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Asia Democracy Program Strategy



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
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APRE/ADP REGION



Executive Summary

The Asia and Private Enterprise Bureau's emphasis on economic development and democracy grows out of a long history of American interest in promoting both objectives. Although foreign assistance efforts since World War II have been mainly economic, the two interests have been intertwined. Economic development makes possible the standard of life and openness to the world that forms the basis for modern democratic society. Democratic development frees societies for the exchange of goods and ideas necessary for long-term, competitive economic performance. Each represents a separate and legitimate goal of U.S. foreign assistance.

In recent years it has been realized that failure to appreciate the **institutional requirements** of economic development is often as important in retarding growth as lack of capital or technological expertise. As a result, the Agency for International Development (AID) increasingly promotes economic deconcentration and free markets. In this context, APRE's Asia Democracy Program (ADP) is a critical component of the overall development effort.

The Asia Democracy Program (ADP) represents a long-range commitment to provide human and material resources to assist developing Asian countries to meet the need for democratic reform in the 1990s and beyond. It is based on recognition of:

- the historical relationship of economic and democratic development;
- the many economic and political advantages of a free society;
- the equal legitimacy of economic and political freedom, and the right of all peoples to control development policy through democratic means.

The purpose of the Asia Democracy Program is the development and strengthening of **Sustainable Democratic Societies**. The five elements of the ADP strategy are:

- (1) **VOICE**: The development and strengthening of: (a) channels for popular influence on government, and (b) channels for the free dissemination of information and opinion;
- (2) **CHOICE**: Free, fair, and meaningful elections;
- (3) **GOVERNANCE**: Effective, democratic and open administration;
- (4) **REDRESS**: Full protection for individual and group rights;
- (5) **ACCOUNTABILITY**: Financially responsible government.

In addition to these elements, ADP will directly and indirectly strive to improve the **contextual preconditions** for democracy through education and the development of more democratic political cultures.

Factors determining the progress of sustainable democratic development include the historical experience of the peoples of the country, especially their experience with democratic institutions. They also include the political culture of the peoples, the ethnic and religious cleavages within the society, and the extent to which the state is regarded as legitimate by constituent peoples. The outlook for democratic development is brighter to the extent that governmental institutions are efficient and capable, the rule of law exists, the class structure is supportive, and regional and worldwide trends are toward democracy.

Programs for sustainable democratic development are expected to include efforts to improve electoral process, develop more varied and impartial communications media, and strengthen public advocacy and constituent advocacy NGOs. Programs will be developed to improve the capability of both legislatures and bureaucracies, and to extend judicial protection to all people in a society. Educational efforts of many kinds support democratic growth, particularly efforts targeted on expanding civic consciousness and knowledge of democratic experience and democratic developments outside host countries. Democracy will be fostered by the development of social science capabilities, particularly policy analysis, the analysis and presentation of data on the state of the society and trends in its development, and opinion survey research and analysis.

ADP country strategies will be developed in accordance with the principles of noninterference in the affairs of the host country and full intergovernmental and public disclosure of programs and policies. They will be planned and carried out in cooperation with representatives from the Embassy and other in-country American governmental organizations. In so far as it is discovered that ADP objectives are already met by existing activities, these will be coordinated with new initiatives under ADP.

Chapter I

INTRODUCTION

The 1990s began with pervasive optimism about the prospects for political and economic democracy. The 1980s had given rise to democratic movements even in countries gripped by decades of arbitrary rule. They were also characterized by emphasis on the private sector and liberalization in promoting economic growth. The breakdown of communist rule in the Soviet sphere, and democratic successes in the Philippines, Pakistan, Nepal, South Korea, and Latin America led to a belief that political and economic freedom was inevitable. It reinforced a growing conviction that economic and political liberalization are closely interconnected.

In developing the Asia Democracy Program (ADP), the APRE Bureau recognizes both the complexity of the relationship between democracy and economic liberalization and the complementarity of economic and political initiatives. The Bureau's optimism is tempered by two realities: many countries in the APRE region have traditionally severely restricted political and civil liberties, and where democracy now exists in the region it remains fragile.

A. Purpose: Sustainable Democracy

The purpose of the Asia Democracy Program is the development and strengthening of **Sustainable Democratic Societies**. The five elements of the strategy to achieve this goal are strengthening voice, choice, governance, redress, and accountability. These depend, in turn, on establishing the contextual preconditions that make these sustainable.

A democratic society respects individual civil, political, ethnic, and economic rights; elects representatives or leaders in free and fair elections held at constitutionally determined intervals; and distributes economic and political power and influence among a wide variety of associations, organizations and other groups. It maintains a government established to serve the interests of the governed rather than the governing, and that strives to balance local and regional interests, as well as majority and minority interests.

B. Principles for ADP Strategy

ADP is not an attempt by the United States or its missions to impose any particular political or social system on the countries within its region. It is a program devised to meet the expressed desire of governments and peoples in host countries to move their societies forward toward indigenous democratic goals. In most societies today, the people and their leaders want to build a functioning democratic system, and it is in this context that ADP strategies must be developed. In pursuing these objectives ADP strategies will be:

- Non-partisan and non-interventionist,
- Transparent to both public and government,
- Supportive of governmental and private institutions,
- Adapted to specific opportunities, and
- Adapted to unique political and cultural situations

C. The Structure of the ADP Effort

The design of ADP projects should be undertaken in consultation with other U.S. government agencies and international organizations to leverage resources and avoid duplication of efforts. The U.S. Information Agency, for example, undertakes activities in the areas of information dissemination and promotion of independent media that complement ADP objectives. More specifically, missions are expected to establish ADP coordinating committees (with representatives from the Embassy and other relevant groups) to help guide the program.

