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Afghanistan
Some New Approaches

George Grassmuck
and
Ludwig W. Adamec
with
Frances H. Irwin
Editors

Center for Near Eastern and North African Studies
The University of Michigan Ann Arbor 48104



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Dedicated to Allan F. Smith

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PREFACE

By design this book's reach exceeds its grasp. It notes many issues, yet supplies few answers; it suggests research methods which could be followed but does not follow them itself throughout. Such sins of omission and commission are characteristic of volumes whose principal purpose is to raise reasoned questions and to give public notice of scholarly efforts that might well be undertaken on new methodological or geographical frontiers.

A precedent for this product is the work done by L. P. Elwell-Sutton, in 1952, on behalf of the American Council of Learned Societies. His Guide to Iranian Area Study posed hypotheses and outlined suggestions for studying Iran similar to those which the present effort offers about Afghanistan.

While our objective is similar, our approach differs somewhat: the book is not a descriptive guide so much as it is a collection of new research methods and tools resulting from group effort and from the varied experiences of members in the country. The changes in area studies and the social sciences in the fifteen years since Elwell-Sutton published his work have some impact too, of course, as does the obvious fact that Afghanistan is not Iran.

The success of the project depended largely on the participants in the special study seminar on Afghanistan held at The University of Michigan in

the summer of 1967. Graduate students with some experience in Afghanistan met then with Ludwig W. Adamec, Assistant Professor of Near Eastern Languages and History at the University of Arizona. The membership included Patrick J. Reardon, political science, University of Wisconsin; Deborah Salter Schastok, art history, University of Michigan; Dunning Wilson, Islamic Studies, University of California, Los Angeles; and Greta and Mark Slobin, Slavic languages and literatures and ethnomusicology respectively, University of Michigan.

For a few days each, Leon B. Poullada, a former foreign service officer now a fellow in international politics at Princeton University, and Abdul Kayeum, a former leader in the Afghan government, gave members of the project valuable insights.

Three area centers at The University of Michigan provided assistance. The Center for Near Eastern and North African Studies under its director, Professor William D. Schorger, served as host and sponsor of the seminar. Director of the Center for Russian and East European Studies, Professor Morris Bornstein, advised on obtaining and using Russian materials. The Center for South and Southeast Asian Studies supplied materials and offered suggestions.

Others at the University gave their help. Mary Lou Walch assisted in the early planning. Mary Rudy Plew translated French material for the chronology. Many of the citations in the specialized bibliographies of recent publications in Persian and English, French, and German come from the bibliography of recent material on Persian-speaking areas compiled by Kenneth A. Luther, Associate Professor of Persian Studies, with the assistance of Jerome Clinton, Donald Croll, and Edward Davis.

Essential too was the cooperation of David Partington, Near East bibliographer at the University of Michigan Library. Ibrahim Pourhadi of the Library of Congress and Labib Zuwiyya-Yamak, former Near East librarian at Harvard, also surveyed their resources on Afghanistan.

The project benefited from the help of the Royal Afghan Embassy in Washington, D.C., especially in procuring Afghan materials. Robert G. Neumann, United States Ambassador to Afghanistan, gave the group his encouragement and assistance. In the U.S. Department of State, James W. Spain, Walter G. Ramsay, and Frank E. Schmelzer made suggestions. Ray Pagan, C. Herbert Rees, and A. M. Withers of the United States Agency for International Development were particularly helpful. Joan Wilber helped compile the specialized bibliographies as did Abigail Elegant. Robert Wolfe, specialist in German records at the National Archives and Records Service, went over the information on material there.

Among others consulted on the project were Louis Dupree and Robert L. Steiner.

The many Afghans who have encouraged and aided the participants in their study of Afghanistan deserve much of the credit for this volume. The Ford Foundation provided financial support through its International Training and Research grants. Of course, responsibility for the content of each paper is assumed by the writer of that selection, and general responsibility for the remainder of the volume lies with the editors.

Mrs. Cathaleen Dunn typed the manuscript. Susan Mott Chilman designed the cover, which was inspired by the decoration on the Gawhar Shad mausoleum in Herat.

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INTRODUCTION

Organized area studies are late in coming to Afghanistan. That is what now brings about these pages and the project which produced them. The justification for the effort lies in the conviction that now is a good time for ordering the scattered varieties of new knowledge about this old land and long independent state, so that there can be broader and better comprehension, and so that the stock of knowledge about it will better serve those both inside and outside Afghanistan who must arrive at operative decisions or "non-decisions." This is asking much, of course, but the book and the effort behind it may point out the path along which the next steps can be taken.

Until well into the middle of the twentieth century the study of Afghanistan was heavily historical. Writings stemmed in great measure from diplomatic relationships and records, and scholars focused upon Afghanistan's engagements with major powers. Most of the chronicles were kept by Europeans, and from them Afghanistan hardly emerges as a united, sovereign state. As for the view from Afghanistan, few of the country's citizens wrote methodically and those who did often relied to a great extent on materials from the West rather than Afghan sources. The number of publications in Dari (Afghan Persian) listed in our bibliography section shows that such work is still infrequent. In the chronicles then,

Afghanistan appeared as the West saw it, from distant vantage.

Since World War II, however, Afghanistan's relationships with other countries have been more than political, military, and occasionally commercial. Today the relationships are complex and competitive. They interlock economic and social development with political arrangement, and they involve many more states. Each year such events are recorded more frequently and in greater detail as more people comprehend occurrences and how to write of them. More kinds of activities lend themselves to written and not just oral records, and greater varieties of events transpire that historians and social scientists note.

In the fifties and sixties outsiders have become more involved. Some twenty foreign countries, from Asia, East Europe, West Europe and the Western Hemisphere, as well as a number of international agencies assist Afghanistan in various ways. Foreigners crowd the streets and taxis of Kabul. Many of them are participants in large development projects, whose progress is faithfully recorded in detail, perhaps as proper justification for the incursions. Like others, Americans have learned in many cases to like and understand something of the country, and their lasting interest is pursued through language and other studies. Out of these efforts come new dialogues and interpretations followed by newer doubts and inquiries which bring about major changes in scholarly interest, concern, and product.

The recording of events we mentioned and the seeking for additional data to support development activity have combined to broaden educational programs and have served to stimulate new state activities and new social and economic efforts. There is a multiplier effect that may

be said to work effectively in Afghanistan, and to prompt a variety of activities and concepts which emerge from her past. The fundamental questions then become, how much change has occurred, what have been the rates of change, and what are the implications of the transitions. For the citizen of Afghanistan and for the foreigner these are matters of significance that call for refined treatment. But such handling is not yet found among our area study groups, development specialists, or quantitative social analysts. Afghanistan still belongs primarily to the chroniclers and the historians, and they have not actually come to grips with the sudden surge of events and records following World War II. Yet they have helped to make us aware of the peculiar handicaps that confront those who would understand the country.

It may be that the nature of regional studies in the United States aggravates the situation. In this respect we need only recall that Afghanistan falls between three areas of influence and culture, and therefore of study. American research on the Soviet Union and on Central Asia skirts Afghanistan on its northern side. From the other direction, American scholarly activity on South Asia covers India and Pakistan but has little energy left for the climb to Kabul. And American students of Islam and the Near and Middle East often extend themselves from Casablanca to Tehran, but lose interest at Iran's eastern border as do the Iranians for that matter. Consequently, Afghanistan is listed but seldom considered as a Near Eastern country despite its affiliations with Persian culture and its devotion to Islam, and the country is usually ignored by South Asian specialists, although they may reserve it for their future attention.

As in the diplomacy and politics of the past, then, Afghanistan falls between the centers of South Asian study, Middle Eastern study, and Soviet and Central Asian study; and because it remains in limbo, those who do research on the country often approach it from the vantage point of their known references, and their individual abilities. There lies the difficulty, and it appears that Afghanistan is almost too much for a social scientist alone or for the advocates of other disciplines. The major changes in scholarly interests and concerns cannot presently be met by the established methods for studying Afghanistan if these methods are not accompanied by additional and new patterns of inquiry and expanded arrays of information.

If there are to be new approaches to the study of this unique country, studies which produce conclusions based on consideration of varied types of information, then it is necessary to pull together special capabilities and qualifications. In addition to Western European language skills, there must be access to the Russian research product because so much writing about Afghanistan is in that language. Our section of Russian bibliography and the materials that are translated from Russian attest to that. There should be access to the Persian materials that are few now but may well increase in volume, particularly if Afghans research extensively and then write for Afghanistan.

Such talents as have been listed are not easily found. In combination, as in the political scientist who handles Russian and studies Afghanistan, they are almost impossible to locate in number. At this stage of country study, they are discovered only after some effort. In the summer of 1967 this extra effort was devoted to bringing together Afghan specialists at the University of Michigan.

The base for the project was found in the advantageous existence on one campus in one building of centers for Near Eastern and North African Studies, for Russian and East European Studies, and for South and Southeast Asian Studies. Each became a resource base for the project, and each contained staff and advanced students who knew something of the research frontiers of Afghanistan. While the Center for Near Eastern and North African Studies served as host and provided the financial support and the leadership, each of the centers contributed resource support for our program during the summer, the period of active, visible project work, and in the many months thereafter.

In planning the summer's Afghanistan activity, the Center for Near Eastern and North African Studies gave it a broad scope. At the outset the seminar group set two major goals for itself. The first was that of becoming aware of the many sources of information concerning Afghanistan and focusing attention on those which were less well known. The results of this effort appear in the translation from the Russian, in the chronology, and in the specialized bibliographies. The second goal was that of exploring different approaches and varied patterns of thought and analysis. Several of these explorations produced articles which are included here.

When the 1967 seminar ran out the project was well underway. It had momentum, but it was far from finished. Much writing and much refinement remained to be done. Surmounting research barriers for a distant country with limited information sources and communication facilities is not easy. Nor can the quality of the work that results be as high as is assured for better known parts of the world. More than just mountains remain for cultural exploration in Afghanistan, and the scholars of Afghanistan are as conversant with this situation as are those from abroad.

Lest there be too long a pause after that hortative declaration, another commonplace should be added--as do other countries, Afghanistan and its society limit what can now be studied. There are substantive limitations; certain matters are not available subjects for study. And there are feasibility limitations; the necessary information is not available or has not been generated.

Military affairs and the relation to society of the military elite are first examples of matters whose scholarly scrutiny is beyond public tolerance. Reporting on such research would probably be as impolitic as it would be inaccurate. Certain religious issues are also off limits to the researcher as are certain tribal-governmental relationships. The fact that in recent years visits by central government figures to various provinces were prime news indicates some of the sensitivity which precludes research. As is to be expected, where issues vital to the state are concerned, study by foreigners can hardly be mounted, much less successful. In sum it may be said that there are significant matters that cannot be studied, but this limitation does not provide the only major stricture.

The lack of recorded information, the shortage of valid data, and the inaccessibility of materials are likewise obstacles to research and understanding. In the past few years, though, many of these barriers have been giving way. Indeed it is the currency of this development which justifies our project at this time.

As of now there are plans for a census in Afghanistan, but the fact that it has not yet been taken forecasts frustration for the scholar who would base his quantitative work on population statistics and on a national sample. This lack of data also bespeaks limitations on the work of economists and other social scientists.

Generally, economic data are being gathered slowly. There are statistics on marketing and some estimates of manpower, but the originators of these reserve the right to verify and to modify their results. There are national development plans too, that require data if they are to be effective. National five year plans which went into effect in 1956, 1962, and 1967, required and inspired efforts to obtain basic data. The current plan provides for taking that national census, for example, and figures have already been obtained for Kabul with its suburbs and are used by the government. Data such as these can be expected to provide further essential materials for basic research as well as for studies directed at solving specific problems. Similar national plans have gone into effect in other advancing countries before, and the accompanying needs for information which permits enlightened administrative decision have impelled studies that serve as building blocks for present and future researchers.

Our special bibliographies list some of these materials. In particular, the collected items which the Agency for International Development lists and holds will yield both background and base for Afghanistan research. There is more for the advanced scholar here than one might anticipate. If this cache is an example, one can conclude that although data are limited and the limitation does handicap some types of research, it is still probable that more information abounds than has been put to use, and more will become available. If the administrative and statistical goals are indeed reached as promised in the Third Five Year Plan, there will be source material in considerable measure for the members of a number of disciplines.

While social scientists may quickly reach their current limits, other avenues of thought

and study are broadened and rewarding. Archeology has been consistently productive in the past, as titles in our special bibliographies attest. Now greater opportunities are discovered by Afghans and outsiders alike. In sequence there are new protective measures, lest artifacts be removed from the country; new museums in the provinces, so that study may be conducted locally to the advantage of the community; and new exploratory agreements, such as that which Louis Dupree arranged between Afghanistan and The New York Museum of Natural History. This authorizes and regularizes explorations of prehistoric sites and calls for the training in the United States of Afghans in archeology. Occasionally mausoleums become museums as antiquity helps to meet current monetary difficulties and to establish another of those commercial peculiarities found necessary when a land of ancient heritage thrusts forward into development.

The work of linguists has also proceeded apace, almost without restriction. As Donald Wilber's 1968 bibliography shows, the Pashtu studies by Georg Morgenstierne, O. L. Chavarria-Aguilar, and Herbert Penzl are results of advanced analysis and thought which citizens of Afghanistan welcome; perhaps because they have become sophisticated in such study through the work of their own Pashtu Academy in Kabul.

These and other advances are indicated by the bibliographies, and perhaps more so by the chronology, which also took a bit of multi-language investigation and compilation.

The first of the essays presented here is an extensive piece by accepted Russian anthropologists on Afghan culture. It stands as a scholarly study from a different point of geographical and political view. The stress is on tribal life and history, and it is the description of the former that made careful though sweeping translation worth the effort.

Affording some bridge from the Russian viewpoint, Dunning Wilson writes next. He approaches Afghanistan literature as just that--the literature which is produced by the writers in Afghanistan, rather than an extension of Persian thought and writing. Nor does he consider the literature a mere Pashtu expression as the Soviet analysts aver. Rather, Wilson feels that Afghanistan literature is based on both languages, on religion and on the traditions of the country. These bases justify his hopes for the future of Afghan expression.

Leon Poullada propounds some theories of modernization and political development as applied to Afghanistan in the early third of the century. Amanullah and his period in the twenties serve both to narrate and illustrate the need for a strong central political base if development is to occur and to last.

In describing events of the current decade, Patrick Reardon dwells upon the political and the social groupings of the fifties and sixties. There are the establishment and interplay of military, administrative, and political elites as well as the underlying influences of traditional religion, of monarchy and of tribal politics. In the essays by Wilson, Poullada, and Reardon the social ingredients appear to be the same. Time and emphasis change the impact of each.

Ludwig Adamec's careful study then reminds us that the powers outside will not be overlooked for long, even in a project that concentrates on Afghanistan. With German sources as a principal base, Dr. Adamec brings the Germany of 1915 to 1946 into view as the most important European power besides Britain and the Soviet Union in Afghanistan's foreign affairs. West Germany is significant in Afghan affairs again today, one needs only to recall.

To be fair to our individual authors it must be said that two years have elapsed since they first drafted their manuscripts. For social science research on a new country, two years can have great significance.

In these studies there is variety, to be sure, and yet there is a common exploratory factor. Each of our colleagues has drawn upon seldom used materials to support his new syntheses. This has been the theme of the considerable and extended effort which finds expression in the next pages.

George Grassmuck

I
ETHNOGRAPHY OF AFGHANISTAN

A Russian study by M. G. Aslanov, E. G. Gafferberg, N. A. Kisliakov, K. L. Zadykhina, and G. P. Vasilyeva.

Mark and Greta Slobin, translators.

Introduction

This translation from Russian of a description of ethnic groups in Afghanistan illustrates the work Soviet scholars have done. It is the section "Peoples of Afghanistan" in Narody Perednei Asii, a work on the peoples of the Middle East, edited by N. A. Kisliakov and A. I. Pershits and published in 1957 by the USSR Academy of Sciences, Moscow.

Since the Soviet Union shares a lengthy boundary with Afghanistan, it is not surprising that its Central Asian neighbor commands a good bit of interest among Russian scholars. Our special bibliography of pertinent Russian-language publications indicates the variety as well as the

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Mark Slobin, a Ph.D. candidate at The University of Michigan, has done field work in ethnomusicology in northern Afghanistan and Soviet Central Asia on a Foreign Area Fellowship. He is the author of Kirghiz Instrumental Music. His wife, Greta, is a graduate student in Slavic languages and literatures at The University.

quantity of recent Soviet writing. This translation by Mark and Greta Slobin goes one step further, for it provides an insight into the kind of anthropology practiced and its particularity. Other scholars may disagree with some of the assertions and interpretations in this selection. However, since the purpose of the translation is to present an unaltered Soviet view, the translators have remained faithful to the text and tone by communicating the sense of each sentence.

Before 1957, Soviet writers had prepared monographs on tribes in Afghanistan, but this publication contained the first combined presentation of their efforts. The five contributors give basic descriptions of seven ethnic groups and offer their interpretations of Afghan history as well. Best known of the authors is M. G. Aslanov, who wrote the material included on the Pashtuns. He was a TASS correspondent in Afghanistan in the thirties and then returned to Moscow to encourage the study of Pashtu by teaching and writing. Other contributors are E. G. Gafferberg on the Hazaras, Jamshids, and Nuristanis; N. A. Kisliakov on the Tajiks; K. L. Zadykhina on the Uzbeks; and G. P. Vasilyeva on the Turkmen. Although the entire section on Afghanistan was translated from Narody Perednei Azii, about a third of it has been cut for lack of space. The omissions are marked by ellipses.

Professor William D. Schorger of the Center for Near Eastern and North African Studies at The University of Michigan suggested including the Russian ethnographical material and provided a copy of the book. William Zimmerman, Assistant Professor of Political Science, made suggestions on the translation. William Irons and Robert Canfield, graduate students in anthropology, read parts of this section.

George Grassmuck
Frances Irwin

Chapter 1: The Afghans

There are more than six million Afghans* in Afghanistan. About fifty thousand Afghans live in Iran and five and a half million in Pakistan, in that area of Pashtunistan which is populated by independent tribes. In 1893 the British Empire annexed this territory, and in 1947 it was included in the newly created state of Pakistan.

In Afghanistan, the Afghans live mainly in the southern part of the country adjacent to Pakistan. They constitute a majority of the population in these provinces as follows: Southern, ninety per cent; Kandahar, seventy-two per cent; Eastern, seventy-one per cent; and Kabul, fifty-seven per cent. In the other provinces the proportion of Afghans in the population fluctuates between eleven per cent and twenty-seven per cent. There the Afghans are quite outnumbered by the Tajiks and Uzbeks. The movement of the Afghans into the northern regions began in the first half of the nineteenth century and continues to the present.

In settled areas, the Afghans are largely rural. About two million of them follow a nomadic or semi-nomadic way of life. The number of urban Afghans is small and in many cases these are government officials or military men. Only in Kandahar, Gardez, and a number of smaller cities are Afghans in the majority in urban populations.

Tribes

As among other peoples of the Middle East, a tribal-clan structure has been preserved to the present. The Afghans are divided into tribes, kaum or qabili, and subdivided into sub-tribes or clans. Tribes are usually joined in tribal

*The terms Afghan, Pashtun, and Pathan are used as equivalents by the author.

confederations or unions. A significant number of Afghan tribes are named after the eponym (the legendary ancestor of the tribe), to which is added the suffix khel (kin) or zai (son).

The Durrani, which numbers about one and a half million people, is one of the most powerful Afghan tribal confederations. The ruling dynasty belongs to this tribe. . . .

The Zirak branch of the Durrani includes four tribes. The Popolzai (c. 200,000) live north and east of Kandahar and west of the Helmand River. The Alkozai (c. 200,000) is another powerful tribe. Its members live to the east of Kandahar and northeast of the Helmand. The Barakzai (c. 300,000) live to the southwest of Kandahar in the Arghestan River valley. All of the tribes just mentioned are settled and are basically agricultural. In contrast, the Atsakzai are partly agricultural and sometimes nomadic. This tribe of about 50,000 lives in the Zamindawar region and along the Kohdaman ridge.

A different series of tribes belongs to the Panjpao branch. The Nurzai (c. 300,000) comprise its major tribe. They live in the southwest and west of Afghanistan and their major occupation is the nomadic raising of livestock. In contrast, the Alizai (c. 200,000), who live in Zamindawar and along the Helmand, plant crops, but the Ishaqzai (c. 200,000), who live west of Kandahar along the Arghandab, in the Farah region and in Seistan, engage in both agriculture and livestock raising.

The second most important Afghan tribal confederation is the Ghilzai. Dispersed over a wide, primarily mountainous territory, the Ghilzai tribes also have an overall population of about one and a half million people. There are two branches of the Ghilzai: the Western--Turan--and the Eastern--Ibrahimkhel Buran. The Western Ghilzai include three tribes. The first is the Khatak (c. 80,000), living to the northeast of

Kandahar and the southeast of Ghazni. The second tribe is the Tokhi (c. 150,000), which lives in the Qalat-i Ghilzai region in the valleys of the Tarnak and Arghandab Rivers to the north towards the Hazarajat. The third tribe is the Andar (c. 130,000), which lives in the Shilgar region.

Among the Eastern Ghilzai, the largest tribe is the Suleimankhel (c. 350,000). Its people live to the south and southeast of Kabul toward Jalalabad. Many of the Suleimankhel are nomads and part of the tribe engages in caravan trade. The Alikhel tribe (c. 70,000) lives mainly in the Mukur region and engages in agriculture.

In contrast, the camel-breeding Akakhel tribe (c. 25,000) migrates around all of Afghanistan, while the Taraki tribe (c. 150,000) is made up of livestock-raising nomads for the most part. They live in the Mukur region with winter quarters in the Durrani area. The Nasir tribe (c. 25,000) maintains summer quarters to the north of Kabul, where it engages in caravan trade. The tribe spends the winter in the plains with its herds. The Qadozai tribe (c. 25,000) also conducts caravan trade in addition to livestock raising and some agriculture. It lives in the Mukur and Kandahar areas.

As a result of British colonialism the great Mohmand confederation is divided between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Bar-Mohmand (c. 80,000) live in Afghanistan's Eastern province and engage in the raising of livestock and in agriculture. The Safi (c. 120,000) are northern neighbors of the Mohmands. Safis live in the Laghman area near the Kunar River as well as in other parts. They farm, raise livestock and keep bees. It is presumed that the Safis were originally Kafirs and were "Afghanized" only recently.

On the slopes of the Safed Koh (Spin Garh) range live the Shinwari tribe members (c. 50,000).

Their occupations are agriculture, silk manufacture, livestock raising, and caravan trade. The Khugiyani (c. 60,000) live further to the west, in the Nimla and Mamakhela region, and also farm and raise livestock.

The Dardagai (c. 25,000) is a tribe of apparent Indian origin. Its members live to the southwest of Kabul where they engage in melon and squash growing and other forms of gardening.

In Southern province, the Jaji (c. 120,000) is one of the major tribes. Its members farm, raise livestock and supply lumber to Kabul. In winter, part of the tribe does seasonal work.

The Jadran (c. 100,000) tribe is neighbor to the Jaji. Its members breed goats, engage in forestry and also do seasonal work in winter. Sometimes the Jaji, the Jadran, and the nearby Mangal are given the common name Khostwal, after the Khost region of Southern province.

East of Kandahar there is the Kakar tribe. Some of its people are in agriculture and others are involved in raising livestock and in caravan trade. In Kandahar there are the small tribes of Babi, Barets (c. 15,000), and Khundi (c. 5,000).

The ethnogenesis of the Afghans has not been investigated. It may be supposed that various elements such as Indian, Iranian, and, evidently, Turkic participated in the formation of the Afghans. Connections between the Afghans and the Hephthalites have not been ruled out, nor have relationships to the Sakas or other ancient peoples. The legends of the Afghans themselves speak of their homeland as a region in the Suleiman mountains, and many historical sources testify to this.

I. M. Reisner believes that the Pathans passed through the last stages of communal-tribal structure in the fourteenth to sixteenth centuries.[1] Predatory wars gained importance in proportion to the growth of material and social inequality.

The Pathan tribes conquered neighboring lands, and the owners of these lands--Tajiks (on the north and west) and Indian peoples (on the east)--became their serfs. At the same time they settled more widely in virgin land.

Towards the beginning of the eighteenth century the Pathans totally controlled the lands between the Suleiman mountains and the Indus River and became a decisive force along the Ghazni-Kandahar range. On the conquered territory the Pathan tribes engaged in livestock raising and agriculture. The land was divided among the tribes, sub-tribes, clans, and families and underwent communal allotment, vesh, for a long time. However, the conquest of the non-Pathan population, and of weaker Pathan tribes by somewhat stronger tribes, achieved in the course of inter-tribal and expansionist wars, as well as the development of caravan trade between India, Iran, and Central Asia, aided the acceleration of class formation among the Pathans. Slave labor was adopted, but in general feudal relationships developed among the Pathans due to contiguity and interaction with the highly developed feudal societies of the Near East and India.

The process of feudalization in Pathan society was especially strengthened in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The so-called Roshani movement is characteristic of this period. In bourgeois scholarship it is generally treated as a purely religious, sectarian movement or as a merely political movement, directed against the conquering Moghuls.[2] In reality, though, this movement was anti-feudal and its proponents led a military and ideological struggle against not only the Moghul Empire but also the Pathan secular and spiritual feudal lords. In the Roshani movement, as in other anti-feudal movements of the Middle Ages, religious slogans played an important role.

In the Pathan historical monument Tarikh-i Murassa (The History Ornamented with Jewels), dating from the early eighteenth century, there is evidence that the masses fought against the seizure of land by the feudalized tribal leadership--the khans and maliks--for the preservation of communal allotment, etc., and simultaneously fought against the Moghuls, who hastened the process of feudalization and sent out troops to put down the Roshanites. Women took an important part in the Roshani movement. Besides general social reasons, this is explained by the fact that the Muslim clergy was striving for the seclusion of women prescribed by the Shariat.

Class warfare within Pathan society was interwoven with the struggle of the Pathans against outside invaders. At the time that the eastern Pathan tribes fought against the power of the Moghuls, the western tribes were subject to Persian conquest. In the second half of the seventeenth century the Kandahar and Herat areas became part of the Safavid empire. In the early eighteenth century, the Western Ghilzai tribes living in the Kandahar region raised an insurrection which was cruelly put down. In 1709 the population of Kandahar, led by Mir Wais, head of the Khatak Ghilzais, began a rebellion against the Safavids. It took six years to repress this rebellion. The leadership of the Pathan tribes recognized Mir Wais as their ruler. The Durrani tribes, warring with the Ghilzai, were driven from the Kandahar region. Mir Wais's heir, Mahmud, organized a raid of Ghilzai tribes into Iran in 1721 and in 1722 he laid seige to and took the Safavid capital, Isfahan, after which he named himself Shah of Iran. In 1725 Mahmud was killed by his first cousin Ashraf, who became Shah. However, Ashraf lost control of Kandahar, where Mir Husein Khatak, the brother of the murdered Mahmud, established himself. In

1729 the Pathan warriors were driven out of Iran, and several years later Pathan lands became part of the short-lived empire of Nadir Shah. Many Pathan tribes, among them the Durrani tribal union, took part in the warring raids of Nadir.

Afghanistan arose as a state after the disintegration of Nadir Shah's empire in the middle of the eighteenth century. After 1747, one of Nadir Shah's amirs, Ahmad Shah, of Durrani origin, united a large part of the Pathan tribes under his power and founded the Durrani Pathan rule. This was an early feudal state in which the process of turning the tribal khans into great feudal landowners had not yet been achieved. For this reason conquest had great meaning for them, enriching their wealth and social weight, while at the same time conquest was necessary to quiet the undampened class warfare within the Pathan tribes. These were the reasons for the campaigns of the Pathans into India and Central Asia. However, the Afghan conquests were not solid. The growth of great feudal landowners within the country and the revolt of the peoples subjugated by the Afghans undermined the Durrani rule. At the beginning of the nineteenth century the state founded by Ahmad Shah fell into a series of self-sufficient principalities and feudal warfare began ravaging the country. Only in 1826 did the ruler of Kabul, Dost Muhammad, succeed in uniting a group of Afghan lands under his power and receiving the title of amir, thus laying the foundations for the new Barakzai dynasty of Afghanistan.

The nineteenth century saw the beginning of English expansion into Afghanistan, expressed in two English wars of aggression: 1838-1842 and 1878-1880. During the First Anglo-Afghan War, when the English tried to reduce Afghanistan to a dependent country and a bridgehead for the seizure of Iran and Central Asia, the whole population

rose against them, not only south of the Hindu Kush, but also north of it, i.e., Pathans, Tajiks and Uzbeks. The Ghilzai were especially active. It is they who destroyed the 14,000-man English army in the Khurd Kabul in January 1842. The English occupying forces had to leave Afghanistan in 1842, and Dost Muhammad was put back on the throne. However a group of territories with a large Pathan population (the Peshawar, Kohat and Baina regions) was left under English rule. After 1849 Dost Muhammad gave up the attempt to regain these lands and turned to the conquest of the non-Afghan peoples living north of the Hindu Kush (Uzbeks, Tajiks and Turkmen) with the support of the British East India Company.

During the Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878-1880) the English met no less solid resistance from the Pathans, who defeated an English brigade at Maiwand (near Kandahar). For all of their great strength, the English aggressors could not maintain themselves for long. They used Sardar Abdur Rahman Khan, who was named amir in 1880, in the struggle against the revolting people. The first step of the new amir was a cruel reckoning with the leaders of the popular movement directed against the occupying forces. Abdur Rahman completed an agreement with England, recognizing her control of foreign affairs of the country, but keeping independence in internal affairs.

In the last third of the nineteenth century a centralized multi-national government of Pathan landowners and merchants was formed. Its rise, called forth by reasons of a socio-economic character (the growth of cities, development of trade, demand for a strong government apparatus to curb feudal warfare, and peasant uprisings), was hastened by the necessity of organizing resistance to the English colonizers. The formation

of a centralized Afghan state became an important and decisive fact in the history of the Pathan people, most of all in their securing of national independence.

The Anglo-Afghan wars undermined the economy of the country and severely delayed its development. Nevertheless, a national trade bourgeoisie grew stronger at the beginning of the twentieth century. At the same time, the so-called Young Afghan movement developed which, under the immediate influence of the Russian revolution of 1905-1907, set as its goal the achievement of national independence and execution of internal reforms.

In the years of World War I, anti-English groups developed in Afghanistan. In 1919 the pro-English Amir Habibullah was murdered and Amanullah Khan, who was close to the Young Afghan movement, came to the throne. He demanded recognition of Afghanistan's independence from England which led to the Third Anglo-Afghan War (1919) and ended with the defeat of England and the abrogation of all of the unfair Anglo-Afghan treaties. The Great October Socialist Revolution had a decisive influence on the development of the national liberation struggle of the peoples of Afghanistan, stirring up all of the oppressed peoples and raising a wave of liberation movements in Afghanistan.

In its declaration of May 27, 1919, the Soviet government unconditionally recognized the sovereign rights of Afghanistan. An Afghan mission to Moscow in November of that year was received by V. I. Lenin. On February 28, 1928, the final ratification of the Soviet-Afghan treaty was accomplished.

Having given Afghanistan strong support in winning its independence, the Soviet Union continued to support Afghanistan unswervingly.[3] On August 31, 1926, the Soviet-Afghan treaty, the

beginning of friendly relations between the USSR and Afghanistan, was replaced by a new treaty--the Paghman pact on neutrality and mutual non-aggression.

This treaty was renewed in 1931. The friendly, good-neighborly relations between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan were reflected in mutually beneficial systematic trade relations, the construction of industrial enterprises in Afghanistan, telephone lines, etc.

Under Amanullah several reforms were attempted: the outlawing of the more severe feudal obligations and of the collection of internal customs, the limiting of the authority of the clergy and tribal aristocracy, and the introduction of laws constructed on bourgeois models. However, the feudal landowners were not touched and these reforms brought out sharp dissatisfaction among the conservative strata of society. In the beginning of 1929, as a result of the reactionary revolt of Bacha-i Saqao, prepared by the participation of the famous English agent Lawrence, Amanullah had to abdicate and leave the country. During the reigns of Nadir Shah and his son Muhammad Zahir Shah (since 1933) the power of the central government has grown, feudalism has been given a decisive blow, and the capitalistic development of the country has accelerated.

