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**CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS AND DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA
PAPER WRITERS CONFERENCE**

RAPPORTEUR'S REPORT

Prepared by

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Montevideo

December 17-20, 1987
Panama City
Caesar Park Marriott

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS AND DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA

Rapporteur's Report

This report summarizes the second conference held under the auspices of the Project, "Civil-Military Relations and Democracy in Latin America," co-sponsored by the American University of Washington, D.C. and PEITHO of Montevideo, Uruguay.

This conference completes the second of four stages which comprise the project. Stage one was completed by convening a planning session in early 1987 in which key topics and leading scholars of civil-military relations were identified. This conference was the subject of a rapporteurs' report produced by Michael Gold and Luis Julia after that meeting. The conference summarized in this report was held for the purpose of reviewing and critiquing papers which had been commissioned for the project. Discussion of the proceedings are included in the pages which follow.

Now that this second stage is completed, the project organizers are making plans for the third stage - a meeting of both paper writers and civil-military relations practitioners (both military officers and defense department officials) - to be held in Washington, D.C. in May 1988 to discuss the themes identified by the commissioned papers. The final stage of this project is also underway. This involves making arrangements for the revision and publication of these papers so they will constitute an important contribution to the literature on civil-military relations.

The overall goal of this project is to deepen knowledge and discussion of civil-military relations and the positive roles Latin American militaries can play in the consolidation of democracy in the region. The frank and open discussions which have characterized the initial stages of this project give us grounds for optimism that we may make a modest contribution toward advancing those objectives. The valuable advice and assistance lent to the project by non-participant scholars and by military officers and defense department officials are also grounds for optimism. Similarly, the project organizers are grateful for the financial support for the project provided by the United States Agency for International Development, The American University, and PEITHO.

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January 25, 1988

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS AND DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA
PAPER WRITERS CONFERENCE
DECEMBER 17-20, PANAMA CITY, PANAMA

Thursday, December 17

5:00 p.m. Opening Reception

6:30 p.m. Dinner

7:30 p.m. Welcome - Louis W. Goodman and Juan Rial

8:00 p.m. The Armed Forces and the Transition

<u>Paper</u>	<u>Commentator</u>
1. Sereseres/Yurrita	Goodman
2. Aguilera	Millett
3. Ricci	Fitch
4. Perelli	Urcuyo

Friday, December 18

7:30 a.m. - 5:30 p.m. Visit to United States Southern Command

Saturday, December 19

8:00 a.m. Breakfast

8:30 a.m. Morning Session: The Military and Democracy

<u>Paper</u>	<u>Commentator</u>
1. Rial	Aguero
2. Urcuyo	Perelli
3. Aguiro	Aguilera
4. Aguilar Zinser	Goodman
5. Varas	Gamba de Stonehouse

1:00 p.m. Lunch

2:00 p.m. Afternoon Session: The New Professionalism

<u>Paper</u>	<u>Commentator</u>
1. Child	Gold
2. Gamba de Stonehouse	Aguilar Zinser
3. Rizzo de Oliveira	Rial

7:00 p.m. Dinner

8:00 p.m. Evening Session: The Perception of Threat

<u>Paper</u>	<u>Commentator</u>
1. Rubio Correa	Yurrita
2. Marcella	Child
3. Millett	Rial
4. Commentary on Perception of Threats in Latin America - Rizzo de Oliveira	

Saturday, December 20

8:30 a.m. Breakfast

9:00 a.m. Discussion

12:00 noon Lunch and Adjournment

"The Armed Forces and the Transition in Guatemala," by Cesar Sereseres, University of California, Irvine and Alfonso Yurrita, Civilian Consultant to the Ministry of Defense of Guatemala
 Commentator: Louis W. Goodman, The American University

ABSTRACT: This paper outline explores four areas: 1) the existence of a fourth generation of insurgencies; 2) the Esquipulas II Peace Plan; 3) the success of civilian governments in dealing with domestic problems; 4) the level of professionalism of the Guatemalan military.

Cesar Sereseres could not attend the conference. Alfonso Yurrita presented a paper with thoughts on their joint effort. The four ideas which form the core of their work are: 1) the existence of a fourth generation of insurgencies; 2) the Esquipulas II peace plan; 3) the success of civilian governments in dealing with domestic problems; 4) the level of professionalism of the Guatemalan military.

Louis Goodman believes that there are two areas which need further elaboration. The first involves the process of institutionalization of the Guatemalan military (i.e. the existence of a military bank). On this point there are different views. Some consider this process as a way in which to incorporate the military into society. Others see this as a "zero sum game" involving the appropriation of scarce resources. Seen from a comparative perspective, militaries throughout the hemisphere have health, vacation, housing and other facilities that general populations may not have.

Second, the Guatemalan case is also interesting because of the ethnic diversity of the population, a situation which has found some expression in indigenous insurrections. The paper should consider the effects of this diversity in terms of the staffing, deployment, and organization of the military, and compare this case with other similar ones (i.e. Peru).

Adolfo Aguilar thinks that there is an emphasis on the military perceptions of change in society. Further questions to be asked include: Does the military consider that insurgencies will increase or become more profound? Has the Esquipulas II plan failed? Is this failure a result of the military perception that regional conflict is becoming more serious? What about the failure of the civilian government to redemocratize society?

Yurrita sees a persistent Marxist presence in Guatemala which is characterized by the belligerent use of insurrectionary tactics. He commented that when speaking of the disorder and corruption experienced in Guatemala, jokes are made at the military's expense. Today's situation is similar to that of 1982, when the opposition was not in a position to intervene in politics. There are three dominant political groupings in

Guatemala: 1) the Christian Democrats; 2) the new right; and, 3) the Marxist currents. The reality is one of a hardening of ideological positions.

