ISN 71851
PN ABI110

301.3072
F514

INTEGRATING POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT PLANNING

Notes on Some Possible Models

By

Oliver D. Finnigan

4030 Union Bay Circle

Seattle, Washington 98105

July 1974

Prepared for SEADAG Population Panel,

Bali, Indonesia, August 12-14, 1974

Integrating Population and Development Planning:...

301.3072 Finnigan, Oliver D.
F514 Integrating Population and Development Planning: Notes on Some Possible Models. July 1974.
62 p.
Bibliography: p. 54-56.
Prepared for the SEADAG Population Panel Seminar, Bali, Indonesia, August 12-14, 1974.
Not for quotation.

1.Population - Research. 2. Models - Development planning. 3. Development pl ing. 4. Social science research. 5. Family planning I. Title.

Center
Room 1656 HS

Introduction:

A distinguished colleague, Dr. Ashok Mitra, has often been heard to state that there are several prerequisites to continued and sustained fertility decline which include the following:

1) Sufficient jobs to insure that everyone who wants to work may find secure employment for his or her full working life;
2) Adequate educational facilities and programs to guarantee that every citizen will be able to function within the technical demands of the society;
3) Convenient and low cost health and medical care which will help to guarantee that children will survive to adulthood;
4) Some means such as a social welfare program to insure that those who have not succeeded in saving for their old age or for premature exit from the labor force will be taken care of by society and will not have to fall back on their children for support. (Mitra, discussion)

Dr. Mitra's views are echoed by many others who have studied the interrelationship between development and population growth.

It goes without saying that the achievement of Dr. Mitra's ideal society will take a good deal of time and effort. To the extent that reduced fertility can aid in the achievement of these social and economic goals, it should be encouraged to precede, or to be closely linked to the several development activities listed above. In any case, the development process will be gradual, and we should not imagine that it will have to be finished before fertility decline can begin to take place.

Any program which could tie these two aspects of development more closely together would seem to be useful, particularly so if a community can develop sufficient faith in the future that they can act on their development plans and begin to reduce fertility even before those development plans fully mature.

This paper therefore offers the bare bones of a plan by which the complementary processes of fertility decline and economic development might be promoted simultaneously. Because I have worked only in health and family planning programs I must apologize to readers if this proposal has already been advanced repeatedly in the literature of community development. To many of us in family planning it seems a natural outgrowth of a number of recent findings and social experiments including what we know about why people do or do not accept contraception or adopt a small family "norm".

This paper is divided into two sections. First, I briefly review some of the recent trends which seem to call for a close integration of population and developmental activities. I hope also to show that there is some logic in making the proposals put forth in Part II.

In the second portion of the paper, I will present three models by which the complementary processes of economic development and social change might be brought closer together, with some special emphasis upon the area of fertility reduction.

Finally, as an appendix, I present an experimental program which could be tested in an LDC or several LDC's.

These ideas are largely a result of discussion with my colleagues in this field and I am particularly indebted to Mr. Lenni Kangas for much of this thinking. However, all faults and inaccuracies are mine and I take full responsibility for the naivité with which I approach this task of drawing together materials from a number of disciplines.

PART I

What Recent History Shows Us:

Our present predicament seems to be the result of the convergence of a number of historical trends. Fortunately, a way out of this predicament may be evolving. I will briefly list some of the most important factors in this formula. Readers who demand more depth may refer to the Bibliography since space requirements preclude the presentation of all of the data.

1. Some economists have repeatedly told us to beware of overconfidence with regard to the power of family planning to curb fertility. They have pointed out that, historically, development has virtually always preceded fertility decline. Other economists have posited that some fertility decline could precede development, or might be closely tied to it. None seem to have suggested that fertility decline to replacement levels could take place in the absence of economic and social development. Even so, development planners have often transferred to the medical and health community full responsibility for reducing fertility; and when fertility reduction goals are not met, it is quite often a physician who is called on the carpet. Family planners are beginning to question whether they should have so eagerly accepted the responsibility for fertility reduction, and are beginning to seek ways to place the burden of proof back on development planners without appearing to have "failed" to carry out their obligations.

2. We have participated in the development of family planning service delivery programs which now offer supplies and services to virtually all citizens in some countries. The achievement of these programs has been substantial and much credit must be given to the pioneers who brought contraception to the village. However, it has

repeatedly noted by these program leaders that at best all they can do is help reduce birth rates to a level where couples are having the number of children that meet their needs. Since these needs seem to average out at or above the four child family, many programs have begun to plateau once all of the "easy adopters" have come in.

3. In some parts of South and Southeast Asia, economic development programs have failed to meet the needs of village people sufficiently to permit them the "luxury" of having fewer than four children. Children are still, too often, a poor man's capital and his only hope for the future. They provide a low cost source of farm labor and an "insurance policy" for old age. The lack of adequate health and medical care means that each family must "invest in" one or two extra children to make up for those who will die. The failure of educational efforts to keep up with the growing numbers of school-aged children, and the lack of jobs for those who do obtain education, illustrate to the villager the need to have many children in order that, through perseverence and luck, one may succeed in obtaining education and good employment, will remain filial, and will take care of his or her parents and siblings.

4. At the Second Asian Population Conference a call was issued for "intensive and innovative action to solve the urgent population problems of the ECAFE region." Repeated reference was made to the need to find ways of integrating population planning with other development activities, particularly "education, health, housing, social security, employment and agriculture (which) have an impact on population and, therefore, require integrated national planning and co-ordinated action at the highest government level." Also, it was declared that "the widespread benefits of economic growth should be ensured through

policies and programmes to bring about a more equitable distribution of opportunity and income, with particular attention being paid to health and nutrition programmes to reduce infant and maternal mortality, programmes to achieve full and productive employment, action to reduce excessive rates of migration to the larger cities, measures to improve the status of women, and appropriate social security measures." Thus, it is obviously recognized that integration of population and development planning activities is necessary, and the call is out to discover means to bring about such integration. (Summary and Conclusions, Second Asian Population Conference, November 1972.)

5. Of course, one of the reasons that family planning programs have not been well integrated in overall development planning in the past has been the fact that reducing fertility and bringing about economic development have been seen by many as separate processes. Now that they are being regarded as two sides of the same coin, it is the responsibility of "population people" to learn all that they can about development and vice versa. At the same time, the many social scientists active in the family planning movement may have gained insights and expertise which could be of great value to development planners. Recent field experiments with incentives and disincentives, experience with changing roles of women and youth, and other social research and guided change programs of family planners may help development planners to see beyond economic change and into the realm of total change - cultural, social, and economic.

It is suggested that this process should be synergistic. In other words, the total should be more than equal to the sum of the two contributions. This can only occur if an interchange of some

breadth and depth takes place between these two groups of well-intentioned people.

The following notes, then, are my own first attempt to understand what has been happening in the broader arena of social and economic change; and it is with a good deal of trepidation that I attempt to draw some conclusions and construct some descriptive and non-quantitative models of how I feel these two areas might begin to be brought [illegible]

6. One of the primary reasons for the failure of development programs seems to be that they are "top heavy" and that they rely on development "trickling down" to the local level. In effect, villagers are often disenfranchised as regards their own development. Rather than asking people what they want and then helping them to achieve their wants and needs, development planners decide what the people need, and set out to convince them that they want it. This is an internal version of what is called "economic imperialism" if practiced between countries. It is no wonder that villagers become disenchanted with development when it often seems to be meeting the needs of central planners rather than the needs of the people.

Even where some substantial economic gains have come about, they have not necessarily increased the peasant's feeling of control over his own destiny. Instead, they may increase the feeling of powerlessness and the villager may feel (rightly so in some cases) that the same benevolent and powerful government which "gave him" his new life may just as easily take it away. (See, for instance, Frank Cancian, Change and Uncertainty in a Peasant Economy, 1971, Stanford U. Press)

Because most development projects imposed from above are not coordinated well with one another, there may be no consistent

picture of comprehensive change presented to the villager. He sees only a piecemeal patchwork of projects which either fail or succeed based on their national level leadership and funding, the agents they employ, the vigor with which they are pursued, and (to a far lesser extent) their relevance to local needs.

According to Kurt Lewin, "Man must participate in his own re-education if he is to be re-educated at all. And re-education is a normative change as well as a cognitive and perceptual change. These convictions led Lewin to emphasize action research as a strategy of changing, and participation in groups as a medium of re-education." (Chin and Benne in Zaltman, Kotler, and Kaufman, p. 242.)

Garth N. Jones has identified four categories of strategies and tactics which could be employed by an agent of change: coercive (including pressure and stress induction), normative (participation by clients and education/training), utilitarian (placement of trustworthy persons or trusted assurances and use of empirical proofs), and others (action research, changes in the traditional structure of systems, and use of marginal persons). His analysis, and others indicate that, among other tactics, participatory democracy and the involvement of community personnel in policy making can lead to positive changes. (Jones, pp. 254-265 in Zaltman, et al.; see also Bennis, Benne and Chin)

There are a growing number of studies which have shown that if villagers are given sufficient opportunity and are encouraged to deal with their own social and structural problems, at the same time that they are helped to organize and manage their own economic development, they can resolve both social and economic spheres satisfactorily.

