PN-ABI-901

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT, DEMOCRATIZATION, AND GOVERNANCE

May 20-24, 1991

Development Studies Program
1815 North Fort Myer Drive, Suite 600
Arlington, Virginia 22209

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT, DEMOCRATIZATION AND GOVERNANCE: A WORKSHOP

Monday, May 20

8:30-9:00
WELCOME AND WORKSHOP OVERVIEW
Michael Rock, Director, Development Studies Program

9:00-10:00
AID AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER
John Blackton, Executive Assistant to the Administrator and Deputy Assistant Administrator for Policy

This session is designed to answer two questions: 1. Why is the U. S. Government involved in supporting the transition to democracy in developing countries? 2. What is AID's role?

Readings:

"The Democracy Initiative", January 1991

"The Democracy Initiative: Progress Update" April 1991

10:00-10:30
PAIRED INTRODUCTIONS
James Weaver, Development Studies Program

The purpose of this session is to provide an opportunity for workshop participants to share expectations concerning the workshop.

10:30-11:15
DEMOCRACY AND DEMOCRATIZATION: WHAT WE KNOW AND DON'T KNOW
Presentation by Mancur Olson, University of Maryland

The purpose of this session and the session this afternoon is to explore the following questions:

1. What do we mean by the term democracy?
2. What are the necessary and sufficient conditions for a society to be labeled democratic?
3. What do we know about the transition to democracy?
4. Should the U.S. government be involved in helping countries move toward democracy?
5. If so, what are the most useful interventions, and what types or kinds of interventions should be avoided?
6. What is the relationship between democracy and development? Are there certain minimal prerequisites (such as the rule of law) before development can take place?

Readings:
L. Diamond et al, "Introduction: Comparing Experiences with Democracy", L. Diamond et al, (eds.), Politics in Developing Countries, 1990.

S. Haggard, "Democracy and Growth", Paper prepared for USAID Conference on Democratic Pluralism Initiative, June 15, 1990.

M. Olson, "Autocracy, Democracy, and Prosperity", Draft Paper, December 4, 1990.

P. Schmitter and T. Karl, "Exploring Meanings of Democracy to Provide Guidelines for Policy", PPC/PDPR, February 1991.

11:15-11:25
Comments by Larry Diamond, Stanford University and Stephan Haggard, Harvard University; Jim Weaver, Moderator

11:25-12:00
Group Discussion

1:00-1:45
DEMOCRACY AND DEMOCRATIZATION: WHAT WE KNOW AND DON'T KNOW
Presentation by Larry Diamond, Stanford University

1:45-1:55
Comments by Mancur Olson, University of Maryland and Stephan Haggard, Harvard University; Jim Weaver, Moderator

1:55-2:30
Group Discussion

2:45-3:30
DEMOCRACY AND DEMOCRATIZATION: WHAT WE KNOW AND DON'T KNOW
Presentation by Stephan Haggard, Harvard University

3:30-3:40
Comments by Larry Diamond, Stanford University and Mancur Olson, University of Maryland; Jim Weaver, Moderator

3:40-4:15
Group Discussion

Tuesday, May 21

9:00-10:30
STRENGTHENING DEMOCRACY: AGENCY EXPERIENCE
Travis Horel and Michael Morfit, PPC; William Hammink, AFR; Richard Whitaker, A/PRE; William Schoux, LAC; Gerald Hyman, ENE; Jim Weaver, Moderator

The purpose of this session is to come to understand: AID's overall policy concerning the democracy initiative; what the bureaus have been doing to strengthen democracy; what AID has learned from its experience - what has worked and what has not worked.

Readings:

PPC, "Development, Governance and Democracy", Undated.

Africa Bureau, "Africa Bureau Strategy on Democratization," Unclassified Cable to all AFR Missions, January 8, 1991.

LAC Bureau, "FY 1992 LAC Congressional Presentation: Strengthening Democracy." Undated.

A/PRE, "Asia Democracy Program Strategy," March 1991.

10:45-12:00
Group Discussion

1:00-4:00
GOVERNANCE: CREATING AN ENABLING ENVIRONMENT FOR DEVELOPMENT
Charles Cadwell, IRIS, University of Maryland; Jim Wesberry, LAC/DI; Mike Rock, Moderator

The purposes of this session are to define what we mean by the term effective governance; to examine ways to improve governance; and to consider the ways in which good governance creates the conditions for market driven development.

Readings:

Hernando De Soto, "Constraints on People: The Origins of Underground Economies and Limits to Their Growth", from an address to AID/W, 1988.

M. Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, pp. 1-36.

I. Serageldin and P. Landell-Mills, "Governance and the External Sector", Annual Conference on Development Economics, The World Bank, April 25-26, 1991,

Wednesday, May 22

9:00-10:15
IMPROVING GOVERNANCE: ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE CASE STUDY FROM LATIN AMERICA
Norma Parker, LAC and Irv Levy, Georgetown University; Ken Kusterer, Moderator

The purpose of this session is to examine LAC's long experience with Administration of Justice programs, the lessons of their experience and the applicability of these lessons to other regions. Case studies will consist of Colombia and Honduras.

Reading: Barr, C., "Colombia's Bloodied Bench," The American Lawyer, March 1990

10:30-12:00
IMPROVING GOVERNANCE: STRENGTHENING LEGISLATURES
Abdo Baaklini, SUNY-Albany; Ken Kusterer, Moderator

The purpose of this section is to review AID's experience with providing TA to strengthen legislatures. Issues to be considered include how to: secure participation across the political spectrum; train newly elected legislators ; strengthen managerial and organizational capacity of legislative technical staffs; assess the political feasibility of mounting these programs in various country contexts.

Reading: None

1:00-4:00
IMPROVING GOVERNANCE: STRENGTHENING THE ELECTORAL PROCESS
Arturo Valenzuela, Georgetown University; Jennie Lincoln, Carter Center, Emory University; John Holm, Cleveland State University; Richard Soudriette, International Foundation for Electoral Systems, Discussant; Ken Kusterer, Moderator

The purpose of this session is to review what we know about electoral systems and our experience in providing technical assistance to set up electoral systems in countries with little recent experience in running fair and open elections. Issues to be covered: The importance and consequences of the specific type of electoral system for the nature of the party system and democratic stability; the range of technical and organizational capacities needed; the extent to which this aid can be given "apolitically"; the difficulties of separating technical election-management concerns from issues of political culture (campaign management, polling place security, voter education, etc.); negotiating, facilitating, and funding an international monitoring system.

Readings: Garber, L., "Guidelines for an In-Depth Analysis of an Electoral Process."

Thursday, May 23

9:00-10:45
STRENGTHENING CIVIL SOCIETY
Cinnamon Dornsife, Asia Foundation; Hortense Dicker, Resources for Action; Anne Drabek, Project Leader, PVO/NGO Initiatives Project; Ken Kusterer, Moderator

The purpose of this session is to learn what has been done and what can be done to strengthen public advocacy and constituency organizations such as business, labor, and environmental groups that unite people across ethnic, racial and/or religious lines and teach people the skills necessary to provide voice for their own self interests.

Readings: Diamond, L., "Introduction: Civil Society and the Struggle for Democracy,"

11:00-12:00
AIDING A FREE PRESS
Chuck Greene, Florida International University;
Ken Kusterer, Moderator

A short presentation, followed by questions and answers. What is LAC's experience in the nitty-gritty of nurturing the development of a free press. What is AID's role, as opposed to the role of USIA? How transferable is the LAC experience to other regions?

Readings: None.

1:00-2:45
MEASURING DEMOCRATIC PERFORMANCE: CREATING INDICATORS
Raymond Gastil, Private Consultant; Jo L. Husbands, National Academy of Science;
Ken Kusterer, Jim Weaver, Moderator

The purpose of this session is introduce participants to issues and experience in measuring democratization. The session will center on Gastil's work on measuring human and political rights. Gastil will describe the evolution of his work. Husbands will report on the results of the AID-sponsored seminar just concluded on measuring democratic performance.

Readings:

Raymond Gastil, Freedom in the World, pp. 3-29 and 31-92.

LAC Bureau, "LAC Country Performance Indicators", Unclassified Cable to all LAC Missions, December 21, 1990.

UNDP, Human Development Report, 1991 (if available.)

3:00-4:00
MEASURING PROGRESS IN DEMOCRATIZATION PROGRAMS
Larry Cooley, Management Systems Inc.; Ken Kusterer, Moderator

Discussion of first efforts towards conceptualizing and measuring performance of individual democratization projects and programs. How do we evaluate their success or failure in achieving democratization objectives?

Reading:

MSI Report for LAC, "Strengthening Democracy in Latin America and the Caribbean: USAID's Experience to Date and Plans for the Future," November, 1990.

Friday,May 24

9:00-12:00
UNDERTAKING A DEMOCRACY ASSESSMENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE
William Cole, ENE; Larry Harrison, Harvard University; Mike Rock, Moderator

The purpose of this session is to explore the theoretical underpinnings needed to assess democratic prospects and to demonstrate how that theory can be applied in a particular country. In the session questions such as: How can AID decide which are the biggest constraints to democratization? What can AID do to facilitate the transition to democracy? will be addressed.

Readings:

W. Cole, et al, "Political Economy of Thailand: An Analysis of Recent Thai Development", USAID/Thailand, March 1990.

W. Cole et al, "Strengthening Participatory Institutions and Resources in Thailand", USAID/Thailand, March 1990

1:00-3:00
WHAT IS TO BE DONE? HOW DO WE INTEGRATE DEMOCRATIZATION INTO THE AID PROGRAM?
Jim Weaver, Moderator

The purpose of this session is for workshop participants and Agency representatives to have an opportunity to engage in a dialogue over where we go from here. What have we learned? What are the issues about which there is uncertainty and/or confusion? How do we integrate democratization into our regular programs and projects?

Readings: None

3:00-4:00
FINAL EVALUATION
Mike Rock

DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT BIBLIOGRAPHY

Prepared for the Workshop on Political Development, Democratization, and Governance (May 20-24, 1991)

BOOKS (Some Selections Annotated):

Andrain, Charles F. Political Change in the Third World. Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1988.

Arat, Zehra F. Democracy and Human Rights in Developing Countries. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991.

Barany, Zoltan D. "Breakthrough to Democracy: Elections in Poland and Hungary." Studies in Comparative Communism. Summer 1990, v.23, p.191-212.

Notes: "A comparison of the Polish and Hungarian elections can contribute to our understanding of the mechanisms behind the collapse of the communist system in the region. It can also suggest the directions in which parliamentary democracy will develop in the two countries."

Clapham, Christopher S. Third World Politics. Madison, Wis.: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985.

Decentralization and Development. Beverly Hills: Sage, 1983.

Diamond, Larry. "Introduction: Civil Society and the Struggle for Democracy." Forthcoming book from Freedom House, 1991. 32 Pages.

Diamond, Larry et al. "Introduction: Comparing Experiences with Democracy." L. Diamond et al, (eds.), Politics in Developing Countries, 1990.

Diamond, Larry, Juan J. Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset, ed. "Introduction: Comparing Experiences with Democracy." Chapter one in Politics in Developing Countries. 1990. 35 pages.

Ethnicity, Politics, and Development. Boulder, CO.: L. Rienner, 1986.

Friedman, Milton. Capitalism and Freedom. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. pp.1-36.

Gastil, Raymond. Freedom in the World. New York, N.Y.: Freedom House, 1989. (pp.3-29 and 31-92)

Gould, David J. The Effects of Corruption on Administrative Performance. Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1983.

Higgott, Richard A. Political Development Theory. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983.

Lamounier, Bolivar. Brazil: Inequality Against Democracy. In Politics in Developing Countries: Comparing Experiences with Democracy. Boulder: L. Rienner Publ., 1990. p.87-134.

Notes: "Observing processes of 'opening' or 'decompression' in authoritarian regimes, the Brazilian case is certainly worth examining...Can we say that the Brazilian Nova Republica is fully democratic or fully consolidated? The answer to this question transcends the Brazilian case."

Lee, Su-Hoon. State-Building in the Contemporary Third World. Boulder: Westview Press Seoul, Kyungnam University Press, 1988.

Markets, Politics, and Change in the Global Political Economy. Boulder: L. Rienner, 1989.

Migdal, Joel S. Strong Societies and Weak States. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988.

Nelson, Joan M. Fragile Coalitions. New Brunswick, USA: Transaction Books, 1989.

Prosterman, Roy L. Land Reform and Democratic Development. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987.

Public Administration in the Third World. New York: Greenwood Press, 1990.

Randall, Vicky. Political Change and Underdevelopment. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1985.

Robinson, A.N.R. "The U.S. and the Caribbean: Dialogue for Democracy and Development." TransAfrica Forum. Spring-Summer 1989, v.6, p.9-15.

Notes: Contends that "what is urgently required is a fresh approach based on a clear understanding of interdependence. U.S. interest in the economic health of the Caribbean Basin countries not only reflects security concerns arising from possible political or social economic upheavals in the region but also the realization that the U.S. economy is closely intertwined with that of the region."

Rondinelli, Dennis A. Decentralization in Developing Countries. Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1983.

Sidell, Scott R. The IMF and Third-World Political Instability. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988.

Sithole, Masipula. "Zimbabwe: In Search of a Stable Democracy." In Politics in Developing Contries: Comparing Experiences with Democracy. Boulder: L. Rienner Publishers, 1990. p.449-490.

Notes: "The debate surges about whether the democracy Zimbabwe should have is the Western liberation type, or the Leninist vanguardist type, or the Third World mass mobilization type....Democracy's universal character is that those who exercise political authority do so with the explicit consent and genuine electoral mandate of their subjects. This is the criterion I use in assessing the democratic project in Zimbabwe."

Smith, Anthony D. State and Nation in the Third World. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983.

Third World at the Crossroads. New York: Praeger, 1989.

Toward a Political Economy of Development. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988.

The Rise and Fall of Democracies in Third World Societies. Williamsburg, Va.: Dept. of Anthropology, College of William and Mary, 1986.

The State and Development in the Third World. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986.

Usher, Dan. The Economic Prerequisite to Democracy. New York: Columbia University Press, 1981.

Valenzuela, Arturo. Chile: Origins, Consolidation, and Breakdown of a Democratic Regime. In Politics in Developing Countries: Comparing Experiences with Democracy. Boulder: L. Rienner Publ., 1990. p.39-86.

Notes: "Though authoritarian rule and the sharp divisions persist in Chilean politics...there is reason to believe that because of Chile's long history of democratic practices, once a transition is instituted it may be more durable than in many other countries...The historical overview provides a sketch of the major trends in Chilean politics."

Periodicals and Reports:

Arat, Zehra F. "Human Rights and Democratic Instability in Developing Countries." Policy Studies Journal. September 1986, v.15, p.158-172.

Notes: "This paper seeks to study the balance among different human rights policies, classifying human rights into two groups, namely civil and political rights, and social and economic rights respectively. This paper will also attempt to analyze the impact of these two groups of human rights on the stablity of democratic political power."

Barr, Cameron. "Colombia's Bloodied Bench." The American Lawyer. March 1990, pp.94-99.

Becker, David G. "Development, Democracy and Dependency in Latin America: A Post-Imperialist View." Third World Quarterly. April 1984, v.6, p.411-431.

Notes: Considers the questions of development and democracy within the Latin American context. Discusses the idea of dependencismo, which "embraces both an explication of economic structures of dependence and a political exploitation...." Offers a post-imperialist view which "shares the Marxian perspective that theories of development are to be judged in large part according to their contribution to a progressive praxis. It insists that such a praxis must work toward the attainment and perfection of democracy in addition to economic equality; and that all forms of democracy are intrinsicially more favourable in the long run for popular-class interests than is any form of authoritarianism."

Berger, Peter L. "Democracy for Everyone?" Commentary. September 1983, v. 76, p.31.

Binnendijk, Hans. "Authoritarian Regimes in Transition." Washington Quarterly. Spring 1987, v.10, p.153-164.

Notes: "Today, the prospects seem to have improved for healthy and democratic political change in countries ruled by authoritarian governments. During the 1980s, Brazil, Argentina, and numerous other countries shed authoritarian regimes for democratic alternatives...Key questions are being asked. Why do dictators fall? What are the warning signs? Why do democracies develop? What should the United States do?"

Carpenter, Ted Galen. "The United States and Third World Dictatorships: A Case for Benign Detachment." Washington CATO Institute, 1985. 24p. (Policy Analysis No.58)

Notes: "Carpenter warns that 'it is debilitating for a society that honors democracy and fundamental human rights to embrace regimes that scorn both values.' We must no longer let our values of capitalism and democracy be associated with repressive regimes that are proclaimed 'friends' of the United States."

De Onis, Juan. "Brazil on the Tightrope Toward Democracy." Foreign Affairs. Fall 1989, v.68, n. n4, p.127.

Economist. "Welcome Africa's Newest Arrival; The Best Foreign Aid for Independent Namibia Will Come With Strings Attached for the Promotion of Democracy." 4 November 1989, v.313, n. n7627, p.16.

Economist. "East Europe's Wobbles; Building Democracies May Prove As Hard As Mending Economies." 3 February 1990, v. 314 n. n7640, p.14.

Elliot, James. "Towards Parliamentary Democracy in the Third World: The Case of Thailand." Parliamentary Affairs. Spring 1984, v.37, p.216-228.

Notes: "Thailand has experienced many forms of government, but the constitutional struggle and election of 1983 suggests that parliamentary democracy is still a possible answer to the inherent conflicts which exist within Third World countries. Parliamentary democracy in this context is not the same as liberal democracy as practiced in the West, but it is a movement towards it. The seven problem areas mentioned can help to explain and clarify happenings in the Third World and highlight factors which can either hinder or assist towards parliamentary democracy."

Gayle, Dennis J. "Democratic Pluralism and Economic Growth: Reflections on the Costa Rican Case." Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies. Winter 1983, v.8, p.355-371.

Notes: "This small, middle-income developing country case contradicts the traditional and still rather general assumption that domestic democracy correlates well with an open economy, at and above a median level of economic growth."

Hoffmann, Stanley. "A New World and Its Troubles." Foreign Affairs. Fall 1990, v.69, n. n4, p.115.

Huddle, Donald L. "Democratizing Brazil: Problems of Transition and Consolidation." Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. March 1990, v.508, p.198.

Kamrava, Mehran. "Intellectuals and Democracy in the Third World." Journal of Social, Political, and Economic Studies. Summer 1989, v.14, p.227-234.

Notes: "Third World intellectuals, the main social class responsible for educating and guiding their society, have become alienated from their surroundings and cut off from their people, an alienation brought on mostly by the intellectuals themselves."

National Research Council. "The Transition to Democracy - Proceedings of a Workshop." October 1990. 93 pages.

Olson, Mancur. "Autocracy, Democracy, and Prosperity." Draft paper of December 4, 1990. 44 pages.

Olson, Mancur. "Introducing IRIS." Outline of Institutional Reform and the Informal Sector (U. of Maryland). November 1990. 7 pages.

Oswald, Rudolph and William Doherty. "Latin American Labor and Structural Adjustment in the 90s: A Union View of Open Markets and a Worker-Ownership Response." AFL-CIO Document, January 1991. 43 pages.

Palmer, David Scott. "The Changing Political Economy of Peru Under Military and Civilian Rule." Inter-American Economic Affairs. Spring 1984, v.37, p.37-62.

Notes: "Peru is one of the many Latin American countries to experience fairly extended periods of both democratic and authoritarian rule since the early 1960s...After examining the basic constraints within which both types of governments have had to operate in Peru in recent years, the paper...analyses the most significant politicy initiatives...for economic growth and development of the civilian government of Fernando Belaunde Terry from 1963 to 1968, of the Revolutionary government of the Armed Forces (GFRA) of 1968 to 1980."

Pandin, Jeffrey L. "South Korea Clears Hurdle Toward Democracy." International Freedom Review. Summer 1988, v.1, p.21-32.

Notes: "There is no disputing the tremendous progress the country has made since the end of the Korean War. For the past 30 years, the economy has grown five to ten percent annually...Political development has been less than consistent. Repeated attempts at democracy have been thwarted by military coups and recurrent bouts of instability...Though the turbulent nature of Korean politics makes forecasting difficult, there are strong indications that democracy has arrived for good."

Policy Sciences. "Policymaking in Developing Countries: Special Issue." November 1989, v.22, whole issue.

Notes: Partial contents.--Is there a Third World policy process? by Donald Horowitz.--Policy makers, policy choices, and policy outcomes: the political economy of reform in developing countries, by Merilee S. Grindle and John W. Thomas.--Cause and consequence in public policy theory: ethnic policy and system transformation in Malaysia, by Donald Horowitz.--Planning democracy in Africa: a comparative perspective on Nigeria and Ghana, Naomi Chazan.--The politics of economic adjustment policy in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico: experiences in the 1980s and challenges for the future, by Robert F. Kaufman.--Language policy and political strategy in India, by David D. Laitin.--Foreign aid in the making of economic policy in Sri Lanka, 1977-1983, by Brian Levy.

Rao, Vaman. "Democracy and Economic Development." Studies in Comparative International Development. Winter 1984-85, v.19, p.67-81.

Notes: Presents "an explanation of why democracy as is generally understood may not be suitable to meet the challenges of a developing economy and how democratic institutions generally fall to respond to the immediate demands of a population impatient to raise its level of living." Argues that in the initial stage of development, a period of transitional curbs on democratic rights may be necessary to provide a political framework for economic development. Asserts that these curbs on democratic rights may come to an end as society develops an in-built mechanism for steady growth.

Serageldin, I. and P. Landell-Mills. "Governance and the External Sector." Annual Conference on Development Economics. The World Bank, April 25-26, 1991.

Sirowy, L. and A. Inkeles. "The Effects of Democracy on Economic Growth and Inequality: A Review." Studies in Comparative International Development, Spring 1990, Vol. 25, no. 1, 126-157.

Thakur, Ramesh. "Liberalism, Democracy, and Development: Philosophical Dilemmas in Third World Politics." Political Studies. September 1982, v.30, p.333-349.

Notes: "In Third World countries, the imposition of liberal democracy may generate contradictions between the market and traditional sectors of the polity. Furthermore, liberalism favours restrictive authority in order to safetguard individual rights against the state. In Third World contexts, the more urgent need may be for an interventionist state that will create conditions of minimum democratic equality for all...These abstract issues of political philosophy can be profitably discussed with respect to recent controversies in India."

Third World Quarterly. "On Negotiating Democratic Transition." April 1985, v.7, p.7-16.

Notes: This editorial comment discusses ways of ending military dictarorships in Third World countries by analyzing recent transitions to democracy in Brazil and Uruguay.

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Notes: Contents.--Introduction, by Joshua Muravchik.--Building and sustaining Democratic government in developing countries: some tentative findings, by Larry Diamond, Seymour Martin Lipset, and Juan Linz.--Botswana: a paternalistic democracy, by John D. Holm.--Democracy in Thailand: a case of a stable semi-democratic regime, by Chai-Anan Samudavanija.--Costa Rican democracy, by John A. Booth.

USAID DOCUMENTS, REPORTS AND MEMORANDA:

>Bibliography of Documents on Democratic Pluralism

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USAID. "African Strategy on Democratization." Unclassified Outgoing Telegram. 4 Pages.

5/24/91

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT, DEMOCRATIZATION AND GOVERNANCE WORKSHOP -

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*Barbara Haig, National Endowment for Democracy

*Esther Hannon, Mary Washington University; Latin America, Democratic Theory, Relationships - Democracy

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DEVELOPMENT STUDIES PROGRAM

NED - National Endowment for Democracy 293-9072

Center for Democracy 429-9141

InterNation Foundation for Electoral Systems 828-8507

AFL/CIO	637-5000		
	AFIELD	659-6300	Amer. Inst. for Free Labor Development
*	CIPE	463-5901	Center for Int'l Private Enterprise
*	AAFLI	737-3000	Asian American Free Labor Institute
*	AALC	789-1020	African American Labor Center
	FTUI	637-5315	Free Trade Union Institute

CIPE'S Goal is to promote principles and policies of private enterprise which strengthen democratic development. CIPE seeks to realize its goal through programs that:
- establish legal institutions & policies necessary for private enterprise & market-oriented economies.
- foster independent private voluntary business organizations.
- increase business participation in democratic policy processes.
- cultivate an understanding and appreciation by government officials and the general public of the private sector's vital role in economic growth.
- demonstrate that "real" free market principles and practices contribute significantly to democratic pluralism.

AAFLI provides programs on trade union development activities at the request of local labor movements and in conjunction with them. AAFLI spans 18 countries in Asia, the Middle East, and the Pacific. Resources for these joint programs are provided by the AFL-CIO and its affiliates, by cooperating labor organizations in Asia and the Pacific, and by the U.S. Agency for International Development and the National Endowment for Democracy. AAFLI is part of the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations - the AFL-CIO. AAFLI works to strengthen the bond of solidarity between the working men and women of the United States and those of the Asian-Pacific area.

AALC provides a direct means of support to the trade union movements of the African continent in their struggles for economic and social interdependence and the securing of workers and human rights. AALC's commitment to help African trade unions is related to their long-standing concerns for free and democratic trade union movements all over the world. The AFL-CIO believes that all workers have the right to organize, the right to strike and the right to express themselves politically. For labor, there is only one human rights standard: all people must be free to create and control their own organizations and institutions independent of the state. It is this atmosphere of freedom and democracy that is conducive to national development in Third World countries leading to better living and working conditions for all workers.

U.S. Chamber of Commerce 659-6000

NDI - National Democratic Institute for Int'l Affairs 328-3136

NRI - National Republican Institute for Int'l Affairs 408-9450
The NRI, a nonprofit corporation, is committed to the principle that strong and independent political parties are fundamental to pluralistic, democratic systems of government. The primary mission of the Institute is to assist political parties, struggling to realize representative forms of government, in countries where development has been stunted by command economies and monopolistic political structures.

U.S. Agency for International Development -

Florida International University - Latin American Studies, Miami (305)-348-2894

SUNY Institute - Albany, N.Y.
(518)-442-3300

Asia Foundation - Political Development in Asia - 223-5268
The Asia Foundation is a private American grant-making organization with headquarters in San Francisco, ten field offices in Asia, and programs in 27 Asian and Pacific Island nations. Foundation grants support Asian initiatives to strengthen institutions concerned with representative government, the administration of justice, human rights, market economies, independent media, regional cooperation and non-governmental organizations that encourage broad participation in public life. The Foundation also encourages leadership development through internships, training, and study tours. The Foundation's Center for Asian Pacific Affairs promotes better U.S. - Asian relations through bilateral and regional discussions of policy issues.

MacArthur Foundation -

Tinker Foundation -

Freedom House -

Martin Luther King Center - Atlanta, GA

Jimmy Carter Center - Atlanta, GA

The American University - School of International Service (SIS)

Research Triangle Institute - North Carolina - Municipal Development, Decentralization, Participation, Legislature.

Southwest Voters Research/Education Institute - civic education, election observers.

Management Sciences for Development - Washington, D.C. (202) 785-8228 - Administration of Justice - Panama, Ecuador

Center For Administration of Justice, Florida International University, Luis Salas, (305) 940-5952

ICITAP, David Kriskovich, Director, Washington, D.C. (202) 653-9122

Americas Development Foundation (703) 836-2717

* (see organizational statement and objectives directly below)

(all area codes are (202) Washington D.C. unless otherwise noted)

LAC Bureau Regional AOJ Project -

Background + Brief Description

REGIONAL ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE SUPPORT PROJECT

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I. BACKGROUND

A. Democratic Initiatives

A.I.D. Administrator Ronald Roskens cites support for democracy as one of six principles that guide AID in meeting its overall objectives of assisting "developing countries to realize their full national potential through the development of open and democratic societies and the dynamism of free markets and individual initiatives."

Underscoring the importance of democratic development, the Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean has identified support for the evolution of stable democratic societies as one of two major Bureau objectives. This objective is to be accomplished, in part, by strengthening civilian government institutions, including the justice sector institutions. This Bureau objective is implemented through LAC/DI and bilateral mission democracy programs.

Democratic Initiative activities are focused primarily on the fragile or emerging democracies of Central and South America, rather than on stable, established democracies or on countries that are still non-democratic, although limited assistance is provided to these as well where opportunities exist. AID is currently spending about $70 million a year in LAC for democracy activities, including $20 million for administration of justice (AOJ).

Although consistent with long-standing Bureau goals, AOJ is a relatively new program area for A.I.D. The purpose of the AOJ program is to increase the judicial independence and competence of the justice systems in LAC countries. The purpose is to be achieved by a broad-based assistance program designed to increase justice sector personnel training, improve court administration, modernize legal codes, bolster local institutional support, upgrade local law libraries, increase judicial sector budgets, ameliorate judicial career standards, help local bar associations, and improve criminal investigative capacities of governments in the region.

Given the unprecedented swing toward democracy in the past few years, A.I.D. will increase substantially the emphasis it places on democratic development, including support for improved administration of justice. Other high priority USG objectives, such as stemming the production and distribution of narcotics, also relate to improved performance of criminal justice systems in Latin America. This heightened attention will increase the demand on LAC/DI and the Missions to provide continued or expanded support for AOJ activities.

Naturally, the demand for information on the impact of AOJ programs also will increase as interest in the subject continues to grow.

There is great interest throughout the region in the AOJ program, and clear needs exist for assistance that can be met with relatively modest funding levels.

B. Prior A.I.D. Experience

1. History

The democratic initiatives program has evolved from U.S. concern with human rights. Between FY 1978 and 1983, the LAC Bureau managed a human rights program, authorized under Section 116(e) of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) that included, inter alia support for: the regional human rights education and research programs of the Inter-American Institute of Human Rights (IIHR); the technical assistance and training programs of the Center for Electoral Assistance and Promotion (CAPEL), part of the IIHR; and programs of the UN-affiliated Latin American Institute for Crime Prevention and Treatment of Offenders (ILANUD) that were forerunners of the present AOJ program.

In FY 1984, a special Congressional earmark provided the first $3 million of the $9.2 million Administration of Justice program in El Salvador.

At about the same time, the Central America Democracy, Peace, and Development Initiative of 1984 (known as the Central American Initiative, or CAI) was approved by the U.S. Congress to implement the recommendations of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America (known as the Kissinger Commission). The Kissinger Commission, named in 1983 to propose a long-term U.S. strategy that would best respond to the social, economic, and democratic development challenges in the region, placed democratic development at the core of U.S. policy and recommended the strengthening of democratic institutions. As part of the CAI, the Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean established the Office of the Administration of Justice and Democratic Development (now called the Office of Democratic Initiatives) in 1985 to assist Central American governments in improving their judicial systems and democratic institutions.

Since then, AID/LAC has funded several regional and bilateral projects to develop and strengthen democratic values, practices, and institutions, initially in Central America and increasingly in South America and the Caribbean.

2. Overview of LAC Administration of Justice Projects

The Administration of Justice program has become a major element of the Democratic Initiatives program. Initiated in 1983 at modest levels, the AOJ program expanded due to Congressional earmarks of $20 million each year from 1985 through 1989. The objective of the program is to increase the independence and competence of justice systems in Latin American countries. Activities are designed to train judicial personnel, improve court administration, revise and reform laws, bolster local institutional support, upgrade local law libraries, upgrade judicial qualifications, assist local and regional bar associations, improve criminal investigative capacities of governments, establish and expand public defender systems, conduct public education programs and continuing legal education, and publish case reports and textbooks.

The program includes waivers of the general prohibition on police assistance for enhancing police investigative and forensic capabilities, management training, and academy curriculum development. Unlike AID's earlier public safety program, which was terminated amid allegations of the use of torture by U.S. trained police, this program does not provide general law enforcement training. The U.S. Department of Justice administers the police assistance component.

In April 1983, the Department of State and AID sent a team to El Salvador to assess the problems in the administration of justice. Based on the information gathered, the team presented a series of recommendations encompassing all aspects of the judicial system: the criminal code, legal education, training for prosecutors and investigators, judicial administration, witness and judicial protection, and improved forensic capabilities.

In recognition of the compelling need for assistance in the area of judicial administration, specifically the prompt and equitable resolution of criminal cases, the U.S. Congress passed the Spector Amendment to the Second Continuing Resolution for Fiscal Year 1984. That recommendation given by the team in 1983 and the passage of the cited amendment constitute the basis of the first phase of the pilot judicial reform project, which allowed AID to initiate its work in the AOJ field in Latin America.

In 1985, AID initiated the Regional AOJ project, which is based in Costa Rica and whose efforts were to strengthen judicial systems in Panama, El Salvador, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Honduras and Guatemala. The project, which is still ongoing, also includes training for Colombia, Ecuador, Peru,

Bolivia, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Chile. The primary responsibility for implementing the project was given to the United Nations Latin American Institute for the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders (ILANUD). The project design anticipated and promoted the establishment of bilateral USAID AOJ projects in participating countries.

The second regional project, which began in 1986, was designed to provide technical assistance to seven Caribbean countries. After independence from the United Kingdom, these countries (Belize, Grenada, St.Kitts/Nevis, Antigua, St. Lucia, Dominica, and St. Vincent) assumed responsibility for major legal areas such as civil aviation, trademarks and intellectual property, and taxation. Assistance includes construction and renovation of courts, development of law libraries and civil registries, judicial training and law revision and reform. Limited grants were also given to Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago, Anguilla, the Bahamas, Montserrate, the British Virgin Islands, and the Cayman Islands. A separate component of this project included assistance to Jamaica in the form of facilities renovation, training, computer applications, and library development.

Since these early beginnings, LAC/DI has encouraged AOJ programs wherever freely elected governments in the Hemisphere evidence commitment to judicial reform. The increase in the number of freely elected governments has enabled the program to expand throughout Central and South America and the Caribbean.

Today, there are six major bilateral AOJ projects in Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Costa Rica, Peru and the Caribbean. Three new bilateral projects are planned for FY 91 in Colombia, Chile and Panama. Other countries, such as Bolivia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Uruguay, Brazil and Argentina, have initiated activities in the areas of judicial training, court administration, judicial protection, and justice sector assessments. Two of these countries -- Paraguay and Uruguay -- will receive special technical assistance and judicial training leading to larger programs next year. In addition, three new regional projects have been approved in the FY 91-92 Action Plan: Democracy through Law Education, New Technology Information Systems, and Judicial Administration for Latin American Court Personnel. By 1992, the AOJ program will be operational in almost all of the advanced developing countries, at the request of the host countries.

C. First Regional AOJ Technical Support Project

Since August 1989, LAC/DI has provided technical assistance to the Missions through a Technical Services Contract to Checchi and Company Consulting, Inc., under the LAC Regional

Administration of Justice Project. The contract is funded at a level of $1,305,475 over a two year period through August 15, 1991. The general consensus among DI officers at participating missions is that the contract has provided a useful, effective and quick vehicle to further mission strategies in the administration of justice field. It is envisioned that, through August 1991, missions will continue to use this contract as their primary contractual vehicle.

The purpose of the contract was to provide technical services in ten categories of AOJ-related activities. Of the 1340 person days of contract services envisaged in these areas, 981 days have been provided as of October 1, as follows:

Skill Category	Days in Contract	Days Provided
1) Court Administration	115	140
2) Judicial Training	145	114
3) Legal Analysis	125	143
4) Law Library Science	25	--
5) Information Systems	180	58
6) Political Science/Polling	35	187
7) Public Administration	73	--
8) Project Design/Evaluation	547	304
9) Financial Analysis	50	35
10) Law Enforcement	45	--

Activities funded under the project have ranged from assessments, project design, management information systems, public awareness campaign and the creation of a judicial school.

The current contract is funded at $1,305,475. Of this amount, $912,303 or 70% has been obligated under 30 technical service orders (TSOs), as of November 1990. Of this amount, $230,000 is expected to be reimbursed from bilateral missions in Panama and El Salvador. Contract management will require $120,000 through August 1991. Thus, about $500,000 is available for additional technical services between November 1990 and August 1991. Requests for services into the first two quarters of 1991 currently total $370,000, leaving about $130,000 for additional programming.

The rate of utilization of technical services has ranged from $60,000 to $191,000 per quarter, in addition to about $30,000 per quarter for contract management (See Annex C.1.). Annex C.2 includes a list of past and proposed technical services funded under the contract. These include design (11), evaluation (10), assessments and strategy (6), polling (2), scopes of work (3),

and technical assistance for judicial schools and other activities.

Contract expenditures as per Table C.3 show that 62% of total budget was expended through October 1, 1990 with only 38% of projected expenditures for subcontracts, and 72% of projected amounts for salaries. Table C.4 includes a graph of expenditures showing salaries, overhead, travel, subcontracts and other expenditures.

Contract utilization by country (Table C.5) shows Panama as the greatest user of services (27%), followed by Paraguay (18%), El Salvador (13%) and Colombia (12%). These percentages will change substantially as large contracts for PP designs in Chile, Colombia and Peru are added to the list.

Project design and evaluation represent 32% of services delivered to October 1, followed by political science for assessments and polling (20%), legal research (14.5%) and court administration (14%) (See Annex C. 6). Public administration has not been utilized as a category, although court administration (which could be considered a component of public administration) has absorbed 14% of services. A redefinition of categories is required to reflect more accurately the types of services offered.

The selection of consultants has been provided disproportionately from home office support (40%), with Latin American consultants providing the least services (27%), and U.S. short-term consultants providing the balance (Annex C.7).

The earlier technical services contract, administered as part of the Regional Administration of Justice Project. While the project is administered from Costa Rica, the technical services contract has been administered from AID/W, through LAC/DI. It was determined at the DAEC for the technical services contract that subsequent activities would be undertaken as a separate project.

II. PROJECT DESCRIPTION

A. Goal and Purpose

One of two major goals of the LAC Bureau is to support the evolution of stable, democratic societies in the LAC region. This goal echoes U.S. objectives as defined by the Department of State throughout the region and the world. The goal also coincides with the goal of the Regional Administration of Justice Project.

The purpose of the project is to assist the Bureau in achieving this goal by providing assistance through USAIDs, LAC/DI and regional AOJ offices to host government institutions to 1) increase the independence, competence and efficiency of the judicial system in LAC countries; and 2) promote information-sharing of experiences gained in the LAC region in the administration of justice.

The three components of the project are: 1) to provide technical assistance and selected short-term training of host country nationals in strategy formulation, identification, design, implementation and evaluation of AOJ activities; 2) to improve information-sharing on AOJ-related topics; and 3) to consolidate AOJ experience, undertake analysis of structural issues including policies, practices and laws which impede the effective functioning of legal systems, and provide strategic guidance on what has worked well and how further progress can be made. The third component will provide an analytical base for the newsletter proposed under second component through in-depth analytical work and the examination of issues on sub-sectoral or cross-cutting issues, based on country comparisons or subregional analyses.

The project will be implemented through a three-year contract, which will be competitively bid. One contractor is desirable for efficiency, program integrity, and economies of scale. Such a contractor would also be in a position to achieve specific program goals such as development of standard training modules, evaluation criteria and techniques and judicial record keeping. Development, implementation, and evaluation of these projects is a new speciality for contractors. It would further AOJ program and LAC Bureau goals to develop the institutional capacity of a contractor who can provide technical assistance in a variety of areas such as training, court administration, information systems management, forensic investigatory techniques, and legal research.

Activities under the three components are designed to be responsive to field mission needs and will be executed in close

An End to Imprisonment Without Due Process

A First Step Toward Judicial Reform

President Alberto Fujimori moved decisively to bring Peru's legal process into line with international standards of human rights with his announcement on September 15, 1990 of his Executive Order to free individuals accused of minor offenses and detained for excessively long periods in Peruvian prisons without trial. The Executive Order, popularly known as the "Decriminalization Law," will provide due process and potential liberty for up to 3,500 individuals held without trial. The Executive Order is rooted in the President's constitutional power to pardon and provides for such pardon to be granted after a special commission has reviewed and approved cases of lengthy detention without trial.

The ILD worked with the President and the Ministry of Justice to research precedents for the application of presidential pardon to such detainees and to draft the Executive Order.

The Executive Order is aimed squarely at the country's Judicial Branch, widely considered to be highly inefficient and corrupt. In making his announcement of the "decriminalization law" before a group of prisoners in Lima's San Jorge Prison, the President challenged the Judicial Branch to do away with its image as "the Palace of Injustice."

Delays in bringing accused individuals to trial have filled the nation's prisons to dangerous and chaotic levels, and have deprived thousands of their right to be judged within a reasonable time, as stipulated in the Human Rights convention. The inequity of extended detention periods and inhumane prison conditions have been the source of harsh criticism by the nation's senate, the church, professional groups, as well as the prisoners themselves and their families.

President Fujimori delivers a copy of his Executive Order on Decriminalization to ILD President Hernando de Soto. The signature took place at San Jorge Prison.

The ILD estimates that more than 75% of Peru's prison population —i.e., some 13,595 individuals— have yet to stand trial, despite detention periods that frequently exceed several years. The "decriminalization law" addresses particularly those who have been detained under summary proceedings for 9 months or more without trial and those detained under ordinary proceedings for more than 18 months. The President's pardon is thus expected to benefit 25-30% of the total prison population, or roughly 3,500 individuals.

President Fujimori described prison conditions as "a kind of Hell" where severe overcrowding, disease and malnutrition are the norm. In the third quarter of 1990, 10 prison deaths occurred, 9 of them the result of malnutrition. Venereal disease and tuberculosis are common. Referring to the slum conditions which prevail, the President noted that Lima's high security prison, San Juan de Lurigancho, is designed to accommodate 2,500 prisoners but at the present holds 5,850.

Only persons charged with minor infractions of the law and those who have shown good behavior while in prison will be eligible for "decriminalization." Those charged with serious offenses, including drug trafficking, terrorism and homicide, will not be considered for pardon.

The ad on the following page was published in *El Comercio* on September 14, 1990



President Fujimori announces his Executive Order to provide Presidential pardon to individuals accused of crimes and imprisoned without trial.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT, DEMOCRATIZATION, AND GOVERNANCE WORKSHOP

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CAREY COULTER
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LARRAINE DENAKPO
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INITIATIVES

DATEX Inc — PVO/NGO Initiatives Project
Winter 1990/91

Initiatives Expands NGO Networking

Datex Inc's Africa-focused PVO/NGO Initiatives Project (PIP) has several objectives: facilitating dialogue on substantive development policy and program issues among A.I.D., U.S. PVOs, and African NGOs at both the headquarters and field levels; promoting more effective means of PVO-NGO collaboration; and, strengthening the institutional capacity of African NGOs and community organizations through training and technical assistance.

To achieve these aims, Datex staff have visited and/or established contacts in over 20 sub-Saharan countries and have developed linkages with, and between, USAID missions, PVOs, and NGOs. We have established a network for information exchange, reaching close to 1,000 organizations. Response to our efforts from all directions has been overwhelmingly supportive.

INITIATIVES will be a key forum, *your* forum, for A.I.D./PVO/NGO networking, with a view to increased learning, coordination, and collaboration in development. Each issue will focus on a theme of common concern, presented from a variety of perspectives. This first issue focuses on two related themes: PVO-NGO partnership and USAID-funded PVO/NGO umbrella projects.

I encourage you to respond with your comments on this issue and your suggestions for future themes so that *INITIATIVES* becomes an active forum. Promoting balanced dialogue and collaboration, *INITIATIVES* will contribute towards more sustainable development efforts throughout Africa and the world.

Welcome to this issue of *INITIATIVES.*

Ajit S. Dutta
President, Datex Inc

Partnership: Broad Concepts, Local Approaches

PVOs/NGOs Define Actions at Mali Seminar

Partnership among African populations, NGOs, and U.S. PVOs is not a goal in itself, but a method or tool to build solidarity. The goal is achieving the self-reliance and development of African communities -- the exact manifestations of which will vary depending on the specific context in which it is to take place and the people who are participating in this dynamic process.

In the context of various international fora, Northern PVOs and Southern NGOs have discussed, defined, and redefined the nature and uses of partnership. It is generally agreed that among the prerequisites for successful partnership are: mutual confidence,

> *My friend, add your hand to mine.*
>
> *-translated from a Bambara proverb*

shared objectives, shared responsibility in decision-making, harmonization of methods of action, and mutual respect for each others' values. So, why more partnership seminars?

Most of the participants in these extensive and intensive discussions constitute a relatively small, elite group of senior headquarters staff of U.S. and international PVOs, and African NGO representatives who have been identified as spokespeople for their national NGO communities. What is still not clear, however,

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In this issue:

PVO/NGO Partnership--U.S. and African NGOs share lessons learned from working partnerships

A.I.D. PVO/NGO Umbrella Projects-- Datex issues comprehensive study of past and current projects; USAID/Senegal collaborates with NGOs in project design

INITIATIVES

The PVO/NGO Initiatives Project
Datex Inc

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INITIATIVES is published three times a year in English and French. It is designed to facilitate dialogue among U.S. private and voluntary organizations (PVOs), African non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and A.I.D. on issues related to collaborative efforts towards sustainable development in sub-Saharan Africa.

So that this publication may serve as a useful vehicle for the exchange of ideas and information, the editor invites comments, letters, suggestions, and issues-oriented articles on PVO/NGO activities. Contact:

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MILESTONES

Washington Task Force Promotes A.I.D.- PVO Dialogue

PIP has significantly increased the level of dialogue between A.I.D./Washington and the U.S. PVO community through its PVO Task Force, which meets quarterly in the Datex offices in Washington. More than 30 PVOs active in Africa, including relief and development assistance organizations as well as cooperatives and advocacy groups, have participated in four meetings of the Task Force, along with representatives from A.I.D.'s Africa Bureau and the Office for Private and Voluntary Cooperation (PVC).

Discussions focus on issues of coordination in development, particularly areas where A.I.D.'s policy making affects the PVOs' development planning or operations. When the Africa Bureau began formulating its criteria for designating emphasis countries to receive program funds from the Development Fund for Africa, the Task Force was instrumental in ensuring that PVO concerns were factored into the Bureau's strategy, especially with regard to program management. At the December 1990 meeting, the Africa Bureau asked the PVOs to present their ideas on the current climate for furthering governance and participation in Africa and the proper roles for A.I.D., PVOs, and NGOs in this effort. Margaret Bonner, A.I.D.'s Associate Assistant Administrator for Africa, agreed to share the group's comments with the Africa mission directors and suggested that the Task Force meet again this spring to further examine the issue as A.I.D. develops its strategy.

The Task Force keeps the Datex team informed about PVO activities and concerns, providing feedback on areas where PIP involvement might be most beneficial. The PIP team also shares information with PVOs on current or planned PVO/NGO activities in Africa and potential African NGO partners. Any PVOs active in Africa who wish to participate on the Task Force should call Carolyn Reynolds at 202/789-4300.

Datex Studies PVO Information Resource Options for A.I.D.

In November 1990, Datex completed *Development of a PVO/NGO Activities Database: A Feasibility Study* for the A.I.D. Africa Bureau. The study team examined PVO/NGO information requirements in A.I.D. and analyzed the costs and benefits of information. The study presents strategies for development of a PVO/NGO information resource under PIP.

Recent PVO/NGO Publications By Datex

***PVO/NGO Partnership in Mali: A Seminar Report*, Volume I (English and French) and II (French only)**, November 1990. See article beginning on page 1 for a discussion of this seminar, held jointly by Datex and CCA/ONG in Mali.

Mozambique: Opportunities for PVO Collaboration in the Transition From Relief to Development, A Seminar Report, November 1990.

Governance in Africa: Roles for PVOs/NGOs

The spring issue of *INITIATIVES* will tackle the issue of governance and popular participation--how PVOs and NGOs can work with each other and with governments and donor agencies to promote the creation of an "enabling environment" for greater popular participation and strengthening of civil society in Africa. Contact the editor if you wish to propose an article.

The Datex staff would like to express its condolences to the family of Richard Dublin, Datex's Controller and Business Manager, who passed away suddenly in January. His support for PIP and his dedication will be missed.

Focus on USAID PVO/NGO Umbrella Projects

Datex Study Offers Guidelines for Improved Design, Implementation of PVO/NGO Umbrella Projects

Consider these four actual scenarios:

- An A.I.D.- funded PVO/NGO "umbrella" project in the Horn of Africa comes to an impasse in mid-implementation due to disagreements over the role of the host government.

- After years of planning for an umbrella project in one Sahelian country, the USAID mission finds that very few national NGOs apply for funds. Those that do apply require much more technical assistance and start-up than the mission had anticipated.

- Another USAID mission, this time in East Africa, halts its ambitious umbrella project after less than two years of operation and substantially redesigns the project.

- In several African nations, missions have insufficient access to documented experiences from similar umbrella projects as they design their own.

Minimizing such problems in A.I.D. PVO/NGO umbrella project implementation has become crucial. Three umbrella projects designed in 1990 alone total over $50 million US dollars (exclusive of local currency budgets). At least four Africa-based missions are also planning PVO/NGO umbrella projects in the near future. As missions balance their internal management constraints with mandates to work more closely with the non-governmental sector, umbrella projects are likely to become an even more significant element of A.I.D.'s relationship with PVOs and NGOs.

Early in 1991, Datex Inc will publish the first of two reports on ***Designs for Collaboration: PVO/NGO Umbrella Projects in Africa.*** Based on a desk study of documents from 10 projects, the initial report reviews the diversity of approaches that have been used and offers a framework for designing umbrella projects. The second report will follow extensive interviews with the personnel involved in these projects, and will offer guidelines for improving the design and implementation of this funding mechanism.

What are umbrella projects?

Pioneered in the 1970s in Asia, umbrella projects have become a major vehicle for A.I.D.'s PVO/NGO funding in Africa in the last five years. Broadly speaking, umbrella projects are a way of making multiple grants, usually called subgrants, to U.S. PVOs and/or African NGOs under a single mission project. In addition to subgrants, most umbrella projects also provide learning opportunities for PVO/NGOs through training, technical assistance, research, information exchange, and coordination.

What are the issues in umbrella project design?

The Datex team identified 40 core issues. One fundamental concern is internal (within the mission) versus external management of these projects. The Mali PVO Cofinancing Project is an example of a project managed in-house by the mission, while the Zaire Small Project Support Project is managed for USAID by a U.S. PVO under a Cooperative Agreement. This management decision has many ramifications for umbrella project activities. For example, most mission-managed projects in Africa have concentrated their grants on U.S. PVOs, while those with external management units have had the capacity to work directly with local African NGOs as well.

Other issues concern the roles of the host government and of the PVO/NGO community in project design, management, and implementation. Host government roles have ranged from virtually nil (in the Liberia PVO/NGO Support Project) to being co-implementors (in the Somalia PVO Development Partners). Likewise, some umbrella projects have been designed with little or no input from PVOs and NGOs, while the new Senegal PVO/NGO Support Project benefited from a thorough involvement of national agencies in the design process. (See pages 4-5 for discussion.)

As missions balance their internal management constraints with mandates to work more closely with NGOs, umbrella projects are likely to become an even more significant element of the A.I.D.-NGO relationship.

Another key consideration is the mission's own objectives for the project. Does a mission view PVOs and NGOs mainly as a means of achieving its own specific objectives? Or do these projects permit and encourage PVOs and NGOs to implement activities based on their own analysis of their constituents' priorities? Does the mission consider strengthening the non-governmental sector an objective in itself?

In the cases of the Chad Development Initiatives and Sudan Regional and Financial Planning Projects, PVOs are primarily vehicles in the missions' programs. In contrast, the objective of the Kenya Cofinancing Project is to increase the development impact of PVO/NGO activities in their chosen sectors and zones.

What are the study's findings?

Although PVO/NGO umbrella projects vary greatly, some trends can be discerned: lengthening life of projects, rising budget levels, and an increasing range of project activities beyond subgrants management. These patterns suggest A.I.D.'s need to improve its understanding of the time frame, resources, and support required for

continued on page 12

Focus on USAID PVO/NGO Umbrella Projects

USAID/Senegal Project Design Benefits From NGO Participation

In mid-1989, USAID/Senegal decided to design a new PVO co-financing project that would provide subgrants to local NGOs and U.S. PVOs to co-finance community level development activities. The original approach to this project was similar to other cofinancing projects already being implemented by USAID missions in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

The Senegal mission also had about five years of experience working with U.S. PVOs and local NGOs under the Community Enterprise and Development (CED) umbrella project. However, because the CED Project was limited to one region and only worked with eight PVOs/NGOs, the mission did not have much contact with the over 100 PVOs and NGOs registered in Senegal.

In the USAID Project Development Office (PDO), we started a series of meetings with many NGO leaders, especially those in the rural areas. We worked closely with a wide range of PVOs and NGOs to develop a concept paper for the project. From our discussions, we realized that a typical cofinancing project, whereby the mission cofinanced local level subproject activities with established PVOs or NGOs, was not appropriate. Rather, because many NGOs do not have the institutional capacity to design, implement, and account for subgrant activities, the project design included a major focus on building the capacity of those local NGOs, NGO associations, and community groups, with U.S. PVO assistance.

The successful project design was assisted by USAID/Senegal's decision to allow a deliberate design process driven by the perceived needs and ideas of local NGOs.

-William Hammink, A.I.D.

In order to better inform the local NGO community about umbrella project design options, the mission organized an observational tour for five Senegalese PVO/NGO leaders, representing the Senegal field office of a U.S. PVO (the National Council of Negro Women); the Federation of NGOs of Senegal (FONGS), an association of NGOs; the Ministry of Social Development, which is the government agency responsible for monitoring PVOs/NGOs; a local NGO who is a member of FONGS; and CONGAD, the national PVO/NGO consortium. Each group selected its participant. These five leaders visited A.I.D. projects in Kinshasa, Monrovia, and Nairobi, to see potential NGO roles in different countries and how USAID-funded NGO support projects could work. Upon their return, the group debriefed the PDO staff and made suggestions for the new project design based on what they had learned.

If these institutional development programs are expected to strengthen the NGOs, then the process by which they are designed and implemented must itself be participatory in nature.

-Fatim N'Diaye, CONGAD

USAID/Senegal engaged a team of consultants, who visited over 40 local NGOs and provided the mission with much needed insight into special local NGO needs. Finally, with the assistance of the working group, USAID organized a two-day workshop for all PVOs and NGOs in Senegal. Over 120 PVO/NGO representatives contributed to the discussion of the proposed project approach and focus. A five-page summary of the project had been sent to all of the PVOs and NGOs in Senegal, and this formed the basis for the discussion. Besides providing important input for the final project paper design, this workshop also generated enormous goodwill among the large number of local NGOs and USAID.

The successful collaborative design process was assisted by the following:

- an active consortium of PVOs/NGOs in Senegal;
- a growing and active positive relationship between the Senegalese government and local NGOs;
- growing awareness by the government of the important role of PVOs/NGOs;
- a successful collaborative UNDP-funded NGO project already underway: the Sahel Information System;
- USAID/Senegal's decision to allow a deliberate design process driven by the perceived needs and ideas of local NGOs.

William Hammink served as project design officer for the PVO/NGO Support Project in the USAID/Senegal mission. He is now posted in the Africa Bureau in A.I.D./Washington.

Editor's Note:

***Designs for Collaboration*, Datex's study of PVO/NGO umbrella projects in Africa (discussed on page 3), is intended as an informative guide to assist USAID missions in future project design and implementation, as well as in the evaluation of current projects. In the course of our study, we have highlighted the USAID/Senegal approach as a potential model for other USAID missions. PVO/NGO study tours, needs-assessment studies, and USAID/PVO/NGO/Government working groups and conferences on both substantive and project design issues are encouraged to promote mutual understanding and, therefore, more sustainable development efforts.**

Focus on USAID PVO/NGO Umbrella Projects

NGO Team Presents Participatory Guidelines for Institutional Support Programs

Beginning in February 1990, I participated on a study team comprised of Senegalese NGOs and Government representatives. The team visited Liberia, Zaire, and Kenya to exchange ideas about the USAID-funded PVO/NGO support "umbrella" projects in those countries, as a part of the effort to design a similar project for Senegal.

In each of these countries, we observed that the notion of institutional support was not clearly defined prior to project implementation. Institutional support seemed to be limited to assistance in organizational and financial management, planning, and technical assistance.

I believe that institutional support must also envisage the objective of reinforcing the autonomy and the overall capacity of NGOs, particularly national NGOs. This definition encompasses a broader set of needs (material, financial, and human), which NGOs must define for themselves. Such support should serve above all those small NGOs characterized by institutional weakness.

In the countries visited, there appeared to be no USAID-NGO consultation during the project design phase; yet this type of consultation is necessary to allow local NGOs to define their understanding of institutional support and subsequently to identify their own needs.

Likewise, we feel that the rigidity of some of A.I.D.'s regulations and the selection criteria for NGO participation in these programs, such as demonstrated capacity in management, organization, and identification of problems and their solutions, are a major constraint to the participation of the wider NGO community (especially smaller NGOs). If A.I.D. wishes to achieve a sustained collaboration with the African NGOs, then missions must adopt more flexible norms and be willing to discuss openly with the NGOs those regulations and criteria that appear to be in conflict with the NGOs' mode of operation. Flexibility on the part of the USAID mission will result in better and more efficient PVO/NGO programming.

During the study tour, the team also observed that NGO needs were largely predetermined by the USAID missions. Often, there was no in-depth discussion between the mission staff and the NGOs concerning their respective participation, contribution, and responsibilities. One indicator of this is the serious lack of NGO participation on the project management committees.

If these programs are intended to target the NGO community, it is essential that the NGOs take part not only in project implementation, but also particularly in the stages of design, management, and evaluation.

It has also become increasingly evident that one of the criteria for receiving a subgrant from A.I.D. under these programs is that NGOs "have the capacity to demonstrate popular participation." However, participation should not be confined to technical, financial, or physical assistance.

If these institutional development programs are expected to strengthen the NGOs, then the process by which they are designed and implemented must itself be participatory in nature. A.I.D. must, in collaboration with the NGO community, maintain an ongoing dialogue and seek broader participation among the NGOs.

Fatim N'Diaye is Director of CONGAD, the consortium of NGOs in Senegal.

Partnership, Participation Crucial to Sahel Resource Management

Representatives from North American PVO/NGOs, Sahelian NGOs, and several donor agencies confirmed the importance of pursuing active partnerships when they joined in Quebec for a conference on "Partnership and Participation in Natural Resource Management (NRM) in the Sahel" in November 1990. At this conference, funded jointly by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and A.I.D. and organized by Solidarité-Canada-Sahel and PACT, participants approached issues of local participation in NRM from the perspective of a range of institutional partnerships: PVOs - NGOs, PVO/NGOs - local organizations, PVO/NGO associations or consortia, and PVO/NGO - donors.

During the first two days, the PVOs and NGOs met to exchange information and explore the current status of partnership relationships between organizations promoting local NRM. Discussion was facilitated by the sharing of case studies as well as presentations on specific concerns. The final two days of discussions included representatives from CIDA, A.I.D., Club du Sahel, UNDP, the World Bank, and the Sahelian intergovernmental agency, CILSS. Partnership discussions during these sessions included the roles and relationships of these donors.

Recommendations emphasized the importance of strengthening the institutional capacities of Sahelian NGOs and local organizations, and of accentuating women's participation in resource management decisions. Donors were encouraged to harmonize their methods and requirements for working with PVO/NGOs, include PVO/NGOs in their strategic planning for development, and increase Sahelian NGO participation in project management.

Also called for were mechanisms to permit direct negotiations between donors and groupings of Sahelian NGOs, and donor support of expanded North-South PVO/NGO interaction.

Proposed next steps include national encounters involving grassroots organizations and increased interorganizational communication at all levels.

PVOs/NGOs in Mali Commit To

This Seminar is an opportunity that we must seize to discuss frankly our strengths and our weaknesses, our needs and our constraints, in order to see how we can improve our interventions in the field in favor of the populations of the South and better inform and better involve the populations of the North in our actions of solidarity.

-Moustapha Soumaré, President, CCA/ONG

continued from page 1

is whether the results of these international meetings have filtered back to the people who are actually working in the field in Africa---those who would benefit most from participation in the consciousness-raising process of a partnership dialogue.

The reluctance of some U.S. PVOs to change their field approaches and begin to work more closely with local partner NGOs will not change without involvement of the field staff in these partnership dialogues. Though this rhetoric may have been largely accepted by the PVOs' headquarters, it is yet to be put into practice in Africa in many cases.

How the individual participants can promote partnership:

- adhere to the participatory approach to development;
- be willing to collaborate;
- expand contacts in order to deepen the partnership relations;
- disseminate the results of this seminar within the participant's own PVO/NGO;
- engage in a frank exchange of ideas in order to promote better understanding of the objectives of partnership;
- show a generous spirit and desire to serve the population;
- get to know the PVO/NGOs operating in the same areas (sector and geographic);
- collaborate with PVO/NGO field staff;
- participate in the meetings of PVO/NGO consortia.

Concrete Actions for PVOs/NGOs:

- disseminate information among PVO/NGOs;
- permit personnel to pursue partnership relations;
- encourage the joint execution of projects;
- multiply the contacts among PVO/NGOs;
- permit wide circulation of information within organizations;
- publicize the projects and other activities of the PVO/NGO;
- train local staff;

Nor has enough analysis been done of existing partnership relationships in order to understand their complexity. The lessons learned from these experiences need to be widely disseminated.

Though we have probably reached a point now in the international PVO/NGO community where there is a considerable consensus on why partnerships are a desirable means of working towards development, many of the assumptions made emphasize the local context and the conditions that need to be met prior to the concretization of a partnership in all of its dimensions:

- **Cultural:** Each partner has to make an effort to understand better the culture of the other and accept cultural differences (tolerance) in order to accomplish objectives decided upon jointly.
- **Socio-economic:** None of the partners' contributions should be minimized. Each partner has an influence on social and economic matters and needs to be conscious of its potential impact.
- **Institutional:** Partnership should permit each partner an opportunity to reinforce its structures, its work methods, and its management (leadership, equipment, operations).

It is in order to explore these dimensions in more depth and to promote mutual understanding, confidence, and respect within the PVO/NGO community in individual countries that PIP is conducting a series of partnership seminars. The objective is to engage the critical PVO/NGO players at the

Build Genuine Partnerships

**:xchange information on projects prior to im-
lementation;**

**inform the rest of the PVO/NGO community
bout actual experiences of partnership;**

**:onduct proper negotiation of partnership agree-
ıents and make commitments to respect them;**

**:ncourage Northern PVO support of Southern
GO partners;**

**vo.k towards mutual institutional strengthening
nd appropriate sharing of responsibility;**

**ıse and provide information to available databases
inform partnership process.**

national level in this dialogue so that they can each move forward in determining the most appropriate approaches to partnership in their own particular working environment.

The Context in Mali

Mali was chosen as the site for the first of these seminars for a variety of reasons. First, the leaders of the Malian NGO community had expressed a strong desire to get to know better the U.S. PVOs working in their country. Second, we knew that we could draw on case studies of already existing partnership experiences in Mali. Third, several U.S. PVOs had indicated that they were interested in working more closely with Malian NGOs for mutual institutional strengthening, but they did not know how to identify potential partners. Fourth, a number of donor agencies in Mali - especially A.I.D. - had recently introduced programs that were intended to promote partnerships, but did not have processes in place to set this in motion.

Datex and CCA/ONG (Coordinating Committee for NGO Actions in Mali) jointly organized the Partnership Seminar, which was held on September 19-21, 1990, in Bamako, Mali. About fifty Malian and international PVO/NGOs (including at least eight U.S. PVOs) participated in the seminar. Participants had been encouraged to think about the issues prior to the seminar by filling out a questionnaire on their own partnership experiences in Mali. The organizers also commissioned a dozen case studies from PVO/NGOs in Mali. Thus, as we hoped, the seminar preparation sparked a significant consciousness-raising process within the PVO/NGO community.

The most important conclusions to emerge from the Mali dialogue are highlighted in the boxes on these pages. In order to move from rhetoric to practice, the participants in the seminar recognized the importance of committing themselves to taking concrete actions to promote and strengthen partnerships in Mali. The participants agreed that a follow-up seminar should be held in a year's time to assess progress made. This individual and collective commitment was the most important outcome of the process--a witness to the willingness of the PVO/NGO community in Mali to move away from theoretical discussions (interesting as they may be) and to translate them into the deeds of genuine partnership. We will be looking at the extent to which new partnerships have emerged and new synergies developed among the PVO/NGO community.

This Mali experience will be followed by partnership seminars in other African countries, yet to be identified. We would welcome expressions of interest from PVO/NGOs or from A.I.D. missions, based on similar criteria to those applied in the case of Mali (see above). We will continue to build on the knowledge gained from the Mali discussions and to disseminate it widely so as to promote partnership even in those countries where we are unable to actively facilitate the process.

Anne Drabek is the PVO/NGO Initiatives Project Leader.

Editor's note: A full report of the Mali Partnership Seminar is available from Datex. Volume I, available in French and English, includes a summary of the discussion and conclusions of the seminar. Volume II, available only in French, includes all of the case studies prepared for the seminar.

Roles for NGO consortia:

·disseminate information about and for PVO/NGO members;

·promote the multiplication of contacts between potential partners (assist young NGOs in finding partners);

·exchange information among country consortia on existing and potential partners (North-North, South-South, North-South);

·exchange databases;

·create occasions for meetings and working groups on specific themes;

·encourage exchanges in national and local languages.

Focus on Partnership

Botswana's NGOs Launch A United Way . . .

The path to a United Way for Botswana began in early 1990, when Jeff Unsicker, then a Fulbright Fellow at the Institute of Adult Education, University of Botswana, conducted a study of the national NGO community. The study noted several areas of NGO concern about their institutional capabilities:

- Need for **fundraising** techniques to secure funds for operating costs and continuing programs. Also NGOs expressed concern about their ability to meet continual requests from both international and local donors for matching funds.

- Need for relevant training in project **planning** and financial management.

- Need for a **collective voice** to educate key sectors on NGO needs and to provide information on how current and potential policies affect NGO activities.

At Unsicker's request, USAID/Botswana convened a meeting for the local NGO community. During this meeting, the NGOs developed a vision for how a support group, such as a United Way organization, could help them. We (the NGOs) saw United Way as a means to provide matching funds for our programs as well as sorely-needed operating costs. We also saw the benefits of increased solidarity among NGOs, which could result from working with an umbrella organization devoted to helping NGOs become stronger, self-sufficient organizations.

A representative group of NGOs, which became the NGO Planning Group, took charge of the effort to explore the potential for establishing a United Way organization in Botswana. The USAID mission then contacted United Way International (UWI) on behalf of the NGO Planning Group and expressed the NGOs' interest in building their own United Way. Through a grant from the Partnership Initiatives Fund (PIF), UWI and the NGO Planning Group jointly conducted a feasibility study in Botswana.

Did the results of the feasibility study meet the NGOs' expectations?

We learned that the United Way model could in fact contribute to better identification of Botswana's social service needs and NGO planning to meet those needs.

It was helpful to have UWI come and explore whether the government and the private sector would agree to support or participate in a United Way. With UWI's help, key government leaders offered to facilitate contributions to the new United Way, and talks with private sector leaders established a preliminary base of support.

However, the Board that was developed as a result of the feasibility study was unable to sustain momentum as the NGOs had hoped. We realized that continuing this effort from the start-up point required a full-time local staff person.

Trust between UWI staff and the NGOs, as well as community support for the United Way effort, was facilitated by the fact that this effort was initiated by local NGOs, and grew out of their own identified need and desire for a stronger NGO sector.

-Diana Torres

If you were to initiate this effort over again, what would you do differently?

I would have encouraged the planning group to work with more NGOs to ensure their support and facilitate further sharing of information. This is necessary to prevent misconceptions about the new organization and its impact on the NGOs' activities.

Ipelegeng/United Way will greatly encourage institutional development by mobilizing our NGO movement.

-Pony Hopkins

We also realized that it would have been more beneficial for us to have established our Board and identified the objectives and aims of the organization prior to the feasibility study. We discovered afterwards that we already had the capability to do this: The suggestions and the vision of the NGO Planning Group were actually more sound and better thought out than those of the Board that was subsequently formed. In fact, the Board that was created was more of a plea from the NGOs to garner the support of the private sector.

The feasibility study also showed the need for extended, on-site technical assistance.

Ipelegeng ("self-help" in Setswana), our own United Way, will greatly encourage institutional development by mobilizing our NGO movement. In addition, it will involve a broad section of local contributors in fundraising for NGO initiatives.

Pony Hopkins is Director of Worldview International Foundation in Botswana and is a member of the NGO Planning Group for Ipelegeng/United Way of Botswana.

About United Way International

Promoting voluntary initiatives worldwide, UWI helps interested countries establish and offer support to United Way organizations and similar voluntary-based, communitywide programs aimed at providing humanitarian and development assistance. A separate, nonprofit organization from the United Way of America, UWI provides orientation, technical assistance, fundraising support, training, and information linkages for both new and existing United Ways.

A.I.D. Awards First Round of Partnership Grants for Africa

Aiming to foster effective partnerships between U.S. PVOs and African NGOs, the Africa Bureau of A.I.D. awarded grants to nine sets of partner organizations during the first round of disbursement for the Partnership Initiatives Fund (PIF). The grants, ranging up to a maximum of $15,000, are intended as seed money for organizations to explore or build on collaborative development activities at the grassroots level. Some of the funded activities include: product development workshops and fundraising consultations between Aid To Artisans/U.S. and ATA/Ghana; a joint feasibility study for collaboration in dry season economic activities by Save the Children/ Burkina Faso and local organizations in the Sapone area; co-facilitation of self-assessment workshops for staffs of local women's organizations in Ghana by OEF International and GAPVOD, the Ghanaian consortia; and joint materials development and training in food-processing technologies by TechnoServe and the Country Women's Association in Nigeria.

U.S. and African interest in the PIF has been increasing. The PIP team has managed the solicitation and review process and will be actively monitoring the impact of this grant concept. *INITIATIVES* will continue to report on PIF activities.

. . . And Provide A Lesson in Collaboration

When the NGO community came together in Botswana to discuss common concerns, they indicated their interest in developing their own United Way organization. However, NGO support alone does not automatically lead to a successful NGO organization.

Because the economic and political environment also influences the viability of a United Way, UWI always conducts a feasibility study for the organization on-site in the proposed country. The PIF grant allowed UWI to proceed with this study. USAID/ Botswana also supported the effort by sharing UWI's guidelines for a successful feasibility study with the NGO group.

UWI was impressed and energized by the initiative of the Botswana NGOs to bring United Way to their country. After reading the minutes of the NGO Planning Group meetings, indicating enthusiastic and unanimous support for a United Way, I knew this was a dynamic group and was eager to meet them. In our first meeting in Botswana, we reviewed how the NGOs came to desire a United Way, discussed how United Way works, and reviewed the objectives of the feasibility study. The Planning Group arranged for two weeks of meetings with UWI staff and key leaders in the public and private sector.

How did UWI staff and the NGOs build mutual trust and community support?

Trust and community support were facilitated by the fact that this effort was initiated by local NGOs and grew out of their own identified need and desire for a stronger NGO sector. Although the NGOs wanted an umbrella group to represent them, they were concerned about how the new organization would work. Detailed discussions allowed us to garner support from key NGO leaders. Over the last 20 years, UWI has learned to wait until strong local initiative is indicated before going ahead with a feasibility study.

The feasibility study process is as much a consultation as an assessment, allowing for suggestions and concerns to be factored into the local model. Even government leaders who were at first skeptical or doubtful, because the concept of a flexible United Way system is new to their country, are intrigued by the vision of an independent, locally-operated entity that would address local concerns and ultimately better serve the community.

What lessons were learned?

New information acquired during this process led us to alter our original plans. Initially, UWI envisioned that, once the results of the feasibility study proved positive, the local NGO Planning Group would assume the task of launching the new United Way organization. This assumption proved unrealistic in this case. We reworked the budget and secured in-kind contributions to hire the necessary local staff.

We also recognized the need to work with a committee. As these efforts unfolded, the purpose and mission of the new organization became clearer to both UWI and the NGOs. Typically, a few participants drop out during this stage, but this is just a healthy part of the process. Those who continue the local effort have the vision of helping the broader NGO community and its recipients. It is these motivated individuals who will get the organization off to the right start.

The collaborative process was successful in that the framework and necessary support for the new United Way, or Community Chest of Botswana, was firmly established. We established a positive working relationship between the new organization's leaders and UWI staff. With continued commitment, Botswana's NGOs will develop a very successful, independent United Way for their country.

Diana Torres is UWI's Director of Training and Consultation.

Focus on Partnership

A Partnership Worth Its Gold Weight

Aid To Artisans/U.S. Follows Lead of Ghanaian Partner

Carved in the lintel of his studio doorway in Kyoto, Kawai, the potter, wrote, "We do not work alone." A simple motto, but a wise guide for thinking about development.

Aid to Artisan's partner, Aid to Artisans/Ghana (ATAG), is more like a sister organization. The idea that became ATAG was hatched as Esther Ocloo and I sat under a tree in the outdoor workshop of Isaac Mensah, the master craftsman in lost-wax casting. ATAG was modeled after our own ATA in its mission, but its operations are different, as befits completely different conditions.

We have a joint project in Ghana, more ATAG's than ours, though we have been instrumental in getting it up and running. Together we plan to revitalize the fine traditional crafts of Ghana: pottery, weaving, woodcarving, and metalwork. The vehicle for this revival is basic and practical: marketing. We are providing product development workshops for artisans in the field, with training in sales, quality control, and small business management.

ATA/U.S. supplies two parts of the process:

Our Market Link Program: a practical, practiced method of bringing products to market, involving several technical product development workshops followed by sales presentations to trade shows in the U.S. gift and decorative accessories market.

Strategic Financial Planning: a workshop in planning and implementing support for the project, including revenue producing sales, "materials banks", as well as guidance in locating and securing appropriate international funding sources. ATAG plans and provides the rest, the entire in-country program.

One of our most pleasant lessons learned was how our Ghanaian partners already exhibited a strong capability for success, as shown by the speed in which a remarkable, high-level group of Ghanaian philanthropists was formed as ATAG's Board of Directors. Given the energy and dedication of ATAG's founders, in particular Dr. Ocloo, ATAG is far more than just a counterpart--it is a partner to learn from.

photo by Clare Brett Smith

ATA Product Design Consultant Holland Millis and brass master craftsman Isaac Mensah collaborate in Ghana.

Our grant from the Partnership Initiatives Fund is a boost to our concept of partnership. The grant allowed our product design consultant, Holland Millis, to work with artisans in many different regions of Ghana. He has worked with the lost-wax craftsmen in the village of Ampobane to refine the brass used in casting, and to develop elements of the traditional gold weights into elements for costume jewelry. He will also work with the Kente cloth weavers to produce a version of the traditional brilliant strip weaving that will serve, when combined with the brass elements into costume jewelry, as both a new and a traditional product line.

Ours is meant to be a long-term working partnership and will continue to evolve. ATA/U.S. will continue to act as a guide to the U.S. export market, but we are now following ATAG's lead in determining how we can be most helpful in their work. As a result of this partnership, ATAG will become a source of trainers in technical skills, marketing, and small business management for the West Africa region. Both ATA/U.S. and ATAG recognize that our partnership supports the Chinese principle of "Clear Mutual Gain".

Clare Smith is President of ATA/U.S.

Partnership Enriches Service To Artisans

Ghana is one of the richest countries in terms of African crafts, yet somehow only the famous handwoven Kente cloth has found its way to the world's crafts markets. In order to provide a means for bringing the broad range of talents and ingenuity of Ghanaian artisans to the mainstream of the world crafts trade, a group of philanthropic Ghanaian citizens founded ATAG. We approached the U.S. organization of the same name to assist our new organization in designing and marketing products.

ATA/U.S. President Clare Smith promptly responded to ATAG's request, and Smith and product designer Holland Millis traveled to Ghana to meet and work with ATAG and various artisan groups. As a result of this visit, crafts worth over $6,000 were exported to U.S. markets. This collaborative venture gave new importance to

Focus on Partnership

the role and contribution of artisans in Ghana and laid a solid foundation for ATAG's future effectiveness as a training and support organization.

Together with ATA/U.S. we were able to identify the problems most commonly faced by the artisans. We learned that they lacked the necessary managerial and entrepreneurial skills, and access to reliable markets, credit, and often good quality raw materials. As a result, the Board asked ATA/U.S. for funds to run some training programs and to establish a revolving fund to set up a raw material bank.

The ATAG - ATA/U.S. partnership has clearly helped to unearth the vibrant potentiality and ingenuity of Ghanaian artisans. The efforts provided in designing new and more marketable products will help Ghanaian artisans to compete favorably and confidently in the world's crafts markets.

Dr. (Mrs.) Esther Ocloo is the Founder of ATAG. The 1990 recipient of The Hunger Project's Africa Prize for Leadership, she also founded Women's World Banking in Ghana and is a leader in the Ghana Business and Professional Women's Association.

Datex Builds Resource Center on PVO/NGO Information

In the course of our work on PIP, Datex has been building a library and a database for A.I.D. on PVO/NGO activities in Africa, and on A.I.D. and other donors' projects and documentation related to PVOs/NGOs. Our growing resources include materials on A.I.D. PVO/NGO Umbrella Projects, as well as conference reports, newsletters, program profiles, and annual reports from PVO/NGOs. We would appreciate being placed on your mailing list for publications so that our information will be as comprehensive and current as possible.

HVO, Save Share Resources, Goals in Mozambique

While most agree that the concept of partnership is essentially positive, many organizations fear that working with a partner may compromise their own program objectives and hamper their operating style. Two U.S. PVOs, Health Volunteers Overseas (HVO) and Save the Children Federation (Save), began working together this year in Mozambique on two phases of the Prosthetics Assistance Project funded by USAID/Maputo. The project goal is to establish the nation's capacity to treat and physically rehabilitate all of the emergency-related disabled civilians and assist them in leading normal lives. Below, HVO and Save discuss their joint project and their discovery that the sometimes rough aspects of collaboration are more than countered by the gains for both the partners and the project beneficiaries.

HVO has a key institutional development role in providing long-term and short-term technical assistance, as well as medical equipment and supplies. In July 1990, HVO fielded a long-term orthopedic surgeon whose role is to work with and advise Mozambique's only orthopedic surgeon in strengthening medical orthopedic training, and in upgrading the country's orthopedic surgery services. HVO will also provide short-term consultants and skilled volunteers to complement these ongoing efforts and training activities.

Save, operating in Mozambique since 1986, has two functions in this project. First, Save provides administrative and logistical support, including office space, transport, communications, support staff, and housing, to the HVO Medical Director and consultants. Second, Save is constructing hostels (transit centers) in each of four provinces to shelter prosthetics and orthopedic patients while they are receiving orthotic or prosthetics assistance and/or undergoing physical therapy.

The major advantage of this arrangement for HVO was the acquisition of a ready-made support team and system on arrival. This enabled HVO to begin project work almost immediately, without the long and arduous tasks of establishing the systems and protocols necessary to function in a new country setting.

HVO and Save share a Project Coordinator and certain administrative staff, who handle Project tasks for both PVOs. Combining general office facilities and equipment enables both agencies to be more cost-efficient.

HVO and Save have separate grant agreements with USAID, which specify money flows and clearly determine the obligations and work plans of each party. While a portion of Save's funding is to provide administrative support to HVO, all of HVO's funds go directly towards service delivery.

Defining Roles: The Key to Success

In August 1990, HVO and Save signed a jointly prepared Memorandum of Understanding, which detailed the responsibilities of each PVO, outlining specific means of working together. This document was intended to permit the timely resolution of conflicts or disputes. Coordination at the field level is facilitated by frequent discussions between HVO's Medical Director and Save's Country Director. To date, there have been no major areas of difficulty or conflicts that could not be resolved amicably. Both parties have made sincere efforts to work well together in pursuit of the overall project goal.

A potential problem area may center on budget decisions. One component of the Save budget contains line items and funds directly related to HVO activities. A clear decision-making system and an open, effective flow of information need to be maintained in this area, along with a practical mechanism for resolving any conflicts that might arise.

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HVO, Save Team Up on Mozambique Prosthetics Project

continued from page 11

Improving our joint effectiveness might involve a redefinition of each partner's role. Currently, HVO plays a major, substantive institutional development role, perhaps the key role, in the Project. No single PVO or NGO, even one with highly advanced technical skills, can be expected to generate sufficient leverage to move an entire national orthopedic/medical training, service, and delivery system forward rapidly enough to achieve the hoped-for outcomes in just three years.

It is possible that Save, together with HVO, could further support this effort by increasing its role to help form more effective working/consulting coalitions (a) among the organizations comprising the Project Steering Committee, and (b) at higher levels within the health and medical community in Mozambique. In addition to PVOs/NGOs working harmoniously together, there is a need for effective dialogue among key institutions, agencies, and individuals -- a need to encourage them to become active shareholders and participants in the Project. Creating a stronger, more concerted team of players will result in a broader partnership; more effective communications, decision-making, and planning; and increased positive action.

Richard Fisher, M.D., Medical Director for HVO in Mozambique., and Donald Batchelder, Save the Children's Field Office Director, contributed this article.

Designs for Collaboration

continued from page 3

effective grassroots programming through PVOs/NGOs.

Certain projects have shown limited effectiveness because of an inadequate commitment to strengthening local and national institutions.

A preliminary conclusion: PVO/NGO institutional strengthening, coordination, and information sharing under umbrella projects are usually a precondition for attainment of all other performance objectives.

The Datex team for the PVO/NGO umbrella project study was headed by Jonathan Otto and Anne Drabek.

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Editor's Note: This partnership was introduced to the larger U.S. PVO community at a Datex seminar on "Mozambique: Opportunities for PVO Collaboration in the Transition from Relief to Development," held in Washington, DC in September, 1990. More than 50 participants attended the seminar, representing the Mozambique Government, A.I.D., World Bank, foundations, policy and research organizations, as well as PVOs. The seminar report is available from Datex/DC.

INITIATIVES

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OPINION

What Makes Us Need Pluralism Now?

By William R. Ochieng

A spectre is haunting Africa — the spectre of multi-partism. Everywhere on the continent, even in the hitherto sleepy kingdoms and kleptocracies, the vast masses of the people are calling for pluralism and fundamental changes. Even imperialist powers and foreign agencies, which hitherto were the strongest supporters of authoritarian and corrupt regimes, are all for multi-party systems. Indeed, even the so-called African Marxist intellectuals who were once the loud advocates of monolithic Communist edifices, have been seduced into mouthing pluralism as the panacea for Africa's historic economic and political tragedies. The winds of change are said to blow from the direction of eastern Europe, where hitherto "people's democracies" have been overthrown and the people have embraced "bourgeois market philosophies", which only recently were associated with decadence, exploitation and human degradation.

At the core of multi-partism is the struggle for democracy; it is the idea of equality and the belief that men, as men, have something in common, and to that extent are entitled to equal treatment and equal access to national resources.

The above are the noises we are hearing. In Kenya, the multi-party advocates are calling specifically for two things: (a) the repeal of Section 2A of the Kenya Constitution, which recognises only one political party, Kanu, and (b) the restoration of democracy and justice in Kenya so that Kenyans can be governed by a government of their choice, pursuing policies in the interests of national development and not individual aggrandisement.

Let me hasten to add that many social thinkers in Africa are baffled by the sudden faith the multi-party advocates have put in the ideas of democracy. Is it not a fact that Africa started at independence with multi-party democracies? How come that nobody today analyse why African multi-party systems failed? Was it because Africa was still too immature to operate democracy? Has Africa suddenly matured? What is the evidence? Was it because the African leadership was too autocratic and wicked? What is the evidence that from now on multi-party democracies will succeed?

It might help to have a quick glance at the meaning of democracy. The term is derived from the Greek words *demos* and *Kratos*, the former meaning the people and the latter power. Democracy, thus, means power of the people. But while in traditional society all adults participated directly in the formulation of policies and decisions that governed them, today's national populations are too huge to allow for direct participation. Thus, democracy is today regarded as a form of government in which the people rule themselves indirectly through their representatives.

Prof. William Ochieng of Maseno University

In democracy, unlike in other forms of government, the will of the majority prevails, because (i) the majority are, on the whole, more likely to be right than the minority, and (ii) the majority, in most cases, are physically stronger than the minority and can make the government of the minority impossible.

The merits and major assumptions of democracy include the feeling that under it, the sphere of our private life — our family, our diversions, our worship, our work — will not be invaded, except by due process of law in which we have an equal say with any. It is also usually assumed that human rights are better protected under democracy than under other forms of governance. As Prof. A.C. Kapur has put it, in his book *Principles of Political Science*, under democracy we remain tranquil that officials, policemen and judges will not abuse their powers and that they themselves will have to answer for discrimination, bias and unauthorised invasion of our private and public life in a public tribunal in which we, as of right, either sit or are legally represented.

These democratic values are both universal and primeval. Besides, they have not always been fairly applied. During different periods, democracy has taken different forms, just as the "human" in "human equality" differed from time to time. For example, in slave societies, all free men were equal, except slaves who were not considered human beings. In colonised societies, all men were equal except "natives", who were often compared to monkeys, and in most western societies, until the early part of this century, all men were equal except women and children.

More recently, democracy has been criticised for its idealism and impracticality. Democracy demands from the masses a very high civic capacity, which they definitely do not have. The ordinary man, it is argued, does not possess the capacity to understand complex political, international and economic problems, and is more often than not incapable of intelligent action. Indeed, the average citizen has not the time, inclination or ability to inform himself on the affairs of the state.

Finally, democracy does not take into account the problems of classes and the notion of class struggle. Candidates who offer themselves for election, as we have observed in Kenya, are usually the wealthy men who can foot election bills. While in power, this propertied oligarchy will make laws, as it has done in the past, to the advantage of its own class, rather than in the interests of the common man. The wealthy class, obviously, will still struggle at all costs to perpetuate its interests.



International Foundation for Electoral Systems

...strengthening democracies around the world by providing support for free, fair and credible elections

Previous Page Blank

WHAT IFES DOES...

IFES is a private, non-profit foundation dedicated to studying, supporting and strengthening the election process world-wide in emerging democracies through:

- **Pre-Election Assessments**
- **Technical Assistance in the Areas of:**
  - Electoral commissions and election laws
  - Voter registry
  - Voting station procedures
  - Poll worker training
  - Transportation
  - Voting materials
  - Security
  - Counting, reporting and certification of votes
  - System management
  - Voter education and motivation
- **Procurement of Election Commodities**
- **Technical Training**
- **Support of Civic Education Efforts**
- **Election Observers**
- **Post-Election Analysis**

WHERE IFES HAS WORKED...

Argentina - Bolivia - Brazil - Bulgaria - Chile - Costa Rica - El Salvador - Grenada - Guatemala - Guyana - Haiti - Honduras - Hungary - India - Nepal - Nicaragua - Nigeria - Pakistan - Panama - Paraguay - Poland - Romania - Soviet Union - Taiwan - Tunisia - Uruguay - Venezuela

DEMOCRACIES DON'T GROW ON TREES...

THEY BEGIN WITH FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS!

IFES RESOURCE CENTER

The IFES Resource Center serves as a clearinghouse for election information dissemination. The Resource Center includes:

Computerized Database

- World-wide Election Calendar
- Country Election Statistics
- International Election Experts
- Commodity Vendors

Elections Library

- Pre-election Survey Reports
- Election Observer Reports
- Country-Specific Books and Reports
- Election Manuals
- Election-Related Videos
- Election Worker Training Material

Country Files

- Election Results
- Constitutions and Electoral Laws
- Sample Ballots
- Civic Education Materials

SELECT IFES ACTIVITIES

Latin America

Haiti. IFES managed a $1.8 million technical assistance project for the 1990 elections including commodity procurement, assistance in the development and implementation of a civic education program and voter registrar training.

Nicaragua. Since July, 1989 IFES has provided technical and financial support to Via Civica, a nonpartisan, grassroots civic organization dedicated to the democratic process in Nicaragua.

Central Europe

Bulgaria and ***Romania.*** IFES sponsored pre-election assessment missions, provided limited technical assistance to the election commissions and sent observer delegations to each country's 1990 national elections.

Asia

Nepal and Pakistan. IFES sponsored a pre-election survey team and an election observer delegation to the 1991 Nepalese elections and sent electoral experts as part of a forty-member international observer delegation to the 1990 Pakistani elections.

Africa

IFES has provided some technical assistance to the region. The program staff is actively seeking further opportunities for IFES to support the democratic process.

Election Administration Symposia

IFES sponsors a series of symposia, organized on a regional basis, designed to examine election administration issues among election officials, scholars, and electoral experts.

Symposia include: *Interamerican Electoral Systems Conference,* Caracas, Venezuela, May, 1990; *Central European Electoral Systems Symposium,* Budapest, Hungary, July, 1991. IFES also plans to hold similar symposia in Africa and Asia.

Since 1987, the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) has been a vital resource center for any nation seeking assistance in developing a sound electoral process. This process is essential to establishing and maintaining a democratic form of government.

Each nation requires an election system tailor made to its unique culture and environment. *The consultation of international experts reflecting the diversity of electoral systems around the globe allows IFES to provide custom assistance to countries establishing or fine tuning an electoral process.*

In addition to providing direct technical assistance, IFES serves as a clearinghouse for sharing information about any aspect of electoral systems, including the people expert in these systems and the materials essential to establishing and managing democratic elections.

Free and fair elections express the will of the people. IFES is committed to supporting a credible process for that expression.

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IFES International Foundation for Electoral Systems

Elections: The Roots of Democracy

Fall 1990 Volume 1, Number 4

IFES PLAYS KEY ROLE IN FREE ELECTIONS IN HAITI

Haiti held its first free democratic elections on Sunday, December 16, 1990 under the watchful eyes of hundreds of international observers and the international press corps. IFES played a decisive role in promoting these elections through direct technical and material assistance to the Provisional Electoral Council (Conseil Electoral Provisoire - CEP). IFES' activities in Haiti were supported by a $1.86 million grant from the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID).

Preliminary results indicate that Rev. Jean-Bertrand Aristide won a sweeping victory, rolling up large majorities in most areas of the country. The IFES team, including Ray Kennedy, IFES' Program Officer for Latin America and the Caribbean, and project co-manager Jeff Fischer, witnessed vote tallies in Port-au-Prince giving Aristide margins as great as 10-to-1.

The general atmosphere of the election was very calm, as the army and security forces worked closely with the CEP to ensure a peaceful election. Despite logistical problems such as late delivery of election materials and delayed opening of some polling stations, international observers agreed that most Haitians who wanted to were ultimately able to vote. IFES Chairman F. Clifton White praised the CEP for its hard work in making the elections a reality.

IFES' assistance to the CEP began in early September 1990. The first segment involved the procurement of election commodities, including nearly 4 million registration cards in Creole. With IFES' assistance, the CEP dispatched over 6,000 registration kits to electoral offices throughout the country. IFES project managers and local consultants also designed and administered a training program for poll workers, who ultimately registered nearly 3 million voters during the official registration period (October 5-27). Additionally, IFES helped the CEP acquire a computer system to process the registration forms, produce voter lists for distribution on Election Day, and tabulate the election results.



International election observers watch counting of ballots at a precinct in Port-au-Prince

After pre-election assessment indicated a need for assistance in the area of communication, IFES procured a nationwide radio system for use by the CEP and its departmental and communal offices. This system has allowed uninterrupted communication between outlying areas of the country, many of which are not dependably served by regular telephone service, and the CEP in Port-au-Prince. The system was critical in enabling election officials to identify and communicate logistical problems to the CEP.

IFES and the CEP also collaborated in a civic education

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IFES Announces The Central European Electoral Systems Symposium

Over the past 12 months the world has witnessed a tidal wave of democracy that has swept Central Europe. One by one each of the countries of the region have rejected the old communist order in hopes of establishing new governments based upon democracy and the rule of law. A fundamental cornerstone of the new order is the concept of free and fair elections. Now that the fanfare of the initial elections is over it is imperative that the United States and other members of the democratic community of nations lend full support to institutionalize the changes that have taken place.

Therefore, IFES announces the Central European Electoral Systems Symposium (CEESS) to be held July 30-August 2, 1991 at the Hilton Hotel in Budapest, Hungary. The Symposium will provide a forum for the top election administrators, scholars, and leaders of Central Europe to examine the essential elements of the democratic election process, using the recent elections in the region as case studies. The Hungarian National Election Committee will be hosting this important event.

The CEESS is modeled after the IFES sponsored InterAmerican Electoral Systems Conference held in Caracas, Venezuela, in May, 1990. Senior election officials, civic education leaders, political party representatives and academics from Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia will be invited to participate in the symposium.

Symposium research presentations and workshops will focus on such topics as electoral law and the role of the electoral council, voter registration, voting procedures, vote counting and control of fraud, the role of political parties, civic education, election day activities and an overview of the election process.

Election officials from each participating Central European nation and election specialists from around the globe will address the plenary sessions during the three day symposium. Small group discussions will focus on each topic in workshop sessions. The plenary sessions and workshops will include case studies on the election experiences of all the countries of Central Europe over the past year.

Another feature of the Symposium is the Election Commodity and Equipment Exhibition. This is the first election equipment and commodity exhibit of its kind to be held in Central Europe and will feature such equipment as voting and vote counting machines, ballot boxes, ballot security bags and locks, portable voting booths, computer hardware and software, security paper and indelible ink.

Finally, the Symposium will produce the **Election Administrators Guide** that will consist of the papers commissioned by IFES and presented at the Symposium. The manual will be serve as a practical reference guide for professional election administrators and will be distributed to all participants and election offices in the participating countries.

For more information on the Central European Electoral Systems Symposium contact Christopher Siddall at (202) 828-8507 or write to IFES, 1620 I Street, N.W., Suite 611, Washington, D.C. 20006.

IFES Chairman F. Clifton White, Director Richard Soudriette, and consultant Peter Schramm meet with Dr. Csalotzky Gyorgy and Dr. Szepe Edit of the Hungarian National Election Commission

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The International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) is a private, non-profit 501(c)(3) foundation dedicated to providing assistance in monitoring, supporting and strengthening the mechanics of the election process in emerging democracies. For additional information contact: The International Foundation for Electoral Systems, 1620 I Street, NW, Suite 611, Washington, DC 20006; (202) 828-8507.

HAITI ELECTION (cont.)

program. Project Co-Manager Marta Maria de Ordonez designed the extensive program, which included videos on registration, voting, and the polling place, as well as frequent public service announcements on radio stations and cable television throughout the country urging citizens to register and vote. Because the multiple ballots used were quite different from those used in previous elections, the announcements were carefully designed to instruct voters on correct procedures for casting their ballots. The program appears to have been a tremendous success, as the number of spoiled ballots was minimal.

IFES also arranged for Dr. Gonzalo Brenes Camacho, President of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal of Costa Rica, to assist the CEP in logistics planning for the entire election process, from design, production, and transportation of election materials to the communication of election results.

IFES will also assist the CEP with its preparations for the second round of the elections, which is now scheduled for late January.

IFES Haiti staff (front row l-r Pierre Andre Gilles, Jeff Fischer, Marta Maria de Ordonez, Gussie Georges, back row l-r Ray Kennedy, Georges Brunet, Deborah Levine, Charles Tardieu)

IFES is accepting resumes for experts in the fields of election administration, law, or area studies. We are also looking for Interns to start immediately. For more information, contact Lida Peterson at 202/828-8507.

Haitian Election workers assembling 12,000 voter registration kits

CEP pollworkers count ballots as Georges Brunet (second from right) of IFES looks on

IFES Hosts Soviet Delegation: Illinois Election Observed

The International Foundation for Electoral Systems and the U.S. Federal Election Commission hosted the visit of a delegation from the Soviet Gentral Electoral Commission (CEC) to observe the November elections in Illinois. Vladimir P. Orlov, Chairman of the Soviet CEC led the delegation which met with persons directly involved in the election process in Washington, New York, and Chicago.

While in Chicago, the CEC delegation met with Mayor Richard M. Daley and members of the state and local election boards. On election day, the delegation visited area campaign headquarters, phone banks, polls, and the watch party of the victorious candidate for Governor.

Soviet CEC Chairman Vladimir P. Orlov praised the U.S. system of elections in an interview with the Soviet news agency TASS, "The U.S. election system has many valuable elements which can be successfully used to perfect the Soviet election process." Orlov did, however, save some criticism for the U.S. system of voter registration which he termed "rather cumbersome."

The timing of CEC Chairman Orlov's visit to the U.S. was auspicious. During the course of next year the Soviet CEC will entirely rewrite the existing Soviet electoral law to allow for a multiparty system.

IFES is indebted to the Charles Stewart Mott Foundation, which continues to provide primary funding for this historic exchange.



IFES hosts Soviet and US election officials

Chicago's Mayor Daley with members of the CEC Delegation

IFES Delegates Observe Pakistan Vote

Voters opted for new political leadership during the October 24, 1990 elections in Pakistan. Despite some instances of violence, IFES observers noted, that in many regions voting proceeded in a calm and orderly fashion without hint of internal tension and turmoil.

IFES observers were Dr. William Richter, head of the Department of Political Science at Kansas State University and a respected scholar on Pakistan and Indian Affairs; Mr. Peter Hatch, the Elections Officer for the city of Birmingham, England, the largest electoral district of England, and an election expert with more than 20 years experience; and Professor Minoru Nakano, a respected political scientist of Tokyo, Japan who has done extensive work in comparative election systems.

The IFES observers were part of the International Observer Delegation sponsored by the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs. The 40 member delegation included nationals of 17 countries and was led by former Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Vahit Halefoglu and Polish Senator Stanislaw Dembinski.

The delegation was considered crucial to reporting on the credibility of elections in Pakistan during a time of domestic turmoil and upheaval. The dismissal of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto just prior to the elections had cast some doubts on the ability of the Pakistani government to hold free and fair elections.

Although some questions were raised by the delegation about possible irregularities, it was indicated that widespread electoral fraud was not a factor. Although some charges of fraud are yet to be resolved in Pakistani courts, election experts agreed that the final results of the election were little affected by reported isolated infractions of the electoral law. The final report on the 1990 Pakistani elections is available from the National Democratic Institute.

ELECTION CALENDAR

Selected Election Results:

Brazil: Brazilians elected 503 deputies and 31 of 81 senators in legislative elections on October 3, 1990. Candidates from nineteen parties won seats in the Chamber of Deputies, and from eleven parties in the Senate. The once-dominant centrist Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement (PMDB) slipped from about 130 deputies to 107 and won 8 senatorial seats. The center-right Liberal Front Party (PFL) elected 86 deputies and 8 senators. Other winning parties include the center-left Brazilian Social Democratic Party (PSDB) (37 deputies and 1 senator); the conservative Social Democrat Party (PDS) (43 and 2); the left Democratic Workers Pary (PDT) (47 and 1); the left-wing Workers Party (PT) (35 and 1); and the center-right Brazilian Workers Party (PTB) (36 and 4) and the National Reconstruction Party (PRN) (40 and 2). Party affiliations do not, however, necessarily mean very much in Brazilian politics. Politicians frequently change parties, and President Collor cannot count on center-right (or even PRN) deputies and senators to vote for his policies.

Cote d'Ivoire: In presidential elections on October 28, 1990, long-time leader President Felix Houphouet-Boigny won 81.7 percent of the vote while the leader of the Ivorian Popular Front (FPI), Laurent Gbagbo, won 18.3 percent. The first contested presidential election was marred by violence and allegations of extensive fraud. Gbagbo unsuccessfully appealed to the Supreme Court to annul the election. Mr. Gbagbo alleges that President Houphouet-Boigny and his Democratic Party of Ivory Coast-African Democratic Rally (PDCI) merely want to give the impression of democracy to please the IMF and the World Bank. The government, on the other hand, accuses the FPI of promoting hatred and violence. The Ivorian Workers' Party, the Ivorian Socialist Party, and the Republican Party declined to participate in the presidential race. In legislative elections on November 25, 1990, the PDCI won 163 of 175 seats, leaving 12 seats for the opposition parties. Voter turnout was 35 to 40 percent compared to 60 percent for the October 28 presidential election.

Egypt: A referendum called by President Husni Mubarak on October 11 to dissolve the People's Assembly passed with 94 percent of the vote. New elections were held November 29, with runoffs on December 6. The main opposition parties boycotted the election after their demands for judicial supervision of the polls and repeal of emergency laws were not met. Although some opposition candidates ran as independents, the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) won overwhelmingly. Unofficial results gave the NDP 348 seats in the 454-seat People's Assembly, the National Unionist Progressive Party 6, and independents 83.

ELECTIONS TO WATCH

Albania -- legislative, February 10, 1991
Algeria -- legislative, before July 1991 (no date set)
Bangladesh -- legislative/presidential, (no date set)
Bulgaria -- parliamentary, May, 1991 (no date set)
El Salvador -- legislative, March 17, 1991
Guatemala -- presidential runoff January 6, 1991
Guyana --legislative/presidential, March 1991 (no date set)
Mozambique -- legislative/presidential, late 1991 (no date set)
Paraguay -- municipal, May 26, 1991
Zaire -- legislative/presidential, late 1991 (no date set)
Zambia -- legislative/presidential, by October 1991 (no date set)

Gabon: In the first multi-party elections in Gabon, the ruling Gabonese Democratic Party (PDG) won 59 of the 120 seats in the National Assembly, with an affiliated party picking up 3 more thereby providing the PDG with a majority. The National Recovery Movement-Lumberjacks (MORENA-Bucherons) won 20 seats, the Gabonese Party for Progress won 18, MORENA-Original 7, the Union for Socialism in Gabon 6, and the Circle for Renovation and Progress and the Union for Democracy and Development one each. Fifty-eight seats were decided in the initial first round on September 16, but results were cancelled in 32 districts after opposition parties protested "massive fraud," and another first round was held on October 21. Father Paul Mba Abessole, leader of MORENA-Bucheron, called on his party to boycott the second round (October 28) because of continuing election irregularities.

Guatemala: A little known candidate, Jorge Serrano Elias of the Solidarity Action Movement (MAS), won 24.21 percent of the vote in the November 11 first round of presidential elections and is the favorite to win the January 6 runoff. Serrano was only slightly behind front-runner Jorge Carpio (25.72 percent) of the Union of National Center (UCN), and he is expected to pick up the votes of Alvaro Arzu of the National Advancement Party (PAN) who won 17 percent of the vote and is a rival of Carpio. The incumbent Christian Democratic Party's (DCG) candidate, Alfonso Cabrera, placed third with 17.48 percent. Serrano, an evangelical businessman, is expected to do well among evangelical protestants who comprise one-third of the population. In the National Congress elections, the UCN won 41 seats, the DCG won 28, MAS won 18, PAN won 12, and General Rios Montt's party won 11. Montt had been considered the front-runner in the presidential campaign, but his candidacy was constitutionally barred because he led a coup in 1982.

(continued on page 7)

IFES Pre-election Assessment Team Travels to Guyana

Randal C. Teague, counsel to the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), and Ronald A. Gould, assistant chief electoral officer at Elections Canada, traveled to Georgetown, Guyana October 8-13, 1990 to conduct an on-site technical assessment of Guyana's electoral system for IFES. The U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) has awarded IFES a grant of $389,000 to assist the Elections Commission of Guyana prepare for general elections to be held in 1991.

The IFES team examined the electoral process, including the role of the constitution, electoral laws, the composition and role of the Elections Commission, national registration and voter list compilation procedures, ballot security, vote counting and verification, and contest appeals

(continued on page 7)



Work continues on Guyana's registration list

IFES Assesses Electoral System of Nepal

Members of a pre-election survey team recently returned from the Kingdom of Nepal where a grass roots democratic movement convinced King Birendra to pave the way for multi-party elections. IFES was asked by the United States Embassy in Nepal to send the survey mission in order to assess preparations for elections currently scheduled for Spring, 1991.

Team members included Mr. Lewis Macfarlane, an international affairs consultant and retired Foreign Service Officer who served as Deputy Chief of Mission and Charge d' Affaires in Nepal from 1985 to 1988; Professor Rei Shiratori, Professor of Political Science and Dean of Political Science, Tokai University, Director of the Research Institute of Social Sciences, and Chairman of the Institute for Political Studies in Japan (IPSJ); and Dr. Richard Smolka, Professor, School of Public Affairs, the American University, and author, editor, and publisher of Election Administration Reports.

The IFES team travelled through Nepal October 24 - November 4, 1990, to interview Nepalese government officials, election officials, political party representatives, journalists, business leaders, scholars, and U.S. Embassy officials. The team conducting 37 meetings which included an interview with Prime Minister Krishna Prasad Bhattarai.

The team was impressed by the organization and work done so far to prepare for the elections, and believes that the elections will be held next spring as promised. At the same time the team noted that many challenges lie ahead for the Nepalese. Questions of campaign practices and financing, possible violence and voter intimidation and duplication of names on voter registries remain obstacles to successful elections.

An international observer delegation for the elections has been suggested as one way to assist the democratic process in Nepal. Many of the Nepalese interviewed expressed hope that there would be such a delegation. Fielding observers in Nepal will be a formidable task given the terrain and infrastructure of the country. Some observers may have to trek miles into the mountains to reach polling sites, but reaching such sites is considered crucial for a comprehensive assessment of the elections. The Nepal election is sure to be fascinating, and IFES looks forward to contributing to the democratic transition in that country.

The official results of the pre-election mission were released at a briefing in Washington by Mr. Macfarlane and Mr. Smolka on December 6, 1990. Findings and recommendations presented at the briefing are contained in the IFES report The 1991 Nepalese National Elections, A Pre-Election Survey. This report is available from IFES.

ELECTION WATCH (cont.)

