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**AN ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY  
FOR RURAL PERU**

by  
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**DESFIL**

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## **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

This paper proposes a carefully planned bilateral or multilateral assistance program with a strong institutional strengthening component for Peruvian rural development institutions. The goal is to re-establish a healthy relationship between peasant communities in the Andean highlands and their regional and national government by promoting community-based development projects. Communities would demonstrate their interest in small-scale projects by preparing proposals for \$5,000 grants. A percentage of the grant would be earmarked for technical assistance which communities would purchase from private, government, or NGO agencies. The rationale for the proposal is based on the following factors:

- communities need to rebuild essential infrastructure and have already developed priorities.
- local control of projects will foster growth, learning, and capacity-building.
- peasant perceptions of dependency on outside agencies will be reversed through participation.
- self-confidence generated through community responsibility will help impede terrorist insurgency.
- government bureaucratic structures will shrink as communities undertake project planning and implementation.
- efficiency in implementation will increase if communities assess the feasibility of projects.
- civilian initiatives are a positive, non-violent model of development at a time when terrorist and military violence dominate the countryside.

A precedent for community-directed development was established during the Rimunakuy Program in Perú. During this time, rural communities took the initiative to plan and implement their own projects which improved productive infrastructure and managed limited resources on marginal lands. The Rimunakuy Program, and recent legislation and changes in government institutions, set the stage for a broad-based program to facilitate community self-help development.

## INTRODUCTION

This paper outlines a policy to support Peruvian peasant communities (*Comunidades Campesinas*) in rural areas<sup>1</sup>. The policy is designed to improve the capacity of communities to organize themselves through the execution of small-scale development programs, and thereby achieve a political response against terrorism. The assumption is that revitalized grass-roots institutions will be able to counter terrorist insurgents in their midst. This proposed policy will also benefit the Government of Peru (GOP) by providing a new initiative to the current economic crisis, by utilizing resources on marginal lands in a sustainable manner to benefit rural areas.

Regardless of the political situation, the implementation of this policy implies a fundamental change in the development approach of the GOP. The state will move away from the frustrating and difficult task of directly executing development programs and become, instead, the financier and facilitator of small-scale development projects. Adoption of this policy will strengthen the state's position in rural areas by making the GOP more responsive to local needs and more effective in providing means for solving local problems. By directly providing communities with the financial means to carry out urgently needed local projects, such as water management and soil conservation, the policy will support local peasant community priorities and release local energies towards constructive efforts.

As a means of addressing the current political crisis, the policy provides an alternative to a purely militaristic response to terrorism. The government will gain new tools to counteract terrorism by opening the doors to civil actions of reconstruction and pacification. Military actions by the government tend to escalate conflict, engender violence, and foster human rights abuses. In the eyes of the peasants, military actions tend to place the government on the same plane as the terrorists. In contrast, the proposed civil

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<sup>1</sup> This paper is a follow-up of my previous paper "Steps toward a Coherent Policy for Andean Peasant Agriculture," Development Strategies for Fragile Lands (DESFIL), March 1989. Prepared for the U.S. Agency for International Development under contract number DHR-5438-C-00-6054-00.

actions will make the GOP more responsive to the needs of the communities and strengthen national loyalties of the impoverished Peruvian peasant.

This proposed policy will provide small but recurring development funds directly to the peasant communities for projects and programs that they themselves want to carry-out. It would cost approximately US \$100 million for four years and US \$ 5 million in operating costs. The funds could be provided through international funding agencies such as the World Bank, IRDB, or USAID. Each peasant community could receive outright, approximately \$5,000 per year for four years. After that, the funds available to communities could become development loans.

This proposal is also a means to rationalize the activities of private NGOs by providing them with a more effective and less confrontational role to play in the development process. This proposal is intended to complement other efforts necessary to improve conditions in the rural areas, such as wage and price policies that will influence production and restoration of degraded lands. It is modeled after similar successful efforts undertaken elsewhere in Latin America, including the programs of reconstruction and pacification undertaken by the government of Colombia under the leadership of President Virgilio Barco, and the successes of Ecuador's development financing corporation of the Central Bank *Fondo de Desarrollo Rural para Poblaciones Marginales (FODERUMA)*.

Section I outlines the substance of the proposed policy. Section II provides background information on the political crisis in Peru that has almost closed down development efforts in rural areas. It is imperative for the GOP to respond in a new way to the present political and economic crisis. The third section (III) analyzes the current legislative and institutional framework under which such a policy could be implemented. Section IV restates the policy proposal and further outlines the justifications for such an approach to rural development and anti-terrorist measures.

## **I. THE PROPOSAL**

The proposal has two components:

1) The first component is a strengthening grant to the *Instituto Nacional de Desarrollo de Comunidades Campesinas* (INDEC) of US \$5 million. Created through 1987 legislation, INDEC is an autonomous public organization charged with formulating national policy and developing plans for local community projects. The proposed strengthening grant would enable USAID to assist the GOP in implementing and institutionalizing INDEC at the national level and in establishing equivalent organizations at the Departmental levels. The support would help to reform the institution and to provide qualified personnel capable of designing, implementing, monitoring, and evaluating local development programs.

2) The second component is to provide US \$100 million over four years to Fondo de Desarrollo Comunal (FONDEC), the financial branch of INDEC, for small community development projects. Approximately US \$5,000 would be available per community per year. These funds would be made available to *Comunidades* pursuant to their presentation of a short proposal. A percentage of the grant would be earmarked for technical assistance that communities would purchase from local private, governmental or NGO development agencies. Renewal of the grant would occur annually and be dependent on the performance of the previous year's grant. INDEC, local government agencies, and NGOs would be in charge of administration, monitoring, and evaluation of the program. After four years FONDEC grants would become development loans available to the *Comunidades*.