This has certainly been true in a number of American Indian communities where, after decades of stagnation under the paternalistic guidance of government officials, the management of tribal affairs has been turned over to the people.

Similar studies have been performed in Latin America where haciendas have been gradually turned over to the peasantry under controlled conditions. In both the American Indian and Latin American examples, local management has often led to noteworthy success in the realm of technological change, economic reorganization, and social and cultural structures and patterns.

Mahmood Mamdani has recently shown us most vividly how any development program which ignores the perspective of the recipients is destined to failure. He contrasts the frames of reference of the foreign and urban change agents in an Indian village with those of the populace and finds some of the reasons why a seemingly successful family planning program actually was failing. (For complete discussion see works by Steiner, Fowler, Dobyns, Nuñez and Mamdani in references.)

7. In the developed countries a good deal of work has gone into the formulation of theories of social and behavioral change. Operant research has moved out of the laboratory and into field settings. With reference to social and economic change, the behavioral model of man is concerned with shaping and maintaining new behavioral patterns which reduce the importance of internal (psychological) characteristics and stress alterations in the social and economic structure as the prerequisites for economic development. Operant theorists contend that "selected elements of the societal environment are amenable to change today, thereby making possible the shaping of behavior patterns necessary for economic development. Such procedures involve diffi-

culties, but these are due in large part to the small amount of control which can presently be exerted over the relevant aspects of the societal environment. Since usually only a few aspects of the societal environment can be altered, present efforts to create behavioral prerequisites must begin on a small scale." (Kunkel, pp. 257-277.)

B. F. Skinner contends that "the trouble with both affluent and welfare societies is that reinforcers are not contingent on particular forms of behavior. Men are not reinforced for doing anything, and hence, they do nothing." He further asserts that "The experimental analysis of behavior has a very special relevance to the design of cultures. Only through the active prosecution of such an analysis, and the courageous application of its results to daily life, will it be possible to design contingencies of reinforcement that will generate and maintain the most subtle and complex behavior of which men are capable." (Skinner, pp. 159-66.)

These theorists and experimentors stress the need for thorough understanding of the social and economic context in which behavioral outcomes take place, including the necessity to bring about environmental changes which will support and continually reinforce new behaviors. Of course, the best reinforcers of change would be those which could meet the self-defined wants and needs of the person who is changing. By building these self-defined or community selected reinforcers into feedback mechanisms which operate shortly after or at the same time that the new behavior takes place, a strong, positive momentum of change might be feasible. (See also Burgess and Bushell for selected readings in this area.)

8. In his book, Beyond the Welfare State, Gunnar Myrdal says that there seem to be two main reasons why Western man is generally

satisfied to be "living and working in the regulated national communities of the Western world." First, they do not notice the controls on their lives because of the gradualism with which they are introduced. "But partly, and I believe more significantly, the explanation of people's satisfaction with what has happened is that regulations in the Welfare State are not pressed upon them from above, by a state dictatorship. They are felt to be the outcome of a social process, in the steering of which people are themselves participating. Also, these regulations - - - increase opportunities (for the masses), open roads that were closed before - - - and secure them against risks that in earlier times were disastrous for the individual and his family." He notes that rules can be changed by "a process where nobody is without a voice", and lauds "the fact that so many public policies are actually taking shape within the authorities for provincial and local state governments", and that "an increasingly large portion of the adult population is participating in government through membership on various municipal boards and councils."

Myrdal further states that when local participation in planning is negligible, "we should expect people to be more apt to feel that the regulations are imposed upon them from above and that they are being pushed around by 'them' - the bosses, the bureaucrats, and the oligarchies in the organizations." This will "frustrate people's feeling of solidarity and identification with the purposes of the regulations." He suggests replacing state interventions with the pressure of enlightened public opinion, and the bargaining strength of organizations with "general rules laid down by the democratic state."

In summary, Myrdal traces a route in the West which starts with "the quasi-liberal state of mass poverty, much social rigidity, and gross inequality of opportunity," goes through a transitional phase "of increasing public and private intervention and, flowing from this, intermittent attempts at their coordination by planning."

He assumes that "as planning proceeds, it will be seen to be in line with the ideals of the Welfare State, to delegate, wherever it is safe and practicable, responsibility for detailed public regulations to local and sectional - - - authorities rather than having them carried out by means of direct state intervention," implying "an actual decrease in state intervention" in this third phase. (pp. 72-80.)

Where Myrdal sees the delegation of authority in the modern welfare state as the culmination of an evolutionary process, Neil Chamberlaine sees the same devolvement as one of the consequences of increasing population size and complexity. He says that "As the size of a population increases, its subunit characteristics become more divergent, requiring the special knowledge and greater attention that can only come at the local level . . . (C)ertain aspects of a given problem may require central coordination, and other aspects of the same problem, local application." (Chamberlaine, p. 139.)

9. Over the past several decades we have witnessed the economic and social transformation of the world's most populous country. To a very large extent, this process relied on the devolvement of authority to the local level. It gave to villagers the feeling that they controlled their own destinies, that they could plan for their own future, and that their planning was sound and workable. Where experts had said that the economic and technical resources were unavailable, China built a village level medical delivery system second to none in the developing world. The secret was the mobilization of people to work

on the solution of their own problems. The political system was only important in that it gave the people a sense of participation and control over their own destinies within a set of guidelines. The lesson to be learned from this experience by the rest of Asia is that the power and wisdom of the peasantry is being overlooked in many development programs; and mobilization of these human resources could mean the difference between success and failure of specific development projects or of overall national development efforts.

As Mao Tse-Tung has said, "In building the - - - country we - unlike the modern revisionists who one-sidedly stress the material factor, mechanization and modernization - pay chief attention to the revolutionization of man's thinking and through this command, guide and promote the work of mechanization and modernization." (Mao Tse-Tung, pp. 19-20.)

It has largely been by creating a nation of generalists and by de-emphasizing the role of the specialist or expert that the power of the peasantry has been so effectively tapped in modern China. (Gurley, p. 33.)

10. Certainly, the mood in many countries is away from big enterprises and big plans and toward financing of social and economic change projects which focus the benefits of development on the villages. In an article entitled "Development: The End of Trickle Down", James P. Grant, President of the Overseas Development Council, says that "a major rethinking of development concepts is taking place, compelled by a single fact: The unparalleled economic growth rates achieved by most developed countries in the 1960's had little or no effect on most of the world's people, who continue to live in desperate poverty." Mr. Grant points out that "increased output of goods and services

has failed to 'trickle down' to the poorer half of populations" but that we are learning that "if small rural and urban producers and underemployed workers are given a chance to participate in the development process and access to education, credit, technology, and health services, then they, too, can become highly productive, with a high capability for savings and effective investment," and that "policy changes designed to provide more opportunity for the 'little man' to participate in development can be highly efficient in helping economic growth."

With specific reference to population, he cites China, Barbados, Sri Lanka, Singapore, Uraguay, the Punjab, Taiwan, and South Korea as examples of societies where "birth rates have been declining sharply in some areas even before the introduction of large-scale family planning programs - and at much lower income levels than in the West . . . In each of these countries, the population as a whole has shared in the economic and social benefits of progress to a far greater degree than in most developing countries." He asserts that "population policies are not enough" and that "more equitable growth is the necessary ally of family planning programs."

Grant contends that "if leaders in developing countries pursue economic growth without reforming existing political, economic, and social structures, the ultimate result will be to fail to reach national goals . . . development is not possible without constant change in the structures."

He closes by saying in part, that "greater equality of opportunity to participate, rather than more aid of the welfare variety, is the most urgent need of the poor within countries (and of the low-income states within the community of nations)." (Grant, pp. 43-65.)

These views seem to be strongly held as well by the U.S. Congress, the Senate, and the Department of State. The feelings of the legislature have been echoed within USAID by several recent directives and memoranda to field staff, and by constant reference of "in house" organs to these new directions in foreign assistance. No longer will stress in foreign aid be on capital intensive projects - dams, airports, super highways; instead, emphasis will be shifted to programs such as land reform, "intermediate" agricultural technologies (replacing caribou, not farmers), cooperatives, small farmer credit systems, and creation of small scale industries throughout the countryside. It seems, also, that along with the demise of macro-projects, macro-planning may be on the decline as well.

The widespread and growing viewpoint that "trickle down" is dead apparently has grown out of disappointment with the U.N. Development Decade of the 60's and seems to be leading to a new definition of development. One scholar, Dudley Seers, has hypothesized that real development is only taking place where poverty is decreasing in absolute terms, where unemployment has been falling, and where inequality between social and economic classes has been lessened. Even if per capita income or Gross National Product were to have doubled, as long as there are no improvements in these several areas, development has not been occurring. (Seers, pp. 2-6.)

A Short Summation:

The foregoing may seem to the reader to be simply a jumble of disconnected thoughts, however, in order to try to give them coherence allow me to summarize what I feel is a common thread.

1. Experience has shown us that promotion of family planning alone, without economic and social change, cannot reduce fertility to replacement levels.

2. Some family planning programs have begun to plateau once all of the "easy adopters" have come in.

3. The relative failure of economic development programs has hampered attainment of family planning goals, yet family planners are urged to "do more" to reduce fertility.

4. Recognizing this, Asia's population and development communities have begun calling for increased integration of population and development plans and strategies.