D. The Place of ADP in AID Development Strategy

The Asia Development Program is an attempt to supplement the long-term efforts of AID and other international aid organizations to bring the benefits of modern material and cultural life to peoples that are presently deprived of these benefits. Its relation to the rest of the AID effort is a subtle and complex one. On the one hand, economic assistance makes possible the standard of life and openness to the world that lays the basis for the functioning of a democratic society. On the other, increasing respect for democratic rights plays a significant part in opening societies to the exchange of goods and ideas that is necessary for long-term, competitive economic performance. But these relations are neither automatic nor necessary rationales for supporting economic assistance, private economic activity, or democratic growth. Each represents a separate and legitimate interest of both the United States and host countries. All peoples have a right to determine their own affairs through democratic institutions and to enjoy the benefits of democratic freedoms. Countries that already enjoy these rights and benefits have a responsibility to help others attain them.

Chapter II

THE RATIONALE FOR THE ASIA DEMOCRACY PROGRAM

The Asia Democracy Program (ADP) arises naturally from the history of democratic and economic development, of the role that the United States has taken in this development, and of the international human rights movement. It is based on a recognition of:

- The close historical connection between economic and democratic development;
- The common economic and political advantages of an open society;
- The equal legitimacy of economic and political freedoms; and
- The right of all peoples to control their economic future through democratic means.

A. American Support for Economic and Democratic Development

The diffusion of economic and democratic pluralism has long been promoted by citizens of the most advanced societies. From its beginning, the United States saw itself as a model for the world. Over time its institutions were copied by many countries, particularly in Latin America. British colonialists came to see the Empire as a means to implant their version of these ideas in societies throughout the world, and took effective steps to achieve this vision before decolonization. Students from every country were indoctrinated in Western ideas in Western universities; educators from Western universities went out to teach modernism in educational institutions almost everywhere.

After World War II, the United States began to make a more concerted effort through foreign aid to hasten the development of poorer states, states that in many cases (outside of Europe) had not yet been successful in developing effective, democratic economic or political institutions. This aid was primarily technological assistance and capital transfer.

Yet because of the close historical association of economic growth with political development, and persistent Congressional interest in the political dimension of foreign aid, transfer of economic and political ideas became a part of the aid process. Congress mandated through the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (as amended in 1966) under Title IX that democratic participation be promoted "through the encouragement of democratic private and local institutions". On the assumption that economic, social, and political development were inseparable, AID was directed to see how its programs might promote democratic trends.

Title IX's emphasis on popular participation at the grass-roots level was augmented in the 1970s by new emphasis on human rights. In the spirit of the times, the Foreign Assistance Act (1978) under Section 116(e) directed AID to carry out programs to enhance respect for civil and political rights. Projects under this heading have emphasized developing awareness of human rights, adherence to the rule of law, democratic electoral systems, developing organizations promoting human rights, and efforts to increase the access of women and minorities to the judicial process.

Recent changes in the position of AID and trends in the world have reinforced this trend. The role of the United States in foreign aid has greatly declined relative to that of other countries and to the economic size of the states that need assistance. It has also become clearer that without institutional change traditional forms of aid are relatively inefficient. In an effort to increase the effectiveness of limited resources, and to recognize explicitly that internal changes in developing countries are ultimately more important than any amount of outside assistance, AID now places more emphasis on the private sector.

B. The Relationship between Economic and Political Growth

A strong statistical association exists between the level of economic and democratic development. Although the relationship is not rigidly deterministic and is especially indeterminate for middle-income countries, below some minimum level of income per capita, democratic rights are nearly always poorly developed. Higher levels of GNP/Capita and literacy, and lower levels of infant and general mortality are associated with democracy, particularly at the extremes of their distributions. While it can be argued that cultural changes associated with modernity may be a more important determinant than income per se, in most countries common economic statistical indicators closely reflect these cultural changes.

A relatively fair distribution of wealth or health among different segments of the population is equally important for democratic success. If economic growth fails to reach a large sector of society, it is unlikely to be conducive to democratic growth. A highly skewed income distribution provides stony ground for the establishment of democracy, and a poor prognosis once established.

As important as the absolute levels of socioeconomic indicators and their distribution across the population, are trends in these indicators. Positive trends in indicators reinforce the stability of any regime, democratic or not. However, for those modernizing regimes whose elites have made a firm commitment to bring their country into the modern world and who accept the theoretical desirability of democracy (Thailand and Philippines may fall into this category), positive trends will support transitions to democracy rather than stasis.

Economic downturns, crises, and persistently poor economic performance are associated with changes in governments and governmental systems. Poor

economic conditions contributed to the wave of democratic transitions in the last decade. However, poor economic conditions led to the dramatic collapse of democratic regimes in prior decades, and to subsequent repudiations of democracy. Thus, economic failure can lead either toward, or away from, democracy. Economic crises also exacerbate political and social cleavages and increase social polarization. While economic crises are generally associated with poor growth, crises can also result from very rapid growth, with consequent disruption of the political system.

No conclusive evidence exists that the economic performance of democracies is either better or worse than the economic performance of authoritarian regimes over the long term. The transition to democracy will not necessarily improve economic performance, although it may change the distribution of gains from growth. Arguments and evidence can be marshaled both for and against the economic advantages of democracy, particularly during the take-off phase of economic growth. A good argument can be made that authoritarian states can impose rational but painful economic policies conducive to rapid growth more readily than democratic regimes. On the other hand, democracy works against the persistence of economically undesirable privileges for the few or the diversion of national resources into the private pockets of leaders that frequently characterizes authoritarian states.

