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ANALYSIS OF INSTITUTIONAL  
SUSTAINABILITY ISSUES IN USAID  
1985-86 PROJECT EVALUATION REPORTS

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The purpose of this report was to analyze the sustainability of institutional components in AID projects and the nature of the relationship between the sustainability of project benefits and institutional development. It was based on a review and analysis of the findings from project Evaluations Reports (ERs) in FY 85 and FY 86. While 212 ERs were reviewed, a subset of 50 ERs with highly positive (17) or strongly negative (33) "significance ratings" for Overall Sustainability were reviewed in-depth. In addition, information from the examination of the larger universe of 212 ERs pertaining to Sustainability and the in-depth review of 20 ERs relating to Implementation Constraints is included. All the data, examples cited, findings and lessons learned are based on Devres' review of the Evaluation Reports. No other sources of information on the AID projects or activities treated in this report were used. Devres has therefore based all of its analysis on information from this single source and sought not to interject ideas or conclusions derived from other experience or development literature generally.

For the larger universe of 212 ERs as a whole, only 11 percent of ERs received highly positive sustainability ratings whereas 26 percent received strongly negative ratings. The balance was either in the "average" range with marginal sustainability prospects (56 percent) or was not rated (2 percent). Among ERs for projects in the three geographic Bureaus, the AFR Bureau had both the highest percentage of highly positive ratings on overall sustainability (13 percent) and of strongly negative ratings as well. From a sectoral viewpoint, the POP sector had the largest percentage of highly positive sustainability ratings while the ARD sector had the largest percentage of strongly negative ratings and lowest percentage highly positive ratings. Organizational/ institutional capacity for the continuation of project benefits showed a high correlation with overall sustainability--55 percent of the projects with high ratings on the latter sub-topic also had high overall sustainability ratings and 56 percent with strongly negative organizational/institutional capacity ratings also had strongly negative overall sustainability ratings.

Within the sample of 50 intensively reviewed ERs, there is a broad spectrum of bureaus, countries, sectors and subsectors included. Thirty-three (66 percent) of the ERs received strongly negative ratings on overall sustainability. Of these, similar negative ratings were given in 27 instances for organizational/institutional capacity for the continuation of project benefits; in 18 instances for the cooperating organization's ability to respond to changing conditions; in 20 instances for financial provision for O & M and recurrent/capital cost recovery; and, in 23 instances for the development of management capacity. For the 17 ERs given highly positive ratings on overall sustainability, the sub-topic ratings of a similarly positive level numbered 11, 6, 8 and 9 respectively. Clearly the breadth of the concept of the "organizational/institutional capacity" sub-topic

embraces some of the other sub-topics so it inevitably has a very strong correlation with overall sustainability.

The intensively reviewed sample was examined to determine whether sustainability was directly addressed and in what context. In 20 of the 50 cases, the issue was addressed directly (14 rated strongly negative and 6 highly positive). Sustainability was considered to be directly addressed if at least some of the key sub-topics related to sustainability were explicitly discussed. In very few cases was the overall topic treated analytically or comprehensively. Not surprisingly, all but three of the sample cases showed a significant interrelationship between sustainability and institutional factors.

Key findings from the examination of the sustainability sample include:

- o Evaluation reports prepared in FY 85 and 86 addressed sustainability directly in only a minority (40 percent) of cases including final and ex post ERs;
- o No clearly discernible increase occurred in the level of attention given to sustainability in FY 86 as compared to FY 85;
- o Sustainability does not appear to be a factor receiving primary attention in project design;
- o Evidence was not found to indicate whether new or existing institutions have a greater prospect for sustainability;
- o The lack of effective and continuous leadership was a frequent cause of poor prospects for sustainability;
- o Institutions providing services to client bodies were occasionally performing well but not "marketing" their services effectively enough to be sustainable;
- o Public sector institutions are vulnerable to rigid rules and practices and frequently lack the financial resources to perform flexibly and become sustainable;
- o Inadequate arrangements for the participation of local people in planning, policy making and management of projects with large numbers of beneficiaries was a cause of some problems of sustainability;
- o Inadequate attention to important social attitudes and patterns was a significant cause of weak sustainability of some projects serving socially traditional rural groups;
- o The lack of strong management was a frequent cause of failure to achieve sustainability;

- o Weak linkage of those institutions playing key roles in projects to those on which they depend weakened their sustainability prospects in many cases while strong linkages frequently were a factor in projects with good sustainability prospects;
- o Poor sustainability was not infrequently associated with ill-adapted, costly technologies or those not institutionalized;
- o Policy problems which should have been confronted explicitly were sometimes "assumed away" resulting in the inability of projects to perform or to become sustainable;
- o Projects which had the internal capacity to be sustainable sometimes foundered due to non-supportive policies of the host country;
- o Financial stringency (often arising out of a national economic crisis) is a frequent contributor to poor sustainability;
- o Few projects include explicit plans to mobilize resources or develop innovative means to cover costs in the long run;
- o Human resource constraints arising from poor planning, inadequate resources for training and/or weak incentive arrangements for recruitment/retention of qualified personnel were a frequent and significant contributor to weak sustainability; and
- o Over-ambitious goals and plans relative to resources committed were frequently observed to be a cause of failing to achieve success ( and by indirection, sustainability) in many projects.

Key lessons learned pertaining to sustainability from the review of the FY 85 and 86 ERs are as follows:

- o Sustainability should be a central concern of project designers and be consciously sought as an outcome of most projects;
- o Leadership is a scarce and critical factor in achieving sustainability but human resource deficiencies generally are also a frequent source of poor sustainability;
- o Institutions need to develop "marketing" capabilities to sustain their relationships with clients or client institutions;

- o Flexible arrangements should be sought to permit public sector institutions to respond adequately to changing circumstances and client needs;
- o Local people's participation in planning, policy making and management are frequently important to sustainability of projects with a large body of intended beneficiaries;
- o Locally respected social patterns cannot be ignored if traditional groups are important participants/beneficiaries in projects;
- o Management capacity should be developed during the LOP so that responsible institutions can function effectively after external support is withdrawn;
- o Forward, backward and lateral institutional linkages can be critical factors in achieving sustainability;
- o Technologies need an appropriate institutional structure, must be well adapted to the local scene and be seen as a cost-effective "property" belonging to the users in order to support sustainability;
- o Policy problems which are "assumed away" at the project design stage can "haunt" projects when they should have been confronted explicitly;
- o A supportive policy environment can be a critical factor in sustainability;
- o In a country with weak fiscal and economic prospects, special arrangements are essential to achieving financial self-sufficiency of projects so that post-project benefits can be sustained;
- o Explicit plans to provide a continuing flow of funds in the future to cover operating or capital replacement costs can be a strong plus in the achievement of sustainability;
- o Projects need to be provided an adequate and assured source of human resources and incentives for their recruitment and retention as a basis for sustainability;
- o Projects should have resources of funds and personnel in balanced proportion to the scope of the purposes and goals sought and their availability should be within the capacity of the host country to provide on its own by the end of the LOP if sustainability is to be achieved.

## I. INTRODUCTION

### A. Purpose, Procedure and Scope

#### 1. Purpose

The objective of this analysis of institutional sustainability issues in USAID 1985-86 project Evaluation Reports (ERs) was to analyze (1) the sustainability of institutional components in AID projects and (2) the nature of the relationship between sustainability of project benefits and institutional development. It was intended to serve as one of the primary sources of data for determining the future direction of AID's activities in this field.

#### 2. Procedure

The analysis of sustainability issues was initially a part of a larger effort to review in-depth and synthesize over 200 AID ERs for CDIE. CDIE provided Devres with the evaluation reports undertaken in FY 85/86 that were to be reviewed. CDIE also specified the descriptive and substantive data that it wanted to identify and gather on each of the evaluation reports to be reviewed and processed. A matrix was designed to include:

- o A listing of FY 85/86 evaluation reports by Bureau, sector and country;
- o Descriptive data about the projects/programs evaluated and about the evaluation reports themselves; and
- o Substantive information on five topics (including sustainability) and selected sub- topics (one to three) under each topic.

An Evaluation Synthesis Rating Form was organized so that all the data could be entered into a computerized database and subsequently manipulated to develop many different matrices of data on the evaluation report.

Regarding this specific analysis of sustainability issues, Devres' staff reviewed the results of the statistical analysis for the universe of 212 ERs on the sustainability topic and sub-topics as background to the analysis of a sample of 50 ERs to be intensively reviewed. To select the sample, all ERs rated either +3 to +5 or -3 to -5 on Overall Sustainability were identified on the computer and a list printed out showing which were final, ex post and/or interim evaluations. All final and ex post ERs were retained in the list while the list was pared down to the agreed number of 50 by eliminating ERs which were not, strictly speaking, evaluations, were for less significant projects or were of questionable value in the sample.

The remaining 50 ERs were then reviewed with reference to each of the topics specified in the Sustainability SOW. Notes made on these topics gave special emphasis to the interrelationship of sustainability and institutional factors. These notes then formed the basis for the analytical presentation, the examples cited and for the findings and lessons learned. In addition a tabular presentation was prepared and included in this report for the sample of 50 ERs divided between highly positive and strongly negative cases and indicating which ERs did or did not directly address the issue of sustainability. It also describes the context in which it was addressed (either directly or indirectly). A count is given for the numbers of ERs addressing the topic directly or otherwise. The tabular presentation also treats the interrelationship of institutional factors and sustainability in the same manner. Counts are also presented showing the degree of coincidence between highly positive and strongly negative ratings for the sustainability sub-topics as compared to such ratings for Overall Sustainability as determined for the CDIE Work Order (# 1).

### 3. Scope

As noted above, Devres reviewed 212 ERs and rated nearly all of them on "sustainability overall" and on a variety of related "sustainability" sub-topics. Annex 2 lists the 212 ERs and their respective "sustainability overall" ratings. As discussed under Methodology below, the statistical data generated by the ratings plus the narrative in the Evaluation Reports was analyzed and 50 reports were selected for in-depth analysis of sustainability issues.

## B. Methodology and Statistical Analysis

### 1. Overall approach

Devres and PPC/CDIE collaborated in developing the overall approach to the evaluation synthesis project. The major topics were clarified early on and informal consultation occurred throughout the process about the various sub-topics to be included and about the conceptual and analytical structure of the synthesis.

After discussion with CDIE of the content of this synthesis, it was decided that the task would be carried out by a limited group of full time employees of Devres, all of whom had worked together for some time. All have multi-disciplinary development experience in a wide range of fields, functions and countries in all regions of the world. All have been involved in project identification, design, implementation and evaluation of development projects and share a concern for successful work among low-income people in developing countries. With this approach we were able to ensure that a variety of substantive perspectives on all the key issues would be brought to bear regardless of who conducted the review of a particular evaluation.

Moreover, at the outset of the process of reviewing the Evaluation Reports, several "pilot" tests were run with several different

reviewers rating the same evaluation, discussing the results and evolving a common approach. This resulted in a large measure of agreement and consistency of understanding.

From time to time over the life of this activity there were further consultations among the group of reviewers to discuss and resolve issues. We believe this has resulted in a coherent basis for the subsequent statistical analysis of the whole universe and for the more detailed review of the selected samples under each major topic. We also believe that this approach led to a high degree of consistency and intellectual integrity despite the wide range of topics, issues, countries and reviewers involved.

The particular approach to the sustainability analysis evolved out of the general approach to the larger project. It was designed to derive additional insights from the ERs by carrying out an in depth analysis of the sub sample.

## 2. Selection of topics for review

Sustainability was one of the five principle topics analyzed in the larger sample. The others included:

- o Implementation constraints;
- o Role of women in development;
- o Environmental impact; and
- o Impact on private sector.

In addition, over 40 sub-topics were identified related to the five main topics. The sub-topics related to Implementation Constraints were specified in the Statement of Work, the others were discussed and agreed upon between Devres and PPC/CDIE over the course of the review. Definitions were prepared for each topic and sub-topic and we arrived at a general consensus on these definitions. The sustainability topics and sub-topics on which all 212 ERs were reviewed were identified very early in the synthesis process and formed the basis for the analysis on sustainability contained here. Other sustainability sub-topics were identified in the subsequent SOW.

In addition, over 23 descriptive characteristics of the projects/-programs evaluated as well as of the Evaluation Reports themselves which covered those activities were also specified in the SOW and sources for the data were agreed upon.

Some supplementary materials were made available by AID to amplify the nature of the topics although they were not required to be covered by our tabulated significance ratings. These memoranda related in particular to the nature of the issues involved in sustainability, implementation constraints and women in development. The analysis

treats all issues raised to the extent that information contained in the ERs sheds light on the issues.

### 3. Development of the rating form

A rating form was devised which would capture in a Matrix A and a Matrix B all of the descriptive elements pertaining to the projects and the Evaluation Reports and the ES/PES documents which accompanied many (but by no means all) of the reports. These appeared on a face page on the Rating Form. A five-part Matrix C was developed to cover the substantive topics to be rated.

On five subsequent pages, each of the five topics and their respective sub-topics were set out in a manner to permit a numerical significance rating or other appropriate response to be recorded. Responses to significance ratings were given on a scale of 10 entries, +5 to -5. In the case of Implementation Constraints only negative ratings were entered for the "overall" rating on the theory that a "constraint" could by definition only be negative. Other implementation sub-topics were rated on the scale of 10 entries. On consideration at a late stage of the process some feeling had arisen that a scale of -5 to +5 would have been more useful for statistical analysis of the implementation overall rating. A statistical "proxy" was developed for this purpose. Other questions were given a "Yes/No" response where appropriate and provision was made for "not applicable" or "not observed" entries as appropriate when the ER gave no basis for a response or it was not relevant in the particular case.

The forms also provided for notations on the issues related to the topics/sub-topics on each page to facilitate analysis at a later stage and to comment on issues not related to the sub-topics on the form. One problem with the rating forms was the lack of mutual exclusivity of some of the sub-topics. However, the reviewers took this into account in their analysis. Copies of the ER Rating Form and the guidelines for using it are included in Annex 3.

### 4. Significance ratings of topics and sub-topics

Each of the 212 ERs was carefully reviewed and the significance of topics/sub-topics, as noted by the project evaluator in the evaluation report, was rated on a scale of +1 to +5 for positive influence (with +1 indicating little or no significance and +5 denoting high significance). The scale also included ratings for negative influence from -1 to -5 parallel to the positive scale. Thus, a rating of +5, for example, reflects the Devres reviewer's notation of the ERs' determination of high positive significance of the influence or impact of any given topic or sub-topic on the activity evaluated. Similarly, a rating of -5 indicates high negative significance of the influence or impact of the topic or sub-topic on the project, as indicated by the evaluation report. Ratings of eight or nine were given to those topics/sub-topics listed on the rating form when an issue was respectively "not applicable" or "not observed" in the evaluation. With a couple of exceptions, the reviewers assigned ratings on the basis only of the information in the evaluation itself. If a given topic was not noted, an "8" or "9" was the rating.

For the purposes of simplifying both statistical and written analysis, the ratings were grouped into three categories of significance:

- o +3 to +5 impact or influence of highly positive significance;
- o -3 to -5 impact or influence of strongly negative significance; and
- o +2 to -2 impact or influence of modest or no significance.

The development of various numerical matrices was based on these groupings and the testing of statistical significance and strength carried out among the "groups." For the in-depth analysis, individual evaluation reports were selected on the basis of their individual (not group) ratings for review. Efforts were made to carefully select reports that had either very high or very low significance ratings on a given issue so as to discern to the extent possible from the material in the selected reports, the causes and explanations for project/program results found by the evaluators.

ERs varied dramatically in quality, coverage and structure. The directness and precision with which a topic was covered sometimes required considerable judgment in making a rating of significance. The review team sought not to introduce the reviewer's views but instead to attempt to reflect what the evaluation report presented. Some limited measure of influence was sometimes required to provide a specific rating. It was our position, however, that the ratings for any topic/sub-topic should still rest on the report's findings as directly as possible.

##### 5. Creation of computerized database

Devres developed an integrated data analysis and information system for the final 212 project evaluation reports selected, which utilized dBASE III PLUS, LOTUS 123, and StatPac Gold software packages.

Database files, fields and variable characteristics were formulated based on the Evaluation Rating Form. Every question from each major topic was assigned a field or variable name. Records were stored in respective datafiles and related by corresponding evaluation numbers assigned at the time of entry.

Nine dBASE III files, two LOTUS 123 worksheets, and a StatPac Gold datafile, totalling over 800,000 bytes, were used to organize and store topic specific data. Thirty reporting templates and approximately 20 application software programs were designed and written to address system constraints, execute repetitive task, generated frequency reports, multi-variable cross-tabulated tables, derive various statistical measures and perform hypothesis testing. Two IBM-PC's, an

IBM-based 80286 8Mhz AT and three printers were made available to process hundreds of data queries and statistical requests from the evaluation synthesis staff.

6. Statistical methodology: description of approach

The statistical methodology was designed to provide quantitative analysis of the measures of project performance based on Devres ratings of AID Evaluation Reports. A variety of statistical techniques were utilized to gain greater understanding of the nature and context of the determinants of five overall topic measures and the import of the subcomponents of the topic areas. The five topics treated in the larger evaluation rating exercise were project sustainability, the implementation constraints facing project execution, the emphasis of private enterprise issues, the role of women in development and the impact of environmental concerns. The project rating exercise yielded statistical data for each topic consisting of an overall topic measure and a set of measures of related factors-subcomponents of the major topic areas. However, some projects did not involve certain topics and hence those factors were not rated, unknown or otherwise unanswerable.

The approach of the statistical methodology supported the formation of verifiable assertions about AID projects. First, organization of the data by issues for each topic was required. Assessment of regional and sectoral differences of project ratings was essential. In order to further refine and organize the conceptualization of the issues, a sizable amount of the data was stratified by range of response--high significance rating, low significance and non-significance. Consequently, frequency distributions of projects were extensively used to describe specific sub-populations. Subsequently, a major focus of the statistical methodology concerned the derivation and testing of hypotheses about the determinants of the overall performance indicators for the five topics. The objective was to find specific instruments that could be shown to affect project performance.

A combination of inductive and deductive reasoning underlies the development of the assertions discussed in the analysis. The use of frequency distributions provided some initial guidance about the general trends and obvious differences that could be obtained by inspection of the data. A set of the most interesting variables (overall ratings and subcomponents) were then ordinally ranked by their simple correlation coefficients using a pairwise correlation matrix. The pairwise correlation matrix is the correlation coefficient (a measure of how strongly one variable is related to the other) of each pair of variables, given valid responses existed for both variables. Based on a priori conceptual expectations and the ordinal ranking of the factors from the pairwise correlation results, a set of plausible specifications were postulated to describe the determinants of the overall topic measures. In general, it was assumed the overall topic measure was affected by at least one major factor and one or more minor

factors. Each of these specifications was subjected to empirical estimation and verification to obtain the most likely form of the relation.

The multiple regression econometric estimation technique was employed to derive exact measures of the strength of a factor's influence and its statistical significance as a potential determinant of a critical variable. A critical variable was usually defined as an overall rating for a topic and was specified as the left hand side (dependent) variable. The right hand side (independent) variable(s) usually included the various subcomponents as either major factor(s), minor factor(s) or both. The regressions were estimated on the available valid data for the variables. The regression results empowered a test of the specification of a relation between the critical variable and a set of potential determinants. The hypothetical specifications selected as acceptable demonstrated a combination of high overall predictability (R-squared), and statistically significant estimators (rejection of the null hypothesis that the parameter was zero at 95 percent confidence) of the parameters for each of the factors, given the magnitude of the parameters was of the right sign and within theoretical bounds. The regressions specified the relationship as linear and included a constant term in the equation:

$$Y = a + b * X1 + c * X2$$

In this general form, Y is the critical variable, X1 is the major factor influencing it and X2 a minor factor. All variables were either binary (yes/no) or restricted to the same range of values (-5 to +5). This allows comparison of the estimators of the coefficients ("a" and "b" in the equation above) in terms of both their magnitude and statistical significance. The ratio of the parameter estimator ("a" and "b") and the variance of the estimator yields a "t-ratio" used to determine the significance of the estimator. Statistics on overall goodness of fit and other measures are also occasionally included where pertinent.

#### 7. Limitations of this analysis

Every effort has been made to ensure that the findings and lessons learned stated in this report are accurate and reasonable in light of the data available in the Evaluation Report documents. Conclusions regarding cause and effect as well as lessons learned have been drawn cautiously so as to faithfully report what can be learned from various development project experiences for the purpose of helping to improve the planning, design, implementation and management of development assistance programs.

However, for a variety of reasons, the applicability of the results of the analysis must be carefully considered. First, since almost all of the Evaluation Reports were generated through AID's decentralized evaluation system, the reports varied greatly in terms of

the specific issues addressed in each evaluation, the scope and depth of the analyses contained in each report, and the quality and reliability of the data used to support the findings in the Evaluation Reports. The important point here is that this review and analysis was limited by the overall quality of the reports reviewed. A few reports were rich in detail on all topics relevant to a particular project; many others had little detail upon which to base a rating. The reviewers inevitably recorded many "9s" (not reported) on some topics or sub-topics not covered in the Evaluation Reports. This was not necessarily because a topic was totally insignificant but rather because the evaluators did not deal with it in the written Evaluation Report. Some topics were generally "not applicable" and were recorded accordingly (8).

Since the reviewers did not draw upon any project information outside the Evaluation Report itself the significance of the impact of a particular topic or sub-topic could not be determined unless it was related in the ER. Reviewers sought to apply reasonable judgments to information in the ERs but generally avoided making inferences simply to give a rating to a topic. The inability to obtain information from any source other than the ER (due to limitations of time and funding and by agreement with AID) was a significant constraint to gaining comprehensive insight into projects under review and the influence or impact of particular topics.

Second, the Evaluation Report universe for the synthesis study was not drawn from a "scientific" random sample of all projects on-going (i.e., that could theoretically have been evaluated) during the time period (FY 85/86) under review. The 212 evaluation reports from FY 85/86 constitutes only 17 percent of the 1244 active projects and "non-project" loans, grants and CIPs (excluding proposed projects) in AFR, ANE and LAC missions or other offices pertinent to the two years under review.<sup>1</sup> The universe includes those project evaluations that were completed during FY 85/86 that were available to CDIE and met certain criteria. It does not include evaluations undertaken in FY 85/86 for small projects under \$500,000, for Housing Investment Guarantee (HIG) Projects, pre-FY 85 evaluations or reports not considered to be essentially evaluative in nature. Thus, this universe provides a "snapshot" of only a part of AID's program.

Third, the 212 evaluation reports were reviewed and rated by four people each of whom, because of their own experience, may have interpreted the significance of any given element in any given report somewhat differently. Thus, the significance ratings could be slightly skewed by one or two points depending on what a given reviewer considered "significant." However, the four analysts who had different, yet complementary, experiences in many different areas of development, have worked together for more than five years and share

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<sup>1</sup>This figure does not include Central Bureau Projects as they did not figure prominently in the set of evaluation reports under review.

some common viewpoints on development projects. During the course of this study, the reviewers compared their results on projects and found their ratings to be generally consistent.

Fourth, there is wide variation in the purposes of the evaluations reviewed and in the issues to which they devoted primary attention. There is some possibility that the evaluations may tend to be skewed toward identifying problems and negative findings rather than successes. For example, evaluations are often triggered because AID staff believed that there are problems with a project, have reservations about its efficiency or effectiveness, or uncertainty about its continued relevance to a development strategy in the sector. Offsetting this possible negative bias in some interim evaluations is an apparent tendency of evaluators to be "kinder" or more constructive in their findings, conclusions and recommendations, i.e. to give the project the "benefit of the doubt."

Fifth, the projects under review in evaluations carried out in FY 85/86 have seldom been initiated since the major structural, policy and management reforms were put in place by AID in 1983. At most they would be Interim evaluations at an early (even formative) stage of project life. As a result, not too much significance should be read into the results in terms of the impact of those reforms. This has particular relevance to the assessment of implementation constraints.

Sixth, and finally, errors in data entry have undoubtedly occurred despite careful efforts to proof and edit the database as it was being accumulated. All that were identified were corrected. Despite the few errors that remain, we are confident that this is only a minor source of error.

### C. Descriptive Characteristics of the Projects and Evaluation Reports Reviewed

#### 1. Characteristics of projects identified in evaluation reports

This study and analysis is based on the experiences of 212 projects evaluated by AID FY 85 and 86. Table 1 shows the distribution of these projects by bureau and by sector. Nearly 40 percent of the projects were from the ANE bureau. The AFR and LAC bureaus were about equally represented with 29 and 28 percent of the report respectively. The PRE, FVA and S & T bureaus accounted for just 4 percent of the total. ERs from 50 countries are represented in the universe. One country (Egypt) had 21 ERs; four countries (Botswana, Zaire, Dominican Republic, and Jordan) had eight to ten ERs apiece. In addition, there were 25 multiple country ERs. Table 2 lists the ERs by bureau and country.

Overall, in terms of the sectoral breakdown of ERs in the universe, 52 percent of the projects ERs reviewed were in ARD; 19 percent were in SDA; 14 percent were in EHR; and another 14 percent in

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Table 1: Project Characteristics Identified in Evaluation Reports, by Bureau and Sector

a. Percent, by Bureau

<u>SECTOR</u>	AFR		ANE		LAC		OTHER		TOTALS	
ARD	33	54%	39	47%	34	58%	4	44%	110	52%
EHR	5	8%	14	17%	9	15%	1	11%	29	14%
HEA	8	13%	9	11%	3	5%	0	0%	20	9%
MLT	1	2%	1	1%	0	0%	0	0%	2	1%
POP	3	5%	5	6%	1	2%	1	11%	10	5%
SDA	11	18%	15	13%	12	20%	3	33%	41	19%
	<u>61</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>83</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>59</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>212</u>	<u>100%</u>

b. Percent, by Sector

<u>SECTOR</u>	AFR		ANE		LAC		OTHER		TOTALS	
ARD	33	30%	39	35%	34	31%	4	4%	110	100%
EHR	5	17%	14	48%	9	31%	1	3%	29	100%
HEA	8	40%	9	45%	3	15%	0	0%	20	100%
MLT	1	50%	1	50%	0	0%	0	0%	2	100%
POP	3	30%	5	50%	1	10%	1	10%	10	100%
SDA	11	27%	15	37%	12	29%	3	7%	41	100%
TOTALS	<u>61</u>		<u>83</u>		<u>59</u>		<u>9</u>		<u>212</u>	
	29%		39%		28%		4%		100%	

✓ The category "Other" includes ER's from PRE, FVA, and S&T.