Malaysia: Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad announced the dissolution of Parliament on October 4, 1990. Elections were held October 20-21 to fill the 180 seats in the Dewan Rakyat, or lower house. The ruling Barisan Nasional (National Front) coalition (dominated by Dr. Mahathir's United Malays National Organization, UMNO) won 127 seats, followed by the Democratic Action Party (DAP) with 20, Parti Islam (PAS) with 7, Semangat '46 (Spirit of '46) with 7, Parti Bersatu Sabah (PBS) with 14, and independents with 4. Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah, a former trade minister and member of UMNO, led two loose coalitions of opposition parties: Gagasan Rakyat (the "people's might") consisting of his Semangat '46, the DAP, and smaller parties; and Angkatan Perpaduan Ummah (Islamic Unity Movement) consisting of Semangat '46, PAS, and the Malaysian Islamic Council Front. Opposition parties won all of the seats in two states--Kelantan and Sabah, but very few elsewhere. The opposition claims they were denied access to the mainstream media and that the campaign period of nine days was too short. Commonwealth observers, however, concluded that despite concerns about "imperfections" the elections "were free in accordance with Malaysian law and circumstances."

Poland: With over 75 percent of the vote, Solidarity leader Lech Walesa won a landslide victory over Stanislaw Tyminski, a previously unknown emigrant businessman who returned to Poland after making millions in Canada and Peru. Tyminski shocked many political leaders and foreign observers by placing second in the November 25 first round with 23 percent of the vote, compared to Walesa's 40 percent and Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki's 18 percent. This forced a runoff, held December 9, with Walesa and the resignation of the Mazowiecki government. Alarmed by Tyminski's strong showing, Mazowiecki urged his supporters to back Walesa in the runoff, and polling responses indicate that they heeded that advice.

USSR-Georgia: In the USSR's first officially-sanctioned multi-party elections, the non-Communist Georgian Round Table beat the Communist Party by 2 to 1. A total of 35 parties contested the elections. The Round Table, a coalition of seven parties led by former dissident Zviad Gamsakhurdia and supporting independence from the Soviet Union and creation of a free-market economy, won 110 of the 250 seats in the Georgian Soviet, while the Communist Party won 25. Most of the smaller parties that won the remaining seats are closer to the Round Table than the Communists. The National Democratic Party, led by Giorgi Chanturia, boycotted the elections and set up a "shadow parliament"--the Georgian National Congress.

Western Samoa: Seventy-four percent of registered voters participated in an October 29 referendum on universal suffrage. Forty-nine percent voted in favor of universal suffrage, and 44 percent against, a difference of less than 2,000 votes. The opposition suspects that the fact that 21,000 eligible voters were not registered was deliberate. Prime Minister Tofilau Eti has said that as a result of the referendum he will offer legislation to introduce universal suffrage by elections scheduled for February, apparently contradicting a statement he previously made in parliament.

Yugoslavia: The hard-line leader of the Serbian Socialist (formerly Communist) Party, Slobodan Milosevic, won an overwhelming 60 percent of the vote in *Serbia* in that republic's December 9 presidential election. He beat his primary opponent, Vuk Draskovic of the Serbian Renewal Movement, by a 4 to 1 margin. In parliamentary elections, the Socialist won 87 of 250 seats, and the opposition won 9; the remaining contests were decided in a December 23 runoff, the results of which will be reported in the next issue.

GUYANA (cont.)

procedures. Team members also researched the role of political parties, minority parties' coalitions, and civic reform organizations and returned to Washington with copies of election regulations and other relevant material for IFES' resource center.

The team presented an extensive report to IFES which has been forwarded to the Government of Guyana and to AID for consideration. The report contains recommendations of specific commodities that could be provided by AID or other donors.

Widely reported charges of fraud in the 1980 and 1985 elections have focused international attention on the upcoming balloting. At the same time, the majority People's National Congress Party recently stated its commitment to holding free and fair elections and its desire to eliminate structural opportunities for election fraud. True to this position, President Desmond Hoyte joined the opposition parties in inviting former president Jimmy Carter, as president of the Council of Freely Elected Heads of Government, to lead a group of international observers during the elections. Mr. Gould of the IFES team briefed Carter during the latter's visit to Georgetown in October 1990 on IFES' findings and recommendations.

Under the 1980 constitution, Guyana's National Assembly comprises 53 members elected directly through a single-list proportional system and 12 regional representatives elected indirectly. The head of the majority party in Parliament serves as Executive President. Guyanese campaigns, following the general Commonwealth model, are generally only five to six weeks long.

The beginning of the campaign period will have to wait, however, as the government and opposition are currently negotiating over provisions for a nationwide enumeration of voters. Opposition leaders have long charged the majority party with concealing irregularities in the voter registry, and a nationwide canvass to register all eligible voters was agreed upon in October by the majority and minority parties. The means of implementing that enumeration, however, have now engendered a spirited debate.

VIA CIVICA UPDATE

Via Civica Executive Director Dr. Carlos Quinonez (top row, center) and a group of young volunteers

Since July 1990, Via Civica has concentrated its efforts on educating all Nicaraguan citizens regarding roles and responsibilities in the political and social framework of their country. Current programs include a heavy promotion of the blue and white Nicaraguan flag, ongoing seminars in high schools and the production of a civic education text for preschool children. Via Civica continues to conduct periodic civic education seminars in Managua, and has volunteers working in other provincial cities, with the goal of providing education all the way to the Atlantic Coast. While Via Civica stresses the importance of youth education, it is increasing its efforts to encompass the adult population in seminars and community activities. IFES has supported Via Civica's inroads in gaining access even to Nicaragua's mountainous regions to provide local transportation to seminars and other community projects.

On October 12, Via Civica sponsored the first Columbus Day celebration in Managua in more than 10 years along with the Ministry of Education and the Mayors Office of Managua. They organized a number of activities that culminated in a program that attracted 1,000 participants. Future plans include a civic education seminar for city officials, establishment of a Nicaraguan election resource center, and a conference on civic education.

Via Civica is dedicated to establishing a permanent organization to promote participants in the democratic system in Nicaragua through its dedicated group of volunteers.

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INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON
POPULAR PARTICIPATION
IN THE RECOVERY AND DEVELOPMENT
PROCESS IN AFRICA

AFRICAN CHARTER FOR POPULAR PARTICIPATION IN DEVELOPMENT AND TRANSFORMATION (ARUSHA 1990)

Arusha
United Republic of Tanzania
12 - 16 February 1990

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ANNEX VI

Expressions for Popular Participation in Several African Languages

KISWAHILI (Tanzania)	Hamasa ya umma
KISWAHILI (Kenya)	Harambee
BULU (Cameroon)	E nyòne ngap ya bo djam ezing
EWONDO (Cameroon)	Ekaas
AMHARIC (Ethiopia)	Hezbawi tesatifo
TWI (Ghana)	Walantu Walansa
GA (Ghana)	Wo bole kutu wokpe
YORUBA (Nigeria)	Ise asaowopo ge
IGBO (Nigeria)	Iso na n ndi na ekwu ihe agame
COMORIAN (Comores)	M'rengo funvu djimla
ABOURE (Cote d'Ivoire)	N'tcha n'gbo soin
MORE (Burkina Faso)	Sissoaga
PULAAR (Senegal)	Baawal leeñol or golle leñol
WOLOF (Senegal)	Mboolo askaan - wi
LINGALA (Zaire) (Congo)	Salongo
MUNU-KUTUBA (Congo)	Zola
KIKONGO (Zaire)	Sala - sambila
BAMBARA (Mali)	Diama dje jé ko
ARABIC (Sudan)	El Nafir
LUGANDA (Uganda)	Eulungi bwansa
SISWATI (Swaziland)	Lubambiswano
CHICHEWA (Malawi)	Chigwirizano
SHONA (Zimbabwe)	Mushandirapamwe kweruzhinji
ZULU/NDEBELE (Zimbabwe)	Ukaphathisana kukazulu
SESOTHO (Lesotho)	Matla moruong ke a sechaba
HAUSA (Nigeria)	Siyasa da mulkin kasar sha'nin jamaa
KIRUNDI (Burundi)	Tuje inama
CREOLE (Sierra Leone)	Hep oona sef
MALAGASY (Madagascar)	Vahoaka mahdray anjara

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INTRODUCTION

This publication contains the **African Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation (Arusha, 1990)** which was adopted by acclamation by the participants of the International Conference on Popular Participation in the Recovery and Development Process in Africa recently held in Arusha, the United Republic of Tanzania during 12 to 16 February 1990. It also contains excerpts from the statements made at the opening and closing sessions of the Conference and the programme, list of papers and list of participants of the Conference.

The conference, the theme of which was **Putting the People First**, was a truly participatory encounter. It featured an **Ideas Market Place and Exhibition** which reminded the participants of the limitless talents and ingenuity of African grassroots and small-scale entrepreneurs. In plenary sessions and workshops the participants listened to each other, learned and worked together to reach consensus. Communication and cooperation was found to be both necessary, urgent and possible at all levels of development work. It was discovered that in almost every African language words exist which capture the meaning of popular participation and these expressions have been included in the publication for interest and reference.

The **Charter** calls for the emergence of a new era in Africa - an Africa in which democracy, accountability, economic justice and development for transformation become internalized and the empowerment of the people, initiative and enterprise and the democratization of the development process are the order of the day

in every country. It delineates the actions that are required by all concerned - the people and their organizations, governments, African and non-African NGOs and the international community - to achieve the aforesaid objectives and also proposes national and regional mechanisms to monitor and report on the progress made in the implementation of the Charter.

The momentum begun in Arusha must continue. It is hoped that this publication would not only inform of the outcome of this unique and participatory encounter in Arusha, but would also serve as a tool in the hands of governments, non-governmental and grassroots organizations, youth and womens' groups, trade unions, the United Nations and the international community in galvanizing support for the Charter, carrying out the actions it prescribes, building effective networks locally, nationally and continent-wide and in establishing the necessary monitoring mechanisms. To the extent that success is achieved in that direction, can a process then be initiated and sustained to create a new and better tomorrow for Africa and her people.

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PART I

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Our major resource is our people. We all recognize the inherent relationship between people and development. We are fully conscious of the fact that the primary objective of development is to improve the living conditions of our people. But we also know that it is the people who are the principal actors in the recovery and development process. It is obvious, therefore, that the success of the recovery and development process very much depends on the effective participation of the people in that process.

The main task confronting many African national authorities is to create favourable conditions which would enable the people to fully apply their energy, skills and creativity for their own benefit and for the benefit of their countries. Those conditions should, first and foremost, aim at enhancing the people's participation in the decision-making process on matters affecting their welfare. That situation will make them feel fully responsible for their own development and hence motivate them to participate actively in the planning and implementation of their development activities.

Tanzania also remains convinced that the principle of self-reliance should be pursued beyond national borders in the interest of the African continent as a whole. There is a great need for African countries to intensify their efforts to achieve collective self-reliance through increased cooperation among themselves. For while we acknowledge that individually we may not possess sufficient productive capacity to meet the growing needs of our people, I believe that by pooling our resources together we can substantially increase production to meet our domestic requirements and to increase our exports.

The concept of peoples' participation in their own development is enshrined in the principal documents of the United Nations. The charter itself not only begins with the words "we the people of the United Nations", but also declares that they, the people, are determined among other things, "to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women..." and "to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom".

You convene at an extraordinary moment in contemporary history. The transnational communication of peoples' ideas has accelerated exponentially in the last decade. All over the world, and regardless of ideology or education or economic circumstance, people -especially young people - are drawing inspiration from each other and voicing their concerns on a variety of issues. The sheer example of one popular demand becomes, by itself, a new motive force for others in neighbouring or even distant countries to express their wish for a greater share in governance and in the management of economic and social development.

It is encouraging that in response, Africa has convened this truly historic gathering to develop a collective understanding of and position on the role of popular participation in the development and transformation of the region and seek to identify African solutions to African problems. I am pleased that the United Nations, in particular the Economic Commission for Africa, could join in this initiative.

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There is no gainsaying the fact that the foundation for self-reliant and internally self-sustaining processes of development is people's participation. It is the engine for launching the processes for economic transformation of the structures and material attributes of a society. Authentic, self-reliant processes of development inevitably result in the transformation of the people who bring about the change - their culture. their attitudes to work, their saving and investment habits, their concepts and skills and their social systems. Genuine self-reliant development of an economy brings in its trail this process of self-transformation of the people.

Self-reliant development requires, and indeed, demands universally in Africa, the politics of consent and consensus, the politics of conviction and commitment, and the politics of compassion and accountability. Consensus politics is involving people in the process by which policies are developed, listening to what they have to say and adapting the approach of the leadership and government in the light of all these. By so doing, government is most likely to win the consent of the majority of the people, if not of all, to such policies and, with that consent, conviction in the rightness of the courses being pursued and commitment to see them through successfully. The politics of consensus and consent, conviction and commitment, and compassion and accountability are the practical corollary of a concern for a nation as a whole, not just for a particular group.

Dr. Salim Ahmed Salim,
Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity

The idea that people - all people, the youth, women, the elderly - should be involved in the development process is an extremely important one, particularly at this time when Africa needs to marshal all its available resources for development. At the present time, the involvement of the wide spectrum of people in the development process is rather limited. ... Effective utilization of human resources at all levels and in all dimensions, is key to the promotion of real development in Africa.

The real challenge facing this Conference is to come out with practical, implementable and realistic proposals and recommendations on the specifics on how to effect popular participation of the people in the development process. It is my wish that this Conference does not become yet another theoretical and philosophical forum for articulating views which cannot be put into practical use.

A conference of this type should be held regularly, more often, and at all levels national, sub-regional and regional.

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The time has come that a change of attitude must take place Women have now for sometime realised that they have the potentia (social, political and economic potential) and wisdom to shape th future of this region. They therefore rightly demand the opportunit to have this valuable potential fully tapped for the development o Africa. Machineries to enable women of Africa to fully participate i the development of their motherland must be put in place now an not later.

To women; I say, rights are taken, they are not given. Wome of Africa, arise and take your rightful position in society.

To men; I say, please accept women as your equal partners i development and give them the way.

Do understand that without a conducive political atmosphere we cannot talk of popular participation. Therefore the talk o popular participation necessarily calls for an immediate end to al wars and conflicts in Africa. Let us look to each other for love an support. Let us live as brothers and sisters.

Mr. Issebre Hamadou Ibrahim, Secretary-General, Pan-African Youth Movement

Africa's incapacity and inadequate plans to mobilize the energies of young people has led to a regrettable loss of the most active segment of our societies' labour power. What will be the future of our continent if this trend is not averted? Youth rural-urban exodus; delinquency and the desire to escape one's country are not inborn natural vices but are products of objective conditions within which African countries rear their youth especially failing to mobilize them for development.

The youth of Africa believe the most effective means for curing the African socio-economic and political malaise lies first and foremost within Africa itself, and hence the need for concerted efforts to mobilize our abundant local resources of which popular participation of the African people constitutes an inevitable part. The rupture and lack of dialogue and confidence between the leadership and the people has to be mended if Africa is to make headway to recovery and development. The people have to be the source of inputs for the development plans so that they can take development strategies as theirs and not feel alienated from the would be peoples' development. This could be the source of commitment, initiative, efficiency and accountability. The leadership and technocrats have to listen to the people to ensure that their policies will function effectively.

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The hardship brought on the people by the implementation of the present Structural Adjustment Programmes made the majority of the people, including organised labour, to oppose them. This has led to the use of force by governments to suppress these protests, resulting in further alienation and in some cases, political instability.

With the failure of the orthodox, doctrinaire development policies that have led Africa to the present economic mess, there is therefore the need for African countries to design a different Structural Adjustment Programme on the basis of the African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programmes for Socio-Economic Recovery and Transformation (AAF-SAP) prepared by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, which was adopted in July 1989 by the OAU Summit, and by the United Nations General Assembly in September 1989.

In order to bring about recovery and development in Africa, there is the essential need to involve the participation of the people, the workers, trade unions and other grassroots organisations in all aspects of planning, implementation, management and monitoring of development programmes.

The active involvement of the people in development will guarantee their commitment to the success of the development effort. Gone were the days when development programmes were drawn in air-conditioned offices for the people. Now, people should decide their developmental needs, plan and contribute to their implementation, supervise their construction, manage and monitor them.

Mazide N'diaye
President of FAVDO

The Non-Governmental Organizations, Voluntary Development Organizations and Grassroots Development Organizations believe that no development can be possible in Africa if the people, who are the most reliable engine for development, are not fully involved. There are a number of issues, however, which must be seriously addressed: the poor quality of their working relationships with African governments; the failure to empower the African people so that they can take the initiative in developing their own resources; the lack of concerted effort, cooperation and coordination among NGOs and GRO's; the conditions of insecurity and injustice which displace people and compel them to seek refuge; development options which fail to take the environment into account; the unfair burden of debt and structural adjustment measures which combine to worsen the situation of the people and to make African economies dependent on the outside world.

The Voluntary Development Organizations together with the Grassroots Development Organizations also hope that the OAU and the United Nations would intervene more effectively in impressing upon African leaders the need to stop fratricidal wars which retard development and swell the numbers of refugees.

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PREAMBLE

1. The International Conference on Popular Participation in the Recovery and Development Process in Africa was held, in Arusha, the United Republic of Tanzania from 12 to 16 February 1990, as a rare collaborative effort between African people's organizations, the African governments, non-governmental organizations and the United Nations agencies, in the search for a collective understanding of the role of popular participation in the development and transformation of the region. It was also an occasion to articulate and give renewed focus to the concepts of democratic development, people's solidarity and creativity and self-reliance and to formulate policy recommendations for national governments, popular organizations and the international community in order to strengthen participatory processes and patterns of development. It was the third in a series of major international conferences organized by the Economic Commission for Africa in collaboration with the rest of the United Nations system to contribute to the implementation of the United Nations Programme of Action for African Economic Recovery and Development, 1986-1990 (UN-PAAERD). It came as a sequel to the Abuja International Conference on Africa: The Challenge of Economic Recovery and Accelerated Development held in 1987, and the 1988 Khartoum International Conference on the Human Dimension of Africa's Economic Recovery and Development. It is important to note that the initiative for this Conference came from the submission of the NGOs to the Ad Hoc Committee of the Whole of the General Assembly on the mid-term review and assessment of the implementation of UN-PAAERD in September 1988.

2. The Conference was organized under the auspices of the ited Nations Inter-Agency Task Force on the Follow-up on the plementation of the UN-PAAERD at the Regional Level (UN-IATF) d with the full support and warm hospitality of the government d people of the United Republic of Tanzania. The ECA nference of Ministers responsible for Economic Development and nning adopted resolution 664(XXIV) at its twenty-fourth session in ich it supported this Conference and urged member states of the mmission, the international community, NGOs and the United tions system to support and actively participate in it. The nference was attended by over 500 participants from a wide range African people's organizations - including, in particular, non-vernmental, grass-roots, peasant, women and youth organizations d associations, trade unions and others - as well as representatives African Governments, agencies of the United Nations system, non-

African non-governmental organizations, regional, sub-regional and intergovernmental organizations, bilateral donors, multilateral organizations as well as specialists, both from within and outside Africa. The Conference was opened by H.E. Ali Hassan Mwinyi, President of the United Republic of Tanzania. Opening statements were also made by the representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Executive Secretary of the Economic Commission for Africa, the representative of the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity, the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Trade Union Unity and representatives of the Non Governmental Organizations, African Women's Organizations and the Pan African Youth Movement. The Conference would like to put on record its appreciation for the full support and warm hospitality of the Government and people of the United Republic of Tanzania.

3. The Conference was organized out of concern for the serious deterioration in the human and economic conditions in Africa in the decade of the 1980s, the recognition of the lack of progress in achieving popular participation and the lack of full appreciation of the role popular participation plays in the process of recovery and development.

4. The objectives of the Conference were to:

(a) Recognize the role of people's participation in Africa's recovery and development efforts;

(b) Sensitize national governments and the international community to the dimensions, dynamics, processes and potential of a development approach rooted in popular initiatives and self-reliant efforts;

(c) Identify obstacles to people's participation in development and define appropriate approaches to the promotion of popular participation in policy formulation, planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of development programmes;

(d) Recommend actions to be taken by Governments, the United Nations system as well as the public and private donor agencies in building an enabling environment for authentic popular participation in the development process and encourage people and their organizations to undertake self-reliant development initiatives;

ANNEX V

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(e) Facilitate the exchange of information, experience and knowledge for mutual support among people and their organizations; and,

(f) Propose indicators for the monitoring of progress in facilitating people's participation in Africa's development.

5. We, the people, engaged in debate and dialogue on the issues involved over the span of five plenary sessions and fifteen workshops during the five-day long International Conference. In the light of our deliberations, we have decided to place on record our collective analysis, conclusions, policy recommendations and action proposals for the consideration of the people, the African Governments and the International community.

I. ASSERTING THE ROLE OF POPULAR PARTICIPATION

6. We are united in our conviction that the crisis currently engulfing Africa, is not only an economic crisis but also a human, legal, political and social crisis. It is a crisis of unprecedented and unacceptable proportions manifested not only in abysmal declines in economic indicators and trends, but more tragically and glaringly in the suffering, hardship and impoverishment of the vast majority of African people. At the same time, the political context of socio-economic development has been characterized, in many instances, by an over-centralization of power and impediments to the effective participation of the overwhelming majority of the people in social, political and economic development. As a result, the motivation of the majority of African people and their organizations to contribute their best to the development process, and to the betterment of their own well-being as well as their say in national development has been severely constrained and curtailed and their collective and individual creativity has been undervalued and underutilized.

7. We affirm that nations cannot be built without the popular support and full participation of the people, nor can the economic crisis be resolved and the human and economic conditions improved without the full and effective contribution, creativity and popular enthusiasm of the vast majority of the people. After all, it is to the people that the very benefits of development should and must accrue. We are convinced that neither can Africa's perpetual

economic crisis be overcome, nor can a bright future for Africa and its people see the light of day unless the structures, pattern and political context of the process of socio-economic development are appropriately altered.

8. We, therefore, have no doubt that at the heart of Africa's development objectives must lie the ultimate and overriding goal of human-centered development that ensures the overall well-being of the people through sustained improvement in their living standards and the full and effective participation of the people in charting their development policies, programmes and processes and contributing to their realization. We furthermore observe that given the current world political and economic situation, Africa is becoming further marginalized in world affairs, both geo-politically and economically. African countries must realize that, more than ever before, their greatest resource is their people and that it is through their active and full participation that Africa can surmount the difficulties that lie ahead.

9. We are convinced that to achieve the above objective will require a re-direction of resources to satisfy, in the first place, the critical needs of the people, to achieve economic and social justice and to emphasize self-reliance on the one hand, and, on the other hand, to empower the people to determine the direction and content of development, and to effectively contribute to the enhancement of production and productivity that are required. Bearing this in mind and having carefully analyzed the structure of the African economies, the root causes of the repeated economic crisis and the strategies and programmes that have hitherto been applied to deal with them, we are convinced that Africa has no alternative but to urgently and immediately embark upon the task of transforming the structure of its economies to achieve long-term self-sustained growth and development that is both human centered and participatory in nature. Furthermore, Africa's grave environmental and ecological crisis cannot be solved in the absence of a process of sustainable development which commands the full support and participation of the people. We believe in this context that the African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programmes for Socio-Economic Recovery and Transformation (AAF-SAP) - which was endorsed by the twenty-fifth Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) held in July 1989, and by the Conference of Heads of the State or Government of Non-Aligned countries held in Belgrade in September 1989 and by the Forty-fourth Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations which invited the international community, including multilateral, financial and development institutions, to consider the framework as a basis for

Working Group 10:

Topic: **Popular participation and the challenge of self-reliance.**

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Rapporteur : Mr. A.M.A. Dirar

Workshop 11A:

Topic: **Education and training for participatory development.**

Chairperson : Dr. Mahdouh Mohamed Wabba
Presenters : Mr. John Kabore
Dr. Pai Obaya
Rapporteur : Prof. Gelase Mutahaba

Workshop 11B:

Chairperson : Mr. Mutombo Mulami
Presenter : Mr. Pai Obanya
Rapporteur : Mr. S. Josue Mamder

Workshop 12:

Topic: **Democratizing the development process.**

Chairperson : Hon. Mulondwe K. Muzungu
Rapporteur : Mr. Akpalo Kouassivi

Workshop 13A:

Topic: **The role and responsibilities of government and donor agencies in promoting popular participation.**

Chairperson : Mr. Alioune Sall
Rapporteur : Ms. Carol Capps

Workshop 13B:

Chairperson : Mr. Justin Savagdo Karousia
Rapporteur : Ms. Florence Tobo Lobe

Working Group 5B:

Chairperson : Mr. S.C. Nana-Sinkam
Presenter : Mr. Louis Mahoungou
Rapporteur : Mr. Pierre Brien

Working Group 6:

Theme: **People's responses to the economic crisis in Africa.**

Chairperson : Mr. Marc Laporte
Presenter : Mr. Faustin Musare
Rapporteur : Dr. Carmela Abate

Working Group 7:

Topic: **Participatory development as an essential dimension in Africa's development and transformation efforts.**

Chairperson : Prof. Peter Oakley
Presenter : Prof. Dharam Ghai
Rapporteur : Ms. Melody Morrison

Working Group 8:

Topic: **Promoting indigenous non-governmental organizations as an instrument of popular participation.**

Chairperson : Chief (Mrs.) Bisi Oyunieye
Presenters : Mr. Seydou Sall
Mr. Christopher M. Lekyo
Rapporteur : Ms. Adrienne Allison

Working Group 9:

Topic: **People's participation and access to resources and services including media.**

Chairperson : Mr. Mathias Hundsalz
Presenters : Mr. Naason Nsabimana
Mr. Constantinos Berhe
Rapporteur : Prof. Bade Onimode

constructive dialogue and fruitful consultation - offers the best framework for such an approach. We also wish in this regard to put on record our disapproval of all economic programmes, such as orthodox Structural Adjustment Programmes, which undermine the human condition and disregard the potential and role of popular participation in self-sustaining development.

10. In our sincere view, popular participation is both a means and an end. As an instrument of development, popular participation provides the driving force for collective commitment for the determination of people-based development processes and willingness by the people to undertake sacrifices and expend their social energies for its execution. As an end in itself, popular participation is the fundamental right of the people to fully and effectively participate in the determination of the decisions which affect their lives at all levels and at all times.

II. PROMOTING POPULAR PARTICIPATION

11. We believe strongly that popular participation is, in essence, the empowerment of the people to effectively involve themselves in creating the structures and in designing policies and programmes that serve the interests of all as well as to effectively contribute to the development process and share equitably in its benefits. Therefore, there must be an opening up of political process to accommodate freedom of opinions, tolerate differences, accept consensus on issues as well as ensure the effective participation of the people and their organizations and associations. This requires action on the part of all, first and foremost of the people themselves. But equally important are the actions of the State and the international community, to create the necessary conditions for such an empowerment and facilitate effective popular participation in societal and economic life. This requires that the political system evolve to allow for democracy and full participation by all sections of our societies.

12. In view of the critical contribution made by women to African societies and economies and the extreme subordination and discrimination suffered by women in Africa, it is the consensus of the participants that the attainment of equal rights by women in social, economic and political spheres must become a central feature of a democratic and participatory pattern of development. Further, it is the consensus of this conference that the attainment of women's

full participation must be given highest priority by society as a whole and African Governments in particular. This right should be fought for and defended by society, African Non-Governmental Organizations and Voluntary Development Organizations as well as by non-African Non-Governmental Organizations and Voluntary Development Organizations, Governments and the United Nations system in due recognition of the primary role being played by women now and on the course to recovery and transformation of Africa for better quality of life.

People's Role

13. We want to emphasize the basic fact that the role of the people and their popular organizations is central to the realization of popular participation. They have to be fully involved, committed and indeed, seize the initiative. In this regard, it is essential that they establish independent people's organizations at various levels that are genuinely grass-root, voluntary, democratically administered and self-reliant and that are rooted in the tradition and culture of the society so as to ensure community empowerment and self-development. Consultative machinery at various levels should be established with governments on various aspects of democratic participation. It is crucial that the people and their popular organizations should develop links across national borders to promote co-operation and inter-relationships on sub-regional, regional, south-south and south-north bases. This is necessary for sharing lessons of experience, developing people's solidarity and raising political consciousness on democratic participation.

14. In view of the vital and central role played by women in family well-being and maintenance, their special commitment to the survival, protection and development of children, as well as survival of society and their important role in the process of African recovery and reconstruction, special emphasis should be put by all the people in terms of eliminating biases particularly with respect to the reduction of the burden on women and taking positive action to ensure their full equality and effective participation in the development process.

15. Having said this, we must underscore that popular participation begins and must be earnestly practiced at the family level, because home is the base for development. It must also be practiced at the work place, and in all organizations, and in all walks of life.

II. WORKING GROUPS

Working Group 1:

Topic: **What is popular participation: Towards a common understanding.**

Chairperson : Mrs. Aissata Kane
Presenters : Ms. Emilienne Ngo Basse
Dr. Mbuyi Tuambilangana
Rapporteur : Prof. Bade Onimode

Working Group 2:

Topic: **Approaches and experiences on promoting popular participation in Africa: a historical perspective.**

Chairperson : Dr. Edda Gachukia
Presenter: Mr. Akpalo Kouassivi
Rapporteur : Mr. Simon Stocker

Working Group 3:

Topic: **Innovative popular participation experiences.**

Chairperson : Dr. John Tesha
Presenters : Mrs. V.B. Dunmade
Dr. E.M. Maganya
Rapporteur : Dr. W. Karanja

Working Group 4:

Topic: **External and internal impediments to effective popular participation in Africa.**

Chairperson : Mr. Henri Bazin
Presenter : Mr. Tim Shaw
Rapporteur : Mr. Patrick Bugembe

Working Group 5 A:

Topic: **How to unleash the talents and energies of the people to contribute effectively to the process of development and transformation.**

Chairperson : Mrs. Olive Luena
Presenter : Dr. P. Anyang-Nyong'o
Resource Person: Mrs. Thelma Awori
Rapporteur : Mr. Tim Brodhead

Plenary Session 3

Theme: **Strategies for popular participation.**

Chairperson	:	Ms. Miriam Matembe
Presenters	:	Mr. Mazide N'Diaye
		Mrs. Lalla Ben Barka
		Mrs. Florence Tobo Lobe
Discussants	:	Dr. Sadig Rasheed
		Mr. Abdul Mohammed
		Mrs. Lucia Quachey
		Mr. Kena Jean Francis
Rapporteur	:	Ms. Barbara Adams

PANEL DISCUSSION

Theme: **The exhibition and ideas market place.**

Chairperson	:	Mrs. Thelma Awori
Discussants	:	Mr. Moses
		Ms. Lucia Quachey
		Mr. Elimo P. Njau
		Ms. Miriam Were
		Mr. Peter O'Niel
		Mr. Piet Winnubst
		Mr. Ngaiza
		Ms. Doreen Vester
Resource Person:		Ms. Ruth Bamela Engo Tjega
Rapporteur	:	Mr. Tony Hill

Plenary Session 4

Theme: **Towards an enabling environment for participatory development in Africa.**

Chairperson		Mr. Mazide N'Diaye
Presenters	:	Ms. Mary Racelis
		Mr. Alioune Sall
		Mr. Peter Oakley
		Mr. E. Childers
		Mr. King Lee
Discussants	:	Mr. John Kabore
		Ms. Aminata Traore
		Mrs. Aissata Kane
		Mrs. Sithembiso Nyoni
Rapporteur	:	Mrs. Lalla Ben Barka

Role of African Governments

16. We strongly believe that popular participation is dependent on the nature of the State itself and ability of Government to respond to popular demand. Since African Governments have a critical role to play in the promotion of popular participation, they have to yield space to the people, without which popular participation will be difficult to achieve. Too often, the social base of power and decision-making are too narrow. Hence the urgent need to broaden these; to galvanize and tap the people's energy and commitment; and to promote political accountability by the State to the people. This makes it imperative that a new partnership between African Governments and the people in the common interest of societal and accelerated socio-economic development should be established without delay. This new partnership must not only recognize the importance of gender issues but must take action to ensure women's involvement at all levels of decision-making. In particular Governments should set themselves specific targets for the appointment of women in senior policy and management posts in all sectors of government.

17. We believe that for people to participate meaningfully in their self-development, their freedom to express themselves and their freedom from fear must be guaranteed. This can only be assured through the extension and protection of people's basic human rights and we urge all Governments to vigorously implement the African Charter on Human and People's Rights and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the ILO Convention No. 87 concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women.

18. We also believe that one of the key conditions for ensuring people's participation throughout the continent is the bringing to an end of all wars and armed conflicts. The millions of African refugees and displaced persons are those with least opportunity to participate in the determination of their future. We urge Governments and all parties to Africa's conflicts, domestic and external, to seek peaceful means of resolving their differences and of establishing peace throughout Africa. In situations of armed conflicts, we uphold the right of civilians to food and other basic necessities and emphasize that the international community must exercise its moral authority to ensure that this right is protected.

19. We cannot overemphasize the benefits that can be reaped if, with the elimination of internal strife or inter-country conflicts, the

resources spent on defence were to be redirected to productive activities and social services to the people. As rightly noted in the **African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programmes for Socio-economic Recovery and Transformation,** "it is not difficult to imagine what it would mean to social welfare in Africa, with all its positive multiplier effects, if a saving can be achieved in defence spending
and non-productive expenditures". We believe that our Governments can make such savings and we call upon them to do so urgently.

20. We are, however, aware of certain situations, particularly, for the Front-line States which continue to face the destabilization acts of apartheid South Africa. This destabilization results in a debilitating diversion of resources that would otherwise have been used to meet critical basic needs of the people in these countries.

Role of the International Community

21. We call on the international community to examine its ov record on popular participation, and hereafter to support indigenous efforts which promote the emergence of a democratic environment and facilitate the people's effective participation and empowerment in the political life of their countries.

22. We also call on the United Nations system to intensify its effort to promote the application of justice in international economic relations, the defence of human rights, the maintenance of peace and the achievement of disarmament and to assist African countries and people's organizations with the development of human and economic resources. We also call on the United Nations system to implement its own decision to have at least 30 per cent of senior positions held by women . Special efforts are needed to ensure that African women are adequately represented at senior levels in United Nations agencies, particularly those operating in Africa.

III. POPULAR PARTICIPATION IN DEVELOPMENT

23. On the basis of the foregoing, we lay down the following basic strategies, modalities and actions for effective participation in development.

ANNEX IV

List of plenary and working group chairpersons, presenters, discussants and rapporteurs

I. PLENARY SESSIONS

Plenary Session 1

Theme: **What is popular participation: Towards a common understanding.**

Chairperson	:	Prof. Adebayo Adedeji
Presenters	:	Dr. M. Olaseinde Arigbede
		Prof. Dharam Ghai
		Dr. Miriam Were
Discussants	:	Mme. Koffi Kuegah Adakou
		Chief (Mrs.) Bisi Ogunleye
		Mr. Makambo Siongo
		Mr. A.H. Sonmonu
Rapporteur	:	Mme. Ruth Bamela Engo-Tjega

Plenary Session 2

Theme: **The role of popular participation in meeting the challenge of recovery and development in Africa.**

Chairperson	:	Hon. Stephen Lewis
Presenters	:	Prof. Adebayo Adedeji
		Mrs. Thelma Awori
		Prof. Yash Tandon
Discussants	:	Dr. Zachary T. Onyonka
		Mr. Tim Brodhead
		Mrs. Olive Luena
		Musokolwa Leonidas
Rapporteur	:	Mr. Samba Jack

A. At the level of Governments

1. African Governments must adopt development strategies, approaches and programmes, the content and parameters of which are in line with the interest and aspirations of the people and which incorporate, rather than alienate, African values and economic, social, cultural, political and environmental realities.

2. We strongly urge African Governments to promote the formulation and implementation of national development programmes within the framework of the aforesaid aspirations, interests and realities, which develop as a result of a popular participatory process, and which aim at the transformation of the African economies to achieve self-reliant and self-sustaining people-centered development based on popular participation and democratic consensus.

3. In implementing these endogenous and people-centered development strategies, an enabling environment must be created to facilitate broad-based participation, on a decentralized-basis, in the development process. Such an enabling environment is an essential pre-requisite for the stimulation of initiatives and creativity and for enhancing output and productivity by actions such as:

   (i) extending more economic power to the people through the equitable distribution of income, support for their productive capacity through enhanced access to productive inputs, such as land, credit, technology, etc., and in such a manner as to reflect the central role played by women in the economy;

   (ii) promoting mass literacy and skills training in particular and development of human resources in general;

   (iii) greater participation and consensus-building in the formulation and implementation of economic and social policies at all levels, including the identification and elimination of laws and bureaucratic procedures that pose obstacles to people's participation;

(iv) increasing employment opportunities for the rural and urban poor, expanding opportunities for them to contribute to the generation of output and enhanced productivity levels and creating better marketing conditions for the benefit of the producers; and,

(v) strengthening communication capacities for rural development, mass literacy etc.

4. Small-scale indigenous entrepreneurship and producers co-operatives, as forms of productive participatory development, should be promoted and actions should be taken to increase their productivity.

5. Intensifying the efforts to achieve sub-regional and regional economic co-operation and integration and increased intra-African trade.

B. At the level of the people and their organizations

To foster participation and democratic development, the people and their organizations should:

1. Establish autonomous grass-roots organizations to promote participatory self-reliant development and increase the output and productivity of the masses.

2. Develop their capacity to participate effectively in debates on economic policy and development issues. This requires building people's capacity to formulate and analyze development programmes and approaches.

3. Promote education, literacy skill training and human resource development as a means of enhancing popular participation.

4. Shake off lethargy and traditional beliefs that are impediments to development, especially the customs and cultural practices that undermine the status of women in society, while recognizing and valuing those beliefs and practices that contribute to development. Rural and urban people's organizations, such as workers, peasants, women, youth, students etc., should be encouraged to initiate and implement strategies to strengthen their productive power and meet their basic needs.

E.W. Gachukia O.N. Gakuru	Popular Participation in the Recovery and Development Process in Africa; A Case Study of Kwale District Community Water Supply and Sanitation Project, Kenya
Lalla Ben Barka	Leadership Training for Rural People
V.B. Dunmade	Approaches to Promoting People's Participation in the Recovery and Development Process - A Case Study of Nigeria
Naasson Nsabimana	Popular Participation in Rwanda
Ernest N. Maganya	The Role of Popular Participation in Meeting the Challenge of Recovery and Development in Africa. The Case Study of the United Republic of Tanzania
Ludovick A. Ngatara	Popular Participation in the Recovery and Development Process in Africa. Case Study of Tanzania
Mbuyi Tuambilangana	The Practice of Popular Participation in Zaire's Recovery and Development
World Food Programme	Food Aid in Support of Popular Participation Summary of World Food Programme
Matthias Stiefel Mary Racelis	The Role and Responsibilities of Government and Development and Donor Agencies
Chief (Mrs.) Bisi Ogunleye	Alleviation of Rural Poverty Through Traditional Credit System... Ondo State Country Women Association of Nigeria (COWAN) Case Study

Ruth Bamela Engo-Tjega	A Vision
Peter Oakley	The Monitoring and Evaluation of Popular Participation in Development
Carmela Abate	An Integrated urban Development Programme for Needy Women with Twins or Triplets
Timothy M. Shaw	External Impediments to Effective Popular Participation in Africa: Towards Democratic Development in the 1990s
Erskine Childers	Communication in Popular Participation Empowering People for their Own Development
Sharon A. Billings, Ruth Bamela Engo-Tjega, James M. Noss	"One Day in Her Life" A Day in the Life of an African Woman
Miriam K. Were	Women Participation at the Heart of Africa's Recovery and Development
Akpalo Kouassivi	The Roles and Responsibilities of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and Grass-Roots Communities
Dharam Ghai	Participatory Development: Some Perspectives From Grass-Roots Experiences
Alioune Sall	The Role of Aid Agencies in the Promotion of Grass-Root Organizations and Human Development in Africa: Democratization of the Development Process
Adebayo Adedeji	The Role of Popular Participation in Meeting the Challenges of Recovery and Development in Africa: Democratization of the Development Process
Maimunatu Abokl	National Level Analysis of the Degree to Which Popular Participation is a Reality (A case of Nigeria)
Barry Koumba	Popular Participation in Burkina Faso: Contribution of the Peasant Society
Emilienne Ngo Basse	Analysis on the Reality of Popular Participation at the National Level: The Case of Cameroon
Constantinos Berhe	Popular Participation: an NGO Perspective

5. Concerted efforts should be made to change prevailing attitudes towards the disabled so as to integrate them and bring them into the main stream of development.

6. Create and enhance networks and collaborative relationships among peoples organizations. This will have the effect of social involvement capable of inducing social change.

7. People's organizations should support strongly and participate in the efforts to promote effective sub-regional and regional economic co-operation and integration and intra-African trade.

C. At the level of the International Community

We also call on the international community to support popular participation in Africa by:

1. Supporting African countries in their drive to internalize the development and transformation process. The IMF, World Bank and other bilateral and multilateral donors are urged to accept and support African initiatives to conceptualize, formulate and implement endogenously designed development and transformation programmes.

2. Directing technical assistance programmes, first and foremost, to the strengthening of national capabilities for policy analysis and the design and implementation of economic reform and development programmes.

3. Fostering the democratization of development in African countries by supporting the decentralization of development processes, the active participation of the people and their organizations in the formulation of development strategies and economic reform programmes and open debate and consensus - building processes on development and reform issues.

4. Allowing for the release of resources for development on a participatory basis which will require the reversal of the net outflow of financial resources from Africa to the multilateral financial institutions and donor countries and their use for development purposes and for the benefit of the people.

5. Reducing drastically the stock of Africa's debt and debt-servicing obligations and providing a long-term period of moratorium on remaining debt-servicing obligations in order to release resources for financing development and transformation on a participatory basis.

6. Ensuring that the human dimension is central to adjustment programmes which must be compatible with the objectives and aspirations of the African people and with African realities and must be conceived and designed internally by African countries as part and parcel of the long-term objectives and framework of development and transformation.

7. Supporting African NGOs, grass-roots organizations, women's and youth organizations and trade unions in activities such as training, networking and other programme activities, as well as the documentation, and wide dissemination of their experiences.

D. At the level of NGOS and VDOs

The African and non-African NGOs and VDOs have an important role in supporting recovery and development efforts and popular participation initiatives and organizations in Africa. They are urged to take the following actions:

1. African NGOs and VDOs and their partners should be fully participatory, democratic and accountable.

2. African NGOs, VDOs and GROs should develop and/or strengthen institutional structures at the regional sub-regional and national levels, such as FAVDO, to bring them together.

3. African NGOs and VDOs should broaden the dissemination of successful African popular participation and grass-root experiences throughout the continent and the exchange of experience thereon to create a multiplier effect and sensitize policy-makers.

4. The International Conference on Popular Participation is clear in its recognition of the value of the contribution of grass-roots organizations and NGOs to Africa's development and demonstrates that effective dialogue

ANNEX III

List of Conference Papers

Author	Title
Secretariat	Information Paper on Exhibition and Ideas Market Place
Dharam Ghai	Concept and Practice of Participation: Some Theoretical Considerations
Makanjuola Olaseinde Arigbede	Popular Participation by Whom and How: Towards a Collective Understanding of the Concept
P. Anyang Nyong'o	Popular Participation and the Challenge of Self-Reliance in Africa
Paul Wangoola	Promoting Indigenous NGOs as Instruments of Popular Participation
Yash Tandon	Participatory Development as a Dimension in Africa's Development and Transformation Efforts
Thelma Awori assisted by Gloria Mamba	How to Unleash the Talents and Energies of African People to Contribute Effectively to the Process of Development and Transformation
Mazide N'diaye	Domestic Impediments to Popular Participation in the African Economic and Social Recovery and Development Process
Jacinto Santos	Popular Participation and Challenges of Self-Reliance in Africa
Faustin Musare	Report on Popular Participation and Access to Resources and Services: the Case of Rwanda
Florence Tobo Lobe	Savings and Credit Co-operatives as a Means of Community Participation in the Socio-Economic Development of People: the Cameroonian Experience
Claude Ake	Building on the Indigenous

We therefore call for the immediate dismantling of apartheid and the introduction of a democratic system of government which will enable all the people of South Africa to participate fully and effectively in the political, economic, social and cultural life of their country. Only the full attainment of this goal, and nothing less, will be consistent with the legitimate aspirations of the majority of the South African people, the expressed wishes of mankind and the Charter of the United Nations.

Note: Similar messages concerning Mr. Mandela's release from prison were sent to the Secretary-General of United Nations and the Chairman of the Organization of African Unity.

between governments, NGOs and grass-roots organizations is essential and valuable. This Conference recommends that national fora be established to enable honest and open dialogue between African Governments, grass-roots organizations and NGOs in order that the experience of grass-roots participatory development informs national policy-making.

5. Non-African NGOs and VDOs should give increased support and target their operations within the framework of national economic strategies and reform programmes aimed at transforming the structures of the African economies with a view to internalizing the development process and ensuring its sustainability with a particular focus on the human dimension and people's participation.

6. Non-African NGOs and VDOs should give due recognition to African NGOs and participatory, self-reliant development initiatives launched by African grass-roots organizations.

7. Non-African NGOs and VDOs should utilize African expertise to the maximum extent possible with regard to their development work in Africa and advocacy and campaigning work at the international level.

8. Non-African NGOs should strengthen their advocacy work internationally and in their home countries and with regard to bilateral donors and the multilateral system, closely monitoring their response to the African crisis and holding donor governments and agencies accountable for their policies and actions. In particular, non-African and African NGOs should formulate a programme of action geared towards their fullest participation in the end-term review of UN-PAAERD.

9. Co-operation and dialogue between African and Non-African NGOs and VDOs should be strengthened to increase the effectiveness of their interventions at the community level and the building of greater understanding on the part of international public opinion of the real causes of the African socio-economic crisis and the actions that are needed to deal with its root causes.

10. Non-African NGOs acknowledge that their influence as donors is often detrimental to ensuring genuine partnership with African NGOs, VDOs and grass-root organizations and affects the enabling environment for popular participation. In that context co-operation in all its forms must be transparent and reflect African priorities.

11. African and non-African NGOs and VDOs should, in addition to their traditional humanitarian activities, increasingly provide support for the productive capacities of the African poor and for promoting environmentally sound patterns of local development.

E. At level of the Media and communication

1. The national and regional media should make every effort to fight for and defend their freedom at all cost, and make special effort to champion the cause of popular participation and publicize activities and programmes thereof and generally provide access for the dissemination of information and education programmes on popular participation.

2. Combining their indigenous communication systems with appropriate use of modern low-cost communications technology, African communities and NGOs, VDOs and trade unions and other mass organizations must strengthen their communication capacities for development. Regional and national NGOs should participate in the assessment of Africa's Development Support Communication Needs to be carried out under the auspices of the United Nations Steering Committee and the United Nations Inter-Agency Task Force on UN-PAAERD.

F. At the level of women's organizations

In ensuring that the participation of women in the development process is advanced and strengthened, popular women's organizations should:

1. Continue to strengthen their capacity as builders of confidence among women;

ANNEX II

Message to Nelson Mandela from the Conference

To: Our dear brother Nelson Mandela and
all members of the African National Congress (ANC)

Our dear brother,

We the participants at the International Conference on Popular Participation in the Recovery and Development Process in Africa, taking place in Arusha, United Republic of Tanzania from 12 to 16 February 1990 and jointly organized by African people's organizations (Non-Governmental Organizations, Grassroots Organizations, Trade Unions, Youth and Women's organizations), non-African NGOs, African Governments, and the UN system under the auspices of the Economic Commission for Africa and the United Nations Inter-Agency Task Force, seize the opportunity of the official opening of our conference by his Excellency Ali Hassan Mwinyi, President of the United Republic of Tanzania to salute, with great joy and pride, the legitimate and long-awaited release of our illustrious brother, Nelson Mandela, leader of the African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa and African symbol of the relentless struggle for justice, equality, freedom and democracy.

All the participants at the Conference congratulate you, the ANC and all the people struggling for justice in South Africa. Your release is an eloquent testimony to the effectiveness of the unrelenting solidarity and resolute commitment of the people of South Africa. It is also a salute to your resolute courage and determination. We must see your release, however, as only a beginning because apartheid remains basically intact.

RESOLUTION 3

TRANSMITTAL OF THE AFRICAN CHARTER FOR POPULAR PARTICIPATION IN DEVELOPMENT AND TRANSFORMATION (ARUSHA, 1990)

TO THE ASSEMBLY OF HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT OF THE OAU AND UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY

The Conference;

Recalling General Assembly resolution S-13/2 on the United Nations Programme of Action for African Economic Recovery and Development, 1986-1990 (UN-PAAERD),

Recalling also General Assembly resolution 43/27 and its annex on the mid-term review and appraisal of the implementation of UN-PAAERD,

Mindful of ECA Conference of Ministers resolution 661 (XXIV) entitled "International Conference on Popular Participation in the Recovery and Development Process in Africa",

1. **Requests** the Executive Secretary of ECA to submit the **CHARTER** to the Sixteenth Meeting of the ECA Conference of Ministers,

2. **Invites** the Secretary-General at the OAU in collaboration with the Executive Secretary of ECA to submit the **CHARTER** to the Fifty-second Session of the Council of Ministers of the OAU.

2. Strive for the attainment of policies and programmes that reflect and recognize women's roles as producers, mothers, active community mobilizers and custodians of culture;

3. Work to ensure the full understanding of men, in particular, and the society, in general, of women's role in the recovery and transformation of Africa so that men and women together might articulate and pursue appropriate courses of action;

4. Implement measures to reduce the burden carried by women through: (a) advocating to the society at large, including central and local government levels, the importance of task sharing in the home and community, especially in the areas of water and wood fetching, child rearing etc.; (b) promoting the establishment and proper functioning of community-based day care centers in all communities; and, (c) striving to attain economic equality by advocating the rights of women to land and greater access to credit.

5. Women's organizations should be democratic, autonomous and accountable organizations.

G. At the level of organized labour

Trade Unions should:

1. Be democratic, voluntary, autonomous and accountable organizations.

2. Initiate, animate and promote mass literacy and training programmes.

3. Organize and mobilize rural workers in accordance with ILO Convention 141, which African Governments are strongly urged to ratify.

4. Defend trade union rights, in particular the right to strike.

5. Assist in the formation of workers' co-operatives

6. Assist in organizing the unemployed for productive activities, such as the establishment of small and medium scale enterprises.

7. Give special attention to effective and democratic participation of women members at all levels of trade unions.

8. Promote work place democracy through the call for the protection of workers' rights to freedom of association, collective bargaining and participatory management.

H. At the level of youth and students and their organizations

Considering the centrality of the youth and students in Africa's population and the recovery and development process, the following actions should be taken:

1. Preparation and adoption of an African Charter on Youth and Student Rights to include the right to organize, education, employment and free and public expression.

2. The full democratic participation of youth and students in African society requires immediate steps by Government, popular organizations, parents and the youth themselves to eliminate the major impediments to youth participation, such as frequent bans on youth and student organizations, police brutality against unarmed protesting students, detention and harassment on campuses, dismissal from studies and the frequent and arbitrary closure of educational institutions.

3. Youth, students, Governments and the international community must join forces urgently to combat growing drug trafficking and drug abuse. We also urge Governments to sign and ratify the International Convention on the Illicit Trafficking of Drugs and Psychotropic Substances.

4. The advancement of youth participation in development also requires the protection of Africa's minors against forced military service, whether in national or insurgent/rebel groups.

RESOLUTION 2

INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON POPULAR PARTICIPATION IN THE RECOVERY AND DEVELOPMENT PROCESS IN AFRICA
POPULAR PARTICIPATION DAY IN AFRICA

The Conference:

Recognizing that without popular participation there can be no true and lasting development for Africa,

Rejoicing that this Conference coincided with the release of Nelson Mandela on 11 February 1990 who sacrificed his freedom for his belief in the right of the people to decide their own future,

Recognizing that Governments, agencies of the United Nations system and Non-Governmental Organizations are giving increased importance to the role of participation as a means to and an end of development,

Affirming the need to acknowledge the efforts and sacrifices of grass-roots and people's organizations to make popular participation a reality,

Resolves that henceforth the eleventh day of February each year should be proclaimed **Popular Participation Day in Africa,**

Recommends that the Executive Secretary of ECA should bring this resolution before the forthcoming meeting of the ECA Conference of Ministers in May 1990 and thereafter to the General Assembly of the United Nations at its Forty-fifth Session as well as to the Fifty-second Session of the Council of Ministers of the OAU and the Twenty-sixth Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU.

1. Expresses its deep appreciation to the Government and People of the United Republic of Tanzania for having hosted the meeting so generously;

2. Also expresses its appreciations to His Excellency Ali Hassan Mwinyi, President of the United Republic of Tanzania, for officially opening the Conference and for the inspiring address which he delivered;

3. Requests the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania to transmit the **African Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation (Arusha, 1990)** to both the Twenty-sixth Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU and to the Forty-fifth Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations for their information and such necessary action as they may deem fit.

5. African youth and students should organize national autonomous associations to participate in and contribute to development activities and programmes such as literacy, reafforestation, agriculture and environmental protection.

6. Student and youth organizations must also strive to be democratic, accountable, voluntary and autonomous and should co-ordinate their activities with workers', women's and peasant organizations.

7. National youth and student organizations should take urgent steps to strengthen and further democratize existing pan-African youth and student organizations to make them play their roles more effectively in Africa's development process.

IV. MONITORING POPULAR PARTICIPATION

24. We proclaim the urgent necessity to involve the people in monitoring popular participation in Africa on the basis of agreed indicators and we propose the use of the following indicators, which are not necessarily exhaustive, for measuring the progress in the implementation of the recommendations of the Charter.

1. The literacy rate, which is an index of the capacity for mass participation in public debate, decision-making and general development processes;

2. Freedom of association, especially political association, and presence of democratic institutions, such as political parties, trade unions, people's grass-root organizations and professional associations, and the guarantee of constitutional rights.

3. Representation of the people and their organizations in national bodies.

4. The rule of law and social and economic justice, including equitable distribution of income and the creation of full employment opportunities.

5. Protection of the ecological, human and legal environment.

6. Press and media freedom to facilitate public debate on major issues.

7. Number and scope of grassroots organizations with effective participation in development activities, producers and consumers co-operatives and community projects.

8. Extent of implementation of the Abuja Declaration on Women (1989) in each country.

9. Political accountability of leadership at all levels measured by the use of checks and balances;

10. Decentralization of decision-making processes and institutions.

25. We are convinced of the imperative necessity to follow-up and monitor the implementation of this Charter and to report periodically thereon on progress achieved as well as problems encountered. We accordingly recommend that at the national level a follow-up mechanism on which representatives at high level of Government, trade unions, women's organizations, NGOs, VDOs, grass-roots and youth and student organizations will be members.

26. At the regional level, we propose a joint OAU/ECA Regional Monitoring Machinery on which also, in addition to representatives of these two organizations will be representatives of the network of organizations named above. This regional monitoring group will submit biennial progress reports on the implementation of the Charter to the ECA Conference of Ministers and the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU.

CONCLUSION

27. This Conference has taken place during a period when the world continues to witness tumultuous changes in Eastern Europe. Even more dramatically, this Conference has taken place during the

ANNEX I

Resolutions

RESOLUTION 1

TRANSMITTAL OF THE AFRICAN CHARTER FOR POPULAR PARTICIPATION IN DEVELOPMENT AND TRANSFORMATION (ARUSHA, 1990)

TO
THE OAU MINISTERIAL COUNCIL AND ECA
CONFERENCE OF MINISTERS

The Conference:

Recalling General Assembly resolution S-13/2 on the United Nations Programme of Action for African Economic Recovery and Development, 1986-1990 (UN-PAAERD),

Recalling also General Assembly resolution 43/27 and its annex on the mid-term review and appraisal of the implementation of UN-PAAERD,

Mindful of ECA Conference of Ministers resolution 664 (XXIV) entitled "International Conference on Popular Participation in the Recovery and Development Process in Africa",

Aware of the need to mobilize support from every quarter for promoting Popular Participation in the recovery and development process in Africa,

very week when Nelson Mandela's release has exhilarated all of Africa, and galvanized the international community.

28. There is an inescapable thread of continuity between those events and our Conference; it is the power of people to effect momentous change. At no other time in the post-war period has popular participation had so astonishing and profound an impact.

29. History and experience both teach that this world never works in compartments. The forces of freedom and democracy are contagious. Inevitably, and irresistibly, popular participation will have a vital role to play on the continent of Africa, and play that role we will.

30. It is manifestly unacceptable that development and transformation in Africa can proceed without the full participation of its people. It is manifestly unacceptable that the people and their organizations be excluded from the decision-making process. It is manifestly unacceptable that popular participation be seen as anything less than the centerpiece in the struggle to achieve economic and social justice for all.

31. In promoting popular participation, it is necessary to recognize that a new partnership and compact must be forged among all the ACTORS in the process of social, political and economic change. Without this collective commitment, popular participation is neither possible nor capable of producing results. We, therefore, pledge to work together in this new partnership to promote full and effective participation by the masses together with Governments in the recovery and development process in Africa.

32. We, the people here assembled, have no illusion that the Charter will be embraced overnight by all of those to whom it is directed. But we are confident that this document is an indispensable step on the road to everything we would wish for the people of Africa.

Done at Arusha, The United Republic of Tanzania
16 February 1990

ANNEXES

Professor Kighoma Malima,
Chairperson of the Conference,
Vice-Chairman of the Planning Commission and
Minister of State in the Office of the
President of United Republic of Tanzania

This Conference has provided us with the much needed and renewed inspiration as well strength to press on and correct any shortcomings that have become apparent. This is why the Charter we have adopted today will be an invaluable working document for the Government in its continued effort to ensure effective people's participation which as the conference has rightly noted, is the only way of accelerating sustainable development and transformation for Africa.

Please, take this message home with you and work for the realization and implementation of this Charter in your different capacities as ambassadors of good hope for Africa. We have too often disastrously underestimated the POWER OF IDEAS and in so doing grossly overestimated the IDEA OF POWER, at our own "peril".

PART III

QUOTES FROM CLOSING STATEMENTS

Professor Adebayo Adedeji, United Nations Under-Secretary-General and Executive Secretary of Economic Commission for Africa

The African Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation which has just been adopted by acclamation by this Conference has, in no unmistakable language, argued the case for the launching of a new era in Africa, on the basis of which the new Africa of our vision can emerge - an Africa in which democracy, accountability and development for transformation become internalized in every country and deep-rooted at every level of our society; an Africa where the enabling environment that promotes initiative and enterprise and guarantees the dignity of each human being becomes pervasive; and, an Africa where the empowerment of the people and the democratization of the development process is the order of the day.

Africa needs fundamental change and transformation, not just adjustment. The change and transformation required are not just narrow, economistic and mechanical ones. They are the broader and fundamental changes that will bring about, over time, the new Africa of our vision where there is development and economic justice, not just growth; where there is democracy and accountability not despotism, authoritarianism and kleptocracy; and where the governed and their governments are moving hand-in-hand in the promotion of the common good, and where it is the will of the people rather than the wishes of one person or a group of persons, however powerful, that prevails.

That new Africa must be born today not tomorrow. The world has witnessed in the past four months momentous developments in Eastern Europe where the people are asserting their rights. A new revolution is in process -a democratic revolution, that will give full reign to popular participation. Will we, the Africans, stand by and allow this wind of change to pass us by? Will we remain onlookers or will we join in the crusade in order to set in motion the badly needed process of change and transformation?

We stood by during the period of the renaissance. We were even less than onlookers in the era of the industrial and technological revolutions. Now that the rebirth of democracy is taking place at a time when the last vestiges of colonialism have disappeared from Africa, are we going to allow the continent to be further marginalized, to be out of the new mainstream? Let the people decide. Let the people of Africa assume their responsibility. Let them face their historic challenge.

Corrigendum

ANNEX 1 Resolutions

Resolution 1 should read:

TRANSMITTAL ... TO THE ASSEMBLY OF HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT OF THE OAU AND UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY (page 41)

Resolution 3 should read:

TRANSMITTAL ... TO THE OAU MINISTERIAL COUNCIL AND ECA CONFERENCE OF MINISTERS (page 44)

PVO/NGO INITIATIVES PROJECT

Rationale

Africans, especially at the community level, are increasingly taking charge of decisions affecting their own development. "Putting the people first" is a goal which has long been expressed as a priority for non-governmental organizations (NGOs). With the rapid emergence in recent years of African NGOs and other grassroots organizations as a more effective voice for the African people, donor agencies and US private voluntary organizations (PVOs) have been looking to such groups more and more as partners in their development assistance efforts.

Calls for true partnerships between US PVOs and African NGOs have become a major focus and challenge. Organizations are moving towards a serious assessment of their changing roles in the development process. They are addressing the need to move from a donor-recipient relationship to one that is equitable and mutually supportive. PVOs and NGOs are working together to identify the needs of African communities and to provide the resources required for institutional strengthening as a precondition for sustainable development.

The PVO/NGO Initiatives Project was funded by the United States Agency for International Development (A.I.D.) Africa Bureau in recognition of the important role played by PVOs and NGOs in Africa. The Project also responds directly to the Congressional mandate arising out of the Development Fund for Africa legislation, which was passed in December 1987 and called for increased involvement of PVOs and NGOs in U.S. foreign assistance to Africa. The PVO/NGO Initiatives Project will permit the Bureau to be more aware of trends and viewpoints within the PVO/NGO community in order to follow up with appropriate action. Most importantly, it gives the PVOs/NGOs an opportunity to actively pursue, with A.I.D. support, new partnerships, funding mechanisms and ideas for programs and policy, which will promote more self-reliant and sustainable African development.

Objectives

The PVO/NGO Initiatives Project objectives emerged as a direct outcome of a consultation process with PVOs and NGOs. They [illegible] understood by [illegible] project will be responsive to the needs and priorities of the PVO/NGO community in the context of [illegible] will [illegible] increased [illegible] among PVOs, NGOs and A.I.D., both at headquarters and field levels on substantive issues [illegible] development policy and methodology [illegible] existing means [illegible] of *collaboration* [illegible] PVOs, NGOs and [illegible] meaningful sharing [illegible] experience to find more effective ways of collaboration [illegible] the future.

- Assist PVOs and NGOs in forming new ***partnerships***, strengthening existing ones, and redefining their respective roles in the design and implementation of development activities.
- Build the technical and ***institutional capacity*** of African NGOs and other local community organizations to promote long-term sustainable development in Africa.
- Design a comprehensive ***information*** base, accessible to the wider development community, on the scope and impact of PVO/NGO activities in Africa.

Project Activities

The Project is being implemented over a three-year period by Datex Inc., which has brought together a highly qualified and committed team. The broad categories of project activity explained below allow for flexibility and responsiveness to ongoing PVO/NGO/A.I.D. input. African expertise will be used wherever possible to assist in carrying out these project activities.

- **Washington-based dialogue.** The project team will coordinate and facilitate an ongoing exchange of ideas between the US PVO community and A.I.D. at the headquarters level through the PVO/NGO Initiatives Task Force. Agenda topics will be developed jointly and may include sector strategies, cross-cutting issues such as human resource development or participatory methodologies, problems associated with collaborative strategies in the field, etc.
- **Africa-based dialogue.** The project team will work with PVOs, African NGOs, and USAID field offices to develop an agenda for field-based seminars where experience and ideas will be shared:
  - enhancing involvement of all three parties in the planning and implementation of development assistance, and
  - prompting partnerships be-

and to facilitate productive PVO/NGO partnerships, the project will examine a numb of issues.

- The use of "umbrella" projec has become a major A.I.D. funding mechanism for PVO/NGO activities, and variations of these are of increasing interest to donors What types of projects have been designed, and have the been effective?
- What is the impact of Title II Food Aid programs implemented by PVOs/NGOs? To what extent can they be mad more developmental vs. relie oriented?
- How do recent changes in A.I.D.'s regulations and proce dures for PVO registration affect African NGOs' ability tc participate in A.I.D. funded programs? How could administrative burdens be minimized?
- **Partnership Initiatives Fund.** To address the lack of exploratory capital, which is often a constraint to formatio of partnerships, the project team will manage a small grants fund on behalf of the A.I.D. Africa Bureau. Grants will provide opportunities for PVOs and NGOs to develop and/or test partnership ideas, arrange staff exchanges, conduct joint project feasibility studies, or engage in other activities aimed at promoting partnerships.

USAID field offices to develop an agenda for field-based seminars where experience and ideas will be shared:

- enhancing involvement of all three parties in the planning and implementation of development assistance, and
- promoting partnerships between US PVOs and African NGOs in areas of mutual interest.

Training workshops and materials. African NGOs often cite their need for training in technical and managerial skills to better serve the communities with whom they work. After conducting needs assessments, the project team will organize a series of training workshops in Africa and, working with PVOs and NGOs, develop innovative and widely-applicable training materials. Financial management, proposal development, monitoring and evaluation, fundraising and income generation, and scaling up of pilot efforts are possible topics.

Database development. The Project will investigate existing databases on PVO/NGO organizations and activities in Africa, survey user needs for additional information or analytical capabilities, and design new systems in collaboration with database administrators and potential users.

Studies and evaluations. To learn more about the strengths and weaknesses of PVO/NGO project funding mechanisms as well as project design and implementation,

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Telex: 219744 ICC UR

A.I.D. Africa Bureau. Grants will provide opportunities for PVOs and NGOs to develop and/or test partnership ideas, arrange staff exchanges, conduct joint project feasibility studies, or engage in other activities aimed at promoting partnerships.

Collaborative research. The Project will encourage collaboration between African researchers and African NGOs to enhance understanding of the development programs and processes in which they are engaged, build longer-term links between research institutes and NGOs, and provide opportunities for African-based analysis of development policy concerns. Small research grants will be made, and results disseminated, so that the wider PVO/NGO and donor community may learn from them.

Newsletter. A project newsletter will offer a venue for comprehensive exploration of topics from a variety of perspectives. Issues such as institutional capacity building, partnership formation, sectoral development and information design will be discussed.

The Project will serve as a focal point for PVO/NGO relations with the A.I.D. Africa Bureau and facilitate coordination within A.I.D. and with other bilateral and multilateral donor agencies working with NGOs in Africa. It will be ***a source and catalyst of innovative and challenging ideas for new initiatives.***

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The Datex Approach

Datex is an international management consulting firm which provides its Clients with the capacity to improve their operations via ***management by design***. Datex has proven expertise in a wide array of functional areas:

- financial management
- information systems
- strategic planning
- human resource development and training
- project design, analyses, evaluations and monitoring.

Datex has provided its services to a variety of private and public sector clients including a number of US and international PVOs, USAIDs, and international organizations such as the World Bank and the United Nations. Activities have been carried out in Asia, Africa and Latin America in a range of sectors including health, population, agriculture, education and industry.

DATEX INC
Management By Design

The Datex Project Team

Ajit S. Dutta
President, Datex Inc.

Anne Gordon Drabek
Project Leader

Patricia Scheid
Manager, Information Systems

Karl Zander
Systems Administrator

Carolyn Reynolds
Administrative Assistant

In addition to the full-time staff, the project will utilize the expertise of a range of intermittent staff, consultants and PVO/NGO personnel in implementing project activities. The project will maintain a roster of quality consultants available to work with PVOs, NGOs and A.I.D. in Africa in a wide range of specialized areas.

For More Information Contact:

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Introducing

I R I S

Institutional Reform and the Informal Sector at the University of Maryland at College Park

November 15, 1990

1. The IRIS Idea
2. IRIS Goals
3. IRIS Research
4. Reform Advancement
5. Training
6. Information
7. The IRIS office

INSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND THE INFORMAL SECTOR
AT THE UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND AT COLLEGE PARK
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1. THE IRIS IDEA:

"DEVELOPMENT DEPENDS ON INSTITUTIONS"

Institutions Matter At the same time that many less developed countries have fallen further behind the richer nations, other developing countries have achieved spectacular economic growth. While the Soviet-type economies of Eastern Europe have failed, most of the nations of Western Europe have become prosperous.

These striking differences in economic performance were not due to the varying amounts of capital or other resources available to different countries. It was normally not the countries that were given the most capital or whose populations were forced to save the most whose performance was best. Neither was it the countries with the most land and natural resources in relation to population. There was the same kind of labor force and culture in the parts of China, Germany, and Korea that failed to grow as in the parts that succeeded. The economically successful countries have, on the other hand, always had different institutions -- different legal and organizational arrangements and economic policies -- than those that have failed.

Thus the quality of a country's institutions principally determines its economic performance. While recognizing that other factors are also important, the premise of the project on Institutional Reform and the Informal Sector (IRIS) is that institutional reform is essential for economic development, both in Eastern Europe and in the third world.

Individual Rights and Competitive Markets Unfortunately, a country cannot obtain a competitive market economy simply by repealing communism and making sure that the government does not interfere with the economy. A thriving market economy does not emerge automatically. It requires institutions that most people in the economically developed democracies unthinkingly take for granted, but that the emerging democracies of Eastern Europe and the societies of Africa, Asia, and Latin America usually do not have.

A thriving market economy requires, among other things, institutions that provide secure individual rights -- rights that insure that individuals, and the firms that they create, can best advance their interests by being as productive as possible and engaging in mutually beneficial trade. The incentives to save and to invest depend upon individual rights to marketable assets -- on property rights.

Similarly, a society cannot have much borrowing and lending or obtain many of the other gains from mutually advantageous trade unless individuals and firms have the right to make contracts with one another that will be impartially enforced. If there is no

right to create legally secure corporations with limited liability, the private economy cannot properly exploit those productive opportunities that are too large for most individuals to undertake. If there is no legal framework to encourage invention through patents and copyrights or to facilitate risk-sharing through insurance and hedging in futures markets, a market economy will be defective.

Even in some of the countries where all the foregoing rights are available, they are not secure. Some dictatorships have at times provided individuals with the rights needed for competitive markets and thereby brought about periods of rapid economic growth.

Yet the dictators' subjects have not only lacked political freedoms, but also any confidence that their property and contract rights will continue to be respected if the regime, or even the dictator's policy, changes. Thus the market rights do not elicit as much investment and economic advance as would have occurred if everyone were confident that they would last.

It is only in the stable, developed democracies that there is widespread confidence that the rights needed for a thriving economy can be relied upon over the long run. These are the societies where property and contracts are most predictable. It is in these societies that capital is least scarce and where it would accordingly be expected to have the lowest return. Capital nonetheless often flees to these societies from capital-poor countries with undemocratic, unstable, and otherwise inadequate institutions. It is no accident that the countries in the world with the highest per capita incomes are stable democracies.

The Informal Sector - A symptom of inadequate institutions There is a strange dualism in governments that partly explains why the institutions needed for successful development are not more generally understood or more widely used. In the absence of government, a powerful individual may physically possess something, but no one has any socially enforceable rights: there is no private property without government. Neither are there contracts, corporations, or patents. The relatively large informal sectors in most developing countries are much less productive than they would otherwise be because the relatively poor and powerless individuals in these sectors have almost no legal rights.

The role of government Just as governments are essential for individual rights, so governments are also the greatest threat to these rights. It is only governments that can expropriate property on a large scale, or unilaterally change the terms of contracts, or systematically repress mutually advantageous trade. Thus we arrive at the paradoxical presumption that sustained economic development may require governments that are strong enough to last indefinitely, yet so limited and restrained that they do not use their overwhelming power to abrogate individual rights.

The role of IRIS This last presumption illustrates only one of the many reasons why institutional reform is a fresh and promising approach to economic development. With this approach the IRIS project will not only stimulate innovative and socially useful research, but also provide a new kind of assistance to receptive organizations and individuals in the developing countries and in the emerging democracies of Eastern Europe. This research and assistance will help interested countries develop the institutions needed to generate the prosperity and freedom that their peoples seek.

Mancur Olson
Principal Investigator

2. IRIS GOALS

Launched in November 1990 with initial funding from the U.S. Agency for International Development, the IRIS project has two primary goals:

to change institutions which retard economic development in Eastern Europe and the developing world, and

to increase the understanding of the economics of institutions and institutional reform

To accomplish this, the program has four components.

3. RESEARCH

IRIS research will address both the theoretical issues explaining institutional reform problems and the very practical measurement and economic analysis required to support reform of institutions.

The formal research program of IRIS will be be conducted by individuals selected as IRIS Fellows or IRIS Scholars. Periodic announcements by IRIS of topics of general interest to us will be the basis for competitive selection of awards by an IRIS committee. Individuals at the University of Maryland or nearby institutions who are able to offer occasional assistance at the IRIS offices will be eligible for IRIS Fellow awards. IRIS Scholars will not be restricted geographically.

In addition to the juried research program, IRIS field projects will most often contain a research component. We are always interested in working with qualified economists or others with expertise particularly applicable to specific institutional reform projects.

04. REFORM ADVANCEMENT - FIELD PROGRAMS

Support for those seeking to reform institutions is integral to IRIS's mission. IRIS will provide advice, technical assistance, research or direct financial support to groups seeking to improve laws, rules, procedures related development of competitive markets. Active involvement of local organizations is central to IRIS's participation.

Examples of initiatives IRIS will promote are:

- measurement of the costs of particular laws or regulations, the benefits of change,

- assignment of legal experts to assist in analyzing and redrafting laws or systems of laws,

- assistance in developing strategies for implementing changes,

- support for meetings to define and focus local institutional reform initiatives.

Requests for IRIS support for local efforts will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. While IRIS will consider all applications, initiatives which receive IRIS support should include:

- a clear statement of the problem to be addressed,

- identification of the specific goal of the initiative and any broader strategy of which it may be a part,

- estimate of expected outcome, populations or community to benefit, type of benefit hoped for.

- frank statement of obstacles to success, including the economic, political and information hurdles,

Interested groups are invited to contact IRIS informally to discuss ideas and proposals and to obtain more detailed guidance.

5. TRAINING

IRIS will provide support for individuals seeking to obtain a basic understanding of institutional economics and the process or reform. Sessions at the IRIS Center can be arranged for individuals or groups. In addition, special arrangement for seminars, conferences and other meetings can be arranged outside the United States. In each case IRIS will provide, from its own staff or from others with successful backgrounds in the field, expertise on the economics of institutions, practical discussion of prerequisites to

change and strategies for accomplishing reform. Working with groups, we can customize a program which meets specific needs.

6. INFORMATION

An IRIS Newsletter, research reports and conference proceedings will broaden the understanding of the ideas which constitute institutional reform and the activities of those who are successfully implementing change.

The IRIS Database will be launched in January 1991 and will be an on-line resource for researchers, activists, journalists and others. Included in the database will be information on groups engaged in institutional reform efforts, bibliographies of research and other publications, experts in various disciplines and issue areas, a calendar of institutional reform events and information on IRIS itself. The IRIS library will collect core materials of use to those interested in institutional reform and the informal sector. Items referenced in the Database may be available in the library.

IRIS staff are available, schedules permitting, to meet with groups attempting to develop their own institutional reform programs.

7. IRIS OFFICE

The IRIS staff is based adjacent to the College Park Maryland campus of the University of Maryland, seven miles outside Washington, D.C. Building on the resources of the University and funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development, IRIS extends its impact through close coordination with other groups, a network of consultants and focussed information services for individuals and organizations interested in institutional reform.

Both the IRIS training center and institutional reform database and library are located at the College Park site.

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IRIS UPDATE

January 1991

THE TRANSITION TO A MARKET ECONOMY

A conference on the Transition to a Market-Economy in the emerging democracies of Eastern Europe will be held at the Hotel Forum in Prague on March 24-27, 1991. The conference will focus on the problems of the transition and the institutional requirements for a market economy. The objective of the conference is to help Eastern European policymakers and opinion leaders create the right institutions to sustain the development of policies leading to efficient and equitable societies.

Topics will include the following:

1. Property Rights and the Transition

2. Institutions for a competitive Private Sector: Demonopolization and Foreign Trade Policies

3. Macroeconomic Balance and Financial Discipline

4. The Privatization Process

5. The Speed and Sequencing of the Transition

Vaclav Klaus, Finance Minister of Czechoslovakia, will address the conference. Other speakers will include three current or former vice-presidents for research of the World Bank, Stanley Fischer of M.I.T., Lawrence Summers of Harvard University, and Anne Krueger of Duke University. Presentations will also be made by Alan Walters, former economic adviser to Prime Minister Thatcher, Hernando deSoto, President of the Institute for Liberty and Democracy in Peru, and by Robert Willig, Deputy Assistant Attorney General of the United States. Professors participating in the conference include Robert Cooter, Oliver Williamson, Gordon Rausser, and George Akerlof of the University of California at Berkeley, Ronald McKinnon and Joseph Stiglitz of Stanford, David Newbery of Cambridge, Christopher Clague, Peter Murrell and Mancur Olson of Maryland, and Arnold Harberger and Sebastian Edwards of U.C.L.A.

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The conference is jointly sponsored by the Institute for Policy Reform (IPR) and the Project on Institutional Reform and the Informal Sector (IRIS) at the University of Maryland. Both the IPR and IRIS are funded by the Agency for International Development.

Participation in the conference will be by invitation. The papers and discussion will be published in a volume.

IRIS Workshop for Mongolian Policymakers

More than 100 officials from the new Mongolian government and parliament participated in a three-day workshop on the transition to a market economy conducted by IRIS in Ulan Bataar on January 15-17, 1991. IRIS Director, Charles Cadwell, and University of Maryland economist, Dr. Peter Murrell, conducted the workshop which constitutes one part of the assistance committed by Secretary Baker during his August visit to Mongolia.

Mongolia has a new government which is in the midst of drafting a new constitution and dozens of new laws to effect a transition from a centrally planned economic system to a free market. While there is significant commitment to accomplishing the transition, Mongolian policymakers have little experience with the institutions which support free private markets. Questions for the IRIS team covered a wide range of economic and legal issues and indicated intense interest in learning about specific laws and policies.

Workshop sessions covered macroeconomic concerns during the transition, development of private property, price deregulation, development of capital markets, taxation, foreign investment and privatization. Planning for future levels and types of assistance is underway.

IRIS Scholars Program Announcement

Invitations to participate in the IRIS research program were distributed widely at the end of December. In announcing the IRIS Scholars Program, IRIS Research Director, Christopher Clague, outlined a program which will provide for consideration of research proposals at three points during the year. A paper describing the "IRIS Idea" and areas of suggested research is intended to help researchers understand the types of research we will fund. Copies of the full announcement are available from IRIS. The deadline for the first round of proposals is March 15, 1991, with decisions to be made by April 30. The second deadline for proposals will be September 1. A separate IRIS Fellows program is targeted at faculty at the University of Maryland and other local universities who can commit to broader involvement with IRIS staff in addition to research.

Private Sector in Nepal to Establish Reform Priorities

Five business and legal organizations are sponsoring a February 28 forum to develop priorities for institutional reform in Nepal. Nepal has a new constitution and elections for a new parliament are expected in mid-April. With assistance from IRIS field staff Mark Huisenga, the Nepalese groups will develop options for reform and prioritize the options into a private sector agenda for the new parliament. Areas of concern identified during a November reconnaissance trip by IRIS include business registration, arbitrary tax administration, access to foreign exchange and import/export regulation and access to capital.

IRIS "Idea" Explained to Allied Social Sciences Association

In a paper delivered to the winter meeting of the Allied Sciences Association, IRIS Principal Investigator, Dr. Mancur Olson, detailed the reasons that the adequacy of institutions is the key determinant of economic development. Olson, the author of The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities, presented arguments which suggest that traditional factors which might affect rates of development--such as natural resources, levels of capital intensity, rates of population growth or levels of technology--do not adequately explain the different performance of nations. Rather the institutions a nation imposes on itself seem to be most important. In other words, a nation's economic progress, to a large extent, lies in its own hands. Copies of the paper are available from IRIS.

IRIS Scholars Program
1991

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A. THE IRIS IDEA: THE NEEDED RESEARCH

Much of the best research on economic growth has postulated an aggregate production function in which output is a function of two or three aggregated factors of production. The three conventional aggregate factors are, of course, capital, land (or land and other natural resources), and labor (or human capital, including the skills, culture, and entrepreneurial abilities of the population). The increase in output that is not explained by the increases in the quantity of the familiar factors of production--the "residual"--is usually attributed to the advance of knowledge. Many researchers have emphasized inadequate supplies of one or the other of the classical factors as the decisive problem for economic development.

When the study of economic development first became a separate specialty, almost everyone believed that the main obstacle to development was a lack of savings and capital goods. Costly capital goods are, of course, needed for a modern economy. Nonetheless, high rates of forced saving and investment have in fact failed to prevent economic failure in the Soviet-type societies. There has also been no correlation between the amounts of capital provided to countries through foreign aid and their rates of economic growth. In the many poor countries with very little capital in relation to the supply of labor and natural resources, the marginal product of capital should be many times higher than it is in the capital-rich countries, at least if a shortage of capital is the decisive obstacle to development. If other things were equal, this would imply a gigantic gain to investors from shifting their capital to the countries with the least capital, but usually this has not occurred--capital often even flees from capital-poor to capital-rich countries. This suggests that other things are by no means equal and that the supply of capital cannot be an exogenous variable in any model that succeeds in explaining economic growth.

Many observers have similarly taken it for granted that shortages of land and other natural resources arising from overpopulation are the main cause of poverty. Diminishing returns to labor is an obviously important reality. Yet the low-income countries of the world are, in fact, slightly less densely settled, on average, than the rich ones. The relatively prosperous countries of Western Europe and Japan have population densities as great or greater than India and most other low-income countries. Some of the most successful developing economies have been crowded cities like Hong Kong and Singapore, which support huge populations with virtually no natural resources. There is also no correlation between the rates of growth of population and of per-capita income across the countries of the world.

Other students of development have focused on labor and supposed that education, or cultural attitudes toward work and saving, or the different traits of various peoples, were the key to economic development. Human capital is an obvious determinant of productivity. Nonetheless, those individuals from poor countries who happen to be able to enter the economically successful countries usually produce several times as much in the new institutional environment as they did in the one they left, even before they have been in the new environment long enough to have acquired a different culture or education. There are immigrants to the United States from both poor and rich countries, but the differences in the average earnings in the U.S. across these groups of immigrants is very small in comparison to the differences in per-capita incomes in the countries of origin. In addition, the same peoples who fail to prosper under one set of institutions succeed brilliantly under another, as the experience of the Chinese, the Germans, and the Koreans shows. Thus a large part of the differences in per-capita incomes across countries cannot be accounted for through differences in education or in the willingness to work or to save.

The dramatic differences in real per-capita incomes between Eastern and Western Europe, or between the less developed and the most developed countries, certainly cannot be explained by differences in access to the world's stock of technological knowledge. To a great degree, the ideas and production functions used in the richest countries are available to the whole world. Technological discoveries and other ideas can be used by ever more countries without being depleted or congested and they are often also unpatentable and thus available free of charge. Those few low-income countries that have found the right institutions have accordingly been able to enjoy uniquely rapid "catch up" growth. The many developing countries that lack the appropriate institutions, like the Soviet-type countries, usually have, in spite of their opportunity for technological borrowing, slower "residual" or productivity growth than the advanced countries.

Evidently neither the amounts of the conventional aggregate factors of production nor the opportunities for technological borrowing are able to explain economic performance. The process of elimination suggests that the economically successful countries must have systematically different institutions--different legal and organizational arrangements and economic policies--than the economies that have failed. Observation confirms that this is in fact the case.

Thus the working hypothesis of the project on Institutional Reform and the Informal Sector (IRIS) is that the quality of a country's institutions is a principal determinant of its economic performance. While recognizing that other factors, including the conventional aggregate factors of production and the rate of

advance of knowledge, are also important, the project will focus on research into the relationships between institutions and economic development, both in Eastern Europe and in the Third World.

* * *

No one idea will guide all of the prospective research about institutions and economic development. It may nonetheless be heuristically useful to discuss one hypothesized link between institutions and development that is suggested by the difficulties and disappointments associated with the transitions to market economies in Eastern Europe.

It is becoming clear that a country cannot obtain a competitive market economy simply by repealing communism and making sure that the government does not interfere with the economy. A thriving market economy does not emerge automatically. It requires institutions that most people in the economically developed democracies unthinkingly take for granted, but that the emerging democracies of Eastern Europe and the societies of Africa, Asia, and Latin America usually do not have.

A thriving market economy apparently requires, among other things, institutions that provide secure individual rights--rights that insure that individuals, and the firms that they create, can best advance their interests by being as productive as possible and engaging in mutually beneficial trade. The incentives to save and to invest depend upon individual rights to marketable assets--on property rights.

Similarly, a society cannot have much borrowing and lending or obtain many of the other gains from mutually advantageous trade unless individuals and firms have the right to make contracts with one another that will be impartially enforced. If there is no right to create legally secure corporations with limited liability, the private economy cannot properly exploit those productive opportunities that are too large for most individuals to undertake. If there is no legal framework to encourage invention through patents and copyrights or to facilitate risk-sharing through insurance and hedging in futures markets, a market economy will be defective.

Even in some of the countries where all the foregoing rights are available, they are not secure. Some dictatorships have, at times, provided individuals with the rights needed for competitive markets and thereby brought about periods of rapid economic growth. Yet the dictators' subjects have not only lacked political freedoms, but also any confidence that their property and contract rights will continue to be respected if the regime, or even the dictator's policy, changes. Thus the market rights do not elicit as much investment and economic advance as

would have occurred if everyone were confident that they would last. It is only in the stable, developed democracies that there is widespread confidence that the individual rights needed for a thriving economy can be relied upon over the long run. These are the societies where property and contracts are most predictable. It is in these societies that capital is least scarce and where it would accordingly be expected to have the lowest return. Capital nonetheless often flees to these societies from capital-poor countries with undemocratic, unstable, and otherwise inadequate institutions. It is probably no accident that the countries in the world with the highest per capita incomes are stable democracies.

There is a strange dualism in governments that partly explains why the institutions needed for successful development are not more generally understood or more widely used. In the absence of government, a powerful individual may physically possess something, but no one has any socially enforceable rights --there is no private property without government. Neither are there contracts, corporations, or patents. The relatively large informal sectors in most developing countries are much less productive than they would otherwise be because the relatively poor and powerless individuals in these sectors have almost no legal rights.

Just as governments are essential for individual rights, so governments are also the greatest threat to these rights. It is only governments that can expropriate property on a large scale, or unilaterally change the terms of contracts, or systematically repress mutually advantageous trade. Thus we arrive at the paradoxical hypothesis that sustained economic development may require governments that are strong enough to last indefinitely, yet so limited and restrained that they do not use their overwhelming power to abrogate individual rights.

This last hypothesis is meant to illustrate rather than delineate the area of research of interest to IRIS. Among the other problems on which research is needed is the special difficulty of establishing efficient and incorruptible large scale organizations, both governmental and corporate, in poor societies. In less developed societies today, as in Europe in pre-industrial times, the moral commitments to small units, such as village communities, tribes, and extended families, are impressive, but faithfulness to the purposes of large organizations and to the impersonal rules that are needed if they are to function honestly and effectively is usually lacking. The principal-agent problems in bureaucracies in pre-industrial countries are notorious. Therefore, diseconomies of scale appear to be an important reality in low-income countries and this

implies that these countries will not usually have comparative advantage in those types of production that require large-scale organization.

The same information problems that especially handicap large bureaucracies in poor countries also sometimes generate problems in credit, insurance, land, and output markets, at least when trade reaches beyond traditional small social units. For example, credit is not available to many poor farmers, not only because legal rights are often not well defined, but also because farmers lack collateral, violations of credit contracts are costly to verify, and loan quantities are too low to justify the costs of administration. Interestingly, alternatives to impersonal credit markets in the form of lending or financial intermediation by small community groups that rely on peer pressure may entail better and much less costly enforcement than the existing formal legal system. Programs to expand the market for livestock and to insure farm animals have often failed because of the high costs of monitoring the activities of farmers and the quality of animals, yet there have been some successes in cattle insurance where it was accompanied by widely available veterinary services that could monitor farmers' care of animals at low cost. In general, a successful economy requires both private and public institutions that limit information, bargaining, and transactions costs, and many of these institutions are lacking in both the developed countries and in Eastern Europe.

There is also a need for more research on the extent to which societies have coalitional or organizational structures that emphasize distributional struggle as opposed to production and mutually advantageous trade. In many countries, whether developed or developing, there is a high density of organizations designed to seek special-interest favors from government or to cartelize markets. In some countries, such as Argentina, this problem may well be overwhelming, and it appears to be important even in explaining some problems in developed countries, such as the "British disease" of slow growth. There is also evidence that collusions for distributional advantage of a smaller and less conspicuous (but by no means necessarily less damaging) kind are important in explaining the extraordinary deterioration in economic performance over time in the Soviet-type economies. This is yet another example of the type of institutional question on which IRIS will encourage research.

The research supported by the IRIS project is not restricted to any one methodology or disciplinary perspective. If it promises sound results of practical pertinence to the project, IRIS will, for example, support research of any level of technical complexity, and also historical research on situations in prior centuries that generate insights of pertinence to institutional reform today. In view of the IRIS mission, most

pertinent research will, however, need to be informed by a good understanding of the well established theory of the contribution that competitive markets can make to social efficiency, and also an understanding of the logic of market failure and collective choice that is inherent in the same body of theory.

Mancur Olson*
Principal Investigator

*I am especially thankful to Christopher Clague and Karla Hoff for helpful criticisms, but I am solely responsible for any shortcomings.

B. THE IRIS RESEARCH AGENDA

Topics

1. The IRIS project is looking for good ideas for research projects. We cannot of course anticipate what ideas creative minds might develop, but we can indicate what seem to us to be promising lines of inquiry. The fundamental objective is to achieve a greater understanding of the role of institutions (legal, administrative, regulatory, or political) in economic development.

2. A major IRIS hypothesis is that a crucial ingredient in economic development is an appropriate set of institutions or institutional matrix to channel the efforts of individual in productive directions. An implication of this hypothesis is that a substantial part of the differences in development success of countries can be explained by the differences in the institutional matrix. But is this implication really borne out by recent history? Evidence that bears on this question would be very relevant to IRIS interests. The question is not necessarily easy to research, mainly because it is not easy to quantify differences in the institutional matrix, but it does seem to be possible to shed light on the question by gathering qualitative data on the legal structure, administrative practices of governments, and business responses to the legal and administrative environment, and then relating these to measures of development success. It may be possible to identify which aspects of the institutional matrix are crucial and which are not by examining the legal and administrative structure in more successful and less successful countries.

3. Since one of the goals of the IRIS project is to focus the attention of the development community, both in the more developed and the less developed countries, on the importance of a good institutional structure, dramatic examples of the effects of good and bad institutions would be valuable for the IRIS project. Such examples may have an impact on people's thinking that is greater than their evidentiary value would justify.

. Under the working hypothesis that the institutional matrix is indeed crucial for economic development, a great deal of interest attaches to the conditions under which institutions evolve in a favorable direction. Successful institutional development has often involved gradual evolution of self-imposed governmental restraints on interference with individual rights. However, important steps may have been taken at critical junctures in this evolutionary process. Studies of these critical junctures to illuminate the ingredients of success would be valuable.

5. Thus a major part of the research agenda of IRIS may be divided into two parts: studies of the effects of institutions on development and studies of the determinants of institutional evolution. Since institutions evolve in part to ameliorate problems stemming from information costs, opportunism, and bounded rationality, and since their development is also powerfully influenced by the objectives of rulers and the collective action (or lack thereof) of interest groups, the incorporation of these elements into the analysis is likely to prove fruitful.

6. One large set of researchable questions relates to the impact of institutions on the informal parts of the housing, retailing, and transport sectors. It would be valuable in particular countries to characterize carefully the benefits and costs to individual entrepreneurs of going the formal or the informal route. What are the magnitudes of these benefits and costs? What exactly are the social inefficiencies arising in these informal markets? How exactly might efficiency and equity be improved by a different legal framework? Are street vendors really less efficient than vendors located in constructed stalls? In what ways? Quantification of the possible gains from specifying and enforcing property rights of retailers would be interesting. Similarly, are gypsy taxicabs really socially inefficient? What gains in social efficiency might come from an improved set of laws regulating urban transport? Also valuable would be studies of the operation of urban land and housing markets in Third World cities. Quantification of the social gains from more clearly specified property rights would be useful.

7. Under the heading of the determinants of institutional evolution would fall studies of successes and failures of policy initiatives. Insightful scholars have pointed out examples where the launching of a policy and the consequent creation of a bureaucracy to implement it create an interest group with the ability and motivation to divert resources to its own ends. Interest group capture of regulatory agencies is a familiar phenomenon to students of more developed democracies; the phenomenon has perhaps been under-researched in the context of the dictatorships and semi-democracies of the Third World. Another phenomenon familiar to economic and political observers is the politicization of an issue that once lay outside the political arena. For example, regulation of food prices or provision of food subsidies creates a consciousness of a group interest that permits some of the affected parties to pressure the government not to withdraw from regulation or subsidization.

8. Studies of successful reforms in laws and regulations would be especially interesting for the light they might throw on strategies and tactics of reform. What policy dialogue preceded the reforms? Areas of study might include business registration requirements, price controls, safety regulations, trade restrictions, foreign exchange market regulations, legal restrictions on laying off workers, and patent laws. One type of study is the quantification of gains and losses of different groups resulting from certain laws and regulations; these magnitudes indicate the ex-post political power of different groups. Another type of study is a political analysis of the sources of influence of different groups and the reasons for their ability to influence the political system in their favor.

9. Composition of International Trade. There is a long tradition in international economics of explaining this composition in terms of factor endowments of countries and production functions of commodities, under the assumption that production functions are the same around the world and the implicit assumption that institutional differences do not matter. The effects of institutional structure on the composition of trade do seem to be important, however; a plausible hypothesis is that a good transportation and communications system is vital for developing a comparative advantage in commodities with a high degree of sectoral interdependence, and that a poorly articulated economy will tend to have a comparative advantage in self-contained commodities.

10. Financial Development. The effect of financial development on economic development is not easy to determine because the causation clearly runs both ways and it is difficult to disentangle the causal chains. However, it is a reasonable working hypothesis that financial development has a highly beneficial effect on economic development and is therefore worth trying to promote. (It may also affect welfare by providing greater security to people, apart from its effect on the rate of economic growth.) Some of the conditions favorable to financial development are well known: a stable macroeconomy, low and predictable rate of inflation, absence of severely binding interest ceilings, and moderate reserve requirements on banks. From the perspective of IRIS the interesting determinants of financial development are those that might come into operation under these favorable conditions. These conditions are clearly not sufficient for financial development, for even when these conditions prevail, the formal financial sector has remained poorly developed in the rural parts of many poor countries. What is it that enables the formal banking system to compete successfully against money-lenders operating in the informal sector? Is it primarily the manifestations of economic

development itself, in the form of better roads and communications, higher levels of education, and larger volumes of savings? Or are there institutional developments that facilitate the penetration of banks into rural areas? Studies of episodes of expansion of rural banking systems might prove helpful in answering this question. Has the government in such episodes played a facilitating role, apart from exercising restraint in taxing or otherwise appropriating assets?

11. Labor Markets. There has been a good deal of recent research on the operation of urban and rural labor markets in developing countries, and notions of surplus labor and subsistence income are now much less widely accepted than in earlier decades. Of particular interest to IRIS would be studies of how labor market practices are affected by the conditions of underdevelopment and by the legal and administrative environment. The existence of firms that evade the labor laws are of course one adaptation to the legal environment. How does such informality affect tenure on the job and skill acquisition?

12. Land Markets. The importance of customary land rights systems in the rural sector of developing countries has been widely accepted. Yet data are fragmentary on the extent to which they are a constraint on productivity. There is evidence that land rights systems evolve engodenously toward greater individualization of rights in response to changes in technology and the expansion of markets for agricultural outputs and credit. From the perspective of IRIS, we would wish to understand better the development impact of restrictions in customary law on the transferability of use rights in land, the evolution of customary land rights systems, and successes and failures of government intervention in land rights systems.

13. Taxation and Pricing Policy. A limitation of most studies of taxation and pricing is that they implicitly assume a well-developed market system. We would be interested in knowing how the results on efficiency and incidence obtained from perfect market models change when account is taken of the institutional features of developing countries--the absence of insurance markets, imperfection in credit markets, share- cropping, rural-urban migration, and parallel labor markets. In addition, tax policy affects the extent to which transactions occur in formal and informal markets: Tax-induced shifts in the "choice" of markets have both efficiency and equity effects that have not yet been

14. The Transition to a Market Economy. IRIS is co-hosting (with the Institute for Policy Reform) a major conference on this topic in Prague in March 1991. IRIS will continue to be interested in the institutional aspects of the problems of the transition.

15. Democracy and the Rule-Making Process, Public participation in rule-making process.

The formality--or informality--of the process by which laws or rules are established and implemented affects not only the nature and quality of information available to policymakers; it also affects the levels of confidence and compliance enjoyed by the result. Administrative procedures and decision standards may not exist, or if they do, are practically unenforceable. Studies which examine not simply models of effective input into the policy process, but which also explore the process by which that access was obtained and distinguish between increased information related to political or economic decisions would be of interest.

Guidelines for Applications for Research Scholars

1. The IRIS project solicits research proposals relating to institutional reform and the informal sector from scholars in the United States and elsewhere in the world. These proposals will be evaluated on a competitive basis by the IRIS Proposal Review Panel.

2. Applications should contain a description of the proposed research of not more than twenty pages, with references to the relevant literature. The cover letter should indicate the period for which support is being sought and the applicant's salary level. Support may be provided for a half-semester, a summer, or some other period. (IRIS support is limited to the AID cap salary, which is about $300 per day.) If funds are being sought for additional research expenses (research assistance, travel), these should be described and justified. A recent curriculum vitae should be included with the application. It is helpful to the Panel to include copies of the applicant's recent papers that relate to the proposed research. The Panel will need six copies of the cover letter, proposal description, and curriculum vitae. A single copy of each of the recent papers will be sufficient.

3. Proposals should be submitted to Professor Christopher Clague, IRIS Director of Research, Economics Department, University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland 20742.

The schedule for applications is as follows.

Application deadline	Panel Decision
March 15, 1991	April 30, 1991
Sept 1, 1991	Sept 30, 1991
Jan 15, 1992	Feb 28, 1992

C. BACKGROUND ON IRIS

Goals

Launched in November 1990 with initial funding from the U.S. Agency for International Development, the IRIS project has two primary goals:

1. To change institutions which retard economic development in Eastern Europe and the developing world, and

2. To increase the understanding of the economics of institutions and institutional reform.

To accomplish this, the program has four components: reform advancement, training, research, and information.

Iris Activities

1. Reform Advancement - Field Programs:

Support for those seeking to reform institutions is integral to IRIS's mission. IRIS will provide advice, technical assistance, research, or direct financial support to groups seeking to improve laws, rules, and procedures related to development of competitive markets. Active involvement of local organizations is central to IRIS's participation.

Examples of initiatives IRIS will promote are:

- assignment of legal experts to assist in analyzing and redrafting laws or systems of laws,

- assistance in developing strategies for implementing changes,

- support for meetings to define and focus local institutional reform initiatives,

- measurement of the costs of particular laws or regulations, the benefits of change.

2. Training:

IRIS will provide support for individuals seeking to obtain a basic understanding of institutional economics and the process of reform. Such sessions can be arranged for individuals or groups at the IRIS Center. In addition, special arrangements for seminars, conferences, and other meetings can be arranged outside the United States. In each

case IRIS will provide, from its own staff or from others with successful backgrounds in the field, expertise on the economics of institutions, practical discussion of prerequisites to change and strategies for accomplishing reform. Working with groups, we can customize a program which meets specific needs. Internships with IRIS are also available.

3. Research:

IRIS research will address both the theoretical issues explaining institutional reform problems and the very practical measurement and economic analysis required to support reform of institutions.

The formal research program of IRIS will be conducted by individuals selected as IRIS Fellows or IRIS Scholars. Periodic announcements by IRIS of topics of general interest to us will be the basis for competitive selection of awards by an IRIS committee. Individuals at the University of Maryland or nearby institutions who are able to offer occasional assistance at the IRIS offices will be eligible for IRIS Fellow awards. IRIS Scholars will not be restricted geographically.

In addition to the juried research program, IRIS field projects will most often contain a research component. We are always interested in working with qualified economists or others with expertise particularly applicable to specific institutional reform projects.

4. Information:

An IRIS Newsletter, research reports and conference proceedings will broaden the understanding of the ideas which constitute institutional reform and the activities of those who are successfully implementing change.

For more information write:

IRIS
7100 Baltimore Avenue, #510
College Park, Maryland 20740
Tel.: 301-403-8153
Fax : 301-403-8163

IFES International Foundation for Electoral Systems

Elections: The Roots of Democracy

Spring 1991 Volume 2, Number 2

VIA CIVICA TRANSLATES TO VIE CIVIQUE IN CÔTE D'IVOIRE

IFES recently assisted two citizens of Côte d'Ivoire with the development of the first Ivorian civic education association. Modeled on the structure of Via Civica of Nicaragua, one of IFES' most successful ongoing projects, the Ivorian Association for the Civic Education of its Citizens (IACEC) will use the next five years to provide information to the Ivorian electorate. IACEC's goal is to make all voters aware of the part they play in the electoral process and to develop nationwide participation in that process.

The political climate of Côte d'Ivoire experienced several changes in 1990. Bowing to universal public pressure, President Felix Houphouet-Boigny (of the ruling Democratic Party of Côte d'Ivoire) opened the system to all interested political parties on April 30. Within weeks, twenty-five parties had registered with the intention of presenting candidates for the October 28 elections. Several parties later withdrew their presidential candidates following the emergency declaration of a financially prohibitive candidate's fee, reimbursable if the candidate received 10% of the vote. During the November 25 legislative elections, the Democratic Party of Côte d'Ivoire won 163 out of 175 available seats, but the average voter turnout was barely 40%.

IFES was approached last year by Robert Tagro and Robert Mahounou, the founders of the Ivorian Association for the Civic Education of its Citizens, to provide assistance in the development of a civic education organization. They were concerned that a potentially decisive shift in government power in the last presidential and legislative elections was stymied by such a weak voter turnout.

Côte d'Ivoire

Capital:	*Abidjan*
Population:	*11.6 million*
Languages:	*Baule (24%)* *French (1%)* *Regional Languages (75%)*
Political Parties:	*Ivorian Democratic Party (PDCI)* *Ivorian Popular Front (FPI)* *Ivorian Workers Party (PTI)* *Social Democrat Party (USD)* *Ivorian Socialist Party (PSI)* *Republican Party (PR)*

Note: All parties except PDCI were illegal until fall '90.

Next Presidential and Legislative Elections: 1995

Tagro, himself an unsuccessful parliamentary candidate, was further galvanized by the fact that he had had difficulty convincing people to vote. Citizens did not understand or were not yet comfortable with the electoral system and did not see the rise of several new political parties as providing more of a choice than they had previously enjoyed.

IFES supplied Tagro and Mahounou with initial program outlines, pamphlets, course descriptions, newsletters, buttons, flyers and financial information from the Via Civica project in Nicaragua. Using these as a guide, Tagro and Mahounou outlined a civic education organization that will target all sectors of the Ivorian population including children. While the next presidential and legislative elections are not scheduled to take place until 1995, redistricting will necessitate repeat local elections in several departments early this summer.

Tagro's vision is to see all voters enthusiastic and fully knowledgeable about their rights, their choices and their responsibilities as citizens for the next and all future elections. During the first year of its existence, IACEC will lay the groundwork for the achievement of this objective. IACEC's long term goal is to

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NOTE FROM THE DIRECTOR



IFES Haiti Project team receives thanks from the Director

In increasing numbers, countries are turning towards free and fair elections as fundamental building blocks of democracy. As the democratic revolution has spread around the globe, IFES has been in the forefront of international efforts to assist and support emerging democracies in the field of elections. IFES' activities have mirrored the trend of democratization, beginning in Latin America, spreading to Eastern Europe, and now moving into Asia and Africa as well (see the cover article in this issue).

IFES was established in 1987 as a clearinghouse of election information. In early 1988, IFES began collecting and cataloguing electoral information from around the world. Today, the IFES database contains a country-by-country file of general background information, election dates, names and addresses of election officials and offices, and voter eligibility requirements. There is also a file containing names of experienced election technicians, country scholars, and potential election observers. A vendor file for election-related commodities and equipment comprises the third component of the database.

In addition to the database, IFES' resource center maintains manual files containing constitutions, election laws, election statistics, sample ballots, election documentation, news articles, and sample civic education materials.

IFES also encourages the exchange of information by organizing conferences and symposia. In May 1990, IFES organized the InterAmerican Electoral Systems Conference, which it co-hosted along with the InterAmerican Center for Electoral Assistance and Promotion (a special program of the InterAmerican Institute of Human Rights in San Jose, Costa Rica) and the Supreme Electoral Council of Venezuela. This meeting brought together election officials from 23 countries in the Americas who focused on the elements of the democratic election process. The conference also featured the first major exhibition of election equipment in South America.

IFES is currently organizing the Central European Electoral Systems Symposium to be held in Budapest, Hungary from July 30 to August 2, 1991. This important gathering is co-hosted by the Hungarian National Election Office and will bring together election officials from Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia to reflect upon case studies of the elections that have taken place in the region during the past 24 months. The symposium will afford election officials the opportunity to build a professional network in the region to assist in strengthening the election institutions in all of the participating countries. The symposium will also feature an exhibition of producers of election equipment.

IFES generally receives requests for assistance in two ways. A number of requests have been channeled through the U.S. Embassy, while others come directly from countries seeking assistance.

IFES has provided technical assistance to many countries, including on-site technical assistance, training, and procurement of election commodities. The types of assistance provided are based on the recommendations of IFES pre-election technical assessment teams which generally visit countries requesting assistance. In Paraguay, Bulgaria, and Romania, IFES assisted in procuring and shipping election commodities such as indelible ink, ballot manifest security bags, and photo-identification equipment. In Haiti, IFES provided a full range of long-term on-site technical and material assistance to the Provisional Electoral Council.