Neither the military, the civil bureaucracy, nor the domestic private sector in developing countries have been strong, consistent, or principled supporters of either democracy or the free market. Support by these and other sectors of society is generally instrumental, depending on country-specific or policy-specific factors. Both foreign and domestic investors, for example, support democratic transitions when they seem likely to stabilize the political situation or to improve the relationship between the country and its trading partners; however, most investors oppose democracy when it promises to result in increasing or continuing instability or other threats to economic interests.

C. Conclusion

In supporting ADP in a country, the Bureau supports a transfer of political and economic power to the people, a transfer that they are entitled to, that will assist their participation in the modern world, and that makes possible the economic and social growth they desire. Historical experience suggests that democratic systems have been effective at every stage of economic development. Democratic development has often assisted, or made possible, the growth process.

Chapter III

ELEMENTS OF THE STRATEGY

The purpose of the Asia Democracy Program is the development and strengthening of **Sustainable Democratic Societies**. The five elements of the strategy to achieve this goal are:

- **VOICE:** The development and strengthening of: (a) channels for popular influence on government, and (b) channels for the free dissemination of information and opinion;
- **CHOICE:** Free, fair, and meaningful elections;
- **GOVERNANCE:** Effective, democratic, and open administration;
- **REDRESS:** Full protection for individual and group rights; and
- **ACCOUNTABILITY:** Government without corruption.

A. VOICE

1. Channels for Popular Influence on Government

In a democracy, the power of the central government is balanced by the existence of alternative centers of social, economic, and political power. *Public advocacy NGOs include* "good government", educational, consumer, and environmental groups. *Constituent advocacy groups* include professional, worker, farmer, business, caste, and even recreational groups. Because of their importance in the creation of a modern democratic society, women's advocacy groups are particularly important. Neighborhood and community organizations defend local interests. Whatever the issue or interest, such groups serve to check the unbridled power of government and to give interested citizens a more direct role in the political system. Third, well-organized *religious groups* are an important check on absolutist governments. Finally, *private economic organizations*, such as corporations and cooperatives, may also be necessary in a democracy. Domination by one group or a few groups must be avoided: sustainable democracy requires a thick network of associational structures, so that power cannot fall into the hands of the few.

2. Channels for the Free Dissemination of Information and Opinion

A democratic society requires effective and open channels for the acquisition and dissemination of information. In a fully functioning modern liberal democracy, the printed and broadcast media, as well as newer media, offer a wide variety of opinion and information, and represent many different perspectives. Americans often assume that this is best achieved by multiple private media. The relationship

between private media and open media, however, is not as close as this suggests. In many countries nongovernmental media offer very little information or opinion that goes against the desires of the government. On the other hand, in some European countries governmental control of the broadcasting media has not prevented the free and varied dissemination of information and opinion over the air. But experience suggests that this European combination of government monopoly with freedom is difficult to achieve in the developing world.

An open society requires freedom from fear of reprisal, especially among those concerned with gathering and disseminating information and opinion. In democracies, people do not fear imprisonment, torture, or execution as the result of their expression of opinion or reportorial activities. Neither do they fear private reprisal, as has been common, for example, in Central America and Colombia.

Democracy also requires freedom of access to information. With few exceptions, a democratic society cannot function successfully if information about the workings of government, and basic data on the economy and society, are withheld from the public, either openly or covertly. Investigative reporting is a cornerstone of effective modern democracy.

B. CHOICE: Free, Fair, and Meaningful Elections

Democracy is a political system in which the people elect legislators or administrators at national, regional and local levels. Today, democracy requires that all adult citizens have the right, in both theory and practice, to run for office without distinctions as to gender or ethnicity. Democratic elections must be preceded by opportunities to organize around support for, or opposition to, particular laws, policies, or ruling groups. This generally requires the formation of two or more political parties. Elections may also directly fill some executive positions, beginning with the presidency. Referendums may be held to supplement the election of representatives. Reliance on plebiscites, referendums, or exceptional elections, however, suggests an unstable democratic system. Whatever the details of the system, it is important that elections are held at constitutionally approved intervals. Districting should assure that the votes of people from different parts of the country have roughly equal effects on the outcome. Alternatively, the differences between the votes of people from different areas, classes, or ethnic groups must be popularly regarded as legitimate.

Elections must be transparent, free, and credible. Elections require adequate voter education and fair campaigning regulations and practices. Since in all systems incumbents have many built-in advantages, voter educational adherence to campaign regulations are as necessary for free elections as fair voting procedures and tabulation. Complaints about the administration of elections must be expeditiously adjudicated by impartial bodies. Because of the dramatic impact of elections and relative ease of observation, efforts to support democracy or judge levels of democracy in recent years often concentrate on electoral procedures. Judging the

electoral process itself is, of course, only one step in evaluating the fairness of an election. In many countries, equally important may be the ways in which elections are financed and the part that money plays in voter recruitment.

Finally, and most important, elections are only meaningful to the extent that those elected are able to exercise control over the country and to implement programs and carry out their mandates.

To the degree that a hereditary ruler, a religious leader, an officer corps, or foreign power denies power to elected leaders, the system is not a democracy. A country may also not be considered a functioning democracy if a nondemocratic guerrilla or secessionist group controls major sections of the country.