Armed Forces, Democracy and Transition in Central America," by Gabriel Aguilera, FLACSO
 Commentator: Richard Millett, Southern Illinois University, Edwardsville

ABSTRACT: The author discusses the cases of Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras. Gabriel Aguilera's analytic focus is on transition from authoritarian rule, and the consolidation of democratic rule. The transition is similar in the three countries considered: internal coups and/or non-consensual changes in the authoritarian regime; formation of one or more transition governments; and, the call for elections for a Constitutional Assembly and the Executive and Legislative branches. The author's working hypothesis is that the existence of internal war, as well as the presence of extra-regional actors and processes affect and block the process of democratization. In his view, only the resolution of internal conflict, accompanied by a more regional orientation, will lead to peace in Central America. The article provides a thorough presentation of the Central American perspective of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.

Aguilera's paper is useful. It presents a positive analysis of the military in three nations: Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador. Honduras differs from the other two nations essentially because it experiences no serious internal conflict. There is, however, a tendency to view the Honduran armed forces, as well as others, in monolithic terms. It would be interesting to see a model of failed transition to democracy (i.e. Panama) compared with the cases discussed by Aguilera. Panama's transition is a "start/stop" regression which makes it a difficult endeavor.

There are changes in the region which are of importance. For example, in Honduras the military developed during World War II, with United States aid. It has only been in recent years that a Honduran "tanda" system, like the Salvadoran one, has been developing among cadets to foster allegiances among different classes. In El Salvador interlocking "tanda" alliances have great impact on military decisions and functioning. In the latter case, however, the internal war has served to break the "tanda" system down (this is still a contentious point among scholars). Furthermore, in El Salvador the military officer corps controls all branches of the armed forces (There is only one military academy and officers are rotated). The Honduran case is different since here the National Party and the military

work together to produce such figures as Lopez Arrellano and Lopez Reyes.

"The Military Regimes in Argentina: 1966-1973 and 1976-1983," by Maria Susana Ricci, Civilian Consultant
 Commentator: J. Samuel Fitch, University of Colorado, Boulder

ABSTRACT: Maria Susana Ricci explores the historical and contemporary role of the military in Argentina. The military has traditionally held a triple responsibility: centralization of power, factual control of the national territory, along with the defense of its sovereignty, and the integration of diverse social, ethnic, and regional components in order to create a sense of community. Thus, the author concludes that the military institution in Argentina has to be involved in the process of transition and reconstruction, with newly defined perceptions and roles. In this context she introduces the notion that "the military organization is not equipped to politicize itself," and so depends heavily on civilians which support and "accompany" the governing military elite. She defines the "governmental elite" to include economic, political, and military organizations because of their similar social origins, views, and personal contact. She also discusses the causes of military interventions in government, and attributes these to the elements found in society and not in the military institution itself.

The main theme of this paper is the incapacity of the Argentine military to construct a governing elite that will do more than only administer the state. Such an elite must have previous experience in government, be capable of promoting and sustaining relations with other elites and, finally, have ties with civil society. When the armed forces cannot govern alone they have to do so with civilians. Thus, the central problem of a military government is the conflict between the military as an institution, and the military as government.

The 1966 intervention by Ongania is a case of military government with minimum officer involvement. The 1976 case is very different, since the military controlled all of the government. Both of these interventions were ultimately unsuccessful. Any future military regime will have to deal with these institutional and governmental failures. Inter-service rivalries were rampant in both cases and were not resolved. For Ricci it is necessary to emphasize the lessons of the failures. In Argentina there seems to be no solution to the above dilemmas.

Ricci's work contains very important specific data on the presence of civilian elites in military governments. These civilians have the same political short-comings of the military. For example, they have no practical political experience except being in a previous military government and they have had no

significant contact with political society. Political experience to manage social conflict is clearly lacking. The military has an anti-political bureaucratic mind; for them this means that governing is a product of technocratic long-term plans formulated by professionals and technicians. The military seeks to eliminate political conflict from the political arena. Fisk recommends the removal of the last section of the paper dealing with the democratic period, especially the trials of the military, because this section is difficult to integrate into the discussion.

"The Legacy of the Transition Processes in Argentina and Uruguay," by Carina Perelli, PEITHO
 Commentator: Constantino Urcuyo, CIAPA

ABSTRACT: This paper argues that a fragile consensus for democracy underlies the transition that Argentina and Uruguay have experienced, beginning with the election of Raúl Alfonsín in Argentina in 1983. If the military dictatorships in the southern cone had any purpose it was to forge an opening for the legitimacy of democratic governments that have replaced them. But, underlying this democratic euphoria are many unresolved problems that remain regarding civil-military relations. Both the democratic-liberal politicians and the military they replaced face severe readjustment problems in the years ahead. For example, the return of civilian rule potentially implies a loss of prestige for members of the armed forces. It also questions whether the mission of the military, saving nations from subversive Marxism, has yet been achieved. Finally, the military itself has yet to examine the internal costs that such a transformation implies. Carina Perelli examines how perceptions about the military will affect the political processes that are needed to reinforce the democratic regimes that took root in 1983 and 1985, respectively. She believes that only by a return to the rule of law will the stage be set to create a new order that carries with it a place for the military in civil society.

This paper contains an innovative argument and a creative perspective on the military. The first military literature was based on the Johnson perspective of history. The writings that followed were structurally oriented and attempted to explain sources of conflict in global terms. Further analysis was based on sectoral (middle class) arguments, which Urcuyo considers to be insufficient. There are new dimensions in Perelli's paper dealing with the perception of circumstances and conduct based on such perspectives. It is clear that the perception of reality also determines peoples' actions, especially in transitional situations, to create political space or accommodation. The incursion into the macro-political is more than merely episodic. Thus, it is possible to consider the individual's perception at a "structural level".

Urcuyo suggests that the paper limits the reader who is not familiar with the Uruguayan situation. It is also the case that the analytic scope of the paper does not exclude the possibility of studying concrete situations in the form of specific historical examples, i.e. witnesses of mental and physical repression. The summary of the historical review, which is not accommodated by the structure of the paper, could be excluded. Millet commented that Perelli's paper is her vision of the Uruguayan reality and the options present in it. In her mind the civilian determination of the political reality of Uruguay is paramount yet, like in Argentina, civilians as well as political parties are divided.