Providing the *Comunidades* with direct funds to purchase technical assistance reverses the patron-client relationship that often clouds the development process. The rationale underlying this recommendation is that given the current political situation, the communities can better decide on their priorities than external agents (whether governmental or private). This proposal also incorporates the argument that when the funds for technical assistance are in the hands of those who need them, they will

be more effectively allocated than when government agencies control scarce resources. The market principle of resource allocation also will introduce an element of efficiency to the provision of technical assistance; efficient NGOs and government agencies will have customers, while those that provide mediocre services will flounder and fail. Finally, government agencies and NGOs will be forced to become more responsive to local needs if the technical assistance funds are placed directly in the hands of the communities .

## **II. TERRORISM AND THE PEASANT COMMUNITIES**

Beginning in 1980, terrorist insurgency in rural areas of Peru escalated, posing a grave threat to the stability of the country. From a base in the Ayacucho highlands, the *Sendero Luminoso* (Shining Path) guerrillas gained strategic command in many highland Departments and now challenge the GO for control in the southern and central Departments of Puno, Apurimac, Abancay, Huancavelica, Junin, Lima, Pasco, and Huánuco. The northern Departments of Ancash, and Cajamarca also are contested areas. Other armed insurgent groups, such as the Movimiento Tupac Amaru (MRTA), and armed groups related to illegal drug trafficking are active in the rural areas. Even legally constituted political parties such as the *Partido Unificado Mariateguista* (PUM), have announced that they will create armed groups in the countryside, ostensibly as a measure for self-defense against Senderistas<sup>2</sup>. Right-wing death squads such as the *Movimiento Rodrigo Franco* and the *Comando Santana Chiri* are imitating the tactics of left-wing guerrillas, and assassinating prominent citizens. The prospect of armed groups fighting the Peruvian military and police forces and each other, in both rural and urban areas is increasing.

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<sup>2</sup> members of Sendero Luminoso.

Reported statistics<sup>3</sup> on violence reveal an alarming increase since 1980, with peaks in 1985, 1986, and 1989. Since 1983 the number of terrorist attacks has consistently been more than 1,000 per year. In 1989 there were more than 3,000 deaths, 720 of them political assassinations of local authorities. Between 1982 and November 1989 the number of terrorist-related deaths exceeded 17,000<sup>4</sup>. Gorriti estimates that 52 percent of the deaths are of "presumed terrorists," 41 percent are civilians, 1.6 percent are civil authorities, 0.9 percent are members of Peru's armed forces, and 3.2 percent are members of the police force. By the government's admission, the category "presumed terrorists" includes an unspecified number of innocent civilians.<sup>5</sup> Therefore, the greatest number of victims are civilians, victimized by either the military or the terrorists.

The figures show that in 1989 there was a great increase in terrorist and counter-terrorist violence related to a rapid advance by *Sendero* and MRTA. The increase in violence was related to the explicit campaign by *Sendero* to force the resignation of local authorities and electoral candidates from municipal and national elections. The growth of armed insurgents in the last two years can be associated with the increasingly poor economic climate, the drug trafficking, and the collapse of popularity of the Garcia government.<sup>6</sup> Any attempt to address issues of sustainable production on fragile lands in the above-

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<sup>3</sup> Gorriti, Gustavo, "Democracia, Narcotráfico y la Insurrección de Sendero Luminoso" in Luis Pásara & Jorge Parodi eds. Democracia, Sociedad y Gobierno en el Perú, Lima, Centro de Estudios de Democracia y Sociedad, 1987, pp 193-212.

<sup>4</sup> Information obtained from Washington Office on Latin America.

<sup>5</sup> General Cisneros, a prominent military officer stated on television that "One doesn't know who they are and where they are, since they all have the same characteristics as the people of the sierra. For the police to be successful, they would have to start killing Senderistas and non-Senderistas... They kill 60 people, and at best there are three Senderistas, and of course the police will say that the 60 were Senderistas."

<sup>6</sup> "More than in any other country of Latin America, economic performance is central to maintaining the very precarious social peace in Peru. At issue is not only the possible confrontation between left and right. Far more dangerous is the widening conflict opened by the Maoist Shining Path guerilla... Further deterioration of economic performance with declining per-capita incomes, explosive inflation, and real wage cutting would make Peru ungovernable" Dornbush, Rudiger "Peru on the Brink" Challenge Vol

mentioned departments of the Peruvian Andes must consider and take account of these patterns of now endemic violence.

Military tactics of the GOP in response to guerrilla actions have had mixed effects. The denunciation of military excesses and abuses<sup>7</sup> during the Belaunde government (1979-1985) resulted in a reduction in the number of arbitrary attacks on villagers, but this policy was unsuccessful in containing the spread and advance of guerrillas in the countryside.<sup>8</sup> However, Farnsworth reports, "the security forces have apparently been chafing under the impression that the García administration does not support their efforts in the fight against *Sendero*."<sup>9</sup> Amnesty International in August 1989 again denounced a recurrence of arbitrary human rights abuses perpetrated by a frustrated military establishment.<sup>10</sup>

### Guerrilla Strategy and Community Responses

By studying the patterns of guerrilla attacks in rural areas, it is possible to determine some elements of guerrilla strategy and community response.

#### **Guerrilla Strategy:**

Armed insurgent groups strategically and systematically attack development installations because these are the clearest manifestations of government in the countryside. Terrorists have targeted and

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31, No 6 pp 31-37.

<sup>7</sup> Amnesty International Peru Briefing 1985, Americas Watch 1984.

<sup>8</sup> The mismanaged suppression of a Sendero rebellion in three prisons in Lima led to an unprecedented brutal bombing and killing of a number of prisoners in Lima's prison island of El Fronton and the prison of Lurigancho in June of 1986. This action has spurred reprisals from Senderistas who vowed to kill one member of the ruling party APRA per week.

<sup>9</sup> Farnsworth, Elizabeth, "Peru, a Nation in Crisis", World Policy Journal, Vol V, No. 4, Fall 1988, pp 729.