C. GOVERNANCE: Effective, Democratic, and Open Administration

Ideally, the desires of the people in a democracy are expressed through effective and transparent administrative structures. Legislative processes and discussion should be both open and productive. Democratic leaders consult with all those affected by governmental policy decisions or their implementation. Democracy particularly requires that such consultation be invoked when minority interests are likely to be severely damaged by strict majoritarian policies.

Many aspiring democracies lack both experienced democratic leaders willing and able to develop policy and delegate responsibility and a cadre of trained, professional civil servants to carry them out policies once developed. Because of the high popular expectations of government at times of democratic transition, these incapacities become a critical barrier to sustainable democracy.

D. REDRESS: Full Protection for Individual and Group Rights

The judicial system of a modern democracy must sustain internationally recognized individual and group rights. In particular, it protects the accused against excessive force and torture, as well as excessive delay in making known charges against the accused and bringing them to trial.

The work of the judicial system is sustained by a separation of judicial, legislative, and executive power that prevents interference with judicial processes. It is also sustained by an attentive public, investigative reporters, and human rights NGOs or "watch" organizations that are able to mobilize public opinion against abuses as they occur.

E. ACCOUNTABILITY: Financially Responsible Government

In an ideal democratic society, elected, appointed, and career officials are assumed to devote the bulk of their time to serving the public interest, a service for which they are rewarded by both stable and respectable incomes and public honor. Neither their families, associates, nor political supporters expect special favors. Although this ideal is seldom attained even by the most successful democracies, fully functioning democracies are able through a variety of self-policing mechanisms and public disclosure to maintain a cadre of public servants accountable to society rather than personal interests. Where this is not the case, real and imagined corruption affects all aspects of political life, and ultimately calls into question the legitimacy of all political institutions. Ineffective, corrupt government cannot sustain economic or democratic development.

Chapter IV

KEY FACTORS AFFECTING PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT

Varying explanations of what conditions make possible the emergence and preservation of democracy have been offered at least since Aristotle. While some explanations have stressed historical factors, others have stressed culture, class structure, or external influence. The major factors that have been found to affect the prospects for democratic development in a particular country include:

- Historical experience of its peoples
- Political culture: relatively stable values and attitudes
- Ethnic and religious cleavages within the state
- Legitimacy of the state's borders in its peoples' eyes
- Institutional factors
- Class structure
- Political attitudes: short-term reactive opinions
- Support for democracy by neighbors or the world community

A. Historical Experience

Successful modern democracies are generally states in which democratic institutions and attitudes have developed over a very long period. Although it appears at first sight that the United States and its allies successfully imposed democracy on Germany, Italy, and Japan after World War II, the success of this massive effort at transformation was made possible by the fact that the peoples of Germany, Italy, and to a lesser extent Japan, had experienced both political and civil democracy for many years before the fascist ascendancy. In addition, they were in many other respects already "modern countries". Similarly, the establishment of democracy in former colonies of the United Kingdom and the United States was greatly aided by the development of democratic institutions by the colonial power long before independence. Where this development did not occur under colonial rule, democracy has found little basis in the post-colonial world. Aside from the former colonies of the United States and the U.K., no country decolonized after World War II managed to maintain democratic institutions. Countries that were never effectively colonized, and thereby not exposed to intensive democratic experience, have generally failed to become democracies. At least until very recently, all countries that sustained democracy after World War II had had experience with democratic institutions prior to the war.

Historical experience should not, however, be compartmentalized as belonging only to the past. It is continuous, extending out of the past into the present and future. Former British and American colonies maintain political, economic and educational links with the "home countries", and the movement of peoples between the former colonies and the home countries gives continuing life to the historical association. Similarly, in spite of the relative thinness of prior democratic experience in Spain, Portugal, and Greece, democracy has been successfully extended to these countries because of the continuous and growing interchange between them and democracies in Northwestern Europe and the United States. To a degree, what people in these countries lacked in democratic experience in their homelands was made up for by the democratic experience they had as individuals while living in democracies, trading with them, and communicating with them.

B. Political Culture: Relatively Stable Values and Attitudes

Material factors supporting freedom may be less important than cultural factors. These may be directly political, such as the norms by which the society traditionally chooses its leaders, or less obviously political, such as the degree of trust people have in others outside the immediate family. Social scientists have identified a number of "modern attitudes" and values that appear to support democracy, or make possible sustained support for democratic institutions. These include an ability to empathize with people outside closely bounded communities, and a sense that their lives can be changed through personal or group action.

A country's political culture can be defined as the norms, values, and understanding of political processes and political facts that characterize its population. A country may have the forms of democracy, but if it does not have an elite and a general citizenry with the attitudes, interests and knowledge necessary for democratic viability, its democracy will remain empty. For a democracy to be established successfully and endure, the people must be committed to a democratic system, if they have one, or to the idea of a democratic system, if they do not. They must not see democracy as an attractive alternative among many, but as the only legitimate political system in the modern world. Lacking this commitment, economic or other troubles can easily lead to the overnight loss of democratic gains, and the kind of serial or episodic democracy characterizing, for instance, the recent history of Nigeria.

To have this commitment, both elites and their followers must have an intellectual and emotional understanding of the nature of the democratic system, a belief that meaningful change can be achieved through this system, and willingness to work for change through it rather than searching for nondemocratic shortcuts to solve immediate problems. They must understand the nondemocratic and illegitimate nature of leadership attained by unconstitutional processes, and understand the human or natural right to political equality for all.