Perelli sees an important theme in the discussion of the civilian use of the military as a symbol or threat to enforce social control. This involves a comprehensive study of society, and not a fragmented view of one or two actors in a social environment. The Uruguayan case before 1973, especially from 1904 to the 1960s, was one of a "civilist" emphasis, with anti-militarist leanings. The Left's myths legitimate the image of the military officer as a politician.

"Latin American Military Corporations and Their Support for Democratic Regimes," by Juan Rial
 Commentator: Felipe Aguero, Duke University

ABSTRACT: The author discusses the unifying myth of the existence of a "Latin America," as well as the individual nations of the region and the places, historical and contemporary, that their military occupy. The author separates the cases of Mexico, Cuba, and Nicaragua from the rest of Latin America, because of the subordinate role the military establishments of these countries have. The military institutions of the rest of Latin America cannot deny the power of the myth of a Western style political democratic government for their existence. The author finds that in Latin America the armed forces are separate from civil society and autonomous from the state (the exceptions are of course, Mexico, Cuba, and Nicaragua). Thus, when dealing with democracy the military establishment finds itself outside of the myth, while still propounding it. This, in part, is a result of the "anti-militarist" liberalism inherent in this myth. The author concludes that a tacit pact of support for democratic norms of government is necessary in the Latin American context. This is to be achieved by a respect for the "rules of the democratic game" on the part of both civilians and officers. These rules have to be respected before any attempt at societal change is made.

Several subjects have to be further elaborated upon in Rial's discussion. The origins of the doctrines espoused and practiced

by militaries must be related to, or linked with, capitalism and the Western emphasis on "democracy". The "Occidental" concern with National Security issues is tied to an apparently democratic rhetoric, with a heavily anti-liberal slant. In addition, it would appear necessary to emphasize class, and not group, conflict. The institutional concerns of the military are not clear, even though an "occupational" concern is noticeable in the work. The dichotomy of civil-military is not applicable to the Latin American situation. In advanced industrial societies the military works in as an instrument of the state, in relative independence. The image of the military as an instrument in Latin America does not seem to be a relevant one for Latin America.

The conclusion of the paper, that the armed forces are corporations having their own interests, seems to be appended to the paper and is not clearly developed in the discussion. There is a need to make reference to the organizational and cohesive elements of the military corporation. Some general questions to be asked are: To what extent is a cultural influence important in the transition process? Is this vital to the process of transition? In this same cultural context, what are the specific missions of armies? What should these missions be? In Aguero's opinion, the cultural context, with an origin in the Western world, implies the acceptance of capitalism and liberal democratic norms.

"Costa Rica: Militarization or Adaptation to New Circumstances?"
 by Constantino Urcuyo, CIAPA
 Commentator: Carina Perelli, PEITHO

ABSTRACT: Constantino Urcuyo presents an historical evaluation of Costa Rica's past and present in terms of the legal proscription, as opposed to the elimination, of the armed forces. He argues that the final and legal abolition of the armed forces in 1948 was the result of a gradual withdrawal of the military from government, especially due to decreasing budgetary allocations. Thus, making Costa Rica an example for other Latin American countries is inappropriate. The author also discusses the present militarization of Costa Rica. He finds contradictory tendencies which still favor a non-professional security establishment. He states that foreign influence, for example from the United States, is detrimental to the domestic political consensus that is necessary to strengthen security without paying the price of intervention by the military in government. There is a need for a democratic professionalization which would account for intra-regional and not extra-regional needs.

An important undertaking by Urcuyo is his effort to combat the myth of Costa Rica as a country without weapons. The cultural and doctrinal elements of the Costa Rican myth obscure the

reality that the country is an integral part of the United States policy in Central America. The United States exploits the non-military myth of Costa Rica. Urcuyo must expand on the non-existence of a National Security policy in Costa Rica. Other themes to be developed include a discussion of the militarization of public life and the apoliticism of the Costa Rican people. The process of informal professionalization observed in the country merits closer study. Perelli considers Urcuyo's methodology to be appropriate and relevant.

For Gabriel Aguilera, Costa Rica is the example for a state without armed forces and having a social context accepting this situation. It is always possible to create a military. In Bolivia, for example, the political culture supports the military establishment. The alleged militarization of Costa Rica is in reality the modernization of the security forces. This is a reaction, in part, to the tradition of losing influence on budgetary allocations on the part of the armed forces. Finally, security personnel are political appointees, who are rotated, and are civil servants.

Adolfo Aguilar considers that Urcuyo's work deals with three important questions: 1) What accounts for the civilian culture in Costa Rica? 2) What accounts for the non-existence of a military institution in Costa Rica? 3) What are the control mechanisms to keep the military at bay? Urcuyo is trying to draw parallels with Mexico, i.e. referring to the trend to the militarization of society in the two countries. What are the circumstances that prevent the creation of a military doctrine in Costa Rica, i.e. a national security concept? Mexico did not devise a military doctrine of national security. The emphasis was on not militarizing national security, but rather the desire was to confront threats at a social level, like in Costa Rica. Furthermore, the political relations of Mexico and Costa Rica with the United States are similar. Mexico, however, fears a United States threat to political stability while this is not the case in Costa Rica. In Mexico, too, there is a pejorative view of the military.

Urcuyo commented that it is important to refer to popular attitudes in these studies. In the Costa Rican case it is also important to look at the Minister of Security. Who is he? How is he selected? Where does he come from? Where does he go? Usually these people have no previous military experience, and their selection is based on loyalty to the president. This is important not only in terms of the relationship between the President and the Minister, but also because the "coronelitos" have to be watched over by a loyal and responsible individual.

The United States consideration of the Costa Rican case does not deal with the factors leading up to the "Figueres Myth", since only the executive action of legislating the armed forces

out of existence is emphasized. As a matter of fact, this was the result of the neutralization of the civil war factions in a situation similar to that where "if there are not enough spoils for all, then there will be no spoils for anyone". The conditions involved in the disappearance of the armed forces in Costa Rica are possibly valuable for a comparative study. Urcuyo comments that Costa Rican case may serve for a "psychoanalytic reflection" on the Latin American reality, where military non-intervention in politics is an anomaly. This also implies the acceptance of the liberal myth which must be rejected. In advanced industrial societies the military is a political actor (i.e for budgetary purposes).

