CARE

REPATRIATION OF THE AFGHANISTAN REFUGEES

AND ANTICIPATED FOOD NEEDS

Prepared by
CARE

for the United States Agency
for International Development

January 10, 1989

Mr. John Gunning
Office of the AID Representative
C/C U.S. Embassy
Islamabad, Pakistan

Subject: Report on Post Soviet food needs in Afghanistan as outlined under Section A. of Attachment 2 of USAID Grant # 306-0201-G-00-8947-00.

Dear John,

The attached revised report entitled, Repatriation of the Afghanistan Refugees and Anticipated Food Needs, contains modificatons and amendments discussed at our November 14, 1988, meeting. Only the main body of the report is submitted herewith since maps and annexes, contained in the original submission of November 7, 1988, remain unchanged.

We trust the attached will meet with your approval.

Sincerely,

for Joseph Steele
Chief of Mission
CARE-International
Pakistan

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

I. Overview

This Report uses the same "Regional Breakdown by Province" as is found in Richard English's Preliminary Report on Conditions Affecting the Repatriation of Afghan Refugees, June 1988 (hereinafter referred to as the "English Report"). This format is identical to that used by the Swedish Committee for Afghanistan in their Agricultural Survey of Afghanistan, May 1988 (hereinafter referred to as "Swedish Committee Report") with the exception of Zabul Province, which the Swedish Committee included in the East Central Region. For purposes of consistency with the English Report we have included Zabul in the Southern Region.

A. Population Studies

The Afghan refugee rate of repatriation, the quantitative absolute number, evaluated against a time line for their return, will assist in determining what food requirements will be needed to sustain the increased population. However, this return rate must be evaluated against existing conditions and circumstances, with an analysis of both population and current agricultural capabilities within a given Region, Province or Ulueswali (District) before a determination can be made regarding what the additional requirements will be.

Pre-war statistics vary dramatically. The population in Afghanistan prior to 1979 was estimated at 12 to 15 million people. According to the Afghanistan census of 1979, the population was 12.9 million people, which did not account for the nomad population of 1.5 to 2 million people. Urban population was 15% of the total; the balance rural farm owners.

Since the war, estimates of the number of refugees, as well as the population in-country, has been difficult to ascertain. Refugee figures are cited as 3.9 million to 5 million people, excluding the internally displaced, which can be as much as another 2 million people.

Of the original pre-war population, almost 10% have been killed. Thirty-three percent are estimated to be refugees now located in both Pakistan and Iran. An additional 11% have been displaced by the war. Only 23% are thought to be living in the rural countryside, and fully 24% are now living in the urban areas, seeking a safe haven from the war. (See English Report, page 63.)

The Swedish Committee estimates the current rural population to be no more than 7 million and the current refugee population to be approximately 3 million in Pakistan and 1.5 million in Iran. Ray Hooker, in his report Food Prospects In Afghanistan, An Assessment (June, 1987 for VITA under contract with USAID), estimated the 1987 population in-country to be 82% of the 1979 total of 15.2 million, for a total current population figure of approximately 12.5 million people. Calculations were based on fatality figures plus the net-out migration, including a 2.3% in-country population growth rate.

The Office of the AID Representative for Afganistan, relying on data derived from the Afghan Demographic Study (ADS) of the mid 70's (adjusted for assumed population growth, refugees out flow and war deaths), estimates that between 8 and 10 million people remain inside Afghanistan.

While virtually all estimates of the pre-war population of Afganistan and, thus of necessity, estimates of more recent periods, deserve to be treated with a healthy dose of scepticism, those consequent to the Afghan Demographic Studies Survey (ADS) appear to be most reliable. This document, therefore, uses the ADS '79 and '88 Steady State Population projections by province as base-line data. These projections were established by adjusting ADS '73 population figures by a factor of 1.043, to correct for an observed under count of 4.3%, and a 2.2% annual growth rate.

The following table, compares ADS unadjusted '73 population estimates with ADS '79 and '88 Steady State Population projections by province:

PROVINCE	ADS UNADJUSTED '73 POPULATION	ADS STEADY STATE '79 POPULATION	ADS STEADY STATE '88 POPULATION
KABUL	911,927	1,083,802	1,318,281
KAPISA	313,974	373,150	453,880
PARWAN	391,359	465,120	565,749
MAYDAN	308,344	366,459	445,742
LOGAR	188,329	223,825	272,249
GHAZNI	538,083	639,497	777,852
PAKTIKIA	146,743	174,400	212,131
PAKTYA	328,288	390,161	474,572
NANGARHAR	769,495	914,525	1,112,381
KONAR	244,069	290,069	352,825
LAGHMAN	289,880	344,514	419,050
BADAKSHAN	358,757	426,374	518,619
TAKHAR	345,856	411,041	499,969
BAGHLAN	266,762	317,040	385,631
KUNDUZ	315,563	375,038	456,177
SAMANGAN	208,503	247,800	301,412
BALKH	403,844	479,958	583,796
JOWZJAN	454,214	539,822	656,612
FARYAB	450,576	535,498	651,353
BADGHIS	245,643	291,940	355,101
HERAT	645,242	766,853	932,761
FARAH	253,778	301,609	366,862
NIMROZ	107,611	127,893	155,563
HELMAND	324,962	386,209	469,765
KANDAHAR	545,653	648,495	788,796
ZABUL	110,880	131,778	160,288
ORUZGAN	335,752	399,033	485,363
GHOR	165,373	196,542	239,063
BAMYAN	217,900	258,969	314,996
TOTAL	10,187,360	12,107,414	14,726,839
NOMADS	1,074,000	1,248,944	1,519,152
TOTAL	11,261,360	13,356,358	16,245,991

Hence, the pre-war; 1979, population of Afghanistan is calculated at 13.35 million. Similarly, under the assumption of steady state growth (No change in the crude rate of growth), the 1988

population is calculated at 16.24 million. This assumption is of course false but does provide a meaningful starting point from which to develop our projections.

Using the 1988 ADS Steady State projection (16.24 million), as our base-line figure, adjustments have been made by way of subtracting out the estimated actual refugees and the estimated proportional war related deaths per province to arrive at the adjusted '88 population. Refugee figures used in this report are based on Government of Pakistan, UNHCR and VITA estimates as of February 1988. War related deaths are estimated at 10% of the pre-war; 1979 population.

The following table reflects the adjusted '88 population figures by province in keeping with the above adjustment factors. Adjustments have been made for an estimated 1.4 million nomads thought to be living in Afghanistan as well as an estimated 300,000 unregistered refugees in Pakistan.

REGION	ADS 79 SS	ADS 88 SS	-WAR DEATHS	-REFUGEES	ADJUSTED '88
(NORTH)	//	//			
FARYAB	535,498	651,353	53,550	N/A	597,803
JAWZJAN	539,822	656,612	53,982	7,000	595,630
BALKH	479,958	583,797	47,996	13,000	522,801
SAMANGAN	247,800	301,412	24,780	15,000	261,632
TOTAL	1,803,078	2,193,174	180,308	35,000	1,977,866
(NORTH EAST)	//				
BAGHLAN	317,040	385,632	31,704	104,000	249,928
TAKHAR	411,041	499,970	41,104	5,000	453,866
KUNDUZ	375,038	456,177	37,504	76,000	342,673
BADAKHSHAN	426,374	518,620	42,637	29,000	446,983
TOTAL	1,529,493	1,860,399	152,949	214,000	1,493,450
(EAST)	//				
PAKTYA	390,161	474,572	39,016	349,000	86,556
NANGARHAR	914,525	1,112,382	91,453	399,000	621,929
LAGHMAN	344,514	419,050	34,451	224,000	160,599
KUNAR	290,069	352,825	29,007	223,000	100,818
TOTAL	1,939,269	2,358,829	193,927	1,195,000	969,902
(EAST CENTRAL)	//				
KABUL	1,083,802	1,318,283	108,380	69,000	1,140,903
BAMYAN	258,969	314,997	25,897	N/A	289,100
PARWAN	465.120	565,749	46,512	53,000	466,237
LOGAR	223,825	272,250	22,383	283,000	(33,133)
WARDAK/MAYDAN	366,459	445,742	36,646	9,000	400,096
KAPISA	373,150	453,881	37,315	N/A	416,566
GHAZNI	639,497	777,852	63,950	380,000	333,902
TOTAL	3,410,822	4,148,754	341,083	794,000	3,013,671