5. In order to identify some of the reasons why development programs have not been integrated with family planning programs in the past, family planners must take a critical look at development planning and make whatever suggestions they can about future integration.

6. One of the problems with economic development programs to date has been their emphasis on "trickle down" and the disenfranchisement of the masses from participation in planning their own destinies; yet development scientists have concluded that when communities participate in policy making, they can effectively carry out their own development programs.

7. This conclusion seems to be supported by studies of the development process as behavioral change, which have identified the need to build in continuous and automatic reinforcement of economic and social change through feedback mechanisms.

8. Gunnar Myrdal seems to agree that delegation of planning and regulating mechanisms to local levels is a necessary and desirable condition of modern post-welfare states.

9. Mao Tse-Tung as well seems to have used devolvement of authority quite successfully in the economic and social transformation of China.

10. With the death of "trickle down", a search seems to be on in development circles for new methods of bringing real development to the villages of the Third World, including social and economic transformation of substantial magnitude.

These several and disparate findings, it is proposed, may lead us to begin to help our development colleagues to put together some models of development which will be more suitable to the absorption and constructive integration of population planning into the development planning process. In the next section, I will propose a few of these models, albeit in very rough form.

Before going on to the next section, and in the light of the preceding discussion, I would like to propose that we take a look at questions that the various disciplines might be asking themselves in this search for common and complementary approaches to the central question of achieving modernization.

Questions We Might Be Asking Ourselves:

It seems to me that from the point of view of an economist the question is not whether economic growth will have a negative effect on population growth rates; that has been proven to be true. Neither is the question whether population growth rates can decline in the absence of economic growth; although results are mixed, indications are that only minimal reductions in fertility can precede development. Some practical questions to be researched are 1) how to invest limited development resources into projects that will maximize the potential for a fertility decline; and 2) how to tie the subsequent drop in fertility closely to development outcomes in order that the time lag between development occurring and fertility falling is minimized; and 3) whether it might be possible for fertility to fall at

an even faster rate than economic change would dictate, once faith in the development process has been established.

From the point of view of a community development worker or a behavioral scientist, it seems that valid questions include 1) how to involve local people in the planning process so that they can identify with development outcomes; 2) how to mobilize local resources to work on locally derived problems; 3) how to structure reinforcement into the development process so that each increment of effort brings an increment of reward; 4) how to help people to eliminate from the environment those reinforcements which run counter to the achievement of their wants and needs; 5) how to build into development programs positive methods of evaluation which can be used by the local people without reference to a higher authority or fear of punishment from external sources; and 6) whether community development workers can, indeed, be sensitized to regard the wants and needs of local people as valid, and can support these needs in dealings with higher authorities.

From the point of view of a family planner, the question should not be how can I increase my control over program activities, but how can I turn control over to responsible local officials, and what could my role be in a family planning effort subordinated to the wishes of the local communities and the needs of development planners. During the build-up phase of family planning programs, it may have been necessary to centralize authority; but once service points are established and personnel are trained, devolvement of authority to lower levels seems logical and even inevitable.

It seems to me that all of us in the family planning movement must ask ourselves, before we simply hand over our programs to development planners, what their methods and methodologies are likely to be, whether these have worked in the past, or are applicable to the future, and what economic planners see as prospects for the future within their own discipline.

Further, we must ask at what levels we are discussing integration. Are we simply interested in the marriage of two national level planning bodies? Will this change appreciably the way that field programs operate, or the viability of particular approaches? Will it bring successful development where there was failure before; and will fertility declines be enhanced in the process?

We should resist strongly the temptation to simply become handmaidens to failing or stagnant development programs. We should decide within each national framework what approaches we think will have a chance of working, and we should insist on entering into this marriage on our own terms.

We should, for instance, insist on some voice in how community development is to take place, and what processes will be used for the introduction of change. To the extent that other development efforts can impinge on fertility or on family size norms, we should insist on a vote or a veto. We may find that we are more interested than are traditional economic development planners in the human dimensions of change, the processes as well as the product and the packaging; and if our humanitarian values are at odds with apparent opportunism, we should take a stand for the human element.

Part II - The Models

There are several different means by which an integrated program of economic development and social change might be undertaken. If field testing is anticipated, these several approaches should be looked at from the frame of reference of the society in question. The choice of one approach over another implies some ethical considerations on the part of the country in question as well as appraisal of political, economic and administrative realities. If the end result is a program of development which meets the wants and needs of local people and simultaneously "solves" some of the larger social problems of a country, then it is certainly not the responsibility of an outsider to question the means by which the end result is achieved.

The concept of "trickle down" is quite complex, encompassing not only the level at which plans are made and acted upon, but including some assumptions about political and economic structures as well. Rather than speaking to the question of political and economic structure, I have chosen to look only at the levels at which plans are made, acted upon, and evaluated. It seems obvious that once a society becomes disenchanted with "trickle down", it begins to make the political structure and economic system changes needed to get "bubbles" of development started at the lowest possible levels.

Thus whereas "trickle down" seems compatible with oligarchic structures, urban elites, top heavy burocracies, intra-national "imperialism", centralized planning, monopolistic business practices and dependence on the development of foreign trade; "bubble up" seems compatible with participatory democracy, reduction of class differences, land reform, managed redistribution of wealth, elevation of laborers and farmers in terms of social status, simplistic burocracies, decentralized

commercial practices, and dependence on "internal" capital defined as manpower, ideas, and local raw materials. "Trickle down" is a technology intensive strategy; "Bubble up" is a humanity intensive process.

Unless a society's leaders realize fully the implications of "bubble up" for changes in political structure and economic systems, they would do well to consider them carefully before jumping on the "trickle down is dead" bandwagon. Because I am neither a political scientist, nor an economist I will not delve deeply into the rather obvious quicksand of the ancillary changes implied in the death of "trickle down". As a part-time anthropologist, sociologist, and development/population planner I will be looking at only one part of this revolution in the world's approach to modernization, and that is the levels at which plans are made, implemented, and acted upon in specific societies.

Readers may find valid grounds for objection to my classification of a society where planning, implementation and evaluation are all centralized as "pure trickle down", and to the classification of a society where these activities are all locally generated as "pure bubble up". These classifications are admittedly simplistic, but they provide decided bench marks from which to procede with discussion.

The main point I want to make is this: If trickle down is dead, what are some of the possible strategies or processes of development which might take its place? And further, is there a role for family planning and for family planners in a "bubble up" process, and if so, what is it?

The "models" presented on the following pages will disappoint mathematicians in that they are purely descriptive. In this regard I would like to quote the dictum put forth by Gioanni Sartori that "concept formation stands prior to quantification" (Sartori p. 1038) and from

Uphoff and Ilchman that "First priority goes to developing concepts and models that can stake out the boundaries and focus on the central factors of analysis" (p. 494).

By way of atonement I present figure one for the benefit of symbolic thinkers, (and figure two for those who prefer non-symbolic approaches).

In figure 1 I attempt to present the 27 different configurations which the authority for planning, implementation or evaluation of development programs could assume. It is posited that anyone of these activities could take place at the local level (subscript 1), or it could be carried out jointly by local and higher authorities (subscript 2), or it coult take place a a higher level (subscript 3). Thus planning could be a purely local matter, implementation could be a joint effort, and evaluation could be by a higher authroity (P_1, I_2, E_3). Alternatively planning could be done jointly as could implementation with evaluation also jointly conducted (P_2, I_2, E_2).

It seems to me that "trickle down" tends to assume a configuration close to P_3, I_2, E_3 or even P_3, I_3, E_3. On the other hand, a "bubble up" development program would be a more likely to have a configuration such as P_1, I_1, E_1, or P_1, I_2, E_2.

Figure 1 seems to show rather graphically the great distance between "bubble up" and "trickle down" and could serve to warn us of the difficulties inherent in an attempt to suddenly shift from one to the other. This would be particularly true if a country had not yet even gotten fully onto the table; in other words if there were a good deal of central planning (P_3) but little implementation and hence no evaluation.

Figure 1 presents all of the possible combinations; figure 2 selects out only those few which may be most likely to be chosen from

among the 27. They could be called:

1. Pure "Bubble up" (P_1, I_1, E_1)
2. The classic community development approach with strong local participation (P_2, I_2, E_2)
3. A common pattern found in many existing programs (P_3, I_2, E_3)
4. Pure "trickle down" (P_3, I_3, E_3)

Each of these four selected models is then briefly presented with comments on a few of the operational procedures for carrying them out and taking note of potential pitfalls in this process. Each has its advantages from political, administrative, economic and ethical perspectives. Each could be critiqued for the degree to which it fits the current thinking of the several disciplines involved in the process of modernization. Obviously the "bubble up" approach could find allies among community development workers and anthropologists. Sociologists, in general, might prefer the second or third model because of their stronger emphasis on "professional" data collection and analysis. Incumbent middle level bureaucrats may prefer the fourth model since it does not threaten their security.

No model is perfect, and none of these purports to represent a perfect society. A (P_1, I_1, E_1,) "pure bubble-up" model would present a whole new order of questions. How can national planning take place at all if each community designs and executes its own programs? How can a country know whether "progress" is taking place without national indices; monthly summaries and periodic surveys? How can the collective will accord with national priorities of overriding importance, such as foreign trade or military perparedness? How far should a government go in setting limits on the local planning process? What should be the role of indoctrination,

training, propaganda, education or other interventions to guard against "irrational" or totally unrealistic plans? To what extent is the government prepared to lose efficiency in the short run, in order to achieve longer run human development (in other words is the creation of a local planning infra-structure sufficiently valued to permit it to drain off some time and capital in the learning process?)?