Two culturally defined relationships are especially important: the relationship between the group and the individual, and that between the majority or dominant group and the minority or subordinate group. Democracy requires that group and individual rights are balanced, and in particular that the individual should have his public say on any question, no matter how heretical his opinion. Successful democracy also requires that the political, social, and economic system not be a "winner-take-all" system in which opposition or minority rights are ignored -- or where it is assumed that those who do not join the majority when it is possible are both foolish and traitorous. Democracy requires the concept of the legitimacy of a "loyal opposition", a legitimacy lacking in many political cultures.

C. Ethnic and Religious Cleavages Within the State

Universally, the people of different ethnic and religious groups have found it hard to live together peacefully in the same political unit. Authoritarian systems that dictate group relations often submerge rather than eliminate group antagonisms. Where this is the case, opening a society to democratic competition may cause ethnic and religious conflicts to be rekindled as groups struggle to defend or increase their share of power in the altered system. So in societies with political cultures that have not yet incorporated the concept of equal rights for members of minority groups, discrimination against minorities may be increased by democracy. Consequent denials of human rights contradict democracy. While some democracies have resolved the relationships of different ethnic and religious groups successfully, in most cases this has taken many generations. Until they are resolved, full democracy can seldom be sustained.

The problem is particularly intractable when there is no easy way to demarcate contending groups geographically. As the examples of the Sikhs today or the Muslims in pre-partition India attest, attempts to transform nongeographical divisions into geographical ones are problematic. A particularly difficult situation for sustaining democracy is one, exemplified by Malaysia and Fiji, in which the Staatsvolk (the people historically identified with the state) has become a minority within its own borders. To allow democracy to function freely and fairly in such a situation appears to its Staatsvolk both unjust and an invitation to ethnic disaster.

D. Legitimacy of the State's Borders in Its Peoples' Eyes

For democracy to prosper, the citizens of a state must accept the legitimacy of that state as the unit of political life. Far in the past, state boundaries were imposed on the peoples who lived within them, but the democratizing world no longer accepts such impositions. While the peoples within most traditional democracies have long since either coalesced into a new and distinct nationality identified with their state or adjusted to living in a multinational state, in many new states, such as India or Indonesia, this is not the case.

Characteristically, as democracy develops in a state, its "submerged peoples", generally those that do not have a long history of identification with the state, are able to express more clearly and forcibly their claims for independence. The USSR finds itself in this situation today: increasing democracy threatens to result in the progressive dissolution of the country. The situation may be repeated in many countries as democratization proceeds.

In most cases, democratic development will be arrested at that point where claims to ethnic autonomy begin to threaten the dissolution of the state. A number of states, such as India, have been able to move beyond this point, but survive as democracies only with great effort and attendant large-scale violence. Political violence becomes endemic and effective democracy impossible when ethnic dissidents will not accept the claims of the government, no matter how democratically elected, and the government considers the efforts of dissidents, both violent and non-violent, to be treasonable.

E. Institutional Factors

The continuity of a democratic government is largely determined by the strength and effectiveness of governmental institutions: executive, legislative, and judicial. This classification includes the corresponding branches of government at regional or other levels below the national. In many ways, democracy requires stronger institutions than nondemocracy, because to be effective a democratic government must use a much broader mix of approaches than a less democratic state that may rely largely on the threat of force to achieve its objectives. The relative complexity of democratic governance is also suggested by the fact that in most non-democracies the judicial and legislative branches have little or no separate existence -- in some cases these branches hardly exist.

Transitions to democracy may be greatly hampered, and resulting governments inefficient, weak, and unstable, because the prior development of basic governmental institutions has not taken place. One cannot suddenly call judicial and legislative systems into existence and expect them to function successfully. This is one reason why democratic transitions were successful in British colonies, such as Sri Lanka, that had effective democratic institutions before independence, while in states without this basis they were not.

This does not imply that all states need the same developed governmental institutions that we have in the United States. For example, the British system, with a relatively weak legislature and judiciary, is able to ensure full democratic rights. Therefore, the institutional strength of a system should be considered in terms of models appropriate to its traditions rather than American models.

The morale of leaders throughout the governmental structure of a country may be critical in predicting its movement away or toward democracy. Collapse in the morale of authoritarian leaders in the USSR and its satellites was the immediate

cause of the breakdown of governments in this sphere, and allowed the consequent democratic opening. This opening has led to parallel events in Mongolia and elsewhere in the communist world. By contrast, the democratic movement in Burma has so far been denied power by the continued ability of the Burmese generals to maintain morale in the face of multiple pressures.

Movement toward or away from democracy will also be determined by the effectiveness of organizations not under government control, whether or not these be directly concerned with the political arena. As a country moves toward democracy and away from authoritarianism, increasing numbers of effective organizations or groups of individuals will publicly oppose those in power, or oppose the governmental system in so far as it is not fully democratic. The goals and popularity of such groups are critical to the future of democracy in a country. Of course, where the leaders or goals of an opposition are not democratic, the meaning of opposition strength for the sustainability of democracy can be reversed. We might, for example, have judged the strength of Hitler's movement in the early 1930s, or of Khomeini's in the late 1970s, to be evidence of a healthy and dynamic opposition -- but the outcomes were hardly democratic.

F. Class Structure

Democracy has become dominant in the world during the same period that the middle classes have come to dominate modern societies. The reasons for this association begin with the fact that democracy was the ideological sword by which the middle classes defeated the upper classes that had formerly dominated society. Since the upper classes are never more than a small percentage of a country's population, they find it difficult to use functional democratic institutions to attain or retain dominance. On the other hand, the middle classes in some societies have achieved a plurality or even majority position that allows democracy to "work for them". Middle class people can also use democracy because they have a sense of efficacy, of being able to achieve change, that allows them to take advantage of democratic opportunities in a manner not open to more traditional upper and lower classes.