(SOUTH)	//////////	//////////	//////////	//////////	//////////
HELMAND	386,209	469,765	38,621	155,000	276,144
KANDAHAR	648,495	788,797	64,850	466,000	257,947
NIMROZ	127,893	155,563	12,789	117,000	25,774
PAKTIKA	174,400	212,131	17,440	268,000	(73,309)
URUZGAN	399,033	485,364	39,903	51,000	394,461
ZABUL	131,778	160,288	13,178	49,000	98,110
TOTAL	1,867,808	2,271,908	186,781	1,106,000	979,127
(NORTH WEST)	//////////	//////////	//////////	//////////	//////////
HERAT	766,853	932,762	76,685	700,000	156,077
GHOR	196,542	239,064	19,654	43,000	176,410
BADGHIS	291,940	355,101	29,194	43,000	282,907
FARAH	301,609	366,862	30,161	200,000	136,701
TOTAL	1,556,944	1,893,789	155,694	986,000	752,095
GRAND TOTAL	12,107,414	14,726,853	1,210,742	4,330,000	9,186,111
PLUS NOMADS	1,248,944	1,519,153	124,894		1,394,259
ADJUSTED	13,356,358	16,246,006	1,335,636	4,330,000	10,580,370
	PLUS UNREGISTERED REFUGEES---------->			300,000	(300,000)
				4,630,000	10,280,370

B. Rate of Repatriation

The Afghan refugees rate of repatriation is fundamental to determining what the food needs will be. Although all authorities agree that Afghanistan is food sufficient - either importing or producing current requirements - the sheer number of refugees ready to return creates the potential for a significant food shortage. The international community must be ready to respond to a "worst case" scenario.

When will the refugees begin to return and in what numbers? The refugees have set several pre-conditions for their return: that the province or district to which they are returning is secured, i.e. that the Soviets and Kabul Regime have withdrawn; that the mines have been cleared*; and that an Islamic government is installed in Kabul. Of the three, most experts agree that once an area has been secured and relatively free of mines, the refugees will begin to return. Assuming these pre-conditions are met by February 15, 1989, the final date for Soviet withdrawal as set by the Geneva Accords, refugees may be expected to state returning. But only to those areas, districts or provinces that are secure; and it is inconceivable that the entire country will be secured simultaneously.

* * * * * * * * *

* The number of mines in Afghanistan is estimated at 5 to 15 million. This report does not discuss the issue of mine clearance since it is not germane to an analysis of total food requirements. It is, of course, critical to determining when specific tribes of refugees will return to a particular district or province, but is outside the limited scope of this report.

Should there be no "push" or "pull" effect by the international community - cutting the supplies to the refugee camps creating a "push-out" or providing massive centralized supplies in-country creating a "pull-in" - the estimates for the refugee return rate are not exceedingly high. Between a 10% and 25% return is expected for the first six months of repatriation, 50% for the subsequent twelve month period, with the balance returning thereafter and 5% not at all. (See VITA's Food Report, Third Draft, April 1988.)

There is much disagreement among experts concerning whether the refugees will send able-bodied men back to the villages and farms to cultivate the first crop leaving their families behind in the camps, or return immediately with their families without the security of a consistent food source. Dr. English asserts the former as a likely scenario, but Drs. Carter and Azoy in their report Agricultural and Rural Reconstruction in Afghanistan, (April 1988) disagree strongly based on interviews they conducted with men living in the Pakistan camps. "Reconstruction is a person's responsibility to be accomplished by each man together with his family."

Considering all available information to date, this report evaluates wheat requirements based on 10% and 25% return for the first six-month period of repatriation. The methodology is available to use other rates of return, even 50% or 100%. Annexes containing tables of wheat requirements based on rates of return calculated at 10% increments are provided for those who wish to consider other scenarios.

If the refugees begin returning by February, the first six months will encompass whatever wheat harvests there were for those areas where farmers have already returned to sow a crop. (See English Report, Annex Table 3). Obviously, the success of these harvests depends on the current availability of seed and fertilizer and assumes a sufficient level of rainfall. (See generally, Swedish Committee Report.) Additionally, the marketplace will provide certain levels of imports, which can only be estimated based on past performance and interviews with cross-border traders. During the initial phase of repatriation, information will become available with respect to current productivity capabilities and import levels, as well as actual numbers of return refugees, to significantly out-date this report.

C. National Agricultural Capabilities and Current Levels of Wheat Imports

This report evaluates wheat requirements for Regional populations based on the adjusted daily and annual allowance currently being distributed in the refugee camps in Pakistan. Thus, 186 kilograms per person annually has been reduced to 150 kilograms per person in acknowledgment of the large extent non adult refugee population. Other food distributions currently being made at the camps are edible oil, sugar, tea and when available, dry skim milk, rice and oats. Only wheat requirements are discussed herein.

Specific data on other food commodities currently being produced in-country are not readily available. Since wheat is a staple for the diet - other commodities not being as critical to daily nutritional requirements - extrapolations and conclusions were drawn only on anticipated wheat needs.

However, wherever possible each of the regional profiles discusses general pre-war production of all agricultural commodities and current capabilities based on assumptions and data collected by the Swedish Committee. When first-hand data can be collected, individual districts and provinces should be separately analyzed to determine long-term production capabilities.

Prior to 1979, Afghanistan was considered primarily food sufficient, either producing or importing its own requirements. According to Afghan Agricultural Figures, 1978, reproduced by the Swedish Committee, wheat production comprised over 38% of the total national agricultural production. Other critical crops included maize, barley and rice. Cotton, fruits and vegetables were cash crops. From 1975 to 1978 agricultural imports fell from 25% to 15% of the total commodity imports for the country. (See Swedish Committee Report, page 13.)

The Northeast, followed by the North, was considered the most important agricultural area in Afghanistan. These provinces produced surplus food commodities sold elsewhere in the country. Even throughout the war, the provinces of the North and Northeast were considered food sufficient.

Together, the North and the Northeast regions represented 41% of the total national irrigated land areas and 54% of the total dryland agriculture with wheat, rice and barley being the most important crops. Additionally, 80% of the country's entire wheat crop was cultivated on irrigated land, hence the critical importance of these regions. In all the regions throughout Afghanistan, wheat was is the primary crop, with 1.5 million hectacres of irrigated land dedicated to wheat production and 1.2 million hectacres of non-irrigated land producing wheat.

As with all statistics relating to Afghanistan, estimates vary significantly with respect to current agricultural production levels relative to 1978 outputs. Ray Hooker's report to VITA, Food Prospects in Afghanistan, 1987 indicates a 30% drop in overall production. The Swedish Committee indicates a 33% decline in irrigated wheat production, a 50% decline in dryland wheat production in 1986 and an overall agricultural decline of 55% from 1978 levels. Although average yields increased in 1987, production was still down 47% from 1978 levels.

Agricultural specialists expected 1988 to be an even better year for production than 1987. In some provinces, particularly Takhar, Kunduz and Baghlan in the Northeast this was true. Throughout this report assumptions were made that the ecological systems will be favorable to production and that no natural disaster will occur to limit production.

If we use the Swedish Committee figures and assume that the agricultural potential is at 50% of the 1978 levels, only 1.3 million metric tons of wheat is being produced in - country. Additionally, VITA and the Swedish Committee experts estimate that 300,000 to 400,000 metric tons of Soviet wheat is imported and another 150,000 to 200,000 tons is transported by traders cross-border from Pakistan. Indeed, offtake from Pakistan during the month of November, 1988 was reported to be fully 30,000 metric tons.

Together this represents an availability of approximately 1.8 to 1.9 million metric tons of wheat annually. Using the ADS '79 Steady State projections as population figures for that year (13.35 million people) and reducing this number by the estimated actual refugees, estimated unregistered refugees and the estimated proportional war related deaths per province (see explanation of Population Analysis and Anticipated Repatriation), the total 1988 population in-country is 8.88 million people. Add to this figure an estimated but unaccounted for nomad population of 1.39 million people and the current in-country population is increased to 10.27 million. This figure multiplied by 150 kilograms of wheat per person annually evidences an approximate national wheat requirement of 1.54 million metric tons annually - marginally less than the current estimates of wheat availability in-country.

