
THE DEMOCRATIC PLURALISM INITIATIVE: A MANUAL FOR MISSION APPLICATION

Draft Report

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SUMMARY

The democratic pluralism initiative (DPI) was developed to supplement and complement ANE's support of economic liberalization as a critical component of economic development strategy. This manual's objective is to aid individual AID missions in the development of projects and programs that help to attain the purposes of the initiative within the context of their particular situations. The goals of DPI are addressed, particularly as it strives to promote the dissemination of information through free press and broadcasting services, encourage free elections and effective democratic government, and develop democratic political cultures. The manual suggests that Mission DPI teams begin with an evaluation of the current level of democratic freedoms, together with those host country historical experiences, and consequent social structures and attitudes, that undergird this level. This evaluation lays the basis for a diagnosis of the specific opportunities and dangers with which Mission DPI teams must deal. The team should then consider the relation of the Mission's current non-DPI strategy and programs to DPI objectives. After developing this background, guidelines are suggested for the development of a DPI substrategy that would support DPI objectives within the constraints of the host country situation, Mission resources, and possibly conflicting political or other interests. Methods to evaluate the achievements of DPI programs developed in terms of this substrategy are addressed.

I. DPI OBJECTIVES

General Statement

DPI represents an initiative supplementing and complementing previous efforts to support economic liberalization and open markets. It is thus the political side of the new ANE development initiative "Open Markets and Open Societies". This broadening of the development mandate is in line with the assumption of recent and current United States policy that societies require open social and political, as well as economic, systems.

A democratic, pluralistic society is one that respects individual civil, political, ethnic, and economic rights; elects representatives or leaders in free and fair elections held at constitutionally determined intervals; distributes economic and political power and influence among a wide variety of associations and organizations; and governs the populace in a fair and legitimate manner, balancing in its administration local, regional, and national interests, as well as majority and minority interests.

Supporting the development and stability of democratic societies has been a national goal from the beginning of the Republic. The democratization of the former Axis powers was one of the outstanding success stories of the post-World War II period. In recent years this commitment has been reflected in the Alliance for Progress, the Title IX requirement of USAID programs, and the establishment of the National Endowment for Democracy. It can also be argued that the emphasis on the promotion of human rights in recent United States foreign policy is essentially another way to support the long-term American policy goal of advancing global respect for all human rights.

The relationship of open markets and open societies is critical to understanding this initiative. The correlation of democratic institutions and relatively free market institutions, of political and economic openness, has led some observers to conclude that free economies require free polities and vice-versa. Others believe they observe a lead and lag phenomenon, where openness in one area tends to be followed by openness in the other. Still others point to the importance of economic development, or at least "economic sufficiency", in providing

a basis for the development and stability of democratic institutions in the modern world. Others would point to a third factor, "modernization", for in so far as a society is open to trends in the modern world, a world in which democratic pluralism and market economies have rapidly become dominant, the people in that society will see both an open market and an open society as natural and inescapable goals. Regardless of these theoretical positions, it is certainly true that achieving and maintaining a stable democracy is greatly aided by economic success and seriously imperiled by economic setbacks, particularly in poor and new democracies. This suggests, at a minimum, that economic and democratic development are at times congruent and supportive.

in pointing to this relationship, however, we should not ignore the fact that it is commonly believed by Americans and others that it is possible to have "too much democracy", and that some countries are so poor that they "cannot afford democracy". Certainly, in some situations the mobilization of resources and enforced savings that only authoritarian societies can impose have played a key role in economic development — at least up to a point. But in much of the world authoritarian regimes without democratic rights have failed to achieve or maintain competitive economic growth, particularly where they have denied their peoples economic as well as political pluralism.

We conclude that DPI should not be regarded as simply another economic development program. The discussion suggests that both democratic and economic pluralism are values in themselves, to be pursued jointly and separately. It is with this realization that both are to be incorporated in USAID development strategies.

Subobjectives

DPI strives to promote:

- Open and adequate dissemination of information;
- Effective channels for popular influence on government (voice);
- Open and fair elections (choice);
- Democratic and open governance; and
- Democratic political culture.

A discussion of each of these subobjectives follows.

Open and Adequate Dissemination of Information and Opinion

A democratic society requires effective and open channels for the acquisition and dissemination of information. Ideally, the daily and weekly press and other publications, radio, television, and other electronic media should offer a wide variety of opinion and information, representing many different perspectives. We often assume that this is best achieved when there is an absence of monopoly, government (government-party) or private. However, in many countries non-governmental, formally pluralistic media offer very little information or opinion that goes against the desires of the government. On the other hand, evidence from some European countries suggests that governmental control of the broadcasting media, at least, is not necessarily inconsistent with the free and varied dissemination of opinion and information. Experience suggests that this combination of government monopoly with freedom is harder to achieve in newer democracies or nondemocracies.

Perhaps most important in insuring an open society is freedom from fear of reprisal, especially among those concerned with gathering and disseminating information and opinion. In democracies people do not fear imprisonment, torture, or execution as the result of their expression of opinion or reportorial activities. Neither do they fear private reprisal, as has been common, for example, in Central America and Colombia.

Democracy also requires freedom of access to information. With few exceptions, a democratic society cannot function successfully if information about the workings of government, and basic data on the economy and society, are withheld from the public, either openly or covertly. Investigative reporting is a cornerstone of effective modern democracy.

Effective Channels for Popular Influence on Government

In a pluralistic democracy, the power of the central government is balanced by the existence of a wide variety of alternative centers of power in an organized society. DPI addresses this requirement, first of all, by supporting the development of issue-oriented host-country NGOs

that mobilize the people locally or nationally to address particular issues. The issues around which these organizations can grow will vary. They include human rights monitoring groups, good government educational or advocacy groups, consumer advocacy and environmental groups. Whatever the issue, such groups serve to check the unbridled power of government and give interested citizens a more direct role in government. Secondly, DPI is concerned with strengthening labor, business, and professional organizations. In most underdeveloped countries farmer or peasant organizations are particularly important. Third, experience has shown that the existence of well-organized religious groups is often an important check on government power, offering an important umbrella for dissidents in times of repression. Finally, private economic organizations, such as corporations and cooperatives, are also necessary for pluralistic democracy. While ideally all these groups are internally democratic, it is possible for internally autocratic organizations to play a major role in supporting the development of democratic pluralism.

Open and Fair Elections

While elections do not in themselves guarantee democratic pluralism, without a regular and open chance to influence the system through elections, a system cannot be defined as democratic. To have democratic meaning, elections must be preceded by opportunities to organize people around support for, or opposition to, particular laws or ruling groups. In most modern societies this requires the existence of strong political parties; however, formal political parties may not be required in microstates. The issue is not so much whether political parties exist formally as whether the functions of parties are performed adequately. In a democracy restrictions on who may compete for office should be minimal, and all adult citizens should be allowed to vote. Formal restrictions on candidacy and voting are now rare, but informal restrictions remain important in some countries.