IFES has also worked to support non-partisan civic education groups. For the past two years, IFES has served as the U.S. grantee for National Endowment for Democracy grants to Via Civica, a non-partisan civic education organization based in Managua, Nicaragua. IFES has also provided technical assistance to Via Civica, which played a key role in encouraging Nicaraguans to register and vote in the elections of February 25, 1990. Since then, Via Civica has become a permanent civic education or-

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THE INTERNATIONAL FOUNDATION FOR ELECTORAL SYSTEMS

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The International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) is a private, non-profit 501(c)(3) foundation dedicated to providing assistance in monitoring, supporting and strengthening the mechanics of the election process in emerging democracies. For additional information contact: The International Foundation for Electoral Systems, 1620 I Street, NW, Suite 611, Washington, DC 20006; (202) 828-8507.

Central European Electoral Systems Symposium Receives Wide Support

On July 30 through August 2, 1991 the top election officials of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Yugoslavia will convene at the Hilton Hotel in Budapest, Hungary for the Central European Electoral Systems Symposium. The three-day symposium will bring these election officials from throughout the region of Central Europe together with election officials and experts from Western Europe, Latin America and North America to focus on the mechanics of the electoral process using the past round of elections in Central Europe as a basis for discussion.

Symposium plenary sessions and small group discussions will focus on the following topics:

- Election Administration and Voter Registration
- Voting and Vote Counting
- Role of Political Parties in the Electoral Process
- Civic Education, Participation and Training
- Election Day Procedures
- Analysis of the Democratic Election Process

After the plenary session topics are presented to the full assembly of delegates in an original research paper, the topics will be openly debated during small group discussions.

IFES is pleased to have received extensive support for the Symposium from election officials of the region as well as from the National Election Office of Hungary, a permanent body responsible for all aspects of the Hungarian election process. Dr. Pal Kara, Deputy State-Secretary of the Republic of Hungary, will deliver the first plenary session paper on the subject



Dr. Pál Kara, Deputy State Secretary of Hungary meets with IFES Director Richard Soudriette

of the role of a permanent election body in the Hungarian electoral process. In addition to his duties as Deputy State-Secretary, Dr. Kara is responsible for oversight of National Election Office activities.

The original research papers presented at the Symposium will be compiled in the Central European Election Administrator's Guide, which will be edited by Dr. Richard Smolka, Editor of Election Administration Reports and Professor in the School of Public Administration at American University.

The Symposium will officially open on July 30 with a tour of historic Budapest followed by the Symposium inaugural dinner. Prime Minister of the Republic of Hungary, József Antall has been invited to deliver the keynote address at this

(continued on page 4)

PRE-REGISTRATION/REQUEST FOR INFORMATION

CENTRAL EUROPEAN ELECTORAL SYSTEMS SYMPOSIUM
BUDAPEST, HUNGARY
JULY 30 - AUGUST 2, 1991

Name _____

Address _____

_____

Telephone _____ Fax _____

Organization _____

_____

☐ I am interested in attending the Symposium. Please send additional information about the workshops, speakers, hotel information and symposium costs.

SYMPOSIUM (cont.)

opening dinner. After the first working day, an outdoor reception will allow the delegates to enjoy the view from Castle Hill in historic Buda. The following night, the Symposium will bring the delegates onboard a Danube river cruise ship for a buffet reception.

The centerpiece of the Symposium will be the Central European Election Commodities and Equipment Exhibit. The key decision makers regarding election administration in Central Europe will be given "hands-on" access to election commodities and equipment. To date, more than twenty vendors have expressed interest in exhibiting and attending the Symposium.

IFES is pleased to add the National Endowment for Democracy, the Charles Stewart Mott Foundation, RJR Nabisco and NYNEX Corporation to the list of corporate and charitable sponsors of the Symposium.

For more information on the Central European Electoral Systems Symposium contact Christopher Siddall at (202) 828-8507; Fax: (202) 452-0804 or send enclosed pre-registration/request for information form to IFES, 1620 I Street, N.W. Suite 611, Washington, D.C. 20006.



View from Fishermen's Bastion, Castle Hill, Budapest

Dr. Zoltán Tóth and Dr. Edit Szépe meet with IFES delegation

Place stamp here

Central European Electoral Systems Symposium
c/o International Foundation for Electoral Systems
1620 I Street, NW
Suite 611
Washington, DC 20006 USA

ELECTION CALENDAR

Selected Election Results:

The information contained here is current as of press time.

Albania: Legislative elections were held on March 31, 1991. Results were not available as of press time. They will be published in our next issue.

Bangladesh: The centrist Bangladesh Nationalist Party won 140 of 300 seats in National Parliament elections on February 27, 1991. The party is lead by Khaleda Zia, widow of assassinated president General Ziaur Rahman. The rival Awami League, an eight party coalition led by Sheik Hasina, gained 84 seats and outgoing President Ershad's Jatiya Party won 35 seats. Jamaat-e-Jalami, a right-wing Muslim fundamentalist group won 17 seats, while 11 seats went to small party alliances of the Awami League and 6 went to other small parties and independents. International observers declared the election to be fair.

Benin: In the February 17, 1991 parliamentary elections, none of the 20 parties fielding candidates emerged with a majority of the 64 parliamentary seats, although the backers of Prime Minister Nicephore Soglo won 11. In the first free presidential elections in nearly 30 years held on March 10, 1991, Prime Minister Nicephore Soglo garnered 36% of the popular vote, while President Mathieu Kerekou captured 26%. The rest of the vote was fragmented among the other 11 candidates. Because none of the 13 candidates received a majority of the vote, a run-off election between the top two contenders, Prime Minister Soglo and President Kerekou, will take place March 24. The turnout of voters from among 2 million eligible was high in this election, with some areas reporting an 80% voting rate.

Barbados: In the parliamentary elections held on January 22, 1991, the Democratic Labor Party (DLP) retained its position as the ruling party, garnering 18 of 28 seats. The Barbados Labor Party reduced the DLP's majority with a significant gain of 10 seats. The National Democratic Party was shut out. Prime Minister Erskine Sandiford will remain for a second-term. 62% of registered voters cast their ballots in these elections.

Cape Verde: The opposition party, Movement for Democracy, won 66.6% of the vote and 56 of 79 seats in legislative elections January 13. On February 17, approximately 60% of voters turned out to elect opposition candidate Antonio Masdarenhas as president, who won with a 72% margin.

El Salvador: According to the official results of the March 10 legislative elections, the governing conservative party, the Republican Nationalist Alliance (Arena) lost its majority in the new legislature although it won 39 seats in the new 84-seat legislature, Assembly of Deputies. The Christian Democratic Party (PDC) garnered 26 seats while the leftist coalition, the Democratic Convergence (CD), an alliance of three socialist parties, won 8 seats. Three smaller parties split the remainder of the vote: the rightest Party of National Conciliation won 9 seats, the Authentic Christian Movement, also rightist, won one, and the Nationalist Democratic Union, a Marxist party, won one seat. Fifty three percent of the 2.18 million Salvadorans eligible to vote turned out at the polls.

Guatemala: In the presidential runoff on January 6, Jorge Serrano won with a wide margin over Jorge Carpio. Gathering support from the growing evangelical sector, the conservative businessman drew 68% of the vote while Carpio finished with 32%. With only 45% of the electorate participating, voter turnout was moderate. As the first transfer of power from one elected president to the next, the election was free from acts of violence.

Haiti: On December 16, 1990, Haitians went to the polls for its first democratic presidential election in five years. The Rev. Jean-Bertrand Aristide, representing the National Front for Change and Democracy (NFCD), garnered an overwhelming majority of the popular vote, sixty-seven percent. His closest competitor from amid a field of eleven candidates, Marc Bazin of the Movement for the Establishment of Democracy in Haiti (MIDH), won less than fifteen percent. Aristide, a former priest popular among most of the country's poor, must now address the challenges of leading a country with staggering economic and social problems while assuaging business and international interests about his program and objective.

Haitians also voted for members of the National Assembly, a bicameral legislature, in the December elections. Legislative run-off elections were held on January 20, 1991 which determined most of the legislative races. Although no party achieved a majority in the National Assembly, the National Front for Change and Democracy won a plurality with 13

(continued on page 6)

ELECTIONS TO WATCH

Algeria: legislative, before July, 1991 (no date set)
Bangladesh: presidential, June 6, 1991 (tentative)
Bulgaria: parliamentary, by June, 1991 (no date set)
Guyana: legislative/presidential, Summer/Fall 1991 (no date set)
Kiribati: parliamentary, by May, 1991 (no date set)
Mozambique: legislative/presidential, late 1991 (no date set)
Nepal: parliamentary, May 12, 1991
Suriname: presidential/legislative, May 25, 1991
Trinidad and Tobago: parliamentary, by December 1991 (no date set)
Vanuatu: parliamentary, by November 1991 (no date set)
Zaire: presidential, December 1991 (no date set)
Zambia: legislative/presidential, October 1991 (no date set)

ELECTION WATCH (cont.)

of 27 Senate seats and 27 of 83 deputies's seats. The National Front for Change and Democracy elected Renee Preval as the Prime Minister during the last week of February. A center-left bloc supporting Aristide, consisting of the National Front for Change and Democracy and other parties is expected to form a ruling coalition.

Sao Tome and Principe: The opposition group, the Party of Democratic Convergence (PCD) gathered 70% of the vote in the first multi-party elections held in Sao Tome and Principe. The PCD placed 33 deputies in the 55-seat National Assembly. The ruling MLSTP party won approximately 30% of the vote, placing 21 deputies in the National Assembly. Two smaller parties, The Democratic Front and the Christian Democratic Front, picked up 2% of the vote. The Democratic Coalition holds 1 seat in the National Assembly. Although the MLSTP called for people to refrain from voting in the presidential election on March 3, 65% of voters went to the polls to elect Miguel Trovoada of the PCD. Because the two smaller opposition parties withdrew their candidates the day before the election, Trovoada won with an 80% majority as the only candidate. The Appeals Court of Sao Tome rejected charges of corruption and slander brought forth by the smaller opposition parties. Portuguese election observers stated that the elections were conducted peacefully.

Yugoslavia: On December 23, 1990, the second-round of elections for Serbia's multi-party parliament, the People's Assembly of Serbia, were held. The Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) claimed a majority in the parliament, adding 107 more seats to the 87 seats won in the first-round for a total of 195 seats out of 250 seats. The opposition parties and independent candidates garnered 47 more seats to add to the 9 won in the first-round for a total of 56 seats. Approximately 49% of the electorate voted in these elections.

In Slovenia, the electorate voted overwhelmingly (88.5%) in favor of an autonomous and independent Slovenia on December 23, 1990. Ninety four percent of the electorate or 1,361,738 people, voted in the plebiscite on Slovenian independence.

VIE CIVIQUE (cont.)

be the site of the Ivorian Institute for Political Studies, with local offices providing continuous civic education and training.

IACEC is firmly committed to the development of democracy in Côte d'Ivoire and the process it has outlined to achieve that goal. It has demonstrated its commitment by the extensive use of Via Civica of Nicaragua as a model for its organization. During the two years of its existence, Via Civica has grown to be a worthwhile institution unfailingly dedicated to ensuring voter education and participation of all citizens. IFES was proud to offer Via Civica as an exemplary organization to IACEC.

The citizens of many African countries are now challenged to examine the current electoral system, to develop new political parties and to ensure that all enfranchised citizens are fully aware of their rights and responsibilities. Well educated, interested and participating voters are critical to the democratic election process and its ultimate success as a form of government in Africa. IFES is very enthusiastic about the sweeping changes in Africa and will expand its program activities as opportunities arise.

Focus On Africa

The invasion of Kuwait and subsequent war have occupied international headlines since August. Events occuring in the Persian Gulf have almost completely obscured the dramatic political changes occuring in sub-Saharan Africa. As the dust settles, IFES and other international organizations will look to several African countries as they focus on the status of their electoral systems.

From Algeria to Lesotho, governments are responding to pressure from local organizations as well as international human rights groups to expand their electoral systems to include the participation of opposition parties. Such organizations are increasingly linking their financial support directly to opportunities for people to take part in the selection of their nation's leaders.

Most of the former protectorates of the United Kingdom, France and Portugal had direct electoral systems in place upon independence in the 1970s. These systems quickly degenerated into one party autocracies, with opposition parties declared illegal. Some, like Sierre Leone and Kenya, constitutionally decided on a one-party election system. Others, like Liberia, ignored their constitutional provisions and created authoritarian regimes.

A partial list of other African countries that have experienced changes and calls for electoral reform: Angola, Burkina Faso, Congo, Gabon, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Togo, Zambia and Zaire. South Africa is also to be counted as it prepares for the first time in its history to enfranchise and confer elective office upon the majority of its population.

There is no specific area of assistance that can be applied universally to the African countries. For example, civic education is essential to those countries with low voter turnout. Electoral law reform is relevant when no law exists, or when the system set up by the law no longer reflects the needs of the government. Each country must be studied to determine the particular needs of its electoral process and the degree of assistance required. During this exciting period in African history, IFES will provide comprehensive needs assessments of individual country governments and suggestions for the development of effective technical assistance programs.

SPOTLIGHT: Gonzalo Brenes Camacho

One of the key participants in IFES' Haiti project was Gonzalo Brenes Camacho, president of Costa Rica's Supreme Elections Tribunal. Mr. Brenes' years of experience in organizing elections in Costa Rica enabled him to provide Haiti's Conseil Electoral Provisoire (CEP) with advice on every aspect of the December 16, 1990 elections, from the design and printing of forms and the compilation of a national voter registry to the brieting of international observers.



Gonzalo Brenes Camacho (center) at the InterAmerican Electoral Systems Conference held in Caracas, Venezuela

In addition to his experience in Haiti with IFES, Mr. Brenes has worked with the Organization of American States in evaluating the civil registry system in the Dominican Republic and was a personal advisor to Secretary-General João Clemente Baena Soares throughout the 1990 Nicaraguan election process. He has also worked directly with the election commissions of the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Panama, Bolivia, and Paraguay. Mr. Brenes has served as an international observer in recent elections in Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Bolivia, Argentina, and Haiti.

Mr. Brenes was a featured speaker at the first InterAmerican Electoral Systems Conference, co-sponsored by IFES and CAPEL in Caracas, Venezuela in May 1990, where he addressed the topic of election day planning and logistics.

Mr. Brenes became president of Costa Rica's Elections Tribunal in 1986, a year after joining that body. Prior to that, he was chief judge of the Costa Rican administrative court system, secretary-general of the Costa Rican Supreme Court, and a judge in Costa Rica's civil courts.

CIVIC ALLIANCE IN ROMANIA

IFES Romania Program Consultant Anca Hassing spent February 1 through February 13 in Bucharest and Timisoara, Romania. The purpose of her visit was to assess non-partisan pro-democracy forces in Romania and to meet with potential participants of the Central European Electoral Systems Symposium (CEESS) being held by IFES in Budapest later this year.

According to government officials, local elections, initially planned for March 1991, will be held in the fall of 1991. All 110 registered parties still exist, although many of them do not have clear platforms.

While in Romania, Ms. Hassing interviewed prominent members of non-partisan pro-democracy groups, to determine their strengths and requirements for civic and voter education.

A recent, most positive development has been the emergence of a surprisingly energetic civil society, consisting of a large number of civic-minded groups willing and able to organize and pursue their purposes independently of state control. These independent civic groups have played and will continue to play a major role in Romania's arduous and unsteady passage to democracy. Of them, the largest and most far-reaching is Civic Alliance, established in the fall of 1990.

Civic Alliance emphasizes its determination to carry on "a balanced and patient struggle to help each citizen rise above personal interests and become responsible for the destiny and future of the country." The main goal of Civic Alliance is to encourage the development of civil society. Civic Alliance can be joined by individual members only, and is thus the first genuine grass roots organization in Romania. Political parties and other organizations are not admitted as members, but their support and endorsement are valuable assets for the newly formed organization. Civic Alliance branches have opened up in almost all 40 districts. The first Civic Alliance convention is scheduled for June 1991, at which time the coordinating committee and the commission of auditors will be elected. If necessary, changes in the statute of the organization will be operated.

A large number of smaller independent civic groups have endorsed Civic Alliance and its goals, including privatization of the economy and the return of the land to the peasants, rule of law, and the country's rapid integration in Europe.

DIRECTOR'S NOTE (cont.)

ganization dedicated to encouraging the people of Nicaragua to support the democratic process.

As I travel, I am constantly reminded that there are many who are unaware of the critical importance of the mechanics of the democratic election process. IFES is dedicated to focusing attention not only on the process itself, but also and more importantly on the types of assistance that emerging democracies require to help provide for a free, fair, and smooth-running election process. IFES is also dedicated to promoting the concept of civic education as the best means to encourage people to exercise their duties and discharge their responsibilities as they participate in the democratic process.

By focusing on the election process and on civic education, IFES is working to ensure that the gains of the democratic revolution are consolidated. We seek to strengthen those institutions directly involved in implementing democratic elections to ensure that the 1990s truly becomes the decade of democracy.

Richard W. Soudriette

IFES Director

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FY 1990 DEMOCRATIC INITIATIVES AND HUMAN RIGHTS PROGRAM SUMMARY

Democratic Institution-Building
by Region

AFRICA*

BENIN

$16,000 for the Benin chapter of the African Jurists Association. The Benin chapter of the AJA will use this grant to organize a conference and series of workshops on the theme of "reform of Benin's basic legal texts" and other human rights issues.

$4,500 through the government's ongoing "Popularization" campaign to assist in financing the printing of the recent draft constitution for disbursement to the public during the period prior to the popular referendum.

$25,000 for the newly formed Human Rights Commission.

$25,000 to the GOB to help support the upcoming elections, including the constitutional referendum.

BURKINA FASO

$20,000 to fund the Burkina Movement for the Rights of Man and Peoples (MDBHP). The grant will cover start-up and administrative expenses for the MDBHP human rights handbook and a multilingual pamphlet on constitutional government and the rule of law.

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

$3,000 to the GOCAF to provide a labor consultant to advise Bangui unions on preparing for the National Congress. Funds will also send an elected union representative to the interior of the CAR to aid in the organization of rural unions.

CHAD

$75,000 to the GOC for promotion of efforts toward elective democracy through assistance including voting list revision, ballot printing, and administrative costs.

$20,000 for Justice of the Peace Training.

(*the program in South Africa, a related but separate activity, appears as an appendix on page 20.)

CONGO

$4,000 to Congo's first human rights committee to finance office supplies for the printing of advertizing flyers and information pamphlets on human rights for the initial meeting. Funds will also aid administrative office operations.

$1,300 grant to the Association of Women Jurists of the Congo, a Congolese legal association, to launch the Association and to arrange and present a three day meeting in Brazziville to publicize legal and human rights in the region.

GHANA

$7,000 to fund the preparation of a brochure which extends the knowledge of the Ghanan Legal Board and its services to a wider audience of potential beneficiaries. Areas covered will include: legal aid, basic rights of citizens, eligibility, and information on applications for membership.

GUINEA BISSAU

$35,000 to support the promulgation of a new constitution and electoral law, in order to assist the government of Guinea-Bissau in its efforts to politically complete the transformation from a state-controlled to a liberalized economy and political system.

$6,750 material support for Guinea Bissau Ministry of Justice.

IVORY COAST

$2,500 to defray the costs of publication of a human rights brochure by the Human Rights League watchdog group. This bi-monthly publication will add to the strength of the rule of law, the administration of justice, and methods of reporting.

$10,000 to the Human Rights League's watchdog publication.

LESOTHO

$15,000 to train court clerks and registrars of the high court to improve the administration of justice and provide additional efficiency. Lectures, workshops, and on-the-job training will be provided to the clerks and magistrates as well as to new entrants to the judicial system.

MALAWI

$9,500 to support the creation of a bilingual handbook on women's rights and a foundation for women in development. The handbook will discuss issues ranging from forms of protection under the law to land ownership rights.

$15,000 to the Malawi Law Society to start a quarterly law review. The MLS will publish this quarterly to announce precedent-making supreme high court decisons. Currently there is a 13 year backlog of lengthy judgements for which there is no efficient method of reference and retrieval.

MALI

$6,000 to the Association Mutualistic de la Magistrative (AMUMA) to undertake a study to evaluate and propose reforms of the penal code and to clarify rights of detainees. Discussion forums for government employees, legal authorities, and the public will be presented with the findings.

$6,250 to Jamanna Press to research and write a booklet series. Three subjects will be covered: The Rights of Individuals and the Family, The Police and the Citizen, and The Judicial System in Mali. The project will help inform the average Malian of his rights and enable the legal system to become more approachable.

MOZAMBIQUE

$14,200 to support an autonomous "Organizing Commission" to plan and execute a series of seminars on constitutional reform. Public participation will be encouraged during Mozambique's process of democratization.

NIGERIA

$14,000 to support the Civil Liberties Organization (CLO), a human rights watchdog group of attorneys, to focus on the development of democratic principles and institutions with an emphasis on the legal systems.

$10,000 to the Nigerian Association of University Women (NAUW) to finance voter registration and to expand its voter education network for the transition to civilian rule in 1992.

RWANDA

$10,000 for Magistrates training.

SAO TOME & PRINCIPE

$40,000 to a U.S. election consultant to provide technical electoral support and to research the recent constitutional referendum. A consultant will assess the country's needs and provide advise on organization and implementation of the general elections and will supply financial support for regional material for the electoral process.

SENEGAL

$14,000 to the government of Senegal for support and production of materials for use in civics courses in local schools. This enhancement of responsibilities of citizens will present a more even instruction pattern with greater emphasis on the organization and responsibilities of the government.

SIERRA LEONE

$25,000 to continue a multi-year program of training court stenographers who will continue to provide trial records for both judges and juries. The grant will also continue to support the financing of legal material to allow better preparation of cases in accordance with English common law.

TANZANIA

$20,000 to the University of Dar Es Salaam Legal Aid Committee to finance two legal aid camps for training and providing seminars, individual counseling, and the distribution of legal literature. Additionally, the present monthly production of the Kiswahilli bulletin will continue. Its goal is to discuss constitutional and general law with regard to basic human rights.

TOGO

$5,000 to the Togo Human Rights Commission.

$26,000 to support the Togolese Human Rights Commissions in publishing a series of human rights bulletins to educate the Togolese of their basic human rights and to serve as a clearinghouse for human rights activities.

UGANDA

$2,500 to the Association of Women Lawyers to publish and disseminate a collection of studies on the treatment and rights of the women of Uganda to government leaders, the press, academics, the police and the general public. The association lobbies the Ugandan parliament to enact stronger laws combatting violence against women and to raise their access to political and legal institutions.

$1,500 to assist the Ugandan Human Rights Group (UHRA), a non-partisan organization, in the publication of a human rights report and the magazine "The Activist". Funding will assist with the purchases of paper and newsprint imported from Kenya.

ZAIRE

$7,500 to the Judicial Council and Kinshasa Bar Association to provide legal aid to indigents at no cost.

$9,000 to the production of Moribund Law Facility Review Journals. These journals increase support for administration reform and adherence to human rights.

ZIMBABWE

$8,000 to the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (CCPJ) leaflets on the advantages of multi-party democracy.

$16,500 to Harare Legal Resources Foundation (HLRF) to establish a legal projects center in Masvingo. This will assist HLRF extend the benefits of Zimbabwe's western-based legal system and to broaden the segment of the community that is involved in administering the law.

$25,000 to the University of Zimbabwe in election and campaign monitoring. Funds are directed toward training an election monitoring team and suppling educational support materials.

BUREAU FOR ASIA AND PRIVATE ENTERPRISE

BANGLADESH

$41,130 through The Asia Foundation (TAF) for the Bangladesh Society for the Enforcement of Human Rights (BSEHR) whose project will strengthen the grantee's work encouraging public confidence in the rule of law at the national level.

$25,691 through AAFLI to support human rights workshops for women garment workers.

$46,150 to the GOB for support for the protection of human rights through an investigation team.

$300,000 through TAF toward the Institutional Strengthening and Civic Participation project.

FIJI:

$45,249 through TAF to strengthen the capacity of the judiciary in Fiji by promoting awareness of and adherence to the laws in the government and society. Efficiency in the judiciary, public access to the law, and the implementation of judicial training are to be the major focuses of this project.

INDONESIA

$118,570 to the GOI for support for TAF to support a labor law review panel and video documentary production training facility and facilitators to promote legal awareness among environmental groups.

MALDIVES

$85,110 to the GOM for program support for the training of headmasters in civic education.

NEPAL

$820,000 to the GON for a program to support a wide range of political, economic, and social pluralism activities during the pre-election period.

$50,000 through TAF to strengthen the Judicial Training Center. This program will promote human rights in Nepal by encouraging adherence to the rule of law through a legal framework conductive to civil and political rights. The Center is responsible for training judges and government attorneys who will then become more accessible to all Nepalese citizens with cause to use the system.

PAPUA NEW GUINEA

$25,000 through TAF to continue and expand Legal Education and Assistance to the Provinces program (LEAP). Expansions will include legal aid and education activities through the University of the South Pacific.

SRI LANKA

$439,849 to the GOSR for support for democratic integration efforts through human resource development using the private sector and non-government communities.

$54,540 through TAF to develop and manage a pilot clinical legal aid program. The project will: introduce law students to a variety of practical skills necessary for a successful practice; provide free legal counselling and assist with low income advocacy services; and promote a community legal service project.

THAILAND

$40,000 through the AAFLI to advance the knowledge and participation of worker rights.

$600,000 to the GOT for a program to increase citizen access through private voluntary organizations, strengthen elective representation, and improve government responsiveness.

BUREAU FOR EUROPE AND THE NEAR EAST

Europe

BULGARIA

$2,237,000 through the NED to assist with democratic institution building. Organizations and projects included: NDI to provide assistance in the development of the Bulgarian Association for Fair Elections (BAFE), a non-partisan election monitoring organization; NRI to provide support to the United Democratic Front (UDF) in the form of seminars as well as infrastructure support to prepare for the national election;

IFES to send a pre-election survey team for the national elections to study the new electoral law and structures designed to implement elections; Institute for Democracy in Eastern Europe (IDEE) to supply the Federation of Independent Student Associations with basic infrastructure support to help improve its outreach capacity and strengthen its contacts in other Eastern European countries; FTUI to assist the independent trade union Podkrepa to organize its members to enable them to participate in the national election; and, Freedom House in providing needed supplies to the UDF's independent newspaper.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

$1,018,000 through the following organizations to assist with democratic institution building: NDI for workshops for leaders and organizers of several political parties; NRI to send an international observer mission for the election to monitor the final stages of the process; IDEE to provide assistance in the form of infrastructure support to independent groups, including the Civic Forum; IDEE to provide assistance in the form of infrastructure support to independent groups, including the Public Against Violence, the Slovak counterpart of the Civic Forum; Freedom House to provide assistance to Lidove Noviny, the first independent daily in the country, in the form of technical equipment; and, FTUI to provide support to the Czechoslovkia Trade Union to participate effectively in the election and provide leadership training to unionists.

HUNGARY

$257,000 through the National Republican Institute for International Affairs (NRI) to provide pre-election material assistance to opposition political parties, a public opinion survey, long -term political management training and election monitoring teams.

$233,391 through the Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) to provide pre-election material assistance to opposition political parties, a public opinion survey, long -term political management training and election monitoring teams.

$502,000 through the Free Trade Union Institute (FTIU) to assist the Democratic League of Independent Trade Unions in Hungary in organizing a campaign of non-partisan voter education and participation.

$549,700 through SUNY/Albany (State University of New York) to strengthen and support the capacity of the Hungarian Parliament.

POLAND

$3,009,000 through National Endowment for Democracy (NED) to assist with democratic institution building.

ROMANIA

$2,162,000 through NED to assist with democratic institution building.

YUGOSLAVIA

$271,000 through the following organizations to assist with democratic institution building: NDI to organize a conference on democratic political structures to address central Yugoslavian issues; NRI to send a team to asses the needs of the major organizations which are part of the democratic opposition. Additionally an election observation team was sent for the April elections; and, Congressional Human Rights Foundation to sponsor a conference on human rights and pluralism and their roles in national politics and international relations.

REGIONAL

$1,000,000 through USIA and NED focussed on the establishment of independent radio and TV stations, newspapers and journals, and on training for independent journalists on professional standards.

$894,000 through NED for regional democratic initiatives including rule of law activities.

Near East

AFGHANISTAN

$121,070 to the GOA support for a series of seminars on future judiciary and legal system structures, women's educational opportunities, and seminars and publications on pluralism and human rights.

JORDAN

$52,270 through AMIDEAST for legal education and training supporting the Arab Organization for Human Rights. This program was timed to coincide during the Parliamentarian reorganizations.

MOROCCO

$50,000 through AMIDEAST to continue to support local initiatives in developing and existing activities which promote civic and political rights. The three target areas include: The Judiciary through the Institute National d'Estudes Judiciaries, the academic community, and the Association Democratique des Femmes del Morocco (ADFM) which is concerned with women's issues.

PAKISTAN

$95,762 to the Lawyers for Human Rights and Legal Aid (LHRLA) to fund continuing operations of a legal aid center in Karachi for a two-year period. Such assistance will support activities protecting human rights by acting as a medium for appropriate action curbing such violations. This will be accomplished through judicial training and expansion of public information.

$32,334 to prepare a report on problems and issues confronting women and to prepare a solution for improving the status of women.

$73,772 to fund a half-way home for destitute women. These women are victims of human rights abuses and will be given legal aid and information outlining their legal and civil rights. This type of program, where legal aid and shelter are combined, previously has not been placed in a unitary setting in Pakistan.

$47,147 through TAF to support the production of a quarterly newsletter on human rights to increase the awareness among various segments of the population, domestic and abroad. The grant will also cover the costs of a scanner and laser printer, allowing the program to become self-sustaining.

$75,000 through TAF for a publications and information series by AURAT to promote knowledge of the women of NWFP of their rights through legal aid and legal literacy. Funds will assist in holding lectures and seminars, publishing brochures, and arranging short courses for paralegals and other women.

PHILIPPINES:

$200,000 through TAF to alleviate the inadequacy and inefficiency of the formal dispute mechanisms of the Philippine judicial sector. This funding will continue to promote an officially recognized mechanism to provide an alternative to

litigation. This will ease the strain on reserves and time of using the formal judicial system by providing regional/provincial councils which will deal with conflicts where the potential jail term is less than 30 days or the fine is less than 200 pesos. The estimated governmental savings from completing this system is believed to exceed 2 billion pesos.

$30,000 through AAFLI to produce, direct, and air a series of human rights radio dramas to provide information and present life-like situations to a diverse listening audience. The estimated audience of 3 to 5 million will be exposed to questions and complaints of violations of human rights and will be presented with options of response and organizations where assistance is available. Program scripts will be made available to trade unions and other organizations for their human rights training programs.

TUNISIA:

$59,000 through AMIDEAST was recommended to provide leadership and influence in the support of human rights activities in Tunisia through the use of several organizations including: The Tunisian League of Human Rights, The National Union of Tunisian Women, The Center for University Research in Law, The Academy for Constitutional Law, and other emerging organizations. AMIDEAST will present training fellowships, scholarships, publications, conferences, and consultations with noted experts to engage the recommended proposal.

$25,000 program through the Asian-American Free Labor Institute (AAFLI) to support labor union leadership training.

YEMEN

$120,000 through AMIDEAST to develop a constitutional court. Funds will be delegated to assist the Yemeni parliament in preparing a staffing pattern for administration of the court. This will be used in training the administration and legal staff and judges of the court to how best fulfill their responsibilities. Workshops will be held for the staff and judges of the court to present how best to communicate thus allowing smooth proceedings in the new court.

$600,000 program through the TSFS, SUNY/Albany, GAO, and the GOY, to support activities to strengthen democratically elected legislative institutions, strength judicial institutions and the effective, and efficient administration of justice, and encourage and help to channel participatory democracy.

REGIONAL

$81,194 through the International Institute of Higher Studies in Criminal Studies (ISISC) to train journalists on human rights issues and to raise the awareness of the issue in the Arab world. Invited countries include: Egypt, Jordan, YAR, Tunisia, Morocco, The Sudan, Lebanon, Oman, and the occupied territories of the West Bank and Gaza. The participants will be from all media sectors including opposition press and women and minority representatives. Respect and observance, enhancement of networking, accurate and increased coverage, and strengthening of democratic initiatives are the major areas of focus.

LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

BOLIVIA

$1,038,000 for the Bolivia Justice Sector Project, which included selected studies on case-flow management, judicial training, court administration, and personnel management; judicial training courses; broad computer applications; and information management.

CHILE

$430,000 to IIDH/CAPEL (Inter-American Institute of Human Rights/Center for Educational Assistance and Promotion) to continue support for civic education in Chile through assistance to consolidate a Chilean NGO, Participa, into a permanent, non-partisan, volunteer civic education organization serving the democratic system in Chile through programs addressed to youth, women and the general populace.

$47,000 to Development Associates to assist with the Participa proposals.

$300,000 for the Chile Legislative Assistance Center to strengthen democracy in Chile through the development of a strong and efficient legislative branch. The complete 3-year program will also assure the permanence of the Comparative Development Studies Center at SUNY/Albany (CEAL) as a self-supporting institution after the project is completed.

$142,000 through the National Democratic Institute (NDI) for election observers.

COLOMBIA

$2,134,000 to improve protection for judges and other individuals under threat of narco-terrorist attack; improve the capacity of the justice system to resolve cases effectively; and provide funding for the ongoing International Criminal Investigative Training and Assistance Program (ICITAP).

$1,100,000 to the Colombian Foundation for Higher Education (FES) to complete ongoing activities and to conduct analytical and other pilot-work for the development of a multi-year, bi-lateral government to government program for FY91-94. Grant activities have focused on the following activities: a) study and research related to reform within the judicial system; b) automated criminal case distribution system; c) strengthen legal libraries and access to legal information; d) judicial training; and e) judicial protection.

ECUADOR

$115,000 grant to Latin American Institute for Prevention of Crime and Treatment of the Offender (ILANUD) for the implementation of a judicial sector assessment in Ecuador as a preliminary step in developing an administration of justice project. The assessment will provide baseline data needed to design the project and will also serve as a vehicle for policy dialogue with the court and other sector institutions.

EL SALVADOR

$490,000 to strengthen the Legislative Assembly to engage in more analytical and informed policy dialogue, both internally and with other branches of government. Project resources are used to expand the Assembly's Data Resource Center and Services, purchase equipment, and carry out training programs for representatives and staff.

$3,000,000 to the Judicial Reform Project to improve the administrative, technical, and legal performance of the criminal justice system by supporting: legal reform (through CORELESAL); the Judicial Protection Unit (SIU); and judicial administration and training.

$500,000 to strengthen the Salvadoran Federation of Bar Associations to enable it to better serve its members' interests and those of the general citizenry.

GUATEMALA

$1,000,000 for election observer activities (through the Center for Democracy and FUNDESA), an orientation program for the national congressmen (through ESTNA), and several activities with the Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman, in order to strengthen these institutions and other groups dedicated to responsible democratic government, human rights, and civic education.

$600,000 to assist in the implementation of needed judicial reforms by: training and establishing a civil service for judicial personnel; improving the legal defense system; strengthening the public prosecutor system; and establishing improved systems for planning and administration of the judicial system.

$600,000 to provide consultation and fellowship programs through Harvard Law School in order to: strengthen the institutional capacity of Guatemala's judicial branch; improve the criminal justice system; and provide recommendations for actions to be taken to respond to identified needs.

$500,000 under a cooperative agreement with the Center for Democracy to provide technical assistance, training, and computer and other equipment to the Guatemala Congress. In addition, the Center is to perform studies of several subjects fundamental to a well-functioning legislature.

HAITI

$4,500,000 to provide financial and technical assistance (including training, civic education, and procurment of essential elections commodities - i.e. registration materials and communications equipment) to the Provisional Electoral Council and related organizations so they can contribute to the process of carrying out free, fair, and credible democratic elections in Haiti.

$5,500,000 toward general election assistance through four subgrants: IFES for operating costs mainly commodities, which included computers and ballot boxes, and other administrative supplies; NED for assistance with pre-election and election day activities; Organization of American States (OAS) for monitoring and observer missions during the election; and United Nations Development Project (UNDP) for operating costs.

HONDURAS

$5,000,000 to: strengthen the court system in civil and criminal justice; improve the legislative effectivness of the Honduran Congress; strengthen electoral institutions (National Elections Tribunal and the National Registry); and provide democratic leadership training.

$70,000 through the National Republican Institute (NRI) to place election observers during the Presidential and Legislative elections.

GUYANA

$693,000 toward general election assistance including election observers and technical training through a number of sub-grantees including NDI and IFES.

PANAMA

$1,500,000 to assist Panamanian efforts to re-establish and consolidate representative government by: providing civic education and training of youth in democratic principles; strengthening the new Electoral Tribunal; and dtrengthening the legislative assembly.

$13,200,000 for the ICITAP program in Panama to promote the civilianization, professionalization, and integration into the criminal justice system of the police force, thus helping to make the Public Defense Force into one that will respect human rights and contribute to the institutionalization of democracy in Panama.

$1,122,000 toward Panamanian assistance programs including: commodities for courtrooms, administration of justice workshops, democratic initiative needs assessment, several new project designs, and a journalism project. Principle grantees include: FIU, CCI Inc., CAPEL, and Checci & Company.

PARAGUAY

$100,000 through NED to provide support, through a series of subgrants, to a broad cross-section of democratic civic groups inside Paraguay prior to and after the Presidential and Congressional elections. The activities supported by this grant will seek to: (1) strengthen the democratic electoral process through timely measures in cooperation with indigenous democratic forces; (2) support the participation of NED's U.S. institutes in fostering cooperation with those Paraguayans dedicated to the cultural values and institutions of democratic pluralism; and (3) encourage the establishment and growth of democratic development.

NICARAGUA

$4,000,000 to promote democratic initiatives through a number of training and support programs including: legislative support through the Consortium for Legislative Development; and analysis of the Constitution and laws with Amb. Ayales (Costa Rica); a Central American Journalism Project (CAJP) which will develop regional seminars for Nicaraguan journalists; USIS training for TV and newspaper media and the training of key personnel in the Department of Information and Press; civic education activities in urban areas by Comision Permanente de Derechos Humanos (CPDH) and in rural areas by Asociacion Nicaraguense Pro de Derechos Humanos (ANPDH); an AIFLD cooperative agreement for $700,000 to be part of the Regional Cooperative Agreement for labor related training activities; and civic education and assistance activities through the NED.

$1,500,000 through National Endowment for Democracy (NED) which was contributed, in part, to the Organization of American States for election monitoring activities relating to the presidential, legislative, and municipal elections.

$250,000 through the Center for Democracy to observe and report on the electoral process during the entire election period. Activities also include gathering and distributing information on the elections to participants.

$400,000 through the Carter Center to observe pre-election and election-day activities and present conclusions to interested governments and to the world press.

$400,000 through the CAPEL to provide instructional material and technical assistance for the Supreme Electoral Council's pollwatcher training program.

$82,000 through Freedom House to sponsor two delegations of Eastern European and Soviet diplomats to observe pre-election and election week activities and to report on the political rights situation during the electoral process.

$7,735,000 through NED to five sub-grants encompassing: the Instituto para la Promocion y la Capacitacion Electoral (IPCE) to encourage participation and confidence in the electoral process with the long-term objectives of fostering an informed citizenry and strong democratic institutions; Union Nacional Opositora (UNO) to support a broad-based alliance of Nicaraguan parties and enable UNO to perform normal party functions; Free Trade Union Institute (FTUI) and the Confederation de Unification Sindical (CUS) to mobilize workers and their families to participate in the electoral process and strengthen the ability of the democratic trade unions to support human and worker's rights; and, International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) to support a democratic civic movement from key sectors of Nicaraguan society through grassroots democratic education programs, seminars, and the process of constitutional guarantees.

$235,000 through the NED to assist with the rebuilding of a Nicaraguan radio station.

URUGUAY

$100,000 through FIU and ILANUD to continue Administration of Justice program activities by supporting courses for Uruguayan government officers and court administrators.

REGIONAL

$600,000 to the IIDH, the final tranche of the five-year grant that ends August 1991. This continues support for research and education programs throughout the region.

$125,000 to Management Systems Internatioal (MSI) to develop indicators for measuring progress toward democracy strengthening goals throughout the region.

$300,000 to the National Democratic Institute (NDI) to provide support for bipartisan election activities in Latin America and the Caribbean and support Latin American participation on election observer missions to other regions during FY90. NDI will recruit and engage qualified personnel to participate on pre-election observer missions, advance teams, and election day observer missions; provide logistical support for program activities; provide participants with briefing materials and arrange itineraries for delegates; and produce and distribute final reports.

$270,000 to American University to continue and expand activities aimed at improving civilian-military relations in LAC. New research will be undertaken, a regional dialogue will be held among Southern Cone and Andean countries, and new programs in Panama and Nicaragua will examine issues related to demilitarization and establishment of civilian police forces.

$1,350,000 to support the Regional Administration of Justice Project (RAJP) through ILANUD . Since January of 1989, ILANUD Training Department has carried out 25 regional and national activities. In addition, 23 lawyers from Central America and the Dominican Republic have participated in the Graduate Law Scholarship Program at the University of Costa Rica. Under the Advisory Services component of the Project, ILANUD carried out 35 technical assistance assignments and 25 training activities. Projects were initiated in Court Administration, Environmental Legal Protection, and Agrarian Justice. ILANUD has delivered ten libraries which are fully catalogued collections totalling over 7,000 books and other documents. Under ILANUD's judicial training section, several Latin American countries have received bench manuals for judges, key tools in upgrading the judicial function and creating uniformity in sentencing.

$450,000 through the Florida International University's Center (FIU) for Administration of Justice to provide technical assistance to ILANUD, RAJO, LAC/DI, USAIDs, and participating countries. FIU has provided project identification assistance in Paraguay and Uruguay and training needs assessment of the judiciary and prosecutor's office in Panama and Equador. In Costa Rica, FIU is helping the National Commission through: (1) an update of the sector assessment; (2) evaluation of the law enforcement agencies; (3) development of a draft civil service law for law enforcement agencies; (4) review of record keeping in the correctional system; (5) establishment of an information system in the judiciary; and (6) creation of a judicial planning unit. FIU is publishing a number of documents which include publications on criminal codes, laws of court organizations, and special procedures for drug offenses. FIU will distribute these to the Supreme Courts of LA countries and to appropriate libraries in the region.

$1,300,000 toward the Central American Journalism Project (CAJP), implemented by the FIU to establish a "training mentality" that recognizes the value of professional development. Training seminars, held mostly in the region, are being offered covering such areas as writing for mass media, radio/TV news production, journalism education and ethics. A total of 30 individuals will undertake graduate training, many of whom are expected to become journalism educators in their own countries.

$773,000 through the Consortium for Legislative Development, which is comprised of three private institutions: The Center for Democracy, the State University of New York at Albany, and Florida International University (FIU). This two-year regional legislative development program will provide resources for four project components: assessments of the institutional development needs of the different LAC legislatures; training through regional workshops, on-site, and Master's degree programs; and technical assistance and some selected commodities to increase the management capacity of legislatures in ten countries.

$630,000 toward grants to OEF International's Education for Participation (PEP) program to present a training program in Honduras, Costa Rica, and Guatemala to assist citizens at the grassroots level to learn and use leadership and organizational skills to address local problems. Training manuals, videos, and other materials were developed, tested and used effectively to train more that 350 individuals. The training reached more than 160 community-based organizations, benefiting more than 200,000 individuals in communities that now have access to potable water, literacy classes, health services and access roads that did not exist prior to actions taken by PEP-assisted community groups.

$860,000 to the Regional Financial Management Improvement Project to offer government officials a program to improve accountability standards and financial management practices through Price-Waterhouse.

$7,940,000 through American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD) to promote free labor development programs throughout the region.

$251,000 through Partners of the Americas for various country-specific development progects.

CENTRAL FUNDING

Bureau for Science and Technology

$150,000 through Decentralization: Finance and Management (DFM) to promote improvement of rural infrastructure, including improving financing mechanisms for maintenance of rural roads and irrigation systems in Nepal, Zaire, Banladesh, and Indonesia. DFM has also done work in Cameroon on institutional development for privatization of coffee marketing and in the Sahel on natural resource management. An element in all of these efforts is enhancing democratic institutions at the local level in order to improve incentives to provide maintenance and effective resource management.

$90,000 producing a workshop on Transitions to Democracy, held by the National Academy of Sciences, to develop a better understanding of how A.I.D. projects could enhance the transition to democracy in developing countries.

Bureau for Policy and Program Coordination

$50,000 to the African Centre for Democracy and Human Rights (ACDHRS) in the Gambia to provide for a series of human rights training workshops for selected upper level magistrates from five francophone countries, including Benin, Cameroon, Gabon, Guinea, and Togo, focusing on the rule of law, relevant human rights standards and the administration of justice, including courtroom management, professional ethics and the role of non-government organizations in human rights.

$50,000 to Consortium for Service to Latin America (CSLA) to provide for a survey of the status of legal systems in selected African francophone countries and to explore the feasibility of a regional Administration of Justice program.

$10,000 to a contractor to review what research applications and indicators exist in the fields of human rights as it relates to the developing world, and to propose concepts for strengthening the role of human rights in U.S. foreign policy.

$245,000 to the Hoover Institution for a two-year program to study the relationship between the economic and social structures of developing countries and their prospects for evolving and maintaining democratic governments. A principle thrust of the project will study how the relationship between market competition and autonomous economic organization affect the prospect for democracy in developing countries.

$200,000, as part of a five-year grant, to International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) to perform five primary functions. These include: election observation; technical electoral assistance; statistical election analysis; election problem analysis; and election information transfer. In coordination with the USG, IFES works closely with USAID Missions and, as appropriate, other embassy officials to coordinate appropriate responses to requests for technical assistance, analysis, information or observers.

$50,000 to the Administrative Office of the United States Courts for assistance in conducting an International Judicial Conference including the Chief Justices or Chief Judicial Officers of A.I.D.-assisted countries. The two primary objectives of the conference are: the protection by the judiciary of the principles of each nation's constitutional system through judicial review of executive and legislative actions; and to present a forum for the discussion of the problems they share in the administration of justice in their respective countries.

$175,000 to the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) for Nepal to provide pre-election assessments, which includes specific recommendations for technical electoral assistance.

SOUTH AFRICAN HUMAN RIGHTS FUND

OVERVIEW OF FUNDING

$2,000,000 was obligated in FY90, through a total of 88 grant agreements or amendments providing incremental funding.

--$895,000 was obligated in 13 grant actions (3 new agreements, 10 amendments) under the Legal and Other Assistance element authorized by FAA section 116(f);

--$755,000 was obligated in 72 new agreements under the Small Grants element authorized by FAA section 116(e)(2);

--$175,000 was obligated in one amendment under the Victims of Violence element authorized by FAA section 116(g); and

--$175,000 was obligated in two agreements under the Democratic Alternatives element authorized by FAA section 116(g).

LEGAL AND OTHER ASSISTANCE

The thirteen agreements or amendments, totaling $895,000, executed in FY90 are the following:

--a grant for $50,000 for human rights legal work by a private black attorney in the rural area of the Northern Transvaal.

--a grant for $30,000 for a specific political trial.

--a grant for $50,000 for general human rights work by black attorneys in East London (Cape), serving black rural communities from the Ciskei.

--a grant for $100,000 for general human rights legal work by black public interest law group.

--a grant for $70,000 for a legal project focusing on actual cases of violence in Natal which examines the actions of the police, security forces, magistrates, judges and the laws and procedures in operation from the time of the killing until the conviction or release of the accused. The results will be used to support judicial reforms.

-- a grant for $75,000 to support a community legal project seeking to develop the capacity within rural communities to use the laws to protect the rights of the black community and its individual members.

--a grant for $80,000 for specific major cases involving forced removals of black communities.

--a grant for $100,000 for general human rights legal work by the public interest division of a private law firm.

--four grants totalling $260,000 for general human rights legal work.

--a grant for $80,000 for general human rights legal work by a black law group and for its legal clinics located in rural areas.

SMALL GRANTS (72 GRANTS TOTALLING $755,000)*

Distribution by activity and location

Twenty-six grants totalling $235,000 (31.1%) were for legal aid and black township advice centers, focussing on human and civil rights matters.

--8 located in rural areas--$ 64,600 (27.5%)
--18 located in urban areas--$170,400 (72.5%)

Seventeen grants totalling $178,500 (23.6%) were for "think tanks" and organizations working on human rights and constitutional/legal reform.

Eight grants totalling $100,000 (13.3%) were for human rights litigation.

--4 located in rural areas--$40,000 (40.0%)
--4 located on urban areas--$60,000 (60.0%)

Seven grants totalling $64,000 (8.5%) were for civics (alternative political structures).

--2 (28.6%) located in rural areas--$20,000 (31.3%)
--5 (71.4%) located in urban areas--$44,000 (68.7%)

Three grants totalling $30,000 (4.2%) provided to support detainees and political prisoners.

--2 located in rural areas--$20,000 (67.7%)
--1 located in urban areas--$10,000 (33.3%)

Five grants totalling $98,000 (13.0%) were for opposing forced removals and the Group Areas Act.

(* Sixty-nine grants were for $10,000 or less (average size $9,940). Three $30,000 grants were concluded under the FAA Section 116(e)(2)(ii) exception to the $10,000 grant ceiling which permits a total of $100,000 per year in grants of up to $30,000.)

Six grants totalling $49,500 (6.6%) were for other activities.

--$8,000 (16.2%) to a church organization to assist victims of police shootings.

--$10,000 (20.2%) to support the efforts of a black and a white student organization jointly attempting to form one non-racial student body.

--$10,000 (20.2%) to a human rights organization to set-up a tracing system for people arrested.

--$10,000 (20.2%) to a church organization doing human rights work in the impoverished areas around Pretoria.

--$10,000 (20.2%) for media support.

--$1,500 (3.0%) to a church organization doing human rights work in the Northern Transvaal.

FY90 SMALL GRANTS, BRIEF DESCRIPTION

In FY90, Small Grant funds supported:

--a community education center conducting street law projects in townships and rural communities in the violence-stricken Pietermaritzburg area;

--a campaign aimed at highlighting the plight of the families and the fate of the 26 people convicted in the well-known Upington 26 trial under the notorious "common purpose" doctrine;

--legal costs of a church organization claiming compensation from the Minister of Law and Order on behalf of one of their priests who was hit with a teargas canister and lost his eyesight as a result;

--an organization setting up a tracing service whereby a person who has been arrested can phone the organization using a toll free number so that the organization can, in turn, notify the accused's family, attorney or support organization(s) of the arrest and the police unit involved;

--a black theater group in Johannesburg helping homeless street children most deeply affected by the inequalities of apartheid to develop a means of expressing and re-focussing their frustrations in a non-violent, creative manner;

--an ecumenical consultancy group undertaking a series of nation-wide consultations on the feasibility of establishing a Martin Luther King project in South Africa;

--an attorney in Pietersburg doing human rights work in rural areas;

--an attorney involved in rent boycotts actions of black townships in the Vaal Triangle area;

--a workshop to formulate the merger of two major university student groups, one black and one white;

--a series of workshops on continuing legal education and training for black lawyers;

--a black rural community threatened with forced removal;

--a law group seeking changes in the application of the death penalty in South Africa particularly as it relates to blacks;

--a conference sponsored by a human rights legal organization on constitutional reform and negotiations;

--a rural-based human rights legal unit providing legal services to the nearby townships and to rural farm workers;

--a legal aid unit doing legal and human rights work in townships located in violence-stricken areas of Natal;

--a Durban-based group focusing on mediating the violence in Natal;

--a detainee support group in the Northern Transvaal providing assistance to detainees;

--a church group to help cover burial costs after five youths were shot by the South African police in the Orange Free State;

--a Natal human rights institute carrying out an interracial youth conference on future constitutional alternatives;

--human rights attorneys based in the northern Transvaal working on rural cases;

--a research project of a prominent human rights expert to examine the question of what role the law and a future constitution can play in redressing the economic and social injustices caused by apartheid;

--a debate by different political groupings on post-apartheid issues such as constitutional development, land tenure and judicial reform;

--a series of nationwide conferences on interracial mediation;

--a law students group publishing a legal service manual which will be distributed free of charge to advice centers and community organizations;

--the costs of a multi-faceted research and reconciliation initiative run by a multi-racial church group;

--a litigation fund for a group of lawyers handling human rights and related cases in the rural areas of the Eastern Transvaal;

--the purchase of equipment for a group working with problems faced by the so-called "squatter" communities in the Eastern Cape;

--a research group developing the basic framework for a graduate program in Public Policy and Development (no such program exists today in SA) which will help to address the shortage of skilled black personnel who could take over the management of major government departments;

--a publication commissioning a series of papers that would make a constructive contribution on how major development funding might be directed to remove or reduce the underlying conditions that have, in part, given rise to the violence and conflict in Natal;

--travel and accommodation costs for two U.S. human rights/legal experts to participate in a constitutional conference organized by a black lawyers association;

--a trust, which was established as a result of successful human rights litigation, which will be developing projects and other support for so-called "squatter" communities in the Cape area;

--a church-related group providing support to a large number of recently released political prisoners;

--a human rights pressure group fronting for black business in a "whites only" business area of Pretoria;

--a think tank group dealing with issues such as land and constitutional reform in a post-apartheid South Africa;

--a human rights group which uncovered the activities of the Civil Cooperation Bureau (CCB), which was allegedly responsible for the deaths of many anti-apartheid activists;

--a black attorney doing human rights work in Johannesburg;

--a black attorney doing human rights work in the East Rand;

--a church organization in the Northern Transvaal doing human rights work;

--a black public interest law firm providing legal assistance to civics;

--an Afrikaans newspaper involved in exposing the activities of the Civil Cooperation Bureau (CCB);

--twenty-six legal clinics and community advice centers which serve as a critical link to disadvantaged communities in providing them vital information about their human and civil rights. Without these important offices, the majority of blacks, particularly those in rural areas, would have no access to legal assistance, nor an understanding of their rights and that the law can serve their legitimate interests. It must also be remembered that among thirty million black South Africans, there are only 700 black lawyers, 25 black advocates (i.e. barristers) and no black judges. Of the 26 clinics and advice centers supported this FY, 19 were located in urban areas and seven in rural areas; and

--six so-called "civics"--alternative political structures that articulate the problems and needs of urban and rural blacks. Civic associations were formed in almost all black townships as an effort to undermine the 1983 Black Local Authority Act (BLAA) which, in fact, excluded blacks from taking part in the decision making processes of local government. These civics became so powerful during the state of emergency that most of their leaders were detained. Since the partial lifting of the state of emergency, these civics are now operating in full force and are:

--calling for the scrapping of the BLAA and the Group Areas;
--demanding that townships be part of the cities and organized on a non-racial basis;
--organizing cooperatives in the townships;
--calling for the right of blacks to own land and houses; rather to only rent them; and
--attending to the day-to-day problems of the community.

Of the six civics, four are located in urban areas and two in rural areas.

A.I.D. SUMMARY FUNDING FIGURES FOR FY 1990

TOTAL AFRICA BUREAU		$2,555,000
South Africa	$2,000,000	
TOTAL ASIA BUREAU		$2,691,289
TOTAL EUROPE AND NEAR EAST		$13,795,640
Europe	$12,133,091	
TOTAL LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN		$73,233,000
TOTAL PROGRAM AND POLICY COORDINATION		$780,000
TOTAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY		$240,000
A.I.D. SUMMARY GRAND TOTAL		$93,389,973

The Effects of Democracy on Economic Growth and Inequality: A Review

Larry Sirowy and Alex Inkeles

What effects does political democracy have on such development outcomes as economic growth and socioeconomic equality? Competing theoretical models have been proposed that represent each of the possibilities: democracy as facilitating development, democracy as a hindrance to development, and democracy as bearing no independent relationship to development outcomes. Each of these theoretical models is explicated and, then, the evidence from quantitative, cross-national tests of the effects is reviewed. Overall, the evidence provided by the approximately dozen studies for each outcome yields few robust conclusions with respect to the theoretical models. To guide in the evaluation of the evidence, the studies are in turn distinguished by such design characteristics as sample, period observed, measures used, and form of relationship specified. This procedure, while it does not produce definitive support for any of the models, does assist in interpreting the results of past research as well as generating fertile guidelines for future research.

Over the last two decades many researchers have sought confirmation for hypotheses expressing systematic relations between characteristics of political regimes and patterns of national development. More specifically, do politics matter with respect to the pace and form of economic growth, and with respect to the distribution of economic and social benefits?

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Alex Inkeles is currently professor of sociology at Stanford University. He is also a senior fellow of the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305—6010. His most recent book is *Exploring Individual Modernity*, and his current research focusses on convergent trends in the social organization and popular attitudes and values within sets of industrial and industrializing nations.

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Of the characteristics of political regimes that have been considered in theory and research, the democratic character of national political procedures and institutions has been allotted considerable attention. While we should not find this surprising, since most of us would wish to observe the simultaneous advance of democracy and economic development, the fact remains that theorists are strongly divided with respect to the compatibility of development and political democracy, particularly within the context of developing societies (though note the parallel argument as it has arisen with respect to the crises of governability and economic management in the advanced democracies as presented, for example, by Thurow 1980). Moreover, despite the lengthy and rich dialogue on the subject, many of the central questions pertaining to the developmental consequences of political democracy remain, by and large, unresolved (see also Nelson's 1987 appraisal). Instead, the relevant quantitative, cross-national research continues to be plagued by conflicting findings, a state of affairs made only more complex by conceptual, measurement, modeling, and research design differences. Together these theoretical and research-related issues have contributed to a good deal of confusion with respect to theories of how political democracy might affect development, and with respect to the empirical status of testable claims implied by such theories.

In view of the present state of affairs in this research program, this article seeks to accomplish two tasks in order to provide a firmer foundation for future research: first, to review the relevant theoretical literature in order to explicitly identify and elaborate the different sets of arguments that explain how political democracy might affect development generally, and economic growth and socioeconomic inequality more specifically; and second, to review systematically the relevant quantitative, cross-national studies that have been conducted to evaluate the consequences of political democracy for economic growth and socieconomic inequality within nations so as to assist our interpretations of their diverse results as well as to suggest fertile avenues for future research efforts.

Strikingly, the task of reexamining the development consequences of political democracy could not come at a more critical time in contemporary history. On the one hand, the presumption of a linkage between current democratic political reforms and future economic prosperity has come to inform much of the West's policy prescriptions for Eastern Europe and China. At the same time, numerous Latin American nations face critical political tests in the near future because of the severe economic problems they are experiencing, problems which may or may not be contributed to by the democratic political organization of their polities. In the final analysis, such current events point out the urgent need to reexamine the issue of the development consequences of democracy.

Theoretical Perspectives

Effects of Political Democracy on Economic Growth

Since the early 1970s, a growing body of scholars and Third World officials have come to embrace the position that difficult, sometimes cruel, choices must be made

among such development goals as economic growth, socioeconomic equality, and political democracy (for example, see the works of Hewlett 1979 and Huntington and Nelson 1976). As Huntington (1987) aptly describes it, there has emerged a strong tendency to perceive the relationships among such development goals as being conflictive, even to the point of incompatibility. With respect to the particular empirical questions of interest here, the implications of this position are clear: political democracy is a luxury that can be ill-afforded by Third World countries.

In general, proponents of this perspective suggest that developing countries in today's world cannot achieve rapid economic growth through a democratic framework. In other words, developing countries are considered to face the dilemma of choosing to pursue either economic growth or democratic development, but not both simultaneously.

This position stands in stark contrast to the earlier perspective that democratic institutions and political freedom are neither peculiarly limited to Europe nor relevant only to the nineteenth century, but rather that democratic institutions are meaningful, appropriate, and potentially very satisfying programs for organizing social and economic life in the currently less-developed countries. Moreover, proponents of this alternative perspective contend that the notion of conflict between democracy and development in Third World nations only serves to legitimate the denial of basic human rights and freedoms by repressive and exclusionary regimes, and so ultimately undermines democratic political change.

As Huntington (1987) notes, this older, alternative perspective, which appears to be receiving a groundswell of support in recent years, has its roots in the works of such modernization theorists as Karl Deutsch, Daniel Lerner, and Cyril Black. For them, modernization was a systematic process, wherein such development goals as political democracy, economic growth, and equity were not only compatible with one another, but generally mutually reinforcing. All in all, it remains the case, as Huntington so perceptively points out, that this perspective continues to influence U.S. policy toward the Third World.

Following Huntington (1987) we adopt the terminological convention of labeling these theoretical positions as the "Conflict" and "Compatibility" perspectives, respectively. In the balance of this section these perspectives are more fully elaborated with respect to their implications for the effects of political democracy on economic growth and socioeconomic inequality. In addition, a third perspective, which we shall refer to as the "Skeptical" alternative, is presented. The hallmark of this latter alternative is the contention that no universal relationship exists between political democracy and the developmental outcomes under consideration here. Put simply, economic growth is held to be potentially compatible with both a more democratic framework and a more authoritarian framework.

The Conflict Perspective

Fundamental to the conflict perspective is the claim that economic growth is hindered by the democratic organization of the polity (see De Schweinitz 1964, Andreski 1968, Chirot 1977, and Rao 1985). In other words, democracy and eco-

nomic growth are seen as being competing concerns; hence trade offs in the political realm are considered necessary. Moreover, in this view successful and rapid economic growth requires an authoritarian regime that suppresses or delays the extension of basic civil and political rights and the development of democratic procedures and institutions, because these latter would otherwise subvert the national development project. The reasons that have been offered in support of such a claim are basically threefold: 1) dysfunctional consequences of "premature" democracy act, in turn, to slow growth, 2) democratic regimes are largely unable to implement effectively the kinds of policies considered necessary to facilitate rapid growth, 3) the uniqueness of the present world-historical context requires pervasive state involvement in the development process, which is in turn unduly fettered by political democracy. We will consider each of these reasons in turn.

With respect to the first reason cited, two lines of theory and research on political change have been influential. The first consists of early research supporting the idea that economic development is a prerequisite of democracy (for example, Lipset 1959). And the second is the theory of political change offered by Huntington (1968). From research on the antecedents of democracy, many have drawn the conclusion that the relationship between economic development and political democracy properly conceived is sequential: first growth, then democracy. Regimes more democratic in character that emerge before the appropriate thresholds of resource availability, consonant class structure, and psychological and institutional modernity are crossed will tend to generate dysfunctional consequences that not only threaten further economic progress, but endanger the democratic character of the political institutions as well.

Chief among these dysfunctional consequences is political instability. As Huntington (1968) argues, the political institutions of developing societies tend to be weak and fragile to begin with. Add to that the enormous pressures on government created by a democratic system's participatory institutions and the sources of instability are greatly magnified. Because of the greater availability of channels through which such impatient groups as workers and the poor can express their demands and because political elites and their parties must cater, at least to some extent, to such groups in order to win support in elections, democratic regimes in less developed countries quickly become overburdened and must necessarily become preoccupied with the maintenance of internal order.

In addition, states the conflict perspective, many of today's Third World societies are so besieged by internal conflict stemming from heterogeneity of region, caste, religion, ethnicity, and class that forging a consensus by force becomes critical if these nations are successfully to undertake mobilization for rapid national development. Democratic regimes, because of the political and civil liberties they rest on, only act to inflame social division and erode the capacity of the government to act quickly and effectively. More authoritarian systems, in contrast, are held to be better able to suppress disruptive dissent and conflict.

Finally, even short of disruptive internal conflict and instability the electoral politics that are inherent in democracy may well act to distort the economy and incapacitate the government as officials shift their allegiances among policies based

on short-run political expediency, rather than focusing exclusively on policies oriented toward national development in the long-run.

Overall, the implications of this reasoning for the effect of democracy on economic growth are clear. As Apter (1965) has argued, before a certain level of economic development has been attained, coerciveness is best suited to change. To deal successfully with the problems of nation-building, to contain discontent, and to control domestic pressures, a Third World regime must be able to insulate itself while having the wherewithal to impose its programs against opposition efficiently and effectively. These are needs best filled by authoritarian rule. In contrast, democracy is held to decrease the efficiency of decision making, thereby leading to inconsistent and vacillating policies, if not outright paralysis, as well as engendering higher levels of instability, all of which in turn slow economic growth.

The particular relevance of these arguments for us lies not solely in the implication that, in the Third World nations, authoritarian regimes are simply better able to govern, but that such regimes are better able to implement the kinds of policies thought critical for rapid economic growth and to create the conditions necessary to support them. In this view, the superior ability of an authoritarian regime to govern that facilitates economic growth is expressed indirectly by the social and political stability it fosters, the insulation from outside influence it allows, and the single-minded strength that it can muster. But authoritarian forms of regimes are also thought to facilitate rapid economic growth directly through a number of mechanisms. Some of these mechanisms include their ability to exert firmer control over labor and labor markets, their greater efficiency in the allocation of resources, their ability to use coercion to break traditional patterns, and their capacity to collectively organize and direct economic policies.

But perhaps the most frequently noted mechanism by which authoritarianism is thought to directly facilitate economic growth is through its effect on consumption and saving. Underlying this idea is the notion that growth is primarily the result of huge material and personnel investments. In a poor economy, total production cannot be increased rapidly without building new factories, improving education, developing infrastructure services such as communication and transportation, and introducing new productive technologies. But these goals cannot be achieved without the accumulation of capital, which in turn depends on the rate of saving.

The accumulation of a surplus for investment requires enormous sacrifices. Current consumption must be cut at the same time that savings increases. But who is to bear the burden of the sacrifices? In the authoritarian model, since the rich have a higher marginal propensity to save, the larger share of national income and of increments due to growth should be directed toward those who are already well off in order to maximize the rate of social savings. Any shifting of resources to the poorer segments of the population, in contrast, would unduly hamper the accumulation of capital because such groups tend to consume rather than save. Hence the idea that economic growth requires large distributive inequalities is assumed by proponents of this model, and is thought to be confirmed by the experience of Western European societies during their own periods of industrialization (see Kuznets 1955).

The model further holds that no democratic government can tolerate the degree of restraint in consumption necessary for maximizing the rate of growth in a developing economy (Hewlett 1979). This is the case because, for a Third World nation to successfully expand economically, the government needs to adopt policies that hold down the real wages of the working classes and favor national and foreign capital. Because of their openness and need for internal legitimacy, democratic governments fall victim to numerous claims for shares of national resources; hence they become preoccupied with issues of distribution (expansion of government benefits and welfare policies) rather than accumulation. The consequence is that the allocation of national income is likely to be biased toward consumption and away from saving (Nelson 1987). More authoritarian regimes, in contrast, because of the absence of a political mechanism through which accountability can be demanded and because of their relative freedom to act coercively, can pursue policies that benefit a minority at the expense of the majority, and thereby foster the accumulation of needed capital. Such regimes are relatively unrestricted in their ability to squeeze surplus from some domestic groups in order to finance industrialization.

Finally, with respect to the third reason cited in support of the conflict perspective, a number of writers, including De Schweinitz (1964), Chirot (1977), and Cohen (1985), argue further that the unique domestic and international conditions complicate greatly the situation facing Third World nations in their development drives today. In contrast to the development experience of most European nations in the nineteenth century, the late developers need to implement distinct strategies because of differences in demographics, class structures, level of technological development, structures of finance, rural-urban dynamics, and transnational linkages, such as the multinational corporation. Under these different circumstances, it is argued that authoritarian regimes are better able to adopt appropriate national strategies because the state necessarily must play a more initiating and direct role under these new historical conditions. Thus, more autocratic governments are assumed to be better able to resist the influences of multinational businesses and "core" governments.

Hence, in general, proponents of the conflict model argue that in the world facing developing nations after World War II, those with a more authoritarian form of government will experience more rapid economic growth than will democratic regimes. One must say "in general" because at least two kinds of qualifications can be identified in the literature. These qualifications are not inconsistent with the claim stated above; rather they identify specific kinds of authoritarian regimes that are most capable of generating economic change for different types of developing countries.

One popular qualification of the general argument revolves around the proposed effects of military rule, as opposed to civilian rule, whether the latter happens to be more or less democratic. Such theorists as Pye (1966), Shils(1964), and Levy (1966) have argued that in developing countries military rule is a progressive force in society. The reasoning behind this argument is as follows. In modernizing societies, the military is unrivaled by any other organization in its ability to combine high levels of modernization with maximum levels of stability and control. The progres-

sive consequences of military rule stem from the fact that alternative organizations are not only weak, but that the military, as one of the few avenues available for social mobility, attracts the most talented and confers on its members substantial experience with rational organization and sophisticated modern technology. Moreover, the military regularly recruits individuals of middle class background, and such individuals are more progressive in their policies than the prior entrenched ruling elites were.

It is important to note, however, that a number of theorists, for example, Bienen (1971) and Nordlinger (1970), have argued exactly the opposite. They charge that military rulers are too obsessed with maintaining order and power to act as modernizing agents. A sort of compromise is offered by Huntington who suggests that the effects of military rule depend on the degree of backwardness of the developing country: military rule has a progressive effect only at very low levels of socioeconomic development.

A second qualification of the general hypothesis has been put forth by O'Donnell (1979). He argues that because of the associated problems of delayed dependent industrialization, late industrializers already far along on the road to modernity can be greatly benefited by a specific type of authoritarian rule, bureaucratic-authoritarianism. More specifically, bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes are necessary to deepen import substitution from final demand goods to intermediate and capital goods. Only bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes (formed by a peculiar alliance of the military and technicians) are capable of freezing consumption and creating the policy predictability and political stability necessary to generate the preconditions for the kinds of long-term investments needed. Though the necessity of bureaucratic-authoritarianism on these grounds has been seriously questioned (see the essays in Collier 1979), Cohen (1985) argues that such regimes still possess an advantage in effectively implementing the kinds of austere orthodox policies necessary for industrialization to deepen more thoroughly and quickly.

In sum, then, while there is some disagreement among these theorists over which kind of authoritarian rule is best suited for which kinds of developing countries, they still share the contention that democracy hampers economic growth.

The Compatibility Perspective

Proponents of the democratic model sharply object to the charges levied by proponents of the authoritarian model. Although the compatibility model concedes that economic development requires an authority to enforce contracts, ensure law and order, and so on, they strongly disagree with the assumption that development needs to be commanded in all respects by a central authority, an assumption that takes a heavy toll in terms of citizen rights and freedoms (see Holt and Turner 1966). Moreover, even if one accepts the argument that latecomer nations in the post—World War II era need governmental structures that perform a wider range of functions and more heavily penetrate sectors of their societies than their Western counterparts did, we can still treat as analytically distinguishable the scope of state involvement and the democratic character of political institutions.

In addition, proponents of the democratic model challenge the authoritarian model on such assumptions as the propensity of the well off to save in a manner that is beneficial to the nation (Goodin 1979), the prevalence of distortions of economies in democracies (Goodin 1979), the degree of corruption in Third World democracies (McCord 1965), the tendency of democracy to foster internal divisiveness and conflict (see the evidence in Hibbs 1973 and Marsh 1979), and the cost of political competition to the accumulation of capital and scale of investment (Goodin 1979). Finally, in this model it is assumed that the redistributive tendencies of democracies, far from fueling useless consumption and thereby being a drain on growth, actually broaden markets and promote economic expansion.

Indeed, proponents of the democratic model are quick to point out numerous weaknesses of centralization under authoritarian rule. These weaknesses include a relative deprivation of the informal sector, a distorted size distribution of enterprises (the Barton gap), a tendency toward corruption and waste, a tendency to transform conflicts normal to the development process into larger confrontations, and a limited capacity of the center to handle problems in the periphery of society. Moreover, as Nelson (1987) notes, democratic regimes have no monopoly on internally inconsistent policies, policies that vacillate over time, or policy paralysis, since sharp factional or ideological disputes within regime circles or among fairly narrow participatory groups can paralyze a regime effectively as can highly mobilized and conflicting mass groups. Finally, King (1981) charges that the kind of development strategy so frequently adopted under authoritarian rule, capital-intensive development, is unbalanced and detrimental not only to the rural sector but to the society as a whole in the long-run.

Some proponents of the democratic model, however, do not stop at simply taking issue with the assumptions of the authoritarian model. Indeed, such theorists as McCord (1965), Goodin (1979), King (1981), Goodell and Powelson (1982), and Kohli (1986) argue that it is a democratic government in the Third World that is best suited to foster sustained and equitable economic development. In their view, democratic processes and the existence and exercise of fundamental civil liberties and political rights generate the societal conditions most conducive to economic development.

Goodin (1979) and Goodell and Powelson (1982) argue that economic pluralism is essential for economic growth. In other words, a requisite of economic growth is a condition where members are free to accrue and dispense their resources within the marketplace. Only under this condition of economic pluralism will the most innovative and competitive technologies emerge.

Central to this model is the argument that political pluralism is critical to the survival and vitality of economic pluralism. Goodell and Powelson argue that economic pluralism depends on open competition and predictability. In their view, only when the political system is organized according to democratic rules and mechanisms and citizens have fundamental safeguards against governmental intrusion do conditions conducive to competition and predictability exist.

Overall, the extension and protection of civil liberties and basic freedoms are thought to generate the security of expectation necessary to motivate citizens to

work, save, and invest (Claude 1976). In addition, popular political participation not only has the consequence of breaking down the privilege and vested interests of a few but also feeds a participative mentality that carries over into the economic arena and greatly increases the flow of information so essential to effective and efficient governments. In sum, political pluralism acts to release energies and foster conditions conducive to change, entrepreneurial risk, and economic development.

Proponents of the compatibility perspective hold that, at most, only limited trade offs are necessary between democracy and economic development. Indeed, proponents of this model view democracy and development as very much compatible, actually working to support one another. Among the proponents there is the sentiment that although authoritarian rule may, on some occasions, generate a more rapid rate of economic development in the short run, democratic rule is more conducive to a sustained, sectorially balanced, and equitable growth in the long run. Hence repression is viewed as not being necessary for growth, but only to protect a particular inequitable distribution of resources and power.

The Skeptical Perspective

Finally, we would like to briefly mention an alternative stance that some theorists have taken toward the issue of the consequences of democracy for economic growth. This alternative stance is skeptical that there is any systematic relationship between democracy and economic development (see Pye 1966). In other words, politics alone matter very little. Proponents of this perspective note the variable nature of levels of economic performance within groupings of more democratic and more authoritarian regimes and suggest that this variability indicates that we need to concentrate instead on the institutional structures that exist and the government strategies that are embraced, factors that may vary independently of the democratic character of a system, and how these can act to reconcile such development goals as democracy and development. Such factors include, for example, the nature of the political party system (two-party vs. multiparty), the level and form of state intervention into the economy, the pattern of industrialization pursued (labor-intensive vs. capital-intensive), and the cultural environment (see Huntington 1987). Hence, the skepticism in this perspective derives from the contention that additional, often intervening, factors operate to confound the direct link between democracy and development.

The Effects of Democracy on Inequality

With respect to the consequences of political democracy for socioeconomic inequality, we again find the positions of theorists divided. Regarding this relationship, the source of that division, which is obviously very much related to that of the foregoing discussion, is the question of whether democracy operates to reduce inequality, exacerbate inequality, or simply has no systematic influence. In the following section these various positions are referred to as the "Democratic Model," the "Authoritarian Model," and the "Skeptical Model," respectively.

Democratic Model

Oddly enough, many proponents of either the conflict or the compatibility perspectives, as discussed in reference to the consequences of democracy for economic growth, converge on the position that political democracy operates to reduce distributional inequalities. The reasoning behind this convergence is essentially twofold. On the one hand, democracy is viewed to facilitate equality indirectly because economic development itself is argued to aggravate inequalities (Kuznets 1955), at least up to a point, and democracies are argued by proponents of the conflict perspective to be less able to achieve rapid economic growth.

On the other hand, proponents of the compatibility perspective emphasize the same outcome for different reasons. Democracies are conceived to tend to neither adopt economic growth policies that directly attempt to deprive specific social groups of their relative economic shares nor are they free to ignore the voices of mobilized sectors of the population due to their legitimacy needs. Because of electoral mechanisms and rights to opposition and participation, democracies are relatively open to battles over the distribution of societal resources (Lipset 1959). And since these institutional underpinnings aid a shift in political power away from the most well-off and toward the middle classes and poorer segments of society, democratic regimes must be responsive to claims from the latter sectors as well. The consequence of all of this is the likelihood of lower distributional inequalities within democratic developing nations than within authoritarian developing nations. In short, as Lenski (1966) argues, given the existence of an egalitarian political structure, it is plausible to expect that, over time, as the more numerous poorer members of the population organize into unions and other interest groups, and as parties of the social democratic Left develop a solid electoral base, win seats in legislatures, and participate in or control the machinery of government, democracy becomes facilitative of gradual reduction of economic inequality.

Authoritarian Model

The relatively popular democratic model just presented is not, however, uniformly accepted. Beitz (1982), for one, disagrees. For Beitz, authoritarian regimes are more likely to pursue egalitarian development policies than are democratic regimes. Central to his argument is the contention that authoritarian regimes may do a better job of protecting the interests of the poor and working classes in developing societies than democracies can. Why? Because the available political rights and their expression through electoral mechanisms cannot be taken advantage of by the more disadvantaged elements of society. In other words, inequalities in the distribution of material resources are reproduced in inequalities of political influence. Thus, although Beitz accepts the view that democracies are more receptive to claims made by societal members, he contends that democracies fail to respect their members equally as sources of claims. Moreover, the disadvantaged are unable to defend their interest through democratic processes. In contrast, authoritarian regimes are more capable of protecting interests unlikely to be protected by democracies.

Huntington and Nelson (1976), while supporting the logic of Beitz' argument to a degree, nevertheless qualify his reasoning by contending that since more privileged groups usually become politically active earlier than the less privileged, then it might well be the case that at most there is a curvilinear relationship between levels of participation and equality. Still, however, this pattern of relationship depends on how much, and how effectively, the less privileged strata exercise the opportunity to participate relative to participation by the "haves." Finally, Bollen and Jackman (1985) also question whether democracies tend to be better for equality. In particular, they question whether democracies adhere to majoritarianism, whether low-income voters demand redistribution—especially given the government intervention it requires—and whether inequality is even perceived as being unjust.

Skeptical Model

The two schools of thought most frequently cited as representatives of the skeptical model are functionalists and Marxists. As Marsh (1979) argued in his review of the "skeptical model," functionalism implies that the form of government does not affect the stratification system, since any changes in the distributive outcomes are explained as a result of changes in the shape of the occupational structure brought on by the imperatives of industrialization. Any association between democracy and socioeconomic equality is spurious since both are determined by the level of a nation's economic development.

Alternatively, Marxists hold that the political system is largely of little importance. What is important is the particular configuration of the class structure, and, in particular, the economic power of the capitalist class. To understand the "why" of the distribution of inequalities and changes in distribution, one must understand the class structure and dynamics.

Finally, Nelson (1987) suggests that we should be skeptical in embracing any universal relationship between extended patterns of political participation, or democracy, and equality, since the pattern of participation may play an important intervening role. Particularly crucial may be the relative participation rates of urban versus rural populations in developing countries.

State of Empirical Research

The Effects of Democracy on Economic Development

Thirteen cross-national, quantitative studies have been reviewed in the course of our work. Each of these studies explicitly attempted to evaluate the economic consequences of differences in the democratic character of national regimes. The studies reviewed are contained in Table 1.

Out of these thirteen studies only three—Huntington and Dominguez (1975), Marsh (1979), and Landau (1986)—report findings suggesting an unqualified negative effect of democracy on rates of economic growth. Six studies—Feierabend and Feierabend (1972), Dick (1974), Russett and Monsen (1975), Meyer *et al.* (1979),

TABLE 1

Adelman and Morris (1967)
Feierabend and Feierabend (1972)
Dick (1974)
Huntington and Dominguez (1975)
Russett and Monsen (1975)
Marsh (1979)
Meyer et al. (1979)
Weede (1983)
Berg-Schlosser (1984)
Kohli (1986)
Landau (1986)
Sloan and Tedin (1987)
Marsh (1988)

Kohli (1986), and Marsh (1988)—report that there is no relationship between the democratic character of regimes and the pace of economic growth. Finally, each of the remaining four studies report some kind of qualified, or conditional, relationship. For example, Adelman and Morris (1967) report that democracy appears to inhibit growth, but not among the wealthier less-developed countries. Weede (1983) reports the existence of a negative relationship only when developed countries and less-developed countries are both included in the analysis (no effect when less-developed countries are examined alone), and also in those societies in which the role of the state in economic affairs is decidedly larger. Both Berg-Schlosser (1984) and Sloan and Tedin (1987), in contrast, report that the type of regime matters, that is, there are real differences among regime types, but the pattern of these differences depends on the particular measure of economic progress examined.

Hence, overall, these studies present a very mixed and confusing picture with regard to the effect of democracy on economic growth. The inconclusive results presented by these studies are further compounded by the fact that these studies are quite heterogeneous with respect to characteristics of measurement, coverage, design, and method of analysis.

One of the most systematic deficiencies to be found in these studies is the misspecification of the economic growth model. Only in the studies by Adelman and Morris (1967), Meyer et al. (1979), Weede (1983), Landau (1986), and Marsh (1988) is there any attempt to include as controls a number of factors known to affect economic growth. Indeed, clearly in seven of the studies: Feierabend and Feierabend, Dick, Huntington and Dominguez, Russett and Monsen, Marsh (1979), Kohli, and Sloan and Tedin, either no other factors were specified as influencing economic growth in the analysis or the analysis was badly underspecified. Such factors as initial level of development, the availability of human capital, the availability of internal investment, population growth, and so on must be properly specified in the analysis and thus controlled for in order for estimates of the effect of democracy to be at all meaningful. Nevertheless, even among the five studies identified as being the most adequate with respect to model specification, rather discrepant results were found.

TABLE 2
Wide Survey of LDCs

Adelman and Morris (1967)	conditional	(N = 74)
Dick (1974)	none	(N = 72)
Huntington and Dominguez (1975)	negative	(N = 35)
Marsh (1979)	negative	(N = 80)
Meyer et al. (1979)	none	(N = 23)
Weede (1983)	none	(N = 74)
Landau (1986)	negative	(N = 65)
Marsh (1988)	none	(N = 55)
Survey of DCs and LDCs		
Feierabend and Feierabend (1972)	none	(N = 84)
Russett and Monsen (1975)	none	(N = 80)
Meyer et al. (1979)	none	(N = 50)
Weede (1983)	negative	(N = 93)
Survey of Select LDCs only		
Kohli (1986)	none	(N = 10)
Sloan and Tedin (1987)	conditional	(N = 20, all L.A.)
Berg-Schlosser (1984)	conditional	(N = 38, all African)

A second feature that could account for the discrepancies in the results obtained is the set of countries examined. Besides substantial variation in the number of countries examined, some looked at a set including both developed and developing nations, some surveyed less-developed countries only, and several examined only a select group of less-developed countries. The exact composition of the set of countries analyzed in each study is presented in Table 2, along with a notation on the major result found in each study for the relationship between democracy and economic growth.

As the Table 2 indicates, there has indeed been a substantial amount of variation in the number and set of countries examined. Moreover, an examination of the results reported by each of these studies indicates that there is no clear association between the population of countries observed and the major finding. Unfortunately, there has been little effort to replicate studies and thereby enhance our knowledge in the area in a cumulative fashion.

A third factor that may account for the differences in findings is the period for which economic performance was assessed. Roughly speaking, three broad periods were investigated: studies assessing economic performance for a period beginning before 1960 and ending by 1965; studies assessing economic performance for a period roughly equivalent to the decade of the sixties; and, finally, studies assessing economic performance for a period beginning in the sixties and ending in the early eighties. The exact period of each of the studies is described in Table 3.

If we categorize the twelve studies according to the appropriate period and then examine the findings reported, does any pattern emerge? Again the answer would have to be no. No systematic relationship appears between the period examined and the results.

A final feature of these studies that we can examine is how each measured democracy. How did each go about distinguishing types of political regimes? Two

TABLE 3
Period Examined Ends by 1965

Adelman and Morris (1976)	conditional
Feierabend and Feierabend (1972)	none
Huntington and Dominguez (1975)	negative
Russett and Monsen (1975)	none
Period Examined ends by 1970	
Dick (1974)	none
Marsh (1979)	negative
Meyer et al. (1979)	none
Period Examined ends by the early 1980s	
Weede (1983)	conditional
Kohli (1986)	none
Landau (1986)	negative
Sloan and Tedin (1987)	conditional
Berg-Schlosser (1984)	conditional
Marsh (1988)	none

characteristics of the measure used seem relevant here. The first is whether the characteristic of the regime was measured at basically a single point in time for a country ("point measurement") or was assessed for a period of time ("period measurement"). The measurement of a political characteristic such as democracy at a single point in time (or over an interval of time shorter in length than the period over which the dependent variable is observed) suffers from severe weaknesses. Most important is the fact that the point measurement method makes no allowances for subsequent changes which may necessitate substantially altering how a country is classified or rated in terms of democracy. Therefore, in order to use the strategy of point measurement one must be willing to assume that a country's political regime was accurately characterized by the same value or classification throughout the entire period during which the dependent variable is being assessed. The longer this period is, the more likely this assumption would be violated, especially in the case of Third World nations. In addition, unless one is willing to make some rather heroic assumptions about the exact length of the lag with respect to the effects of the political characteristic, the point measurement technique again falls far short of adequacy.

Overall, seven of the studies reviewed employed the point measurement technique (Adelman and Morris, Feierabend and Feierabend, Russett and Monsen, Marsh (1979, 1988), Meyer et al., and Weede). Though there is no apparent pattern to the findings of these six, the weaknesses of point measurement cast a shadow over their results. In fact, none of the authors of these seven studies make any claims about having taken political changes into account in any manner.

Period measurement of political characteristics stands in sharp contrast to point measurement. Strictly speaking, period measurement refers to the technique by which democratic characteristics are assessed for exactly the same period for which the dependent variable is assessed. This could be accomplished in either of two ways. First, one could make annual measurements of both the democratic measure and the dependent variable, as well as any other variables, and thus obtain time-

series data. Alternatively, one could explicitly take steps to examine only those countries which, in terms of the investigator's rating or classification scheme, were consistent over the course of the period examined. Of these two alternatives, the first has considerably more advantages. The chief weakness of the second alternative is that it confuses stability with the characteristics of the political regime by including only those that are, for example, stable democracies or stable nondemocracies

The studies conducted by Dick, Huntington and Dominguez, Kohli, Landau, Sloan and Tedin, and Berg-Schlosser all indicate that they have employed a kind of period measurement. However, except for the effort by Sloan and Tedin, all five of the others opted for the second alternative. For example, Dick (1974) writes that his regime classification scheme, ". . . reflects the general political state of a country during the 1960s," which was the period of his analysis. Either these authors created a classification based on the average political characteristics of a nation's regime across an interval of time—as apparently Dick and Landau did—or they excluded or assigned to a distinct category those countries that substantially changed in terms of their regime characteristics. The latter is apparently the case for the efforts by Huntington and Dominguez, Berg-Schlosser, and Kohli. By pursuing the latter course, the political measures used confound democracy with stability. As Bollen (1980) notes, the problem with implicitly or explicitly including stability in the measure of democracy—something that Lipset (1959), Cutright (1963), Smith (1969), Coulter (1975), and Hewitt (1977) all do in their measures—is that it and its effects are analytically and empirically distinguishable from democracy and the latter's effects.

Only Sloan and Tedin employ the first alternative of period measurement. They classified twenty Latin American countries annually for the period 1960 through 1980. Their exact regime classification scheme will be discussed more fully in this article.

Overall, the thirteen studies examined here are fairly evenly split with respect to whether the procedure they employed to measure democracy, or a related regime attribute, was point or period. By dividing the set of studies into these two groups, it is obvious that the attribute of measurement being considered is not sufficient alone to begin to explain the disparities in findings reported. But perhaps more important is the fact that only one study adopted a procedure that, in our opinion, does not suffer from as many weaknesses as the others.

A second feature of the measures of political characteristics used in these studies relates to their operationalizations of democracy. Each of the studies reviewed here sought to identify some characteristic(s) of democracy and then to rate or classify the political regimes of a set of countries based on an operationalization of those characteristics. In terms of the methods of operationalization, either a single scale was developed consisting of numerical ratings or a typology with more or less discrete categories was adopted. This quantitative-qualitative distinction in operationalization parallels the point-period measurement distinction made earlier, with all of the studies employing point measurement also employing a quantitative operationalization. This, however, is by no means a necessary association.

TABLE 4
Scales Used by Quantitative Operationalizations

Adelman and Morris (1967)	Index of the Strength of Democratic Institutions, 1957–62 (4 pt. scale)
Feierabend and Feierabend (1972)	Index of Regime Coerciveness, 1948–60 (6 pt. scale)
Russett and Monsen (1975)	Taylor and Hudson's Electoral Regularity Scale (3 pt. scale)
Marsh (1979)	1) Bollen's Index of Democracy, 1965 2) Bank's Political Competition Index, 1962–66
Meyer et al. (1979)	1) Cutright's Formal Political Representation Index, 1950–55 2) Adelman and Morris' Index of Political Participation, 1957–62
Weede (1983)	Bollen's Index of Democracy, 1965
Marsh (1988)	1) Sum of Gastil's Political Rights Ratings, 1973–79 2) Sum of Gastil's Civil Liberties Ratings, 1973–79

With regard to the seven studies employing a scale of one kind or another, it is important to realize that each of the scales used is only ordinal in nature. This fact is important, because, in each of these studies, the scales are treated in the analysis as if they are interval-level in nature. Although it may well be the case that ordinal information is the only kind available to use in the construction of the scales, they are still ordinal-level. And no effort is made in these studies to examine what consequences this may have for the kinds of statistical analyses carried out.

The particular operationalizations used in each of the seven studies are described in Table 4.

Finally, we can consider the six remaining studies which rely on qualitative discriminations of regime types. The respective classification schemes of each of these studies are listed in Table 5.

As is made clear by Table 5, only Landau and Kohli adopted a simple dichotomy. In essence, the typologies of Landau, Kohli, and Dick are dichotomous or trichotomous breakdowns of ordinal rankings. The other three studies that employ a categorical indicator of regime type sought to discriminate among regimes in a more qualitative sense. For example, Huntington and Dominguez, Sloan and Tedin, and Berg-Schlosser each assigned Communist-Socialist nations to a distinct category. In addition, each of these also assigned to a distinct category those nations whose political regimes were unstable, though they did so in varying ways: Berg-Schlosser and Huntington and Dominguez seem to have decided, after looking at the entire regime histories for the relevant period of study for their set of nations, to assign to a separate category any nations which were judged as more or less mixed due to regime changes. In effect, this excludes these nations, and the other categories include only countries with relatively stable regimes of one kind or another. Sloan and Tedin, with their "transitional" category, took a strikingly different, and we

TABLE 5
Categorical Operationalizations

Dick (1974)	1) Authoritarian
	2) Semicompetitive
	3) Competitive
Huntington and Dominguez (1975)	1) One-party Communist
	2) One-party Non-Communist
	3) Competitive Party System
	4) Unstable System
Kohli (1986)	Dichotomization based on Bollen's Index of Democracy (Democratic-Authoritarian)
Landau (1986)	1) Democratic
	2) Non-democratic
Sloan and Tedin (1987)	1) Democratic
	2) Bureaucratic-Authoritarian
	3) Communist
	4) Traditional Authoritarian
	5) Transitional
Berg-Schlosser (1984)	1) Stable Polyarchic
	2) Stable Socialist
	3) Stable Authoritarian
	4) Praetorian

believe superior, approach. Since Sloan and Tedin took annual observations, a nation's regime was coded as "transitional" only for the year in which it changed. Thereafter, it was coded with the new regime code until it again changed.

In terms of the substantive distinctions among the regime types coded, each of these investigators sought to at least single out one category that conforms, more or less, to what a democracy would be. Central to nearly all of the typologies used in the six studies is the political party structure and the meaningfulness of elections (what criteria Landau used for discriminating between democracies and nondemocracies is unclear because he never formally states them nor even offers a basic conceptual distinction). This is clearly the case for the typologies constructed by Dick and Huntington and Dominguez (with the addition of a Communist-Socialist dimension). The typologies constructed by Berg-Schlosser and Sloan and Tedin also obviously consider the structure of the party system and the role of elections, though both include a number of additional dimensions. For instance, Berg-Schlosser names as other major system characteristics the following: basis of legitimacy, head of executive branch, degree of vertical and horizontal power separation, scope of regime control, and ideological orientation. The problem with Berg-Schlosser's effort, however, is that, having once stated this large number of dimensions, he employs what he describes as a "handmade factor analysis" in order to combine and reduce the dimensions down to four types of regimes. Not only does this preclude the possibility of replicating his procedure, it gives us little insight into how his dimensions were actually weighted (and it is obvious they were) in order to arrive at final classifications.

The study by Sloan and Tedin is unique because these investigators attempted to differentiate the more authoritarian end of the democracy/nondemocracy dimension by separating out not only Communist nations but also by differentiating what they label as bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes from traditional authoritarian regimes. Such an approach as this seems to possess a number of advantages, since implicitly when the claim is made that authoritarian-led nations will develop more quickly, those making the claim generally appear to have in mind the bureaucratic-authoritarian type of regime. Moreover, a good case could be made that lumping all nondemocratic regimes into a single category might well inhibit the uncovering of political effects. Unfortunately, in their article, Sloan and Tedin never formally state how they went about assigning national regimes to one or the other category, a guide which would be necessary if one wished to build on their analysis by expanding the coverage.

Before moving on to a review of the set of studies that had income distribution as their dependent variable, we would briefly like to review six studies that focused on the specific effects of military rule, a special kind of nondemocratic regime. These six studies include Nordlinger (1970), McKinlay and Cohan (1975), Jackman (1976), Dickson (1977), Pluta (1979), and Ravenhill (1980). Overall, these six studies, like the twelve discussed earlier, suffer from significant differences in coverage, measurement, and analysis technique. As a consequence, the results of these studies taken together yield few firm conclusions.

Nevertheless, these efforts are noteworthy because, besides attempting to identify significant differences between military and civilian regimes, almost without exception each of these studies examined a wide array of dependent variables (regime outputs and outcomes). In other words, they tended to go beyond a simple comparison of economic growth rates and also looked at changes in the quality of life and changes in the distribution of societal resources as indicated by government spending patterns.

If anything can be concluded from these studies, and any conclusion must be made cautiously, it is that civilian regimes as compared to military regimes appear to do better in terms of improving the basic quality of life of the masses of citizens and in improving the distribution of access to such societal benefits as health facilities and schools. Overall, this suggests that in our research effort we might be very well served by identifying different classes of outcomes and outputs for examination.

The Effects of Democracy on Inequality

Cross-national, quantitative research on the effect of democracy on societal inequality has come to form more of a research program than has research on the effects of democracy on economic growth. Surprisingly, however, the relevant studies are inconclusive. Twelve relevant studies are reviewed in this section. Included are studies performed by Cutright (1967), Jackman (1975), Hewitt (1977), Rubinson and Quinlan (1977), Stack (1979), Stack (1980), Bollen and Grandjean (1981), Weede and Tiefenbach (1981), Weede (1982), Kohli and Associates (1984), Bollen

TABLE 6

Yes	No
Cutright (1967)	Jackman (1975)
Hewitt (1977)	Rubinson and Quinlan (1977)
Stack (1979)	Bollen and Grandjean (1981)
Stack (1980)	Kohli et al. (1984)
Weede and Tiefenbach (1981)	Bollen and Jackman (1985)
Weede (1982)	
Muller (1988)	

and Jackman (1985), and Muller (1988). In each of these studies the indicator of social equality is the distribution of income.

Have these studies found support for a negative effect of democracy on societal inequality as Lenski (1966) and many other have predicted? As Table 6 shows, no clear answer to this question has emerged from these studies.

As can be seen above, seven of the studies present evidence indicating confirmation for the inverse relationship between democracy and societal inequality, where inequality is measured by the distribution of income. Their support, however, must be qualified. Cutright, after assigning nations to subgroups based upon level of economic development, found confirmation for the low and middle income subsets of nations, but not for the most advanced subset. Weede and Tiefenbach found confirmation of the inverse relationship for two measures of personal income inequality (using Paukert's data 1973), but not for four alternative measures of income inequality from two different sources. Hewitt found a negative correlation for his indicator of political democracy and income inequality, though he argues that it is social democracy (meaning the strength of Socialist parties or working-class politics within the lawmaking bodies), rather than political democracy, that is important. Finally, Muller presents results that would indicate it is the length of experience of democracy, rather than the level of political democracy as measured at one point in time, that facilitates reductions in inequality.

The five studies that indicate a disconfirmation of the proposed linkage report either that there is no significant relationship, in either a positive or negative direction, between political democracy and societal inequality or that the line of causation properly modeled actually runs in the opposite direction. The investigations of Jackman (1975) and Bollen and Grandjean (1981) each found nonsignificant effects of political democracy on societal inequality. Rubinson and Quinlan (1977) report that once the reciprocal effects between the two variables are explicitly taken into consideration, something that had not been examined before their study, the only signigicant direction of effects lies in the opposite direction (i.e., inequality affects democracy). In a more recent study, however, Bollen and Jackman (1985) reexamined the argument of Rubinson and Quinlan and found no significant effects between democracy and inequality in either direction. Muller (1988), however, reports that whereas length of democratic experience appears to facilitate significantly greater levels of income equality, he found no support for the "genesis" version of the causal impact of inequality on the inauguration of democracy.

Where do these studies leave us? It is clear that while no generalizable and robust confirmation of the thesis that democracy promotes greater equality is forthcoming from this set of studies, the issue is by no means settled. Numerous differences in design, measurement, and model distinguish these studies, which alone or in combination might account for the kinds of results they have produced.

The first of these differences that can be considered is how social equality was measured. Each of these studies attempted to measure social equality by assessing the degree of concentration of the distribution of income, or some proxy for it. The difficulties in accurately measuring the distribution of income are widely known. Information on income distribution is confounded by global heterogeneity in its standards of collection, which makes international comparisons exceedingly difficult. Some of the sources of this heterogeneity include whether the income figures are pretax or posttax, whether the data are based on households or individuals (though the efforts of Bollen and Jackman (1985) and Muller (1988) attempt to control for this confounding factor in their analyses), and whether the income figures are representative of the nation as a whole or refer only to certain regions or cities.

These data problems are yet further complicated by the fact that there are a number of data sources available (for example, Paukert, Ahluwalia, the World Bank), and these sources, although overlapping to some extent in years reported and nations covered, are still distinguishable in terms of coverage and some of the figures reported. Hence it matters whose measure one happens to be using. This has been vividly demonstrated by Weede and Tiefenbach who found confirmation using the data reported by Paukert (1973), but disconfirmation using the data of Ahluwalia (1976), though the two sources also differ somewhat in the nations covered.

Finally, one of the most serious obstacles to research on the link between democracy and income inequality continues to be the relative absence of data at more than one point in time. This forces research designs to be cross-sectional, which gives one very little leverage in addressing questions posed in dynamic terms. Efforts to piece together two points of inequality data, as only Kohli and associates attempted, to support at least a simple panel design are besieged by problems of comparability.

It is also important to remember that the dates the income inequality figures refer to in existing data banks vary across nations. Only Rubinson and Quinlan sought to explicitly match the dates for all of their variables in an effort to control for this possible weakness (they then included a control variable in their analysis, the value of which was the year the values were coded for). None of the other ten studies adopted this strategy. How much error is introduced in a cross-sectional design by having one variable measured in 1960 and another measured in 1965 is difficult to estimate, but it certainly would seem necessary in instances of discrepancies of a few years or more to make some effort to be reasonably sure that the discrepancy is not confounding the results.

In the set of twelve studies under review, only two, Cutright (1967) and Jackman (1975), did not use some measure of personal or household income distribution.

TABLE 7
Source of Personal/Household Income Distrib. Data

Paukert (1973)	Other
Stack (1980)	Weede (1982) (World Bank)
Bollen and Grandjean (1981)	Kohli et al. (1984) (World Bank)
Hewitt (1977)	Weede and Tiefenbach (1981) (Ahluwalia, Ballmer-Cao)
Rubinson and Quinlan (1977)	Bollen and Jackman (1985) (World Bank, Ahluwalia, Jain) (replicated with Paukert data)
Weede and Tiefenbach (1981)	Muller (1988) (Ahluwalia, Jain, World Bank, Lecaillon et al., Paukert, Sawyer, UNECLA)

Specific Measure of Personal/Household Income Distrib. Used

Hewitt (1977)	1) Income share to top 5%: –
	2) Income share to top 20%: 0
Rubinson and Quinlan (1977)	1) Gini coefficient: 0
	2) Income share to middle 20%: 0
Stack (1979)	Gini coefficient: –
Stack (1980)	Gini coefficient: –
Bollen and Grandjean (1981)	Gini coefficient: 0
Weede and Tiefenbach (1981)	Paukert: Share to bottom 40%: +
	Share to top 20%: –
	Gini coefficient: –
	Ahluwalia: Share to bottom 40%: 0
	Share to top 20%: 0
	Ballmer-Cao: Gini coefficient: 0
Weede (1982)	1) Income share to top 20%: –
	2) Income share to bottom 40%: +
Kohli et al. (1984)	Difference (1970–1960) of ratios of income share to top 5% to share to bottom 20%: 0
Bollen and Jackman (1985)	Ratio of income share of top 20% to income share of bottom 40%: 0
Muller (1988)	1) Income share of upper quintile: –
	2) Gini coefficient: –

(symbol after the colon indicates whether negative (–) effect or no (0) effect found using that particular measure)

Instead, these two investigators used a measure of the distribution of income across industrial sectors. As Bollen and Jackman (1985) point out, this latter measure is only an imperfect proxy for personal income distribution and may well be analytically and empirically distinguishable.

The remaining ten studies used some explicit measure of personal or household income distribution, but as a set they exhibit considerable variability with respect to the source of that data and with regard to which particular measures of income distribution they examined.

As the listings in Table 7 indicate, the importance of which source of data or which particular measure was used does not seem sufficient to explain discrepancies

in the findings of these studies, though they are certainly important in and of themselves. The state of data gathering on income distribution continues to be in turmoil, though Bollen and Jackman (1985) suggest that the more recent efforts and compilations of the World Bank are improving the situation.

In light of these weaknesses, a profitable area for future research is to investigate the construction of alternative indicators that have the virtue of being highly correlated with existing inequality measures, but which are available on a time-series basis and are based on information gathered according to standards that are much more comparable internationally. Such a measure might be along the lines of Morris' (1979) physical quality of life index.

Along these lines two additional studies are particuarly noteworthy. Williamson (1987) examined in cross-sectional analysis the effect of the level of political democracy, using Bollen's measure, on the physical quality of life index for eighty developing countries. He found only very weak, insignificant effects of political democracy on such an alternative indicator of welfare outputs broadly conceived. Similarly, Williamson and Pampel (1986) when estimating the lagged effects of a host of variables on still yet another welfare output indicator—in this case social security effort as measured by the percentage of GNP expended on five categories of social security programs—found that the level of political democracy, again indicated by Bollen's measure, significantly facilitated the expansion of a nation's social security effort for a sample of industrialized nations (N=26), but found no effect within the only subsample (N=32) of developing countries. Williamson and Pampel interpret this pattern of findings as substantiating the ideas of Lenski (1966): Democracy will have a greater effect on the distribution of societal resources in those nations with a greater economic surplus. A more recent effort on their part (Pampel and Williamson 1988), which is limited to examining the effect of two indicators of democracy—percentage of the eligible population actually voting, and electoral competition—on change in the social security efforts of eighteen advanced societies, found further support for their conclusions.

These results, however, stand in conflict with those of Moon and Dixon (1985). In their cross-sectional analysis of the correlates of physical quality of life levels in approximately 115 nations (both MDCs and LDCs), they found that the level of political democracy (as measured by an average of Bollen's 1960 and 1965 codings of political democracy) had a strong, positive impact on the PQLI index net of such other factors as level of economic development, government expenditures as a proportion of national product, and the ideological norms of the ruling regime. On the basis of their finding, Moon and Dixon argue that the provision of basic needs as policy outputs responds to representational processes.

Beyond the factors already considered, what other factors might be affecting the discrepant findings evident in the set of a dozen studies under consideration? Three issues which have been noted in the literature (see Weede 1982; Bollen and Jackman 1985) are the model specification of the relationship between level of economic

development and the measure of inequality, the possibility of reciprocal effects between democracy and inequality, and the composition of the sets of nations included in the respective data bases. We will turn briefly to each of these.

First both Kuznets (1955) and Lenski (1966) have argued that the relationship between economic development and inequality follows a nonlinear (inverted U) form. However, only five of the studies have specified this form of the relationship in the models they have tested (Bollen and Grandjean, Weede and Tiefenbach, Weede, Bollen and Jackman, and Muller). Though it is obviously important to include the correct specification, the presence or absence of a nonlinear relationship cannot alone explain the discrepant findings: two of the five studies that did specify a curvilinear relationship report a negative relationship between democracy and income inequality; two report no relationship; and one, Muller, reports a negative effect of democratic experience on inequality but no independent effect of the mere level of political democracy, as measured by Bollen's indicator, on inequality.

With regard to the possibility of reciprocal effects between democracy and inequality, only three studies, those by Rubinson and Quinlan, Bollen and Jackman, and Muller, have explicitly tested this possibility. In the kind of cross-sectional research being conducted on this issue, it is important to estimate a simultaneous-equations model in order to be relatively certain that a simple recursive model, where the only allowed effect is from democracy to inequality, is not yielding misleading results. Both of these studies found no effect of democracy on income inequality

A third characteristic of these studies that must be considered in both interpreting the contradictory results of existing studies and developing an alternative indicator is that of sample composition. Because of the general scarcity of data on inequality, most of the studies examined here performed their analysis on an average of about a third of existing nations. The details of the composition of the sets of countries analyzed are presented in Table 8.