The decline in agricultural production from pre-war levels has been attributed to the following factors according to the Swedish Committee:

1. The direct effects of the war, particularly the policy of deliberate and systematic destruction of croplands and irrigation systems;

2. Reduction in farm labor and animal farm power;

3. Decline in the genetic potential of wheat seed;

4. The dramatic decline in the use of fertilizer.

Immediate factors contributing to the current level of food sufficiency is the amount of rain in the Northern provinces and the quantity of imports, both from Pakistan and the Soviet Union. Should either of these contributing factors be altered, or should the country face a natural disaster, such a wide-spread and prolonged drought, Afghanistan would not be able to sustain its existing population and would certainly not be able to absorb any significant repatriation.

D. Explanation of Regional Population Analysis and Anticipated Repatriation Charts

Each regional profile includes a chart entitled "Population Analysis and Anticipated Repatriation". The Provinces are evaluated individually based on 1979 population figures using the ADS '79 Steady State population projections. Total refugee population figures are based on Government of Pakistan, UNHCR and VITA estimates. Total estimated refugees as of February 1988 were 4.33 million with an additional 300,000 estimated unregistered.

Column 3 represents the adjusted '88 ADS based figure of current population in-country calculated against the '79 ADS Steady State figure for each province.

Column 4 represents refugee figures based on Government of Pakistan, UNHCR and VITA estimates.

Columns 5 and 6 calculate the rate of return, showing quantitative figures for each province should 10% of the refugees return, and again if 25% return.

Hence, the chart for each region is included as follows:

POPULATION ANALYSIS AND ANTICIPATED REPATRIATION

Region: NORTH

Province	'79 ADS Steady State Population	'88 ADS Adjusted Population	Number of Refugees	10% Return	25% Return
Faryab	535,498	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Jawzjan	589,000	400,520	7,000	401,220	402,970

II. Regional Profiles

Each region will be analyzed by pre-war population and production capabilities, the general effects of the war, refugee net-out migration, current population in-country and total wheat requirements. Where there was sufficient data, conclusions were drawn with respect to food surplus, sufficient and deficit provinces or regions.

A. NORTH Faryab, Jawzjan, Balkh, Samangan

Total Refugee Population: 35,000

Percentage of Refugee Population: less than 1%

Considered the second most important agricultural region in the country, it is also of strategic importance to the Russians with each province bordering on the Soviet Union. The topography is flat and desert-like in the northern most areas and becomes more mountainous toward the east and south. The area between the mountains and desert is farmland.

Prior to the war this region had 24% of the total irrigated land area and 24% of the total cultivated rainfed area. Crops included wheat, barley and cotton, among others.

Farmers from this region interviewed by the Swedish Committee, cite war effects as their number one problem. (In Balkh, 80% of those interviewed said this was their biggest problem). Although, many became internally displaced persons, moving to the more mountainous southern areas of the provinces, many people from this region chose not to leave since transport to Pakistan is very difficult.

According to Dr. Azum Gul and other knowledgeable Afghans, the region is capable of producing enough food for its own consumption and with normal rainfall, can export to the East central region. However, according to reports from returning refugees, Faryab province had not had any significant rainfall since the spring up until the end of summer '88 and suffered from insect infestation. Faryab's provincial capital of Maimana has traditionally been self-sufficient, providing a surplus of grain other parts of the North and East central regions.

(Lack of available roads combined with great distances to the western provinces made transport to the Northwest Region impossible). This year the limited rain fall and insect damage appears to have caused the price of wheat in Maimana to be 50 afghanis per seer higher than in the rest of the province. Ray Hooker's report Food Prospects in Afghanistan 1987, cited Jawzjan, Faryab and the Northwest province of Badghis as potential food shortage areas for 1987-1988. Of the three, Faryab is still considered vulnerable. Dr. Abdul Wakil from VITA, stated that the most important input for this region is fertilizer, which if used properly could produce 4 to 5 tons more of wheat for each ton of fertilizer used. In the event of massive repatriation, it is critical that this region become a food surplus area as quickly as possible.

The English Report indicates that tribes from this region - Turkman and Uzbek - are dissimilar from their host population in the Punjab, which may create the impetus for an early return.

UNHCR coded this region for Phase III of repatriation and program assistance based on low density of the population, and transport difficulties.

POPULATION ANALYSIS AND ANTICIPATED REPATRIATION

Region: NORTH

Province	79 ADS STEADY STATE POPULATION	'88 ADS ADJUSTED POPULATION	NUMBER OF REFUGEES	PLUS 10% RETURN	PLUS 25% RETURN
Faryab	535,498	597,803	N/A	597,803	597,803
Jawzjan	539,822	595,630	7,000	596,330	597,380
Balkh	479,958	522,801	13,000	524,101	526,051
Samangan	247,800	261,632	15,000	263,132	265,382
	1,803,078	1,977,866	35,000	1,981,366	1,986,616

*Population totals do not include refugee figures for Faryab.

Current annual wheat requirements for the existing population can be calculated as follows:

Current total population: 1,977,866
(multiplied by)
150 kg/wheat per person annually = 296,679 metric tons

Should refugees begin to return in the spring, additional annual metric ton wheat requirements will be:

Current refugee population: 35,000

10% refugee population: 3,500
3,500 x 150 kg/wheat per person 525 metric tons

25% refugee population: 8,750
8,750 x 150 kg/wheat per person: 1,312 metric tons

SURVEY OF AVERAGE WHEAT PRICES
Figures Consolidated From VITA Reports
(Per Seer in Afghanis)

	April/May 1985	April/May 1986	April/May 1987	April/May 1988	June 1988
Faryab	175	325	395	255	390
Jawzjan	185	290	110	230	180
Samangan	125	205	355	215	200
Balkh	115	180	265	250	190

These charts suggests that the North is unlikely to suffer from serious food shortages when the refugees begin to return unless a natural disaster occurs. However, without inputs of fertilizer and seed, and possibly farm power, it will not be able to provide the surplus food commodities into the general marketplace.

B. NORTHEAST Baghlan, Takhar, Kunduz, Badakhshan

Total refugee population: 214,000

Percentage of refugee population: 4.9%

This Region borders the Soviet Union. Prior to the war, the Northeast was the most important agricultural region in the country with what was considered good systems of irrigation and infrastructure. The region held 17% of the total irrigated farmland and 30% of the rainfed farmland. According to the English Report good rainfall allowed for double cropping in some areas. The very northern and western areas of the Northeast are good farmlands; the eastern and the southern parts are mountainous and considered very isolated.

The region is considered more self-sufficient than any other in Afghanistan; Baghlan being the richest province agriculturally. Production of irrigated wheat, rainfed wheat, rice, cotton, and barley were of utmost importance. Those living in the mountainous ranges sold stocks of animals, fruits and nuts in exchange for grain. The Northeast represented one-fifth of the fruit production nationally.

The Swedish Committee reports that 95% of those surveyed cited direct effects of the war as their biggest problem.

Winter and spring 1988 brought reports of drought in Badakhshan province. The situation as of December '88, remains confused. While reports by Medecins Sans Frontieres (A French NGO which is active in the area) indicate the existence of potential famine, members of a UN cross border mission who visited the area in October, report that limited food shortages may be expected (Estimated 400 MT) in the spring of 1989. An end to the fighting and normal rainfall could enable this area to be food sufficient or even food surplus again.

Although, the Swedish Committee recommended that the most important inputs to this region would be seed and fertilizer, political conditions and problems of road access lead the English Report to identify this region for Phase III of UNHCR's repatriation and program implementation plan.

POPULATION ANALYSIS AND ANTICIPATED REPATRIATION

Region: NORTH EAST

Province	79 ADS STEADY STATE POPULATION	'88 ADS ADJUSTED POPULATION	NUMBER OF REFUGEES	PLUS 10% RETURN	PLUS 25% RETURN
Baghlan	317,040	249,928	104,000	260,328	275,928
Takhar	411,041	453,866	5,000	454,366	455,116
Kunduz	375,038	342,674	76,000	350,274	361,674
Badakhshan	426,374	446,983	29,000	449,883	454,233
	1,529,493	1,493,451	214,000	1,514,851	1,546,951

Current annual wheat requirements for the existing population can be calculated as follows:

Current total population: 1,493,451
(multiplied by)
150 kg/wheat per person annually = 224,017 metric tons

Should refugees begin to return in the spring, additional annual metric ton wheat requirements will be:

Current regional refugee population: 214,000

10% refugee population: 21,400
21,400 x 150 kg/wheat per person 3,210 metric tons

25% refugee population: 53,500
53,500 x 150 kg/wheat per person: 8,025 metric tons

SURVEY OF AVERAGE WHEAT PRICES
Figures Consolidated From VITA Reports
(Per Seer in Afghanis)

	April/May 1985	April/May 1986	April/May 1987	April/May 1988	June 1988
Baghlan	130	180	235	205	190
Takhar	115	150	200	230	180
Kunduz	115	150	180	210	180
Balkh	170	170	270	300	200

The dramatic decrease in wheat prices in Badakhshan between May and June, 1988 may reflect the national trend of lower prices in June as a result of the spring harvest throughout the country, or may be the result of increased importation of Soviet grain to areas controlled by the Kabul Regime. Reports suggest that without increased stability, assistance in irrigation repairs, and seed and fertilizer inputs, this region will not be able to support surplus food commodities into the marketplace.