"The Military and Democracy in Venezuela," by Felipe Aguero, Duke University

Commentator: Gabriel Aguilera, FLACSO

ABSTRACT: The Venezuelan case is important because of the apparent subordination of the military to civilian rule for almost 30 years. The author discusses the Venezuelan case and considers it unique because of the oil revenues which have permitted the state to support its economy and face sectoral demands. He asserts that this single factor conditioned much of Venezuela's experience. Felipe Aguero also considers additional factors which affected the civil-military relationship, such as the successful counterinsurgency campaign, border disputes, and developmental needs, in order to contextually present the Venezuelan case.

The Venezuelan transition of 1958 and the consolidation which followed provides an example of the possibility of change from authoritarian to democratic governments. The Perez Jimenez regime was a form of unipersonal dictatorial rule which did not represent the military. The military itself did not have a doctrine for the control the government. The Venezuelan case is a pivotal one; it is not a real transition, but happens during a transitional phase, thus becoming a precedent, an antecedent. The paper should be centered around the analysis of the consolidation.

The author argues that Venezuelan society was united in a democratic pact, but there still was fragmentation and division in society despite it. The economic element of the petroleum crisis is important. Indeed, the increase in prices after the crisis helped the new civilian government deal with popular demands, including the co-optation of the unions. Aguero indicated that in Venezuela the transition was a happy one because there was a civilian control over the military.

In Venezuela the internal war promoted the process of democratic consolidation, since it was the president who

initiated the fight against the guerrillas. The insurgents were eventually defeated and eventually reintegrated into the society. Further study of the evolution of military thinking during the transition period, including changes in doctrine, would be helpful. Urcuyo commented that it is dangerous to explain the military in terms of its context, since it is possible for the argument to become circular: the political system produces the military system, and vice versa.

"Civil-Military Relations in Mexico," by Adolfo Aguilar Zinser,
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Commentator: Louis W. Goodman, The American University

ABSTRACT: The Mexican military lacks political initiative, is totally subordinate to the President, and is integrated into the cooptative mechanisms of the PRI. This condition is due, primarily, to Mexican authoritarianism, which is based on a variety of mechanisms and institutions composed of and controlled by civilians. Adolfo Aguilar also discusses other important components of the Mexican situation. For one, the proximity of Mexico to the United States makes it unnecessary for the military to expand. For the armed forces, only negotiation and diplomacy can deal with the "Giant of the North". Domestically, the Mexican military has a civil defense function in case of natural disasters. It also plays an important role in the anti-narcotics policy of the government. These latter two roles have placed the military in contact with society and government and have caused some friction. It is doubtful, however, that the Mexican military will participate more openly in the political arena or stage a coup on its own initiative.

The process which eventually subordinated the Mexican military to the PRI is well discussed in Aguilar's paper. The questions to be explored are those which deal with the Mexican future, as well as those which open the door to the comparative analysis with other national situations where the military and political parties have different relationships. Nonetheless, Mexico is different. It is not in SOUTHCOM; its military doctrines are different from those of other countries in the region. The special relationship between Mexico and the United States apparently came about in a consultative framework and is an interesting case to be studied in some depth.

The increasing role of the Mexican military in politics is well developed, raising the not trivial question of when a coup is going to happen. If this is not the case, the military certainly sees instability in the country, which leads to the question of what it thinks of this, and what it will do. These questions may be more appropriate in a different context, but an answer to them is important for a comparative perspective. If

they are indeed not appropriate for the Mexican case, then the reasons for this should be clearly presented.

The United States concern about narcotics and subversion, and the potential instability of the Mexican military, have important policy repercussions. The political pressures exerted by the United States on the Mexican military, and Mexico in general, have effects which should be explored. A potential comparison is that of Mexico and Brazil. In the latter case the military industry is an important element for the development and professionalization of the military, including a growing role in civil society. In the former case, during the early part of the de la Madrid "sexenio" there was an emphasis on the arms industry which was not extensively implemented. The reasons for this, as well as the lessons learned in Brazil, are important for an understanding of where Mexico is going in the future.

The Mexican military, according to Aguilar, is suffering from a crisis of confidence in terms of its historical relationship to Central America, which is now undermined and overshadowed by the United States. The question is, has this produced a politically autonomous role for the military in terms of the defense of the oil fields?

Many policy questions the United States has about Mexico are based on future scenarios. Some of the scenarios for Mexican transformation are based on three dimensions of security doctrines which follow. First, there is no explicit national security doctrine in Mexico. Diplomatic efforts exclude military concerns. Second, the doctrine of state security is different than the doctrine of national security, based on the policing of societies. The military apparatus does not have an intelligence function. The Direccion de Seguridad Nacional operates outside of the judicial system. The Direccion Federal de Seguridad is penetrated by the narcotics traffic and has elements of militarization. Third, public security - a threat to state security is not necessarily the same as a threat to public safety or national security. There are many police forces, which are "independent" police forces. The military is residual force, a "reserve" of the state.

Aguilar stated that Mexican commentators do not think that it is possible to compare the Mexican military establishment with other Latin American militaries. There is a belief that the Mexican case is "sui generis" in terms of democratic participation without electoral mediation. In Mexico social stability is maintained through six-year governments permitting "democratic" changes of some sort, and with the minimized role of the military in relation to the maintenance of social stability.

The loss of legitimacy of the President, or an increased weakness of the presidential institution may seriously challenge

the Mexican situation. The presidential military staff is a political (electoral) apparatus of the official candidate of the PRI. Modernization is a threat that modifies the perceptions of friends and enemies. There is a fear of neo-liberal competition which promotes social strife. If the United States expects more saliency on the part of the Mexican military, there will be rupture with national myths. A change in the civil-military relations of Mexico and Costa Rica means a change in their political systems, a rupture with the past. The Mexican state, and not the Mexican left was the interlocutor of the anti-imperialist movement. The Mexican military does not want a social role definition; it wants to avoid social strife.