In a democracy, elections are held for representatives of the people and often for a variety of administrative posts, starting with the presidency. Referendums may be held to supplement the election of representatives. Whatever the system, it is important that elections are held at constitutionally approved intervals, and that exceptional elections or referendums, particularly those that interrupt regular timing,

be held to a minimum. Districting must be fair so that the votes of people from different parts of the country are roughly equal; alternatively the differences between the votes of people from different areas, classes, or ethnic groups must be generally regarded as legitimate. There must be adequate voter education. This requires at a minimum fair campaigning regulations and practices. Since in all systems incumbents have many built-in advantages, this is an especially important component of free elections. Fair voting regulations and tabulation are obviously necessary. Because this is the part of the electoral process that is most technical and clear cut, efforts to support democracy in recent years have often concentrated on the process itself. Judging the electoral process itself is, of course, only one step in evaluating the fairness of an election.

Finally, and most important, a country is only democratic to the extent to which those elected are able to exercise their control over the country. To the degree that a hereditary ruler, a religious leader, an officer corps, or foreign power exercises decisive control, or is outside the control of elected leaders, the system is not a democracy. A country should also not be regarded as a functioning democracy if a guerrilla or secessionist group controls large sections of the country (and are not themselves internally democratic).

Democratic and Effective Governance

Ideally, the desires of the people in a democracy are expressed through effective and fair administrative and judicial structures. Legislative processes and discussion should also be effective and open. However, standards of fairness and efficiency vary widely from country to country and over time, so that it is inappropriate to place very high standards on governance. But the DPI initiative will at a minimum strive to encourage the creation or preservation of administrative and judicial systems that operate free of excessive interference by special interests through such means as bribery. It will also support consultation with all those affected by governmental policy decisions or their implementation. A pluralistic democracy particularly requires that such consultation be invoked when minority interests are likely to be severely damaged by strict majoritarian policies. The administrative and judicial system must operate without violating generally recognized indi-

vidual and group rights, such as prohibitions on the use of excessive force, including torture.

Democratic Political Culture

Democracies require more than the forms of democracy. They require an elite and a general citizenry that have the values, attitudes, interests, and knowledge necessary for democratic viability. For a democracy to last or be established successfully, the people must be committed to a democratic system, if they have one, or to the idea of a democratic system, if they do not. They must not see democracy as an attractive alternative among many, but as the only legitimate political system in the modern world. Lacking this commitment, economic or other troubles can easily lead to the overnight loss of democratic gains, and the kind of serial or episodic democracy characterizing, for instance, the recent history of Nigeria.

To have this commitment, both elites and their followers must have a considerable grasp of the nature of democratic systems, a sense that meaningful change can be achieved through such systems, and a commitment to work for change through the system rather than searching for nondemocratic shortcuts to solve immediate problems. They must understand the nondemocratic and illegitimate nature of leadership attained by unconstitutional processes, and understand the human or natural right to political equality for all.

For a pluralistic democracy to work, people must respect the values, opinions, and rights of other individuals and groups. This includes tolerance for people with differing or unpopular opinions, and tolerance for people with different ways of life, religions, or ethnic backgrounds.

II. EVALUATE THE CONDITION OF DEMOCRATIC PLURALISM IN THE HOST COUNTRY

Several different approaches to evaluation will be discussed in this section, each offering a different way to think of the host country's situation. In subsequent discussion, it is assumed that a Mission DPI team (which in a small Mission might be a single individual) has been set up to analyze DPI requirements and possibilities, develop a DPI substrategy, suggest programs and projects, and follow subsequent DPI activities. In reading through the following discussion, the team should note the issues raised in the consideration of each approach.

Comparative Evaluations from an International Perspective

The Mission should begin its evaluation by noting how the host country compares with other countries in terms of the most relevant indicators: human rights, political rights, and civil liberties.

The best place to begin is the State Department's annual report to Congress, entitled **Country Reports on Human Rights Practices**. The latest submission by the United States Embassy in the host country for incorporation in this annual report will be immediately available to the DPI team, and some of those responsible for putting together the Embassy's submission can be consulted directly. Most of the issues of concern to DPI are reported for each country. More limited in scope are the Annual Reports of Amnesty International and other private human rights organizations that are concerned with particular aspects of civil liberties and the treatment by governments of their citizens. If Amnesty International or other organizations have directed sufficient attention to the host country, their reports will offer useful additional perspectives to those of the State Department. Neither State nor Amnesty gives explicit "ratings" in terms of human rights, but it should be fairly easy for the team to read through selected parts of these compendiums, comparing what is said about the host country with what is said about a variety of other states. It would be well to look at the discussions of Canada or Western Europe, of India or Brazil, of Thailand or Malaysia, of Indonesia or the Soviet Union, or of Albania and North Korea to achieve some understanding of the characteristics of countries at different levels of human rights performance. Another useful

exercise would be to compare the discussions of the host country with those of neighboring countries, or with countries throughout the world that are at roughly the same socioeconomic level.

Political rights and civil liberties are subsets of human rights that have been addressed in a somewhat different form in the Freedom House annual surveys of freedom. Unlike the work of Amnesty and State, these are explicitly comparative, and therefore allow for an easier positioning of the host country.

The interests of DPI overlap strongly with those of the surveys just discussed. However, DPI's emphasis on voice, in the sense of the strength, rather than the "freedom", of nongovernmental organizations and DPI's emphasis on political culture and civic attitudes are two areas not directly addressed by the surveys. To obtain an adequate understanding of how the host country compares with others in these regards it may be useful to read more widely in the social science and area studies literature.

Sample Evaluation Sketch

Country A has regular elections and a parliamentary system. There is little or no direct censorship. The civilian government is completely in control, and the opposition regularly wins a substantial number of votes. The ruling party has, however, never been defeated. This can be attributed to popular satisfaction with the government and the success of its policies. It also can be attributed to governmental control over most mass media, severe limits on campaigning, and a governmental policy of punishing with a withdrawal of equal services those areas of the country that vote against the ruling party. Members of the opposition and outspoken critics of government policy or leaders are often detained without trial for short periods. Country A has many active professional organizations. However, nearly all mass organizations of workers and peasants are under the influence of the ruling party and are regarded as conduits for both favors and directives from above. Traditionally, people at all levels view governmental leadership in hierarchical and paternalistic terms; the concepts of political equality or of an abstract law above the decisions of right-thinking individuals are little developed.

In international perspective, Country A falls somewhere toward the middle of a scale for democratic pluralism. Comparison with India, for example, will show that the intensity of opposition political activity and degree of opposition success in India has been much greater. Independent organizational activity at all levels is much more extensive in India, and the press is freer. However, Country A's government control over broadcasting is very similar to India's, and its tendency to detain members of the opposition is only somewhat greater than India's. Country A seems a good deal freer, on the other hand, than countries such as Indonesia or Kenya in which political imprisonment is likely to be longer and harsher, and government control over the communication's media is much more complete. Legal opposition does not exist at all in Kenya, while in Indonesia the opposition is under more complete control than in Country A. In addition, the military in Indonesia comprises a separate power structure, both involved in the civilian structure and parallel to it. Country A is securely under civilian control.

Classifying the Host Country for DPI Strategy Determination

After this initial investigation, the team should consider how the host country should be placed in a classification scheme designed to suggest the approaches, initiatives, or priorities that are most appropriate for different levels of democratic development. The classes of states follow:

Secure democracies include traditional democracies such as Denmark or New Zealand. Characteristically, State Department reports and Amnesty annuals have little or nothing to say about states in this class. Generally, such states will also not be of interest to DPI. However, some states in the Third World, such as Barbados or Costa Rica, fall into this category. Threats to democracy in such states generally come from the danger of external events impacting the local system.