Nevertheless, the middle classes are not necessarily wedded to democracy. This is particularly so where the middle classes remain small relative to large peasant or working classes. In these cases, middle class citizens may see political activity and free expression that mobilizes workers and peasants to be a direct threat to their class interests. As a result, they may use every available means, including violence, to limit the degree to which democratic rights extend to all citizens. For this and other reasons, in some countries, including Muslim countries today, many middle class people become attached to ideological movements that do not accept democratic principles.

The class structure least favorable for democracy is one in which a very large percentage of the population remains dependent on the favors of a few powerful per-

sons, as in landlord-tenant relationships. In these cases, traditional leaders -- feudal lords, urban machine bosses, union leaders, or gang leaders -- are able to use a combination of threats and promises to convince most people that they should follow the political wishes of nondemocratic local leaders. By being able to "deliver votes", such leaders make a mockery of democracy and bring it into disrepute.

G. Attitudinal Factors: Short-term Reactive Opinions

What the general public and the elites of a country think of the performance of the current regime and its leaders is critical to its success. Whether satisfaction or dissatisfaction propels a country in a democratic or antidemocratic direction depends on whether current leaders are defined as democratic, democratizing, or authoritarian. Attitudes are often determined by economic success or failure. However, they also may be determined by the standing of a country's leaders in the world, their reputation for honesty or corruption, or the degree to which they express personally and through their actions the beliefs and values of their people. Islamic fundamentalists, for example, profit from economic distress, but it is a materialist mistake to deny that their campaigns in favor of the shari'ah (Islamic law) are an expression of religious dissatisfaction with Westernized leaders.

Attitudes toward the means that are acceptable and appropriate to reach desired alternatives must be considered. In a democratic state, alternative leaders or policies may be desired, but they are desired through constitutional means. Attitudes in nondemocratic states favoring an alternative regime are only favorable for democratic development if the alternative to the regime is seen as a modern liberal democracy -- as was the case in most Central and Eastern European states before recent transitions. However, the sustainability of democracy in many third-world countries is threatened by widely held attitudes that change is desirable even if the change is in a nondemocratic direction (for example, to military rule) and attitudes that do not distinguish between roads to power by contending elites.

H. Support for Democracy by Neighbors or the World Community

No state in the world, particularly no small- or medium-sized state, exists in a vacuum. Its people are influenced by the continual interactions of its leaders and populace with surrounding countries, their goods, and their communications. Since most people want their country to be well thought of by people in other countries, movements toward and away from democracy have some of the characteristics of fads or fashions. Between the world wars, fascism or extreme nationalism was a fashion that infected many countries throughout the world, just as democracy, at least to the extent of republicanism, had been the fashion before World War I, and just as communism, or one-party socialism, became the fashion in the third world in the 1960s and 1970s. In the eighties, the democratic fashion swept through Eastern Europe and Latin America, and had reverberations throughout the world. Cross-border forces for change have become more and more important with the rapid develop-

ment of instantaneous communication and the increasing involvement of peoples in a worldwide labor market.

Chapter V

PROGRAMS IN SUPPORT OF DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT

The purpose of the Asia Democracy Program is the development and strengthening of **Sustainable Democratic Societies**. To serve this purpose, programs will be developed either to strengthen the five program elements of the strategy or to create and entrench the contextual preconditions of democracy.

A. Strengthening the Basic Elements

1. Voice

ADP programs should be devised to strengthen a broad range of public advocacy and constituent advocacy NGOs. Programs initiated under ADP or integrated subsequently into its strategy will support women's organizations, business associations, chambers of commerce, rural cooperatives, and workers' and farmers' unions, to name a few. They will support consumer and environmental organizations, which have played an important role in democratic development in recent years. Because support of such nongovernmental organizations is a traditional area of AID assistance, a crucial first step will be to review the mission's portfolio to determine which organizations should be the main targets of assistance from the ADP perspective.

Beyond support for individual organizations, ADP efforts might include support for the development of private think tanks or research institutes that would offer critical perspectives on public policy. Toward this objective, ADP might support a Center for the development of Public Interest Foundations in some countries.

Media development is often critical for democratic growth. Help might be made available for both private and governmental media, as long as the goal of increasing the availability of unbiased information is foremost. Special purpose media, such as high school or college newspapers or broadcasting stations might be initiated with AID assistance.

2. Choice

A fundamental requirement of a democratic society is free and fair elections, ADP programs may be directed toward improving electoral mechanisms, in cooperation with the work of organizations such as the National Endowment for Democracy or the International Foundation for Electoral Systems. In addition to improving these mechanisms, ADP assistance may also be directed toward strengthening the capabilities of legislatures or elected representatives at every level of government. Supported projects may develop orientation programs for newly elected repre-

representatives or legislative information systems. Responsiveness to constituents can be strengthened through TA and training programs to help elected representatives at all levels of government present budgets in a realistic fashion to the citizens. Legislators should be trained in mechanisms for laying out choices and reporting to the electorate, thereby increasing public awareness of the costs of policy choices.

Strengthening political party structures is a basic need in many new democracies. However, it may be difficult to structure acceptable programs in this area. One possibility is to provide across-the-board party development support through a neutral intermediate agency.

3. Governance

Support for improving and democratizing governmental administration may take a number of forms. Many countries lack a professional civil service able to provide continuity and efficient policy execution. Civil servants must be trained at all levels in program implementation, budget preparation and presentation, and external and internal reporting requirements. Encouraging the regular collection and publication of national statistics and other information on governmental activities will aid in the creation of a more open and effective system. In some cases, the establishment of a popular advocate or ombudsman within the bureaucracy will help. Institutions, public and private, for the analysis of policy issues may also be a critical need.