C. EAST Paktya, Nangarhar, Laghman, Kunar

Total refugee population: 1,195,000

Percentage of Refugee population: 27.6%

This is the most heavily populated rural area in the country. It is also one of the most intensively irrigated. Mild winters and hot summers allow for double cropping of wheat, maize, rice and corn. Much of the farming in this mountainous region occurs on steps. The region comprises 6% of the total irrigated land area, and 52% of the national forests.

Fertilizer and irrigated water systems was considered by farmers to be their most serious problems, except for the province of Kunar which cites effects of the war as their biggest problem. (See Swedish Committee Report). Livestock unavailability and crop disease also ranked high for this region.

The East accounts for the highest percentage of refugees. Supply routes for the resistance run from Pakistan across Paktya, hence the area has seen much heavy fighting. The refugees from this region had relatively easy access to Pakistan and cultural similarities with the host population cross-border, thus creating a strong impetus for mass migration.

Generally, the region has not suffered from food shortages due to its proximity to Pakistan and the availability of imports. Dr. Wakil considers Nangarhar to be capable of self-sufficiency from its own production. Should massive repatriation occur, two schools of thought currently prevail which may not be mutually exclusive. According to Dr. Azum Gul, the East will not suffer from a food crisis since there will always be access to resources cross-border. However, should the refugees begin to return in large numbers, the price of imported wheat (Due to the expected increase in transport costs), could become prohibitive, and hence a shortage for those without the resources to purchase grain. Frances D'Souza, in her report The Threat of Famine in Afghanistan (Afghanaid, May, 1984) indicates that the large amount of existing foreign aid would monetarily benefit the trading centers in Afghanistan. Thus, this region would not have to rely on its own production capabilities.

Dr. Ray Hooker indicates that imports accounted for 50% of the wheat consumed in the region in 1986-1987, the balanced supplemented by local production. (See Food Prospects in Afghanistan, VITA 1987). It would appear that monitoring the refugee movement into this region is critical. With 1,200,000 refugees capable of returning quickly, food resources should be made readily available. UNHCR has included this Region in Phase I of repatriation and program implementation.

POPULATION ANALYSIS AND ANTICIPATED REPATRIATION

Region: EAST

Province	79 ADS STEADY STATE POPULATION	'88 ADS ADJUSTED POPULATION	NUMBER OF REFUGEES	PLUS 10% RETURN	PLUS 25% RETURN
Paktya	390,161	86,556	349,000	121,456	173,806
Nangarhar	914,525	621,930	399,000	661,830	721,680
Laghman	344,514	160,598	224,000	182,998	216,598
Kunar	290,069	100,819	223,000	123,119	156,569
	1,939,269	969,903	1,195,000	1,089,403	1,268,653

Current annual wheat requirements for the existing population can be calculated as follows:

- Current total population: 969,903
  (multiplied by)
  150 kg/wheat per person annually = 145,485 metric tons

Should refugees begin to return in the spring, additional annual metric ton wheat requirements will be:

Current regional refugee population: 1,195,000

10% refugee population: 119,500
119,500 x 150 kg/wheat per person 17,925 metric tons

25% refugee population: 298,750
298,750 x 150 kg/wheat per person: 44,812 metric tons

SURVEY OF AVERAGE WHEAT PRICES
Figures Consolidated From VITA Reports
(Per Seer in Afghanis)

	April/May 1985	April/May 1986	April/May 1987	April/May 1988	June 1988
Paktya	140	200	260	270	210
Nangarhar	100	150	220	195	200
Laghman	110	160	250	205	210
Kunar	n/a	n/a	n/a	250	200

Prices for Kunar (1985, 1986, 1987) were not available. Price increase on Laghman in April/May 1987 reflect increased fighting during that period.

D. EAST CENTRAL Kabul, Bamyan, Parwan, Logar, Wardak, Kapisa, Ghazni

Total refugee population: 794,000 (no figures available for Bamyan or Kapisa).

Percentage of refugee population: 18.3%

(Note: For the province of Logar, ADS '88 Steady State population figures are lower than the current registered refugee population of 283,000. It is assumed that the statistical variable is accounted for by the current birth rate in the camps).

This region is particularly mountainous, with flat farmland occurring only in the narrow valleys between mountains. Cool weather creates a short growing season, yet the region accounts for 21% of the national fruit production including grapes, apples and pears. Only 5% of the rainfed farmland, but 14% of the irrigated farmland, is located in this region, which has never been particularly important agriculturally. (See Swedish Committee Report.)

The region is important because it is linked by Afghanistan's one principal road which runs North-South through Parwan, Kabul, Wardak, and Ghazni. Primary connecting arteries run East-West through Wardak and Kabul into Nangarhar and cross-border into Pakistan. Because of the strategic importance of this route, Soviet and Kabul Regime armies destroyed much of the homes and vegetation paralleling the road so as to prevent Mujahedeen ambush attacks. As a result of this fighting, many people left for Pakistan, although many more became internally displaced, migrating to the cities - such as Kabul or Ghazni - to seek protection from the war. Still others moved to the central highlands.

The Swedish Committee found most farmers in this region cited direct war effects as their biggest problem. Almost 100% of those interviewed in Parwan said this was their biggest problem, since the province was known to be a stronghold for the Mujahedeen and was subjected to sustained bombing attacks. Parwan was a fertile area before the war, exporting fruits and produce. Now farmers also cite crop disease and lack of irrigated water as a particular concern.

Direct war effects are still an immediate problem for other provinces as well. Good crop harvests were anticipated for Logar this year. However, increased fighting in the last year delayed planting, causing much poorer harvests than originally expected. Many areas of Bamyan and Wardak are particularly isolated; these provinces have traditionally been two of the poorest in the country. Very difficult mountainous terrain prevented relief efforts from reaching many people during the 1971-1972 drought. However, Ray Hooker's 1987 report Food Prospects in Afghanistan, indicates that the central highland provinces of Bamyan and Wardak (together with Ghor and Uruzgan) were food sufficient at that time and were expected to remain that way through the winter of 1987-1988.

The capital city of Kabul, whose population has apparently swollen from a pre-1979 estimate of 700,000 to more than 2 million people today, is being supplied wheat as well as other imports by the Soviet Union. The city and the province will remain food sufficient only through continued imports. Once the Soviets withdraw, it may be expected that free market forces will quickly come in to play to meet demand.

Because of the differences in topography, as well as anticipated need, the provinces in this region were split within the three phases of UNHCR's repatriation and program implementation plan as reported by Richard English. Ghazni, Logar and Wardak are included in Phase I because of the massive war destruction in Ghazni and Wardak and the recent bad crops in Logar. Bamyan and Kapisa were included in Phase II, and Kabul and Parwan in Phase III because of Kabul's access to imports from the Soviet Union and Parwan's access to surplus commodities from Baghlan and Kunduz.

POPULATION ANALYSIS AND ANTICIPATED REPATRIATION

Region: **EAST CENTRAL**

Province	79 ADS STEADY STATE POPULATION	'88 ADS ADJUSTED POPULATION	NUMBER OF REFUGEES	PLUS 10% RETURN	PLUS 25% RETURN
Kabul	1,083,802	1,140,902	69,000	1,147,802	1,158,152
Bamyan	258,969	289,100	N/A	289,100	289,100
Parwan	465,120	466,237	53,000	471,537	479,487
Logar	223,825	(33,133)	283,000	(4,833)	37,617
Wardak/May	366,459	400,097	9,000	400,997	402,347
Kapisa	373,150	416,566	N/A	416,566	416,566
Ghazni	639,497	333,902	380,000	371,902	428,902
	3,410,822	3,013,671	794,000	3,093,071	3,212,171

* Population totals do not include refugee figures for Kapisa or Bamyan.