<sup>10</sup> Amnesty International Report, Peru: Human Rights in a State of Emergency, August 1989. See also Farnsworth; op.cit. pp 725-746.

dynamited electricity pylons and transformers, bridges, roads and railroad connections, milk processing plants, government agencies, newly built irrigation canals, university and private research and extension installations, and agrarian cooperatives. Since 1988, personnel involved in development work also have become the targets of terrorist assassinations. This strategy is very effective, since one single attack provokes the retreat of all other government and NGO development efforts in a region. The only remaining government presence is military. Such a retreat leaves the peasants feeling totally abandoned, reinforcing the tendencies of families to flee from the area.

### **Community Responses to Terrorism:**

When there is heavy out-migration from an area, whole communities fall under the control of terrorist groups and become so called "liberated" areas. Terrorist methods for controlling communities begin with forcing the resignation of their authorities by threatening them with death. Local leadership is then replaced by "committees" created by *Sendero* under the direct command of a Senderista commander. They conduct "exemplary" popular trials against so called "exploiters" followed by their immediate execution. Cattle, goods, and assets from so called "rich" peasants are expropriated and distributed. *Sendero* then implements measures geared to its so-called "war economy." Aimed at depriving the cities of food, peasants are forbidden to grow commercial crops and punished if they try to market their crops. Roads are blockaded, bridges blown up, and truck drivers threatened. All of these measures are unpopular with the local population.

The military response to a "liberated area" worsens the situation, because the army acts as an occupying force. Instead of defending the communities against *Sendero*, the army assumes that there is a degree of *comunero*<sup>11</sup> complicity with *Sendero Luminoso*. Therefore, the army will institute repressive measures against the local population very similar to those organized by the guerrillas<sup>12</sup>.

Studies of communities under military occupation in the Department of Ayacucho present an extremely grim picture of the types of protection the military provides the communities. Initial actions by *Sendero* force the peasants to dismantle all existing Agrarian Reform cooperatives, slaughter cattle, destroy installations, and divide up land into individual plots. Subsequent military intervention then interdicts all access to the highland puna areas, forcing peasants off these areas. As a consequence, access to highland crops and pastures is drastically cut off, and peasants are forced to sell their animals. Cash from the sales of animals is used to buy food, since militarization of the area forces peasants to reduce cultivation to pitifully small, but secure, areas around their houses. Military reorganization of the communities, modelled after Vietnamese fortified villages, displaces the legitimate leadership of the community and subordinates it to arbitrary military commanders, who force the peasants into contributing work days and produce. Those who refuse are branded *Sendero* sympathizers and punished, while those who collaborate with the military will suffer a worse fate if the guerrillas retake the village. The local population is caught in the middle. Each side threatens severe reprisals against those who collaborate with the other side. Intimidation by both sides escalates the violence.

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<sup>11</sup> a member of a Comunidad Campesina.

<sup>12</sup> One of the recurrent complaints is that of arbitrary requisitions by army, police and guerrillas of food, animals and supplies from peasant households.

Between 1981 and 1985, large portions of the rural population fled their villages and relocated to urban centers, primarily to the city of Ayacucho. A concomitant reduction of 60 percent in the surface area planted in agricultural crops resulted in a 52 percent fall in agricultural production.<sup>13</sup> Insufficient local production has created an "import" economy that brings in food from surrounding regions. The food is purchased, in part, with money from government sponsored employment programs. However, these government programs have a greater impact in urban areas than they do in rural areas. Between 1980 and 1985, agricultural production as a percentage of GNP for the Department of Ayacucho fell from 34 percent to 18 percent, while government expenditures increased from 4.3 to 11.6 percent.<sup>14</sup>

Under certain circumstances, however, the communities have successfully rejected incursions of guerrillas in their areas. The community of Chuschi in Ayacucho<sup>15</sup> decided to throw out the Senderistas and to invite the army and police into their community. *Rondas Campesinas* (peasant vigilante groups) and self-defense groups increasingly are defending themselves from *Sendero* incursions. These actions provide the basis for a greater civilian-led response against terrorist activities. Similar responses are occasionally reported in the Peruvian press.<sup>16</sup> They demonstrate that if given support, many communities could be persuaded to begin civil actions to run the terrorists out of their villages. The program proposed here assumes that when circumstances and conditions are right, communities will reach a point where they could make a decision to liberate themselves from terrorist domination. Immediate support for reconstruction of destroyed facilities and assistance in restoration of production is urgently required. This proposal calls for government action that will tip the balance in favor of such an action,

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<sup>13</sup> Perez Liu, Rosario, "Violencia, Migración y Productividad: Cuatro estudios de caso en las comunidades Ayacuchanas" in Eguren, Fernando et. al. eds. *Perú El Problema Agrario en Debate (SEPIA II)*, Lima 1988, pp 383, 515-536.

<sup>14</sup> Mendoza Bellido, Waldo, "La Crisis Agraria en el Departamento de Ayacucho: 1980-1985" in Eguren, Fernando et al., eds., *Perú El Problema Agrario en Debate (SEPIA II)*, Lima 1988, pp 487-8.

<sup>15</sup> Isbell, Billie Jean, "The Emerging Patterns of Social Change in the Andes" M.S. 1988.

<sup>16</sup> For example, in March 1990 peasants in the Huaucayo region ambushed and killed 13 rebels.

providing an incentive for communities to strengthen their own internal organization by undertaking a task that is for the common good, and thereby also strengthening the conditions under which the community organization begins to resist terrorist impositions.

The extent to which terrorist groups, like *Sendero*, achieve total control over a community is questioned. The image of total terrorist domination in communities is contradicted by reports of the development of subtle and underground methods of resistance.<sup>17</sup> Individuals inevitably find ways to contravene strict orders imposed by terrorist commanders. The community members protect each other from discovery, and achieve a certain "modus vivendi" with occupying forces -- government or terrorist -- that gives them greater freedoms. The same 'peasant craftiness' used in coca growing areas to consistently outwit government attempts to control coca growing and processing is applied to contravene orders and commands instituted by occupying guerrilla forces.