4. Redress

The judicial systems in many countries require additional training for judges, and enhanced judicial capacity to obtain information about the cases before them and the applicable law. Often there is an equal need for better trained and informed lawyers representing the larger community. Access to legal procedures on the part of the poor needs to be strengthened in many countries. There are also increasing requirements for knowledge concerning human rights conditions and law, both within the judicial system and within the larger community of practicing lawyers. The development and strengthening of human rights NGOs will be particularly helpful in many situations.

5. Accountability

Measures to reduce corruption and increase the transparency of governmental decisions include the improvement of financial accounting practices and the development of objective criteria for measuring performance. The ability of governments to investigate and prosecute those accused of corruption must be strengthened. Administration must be trained in effective means by which the public may be informed of abuses and compel investigation. Improving the pay, morale, and professionalism of governmental employees is a second avenue. As im-

portant as these is developing a consciousness throughout society that believes in government as a means to serve public purposes and no longer accepts the necessity of accepting the corruption of the past.

B. Establishing the Contextual Preconditions

1. Assist Civic and General Education

The close correlation of educational levels and democratic development, as well as overall modernization, suggests that ADP should regard education as a central concern, especially the education of disadvantaged groups. Many countries need to develop a "rights consciousness". Other societies need civic education that stresses the importance and legitimacy of governmental institutions, of civic responsibilities such as voting and obeying the law, and the necessity for tolerating other cultures, ways of life, and opinions.

Knowledge of what has been going on in neighboring democracies and the larger world has been a critical element in recent democratic transformations. ADP programs could strive to increase democratic communication through expanding the number and length of visits between the United States and other democracies and nondemocracies. Other means might be support for the international distribution of selected media.

2. Develop Social Sciences

The development of at least three social science capabilities would support ADP goals. First would be the transmission and dissemination of basic information relative to the democratizing process. This would include information on alternative social and economic systems, as well as information on how legislatures, executives, judiciaries, and political parties function in democracies. This will require educational efforts directed at both elites and the general public, and involve lectures, seminars, sample syllabi, and translations. Second, governmental and private policy research capabilities would improve the quality of the work of both bureaucracies and independent or opposition organizations attempting to develop alternatives. Third, the development of credible capabilities for attitude and value surveys would both improve popular input into the political process and better understand obstacles to democratic development. Eventually such a capability would help track ADP performance and basic change in the political culture in the host country.

**C. Schematic for ADP Program Opportunities
(Illustrative Only)**

Program Category	Program Goal	Targeted Support Activity
<u>Element Support</u>		
1. Voice	Support NGOs	- women's rights orgs. - professional orgs.
	Support Media Development	- training journalists - special purpose media
2. Choice	Improve Electoral Process	- observer missions - computerized rolls
	Strengthen Legislatures	- orientation programs - information services
	Strengthen Political Parties (only through intermediaries)	- training in political organization
3. Governance	Improving Openness	- govt. data publication
	Improving Responsiveness	- ombudsman experiment
4. Redress	Improving Judiciary	- legal information system
	Improving Representation	- support for legal aid
	Strengthening Civil Rights	- support watch NGOs
5. Accountability	Improving Govt. Accounting	- finan. managem. training
	Improving Compensation	- civil service development
<u>Contextual Support</u>		
1. Dem. Education	Improving Civic Consciousness	- civic education - voter education
	Improving Democratic Contacts	- visits among democracies - contacts with democracies
2. Social Science	Improve Policy Analysis	- policy institutes
	Improve Knowledge of Opinion	- opinion polling capabilities

APPENDIX A

COUNTRY TYPES BY LEVELS OF DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT

In terms of political and civil liberties, countries can be classified along a scale from "least free" to "most free". General agreement exists among political analysts on the ratings of most countries. The important issues for ADP are the range of countries that must be considered and the movement of individual countries up or down in such a scale. The exact point at which to place a particular country on the scale is of little moment.

For the purposes of ADP, it seems preferable to combine such a unidimensional "freedom scale" with more easily identifiable system markers. To classify a country in such a system will not require detailed comparative information. With this objective in mind, countries can be classified roughly into five groups:

- A. Anarchical
- B. Totalitarian or Extensively Repressive
- C. Authoritarian
- D. Transitional: Authoritarian-to-Democratic
- E. Democratic

A. Anarchical Systems

It would be a mistake to place countries that are in a state of advanced political crisis and disorganization in any of the foregoing categories. For much of 1990, for example, the category would have included Lebanon, Liberia, Haiti, and possibly Sudan. For most people anarchy means a diminution of all rights; the freedoms it offers for some are largely illusory and transitory.

B. Totalitarian Systems

This grouping includes all those states whose rulers or ruling elites use their political power to closely control their people's social, cultural, and economic life. This is the classic model of the Stalinist Soviet Union in which it was assumed that the function of the state was to create a "new man" who would then transform the world. To achieve this utopian objective, the interests of current generations were ruthlessly sacrificed. Nazi leaders attempted in a similar manner to remake their people, as did to a lesser extent those of Fascist Italy and Japan. After World War II, many states copied the Stalinist approach, especially states modeling themselves directly on the USSR. In recent years Libya became an example in the Arab world of a similar but less strictly communist attempt. In general, countries in the Arab world have a totalitarian tendency because of the all-inclusive and detailed nature of Islamic law and the theoretically close connection of religious and political power. Saudi Arabia represents the traditional form of this relationship, in which pragmatic political leaders rule within the limits of Islamic law; Iran (especially during Ayatol-

lah Khomeini's rule) represents a more innovative and "modern" totalitarianism in which, paradoxically, religious leaders are directly in charge.