"Civil-Military Relations and Civilian Control of the Armed Forces," by Augusto Varas, FLACSO
 Commentator: Virginia Gamba de Stonehouse, MacArthur Fellow,
 University of Maryland, College Park

ABSTRACT: In this article Augusto Varas proposes that civilians and democratic elites possess little understanding of the history, needs, and perspectives of the military institutions in their societies. This is a result of structural insufficiencies which do not allow for the integration of the various institutions of the state. This is particularly evident in the relative autonomy the armed forces have in Latin American states. The structural peculiarities are reinforced as well by the frequent appeal by civilian elites for the intervention of the armed forces in order to pursue narrow parochial political interests. The author counsels for a process of accommodation that will account for the needs of the military institution, as well as for the needs of the civilian-controlled state. This necessitates the redefinition of the military role in a country. The author calls for the joint civilian and military development of doctrines in addition to international and national political processes.

The most basic issue of civil-military relations is the need for society to control military issues. There is an absence of the organic integration of the state in Latin America, and thus the military remains autonomous. The pervasive political problem continues to be the use of the military by civilians to resolve social problems. Varas indicates that there are non-violent forms of societal intervention by the military. The solution to this problem is the social control of the institution to prevent the structural availability of the use of the military. In this context, how can accommodation be prevented from becoming a permanent situation? For the author, the solution is to study the negative accommodation which prevents the integration of the military into civilian society. A further concern for Varas is civil society itself.

Virginia Gamba thinks that the presentation of the paper is confusing. In reality this is not a paper, but rather a methodological presentation. The discussion of the integration of society is important, as well as the cleavages affecting it. For Gamba control is not only a concept, it is also society living in harmony. How will civilians acquire power over the military? The use of information in an educated fashion is control. Both civilians and the military must come together in the formulation of foreign policy and security policy. Accommodation is seen by Varas as negative, but this is not always the case.

Aguero commented that in the Varas paper the theme of punishment is important. In addition, empirical study especially in terms of military sociology is also important. Fitch said of the Varas paper that the use of the term "accommodation" was too general because of its undifferentiated application in different contexts. Rial indicated that in some countries, like Peru and Brazil, the military have vetoed political candidates in the transition period, in order to limit and control this process. Accommodation permits and facilitates the transition process; this is the essential problem of Chile, since the pact for a democratic opening is not defined.

"Geopolitical Thinking," by Jack Child, The American University
 Commentator: Michael Gold, The American University

ABSTRACT: This article examines geopolitical thinking in the Southern Cone of South America over the two past decades, with emphasis on the relationship between geopolitical thinking, the military, and democracy. The author states that in the past few years there has been an increasing awareness that geopolitical thinking favored by the military might shed some light on the way the military perceives its role in internal and international affairs. As a result of this awareness, analysts of South American civil-military affairs have begun to pay some attention to this geopolitical thinking. However, this attention has usually taken the form of general statements supported by occasional references to scattered items in the literature. In this article the author systematically analyzes geopolitical thinking by examining the principal journals and books, and by tracking a series of themes which have appeared over the years.

It has been said that geopolitics is the geography of the national security state. Gold indicated, however, that he believed geopolitics also to be the language through which a particularly virulent and aggressive form of nationalism, wed to right wing political elements, finds its expression. It is, even in its most positive forms, the assertion of parochialism: confining, restrictive, limiting, and petty. Geopolitics, notwithstanding, in its Anglo-Saxon formulation national security

Policy remains fundamental to the study of civil-military relations.

As shown by Child, Latin American geopolitics is a product of active or retired military officers. Realizing that there are positive and negative elements to be found in geopolitics, the question arises, does integrative geopolitics also apply to the transition process? In addition, realizing the pervasiveness of geopolitical thinking, especially in the Southern Cone, can geopolitics be re-directed to become a part of the education process of both civilians and military discussed by Gamba?

For the study and production of geopolitics the South Atlantic war was a breaking point which paralleled the disappointment experienced in inter-american relations. Child recognizes that strict causal relations between aggressive geopolitics and national security states cannot be proven, however, there do exist links between geopolitics and the organic state. Ultimately a civilian leadership must encourage diversity in geopolitical thinking, in light of the need for integration and the negative possibilities of resurgent jingoism. In the final analysis, geopolitics is only one variable in any social equation. Gamba and Millet discussed the subjective nature of the coding system used by Child. Child argued that it was the necessary price to be paid due to the uneven production of material (in the Southern Cone) and the variation in available resources.

"Missions and Strategy: The Argentine Example," by Virginia Gamba de Stonehouse, MacArthur Fellow, University of Maryland, College Park

Commentator: Adolfo Aguilar Zinser, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

ABSTRACT: In her article, Virginia Gamba develops the relevance of strategic thinking in relation to the Argentine military. She deals with the development of strategic studies and its relation to the problems of threat definition and response in the Argentine context. The article also relates the Latin American military experience, including the wars of independence. The author demonstrates the erroneous belief that the "country has been created by the military." The root of this belief is directly connected with the military intervention in government in order to promote as well as to defend the state and nation. Her discussion is complemented with a consideration of the divided composition and nature of the military, in terms of objectives as well as inter-service rivalries. The author concludes with a call for a new professional role for the military through education, and the fostering of cooperation at all bureaucratic levels. Gamba calls for international

cooperation through the promotion of exchanges and the sharing of experience.

Gamba's work has two methodological dimensions, one is analytical and the other is prescriptive. The analytical part is the central one, and indeed in the prescriptive part Gamba is carried away by her views on politics. The core of the paper deals with the necessary recognition of a valid and harmonious basis to the military-political encounter. In Argentina the armed forces still do not have a civilian-directed mission. The crisis of the historical military entity continues. The Argentine military continues to be, despite its lack of professional mission, the guardian of the Argentine republic. The armed forces are a part of the formation of the nation and the state.

It is necessary to differentiate the resolution of the problem of a search for a military identity, from the problem of the pursuit of professionalism. Civilians still do not understand the military mind and conceptions; there is no civilian culture of national defense. For Gamba an elaboration of the divorce of public opinion and militarization in Argentina is necessary. When commenting on the civilian guidance of the military, Gamba makes a jump to political suggestions which skip creating an identity for the military. Professionalization is the result of the civilian clarification of strategic dimensions.