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Table 2: List of Evaluation Reports by Bureau by Country

<u>Bureau</u>	<u># of Evaluations</u>	<u>Bureau</u>	<u># of Evaluations</u>
<u>AFR</u>		<u>ANE</u>	
BOTSWANA	9	BANGLADESH	1
BURUNDI	1	EGYPT	21
CAMEROON	1	INDIA	3
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	1	INDONESIA	7
CONGO	4	JORDAN	8
EQUATORIAL GUINEA	2	MALAYSIA	1
GHANA	1	MOROCCO	5
KENYA	6	MULT	5
LIBERIA	3	NEPAL	3
MALAWI	1	OMAN	1
MOZAMBIQUE	1	PAKISTAN	6
MULT	6	PHILIPPINES	3
NIGER	4	POLAND	1
RWANDA	1	PORTUGAL	1
SOMALIA	1	SRI LANKA	6
SOUTH AFRICA	1	THAILAND	7
SUDAN	2	TUNISIA	1
SWAZILAND	1	YEMEN	3
TANZANIA	1		
ZAIRE	9	subtotal	83
ZAMBIA	2		
Subtotal	61	<u>PRE</u>	
		KENYA	1
		MULT	3
		THAILAND	2
		subtotal	6
<u>LAC</u>		<u>FVA</u>	
BELIZE	2	MULT	1
BOLIVIA	4	subtotal	1
COSTA RICA	2		
DOMINICA	1	<u>S&amp;T</u>	
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	10	BOLIVIA	1
ECUADOR	1	PHILIPPINES	1
EL SALVADOR	3	subtotal	2
GUATEMALA	5		
HAITI	3	TOTAL	212
HONDURAS	6		
JAMAICA	3		
MULT	10		
PANAMA	2		
PERU	7		
subtotal	59		

HEA and POP together.<sup>2</sup> In terms of regional distribution, each region accounted for roughly one-third of the ARD projects reviewed. ANE accounted for about 50 percent of the EHR and HEA, and POP projects and 37 percent of the SDA projects overall. AFR accounted for 40 percent of the HEA projects. Within each region the percentages are a little different. While ARD accounted for about half of the total projects within the AFR and ANE bureaus they accounted for nearly 60 percent of the LAC projects reviewed. Projects in the EHR sector accounted for roughly 16 percent of the total projects reviewed for both ANE and LAC bureaus. However, EHR projects constituted only 8 percent of AFR projects. Projects in SDA accounted for 18 to 20 percent of the projects in each of the three regions.

The project life and size as stated in the ERs varied greatly. As Table 3 indicates, overall nearly 60 percent of the ERs indicated a LOP of more than 5 years; 23 percent had LOP three to five years; 19 percent had a LOP of 1 to 3 years. The AFR bureau had the largest percentage (43 percent) of 3 to 5 year projects; ANE had the largest percentage (44 percent) of "more than five year" projects; and LAC and ANE each 37 percent of 1 to 3 year projects. Within each of the bureaus, 50 to 66 percent of the projects had a life of more than five years. Approximately 75 percent (159 of 212) of the projects began in FY 82 or earlier.

The projects described in the 212 ERs under review varied in size. Not surprisingly the size of projects in general correlated with the LOP. About 48 percent of "very large" projects (in excess of US \$10 million) were undertaken in the ANE bureau, followed by LAC with 30 percent. The largest percentage of projects with a size ranging from US \$3 to US 10 million, were also carried out by ANE followed by AFR with 33 percent of projects in this range. Of the smaller projects (US \$1 to 3 million), 44 percent were in AFR; 32 percent in ANE. LAC and AFR bureaus each carried out about one-third of the smallest size (less than US \$1 million) projects. In sum, the largest percentage of smaller projects was in AFR and the largest percentage of large projects was in ANE.

## 2. Characteristics of the evaluation reports

The evaluation reports in this universe varied widely in structure and content. As Table 4 indicates, two thirds of the evaluations were undertaken in FY 85; about 30 percent in FY 86. Over 60 percent of the ERs reviewed were "interim," 30 percent were "final"

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<sup>2</sup>No sectoral breakdown figures are available for AID's portfolio of projects active in FY 85 and/or FY 86 similar to the Bureau breakdown. It is not possible to derive this figure because SDP and ESF projects are not distributed by sector and because many projects funded by DA sectoral appropriation categories do not reflect the real substance of the projects, e.g. some health projects all POP funded; some rural development projects are health-funded, etc.

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Table 3 : Characteristics of Project Life & Size Identified in Evaluation Reports, by Bureau

A. <u>FY Project Began:</u>					
	AFR	ANE	LAC	OTHER	TOTAL
1983 or later	17	9	14	5	45
1982 or earlier	42	69	44	4	159
N/O	2	5	1	0	8
	<u>61</u>	<u>83</u>	<u>59</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>212</u>
B. <u>Project Life by Region</u>					
	AFR	ANE	LAC	OTHER	TOTAL
1 to 3 years	10	14	15	1	40
3 to 5 years	20	14	9	5	48
More than 5	31	55	35	3	124
	<u>61</u>	<u>83</u>	<u>59</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>212</u>
Percentage of Column					
	AFR	ANE	LAC	OTHER	TOTAL
1 to 3 years	16.4%	16.9%	25.4%	11.1%	18.9%
3 to 5 years	32.8%	16.9%	15.3%	55.6%	22.6%
More than 5	50.8%	66.2%	59.3%	33.3%	58.5%
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>
C. <u>Project Size by Region</u> (US\$ million)					
	AFR	ANE	LAC	OTHER	TOTAL
Less than \$1	20	12	19	6	57
\$1 to \$3 million	11	8	6	0	25
\$3 to \$10 million	14	19	9	0	42
More than \$10	14	30	19	0	63
N/O	2	14	6	3	25
	<u>61</u>	<u>83</u>	<u>59</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>212</u>
Percentage of Column					
	AFR	ANE	LAC	OTHER	TOTAL
Less than \$1	33.7%	14.5%	32.2%	100.0%	29.9%
\$1 to \$3 million	18.0%	9.6%	10.2%	0.0%	11.8%
\$3 to \$10 million	23.0%	22.9%	15.3%	0.0%	19.8%
More than \$10	23.0%	36.1%	32.2%	0.0%	29.7%
N/O	3.3%	16.9%	10.1%	0.0%	11.8%
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>

Project Size by Region (continued)

Percentage of row

	AFR	ANE	LAC	OTHER	TOTAL
Less than \$1	35.1%	21.1%	33.3%	10.5%	100.0%
\$1 to \$3 million	44.0%	32.0%	24.0%	0.0%	100.0%
\$3 to \$10 million	33.3%	45.2%	21.4%	0.0%	100.0%
More than \$10	22.2%	47.6%	30.2%	0.0%	100.0%
N/O	8.0%	56.0%	24.0%	12.0%	100.0%
TOTAL	28.8%	39.2%	27.8%	4.2%	100.0%

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Table 4 : Characteristics of Evaluation Reports by Bureau

A.	Type of Evaluation	Total #	% of Universe <sup>1</sup>	BUREAU			
				AFR	ANE	LAC	OTHER
	Interim	132	62%	40	56	32	4
	Final	64	31%	15	21	24	4
	E. Post	15	7%	6	6	2	1
	N/A	1		0	0	1	0
B.	FY Evaluation Completed:						
	1984	8	4%	3	2	3	0
	1985	142	67%	35	58	43	6
	1986	60	28%	21	23	13	3
	N/O	2	1%	2	0	0	0
C.	Evaluation Performed:						
	Internally	44	21%	16	16	12	0
	Externally	164	77%	44	64	47	9
	N/O	4	2%	1	3	0	0
D.	Evaluation Team Composition						
	Contractor	82	39%	17	21	39	5
	AFD	21	10%	8	9	4	0
	Mixed	41	19%	17	13	8	3
	Host Country	2	1%	0	0	2	0
	Host Country/AID	11	5%	4	7	0	0
	Host Country/Contractor	28	13%	1	21	5	1
	Host Country/Mixed	22	10%	12	9	1	0
	Not Observed	5		2	3	0	0
E.	Contents of Written Reports						
	PES/ES Present	145	68%	43	51	50	1
	Executive Summary	162	76%	46	65	42	9
	Table of Contents	169	80%	45	68	47	9
	Evaluation SOW	103	49%	30	42	22	9
	Evaluation Methodology	159	75%	41	63	47	8
	Conclusions	136	64%	41	58	29	8
	Recommendations	188	89%	57	77	45	9
	Lessons Learned	116	55%	34	47	30	5
	Design Documents	51	24%	8	25	17	1

<sup>1</sup>Note: Percentage is based on total universe of 212 projects. Percentages have been rounded.

and only 7 percent were "ex post." Thus, many of the comments regarding project implementation and/or sustainability were essentially "partial" as the evaluator was stepping into the project at some early or mid- "point" and did not generally have the long-time perspective that might have been found in a final or ex post evaluation, this fact is important to remember in terms of the lessons learned from this evaluation review. They generally do not provide as much in-depth insight into a project because they are based on shorter time frames.

More than three-fourths of the evaluations reviewed were performed externally using contractors, or host country personnel or a combination of either or both of these with or without AID staff. For the universe as a whole, nearly 40 percent of the evaluations were performed by US contractors. Evaluation teams involving host country personnel constituted 30 percent of all the evaluation teams. The LAC bureau relied on outside contractors alone to prepare 66 percent of their ERs. The ANE bureau involved host country personnel more frequently (44 percent) than the other bureaus in their evaluation process though they involved US contractors about 40 percent of the time. The AFR bureau utilized the services of contractors, mixed AID/contractor teams and teams with host country participants in about equal proportions.

From the reviewer's perspective, "good" evaluations were those that included at a minimum an Executive Summary, distinct sets of Conclusions and Recommendations and Lessons Learned. Other important criteria, particularly for reference, were the inclusion of a Table of Contents, the evaluation SOW, a discussion of the evaluation methodology and specific pertinent design information. Table 4 summarizes some of the contents of the ERs. Nearly 90 percent of the ERs included Recommendations but only two-thirds included Conclusions and about half had Lessons Learned. Roughly 75 percent included an Executive Summary and Evaluation Methodology but only half included the Evaluation Scope of Work. Less than 25 percent included any design documents. In terms of the inclusion of Conclusions, Recommendations and Lessons Learned, it appears, from an analysis of this universe, at least, that the AFR and ANE bureaus have produced the most "complete" evaluations.

In terms of which type of evaluation team delivers the most "complete" ER, the data shows no clear pattern. Table 5 shows some variation between types of teams and the ER delivered. Host country participation seems to be a "plus" particularly in terms of the detail which such individuals can provide.

### 3. Comments on the evaluation reporting process

As noted above, there were wide disparities in both the quantity and quality of the written ERs. Some were long and detailed; others short and general. There was little conformity to any particular pattern of organization or content. Few addressed AID's "four pillars;" even fewer discussed environmental, private enterprise,

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Table 5: Evaluation Report Contents by  
-Composition of Evaluation Team  
 (percentage of total universe)

	<u>Executive</u> <u>Summary</u>	<u>Conclusions</u>	<u>Recommendations</u>	<u>Lessons</u> <u>Learned</u>	<u>Table of</u> <u>Contents</u>	<u>Evaluation</u> <u>SOW</u>	<u>Evaluation</u> <u>Method</u>	<u>Design</u> <u>Documents</u>
Contractor	77%	62%	87%	50%	87%	54%	78%	29%
AID	71	71	76	68	52	38	76	10
Mixed	80	56	98	59	93	51	76	27
H/AID	73	64	91	36	73	36	82	36
H/Contractor	79	76	93	49	90	62	76	21
H/Mixed	86	68	91	68	68	41	73	23
Host Country	50	50	50	50	50	--	50	--

or WID impact. Thus while many of the projects evaluated may have had an impact, for example, on women, there was little consistent detail about gender in the reports. Indirect insight was necessarily relied on in others. Too few made clear references to whether sustainability had been a primary concern or goal in the original design of the project.

Overall, it appears that AID is not clear about exactly what information it wants in, or from, evaluation reports. Sustainability, for example, was not a focus of most ERs (This is discussed in more depth in Chapter II). Moreover if AID is trying to "track" progress on WID, PRE or environment issues this does not appear to be understood by the evaluators or the Missions requesting evaluations. Little indication emerged that evaluators were more sensitive to these points in FY 86 when they were to be stressed than in FY 85. Inclusion of gender-specific data or information on such standard PRE "success" indicators as jobs created or income generated appear in the ERs more serendipitously than anything else and then usually in a descriptive, not analytical, mode. In fact the evaluations themselves are overwhelmingly descriptive of "events" that took place in a project's life cycle. It is the exception that a clear-cut analysis explains why something went well or poorly. With this in mind, CDIE may want to consider more explicit guidelines for "impact" analysis on certain issues of importance to the Agency.

As for the ERs themselves, there is no common format in terms of organizing or presenting information or statistical data. Some begin with a project description and end with Conclusions and Recommendations; other ERs reverse the process. Some dwell on the methodology of the evaluation, others don't mention methodology at all. With this in mind, it might be helpful for the future to establish a "format" and "checklist" for ERs to facilitate analysis of their findings across a wide range of projects and special issues by bureau and by sector.

## II. SUSTAINABILITY

### A. Overall Patterns

#### 1. Introduction

In examining the evaluations carried out during FY85 and 86 with reference to sustainability, special emphasis has been given to institutional factors and to a series of other issues previously agreed to with AID. Key issues examined include:

- o Institutional factors
  - type and function
  - new vs. existing
  - grass roots participation
  - strength of constituency
  - leadership and management capacity and
  - linkages among institutions and with beneficiaries
- o Technology adoption
- o Cultural factors
- o Policy environment
- o Cost coverage and post-project finance
- o Human resource development
- o Implementation/sustainability relationships
- o Project design
- o Life of project
- o Flexibility of management
- o Technical assistance team composition.

This analysis is a combined response to the requirements of the scopes of work for sustainability under the Work Order issued by CDIE (W.O. No. PDC-0085-I-00-6095-00 #1) and the more comprehensive coverage called for by the additional tasks in a supplementary Work Order (No. PDC-0085-I-00-6095-00 #4). A description and detailed statistical tabulations of the universe of evaluations with reference to sustainability and an in-depth analysis of 50 evaluations which received highly positive or strongly negative overall ratings for sustainability are included in this effort. This larger sample complies with the requirements of both Work Orders.

## 2. Sustainability patterns for the universe

Sustainability ratings were given for projects described in 198 individual ERs of the 212 report universe. Ratings ranged from -5 (strongly negative) to +5 (highly positive) in determining the likelihood of projects (at the time of evaluation) to achieve long-term viability. Sustainability ratings have been grouped into three categories: sustainability likely, for projects with highly positive overall ratings; sustainability unlikely, for projects with strongly negative overall ratings; and marginal sustainability cases for projects with average ratings (between -2 and +2). As one would expect, given normal distribution patterns, the majority of projects (56 percent or 119 of the total ER universe of 212) fall within the category of average or marginal sustainability. Evaluations with highly positive sustainability ratings overall make up only 11 percent of the ER universe, while projects with strongly negative ratings comprised 26 percent of the population.

Overall sustainability ratings were analyzed by bureau as noted in Table 6. Of the three regional bureaus, a higher percentage of projects in the AFR bureau (13 percent) received highly positive overall sustainability ratings than did projects in either the ANC or LAC bureaus which received highly positive ratings on only 7 percent and 10 percent of their universe of projects reviewed respectively. The AFR bureau also had the highest percentage of projects with strongly negative ratings followed by ANC and LAC. Both the ANC and LAC bureaus had larger percentages of projects in the "marginal" range than did the AFR bureau.

The overall sustainability ratings were also examined by sector. As noted in Table 7, the POP sector had the highest percentage of projects receiving highly positive overall sustainability ratings. ARD had the lowest percentage of projects with this rating. The HEA sector had the highest percentage of projects receiving strongly negative ratings, and ARD had the lowest percentage of projects with strongly negative ratings.<sup>1</sup> Another way to look at this is to look "inside" the rating groups (e.g., +3 to +5, -3 to -5, etc.) to see which sector had the highest percentages of highly positive and strongly negative ratings. Of the 24 ERs that indicated highly positive overall ratings on sustainability, 42 percent were in ARD; 25 percent were in HEA/POP together; SDA and EHR each accounted for 16 percent of the highly positive ratings. Of the group of 55 projects that received strongly negative sustainability ratings, 40 percent of those rated were in ARD; 22 percent in HEA/POP; and 24 percent in SDA.

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<sup>1</sup>The two multiple sector projects are not considered here because of the small number of projects in the sector.

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Table 6 Overall Sustainability Ratings by Bureau

<u>Bureau</u>	<u>Total # Projects Rated</u>	<u>Percent Highly Positive Ratings</u>	<u>Percent Strongly Negative Ratings</u>	<u>Percent Marginal Ratings</u>	<u>Percent Not Observed</u>	<u>Total</u>
AFR	61	13%	34%	46%	7%	100%
ANE	83	7	22	61	10	100
LAC	59	10	19	69	2	100
OTHER	9	45	33	11	11	100
	=== 212					

Table 7: Overall Sustainability Ratings by Sector

<u>Sector</u>	<u>Total # Projects Rated on Issue<sup>1</sup></u>	<u>Percent Highly Positive Ratings</u>	<u>Percent Strongly Negative Ratings</u>	<u>Percent Marginal Ratings</u>	<u>Percent TOTAL</u>
ARD	106	9%	21%	70%	100
EHR	23	17	26	57	100
HEA	19	16	47	37	100
MLT	2	-	100	-	100
POP	10	30	30	40	100
SDA	37	11	35	54	100
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	197				

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<sup>1</sup>The difference between number of projects rated and the universe of 212 ERs is a result of some projects receiving an 8 or 9 rating on this issue.

Cross tabulation of ratings on selected sustainability sub-topics with overall sustainability ratings shows some interesting relationships. For example, in terms of financial provision for O & M and recurrent/capital cost recovery, only 12 percent of the 148 projects rated on this issue received highly positive ratings; over 40 percent received strongly negative ratings. Of the 17 projects receiving highly positive ratings for financial provisions for O & M, 70 percent also had high overall sustainability ratings indicating that the one is important to the other. On the subtopic, organization/-institutional capacities for the continuation of project benefits, only 15 percent of the 189 projects rated on the issue received highly positive ratings; nearly 40 percent received strongly negative ratings. However, as with the financial provisions sub-topic, 55 percent of the 29 projects with a high organizational/institutional rating also had a high positive overall sustainability rating. Conversely, 66 percent of the 71 projects with a strongly negative organization/institutional rating also had strongly negative sustainability ratings. Regarding strength of constituency, less than 30 percent of the 171 ERs rated on this issue had a highly positive rating. Over 50 percent had average or marginal ratings. These ratings are not closely tied to high overall sustainability ratings.

### 3. Statistical findings

The subcomponents of sustainability were analyzed statistically using regression techniques to measure the relative strength and statistical significance of their influence as potential determinants of sustainability. The evidence supports an assertion that sustainability is most strongly affected by the organizational and institutional capacities for continuation of project benefits. Several other subcomponents were identified as having weaker albeit statistically significant influence on sustainability. The cooperating organizations ability to respond to changing conditions, the development of management capacity and the financial provision for O&M and recovery/capital cost all had similar magnitudes of influence on sustainability but their strength was only about half that for the organizational capacity effect. The remaining subcomponents all were found to be significantly related to overall sustainability. However, the magnitude of their influence was low. It is plausible that their limited influence may contribute important complementary effects and some of the subcomponents may act as substitutes for others.

The evidence supports an assertion that sustainability is most strongly affected by the organizational and institutional capacities for continuation of project benefits, and several other minor factors including cooperating organizations ability to respond to changing conditions, the development of management capacity and the financial provision for O&M and recover/capital cost. The organizational capacity variable has a simple correlation of more than 0.8 with sustainability in the pairwise correlation matrix and the strength of its influence as measured by the parameter estimator in the regressions

ranges from about 0.5 to 0.65. In every equation the estimator for the parameter on institutional capacity is highly significant, with t-ratios in excess of eight.

The three subcomponents having relatively lower but still sizable effects on sustainability can be considered as minor factors in the determination of sustainability. These factors, when tested jointly with capacity, have strengths ranging in magnitude from 0.39 for the organizations ability to change, to 0.3 for the development of management capacity and 0.3 for financial provision of O&M. Each coefficient is also highly significant.

The results for the other subcomponents, when tested jointly with organizational capacity, are less explicit. For all the other sustainability components, when tested jointly with capacity, the regressions show they are all statistically significant as influences on the level of overall sustainability. However, despite their significance, the magnitude of the effect on sustainability is quite low, ranging downward from 0.25.

## B. In-depth Analysis of Issues

### 1. The sample

#### a. The selection process and the sample structure

In order to select a sample set of projects for in-depth review on the sustainability issue it was agreed that those which received high (+3 to +5) and low (-3 to -5) significance ratings on the overall sustainability topic would be the starting point. This turned out to yield about 70 ERs. In winnowing down to 50 cases as the sample as agreed for the special sustainability analysis (although only 20 had originally been contemplated for the CDIE intensive review of sustainability) preference was given to final and ex post evaluations and several which seemed likely to be less instructive because they were very brief or on special topics were eliminated. Table 8 lists the ERs selected for the sample.

The final sample included 32 reports with strongly negative ratings and 18 with highly positive ratings for overall sustainability. Of those with strongly negative ratings, the distribution of ERs by sector/subsector was as follows: agricultural research and extension 5, land settlement and rural development 2, health 8, population/family planning 1, water use and management 1, fisheries 1, urban services 1, education and human resources 1, development administration 1, infrastructure development 4, energy/technology 5, private sector 2. Of the 18 ERs given strongly positive ratings the sector/subsector breakdown was as follows: agricultural production/extension/research 2, water management 1, education/human resources 3, health 2, population/family planning 2, development planning 1, renewable energy 1, infrastructure development 2, women in development 2, private sector

Table 8: List of ERs in Sustainability Sample

Country	Evaluation Name	Project No.
BOTSWANA	Renewable Energy Technology	633-0209
BOTSWANA	Accelerated Impact Program--Borehole Drilling	698-0410-21
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	Central African Republic Rural Development I	676-0015
CONGO	Congo Primary Health Care	698-0410-30
CONGO	Smallholders Agricultural Development I (SMAG I)	679-0001
EQUATORIAL GUINEA	Agricultural Development	653-0001
KENYA	Women in Development: Rural Women's Extension	698-0388
NIGER	Niger Integrated Livestock Production	683-0242
SUDAN	Southern Regional Infrastructure Phase I	650-0031
TANZANIA	Farming Systems Res. and Related Activities	621-0156
ZAMBIA	Agricultural Development Research and Extension (ZAMARE)	611-0201
BOTSWANA	Primary Education Improvement Project (PEIP) (2)	633-0222
CONGO	Combatting Communicable Childhood Diseases	698-0421-79
LIBERIA	Combatting Childhood Communicable Disease: Liberia	698-0421
NIGER	Rural Health Improvement	683-0208
SUDAN	Rural Health Support	650-0030
ZAIRE	Family Planning Services	660-0094
BOTSWANA	Botswana-Zambia Road Paving	633-0072
BOTSWANA	Gaborone West Housing and Facilities	633-0238
LIBERIA	Small and Medium Scale Enterprise Development and Support	669-0201
EGYPT	Small Farmer Production	263-0079
MOROCCO	Morocco Renewable Energy Development	608-0159
NEPAL	Strengthening Institutional Capacity in Food & Agricultural Sector	NP
OMAN	Fisheries Development	272-0101
PAKISTAN	Tribal Areas Development	391-0471
PHILIPPINES	Rural Energy Development	492-0375
SRI LANKA	Water Management I	383-0057

(cont'd)

Table 8: List of ERs in Sustainability Sample

Country	Evaluation Name	Project No.
JORDAN	Health Education	278-0245
MOROCCO	Health Management Improvement	608-0151
PHILIPPINES	Primary Health Care Financing (PHCFP)	492-0371
SRI LANKA	Malaria Control (1986)	383-0043
INDONESIA	Family Planning Development and Services	MULT
MOROCCO	Population/Family Planning Support II	608-0155
EGYPT	Water and Wastewater Sector Assessment	MULT
EGYPT	Applied Science and Technology: Scientific and Tech Info Component	263-0016
EGYPT	Private Sector Feasibility Studies	263-0112
EGYPT	Neighborhood Urban Services (NUS)	263-K-605-5
EGYPT	Development Planning Studies	263-0061
INDIA	Technologies for the Rural Poor	386-0465
BOLIVIA	New Lands Settlement Regional Development - San Juliano	NP
MULT	Caribbean Agricultural Extension II	538-0068
PERU	Improved Water and Land Use in the Sierra (Plan MERIS)	527-0156
BOLIVIA	Rural Education II (1986)	511-0482
BOLIVIA	Rural Education II (1985)	511-0482
HONDURAS	Development Administration Record H	522-0174
MULT	Caribbean Education Dev UWI/USAID Primary Curriculum Subproject	538-0029
MULT	Caribbean Epidemiological Surveillance and Training	538-0027
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	Energy Policy Development	517-0143
MULT	Caribbean Marketing Assistance	538-0102
MULT	Women's World Banking	940-0002
THAILAND	Siam Commercial Bank Ltd	940-0002-1
BOLIVIA	Water Supply and Small Scale Irrigation	511-0581

2. The distribution by sector/subsector appeared to be quite representative.

The projects are equally diverse in terms of the types of host country institutions through which they operate. These include central, regional and local government bodies; parastatal bodies; decentralized government ministries; expatriate and indigenous private voluntary organizations; community-based and farmers associations; quasi-governmental and inter-governmental regional institutions, etc. In a few projects, no host country institution was involved.

b. The analytical process

Notes were taken concerning the sustainability performance of all of these projects. In order to array these in a comprehensive layout for review a matrix was prepared with rough scores of the level of performance for each of the projects on each of the sub-topics on which information was to be compiled. These included all the sub-topics on which information was sought for the special analysis of institutional and other factors relating to sustainability. A computer printout list was also prepared showing the overall sustainability ratings and the "significance ratings" for all sub-topics on the CDIE list. In this way it was possible to identify the evaluation reports which were likely to provide substantial insights and/or lessons on all the topics.