Current annual wheat requirements for the existing population can be calculated as follows:

Current total population: 3,013,671
(multiplied by)
150 kg/wheat per person annually = 470,506 metric tons

Should refugees begin to return in the spring, additional annual metric ton wheat requirements are:

Current regional refugee population: 794,000

10% refugee population: 79,400
79,400 x 150 kg/wheat per person 11,910 metric tons

25% refugee population: 198,500
198,500 x 150 kg/wheat per person: 29,775 metric tons

SURVEY OF AVERAGE WHEAT PRICES
Figures Consolidated From VITA Reports
(Per Seer in Afghanis)

	April/May 1985	April/May 1986	April/May 1987	April/May 1988	June 1988
Kabul	125	170	260	315	210
Bamyan	150	180	320	275	220
Parwan	100	165	235	290	190
Logar	120	165	235	290	190
Wardak	145	185	265	265	200
Kapisa	100	150	260	n/a	n/a
Ghazni	140	190	235	280	240

Prices for Kapisa April/May and June, 1988 are not available. The decrease in June, 1988 prices reflect the summer harvest, which was generally considered good except for the two provinces already discussed: Faryab and Badakhshan.

E. SOUTH Helmand, Kandahar, Nimroz, Paktika, Uruzgan, Zabul

Total Refugee Population: 1,106,000

Percentage of Refugee Population: 25.5%

This region is primarily desert, particularly Farah, Nimroz and Helmand. It relies heavily on karez irrigation systems, and in the Helmand valley on more modern systems. Before the war, the South had 22% of the national irrigated land area and 11% of the rainfed area. Irrigated crops included wheat and maize. The province of Kandahar hosted 21% of the national fruit production in the country.

Uruzgan province is located in the central mountainous region of the country and refugees from this area comprise only 1.2% of the total. Likewise, Zabul only represents 1.1% of the total refugee population, but from a much more strategically and agriculturally important area.

Zabul and Kandahar had been reporting imported food availability. However, a recent plague on the almond trees in Zabul has devastated this crop. Fruit orchards in Kandahar have been severely damaged by the war, be it from neglect or destruction.

Of all the regions in Afghanistan, the South has been particularly effected by the war. Richard English reports that "Kandahar claims two-thirds of the city and all the villages within a twenty mile radius have been razed." The city of Kandahar stands as a cross-roads for Afghanistan's only major highway: Northeast the road leads to Kabul; Northwest to Herat. To the South is a major cross-border artery between Afghanistan and Quetta, Pakistan. The Helmand River Valley was also severely effected.

Traditionally, this region was not densely populated due to the vast desert areas. Today, there is a large refugee and displaced persons population; Kandahar has the largest percentage of refugees from any province in Afghanistan. The effects of the war has left very little of the original agricultural capability.

The Swedish Committee's Report indicates that the farmers in Paktika consider direct effects of the war to be their biggest problem, together with the immediate need for mine clearance. For Kandahar and Helmand, repair of the karez irrigation systems is also of significant concern.

Ray Hooker found the country's lowest wheat prices in 1986-1987 to be in the provinces of Kandahar, Helmand and Uruzgan (together with two Northwest provinces: Farah and Herat). There appears to be enough imports to sustain the existing population.

The concern expressed by several experts was that should significant numbers of refugees return to this region quickly, a serious food shortage could develop. Food imports would have to increase with the level of the population, since the considerable damage done to this region will take many months, or even years, to repair. UNHCR has included all the provinces of the South in Phase I of repatriation and program implementation.

POPULATION ANALYSIS AND ANTICIPATED REPATRIATION

Region: SOUTH

Province	79 ADS STEADY STATE POPULATION	'88 ADS ADJUSTED POPULATION	NUMBER OF REFUGEES	PLUS 10% RETURN	PLUS 25% RETURN
Helmand	386,209	276,144	155,000	291,644	314,894
Kandahar	648,495	257,947	466,000	257,947	257,947
Nimroz	127,893	25,773	117,000	37,473	55,023
Paktika	174,400	* (73,309)	268,000	(46,509)	(6,309)
Uruzgan	399,033	394,460	51,000	399,560	407,210
Zabul	131,778	98,110	49,000	98,110	98,110
	1,867,808	979,125	1,106,000	1,038,225	1,126,875

* Based on the English Report Annex Table 2, refugee population exceeds base population figure.

Current annual wheat requirements for the existing population can be calculated as follows:

Current total population: 979,125
(multiplied by)
150 kg/wheat per person annually = 146,868 metric tons

Should refugees begin to return in the spring, additional annual metric ton wheat requirements are:

Current regional refugee population:	1,106,000
10% refugee population:	110,600
110,600 x 150 kg/wheat per person	16,590 metric tons
25% refugee population:	276,500
276,500 x 150 kg/wheat per person:	41,475 metric tons

SURVEY OF AVERAGE WHEAT PRICES
Figures Consolidated From VITA Reports
(Per Seer in Afghanis)

	April/May 1985	April/May 1986	April/May 1987	April/May 1988	June 1988
Helmand	120	150	180	225	180
Kandahar	120	150	180	275	200
Nimroz	n/a	n/a	n/a	235	190
Paktika	140	200	260	270	200
Uruzgan	120	150	185	275	230
Zabul	135	190	240	260	200

Note the increase in wheat prices for Helmand, Kandahar and Uruzgan between 1987 and 1988, when Ray Hooker evaluated the provinces. Prices have increased substantially, possibly reflecting the unavailability of imported grain.

F. NORTHWEST Herat, Ghor, Badghis, Farah

Total Refugee Population: 986,000

Percentage of Refugee Population: 22.8%

Very little is known about conditions in this region. Agricultural and economic information has been difficult to obtain due to poor communications within region. Additionally, most of the refugees have migrated to Iran, which even prior to the war hosted Afghanistan's "economic refugees". (See R. English Report.)

The region is undeveloped, consisting primarily of rainfed farmlands in Badghis, Ghor, and eastern Farah. Irrigation is limited to relatively small districts in Herat and Farah. Important crops for this region are wheat, cotton, maize and fruit trees. The forests of pistachio comprise 12% of the national timber stock.

The Northwest has suffered some of the heaviest fighting, especially in the province and city of Herat. The city intersects the main roads to Iran and the Soviet Union. As with the Southern region, farmlands and villages near the road networks were razed to prevent the resistance from having secure places to hide. Richard English states "control of the city by the resistance would effect supply and communications to the entire southwestern sector as far as Kandahar." Badghis has been much less effected by the war than Herat or Farah. Availability of irrigation water is a particular problem in this region. Farmers in Ghor also cited irrigation as a problem. In Herat, direct effects of the war were cited by farmers interviewed by the Swedish Committee for each year of the survey.

Although Ray Hooker's report indicates wheat availability in Farah and Herat during 1986-1987, extreme food shortages were reported in Ghor in the Fall of 1986. These reports may not have to be entirely substantiated by the interviews conducted. See Food Prospects in Afghanistan 1987, page 8. The report concludes that there may have been a shortage, but not an emergency during the summer of 1987.

It appears that wheat is being imported into the region since estimates of local production do not seem sufficient to meet current demand. As with the South, mass refugee repatriation could create a crisis quickly, as the region could not support itself agriculturally. UNHCR has included this region in Phase I of their plan for repatriation and program implementation.

POPULATION ANALYSIS AND ANTICIPATED REPATRIATION

Region: NORTH WEST

Province	79 ADS STEADY STATE POPULATION	'88 ADS ADJUSTED POPULATION	NUMBER OF REFUGEES	PLUS 10% RETURN	PLUS 25% RETURN
Herat	766,853	156,077	700,000	226,077	331,077
Ghor	196,542	176,410	43,000	180,710	187,160
Badghis	291,940	282,907	43,000	287,207	293,657
Farah	301,609	136,701	200,000	156,701	186,701
	1,556,944	752,095	986,000	850,695	998,595

Current annual wheat requirements for the existing population can be calculated as follows:

Current total population: 752,095
(multiplied by)
150 kg/wheat per person annually = 112,814 metric tons

Should refugees begin to return in the spring, additional annual metric ton wheat requirements are:

Current regional refugee population:	986,000	
10% refugee population:	98,600	
98,600 x 150 kg/wheat per person	14,790	metric tons
25% refugee population:	246,500	
246,500 x 150 kg/wheat per person:	36,975	metric tons

SURVEY OF AVERAGE WHEAT PRICES
Figures Consolidated From VITA Reports
(Per Seer in Afghanis)

	April/May 1985	April/May 1986	April/May 1987	April/May 1988	June 1988
Herat	n/a	n/a	200	295	200
Ghor	160	220	270	270	200
Badghis	250	335	410	260	190
Farah	155	170	210	215	190

Price of wheat in Badghis in 1987 reflects drought situation in that province.