TABLE 8
Sets of Countries Examined in the Studies

DCs and LDCs	
Stack (1980) negative	(N = 37)
Weede (1982) negative	(N = 21)
Bollen and Jackman (1985) none	(N = 60)
Jackman (1975) none	(N = 60)
Bollen and Grandjean (1981) none	(N = 50)
Rubinson and Quinlan (1977) none	(N = 32)
Weede and Tiefenbach (1981) negative	(N = 34–46)
Cutright (1967) negative	(N = 44)
Muller (1988) negative	(N = 50–55)
DCs only	
Stack (1979) negative	(N = 18)
Hewitt (1977) negative	(N = 25, 2 LDCs)
LDCs only	
Kohli et al. (1984) none	(N = 20)

TABLE 9
Used Bollen's Index of Democracy

Bollen and Grandjean (1981) none
Weede (1982) negative
Kohli et al. (1984) none
Bollen and Jackman (1985) none (replicated with a voter turnout measure)
Muller (1988) none

Used Jackman's Index of Democratic Performance

Jackman (1975) none
Rubinson and Quinlan (1977) none
Stack (1980) negative
Weede and Tiefenbach (1981) negative

Other Measures

Cutright (1967) negative (Cutright's Political Represen. Index, 1945–54)
Hewitt (1977) negative (yrs. of full democracy)
Rubinson and Quinlan (1977) none (Cutright's Political Represen. Index, 1945–54)
Stack (1979) negative (voter turnout as % adult pop.)
Weede (1982) negative (voter turnout as % adult pop.)
Muller (1988) negative (length of experience of democracy)

How far does the variation in composition of the sets of countries analyzed go toward explaining the pattern of results found? The answer is largely unknown. Obviously the differences in the sizes of the sets of countries analyzed could have had profound consequences for the results found. The sizes of many of these studies make them extremely sensitive to the inclusion or exclusion of just a few cases. Although Bollen and Jackman (1985) undertook the only effort to estimate whether their results would hold up under a check for outliers and replications with random subsamples, the fact remains that their sample was neither a random sample of all countries nor is its size large enough for us to place complete confidence in it. In addition, the issue remains as to whether the analysis should contain both developed countries and developing countries or only the latter.

A final feature of the studies being reviewed in this section that warrants attention is how democracy was measured in each. Table 9 lists the different measures used.

Again, as made obvious by Table 9, differences in the particular measure used cannot alone begin to explain the discrepancies on findings. Indeed, as is pointed out in the following section, most measures of political democracy tend to be fairly strongly intercorrelated.

Before leaving this topic, however, it must be noted that the use of voter turnout measures as an indicator of political democracy may well be quite unsatisfactory. Voter turnout data were used by both Stack and Weede in two of the studies above, and voter turnout is a component of Jackman's Democratic Performance Indicator which, in turn, was used in four studies. The problems with voter participation data are many-fold and are aptly described by Bollen (1980). Indeed, Bollen found that a measure of the percentage of the adult population who voted was either not related to or inversely related to a number of other dimensions of political democracy. Hence, its use probably only further confounds the results.

All in all, the twelve studies on the relationship between democracy and inequality reviewed here are striking in the fact that they provide us with a very weak foundation for concluding anything about the theoretically interesting link. Perhaps the best work to date is that of Bollen and Jackman (1985). Nonetheless, even this study does not escape the problems caused by the quality of the income distribution data, the lack of fuller global coverage, the validity of their measurement of democracy, and, perhaps, most important, the lack of a dynamic form of analysis.

Summary

When all is said and done, what can we conclude with confidence about the development consequences of political democracy? Even though the theoretical literature on the subject is rich and exciting, cross-national quantitative efforts to test the various hypotheses have fallen far short in their effort to yield clear grounds for rejecting or accepting many of the claims made. Almost twenty years of research efforts on the issues of economic growth and socioeconomic equality have produced few if any robust conclusions.

A. Democracy and Economic Growth

With respect to those studies where national differences in rates of economic growth have been examined, the evidence, as presented in the studies reviewed, would seem to suggest that political democracy does not widely and directly facilitate more rapid economic growth, net of other factors; hence, the compatibility perspective finds little support.

Beyond this, however, very little else seems clear. The studies examined are divided nearly equally with respect to whether a negative relationship or no relationship was found between democracy and economic growth. Our examination of such study characteristics as sample composition, use of controls in analysis, method and substance of the democracy measure used, period analyzed, and so on, unfortunately provides us with little leverage to discriminate among the conflicting findings since these characteristics tend to bear no particular relationship to the findings reported in the studies examined.

Even if we acknowledge that not all of these studies are created equal in terms of the appropriateness of their measures, research design, and methodology, something that might warrant the weightier treatment of one or a few of these studies, the sad fact remains that each of the studies reviewed suffers from one or another serious shortcoming. Ideal standards aside, perhaps the strongest analyses consist of the efforts of Marsh, Landau, Meyer and Associates, and Weede. But again we find no consensus within this subset of the studies. Therefore, in light of these weaknesses, even the conclusion that political democracy does not facilitate economic growth is at best a tentative one. Even if one were to embrace such a conclusion, the existing body of research has little to say about the form and balance of that growth.

B. Democracy and Inequality

With respect to those studies where national differences in levels of income inequality have been examined, the evidence appears to allow us to conclude that political democracy does not widely exacerbate inequality, net of other factors; hence the authoritarian model as discussed finds little support.

The debate, therefore, reduces to the issue of whether or not political democracy bears a systematic relationship to lower levels of income inequality. With regard to this question, the existing evidence suggests that the level of political democracy as measured at one point in time tends not to be widely associated with lower levels of income inequality. The validity of this conclusion rests upon an assessment of the differential quality of the studies reviewed. Clearly the efforts of Bollen and Jackman and Muller are superior to the others in terms of such considerations as their sample composition, assessment of simultaneity, and controls for the source of income data, and these two studies both support the above conclusion.

Caution must be interjected here, however, because, as Muller argues, political democracy may well act to reduce inequality in the long run. Moreover, none of the studies reviewed here are beyong reproach with respect to their coverage, model specification, research design, or measurement of democracy and inequality.

C. Conclusion

In the final analysis, the worth of our review lies in its clarification of the theoretical issues at hand and in its careful scrutiny of the studies that have been performed so as to guide our evaluations of the theoretical implications and to inform future research with the hope that such efforts will not repeat past mistakes. All in all, lively debate continues along the lines of the theoretical perspectives we have identified. When these alternative theories are confronted with the evidence as generated through quantitative, cross-national investigations, only a few basic insights appear to have been gained. In other words, much empirical work remains to be done.

In light of this state of affairs, a few remarks are in order. First, carefully designed replications of the kinds of studies reviewed are of utmost importance. In these studies special attention needs to be paid to the issues of sample composition, method of analysis, model specification, and measurement of the central variables. Moreover, assessments of robustness are crucial with respect to differences in subsamples of countries, measures, and periods examined.

Second, before this program of research can move forward in a fertile fashion, numerous measurement issues must be addressed. Of these, none is more central than the valid and reliable measurement of political democracy. Should political democracy be assessed on a point or period basis? Which dimensions of political procedures, practices, and institutions are relevant to our classifications of national

societies in terms of political democracy, and which are not? Should our measure of political democracy be continuous (ordinal) or discrete in form? All of these are critical issues that have only begun to be addressed (for a noteworthy exception, see Bollen (1980).

Along these lines our own review of existing measures of political democracy has identified ten, each of which is based upon the coding of at least two properties of a nation's political system deemed indicative of political democracy, each of which yielded ordinal rankings on some combined final index of political democracy, and each of which possesses a coverage of at least forty nations around the world. With respect to these ten indices, several points are worth noting. First, of the ten, five are basically point measured and five are period measured. Hence, at least half explicitly incorporate information on political form stability into the final index scores. Second, regardless of whether the index is point or period, all but two of the ten are based on observations made of national political systems before the start of the seventies. To some extent this is due to the fact that a considerable number of these measures are based on a small set of cross-national raw data files that were compiled during the sixties. In contrast, very little effort appears to have been undertaken to develop explicit measures of political democracy, especially annual assessments, after 1970.

Third, with respect to information about the national political systems covered by these measures, the measures differ from one another with regard to whether information on system stability, extent of franchise, and degree of exercise of the franchise are included. Nonetheless, nearly all of the measures surveyed are anchored in the notion that distinguishing systems in terms of political democracy rests ultimately on the degree to which political elites are selected by citizens via elections that are regular and meaningful. Obviously, the meaningfulness of elections of political elites is a slippery concept to operationalize. Thus, how it is exactly observed and coded is of great interest and importance. Judging from the all too frequently brief and cryptic annotations associated with the existing measures, it would appear that evidence for making "meaningfulness" judgements rests most commonly on two pieces of information: 1) was the election conducted under circumstances that would have been conducive to the presentation of real electoral choice? and 2) were the elections in fact competitive or contested?

Relevant information examined to assess the first of these prerequisites of meaningfulness, while by no means universally examined, includes such factors as the status of press freedom, freedom from government acts to suppress opposition, and the health and vitality of intermediary interest groups such as parties and unions. The degree to which elections were indeed actually competitive is most frequently inferred from an examination of the outcomes of the elections observed, particularly those elections for positions in the national legislative body, namely in terms of the proportional representation of the party memberships of those in office.

All in all, although the presence, regularity, and meaningfulness of elections are central to the assessment of political democracy in each of the measures we have scrutinized, on the whole, the set of ten remain a fairly heterogeneous lot in terms

of specific pieces of information included. Some are biased in such ways that they may be designated as more democratic, including those systems that are more stable, or those systems wherein mass participation is greater, or those systems wherein interparty competition is greater than intraparty competition, or those systems wherein the parties are of generally equal size and power. Hence, the adequacy of any one of these ten measures depends not only on coverage or timing of observation, but also on the degree to which it best captures and indicates political democracy as the investigator conceives it to be. Too often little attention is paid to this linkage between concept and indicators, an issue which becomes critical for validly testing one's arguments about the development consequences of democracy.

Nonetheless, our own review of existing measures of democracy indicates that generally they correlate fairly strongly with each other, if we limit our attention to those of the ten that were measured basically around the same period of time. The average level of intercorrelation is $r = .75$, with a range of the specific correlations running from around $r = .60$ to $r = .90$. This level of intercorrelation suggests that a diverse set of measurement efforts have yielded a fair amount of agreement in discriminating systems with respect to political democracy. The task remains to extend the coverage of our measurement efforts and to assess the robustness of the conclusions we arrive at in such analyses as discussed earlier, given the use of alternative existing measures as well as new ones.

A third critical point is as follows. It is painfully clear that in order for the relevant theoretical debates to move forward, considerable attention must be allocated not just to evaluating the overall relationship between political democracy and development outcomes but also to evaluating the relationships between political democracy and a host of intervening factors through which democracy is considered to have its ultimate effects on such development outcomes as rate of economic growth and inequality. For example, some speculate that democracy hinders growth because the former engenders higher levels of instability. Huntington (1987) notes, however, that this connection is less clear than we assume. In light of Hibbs's (1973) finding that there is little systematic relationship between mass political violence and economic growth, Huntington suggests that there is perhaps a threshold effect of political violence on economic growth. Couple this with Marsh's (1979) finding that among less-developed countries there is little difference in the level of conflict between those with democratic and those with authoritarian political institutions; then even a general negative relationship between democracy and rate of economic growth offers little support to a theory that is grounded in the linkages between democracy and political instability, and, in turn, instability and economic growth.

Fourth, clearly more attention needs to be paid to specifying the conditions under which the relationships of interest hold and under which they do not. This point derives from the arguments of those who embrace what we have referred to as the "skeptical" perspectives. Clearly, even the conclusions put forth here—that democracy does not widely lead to rapid economic growth and that authoritarianism is not widely associated with lower levels of inequality—must be necessarily tempered in light of such obvious countercases as Taiwan, Republic of Korea, and Japan.

Considering quantitative, cross-national research, Weede's (1983) investigation of the effects of political democracy on economic growth under different degrees of state involvement in the economy illustrates the kind of avenue that new research could pursue.

Fifth and last, we would wholeheartedly recommend that new outcome measures be pursued in future research. Along these lines it would be most worthwhile to move beyond simple measures of rate of economic growth and on to measures that indicate features of the type of economic growth and the pattern of industrialization. Income inequality, with its widely acknowledged shortcomings, needs to be supplemented by other indicators of the general social and economic welfare of the population, indicators that likewise tap into the issue of distribution. Such indicators exist in the form of measures of fulfillment of basic human needs and welfare provisions. But as of yet, and as briefly noted earlier, only a handful of studies have begun to look at such alternative indicators of development outcomes and their relation to democracy. Obviously, much work remains to be done.

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Inkeles:
→ Found with no exception that all measures correlate .9 or above. So we could use Freedom House or 5 others and come out almost at exactly the same place.
→ Growth not an outcome of democracy necessarily. They are separate values
→ Don't confuse democracy or its measurement with its correlates. Need to measure effective separate. Democracy is not necessarily effective
→ Systematic scholarly research does not support assertions made for democracy as a precondition for growth – more effective system
→ Growth indicators don't have necessary sensitivity

Africa (Williams): haven't decided yet whether its pro-democracy

Coppedge: need to define democracy. Dahl's "polyarchy" has widespread agreement – political only, + rather low standards.

(B.) * – weighting schemes don't make much difference for cross-national research as all are can come up with anyway. Inkeles & Bendix-Lipset
– Coppedge/Reinicke would like IMD (Lausanne) to replicate it every year. The system needs some improvement.

Fallin: get his conclusions of FH data. Hence work has undergone | Banks: [illegible]
good set of indicators

MODERN FEDERALISM

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The theory of federalism advanced in this essay challenges theories of federalism that emphasize the centralizing, legalistic, or amorphous character of federal systems of government. We underscore the crucial importance of the regional governments in federal countries, especially the multiple dimensions of the role and identity of the various states, republics, provinces, Länder, and cantons. Our alternative theory holds that while federalism is hard to conceptualize and measure, it has distinct characteristics; that federal systems can be classified and compared; and that federalism is more than an evanescent ether rooted in past events. Federalism is real and getting stronger. It is on the rise the world over. There are many more federal countries than is commonly recognized.

Daniel J. Elazar reports in his most recent and useful summary volume on the subject that there are 160 "sovereign" nations now in existence of which 58 "are involved in formal arrangements using federal principles."[1] To give a partial list of some of the more prominent members of the club of modern federalism, it includes Australia, Austria, Canada, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Nigeria, Switzerland, Germany, the United States, Yugoslavia, and Brazil under its new constitution. Argentina appears likely to join the club. The Soviet Union currently is struggling with the federal concept, which

was established in the 1918 constitution but minimally implemented even in the post-Stalin era.[2] Moreover, the European Community is moving to adopt features of the federal form.[3]

Drawing on work under way at the Rockefeller Institute of Government of the State University of New York, we concentrate in this essay on four subjects -- the definition of modern federalism; the ways in which federal systems can be studied and classified; the ways in which federal systems come into being; and prospects for a federal form in the Soviet Union.

I. WHAT IS MODERN FEDERALISM?

The most widely cited recent works on modern federalism highlight its amorphous nature, and some observers question whether there is anything left of the true species. Maurice Vile, for example, believes that definitions of federalism "are almost totally vacuous."[4] In a similar vein, Michael Reagan and John Sanzone contend that we face a situation in which federalism is "bankrupt" as an operational concept.[5]

Many leading experts describe federalism as evolutionary, as a way-station to a unitary governmental system. According to Carl J. Friedrich, "federalism is more fully understood if it is seen as a process, an evolving pattern of changing relationships rather than a static design regulated by firm and unalterable rules."[6] As a result of centralizing forces, Friedrich asserted, the 50 U.S. states "appear as administrative subdivisions of the nation, government survivals of another day which must be supported by grants-in-aid, supervised and coordinated by a growing federal bureaucracy, retained as training and proving grounds for political leadership on the national stage."[7]

We have a different view. Federalism is a governmental form that seeks to reconcile regional diversity with a level of collective unity and does so in a way that gives a distinctive role to regional governments. Inevitably, a degree of tension exists

between the central and regional governments over the scope of the federal compact, the boundaries of shared governmental powers, and the relationship of the governmental components -- central and regional -- to the citizenry. Existing federal systems vary greatly in how they deal with these tensions, producing different patterns and outcomes.

There is general agreement among experts that a functioning federal system, composed of a number of regional governments, must have a democratic and pluralist political system that provides opportunities for access and participation by citizens in both national and regional political processes. Otherwise the idea of a separate identity, diversity of interests and actions, and self-expression by the regional governments would not be meaningful. Most experts also agree that an effective federal form needs to operate under a written constitution that stipulates the responsibilities of the central and regional governments, the role of the regional governments in the amendatory process, and the rights of citizenship. Elazar describes federalism as "contractual noncentralization, the structured dispersion of powers among centers whose legitimate authority is constitutionally guaranteed."[8]

Elazar's contribution to the theory of modern federalism is large and eclectic. Consistent with the position taken in this essay, he is skeptical of predominantly legalistic theories of federalism as reflected in the famous article by Edward S. Corwin, "The Passing of Dual Federalism." Focusing on the U.S. Constitution, Corwin in 1950 lamented the way its interpretation has "overwhelmed and submerged" the role of the states

> ... so that today the question faces us whether the constituent States of the System can be saved for any useful purpose, and thereby saved as the vital cells that they have been heretofore of democratic sentiment, impulse, and action.[9]

Corwin charted the shift from "dual" to "cooperative" federalism in the United States. He depicted cooperative federalism as a conception of the national government and the states being "mutually complementary parts of a single governmental mechanism, all of whose powers are intended to realize the current purposes of government according to their applicability to the problem at hand."[10] Corwin saw the shift from one hundred years of duality to this fuzzier shared concept in dire terms, as sounding the death knell of federalism. But, viewed in another way, the history of the U.S. Constitution is a long process of refining this issue of dual versus cooperative action. The Framers saw themselves as inventing a new "composition,"[11] which seems to us to have been deliberately blurred at the conceptual edges. While the Framers could not envision the consequences of their handiwork, one could argue that it was meant to take something like its present form over a period of time in which federal-state relationships were continuously developed and adjusted.

We believe one should view the composition of U.S. federalism as a sharing of power in which citizens relate to two governments, each with consequential roles. As scholars we are challenged to give substance and specification to this arrangement. We are not satisfied with the contemporary view of federalism derived from much of the political science literature that stresses its elusiveness, legalistic character, and intrinsically centripetal development.

Modern federalism, according to British political scientist Kenneth C. Wheare, began two centuries ago in Philadelphia where the U.S. Constitution was written. The Framers of the Constitution invented a new political form, which the brilliant James Madison said is "neither wholly national or wholly federal."[12] In the new American political system, declared Wheare, the citizen is a citizen of <u>both</u> nation and state. "Each citizen is subject to two governments," unlike the earlier confederal form where the states, in effect, belonged to a league as members.[13]

Alexander Hamilton in Federalist No. 15 spoke of the new system as correcting for "the great and radical vice of the Articles of Confederation in which the states acted in the CORPORATE or COLLECTIVE CAPACITIES as contradistinguished from the INDIVIDUALS of whom they consist."[14] Madison at another point (in Federalist No. 51) referred to U.S. federalism as providing "a double security" against the tyranny of the few. By this he meant the security provided by the checks and balances among the three branches (horizontally at the national level) and, second, the balancing of power between the national and state governments (the vertical dimension of political pluralism).

Nowhere does the U.S. Constitution mention the word "federal," although the authors of The Federalist Papers -- appropriately, employing "Madison Avenue" techniques -- used the term often to win support for ratification. According to James Madison, "The federal Constitution forms a happy combination ... the great and aggregate interests being referred to the national, the local and particular to the state legislatures."[15] Ralph Ketcham, in his edited collection of Anti-Federalist Papers, noted the cleverness of "taking the popular word 'federal' to denote the new constitution," thereby gaining "an important 'image' victory."[16]

James H. Hutson, Chief of the Manuscript Division of the U.S. Library of Congress, adds that the Federalists at the Convention responded to the "people out of doors" in their early interpretation of the new charter. According to Hutson, the arguments in the Federalist Papers "repudiated the consolidationist sentiments of its authors."[17] While we bow to no scholar in our fascination with the history of the U.S. Constitution, we believe as social scientists that we should focus on outcomes -- specifically, on the way contemporary political systems operate in relation to their "federal" features. We argue that the widespread view of federalism among political scientists as amorphous and defying close specification is mistaken not just for scholars

but for political leaders as well because of the importance of federal arrangements to modern governance.

We prefer to view modern federalism as a political system in which regional governments have a substantial role and identity. Using the United States as the model, we see the states as having a substantial role and identity along six dimensions:

1. The historical/cultural dimension, referring to the states' capacity to generate important loyalties in people's minds and to provide routes of access into the political process. This point is especially important in countries in which federalism is grounded in differences in culture and language, as is the case in the USSR, Yugoslavia, Switzerland, India, Brazil and, to a lesser extent, Canada.
2. The political/constitutional dimension, referring to the extent of the states' authority to determine, organize, and control their own political structure (including their own constitution, major political institutions, and boundaries). This dimension requires us to consider the power of the central government to influence the structure and operations of state and local political institutions and the boundaries of state and local governmental units. It also requires consideration of the constitutional and legal machinery available to define and redefine the federal balance over time, which may involve the roles, powers, and activities of a supreme or constitutional court and the amendatory process for the national constitution.
3. The fiscal dimension, referring to the extent to which states can set and levy their own taxes as well as the tax collection role of the central government and the terms and arrangements for the redistribution of central government revenues to the states. A major variable under this heading is the financial dependence of the regional governments on the central government.

4. The programmatic dimension, referring to the functional areas of government (e.g., public safety, education, health, natural resources, transportation) in which the states have exclusive or predominant responsibility and the nature of these responsibilities (e.g., the regulation of insurance, marriage and divorce, criminal law and corrections, and aspects of business activity, professional conduct, and occupational licensing). The role of the states in areas often considered the responsibility of the central government, such as in international economic affairs and trade, is of increasing importance.

5. The regional governments' representation/participation in the central government. This dimension involves the representation of regional officials in national institutions and the participation of regional officials in the formulation and implementation of national policies. In some countries, regional governments are represented directly by officials elected for this purpose in the upper house of the national legislature, which may have special authority over matters related to center-region relations. Other countries provide for a defined role for regional chief executives in national policymaking (as in a regional premiers' conference with specified powers). In others this role is less formalized (as in the U.S. National Governors' Association or the currently imprecisely defined responsibilities and authority of the USSR's Federation Council). The obligations of the central government to regional governments, often constitutionally guaranteed, are of particular significance in legitimizing regional representation and participation in national politics.

6. The role of regional governments in the supervision of local governments. This dimension includes the authority of regional governments to determine the form, function, and finances of local governments, and also to determine whether and how local officials are selected (e.g., elected or appointed). Also important under

this heading is the extent to which the central government directly or indirectly controls local governmental affairs, bypassing regional governments on matters affecting the policies, finances, and administration of local government.

At its roots, this conceptual framework embodies an assumption that federalism exists in structural, behavioral, historical, and cultural terms as a distinct political form. We go one step further and challenge a prevailing notion in the political science literature that federalism involves a constant centralizing process with the central government becoming stronger vis-a-vis the states. We view the U.S. situation and that of other modern federal countries as cyclical. The history of U.S. federalism involves the rising role of the states in periods when the role of government as a whole has been reduced in the society. In these conservative periods in U.S. history -- the 1880s, 1920s, and 1980s -- initiative and innovation (to the extent they have occurred) have occurred at the state level on the part of particular activist state governments. On the other hand, in liberal or more expansive periods of U.S. history, prior initiatives on the part of activist states (e.g., Wisconsin, New York, California, and Minnesota) have become generalized in the country through national governmental action that substantially expanded the prerogatives and spending of government overall and over time. The history of Australia, Canada, and other federal countries reflect this cyclical pattern.

This cyclical interpretation, contrary to the theories cited earlier about the steady centralization tendency of federal unions, has important implications for theories of federalism advanced by economists. In particular, it challenges the conservative view of public choice economists (notably James Buchanan and Geoffrey Brennan) that federalism is a desirable political form because it restrains "Leviathan" by stimulating competition among the states and thereby restrains the growth of government.[18]

The theory of modern federalism put forward in this article is distinct from one other approach that has become widespread in the literature about federalism, particularly in the U.S. and Australia. We question the large body of work that has narrowed the discussion of federalism to focus on intergovernmental relations. While there is no question that intergovernmental fiscal subsidies have become an increasingly important influence in federal-state relations, a preoccupation with the structure and distribution of such grants-in-aid diminishes the importance of the role of state governments in contrast to the broader multi-factor framework suggested earlier in this article. Elazar agrees. He sees what he calls the "intergovernmentalism" movement as a reflection of behavioralism in social science, contending that this usage "and the confusions surrounding it" have "restricted federalism to its narrowest possible compass" in a way that detracts from the history, values, and purposes of federal governmental arrangements.[19]

In a previous paper, Richard P. Nathan arrayed six countries on a continuum (see chart) in terms of their degree of "federalness" as defined by the relative strength of the role of state governments using the six dimensions of federal practice described above.

Relative Strength of Regional Governments Studied (Selected Characteristics)



See text for discussion of points highlighted in figure.

II. STUDYING MODERN FEDERALISM

The theory of federalism presented in Part I maintains that countries differ according to the role of state governments and that this difference defines their "federalness" and helps us to understand the degree and character of federalism in different settings. There is some point at which countries cease to be federal if the role of component regional governments is very strong in a confederal or non-national political form, or if the role of the central government is very strong in a unified political nation state. We believe researchers should focus on the role of regional governments to develop and refine theories of federalism with conceptual clarity and explanatory power. Such efforts would be especially fruitful in the present period when the federal idea is so relevant to the democratization process in many countries.

It is in this spirit and context that social science researchers should conduct a multi-country comparative study of contemporary federalism. Such a study focusing on the role of regional governments and their relationships with the central government would accomplish four main purposes. It would: (1) define federalism as a political form; (2) classify federal systems, perhaps into different sub-groups; (3) provide a basis to test various hypotheses about the aims and operations of federal governments; and (4) provide a knowledge base for political leaders to monitor and adjust the allocation of functional responsibilities and revenue sources of central, regional, and local governments.

We believe the best research method for such a study is to conduct individual-country case studies as components of a multi-country comparative evaluation conducted by a network of social science researchers using a uniform analytical framework and research design. Currently, we are engaged in the planning and development of such an international comparative field research network. Ideally, one would want the country papers to be multi-disciplinary, reflecting the interest expressed

here in the six dimensions of the regional governments' role and identity: the historical/cultural, political/constitutional, fiscal, programmatic, representational/participatory, and supervisory. These individual-country papers need to encompass both formal characteristics and the actual behavior of the political systems selected for analysis. The research will also give attention to the evolution of the political systems of the countries studied. It has been more than three decades since the publication of Wheare's seminal comparative study of federal governments, and an updated assessment is overdue.

Each country paper will be written by a person from the country being studied and in some cases also a foreign specialist, with both authors having a panel of academic and governmental experts as advisors. We believe that skillful management of this research process can produce a valuable data base, including economic and social statistics. Such a data base will be a practical tool for governmental leaders facing decisions about the role of different types of governments and about the nature and structure of central-regional-local relationships. Building on a preliminary comparative study of federalism conducted at Princeton University in 1987,[20] we plan a sample of ten countries: Australia, Brazil, Canada, Germany, India, Nigeria, Switzerland, Yugoslavia, the USSR, and the U.S. This sample is representative of various geographical areas and types of federal systems.

Some experts on federalism hold that the approach proposed here is too limited and that there should be a well defined set of hypotheses about the aims and outcomes of federalism. We understand this point, but we resist it on the ground that the objectives of federalism vary considerably in different countries and historical periods. Trying to specify these diverse and changing objectives prior to empirical investigation would give pseudo-rigor to a comparative study and would detract from the main purposes of this international comparative field research project. The Framers of U.S.

federalism, for example, were not precise about their objectives, and key participants in debates and policy on American federalism have shifted their priorities over time.

Nevertheless, five principal aims can be derived from the history of federalism in the United States and other countries.

1. Federalism is designed to reconcile unity and diversity.
2. Federalism is a political mechanism to protect against central government tyranny.
3. It is a means for enhancing participation by citizens in the political process at several levels of government.
4. It is a method for increasing the efficiency of government through regional competition.
5. Finally, the federal structure is a way to stimulate innovation by the regional governments, which are seen, in the words of one U.S. Supreme Court Justice, as "laboratories of innovation."

We could convert these and other objectives into hypotheses, but we believe, as noted, that there is a danger in overspecification and that it is wiser to adopt a more inductive, multi-factored, and empirical research approach. The critical initial task is identification and classification, with the role of regional governments being the key to the analysis. Our theoretical framework of six dimensions enables field researchers to examine major attributes of federal systems of government and at the same time assess the relative importance and strength of diverse objectives of federalism such as those listed above. Other dimensions and objectives will be added to this research agenda as the comparative investigations proceed.

The current status of this research is that (1) sample countries have been selected; (2) most field researchers have been designated; and (3) a research conference is scheduled for May 1991 in Kingston, Ontario, Canada in conjunction with the annual meeting of the International Association of Centres for the Study of

Federalism. The project is being undertaken under the auspices of the Nelson A. Rockefeller Institute of Government of the State University of New York. Erik P. Hoffmann is the lead researcher for the Soviet Union. Richard P. Nathan is the principal investigator for the project.

III. THE ORIGINS AND OUTCOMES OF FEDERALISM

So far we have concentrated in this article on three key conceptual points. Modern federalism involves dual citizenship in central and regional governments; multiple dimensions of the role of regional governments; and a cyclical pattern for the strength and importance of regional governments. We can now add a fourth definitional point, which concerns the origins of federalism and helps make the case for conducting comparative field research on federalism at this time.

While not original, we distinguish two basic patterns of the origins of federalism. One is fueled by centripetal forces and concerns, involving the adoption of the federal form to integrate a polity. The second is centrifugal, involving the adoption of federal features to avoid disintegration. The cases we know best from the history of federalism are basically of the first variety. They are federal systems set up to integrate previously more separate political communities. This is the experience of the United States, Australia, and Canada -- all former British colonial federations that covered a large land mass. The same may ultimately occur in the European Community.

In the current period, there now are many cases in which federalism is under close scrutiny as a way to curtail political disintegration and fragmentation. Federalism has been discussed as a solution for ethnic conflict in Cyprus and the Sudan. Federal arrangements have been adopted in Spain to reduce tensions among different ethnic groups. Throughout Eastern Europe new constitutions are being written, with participation by Western jurists and with heavy emphasis being given to the evaluation

and adoption of federal principles. For example, Czechoslovakia has been renamed the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic, and a constitutional amendment has approved a much greater division of powers between central and republic (regional) institutions beginning this year.

Federalism, in brief, is a very important subject in many countries of the world today. During the momentous events of November-December 1989, The New York Times ran a picture showing two East Germans demonstrating about the formation of a new Christian Democratic Union for the German Democratic Republic. A burly bearded man held a sign, "Ich will kein mundel der West DCU werden!" ("I don't want to become a ward of the CDU West!"). He faced a smaller man holding a 3x5 printed card with a counter caption -- "My country Europe." [21]

The U.S. version of modern federalism is rooted in this proposition, "My country America." Article IV, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution declares: "The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States." U.S. citizens move freely from one state to another, can buy property, settle, and seek work in a location of their own choosing. The modern welfare state makes public pensions (Social Security in the U.S.) and disability benefits fully portable. Although the 50 states of the United States vary in the terms and conditions of some social programs, a U.S. citizen for the most part is entitled to many social benefits and protections (e.g., a public pension program, unemployment and workers' compensation) on a uniform basis nationally. Many laws and regulations pertaining to working conditions, minimum wages, and labor organization are uniform among the states. "My country America" is both a matter of patriotism and practice.

It is interesting to ask: How far away is the European Community from this model? The history of social policy in the EC has evolved toward the uniformity of labor-market practices and social programs that enable citizens to move relatively easily and

seek work and conduct business in the member countries. Also, for many years before German reunification, the DDR was a de facto member of the EC, and travel and telecommunications between East and West Germany were increasing. After reunification East Germans automatically received all of the social and citizenship benefits of West Germany, expressing even more the spirit of "My country Europe." Furthermore, Europeans in the Community exercise a franchise for a parliamentary body and are part of a common defense community, both of which are developing slowly but steadily. Political rights of citizenship are reasonably similar among the EC member states, and there is widespread discussion of a common currency and banking system.

Recent experience suggests we should portray European developments as evolving toward the federal form rather than unitary government. It is ironic that this is happening at the same time that many countries are experiencing strong centrifugal forces. If we apply our six dimensions of "federalness" to the European Community, it is striking to observe the extent of the movement toward political arrangements which reflect this theoretical framework. Recalling Jean Monnet's idea that decentralization evolves under federalism, there is reason to think the EC may increasingly move towards and eventually become a successful federal entity. The editors of The Economist said in November 1989:

> Federal Europe or no, the mutual openness basic to the EC is already such as to make a common stand towards the rest of the world inevitable. No neat dividing line can exist between foreign policy and defence policy, nor between the civilian economy and the defence economy.[22]

IV. LESSONS FOR THE USSR

Can the USSR create and sustain a modern federal system? The chief lesson from the comparative analysis we have done so far is that the strengthening of Soviet

federalism will be exceedingly difficult but is of the utmost importance to the future of the country, whatever its ultimate territorial boundaries. It can be argued that Soviet and East European reformers are unique in modern history by trying to move rapidly and simultaneously from a unitary to a federal order, from a one-party to a multi-party structure, from a centralized to a market economy, and from the repression to the expression of national identities. Each of these goals is daunting; most are unprecedented; all are in dispute; and the combination of these factors -- especially their unpredictable effects on one another -- is awesome.

Let us be absolutely clear: federalism is necessary but not sufficient to democratize the USSR. That is, federal forms cannot miraculously eliminate authoritarian legacies or resolve fundamental institutional and behavioral dilemmas in the Soviet polity, economy, and society. However, a federal mechanism does offer important opportunities to stimulate pluralist tendencies, adjudicate competing interests, and curb ethnic rivalries -- all at the same time. To do so under conditions of mounting economic stringencies at home and accelerating economic competition from abroad is, as we have said, a most challenging task.

An insightful American observer, Charles Krauthammer, recently asked whether the future will bring "the federation of different peoples into superpolitical structures" or "the breakup of such polyglot structures as the Soviet Union into their ethnic elements?" He forcefully affirms:

> In the age of the fax and the fiber-optic cable, federation is the future. But federation works only under the condition of freedom. Otherwise what passes for federation is really colonialism. It may be that in a postcolonial world, confederal states require divorce before reconciliation. There are really benefits to confederation, as Europe is in the process of demonstrating. But people are hardly likely to appreciate these benefits until they can choose them freely. [Federation] affords not just economies of scale but also, as Madison predicted, a substrate for free government [in] a large republic. Federalism does more than nurture democracy. It may be the only force capable of taming that great nemesis of the 20th

> century, nationalism. As Europe has discovered after two world wars, sovereignty is not all it is cracked up to be. But those who have never had it may be skeptical about such a judgment. They may need a taste of the fruit, before giving it up for a higher good.[23]

Another essential lesson from a comparative perspective is that, in order to create or strengthen federal structures, national governments must clearly stipulate the constitutional rights and responsibilities of regional governments. All national governmental branches must safeguard these rights and ensure the fulfillment of these responsibilities with minimal use of coercion or threats. Similarly, the prerogatives and duties of national institutions must be well-defined and well-implemented. This sharing of power is a delicate and difficult process, but it is crucial to the successful functioning of a federal polity. Indeed, divided sovereignty may be essential to a polity's survival, especially in a period of economic decline and ethnic assertiveness.

All Soviet republics have particular economic interests, and almost all republics have a substantial role and identity grounded on ethnicity, the sizable and diverse ethnic minorities within most republics notwithstanding. It is thus especially important that ambiguities about the mutual obligations of the national and regional governments be kept to a minimum in the Union Treaty and in the revised constitutions and laws now being drafted for the central and republican governments. The draft Union Treaty contains several imprecise provisos and important lacunae that have the effect of enhancing the power of the national government and undermining the "inalienable right" of a "sovereign" republic to "the autonomous resolution of all questions concerning its developrnent" (Article 1). How much authority do the republics have in defining, facilitating, implementing, and adjudicating the "political rights and opportunities for socioeconomic and cultural development" that they are obliged to "guarantee" citizens under their jurisdiction (Article 3)? If the republics are "owners" of all their land, subsoil, and other natural resources, why is it necessary to authorize the national policymaking

bodies and unspecified national officials -- even the President -- to decide whether the exercise of these rights "impedes the implementation of the powers of the USSR," and to determine which "portion" of state property republics cannot own because it is "essential for the implementation of the powers of the USSR" (Article 7)? Furthermore, how can a republic exercise "self-government" if its powers are vaguely enumerated as "basic principles" and "conjoint" participation in centralized policymaking and administration, while the national government's powers are clearly specified as laws that "take precedence and are mandatory for execution on the territory of all republics"? And is "self-determination" possible if jurisdictional disputes between the national and republic governments are to be resolved by ill-defined "conciliatory procedures" and by the nascent USSR Constitutional Court, whose decisionmaking and enforcement powers are not yet grounded on a law-governed state, an independent judiciary, or sufficient funds and trained personnel (Articles 1, 5, 9, 16)?[24]

In contrast, the draft constitution of the Russian Federation stresses the "inviolability" and "indivisibility" of the republic's sovereignty, identifies the republic's multinational citizenry as "the only source of state power," and does not even acknowledge the existence of the USSR or the republic's current participation in it (Preamble and Articles 1.1, 1.2, ff.)[25] Two brief paragraphs affirm the Russian Federation's right to freely join or withdraw from a larger Union or Commonwealth, and to "voluntarily delegate some of its rights to the Union (Commonwealth) for the purpose of pursuing joint common activities, while retaining for itself the right to supervise and participate in their implementation" (Article 1.10). But lengthy expositions of "the federative structure" and "the system of state rule" (Sections IV and V) view the Russian Federation as a sovereign nation and delineate the rights and responsibilities of its national and regional states and federal territories as well as of its executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government and their officials.

For example, governmental powers are to be "divided" between the Russian Federation and its republics "in accordance with this Constitution," and these powers can be transferred permanently or temporarily only by mutual consent and with "the corresponding material support" (Articles 4.2.1, 4.2.8). Also, "resources of federal importance" are under the "joint jurisdiction" of the Federation and its republics (Article 4.2.3). And the roles of the Federation's President, Vice President, and Parliament as well as the prominence of the elected deputies, the independence of judges, and the constitutional restraints on the armed and security forces and police are specified in some detail. Briefly stated, this draft constitution espouses federal principles but applies them much more vigorously to the Russian republic's relations with its subregional governments than to the current USSR or to a future confederation or commonwealth of sovereign nations.

As a general rule, short constitutional documents with elastic concepts are far superior to long documents with detailed prescriptions as a mechanism for flexibly adapting to changing political-administrative, socioeconomic, scientific-technological, environmental-ecological, and international conditions. But concise documents gain legitimacy only if there is widespread public acceptance of the process by which they were created and implemented as well as widespread confidence in the national and regional leaders' will and capability to fulfill their reciprocal commitments. Otherwise, a succinct document will lack legitimacy and do no more than justify the current priorities of central officials and the existing political order -- be it reactionary, conservative, reformist, or radical. Additional critical sources of legitimacy are free, frequent, and direct elections, honest and able legislators and administrators, independent judges and lawyers, relatively stable and accepted institutional relationships, equitable representation of ethnic and other particularistic interests, and economic and international accomplishments.

The obstacles to a legitimate and effective federal order in the Soviet Union are rooted in centuries of political culture and institutional developments, especially since 1917. The concentration of power at the Communist Party's apex, together with the proscription of party factions, associational interest groups, and rival political parties, spawned methods of managing a multiethnic society in which higher party committees dominated lower party committees both in theory and in practice. The predominantly Russian national party apparatus controlled the ethnically diversified regional party apparatus, and party organizations at all levels controlled their respective soviets (governmental councils), the ethnic diversity of some of these soviets notwithstanding. As Commissar of Nationalities, Joseph Stalin clashed with Vladimir Lenin on short-term but probably not long-term nationality policy. Stalin promoted a unitary rather than a federal system and recommended dire penalties for ethnic assertiveness in the localities. Later, after he succeeded Lenin, Stalin deported whole nationality groups during the great purges and World War II, and attributed the victory over fascism to the decisive contributions of the ethnic Russian people.

To his credit, Nikita Khrushchev released the vast majority of political prisoners from the labor camps after Stalin's death, and many returnees were members of ethnic minorities. But Khrushchev continued the practice of staffing major regional party committees with ethnic Russians, often with a native first secretary and a powerful Russian second secretary. He continued to extract far more economic resources from prosperous republics than he allocated to them. And he continued to try to create a homogeneous political culture exemplified by "the new Soviet man." In his turn, Leonid Brezhnev accentuated the seamier sides of official and unofficial nationalities policy. Many dissidents were incarcerated for pressing the political, economic, and cultural claims of aggrieved ethnic groups. Brezhnev's "collective leadership" dismissed one of its own members from the Politburo, Petr Shelest, for advocating too vigorously the

interests of Ukraine, where he served as First Secretary of the republic party organization. The lesson was not lost on other central and regional party cadres.

Mikhail Gorbachev's policies of glasnost and democratization represented a major reversal of nationality policy, because they enabled citizens inside and outside of the major bureaucracies to vent their pent-up concerns. Petitions about cultural, linguistic, religious, and historical issues became petitions about political, economic, environmental, and territorial issues. Petitions became demands. Demands for change shifted from the functional sphere of policies and administration to the systemic sphere of institutional relationships, legality, and morality.

Many established and emerging organizations have exercised expanded rights of expression and assembly under Gorbachev. Several republics have sought to secede from the Soviet Union, and all republics have proclaimed either independence or the "sovereignty" of their laws over national laws. Republic, provincial, and local party appointees and popularly elected deputies to the soviets have voiced their preferences much more openly than before. Tens of thousands of voluntary associations and "informal" groups have been formed and have begun to articulate their interests strongly. And, through all of these organizations, ethnic minorities have demanded greater freedom vis-a-vis the central and subnational governments. In short, it has proved to be much easier to unleash conflicting aspirations than to satisfy them.

Under Khrushchev and Brezhnev the chief goals of nationality groups were to establish the principle that all Soviet peoples have equal rights under the law and to ensure that their particular group was permitted to practice its distinctive traditions. Only a few ultra-nationalists called for the adoption of republic constitutions that would guarantee the prerogatives of a sovereign state (e.g., the rights to negotiate political and economic accords with other republics and nations, to transfer extensive powers from the all-union to republic ministries, to protect the soviets from party and ministerial

domination, and to institutionalize popular representation through open campaigns and multi-candidate elections). In the 1990s, to date, such proposals have been commonplace and are espoused by many party and government officials at the national and especially the republic levels. The ambitions of virtually all ethnic groups and many subnational administrative units -- even individual districts of cities -- have been expanding exponentially in a veritable revolution of rising political expectations.

Indeed, powerful and competing social forces are profoundly influencing, and perhaps right now are shaping, a new Soviet theory and practice of federalism. Some elected republic presidents, nascent political parties, and noncommunist popular fronts are calling for more radical forms of confederation and eventual secession. A draft Union Treaty and laws on the political, economic, security, environmental, and cultural dimensions of federation are being vigorously debated at the time we concluded our work on this article. First secretaries of all republic Communist parties are now included in the Politburo, headed by General Secretary Gorbachev, and all presidents of the republics are members of the Federation Council, headed by President Gorbachev. Directives from these and other central bodies now appear to be a mix of inducements and threats to keep restive republics inside the USSR, to defuse conflicts between republics, and to preserve the rights of ethnic minorities within republics. The only certainties are that the Communist party has been fragmenting and that Russian dominance of the USSR has been eroding. The "leading role" of a single party has ended, and so has the leading role of a single nationality. Whether these are steps toward the breakup of the USSR, toward the forceable reintegration of the USSR, or toward the creation of a legitimate and effective federal system within all or part of the present-day USSR remains to be seen.

V. CONCLUDING REMARKS

It has not been sufficiently recognized in the current excitement about strengthening democracy throughout the world that the American brand of pluralism is two-dimensional. Both dimensions are having a revival. One dimension of American pluralism can be said to be horizontal, involving the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government. The other is the vertical dimension, involving the division of power between the central government and regional governments -- the federal idea. Not just scholars but also political leaders and citizens would be well served by having a deeper and fuller understanding of the nature and workings of the vertical dimension of political pluralism. As diverse societies learn more about themselves and others, as national economies become more and more interdependent, and as polities increasingly contribute to and benefit from one another's development, the federal idea and experience can provide valuable guidance for future relationships within and among nations.

NOTES

1. Daniel J. Elazar, Exploring Federalism (Tuskaloosa, Ala.: University of Alabama Press, 1987), p. 8.

2. See, for example, Stephan Kux, Soviet Federalism: A Comparative Perspective (New York: Institute for East-West Security Studies, 1990), which analyzes the origins and especially the current status of the federal idea in the USSR. Past practice, as he notes, produced a "highly centralized, unitary state with a measure of administrative devolution" despite the theoretically federal constitutional base.

3. Richard P. Nathan, "Implications for Federalism of a European Open Market." Paper presented for a conference on Europe and America in the 1990s, American Enterprise Institute, March 10, 1990.

4. M.J.C. Vile, "Federal Theory and the 'New Federalism,'" in The Politics of New Federalism, D. Jaensch, ed. (Adelaide: Australian Political Studies Association, 1977), p. 1.

5. Michael D. Reagan and John G. Sanzone, The New Federalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), p. 19.

6. Carl J. Friedrich, Trends of Federalism in Theory and Practice (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1968), p. 173.

7. Ibid., p. 24.

8. Elazar, p. 34.

9. Edwin S. Corwin, "The Passing of Dual Federalism," Virginia Law Review 36, no. 1 (February 1950), p. 23.

10. Ibid., p. 19.

11. James Madison, "Federalist No. 39," in The Federalist Papers (New York: Mentor Books, 1960), p. 256.

12. Ibid., p. 246.

13. Kenneth C. Wheare, Federal Government (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946; reissued, see 1964 edition), p. 2.

14. The Federalist Papers, p. 108.

15. Ibid., p. 83 (emphasis added).

16. Ralph Ketcham, ed., The Anti-Federalist Papers and the Constitutional Convention Debates (New York: Mentor Books, 1986), pp. 12-13.

17. Correspondence between Richard P. Nathan and James H. Hutson, March 13, 1990.

18. Geoffrey Brennan and James M. Buchanan, The Power To Tax: Analytical Foundations of a Fiscal Constitution (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1980).

19. Elazar, p. 16.

20. Richard P. Nathan and Margarita M. Balmaceda, "Comparing Federal Systems of Government," in Decentralization, Local Governments, and Markets: Towards a Post-Welfare Agenda, Robert J. Bennett, ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 59-77.

21. The New York Times, December 16, 1989, p. A-8.

22. The Economist, November 25, 1989, p. 12.

23. Charles Krauthammer, "Blest Be The Ties That Bind," Time, August 13, 1990, p. 76.

24. "Soiuznyi dogovor," Izvestiia, November 24, 1990, pp. 1-2.

25. "Proektnaia konstitutsiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii," Sovetskaia Rossiia, November 24, 1990, pp. 1-8. This reformist document's initial section affirms the desirability of "government by the people," "political and ideological pluralism," and "separation (variant: 'and balancing') of powers into legislative, executive, and judicial branches, and the separation of the rights of the Federation and its members and the organs of local government." The document was published by decision of the Russian republic's Constitutional Committee and is not to be confused with the draft or final changes to the existing RSFSR Constitution, which appeared in Sovetskaia Rossiia, August 11, 1989, pp. 1-2, and December 26, 1990, p. 3.

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Parts of this essay are from Richard P. Nathan's papers prepared for the Fourth Annual Berkeley Seminar on Federalism, University of California at Berkeley, April 19, 1990, and for a conference on "The United States and Europe in the 1990s," The American Enterprise Institute, March 10, 1990.

D. Mariano Grondona's formulation

Factor	Development-prone societies	Development-resistant societies
1. Religion	Focuses on success (e.g.Calvinist Protestantism)	Focuses on poor and downtrodden (e.g. Catholic Liberation Theology)
2. Value of the individual	Respect for, confidence in individual lead to egalitarianism and decentralization	Disrespect for the individual leads to hierarchy and authoritarianism
3. Morality	The goal is a moral average of reasonably self-centered, mutually-respectful people	The goal is moral perfection
4. Wealth	Expandable through human creativity	It is what exists. The problem is to distribute it.
5. Competition	A form of cooperation that leads to excellence	A form of aggression that should be discouraged
6. Economic justice	Future generations have a claim--save and invest	Distribute to the current generation
7. Labor	A moral duty	A burden
8. Heresy	The basis of invention	A threat to society
9. Education	To nurture creativity	To transmit orthodoxy
10. Pragmatism, utilitarianism	Great virtues	Great vices
11. "Lesser virtues"	A job well done, tidiness, courtesy and punctuality are important	The lesser virtues are unimportant
12. Time	What is most important is the future	What is most important is the past
13. Reason	A good life cannot be led without rationality	Life depends mostly on luck
14. Authority	Derives from law	Law derives from authority
15. The World	The arena of achievement	What one must escape

16. Life	Is what the person makes of it.	Is what happens to the person[1]
17. Salvation	Must be found in this world	Can only be found in the other world
18. Perfectability	Must be the goal, although never fully attainable	Inevitable flaws seized upon by spiritual and political leaders to induce guilt
19. Optimism	The model is the achiever	The model is the survivor
20. Democracy	Dissolves the power of absolutism and creates pluralism	Is window dressing for a new autocracy

[1] I am reminded of the comment of a friend, a social worker in Boston, several of whose clients are Haitian immigrants: "They are letting life happen to them."

Attachment 2: SCHEMATIC REPRESENTATION OF POLITICAL ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIPS AND REPRESENTATION IN PARLIAMENT




Medium Growth
BUREAU-CRACY
MILITARY
BUSINESS
"MIDDLE CLASS"
URBAN LABOR
PEASANTS & FARMERS
BROADLY REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRATIC POLITY
1990s


Low Growth
BUREAU-CRACY
MILITARY
BUSINESS
"MIDDLE CLASS"
URBAN LABOR
PEASANTS & FARMERS
BI-POLAR OLIGARCHIC POLITY
1990s


High Growth
BUREAU-CRACY
MILITARY
BUSINESS
"MIDDLE CLASS"
URBAN LABOR
PEASANTS & FARMERS
EMERGING DEMOCRATIC POLITY
1988 to Present


LEGEND
Class
Elites
Special Linkages
Parliament
Representation in Parliament

ATTACHMENT 1

PROPOSED USAID/THAILAND DPI PROGRAM

DPI SUB-AREA	ACTIVITY SET	ACTIVITY	POSSIBLE INTERMEDIARY	FUNDING SOURCE	FY90 - FY93 Low	High
1. PLURALIZING ACCESS THROUGH STRONG ADVOCACY NGOS	• Business	• strengthening Prov ChamCom	TCC	CoFi [or RIE]	200	300
		• strengthening TCC research unit	TCC	CoFi [or RIE]	100	300
		• strengthening prov FTI branches	FTI	CoFi [or RIE]	100	200
		• strengthening FTI research unit	FTI	CoFi [or RIE]	100	300
		• strengthening Prov JPPSCCs	TAF	CoFi [or RIE]	50	100
	• Labor	• unions democratic development	AAFLI	CoFi	0	150
				116e	200	500
	• Public Advocacy (incl. some Envir.)	• public demand gen.; coalision building; problem resolution	PACT	CoFi	400	1200
	• Improving NGO Domestic Income	• studies; public campaign	PACT [or NGO Coord]	CoFi	20	50
2. STRENGTHENING ELECTIVE REPRESENTATION	• Parliamentary Committees	• parliamentary research services	TAF	CoFi	200	500
		• studies thru parlia. committees	Parliament	EPO II	[not incl. here	
	• Locally Elected Councils	• municipal councils development	TAF	CoFi	200	500
3. STRENGTHENING LOCAL GOVERNMENT RESPONSIVENESS	• Muni Finance	• increasing tax bases	ICMA and direct	MUP	100	200
				EPO II	250	1000
	• Muni Plan/Manage	• improving capacity and responsiveness	ICMA and direct	MUP	100	200
				EPO II	250	1000
TOTAL COST					2270	6500
CoFi					1370	3600 *
116e					200	500
EPO II					500	2000
MUP					200	400

* Leaves $.9 million of the total planned amendment of $6.5 million for a PSC contractor, evaluations, and unforeseen proposals.

THAI ASSESSMENT SUMMARY

STEP 1: DEFINITION OF DPI AND THE OBJECTIVES OF THE USAID DPI PROGRAM

The first step, in Thailand as elsewhere, was to be clear on the limits of a DPI program. It is not useful to define DPI so broadly and loosely (e.g., simply as "pluralism") that a goodly portion of AID activities could be covered under the DPI justification umbrella. It is minimally useful and possibly counter-productive to simply select activities as "targets of opportunity". Both approaches forego the opportunity to develop a more sophisticated, strategic approach to the role of political and legal factors in the development process.

We needed to approach democratic political development as we approach other development sectors like agriculture and environment--i.e., (1) by determining why this sector is important to broader development processes, (2) analyzing the sector to determine where the priority problems are, and (3) developing a clear strategy to align available A.I.D. resources against the priority objectives.

The USAID/Thailand effort distinguished two phases--the **Assessment** which generated a "big picture" sector analysis yielding the key objectives of the Thai DPI program and the **Program Strategy** development which outlined a practical program for addressing those objectives.

STEP 2: ASSESSMENT

Task 1: Identifying the Major Constraints to Development in Thailand

Start with the "big development picture" (CDSS level) before moving to DPI strategy. Without this step there can be no strong link between democratic political/legal development and broader development objectives.

Current major Thai development problems are related to the rapid industrialization through the 1970s and 1980s and are widely agreed to be:

1. Inadequate physical infrastructure (severe shortages in energy, communications, transportation, etc)

2. Inadequate labor stills base (labor unprepared for industrial jobs)

3. Erosion of the natural resource base (water, coastal resources, forests)

4. Potential instability due to widening income distributions--"two caste society".

5. Rise in demands for attention by government from the emerging new industrial classes (smaller business, factory labor, private sector professional class).

Task 2: <u>Select a Conceptual Framework for Linking "Politics/Law" and the Identified Constraints to Development</u>--Why is the government failing to address these constraints?

In Thailand we combined a "class analysis" with an "institutional analysis".

The failure of the Thai government to adequately address these severe emerging constraints could not be understood through an analysis of political institutions alone. This is because the existing form and function of political and legal institutions has been shaped by those whose interests they serve. Those interests are partially <u>ideological</u> (i.e. legitimizing existing leadership) and partially <u>practical</u> (i.e. they control the allocation of resources and opportunities). It is therefore essential to look closely at (a) the relative dominance among various classes and (b) the shifting alliances among them, to see whose interests are being met by specific state institutions.

Task 3: <u>Analysis of the Political Economic Context</u>--This will tell us where USAID should focus its efforts.

The central underlying dynamic in the Thai political drama over the past four decades has been the struggle, within a broader encompassing alliance, between the combined interests of the <u>military and bureaucratic elite</u> on the one side and the <u>business class</u> on the other. Through the 1970s--despite political turbulence and coups--the military/bureaucratic alliance remained dominant. From its inception in the 1930s, the Thai Parliament had little decision making function and has been maintained by the elite for its "symbolic" function to legitimize their continued the rule.

During the eight year period of technocratic rule in the 1980s, a small group within the business class--with popular support--succeeded in displacing the military from Parliament, seized the bureaucracy through control of the Cabinet, but cut off the demands of other classes (including broader business interests) through widespread "vote buying" during elections.

This "half democracy" in a sense had the wrong half of a sustainable democratic system. The Cabinet, filled with self serving business/political cliques, was unable to address the five critical development problems listed above. This rapidly undermined the public's commitment democratic rule, the essential commitment which had made it possible to isolate the military from the Cabinet in the first place.

The long term difficulty for Thai development is that the military had also been active through the 1980s carving out a new legitimizing principle to support its return to leadership. That principle, very unlike the earlier period of military/bureaucratic dominance, became a vaguely anti-capitalist populism supporting the logical necessity for military oversight of state policy and administration "in the broad public interest". A serious return by the military to governance, either indirectly through manipulation of labor strikes, etc. or directly through a coup, could be expected to polarize government institutions and lead away from pro-open market, pro-growth economic policies which were bringing Thailand into the ranks of advanced industrial societies.

> This analysis identified the key objective of a DPI program: shoring up popular commitment to democratic rule to head off re-entry of the military into politics. The two DPI tasks were seen as: (1) strengthening elected representative bodies (parliament and local elected councils) as the best mechanism for creating open and sustainable consensus on key development issues and (2) Widening access to the political process by groups outside the current elites to head off linkages between these groups and the military as "patron".

(Note: The most striking result of the recent coup in Thailand was the lack of public outcry--public commitment to "democratic" rule had been rapidly eroded, and the military correctly understood this opportunity.)

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STEP 3: PREPARE THE MISSION DPI PROGRAM STRATEGY

Task 1: Review and Select from the Range of DPI Program Possibilities (DPI "toolkit") for Addressing the Selected DPI Objective(s)

This list was considered to be roughly as follows:

1. Increasing Citizen Participation in Public Policy Formation
   - legislative development
   - municipal/local councils development
   - political party development
   - elections institutions
   - strengthening constituent and/or public advocacy non-government organizations (business, labor, farmers, professional, uplands tribe, etc.)

2. Strengthening the Rule of Law (limiting the bureaucracy and military/police and setting a peaceful and predictable framework for social and economic interaction)
   - judicial development
   - strengthening legal education
   - expanding legal services
   - reforming law
   - reducing official corruption
   - reducing violent inter-group conflict

3. Strengthening Basic Human Rights (particularly rights having to do with the "integrity of the person"--torture, imprisonment, punishment, etc.

4. Increasing the Flow of Public Information
   - reducing censorship & encouraging independent journalism
   - strengthening journalistic ethics
   - increasing media professionalism
   - making bureaucratic decision making processes more transparent

The activity areas which made most sense in terms of addressing the key strategic objective clearly fell under

Task 2: **Filter the Priority Activity Areas through Program Feasibility Criteria:**

1. **Avoid Host Country Sensitivities:** The mission should avoid both activities and approaches which the Thais (either RTG or political intellectuals) would consider overly politically sensitive.

2. **Focus on Opportunities for Major Impact:** The mission should concentrate its scarce resources on those sub-areas, organizations, and activities where its assistance is likely to make a major difference. The mission should avoid adding its resources to organizations or activities where current domestic or foreign donor assistance already appears adequate. Efforts which would require investment of a high level of resources or an unrealistically long duration of assistance to achieve meaningful impact should also be avoided.

3. **Ensure Sustainability without Dependence:** The mission should avoid supporting DPI activities which are likely to require recurrent USAID funding over the medium to long term to sustain initial impacts.

4. **Minimize In-House Staff Costs:** Special attention needs to be given to the design and selection of activities to minimize on-going USAID personnel cost (particularly Direct Hire). Strong preference should be given to activities which can be administered through intermediary organizations.

The result of this filtering process lead the Mission to cut out work with the Election Commission. Though elections are clearly important giving the "vote buying" problem, this was considered to be an area in which the Thai were too sensitive for U.S. assistance at present. In addition, consideration of criterion #2 added to the Mission's determination not to work on the Rule of Law. This would have to be a massive undertaking in which having a meaningful impact would require resources on a scale and duration which the Mission wisely determined to be out of its range.

The outcome of the over process focusing the strategy on priority areas and further narrowing on the basis of the above criteria resulted in a concentration on three main activities areas: (1) Pluralizing access through stronger non-government advocacy organizations, (2) strengthening elected representative institutions, and (3) improving local government responsiveness.

Task 3: **Identify Funding Sources**

The Program Strategy should include an assessment of the range of A.I.D. resources and funding levels currently being applied or potentially available for work in the selected activity areas. It should also consider the feasibility, content, and level of resources needed for building a separate DPI Project if the Mission wants to move in this direction.

The Thai Mission decided to redirect resources in several existing projects to address Thai DPI Objectives rather than to form a separate DPI project.

Task 4: **Assessing DPI Management Issues**

The Program Strategy should determine the staffing requirements for supporting the DPI Program elements identified. Experience is showing that two management principles seem to be important in these considerations: (1) coordination of the DPI Program should be under the responsibility of a single Direct Hire, and (2) many DPI activities are most efficiently carried out under umbrella Cooperative Agreements with experienced intermediary NGOs concentrating with expertise in political and/or legal development.

Task 5: **Prepare a Summary DPI Program Outline Chart**

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April 29, 1991

AN INDICATOR SYSTEM FOR DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT

For the Latin America Bureau of USAID, I attempted recently to devise an indicator system that combined the experience of my Comparative Survey of Freedom with an understanding of the interests of the foreign assistance community as I had come to understand it through recent work. This system can, I believe, be easily adapted for use by any agency concerned with democratic development. The system consists of three levels, the first for obtaining an overall evaluation of a country's current democratic status, and the second and third levels for program and project evaluation as they might contribute to changes that will eventually improve a country's democratic status.

First, I will present a checklist for evaluation and then show how this might be employed for country comparisons and overall assessment. Tentative numerical "scores" for sections and subsections of the checklist are given in parentheses.

A. Effective Channels for Citizen Influence on Government (15)

the strength and coverage of:

1. Issue-oriented NGOs: (5)
   a. human rights monitoring groups,
   b. "good government" educational and advocacy groups,
   c. special interest groups (e.g. consumer, educational).

2. Peasant, labor, business, and professional groups. (4)

3. Religious organizations, formal and informal, (3)

4. Economic organizations (private corporations, co-ops). (3)

(For all groups in [A] ask: Do these groups exist? To what extent are they independent of government [or of business or landowners in the case of labor or peasant groups]? Do the groups operate or recruit members without hindrance? To what extent are these groups allowed to participate in the political process?)

B. Open and Fair Elections (30)

the degree to which:

1. The system is based on free and fair elections without fear or compulsion from any quarter. (10) (Have recent elections been generally free of violent interference or dishonesty in the voting process? Has the selection of candidates offered a fair chance to all parts of the community?)

2. Control of the political process in the hands of those elected. (10) (Have military officers, foreign governments, or other forces intervened in, or cast their shadow on, government decision making or policy execution?)

3. The system responds to voter desires through ballots or referenda (3) (Did recent elections directly or indirectly ask voters to choose among policies? Are those elected generally pursuing the policies they advocated in their campaigns?)

4. Minority desires play a role in political decisions. (4) (Are minority concerns adequately taken into account by leading political parties? Is there provision for ensuring they will be represented in the political process?)

5. The political system allows voter choice at regional and local levels. (3) (To what extent do provincial, district, or local levels of government possess independent powers of decision, especially taxing and budgetary powers? To what extent are office holders at these levels chosen through democratic processes?)

C. Effective, Open, and Democratic Administration (15)

as direct measures, the degree of:

1. Government control over the country. (2) (Are portions of the country actually under the control of local leaders, military commanders, guerrilla organizations or other nongovernmental forces?)

2. Effective, fair executive policy implementation. (2) (Is the bureaucracy responsive to political changes in the country. Can development policies be carried through effectively?)

3. Open and useful legislative discussion and decision. (2) (Do means exist for reporting legislative discussions? Are most legislative sessions open to the public? Do legislators actively criticize governmental actions? How often and in what numbers do legislators vote against governmental proposals?)

4. Fair and efficient administration of governmental services. (2) (Is there habeas corpus? Do people languish in jail for years without trial? Are poor people, or those out of government favor, able to obtain lawyers?)

5. For all three branches, is there: (3)

   a. operation relatively free of special interest interference?
   b. consultation with those affected by policies or their implementation?
   c. effort to reach consensus where minority interests would be severely damaged by majoritarian or executive decision?

d. respect for generally recognized individual and group human rights in policy implementation, legislation, or judicial decision?

as well as, the extent to which:

6. The security services act in a disciplined manner in accordance with government directives. (2) (Can the government act without fear of offending its own security services? Can officers in the security services discipline those under them for illegal activities?)

7. Violent criminal or revolutionary activity if controlled by the government. (2) (Can the security services guarantee the security of citizens against terrorist attacks? Can they adequately control mobs that attack groups that are out of favor?)

quantitative measures, such as yearly reports of the number of:

CQ1. Cases of ethnic violence.

CQ2. Cases of nonethnic terrorist or guerrilla attacks.

D. Democratic Political Culture (15)

the extent of elite and popular:

1. Respect for the values, opinions, and rights of other individuals and groups, in particular: (3)
   a. the right to express differing or unpopular opinion.
   b. tolerance for different ways of life, religions, etc.

2. Knowledge of the political system. (2)

3. Belief in change through the political system. (2)

4. Commitment to the democratic political system, or to the idea of such a system. (5)

5. Sense of individual responsibility to work for change through the political system. (3)

Note: To answer questions in this section, a capability will have to be developed to assess and reassess host country information levels, opinions, attitudes, and values. Although this can and should be done informally, the system will eventually require access to more formal opinion and information level assessment capabilities.

E. Free and independent media. (25)

direct measures, including the extent and degree of:

1. Freedom from direct media censorship. (5) (How often and to what extent has media censorship been employed during the last year? How significant has this been for curtailing the national discussion?)

2. Freedom of the public media from other forms of censorship or control. (4) (Who owns the media? If there is significant government ownership, to what degree is there a commitment to a presentation of all points of view on the BBC model? How significant is self-censorship in the private media?)

3. Freedom of politically relevant discussion among individuals. (4) (How freely do people discuss political issues with other in the community, or outsiders?)

4. Freedom from government reprisal -- e.g. through imprisonment, torture or dismissal -- against individuals expressing opinion or disseminating information. (4)

5. Freedom from private reprisal, including assassination, against individuals expressing opinion or disseminating information. (4) (Do citizens express themselves free of fear that local warlords or terrorists will harm them? Do tenant farmers or farm workers express opinions free of fear of land owners or supervisors? Are women able to express their opinions free of fear of male reprisal?)

6. Access to information about governmental activities. (4) (Are governmental statistics easily available to reporters and others? Are heads of government departments open to questioning in the legislature or otherwise?)

indirect quantitative measures:

EQ1. Number of unadjudicated political prisoners.

EQ2. Number of documented or estimated cases of execution, assassination, torture, or disappearance.

Using the Indicator System for Country Comparisons

Example: Comparing U.S.A. with Dominican Republic

Indicator	United States	Dominican Republic
A. Citizen Influence Channels	15	12
1. issue-oriented NGOs	5	3
2. professional groups	4	3
3. religious groups	3	3
4. economic organizations	3	3
B. Free and Fair Elections	30	24
1. free and fair	10	9
2. elected rule	10	9
3. responsive to voters	3	2
4. responsive to minorities	4	2
5. local choice	3	2
C. Effective, Just Administration	15	9
1. adm. control of country	2	2
2. effective and fair adm.	2	1
3. eff. legislative consideration	2	1
4. effective and fair adjudication	2	1
5. no spec. interest interference	3	1
6. reliable security services	2	1
7. control of mobs and terror	2	2
D. Political Culture	14	9
1. tolerance and respect	3	3
2. knowledge of system	2	1
3. belief in political efficacy	2	1
4. commitment to democracy	5	3
5. individual pol. responsibility	2	1
E. Free Expression	25	20
1. direct censorship	5	5
2. indirect censorship	4	3
3. open private discussion	4	3
4. free of government reprisal	4	3
5. free of private reprisal	4	4
6. information access	4	2

To avoid the frustration that a user might feel with using an inflexible system that did not seem to reflect his or her understanding of a situation, for each of the five sections the user should be able to apply a correction factor. This will be used most commonly where the user feels some aspect of a situation has

not been addressed adequately, or that the points under a particular heading do not offer a sufficient range. For example, if the user felt that the personalism of Dominican politics was not sufficiently addressed by the items under political culture, the user could lower the political culture rating of the DR by one or two points. Of course, there is a cost to introducing such flexibility: correction factors should be used sparingly and their rationale must be clearly explained.

This adjustable rating system has two advantages over many other quantifications. First, what is happening in the quantification process is transparent to both user and consumer. Secondly, either can easily experiment with alternative values both in judgment and weighting. The system as it stands is heavily weighted toward the traditional political rights--civil liberties concept of democracy rather than a more administrative, quality of governance, concern. Items and classes of items can easily be changed to accommodate these and other differences in values and judgment. In order to facilitate considering increasing the influence of some classes of entries and decreasing that of others, the system could be computerized in a way that would make such adjustments instantaneous. The simple formula is new score = (old score * new maximum) / old maximum. If, for example, we were to change the maximum scores for the five classes of indicators from 15-30-15-15-25 to 30-15-30-10-15 the Dominican score would be 72. Generally, such experiments will show the insensitivity of the system to this kind of change in weightings.

Using the System for Program-oriented Democracy Assessment

For each country for which democratic support is contemplated, it would be desirable to use the foregoing checklist to establish a baseline democracy status assessment. For each item, a short qualitative description should be developed, with examples of conditions, events, or statistics that support the description. Wherever possible, this description should be compared with those for other countries that appear more democratic, as well as those less democratic. The emphasis in this use of the system should be placed on the qualitative descriptions rather than the numbers that might or might not be placed on the items.

After the baseline has been established, assessors should annually update the qualitative descriptions for the checklist items. If it is felt necessary to rewrite an item description, the assessors should decide whether, on balance, the new description represents no change (0), improvement (+), or decline (-) from the democratic perspective. If equal weight is given to each item in this use of the system, then an annual quasi-quantitative assessment of change and its direction would be based on subtracting the pluses from the minuses. Obviously, the system provides the basis for a weighted assessment if this were desired.

For measuring progress or decline, this approach would be preferable to the numerical cross-country approach described initially. Anyone using figures would frequently find it very difficult to decide whether a particular item has changed sufficiently to justify changing its numerical value. For example, comparing year-to-year qualitative descriptions might show a steady increase in the knowledge of the political system in a particular country (item D2). Yet with a constricted choice of numerical ratings (0-2), the assessor would seldom

see enough change in one or two years to justify changing the rating. An excess of advances over declines in several items of this kind could be legitimate evidence of substantial improvement in a country, even though the country's quantitative indicators might show little or no change. (Experience suggests that continual problems of this kind may lead to the inflation of numerical ratings and the ultimate destruction of the discriminatory value of this kind of system.)

Using the System for Program and Project Assessment: Levels 2 and 3

Programs and projects developed to support improvement in one or more of the sections of the democratic development checklist should include in their descriptions additional questions to augment the basic checklist in the area of most interest. For example, on level 2 a program to improve the legal system under D4 might include a number of more specific questions concerned with the training that lawyers and judges receive, the ratio of lawyers to the general population, or the availability of legal libraries, particularly in a common-law system. On level 3, a project concerned with improving fairness in the treatment of men and women in cases of adultery and rape would need to develop a checklist relating more specifically to these crimes, both in law and the application of law. Questions developed for levels 2 and 3 should be constructed in such a way that information gained on these levels can be fed back into overall annual country assessments in a manner that does not overbalance the system in favor or particularized concerns.

As projects and programs are developed, their sponsors should indicate how they expect their efforts to change overall assessments or particular items in them. Generally, they should expect any changes to be positive; however, in some cases gains expected in one section might carry an acknowledged danger of producing declines in another. For example, many recent democratizing changes in the USSR have carried the burden of reducing governmental effectiveness, and possibly increasing political violence. Annually, what has happened, as reflected in qualitative descriptions on all levels, should be compared with the expectations of the program or project sponsors. Since in the area of democratic change, few programs can be expected to have major impacts in a year's time, assessments should concentrate on looking for evidence of any more limited changes that may have occurred. Although democratic support performance indicators should generally indicate real gains for democracy rather than project self-reference performance indicators, some indicators on the third level might be essentially self-referential. For example, a project to develop peasant unions in a particular area could use increase in the number of dues-paying peasant union members as an indicator of improving democratic organizational strength, without showing a firm connection between dues-paying numbers and organizational strength. Therefore, this level of indicator may be little different from those commonly used for project assessment, except that they should be more tightly bound to an overall conception of how they might add up to democratic improvement.

It needs to be repeatedly stressed that the use of indicators must not be allowed to lead to emphasis on showing annual progress. To do this may lead on the one hand to a sense of failure, when no failure has occurred, or to concentration on programs that appear likely to give short-term gains. What is ultimately most important is change in attitudes and values, for only such changes will stabilize democratic rule for long. Meanwhile, other indicators

of democracy may rise and fall with the political and economic fortunes of the countries that are being assisted. It is important for this reason to include with the baseline assessments for each country a discussion of its recent history of advance and/or decline in democracy, so that future changes may be evaluated in the light of this record.

SCHEMATIC FOR INDICATOR SYSTEM



R. D. Gastil
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HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1991

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The human freedom index

Human Development Report 1990 emphasized the importance of human freedom: "Human development is incomplete without human freedom. Throughout history, people have been willing to sacrifice their lives to gain national and personal liberty." That being the case, it was recognized that "Any index of human development should therefore give adequate weight to a society's human freedom in pursuit of material and social goals."

Yet the HDI does not include freedom. The problem is that freedom is easier to talk about than to measure. In this Report, a start has been made to reflect one of the most significant aspects of human life. The result, however imperfect, at least shows the direction that future work can take.

The many kinds of freedom generally belong to two broad "clusters". The first comprises "negative" freedoms, so called because they imply freedom *from* something—from arbitrary rule, from illegal arrest or from unwarranted attack on person or property. Whether in villages or nations, these freedoms have always had to be defended—often fought for. And a number of institutions have been developed by democratic systems to protect these freedoms—including the universal franchise, the secret ballot and the rule of law, which guarantees the rights of persons and property.

The second cluster comprises the "positive" freedoms. These are the freedoms to do something—to take part in the community's life, to organize opposition parties or trade union groups, or to go about without being "ashamed to appear in publick", as Adam

Smith expressed it some 200 years ago. The most systematic codification of freedoms is in the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in the International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. These include many personal rights: the right to life, liberty and security of person; equality before the law; freedom of assembly; freedom of thought, religion and opinion; the right to work, the free choice of jobs; the right to an adequate standard of living—including adequate food, clothing, housing, education; the right to participate in community life; and so on.

Many people have attempted to classify human rights and to measure each country against that classification. The systems differ in their concepts, definitions and coverage. And none has so far gained universal, or even common, acceptance (technical note 6).

The one that offers the most systematic and extensive coverage is the index designed by Charles Humana. He examined various UN conventions and international treaties, and from them distilled 40 distinct criteria for judging freedom. These include freedom of movement, the rights of assembly and free speech, the rights to ethnic and gender equality, the rule of law, and other democratic freedoms. Humana's index is thus more than a political freedom index, more than a human rights index. It is a *human freedom* index. Constructed for 1985, the index covers only 88 countries because of the non-availability of data for other countries.

Applying a system of measurement to human freedoms will always be a precarious exercise. The first difficulty is to decide what constitutes serious violations of rights or curtailments of freedom. Does the fact that a few citizens of a country have had their passports revoked mean that the country does not, in principle, allow its citizens to leave the country? Does the fact that some critics of government cannot appear on state-controlled television mean that the country practices press censorship and should be marked down accordingly?

The second contentious area is the relative importance of different rights. Is the right to free assembly more important, or less important, than a free press? Is the right to ethnic language more significant than the right to vote?

These questions will, no doubt, also arise in respect of the Humana index. And they should be posed. This will encourage more systematic research and studies on human freedom, which today are very scarce.

One aspect of the Humana index, in particular, is likely to be an issue of contention—the gradation of freedom violations ranging from "some violations or infringements" to "substantial oppression" and on to "total denial". Adopting a simpler method of judgement, one that distinguishes between "freedom guaranteed" and "freedom violated" (a "one"–"zero" approach), gives an illuminating ranking of countries (box 1.2). No country among the 88 covered by the Humana index observes *all* freedoms. Sweden and Denmark top the list with 38 of the 40 measured freedoms guaranteed to their people, followed by the Netherlands with 37 freedoms. Iraq is at the bottom of the list; and Romania and the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya just above it.

But human freedom is a matter that can change very quickly. And it does. Between 1985 and 1990 many countries have witnessed political change, at times of dramatic speed and proportions. There are 18 countries that have recently moved towards greater freedom and democracy. On the whole, the world today is a much freer world than it was only five years ago.

Is there a correlation between human freedom and human development? Any systematic comparison is no doubt hampered by lack of information on certain countries. Nevertheless, for the countries having data, an interesting pattern emerges. Countries that rank high on one indicator also tend to rank high on the other. No doubt, in the mid-1980s, when Humana collected his information, several countries with fairly good levels of human development ranked low on freedom—the Eastern European countries, such countries as Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay in Latin America, and the Philippines in Asia. But they have since made significant strides towards greater democracy. The countries that ranked low on freedom in 1985 and continue to do so include a number of countries with low human development levels.

Human development is incomplete without human freedom

BOX 1.2

The human freedom index

The goal of human development is to increase people's choices. But for people to exercise their choices, they must enjoy freedom—cultural, social, economic and political.

The *World Human Rights Guide*, by Charles Humana, uses 40 indicators to measure freedom:

The right to
- travel in own country
- travel abroad
- peacefully associate and assemble
- teach ideas and receive information
- monitor human rights violations
- ethnic language

The freedom from
- forced or child labour
- compulsory work permits
- extra-judicial killings or "disappearances"
- torture or coercion
- capital punishment
- corporal punishment
- unlawful detention
- compulsory party or organization membership
- compulsory religion or state ideology in schools
- arts control
- political censorship of press
- censorship of mail or telephone-tapping

The freedom for
- peaceful political opposition
- multiparty elections by secret and universal ballot
- political and legal equality for women
- social and economic equality for ethnic minorities
- independent newspapers
- independent book publishing
- independent radio and television networks
- independent courts
- independent trade unions

The legal right to
- a nationality
- being considered innocent until proved guilty
- free legal aid when necessary and counsel of own choice
- open trial
- prompt trial
- freedom from police searches of home without a warrant
- freedom from arbitrary seizure of personal property

The personal right to
- interracial, interreligious or civil marriage
- equality of sexes during marriage and for divorce proceedings
- homosexuality between consenting adults
- practice any religion
- determine the number of one's children

Drawing on the 1985 data in the *World Human Rights Guide* and assigning a "one" to each freedom protected and a "zero" to each freedom violated, the country ranking in table 1.5 emerges. Clearly, this ranking for the human freedom index (HFI) needs updating. Adding recent information for only one of the 40 aspects of freedom—multiparty elections by secret and universal ballot—makes for many changes. Eighteen countries see their HFI improve.

The world today is a freer world. An updated human freedom index based on a limited number of observable and objectively measurable key indicators is more than overdue.

TABLE 1.5
HFI ranking of selected countries

Country total of freedoms, 1985		▲ recent move towards greater freedom (multiparty elections held)
High freedom ranking (31-40)		
38 Sweden		
38 Denmark		
37 Netherlands		
36 Finland		
36 New Zealand		
36 Austria		
35 Norway		
35 France		
35 Germany, Fed. Rep. of		
35 Belgium		
34 Canada		
34 Switzerland		
33 USA		
33 Australia		
32 Japan		
32 United Kingdom		
31 Greece		
31 Costa Rica		
Medium freedom ranking (11-30)		
30 Portugal		
30 Papua New Guinea		
29 Italy		
29 Venezuela		
27 Ireland		
26 Spain		
26 Hong Kong		
26 Botswana		
25 Trinidad and Tobago		
25 Argentina	▲	
25 Jamaica		
24 Ecuador		
23 Senegal		
21 Panama	▲	
21 Dominican Rep.		
19 Israel		
18 Brazil	▲	
18 Bolivia		
16 Peru		
15 Mexico		
14 Korea, Rep. of		
14 Colombia		
14 Thailand		
14 India		
14 Sierra Leone		
13 Nigeria		
13 Benin	▲	
11 Singapore		
11 Sri Lanka		
11 Tunisia		
11 Egypt		
11 Ghana		
Low freedom ranking (0-10)		
10 Poland	▲	
10 Paraguay	▲	
10 Philippines	▲	
10 Tanzania, U. Rep. of		
9 Malaysia		
9 Zambia		
9 Haiti	▲	
8 Yugoslavia		
8 Chile	▲	
8 Kuwait		
8 Algeria	▲	
8 Zimbabwe		
8 Kenya		
8 Cameroon		
7 Hungary	▲	
7 Turkey		
7 Morocco		
7 Liberia		
7 Bangladesh	▲	
6 German Dem. Rep.	▲	
6 Czechoslovakia	▲	
6 Saudi Arabia		
6 Mozambique		
5 Cuba		
5 Syrian Arab Rep.		
5 Korea, Dem. Rep. of		
5 Indonesia		
5 Viet Nam		
5 Pakistan	▲	
5 Zaire		
4 Bulgaria	▲	
3 USSR	▲	
3 South Africa		
2 China		
2 Ethiopia		
1 Romania	▲	
1 Libyan Arab Jamahiriya		
0 Iraq		

Note: Ranking of countries with the same degree of freedom is done in accordance with HDI ranking.

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Yet, some countries with relatively modest achievements in human development also rank fairly high in human freedom: Botswana and Senegal.

This evidence shows that launching and promoting human development does not require the sacrifice of freedom—as governments determined to retain an iron grip have sometimes argued.

Overall, there seems to be a high correlation between human development and human freedom. The causality is far from clear, however. In some cases (the Nordic countries and the USA), political freedom seems to have unleashed the creative energies of the people—and led to ever higher levels of income and human progress. In other countries, a sustained investment in people has eventually given them sufficient power and confidence to loosen the authoritarian grip of their rulers and to increase their political and personal freedom.

The evidence also confirms a central tenet of this Report: that human development is incomplete if it does not incorporate freedom. The next logical step would therefore be to merge the HDI and the HFI into one overall index. This, however, is not yet possible in any realistic fashion—because of several difficulties. The most significant one is lack of data. Even updating the Humana index poses tremendous difficulties. Yes, we know that significant changes have taken place in many countries between 1985 and today that affect—in most instances, positively—human freedom. But there exists no systematic study that would have recorded all those changes. A new, comprehensive human freedom index is overdue. A second difficulty is political volatility. The human development index is based on relatively stable indicators, which do not change dramatically from year to year. Political freedom, by contrast, can appear or vanish abruptly. A military coup, for example, would cause a sudden drop in the index, even though many aspects of life might remain unchanged.

The winds of economic and political freedom that are now sweeping across so many lands—from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe to Africa and across to Latin America and the Caribbean—will probably prove to be the best ally of improving the availability of data on human freedom. Democracy facilitates transparency; it encourages accountability and the rule of law. It allows reporting of violations and thus improves recording. An objective, reliable human freedom index could be an important tool of human freedom.

There seems to be a high correlation between human development and human freedom

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Human development offers a different vision of economic and political change. Each Report will further refine both the concept and measurement of human development. Each Report will also focus on one important subject. This year the subject is public finance. The Report takes a hard look at the way governments spend their money—and how they could better spend it to transform human development from hope into reality.

6. The human freedom index measurements and estimation

The importance attached to issues of human rights and political freedom by many individuals, countries, national and international organizations, governmental and non-governmental entities is considerable. That makes it surprising to find that the availability of data is a problem in this field—and that only a limited number of studies have so far tried to address the issue of measuring human rights and political freedom in a systematic way.

Such journals as the *Human Rights Quarterly* (1986) and *Studies in Comparative International Development* (1990) have devoted attention to this question. These attempts differ in philosophy, definitions, coverage and dates—as well as in concepts and quantifiers. No one attempt has gained universal, or even common, approval.

The major indices are:

1. Freedom House, in New York, produces an annual survey of *Freedom in the World*, based on two seven-point ranking scales for political freedoms and civil liberties.
2. *The World Handbook of Economic and Social Indicators*, by Charles Taylor and David Jodice, includes one series on government sanctions on political dissent and another on state coercive behavior.
3. David Cingranelli and Thomas Pasquerello produced an index of human rights practices based on content analysis of the US State Department's *Country Reports on Rights Practices*. The types of violations to which the content analysis was applied were chosen by use of principal components techniques. But they covered only Latin America and only the years 1979 and 1980.
4. The *World Guide to Human Rights*, by Charles Humana, evaluates the human rights performance of 88 countries according to 40 subindices based on international human rights documents, such as the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and the two associated covenants—the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

This last index, the Humana index, provides the starting point for the human freedom index (HFI).

The subindices of the Humana index are arranged into five groups of rights or freedoms: (1) six questions on rights, or "freedoms to"; (2) 12 on "freedoms from"; (3) ten on "freedoms for"; (4) seven on legal rights; and (5) five on personal rights. The performance of each country is on a scale from zero (no rights) to three (guaranteed rights). These scores are then aggregated. The evaluation is that of the author, however.

Seven "freedoms from," relating to respect for the personal integrity of the individual, are weighted at three times those of the rest. Thus, the maximum possible score a country can receive is 162 (33x3 + 7x3x3). Each country's score out of 162 is converted to a percentage, to give its final human rights score.

Starting with the Humana index

The strengths of the Humana index are threefold. Each question is based on an internationally recognized human right. It has clear and reproducible computational procedures. And the final scale has good discrimination. The ranked countries are fairly evenly distributed all the way along the scale from 0% to 100%, and not simply grouped into "good" at one end and "bad" at the other.

The disadvantages of the Humana procedure lie in its subjectivity and its data intensity. Any ratings scale, including this one, is inevitably subjective. Although the manipulations of data are clear and reproducible, the evaluations of data are less so—at what point, for example, do "some violations or infringements" become "substantial oppression"? Further, a 40-question, four-scale index requires a considerable amount of data, which is very difficult to compile consistently for all 160 countries covered by the *Human Development Report*. The *World Guide* covers only 88 countries plus Taiwan, the Province of China.

The weighting of the first seven "freedoms from" differentiates between these countries' human rights performances more precisely but not necessarily more accurately. The decision to weight certain questions begs a number of questions. First, are not the weightings inevitably arbitrary, even if changing the weightings does not affect the final rank outcomes very much? Second, why stop at a different weighting of only seven questions? Why not have a different weight for every question? On the other hand, if the weightings do not affect the rankings very much, why weight at all?

Adjusting the Humana index

Chapter 1 of the Report presents a revised human freedom index, based on the Humana index but eliminating the weights assigned to certain questions and reducing Humana's four-point scale of observations to a two-point scale, or simple "yes" (=1) and "no" (=0) scale. The resultant ranking of the 88 countries covered by the Humana index is shown in table 1.5 in Chapter 1. It is a revised 1985 ranking of countries.

During the past five years, however, the human rights and political freedom situation in many countries has changed. Clearly, an update of the 1985 human freedom index is more than urgent. Nevertheless, lack of data did not permit this at present. There can be marked deviations from one source of information to the other.

Given this situation, it was felt that for the time being it might therefore be best not to give the impression of precision where precision cannot exist, to make quantitative assessments where even qualitative judgements are hampered by lack of reliable information. Accordingly, the 1985 human freedom index has been updated in a cautious way: based on information available from a variety of country reports, a triangle has been placed against countries that are known to have held multiparty elections since 1985 and continue to follow a democratic system of government.

Clearly, there is an urgent need for more systematic work on human freedom: the issue of data availability needs to be addressed; the concept of human freedom needs clarification—especially its historical and socio-cultural traditions and implications; and methods of measuring various human freedoms have to be designed. We are still very much at the beginning of a systematic analysis and debate of human freedom.

Table III

Goal: Support the evolution of stable democratic societies.

Sub-Goal	Strategic Objective
A. Strengthen the competence of government and political institutions so they will merit the confidence of political and military leaders, citizens, and investors.	1. Rule of law strengthened: • effectiveness of judicial system improved; • adherence to and respect for human rights improved; • property rights improved. 2. Ability to administer free, fair, and open elections strengthened. 3. Honesty and competence of executive branch improved: • Financial management capability, accountability, and transparency improved; • Effectiveness and efficiency of programs and services improved. 4. Local and municipal government strengthened. 5. Control of civilian elected leadership over the military strengthened. 6. Legislative branch effectiveness strengthened. 7. Multi-party political party systems strengthened.
B. Helping create a vigorous, pluralistic, autonomous civil society that can balance and limit state power while providing channels for the articulation and practice of democratic interests.	8. Alternative information and opinion sources strengthened, including a responsible free press and media, think tanks, and textbook distribution. 9. Civic, professional, and community organizations and free, democratically oriented trade unions strengthened.
C. Making the political culture more democratic by strengthening the values, attitudes, beliefs, and information that support democratic pluralism and are required for effective leadership.	10. Formal and non-formal civic education programs expanded and improved. 11. Leadership training provided that strengthens democratic values, practices, and skills; • Other innovative approaches tested and replicated when found effective.

CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM

MILTON FRIEDMAN

WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF ROSE D. FRIEDMAN

With a new Preface by the Author

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against which classical liberalism fought. In the very act of turning the clock back to seventeenth-century mercantilism, he is fond of castigating true liberals as reactionary!

The change in the meaning attached to the term liberalism is more striking in economic matters than in political. The twentieth-century liberal, like the nineteenth-century liberal, favors parliamentary institutions, representative government, civil rights, and so on. Yet even in political matters, there is a notable difference. Jealous of liberty, and hence fearful of centralized power, whether in governmental or private hands, the nineteenth-century liberal favored political decentralization. Committed to action and confident of the beneficence of power so long as it is in the hands of a government ostensibly controlled by the electorate, the twentieth-century liberal favors centralized government. He will resolve any doubt about where power should be located in favor of the state instead of the city, of the federal government instead of the state, and of a world organization instead of a national government.

Because of the corruption of the term liberalism, the views that formerly went under that name are now often labeled conservatism. But this is not a satisfactory alternative. The nineteenth-century liberal was a radical, both in the etymological sense of going to the root of the matter, and in the political sense of favoring major changes in social institutions. So too must be his modern heir. We do not wish to conserve the state interventions that have interfered so greatly with our freedom, though, of course, we do wish to conserve those that have promoted it, Moreover, in practice, the term conservatism has come to cover so wide a range of views, and views so incompatible with one another, that we shall no doubt see the growth of hyphenated designations, such as libertarian-conservative and aristocratic-conservative.

Partly because of my reluctance to surrender the term to proponents of measures that would destroy liberty, partly because I cannot find a better alternative, I shall resolve these difficulties by using the word liberalism in its original sense — as the doctrines pertaining to a free man.

Chapter I

The Relation between Economic Freedom and Political Freedom

IT IS WIDELY BELIEVED that politics and economics are separate and largely unconnected; that individual freedom is a political problem and material welfare an economic problem; and that any kind of political arrangements can be combined with any kind of economic arrangements. The chief contemporary manifestation of this idea is the advocacy of "democratic socialism" by many who condemn out of hand the restrictions on individual freedom imposed by "totalitarian socialism" in Russia, and who are persuaded that it is possible for a country to adopt the essential features of Russian economic arrangements and yet to ensure individual freedom through political arrangemer The

thesis of this chapter is that such a view is a delusion, that there is an intimate connection between economics and politics, that only certain combinations of political and economic arrangements are possible, and that in particular, a society which is socialist cannot also be democratic, in the sense of guaranteeing individual freedom.

Economic arrangements play a dual role in the promotion of a free society. On the one hand, freedom in economic arrangements is itself a component of freedom broadly understood, so economic freedom is an end in itself. In the second place, economic freedom is also an indispensable means toward the achievement of political freedom.

The first of these roles of economic freedom needs special emphasis because intellectuals in particular have a strong bias against regarding this aspect of freedom as important. They tend to express contempt for what they regard as material aspects of life, and to regard their own pursuit of allegedly higher values as on a different plane of significance and as deserving of special attention. For most citizens of the country, however, if not for the intellectual, the direct importance of economic freedom is at least comparable in significance to the indirect importance of economic freedom as a means to political freedom.

The citizen of Great Britain, who after World War II was not permitted to spend his vacation in the United States because of exchange control, was being deprived of an essential freedom no less than the citizen of the United States, who was denied the opportunity to spend his vacation in Russia because of his political views. The one was ostensibly an economic limitation on freedom and the other a political limitation, yet there is no essential difference between the two.

The citizen of the United States who is compelled by law to devote something like 10 per cent of his income to the purchase of a particular kind of retirement contract, administered by the government, is being deprived of a corresponding part of his personal freedom. How strongly this deprivation may be felt and its closeness to the deprivation of religious freedom, which all would regard as "civil" or "political" rather than "economic", were dramatized by an episode involving a group of farmers of the Amish sect. On grounds of principle, this group

regarded compulsory federal old age programs as an infringement of their personal individual freedom and refused to pay taxes or accept benefits. As a result, some of their livestock were sold by auction in order to satisfy claims for social security levies. True, the number of citizens who regard compulsory old age insurance as a deprivation of freedom may be few, but the believer in freedom has never counted noses.

A citizen of the United States who under the laws of various states is not free to follow the occupation of his own choosing unless he can get a license for it, is likewise being deprived of an essential part of his freedom. So is the man who would like to exchange some of his goods with, say, a Swiss for a watch but is prevented from doing so by a quota. So also is the Californian who was thrown into jail for selling Alka Seltzer at a price below that set by the manufacturer under so-called "fair trade" laws. So also is the farmer who cannot grow the amount of wheat he wants. And so on. Clearly, economic freedom, in and of itself, is an extremely important part of total freedom.

Viewed as a means to the end of political freedom, economic arrangements are important because of their effect on the concentration or dispersion of power. The kind of economic organization that provides economic freedom directly, namely, competitive capitalism, also promotes political freedom because it separates economic power from political power and in this way enables the one to offset the other.

Historical evidence speaks with a single voice on the relation between political freedom and a free market. I know of no example in time or place of a society that has been marked by a large measure of political freedom, and that has not also used something comparable to a free market to organize the bulk of economic activity.

Because we live in a largely free society, we tend to forget how limited is the span of time and the part of the globe for which there has ever been anything like political freedom: the typical state of mankind is tyranny, servitude, and misery. The nineteenth century and early twentieth century in the Western world stand out as striking exceptions to the general trend of historical development. Political freedom in this instance clearly came along with the free market and the development of capitalist

institutions. So also did political freedom in the golden age of Greece and in the early days of the Roman era.

History suggests only that capitalism is a necessary condition for political freedom. Clearly it is not a sufficient condition. Fascist Italy and Fascist Spain, Germany at various times in the last seventy years, Japan before World Wars I and II, tzarist Russia in the decades before World War I — are all societies that cannot conceivably be described as politically free. Yet, in each, private enterprise was the dominant form of economic organization. It is therefore clearly possible to have economic arrangements that are fundamentally capitalist and political arrangements that are not free.

Even in those societies, the citizenry had a good deal more freedom than citizens of a modern totalitarian state like Russia or Nazi Germany, in which economic totalitarianism is combined with political totalitarianism. Even in Russia under the Tzars, it was possible for some citizens, under some circumstances, to change their jobs without getting permission from political authority because capitalism and the existence of private property provided some check to the centralized power of the state.

The relation between political and economic freedom is complex and by no means unilateral. In the early nineteenth century, Bentham and the Philosophical Radicals were inclined to regard political freedom as a means to economic freedom. They believed that the masses were being hampered by the restrictions that were being imposed upon them, and that if political reform gave the bulk of the people the vote, they would do what was good for them, which was to vote for laissez faire. In retrospect, one cannot say that they were wrong. There was a large measure of political reform that was accompanied by economic reform in the direction of a great deal of laissez faire. An enormous increase in the well-being of the masses followed this change in economic arrangements.

The triumph of Benthamite liberalism in nineteenth-century England was followed by a reaction toward increasing intervention by government in economic affairs. This tendency to collectivism was greatly accelerated, both in England and elsewhere, b[illegible]e two World Wars. Welfare rather than freedom became the dominant note in democratic countries. Recognizing the implicit threat to individualism, the intellectual descendants of the Philosophical Radicals — Dicey, Mises, Hayek, and Simons, to mention only a few — feared that a continued movement toward centralized control of economic activity would prove *The Road to Serfdom*, as Hayek entitled his penetrating analysis of the process. Their emphasis was on economic freedom as a means toward political freedom.

Events since the end of World War II display still a different relation between economic and political freedom. Collectivist economic planning has indeed interfered with individual freedom. At least in some countries, however, the result has not been the suppression of freedom, but the reversal of economic policy. England again provides the most striking example. The turning point was perhaps the "control of engagements" order which, despite great misgivings, the Labour party found it necessary to impose in order to carry out its economic policy. Fully enforced and carried through, the law would have involved centralized allocation of individuals to occupations. This conflicted so sharply with personal liberty that it was enforced in a negligible number of cases, and then repealed after the law had been in effect for only a short period. Its repeal ushered in a decided shift in economic policy, marked by reduced reliance on centralized "plans" and "programs", by the dismantling of many controls, and by increased emphasis on the private market. A similar shift in policy occurred in most other democratic countries.

The proximate explanation of these shifts in policy is the limited success of central planning or its outright failure to achieve stated objectives. However, this failure is itself to be attributed, at least in some measure, to the political implications of central planning and to an unwillingness to follow out its logic when doing so requires trampling rough-shod on treasured private rights. It may well be that the shift is only a temporary interruption in the collectivist trend of this century. Even so, it illustrates the close relation between political freedom and economic arrangements.

Historical evidence by itself can never be convincing. Perhaps it was sheer coincidence that the expansion of freedom o[illegible]ed

at the same time as the development of capitalist and market institutions. Why should there be a connection? What are the logical links between economic and political freedom? In discussing these questions we shall consider first the market as a direct component of freedom, and then the indirect relation between market arrangements and political freedom. A by-product will be an outline of the ideal economic arrangements for a free society.

As liberals, we take freedom of the individual, or perhaps the family, as our ultimate goal in judging social arrangements. Freedom as a value in this sense has to do with the interrelations among people; it has no meaning whatsoever to a Robinson Crusoe on an isolated island (without his Man Friday). Robinson Crusoe on his island is subject to "constraint," he has limited "power," and he has only a limited number of alternatives, but there is no problem of freedom in the sense that is relevant to our discussion. Similarly, in a society freedom has nothing to say about what an individual does with his freedom; it is not an all-embracing ethic. Indeed, a major aim of the liberal is to leave the ethical problem for the individual to wrestle with. The "really" important ethical problems are those that face an individual in a free society — what he should do with his freedom. There are thus two sets of values that a liberal will emphasize — the values that are relevant to relations among people, which is the context in which he assigns first priority to freedom; and the values that are relevant to the individual in the exercise of his freedom, which is the realm of individual ethics and philosophy.

The liberal conceives of men as imperfect beings. He regards the problem of social organization to be as much a negative problem of preventing "bad" people from doing harm as of enabling "good" people to do good; and, of course, "bad" and "good" people may be the same people, depending on who is judging them.

The basic problem of social organization is how to co-ordinate the economic activities of large numbers of people. Even in relatively backward societies, extensive division of labor and specialization of function is required to make effective use of available resources. In advanced societies, the scale on which co-

ordination is needed, to take full advantage of the opportunities offered by modern science and technology, is enormously greater. Literally millions of people are involved in providing one another with their daily bread, let alone with their yearly automobiles. The challenge to the believer in liberty is to reconcile this widespread interdependence with individual freedom.

Fundamentally, there are only two ways of co-ordinating the economic activities of millions. One is central direction involving the use of coercion — the technique of the army and of the modern totalitarian state. The other is voluntary co-operation of individuals — the technique of the market place.

The possibility of co-ordination through voluntary co-operation rests on the elementary — yet frequently denied — proposition that both parties to an economic transaction benefit from it, *provided the transaction is bi-laterally voluntary and informed.*

Exchange can therefore bring about co-ordination without coercion. A working model of a society organized through voluntary exchange is a *free private enterprise exchange economy* — what we have been calling competitive capitalism.

In its simplest form, such a society consists of a number of independent households — a collection of Robinson Crusoes, as it were. Each household uses the resources it controls to produce goods and services that it exchanges for goods and services produced by other households, on terms mutually acceptable to the two parties to the bargain. It is thereby enabled to satisfy its wants indirectly by producing goods and services for others, rather than directly by producing goods for its own immediate use. The incentive for adopting this indirect route is, of course, the increased product made possible by division of labor and specialization of function. Since the household always has the alternative of producing directly for itself, it need not enter into any exchange unless it benefits from it. Hence, no exchange will take place unless both parties do benefit from it. Co-operation is thereby achieved without coercion.

Specialization of function and division of labor would not go far if the ultimate productive unit were the household. In a modern society, we have gone much farther. We have introduced enterprises which are intermediaries between individuals

in their capacities as suppliers of service and as purchasers of goods. And similarly, specialization of function and division of labor could not go very far if we had to continue to rely on the barter of product for product. In consequence, money has been introduced as a means of facilitating exchange, and of enabling the acts of purchase and of sale to be separated into two parts.

Despite the important role of enterprises and of money in our actual economy, and despite the numerous and complex problems they raise, the central characteristic of the market technique of achieving co-ordination is fully displayed in the simple exchange economy that contains neither enterprises nor money. As in that simple model, so in the complex enterprise and money-exchange economy, co-operation is strictly individual and voluntary *provided*: (*a*) that enterprises are private, so that the ultimate contracting parties are individuals and (*b*) that individuals are effectively free to enter or not to enter into any particular exchange, so that every transaction is strictly voluntary.

It is far easier to state these provisos in general terms than to spell them out in detail, or to specify precisely the institutional arrangements most conducive to their maintenance. Indeed, much of technical economic literature is concerned with precisely these questions. The basic requisite is the maintenance of law and order to prevent physical coercion of one individual by another and to enforce contracts voluntarily entered into, thus giving substance to "private". Aside from this, perhaps the most difficult problems arise from monopoly — which inhibits effective freedom by denying individuals alternatives to the particular exchange — and from "neighborhood effects" — effects on third parties for which it is not feasible to charge or recompense them. These problems will be discussed in more detail in the following chapter.

So long as effective freedom of exchange is maintained, the central feature of the market organization of economic activity is that it prevents one person from interfering with another in respect of most of his activities. The consumer is protected from coercion by the seller because of the presence of other sellers with whom he can deal. The seller is protected from coercion by the consumer because of other consumers to whom he can sell. The loyee is protected from coercion by the employer because

other employers for whom he can work, and so on. And the market does this impersonally and without centralized authority.

Indeed, a major source of objection to a free economy is precisely that it does this task so well. It gives people what they want instead of what a particular group thinks they ought to want. Underlying most arguments against the free market is a lack of belief in freedom itself.

The existence of a free market does not of course eliminate the need for government. On the contrary, government is essential both as a forum for determining the "rules of the game" and as an umpire to interpret and enforce the rules decided on. What the market does is to reduce greatly the range of issues that must be decided through political means, and thereby to minimize the extent to which government need participate directly in the game. The characteristic feature of action through political channels is that it tends to require or enforce substantial conformity. The great advantage of the market, on the other hand, is that it permits wide diversity. It is, in political terms, a system of proportional representation. Each man can vote, as it were, for the color of tie he wants and get it; he does not have to see what color the majority wants and then, if he is in the minority, submit.

It is this feature of the market that we refer to when we say that the market provides economic freedom. But this characteristic also has implications that go far beyond the narrowly economic. Political freedom means the absence of coercion of a man by his fellow men. The fundamental threat to freedom is power to coerce, be it in the hands of a monarch, a dictator, an oligarchy, or a momentary majority. The preservation of freedom requires the elimination of such concentration of power to the fullest possible extent and the dispersal and distribution of whatever power cannot be eliminated — a system of checks and balances. By removing the organization of economic activity from the control of political authority, the market eliminates this source of coercive power. It enables economic strength to be a check to political power rather than a reinforcement.

Economic power can be widely dispersed. There is no law of conservation which forces the growth of new centers co-

nomic strength to be at the expense of existing centers. Political power, on the other hand, is more difficult to decentralize. There can be numerous small independent governments. But it is far more difficult to maintain numerous equipotent small centers of political power in a single large government than it is to have numerous centers of economic strength in a single large economy. There can be many millionaires in one large economy. But can there be more than one really outstanding leader, one person on whom the energies and enthusiasms of his countrymen are centered? If the central government gains power, it is likely to be at the expense of local governments. There seems to be something like a fixed total of political power to be distributed. Consequently, if economic power is joined to political power, concentration seems almost inevitable. On the other hand, if economic power is kept in separate hands from political power, it can serve as a check and a counter to political power.

The force of this abstract argument can perhaps best be demonstrated by example. Let us consider first, a hypothetical example that may help to bring out the principles involved, and then some actual examples from recent experience that illustrate the way in which the market works to preserve political freedom.

One feature of a free society is surely the freedom of individuals to advocate and propagandize openly for a radical change in the structure of the society — so long as the advocacy is restricted to persuasion and does not include force or other forms of coercion. It is a mark of the political freedom of a capitalist society that men can openly advocate and work for socialism. Equally, political freedom in a socialist society would require that men be free to advocate the introduction of capitalism. How could the freedom to advocate capitalism be preserved and protected in a socialist society?

