor communication among various involved UN family, GSDR, and U.S. agencies/ministries.
- (3) recruitment techniques.

Seventeen of the original 22 positions are now filled. Two additional positions were filled, but one UNV died and another returned home. There is general satisfaction with the UNVs, but especially with those recruited for non-commodity-related positions.

Recommendations:

That RP should fund 18 UNV positions for a second year; that UNDP offices where candidates apply should be provided with guidelines for interviewing and selection and instructions to provide UNDP/Mogadishu with travel schedules sufficiently in advance so that the UNVs can be met at the airport; that new recruits should be provided with orientation materials to include information about Somalia, its people, the refugee situation, the UNVs job and living conditions; and changes in job descriptions must be approved by the U.S. refugee officer in Mogadishu.

ANALYSIS OF AGRICULTURAL POTENTIAL BY REGION

1. Lower Shabelli Region - Qoryole:

Present Situation - It is reported that sixty percent of the refugee population have an agricultural background and were self-supporting farmers before they were displaced four years ago. Refugees in Qoryoley camps now have 200 hectares of land open for cultivation. As a result of changes in government policy in March 1981, (see Annex F) there has been a dramatic change in attitudes of refugees for self-reliance food production causing heavy demand for land.

The 200 hectares now available for over 5-6,000 refugee families interested in farming does not give sufficient incentives to increase production. Refugees are now showing enthusiasm for access to land and water. Some refugee families are going as far away as 20 KM to rent land from the local population for farming.

Constraints: The expansion of farming in the immediate vicinity of the refugee camps is curtailed by:

1. Lack of sufficient land,
2. Limitation of available water.

Proposals

1. Relocation of refugees into smaller groups in areas where there is sufficient land and water;
2. Development of water use plan for the Shabelli river;
3. Technical assistance in pest management, soil and water surveys, socio-economic research and interface between refugee and local population and transformation of production-oriented projects into a unified community development plan;
4. Reforestation project based on food/cash for work initiatives.

2. Hiran Region:

Present Situation - A large number of refugees (exact figure unknown), have a strong agricultural background, primarily rainfed crop production. There is increasing demand for land; however, the land that is now allocated to refugee camps is marginal due to high salinity. In the absence of a proper drainage system, extensive agricultural production is not being advised. PVOs believe that land could possibly be used for the establishment of a fuelwood plantation.

Constraints:

1. Lack of arable land in the immediate vicinity of the refugee camps;
2. Plot size that is allocated is too small;
3. Lack of camp-based technicians;
4. Lack of well-defined land tenure policy;
5. Lack of sufficient coordination between research findings and practical applications.

Proposals:

1. Increase amount of arable land suitable for crop production. If no land is available near the camps, relocation should be considered;
2. Provide technical assistants to work and live with refugees;
3. Expand poultry production;
4. Conduct research on land, water, social/community organization;
5. Confirm feasibility for reforestation and fuelwood projects.

3. West Galbeed - Northwest Region:

Present Situation -- The background of refugees ranges from transhumant pastoralists and mixed farmers to skilled laborers such as masons, carpenters, etc. There is more interest in agricultural activity; however, there is insufficient water and land for crop production in most Northwest camps. The prerequisite for any substantial agricultural activity in this region is relocation to higher rainfall, arable lands. Deforestation is a critical problem in the areas of all camps.

Constraints:

1. Lack of sufficient arable land;
2. Lack of water;
3. Insufficient technical staff;
4. Refugees' lack of background in farming technique.

Proposals:

1. Study the feasibility of refugee relocation to rainfed arable lands, possibly at Wahan, Garba Hare, and Silil;
2. Reforestation project based on food for work;
3. Camel milk production project;
4. Off-farm employment projects to tap skilled refugee labor.

4. Gedo Region - Luuq District:

Present Situation -- Majority of refugees have some familiarity with agricultural production. Exact figure is unknown, although regional governors claim 85% of refugees in Luuq area were sedentary farmers before they were rendered refugees. All available land has been cleared and is under cultivation by refugees. Demand for more arable land is consistent problem in all camps. There is no access to regional officers of the Ministry of Agriculture and only limited technical assistance available in crop protection, soil fertility or improved simple technology.

Constraints:

1. Lack of fair allocation of land to those refugees interested in farming;
2. Lack of available land near refugee camps;
3. Lack of technical assistance;
4. Lack of appropriate farming technology.