A review was then conducted of the ERs and of the notes taken at earlier stages. Reference was also made to the correlations and significance tests as a guide in reviewing each sub-topic. From these a composite picture was developed of the indications in this sample of the nature and degree of impact on sustainability of the various topics and issue areas. The lessons learned reflect both the reviewer's insights from the analysis of each report, the "lessons learned" presented in the reports by the original evaluators and a synthesis based on an overall analysis of the sustainability issue. The reviewer had also conducted a detailed review of many evaluation reports outside the sample which provided insights.

2. Key institutional factors

a. Institutional type and function

It is widely believed that institutions play a key role in achieving success in development. When success is examined with particular emphasis on the sustainability of the flow of outputs or benefits a given project seeks to deliver, the institutional role becomes even more critical. By sustainability is meant the collective ability of all of those engaged in the activity to carry forward into the future a stream of needed benefits to a designated client or beneficiary group at a cost which is acceptable. Generally this must result in one or more of the following: greater productivity, improved indigenous capacity to deliver a needed service, and/or the capacity to

distribute domestic resources more efficiently for the project. If these developments are to occur, it is inevitable that some sort of institution must be the instrument by which they occur.

Review of the evaluations carried out by AID over the past two fiscal years confirms the central and essential role of institutions in achieving sustainability. Both the manner and the degree to which the institutions perform this role successfully reflect the suitability of their structure, their placement in the process, their maturity and the inputs they receive during implementation. The type of institution involved and its function(s) are similarly important determinants of the support and inputs required to perform successfully when the external assistance provided by the project comes to an end. This also foreshadows the discussion of project design below in that unless the design is sound, needed inputs will not be present.

o Public sector

Institutions in the public sector intended to deliver services to and/or interact with a dispersed clientele will have some different requirements from those whose principal functions are of a regulatory, policy making, tax collecting, or enforcement oriented sort. Both types also have some similar requirements.

A review of projects with planning and policy functions carried out by central government institutions suggests that they are particularly vulnerable to key weaknesses and constraints that tend to limit their sustainability. The principal findings concerning this institutional group can be summarized as follows:

- o Leadership is a critical ingredient to success and is often subject to disturbance from external political forces;
- o Technical assistance can make a signal contribution to successful implementation, institutional development and sustainability by placing local staff in performing key functions;
- o When project expectations are well matched with institutional capability--existing or expanding over time--sustainability is enhanced; many projects establish unrealistic institutional objectives relative to the time and resources available; this reduces project sustainability;
- o Training and organizational development achievements which are essential to sustainability are easily lost due to poor personnel policies, uncompetitive salaries, weak management or failure of higher level policy makers to make effective use of developed capacity.

Several brief examples illustrate these points:

- o A project in Honduras (522-0174 Development Administration) which sought to strengthen tax, revenue, accounting, procurement and related services is reported in an FY 85 final evaluation to have suffered because of:
  - Poor management and erratic, distracted leadership by GOH officials;
  - An unsatisfactory incentive structure which resulted in high turnover of staff; this reduced the potential for institutionalization of reforms; and
  - Poor project design; it set goals that were unattainable and structured TA in ways inimical to purpose achievements.
  
- o A final evaluation completed in FY 85 in the Dominican Republic (517-0143, Energy Policy Development) concluded the project had poor prospects for sustainability without further inputs. Project purposes were to assist the National Energy Policy Commission and provide information support for policy formulation, data for public and private sector use and upgrade skills for public and private sector energy programs. It is unclear when the institution was created. The principal reasons for the project's lack of sustainability were:
  - Weakness of project design which included inappropriate technology, inadequate resource inputs, misconceptions of the ultimate use of policy information;
  - Heavy personnel turnover due to ineffective use of skills gained through training;
  - Leadership ineffective in use of data and forming of policy issues; and
  - A reputation among its constituency for inefficiency.
  
- o In examining the results of technical assistance provided to various Ministries of the Government of Kenya under Project No. 615-0213 (Structural Adjustment), the interim evaluation concludes that results were mixed at best and significantly negative in key respects. Institutional development efforts led to a negative sustainability rating for the following reasons:
  - Advisors intervened at a level which caused local officials to become over-dependent on TA; local staff were demoralized;

- Despite abundant high quality TA, various Kenyan institutions had limited analytic ability for dealing with policy issues;
- Procedures for project generation and investment allocation remained fragile; and
- Management was not strengthened.

By way of counterpoint, the Development Planning Studies project in Egypt (263-0061) which supports the Development Research and Technology Planning Center (DRTPC) within the structure of a public university to serve public sector entities/Ministries and parastatals made sufficient progress in key areas to receive a positive sustainability rating. It was newly established when the project was initiated and was six years old at the time of the evaluation. The main reasons for its highly positive sustainability rating are:

- o Good progress in development of staff and management capacity;
- o Flexibility in dealing with change;
- o Support from a reasonably strong constituency;
- o Wide acceptance of technologies developed; and
- o A good national policy environment.

There remain significant needs for DRTPC to expand its capability for sustainability by broadening its financial support base, further strengthening its management and achieving greater promotional and marketing impact among its prospective client agencies.

Public sector institutions charged with delivering social services and/or developing programs otherwise relating to dispersed constituencies face different and, in many respects, more complex problems. The sample includes projects carried out by such agencies which show both strong sustainability potential as well as a poor outlook for continuing benefits. In the latter case, key problems appear to have been:

- o Weak institutional management and outreach capacity for effective linkage with local institutions and groups;
- o Inadequate budgetary resources for maintenance and replacement of equipment and facilities;
- o Inappropriate and non-supportive policies of governments and major responsible bodies;

- o Insufficient involvement in planning policy and/or implementation by groups of participants and beneficiaries at the local level; and
- o Ineffective mechanisms for training staff and middle management.

Where substantial success was achieved, it can be attributed mainly to the following factors:

- o Strong institutions in place with effective leadership, linkages and management;
- o Good provision for mobilization and support of participating groups and constituencies;
- o Acceptance of methods and technologies;
- o Good provision for O & M cost coverage in the future;
- o Effective training of project participants;
- o Good policy environment; and
- o Local leadership well-supported by authorities.

Some examples selected from the projects reviewed in-depth illustrate these points. Projects which have been judged to have good sustainability prospects include the following.

- o The Primary Education Improvement project in Botswana was given high marks for sustainability in a final evaluation performed in FY 85 after five years of operation and commitment of \$7.3 million. The principal reasons advanced for its high potential to maintain the flow of benefits were:
  - Strong leadership and effective management in the Ministry and the University created strong programs and constituency support;
  - Supportive policies laid down by the Government of Botswana were faithfully adhered to;
  - Institutions involved were effective and flexible in dealing with change; and
  - Cooperation of major institutions was close and liaison with local authorities was extensive with favorable impacts on teacher performance.
- o In Sri Lanka a Water Management project (383-0057) was given a strong rating on sustainability in a final evaluation

carried out in FY 86. The project was concluding its 7-year life during which AID funding of \$13.6 million was committed. Some elements of the project design resulted in resource misallocation and some uncertainty about the effectiveness of farmer groups in future O & M of field distribution systems for irrigation water. Nevertheless, the project's prospects for sustainability were seen by the evaluators as bright for the following reasons:

- Strong leadership by the Project Director;
  - Effective training of project personnel;
  - Sound strategy to create and support Water Users Associations (WUA's) by employing institutional organizers; this resulted in greatly increased rapport between farmers and officials and increased participation by farmers in policy decisions; and
  - Greatly increased acreage and yields of irrigated crops giving good internal rate of return (IRR); this was partially clouded by uncertainties about future irrigation system maintenance unless the follow-on project activities continued and improved the cohesiveness of WUA's.
- o The Primary Curriculum Development project in the Caribbean (538-0029) was given a final evaluation in FY 85. Highly positive prospects for sustainability were cited by the evaluators because of the following factors:
- Implementation by a well-established regional institution (University of West Indies) with long-standing strong linkages to the educational establishments of the countries in the region;
  - Good acceptance by governments, officials and teachers of the practicality of the reforms proposed and instituted; re-enforcement systems were put in place; and
  - Strong management systems were incorporated in the project.

Projects whose prospects for sustainability were judged to be negative are well represented by the following examples:

- o A Comprehensive Groundwater Development project in Somalia (649-0104) was given an ex-post evaluation in FY 86 after a seven year life. It was deemed to be unlikely to continue benefits effectively, despite considerable success in

providing wells under an \$18.8 million AID-funded program, mainly for the following reasons:

- Weak institutional development--a Water Development Authority with inadequate management, ineffective use of trained personnel, intra- and inter-agency tensions, inadequate planning and poor linkages with regional bodies and local community groups responsible for well operation;
  - Poor systems for financial resource mobilization for equipment procurement and O & M of construction equipment and completed wells; and
  - Inadequate involvement of communities in well placement decisions and training of local personnel for operation and maintenance.
- o A \$1.0 million Health Education project in Jordan (278-2045) received poor marks for sustainability prospects in a final evaluation carried out in FY 85. The principal causes for this low rating were:
- Poor acceptance by the institution (Ministry of Health) of the relevance and importance of health education as a major element of a national health strategy;
  - Limited success in development of management capacity;
  - Inadequate staffing and budgeting support for the program; and
  - Unwillingness to accept a role for the private sector in health education.
- o An \$11 million project for Improved Water and Land Use in Peru (on which a final evaluation was conducted in FY 85) was unlikely to be sustainable mainly for the following reasons:
- Ineffective management, technical staff, and capacity to maintain contact with field operations by Plan MERI, the central institution responsible for project execution;
  - Inflexible response to change by Plan MERI;
  - Ineffective mechanisms for outreach to and collaboration with existing irrigation committees and regional authorities; and
  - Inadequate development of financial provisions for O & M; are inadequately developed.

b. Grass roots participation<sup>2</sup>

In all programs designed to benefit large groups of people, it is desirable that they participate in setting policies, priorities and program design. This appears to be a necessary, though certainly not sufficient, condition for sustainability. Where other factors which support sustainability are present, widespread participation can be a positive force overcoming the resistance which may otherwise be present. This comes about in part because such participation is likely to facilitate communication between local people and officials who may otherwise ignore important cultural factors.

Organization of grass roots participation seems most likely to develop successfully if groups are organized around activities important to the economic well-being of individuals. Good organization can be an effective means to reduce conflict. Strategies to encourage popular participation depend heavily on cultural factors. Cultural homogeneity is likely to favor successful participation and diversity to work against it. In any case, it is vital to be aware of cultural considerations at the design stage and to be especially concerned with this for groups who have been isolated and/or have a strong tradition of independence both from formal systems of government and between sub-groups within the society. It may be necessary not only to include efforts to initiate grass roots organization through project action, but to support it through an extended consolidation phase to prevent interest from flagging.

External factors can arise to cause disintegration of groups and reduce participation. When this occurs it becomes very critical that the leadership of the program management institution(s) have the capacity to respond with flexibility.

c. Strength of constituency

The reports under review indicate that the strength of a project's constituency is a very important and useful asset to the achievement of project success and sustainability. However, it is of limited significance if other major elements of a project's support system are not present and operating effectively. Thus, there is only a moderately strong correlation (0.58) between strength of project

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<sup>2</sup>This discussion rests particularly on issues raised in the evaluations of the following projects: Rural Development I, C.A.R. 676-0015; Integrated Livestock Development, Niger, 683-0242; Tribal Areas Development, Pakistan, 391-9471; Family Planning in Indonesia; Water Management I, Sri Lanka, 383-0057; and the New Lands Settlement Program in Bolivia.

constituency and overall sustainability for the 151 cases in the overall universe where both elements were rated.

Projects which seek to serve and favorably impact large numbers of people, dispersed groups or sub-institutions are especially dependent on strong constituency support. Examples are the Caribbean Epidemiology Surveillance and Training (538-0027), Botswana Primary Education (633-0022) and the Caribbean Curriculum Development (538-0029) projects. All were judged to have strong prospects for sustainability and enjoyed support from a powerful constituency. However, it was equally clear that good project design, management, leadership and financial support were also present in these projects as ingredients of success.

Strong, supportive constituencies were not of great value when the other key factors were weak or absent. For example, Technologies for the Rural Poor in India (386-0465), Bolivia Water Supply and Small Scale Irrigation (511-0081) and Rwanda Fish Culture (696-0012) all had strong constituencies but poor sustainability ratings.

d. Management capacity

The statistical evidence developed from the ERs considered indicates that management is a significant factor affecting sustainability. To carry on its programs and benefits successfully an institution must be managed effectively. A new institution would need to have that capacity developed in the early stages of its operation or an existing one with weak management would need to strengthen that capacity for the benefits it is intended to provide to be maintained. The evidence provided by the selected sample strongly supports this conception. Management capacity is very consistently rated on a level identical or close to that of overall sustainability whether positive or negative. A few examples will serve to suggest the manner in which this developed.

On the negative side a project directed toward developing a Science and Technology Information System in Egypt (263-0016) was judged to have poor sustainability potential unless substantial improvements were effected. In particular, a unit needed to be established to provide effective management of the system. In a Liberia project for Combating Childhood Communicable Disease (698-0421), poor management led to waste, lack of coordination and clarity of program priorities, poor equipment maintenance and was a major element of a poor sustainability outlook. A project in Honduras to improve Development Administration was judged by the evaluators to have made some significant gains during implementation. However, it would support only limited improvements in the future due to management weaknesses. These were likely to thwart the maintenance of gains made at the administrative level. Management problems also created a serious difficulty with malaria control efforts in Sri Lanka under project 383-0043 as Central and Regional offices failed to respond to field findings thus threatening project performance.

On the positive side, good management repeatedly shows up as an important factor in developing capacity that will carry the benefits forward. A project for Renewable Energy Development in Morocco is in a strong position to maintain its capacity because the parastatal organization, although it was established only four years before the evaluation was carried out, enjoyed strong leadership and good management. The organization appears to be making good progress in organizational development despite the country's economic and fiscal difficulties. The Siam Commercial Bank project to promote small and medium scale private enterprises in Thailand evaluated at an interim stage showed a very strong capacity for sustainability. It was mainly dependent on the long established Siam Bank which had the management capability to market, monitor and carry out the operations associated with lending to new ventures and some existing ones. It responded well to having a special source of funds to make term loans. The bank's success rested substantially on its sound management. It seems likely to continue such lending into the future. For a Primary Education Improvement project in Botswana operating through the public sector, good management was a contributing factor to high sustainability as seen in a final evaluation. It was also helped by good leadership, a strong institutional setting, and a favorable policy environment.

e. Linkages to other organizations and to beneficiary populations

Institutions only exist to serve a purpose. Institutions intended to serve a development purpose must deliver their output (goods or services) to another institution or to a beneficiary group. Institutions must also derive support in various forms through backward linkages to other institutions or groups which furnish ideas, knowledge, trained personnel, funds, physical inputs, etc. which nurture and build their capacity. The strength of those institutions and their capacity to contribute to sustainability are directly linked to the vitality of both their backward and forward linkages and capacity for communication.

Policy and analysis institutions need to be well related to the decision makers or they are likely to be quickly cut of step with the needs of their clients (policy makers). This happened in the case of the Energy Policy Development project in the Dominican Republic. It failed to maintain good linkage with its technology source and became obsolete. In the process it lost its trained staff. A similar project based at Cairo University in Egypt to carry out Development Planning Studies shows good prospects of remaining viable because it has been relatively successful in forging links with and performing marketing functions related to its broad prospective clientele (government ministries and parastatals) and has successfully recruited talented staff by working closely with various training institutions.

Institutions engaged in the provision of services to a dispersed clientele have special needs to create systems of information

transmission to and from those groups, usually through a network of "agents" at various levels. At the same time they need institutional linkages which may be backward for support and lateral for coordination. This calls for special talents of leadership, management and communication. Where they are well developed, as in the Indonesia Family Planning program and the Caribbean Epidemiological Surveillance and Training projects, progress is greatly strengthened and the potential for sustainability increased. The highly successful pilot project to promote Small Farmer Production in Egypt (263-0079) shows the great importance of close linkage with collateral entities (notably the Ministry of Agriculture) providing key complementary services and of having a well-managed system to link the related field services (i.e. audit, input delivery and extension in this instance) in an efficient and financially viable manner by using its network of village banks and farmers organized in blocks.

A case with a much less satisfactory result is the Philippine Primary Health Care Financing project (492-0371) where plans and actions to provide linkage and coordination among a complex network of institutions were ill-defined and their relationship to local groups at the village level were not clear. The result was that the evaluators at this interim stage of the project see a poor prospect for success unless the project purpose and organizational structure are clarified.

Since many projects are heavily dependent on good linkage, communication and relations with beneficiary groups these factors deserve careful attention at the project design stage and must be accompanied by sound management to effect good linkage during project implementation.

### 3. Technology adoption and diffusion

There is not a very high correlation between overall sustainability ratings and acceptance of technology for our universe. Not surprisingly there are a number of instances where there was good acceptance of technology but sustainability prospects still appear very slim because other more important factors were not favorable. Examples include:

- o Gaborone West Housing and Facilities in Botswana;
- o Development Planning Studies in Egypt;
- o Water Supply and Small Scale Irrigation in Bolivia.

It is clear that when other factors are favorable to sustainability the ready acceptance of the technology the project seeks to apply is important to success. In cases where the technology is a critical factor to the project's impact, its acceptance is also of central importance to sustainability. There are very few cases in which negative technology acceptance is associated with positive overall sustainability.

#### 4. Attention to cultural factors

Cultural factors do not appear to have been identified as a significant factor in the majority of the projects with highly positive and strongly negative sustainability ratings. One instance is discussed below where the attention given to cultural factors was substantive and could be identified as a significant factor influencing sustainability. There are some others (where sustainability was rated neither high nor low) in which project design either failed to take account of cultural factors or gave strong and appropriate attention, and where this factor had some, but less than major impact.

In the case of the Northeast Small Scale Irrigation project in Thailand (493-0312), serious mistakes were made in the design and staffing of the project. These mistakes resulted in poor cultural interactions and seriously affected implementation. However, with modifications and restructuring, a basis was developed for a reasonably optimistic outlook for sustainability.

A few cases can be cited from the sample where inadequate attention was given to cultural factors with varying amounts of impact on sustainability.

##### o Pakistan: -391-0471, Tribal Areas Development

Project design and staffing took no account of the unique value system and socio-political relations prevailing in the project region. The intended beneficiaries were unprepared to collaborate on the basis of activities not negotiated through their representatives or which did not take account of long standing informal arrangements with the Government. This lack of collaboration hamstrung implementation and gave virtually no prospect for sustainability. The personnel assigned to design and construct irrigation infrastructure were purely technical personnel with no prior experience in the area.

##### o Pakistan: -391-0475, Primary Health Care

The project had a sound basic design but operators were insensitive in appointing Community Health Workers (CHW) without consultation with villages. As a result, CHWs lacked standing and effectiveness. Other management and systems problems were also serious factors in a low sustainability rating.

##### o Niger: -683-0242, Integrated Livestock

The project set about to have the technical assistance team develop and strengthen herders associations with far too little understanding of the complexities of the socio-

cultural environment. Other organizational and management factors were also significant barriers to achieving sustainability.

- o Sri Lanka: -383-0057, Water Management I

Good work was done with significantly successful results at the outset by using Institutional Organizers (IO's) to form Water Users Associations. The IO's, however, were withdrawn before the associations became consolidated. This threatened to undermine an otherwise successful activity with good sustainability because not enough was understood of the need to nurture such groupings in the Gal Oya cultural context.

It should not be inferred from this limited number of cases that cultural factors were relatively unimportant in affecting sustainability. In fact, cultural sensitivity is especially important for programs that seek to change the patterns of economic and social behavior of groups of people in traditional settings. However, cultural factors were not identified in most of the ERs considered. This suggests that such factors either were not of major significance or that evaluators were not well attuned to that significance. More detail regarding this matter is set out in the discussion of WID issues.

#### 5. Policy environment

The policy environment within which projects operate can be a critical factor to sustainability and is often a key link between success in implementation and longer term sustainability. Nevertheless, for most projects, many other factors have a stronger and more direct influence on sustainability. Where severely unfavorable policies which directly impact the project are present or where the general macro-economic policy environment is very disruptive, however, it is unlikely that projects will produce sustainable results. The key moment to deal with policy issues is at the time of design. If an unfavorable policy set cannot be modified to create a substantial probability of success it is doubtful that resources should be committed. A few examples illustrate these points:

- o Bolivia: -- New Lands Small Farmer Settlement Programs

The absence of policies to provide infrastructure, service centers, inputs, and technologies for high value crops and off-farm employment opportunities resulted in the target group remaining poor, subsistence farmers. As a result, they appear to be doomed to become wage laborers on large scale extensive farming and ranching estates.

- o Jordan: - 278-0245 Health Education

The Government of Jordan undertook a program to incorporate health education as an integral component of primary health care. In fact, however, on a policy level it never embraced the health education concept. As a result, the program was not institutionalized. This is the primary reason for its potential sustainability being low five years after initiation of the program.

- o Nepal: - 367-0144, Strengthening Institutional Capacity of the Food and Agriculture Sector

Despite success in training agricultural policy analysts for work in various policy bodies of the Government of Nepal, no significant progress in institutionalizing policy analysis had occurred. This was essentially because the Government of Nepal was unprepared to come to grips with the policy issues it confronts. As a result, trained personnel have an unsatisfactory environment in which to pursue policy analysis.

- o Bolivia: -- 511-0982, Rural Education II

A long period of social/political upheaval and economic dislocation has led to serious discontinuity of policy. Despite good progress in training personnel little progress is being made due to lack of coherent public sector programs.

- o Botswana: -- 633-0222, Primary Education Improvement

By way of contrast with the above activity in Bolivia, the inputs to a similar program in Botswana show strong signs of sustainability in a highly stable, favorable and well-oriented general development policy which is effectively focused on education as well. This favorable policy environment has a major impact on the morale of officials, teachers, students and hence on the seriousness of efforts to introduce change and reform.

- o Philippines: -- 492-0375, Rural Energy Development

The project was an effort to evolve renewable energy sources to reduce the strain on the balance of payments due to the heavy oil import bill. However, Government of Philippines had not undertaken studies and failed to make a variety of policy determinations essential to devising a coherent energy strategy around which project decisions could be made. The result was a set of incoherent actions with potentially destructive effects on the environment. In part, this derived from political instability.

6. Recurrent/capital cost coverage and provision for post-project finance

For all the project evaluations reviewed, provision for O & M and capital cost recovery showed a statistically significant influence on sustainability. While weaker than organizational capacity it is still an important influence. Sixty percent of the projects with high overall sustainability ratings also had high ratings for financial provision of O & M/capital cost recovery and 72.9 percent of those with low ratings on the main topic also had low ratings on this sub-topic. There were only 11.6 percent which showed strong provision for the financial needs of the project despite a low overall sustainability rating.

Given these indications of the importance of adequate financial provision for future project benefits to be sustained, little explicit reference is made in ERs to special plans to ensure that the post project requirements for funding will be met. If current performance and prospects are portrayed as being satisfactory, it is generally because moneys are being provided from general budget revenues. The responsible institutions are, more often than not, regular line agencies of a central or local government whose only source of funds is the budget. Exceptions are occasionally encountered such as a parastatal with a measure of financial autonomy or a private body, for example the Small Farmer Production Project in Egypt (263-0079) did succeed in transferring the marginal costs of intensive extension services provided by the Principal Bank for Development and Agricultural Credit, a parastatal institution. In large measure, the reality is that most projects are heavily dependent on the regular government budgets for their financial resources. In these times when most developing countries are experiencing some measure of economic, financial and fiscal stringency (many of them with severe problems), prospects for post-project financial resources are rated marginal-to-poor in a larger majority of the cases reviewed. Surprisingly, only a limited degree of attention seems to be given to this issue, especially at the design stage.

This limited attention may be due to the emphasis placed on achieving near term results in terms of outputs; less attention is sometimes given to longer term results such as sustainability whose costs in the short run may be high relative to immediate product. While AID has generally not placed strong emphasis on economic rate of return (ERR) as the prime measure of project feasibility, it has tended to look for early results. Arguably, this can build in a bias, similar to that of the World Bank with its major reliance on the ERR, which militates against a strong and explicit quest for sustainability.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup>Some argue that an ERR effectively incorporates sustainability issues because such matters should be dealt with prior to the ERR analysis and any costs or returns) associated with them incorporated

Some evaluations indicated designers set unrealistic goals for a project that is too short and that received inadequate financial, material and/or human resources from both the host country and AID alike. If this is true while external resources are being provided, it is likely to be still more difficult to provide an adequate level of funding in the post-project period. This was pointed out as a lesson to be learned by several evaluators.

A few examples may shed light on the nature of the problem:

- o Sudan: 650-0030, Rural Health Support

Over the five first years of the project life the GOS found it impossible to provide an adequate level of recurrent cost funding despite its concern with rural health improvement as a high priority goal. The problem was exacerbated by a fiscal crisis arising out of broad economic difficulties, a project design flawed by seeking to achieve action on too many fronts, and an underestimate of transport and other constraints.

- o Egypt: 263-K-605-5, Neighborhood Urban Services

The evaluation expresses concern about the high costs of future maintenance of infrastructure built by local PVO's and local government bodies because of the poor quality of construction. This will endanger the continuance of the stream of benefits in the future. Obviously this is both a financial and a management problem.

- o Pakistan: 391-0472, Malaria Control

Underfunding of the local institutions responsible for operations is a pervasive constraint to adequate surveillance and control measures. The longer term outlook is not explicitly covered, but the prospect has to be seen as dim once external support is removed.

- o Caribbean: 538-0102, Regional Marketing Assistance

The local "Partners" groups of private entrepreneurs clearly lack the resources to maintain contacts abroad and even less to undertake the export marketing operation without continued external support.

- o Liberia: 698-0421, Combatting Childhood Communicable Disease

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into the ERR calculation. Thus, the ERR in the "last step," made only after all other project decisions are completed.

The Government has been unable to provide the level of funding to which it was committed despite a genuine interest. This reflects in part the political tensions of the period and serious economic and financial crises confronting the country. The longer term future may bring some relief, but on the basis of the current situation, sustainability prospects are judged to be very weak.

o Bolivia: 511.0581 Water Supply and Small Scale Irrigation

A program undertaken to provide water in the wake of a drought emergency, it performed reasonably well in the development and implementation stage. However, provisions for meeting O & M costs in the future were judged to be precarious due to the financial weakness of the host government agency and the local communities involved.