All in all this is a stimulating work. Gamba said that the threats to the Latin American reality and its "raisons d'etre" are very different. Child indicated that the military may have a "dissuasive" role in Latin America, through crisis management, or the formation of an Inter-American Defense Alliance, the latter being a distinctly Latin American alliance to generate confidence in integration. There are several roles for the military in Argentina: 1) it could become a verification instrument for a Central American Peace Plan; 2) it could participate in peace operations - but not "peace keeping" - in other areas different to Central America; 3) it could have a military functionalist role, in terms of search and rescue or national disaster operations; 4) or, it could participate in a cooperative effort to work peacefully with other nations in Antarctica. Aguilar indicated that Gamba should expand on the need to find a middle ground between the transition of the military from being the national backbone to the military as an extremity, like an arm of the nation.

"Political Transition and the Armed Forces: New Professionalism?" by Eliezer Rizzo de Oliveira, Campinas State University

Commentator: Juan Rial, PEITHO

ABSTRACT: Several elements are involved in the perception of threat in Argentina, Uruguay, and Brazil. Some of these are: 1) transition and consolidation threatened the autonomy of the military; 2) the definition of the strategic threat is "owned" by the military; 3) the military definition of threats is autarchic; 4) the issue of identity involves not only the military itself, but other political actors. Furthermore, there is a fear of losing autonomy, along with the concern over its subordination to civilians. There is indeed an exaggerated fear of free association; freedoms are seen by the military as being communist. The political victory of the left is feared because it is expected that this would threaten the institutions' existence.

Rial believes that the paper is too long to answer the crucial question: Does professionalism exist or not in the Brazilian military? The information contained in the present version of the paper contains the answer to this question, and should be kept in the final version of the paper. The argument should be centered around the strong aspects of the New Professionalism. Oliveira argues that in Brazil there is no New Professionalism: there is either subordination to politics or a presence in politics. Nevertheless, there must be a normative dimension to professionalism.

What is the definition of the role of the Brazilian military at the strategic level? Brazilians look at plans having projections into the next 20 or 30 years; this is a New Professionalism. It also has effects on society, the political system, and the economic system. This is an area where valid comparisons could be made with other countries. Is the Brazilian military's leadership project novel or different? It should not be forgotten that Brazil is creating a civilian intelligence establishment. Marcella indicated that besides Brazil, El Salvador and Panama, among others, have long term strategic plans.

Oliveira commented that it is true that New Professionalism is not clearly defined in the paper. The historical role of the military is one of intervention when there is a failure in the order and legitimation of politics. In Brazil the military does not have a party; instead, it is itself a great party due to the political illegitimacy of the armed forces. Military tutelage prevents the formation of an instrument for the civilian control of the military. In Brazil there is great concern with the East-West situation, but this is perceived to be the result of a pervasive inequality between the North and the South. In the public realm the East-West dimension is an important element.

"Civil-Military Relations: The Perception of the Subversive

Threat in Peru," by Marcial Rubio Correa, Pontifica Universidad Catolica del Peru

Commentator: Alfonso Yurrita, Civilian Consultant to the Ministry of Defense of Guatemala

ABSTRACT: The author focusses his analysis on the democratic process in Peru, which is conditioned by the country's extreme poverty, the ongoing debate over development, and the existence of a serious concern over human rights. All political forces in Peru accept these to be inherent aspects of the Peruvian political scene. Even the Peruvian armed forces, in the formulation of their doctrine, account for this in their "essential goals," namely the "general well being" of the nation, and "national security". The "essential goals" include: the establishment of a social system which is just; institutionalization of equal opportunities; observance of human rights as part of everyday life, and the realization of each person's potential, with the support of the state. The author concludes by stating that there should be an integration of the military into the political process. He argues that it is essential, in light of the relative autonomy of Peru's military, to account for the inevitable presence of the armed forces in government. This presence has to be clearly established and defined.

Rubio is a legalist, emphasizing legal and constitutional aspects. The subversive processes of Peru are defined by the armed forces. The paper clarifies that the Peruvian armed forces perceive poverty to be a national and social threat. Despite this, there are threat perceptions which remain unclear, especially in terms of internal development, and the definition of external threats. The subversive threat itself is not clearly elaborated. The paper is rich in quotes, which should be in the footnotes. The document is very structured and does not differentiate the processes of change. What are the new elements in the Peruvian political panorama? How do they relate to the pervasive problems, like the race issue?

Aguilera indicated that the Sendero Luminoso is a "sui generis" case among insurrectionist groups in Latin America. Gold finds that the Colombian case is under-represented and underestimated, saying that the Colombian population may have grown accustomed to the endemic violence of the nation, but that this has to come to a critical stage at some point. He thus made a plea for a closer consideration of the Colombian case, indicating that it may be a perfect example of the transition from a semi-democratic government to an authoritarian alternative. This unique situation stems from the country's endemic violence, which has strained the political and economic systems to the limit. It may possibly lead either to the indicated authoritarianism, or the appearance of a new Violencia, with anarchic dimensions.

Fitch commented that any effort at social reform (i.e land reform) becomes a security problem in terms of guarantees and enforcement. The appearance of a "garrison state" in Peru must be closely studied, as it may serve for comparisons with similar situations in the continent. The question of how to deal with the process of militarization in a country remains to be answered. Marcella sees the Peruvian case as an example where the "Theory of War" must be studied. Urcuyo remarked that the military operates in an ideological context with symbols which legitimate dying and killing. Millett commented that this willingness to die separates the civilians from the military, especially moderate politicians from radical officers. In terms of Peru, the military is convinced that the Sendero Luminoso is worse than the politicians, despite the continuing fears held by the armed forces of political parties, stemming from the APRA experience. For Colombia, Millett concluded, it is clear that the Violencia was and is indicative of the failure of politics.