FIGURE 1

Level at which authority could theoretically rest in the planning, implementation and evaluation of social change programs



Note:

Subscript definition

1 = authority rests with local personnel

2 = authority jointly shared

3 = authority rests with political subdivision above the local level, acting "in the interests" of local people

FIGURE 2

Four Selected Paradigms of
the Development Process

Designation	Description	Responsibility for planning	Implementation	Evaluation
Model 1	"pure" bubble up	local	local	local
Model 2	"classic" community development	joint	joint	joint
Model 3	a "data rich" program	higher	joint	higher
Model 4	"pure" trickle down	higher	higher	higher

*Note: local = authority rests with local personnel
joint = authority jointly shared
higher = authority rests with political subdivision above the local level, acting "in the interests" of local people

Previous Page Blank

Model Number One ($P_1 I_1 E_1$)

Alexis de Toqueville, writing in the 1830's concerning his observations of the developing country known as the United States of America said - "I am tempted to believe that what we call necessary institutions are often no more than institution to which we have become, accustomed. In matters of social construction, the field of possibilities is much more extensive than men living in their various societies are ready to imagine."

With de Toqueville's iconoclastic approach to human institutions in mind, I would like to take a fresh look at the existing approaches to development and at the structures and organizations which now plan, implement, and evaluate development programs. In order to attempt to make up for some of the problems inherent in "trickle down" I have chosen to build the first model around the concept of "bubble up". We might say that this is the most radical of the several suggested approaches, because it is the antithesis of top-down macro-planning. This model would rely heavily on creating small bubbles of development through the encouragement of village-level planning, program management, and evaluation. Just as bubbles expand while rising through a liquid, so these increments of development should increase in total impact as they rise through the social and economic environment.

This model places full trust in the villagers to make wise decisions. It assumes that education can take place as to the adviseability of making a village plan, the planning process, and channels for seeking approval. However it leaves to each community identification of wants, specification of needs, and creation of a plan. Again communities will

be expected to carry out their own plans, possibly with a bit of technical assistance from above, but with local people and local capital doing the work. The local community then would provide its own evaluation critique, and readjustment.

This model is obviously naive in that it assumes that a government could so thoroughly "trust" the peasantry to give over all planning, implementation, and evaluation functions to them. Although the planning "parameters" were well specified in advance, this system has been used with some success in China.

The model is simple. The program could be initiated by a few community development workers strategically placed who would be available for consultation and might even lobby among the villagers for such a program to take place.

Implicit in this model is the assumption that a community can evaluate and correct itself, if properly advised and motivated. The greatest danger in setting conditions for the continued receipt of development aid is that the community development workers and the central development authorities will inflict indignities on local decision makers by insisting that they adopt social, cultural and structural changes which are not of their own choosing. This would be very much akin to "tied" foreign aid where "the aid-receiving country agrees to adopt the 'right' monetary, fiscal, and development policies as a quid pro quo for aid (which) can be far more humiliating than the old-fashioned deals through which a country agrees to the use of its territory as a naval or air base by another, for a consideration" (Hirschman p. 715).* Such

---

* For a rather thorough discussion of quid pro quo and conditional arrangements in foreign aid, readers are referred to the following discussion: Albert O. Hirschman and Richard M. Bird, "Foreign Aid: A Critique and a Proposal" which appears as Chapter 10 in Albert O. Hirschman, A Bias for Hope: Essays on Development and Latin America, New Haven Conneticut: Yale University Press, 1971 critiqued by Charles Montrie in "The Organization and Functions of Foreign Aid" with a reply by Albert O. Hirschman both contained in Economic Development and Cultural Change, vol. 21, no. 4, part 1, July 1973. also I. G. Patel "Aid Relationship for the Seventies" in The Widening Gap, Barbara Ward editor, New York, Columbia Press 1971

a situation can only be avoided if the government is willing to abide by the decisions of local leaders, even though they might not accord with priority government programs.

Just as no national government would want an international agency or another country to tell it how to proceed with development, so villages often resent national level planners who have blanket solutions for rural problems. In many cases development is failing not because the plans are poor or the people are uneducated, but because the people who are expected to change are not brought into the change process except as pawns. If they have no emotional committment to the plans, why should they be interested in their success or failure.

Similarly no country likes to be evaluated by another. Thus the assessment of the effects of national family planning programs may be funded by international agencies both as an auditing measure and as a means of validating further expenditures in a particular country. However, the "on the ground" evaluation is usually conducted by the local program personnel or their designated agents, not by the funding agency. Certainly the same applies to assessment of local achievement by national agencies. Where there is sensitivity regarding achievement of goals, local officials often ask for the authority to collect their own figures and to carry out their own evaluation. Another reaction to such a system is to falsify reports in order to escape punishment.

In China, the collection of national level figures in many areas was terminated because of such falsification, and the entire process of target setting, evaluation, re-adjustment, and reward was passed on to the local level. In mixed economies, where there is little tradition of flexibility among government officials, the reaction to "padded"

figures is a crack-down on local officials. Possibly a better reaction would be to find out why the targets are not being met and whether they might not be unrealistic. Local personnel could then be asked to set their own targets, to devise their own methods of evaluation, to carry out their own assessments, and to mete out their own rewards and sanctions.

After all, what counts in true modernization is not that figures demanded by a higher authority which show achievement of development targets be met, but rather the firm committment to achieve such goals for the simple reason that they logically flow out of the development process.

Model Number Two ($P_2 I_2 E_2$)

Although the program which follows could be top heavy with behavioral scientists or other change "experts", we will assume that it is being adequately managed by a corps of community development workers who have been trained specifically to return to their home areas and to assist communities to plan and to execute their own development programs. These workers have learned that development is not things, it is a process "which fosters a participant society and democratic dialogue which results in social action. It promotes conditions which make it possible for each person to develop his potentials as an individual and as a responsible citizen." (Minicleir, 1960).

In the description which follows, I will be painting an ideal picture, variations are possible (anywhere from code numbers A211 to A223 in Figure 1), and the choice of approaches may depend to a large extent on cultural conditions, prior experiences with development "experts", the status of outsiders in the village, and other factors. For instance, it might be just as valid to have the advisor arrive by jeep, be more urban than rural, and even deal through an interpreter. However I will try to paint an "ideal" picture in this particular model of the romanticized methodology of the traditional community development worker. I would still classify this method as "bubble up", although in contrast to the bottom-most model; this community development approach is quite a good deal more complex.

In the presentation of this particular model, I hope to show how a community could be helped to take a broad perspective toward development, to see that social changes are necessary in support of economic or technical change, and to integrate social and structural changes into their own plans. I also would like to suggest that joint implementation

and joint evaluation could lead to mutual trust and an exchange of knowledge from the community development worker to the community.

In the ideal situation our model 2 community development worker would come to the village on foot or by public transportation. He would appear to be a simple man, and would speak in simple language that can be understood by everyone. He seems to be a village man himself, even down to his hardened hands and sun darkened complexion. He is relaxed, quiet, and self-assured, a good listener who asks questions about things that really count, not a clip-board carrying "expert" with statistics in his brain and ready-made solutions in his pockets.

This development worker approaches the real leaders of the community, the ones who have the respect and allegiance of most of the people. He lets them know that the government's development programs have not always succeeded because the plans were often made too far away to be realistic. He says that he has been sent to find out what this community really wants, and what it needs in the way of outside resources to meet these wants. He offers his help to the leaders in the determination of these wants and needs. He sets no immediate deadlines, but just gets discussion started.

The community development worker will suggest that people look first at their own wants, and then come up with the needs to achieve those wants. He will help the leaders to do the "research" necessary to decide these basic questions. If some data on landholding or other aspects of social and economic organization must be gathered he will help the village to gather them. Where data have already been collected by higher authorities, such as census, labor force or crop data, he will insure that they are available during this planning stage.

Once the overall desires of the community have been assessed, specific needs should be identified and restated in terms of objectives. The community development worker may suggest areas that the community might look into as possible needs such as irrigation or water supply systems, farm to market roads, better prices for cash crops, better health care, more and more practical education for village children, etc. However, this specification of needs should follow the identification of community wants, not precede it; otherwise activities will be suggested for their own sake without any goal in mind.

Once the villagers have come up with a list of wants and have specified the commodities and technologies that must be provided by the higher levels of governments, the community development worker should help the leaders to specify what social, structural, and cultural changes will be necessary to insure that these commodity and technology inputs will actually be useful to meeting the community goals or wants.

For instance, if one goal is that farmers should get better prices for their produce, an obvious technological input might be a farm to market road. However, there is the danger in many societies that urban merchants will simply take advantage of the situation by bringing their trucks out to the village to purchase the produce, and that they, as middlemen, will reap the profits. The community development worker might then suggest a "quid pro quo" to the village. The road will be built, if the farmers in the village will form and maintain a cooperative for transporting and selling their produce. This co-op might also receive some funding but the primary input by the higher government level would be technical advice on establishment and operation of the co-op. In fact, the government might even loan the co-op

sufficient funds to purchase a truck, but again there might be a "quid pro quo" arrangement whereby a maintenance contract would have to be negotiated with a local garage by the villagers prior to release of title of the truck.