Developing democracies are states with a fairly consistent democratic record, with little fear of repression for expressing dissent, evidence of fairly deep elite and popular commitment to democracy, and a well developed popular, organizational voice. India is a prime example. However, for a variety of reasons, economic, social, and communal, some states at this level are repeatedly torn by violence —

and the violent repression of violence. Many freedoms are not complete, and given the problems these societies face, perhaps they cannot be.

Embattled democracies are states such as Sri Lanka or Peru that are, and have been, democratic both formally and substantially, and yet are unable to sustain or secure a democratic life consistently, or over the country as a whole. Obviously, drawing the line between developing democracies and embattled democracies will always be difficult, for the distinction is a quantitative one based on an estimation of what percentage of the population is effectively incorporated within the democratic system at the time.

Intentional democracies are states such as Turkey or Thailand that regard themselves as democracies and yet have found it difficult to overcome certain historical barriers to democratic life. For Turkey, a major barrier is the unwillingness of the government to recognize even the most basic cultural rights of its large Kurdish minority. For Thailand, the continued power and special position of the monarch is a minor barrier to full democracy. In both, and especially Thailand, the continuing direct and indirect influence of the military in the political system inhibits further growth in democratic pluralism.

Authoritarian transitional democracies are states whose leaders, in apparent good faith, have embarked on a rapid democratization process but have not yet turned the country over to a democratic system, particularly in regard to human rights. In the late 1980s Nigeria was a good example — Brazil had been a few years earlier. For a Mission to decide a country belongs in this class, the pace of change must be rapid, following a definite timetable, and important democratic rights should have already been attained (for example, the holding of a democratically elected constitutional convention). Often states in this class have been operating democracies in the past.

Authoritarian democracies are states with established democratic institutions, but in which these institutions, such as the press, legislature, elections, and judiciary, are not allowed to operate in a way that threatens the continuation of the regime in power. Singapore is a classic instance. Many political systems at this level are referred to as "dominant party" regimes.

Authoritarian experimental democracies are states under authoritarian rule in which arguments for democracy, or the public relations value of democracy, have been accepted to the extent that democratic institutions have been established, sometimes repeatedly established. Whatever has been accomplished formally, democratic institutions at this level remain artificial, with little or no roots in the society and little constituency. The free media and the political attitudes and values necessary for democracy are largely absent. In recent years North Yemen would seem to fall into this category.

Authoritarian false democracies are states in which democratic institutions have been securely established, but these institutions exist within the framework of a resolutely antidemocratic, authoritarian state. Before recent events, the Soviet Union provided a prime example of this class; today one-party states of right or left in Africa, such as Malawi or Benin, provide some of the best examples. Of course, many levels of stringency or repression within this group exist. Zambia is relatively open, while Iraq is so closed that one imagines it would fall outside the limits of possible DPI concern.

Totalitarian democracies are states in which democratic institutions are grafted onto theological (secular or religious) views of the world that harshly deny basic rights to important sections of the population. Being totalitarian, the government intrudes into every aspect of life. For those who accept the basic theology, however, the democratic aspects of the system may function quite well. Within these limits meaningful elections are held in the context of active campaigning and plural media. Iran is the primary example today. Generally, DPI will not be operating in states in this class.

Authoritarian nondemocracies are states that make no claim to modern democratic practices or assumptions. They may be simple military dictatorships, but several are states with premodern institutions, such as Saudi Arabia.

Totalitarian nondemocracies are states ruled in terms of theological worldviews that allow little or no deviation from prescribed behavior in either the public or private sphere. North Korea and Albania are examples. DPI will not be concerned with this class.

Attempting to place the host country in the foregoing classification will serve two purposes. First, it will help the team realize the ways in which the host country is similar to, and differs from others. Secondly, it will help the team place the host country in a class, or comparative position, that will suggest what kinds of programs are likely to be most useful and acceptable for the Mission to undertake under DPI. The team may not be able to neatly fit the host country into any of the above classes. If it appears borderline, or has aspects of several classes, the team should so describe it.

Predominantly Muslim states should be considered to form subclasses within several of the foregoing classes. Experience suggests the extreme difficulty of modernization in Muslim societies, whether it be religious, political, or social. Illiteracy and the suppression of women remain remarkably high in Muslim countries of the Middle East, given their long history of contacts with the West and, in some cases, their oil wealth. Outside Turkey, in the early 1970s the only democratic Muslim countries were Malaysia and Lebanon, both of which are about fifty percent Muslim — since the 1970s democracy has not fared well in either state. Turkey, a Muslim society in the intentional democracy class, quite undemocratically forbids introducing Islamic considerations into political dialogue. Today, Pakistan, Tunisia, and a few other Islamic states suggest possibilities that democracy will fare better in the future in the Muslim world.

Historical, Attitudinal, Social Structural, and Economic Bases for Democratic Development

The **history** of the host country has more to do with the present state of its democratic pluralism than any other single factor. Therefore, the expectations of the AID Mission, and the strategy it undertakes to help the host country fulfill these expectations must be closely based on the nature of this history. Two critical aspects of the host country's history are the number of years, if any, that it has experienced a working democratic system and the length and intensity of contact between the country and democratic countries — particularly the extent to which it has been geographically or culturally enveloped by the democratic world. When the communist dictatorship was destroyed by outside intervention in Grenada in the 1980s, for example, it was to

be expected that democracy would readily be reestablished if the people were given the chance. Similar microstates in the region with hundreds of years of British colonial background were and are functioning democracies, and before its experience with communism Grenada had had considerable experience with democratic institutions. Even though under Prime Minister Gairy the country was no more than an intentional democracy, when communism was overcome with outside intervention Grenada was able easily to restore democracy because it had a population used to democratic political activity. Grenada was, in turn, surrounded by countries whose peoples spoke the same language and practiced democracy. The ending of dictatorship in Haiti, on the other hand, found the country totally unprepared for democracy. The history of Haiti has been a history of despotism. Haitians are not used to the exercise of democratic rights, to mass-based political parties, or to the rule of law. Moreover, Haitian democracy has much less regional support: the other French or Creole speaking peoples in the Caribbean live primarily in French colonies denied independent political rights.

The team should be interested in the host country's **political culture** in so far as it represents a distillation of the country's history into those characteristic political attitudes, beliefs, values, and information that support or impede democratic pluralism. Even among democracies there are wide variations in political culture. American political culture, for example, is highly individualistic, almost anarchic, anti-governmental. Scandinavian political culture, on the other hand, is more group oriented and pro-governmental. Partly as a consequence, political parties in the United States are very weak, while those in Scandinavia are strong.