Foreign agents have tried to use the dissatisfaction of the reactionary feudal lords to their own interests. Before the Second World War, the activity of Hitlerist agents increased, but their attempts to incite Afghanistan to war failed. True to its needs and to its good-neighborly relations with the Soviet Union, Afghanistan maintained a policy of neutrality.

General Occupations and Conditions of the Masses

Farming and raising livestock are the basic occupations of the Afghans. About ninety per

cent of the population is engaged in agriculture. Crops are usually irrigated. In southern Afghanistan about 130,000 hectares are irrigated while an additional 300,000 could be irrigated. Although the building of dams began about twenty-five years ago, they have not yet influenced the agriculture of the country basically. Farmers use arigs (irrigation ditches) for irrigation. In the southwest they use even more complex underground constructions called karizes.

The primary agricultural equipment includes a wooden plow, iyve, with an iron blade; a smoothing-board, mala, which substitutes for a harrow; and a spade, gakhavar. The harvest is gathered with sickles. Threshing is done with oxen which are driven over the threshing floor. The farmers separate the chaff in the wind with a spade and then carry the harvest on donkeys or in special wicker baskets. A water mill of simple construction, zhranda, is used everywhere. The nomads still use hand-mills, mechyn. . . .

Feudal forms of landowning and land use are still current in Afghanistan. The land belongs primarily (seventy per cent) to landowners, important officials, and merchants, and about ten per cent to the government and religious groups (wakf). The forests were nationalized in 1932, and grazing land is considered to be in common use.

About twenty per cent of the land is privately owned by peasants. More than seventy per cent of all peasant households are landless or have but small plots. In recent decades the transfer of peasant land to large landowners has accelerated.[4]

The majority of the Afghan peasants find themselves in feudal dependence on landowners. A large number of them are tenant farmers, bazgari. In Kandahar province the land is held in tenancy under the following conditions: if the landlord provides the plow, animals, and seed in addition

to the land, he takes four-fifths of the harvest and the tenant gets only one-fifth. If the tenant has his own bulls and seed he receives more--one-quarter of the harvest. Capitalistic relationships are weak in Afghan villages, but the peasant landowning class has appeared. Peasant landowners may also be moneylenders. At the same time, feudal and nascent capitalistic relationships are intertwined to a great extent with "patriarchal-clan" survivals.

Patriarchal-feudal relationships are especially characteristic of nomadic and semi-nomadic tribes and of more traditional settled tribes in eastern Afghanistan and other marginal regions of the country. Among the majority of Durrani and Western Ghilzai, feudal relationships were formed as early as the beginning of the nineteenth century. Among the Eastern Ghilzai, part of the Mohmand, part of the Atsakzai, and apparently the Nurzai now live under patriarchal feudal conditions. Many tribes, such as the Safi, Khostwali, and part of the Eastern Ghilzai, preserve clan-tribal military organization. The jirgah (council of the elders) decides internal affairs of the clan and tribe. At the base of this outmoded organization is the khel--the clan community and military unit which represents a contingent of warriors. The kinsmen are united by various aspects of mutual aid, ushr. Particularly interesting as an example is the temporary artel, paiwaz, (among eastern Afghans) for the preparation of dairy products in the winter.

The khan stands at the head of the tribe; the malik or mashr at the head of the clan. Among the Eastern Ghilzai, the khan can be deposed in extraordinary conditions and a tsalveshti (from tsalvesht or forty) chosen. All members of the tribe submit to the tsalvesht in time of danger.

However, among the majority of tribes the outmoded patriarchal clan relationships merely cover

the emerging forms of feudal exploitation. As early as the Middle Ages a series of tribes formed a special clan, the khan khel, from which khans came. The head of the khan khel was the leader of the tribe. . . .

Language and Cultural Life

The Afghan language (Pashtu) belongs to the eastern group of Iranian languages. In phonetic terms Pashtu is strongly consonantal. It has thirty consonant phonemes and eight vowel phonemes. Its accent is dynamic, flexible, and free.

Pashtu is spoken in several dialects. These can be grouped according to morphological and phonetic characteristics into the northeastern group, which centers in Peshawar, and the southwestern group, which centers in Kandahar. It should be noted that eastern Pashtu contains words from Indian languages, and that in the west there is significant borrowing from Iranian languages.

Most, or about seventy per cent, of the Afghan tribes speak the northeastern dialect. Among the tribes who do so are such important ones as the Ghilzai, the Mohmand, and the Yusufzai.

Some dialects of Pashtu deviate sharply from the common speech. The Afridi dialect in the northeastern group and the Wazir in the southwestern are examples here. In both of these dialects "a" is pronounced like "o". In the Wazir dialect "o" is replaced by the sound "e" or "yo" and the sound "u" by "i". These two dialects are little understood by other Afghans. However, the other dialects demand only slight practice for mutual comprehension. In fact, regardless of these sometimes significant differences, the Pashtu dialects have a single grammatic structure and vocabulary. Taken as a whole they constitute a single language.

Literature

The Life of Afghan Saints, written by Suleiman Maku in the twelfth century, can be considered the oldest monument in Pashtu writing. Another literary work comes from the fifteenth century. It is the history of the conquest of the territory of Swat by the Yusufzai tribes in the years 1413-1424 and the division of the land of Swat among themselves. Sheikh Mali (Adam bin Mali), the leader of the Yusufzai, wrote this history which is called The Cadastral Book of Sheikh Mali.

In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Roshani movement gave a strong impetus to the development of Pashtu literature. Bayazid Ansari founded the Roshani sect about 1650. It was long believed that his most important work, Khair ul-Bayan (Blessed News), had been destroyed by his enemies. It was saved, however, and in 1939 parts of the manuscript were published in India in the Pashtu language. Khair ul-Bayan was written in Pashtu with passages in Arabic, Persian, and Hindi. It is the first example of rhymed poetry in Pashtu, and the language and stylistic traits which Bayazid displayed exerted a strong influence on contemporaries and followers. A group of poets organized around Bayazid and his successors and propagandized the Roshani views. Among these poets were the mullah Arzani, Lavlat Dokhani, Mirza Khan Ansari, and others.

The opponents of the Roshani movement also adopted Pashtu in order to fight it. Darveza (1553-1638), the most important of the opponents, wrote a catechism in Pashtu called Makhzan ul-Islam (Treasure House of Islam). In it he defended orthodox Islam and defamed the Roshanites.

Among the works of secular feudal poetry, those of Khushhal Khan Khatak (1613-1688) achieved renown. Khushhal Khan was the head of the Khatak tribe and a military leader as well as a poet.

His language is marked by simplicity and his themes range through love lyrics, calls to battle against Moghul power, falcon hunting, and autobiography. About twenty poets and prose writers can be considered followers of Khushhal Khan. The better of these are the poets Abdul Qadir, Qasim Khan, and Sayyida, and the historian Afzal Khan.

The major Sufi poet Abdur Rahman, who was a Mohmand, also wrote in the seventeenth century. His divan contains lyric poems along with didactic and religious works. Abdur Rahman's lyrics are lively and affirmative. They achieved great popularity, and they still serve as models.

The work of Abdul Hamid, another Mohmand poet, belongs to the eighteenth century. His lyricism contrasts with that of Abdur Rahman for it is marked by pessimism and depression.

The temporary decline of Pashtu literature started in the second half of the eighteenth century. It underwent a revival in the third quarter of the nineteenth century in the northwest provinces of India. In Afghanistan itself the Young Afghan movement gave impetus to Pashtu literature at the beginning of the twentieth century.

In 1936 Pashtu was decreed the state language of Afghanistan and simultaneously the Afghan Academy was established. Its purpose was the study of Pashtu and the development of literature in the language. Since 1936 two newspapers, and recently two more, have come out entirely in Pashtu. Since 1940 the literary and artistic journal Kabul has been published by the Afghan Academy. It is also written in Pashtu.

In recent years Afghan poetry and prose have developed significantly. New genres have arisen and developed including the novel, the short story, and the essay. While poetry keeps its traditional forms, poetic genres have an

increasing tendency toward rapprochement with folk-colloquial speech. Out of this has come an attempt by several contemporary Afghan poets to introduce the form called "poetry in prose" into the literature. In lyric poetry, where traditional love motives were especially prevalent, social motives can now be heard more strongly. In prose, reflections of vital national problems appear even more widely.

The greater development of Afghan literary life began in the 1940's when national liberation struggles burgeoned in many countries of the East due to the impact of the world-wide, historic victory over Fascism. The most important work of that period was the cycle of poems in prose by Benawa entitled Sorrowful Reflections. It brought forth many imitations.

Abdul Rauf Benawa is one of the most important writers of contemporary Afghanistan. At an early stage in his literary mastery, Benawa produced works which sharply condemned the idlers of the bureaucracy. The story "Me--Never" is an example. He also exposed antiquated domestic customs. The payment of the bride price in the story "The Unfortunate Girl" is an example of such exposure. Benawa created the cycle Sorrowful Reflections in 1947-48. The words of this writer which were included in the literary journal Kabul characterized his output: "In our age it is impossible to sing only of intimate feelings. It is necessary to attend the condition of one's people and of society."

The path which Sadiqullah Rishtin followed in his creative work is characteristic. At the end of the 1930's, Rishtin was still attracted to the traditional themes of "the nightingale and the rose." Then he turned to the essay and his series of travel sketches stems from his impressions on a trip to Kataghan province in Afghanistan. During this journey Rishtin had an

opportunity to observe many native projects and to acquaint himself with the living conditions of the workers. The writer aims at presenting objectively everything which he saw and heard. His sympathy for Afghan workers is noticeable.

Other Pathan writers, such as Salimi and Nur Muhammad Taraki, focus on the life of the peasant. Two essays which came from Taraki's pen are interesting for their social direction. In "Dried Beef" and "Hey, Get to Work!" the author shows his sympathy for the Afghan peasantry--work-loving and honest.

After the end of the 1940's, a new wave can be detected in the work of many other Pathan writers. Their writing is popular because to some degree it expresses the thoughts and hopes of a large part of the Pathan people. The heartfelt thought of the writer who wishes his country to flourish in peace resounds in the heart of every patriotically inclined Afghan. Readers speak most respectfully of the work of such major poets and writers of prose as Rishtin, Khadim, Benawa, Majruh, Mukhils, Gul Pacha Ulfat, Ghulam Rahman Jarar, Muhammad Arsalan Salimi, Zmarialai, Painda Muhammad Zahir, and others.

Most recently a new generation of Afghan writers has appeared on the scene. Young graduates of Kabul University and other centers of learning such as Ghulam Muhaiuddin Ayubi, Muhammad Ghulaba Nangarhari, Muhammad ud-Din Zhwak, Muhammad Khalil Roashan, and others form a worthy new generation who are destined before long to play a large part in the future development of all the genres in Afghan literature.

Now the translation of foreign writers into Pashtu has also become important. Russian literature, including the stories of Chekhov, Tolstoi, Gorki, and other writers, is being translated.

It should be noted that in Afghanistan the government provides considerable support for the

development of literature. This is done partly through the granting of literature prizes.

Folklore

Folklore continues to have an important meaning in the spiritual life of the Afghan people. The folk couplet-songs, landai, enjoy great popularity, for example . . . These are poems in which the first line must contain nine syllables and the second, thirteen. Thus an illustration:

> Z gul p'las d'rta valar i'm
> Ya gul me wakhla, ya rukhsat me ka
> che dz'ma.
> (I stand before you with a rose in my
> hand,
> Either take my rose, or set me free and
> I shall leave.)

The themes of the landai vary to include love, war, satire, and so on. Folk poetry is rich. The basic genres are the ghazal and charbeiti.

Folk tales also range widely in content. The legends about Adam Khan and Durkhanai, the Afghan Romeo and Juliet, are quite popular. So are those about Fateh Khan who marched with troops to win an Indian kingdom only to perish in the battle.

Music and Entertainment

Wedding and dance songs are widespread. The dum, a bard, plays an important role at weddings and other celebrations. Although dums are usually illiterate, there are schools for them where they undergo special training. The novice or student, shagerd, goes to a famous dum, who becomes his master, ustad. Often the dums are Afghanized Indians. In fact, the word dum is itself of Indian origin and signifies a member of the derivative forms dom, lom or rom. Usually

the dums come from the people. Among them one finds weavers, gardeners, and other laborers.

The compositions of the Afghan dums use themes which are related to the folk poetry of other Eastern peoples. These include historic songs on the news of the day, legends, love lyrics, and others.

Of musical instruments the most common are the oboe, surna, and drum, dolkai. The Afghans also have a tambourine, darial, and a fiddle, saringai, which is held vertically. The shepherds play on a flute, shpelai. At weddings there are sometimes kettledrums, nakara. Bagpipes, binbaja, are used too at times. Music or singing accompanies dancing in which both men and women take part. War dances, in which men carry rifles or sabres, are outstanding.

Here are a few observations on the folk entertainments of the Afghans. National sports are quite widespread. These include jumping, games on horseback, target-shooting, and war games. In the ghurtai game two sides take part. Each player holds his left leg up with his right hand and, hopping on one foot, tries to topple his opponent. Both children and adults play knucklebones and ball. Men also enjoy quail and cock fights. Recently other sports have spread, and an Olympic games committee has been established in Kabul. In 1955 an Afghan sports delegation visited the USSR.

Religion

Religion continues to play a large role in the spiritual life of the Afghans. The Afghans are all Sunni Muslims with the exception of the Jaji tribe. It is Shiite. . . .

Customary Law of the Tribes

The clan or tribal jirgah interprets customary law and determines the compensation which is

to be paid. Members of the jirgah are called jirgatu while experts on tradition are called jirgatar. The severity of a punishment is described by the terms drana tizha (heavy stone) or spika tizha (light stone).

The norms of customary law and the sizes of compensations vary among the Afghan tribes. The most important norms in Afghanistan are those of the Mohmand, Ahmadzai, Mangal, and Jadran. Of lesser importance, but widespread, are the norms of the Tokhi, Taraki, Khatak, and Durrani.

One of the most important codes of customary law was published in 1940.[5] This is the code of the Isakhel, a branch of Ahmadzai. Other tribes use this code, along with their own norms. The code establishes compensations for murder, injury and mayhem, kidnapping of women, damage to fields, theft, and other acts.

For murder the code exacts "the price of blood," khun, which was 7,000 to 11,000 afghanis in the 1930's. This was a much higher price than the earlier requirement of 3,500 Kabul rupees. (This rupee equalled the afghani.) The khun for murdering elders, respected people, and soldiers is higher.

Dishonoring a murdered person (male or female) calls for a double price of two khuns. Among some tribes there is no difference in the "blood price" for men and for women, while among others the "blood price" for women or non-Afghans is one-half. If the weapon of the victim has been taken, its return and the payment of sharm to the heirs is demanded. If several persons took part in a murder, they share the burden of the khun except that the actual murderer pays 500 afghanis more.

Should the victim's heirs be given a girl as a bride in payment, the bride price is considered two-thirds of the khun. If a baby is given, the child counts as one-third of the khun. The Afghans

prefer to make peace by entering into a marriage relationship. They forgive a murderer if he appears and grasps the bed of a deceased member of the family or lies in the grave of a family ancestor, on the condition that he pay some compensation.

The amount of compensation for injury and mayhem depends in part on whether an exposed part of the body (face, eyes, ears, etc.) or an unexposed part is destroyed. The fines vary as follows: if one eye is taken out, the compensation is one-half khun; if both eyes are lost, one khun. One ear requires one-half khun, and two ears a khun. The tongue requires a khun, and the teeth are valued at one-tenth khun each, and so on. In the case of a knife wound in the back the compensation is lowered, because such a wound is considered disgraceful for the victim.

If a girl is forcibly kidnapped, the compensation is one khun plus a half khun as a fine. In case the girl consents to marry the kidnapper, the jirgah meets and pronounces that the bride-price must be doubled. However, there must also be a reconciliation if the girl is to gain access to her parents' house. If the girl marries without the consent of the father, he has the right to kill her. The story "The Bride Price" by the Afghan writer Salimi mentioned earlier describes this situation with clarity. The story appears in a 1947 issue of the magazine Kabul.

In case a wife is unfaithful, the husband can murder both of the culprits if he catches them on the spot. Nor do the relatives of the victims have the right of revenge in this case. If a man carries off another's wife, he must pay a seven-fold khun. For rape, the ear or nose of the guilty party is cut off.

The custom of levirate is observed: the widow goes to a brother or first cousin of the

deceased without payment of the bride-price. However, if the widow marries outside the clan, the husband must pay compensation. There is a rule that "the widow belongs to the clan."

If a husband beats his wife to death her father can take up the case and revenge the wronged woman as he would a murder.

If a person burns down another's house, the value of the lost property is demanded plus a fine for dishonoring the household. The burning of a nomad's tent is punished more severely.

The theft of livestock requires a nine-fold payment. The spoiling of fields of grain requires compensation equal to four times the value. If water is diverted out of turn, a fine is imposed.

There are further tribal customs related to blood-revenge, hospitality, and other personal matters. . . .

Chapter 2: The Hazaras, Jamshids, and Kafirs

The Hazaras

The Hazaras are a people of Mongol origin who speak one of the dialects of the Tajik language. The main mass of them (over one million) occupy the vast mountain region in the central part of Afghanistan between Kabul and Herat. This region is called the Hazarajat. Besides these Eastern Hazaras, who are called "Berbers," about fifty thousand Hazaras live in northwest Afghanistan . . .

The surrounding population uses the term aimak when referring to the western group of the Hazaras together with other non-Pathan, semi-nomadic tribes that live in northern Afghanistan. (In literature the term char-aimak is also used.) This Mongol word was brought to Afghanistan by the Mongols during their conquests. It means tribe or extended family.

Some of the Hazaras, numbering in the ten thousands, live in separate settlements in other regions of northern Afghanistan. They also live in Iran, along the Irano-Afghan border near Mashhad, and likewise in Soviet Central Asia.

While the Eastern Hazaras and the Western Hazaras are of common origin and have many common features in their culture and everyday life, they are quite divided in territory and in religion. The Eastern Hazaras are Shiites and the Western are Sunnite Muslims. Moreover the Hazaras do not consider themselves as one people. Even where the Eastern and the Western settlements meet, as in Kala-i Nau and in Khorasan, each group lives separately.

Like the eastern group, the Western Hazaras resettle continuously, in part to the north and more to the west. The movement of Western Hazaras into Iran began in the eighteenth century. They have spread into two sectors, to the northeast and southeast of Mashhad, in Kan Gushe and Kan Biste along the Afghan border, in Musinabad, Faizabad and the eastern part of Sari Jam, and around the village of Karat.

The movement of the Berber Hazaras into Iran also began quite long ago. At the end of the nineteenth century, when the Afghan government suppressed their rebellion, a significant number of Eastern Hazaras resettled in Baluchistan, in the Quetta area, and in Iran around Mashhad. Later some of the refugees returned and settled in Afghan Turkestan.[6] On the whole, however, the movement of Eastern Hazaras into Iran continues.

The Hazaras have maintained distinctions of clan and tribe and even settled according to these distinctions. However, in the course of the last century, internal warfare and conquest by Afghan feudal rulers have so decimated several tribes that they have been assimilated by

other tribes and put into the groupings of these other tribes. In other cases splinter groups broke away from their tribes and achieved independent status.

Today the largest tribes of the Hazarajat are the Daizingi, Daikundi, and Behsud. They occupy the area south of the Hindu Kush. On the southern slope of the Hindu Kush live the Yekaulang. To the east of the Hazarajat live the Teimuri, who are not a true Hazara tribe. They constitute a small people of northwestern Afghanistan and are included among the aimaks. The Teimuri live south of Herat, and part of them also live in northeastern Khorasan. At some time, part of the Teimuri moved their nomadic activities into the Hazarajat and were assimilated by the Hazaras.

To the south of the central tribes and scattered from west to east are the Polada; the Urusgani, who consist of the previously independent tribes of Daikutai and Daichopan; the Jaguri; the Ghazni Hazaras, who divide into Chardasti, Muhammad Khwaja, and Jaghtu; and the Daimiradad.[7]

When it began in 1221-1223, the Mongol troop invasion of the territory of present-day Afghanistan brought forth energetic opposition from the local people. After conquering the country the Mongols left detachments there. Later four sons of Ghenghis Khan, and thereafter his grandson Mangu Khan, also invaded, accompanied by thousands of men who established permanent garrisons in the conquered country.[8] These men mixed with the local people and gradually adopted the language of the conquered. It is possible that other Mongol detachments joined them later, settled there, and sometimes took the names of their leaders. As an example, this procedure is frequently mentioned in the historic sources on the Nikuder (modern Nukderi). They arrived there in the thirteenth century and originally constituted a detachment of the Chagatai prince Nikuder,

who served Hulagu Khan, the conqueror of Iran. In 1928 the Central Asian Ethnological Expedition registered the Nukderi tribe as among the Hazaras who moved into the territory of the Turkmen SSR in 1927-1931.

Over the centuries the Hazaras retained their independence even when Tamerlane and the Timurids campaigned against them. It is true that the contemporary settlement of the Hazaras does not coincide with the original distribution of settled Mongol detachments and groups. They occupied more favorable and more fertile valleys and slopes of eastern and northern Afghanistan. However, these Mongol groups who had settled on foreign land lost their power with the weakening and dissolution of the Mongol Empire. Step by step newcomers forced them into higher valleys and onto higher slopes. Pathans came from the east and south and Uzbek tribes came from the north. In the process, part of the Mongol tribes were surely assimilated into the peoples who drove them upward. But another part, pushed back from the north, east, and south, gradually took the mountainous land which was named the Hazarajat after its population. As early as the sixteenth century, these peoples called themselves the Hazara and the Nikuderi. Since that time they have partially maintained the Mongol language.

The process of weakening Hazara power and gradually forcing them from their original land did not break their independence. Neither historical sources nor Hazara legends give any indication of prolonged submission to any outside power in the course of six centuries. The rulers of Kabul, Kandahar, and Herat often tried to conquer them, and individual Afghan leaders sometimes succeeded in forcing nearby Hazara tribes to pay tribute for short periods. Yet when J. P. Ferrier traveled in the middle of the nineteenth

century, the Hazaras were completely independent and submitted only to their own leadership.[9]

From the mid-nineteenth century on, Yar Muhaddad Herati and the Kabul empire undertook campaigns with the object of annexing them, but it was only at the end of the nineteenth century, after prolonged and bitter fighting, that Amir Abdur Rahman defeated the Hazaras. In 1891 the Hazaras began a rebellion that was quelled the next year. Afghan feudal lords and officials snatched a considerable portion of the land of the Hazarajat. The Hazara peasantry was partly landless and partly subjected to cruel exploitation. Many Hazaras fell into slavery and remained in that state until Amanullah abolished it.

Basic Occupations

The Hazarajat is a high mountain district with a temperate or cold climate. A belt of greatest precipitation lies at an altitude of approximately 2,000 meters. Above and below it there is less rainfall, and beyond the rain clouds the atmosphere becomes dry again. In the course of the long severe winter, deep snows make transportation difficult. For several months villages are isolated from each other and from the surrounding world.

Deep winding valleys which lie between the steep spurs that jut out from the main mountain chains appear to be continuous ribbons of fields that use all the arable land. The soils of these valleys are usually shallow loam.

Acute land shortage is a characteristic of Hazara mountain agriculture. Every meter of available land is put to use. Land which has been made workable is prized, and villages are laid out so that all the arable land will remain in cultivation. Dry, stony slopes are used for cemeteries. Roads go along the extreme edges of

plowed fields. Stone terraces, made of rocks collected from the fields, keep mountain streams from undermining the fields. Poplars are also planted along the edges of the fields as are a few fruit trees on occasion.

The Hazarajat is primarily an area of spring crops. Winter wheat does not grow in the mountains above a height of 2,400 meters, and most of the valleys are above this level. Non-irrigated agriculture is almost never found here. Instead a large majority of the crops require irrigation, and the Hazaras are masters of irrigation under difficult mountain conditions. The technique of "stream irrigation" is particularly well developed. In each field small furrows are dug some twenty to twenty-five centimeters apart. The water runs through these from a small irrigation ditch. Two people do the watering. One makes sure that the water flows evenly in the furrows while the other clears the furrows with a bent stick so that the water does not back up in them. The advantage of this kind of irrigation stems from the shallow soils in the valley of the Hazarajat. Deep tillage is impossible because it may uncover the gravelly subsoil. "Estuary irrigation" is also sometimes used. Here rain or melted snow water is directed through a whole system of water-gathering furrows, in which wheat is sown, until it collects in an estuary.

Hazara agriculture is mainly small grain agriculture. Wheat, winter rye, and barley are grown as are Italian millet and small corn. Barley is substituted for wheat in bread, and it is also used as a basic feed for horses. Leguminous plants have a very important place among agricultural products. Clover is also grown for the feeding of cattle.

After the grain is harvested, the field is tilled lightly, and it is maintained this way

until the next planting. Before the sowing, the tilled field is watered, and it is allowed to dry. Both the fields that are irrigated and those that are not are carefully weeded.

Because there is a shortage of arable soil, the Hazara peasant always feels the lack of grain. This explains the wholesale departure of the Hazaras, either to some rich farm during harvest time or into the cities. In Afghanistan and in Iran, many poor Hazaras work for local landlords. They provide labor in the large urban centers, such as Kabul, in which they are hired as unskilled laborers, porters, and servants. They also work in India.

The lack of farming land in the Hazarajat, aggravated as it is by undeveloped agricultural techniques, accounts for the continued raising of livestock on the steep mountain slopes. The Hazaras primarily raise sheep and goats, but they also raise horses, donkeys and other large livestock. In some tribes which possess large herds of small animals, many families move each spring to summer quarters. These are usually located near villages. In the fall they return to gather the harvest.

Livestock provide raw material for the home production of cloth. The fabric called barak is cruder than its factory-made counterpart but is worth more because of its strength. This Hazara fabric is light brown in color. It is used principally for European cut jackets and is sold in the bazaars and distributed widely among the Afghan population. The Hazaras also produce a finer cloth which is used for the sholi. This is a winter shawl with wide black stripes on a checkered field. Sholis are common in the Ghazni and Kandahar regions.

More so than the Eastern Hazaras, the Western Hazaras preserve elements of a semi-nomadic life. After sowing the fields they move to the mountains

for the summer, that is for the period of sheep grazing. The range of their nomadic wandering is significantly greater than that of the Eastern Hazaras, but usually does not go beyond a hundred kilometers. The Western Hazaras raise goats and sheep, including karakuls. They also keep camels, donkeys, big-horned cattle, and horses.

Western Hazara agriculture is like that of northern Afghanistan generally rather than that of the Hazarajat. Excellent fertile loam, good precipitation, wide pasturage, and rich grazing all create the conditions for dry farming. This is found along with semi-nomadic livestock breeding. The relationship between the quantity of livestock and the size of area cultivated is noteworthy. A household possessing a large number of sheep usually has only a few fields. In contrast, for households with little livestock, cultivation plays the leading role. Because of this the process of settlement proceeds more quickly for the poor.

Among the Western Hazaras the most important crops are wheat and barley. The raising of melons is important, and various types of peas, lentils, and vetches are also grown. Cotton takes third place in acreage. . . .

Settlements and Dwellings

In the Hazarajat, settlements are usually located on the side of a hill or on the edge of a cultivated valley. Above the village lies the pasturage and below it the fields. As noted above, the village does not occupy an inch of arable land.

The village plot is rectangular and it is surrounded by a massive clay wall with a tower at each of the four corners. Made of clay mixed with chopped straw, the houses are built close to the inside of the wall. This leaves a large

courtyard in the center of the village. In some villages the buildings are simply built wall-to-wall under the protection of a high tower.

This style village is often found in several regions of Afghanistan. It resulted from continual feudal warfare and periodic resettlement of nomadic tribes, from the need for protection from incursions by armed tribes of nomads who seized villages and stole cattle, and from the danger of vendettas and other conflicts, all of which played a large part in the life of the peoples of Afghanistan until recently.

To this day the Hazaras suffer extensive damage from Pathan tribes as they pass through enroute to the northern pastures.

When the summer heat burns up the remaining grasses in the desert regions of southern Afghanistan, the people of whole regions move in search of feed for their herds. They wander from the south to the north, covering many hundreds of kilometers. Then the Hazara fields suffer due to grazing.

The Western Hazaras have settled in clusters of 200 to 300 families. The fortress and village of Kala-i Nau is the largest of these settlements. It consists of several hundred clay buildings surrounded by gardens.

A large portion of the Hazaras live in nomad dwellings called chappari. The chappari is a dwelling that stands in transition between a yurt and a hut. First, sixteen to twenty wooden stakes are driven into the ground in a circle. Then poles are attached to their upper ends and the upper ends of the poles meet to form a conical roof. This framework is next circled with wicker matting and then covered with koshma. For the poor the koshma is old, torn, and worn, so that it must be pulled together with ropes. The poorest Hazaras live in half-earthern huts, however, or in huts made of the most varied materials.

Rich Hazaras have clung to the ancient Mongol yurt of the thirteenth century, the khana-i khirga.[10] This is a fairly complicated structure. As with other yurts, the wooden framework consists of a vertical latticework wall against which the poles are placed. These come together in a round top in which the upper ends of the poles are fastened. But in contrast to other types of yurts the framework of the khana-i khirga consists of two series of latticeworks which are tightly fastened, one on top of the other. To hold them in place, the lower layer of latticework is slightly bent out and the outer layer is slightly bent in. The construction of the roof is also unique. The poles of the roof frame are bent out below and bent in above. Their upper ends are pulled into a wooden rim of the rooftop, the sar-i khana. This does not have a spherical shape, as do the Turkmen and Kazakh roofs, but has a completely unique form. The rim is from sixty to seventy centimeters in diameter, which makes it somewhat smaller than the roof of a Turkic yurt. A conical peak is attached to it and is fastened by leather straps. These consist of two cross pieces which are bent to form loops fitting into each other and are caught just below the peak by a thin leather strap, thus creating the shape of a neck. All of these distinctive features of the wooden framework give the yurt a special shape. The yurt is covered with koshma. . . .

Social Relations[11]

Until the Afghan government conquered the Hazara tribes, they were but weakly linked to each other in terms of both economic and political relations. The khans governed their tribes and led them in times of inter-tribal warfare. The memory of the time when the khans headed the Hazara tribes, subtribes, and clan groups has not faded.

Inter-tribal warfare and feudal tribal rivalries were the usual occurrences in Afghanistan until the end of the nineteenth century. They were accompanied by raids, seizure of land, and cattle rustling. These conflicts widened the differences among the Hazaras, enriched the khans, and turned them into veritable feudal lords. In the period before the Afghans conquered them, the Hazaras were not led by tribal or clan khans. Rather they were led by maliks who headed relatively broad territorial units which contained from five villages up to three or four hundred. Today the Hazaras are divided internally along the same administrative-territorial lines. These groups do not have clan names or common names in other forms. Nor do the cleavages correspond to tribal divisions although they sometimes coincide with them. In the case of the Jaghuri tribe there is coincidence because traces of the former clan/tribal structure are preserved. At the beginning of the twentieth century there were four maliks among the Hurkroz, a division of the Uruzgani tribe. Each of the maliks ruled over eighty villages. The Teimuri group, which comprised about twenty villages, was under one malik.

During times of frequent warfare and raiding, the malik was expected to be a strong commander who controlled a large army. The great number of these troops led to more than the feudal stratification of the Hazaras. It also enabled the maliks to use compulsion in their relations with their fellow tribesmen who were in the rank and file.

Class stratification, which began when the few leaders and their cohorts accumulated large herds of livestock, was intensified when the Hazaras changed to settled agriculture. Large portions of the best land were gathered into the hands of the maliks. This process had distinctive peculiarities among the various tribes, but in all cases

it led to the concentration of land in the hands of major landholders. Consequently, for example, in the Uruzgani tribe one can identify three different types of people in terms of land ownership. The first includes people who own no land and must work for the rich Hazaras; the second comprises those who have a small piece of land and work it with combined family strength; the third type includes people who have large lands and have access to manpower.