In order for men to advocate anything, they must in the first place be able to earn a living. This already raises a problem in a socialist society, since all jobs are under the direct control of political authorities. It would take an act of self-denial whose difficulty is underlined by experience in the United States after World War II with the problem of "security" among Federal

employees, for a socialist government to permit its employees to advocate policies directly contrary to official doctrine.

But let us suppose this act of self-denial to be achieved. For advocacy of capitalism to mean anything, the proponents must be able to finance their cause — to hold public meetings, publish pamphlets, buy radio time, issue newspapers and magazines, and so on. How could they raise the funds? There might and probably would be men in the socialist society with large incomes, perhaps even large capital sums in the form of government bonds and the like, but these would of necessity be high public officials. It is possible to conceive of a minor socialist official retaining his job although openly advocating capitalism. It strains credulity to imagine the socialist top brass financing such "subversive" activities.

The only recourse for funds would be to raise small amounts from a large number of minor officials. But this is no real answer. To tap these sources, many people would already have to be persuaded, and our whole problem is how to initiate and finance a campaign to do so. Radical movements in capitalist societies have never been financed this way. They have typically been supported by a few wealthy individuals who have become persuaded — by a Frederick Vanderbilt Field, or an Anita McCormick Blaine, or a Corliss Lamont, to mention a few names recently prominent, or by a Friedrich Engels, to go farther back. This is a role of inequality of wealth in preserving political freedom that is seldom noted — the role of the patron.

In a capitalist society, it is only necessary to convince a few wealthy people to get funds to launch any idea, however strange, and there are many such persons, many independent foci of support. And, indeed, it is not even necessary to persuade people or financial institutions with available funds of the soundness of the ideas to be propagated. It is only necessary to persuade them that the propagation can be financially successful; that the newspaper or magazine or book or other venture will be profitable. The competitive publisher, for example, cannot afford to publish only writing with which he personally agrees; his touchstone must be the likelihood that the market will be large enough to yield a satisfactory return on his investment.

In this way, the market breaks the vicious circle and makes it possible ultimately to finance such ventures by small amounts from many people without first persuading them. There are no such possibilities in the socialist society; there is only the all-powerful state.

Let us stretch our imagination and suppose that a socialist government is aware of this problem and is composed of people anxious to preserve freedom. Could it provide the funds? Perhaps, but it is difficult to see how. It could establish a bureau for subsidizing subversive propaganda. But how could it choose whom to support? If it gave to all who asked, it would shortly find itself out of funds, for socialism cannot repeal the elementary economic law that a sufficiently high price will call forth a large supply. Make the advocacy of radical causes sufficiently remunerative, and the supply of advocates will be unlimited.

Moreover, freedom to advocate unpopular causes does not require that such advocacy be without cost. On the contrary, no society could be stable if advocacy of radical change were costless, much less subsidized. It is entirely appropriate that men make sacrifices to advocate causes in which they deeply believe. Indeed, it is important to preserve freedom only for people who are willing to practice self-denial, for otherwise freedom degenerates into license and irresponsibility. What is essential is that the cost of advocating unpopular causes be tolerable and not prohibitive.

But we are not yet through. In a free market society, it is enough to have the funds. The suppliers of paper are as willing to sell it to the *Daily Worker* as to the *Wall Street Journal*. In a socialist society, it would not be enough to have the funds. The hypothetical supporter of capitalism would have to persuade a government factory making paper to sell to him, the government printing press to print his pamphlets, a government post office to distribute them among the people, a government agency to rent him a hall in which to talk, and so on.

Perhaps there is some way in which one could overcome these difficulties and preserve freedom in a socialist society. One cannot say it is utterly impossible. What is clear, however, is that e are very real difficulties in establishing institutions th-

will effectively preserve the possibility of dissent. So far as I know, none of the people who have been in favor of socialism and also in favor of freedom have really faced up to this issue, or made even a respectable start at developing the institutional arrangements that would permit freedom under socialism. By contrast, it is clear how a free market capitalist society fosters freedom.

A striking practical example of these abstract principles is the experience of Winston Churchill. From 1933 to the outbreak of World War II, Churchill was not permitted to talk over the British radio, which was, of course, a government monopoly administered by the British Broadcasting Corporation. Here was a leading citizen of his country, a Member of Parliament, a former cabinet minister, a man who was desperately trying by every device possible to persuade his countrymen to take steps to ward off the menace of Hitler's Germany. He was not permitted to talk over the radio to the British people because the BBC was a government monopoly and his position was too "controversial".

Another striking example, reported in the January 26, 1959 issue of *Time*, has to do with the "Blacklist Fadeout". Says the *Time* story,

> The Oscar-awarding ritual is Hollywood's biggest pitch for dignity, but two years ago dignity suffered. When one Robert Rich was announced as top writer for the *The Brave One*, he never stepped forward. Robert Rich was a pseudonym, masking one of about 150 writers . . . blacklisted by the industry since 1947 as suspected Communists or fellow travelers. The case was particularly embarrassing because the Motion Picture Academy had barred any Communist or Fifth Amendment pleader from Oscar competition. Last week both the Communist rule and the mystery of Rich's identity were suddenly rescripted.
>
> Rich turned out to be Dalton (*Johnny Got His Gun*) Trumbo, one of the original "Hollywood Ten" writers who refused to testify at the 1947 hearings on Communism in the movie industry. Said producer Frank King, who had stoutly insisted that Robert Rich was "a young guy in Spain with a beard": "We have an obligation to our stockholders to buy the best script we can. Trumbo brought us *The Brave O*[illegible] and we bought it". . . .
>
> In effect it was the formal end of the Hollywood black list. For barred w[illegible] formal end came long ago. At least 15% of [illegible]

rent Hollywood films are reportedly written by blacklist members. Said Producer King, "There are more ghosts in Hollywood than in Forest Lawn. Every company in town has used the work of blacklisted people. We're just the first to confirm what everybody knows."

One may believe, as I do, that communism would destroy all of our freedoms, one may be opposed to it as firmly and as strongly as possible, and yet, at the same time, also believe that in a free society it is intolerable for a man to be prevented from making voluntary arrangements with others that are mutually attractive because he believes in or is trying to promote communism. His freedom includes his freedom to promote communism. Freedom also, of course, includes the freedom of others not to deal with him under those circumstances. The Hollywood blacklist was an unfree act that destroys freedom because it was a collusive arrangement that used coercive means to prevent voluntary exchanges. It didn't work precisely because the market made it costly for people to preserve the blacklist. The commercial emphasis, the fact that people who are running enterprises have an incentive to make as much money as they can, protected the freedom of the individuals who were blacklisted by providing them with an alternative form of employment, and by giving people an incentive to employ them.

If Hollywood and the movie industry had been government enterprises or if in England it had been a question of employment by the British Broadcasting Corporation it is difficult to believe that the "Hollywood Ten" or their equivalent would have found employment. Equally, it is difficult to believe that under those circumstances, strong proponents of individualism and private enterprise — or indeed strong proponents of any view other than the status quo — would be able to get employment.

Another example of the role of the market in preserving political freedom, was revealed in our experience with McCarthyism. Entirely aside from the substantive issues involved, and the merits of the charges made, what protection did individuals, and in particular government employees, have against irresponsible accusations and probings into matters that it went against their conscience to reveal? Their appeal to the Fifth Amendment

would have been a hollow mockery without an alternative to government employment.

Their fundamental protection was the existence of a private-market economy in which they could earn a living. Here again, the protection was not absolute. Many potential private employers were, rightly or wrongly, averse to hiring those pilloried. It may well be that there was far less justification for the costs imposed on many of the people involved than for the costs generally imposed on people who advocate unpopular causes. But the important point is that the costs were limited and not prohibitive, as they would have been if government employment had been the only possibility.

It is of interest to note that a disproportionately large fraction of the people involved apparently went into the most competitive sectors of the economy — small business, trade, farming — where the market approaches most closely the ideal free market. No one who buys bread knows whether the wheat from which it is made was grown by a Communist or a Republican, by a constitutionalist or a Fascist, or, for that matter, by a Negro or a white. This illustrates how an impersonal market separates economic activities from political views and protects men from being discriminated against in their economic activities for reasons that are irrelevant to their productivity — whether these reasons are associated with their views or their color.

As this example suggests, the groups in our society that have the most at stake in the preservation and strengthening of competitive capitalism are those minority groups which can most easily become the object of the distrust and enmity of the majority — the Negroes, the Jews, the foreign-born, to mention only the most obvious. Yet, paradoxically enough, the enemies of the free market — the Socialists and Communists — have been recruited in disproportionate measure from these groups. Instead of recognizing that the existence of the market has protected them from the attitudes of their fellow countrymen, they mistakenly attribute the residual discrimination to the market.

Chapter II

The Role of Government in a Free Society

A COMMON OBJECTION to totalitarian societies is that they regard the end as justifying the means. Taken literally, this objection is clearly illogical. If the end does not justify the means, what does? But this easy answer does not dispose of the objection; it simply shows that the objection is not well put. To deny that the end justifies the means is indirectly to assert that the end in question is not the ultimate end, that the ultimate end is itself the use of the proper means. Desirable or not, any end that can be attained only by the use of bad means must give way to the more basic end of the use of acceptable means.

To the liberal, the appropriate means are free discussion and voluntary co-operation, which implies that any form of coercion is inappropriate. The ideal is unanimity among responsible individuals achieved on the basis of free and full discussion. This is another way of expressing the goal of freedom emphasized in the preceding chapter.

From this standpoint, the role of the market, as already noted, is that it permits unanimity without conformity; that it is a system of effectively proportional representation. On the other hand, the characteristic feature of action through explicitly political channels is that it tends to require or to enforce substantial conformity. The typical issue must be decided "yes" or "no"; at most, provision can be made for a fairly limited number of alternatives. Even the use of proportional representation in its explicitly political form does not alter this conclusion. The number of separate groups that can in fact be represented is narrowly limited, enormously so by comparison with the proportional representation of the market. More important, the fact that the final outcome generally must be a law applicable to all groups, rather than separate legislative enactments for each "party" represented, means that proportional representation in its political version, far from permitting unanimity without conformity, tends toward ineffectiveness and fragmentation. It thereby operates to destroy any consensus on which unanimity with conformity can rest.

There are clearly some matters with respect to which effective proportional representation is impossible. I cannot get the amount of national defense I want and you, a different amount. With respect to such indivisible matters we can discuss, and argue, and vote. But having decided, we must conform. It is precisely the existence of such indivisible matters — protection of the individual and the nation from coercion are clearly the most basic — that prevents exclusive reliance on individual action through the market. If we are to use some of our resources for such indivisible items, we must employ political channels to reconcile differences.

The use of political channels, while inevitable, tends to strain the social cohesion essential for a stable society. The strain is least if agreement for joint action need be reached only on a limited range of issues on which people in any event have common views. Every extension of the range of issues for which explicit agreement is sought strains further the delicate threads that hold

society together. If it goes so far as to touch an issue on which men feel deeply yet differently, it may well disrupt the society. Fundamental differences in basic values can seldom if ever be resolved at the ballot box; ultimately they can only be decided, though not resolved, by conflict. The religious and civil wars of history are a bloody testament to this judgment.

The widespread use of the market reduces the strain on the social fabric by rendering conformity unnecessary with respect to any activities it encompasses. The wider the range of activities covered by the market, the fewer are the issues on which explicitly political decisions are required and hence on which it is necessary to achieve agreement. In turn, the fewer the issues on which agreement is necessary, the greater is the likelihood of getting agreement while maintaining a free society.

Unanimity is, of course, an ideal. In practice, we can afford neither the time nor the effort that would be required to achieve complete unanimity on every issue. We must perforce accept something less. We are thus led to accept majority rule in one form or another as an expedient. That majority rule is an expedient rather than itself a basic principle is clearly shown by the fact that our willingness to resort to majority rule, and the size of the majority we require, themselves depend on the seriousness of the issue involved. If the matter is of little moment and the minority has no strong feelings about being overruled, a bare plurality will suffice. On the other hand, if the minority feels strongly about the issue involved, even a bare majority will not do. Few of us would be willing to have issues of free speech, for example, decided by a bare majority. Our legal structure is full of such distinctions among kinds of issues that require different kinds of majorities. At the extreme are those issues embodied in the Constitution. These are the principles that are so important that we are willing to make minimal concessions to expediency. Something like essential consensus was achieved initially in accepting them, and we require something like essential consensus for a change in them.

The self-denying ordinance to refrain from majority rule on certain kinds of issues that is embodied in our Constitution and in similar written or unwritten constitutions elsewhere, and the specific provisions in these constitutions or their equivalents prohibiting coercion of individuals, are themselves to be regarded as reached by free discussion and as reflecting essential unanimity about means.

I turn now to consider more specifically, though still in very broad terms, what the areas are that cannot be handled through the market at all, or can be handled only at so great a cost that the use of political channels may be preferable.

GOVERNMENT AS RULE-MAKER AND UMPIRE

It is important to distinguish the day-to-day activities of people from the general customary and legal framework within which these take place. The day-to-day activities are like the actions of the participants in a game when they are playing it; the framework, like the rules of the game they play. And just as a good game requires acceptance by the players both of the rules and of the umpire to interpret and enforce them, so a good society requires that its members agree on the general conditions that will govern relations among them, on some means of arbitrating different interpretations of these conditions, and on some device for enforcing compliance with the generally accepted rules. As in games, so also in society, most of the general conditions are the unintended outcome of custom, accepted unthinkingly. At most, we consider explicitly only minor modifications in them, though the cumulative effect of a series of minor modifications may be a drastic alteration in the character of the game or of the society. In both games and society also, no set of rules can prevail unless most participants most of the time conform to them without external sanctions; unless that is, there is a broad underlying social consensus. But we cannot rely on custom or on this consensus alone to interpret and to enforce the rules; we need an umpire. These then are the basic roles of government in a free society: to provide a means whereby we can modify the rules, to mediate differences among us on the meaning of the rules, and to enforce compliance with the rules on the part of those few who would otherwise not play the game.

The need for government in these respects arises because absolute freedom is impossible. However attractive anarchy may be as a philosophy, it is not feasible in a world of imperfect men.

Men's freedoms can conflict, and when they do, one man's freedom must be limited to preserve another's — as a Supreme Court Justice once put it, "My freedom to move my fist must be limited by the proximity of your chin."

The major problem in deciding the appropriate activities of government is how to resolve such conflicts among the freedoms of different individuals. In some cases, the answer is easy. There is little difficulty in attaining near unanimity to the proposition that one man's freedom to murder his neighbor must be sacrificed to preserve the freedom of the other man to live. In other cases, the answer is difficult. In the economic area, a major problem arises in respect of the conflict between freedom to combine and freedom to compete. What meaning is to be attributed to "free" as modifying "enterprise"? In the United States, "free" has been understood to mean that anyone is free to set up an enterprise, which means that existing enterprises are not free to keep out competitors except by selling a better product at the same price or the same product at a lower price. In the continental tradition, on the other hand, the meaning has generally been that enterprises are free to do what they want, including the fixing of prices, division of markets, and the adoption of other techniques to keep out potential competitors. Perhaps the most difficult specific problem in this area arises with respect to combinations among laborers, where the problem of freedom to combine and freedom to compete is particularly acute.

A still more basic economic area in which the answer is both difficult and important is the definition of property rights. The notion of property, as it has developed over centuries and as it is embodied in our legal codes, has become so much a part of us that we tend to take it for granted, and fail to recognize the extent to which just what constitutes property and what rights the ownership of property confers are complex social creations rather than self-evident propositions. Does my having title to land, for example, and my freedom to use my property as I wish, permit me to deny to someone else the right to fly over my land in his airplane? Or does his right to use his airplane take precedence? Or does this depend on how high he flies? Or how much r he makes? Does voluntary exchange require that he pa

me for the privilege of flying over my land? Or that I must pay him to refrain from flying over it? The mere mention of royalties, copyrights, patents; shares of stock in corporations; riparian rights, and the like, may perhaps emphasize the role of generally accepted social rules in the very definition of property. It may suggest also that, in many cases, the existence of a well specified and generally accepted definition of property is far more important than just what the definition is.

Another economic area that raises particularly difficult problems is the monetary system. Government responsibility for the monetary system has long been recognized. It is explicitly provided for in the constitutional provision which gives Congress the power "to coin money, regulate the value thereof, and of foreign coin." There is probably no other area of economic activity with respect to which government action has been so uniformly accepted. This habitual and by now almost unthinking acceptance of governmental responsibility makes thorough understanding of the grounds for such responsibility all the more necessary, since it enhances the danger that the scope of government will spread from activities that are, to those that are not, appropriate in a free society, from providing a monetary framework to determining the allocation of resources among individuals. We shall discuss this problem in detail in chapter iii.

In summary, the organization of economic activity through voluntary exchange presumes that we have provided, through government, for the maintenance of law and order to prevent coercion of one individual by another, the enforcement of contracts voluntarily entered into, the definition of the meaning of property rights, the interpretation and enforcement of such rights, and the provision of a monetary framework.

ACTION THROUGH GOVERNMENT ON GROUNDS OF TECHNICAL MONOPOLY AND NEIGHBORHOOD EFFECTS

The role of government just considered is to do something that the market cannot do for itself, namely, to determine, arbitrate, and enforce the rules of the game. We may also want to do through government some things that might conceivably be done through the market but that technical or similar conditions

render it difficult to do in that way. These all reduce to cases in which strictly voluntary exchange is either exceedingly costly or practically impossible. There are two general classes of such cases: monopoly and similar market imperfections, and neighborhood effects.

Exchange is truly voluntary only when nearly equivalent alternatives exist. Monopoly implies the absence of alternatives and thereby inhibits effective freedom of exchange. In practice, monopoly frequently, if not generally, arises from government support or from collusive agreements among individuals. With respect to these, the problem is either to avoid governmental fostering of monopoly or to stimulate the effective enforcement of rules such as those embodied in our anti-trust laws. However, monopoly may also arise because it is technically efficient to have a single producer or enterprise. I venture to suggest that such cases are more limited than is supposed but they unquestionably do arise. A simple example is perhaps the provision of telephone services within a community. I shall refer to such cases as "technical" monopoly.

When technical conditions make a monopoly the natural outcome of competitive market forces, there are only three alternatives that seem available: private monopoly, public monopoly, or public regulation. All three are bad so we must choose among evils. Henry Simons, observing public regulation of monopoly in the United States, found the results so distasteful that he concluded public monopoly would be a lesser evil. Walter Eucken, a noted German liberal, observing public monopoly in German railroads, found the results so distasteful that he concluded public regulation would be a lesser evil. Having learned from both, I reluctantly conclude that, if tolerable, private monopoly may be the least of the evils.

If society were static so that the conditions which give rise to a technical monopoly were sure to remain, I would have little confidence in this solution. In a rapidly changing society, however, the conditions making for technical monopoly frequently change and I suspect that both public regulation and public monopoly are likely to be less responsive to such changes in conditions, to be less readily capable of elimination, than private monopoly.

Railroads in the United States are an excellent example. A large degree of monopoly in railroads was perhaps inevitable on technical grounds in the nineteenth century. This was the justification for the Interstate Commerce Commission. But conditions have changed. The emergence of road and air transport has reduced the monopoly element in railroads to negligible proportions. Yet we have not eliminated the ICC. On the contrary, the ICC, which started out as an agency to protect the public from exploitation by the railroads, has become an agency to protect railroads from competition by trucks and other means of transport, and more recently even to protect existing truck companies from competition by new entrants. Similarly, in England, when the railroads were nationalized, trucking was at first brought into the state monopoly. If railroads had never been subjected to regulation in the United States, it is nearly certain that by now transportation, including railroads, would be a highly competitive industry with little or no remaining monopoly elements.

The choice between the evils of private monopoly, public monopoly, and public regulation cannot, however, be made once and for all, independently of the factual circumstances. If the technical monopoly is of a service or commodity that is regarded as essential and if its monopoly power is sizable, even the short-run effects of private unregulated monopoly may not be tolerable, and either public regulation or ownership may be a lesser evil.

Technical monopoly may on occasion justify a *de facto* public monopoly. It cannot by itself justify a public monopoly achieved by making it illegal for anyone else to compete. For example, there is no way to justify our present public monopoly of the post office. It may be argued that the carrying of mail is a technical monopoly and that a government monopoly is the least of evils. Along these lines, one could perhaps justify a government post office but not the present law, which makes it illegal for anybody else to carry mail. If the delivery of mail is a technical monopoly, no one will be able to succeed in competition with the government. If it is not, there is no reason why the government should be engaged in it. The only way to find out is to leave other people free to enter.

The historical reason why we have a post office monopoly is because the Pony Express did such a good job of carrying the mail across the continent that, when the government introduced transcontinental service, it couldn't compete effectively and lost money. The result was a law making it illegal for anybody else to carry the mail. That is why the Adams Express Company is an investment trust today instead of an operating company. I conjecture that if entry into the mail-carrying business were open to all, there would be a large number of firms entering it and this archaic industry would become revolutionized in short order.

A second general class of cases in which strictly voluntary exchange is impossible arises when actions of individuals have effects on other individuals for which it is not feasible to charge or recompense them. This is the problem of "neighborhood effects". An obvious example is the pollution of a stream. The man who pollutes a stream is in effect forcing others to exchange good water for bad. These others might be willing to make the exchange at a price. But it is not feasible for them, acting individually, to avoid the exchange or to enforce appropriate compensation.

A less obvious example is the provision of highways. In this case, it is technically possible to identify and hence charge individuals for their use of the roads and so to have private operation. However, for general access roads, involving many points of entry and exit, the costs of collection would be extremely high if a charge were to be made for the specific services received by each individual, because of the necessity of establishing toll booths or the equivalent at all entrances. The gasoline tax is a much cheaper method of charging individuals roughly in proportion to their use of the roads. This method, however, is one in which the particular payment cannot be identified closely with the particular use. Hence, it is hardly feasible to have private enterprise provide the service and collect the charge without establishing extensive private monopoly.

These considerations do not apply to long-distance turnpikes with high density of traffic and limited access. For these, the costs of collection are small and in many cases are now being

paid, and there are often numerous alternatives, so that there is no serious monopoly problem. Hence, there is every reason why these should be privately owned and operated. If so owned and operated, the enterprise running the highway should receive the gasoline taxes paid on account of travel on it.

Parks are an interesting example because they illustrate the difference between cases that can and cases that cannot be justified by neighborhood effects, and because almost everyone at first sight regards the conduct of National Parks as obviously a valid function of government. In fact, however, neighborhood effects may justify a city park; they do not justify a national park, like Yellowstone National Park or the Grand Canyon. What is the fundamental difference between the two? For the city park, it is extremely difficult to identify the people who benefit from it and to charge them for the benefits which they receive. If there is a park in the middle of the city, the houses on all sides get the benefit of the open space, and people who walk through it or by it also benefit. To maintain toll collectors at the gates or to impose annual charges per window overlooking the park would be very expensive and difficult. The entrances to a national park like Yellowstone, on the other hand, are few; most of the people who come stay for a considerable period of time and it is perfectly feasible to set up toll gates and collect admission charges. This is indeed now done, though the charges do not cover the whole costs. If the public wants this kind of an activity enough to pay for it, private enterprises will have every incentive to provide such parks. And, of course, there are many private enterprises of this nature now in existence. I cannot myself conjure up any neighborhood effects or important monopoly effects that would justify governmental activity in this area.

Considerations like those I have treated under the heading of neighborhood effects have been used to rationalize almost every conceivable intervention. In many instances, however, this rationalization is special pleading rather than a legitimate application of the concept of neighborhood effects. Neighborhood effects cut both ways. They can be a reason for limiting the activities of government as well as for expanding them. Neighborhood effects impede voluntary exchange because it is difficult

to identify the effects on third parties and to measure their magnitude; but this difficulty is present in governmental activity as well. It is hard to know when neighborhood effects are sufficiently large to justify particular costs in overcoming them and even harder to distribute the costs in an appropriate fashion. Consequently, when government engages in activities to overcome neighborhood effects, it will in part introduce an additional set of neighborhood effects by failing to charge or to compensate individuals properly. Whether the original or the new neighborhood effects are the more serious can only be judged by the facts of the individual case, and even then, only very approximately. Furthermore, the use of government to overcome neighborhood effects itself has an extremely important neighborhood effect which is unrelated to the particular occasion for government action. Every act of government intervention limits the area of individual freedom directly and threatens the preservation of freedom indirectly for reasons elaborated in the first chapter.

Our principles offer no hard and fast line how far it is appropriate to use government to accomplish jointly what it is difficult or impossible for us to accomplish separately through strictly voluntary exchange. In any particular case of proposed intervention, we must make up a balance sheet, listing separately the advantages and disadvantages. Our principles tell us what items to put on the one side and what items on the other and they give us some basis for attaching importance to the different items. In particular, we shall always want to enter on the liability side of any proposed government intervention, its neighborhood effect in threatening freedom, and give this effect considerable weight. Just how much weight to give to it, as to other items, depends upon the circumstances. If, for example, existing government intervention is minor, we shall attach a smaller weight to the negative effects of additional government intervention. This is an important reason why many earlier liberals, like Henry Simons, writing at a time when government was small by today's standards, were willing to have government undertake activities that today's liberals would not accept now that government has become so overgrown.

ACTION THROUGH GOVERNMENT ON PATERNALISTIC GROUNDS

Freedom is a tenable objective only for responsible individuals. We do not believe in freedom for madmen or children. The necessity of drawing a line between responsible individuals and others is inescapable, yet it means that there is an essential ambiguity in our ultimate objective of freedom. Paternalism is inescapable for those whom we designate as not responsible.

The clearest case, perhaps, is that of madmen. We are willing neither to permit them freedom nor to shoot them. It would be nice if we could rely on voluntary activities of individuals to house and care for the madmen. But I think we cannot rule out the possibility that such charitable activities will be inadequate, if only because of the neighborhood effect involved in the fact that I benefit if another man contributes to the care of the insane. For this reason, we may be willing to arrange for their care through government.

Children offer a more difficult case. The ultimate operative unit in our society is the family, not the individual. Yet the acceptance of the family as the unit rests in considerable part on expediency rather than principle. We believe that parents are generally best able to protect their children and to provide for their development into responsible individuals for whom freedom is appropriate. But we do not believe in the freedom of parents to do what they will with other people. The children are responsible individuals in embryo, and a believer in freedom believes in protecting their ultimate rights.

To put this in a different and what may seem a more callous way, children are at one and the same time consumer goods and potentially responsible members of society. The freedom of individuals to use their economic resources as they want includes the freedom to use them to have children — to buy, as it were, the services of children as a particular form of consumption. But once this choice is exercised, the children have a value in and of themselves and have a freedom of their own that is not simply an extension of the freedom of the parents.

The paternalistic ground for governmental activity is in many ways the most troublesome to a liberal; for it involves the accept-

ance of a principle—that some shall decide for others—which he finds objectionable in most applications and which he rightly regards as a hallmark of his chief intellectual opponents, the proponents of collectivism in one or another of its guises, whether it be communism, socialism, or a welfare state. Yet there is no use pretending that problems are simpler than in fact they are. There is no avoiding the need for some measure of paternalism. As Dicey wrote in 1914 about an act for the protection of mental defectives, "The Mental Deficiency Act is the first step along a path on which no sane man can decline to enter, but which, if too far pursued, will bring statesmen across difficulties hard to meet without considerable interference with individual liberty."[1] There is no formula that can tell us where to stop. We must rely on our fallible judgment and, having reached a judgment, on our ability to persuade our fellow men that it is a correct judgment, or their ability to persuade us to modify our views. We must put our faith, here as elsewhere, in a consensus reached by imperfect and biased men through free discussion and trial and error.

CONCLUSION

A government which maintained law and order, defined property rights, served as a means whereby we could modify property rights and other rules of the economic game, adjudicated disputes about the interpretation of the rules, enforced contracts, promoted competition, provided a monetary framework, engaged in activities to counter technical monopolies and to overcome neighborhood effects widely regarded as sufficiently important to justify government intervention, and which supplemented private charity and the private family in protecting the irresponsible, whether madman or child—such a government would clearly have important functions to perform. The consistent liberal is not an anarchist.

Yet it is also true that such a government would have clearly limited functions and would refrain from a host of activities that are now undertaken by federal and state governments in

[1] A. V. Dicey, *Lectures on the Relation between Law and Public Opinion in England during the Nineteenth Century* (2d. ed.; London: Macmillan & Co., 1914), [illegible]

the United States, and their counterparts in other Western countries. Succeeding chapters will deal in some detail with some of these activities, and a few have been discussed above, but it may help to give a sense of proportion about the role that a liberal would assign government simply to list, in closing this chapter, some activities currently undertaken by government in the U.S., that cannot, so far as I can see, validly be justified in terms of the principles outlined above:

1. Parity price support programs for agriculture.
2. Tariffs on imports or restrictions on exports, such as current oil import quotas, sugar quotas, etc.
3. Governmental control of output, such as through the farm program, or through prorationing of oil as is done by the Texas Railroad Commission.
4. Rent control, such as is still practiced in New York, or more general price and wage controls such as were imposed during and just after World War II.
5. Legal minimum wage rates, or legal maximum prices, such as the legal maximum of zero on the rate of interest that can be paid on demand deposits by commercial banks, or the legally fixed maximum rates that can be paid on savings and time deposits.
6. Detailed regulation of industries, such as the regulation of transportation by the Interstate Commerce Commission. This had some justification on technical monopoly grounds when initially introduced for railroads; it has none now for any means of transport. Another example is detailed regulation of banking.
7. A similar example, but one which deserves special mention because of its implicit censorship and violation of free speech, is the control of radio and television by the Federal Communications Commission.
8. Present social security programs, especially the old-age and retirement programs compelling people in effect (*a*) to spend a specified fraction of their income on the purchase of retirement annuity, (*b*) to buy the annuity from a publicly operated enterprise.
9. Licensure provisions in various cities and states which restrict particular enterprises or occupations or professions to people who have a license, where the license is more than

receipt for a tax which anyone who wishes to enter the activity may pay.

10. So-called "public-housing" and the host of other subsidy programs directed at fostering residential construction such as F.H.A. and V.A. guarantee of mortgage, and the like.

11. Conscription to man the military services in peacetime. The appropriate free market arrangement is volunteer military forces; which is to say, hiring men to serve. There is no justification for not paying whatever price is necessary to attract the required number of men. Present arrangements are inequitable and arbitrary, seriously interfere with the freedom of young men to shape their lives, and probably are even more costly than the market alternative. (Universal military training to provide a reserve for war time is a different problem and may be justified on liberal grounds.)

12. National parks, as noted above.

13. The legal prohibition on the carrying of mail for profit.

14. Publicly owned and operated toll roads, as noted above.

This list is far from comprehensive.

Chapter III

The Control of Money

"FULL EMPLOYMENT" and "economic growth" have in the past few decades become primary excuses for widening the extent of government intervention in economic affairs. A private free-enterprise economy, it is said, is inherently unstable. Left to itself, it will produce recurrent cycles of boom and bust. The government must therefore step in to keep things on an even keel. These arguments were particularly potent during and after the Great Depression of the 1930's, and were a major element giving rise to the New Deal in this country and comparable extensions of governmental intervention in others. More recently, "economic growth" has become the more popular rallying call. Government must, it is argued, see to it that the economy expands to provide the wherewithal for the cold war and demonstrate to

POLITICS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Comparing Experiences with Democracy

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• CHAPTER ONE •

Introduction: Comparing Experiences with Democracy

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The ten case studies in this book analyze the political development of a selection of countries from Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East—or what we term, for lack of a better label, "developing countries." While analyzing the full sweep of regime evolution and change, we focus on a particular issue in political development that can justifiably be called the preeminent political issue of our times: the struggle for democracy. Beginning from a common theoretical agenda, we seek to explain whether, why, and to what extent democracy has evolved and taken root in the vastly different cultural and historical soils of these countries.

The larger (twenty-six-nation) comparative study from which these cases derive was undertaken at a time of tremendous democratic ferment in the developing world.[1] The movement toward democracy that witnessed, in the mid-1970s, the toppling of Western Europe's last three dictatorships—Greece, Portugal, and Spain—moved on through Latin America. In the ensuing decade, most Latin American military dictatorships collapsed or withdrew, defying predictions of a longer reign for these "bureaucratic-authoritarian" regimes. By the end of the 1980s, the transition to democracy was nearing completion in Chile, and the world was transfixed by the campaign for democratization in China, the growing demands for national autonomy and further political liberalization in the Soviet Union, and the stunning collapse of Communist rule throughout Eastern Europe. The latter developments showed the diversity of paths to democracy—even within the seemingly homogeneous Communist world—ranging from reform from above to negotiation to the violent overthrow of a regime that combined Communist with personalistic (sultanistic) rule in Romania.[2]

In East Asia, democratic progress was apparent in the dramatic transitions in the Philippines and South Korea, and in the incremental but considerable movement in Taiwan and Thailand. In the old British South Asian raj, Pakistan completed a transition to democracy, but India experienced serious and persistent challenges to its democratic institutions and Sri Lanka descended into an ethnic civil war.

Among the states of Africa, which found it difficult to establish new nationhoods and democratic regimes, there were also some signs of democratic emergence or renewal. Uganda, for example, struggled to put an end to decades of anarchy, tyranny, and civil strife in order to fulfil its hopes for democracy and human rights. Despite intense repression (somewhat diminished by 1990), the black and colored peoples of South Africa continue their struggle for a nonracial democracy through multiple forms of nonviolent action, including an increasingly powerful trade union movement. Nigeria instituted an elaborate timetable for democratic transition from military rule, beginning with local government elections and the formation of two political parties, to be followed in stages by partisan elections at the local and state and then federal levels. In North Africa, processes of political liberalization were launched in the late 1980s in Tunisia and Algeria, and a partially competitive, partially liberal, multiparty system persists in Egypt.

The 1980s witnessed an unprecedented growth of international concern for human rights—including, prominently, the rights to choose democratically the government under which one lives and to express and organize around one's political principles and views. As torture, disappearances, and other grave human rights violations became more widespread but also more systematically exposed and denounced around the world, there developed a renewed and deeper appreciation for democratic institutions which, with all their procedural messiness and sluggishness, nevertheless protect the integrity of the person and the freedoms of conscience and expression. The growth of democratic norms throughout the world is strikingly evidenced in the degree to which authoritarian regimes find it necessary to wrap themselves in the rhetoric and constitutional trappings of democracy, or at least to state as their goal the eventual establishment of democracy.

The global advance of democracy in the 1980s was assisted by the demise of its historic ideological rivals. Fascism was destroyed as a vital force in World War II. The appeals of Marxism-Leninism have declined with the harsh repressiveness, glaring economic failures, and loss of revolutionary idealism of the existing Communist regimes. More-limited, quasi-socialist or mass mobilizational models—the Mexican, Yugoslav, and Nasserite—have also lost their aura. Military regimes almost universally lack ideological justification and legitimacy beyond a temporary intrusion to correct political and social problems. With the important but still-indeterminate exception of the Islamic fundamentalist state—for that large portion of the world from Indonesia to West Africa wherein Islam is a major or dominant religion—democracy is the only model of government with any broad ideological legitimacy and appeal today.

It is a sign of the changes in our world, politically and intellectually, that the normative question—Why study democracy?—now seems, at the start of the 1990s, less contentious and problematic than it did in the 1960s. Nevertheless, previous historical cycles warn that the 1990s may bring

setbacks and even a renewed crisis of confidence in democracy. Some critics suggest that political democracy is the wrong problem and ask: Are there not more pressing issues of survival and justice facing developing societies? Others contend our choice of topic betrays a misplaced value bias for democracy. They ask (or assert): If in some societies democracy in our (liberal) sense has to work against so many odds, as our research unveils, is it worth striving for, or are there alternatives to democracy that should be considered?

We wish to state quite clearly here our bias for democracy as a system of government. For any democrat, these questions carry serious implications: The former suggest that economic and social rights should be considered more important than civil and political liberties; the latter implies granting to some forms or cases of authoritarian rule the right to use coercive measures, in the name of some higher good, to suppress democratic opposition. For ourselves, neither of these normative suppositions is tenable.

If there were many undemocratic governments (now and in the past) committed to serving collective goals, rather than the interests of the rulers, and ready to respect human rights (to refrain from torture and indiscriminate violence, to offer due process and fair trial in applying laws that, even if antiliberal, are known in advance, to maintain humane conditions of imprisonment), we might find these questions more difficult to answer. However, no undemocratic regime meets these two requirements, and even those that begin with a strong ideological commitment to the collectivity and a professed sensitivity to human rights often become increasingly narrow, autocratic, and repressive, although these trends, too, are subject to reversal.

Even where authoritarian rulers (whether civilian or military, bureaucratic or charismatic) strive to serve collective goals, why should we assume that their conception of the collective good is better than that of any other group in society? Only if we were totally certain that one ideological conception is the expression of historical reason—true and necessary—would we be forced to accept such an authoritarian alternative as better than democracy. To do so, as we know, justifies any sacrifices and ultimately terrible costs in freedom and human lives. Democracy—with its relativism and tolerance (so disturbing to those certain of the truth), and its "faith" in the reasonableness and intelligence of the common people, deciding freely (and with a chance to change their minds every four or five years) and without the use of force—seems still a better option.

• THE ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY •

Despite the growth of political and intellectual interest in democracy in developing countries, there remain huge gaps in our understanding of the factors that foster or obstruct the emergence, instauration (establis[illegible]), and consolidation of democratic government around the wor[illegible]e

contributions to this book are distinctive in that they deal with the entire history of a country's experience with democracy: establishment, breakdown, reequilibration and consolidation of democratic government; periods of democratic persistence, crisis, authoritarianism, and renewal; and all of the ambivalences and oscillations in between. We consider each country's early cultural traditions, analyze (where relevant) the colonial experience, and consider all of its postindependence history, giving special emphasis to post–World War II developments. Whereas most other works cut horizontally through the history of countries to focus on limited time spans and particular processes (usually ignoring the phenomena of democratic consolidation and stability),[3] we cut vertically through historical phases in order to explain the overall path of a country's political development.

While it can be enormously fertile, this historical approach is not without methodological problems. In particular, it runs the risk of attributing contemporary political patterns to antecedents far removed in time, without clearly demonstrating that those factors (or characteristics resulting from them) are operating at a later time and account for the failure or success of democracy. To overcome this risk, each case study author reviews the country's political history, describing its major experiences with democratic and undemocratic governments, including the structure, nature, and characteristic conflicts and tensions of each regime; and explains the fate of each regime (especially each democratic one)—why it persisted, failed, or evolved as it did, and why successive regimes emerged as and when they did. Finally, each author offers a summary theoretical judgment of the factors that have been most important in determining the country's overall degree of success or failure with democratic government, and considers its prospects for democracy, along with any policy implications he or she might wish to derive. Each country's overall experience is assessed along a six-point scale of ideal types, ranging from stable and consolidated democratic rule to the failure or absence of democracy.[4] Our readers are cautioned, however, that the case studies provide no more than capsulized surveys of a country's experience, which will hopefully inspire wider study.

Culturally, the cases in this book encompass much of the enormous variation in the developing world: Brazil, Chile, and Mexico—Christian (largely Catholic) societies of Latin America; India with its mosaic of traditions, including the distinctive Hindu culture; two largely Islamic societies—Senegal and Turkey (whose secularization is linked historically with its democratization); largely Buddhist Thailand; South Korea with its mixture of Buddhism, Confucianism, and Christianity; multiethnic Zimbabwe; and a major example—Nigeria—of what Ali Mazrui calls the "triple heritage" of Christianity, Islam, and traditional African religion and culture.

One of the most complex and intractable problems in our world is the tension between the model of ethnically, linguistically, and culturally homogeneous societies that satisfy the ideal of the nation-state and the

multiethnic, multilingual societies that face the difficult task of nation- or state-building in the absence of the integration and identification we normally associate with the idea of the nation-state. Even in Europe, before the massive and forced transfers (if not destruction) of populations, most states did not satisfy that ideal, but outside of Europe, even fewer do. Virtually no African or Asian countries and only a few Latin American countries (in this book, only Chile) seem to satisfy that model. Others, such as Brazil and Mexico, include not only descendants of the *conquistadores* and European immigrants but also substantial populations (intermixed to varying degrees with the above) of Indians and descendants of black slaves. To the list of the relatively homogeneous countries could be added South Korea and Turkey (with some significant minorities, such as the long-suffering Kurds). Our remaining cases confront us with the problem of democracy in ethnically and culturally divided societies. In some of our cases, most prominently India and Nigeria, these cultural divisions have generated conflicts that have cost dearly in terms of political trauma and human bloodshed, and that continue to endanger the prospects for democracy and political stability.

One experience that almost all of these countries share is a previous history of domination by an outside imperial power. Only Turkey and Thailand have been continuously independent and only in the latter do we find a continuity with a premodern traditional monarchy. Our study therefore does not cover a sufficient number of countries to deal with the question: Does continuous legitimacy of rule by an indigenous state facilitate both modernization and, ultimately, democratization, by contrast with the historical trauma of conquest and colonial domination?

For those who have raised the question of the relation between size and democracy,[5] our larger, twenty-six–country study includes the largest (most populous) democracy—India—and some of the smallest. Because the larger countries are generally of wider interest for classroom consideration of cross-regional comparisons, we have tended to favor them in the selection of cases for this book. Unfortunately, this required us to exclude the fascinating and theoretically informative cases of several small countries that have experienced unusual democratic success (Costa Rica, Uruguay, Botswana) or crisis (Sri Lanka). Since the major countries—with their political influence and their capacity to serve as models—occupy a special position in their respective areas, leading some to speak of subimperialisms, we feel our selection on this account is justified.

Save for the deliberate exclusion of countries with no prior democratic or semidemocratic experience, or no prospect of an opening to freedom, our study encompasses virtually every type of democratic experience in the developing world. As the decade turns, several of the cases in this book can be classified as democratic, albeit with some important qualifications (India, Turkey, Brazil, and South Korea); some are semidemocratic but moving in different directions (Thailand toward greater democracy, Zimbabwe toward

less); and two are authoritarian military regimes embarked on transitions to democracy, with Chile transferring power to an elected civilian president (but not yet fully repealing military prerogatives), while Nigeria is not scheduled to reach the same point until October 1992. Although its democratic institutions and cultural commitments have been wearing thin over the past twenty years, India's democracy has persisted for four decades (interrupted only by Indira Gandhi's emergency rule from 1975 to 1977). The democracies in Turkey, Brazil, South Korea, and now Chile, are only recently renewed after long, traumatic periods of authoritarian rule or, in Turkey's case, unstable alternation between civilian-democratic and military regimes. From these cycles of regime change, Turkey has managed to emerge with a generally longer and more-successful democratic experience than has Thailand or Nigeria, although the increasing historical and political distance from its last successful coup in 1977 suggests that Thailand may be well on the road to the institutionalization of a stable (if not yet fully democratic) parliamentary regime.

• CONCEPTS, DEFINITIONS, AND CLASSIFICATIONS •

Depending on the individual, ideology, paradigm, culture, or context, democracy may mean many different things. It is reflective of the political climate of our time that the word is used to signify the desirable end-state of many social, economic, and political pursuits, or else to self-designate and thus presumably legitimate many existing structures. Hence, it is imperative to be as precise as possible about exactly what is being studied.

The term *democracy* is used in this book to signify a political system, separate and apart from the economic and social system to which it is joined. Indeed, a distinctive aspect of our approach is to insist that issues of so-called "economic and social democracy" be separated from the question of governmental structure. Otherwise, the definitional criteria of democracy will be so broadened and the empirical reality narrowed to a degree that makes study of the phenomenon very difficult. In addition, unless the economic and social dimensions are kept conceptually distinct from the political, there is no way to analyze how variation on the political dimension is related to variation on the others. Most of all, we distinguish the concept of political democracy out of a clear and frankly expressed conviction that it is worth valuing—and hence worth studying—as an end in itself.

In this book, then, democracy—or what Robert Dahl terms polyarchy—denotes a system of government that meets three essential conditions: meaningful and extensive *competition* among individuals and organized groups (especially political parties) for all effective positions of government power, at regular intervals and excluding the use of force; a highly inclu[illegible] el of *political participation* in the selection of leaders and policies, [illegible] through regular and fair elections, such that no major

(adult) social group is excluded; and a level of *civil and political liberties*—freedom of expression, freedom of the press, freedom to form and join organizations—sufficient to ensure the integrity of political competition and participation.[6]

While this definition is, in itself, relatively straightforward, it presents a number of problems in application. For one, countries that broadly satisfy these criteria nevertheless do so to different degrees (and none do so perfectly, which is why Dahl prefers to call them polyarchies). The factors that explain this variation at the democratic end of the spectrum in degrees of popular control and freedom is an important intellectual problem, but it is different from the one that concerns us in this book, and so it is one we have had largely to bypass. We seek to determine why countries do or do not evolve, consolidate, maintain, lose, and reestablish more or less democratic systems of government, and even this limited focus leaves us with conceptual problems.

The boundary between democratic and undemocratic is sometimes blurred and imperfect, and beyond it lies a much broader range of variation in political systems. We readily concede the difficulties of classification this variation has repeatedly caused us. Even if we look only at the political, legal, and constitutional structures, several of our cases appear to lie somewhere on the boundary between democratic and something less than democratic. The ambiguity is further complicated by the constraints on free political activity, organization, and expression, and the substantial remaining political prerogatives of military authorities, that may in practice make the system much less democratic than it might appear. In all cases, we have tried to pay serious attention to actual practice in assessing and classifying regimes. But still, this leaves us to make difficult and in some ways arbitrary judgments. The decision as to whether Thailand and Zimbabwe, for example, may today be considered full democracies is replete with nuance and ambiguity. Even in the case of Brazil, which was generally presumed democratic after the election of a civilian president in 1985, Alfred Stepan cautions that the extent of military prerogatives to participate in government and wield autonomous power put the country "on the margin of not being a democracy."[7] With the direct presidential election of December 1989, the transition may now be considered closed, but serious problems of democratic consolidation remain.

We have alleviated the problem somewhat by recognizing various grades of distinction among less than democratic systems. While isolated violations of civil liberties or modest and occasional vote-rigging should not disqualify a country from broad classification as a democracy, there is a need to categorize separately those countries that allow greater political competition and freedom than would be found in a truly authoritarian regime but less than could justifiably be termed "democratic." Hence, we classify as *semidemocratic* those countries in which the effective power of elec[illegible] officials is so limited, or political party competition so restricted, or

freedom and fairness of elections so compromised, that electoral outcomes, while competitive, still deviate significantly from popular preferences; or where civil and political liberties are so limited that some political orientations and interests are unable to organize and express themselves. In different ways and to different degrees, Senegal, Zimbabwe, and Thailand fit this category (so would the electoral but still heavily military-dominated regimes in Guatemala and Honduras, for example).

Still more restrictive is a *hegemonic party system*, in which opposition parties are legal but denied, through pervasive electoral malpractices and frequent state coercion, any real chance to compete for power. Such a system has long prevailed under the domination of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) in Mexico, but the political reforms of the 1980s and especially the unprecedented gains of both right and left opposition parties in the 1988 elections, discussed by Daniel Levy in his chapter, justify a reclassification of the Mexican system as a "semidemocracy."

Descending further on our scale of classification, *authoritarian* regimes permit even less pluralism, typically banning political parties (or all but the ruling one) and most forms of political organization and competition, while being more repressive than liberal in their level of civil and political freedom. Paying close attention to actual behavior, one may distinguish a subset of authoritarian regimes that we call *pseudodemocracies* because the existence of formally democratic political institutions, such as multiparty electoral competition, masks (often in part to legitimate) the reality of authoritarian domination. Central America has long lived under such regimes. While this regime type overlaps in some ways with the hegemonic regime, it is less institutionalized and typically more personalized, coercive, and unstable.

Democratic trappings aside, authoritarian regimes vary widely in the degree to which they permit independent and critical political expression and organization. Judging by the level of what the regime allows, one can distinguish between what Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter call "dictablandas," or liberalized autocracies, and "dictaduras," harsher dictatorships that allow much less space for individual and group action.[8] Classifying by the level of what groups in the society recurrently demand (which may or may not overlap with what the regime allows), one can distinguish between authoritarian situations with strong democratic pressures and those with weak democratic pressures. In selecting cases for this book, our bias was toward the former.

Finally, of course, are the *totalitarian* regimes, which not only repress all forms of autonomous social and political organization, denying completely even the most elementary political and civil liberties, but also demand the active commitment of citizens to the regime.[9] With the decay, collapse, or at least partial liberalization of most of the world's Communist regimes in the late 1980s, it is debatable whether the totalitarian distinction is any longer salient. Nevertheless, the totalitarian legacy shapes in distinctive

ways the possibilities and conditions for democratization even in a post-totalitarian age, and what seemed in 1984 the dim possibilities for imminent transitions from communism led us to exclude all of these systems from our larger comparative study.[10]

The "dependent variable" of our study was concerned not only with democracy but also stability—the persistence and durability of democratic and other regimes over time, particularly through periods of unusually intense conflict, crisis and strain. A *stable* regime is one that is deeply institutionalized and consolidated, making it likely to enjoy a high level of popular legitimacy. *Partially stable* regimes are neither fully secure nor in imminent danger of collapse. Their institutions have perhaps acquired some measure of depth, flexibility, and value, but not enough to ensure them safe passage through severe challenges. *Unstable* regimes are, by definition, highly vulnerable to breakdown or overthrow in periods of acute uncertainty and stress. New regimes, including those that have recently restored democratic government, tend to fall in this category.

• FACILITATING AND OBSTRUCTING FACTORS FOR DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT •

Legitimacy and Performance

All governments rest on some mixture of coercion and consent, but democracies are unique in the degree to which their stability depends on the consent of a majority of those governed. So intimately is legitimacy tied to democratic stability that it is difficult to know where definition ends and theorizing begins. Almost as a given, theories of democracy stress that democratic stability requires a widespread belief among elites and masses in the legitimacy of the democratic system: that it is the best form of government (or the "least evil"), "that in spite of shortcomings and failures, the existing political institutions are better than any others that might be established," and hence that the democratic regime is morally entitled to demand obedience—to tax and draft, to make laws and enforce them, even "if necessary, by the use of force."[11]

Democratic legitimacy derives, when it is most stable and secure, from an instrinsic value commitment rooted in the political culture at all levels of society, but it is also shaped (particularly in the early years of a democracy) by the performance of the democratic regime, both economically and politically (through the "maintenance of civil order, personal security, adjudication and arbitration of conflicts, and a minimum of predictability in the making and implementation of decisions").[12] Historically, the more successful a regime has been in providing what people want, the greater and more deeply rooted tends to be its legitimacy: A long record of successful performance tends to build a large reservoir of legitimacy, enabling the system better to endure crises and challenges.[13] As Arturo Valenzuela shows

here in the case of Chile, however, such a long accumulation of democratic legitimacy does not confer immunity from breakdown and can be squandered with great speed by a combination of poor leadership, wrong choices, and outmoded political institutions.

Regimes that lack deep legitimacy depend more precariously on current performance and are vulnerable to collapse in periods of economic and social distress.[14] This has been a particular problem for democratic (as well as undemocratic) regimes in the developing world, given especially their tendency to experience an interaction of low legitimacy and low effectiveness. Because of the combination of widespread poverty and the strains imposed by modernization, regimes that begin with low legitimacy also find it difficult to perform effectively, and regimes that lack effectiveness, especially in economic growth, find it difficult to build legitimacy. Our own studies and many others caution against drawing too deterministic a linkage between the economic performance of democratic regimes and the probability of their survival. Nevertheless, the correlation remains both obvious and understandable.

While they have not been immune to problems of recession, inflation, and corruption, the more successful democracies in our study have generally experienced relatively steady economic growth, which in turn has benefited their legitimacy. Often this is traceable not (just) to sound policies but to the bounty of highly marketable natural resources, but the dangers of such dependence (and the free-wheeling, populist neglect of savings and investment to raise productive capacities that often accompanies it) are substantial. These were revealed in Venezuela, for example, in early 1989 when the public erupted into violent rioting over the imposition by President Carlos Andres Pérez of harsh austerity measures, necessitated by the decline in oil revenues and by decades of overspending and overborrowing.[15]

An important determinant of steadily successful economic performance, however, is policy. Botswana has benefited from great natural resources and high levels of foreign aid, but underlying its development performance have been sound policies and effective management (which have helped attract foreign aid). State policies have not strangled producers of agricultural exports (in this case, cattle) as they did in much of the rest of tropical Africa. The state has prudently invested in basic infrastructure, and the elite has kept an effective lid on political and administrative corruption. Parastatals have been managed efficiently, and efforts have been made to distribute growth through state investment in education, housing, health, and other social services; unusually effective food distribution programs to relieve the effects of drought; and improvement of wages in the formal sector.[16] This record of performance contrasts markedly with the bloated, predatory state structures, widespread corruption, and ill-designed, poorly implemented development policies that sucked the economic breath from putative democratic republics in Nigeria [illegible] elsewhere in Africa.

Altho[illegible] often presumed to have done poorly in delivering material

progress, India has actually achieved significant, if incremental, socioeconomic development, and would have done much better had its population not doubled in the past three decades to 800 million people. As Jyotirindra Das Gupta observes, since independence India has "experienced a partial renovation of agricultural production leading to self-sufficiency in food, developed a structure of industrialization that produces most products that the country needs, expanded the supply of educated and technical personnel . . . , consistently held down the level of inflation to one of the lowest in the world, and in the process ensured a level of self-reliance and payment ability that kept it away from debt crisis." Ample evidence for these claims may be found in Table 1.1, which demonstrates the steady economic and social gains India has continued to make since the mid-1960s, significantly improving such crucial social indicators as education and life expectancy (to among the highest levels for low-income countries) while restraining inflation and foreign borrowing (as a percentage of gross national product (GNP), India's foreign debt burden is the lowest of any of the ten cases in this book). High levels of poverty and inequality remain, along with a need to rationalize the highly inefficient public sector, but such economic prudence and steady development progress, which has dramatically expanded the size of the middle class in a generation, may be one of the least appreciated foundations of India's democratic persistence.

It appears that consistency, prudence, and moderation in economic policy, as in politics, are conducive to democratic stability. In Colombia, eclectic, pragmatic, undoctrinaire economic policies produced steady economic growth with low inflation, following the transition to democracy in 1957. Colombia's flexibility and pragmatism, which motivated a relatively early partial reorientation of the economy from import substitution to export promotion, enabled it to avoid some of the disastrous experiences in import substitution and sharp pendular swings in policy (between populism and radical neoliberalism) that so devastated the economies of Chile, Argentina, Peru, and Uruguay.[17]

As Table 1.1 suggests, a similar emphasis on prudent and consistent economic policies, and on controlling inflation, fiscal deficits, and foreign borrowing (with a particular emphasis on export promotion) has produced an impressive record of economic growth in Thailand, which at the beginning of the 1990s ranks as one of the most dynamic economies in the world, growing at an annual rate of 9–10 percent. While it is accentuating problems of corruption and inequality, rapid economic growth in Thailand is producing many of the same social forces for democratization that arose in South Korea and Taiwan during the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s: the expansion of autonomous (and increasingly politically conscious) entrepreneurial and professional middle classes (including social scientists and intellectuals); the movement of labor into manufacturing, furthering the differentiation and organization of the urban sector; and improvements in literacy, educa[illegible] and communication, which bring much wider circulation of pe[illegible]

Table 1.1.5 [illegible]ed Development Indicators, 1965–1987[a]

	Chile		Brazil		Mexico		Turkey		India		Thailand		South Korea		Nigeria		Senegal		Zimbabwe	
	1965	1987	1965	1987	1965	1987	1965	1987	1965	1987	1965	1987	1965	1987	1965	1987	1965	1987	1965	1987
Civil and Political Liberties, 1975 & 1989[b]	12	7	8	4	7	7	5	6	5	5	8	5	11	5	10	11	11	7	11	10
Population in Millions, 1966 & 1987	8.7	12.5	86.5	141.4	44.9	81.9	31.9	52.60	498.8	797.5	32.0	53.6	29.5	42.1	60.0	106.6	4.0	7.0	4.5	9.0
Population Growth Rate, 1965–1980 & 1980–1987	1.7	1.7	2.4	2.2	3.1	2.2	2.5	2.3	2.3	2.1	2.9	2.0	2.0	1.4	2.5	3.4	2.5	2.9	3.1	3.7
Projected Rate of Population Growth, 1987–2000		1.4		1.8		1.9		1.9		1.8		1.5		1.0		3.0		3.1		3.0
Projected Population in Millions, 2000 & 2025	15	19	178	234	105	141	67	90	1010	1365	65	82	48	56	157	286	10	20	13	22
Current GNP per Capita in US Dollars,[c] 1966 & 1987	740	1310	280	2020	490	1830	310	1210	90	300	150	850	130	2690	70	370	210	520	220	580
Average Annual Growth Rate, GNP per Capita, in Percentages, 1965–1987		0.2		4.1		2.5		2.6		1.8		3.9		6.4		1.1		-0.6		0.9
Average Annual Growth Rate of GDP, 1965–1980 & 1980–1987	1.9	1.0	9.0	3.3	6.5	0.5	6.3	5.2	3.7	4.6	7.2	5.6	9.5	8.6	6.9	-1.7	2.1	3.3	4.4	2.4
Average Annual Rate of Inflation, 1965–1980 & 1980–1987	129.9	20.6	31.3	166.3	13.0	68.9	20.7	37.4	7.6	7.7	6.3	2.8	18.8	5.0	13.7	10.1	6.5	9.1	6.4	12.4
Urban Population as Percentage of Total[d]	72	85	58	75	55	71	34	47	19	27	13	21	32	69	17	33	33	37	14	26
Percentage of Labor Force in Agriculture, 1965 & 1980	27	17	49	31	50	37	75	58	73	70	82	71	55	36	72	68	83	81	79	73
Life Expectancy at Birth																				
Male	56	68	55	62	58	65	52	63	46	58	53	63	55	66	40	49	40	46	46	56
Female	62	75	59	68	61	72	55	66	44	58	58	66	58	73	43	53	42	49	49	60
Infant Mortality Rate per 1,000 Births	103	20	105	63	82	47	165	76	151	99	90	39	64	25	179	105	172	128	104	72
Percentage Enrolled in Primary School, 1965 & 1986[e]	124	110	108	105	92	114	101	117	74	92	78	99	101	94	32	92[f]	40	55	110	129
Percentage Enrolled in Secondary School, 1965 & 1986	34	70	16	36	17	55	16	44	27	35	14	29	35	95	5	29[f]	7	13	6	46
Total External Public Debt as Percentage of GNP, 1970 & 1987	25.8	89.4	8.2	29.5	8.7	59.5	14.7	46.6	14.7	15.1	4.6	29.6	20.3	20.7	3.4	109.8	11.9	68.3	15.5	36.2

Sources: World Bank, *World Development Report 1983, 1987, 1989* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1983, 1987, 1989); World Bank, *World Tables 1987*, 4th ed. (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1987); and (for the ratings of political and civil liberties) Raymond D. Gastil, *Freedom in the World: Political Rights and Civil Liberties 1987–88* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1988), and *Freedom at Issue* 112 (January–February 1990), with permission of Freedom House.

[a] The figures are for the years 1965 and 1987, unless otherwise indicated in the labels for each row.

[b] Combined score of civil and political liberties, each rated on a 1 to 7 scale with 1 being freest and 7 least free. A score of 5 or less (with a 2 on political rights) is regarded as "free," 6 to 11 as partly free, and 12 to 14 as "not free."

[c] GNP per capita is expressed in current U.S. dollars for each year. Comparison between 1966 and 1987 figures therefore is not controlled for (U.S.) inflation.

[d] Because these estimates (taken from UN data) are based on different national definitions of what is urban, cross country comparisons should be interpreted with caution.

[e] In some countries with universal primary education, the gross enrollment ratios may exceed 100 percent because some pupils are younger or older than the country's standard primary school age.

[f] Figure is for 1983.

information, and ideas. Together, these changes increase the proportion of the population desiring political liberalization, draw the country increasingly into contact and exchange with the advanced, industrialized democracies, and enhance the resources and skills necessary for people to organize autonomously to pursue their interests, as Sung-joo Han explains for the case of South Korea.[18]

Such changes help us to understand why authoritarian (especially military) regimes do not derive from successful economic performance the same enduring benefits for their legitimacy that democratic regimes do. Unlike democratic regimes, most authoritarian regimes are not intrinsically applauded and admired for their organization of power. Rather, their monopoly of power, and their limitation and repression of political and civil liberties, is accepted by the people only to achieve some higher good (economic growth, socialism, the Islamic society, utopia). Such regimes, therefore,

> face a legitimacy contradiction, a kind of catch-22. If they do not perform, they lose legitimacy because performance is their only justification for holding power. However, like South Korea or Peru (under Velasco's reformist military rule), if they do perform in delivering socioeconomic progress, they tend to refocus popular aspirations around political goals for voice and participation that they cannot satisfy without terminating their existence. Similarly, if they succeed in meeting the critical threat or challenge (e.g., subversion, terrorism, political violence) that justified their seizure of power, they become dispensable, just as the generation of new challenges and interests with the passing of time makes them, with their inability to adapt, irrelevant.[19]

At the same time, democracies also have their peculiar vulnerabilities. One of these is the particularly corrosive effect of corruption on the legitimacy of democratic regimes, even more than of authoritarian ones. This is so in part because under conditions of freedom, with competitive elections, an independent judiciary, an opposition in parliament, and a free press, corruption is likely to be more visible than under authoritarianism. Its scale and its extension to the whole democratic political class—as has repeatedly occurred in Ghana and Nigeria, for example—delegitimize the whole political system rather than disqualifying a particular politician or party. Further, the prevalence of political corruption as the primary motive for the pursuit of power (because of the dominance of the state over economic life) reduces the political process to a struggle for power rather than a debate about policies, and taints the electoral process while generating cynical and apathetic responses in the electorate (or at least the bulk of it outside patronage networks). Such widespread corruption also undermines economic development and is one of the major arguments used by the military to justify its overthrow of elected governments, even though its own corruption will likely be as great or greater in time.[20]

Political Leadership

While our theoretical orientation gives substantial emphasis to the importance of various structural factors in shaping the prospects for democracy, these are never wholly determinative. As we have just seen, regime performance and viability, not only economically but politically, are the outcome in part of the policies and choices that political leaders make—acting, to be sure, within the constraints of the structural circumstances they inherit. Even structures and institutions, especially political ones, are shaped by the actions and options of political leaders. The more constraining and unfavorable are the structural circumstances, the more skillful, innovative, courageous, and democratically committed must political leadership be for democracy to survive. Even where the obstacles are formidable, democratic breakdowns are not inevitable but are accelerated by poor leadership and bad choices.[21]

In this book, we see the way in which inefficacious, weak, and often militant and uncompromising political leadership has contributed to democratic breakdown in Chile, Brazil, Turkey, South Korea, Thailand, and Nigeria. In some of these cases, it could be argued that structural circumstances were highly unfavorable, but often this was due in part to the failure of politicians to produce needed economic reforms and institutional innovations. Certainly, Valenzuela and Ergun Ozbudun show, for the breakdowns in Chile (1973) and Turkey (1980), how much the miscalculations and intransigence of political leaders contributed.

We see also the importance of strong democratic commitments on the part of political leaders—what Juan Linz calls "loyalty" to the democratic system. Democratically loyal leaders reject the use and rhetoric of violence and illegal or unconstitutional means for the pursuit of power, and they refuse to condone or tolerate antidemocratic actions by other participants.[22] The Nigerian case portrays graphically how electoral violence and fraud, thuggery, demagoguery, and widespread political corruption delegitimated and destroyed the Second Republic—even in the absence of the polarized ethnic conflict that further contributed to the failure of the First Republic. In the case of India, we see the central role of Indira Gandhi's equivocal commitment to democratic values in motivating not only her declaration of emergency rule in 1975 but her centralization and personalization of political power in the preceding years and after her return to power in 1980. Throughout Africa and Asia, the erosion or destruction of democratic institutions has come through the actions of self-aggrandizing, authoritarian elected leaders such as Marcos in the Philippines, Syngman Rhee in South Korea, Nkrumah in Ghana, and Obote in Uganda. This confirms G. Bingham Powell's generalization that democratic breakdown (by executive or military coup) is commonly preceded by "renunciation of the democratic faith by its elected leaders."[23]

The story, of course, is not all negative. Throughout the developing world, flexible, accommodative, consensual leadership styles have

contributed notably to democratic development, as in the early years of institution-building under Gandhi and Nehru and a gifted crop of Congress party leaders in India. Accommodating and shrewd political leadership, showing keen timing and some political courage, by Roh Tae Woo in South Korea and Chiang Ching-kuo in Taiwan must be partially credited for the democratic transformations of those two countries in recent years. Similarly, the personal leadership decisions and skills of Leopold Senghor and Abdou Diouf were important, as Christian Coulon shows, in opening up Senegal's politics to more democratic pluralism and competition. Democracy in Colombia and Venezuela came into being as the result of creative negotiation among contending party elites who, learning from past political mistakes, agreed to transcend their rivalries and arrange a sharing of power.[24] Valenzuela shows how important able, democratically committed, and even visionary political leadership was in the founding of democracy in Chile in the early nineteenth century, its adaptation and expansion during periods of turbulent change and growth, and its maintenance during the Great Depression of the 1930s. Demonstrating a different, corollary rule, Levy shows in his case study of Mexico how consistently skilled and effective leadership, with many undemocratic values, contributed to the stability of an undemocratic regime for several decades.

Political Culture

One important dimension of regime performance is the management of conflict. As Seymour Martin Lipset has argued, in a long theoretical tradition dating back to Aristotle, "a stable democracy requires relatively moderate tension among its contending political forces."[25] Here again, democratic regimes require an unusually high degree of effectiveness. As institutionalized systems of competition and conflict, they are especially liable to witness the disintegration of competition into enmity, of conflict into chaos. If political freedom and competition are not to descend into extremism, polarization, and violence, there must be mechanisms to contain conflict within certain behavioral boundaries. One of the most important factors in this regard is a country's political culture; that is, the beliefs and values concerning politics that prevail within both the elite and the mass.

Theorists in the pluralist or liberal tradition identify several values and beliefs as crucial for stable democracy: belief in the legitimacy of democracy; tolerance for opposing parties, beliefs, and preferences; a willingness to compromise with political opponents, and, underlying this, pragmatism and flexibility; some minimum of trust in the political environment, and cooperation, particularly among political competitors; moderation in political positions and partisan identifications; civility of political discourse; and political efficacy and participation—tempered by the addition of two other roles—the subject (which gives allegiance to political authority) and the primordial (which involves the individual in traditional,

nonpolitical pursuits).[26] Dahl in particular emphasizes the importance of such a democratic culture among the political elite, especially early on.

Our larger study provides considerable evidence that such presumed features of democratic culture are closely correlated with democratic stability. Those countries that have been the most strongly and stably democratic also appear to have the most democratic political values and beliefs. In Venezuela, survey data on mass beliefs "show consistently strong support for democracy as a political system" and for such basic democratic principles as the legitimacy of elections, open opposition, and open criticism. Moreover, peasants and political leaders alike commonly stress the need for caution, compromise, and conciliation in politics.[27] Similarly, survey data in Costa Rica show broad support for democratic institutions within both elites and masses, and a striving toward compromise and consensus. In particular, the political elite disavows violence and responds to protest and confrontation with moderation and conciliation. Costa Rica also manifests unusually high levels of mass political participation, interest, and awareness, comparable in many respects to the world's most-developed democracies.[28]

Democratic success in developing countries may be traced not only to the growth of democratic values but also to their roots in a country's historical and cultural traditions. Das Gupta points out that from the time of the founding of the Indian National Congress a century ago, "democratic rules of procedure, tolerance of adversaries and reconciliation of conflicting claims became part of the political education of the participants." This liberal tradition was further deepened by Gandhi's emphasis on accommodation, compromise, and nonviolence. In Botswana, the political culture of public discussion, community consensus, and nonviolence is a major foundation of democratic stability. John Holm traces this to the cultural tradition of popular consultation and pursuit of consensus known as the *kgotla*, which the ruling party has amplified through the practice of discussing "all new policies with the local community in *kgotla* before any local implementation."[29]

Ambivalence in a country's political culture is also associated with ambivalence in its experience with democracy. Turkey, Ozbudun tells us, has been torn between a strong consensus on the legitimacy of popular, elective government and the continuing predilection (dating back to Ottoman rule) for organic theories of state, which spawn excessive fear of division, intolerance of political opposition and individual deviation, and a tendency to see politics in absolutist terms. The behavioral manifestations of these values have figured prominently in Turkey's democratic breakdowns. Similarly, as Larry Diamond shows, Nigeria has been torn between a deep and broadly based commitment to political freedom with popular, accountable government, and a weak inclination toward tolerance and accommodation. Twice this contradiction has made for political chaos, violence, and democratic breakdown. In both countries, these cultural tendencies have been shaped in part by the overbearing state.

Coulon shows the correspondence between th[illegible] culture of Senegal and the semidemocratic character of the regime. Traditional political cultures in Senegal balanced authoritarian values with "a propensity for debate, political game-playing," and constitutional limits on monarchical authority. Liberal, Western cultural influences further press in a democratic direction, but this is undermined by the lack of support for democracy among the neglected and alienated lower classes and the growing interest in authoritarian Islamic doctrines felt by a segment of the elite. Chai-Anan Samudavanija suggests that repeated military intervention in the politics of Thailand derives in part from a military conception of democracy that values "national security, stability, and order" over freedom and participation, and dislikes pressure groups and conflict. And, as Masipula Sithole demonstrates, the violence and instability of democratic politics in postindependence Zimbabwe owes much to a political culture that, despite its appreciation in principle for democratic institutions, bears the scars of the "intolerant, violent, and commandist" culture of the liberation struggle.

Strong democratic currents in a country's political culture may make it very difficult for an authoritarian regime to institutionalize its rule. The instability of dictatorial rule in Nigeria can be traced in part to the popular devotion to political freedom, which has made it impossible for any military regime to survive long in power without committing itself to a firm date for transition to civilian, elected government. Authoritarian rule was never really accepted in the Philippines as a long-term proposition because of that country's commitment to democratic values and traditions—in contrast to Indonesia and Thailand, for example.[30] In Uruguay, the military's failure to perpetuate authoritarian rule was due in part to "the resilience of the democratic political culture permeating even the armed forces, and the inhospitable climate for authoritarian discourse."[31] A similar observation could be made of Chile.

Social Structure and Socioeconomic Development

The favorable effects of a democratic political culture are reinforced by social structures that minimize the possibility of social and political polarization. In particular, many theorists have argued that socioeconomic development changes fundamentally the way in which individuals and groups relate to the political process. An advanced level of economic development, producing greater economic security and more-widespread education, is assumed to reduce socioeconomic inequality and mitigate feelings of relative deprivation and injustice in the lower class, thus reducing the likelihood of extremist politics.[32] Increased national wealth also tends to enlarge the middle class, which has long been associated in political theory with moderation, tolerance, and democracy.[33]

Over [illegible] three decades, a large number of quantitative analyses have supp[illegible] thesis of a positive relationship between socioeconomic

development and democracy. Theoretically, the more interesting question now is not whether the relationship exists but how it is manifested over time. As Samuel Huntington has argued, while modernity tends eventually to bring democratic stability, the process of modernization may be destabilizing: "Social and economic change—urbanization, increases in literacy and education, industrialization, mass media expansion—extend political consciousness, multiply political demands, broaden political participation."[34] Political institutions must expand and adapt to incorporate this increasing (and increasingly autonomous) participation or risk breaking down. Thus, the relationship is best framed in probabilistic terms: "As countries develop economically, they can be conceived of moving into a zone of transition or choice, in which traditional forms of rule become increasingly difficult to maintain and new types of political institutions are required to aggregate the demands of an increasingly complex society."[35] Whether the new institutions chosen are democratic—and whether, if chosen, democratic institutions can be maintained—depends on a host of other factors.

The evidence indicates that the most common and in the long run probably the most important effect of rapid socioeconomic development under authoritarian rule has been to generate pressures and create social structural conditions more conducive to democracy. At different historical periods and to different degrees, this has been true of Brazil, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Peru, Thailand, Taiwan, and South Korea. In addition, an important foundation for democracy in Peru and especially (much earlier) in Taiwan was generated by land reforms and other steps that reduced socioeconomic inequality, eliminated semifeudal relations, and created a significant middle peasantry. (Because Peru's reforms were insufficiently extensive and sustained, however, poverty and regional and class inequalities continue to threaten its democratic future). Similarly, in South Korea the social reform and substantial improvement in the welfare of lower-income groups that accompanied rapid growth stimulated political consciousness and democratic opposition. Of course, slow or negative growth has also helped to destabilize and bring down authoritarian regimes, as in the Philippines and Haiti, but changes made under such conditions do not bode so well for the future of democracy.

Socioeconomic inequality. Comparative evidence supports the proposition that democracy and socioeconomic equality are related. In particular, deep, cumulative social inequalities represent a poor foundation for democracy. Historically, this has been a contributing factor to the instability of democracy in much of Latin America, including the Dominican Republic and Peru, and most of Central America. By contrast, the historic absence of *hacienda* agriculture and large landholdings in Costa Rica, and the shortage of agricultural labor that kept rural wages high, bred an egalitarian social culture and what John Booth terms an "interdependence among classes" th[illegible] [illegible]lped significantly to foster the development of democracy.[36]

Perhaps nowhere in the coming years will inequality pose a more acute and urgent problem for democracy than in Brazil, where the wealthiest tenth of the population controls a higher percentage of income (about half) than in any other country for which the World Bank reports data.[37] Bolívar Lamounier shows that the marked failure to reduce inequality was an important structural factor weakening the democratic system and contributing to its breakdown in 1964. As Brazil has become even more urbanized and socially mobilized in the past quarter-century—while income inequality and, by some accounts, even absolute poverty worsened, despite the stunning overall rates of economic growth under military rule—"deconcentration" of wealth has become imperative, Lamounier maintains, for democratic consolidation. And yet, policies to reduce inequality, such as land reform, carry serious short-term political risks, while reducing absolute poverty requires long-term policy commitments that may be politically difficult to sustain. The potential polarizing effects of inequality in Brazil have recently been evidenced in the growth of urban labor militancy and strife, violent rural land conflicts, and electoral support for populist and radical candidates, including labor leader Luis Inácio (Lula) da Silva, who finished second to free-market advocate Fernando Collor de Mello in the December 1989 run-off presidential election.

Population growth. A socioeconomic problem that is often overlooked in evaluating democratic performance and prospects is that of rapid population growth. Although birthrates do tend to decline with higher standards of living and improved socioeconomic opportunities for women (as suggested by the data in Table 1.1), population growth rates nevertheless remain high in most of Asia, Latin America, and, especially, Africa. Even if countries reduce these annual growth rates down toward 2 percent, as Brazil, Mexico, Turkey, Thailand, and India (nearly) managed to do in the 1980s, populations will *double* in thirty-five years or less. With populations growing annually at rates closer to 3.5 percent, as in Nigeria, Zimbabwe, and some other African countries, the doubling time is reduced to about twenty years. In countries with such rapid growth rates, the age structure is heavily tilted toward children and adolescents, with 40 to 50 percent of the population typically under fifteen years of age.[38] Thus, not only is there a much larger dependent population to be cared for, schooled, and ultimately somehow gainfully employed, but there is a hidden momentum to population growth that will only be fully felt when these children in turn bear children of their own—even if social, economic, and cultural conditions are by then transformed so that they do so only at the rate of replacement fertility (i.e., two children per couple).

The political consequences of such rapid population growth follow closely, but not entirely, from the economic ones. To the extent that its population is growing rapidly, a country's economic growth each year is absorbed in providing for its additional people at existing levels of nutrition, schooling, health care, and so on, rather than improving per capita standards. Thus, improvement in per capita income and services—in *real* standard of living—lags well behind the gross gains in national income. The annual increments of population are often quite large in absolute terms: at current growth rates, more than 3 million additional people each year in Nigeria and Brazil; more than a million a year in Turkey and Thailand; more than 16 million annually in India. And increasingly, as these countries also become more urbanized, these burgeoning numbers are concentrated in the cities. To the extent that economic growth is rapid enough to provide adequate schooling, training, jobs, and opportunities for these young populations, political stability may not be affected, and population growth rates will decline to the more manageable levels (1 percent or less) found in the advanced industrial countries. But only in South Korea, among our cases, is this projected to occur in the next decade, although birthrates are forecast to approach this reduced level in Chile and Thailand as well (see Table 1.1). In the seven other cases in this book, population growth in the next decade is expected to remain near 2 percent or higher, generating exploding economic and political demands and expectations that these systems will be hard pressed to meet. The problem is exacerbated by substantial economic inequality, since the poor typically have higher birthrates while being less able to provide for their children's future.

If current assumptions are not altered, the resulting stagnation, frustration, and political turmoil may be blamed on economic mismanagement, but rapid population growth should not be overlooked as a contributing factor. National programs to foster family planning and population consciousness must be accelerated—along with efforts to improve health care and education for women and the poor—if population growth rates are to be slowed sufficiently to allow these developing countries a reasonable chance to consolidate and maintain stable democratic government.

Associational Life

Both theoretical work, going back to Alexis de Tocqueville, and empirical evidence argue strongly for the importance to stable democracy of a pluralistic, autonomous, vigorously organized civil society that can balance and limit state power while providing additional channels for the articulation and practice of democratic interests. A rich associational life can supplement the role of political parties in stimulating political participation, increasing citizens' efficacy, recruiting and training political leaders, and enhancing commitment to the democratic system.[39] In each of the three countries in our twenty-six-nation study that have enjoyed the most successful experience with democracy in the past few decades—India, Costa Rica, and Venezuela—a vigorous network of autonomous and increasingly sophisticated voluntary associations has been an important foundation of

democratic stability and robustness.

From its earliest beginnings in the nationalist [illegible] against colonial rule a century ago, democracy in India has been invigorated by the presence of a rich array of voluntary associations directed to language reform, legal reform, educational modernization, defense of press freedom, civil liberties, and women's rights. While strong trade unions and peasant, student, and business associations today often align with political parties, they also act autonomously to pursue their own interests, and this political autonomy has increased as new leadership groups within them give greater emphasis to economic issues. In addition, notes Das Gupta, the Indian scene is today replete with a vast network of issue-oriented movements, "bringing together various parties, groups, and concerned publics" in aggressive campaigns for social and political reform. Indeed, as formal political institutions have deteriorated in the past two decades, India's associational life has become an increasingly crucial resource for democratic articulation and accountability.

Where associational life is dense, institutionalized, and autonomous, it may also undermine authoritarian rule and generate effective pressure for democratization, as was dramatically evidenced during 1985–1986 in the Philippines. There (where 95 percent of the population is Catholic) the Catholic church was the one institution that Marcos was not able to co-opt in his two decades in power, and it proved to be a vital source of protest against government repression and abuse of power. Associations of lawyers, intellectuals, and students also helped to keep democratic aspirations alive and, with key segments of the modern business community, joined the church in the broad popular mobilization that ultimately brought down the Marcos dictatorship. Throughout Latin America in the 1970s and 1980s, the Catholic church has played a similar role in opposition to political tyranny and in defense of social and political pluralism. And in South Korea, the Protestant denominations, along with the much smaller but still-influential Catholic church, endorsed and gave encouragement to the campaign for an end to authoritarian rule. One asset of religious institutions in the struggle for political freedom and pluralism is the special moral legitimacy they have almost by definition, but religious institutions may also be advantaged by the fact that they are less explicitly politically self-interested in character than are other types of interest groups that seek rewards and resources from the state.

In Nigeria, efforts to sustain authoritarian rule in the 1970s, and to deepen its repressive character under the military regime of General Buhari (1984–1985), were frustrated by the vigilance and organizational strength of the press, the bar association, student groups, trade unions, business associations, and intellectuals and opinion leaders. These groups were responsible for the popular resistance to authoritarian decrees that helped precipitate Buhari's downfall in a coup, and they have exerted similar pressure [illegible] military successor, Ibrahim Babangida, for liberal and

accountable government. The assertive and extensively organized civil society is probably the single most-important force holding the military regime to its stated commitment to withdraw from power in 1992. More generally, sub-Saharan Africa has been experiencing a promising, and in some countries prodigious, efflorescence of informal participation as a result of the growth of independent associational life. Although this development has come in response to the pervasive abuse of state power and what Naomi Chazan calls the disengagement of the state from society, it has important democratic implications. Many of the emerging popular organizations provide "small-scale settings for meaningful political participation," constitutional means for the transfer and rotation of power, consultative processes of decisionmaking, and "innovative means of information collection and communication."[40] Collectively, they constitute a major means for the creation of an informed, efficacious, and vigilant citizenry, and for the reconstruction—from the ground up—of democratic political processes.

As a strong and autonomous associational life may buttress or foster democracy, so the absence of a vigorous sector of voluntary associations and interest groups, or the control of such organizations by a corporatist state, may reinforce authoritarian rule and obstruct the development of democracy. Perhaps the classic demonstration of this in our study is Mexico, where, as Levy points out, the early encapsulation of mass organizations (especially of peasants and workers) by a hegemonic ruling party has been an important foundation of the stability of the authoritarian regime, and where the struggle of labor and other popular movements to break free of corporatist controls is now critical to the struggle for democracy. In Thailand, and many other Asian countries as well, state corporatist controls have stunted the development of autonomous associational life, and thus of democracy.

State and Society

One of the crucial problems for democratic theory is how to restrain the power of the state so that its incumbents remain responsive and accountable to the people. This is why so much emphasis is appropriately given to the need for a pluralistic, independent associational life. But, as with other factors, the relationship between state and society must manifest a certain balance if democracy is to be viable. The state must not become too powerful and autonomous, but if it is too weak and easily penetrated it may be unable to deliver the social and economic goods that groups expect or to maintain order in the face of conflicting group demands. The state bureaucracy must be subjected to democratic control by elected politicians, but at the same time the relative autonomy and continuity of the bureaucracy constitute an important check on the potential for patronage and corruption, and for absolute and arbitrary power, by party politicians.

A problem for democracy in some Asian countries, such as Thailand and [illegible]

South Korea, has been the excessive power of the state, and its bureaucratic and coercive institutions, in relation to civil society. In Thailand, the dominance for the past half-century of central and highly centralized bureaucratic institutions—with the military in an increasingly ascendant position—discouraged the development of strong and autonomous interest groups, village associations, and political parties. When these did begin to emerge, they were co-opted or overrun by the bureaucracy and by the military, which extended its control into vast sectors of society, including the mass media, rural development, and civic education. A similar historical process was at work in South Korea, with a similar effect: The weakness of independent civic institutions created both the opportunity and the justification for continued military-bureaucratic intervention and control. Although the trend abated in both countries during the late 1980s, as the process of socioeconomic development gives new organizational resources and momentum to independent interests, repealing state corporatist controls over the flow of information and the expression and organization of diverse interests remains an important priority for the thorough and lasting democratization of these societies.

Among the most important dimensions of the state-society relationship is the strong tendency we find for state dominance over the economy and society to undermine democratic politics in developing countries. In the least developed region, sub-Saharan Africa, this tendency has been most powerful because there the state's extensive ownership and mediation of socioeconomic resources and rewards is not counterbalanced by private means of economic accumulation and opportunity. Hence, upward social mobility and the accumulation of personal wealth depend on getting and maintaining control of, or at least access to, the state.[41] This raises the premium on political power to the point where no competing party or candidate is willing to entertain the prospect of defeat. The result is a zero-sum game—the politics of intolerance, desperation, violence, and fraud.[42]

This zero-sum character of politics in the swollen African state has heavily motivated the postindependence drive by ruling parties and elites to monopolize power in such countries as Senegal and helps to explain the current unwillingness of the political bosses of Senegal's ruling Socialist Party to allow the opposition parties a fully free and fair chance to compete for power. In Nigeria, where most of the country's wealth is mediated through government contracts, jobs, licenses, development projects, and other state largesse, it has been a primary factor underlying the failure of both the First and Second republics. Ozbudun notes a similar effect in Turkey, where public enterprises proliferated to the point where they produced about half of Turkey's industrial output. The ruling party's access to such immense resources in relation to the resource base of society, and the clientelistic traditions that give the political class wide scope in distributing state resources, made being out of power in Turkey very costly. This in turn helped to generate the political polarization and unwillingness to

compromise that have repeatedly destabilized democratic regimes. Statism also intensifies ethnic political conflict in Africa and Asia. The fact that the state is the biggest employer in Sri Lanka, for example, has heightened the stakes in the ethnic struggle and made accommodation (and so the reequilibration of democracy) more difficult.[43]

Excessive state control over the economy and society may also reduce democratic regime performance in two important respects. As we have already implied, it feeds corruption. And, throughout the world, the evidence is accumulating that huge public sectors and pervasive state subsidies and controls have hampered economic efficiency and come to represent a major obstacle to vigorous economic growth. This has become increasingly apparent in India, where state ownership has led to higher waste of capital and labor, to corruption, and to a heavy drag of unprofitable, inefficient state enterprises, depressing growth potential. Similar problems exist in many other countries, including such prominent examples as Turkey, Mexico, Nigeria, Senegal, the Philippines, and Argentina. It is probably no coincidence that the country in Latin America that has done the most to prune back state control of its economy and open it to national and international market forces—Chile—also showed the most robust economic performance in the final years of the 1980s; a fact not lost on its neighbors or even on the bulk of the democratic opposition to the dictatorship.

One must be cautious, however, about drawing blanket conclusions. There are cases, such as Costa Rica, Botswana, and Uruguay, where extensive state economic ownership and control has not had such destructive consequences for democracy. But each of these countries has had institutional mechanisms or sociocultural traditions (like those in the European social democracies) that have tended to insulate the state from brazen partisan abuse and widespread corruption.

Political Institutions

Constitutional and party structures play an important role in shaping the conflict-regulating capacity of democratic systems. While these conditions of political structure are not intrinsically necessary for stable democracy, they become particularly significant as social, cultural, and economic conditions become less favorable.

Parties and party systems. Political scientists have long debated the ideal number of parties for stable democracy. Lipset considers the two-party system most likely to produce moderation, accommodation, and aggregation of diverse interests because it compels each party to fashion broad political appeals, in contrast to the strident and ideological appeals small parties tend to make in a multiparty system in order to consolidate and mobilize their limited bases.[44] However, the two-party system requires crosscutting cleavages; if the two-party cleavage coincides with other accumulated

cleavages (such as ethnicity and religion), it might so further polarize conflict as to produce democratic breakdown and civil strife.[45] Linz and Giovanni Sartori draw the distinction instead between moderate (with fewer than five relevant parties) and extreme, polarized multiparty systems, the latter increasing significantly the probability of democratic breakdown.[46] Yet Powell argues, from empirical examination of twenty-nine democracies over time, that a "representational" party system, in which numerous parties exhibit strong linkages to distinct social groups, may contribute to democratic stability by facilitating the involvement of potentially disaffected groups in legitimate politics—provided that extremist parties are unable to gain significant support.[47]

It is difficult and probably inadvisable to derive a single, general rule about the ideal number of parties, since this depends in important ways on the social structure and related institutional arrangements. Because the party system is a crucial institutional device not only for representation but for conflict management, what appears most important is that the party system suit the social and cultural conditions, and that it articulate in a coherent way with other political institutions. Thus, if the constitutional system is designed to induce a two-party system—as tends strongly to result from a presidential system with election of legislators from single-member districts, by simple plurality and single ballot[48]—it makes sense to have in place other institutional inducements to crosscutting cleavage, such as federalism or even, as in the Nigerian case, specific laws requiring parties to establish transethnic organizations, bases, and symbols. If the "representational" system is sought, proportional representation (in a parliamentary system) is its electoral means, and the encouragement of crosscutting cleavages becomes a less pressing concern.[49]

Our twenty-six-nation study does offer some support for the proposition that a system of two or a few parties, with broad social and ideological bases, may be conducive to stable democracy. Of the five most-stable democratic systems in our study, two (Venezuela and Costa Rica) have two-party systems composed of broad, multiclass parties, in societies that lack deep social cleavages; two (India and Botswana) have had one-party dominant systems in which the ruling parties incorporate and aggregate a wide range of ethnic and social interests (although with the displacement of the Congress party from power in December 1989, India's system appears to have broken down); and one (Papua New Guinea) has a moderate multiparty system in which two parties are dominant. Certainly, fragmentation into a large number of parties—as has occurred historically in Thailand, as well as Pakistan and Indonesia—is associated with democratic instability and breakdown. This is not only because such party systems tend toward the conditions of polarized pluralism outlined by Linz and Sartori but also because parties in such systems are poorly institutionalized.

A critical consideration for democracy is not just the number of political parties but [illegible] rall institutional strength, as indicated by Huntington's

criteria of coherence, complexity, autonomy, and adaptability.[50] Among the twenty-six cases of our larger study, we find that where at least one and eventually two or more parties were able to develop some substantive coherence about policy and program preferences, some organizational coherence and discipline, some complexity and depth of internal structure, some autonomy from dominance by individual leaders or state or societal interests, and some capacity to adapt to changing conditions—incorporating new generations and newly emergent groups—democracy has usually developed considerable durability and vitality. The early and deep institutionalization of the Congress party became an important foundation for democratic consolidation in India, just as the personalization of party power and decay of party organization under Indira Gandhi reflected and heightened the overall deterioration of democratic institutions since the mid-1960s. The strength of Chilean parties likewise contributed for many decades to stable democracy, with breakdown resulting not from their institutional deterioration but from the polarization of relations among them. In Brazil, the "deinstitutionalization" of the party system that began in the mid-1950s, fragmenting or dividing each of the major parties and so undercutting their capacity to respond to and harness changing economic and social forces, heavily contributed, as Lamounier shows, to the democratic breakdown in 1964.

Thailand shows vividly the linkage between extreme party fractionalization and the institutional weakness of parties and the party system. With 143 parties crossing the Thai political stage between 1946 and 1981, political elites have been unable to build strong bases of popular support, to articulate, aggregate, and mobilize political interests, to incorporate emerging interests into the political process, and to cooperate with one another in achieving policy innovations. As a result, the military and bureaucracy have been able to claim many of these functions, making it more difficult for independent democratic forces to establish themselves. The weakness and fragmentation of Thailand's party system was a leading factor in the failure of past democratic attempts (notably the 1974–1976 regime), and, with fifteen parties having won legislative seats in the 1988 elections, remains an obstacle to the evolution and consolidation of a fully democratic system today.

Democratic consolidation requires in part the consolidation of a reasonably stable and workable party system. In two important efforts at engineering the reconstruction of democracy, the Turkish military—seeking to prevent the classic conditions of polarized pluralism that brought down democracy in 1980—adopted measures (a 10 percent electoral threshold for representation in parliament; banning of extremist, religious, and separatist parties) to encourage a two- or three-party system that would yield stable parliamentary majorities and preclude centrifugal pulls. The Nigerian military mandated that the new Third Republic would have two and only two [illegible]. When none of the parties that vied for recognition in 1989 proved to

the liking of Nigeria's Armed Forces Ruling Council, it took the further, and unprecedented, step of establishing two new pa. 'es by fiat.[51]

Constitutional structure. Although presidential government is associated with the world's longest and most successful democratic experience, in the United States, its record in the developing world exhibits several characteristic problems. For one, a presidential system tends to concentrate power and legitimacy in the executive branch, which may be unhealthy for nascent democracies where the separation of powers and checks and balances are not well established. Second, presidentialism, with its "winner-take-all" distribution of power, "tends to make democratic politics a zero-sum game, with all the potential for conflict such games portend."[52] Third, presidentialism, with its fixed terms, rigidifies outcomes, possibly sticking a nation, even for several years, with a government that has utterly lost public confidence and support.

The advantages of a parliamentary system lie in its greater flexibility. An executive who has lost popular support can be turned out of office before his term is up. Coalitions can be formed to reach across significant political divisions, and these can be reformed in light of shifting political issues and fortunes, making for a more than zero-sum game. Because they are associated with a greater number of parties, parliamentary systems are somewhat less conducive to the polarization of politics between two or three major political parties, each identified with major class or ethnic cleavage groups. Moreover, presidential coalitions typically have little incentive to cohere (and often real incentives to fragment) after the election, while in a parliamentary multiparty system the parties have to assume responsibility in supporting a government that would otherwise fall.[53]

The theoretical case for these advantages lies largely with the experience of parliamentary democracy in Western Europe and the disastrous experience with presidentialism of some Latin American countries, especially Chile. Valenzuela demonstrates the lack of fit between a highly polarized and competitive multiparty system—which, because it could not generate electoral majorities, necessitated bargaining and coalition-making—and a presidential system of centralized authority, zero-sum outcomes, and fixed terms. The contradictions "came to a tragic head in the Allende years," culminating in 1973 in a breakdown of democracy that could have been avoided. In the late 1980s, the debilitating rigidities of presidentialism became manifest in Brazil and Peru, where presidents whose programs had failed catastrophically and whose political support had evaporated were forced to limp through their remaining terms with virtually no capacity to respond effectively to the deepening economic and political crises.

We also stress the importance to democracy of a strong and independent judiciary. A powerful judiciary can be the bulwark of a democratic constitution, defending both its integrity (and hence political freedom and due process) and also its preeminence as the source of democratic legitimacy.

More generally, the judiciary is the ultimate guarantor of the rule of law, and thus of the accountability of rulers to the ruled, which is a basic premise of democracy. During the authoritarian emergency in India, "a beleaguered and partially 'captured' Supreme Court still struck down a constitutional amendment, enacted by parliament, that would have destroyed an 'essential feature' of the constitution."[54] Similarly, in Zimbabwe an independent and sophisticated judiciary has at times played an important role in the defense of human rights and democracy as they have come under increasing pressure.[55]

Ethnic and Regional Conflict

One of the stronger generalizations emerging from our larger study is the danger for democracy of excessive centralization of state power. Where there are major ethnic or regional cleavages that are territorially based, the relationship is by now self-evident and axiomatic: The absence of provisions for devolution and decentralization of power, especially in the context of ethnoregional disparities, feeds ethnic insecurity, violent conflict, and even secessionist pressures. These, in turn, are poisonous to democracy.

Secessionist pressures carry a dual threat. Unless resolved by political means, through institutions such as autonomy, federalism, or—in the extreme—separate statehood, they can lead to the imposition of authority by force and the deterioration or breakdown of democratic rule. Alternatively, a democratic center may be questioned for its inefficiency in creating or its weakness in handling the secessionist crisis, opening the way for military intervention. In differing ways and to differing degrees, these dangers have threatened or damaged democratic regimes in recent years not only in Peru and Sri Lanka but in India, the Philippines, and Sudan (contributing in no small way to the failure of that democratic experiment in 1989). Historically, they figured prominently in the failure of Nigeria's first democratic attempt in the 1960s. And though India benefits in some ways from the multiple, complex character of religious, linguistic, and regional identities—fragmented and crosscut by caste and class formations—its more recent failure to integrate diverse ethnic communities (especially Sikhs and Muslims) into the national polity, or at least to find some stable formula for accommodating and managing diversity, has been a major source of instability. Das Gupta's conclusion from the Indian experience is confirmed by our wider evidence: "When ethnic leaders are allowed to share power, they generally act according to the rules of the regime," but when the state responds to ethnic mobilization with exclusion and repression, violence festers.

Democracy in plural societies requires not just a federal structure but a properly balanced one. An important reason for the failure of the First Nigerian Republic, and for the subsequent descent into civil war, was the gross inadequacy of the three-region federal system, which reified the major tripartite ethnic cleavage while assuring one group political hegemony. By

contrast, the nineteen-state federal structure in the Second Republic went a long way toward giving Nigeria's many ethnic groups a much greater sense of political security and also crosscut ethnicity to some extent. Moreover, as in India—where federalism has functioned, even in a context of virtually continuous one-party dominance, to give opposition parties a stake in the system and to expand access to new groups—federalism in Nigeria disperses the stakes in electoral competition and so reduces the fixation on the center.

It is not only to manage ethnic and regional cleavage that decentralization is important to democracy. Centralization of power, by its very nature, tends to undermine democracy and thus constitutes an important obstacle to democratization in several of our cases. In Mexico, centralization and strong presidentialism have been important pillars of one-party hegemony and have become major targets of groups seeking democratic reform. In Turkey, state centralization—as reflected in the absence of any tradition of autonomous municipalities and the dependence of municipal and provincial administrations on the central government—has increased the stakes riding on control of the central government, and so the tendency toward violence and intolerance in the electoral struggle. In Thailand, a highly centralized state bureaucracy manifests cynicism and suspicion of democratic politics. In Senegal, the unresponsiveness to popular concerns and distance from popular reach of a highly centralized state have not only fueled a sometimes violent resistance movement in the geographically isolated and culturally distant Casamance region, but have also undermined the legitimacy of the semidemocratic regime throughout the country. By contrast, the substantial power of local elected councils over community development and services can be a source of democratic vitality, as it has been in Botswana, where opposition party control of some local councils has mitigated somewhat the effect of continuing one-party dominance at the center and so enhanced commitment to the system.

The Military

In most of the countries in our larger study, democracy is threatened and in the past has been overturned by military establishments that regard themselves "as the privileged definers and guardians of the national interest."[36] However, the military variable is not independent of political ones. Typically, military role expansion is induced by the corruption, stagnation, and malfunctioning of democratic institutions, to the point where the military is increasingly called upon to maintain order and comes to see itself as the only salvation of the country. In virtually every country considered here that has experienced democratic breakdown by military coup, these interventions have come in the wake of manifest political and, often, economic crises: This is true for the military coups in Brazil in 1964, in Chile in [illegible] in Turkey in 1960 and 1980 (and the "half-coup" in 1971), in South [illegible] 1961, in Thailand in 1976, and in Nigeria in 1966 and

1983. The military's size, autonomy, professional doctrine, and role conception may determine its threshold for intervention but do not constitute an independent cause of democratic breakdown.

This is not to say that factors external to the political process do not shape the military disposition to intervene. External Communist threats, or perceptions of Communist support for indigenous insurgencies, have heightened the military's readiness to intervene and rule on behalf of "national security" not only in much of Latin America, but in Thailand and, especially, in South Korea. In fact, the "militarized" nature of South Korean society was, as Han explains, a major factor creating a political setting conducive to authoritarian rule. The contemporary problem, however, is that repeated interventions in politics over decades have shaped the mentality of many officers, and the formal role conception and organization of the armed forces, in ways that generate a higher probability of future intervention at a lower threshold of civilian malfunctioning (witness the four serious coup attempts in Argentina during 1987–1988).

As Stepan has shown, once military role expansion occurs, it tends to endure and advance, diminishing not only the stability but also the authenticity of democracy, as numerous areas of public policy pass from elected civilian to unaccountable military control. It is thus imperative that newly restored democracies reorient the military role around external defense; reduce military prerogatives to control or influence vast reaches (military and nonmilitary) of the state, the political system, and even civil society; and assert civilian control and oversight even over strictly military functions. These steps require, Stepan forcefully argues, "democratic empowerment." By this process, civilian scholars and policy specialists acquire credible expertise in military and intelligence affairs, legislatures develop the institutional capacity to monitor military and intelligence systems effectively and routinely, and democratic state leaders implement "a well conceived, *politically* led strategy" to narrow military involvement in conflict regulation, enhance military professional capacities, and build effective procedures for civilian control.[37]

International Factors

In an influential theoretical movement that dominated academic thinking in the 1970s, various dependency theorists maintained that political exclusion and repression of popular mobilization were inevitable concomitants of peripheral status in the global division of labor and the dependent character of economic development.[38] The authors of the case studies in this book reject that assumption and attribute the course of political development and regime change primarily to internal structures and action. Nevertheless, they do recognize how structures have been been shaped historically by a variety of international factors, including colonial rule, cultural diffusion, and demonstration effects from abroad.[39]

Any accounting of the colonial legacy has to include not only the authoritarian and statist character of the colonial state, which heavily influenced indigenous norms and models (especially in Africa), but also the liberal and democratic values communicated by the French and, especially, British colonizers that provided India and, to a lesser extent, countries such as Nigeria and Senegal some preindependence experience in self-governance and scope for democratic, pluralist expression and organization.[60] In the postcolonial period, and for Turkey and Thailand, which were never colonized, cultural diffusion of democratic norms and models has remained an important stimulant of democratic progress. Regional demonstration effects have also helped to induce waves of change, such as the military coups in South America of the late 1960s and early 1970s, inspired by doctrines of national security; the Latin American redemocratizations of the 1980s; and the sudden collapse of Communist regimes throughout Eastern Europe in 1989. In East Asia, the transition to democracy in South Korea was spurred on by the demonstration of "people power" toppling Marcos in the Philippines, but the more potent international pressure may have come from the sense that full acceptance into the club of advanced, capitalist nations required a democratic political system (this has helped to motivate the democratic opening in Taiwan as well).

Under certain circumstances (including questionable or eroding internal legitimacy), democratic and authoritarian regimes in developing countries can be vulnerable to direct international political and military pressures. International pressure alone cannot effect democratic change, but the potential for democratic influence from the United States or other external actors should not be underestimated. Of course, neither should one overlook past Western and U.S. support for authoritarian regimes, and willingness to conspire against, sabotage, or even overthrow popularly elected regimes that seemed threatening.[61] One supporting factor in the consolidation of democracy in Venezuela was the fact that the Kennedy administration "bet heavily on democracy in Venezuela, the kind of bet later administrations have made all too rarely."[62] In Argentina, U.S. human rights pressure under the Carter administration did not force the withdrawal of the military, but it "saved many victims of indiscriminate repression in the late 1970s and was a factor in the international isolation of the military regime."[63] By the same token, the absence of pressure can be taken as a sign of tacit support from which an authoritarian regime may draw strength. During the later 1960s and 1970s, the lack of U.S. pressure for democratization was an important "permissive" factor in the construction and consolidation of authoritarian rule in South Korea, yet U.S. diplomatic pressure may have played a critical role in dissuading President Chun Doo Hwan from unleashing massive repression against the popular mobilization for democracy during the tense days of mid-1987 when democratic transition was almost aborted. U.S. support for multilateral loans to Chile—$2.2 billion between 1980 and

:t on the one occasion

when substantive pressure was threatened—the 1985 multilateral loan abstentions—the dictator quickly lifted the state of siege."[64]

Of course, there are still more direct forms of foreign influence. As Dahl observes, many of the world's now-established democracies were imposed by foreign powers through armed conquest or colonization.[65] Needless to say, external military intervention can help rescue a democratic government threatened by coup—such as Aquino's in the Philippines—or topple a dictatorship such as Noriega's, but such actions often have deleterious consequences for the legitimacy of the democratic government so saved or installed—especially when, as in the Philippines and Panama, the external intervention is unilateral and by a nation whose previous interventions have historically been viewed with resentment and suspicion by indigenous actors. It remains to be seen whether these dramatic U.S. actions at the close of 1989 will contribute to real and lasting democracy in these two countries.

External military pressure or insecurity can affect the democratic prospect by strengthening the military establishment and its claim to power, as we have already noted in the case of South Korea. In Thailand, the Communist insurgency heightened the military's fear of competitive politics, so that, as Chai-Anan tells us, "any democratic movement that aimed at mobilizing and gaining support from the masses was usually suspected of being communist-inspired."

At the current time, however, and no doubt in many previous decades, the most important international influences on the prospects for democracy in developing countries appear to be economic ones. While we reject the argument that international economic dependence or capitalist industrialization is incompatible with democracy, we cannot ignore the degree to which international economic constraints—severe indebtedness, weak or obstructed export markets, sluggish growth and demand in the industrialized countries, and steep balance of payments crises—may severely limit the maneuverability and damage the legitimacy of democratic regimes, especially relatively new ones, in developing countries.

To be sure, democratic legitimacy rests on other foundations than short-term economic performance, and the task of democratic consolidation is, to a substantial degree, a matter of what Linz and Stepan term "political crafting."[66] Thus, even in a recently established democracy such as Spain, the consolidation of democracy may proceed for a time in the face of relatively weak economic performance and sharply declining belief in the socioeconomic efficacy of democracy.[67] However, there is always some danger in extrapolating from one historical case to another. The recently reestablished democracies of Latin America, the Philippines, and Pakistan, and the liberalizing regimes of Africa face even deeper economic crises and social tensions, with less working capital of system legitimacy and without the benefits of being part of the democratic community of Europe (something from which the Eastern European countries, even with all their unique problems of transition from bankrupt socialist economies, are

nevertheless uniquely poised to benefit). The new democracies of the developing world are deeply threatened by grave and urgent economic crises, the relief (not to mention resolution) of which depends in part on a host of factors in the world economy over which they can have only very limited if any influence—interest rates, growth rates, trade barriers, levels of economic assistance, and so on.

Consolidating these new democracies requires skilful political crafting and courageous and wise policy choices by their leaders. Economies must be reoriented to compete in international markets, state economic ownership and control must be reduced, and the enormous inequalities between rich and poor must be considerably narrowed. Foreign capital must find it attractive to invest, at a time when there are still many investment opportunities in the advanced industrial countries as well as new ones emerging in Eastern Europe. At the same time, democratic consolidation will demand considerable patience and forbearance from their publics and interest groups. But, it is also likely to depend on the flexibility and vision of powerful international economic actors, and especially the major industrialized democracies, in dealing with the critical issues of developing countries' debt and trade. The more hostile and inflexible is this international environment, the more heroic must be the performances and compromises of leaders and the sacrifices and forbearance of publics. History suggests that heroism and sacrifice are not promising conditions on which to depend for the survival, much less consolidation, of new democratic regimes.

• NOTES •

1. For all twenty-six case studies, see Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, eds., *Democracy in Developing Countries*, vols. 2, *Africa*; 3, *Asia*; and 4, *Latin America*. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1988 and 1989). Vol. 1, containing the theory and conclusions of the project and subtitled *Persistence, Failure, and Renewal* is forthcoming from the same publisher.