Few instances are revealed where user fees or other special resources have been developed to ensure the future financial soundness of activities. Where strong policy support and training has been made a basic part of local community-based programs, volunteer labor sometimes has been a significant substitute for cash. A program for self-help rural water supply in Malawi provides an example where the government has maintained steady support for local responsibility over a long period of time and sustainability of the small scale projects appears to be very good. Other examples of adequate provision for future financial support of development activities seem to be closely related to the soundness of the macro-economic and financial situation and/or the broad commitment to equitable development such as in Botswana and Kenya. This suggests the great importance of a world economic environment favorable to development and sound local macro-level development policies as key conditions for future sustainability of projects. Unless the national economics provide a sound basis for underwriting future costs, no amount of good intentions or binding agreements with donors can succeed in ensuring the actual availability of the resources.

7. Human resource development

Human resource development is a necessary, but not sufficient basis for achieving good sustainability. Approximately one-third of the activities with low overall prospects for sustainability made at least reasonably good progress in training and placing needed personnel. Other negative factors were present, however, significantly clouded sustainability prospects. For projects whose sustainability prospects were among the best, important progress in human resource development had been made. Nearly half of all the highly positive cases examined in-depth made excellent progress and one-third had made at least a good showing. These observations indicate that to achieve sustainability, competent human resources are necessary at all levels in various roles. The rule appears to hold for all fields and for all functions such as policy development, planning, administration,

research, service delivery or infrastructure development. A sound plan must be formulated at the design stage for the development of needed human resources. It needs to take into account the requirement for both formal and on-the-job training. Time must be allowed for both; adequate funds must be available to cover training costs. Incentives are needed to retain personnel, including competitive salaries and non-monetary rewards. Inflation accompanied by fiscal constraints that limit public sector salary adjustments can easily result in the loss of key staff and rapid turnover. Likewise, failure to provide an opportunity for specially trained personnel to perform at a level which calls for the exercise of their skills can result in the dissipation of their newly acquired capability. Thus, a project must build needed competence and retain its personnel to have the capacity to deliver benefits in the future. At the same time, the pool of adequately trained personnel, which a project can draw upon, cannot be over estimated or the best project-based effort may be inadequate.

Some examples drawn from the ERS are cited below to illustrate these points:

- o Dominican Republic: 517-0143, Energy Policy Development

Personnel were trained for computer-based analysis, but leadership and external factors resulted in their training being irrelevant and unused. As a result, the staff was lost before a remedy was found.

- o Morocco: 608-0151, Health Management Improvement

The design of this project assumed greater capacity in the host agency to furnish, recruit, fund training for, and effectively mobilize skilled and motivated administrators and analysts to improve management. Agenda capacity was too thin for effective skills transfer on the scale required. The result was a project that came to an end with less than needed capacity to carry on essential tasks.

- o Sri Lanka: 383-0057, Water Management I

A set of training programs was developed for officials, field personnel and former participants in Water Users Associations combined. The training effort changed fundamentally the pattern and openness of communications among farmers and between farmers and officials. This contributed substantially to the success and sustainability of this project.

The WID section of synthesis report details other examples of the impacts of human resource components on projects.

## 8. Relationship between implementation and sustainability

Implementation and sustainability are positively correlated in the ERS. This correlation is probably insignificant in statistical terms although the hypothesis was not tested. From a "reasonableness" point of view, however, the achievement on schedule of the projected EOPS of a well-designed project should make the program sustainable if that were its objective.

## 9. Project design

Project design is a very complex factor. For purposes of the ER ratings, it was treated as a "sub-topic." This sub-topic status and the fact that the evaluations provided uneven insight into design resulted in a correlation coefficient with sustainability of only 0.46. However, it seems reasonable to postulate that project design could exert a reasonably strong influence on sustainability. Observations in a number of evaluations tend to bear this out by citing good or poor design as a factor for or against success (read: "sustainability" though the word was seldom mentioned) or in explaining the satisfactory or unsatisfactory performance of one element or another of various projects.

## 10. Flexibility

Many forms of flexibility are desirable in furthering both implementation and sustainability. Without question it is important for AID, the host country implementing agency and the project design to operate flexibly because nothing is so certain as change. Repeatedly evaluators commend "flexibility" as a significant factor in maintaining momentum and achieving success. They are equally strong in condemning its absence. Perhaps the classic case was one in which AID persisted in pursuing a project design in the Tribal Access Development Project in Pakistan. AID would not depart from standard FAR procedures and would not treat the project as anything but a purely infrastructure development activity despite the special situation in this unique and remote traditional social environment. What happened? There is little doubt that preserving a measure of capacity for adaptation and change will further AID's objectives and speed their achievement in many situations.

## 11. Life of project

Life of project must be appropriate to the task at hand and consistent with resource availability. Many projects sought to accomplish unrealistic or over ambitious objectives within the time and resources available. A longer life of the project would have been the answer in some cases. In others a scaling back of targets, purpose or goal would have been more appropriate and brought achievement closer.

ERS showed no significant difference in the proportion of projects achieving high sustainability ratings for project life of more than

five years, as compared to projects of three to five or less than five years.

In our judgment, this is because many other factors relating to project design, management and support (from AID and the host country as well as participants and beneficiaries) have greater influence on sustainability than life of project per se. At the same time, the life of the project needs to be carefully balanced with the project's strategy, resource endowments, expected outputs and purpose. But merely extending the life, in and of itself, does not assure a higher probability of success or sustainability. Having the option to design a project with an extended life, however, seems likely to be one important and desirable aspect of flexibility.

#### 12. Technical assistance team composition

Many different kinds of long-term technical assistance team composition are represented in the projects in the universe and among those reviewed in-depth. The ER's give a highly variable degree of insight into the composition of teams providing technical assistance. Some are very explicit giving names of contractor, individuals and their areas of responsibility. Others provide little or no picture or, at best, provide some limited insight.

Success, and particularly the achievement of sustainability, seems to be unrelated to the pattern of team composition or the source of the institutional suppliers of the team. Successes, failures and average performance appear to be associated in no discernible pattern with university teams, non-profit and for-profit private contractors, or PVO, PASA, or other individuals. Numerous examples exist where signal successes or very dismal failures occurred in relation to similar team source and composition. The real source of project achievement or otherwise does not appear to be materially determined by this factor in ways which would provide insight as to what remedies to pursue.

### C. Findings

#### 1. AID attention to sustainability

- o Evaluations completed in FY 85-86 show some increase in attention to sustainability relative to that which was reported to prevail in the report of a review of evaluations carried out in FY 84;
- o Evaluation reports prepared in FY 85-86 directly address the issue of overall sustainability in a minority of cases as indicated by the intensive review of 50 ER's receiving strongly positive and negative ratings (only 20 ER's out of the 50 or 40 percent reflect such attention);

- o There was no clear increase in emphasis or attention given to sustainability in evaluations prepared during FY 86 over FY 85 despite a request to Bureaus and Missions to examine the issue with greater concern in order to respond to the DAC.
- o A minority of ER's indicate that clear and explicit attention was given to sustainability when the project was designed;
- o Even final and ex post evaluations give limited attention to sustainability in a high proportion of cases despite its significance as a factor in overall success.

## 2. Institutional factors

### a. Institutional type

- o The degree of success in achieving sustainability does not appear to be independently related to whether an institution is new or already existing when a project is undertaken. The sample for this analysis was heavily weighted with projects working through existing (mostly public sector) institutions. Those which involved new institutions were largely projects where beneficiary groups were specially organized for the project (e.g. water users associations or community-based women's groups in income generating activities) because they were essential to the mobilization of group action and coordination. Other instances were a technology information (database) network and a research/development planning effort within a university. In these instances also no entity already existed which was capable of undertaking the function. It could, therefore, be undertaken only if a new entity was created. Little light was shed on the issue of whether or not to create a new entity based on the effect it might have on sustainability;
- o Policy analysis, planning and similar institutions are especially dependent on high quality and stable leadership, good incentive systems to attract and hold highly trained staff and effective staff utilization to maintain output and morale;
- o New institutions or existing bodies which undertake new functions need to give major concern to "marketing" in order develop essential forward linkages to their clients and potential clients

which are expected to use their output. Quality of output in the early stages is also critical to building confidence among users or clients;

- o Line agencies in the public sector are especially vulnerable to being stifled by rigid rules and practices which limit flexibility of response to dynamic developments;
- o Many governments are experiencing economic difficulties and related fiscal constraints which frequently impose limits on the ability of public institutions to meet financial commitments and respond adequately to change.

b. Grass roots participation

- o Sustainability ratings on projects involving outreach to dispersed participant and/or client groups are closely related to the degree to which those groups are involved in policy making, planning and program management;
- o Projects which otherwise appear to be moving well toward sustainability have been threatened because project design provided an inadequate period for consolidation of "grass roots" organizational capacity following formation;
- o Project effectiveness is dependent on good rapport between local contact personnel and the communities in which they work. Outside selection of such personnel without community input hampers project success and sustainability;
- o Beneficiary needs, problems and reaction to programs are dynamic and subject to change over time. Program implementors have sometimes lost touch with these changes with the result that programs falter;
- o Locally respected bodies and patterns of behavior are ignored only at great peril to program progress and ultimate sustainability in programs seeking to effect change and benefit traditional societies.

c. Strength of project constituency

- o Clear commitment to equity-oriented policies by leaders at all levels strengthens constituency support for projects aimed at benefiting low income groups;

- o Programs which offer constituency groups an opportunity for direct gain and a sense of "ownership" receive strong support from such groups.
- d. Management capacity
- o Where management capacity was weak at the outset of projects it remained weak and threatened sustainability unless project design made explicit provision for its development during the project;
  - o Technical personnel who received training in their technical field were reported frequently to be promoted to positions with management responsibility but were not trained for and hence were ill-equipped to handle such responsibilities.
- e. Linkage to other institutions, beneficiaries and participants
- o Institutions which had responsibilities for providing analytical, policy planning and similar functions occasionally failed to develop the "marketing" capacity to forge strong forward linkage to their prospective clients or users of their outputs;
  - o Institutions frequently had inadequate arrangements to assure a flow of basically trained people to supply their human resource needs;
  - o Projects were occasionally reported to be succeeding because they provided incentive arrangements for personnel in collateral institutions to ensure the effective delivery of key inputs and services needed for success in their own programs; and
  - o Local outreach programs were reported to have failed or succeeded in relation to the degree to which their local contact personnel were selected from and by their communities and hence were or were not perceived as legitimate.

### 3. Technology

- o Household technologies were not adopted unless they were very well adapted to the specific local setting and were marketed through a locally-based institutional structure;

- o Technology that was expensive to maintain, not well understood locally and far ahead of that in use was observed to be under-utilized and wasteful;
- o Technologies were reported to be more widely accepted in cases when users saw immediate advantages, were trained to carry out O & M, felt they controlled the action and believed the cost for O & M was reasonable;
- o Technology transfer was reported to be proceeding successfully mainly where a strong indigenous institution was in place to sustain the process.

#### 4. Cultural factors

- o Social values and traditional relationships were given inadequate weight and attention in the design and implementation of a number of projects working with traditional, rural groups or societies. This feature was seen by the evaluators as closely related to poor prospects for sustainability;
- o Societal characteristics, even within a given country, vary significantly. Action programs which were reportedly very successful in one setting were less successful in others where they were not carefully adapted. Socially sensitive programs such as family planning showed particular need for such adaptation.

#### 5. Policy environment

- o Projects suffered significantly in their sustainability where logical frameworks (i.e. designs) assumed away key policy problems which experience showed needed to be addressed explicitly;
- o Policy analysis projects in a number of fields and countries achieved some technical success but had little impact because governments, even with good analysis in hand, were reluctant to confront difficult policy issues; and
- o A supportive policy environment was frequently reported to be a critical factor in success or failure of projects, especially with respect to such fields as natural resource conservation, alternative energy development and agricultural production/marketing activities.

- o Prices for inputs or outputs set outside the project's control had positive or perverse effects in some instances and influenced sustainability in a significant degree.

6. Financial support and stability

- o Financial stringency prevailing in many countries and budgetary constraints arising from other causes seriously hampered and constrained implementation progress and had a significant impact on sustainability prospects as well;
- o Few evaluations cited consciously conceived programs to develop new or independent sources of funding to undergird future sustainability when external support is terminated. When such funding devices were implemented they appear to have enhanced sustainability;
- o User fees and other devices to generate a source of funding for needed services were reported in a limited number of cases with good effect for sustainability prospects; and
- o Evaluations gave infrequent indications that post-project financial needs were given significant consideration at the design stage.

7. Human resource development

- o Human resources in the form of trained personnel are very frequently reported to be inadequate during and at the end of project life and therefore to be a significant factor in poor sustainability prospects;
- o Project designs frequently omit a concrete plan to ensure the recruitment and training of adequate personnel numbers assuming that "normal processes" will suffice to meet the needs;
- o Government budgets are often too constrained to fund salaries at sufficient levels to permit recruitment and retention of adequate staff;
- o Leadership at the most senior level of institutions was reported in a significant number of instances to be inadequate in quality or subject to frequent change so that projects lacked continuing and effective direction. The negative impact of inadequate leadership appeared to affect sustainability significantly.

## 8. Project design

- o Evaluators frequently concluded that too much was anticipated to be achieved by projects relative to the level of resources committed;
- o According to the evaluations reviewed sustainability is infrequently highlighted as a major concern of projects at the design stage; and
- o Projects frequently appear to be focussed on outputs during implementation to the detriment of concern with longer term sustainability. This may reflect efforts to improve Economic Rate of Return (ERR) calculations but more frequently seems to stem from a desire to demonstrate early positive results and may impact unfavorably on sustainability.

## D. Lessons Learned

From the review of a large number of evaluation reports prepared for AID project and non-project activities there are a number of lessons which may be useful in the continuing effort to improve overall performance of the Agency's work. The lessons are treated under a number of headings to facilitate presentation:

### AID concern with sustainability

- o Sustainability still is not given as much attention as it deserves. If sustainability is the true measure of project success that it seems to be, it should be a key concern at all times for project designers, implementors, managers and evaluators.
- o By giving more direct and specific attention to sustainability, the feedback to project/program managers could be enhanced. Not every project aims to achieve full sustainability at the end of its life because a subsequent phase is contemplated. Evaluations should, however, be more explicit about the EOPS sought by more consistently providing the complete log frame or other indicators and relating their findings to the EOPS with special emphasis on sustainability.

## 2. Institutional factors

### a. Institutional type

- o Whether institutions are new or existing at the time a project is initiated appears to be less important in achieving independence and contributing to sustainability than the quality of

leadership, management and staff; availability of financial and material resources; and their linkages and communications with other institutions, clientele or beneficiaries;

- o Policy analysis, planning and similar organizations are exceptionally sensitive to leadership continuity, policy environment and quality of marketing contacts for their effectiveness;
  - o Line agencies of government are frequently victims of rigid rules and funding constraints that render them unable to obtain or hold staff, deliver the services expected or respond flexibly to changing conditions and hence are unable to be effective partners in the quest for sustainability. Policy dialog could be focused on this issue with significant benefit to sustainability;
  - o Few institutions in developing countries experiencing serious economic and fiscal difficulties are able to provide the outputs required for the projects in which they are involved regardless of type.
- b. Grass roots participation
- o Grass roots participation in planning, policy making and program management is important to sustainability for programs seeking to impact favorably the well-being of large groups of people;
  - o Institutions charged with management of outreach impact activities need to:
    - structure a plan to institute and sustain participant/beneficiary groups through a consolidation period;
    - operate sensitively in identifying contact personnel at the local level to ensure that the community will accept them as their own by permitting them to be selected by the local communities or otherwise ensuring their legitimacy as change agents in the community;
    - be responsive to change in beneficiary situation and needs;
    - work through established traditional channels that reflect local values and relationships.

- o Participation is facilitated when local communities are in close and harmonious contact and form homogeneous social or ethnic groups;
  - o Organization of grass roots groups can greatly facilitate communication between officials and beneficiaries and the efficient administration and distribution of inputs, services and collection of the costs of providing services;
  - o Primary responsibility for organizing local groups should be in the hands of well-informed and culturally sensitive host country groups, not of expatriates;
- c. Strength of project constituency
- o Project constituency support is important and is strengthened in a symbiotic relationship where people believe that higher level leadership is interested and involved;
  - o A measure of "self-interest" and "ownership" is important to strengthening constituency support;
- d. Management capacity
- o If sustainability is to be achieved, project management must be strong enough in any new or existing institution to operate independently when external support is withdrawn. Project design must include a practical strategy to build independent management capacity during the LOP;
  - o Technical training often results in promotion of host country personnel to positions of major management responsibility without their being prepared for that function.
- e. Linkage to other institutions, beneficiaries and participants
- o Where institutions need forward linkage to client organizations, "marketing" capacity must be developed to forge that essential connection;
  - o Institutions are inevitably dependent on other bodies to supply inputs of which trained staff is a key element. The limited capacity to meet the need for human resources through these backward linkages

is a frequent source of problems in moving toward sustainability;

- o Collateral linkages to institutions that supply important complementary services are often difficult to forge but may be facilitated in part by providing incentive pay and support costs for the collateral body to encourage concentrated and effective delivery of services to the key target groups;
- o Institutions which relate effectively to their participants and beneficiaries have usually done so through a well-structured field staff whose contacts with "grass roots" personnel are accepted as legitimate because they have been selected by the communities or groups they serve and/or are well respected and trained local people.

### 3. Technology

- o Attempts to transfer household technology in a vacuum, i.e., without a clear institutional framework, are unlikely to take root and achieve wide adoption because of the absence of a marketing channel;
- o Technology needs to be examined, pilot tested and adapted to ensure its suitability in a particular developing country setting even if it has been widely adopted in another developing country;
- o A suitable institutional structure is as important to technology transfer and diffusion as the technology itself;
- o Advanced technology and expensive hardware which exceed an institution's financial or technical capacity for maintenance and repair are likely to be wasteful, ineffective and unused;
- o Technology acceptance is likely to be enhanced where the users see immediate benefits from its application, are trained in its use and maintenance, feel that they have effective control of the technology as individuals or groups and believe that its O&M costs are sustainable;
- o Sustainability of the technology transfer process is dependent on the development of an indigenous institutional structure to maintain the system after external support is withdrawn.

#### 4. Cultural factors

- o Cultural factors are of maximum concern to sustainability where beneficiaries are part of a traditional society in which social relationships and values are well defined and need to be respected if desired changes are to be accepted in the community;
- o Strategies for beneficiary mobilization to achieve social change must be adapted to specific cultural settings and cannot be transferred even within a given country without reference to the specific setting. The more sensitive the subject matter (e.g., family planning), the more specifically the strategy must be tailored.

#### 5. Policy environment

- o Policy issues should not be "assumed away" at project design but confronted clearly as a part of developing an explicitly agreed and favorable climate within which projects can proceed;
- o Where governments are reluctant to confront policy issues and provide a framework in which the results of policy analysis can be brought to bear, it is unlikely that development of people with analytical competence will be an effective instrument of change;
- o The absence of coherent and stable policies at the macro level can undermine the results of soundly-designed and effectively implemented projects. On the other hand, the pursuit by host governments of strongly equity-oriented policies and programs creates a climate in which cooperation and commitment grows so the achievement of sustainability becomes much more probable at the project level.

#### 6. Financial support and stability

- o Projects which fail to obtain a suitable measure of independent financial capacity during the period when external support is being provided have a poor prospect of sustained delivery of benefits in the period after such support ends;
- o Few projects are designed to develop special sources of funding that will provide the resources to ensure their financial viability into the indefinite future;
- o User fees or other special funding devices that permit the leveraged application of intensive services to key

beneficiary groups through incentive payments for extra duty by service providers (e.g., extension personnel) or for other increased marginal costs of such services may substantially enhance sustainability prospects;

- o Post-project financial resources adequate to meet costs are an obviously important element of sustainability. They receive inadequate attention in project design, by managers overseeing project implementation and by evaluators in assessing projects;

## 7. Human resource development

- o Human resources--a crucial input to project implementation and achievement of sustainability--are generally inadequate in part because poor analysis is undertaken to determine the real potential of key institutions to provide adequate personnel;
- o Few projects have had success without having a sound design and an effectively executed strategy to meet human resource needs on a continuing basis;
- o Governments frequently make commitments in good faith to provide for training to meet the needs for skilled personnel but fail to budget adequate funds to cover the costs;
- o There is frequently an inadequate understanding of the human resource constraints to project accomplishment. A more careful analysis of the potential of the key local institutions to provide qualified personnel and remedial steps as needed could improve sustainability prospects as projects approach their conclusion;
- o Leadership is the scarcest element in the human resource armamentarium required for development. This is evident not only in the need for policy makers, decision makers and entrepreneurial skills but even in the scarcity of people able and willing to undertake the analytical responsibilities that underlie the policy process;

## 8. Project design

- o There is a pervasive tendency of AID to make unrealistic and overly optimistic projections at the project design stage regarding the delivery of outputs, massive change at the purpose level and greater contribution to a project's goal(s) than the available financial, human and physical resources will permit;

- o If sustainability is regarded as a key measure of ultimate success, several actions could be taken to improve performance toward its achievement, namely:
  - Increase the importance given to this element of the EOPS component of the log frame;
  - Clarify whether sustainability is anticipated at the end of the LOP if a project is expected to be followed by another phase, but determine clearly what advances in that direction are anticipated. This would apply both to design and evaluation processes;
  - Diminish the emphasis on the outputs achieved in the short run in favor of development of capacity for a continuing stream of benefits in the long run;
  - Adjustments in overall country development strategies may be required if few projects are achieving sustainability. Focus available resources on a smaller range of activities to improve total performance.

ANNEX 1

Statements of Work

- A. Analysis of Institutional Sustainability Issues
- B. Evaluation Synthesis

ANNEX 1

A. Analysis of Institutional  
Suitability Issues

ARTICLE III - STATEMENT OF WORK

BACKGROUND

This activity will provide information on A.I.D.'s most recent project experiences in the realm of institutional development and sustainability. It will serve as one of the primary sources of data for determining the future direction of the Agency's activities in this field.

In preparing its report, the contractor shall perform the following activities:

- I. Selection of a sub-sample of reports from the total sample of 1985-86 A.I.D. Project Evaluation Reports (previously furnished to the contractor) reviewed for further in-depth analysis of institutional sustainability:
  - A. From the total sample of reports reviewed, the contractor shall select a sub-sample with the following characteristics:
    1. Preference to "final" as opposed to "interim" reports, except wherein the latter contains information particularly relevant to the subject areas-identified below;

2. Reports on projects noted in either the +3 to +5 and -3 to -5 category on the topic of sustainability and those elements of the implementation constraints topic which have greatest relevance to sustainability.

## II. In-depth analysis of the Sub-sample:

The contractor shall perform an in-depth analysis on the above sub-sample and provide a report covering the following:

- A. The relevance of the various questions listed in the document entitled, "Questions About Sustainability", previously furnished to the contractor, to conditions of sustainability reported in the sub-sample and the degree of incidence of each. This shall include a reflection of the major problems or impediments encountered in the project implementation, with respect to the subjects covered by these questions.
- B. An analysis of the nature and degree of the relationship, either positive or negative, between sustainability of project benefits and institutional development. In cases where the data are sufficient to permit such analysis, factors to be examined in seeking to establish this relationship should include the following:
  1. Length of the project.
  2. Character and sources of financing for the project.
  3. Provisions for technical assistance:
    - a) composition of TA Team
    - b) problem areas being addressed by TA Team and degree of success being attained.
  4. Nature of degree of provision in project design for post-A.I.D. financing. Degree of success in attaining it.
  5. Characteristics of the institutional/organizational component of the project and relationship of these characteristics to plus or minus rating given. Characteristics to be examined should include but not be limited to the following:
    - a) whether project seeks to build on existing institutions and organizations or create new ones;

- b) quality of institutional/organizational leadership;
- c) degree of autonomy/flexibility including alternate sources of funding for institutional/organizational activities and maintenance.
- d) extent and character of linkages to other organizations or institutions are important to achieving the basic organization/institution's objectives.
- e) extent and character of linkages to the participating/benefiting population.
- f) provisions for development of indigenous human resources to carry out the institutional/organizational functions required to achieve project or organizational goals and sustain benefits.
- g) technology of organization and how it relates to institutionalization. Is there anything in nature of task which impacts on this? Is organizational structure affected by technological requirements of task?

- C. The in-depth analysis should identify and describe examples from the sub-sample projects which are particularly good illustrations of success attained in dealing with institutional problems related to achieving sustainability, and examples which illustrate basic problem areas, including A.I.D. or host country policies, regulations or procedures which either impede or promote achievement of sustainability.

### III. Further Analysis of the Full Sample:

- A. The contractor shall accomplish a further review of the full sample to establish and report on the following:
  1. The number of instances in which sustainability is directly addressed and in what context.
  2. The number of instances in which sustainability of benefits from projects and institutional factors are seen to be interrelated in the evaluation reports and how such interrelationships are characterized.
  3. A listing of the evaluation reports where one or two above pertains.

ARTICLE III -- STATEMENT OF WORK

The contractor will undertake and complete the following tasks:

A. Categorization of Evaluation Reports

1. Based on lists and actual reports provided by PPC/CDIE, an initial comprehensive review of evaluation reports and related materials. These include:

a. Approximately 350 evaluations of AID projects and programs, submitted by AID field Missions, AID/W office and CDIE during FY 85 and 86. Contractor will make arrangements necessary to transport the reports from PPC/CDIE offices to contractors' place of business and to return these to PPC/CDIE upon completion of the work.

b. Computer printout of active AID projects, including amounts obligated to date, for FY 1985 and FY 1986 projects, and copies of Congressional Presentations covering those years.

2. Development of a matrix consisting of a checklist of descriptive and substantive elements against which the contractor will review and process all evaluation reports. This matrix will include:

a. A listing of FY 85/86 evaluation reports by Bureau, by sector (as identified by AID) and then by country (alphabetical).

b. Descriptive elements about the projects/programs evaluated and about the evaluation reports. For the first: the project number; project/program title; LOP; dollar amount obligated, as identified in 1b above. For the second: interim/final/ex-post; internal/external; contractor/AID/mixed team; and specific aspects of the report format (executive summary included; PES/ES included; table of contents; statement of evaluation purpose; Scope of Work included; methodology described; conclusions; recommendations; lessons learned).

c. Substantive elements: Five topics and selected sub-topics. Contractor will not be expected to research information in these 5 topics and selected sub-topics beyond that in the evaluation reports. The topics are:

- implementation constraints
- impact on private sector
- role of women in development
- sustainability
- environmental impact

In preparing the matrix, contractor will consult with PPC/CDIE regarding inclusion in the checklist of one or more sub-topics or factors under each topic, which will be derived from final lists of questions under each topic as agreed with PPC/CDIE. Under the topic "implementation constraints", the contractor will include the following sub-topics: months project behind schedule; procurement delays; delays in contracting implementation advisors/team; poor project design; understanding with borrower/grantee; and delay in monitoring/evaluation affecting project management. For the other topics, one to three sub-topics will be determined in consultation with PPC/CDIE.