III. National Profile

A. Population Analysis and Wheat Requirements

Based on calculations justified in the regional profiles, statistical data can be analyzed for a national profile as follows:

POPULATION ANALYSIS AND ANTICIPATED REPATRIATION

Region:	79 ADS STEADY STATE POPULATION	'88 ADS ADJUSTED POPULATION	NUMBER OF REFUGEES	PLUS 10% RETURN	PLUS 25% RETURN
NORTH	1,803,078	1,977,866	35,000	1,981,366	1,986,616
NORTH EAST	1,529,493	1,493,451	214,000	1,514,851	1,546,951
EAST	1,939,269	969,903	1,195,000	1,089,403	1,268,653
EAST CENTRAL	3,410,822	3,013,671	794,000	3,093,071	3,212,171
SOUTH	1,867,808	979,125	1,106,000	1,038,225	1,126,875
NORTH WEST	1,556,944	752,095	986,000	850,695	1,198,674
	12,107,414	9,186,111	4,330,000	9,567,611	10,339,940
	PLUS NOMADS	1,394,259			
		10,580,370			
	UNREGISTERED REFUGEES	-300,000	300,000		
	ADJUSTED POP.	10,280,370	4,630,000		

* Refugee population totals do not include figures for Faryab province.

** Refugee population totals do not include figures for Kapisa or Bamyan provinces.

*** Refugee populations in Nimroz and Paktya exceed 1979 base figure.

Current annual wheat requirements for the existing population can be calculated as follows:

Current total population:	10,280,370 (multiplied by)
150 kg/wheat per person annually =	1,542,055 metric tons

Should refugees begin to return in the spring, additional annual metric ton wheat requirements will be:

Current estimated refugee population:	4,630,000
10% refugee population:	463,000
463,000 x 150 kg/wheat per person	69,450 metric tons
25% refugee population:	1,157,500
1,157,500 x 150 kg/wheat per person:	173,625 metric tons

B. Comparisons of Wheat Requirements

Based on interviews conducted with experts from the Swedish Committee for Afghanistan and VITA, as well as documentation collected from other sources, PART I (Overview) concluded that 1.8 to 1.9 million metric tons of wheat was currently available in-country from internal production, imports from Pakistan and imports provided by the Soviet Union (see page 6).

This wheat availability is currently sustaining the existing population of 10.28 million people.

The regional profile calculations indicate a total annual wheat requirement of 1.54 million metric tons. Thus, it can be assumed that Afghanistan is currently food sufficient. Yet, the return of even 10% of the refugees within the first six months will require an additional availability of more than 69,000 metric tons of wheat, and a return of 25% will require more than 173,000 metric tons.

Critical to these calculations is obviously the rate of return for the refugees. Should smaller numbers return initially and begin reconstruction, agricultural capabilities together with imports may be able to sustain a limited increase in the population. This will certainly not be the case if substantial numbers return quickly.

IV. ROADS & TRANSPORTATION

Information for this section was obtained from a variety of sources, including a World Food Program report dated April, 1988 prepared by Olam Shah and M. Azim Khan, Field Officers, Peshawar, Office of the AID Representative, interviews with traders and transporters and UNHCR unpublished documents. The map entitled "Afghanistan's Road Network" indicating Government of Afghanistan and Mujahedeen controlled roads was supplied by WFP.

A. General Transportation Structure

The total number of trucks operated by Afghans within the North West frontier Province of Pakistan is currently estimated at 25,000. Of this number approximately, 10,000 trucks are thought to be operating solely within Pakistan while the balance of 15,000 operate between Pakistan and Afghanistan. This estimation is based on the number of trucks with Pakistan and Refugee license plates.

Two transporters, Malhem Nick Mohammad and Haji Mohammad, are said to regulate the movement of all general cargo between Peshawar and Kabul, via Highway 1. Khugiani Transport Company, which is owned by Haji Mohammad, controls about 300 trucks owned by Afghans with Pakistan registration. This fleet of 300 trucks is said to consist of 16 to 24 ton capacity Nissans, Bedfords and Mercedes. These trucks operate between Peshawar and Nadar Mushawani at a rate of 15-50 trucks daily. In addition, a Kabul controlled group of Afghan truck owners; Afghan Transport Company, possess a fleet of about 4 to 5 hundred trucks with Afghan/R.O.A. Registration plates. This company is said to dispatch sixty to seventy trucks from Peshawar railway station each day and thirty to forty from Peshawar bazaar. Each truck is expected to make four to five round trips between Peshawar and Kabul per month.

It is assumed that there is an extremely limited Afghan trucking capacity that could be used within the country. Pakistan-registered trucks will probably predominate in the carriage of relief cargo to Kabul while Afghan trucks are likely to be more numerous going to Kandehar.

It has been estimated that at least 450,000 MT of relief supplies (mostly food) will need to be transported annual into Afghanistan subsequent to the withdrawal of the Soviets. This volume of commodities will require 120 trucks a day assuming an average 12 ton capacity, 26 working days a month and 12 months a year. Put another way, a fleet of about 600 trucks would be required to move this volume of supplies, assuming an average 12 ton capacity, 26 working days a month with four days average round trip per truck.

Additionally, withdrawal of the Soviets and return of Afghan refugees will certainly provide for resurgence of Pakistan-Afghanistan trade opportunities and a concomitant increased demand for non relief transport. Therefore, despite the large number of trucks in Pakistan, availability will be determined by forces operating within the context of a high demand market.

In order to offset the disadvantages associated with a high demand market, the UN, under the joint management of UNHCR and WFP, have decided to establish and operate its own fleet of 150 trucks. It is believed that such a fleet, under the direct management of the UN, will provide the needed degree of flexibility and assurance that trucks will be available as required for transport of relief materials when used in combination with available commercial transport.

B. General Conditions of Major Arteries

Afghanistan is linked by one major roadway running circular through the entire country. Four major routes extend from Kabul, respectively connecting the Northern provinces, Southern Provinces, east from the city of Kabul to Pakistan, and southeast from Kabul to Logar and Paktiya.

Afghanistan relies on six main routes of entry and exit for its trade: Torkham and Chaman with Pakistan in the east, Turghandi, termez-hayratan and Imam Sahib with the Soviet Union in the north and Islam Qala with Iran in the west.

The internal road network consists of 2,700 kms of paved road, 4,300 km of gravel roads and 10,000 km of dirt roads. Due to war caused damage and disrepair to the main paved roads and major bridges, extensive use has been made of the secondary roads, particularly in the border areas. These mostly dirt roads, although in poor condition suffering from continuous damage from combat vehicles, tanks, etc., have supported much of the Resistance's logistic needs during the war in addition to serving the commercial trade network. This is said to be especially so in the South Eastern part of the country along Kunar, Waziristan and Baluchistan which allows access throughout most of the central part of the country. Still, vehicles using these roads will experience long delays and possibly frequent breakdowns.

1. The Southwestern Road

This road links Kabul with the provinces of Wardak, Ghazni, Zabul, Kandahar, Helmand, Farah and Herat. Due to its strategic importance it has been the most seriously damaged by the war, with only minor repairs having been accomplished in the last ten years.

In particular, the Ghazni - Kabul road is said to have sustained damage from mines and heavy vehicular traffic during December and January of 1987/8. Major delays can be expected due to road washouts and damaged bridges. There are also reports of mine holes in some places. Further on from Kandahar city, heading west, major delays have been reported. This section of the road is in generally poor condition with potholes and ruts and one or more long detours. Overall, traffic is said to continue to move over this section of road with only minor delays. Other sections, however, are reported to have major delays.