Under present conditions, communities are better able to carry on needed development projects than government agencies. Community leaders can carefully evaluate their own situation and request financial help from the government if they are reasonably sure they can carry out the proposed project. Terrorists may find it counter-productive to oppose or destroy local initiatives, since ultimately they need to gain the support of the local peasantry. In contrast, when the government or the army engages in development projects, the terrorists immediately destroy the projects. For example, in the Ayacucho area, terrorists systematically dynamited and destroyed irrigation canals built by the army. Thus, projects initiated at a grass-roots level have a greater chance of success than any other kind of development work in the war-torn rural areas of Peru.

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<sup>17</sup> Scott, James, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday forms of Peasant Resistance, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1985.

### **III. INSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND**

#### **Comunidades Campesinas**

Andean rural communities have a strong tradition of autonomous internal organization. *Comunidades Campesinas* are corporate land-holding units with legal title to large land areas. They have a communal governing body empowered to make and enforce its own decisions. Through communal labor the organization maintains and expands existing infrastructure. Communities also have a strong tradition of defending their communal territory from outside encroachment and will resist outside interference if the means of self-defense are strengthened. Communities have viable organizations that provide the basic structure for development purposes. With adequate financial support, they could become the units best suited to execute needed reconstruction projects.

*Comunidades* have relied on self-help since they were created by the Spanish colonial administration centuries ago. These units, in turn, are based on ancient well-established Inca and Pre-Inca patterns of labor contributions. Even today, membership in a community is contingent on the obligation to contribute work and resources for communal projects.

One of the most important and encouraging trends in the last twenty years is the emergence of the *comunidad* in Peru as a strengthened, grass-roots organization that increasingly challenges and collaborates with government organizations, regional development corporations, and political institutions. In assessing *Comunidades* for development activities, one must bear in mind that they are both "natural" units, resulting from self-governing village organizations, and units possessing official government and legal recognition through special legislation.

According to official sources, in 1980 there were more than 3,000 *Comunidades Campesinas* recognized by the *Dirección de Comunidades Campesinas*, a division of the Ministry of Agriculture (Table 1). From 1980 to 1989 the number of recognized communities grew to almost 4,500, an increase of 46 percent over nine years. Ex-cooperatives and other forms of organization created by the agrarian

reform now are requesting official recognition as *comunidades*. Concentrated mostly in the sierra, the population in community organizations is estimated at 50 percent of the region's rural population.

The territory occupied by *comunidades* is estimated to be 19 million hectares. In the sierra, *comunidades* occupy 15 million hectares, or about 29 percent of the territory of this natural region.<sup>18</sup>

TABLE 1  
*Comunidades Campesinas* in Peru:  
 Number, Population, and Proportion of Population

Department	Number of Communities	Population in Communities	Percentage of Department Population in Communities
Amazonas	47	64,559	33.2
Ancash	193	154,390	21.2
*Apurimac	180	182,932	59.2
Arequipa	180	27,776	5.2
*Ayacucho	312	223,815	48.9
Cajamarca	77	100,000	10.8
Cuzco	565	335,132	46.6
*Huancavelica	231	216,105	65.1
*Huánuco	104	165,604	39.9
Ica	5	6,104	1.7
*Junin	330	392,848	56.3
La Libertad	25	47,986	6.1
Lambayeque	16	138,244	26.8
*Lima	266	156,403	4.1*
Moquegua	40	13,174	17.6
*Pasco	48	95,877	54.3
Piura	45	228,258	26.7
*Puno	460	184,450	23.7
Tacna	32	11,569	12.1
Totals	3,030	2,745,310	20.2

\* Indicates a Department heavily threatened by *Sendero Luminoso* activities.

\*\* Includes the population of metropolitan Lima and Callao

Source: *Comunidades Campesinas del Peru: Información Básica*, Ministerio de Agricultura, Dirección de Comunidades Campesinas y Nativas, 1980.

<sup>18</sup> *Comunidades Campesinas del Perú: Situación y Problemática 1978.*

Table 1 reveals that the rural areas most threatened by *Sendero Luminoso* also are the areas where communities are the prevalent form of rural organization. Because peasant communities occupy isolated, the highland areas where the Senderistas can move with relative impunity, they are most vulnerable to terrorist actions. But it also is likely that peasant communities will initiate the actions to expel the Senderistas. This proposal thus calls for a stronger and immediate response by the GOP to support and strengthen these communities.

There are precedents for successful government help to communities. In 1963 the first administration of President Fernando Belaunde created a state organization called *Cooperación Popular*, which provided technical know-how, financial support, earth-moving equipment, and materials to local villages and communities to organize public works projects with communal labor. The program was immensely popular. Over time, however, *Cooperación Popular* became a contested, corrupted, lethargic, and underfunded government bureaucracy. The García Administration closed it down because other mechanisms of providing financial and technical help to local projects, such as the *Corporaciones Departamentales de Desarrollo* (CORDES) have overshadowed the old *Cooperación Popular*. The CORDES, however, are bureaucracies that are heavily linked to party loyalties, graft, and corruption. Thus a need exists to change the process of funding local projects and minimize bureaucratic complications.

### **Rural Development Under the García Administration**

The government of Alan García attempted several new measures to help the *Comunidades Campesinas*. A brief review of recent policies helps set the context for the proposed policy in this paper, which is designed to revitalize central government support for the threatened and needy rural areas Peru.