2. Although the larger comparative project does not incorporate cases from the Communist world, these recent regime changes in Eastern Europe indicate the salience of the kind of variables we consider—including historical traditions, political culture, state-society relations, and regime type—for explaining the types of processes of democratization that occur, and their likelihood of success.

3. This neglect is to some extent overcome in Arend Lijphart's creative and enterprising study, *Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1984). However, Lijphart's focus is mainly on political structure, and the comparison is limited to the continuous and stable democracies of the advanced, industrial countries.

4. Specifically, the points on this scale are: (1) *high success*—stable and uninterrupted democratic rule, with democracy now deeply institutionalized and stable; (2) *progressive success*—the consolidation of relatively stable democracy after one or more breakdowns or serious interruptions; (3) *mixed success*—democratic and unstable (e.g., democracy has returned following a period of breakdown and authoritarian rule but has not yet been consolidated); (4) *mixed success—partial or semidemocracy*; (5) *failure but promise*—democratic rule has broken down, but there are considerable pressures and prospects for its return; (6) *failure or absence*—der never functioned for any significant period of time, and there is little prospect that coming years.

5. See Robert A. Dahl and Edward Tufte, *Size and Democracy* (Stanford, CA:Stanford University Press, 1973).

6. Robert A. Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1971), pp. 3–20; Joseph Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy* (New York: Harper and Row, 1942); Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man*, expanded and updated ed. (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), p. 27; Juan Linz, *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown and Reequilibration* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), p. 5.

7. Alfred Stepan, *Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), p. 123.

8. Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).

9. The distinction between authoritarian and totalitarian regimes has a long intellectual history. See Juan J. Linz, "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes," in *Handbook of Political Science*, ed. Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1975), vol. 3, pp. 175–411.

10. The possibilities and conditions for transition from communism to democracy are quite different in Eastern Europe—particularly in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and East Germany, with their previous, pluralist party traditions and the heavy dependence of their Communist regimes on the prop of Soviet troops. The time is clearly now ripe for a comparative study of transitions from communism.

11. Linz, *Breakdown of Democratic Regimes*, pp. 16–17. See also Lipset, *Political Man*, p. 64; and Dahl, *Polyarchy*, pp. 129–131.

12. Linz, *Breakdown of Democratic Regimes*, p. 20.

13. Lipset, *Political Man*, pp. 67–71.

14. Ibid., pp. 64–70; Dahl, *Polyarchy*, pp. 129–150; and Linz, *Breakdown of Democratic Regimes*, pp. 16–23

15. For insights into the problems such populist political strategies have generated for Venezuela's democratic institutions, see Aníbal Romero, "The Political Culture of Democratic Populism: The Case of Venezuela," in *Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries*, ed. Larry Diamond (forthcoming).

16. John D. Holm, "Botswana: A Paternalistic Democracy," in Diamond, Linz, and Lipset, *Democracy in Developing Countries: Africa*, pp. 198–199.

17. Jonathan Hartlyn, "Colombia: The Politics of Violence and Accommodation," in Diamond, Linz, and Lipset, *Democracy in Developing Countries: Latin America*, pp. 310–311.

18. For evidence and analysis of how rapid social and economic change has ultimately contributed to democratization in Taiwan, see Tun-jen Cheng, "Democratizing the Quasi-Leninist Regime in Taiwan," *World Politics* 41, no. 4 (July 1989): esp. 480–483; Tun-jen Cheng and Stephan Haggard, "Regime Transformation in Taiwan: Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives," in *Political Change in the Republic of China on Taiwan*, ed. Cheng and Haggard (forthcoming); and (with particular reference to the democratizing effects on political culture) Ambrose Y. C. King, "A Non-Paradigmatic Search for Democracy in a Post Confucian Culture: The Case of Taiwan, R.O.C.," in Diamond, *Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries*.

19. Larry Diamond, "Beyond Authoritarianism and Totalitarianism: Strategies for Democratization," *The Washington Quarterly* 12, no. 1 (Winter 1989): 150.

20. New or newly restored democracies are particularly vulnerable in this regard. Her inability to control the widespread venality around her—despite her own integrity and honorable intentions—was, for example, a key factor not only in the erosion of Corazón Aquino's base of political support during 1989, but in the coup that almost toppled the Philippines' democratic system near the end of the year.

21. Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, eds., *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes*, 4 vols. (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978).

22. Linz, *Breakdown of Democratic Regimes*, pp. 27–38. For extensive evidence of the role of violence and terror, and party reactions to them, in the breakdown or persistence of democracies, see G. Bingham Powell, Jr., *Contemporary Democracies: Participation, Stability, and Violence* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982), pp. 155–170.

23. Ibid, p. 174.

24. Daniel H. Levine, "Venezuela: The Nature, Source, and Future Prospects of Democracy,"

GUIDELINES FOR INTERNATIONAL ELECTION OBSERVING

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APPENDIX IV

Guidelines for an In-depth Analysis of an Electoral Process

Election observer missions, as the term has been used in the Guidelines, are not dispatched to conduct a comprehensive academic analysis of the political system of a foreign country. Nonetheless, in certain instances, various aspects of the electoral process may warrant an in-depth examination because they may affect the overall fairness of the process. This Appendix is designed to assist observers in identifying problems that may be present in an electoral process.

The Appendix is organized in outline form.* With respect to most of the subjects covered by the Appendix, there is no prescribed procedure for ensuring a fair election. This reflects the cultural and historical diversity that make the development of one ideal electoral system a practical impossibility. Observers must rely on their own judgment in evaluating whether a particular procedure in the context of an election in a particular country, is unfair, and, to the extent that the procedure is unfair, its impact on the overall process.

I. Evaluation of the Electoral Law

A. The Election Administrators

1. Who are the administrators? (e.g. civil servants, party appointees, political independents, etc.)
2. How are the election administrators appointed?
3. What is the specific authority of the election administrators?

B. Parties

1. What are the formalities for registering parties, if any?
2. Do the formalities operate to exclude certain parties from participating in the political process?
3. If parties are excluded, are there nonetheless electoral choices between candidates either within a prescribed party or between parties that are legally authorized to participate in the process?
4. Do the electoral laws govern internal party activities such as the nomination of candidates?
5. What is the role of parties in administering the election?

C. Voter Registration

1. Is pre-registration required?
2. If registration is required, how is it accomplished? (e.g. is it a continuing list? is it automatic upon reaching a certain age? etc.)

* This Appendix is based in part on a model developed by Mr. William Kimberling, whose assistance the Law Group gratefully acknowledges.

3. If pre-registration is not required, how is voter eligibility determined? (There are circumstances where pre-registration may be inappropriate; in such instances, the authorities must develop means to prevent double-voting and voting by those not eligible to vote.)
4. Who is excluded from voting? (e.g. felons, military personnel, citizens outside the country, etc.)

D. Election of Candidates

1. How are candidates elected? (majority or plurality vote per constituency or by some form of proportional representation.)
2. Does the system effectively disenfranchise voters in a discriminatory fashion?

E. Constituencies

1. Where constituencies are used, how are they established?
2. Do the constituency delineations respect consistent principles, such as: equality of voting power; geographic contiguity; and tradition?

F. Administration of the election at the local level

1. Who appoints local electoral officials? (e.g. the incumbent authorities, an independent electoral administrator, the parties.)
2. How are local officials trained?

G. Challenges

1. Who is authorized to file challenges? (e.g. voters, party poll watchers.)
2. What are the procedures for reviewing initial decisions made by local election officials?

H. Other aspects of electoral law

1. Are there provisions pertaining to media access?
2. Are there provisions pertaining to campaign financing?
3. Are there provisions pertaining to the holding of political meetings or rallies?

II. The Political Campaign

A. Political parties

1. Background information (should be provided to observers prior to arrival in host country)
   a. names of parties;
   b. political orientation;
   c. participation in previous elections or governments;
   d. leaders of parties;
   e. sources of political support—e.g. ethnic, religious, education level, economic class;
   f. affiliations within host country and with parties outside country.
2. Party participation in election
   a. Are all political parties and political personalities participating in the electoral process?

b. If parties are not participating, what are the reasons for non-participation?

B. Atmosphere during campaign

1. factors to consider
   a. martial law in effect;
   b. civil war;
   c. war or serious threat of war between host country and another country;
   d. persistent violations of human rights by government controlled or affiliated forces;
   e. intimidation of voters or parties by supporters of competing party(ies);
   f. rule of law not respected by government organs;
   g. severe economic conditions.
2. Has there been an atmosphere in the host country that permits participation in the electoral process by all those interested in participating?

C. The Media

1. Background information
   a. newspapers and magazines
      i. names of major papers;
      ii. affiliations of papers;
      iii. circulation of major papers.
   b. television and radio
      i. licensing requirements;
      ii. percentage of the population with access to television and radio.
2. Issues to be considered
   a. censorship
      i. is the media censored?
      ii. if so, who has the authority to censor?
      iii. what are the legal grounds for censoring articles or reports?
      iv. what types of materials are censored in practice?
      v. does the media practice self-censorship?
   b. access
      i. have the various newspapers and radio and television stations endorsed candidates and parties?
      ii. do all components of the media support the same candidates and parties?
      iii. do parties and candidates have equal access to the media in order to present their positions?
      iv. if there is uniformity of viewpoints among the media, are there other means available for circulating information pertaining to the electoral campaign?
   c. reporting — does the media report on the campaign in a balanced manner?

D. Methods of campaigning

1. types of campaign activities
   a. advertising in public areas;
   b. advertising in the media;
   c. holding small political meetings;
   d. holding mass political rallies.
2. Issues to consider
   a. are there limits on public advertising?
   b. are there attempts to destroy campaign materials of competing parties?
   c. does the media provide adequate access to all parties?
   d. are meetings or rallies disrupted by security forces or competing parties?

II. Voter attitudes

A. Background factors

1. literacy;
2. education levels;
3. voter access to media and campaign information;
4. prior electoral experience.

B. Issues to consider

1. Voter education campaign
   a. who organized the voter education campaign?
   b. how much time prior to election did it begin?
   c. was it considered impartial?
2. Motivation for voting
   a. are people enthusiastic about the electoral process?
   b. is voting required by law?
   c. do people view voting as a civil duty?
   d. are people afraid of extra-legal adverse consequences that may result from not voting?
   e. are voters aware of the significance of the election?

IV. Elections occurring under special circumstances

A. Evaluating nonparticipation by groups or organizations

1. What are the grounds for nonparticipation? (e.g. partisan administration of electoral process, constitutional deficiencies, etc.)
2. Is the election notwithstanding the nonparticipation of certain groups meaningful?
   a. Background factors
      i. are groups not participating encouraging others not to participate?
      ii. can groups not participating effectively communicate their position to the population?
      iii. is there a government campaign encouraging voting?
      iv. are there legal or extra-legal penalties for not voting?
   b. Interpreting the results
      i. what is the level of voter turnout?

ii. how does voter turnout compare with previous elections?
iii. what is voter turnout in countries with similar electoral systems?
iv. how does the number of spoiled ballots compare with previous elections?

B. Transition from military to civilian government

1. Is the government or military participating in the electoral process by supporting a party or candidate?
2. Is the government or military using government monies or facilities in a partisan manner?
3. Is the government or military placing pressure on government employees to support government candidates? (e.g. by requiring that they: provide financial support; attend political rallies; or distribute government benefits in partisan manner)

V. Balloting Process

A. The polling site

1. Where is the polling site located?
2. How many people are authorized to vote at a polling site?
3. Who is the supervising authority at the polling site?
4. Who else is present in a supervisory or observer capacity at the polling site? (e.g. party poll-watchers, security forces, etc.)

B. Voting procedure

1. How is voter eligibility established? (e.g. voter list, I.D. card, other form of identification, etc.)
2. What are the mechanics for voting? (e.g. placing a mark on a paper ballot, voter machines, placing a ballot in a designated box, etc.)
3. Do the physical arrangements assure voter secrecy?

C. The ballot

1. What type of ballot is used?
2. Is the ballot comprehensible?

D. Counting of the ballots

1. Who is present during the counting?
2. How are disputes resolved?
3. How is the counting reported?
4. Who receives a copy of the record of the voting?

E. Fraud prevention

1. What safeguards are used to prevent double- voting and ballot stuffing?
2. If the counting of the ballots occurs at a place different from the polling site, how is the security of the ballot box assured?
3. If absentee balloting is permitted, how is voter eligibility determined?

VI. Post-Election Considerations

A. Announcement of results

1. Who is authorized to announce the results?

2. How quickly are the results announced?
3. If there is a delay in announcing the results, to what is it attributable?

B. Challenging the results

1. Who can challenge the results?
2. What is the procedure for challenging the results?
3. How long does it take for challenges to be resolved?

C. Transfers of Power

1. What is the length of period between the election and the assumption of power by the person elected?
2. What is the atmosphere in the country during this period?

VII. Prognosis

A. Will the person(s) receiving the prescribed number of votes be able to assume office in the prescribed manner?

B. Will the person(s) receiving the prescribed number of votes be able to exercise the authority vested in his or her office?

C. Will the person(s) installed in office exercise power in the manner prescribed by the country's constitution, and in accordance with the country's international obligations?

D. Are future elections likely to occur as scheduled?

FREEDOM IN THE WORLD

Political Rights & Civil Liberties, 1988-1989

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FREEDOM IN THE COMPARATIVE SURVEY:

DEFINITIONS AND CRITERIA

Understanding freedom is not a simple task. To attempt to understand its many meanings would carry us far beyond the discussion of political systems with which the Comparative Survey of Freedom has been principally concerned. Yet in common parlance the meanings of freedom infect one another, so that a "free society" may be taken to be a society with no rules at all, or a free man may be taken to be an individual with no obligations to society, or even another individual. This global sense of individual freedom leads many Americans to scoff at the idea that theirs is a free society. Not primarily concerned with politics, most Americans apply the word "free" to their personal relationships, sensing correctly, but for our purposes irrelevantly, the necessity to work at a job, or to drive at a certain speed on the highway. To these individuals, "freedom" sounds like a wonderful goal, but hardly a goal that their society has achieved. Yet freedom, when addressed in a narrow political sense, is the basic value, goal, and, to a remarkable degree, attainment of successful democratic regimes.

Freedom as independence is important to the Survey, but this too is not a primary basis of judgment. When the primary issue for so many countries in the colonial era was to become free from a colonial or occupying power, "freedom" meant that a country had emerged from control by another state, much as the United States had achieved freedom in the 1780s. This sense of freedom was applied to the term "the free world" after World War II because the Soviet Union forced satellization on so many countries of Eastern Europe. By contrast those beyond this sphere were said to be free. In this sense Spain was part of the free world, but at the time only in its relative independence. Still, for a people to accept rule by leaders of their own nationality rather than by foreign leaders is an aspect of political freedom—self-determination is a democratic right. But the fact, for example, that the dictators of Haiti have

been Haitians has done little for the freedom or democratic rights of their people.

Since democratic freedoms and human rights are often considered together, it is frequently assumed that the Survey of Freedom is equivalent to a survey of human rights. However, in spite of the considerable overlap of the two, concern for democracy and concern for human rights are distinct. A free people can deny human rights to some of their number, and they can certainly deny human rights to others. Thus, the Japanese tendency to exclude foreigners may be judged unfortunate but does little to affect its democracy. If people are beaten cruelly in the jails of Arkansas, this too is a violation of human rights, but the ill-treatment may be passively approved by the people of the state and not restrict free speech and nonviolent pluralism.

One concern that many have felt with the human rights movement has been its tendency to proliferate as "rights" an ever-lengthening list of desiderata, a list that mixes general principles of natural rights with the particular concerns of modern intellectuals. This weakens the proposition that there are basic natural rights that all peoples in all places and times should feel incumbent upon themselves and their societies. It also leads to an increasing opposition between expanding democratic freedoms (that is, the ability of a people to decide its own fate) and expanding human rights.

In the Survey, freedom or democracy is taken to mean "liberal democracy." It is surprising how many well-informed persons believe that since the "German Democratic Republic" also uses the term democracy in its label, we must include regimes of this type within our definition. It would be like saying that since the German fascists called their party "National Socialist," discussions of socialism must use definitions that would include the Nazis. Words can be appropriated to many uses, and no one can stop the appropriation, but when an extension of meaning adds little but confusion, and begins to call black white, it should be rejected.

In rejecting the Marxist-Leninist or extreme leftist usage of the word democracy, as in "people's democracy," we do not mean to imply that there is not a range of acceptable meanings of "democracy" that must be taken into account in any survey of democratic freedoms. We have explicitly addressed in previous volumes of the Survey the question of how "economic freedom" might be defined.[1] Our conclusion was that a system was free primarily to the extent

that the people were actually given a choice in determining the nature of the economic system. Therefore, a system that produces economic equality, if imposed, is much less democratic than a more unequal system, if freely chosen. Of course, questions must always be asked about the extent to which a system is freely chosen by any people. Economic measures such as land reform in a poor peasant economy may play a significant fact in improving the ability of people to take part in the political process fairly, and thereby choose the economic strategies that they desire.

The Comparative Survey was begun in the early 1970s as an attempt to give a more standardized and relativized picture of the situation of freedom in the world than could be provided by essays of individuals from different backgrounds that had formed, and in part still form, Freedom House's annual review of the condition of freedom in the world. My own experience had been that the world media and, therefore, informed opinion often misevaluated the level of freedom in countries with which Westerners had become particularly involved. In many countries oppressions were condemned as more severe than they were in comparative terms. On the other hand, the achievements of the postwar period in expanding freedom were often overlooked. Many small countries had quietly achieved and enjoyed democracy with relatively little media attention. The most oppressive states were those about which there was the least news in the media. Although these imbalances are still present, it is possible that some improvement in the presentation of the state of freedom in the world has resulted from the development of these Surveys.

The Comparative Survey of Freedom was hardly the first survey. There had been a number of other surveys. Bryce had listed the number of democracies in the world in about 1920.[2] An extensive cross-comparison of societies on social and cultural variables was published in the early sixties by Banks and Textor.[3] Based on an analysis of qualitative and quantitative data for all nations in the period 1960-62, the authors ranked and categorized polities on a wide variety of indices. These included economic development, literacy, and degree of urbanization, as well as political and civil rights. Since the authors' purpose was ultimately to discover correlations among the variables, their indices were more specific than those used in the Comparative Survey. They were interested primarily in presenting detailed information on items such as the nature of the party system, the presence or absence of military

intervention, the freedom of opposition groups to enter politics, or the freedom of the press.

The next major effort, by Robert Dahl and colleagues at Yale, was much closer in intent to the Comparative Survey.[4] In updating Banks and Textor's work they placed all significant states along a variety of scales relating to democracy. The resulting scales were then aggregated into scales representing the two fundamental dimensions of "polyarchy" according to Dahl: opportunities for political opposition and degree of popular participation in national elections. Dahl's lists of polyarchies and near-polyarchies were very similar to our lists of free states. A similar rating of democratic systems was developed about the same time by Dankwart Rustow.[5] In both cases, and especially that of Rustow, there seemed to be an overemphasis on the formal characteristics of participation in elections and too little regard for the civil liberties that must complement elections if they are to be meaningful. Nevertheless, the resulting lists were very similar to those produced a few years later in the first Comparative Survey of Freedom, as are the lists of higher ranking states in analyses of human rights conditions.[6]

The essential difference between the Comparative Survey and the other attempts of the last generation has been its annual presentation of the evidence and ratings, as opposed to what are essentially one-shot presentations. The latter often represent much more detailed study, but they suffer from the lack of experience with repeated judgments and changes over a period of years that has served to improve the Comparative Survey.

In many ways more comparable to the Survey are the annual reports on human rights to Congress of the State Department's Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs.[7] Presenting detailed information on the state of human rights in every country, the reports consider political and civil liberties as well as other issues. They are, of course, influenced by America's foreign policy concerns, but for the vast majority of countries they are remarkably informative. Improving in coverage and comparability are also the annual reports of Amnesty International.[8] Amnesty's concerns in the area are much narrower, but information on Amnesty's issues—execution, political imprisonment, and torture—often has a wider significance. Both of these efforts have now become basic sources of information for the Comparative Survey.

The purpose of the Comparative Survey, then, is to give a general picture of the state of political and civil freedoms in the world. By taking a consistent approach to the definition of freedom, distinctions and issues that are often overlooked are brought out. In particular, its comparative approach brings to the reader's attention the fact that the most publicized denials of political and civil liberties are seldom in the most oppressive states. These states, such as Albania and North Korea, simply do not allow relevant information to reach the world media. There may or may not be hundreds of thousands in jail for their beliefs in North Korea: few care because no one knows.

Besides giving a reference point for considering the performance of independent countries, by its existence the Survey stands for the importance of democracy and freedom in an often cynical world. Too often, Westerners believe that democracy is impossible outside a few Western countries, and consign the rest of the world to perpetual despotism. The story of the struggle for democratic freedoms is a much more complicated one, and needs to be told. In a sketchy manner the Survey records the advances and retreats of democracy, and alerts the world to trends that should be resisted and those that should be supported.

The Categories of the Survey

The two dimensions of the Survey are political rights and civil liberties. **Political rights** are rights to participate meaningfully in the political process. In a democracy this means the right of all adults to vote and compete for public office, and for elected representatives to have a decisive vote on public policies. **Civil liberties** are rights to free expression, to organize or demonstrate, as well as rights to a degree of autonomy such as is provided by freedom of religion, education, travel, and other personal rights.

Political rights and civil liberties are rated on seven-point scales, with (7) the least free or least democratic and (1) the most free. With no exact definition for any point on these scales, they are constructed comparatively: countries are rated in relation to other countries rather than against absolute standards. The purpose of the rating system is to give an idea of how the freedoms of one state compare with those of others. Different persons with differ-

ent information, or even with the same information, might compare countries differently. But unless the results of such comparisons are wildly different, there should be no concern. For example, if the Survey rates a country a (3) on political rights, and another person, accepting the criteria of the Survey, rates it a (4), this is an acceptable discrepancy. If judgments of two persons should turn out to be more than one point off, however, then either the Survey's methods are faulty, or the information of one of the judges is faulty.

The Checklist for Political Rights

The criteria may for convenience be considered as checklists. The checklist for political rights asks the investigator to determine the presence or absence of aspects of the political process common to democratic states, and then checks for the status of other aspects of the system that may impinge on, or provide alternatives to, the normal democratic process. The following discussion of some checklist items is keyed to the accompanying tabular presentation of the political rights checklist.

(1-2) The alternatives listed after (1) and (2) reflect variations in the extent to which political systems offer citizens or subjects a chance to participate through electoral choice, as these variations have been discovered in the course of Survey monitoring. At the antidemocratic extreme are those systems with no popular process, such as inherited monarchies or purely appointive communist systems. Little different in practice are those societies that hold elections for the legislature or president, but give the voter no alternative other than affirmation. In such elections there is neither the choice nor possibility—in practice or even sometimes in theory—of rejecting the single candidate that the government proposes for chief executive or representative. In elections at this level the candidate is usually chosen by a secretive process involving only the top elite. More democratic are those systems, such as Zambia's, that allow the voter no choice, but suggest that it is possible to reject a suggested candidate. In this case the results may show ten or twenty percent of the voters actually voting against a suggested executive, or, rarely, rejecting an individual legislative candidate on a single list. In some societies there is a relatively more open party process for selecting candidates. However the list of preselected

TABLE 1

CHECKLIST FOR POLITICAL RIGHTS

. Chief authority recently elected by a meaningful process

2. Legislature recently elected by a meaningful process

Alternatives for (1) and (2):

a. no choice and possibility of rejection
b. no choice but some possibility of rejection
c. government or single-party selected candidates
d. choice possible only among government-approved candidates
e. relatively open choices possible only in local elections
f. open choice possible within a restricted range
g. relatively open choices possible in all elections

. Fair election laws, campaigning opportunity, polling and tabulation

. Fair reflection of voter preference in distribution of power
— parliament, for example, has effective power

. Multiple political parties
— only dominant party allowed effective opportunity
— open to rise and fall of competing parties

. Recent shifts in power through elections

. Significant opposition vote

. Free of military or foreign control

. Major group or groups denied reasonable self-determination

0. Decentralized political power

1. Informal consensus; de facto opposition power

candidates is prepared, there is seldom any provision for serious campaigning against the single list.

The political system is more democratic if multiple candidates are offered for each position, even when all candidates are government or party selected. Popular voting for alternatives may exist only at the party level—which in some countries is a large proportion of the population—or the choice may be at the general election. Rarely do such systems extend voter options to include choice of the chief authority in the state. Usually that position, like the domination by a single party, is not open to question. But many legislators, even members of the cabinet, may be rejected by the voters in such a system, although choices are restricted to what the party approves. Campaigning occurs at this level of democracy, but the campaigning is restricted to questions of personality, honesty, or ability; for example, in Tanzania campaigning may not involve questions of policy. A further increment of democratic validity is effected if choice is possible among government-approved rather than government-selected candidates. In this case the government's objective is to keep the most undesirable elements (from its viewpoint) out of the election. With government-selected candidates there is reliance on the party faithful, but self-selection allows persons of local reputation to achieve office. More generally, controlled electoral systems may allow open, self-selection of candidates for some local elections, but not for elections on the national scale. It is also possible for a system, such as that of Iran, to allow an open choice of candidates in elections, but to draw narrow ideological limits around what is an acceptable candidacy.

Beyond this, there is the world of free elections as we know them, in which candidates are both selected by parties and self-selected. It could be argued that parliamentary systems, such as are common outside of the United States, reduce local choice by imposing party choices on voters. However, independents can and do win in most systems, and new parties, such as the "Greens" in West Germany and elsewhere, test the extent to which the party system in particular countries is responsive to the desires of citizens.

(3) In most of the traditional western democracies there are fair election laws, at least on the surface. This is not true in many aspiring democracies. The government of Senegal, for example, has tried to prevent opposition parties from forming a coalition. Since effective oppositions often emerge from coalitions, this regulation is a useful device for preventing fragmented opposition groups from mounting a successful challenge. At least until recently, election laws in Egypt and South Korea have been devised so that the size of the majority of the governing party is artificially inflated after its victory.[9] This is a useful device where there is a danger of excessive fragmentation leading to majorities too weak to govern, but it seems in these cases to have been intended to reduce the size of the opposition.

Political scientists dispute whether it is fairer to allow people to contribute to candidates as they like, or whether the government should disburse all campaign funds. Obviously, if the former system is allowed there will be advantages for the more wealthy. However, if the latter is allowed there will be advantages for those who already have power, since governmental disbursement systems must allow funds to be spent in accordance with past patterns (and impoverished campaigns favor incumbents who initially are better known). If outcomes of elections were determined simply by the amounts spent, then depending on government financing would support a quite unchanging vote distribution. One example of this tendency on a restricted scale is the use of the public media for electioneering, usually by giving the parties, or candidates, or at least the major parties and candidates, specified and equal time on television or radio.

Perhaps the most common accusation against the fairness of elections is the extent to which the government takes advantage of the resources of office to defeat its opponents. Incumbents and government officials can often issue statements and make appearances related to the campaign that are not strictly described as campaigning. "News," whatever its origin, is likely to favor incumbents simply because as long as they are incumbents their actions are more newsworthy. Other practices that continue in the less-advanced democracies, but were common in all democracies until recently, are various forms of "vote buying," whether this be by actually distributing money, the promise of large projects, or the promise of future positions to well-placed influentials in critical districts. The use of government equipment such as jeeps and helicopters has often been alleged in campaigns in the third world, such as those of Congress (I) in India or of Barletta in Panama in 1984.

Few democracies are now seriously plagued by direct manipulation of votes, except occasionally on the local level. However, new democracies and semidemocracies are plagued both by such manipulations and equally by accusations that they have occurred. Elections recently in Bangladesh, Guyana, and Mexico have been marred by such accusations, and with justification. One test of a democracy is the extent to which it has effective machinery in place to prevent flagrant cheating. Such methods generally include genuinely neutral election commissions and poll watchers from all major parties to observe the voting and tabulation of results—a requirement Senegal, for example, refuses to accept.

Given the advantages of the incumbents, and thereby generally the government and its party, any campaigning rules that restrict the campaign are likely to affect opposition candidates or parties most severely. The very short campaigns prescribed by many democratic systems might seem unfair to Americans—yet many countries have a fully competitive system with such limited campaigns (probably because their strong parties are, in effect, continuously campaigning). More serious are restrictions placed on campaigning or party organization, such as Indonesia's rule that opposition parties may not organize outside the cities.

(4) Even though a country has a fair electoral process, fair campaigning, and meaningful elections, it will not be a functioning democracy unless those elected have the major power in the state. The most common denial of such power has come through the continued domination of the political system by a monarch or a self-selected leader, as in Morocco or Pakistan. Another common denial of real parliamentary power is occasioned by the continued direct or indirect power of the military—or military and king as in Thailand. In Latin America it is common even in otherwise functioning democracies for the military services not to be effectively under the control of the civilian and elected government. By tradition, ministers of defense in most Latin American countries are appointed from the military services rather than being civilians as is the practice in more mature democracies. In countries such as Guatemala and El Salvador, the problem has gone beyond that of the military not being under civilian control. In such cases, at least until recently, an economic elite has been unwilling to let elected governments rule. Such an elite may directly and indirectly struggle against its opponents through violent internal warfare outside the control of the system—although elements of the system may be used to implement the desires of these shadowy rulers.

(5) In theory it should be quite possible for democracy to be perfected without political parties. Certainly the founding fathers of the American Republic did not think parties were necessary. The leaders of many countries that have moved from liberal democratic models to single parties argue for the necessity to reduce the adversarial spirit of parties; they claim to be able to preserve democracy by bringing the political struggle within the confines of one party. However, in practice policy is set in single parties by a small clique at the top; those in disfavor with the government are not allowed to compete for office by legal means—indeed, they are often ejected from the single party all together, as in Kenya.

The conclusion of the Survey is that while parties may not be necessary for democracy in very small countries such as Tuvalu, for most modern states they are necessary to allow alternatives to a ruling group or policy to gain sufficient votes to make a change. Therefore, the existence of multiple parties is important evidence for the existence of democracy, but is not absolutely conclusive. We are waiting for demonstrations of the ability of one-party or nonparty systems to achieve democracy. (Nepal's experiment with a nonparty system is worth watching in this connection.)

"Dominant party" structures such as those of Malaysia or Singapore allow oppositions to mobilize to the extent that they can publicize alternative positions and effectively criticize government performance, but not to the extent that they represent a realistic threat to the group in power. Controls over campaigning, expression of opinion, patronage, and vote manipulation, as well as "punishment" of areas that vote against the government are methods used in such systems to make sure that the governing party remains in power.

(6-7) An empirical test of democracy is the extent to which there has been a recent shift in power occasioned through the operation of the electoral process. While it is true that the people of a country may remain relatively satisfied with the performance of one party for a long period of time, it is also true that a party in power may be able over time to entrench itself in multiple ways to such a degree

that it is next to impossible to dislodge it by legitimate means. For a time in the first years of the Survey there was the suspicion that the social democratic party of Sweden had accomplished this. However, in 1976 social democratic domination was ended after forty-four years. The extent of democratic rights can also be empirically suggested by the size of an opposition vote. While on rare occasions a governing party or individual may receive overwhelming support at the polls, any group or leader that regularly receives seventy percent or more of the vote indicates a weak opposition, and the probable existence of undemocratic barriers in the way of its further success. When a government or leader receives over ninety percent of the vote this indicates highly restrictive freedom for those opposing the system: over ninety-eight percent indicates that elections are little more than symbolic.

(8) A free, democratic society is one that governs itself through its own official processes. The two most blatant means of denying the control of a society by its elected leaders are military or foreign control. Since control of violent force is a basic requirement of all governments, when those who directly have this power begin to affect the political process, this aspect of government is turned on its head. The traditional democracies have long since been able to remove the military from power; at the opposite extreme are purely military regimes, as in much of Africa. A few countries remain under a degree of foreign control or influence. For example, in Europe, Finland, and to a lesser extent Austria, must remain neutral because of pressure from the Soviet Union. Mongolia and Afghanistan (until 1989) have been under direct Soviet occupation.

There are many vague accusations that one or another country is under military or foreign control. In this spirit the United States is said to be "ruled" by a military-industrial complex or Mexico is said to be under American control. But there is simply too much evidence that these "controllers" are frequently ignored or slighted for such accusations to be taken seriously. To a degree every country in the world is influenced by many others—large and small. (While smaller countries generally have less power of self-determination than larger countries, for most issues the power of the individual voter in the smaller states to control his life through the ballot is likely to be greater than that of people in larger countries.) The Survey's position in regard to both of these kinds of "outside" control

is to record only the most conspicuous cases, and to not enter the area of more complex interpretations.

(9) A democratic polity is one in which the people as a whole feel that the process is open to them, and that on important issues all individuals can be part of a meaningful majority. If this is not true, then the democratic polity must either divide, or devise methods for those who feel they are not part of the system to have reserved areas, geographical or otherwise, in which they can expect their interests to be uppermost. In other words, the system must provide for either external or internal self-determination. Most democracies are relatively homogeneous. But even here, without some forms of elected local or regional government, people in some areas will feel crushed under a national majority that is unable to understand their particular problems or accept their values. Federal democracies, such as India or the United States, have devised elaborate methods for separate divisions of the country to be in important degrees self-governing. The problems of over-centralization in Europe have recently been addressed by countries such as France, Spain, and the United Kingdom, but in the case of Ulster current subdivisions or political boundaries continue to make a section of the people feel like foreigners in their own land.

(10) The question of self-determination is closely related to the extent to which political power has been decentralized. Since it would be possible for a country to have an elaborate degree of decentralization and still hand down all the important decisions from above, we must test empirically the extent to which persons or parties not under control of the center actually succeed politically. The fact, for example, that Japanese-Americans are able to play a leading role in Hawaiian politics, or that the Scots nationalists are able to achieve a significant vote in Scotland suggest an authentic devolution of political power.

(11) Finally, the Survey wants evidence for the extent to which the political-decision process depends not only on the support of majorities at the polls, but also on a less adversarial process involving search for consensus among all groups on issues of major public interest. A democracy should be more than simply a society of winners and losers. The most common way for this to be demonstrat-

ed is for the opposition to be taken into account in major decisions and appointments, even when it does not have to be consulted in terms of the formal requirements of the system. Sri Lanka, and Lebanon are current examples of the breakdown of democratic systems when one or more groups are no longer willing to accommodate the interests of others, and accept the electoral process as an arbiter. Colombia's "la violencia" was another example, an example with analogies that continue to threaten several countries in Latin America. Obviously, the distribution of informal power is particularly important in judging the degree of success of one-party "democracies" that base their claim to legitimacy on their willingness to achieve national consensuses.

The Checklist for Civil Liberties

In considering the civil liberties checklist, we are entering on a field made familiar by many special or annual reports on human rights violations. It is important to mention one of the chief differences between such reporting and the Survey approach. The Survey is looking for patterns in activities and balances in activities, rather than numbers of failures to observe particular human rights standards. The quantitative human rights violations approach has at least three difficulties that we should strive to avoid. The first and most obvious is that countries differ dramatically in size. One case of government interference with the media in Barbados is of much greater importance to our judgment of its freedom than tens of such interferences in a country such as India. It is not just that there are infinitely more media channels in India, but also that there are so many channels that the repression of individual channels is unlikely to be effective. The significance of cases of repression is greater in Barbados. The second is that counting numbers of violations is often an inadequate measure of the presence or absence of the behavior at issue. Although the number of journalists imprisoned in North Korea in the 1970s might have been low, journalism was totally controlled. In South Korea journalists were much more likely to get in trouble with the law, but journalism was much freer. Finally, and most important, there is the question of the balance of positive and negative activities. For example, a very large number of civil liberties violations are reported every year in South Africa; yet every year we also find reports of a remarkable number of free and open dem-

TABLE 2

CHECKLIST FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES

12. Media/literature free of political censorship
    a. Press independent of government
    b. Broadcasting independent of government

13. Open public discussion

14. Freedom of assembly and demonstration

15. Freedom of political or quasi-political organization

16. Nondiscriminatory rule of law in politically relevant cases
    a. independent judiciary
    b. security forces respect individuals

17. Free from unjustified political terror or imprisonment
    a. free from imprisonment or exile for reasons of conscience
    b. free from torture
    c. free from terror by groups not opposed to the system
    d. free from government-organized terror

18. Free trade unions, peasant organizations, or equivalents

19. Free businesses or cooperatives

20. Free professional or other private organizations

21. Free religious institutions

22. Personal social rights: including those to property, internal and external travel, choice of residence, marriage and family

23. Socioeconomic rights: including freedom from dependency on landlords, bosses, union leaders, or bureaucrats

24. Freedom from gross socioeconomic inequality

25. Freedom from gross government indifference or corruption

onstrations, new organizations, critical publications and reports, and so on. If we are to use quantitative measures we must develop a means of measuring both demonstrations that occur and demonstrations suppressed; public critidisms not suppressed along with public criticisms suppressed.

(12) At the top of the list are questions of freedom for the communications media. The analyst asks whether the press and broadcasting facilities of the country are independent of government control and serve the range of opinion that is present in the country. Clearly, if a population does not receive information about alternatives to present leaders and policies, then its ability to use any politica process is impaired. In most traditional democracies there is no longer any question of censoring the press: no longer are people imprisoned for expressing their rational views on any matter—although secrecy and libel laws do have a slight affect in some democracies. As one moves from this open situation, from ratings of (1) to ratings of (7), a steady decline in freedom to publish is noticed: the tendency increases for people to be punished for criticizing the governmc t, or papers to be closed, or censorship to be imposed, or for the newspapers and journals to be directly owned and supervised by the government.

The methods used by governments to control the print media are highly varied. While pre-publication censorship is often what Westerners think of because of their wartime experience, direct government ownership and control of the media and post-publication censorship through warnings, confiscations, or suspensions are more common. Government licensing of publications and journalists and controls over the distribution of newsprint are other common means of keeping control over what is printed. Even in countries with a degree of democracy, such as Malaysia, press controls of these sorts may be quite extensive, often based on an ostensible legal requirement for "responsible journalism." Control of the press may be further extended by requiring papers to use a government news agency as their source of information, and by restricting the flow of foreign publications.[10]

Broadcasting—radio or television—are much more frequently owned by the government than the print media, and such ownership may or may not be reflected in government control over what is communicated. It is possible, as in the British case, for a government-owned broadcasting corporation to be so effectively protected from government control that its programs demonstrate genuine impartiality. However, in many well-known democracies, such as France or Greece, changes in the political composition of government affects the nature of what is broadcast to the advantage of incumbents. The government-owned broadcasting services of India make little effort to go beyond presenting the views of their government.

In most countries, misuse of the news media to serve government interests is even more flagrant. At this level, we need to distinguish between those societies that require their media, particularly their broadcasting services, to avoid criticism of the political system or its leaders, and those that use them to "mobilize" their peoples in direct support for government policies. In the first case the societies allow or expect their media, particularly their broadcasting services, to present a more or less favorable picture; in the second, the media are used to motivate their peoples to actively support government policies and to condemn or destroy those who oppose the governing system. In the first, the government's control is largely passive; in the second it is directly determinative of content.[11]

The comparison of active and passive control by government brings us to the most difficult issue in the question of media freedom—self-censorship. It is fairly easy to know if a government censors or suspends publications for content, or punishes journalists and reporters by discharge, imprisonment, or worse; judging the day-to-day influence of subtle pressures on the papers or broadcasting services of a country is much more difficult. Perhaps the most prevalent form of government control of the communications media is achieved through patterns of mutual assistance of government and media that ensure that, at worst, reports are presented in a bland, non-controversial manner—a common practice in Mexico and Pakistan.

Some critics believe that most communications media in the West, and especially in the United States, practice this kind of censorship, either because of government support, or because this is in the interest of the private owners of the media. However, in the United States it is noteworthy that National Public Radio, financed largely by the state, is generally much more critical of the government in its commentaries than are the commercial services. The

critics would explain this difference by the greater ability of commercial stations to "police" their broadcasts and broadcasters. The primary explanation, however, lies in the gap between the subculture of broadcasters and audience for public radio and the subculture of broadcasters and especially audience for commercial stations.[12] The highly critical and elitist commentary on public radio serves and is produced by a narrow, emotionally disaffected segment of American society: its lack of commercial appeal suggests that it would be neither acceptable nor interesting to a broader public.

(13) Open public discussion is at least as important a civil liberty as free communications media. The ultimate test of a democracy is the degree to which an atmosphere for discussion in public and private exists free of fear of reprisal by either the government or opposition groups. Even in the relatively free communist society of Yugoslavia, at least until recently people have been imprisoned for the expression of critical opinions in private.[13] Certainly Iranians have had to be careful in recent years not to express too openly opinions that go against the prevailing ideology.

(14-15) Open discussion expressed through political organization, public demonstration, and assemblies is often threatening to political incumbents. There are occasions in which such assemblies may be dangerous to public order and should be closely controlled or forbidden. But in many societies this hypothetical danger is used as a pretense to deny opposition groups the ability to mobilize in support of alternative policies or leaders. In Malaysia, for example, the government's denial of public assembly to the opposition has been one of the main ways to restrict the ability of the opposition to effectively challenge the rule of the government.[14] Obviously, denial of the right to organize freely for political action is the most generalized form of the attempt to prevent effective mobilization of opposition to government policies. Control over political organization is a distinguishing characteristic of one-party states, but many multiparty states place limits on the kinds or numbers of political parties that may be organized. Controls over extremist parties that deny the legitimacy of democratic institutions, such as many fascist or communist parties, are understandable—still, they represent limits on freedom. Political and civil freedoms overlap closely on the right to political organization. The distinction is between

denying the right to participate in elections and denying the right to organize to present alternative policies or arguments for and against change in other ways.

(16) A democratic system is not secured unless there is a legal system that can be relied on for a fair degree of impartiality. The electoral process, for example, needs to be supervised by electoral commissions or other administrative systems that ultimately can be checked or overruled by the judicial system. People accused of actions against the state need to have some hope that their cases will be tried before the courts of the society and that the process will be fair. One of the tests that the author often applies to a country is whether it is possible to win against the government in a political case, and under what conditions. A reliable judicial system requires a guarantee of the permanence of judicial tenure, particularly at the highest levels, as well as traditions of executive noninterference developed over a period of years. Although in no society are all trials fair or all judges impartial, in this respect fundamental differences exist between democracies and nondemocracies.

A significant, but less striking, difference exists between the ways in which security services treat the public in democracies and nondemocracies. Since the people of a democracy are the sponsors of the system,[15] in theory the security services are their hired employees, and these employees should treat them with the utmost respect. However, because of the nature of the task of police and army, and their monopoly over force, in larger democracies, at least, this relationship is often forgotten. For example, in France and certain parts of the United States security forces have the reputation of treating people with carelessness and even brutality. To the degree that security forces are the employees, even in theory, of a smaller group than the people as a whole, then their behavior will be even less "democratic." Security forces that serve "a party" or a particular leadership faction are particularly likely to disregard citizens' rights.

(17) Certainly democracy requires that people be free from fear of the government, especially in regard to their politically related activities. To this extent, the emphasis of organizations such as Amnesty International on the extent of imprisonment, execution, or torture for reasons of conscience is closely related to any measure-

ment of democracy. Oppressive countries imprison their opponents, or worse, both to silence the particular individuals, and to warn others of the dangers of opposing the system. Recently, exile and disappearances have been used as a further deterrent. "Disappearance" is generally a form of extra-judicial execution, often carried out in support of the ruling system. Such terrorism may or may not be directly under the orders of government leaders. These practices underscore the fact that a great deal of such internal state terrorism does not involve the normal legal process; frequently opponents are incarcerated through "detentions" that may last for years. In the Soviet Union and some other communist countries, the practice of using psychiatric institutions to incarcerate opponents has been developed on the theory that opposition to a people's state is itself a form of mental illness.

It is important in this regard to distinguish between the broader category of "political imprisonment" and the narrower "imprisonment for reasons of conscience." The former includes all cases that informed opinion would assume are related to political issues, or issues that can be defined politically in some states (such as religious belief in many Islamic societies). It includes those who have written articles that the regime finds offensive as well as those who have thrown bombs or plotted executions, or even caused riots, to dramatize their cause. Since clearly the latter actions cannot be accepted by any government, all states, at whatever level of freedom, may have some "political prisoners." But if we take the category of political prisoners and separate out those who appear to have not committed or planned, or been involved in supporting acts of violence, then we have the smaller category of "prisoners of conscience." Their existence must be counted against the democratic rating of any country. This is not to say that the existence of prisoners of conscience who have been involved in violence cannot also be taken in many countries as an indication that a system may not be sufficiently responsive to demands expressed nonviolently—too often there may be no effective means to express opposition without violence. The distinction between prisoners by reason of conscience and political prisoners is in practice often blurred by the outsider's difficulty in deciding whether particular incarcerated individuals have or have not committed or planned acts of violence. Nevertheless, by looking at the pattern of a regime's behavior over a period

of years it is possible to estimate the degree to which a regime does or does not have prisoners of conscience.

Anti-dissident terror undertaken by groups that support the general system of a country but are not, or may not be, under government control is often difficult to evaluate in determining a country's rating. In the case where the terrorism is carried out by the security services, or their hired hands, we can either assume that these services are no longer controlled by the civilian administration, and to this extent the system cannot be called free, or that the civilian administration actually approves of the actions.

(18-20) Democracies require freedom of organization that goes far beyond the right to organize political parties. The right of individuals to organize trade unions, cooperatives, or business enterprises is a basic right that may be limited only with great care in a free society. The right of union or peasant organization has been particularly significant because it allows large groups of ordinary people in many societies to balance, through numbers, the ability of the wealthy to concentrate power. However, in some societies, such as those of western Africa, the ability of medical, bar, and academic associations to mobilize or maintain alternatives to ruling groups has been of equal importance. Democracies require freedom of organization because they require organized, countervailing power centers —which is one definition of pluralism—in order to maintain free institutions against the natural tendency of governments to aggregate power.

(21) It is for this reason that religious freedom, in belief and in organization, has been particularly important for the defense of freedom in a more general sense. Religious institutions have been able to maintain opposition strength in societies as different as those of Poland and Chile. A strong religious institution can build a wall around the individual dissident that a government will be loathe to breach for the sake of imposing its order. In countries such as Argentina or Philippines the organized church and organized unions have gone a long way toward insuring a society able to resist the encroachments of government. The question is not whether a particular established organization, such as the church, is itself favorable toward democracy. It is rather whether organizational structures are able to exist independently of governmental direction.

Without such countervailing organizational power, it is unlikely that significant civil liberties can be maintained against government pressure.

(22) Civil liberties also include personal and individual social rights, particularly those that are likely to most directly affect the ability of people to withstand the pressures of the state. Especially important are those to property, travel (including emigration), and to an independent family life. The right to property does not necessarily mean the right to productive property, but it does mean the right to property that can provide a cushion against government pressures such as dismissal from a position, that will make possible private publications, or other activity that cannot be financed unless people have more than subsistence incomes. The ability of an individual to travel, particularly to leave the country, is of great importance to dissidents or potential dissidents. It allows them additional sources of support and an additional refuge should the effort to improve conditions in their own country fail. An independent family offers another type of emotional haven that makes possible independent thinking and action. Opposition to Mao during the 1960s in China became almost impossible when individuals could no longer trust even their spouses and children not to inform on their activities. The complete isolation of the individual, even in the midst of a crowded life, is the ultimate goal of oppressors.

(23-24) Civil liberty requires, then, that most people are relatively independent in both their lives and thoughts. It implies socioeconomic rights that include freedom from dependency on landlords, on bosses, on union leaders, or on bureaucrats. The kind of dependencies that the socioeconomic system imposes on individuals will vary from society to society, but widespread dependencies of these kinds are incompatible with democratic freedoms. This implies that there should be freedom from gross socioeconomic inequality. It should be noted that we are not saying that democracy requires that incomes or living standards be equalized. But we are saying that if inequalities are too great, if a small group of very wealthy lives in the midst of a large number of very poor individuals, it is likely that relations of dependency will develop that will make impossible the unfettered expression of opinion or a free and uncoerced vote.

(25) Finally, there would seem to be an indirect requirement that the civil liberties of a democracy include freedom from the extremes of government indifference and corruption. These conditions make it impossible for the people affected to feel that they are in any important sense the sponsors of their political system. Such indifference and corruption also implies that the mechanisms of democracy in the state are simply not working. If there is a continued record of disregard for the interests of the people, and yet the representatives of the people are not replaced by the electoral or judicial process, the system is not working. Such indirect tests are necessary for a rating system that is based in large part on regular monitoring of press reports from around the world.

Freedom Ratings

A three way division of countries into "free", "partly free", and "not free", the "status of freedom", was formerly used by the Survey. (For a fuller discussion of the status of freedom in earlier surveys see **Freedom in the World: 1987-88.**) In any event, the seven-point scales have always been the heart of the Survey, with the three-point generalized status of freedom little more than a heuristic devise for printing maps or adding up doubtful totals for free or unfree peoples. (The careful student may have noted that the author has avoided making such calculations—they are certainly not in recent yearbooks or the texts of the annual Survey articles appearing in the January editions of **Freedom at Issue**. Such calculations implicitly make a claim for Survey precision that it will not carry. To say that one percent more or less of the world's people live in tyranny this year than last rings hollow. After all, the dividing lines between the categories of the Survey are purely arbitrary points at which to cut into continua. However, I have found it useful to consider the 58 or so "free" countries to be a rough list of democracies.)

In this Comparative Survey, the status of freedom will be replaced by a **Freedom Rating** that simply adds together ratings for political rights and civil liberties. This rating, ranging from 2 for most free to 14 for least free, will allow for the division of countries into a variety of subgroupings, depending on the purpose. One division will be into high (1-5), medium (6-10), and low (11-14). Coun-

tries rated "high" in this accounting approximate a list of democracies as before. Obviously, maps may be drawn using many breakdowns.

The Survey is based on library research, updated by a more or less continuous flow of publications across the author's desk. Once the basic nature of the political system and its respect for civil liberties is established, following the flow of information has two primary objectives: 1) to confirm or disconfirm the level of freedom expected by the prior analysis, and 2) to bring to the Survey's attention changes in this level that might have occurred in successive years. It also has had the effect since the beginning of the Survey in 1972 of refining the author's sensitivity to those conditions and indicators that go with different levels of democratic rights.

The use of general descriptions and a flow of information is particularly useful because the Survey is based on evidence of democratic or nondemocratic behavior by the governments of countries in regard to their own peoples. Because interest in human rights and democracy is often centered in the legal community, many students or analysts in this area concentrate their attention on changes in laws or legal structures. Even Amnesty International takes the position that the numbers imprisoned or executed in a country is a less important indicator of change than change in the law in regard to these practices.[16]

The criticism is often made that the Survey ignores many "human rights," such as the right to adequate nutrition. This criticism can be addressed on several levels. Most appropriate is the remark that the Survey is of political and civil freedoms and not of human rights. (In philosophical terms neither freedom nor democracy are properly understood as including all "goods" and only "goods".) The Survey is seriously concerned with those social and economic rights, such as the right to the freedom of workers or businessmen to organize, that fall under its understanding of basic civil liberties. It is our feeling that some other proposed rights, including some of those implied by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, would predetermine social priorities or social issues that societies have a right to decide for themselves through the political process. To get too out ahead of the attitudes and capabilities of the world's peoples is to threaten the growing respect given to the concepts of rights and freedom. In order to give people maximum freedom to develop

their societies in terms of their needs and desires as they understand them, it is important that the list of rights be kept to a minimum so as not to diminish unduly the sphere of popular political determination.

The objection that the Survey should take more seriously "economic rights" in the narrower sense of economic freedom has been addressed in the 1982 and 1983-84 Freedom in the World volumes. As was mentioned in the beginning of this Chapter, the conclusion was that the basic economic right of all democracies was for the people to have an authentic and repeated opportunity to choose the economic system they desired. Their choice might range from libertarian to any one of a number of forms of socialist. To this we added that to be effective this economic freedom of choice must be based on some relative equalities in power; the absence of dependency that is included in the checklist above as a requisite civil liberty in a democracy must be generally present for economic freedom to be meaningful.

We have, of course, always been concerned with the relationships that might exist between needs variables, such as medical care, nutrition, or education, and the political and civil liberties with which we are concerned. It is important to see if there are any necessary relationships between freedom and standards in these areas, or whether the existence of civil and political liberties enhances the meeting of such needs by a society. Table 11 below offers the reader a chance to look empirically at some of the relations that exist. These relationships were addressed in **Freedom in the World: 1987-88**, Part IV.

If more resources were available for assistance and on-site investigations, the Surveys could be greatly improved. They began, and have continued to be, a generalized attempt to improve the informed public's picture of the world. In spite of their limitations, some political scientists, economists, and sociologists have used the yearly Surveys as a source of data for correlation analyses of related variables. They are useful because they represent the only annual attempt to compare the level of democratic rights in all the countries in the world. (For further discussion of the Survey see **Freedom in the World: 1986-87**, pages 79-96.)

NOTES

1. See R. D. Gastil, **Freedom in the World: 1982** (Westport Greenwood Press, 1982), especially the article by Lindsay Wright and **Freedom in the World: 1983-84.** For further discussions of th definitions of freedom and democracy from the viewpoint of th Survey see the relevant discussions in **Freedom in the World** 1978 1984-85, and 1986-87.

2. James Bryce, Viscount, **Modern Democracies** 2 vols. (Macmil lan, 1924).

3. Arthur Banks and Robert Textor, **A Cross-Polity Surve** (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1963).

4. Robert Dahl, **Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition** (Ne Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), pages 231-49.

5. Dankwart A. Rustow, **A World of Nations** (Washington: Brook ings Institution, 1967).

6. For example, Charles Humana, **World Human Rights Guid** (New York: Facts on File, 1986). For some other surveys compara ble to the Comparative Survey, see also **Freedom in the Worl 1987-1988**, pages 89-125.

7. For example, United States Department of State, **Countr Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1986**, Department of Stat (Washington, 1987).

8. **Amnesty International Report, 1983** (London: Amnesty Inter national, 1983).

9. On Senegal see **Africa Research Bulletin**, December 1983 page 7050; on Egypt, **Middle East**, July 1984, page 22.

10. **Keesing's Contemporary Archives**, 1984, pages 32782-85; **Fa Eastern Economic Review**, September 20, 1984, pages 40ff.

11. William Rugh, **The Arab Press: News Media and Politic Process in the Arab World** (Syracuse: Syracuse University Pres 1979).

12. For an attempt to suggest the relatively greater importance o subcultural as opposed to class or other interests in determining th opinions of people in our society see R. D. Gastil, "'Selling Out' an the Sociology of Knowledge," **Policy Sciences**, 1971, 2, pages 271 277.

13. **Amnesty Action**, January 1985.

14. See, for example, **Far Eastern Economic Review**, August 23, 1984.

15. Alfred Kuhn, **The Logic of Social Systems** (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1975), pages 330-61.

16. **Amnesty Action** January 1, 1985, page 7. Here it is suggested that improvement in human rights is seen less in changes in the numbers imprisoned or killed in a country than in changes in its laws, such as laws against torture or imprisonment without trial.

SURVEY RATINGS AND TABLES FOR 1988

Progress toward freedom and democracy in 1987 was strengthened and reinforced by the events of 1988. South Korea continued its march, begun at the end of 1987, to a more liberal, democratic state: by the time of the Olympics a working democracy had been established, and the process continues. Pakistan made a decisive move toward democracy near the end of 1988, placing it in the same position South Korea had found itself in a year earlier, or the Philippines about a year before that. In 1988 liberalization in the Soviet Union continued and accelerated. With all the caveats that must be made, including regional variations in the rate of change, the Soviet Union is a much freer country today than at any time since the 1920s.

The Tabulated Ratings

The accompanying Table 3 (Independent States) and Table 4 (Related Territories) rate each state or territory on seven-point scales for political and civil freedoms, and then provide an overall "freedom rating". For each scale, a rating of (1) is freest and (7) least free. Instead of using absolute standards, standards are comparative. The goal is to have ratings such that, for example, most observers would be likely to judge states rated (1) as freer than those rated (2). No state, of course, is absolutely free or unfree, but the degree of freedom makes a difference in the quality of life.[1]

In political rights, states rated (1) have a fully competitive electoral process, and those elected clearly rule. Most West European democracies belong here. Relatively free states may receive a (2) because, although the electoral process works and the elected rule, there are factors that cause us to lower our rating of the effective equality of the process. These factors may include extreme economic inequality, illiteracy, or intimidating violence. They also include the weakening of effective competition implied by

TABLE 3

INDEPENDENT STATES: COMPARATIVE FREEDOMS

	Political Rights[1]	Civil Liberties[1]	Freedom Rating[2]
Afghanistan	6 ∘ †	6 ∘ †	12
Albania	7	7	14
Algeria	5 †	6	11
Angola	7	7	14
Antigua & Barbuda	2	3	5
Argentina	2	1	3
Australia	1	1	2
Austria	1	1	2
Bahamas	2	3	5
Bahrain	5	5	10
Bangladesh	4	5	9
Barbados	1	1	2
Belgium	1	1	2
Belize	1	2 ∘ †	3
Benin	7	7	14
Bhutan	5	5	10
Bolivia	2	3	5
Botswana	2	3	5
Brazil	2	3 ∘	5
Brunei	6	6 †	12
Bulgaria	7	7	14
Burkina Faso[3]	7	6	13
Burma	7	6 †	13
Burundi	7	6	13
Cambodia[4]	7	7	14
Cameroon	6	6	12
Canada	1	1	2
Cape Verde Islands	5	6	11
Cen. African Rep.	6	6	12
Chad	6	7	13
Chile	5 †	4 †	9
China (Mainland)	6	6	12
China (Taiwan)	5	3 †	8
Colombia	2	3	5
Comoros	6	6	12
Congo	7	6	13
Costa Rica	1	1	2
Cote d'Ivoire[5]	6	6 ∘	12
Cuba	7 ∘	6	13
Cyprus (G)	1	2	3
Cyprus (T)	2	3	5
Czechoslovakia	7	6	13
Denmark	1	1	2
Djibouti	6	6	12
Dominica	2	2	4
Dominican Rep.	1	3	4
Ecuador	2	2 †	4
Egypt	5	4	9
El Salvador	3	3 †	6
Equatorial Guinea	7	7	14
Ethiopia	6	7	13
European Community	2	1	3
Fiji	5 †	4 †	9
Finland	1	2	3
France	1	2	3
Gabon	6	6	2
Gambia	3	3	6
Germany (E)	7	6	3
Germany (W)	1	2	3

	Political Rights[1]	Civil Liberties[1]	Freed Rating
Ghana	6 ∘ †	6	12
Greece	2	2	4
Grenada	2	1	3
Guatemala	3	3	6
Guinea	7	6	13
Guinea-Bissau	6	7	13
Guyana	5	5	10
Haiti	7 †	5	12
Honduras	2	3	5
Hungary	5	4	9
Iceland	1	1	2
India	2	3	5
Indonesia	5	5 ∘	10
Iran	5	6	11
Iraq	7	7	14
Ireland	1	1	2
Israel	2	2	4
Italy	1	1	2
Jamaica	2	2	4
Japan	1	1	2
Jordan	6 †	5	11
Kenya	6	6	12
Kiribati	1	2	3
Korea (N)	7	7	14
Korea (S)	2 †	3 †	5
Kuwait	6	5	11
Laos	6 ∘ †	6 ∘	12
Lebanon	6	5	11
Lesotho	6 ∘ †	6	12
Liberia	5	5	10
Libya	6	6	12

	Political Rights[1]	Civil Liberties[1]	Freedom Rating[2]
Luxembourg	1	1	2
Madagascar	5	5	10
Malawi	6	7	13
Malaysia	4 †	5	9
Maldives	5	6	11
Mali	6 †	6	12
Malta	1	2	3
Mauritania	6	6	12
Mauritius	2	2	4
Mexico	3 †	4	7
Mongolia	7	7	14
Morocco	4	5	9
Mozambique	6	7	13
Nauru	2	2	4
Nepal	3	4	7
Netherlands	1	1	2
New Zealand	1	1	2
Nicaragua	5	4 ∘	9
Niger	6 ∘ †	6	12
Nigeria	5 †	5	10
Norway	1	1	2
Oman	6	6	12
Pakistan	3 †	3 †	6
Panama	6 †	5	11
Papua New Guinea	2	3 ∘	5
Paraguay	6 ∘	6	12
Peru	2	3	5
Philippines	2	3 ∘	5
Poland	5	5	10
Portugal	1	2	3

	Political Rights[1]	Civil Liberties[1]	Freedom Rating[2]
Qatar	5	5	10
Romania	7	7	14
Rwanda	6	6	12
St. Kitts-Nevis	1	2	3
St. Lucia	1	2	3
St. Vincent	1	2	3
Sao Tome & Principe	6 ∘ ↑	7	13
Saudi Arabia	6	7	13
Senegal	3	4	7
Seychelles	6	6	12
Sierra Leone	5	5	10
Singapore	4	5	9
Solomon Islands	2	2	4
Somalia	7	7	14
South Africa	5	6	11
Spain	1	2	3
Sri Lanka	3	4	7
Sudan	4	5	9
Suriname	3 ↑	2 ↑	5
Swaziland	5	6	11
Sweden	1	1	2
Switzerland	1	1	2
Syria	6	7	13
Tanzania	6	6	12
Thailand	3	3	6
Togo	6	6	12
Tonga	5	3	8
Transkei	7 ↓	6	13
Trinidad & Tobago	1	1	2
Tunisia	6	4 ↑	10
Turkey	2	4	6
Tuvalu	1	1	2
Uganda	5	5 ∘	10
USSR	6 ↑	5 ↑	11
Un. Arab Emirates	5	5	10
United Kingdom	1	1	2
United States	1	1	2
Uruguay	2	2	4
Vanuatu	2	4	6
Venezuela	1	2	3
Vietnam	6	7	13
Western Samoa	4	3	7
Yemen (N)	5	5	10
Yemen (S)	7 ∘	7	14
Yugoslavia	5 ∘ ↑	5	10
Zaire	6	7	13
Zambia	6 ∘ ↓	5	11
Zimbabwe	6 ↓	5 ∘	11

Notes to the Table

1. The scales use the numbers 1-7, with 1 comparatively offering the highest level of political or civil rights and 7 the lowest. An up arrow ↑, or a down arrow ↓ following a rating indicates an improvement or decline since the last yearbook. A rating marked with the diacritical sign ∘ has been reevaluated by the author in this time; there may have been little change in the country.
2. The Freedom Rating sums the first two scales.
3. Formerly Upper Volta.
4. Often written Kampuchea.
5. Formerly Ivory Coast.

the absence of periodic shifts in rule from one group or party to another.

Below this level, political ratings of (3) through (5) represent successively less effective implementation of democratic processes. Mexico, for example, has periodic elections and limited opposition, but for many years its governments have been selected outside the public view by the leaders of factions within the one dominant Mexican party. Governments of states rated (5) sometimes have no effective voting processes at all, but strive for consensus among a variety of groups in society in a way weakly analogous to those of the democracies. States at (6) do not allow competitive electoral processes that would give the people a chance to voice their desire for a new ruling party or for a change in policy. The rulers of states at this level assume that one person or a small group has the right to decide what is best for the nation, and that no one should be allowed to challenge that right. Such rulers do respond, however, to popular desire in some areas, or respect (and therefore are constrained by) belief systems that are the property of the society as a whole. At (7) the political despots at the top appear by their actions to feel little constraint from either public opinion or popular tradition.

Turning to the scale for civil liberties, in countries rated (1) publications are not closed because of the expression of rational political opinion, especially when the intent of the expression is to affect the legitimate political process. No major media are simply conduits for government propaganda. The courts protect the individual; persons are not imprisoned for their opinions; private rights and desires in education, occupation, religion, and residence are generally respected; and law-abiding persons do not fear for their lives because of their rational political activities. States at this level include most traditional democracies. There are, of course, flaws in the liberties of all of these states, and these flaws are significant when measured against the standards these states set themselves.

Movement down from (2) to (7) represents a steady loss of the civil freedoms we have detailed. Compared to (1), the police and courts of states at (2) have more authoritarian traditions. In some cases they may simply have a less institutionalized or secure set of liberties, such as in Portugal or Greece. Those rated (3) or below may have political prisoners and generally varying forms of censorship. Too often their security services practice torture. States

rated (6) almost always have political prisoners; usually the legitimate media are completely under government supervision; there is no right of assembly; and, often, travel, residence, and occupation are narrowly restricted. However, at (6) there still may be relative freedom in private conversation, especially in the home; illegal demonstrations do take place; and underground literature is published. At (7) there is pervading fear, little independent expression takes place even in private, almost no public expressions of opposition emerge in the police-state environment, and imprisonment or execution is often swift and sure.

Political terror is an attempt by a government or private group to get its way through the use of murder, torture, exile, prevention of departure, police controls, or threats against the family. These weapons are usually directed against the expression of civil liberties. To this extent they surely are a part of the civil liberty "score." Unfortunately, because of their dramatic and newsworthy nature, such denials of civil liberties often become identified in the minds of informed persons with the whole of civil liberties.

Political terror is a tool of revolutionary repression of the right or left. When that repression is no longer necessary to achieve the suppression of civil liberties, political terror is replaced by implacable and well-organized but often less general and newsworthy controls. Of course, there is a certain unfathomable terror in the sealed totalitarian state, yet life can be lived with a normality in these states that is impossible in the more dramatically terrorized. It would be a mistake to dismiss this apparent anomaly as an expression of a Survey bias. For there is, with all the blood, a much wider range of organized and personal expression of political opinion and judgment in states such as India, or even Guatemala, than in more peaceful states such as Czechoslovakia.

In making the distinction between political terror and civil liberties as a whole we do not imply that the United States should not be urgently concerned with all violations of human rights and perhaps most urgently with those of political terror. Again it must be emphasized that the Survey is not a rating of the relative desirability of societies—but of certain explicit freedoms.

The Freedom Rating simply sums the political and civil liberties ratings, providing a thirteen-point scale from 2 to 14. States rating 5 or better have conventionally been considered to be "democracies"

from the Survey's perspective, but the standard for democracy could be set at any level as desired.

The reporting period covered by this Survey (November 1987 to November 1988) does not correspond with the calendar of short-term events in the countries rated. For this reason the yearly Survey may mask or play down events that occur at the end of the year.

The Survey is aware that many of its judgments of what is or is not an independent country are questioned. The principle that we have used is a pragmatic one that combines several criteria. A country exists independently to the extent that persons from a central core of people identified with that country more than any other country rule in the name of their country through control of its territory, or at least what they define as the central area of that territory. It helps if a country, in the modern world, has some historical and geographical continuity. But historical existence in the past, such as that of Lithuania or Georgia in the USSR, or Tibet in China, is not enough to make the Survey's list. Whether a country's leaders are actually in control, or "rule" is also defined loosely. Many doubt, for example, the existence of a separate country of Transkei—and for good reason. However, the Survey believes that the independence or separateness of Transkei is comparable to that of Swaziland, Lesotho, Mongolia, Laos, or, in a different sense, Afghanistan or Lebanon. The separateness of the other homeland states is less clear, if only marginally.

Significant Declines in Freedom in 1988

Declines in freedom in 1988 were scattered, and none was substantial. Most important was the continuation of the erosion of freedom in **Malaysia**. In several of its states the use of certain words is now restricted to an Islamic context, and it is a crime to try to change a Muslim's religion. The imprisonment of opposition leaders has been supplemented by further interference with the already limited independence of the judiciary. The prime minister forced the ouster of the head of the supreme court as well as other judges that disagreed with him. Appeals to the court against security detentions were made impossible. The use of suspensions and other measures further emasculated the media. The suspension of parliament reduced political rights in **Jordan**. **Brunei**'s nascent opposition party

TABLE 4

RELATED TERRITORIES: COMPARATIVE FREEDOMS

	Political Rights[1]	Civil Liberties[1]	Freedom Rating[2]
Australia			
Christmas Island	4	2	6
Cocos Island	4	2	6
Norfolk Island	4	2	6
Chile			
Easter Island	5	4 †	9
Denmark			
Faroe Islands	1	1	2
Greenland	1	1	2
France			
French Guiana	3	2	5
French Polynesia	3	2	5
Guadeloupe	3	2	5
Mahore (Mayotte)	2	2	4
Martinique	3	2	5
Monaco [4]	4	2	6
New Caledonia	2	2	4
Reunion	3	2	5
St. Pierre & Miquelon	2	2	4
Wallis & Fortuna	4	3	7
Israel			
Occupied Terrs.	5	5	10
Italy			
San Marino [3]	1	1	2
Vatican City [3]	6	4	10

	Political Rights[1]	Civil Liberties[1]	Freedom Rating[2]
Netherlands			
Aruba	1	1	2
Neth. Antilles	1	1	2
New Zealand			
Cook Islands	2	2	4
Niue	2	2	4
Tokelau Islands	4	2	6
Portugal			
Azores	2	2	4
Macao	3	4	7
Madeira	2	2	4
South Africa			
Bophuthatswana [4]	6	5	11
Ciskei [4]	6	6	12
SW Afr. (Namibia)	6	5	11
Venda [4]	6	6	12
Spain			
Canary Islands	1	2	3
Ceuta	2	3	5
Melilla	2	3	5
Switzerland			
Liechtenstein	3	1	4
United Kingdom			
Anguilla	2	2	4
Bermuda	2	1	3
B. Virgin Islands	2	1	3
Cayman Islands	2	2	4
Channel Islands	2	2	4
Falkland Islands	2	2	4
Gibraltar	1	2	3

	Political Rights[1]	Civil Liberties[1]	Freedom Rating[2]
United Kingdom (cont.)			
Hong Kong	4	3	7
Isle of Man	1	1	2
Montserrat	2	2	4
St. Helena	2	2	4
Turks and Caicos	2	2	4
United States			
American Samoa	2	2	4
Belau	2	2	4
Guam	2	2	4
Marshall Isls.	2	2	4
Micronesia (F.S.)	2	2	4
No. Marianas	1	2	3
Puerto Rico	2	1	3
Virgin Islands	2	2	4
France-Spain Condominium			
Andorra [3]	3	2	5

Notes to the Table

1. See Notes, Table 3.
2. See Notes, Table 3.
3. These states are not listed as independent because all have explicit legal forms of dependence on a particular country (or countries in the case of Andorra) in such areas as foreign affairs, defense, customs, or services.
4. The geography and history of these newly independent "homelands" cause us to consider them dependencies.

was disbanded and its leaders jailed. The attempt to create a democratic regime in **Haiti**, already failing in 1987, collapsed in 1988, turning the country over to arbitrary military rule. Nonviolent opposition was again dangerous. **Panama**'s strongman, General Noriega, tore off the veils and took all but direct charge of the country. The remaining independence in the media was crushed and demonstrators regularly detained. **Transkei**'s elected government was set aside in favor of a military regime, a pattern too common in Africa. (For **Zimbabwe** see "Other Changes and Trends" below.)

Significant Advances in Freedom

Major advances in freedom were recorded from nearly every part of the world.

Nigeria continued its slow movement toward another attempt at democracy. Local elections have been held and an indirectly elected constituent assembly has set to work, although political parties have still not taken part. The normally strong media are in the process of reestablishing their traditions. After the destruction of its fully democratic system, the new rulers in **Fiji** have moved toward a new constitutional system enshrining special rights for the Fiji natives. It is an advance over arbitrary rule, but still a long way from the democracy that existed before. **Mali** has introduced an electoral system that at least allows minimal choice. **China (Taiwan)** has ever-freer media. Opposition political activity is now fully accepted both in the streets and the legislature. In **Tunisia** many political prisoners have been released, exiles have returned, direct press censorship has been lifted.

In Latin America, **Chile** held a referendum on the continued rule of General Pinochet. Despite many doubts as to the legitimacy of the process, and the advantages offered by the repressive system of the state, the people voted against the system. By their vote they opted for a democratic election in 1989; the process and its results weakened the oppressive apparatus of the state in most spheres. In **Ecuador** a successful general election and runoff brought a moderate to power, thereby bringing to an end a particularly bitter conflict between the branches of government that had threatened the continuance of its democracy. At last successful, competitive elections without military interruptions are beginning to be part of Ecuador's

TABLE 5

COUNTRIES BY FREEDOM RATINGS

Most Free

2

Australia
Austria
Barbados
Belgium
Canada
Costa Rica
Denmark
Iceland
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Luxembourg
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Sweden
Switzerland
Trinidad & Tob.
Tuvalu
United Kingdom
United States

3

Argentina
Belize
Cyprus (G)
European Com.
Finland
France
Germany (W)
Grenada
Kiribati
Malta
Portugal
St.Kitts-Nevis
St.Lucia
St.Vincent
Spain
Venezuela

4

Dominica
Dominican Rep.
Ecuador
Greece
Israel
Jamaica
Mauritius
Nauru
Solomon Isls.
Uruguay

5

Antigua & Barbuda
Bahamas
Bolivia
Botswana
Brazil
Colombia
Cyprus (T)
Honduras
India
Korea (S)
Papua New Guinea
Peru
Philippines
Suriname

6

El Salvador
Gambia
Guatemala
Pakistan
Thailand
Turkey
Vanuatu

7

Mexico
Nepal
Senegal
Sri Lanka
Western Samoa

8

China (T)
Tonga

9

Bangladesh
Chile
Egypt
Fiji
Hungary
Malaysia
Morocco
Nicaragua
Singapore
Sudan

10

Bahrain
Bhutan
Guyana
Indonesia
Liberia
Madagascar
Nigeria
Poland
Qatar
Sierra Leone
Tunisia
Uganda
United Arab Emirates
Yemen (N)
Yugoslavia

11

Algeria
Cape Verde Isls.
Iran
Jordan
Kuwait
Lebanon
Maldives
Panama
South Africa
Swaziland
USSR
Zambia
Zimbabwe

12

Afghanistan
Brunei
Cameroon
Cen. Afr. Rep.
China (M)
Comoros
Cote d'Ivoire
Djibouti
Gabon
Ghana
Haiti
Kenya
Laos
Lesotho
Libya
Mali
Mauritania
Niger
Oman
Paraguay
Rwanda
Seychelles
Tanzania
Togo

13

Burkina Faso
Burma
Burundi
Chad
Congo
Cuba
Czechoslovakia
Ethiopia
Germany (E)
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Malawi
Mozambique
Sao Tome & Principe
Saudi Arabia
Syria
Transkei
Vietnam
Zaire

14

Albania
Angola
Benin
Bulgaria
Cambodia
Equatorial Guinea
Iraq
Korea (N)
Mongolia
Romania
Somalia
Yemen (S)

Least Free

tradition. In **El Salvador** new and more independent television programming, radio interviews, and new small publications have gotten around the stranglehold of the very conservative major print media. In addition, civilian leaders identified with the guerrilla movements, if not identical with them, have been able to return and speak openly for their cause. **Suriname**'s elected civilian leaders have been able to reestablish the democratic system of the country's first years, both in the political and civil realms. The country still faces a small guerrilla movement among a disaffected people, and the problem of attaining complete control over its military.

The most dramatic move toward greater freedom in Latin America centered around the drama of **Mexico**'s general election. In the past, Mexican elections have featured an overwhelming majority vote for the official presidential candidate of the dominant PRI party (picked secretly by a small elite group within the party) and PRI victory in all or nearly all legislative contests. A dedicated conservative party regularly attained fifteen or twenty percent of the vote from the middle class, especially in the north. Leftists received so few votes outside the PRI that most leftists campaigned on a factional basis within it. The PRI's electoral dominance was maintained by a combination of coercion, near-monopoly of the media, and presumed electoral fraud both in voting and tabulation. In spite of appearances, most voters either went through the motions of voting or did not vote. In 1988 a major leftist figure in the PRI quit the party, united the left behind him, and managed a major nationwide campaign. The same methods were used by the government as before, but the sheer size of the opposition effort, and its ability to break off parts of the PRI structure allowed the opposition to win nearly fifty percent of the reported vote. Conservatives and leftists won for the first time a significant number of legislative seats by election (by formula they had received seats before, but this new achievement transformed the legislature into a more effective body). The opposition claimed that the election was stolen through massive fraud. Certainly there was some fraud, it had become traditional, but how much of the government's eventual victory was due to fraud is impossible to determine without a major, and improbable, investigation.

At the beginning of 1988 **South Korea** had just gone through a traumatic presidential election in which the government's candidate had won with a narrow plurality. Although ideologically the three

candidates running in opposition were not far apart, personality differences and regional loyalties could not be overcome in time to achieve victory. In addition, many South Koreans must have felt safer with a government candidate that retained the confidence of the military that had ruled in one form or another through most of the postwar period. The subsequent legislative elections in the spring allowed the opposition to achieve victory, and thus face a new president with an uncontrolled legislature for the first time. In this situation the country has steadily liberalized: many political prisoners have been released, and the corruption and abuse of power by past leaders have been brought increasingly into the spotlight by the courts and ever more aggressive media.

Pakistan's political system has oscillated between regimes based directly on the military and "transitional" civilian regimes with more or less military support. In 1988 Pakistan's military president continued to move hesitantly toward sharing power with an elected civilian government on the Westminster model. To maintain support for his position the president had instituted Islamic regulations that reduced civil liberties (for example, by reducing the equality of women before the law) and entrenched military officers throughout the society. In this situation it was unclear whether a truly open election with full party participation would take place in November. However, with the sudden death of President Zia the situation completely changed. The parties were allowed to campaign fully, and support for Zia's conservative allies plummeted. In a few weeks the opposition had come to power, the press was freer than ever, and women were being let out of jail as a symbolic reestablishment of their rights. In this period of euphoria, it is well to remember that the military and the president retain great, if somewhat vague, powers, and that Pakistan's civilian leaders have in the past also disappointed those who hoped for a permanent democracy.

Yugoslavia's continuing crisis of government has steadily eroded the power of central party and governmental authorities, thereby increasingly devolving power on regional officials. The process has seen an increasing involvement of the general public as people begin to take sides in the public quarrels of high officials or take to the streets in favor of popular (generally ethnic) causes.

On a worldwide scale the liberalization in the **USSR** is perhaps the most significant gain for freedom. In political rights this has meant a partial opening up of the decision-making process within the

communist party, and more effective and lively legislative bodies at all levels of the formal government. Yet most of the decision-making process at higher levels remains shrouded in mystery. The demands of the peoples of the Soviet Union for greater self-determination, demands expressed through popular action as well as regional governments, have been heard in forms and with a persistence unimaginable a few years ago. The reaction of Moscow to such demands has been mixed: some have been rejected, some have met with temporization, some seem to have been tacitly accepted. The main achievement, however, has been the mass organization of people, including communist leaders, in the Baltic republics, Armenia, and elsewhere, to openly press for policies not previously approved by Moscow. In civil liberties, change has meant the development of a much more open official press. Mass circulation publications now regularly and critically consider government policies and performance, and their alternatives, in many formerly forbidden areas. Movies long censored or suppressed are shown. Political prisoners continue to be released. Religious and economic freedoms are beginning to be countenanced. In the present climate, even when persons are detained, it seems to be for short periods. With all this, it is still true that the repressive apparatus, together with the lack of political choice, that has characterized the USSR remains in place. Theoretically, the gains of the last few years could be swept away overnight. But one suspects it would not be that easy. Too much hope has been aroused in too many millions; we are no longer speaking of the fortunes of a heroic but tiny group of hard core dissidents shuttling between Moscow and the camps.

Other Changes and Trends

Although there has been no decisive gain for freedom, by the end of 1988 it was time to recognize that the situation in **Afghanistan** has been steadily changing. With the government controlling little more than the major cities and the routes in between and the Soviets slowly withdrawing, political control is falling increasingly into the hands of a patchwork of resistance groups, or even local "neutralists". In Kabul and its environs, private discussion has been somewhat freed by the feeling of transition, with increasing numbers daring to say publicly they are neither for the guerrillas nor the

communists. In many respects, Afghanistan is now in a state of anarchy comparable to that of Lebanon, and such anarchy gives a measure of freedom to those who survive.

The people of **Burma** made a major effort to overthrow their oppressive system in 1988. In the end they were defeated, and the military instituted a new, more explicitly military system. The ability of some leaders to continue to speak of alternatives in the aftermath of revolt suggested that there was some gain, but the brutality of the reimposition of tyranny offered little hope for permanent gain.

Following the general tendency in the communist world, the government of **Laos** has slowly eased its oppression in recent years. Buddhists are again more active; the government has allowed some opening of the flow of information from Thailand. Limited elections have been held.

Thailand is itself poised on the threshold of full democracy. Another successful election in 1988 was followed by the selection of the prime minister by a more regular process than in the past. However, the continued special powers surrounding the throne, and the insistence of military leaders that they play a direct role in politics makes us still hesitate to see the transition as having been achieved.

Zimbabwe took the final step and inaugurated one-party rule—and further strengthened discipline within that party. However, the continuing degree of open discussion in the society makes it impossible to reduce its overall rating, when compared to neighboring states.

In Latin America it should be noted that several democracies, notably **Brazil** and **Peru** are facing massive economic problems and a severe loss of confidence in the new, democratic political system. The hemisphere will be lucky to see such states through 1989 with their recent gains in freedom intact. If they do not make it through, much recent progress in the region could unravel.

Even though it does not directly affect the ratings, we cannot ignore the continuing civil strife, struggle, and starvation in the Sudan and Ethiopia, the racial and ethnic conflict that continues in countries such as South Africa or Burundi, or the heightened conflict in Israel's occupied territories (Palestine). Only when such conflicts are overcome will there be a chance for substantial progress toward greater freedom in these areas.

TABLE 6

COUNTRY RATINGS SINCE 1972

Country	72	74	76	78	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88
Afghanistan	4 5 PF	7 6 NF	7 6 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	6 6 12
Albania	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 14
Algeria	6 6 NF	6 6 NF	6 6 NF	6 6 NF	6 6 NF	6 6 NF	6 6 NF	6 6 NF	6 6 NF	6 6 NF	6 6 NF	6 6 NF	5 6 11
Angola1	7 6 NF	6 4 PF	6 6 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 14
Antigua & Barbuda1	2 3 F	2 3 F	2 3 F	2 2 F	2 2 F	2 2 F	2 3 F	2 3 F*	2 3 F	2 3 F	2 3 F	2 3 F	2 3 5
Argentina	6 3 PF	2 4 PF	6 5 NF	6 5 NF	6 5 NF	6 5 NF	6 5 PF	3 3 PF	2 2 F	2 2 F	2 1 F	2 1 F	2 1 3
Australia	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F*	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 2
Austria	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 2

Notes to the Table

Ratings are from the Jan/Feb issues of the subsequent year in Freedom at Issue (eg. Jan/Feb 1973 rates 1972) through 1982. Ratings for 1983 and subsequently are based on this yearbook series (1983 from the 1983 84 edition, etc.). Previous editions of this table identified ratings from Freedom at Issue with the year of publication, instead of the previous year to which they applied. Because of this confusion the changeover to use of the book caused the ratings for 1982 to be omitted from the table. These ratings from the Jan/Feb 1983 FAI are included in this table for the first time. For reasons of space, ratings for 1973, 1975, and 1977 are omitted from this table, but may be obtained by consulting the 1985-86 annual (remembering they were listed there as 1974, 1976, and 1978, respectively).

Until 1988 the three lines are political rights, civil liberties, and status of freedom. Beginning with 1988 status of freedom is replaced by a summed "freedom rating", ranging from 2 to 14.

*. Indicates year of independence.

1. Until 1974 Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau (formerly Portuguese Guinea) were evaluated together as Portugal Colonies (A), while Sao Tome and Cape Verde were Portugal (B). Until 1977 Antigua, Dominica, and St. Lucia were considered together as the West Indies Associated States (and Grenada until 1974). Until 1974 Comoros and Djibouti (Territory of the Afars and Issas) were under "France: Overseas Territories", while Kiribati and Tuvalu were considered together as the Gilbert and Ellice Islands. Cyprus was regarded as a unit until 1980.

2. 1972 ratings for South Africa were white: 2,3,F and black: 5,6,NF.

3. Ratings for North Vietnam for 1972-1975 were 7,7,NF; those for South Vietnam were 4,5,PF for 1972-74, 7,7,NF for 1975.

Table 6 (continued)

Country	72	74	76	78	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88
Bahamas	2 2 F	1 2 F	1 2 F	1 2 F	1 2 F	1 2 F	2 2 F	2 2 F	2 2 F	2 2 F	2 2 F	2 3 F	2 3 5
Bahrain	6 5 NF	4 4 PF	6 4 PF	6 4 PF	5 4 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 10
Bangladesh	2 4 PF	4 4 PF	7 4 PF	4 4 PF	3 3 PF	3 4 PF	5 5 PF	6 5 PF	6 5 PF	5 5 PF	4 5 PF	4 5 PF	4 5 9
Barbados	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 2 F	1 2 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 2
Belgium	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 2
Belize	2 2 F	1 2 F	1 2 F	1 2 F	1 2 F	1 2 F	1 2 F	1 2 F	2 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 2 3
Benin (Dahomey)	7 5 NF	7 6 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 6 NF	7 6 NF	7 6 NF	7 6 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 14
Bhutan	4 4 PF	4 4 PF	4 4 PF	4 4 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 10
Bolivia	5 4 PF	6 5 NF	6 4 PF	5 3 PF	7 5 NF	7 5 NF	2 3 F	2 3 F	2 3 F	2 3 F	2 3 F	2 3 F	2 3 5
Botswana	3 4 PF	2 3 F	2 3 F	2 3 F	2 3 F	2 3 F	2 3 F	2 3 F	2 3 F	2 3 F	2 3 F	2 3 F	2 3 5
Brazil	5 5 PF	4 4 PF	4 5 PF	4 4 PF	4 3 PF	4 3 PF	3 3 PF	3 3 PF	3 3 PF	3 2 F	2 2 F	2 2 F	2 3 5
Brunei	6 5 NF	6 5 NF	6 5 NF	6 5 NF	6 5 NF	6 5 NF	6 5 NF	6 5 NF	6 6 NF	6 5 PF	6 5 PF	6 5 PF	6 6 12
Bulgaria	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 14
Burkina Faso	3 4 PF	6 4 PF	5 5 PF	2 3 F	6 5 PF	6 5 PF	6 5 NF	6 5 PF	7 5 NF	7 6 NF	7 6 NF	7 6 NF	7 6 13
Burma	7 5 NF	7 5 NF	6 6 NF	7 6 NF	7 6 NF	7 6 NF	7 6 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 6 13

Table 6 (continued)

Country	72	74	76	78	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88
Burundi	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 6 NF	7 6 NP	7 6 NF	7 6 NF	6 6 NP	6 6 NP	7 6 NF	7 6 NF	7 6 NF	7 6 NF	7 6 13
Cambodia	6 5 NF	6 6 NP	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 14
Cameroon	6 4 PP	6 4 PF	7 5 NF	6 5 NP	6 6 NF	6 6 NP	6 6 NP	6 6 NF	6 7 NP	6 7 NF	6 6 NF	6 6 NP	6 6 12
Canada	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 P	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 2
Cape Verde Isls.1	5 6 NP	5 5 PP	6 6 NF	6 6 NF	6 6 NF	6 6 NP	6 6 NF	6 6 NF	6 7 NF	6 7 NF	6 6 NF	5 6 PF	5 6 11
Central Afr. Rp.	7 7 NF	7 7 NP	7 7 NF	7 7 NP	7 6 NF	7 5 NF	7 5 NF	7 5 NF	7 6 NF	7 6 NF	7 6 NF	6 6 NF	6 6 12
Chad	6 7 NF	6 7 NF	7 6 NP	6 6 NF	6 6 NF	7 6 NF	6 7 NF	7 6 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	6 7 NF	6 7 13
Chile	1 2 F	7 5 NF	7 5 NF	6 5 NP	6 5 PF	6 5 PF	6 5 NF	6 5 PP	6 5 PF	6 5 PF	6 5 PF	6 5 PF	5 4 9
China (M)	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	6 6 NF	6 6 NF	6 6 NF	6 6 NF	6 6 NF	6 6 NF	6 6 NF	6 6 NF	6 6 NF	6 6 12
China (T)	6 5 NF	6 5 NF	5 5 PF	5 4 PF	5 6 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 4 PF	5 3 8
Colombia	2 2 F	2 2 F	2 3 F	2 3 F	2 3 F	2 3 F	2 3 F	2 3 F	2 3 F	2 3 F	2 3 F	2 3 F	2 3 5
Comoros1	4 4 PF	2 2 F	5 3 PP	5 4 PF	4 5 PF	4 5 PF	4 5 PF	4 4 PP	5 5 PF	6 6 NF	6 6 NF	6 6 NF	6 6 12
Congo	7 7 NF	5 6 PF	5 6 PP	7 6 NF	7 7 NF	7 6 NF	7 6 NF	7 6 NF	7 6 NF	7 6 NF	7 6 NF	7 6 NF	7 6 13
Costa Rica	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 2
Cote d'Ivoire	6 6 NF	6 6 NF	6 5 NF	6 5 NF	6 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	6 5 PF	6 5 PF	6 5 PF	6 5 PF	6 4 12

Table 6 (continued)

Country	72	74	76	78	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88
Cuba	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 6 NP	6 6 NP	6 6 NF	6 6 NP	6 6 NP	6 6 NF	6 6 NF	6 6 NP	6 6 NF	6 6 NP	7 6 13
Cyprus(G)2	2 3 F	4 4 PP	3 4 PP	3 4 PP	3 3 PP	1 2 P	1 2 P	1 2 P	1 2 P	1 2 F	1 2 P	1 2 P	1 2 3
Cyprus(T)2						4 3 PP	4 3 PP	4 3 PP	4 3 PP	3 3 PP	2 3 P	2 3 P	2 3 5
Czecho-slovakia	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 6 NF	7 6 NF	7 6 NF	7 6 NF	7 6 NP	7 6 NP	7 6 NF	7 6 NF	7 6 NP	7 6 NP	7 6 13
Denmark	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 P	1 1 F	1 1 2
Djibouti1	4 4 PF	4 3 PP	3 3 PF	2 3 F*	3 4 PP	3 5 PF	5 6 NP	5 6 NF	5 6 PF	6 6 NP	6 6 NP	6 6 NP	6 6 12
Dominica1	2 3 F	2 3 P	2 3 F	2 3 F*	2 2 F	2 2 F	2 2 P	2 2 P	2 2 P	2 2 P	2 2 P	2 2 P	2 2 4
Dominican Republic	3 2 F	4 2 PP	4 3 PF	2 2 F	2 3 F	2 3 F	1 2 P	1 2 F	1 3 P	1 3 P	1 3 P	1 3 P	1 3 4
Ecuador	7 3 PF	7 5 NF	6 5 PP	5 3 PF	2 2 F	2 2 F	2 2 F	2 2 P	2 2 F	2 3 F	2 3 F	2 3 P	2 2 4
Egypt	6 6 NF	6 4 PP	5 4 PP	5 5 PP	5 5 PF	5 6 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	4 4 PF	4 4 PP	5 4 PP	5 4 PP	5 4 9
El Salvador	2 3 F	2 3 F	3 3 PF	4 4 PP	6 4 PP	5 5 PF	4 5 PF	4 5 PF	3 5 PF	2 4 PF	3 4 PF	3 4 PP	3 3 6
Eq. Guinea	6 6 NF	6 6 NF	6 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 6 NF	7 6 NF	6 6 NF	7 6 NF	7 6 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NP	7 7 14
Ethiopia	5 6 NF	6 5 NF	7 6 NF	7 7 NP	7 7 NF	7 7 NP	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	6 7 NF	6 7 13
Fiji	2 2 P	2 2 F	2 2 F	2 2 F	2 2 F	2 2 F	2 2 F	2 2 F	2 2 F	2 2 F	2 2 P	6 5 PP	5 4 9
Finland	2 2 F	2 2 P	2 2 F	2 2 F	2 2 F	2 2 F	2 2 P	2 2 F	2 2 F	2 2 F	2 2 P	1 2 P	1 2 3

Table 6 (continued)

Country	72	74	76	78	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88
France	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	3
Gabon	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6
	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6
	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	12
Gambia	2	2	2	2	2	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
	2	2	2	2	2	4	3	4	4	4	4	3	3
	F	F	F	F	F	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	6
Germany (East)	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
	7	7	7	6	6	7	7	7	6	6	6	6	6
	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	13
Germany (West)	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
	P	P	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	3
Ghana	6	7	7	6	2	2	6	6	7	7	7	7	6
	6	5	5	4	3	3	5	5	6	6	6	6	6
	NF	NF	NF	PF	F	F	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	12
Greece	6	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2
	6	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
	NF	F	P	F	F	F	P	P	F	F	F	F	4
Grenada	2	2	2	2	5	6	6	7	5	2	2	2	2
	3	4	4	3	5	5	5	6	3	3	2	1	1
	F	PF	PF	F	PF	NF	NF	NF	PF	F	F	F	3
Guatemala	2	4	4	3	5	6	6	6	5	4	3	3	3
	3	3	3	4	6	6	6	6	6	4	3	3	3
	F	PF	PF	PF	PF	NF	NF	NF	PF	PF	PF	PF	6
Guinea	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	5	5	5	6	6
	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	13
Guinea-Bissau	7	6	6	6	6	6	6	7	6	6	6	6	6
	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	7	7	7
	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	13
Guyana	2	4	3	4	4	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
	2	3	3	3	4	4	4	5	5	5	5	5	5
	F	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	10
Haiti	7	6	6	7	6	7	7	7	7	7	5	6	7
	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	4	5	5
	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	PF	PF	12
Honduras	7	6	6	6	4	3	2	3	2	2	2	2	2
	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	F	PF	F	F	F	F	5
Hungary	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	5	5	5	5
	6	6	6	5	6	5	5	5	5	5	5	4	4
	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	PF	PF	PF	PF	9

Table 6 (continued)

Country	72	74	76	78	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88
Iceland	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	F	P	P	P	F	F	F	P	P	P	P	P	2
India	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
	3	3	5	2	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
	P	P	PP	P	F	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	5
Indonesia	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	6	6	6	6	5
	PP	PP	PP	PP	PF	PF	PF	PP	PP	PP	PP	PP	10
Iran	5	5	6	6	5	6	6	6	5	5	5	5	5
	6	6	6	5	5	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6
	NF	NF	NF	PF	PF	NF	NF	NF	PF	PP	PP	PP	11
Iraq	7	7	7	7	6	6	6	6	7	7	7	7	7
	7	7	7	6	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	14
Ireland	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	F	P	F	F	P	F	F	F	P	P	P	P	2
Israel	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
	3	3	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
	F	F	F	P	F	F	F	F	F	P	F	F	4
Italy	1	1	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	1
	P	F	P	P	F	P	P	P	P	P	F	P	2
Jamaica	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
	2	2	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	2	2
	F	P	P	P	F	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	4
Japan	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	F	F	F	F	F	P	P	P	F	P	F	P	2
Jordan	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	5	5	5	5	6
	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	5	5	5	5	5
	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	PP	PP	PP	PP	11
Kenya	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	6	6	6	6	6
	4	4	5	5	4	4	5	5	5	5	5	6	6
	PF	PP	PP	PP	PP	PP	PP	PF	PP	PP	PP	NP	12
Kiribati	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1
	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
	F	P	F	F	F	P	F	F	P	F	P	P	3
Korea (N)	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
	NF	NF	NP	NP	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NP	NP	NP	14
Korea (S)	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	4	4	4	2
	6	6	6	5	6	6	6	6	5	5	5	4	3
	NP	PF	NF	PP	PF	PF	PP	PP	PF	PF	PP	PP	5

Table 6 (continued)

Country	72	74	76	78	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88
Kuwait	4 4 PP	4 3 PF	6 5 NF	6 3 PF	8 4 PF	4 4 PF	4 4 PF	4 4 PF	4 4 PF	4 4 PF	6 5 PF	6 5 PF	6 5 11
Laos	5 5 PP	5 5 PP	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	6 6 12
Lebanon	2 2 F	2 2 F	4 4 PP	4 4 PF	4 4 PP	4 4 PP	4 4 PF	5 4 PP	5 4 PF	5 4 PF	5 4 PF	6 5 PF	6 5 11
Lesotho	7 4 NF	5 4 PP	5 4 PP	5 4 PP	5 5 PP	5 5 PP	5 5 PP	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 6 PF	6 6 12
Liberia	8 6 NF	6 3 PP	6 4 PP	6 4 PF	6 6 NF	6 6 NF	6 6 NF	5 5 PF	6 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 10
Libya	7 6 NF	7 7 NF	7 6 NF	6 6 NF	5 6 NF	6 7 NF	6 8 NF	6 8 NF	6 6 NF	6 6 NF	6 6 NF	6 6 NF	6 6 12
Luxembourg	2 1 F	2 1 F	2 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 2
Madagascar (Malagasy Rep.)	5 3 PF	5 4 PF	6 5 NF	5 5 PF	6 6 NF	6 8 NF	5 5 PF	5 6 PF	5 6 PF	5 6 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 10
Malawi	7 8 NF	7 8 NF	7 6 NF	6 6 NF	6 7 NF	6 7 NF	6 7 NF	6 7 NF	6 7 NF	6 7 NF	6 7 NF	6 7 NF	6 7 13
Malaysia	2 3 F	3 3 PP	3 4 PF	3 3 PF	3 4 PF	3 4 PF	3 4 PF	3 4 PF	3 5 PF	3 5 PF	3 5 PF	3 5 PF	4 5 9
Maldives	3 2 PP	3 2 PF	4 4 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PP	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 6 PP	5 6 PF	5 6 11
Mali	7 8 NF	7 8 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 6 NF	7 6 NF	7 6 NF	7 6 NF	7 6 NF	7 6 NF	7 6 NF	7 6 NF	6 6 12
Malta	1 2 F	1 1 P	1 2 F	2 2 F	2 3 F	2 3 F	2 3 F	2 4 PF	2 4 PF	2 4 PF	2 4 PF	1 2 F	1 2 3
Mauritania	6 6 NF	5 8 NF	6 6 NF	6 6 NF	7 6 NF	7 6 NF	7 6 NF	7 6 NF	7 6 NF	7 6 NF	7 6 NF	6 6 NF	6 6 12
Mauritius	3 2 P	3 2 F	2 2 F	2 4 PF	2 4 PP	2 3 F	2 2 F	2 2 P	2 2 F	2 2 F	2 2 F	2 2 F	2 2 4

Table 6 (continued)

Country	72	74	76	78	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88
Mexico	5 3 PP	4 3 PP	4 4 PP	4 4 PP	3 4 PP	3 4 PP	3 4 PP	3 4 PP	3 4 PP	4 4 PP	4 4 PP	4 4 PP	3 4 7
Mongolia	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 14
Morocco	5 4 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	3 4 PF	4 4 PF	4 5 PP	4 5 PP	4 5 PP	4 5 PP	4 5 PP	4 5 PP	4 5 PP	4 5 9
Mozambique1	7 6 NF	6 6 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 6 NF	6 7 NF	6 7 NF	6 7 NF	6 7 NF	6 7 13
Nauru	2 2 F	2 2 P	2 2 P	2 2 P	2 2 F	2 2 P	2 2 F	2 2 P	2 2 P	2 2 P	2 2 F	2 2 P	2 2 4
Nepal	6 5 NF	6 5 NF	6 5 NF	6 5 NF	3 4 PF	3 4 PP	3 4 PF	3 4 PP	3 4 PF	3 4 PP	3 4 PF	3 4 PP	3 4 7
Netherlands	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 P	1 1 F	1 1 P	1 1 P	1 1 P	1 1 P	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 P	1 1 2
New Zealand	1 1 P	1 1 P	1 1 P	1 1 F	1 1 P	1 1 P	1 1 P	1 1 P	1 1 P	1 1 P	1 1 P	1 1 P.	1 1 2
Nicaragua	4 3 PP	5 4 PP	5 5 PP	5 5 PF	5 5 PP	6 5 PP	6 5 PP	6 5 PP	5 5 PP	5 5 PP	5 6 PP	5 5 PP	5 4 9
Niger	6 6 NF	7 6 NF	7 6 NF	7 6 NF	7 6 NF	7 6 NF	7 6 NF	7 6 NF	7 6 NF	7 6 NF	7 6 NF	7 6 NP	6 6 12
Nigeria	6 4 PF	6 4 PP	6 4 PP	5 3 PP	2 3 F	2 3 F	2 3 P	2 3 F	7 5 NP	7 5 NF	7 5 NF	6 5 PP	5 5 10
Norway	1 1 P	1 1 P	1 1 P	1 1 P	1 1 P	1 1 P	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 P	1 1 P	1 1 P	1 1 2
Oman	7 6 NF	7 6 NP	6 6 NP	6 6 NP	6 6 NP	6 6 NP	6 6 NP	6 6 NF	6 6 NF	6 6 NP	6 6 NP	6 6 NP	6 6 12
Pakistan	3 5 PF	3 5 PF	4 5 PP	6 5 PP	7 5 NP	7 5 NP	7 5 NP	7 5 NP	7 5 NP	4 5 PP	4 5 PP	4 5 PP	3 3 6
Panama	7 6 NF	7 6 NP	7 6 NP	5 5 PP	4 4 PP	4 4 PP	5 5 PP	5 4 PP	4 3 PP	6 3 PP	6 3 PP	5 5 PP	6 5 11

Table 6 (continued)

Country	72	74	76	78	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88
Papua New Guinea	4 2 PF	3 2 PF	2 2 F	2 2 F	2 2 F	2 2 F	2 2 F	2 2 F	2 2 F	2 2 F	2 2 F	2 2 F	2 3 5
Paraguay	4 6 PF	5 5 PF	5 6 NF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 6 PF	5 6 PF	6 6 1
Peru	7 5 NF	6 6 NF	6 4 PF	5 4 PF	2 3 F	2 3 F	2 3 F	2 3 F	2 3 F	2 3 F	2 3 F	2 3 F	2 3 5
Philippines	4 6 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 4 PF	5 5 PF	4 4 PF	4 3 PF	4 2 PF	2 2 F	2 3 5
Poland	6 6 NF	6 6 NF	6 6 NF	6 5 PF	6 4 PF	5 4 PF	6 5 NF	6 5 PF	6 5 PF	6 5 PF	6 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 11
Portugal	5 6 NF	5 3 PF	2 2 F	2 2 F	2 2 F	2 2 F	1 2 F	1 2 F	1 2 F	1 2 F	1 2 F	1 2 F	1 2 3
Qatar	6 5 NF	6 5 NF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 11
Romania	7 6 NF	7 6 NF	7 6 NF	7 6 NF	7 6 NF	7 6 NF	7 6 NF	7 6 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 1
Rwanda	7 6 NF	7 5 NF	7 5 NF	6 5 NF	6 6 NF	6 6 NF	6 6 NF	6 6 NF	6 6 NF	6 6 NF	6 6 NF	6 6 NF	6 6 1
St.Kitts-Nevis1	2 3 F	2 3 F	2 3 F	2 3 F	2 3 F	2 3 F	2 3 F	2 F*	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 2 F	1 2 3
St.Lucia1	2 3 F	2 3 F	2 3 F	2 3 F	2 3 F	2 2 F	2 2 F	2 2 F	1 2 F	1 2 F	1 2 F	1 2 F	1 2 3
St.Vincent	2 2 F	2 2 F	2 2 F	2 2 F	2 2 F	2 2 F	2 2 F	2 2 F	2 2 F	2 2 F	2 2 F	1 2 F	1 2 3
Sao Tome & Principe1	5 6 NF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	6 5 NF	6 6 NF	6 6 NF	6 6 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	8 7 1
Saudi Arabia	6 6 NF	6 6 NF	6 6 NF	6 6 NF	6 6 NF	6 * NF	6 6 NF	6 7 NF	6 7 NF	6 7 NF	6 7 NF	6 7 NF	6 7 1
Senegal	6 6 NF	6 5 NF	6 4 PF	4 3 PF	4 4 PF	4 4 PF	4 4 PF	4 4 PF	3 4 PF	3 4 PF	3 4 PF	3 4 PF	3 4 7

Table 6 (continued)

Country	72	74	76	78	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88
Seychelles1	3 2 PF	2 2 F	1 2 F*	6 4 PF	6 6 NF	6 6 NF	6 6 NF	6 6 NF	6 6 NF	6 6 NF	6 6 NF	6 6 NF	6 6 12
Sierra Leone	4 5 PF	6 5 PF	6 5 PF	6 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	4 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 10
Singapore	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	4 5 PF	4 5 PF	4 5 PF	4 5 PF	4 5 PF	4 5 PF	4 5 PF	4 5 9
Solomons	4 2 PF	4 2 PF	2 2 F	2 2 F*	2 2 F	2 2 F	2 2 F	2 2 F	2 3 F	2 3 F	2 2 F	2 2 F	2 2 4
Somalia	7 6 NF	7 6 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 14
South Africa2		4 5 PF	4 5 PF	5 6 PF	5 6 PF	5 6 NF	5 6 NF	5 6 PF	5 6 PF	5 6 PF	5 6 PF	5 6 PF	5 6 PF
Spain	5 6 NF	5 5 PF	5 3 PF	2 3 F	2 3 F	2 3 F	1 2 F	1 2 F	1 2 F	1 2 F	1 2 F	1 2 F	1 2 3
Sri Lanka	2 3 F	2 3 F	2 3 F	2 3 F	2 3 F	2 3 F	2 3 F	3 4 PF	3 4 PF	3 4 PF	3 4 PF	3 4 PF	3 4 7
Sudan	6 6 NF	6 6 NF	6 6 NF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 6 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	6 6 NF	6 6 NF	4 5 PF	4 5 PF	4 5 9
Suriname	2 2 F	2 2 F	2 2 F	2 2 F	7 5 NF	7 5 NF	7 6 NF	7 6 NF	7 6 NF	6 6 NF	6 6 NF	4 4 PF	3 2 5
Swaziland	4 2 PF	6 4 PF	6 4 PF	6 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 6 PF	5 6 PF	5 6 PF	5 6 PF	5 6 11
Sweden	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 2
Switzerland	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 2
Syria	7 7 NF	6 7 NF	6 6 NF	5 6 PF	5 6 NF	5 6 NF	5 7 NF	6 7 NF	6 7 NF	6 7 NF	6 7 NF	6 7 NF	6 7 12
Tanzania	6 6 NF	6 6 NF	6 6 NF	6 6 NF	6 6 NF	6 6 NF	6 6 NF	6 6 NF	6 6 NF	6 6 NF	6 6 NF	6 6 NF	6 6 12

Table 6 (continued).