As a further example, let us imagine that one of the village wants is reduced mortality and morbidity which indicates the need for a health facility and a health worker. The government will provide mortar and bricks for the building and interior furnishing, and the village might decide to provide the land, construct the building, and maintain the grounds as counterpart. Likewise the government might provide a trained nurse-midwife, but the village might agree to insure that she is protected from harm (often regarded as important if the nurse is young and single), that her services are used, especially*by the most needy, and that she gets all the help she might need from volunteer auxillaries who may be other village girls or women.

Further, let us imagine that the village wants higher crop yields and feels that it needs tube wells, pumps, and pipes for irrigation systems, more fertilizer at subsidized prices, access to better seeds, and cash to finance this higher technology farming. The community development worker might then suggest the creation of a water distribution plan even before the first well is dug or the first pipe delivered. He

---

*Note: These idealized descriptions may be galling to readers. Of course in the ideal situation the community development worker would be dealing with a literate population with a long democratic history, a legitimized and respected local government, and a tradition of collective solution of common problems. By definition, most less developed areas of the world do not share these ideal conditions. Thus a range of approaches seems possible in order to address the problems of 1) locating or creating organizations with which to work, 2) identifying community wants and needs, 3) assigning priorities to these needs, 4) specifying goals and objectives, 5) creating mechanisms for action, 6) designing and conducting evaluation. For more thorough discussion of this process, please refer to references in the bibliography.

might also point out the need for a working agricultural credit union which could apply to the rural bank for a low interest agricultural loan. He could forward the request for better seeds along with a request for an extension agent to come and talk to the villagers about the new strains and their special problems. This would require a committment from the community to learn the new farming methods as a requirement for obtaining the new seeds.

As a further example, and one more closely related to family planning, let us imagine that the community were to single out education as their most important need, including the construction and staffing of middle, high, and/or vocational schools. The community development worker could then help the villagers to see the implications of continued high fertility on the capacity of such a school system. It might then seem logical, as a quid pro quo for universal availability of higher education, to attempt to reduce fertility, thereby eventually leveling off (and possibly even slightly reducing) the higher number of students eligible to use the facilities.

If it were a community decision, for instance, that each family could send only two children to these higher schools because of lack of capacity, then as the schools went up and as children began to enter, you might expect fertility to fall.

A number of additional examples are presented in table 1. Table 1 presents a list of possible local inputs into development programs which might serve as "counterpart" to, or insurance for, the successful adoption of new technologies. Whether these social counterparts are determined by the people, are jointly derived, or are imposed from above, may determine their acceptability, the degree to which they are internalized, and their successful execution.

This list is simply an illustration; it is not a guide, and certainly only scratches the surface of ideas. It is hoped that others will develop additional or supplemental lists.

TABLE 1

Illustrative Listing of Government Inputs and Village Counterpart in a Social Modernization and Economic Development Model

Government Input	Village Counterpart	Purpose of Counterparting
1. Farm to market road and a truck.	a. Transportation cooperative.	a. To insure that urban middlemen don't ship produce and make the profits.
	b. Marketing cooperative.	b. To give farmers some collective bargaining power when the product does get to market.
	c. Maintenance agreement.	
2. High School building materials, school equipment, teachers, textbooks.	a. Donated land.	a. To give community feeling that it is their school.
	b. Labor for construction.	b. Same plus saving money.
	c. Reduced fertility.	c. To insure that school will not be made quickly obsolete by rapid population growth.
	d. More "untouchables" in school.	d. To distribute educational benefits to the poor
3. Health center building materials, medical supplies, trained health worker.	a. Donated land.	a+b. To give community feeling that it is their facility and to save money.
	b. Donated labor.	
	c. "Family" for worker.	c. To give community paternalistic attitude toward "their" worker.
	d. Cooperation in conducting village "rounds".	d. To insure that villagers accept medical worker.
4. Tube wells, pumps, pipes, cement for reservoir.	a. Wellsite on community property	a. To prevent monopolization by landowner
	b. Labor to construct system.	b. To save money, to teach.
	c. Irrigation cooperative.	c. To insure mechanism exists for settling disputes.
	d. Water distribution plan.	d. To minimize disputes.

All of these examples illustrate several basic principles of community development work. 1. For any new technology to be successfully adopted, changes are necessary in the social, economic, and cultural fabric of the community. 2. For any change to be sustained it must be substantive and come from the committment of the person making the change rather than from the committment of the change agent. 3. Unless the person making the change understands the possible "side effects" of the new technology or the new commodity, and participates in planning from the start, he may resist the change or adopt it only symbolically. 4. An individual's committment to a new way of doing things is directly proportional to the amount of involvement he has had in planning and execution of the innovation.

The community development worker could also help the community to develop its own evaluation system to permit it to assess the degree to which the planned social, structural, and cultural changes are being met. Each community might conduct evaluation and make corrections in its own programs rather than relying on higher authorities to investigate, uncover, and correct program deficiencies. The government may encounter a good deal of difficulty in getting local people to take this responsibility, and in wresting the power of inspection and correction from intermediate burocracies. However, whatever effort must be expended to make these changes in perspective should be worthwhile in terms of program achievement.

Rather than restricting the flow of development goods and services from above based on failure to meet development objectives, the government would be helping communities to internalize the social, cultural, and other environmental changes necessary for the orderly and

beneficial absorption of resources. The community would be given freedom to formulate its own plans and to carry them out, but would also have the obligation to assess its own progress and to make mid-course corrections on its own projects.

Even though evaluation might be initially performed by the higher levels of government, some portion of development assistance could be conditional upon rapid improvement of evaluation procedures by local personnel and eventual takeover of this function. Thus, model number two lends itself to conversion in the direction of model number one, through devolvement of the evaluative function.

The end result of this process should be a village plan which aims at the achievement of objectives, the fulfillment of needs, and the satisfaction of wants. It should be balanced between inputs from the government (primarily goods, training, and technology) and inputs from the people (primarily labor, some land, and a committment to make the social and structural changes necessary to sustain the process of change).

If the community development worker is skilled, he can get the community to realize the potential benefits of some general programs in which there may be a higher level interest such as improvement in vital registration, tax collection or family planning participation. However, in this model as in model one, the community's vote must carry the issue, or the avowed participatory democracy becomes merely a pretense. Thus family planners, or others with their own programs to "peddle", must be willing to accede to the will of the people, even if it means waiting for a number of years until the community gets down to "fertility" on its own development checklist.

Equally, important as the product of this program would be the process used by the community development worker. It is strongly suggested that he (or she) come from the community in question and receive a thorough training course of many months duration.

This approach to development may appear to be quite idealistic on the one hand and revolutionary on the other. Family planners, however, may be able to further refine these rough suggestions based on their knowledge of communities and couples in their own areas. Of course for any such program to be successful, decentralization of authority and of decision-making, will be necessary throughout the existing government structure. In some countries, such as the Philippines, this process is already underway, and these countries may be most open to testing these several ideas. (see appendix two which illustrates how model 2 might fit quite well into the goals of the New Society in the Philippines)

It is certainly true that in many parts of many countries this sort of planning process would not stand a chance of succeeding. Where there is only skepticism regarding government programs, where there are no respected or trusted local leaders to whom a community development worker could relate, where the government is patently unpopular or unrespected, or where financial resources simply are not sufficient to fulfill even the most simple community wants, such an approach is as likely to succeed as is any other, with one additional positive factor--since the people must inevitably be involved in the planning process they will bring in the resources of local energy and initiative which might make the difference between assured failure and marginal success.

In effect either model 1 or model 2 would be fostering a series of small feedback loops. With each small success in development would

serve as a reinforcer causing a small success in social change and reinforcing further development. In anthropological terms, as these small social changes take place, they would expand the public and private cultures of the villagers, would begin to meet local needs, and would begin the process of individual and group identity change which would lead to further incorporation of development products and processes. To the extent that reduced fertility is involved, each added increment of development would lead to a bit more reduction in fertility, to lower dependency burdens, to expanded opportunities for women to enter the labor force, to higher rates of saving, to gains in income per capita and thus to increased economic development. If left to chance, the social and cultural changes that are "inevitable" results of economic transformation might take several decades or even several generation to achieve.

The traditional feedback mechanism calls for mortality to fall, education to rise, employment to increase, industrialization to be fairly and irreversibly in process, and individual welfare to be appreciably increased. As a result, people learn by experience that large families are either not necessary or disfunctional. Through that feedback mechanism, then, the next generation may decide to reduce fertility.

The proposed system merely replaces this long term experiential feedback system, which is generally seen (particularly by some economists) as a one-step process. In its place there could be developed a series of small reinforcements which may be experiential, or might be based on each man's ability to perceive the logical results of the process of which he is a part, or might even be hastened by the use of incentives, propaganda, pleas for cooperation, or other "artificial" means.