"The Perception of Threat: International Influences, Ideological and Material," by Gabriel Marcella, Scholar in Residence, United States Southern Command
 Commentator: Jack Child, The American University

Marcella argues that the study of civil-military relations has to include a consideration of the political role of the military. The traditional role of the military includes National Security, Threats, and Strategies. The definitions for these aspects of their role vary, but what is important is to penetrate the perceptual screen which surrounds them. It is also vital to legitimize the political role of the military in order to clearly and efficiently deal with the military in Latin America. It is important to understand what deterrence, escalation, crisis management and limited wars mean to the armed forces in Latin America. In terms of what can be done, it is important to encourage more interaction between civilians and military, to educate the military, and to find fora for the self-criticism of both the military and the civilians.

Child agrees with Marcella that it is important to encourage military studies, including strategic thought, in universities and other centers of higher education. Despite the need for such efforts, even in universities in the United States, it is very difficult to introduce the study of geopolitics and military studies. Marcella appears to promote military functionalism, in terms of communications, arms control, peacekeeping and other similar functions. In the context of an arteriosclerotic Inter-American system this position is difficult to encourage. In order to promote such ideas it is necessary to be innovative and foster linkages and feedback opportunities for all concerned parties. Child considers that emphasis is needed on cross-

cultural and linguistic studies to increase and promote communication between the civilian culture and the military culture.

"The Limits of Influence: The United States and the Military in Central America and the Caribbean," by Richard Millett, Southern Illinois University, Edwardsville
Commentator: Juan Rial, PEITHO

ABSTRACT: The armed forces in Central America and the Caribbean, by virtue of their limited resources, small size, and relative underdevelopment, have developed a high dependence on external forces, principally the United States. Historically, the United States has emphasized internal security over development. The militaries in these countries are not subject to civilian or political controls, and become institutions of repression and tools of dictatorships, as in the cases of Nicaragua, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic. Millett concludes that attempts by the United States to create moderate states have usually been "too little, too late." Decision-makers in the dictatorships learned how to exploit divisions in the United States Congress and inconsistent policies from one executive administration to the next. Recently, United States presence and influence have declined. This is attributable to the growing power of ideology, non-government institutions, and Third World development.

Rial finds that only small adjustments are necessary in Millett's presentation. The emphasis on "tandas" and promotions in the Central American armies is important. In addition, Millett calls attention to the Israeli, Argentine and Taiwanese advisory and military sales presence in the region. The strongest point of the paper is perhaps the emphasis Millett places on the reality that a common political and social vocabulary does not mean that there are common political and social perceptions in the area. This issue is noteworthy, and should be emphasized.

Millett also mentions that the United States regional presence is strongly over-emphasized. He points to two periods in the relations between the United States and Central America. The first period was characterized by the United States ignoring civil-military relations; during this time the regional situation did not deteriorate and the emphasis was on stability. The second period was one during which the United States promoted "democratic control"; it had mixed results. Finally, it is true that the crisis in Central America is dangerous and serious, but there are indeed opportunities for alternative outcomes which must be explored.

**Commentary on the Perception of Threats in Latin America by
Eliezer Rizzo de Oliveira, Campinas State University**

National security doctrines are based on Christianity, liberalism and a limited vision of national society. There is a belief that "social criminalization" is possible, due to communist overtures. The international threat dimension is centered around the substitution of the East-West stand-off for the North-South confrontation. The Malvinas/Falkands War is seen as a North-South confrontation, with Argentina as a "Messianic country" confronting imperialism. In addition, this war changed the strategic perceptions in the region by emphasizing air and sea war over the traditional primacy of land-based notions. Brazilian forces are now preparing for a possible confrontation with the United States, fearing the American hegemony. Brazil is also now considered a "Middle Power".

General Discussion

Marcella was impressed by the pragmatism of the authors in comparison to the attitudes taken twenty years ago when such studies were not so "detached". This reflects the growth of the discipline. It also indicates an apparent agreement that neither the civilians nor the military have solutions to problems of policy. Some specific policy questions which should be raised include: What is the role of the United States in the processes of democratic transition? What are the limits and the potential of such a role? What are the limitations and possibilities of the main form of United States pressure: security assistance? Is there a need for a "doctrine" of democratic transitions? Is there any model to follow? How do military and civilian institutions react to crises? The professional role of the military is security and it is dedicated to national security. The United States accesses Latin American military institutions by addressing their professionalism.

Millett commented on the differences between the transitions in Central America and those of Argentina and Uruguay. In the former case there is more military power to dictate the terms of the transition, especially because the armed forces control the appropriation of their funds. This contrasts with a situation where the military is "forced" out of power, or has "rented" the state for a short time. Aguilera stated that in Argentina the military project was a "developmental" one intended to transform society, while in Central America the internal wars condition military involvement in politics. Aguilar indicated that the political maturity of Argentina and Uruguay, as contrasted with Central America, conditions or even determines the transition process.

Aguilera questioned the role of military banks and social security arrangements in Central America. The problems created by the "tanda" system must be confronted and studied. There are conceptual problems involved with the use of the term "transition". Transition is a process, it is a moment of change, but does not resolve problems. Is transition possible in a society involved in an internal war? In such a situation an absolute respect for human rights is not possible. Indeed, the process of transition may be "frozen" where there is an internal war. A military solution in Central America is not possible, and the process of transition in the region must be seen as a response to internal wars.

Urcuyo emphasized that Central American authoritarianism/totalitarianism is a response to violence and insurrection. In that region external influence and pressure are an issue, since the "backyard has become the front-yard" for the United States. He agrees with Aguilera that elections are not enough in terms of political change. Transitions have to be guaranteed with genuine social change. Political openings do not necessarily have to parallel perfect social change, this being an impossibility. Nevertheless, health, education, food, employment solutions must be present in order to guarantee the transition. Aguilera commented on the two moments of the political movement from a military to a civilian government in terms of first, transition, and second, consolidation. In Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay there is also a pre-transition moment.

Perelli talked about the process of militarization undertaken by the military to submit populations to particular political positions. Previous repression will determine or affect the process of transition. Finally, the crisis of military institutions can be explained by the evolution of the military as a political actor. Ricci considers that the study of the military must involve three parts: 1) What is the amount of power taken by the military in the transition process? 2) What is "professionalism"? Is it modernization or a North-South problem? 3) What is the role of the military in defense/security?