Still further west of Kandahar where the highway crosses the Helmand river conditions are said to be OK. Two major bridges on this section are reported to be intact. Continuing west to Farah, one section of the road north of the airfield is reported to be in a bad state of repair with at least one long detour. Other sections in this general local appear to be OK. In particular, the section of road running north of Farah over the Farah river is believed to be in reasonable condition with the bridge intact.

Vehicles traveling the section of road west of Herat leading to the border with Iran, are reported to be experiencing some delays. The primary road north of Herat is said to be in good condition with only a few bad sections causing minor delays. Aside from the primary road between Herat and the Iranian border, other roads running east to west from the general vicinity of Herat are thought to be in fair to poor condition.

The section of road south of Herat running toward Farah, is said to have a long detour parallel to the main road. Traffic is reported to be moving on both.

The road east of Kandahar city toward Zabul and Ghazni, is reported to be in mixed condition. Some long stretches appear to be in fairly good condition but there are slowdowns due to potholes, ruts, and partial washouts.

The road running south out of Kandahar to the Pakistan border connecting with Chaman (Site of the UN's truck fleet headquarters for the southern portion of Afghanistan) just south of the Afghanistan border inside Pakistan, is reported to be in a perpetual state of disrepair. This road has major problems and vehicles using it may expect to experience major delays. In some segments the road is said to all but disappear.

In addition to the main southwest trunk road, there are numerous secondary dirt and gravel roads which cross from Pakistan into the central part of Afghanistan. According to Shawaly Commander of the Jamiat-e-Islami, one such route originates on the Pakistan border in the Toubha and Kakar Range and arcs its way north by north west through Sin Naray, Arghastan, Shar-i-safa, Shavalikot, Ghorak and Sangin on its way to Nausad district of Helmand Province. The following is a brief description of the condition of this route and the villages/locals through which it passes:

1. Toubha to Shin Naray takes about 30 minutes. The road is dirt but in good condition with all bridges intact. There are about 30 shops in the village but fuel must be bought on the black market at 8000 Afs per 200 liters of diesel and 12000 Afs for 200 liters of petrol.

2. Shin Naray to Arghastan district of Kandahar Province takes about 4 hrs and 30 minutes. The road is reported to be in good condition. There are about 80 well stocked shops in the district and the agricultural land has not been significantly affected by the war. About 5% of the Arghastan District villagers are believed to be living as refugees in Pakistan.

3. Arghastan to Shar-i-Safa takes about 3 hours. The road is in good condition. About 80 vehicles travel along this road each day, the majority of which are Mujahedeen trucks. No fuel or workshops are available along this section of road.

4. Shar-i-Safa to Shavalikot takes about an hour and a half. The road is in good condition.

4. Shavalikot to Ghorak takes about 12 hours and the road is reported to be in good condition. However, this section is only passable in the summer months when the Shavalikot river bed is dry.

5. Ghorak to Sangin takes about 1 hour, 30 minutes. This section of road is reported to be in good condition. There is, however, no bridge over the river Helmand flowing between Ghorak and Sangin which poses a problem for the Mujahidin and others who us this section. Pickups are frequently floated across the river by balancing them on 20 or so empty 55 gal. barrels.

6. Sangin to Nausad district of Helmand Province takes about two hours, 30 minutes. The road is in good condition. There are reported to be 400 well stocked shops in the district. Diesel is 9000 Afs/barrel and petrol is 14000 Afs/barrel. There were about 6000 homes in the district but 70% are reported to have been destroyed by bombardment.

One way to evaluate the conditions of the road network is to examine driving times. WFP has done this where information was available and found that for this road the average speed is 20 to 25 kilometers per hour, or a 100% increase in driving time from pre-war conditions.

FROM	TO	DISTANCE	DRIVING TIME Present
Kabul	Maidan	33 km	1 1/2 hours
Kabul	Ghazni	135 km	6 - 7 hours
Ghazni	Kandahar	356 km	16 - 18 hours
Kandahar	Girisk	143 km	8 - 9 hours
Girisk	Farahrod	247 km	12 hours
Farahrod	Herat	212 km	10 - 11 hours

2. The Northern Road

This roadway extends from Kabul north through the provinces of Parwan and Baghlan. In the city of Puli Khumri in Baghlan the road branches and to the west connects the provinces of Samangan, Balkh, Jowzjan and Faryab. To the northeast from Puli Khumri the road passes through Kunduz and leads into the Soviet Union. The road through Samangan also branches, with the northern arm crossing into the Soviet Union at Haritan. Generally, this is the best maintained road in Afghanistan. While road conditions are reported to be good, some delays may be expected due to switchbacks, tunnels, etc.

FROM	TO	DISTANCE	DRIVING TIME Present
Kabul	Puli Khumri	278 km	13 hours
Puli Khumri	Mazarisharif	298 km	8 - 9 hours
Mazarisharif	Shibargan	150 km	8 hours

Because this road represents the communications and logistical connection between the capital city of Kabul and the Soviet Union, for most of the war it was controlled and protected by the Regime and the Soviets.

3. The Road East

Connecting the city of Kabul with the province of Kabul and Nangarhar, this road crosses the border into Pakistan via Jalalabad. It has fallen into serious disrepair since the war began with approximate driving times having doubled. Yet the distances are relatively short and thus the practical effect is not as dramatic as with the destruction on the southern road.

There are two secondary roads from Jalalabad to Kunar Province, one running to the south and the other to the north of the river Kunar. At the point where the southern road crosses the river it divides with one branch leading to Kamma and Goshta districts of Nangarhar, the other to Sarkani district. The road conditions are not good but heavy traffic is reported on this road nonetheless. Travellers on the north road to Kunar must cross the river in boats, a particularly difficult task when the river is in high flood.

The road north of the river Paka leads to the Noorgal sub-district. It is 90 km by road from Jalalabad to Chagasarai where it divides. One road leads to the east passing through Asmar, Barikot and Kamdesh, while the other passes through the Pech valley. Almost all refugees returning to these areas may be expected to return via these roads thus avoiding the mountains and mines.

FROM	TO	DISTANCE	DRIVING TIME Present
Kabul	Jalalabad	147 km	8 - 9 hours
Jalalabad	Torkham*	77 km	2 - 3 hours

* Torkham is on the Pakistan - Afghanistan border.

4. The Road Southeast

This road connects the provinces of Logar and Paktya with the city of Kabul. WFP and the English Report consider this a major access route for supplies into the provinces. A number of roads enter into Afghanistan from Paktya province, The following is a brief description of one such road, Angur Ada to Askar Kot, which is reported to be a frequently used route through this area.

Angur Ada to Askar Kot: This road originates at Angur Ada on the Pakistan side of the Afghanistan province of Paktya.

Angur Ada to Rabat, on the Afghanistan provinical border of Paktya, is reported to be a two hour drive by dirt road. Rabat is a small village of 10 shops of which three sell fuel etc. for vehicles. Petrol is reported to be 500/700 Afghani/gallon and a barrel of diesel (200 litres) is 8000/9000 Afghani. The items are said to available only on the black market; there are no petrol pumps, workshops or spare parts available at Rabat.

Rabat to Kotal Kharairi takes seven hours and reportedly must only be attempted at night due to the danger of bombardment. There are no bridges, Government posts or danger of mines on this section of road.

Kotal Kharairi to Gomal district of Paktika province is a four hour ride over a very bad road. Some reports indicate that this one of, if not the worst border road. The Mujahedeen are said to be in control of this section. There are no bridges on this section and mines are not reported to be problem.

Gomal to Khalifa Sarwan takes four hours by dirt road which is reported to be without bridges. The village of Khalifa Sarwan is reported to have been deserted for some time of its original 300 families. It is said to be a frequent stopping off point for caravan travellers who make use of the shelter offered by the deserted dwellings. Vehicles must carry sufficient fuel to get them over this section of road due to the reported non-availability of petrol in the area.

Khalifa Sarwan to Babu Khel and Khush Amand takes 3 to 4 hours. This section of road is dirt with four small wooden bridges located at Khush Amand which are said to be in a state of considerable disrepair. Shops and petrol are nonexistant. The Commander, Sharbat is headquartered at Babu Khel village. He belongs to Jamiat-e-Islami and is from the Mohmand tribe.

Babu Khel and Khush Amand to Auband takes 3 hours. The road is reported to be in reasonable condition. There is no bridge over the Theek Godar river. The river bed is reported to be well pebbled allowing for ease of crossing at most times. The Commander, Maulvi Shamim, in Khush Amand, also belongs to the Jamiat-e-Islami and is from the Mohmand tribe. He is reported to be of considerable help in feeding and guiding visitors through the area.