Proposals:

1. Relocation of refugees in smaller groups to areas with suitable land and water.
2. Reforestation projects
3. Technical expertise in appropriate farming technology (use of improved hand tools, oxen and ploughs)
4. Research on soil, water, marketing
5. Poultry projects.

5. Gedo Region - Garba Hare District

Present Situation -- All refugee camps in Garba Hare district are located along the Juba River which provides sufficient water for irrigated agriculture. All available land now allocated to refugee camps is under cultivation. Crops and mixed farming was major means of livelihood pre-flight.

Constraints:

1. Lack of available land and too small plot size @ family;
2. Lack of farm management expertise;
3. Lack of technical assistance.

Proposals

1. Relocation of refugees on arable land along Juba River;
2. Project in simple technology, local tool production;
3. Reforestation project;
4. Poultry project;
5. Surveys in soil, pests, community development, training labor allocation, marketing.

CHANGES IN GOVERNMENT POLICY

In March 1981, Ministry of Local Government and Director of NRC changed government policy including the following provisions:

(1) Beginning with the long rainy season 1982, land is to be allocated to refugees on an individual family basis. Individual families may work on their own plots of up to one-half hectare;

(2) The distribution and use of the produce of these farm plots is to be at the discretion of the farmers themselves. What they want to sell must be marketed through the Agricultural Development Corporation (ADC). This introduces the possibility for the refugees to acquire cash in order to diversify their diets or to spend in other ways. (Comment: in all camps that were visited refugees were selling a portion of produce but not through official channels);

(3) The PVOs are to have primary responsibility and authority for farm management under the Agricultural Division of the NRC. The PVOs will allocate land and provide the inputs;

(4) Refugees who work the land must show results from their labors or forfeit their plots. Furthermore, in order to avoid problems of long-term land claims, no family may keep the same plots for two years in a row. (Comment: according to most PVOs interviewed, land rotation provision has been overruled and now families are allowed to cultivate the same plots every year).

NOTIONAL PROJECT BUDGET

I.	Planning Unit		
	Development Planner	3 yrs x \$150,000	\$ 450,000
	Sociologist	3 yrs x \$150,000	450,000
	Administrative Assistant	3 yrs x \$110,000	330,000
			<u>\$ 1,230,000</u>
II.	Studies/Data Collection -- Including Technical Assistance for Agriculture		500,000
III.	Specific Sub-projects:		
	Calculation of Average Costs =		
	A. Expatriate Staff: 48 months x \$6,250/month		300,000
	B. Local staff: 96 months x SoSh.1,300/month		10,230
	C. Commodities		40,000
	D. Project Evaluation		5,000
			<u>\$ 335,230</u>
	x U.S. share of total cost		75%
			<u>\$ 266,423</u>
	+25% administrative costs		66,606
			<u>\$ 333,029</u>
	Rounded		<u>\$ 333,000</u>
	x Maximum number of projects		15
			<u>\$ 4,995,000</u>
IV.	Support to Food for Work Activities		
	Technical Assistance		
	36 months s/t at \$ 12,000/month		\$ 432,000
	Commodities		500,000
			<u>\$ 932,000</u>
V.	Camp Health/Nutrition/Environment Monitoring System		
	Technical Assistance		
	3 s/t advisors x 3 months x \$12,000		\$ 108,000
	Local staff (pt) 2 x30 months x So.sh.800		3,950
	Commodities (supplies)		10,000
			<u>\$ 121,950</u>
VI.	Miscellaneous		
	Evaluation, Contingency, Inflation(25%)		\$1,930,000
	ROUND TOTAL		<u>\$9,650,000</u>

USG REFUGEE ASSISTANCE
TO SOMALIA

		<u>FY '81</u> (Actual)	<u>FY '82</u> (Estimated)
CDC		\$ 265,879	\$ 187,000
EIL		442,600	--
AFRICARE		348,608	225,000
Food Monitors		400,000	355,000
World Concern		542,000	--
CARE		1,879,940	--
UNV		--	470,000
UNHCR	Cash	\$15,300,000	16,600,000
	in-kind	274,486	--
FFP	Govt to Govt.	18,363,500	10,000,000
	WFP	8,984,017	--
Refugee Self-Reliance Project		--	12,000,000
TOTAL		<u>\$46,801,030</u>	<u>\$39,837,000</u>