We can expect the variation in political culture between democracies and nondemocracies to be much greater. People in nondemocracies expect social and political inequality rather than equality. Often they do not believe that "ordinary people" understand enough, or can ever understand enough, to take an active part through voting or civic action in the affairs of the country. Nondemocratic people frequently identify primarily with their family, local community, or ethnic group, and have little knowledge of, or interest in, the "national community" that people in democratic states normally see as coterminous with the state. Frequently people in nondemocracies have not experienced, and

cannot imagine, an impersonal rule of law. With such views it is impossible to go beyond the exchange of favors between individuals as a basis for public policy. In such a society, political leadership is generally based on traditional inherited position and the extension of this position through granting favors to followers. Nontraditional leadership is either obtained through naked force, as in a military coup, or through a charismatic appeal to the quasi-religious emotional needs of the people. In either case, the acquisition of power through such means "fits" with the political culture of nondemocracies much more easily than with that of democracies.

Social cleavages based on class, gender, ethnicity, or other bases are an inevitable part of social life. However, they may be of such a nature that they seriously constrain the development of democratic pluralism. The inequality of men and women in many societies reinforces the patriarchal, hierarchical structure of nondemocracies, and interferes with the spread of literacy and associated modern ideas into the home, and thus the lives of children of both sexes. As serious are ethnic cleavages (often combined with religious) that frequently divide new countries, or countries newly introduced to the possibility of popular rule, into warring camps quite unable to put national interest above more parochial group interest. If such a cleavage leads toward a full-blown desire for a separate state, then both the preservation of separatist minority rights and the existence of the state itself are at issue.

Critical to the chances for democratic pluralism is the **independence of the individual from domination by family, clan, landowner, or employer**. In some societies large numbers of people work as bonded laborers or apprentices in conditions little removed from slavery, if not in slavery itself. A society with a small, wealthy elite and a large mass of landless, dependent peasants or workers is particularly difficult ground for democracy. Empirically, modern democracies have risen with the rise of the middle classes to a position of dominance in society. Unused to working together beyond the local community, and dependent economically on a landlord or other feudal boss, the peasant often sees an election as little more than another opportunity to demonstrate his fealty to those above him. On the other hand, the middle classes in most societies are comprised of people with a sense of their own self-worth. No longer willing to be the servants or

lackeys of people immensely more powerful and wealthy, members of the middle classes have always been at the forefront of modern democratic development. Members of this class often have ties both to the classes above them and to the classes below them. They are mobile people, aware of the possibilities of change in society and of the role they can play in that change. Used to working together with people beyond the family or local community for common ends, they are able to utilize the mechanisms of political democracy to achieve their individual and class aims, and thus to struggle with the wealthier and traditionally embedded upper classes on much more equal terms than those in lower classes.

Modern democracy is more likely to be successful in a **society with a high level of literacy and general education**. Education makes possible knowledge of the world beyond the immediate face-to-face community, and thus helps to create the national sense of community without which the modern state, and particularly the modern democracy, cannot exist. It also tends to open up channels to the world beyond the immediate context, so that people in states with insufficient or little democratic pluralism begin to understand that other people live in a world with greater political equality, with more regard for human rights, where change occurs more readily, and ordinary people can have a hand in that change. An educated people is also one that can be more easily organized by political parties or other NGOs around common national objectives. Educated people are easier to communicate with, and they are more able to understand abstract political ideas that may not benefit them directly.

Democracy is also more likely to arise and be maintained in a **society with little extreme deprivation**. It is not true that poor people are uninterested in democracy. At the beginning of their democratic experiments, many Swiss and Americans were quite poor by modern standards. We must also recognize that standards of material well-being, of what is a necessity, vary widely. But every society has some standard, a cultural expectation of what every human being should have. Where this standard is not being met for large numbers, particularly where the numbers living below the standard are increasing, the prospects for effective democratic development are poor. Of course, such a society may turn to democracy as a solution to its problems, but a new democratic system should not be seen as a short-term solution to

a deprivation crisis; selling it as such a solution is likely to setback the long-term prospects for democracy in a country.

Current Problems Affecting Prospects for Democratic Development

Aside from the general considerations noted by the team previously in this section, it will be aware of current conditions that are particularly favorable or unfavorable from the viewpoint of promoting democratic pluralism. Examples of such specifics are:

A rapidly improving economic situation.

Abrupt decline in the world market price for a major export.

Serious guerrilla warfare leading to violent government repression.

Imminent political transition due to the illness or death of a national leader (democratic or antidemocratic).

Collapse of neighboring democratic (nondemocratic) regimes.

Imminent change in the ethnic balance in government.

Widely reported international condemnations of host country human rights violations.

Democratic election appears to be leading to election of government dominated by religious radicals, extreme leftists, or other antidemocratic groups.

Successful land reform policy strengthens government.

Baseline Evaluation

At this point, the DPI team should bring together its preliminary work in the form of a Baseline Evaluation. This should include:

1. The baseline DP behavioral assessment. (See above and Section VI below.)
2. The classificatory position of the country, together with a brief argument for this positioning. (See above.)
3. The host country's historical, social, structural, and economic bases for democracy. (See above.)
4. A discussion of current problems, opportunities, and trends. (See above.)

III. DIAGNOSE OPPORTUNITIES AND DANGERS IN MISSION PROMOTION OF DEMOCRATIC PLURALISM

Develop a Scenario for Deterioration in DP

Certain aspects of the social structure or situation of any country can be identified as likely to lead to deterioration in the level of its democratic pluralism. The team should identify what these are for the host country and describe what negative trends have already appeared that might lead to this decline. The Mission should strive to place some probability on the likelihood of the resulting decline scenario.

Example scenario 1: A developing democracy in Latin America has a past record of military interventions "in the national interest". Economic growth has been very slow or nonexistent for several years, but consumer demand remains high. If the country's democratic leaders are unable to improve the situation and they allow inflation and unemployment to worsen, the chance of military intervention and the temporary setting aside of the democratic system appears high.

Example scenario 2: An authoritarian democracy has started to allow a more authentic political discussion and to reduce censorship. To date this liberalization has been largely inspired by the government's desire to look better internationally; it has been initiated from a position of strength and the assumption of the country's leaders that the people are behind the government. However, if the opposition starts to harshly accuse the government's top leader and his family of massive corruption (about which there have long been rumors), mass antigovernmental demonstrations may take place. The likely short-term outcome will be violent suppression of the demonstrations, the reimposition of censorship, and the imprisonment of opposition leaders. Given the Mission's estimate of the latent hostility of the population to the government -- particularly the young educated, urban population -- should the present liberalization of the society continue, the probability of this sequence of events appears quite high.

Develop a Scenario for Improvement in DP

Equally important for DPI strategy are possibilities for improvement in democratic pluralism.

Example scenario 1: An authoritarian nondemocracy has had a recent history of increasingly intense and extensive contact with advanced democratic states. In particular, many young people, particularly from the ruling family, have been educated in the West. Recently, a relative of the ruler has announced that he believes that eventually the country should become a constitutional monarchy. Since the present ruler is old and has talked of retiring, the Mission might decide that there was a 50/50 probability that a younger member of the family might come to power and institute at least limited democratic reforms, beginning with the freeing of political prisoners and some opening up of the media.

Example scenario 2: An authoritarian experimental democracy is currently under development by its nonelected military ruler. In recent years the press has become increasingly pluralistic and has seriously criticized government policies without government retaliation. The ruler has announced a constitutional conference to establish democracy, and leaders of the nascent opposition have responded favorably. The Mission might conclude that there was a better than even chance that there would be at least a short-term improvement in political rights and civil liberties. But it might also conclude that the probability was low that the planned democratic system would be stable enough to result in the movement of the country out of authoritarian experimental into developing democracy.