With regard to one frequently discussed topic today, incen-

tives may work well in Taiwan where a good deal of economic advance has already taken place, and where people are free to accept or reject the persuasion inherent in the offer of a valued commodity. It could be that in a less economically advantaged situation incentives would "work even better" in terms of the reduction of fertility, but at a greater price in terms of human liberty. In his landmark work: Today's Revolution: Democracy Ferdinand Marcos asks the question whether men can "exercise the political freedom of citizenship without freedom from economic dependence on the will of other men?" and asserts that "power over a man's subsistance amounts to power over his will". He claims that citizens "are all able to judge (a policy)", and that without freedom, the whole concept of democracy falls apart. If the only test of a system of government is how it can provide clothing, shelter, housing and other services to a people, then a government might just as well be autocratic as democratic." (pp. 8-40)

It would appear that in some societies, such as the Philippines given its recent political and economic changes, the imposition of incentives by the central government could be characteristic of "Old Society" thinking, whereas the decision of a community to adopt social and cultrual changes as a "quid pro quo" for economic changes, and that community's dedication to evaluate and criticize its own performance might be characteristic of "New Society" thinking. The comments of President Marcos on this proposition would certainly be useful to Philippine family planning and development leaders, and might be worthy of solicitation.
(For a more thorough explanation of how this sort of integratio of social change and development might fit into the specific situation in the Philippines, readers are invited to look over appendix two to this paper)

Model Number three ($P_3I_2E_3$)

Model number three is a bit simpler from the point of view of a national level administrator. Show-case projects are possible. Decisionmaking is simplified because even if a nod toward community participation is made, local points of view can be disregarded by the national level planners.

For instance, if a community feels that it does not want family planning at this time, or if they are not asked what they want, family planning targets may still be one of the standards against which localities are judg d. Model three societies tend to rely heavily on statistics; therefore, it is hard to "sell" a program based on unquantifiable criteria such as changes in social organization, or personal identity, or attitudes. Any program without measurable and fairly short-term outcomes may be extremely difficult to get funded; and occasionally a project can find funding simply because it does have quantifiable outcomes, even if the data are not necessary.

This model bears many similarities to the modus operandi of several Asian family planning programs. Typically, national level leaders think up a project, plan it, design an evaluation schema, and then go out to locate a community willing to adopt the change. Such programs or projects tend to have a technological fix, such as creation or construction of a service delivery system, introduction of a new contraceptive method, or experimentation with behavior change through modification of the contingencies of reinforcement.

If community desires are brought in, it is more likely to be on the strength of a survey or after consultation with a few typical natives (e.g., "my office mates, my neighbors and the maid"). Quite often the community has no idea that evaluation is taking place, in what form, or what the findings have been. This seeming disregard for local people may be a function of the aggregative sciences of demography and economic planning, or may be a result of the training received by officials and national leaders.

Of course, in implementation, where it is virtually unavoidable, meetings and joint action take place. It is from this joint implementation that programs often move into joint planning and/or evaluation (Model 2), and it seems that such a move could be fostered if desirable.

In terms of probability of success, this model is the best sort into which one might attempt to structure incentive programs, both in the family planning realm, and in other areas of social and structural concern. Because the central government has full control over planning, it may decide to invest heavily in incentive projects, as a short-cut to fertility decline or to other social ends. This approach, to the extent that it gives people substantial economic rewards for acceptable social behavior can be said to be generally feasible. A schema follows for the operation in Model 3 of the guid pro quo arrangements which were discussed earlier in this paper.

In simple terms, the decision as to what constitutes development would be arrived at by the government. The existing ministries concerned with economic and social change such as health, social welfare, agriculture, labor, industrial development, land reform, and local government would be united into a Development Body which would have full authority over all development programs. This Body would then specify which commodities, technical skills, and other goods

could be made available to communities, and would stipulate what social cultural, and structural changes would have to be achieved by these communities in order to obtain the development goods. All development inputs by the government would require counterpart activities by the recipients in order to insure that the social and cultural changes necessary for proper utilization of these resources would be made.

Rather than give new examples, I would ask the reader to review the counterpart arrangements suggested in model number 2, with a change of perspective which would substitute "would" for "could" and "should" for "might".

Model number three is a simpler approach than models one and two, and may accord more closely with the way things have been done in the past in many societies; thus, it may be less radical, less threatening, and more feasible for early testing. It omits a number of desirable factors such as community participation in the planning process, but it might work with modification and adaptation to a specific country.

If this model is used, it is advised that to the extent possible, each community be looked at separately by a competent c.d. worker before change is introduced. Examples of this sort of planned intervention in change abound. Usually a researcher looks at a community in depth, decides what it needs and through which structures the new idea or item could best be introduced. He then introduces the change to the community in what he feels is the most logical way and would be most likely to lead to adoption. (A concise summary of the methodology which an outside change agent might use in assessing an individual community is D.W. Adams and A. E. Havens "The Use of Socio-Economic Research in Developing a Strategy of Change for Rural Communities" Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 14,

No. 2 (1966); also readers are encouraged to investigate the extensive literature on organizational development which has focused on changing social norms and values in commerical enterprises as a means of achieving social change. One major compendium on this topic is Social Intervention: A Behavioral Science Approach, Harvey A. Hornstein et al., Collier MacMillan, New York, 1971.)

The advisability or necessity for including villagers in the policy-making process depends, to some extent, on leaderships' view of the peasantry and how peasants view the social order in which they find themselves. Some feel, as Everett Hagen points out, that a peasant tends to take an ordered view of the social, governmental and business elites who inhabit "a world beyond his ken". Hagen claims that the peasant "looks on the statuses of these groups as higher and lower, but also as not merely appropriate, but proper. It never occurs to him to think that he might act so as to change things. The world is as it is. He thinks the concept of his trying to change it to be ridiculous, shocking, a little indecent, and immoral." As long as the masses believe that there is legitimacy in existing decision-making structure, and as long as they have no expectation that they can or should, change the order of things, these views seem to caution that leaders would be advised to not broach the subject of participatory democracy. (Hagen p. 71).

Of course, this point of view may be faulted for several assumptions which might be called "elitist". First, is the naivité of this seemingly static view of a world where, in actuality, rising expectations have permitted villagers to begin to dream of the day when they will control their own destinies. This attitude could be used to justify any status quo, such as slavery, on the grounds that everyone seems contented. Further, this view leaves out the

role of education as a stimulus toward dissent; and it omits the growing activist and advocacy roles of local leaders.

It is possible that in some societies the masses can have their futures planned for them for a period of some decades. However, as Myrdal, Mao, and Marcos all have pointed out, the day comes when people will insist on planning their own futures; and governments must be prepared to accede to the insistance on local participation or must pay a heavy price with oppressive measures and enforced regimentation.

Quoting again from de Toqueville "Men are not corrupted by the exercise of power or debased by the habit of obedience, but by the exercise of a power which they believe to be illegitimate, and by obedience to a rule which they consider to be usurped and oppressive." (de Toqueville, Ch. 1.).

Model Three, and trickle down in general, will only work as long as people feel that the government is acting in their best interests, and as long as those in power and those making the plans are minimally acquisitive.

Model Number Four ($P_3I_3E_3$):

Because it is so prevalent in development work today, this method of getting things done could hardly be called a model. Under this system, just as with model three, planning and evaluation take place at a high level. However, in this model even the implementation takes place using national resources.

One is reminded of the poignant tale which came out of the tragedy of Viet Nam. In both North and South Vietnam the scenario was the same: the bombs began falling along the road out of a clear sky and people dove for cover. In North Vietnam, there were innumerable public roadside trenches dug by the peasants from that area. These were common property and filled up quickly. After the bombs stopped falling, the people would get out of the trenches and immediately begin to repair the road with little or no instruction and only an informal and ad hoc organization. Once the road was passable, they would move on.

In South Vietnam with the same scenario trenches were more scarce, and tended to either be private or to have been dug by the military; thus, casualties were higher. After the bombers left the people who lived elsewhere moved on, and the residents would often simply sit by the road and complain that the government wasn't coming along to fill in the bomb craters.

Abhorent as it may be to some, we must face the fact that some societies have brought home to their people the value of personal effort for the common good. This is not a secret formula reserved for totalitarian governments; but is a sound method of getting people to identify with, to enjoy, and to eagerly pursue community goals.

In South Vietnam it was quite understandable that the dependency syndrome alluded to above should have been created. Emphasis for decades had been not on what people could do for themselves, but on what the government or the military could do for the people.

This fixation on implementation by the government is not restricted to Vietnam, nor to Asia, but is shared widely in the West. It is particularly apparent in those societies which have not moved "Beyond the Welfare State", but pay lip service to socialist principles through doles, handouts and giveaway programs which can be extremely destructive of pride. Thus, the U.S. state or federal governments go on building sprees to create things that they feel people need (like monuments and superhighways) but they are then amazed when people abuse these services or structures.

This fourth model, then, is all too familiar. It is the basis for "trickle down"; it leads to "do-gooders" handing out meals to starving people; it disenfranchizes the recipient entirely from the process of planning, implementing, and evaluating his own development.

Just as some development programs have been hampered by the concept of trickle down, so have some family planning programs. If current family planning/population programs are dominated by leaders who have a single minded devotion to the propagation of their message and the mass dispensing of contraceptives, then the fourth model may be the model of their choice, and it may be difficult to get them to change their thinking. This is particularly true where there is a distinct class line perception where the program leaders are from the educated upper classes and consider their reasoning powers to be far superior to those of the lower classes. Where program leaders blame "ignorance" or "intransigence" on the part of villagers for

non-acceptance, it is doubtful whether the concept of trickle down could be modified at all.