Auband to Askar Kot takes 2 to 3 hours along the kabul Kandhar road. There is no reported danger from mines or Government posts. However, there have been reports of frequent bombardment along this section. Mujahedeen caravans using this route travel mostly at night without lights and keep a distance of 5 KM between vehicles.

FROM	TO	DISTANCE	DRIVING TIME Present
Kabul	Qunduz	122 km	8 - 9 hours

C. Conditions of the Primary Roads into Food Shortage Areas

The Southern provinces are expected to be food shortage areas if the refugees return quickly. Additionally, the Northwest, depending on the situation in Badakhshan, may also experience some degree of food shortages. Unfortunately, these provinces also coincide with the worst conditions on the primary roads.

Although the major road is passable, should there be massive repatriation and a significant need for supplies and food to these regions, the logistical situation could become very difficult. The additional expected traffic, together with the lack of resources to make any repairs and the long distance for travel, could create a significant obstacle to supplying the returnees with needed food and materials.

Food shortage areas could also result in certain areas of the East and East central regions. However, throughout the war traders have managed to supply these areas and have been able to move commodities cross-border. Therefore, the primary road network to provinces closer to the Pakistan border are not as critical as for those further away.

Finally, the central provinces have no access to the major road network of Afghanistan. Whatever the food shortage or medical supply situation is for the people in the central highlands, access to these areas will be almost impossible. As discussed previously, even during the 1971 - 1972 drought food supplies could not reach these provinces.

The annexed map outlines the primary roads, secondary roads and roads currently controlled by the Mujahedeen. It is the most recent information available from WFP.

V. Conclusions

A. Anticipated Food Needs by Province

The attached map "B": Anticipated Food Needs by Province outlines the conclusions discussed herein. Based on the research utilized throughout in this report, three levels of need were identified in much the same way as they were in the English Report, albeit with somewhat different results.

The three levels identified are: provinces of primary concern, provinces of secondary concern, and provinces which will require assistance but are not an immediate priority. Since the Afghanistan refugee population represents the largest in the world, with estimates as high as five million people ready to return upon Soviet withdrawal, it is essential that the provinces are prioritized. Only in this way can the international community be ready to respond to areas of most critical need.

Although provinces are identified as areas of primary concern, much of this analysis assumes a large refugee return quickly. There is no indication as yet that this will happen, but rather that repatriation will be slow process, reflecting political stability and security as much as resource availability.

1. Provinces of Primary Concern

Badakhshan, with good rainfall and a continued availability of imports from adjacent provinces, can be food sufficient.

Kunar, Paktya, and Laghman together represent a refugee population of almost 800 thousand people. Although there is an availability of imports from Pakistan, easy access to the border also will enable large numbers of refugees to return quickly. Should this occur there may well be a food shortage in these provinces.

Ghazni and Logar suffered considerably from the war since the primary roadway for Afghanistan runs directly through these provinces. Logar suffered bad crops recently due to increased fighting in the area and the two provinces comprise some 663,000 refugees.

Kandahar and Helmand also suffered significant damage from the war, particularly the fertile Helmand River Valley, one of the few agriculturally productive areas in these provinces. Kandahar next to Herat represents the largest refugee population of any province in Afghanistan. Poor road conditions into the area will create serious difficulties if an immediate and unanticipated response is needed.

Nimroz, Herat and Farah also have large refugee populations, in provinces that are relatively underdeveloped agriculturally. Farah and Herat were particularly damaged which is reflected by Herat's huge 700,000 refugee population. Roads into these regions are also difficult.

2. Provinces of Secondary Concern

Nangarhar could become food sufficient should seed and fertilizer be made available. The province hosts good agricultural land and its relatively easy accessibility to Pakistan will ensure access to food supplies.

Kabul receives much of its food supplies from the Soviet Union. It is likely that this will have to be replaced by imports from Pakistan once the Soviets withdraw. There are few refugees from this region, less than 75,000, but reports indicate that the population of Kabul city is three times what it was pre-war.

Parwan and Kapisa were also relatively good areas agriculturally before the war. Both regions have access to imports from Kabul and Parwan borders on two of Afghanistan's richest regions, Baghlan and Takhar.

Zabul also has an availability of imports from Pakistan and represent only a small fraction of the total refugee population.

Both Paktika and Zabul were productive before the war. Paktika represents 6% of the refugee population, more than 250,000 people, but suffers from the problem of mines, which may seriously restrict refugee repatriation.

4. Provinces Not Of Immediate Priority

Baghlan is a province to monitor closely, not because of its refugee population of over 100,000 but because it is the most productive region in the country. At issue is whether the province can still maintain its current levels of food surplus.

The northern provinces of Jawzjan, Balkh, Samangan and Faryab together represent only 35,000 refugees, less than 1% of the national total. These regions need seed and fertilizer to continue to be self-sufficient or provide a food surplus. Only in Faryab may there be a problem due to the drought and insect infestation. The price of wheat is extraordinary high suggesting that this region be monitored for a change in status.

Takhar represents only 5,000 refugees and both Takhar and the province of Kunduz are in a position to supply surplus food to Badakhshan should there be need. Additionally, both provinces are known for there agricultural capabilities.

Bamyan's population is relatively small and isolated in the central mountain region. Logistically it will be very difficult to supply the region with resources, as it will be for Ghor and Uruzgan, also located in the mountains. These regions were not assisted during the 1971-1972 drought because of their inaccessibility and the road situation has not improved since that time.

Wardak is not as isolated as the others, yet it represents less than 9,000 refugees. Additionally, the eastern part of the province is accessible to Kabul.

Badghis in the Northwest has been less affected by the war than other provinces. It was receiving food surplus from Faryab and imports from the Soviets.

B. Repatriation and Anticipated Food Needs/ MAP

This map should be compared with the map entitled "C": Phases of Refugee Repatriation and Program Implementation. There are discrepancies between conclusions regarding several provinces. Some of these discrepancies are the result of new information. Other discrepancies are simply the result of different interpretations based on the same data. Wherever there is a distinction between the two analysis, the above narrative explains conclusions outlined in "B".

C. PHASES OF REPATRIATION AND PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION/ MAP

This map outlines information found in Table VI of the English Report. For UNHCR purposes, Richard English identified provinces according to likely patterns of Soviet withdrawal and general security, together with the anticipated need of each and the level of access cross-border.

Although certainly not definitive in its conclusions, most of the regions outlined in Phase I correspond to those that Dr. Azum Gul considers most vulnerable based on the number of refugees and the current inability to support the returnees agriculturally.

The numbers identified in each region correspond to the percentage of refugees originating from each province. UNHCR's Phase I includes more than 85% of the returning refugees, but is not meant to represent a simultaneous return.

Finally, throughout this report it has been assumed that the refugees will return to their province of origin. This theory is supported by WFP's survey conducted in August of 1988 entitled Afghan Refugees on Repatriation and Rehabilitation. Of the persons interview by WFP 100% stated that they will return to their own village.

PHASES OF REPATRIATION (UNHCR)
with percentage of refugees by province



B.) REPATRIATION AND ANTICIPATED FOOD NEEDS

Provinces of

Primary Concern

Secondary Concern

Not an Immediate Priority





COMPILED FROM: Swedish Committee's Agricultural Survey (May, 1988)
and R. English Report to UNHCR (June, 1988)

D.) TOPOGRAPHY

Source:
The Threat of Famine
In Afghanistan, F. D'Souza



Fig 1. Map of Afghanistan showing mountains, deserts and plains


Sheberghan
Mazar-i Sharif
Pol-e Khomri
Ghowri
Harat
Kabul
Ghazni
Darya-ye Helmand
Farah
Cu
Fe
U
Economic Activity and Land Us
Food processing plant
Cotton gin
Textile plant
Cement plant
Electric power plant
Oilfield
Gasfield
Iron deposit
Copper deposit
Uranium deposit
Oil/Gas potential
Irrigated
Mixed dry
and graz
Forest
Sparse veg

AFGHANISTAN



B. Persons Per Square Kilometer

(WFP Sub-Office, Quetta)



AFGHANISTAN

PROVINCE MAP WITH SIX REGIONS SHOWN

LEGEND

NORTH	EAST CENTRAL
NORTH EAST	SOUTH
EAST	NORTH WEST

0 50 100 km