### **Micro-regional Rural Development Projects:**

Established in 1985 at the inception of the García administration, micro-regional development programs were designed to provide planning, investment, and program execution capabilities in well defined small regions at the provincial and district levels. By 1987, the government had implemented programs in 52 micro-regions. Although subordinated to CORDES, the law creating the micro-regions provided for relative fiscal and executive autonomy and mandated civilian participation in decision-making. Yet the program is hampered by a complex web of competing government bureaucracies at different hierarchical levels. The program is burdened by the skimming of funds, administrative charges, graft, politically motivated priorities, and initiative responsive to only short-term political benefits. An evaluation of the micro-regional program concludes that only 30 percent of the funds really reach the local level, that technocratic priorities prevail over local opinions, and that the construction companies, looking for lucrative government contracts, often "spread cement" all over the countryside, creating white elephants in the name of development".<sup>19</sup> Terrorist attacks on micro-regional projects (such as blowing up government pick-up trucks) demonstrate the inherent vulnerability of the program. Furthermore, fiscal shortages have virtually killed the program in the last two years resulting in negligible impact.

### **Rimanakuy Program:**

In contrast to the top-down approach of micro-regional development program, the Rimanakuy program was a bottom-up approach. Though not lacking in demagogic manipulation, the program nevertheless had considerable success. In 1986, President García personally held direct meetings with presidents of the communities in Piura, Huancayo, Cuzco, Puno, and Madre de Dios

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<sup>19</sup> Rojas, Telmo, "Límites y Posibilidades del Desarrollo Micro Regional" in Eguren, Fernando *et al.*, eds., *Perú El Problema Agrario en Debate (SEPIA II)*, Lima 1988, pp 383-411.

(capital cities of different regions of the country). The intent was to permit the presidents of each community to participate in direct dialogue with him. The program was named Rimanakuy (a Quechua word meaning "to talk to each other"). The meetings were structured around problematic themes, such as resources, production, land tenure, organization, credit, basic services, and critical problems. The President then listened to the conclusions and recommendations of each working group. More importantly, each community was given a check of approximately \$5,000.

An assessment of how the communities used the money is encouraging. A study by COINCIDE<sup>20</sup> determined that over 60 percent of the money was invested in productive activities and 26 percent was spent on needed social service work. These results indicate the capacity and degree of maturity that communities can demonstrate when using scarce financial resources for their own benefit. The results of this program contradict the paternalistic assumption that peasants are incapable of managing their own affairs or determining their own priorities.

The COINCIDE study also cited some community shortcomings and difficulties. Some comunidades were slow in developing coherent plans. The community delay in determining how to utilize the funds is partly explained by the total surprise with which the program was implemented, the communities' lack of experience, the undefined political liabilities, and the uncertainty about whether the funds would have to be returned at a future date. The COINCIDE study also found that those communities who could count on external advice through NGOs or other government organizations often had more coherent plans than those who did not, although many initiatives came from local leaders and all initiatives were ultimately approved by the general assembly of each community.<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> COINCIDE "Cómo utilizan las comunidades campesinas del Cusco el fondo de apoyo al desarrollo comunal?" in Eguren, Fernando *et al.* eds. Perú El Problema Agrario en Debate (SEPIA II) , Lima 1988, pp 373-382.

<sup>21</sup> The Rimanakuy Program had less success with the Indian communities of the tropical forest region organized by previous governments and known as comunidades nativas. A different strategy, not covered in this paper, will be required to deal with these communities.

The shortcomings of the Rimanakuy program can be corrected by providing clear messages about the nature of the program, its duration, and conditions. Communities should be required to request funds through a simple and standardized proposal process. The proposal process would encourage community planning to precede the funding phase.

Future programs based on these simple ideas must recognize the significant differences among communities in the highlands. Some communities are large, established villages with a strong tradition of local leadership and internal organization. Others may be newly established, or isolated and inexperienced groups, requiring more technical support. For example, the communities on the western slopes of the Andes are dependent on maintaining ancient irrigation systems and therefore have stronger internal organizations than dry-land agricultural communities in the inter-montane areas<sup>22</sup>. By providing opportunities to use the funds in many different ways, each community is allowed to design a program that is appropriate to its own needs and capabilities. If it becomes a continuous program, each community can learn from its own experience.

The lessons learned from the Rimanakuy program demonstrate that small grants are an effective catalyst for revitalizing community organizations. The experiences also demonstrate that communities have clear priorities and are generally effective in implementing them. The Rimanakuy program also provided a more effective distribution of government funds by making them available to each community with a minimum of red tape and preferential conditions. Only 8 percent of the funds were mismanaged,<sup>23</sup> in contrast to the 70 percent of funds illegally diverted under the micro-regional development program.

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<sup>22</sup> See Fonseca, Cesar & Enrique Mayer, "Comunidad y Producción en la Agricultura Andina," FOMC:ENCIAS, Lima 1988, and Mayer, Enrique & Marisol de la Cadena, "Cooperación y Conflicto en la Comunidad Andina," Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, Lima, 1989.

<sup>23</sup> COINCIDE, op. cit. pg 377.

Like other programs of Alan García's administration, even the funds for the fairly effective Rimanakuy program were in jeopardy by 1988. Table 2 shows the amounts distributed over a five year period.

TABLE 2  
Funds Distributed through  
Fondo Nacional de Desarrollo Comunal (FONDEC)

<u>Year</u>	<u># of Communities</u>	<u>Amount in Million Intis</u>	<u>US\$ Equivalent (millions)**</u>
1985	231	10.9	0.86
1986	4,165	280.0	15.66
1987	4,851	500.0	11.95
1988*	5,158	1,475.2	4.56
1989*	5,158	1.5	0.0005

\* In '88 I./ 2,212,9000 were budgeted but only 66% of the funds were actually made available for distribution. For 1989, I./ 5.9 million were budgeted but by July '89 only 1.5 million Intis (\$US 500) had been authorized for expenditure.  
\*\* Free Market Dollar

Other funds were also made available to communities and to individual peasants during the "good" years of 1985 to 1987, including "soft" credits, reduced and "0 percent" interest loans, subsidized fertilizers, and guaranteed prices for agricultural production. In general, conditions improved for the rural population.<sup>24</sup> But the fiscal crisis and the severe readjustment programs repeatedly implemented since September 1988 have rapidly dissipated the small gains made during those years.