Country	72	74	76	78	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88
Thailand	7 5 NF	5 3 PF	6 6 NF	6 4 PF	3 4 PF	3 4 PF	3 4 PF	3 4 PF	3 4 PF	3 4 PF	3 3 PF	3 3 PF	3 3 6
Togo	7 5 NF	7 6 NF	7 6 NF	7 6 NF	7 6 NF	7 6 NF	7 6 NF	7 6 NF	6 6 NF	6 6 NF	6 6 NF	6 6 NF	6 6 12
Tonga	4 2 PF	5 3 PF	5 3 PF	5 3 PF	5 3 PF	5 3 PF	5 3 PF	5 3 PF	5 3 PF	5 3 PF	5 3 PF	5 3 PF	5 3 8
Transkei			6 5 NF*	5 5 PF	5 6 PF	5 6 PF	5 6 PF	5 6 PF	5 6 PF	5 6 PF	5 6 PF	5 6 PF	7 6 13
Trinidad & Tobago	2 3 F	2 2 F	2 2 F	2 2 F	2 2 F	2 2 F	1 2 F	1 2 F	1 2 F	1 2 F	1 2 F	1 1 F	1 1 2
Tunisia	6 5 NF	6 5 NF	6 5 NF	6 5 NF	6 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 6 PF	6 4 10
Turkey	3 4 PF	2 3 F	2 3 F	2 3 F	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	4 5 PF	4 5 PF	3 5 PF	3 5 PF	3 4 PF	2 4 PF	2 4 6
Tuvalu1	2 2 F	2 2 F	2 2 F	2 2 F*	2 2 F	2 2 F	1 2 F	1 2 F	1 2 F	1 2 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 2
Uganda	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	4 5 PF	4 5 PF	5 4 PF	5 4 PF	5 4 PF	5 5 10
USSR	6 6 NF	6 6 NF	7 6 NF	7 6 NF	6 7 NF	6 7 NF	6 7 NF	6 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 6 NF	6 5 11
United Arab Emirates	7 5 NF	6 5 NF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 10
United Kingdom	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 2
United States	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 2
Uruguay	3 4 PF	5 5 PF	6 6 NF	6 6 NF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 4 PF	5 4 PF*	5 4 PF	2 2 F	2 2 F	2 2 F	2 2 4
Vanuatu	4 3 PF	4 3 PF	3 3 PF	3 3 PF	2 3 F*	2 3 F	2 2 F	2 4 PF	2 4 PF	2 4 PF	2 4 PF	2 4 PF	2 4 6

Table 6 (continued)

Country	72	74	76	78	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88
Venezuela	2 2 F	2 2 F	1 2 F	1 2 F	1 2 F	1 2 F	1 2 F	1 2 F	1 2 F	1 2 F	1 2 F	1 2 F	1 2 3
Vietnam3			7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 6 NF	7 6 NF	7 6 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	6 7 NF	6 7 13
Western Samoa	4 2 PF	4 2 PF	4 2 PF	4 2 PF	4 3 PF	4 3 PF	4 3 PF	4 3 PF	4 3 PF	4 3 PF	4 3 PF	4 3 PF	4 3 7
Yemen (N)	4 4 PF	5 4 PF	6 5 NF	6 5 NF	6 5 NF	6 5 NF	6 5 NF	6 5 NF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 10
Yemen (S)	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	6 7 NF	6 7 NF	6 7 NF	6 7 NF	6 7 NF	6 7 NF	6 7 NF	6 7 NF	7 7 14
Yugoslavia	6 6 NF	6 6 NF	6 6 NF	6 5 NF	6 5 NF	6 5 NF	6 5 NF	6 5 PF	6 5 PF	6 5 PF	6 5 PF	6 5 PF	5 5 10
Zaire	7 6 NF	7 6 NF	7 6 NF	7 6 NF	6 6 NF	6 6 NF	6 7 NF	6 7 NF	6 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	6 7 NF	6 7 13
Zambia	5 5 PF	5 4 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 6 PF	5 6 PF	5 6 PF	5 6 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	6 5 11
Zimbabwe	6 5 NF	6 5 NF	6 5 NF	5 5 PF	3 4 PF	3 5 PF	3 5 PF	4 5 PF	4 5 PF	4 6 PF	4 6 PF	5 6 PF	6 5 11

The Record of Gains and Losses: 1973-1988

Table 6 allows the reader to roughly trace the course of freedom since the Survey began. It should be noted that changes in information and judgment since 1973 make many ratings not strictly comparable from year to year. Nevertheless, the table reflects the direction of trends in each country. (The reader should also note a correction in this table when compared with previous editions of this annual: the correction is described in the Notes to the Table.)

Since the Survey began, the world has experienced a number of gains and losses of freedom, either immediate or prospective. Most generally, there has been an advance of Soviet communism in Southeast Asia after the fall of South Vietnam, and at least its partial institutionalization in South Yemen, Ethiopia, and the former Portuguese colonies of Africa. In the Americas an imminent danger of the spread of communism has arisen in Nicaragua, and an erstwhile danger in Grenada. Perhaps equally significant has been the modification of communism in many areas. While mainland China is still a repressive society, it has increased freedom through the support of private initiative, through more open discussion in some areas, and through the sending of thousands of students overseas. While limits on freedom are often galling, most East European countries are freer today than at the beginning of the 1970s. Recently, Soviet leaders have become leaders in this development.

In Western Europe gains for democracy in Spain, Portugal, and Greece were critical to its continual advancement everywhere. After the setback in Chile, gains have been achieved in many parts of Latin America. Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Honduras, Peru, and Uruguay reestablished democratic institutions. Several countries that the Survey listed as "free" (freedom ratings of 5 or less) at the beginning may now be more authentically free. Colombia is an example. (El Salvador and Guatemala probably should not have been listed as free in 1973. El Salvador is probably freer today than in 1973.)

African democracy has not fared well during these years. In many areas there has been a noticeable decline, especially in countries such as Ghana, Nigeria, Burkina Faso (Upper Volta), and Kenya in which great hopes were placed in the 1970s. In Sub-Saharan Africa only Senegal seems to have made progress, and this remains limited. While there has been a very modest resurgence of free

institutions in Middle Eastern countries such as Jordan or Egypt, the destruction of Lebanon's democracy will be hard to make up. Further east, India has hung on tenaciously to its freedoms. The people of Sri Lanka have lost freedoms (although, amid violence, they may be regaining them); those of Thailand and Nepal have made some hopeful progress. In Southeast Asia, in the arc from Philippines to Korea, there has been a remarkable turn away from authoritarian institutions and toward democracy. We can only hope it continues.

During this period many new democratic states successfully emerged—in the South Pacific from Papua New Guinea to the east, and among the islands of the Caribbean. Yet 1987 saw the crown of this development in the Pacific—Fiji—succumb to an all too familiar military intervention in the name of ethnicity.

Elections and Referendums

Evidence for political freedom is primarily found in the occurrence and nature of elections or referendums. Therefore, as a supplement to our ratings we summarize in the accompanying Table 7 the national elections that we recorded for independent countries between November, 1987 and December, 1988. One or more elections from earlier in 1987 are included because they were overlooked in last year's annual. The reader should assume that the electoral process appeared comparatively open and competitive, unless our remarks suggest otherwise. For example, an extremely one-sided outcome implies an unacceptable electoral process. Its unacceptability may lie in the repressive context in which it is held, the exclusion of potential oppositionists from the process, or questionable electoral or tabulation procedures. To understand the context of elections in a particular country, consult the Country Summaries in Part III.

Although we do not include non-national elections in this table, they are occasionally more significant than national elections. Regional elections in the major democracies are certainly as important politically as minor elections in very small democracies. The reader's attention should also be drawn to the number of referendums that occurred during the year. In the course of the Survey work, we have seen a steady increase in the willingness of democracies to let their citizens more directly influence government policy through this means.

TABLE 7

NATIONAL ELECTIONS AND REFERENDUMS

Country Date	Type of Election	Results and Remarks
Afghanistan 4/5-14/88	legislative	geographically and politically restricted exercise; possibly some pluralism
Algeria 11/3/88	referendum	on constitutional changes; wins easily within a highly restricted system
Australia 9/3/88	referendum	people overwhelmingly defeat government's constitutional proposals
Bangladesh 3/3/88	legislative	most parties boycott, government wins; little independent supervision
Belgium 12/13/87	legislative	governing coalition wins narrowly
Botswana 9/26/87	referendum	80 percent approve change in electoral oversight
Cameroon 4/24/88	general	one party; choice among party-approved candidates; president receives 99 percent of votes
Canada 11/21/88	legislative	government wins bitter battle
Chile 10/5/88	referendum	people reject leader in very high turnout; demand change
Cyprus (G) 2/14,21/88	presidential	incumbent president comes in third; runoff shifts to left
Denmark 5/10/88	legislative	high turnout, mixed results
Ecuador 1/31/88	general	government loses badly; pres. runoff required
5/8/88	presidential (runoff)	moderate Borja wins
El Salvador 3/20/88	legislative	government loses to right, even in capital; winner disputes results low turnout as guerrillas oppose
Equatorial Guinea 7/3,10/88	legislative	99 percent approve single list
Finland 1/31,2/1/88	presidential	incumbent wins handily in first essentially direct election
France 4/24/88	presidential	incumbent far ahead (far right does well)
5/8/88	presidential (runoff)	incumbent wins
6/5/88	legislative	evenly balanced parties
6/12/88	legislative (runoff)	government narrowly misses majority
11/6/88	referendum	little interest in issue relating to New Caledonia
Haiti 1/17/88	general	major groups boycott; only serious contest at presidential level; army dominates
Iceland 6/25/88	presidential	incumbent wins handily; first time incumbent has been opposed
Iran 4/8/88	legislative	real contests; candidates must be approved by ruling group
5/13/88	legislative (runoff)	relatively low participation; lengthy checks of validity before and after

Israel 11/1/88	legislative	highly pluralistic, slight rightist gain
Kenya 3/21/88	legislative	controlled exercise; one-party nomination process criticized (President had been reelected by declaration 2/29)
Korea (S) 12/16/87	presidential	incumbent wins with third of vote; well contested, heavy turnout
4/26/88	legislative	divided opposition wins fair election
Maldives 9/26/88	presidential	incumbent wins with 96%; unopposed
Mali 6/26/88	legislative	some choice among one-party selected candidates
Mexico 7/6/88	general	first effectively contested election in generations; opposition makes important gains; accusations of widespread cheating plausible
Pakistan 11/16/88	legislative	opposition wins plurality; forms government
Paraguay 2/14/88	general	reported high turnout; incumbent 89%, little freedom in process
Senegal 2/28/88	general	contested; government wins handily; plausible accusations against process
Seychelles 12/5/87	legislative	single party, little contest
Singapore 9/3/88	legislative	well-contested within a repressive atmosphere
Sweden 9/18/88	legislative	government wins, "greens" gain

Switzerland 12/6/87	referendum	voters approve 2 (including one of the very few initiatives ever approved), reject one
Thailand 7/24/88	legislative	open pluralistic process; relatively fair
Turkey 9/25/88	referendum	government plan for local elections defeated
United States 11/8/88	general	governing party wins presidency easily; but opposition continues to control congress; only six incumbents in House defeated
Vanuatu 11/3/87	legislative	government wins with plurality; controls media
Western Samoa 2/26/88	legislative	incumbent party defeated; extremely close; outside judge brought in to decide
Yemen (N) 7/5/88	legislative	heavily contested; no formal parties
Zambia 10/26/88	general	government wins handily; little real opposition allowed

Political-Economic Systems and Freedom

The accompanying Table 8 (Political and Economic Systems) fills two needs. It offers the reader additional information about the countries we have rated. For example, readers with libertarian views may wish to raise the relative ratings of capitalist countries, while those who place more value on redistributive systems may wish to raise the ratings of countries toward the socialist end of the spectrum. The table also makes possible an analysis of the relation between political and economic forms and the freedom ratings of the Survey. Perusal of the table will show that freedom is directly related to the existence of multiparty systems: the further a country is from such systems, the less freedom it is likely to have. This could be considered a trivial result, since a publicly competitive political system is one of the criteria of freedom, and political parties are considered evidence for such competition. However, the result is not simply determined by our definitions: we searched for evidence of authentic public competition in countries without competitive parties, and seldom found the search rewarded. Both theoretical and empirical studies indicate the difficulty of effective public political opposition in one-party systems.

The relation between economic systems and freedom is more complicated and, because of our lack of emphasis on economic systems in devising our ratings of freedom, is not predetermined by our methods. Historically, the table suggests that there are three types of societies competing for acceptance in the world. The first, or traditional type, is marginal and in retreat, but its adherents have borrowed political and economic bits and pieces from both the other types. The second and third, the Euro-American and Sino-Soviet types, are strongest near their points of origin, but have spread by diffusion and active propagation all over the world. The Leninist-socialist style of political organization was exported along with the socialist concept of economic organization, just as constitutional democracy was exported along with capitalist economic concepts. In this interpretation, the relation of economic systems to freedom found in the table may be an expression of historical chance rather than necessary relationships. Clearly, capitalism does not cause nations to be politically free, nor does socialism cause them to be politically unfree.[2] Still, socialists must be concerned by the empirical relationship between poor freedom ratings and socialism that is found in tables such as this.

The table shows economies roughly grouped in categories from "capitalist" to "socialist." Labeling economies as capitalist or socialist has a fairly clear significance in the developed world, but its usefulness may be doubted in labeling the mostly poor and largely agrarian societies of the third world in this manner. However, third world states with dual economies, that is, with a modern sector and a preindustrial sector, have economic policies or goals that can be placed along the continuum from socialist to capitalist. A socialist third world state usually has nationalized all of the modern sector—except possibly some foreign investment—and claims central government jurisdiction over the land and its products, with only temporary assignment of land to individuals or cooperatives. The capitalist third world state has a capitalist modern sector and a traditionalist agricultural sector, combined in some cases with new agricultural projects either on family farm or agribusiness models. Third world economies that fall between capitalist and socialist do not have the high taxes of their industrialized equivalents in the first world, but they have major nationalized industries (for example, oil) in the modern sector, and their agricultural world may include emphasis on cooperatives or large-scale land reform, as well as more traditional forms.

The terms inclusive and noninclusive distinguish between societies in which the economic activities of most people are organized by the labeled, nontraditional system and societies in which the economic activities of fifty percent or more of the population are still organized largely by the traditional economic system.

States with inclusive capitalist forms are generally developed states that rely on the operation of the market and private provision for industrial welfare. Taxes may be high, but they are not confiscatory, while government interference is generally limited to subsidy and regulation. States classified as noninclusive capitalist, such as Liberia or Thailand, have not over fifty percent of the population included in a capitalist modern economy, with the remainder of the population still living traditionally. In these the traditional economy may be individual, communal, or feudal, but the direction of change as development proceeds is capitalistic.

Capitalist countries grade over into capitalist-statist or mixed capitalist. The capitalist-statist category includes states, such as

TABLE 8

POLITICAL SYSTEM:	Multiparty: centralized		Multiparty: decentralized		Dominant-Party
ECONOMIC SYSTEM: Capitalist inclusive	Antigua & Bar 5 Barbados 2 Belize 3 Colombia[4] 5 Costa Rica 2 Cyprus (G) 3 Cyprus (T) 5 Dominica 4 Dom. Rep.[4] 4 El Salvador[1/3] 6	Iceland 2 Ireland 2 Japan 2 Luxembourg 2 Mauritius 4 New Zealand 2 St. Lucia 3 St. Vincent[3] 3 Spain[1] 3 Suriname[1] 5	Australia 2 Belgium 2 Canada 2 Germany (W)[1] 3 Lebanon 11 St. Kitts-Nev 3 Switzerland 2 United States 2	Malaysia 9
non inclusive	Ecuador 4 Guatemala[1] 6 Honduras[1/4] 5	Thailand[1] 6 Western Samoa[2/4] 7	Botswana 5 Papua New Guinea 5 Solomons[2] 4	Gambia[4] 6 Liberia[1] 10
Capitalist-Statist inclusive	Argentina 3 Bahamas 5 Grenada 3 Italy 2 Jamaica[1] 4 Korea (S) 5	Panama[1] 11 South Africa 11 Sri Lanka 7 Turkey 1/4 6 Venezuela 3	Brazil[1/4] 5 Trinidad & Tobago 2	China (Taiwan) 8 Mexico 7
non inclusive	Bolivia 5 Morocco[1] 9 Pakistan[1/3] 6 Peru[4] 5	Philippines 5	India 5 Vanuatu 6	Bangladesh[1] Indonesia[1/4] 10 Iran[2/4] 11 Paraguay[1/3/4] 12
Mixed Capitalist inclusive	Austria 2 Denmark 2 Finland 3 France 3 Greece 4 Israel 4 Malta 3	Netherlands 2 Norway 2 Portugal 3 Sudan[6] 9 Sweden 2 U.K.[1] 2 Uruguay 4		Nicaragua 9 Senegal[1/4] 7 Singapore[1] 9 Tunisia[4] 10
Mixed Socialist inclusive				Egypt[1/3/4] 9 Guyana 10 Syria[1/4] 13
non inclusive				Madagascar[1/3] 10
Socialist inclusive				
non-inclusive				

Notes to the Table

1 Under heavy military influence or domination
2 Party relationships anomalous
3 Close decision along capitalist to-socialist continuum
4 Close decision on inclusive/noninclusive dimension
5 Mixed Capitalist-Statist
6 Noninclusive

POLITICAL-ECONOMIC SYSTEMS

	One-Party: socialist	One-Party: communist	One-Party: nationalist	Non-Party: military	Non-Party: nonmilitary
			Djibouti 12	Chile[3] 9	Jordan[2/3] 11
	Sierra Leone[1] 10		Cameroon[1] 12 Comoros 12 Côte d'Ivoire[4] 12 Gabon 12 Kenya 12 Malawi 13	Chad 13 Fiji[4] 9 Haiti 12 Lesotho 12 Niger 12 Transkei 13 Yemen (N) 10	Bhutan[3] 10 Maldives 11 Nepal[3] 7 Swaziland 11 Tonga 8 Tuvalu 2
				Ghana 12 Nigeria[3/4] 10	Bahrain 10 Brunei 12 Qatar[3] 10 Saudi Arabia 13 United Arab Emirates 10
	Zimbabwe 11		Central Afr. Rep.[1] 12 Zaire[1] 13	Eq. Guinea[3] 14 Mauritania 12 Uganda[3] 10	Kiribati 3 Oman 12
	Burundi[1/3] 13			Guinea[6] 13	Kuwait[3] 11 Nauru[3] 4
	Libya[1/3] 12 Seychelles[3] 12	China (M)[3] 12 Poland[1] 10 Yugoslavia[3] 10			
	Benin[1] 13 Cape V.I.[3/4] 11 Congo[1/3] 13 Somalia[1/3] 14 Zambia[3] 11		Mali[1] 12 Rwanda[1/3] 12 Togo[1] 12	Burkina Faso 13	
	Algeria[1] 11 Sao Tome & Principe[3/4] 13	Albania 14 Bulgaria 14 Cuba 13 Czechoslovakia 13 Germany (E) 13	Hungary[3] 9 Korea (N) 14 Mongolia 14 Romania 14 USSR 11 Vietnam 13		
	Angola 14 Benin[1/3] 14 Guinea-Bissau[1/3] 13 Iraq[3/4] 14 Mozambique 13 Tanzania 12 Yemen (S)[1] 14	Afghanistan 12 Cambodia 14 Ethiopia[1] 13 Laos 12			

Brazil, Turkey, or Saudi Arabia, that have very large government productive enterprises, either because of an elitist development philosophy or major dependence on a key resource such as oil. Government interferes in the economy in a major way in such states, but not primarily because of egalitarian motives. Mixed capitalist systems, such as those in Israel, the Netherlands, or Sweden, provide social services on a large scale through governmental or other nonprofit institutions, with the result that private control over property is sacrificed to egalitarian purposes. These nations still see capitalism as legitimate, but its legitimacy is accepted grudgingly by many in government. Mixed socialist states, such as Syria or Poland, proclaim themselves to be socialist but in fact allow rather large portions of the economy to remain in the private domain.

Socialist economies, on the other hand, strive programmatically to place an entire national economy under direct or indirect government control. States such as the USSR or Cuba may allow some modest private productive property, but this is only by exception, and rights to such property can be revoked at any time. The leaders of noninclusive socialist states have the same goals as the leaders of inclusive socialist states, but their relatively primitive economies or peoples have not yet been effectively included in the socialist system. Such states generally have a small socialized modern economy and a large preindustrial economy in which the organization of production and trade is still largely traditional. It should be understood that the characterizations in the table are impressionistic; the continuum between capitalist and socialist economies is necessarily cut arbitrarily into categories for this presentation.

Political systems range from democratic multiparty to absolutist one-party systems. Theoretically, the most democratic countries should be those with decentralized multiparty systems, for here important powers are held by the people at two or more levels of the political system, and dissent is legitimated and mobilized by opposition parties. More common are centralized multiparty systems, such as France or Japan, in which the central government organizes lower levels of government primarily for reasons of efficiency. Dominant-party systems allow the forms of democracy, but structure the political process so that opposition groups do not have a realistic chance of achieving power. They often face censorship, vote fraud, imprisonment, or other impediments.

The now classical form of one-party rule is that in states such as the USSR or Vietnam that proclaim themselves to be communist. The slightly larger group of socialist one-party states are ruled by elites that use Marxist-Leninist rhetoric, organize ruling parties very much along communist lines, but either do not have the disciplined organization of communist states or have explicitly rejected one or another aspect of communism. A final group of nationalist one-party states adopts the political form popularized by the communists (and the fascists in the last generation), but the leaders generally reject the revolutionary ideologies of socialist or communist states and fail to develop the totalitarian controls that characterize those states. There are several borderline states that might be switched between socialist and nationalist categories (for example, Libya). "Socialist" is used here to designate a political rather than economic system. A socialist "vanguard party" established along Marxist-Leninist lines will almost surely develop a socialist economy, but a state with a socialist economy need not be ruled by a vanguard party. It should be pointed out that the totalitarian-libertarian continuum is not directly reflected by the categorization in this table.

Nonparty systems can be democratic, as in the small island of Nauru, but generally they are not. Nepal's nonparty system is one of the most democratic of attempts to establish such systems. Other nonparty systems may be nonmilitary nonparty systems such as Tonga or Saudi Arabia, or military nonparty systems, such as that in Niger.

Social and Economic Comparisons

Table 9, social and economic comparisons, is intended to help the reader relate the discussion of political and civil liberties to the more standard measures by which countries are compared. The table offers three measures of social and economic health alongside the Survey rating. The measures are GNP/Capita, under five mortality, and literacy. In gathering the data for the first three, an attempt was made to derive from a wealth of conflicting data a reasonable figure for each country. In many cases the data are doubtful either because the figures have not actually been gathered, or because of political considerations. It seems most unlikely, for

TABLE 9

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC COMPARISONS*

	GNP per Person	Under 5 Mortality per 1000	Adult Literacy per 100	Freedom Rating
Afghanistan[3/4]	200	330	24	12
Albania	950	52	75	14
Algeria	2500	117	50	11
Angola[2/3]	500	242	41	14
Antigua & Barb.	2500	32	89	5
Argentina	2100	40	96	3
Australia	10800	11	100	2
Austria	9100	13	100	2
Bahamas	7000	30	89	5
Bahrain	10500	35	72	10
Bangladesh	150	196	33	9
Barbados	4600	16	98	2
Belgium	9000	13	100	2
Belize	1100	23	91	3
Benin	270	193	26	14
Bhutan	150	266	18	10
Bolivia	500	184	74	5
Botswana	900	99	71	5
Brazil	1900	91	78	5
Brunei	20900	14	80	12
Bulgaria	5690	21	96	14
Burkina Faso	150	245	13	13
Burma	180	91	78	13
Burundi	230	200	34	13
Cambodia	75	216	75	14
Cameroon	800	162	56	12
Canada	13000	10	100	2
Cape Verde	400	95	50	11
Cen. Afr. Rep	270	232	41	12
Chad	80	232	26	13
Chile	1800	26	97	9
China (M)	370	50	69	12
China (T)	2800	9	92	8
Colombia	1350	72	88	5
Comoros	300	135	48	12

Table 9 (continued)

	GNP per Person	Under 5 Mortality per 1000	Adult Literacy per 100	Freedom Rating
Congo	1000	122	63	13
Costa Rica	1250	25	94	2
Cote d'Ivoire	620	157	43	12
Cuba	1600	19	96	13
Cyprus (G)	3700	17	89	3
Cyprus (T)	na	na	na	5
Czechoslovakia	7000	17	100	13
Denmark	11000	10	100	2
Djibouti	480	257	12	12
Dominica	1100	30	80	4
Dominican Rep.	900	88	77	4
Ecuador	1150	92	82	4
Egypt	700	136	45	9
El Salvador[2]	710	91	72	6
Equa. Guinea	180	223	37	14
Ethiopia	130	257	11	13
Fiji	1800	34	86	9
Finland	10800	8	100	3
France	9800	11	99	3
Gabon	3500	178	62	12
Gambia	250	292	25	6
Germany (E)	8000	13	100	13
Germany (W)	10900	12	100	3
Ghana	380	153	53	12
Greece	3900	18	92	4
Grenada	900	20	50	3
Guatemala	1200	109	55	6
Guinea	330	259	28	13
Guinea-Bissau	180	232	31	13
Guyana	580	41	96	10
Haiti	340	180	38	12
Honduras	730	116	59	5
Hungary[3]	5000	21	99	9
Iceland	11000	7	100	2
India	250	158	44	5

Table 9 (continued)

	GNP per Person	Under 5 Mortality per 1000	Adult Literacy per 100	Freedom Rating
Indonesia	540	126	74	10
Iran[3]	3500	162	51	11
Iraq	1900	100	47	14
Ireland	4800	12	100	2
Israel	5000	16	95	4
Italy	6500	13	97	2
Jamaica	1000	25	92	4
Japan	11300	9	100	2
Jordan	1600	65	75	11
Kenya	300	121	59	12
Kiribati	460	100	100	3
Korea (N)	1000	35	90	14
Korea (S)	2100	35	92	5
Kuwait	16000	25	70	11
Laos	200	170	84	12
Lebanon	1600	56	77	11
Lesotho	500	144	74	12
Liberia	470	215	35	10
Libya	8000	130	66	12
Luxembourg	13000	11	100	2
Madagascar	250	97	68	10
Malawi	180	275	41	13
Malaysia	2000	38	73	9
Maldives	300	91	82	11
Mali	140	302	17	12
Malta	3400	14	81	3
Mauritania	425	223	17	12
Mauritius	1100	32	83	4
Mexico	2000	73	90	7
Mongolia	1000	64	90	14
Morocco[2]	650	130	33	9
Mozambique[2]	360	252	17	13
Nauru	19000	38	99	4
Nepal	160	206	26	7
Netherlands	9200	10	100	2

Table 9 (continued)

	GNP per Person	Under 5 Mortality per 1000	Adult Literacy per 100	Freedom Rating
New Zealand	7300	14	100	2
Nicaragua[2]	850	104	85	9
Niger	200	237	14	12
Nigeria	760	182	43	10
Norway	13900	10	100	2
Oman	7000	172	30	12
Pakistan	380	174	30	6
Panama	2000	35	88	11
Pap. New Guinea	720	94	45	5
Paraguay	1000	61	88	12
Peru	1000	133	85	5
Philippines	650	78	86	5
Poland[3]	4500	21	100	10
Portugal	2000	22	85	3
Qatar	18000	43	51	10
Romania[3]	3500	31	97	14
Rwanda	290	214	47	12
St. Kitts-Nevis	1500	36	92	3
St. Lucia	1200	22	60	3
St. Vincent	900	33	84	3
Sao Tome & P.	320	80	60	13
Saudi Arabia[2]	10000	101	30	13
Senegal	380	231	28	7
Seychelles[2]	2500	20	57	12
Sierra Leone	370	302	29	10
Singapore	7400	12	86	9
Solomon Isls.	600	50	50	4
Somalia[2]	270	257	12	14
South Africa[2/3]	2300	104	46	11
Spain	4500	12	95	3
Sri Lanka	350	48	87	7
Sudan[2]	350	187	25	9
Suriname	3000	41	90	5
Swaziland	800	182	68	11
Sweden	11800	8	100	2

Table 9 (continued)

	GNP per Person	Under 5 Mortality per 1000	Adult Literacy per 100	Freedom Rating
Switzerland	16000	9	100	2
Syria[2]	1600	71	60	13
Tanzania[2]	260	183	80	12
Thailand	825	55	91	6
Togo	250	160	41	12
Tonga[2]	1000	28	90	8
Transkei	na	na	na	13
Trinidad & Tob.	6500	26	96	2
Tunisia	1300	110	54	10
Turkey	1130	104	74	6
Tuvalu	700	40	95	2
Uganda[2]	300	178	57	10
USSR	7400	29	99	11
Un.Arab Emirs.	20000	43	71	10
United Kingdom	8500	12	100	2
United Sthtes[2]	16400	13	96	2
Uruguay	1700	32	94	4
Vanuatu[2/4]	800	100	10	6
Venezuela	3400	45	88	3
Vietnam	200	98	90	13
Western Samoa	700	50	98	7
Yemen (N)[2]	550	210	10	10
Yemen (S)[2]	550	210	40	14
Yugoslavia[2]	2200	31	90	10
Zaire[2]	170	170	61	13
Zambia	450	135	70	11
Zimbabwe	700	121	75	11

Notes to the Table

1. Aside from the Freedom Ratings (Table 3 above), the sources for the table data were UNICEF, **Statistics on Children in UNICEF Assisted Countries** (New York: 1987); UNICEF, **The State of the World's Children** (New York: 1987); Population Reference Bureau, **1987 World Population Data Sheet** (Washington: 1987); **1987 Britannica Book of the Year**, "World Data," pages 577ff. and 812ff.
2. This country's literacy figure is questionable or incomparable
3. The GNP for this country is questionable or incomparable.
4. The mortality rates for this country are questionable.

TABLE 10

HUMAN SUFFERING, WOMEN'S EQUALITY, AND FREEDOM

	Human Suffering Index	Women's Status Index	Women's Advancement Rating	Freedom Rating
Afghanistan	88	74	7	12
Albania	47		6	14
Algeria	67	52.5	5	11
Angola	91		6	14
Antigua & Barb.			4	5
Argentina	38	32	3	3
Australia	16	20.5	3	2
Austria	9	24.5	3	2
Bahamas			4	5
Bahrain			5	10
Bangladesh	79	78.5	7	9
Barbados		26	3	2
Belgium	9	23	3	2
Belize			3	3
Benin	83		6	14
Bhutan	80		5	10
Bolivia	66	53	5	5
Botswana	60	47	4	5
Brazil	50	45.5	4	5
Brunei			6	12
Bulgaria	20	22	5	14
Burkina Faso	84		6	13
Burma	61		6	13
Burundi	77		6	13
Cambodia	80		6	14
Cameroon	78	60	5	12
Canada	9	19.5	2	2
Cape Verde			5	11
Cen. Afr. Rep.	84		6	12
Chad	88		6	13
Chile	46	40.5	4	9
China (M)	50	41.5	5	12
China (T)		33		8
Colombia	44	40	4	5
Comoros			6	12

Table 10 (continued)

	Human Suffering Index	Women's Status Index	Women's Advancement Rating	Freedom Rating
Congo	74		6	13
Costa Rica	40	30.5	3	2
Cote d'Ivoire	73		5	12
Cuba	31	31	4	13
Cyprus (G)			3	3
Cyprus (T)				5
Czechoslovakia	20	23	5	13
Denmark	9	20	3	2
Djibouti			6	12
Dominica			4	4
Dominican Rep.	53	43	4	4
Ecuador	54	39	4	4
Egypt	55	62	5	9
El Salvador	65	44.5	5	6
Equa. Guinea			6	14
Ethiopia	82		6	13
Fiji			4	9
Finland	16	15	2	3
France	14	24	3	3
Gabon			6	12
Gambia			5	6
Germany (E)	15	18	4	13
Germany (W)	5	24	3	3
Ghana	87		5	12
Greece	25	30	3	4
Grenada			4	3
Guatemala	64	54	5	6
Guinea	82		5	13
Guinea-Bissau			5	13
Guyana	42	40.5	5	10
Haiti	74	56.5	6	12
Honduras	62	48	4	5
Hungary	17	23	4	9
Iceland	16		2	2
India	61	56.5	5	5
Indonesia	62	53.5	5	10
Iran	65		7	11

Table 10 (continued)

	Human Suffering Index	Women's Status Index	Women's Advancement Rating	Freedom Rating
Iraq	64	53	6	14
Ireland	23	34	3	2
Israel	32	29	3	4
Italy	16	26	3	2
Jamaica	40	22.5	3	4
Japan	11	31.5	4	2
Jordan	53	50	5	11
Kenya	77	55	6	12
Kiribati			4	3
Korea (N)	40		5	14
Korea (S)	44	38	4	5
Kuwait	35	50.5	5	11
Laos			6	12
Lebanon	46		5	11
Lesotho	69	54.5	6	12
Liberia	71	66	6	10
Libya	53	63.5	6	12
Luxembourg	6		3	2
Madagascar	68		5	10
Malawi	83	68	6	13
Malaysia	48	42	5	9
Maldives			5	11
Mali	88	74	7	12
Malta			3	3
Mauritania	81		6	12
Mauritius	39		4	4
Mexico	47	38.5	4	7
Mongolia	47		6	14
Morocco	66	61	6	9
Mozambique	95	55.5	6	13
Nauru			4	4
Nepal	81	63	6	7
Netherlands	7	25	3	2
New Zealand	16	23.5	3	2
Nicaragua	67	45.5	5	9
Niger	85		6	12
Nigeria	80	71	6	10

Table 10 (continued)

	Human Suffering Index	Women's Status Index	Women's Advancement Rating	Freedom Rating
Norway	14	18.5	2	2
Oman	53		6	12
Pakistan	73	72	5	6
Panama	47	32.5	4	11
Papua N. Guinea	68		4	5
Paraguay	53	43	5	12
Peru	61	42.5	4	5
Philippines	55	36	4	5
Poland	25	24.5	5	10
Portugal	33	28.5	3	3
Qatar			7	10
Romania	25	32	5	14
Rwanda	80	61.5	6	12
St. Kitts-Nevis			3	3
St. Lucia			3	3
St. Vincent			3	3
Sao Tome & Pr.			6	13
Saudi Arabia	56	70.5	7	13
Senegal	71	67	6	7
Seychelles			5	12
Sierra Leone	76		5	10
Singapore	18	33.5	4	9
Solomon Isls.			4	4
Somalia	87		6	14
South Africa	52	47.5	5	11
Spain	25	30	3	3
Sri Lanka	58	40	4	7
Sudan	77	68.5	6	9
Suriname			6	5
Swaziland			6	11
Sweden	12	13	2	2
Switzerland	4	27	3	2
Syria	61	60	6	13
Tanzania	75	60.5	6	12
Thailand	47	42.5	5	6

Table 10 (continued)

	Human Suffering Index	Women's Status Index	Women's Advancement Rating	Freedom Rating
Togo	82		6	12
Tonga			4	8
Transkei				13
Trinidad & Tob.	21	32	3	2
Tunisia	56	51	5	10
Turkey	55	47.5	4	6
Tuvalu			4	2
Uganda	71		6	10
USSR	19	23	5	11
Un.Arab Emirs	40	57	6	10
United Kingdom	12	25.5	3	2
United States	8	17.5	2	2
Uruguay	37	30	4	4
Vanuatu			4	6
Venezuela	44	33	4	3
Vietnam	69		5	13
Western Samoa			4	7
Yemen (N)	78	73.5	7	10
Yemen (S)	74		5	14
Yugoslavia	32	28	5	10
Zaire	84		7	13
Zambia	74	58	6	11
Zimbabwe	69	53	5	11

Note to the Table

Lower scores are preferable. Where data was not available spaces have been left blank. The human suffering index is taken from the chart, "Human Suffering Index" produced by the Population Crisis Committee in Washington, D. C., 1987. The Women's Status Index is adapted from the the chart "Country Rankings of the Status of Women", Population Crisis Committee, 1988. The "total scores" given in the latter were subtracted from 100 to provide results comparable to those in the suffering index. The scores for women's advancement is based on Raymond Lloyd's publication, "Women and Men", September 3, 1988. Pakistan's rating was raised slightly to reflect recent events.

example, that the under five mortality rates for North and South Yemen are exactly the same, or those for North and South Korea. But variations among countries with different systems, and at different levels of development, are so extreme that precision is not necessary for understanding, or searching for, the major relationships.

The quantitative measures chosen are those that offer the best available evidence for the presence or absence of economic and social growth, on the one hand, and the extension of the results of this growth fairly over a population, on the other. If a country with a relatively high GNP/Capita does relatively poorly in providing health services and nutrition for its young (and the under five rate serves as an indicator for performance here), or allows its population to remain unlettered, then we can rightly question the desirability of its institutions. If it is a democracy, we can question whether the formal institutions of democracy are actually working as they should to give the majority of the people a means to pursue their interests.

Table 10 supplements Table 9 by offering ratings or indices focused on the extent of human suffering and the position of women in the world. The first set of figures is taken from the work of the Population Crisis Committee. Their "suffering index" incorporates data similar to those presented in Table 9 (including that from the Comparative Survey), but adds to this measures of inflation, growth in labor supply, urban growth, per capita calorie supply, access to clean drinking water, energy use, and personal freedom. One can quarrel with what has been included or excluded from the table, but by and large it is reasonable to suppose that people in countries toward the bottom of the list would wish to live in those toward the top more than the reverse. Better living offers certain kinds of "freedom" the Comparative Survey misses. It is also true that for those placing particularly high values on political and civil freedoms, on religious liberty, or on a locally- threatened belief system this table would not be a reliable guide. Terror in a general rather than politicized sense, might also have been included in the suffering index. For some, placing Lebanon in the middle of a ranking of countries by suffering may seem mistaken.

Since the position of women is another test of the growth of equality and liberty—where women are severely repressed modern democracy may be impossible—the table offers two series on the status of women. The first, again from the Population Crisis Committee, looks at health, marriage and children, education, employment, and social equality; this time considering these and other factors in relation to inequality in what is available to, or achieved by, males and females. The second rating scale for women's status is taken from work by an individual who has long studied women's issues and followed closely the development of the Comparative Survey and its categories. By using the same 1 to 7 scale that is employed for the Survey's political and civil rights scales, his results are quite easily related to those of the Survey. While it is impossible to make such ratings accurate, or "fair" in the face of legitimate arguments against ethnocentrism, one suspects that the accuracy of these ratings is in the same range as that of the Survey itself.

Conclusion

Freedom continues to expand. This expansion has in the past few years encompassed nearly all developed states outside the communist orbit. More recently democracy has become the dominant political form of organization in Latin America. Today, it is expanding in both East Asia and the communist world. Significantly, in the latter only the most backward states, such as Romania, Albania, or South Yemen remain outside the general movement. Sadly, the supporters of political and civil liberties have failed to achieve permanent success in either the Middle East or Africa.

In noting the recent advance of democracy, the reader should be cautioned that in much of the world new structures of freedom are very lightly built. Economic and social problems, the enmities aroused by nationalism and fanaticism, threaten many new or aspiring democracies. New elites, whether communist or capitalist, have in too many cases failed to make a firm commitment to share power—and thus income—with their fellow countrymen.

The movement toward freedom is more and more to be seen as an aspect of modernization and modern communication reaching out from the developed democracies to the rest of the world. While the rise of the fascist powers in relatively developed societies in the twenties and thirties demonstrated that there was no necessary relationship between development and democracy, in our era this relationship seems increasingly to be accepted. In spite of the excursions attempted by religious and ideological fanatics, as people

develop societies, as their desires are extended and modernized, bot followers expect that there will be a growing regard fo and civil liberties, and human rights. It is our responsit to see that we do nothing to divert the world from this course.

NOTES

1. For further details on the methods and criteria used in the Survey see the foregoing chapter on definitions and criteria.

2. See Lindsay M. Wright, "A Comparative Survey of Economic Freedoms," in R. D. Gastil, **Freedom in the World: Political Rights and Civil Liberties, 1982** (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1982), pages. 51-90.

PART II

Political Participation in America

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

As part of an attempt to understand changes in American political life that may effect the future of freedom in this country, a small discussion group was convened at Freedom House, August 26-27, 1988. The particular topic of discussion was political participation, as reflected in the first instance by the turnout in elections, and in the second, by willingness to go into government service. In addition to the director of the Comparative Survey, who produces this volume, the attendees were: Gabriel Almond, Professor of Political Science, Emeritus, Stanford University; Stephen Earl Bennett, Professor of Political Science, University of Cincinnati; Curtis Gans, Director, Committee for the Study of the American Electorate; Richard Jensen, Professor of History, University of Illinois, Chicago; Paul Kleppner, Director, Social Science Research Institute, Northern Illinois University; Charles Levine, Professor, School of Public Affairs, American University; Howard Penniman, American Enterprise Institute; J. Bingham Powell, Professor of Political Science, University of Rochester; Roberta Sigel, Professor of Political Science, Rutgers University; and Peter Zimmerman, Associate Dean, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University.

After opening remarks by the moderator, the section opens with the three invited papers by Professors Kleppner, Jensen, and Bennett and the recorded discussions subsequent to each. This is followed by more general discussions of the issues. The first day's discussion centered on the question of changes in the willingness of Americans to vote; the second day added to this the question of willingness to serve in the government or bureaucracy.

The reader may be interested to note that the decline in voter participation in the United States that concerned most participants in the discussion continued through the subsequent general election of November 8, 1988. According to Curtis Gans, 50.16 percent of potentially eligible voters participated. This represented a 2.9 percent decline since 1984. He also remarks that this was the lowest turnout in a presidential election since 1924, and outside the South, since 1824. Bush's mandate was given by 26.6 percent of potential voters, the smallest mandate in a two candidate election in this century. Numerically, fewer people voted in 1988 than 1984—only 1944, in the midst of war, recorded an equivalent numerical decline in successive presidential elections.

OPENING REMARKS

GASTIL: Before we turn to Professor Kleppner's paper, some opening remarks are needed to provide a context for the discussion. The broader question we are addressing is the nature and reality of the long-term progress of political institutions and political behavior, of political rights and civil liberties. Political development has led to increases in the size of political units, their complexity, and organizational efficiency; more qualitatively it has led to advances in political rights and civil liberty. This development started out in a few countries and then spread to many others. And within those original countries it has continually deepened and widened. In this process, in the last two centuries the United States has been a leader.

Very quickly this brings us to the question, "Where do we go from here?" We presume, looking at the past, that the future will show the evolution of a more and more developed and inclusive democracy. Of course, sitting where we are, with only the past to guide us, it is impossible to know in what ways the democracies of the future will appear advanced in relation to today. We can surmise that some rights will be extended, and new forms of participation developed. I hope that the age of voting will not continue to drop, to go on down from 18, to 16, to 12. There is no obviously rational stopping place. I believe they now vote in Massachusetts prisons. In any event, as time goes on we can expect more and more peoples to be involved with democratic institutions, democracy to diffuse to more and more countries, and, with that, increasing respect for human rights.

Perhaps we will eventually achieve a kind of universal democracy. I often irritate some of my friends by pointing out that the best argument the Soviet Union has against the United States, when we argue that they should freely allow emigration, is the rejoinder "You should freely allow anyone who wishes to come to America." Answering this demand will be a critical problem for democracy, as we go forward to a universalization of the concept.

The concern that brings us here is that in the process of this development, seeds of destruction may be growing within the oldest democracies. Since the United States is in many ways the oldest, we

would expect to find this growth most evident within the United States.

All systems, as they develop, produce negative and positive feedback. Positive feedback has fueled democratic development—a little democracy leads to more—so that the system not only keeps operating, but starts expanding. You start with a few people voting, then more people voting, and then even more people, and eventually nearly everyone.

But any system also produces negative feedback. This provides stability based on an oscillating balance of forces. For the gains there are counterbalancing losses. In Kleppner's paper, his "middle period" is largely a discussion of negative feedback—as we were expanding the electorate with the right hand, we were contracting it with the left.

Negative feedback could also, of course, be much more than that. It could cause a permanent reversal of direction. This is one explanation of the history of the Weimar Republic: an explosion of democracy that eventually produced its opposite.

Another way to look at systems is to note that they all develop and adapt within specific contexts. This may be relevant to what we are doing here. When the context changes, the system may become maladaptive. Then it must change or collapse.

So we want to ask if democracy has produced changes that inhibit its functions. In terms of feedback, is democracy producing anti-democracy? And we want to ask if the environment of democracy has changed to where the system is no longer adaptive? Reasons for the problems American democracy faces may be found in increased mobility, increase and change in communications, in the sheer complexity of life, in the breakdown of a sense of community. With the incredible specialization of life today, there is a tendency of many people to collapse into their specialties, whether these be occupational or recreational or whatever, and to attenuate their identification with a larger, less specialized community.

Finally, if either of these tendencies are occurring—if democracy is feeding on itself, and destroying itself—or if the environment is changing in ways that make our old assumptions about democracy no longer adaptive, then are there ways to reduce or change these processes, or manipulate the environment, to get back on track? This is the policy aspect of our discussion.

Political Participation

To examine these questions we will look at the history and expansion of suffrage, and consider the role that political parties have played and may play in our political process. We will consider trends in political participation, particularly in voter participation, and examine arguments over the existence and meaning of these changes, including a comparative discussion of voter participation elsewhere. The day will conclude with a consideration of proposals to improve voter participation, asking whether these proposals are necessary or desirable, whether they will work or not.

Tomorrow we will go beyond voting to examine other problems of political participation, especially the willingness of competent people to participate in public service. We want to know whether the country is going to continue to have the quantity and quality of people that it needs to staff its political democracy.

Finally, we will try to put these questions together and ask whether there are general trends that may link together problems of voter participation and participation in the public service, and see if problems in both areas cannot be traced to similar causes. To the extent they can, we will consider whether there are common solutions or approaches to improving performance in these rather different forms of participation.

PPC

II. DEVELOPMENT, GOVERNANCE AND DEMOCRACY

Constraints to Development. In most developing societies, the character of social organizations, rather than lack of physical resources, is the crticial constraint to sustained, broadly-based economic growth and expanded opportunity. Patterns of organization which are inappropriate, inadequate or ineffective may results from a lack of technical knowledge, but they are also frequently rooted in the political process.

How public issues are debated, the ways in which laws are formulated, and how they are implemented by the state, all have a direct impact on how a society addresses its development problems. Suppression of citizens groups, restrictions on the free flow of information and curtailment of public debate distort how political issues are understood, and how options for dealing with these issues are formulated and decided upon. the legal and regulatory structure, and administration of the state can divert limited physical resources, constrain the development and employment of human capital, and inhibit broadly-based and sustained economic development.

Political systems will adversely affect economic and social development when there is:

1. **Violent civil conflict** and contests for political power which threaten public order and security, frequently resulting in loss of life and property;

2. **Arbitrary government**, unwilling to be bound by the rule of law and respect for basic human rights; and

3. **Unresponsive government**, unwilling or unable to address the basic needs of society and improve the lives of citizens.

Democracy. Democracy by itself is not sufficient to overcome these political problems. There are many historical examples of ineffective and incompetent democratic governments, just as there are examples of effective authoritarian ones. The academic debate about the relationship between democracy and sustained economic development is substantial, but thus far yields no firm conclusions concerning a direct, causal link between democracy and development.

Nonetheless, democracy is high conducive to successfully addressing development problems, and to establishing the basis for sustained economic growth. Democracy helps prevent abuses of power

and the emergence of a political system which inhibits and constrains (rather than supports and facilitates) broadly-based economic growth and social development.

Modern democracies channel and contain political competition and conflict through the periodic and orderly exercise of choice by (nearly) all adult citizens. These elections appoint representatives and transfer political authority (**elections through universal sufferage**). A key aspect of ensuring effective political competition is the free flow of information on public issues and open debate on the alternative ways to resolve them (**freedom of expression**). A second is the freedom to form associations and groups of citizens which can inform and influence public debate and articular the interests of citizens (**freedom of association**).

Governance. Having a commonly accepted system of choosing rulers, based on the principles of free elections, freedom of expression and freedom of association, does not inevitably result in good government. Nonviolent political competition, free flow of information and the ability to form associations to articulate group interests do not guarantee that the rights of xitizens are respected (**political and civil rights**). There are historical examples of gross violations of civil rights by democracies, such as the internment of Japanese-Americans during World War II or racial secgregation in the American public school system up through the middle of this century. However, democracy increases the likelihood that political and civil rights will be respected over the long term.

Similarly, democracy does not guarantee responsive government, but it does help ensure that officials of the state action only within the mandate given to them by authorized representatives (**rule of law**), and that their actions are open to public scrutiny (**transparency**). Governbment according to the rule of law, and transparency of state actions, make public servants responsible for their officials actions (**accountability**), and reduce the likelihood that the state will long ignore the wishes and needs of the majority of its citizens.

A.I.D. Program Objectives

A.I.D. supports open, democratic practices and institutions, and improved governance, in order to help developing countries aboid civil conflict and arbitrary, unresponsive government. These objectives are directly supportive of A.I.D.'s continuing mission of reducing poverty and alleviating human suffering in developing countries. These program objectives remain the same across the Agency, even though the ways of pursuing them can vary significantly across regions and from country to country within each region.

Examples of possible areas where A.I.D. may support specific activities include the following:

-- Promote nonviolent political competition

Elections through universal sufferage

- voter education and registration
- development of the electoral process
- election monitoring
- civil-military relations

Freedom of expression

- independent media
- support for indepedent policy research institutions

Freedom of association

- support for professional associations, civic groups, labor organizations

-- Promote lawful governance

Political and civil rights

- human rights education programs
- protection of ethnic or cultural minorities

Rule of law

- administration of justice
- judicial reform

-- Promote responsive goverance

Transparency and accountability

- decentralization and local government development
- strengthen financial integrity (auditing and accounting)
- improved management of the public sector

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ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS

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GOVERNANCE AND THE EXTERNAL FACTOR

by: Ismaïl Serageldin and Pierre Landell-Mills

The views presented here are those of the authors, and they should not be interpreted as reflecting those of the World Bank.

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ABSTRACT

There is an active ongoing debate worldwide on the design and functioning of governmental systems. Non-democratic governments are coming under increasing pressure to reform. Linked to this is a widespread conviction that centrally controlled economies are inefficient and that liberal market policies offer better prospects for rapid economic growth. Aid agencies are increasingly preoccupied with questions of governance that are seen to greatly influence aid effectiveness in promoting development. This paper seeks to provide a framework for the analysis of these issues. It attempts to define the essential core characteristics of good governance that enjoys wide acceptance internationally and then examines how such characteristics may be legitimately and effectively fostered in developing countries by external agencies. Lastly, the possible roles of the different agencies are discussed.

1/ This paper draws upon earlier work by the authors, notably Serageldin (1990 and 1991), World Development Report (1983) and The World Bank's Long-Term Perspective Report on Africa (1989). The authors are especially grateful to Dunstan Wai for his comments and advice.

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I. Origins and Growth of the Debate on Governance.

Inspired in part by the remarkable success of the Marshall Plan, development economists in the 1950s amd 1960s seemed self-confident in their ability to bring about sustained improvement in the welfare of poor nations. 3/ For many progress was seen as almost inevitable. This somewhat naive optimism has given place progressively to a sense of failure and self-doubt. The development process is now viewed as a much more uncertain process, and there is a growing recognition that the relatively neglected issues of governance lie at the heart of the problem. 4/ There is a renewed attempt being made to link political science, institutional economics, and neo-classical economics within a more coherent theory of development management. 5/

While by no means a new topic in the literature on economic development, 6/ the growing focus on issues of governance during the 1980s has been given new impetus by the collapse of the totalitarian states in Eastern Europe, by China's prodemocracy movement and by the popular call for multiparty democracy now widespread in Africa and Latin America. Public debate has centered on five underlying themes. First, the perceived success of market economies is contrasted with the increasingly obvious failure of centralized planning. Second, the abuses of authoritarian regimes have spurred countries to search for more democratic and responsive forms of government. Third, the inefficiencies of state enterprises and public agencies have led to a re-examination of the role of the state. Fourth, the growing concern that widespread corruption is siphoning away both domestic and foreign aid resources. And fifth, a resurgence of problems of ethnicity have greatly complicated the task of nation building and can no longer be suppressed.

With a rapidly evolving international situation, increased attention is being given to issues of human rights, democracy and governance in the context of a new world order. Donors' growing awareness that better governance is crucial to instituting effective development programs has sparked a debate on making aid conditional on improvements in governance.

The objective of this paper is to examine the possible role of external agencies in promoting good governance. To achieve this objective, it is first necessary to clarify what we mean by the term "good governance", recognizing that the concept is a highly complex one and is surrounded by intense controversy. The paper also

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3/ For example as expressed in the U.S. Government's support for the Alliance for Progress.

4/ See North (1990).

5/ Eggertsson (1990),

6/ e.g., the "soft" state "hard" state debate in Myrdal (1968).

attempts to clarify the basis for external agencies to intervene in such a politically sensitive area as governance. The paper is intended as a contribution to the debate on the possible efficacies and modalities of different external interventions; there is no *a priori* presumption that such interventions are either desirable or effective.

II. The Meaning of Governance

"Governance" is not a word that has been used extensively in the past by political scientists, but its recent appearance in popular usage has not been very rigorous. It has become in many ways both an all-embracing and a vague concept.

According to the Oxford Dictionary, governance means "the act or manner of governing, of exercising control or authority over the actions of subjects; a system of regulations." In essence, therefore, governance may be taken as denoting how people are ruled, and how the affairs of a state are administered and regulated. It refers to a nation's system of politics and how this functions in relation to public administration and law. Thus, the concept of "governance" goes beyond that of "government" to include a political dimension.

The World Bank's 1989 report on Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth, 7/ which forcefully raised the issue of governance in the context of Sub-Saharan Africa, defined governance as the "exercise of political power to manage a nation's affairs". 8/ And while there is no presupposition about the particular political form of government, the term does connote a judgement on the quality of government.

It is this broad interpretation of governance which will be used in this paper. It may be summarized as: ***the use of political authority and exercise of control over a society and the management of its resources for social and economic development.*** This broad definition encompasses the nature of functioning of a state's institutional and structural arrangements, decision-making processes, policy formulation, implementation capacity, information flows, effectiveness of leadership, and the nature of the relationship between rulers and the ruled.

This definition recognizes that a state's public authorities play an indispensable and potentially creative developmental role in establishing the environment in which economic operators function and in determining the distribution of assets and benefits. Conversely, it also implies the possibility that the apparatus of government may be "captured" by a self-seeking elite which may plunder a nation's wealth for its own narrow benefit and, in so doing, obstruct development. From time immemorial,

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7/ World Bank (1989).

8/ This definition was first proposed by Wai (1985).

societies have struggled to establish governmental systems that promoted the public interest only too often to find that in practice the ruling elite diverted public resources to its private benefit and retained power by violent and arbitrary means. 9/

There are, in most societies, social and ethnic divisions which must be reconciled if the conditions for good governance are to be established. These divisions, and the tensions they generate, may make compromise inevitable and consequently not all the conditions for good governance can be achieved even by a competent and well intentioned government. But too often these problems are deliberately exaggerated to mask the rapacious and exploitative actions of the ruling elite and their supporters. However, sheer lack of capacity also limits the ability of public authorities to fulfill their responsibilities even when they are fully committed to doing so.

Above and beyond these concerns, there is the more profound issue of the precise relationship between the different components of governance and development, and beyond that the question of what is meant by the term "development". Thus, while it can be plausibly argued that freedom of expression, institutional pluralism, transparency, accountability, participatory approaches, and the like (all seen as key ingredients in the process of democracy) are important aspects of "good governance", the evidence is far from overwhelming that multiparty democracy which is being urged on developing countries by some western donors is necessary for achieving social and economic development. 10/ The cases of Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore stand out in the 1960s and 1970s and more recently the performance of Chile stands out in the 1980s, not only in terms of economic growth, but also in respect of social indicators and poverty reduction. Spending on education and health out-performed other countries 11/ and beyond the aggregate spending levels, the poor benefitted to an increasing degree at the expense of the rich 12/.

There are, of course, numerous examples of dictatorships ruining economies, but these are matched by examples of inept or corrupt democratic regimes. Examples can be found, too, of relatively successful, clean and well-run democracies (e.g., Malaysia, Botswana and Mauritius). Objectively, the best that can be said is that the evidence is mixed. Totally benevolent dictators are rare now as they were in Hobbes' time, but on the other hand democracies have an unfortunate tendency to produce crude populism that is equally inimical to good governance and sustainable development.

9/ See, for example, S. Huntington (1968), G. Hyden (1983) and P. Chabal (1986).

10/ S. Huntington and J. Nelson (1976)

11/ World Development Report (1990) Ch. 9 "Equity and Justice", pp 131-151.

12/ See World Development Report. (1990) p. 117.

Economic and social progress are not the only objectives being sought. Freedom from fear, from arbitrary arrest, the ability to practice free speech, free association, as well as to run for and obtain political office, can all be viewed as elements of living a fuller and more meaningful life 13/. It is, therefore, arguable that actions in these areas can and should be subsumed under a broadened heading of development well-being 14/. Indeed, although the performance of Chile's military regime in the 1980s was not only an economic success, but also as a success in improving social indicators, at the first open elections (1989) the regime was voted out of office because of its repressive character and its systematic transgressions against human rights. The people have therefore unambiguously indicated their "utility function" and their perception of well-being.

While in general terms the notions of participation, freedom, transparency, and accountability as key ingredients for good governance, country situations are never identical. Moreover, it must be recognized that significant improvements in some areas may not be accompanied by improvements in others, and that the "acceptable" level of deviance from an ideal still remains a subjective matter 15/. Conceptually, it is almost impossible to reduce the complex institutional, social, cultural, 16/ political, economic, legal, and other realities of the web of interactions that makes up a modern society and polity to a single measurement of good governance or even to a number of such indicators. The interpretability of whatever indicator is selected poses problems, too, except if measured linearly against itself, (i.e., whether the country is improving or deteriorating) and only by that particular yardstick.

Individual country circumstances are such that judgmental approaches are inescapable. Is a government actively repressing its citizens by the use of force or is it defending itself against insidious destabilization efforts launched from the outside? In practically every instance, there is a little of both, and judgements as to the legitimacy of the government, the representativeness that it enjoys, the adequacy of its policies, and the appropriateness of its actions, are all inescapable.

Further complicating the conceptual domain, is the notion that one can frequently run into situations where governments perform well in respect of one set of indicators

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13/ These issues, much debated by Greek and Chinese philosophers, have again come to the fore in the work of distinguished researchers, see for example Sen (1989) and Sen (1990).

14/ The issue of welfare and well-being is treated by many but see especially Sen (1979) Ch. 9 "Equity and Justice", pp 131-151. and Sen (1984) part IV "Morals and Mores" and Part V. "Goods and Well-being", pp. 227-369.

15/ See inter alia H.F. Spirer (1989) and L. Grosenick (1984).

16/ The Cultural Dimensions of Development are receiving increasing attention. See inter alia I. Serageldin (1990) and D. Etounga (1991).

and perform poorly in others (Chile in the 1980s, for example), and since there is limited ability, at least at present, in bringing together the various elements of this complex social, cultural, political, legal and economic reality, moving from this confused conceptual situation to an operational one is fraught with difficulty. The UNDP's current work on Human Development 17/ represent some important first steps in resolving these issues.

III. The Characteristics of Good Governance

Given the conceptual complexity noted above, the only viable practical approach is to try to identify and foster those aspects of governance that seem least controversial. Thus, while there are many different views as to what constitutes good governance, some of which are ethnocentric or culturally determined, the central thesis of this paper is that we can specify a minimal core of characteristics which, if not universally accepted, are nonetheless widely agreed. In large measure, these derive from, or are related to, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 18/ which has been signed and thus accepted, at least nominally, by the vast majority of countries as representing the moral consensus of the international community of nations. This core includes the following:

- The political rulers and government officials are both held accountable to the ruled for their actions through clearly formulated and transparent processes, and more particularly that the legitimacy of a government is regularly established through some well defined open process of public choice such as elections, referendum, etc. (Article 21);

- The safety and security of citizens is assured (Articles 3 & 5) and the rule of law prevails, such that contracts can be fairly enforced both among private operators (individuals or enterprises) and between a private operator and the state. Moreover, citizens should be legally protected from arbitrary or capricious actions by public authorities (Articles 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 & 28);

- Public agencies are responsive to the need of the public and social and economic development is promoted for the benefit of all citizens in an equitable manner (Articles 22, 23, 24 & 25);

17/ UNDP (1991).

18/ The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted and proclaimed by the UN General Assembly resolution 217 (III) of 10 December 1948.

- The ready availability of information that will permit accountability to be practiced, laws to be correctly applied, markets to function, and people to be creative and innovative (Article 19);

- Freedom of association and expression of opinions (Articles 19 & 20).

These general principles were subsequently articulated in a series of documents, 19/ the most important of these being the International Covenants on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and on Civil and Political Rights 20/. Their relevance to international institutions as well as governments has been the subject of scholarly study 21/.

It is important to note that there are two distinct but intimately intertwined dimensions of governance: one is *political* (and relates to the degree of genuine commitment to the achievement of good governance) and the other is *technical* (and relates to issues of efficiency and public management). Both must be addressed. Without political commitment little can be achieved, even with an efficient public administration. But without an efficient public administration a ruler however benevolent, or a government however legitimate, would be ineffective. Thus, above and beyond the factors listed above, it is self-evident that the performance of governments in promoting development broadly interpreted depends also on: the *economic role assigned to the state* and the nature of a government's functions, the *competency of public agencies* which deliver public services, and the extent to which

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19/ United Nations (1978).

20/ United. Nations. The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly Resolution 2200 A (XI) of 16 December 1966, 21 U.N. GAO Supp. (No.16), at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967). This Covenant entered into force on 3 January 1976. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly Eesolution 2200 A (XI) of 16 December 1966, Ibid., at 52. This Covenant entered into force on 23 March 1976. [Cited in I. Shihata "The World Bank and Human Rights: An Analysis of the Legal Issues and the Record of Achievements", World Bank, 1991].

21/ The importance of these documents and their reference to the work of such institutions as the World Bank has been the subject of an important study by the Bank's Vice-President and Legal Counsel, see I. Shihata "The World Bank and Human Rights: An Analysis of the Legal Issues and the Record of Achievements." This essay is based on a paper presented by the author to the International Third World Legal Studies Association Panel on the World Bank, Development Projects and Human Rights, at Miami, Florida on January 8, 1988, which was published with some editorial changes in Denv. J. Int'l L. & Pol, Vol. 17, No. 1 (1988). Data in this version have been updated to January 1991.

there is an *enabling environment* that facilitates and encourages the activities of private operators and the civic-minded behavior of public officials. 22/

The trend towards the disengagement of the state in productive activities, while re-emphasizing the state's crucial responsibilities for the provision of public social and infrastructural services and in creating an enabling environment, is having a major impact on issues of governance. Distinct, though related, is the parallel trend towards decentralization and the empowerment of local communities who are expected to assume greater responsibilities for public service delivery. 23/ Features that facilitate accountability can be built into these processes, as will be seen below.

But empowerment and greater accountability will not assure better governance unless public agencies are made more competent. This brings to the fore issues of technical management and, related to that, skill acquisition. It also highlights the need for institution building in the broadest sense.

Competent and accountable government dedicated to liberal market economic policies will not alone ensure development unless public agencies invest adequately in infrastructure and human resource development. When this is done, most elements are present to create a truly enabling environment where private operators can flourish. 24/

This then is the challenge of good governance. But, before we can explore the operational aspects of the role of external agencies in fostering the characteristics of good governance noted above, there is a fundamental issue not yet discussed which must be tackled -- namely, the issue of sovereignty. This question is addressed in the next section.

IV. Sovereignty, Interdependence and the International Community

Since the present international order is based on the concept of the sovereignty of states, it might well be argued that the quality of governance of a country is not a legitimate concern of any outside body. This proposition merits careful examination, particularly because the issue of governance is mostly raised by developed countries in relation to developing countries. And yet in their interaction, concerns about accountability and bureaucratic failure relate not only to the developing countries, but also to the external agencies involved.

22/T. Killick (1990).

23/ R. Bates (1988).

24/ World Bank (1989).

The concept of sovereign 25/ nations underlies all aspects of the international order. It implies reciprocal non-interference in internal affairs and respect for the territorial integrity of states and of the internationally recognized frontiers. Furthermore, the corollary of sovereignty is the recognition of governments who exercise this "supreme power over a body politic" and are presumed to be able to exercise their "controlling influence" over the affairs of the societies within the territorial boundaries of the "sovereign state" in "freedom from external control", in a word, to enjoy "autonomy".

There exists a network of diplomatic and other relations between such governments, providing formal channels for contacts and dialogue for almost all aspects of intercourse between nations. Indeed, all undertakings that commit societies, economically, militarily, politically and even on issues such as cultural exchanges and human rights, are entered into by national governments, not by some undefined society at large.

While idealists may posit a more perfect world based on a stronger international order, we must accept as our starting point the reality of a world made up of sovereign states. One must therefore approach any proposition involving breaching sovereignty with a great deal of caution.

The principal justification for building a world order on the basis of sovereign states is found to be in the recognition of the differences between human societies, and the inalienable right of each society to organize itself in the manner that suits it best, the formalistic expression which is "a peoples' rights to self-determination" and to be free from another people's imposition upon them of an order to which they do not subscribe. This, of course, was the basis of decolonization, independence and accession of many states to full membership in the community of nations. It also raises issues about the rights of minorities to secede from existing states and a host of thorny issues associated with the relationships between sovereign states and minorities within the boundaries of other sovereign states, which are clearly beyond the scope of this paper.

25/ Sovereignty is defined as:

a. supreme power especially over a body politic;

b. freedom from external control (autonomy); and

c. controlling influence or one that is sovereign, esp. an autonomous state.

Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary, Merriam, Springfield, Massachusetts, 1075, p. 1112.

More pertinent is the fact that sovereignty is subjected to some internationally recognized constraints such as respect for human rights. Such constraints are enshrined in international conventions 26/ to which governments have committed their sovereign states. There are also questions about the legitimacy or representativeness of existing governments, which lead to issues of de-facto and de-jure recognition of governments, usually as a result of conflictual changes of authority within a sovereign state. There is one notable case where the legitimacy of a firmly established government within a sovereign state was impugned by the UN General Assembly due to its systemic (not just systematic) violation of Human Rights, and that is the Republic of South Africa.

It is noteworthy, however, that while rejecting the representativeness or legitimacy of the present South-African government, these debates have not questioned the South Africa's sovereignty per se and have sought to remedy the situation by using diplomatic and economic sanctions. These were debated and adopted within the existing international framework; that is, within and by the community of sovereign states. Indeed one can see in this the legitimation of collective action both for dealing with individual situations and to set in motion a process for conflict resolution. More broadly, states are bound together in an international community by a web of international, multilateral and bilateral agreements that create mutual binding obligations within an established system of international law. We live in an increasingly interdependent world, where the actions of each state must take into account the effect of those actions on others.

Developing countries are particularly vulnerable to events in the rest of the world. Consequently, they have come to depend heavily on the international community for financial and technical assistance for their development. Donor governments and their publics are increasingly aware that the impact of their assistance is greatly affected by the quality of governance in the recipient country. Consequently they are concerned to foster good governance and have clearly announced their intention to become more proactive in this regard -- though in a positive rather than a punitive way 27/.

In this context, the role of the International Institutions is crucial in the sense that they can be viewed as expressing the will of the international community and therefore carry more authority than individual bilateral agencies. But at the same time, and for this very reason, their mandates in this area are strictly circumscribed. Against the backdrop of an international order founded on sovereignty, International

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26/ The most important of these are the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the Vienna Convention on Human Rights.

27/ See record of December 3-4, 1990 DAC Meeting, French President Mitterand's speech at La Baule on June 20, 1990, and UK's Minister Hurd's June 6, 1990 ODI speech.

Institutions have to respect their existing statutes. For a discussion of this topic, see Shihata (1990) (unless and until they are legally amended) and define their role on the basis of several key issues. *First*, is the role of International Institutions to provide support to those governments whose policies and programs correspond to what they feel they can support in the context of their mandate - or do the International Institutions have a responsibility to take on an activist role in getting governments to adopt such policies and programs? *Second*, if the International Institutions are to adopt an activist posture in pursuit of an agenda relating to governance, then what is the content of this agenda? And how does such an agenda relate to the statutes governing the International Institutions. *Third*, who determines the agenda? Looking at the World Bank's case, for example, is the agenda determined by the Member states? By consensus or simple majority? Would that "politicize" the agenda and poison the working atmosphere at the Bank? Clearly, the role of the International Institutions is a function of the sovereignty of the member states and the mandate that these same sovereign states are willing to give the International Institutions.

Beyond the question of who sets the agenda, and who gives the International Institutions the mandate to pursue it, there is the question of how it is pursued. The *modus operandi* of the International Institutions is also intertwined with the sovereignty of their member states, since ultimate authority (at least in the International Financial Institutions) rests with the representatives of governments. The staff only make the proposal, the relevant board or governing body has to approve it. The other party to any agreement with the International Institutions is the government of a member-state. In the International Financial Institutions' case, it is the borrowing government that must negotiate and sign the loans and credits -- not NGOs, not opposition groups, not intellectuals from that country, but the officially designated representatives of the government, exercising its sovereign rights.

While the ultimate beneficiaries may be "the people", or "the poor", given that International Institutions are constructed as associations of member states, the channel of communication remains the government concerned. This does not imply that International Institutions staff do not have the right to contact others in the country. The World Bank, for example, is obligated to form an independent judgement in deciding on an investment, and this calls for contacts with persons other than government officials and for field visits as well. Thus, while this requirement to form an independent judgement gives the World Bank staff some leeway to avoid excessive restrictions by governments of member states, it does not fundamentally affect the role of governments or the sovereignty of its member states.

Since poor countries generally have fragile polities and weak systems of accountability, with few autonomous institutions and little countervailing power to that exercised by the government at the center, external agencies are potentially key political players capable of exerting considerable influence in promoting good or bad governance. In raising the shortcomings of a country's governance, external agencies are calling into question its government's performance. Clearly, this goes further

than a critique of a particular program or project (generally regarded as a legitimate concern of a financing agency), to touch on the ability of a regime to govern effectively in the interest of its citizenry. This is a set of issues on which, to say the least, governments are likely to be defensive and where external intrusion could be considered to be offensive.

Beyond the considerations of sovereignty discussed above (and hence the efficacy of external interventions), tackling governance raises the fundamental issue of the link between government and the governed, and between state and society, which are both culturally and politically sensitive. Few development questions are merely technical; typically they involve a great deal of political judgement and there are no accepted means of arbitration between competing views. Such judgements are inherently hostage to cultural and social particularities. The intrusion of external views and judgement may well be resented and hence be counter-productive.

From this discussion, it is clear that the actions of external agencies, if they are to be effective, must be thorough convincing and assisting the governments in power to improve governance while accepting the sovereignty of the state. In this case, for there to be a successful partnership between external agencies and the beneficiary countries, there must be a strong recognition of interdependency on both sides.

While the governments of sovereign states have every right to resist the individual or collective actions of donors in fostering what they perceive to be good governance, bilateral donor agencies representing sovereign states equally have a right to condition their assistance on "measurable" progress being made by the recipient governments to improve governance. Moreover, there is a growing appreciation among donors that improved governance is central to achieving development and that external aid will never yield lasting benefits unless concrete steps are taken to tackle the systematic causes of poor governance. But the right to be proactive and the willingness to be so does not in itself ensure donor effectiveness in this area. It is therefore proposed in the next section of this paper to examine modes of intervention that seem both justifiable and promising. However, there is one other issue that must first be addressed, namely: how can donor agencies be held accountable by the international community for the actions that they take to promote better governance which will effect the welfare of many millions of people?

In the case of the International Institutions, it can be argued that there are already established mechanisms for their control and supervision via their governing bodies which invariably include both donors and LDCs. However, there is not a comparable constraint on the activities of bilateral agencies, which are subject to considerable pressure from their own interest groups and therefore need to be restrained by some form of international process for accountability. This may to some limited extent be achieved through the reinforcement of Consultative Group processes where donors would explain their actions. In addition, the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD is already a forum encouraging self-regulation which has done much to improve donor practices. Even though "peer" pressure does

act to constrain the blatant exercise of national self-interest by donors, it is a weak mechanism that needs enhancing. This is a topic that merits further study.

V. Fostering Good Governance

From the earlier discussion on the core characteristics of good governance that can be considered to enjoy a broad consensus internationally , it may be concluded that good governance depends on the extent to which a government is: perceived and accepted by the general citizenry to be *legitimate*; *committed* to improving general public welfare and *responsive* to the needs of its citizenry; *competent* in assuring law and order and in delivering public services; able to create an *enabling policy environment* for productive activities; *and equitable* in its conduct, favoring no special interests or groups.

For these conditions to be fostered, it is necessary (though not sufficient) to have in place credible arrangements for:

- *political accountability* through an objective system for periodically renewing the mandate of a government or changing the political leadership by peaceful and democratic means; 28/

- *freedom of association and organization* to prosecute specific interests (e.g., the formation of NGOs, religious groups, professional associations, cooperatives and the like), and to enable the supposed beneficiaries of government programs to participate effectively in determining and meeting their needs;

- nurturing an *objective and efficient judiciary* that administers the law objectively and impartially;

- ensuring the *bureaucratic accountability* of public agencies and officials through formal and transparent processes for monitoring and reporting promptly their actions (e.g., through the maintenance of proper financial accounts, public auditing and the imposition of prompt penalties for malfeasance, etc.);

- *freedom of information and expression* which is not only a prerequisite for achieving accountability and responsiveness to the needs of the general public, but is also essential for economic efficiency;

28/ J. Lonsdale (1986).

- fostering *efficiency* within public institutions by enhancing technical and management capacities and improving organizational arrangements and management systems.

In discussing the possible role of external agencies in addressing these different facets of governance, it is important to bear in mind the distinction between the political and technical dimensions of governance noted earlier. In addition, it is also important to address the three levels of government: central, intermediate and community. These correspond roughly to the macro, meso and micro levels used in economic analysis.

Let it be stressed from the outset that, given the risk of ethnocentric and cultural bias, it behooves the external agencies to be extremely cautious in proposing specific solutions for achieving the conditions for good governance listed above or advocating a particular arrangement for achieving them. Through dialogue and analysis, options can be examined, but ultimately it must be the responsibility of the sovereign state to determine its own home-grown solutions. For their part, external agencies within the legal limits of their statutes, have a right to judge whether the solutions proposed appear credible, to assist and to monitor their implementation, and to modulate their financial assistance accordingly.

Lastly, one must recognize that the facets of good governance are not all conceptually independent nor invariably complementary. Conflicts may easily arise at least in the short run. If open and participatory processes are pursued, for example, governance may become less predictable and efficiency can be reduced. Nonetheless, over the longer term it seems likely that the interlinkages will mostly be mutually reinforcing, since processes imposed on beneficiaries are generally less sustainable than those developed through a participatory process.

Political Accountability. Ostensibly governments exercise power for the purpose of promoting the well-being of the general populace. In practice there is a constant danger that the political and bureaucratic elites holding office will manipulate state power for their own benefit unless constrained. 29/ The classic mechanism for ensuring political accountability built into most constitutions is to subject the political leadership (and even other public officials at the three levels of government) to an electoral process with limited periods in office. This does not necessarily mean a multiparty system nor, as has been argued earlier, can it be objectively asserted that a system of democratic elections necessarily leads to good governance. But there is a wide consensus that some system of popular choice is normally required to legitimize a government, make it responsive to popular demands, and thereby help create an environment where public agencies feel impelled to devote themselves more to promoting development rather than to suppressing popular discontent.

29/ Bayart (1989).

External agencies can assist, and indeed are currently assisting, in promoting political accountability in various ways. *First*, there is much scope for conflict resolution, such as that attempted by the Carter Center (in Ethiopia and Sudan) and encouraged (as yet rather ineffectually) by various regional organizations (e.g., OAU and OAS) and by the UN system. *Second*, by helping to organize and monitor elections, as was done recently in Eastern Europe, Namibia, Panama and Nicaragua 30/. Occasionally, donors have acted by withholding external financial support from governments that have clearly lost popular support to the point where they cannot govern effectively until they adopt a credible process of legitimation, as was the case for Benin in early 1990.

While there should be no question of imposing a particular democratic system on any country, it would seem to be reasonable for the international community to withhold assistance from a government which cannot demonstrate that it enjoys some minimal level of popular support, and that those holding the highest political office submit themselves periodically to some form of genuine and transparent process of popular choice. Willingness of some donors to continue to deal with regimes that did not have minimal levels of popular support (such as that of Bokassa in the Central African Empire or Amin in Uganda) was largely ineffective in promoting development and arguably may have delayed rather than promoted good governance.

These matters are inevitably highly judgmental. To move more effectively towards a policy of aid sanctions will require a cautious, consensual approach that develops an internationally agreed and recognized framework for collective actions, that would involve the key OECD bilateral agencies as well as the developing countries.

Freedom of Association and Participation. Closely allied to the above concern is the question of whether a country's citizenry enjoys the freedom to organize according to specific interests. Institutional pluralism can be seen as an important mechanism for diluting and disseminating exclusive central political power. 31/ But it is not always conducive to stability. As has been demonstrated repeatedly, particularly recently in Africa and Eastern Europe, where people have shown a strong tendency to organize along ethnic lines, pluralism can be socially and economically disruptive. This is not a reason to oppose freedom of association, but it involves certain risks, which may call for special counter-measures.

At the national level, freedom of association means the freedom to establish religious groups, professional associations, women's groups and other private

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30/ At the request of the Argentinian government, the World Bank has been assisting Argentina to strengthen its elected local government system, concentrating particularly on fiscal efficiency.

31/ Ake (1990), Hyden (1990) and Korten (1990).

voluntary organizations to pursue political, social or economic objectives. Clearly it is the latter two which would be of principal interest to external agencies concerned with assisting development. Donors can provide valuable financial and technical assistance to such organizations, which can empower groups that are otherwise marginalized within the existing political and economic system. Surprisingly little has been done in this sphere, not so much due to official opposition as simply because this aspect of institution building has not attracted significant donor attention.

The situation is different at the local level. Considerable assistance has been provided by donors to grass roots community organizations and cooperatives, often channelled through NGOs. These are viewed as directly addressing the needs of the poor. The success of such initiatives in promoting better governance is evident from the political impact local NGOs have begun to have in a number of developing countries. The risks, openly acknowledged by those active in this field, are that the leadership of NGOs and community associations may be captured by local elites that are not responsive to the needs and interests of ordinary members 32/. The involvement of foreign NGOs may mitigate these risks, but ultimately systems of accountability must be built into the institutional design of each organization (e.g., the self-policing of cooperatives via cooperative unions as happens in the Cameroonian credit union movement 33/).

This leads to the broader role of external agencies in promoting the active participation of the ultimate beneficiaries of development projects and programs that they finance in both design and implementation 34/. There is now a wide consensus in the development community on the desirability of such participation and few governments would openly oppose the concept. Nonetheless, even for regimes that were not notably repressive, such grass-roots "democratic" initiative have frequently been regarded as potentially threatening and hence more reason for the external agencies to seek effective and genuine participatory arrangements, while giving due attention to the possibilities of local abuses. And indeed, by deliberately supporting the development of plural institutional structures, external agencies can help to create progressively an environment that will tend to constrain the abuse of political power.

A Sound Judicial System. There are few aspects of governance where consensus is more firmly established within the development community than on the need for an objective, efficient and reliable judicial system as a prerequisite for good governance. The means for achieving this has been to create a strong and independent legal profession capable of defining and imposing professional and ethical standards, and by instituting a process for the selection of judges based on professional criteria, by guaranteeing the judges' tenure of office. An essential

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32/ See J. Nelson (1989) p. 97.

33/ World Bank (1989), p. 94.

34/ See e.g. L. Salmen (1990) and D. Karten (1984) pp.176-188.

concomittant is the creation of honest law enforcement agencies that effectively carry out court decisions and to have a court administration that ensures that cases are dealt with expeditiously and at reasonable cost to the plaintiff.

The public acceptance of a country's legal system is in part a function of the citizens' perception about the fairness not only on the administration of established laws, but also of the laws themselves -- laws enacted by who and for the benefit of whom? Thus, achieving the rule of law is inseparable in a fundamental sense from the issue of political legitimacy. 35/

Typically external aid agencies have been reluctant to assist in strengthening judicial systems because the link to development is seen (incorrectly) as indirect. More particularly, external agencies have feared that their involvement in law enforcement will risk association with inequitable or unjust law enforcement. While very real, these risks can be exaggerated. The urgent need for solid legal training and for technical assistance in improving court administration poses no risks. Nor does assistance in publishing and disseminating a country's body of laws. Often there is no up-to-date, comprehensive set of laws available to the general public and the official government gazette is frequently not published regularly -- all simple matters that are nonetheless a prerequisite for the efficient administration of justice.

Weaknesses in the legal system -- ignorance of the laws and regulations in force, lack of predictability in their administration, delays in handling court cases, lack of enforcement of court decisions -- all tend to increase business costs, discourage private investors and generally obstruct development. Moreover, they imply considerable injustice and inequity. More fundamentally, there can be no legal accountability (a prerequisite for effective political and bureaucratic accountability 36/) without a sound judicial system.

The inefficiencies in a country's judicial system can be systematically tackled by a committed government and improvements can easily be monitored. Governments unwilling to address these problems may be viewed as lacking commitment to good governance and hence may be justifiably penalized by external agencies whose financial assistance is being sought.

Bureaucratic Accountability. To be fully effective, measures to achieve political and legal accountability need to be accompanied by arrangements to make bureaucracies accountable. To this end, the performance of public agencies and officials requires monitoring and an effective system to be put in place to correct bureaucratic abuses and inefficiencies. The issue is how to design arrangements that are not subject to political interference or manipulation by the officials whose

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35/ Kuitenbrouwer (1986).

36/ S. Paul (1990).

behavior is being controlled. This is partly a technical question, but equally a political, social and cultural matter. The two are closely intertwined. Political commitment to establish honest and effective systems of bureaucratic accountability can only be achieved through the existence of effective system of political accountability and a sound judicial system as discussed above. Without strong political commitment, there cannot be effective systems of bureaucratic accountability.

Even with strong political commitment, it is no easy technical matter to achieve bureaucratic accountability. Since much depends on the social and cultural environment that determines the ethical standards and social norms which underlie the behavior of bureaucrats. Nonetheless, considerable experience exists worldwide which can be drawn on. The need here is to follow the classic Japanese injunction to "adopt modern (western) technology, but keep Japanese spirit". In other words, bureaucratic systems must incorporate an incentive system compatible with local social values.

A critical dimension of accountability is transparency which implies making readily available for public scrutiny, all public accounts and audit reports (including those of all parastatal organizations), a practice that most governments strongly resist for obvious reasons. There can be little justification for secrecy and any exceptions need to be carefully circumscribed. Even secrecy about military expenditure is hard to justify and almost always is a cover for abuse. This is not a question of sovereignty, but simply a matter of good governance, that every citizen, as well as every donor, has a right to expect. They can and should insist on it.

At the core of bureaucratic (and political) accountability is the need for rigorous systems of financial management and procurement, with swift and tough penalties for malfeasance. Sound methods of accounting and auditing, and of customs duty and other revenue collection, are readily available and there can be no excuse for laxity. The same is true for procurement. External aid agencies have been extraordinarily tolerant of financial abuse and indeed have at times indirectly shown complicity in corrupt practices by responding to improper pressures from their own suppliers. The financing of "commissions" by export credit agencies is but one example 37/.

There is a considerable technical literature on other aspects of accountability. Much of it has focussed on monitoring inputs rather than outputs, although the latter is equally important. As Paul 38/ has recently stressed, there are in essence two ways to promote accountability in respect of the outputs: *exit* and *voice*. Where the supposed beneficiaries have a choice, as is the case with competitive markets for goods and services, expenditure switching (i.e., exit) effectively disciplines the

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37/ See, for example, P. Pean, (1988).

38/ S. Paul (1991).

suppliers. However, in the case of public goods and monopolies, the only way for beneficiaries to protect their interests is by making their voice heard -- ultimately through elections, but on a day-to-day basis through special-interest organizations (e.g., parent associations, trade unions and the like). As was discussed earlier, donors can play an invaluable role directly, or through local NGOS, in helping to build mechanisms for giving beneficiaries an effective voice in the delivery of public services. Here again vigilance is needed to discourage powerful interests capturing these mechanisms for their own benefit.

Fostering markets and helping to create quasi-market mechanisms (e.g. contracting out the provision of services such as refuse collection or road maintenance through competitive building procedures) is also a useful way to foster accountability and donors can help arrange for this. Other instruments that can be considered include the appointment of ombudsman and watch dog committees, holding public hearings and conducting opinion polls. Also loosening controls and simplifying the regulatory framework, if it facilitates competition, will increase the opportunities for exit. However, less regulation may equally increase monopolistic abuse. Again much care must be taken in designing the arrangements to fit the specific circumstances. There is, however, a happy coincidence in that depending more on markets and less on administered systems is likely both to improve economic efficiency and reduce the opportunities for "rent seeking".

Freedom of Information and Expression. The free flow of information is crucial for accountability. Efficient markets depend on good information as does the exercise of "voice". The need for the free dissemination of information goes well beyond facilitating accountability. Vital data such as that relating to national accounts, trade, balance of payments, employment, cost of living, household expenditures and the like are frequently withheld from the public and yet such information is essential to permit public debate of the performance of a government and its public agencies and to enable informed policy discussions to take place which is at the heart of a healthy political process. Moreover, good social and economic data are important for business planning and their absence is a hindrance to development.

There are many ways for external agencies to assist in the collection and dissemination of economic and social data and other information needed for informed public debate. And yet, their efforts in this field have been remarkably slight. The need is for sustained and coordinated programs to assist in building national capacities for data collection and dissemination, as well as to encourage public debate by financing seminars and public information programs 39/. It is not enough for the information to be available; analysis and research are also needed, and this should

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39/ The data collection through household surveys initiated under the LSMS program and adapted by the Social Dimensions of Adjustment Project in Africa, sponsored by some 11 agencies is a good example of what can be done.

not be a monopoly of the state. Donors can contribute to this process by funding independent research organizations and by supporting the autonomy of the universities 40/.

Capacity Building. Good governance requires not only political commitment and systems for ensuring accountability, the sound administration of justice and freedom of information but also competent public agencies. This is an area where external agencies have been active for many years, but still with poor results. The failure of external assistance for public management is partly because political commitment was lacking, but it is also due to the poor design of the interventions. This is not the place to examine the broad topic of external assistance for public management reform, but simply to state that much more imagination and determination is needed to deal effectively with the many issues involved. However, two features merit stressing: first, that capacity building is a long-term venture and external agencies need to evolve approaches that will enable sustained long-term support programs to be adopted. Second, external agencies cannot be fully effective unless they adopt a collaborative approach in partnership with the governments concerned. There needs to be a much more concerted effort to help governments define clearly a single comprehensive program of administrative reform and capacity building which all concerned can support. Examples of such programs abound -- including Ghana, Gambia, CAR, and Madagascar to name but four in Africa supported by the World Bank.

VI. The Differing Roles of External Agencies

There are many different external actors and each has its distinct role in fostering better governance depending on their varying missions and mandates. It is self evident that external agencies generally can more easily address the technical aspects of governance, but by no means exclusively so, depending on their nature. It is therefore important to discuss separately the possible contributions of each category of external agency. Little of what is set out below had not already been tried, but in most instances rather half-heartedly. It is only by pursuing these opportunities more energetically that progress may be made.

International and Multilateral Institutions. Since, except in the case of the newly created European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the statutes of international and multilateral institutions expressly rule out political considerations, the focus of their action must be on the technical aspects of governance. Thus, the World Bank and UN Agencies have been active in assisting countries in strengthening their public administration (including the administration of justice), reforming public

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40/ The African Economic Research Consortium, located in Nairobi and sponsored by the Rockefeller Foundation, CIDA and several other bilateral donors, is a good example of a donor-sponsored research program.

enterprises and building institutional capacities. This is entirely the right focus, though much more could be done to improve the effectiveness and sustainability of technical assistance in this area. In addition, there has been increasing effort to promote institutional pluralism by fostering local government 41/, NGOs, and grassroots organizations 42/with the objective of mobilizing local human and financial resources in the provision of community services. There is no reason why this support for institutional development cannot also be extended to assisting the growth of a whole range of non-governmental organizations including professional associations, chambers of industry and commerce. Lastly, institutional organizations are already a major (sometimes the only authoritative) source of basic social and economic data. This is an invaluable service which could be expanded.

Bilateral Agencies. Although international agencies have a particularly strong role to play in the areas noted above, bilateral agencies can also contribute significantly in similar ways. In addition, it is clearly open to bilateral agencies to use their influence to promote political accountability and respect for human rights. This would be most effective if it were focussed particularly on encouraging the rule of law in all its different dimensions. Helping to organize fair elections by furnishing both resources and observers is another possibility . The practice of supporting particular political parties, however, clearly undermines good governance by putting in question the political process.

Important opportunities exist for bilateral donors to promote honest government by channeling funds in ways that reduce the chances of corruption. By untieing aid, insisting on open competitive procurement procedures, and outlawing bribery or the payment of "commissions" by their suppliers. The United States has given the lead on this, but other OECD countries have so far been reluctant to follow.

Non-Governmental Organizations. There are two special contributions that industrial country NGOs can make to promote better governance. One is to support developing country NGOs and hence foster pluralism. Their relative small size means that they can operate more effectively than other agencies at the community level and they are less constrained by the need to maintain a special working relationship with the central government authorities. This gives them greater credibility with the groups they are assisting. The second is to address human rights abuses in a manner that is seen to be completely apolitical. Moreover, by achieving a strong reputation for professionalism and objectivity an organization such as Amnesty International has achieved considerable moral authority in international affairs. It is not unimaginable that a comparable institution -- perhaps to be called Integrity International -- could be established to expose major corruption. Such an

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41/ For example the multi-donor Municipal Development Program located in Harare, and sponsored by the World Bank

42/ L. Salmen (1990).

organization would need to be even handed in its treatment of developed and developing countries and would address the practices of both public officials and transnational corporations. Another area where specialized NGOs such as the Carter Center in Atlanta may be effective, as noted earlier, is in conflict resolution. This is related to various other humanitarian actions to relieve suffering and re-establish civil order in war-torn zones.

Yet another category of activities where NGOs can play a key role -- namely, in twinning arrangements or networks between groups with common concerns or shared missions -- professional associations, trade unions, chamber of commerce and industry, and other special interest groups.

General. The issue of *conditionality* is often raised -- on the one hand by representatives of some external agencies who believe that an element of coercion is needed to counter-balance the private agendas of the ruling elites, and on the other hand by developing country officials and many others who view coercion as either counter-productive or an unacceptable infringement of sovereignty. As a general principle, institutional reforms are unlikely to be sustained unless underpinned by a genuine political commitment. Thus, it is self-evident that a collaborative approach is likely to be more effective than coercion over the long run. However, it has been found useful in the context of structural adjustment lending to overcome inertia by setting a timetable for specific agreed actions (considered to be crucial for the achievement of program objectives) which is linked to the release of external funds. For this reason conditionality should be regarded as a judgmental matter, depending on the circumstances and the actions being sought.

VII. In Conclusion

While recognizing that the world order remains strongly anchored to the principle of the sovereignty of nations, nonetheless external agencies can contribute significantly to fostering good governance in those countries seeking their assistance. Let us reemphasize that we are talking about governance and not a specific form of government, and recognize that governance covers both political and technical aspects. The latter is essential for effective development. Without better governance aid resources are likely to be largely wasted. While concerted action among agencies would ensure a greater impact in fostering better governance, not all agencies have the same role to play. Bilateral agencies can press for political accountability, and non-governmental and some international agencies can address issues of human rights abuse and conflict resolution, while the international financial institutions are mandated by their statutes to promote only the developmental aspects of governance more narrowly defined. But all agencies could be more insistent on governments instituting more effective systems of bureaucratic accountability and could provide more targeted assistance programs aimed at strengthening capacity building for both public and private institutions. They could promote a more plural institutional structure, better information flows, the rule of law, and a more participatory development process. This, too, is a route to greater political accountability.

At one extremity donors will enjoin the willing collaboration of governments committed to improving their effectiveness. At the other extreme there will be governments that have entrenched elites strongly resistant to reform where the donors will need a solid front if progress is to be achieved. The majority will be somewhere in between. The goal is not some theoretical ideal state of governance, but rather to achieve progressive painstaking and systematic improvements. To this end it would be useful in the case of each country to set benchmarks in terms of each of the components of governance discussed above against which progress could be measured.

The effectiveness of external interventions will be a function of their sensitivity to local conditions and the degree of popular participation that is engendered. Although close coordination among agencies is a prerequisite for a concerted and coherent approach, the success of external interventions is likely to depend less on coercion and more on persuasion and on progressively changing internal power structures brought about by education, income growth and pluralistic institutional development.

Good governance is a fragile plant that will need sustained nourishing. It will require a fundamental change in mentality and social expectations that will change only gradually. However, the pace of change is likely to be strongly influenced by economic circumstances. Economic crisis can precipitate radical political change and lead to a rapid change in the perception of what is and what is not possible. We are living in a period of sueh crisis and change.

The possibilities for positive action by donor agencies does not negate the urgent need to understand better the complex conceptual and cultural issues related to governance. Some efforts are already underway in academic and international fora (e.g., the governance program at Emory University in Atlanta, Georgia and the UNDP's follow-up to their first Human Development Report). In the context of such thinking, complex matters raised in this paper -- the state-society relationship and the link between effective development processes and questions concerning legitimacy, power, representativeness and participation, as well as human and civil rights, the rule of law, political processes, patronage, corruption, etc. -- should all be the subject of further inquiry, and their multi-faceted nuances explored to arrive at a more lucid understanding of the issues surrounding the code word "governance". Thus, through a two pronged approach -- more thorough and complete conceptual analysis by scholars combined with pragmatic collaborative operational initiatives by donor agencies and recipient governments -- it should be possible to achieve significant improvements in governance.

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AUTOCRACY, DEMOCRACY, AND PROSPERITY

Mancur Olson

What incentives explain the emergence of government? How do the incentives facing the leaders of dictatorial and democratic governments differ? Do the democratic nations of the world have higher per capita incomes, on average, than the nondemocratic countries because of -- or in spite of -- their democratic governments? In this paper I shall develop an argument that answers these three questions. The main foundation stone on which my argument rests is an insight in Thomas Schelling's book on Arms and Influence. It was also because of Schelling that I became aware of Edward Banfield, and it was a quotation in a book by Banfield that happened to start me thinking, quite some time ago, about the questions with which this paper deals.

In The Moral Basis of a Backward Society, Banfield reported the results of interviews with the residents of a poor and remote village in southern Italy. One of the interviews was with a man in the village who believed in monarchism -- not in a figurehead monarch of the British or Scandinavian type, but absolute monarchy. The village monarchist suggested that "A monarchy is the best kind of

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government because the King is then owner of the country. Like the owner of a house, when the wiring is wrong, he fixes it."[1]

When, in my graduate student days, I read this quotation, I had never before come upon any similar argument, and the idea jarred against my democratic convictions. There was undoubtedly some truth in the monarchist's argument: the owner of a country would indeed have an incentive to make his property as productive and valuable as possible. The monarch's subjects would presumably also gain something from this. Yet I believed that democracy is probably the highest form of government and that absolute monarchy was a totally outdated idea. Thus it was natural to ask, "Can our belief that democracy is a much better form of government than absolute monarchy be reconciled with the obvious germ of truth in the village monarchist's argument?" Some may think this question is silly or trivial, but it bothered or intrigued me so much that I have been thinking of it, off and on, over most of my career. When, more recently, I came upon an answer to this question, it seemed worth developing into a systematic analysis or model of anarchy, autocracy, and democracy.

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[1] The Moral Basis of a Backward Society (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press/Research Center in Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago, 1958), p 26. Charmingly, the monarchist who is quoted joined the Communist party a few weeks after making the statement, and then a few weeks later became a monarchist again.

II

To develop an intellectual framework that does justice to the village monarchist's argument and to the visceral belief in democracy that most of us have, we need to go back to basic questions about why government's are needed and how they came to exist. Since governments are the main custodians of the power to employ violence in modern societies, we have to go back to the even more elemental question of why violence plays such a depressingly large role in human affairs.

This primeval question was best answered by Thomas Schelling:

> One of the lamentable principles of human productivity is that it is easier to destroy than to create. A house that takes several man-years to build can be destroyed in an hour by any young delinquent who has the price of a box of matches. Poisoning dogs is cheaper than raising them. And a country can destroy more with twenty billion dollars of nuclear armament than it can create with twenty billion dollars of foreign investment...
>
> The power to hurt -- to destroy things that somebody treasures, to inflict pain and grief -- is a kind of bargaining power, not easy to use but used often. In the underworld it is the basis for blackmail, extortion, and kidnapping, in the commercial world for boycotts, strikes, and lockouts...it underlies the humane as well as the corporal punishments that society uses to deter crime and delinquency...It is often the basis for discipline, civilian and military; and gods use it to exact obedience.[2]

Thus there are often incentives to threaten the use of -- and sometimes to employ -- violence: violence, for the

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[2] Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966) p. v.

individual person or individual country, is sometimes rational. If violence were never rational, there would not be so much of it. Since violence normally brings great costs to those on whom it is inflicted and also brings some risks and other costs to those who use it, but nonetheless produces nothing of value, the use of violence is virtually always inconsistent with social rationality: it is only in the bizarre case of consensual violence between a sadist and a masochist that violence could conceivably be rational from the point of view of the society or the human race as a whole.

It is mainly because of the incentive individuals sometimes have to commit violence that anarchy is so terrible. Throughout history, people have fled from anarchic areas and moved even to areas with very bad governments; there have also been many cases of individuals opting for slavery to get protection from anarchy. Hobbes seems to have been right in saying that the life of man in anarchy is "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short." The history books do not recount a single case of a successful anarchy.

Since life in an anarchy is appallingly inefficient, there are gains from making and carrying out an agreement to maintain peace and order. Indeed, these gains are so colossal that there are a vast variety of ways in which the gains from a peaceful order can be shared that will leave everyone in a society better off than under anarchy. Can

we, then, conclude that, because everyone can gain from it, peaceful order emerges by voluntary agreement?

III

In very small groups whose members have reason to interact over an indefinitely long period, a generally peaceful order should indeed emerge by voluntary agreement. If there are, say, five similar people, each of them will tend to get about a fifth of the gains from the creation of a peaceful order. Though each individual will bear the full costs or risks of what he does to help establish such a peaceful order, the advantages of a peaceful order over anarchy are so large that one-fifth of the gains from a peaceful order could easily exceed the total sacrifice needed to establish such an order. Moreover, when there are only a few people in a group, it will be clear that the welfare of each person depends conspicuously on whether each other individual acts in a group-oriented or in an anti-social way. Thus each person, by making clear that cooperation by others will bring forth cooperation from him but that non-cooperation will not, can increase the likelihood that others match his behavior. This not only increases the probability of peaceful interaction, but even makes it easily possible that cooperation will reach an ideal or group-optimal extent.[3]

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[3] See my Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965).

When the gain from peaceful interaction is just a one-time thing or is definitely coming to an end at a given date, there can be an incentive to cheat on agreements to cooperate; someone who steals the fruits of peaceful cooperation as the interaction ends may be better off than if he honored his agreement. Though this possibility does sometimes cause problems, human interaction normally provides benefits indefinitely. In addition to the gains from a continued peaceful order, there are normally also gains from trade and from producing goods in cooperation with others, not only in modern societies but also in the most primitive societies (in the hunting of big game, for example). There are also gains to virtually everyone from sociable companionship (in many societies, solitary confinement is the harshest legal punishment short of death). Since the gains from social cooperation go on through ones entire life and the date of ones' death is normally unknown, there is often no last period in which it pays to renege on an otherwise advantageous agreement to cooperate. In some conditions, an individual may betray one small group yet later enjoy the gains of social participation in another group, but in other conditions (such as sparsely settled primitive societies) this is not possible. Therefore, when the numbers of those involved are small and stable enough for a peaceful order to be established by voluntary cooperation, we know (by the so-called "folk theorem" of game theory) that this cooperation

can be sustained over time. Thus the logic of rational individual behavior leads to the prediction that sufficiently small groups will be able to establish and maintain peaceful order by voluntary agreement.

This theoretical prediction fits the evidence very well. We have not only the general evidence that voluntary cooperation of small groups to achieve common purposes is commonplace,[4] but also the anthropological observation of the most primitive societies. The very most primitive food-gathering and hunting societies are normally made up of bands of only about 50, and almost never more than 100, people, including the children. In other words, such a band will normally have only about a few families that need to cooperate. As the theory predicts, such hunter-gatherer bands normally maintain peace and order by voluntary agreement. Many readers may assume that primitive tribes are at least as dictatorial and repressive as the monarchies of early modern Europe, but this is not so. Many such hunter-gatherer bands are acephalous and make all important collective decisions by consensus. Those that have chiefs are also fundamentally consensual. When a band gets larger and disagreement is intense, the band may split in two, but the new bands normally also make decisions by consensus. Thus it is voluntary agreement that normally explains the relatively peaceful order in the most primitive and smallest bands. For these small groups, the huge gains from peaceful

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[4] Ibid.

order rather than anarchy motivate voluntary agreements to maintain the order of the band.

Many less primitive and larger societies are made up of small groups such as extended families, villages, and other communities small enough to maintain order through voluntary consent. Some are even federations of such small groups. Some of the peaceful order in these societies is also explained by the gains of voluntary agreement to keep the peace. It is obvious, however, that only a part of the order in large societies with many thousands or millions of people can be explained in this way. What mainly explains the law and order that normally characterizes larger societies?

IV

The fact that law and order is incomparably better for people than anarchy clearly does <u>not</u> explain the emergence of law and order in large societies. A typical individual in a society with a million people will get only about one-millionth of the gain from establishing law and order but will bear the whole cost and risk of whatever he does to establish it. The typical individual in a population of a million will normally have no significant impact on the likelihood any other individual will enjoy law and order, so there is also no strategic interaction; it pays an individual to make no voluntary contribution to providing the collective good of law and order whether others

contribute or not. The rewards and punishment of social interaction also do not motivate contributions to collective action when groups are too large for most individual to interact socially with most of the others. So logic tells us that the collective good of law and order, like other collective goods, can never be obtained through voluntary collective action in really large groups.[5]

This theoretical prediction fits the facts. There have been lots of writings about the desirability of "social contracts" to obtain the benefits of law and order, but no one has ever found a large society that obtained law order through a voluntary social contract of the individuals in the society. There is no record of any large society that overcame an anarchic situation through any kind of voluntary agreement.

V

Why, then, do virtually all large societies no less than small ones have law and order rather than anarchy? The route to the answer came to me when by chance I was reading a book on a Chinese warlord. In the 1920's China was in large part under the control of various warlords. The warlords were men who had some armed band or small army with which they had conquered some province or set of villages and who then made themselves lords of the territory that they had conquered. They usually taxed the population

[5] Ibid.

heavily and pocketed the proceeds of this taxation for their own purposes. One warlord, Feng Yu-hsiang, had a reputation for the exceptional extent to which he used his army for suppressing bandits and for his defeat of the relatively substantial army of the famous bandit leader White Wolf. There was evidence that considerable numbers of peasants, merchants, and intellectuals in his domain were sorry to lose him.

This seemed arbitrary to me: why should warlords who were simply stationary bandits be preferred to roving bandits? The warlords had no claim of any kind to legitimacy and were distinguished from leaders of roving bandit armies only because they took their theft in the form of regular taxation rather than episodic plunder. Others have also asked whether "'warlord' was not simply a euphemism for 'bandit'."[6]

I am now convinced that I was wrong and that the Chinese who preferred settled bandits to roving ones were right. If a roving bandit settles down and decides to steal through regular taxation, and at the same time insists that he has a monopoly on theft in his domain, then those from whom he exacts taxes will, in spite of his exactions, have an incentive to produce and accumulate wealth. The rational

[6] James E. Sheridan, Chinese Warlord: The Career of Feng Yu-hsiang (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1966), pp. 19 and 51-119. Feng is alleged to have been a better administrator of his domains than many other warlords. He was also exceptional among the warlords in being a Christian, and this may have added to his reputation among Western observers in China.

stationary bandit will take only a part of income in taxes, because he will be able to exact a larger total amount of income from his subjects if he leaves them with an incentive to have a high level of production.