Exploitation has a feudal character here. The landless Hazaras with their entire families work for the landowner and gradually become so dependent on the landlord that they cannot move to a new landowner without permission.

The social-administrative structure of the Hazaras reflects the same feudal rule and submissive relationship. When Amir Abdur Rahman organized a centralized, multi-national, feudal, autocratic state, the Hazara maliks lost political power and the independent rulers were reduced to representing the Amir's government. Their most important responsibility was that of collecting taxes from the population. Supposedly the maliks were elected, but actually they were always chosen from among the powerful khans. In the Uruzgani tribe the tendency toward hereditary succession to the post of malik could be observed. The deputy of the malik was an elder, chosen by the same method and exercising analogous powers within the boundaries of a village.

Amanullah limited the political power of the maliks even more. As a 1921 law provided, the tax-collectors, or maliks, were reduced to officials whom the people chose for three years from among the "independently substantial and respectable people."[12]

As a result the Hazara maliks are not always descendants of tribal leaders, but they are always rich landowners. A malik normally controls

one village; only exceptionally are three villages assigned to one malik. Formally every adult had the right to participate in selecting the malik, but in actual practice only the elders and the rish safeds (old men, literally "white-beards"), as well as mullahs and other religious figures, take part at meetings. Therefore, the malik always reflects the interests of the exploiting group of the village and of the clergy. In addition, the malik is an official of the Afghan government. He collects taxes and administers decrees.

Domestic Life

Most Hazaras are monogamous. Polygamy occurs only among the prosperous. If a poor Hazara takes a second wife, he is usually mocked and ridiculed. Most often marriages are concluded within the clan subdivision, taifa. Marriage between first cousins is widespread. In such cases the bride price is lowered or not paid at all.

A set of customs precedes the completion of a marriage. (Here the wedding customs described are those of the Western Hazaras). Matchmaking is accompanied by the gandshekeni custom (splitting of the sugar). The father of the groom and the father of the bride exchange kerchiefs. Then the father of the groom puts a small sum of money on the kerchief given him by the father of the bride. Next a lump of sugar is broken into pieces which are distributed to those present.

Approximately one year before the marriage the fatakhuni is celebrated (from the reading of the fatikhi, the first chapter of the Koran). During this celebration the bargaining over the bride price is completed. If several fatakhuni are expected in the village, they are celebrated jointly to save costs. After three days the

relatives of the groom carry sweet bread wrapped in a tablecloth to the house of the bride. There the groom's relatives refuse the tea and bread offered them but again ask that the bride price be lowered. It is reduced a bit again, but then the bride price is considered final. This custom is called surfa-i riza, "the tablecloth of agreement." It is interesting to note the fatakhuni, like the surfa-i riza, seems to be a women's holiday among the Hazara and the neighboring Jamshid. For the fatakhuni, the women gather on the previous evening, while the men do not arrive until the day of the holiday. For the surfa-i riza, only women go to the home of the bride. Thus among the Hazaras, in contrast to most peoples, the final bride price is formally set by women. In this, one can see a survival of very ancient social relations.

The wedding is celebrated a year after the fatakhuni. Both men and women guests begin to arrive at the village of the bride the evening before the wedding day. The women, who come only from nearby villages, walk to the wedding and find places in huts which are some distance from the men's quarters. Refreshments are provided for the women, and they sing and dance to the sound of a tambourine. The men assemble at a clearing in the center of the village. After refreshments they entertain themselves almost all night with dances, wrestling, and performances by actor-improvisers. In the morning the men go out to see horse racing. At lavish weddings the winners receive prizes such as livestock, robes, and money. More refreshments come next, and then most guests depart.

On the wedding day, some "happy women," who are rich and have many children, dress the bride. Then the bride takes off the silk wedding veil and wipes her eyes with a kerchief as she begins to lament. She is joined by her mother and her

sisters. Meanwhile, the mullah, relatives, and respected guests gather in a large yurt. They send a messenger to the bride to find out whom she has chosen as her representative, wakil. The mullah then asks the representative and the groom if they agree to the bonds of marriage. He next reads a prayer and blesses the groom.

Accompanied by a crowd of kinsmen and women who dance before him, the groom is led by the hand to the home of the bride. He leads his bride out of the house and helps her mount a horse or camel. As they leave the house, the guests throw silver coins, vinegar, and sweet cakes at the bride and groom. An elderly female relative sits behind the bride and accompanies her to the husband's home. If the home is in the same village, the bride and groom ride around the village, accompanied by a crowd of kinsmen and guests, dancing women, and horsemen who shoot their rifles.

A marriage to a widow or divorcee is not celebrated. According to a general Hazara custom, the levirate marriage, the widow usually becomes the wife of the younger brother of her deceased husband. If she has children, she may choose to remain unmarried and live with the children in the home of her husband's brother.

Many patriarchal traits are preserved in Hazara domestic life and weigh heavily on the shoulders of the women. Although women work much more than men, they play a submissive role in the family. Women receive a much smaller portion of inheritance than do men. A woman does not have the right to leave her children. If, upon the death of her husband, she does not want to marry his brother but chooses someone else, she loses the small portion of inheritance which belongs to her by right and the children remain in the father's house.

Language and Spiritual Culture

In the sixteenth century the Hazaras still spoke the Mongol language. According to Leech, a small number of the Hazaras speak a language which Gabelentz described as close to Mongol.[13]

According to L. Ligeti, the Eastern Hazaras speak the Tajik language. However, in its lexicon "elements which strike one most readily are Mongol."[14] A large part of the latter are unknown even to the Mongol tribes that live in Afghanistan.

"One finds some words among them which I do not presently find in any of the surrounding Tajik dialects," writes L. Ligeti. He then cites several Hazara words which are of Mongol origin.

As for the language of the Western Hazaras, again according to L. Ligeti, these people speak a Tajik dialect which is significantly different from that of Herat. It has Turkic elements and, somehow, several Mongolian words. However, all of this is typical for a majority of Tajik dialects in Afghanistan, among them Herati.[15] The Hazaras do not have their own writing system. Among them literacy is quite low.

As in the case of their language, the oral art of the Hazaras has not been studied. Their songs are mostly heroic or lyric in content, and they are often light with couplet lyrics. They are primarily about love and adventure.

The Hazaras have the rudiments of folk theater. . . .

The Jamshids

The Jamshids (own name: Jamshid, Jamshidi) are few in number. They speak a Tajik dialect. The neighboring people think of the Jamshids as belonging with other half-nomadic tribes of non-Pashtun origin all of whom are grouped in the general category of aimak (also char-aimak).

The majority of the Jamshids live in northwest Afghanistan, on the banks of the Kushka River and on the northern ridge of the Paropamisus up to the border of the USSR. Their main centers of population are Kushk and Yakdarakht. Some of them live in Iran along the lower Kash Rud and to the north of Torbet-i Sheikh Jama and Torbet-i Haidari. A few live in the Turkmen SSR. In Afghanistan there are about 60,000 Jamshids. In Iran there are somewhat more than 30,000.

The question of the origin of the Jamshids has not been sufficiently studied. Some authors consider them to be a people of Turkic or Turco-Mongol origin, because their neighbors link them with the aimaks.[16] However, the Jamshids distinguish themselves from the aimaks. In the Jamshid language, the concept of aimaki relates to simple clothing, coarse behavior, and low, coarse taste. For example a person who is being reprimanded is told: aimake na ku ("don't so aimaki").

V. V. Bartold considers the Jamshids, like the aimaks in general, to be a people of Iranian descent.[17] He supposes that they are descended from the Ghori, natives of the Ghor region, who produced the mighty Ghor dynasty in the Middle Ages.

The Iranian origin of the Jamshids is partly confirmed by historical data contained in the Persian manuscript of the Jamshid writer Aga Khan, the son of Yalangtush Khan Amin-ud-Dulleh. This information was apparently compiled on the basis of oral traditions.[18] Aga Khan attributes the origin of the name to a legendary Persian king. Somewhat earlier evidence given by the author relates to the fourteenth century when the Jamshids lived in Seistan. According to the author, they settled there after their tribal founders lost their homes in Persia when the

land was conquered by the Arabs and the Sassanian dynasty fell. From 1392 to 1393 Tamerlane resettled the Jamshids in Badghis. He entrusted them with the protection of the Khorasan border and placed them in a privileged position as related to the multi-tribal local people. All of them began to be called Jamshids after the newly arrived guardians.

When Nadir Shah took Herat in 1729, the Jamshids were resettled in the Mashhad area of Iran. After spending four years there, they returned to Badghis, about 80,000 families strong. In 1844, when the ruler Yar Muhammad Khan waged a victorious campaign against the small tribes of Badghis, the Jamshids lost their privileged position. Their leader Mir Ahmad Khan was forced to flee with 12,000 Jamshid families to Khiva. In 1858, under Amir Dost Muhammad, the Jamshids returned to Badghis.

According to Aga Khan, in 1883, 30,000 Jamshid families, headed by Yalangtush Khan, settled in the Bala Murghab and Darai Chuvala regions as far up as Kara Tepe. Then a year later, when the Anglo-Russian Frontier Commission was at work defining the border between Russian territory and Afghanistan, Yalangtush Khan was suspected by Abdur Rahman of separate dealings with the Russians. In 1885 the provocative activities of English officers led to a clash between Afghan and Russian soldiers. The Afghans were defeated in a battle near Tashkepri, and following this, Yalangtush Khan and his brothers were arrested and executed. Their families were imprisoned in Kabul.

In 1908 the sons and nephews of the executed khan fled to Badghis and then left for Russia with the elders of the tribe and 3,000 Jamshid families. Only a few of them were permitted inside Russian borders where they occupied the environs of Chemene Bid and Kala-i Mor stations

in the Kushka valley. Thereafter Jamshids living in neighboring regions often crossed over the border into Afghanistan and back to Turkmenia.

In 1919, as Aga Khan reports, approximately five to seven thousand families of Jamshids were brought into Kunduz. At the time of this resettlement or soon after, a large number of the resettled Jamshids perished because of the severe and unusual climate of the Kunduz region. The survivors were allowed to return to Badghis after three years, but they found their land already occupied. . . .

Basic Occupations

The Badghis highland is a hilly region located between the Hari Rud and Murghab rivers. It is here that the majority of Jamshid settlements can be found. The land is a sloping sandy loess steppe (locally called chul). The deep soil is crumbly and porous and is very easily worked. Beginning at a height of 600 meters above sea level, this land yields a sizeable harvest of wheat and barley without irrigation. The climate also favors non-irrigated crops over those requiring irrigation. There is greater precipitation here than in other areas of Afghanistan. The rain falls largely in the winter.

The abundance of good pasturage and plentiful natural fodder supports the wide development of extensive livestock raising and attracts herdsmen in large number to the Badghis highlands. Pashtun tribes drive huge herds of sheep and goats here from all over Afghanistan, even from below Kandahar. They let the herds feed here all summer, and the herds often trample the fields of the local population.

The literature contains very few accounts of Jamshid life. They substantiate only the fact that the Jamshids lead a semi-nomadic existence and engage in herding and agriculture. Sheep

raising predominates and wealth is gauged by the number of sheep a household owns. Sheep products are used for food while wool yields material for housing, clothing, sacks and so on. The Jamshids prefer the so-called Maimana fat-tailed sheep. They also raise karakul sheep and keep a few goats. . . .

Social Relations

For the Jamshids livestock is basic wealth. It is found in the hands of large landowners who own thousands of sheep. At the same time the poorest livestock raisers do not have more than ten sheep. The landowners also control the distribution of pasturage and fields. In consequence, there is feudal exploitation by a landowning group of fellow tribesmen both in herding and in agriculture, especially the latter. In the past this exploitation is explained by vestiges of patriarchal-clan relations.

Even today the Jamshids divide themselves into clan-tribal groupings, taifa. Some of these are rather large. In Herat province, forty-six have been counted. The largest of these are the Kokchi, the Souzaki, the Murtuzai, the Khalifati, the Shagai, the Moududi, and the Rauti. In the majority of cases the name of a taifa originates with the name of its leader or with the area in which the group is located. The heads of major taifa are large landowners who rule not only their own, but also neighboring and economically weaker ones.

The fact that the head of the taifa is usually the representative of government authority in his region further strengthens the power and overwhelming authority of the ruling group. In such cases the head rules nonchalantly over villages and nomads. He can be rebuked only by his local superior or the governor-general of the province.

Like the Hazaras the Jamshids are among the national minorities of the country. Through the

eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries, the number of Jamshids in Afghanistan has steadily declined. For the most part this is related to the resettlement of many Jamshids in Turkmenia and in Iran. . . .

The Kafirs (Nuristanis)

Seventy thousand Kafirs live within the borders of Afghanistan. A large number of Kafirs also live in Pakistan, in Chitral, to which they fled in order to save themselves from the soldiers of Abdur Rahman. The Kafirs have no single name but call themselves after individual tribes into which the people of Kafiristan are divided: Kati, Waigeli, Prazun (or Parun), Ashkun, and Wama (or Wamai).

The Kati, the largest Kafir tribe, live in western and eastern Kafiristan. The Western Kati occupy the valley of the Kantiwo stream and the valley systems of the Kulam and Ramgol (Rambul) Rivers, as they flow into the Alingar. The Karis call themselves Kuli and Ramgoli after these small rivers. The most important villages of the Western Kati are Kantiwo, Aspit, Kulam, Parigel, Wetzergrom, Shamu, Panshigrom, and others.

The Eastern Kati live in the Kunar River valley. The tribal subdivisions of the Eastern Kati are the Kamo, Kanto, Mandagel, and Kushto. The Kamo occupy the lower part of the Bashgul River valley, including the villages of Kamgrom, or Kamdesh (the largest Kafir village), Kamu, Zaret, Petigel and Gavardesh. The Kanto occupy the upper part of the valley. The most important villages are Lutdek, Badamuk, Bargromatal, Aptzai, Ptzigrom, and Ahmad-i Devana (a place of pilgrimage to warm springs). The Mandageli live along the middle course of the Bashgul. The smallest subdivision of the Eastern Kafirs is the Kushto, who occupy a small area west of the Kamo.

Between the regions of the Western and Eastern Kati lies the Peich River valley. It is occupied by the Prazun (Parun) Kafirs, who are thought to be the oldest and purest in strain of the strangely mixed Kafir population. The main Prazun villages are Pashkigrom (Pashki), Tussumgrom, Lewergrom, Prunsgrom, and Shtewgrom.

The Waigel live to the south of the Prazun. They are settled in the higher and middle lands of the Waigel River, while the lower part of the valley is occupied by Pathan tribes. The most sizeable settlements of the Waigel people are Waigel and Wrenchigel.

The Ashkun Kafirs occupy the upper mountain region which is the watershed between the Peich and Alingar Rivers. This includes part of the high, thickly forested mountains bordering the Kantiwo valley and a series of valleys which fan out to both rivers. The main Ashkun villages are Badshaigel, Gwarnar, and Maswi.

The Wama live along the middle course of the Peich in one spot--the settlement of Wama. They are linguistically close to the Ashkuns, but differ from them in several anthropological traits.

The classification of the Kafirs into <u>siyahpush</u> ("wearing black") and <u>safedpush</u> ("wearing white"), found in the older literature, was based on superficial impressions of the surrounding peoples and, apparently, does not coincide with reality.

Until the Afghan conquest, the land of the Kafirs was practically inaccessible to European travelers. To a significant extent this same situation exists even in present times. For this reason, the knowledge of Kafiristan has a markedly fragmentary, inaccurate, and even partly contradictory character.[19]

Basic Occupations

The basic occupations of the Kafirs are farming and raising livestock. The division of labor in a Kafir household preserves some unusually archaic traits. All of the agricultural work--sowing, plowing, and harvesting--is done by women who are helped by children; all of the livestock work--pasturing and feeding the animals and preparing cheese and butter--belongs to the men.

Kafiristan's climate allows agriculture only to a height of 3,400 meters. It is impossible higher than that. The advancement of agriculture is also inhibited by the forested nature of the land. Fields are won from the forest with the aid of fire and the ax. Then within a few years they are exhausted and left alone and are soon overgrown by forest again.

The diversity of agriculture in Kafiristan is limited. The grains planted are barley, winter wheat, millet mixed with rye, some peas and corn, and jugara, a kind of grain that is similar to rye. Italian rye and occasionally winter wheat are planted in deep, sheltered valleys. . . .

Social Relations

While the Kafirs have preserved the clan structure for a relatively long time, it is presently disintegrating according to the quite incomplete data available. Clan-tribal traits relate only to the spheres of administrative structure and domestic life. Clan exogamy is preserved and in it vestiges of matriarchal traits are noticeable. A man cannot take a wife from his mother's clan or from his father's mother's clan.

Only rarely does a Kafir village consist of members of one tribe. Depending on the size of the village, it includes representatives of five

to ten different tribes. At the same time each tribe is distributed in clusters in different villages. In this way the village does not belong to a clan, nor is the land clan property. The Waigel villages are mentioned in the literature as an "exceptional case." Here a section of land was ruled by a given tribe.[20] All this permits one to suppose that the economic basis of clan structure among the Kafirs has already been destroyed, but it remains unclear whether ownership of land appears to be communal only formally or is really subject to common redistribution. Supporting the theory of communal nature of land use is the fact that a council of elected members, the urir, decides the time to begin sowing and reaping, supervises the distribution of water and picking of grapes, and so on. However, supporting the rudiments of private ownership of land are data on sharp stratification by property, the citing of "poor" and "very rich" Kafirs and, finally, reports that a landlord gave a slave a small piece of land for his subsistence.[21]

Slavery existed among the Kafirs to the end of the nineteenth century at least. All the tribes had slaves, but the Kati had more than the others. There was even a slave market in Kamdesh village on the Bashgul River. There the Kati sold slaves not only to other Kafirs but also to neighboring peoples. The inhabitants of Kamdesh village had from five to twenty slaves. It is known that one hundred and eighty slaves belonged to one powerful elder. In other tribes there were fewer slaves, and in individual cases several households held one slave in common.

The owner was completely in charge of a slave. He could sell him or put him out for hire. Slaves lived in separate quarters on the edge of the village (in Kamdesh village these quarters constituted a separate small settlement). These

slaves, bari, were probably descendants of war prisoners. The Kafirs considered the bari unclean and forbade them access to holy places or even to Kafir houses. Only those slaves who did housework could enter the space between the door and the first pillar and when darkness fell they had to return to their dwellings.

Custom forbade marriages between bari and free men. Children born of a slave concubine did not become members of their father's clan. Bari could not buy themselves out of slavery and their owners could not free them. The contingency of birth into slavery was similar to the tribal identity of free Kafirs, and it was impossible to change this situation.

Along with bari some tribes also had debtor-slaves, lane. A poor debtor and his family had to work for the creditor until the debtor paid for his freedom. The lane, like the bari, could be sold or given as a dowry. The cost of purchase was usually equal to double the amount of the debt. However, in contrast to the bari, the lane, who was a member of the tribe of his master, could be sold only to a member of his tribe. The lane did field and household work for their masters, while most of the bari were artisans. The uneven social position of the vocational groupings of the bari is reminiscent of the Indian caste system. For example, woodburners and shoemakers were considered higher than blacksmiths and potters.

On the whole, the social structure of the Kafirs at the end of the nineteenth century preserved patriarchal-slave owning features which were characteristic of the majority of peoples of Central Asia and northern Afghanistan in ancient times.[22]

Vestiges of patriarchal organization are noticeable in the administrative structure. Before the Afghan feudal lords conquered Kafiristan,

a group of influential elders, the jasts, decided all village affairs. A jast obtained his position after passing through a series of religious ceremonies which were embellished by plentiful entertaining and banqueting of the people and elders. According to some reports, in order to become a jast a man had to be host to the whole population of the village eleven times and to entertain important people ten times.[23] For these reasons, the main requirement for candidacy as a jast was considerable prosperity. In addition, a candidate needed to belong to an influential tribe that included a large number of male descendants, and he needed to possess certain talents such as the gift of oratory. In earlier times, a future jast was expected to have military powers--he must have killed five enemies. The religious ceremonies and celebrations which preceded the election of a jast extended over a considerable period; within the Kati tribe it was up to three years.

A jast could exercise considerable dominance in the council of elders if his clan had wealth and numerical power. If the kinsmen of a powerful jast constituted the majority of the population of several nearby villages, his power was extended to those villages. Great wealth and influence and generous entertainment made a jast eligible to rise to the rank of mir, who, according to some data, was the head of a tribe. However, the situation differed within various tribes. In the Kam tribe (a division of the Eastern Kati) the Demideri tribe was opposed by several equally powerful tribes. As a result power in this group was divided among several jasts. In some subdivisions of the Kati, the jast of the most powerful clan held despotic power. He ruled the village of his clan and many other villages for life. In the Ashkun and Prazun tribes, there was one ruler for each

village. Yet, at one time, the Prazun had a special ruler whose political power extended only to the area occupied by his tribe, but whose religious powers extended much further. The temple of the great Kafir god Imra was located in the territory of the Prazun. In these tribes the position of a ruler was not hereditary. The council of elders appointed the ruler from among respected people.

Aside from the jasts, who kept their posts for life, there was another special body in Kafir villages, the urir, an elected group. It was headed by one of the jasts, who in this case was called urjast. The urjast and his assistants had jurisdiction over the distribution of water, the regulation of the use of forest products and fruits, the decision to begin sowing and reaping, the settling of small quarrels, and a variety of other affairs. Relations with the outside world, hospitality to strangers and the like, all came under the jurisdiction of the urjast.

We know in only a general way about the administrative order in Kafir villages. It was established after Abdur Rahman conquered Kafiristan and it remains today. At the head of each village is a malik who is popularly chosen, usually from the ruling clan, and confirmed by the government. The malik must collect taxes from the population. The second most important person in the village, the mullah, is the spiritual judge and religious teacher. The council of elders was retained from the previous order to handle internal village affairs.

Family Life

Remnants of the patriarchal-clan structure are especially evident in the family life of the Kafirs. Along with the nuclear family, the extended family, which includes the families of married sons, has been preserved. The father

rules despotically as head of the family and enjoys unlimited authority over all its members. A price is levied for a bride. Its size, from ten to twenty cows, varies in different regions depending on the prosperity of the parents. Rich Kafirs have four or five wives. Women have absolutely no rights. A wife does not inherit the property of her deceased husband; it is divided among his sons, brothers, or other relatives. The widow is also at the disposal of the heirs since the levirate is widespread.

After the death of the head of the family, the property belonging to the extended family is sometimes kept under the supervision of the older brother and is sometimes divided among nuclear families.

Settlement and Housing

The settlement and housing of the Kafirs varies according to the abundance of building materials, the characteristics of the locality, the need for protection from enemies, and so on. In villages located in high valleys, houses are built of stone or clay, but in the middle belt with its large forests, houses are usually made of wood.

Most villages are large--a hundred houses or more. In the largest one, Kamdesh, one can count eight hundred houses. According to the observations of the Soviet botanical expedition of 1924, neatness and a settled appearance, which testify to an ancient settled culture, are characteristic of the Kafir village.[24]

Fortress villages are found in several areas of Kafiristan. In these, houses of two or three stories are located in a rectangle. Their facades face the inside of the rectangle while their thick rear walls face outside. Such villages can be entered only through the gate or through the gates if two have been provided. Often

watchtowers were built at the edges of such a village. Within the square, at the center of the village, there is a special area for meetings and dances. Formerly there was also a communal house, gromma. It was a large wooden structure that consisted of one room with two rows of massive pillars to support the roof. In the roof was a square smoke hole.

Many villages are located on barely accessible rocks or mountain ridges. The houses cling to rocky mountain slopes, often at a height of several hundred meters, and are terraced one above the other. The first row of houses supported by pillars, serves as the base for the facades of houses in the next row, and so on. Such structures are quite solid.

Some villages, built on flat land, have protective towers that are now reminders of the days when the Kafirs had to defend themselves against cruel invasions by neighboring peoples. Such towers are about ten meters high. They are constructed of stone for the most part and have loopholes. The door is placed at a height of four meters and is reached by ladder. The vertical stone columns are decorated with the horns of mountain goats. The wooden houses which characterize the middle ground are often two or three stories high. The living quarters and space for the livestock are in the lower stories. Steep stairways, or often ladders which can be removed easily when necessary, lead to the upper stories. The living quarters consist of one or several rooms whose doors open on a suspended veranda. A stove is built in the middle of the house. It is a square piece of earth, at the corners of which rise four posts that support the ceiling beams. Above the stove in the roof there is an opening to let light in and smoke out. It is edged by boards which stick out above the roof. The roof is quite solid, for

it is made of boards covered with a layer of earth. Often the roof serves as a veranda or as the entryway to such a house. In warm weather the domestic life of the Kafirs takes place mainly on the roof, which also serves as a threshing floor and a place to dry fruits.

A narrow door is made in the front wall of the house along with small window openings which are covered with shutters. The door, like the shutters, is hewn out of one piece of wood, usually a thick board, and hangs on wooden hinges which are fitted into beams. Some wooden parts of houses, especially pillars, are often decorated with intricate carving.

In villages located below or above the forest, houses are built of stone and differ little from the homes of the mountain Tajiks of the Wakhan except that there is greater care in construction. In these villages, the houses are often built in several stories on the slope of the mountains. Half-earthen houses are characteristic of the Parun tribe.

Furnishings

The interior furnishings of a Kafir house are distinctive. An iron tripod or three stones are placed in the cooking space, and the pots rest on these. There are shelves along the walls, and in some places there are pegs for hanging small items. The kitchenware, placed on the shelves, includes clay dishes of local origin, imported copper tureens, wooden tureens, plates and spoons, wooden boards for kneading dough, and wooden pots that are used for cooking. Liquids are brought to a boil by putting red-hot stones into the pots.

The furniture consists of low beds, stools, and small tables. Sometimes wooden blocks or boards mounted on stone bases are used for sitting. The seats of stools usually consist of

a frame interlaced with leather straps. The Kafirs also make bed frames and table tops in this fashion.

The Kafirs consider sitting on the floor "not substantial." At meetings the oldest men sit on stools, while the other Kafirs, lacking the right to speak, stand around or sit on the floor. The material culture of the Kafirs has no place for carpets and koshma which are spread on floors. All of this differentiates them sharply from the surrounding population and possibly indicates connections with India.

Goatskin sacks, in which flour, grain, dried fruits and fat are kept, stand in the corners or near the walls. There are also coarsely hewn chests. A loom is located in one corner of the house.

Clothing

The clothing of the Kafirs is also very distinctive. It differs markedly from the clothing of surrounding peoples. Even today many men and children wear goatskin clothing with the hair worn inside or outside depending on the weather. This article of clothing looks like a vest made of three skins, one in the back and two in the front; the tail of the back skin is usually at the level of the buttocks. In years past, when women also wore skin clothing, a fashionable girl would hang a bell on the tail and the bell would ring as she walked or danced. Today women's goatskin clothing is rarely found.

Nowadays men wear baggy trousers under robes which are made of light grey or dark brown homemade wool. These reach to the knees and have long sleeves. The robe is secured at the hips or waist with a wool or cotton sash, or a leather belt, to which a dagger is usually attached. This material is used for making both men's and women's trousers. The trousers are fastened at

the ankles with strings. Prosperous Kafirs wear cotton shirts under their robes. In cold weather they wear longer outer robes which are also made of grey or brown wool.

The traditional woman's dress barely differs from the man's clothing. Above the trousers women wear an underrobe, somewhat longer than men's robes. Women do not cover their faces.

Like the Pathan men, Kafir men wear long shawls which they wrap around their shoulders, throwing the right end over the left shoulder. Women wear black and colored scarves. In recent times in Kafiristan colored cotton has been used widely. The young women wear shirt dresses of brightly colored cotton, like those of surrounding peoples. The dress of the Eastern and Western Kati is becoming Pathanized particularly fast. The men and women wear long cotton trousers, either white or black, and the men wear embroidered vests and black robes.

Kafir headdress is characterized by great variety. Children, and also men, go with bare heads. Before the coming of Islam a man left a long strand of hair at the back of his head. It was tied in a knot and hung down to the back of the head. Now men shave their heads. The majority of men wear small felt caps which are similar to the pakol of the Pamir Tajiks and the population of northern India. They also wear black and white turbans borrowed from neighboring peoples. Women wear small hats and kerchiefs. They braid their hair in small braids or wear it loose, gathered only by a forehead ribbon.

The very interesting, old-fashioned horned hat which was worn for religious dances in pre-Islamic times has almost disappeared. It is a horse-hair cushion covered with a black net. There are horns on the side and others extend out in front and in back. The horns are made of the same material as the cushion or of wood. They are covered with

black material. In front and on top the hat is decorated with metal ornaments, thimbles, bells, shells, and the like. At the beginning of our era, Chinese travelers commented on the horned headdresses in this area.

Children go barefoot as do many men and women. Men's and women's shoes are sewn from soft leather and are colored red. The shoes come up to the ankles and are fastened with leather straps. Both men and women wear woolen puttees in the winter. Women adorn themselves with rings, with large heavy earrings of brass or tin, and with bead necklaces. The holiday dancing costumes of the Kafirs are smart and colorful.

The description of the appearance of the Kafirs would be incomplete without some mention of the long wooden staffs which men and women always carry with them.

Food

The basic foods of the Kafirs are bread and dairy products. In the higher parts of the country, bread shaped like flat cakes is baked from millet and barley flour and also from corn flour. In lower localities and in rich families, the bread is made from wheat flour. The flour may also be made out of the seeds of weeds in lean years. The dough is mixed with water, milk, boiled fat, or butter. It is not leavened. The women knead the dough in small wooden bowls and bake it on small iron sheets over an open fire. They also make porridge of millet, some of which is threshed in primitive hulling mills. Milk and buttermilk are consumed as are butter and cheese from goat's milk. The vast majority rarely eat meat.

Language

In speech the individual Kafir tribes differ markedly from one another. Sometimes Kafirs of

one tribe cannot understand the language of another tribe. On the whole linguists classify the languages of the Kati, Waigel, Ashkun, and Prazun tribes as a separate Kafir group of languages which occupy an intermediate position between the Indian and Iranian languages. The Norwegian linguist, Georg Morgenstierne, who has studied the Kafir languages most fully, concludes that they stand closer to the Indian languages.[25] The Kafir languages relate most closely to Dardic languages, which branched off from the Indian group long ago when the difference between Sanskrit and Avestan was considerably less than the difference between the contemporary Indian and Iranian languages. . . .

All that has been said here about the culture of the Kafirs indicates that this small group of people, which preserved its identity over many centuries of stormy political life, can serve as a unique key to the understanding of the distant past of many of the neighboring peoples. To this day the true origin of the Kafirs remains unclear. Yet a series of cultural traits indicates ancient ties between this people and both the Indian and Iranian worlds.

Chapter 3: The Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Turkmen

The Tajiks

The Tajiks constitute the principal population of the northern region and part of the central region of Afghanistan, the most developed areas of the country economically. The second largest people in Afghanistan, they number approximately 2,300,000.

Most of the Afghan Tajiks live in the northeastern part of Afghanistan--in Kataghan and in Mazar-i Sharif provinces. There the Tajiks make

up a majority of the population. Another sizeable group of Tajiks lives in the northwest in Herat province, in the Hari Rud River valley and adjacent regions. Finally, the Tajiks are also settled on the northern and southern slopes of the western part of the Hindu Kush, particularly the northern part of Kabul province and the valleys of the Panjshir, Ghorband, and Salang mountain rivers and part of Charikar. A sizeable number live in the city of Kabul.

Along with the Tajiks, who speak the Tajik language, a group of Pamir Tajiks lives in Badakhshan in the upper Panj basin directly across from the Soviet Pamirs. These Pamir Tajiks, like the Soviet Pamir Tajiks, speak the so-called Pamir languages. The largest group of these Tajiks lives on the left bank of the Panj. It can be divided into the Wakhani (sixty-four villages), Ishkashimi (seventeen villages), and the Shunguns (twenty-one villages). Deeper in the back country live the Munjani (twelve villages), Sarghulami (eight villages), and Sanglechi (two villages). The Pamir languages were apparently used widely over a larger territory in times past, but they were crowded out of the territory which is now occupied by the Tajik-speaking population. The languages of the contemporary Munjani, Sarghulami and Sanglechi represent only remnants of languages and dialects which were once used widely. The same may be said for the languages of the Parachi and Pashayi in the Panjshir River valley and in neighboring valleys not far from Kabul. . . .