#### B. Significance Rating of Topics/Sub-Topics

Contractor will review 350 reports and will rate the significance, as given by the evaluation to the topics/sub-topics as these appear in the report, on a scale of 1 to 5 (with 1 connoting little or no significance and 5 connoting high significance). This scaling mechanism will include some method of indicating positive or negative significance. Since almost all the evaluation reports were generated through AID's decentralized evaluation system, contractor will recognize that the reports vary in terms of the specific questions addressed in each evaluation, the scope and depth of the analysis contained in each report, and the quality and reliability of the data used to support the findings.

A completed preliminary Matrix with initial assigned ratings will constitute the interim report for this contract, to be submitted o/a eight weeks following signing of the contract.

#### C. Analysis of Lessons Learned

Using appropriate samples from the 350 reports, contractor will identify and describe lessons learned for each of the five topics. The contractor will:

1. Select detailed factors/questions for analysis of lessons learned: Contractor will refer to lists of questions provided by PPC/CDIE for the topics on women in development, sustainability and environmental impact, and will consult with CDIE regarding final relevant questions for all five topics (not all of which maybe applicable to every report). CDIE will provide Contractor with lists of initial questions under each topic at the time the 350 reports are delivered. Following early agreement between CDIE and Contractor on final lists of questions for each topic (which will be the same as those used in task 2c), Contractor will focus subsequent analysis on these questions for the purpose of deriving lessons learned.

2. Select a sample of reports for in-depth analysis of lessons learned. In terms of the level of effort expected under this contract, contractor will select an average of 20 reports per topic for intensive review and analysis. Within this level of effort, contractor may assign more or fewer reports to each topic as contractor deems necessary to investigate lessons learned. In drawing the sample, contractor will consider:

- a. Reports from among the 350 on a list of possible candidates provided by PPC/CDIE on the topics of women in development, sustainability, and environmental impact.
- b. Reports which were assigned high significance values relative to the topic under Task B above.

This in-depth analysis will explore, to the extent possible from the material in the selected reports, the causes and explanations for project/program results found by the evaluators.

3. If, during the performance of this task, contractor encounters unusually difficult selection/analytical problems, or notes findings that, by virtue of their occurrence, distribution or unique character, may warrant immediate PPC/CDIE attention, contractor will refer these matters to PPC/CDIE for resolution.

D. Written Report Presenting a Synthesis of Findings and "Lessons Learned" from AID Evaluation Reports, and Spoken Presentation to AID Staff.

Contractor will deliver to PPC/CDIE a written report on the results of the review and analysis undertaken in Tasks B & C above. This report will include the following information:

- A final matrix and rating of all reports, presented as an annex, with some summary data (e.g., proportion of interim/final evaluations, external/internal evaluations).
- A summary of major patterns revealed by the matrix, e.g., patterns by region, by sector, frequency of significance ratings.
- Lessons learned for each topic derived from the in-depth analysis of selected reports.

ANNEX 2

List of Evaluation Reports by Selected Characteristics and Overall Ratings on  
Five Principle Topics by Bureau, by Sector

## ANNEX 2

List of Evaluation Reports by Selected Characteristics and Overall Ratings on  
Five Principle Topics by Bureau, by Sector

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COUNTRY	EVALUATION TITLE	PROJECT NUMBER	FISCAL YEAR BEGAN	AMOUNT	EVALUATION TYPE	FISCAL YEAR COMPLETED	ISSUES IDENTIFIED	ENVIRONMENTAL CONSTRAINTS OVERALL	SUSTAINABILITY OVERALL	WID OVERALL	ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OVERALL	PRE-IMPACT OVERALL
** BUREAU ATR												
SECTOR AND BOTSWANA	Agricultural Technology Improvement	633-0221	81	9.0	I	84	Y	-1	-2	1	9	9
BOTSWANA	Renewable Energy Technology	633-0209	80	3.3	F	85	Y	-2	-3	9	9	9
BOTSWANA	Accelerated Impact Program—Borehole Drilling	698-0510-21	79	0.0	E	9	Y	-1	3	9	3	9
MURZIEL	Rural Roads	MULT	0	0.0	I	85	Y	-2	2	3	3	9
CAMEROON	Small Farmer Livestock and Poultry Development	631-0015	80	1.3	F	85	Y	-3	2	9	9	9
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	Central African Republic Rural Development I	676-0015	82	1.0	E	85	Y	-3	-3	2	9	2
COXCO	Smallholders Agricultural Development II (SAPG II)	679-0002	83	2.8	I	85	Y	-2	-2	9	9	1
COXCO	Congo Primary Health Care	698-0510-30	82	0.5	F	85	Y	-3	-3	2	2	1
COXCO	Smallholders Agricultural Development I (SAPG I)	679-0001	81	3.5	F	85	Y	-3	-3	9	9	1
EQUATORIAL GUINEA	Equatorial Guinea Cooperative Development	653-0002	83	3.0	I	86	Y	-3	-2	-2	9	9
EQUATORIAL GUINEA	Agricultural Development	653-0001	81	2.0	F	86	Y	-4	-4	9	9	8
GHANA	Mixed Inputs and Delivery of Agricultural Service (MIDAS)	641-0102	80	9.5	F	86	N	-3	-3	9	9	-3
KENYA	Agricultural System Support	615-0169	78	49.8	F	85	Y	-2	2	9	9	9
KENYA	Women In Development: Rural Women's Extension	698-0288	80	1.1	F	85	Y	-2	3	4	1	4
MOZAMBIQUE	Private Sector Rehabilitation	656-0201	84	30.6	E	86	Y	-1	2	9	9	3
MULT	CBERT On Farm Research	698-0544	82	1.2	F	85	N	-2	-2	9	9	9

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Devres

UNRESTRICTED

COUNTRY	EVALUATION TITLE	PROJECT NUMBER	FISCAL YEAR BEGAN	ADJUST	EVALUATION TYPE	FISCAL YEAR COMPLETED	LESSONS LEARNED	REPRESENTATION OVERALL	SUSTAINABILITY OVERALL	WID OVERALL	ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OVERALL	PRE IMPACT OVERALL
MALI	Semi-Arid Food Grains Research and Development (SARFD)	698-0393	77	19.2	F	85	N	-3	-2	9	1	1
NIGER	Niamey Departmental Development II	693-0240	81	13.6	I	85	Y	-3	-2	2	9	8
NIGER	Niger Integrated Livestock Production	693-0242	83	13.4	I	86	Y	-4	-3	9	-2	9
RWANDA	Agriculture Education	696-0109	79	4.1	I	85	N	-3	2	3	2	2
RWANDA	Fish Culture Project (2)	696-0112	81	2.5	I	85	N	-4	-2	-1	-1	-1
RWANDA	Projet D'Enquetes et Statistiques Agricoles (SESA)	696-0115	81	3.7	I	85	Y	-3	-2	9	9	9
RWANDA	National Fish Culture	696-0112	81	2.5	I	86	N	-4	-4	2	2	1
GHANA	Comprehensive Grassroots Development	649-0104	79	18.3	F	86	N	-3	-3	2	-2	-3
SENEGAL	Southern Rural Infrastructure, Phase I	670-0031	80	3.5	E	85	Y	-3	-3	9	9	9
TANZANIA	Farming Systems Res. and Related Activities	621-0156	82	3.0	I	86	N	-2	-3	2	9	9
ZAMBIA	Private Management Support	660-0113	85	0.8	I	86	N	-1	2	9	9	2
ZAMBIA	Agricultural Sector Studies	660-0070	77	5.5	I	85	N	-2	1	9	9	9
ZAMBIA	Area Nutrition Improvement	660-0079	82	4.3	I	85	Y	-3	-2	1	9	9
ZAMBIA	Agricultural Marketing Development	660-0098	84	8.0	I	86	N	-1	9	9	9	9
ZAMBIA	North Shaba Rural Development	660-0059	76	18.6	I	86	Y	-1	2	9	9	3
ZAMBIA	Agricultural Marketing Development	MILT	79	5.0	I	86	N	-3	-2	9	9	9
ZAMBIA	Agricultural Development Research and Extension (ZAMARE)	611-0201	80	12.5	I	85	N	-1	3	9	9	9

MAJOR STUDIES

COUNTRY	EVALUATION TITLE	PROJECT NUMBER	FISCAL YEAR BEGAN	AMOUNT	EVALUATION TYPE	FISCAL YEAR COMPLETED	LESSONS LEARNED	IMPLEMENTATION CONSTRAINTS OVERALL	SUSTAINABILITY OVERALL	WID OVERALL	ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OVERALL	PRE IMPACT OVERALL
SECTOR FHR												
BOTSWANA	Workforce and Skills Training (BWSST)	633-0231	82	14.6	I	85	N	-3	2	9	9	9
BOTSWANA	Primary Education Improvement Project (PEIP) (2)	633-0222	81	7.3	I	85	Y	-1	4	9	9	9
BOTSWANA	Primary Education Improvement Project	633-0222	81	7.3	F	85	Y	-1	4	1	9	9
MULT	Sahel Manpower Dev Project (SDP)	625-0060	83	12.8	I	85	Y	-2	9	2	1	1
CAMBIA	Agricultural Training, Planning and Institutional Development	611-0075	80	6.8	I	86	N	-2	2	9	9	9
SECTOR HEA												
CHAD	Combating Communicable Childhood Diseases	608-0421-79	85	0.6	I	85	N	-2	-3	9	9	9
KECHA	Family Planning Management and Research Project	615-0215	83	25.1	I	85	N	-2	9	3	1	2
LIBERIA	Combating Childhood Communicable Diseases: Liberia	698-0421	0	0.7	I	86	Y	-3	-3	9	9	1
MALAWI	Malawi Self-Help Rural Water Supply	612-0207	80	6.0	I	84	Y	-1	3	3	4	2
MULT	Center for Communicable Childhood Diseases	698-0421	85	82.0	I	86	N	-3	9	9	9	9
NIGER	Rural Health Improvement	693-0208	78	2.0	I	85	N	-2	3	9	9	9
SWAZILAND	Health Planning and Management	645-0215	81	1.1	F	86	Y	-2	-2	2	3	2
ZAIRE	Combating Childhood Communicable Diseases (CCD)	698-0421-60	82	0.0	I	85	N	-3	-4	-2	9	9

ANNEX 11

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COUNTRY	EVALUATION TITLE	PROJECT NUMBER	FISCAL YEAR BEGAN	AMOUNT	EVALUATION TYPE	FISCAL YEAR COMPLETED	ISSUES LEARNED	IMPLEMENTATION CONSTRAINTS OVERALL	SUSTAINABILITY OVERALL	WID OVERALL	ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OVERALL	PRE IMPACT OVERALL
SECTOR MLT ZAIRE	PAO Economic Support	660-0277	83	5.0	I	85	N	-2	-4	9	9	9
SECTOR POP KENYA	Family Planning II	615-0193	82	2.4	I	85	Y	-1	2	9	9	9
SUDAN	Rural Health Support	650-0030	80	18.1	I	85	Y	-4	-3	-1	9	-2
ZAIRE	Family Planning Services	660-0004	82	3.9	I	85	N	-3	-3	1	9	9
SECTOR SIA BOTSWANA	Botswana-Zambia Road Project	633-0272	77	0.5	F	85	Y	4	3	9	9	9
BOTSWANA	Gaborone West Housing and Facilities	633-0238	83	0.7	I	85	N	-3	-3	9	9	1
BOTSWANA	Transport Sector I	633-0073	79	6.0	E	9	Y	-2	-2	9	9	9
KENYA	Structural Adjustment Program	615-0213	83	76.0	I	86	Y	-3	-4	9	9	-4
LIBERIA	Increased Revenue for Development	669-0132	78	8.7	I	85	Y	-3	-2	9	9	9
LIBERIA	Small and Medium Scale Enterprise Development and Support	669-0201	84	2.9	I	86	N	-4	-3	9	9	2
MLT	Environmental Training for Africans: Rwanda Component	698-0427	85	7.3	I	86	N	9	1	9	2	9
MLT	Sabel Data Network and Management II (ACRIMBEL)	625-0040	82	6.2	I	85	Y	-3	-3	9	9	9
NIGER	Niger Basin Development and Planning	625-0015	76	1.9	F	85	Y	-3	-2	9	2	9
RWANDA	Private Enterprise Development	696-0121	84	4.1	I	86	N	-1	1	9	9	2
SOUTH AFRICA	AALC—African American Labor Center	690-0223	83	1.9	F	85	N	-2	2	9	9	9

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TABLE III

COUNTRY	EVALUATION TITLE	PROJECT NUMBER	FISCAL YEAR BGN:	AMOUNT	EVALUATION TYPE	FISCAL YEAR COMPLETED	LESSONS LEARNED	IMPLEMENTATION OVERALL	SUSTAINABILITY OVERALL	WTD OVERALL	ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OVERALL	PRE IMPACT OVERALL
SECTOR FIR												
INDONESIA	Workforce and Skills Training (BWSKT)	633-0231	82	14.6	I	85	N	-3	2	9	9	9
INDONESIA	Primary Education Improvement Project (PEIP) (2)	633-0222	81	7.3	I	85	Y	-1	4	9	9	9
INDONESIA	Primary Education Improvement Project	633-0222	81	7.3	F	85	Y	-1	4	1	9	9
MILT	Sabel Muposer Iya Project (SDP)	625-0260	83	12.8	I	85	Y	-2	9	2	1	1
ZAMBIA	Agricultural Training, Planning and Institutional Development	611-0075	80	6.8	I	86	N	-2	2	9	9	9
SECTOR HEA												
GHANA	Combating Communicable Childhood Diseases	698-0421-79	85	0.6	I	86	N	-2	-3	9	9	9
KENYA	Family Planning Assessment and Research Project	615-0216	83	25.1	I	85	N	-2	9	3	1	2
LIBERIA	Combating Childhood Communicable Diseases: Liberia	698-0421	0	0.7	I	86	Y	-3	-3	9	9	1
MAWLI	Malawi Self-Help Rural Water Supply	612-0207	80	6.0	I	84	Y	-1	3	3	4	2
MILT	Center for Communicable Childhood Diseases	698-0421	85	82.0	I	86	N	-3	9	9	9	9
NIGER	Rural Health Improvement	683-0208	78	2.0	I	85	N	-2	3	9	9	9
SWAZILAND	Health Planning and Management	645-0215	81	1.1	F	86	Y	-2	-2	2	3	2
ZAIRE	Combating Childhood Communicable Diseases (CCD)	698-0421-60	82	0.0	I	85	N	-3	-4	-2	9	9

COUNTRY	EVALUATION TITLE	PROJECT NUMBER	FISCAL	ASSET	EVALUATION TYPE	FISCAL	RESOURCES USED	IMPLEMENTATION OBSERVATIONS OVERALL	SUSTAINABILITY OVERALL	WID OVERALL	ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OVERALL	PRE IMPACT OVERALL
			YEAR BEGINS			YEAR COMPLETES						
THAILAND	Land Settlements Project	493-0289	79	4.2	F	85	N	-1	2	9	9	9
THAILAND	Northeast Rainfed Agricultural Development (NERD)	493-0208	81	10.0	I	85	N	-3	-2	9	9	9
THAILAND	Hon Enen University Research Dev. Project: ESR Subproject	493-0322	83	70.0	I	86	Y	-2	-2	1	2	9
THAILAND	Private Sector Development	493-0329	84	3.5	I	86	N	-3	-1	9	9	2
YEMEN	Agricultural Development Support	279-0052	82	6.2	I	84	Y	-3	-2	-2	1	1
SECTOR EHR EGYPT	Vocational Training for Productivity	263-0090-02	81	0.0	F	85	N	-2	-2	3	9	9
EGYPT	Industrial Production Project	263-0101	82	1.6	F	85	Y	9	9	9	9	9
EGYPT	Basic Education	263-0139	81	105.0	I	85	Y	-1	9	3	9	9
EGYPT	Education Program	263-0139	81	85.0	I	86	N	-1	2	3	9	9
INDIA	Development and Management Training	386-0587	82	6.2	I	85	Y	-3	-2	-2	9	1
INDONESIA	Provincial Small Business Mgt Training in Indonesia: The IPPU/PIK Prog	BP	9	0.0	I	86	N	-2	-2	9	9	1
INDONESIA	In-Country Management Development	497-0317	82	3.1	I	85	N	9	2	9	9	9
JORDAN	Vocational Training	278-0238	79	2.1	I	85	Y	-3	1	4	9	1
JORDAN	Health Education	278-0245	80	1.0	F	85	Y	-3	-3	2	1	2
JORDAN	School Construction II	278-0232	80	6.7	F	85	Y	-2	9	2	9	9
MOROCCO	Sector Support Training Project	608-0178	83	8.4	I	85	Y	-2	8	2	9	1
PAKISTAN	Development Support Training	391-0474	83	18.5	I	86	Y	-3	-3	-3	1	-2

TABLE 1.131

COUNTRY	EVALUATION TITLE	PROJECT NUMBER	FISCAL YEAR BEGAN	AMOUNT	EVALUATION TYPE	FISCAL YEAR COMPLETED	LESSONS LEARNED	IMPLEMENTATION CONSTRAINTS OVERALL	SUSTAINABILITY OVERALL	WID OVERALL	ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OVERALL	PRE IMPACT OVERALL
HAITI	Fruit Tree Crops Improvement Project	521-0159-4	83	0.6	F	85	N	-2	-2	9	9	9
HAITI	Agroforestry Outreach	521-0122	81	11.4	F	86	N	-1	2	-1	3	1
HONDURAS	Small Farmer Titling Project	522-0173	82	12.5	I	86	Y	-1	2	9	9	9
HONDURAS	Small Farmer Coffee Improvement	522-0176	81	14.0	I	86	Y	-1	2	9	9	9
HONDURAS	Evaluation of Agriculture Cooperatives	522-0177	82	0.0	F	85	N	-1	-2	9	9	1
HONDURAS	Natural Resources Management	522-0168	80	14.0	I	85	Y	-1	4	4	3	9
JAMAICA	Fish Production System Development	532-0059	78	1.0	F	85	8	-2	-2	9	-2	1
JAMAICA	Small Farmer Production and Marketing	532-0097-1	83	0.6	F	85	N	-2	1	9	9	9
MULT	Regional Tropical Watershed Management (2 parts)	596-0106	83	4.0	I	86	N	-3	-3	9	2	9
MULT	Caribbean Agricultural Extension II	533-0068	82	7.2	E	85	N	-1	3	2	9	-2
MULT	Latin American Agribusiness Development Corporation	596-0097	81	0.0	F	86	N	9	2	9	9	1
MULT	Fuelwood and Alternative Energy Sources (2 parts)	596-0089	79	8.8	I	85	N	-1	2	9	4	9
MULT	Small Farm Production Systems	596-0083	79	8.2	F	85	N	-2	-2	9	9	9
MULT	Agricultural Secretariat	596-0094	81	0.9	F	86	N	-4	-2	9	9	9
PANAMA	Mixed Fish Production	525-0216	81	1.1	B	85	N	9	9	9	9	9
PERU	Integrated Regional Development	527-0178	79	16.6	F	85	N	-1	2	9	9	9
PERU	Improved Water and Land Use In the Sierra (Plan MERIS)	527-0156	76	11.0	F	85	Y	-2	-3	9	-2	9

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Devres

ANNEX 1  
 EVALUATION

COUNTRY	EVALUATION TITLE	PROJECT NUMBER	FISCAL YEAR BUDGET	AMOUNT	EVALUATION TYPE	FISCAL YEAR COMPLETED	ISSUES IDENTIFIED	IMPLEMENTATION CONSTRAINTS OVERALL	SUSTAINABILITY OVERALL	WID OVERALL	ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OVERALL	PRE IMPACT OVERALL
PERU	Private Sector Agricultural Investment Promotion (PAP)	527-0265	83	10.0	I	85	Y	-3	1	9	9	2
PERU	Agricultural Planning and Institutional Development	527-0239	83	15.5	I	86	N	-1	1	9	9	-1
PERU	Soil Conservation	527-0220	80	1.6	F	85	N	-2	1	9	9	9
SECTOR FHR BOLIVIA	Rural Education II (1986)	511-0682	77	12.1	I	85	N	-4	-3	9	9	9
BOLIVIA	Rural Education II (1986)	511-0682	0	0.0	F	84	N	-4	-4	9	9	9
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	Human Resources Development	517-0127	81	5.4	I	85	Y	-3	2	9	9	9
EL SALVADOR	Rural Primary School Expansion	519-0190	79	4.4	F	85	Y	-1	2	9	9	2
GUATEMALA	Integrated Non-Formal Education	520-0281	82	3.9	I	85	Y	-3	-2	9	9	9
HONDURAS	Development Administration Record II	522-0174	82	2.5	I	85	Y	-2	-3	9	9	9
HONDURAS	Rural Primary Education (1986)	522-0167	80	19.7	F	85	N	-2	1	9	9	9
MULT	Caribbean Regional Dev Training: CARICOM Component	538-0014	79	0.0	F	84	Y	-2	4	3	3	3
MULT	Caribbean Education Dev IWI/USAID Primary Curriculum Subproject	538-0029	79	3.8	F	85	Y	-1	3	9	9	9
SECTOR HEA EL SALVADOR	Health Systems Vitalization (VISISA)	519-0291	83	35.6	I	85	N	-3	-2	9	9	9
MULT	Caribbean Epidemiological Surveillance and Training	538-0027	79	2.6	F	85	Y	-1	4	9	9	9
PERU	Rural Water and Environmental Sanitation	527-0221	80	11.0	I	85	N	-4	-2	9	9	9

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Devres

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MAJORST. IRII

COUNTRY	EVALUATION TITLE	PROJECT NUMBER	FISCAL YEAR Began	AMOUNT	EVALUATION TYPE	FISCAL YEAR COMPLETED	ISSUES LEACHED	IMPLEMENTATION OVERALL	SUSTAINABILITY OVERALL	WID OVERALL	ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OVERALL	PRE IMPACT OVERALL
SECTOR POP GUATEMALA	Integrated Family Planning Services	520-0263	80	2.4	F	85	Y	-1	2	2	9	9
SECTOR SDA COSTA RICA	Energy Policy Development (1986)	515-0175	81	1.0	F	86	Y	-2	2	9	9	9
COSTA RICA	Policy Planning and Administrative Improvement	575-0190	83	8.9	I	85	N	-2	-1	9	9	9
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	Energy Conservation & Resource Development - Mini Hydro Component	517-0144	82	17.5	I	85	Y	-1	1	9	3	9
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	Energy Policy Development	517-0143	80	0.8	F	85	Y	-2	-3	9	1	1
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	Energy Conservation and Res. Development - Energy Planning Component	517-0144	82	0.0	I	86	Y	-2	2	9	9	1
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	Energy Conservation and Res. Development - Industrial Conservation Component	517-0144	82	0.0	I	85	Y	-3	-3	9	9	1
EQUADOR	Revenue Generation for Development (MF Component)	578-0036-1	83	0.6	F	85	Y	-1	2	9	9	9
GUATEMALA	Rural Electrification II (per II)	520-0248	79	10.6	I	85	Y	-4	-2	9	9	9
JAMAICA	Board of Revenue Assistance	572-0095	83	7.0	I	85	N	-1	2	9	9	9
MULT	Caribbean Marketing Assistance	538-0102	83	0.4	I	85	Y	-4	-4	1	9	2
PANAMA	Alternative Energy Sources	525-0207	79	0.8	F	85	Y	-3	-2	-3	3	-1
PERU	Urban Small Enterprise Development	527-0241	82	10.0	I	85	N	-1	1	9	9	2

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DOCS

COUNTRY	EVALUATION TITLE	PROJECT NUMBER	FISCAL YEAR Began	AMOUNT	EVALUATION TYPE	FISCAL YEAR COMPLETED	ISSUES RAISED	IMPLEMENTATION CONSTRAINTS OVERALL	SUSTAINABILITY OVERALL	WID- OVERALL	ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OVERALL	PRE-IMPACT OVERALL
THAILAND	Hill Area Education	493-0297	80	1.6	F	85	N	-3	-2	2	9	1
YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC	Ag. Development Support Program: Secondary Ag. Institute Subproject	279-0052-2	79	12.4	I	86	N	9	9	9	9	9
SECTOR HEA EGYPT	Strengthening Rural Health Delivery	263-0015	76	13.9	I	85	Y	-1	-2	3	9	9
EGYPT	HI Institute of Nursing, Asut University	263-0042	81	0.7	I	85	N	-1	2	2	9	9
INDONESIA	Timor Malaria Control	497-0326	80	3.6	I	85	N	-3	-1	9	9	9
MOROCCO	Health Management Improvement	603-0151	81	2.7	I	85	Y	-2	-3	9	9	9
PAKISTAN	Malaria Control II	391-0472	82	41.0	I	86	Y	-3	-3	1	1	1
PAKISTAN	Primary Health Care	391-0475	82	20.0	I	86	Y	-3	-3	2	2	1
PHILIPPINES	Primary Health Care Efficiency (PHCEP)	492-0371	83	17.0	I	86	N	-4	-3	9	9	9
SRI LANKA	Malaria Control (1985)	383-0043	78	28.5	I	86	N	-3	-3	-1	-2	1
YEMEN	Tafz Water and Sewerage Construction	279-0039	77	11.2	E	85	Y	-4	-2	8	2	9
SECTOR HLT SRI LANKA	IMV Co-financing	383-0060	79	6.6	I	86	Y	-2	2	3	2	2
SECTOR POP INDONESIA	Family Planning Development and Services	MILT	78	28.0	E	85	Y	-1	3	5	0	2
MOROCCO	Population/Family Planning Support II	603-0155	78	9.2	F	85	Y	-1	4	3	9	9
MULT	Near East Regional Population Project	398-0048	86	1.5	I	85	N	-1	1	2	9	1