If the stationary bandit successfully monopolizes the theft in his domain, then his victims do not need to worry about theft by others. If he steals only through regular taxation, then his subjects know that they can keep whatever proportion of their output is left after they have paid their taxes. Thus the rational monopolization of theft, as compared with an anarchic environment with ubiquitous theft, greatly increases the probability an individual will be able to retain any capital that he accumulates. Once an individual has paid the stipulated tax rates, he has reasonably good odds of hanging on to whatever wealth he has accumulated.[7] This greatly increases the incentive to save and to invest. Since all of the settled bandit's victims are for him a source of tax-income, he also has an incentive to prohibit others from killing or maiming his subjects. The monopolization of theft and the protection of the tax-generating subjects eliminates anarchy. Since the warlord takes a significant part of total production in the form of tax-theft, it will often also pay him to provide some

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[7] There is an earlier and, in some ways, analogous account of a King's incentive to improve property rights in Douglass North's valuable historical discussions, especially in his Growth and Structural Change and his book with Thomas on The Rise of the West.

irrigation works and other public goods, since the provision of these goods will normally increase taxable income.

Bandit rationality will also lead bandits who can conquer and hold an area for any considerable period of time to stop roving around and set themselves up as lords of a settled domain: with roving banditry there is little or no incentive for anyone to produce or accumulate anything that may be stolen, and thus little for roving bandits to steal. Thus we have what I call "the first blessing of the invisible hand." The leader of the roving band of bandits is led, as though by an invisible hand, to settle down and set himself up as head of a government; the colossal increase in output that arises from the creation of a peaceful order gives a stationary governing bandit a larger take than he could obtain if no government is provided. The provision of the public goods provided by government to groups that are larger than tribes results from "bandit-entrepreneurship" or, more generally, the entrepreneurship of those with superior capacities to wreak violence. By taking Thomas Schelling's analysis of the incentives that account for violence a few steps further, we have accounted for the emergence of government in large as well as small groups.

The emergence of the Kings, Pharaohs, and Emperors that have played such a large role in human history can be better explained in terms of the incentives to replace roving banditry with tax-theft than by any other model of similar

parsimony. Dictatorial peace also allows the development of some civilization. To a degree, the civilization that emerged, say, in France of the Old Regime -- a civilization that produced a Voltaire -- was due to the superior incentive to produce and create under rational tax-theft than under anarchic types of theft. The peace of a rational self-interested dictator is better than anarchy.

VI

The main tool of thought that drives my analysis of autocracy, and that will also drive the account I will give of democracies, is the concept of the "encompassing interest" from my book on The Rise and Decline of Nations.[8] This is the idea that the extent of the concern of an interest group, office-holder, political party, monarch, or any other partial or total "owner" of the society will vary with the size of the stake in the society. Other things equal, the larger or more encompassing the stake an organization or individual has in a society the greater the incentive the organization or individual has to take action to increase the productivity or efficiency of that society and the greater the incentive to avoid actions that would damage the society.

In the case of our stationary bandit or King, we can see the extent of his encompassing interest most simply by temporarily assuming that the marginal tax rate is the same

8 Yale University Press, 1982

as the average tax rate, so that the autocrat always gets a constant fraction, F, of any increase in the national income in tax revenues. If F is one-third, the monarch gets a third of any increase in the national income in tax collections, and he will then get a third of the benefit of the provision of a public good that increases taxable income. Obviously in this case an optimizing monarch will provide public goods up to the point where the marginal cost of the public good to the monarch is equal to one-third of the increase in the national income that results from this provision. Under the assumption that the monarch gets a specified percentage of the national income in taxes, he will not spend a socially efficient amount on public goods, but the benefits of law and order and of minimal amounts of some other public goods are so extraordinary that a less-than-Pareto-optimal supply is still of profound value. The consumer surplus from a minimal level of government is so gigantic that the provision of these minimal amounts can be of great significance in human history.[9]

VII

All that has been said so far shows the importance of the germ of truth in the argument of Banfield's quaint monarchist. Can the monarchist's insight and the foregoing argument be reconciled with the convictions most of us have

[9] Douglass North has previously emphasized the magnitude of the consumer's surplus from the provision of basic government.

in favor of democracy? When, if ever, do democracies benefit from a similarly encompassing incentive structure?

Though this paper will avoid any genuinely technical matters, we will need to be slightly less casual if we are properly to compare the incentives facing dictators and the leaders of democratic governments. Initially, we will need to develop a clear conception of the level of spending on public goods that an ideal and fully efficient government would have. Once this ideal is clear, it will be possible to understand how government by a self-interested optimizing autocrat, on the one hand, and government by a similarly self-interested democratic politician seeking re-election, on the other, would deviate from this ideal.

To get a model in which we can readily compare how autocracies and democracies compare with an ideal government, we must define the society's income carefully and then go on to define the costs of the public goods that governments must provide. We must define the society's income to include nonmoney or "psychic" income and also properly distinguish "gross" and the "net" social income.

In general, the official national income statistics do not capture the changes in the quality of life or psychic income, but since these things depend partly on public expenditures we need to include them. Obviously, socially desirable expenditures on public goods are worth more to the society than they cost, and conversely excessive or socially useless expenditures reduce the true income of the society.

But the measures of national income defined in the national income statistics do not properly capture this. The national accounts treat all expenditures on final goods and services, whether by the government or the private sector, as contributing identically to the national income, irrespective of whether government expenditures are at a socially efficient level or not. Thus conceptually we need to consider the increase in true (money + psychic) income that results from a given public expenditure, evaluated in terms of the consumers' willingness to pay for it when they honestly reveal their preferences.

This increase in "true gross income" must be compared with the cost of the public expenditure that generated it. The "true net" income is then obtained by subtracting the public expenditure from the true gross income, which is essentially income as defined in the national accounts plus or minus psychic income. We shall make the further simplifying assumption that there are no government surpluses or deficits, so tax revenue equals public expenditures. The true gross income for a society is then analogous to an individual's true "pre-tax" income, and the true net income for the society then is equivalent to true post-tax income for the individual. For the society as well as the individual, it is post-tax income that is relevant for welfare.

To make everything clear with simple pictures, let us look at a utopian situation with the aid of Figure 1. Curve

Figure 1



"Y" in this figure is true gross income as defined in the previous paragraph. The percentage of the national income that is taken in taxes is measured on the horizontal axis. Since I assume that tax collections are equal to expenditures on public goods, both income and expenditures on public goods are functions of the tax rate. When the level of public goods provision is inefficiently low (for example, in a quasi-anarchy), devoting a larger percentage of the national income to public goods necessarily increases gross income. To the right of the peak of the Y function the damage to incentives from the high taxes needed to fund the public goods reduces income more than enough to offset any increase in productivity brought about by the additional public goods.

To look at changes in the level of net income or welfare we must subtract the cost of public goods. This is not quite such a simple matter as it seems, as the cost depends on how the tax burden is allocated among the taxpayers. To make this allocation a precise one that will yield an unambiguous social optimum, I shall assume that there are Lindahl tax shares at all levels of taxes and public goods expenditures. That is, everyone shares the marginal (which is by assumption here also the average) tax burden in exactly the same proportion in which they share the benefits of public goods. Thus each individual's tax bill divided by total tax revenues equals his willingness-to-pay for the public good supply divided by the total

willingness-to-pay of the society. With Lindahl tax shares, at lower-than-Pareto-optimal level of public expenditure there is unanimous support for more public expenditure and at the higher-than-Pareto-optimal levels of public good provision everyone wants less public spending. At every level of public good provision, however far from optimal it may be, all tax collections are by assumption efficiently directed to the provision of public goods.

We can now compare the welfare of citizens at each tax rate. The direct or cash cost of each level of public expenditure can be read off the G or "government" function in Figure 1. The true gross or pre-tax income, Y, is shown at each weighted[10] average tax rate for the society. The vertical distance between the G function and the Y function gives the true net social income.

If the initial allocation of endowments is perfectly just, net welfare is necessarily maximized when Y exceeds tax collections by the largest amount. This is where tangents to the Y curve and the G function are parallel and where the marginal social benefit of public goods just equals their marginal cost. There is then a Pareto-efficient outcome at tax-spending level U, for Utopia, in Figure 1.

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10 Each person's tax rate must have a weight given by the percentage of the total revenue his Lindahl tax share would yield.

VIII

With the aid of the ideal conception that has just been set out, we can examine the outcomes generated by autocratic and by democratic governments. Obviously, it would be easy to favor any type of government by assuming benevolent behavior of leaders of governments of that type whenever this led to better outcomes for the people at issue, and by assuming malicious behavior by the leaders of other kinds of governments. To be impartial, I will assume the same self-interested behavior at all times by all types of political leaders (and also by voters). Democratic political leaders will be assumed to care about nothing but maximizing their chances of election and autocrats will similarly be assumed to exploit their domains entirely for their own purposes. Admittedly, I have, like many others, presented evidence elsewhere[11] that unalloyed self-interest does not characterize most human beings. Nonetheless, if a model is to be of any use, it must sacrifice descriptive accuracy to obtain manageable abstractions. The assumption of self-interest is much more realistic than any other assumption of comparable simplicity and impartiality. In the same spirit, I also abstract from "income effects" so that the willingness to pay for public goods does not change with changes in the distribution of income.

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11 "The Role of Morals and Incentives in Societies," presented at a celebration of the 200th anniversary of Georgetown University.

So, just as we used the rational self-interest of leaders of marauding bands to explain the establishment of peaceful order for large groups, so we must in the same way ask what the tax rate, and what disposition of tax revenues, will be most advantageous for the bandit-leader, once he has decided to be a King.

The rational self-interested autocrat will, of course, choose the tax rate that gives him the maximum attainable resources for his own purposes -- for his palaces and other personal consumption, and most notably for the military power and war that will largely determine his status in relation to other autocrats and national leaders. As the Italian monarchist pointed out, a King will have the same incentive to care for his domain that a landlord has to fix the wiring in his property. But, just as a landlord who owned all housing would have an incentive to charge monopoly rents, so the autocrat has an incentive to use his monopoly of violence in his domain to extract the maximum possible surplus for himself! Thus he will raise tax rates up to the point where any further increases would reduce tax collections.

It might seem that this would lead the autocrat to choose the highest point on the G function that is depicted in Figure 1, but this is <u>not</u> correct. The autocrat will not (except in certain special cases) spend as much on public goods as the utopian government would have done, and this entails that at any given tax rate social income and tax

collections will be lower under autocracy than under an ideal government. For any given level of income of the society, every dollar the autocrat spends on public goods for the society is a dollar less that he can spend for his own purposes. It is in his interest to spend on public goods only so far as this expenditure increases the income of the society to such an extent that he gets his expenditures back in increased tax collections. Though an autocrat has an encompassing interest in his country, and this encompassing interest leads him to provide a peaceful order and other public goods of extraordinary value to his subjects, the very fact that his subjects inevitably get part of the society's income means that the autocrat will normally spend less on public goods than a utopian government.

Suppose the revenue maximizing tax rate for the dictator is 50%. Then the dictator will get 50% of the increase in social income that is generated by the provision of additional public goods. It follows that his interests are best served if he curtails his spending on public goods when the marginal dollar spent on public goods increases the society's income by two dollars, since at this point the last dollar spent on public goods will obviously bring him back just one extra dollar of tax revenue. If the revenue maximizing tax-rate for the monarch goes up, he will gain from providing more public goods.

In general, the rational autocrat will determine his profit-maximizing level of provision of public goods by calculating how "encompassing" his interest in the marginal social income is, and equating the marginal cost of public goods with the value of his share of the resulting increase in social income. It is expected that a fuller and more formal account of the determinants of the autocrat's level of provision, and an analysis of some interesting special cases, will be provided in separate publication.[12]

In part because of the argument that has just been set out, we must go to Figure 2 to find the optimal allocation for a self-interested autocrat. This figure not only presupposes a lower level of public good provision, and corresponding reductions in the level of social income and tax receipts at each tax rate, but also examines the impact of using part of the proceeds of taxes for the autocrat's personal purposes on social income. In Figure 1 gross income was higher to the right of the optimum U because there was more spending on public goods. This spending did not increase gross income by as much as it increased expenditures on public goods, so net income of the society was reduced. But gross income and the amount of taxes that can be collected at any given tax rate were greater immediately to the right of T_u than at T_u. The tax receipts at the maximum of the tax-receipts or G function in Figure 1

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[12] This prospective publication grows out of the work of my colleague Martin McGuire and is being done jointly with him.

Figure 2



could be attained only if all the money obtained from the tax receipts were devoted to the provision of public goods. When the autocrat uses much of the tax receipts for his own purposes, there will be a lower social income and a lower level of tax collections at each tax rate than would have occurred under ideal government.

Thus in Figure 2 we depict a profit-maximizing expenditure on public goods by the autocrat, G_a^*, irrespective of the tax rate. If tax rates were not high enough to obtain G_a^* there would be an inconsistency, so income is undefined to the left of T_m. The autocrat obviously chooses tax rates higher than T_m in order to obtain resources for his personal purposes. The excess burden of taxes tends to lower income, just as it did under ideal arrangements, but there is now no offsetting effect from a higher provision of public goods. Thus the solid Y and G curves, analogous to those in Figure 1, do not apply, and income decreases steadily as tax rates rise beyond the level needed to finance G_a^* of public good provision, as indicated by the dotted line Y′. This also reduces the level of tax receipts at any given tax rate,[13] so the optimum for the autocrat is found on the G′ function. At

[13] Another assumption is that the mix and level of public goods for the society is not altered by the fact that the autocrat takes a substantial share of social output through high taxation for his own purposes. This in turn requires the earlier assumption that there are no income effects. It also requires that all public expenditures affect taxable and nontaxable income impartially, so the autocrat does not have an incentive to emphasize those that raise taxable income.

the peak of this function the difference between tax collections and expenditures on public goods is as great as it can be and the autocrat has maximized the return from his domain. The surplus that the autocrat can use in whatever way best suits his ego is OA minus OG_a^*.

Obviously, this leaves the autocrat's subjects with very much higher taxes than is in their interest, and these high taxes cost the subjects more than the amount they pay to the autocrat because they damage the incentive structure of the society and thus reduce income as well. As the peak of the G′ function is approached from the left, a tiny increase in tax collections can be obtained only at the cost of a much larger drop in aggregate gross income, and the taxpayer's net income must fall by an even larger percentage than gross income. The autocrat nonetheless has an incentive to press all the way to the peak of the G′ function. All taxes beyond those that would have been collected at tax rate T_m, moreover, are devoted to the ruler's wants rather than those of his subjects. Of course, the autocrat will not push tax rates above T_a, since this will reduce his tax collections.

The idea that it is irrational to raise tax rates beyond the level that maximizes tax collections is an old one. Joseph Schumpeter pointed this out in his article on "The Crisis of the Tax State," written in highly-taxed Austria-Hungary not long before its defeat in World War I. There is even the germ of this idea in the 14th century in

Ibn Kaldun's Muqaddimah.[14] Schumpeter's and Ibn Kaldun's important insight has been grossly misapplied and advertised as the "Laffer curve" in the United States in recent times, but this misapplication does not call the argument here into question.

The foregoing analysis should make it clear that, while the peaceful order a rational autocrat provides is vastly superior to a violent anarchy, the rational autocrat's services are very expensive indeed. The rational autocrat uses his monopoly of power to take a huge part of the total gain from the social order for his own purposes. The distribution of income under autocracy gives much of the total taxable output to the autocrat, and the taxes or other exactions that he must impose to exploit his monopoly of the government introduce colossal inefficiency as well.

IX

With an ideal allocation and a self-interested autocrat's optimum as benchmarks, we can now explore how well democratic systems would work in relation to each. The democratic systems that will be considered here are so simple that they have no close counterpart in reality. They will nonetheless illustrate an advantage that relatively effective democratic systems have over autocracies and also reveal ways in which they systematically diverge from the

14 The Muqaddimah, An Introduction to History, translated from the Arabic by Franz Rosenthal (Princeton Univ. Press, 1967) pp. 230-31.

utopian ideal that has been depicted earlier. One model will also illuminate a pathological problem in many democracies.

One prominent and simple possibility is to model the situation with a median voter model in which it is assumed that all voters have single-peaked preferences. If at all sizes of the government everyone always pays a Lindahl share of the tax burden, the median voter who determines the outcome will also pay a Lindahl share and we are back at the ideal allocation U in Figure 1. If, realistically, we assume there are significant departures from a Lindahl tax structure, then the outcome will depend on the tax share of the median voter.

To be specific, suppose the only tax is an income tax. The level of public expenditures would then be those sought by the voter of median income. If the median voter paid more than his Lindahl tax share, the level of provision of public goods would be somewhat too low; if he paid more than his Lindahl tax share, it would be somewhat too high. Since it is highly improbable that the median voter's tax rate is exactly his Lindahl share, the democratic outcome will almost never be Pareto-optimal. On the other hand, there is normally a positive income elasticity of demand for most public goods and usually also higher taxes for higher income people, so there is no reason to believe that median-voter outcomes diverge dramatically from optimal allocations.

They certainly would tend to be vastly better than the autocratic outcome. Since the median voter certainly places a positive valuation on private goods, he would never vote for a tax rate that was at the maximum of the G function. If the allocation is anywhere close to this maximum, a reduction in tax rates generates a large increase in post-tax income at the cost of a tiny reduction in the provision of public goods. Accordingly, the median voter, even if his actual tax share was surprisingly far below his Lindahl share, would tend to vote for such a a tax reduction, so tax rates would normally be much lower in a median voter democracy than in an autocracy. The median voter, moreover, would have an incentive to vote only for those public expenditures that were of some benefit to him, so a median-voter democracy would not generate huge expenditures for the personal consumption of the leader of the government akin to those at the autocratic optimum. In short, whatever plausible assumptions one chooses for a self-interested median-voter model of democracy, the outcomes appear to be vastly better ones for the citizenry than those that result from the self-interested autocrat.

One of the well-known problems of median voter models with single peaked preferences is that they do not capture the most serious distributional conflicts, and these distributional conflicts can bring endless Arrovian cycles. The redistributional struggles and the policies that they give rise to will in general also mean that there are

additional deadweight losses from the taxes and other policies that grow out of the distributional struggle. What, if anything, may be said about how a democracy will work when a governing party or President can for electoral advantage change the tax and subsidy structure, and thus redistribute income in such a way that it "buys" the votes of a prospective majority?

X

To analyze this democratic difficulty most simply, I assume that proportional representation is excluded and there is instead a winner-take-all voting rule, such as applies to the Presidencies in France and the United States and to seats in the House of Commons in Britain. With a winner-take-all voting rule, there is almost no purpose in having a small party since no power can be attained without a majority. Similarly, it cannot be rational for a Presidential candidate to seek less than a majority of the electorate. Thus there will under a winner-take-all voting rule be a tendency toward the two-party or two-candidate elections. I assume that no distributional coalitions or special interest groups play any role, so the outcomes depend entirely upon the policies of the two parties or candidates, each of which maximizes the likelihood of victory. Since the Presidents or party leaders are by assumption self-interested, they have no inhibitions about

using the tax and subsidy system to buy the support of a majority.

Here an important constraint on vote-buying redistribution arises from the "encompassing" character of the constituency each party must have in a two-party or two-candidate system. Since each party or President must get a majority to win anything, its must strive to please a constituency that will obtain a large fraction of the total income of the society -- the fraction F for a party in a two-party system will not be far from one-half. If the income in the society rises or falls, the income of its constituents will on average rise or fall by FdY.

This encompassing interest gives the party or President an important stake in the well-being of the society. Incumbent parties and Presidents want to run for re-election in circumstances where they can credibly tell the voters that "you never had it so good," so they have a strong incentive to achieve good outcomes for the citizenry. Everyday observation confirms that Presidents and leaders of encompassing political parties do indeed strive to be able to claim there is "peace and prosperity" when they run for re-election. However, even a party or candidate with an encompassing constituency may still provide the best outcome of all for a given majority of the electorate by having some redistribution from the minority toward this majority. This can be true even though the deadweight loss from such a

redistribution entails that this makes the national income lower than it would otherwise be.

The extent to which redistributive vote-buying is expedient is limited by the difficulty of targeting the redistribution as well as by the encompassing interest of any majority coalition. The difficulties of targeting arise because the regions, occupations, income levels, or other identifiable attributes of voters that are used to determine whether they get a subsidy are not in general a perfect guide to what party they can be induced to support. A policy to subsidize persons in given categories will probably aid some individuals who prefer the alternative party. A subsidy may even induce the movement of voters who prefer the alternative party to the regions, occupations, or other categories that are subsidized. Thus much of the redistribution intended for the prospective majority will be "wasted" on those who support the other party. If the incumbent party attempts to tax those in the minority to subsidize the prospective majority it will in practice tax some of those in the prospective majority and subsidize some of those in the minority. In general, only a proportion, P, of the redistribution targeted toward a prospective majority will be a net redistribution to it. An examination of plausible examples indicates that P could often easily be as low as .5.[15]

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[15] Suppose that the incumbent party increases taxes on everyone to subsidize a majority, but that to make sure that it reaches the targeted majority it must make transfers to

With the conceptual framework developed here, we can see both the social losses from democratic redistributions and the constraints on such redistributions when there are encompassing coalitions. Simply for convenience, let us suppose we start at the point in Figure 2 depicting the optimum level of provision of public goods for the autocrat. The encompassing political leader with the strategy of using vote-buying redistribution to help obtain a majority will increase taxes and try to target the proceeds to his prospective majority. This redistribution, like the redistribution of the autocrat toward himself, will not increase gross income as the provision of more public goods would have; the taxes and subsidies will bring about deadweight losses. Thus gross as well as net income will decline to the right of T_m as they did as a result of the policy of the optimizing autocrat.

Nonetheless, the democracy with encompassing interests works incomparably better for the citizenry, even with uninhibited vote buying, than an optimizing autocrat. Suppose that the majority coalition earns exactly half of the national income and the difficulties of targeting

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three-fourths of the electorate. One third of the subsidy is then "wasted," and the prospective majority must bear its share, F, of the wasted subsidy (as well as of the deadweight loss on all of the subsidy). If three-fourths of the electorate is then subsidized and the prospective majority bears half of the cost of the misdirected third of the subsidy, its members get net only half, or 4/6ths minus 1/6th, of the subsidy. Thus their net gain from the subsidy is equal to half of the amount redistributed.

dictate that P is also one-half. When the deadweight losses from redistributive vote-buying become as large as the amount of the subsidy, the majority will gain from stopping the redistribution toward itself. Given the targeting difficulties the net redistribution to the majority is only half of the subsidy, but the majority bears half of the reduction in the national income that results from the total subsidy. Even if there were somehow costless and perfect targeting of subsidies, the redistribution would cease when the national income fell by double the amount of the subsidy.

To put the point generally, when the excess burden of the subsidy at the margin reaches P/F, it no longer pays the beneficiaries of the redistribution to carry it any further. At this point their share of the social loss from the redistribution just equals the net redistribution to them, and the upper bound on politically rational redistribution has been reached. Thus, when there are encompassing political parties or offices that determine democratic outcomes, the electoral gains from redistribution are limited, and these limits are more confining the greater the difficulty of targeting redistribution to a prospective majority.

Those who have not studied deadweight losses in the presence of the narrow distributional coalitions may think that the foregoing constraints on vote-buying redistribution are not confining. A limit on redistribution that becomes

effective only when the deadweight loss becomes (say) as large as the redistribution may not seem to be a binding constraint to those who have been brought up to believe that "all Harberger triangles are small." In fact, even in the richest democracies narrow distributional coalitions often lead to deadweight losses that are substantial multiples of the amount redistributed to the members of the coalition, and in many underdeveloped nations the social losses from poor public policies account for most of the gap in per capita income between these countries and the developed world.[16]

To see the importance of the constraint on the losses from vote-buying redistribution with encompassing parties, consider the size of the excess burden that occurs when there is redistribution with tiny political parties (or with narrow special interest groups). Suppose that a political party or a special interest group represents a constituency that earns five percent of the national income. If there were no difficulties in targeting redistribution, it would pay this narrow interest to continue seeking redistributions to itself until the deadweight losses become twenty times as large as the redistribution. Thus democratic societies suffer colossal losses when their public policies become collections of measures won by special interest groups,

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16 This is shown in my "Key to Economic Development."

whether the special interests take the form of lobbies or small political parties.

Though a democracy without <u>any</u> encompassing interest does suffer some losses that an autocrat with his encompassing interest would avoid, even a democracy of this kind has an important advantage for its citizens over an autocracy. Consider the situation at the autocrat's optimum at the peak of the G′ function in Figure 2. The autocrat has an incentive to choose this high tax rate and to keep all of the proceeds (beyond the level T_m spent on public goods) for himself because his gain comes exclusively from tax collections and other exactions: the post-tax income of his subjects has no direct impact on his welfare or choice of tax rate.

In a democracy with competitive political parties even a political party that represented only five percent of the society would have <u>some</u> direct concern with the amount of net earned social income, because its members would get a little of this income. They would not, in other words, be quite at the peak of their G′ function.[17] The vote-buying redistributions of a democracy with narrow parties would

[17] Though the excess burden of a given tax rate would be the same for a redistributive democracy and an autocracy, the excess burden of a given level of subsidies from democratic redistribution would not necessarily be the same as the same amount of autocratic spending. The subsidies from democratic redistribution might have a larger adverse effect on the incentives to work, or the autocratic spending might be more likely to be on socially costly wars, etc. Thus the G′ function in Figure 2 need not be the same for an autocracy and a redistributive democracy.

also differ from the autocrat's exactions in that they would be returned to the citizenry, or more precisely to various subsets of it. As governing coalitions changed over time different subsets of the citizenry would gain from the changing redistributions. Thus for many citizens the distributional gains and losses would in the long run come close to balancing off, so that the only big losses would be the excess burdens. These are serious losses, but there are also large losses of efficiency in an autocracy from the "redistribution" to the autocrat, and the citizenry does not get any of this back.

XI

It is time to sum up and to call attention to the many important factors that have been left out of the argument. We know from Schelling's argument in Arms and Influence that it is often rational for individuals to threaten or to employ violence. Since violence generates great losses without producing anything of value, there are phenomenal gains when anarchy is replaced by a peaceful order. Very small groups, such as the hunter-gatherer bands in environments that have not discovered settled agriculture, normally realize these gains through agreement and voluntary collective action. But large populations cannot, because of the logic of collective action, obtain law and order or other collective goods through voluntary cooperation.

Luckily, with rational self-interest the invisible hand guides roving bandits to settle down and provide law and order and other public goods because this gives them more receipts in the form of tax revenues than they can obtain by roving banditry. The conqueror of a well defined territory has an encompassing interest in that domain given by the share of any increase in the territorial income that he collects in taxes. This encompassing interest gives him an incentive to maintain law and order and to encourage creativity and production in his domain. Much of the economic progress and the development of civilization since the population expansion due to the discovery settled agriculture is partly explained by this incentive. But the same rational self-interest that makes a roving bandit into an established monarch also make him maximize his tax revenue and devote much of it to his purely personal purposes. This leads to a huge waste of resources and a considerable impairment of incentives due to high taxes.

In a democracy with encompassing and coherent political parties or with encompassing elective offices such as the Presidencies in the United States and France, the invisible hand gives the highest political leaders an incentive to take account of the interests of the electorate. This shows up notably in the obvious desire of incumbent national leaders to be able to run for re-election on a record of peace and prosperity. Since a prospective majority may sometimes be made better off by a policy that includes some

redistribution to them, democratic political leaders also have an incentive to generate some deadweight losses. But with encompassing parties or offices the incentive for such redistribution is very limited. The incentives facing the self-interested leaders of encompassing political parties in a competitive democracy are accordingly more nearly consistent with those of the citizens than are the incentives of an autocrat.

The simple paradigm that has just been described obviously leaves out many extraordinarily important factors, such as the role of the "rational ignorance" of the typical citizen in a democracy, the importance of distributional coalitions,[18] and so on. Some of the factors that have been left out of account often make democracies work badly, even when they have encompassing offices or parties. It would be a pity if the foregoing argument generates complacency (or even great optimism) about modern democracies.

XII

At the same time our simple paradigm leaves out many factors that make autocracies work worse than the argument here would lead one to expect and it also ignores many neglected advantages of democratic institutions. When an autocratic government is insecure, or for any other reason has a short time horizon, it no longer has an incentive to encourage the long run investment that will increase the

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18 The Rise and Decline of Nations

output of the domain in the long run -- if the autocrat's time horizon is much shorter than the life of a capital good, he will gain more from expropriating that capital good than by protecting property rights in it. Thus insecure autocrats have often seized accumulations of property and imposed capital levies so high that they reduced tax collections in the long run. Of course, the short time horizons of elected politicians also cause severe problems.

The subset of democracies that have been viable in the long run are, however, almost the only governments that have been able regularly to arrange for a continuing orderly succession of leaders. When the autocrat dies or is deposed, there are no institutions that can be relied upon to select or install a new dictator peacefully. If institutions like the police and the judiciary had derived their power from sources other than the old dictator, then the society would not really have been an autocracy: it would have been pluralistic and, if not democratic, at least an "institutionalized oligarchy," which I define as a semi-democracy. When a real dictator dies or is deposed, all the institutions also lose their authority and there is no reliable means by which the society can insure that it will get a new leader in an orderly way. Thus virtually the only societies in the world today in which there can be much confidence about what the government will be like a decade or two into the future are democracies. Thus to a great degree it is only in these societies that there is a

predictable environment for long run investment in capital goods, in research and development, and in enduring works of art.

The autocrat also has the problem that he cannot easily and straightforwardly make credible commitments. If he runs the society, there is no one who can force him to keep his commitments. Thus he is in a position roughly like the minors in the United States today who cannot get credit cards because the law won't force them to repay their debts. The autocrat who looks forward to a long reign will obtain the greatest tax collections in the long run if his subjects believe there will be no unscheduled new taxes or confiscations of wealth, for this will give them the greatest incentive to accumulate capital and to produce. The autocrat can promise that he won't impose any future taxes or confiscations that would make current investments unprofitable, but since he has an incentive to make that promise even if he intends to break it, the promise may not be credible.

This problem is far less serious in a pluralistic democracy. The independent judiciary and court systems of such societies make property rights much more predictable, and the pluralistic dispersion of power means that there are many powerful interests that have a stake in opposing any violations of property rights or failures to enforce contracts. The people who would have to pay any confiscatory taxes also have a right to vote, and that makes

future tax rates and policies more predictable than they would otherwise be. All this makes an economy work better.

Thus it is probably not an accident that the richest countries in the world are mainly democracies. The undeniable correlation between democracy and high income is sometimes alleged to be due to a taste for democracy in high income societies: democracy is a luxury. Though the demand for democracy may well rise with income, the causal sequence implied by the foregoing argument does not fit the facts. Though there are of course examples of dictatorships with very successful economies, it was relatively pluralistic and democratic countries that generated the industrial revolution. It was mainly also relatively pluralistic and democratic countries that were the first to copy the industrial revolution. After World War II economic development and technological advance has again spread mainly from democracies to other countries rather than the reverse. West Germany, Japan, and Italy grew with miraculous rapidity after their conversion to democracy, as did most of the democracies of continental Europe. The totalitarian societies of the Eastern Europe grew rapidly for a time but were unable to sustain this growth or even to insure their viability.[19]

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[19] Given the nature of totalitarian societies, it is not straightforwardly possible to isolate the proportion of the social surplus that has been used to serve the objectives of the conquerors or rulers of these societies and what proportion has been used to serve the interests of their subjects. The exceptionally high rates of forced saving, the high proportion of the GDP devoted to military

Some dictatorships have grown for a time at very rapid rates -- I have calculated the variance of the growth rates of the dictatorships in recent decades and found it higher than that of the democracies. But no society with a continuing absolute monarchy[20] or any other kind of dictatorship has ever reached a high level of development. Even areas with episodic dictatorships,[21] such as most of

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expenditures, and the low standards of living in the Soviet-type societies indicate that extraordinarily high proportion of output has been devoted the purposes of the rulers, but the Soviet societies would have had some investment and military spending and some economic problems even under democratic governments, so the exact allocation of the social output between the rulers and the subjects can only be estimated. In the case of Hitler's Germany, ultimately about half of the GDP was used in the effort to augment and protect Hitler's domain.

20 It is unfortunately not possible directly to test the theory offered here by comparing the proportions of the national income used by governments in absolute monarchies and in democracies. Since absolute monarchies have usually existed only in historic and pre-industrial societies, one cannot meaningfully compare the proportions of the national income that the monarchs took in taxes with the proportions of the national incomes used by democratic governments in developed societies. This is partly because so much of the activities of modern governments in the democracies are to transfer income or provide services to the citizenry (or to subsets of it). Since in the long-run the electorate loses only the deadweight losses from this redistribution, its costs can not appropriately be compared with the autocrat's taxation for his personal purposes. In addition, in pre-industrial societies the total per capita output is not usually far above the subsistence level, so a conqueror can extract only a tiny proportion of total output, at least over the long run. Finally, the lack of the technological and cultural requirements for efficient large scale administration also greatly limits the amount of surplus that a bandit-conqueror can feasibly extract (on the administrative difficulties, see my "Diseconomies of Scale and Development," in The Cato Journal Vol 7, No. 1, Spring/Summer, 1987, pp. 77-97).

21 In those modern environments where democracies are familiar and often feasible alternatives, dictatorships

Latin America, have not been able to reach high levels of development. There is not much debate about how democracies fare in cultural and scientific competition, but they are sometimes thought to be at a disadvantage in war or military competition. David Lake has, however, carefully gathered all of the historical evidence on wars between democracies and dictatorships and discovered that democracies have been almost twice as likely to win their wars as have dictatorships.[22] It is not clear whether this is because of greater capabilities in fighting wars or to fewer mistakes in starting unsuccessful wars, but the result is favorable to democracy under either assumption.

So I conclude that the quaint Italian monarchist had a valid point. It helped us explain how the hidden hand leads to the emergence of government and thus helps to account for a large proportion of the history of civilization. But if the monarchist had carried the logic of his argument further, he would also have discovered a powerful case for democratic governments with encompassing institutions.

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frequently have to strive to be popular with the population as a whole or at least with large segments of it. It is therefore difficult empirically to distinguish modern popularity-dependent dictatorships from democracies; in some cases their actions are very similar. Thus the theory here makes no unambiguous predictions about the proportion of the proportion of the GDP used by governments in such dictatorships and in democracies. It does, however, predict that future policies are more predictable in the stable democracies and that this is favorable to their growth.

[22] David A. Lake, "Why Democracies Win Wars" (mimeo, University of California at Los Angeles).

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT, DEMOCRATIZATION, AND GOVERNANCE
Evaluation

AID AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER
Monday, May 20, 9:00

RATINGS

Please check the appropriate column (1=low, 4=high).

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
1. How appropriate was this session for the DSP?		2	1	14
2. How effective was the speaker? John Blackton	1	3	4	11

COMMENTS

1. What ideas from today's presentation will be most useful to you?

Understanding of AID's role; new legislative framework; relationship between AID, Congress and other agencies

It's always good to start with the party line

Expanded my thinking on how AID can respond to the rapildy changing world order

Is Democracy helpful to Development? - the jury is still out

Information on the FAA

AID's new legislative approach

The explanation of the broad framework within which we place democratization activities

Quotation of Roosevelt (1941) should be our basic guideline

The new thinking of AID Administration on management changes and legislative reform

AID may be more serious about this (at least at the upper levels) than I believed. Also that the same group of "believers" may also have a sense of reality.

The presentation of elements of draft FAA and status of Agency restructuring

Changing concept of foreign aid and views on new legislative approaches

Provided general overview of AID policy, especially helpful for a non-career employee

Context within AID's priorities

Those sections which structure FAA concept of partnership/performance

2. **What questions were left unanswered or would you have liked to discuss?**

Greater discussion of conditionality

Explore in a clear fashion the relationship between democracy and economic development -- or just development - both from an empirical point of view and theoretical. Why are people, individuals and cities better off with it and worse off without it?

The relationship of initiatives (especially Democratization) to a country's programming process and AID's human resources

How can we overcome the "ex-patriate" pre and misconception as we attempt to implement programs for democratic pluralism?

Would like to know Congress' view of AID's involvement in democracy issues

AID as "partnership" vs. "conditionality"

Where does support for bilateral "economic" programs stand in the face of this new "Democracy Initiative"?

Who will implement democracy within the USG under the new legislation?

Relationship/impact of new initiatives on how AID works at the budget levels

Congressional reaction to new Democracy Initiative

Background of Democracy Initiative and how AID got involved along with the role of AID within NSC effort

The political realities in Washington of "pulling this off"

The relationship to the State side - ARA and the Embassies

The "who should be in charge of this" issue

If Ronald Roskens was to disappear tomorrow, would the new initiative disappar with him?

3. **Other comments:**

Very useful introduction. Particularly interesting exposition on FAA, AID's new initiative, etc.

"Democratization" is a highly enlarged ("hot") political term. It drives the mind forward helping/assisting political organizations. But I think what AID wants to do is help political organizations, public sector organizations, and non political and public sector organizations. I wonder, therefore, if instead of taking a political scientist's approach, an organizational

theorist approach would be more useful...as Kaufman, Golembooki and Gawthorp...these individuals have theories about organizations and organizational structures which work better (improve efficiency and effectiveness in the political, public sector and private sector)

More time for questions and answers

It looks like we are taking the State Department's job into our own hands

First part was a smooth presentation of the current "company line", but wasn't useful to those of us not wrapped up in AID with politics. John Blackton has a lot to offer, but a less formal presentation would be more useful

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT, DEMOCRATIZATION, AND GOVERNANCE
Evaluation

DEMOCRACY AND DEMOCRATIZATION: WHAT WE KNOW AND WHAT WE DON'T KNOW

Monday, May 20, 11:15

RATINGS

Please check the appropriate column (1=low, 4=high).

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
1. How appropriate was this session for the DSP?	1		5	12
2. How effective was the speaker? Mancur Olson		4	4	10

COMMENTS

1. What ideas from today's presentation will be most useful to you?

Argument for democracy correlating with development.

Looking at complexity of issues interesting—interface between economic development and democracy.

Ideas concerning dictatorship vs. democracy on economic basis.

Dictators take all the surpluses unchecked.

There are institutions providing checks and balances in democracies.

Historical sequences and overviews.

The economic concepts behind the intrinsic objectives of the "stationary bandit."

Theory of "encompassing institutions."

Economic justification, albeit weak, for democracy.

Factors which lead to emergence of democracy.

Use of the classical economic paradigm as analytic model for analysis of political systems and behavior and the importance of avoiding program led political party structure.

Excellent theoretical framework to use in the particular situations presented by individual developing countries.

The transition from warlords to a destabilizing pluralism.

Good theoretical foundation for thinking about democratization/governance.

2. **What questions were left unanswered or would you have liked to discuss?**

Further discussion on development and democracy. There developed an intersting hypothesis. but further discussion would have been useful.

What about in-between? Most countries in Africa are going through a transition - What does Mancur's conceptual framework say about outcomes and incentives of countries in transition?

Can't you have a dictator observing the values of human rights?

"Encompassing institutions" and enabling environment for growth of democratic values and institutions.

Why the apparent difference between empirical (and relevant) evidence and the theoretical.

People perspective, or the view from the poor/lower class of the democratic evolution.

Additional reference/discussion to LAC countries or more recent history/political development.

Sustainability issues for democracy.

3. **Other comments:**

Olson's approach was too simplistic to be useful and infact was really not applicable to our needs and interests.

More Third World, practical applications needed.

Very good initial speaker - Set tone for the day's debate.

More time for discussion.

Delightful lecture/delivery.

I'm unclear as to whether he really believes this arguement or simply volunteered to defend the undefendable.

Would have been useful to bring the discussion "down to earth" more frequently with specific examples from developing countries.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT, DEMOCRATIZATION, AND GOVERNANCE
Evaluation

DEMOCRACY AND DEMOCRATIZATION: WHAT WE KNOW AND WHAT WE DON'T KNOW
Monday, May 20, 1:00

RATINGS

Please check the appropriate column (1=low, 4=high).

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
1. How appropriate was this session for the DSP?	1	1	1	17
2. How effective was the speaker? Larry Diamond	1	2	2	15

COMMENTS

1. What ideas from today's presentation will be most useful to you?

If one accepts the assumption that AID ought to do something directly to foster Democratization, then Diamond's list of do's and don'ts will be useful

Very careful judgement is necessary to undertake effective democracy initiative projects and integration of activities is paramount.

Fragility of system—need for political elites to buy into concept of democracy—won't work otherwise.

Semblance of democracy but no real structure and in fact oppression or counter-democratic structures.

Correlation between infant mortality, growth and political system.

Practical approaches of principles to LDC situations.

AID's limited role and influence in the Democracy Initiative.

The fact that there is no proof that DI and economic development are causally related.

Developing the civic infrastructure of a society is perhaps the most enduring assistance we provide.

Factors impacting on a transition to democracy.

Suggestions on what AID can do - need for elite support to promote change.

Structuring regarding political factors impact for democracies.

The concept of developing/strengthening NGOs along democratic principles as move towards developing democratic principles in larger society.

Alternative political systems to address ethnicity issues.

Polarization and problems of extreme fragmentation.

What to do when historical democracy is on the descent.

Enumeration and description of elements of democratic legitimacy.

Academic confirmation that political will is a necessary condition.

Discussion of various aspects of legitimacy were of interest.

Importance of avoiding fragmented political party structure.

Has practical applicability to individual situations as in identifying factors that are common in declining democracies, factors needed to legitimize govt, etc.

Relationship between political performance and democracy - importance of political elites to achieve and sustain democracy.

The recommendation that we support local organizations which become the "civic infrastructure."

2. What questions were left unanswered or would you have liked to discuss?

Need to look at issue of whether AID can really do some of the things suggested to foster democratization (impose political conditionality, etc.).

What should AID do?

Further discussion of conditionality.

Further discussion on whether AID sees democracy initiatives as an end in themselves or as a means to an end, that is economic growth.

More on civilian oversight of military and transition.

More on political institutions and structure at the local level.

The point on authoritarian regimes (including many populist, reasonably freely elected governments) and the flow of capital resources.

More on how to sustain imperiled democracies.

More specific case studies.

How should AID deal with situations where we are instructed (by Congress) to provide support to particular political organizations? Is there any way that we, not Congress, can arrive at a division of resources that makes sense?

3. Other comments:

I found Diamond too prescriptive and perhaps a little too sure of his approach - more humility would lend credibility.

Very interesting and stimulating discussion.

More time for discussion.

Was highly philosophical/theoretical.

Seems to have a very realistic foundation for his theory which is refreshing.

Would suggest passing out his article to participants before presentation for reading to improve understanding of his point of view.

Good articulatin of issues facing development practitioners with ideas on how to deal with them.

More time for Larry to expound on the topic.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT, DEMOCRATIZATION, AND GOVERNANCE
Evaluation

DEMOCRACY AND DEMOCRATIZATION: WHAT WE KNOW AND WHAT WE DON'T KNOW
Monday, May 20, 2:45

RATINGS

Please check the appropriate column (1=low, 4=high).

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
1. How appropriate was this session for the DSP?		1	4	11
2. How effective was the speaker? Stephan Haggard	1	1	4	10

COMMENTS

1. **What ideas from today's presentation will be most useful to you?**

Problems/complexities of supporting special interest groups.

Interference of political liberalization with structural adjustment.

Limited range of activities that AID gets involved in.

I have many more doubts as to whether or not AID should expand this initiative—AID should continue to do what we do best—institution building.

Skepticism of AID's role.

Incompatibility theory.

AID should support neutral institutions and stay away from financing the interest groups.

Concerns for AID assistance to other interest groups (in addition to political parties).

Discussion of trade-offs in development/growth and participation/democracy.

Problems with support for interest groups.

Focus on rules of playing field rather than players.

Advocacy regarding relatively neutral institutions (legislature without analytic capabilities).

Issue of being sure that the case for the real costs of continuing current economic policy vs. structural adjustment is fully aired was useful.

Stay away from partisan groups.

The fact that democracy does not necessarily lead to development.

The suggestion that we leave it at a baseline of human rights and leave it at that.

2. What questions were left unanswered or would you have liked to discuss?

More discussion of structural adjustment and how governments can be supported and the problems of supporting interest groups.

Relationship of development and democratization.

What's symbolic sustainability?

A clearer and more structured debate between Haggard and Diamond or their predefined points of difference would have been more instructive in clarifying their views.

If you had to choose between economic reform or political development, which would you choose and why?

The role of unions and other typically "political" interest groups in emerging democracies.

The costs of market building.

Emphasis on "neutral arenas"—think strengthening technocratic groups which is probably what AID does best may be inherently anti-democratic.

Should we be in this area at the cost of structural adjustment?

If economic arguements are not convincing, what do we say to convince host governments of the need for democracy?

3. Other comments:

Excellent presentation; interesting and intellectually stimulating.

This session had more time for question and answers!

A little too much jargon and assumptions used—all shared the same background.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT, DEMOCRATIZATION, AND GOVERNANCE
Evaluation

STRENGTHENING DEMOCRACY: AGENCY EXPERIENCE
Tuesday, May 21, 9:00

RATINGS

Please check the appropriate column (1=low, 4=high).

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
1. How appropriate was this session for the DSP?			2	9
2. How effective were the speakers?				
Travis Horel, PPC		2	6	5
Michael Morfit, PPC		3	4	6
William Hammink, AFR		2	7	4
Richard Whitaker, A/PRE		2	5	6
William Schoux,LAC		1	5	6
Gerald Hyman, ENE		2	3	8

COMMENTS

1. What ide s from today's presentation will be most useful to you?

No Agency unanimity on the subject.

Schoux's do's and don'ts are practical advice with immediate relevance. Whitaker's comment that strategy in country will help you decide how to sequence activities and when to start things. Focus on institutionalization of democratic process through working to strengthen basic democratic institutions such as legislature, local governments, civil society, the rule of law. Useful to know what other bureaus are doing and who is involved.

Moving closer to the conclusion that our democracy initiative is/can be an end in itself. Need for country team effort.

No clear indication of where going on this.

Diversity and local adaptation = best.

The breadth of experience from LAC. The careful and comprehensive consideration of all issues and concerns to AID personnel who have been tasked with addressing this initiative. Discussion of how DI strategy was being formulated—role of Tuesday Group. Very important—Asia bureau W/field/expert team for doing country assessment. Given complaint about "irrelevance" of such an assessment under expert-dominant LAC format, I think this should be given greater play/consideration.

That according to the AFR Bureau, the democracy initiative has to be integrated into the overall mission strategy in the field. Although we are still to remember that democracy may not lead to overall economic development.

Specific organizational concerns to address with country team and other USG agencies in design of DI activities.

Evolution of AID policy framework and regional bureau policy statements.

Those of us in the field don't spend a lot of time reading AID/W policy guidance. Nevertheless, there is some value in knowing what AID/W is thinking and what lessons have been learned from the experience of various regional bureaus.

2. What questions were left unanswered or would you have liked to discuss?

Level of commitment in Washington and field to this activity. Yes, it's long-term but AID;s typical agenda is short-term. How do we rationalize these. Mandate for implementation of democratic programs in AID vs. other USG agencies is unclear.

Speaking with one voice—antidemocratic trends in AID. Seems worse in DI area (maybe because values are more directly touched). Maybe we need a democracy initiative in AID.

Where does economic development stand in overall AID program strategy vis-a-vis democracy initiative?

Is this another passing fad in AID? Will the human resources of the Agency be made available to manage these new, visible programs to develop political institutions and processes. In the country team context, how do you keep the ambassador, USIA from using AID resources as their personal slush fund; i.e., how to maintain integrity for program rather than short-term quick fix to some political pressure the ambassador might feel.

AID/W is pretty far apart.

What more specifically does USIS do with support to free press and where might AID DI efforts complement? We are talking rather narrowly about AOJ, political parties, legislative bodies, civil authorities. I would like to hear more on mainstreaming DI into all of our development initiatives.

More discussion on how other bureaus/missions could access LAC experience. Problem of missions still having to do other programs of health, education. The new initiatives on top of this.

Too many to enumerate.

3. Other comments:

The speakers were very good. Some informal communication system (newsletter?) for DI personnel would be useful to ensure information flows.

Too many people at once with too many visitors and hangers-on floating in and out.

Suggest consider small working group discussions involving mix of regional people, e.g., LAC participants with AFR or ENE bureau representative for discussions.

Info is coming so quickly that it is difficult to absorb.

Speaking with one voice" —possible? a good idea?

Need more time for exchange of views. Probably could be later in week when we have more academic/theoretical background with which to view Agency/bureau policies/strategies/activities.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT, DEMOCRATIZATION, AND GOVERNANCE
Evaluation

GOVERNANCE: CREATING AN ENABLING ENVIRONMENT FOR DEVELOPMENT
Tuesday, May 21, 1:00

RATINGS

Please check the appropriate column (1=low, 4=high).

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
1. How appropriate was this session for the DSP?		2	3	8
2. How effective were the speakers?				
Charles Cadwell, IRIS, U.Md		8	4	5
Jim Wesberry, LAC/DI		11	3	1

COMMENTS

1. What ideas from today's presentation will be most useful to you?

Didn't see much new. Question relevance to democracy. Suddenly feel that AID should avoid the word "democracy" and look instead at what makes sense to promote broad-based growth—if that involves so-called "democracy" components, O.K.

I inferred from presentation that corruption in my country circumstances is broader and different than financial management or even rent-seeking (although these are both part of the problem). It would seem to me that democratic principles are more obviously important in our situation as a result of the presentation.

Broad application of rent-seeking analytic paradigm. Ability of AID to deal directly with some elements of some host governments on the corruption issue.

I am overwhelmed by the inability of AID to do any of these labor/resource intensive initiatives given the current-state-of the-art.

Both concepts useful, but neither fully explored.

Rent-seeking behavior and the processes/techniques to breaking the circle.

Rent-seeking behavior. How to overcome.

Reinforcement of ideas regarding role of participatory process. Rent-seeking analysis.

Governance is not necessarily linked to democratization. Governance is more or less what we have been doing or would do anyway.

Idea that corruption is now a subject suitable for explicit attention in AID programs.

Concept of rent-seeking is interesting, but I don't have a firm grasp of what it is and how you work with governments to reduce negative rent seeking. The importance of uniform financial and accounting systems which are simple and affordable is key, but Jim only talked about what the financial management project was doing in the breakout group. His sales

pitch speech was inappropriate for this audience. He needs to talk in a more down to earth way about how financial management systems reduce corruption.

None of the ideas were new, but it was useful to hear what was being done in these areas or what claims were being made.

The need to address the accountability issue—especially if the host government is interested in addressing the issue.

2. What questions were left unanswered or would you have liked to discuss?

Examples of how financial management performance can address corruption issues. Efficacy of approaching corruption/rent-seeking behavior issues by "nibbling" around the edges.

Case study material regarding rent-seeking behavior; all of the variables that can affect outcomes.

Why would a government invite IRIS in to provide "all the answers" if there is not grassroots pressure to address these issues?

Greater discussion of both concepts into democratic systems/institutionalization.

How to get civil society involved in anti-corruption efforts, particularly when government is not responsive. Application of IRIS theory to noneconomic issues; e.g., AOJ, when have public good like justice that affects small segment and no explicit/tangible payoffs to general public.

What are project activities outside of IFMS & OCAS that can be undertaken in "anti-corruption" programs?

Implementation strategies.

The politics of corruption rather than financial mechanics.

What to do about it. What works?

How do you change the values of people in a situation where corruption has become acceptable, or a part of the culture? Simply changing/strengthening financial management institutions and systems will not change the underlying values.

Practical elements of implementing accountability or reducing rent-seeking; success stories.

3. Other comments:

Thanks to Jim Wesberry for waking me up!

Drop the talk on corruption except for the programs specifically aimed at LAC.

Accountability and corruption greater than financial management. Cultural definition of corruption important—changing social attitudes. Political accountability greater than financial accountability.

Liked the half-hour smaller group discussion session.

Need handout on IRIS project.

Would like handout re IRIS.

The first southern Baptist sermon I've heard in AID!

Fighting corruption is important, we all agree, but how do we do it?

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT, DEMOCRATIZATION, AND GOVERNANCE
Evaluation

IMPROVING GOVERNANCE: ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
Wednesday, May 22, 9:00

RATINGS

Please check the appropriate column (1=low, 4=high).

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
1. How appropriate was this session for this workshop?	3	2	5	7
2. How effective were the speakers?				
Norma Parker, LAC	3	4	10	1
Irv Levy, GU	3	8	5	1

COMMENTS

1. What ideas from today's presentation will be most useful to you?

Need to work with host country counterparts, provide assistance to what host governments want to do. Don't impose.

Elements of Colombia AOJ project design. Plan of LAC to get into "rule of law."

General information on structure/needs of court systems.

A general understanding of how LAC has addressed these issues (my first exposure to the subject).

The LA experience isn't applicable in Africa.

Need for counterparts to take lead and AID not to overmanage or overbudget.

AOJ programs may not actually result in improved governance.

While the presentations were region specific (LAC), the issues of collaboration, host country relationships, and philosophical issues were food for thought.

Increased interest in civil, as well as criminal, code reform in LAC. Involvement of private sector in reform efforts. Importance of public education. However, this concept needs to be further elaborated.

The host country commitment to get started and to stay involved.

N.A. We are at a different stage and have almost nothing in common with LAC.

Huge resources have been routed to LAC for these programs. For what?

Justice problems in other countries are very different. Impact is questionable unless carefully targeted. Sustainability is major issue.

Very few, since Afghanistan, the section we work with, at least, does not have a judicial system.

Description of Colombian model.

2. What questions were left unanswered or would you have liked to discuss?

It would have been more useful if they could have addressed the topic in a "lessons learned" approach based on the questions that were posed by the audience. They appeared to be selling a product rather than analyzing how to approach our work in this area and its relationship to development processes. The Colombian case is clear: a country that has had real success on the economic development side (highest sustained growth in the region) but is coming apart institutionally and socially. Thus, AID's role in this area . . . .

A clearer idea of lessons learned. So what. There are always a lot of high expectations at project outset.

If narcotic drugs were decriminalized in the USA, would there be any need for an administration of justice program in Colombia? The U.S. justice system is a disaster. Why should other countries accept "technical assistance" from us? Is there any correlation between the resources and time spent on AOJ projects design and the quality of the outcome? Colombia appeared to be an award winning design, but is it linked to reality.

Unresolved U.S. political interests (foreign policy) in certain cases, elements (drugs). U.S. emphasis on long term.

More on how to build public support for reform. Can it be done with only limited support for reform to be lasting? Indicators of improved AOJ that measure real changes; i.e., increase in civil liberties or protection, as opposed to number of convictions, establishment of training program. Particularly with concepts of independence and impartiality of equality under law.

Would have liked to have heard about a larger variety of programs and their success (or not) stories.

More specific examples of what AID has successfully done in AOJ. Discussion of lessons learned in AOJ. What do other donors do?

Relevance to my bureau's development problems.

What could/should we be doing in AOJ in non-LA, non-drug problem countries.

Positive impact USAID AOJ programs can make on judicial system performance through administrative reforms even without substantive law reform (aside from legal process and organic laws).

3. Other comments:

Too much time spent on Columbia, which is atypical.

I don't believe the LAC experience is particularly relevant to other geographic regions.

Case study of African, European, or Asian problems and possible solutions to compare LAC strategy.

Too descriptive of two cases—Colombia and Honduras.

The topic was very appropriate, but I expected to get more from it than I did. My final conclusions are now that AOJ programs can be merely administrative reform and infrastructure development or they can focus on making major changes in the judicial system.

Several participants are clearly interested in the LA AOJ experience. Maybe they would like a private session with the presenters.

Both speakers should have tried to generalize somewhat from the 2 specific cases they discussed.

LA representative in administration of justice was not particularly relevant to rest of group. More discussion on rule of law and basics would have been more useful.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT, DEMOCRATIZATION, AND GOVERNANCE
Evaluation

IMPROVING GOVERNANCE: STRENGTHENING LEGISLATURES
Wednesday, May 22, 10:30

RATINGS

Please check the appropriate column (1=low, 4=high).

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
1. How appropriate was this session for this workshop?	1		4	16
2. How effective was the speaker? Abdo Baaklini			7	14

COMMENTS

1. **What ideas from today's presentation will be most useful to you?**

Focus on process rather than product, concept of legislature as institution for reaching agreements rather than rationally optimal decisions, how these thoughts should inform our approach to providing assistance.

Not very much.

Extremely clear presentation of legislative issues and objectives.

Don't bureaucratize legislature.

Distinction between lateral (legislature) and hierarchical (bureaucracy) organizations. Point that legislatures are concerned not with efficiency but what will increase their power.

Strengthening a legislature may have no impact on the kinds of legislation coming out; one has to have a clear view of the end purpose of legislative reform and hope that management and infrastructure support has a trickle down (or up?) effect on the end products (implementational conflict with embassy).

Emphasis on Latin American experience assumes similarities of development of systems. In many countries outside LAC, such programs are overwhelming and years beyond them. Interesting thoughts/issues brought up , particularly the coordination of AID, embassy, and other institutions of the host country.

The difficulty in evaluating the success of an outside effort to strengthen a legislative branch of a government. A good speaker who really communicated. You knew he had experience and is committed. The detailed knowledge about a country situation used to design a legislative strengthening project.

Combining conceptual with pragmatic approach was good. Anecdotes and practical experience were good, too. Focus on different agendas of USAID and embassies was very good.

Indicators for measuring progress on legislative improvements. Linkages between assembly and universities and other institutions. Constructive engagement. Potential focus on budget issue as nonpartisan (to an extent) issue.

Roles of legislatures. Legislatures shouldn't be viewed or treated as a rational bureaucratic organization.

Importance of distinguishing between political and bureaucratic institutions, and good advice about value of CRS-type research bodies.

I am now aware of the availability of legislative training programs in the U.S.

Yes on understanding the consortium's approach to legislative development.

Importance of process.

Fascinating distinction between political and bureaucratic institutions and implications for working with legislature as a political institution. As a member of a bureaucratic culture, AID will have a hard time understanding what is possible here and how to measure success. Importance of linkages of legislature to institutions which make public opinion.

He was able to synthesize his overall experience and recommendations, based on his personal reflections.

So far as legislatures are instrumental in determining rule of law, the outcomes of legislative projects vis-a-vis his approach will hopefully have a better system of researching existing systems.

I found his whole analysis of legislative development and its inherent problems in the Third World countries most interesting and informative, since it is not something I have been exposed to before.

Importance and predominance of process in focusing on technical assistance targets. Analytical framework of the problem

2. What questions were left unanswered or would you have liked to discuss?

Given the realities of AID's juxtaposition with the embassy, should the political prerogatives prevail?

Would have liked him to have address implementation ideas in more detail.

How to figure out what to do, with whom, and how to implement it. U.S. doesn't have much experience in parliamentary systems (which is system where I am working), what is our advantage to assist in developing a system which we know as a model but have no experience per se?

What is legislative development? How is it measured? What model is the consortium working with? Is any country that starts with the consortium stuck with them forever?

Didn't generalize enough from his particular cases. Didn't explain enough his breakdown of "legislative roles."

If legislature is truly nonrepresentative in its function, is support to it solely as means for broadening participants in decisionmaking a worthwhile pursuit. Or should , in these cases, AID choose to support interest groups.

Why is it important to leave strong legislative bodies. This answer was assumed, but the session might include a quick 5-minutes devoted to answering this fundamental question.

Would like to know more about experience in helping a very young or brand new legislative body. The comments on Hungary were quite interesting.

Somewhat less clear, but still generally effective description of possible intervention.

Good broad-ranging discussion!

How to bring in universities, think tanks, etc., to legislative improvement. (Also NGOs.)

He suggests that a strategic decision be made on assistance to legislatures. How, and based on what criteria, is this decision to be made?

3. Other comments:

Abdo was effective speaker. Wish he could have elaborated on what the consortium and Albany has done in practical cases—problems they faced and how overcome.

More of a formal structure to the talk. It was fascinating, but rambling. He should have dealt with other regions (other than LAC), since he did mention some experience in Africa.

Check on various USAID's extremes with consortium. They are very controversial.

Whole topic very interesting. More time on this and less on LA AOJ case studies would have been more useful.

A dynamic and very interesting speaker.

Could use some readings.

A dynamic and very interesting speaker.

Include readings on this topic in material to participants.

Aid for legislative and judicial development seem to require a highly sophisticated understanding of a country's cultural and political situation. Will AID continue to have the field resources and knowledge needed to design and implement such complex projects.

A very effective speaker.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT, DEMOCRATIZATION, AND GOVERNANCE
Evaluation

IMPROVING GOVERNANCE: STRENGTHENING THE ELECTORAL PROCESS
Wednesday, May 22, 1:00

RATINGS

Please check the appropriate column (1=low, 4=high).

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
1. How appropriate was this session for this workshop?			1	15
2. How effective were the speakers?				
Arturo Valenzuela, GU	1		4	11
Jennie Lincoln, Emory U.		1	3	12
John Holm, Cleveland State U.			6	10
Richard Soudrietre, IFES		1	8	7

COMMENTS

1. What ideas from today's presentation will be most useful to you?

Different electoral systems. Assistance to parties. Emerging interest in parliamentary system to succeed presidentialism.

Presidential democracies with multi parties are a big problem.

Coordination of increasing more complex observer programs. Options for involvement that were mentioned from Botswana experience. Parliamentary alternative or search for other alternatives.

Characteristics and implications of different democratic electoral and governmental systems.

There are ways that AID can assist politically without impropriety.

The triangle of electoral, political party, and institutional systems. Key elements for a successful election.

Interplay between choice of electoral system/party system and regime type. Holm's comments on impact of electoral system on highly polarized societies. Aspects of electoral systems—What to look for in the rules of the game.

Need for electoral systems to be relevant to social mores of country. People have to perceive of elections as fair; support of system important. Whole electoral system, not just election, important.

Lincoln's experience and Valenzuela's concepts.

Elections may differ greatly from country to country, but they are not necessarily invalid because they are different.

Arturo Valenzuela's discussion of the political party implications of electoral systems.

2. **What questions were left unanswered or would you have liked to discuss?**

Can and should AID provide (or even seek to provide) direct assistance to political parties. Whether AID, whose numbers of direct hire are going down (96 less this year), has the resources needed to design and implement democratization initiatives.

Not so much unanswered as the need to go into greater depth on all points that were made, based on different regional perspectives on electoral systems.

Techniques for leveling the playing field, relying only on domestically mobilized (indigenous) resources. Role of military in electoral process. Examples of incentives for making elected representative parties more conciliatory, moderate.

How to interest US PVOs in the electoral process.

Specific measures and programs to institutionalize consensus building.

3. **Other comments:**

Several references were made to a particular academic's solution to political conflict by the speakers, but these solutions are not being discussed within the country in question. Time to climb out of the ivory tower.

With a proposal as radical as Valenzuela's on parliamentary system for LA, I'd like to see the other side represented (Diamond seemed to see this as a discarded idea). Ironically, for a theme I thought would be very nuts and bolts, this one (Holms and Valenzuela in particular) seemed to be most focused on introducing basic system changes and/or directly intervening in politics. I'd have liked to hear more about less intrusive techniques for strengthening electoral infrastructures. I don't think AID is ready to promote basic constitutional changes.

Very interesting topic. Maybe more extensive reading list useful.

How AID can potentially assist in the electoral process—appropriate intervention points and pitfalls.

A very consistently excellent presentation of all issues. Clear explanation of implications of different systems and of possible areas of assistance.

All on panel were lively, interesting—excellent.

Excellent panel—opened up lots of questions in very brief time.

Ken's limiting of questions, except for clarifications, and of discussion made for better session.

Excellent panel. This is the approach to use. Academics put issues/theory on table. Practitioners discuss what they're doing, what works, what doesn't.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT, DEMOCRATIZATION, AND GOVERNANCE
Evaluation

STRENGTHENING CIVIL SOCIETY
Thursday, May 23, 9:00

RATINGS

Please check the appropriate column (1=low, 4=high).

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
1. How appropriate was this session for this workshop?		4	1	13
2. How effective were the speakers?				
Cinnamon Dornsife, Asia Fdn		3	10	10
Hortense Dicker, Resources for Action	2	8	6	7
Anne Drabek, PVO/NGO Initiatives	1	3	4	14

COMMENTS

1. **What ideas from today's presentation will be most useful to you?**

Experiences in and methods of working with NGOs in DI areas.

Concept of creating an Advisory Council of NGOs to give policy input to government as a way to create public policy dialogue and partnerships between NOGs and government.

The lessons learned section, particularly of the Africa presentation, was extremely useful. The integration of other PVO activities with democractic initiatives topics.

The explanation of the different indicator systems and their nuances. The updating on where AID is on discussing, outside the Agency, these issues.

Issue of volatility of rating. Indices don't measure preconditions for democracy. Indicators suggest definite situations—often have partial access/restriction.

Sustainability. Continuity of funding/interest. Forming partnerships and coalitions. Process-oriented/qualitative programs.

Does AID have a comparative advantage in the area of supporting DI? Should NGO involvement be focused on supporting clearly political NGOs (or those involved in democratic issues) or should we continue to support NGOs through efforts to increase their ability to provide technical assistance in a wide range of areas.

Need for policy dialogue with governments to enable NGOs to flourish.

Look at legal/policy issues that might restrict/impede NGO or interest group formation as possible area for AID initiative.

Support what people doing—not push AID's agenda. Long-term commitment. Need to build capacity.

Information on representative democracy initiative activities being carried out by PVO/GOs.

The following questions—Whose agenda are we implementing? Does AID have long-term commitment needed? Does AID have a comparative advantage in democracy promotion? Do we need new initiatives?

Civic education. Training in policy advocacy skills.

Don't force NGOs to participate in democratization activities. It will come by itself.

The need to better communicate the participatory community approach that US PVOs espouse based on the development of the matching grant program.

Ideas of helping "service" NGOs develop policy analysis and advocacy skills. Also, issues of whose agenda is being followed.

Drabek's listing of issues.

Strengthening NGOs to engage in policy advocacy. Assisting NGOs in organizational development and outreach activities.

PVOs role in democratic initiatives. Major thrust of DI. Need to define specific objectives in recognition of culture and local agenda of PVO.

2. What questions were left unanswered or would you have liked to discuss?

More about how to manage this on a country level. How do you do a countrywide economic regional program?

Need more information on specific approaches to wirking with PVOs, especially in countries where they are weak. . .

The indicators they use to measure success, particularly for projects not funded by AID, didn't address the issues sufficiently except for Anne.

University role and other NGOs inpolicy formation and public advocacy.

Does mission need to make a conscious choice to develop/support PVOs/NGOs? If so, how does one choose which ones to support?

This was very clear.

More information on subset system of indicators.

Techniques to maintain independence of NGO community in light of increased donor interest and suspicion of government about growing activism of this sector.

I would have liked more objectivity on the reality of working with the PVO community after allthese years.

Is AID flexible enough to implement these programs.

AID's policy on working with NGOs in DI matters only as they work with governments or in more general terms? Whether and how AID/W's regional/centrally funded programs to support DI will be coordinated with missions-funded programs?

Other models used in areas of the world: on the gound operational considerations.

3. **Other comments:**

Very useful.

Platitudes, attitudes, but nothing much new. Based on content, worth about 20 minutes.

Think a more theoretical discussion of civil society would have been useful. Description of projects interesting, but could have been more contextualized.

I think that a leadership development and public advocacy focus, perhaps three PVOs, but also including universities and other NGOs, for public advocacy and other DI goals such as participation and freedom of expression/association.

What are the indicators of success? Given the pitfalls and the dangers in providing assistance on a short-term basis that may compromise the NGO's ability to create broad-based indigenous support for itself, should we get involved? African NGOs are a very special entity. In Burundi, most are very young (less than 5 years) and have clear connections to the governing political elite. Supporting them at this point in time means supporting the authority government in power.

This was too much on NGOs and not on rest of civil society. Also, too much pushing of own organizations and projects. Need more general presentation on civil society before getting to specifics.

Too much agreement between presenters. There are some very controversial issues in the PVO arena, indicators being one of them, sustainability another, whether AID should be as involved in supporting NGOs. There are many problems working with NGOs and they didn't mention any of them. They all presented a very rosy picture. Perhaps the reason for this is that all three presenters were women, and women more instinctively seek consensus. It is interesting to me that for the last three days, there was only one female presenter, but when we turned to the "helping" aspect, through NGOs, all the presenters were wormen, which somehow supports the stereotype of women as "helpers," facilitators. It was disappointing that they were not as effective presenters, including the AID female professional on Tuesday, as any of the men.

Very interesting concept. Danger that people will begin to make judgments on indicators rather than looking at complexities of situation.

Very similar approaches, issues across regions.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT, DEMOCRATIZATION, AND GOVERNANCE
Evaluation

AIDING A FREE PRESS
Thursday, May 23, 11:00

RATINGS

Please check the appropriate column (1=low, 4=high).

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
1. How appropriate was this session for this workshop?		1	5	11
2. How effective was the speaker? Chuck Greene, FL Int'l U.		1	6	10

COMMENTS

1. What ideas from today's presentation will be most useful to you?

Need to keep arm's length from government in order to dispel any ideas of being "tainted."

Basic good journalism will, in and of itself, encourage openness and free speech.

Complete independence from USG.

Independence requirement. Methodology for improving skills.

Training opportunities for LA journalists.

FIU wants to have its cake and eat it too. In the interest of maintaining their integrity, they have resisted any/all attempts by USAID to see that their funds are used wisely. While this may be appropriate, it suggests this may not be an appropriate area for involvement by a USG agency.

Autonomy from AID, but then should AID fund this?

Technical training of reporters works.

Importance of free press as part of democratization process. Independence of programs for credibility very important. Need for ethics, good journalism, press as watchdog. Technical skills

No law dealing with press is best law. Investigative reporting. important.

USIA and USIS should be the vehicles for USG.

Press assistance projects should be free of USG involvement. Less relevant for other bureaus.

University role in insulating controversial subjects from USG. How program is structured in Central America.

2. **What questions were left unanswered or would you have liked to discuss?**

How the free press impacts on programs more broadly. Relation between USIA and AID in this area. (How about a USIA perspective—as a speaker?

How to deal with constraints to free press that aren't technical; i.e., intimidation by public officials. Attitudinal.

Replicability. Lesson's learned.

PIU program details.

Training journalists is of little value if they are unable to put their new skills to work because the press is shrinking. Is there a role for USAID in improving the management of newspapers, radio, etc? How else can USAID support a free press.

What is role of free press in democracy? How does this relate to role of press in Third World? What is relative importance of free press? (Earlier speaker had said he would choose free press over free elections, if it came to that.)

This program assumes the existence of a free press—at least the existence of non-government-run media. For many countries this is not the case. What can be done when there is no free press?

USAID role vs. USIS role needs to be clarified. More general discussion of the role of the press in democratization efforts.

Could have been broader in conclusions—beyond their project—media in Third World help.

Role of coordinating with USIS. You may have engineered autonomy in Washington, but at the mission level, this would be impossible.

Just needed more time to discuss more issues, but it sounds as though they could have handled them.

3. **Other comments:**

Narrow focus that limited interest to other countries outside Latin and Central America.

Some background reading on topic, particularly approaches to countering censorship, other than wait and the tide will change, would be helpful.

Not general enough. Too focused on project to permit generalization to other regions/countries.

Program overly focused on Latin America.

The relationship of regional projects to bilateral missions—how best to coordinate and follow up?

Sounds like it might be worthwhile to assess the needs of a program like this in Africa. But the question of working with government media remains. In Burundi, French and Germans already provide a lot of technical training to journalists—so each mission has to see what's already being done.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT, DEMOCRATIZATION, AND GOVERNANCE
Evaluation

MEASURING DEMOCRATIC PERFORMANCE: CREATING INDICATORS
Thursday, May 23, 1:00

RATINGS

Please check the appropriate column (1=low, 4=high).

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
1. How appropriate was this session for this workshop?			1	14
2. How effective were the speakers?				
Raymond Gastil		2	7	6
Jo Husbands	1	1	6	7

COMMENTS

1. **What ideas from today's presentation will be most useful to you?**

Cannot use the existing measurement systems to draw conclusions on casual relationships nor preconditions to democracy.

The index on indices bring out individual biases. The controversy raised during the workshop is indicative of the community-wide controversy.

You can measure democratic performance. Have to be careful about what bias you bring to the study. Disaggregated information is best.

Measure of country performance are useful as indicators of progress within a process, but real care must be taken that the indicators don't become ends in themselves.

Clearest indicators for democracy. Systems to be used. Advantage of using multiple systems.

Should have been more directed at AID ongoing work, decisionmaking.

Measurements of democracy are important.

Psychology involved in indicators.

Understanding that various measurement systems exist and that they have a fairly good correlation.

Work ongoing and past to establish democratic index.

2. **What questions were left unanswered or would you have liked to discuss?**

Indices for other aspects of course; i.e., governance, political development, political accountability.

AID needs to come up with its own indicators and try to apply them fairly worldwide.

What are the other systems besides Freedom House, UNDP?

What do you do with a rating system?

Question of whether you can measure progress toward democracy. Also what are preconditions (which Husbands said you could measure). What is definition of democracy they are using? Would have helped if they found out their list of indicators earlier. Also, show someone else's scheme.

Concern about how these indicators will be or can be used at the mission level. I would have liked more specific information on how we can measure success of discrete efforts towards democratization; i.e., how would we measure the impact of an NGO support program on democracy.

3. **Other comments:**

Excellent moderation by Kusterer. A bright future in moderation.

Congress should be involved, too.

A loaded gun.

One could usefully either listen to Ray or read his reading. Both are not necessary.

AID's use of country performance indicators as a means to allocate resources to countries is questionable at best. Academics are good at knowing the limitation of the measures but AID field personnel will be limited in their ability to manipulate the indicator systems and use them within their country context. I fear that USAID will measure the measures/indicators and that they will become ends in themselves or measures of program performance. It worries me that the numbers will dominate and common sense indicators of progress will be forgotten. I am concerned that the performance measures will become check lists and the behavior and complexity behind the indicator will not receive serious attention.

Ray sounded like he was in an academic pissing contest with Freedom House.

Overly confident about existing agreement on what is democracy, etc.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT, DEMOCRATIZATION, AND GOVERNANCE
Evaluation

MEASURING PROGRESS IN DEMOCRATIZATION PROGRAMS
Thursday, May 23, 2:45

RATINGS

Please check the appropriate column (1=low, 4=high).

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
1. How appropriate was this session for this workshop?				19
2. How effective was the speaker? Larry Cooley, MSI	1		1	17

COMMENTS

1. What ideas from today's presentation will be most useful to you?

Discussion on the issues specifically related to M&E in DI programs. Idea of peer review and kinds of data. Issue of what activities to select for mission involvement.

How hard it is to identify objectives and then what can do to measure.

There are no easy answers to evaluation of DI programs.

Have to be realistic about what can do—will have to leave some things out. Difficulty of assessing impact beyond program output level.

Larry (MSI) has done so little work in this area that one or two other speakers could have been used.

What you can and can't measure, and how, and its significance.

Confused about what we can measure or should measure as democratization.

Normative nature of concepts. Need to be clear on strategic objectives.

The PVO community needs to receive a presentation on the progress so far on developing measures.

Importance of setting strategic objectives at outset. Peer review to measure achievement of strategic objectives.

Very clear presentation of his perspectives on the process of developing the system.

2. What questions were left unanswered or would you have liked to discuss?

What is the nature of God (and how do we measure it)?

Real basis of disagreement with LAC? Why did Larry feel so uncomfortable with DI "intrusiveness"?

Measurement of strengthening of civil society and legislature performance.

3. **Other comments:**

Pulled a lot of loose ends together. Great!

Larry is a very logical and articulate presenter. Also, nice flip charts.

Thank God for someone finally using the word "normative."

Handouts might include log frames and evaluation plans from authorized projects for participants to critique. Would provide participants with ideas on specific indicators being used. This would give field perspective juxtaposed with Washington perspective.

Whole presentation was very well done and insightful.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT, DEMOCRATIZATION, AND GOVERNANCE
Evaluation

UNDERTAKING A DEMOCRACY ASSESSMENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE
Friday, May 24, 9:00

RATINGS

Please check the appropriate column (1=low, 4=high).

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
1. How appropriate was this session for this workshop?			1	16
2. How effective were the speakers?				
William Cole, ENE		4	6	7
Larry Harrison, Harvard		1	4	12

COMMENTS

1. What ideas from today's presentation will be most useful to you?

Need for type of list of characteristics of democratic societies or template at program level. Also importance of political culture and attitudes/values.

The relationship between values and doing something. The key log concept. The relationship between institutional change and value change.

Country specific. What can do given constraints—need to identify constraints, see what a "manageable interest."

The importance of values and attitudes are part of the analysis of why democratic institutions are not functioning in many of the countries in which we work. I like Bill's analysis which leads us to focus on where the pressure points in the system are, where we might have significant impact by focusing resources.

Additional questions to ask when assessing needs and planning democratic initiatives. While cultural sensitivity had been mentioned all week, appreciated specific cultural and attitudinal challenges which provided food for thought.

Cultural values/attitudes vs. political economy approach. Programs look similar regardless of country or assessment approach.

Factors in development prone/development resistant societies. Conceptual frameworks for democracy assessments. Importance of evaluating civic education pay-off before undertaking such an initiative, particularly as weighed against other alternatives.

Both speakers' approaches and experience.

Overwhelming importance of a rigorous analysis as a basis for designing interventions.

Provided useful framework for thinking about possible intervention techniques.

The notion of how values/attitudes affect development prospects and what the potential change agents are.

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/competing analytic paradigms and their power to explain different behaviors/outcomes at varying levels.

Comparisons of analytical process employed in Thailand. Overview of analytical and theoretical concepts for assessment.

Fallacy of misplaced concreteness and impact of cultural/ethical values on democratization process vs. impact of institutions/interest group/classes, etc., on democratic initiatives. People/societies act according to what works vs. people act according to their cultural conditioning. My conclusion is that people and societies act according to both and both analytical approaches are valid.

Varied approaches and assessments.

2. What questions were left unanswered or would you have liked to discuss?

None really. It raised the right issues and presented them fairly.

To what degree are the two approaches compatible? completely different? irrelevant to one another? useful under differing circumstances? What has worked?

Does commonality of programs suggest that democracy is a concise, well defined and universal abstraction? Or does it suggest our cultural bias or limited expertise?

Using assessment as a means/tool for building commitment of political elite to efforts aimed at empowering other groups, coalition, or consensus building skills, etc.

More on misplaced concreteness. More on the actual application of assessments into activities. The relationship of assessments to policy dialogue. With whom? By whom?

More useful if could have got out of Thailand, Indonesia examples into generalities.

How far can/should an agency like USAID go in attempting to alter attitudes and values? Should we work, for instance, with religious organizations?

More concrete examples of strategies to increase the dynamism of key institutions after assessing their strengths and weaknesses.

3. Other comments:

Not enough time.

Management intensity—With declining AID resources (OE), what does a move to political development mean for AID as an organization. I believe Cole was intimidated by Larry. Once Larry left, Bill was more articulate and "useful" to the training.

Outstanding session. Very intellectually stimulating. Should lead many to examine unstated assumptions underlying their own perspectives.

Providing samples of democratic assessment SOWs could be helpful.

If one accepts Larry's view of the development process, is USAID wasting most of its energies? Should we direct our attention more to education (al all levels) and USIS type programs rather than conventional approaches?

Found Cole's presentation difficult to follow. Would be interesting to include missions representatives on panel to discuss operational aspects of carrying out a field assessment.

The political economy approach and the cultural/value-attitude approach are very different in analytical starting point but not so different in terms of what we do—our intervention. I conclude both approaches are valid—especially since we end up about the same place.

Some of the material presented was too LA specific.

Presentation was all over the place, but discussion was very good. Need to understand a wide variety of issues relevant to country and see how cultural attitudes impinge on these issues. Democratic assessment part of general broader understanding of country.

Would have liked to see a more broadly based discussion of what an assessment could be, etc. Harrison was too biased to be helpful. Cole didn't seem to have clear enough handle on what he was doing. Perhaps a discussion with him would have been more helpful than a presentation. Maybe this session should be a panel, but with the introducer raising general issues which the panelists could address.

Colombia's Bloodied Bench

The U.S. sends bulletproof vests and armored cars to protect Colombia's judges from the drug lords—but it has all but abandoned the country's justice system.

BY CAMERON BARR

THE UNIVERSAL "no parking" symbol, the letter P in a circle with a line through it, isn't just posted on signs in Bogotá, it's sometimes painted on the street itself. The warnings are big, about the size of a car, and they're enforced by heavily armed military police pacing the sidewalk. People in cities like Bogotá and Medellín have come to fear parked cars, because they are sometimes filled with dynamite.

Near one of Bogotá's courthouses is the now-skeletal headquarters of the Colombian intelligence agency, the Departamento Administrativo de Seguridad. On December 6 a vehicle packed with hundreds of pounds of explosives blew up in front of the DAS, leaving a crater 20 feet deep and killing almost 60 people. The only tall building for blocks around, the DAS is now a monument to car bombs—floor upon floor of crumbling concrete.

A judge we'll call Hernán Sánchez García, one of 59 Colombian judges who preside over specialized narcotics courts, sits in his courthouse office a block away and declares, unsurprisingly, that he feels "totally, absolutely vulnerable, here and elsewhere."

The DAS attack and the August 18 assassination of leading presidential candidate Senator Luis Carlos Galán seem to have made any fear rational in Colombia. The Galán murder evokes the John F. Kennedy assassination: Colombians remember where they were when they heard the news, and they remember the image of Galán's young son, speaking at the funeral, passing the political flame to César Gaviria Trujillo, the politician who took over Galán's campaign. In the background of Gaviria's standard billboard is a red image of Galán's face.

But the *narcotraficantes*—the Colombian idiom for drug traffickers—have had an effect far beyond the circle of politicians, judges, and journalists who are their most frequent targets. And although the "Extraditables," as a group of cartel leaders call themselves, offered in mid-January to quit violence and drug trafficking in exchange for amnesty, Colombia's narco-tension persists. President Virgilio Barco Vargas has refused to negotiate.

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One resident of an upper-class Bogotá neighborhood says she met many of the people in her apartment building because a car bomb exploded down the street. The electricity went off, imposing darkness and silence, and after the neighbors milled around in the hallways, the children in the building stayed up late crying. She was glad she'd applied a special film to the inside of her windows; it held the glass together after it was completely splintered by shock waves. The glass business is booming in Bogotá, but there's a waiting list for the kind that shatters into small pebbles instead of jagged shards.

Protection is also a growth industry. Uniformed armed guards patrol outside banks, restaurants, and government buildings, watching the people who park nearby, listening to see if an approaching motorcycle might bear two teenagers and a gun, trying to remain sensitive to signs of another attack by *los narcos*. At night the streets of Bogotá's commercial, governmental, and affluent residential areas are empty but for troops and watchmen, and thin people gathering recyclable paper in pushcarts, one of the industries of the poor.

Colombia's bodyguards, jittery young men in T-shirts and jean jackets who cluster around selected officials and political candidates, handle assault rifles and machine pistols like old briefcases, letting them clatter against the wall, apparently certain that the weapons won't release a three-second spray of 15 rounds. It's behavior that induces calm, deliberate motions in the people around them.

If the bodyguards bear a resemblance to their "principal," in law-enforcement lingo, they'll occasionally sit in the rear right-hand seat of his or her car while the principal takes a turn in the chase car. A motorcycle outrider or two will precede the pair, alert to that sudden obstruction in the route and the insidious approach of another motorcycle whose passenger is looking for a clear view of the man or woman in the rear right-hand seat.

It's a city where the war on drugs isn't a figure of speech.

Judge Sánchez's office still bears the marks of the DAS blast. His windows have been replaced, but his ceiling tiles have not. The fluorescent lighting fixture hangs jerry-rigged with wire from the exposed supports of the floor above. "As you can see," he says, standing and gesturing upwards, "this was one of the offices most affected by the bomb raid at DAS." He observes that neither the new window glass nor the glass partition that divides his office from the reception area is bulletproof.

Across the courtyard workmen are on the roof repairing bomb damage. If they were assassins, Sánchez would be an easy target. "It's almost a heroic activity," Sánchez says of being a judge in Colombia.

Being a judge in Colombia is heroic—and tragic—not only because about 70 judges have been killed in the past decade, but also because the Colombian justice system is notoriously inefficient, so much so that it's been nicknamed "*La Impunidad*," or the impunity, for its ineffectiveness in punishing wrongdoers. Colombian judges handling drug cases are fighting on two fronts: against the murderous drug traffickers, and against their own unwieldy bureaucracy.

In a cartoon from Bogotá's *El Tiempo* expressing Colombian frustration with the U.S., President George Bush urges Colombia to "say no to the extraditables" as Washington, D.C., mayor Marion Barry snorts cocaine.

Guillermo Benavides Melo, until last month a judge on Colombia's Council of State, a parallel supreme court that decides matters in which the government is a party, says public faith in the justice system is "nearly zero." The popular perception of the system makes him feel "very bad because I'm a judge, and doubly bad—mortifying—because a high percentage of the people are telling the truth," Benavides says.

Judge Sánchez worries that the deterioration of public faith in the system, which he blames in part on shoddy, uninformed journalism, will convert judges into "jokers . . . fragile and weak."

Despite widely publicized concern about Colombia's judiciary, U.S. drug control strategy has promoted a militarized enforcement effort that U.S. officials say is aimed at "repressing" drug traffic. The U.S. government is spending $100 million to $200 million this year on military and law-enforcement assistance for Colombia and $5 million for the protection of judges, journalists, and public officials. Over the past three years the U.S. has set aside only $1.5 million to improve the efficacy of the justice system.

Interviews with seven judges in Bogotá, along with a dozen other officials and academics in Colombia and the U.S., make it clear that U.S. antidrug efforts on the Colombian front are unbalanced at best. The U.S. is not adequately committed to strengthening the criminal justice system in Colombia, even as it enables Colombian security forces to generate ever-increasing numbers of cases against drug traffickers.

James Smith, a lawyer-turned-foreign-service-officer who directs the U.S. Agency for International Development program in Bogotá, says some of his colleagues in the embassy maintain the same disdain for the Colombian justice system that Frank Lloyd Wright reserved for the city of Pittsburgh: Abandon it.

To Colombians, the practice of extradition, so strongly supported by the U.S., only confirms the existence of this attitude. Juan Tokatlian, a professor at Bogotá's University of the Andes who has written on drug trafficking, says extradition was effectively designed to bypass the Colombian justice system.

And to some Colombians, the U.S. mocks the courage of Colombian judges by coddling the drug user—the "first criminal in this interminable chain of crime that has destabilized our society," in the words of one Bogotá columnist. The columnist was writing about alleged cocaine consumer Marion Barry, whose arrest illustrates to Colombians how drug use permeates every level of life in the U.S., and how it often draws compassion rather than punishment.

"In the curious U.S. criminal justice system, in which the penalty is negotiable, Mr. Barry skillfully converted his obligation—resignation—into a currency that produced a lower penalty. That's manifestly absurd and insulting to Colombia," wrote J. Diego Jaramillo in Bogotá's *El Tiempo*.

Judge Sanchez has presided over his anti-narcotrafficking court for about a year. A serious, dark-haired man of 30, he's dressed in a crisp glen plaid suit and a patterned red tie and says he wants to make a name for himself as a judge.

His office, as he puts it, "doesn't have the dignity of what it represents." It's a linoleum-floored room with a desk, three chairs, and a safe that used to be part of a cocaine smuggling operation. Piled on his desk are documents tied in bundles with string, the caseload management device of pre-computer legal systems. On the floor are empty mineral water bottles and a leather machine gun case, also empty, which was seized in a police raid of a narcotrafficker's house. Tacked to the door is a calendar with women in bathing suits, an incongruous deference to machismo.

The Colombian legal system confers great power on judges at a young age. Like Sanchez, they are often named right out of law school, which is an undergraduate institution, and sent to a minor jurisdiction in a small town. The starting salary for a municipal judge is less than $4,500 a year; like public-sector lawyering elsewhere, most of the income is paid in prestige.

After a few years, given the family and political contacts that facilitate a higher appointment, a judge in a rural post may be asked to take a post in Bogotá, Medellín, or another large city. Judges specialize in criminal, civil, labor, or other types of law, so a young jurist with visions of opposing the drug traffickers would opt for a post as a judge of criminal investigation.

Under the inquisitorial system Colombia inherited from Spain, these judges investigate crimes, indict suspects, gather all the evidence, and recommend verdicts and sentences to a superior or circuit court. A prosecutor in the United States develops a case against a defendant; a criminal investigation judge in Colombia attempts to determine the "truth" about a crime.

Judges interview witnesses and collect physical evidence on their own during the investigation phase. They also bear the responsibility for cross-examining and testing the credibility of witnesses, who may never face the defendant or his or her lawyer. Attorneys may, however, consult the judge on behalf of the defendant or the victim and present evidence favorable to their clients.

Once the criminal investigation judge has completed his or her report, a higher court judge will review it and issue a sentence, or ask for more evidence. Three-person juries decide homicide cases.

Specialized investigative judges like Sánchez and members of a "public order" tribunal who hear cases of suspected political or drug-trafficking terrorism not only indict and investigate but also convict and sentence defendants. Their decisions are automatically reviewed—and usually endorsed—by superior tribunals.

Judges who handle terrorism and drug cases are the highest paid trial-

Ambushed on his way to work, Procurador General Carlos Hoyos, one of the country's top legal officials, was kidnapped and then killed in January 1988. In the foreground is one of Hoyos's two slain bodyguards.

level judges in Colombia. They make just over $11,000 a year, compared to the $18,000 salaries of the country's highest paid jurists, members of Colombia's Supreme Court and Council of State. (The judiciary is generally considered to be underpaid, although the priciest apartments and houses in the classified ads of a Bogotá newspaper in January weren't selling for more than $100,000.)

Sánchez, who has been on the specialized bench for a year, says he has about 570 matters pending in his court—100 of them seizure cases in which the security forces have taken custody of a drug trafficker's ranch, airplane, or other property. A burst of these cases, all part of President Barco's August 18 declaration of war against the traffickers, is now winding through the legal system. Sánchez says Barco's war has increased his work load about 40 percent.

The most pressing cases involve some 70 suspects who are in custody. In most criminal cases judges must rule on a prisoner's legal status within five days of receiving the case, and if continued detention is warranted, issue an indictment within another 30 days. Sánchez says last year he released no one due to procedural delays. "This is to show you that it can be done," he adds.

In his remaining 400 cases—all involving allegations of narcotrafficking, kidnapping, or extortion—no suspect has been apprehended. These cases await Sánchez's investigation, and they will probably wait a long time.

"He was an honest and honorable man," says one judge of a colleague who was murdered. He "defied the drug traffickers. So they killed him."

Another specialized judge, Danilo Guzmán Arias, 33, says, "There is not much attention paid to [cases without prisoners], because [of the] cases with prisoners."

María Restrepo de Gómez, a 32-year-old judge of criminal investigation, agrees. "Cases without a prisoner are . . . almost neglected," she says. (Restrepo's name was changed at her request.)

In an average month, Sánchez says, he brings six to eight cases to conviction and sentencing, usually those involving prisoners. But every month 80 to 100 new matters are brought to his court, 10 percent of them cases in which a suspect has been detained. His caseload "is nearly impossible," he says, "and it's the reason why we don't [appear to the public to have] the desired effectiveness."

Judge Guzmán says his caseload numbers about 400. While 60 new cases come in every month, he closes just eight or ten. "As you can see," says the bearded, round-faced jurist, "they are accumulating."

All three judges point to investigation as the area most in need of reform. Says Sánchez: "I do everything."

The judge says he interrogates witnesses himself, and if his clerical staff is occupied, types out the transcript as the interview progresses. (Sánchez's staff includes two legal assistants, a secretary, and a "scribe" who functions as court reporter, taking down proceedings with a manual typewriter.)

Judges inspect crime scenes themselves, although typically they are not provided with a vehicle to do so. Sánchez says he uses his own car for judicial inspections. Judge Restrepo, who doesn't have a car, says she sometimes depends on the lawyers involved for transportation to a crime scene. "If [they] don't take us, sometimes it doesn't happen," even in murder investigations, she says. "Sometimes we spend our own money without reimbursement," she adds.

Judicial duties also include the destruction of drugs not needed as evidence. Sánchez says he's destroyed kilos of cocaine, diluting it in buckets of water and unceremoniously dumping the expensive white mud down the sewer. He says the method is "self-taught."

The responsibility for assisting judges is currently split between a recently created Judicial Police for Criminal Investigation, the DAS security agency, and specialized elements of the national police.

Guzman says the assistance he gets from the judicial police is largely technical: medical, ballistic, and topographical analyses. He maintains that "all the gathering of evidence should be done by a special force."

What Sánchez wants is "a unified judicial police with real preparation on a scientific level and on a legal level. This doesn't mean each officer has to be a lawyer, but that he know what elements are needed for [a judge's] investigation." He complains that he must work with a pool of judicial investigators, because no single officer is assigned to his court. Without a continuing relationship, he says, he cannot trust judicial police agents with much responsibility.

Colombia's national director of criminal investigation, who heads the judicial police, is Omar Henry Velasco Ramírez, an imposing, bearded man who looks like a stout Abraham Lincoln. "The fundamental problem that Colombia has at the moment in relation to the justice system is in investigation," he says. The judicial police, including administrative staff, numbers 3,000. Its backlog of cases is 200,000. If a case is stalled in a judge's court for longer than four to six months without a suspect, it's added to the backlog.

"The number of [cases] we're able to finish is amplified or limited" by what the judicial police can do, Judge Sánchez says. As it is, his days are filled with investigative, administrative, and even clerical tasks. "I just can't sit here and think how I'm going to give a verdict."

All four trial-level judges interviewed by *The American Lawyer*—Judges Sánchez, Guzmán, Restrepo, and public order judge Fernando Domingues Herrera, who is handling the assassination of presidential candidate Galán—say the absence of an effective investigative apparatus is the most pronounced internal impediment to an effective justice system in Colombia. But the external impediments—threats, bribery, and assassination by the *narcos*—are also great.

Judicial protection is recognized by both the U.S. and Colombian governments as part of the antidrug effort. The U.S. Congress, for example, authorized a one-time $5 million appropriation in November 1988 for the protection of judges, journalists, and public officials.

The hardware and training provided by these funds took almost a year to materialize in Colombia, because of bureaucratic inefficiencies

PHOTOGRAPH BY AP WIDE WORLD

in both countries, according to two U.S. embassy officials involved in judicial protection. Now that the funds are largely in place, U.S.-backed judicial protection does provide some solace to threatened judges.

Judge Domingues, who is handling the Galan assassination, estimates that the government spends about $1,700 a month, double his salary, to protect him. Premium protection for Domingues means a detail of six bodyguards, a bulletproof vest, security and weapons training, and the use of a gun and an armored car. (His name was changed at his request.)

Domingues is in his early thirties, and says that although he's a pacifist by nature, he's learned to use an Ingram machine pistol. He varies his routine, sometimes deciding at the last minute to spend the night with relatives, and must clear any public excursion with security forces. His wife and his baby daughter are also protected, but he worries that he'll be unable to afford to send his child to a school abroad when she is older.

Two things are unusual about Domingues's office in a downtown Bogota high rise: the bulletproof vest he peels off every morning and drapes over a chair, and the holstered pistol he keeps in his upper-right-hand desk drawer. From the elevator landing on the other side of the building, the DAS building is visible several miles away. It looks like a construction site, empty and hollow.

James Smith: The key is strengthening the judicial system.

The U.S. appropriation purchased bulletproof vests for Domingues and more than 350 judges, officials, and bodyguards. It also financed training courses in personal security, techniques of protection, building security, and threat assessment, according to the two U.S. embassy officials.

But the big-ticket item for protecting a person from assassination in Colombia is the armored car. The *sicarios*, youthful killers equipped and paid by the drug traffickers, often strike a victim on his or her way to work. Riding motorcycles, the assassins fire machine guns at the victim as he or she sits in traffic, or waits at a bus stop.

The U.S. money was supposed to provide 30 armored cars for those judges the Colombian government considers most endangered, the "threatened thirty," as embassy officials call them. However, 18 of the cars were being armored in a warehouse near DAS headquarters at the time of the bombing; embassy officials say an extra $50,000 is being spent to repair them. So far 18 cars have been delivered.

(The officials add that the Colombian government is expecting a shipment of used armored cars from Italy. Several European countries have participated in conferences on judicial protection in Colombia, among them Italy, Britain, and Spain, which have experience protecting judges from the Mafia and the Red Brigade, the Irish Republican Army, and Basque separatists.)

Since Judge Sánchez is not among the "threatened thirty," he is not receiving the highest level of protection. In December, he says, he attended U.S.-sponsored security awareness courses and got a bulletproof vest. The vest he can use, Sánchez says, but the courses were "beyond reality." He was trained, for example, how to work with a security escort, but he doesn't have one.

Sánchez's docket includes property seizure cases involving the cartel figures who he says "have been elevated by the press": José Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha, who was killed in December by Colombian troops firing from a helicopter provided by the U.S.; Pablo Escobar Gaviria; and Jorge Luis Ochoa. Last year Sánchez sentenced a group of seven traffickers caught with 100 pounds of cocaine to ten years in jail.

Sánchez refuses to discuss in detail the threats he has received, for what he says are security reasons. But he does suggest that during a sensitive case a lawyer might come into his offices and say, "Doctor," using the honorific applied to most professionals in Colombia, "I know you have the case against So-and-So.

"I heard a rumor," this hypothetical lawyer might say, "that you have to take care of yourself. You should." Sánchez says the threats are sometimes that subtle, and other times more direct—unambiguous phone calls and letters threatening him and his family.

Says Restrepo: "All the judges are really exposed." As a criminal investigation judge handling crimes not related to drug trafficking or terrorism, she is supposed to be spared the most dangerous defendants, but as she points out, "You don't [always] know [whether] it's a drug case, and by the time they find out, the criminal investigation judge could be dead." She says she was directly threatened two years ago, before the specialized courts were established, and was assigned a single bodyguard for a week.

According to a fifth judge—a member of the "threatened thirty"—the process of intimidation begins with offers of large bribes. A U.S. embassy official says judges are sometimes offered $50,000–$100,000—many times a judge's salary—to rule favorably or dismiss a case. If the money is consistently refused, this judge says, the traffickers make the options clear: Be corrupted or be killed. She speaks from experience, because a case involving one of the Medellín cartel's most prominent figures is on her docket.

Undimmed by bulletproof glass, the sunlight fills this judge's office on an afternoon in late January. Apparently unsoothed by the announcement two weeks earlier that the drug traffickers would suspend their violence in order to win negotiations with the government, she seeks repeated promises of confidentiality from this reporter.

All the security measures available to judges in Colombia did not protect one of her close colleagues, who was killed within the past year. "He was an honest and honorable man," she recalls, with evident fondness, "who . . . defied the drug traffickers. So they killed him."

Aside from fear and grief, the threats against Colombia's judiciary force judges into a kind of shame about their profession. "Many buildings," says Restrepo, "refuse to rent or sell to judges" because they attract violence. "You shouldn't say you're a judge in Bogotá," she adds. "It's better to keep silent and say you're a lawyer."

Many judges who don't want to resign and don't want to cross the traffickers are intimidated, Restrepo says. "There are judges who say, 'Why are you investigating that case? Leave it alone.' "

"It is not sufficient to protect inefficient jurists," says Smith, who heads the Agency for International Development program in Colombia.

The U.S. officials in Bogotá involved in judicial protection say no new funds have been appropriated to protect judges. It's possible, however, that the U.S. government's $1.5 million commitment to judicial reform over the last three years may increase to $7 million over the next two to three years.

The impetus to assist in a reform effort has come from James Smith, the embassy official who heads the tiny U.S. AID office in Bogotá. A year and a half shy of retirement, Smith is promoting judicial reform in Colombia with the tenacity one might expect from a stocky former wrestler and U.S. marine, but with a diplomatic delicacy fine-tuned by seven years of experience in Colombia.

"It is not sufficient to protec cient jurists," he says. It's ev productive, he suggests, to moun huge enforcement effort that will feed large numbers of drug cases into a system that cannot handle them.

A lawyer who practiced in Cleveland for the first six years of his career, Smith has set up a judicial reform task force in Colombia, financed in part with U.S. tax dollars. Through the Fundacion para la Educacion Superior, or FES, a Colombian institution similar to the Ford Foundation, Smith has marshaled an influential group of legal heavyweights to push reform in the justice system. The group includes a Supreme Court justice, a vice-minister of the Ministry of Justice, a ex-member of the Council of State who has just become the country's first chief administrative judge, the head of Colombia's judicial training school, and Smith and FES officials.

The FES project, for instance, has already applied the U.S. funds, as well as money from FES and other Colombian donors, toward computer systems and libraries for Colombia's higher courts.

The Colombian government is also sensitive to the need for reform. Smith says that almost half of a recent 50 percent increase in federal funds for the justice system is earmarked for modernization. And the executive branch is about to give administrative and financial responsibility for much of the system to the judiciary itself.

The project is now addressing itself to a greater challenge—improv the investigative capacity of th tice system by promoting coo tion among Colombia's someti competitive investigative agencies. At a meeting of the FES committee in late January, that topic provokes the most intense discussion.

As part of a plan to computerize the criminal investigation courts, the committee members debate the need for cooperation and coordination between Colombia's investigative agencies. The problems are partly technical, in that the various security agencies use different administrative systems, but they are also territorial and thus far more sensitive to resolve.

The agencies are reluctant to share their information and intelligence-gathering resources with other bureaucracies, much less investigative judges. These rivalries are replicated within the embassy. The U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency, Smith says, prefers to work exclusively with the DAS security agency and is unenthusiastic about DAS sharing information related to drug trafficking.

After the meeting Smith says he wants to avoid being "bogged down in computers," and that the real issue is coordination and cooperation. But he's encouraged that Supreme Court justice Jaime Giraldo Angel and vice-minister of justice Mauricio Londoño Paredes have agreed to approach the agencies to encourage cooperation.

Smith knows that his commitment to strengthening the Colombia judicial system as a means to pose drug trafficking—and optimism—places him in a smal nority among drug-control strategis in the embassy and in Washington. "Perhaps my quarrel with the people who advocate enormous militariza-

tion is that they ignore the need to have the Colombians be able to handle the wrongdoers in their own situation," he says.

The militarists are not confined to the U.S. embassy, according to Juan Tokatlian, director of the international studies center at Bogotá's University of the Andes and co-editor of *The Political Economy of Drug Trafficking*. "There's a clear tendency [to believe] that the many problems that Colombia faces may be resolved through the use of force rather than through peaceful means and legal mechanisms," says Tokatlian.

The justice system, he argues, "was never seen as the backbone of democracy in Colombia," nor has it been "an institution perceived to reflect people's needs." Its problems "developed well before the drug problem, [which has] just become a catalyst in exacerbating the problems of law enforcement and law credibility in Colombia."

As Smith says, the Colombian justice system "was the perfect target for manipulation by the drug traffickers." Young, underpaid, and inadequately supported judges have been struggling under impossible caseloads, fighting an enemy few believe they can handle.

example, that promoting cooperation between security agencies and judges will be difficult because the judicial union—a group which has agitated successfully for increased protection—has been considered leftist. Some DAS officials suspect that sharing information with judges means sharing it with Colombia's guerrilla armies.

The FES project offers some hope for a strengthened rule of law in Colombia, but unless more is done to improve the Colombian justice system, that country may never be able to enforce its anti-narcotrafficking laws without resort to state-sponsored violence and extradition.

Smith asserts that there is growing commitment to judicial reform in Colombia, both within President Barco's administration and among the presidential candidates vying to replace him. And he is urging the U.S. to support the Colombian justice system and contribute to a long-term solution to that country's crisis.

A senior U.S. embassy official in Bogotá who would not speak for attribution, when asked why more resources were not applied to the justice system itself, says current

"We're paying a price for a problem that is not really ours," insists the *procurador general*. "The first thing is to stop the consumption."

The 1979 extradition treaty between Colombia and the U.S., Tokatlian says, is evidence that U.S. policy makers found it more expedient to bypass the Colombian justice system, rather than take up the daunting task of strengthening a traditionally weak institution. "From then on," he says, "I see a strategy to militarize the war. . . . It's clear."

He asserts that the enforcement-oriented strategy being pursued by both governments "becomes a monster that you have to keep feeding because it's never enough, and you start paying less and less attention to the judicial system."

He says a friend in the judiciary wonders what it will come to. "What are we building here?" Tokatlian says he's been asked by his friend. "After so many deaths, we are finally allowing President Barco an open hand to use extradition. Now not even that seems sufficient at this stage. . . . We have to witness FBI guys running around the country [with recently endorsed powers to arrest people in foreign countries]. We are in a vicious circle, and we are never given the opportunity to show the system may work in some instances."

Tokatlian is skeptical about some of the reform efforts. He predicts, for funding meets the "absorptive capacity" of reform efforts. But he adds: "I think that will shift over the coming years."

As it is, the existing U.S. drug control strategy is engendering bitter resentment among some Colombians. Alfonso Gómez Méndez, Colombia's *procurador general*—a cabinet-level inspector general of the judiciary and the government—rattles off the kinds of people killed in Colombia's war on drugs: magistrates, judges, government officials, union leaders, journalists, political candidates, ministers, and one of his predecessors. "We are paying a price for a problem that is not really ours," he says.

But even an intelligent, nonmanipulative attempt to bolster Colombia's judicial institutions isn't likely to win over Gómez, who takes the long view: "The first thing is to stop the consumption." If the U.S. and other consuming countries cannot control demand, he warns, "we're not going to let ourselves be used in this farce."

What's farcical to Gómez, but painfully so, is that Colombians die while the mayor of Washington, D.C., allegedly abuses drugs. It's a contrast too galling for Colombians to view calmly. □

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