Set Mission DPI Goals and Subgoals

After consideration of their country's situation and the construction of a variety of positive and negative DP scenarios, the Mission should be in a position to set short- and long-term DPI goals and subgoals. Because of the intractable nature of the conditions that must be changed to advance or defend democracy, the short-term should be thought of in terms of a one to three year period and the long-term three to twenty years. Choosing short-term goals and subgoals will be more opportunistic and reactive to the immediate situation; choosing long-term goals and subgoals will take more account of the overall

position of the country in terms of the more stable aspects of the team's evaluation, and be directed more toward establishing or maintaining a healthy base for democratic pluralism.

The **short-term goal** reflects the need to specify the near-term hope for the host country's political system that the DPI team thinks should be set as a target. It will generally be a hope that the host country might be helped to move one class higher in the DPI classification, but in some situations the most realistic near-term goal might be to keep the host country in the class where the team has placed it. The DPI team might hope that in the short-term they could help preserve their country's status as, for example, an authoritarian experimental democracy, or they might hope to help advance the host country from a developing to a secure democracy (an achievement that Spain, for example, could be argued to have accomplished in two or three years).

Short-term subgoals to help achieve this goal might include both political and nonpolitical objectives. Some subgoals will be crisis specific. In the example of a likely reversal of recent liberalization in an authoritarian democracy sketched above, the Mission might set as subgoals slowing down the liberalization process, weakening the repressive apparatus, and increasing the strength and complexity of the forces working for change in the country. In the example of a developing democracy facing the threat of military takeover after economic failure, Mission subgoals might become staving off the economic downturn and promoting a national debate on the effectiveness of military "solutions" in situations of this kind.

In general, short-term subgoals will include such objectives as increasing understanding of universal human rights in the populace as a whole, improving the access of the people to information on global trends -- on what is going on in other countries, particularly democracies and democratizing states. They might include improving the organizational network in the country so that a high percentage of people come to identify with organizations outside their own community and to see events in national terms.

The **long-term goal** that the team sets will generally be somewhat more ambitious than the short-term, assuming, for example, that the host country might be helped to move more than one rung up the DPI

ladder to the democratic pluralism of a secure democracy. In setting classificatory goals, the team must work in terms of the possible. One cannot expect that a country with many starving people, low literacy, little exposure to the democratic world, and classified as an authoritarian nondemocracy would become a secure democracy in twenty years. To promote such an expectation could be counterproductive, especially for a Muslim country. One could hope, however, to help such a country develop many aspects of a democratic political culture and become acquainted with democratic forms. Over such a period it would be possible for private organizations in a country to become much more common and powerful, for women to be freed from the most onerous of their disabilities, and for most human rights to come to be respected in law and practice.

Long-term subgoals in support of the long-term goal are sometimes set in terms of institutionalization, such as helping to establish a respected, effective, and independent electoral commission that comes to have powers that the government does not easily brush aside, or an independent judiciary with judges that cannot be dismissed at the whim of government leaders, or a military corps that no longer believes it has the right and responsibility to step in to "save the nation" when the political or economic system deteriorates. Perhaps the most important long-term subgoals would be to change values and attitudes in a more democratic direction. For example, one subgoal might be for the members of a major minority community in a country to come to regard the government it lives under as legitimate; another might be for the majority community in a state to accept the special rights and interests of minorities as legitimate and worthy of respect.

Sample Scenarios with Short- and Long-term Goals and Subgoals

Scenarios for Country A

For this scenario we return to Country A, the authoritarian democracy that was used for the sample evaluation sketch in Section II. Country A's political development has been institutionalized and stabilized at a point well below the achievement of democratic pluralism.

One negative scenario assumes that the regime's continued inability to respond positively to demands for more democratic pluralism leads to a

spiral of protest and repression that gradually reduces DP. Key factors are the strength of the government, the association of most members of the private and public elites with the government, the government's unquestioned control of the security forces, and the government's control of the media and most urban and rural unions. Negative trends include a growing but still largely inarticulate feeling that the people as a whole are not receiving a fair share in the country's economic growth. Other trends are the people's increasing access to forms of communication not under the control of the government (through cross-border media, travel, overseas education, business contacts, etc.), and growing awareness among younger people in all classes of the ways in which political, labor, and other organizational activity and expression of dissent are respected in more democratic countries where imprisonment for reasons of conscience does not occur. In this scenario the government continues to suppress or coopt independent union activity and to detain critics of the government when they try to organize effectively against the system or to publish unauthorized journals. The result is a slow deterioration in human rights at the same time as a radical, antidemocratic movement becomes increasingly active both inside and outside the country. Its violent activities serve to justify the government in its repressions and thus to inhibit the growth of an effective democratic opposition.

One positive scenario imagines a steady, evolutionary movement toward a more democratic polity. The Key factor is the degree of democratic development that already exists. Positive trends are the increasing knowledge, at both elite and popular levels, of the deficiencies in Country A's democratic pluralism and the growing tendency of the government to see the country as an important participant in the new world international economic and social order. In this scenario the government gradually responds to pressures to release the remaining political detainees, to allow a de facto right to strike, and thus to accept a more independent union movement. Leading members of the ruling elite decide that it is more in their long-term interest to move toward an open and internationally acceptable political system than to continue their unquestioned domination of the government through repressive measures.

In terms of these scenarios, the short-term goal might be to move the country to the status of an authoritarian transitional democracy.

Short-term subgoals for the Mission would be to try and stabilize the development of a broader constituency for increased democratic pluralism and to develop psychological barriers to increased repression. To accomplish this, the Mission might support increasing knowledge at all levels of society of international human rights and the political systems of countries with more complete democratic pluralism, that is, to increase the effectiveness of the democratizing pressure of alternative communication channels on the system. Likewise, the Mission would encourage the development of NGOs, particularly in the labor sector.

In this context a reasonable long-term goal would be to help Country A become a fully secure democratic polity. The country does not have the serious ethnic divisions, illiteracy, or extreme poverty that characterize many Third-World states. In addition, there is little threat of military intervention. Perhaps the strongest barrier to this progression is the widely accepted hierarchical value structure and lack of basic respect for individual rights that leads many people to accept the right of top leaders to determine policy and curtail dissent as long as the leaders do not lead the country into disaster. Therefore, to help the country make the full transition to democracy, a subgoal must be to change the values of the people so that they might more readily accept the right to dissent, the rights of ordinary people to challenge their leaders in democracy. Programs to attain this subgoal might include both internal educational and exchange programs.

Scenarios for Country B

Let us then imagine Country B, an authoritarian false democracy with little historical experience with the institutions or assumptions of democratic pluralism. The country has a history of military intervention and the present ruler came to power by this route many years ago. Few people in the country have a civic sense that goes beyond the local community or ethnic group. In spite of a long history of ethnic strife, under the current regime ethnic relations seem relatively peaceful. Country B's sharp economic decline in recent years has not been accompanied by a relaxation of authoritarian controls. A large percentage of its population work in a neighboring, more democratic and prosperous country — many have moved there permanently.