#### Legislative and Institutional Changes:

In 1976, with the overthrow of the Velazco government, the Dirección de *Comunidades Campesinas*, which was responsible for *Comunidades* programs, was left to decay. At that time, all government agencies were put under the umbrella organization of SINAMOS (Sistema Nacional de

<sup>24</sup> See Figueroa, Adolfo and Raul Hopkins "La Política Agraria del APRA en Perspectiva" in Eguren, Fernando et al., eds., *Perú El Problema Agrario en Debate (SEPIA II)*, Lima 1988, pp 303-344.

Movilización Social). Velazco's successor, Morales Bermudez, proceeded to dismantle SINAMOS, reassigning tasks according to functional specializations within the different ministries, and eliminated the one organization that could coordinate campesino affairs. The second Belaunde administration (1980 - 1984) was even less concerned with campesino matters and pursued a policy of benign neglect.

The García administration inherited a situation where many government agencies dealt directly with the peasant communities. The overlapping jurisdictions caused many agencies to work at cross-purposes or undermine each other. The need for some sort of coordinating mechanism capable of designing and directing long-term policies was apparent.

Recent legislation attempted to redress the situation and began to set up the institutional mechanisms for the GOP to respond to community needs. On April 13, 1987, the GOP promulgated the Ley General de *Comunidades Campesinas*. No such legislation had existed before, other than pre-existing Constitutional guarantees that recognize their existence, autonomy, and inalienability of their common lands.

The new law declares that the development of *Comunidades* is a national necessity and recognizes them as fundamentally democratic, autonomous institutions. The law makes a small concession towards Andean Indian cultural roots by recognizing the validity of customary law by which the *Comunidades* govern themselves. The new law also declares that the defense of ecological equilibrium and rational use of the community natural resources is one of the fundamental principles that is to regulate the community's institutional life. The law defines *Comunidades* as public interest organizations with legal and corporate existence and recognizes that lands are held in common property.

*Comunidades* are charged with formulating, executing, and supervising their own development plans. The *Comunidades* are empowered to regulate access to land and land-use within their territories; authorized to sign contracts and agreements with government and private organizations; and charged to create communal enterprises. The law also defines who is a member of the *comunidad*, and specifies the obligations and rights of members. The law provides for a clear administrative organization and re-names the communal authority system. The new administration of *Comunidades* is now under the command of a Directiva Comunal (Community Executive Board) with a president, vice president, four members, and special purpose committees that report to the Directiva Comunal to be created as needed. The general assembly acts as the "supreme organ of the community" and a deliberative body. The community is empowered and encouraged to develop its own *reglamento interno* (by-laws).

#### Opportunities to Improve the New *Comunidades* Law

In substance the new law does not greatly change pre-existing community structures, but it does give the *Comunidades* greater legitimacy than previous administrative statutes. It is a significant start in permitting *Comunidades* to implement programs. However, the law can be criticized for its tendency to create organizations modelled after western business organizations with detailed rules that stress procedure over substance. What the law seems to miss is that *Comunidades* are, in essence, villages made up of people and families, not modelled after corporations. The lack of attention to culturally appropriate mechanisms of judicial administration in rural areas may create problems in the future. The mechanisms of conflict resolution for administering quick justice are not well defined in this new law<sup>25</sup>.

Certain other problems stand out. Women are disenfranchised unless they are heads of households. The rights and obligations of migrating (temporary or permanent) community members are vague and

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<sup>25</sup> A fact that the terrorists have capitalized on very rapidly. When they enter a village they institute "juicios populares," trying known cattle thieves, exploiters, corrupt officials and executing them.

undefined. Certain provisions are unenforceable because of the imprecise language of the law. For example, Article 11 states that "the monopolization of land is forbidden." It is hoped that as experiences in administering the law are accumulated, the state or parliament will be able to introduce modifications and corrections in the law. Part of this proposal calls for an institutional strengthening grant that would enable the appropriate agencies of the GOP to modify and correct these problems.

### Administration of *Comunidades* Programs

The state apparatus charged with the administration, control, and promotion of *Comunidades* has been legislated but not properly implemented. The *Instituto Nacional de Desarrollo de Comunidades Campesinas* (INDEC) is the autonomous public organization, under the Ministry of the Presidency, in charge of formulating a national policy and development plans for *Comunidades*, coordinating with other government and private agencies, suggesting pertinent legislation, administering funds, and maintaining the registry of officially recognized *Comunidades*. INDEC's advisory commission is to be composed of one representative of each of the following government organizations: Ministry of the Presidency, Ministry of Agriculture, National Institute of Planning, the Instituto Indigenista Peruano,<sup>26</sup> and four representatives directly elected from the *Comunidades*. However, comunero representation is only token participation since it can easily be outvoted, nor are the mechanisms of comunero appointment to this board spelled out.

INDEC is to administer the FONDEC (Fondo de Desarrollo Comunal), which was born out of the Rimanakuy program. It has achieved one important administrative victory: there is a line item in the national budget for FONDEC.

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<sup>26</sup> The Instituto Indigenista Peruano was created in 1946 as the national counterpart of the Instituto Indigenista Interamericano as a government branch dedicated to research and development of projects to benefit Indian populations of the country. In 1969, personnel were absorbed by SINAMOS and the Instituto was abolished. In 1981, under the second Belaunde administration, the Instituto was re-instated and placed within the Labor ministry. It currently has 28 employees, but virtually no budget.

The absence of INDEC at the Departmental or Provincial levels where all the communities are located severely hinders its ability to carry out its mandate. An official described INDEC as an organ with a head but no feet. The relationship of the law of *Comunidades* to other government plans of de-centralization and regional autonomy is unclear. Regional governments are to create their own offices that deal directly with *Comunidades*, but since no regional government has yet been implemented, INDEC has no jurisdiction over local *Comunidades*, or the provincial or departmental agencies that currently manage affairs of the communities.