I believe that many of us would agree that, if trickle down is not dead, it should be. Whatever is substituted for it will certainly be better in terms of the humanization of the process of development.

Summary and Conclusions:

1. Development projects have often failed because they have been imposed from the top and because they have not developed the necessary local committment to the change of supporting social structures and cultural constructs which might serve as "insurance" against failure.

2. Family planning programs seem to have failed or to have stagnated in some areas for the same reason, and also because fertility reduction below a certain level (about 4 children per family) seems to depend on achieving a "threshold" level of economic and social development (e.g. moderately high levels of employment, health welfare, and land reform.)

3. Although development programs may not be succeeding, family planners are often being asked to "do more" with regard to fertility decline. Rather than accepting this burden of responsibility, family planners could point out that unless economic and social change takes place they cannot succeed in reducing fertility beyond the level dictated by sound family economics. At the same time family planners should indicate their willingness and eagerness to join in well-conceived development projects which rely on local inputs and include a committment to change.

4. The recent experience of family planning programs with incentive approaches, and the success of projects where local initiative was especially important, has given rise to a rough idea about the potential for closely interlinking development planning and population planning. This idea is simply that each community could draw up its own development plan with due respect

for the social and cultural changes necessary to insure that inputs of goods and technology are wisely used. Local level social counterpart requirements for sustained development assistance might include any of a number of supporting or complementary activities such as increased literacy, improvement in school enrollment rates, improved nutritional status, improved health care coverage, or reduced fertility.

5. If social and cultural changes are to be offered as "insurance" against the failure of development efforts, there are several methods by which they could be promoted. One of these is of course for a higher authority to insist on the necessary changes; another would be for development agents and community personnel to arrive at plans for change through joint efforts; finally, communities might be trusted to make their own plans with no requirement that they accept "guidance", but with full access to technical help on a consultative basis if desired.

6. These social and cultural changes could be carried out either by the local personnel acting alone, by joint effort, or by outside technicians doing the work. Likewise evaluation and subsequent corrective measures could be carried out locally, jointly or centrally.

7. With the disappointing experience of the Development Decade of the 60's behind us, and faced with energy and food crises of major proportions, it seems logical that some governments see a need to experiment with new mechanisms for bringing development (defined as modernization, or defined in terms of local wants) to the villages of Asia. One of these would be the "bubble up" approach wherein planning, execution, and evaluation are devolved to the lowest

possible level. Another of these would be incentive approaches where control of decision making, evaluation, and punishment is retained at fairly high levels, but where local people are responsible for rather extensive changes in their own private cultures.

8. In order to assess the feasibility of any of these approaches to development, and their effects on fertility, it is suggested that a field trial be established. A rough plan for such a field experiment is attached as Appendix 1 to this paper. Social scientists who are now involved solely in family planning activities might offer their services for such an experiment, since the future of fertility declines seems to depend largely on the future of economic development, and the hope for economic development seems to lie in community level social, cultural and economic changes.

Bibliography

I have included in this bibliography a few titles not cited in the text of the paper, but which I have found useful in gaining my first glimpses of the field of development planning. If family planning specialists are interested in gaining a basic understanding of how development planning has evolved and where it is headed, this bibliography (although incomplete) may provide a good beginning reading list.

Charles Adrian, Social Science and Community Action, East Lansing Michigan State University Press, 1960.

Saul Alinsky Reveille for Radicals University of Chicago Press, 1946.

Warren G. Bennis Changing Organizations: Essays on the Development and Evolution of Human Organization, McGraw Hill Book Co. New York, 1966.

Bennis, Benne, and Chin The Planning of Change, Holt, Rinehard, and Winston, 1969 (second edition).

Guy Benveniste and Warren Ilchman Agents of Change: Professionals in Developing Countries, Praeger Publishers, New York, 1969.

Neil Chamberlain Beyond Malthus: Population and Power, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1970.

Robert Chin and Kenneth Benne, "General Strategies for Effecting Changes in Human Systems" from Creating Social Change Zaltman, Kotler and Kaufman, Holt Rinehart and Winston, 1972.

Dobyns, Doughty and Lasswell, Peasants, Power and Applied Social Change, Sage Publications, Beverley Hills, 1964.

ECAFE Proceedings Second Asian Population Conference, Bangkok, November 1972.

Amitai Etzioni and Eva Etzioni Social Change: Sources, Patterns and Consequences, Second edition, Basic Books, N.Y., 1973.

Lorretta Fowler "The Arapohoe Ranch: An Experiment in Cultural Change and Economic Development", Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 21, No. 3, April 1973.

Ward Goodenough Cooperation in Change Russell Sage Foundation, New York, 1963.

James P. Grant "The End of Trickle Down" Foreign Policy, number 12, Fall 1973.

John W. Gurley "Maoist Economic Development: The New Man in The New China", The Center Magazine, The Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, Santa Barbara, California, May 1970 pp. 25-33.

Everett Hagen On the Theory of Social Change, Homewood, Ill., Corsey Press, 1962.

Stanley A. Hetzler Technological Growth and Social Change, Achieving Modernization, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1969.

John H. Kunkel "Some Behavioral Aspects of Social Change and Economic Development" Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 13, 1965, pp. 257-277.

Charles E. Lindblom, The Intelligence of Democracy: Decision Making Through Mutual Adjustment, The Free Press, N.Y. 1965.

Mahmood Mamdani The Myth of Population Control, Monthly Review Press, New York 1972.

Mao Tse-Tung as quoted in Peking Review, Nov. 11, 1966.

Ashok Mitra, Remarks made at the Second Asian Population Conference, Tokyo, Nov. 1972, and at the Expert Working Group Meeting on Population Planning and Educational Planning, Bangkok, Aug. 1973.

Gunnar Myrdal Beyond the Welfare State, Bantam, New York, 1967.

Oscar Nuñez del Prado Kuyo Chico: Applied Anthropology in an Indian Community, Univ. of Chicago Press, 1973.

William Rich Smaller Families Through Social and Economic Progress, Overseas Development Council, Monograph #7, 1973.

Everett M. Rogers and Floyd Shoemaker, Communication of Innovations: A Cross-Cultural Approach, The Free Press, 1971.

Giovanni Sartori "Concept Misinformation in Comparative Politics" American Political Science Review, Dec. 1970.

Dudley Seers, "The Meaning of Development", International Development Review, Vol. XI, No. 4, Dec. 1969.

Stan Steiver The New Indians, New York, Harper and Row, 1968.

Alexis de Toqueville Democracy in America

United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Measures, Policies and Programmes Affecting Fertility, with Particular Reference to National Family Planning Programmes, New York, 1972.

Norman Uphoff and Warren Ilchman, The Political Economy of Development, Univ. of Calif. Press, 1972.

Charles K. Wilber The Political Economy of Development and Underdevelopment, Random House, New York, 1973.

World Bank Population Planning: Sector Working Paper, March 1972.

Although not available at the time when I wrote these notes, it is believed that the following books should be a useful and timely source of information on the question of what should foloow "trickle down".

Lester Brown, In the Human Interest, 1974.

James P. Grant, Agenda for Action, 1974, OECD, Prager, 1974.

B. F. Skinner, About Behaviorism, 1974.

APPENDIX 1

Draft plan for experimental integration of development planning and social change planning in one country.

This plan is intended to illustrate the social science principles underlying a test of the effectivity and feasibility of the several development objectives specified in figure two in the main body of this paper.

Ideally a country would choose to test all four of the models presented in Figure two using the existing planning system (the bottom line) as a control. However, if any of the models is deemed to be patently inapplicable, it might be eliminated from the experiment. By testing all three models, it will be easier to factor out which of the several changes (i.e. planning, implementation, evaluation) has the strongest impact on social change outcomes.

It is suggested that several regions of the country should be selected for this experiment so as to assure representativeness of the sample. For instance all rural lowland rice communities might be listed together, all dry farming areas together, and all fishing communities with one another. From these several lists, random samples of villages would be drawn with about three communities chosen from each list for each treatment (or model).

It is important that as these lists are being drawn up, obviously anamolous communities such as those with large military installations or those located on major inter-urban thoroughfares by eliminated prior to sampling. What is being sought is a representative sample of a specific type of community, not a represenative of the entire country.

The number of selected communities, of course, will depend on the total population of the sample, the total number of communities in the sample, and the size of each community. Expert statistical help should be sought in making this selection.

Control communities should be chosen by the same random process from the same lists.

Throughout this process of sampling, and until baseline surveys are completed, there must be a news blackout concerning this project throughout the country. Advance news of such a program would certainly bias interview responses in the selected communities.

Once the communities for study and control are chosen, and possibly prior to assignment of specific treatments for specific communities, a thorough baseline survey should be undertaken to assess the status of social systems and the "level" of economic development. If the communities are large, a sample could be drawn. If they are small, all adult residents could be interviewed.

Here a bit of prescience on the part of the development agency would be helpful. In order to know what to ask people about, you have to first make some guesses as to the needs and wants which a community may specify for itself. Here pre-studies could take place in nearby or similar communities in order to design the questionnaires and to find out what sorts of programs and projects may be most important to villlagers.