A negative scenario for Country B might be the mounting of a serious resistance movement in the neighboring country, resulting eventually in a military coup by young officers. The officers announce the dismissal of the nominal parliament and the establishment of a radical people's government — essentially a new military government. The key factors in this situation would be the attitudes and strengths of the nonmilitary emigre community, the strength and diversity of NGOs within the country, and the attitudes and opinions of the young officers. The critical negative trends are the combination of economic failure and the lack of change in an authoritarian system while the surrounding world slowly becomes more democratic.

A positive scenario for Country B would see the nascent internal democratic structures, at local and parliamentary levels, and in NGOs at all levels, gradually make their elections and discussions more meaningful. It would foresee a gradual opening of the closed media so that some of the discussion within these groups begins to reach the public. The key factors are the degree to which the ruler and the repressive apparatus under him are willing and able to continue to ignore international human rights criticisms, and the extent to which those within the government or in alternative groups are motivated to take risks. One important positive trend that should not be overlooked, and is inherent in the situation, is the growing knowledge of the possibility of democracy and free discussion that results from both the ever-larger group of people in important positions throughout the society who have received their education in democratic countries and the affect of communications from the emigre community outside the country on the thinking of those within it.

The short-term goal might be to move the country from an authoritarian false democracy to an authoritarian experimental democracy. At this stage, democratic institutions would be by no means strong, but they would be used by all parties to gain experience, as forums for national discussion if not decision. To achieve this goal, Mission sub-goals might include helping NGOs to play a larger part in society: this will particularly include the development of educational organizations in the human rights area. Members of parliament and local councils should be made more aware of how people in these roles operate in other countries. Achieving these objectives might serve to reduce the probability of the negative scenario and increase that of the positive.

To achieve the stability that would make possible this change in the balance of probabilities, it is necessary to also set an indirect subgoal of improving the economic picture so as to reduce the intensity of internal dissatisfaction and to induce some of the most effective and democratically inclined or exposed young people to return to the country.

The long-term goal would be to move the state toward a higher level of democratic pluralism. Realistically the goal is set at achieving the level of an authoritarian transitional democracy in twenty years. To achieve this goal, the Mission sets out several subgoals. It hopes to help lay a basis for economic stability, and help in the development of those civic values and attitudes, such as respect for the individual and group rights of others, without which democratic pluralism is difficult to sustain. The people of Country B should be aided in becoming much more aware of their nation and its evolving political system than is true today. The Mission plans to play a part in the extension of literacy and in the development of the media -- eventually, if not initially, in the development of media free of government direction. In this regard, to tie the country together and to increase its exposure to the world, the Mission considers supporting educational programs that will make it possible for a large part of the population to communicate in, and be educated in, a world language. In Country B this is particularly appropriate, because English is the language of government, even though it is now spoken by no more than a small minority of the people.

IV. EVALUATE THE CURRENT MISSION CONTRIBUTION TO DEMOCRATIC PLURALISM

Steps in the Evaluation

With Mission DPI goals and subgoals tentatively set on the basis of the analysis suggested in Sections I-III, it is time to consider how these might fit into the overall Mission strategy as described in its CDSS. The next steps are:

1. Study the Mission's CDSS and discuss it with other members of the Mission staff. Discuss DPI with them, and the goals and subgoals tentatively agreed on in the previous exercise. Consider with them how the overall Mission strategy might contribute negatively or positively to the DPI goals and subgoals. Generally, most current Mission work will be directly or indirectly supportive of DPI goals. However, since some current Mission programs or projects may interfere with, or run counter to, DPI objectives, possible conflicts should be considered. For example, while supporting the development of independent worker and peasant unions is desirable from a DPI perspective, it may conflict with Mission programs designed to improve product competitiveness — at least in the short run.
2. Investigate how those Mission activities supportive of democratic development identified in (1) are viewed by elites and the general public in the host country. Again, the team should begin its exploration with the Mission staff, but attempts also should be made to learn host country views from the local media and informed persons in the local community.
3. List specific Mission programs (and projects as appropriate), estimating the impact of each on DPI goals and subgoals and the direction of the impact. The listing should be in the form of a simple matrix. The entries should distinguish between direct and indirect program impacts. If a program has an indirect DPI impact, it is of concern to the DPI team only in so far as it aids in achieving economic development, employment or other economic goals. If a program has a direct DPI impact it includes features that aid democratic pluralism in one or another of those ways envisaged by the DPI. A program with direct

DPI effects could theoretically be chosen for its contribution to DP irrespective of its economic effects. For example, a program assisting in improving a road system is essentially economic development while one helping to establish local cooperatives to make better use of a new irrigation scheme would support both economic development and democratic pluralism. The road program has indirect effects by helping the economy, while the cooperative program has direct DPI benefits.

Sample Evaluation Sketch for Current Programs

Average health and education indicators for Country A are lower than should be expected for a country with A's GNP/Capita. As a result, current AID strategy in Country A is to improve the distribution of income and government services, so that the A's overall economic progress is reflected more evenly throughout the economy. Irrespective of DPI concerns, the Mission has decided to target its economic development programs on Country A's more isolated rural areas and the agriculture. An illustrative economic development/DPI matrix follows:

<u>Econ. Programs</u>	<u>DPI Evaluation</u>		
	Effect	Direct/ind	Significance
1. Land reform	+	indirect	very important
2. Training rural co-op leaders	+	direct	important
3. Help Women's NGO extend nationwide	+	direct	important
4. Credit assistance for rural housing	+	indirect	important
5. Establishing county agent system	+/-	indirect	low importance
6. Establishing agricultural research station	+/-	indirect	low importance

The foregoing matrix is only a short sketch of what should be a much more comprehensive undertaking. The matrix might include projects as well as programs, where appropriate. The evaluation of the particular programs is only illustrative; Mission DPI teams might come to quite different conclusions in regard to analogous programs.

V. DESIGN A MISSION DPI SUBSTRATEGY

Defining a Substrategy and Wining Program Ideas

On the basis of the work in the previous sections, the Mission should now be ready to design a DPI substrategy. The substrategy should begin with conclusionary statements on the comparative condition of democracy in the host country, the DP class or classes in which it should be placed, the short- and long-term goals for DPI policy, and the current Mission contributions to the attainment of these goals. It should then discuss DPI priorities as the team sees them.

On this basis, the Mission team should brainstorm program and project ideas that would seem likely to attain its specified goals and subgoals. Ideas should be especially sought out that would fit in with, supplement, or modify what the Mission is currently doing irrespective of DPI. Ideas should include suggestions for adding to or changing on-going programs in ways that will cause them to directly or more directly serve DPI objectives. Add-on DPI programs of this kind will often be the most cost-effective and least politically sensitive programs. The ideas produced by this process should then be winnowed down by eliminating those ideas that appear least feasible or cost-effective, or are in obvious conflict with United States policy. At this stage, the team should err on the side of inclusiveness rather than exclusiveness.

The team, individually or collectively, should then discuss informally project or program ideas with other members of the Mission or Embassy, country experts, and informed citizens of the host country. In discussions outside the Mission staff, of course the team will be careful to avoid discussions that could in any way affect the sensibilities of the people in the host country. In particular, no discussion should be phrased in a way that indicates the Mission has any intention of interfering in the internal political affairs of the country. Ideally discussions of an idea should include from the Mission the individual most supportive of, and knowledgeable about, the idea and one or more persons neutral or skeptical toward it. The reactions of the discussants should then be summarized. Where discussions have led to a consensus that the original idea should be significantly modified or replaced by

another, this idea should then be reported along with any reactions to it that have been received.