Totalitarian systems may be subdivided into two subgroups:

1. Totally closed: no pluralism or political competition allowed. These are the remaining totalist communist states, particularly North Korea.

2. Partially open: some pluralism and competition. Iran, Libya, and the traditional Muslim states should be included here, as well as many states in the evolving communist world, such as China.

C. Authoritarian Systems

The objective of an authoritarian system is primarily to maintain its unchallenged control over the levers of political power. Authoritarian systems may be further subdivided into those:

1. Without a modern political process. This includes states such as Qatar, Bhutan, or Brunei where the traditional system is still largely intact. There may be free and quite varied nongovernmental activity, particularly economic, but little or no dissent is allowed, at least in public. No organized opposition groups publicizing their viewpoints generally exist within the country.

2. With the outlines of a modern political process. Such states may have, or experiment with, elections and legislatures. Some dissent is allowed in the political arena, but the organization of an opposition is generally not allowed. Outside the political arena, a great deal of pluralism may exist, and not only in economic activities. Iran under the Shah would be a good example of this level of political development.

3. With a functioning modern political process. States at this level have regular elections, well-developed and critical legislatures, and other features of democratic society alongside continuing authoritarian controls. This category may be further subdivided into two subcategories:

- a. Dominant party systems. The ruling elite operates through an entrenched political party that has managed to arrange political life so that effective challenge is next to impossible. Opposition newspapers and political parties may be quite well organized and vocal, but obstacles are continually put in the way of open discussion or challenge, especially around election time. In recent years Singapore and Malaysia have both fallen into this pattern.

- b. Arrested democratic systems. States in this subcategory are often included by political analysts in lists of democracies. Other analysts, however, emphasize

the extent to which these states maintain authoritarianism. Turkey, for example, is democratic in many respects, yet continuing denials of basic cultural rights to the large Kurdish minority and of political expression to those desiring an Islamic polity, the role of the military in government, and regular reports of the use of torture keeps the country outside the community of democratic states for these observers. States in this subcategory differ from transitional states in the following category in that their democratic defects are generally long-standing, and progress in ameliorating them has been very slow, if it exists at all.

D. Transitional: Authoritarian to Democratic Systems

At any one time, some countries are likely to be in transition from an authoritarian system to a democratic. In so far as those forcing the change appear to be sincere and progress is rapid, it is unwise to worry about the precise point in the transition that has been reached. Most countries in the former Soviet orbit, including the Soviet Union itself, fell into this category in 1989-1990 -- even though the actual degree to which complete democracy will be achieved remains unclear, and some states in this group may reestablish authoritarianism. At various times in the 1980s Brazil and many other Latin American states would have been in this category, as well as Nigeria. Obviously, states appearing at any one time to be transitional do not necessarily move all the way to democracy. But as long as the process is on track, and a new system has not been stabilized, a country in this category should be distinguished from either an authoritarian or democratic state.

E. Democratic Systems

Democracies may be subdivided into the following three groups.

1. Democracies under siege. These are states that grant in theory, and to some degree in practice, the full spectrum of political and civil liberties. Democratic practice may be highly developed. Yet its significance is seriously undermined by pervasive governmental and nongovernmental violence, violence that has become more than episodic. Violence often interferes with elections, and leads to the effective denial of rights of expression through threats coming from both governmental and nongovernmental sources. Whether a state falls into this category is partly a quantitative judgment: Sri Lanka, Peru, Colombia, and the Philippines would seem to belong here, while India, in spite of serious violence in many areas and consequent denials of some human rights in these areas, probably should not.

2. Developing democracies. These are functioning democracies for most of their people; pluralism is extensive; and leaders are challenged and often replaced through competitive processes. However, in one or another important respect these states do not qualify as thoroughly modern liberal democracies. For example, the government controlled broadcast media may not make an adequate effort to report fairly on events in the country. Freedom of expression may in other ways be

restricted. Elections may have diminished meaning because of the extent to which voters remain the dependents of large landowners, labor union leaders, or other bosses.

3. Fully functioning democracies. In no democracy is the full spectrum of civil and political liberties completely guaranteed or fully expressed, at least to everyone's satisfaction. The standards by which democracy is judged is also continually being upgraded. But at any one time states in this group set the standard of political and civil liberties for the rest of the world. The subcategory includes most of the traditional Western democracies, as well as a few small third world states such as Barbados and Costa Rica.

Preliminary Classification for APRE Region Countries

Anarchical: none

Totalitarian: Partially Open

Cambodia
Laos
Vietnam

Authoritarian: With the Outlines of a Modern Political Process

Burma (or Totalitarian: Partially Open)

Authoritarian: Dominant Party System

Bangladesh (or Transitional: Authoritarian to Democratic)
Indonesia
Malaysia
Singapore

Authoritarian: Arrested Democratic

Fiji

Transitional: Authoritarian to Democratic

Mongolia (early stage)

Democratic: Democracy under Siege

Sri Lanka

Democratic: Developing Democracy

India (close to Democracy under siege)
Nepal (or Transitional: Authoritarian to democratic -- late stage)
Thailand (or Authoritarian: Arrested democratic)
Papua New Guinea
Kiribati, Nauru, Solomons, Tuvalu, possibly Vanuatu

APPENDIX B

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS AT DPI SEMINARS

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APPENDIX C

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