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Dover

PAJOREST.123

COUNTRY	EVALUATION TITLE	PROJECT NUMBER	FISCAL YEAR BUDGET	AMOUNT	EVALUATION TYPE	FISCAL YEAR COMPLETED	LEASONS LEARNED	IMPLEMENTATION CONSTRAINTS OVERALL	SUSTAINABILITY OVERALL	WID OVERALL	ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OVERALL	PRE IMPACT OVERALL
MYLT	Arid Lands Agriculture Research	298-0170	82	6.0	I	84	Y	-1	2	9	9	9
MYLT	ASEAN Agricultural Development Planning Centre	498-0258-11	80	3.0	F	85	N	-2	1	9	9	9
MYLT	Regional Cooperative Training Technology for the Middle East	298-0190	80	0.0	I	85	Y	-2	2	9	2	9
MYLT	ANERA West Bank/Gaza Development	298-0159	75	0.0	I	85	Y	-1	2	1	2	3
NEPAL	Strengthening Institutional Capacity In Food & Agricultural Sector	NP	82	0.0	I	85	N	-3	-3	1	9	9
NEPAL	Resource Conservation and Utilization	367-0132	80	25.6	F	85	Y	-3	1	9	2	9
GHANA	Fisheries Development	272-0101	81	6.6	I	85	Y	-3	-3	1	3	3
PAKISTAN	Irrigation Systems Management	391-0467	83	52.9	I	85	Y	-3	-2	-1	2	1
PAKISTAN	Tribal Areas Development	391-0571	82	24.0	I	86	Y	-4	-4	9	9	1
PHILIPPINES	Rural Energy Development	492-0375	82	6.0	I	85	N	-4	-3	9	-2	9
PERU	Agricultural Production Program	150-0023	80	10.0	I	85	Y	-2	2	9	9	-3
SRI LANKA	Reforestation and Watershed Management	383-0055	80	8.3	I	85	N	-2	-2	2	3	-2
SRI LANKA	Biodiversity Environment Protection	383-0075	82	5.0	I	86	Y	-4	-2	9	-2	9
SRI LANKA	Water Management I	383-0057	79	13.6	F	86	Y	-1	3	1	-2	8
SRI LANKA	Rice Research Project	833-0050	77	3.8	I	86	N	2	2	9	9	9
THAILAND	Khon Kaen Univ. Research Project: Rural Development Subproject	493-0332	83	0.0	I	85	N	-1	2	9	9	9
THAILAND	Northeast Small Scale Irrigation (NESSI): A Management Review	493-0312	80	8.6	I	85	Y	-3	2	9	1	1

MAJOR ISSUES

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COUNTRY	EVALUATION TITLE	PROJECT NUMBER	FISCAL YEAR RANGE	AMOUNT	EVALUATION TYPE	FISCAL YEAR COMPLETED	LESSONS LEARNED	IMPLEMENTATION CONSTRAINTS OVERALL	SUSTAINABILITY OVERALL	WID OVERALL	ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OVERALL	PRE IMPACT OVERALL
** BUREAU PRE												
SECTOR AFD MULTI	Women's World Banking	940-002	70	0.0	I	85	N	-1	4	3	9	4
MULTI	Feasibility Studies Cost Sharing Program	940-002-26	82	1.4	I	85	N	-4	-3	9	9	4
MULTI	Agricultural Cooperative Development International	938-0275	83	2.1	F	86	Y	-1	-3	2	1	3
SECTOR EHP THAILAND	Institute for Management Education for Thailand, Inc.	940-0072	82	1.0	F	85	Y	-1	1	9	9	2
SECTOR SDA KENYA	Kenya Commercial Finance Co Ltd	NP	83	0.0	I	85	Y	-1	3	2	9	4
THAILAND	Siam Commercial Bank Ltd	940-002-1	82	2.2	I	85	Y	-1	4	4	1	4
** BUREAU S&T												
SECTOR AFD BOLIVIA	Water Supply and Small Scale Irrigation	511-0581	83	1.8	F	85	N	-2	-3	9	-2	9
SECTOR POP PHILIPPINES	Population Planning III	936-3024	84	0.0	F	86	N	-2	3	1	1	9

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COUNTRY	EVALUATION TITLE	PROJECT NUMBER	FISCAL YEAR BEGAN	AMOUNT	EVALUATION TYPE	FISCAL YEAR COMPLETED	LESSONS LEARNED	IMPLEMENTATION CONSTRAINTS OVERALL	SUSTAINABILITY OVERALL	WID OVERALL	ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OVERALL	PRE IMPACT OVERALL
TUNISIA	Technology Transfer	MLT	78	8.5	I	86	Y	-1	2	-3	1	1
** REGION EVA												
SECTOR SIDA MULT	African Emergency Food Assistance	NP	85	1.3	E	86	Y	-2	8	8	9	-2
** REGION LAC												
SECTOR AID BELIZE	Rural Access Roads and Bridges	505-0007	83	6.2	I	85	Y	-2	-2	9	9	1
BELIZE	Livestock Development	505-0006	83	3.2	I	86	Y	-2	1	9	9	9
BOLIVIA	Disaster Recovery Project	511-0581	83	5.7	I	85	N	9	2	4	3	9
BOLIVIA	New Lands Settlement Regional Development - San Julián	NP	75	11.2	E	85	Y	-2	-3	-3	-3	-3
DOMINICA	The Dominica Banana Company	538-0083	82	2.0	I	85	N	-1	-2	9	9	3
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	Natural Resources Management	517-0126	81	11.0	I	84	N	-2	2	1	2	9
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	Rural Savings Mobilization	517-0179	83	1.0	F	85	N	-1	-1	9	9	9
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	Natural Resources Management	517-0126	81	11.0	I	86	Y	-3	-3	9	1	-3
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	Rural Development Management	517-0125	81	1.6	I	85	N	-1	-2	9	9	1
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	Small Farmer Soine Repopulation	517-0155	81	0.4	F	85	N	9	1	9	9	9
EL SALVADOR	Agrarian Reform Credit	519-0263	80	76.0	I	85	Y	-2	3	9	9	2
GUATEMALA	Women In Development	520-0284	81	0.3	I	86	Y	-2	2	5	9	2
GUATEMALA	Small Farmer Diversification System	520-0255	81	9.2	I	85	Y	-3	-2	9	9	9
HAI	Agricultural Development Support II (ADS II)	521-0092	78	3.3	I	86	Y	-3	-3	9	2	9

TABLE 2.1 (Cont.)

COUNTRY	EVALUATION TITLE	PROJECT NUMBER	FISCAL YEAR BUDGET	AMOUNT	EVALUATION TYPE	FISCAL YEAR COMPLETED	LESSONS LEARNED	IMPLEMENTATION ORIGINAL	SUSTAINABILITY OVERALL	WID OVERALL	ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OVERALL	PRE IMPACT OVERALL
NETAL	Population Policy Development Project	936-3024	79	0.0	F	85	N	-1	-2	9	9	9
PAKISTAN	Population Welfare Planning	391-0469	82	81.5	I	85	N	-3	-3	-2	0	3
SECTOR SPA EGYPT	Industrial Productivity Improvement	263-0020-01	80	39.0	I	85	N	-3	-2	9	9	1
EGYPT	Water and Wastewater Sector Assessment	MILT	9	0.0	I	85	N	-3	-3	9	9	1
EGYPT	Applied Science and Technology: Scientific and Tech. Info Component	263-0016	77	23.0	I	85	Y	-3	-3	9	9	9
EGYPT	Private Sector Feasibility Studies	263-0112	79	8.0	I	85	N	-4	-4	9	9	-4
EGYPT	Industrial Technology Applications	MILT	9	0.0	I	85	N	-4	-4	9	9	-3
EGYPT	Neighborhood Urban Services (NUS)	263-K-605-5	81	0.0	I	85	N	-1	-3	1	3	2
EGYPT	Development Planning Studies	263-0061	78	22.5	I	85	Y	-1	3	9	2	9
EGYPT	Construction Contracts Assessment	MILT	9	0.0	E	85	Y	-3	8	8	8	8
INDIA	Technologies for the Rural Poor	386-0465	78	2.0	F	85	N	-3	-3	-3	9	9
JORDAN	Water Systems and Services Management	278-0259	83	21.0	I	85	Y	9	2	9	9	2
JORDAN	Income Tax Assistance	278-0247	81	2.0	I	85	Y	-2	2	9	9	2
JORDAN	Potash Plant, Record D	MILT	78	38.0	E	86	Y	-1	-1	9	9	9
ROMANIA	Small Farm Machinery Industrial Extension	492-0265	9	0.0	I	85	N	-1	-2	9	1	2
YEMEN	Island Relief Program	181-0001	82	5.0	E	85	Y	-1	9	9	9	9

MAJOR STUDIES

COUNTRY	EVALUATION TITLE	PROJECT NUMBER	FISCAL YEAR BEGIN	AMOUNT	EVALUATION TYPE	FISCAL YEAR COMPLETED	LESSONS LEARNED	IMPLEMENTATION CONSTRAINTS OVERALL	SUSTAINABILITY OVERALL	WID OVERALL	ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OVERALL	PRE IMPACT OVERALL
INDONESIA	Agro-Climate Environmental Monitoring Project	398-0066	81	7.4	I	86	Y	-3	-2	9	9	9
EGYPT	Aquaculture Development	263-0064	78	23.4	I	85	Y	-3	2	1	9	1
EGYPT	Water Use and Management	263-0017	77	13.0	F	85	Y	-2	-2	9	9	2
EGYPT	Small Farmer Production	263-0079	79	49.0	F	85	Y	8	3	1	9	1
EGYPT	Irrigation Management System	263-0132	81	93.0	I	85	Y	-2	-2	9	9	9
EGYPT	Irrigation Management System: Structural Replacement Component	263-0132	81	73.6	I	85	Y	-2	2	9	9	9
EGYPT	Data Collection and Analysis	263-0142	80	4.9	I	85	Y	-2	2	9	9	9
EGYPT	Agricultural Management Development	263-0116	80	4.1	F	86	N	-2	2	9	9	9
INDIA	Maharashtra Social Forestry	386-0578	82	30.0	I	86	Y	9	2	1	2	1
INDONESIA	Sumatra Agricultural Research	497-0263	77	9.5	F	86	N	-1	-1	9	9	9
INDONESIA	Sedertama Irrigation II	497-0252	78	10.7	F	85	N	9	9	9	9	9
INDONESIA	Changkay River Basin Development II	497-0281	80	18.9	I	85	N	-3	-2	9	9	9
ISRAEL	Water Management Technology	278-0192	77	1.3	F	85	Y	-3	1	9	9	9
ISRAEL	Jordan Valley Farmers Association (JVFA)	278-0186	77	1.6	F	85	Y	-3	-2	9	9	9
INDONESIA	ASEAN Plant Quarantine Centre and Training Institute (PIAHTI)	498-0258-2	80	2.8	F	85	N	-1	1	9	9	9
ISRAEL	Rainy Management Improvement	608-0145	80	5.1	F	86	N	-2	2	9	2	1
ISRAEL	Morocco Renewable Energy Development	608-0159	80	7.0	I	86	N	-3	3	9	9	9

MAJOR LIST FROM

COUNTRY	EVALUATION TITLE	PROJECT NUMBER	FISCAL YEAR BEGAN	AMOUNT	EVALUATION TYPE	FISCAL YEAR COMPLETED	LESSONS LEARNED	IMPLEMENTATION CONSTRAINTS OVERALL	SUSTAINABILITY OVERALL	WID OVERALL	ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OVERALL	PRE IMPACT OVERALL
KENYA	Women's World Banking	940-0002	70	0.0	I	85	N	-1	4	3	9	4
KENYA	Feasibility Studies Cost Sharing Program	940-0002-26	82	1.4	I	85	N	-3	-3	9	9	-4
KENYA	Agricultural Cooperative Development - Internal Loan	938-0225	83	2.1	F	86	Y	-1	-3	2	1	3
KENYA	Institute for Management Education for Thika, Inc.	940-0072	82	1.0	F	85	Y	-1	1	9	9	2
KENYA	Kenya Commercial Finance Co Ltd	HP	83	0.0	I	85	Y	-1	3	2	9	4
KENYA	Stan Commercial Bank Ltd	940-0002-1	82	2.2	I	85	Y	-1	4	4	1	4
KENYA	Water Supply and Small Scale Irrigation	511-0581	83	1.8	F	85	N	-2	-3	9	-2	9
KENYA	Population Planning III	936-3024	84	0.0	F	86	N	-2	3	1	1	9

MAJOR STUDIES

COUNTRY	EVALUATION TITLE	PROJECT NUMBER	FISCAL YEAR BEGAN	AMOUNT	EVALUATION TYPE	FISCAL YEAR COMPLETED	LESSONS LEARNED	IMPLEMENTATION CONSTRAINTS OVERALL	SUSTAINABILITY OVERALL	WID OVERALL	ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OVERALL	PRE IMPACT OVERALL
** PRE-PROJECT												
SECTOR AFD MULT	Women's World Banking	940-0002	70	0.0	I	85	N	-1	4	3	9	4
MULT	Feasibility Studies Cost Sharing Program	940-0002-26	82	1.4	I	85	N	-4	-3	9	9	-4
MULT	Agricultural Cooperative Development International	938-0225	83	2.1	F	86	Y	-1	-3	2	1	3
SECTOR EHR THAILAND	Institute for Management Education for Thailand, Inc.	940-0072	82	1.0	F	85	Y	-1	1	9	9	2
SECTOR SEA KENYA	Kenya Commercial Finance Co Ltd	NP	83	0.0	I	85	Y	-1	3	2	9	4
THAILAND	Siam Commercial Bank Ltd	940-0002-1	82	2.2	I	85	Y	-1	4	4	1	4
** EARLY STAGE												
SECTOR AFD ETHIOPIA	Water Supply and Small Scale Irrigation	511-0521	83	1.8	F	85	N	-2	-3	9	-2	9
SECTOR POP PHILIPPINES	Population Planning III	936-3024	84	0.0	F	86	N	-2	3	1	1	9

ANNEX 3 '

Evaluation Synthesis Rating Form

EVALUATION SYNTHESIS RATING FORM (revised 10/29)

RATER \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_

\*\*\*\*\*  
 \* 8 = Not Applicable \*  
 \* 9 = Not Observed \*  
 \*\*\*\*\*

RECORD NO. \_\_\_\_\_

PROJECT NAME. \_\_\_\_\_

BUREAU. \_\_\_\_\_

PROJECT NO. \_\_\_\_\_

SECTOR. \_\_\_\_\_

COUNTRY. \_\_\_\_\_

MATRIX A

LOP: BEGIN FY \_\_\_\_\_ PACD FY \_\_\_\_\_

AMT. OBLIGATED \_\_\_\_\_ (Use AID/W Printout as Source)

DECISIONS ON PROJECT FUTURE	NO	CHANGE	CHANGE	DISCONTINUE	8	9
PER PES	CHANGE	DESIGN	IMPLEMENTATION			

EVALUATOR'S RECOMMENDATION	NO	CHANGE	CHANGE	DISCONTINUE	8	9
ON PROJECT FUTURE	CHANGE	DESIGN	IMPLEMENTATION			

MATRIX B

TYPE OF EVALUATION \_\_\_\_\_ I F E  
 (INTERIM/FINAL/EX POST)

EVALUATION TEAM COMPOSITION:  
 CONTRACTOR = CO; AID = AI; MIXED = MI; HOST/AID = HA  
 HOST COUNTRY = HO; HOST/CONT. = HC; HOST MIXED = HM

INTERNAL VS. EXTERNAL \_\_\_\_\_ I E

PES/ES \_\_\_\_\_ Y N 8 9

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY \_\_\_\_\_ Y N 8 9

TABLE OF CONTENTS \_\_\_\_\_ Y N 8 9

EVALUATION SOV \_\_\_\_\_ Y N 8 9

EVALUATION METHODOLOGY \_\_\_\_\_ Y N 8 9

CONCLUSIONS \_\_\_\_\_ Y N 8 9

RECOMMENDATIONS \_\_\_\_\_ Y N 8 9

LESSONS LEARNED \_\_\_\_\_ Y N 8 9

DESIGN DOCUMENTS (LOGFRAME) \_\_\_\_\_ Y N 8 9

FISCAL YEAR \_\_\_\_\_ Y N 8 9



PROJECT NO \_\_\_\_\_

NAME \_\_\_\_\_

2. SUSTAINABILITY-- OVERALL RATING -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 9

A. HOST COUNTRY BENEFICIARIES  
(NOTE: CHOOSE 3 and RATE  
AS FOLLOWS:

<input type="checkbox"/>	Professionals	<input type="checkbox"/>	Children
<input type="checkbox"/>	Paraprofessionals	<input type="checkbox"/>	Students
<input type="checkbox"/>	Wage Laborers	<input type="checkbox"/>	Society
<input type="checkbox"/>	Unemployed	<input type="checkbox"/>	at Large
<input type="checkbox"/>	Entrepreneurs		
<input type="checkbox"/>	Managers		
<input type="checkbox"/>	Consumers		
<input type="checkbox"/>	Farmers/Fishermen		
<input type="checkbox"/>	Women		

1 - MOST IMPORTANT  
BENEFICIARY

2 - 2nd MOST IMPORTANT

3 - 3rd MOST IMPORTANT

B. STRENGTH OF PROJECT CONSTITUENCY -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 8 9

C. HOST COUNTRY POLICIES -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 8 9

D. ORGANIZATIONAL/INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITIES FOR CONTINUATION OF PROJECT BENEFITS -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 8 9

E. COOPERATING ORGANIZATION'S ABILITY TO RESPOND TO CHANGING CONDITIONS -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 8 9

F. FINANCIAL PROVISION FOR O&M AND RECURRENT/CAPITAL COST RECOVERY -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 8 9

G. ACCEPTANCE OF TECHNOLOGY -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 8 9

H. DEVELOPMENT OF MANAGEMENT CAPACITY -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 8 9

PROJECT NO \_\_\_\_\_

NAME \_\_\_\_\_

3.	IMPACT ON WOMEN IN DEVELOPMENT-- OVERALL RATING	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5	8	9
A.	WID WAS A MAJOR PURPOSE OF PROJECT						Y						N
	IF YES, RATE FOLLOWING; IF NOT, USE "8" FOR QUESTIONS A1, A2, A3; FOR QUESTION A4, ANSWER YES OR NO												
1.	PLANNED BENEFITS ACHIEVED?	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5	8	9
2.	PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION REDIRECTED?						Y						N
3.	PROJECT STRATEGY CHANGED?						Y						N
4.	IF NO, SHOULD WID HAVE BEEN A MAJOR CONCERN?						Y						N
B.	DIVISION OF PROJECT RESPONSIBILITIES BY GENDER IN PROJECT DESIGN						Y						N
C.	GENDER-SPECIFICS INTRODUCED DURING IMPLEMENTATION						Y						N
D.	KNOWLEDGE/LACK OF KNOWLEDGE OF THE INSTITUTIONAL SETTING	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5	8	9
E.	WOMEN AS PROJECT PARTICIPANTS	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5	8	9
F.	WOMEN AS BENEFICIARIES	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5	8	9
G.	CHANGE IN WOMEN'S STATUS AS A RESULT OF PROJECT	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5	8	9

PROJECT NO \_\_\_\_\_

NAME \_\_\_\_\_

4. ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT-- OVERALL RATING -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 8 9
- A. ENVIRONMENT WAS A MAJOR PURPOSE OF PROJECT Y N
- IF YES, RATE FOLLOWING; IF NO, USE "8":
1. PLANNED BENEFITS ACHIEVED? -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 8 9
2. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION REDIRECTED? Y N 8 9
3. PROJECT STRATEGY CHANGED? Y N 8 9
- B. UNPLANNED IMPACTS -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 8 9
- C. HOST COUNTRY ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 8 9
- D. HOST COUNTRY SUPPORT OF INSTITUTIONS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 8 9
- E. INVOLVEMENT OF HOST-COUNTRY EXPERTISE IN ENVIRONMENTAL COMPONENT OF PROJECT -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 8 9

PROJECT NO \_\_\_\_\_

NAME \_\_\_\_\_

	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5	8	9
5. IMPACT ON PRIVATE SECTOR-- OVERALL RATING												
A. PRIVATE ENTERPRISE DEVELOPMENT WAS A MAJOR PURPOSE OF PROJECT						Y	N					
IF YES, RATE FOLLOWING; IF NO, USE "8" FOR A1, A2, A3; FOR QUESTION A4, ANSWER YES OR NO:												
1. PLANNED BENEFITS ACHIEVED?	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5	8	9
2. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION REDIRECTED?						Y	N				8	9
3. PROJECT STRATEGY CHANGED?						Y	N				8	9
4. IF NO, SHOULD PRE HAVE BEEN A CONCERN						Y	N					
B. UNPLANNED IMPACTS	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5	8	9
C. NUMBER OF ENTREPRENEURS	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5	8	9
D. PRIVATE SECTOR EMPLOYMENT	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5	8	9
E. VALUE ADDED BY PRIVATE SECTOR	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5	8	9
F. INCOMES OF POOR WAGE EARNERS	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5	8	9
G. FOREIGN EXCHANGE EARNINGS OR SAVINGS	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5	8	9
H. HOST COUNTRY POLICY RE: P/E	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5	8	9
I. INVOLVEMENT OF HOST-COUNTRY EXPERTISE IN P/E COMPONENT OF PROJECT	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5	8	9

## Guidelines for Using the Evaluation Synthesis Rating Form

### Project Name:

- o Use project name unless the evaluation is for more than one project. In that case, use title of the Evaluation Report.

### Project No:

- o Use project no. for single project evaluation.
- o Use "MLT" for multiple projects covered by the evaluation.
- o Use "NP" for non-project evaluations including PL 480 activities.

### Bureau:

- o Attribute to the Bureau which FUNDED the project.

### Sector:

- o Use the Sector shown in the CP except for project funded under ESF and SDF where we should attribute the project to the sector in which it would fall if it were DA funded.
- o In case the evaluation covers projects in more than one Sector Unit, assign to multiple sector and mark as "MLT".

### Country:

- o All single project evaluations in one country will be so marked.
- o If the evaluation covers more than one country in the same region, mark "MLT" in the country space.

### Matrix A:

#### \* LOP

- o Show beginning year indicated in ER or PES/ES or determine from CP (i.e. show first year of obligation).
- o Leave PACD blank to be entered from Evaluation Plans located in CDIE.

#### \* Amount Obligated

- o Leave blank to be completed from CDIE-furnished printout.

#### \* Decisions re Project Future

- o Per PES/ES - Mark as shown or according to statements by USAID where included.
- o Evaluator - Mark according to ER when clear.

### Matrix B:

- o For all entries ER should be clear and explicit in order to mark "Y" especially regarding logframe and lessons learned.
- o Re Eval Team Composition, treat C, A and M as alternatives and, in addition, circle H wherever host country personnel actively participated in the evaluation in any capacity.

Guidelines (cont'd)

- o Re FY Completed, use the date of the Evaluation Report NOT of the Mission Review (ES or PES).

Decisions re Evaluation Synthesis Rating Form

Page Two

Matrix C:

I. Implementation Constraints

General - Mark each constraint only on the basis of explicit statements by the evaluators. Do not attempt to draw inferences from the general context, but circle "9" when no clear statement was made. Indicate general perceptions in notes.

- A. Timing of Procurement - Follow general rule.
- B. Timing in Contracting - Follow general rule.
- C. Cont-AID-B/G Relations - Any relationship problems which constituted a significant implementation constraint should be indicated.
- D. AID-B/G Understanding - Follow general rule.
- E. Timing / Adequacy of B/G Staffing and Budgeting - Follow general rule.
- F. AID Flex/Inflex - Follow general rule.
- G. Adequacy of Monitoring - Follow general rule, but CDIE specifically requested that we use to show if AID allows problems which should have been detected by the monitoring process to persist and become known only as a result of the evaluation.
- H. Quality of Proj. Design - Follow general rule.
- I. Months Behind Schedule - Follow general rule.
- J. Adeq. of Plan for LOP - Follow general rule, but emphasize the feasibility of the projects's plan given the LOP.
- K. LOP Appropriate - Follow general rule.
- L. Add. Years Rec - Follow general rule, but enter "9" when appropriate.
- M. Prem. Terminated - Follow general rule.

Comment - It may be useful to make a note re evaluator's judgement on degree to which project is achieving its purpose either under "constraints" or "sustainability" in order to facilitate analysis.

II. Sustainability

- A. HC Beneficiaries - Mark according to evaluators indications of who the project was intended to benefit.
- B. Strength of Proj Constituency - rely on the evaluator's statements, but do not insist on finding an explicit

Guidelines (cont'd)

statement pointed at this factor in order to provide a significance rating.

- C. H.C. Policies - Follow general rule.
- D. O/I Capacity - Follow general rule.

Decisions re Evaluation Synthesis Rating Form  
Page Three

- E. Cooper. Orgs to changing conditions - Follow general rule.
- F. Financial provision for O&M - Follow general rule.
- G. Acceptance of Tech. - Follow general rule.
- H. Dev. of Mat. Capacity - Follow general rule.

III. Impact of WID

General - Look for explicit evidence of conclusions by evaluators in order to rate significance for all points.

Add - A 4. If no, should WID have been a major concern? Y / N

IV. Environmental Impact

General - Follow general rule of obtaining explicit evidence. Use B. Unplanned Impact to report on environmental considerations of significance where environment was not an (explicitly) major concern of the project.

V. Impact on Private Sector

General - Follow the general rule of reporting what this evaluator makes explicit except with respect to the "if no" question where the reviewer can inject some of his/her own judgement based on the ER's general indications.

ANNEX 4

Definition of Topics and Sub-topics  
for Significance Ratings

ANNEX 4

Definition of Topics and Sub-topics  
for Significance Ratings  
Keyed to Matrix C  
Evaluation Synthesis Rating Form

1. Implementation Constraints (Overall)--a summary numerical indicator of the significance of factors which were seen by the evaluators to be inhibiting progress in the delivery of outputs and achievement of stated goal and purpose of the project during the specific period covered by the Evaluation Report (ER). (By definition a negative scale only was covered).

A. Timing of procurement--significance rating of the degree to which the timeliness of procurement fostered (+) or inhibited (-) output and/or purpose achievement (covered inputs, supplies, commodities, equipment, spares and replacements, etc.).

B. Timing of contracting team or technical assistance (TA)--significance rating of the extent to which the scheduling and/or actual arrival of the contracting team or TA strengthened (+) or weakened (-) project progress or performance.

C. Contractor-AID-B/G relations--significance rating of the degree to which the relationships within and/or among all key parties engaged in the project as a whole improved (+) or inhibited (-) project progress or performance.