The DPI team should then develop a final list of DPI programs, along with sample projects that might fall under each. Add-on programs, where they make a significant change in, or addition to, an economic development program, should be identified here as add-on DPI programs. The assumptions behind each program should be specified, together with how it serves short- or long-term goals and subgoals. The question of minimum costs should be addressed for each program, and a curve of cost-effectiveness with increasing program size should be suggested. An indication of the priority assigned to each program should be indicated.

Included alongside the list of DPI programs should be a list of DPI-related programs. This should include current non-DPI programs that have direct DPI impacts and non-DPI programs with indirect impacts where these impacts are felt to be especially important. The primary emphasis in the listing of programs should be placed on DPI programs and add-on DPI programs, so that the effort is clearly much more than a reanalysis of programs originally undertaken in support of economic development.

The team's conclusions should then be reexamined through discussion with members of the Mission outside the team. They should be reexamined particularly in terms of cost and cost-effectiveness, political sensitivity or other political dangers, and the possible interference of the suggestions with the Mission's overall strategy, or with particular on-going Mission programs or projects.

The final conclusions should then be organized by the team into a coherent DPI substrategy statement, including goals, subgoals, and programs.

Sample DPI Substrategy and Program Sketch for a Developing Democracy

Comparative condition of democratic pluralism and problem context:
Country B has long established political and civil freedoms that place it comparatively just below the advanced industrial democracies

in the West. Although there are still a number of political prisoners as a result of recent civil disturbances, these cannot be said unequivocally to be prisoners of conscience. Effective host country human rights monitors have spotlighted their plight and the monitors' criticisms have been regularly aired in the press, if not in the government-controlled broadcasting services. The country's status as a "developing democracy", however, rests on more than problems in basic freedoms. The principal minority ethnic group in the south of the country continues to demand special consideration, and armed terrorists from this minority sporadically assassinate one or more members of the security forces or majority political leaders. Calls on the government by leaders of the majority people in the north to retaliate harshly against the terrorists and their supporters have become increasingly hard to resist. In addition, economic growth has stagnated in recent years throughout the country. Rural areas in the north have been repeatedly threatened with famine. The government has been forced to import food, thereby exacerbating its severe balance of payments deficit.

Mission goals and subgoals:

The highest priority short-term mission DPI subgoal is to improve relations at both elite and popular levels between the majority north and the dissident south. An important indirect DPI subgoal is to stabilize the economic situation in both the north and south. If these are achieved, then the Mission hopes to be able to achieve the primary short-term goal of stemming the apparent trend for the host country to decline to an embattled democracy or authoritarian democracy through a threatened cycle of revolt and repression.

The long-term goal is to raise the country to the level of a developing democracy. The subgoal is to achieve a more effective, efficient, and secure political system in which all portions of the population feel that they are equal citizens involved in the democratic system, and that that system brings them tangible benefits.

Mission programs:

The Mission decides to undertake a variety of programs to strengthen the density of NGO activity in both rural and urban areas so that people at all levels have a greater sense of participation and political power. These programs are structured so that the organizational activity that is supported is all national in scope, thereby bringing people from all regions together to work on common problems. A

major project under this program is the establishment of a nonpartisan "civic coalition for democracy" that will assist in a wide variety of political and nonpolitical organizational activity and training, thereby increasing the number of people with a stake in the system and increasing the opportunity for people with different interests and backgrounds to work together for a common end. In addition, educational programs are developed for extending the knowledge of all persons of the country and its democratic system, and for teaching tolerance and respect for people of different ethnic backgrounds.

Sample DPI Substrategy and Program Sketch for an Authoritarian Experimental Democracy

Comparative condition of democratic pluralism and problem context:

Country C has not had a record of recognizing either political or civil liberties. Comparatively, however, it is classified as an "authoritarian experimental democracy" because many of the institutions of democracy have recently been established by decree. A parliament has been elected; however, it functions as little more than a debating society and is essentially powerless. The country possesses neither the network of powerful professional, business, labor, or peasant organizations nor the independent media that could stand in the way of the government also revoking by decree the elements of democracy it has just invoked. There are no political parties. Individual religious leaders remain strong, but they are disunited and generally suspicious of those aspects of democratic pluralism that they see as imports from the West. The army is significant politically, and has an unfortunate tradition of political interference. The people are extremely poor and have high infant mortality rates; however, the economy is growing slowly and is able to meet the still very low expectations of the bulk of the population.

Mission goals and subgoals:

The primary short-term goal is to preserve the democratic gains that have been achieved. Subgoals are to strengthen the legislature and improve its acceptance by the people of the country and to develop popular information media so that through demonstrated objectivity they might achieve credibility.

Long-term subgoals are more numerous and significant. They include greatly improving literacy and the general level of citizen

information about their own country. It is hoped that knowledge of democracy can be increased at every level. Another subgoal is to develop democratic organizational activity, both within government structures and through independent organizations (to the extent this is politically feasible). A subgoal is the modernization of the legal system. If all these subgoals can be achieved, it should be possible within twenty years to reach the goal of achieving an authoritarian transitional democracy that is well on its way toward the level of a developing democracy.

Mission programs:

Several Mission DPI programs are educational, ranging from a mass literacy program partially supported by USAID to programs for the training of new members of the legislature and judiciary, to educational programs for reporters and others involved in the media, to support for mass popular education with a civic component. One program is established to assist, through workshops and consulting on organizational problems, the development of political parties able to operate throughout the country. Another program is directed to the establishment in the capital city of NGOs concerned with support of human rights and good government. (Although these latter two programs would be unthinkable in many countries, in this particular situation the government encourages them, at least for the time being.) Mission add-on DPI programs include the establishment of a peasant movement and local democratic governments in areas affected by a major resettlement scheme financed in part by USAID funds.

VI. EVALUATING THE MISSION DPI EFFORT

DPI Performance Measures

DPI performance measures are necessarily less precise than those used for measuring economic development. Creating and using such measures is particularly difficult when there is a requirement for annual performance measures. Nevertheless, it is possible on the basis of the considerations discussed in Parts I and II to develop the following comprehensive checklist. Sample questions that might be asked under most items are included in parentheses. Of course, no one program, and even no one Mission strategy can be expected to affect all items on such a list. Missions DPI teams may wish to add, subtract, or redefine items in this standard list according to their specific needs. Arranged according to the subobjectives in Section I the items are:

A. Open and Adequate Dissemination of Information

Direct measures:

the extent or degree of:

1. freedom from direct media censorship.
(How often and to what extent has media censorship been employed during the last year? How significant has this been for curtailing the national discussion?)
2. freedom of the public media from other forms of censorship or control.
(Who owns the media? If there is significant government ownership, to what degree is there commitment to a presentation of all points of view on the BBC model? How significant is self-censorship in the private media?)
3. freedom of politically relevant discussion among individuals.
(How freely do people discuss political issues with others in the community or outsiders?)