As early as the beginning of the first century B.C., the lands of the Hindu Kush, the Pamirs, and the mountainous region of modern Tajikistan were inhabited by one and the same people, the Bactrians, who formed the mighty ancient state of Bactria. These common ancestors of the left-bank and right-bank Tajiks together formed part

of the Greco-Bactrian kingdom, Tokharistan, and other Central Asian states of antiquity and the Middle Ages. During the late ninth and tenth centuries, at the time of the Samanid state, the basic traits of Tajik ethnogenesis were established and the Tajik people was formed. The Samanid state included the settled Tajiks of present-day Afghanistan along with the left-bank and right-bank mountain Tajiks of the Amu Darya.

After losing their state with the fall of the Samanids, the Tajiks fought stubbornly for their independence over the following centuries. Only in the eighteenth and the first half of the nineteenth centuries did the Afghan feudal lords finally defeat the Tajik peasants of the Kabul, Kandahar, and Ghazni regions. The Tajik population of Badakhshan and Kataghan, like that of the right bank of the Panj, continued to be ruled by local feudal dynasties.

In the 1830's a struggle which would last for several decades began between the Tajiks of Badakhshan, Kataghan, and other regions, and the Afghan feudal lords. The latter aimed to seize the Tajik lands. Not until the 1880's under Amir Abdur Rahman did the Afghans succeed in finally breaking the resistance of the Tajiks. Then the Afghans occupied even the right bank of the Pamir region of Roshan and Shighnan.

Under pressure from England, which looked on Afghanistan as a future colony and was therefore interested in its territorial growth, the Afghan conquests were formalized by the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1873 and then strengthened by the agreement of 1895 by which the border of Afghanistan was fixed at the Panj. Afghanistan withdrew its claims to the right bank area of Shighnan and Roshan and in exchange received Darwaz beyond the Panj, that is that part of left bank Badakhshan which was still subject to the amir of Bukhara around 1870-1880.

The establishment of the authority of the Afghan amir in areas settled by Tajiks was accompanied by private confiscation of land from the local non-Pathan aristocracy, the forcible seizure of land from the working peasantry, and the transfer of unworked lands to the state. The huge body of state land created in this way was distributed among Pathan immigrants who formed military colonies among the Tajiks. The Pathan nobility received part of the land and became a new stratum of landowners. The working Tajik population became the object of double feudal exploitation, on the one hand by the Pathan aristocracy and on the other by their own aristocrats and landowners. Along with this, when the area was conquered by the Pathan feudal lords, the taxes on the local population increased while the Pathan landowners availed themselves of tax privileges.

The breaking of economic ties with Bukhara and Turkestan also affected the Tajik population, and all of this was eventually felt in the condition of the country. Large groups of peasants began to abandon settled places and to leave for Turkestan in search of a living. The arable land decreased. . . .

Basic Occupations

The Tajiks are excellent farmers as well as skillful truck gardeners. The Pathan tribes learned many lessons and techniques in agriculture from them.

Tajiks do their farming on irrigated lands in mountain valleys for the most part and on land that is not irrigated to a lesser extent. Usually canals bring the water to the land from the main river of the valley. The Tajiks use a three-year crop cycle. The first year they sow corn, the next year wheat, and the third barley, often together with beans. The main fertilizer

is manure which is sometimes mixed with ashes and refuse. Rice is grown in the lower regions, and oil producing crops, sesame and flax, are also cultivated. In Kataghan sugar beets play an important part in agriculture. They are processed in the sugar mill in Baghlan.

In the Herat area the farming is more intensive. Here the crops are varied and the farmers use more complex crop rotation. The techniques of agriculture are better developed than in the mountain areas. The fertilizer is not only manure but also pigeon droppings. Special pigeon towers are built to collect this fertilizer. Cotton, alfalfa, poppies, and other crops are of great importance in the Herat oasis.

Truck gardening is an important secondary element in the Tajik economy. Among the fruit trees grown are the peach, apricot, fig, quince, cherry, pear, and walnut. Grapes are also grown. The cultivation of mulberry trees occupies a special place in the economy of the Afghan Tajiks. The mulberries, in fresh, dried, and then ground form, serve as food all year long for much of the population in many localities. In the summer the fresh berries are eaten, in the autumn the dried berries, and in the winter the flour. When they are ripe the berries are shaken off the tree onto large cloths and put on the roofs to dry. The ground under the mulberry trees is kept clean so that falling berries do not get dirty.

Livestock raising is secondary in importance, perhaps because its development is partially checked by a lack of hay. In several regions the settled Tajiks raise sheep and goats of the Maimana variety. The sheep produce wool of high quality and are sheared three times a year. The dairy industry is important in the life of the Afghan Tajiks. Like the mountain Tajiks in earlier days, the Afghan Tajiks form individual artels of from three to eight participating neighboring

households for collecting milk, paiwaz. In Badakhshan and other mountainous regions the Tajiks drive their livestock to high mountain pastures each summer.

Religion

The Tajiks of Afghanistan are Sunni Muslims. Yet among them, as among the surrounding peoples, there are various pre-Islamic cults and beliefs, some of which are partly totemistic and some of which worship fire. Individual groups of Afghan Tajiks belong to the Ismaili sect. Religious teachers, ishani, who are representatives of religious orders, have great influence on their people. Every ishan has students, muridi, among the peasants. The muridi submit unconditionally to him, fulfill his demands, and present him with various presents. The ishani are supported by the mazari, the cult of holy places which is widespread among the Afghan Tajiks.

The Uzbeks

There are over one million Uzbeks in Afghanistan. They occupy the central part of northern Afghanistan, particularly the regions of Maimana, Mazar-i Sharif, Shiberghan, Balkh, Khanabad, Tashkurghan, and Kunduz, and speak various dialects of the Uzbek language.

The historical tie between the Uzbeks of northern Afghanistan and the Uzbeks of Soviet Uzbekistan appears in the names which tribes in both lands share: Kataghan in Kunduz and Tashkurghan; Sarai in Mazar-i Sharif and Balkh; Ming in Mazar-i Sharif, Balkh, Maimana and Tashkurghan; Kungrat in Kunduz and Mazar-i Sharif; Durmen in Hazret Imam Sahib; and Turk, Mongol, Barlas, and Karluk in Kataghan and Badakhshan.

Like those of the right bank, the Uzbeks of the left bank of the upper reaches of the Amu

Darya have no uniform origin. This is evident even today in both material and spiritual cultural differences among individual groups of Uzbeks.

The Uzbeks, who have no clan divisions and are often called Chagatai, comprise the oldest part of the Turkic-speaking population of Afghanistan. Culturally they do not differ at all from the Tajiks, the original settled population of Afghanistan. The possibility cannot be excluded, however, that the Uzbek-speaking Chagatai are the historical descendants of earlier Turkic invaders who settled down and accepted the culture of the local population or are the descendants of that part of the Iranian-speaking Tokharians who were Turkicized in antiquity.

Among early settlers one should mention the Turk and Karluk tribes, whose ancestors came from the Altai and lived along the upper Amu Darya as early as the eighth century. The Arabs clashed with the Tokharian Karluks at the time of the Arab conquest of Central Asia. The Barlas and Mongol tribes, living along the upper Amu Darya in Timurid times, are Mongol in origin but were completely Turkicized by the fourteenth to fifteenth centuries.

The tribes mentioned above that live on the right bank of the upper Amu Darya played a large role in the history of Central Asia during the Timurid period. It was then that the left bank became an indisputable part of the Timurid empire and Balkh became the residence of the heirs to the Timurid throne.

Finally, a sizeable group of the Uzbek tribes (Kataghan, Sarai, Ming, Durmen) are the descendants of relatively late intruders along the upper Amu Darya, the Dasht-i Kipchak Uzbeks of Shaibani Khan, who conquered Central Asia at the beginning of the sixteenth century.

Among the Turkic-speaking people of Afghanistan there is also a group of Karakalpaks, whom

researchers usually consider one of the Uzbek clans. In the first half of the nineteenth century the Uzbeks, who were settled in what is now northern Afghanistan, constituted the feudal Uzbek khanates of Kunduz, Mazar, Shiberghan and Maimana. These were dependent to a greater or lesser degree on the Amir of Bukhara. However, as early as the accession of Dost Muhammad, the Afghan government, incited by England, began to conquer southern Turkestan including the Uzbek khanates. This process extended over several decades. In 1840-1850, the Afghans annexed Balkh, Kunduz and other khanates. Soon after this though, some khanates regained their independence. It was only under Amir Abdur Rahman that the Afghan feudal lords finally took all the land between the Amu Darya and the Hindu Kush. Then the Uzbek khanates were converted into a province of Afghanistan.

During the decades of conquest by the Afghans, a considerable part of the Uzbek population left settled places and went either to the right bank of the Amu Darya or to the mountains of the Hindu Kush. Later, as a result of sharp increases in land taxes, the emigration of Uzbeks took on even greater proportions. The lands of the emigrees and of many local feudal lords were proclaimed state property, and an intensive process of colonization of the area was begun by Pathan feudal lords.[26]

During the reign of Abdur Rahman, after waves of uprisings in Kataghan, Mazar-i Sharif, and Maimana, the colonization of Uzbek lands increased. The Pathans, coming from the south, were allotted tax privileges and large landholdings were given out to Pathan khans. As a result Pathan tribes settled widely on the best Uzbek land and displaced a sizeable number of Uzbek peasants. . . .

Basic Occupations, Social Relations

The Uzbeks of northern Afghanistan are engaged primarily in agriculture and herding. Both irrigated and non-irrigated lands are used. On non-irrigated land, wheat and barley are the main crops; on irrigated land, cotton, rice, corn, millet, sesame, clover, and jugara are raised. The Maimana, Mazar-i Sharif, Balkh, and Tashkurghan regions are the major cotton-growing areas of northern Afghanistan. Rice is grown in the Kunduz valley while market gardening and melon growing are in evidence almost everywhere. . . .

Most of the land belongs to landlords and is rented in small plots to individual peasants or small groups. Often the landlord also supplies livestock and farming tools. Working as tenant farmers on the owner's land, the landless peasants must give the landlord up to three-fourths of the harvest. The tenant and members of his family also serve the landowner's household. The tenant's duties include cleaning the main irrigation channel and the small channels of the whole field, planting the seed, watering the sown fields regularly, fighting off the locusts, weeding, and gathering the harvest.

Many Uzbek households, particularly prosperous ones, practice mutual aid, ushr. This is a vestige of communal, neighboring relationships which has been reduced to an instrument of exploitation that is veiled by the norms of neighborly customary law. Prosperous peasants invite their neighbors to help with the harvest, but do not pay them. Instead they merely provide food.[27]

Turkmen

There are about 400,000 Turkmen in Afghanistan and about 200,000 in Iran.

In Afghanistan, the Turkmen live in the northern areas which border the USSR, specifically the

western part of Mazar-i Sharif and the Maimana area. A small number of Turkmen live in Badakhshan. The majority of the Turkmen in Afghanistan are intermingled with the Uzbeks to form a basically agricultural population. In Mazar-i Sharif and further to the east, Tajiks along with Uzbeks are neighbors of the Turkmen.

The Turkmen preserve tribal and clan divisions. The Afghan Turkmen belong for the most part to the Ersari and Ali-Eli tribes, but there are also groups of Sarik, Salor and Teke. In Iran there are Yomud, Goklan, Igdir, Ali-Eli, Salor, Sarik, and a host of small subdivisions of other Turkmen tribes. The Turkish Turkmen belong to the Salor, Yazir, Abdal, Igdir, and like tribes.

Long ago, the ancestors of the Turkmen, among whom the Oghuz (Guz) and tribes related to them played a large part, settled the steppe regions adjoining the southeastern corner of the Caspian Sea. On this land that is basically identical to the area of these present-day settlements in the Turkmen SSR and in Iran, there began the long process of forming the new Turkmen. Thus as early as the sixteenth century the so-called Sainkhan Turkmen settled on Iranian territory and engaged mainly in farming. From here, individual tribes of Turkmen moved to the west and to the east for varied reasons. Long ago the Turkmen of Afghanistan became part of the population of the small feudal principalities of Andkhoi, Akhcha, Sar-i Pul, Balkh, Shiberghan, and Maimana, which were ruled by Uzbek dynasties. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the greater part of these principalities entered into vassalage to Bukhara. The Afghan amirs tried often to conquer the principalities, but only under Amir Abdur Rahman were the Turkmen of the Andkhoi, Shiberghan, and Maimana regions decisively included in Afghanistan. This resulted from the Russo-English demarcation of 1885-1887. Many lands and pastures

were taken from the Turkmen and given to Pathan landowners north of the Hindu Kush. The clan aristocracy among the Turkmen preserved its landholdings to a large extent, but broad masses of the Turkmen went into total dependency on these landowners and also on the Pathan aristocracy. Because they lost their plots as a result of the Pathan conquest, many settled Turkmen had to revert to the nomadic way of life. The majority of them became shepherds and herded the landowners' flocks. . . .

Raising of sheep, mainly of the karakul breed, and of goats plays the leading role in their economy. They pasture their livestock in the mountains and drive the herds over long distances. Before leaving for summer quarters, the nomads sow bogar wheat and jugara. Then they leave some poor chomur to guard the crops.

There are rich pastures in the southern and southwestern parts of Mazar-i Sharif and in Maimana. In early spring Pathan tribes move from southern Afghanistan to Maimana with their herds, and they are allotted the best pasturage. The better part of the remaining pastures and wells are in the hands of Turkmen, who regulate the use of pasturage and own most of the sheep.

Many men of property have from 20,000 to 25,000 karakul sheep, while fewer than fifteen per cent of the herdsmen have their own livestock. All of the poor Turkmen find themselves completely dependent on the owners of hugh flocks who are usually the tribal elders. The owners thoroughly exploit the labors of their poor "kinsmen," who receive a small part of the issue for their work.

One can judge how important sheep raising is in the economy of the Afghan Turkmen from the following facts: These livestock raisers of Shiberghan, Maimana, and Andkhoi own an overwhelming majority of the four million head of

karakul sheep in Afghanistan. The Turkmen produce up to ninety per cent of the karakul in Afghanistan, which itself has a leading place in world karakul production.[28] . . .

Rug and koshma weaving are widespread among Turkmen everywhere, usually as home industries. Long ago their carpets achieved world fame. Only women engage in this weaving. The making of rugs provides a substantial supplement for the economy of poor Turkmen. . . .

NOTES

1. I. M. Reisner, Razvitie feodalisma i obrazovanie gosudarstva u afgantsev (Moscow, 1954), pp. 25 ff.
2. The Moghuls were a dynasty of Ferghana origin. They created an extensive empire in the sixteenth century on the territory of India and Afghanistan.
3. Soviet Russia was the first to recognize the national independence of Afghanistan and also promised to give it material and cultural aid. On November 22, 1921, England formally recognized the independence of Afghanistan.
4. Watan (Kabul), January 3, 1952.
5. Salnamah-ye Kabul (Kabul, 1939-1940).
6. E. Bacon, "Inquiry into the History of the Hazara Mongols of Afghanistan," Southwestern Journal of Anthropology, VII, No. 3(1951), 231.
7. V. V. Bartold, Istoriko-geograficheskii obzor Irana (St. Petersburg, 1903), p. 5, and a number of other authors consider the Hazaras to be descendants of Mongol tribes from the army of Ghenghis Khan and his sons and grandsons. The name comes from the Persian word hazara for thousand. The Mongols borrowed the word from the Persians and substituted it for the Turkic word ming or thousand. It became the name for a major division of Mongol troops.

8. M. d'Ohsson, Histoire des Mongols, depuis Tchinguis-Khan jusqu'a Tamour Bey, ou Tamerlan (The Hague-Amsterdam, 1834), Vol. 2, p. 280.
9. J. P. Ferrier, Voyages et aventures en Perse, dans l'Afghanistan, le Beloutchistan et le Turkestan (Paris, 1870).
10. E. G. Gafferberg, "Khazareiskaya yurta khana-i khirga (K vosprosu ob istorii kochego zhilishtha)," Sbornik Mae, XIV.
11. The social structure of the inhabitants of the Hazarajat has been the subject of a special study by A. Hudson and E. Bacon, "Social Control and the Individual in Eastern Hazara Culture," in Language, Culture and Personality: Essays in Memory of Edward Sapir (Menasha, Wisconsin, 1941), pp. 243-255. However it is difficult to use because the theoretical part is written from the position of the American psychological school and the factual material is somewhat tendentious and does not shed light on the most important problems.
12. S. Berkman, "Nalogovye reformy Amanullah-khan," in the anthology Ocherki po novoi istorii stran Srednego Vostoka (MGU, 1951), pp. 164 ff.
13. R. A. Leech, "A Vocabulary of the Moghul Aimaks," Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, VII (1938), 785-7. H. C. Gabelentz, "Uber die Sprache der Hazaras und Aimaks," Zeitschrift der Deutsch. Morg. Ges., XX (1866), 326-35.
14. L. Ligeti, "O mongol 'skikh i tyurkskikh yazykakh i dialiktakh Afganistana," Acta Orientalia, IV (1955), 107.
15. Ibid., 106-107.
16. E. Ya. Kilevein, "Otryvok iz puteshestviya Khivu i nekotorye podrobnosti o khanstve vo vremya pravleniya Said Muhammad Khan, 1856-60," Izvestiya russkogo geograficheskogo obshchestva, I (1861) in I. M. Reisner, Afganistan (Moscow, 1948).
17. Bartold, op. cit., pp. 54-55.

18. A. A. Semyonov, "Jamshidi i ikh strana (Po jemshidskoi rukopisi nachala XX v.)," Izvestiya Turkestanskogo otdela Russkogo geograficheskogo obshchestva, XVI (1923).

19. The first European traveler to visit Kafiristan was Lockhart, in 1885. In terms of ethnography, the expeditions which proved more successful were those of Robertson (1890-91), G. Morgenstierne (1924, 1929), and A. Kherlikh and V. Lents (1935). In 1924 the Soviet botanical expedition of N. I. Vavilov and D. D. Bukinich visited Kafiristan.

20. A. Herrlich, "Beitrag zur Rassen und Stammeskunde der Hindu-kusch Kafieren," Deutsche im Hindu-kusch (1937), p. 223.

21. Ibid., p. 235, cf. M. Foigt, Kafiristan (Breslau, 1933), p. 97.

22. S. P. Tolstov, Drevnii Khorezm (Moscow, 1948), p. 337.

23. Herrlich, op. cit., p. 229.

24. N. I. Vavilov and D. D. Bukinich, Zemledelcheskii Afganistan (Leningrad, 1929), pp. 118-119.

25. G. Morgenstierne, Report on a Linguistic Mission to Northwestern India (Oslo, 1932).

26. A. Stanishevskii, Afganistan (Moscow, 1940), p. 35; P. Alekseenkov, Agrarniy vopros v Afganskom Turkestane (Moscow, 1933), pp. 30-31.

27. P. Alekseenkov, pp. 47-60 and 67-73.

28. M. G. Pikulin, Afganistan (Tashkent, 1956), p. 230.

II
AFGHAN LITERATURE: A PERSPECTIVE
By Dunning Wilson

The study of cultural phenomena in Afghanistan necessitates careful definition. Inevitably, a modern national border is imprecise in delineating a culture which has developed within the shifting boundaries of past empires. Afghanistan has historically been a crossroads, a carrefour in the mountains. As a result, it has contributed to and shared various elements of the Sassanid, Ghaznavid, Timurid, and Moghul cultures. The background includes, for example, Persian influences assimilated by Muslim Arab conquerors, subject a century later to Turkic nomadic factors. The territories of each dynasty through centuries of change do not correspond to the boundaries of today. The area which was once the Ghaznavid empire is now divided among several nations including Afghanistan, Iran, and the Soviet Union. The complexities of such history are beyond the scope of this discussion but the significance remains. One component of nation-building in Afghanistan is the molding of this multi-faceted

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past into an identity which is nationalist and distinctive.

A look at literature brings out this cultural overlapping. There is both Persian and Pashtu literature in Afghanistan. But Persian is obviously identified with Iran while Pashtu exists only in part of Afghanistan and extends into Pakistan. What then is defined by the term Afghan literature?

Two approaches have been taken. Some scholarship works from the premise that Pashtu is the unique, national language of the Afghans and asserts that, therefore, Afghan literature shall denote only literature in the Pashtu language.[1] Russian sources particularly use this definition and equate Pashtu culture in general with the force of an emerging Afghan nationalism.[2] Although the name Afghan was originally applied to the Pashtuns, in a national sense an Afghan can also be of Tajik, Turkoman, Hazara, Uzbek or other ethnic background. According to the 1964 Constitution, the term Afghan is properly applied to any citizen of Afghanistan.

Afghan literature, in the second view, is approached by language origin without distinct national identification. Thus the literature becomes only a segment of Persian or Pashtu literature and is depicted under the heading of Persian (or Pashtu) literature in Afghanistan.[3] This experience is parallel to a consideration of Canadian literature which is expressed in both the English and French languages.

The perspective chosen for this essay is of one confronting the contemporary situation and interested in its background and development. The inhabitants of Afghanistan represent many ethnic groups and Afghan literature is the literature of these inhabitants. It can be analyzed by considering language, religion, and tradition, three factors which have combined to shape literary styles, themes, and genre.

The religion of Islam pervades the country. It is a comprehensively structured system which guides man and his activity from the cradle to the grave. The forces of secularization which are apparent in less isolated Islamic countries have not yet touched most Afghans. Religious ideology in the more developed and Western-influenced countries of the Islamic world incorporates sceptical and pragmatic (even cynical) elements. In Afghanistan, religion is literal in ideology and in practice. The key position of Islam is significant in the culture generally and is essential in the particular case of literature. Islam enforces ideals, attitudes, and customs which become inherent in society. This Islamic force has not been substantially challenged by weakening influences in Afghanistan, and it is a sine qua non in the author and in his literary product.

The term tradition as a literary component refers to historical background and detail which contribute myth, character, and event to literature. Tradition also designates awareness of a certain heritage. This is the subjective consciousness of a people of themselves and their past, and whether or not this consciousness coincides with reality, yet, believed in and passed on, it becomes a force in the culture. Literature reflects this social consciousness. For example, a tradition of military prowess and invincibility presents itself in the literature of Afghanistan, whether it is the product of Khyber Pass Pashtuns, Uzbek Central Asian khans, or Tajik mountain ghazis.[4]

Persian and Pashtu, the two distinct literary languages which exist in Afghanistan, are designated by the Constitution as the official languages of the land. Their separate development constitutes the background of contemporary Afghan literature.

The Persian language and literary tradition is a cultural force throughout Central Asia. Consciousness of this rich past manifests itself strongly within Afghanistan. Afghan sources recall and exhort to memory the great masters and court poets of the Samanids, Ghaznavids, and Timurids.[5] The classics and savants of the past are a major theme in modern literature.[6] Concomitantly, Persian is today the lingua franca of the country. It is the language of the educated and administrative class based upon its traditional position as the court language and medium of culture. Dari, an appelation for Afghan Persian, has come into use within the government. It seems to have been adopted officially about 1958 and is the term used in the government press; that is, the radio, newspapers, and magazines. The use of this term is an attempt toward a uniquely Afghan identity for the language, a problem to which reference was made in the first paragraph. Language is a nationalist symbol and thus the name of the language becomes Dari in Afghanistan and Tajik in Tajikistan, although each is Persian and uses the Persian Schriftsprache. The word, Dari, is itself a name for the stylized court language of the pre-Islamic Sassanian dynasty, whose empire extended from the Mediterranean to the Indian sub-continent between the third and seventh centuries. Regardless of name, the literary form of the language closely resembles standard Persian. Indigenous dialects and expressions distinguishable orally are less utilized in the literature of prose and poetry. This retention of classical Persian in the literature has been called a neo-classic movement by one scholar.[7]

Pashtu is the mother tongue of the majority of people in Afghanistan--tribesmen, nomads, rural farmers. It is a native Afghan language, qualified though by five million Pashtu-speakers

in West Pakistan. "The linguistic manifestation of national genius," Mahmud Tarzi called it in 1916.[8] In his newspaper, Seraj ul-Akhbar, 1911 to 1918, Tarzi urged the development of Pashtu language and literature. From this initial impetus, a movement of increasing strength ensued. It was marked by increased bi-lingualism in the national press, the establishment of the Pashtu Academy, and the publication of Pashtu literary and scholarly works.

In 1933 the present monarch, Zahir Shah, succeeded to the throne of Kabul. A youth of nineteen at the time, the King relied heavily on his uncles to conduct affairs and policy of state. Pashtunizing was given attention. Pashtu was declared the national language in 1936. Despite this new status and its incorporation into the school curriculum, the Pashtu language continued in a secondary position to Persian as the lingua franca of the country. The reasons for this involve the established position throughout the country of Persian as the language of government and education, and also the fact that the government bureaucracy employed a majority of intransigent Persian speakers.

The position of Pashtu continues to be recognized, however. According to Article 35 of the Constitution of 1964, "it is the duty of the State to prepare and implement an effective program for the development and strengthening of the national language, Pashtu."[9] This statement suggests the actual subordinate status of Pashtu which is apparent in the country. It also implies recognition that language is a key to this nationalist identity which is being sought. The Constitution of 1964 makes the distinction between national language and official language. Article 3 states, "from among the languages of Afghanistan, Pashtu and Dari shall be the official languages."[10]

In the literary development, no one has been more influential than the aforementioned Tarzi (1866-1935). A man of enlightenment and learning, he sought modernizing reform and national progress for Afghanistan and fits into the pattern of Muslim nationalists of the twentieth century.

Tarzi's early life was spent abroad, initially in Karachi and then for twenty years in Damascus. Employed in the Ottoman administrative bureaucracy as a young man, he was able to absorb the spirit of rising Islamic nationalism. When he returned to Afghanistan in 1902 as an officer of court, it was with the outlook of a modern and broadly sophisticated intellectual.

In 1911 his newspaper Seraj ul-Akhbar (Lamp of the News) first appeared as a lithographed bi-weekly in the Persian language. Beside providing news and information, itself a much-needed innovation for Afghanistan, the paper immediately undertook the cause of educating and modernizing the Afghan ruling class. The first issue included an editorial on the value of modern science. It set a pattern which was sustained by Tarzi's skill and diligence for eight years. During this time his newspaper approached every topic of reform.

His literary forte was the irony and satire of an apologist. In poetry and essay form, he ridiculed the folly of the traditional and religious, the fear of photography, foreign languages, or European clothing. The challenge

> Time and science are changing the world,
> And many nations suffer from impatience.
> Enough of quail shooting!
> Now we need to work.

was aimed at the Amir Habibullah and his fondness for hunting.[11] Tarzi's use of modern subjects and free verse introduced new literary possibilities and ideas. The process of reconciling Islam

and modernizing reform was a key theme in Tarzi's writing. The relation of religion to change is a recurring concern in contemporary prose and poetry.

A knowledge of European literature was part of Tarzi's background and his inclination toward it was shown in his work. Translated stories appeared in his newspaper, and several volumes of Jules Verne novels, translated by Tarzi, were among the first books printed in Afghanistan. Tarzi also published a travel memoir, Travel in Three Continents, written in 1890 after a trip to Syria, Egypt, and France. His other books, Science and Islam and What is to be Done, were collections of essays and editorials.

Mahmud Tarzi was the torchbearer in Afghanistan's modernization. To literary development, he contributed new techniques and a free press. In 1919 he assumed the position of foreign minister for Amir Amanullah, his son-in-law. Seraj ul-Akhbar ceased publication and was succeeded by an official, controlled newspaper, Aman-i Afghan (Afghan Peace). In the mid-twenties, a rising number of newspapers and periodicals were established following the catalysis of Tarzi's activity. This national press formed part of the reform program of Amir Amanullah. The publications were government-subsidized organs to educate the people. Provincial newspapers in Herat, Kandahar, Jalalabad, Baghlan, and Mazar-i Sharif were founded in this period. The weekly newspapers and bi-weekly reviews were usually four lithographed pages containing translated articles, editorials, official notices, and poetry. The editors had worked with or come under the influence of Tarzi and his newspaper. Few of the publications of that time lasted long but two can be traced to the present day.

Anis(Companion) was founded in 1927 and printed in Kabul. Its existence has not been continuous;

however, it is now one of the Ministry of Information and Culture's daily papers in the capital. Anis is written mainly in Persian and is distributed throughout the country. Its circulation is approximately 15,000.

Erfan (Knowledge) originated as an irregularly published pamphlet from Amanullah's Ministry of National Education. Largely polemical in the beginning, it is now a monthly journal of news and academic articles. It is still published by the Ministry of Education and is less Kabul-oriented and more national in scope than the numerous other ministry magazines.

The progress of literature in Afghanistan was interrupted during the civil war and anarchy of 1928-1929. Newspapers were shut down except for one, Habibul Islam (Message of Islam), which was designed to strengthen the regime of the Bandit Amir, Bacha-i Saqao.

General Nadir Khan successfully won control of the country in 1929 and began his reign as King Nadir Shah. At the beginning of his campaign in the former Southern province, now Pakthia, Nadir Khan established a newspaper called Islah (Reform). The thrust of the publication was a call for support and unity in the civil struggle. Nadir Khan brought the newspaper to Kabul and made it his court publication. It is now a daily government paper in the capital and a counterpart to Anis. Islah is written predominantly in Pashtu and apparently also has a circulation of about 15,000.

King Nadir Shah initiated a new development in the literary movement. In 1930 he established an intellectual circle called the Literary Society. The group consisted of twelve members and a good deal of élan vital. Sources speak of poetry readings by turbaned masters in the pavilion of the royal garden and literary prizes for younger poets.[12] The Society started a literary Revue de Kabul in 1930 and, two years later, initiated

publication of an almanac. The leader and poet laureate of the group was Abdullah Khan Qari. A tutor to the royal family, his poetry was stylized and polemical, full of homages to the King and the fatherland.

> Spring spread for us its rose-colored cloth
> With breezes to give it magnificance.
> Clouds passing above the beds of roses are swept by wind.
> Brooks decorate the fields with silvery designs,
> And plains are attired in emerald green.
> For you and me, the earth is our place of labor.
> Seed the grain and reap the harvest.
> O Fatherland! May your atmosphere be such
> That spring may lend you its freshness![13]

Other poets of the Society who published in Revue de Kabul were Abdul Hadi Dawi, editor of Aman-i Afghan, and Khalilullah Khalili. Classical forms (qasida, ghazal, mustazad) were used for themes of mystical love, nature, and patriotic allegiance to King and country. No effort was given to creative prose. Short stories and the novel were introduced to Afghanistan in translated form. Modern prose writers mention the influence on their work of Balzac, Kafka, Dostoevsky, and de Maupassant.[14] The relationship is more assumed than actual but it indicates that prose forms have been learned and incorporated from other sources.

In 1935 the Literary Socity set up a separate department for the development of Pashtu language and literature. This group was later (1937) fused with the original Literary Society under a new name, Pashtu Tolena--Pashtu Academy (or sometimes, Afghan Academy). Pashtunizing carried over to the Revue de Kabul which became more and more a journal in Pashtu. It is still published today under the name Kabul, entirely in Pashtu.

The traditions in Pashtu literature are

exemplified in Khushhal Khan Khatak, the tribal warrior poet of the seventeenth century. The figure of Khatak epitomizes the Pashtun tribal spirit, and his poetry, full of pride and self-assertion has been an enduring literary influence.

Khushhal Khan was born into a chieftain's family in 1613. The Khatak tribe occupied a position as guardian of the route between the plains of the Indus and the Khyber Pass. Its independent existence was maintained by battling both neighboring tribes and the Moghul Empire. In succeeding his father as chief, Khushhal Khan began a lifetime of struggle against adversities inflicted by the tribes, the Moghuls, and his own family. For five years, he was imprisoned and exiled by the Moghul ruler, Aurangzeb. After his return to tribal territory, his attempts to unify support against the Moghuls were abrogated by tribal defections and finally by the betrayal of his sons. The peace he wanted was never found and he died in 1689, fleeing for his life.