D. AID-B/G understanding of project purpose--a significance rating of the degree to which the respective and/or shared understanding(s) of the purpose of the project supported or inhibited implementation.

E. Timing and adequacy of B/G staffing or budgeting for project--a significance rating of the degree to which the project was aided or hindered by the availability of funds and staff, including staff quality.

F. AID flexibility/inflexibility in management of project--a rating of the extent to which AID was sensitive and responsive to developments in ways which facilitated progress in project implementation.

G. Adequacy of monitoring--a significance rating of the degree to which AID was or was not keeping closely informed about project activities to facilitate implementation or recognize problems needing correction.

H. Quality of project design--a rating of the extent to which

the design of the project facilitated or hindered progress in the delivery of outputs and/or achievement of project purpose.

I. Did evaluation indicate number of months behind schedule-- simple yes/no answer.

1. Months behind schedule--numerical answer as specified in the ER.

J. Adequacy of plan for life of project--a significance rating of the degree to which the plan for execution of the project was realistic and consistent with achievement of project purpose within the time allowed.

K. Life of project appropriate--a simple yes/no answer indicating whether the project allowed adequate time for achievement of project purpose.

L. Did the evaluation indicate the number of years recommended beyond PACD--simple yes/no answer.

M. Irregularly terminated--simple yes/no response indicating whether the evaluation judged the project was or was about to be terminated prematurely.

2. Sustainability (Overall)--a significance rating by the reviewer reflecting the indications in the evaluation of the probability of the project being sustainable, i.e. able to continue to provide the intended stream of benefits into the future beyond the termination of external support.

A. Host country beneficiaries--Three socio-economic groups ranked in order of importance as project beneficiaries reflecting the ERs indicated (or implied) target groups. (Reviewer marked three from a pre-determined list which are not altogether mutually exclusive). Beneficiaries are understood to be persons or groups which would receive benefits as a result of successful project action (e.g. improved employment opportunities, increased incomes, increased productive capacity, new skills, etc.). In some instances they could be the same persons or groups as "participants" in whole or in part (e.g. members of farmers' associations or water users associations may be participants but also beneficiaries). In many cases beneficiaries and participants are separate and distinct.

B. Strength of project constituency--significance rating of the impact on sustainability deriving from the strength of any and all constituencies concerned with the project. Constituencies include any and all groups identified in the ER as having a capacity to influence the project (positively or negatively). These could (and ordinarily would) include participants and beneficiaries but might also include others not involved in or benefiting in any

direct way from the project but who have an interest in its activities, redirection, or success and seek to influence its outcome.

C. Host country policies--significance rating of the impact on sustainability of the project by the totality of host country policies impacting the project.

D. Organizational/institutional capacities for continuation of project benefits--significance rating of capacity of organizations and/or institutions involved in the project to continue providing a stream of benefits beyond the end of the period of external support. The "capacities" include a broad range of institutional factors (notably: leadership; management; human resources; funding; marketing; backward linkages for the supply of ideas, information, technology, trained staff, etc.; collateral linkages with bodies performing related functions; forward linkages to bodies utilizing outputs; etc.). This is a broad concept inclusive of several other sub-items (notably 2.F.G. and H.) separately rated for significance (and some which are not) but is not a proxy for or synonymous with overall sustainability. It is a necessary (but not by itself sufficient) basis for achieving overall sustainability. "Institutions" for this purpose are defined as bodies having a formal structure, a formal (generally legal) basis for their existence and a defined system of governance. The term "institutions" is not used in this context to include the generally accepted or traditional social structures which influence a society's modus operandi (e.g. the obligations among individuals in an extended family, etc.).

E. Cooperating organization's ability to respond to changing conditions--significance rating of the ability of organization(s) engaged in the project to respond to changed circumstances to help ensure the activity's benefits would be sustained. Where ER's provide observations explicitly citing examples of significant changes made in response to altered circumstances or show that management of the institution had achieved such capacity, the rating reflects the degree of change reported or the confidence felt by the evaluators in a higher or lower positive rating. Where institutions were reported to have failed to make changes in response to altered circumstances or evaluators saw little or no evidence of capacity or preparedness to make such change, negative ratings reflect the degree of inflexibility reported. If no observations were provided the factor is marked "not observed" (9).

F. Financial provision for O & M and recurrent/capital cost recovery--significance rating of the probability that funds would be available to cover operations and maintenance (of the facilities needed in program) and to recover capital costs so that the benefit stream can be sustained.

G. Acceptance of technology--significance rating of the impact on sustainability of the degree of acceptance of the technology(ies) being applied in the project.

H. Development of management capacity--significance rating of progress made (or being made) in the development of management capacity needed to ensure continued delivery of the intended stream of benefits after external support is withdrawn. "Management" in this context means the systems by which: policies and objectives are determined; programs and plans are formulated; funds, personnel and other resources are secured, deployed and controlled; performance is monitored and evaluated; and relations with outside bodies are organized and governed.

3. Impact on Women in Development (Overall)--A significance rating by the reviewer reflecting the indications in the ER of the sum of all of the project's impacts on women in the development process with a (+) indicating positive impact and a (-) indicating negative.

A. WID was a major purpose of the project--a yes/no response indicating whether the ER identified WID as a major (not necessarily the major) purpose of the project. (Points 1, 2 and 3 below to be answered only if response to A was "yes.")

1. Planned benefits achieved--a significance rating of the degree to which benefits pertaining to WID were being achieved up to the time of the evaluation.

2. Project implementation redirected--yes/no response indicating whether the ER proposed that the implementation plan of the project in relation to WID should be redirected

3. Project strategy changed--yes/no response indicating whether the ER proposed that the project strategy relating to WID should be changed.

4. If no, should WID have been a major concern--A yes/no response indicating whether the reviewer believed that a project for which WID was not a major concern should have had it as such. (This is an exception to the general rule that responses reflect what was specified in the ER or if necessary could be clearly inferred from the ER rather than being the reviewer's opinion or judgment.)

B. Division of project responsibilities by gender in project design--yes/no response indicating what the ER stated concerning the project's design regarding gender responsibilities.

C. Gender-specifics introduced during implementation--yes/no response indicating what the ER proposed or what changes had been made by others regarding gender responsibilities since the project was designed.

D. Knowledge/lack of knowledge of the institutional setting--significance rating indicating whether knowledge or a lack of knowledge (available to the designers and/or implementors of the project) about the institutional setting (including social institutions) were favorably or unfavorably affecting the impact of the project on WID.

E. Women as project participants--a significance rating of the degree to which women were participating actively in the project's operating activities as indicated by the ER.

F. Women as beneficiaries--a significance rating of the extent to which women were recipients of benefits generated by the project as indicated by the ER.

G. Change in women's status as a result of project--a significance rating of the degree to which women's status in the society had changed due to project's activities as indicated by the ER.

4. Environmental Impact (Overall)--a significance rating indicating the extent to which the project's activities up to the time of the evaluation had impacted favorably (+) or unfavorably (-) on the environment as indicated by the ER.

A. Environment was a major purpose of the project--a yes/no response indicating whether environmental modifications were a major purpose (not necessarily the major purpose) of the project as indicated by the ER.

(Responses to sub-points 1,2, and 3 were to be given if the answer to A was positive)

1. Planned benefits achieved--a significance rating indicating the degree to which the environment-related benefits contemplated to flow from the project were being achieved.

2. Project implementation redirected--a yes/no response indicating whether or not the ER proposed that the implementation plan of the project concerning the environment should be revised.

3. Project strategy changed--a yes/no response indicating whether or not the project's strategy toward environmental modifications should be changed according to the ER.

B. Unplanned impacts--a significance rating indicating the degree to which impacts on the environment had occurred which had not been planned (positive or negative) as indicated by the ER.

C. Host country environmental policy--a significance rating indicating whether policy relating to the environment was favorably (+) or unfavorably (-) impacting the achievement of the project's environmentally-oriented outputs and/or purpose as indicated by the ER.

D. Host country support of institutions for environmental monitoring--a significance rating indicating the degree to which the host country support of institutions for environmental monitoring favorably (+) or unfavorably (-) impacted on the project.

E. Involvement of host-country expertise in the environmental component of the project--a significance rating of the degree of involvement of host country personnel in this component of the project as indicated by the ER.

5. Impact on Private Sector, Overall Rating--a composite significance rating for the impact of the project as a whole on private sector activity reflecting the indications in the ER.

A. Private enterprise a major purpose of the project--a simple yes/no response indicating whether PRE was a major purpose (not necessarily the major purpose) of the project.

(If the response to A. was 'yes' sub-items 1,2 and 3 were to be answered.)

1. Planned benefits achieved--a significance rating on the degree to which planned benefits with respect to PRE were achieved.

2. Project implementation redirected--a simple yes/no response indicating whether the ER proposed that the implementation plan regarding PRE should be redirected.

3. Project strategy changed--a simple yes/no response indicating whether the ER proposed that the strategy relating to PRE should be changed.

4. If no, should PRE have been a major concern--a simple yes/no response indicating the reviewer's opinion on this issue based on knowledge derived from the ER.

B. Unplanned impacts--a significance rating relating to impacts on the private sector which occurred but had not been planned.

C. Number of entrepreneurs--a significance rating regarding the number of private entrepreneurs impacted by the project.

D. Private sector employment--a significance rating regarding

the number of persons employed in the private sector as a result of the project.

E. Value added by private sector--a significance rating on the increase in value added in the private sector as a result of the project.

F. Incomes of poor wage earners--a significance rating on the increase in incomes of poor wage earners through employment in the private sector as a result of the project.

G. Foreign exchange earnings or savings--a significance rating of the amount of foreign exchanged earned or saved as a result of activity in the private sector generated by the project.

H. Host country policy re P/E--a significance rating of the impact of host country policy in promoting or inhibiting private sector development.

I. Involvement of host-country expertise in P/E component of the project--a significance rating of the degree to which host country personnel were involved in the project (or project component) relating to private sector development.

ANNEX 5

Implementation Constraints

## ANNEX 5

### IMPLEMENTATION CONSTRAINTS <sup>1</sup>

#### A. Overall Patterns

##### 1. Introduction

Each of the 212 evaluation reports which Devres reviewed was to be given an overall rating from -1 (indicating little significance) to -5, based on the material in the evaluation report. (In fact, no project received a -5 rating for overall implementation constraints). Each of the 212 reports was also given a rating, from -5 to +5, for each of eight principal implementation sub-topics as listed below:

- o Timing of procurement;
- o Timing in contracting team/technical assistance;
- o Contractor-AID-B/C relations;
- o AID-B/G understanding of project purpose;
- o Timing and adequacy of B/G staffing or budgeting for project;
- o AID flexibility/inflexibility in management of project;
- o Adequacy of monitoring; and
- o Quality of project design.

In addition, Devres reviewed each evaluation report with respect to several factors relating to the project schedule and length. Not all of the implementation sub-topics received attention in all of the evaluation reports. For example, the two sub-topics--"B/G staffing or budgeting" and "quality of project design"--were commented on in 85 percent of the reports. The two least frequently mentioned implementation sub-topics were "AID flexibility" and "timing of procurement", each of which were commented on in about 61 percent of the reports.

In terms of overall ratings, ten percent (21) of the reports in the total universe received ratings of -4 and 30 percent (63) received ratings of -3, for a total of 84 reports (40 percent) in which projects evaluated had highly significant implementation constraints. The sub-topics which received the highest percentage of strongly negative (less than or equal to -3) ratings were quality of design (77, i.e., 36 percent) and B/G staffing or budgeting (39, i.e., 32 percent). With one exception, no great differences were observed for the sub-topics among projects carried out in different regions. However, quality of project design for projects in Africa was given a low significance rating more frequently (in 44 percent of the evaluation reports for projects in Africa) than for projects in the other regions.

##### 2. Statistical analysis of implementation variables

The statistical analysis of relationships among the various implementation sub-topics was carried out in three stages:

- o Statements of preliminary hypotheses, based on the reviewers'

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<sup>1</sup>This Implementation Constraints Report constitutes Chapter II of the Evaluation Synthesis Report and is incorporated here for reference purposes.

impressions following an initial reading of the evaluation reports;

- o Derivation of a pairwise combination correlation matrix<sup>1</sup>, which included sub-variables for implementation and for sustainability; and
- o Tests of the strength of influence and statistical significance for a small subset of relationships which the above steps seemed to indicate might be important.

The statistical analysis of the correlation of ratings for overall implementation constraints with each of the sub-topics was made difficult by the truncated scale of the former (overall constraints), which included only negative values (-5 through -1). In order to enhance the correlation matrix analysis and subsequent regression analyses, a full-scaled (positive and negative) overall implementation constraint value was created based on a composite of the subconstraints: an unweighted linear combination of the eight sub-topic variables.

Regression analyses were carried out on the relationship between overall implementation constraints and a number of sub-topics. Of these, the quality of project design, understanding of project purpose, and contractor-AID-B/G relations were most strongly correlated, all with high statistical significance. That is, where project design or relationships, etc. were good, constraints to project implementation were not as great. This was somewhat surprising to the reviewers, who had expected to see strong correlations between overall implementation constraints and such B/G-related variables as timing and adequacy of B/G staffing or budgeting, cooperating organization's ability to respond to changing conditions, organizational/institutional capacities for continuation of project benefits, and development of management capacity.

One of the strongest findings of the statistical analysis was that two of the limiting factors which are most strongly correlated with project implementation--the AID-B/G understanding of project purpose and good contractor-AID-B/G relations--are contemporaneously affected strongly by the quality of project design. Any given level of understanding and relationship ratings was measurably and significantly improved by a good design.

The reviewers were asked to identify differences in project implementation between projects which began before FY 83 and those which began in FY 83 and later, i.e., when AID made a series of changes in its procedures designed to help improve project design and

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<sup>1</sup>The pairwise combination correlation matrix is simply the set of correlation coefficients for each pair of ratings, given both ratings have valid responses.

implementation. However, there was no significant difference between the means of each sample (i.e., of those projects beginning either before or after FY 83) or between the means of either sample and the mean of the whole population of 212 reports. Furthermore, regression analyses revealed that whether projects were begun before or after FY 83 did not significantly change the effect of either the quality of project design or AID flexibility on project implementation constraints.

## B. In-Depth Analysis

### 1. Overview of sample

Following the overall rating of the full universe of projects, a sample of 20 projects was selected for which the evaluation reports had provided some specific comments on various aspects of the implementation process<sup>2</sup>. Most ERs were selected for this sample because they were rated as significant (either positively or negatively) with respect to implementation constraints. They were further narrowed down to those which contained more detailed and/or more in-depth treatment of implementation constraints and sub-topics. A representative mix of projects from different regions and sectors was also sought. Many of the evaluation comments on implementation issues were directed at activities by specific actors--generally AID, the beneficiary/grantee (B/G), or the contractor. Two key activities which received comments generally directed at AID's role were design and monitoring. An area of frequent concern--on which evaluators were not all in agreement--related strongly to the issue of sustainability. This was the degree to which (expatriate) project implementors must or should themselves carry out the tasks at hand as opposed to supporting

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<sup>2</sup>The sample of projects for which the evaluation reports were reviewed is comprised of the following projects: Burundi: Rural Roads (No. 695-0112); Ghana: Managed Inputs and Delivery of Agricultural Service (MIDAS) (No. 6-1-0102); Sudan: Rural Health Support (No. 650-0030); Botswana: Accelerated Impact Program--Borehole Drilling (No. 698-0410-21); India: Maharashtra Social Forestry (No. 386-0478); ASEAN Agricultural Development Planning Centre (No. 498-0258-11); Thailand: Northeast Small Scale Irrigation (NESSI): A Management Review (No. 493-0312); Yemen: Taiz Water and Sewerage Construction (No. 279-0039); Haiti: Agricultural Development Support II (ADS II) (No. 521-0092); Caribbean Agricultural Extension II (No. 538-0068); Peru: Agricultural Planning and Institutional Development (No. 527-0238); Caribbean Epidemiological Surveillance and Training (No. 538-0027); Kenya: Kenya Commercial Finance Co Ltd (NP); Thailand: Siam Commercial Bank Ltd (No. 940-0002-1); Somalia: Comprehensive Groundwater Development (No. 649-0104); Liberia: Small and Medium Scale Enterprise Development and Support (No. 669-0201); Rwanda: National Fish Culture (No. 696-0112); Pakistan: Tribal Areas Development (No. 391-0471); Sahel Data Network and Management II (AGREYMET) (No. 625-0940); Nepal: Resource Conservation and Utilization (RCUP) (No. 367-0132).

the B/G, strengthening its capacity to carry out project-related activities. Evaluations of projects which aimed in significantly new directions highlighted further concerns. The following sections discuss some of the more important of these implementation issues.

## 2. Positive and negative ratings on implementation

Projects, which received positive ratings for overall implementation or for implementation sub-topics generally shared a few common characteristics:

- o Project management was strong and provided overall direction and on-going leadership, guidance, and support;
- o Roles, relationships, and responsibilities were well defined and clear commitments made very early during the life of the project, and usually at the time of project design; and
- o Project activities were tied to needs which were clearly perceived by project participants and beneficiaries.

Projects which received negative ratings on implementation often shared one or more of the following characteristics:

- o Key aspects of the local setting, including key constraints, were not well-identified or not addressed specifically during project design, and project resources were not provided to deal with specific constraints;
- o Project activities were not clearly linked and directed to specific objectives;
- o Roles, relationships, and responsibilities were not defined or were defined too broadly and clear commitments were not obtained; and
- o Technical assistance team leaders and occasionally members were so burdened by administrative and management tasks necessary for efficient implementation that they were unable to provide the overall guidance to project activities needed for effective impact.

## 3. Design issues

### a. Understanding the local setting

The most commonly encountered design issue was inadequate understanding of the local setting for the project. When local conditions were not well-reflected in all aspects of the design

of the project, implementation constraints were increased. For example, in Pakistan, difficulties in implementing the Tribal Areas Development project were greatly exacerbated by the poor understanding of the politico-social environment in a remote and highly unusual environment lacking effective government structures. In Sudan, the evaluation summary of the Rural Health Support project called for "sufficient field work at the design stage to ensure realistic strategies." Constraints--even basic physical constraints such as difficult transport--were not identified clearly and not responded to directly in the project design. A management review of Thailand's Northeast Small Scale Irrigation (NESSI) project noted problems due to a "lack of sensitivity" to socio-cultural factors in the project design and recommended that activities contain both a technological and a sociological component, including user group formation and the hiring of a full-time anthropologist fluent in the local language. The report felt that traditional local practices should not be viewed as a deterrent to development but rather as a base upon which development can occur. It also called for the preparation of all reports in the Thai language, with executive summaries in English. The designs of two water development projects provide a striking contrast to each other. The design of Somalia's Comprehensive Groundwater Development project was not tailored to local conditions. Inappropriate equipment was selected and inappropriate procurement procedures were used. Assumptions regarding the share of water needs that could be met by groundwater development were invalid. The design of Botswana's Accelerated Impact Program--Borehole Drilling project identified appropriate equipment and ensured that local skills and capacity would be in place for operation and repair. Measures were developed for appropriate selection of well sites, e.g. with respect to trek routes.

b. Institution-building

The importance of ensuring some degree of institution-building at the design stage was noted in several projects. The evaluation for the Burundi Rural Roads project noted the importance of getting the host country to understand and be willing to operationalize its role in the project before the project began. In Thailand, the PRE Bureau's Siam Commercial Bank project was well-implemented largely due to the Bank's existing strengths in management, policy, finance, and procedures. Similarly, the Somalia Groundwater project failed to define a clear future role for the host country implementing agency at the design stage, which led to poor transfer of project activities to it by the end of the project.

c. Defining relationships and responsibilities

Poorly defined relationships and responsibilities among AID, contractors, and/or host country agencies contributed significantly to implementation problems--weaknesses which, according to a number of evaluations, should have been addressed during project design. As noted above, the Somalia project did not define the B/G's role in and relationship to project activities clearly. In the Sahel,

the Data Network and Management II (AGRHYMET) project defined the technical assistance provided through a PASA with NOAA far too broadly. In the ASEAN Agricultural Development Planning Centre project, AID B/G relationships were not clearly defined. The evaluation noted that one of the reasons for this was that the design was not subjected to the usual review process.

In some cases, effective relationships were developed despite insufficient clarification at the design stage. For example, the key to some successes against considerable odds in the Peru's Agricultural Planning and Institutional Development project was the establishment of strong relationships at high levels in the Ministry of Agriculture. (However, more routine liaison at lower levels was weak.)

d. Overall integrated strategy

In various ways, evaluation reports noted the importance of project designs having an overall strategy which effectively links together and sequences project activities. For example, the evaluation summary for the Sudan Rural Health Support project notes that even following a "revalidation study" of the project, the modified design still included a list of more than 100 activities with no significant effort to prioritize and sequence these for maximum complementarity, efficiency and impact. In Ghana, the design of the Managed Inputs and Delivery of Agricultural Services (MIDAS) project emphasized technical aspects too heavily, to the detriment of related management, marketing, accounting, and linkage factors. Despite the emphasis in some evaluation reports on the importance of linking activities effectively, at least one report (for the Peru Agricultural Planning project) notes the value in multi-component projects of having components which are not dependent on one another, i.e. the failure of one component does not mean the failure or delay of the others.

4. Technical assistance

a. Team composition

Team composition was one of the issue areas most frequently commented on with respect to the success or failure of technical assistance. This sometimes reflected on project design. In the Pakistan Tribal Areas project, the design's excessive technical focus led to poor selection of the implementation team, which was made up entirely of engineers working to develop physical infrastructure. In the Liberia Small and Medium Scale Enterprises Development and Support (SMEDS) project and in Ghana's MIDAS project, marketing and related expertise (management, accounting, etc.) were not sufficiently emphasized with respect to technical expertise. On the other hand, the Sahel AGRHYMET project evaluation report observed that three prior external evaluations had failed to note critical short-comings, largely because there was insufficient technical expertise represented on the evaluation teams. In Haiti, the technical assistance team for the Agricultural Development Support II (ADS II) project was not well-

enough integrated, with the social scientist particularly isolated from the largely technical activities of the rest of the team. The success of the project's farming systems research approach depended on such integration of the team's members.

b. Leadership and direction

In the Caribbean Agricultural Extension, Phase II (CAEP) project, the most prominent aspect of the project's positive impact was the increased ministry attention to the extension division and administrative organization. The CAEP "forced ministries of agriculture to say what extension should do, to the point of getting plans and job descriptions--which has never been done before...and to use the defined situation to effect changes." Some of the problems faced by the Haiti ADS project were due to insufficient overall direction from the Team Leader. The evaluators recommended that such a project requires a full-time administrator to free the Team Leader to provide overall guidance. Quantitative research carried out under the project, in particular, suffered from a lack of overall analytical guidance. Project activities were expanded to too many different agro-ecological zones before the research methodology was sufficiently well-developed. In the Sahel AGRHYMET project, the NOAA technical representative's effectiveness was hampered by the assignment of too many tasks outside his basic job description. The Peru Agricultural Planning project's "audacious" effort to create a demand for policy-oriented market analyses required strong leadership on the part of the technical assistance team as well as good relationships at high levels within the agricultural ministry. The first Chief of Party was removed because he could not provide the management leadership to form an effective advisory team. This was felt to be especially important because the team's members had neither worked together before nor come from the contractor's lead university campuses.

c. Cross-cultural sensitivity

Lack of sensitivity to the local socio-cultural environment was strongly noted in the Thailand NESSI management review and were judged largely due to poor specifications for team selection, which should have included an ability to work in the language and cultural realities of Thailand. Other reports did not highlight cross-cultural sensitivity as a specific factor in technical assistance performance, but the emphasis in many reports on the importance of local understanding to project design implies that this is an important factor, but one for which fewer problems were noted.

d. Timing

Delays in fielding or replacing technical assistance personnel were noted in many of the sample of evaluation reports, for example, in the Sudan Rural Health Support and Peru Agricultural Planning projects. In the latter project, timing of advisors under one of the contracts generally reflected availability more than a plan.

The departures of three of the long-term advisors were to come at a critical point--after procedures had been agreed upon, but before they had been implemented and staff trained in their use. Delays in recruitment and acceptance under another contract left both the contractor and the host country institution dissatisfied and the contract behind schedule. Twenty percent of the evaluation reports in the overall universe reviewed were rated as significantly problematic (-5 to -3) with respect to timing of technical assistance.

5. Beneficiary/Grantee support

a. Motivation and incentives

The sample of evaluation reports reviewed noted the importance of tying project activity to clearly perceived needs and associated benefits to help ensure that effective B/G support was provided. This should begin at the design phase of the project and involve the clear definition of relationships and responsibilities. The Caribbean Epidemiological Surveillance and Training project demonstrated that, even in a multi-country project, member countries will support a regional organization which they perceive to be meeting a real need.

Many of the evaluation reports commented on the need to provide "incentives" to host country individuals who were involved in a given project. For example, low salary levels for personnel in the ASEAN Planning Centre project made it difficult to attract the level of talent required for the project. Similarly, the Peru Agricultural Planning project noted the "brain drain" problem and the post-design elimination of a Peruvian foundation which had previously been used as a mechanism to provide adequate salaries to senior persons in the public sector and the universities. However, in the Somalia Groundwater Development project, "topping off" of salaries for the small portion (ten percent) of the B/G lead agency personnel involved in the project added to already existing intra-agency jealousies and helped increase the project's isolation from the rest of the agency's program.

In addition to salary, prestige coming from association with a high-profile project was also a motivating factor for individuals, for example, in India's Maharashtra Social Forestry project where local staff were strongly supported by their department. In that project, too, capable leadership helped support high morale. In Thailand, the Siam Bank project noted a number of "interesting intangible elements", including "the 'glamour' of the AID connection..., the challenge of doing something unfamiliar and the knowledge that top management is watching."

b. Effective working relationships

Effective, well-established relationships with B/G institutions and personnel affected project implementation positively in many projects. As discussed above, defining relationships and responsibilities well contributed greatly to positive relationships between and among agencies participating in projects. Inter- and intra-agency tensions in the Somalia Groundwater project contributed to the Somali Water Development Agency's poor support for key project activities. The difficulty of coordinating and integrating the activities of a large number of agencies had a negative effect on the implementation of Nepal's Resource Conservation and Utilization project. Similarly, the many donors involved in Yemen's Taiz Water and Sewerage Construction project helped make implementation difficult and very complex.