The old offices of the *Dirección de Comunidades Campesinas* within the Division of Agrarian Reform in the Ministry of Agriculture, have been restricted to deal exclusively with land and boundary disputes between communities and other land-owning enterprises. Thus, as of July 1989, when *Sendero* forced the resignation of communal authorities, there was no national organization clearly in charge of supervising the elections of community presidents, of legitimating community authorities, or maintaining a current national registry of the existing communities.


Although INDEC has been transferred from the Ministry of Agriculture to the Ministry of the Presidency, as of July 1989 it still functioned in one borrowed room at the old offices of the Ministry of Agriculture in Lima. INDEC's president had a dual appointment in another ministry and had not yet properly assumed his post at INDEC. The four community representatives had been nominated following Peru's ancient tradition of "dedocracia" (democracy by hand-picking).

### Strengthening the INDEC

Clearly, although some important steps towards institutionalizing a new relationship between *Comunidades* and the government have been taken by these new laws and new agencies, they now need urgently to be implemented and refined. At present, INDEC has no resources, nor the capacity to create and implement any kind of short or long-range policy. It has no capability to monitor its programs nor

DIAGRAM 1

**Organization of the Instituto de Comunidades Campesinas  
Ministry of the Presidency  
(Government of Peru)**



any means to coordinate with other branches of the GOP, or incorporate any kind of anti-terrorist plan, policy, or organization.

In conclusion, although the current situation continues to be chaotic, the García administration has begun the first steps in creating a government organization that could be more responsive to Peru's poorest population.

The GOP still needs to determine how INDEC is to relate to the more autonomous regional governments, to its own *Comunidades*, and how inter-sectorial cooperation can be achieved. A carefully planned bilateral or multinational assistance program that includes a hefty institutional strengthening component will provide incentives for re-establishing a more healthy relationship between the local peasant communities and their regional and national governments.

In July of 1990 a new administration will be inaugurated in Peru. It too will have to face the problems of armed insurgency, development efforts, economic crisis, and bureaucratic complexities inherited from the García administration. It is recommended that the donor community carefully evaluate the potential political, social and economic impacts that a strengthening of INDEC and generous funding for FONDEC would have on the *Comunidades Campesinas* of Peru and their potential to reject and expel the armed insurgents from their midst.

#### **IV. THE PROPOSAL AND JUSTIFICATIONS**

As stated in earlier, the proposal has two components:

- a strengthening grant for INDEC (Instituto Nacional de Desarrollo de *Comunidades Campesinas*) of \$5 million, and
- development funds for rural community projects (\$100 million) to be distributed over four years, in small amounts (\$5,000), directly to communities. Availability of funds after the first year would be dependent on evaluation of performance. Communities would be responsible for contracting for technical assistance.

#### **Justification for Proposal**

##### **1) Need.**

Communities desperately need to receive development funds to rebuild destroyed and decaying infrastructure and services.<sup>27</sup> Basic services like potable water, school buildings, and communal stores are still nonexistent or in a poor state of repair. Communities need funds to implement simple improvements of their productive systems, such as anti-erosion measures, the capacity to purchase and reproduce improved seed, to fence communal grazing pastures to reduce overgrazing, to provide for communal infrastructure, or to take care of animal health problems. As the result of the Rimanakuy development program several communities developed a long list of needs and priorities which await implementation. The crucial limitation is the lack of funds to begin working towards the solution of these problems.

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<sup>27</sup> Mayer, Enrique, "Steps towards a Coherent Policy for Andean Peasant Agriculture" DESFIL and DAI, Washington, D.C.1989.

## **2) Greater Efficiency.**

Communities can better decide what problems are priorities, what approaches are feasible, and how a project should be implemented than any external agency. The situation in communities is so varied and so differentiated that no external agency can ever approximate the real local conditions or ascertain the appropriate solutions to a particular context. The proposed policy provides the means to solve problems, without imposing any model or priority. The cumulative effect of aggregate demand for services from communities will expose what the greatest needs are and permit adequate responses. If, for example, most communities begin to seek agronomists to help with their agricultural production, then the increased effective demand for their services will require a shift in their supply through relocation and training. Though initially funded through the state, it will be the market mechanisms that allocate these services in the regions according to demand.

An added political advantage to any GOP administration is that the proposal will remove middle class pressures from technicians to secure government employment, by opening alternative avenues for their services. Forcing the technicians to compete in the open market for clients will improve the effectiveness of their services. In the long run, when communities develop sufficient capacity and funds, technical assistance provided through consulting models based on need is a more effective method of technological transfer than the current system of government extension services.

## **3) Learning Experience.**

An important transformation envisioned in this proposal is to convert the communities from subjects to actors in the development process. Previous development programs have been imposed from above, reducing the local communities to a passive role to accept, reject or resist the development proposal. The proposed policy will give communities a means to promote their own programs, and will provide

opportunities to develop capacity to mobilize community consensus, enthusiasm, resources, and develop administrative know-how needed to build strong communities.

Unlike government sponsored programs, the mistakes and problems arising from the administration of funds have the capacity for self-correction and change. Moreover, if there are losses and mismanagement, the mistakes will only cost \$5,000 and the local community is responsible, not the government. Errors in devising appropriate plans thus do not erode the credibility of the government and consequently have less negative political impact for any GOP administration.