Khatak wrote a large body of poetry. The strength of his work is conveyed by its depth and intimacy. His images and themes are not conventional but the personal expressions of experience and thought. It is the reflection of a human life which "sings of religious devotion, of national hopes, of ambitions and disappointments, of erotic entanglements, and of everyday's small observations, joys, and sorrows."[15]

Whenever I have said a word
To any single friend
Immediately the secret's spread
Till all the world has known.
When the black partridge lifts its voice
From the lush meadowland
He is soon stripped of his regal plumes
By falcon or by hawk.
I've many quite devoted friends
The prize of passing years

But of their thousands there's not one
To call a confidant.[16]

Khatak's verses were often embodied in song. The Pashtu language has a harmonious rhyme and rhythm which characterize the poetry. Khatak's figure of the noble tribesman is a theme which has been reinforced in later literature.

Two modern masters of Pashtu poetry are Gul Pacha Ulfat and Abdul Rauf Benawa. These poets have contributed a thematic framework of realism. Ulfat writes:

Give me wealth of heart and eyes,
Keep the world with you;
Do not give delicious food,
That I cannot chew.
What I want is inspiration
For purposeful deeds.
Fairies and the Paradise
Are least of all my needs.
Sacrifice of Abraham
To me you can repeat.
With sermons of fear, O priest
My doubts you cannot meet.[17]

Pashtu culture is a cohesive unit. The motifs and forms such as the Pashtunwali or Code of Honor, the jirgah or council system, and the landai folk verses fit together in a closer manner than elements in Persian culture which is more attenuated and sophisticated. Consequently, it is interesting to look for exemplars of Pashtu culture as it is assimilated into Afghan nationalist identity in the time-line of future history. The incorporation of buzkashi, a game originating among the non-Pashtun ethnic groups of northern Afghanistan, into Afghan national life suggests this cultural integration.

Afghanistan's literate segment has always been minimal in proportion to the total population. Because the literate group is perhaps five per cent of the population, the development of

literature involves a small group of educated elite. It also indicates that literary themes and forms have developed directly and recently from oral traditions--from song and folklore in Pashtu and from narrative epics and couplets in Persian.

Members of the Literary Society and Pashtu Academy have been active from the beginning in public education. The societies originated before the Faculties, which were eventually united to become Kabul University, and provided many of the teachers for these later institutions. Whereas the impact of Tarzi was directed toward the royal family and secondarily to a small coterie of associates, the influence of the intellectual societies has been more broadly diffused, reaching the entire country. Their work has been a formative factor in the development of literature. Qari, for example, cultivated the Khorasanian style--eleventh century Persian classicism--and his influence is apparent in the work of his pupils, the present laureate Khalilullah Khalili and Abdul Haq Heravi, thus forming a literary school.

The poet has always had a definite and respected position in Islamic society. He is the figure of the court counselor, revered teacher, and wise Muslim. It was the members of the Literary Society who through their publications first introduced Afghanistan to other countries. The literary group of today, in a larger context, forms the intelligentsia in the country. Its members work for the government in high positions as ambassadors, ministers, and members of Parliament. Abdur Rahman Pazhwak, Afghan ambassador to the United Nations and former president of the General Assembly, is a well-known author of poetry and short stories. Benawa has served as minister of information and culture and Khalili as ambassador and member of Parliament.

The latter is perhaps the best-known and most admired contemporary poet in Afghanistan. Born in 1907 in Kabul, he was a student of Qari. Classical style and historical themes mark his poetry. Several volumes of his poems have been published in Kabul.[18] His love of the country is romantically expressed in impressionistic poems.

> How happy are the mountains and the waters there
> With pleasant twists and curls
> As from rock to rock they slip along
> Like elephants gliding in a flood,
> Drops of water on the morning rose
> As from a cup of nourishment some mercury.[19]

The classicism of Khalili, Qari, Betab, and others is an imitation of the past which derives effect from artful and articulate composition. Classical Persian poetry was composed within a strict system of rules. It is these conventions of style, form, and theme which modern classicists use. There are set patterns for the rhyme and meter of each verse. The order of the subject matter is defined by the type of poem. The complexities are compounded by the mystical element and its symbolism. The number of lines in a stanza is a set factor. Thus, the whole composition is approached under a rigid framework.

Contemporary literature in Afghanistan has both a popular category and a classical mainstream. The former reflects Afghanistan's level of development. It aims at general consumption, features values and attitudes for a newly literate population, and utilizes arbitrary, experimental forms. Much poetry is written in the form of free verse.

> Kabul Spring
> Wings from Asmayah,
> Sitting on the water.
> Greenery

and courtship of a village girl involving the interplay of parental machinations, an elderly landowner and a young soldier as suitors, and the girl's own provocative, romantic fantasies. In the background is the functioning of family life and village routine in an aura of superstitious social and religious custom. There is depth and skillful construction in this work by a young professor of the Faculty of Literature, Assadullah Habib.

Literary production in the provinces of Afghanistan is scanty. Literacy is limited, and publications are few. Newspapers do print local poetry, and the number of schools and libraries is growing. Cultural centers of the past, however, such as the old capital of Ghazna, the Bactrian city of Balkh, and Herat in the northwest, have largely settled into provincial status and given way in importance to the capital of Kabul where the Government Press and Education Press print the country's books and magazines.

Folklore thrives in legend and song throughout the country. This oral literature grows out of semi-legendary traditions of saints and miracles, great warriors, unfulfilled lovers, and the caprice of nature. Several volumes of these tales have been published recently.[21] We learn, for example, of Noah and his building of the Ark in a province near Kabul or of the shifting sands of Bagram which move but never diminish.

Afghanistan's literary tradition is rich indeed. It is a rewarding study in itself and also a valuable building block in the development process.

NOTES

1. Georg Morgenstierne, "Die afghanische literatur," in Die Literaturen Der Welt (Zurich, 1964), pp. 953-959; James Darmesteter, Chants Populaires des Afghans (Paris, 1888-90), passim.

2. N. A. Dvoryankov, "Development of Pushtu as the National and Literary Language of Afghanistan," Central Asian Review, XIV (1966), 210-21; G. F. Girs, Sovremennaia khudozhestvennaia proza na pushtu v Afganistane (Moscow, 1958); A. S. Gerasimova, Obshchestvennye motivy v sovremennoi literature Afganistana (Moscow, 1961).

3. H. J. de Dianous, "La litterature afghane de langue persane," Orient, 26,27,31 (1963-1964), 47-63, 129-43, 137-71; G. Scarcia, "Poeti e prosatori afghani moderni," Oriente Moderno, XLVI (1966), 254-67; "Adab va shi'ir dar Afghanistan," Rahnama-yi Kitab, VII (1343/1965), 215-61; Najibullah, Islamic Literature (New York, 1963), pp. 355-62.

4. Poems from the Divan of Khushal Khan Khattak (London, 1965), passim.; M. H. Zhubel, Negahi be-Adabiyat-i-Mu'aser dar Afghanistan (Kabul, 1959), pp. 29-31; M. G. Ghulami, Jangnamah (Kabul, 1957), passim.

5. Zhubel, pp. 3-14; H. Maiwandwal, "Literature of Afghanistan," Colloquium on Islamic Culture (Princeton, 1953), pp. 24-25; M. Ali, The Afghans (Kabul, 1965), passim.

6. A. R. Pazhwak, Afsanah-ha-yi mardum (Kabul, 1955), passim.; Paymane (Kabul, 1964), pp. 57-72; K. Khalili, Az Ash'ar-e Ostad Khalili (Kabul, 1962), p. 66.

7. Najibullah, p. 358.

8. Seraj ul-Akhbar (Kabul), June 3, 1916, p. 5.

9. Constitution of Afghanistan (Kabul, 1964), p. 19.

10. Ibid., p. 3.

11. Quoted by Louis Dupree, "Mahmud Tarzi: Forgotten Nationalist," American Universities Field Staff Reports, South Asia Series, Vol. VIII, No. 1 (New York, 1964), p. 27.

12. René Dollot, L'Afghanistan (Paris, 1937), pp. 315-20.

and courtship of a village girl involving the interplay of parental machinations, an elderly landowner and a young soldier as suitors, and the girl's own provocative, romantic fantasies. In the background is the functioning of family life and village routine in an aura of superstitious social and religious custom. There is depth and skillful construction in this work by a young professor of the Faculty of Literature, Assadullah Habib.

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III
POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IN AFGHANISTAN
THE AMANULLAH REFORMS

By Leon B. Poullada

Introduction and Historical Background

King Amanullah, who reigned in Afghanistan from 1919 to 1929, initiated the first full scale attempt to modernize that country. His extensive reform program crashed in ruins in the midst of a revolution which resulted in Amanullah's abdication and exile. Afghanistan thereby lost at least half a century of progress because the political chaos which followed Amanullah's abortive experiment in fact turned the clock of history back, not to 1919 when Amanullah ascended the throne, but rather to 1880 when his grandfather, the great Amir Abdur Rahman, began to forge a united Afghanistan.

This grievous setback to Afghanistan's ambitions to become a modern state has hampered Afghan development up until recent times. Moreover, the causes and effects of Amanullah's failure contain valuable lessons not only for the

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future of Afghanistan but for the broader problems of modernization in developing countries in general. The Amanullah experience, therefore, deserves careful analytic and objective study as the type of case history which is perhaps as close an approximation as the social sciences can achieve to the controlled experiments of the exact sciences.

Chroniclers of the Amanullah era have been few. For the most part they have been historians, journalists, or polemicists. Nearly all have concluded that Amanullah's overthrow was caused by resistance to his modernization program. The unstated theory behind this conclusion is that his abrupt attempt to impose modern ways on a deeply traditional Islamic society resulted in explosive resistance and civil war. If this version of events goes unchallenged and receives little objective scrutiny, then the implications for violence and strife inherent in other attempts to modernize such traditional societies as that of Afghanistan and of other countries cast in similar molds are grim indeed. But it is the thesis of this paper, instead, that an accurate examination of the events surrounding the Amanullah fiasco demonstrates that Amanullah's downfall was caused, not by the clash of a modern reform program with a traditional society, but rather by internal political dynamics based on historical conflicts between the central government authority and dissident tribal groups. In this view the irritations and resistances generated by the modernization program were tangential to the basic conflict between government and tribes and therefore not a central or proximate cause of the rebellion. The modernization program was at most a contributory factor which may have accentuated, inflamed and to some extent served as a rationalization for the tribal rebellion, but it was not a necessary or a sufficient cause

of the disaster. To better understand the complex relationship of factors which contributed to the Amanullah debacle we must have firmly in mind certain basic elements which are essential to the modernization process and also review briefly some pertinent slices of Afghan history.

Modernization involves much more than social change, economic development, or the adoption of Western customs. It requires a profound transformation of the value system of the entire society. It demands the widespread adoption of an ideology which involves (a) new economic relationships of production, distribution, and consumption; (b) new social attitudes in which rational, secular, and educational values prevail over traditional religious and kinship ties; (c) new commitments to positivistic and scientific methods of truth-seeking, problem solving, and manipulation of, rather than submission to, a hostile environment; and lastly (d) new political orientations in which elite rule is rapidly dispersed into mass participation while at the same time links of national loyalty are forged on the basis of cooperation and legitimacy rather than on coercion or naked power.

While all these elements of modernization are interrelated and interdependent, it is to the last, i.e., to the question of political organization that we must direct special attention as being most apposite to the Afghan case. Some form of effective political unity must be established before the other elements of modernization can adequately germinate and bear fruit. The reason for this is fairly obvious, for how can economic prosperity blossom, or a scientific spirit of inquiry flourish, or education flower, or the straitening bonds of tradition, religious bigotry, dogma, and kinship wither, or democratic rule disseminate except in a polity where at least an adequate measure of settled order and

stability prevails, and where the authority of the government and the loyalty of its citizens are at least in sufficient harmony to permit the prudent husbanding, marshaling, and allocation of resources, and the establishment of an intellectual, spiritual, and commercial climate in which the delicate process of modernization can be incubated? In other words, without an adequate political base the profound transformations affecting all phases of life which modernization demands and the disciplined total national effort which all this implies are bound to falter and perhaps to fail. Self-evident as all this may appear, it is nevertheless sad but true that this essential principle of political science has escaped the notice of most policy makers and is just now beginning to be perceived and acted upon by national leaders involved in the modernization process. The Amanullah case is thus both important and topical since it provides confirming evidence of the essentiality of an adequate political base to support a successful modernization effort.

Probably the most important element of the required political base is some effective form of national unity. For any country deeply riven by irreconcilable cleavages whether based on ethnic, geographical, ideological, or similar grounds, meaningful progress in modernizing is very difficult if not impossible. In the Afghan case, then, we must examine the stage of national unity which had been achieved when Amanullah launched his extensive reforms.

Most historians aver that Afghanistan became a nation during the reign of Ahmad Shah Abdali (later known as Durrani), who ruled from 1747 to 1773. His election as paramount chief of the Durrani tribe, one of the major Pashtun tribes, and his subsequent career of conquest, consolidation, and skillful administration certainly

represented a turning point in Afghan history. Before that time Afghanistan as a geographic entity had no national identity. Its territory had formed part of many empires and kingdoms--Aryan, Scythian, Persian, Mongol, Moghul, etc. Two major empires, the Ghaznavid and the Ghorid, had also originated on Afghan soil but the consciousness and reality of national identity associated with the specific territory that is now Afghanistan simply did not exist. It may be true that with the coming of Ahmad Shah the spark of national consciousness was lit. But if so it was soon extinguished. From the standpoint of political science it seems very doubtful whether the empire based essentially on a Pashtun tribal confederation which Ahmad Shah established could qualify as a nation state in any exact use of the term. For a short time his military prowess and administrative genius did provide effective though precarious tribal unity and no doubt he established the basis for Pashtun hegemony which persists to this day, but his accomplishment was essentially a personal one, a triumph of his towering personality. He made no headway towards institutionalizing or preserving such rudimentary or inchoate nationhood as he may have achieved. As a result his accomplishments died with him.

Constant dynastic struggles, internecine warfare, and political instability were the rule rather than the exception in Afghanistan after the death of Ahmad Shah. Occasionally talented rulers like Dost Muhammad (1835-1863) managed briefly to restore some semblance of order and unity to this troubled land but the task was immensely complicated by internal dissension both within the ruling Durrani tribe and between the Durrani and other Pashtun tribes, particularly the Ghilzai. These internal conflicts are examined in some detail in the following section. Adding to domestic impediments to national unity was the

further complication of a constant threat to Afghan independence--a by-product of the imperial conflict between the British and the Russians whose inexorable march towards the heart of Central Asia seemed destined to end in a massive collision in which Afghanistan undoubtedly would have been the principal victim. As a result of this Anglo-Russian competition Afghanistan was twice physically invaded by the British in the Anglo-Afghan wars of 1838 and 1878 and many times its borders were threatened and nibbled away by the Russians.

National unity and the establishment of a stable political order were almost impossible to achieve under such extreme conditions of internal division and external pressure. Indeed it was not until the reign of Abdur Rahman (1880-1901) that we can really say that Afghanistan began to assume the attributes of true nationhood. In 1878 the British, once again nervous over Russian advances into Central Asia, helped unite the Afghans by invading their country in the Second Afghan War. Initial British military successes bogged down in such a political morass that the British, who had invaded Afghanistan to overthrow an allegedly pro-Russian Amir, were ultimately delighted to hand the country over to Abdur Rahman, a grandson of Dost Muhammad, who had spent eleven years in Russia being groomed as a pro-Russian claimant to the throne.

Fortunately for the British, Abdur Rahman, "The Iron Amir," was first and foremost an Afghan and he cared not a whit for either Russia or Britain. Once having won the throne in 1880 he did everything within his power to keep them both at arm's length. His importance for the purposes of our study lies in the fact that the central policy of this extremely able though cruel and cunning ruler was to weaken the power of the tribes and incidentally of the mullahs

who were an important source of support for the tribal khans. The stories of his severities and the cunning ruses by which he curbed and controlled his recalcitrant countrymen are legion. He himself explains in his autobiography that under the guise of giving the tribal chiefs more power he "liberalized" his government by instituting a royal council with the most powerful chiefs as members. Of course he gave no power to the council but having all the chiefs in Kabul under his watchful eye insured they would not be off in the mountains plotting against the Amir.[1]

By devices of this sort and by sheer repression Abdur Rahman managed to keep the power of the tribes in check and went even further, first, by laying the foundations of a bureaucracy for civil administration; second, by organizing and equipping a professional army which for the first time in Afghan history was to some extent loyal to the government and independent of the tribal structure; and lastly, by designating and training his son, Habibullah, to succeed him. In other words, Abdur Rahman made a vital contribution to the modernization process when he went beyond merely keeping the tribes under control and proceeded to <u>institutionalize</u> the <u>bureaucracy</u>, the <u>army</u> and the <u>monarchy</u>. In this way he hoped to avoid the dynastic struggles and the lack of continuity which had in the past weakened the central government and strengthened tribal power. Thus, Abdur Rahman laid down the policy which every subsequent Afghan sovereign, except Amanullah, tried to follow; a policy of gradual or (if need be) forceful subjugation of recalcitrant tribes, of deliberate extension of the civil power of the central government behind the shield of a strong loyal army, and of strengthening the integrity and cohesiveness of the monarchy and the royal family. This policy is explicitly set forth as Abdur Rahman's political testament in

his autobiography. It constitutes a remarkable document which clearly demonstrates the clarity, vision, and wisdom the Iron Amir brought to the art of governing a fragmented and unruly people.

Abdur Rahman's son, Habibullah, succeeded his father in 1901 and his reign was an added tribute to the sagacity of Abdur Rahman, not only because Habibullah ascended the throne peacefully, a rare occurrence in Afghanistan up to that time, but also because of the cautious and steady pressure he exerted on the tribes, the amicable relations he managed to maintain with both Russia and Britain, and the able manner in which he managed to preserve Afghan neutrality during World War I. It was this latter policy, however, which earned him the reputation of being pro-British and may have accounted for his mysterious assassination in 1919.

Habibullah was assassinated while on a hunting trip. His third son, Amanullah, had been left in charge of Kabul and therefore in control of the garrison and the treasury. Although his two older brothers and presumably his uncle had better claims to the throne, Amanullah, acting on the advice of his father-in-law, Mahmud Tarzi, decided to seize power.[2] Habibullah had not imitated the wise example of his father and had failed to designate his successor. Afghan tribal custom does not recognize primogeniture as a matter of right but it is customary for younger sons to defer to older ones or to the oldest living brother of the dead chief. Amanullah's action, then, in seizing power, while not "illegal" was unusual and he was regarded by the more traditional chiefs as something of a usurper. This point is important because this lingering doubt about the legitimacy of his kingship made it easier to foment the revolt against him and to pass the throne to a collateral branch of the family. Moreover, Amanullah was a member of the

so-called "War Party" which had sympathized with the Central Powers, specially with Turkey in World War I, and opposed Habibullah's neutral (or as some claimed, pro-British) policies. A good many Afghans therefore suspected that Amanullah was in some way implicated in Habibullah's assassination. The fact that the true instigators or perpetrators of the murder were never discovered and that Amanullah hastily arranged for the execution of an apparent scapegoat added fuel to the fire of suspicion.[3]

In the view of many Afghans, then, Amanullah's ascension to the throne was tainted by overtones of usurpation and suspicions of parricide and regicide. On the other hand Amanullah had many assets. His mother was the Ulya Hazrat, the first queen and the daughter of the chief of the Barakzai Durrani, the most powerful tribal chief in the country.[4] Amanullah had been Habibullah's favorite son and was certainly the most able and energetic of the various possible candidates for the throne. As a leader in the "War Party" he enjoyed the tacit support and admiration of many Afghans whose sympathies and religious sentiments favored Turkey. Finally, he had the almost unanimous support of the fledgling intelligentsia because of his known liberal and "modern" views.

In what appears to have been a deliberate move to minimize his liabilities and enhance his assets, Amanullah declared a "holy war of independence" against the British. Britain had sought to protect itself from the threat of Russian intrigues in Afghanistan by asserting the right to conduct Afghanistan's foreign affairs. Amanullah and most Afghans felt this restriction to be a dishonorable blot on their national independence and sovereignty. In 1919 Britain was war-weary, anti-British agitation was running high in India, some of its best Indian troops had been decimated on the European and Middle

Eastern fronts, and Indian Muslims were thoroughly disaffected over the dismemberment of Turkey by the Allies and by the affront which this represented to the Caliphate and to Islam.[5] The time seemed propitious, therefore, for the Afghans to extract concessions from the British. The Afghan attack, launched on three fronts, succeeded only on the central front where the able generalship of Nadir Khan (later king) played havoc with British control of the tribal areas around Waziristan. But even this partial victory was obtained at the cost of invoking the aid of tribal power to supplement the Afghan Army. Reverses on the other fronts finally persuaded Amanullah that a negotiated end to the Third Afghan War was essential. He accordingly requested an armistice. The British, exhausted by World War I and weak in India, were happy to acquiesce. In the treaty signed at Rawalpindi in August 1919, British subsidies to Afghanistan were terminated and the right to handle its own foreign affairs was restored to Afghanistan. Thus Afghanistan regained its last vestige of full sovereignty and thereafter Afghans looked upon the Third Afghan War as their "War of Independence."

Amanullah emerged from the war with enormous prestige as the liberator of his country. He named Mahmud Tarzi to the post of foreign minister and at once set about establishing diplomatic relations with as many countries as would listen to an Afghan delegation which he dispatched to the capitals of all major powers. Soon foreign legations blossomed in Kabul and Amanullah now got down to the serious business of trying to bring to his "backward" country all those blessings of "progress" which were becoming commonplace in the outside world and which Afghanistan, in its splendid isolation, did not have. In this task too, his principal mentor was his foreign minister and father-in-law, Mahmud Tarzi. In a

subsequent section we shall discuss the bewildering plethora of social, economic, and political reforms which Amanullah displayed before the eyes of his dazed subjects. For the moment let us simply note that this sudden exposure to constant change and innovation after centuries of withdrawal startled most of his subjects, annoyed many, dismayed some, angered a few, frightened a small minority, and infuriated a minuscule group of extreme traditionalists.[6]

In 1924, the Mangal and Jaji tribes of the Khost area rebelled and moved on Kabul. These were small relatively weak tribes and would normally have been repressed with ease. Amanullah's army proved unequal to the task and again he had to call for the help of stronger tribes to subdue the rebellion. In the process he had to agree to rescind some of the reforms, particularly those dealing with military recruitment, but once the rebellion was smothered Amanullah reinstituted them. This volte face probably affected his credibility among tribal leaders and perhaps contributed to the ultimate fiasco. One of Amanullah's first acts after declaring himself Amir had been to promise the army that its pay would be doubled and conditions of service would be greatly improved.[7] At that time he needed the army's adherence to back his bid for the throne. But after his success he seems to have forgotten his promises to the army which remained a neglected instrument of power in Amanullah's hands.[8] Under these circumstances the army could hardly be expected to remain unwaveringly loyal to the central government if a serious conflict arose with the tribes from which, after all, most of the soldiers originated. The poor morale and weak loyalty of the army, as we shall see in a subsequent section, was not only significant but probably disastrous. In retrospect, it seems remarkable that the

army's poor showing during the Khost revolt did not alert Amanullah to the urgent need to strengthen his armed forces.

Amanullah, always a dreamer, ardently espoused the Pan-Islamic and Pan-Turanian movements and aspired to leadership in both. On this account he did once enjoy considerable prestige among religious leaders and Muslims generally in Afghanistan and other Islamic countries. Both dreams collapsed however; Pan-Islam before the rude realities of the Hijrat movement which dumped thousands of fleeing Indian Muslims into Afghanistan and left them stranded there; Pan-Turan before the complications in Afghan-Soviet relations which resulted from Amanullah's help to the Basmachi leaders, Ibrahim Beg and Enver Pasha.[9]

In 1927-1928 King Amanullah (as he now styled himself) and Queen Soraya made a triumphal tour of the Middle East, England, and the Continent including Russia. The wonders of the West of the "roaring twenties" made Amanullah more resolved than ever to modernize his country at forced draft. His stays in Turkey with Ataturk and in Persia with Reza Shah convinced him that modern ways could be introduced at a rapid pace. Therefore, on his return to Afghanistan in 1928, the tempo of his modernization program was accelerated. But in 1929 the entire edifice collapsed in the wake of another tribal revolt. This time the Shinwari rose and were quickly joined by other Pashtun tribes. The situation deteriorated rapidly when the Bacha-i Saqao (son of a water carrier), a Tajik bandit from the Koh-i Daman just north of Kabul cunningly chose this moment to attack the capital. Amanullah's army evaporated. Many soldiers deserted to the tribes and the astonished King found he had to abdicate in favor of his brother and flee in order to save himself and his immediate family. An attempt to reconquer Kabul from Kandahar using

Durrani tribal power as a base ran afoul of powerful Ghilzai tribal opposition. Amanullah fled to India and thence to Italy where he died in 1960, unhappy, apparently unrepentant, and feeling much misunderstood.

The postlogue to this unhappy tale can be told briefly. For a short period the Bacha-i Saqao ruled in Kabul. Eventually Nadir Khan, Amanullah's ex-commander in chief, returned with his brothers from self-imposed exile in France, and with the aid of the tribes defeated the Bacha and reestablished Pashtun dominance in Kabul. But Nadir Khan did not restore Amanullah to the throne. Instead Nadir, himself a member of a collateral branch of the royal family, was proclaimed King. He ruled a short time. In 1933 he was assassinated by a student, and his son Zahir Shah sits on the throne of Kabul today.

The purpose of the above historical summary has been to highlight the efforts made by four principal Afghan rulers to build a nation: Ahmad Shah Durrani (1747-1773), who first achieved a degree of tribal consensus and is therefore erroneously considered to be the father of the present Afghan nation; Dost Muhammad (1835-1863), who founded the Muhammadzai dynasty, united the country against the British invasion, and increased the power and authority of the central government by skillful tribal diplomacy; Abdur Rahman (1880-1901), who further reduced tribal power by repression, cunning, and by the first attempts to institutionalize the army, the civil service and the monarchy; and finally, Amanullah (1919-1929), who sought but failed to create national unity by an extensive program of social, economic, and political reforms. The theme which runs consistently through this period of Afghan history is the ebb and flow of political power between the central government and the fiercely independent Pashtun tribes. The thesis which I

shall try to develop in the remainder of this paper is that this tension between national authority and tribal power was the central and determinant factor in the failure of Amanullah's program of modernization. Let us now examine the dynamics of tribal power in more detail and the crucial role this factor played in the collapse of the Amanullah regime.

The Politics of Tribal Power

It is highly significant that the revolt against Amanullah broke out among the tribes where his modernizing reform program made negligible impact. It was not the urban residents nor the rural villagers who took up arms against their sovereign. Instead it was Shinwari tribesmen who were remote from Kabul, whose women habitually went unveiled anyway, who were not subject to the new administrative rules of taxation, who were not harassed by corrupt petty bureaucrats, who were never compelled to wear western dress, who continued to observe Friday as their day of prayer without penalty, and who were not strictly subjected to the rigors of the new recruiting practices.

The Shinwari are not one of the large powerful tribes. The incident which set them off had nothing whatever to do with the modernization program. A small party of Ghilzai nomads was passing through Shinwari territory and, mistaking some Shinwari for brigands, fired on and killed several of them. The Ghilzai were captured and taken to the nearest government commandant who, apparently suitably bribed by the Ghilzai, released them. A small group of Shinwari then attacked and captured the army post and seized the commandant as well as stores of arms. This initial success inflamed them and they followed it up by attacks on other nearby

forts where the army offered little resistance and the tribesmen captured large stores of arms and munitions. Thus far the tribal attack followed the classical and familiar pattern of similar incursions into settled territory known for centuries in this part of the frontier. But now the weakness and inaction displayed by the central government brought out the rest of the Shinwari tribe to share in the spoils. Soon Jalalabad, the capital of Eastern province, fell and Amanullah's winter palace was burned. At this point Amanullah, leading late and from weakness, sent one of his top officials to parley with the Shinwari. The Shinwari reacted by sending deputations to other tribes, spreading the news of the ease of their early success and inviting them to join the insurrection. It was at this point, when the movement was already under way, that the mullahs cast their weight and religious oratory in favor of rebellion. In the various jirgahs (councils) held to decide whether or not to join the fray, the mullahs used the reforms as arguments against Amanullah. The more powerful tribes soon joined the Shinwari and thus what was essentially a small tribal raid turned into a revolt which Amanullah's feeble army could not and hardly even tried to control.[10]

The question arises as to why a local minor tribal incident flared into a full scale revolt. To answer this question we must know a good deal more about the politics of the Afghan tribes. Unfortunately this is a subject about which there has been practically no research or writing. A good deal of material by former British officials on the Northwest Frontier of India does exist but it deals more with the origin, customs, and warlike prowess of the tribes than with their internal political structure and function. What is more, most of this writing refers to the tribes facing the Indus rather than those facing

the Hindu Kush. Olaf Caroe's standard work on the Pathan (Pashtun) tribes sheds little light on tribal politics in Afghanistan.[11] James Spain, the lone American scholar who has studied the tribes in depth, has not focused on the political dynamics of the tribes on the Afghan side.[12] Spain, Caroe, and Fraser-Tytler, however, show clearly in their writing that they are fully aware of how Afghan history is permeated by the tribal problem. The only writer who explicitly ascribes the Amanullah disaster to tribal politics is the Bokharan refugee, Chokaiev.[13]

The present inquiry into tribal politics starts with the fundamental recognition that political dynamics in Afghanistan revolve around two basic conflict situations. One is the conflict within and between the tribes themselves and the other is the historical conflict between any central government authority and the tribes in general.

In examining intra- and inter-tribal conflict, we start with the basic fact that for the past several centuries the two largest and most powerful rival Pashtun tribes involved in Afghan history have been the Ghilzai and the Abdali (now called Durrani). The Ghilzai have never taken well to "civilization" or settled ways. They have remained to a large extent nomadic, aloof, and warlike. The Durrani on the other hand have led something of a double life. While a substantial part of the tribe has remained undomesticated, another part gradually settled, first around the Kandahar area and later in other parts of the country. It was this more sedentary and settled segment of the Durrani that produced the great Ahmad Shah.[14]

The election of Ahmad Shah as paramount chief of the Durrani casts some interesting light on intra-tribal politics. The Durrani tribe was historically divided by rivalry between its

principal sub-tribes, the Popolzai and the Barakzai. Ahmad Shah belonged to the Saddozai clan of the Popolzai Durrani. The Saddozai was a fairly weak and minor clan. It was therefore possible for all the Durrani chieftains to agree on the election of Ahmad Shah only because apart from being distinguished by his military prowess, he would have to court the good will of the chiefs of the more powerful clans. This he did by conferring upon them military honors and positions of power and using them fully in his extensive campaigns of conquest. It was on this basis of political compromise and accommodation with the powerful leaders of the tribe that Ahmad Shah ruled and expanded his empire.

The first rudimentary central government in Afghanistan was therefore created and maintained as a delicate balance of power within the Durrani tribe. The powerful Ghilzai tribe remained outside this arrangement, aloof in its tribal isolation, never sympathetic to the Durrani dynasty(the Durrani had helped the Persian conqueror Nadir Shah inflict an overwhelming defeat on the Ghilzai) but unable or unwilling to challenge its power directly. In the three Afghan wars, however, the Ghilzai figured prominently, joining with the Durrani and other tribes to repel the foreign invader, and throughout the entire period of Durrani hegemony the Ghilzai have loomed ominously in the background ready to pounce whenever outside intervention stirred up latent aggressiveness or internal weakness made the central government an easy prey. It was the Ghilzai who dealt Amanullah the coup de grâce.

After the death of Ahmad Shah, the internal Durrani conflict between the Saddozai and the Barakzai flared up again in the dynastic struggles which eventually resulted in the passing of the throne from the Saddozai ruler, Shah Shujah, to Dost Muhammad, the first Barakzai ruler. His clan,

the Muhammadzai, was the most powerful and influential of the Barakzai sub-tribe and hence of the Durrani tribe. Thereafter, except for a brief period when the British restored the Saddozai, the Muhammadzai ruled Afghanistan. Throughout this period, then, the political history of Afghanistan has been deeply influenced by the fundamental tensions between the two great tribes, the Ghilzai and the Durrani, and within the Durrani tribe by the struggle for preeminence and power between the Popolzai (Saddozai) and Barakzai factions.