During this planning period the training of community development trainers should begin. Each treatment should have its own trainers with their own training kits, but with a similar use of training techniques. Thus although the content of training will be dissimilar, the processes used will be as similar as possible. Also, training should be spread among a number of people in order to minimize personality biases via exposure to different learning environments.

Even after the communities have been selected and the baseline survey has been completed an attempt should be made to keep down the level of publicity that the experiment receives. This will minimize the "Hawthorne" or fishbowl effect wherein the person being studied changes his (or her) behavior because he knows that he is being studied. This does not mean that development should not be publicized, only that the "competition" inherent in assigning different treatments to different communities should be avoided.

It is suggested that advisory or consultative personnel appropriate to the treatments in question be brought in early on in this experiment. For instance anthropologists who have served with some of the more "successful" community change programs, community development "experts" who have been in charge of, or have participated in, success stories, and specialists in the realm of inter-personal communications such as determination of consensus and group process. These people should be selected for their field and practical experience, needless to say.

A meeting of national level development leaders and planners should be held early in order to determine the "size" and "shape" of the maximum input allowable to any community. These persons should set parameters based on what the government expects to have available for the average community over the life of the project (approximately 10 years). They should be willing to give up control where necessary in some treatment areas, and should be helped to understand the importance of this experiment. It is suggested that the Chief Executive or Head of State preside at the first meeting or give official sanction to this experiment.

It must be stressed in planning this experiment that the only "new" costs will be for experimental design and for evaluation, that these will be borne by a higher authority, and that the designated sectoral budgets will only be reduced proportionally

to the population under study. For instance, if the education budget is to be 10 million, and 2 percent of school children will be involved in experimental communities, then the Education Ministry would be expected to set aside exactly $200,000 or 2 percent of his budget for this project. Of course some assistance for such an experiment could come from donors outside the country, but these funds should provide for experimental design and evaluation only. If budgets in excess of planned per capita averages are used, the treatments may not be replicable even if successful.

Of course even a community of some size is located in a cultural and social setting to which it must respond. Thus any changes which are noted as a result of this kind of experiment should err on the side of conservatism to the extent that the reinforcements afforded by contextual change are absent. In other words trying to stay ahead of your neighbors when they are not changing may not be as rewarding as trying to keep up with them when they are.

Just for the sake of design improvement, let us imagine that a donor were willing to invest heavily in an experiment of this nature, with the understanding, that if it succeeded, sufficient funds would be made available for a nationwide expansion of the successful model. In that case, it would be useful to set up a second set of treatments at, say, double the input. This addition of "multiple treatments" would be extremely valuable in assessment. Under some conditions would double capital inputs yield results worth twice as much in economic and social outputs?

A number of measures could be used to assess relative "success" or "failure" of the treatments. Of course periodic sample surveys could be used, possibly of an "omnibus" nature so that questions "of the moment" might be plugged in. These surveys should look separately and in depth at outputs in terms of varying community plans and inputs. Certainly we run into the problem of qualification of results and comparison between communities which have set different goals for themselves (or have had different goals set for them). Here we can use several techniques and technologies of assessment. One is to use psychological scaling to discover how much change individuals perceive to have taken place in their own lives, and in community welfare. Another is to use a "fair witness" like an anthropologist to observe several communities (perhaps one from each treatment plus one control and report before vs. after statuses). Another would be to "contrive" the experiment by insuring that all communities choose one or several development goals in common and one or several social change goals in common. These could then be the strongest bases for comparison. Whatever means of evaluation and comparison are used, there are certainly experts aplenty well distributed throughout the world to help with evaluation.

Of course, in some of the treatment communities this evaluation could be meshed with the feedback type evaluation shown in figure 1. In other cases it might have to simply build on or supplement whatever local evaluation might be planned.

Words of caution in the design and execution of such a social experiment could consume many pages - such as the danger that intermediate political incumbents may attempt to intervene for various reasons in the processes, or the danger that visits by many foreigners will bias the process, or the danger that a political opposition will use the experiment to contrary ends. These shoals can be well charted in advance during the planning process with the help of those who have been previously involved in large-scale social change efforts or social experiments.

As the experiment progresses, small changes may seem dictated by the situation, for instance budget changes, shifts in priority and personnel or manning revisions. These should be carefully scrutinized in order to determine whether they might be of a scale large enough to invalidate results, to strongly change the character of one treatment, or to otherwise devalue results. Conservatism in changes which take place once the experiment begins should be the rule. Here it should be noted that in the strictest terms this undertaking should be called a field test or a quasi-experiment rather than a true experiment, particularly if any of the guidelines above are severely compromised.

However, if there is a choice between satisfying strict or classical experimental design and administrative, political, or economic contingencies, remember that the ultimate decision maker regarding success or failure is likely to be a statesman rather than a social scientist.

A number of references come to mind with regard to design and execution of social science experiments including the following:

Donald T. Campbell "Quasi-Experimental Design", in David Sills (ed), International Encycopedia of the Social Sciences, New York, Macmillan, 1968.

Donald T. Campbell "Reforms as Experiments", American Psychologist Vol 24 pp. 409-429, 1969.

Donald T. Campbell "Methods for the Experimenting Society", American Psychologist Vol 27, 1972.

Everett M. Rogers, Field Experiments of Family Planning Incentives, Michigan State University, Department of Communication, May 1972.

APPENDIX II

Rationale for Integration of Model One Into the New Society in the Philippines

In support of Model number one, I would like to quote extensively from two books by Ferdinand Marcos, Today's Revolution: Democracy, and Notes on the New Society of the Philippines.

In the first chapter of his first book, headed "The Right of Revolution", President Marcos points out the difference between a Jacobian revolution which liquidates an entire ruling class and a liberal revolution which presumes "the existance of a state which is already constitutional in principle, which is under laws that are no longer arbitrary, though they may be unjust and unequal. But this constitutional state, more and more people are admitted to the governing class and the voting electorate. The unequal and unjust laws are reversed until eventually all the people have equal opportunities to enter the government and be represented." President Marcos further states that in the view of those who regard as genuine only those revolutions of a Jacobian nature "...the government can only reform--but cannot revolutionize--society". These poeple betray "an anthropomorphic and ossified view of government." (pp. 1-7).

In his chapter entitled "Revolution from the Center" he says that supporters of Jacobian revolution "do not count on the healing self-rejuvenating power of a democratic system, its capacity to act under pressure of the true sovereign, the people." And a bit later "a democratic government...is obliged to make itself the faithful instrument of the people's revolutionary aspiration." (pp. 8-40). Later he observes that "every system purporting to be democratic is vulnerable to the charge that it is not democratic enough, or not 'really' or fully democratic." In order to help solve this perpetual problem, he calls for modification of the "political culture" to permit the redressing of grievances through a revived democratic process. (pp. 41-59)

It was in order to revive the political process and to separate it from the corruption of economic processes that President Marcos began the series of events which have led to "the New Society" in the Philippines. His "Agenda for Change" was based on the premise that the "glaring economic gap between the rich and the poor" must be narrowed, at the same time doing away with the "precarious ground..of government as patron of the poor." Rather than simply caring for its poor members, "the social mission of government, given widespread poverty, is to turn wards into free men", by the strict regulation of private wealth "for collective human ends", by abolition of the "politics of patronage", and by devolvement of sovereignty from the hands of oligarchs and into the hands of The Filipino People. (pp. 60-90)

As pointed out in the main body of this paper, he asks the question whether men can "exercise the political freedom of citizenship without freedom from economic dependence on the will of other men?" and asserts that "power over a man's subsistence amounts to power over his will." He avers that "without freedom, the whole concept of democracy falls apart. If the only test of a system of government is how it can provide clothing, shelter, housing and other services to a people, then a government might just as well be autocratic as democratic." He claims that citizens "are all able to judge (a policy)."

In the volume written since the advent of the New Society President Marcos states that any involvement of the poor in "the great task of economic development...must meet the test of sincerity. They must participate in what ever boons there are now so that they will freely offer their brains and brawn to meet collective ends." In calling for "the conquest of mass poverty," he rejects both doctrinaire socialism and capitalism and calls for a unique approach not burdened by "-isms". (pp. 79-96)

The unique Philippine solution to these problems seems to be the organization of "barangays, or village councils or citizens' assemblies in the various barrios (which is the smallest political unit in the Philippines"." Through this network referenda are now being held on political and policy questions.

At the same time, that the Four Year Development Plan for Fiscal Years 1974-1977 has set national priorities (which include among others the promotion of social development and a more equitable distribution of income and wealth, and the promotion of regional ization), President Marcos looks forward "to a time when the barrangays - the citizens assemblies - can legislate for themselves in matters of immediate concern..." (pp. 97-124).

I do not pretend to be capable of predicting whether the Philippines might find it economically, politically, administratively, or ethically feasible to utilize Model One presented in the main body of this paper. It seems to me, however, that there are those within the government of the Philippines who could assess these several strategies and could choose the one most in accord with the direction and force of the New Society. It might be, in fact, that a progression would be possible, with a heavy dose of education and feedback, which would start with Model four and progress by stages through the other models to the first. It would be instructive to receive comments on the feasibility of these various models from the appropriate levels of government.