The evaluation reports noted several instances where AID flexibility was a key factor in AID-B/G relationships. In the Botswana Borehole project, AID flexibility, supplier cooperation, appropriate equipment, and host country support and capability all worked together to improve implementation. On the other hand, NOAA's inflexibility in its technical assistance role under a PASA with AID in the Sahel AGRHYMET project seriously affected implementation. NOAA would provide no US inputs "until all host country inputs were delivered", guaranteeing that all delays were on "the critical path".

In the Rwanda National Fish Culture project, a poor B/G Project Director impeded project implementation to such an extent that the technical assistance took over de facto project administration and provided guidance and support to the counterparts at the field level.

#### 6. Monitoring and evaluation

The problems in monitoring the Sahel AGRHYMET project noted earlier (where three external evaluations failed to identify key contractor short-comings) are illustrative of a number of weaknesses encountered in the monitoring of AID projects. The project had no effective problem identification capacity. There was no external evaluation prior to the design of a follow-on phase. AID provided minimal management input and that from an over-burdened and/or inexperienced staff. This, combined with poor record-keeping, resulted in no AID institutional memory over the course of the project. In the Pakistan Tribal Areas project, serious implementation constraints were left unaddressed partly because no systematic evaluation had been carried since project start-up in 1982 until the 1986 interim evaluation. The evaluation report noted the need for flexible implementation on AID's part, coupled with systematic evaluation. In the Nepal RCUP, monitoring and evaluation systems focused only on the use of monitoring as an implementation tool and not on evaluation as a tool to measure impacts.

#### 7. The role of AID: implementing projects or building capacity

The evaluation reports reviewed did not all agree on the degree to which (expatriate) project implementors must themselves carry out project activities in contrast to their role in strengthening B/G capacity to carry out those activities.

Many of the comments and recommendations in the evaluation reports deal with questions of who should have control, of budget, of technical assistance, and of inputs (e.g., procurement). The evaluation report for the Haiti ADS II project argued that a project needs independent control of its budget, as project goals may not coincide with host country goals. In the Sahel AGRHYMET project, evaluators noted that contractor technicians were spread far too thin to effectively control a "myriad of management and technical duties". In the Somalia Groundwater project, the evaluators faulted contractor logistics personnel for "simply getting the equipment and supplies" rather than "improving [emphasis in original]" the B/G agency's logistics systems.

Some reports note projects which had strong implementation because a strong institution was selected to carry out the project. For example, the Siam Bank project evaluation report recommended that such institutions--with strong elements of management, policy, finance, flexibility, procedures, etc.--be sought out to implement private enterprise projects. (The report further noted that the project design was very good, flawed only regarding technical assistance, which the bank was unable to figure out how to use!) AID's efforts in private enterprise development in the Kenya Commercial Finance project on the other hand, suffered from AID understaffing. In other cases, reports recommended that AID give additional support not generally provided under its normal operating guidelines. For example, in the Burundi Rural Roads project, the report recommended that heavy equipment for road-building be financed under the contract. In the Botswana Borehole project, however, AID and the B/G worked together on successful implementation through a project tailored very well to local resources and capabilities. In that case, AID's flexibility helped facilitate rapid procurement of appropriate equipment during a drought emergency.

#### C. Lessons Learned

- o Inadequate understanding of and responsiveness to local conditions--including institutions, infrastructure, and physical, social, and political factors, among others--contributes to faulty design and to increased problems in project implementation;
- o Management capability is critical to good project implementation. Effective management can be provided by B/G institutions if appropriately supported by technical assistance and USAID. Where needed support has not been well identified during design, project implementors have themselves often needed to carry out key project activities,

as opposed to supporting the B/G and strengthening its capacity to carry out such activities;

- o Effective coordination among the various project actors-- including B/G agencies, AID and other donors, and technical assistance contractors--enhances project implementation. Effective coordination is enhanced where roles, relationships, and responsibilities are well-defined and clear commitments made at the time of project design;
- o Good implementation is enhanced when key relationships among project activities are clearly defined and well-understood by project participants. Project design should ensure that each activity is clearly directed towards an objective and that means are in place to ensure that the project actors responsible for that activity are committed to the objective;
- o Overall project progress towards objectives is enhanced when those in leadership positions, e.g., technical assistance team leaders, are able to devote most of their energies to providing overall direction and guidance. In complex projects, this requires fuller administrative support than is often provided; and
- o Counterpart staff are frequently not in place, not in place, not recruitable, inadequately trained or are lost for lack of adequate incentives. As a result, progress in implementation is inhibited and technical assistance cannot be effectively delivered.

ANNEX 6

Sustainability/Institutional Interrelationship

Analysis of the Treatment of Sustainability  
and its Interrelationship with Institutional Factors  
in the Evaluation Reports of the  
Intensively Studied Sample

Overall Sustainability Ratings -3 to -5

Project			Sustainability Directly Addressed			Sustainability/Institutional Factors Interrelated		
Number	Name	Country	Yes	No	Context in which addressed	Interrelated		Characterization of Interrelationship
						Yes	No	
Multiple	New Lands Settlement	Bolivia	x		Institutions absent. Commercialization of small farmers ignored. Infrastructure and off-farm employment/services not developed. Cultural context misjudged.	x		No institutions with responsibility for continuing development created or operational in region settled hence farmers remained at subsistence level and vulnerable to expansion of large scale ranching into settlement area turning farmers into wage laborers.
511-0581	Water Supply and Small-Scale Irrigation	Bolivia		x	Local communities not organized/trained adequately to operate and maintain water systems. PVO competent re: water system technology but weak re: irrigation and economics. ER did not address these on basis of sustainability.	x		Local institutions of COB bypassed and communities not trained or organized to operate systems. Because small communities were selected to meet target defined by no. of communities (not no. of people served) and household taps were only option, systems served limited no. of people and were expensive to build, operate and maintain.
698-0421	Combatting Childhood Communicable Disease	Liberia	x		Crises of national political stability and economic, financial and fiscal deterioration rendered GOI incapable of managing and providing needed resources. Project design also inappropriate.	x		Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, an established body gave high priority to immunization and delivery of primary health care but lacked resources, personnel and management capacity to deliver even with help and no apparent progress being made to develop same. Excess reliance on expatriates.
650-0030	Rural Health Support	Sudan		x	Inadequate availability of trained personnel and funds plus policy environment inimical to development of primary health care. In Southern regions security breakdown caused termination.	x		Institution has inadequate financial and human resources capacity and is over-dependent on external support. Despite stated desire of GOI to make PHC the basis of its health program its policies are not supportive or consistent with PHC concepts.
660-0094	Family Planning Services	Zaire		x	No direct address to sustainability but inappropriate and conflicting institutional roles described, management weak and design based on faulty premise that demand for FP services was strong.	x		Institutions assigned inappropriate and conflicting roles. Managements of institutions weak and have not been capable of flexible response in part because coordinating mechanism for inter-institutional relationship function has foundered.

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Overall Sustainability Ratings -3 to -5

Project			Sustainability Directly Addressed			Sustainability/Institutional Factors Interrelated		
Number	Name	Country	Yes	No	Context in which addressed	Interrelated		Characterization of Interrelationship
						Yes	No	
272-0101	Fisheries Development	Oman		x	ER reports that emphasis has been on TA in technical areas to the serious and almost fatal neglect of institutional development. Local funding and HR availability inadequate. Project overambitious.		x	Sustainability is weak due to excessive dependence on expatriates and lack of focus in project design and follow-through for institutional development.
698-0410.03	Primary Health Care	Congo	x		Sustainability commented on directly only in the sense that fees charged help defray cost but as a pilot project in one district not in harmony with national health delivery policy and not likely to be viable. Project terminated.		x	Project undertaken on pilot basis in one district with overambitious quantified goals without baseline to measure from. Limited evidence suggests some progress made in reducing incidence of disease but because institutional structure for health delivery was not developed impact will be short-lived.
676-0015	Rural Development I	Central African Republic		x	Project sought to increase output and incomes of small farmers engaged in fish, beekeeping and rice culture through farmer/community associations and cooperatives.		x	Cooperation among and within local organizations was weak. Issues were not well understood at design stage. Management in local groups was weak. Technology in some cases was ill-adapted and not understood. Some gains were made but progress limited.
683-0242	Integrated Livestock Production	Niger		x	Project sought to improve livestock production through development of herder associations, training, marketing and natural resource management but was overwhelmed by relationship problems and drought.		x	The effort to develop herder associations was the key element of the project strategy but policies, relationships and local cultural factors critical to the development were ill-understood and not well-defined. Management of host country institution and TA team was weak and too much responsibility placed on expatriates.
538-0102	Caribbean Marketing Assistance	Multiple (Eastern Caribbean)	x		An AID/Peace Corps/Partners of the Americas effort to develop linkage of local private business groups to forge export marketing contacts and arrangements but no clear strategy or EDPS formulated in design.			Except in the case of the more developed environment of Barbados, little or no progress made due to weak management and organizational base in local business groups and absence of clear strategy. TA also not well suited to development of an export marketing program. Local production base also weak.

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Project			Sustainability Directly Addressed		Sustainability/Institutional Factors Interrelated			
Number	Name	Country	Yes	No	Context in which addressed	Interrelated		Characterization of Interrelationship
						Yes	No	
522-0174	Development Administration	Honduras	x		Project sought to train staff and develop improved management and administrative systems for tax and fiscal operations in Ministry of Finance but was overwhelmed by weak management and external factors.	x		Weak management, frequent leadership changes and low morale of staff undermined institutional development though many people benefited and some limited improvement in administrative operations made but no likelihood that increased fiscal resource mobilization would result. Project set overambitious goals.
263-K-605.5	Neighborhood Urban Services	Egypt	x		Project is making many significant gains/improvements in the process of supporting local urban small scale development activities with local PVO and district participation. Still problems abound, notably poor quality of infrastructure construction due to poor design and weak supervision of contractors.	x		Local government management, administration and technical capacity is weak and inexperienced in even moderately complex construction design, contracting, supervision and maintenance. The "ticking bomb" is high cost of maintenance and the slow development of local government and PVO management/technical competence.
511-0482	Rural Education II	Bolivia		x	Project seeks rural education improvement primarily through teacher training but little attention in design/implementation to other aspects of improvement needed.	x		The project design was weak and policy and leadership have been unstable. Hence despite some significant upgrading of teachers poor linkage to other aspects of the institutional setting leads to high turnover and little behavioral change in education process/poor sustainability.
669-0201	Small and Medium Enterprise Development and Support	Liberia	x		The project undertaken by a US PVO focused on technical and management training of entrepreneurs to the exclusion of development of marketing skills and made no provision for host institution to carry on.	x		Lack of a host country institutional entity to carry SME development into future virtually assures no sustainability.
527-0156	Improved Water and Land Use in the Sierra	Peru	x		Extreme fiscal constraints forced budget austerity throughout LOP. Independence of project authority was fictional. Personnel scarce and untrained. Sierra environment very difficult for achieving high intensity irrigation/production.	x		Despite some significant production progress prospects for sustainability could only be judged poor unless significant institutional reforms made with better linkages/relationships, greater continuity of funding/staffing, better technology and better organization and effectiveness of water users associations.

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Project			Sustainability Directly Addressed			Sustainability/Institutional Factors Interrelated		
Number	Name	Country	Yes	No	Context in which addressed	Interrelated		Characterization of Interrelationship
						Yes	No	
278-0245	Health Education	Jordan		x	Up to time of evaluation project operated in a context where OOH/Ministry of Health was not prepared to accord Health Education a major role in health delivery. Only major efforts at high level give some promise of sustainability.		x	Policy regarding the role of health education was predominant over institutional factors but until resolved the institution was left weak, under-funded and with too little manpower. After the evaluation a better environment was expected and better prospects for sustainability if OOH support realized as promised.
650-0031	Southern Regional Infrastructure	Sudan	x		Low volume roads were examined for upgrading and designs prepared without conduct of pre-feasibility studies. Project terminated when inability to justify or cover costs of maintenance became apparent.		x	Main problem was failure to follow a rational process in moving from identification to project design. Design phase undertaken with inadequate prior analysis so project was abandoned prior to construction phase.
263-0016	Applied Science and Technology—S&T Information Component	Egypt	x		The development of a central governance body to direct and mobilize resources for the S&T information system was a key issue still unresolved and hence sustainability left in question.		x	The key institutional component left out of the system was a "governance" center to make strategic decisions for the system, mobilize resources, ensure access to data, etc.
386-0465	Technologies for the Rural Poor	India		x	There was major confusion over project purpose between exploring scientifically interesting alternative energy sources and development/dissemination of technologies feasible for application in remote sites.		x	Design and implementation weaknesses were more critical than institutional factors though if management and policy focus within the host institutions had been clearer, the results would have been more practical and institutional capacity development a more central focus.
633-0209	Renewable Energy Technology	Botswana		x	Evaluation was intended to examine "plans for activities beyond PACT" but took a very narrow view of this issue, perhaps because sustainability appeared to be a very remote possibility.		x	Policy, technology and design factors appear to have been much more critical than institutional factors per se in determining sustainability in this instance.

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Overall Sustainability Ratings -3 to -5

Project			Sustainability Directly Addressed			Sustainability/Institutional Factors Interrelated		
Number	Name	Country	Yes	No	Context in which addressed	Interrelated		Characterization of Interrelationship
						Yes	No	
517-0143	Energy Policy Development	Dominican Republic	x		When this project ended the effort to create a policy analysis center had virtually collapsed and work in that direction only gained momentum under a separate follow-on activity.	x		Institutional factors were a key element in the poor performance of the project. Leadership breakdown, lack of management focus and funding shortage played a major role but were strongly re-enforced by poor design, selection of inappropriate computer hardware and software and changing external priorities.
263-0112	Private Sector Feasibility Studies	Egypt		x	Primary purpose was to provide incentives for encouragement of foreign investment during LOP, not to create a continuing system to subsidize studies as a long-term program for encouraging foreign investment.	x		Institutional factors and relationships among the GOE local and overseas entities involved were weak but concept of targeting (vs early "shotgun") approach to promotion and incomplete development of administrative procedures were key problems in pre-evaluation period.
391-0472	Malaria Control	Pakistan		x	Many technical, staffing and funding problems identified and despite some successes, it is apparent that without significant improvements, project is likely to falter.	x		Funding, staffing and management difficulties are key problem areas leading to a variety of technical problems which must be corrected for program to become more effective and have better potential for long-term viability.
367-0144	Strengthening Institutional Capacity in Food and Agriculture Sector	Nepal	x		IMC/Nepal has failed to show any commitment or will to use trained personnel for policy formulation in which project seeks to strengthen institutions. Little hope for viability unless IMC makes major changes.	x		Institutional linkages and management arrangements plus funding available are all inadequate so institutional factors are interrelated but lack of commitment to facing up to and solving policy issues is the major problem area in order to achieve viability/sustainability.

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Overall Sustainability Ratings -3 to -5

Number	Project Name	Country	Sustainability Directly Addressed		Context in which addressed	Sustainability/Institutional Factors Interrelated		Characterization of Interrelationship
			Yes	No		Yes	No	
633-0238	Caborone West Housing and Facilities	Botswana		x	Self-help Housing Authority was not effectively managed or supervised by Town Council and hence ill-served the poor residents of the squatter community it was intended to help.		x	SHHA's poor management lead to misallocation of resources, and failure to adhere to squatter-assistance criteria adopted; also had conflicting regulatory and TA functions. Result is low employee morale and loss of confidence among clientele resulting in poor performance/sustainability.
383-0043	Malaria Control	Sri Lanka		x	Effective control is in doubt due to overuse of chloroquine and excessive reliance on house spraying as opposed to integrated approach. Management weaknesses are a key issue in effectiveness of operation.		x	While technical problems were of serious proportions, the major reason for the poor sustainability prospects is the ineffective management resulting in misuse of technology, high cost, householder resistance, rising incidence of malaria and failure to detect and attack at focus of outbreaks.
492-0375	Rural Energy Development	Philippines		x	Program to develop renewable energy sources was undertaken without adequate planning and attempts to proceed have revealed serious gaps of knowledge as well as policy void and institutional weaknesses.		x	Management and human resource problems have seriously hampered all three elements of the project for alternate energy development and raise doubts about sustainability re-enforced by policy and project design problems and economic and political crisis environment in the country.
492-0001	Primary Health Care Financing	Philippines		x	Innovative effort to create financing for expansion of rural PHC sought to use IEC and local organizations in conjunction with research and policy improvement to deliver services via village para-medical personnel.		x	Complex inter-institutional relationships among a maze of different actors were ill-defined and local organizational complexities were not well understood. Staffing and management were also inadequate. ER expresses hope project can be put right with major changes but crisis in country a problem.
621-0156	Farming Systems Research and Related Activities	Tanzania		x	Project set out in farmers' fields principle to develop FSR and related capacities but in fact did not move research out of farmers' fields and took inadequate account of farmers total program. Institutional home was weak.		x	The institution within which project sought to develop FSR systems was weak in management, organizational structure and linkages and strapped for financial resources. Poor project design and inadequate actor program provide little hope that FSR will be sustainable.

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Project			Sustainability Directly Addressed		Sustainability/Institutional Factors Interrelated			
Number	Name	Country	Yes	No	Context in which addressed	Interrelated		Characterization of Interrelationship
						Yes	No	
608-0151	Health Management Improvement	Morocco		x	Project sought to develop a cadre and a system for health management. While the policy environment was favorable the absence of staff to receive TA and of funds to operate thwarted progress.	x		The implementing institution was understaffed and underfunded and suffered from weak leadership up to time of evaluation (five year of a six year project) so sustainability prospects remain very poor despite prospective efforts in final stages of IOP.
Multiple	Water/Waste-water Assessment	Egypt	x		This evaluation was undertaken to assess the operational capacity of GOE agencies responsible to water/wastewater activities under several AID projects and assess their sustainability.	x		Weak management systems in all the institutions responsible for design and construction and O&M of water/wastewater facilities results in poor performance due to lack of forcefulness, institutional autonomy, poor training of staff and poor construction management systems
679-0001	Small Holders Agricultural Development (SMAG) I	Congo	x		Project intended to overcome storage and marketing constraints to small farmer commercial production. Administered by CARE/Congo under USAID/Zaire management. No local institution was effectively responsible for action.	x		Relationship of USAID/Z, CARE/Congo Embassy/Congo and GPRC were awkward at best. No agency of GPRC had clear responsibility for project actions. Physical facilities were put in place but lack of clear responsibility and weak management/manpower training leaves sustainability dangling unless exceptional progress made in one year extension.
391-0471	Tribal Areas Development	Pakistan		x	TAD Project was undertaken without due recognition of the special socio-political environment of the region and without the activity having an "institutional home" in the GOP or the NWFP Province. AID procedures were too inflexible and TA team consisted of engineers only with no prior experience in the area hence little cultural knowledge.	x		The unique environment of the Tribal Areas reflects the centuries old resistance to outside influences in this remote and almost inaccessible area where GOP law does not effectively prevail. No institutional base in the GOP/NWFP was identified and no suitable mechanism developed to work effectively with the "tribals" as intended beneficiaries who actively resisted AID's interventions.
Cases where sustainability was directly addressed			14					
Cases where sustainability was <u>not</u> directly addressed			19					
Total negative ratings in sample			33					

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Overall Sustainability Ratings +3 to +5

Project			Sustainability Directly Addressed			Sustainability/Institutional Factors Interrelated		
Number	Name	Country	Yes	No	Context in which addressed	Interrelated		
						Yes	No	Characterization of Interrelationship
633-0222	Primary Education Improvement	Botswana	x		This project is well along its life yet the program of educational reform and upgrading is at an early stage because so much is needed to make primary education more relevant to development.	x		Progress being made is the result of strong high level commitment to reform and major efforts on part of all elements of project leadership and participants but ultimate achievement is dependent on continuing national leadership support.
263-0061	Development Planning Studies	Egypt	x		Project seeks to develop a development analysis and planning capability in the University of Cairo to serve the COE and parastatal bodies.	x		In the evaluator's judgment the institution is a good prospect for sustainability because of good leadership and technical capacity though it still needs support and to achieve greater success in formulating and implementing a plan to market its services to client agencies.
698-0388 .13	Rural Women's Extension	Kenya		x	Project seeks to support and strengthen small community-based groups of rural women to develop income- and employment-generating activities.	x		Women's groups have shown good initiative and cohesiveness for continuing and extending their income/employment generating activities and likely able to carry on even after AID/PCV support terminates.
940-0002 .01	Siam Commercial Bank	Thailand		x	Project was a pilot effort to demonstrate the feasibility of using a commercial bank to provide term lending in support of SME development especially for rural agribusiness.	x		The existence of a strong, well-managed private banking institution was a key factor. It did not, however, make use of a small grant for institutional development. It worked in a good policy environment. Sustainability probability appears high.
698-0410 .21	AIP-Borehole Drilling	Botswana		x	This small Accelerated Impact project was undertaken in the face of a drought emergency where the GOB needed to provide water to communities short of water and it had inadequate drilling capacity.	x		An efficiently run host country entity received the equipment, put it to effective use, maintained it well and demonstrated its efficiency in all aspects of management and technical capacity. This was the essential factor in success.

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Overall Sustainability Ratings: +3 to +5

Number	Project Name	Country	Sustainability Directly Addressed		Context in which addressed	Sustainability/Institutional Factors Interrelated		Characterization of Interrelationship
			Yes	No		Yes	No	
608-0159	Renewable Energy Development	Morocco		x	Project was designed to develop a renewable energy research and development institution. The institution has been put in place, has good management but may be too technically research oriented without adequate economic analysis capacity.	x		The local institution has reached a viable state though problems still need to be overcome in staff training and fully defining its ultimate mission beyond technical and physical research with more emphasis on socio-economic analysis.
538-0027	Caribbean Epidemiological Surveillance and Training	Multiple (Eastern Caribbean)	x		CEST was created to provide technical/ managerial help to member country ministries of health to improve the health status of the societies and overcome their isolation.	x		An exceptionally, soundly organized and managed regional organization has very successfully discharged its responsibilities and received strong member country support. It has achieved exceptional ability to assist and strengthen member institutions.
538-0068	Caribbean Agricultural Extension II	Multiple (Eastern Caribbean)		x	Project works in seven Eastern Caribbean countries to seek development of national extension systems where budgets remain strained and human resources are scarce.	x		Despite some continuing weaknesses in leadership, management, funding and manpower resources progress being made in this second phase gives promise of eventual good viability.
Multiple	AID role in Indonesian Family Planning	Indonesia	x		ER reviews AID efforts in two projects over a decade to strengthen and support the institutional capacity and operations of the FP program in a favorable policy climate where local commitment was strong.	x		Indonesian family planning efforts have been carried out by an innovative institution with strong commitment and policy support to meet the FP objectives. Substantial success attained but more difficult issues lie ahead as remote island and urban areas addressed where old strategies not applicable.
611-0201	Agricultural Development Research and Extension	Zambia		x	Zambia was in a new phase where policy was giving emphasis to agricultural development for the first time and project sought to strengthen the institutions for Extension and Research after long period of weakness.	x		Despite limited financial resources and some human resource constraints good progress is reported within a supportive policy framework to develop and integrate R & E so that sustainability is indicated (indirectly) to be a reasonably strong probability.

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Overall Sustainability Ratings +3 to +5

Project			Sustainability Directly Addressed			Sustainability/Institutional Factors Interrelated		
Number	Name	Country	Yes	No	Context in which addressed	Interrelated		Characterization of Interrelationship
						Yes	No	
633-0072	Bot-Zam Road Paving	Botswana	x		Road paving support by AID was limited to provision of engineering design, contracting and construction supervision while FFC paid for paving construction costs.	x		OGB had developed good management and technical competence for road maintenance and gave strong financial support to ensuring its O & M cost would be covered due to its regional strategic importance.
608-0155	Population/Family Planning Support II	Morocco		x	Project proceeded quietly to develop capacity to respond to a public demand for FP services despite the lack of definitive anti-natalist policy on part of G.M.	x		Strong, well-managed agency provided the capacity to deliver effective FP services with AID support to overcome human resource constraints. Leadership and management superior and financial resources adequate.
263-0079	Small Farmer Production	Egypt	x		This had evaluation for credit/inputs/extension program carried out by the Ag. Credit Bank on a pilot basis which met with success and system judged replicable.	x		Strong institutional capacity combined with a viable project design and strategy combined to produce an exceptionally favorable result in terms of output expansion, ERR and credit repayment record.
383-0057	Water Management I	Sri Lanka		x	Project sought to rehabilitate and organize a badly deteriorated irrigation system develop O & M systems including Water Users/Farmers Associations and raise production intensity and farmer incomes.	x		Leadership of the Project Manager (HC) was a critical factor along with development of WUA's through "Institutional Organizers". ERR was unexpectedly high but O & M system remained weak element due to farmers unwillingness to collaborate on channel maintenance. Report concluded IO's were withdrawn before WUA's fully consolidated.
940-0002	Women's World Banking	Multiple		x	Project seeks to foster women-owned SSE through credit and TA to women entrepreneurs. Some institutional problems of staffing, budgeting and inadequate resources but project has good leadership.	x		Leadership and management at central level has provided the critical ingredient to mobilize resources and stimulate local action despite some management, staffing and budgeting constraints at local level.

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Overall Sustainability Ratings +3 to +5

Project			Sustainability Directly Addressed		Sustainability/Institutional Factors Interrelated		
Number	Name	Country	Yes	No	Context in which addressed	Interrelated	
						Yes	No
538-0029	Caribbean Primary Curriculum Development	Multiple (Eastern Caribbean)		x	USAID worked with the University of the West Indies (UWI) to achieve major curriculum reforms in the primary schools of the Eastern Caribbean. Strong support from member countries was provided.	x	UWI worked effectively with the Ministries of Education in member countries enjoying success as a result of good management and effective technical inputs plus close inter-institutional working relations.
683-0208	Rural Health Improvement Program	Niger		x	The program was undertaken within the context of a strong effort to improve well-being of rural people on all fronts. Much progress achieved despite severe drought and economic crisis. Project design was over-optimistic.	x	MDH had a positive program with as much self-financing as circumstances permit. Training, equipment maintenance and facilities construction good but supervision of front line health workers and funds transfer systems are deficient. Coverage of rural population rose. ER not explicit about sustainability but reviewer believed prospects are very good based on institutional performance.
Cases where sustainability directly addressed			6				
Cases where sustainability was not directly addressed				11			
Total positive ratings in sample			17				
Positive and negative cases where sustainability was directly addressed			20				
Positive and negative cases where sustainability was not directly addressed				30			
Grand total cases in sample			50				

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