But at the same time, cutting across inter- and intra-tribal divisions, conflicts and loyalties, there has been another basic conflict between any central government which sought to impose a national authority and the centrifugal forces of a tribal society whose ideals and way of life depend upon untrammeled freedom from external restraints and demands. Thus the ruling faction in Kabul, which had become sedentary, domesticated, and "civilized," could never count on the undivided loyalty and support even of its own tribe to say nothing of the Ghilzai and the many other tribes who continued to dwell in what Carleton Coon has termed the "land of insolence."[15]

A detailed study of the underlying factors which motivated and enabled the Pashtun tribes to remain in this state of perpetual tension with the central government is beyond the capacity and scope of this paper. However, some of those factors can be briefly summarized as follows:

1. The geographic isolation, the broken mountainous terrain, and the inaccessibility of the tribal areas in eastern and southern Afghanistan have protected the tribes from hostile penetrations or incursions by the central authorities.
2. The impoverished terrain on which most of the tribes live has encouraged a life of lawlessness, violence, and defiance.
3. No mystique of kingship has existed in Afghanistan. Originally the central government was in effect an emanation of a tribal confederation and the Amir was considered a paramount chief, a primus inter pares, by other tribal chiefs. The concept of legitimacy and of religiously sanctioned royalty developed slowly and only in relatively recent times.[16]
4. The "Great Game," the clash of Russian and British imperial interests in Central Asia, had a profound effect on the independence and pugnacity of the Pashtun tribes. The Amirs, knowing that they lacked the power to repel invasions by such powerful neighbors as Russia and Britain, deliberately encouraged the fierce and warlike inclinations of the tribes as a "prickly hedge" and as a handy reservoir of trained guerrilla fighters. Indeed, in all three Anglo-Afghan wars it was the tribes who bore the brunt of the fighting.[17]
5. The frequent dynastic quarrels often impelled one or the other of the contenders for the throne to call on tribal assistance for his cause. After each such tribal intervention the tribal chiefs emerged more arrogant, more disposed to plunder and prey on the settled population, and more independent of the central government, while the latter on the contrary usually lost both power and prestige.

This brief exposition gives some idea of the reasons for tribal power, independence and fierce disposition. But the central government also had at its disposal certain sources of strength. Among these were:

1. The geographic isolation of the tribes mentioned above gave the government a rather

free hand in the rest of the country. This was the productive part of the country which generated revenue for the central coffers. In other words the Amir had access to gold that often proved more effective than guns against tribal intransigence.

2. The fragmented and impoverished terrain in which the tribes lived fomented inter-tribal jealousies, animosities and strife. The tribes found it extremely difficult to unite or join forces for any common cause. It was therefore fairly easy for a skillful Amir to play one tribe off against another and to use subsidies and bribery as potent weapons to command loyalty or neutralize enmity.

3. A lesser but nevertheless significant source of power for the central government was the incipient nationalism which gradually emerged, gained strength, and made itself felt even in the tribal areas. We have already noted that the wars with the British did much to stimulate this nationalist sentiment. No doubt if Afghanistan had been subjected to actual colonial occupation, nationalism would have developed much more quickly and with greater strength.

4. The fact that the ruler had his own base of tribal power as a member of the Durrani tribe limited the extent to which other tribes would dare to challenge the government. On the other hand, the Amir had to placate and defer to the other Durrani chiefs. On balance, the Durrani connection was a source of power for the central government. This was especially true when the Amir was a strong personality and adept at distributing offices and favors not only among Durrani but also among Ghilzai and other tribal chiefs.

5. Finally, a slower but perhaps in the long run more potent force working as a prop to the central government and as a solvent of tribal independence has been the general world trend toward consolidation of nation-states. This is a form of recognition of nationalism by the international political system and its effect is to make groupings such as tribes anachronistic.

From this all too brief summary of the factors affecting the power relationship between the tribes and the central government, it is possible to understand that the political dynamics of Afghanistan at least since 1747 have consisted of a balanced tension between the power and authority of the central government on the one hand and of the tribes on the other. This tension has been dynamic and variable rather than static and stable. During the reigns of strong Amirs like Ahmad Shah, Dost Muhammad, and Abdur Rahman, the center of gravity of power and influence shifted in favor of the central government. These Amirs were successful rulers because they were adept at maximizing those elements of government strength and at exploiting those elements of tribal weakness which have been briefly enumerated. On the other hand, whenever weak or inept Amirs occupied the throne, tribal power expanded, dynastic quarrels flourished, brigandage increased, and the writ of the central government was not honored in the land. But tribal power was never completely subdued even during the reigns of the three great Amirs. Ahmad Shah funneled off excess tribal aggressiveness in constant foreign wars; Dost Muhammad utilized it to repel the British; and Abdur Rahman, who faced four major tribal revolts during his reign, manipulated it by using one group of tribes to defeat another. It was Abdur Rahman, however, who recognized the ultimate futility of this game and

decided that the vicious circle could never be broken unless the central government developed its own independent army with sufficient strength to command tribal obedience and impose eventual submission. This he set out to achieve most energetically and he recommended to his successors that they carry on the task.[18] His son, Habibullah, did so only halfheartedly and his grandson, Amanullah, not at all.

With this view of the nature of the political dynamics of Afghanistan it is now possible to look upon Amanullah's modernization program and its consequences in an entirely different light from that in which it is usually cast. The tribes themselves were little affected by the reforms; yet it was the tribes which rebelled. The urban and settled rural population upon whom the reforms principally impinged did not rise in rebellion against Amanullah, but rather were the victims of tribal looting and rapine as the revolt developed. Under these circumstances it seems difficult to accept the standard explanation that the Afghan revolt was the result of an ill-advised and premature modernization program. Premature it may have been and parts of it certainly were gauche and inexpertly implemented but as the underlying cause for a rebellion which destroyed a dynasty, the modernization program appears, on an objective examination of the facts, to be a poor candidate.

This does not mean that no connection existed between the modernization program and the revolt or that the reforms played no part in the debacle. Certainly to the extent that the more unpopular reforms were exploited as a rationalization for the revolt and as propaganda to justify the overthrow of Amanullah, they did play an important role. This was specially true of the distortions, exaggerations, and deliberate fabrications with which some mullahs in the tribal areas forced

the decision to join the revolt. We must remember, too, that we are dealing here with the nebulous area of human motivation where the differences between what is an excuse, a reason, a motive, and a cause are shrouded in the penumbra of an infinite capacity for self-deception.

It has also been suggested, and is a widespread belief among Afghans, that the tribal revolt was instigated and supported by the British because of Amanullah's friendly relations with Bolshevik Russia. This theory was of course encouraged by the Soviets in the period immediately following the Amanullah revolution.[19] Rumors to this effect were also widely current in India at the time. These were largely centered on the alleged participation of Colonel Lawrence (of Arabia) who at that period was in the Northwest Frontier posing as Aircraftsman Shaw. These allegations were taken seriously enough to move the government of India to issue an official denial and to provoke questions to Austen Chamberlain in Parliament.[20]

The role which Afghanistan's foreign affairs, and more specifically Britain's tribal policy in the Northwest Frontier, played in the Amanullah revolt is without doubt of importance and a worthy subject for detailed and objective study and research. Such an examination, however, is beyond the scope of this paper. All that need be said here is that such evidence as is now available seems fairly convincing that foreign affairs played at most a supporting role in the tribal rebellion. Britain's participation in the imbroglio was perhaps important more for what the British refrained from doing than for what they did. Britain might have done more in the way of restraining some of the tribes on its side of the Durand Line and it could presumably have done more to extend military assistance to Amanullah when he was <u>in extremis</u>. But any final judgment

on these issues must await additional research and investigation.

If the analysis of political dynamics in Afghanistan set forth in this paper has any validity it would seem that to search for the basic causes of the Amanullah rebellion in the resistance to the modernization program or in British intrigues is to miss the mark. A more tenable hypothesis and one more in keeping with the historical realities of Afghan politics is simply that Amanullah permitted the authority and power of the central government to be weakened to a point where the tribes felt secure in challenging its authority. When that point was reached all that was needed was a minor incident such as the Shinwari-Ghilzai clash for the rest of the powder keg to explode. It is specially interesting in this connection to note that Amanullah himself vociferously denied that the reforms had anything to do with his overthrow. Publicly, at least, he never accused the British of plotting against him. On the few occasions in which he discussed the revolt he asserted that he had been the victim of a political coup aided and abetted by religious fanatics.[21] He never elaborated on just what he meant by "a political coup" but since most of the tribal chiefs in and out of court circles had broken with him or quickly joined the rebellion, his meaning seems fairly clear.

The progressive weakening of the central government under Amanullah was probably the result of a large number of factors, the principal ones being:

1. Amanullah's own personality and methods of work. While this judgment is subject to further scrutiny because so many of the sources seem biased, most descriptions of Amanullah stress the fact that he was an erratic, whimsical, unstable, vain, and short-tempered man. His mercurial temperament

made him want to supervise everything personally and be everywhere at once. He took the advice of sycophants and spurned that of more seasoned officials. He seems to have lost touch with popular feelings which would account for many of the ill-advised and ill-timed reforms. He was a visionary but seemed to lack the organizational ability to institutionalize his dreams. Once a program was proclaimed he took it as accomplished and moved on to a new one. He seems to have been under the mistaken impression that his modernization program was being received with great enthusiasm by his people.

2. Partly as a result of his personality but even more because of his failure to understand the true nature of power politics in his country, he recklessly alienated most of the chiefs and powerful figures of his own Durrani tribe. The outstanding example was his disagreement with Nadir Khan who had been his commander-in-chief during the Third Afghan War. Nadir Khan was the head of the influential Musahiban family of the powerful Muhammadzai clan. He and his brothers understood and had personal contact with tribal politics to a greater extent than probably anyone else in Amanullah's court. Nadir Khan broke with Amanullah over the latter's neglect of the army and went into self-imposed exile. He returned after Amanullah's fall and, with the aid of the tribes he knew so well, became King and founder of the present ruling dynasty. Amanullah even alienated his old mentor, Mahmud Tarzi.

3. We have already noted how the social and religious reforms bewildered and unnecessarily offended many of the people in the settled areas and many of the religious leaders. We have also noted that the central

government had to look more and more to the urban and settled rural districts for revenue and political support vis-à-vis the tribal areas. The reforms and more particularly the manner and pace of their imposition weakened the loyalty of these important segments of the Afghan population.

4. The high and sometimes wasteful costs of the modernization program weakened the economic fiber of the revenue system of the central government and deprived it of one of its principal weapons against the tribes, gold.

5. Finally and probably most significant, Amanullah's military policy was disastrous under the circumstances. In the absence of national political unity which was implicit in the tribal situation, a strong and independent army seemed to be essential to any attempt to introduce the kind of changes Amanullah envisioned. This was the advice of Abdur Rahman, it was the advice Ataturk had given Amanullah, it was the advice Nadir Khan pressed upon him, and even the expatriate but discerning Tarzi counseled the wisdom of this course. Only Amanullah failed or refused to see it. He imposed drastic economies in the army, reduced its pay when he had promised to raise it, and changed the recruiting system in a manner calculated to challenge the authority of the rural and tribal chiefs. Such a military policy seems particularly reckless in the face of the army's poor showing during the Third Afghan War and in the 1924 Khost rebellion. On both occasions it became necessary for the central government to play the role of suppliant for tribal assistance. With such friends, Amanullah needed no enemies to insure his eventual downfall.

To summarize, then, we can say that in addition to the problems involving Amanullah's personality and methods, he violated the most fundamental rules of Afghan politics by weakening the four bases of power of the central government: The loyal tribal chiefs, the settled urban and rural population, the economy, and the army. Such a combination of declining strengths did not pass unnoticed among the tribes and when the power, prestige, and authority of the central government sank below the danger point, the tribes moved in for the kill.

The reforms which had affected the tribes only slightly, if at all, made a useful pretext to rationalize the rebellion after it had started and to give it religious overtones which would insure a substantial measure of popular support. It is, therefore, only to the extent that the malfunctions and imperfections of the reforms may have contributed to weakening the bases of power of the central government that it is correct to say that the modernization program was "responsible" for the revolt.

It is a significant and relevant fact supporting the hypothesis that tribal power was the central phenomenon of the rebellion that in the early stages of the revolt Amanullah's own Durrani tribe made no effort to help him. Later, when the Tajik bandit, Bacha-i Saqao, had taken advantage of the confusion and ruled in Kabul, the Durrani tribe did rally briefly and halfheartedly behind Amanullah, who had fled to Kandahar, but then the powerful Ghilzai rose between Kandahar and Kabul and the Durrani quietly withdrew. This was the coup de grâce for Amanullah. Repudiated in effect by his own tribe, Amanullah had no choice but flight and exile. Thus ended Afghanistan's first serious and conscious attempt to modernize. It is against this background of the realities of Afghan tribal politics that we

can now proceed to examine in greater detail the content of Amanullah's modernization program.

The Amanullah Reforms

No serious objective study of the Amanullah reforms or of their impact on various segments of Afghan society has ever been made. The available literature on the subject is weak and seems to reflect contradictions, bias, reliance on rumors, and in some cases deliberate distortions. It is no doubt true that the mercurial Amanullah unleashed such a barrage of innovations in so short a period of time that he generated a good deal of confusion among his supporters, to say nothing of his detractors.

The first step in examining the reforms in a more systematic manner is to list and classify the reforms without attempting to evaluate them. We shall omit from this taxonomy, however, those measures ascribed to Amanullah which are so clearly beyond the pale of reason and so inconsistent with the reality of the man or his epoch as to merit no serious consideration. Scholarly investigation should not dignify with serious inquiry, for example, reports that Amanullah imported a factory to make soap from corpses or that the reforms were part of a Soviet Communist plot in which Amanullah participated in order to undermine Islam, disrupt the country, and facilitate a Soviet takeover of Afghanistan as a prelude to invading India.[22] Putting to one side, therefore, manifestly absurd reports of this kind, it is possible to make the following classification of those reforms fragmentarily reported in the literature which bear the stamp of credibility and reason.[23]

A. Social Reforms

1. Those <u>principally</u> concerned with customs and mores.

a) <u>Dress</u>. Certain decrees were issued at various times by Amanullah which required Afghans to wear Western dress.
b) <u>Veil</u>. Proclamations and speeches urged women to remove the veil.
c) <u>Women's Rights</u>. This subject remains unclear and will require additional research. Amanullah apparently never officially tried to abolish purdah. He apparently did advocate more freedom for women in general terms.
d) <u>Marriage Laws</u>. There seems to have been some effort to prevent students from contracting marriage. A provision in the new Civil Code apparently required the woman's consent for arranged marriages.

2. Those <u>primarily</u> concerned with education.
a) Large-scale expansion of secular compulsory primary education was contemplated. Some primary schools were to be coeducational.
b) Adult education classes for government employees were established.
c) English, French, and German secondary schools to prepare students for European universities were founded.
d) Some itinerant teachers were provided for nomads.
e) A few Afghan girls were sent to Turkey for education.

3. Those <u>primarily</u> concerned with religion.[24]
a) Government allowances and subsidies to religious leaders were reduced.
b) Standards for education of mullahs

were promulgated and a government school for religious leaders was founded. Students were not permitted to attend the Deoband School of Theology in India apparently because it was deemed too "reactionary."
c) The application of Islamic law was circumscribed and in some cases replaced by secular codes (see Political Reforms below).
d) The day of rest was changed from Friday to Thursday.
e) An effort was made to remove the influence of mullahs in the army.

B. Political Reforms

1. Afghanistan's first constitution was promulgated in 1923. It provided for a legislative assembly, a secular judiciary, and a constitutional hereditary monarchy.
2. An administrative code also issued in 1923 established government departments, regulated the conduct of public officials, and prescribed detailed office procedures.
3. A legal code issued in 1924 provided for certain secular courts to perform certain functions formerly handled by qazis, required qazis to prove competence in Islamic law, established a secular school of law, and prescribed qualifications for mullahs.
4. Military reforms reduced the strength of the army and changed the system of recruitment from levies to a lottery method.
5. In foreign affairs, an ambitious expansion of contacts was undertaken with principal European countries. Foreign missions were opened in Kabul.

Foreign technicians in substantial numbers were brought to Afghanistan to help in the modernization program.

C. Economic Reforms

1. A complete reorganization of the tax structure was undertaken. Customs tariffs were rationalized and the customs service was overhauled. Severe penalties were imposed for smuggling and bribery. Land and property taxes were made uniform and the revenue service was reorganized. Tax collections were more strictly enforced.
2. Extensive projects to improve communications were undertaken. A telegraphy and telephone system was installed and technicians were sent to India for training. The postal system was reorganized. Major north and south roads to India and the USSR were started. Aviation was encouraged and a new airport was built in Kabul.
3. Forced labor (begeer) was prohibited except in the "national service."
4. A large number of new construction projects were undertaken. A new capital was started at Darulaman near Kabul and a new summer capital was built at Paghman complete with opera house. A miniature railroad connected Kabul with Darulaman.

The above is a fairly comprehensive list of the major changes which Amanullah sought to introduce. Taken at face value in their totality as related to the many facets of national life which they affected as well as the relatively short time span in which they were attempted, these reforms amounted to a very substantial modernization program. Indeed the avowed aim of this program,

as proclaimed on several occasions by Amanullah himself, was to alter completely the structure and nature of Afghan society. Amanullah described himself as a "revolutionary," and he seemed to be entirely conscious of the fact that he was engaged not in a simple program to "reform," that is, to ameliorate certain conditions, but rather to revolutionize the traditional character of Afghan life and transform Afghanistan into an entirely new kind of entity.[25]

Such transcendental and radical changes imposed so suddenly on a people long immured in a stultified, isolated, static but familiar and comfortable way of life, were bound to produce amazement, wonder, and resentment. Most people, after all, do not like change. New situations require alertness, mental agility, accommodation, and the sacrifice of deeply ingrained habitual behavior patterns. All this is uncomfortable and even painful. The question, then, is not whether Amanullah's modernization program was resisted by people. Such resistance can be almost taken for granted. The question is whether the resentment and the impact of change were of such magnitude and nature as to produce the spontaneous revolt and the expulsion of Amanullah which, in the standard version of Afghan history, is supposed to have occurred. Despite the size and significance of the reform program, I believe that a more careful and objective analysis of the modernization program provides substantial evidence in support of a different hypothesis, one which would place much greater weight on the role played in the revolt by political dynamics of an entirely different kind and magnitude.

Before we examine this question, however, it is essential to take a closer look at the real and effective impact of the reforms themselves. First of all, it is important to note that Amanullah himself had never been out of Afghanistan

until the year before the collapse of his government. Many of the "Western" reforms which he advocated therefore came to him second hand. In this respect, the influence of his father-in-law, Mahmud Tarzi, was without doubt of much importance.[26] Tarzi had lived in exile, mostly in Turkey, for the major part of his adult life. The first important item to note, then, is that the Amanullah reforms were in fact the product of a King who had no firsthand knowledge of the problems of the "modern" world and a minister who had little firsthand experience with the realities of traditional political life in Afghanistan.

Tarzi had drunk deeply in the fountains of the Young Turks and was a worldly early twentieth century "liberal" in the older and more dignified sense of that term. He had a bitter dislike for colonialism in general and for Britain in particular. He was a brilliant writer, a fine conversationalist, fluent in several languages, and bore himself with a commanding presence which inspired respect and affection. Tarzi returned to Afghanistan during the reign of Amanullah's father, Habibullah. The Amir at first was captivated by Tarzi's charm and personality. He permitted him to publish the liberal newspaper, Seraj ul-Akhbar, and for some time seemed captivated by Tarzi's advocacy of modern reforms. But Habibullah was essentially a conservative and had been steeped by his father, the great Abdur Rahman, in the political realities of his country. His interest in modernization therefore remained superficial, confined largely to his fascination for cars, photographic gadgets and the like. As for actually undertaking any of the fundamental social changes which Tarzi advocated, Habibullah avoided any confrontation with the modern world. In the end, the Amir and Tarzi drifted apart. But the latter found an avid and able pupil

in Habibullah's son, Amanullah. Tarzi married his daughter, Soraya, to him and became his guide, mentor, and staunch political supporter.

The older scholar was credited with being largely responsible for Amanullah's decision to seize power.[27] He later became foreign minister and remained Amanullah's close personal adviser until 1925. By that time the perceptive Tarzi sensed that Amanullah's power was being seriously undermined. He apparently came to realize that the basic political structure necessary to support the modernization program did not exist. He aptly remarked: "Amanullah has built a beautiful monument without a foundation. Take out one brick and it will tumble down."[28] So even though Tarzi remained faithful to the end to both Amanullah and the aims of modernization, he reluctantly concluded that unless a stronger political foundation were built the program would not succeed. He began to counsel retreat and moderation, but Amanullah by that time had the bit in his teeth and would not listen.

Most of the writings about the Amanullah era seem to agree that the natural resistance to change generated by the modernization program was considerably intensified by the manner and pace of change which Amanullah imposed. Amanullah was a man of intense and vibrant energy. Ideas and innovations bubbled out of his head and with him the line between thought and action seems to have been exceedingly fine. Many of his reforms and projects were excellent, necessary, and feasible. Even his detractors admitted that much. But a significant number were poorly planned, ill-conceived, and undertaken with undue haste and poor preparation. Fraser-Tytler, who served in the British legation at that period, gives us the following description of Amanullah's <u>modus operandi:</u>

> But while the Amir himself was a patriot, genuinely anxious to pull the country together after the disasters of 1924, and an intelligent and tireless worker, he had not got those qualities of leadership essential in such a crisis. Round his court were collected advisers of most indifferent quality, and he himself was too impetuous in his decisions and revolutionary in his outlook to supply the balance and sobriety of judgment which they lacked. The result was that, while improvement was spasmodic and transient, general deterioration was steady and constant. While the essential services were being starved, large sums were expended on the purchase of aeroplanes which would not fly, of furnishings for the great new capital, and of industrial implements and equipment which, in the absence of suitable arrangements for housing and repair, were rapidly rendered unserviceable until Afghanistan became a mausoleum of derelict machinery and abandoned factories.[29]

Apart from poor implementation even of those projects which were sound, there can be no doubt that some of the reforms were unwise in themselves. The attempt to impose Western dress and the proposal to change the rest day from Friday to Thursday are examples of reforms which accomplished little of use in themselves yet caused considerable offense, inconvenience, and even expense to the people. Of far more serious import was the neglect and mismanagement of the modernization of the army. This amounted to a retrogression in the campaign to consolidate national unity and to strengthen the power of the central government vis-à-vis the tribes, a relationship which had been so laboriously initiated by Amanullah's grandfather, Abdur Rahman, and continued by his father, Habibullah. In the

final analysis it was probably this lack of appreciation by Amanullah of the need to yoke political and military power with modernization that cost Afghanistan the loss of many years of progress and Amanullah his throne.

In order to gain a better understanding of the connection between Afghan political dynamics and modernization it is necessary to analyze more closely the true impact of the reforms on various segments of Afghan society. Most writing about the Amanullah period has created the general impression that dissatisfaction and resistance to the reforms were widespread in Afghanistan and caused the 1929 revolt. This is probably historical "Tonypandy." It must be remembered that most writers on this subject have been tinged with various kinds of bias against Amanullah. In addition, most of them were writing ex post facto, i.e., after the modernization program had failed and been swallowed up by the rebellion. Under these circumstances it is easy to conjure up a casual link between the modernization program and the revolt. But in order to do this credibly, the reforms must be made out to have been much more drastic and much more bitterly resented by the people, as well as more effective than they actually were. It is interesting to note, for example, the contrast between the standard version of the alleged impact of the reforms and the one left us by Maurice Fouchet who was the first French minister in Kabul from 1922 to 1924. Fouchet wrote his book before Amanullah's downfall. In his perceptive assessment of the situation in Afghanistan during those years Fouchet praises the reform program highly and indicates that most of the Afghan population accepted the reforms, perhaps with some apathy and bewilderment but with little visible resentment.[30]

Even Fraser-Tytler, whom we have seen as not particularly sympathetic to Amanullah, indicates

that as late as the fall of 1928, i.e., just before the revolt, the proposed reforms were not badly received. At page 213 of his book can be found this interesting passage:

> His (Amanullah's) audience listened and acclaimed his proposals, except for one dissentient voice whose owner was promptly relieved of his appointment. Even the action of the Queen in dramatically tearing off her veil was greeted with applause.

The occasion described was the same one we have already cited in which Amanullah delivered a series of lectures to a group of representative Afghans in October 1928, just before the revolt broke out.

These estimates by contemporaneous eyewitnesses like Fouchet and Fraser-Tytler of the general Afghan reaction to the reforms become more credible when we look more closely at the reforms themselves. Turning first to the social reforms we learn, for example, that the requirement for Western dress was not directed at the general population. It was limited to participation in certain official functions in the capital or attendance in certain public places. It may have annoyed a few people and made others feel ridiculous but could hardly have generated much popular discontent in the country at large. So too, the removal of the veil seems to have been encouraged but not legally ordered or enforced. Queen Soraya's unveiling act on the palace steps no doubt offended the more traditional, but it must be noted that few felt forced to imitate her example. The fact is that during Amanullah's reign nearly all women who traditionally wore the veil continued to do so.

The subject of women's rights in general was no doubt a much more sensitive matter since it was a threat to a masculine dominated society. Here again while there seems to have been a good

deal of talk about women's rights there was little compulsory action. The few provisions which found their way into the law, such as requiring the woman's consent to arranged marriages, were already observed to a large degree by custom. In the same way, the prohibition of student marriages affected only a minuscule minority and there appears to be no record of any serious attempt to enforce it.

The educational reforms likewise appear, on closer examination, to have been more radical in conception than execution. Universal primary secular education could not be put into effect simply because of lack of schools and teachers. The foreign language secondary schools took only a small number of boys from the capital. Education of girls could not be undertaken, again for the lack of schools, and the few girls whose parents apparently wanted them educated had to be sent to Turkey. In other words the educational reforms were largely on paper; there is no evidence that they were forced on anyone, and indeed there is considerable likelihood that the parents of the few students affected were among those few progressive individuals who wanted their children to receive a modern education.

The religious reforms without question alienated certain elements among the Muslim "clergy" particularly the more ignorant and reactionary mullahs. It is also apparent that Amanullah's personal relations with leading religious figures like the Hazrat of Shor Bazaar were unnecessarily hostile. The laudable program for educating and liberalizing the mullahs was presented in a gauche and unnecessarily offensive manner. The decision to change the day of rest from Friday to Thursday seems to have been a pointless effort to change a deeply rooted and religiously sanctified custom. The threat to replace Islamic law by a more secular code undoubtedly

bit into the prerogatives of the qazis and probably alarmed even the more educated and enlightened ulema. But again the threat was largely on paper since there were practically no Afghans trained in secular law to replace the Islamic judges. Two additional factors should also be considered: First, some of the most influential ulema agreed with the need to upgrade the education and standards of the mullahs; and second, it is not entirely clear that the people were all that much enamored of the kind of justice dispensed by the religious courts.[31] No doubt the religious leaders sensed in the reforms, taken as a whole, a threat to their power and position, but it should be noted that the reforms themselves were more a potential than an actual threat and certainly never assumed the character or proportions of a religious persecution. Amanullah at all times professed himself to be a devout Muslim, even aspired to leadership of important Islamic movements, and so far as we know behaved in general with appropriate piety. This should be borne in mind when we recall the part the religious leaders played in the revolt against him.

Of the political reforms it is difficult to believe that many Afghans could have objected to a constitution which offered them more adequate representation in the government. The administrative and legal codes no doubt caused a few bureaucrats to fret, specially those from whom a higher degree of efficiency was required, but again most of the provisions of these laws were hardly such as to give rise to large-scale popular discontent even had they been strictly applied, which they apparently never were. Two exceptions to this were the rules prescribing higher educational standards for mullahs which we have already noted and the military reforms which reduced the army to a parlous state. Of

these military reforms, probably the one with the widest impact and consequence was the new draft law. Abdur Rahman had established the Kaumi system of recruitment under which each clan was required to provide a certain number of recruits in accordance with numerical strength. Habibullah had modified this by the so-called Hasht Nafari whereby each "eighth man" in a given village or tribe was called up. Amanullah, in an attempt to institute what he deemed to be a fairer system of national service, imposed a lottery system. The older systems imposed this onerous service by means of an open and public selection controlled by the traditional power elite of the village or tribe. Everyone understood this and knew just where he stood. Manifest inequities became a subject for negotiation and pressure within the group itself. The introduction of a secret system transferred control of recruitment to external boards outside the local power structure and susceptible to pressures and types of corruption other than those to which the people were accustomed and knew how to manipulate. This challenged and offended the influential chiefs and maliks, particularly when some of their own sons began to be drafted. Soon widespread discontent with the recruitment system was rampant and charges of bribery, corruption, and blackmail flew in all directions. Here we have a classical example of how even the best intentioned reforms can backfire when they are imposed with a lack of understanding of the internal power structure and the political dynamics of the group on whom the "benefits" are conferred. It is a lesson, however, which reformers and "do-gooders" seldom seem to learn. It should be noted that the recruiting reforms were among the very few which actually affected the rural and to a lesser extent the tribal areas as well as the urban population. It is also worth keeping

in mind that the new recruiting practices were one of the two reforms which Amanullah had to rescind when he compromised with the rebellious tribes after the first uprising in Khost in 1924. The other was the unveiling of women which must have been a symbolic concession to the tribal mullahs since the tribesmen themselves for the most part allowed their women to go unveiled.

Coming finally to the economic reforms, we should note that many of the proposals and projects undertaken by Amanullah, such as better roads and communications, almost certainly provoked positive reactions from the Afghan people. Possibly two of these might have had a fairly widespread negative impact. These were the improved methods of tax collection and the abolition of begeer or forced labor. The former was probably substantially offset by the fact that for the first time the cultivator and property owner knew what his tax liability was and could expect some fairness and uniformity in the collection process. The latter affected mostly the village maliks and some tribal khans for whom begeer was a traditional privileged form of cheap labor. For the forced laborer himself it made little actual difference since the begeer law still permitted the government to "requisition" labor for national purposes and in most cases this simply meant a change of masters.

If it were obtainable, more adequate and detailed information about the actual impact of the modernization program on the Afghan people and of their reactions to it would no doubt cast a clearer light on this important subject which needs more facts and fewer polemics. From the limited evidence at hand, however, the following tentative conclusions seem justified:

1. The reform program advocated by Amanullah because of its conscious aims, its philosophy, and its broad application was in theory a genuine modernization effort.

2. In a number of important respects, however, the modernization program was hastily conceived, clumsily executed and unnecessarily offensive to customary sensitivities.
3. Nevertheless, many of Amanullah's reforms and projects were well conceived and seem to have received a reasonable degree of popular support and approval.
4. To a very considerable extent many of the unpopular parts of the modernization program remained on paper and affected only small parts of the Afghan population.
5. Contemporary eyewitness accounts of the Amanullah reforms by observers who strove for objectivity do not appear to confirm the widespread popular disaffection with the modernization program which is reported in the later less objective literature. This latter appears to be historical "Tonypandy."
6. The religious and some of the social reforms offended a significant section of the ulema and caused disaffection among the more militant and ignorant mullahs, but these feelings were not necessarily shared by the Afghan people in general.
7. The neglect of the army and the new system of recruitment resulted in military weakness and aroused serious opposition among the rural and tribal power elite.

Weighing and balancing these tentative conclusions it seems highly unlikely that, as is usually claimed, the reforms in and of themselves could have been the sole or even the principal cause of the revolt which overthrew Amanullah. A bewildered and partially dissatisfied people may be good revolutionary tinder but the cause of the fire must be sought elsewhere. In the previous section we found it in the political dynamic of the traditional power struggle between the tribes and the central government.

Conclusions

In the past a number of conclusions and lessons have been drawn from the failure of Amanullah's modernization program. These have ranged from statements to the effect that the King was too advanced for his backward subjects to the flat assertion by one Afghan writer that it is inherently impossible to impose "materialistic Western" ways on the "spiritual East."[32] It seems to me that the analysis contained in this paper enables us to postulate a somewhat more refined and sophisticated set of hypotheses. This can be done at two levels: the first, within the context of Afghan history itself by seeking new and better interpretations of what actually occurred; and the second, at a higher level of abstraction by postulating a set of hypotheses in terms of political theory which can be derived from the empirical data. Let us examine each in turn.