#### **4) Reducing External Dependency.**

A survey of peasant perceptions of development programs, recently conducted in the Department of Cuzco, reveals opinions permeated by an extreme attitude of dependency. The research shows people clearly aware of their problems, but expecting the problems to be resolved by external agents, either the government, local municipalities, or NGOs. In addition, all the peasants interviewed expressed a great dependency. Even as they expect the state to provide solutions to their problems, they are acutely aware of the way the state institutions have abandoned them. When they speak of the state, it is only to complain of its lack of support, the poor quality of its services, the discriminatory and condescending treatment of *comuneros*, and the inefficiency with which the state responds to their insistent pleas.<sup>28</sup>

Great strides can be made towards reducing these attitudes of defeatism and dependency by providing the financial means to implement community projects and empowering the community leadership to purchase their own technical assistance rather than beg, cajole, or fruitlessly await government assistance.

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<sup>28</sup> Hopkins, Raul, "La opinion de los Campesinos sobre la Política Agraria" Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, M.S., Lima, June 1989.

### **5) Strengthening the Community**

By providing the community leadership with two of the most scarce resources, funds and the capacity to purchase technical assistance, the most severe bottlenecks to development can be overcome. Dynamism, enthusiasm, and self-confidence can be encouraged within the community. The benefits of self-help to resolve their own problems are so obvious that they do not need to be reiterated here, though it is important to remember that nothing breeds success as much as success. Incentives to assume leadership positions will arise, and, opportunities for peasant initiatives to resist and expel terrorist incursions will be created. Peasant reaction to a terrorist attack on a community sponsored irrigation canal likely would be stronger than the reaction to an attack on one built by the government. Negative community reaction could inhibit terrorist attempts to destroy community efforts to rebuild destroyed bridges and buildings. Moreover, the community can better safeguard and protect its own projects than outside agents, reducing the loss of innocent civilian life from military reprisals and occupations.

### **6) Reducing Government Inefficiency in Administering Development Programs.**

This proposal changes the role of the state as an agent of development. It shifts its role from implementer to financier. As a consequence, much of the responsibility of success is placed in the hands of the actors themselves. Market mechanisms in allocating services are an improvement over the cumbersome planning and programming process currently utilized throughout Latin America. Much of the bureaucracy can be eliminated or redesigned.

This shift does not, however, imply the abdication of state development institutions, nor of NGOs. Their new role requires greater efficiency in detecting needs and anticipating demand. It requires careful monitoring and evaluation, and a judicious use of available funds in order to direct the development process towards national goals. An effective INDEC will oversee and direct the conversion of direct donations to a development loan system; it will coordinate efforts with other government and private

institutions, and develop methods of reinforcing successes. It also should assist communities that have failed to develop their own coherent programs.

**7) An Incentive to Create a Civilian-Based Response to Peru's Current Climate of Violence.**

The present social and political climate of Peru is one of violence and destruction. The personal role-models available to young people are those provided by the romantic image of the masked Senderista, ideologically convinced of the justice of his cause, or that of a Rambo-like soldier combating fanaticism and restoring order and civilization in society. Fewer and fewer avenues for action are open to the great majority who reject either model. Many intellectuals seek to leave the country in the same way that young men and women flee their terrorist and military-dominated communities, only to seek refuge in city slums. This proposal provides the opportunity for non-military external assistance to assist the civilian society and the GOP to reject violent models of social change.

**Response from Terrorist Organizations**

Government development projects are extremely vulnerable to terrorist destruction. By shifting the responsibility and oversight of development projects from the government to the local citizens the insurgent groups will have to rethink their strategies. Three kinds of responses by terrorist groups are envisioned:

First, terrorists can prohibit local community leaders from participating in the program. But such action will expose them, since abstention from participation will clearly indicate which areas are under terrorist domination.

Second, the terrorists can attempt to co-opt the program. They can permit community leaders to apply for funds and initiate programs. Under these circumstances, however, the terrorists will be undermining their own legitimacy. By admitting the validity of the program, they are undermining the

logic of their opposition to the government and thus weakening the ideological grip the group has on its members. Moreover, if they let community leadership grow and expand, they reduce their own control. One result could be the defection of Senderistas to community development work.

Third, terrorists might first permit the program to proceed in the communities they control and later destroy the effort. This strategy would be motivated by the argument that it is necessary to sharpen the contradictions in the system in order to expose the fickleness of the government. If the program is a failure, the terrorists might succeed, but if the terrorists destroy a project that benefits the community they will be exposed as an anti-peasant organization.

Each terrorist reaction strategy has negative consequences for terrorist organizations. Ultimately, they undermine the relationship they seek to build with the peasant communities.

### **Implementation of Proposal**

The ideas outlined here require proper implementation and it is suggested that the USAID office in Peru explore their feasibility. If acceptable, USAID could assign personnel to develop a project with Peruvian counterparts to support INDEC with an institutional strengthening grant. The main focus would be careful consideration of the administration, development, and distribution of FONDEC funds to local communities. Bilateral and multilateral consultation is recommended in developing the major funding proposal for INDEC and FONDEC.

### **CONCLUSIONS**

Guerrilla warfare is very difficult to defeat by conventional military action. Purely military responses to guerrilla insurgency tend to provoke peasant resistance, sympathies for the rebels, and reaction against occupying forces. The significant advantage guerrillas possess -- the ability to move "like fish" among the local population -- can only be overcome if the local population denies the guerrillas free

movement and expels them from their midst. This proposal provides the GOP with a simple but effective method of building civilian resistance against terrorism in the rural areas of Peru through community self-help projects.

## LIST OF ACRONYMS

CORDES	<i>Corporaciones Departamentales de Desarrollo</i>
DAI	Development Alternatives, Inc.
DEFIL	Development Strategies for Fragile Lands
FODERUMA	<i>Fondo de Desarrollo Rural para Poblaciones Marginales</i>
FONDEC	<i>Fondo de Desarrollo Comunal</i>
GOP	Government of Peru
INDEC	<i>Instituto Nacional de Desarrollo de Comunidades Campesinas</i>
MRTA	<i>Movimiento Tupac Amaru</i>
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organizations
PUM	<i>Partido Unificado Mariateguista</i>
SINAMOS	<i>Sistema Nacional de Movilización Social</i>
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development

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