4. freedom from government reprisal -- such as imprisonment, torture and dismissal -- against individuals expressing opinion or disseminating information.
5. freedom from private reprisal, including assassination, against individuals expressing opinion or disseminating information.
(Do citizens express themselves free of fear that local warlords or terrorists will harm them? Do tenant farmers or farm workers express opinions free of fear of landowners or supervisors? Are women able to express their opinions free of fear of male reprisal?)
6. access to information about governmental activities.
(Are governmental statistics easily available to reporters or others? Are heads of government departments open to questioning in the legislature or otherwise?)

Indirect quantitative measures:

7. number of cases of unadjudicated political imprisonment.
8. number of documented or estimated cases of execution, assassination, torture, or disappearance.

B. Effective Channels for Popular Influence on Government (Voice)

the strength and coverage of:

9. issue-oriented NGOs:
 - a. human rights monitoring groups.
 - b. "good government" educational and advocacy groups.
 - c. special interest groups (eg. consumer, environmental).

10. peasant, labor, business, and professional groups.
11. religious organizations, formal and informal.
12. economic organizations (private corporations, cooperatives).

(For all groups in B ask: Do these groups exist? To what extent are they independent of government [or business and landowners in the case of peasant and labor organizations]? Do the groups operate or recruit membership without hindrance? To what extent are these groups allowed to participate in the political process?)

C. Open and Fair Elections (Choice)

the degree to which:

13. the system is based on free and fair elections without fear or compulsion from any quarter.
(Have the recent elections been generally free of violent interference or dishonesty in the voting process? Has the selection of candidates offered a fair chance to all parts of the community?)
14. control of the political process is in the hands of those elected.
(Have military officers, foreign governments, or other forces intervened in, or cast their shadow on, government decision making or policy execution?)
15. the system responds to voter desires expressed through ballots or referenda.
(Did the recent elections directly or indirectly ask voters to choose among policies? Are those elected generally pursuing the policies that they advocated in their campaigns?)
16. minority desires play a role in political decisions.
(Are minority concerns adequately taken into account by

leading political parties? Is there provision for ensuring they will be represented in the political process?

17. the political system allows voter choice at regional and local levels.
 (To what extent do provincial, district, or local levels of government possess independent powers of decision, especially taxing and budgetary powers? To what extent are office holders at these levels chosen through democratic processes?)

D. Democratic and Effective Governance

Direct measures:

the degree of:

18. government control over the country.
 (Are portions of the country essentially under the control of local leaders, military commanders, guerrilla organizations or other forces?)
19. effective, fair executive policy implementation.
 (Is the bureaucracy responsive to political changes in the country? Can development policies be carried through effectively?)
20. open and useful legislative discussion and decision.
 (Are there means for reporting legislative discussions? Are most legislative sessions open to the public? Do legislators actively criticize governmental actions? How often and to what extent do legislators vote against governmental proposals?)
21. fair and efficient administration of judicial services.
 (Is there habeas corpus? Do people languish in jail for years without trial? Are poor people, or those out of governmental favor able to obtain lawyers?)

22. for all three branches, is there:

- a. operation relatively free of special interest interference.
- b. consultation with those affected by policies and their implementation.
- c. effort to reach consensus where minority interests would be severely damaged by majoritarian or executive decision.
- d. respect for generally recognized individual and group human rights in policy implementation, legislative, or judicial decision.

the extent to which:

23. the security services act in a disciplined manner in accordance with government directives.

(Can the government act without fear in its relations with its security services? Can the officers in these services discipline those under them for illegal activities?)

24. violent criminal or revolutionary activity is controlled by the government.

(Can the security services guarantee the security of citizens against terrorist attacks? Can they adequately control mobs that attack groups that are out of favor?)

Indirect quantitative measures:

the number of:

25. cases of ethnic violence reported during the past year.

26. cases of nonethnic terrorist or guerrilla attacks reported during the past year.

E. Democratic Political Culture

the extent of elite and popular:

27. respect for the values, opinions, and rights of other individuals and groups, in particular:
 - a. the right to express differing or unpopular opinion.
 - b. tolerance for different ways of life, religions, etc.
28. knowledge of the political system.
29. belief in change through the political system.
30. commitment to the democratic political system, or to the idea of such a system.
31. sense of individual responsibility to work for change through the political system.

(To answer questions in this area the Mission team will need to develop a capability to assess and reassess host country information levels, opinions, attitudes and values. Although this can and should be done informally, the Mission should be concerned to develop a formal opinion and information assessment capability in the private sector if it does not exist.)

Employing the Performance Measures for Overall DP Assessment

The foregoing checklist should be used in the planning phase of the Mission DPI team's work to establish the Baseline DP Behavioral Assessment. (This should already have been carried out at the conclusion of Section II above, but may need to be updated or revised.) In preparing this baseline, under each heading the team should write a short narrative description of the state of that item as they see it, with perhaps some examples of conditions, events, or statistics that support their judgment. Wherever possible comparative statements might also

be made in regard to how this description might compare to other countries with which team members are familiar.

Annually, the Mission team should expect to reassess, in consultation with others, the checklist items and rewrite the narrative descriptions as appears necessary. For each item in which a change in the description is felt necessary a judgment should then be made as to whether the new description represents no change (0), improvement (+), or decline (-) in an item. If equal weight is given to each checklist item, which is the most defensible procedure initially, then an annual "quantitative" assessment can be based on the balance of plus and minus changes. A qualitative description of changes, and especially of trends and emerging opportunities and dangers should accompany the yearly numerical exercise.

Program and Project DPI Assessment

Before its initiation, the DPI team should indicate for each program or project what checklist items the program or project should be expected to affect. The expected effect should generally be positive, but there may be cases where a program or project is undertaken that has an acceptable risk of causing a decline in a particular indicator. (Recent democratization in the USSR, for example, has reduced the ability of the government to govern effectively in some parts of the country, and has increased certain forms of internal political violence -- while greatly reducing others).

Annually, the team should then note whether the program or project has had the expected effect. Since it cannot be assumed that a Mission DPI program will significantly change a checklist indicator nationwide in a year's time, assessments at this level should concentrate on looking for evidence of more limited changes that may have occurred.

In addition to checklist items, programs and projects should also be undertaken only after additional performance indicators have been developed for the particular undertaking. For example, a program to help in the development of peasant unions might choose as one indicator the annual increase in dues-paying union members. Since this kind of indicator is regularly developed for current Mission programs, this

requirement for DPI programs and projects needs only to be mentioned in passing.

Concluding Note on DPI Assessment

It should be reemphasized that Mission attempts to assist the host country in moving toward increased democratic pluralism should not be undertaken with an assumption that quick, annual results can be achieved. To do so would be likely in many cases to lead to a possibly unwarranted sense of failure and in other cases to a tendency to concentrate on projects with apparently quick DP payoffs rather than long-range, yet perhaps ultimately more important, efforts -- for example, in civic education. It is also important to realize that the apparent DP status of many less developed countries often varies widely from year to year and that initially Mission activity will have little impact on this oscillation. In cases of this kind, a country's annual checklist performance assessment is likely to show declines and gains irrespective of Mission DPI activity. For this reason, it is important at the time of the baseline assessment, and annually thereafter, to discuss current trends, so that this consideration can be included in making final judgments on what DPI is accomplishing in a country.