Within the context of Afghan history a sharper interpretation of the events associated with the Amanullah revolution seems to indicate that:

1. The central fact of internal Afghan politics in the last two centuries has been the precarious balance of power between the central government and the tribes. Whenever the strength of the central government declined <u>for any reason whatsoever</u>, tribal power at once moved in to absorb and challenge the authority of the government.
2. The power of the central government was itself largely dependent upon the cohesion, unity, and political balance within the ruling Durrani tribe. One of the fundamental steps in the political modernization of Afghanistan undertaken by Amir Abdur Rahman between 1880 and 1901 was the effort to create for the central government an independent

non-tribal power base. In this effort, the army was to play a central role.

3. The most serious weakness of the Amanullah government was its failure to develop a strong professional army independent of tribal power. The army was not only ineffective and demoralized but it was essentially an emanation of the tribes. Its primary loyalty was tribal rather than national. When the clash came the army personnel deserted to the tribes adding to their strength instead of opposing it.
4. The Amanullah rebellion was essentially a tribal revolt in the classical pattern. The modernization program was not the principal nor even the proximate cause of the revolt. It probably was a contributory cause to its success because it tended to weaken the extra-tribal sources of support of the government and it provided a convenient and credible casus belli. The fact that the modernization program and the revolt coincided in time has misled historians into assuming that there was a proximate and preponderant causal connection between the two. It is more probable that the modernization program was a victim rather than a primary cause of the revolution.
5. The Amanullah modernization program failed in the execution not because of popular resistance or religious opposition, though both existed, but rather because the program was constructed on a fragile political base which collapsed. As Mahmud Tarzi said: "Remove one brick and the entire structure will tumble down." An incident which started as a minor tribal clash removed the brick.

If we pass now to the level of abstraction of political theory what can we learn from the

Amanullah case history? I suggest the following hypotheses:

1. A substantial degree of national unity is a pre-condition to a successful modernization program.[33]
2. In a nation where the society is essentially tribal and where the tribes still retain substantial autonomy, the extent of national unity required to support modernization is achieved only when the power of the central government is clearly preponderant over tribal power.
3. In a socially fragmented society such as Afghanistan's, the principal instrument for imposing national unity and asserting the power of the central authority is an independent professional army which is loyal to the government. It is specially important in a modernizing situation because change breeds resistance.
4. In such a society a modernization program will have better chances of success if in addition to a strong army there are robust civil institutions capable of providing organized direction and continuity to the program. In other words, a one-man show is a poor foundation for systemic change.
5. Non-totalitarian modernization programs imposed from above must proceed more slowly, cautiously and with more sensitivity than those which result from demands by the people or by their influential leaders. In "from the top" programs the substance of the change is relatively less important and the pace and manner in which the change is imposed is relatively more important than in "from the bottom up" programs.

The Amanullah case provides substantial evidence of an empirical nature to support the above hypotheses. They must of course be tested

19. Oriente Moderno (Rome: Institute Per L'Oriente, 1929) quoting a Stockholm dispatch of L'Echo de Paris in which Soviet views of the causes of the Amanullah revolution are set forth.

20. Ibid., quoting dispatches in The Times (London) of July 1 and 2, 1929.

21. Ibid., quoting a long letter from Amanullah published in an Indian newspaper. In this letter Amanullah made the significant point that even his offer to rescind all the reforms had had no effect on the course of the rebellion. It is true, of course, that during the earlier 1924 Khost revolt he had been forced to abolish some of the reforms and later reinstated them. This would no doubt have affected his credibility but the significant fact is that the rebel tribal leaders made no effort to negotiate the offer or demand safeguards. They seemed more interested in breaking up the central government than in nullifying the reforms.

22. See, however, the interesting analysis of the ambivalent Soviet attitude towards the Amanullah reforms by Mustafa Chokaiev in "The Bolsheviks and Afghanistan," Asiatic Review, London, XXV (July 1929), pp. 497-516.

23. The compilation of reforms listed in this paper was pieced together from a variety of sources, the principal ones being the books and articles already cited written by Fraser-Tytler, Ikbal Ali Shah, Arnold Fletcher, Louis Dupree, and also Donald Wilber, Afghanistan: Its People, Its Society, Its Culture (2nd ed.; New Haven: Human Relations Area Files, 1962).

24. It should be noted that this classification is of necessity somewhat arbitrary and artificial since in a traditional Islamic society such as that of Afghanistan, practically all the reforms had religious overtones and implications. Thus, secularization of education, changes in the marriage customs, or even the introduction of the

telegraph could be considered by certain extreme traditionalists to be as much a danger to the religious way of life as the effort to regulate the education of mullahs or limit their activities in more direct ways.

25. Fraser-Tytler, op. cit., p. 213, states: "In the month of October (1928) he (Amanullah) delivered to a representative gathering of Afghans in Kabul a series of lectures covering in detail the various measures he proposed to adopt. He boldly pronounced himself to be a revolutionary and asked his countrymen to follow him in a programme which, if carried into effect, would have entirely altered every aspect of Afghan social and official life." /Underlining added./

26. The following sketch of Mahmud Tarzi and his influence on Amanullah is based on materials contained in Wilber, op. cit., p. 20 et seq.; and in particular on the excellent monograph by Louis Dupree, op. cit.

27. Dupree, op. cit., p. 28.

28. Ibid., p. 35.

29. Fraser-Tytler, op. cit., p. 206. It should, however, be noted that the author was not an admirer of Amanullah, that British relations with Amanullah were never very cordial, and that Fraser-Tytler was writing retrospectively, i.e., after Amanullah's modernization program had come a cropper

30. Maurice Fouchet, Notes sur l'Afghanistan (Paris: Maisonneuve, 1931), p. 176 et seq. Fouchet died in 1924 and the work was published posthumously.

31. Louis Dupree, "Constitutional Development and Cultural Change, Part IV: The 1964 Afghan Constitution," American Universities Field Staff Reports, South Asia Series, Vol IX, No. 4 (N. Y.: American Universities Field Staff, 1964.) Dupree points out that in the 1964 Loya Jirgah held to ratify the present Afghan

Constitution, delegate after delegate rose to complain of arbitrary, unjust and corrupt practices by qazis. There is little reason to suppose that most Afghans felt very differently in Amanullah's time.

32. Ikbal Ali Shah, op. cit., p. 219 et seq.

33. Manfred Halpern, The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 243. Halpern also seems to suggest that political parties are essential to modernization since they serve as organizers and agents of social transformation and as links between leaders and the people (p. 283 et seq.). He also suggests that ideology may be essential in harnessing popular passion to modernization (p. 288). Amanullah, of course, lacked the help of either a political party or of a stirring ideology and this suggests additional reasons for his failure. However, the present Afghan government seems to be conducting a far-reaching modernization program without benefit of either political parties or ideologies, at least discernible ones.

IV
MODERNIZATION AND REFORM
THE CONTEMPORARY ENDEAVOR

By Patrick J. Reardon

Introduction

The critical stage for Afghanistan's modernization began in the post World War II years when Afghan leaders unalterably committed themselves to intensive development. In the context of a radically changed international environment and in the face of growing internal pressures, the political and socio-economic life of Afghanistan underwent revolutionary and irrevocable changes. The two major components in this decisive modernizing effort were (1) the modernization of the military and (2) the formation and role of the modernizing elite. These two themes have acted as central and determining elements in the course and rate of the country's modernization.

Modernization includes such changes as the secularization of ideas, increased geographic and social mobility, the spread of scientific and technical education, a transition from ascribed to achieved status, innovations in the organizations and institutions of a society, and

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an aspiration for economic growth and a higher standard of living. Moreover, the modernizing process is characterized by a transformation in the values, beliefs, and ideologies of the traditional society. The changes in a socio-economic system are, essentially, both expressed and caused by the formation of new, modernizing roles which mirror the content, complexity, and differentiation of the roles that exist in industrialized societies. With the introduction of modern innovations, the values, social structures, and relationships governing life in the traditional culture are altered. The values and beliefs of the traditional system become less meaningful, acceptable, or applicable in the changed environment. As tradition-oriented members of a society experience the impact of modernization, they become aware of new perspectives and facts. To orient and adapt themselves to the state of continual flux that the reality which surrounds them exhibits, men require new meanings and purposes, that is, modern roles and identities. The formation and expansion of these modernizing roles generate forces which tend to disrupt and undermine a society's traditional hierarchy of power and authority. As the process of innovation accelerates, the individual is faced with increasing pressures to make adaptive responses to the change and uncertainty in his environment. Extreme tension is thus a major feature in the lives of modernizing men and in the organizations and institutions of their societies.

In essence then, modernization requires that people adopt roles that are foreign to their indigenous, traditional cultures. In this sense, the modernizing process can best be viewed as the creation of new roles, modern as opposed to traditional. Central to this process in Afghanistan are the talents and purposes of men who within the organization of their society and its

hierarchy of power attempt to define and guide the destiny of their nation and to achieve those goals of modernity to which their values, beliefs, and ideologies have committed them.

A central theme in the modernization of Afghanistan has been the conscious effort of Afghan rulers (although Amanullah seems to have acted eratically in this area) to adopt modern military technology and organization as a defensive response to the threat of foreign invasion and annexation and to preserve their internal political power. Confronted by competing, hostile, and militarily powerful tribes, clans, and ethnic groups, Afghan monarchs have responded with programs of military modernization to consolidate the power and authority of the central government, the foremost requisite for the achievement of their nation-building and modernization goals. The formulation and implementation of Afghanistan's military modernization programs have been conducted from above by an elite including only a fraction of the total population. This elite has been united by tribe, clan, and family origin, with the hierarchy of power residing in the monarchy, and comprised, principally, of members of the Muhammadzai clan of the Durrani Pashtun tribe from which the monarchs of Afghanistan have been drawn. A cumulative effect of the modernization programs initiated by Afghan monarchs, however, has been the creation and expansion of modernizing groups whose roles in varying degrees embody the values, beliefs, and goals of modernity. The dynamic interaction among members of the modernizing elite, characterized by conflict over the formulation of policy and the control of the government, whose authority in turn depends upon the existence of a strong and loyal military force, provides a central focus for examining the process of modernization in contemporary Afghanistan.

By the end of World War II, Afghanistan had experienced the growth of a political opposition which desired a change from the harsh and repressive policies of Prime Minister Muhammad Hashem Khan, who assumed the reins of the government following the assassination of his brother King Nadir Shah in 1933. A small modernizing elite was beginning to press for more rapid economic development and for major reforms in the social and political life of the nation. Evidence of the growing discontent and opposition to the government appeared in the reported discovery in January 1946 of the existence of anti-governmental activity led by Prime Minister-Adjutant Abdur Rahim Khan, a native of Kohistan, who along with a number of relatives and friends, including several intellectuals and journalists, was arrested by the Afghan security police.[1] Mounting opposition to Hashem's government culminated in his retirement from political life in May 1946. He was succeeded in office by his half-brother Shah Mahmud, the chief commandant of the army.[2]

Shah Mahmud's tenure as prime minister was accompanied by changes in domestic politics that were largely unprecedented in the history of Afghan politics. Two dominant features of Shah Mahmud's exercise of power were (1) the marked increase in the government's tolerance of political activity and expression by political factions and (2) an ambitious plan for economic development predominantly aimed at increasing United States' assistance. A third issue, which was to have monumental consequences, developed in Afghanistan's relations with Pakistan and the question of the disposition of the Pashtun tribes and territory along the Durand line, the boundary which served both to bisect Pashtun tribal groups and to demarcate the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The election of deputies to the 7th Session of the Afghan National Assembly, inaugurated on June 30, 1949, sent forty to fifty reform-minded legislators to the 120-member Assembly.[3] These modernizing elements in the 1949-1952 National Assembly rallied behind the leadership of Dr. Abdur Rahman Mahmudi and Muhammad Ghobar. The demands voiced by the deputies called for the accountability of the cabinet and individual ministers in budgetary matters. The deputies' actions gained the attention and support of Kabul's students who responded by forming a Student Union.[4] A liberal movement developed which was representative of the tensions and pressures in the system that had begun to build up among the small but growing elements of the populace who had received modern, secular education and an exposure to Western values. This opposition movement became the first major expression of political sentiments that were based on a modernizing orientation in contrast to the predominantly traditional, tribal-based values of the society. It was also a seedbed and a training ground for future leaders and a mass political movement which would be characterized by opposition to the monarchy and its policies.

While one of the chief concerns of the liberals was to hold the bureaucracy accountable for its administrative and budgetary practices, it succeeded, importantly, in passing a press law which in 1951 resulted in the publication of three independent newspapers. Among the demands voiced in the independent press were freedom of speech, free elections, accountability of cabinet ministers, and, of particular significance, the withdrawal of the royal family from politics. The royal family attempted to offset the growing opposition by sponsoring the creation of a National Democratic party, a "royalist" and pro-monarchy party, which attempted to garner its support

from the civil servants but which largely failed.[5] The growing strength of the liberal forces became an increasingly serious threat to the monarchy's authority. It reacted in 1951 to restrict the activities of the opposition by banning the Student Union.[6] But anti-government sentiment continued to escalate and reached a peak during mass demonstrations against the palace to protest the banning of the Student Union.[7] The demonstrations did not succeed in forcing the government to lift the ban against the student organization. Instead, the demonstrations were followed by a tightening of government control. A number of student leaders and liberal members of the Assembly were arrested; and the independent press was closed. Further steps to break the opposition elements occurred in 1952 when the session of the National Assembly came to an end and preparations were being made for new elections. The government arrested about forty former deputies,[8] thereby preventing them from being candidates in the new elections.

The measures effecting the progressive demise of the "Liberal Assembly" and the abolition of the political reforms associated with it were indicative of a re-strengthening of the monarchy. Once the supremacy of the monarchy had been reasserted, the locus of political conflict shifted to the leadership elements of the royal family in a struggle for control over the government's policy. With the backing of the Afghan Army and younger members of the royal family, Muhammad Daud, the first cousin of the King, replaced his uncle, Shah Mahmud, who formally resigned on September 6, 1953.[9]

Daud's Revolution: Military and Economic Modernization and Social Reform

Daud's seizure of power was motivated by an increasing dissatisfaction with the country's foreign policy and its internal rate of economic development. The issue of Pashtunistan continued to vex Afghan leaders. The American involvement in the Helmand Valley had failed to produce satisfactory results, and the U.S. had declined Afghan requests for military assistance.[10] The policy of favoring the interests of the private financiers was also felt to be incompatible with the best interests of the country.[11] The lack of success of the government's policy on these fronts was marked by growing pressures to seek assistance from the Soviet Union.[12]

The policy imperatives which Daud faced hinged upon the two-fold need to develop the country economically and to modernize the Afghan military. The disruption of transit facilities through Pakistan had created serious economic difficulties for the Afghans and, in 1950, had prompted a move towards closer relations with Russia. As an effective bulwark of support for the authority of the central government, the Afghan military was seriously handicapped by its antiquated equipment.[13] The military strength of the tribes posed an actual threat to the central government.[14]

The policy shift carried out by Daud was conditioned by external factors. Within the context of the Cold War, the United States created a system of defensive alliances in the Middle East with countries bordering on the Soviet Union. The death of Stalin marked a change in the policy of the Soviet Union towards non-communist, unaligned nations. Afghanistan became the first recipient of the new Soviet foreign aid program which began at that time. On January 27, 1954,

the announcement was made of the first Soviet loan to Afghanistan. This loan was for $3.5 million at three per cent interest. It was to be repaid in eight years with repayment beginning in 1957. The loan was to cover the construction of grain elevators, a flour mill, and a bakery.[15] The projects were intended to alleviate recurring shortages of wheat and flour in Afghanistan[16] and, particularly, to meet the needs of Afghan military and government installations. A month later President Eisenhower announced the United States' approval of Pakistan's request for military assistance.[17]

American military assistance to Pakistan put the Afghans in a critical position. A well-armed Pakistani army, in contrast to the untrained and ill-equipped Afghan forces, represented a threat to Afghanistan's position on Pashtunistan. An insecure border and an army incapable of functioning effectively as an internal security force made obtaining military assistance an urgent matter. In 1954, in negotiations with U.S. officials, the Afghans made a final bid for U.S. arms aid. A number of factors weighed against a successful outcome for the Afghan position. Both Pakistan and Iran were opposed to Afghanistan's membership in CENTO. Moreover, the United States was unwilling to commit itself to the defense of Afghanistan if the Russians should move against that country in response to U.S. military support. Top U.S. military officials felt that Afghanistan was not strategically useful and preferred, in the event of war, to meet the Russians on the subcontinent.[18]

Denied U.S. military assistance, the only viable alternative open to Afghanistan was to seek support from the Russians. The Soviets, in turn, were interested in countering the influence and military alliances of the United States which the Soviet Union regarded as a threat to its security.

A series of events in 1955 culminated in a new foreign policy orientation which was to greatly accelerate the modernization of Afghanistan. On March 27, 1955, Pakistan announced the "One-Unit Act," a plan to merge the provinces of West Pakistan into a single province. This act threatened the Afghan position on Pashtunistan. Daud reacted to Pakistan's action in a violent speech on March 28.[19] And the following day, demonstrators attacked the Pakistan embassy in Kabul, killing four Pakistani officials.[20] These events led to a second closure of the border and seriously disrupted the Afghan economy. Again the Afghan Government turned to the Soviet Union for assistance, first, by concluding an agreement for duty-free transit of Afghan goods across Soviet territory, and, later, by signing a protocol for commodity exchange on August 27, 1955.[21] Angered by U.S. support of Pakistan, Afghanistan threatened to turn American aid projects over to the Soviets. But subsequent United States pressure on Pakistan reopened the border in November,[22] thus assuring the flow of commodities to U.S. sponsored projects in Afghanistan.

In preparation for the acceptance of large-scale Soviet economic and military assistance, a session of the Loya Jirgah (Great Council) was held in Kabul from November 15 to 20. The Jirgah gave its support to the government's Pashtunistan policy, and, in light of that situation, advised a policy of rapprochement with Russia.[23] Moreover, recognizing the need to strengthen the Afghan military, the Jirgah gave Prime Minister Daud's Government a mandate to obtain military assistance from whatever sources were available.[24] With the support of the country's tribal leaders, Daud set the stage for a radical shift in Afghanistan's relations with the Soviet Union.

On November 18, 1955, Bulganin and Khrushchev arrived in New Delhi, India, on the first leg of a journey that was also to take them to Burma and Afghanistan. Their visit to Kabul of December 15-19, 1955, marked the launching of what might well be considered a revolution in the rate and course of Afghanistan's modernization. The tenor of the visit was set on December 17 when the Soviet leaders presented the Afghan government and Kabul municipality with equipment for a 100-bed hospital and fifteen buses. A day later a protocol prolonging the Soviet-Afghan Treaty on Neutrality and Mutual Non-Aggression was signed. This was accompanied by a joint Soviet-Afghan communique on economic relations which signaled a gigantic upswing in Soviet assistance by offering Afghanistan a long-term credit of $100 million.[25] The loan, formally signed on January 28, 1956, was made at an interest rate of two per cent for thirty years, with repayment to be made in export commodities.[26]

The first projects to be carried out under the terms of the loan were designated in an agreement of March 1, 1956, which provided for the development of power, irrigation, and transportation facilities, the purpose of the projects being the creation of an economic infrastructure for Afghanistan. Among the projects to be undertaken, and of paramount importance politically, was the construction of a military airport north of Kabul at Bagram.[27] The dual aim of economic and military development became a more overt fact in April 1956 when the Afghans sent a military mission to Prague to purchase arms. This was followed on August 25, 1956, by the announcement by Prime Minister Daud that Soviet military aid to Afghanistan had been agreed upon. This was in reference to a $26 million credit extended to Afghanistan for the purchase of arms from the Soviet Union and the bloc countries of Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, and

East Germany.[28] Arms deliveries under the agreement were begun in September and were followed in October by the delivery of jet fighters.[29] Strengthening of the Afghan military was further accelerated when Afghanistan obtained an additional credit of $60 million from the Soviet Union for the purchase of planes, tanks, rolling stock and artillery pieces.[30]

United States response to the massive Soviet penetration of Afghanistan was based on a strategy designed to achieve complementarity in assistance programs. U.S. officials felt that American aid should be used to complement Soviet assistance rather than to compete with it on a project for project basis. United States strategists aimed at containing the Soviet Union. This was to be achieved by providing assistance which would help Afghanistan fulfill its most essential needs, thereby preventing the country from becoming completely dependent upon Soviet support. A program of complementarity in aid programs represented a means for achieving this aim by providing Afghanistan with alternative sources of support. The American strategy was intended to enable the Afghans to preserve their position of neutrality and to enjoy greater freedom in foreign policy matters by increasing the range of options available to them. One expression of this policy of containment through complementarity was the U.S. assistance extended on June 29, 1956, for the construction of an international airport at Kandahar. Military considerations were reportedly the primary U.S. motive in undertaking this project.[31] A subsequent change in the U.S. attitude towards military assistance was indicated in the report by Orient, June 26, 1958, that of a total of $150 million in credit extended to Afghanistan by the United States since 1952, $35 million had been for the purchase of armaments.[32]

Military Modernization: The Impact on Domestic Politics

Measured in terms of its impact on the internal power structure, foreign assistance under the Daud regime represented a revolution in the modernization of Afghanistan. Military assistance to the Afghan Army and Air Force ensured for the first time a situation whereby the tribes no longer posed an actual threat to the existence of the central government. Moreover, the economic assistance funneled through the Afghan bureaucracy increased the government's control over the economy. While severely restricting the activities of the private financiers, the government embarked upon a program of planned economic development, initiating the country's First Five Year Plan in 1956. Economic development activities in telecommunications and transportation enhanced the ability of the central government to extend its control into the more remote areas of the country. Economic and military reforms were coupled with innovations in education which was marked by increased secularization. A highpoint in the rapid transformation that Daud set underway in Afghan society was the removal of the veil in 1959. On August 25, 1959, Afghan women appeared unveiled at the Jashen festivities celebrating the country's independence anniversary.

The extension of the central government's power into the hitherto autonomous tribal areas resulted in serious internal revolts. A revolt of Mangal tribesmen in the Khost area was sparked by the government's road-building efforts in the South. Such road construction threatened the autonomy of the tribe and removed its local livelihood derived from caravan traffic. Moreover, the attempt to impose military conscription on the tribes met with strong resistance.[33] Between November 2 and 8, 1959, several thousand

Mangal tribesmen defected into Pakistan where the tribe's leaders reported that ninety tribesmen had been killed in the fighting with the Afghan Army.[34] On December 20, 1959, the new communications routes that extended into the border regions were protested by General Ayub Khan who viewed the military implications as a threat to Pakistan.[35] On December 20, 1959, rioting broke out in the city of Kandahar in southwestern Afghanistan, ostensibly in protest against the government's removal of the restrictions of purdah from Afghan women. The Afghan Army quelled the riot which resulted in about fifty dead and three times that many injured.[36] On March 7, 1960, Prime Minister Daud accused Pakistan of subversive propaganda against the reforms undertaken by the Afghan government.[37] The strained relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan erupted into open conflict in the fall of 1960 and during the summer of 1961 when Afghan irregulars and troops attempted to create revolts among the Pakistani Pashtuns.[38] These events resulted in the suspension of consular and transit relations and culminated in the severence of diplomatic relations between the two countries on September 6, 1961.

The Soviet Union responded to Afghanistan's economic difficulties arising from the border closure by assisting, in 1961 and 1962, in the airlift of the Afghan fruit crop, one of the country's chief earners of foreign exchange; and in the same period, the Soviets extended approximately $212 million in credits to finance Afghanistan's Second Five Year Plan commencing in March 1962.[39]

Of determining significance for the short-run outcome of the problem of the border closure and the Pashtunistan issue was the changed nature of Afghan interests in Pashtunistan. Earlier Afghan policy and demands on Pashtunistan had been based

on pragmatic political and economic interests of vital importance to the Kabul government. The tribes had provided the bulwark of support for the central government and had served as a deterrent, a "prickly hedge," to the threat of foreign invasion. Moreover, the landlocked position of Afghanistan, whose major trade outlets and markets had traditionally been on the subcontinent, made it imperative for the country's economic development that it obtain access to the sea. The geographical region encompassed in the Afghan definition of the Pashtunistan area included access to the sea. However, a number of factors rendered Prime Minister Daud's position on Pashtunistan increasingly untenable. The modernization of the Afghan military eliminated the central government's precarious dependence on military support from the tribes. Given this situation, Afghan policy became an expression of national pride sustained by irredentist sentiments. A second factor contributing to the untenability of Daud's position was the course pursued by President Ayub Khan of Pakistan who, having undermined at least two attempts to seek a rapprochement with Afghanistan,[40] opposed the reopening of the border. This allowed the economic strangulation of Afghanistan to tighten, and thereby created pressures designed to force Afghanistan to drop its demands for an independent Pashtunistan. President Ayub Khan's manipulation of the Pashtunistan problem was also an attempt to place pressure on U.S. foreign policy interests in Afghanistan in order to gain U.S. support for Pakistan's demand for a plebiscite on Kashmir and the resolution of the long-standing dispute between India and Pakistan over this area.[41]

The economic blockade interfered with American policy objectives. Through economic assistance programs, the U.S. attempted to provide Afghanistan

with sufficient freedom of economic action to maintain its neutral stance, but the border closure stopped the flow of critical materials and equipment required for American aid projects in Afghanistan. Soviet willingness to ameliorate Afghan economic difficulties and to support the Pashtunistan cause undermined the ability of Afghanistan to maintain its neutrality. The country's shift towards the Soviet Union for markets and import sources placed Afghanistan in a position of increasing economic and political dependence upon the Soviets.

Not surprisingly, an impasse developed between Prime Minister Daud and President Ayub Khan with the former refusing to abandon his policy on Pashtunistan and the latter demanding an end to Afghan harassment in Pakistan. United States pressure and efforts to mediate eventually helped to end the impasse, but the resolution required either changes in the respective policies, which neither of the two leaders appeared willing to accept, or changes in leadership, which depended on alterations in the respective internal political situations in the two countries.

Oppostion to Daud

Political repercussions occurred in Afghanistan as interrelated consequences of (a) the modernization policies of the Daud Government and (b) the prolonged dispute with Pakistan. Prime Minister Daud, with his brother Muhammad Naim Khan, the deputy prime minister and the minister of foreign affairs, had exercised a virtual monopoly on the formulation of government policy while King Muhammad Zahir Shah had been relegated to a position of secondary influence.[42] He apparently served as a unifying symbol that gave legitimacy to the central government's authority.

An authoritarian rule, the extent of which had evidently not been seen in Afghanistan since the reign of Abdur Rahman, was exercised by Daud through the instruments of a modern, loyal military force and a strengthened network of security police. The control of the government was the privilege of a small circle known as the "inner cabinet" which consisted of royal family members and a few trusted intimates. The key figures in the royal family, indeed the dominant personalities in the government, were: Daud and Naim, first cousins of the King; King Zahir Shah; Shah Wali Khan, the King's last surviving uncle, known as the "conqueror of Kabul," a title earned when he led the forces of Nadir Shah against the supporters of Bacha-i Saqao in the battle for the King's palace; and Abdul Wali, Shah Wali Khan's son and a military officer, married to Princess Bilqis, the King's eldest daughter.[43]

The "inner cabinet" was not unified, however, nor always in agreement on what constituted appropriate government policy. When Daud and Naim had decided to turn to the Russians for military and economic assistance, their policy had been opposed by Shah Mahmud and Shah Wali Khan who, as the last surviving uncle of the King, epitomized the older generation and policies of the Musahiban family.[44]

The border closure, the effects of which were initially cushioned by the Russian airlift of the 1961-1962 Afghan fruit crop, began to hurt the interests of producers and export-import merchants when, in spite of a second Soviet airlift conducted in 1962-1963, the tonnage exported was increased above that of the previous season but brought the Afghans less profit. The ability of the government treasury to retire the Afghan dollar debt to the Soviet Union was reduced by the lowered return on the crop, threatening, if the situation continued, to reach a level where the

annual return to Afghanistan for the fruit crop would be less than the annual interest increase on the debt to the Russians.[45] Afghanistan's growing financial indebtedness, with its implications of Soviet domination of Afghan economic and political policy, was one way in which the border closure tightened the stranglehold on the Afghan economy. In addition, this economic change threatened the security of the royal family's rule, the conservative elements of which entertained no delusions about Soviet aims and potential actions.

The Pakistani blockade also involved Afghanistan's nomadic population, estimated at 2.4 million,[46] some of whom, in the guerilla warfare tradition of the Pashtun tribes, did not peaceably accept Pakistan's blocking of their seasonal migrations from Afghanistan into the Indus Valley. Those turned back at the border were forced to search for alternative grazing lands in Afghanistan which were not always available. This created economic hardships for the nomads and added headaches for Afghan authorities.[47]

The Daud government's military modernization and economic development programs had established the unquestioned hegemony of the central government and ushered in a technological era of revolutionary proportions. To realize his goal of national unification, Daud smashed the power and autonomy of the tribal khans and the religious leaders--the ulema. He imposed strict curbs and controls on the country's private financiers and entrepreneurs and initiated an economic development policy in which the government assumed the dominant role. But the forceful subjugation and destruction of the power possessed by the tribal and religious leaders, as well as the curbs on economic interests, alienated a sizeable portion of the Afghan populace. The danger of dependence upon, or subjugation to, Soviet assistance and

policies violated the sensibilities of the traditional society whose values and beliefs held Soviet ideology in high disrepute, regarding it as a threat to Islamic doctrine and practice. Moreover, a growing Afghan intelligentsia was becoming dissatisfied with the political system. Priority had logically been given to the needs of the military, but this was done at the expense of the civil and economic sectors. The First Five Year Plan had fallen short of its goals. And reformist innovations in the political process were markedly absent.

Under Daud's control, Afghan policy proved unresponsive to the internal and external political pressures which were increasingly threatening the security of the regime. A change in policy was required which, to be carried out, meant a readjustment in the hierarchy of personalities in the inner cabinet. The King began to participate actively in the affairs of government, utilizing the symbolic advantages of his title to rally popular support by touring the provinces, reviewing military units, and establishing a greater public viability. The popularity enjoyed by Shah Wali Khan due to his reputation as a military hero facilitated the efforts to gain the support of the country's top military commanders whose personal loyalty had previously been enjoyed by Daud. Sardar Abdul Wali's position in the military establishment enabled him to be particularly effective in obtaining sufficient support from the military to give the trio the bargaining power necessary to initiate a change in leadership. Through behind-the-scenes maneuverings, the creation of new coalitions, and the successful swaying of the military's loyalties, the balance of inner cabinet power was altered. A dominant grouping emerged which included, as its most powerful figures, King Zahir Shah, Shah Wali Khan, and Sardar Abdul Wali. The stage was

now set for Daud's formal exit from power and the entrance in major force of a new element in the matrix of Afghanistan's modernization--a non-Muhammadzai elite.

The Formation of a Modernizing Elite

The formation of a modernizing elite that was non-Muhammadzai in origin was a cumulative effect of the military and economic modernization efforts that had earlier been initiated from the top by members of the ruling Muhammadzai clan. Generally Afghan rulers since Abdur Rahman had consciously tried as their foremost concern to adopt Western military technology and organization. Reforms in the military sector spilled over into other sectors and contributed to the establishment of a bureaucracy, an educational system, and basic political institutions. To establish a minimal degree of national unity (without relying wholly on military coercion), the monarchy attempted to integrate the diverse ethnic and tribal powers which lay outside the Muhammadzai's kinship allegiances by granting them economic and political concessions and by educating their sons. Thus a new elite evolved which had been recruited from the influential elements of the traditional society whose power derived, for example, from their status as wealthy merchants, large landowners, khans of powerful tribes, and members of the religious clergy.