Referring to Rial's paper, Millett emphasized the importance of subtle influences in the transition process. Understanding that data on the negotiation between political parties and the military is difficult to obtain, it is still important to fully consider the limits imposed by the military itself on the transition. Aguerro commented that the re-incorporation of the left into political life weakens the right. Even so, it is not the left itself, but the ex-guerrillas, who accept the mantle of legitimacy, who are the most serious challenge to the right. Nonetheless, the military does permit this. The inter-service rivalry is pernicious, and is most often reflected in budgetary competition.

Rial relates Western capitalism, democracy and the Latin American military in a mutually dependant framework. It is necessary to distinguish, in the transition phase, the accommodation of corporate interests and societal concerns. In Latin America the work of military sociologist Charles Moskos is not well known, in part because it deals with the reality of the United States and Europe, in terms of the institutional insertion on the military into capitalist democracy. The discussion of civil-military relations must integrate the role society plays in this relationship. The notion of a "military party" is not understood, yet the origin of these parties is to be found in the Mediterranean and among the Greeks. There are thus historical ties of this phenomenon to Latin America. The notion of a "military party" is related to the "mito fundante" of the military being formed before the state, and indeed being instrumental in the formation of the state. The image is that of the military being part and parcel of the historical foundation of the state. Peron used his "military party" for his own survival. In the "military parties" there are internal divisions and schisms, there is no "partido unico militar".

Fitch emphasized that the concept of "apolitical forces" including the United States is not true for purposes of budgetary policy, or Central American policy. Goodman stated that the social concept present in the region is a an Israeli one, a Hobbesian framework to maintain social order. Child commented that the Hobbesian analogy was appropriate, but that this was also a project in cross-cultural analysis, not only along the military-civilian society lines, but also in terms of regional cleavages. The military subculture, especially present in the intelligence and special forces communities, involves a real problem in terms of the means-ends problems. In Latin America the ultimate end is the survival of the "patria"; an early cultural identification with the "patria" contributes to exacerbate this problem. Urcuyo commented that in English there is a distinction between "politics" and "policy", which is appropriate because the military officer does act in terms of policy (i.e. appropriations policy). Millett mentioned the military attitudes toward the media, which tend to be in terms of a threat. Rial commented that the European and United States military officer receives an education similar to that of the modern Latin American officer, yet the origins of the particular pedagogical orientations are different.

Urcuyo reminded the participants that there is no precise understanding of the term "militarization". Its use is abused in the literature. Rial commented that "militarization" is strong in societies where political negotiation is not possible due to internal or external pressures. In many cases there are no political elites to speak of, or there are no political parties which are functional. The definition of the military role by the

military is a result of the lack of civilian influence in this process. In those cases there is usually a violent radicalization of the idea of national defense. Political solutions do not seem possible because there is no framework like NATO to permit it. Professionalism is related to the degree of social isolation suffered by an institution. The primary definition of the military professional is a political one. Rial concluded with the proposal of including a glossary in the final written project, the terms and definitions included being drawn from the contributors' papers.

**CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS AND DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA:
THE MILITARY AND POWER**

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3/10/88

**Military Invitees
Conference on Civil-Military Relations
May 1988**

The following list of military practitioners is a working document which includes individuals invited to our May conference (*) and potential invitees. We have indicated whether the invitee is civilian or military, active duty or retired.

To date, the number of invitations issued has been dependent upon our securing funding to cover an individual's trip. We anticipate that as we are better able to know what sources are available more invitations will be sent.

ARGENTINA

Active Duty: Comodoro Ruben Moro, Interamerican Defense Board
Comodoro Luis Sanz, Interamerican Defense College

Retired: Admiral Fernando L. Milia, Naval Publications
Magazine

Civilian: Dr. Horacio Jaunarena, Minister of Defense*
Dr. Julio Cirino, Universidad del Belgrano,
Professor of Strategic Studies

BRAZIL

Active Duty: Admiral Mario Cesar Flores*
Col. Geraldo Lesbat Cavagnari Filho

Retired: General Carlos Meira Mattos*

COLOMBIA

Active Duty: Brigadier General Enrique Díaz

Retired: General Alvaro Valencia Tovar*

COSTA RICA

Civilian: Harry Wholstein, Partido Unido Social Cristiano
Leonel Villalobos, formerly of the Ministry of
Public Security
Luis Carlos Aroya, Minister of Public Security

ECUADOR

Retired: General Carlos Aguirre Asanza, Ministry of Defense*

EL SALVADOR

Active Duty: Colonel Hernandez, Chief of Staff

Retired: Colonel Adolfo Majano

GUATEMALA

Active Duty: General Hector Alejandro Gramajo Morales, Ministry of Defense*
Colonel Mario R. Terraza P., Operaciones del Estado Mayor
Colonel Luis F. Rios M., Dep. de Evaluación, Centro de Estudios Militares
Colonel José L. Quilo A., Agrupamiento Tactico de la FFAA
Lt. Colonel Roberto E. Letona H., Relaciones Públicas del Ejército

Retired: General Ricardo Peralta Mendez, Marina de la Defensa*

HONDURAS

Active Duty: Lt. Col Hector Rene Fonseca, FFAA
Col. Frank Zepeda

Civilian: Lic. Jorge Arturo Reina,
Scholar of Military affairs

MEXICO

Active Duty: General Juan Maldonado, Colegio de la Defensa Nacional
Major Jorge Nuño, Estado Mayor Presidencial
Rear Admiral Mario Santos Camal, Mexico, D.F.
General Luis Garfias

Civilian: Luis Herrera y Laso, Centro Latino Americana de Estudios Estratégicos

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PERU

Active Duty: Colonel Rafael Córdova Rivera,
Inspector General of Ayacucho

Civilian: José Maria Salcedo, journalist specializing in
military affairs
Senador Enrique Bernales, Izquierda Unida
Diego Garcia Sayán, Executive Secretary of the
Comisión Andina de Juristas

URUGUAY

Active Duty: General Hugo Medina, Minister of Defense
General Washington Varela, Escuela Militar
General Ivan Pavlos, Centro Militar

VENEZUELA

Active Duty: General Blanco, Instituto de Altos Estudios de
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