The modernization process begun by Abdur Rahman, which had centered on the military establishment, was expanded under Habibullah to include the first attempt to train an Afghan officer corps by creating a military academy.[48] Habibia College (high school) was also founded as a school for the "sons of nobility" to supply the increasing manpower needs of the central government. The formation of a modernizing elite received an added impetus from the influence of the nationalists in the Young Afghan party. The expansion of this

elite, drawn from the uppermost strata of the traditional society, was accelerated under Amanullah with the founding of three secondary schools; Isteqlal, staffed by the French; Ghazi, staffed by British-educated Indians; and Nejat, staffed by Germans.

During Amanullah's reign, the intellectual ferment, educational programs, and increased contact with foreign powers resulted in an expansion of Afghan political and economic elites. Growing commercial relations gave rise to a small group of economic entrepreneurs who were predominantly non-Pashtun and outside the kinship alliances of the royal family. An emerging trend in Afghanistan's foreign policy was the growth of closer political and economic ties with the Soviet Union.

Soviet support of the Amanullah regime facilitated the activities of Afghan traders who energetically responded to Soviet needs for cotton, wool, and foodstuffs. Abdul Majid Zabuli and a group of merchants from Herat engaged in trade with Russia through the Herat area and succeeded in amassing substantial profits. Russian holdings in Central Asia were not under the firm control of the Soviet government. The large desert areas across the border from Herat were incapable of supporting the Russian garrisons that were being maintained in the area. The fertile and productive Herat area supplied many of the foodstuffs and supplies required for the support of these garrisons. Another "prime mover" in the trade with Russia was Abdul Aziz Londoni, who was also connected with Abdul Majid Zabuli, and who began the development of cotton production in northern Afghanistan. Abdul Aziz Londoni responded in 1925 to the Soviet government's need for cotton which had been the mainstay of the Uzbekistan economy until it had been almost totally destroyed during the Russian Revolution and the counter-revolutionary uprisings of the

Muslim majorities of the area who were trying to escape Russian control.[49] This trade resulted in the emergence of an economic elite that was able to develop and control major productive resources in the Afghan economy and to amass large financial surpluses.

The modernizing orientation that the Amanullah era had fostered also gained direct expression in the "Liberal Assembly" of 1949-1952 and in the opposition movement whose growth it stimulated; it illustrated the key role of modernizing elites in the dynamic process of modernization. The opposition movement had coalesced around the leadership of Dr. Abdur Rahman Mahmudi and Muhammad Ghobar, both of whom had served as ministers in the Amanullah government. Not until Shah Mahmud's tenure as prime minister were these two men able to participate effectively in political activities again. Their nationalistic and reformist sentiments gained expression in the publication Watan (Homeland) which became the most influential voice of the opposition movement and of the embryonic Watan Party which formed around it. As carriers of modernization, Mahmudi and Ghobar represented the values of the earlier, pro-Amanullah generation. Their direct roles as modernizers ended, however, with the government's suppression of the 1949-1952 opposition movement. Imprisonment chastised Ghobar of his opposition sentiments, resulting in his appointment by the King in 1965 to a seat in the Meshrano Jirgah (House of Elders), a body which has traditionally represented the interests of the monarchy.[50] Mahmudi, however, grew gravely ill while in prison and died within a month after his release. Mahmudi has subsequently come to be regarded as a symbol of the selfless nationalist.

Although the reformist leadership represented by Mahmudi and Ghobar was carefully circumscribed

by the monarchy, its influence on the formation of a future opposition leadership was not insignificant. The "Liberal Assembly" had been successful in its opposition tactics in creating a heightened interest and following among the student population in Kabul. Among a number of students who were imprisoned, one was later to emerge in the reform period of 1963-1966 as a popular leftist leader. Babrak, a student at the Law Faculty of Kabul University and a key leader in the demonstrations of 1951 over the issue of a Student Union, had collaborated with other youthful activists in the publication of Watan, the organ of the embryonic Watan Party which was led by Mahmudi and Ghobar.[51]

Under King Nadir Shah (1929-1933) the educational system was further developed in 1932 with the founding of the Faculty of Medicine, the first institution of higher learning in the country. This effort, a response to a serious absence of modern medical care, was expanded in 1938 by the creation of the Faculty of Law and Political Science, to which was added the present Faculty of Economics (established in 1957). This was a government sponsored effort to supply high level manpower needs in the diplomatic and economic spheres. In the same year, a group of twenty-six Afghan students, many of whom belonged to other than the ruling Muhammadzai clan, was sent abroad on scholarships to study at foreign universities. Two men in this group who later played significant roles in Afghanistan's modernization were Dr. Muhammad Yousuf and Dr. Abdul Kayeum. Yousuf, whose ancestors were from Kashmir, later became prime minister, and Kayeum, a Ghilzai Pashtun, served as minister of interior under Yousuf.[52]

By the early 1960's, the gradual expansion of the educational system and the results of foreign study programs for Afghan students had created

a small core of high-level manpower. Professional, technical, administrative, and executive personnel were estimated in 1962 at approximately 7,000 individuals, ninety-three per cent of whom were employed in the public sector.[53] Although not necessarily characterized by a high degree of cohesiveness or agreement on policy, they did possess a significant potential for affecting the regime's actions. With more than ninety per cent of this highly skilled and literate manpower employed in the government sector, the monarchy depended upon them for the performance of governmental functions. By creating ad hoc alliances to negotiate issues affecting their common interests or relating to common values in their varying ideological orientations, the members of this intelligentsia were able to obtain a certain bargaining advantage vis-à-vis the regime.

In the midst of rapid changes in its national life as it entered the decade of the sixties, Afghanistan lacked a coherent or unifying ideological perspective to guide its modernization. Four major ideological positions had, however, come to dominate the thinking of the most influential power elites in the country. In terms of their general emphases, these four categories of ideology were: (1) the "Traditionalist" which favored the primacy of Islam and the retention of traditional Afghan culture; (2) the "Adaptive" which envisioned the utilization of Western technology and organization by adapting these to the traditional culture and Islamic teachings; (3) the "Democratic" which favored the creation of a representative government and a constitutional republic; and (4) the "Marxist-Leninist" which advocated and anticipated, at least implicitly, the necessity of achieving modernization and the creation of a new society via revolutionary means.[54]

Among the above ideological positions, the "Traditionalist" and the "Adaptive" approaches had increasingly carried little or no appeal for the younger generation of educated Afghans and their leaders. The transformation of the Afghan military and a changed socio-economic life had left an ideological vacuum. The struggle to fill this vacuum with a modern ideology and a legal system with which to guide the nation's destiny was significantly influenced by the political leadership of Dr. Muhammad Yousuf and Dr. Abdul Kayeum, both representative of the ideological stance which favored a system of representative government and a constitutional republic. An effect of their political efforts was to be the enactment in 1964 of a new constitution which, regarded as an interim document, only partially satisfied the country's need for a new articulation of its national policy and goals.

A third leader of major political importance, who was also from the ranks of the non-Muhammadzai members of the modernizing elites, entered the political arena in the person of Babrak and became the most prominent voice of the Marxist-Leninists.

Political Innovation: 1963 - 1966

The leadership elements of the non-royal family elite, who possessed a sufficient power base to make their demands for political modernization heard, represented an ideological orientation which envisioned the establishment of a republican form of government, the separation of the royal family from politics, if not the actual abolition of the monarchy, and an increase in individual and political freedoms, including the creation of a free press and the formation of political parties. The concept of republicanism

which evolved during the political reform period beginning in 1963 involved a demand for democratic representation, with the government being based on a constitution which provided for a constitutional monarchy in which the royal family was, both in theory and practice, separated from politics. The concept of Afghan republicanism was generated during Habibullah's reign, with its proponents working through a small underground movement. Its first significant expression, supported by an expanding popular interest, was under the 1949-1952 "Liberal Assembly." By 1963, however, the monarchy was compelled to give concrete recognition to the demand, and greater popular participation in the government, based on a new constitution, became a reality.[55]

A de facto coalition government was formed which united the monarchists with the advocates of republicanism and democratic reform. A tentative agreement on general policy helped to set the stage for a change in government leadership. On March 3, 1963, Prime Minister Daud submitted his resignation to King Muhammad Zahir Shah who formally accepted the resignation on March 9. On the same day, the King officially appointed Dr. Muhammad Yousuf, former minister of mines and industries, to the post of prime minister, the first commoner to hold the office.

The coalition cabinet, presided over by Prime Minister Yousuf, achieved its first concrete accomplishment on May 28, 1963, when an agreement was reached with Pakistan to re-establish commercial, consular, and diplomatic relations. After an interruption of twenty-two months, transit between the two countries resumed on July 25 with the first passage of trucks through the Khyber Pass.

The process of political reform had begun on March 28, 1963, when the King appointed a seven-member Constitutional Committee to draft a new

constitution. The initial draft was completed in February 1964, whereupon a Constitutional Advisory Commission of twenty-nine members met to consider the new document. The most crucial issue confronted during these deliberations conducted from March 1 to May 14, and the one with the greatest long-term significance, was the controversial question of the royal family's future role in politics. The advocates of democratic reforms wanted to limit the participation of the royal family in the affairs of government, a goal which met with intense opposition. In the battle to exclude the royal family from direct participation in politics, the reform advocates argued that the removal of royal family members from the government benefited the monarchy by placing responsibility for policy and its implementation on the officials of the civil government. This would leave the royal house less exposed to attack and to the vicissitudes of politics.[56] The conclusion finally reached, while preserving the supreme power of the King, excluded members of the immediate royal family from membership in the cabinet, parliament, or the supreme court. The Loya Jirgah convened from September 9 to 20, 1964, considered and finally approved the new Constitution which was then promulgated by the King on October 1, 1964. The final form of the Constitution placed the King at the apex of authority, embodying in his person: the sovereignty of the state; the role of protector of Islam, the symbol of national unity; and the head of the three branches of government.[57] The organizational prescriptions of the Constitution provided for the creation of three separate branches of government, the executive, legislative, and the judicial, with the judiciary to be established in 1967.

On October 2, the King dissolved the National Assembly and designated Prime Minister Yousuf's

cabinet to function as an interim government until elections could be held for the new parliament which was scheduled to convene on October 14, 1965. The interim government prepared for a transformation in the political life of the country by promulgating a number of laws, the most important ones being the Election Law, the Press Law, the Basic Administration Law, and the Income Tax Law.[58] With the August and September 1965 elections for the 216-member Wolesi Jirgah (House of the People) and the Meshrano Jirgah (House of Elders), one-third of whose eighty-four members were selected by direct elections, one-third appointed by the King and the remaining one-third to be chosen by the Provincial Councils, the reformist intentions behind these laws neared reality.

Contrary to past election practices whereby the government selected candidates whom it considered safe, the election results were not shaped beforehand by the monarchy. In one instance, the monarchy attempted to block the campaign activities of Dr. Anahita, a woman candidate from Kabul and a Marxist; but the Ministry of Interior, under the leadership of the democratic reformist Dr. Abdul Kayeum, who was responsible for the conduct of the elections, refused to carry out the restraining action against Dr. Anahita unless the monarchy accepted full responsibility for the action. The King declined and Dr. Anahita was subsequently elected to the Wolesi Jirgah.[59]

The majority of the candidates represented the traditional bases of power in the country, their support being mobilized predominantly from among ethnic, tribal, clan and extended family allegiances. Although the new Constitution grants the right to form political parties, enabling legislation to carry out the provisions of the Constitution had not been enacted at the time of the elections. Voters were, however, drawn to

support candidates on considerations other than those of traditional kinship allegiances and values, being attracted instead to personalities and their ideological positions. Embryonic party movements arose around three general groupings: (1) the monarchists, or government people; (2) the democratic reformers, or republican constitutionalists; and (3) the leftists, or Marxist-Leninists.[60]

Following the announcement of the election results by the Ministry of Interior on October 1, 1965, the Wolesi Jirgah became the center of political activity, characterized by factional power struggles and particularly by volatile opposition to the interim government of Prime Minister Yousuf. The disposition and stormy atmosphere of the Wolesi Jirgah was apparent when the members met three days before the King officially inaugurated it on his birthday, the 14th of October.

With the official inauguration of the Wolesi Jirgah, the King designated Prime Minister Yousuf to form a new government. The sentiments of the deputies, however, were not favorable to the Yousuf Cabinet. The performance of the interim government came under vitriolic attacks charging mismanagement and widespread corruption in the bureaucracy. As part of a drive to prevent bribery and the embezzlement of government funds, the Wolesi Jirgah members demanded that cabinet ministers submit statements detailing their wealth and sources of income.

Although corruption, bribery, and nepotism had not been unknown among members of the Afghan bureaucracy under earlier governments, the issue provided a focal point which various factions could utilize to rally support and advance their particular interests. The floor of the Wolesi Jirgah became an arena in which the major political powers engaged in a fierce battle for dominance,

a struggle that grew so intense that it spilled into the streets in a violent encounter on October 25 (Sehum-i Aqrab), and marked the first phase of a retrenchment in the movement towards political reforms and increased political liberties.[61]

The power struggles that occurred involved: (1) Yousuf's supporters; (2) the monarchy; (3) the faction led by Dr. Abdul Kayeum, the minister of interior in the interim government; and, (4) the leftists led by Babrak. At the summit of the struggle stood the monarchy, including the "inner cabinet" which had strategically initiated the 1963 change of government, and which was now confronted with a threat to its own position by Yousuf's growing dominance of the political scene which was characterized by an accelerated injection of new ideas into the political system. As a symbol of reform and the central focus of national leadership, Yousuf had gained increased popular support which threatened to undermine the authority and dominant status of the monarchy. Within the ranks of the democratic reformists and the proponents of representative government, Dr. Abdul Kayeum, as head of the powerful Ministry of Interior, had been most influential in assuring that the elections would be conducted with as much popular participation and as little interference as was possible under the circumstances. Kayeum had also furthered the cause of reform government by making appointments to provincial governorships that were in marked contrast with past representatives of the central government. These predecessors were generally noted for a proclivity to utilize their offices for personal advantage, sometimes without regard for the welfare of the local populace. A changed atmosphere in the internal administration of the country created added support for both the political faction led by Kayeum and for the increased

liberalization of Afghan politics. However, the coalition of democratic forces under Kayeum and Yousuf was caught in a crossfire between the monarchy and the leftists led by Babrak. With the balance of power favoring it, the monarchy was able to take the initiative in maneuvering designed to reassert its absolute control over the composition of the new cabinet and its policies. The coalition of democratic forces under Kayeum and Yousuf was fractured in repeated assaults by the supporters of the monarchy and the leftists. The repeated charges of corruption against Yousuf's interim cabinet created a difficult situation in which to obtain a vote of confidence from the Wolesi Jirgah.

The most significant series of events in the struggle for power began on Thursday, October 21, when Yousuf appeared before the Wolesi Jirgah in an attempt to obtain a vote of confidence. This possibility was apparently partially countered by packing the galleries with students from the Law Faculty of Kabul University. According to several law students attending, those law students in the galleries were chosen by Hamidullah, dean of the Law Faculty and a son of Ali Muhammad, the King's minister of court. The expressions of enmity which occurred as Yousuf confronted the Wolesi Jirgah issued from the galleries and from members of the Wolesi Jirgah. The negative sentiments of the Jirgah precluded the possibility and the wisdom of Yousuf's asking for a vote of confidence. He exited from the disorderly assembly with the declaration that he would return for the vote of confidence on Sunday, October 24.

However, when the Wolesi Jirgah again met on Sunday, October 24, it was disrupted by crowds which packed the galleries and floor of the Parliament, occupied the seats of the members, and refused requests to leave. The blocking of the Jirgah's premises made it impossible to conduct

a session, and the president of the Wolesi Jirgah, Dr. Abdul Zahir, was forced to adjourn the session until the following day. The parliamentary obstruction tactic has been variously attributed to both the leftists and to the Kayeum faction at this stage. The Kayeum faction had suffered a setback as indicated by Kayeum's absence from the rumored lineup of the new cabinet which Yousuf would present to the Jirgah. The leftists, on the other hand, were antagonistic to some of the rumored cabinet ministers, many of whom were carry-overs from the interim government.

The October 25 Demonstrations

The heightened political tension came to an explosive head on Monday, October 25, 1965. To end the many frustrated attempts to form a new government, the Wolesi Jirgah announced on Sunday evening that its sessions would be closed to the public but that loudspeakers would be installed outside the building so that the public could listen to the Jirgah's deliberations. Although the session was indeed closed to the public, it was also secret. The proceedings were not broadcast to those outside the building. Because the session was not public, the struggle which had previously been fought in the halls of the Wolesi Jirgah moved into the streets of Kabul. There members of the modern elite, leftist leaders and their student followers, and the traditional elite, backed by a modern army, collided in a bloody show of force.

Early Monday morning, a small core of highly politicized students and their leaders attempted to proceed to the area of Parliament but were turned back by the police. A small cadre of students returned to Kabul University and called for other students to join them in a mass protest against the secret session. The students of the University abandoned their classes en masse,

being joined by secondary students from the surrounding schools. A rock battle broke out between the police and the students of Habibia high school which turned into a bloodbath when Prime Minister Yousuf's cavalcade attempted to pass through the area on the way to Parliament shortly before 11:00 a.m. Cars were stoned and at least two police officials were killed.

Motorized army units which had been assembled outside of Parliament were then brought into action by Khan Muhammad Khan, the minister of defense (a Muhammadzai clansman of the King), and by Abdul Wali. The army and police launched a counter movement against the stone-throwing students, disbursing them, and turning the mass of demonstrators back towards the University campus. By noon, at least four students were dead in addition to the two government personnel who had accompanied the motorcade.

A lull ocurred shortly after noon, but between 1:00 and 2:00 p.m., there were renewed demonstrations by students and civil servants who had amassed or regrouped in the downtown area of Kabul. At approximately 2:00 p.m., Prime Minister Yousuf arrived unhindered at Parliament accompanied by armored cars and a heavily armed contingent of six fully occupied troop carriers. At 3:00 p.m., the remainder of Yousuf's cabinet entered Parliament where shortly afterwards, with the demonstrations growing in intensity and magnitude, and in response to an appeal by Yousuf that they consider the seriousness of the crisis confronting the country and act to alleviate it, the members of the Wolesi Jirgah cut short their debate and deliberations and gave a vote of confidence to the Yousuf government. But the day's tragic violence was not finished. Masses of demonstrating students were joined by civil servants who swelled the demonstrators' ranks when the ministries and government offices closed at

3:30 p.m. Demonstrators were confronted by the army in the vicinity of the prime minister's residence and a nearby police station where the demonstrators reportedly intended to demand the release of students who had allegedly been jailed after the morning demonstrations. About 4:45 p.m., the army, under the command of Abdul Wali, opened fire with sub-machine guns in response to rock-hurling students. The cost for the day's political expression was an unofficial toll of twenty-eight dead, mostly students.

The Maiwandwal Government

The demonstrations were followed by a tense and uncertain period during which all public gatherings were banned, the schools of Kabul were closed, and the armed forces were stationed on the streets of the capital. On Friday, October 29, four days after the demonstrations, Prime Minister Yousuf resigned and his new cabinet was dissolved without having actually governed. On the same day, the King designated Muhammad Hashem Maiwandwal, a former ambassador to the United States and the minister of press and information in Yousuf's cabinet, to form a new government. Under the tight control of the monarchy, Prime Minister-designate Maiwandwal, a King's man, formed a new cabinet which was presented to the Wolesi Jirgah on November 2, 1965, where it received a vote of confidence with 190 in favor, 7 against, 3 abstaining, and 16 absent.[62]

The Maiwandwal Government immediately began an attempt to restore the tenuous stability and national unity which the upheaval of October 25 had dangerously weakened. The former ministers of finance, education, justice, agriculture and commerce in Yousuf's interim cabinet had been the principal targets of attack. They had aroused considerable public opposition and

discontent because of their administrative policies and conduct. The removal of these ministers in particular, and the changed composition of Maiwandwal's cabinet,[63] helped considerably to ease existing tensions. In his acceptance speech to the Wolesi Jirgah, broadcast nationally by Radio Afghanistan, the Prime Minister alternately used both Pashtu and Dari (Persian) while emotionally vowing to combat corruption and nepotism in the government.[64]

Prime Minister Maiwandwal was particularly compelled to establish a rapprochement with the university and secondary students of Kabul. Under Prime Minister Daud, the expansion of the educational system had created a new political force. At the beginning of the First Five Year Plan (1956), the total enrollment of Kabul University was 874 students. By 1965, the University's enrollment reached 3,186. The nationwide student enrollment at the secondary level similarly rose from 9,125 in 1956-1957 to a total of 33,300 in 1965 with about half of this number being enrolled in Kabul schools.[65] As members of extended families who represented a new social elite, the Kabul students, some 20,000, possessed a much greater influence than their actual numbers might seem to suggest.

During the drafting and ratification of the new Constitution, a changed political atmosphere had emerged which was accompanied by the increased politicization of the student population. Their involvement in the political process was encouraged by the government's decision to dismiss them from classes during the August-September 1965 elections so that they might vote in their home provinces. This policy was also prompted by the desire to lessen the likelihood of student disturbances or demonstrations during the balloting in Kabul. In the chaotic days preceding the October 25 demonstrations, the students had begun

to formulate a specific set of political demands. One of the most publicized of these demands, displayed on the banners carried by the October 25 demonstrators, called for "an open agenda for Parliament" and the full disclosure of the Wolesi Jirgah's proceedings, a demand which represented something of a precedent in the Afghan political context. A more fully articulated statement of student political objectives demanded: the elimination of corrupt practices in the bureaucracy and the removal of officials found guilty of improbity in the conduct of their public offices; an attack on governmental nepotism through concerted efforts to abolish government hiring practices which gave preference to individuals according to their regional, ethnic, tribal or familial origin; the cessation of the government's manipulation of the Pashtu-Dari language difference, i.e., the promotion of Pashtu over Dari, a practice which had hitherto been followed by the monarchy in its efforts to further the cause of Pashtunistan and also to prevent or discourage differing linguistic groups from entering into coalitions which might prove a threat to the monarchy's hegemony; a program of regionally balanced socio-economic development, with emphasis being given to the balanced expansion of the educational system; and a sweeping reform of the University's administrative practices, organization, curriculum, and educational policies and standards.[66]

Following the November 2 reopening of Kabul's schools, the university students staged a mass rally on November 3 in front of the administration building where in a series of speeches they presented a list of grievances. In the aftermath of the demonstrations, three major demands were voiced by the students: (1) the release of those students (variously estimated from four to one hundred) who had been jailed for

their participation in the demonstration; (2) the right to form a student union and to freely elect representatives from both the University and secondary schools; and (3) an investigation to determine the identities and to hold accountable those responsible for giving the order to fire upon the students.[67]

Prime Minister Maiwandwal chose a solemn, emotionally charged moment to seek rapprochement with the students. On Thursday morning, November 4, a memorial service was held on the University campus for the students who had been killed during the demonstration. As the services were being conducted, Prime Minister Maiwandwal arrived unexpectedly and announced that he too was in mourning and had come to mourn with them. The prime minister promised to meet, insofar as he was able, the demands of the students. To this end, four students who had been jailed were released that evening. A joint executive-legislative committee was formed to investigate the causes of the demonstration. And the first step in creating a student union was initiated on November 9-10 when representatives were chosen by the students of the University.

The expanding political role of the students was curbed, however, following a series of rallies, class boycotts and a peaceful street demonstration, closely controlled by the police and army, that occurred in late November and continued through December 1965.[68] At the instigation of leftist leaders, students in the Faculty of Science initiated a series of anti-German demonstrations on December 9. Based on somewhat ill-defined goals and questionable grievances, the protest ostensibly focused on the West German educational assistance program in the Faculty of Science and the alleged conduct and methods of West German faculty members. The demonstrations gained the partial support of the students in the

other faculties (colleges) of the University, mainly as a result of the government's arrest and sentencing of Muhammad Osman, a teacher in the Faculty of Science, to a two-year prison term for agitating and provoking the students. Osman's conviction was announced by the government on Sunday, December 12, and was followed on Monday by a student march to the Prime Ministry and the picketing of the West German Embassy with signs calling for the expulsion of the German teachers from the Science Faculty. After a protest march on Tuesday, December 14, the Ministry of Interior forbade further demonstrations. Government pressure and University disciplinary measures served to curtail the political activities of the students. However, the demonstrations of October 25 had clearly displayed the students' potential for mass political action.

To establish contact with the bureaucracy, Prime Minister Maiwandwal conducted a series of visits to government ministries and agencies, individually greeting their personnel and discussing with them the goals of his government. The political innovations and reforms of the 1963-1965 interim government of Yousuf had profoundly altered the awareness of the Afghan people, creating new political expectations and demands. The Maiwandwal drive to create a consensus took on a unique character in his program to "Meet the People" which he initiated in December 1965 by utilizing each Friday to make trips into the provinces with the stated intent of becoming acquainted with the local people, learning to understand their problems, and maintaining continual contact with them.[70]

By March 1966, three years after the resignation of Daud, the conservative forces behind the monarchy were again in the ascendancy. When the Wolesi Jirgah reconvened on March 13, after its winter recess, it was unable to open because it

lacked the required quorum of two-thirds of the members. Out of a total of 216 deputies, only 102 were present,[71] a situation vastly different from the one which had prevailed in October 1965 when enthusiastic deputies met and began conducting business a week before the Wolesi Jirgah's scheduled inauguration by the King. The dominant role played during that session of the parliament by the Wolesi Jirgah passed to the conservative Meshrano Jirgah, an indication of the change in power relationships which saw the monarchy emerge as the dominant force. However, in March 1966, the control of the government still remained partially unsettled. As the issue was decided, heightened political tensions gripped the capital city of Kabul accompanied by rumors of both planned and attempted coups. However, the image of an advancing program of reforms was maintained through the activity of the independent press and also by the intimation that the formation of political parties would be forthcoming shortly.

The Independent Press

The Press Law which had been promulgated in July 1965 and adopted on August 11, 1965, by the interim cabinet[72] finally bore fruit in the first half of 1966 after the Wolesi Jirgah passed the law during its 1st Session. Between late January and July 1966, six privately owned papers were published under the provisions of the Press Law. The first was Wahdat (Unity or Solidarity) which appeared on January 31,[73] but which was closed on the initiative of its publisher. On February 9, Payam-i Emroz (The Daily Message) began publishing the first of a number of issues which later created considerable controversy. Payam-i Emroz's publisher, Ghulam Nabi Khater, had published a paper during the 1949-1952 "Liberal Assembly" era and by some accounts had

spent eleven years in prison for political reasons. The paper professed an adherence to the principles and goals established by Dr. Mahmudi whose leadership role in the 1949-1952 period, and later death apparently caused by prison conditions, had established him as a symbol of legitimacy for opposition sentiments. The criticism and opposition stand which emerged in Payam-i Emroz established it as one of two newspapers which would become the chief contenders for the leadership of the anti-government, anti-monarchy opposition elements. Payam-i Emroz's chief contender, and the most radical of the private publications, was first published on April 11, 1966, with the title Khalq (The People). Published by Noor Muhammad Taraki and edited by Bareq Shafie,[74] Khalq was the organ of the Marxist-Leninist Left which was led by Babrak who frequently contributed articles to the paper.

The creation of a private press and, particularly, the expression of political opposition by the newspapers Khalq and Payam-i Emroz represented the last significant forward thrust in Afghanistan's 1963-1966 era of political liberalization. The first and second issues of Khalq, published in a combined edition on April 11, sold 20,000 copies with subsequent issues numbering 10,000.[75] Its Marxist-Leninist ideology and its attack on what it described as the "tyranny of the profiteering ruling group, feudal interests' exploitation, and the use of old traditions by reactionary elements to continue the oppression of the workers, peasants, and enlightened progressives in the country"[76] provided momentum for an expanding leftist movement. An article written by Babrak in the April 25 issue of Khalq explained that the paper's major task was the formation of a national ideology as a first step in a program of social action. This program would require the creation of a nationalist

organization as the necessary instrument for the liberation of the oppressed classes of Afghanistan which would be achieved in an open, peaceful struggle.[77] The leftist movement that began to gain momentum under the influence of Khalq brought a political realignment. It created a polarization of forces. The monarchy, with the support of the traditional elements of the society, confronted the growing influence of the leftists who represented an embryonic mass political movement.

The case of Khalq clearly illustrated to the monarchy the dangers of a free and vitriolic oppositon press. The widespread dissemination of concepts which demanded land reform, for example, and an end to the feudalistic landlord-tenant relationship, tended to undermine the structure of the traditional society and its values from which the traditional elites, particularly the monarchy, derived their authority.

The monarchy's response to the leftists was one which maintained the impression that the government would continue to implement the major political reforms and ideals outlined in the Constitution. On April 13, immediately following the first printing of Khalq, the Inspection and Judicial Affairs Commission of the Wolesi Jirgah initiated proceedings to consider the Draft Law on Political Parties Formation[78] for the first time since the interim cabinet of Dr. Yousuf had approved a draft of the law on September 27, 1965.[79] The monarchy, in turn, began to mobilize supporters with the declared intention of creating a "monarchist" party. Deputy Minister of Agriculture Muhammad Ihsan Rafiq a first cousin of the King, led the mobilization drive within the government ministries and agencies by conducting organizational meetings and rallying the support of the civil servants in the bureaucracy.[80]

By May 1966, the monarchy had built a sufficient consensus to enable it to move against the leftists and to suppress Khalq. On May 4, a resolution submitted by twenty members of the Meshrano Jirgah declared that the concern of the public had been aroused by Khalq, and added that any publication (implying Khalq) contrary to the principles of Islam and the Constitution should be prohibited.[81] With conservative religious leaders rising in opposition to Khalq, the decision to ban the paper was pushed through the Wolesi Jirgah on May 23. The proceedings of the Wolesi Jirgah, dominated by the conservative elements, were not accepted by approximately sixty deputies who reportedly walked out of the assembly, refusing to participate.

Just two days later, Payam-i Emroz was also closed, on the grounds that it did not have the responsible editor needed under the Press Law. Payam-i Emroz had attacked Prime Minister Maiwandwal's policies; but the determining factor in closing the paper stemmed from its attacks on corruption in the government bureaucracy. Although charges and countercharges of corruption and bribery had not been uncommon, Payam-i Emroz had incurred the wrath of a number of top officials by presenting them with evidence of their improbity and threatening to publish the information if the individuals involved failed to submit blackmail payments. The Wolesi Jirgah considered the case of Payam-i Emroz in a secret session.[82] The government's action against Khalq and Payam-i Emroz ended the short life of the opposition press in 1966. With the leftists having been denied a public platform in the press, and with their strength shattered by the overpowering traditional forces aligned behind the monarchy, the issue of political parties was shelved.

The remaining three private papers to be published during the first half of 1966 were representative of views which were relatively acceptable to the government; and thus, they did not at this time reach the heights of controversy to arouse the government and the public in any degree similar to Khalq and Payam-i Emroz The first of these, in the order of initial publication dates, was Afghan Millet, which appeared in April. (It was closed in May 1967 and then allowed to reappear nine months later.) A second, short-lived publication, which was intended to counter the views of Khalq, was first printed on May 11, under the title Mardom, a word which, as "khalq," denotes "the people" but which is devoid of the poetical and inspirational connotations of the word "khalq." The pro-monarchy liberals who published and edited Mardom were unable to muster a content for their paper which carried the needed forcefulness to provide an adequate response or alternative to the views presented in Khalq.[83] The last newspaper of the private genre, Payam-i Wejdan, came out on July 24, 1966.[84] The pro-monarchy voice of Payam-i Wejdan was heard only for a short period.[85] Thus the struggle to create an independent press with the freedom to engage in criticism of the government and to function as a voice for political opposition elements had been temporarily lost.[86] As a corollary to the silencing of the private press, the faltering motions to establish a normal system of political parties were afflicted with paralysis.

By the end of 1966, the accelerated pace of constitutional and political reforms undertaken in 1963 (following the resignation of former Prime Minister Daud) had been slowed. The key leaders and proponents of democratic reforms, republicanism and constitutional government, former Prime Minister Muhammad Yousuf and Abdul

Kayeum, ex-minister of interior, were abroad accepting a quasi exile status. Babrak, the Wolesi Jirgah member who had been the central figure in the leadership of the growing leftist movement, was subjected to a physical attack by his colleagues in the Wolesi Jirgah during a session in 1967. His supporters, mostly students in Kabul, staged a non-violent protest demonstration outside the hospital where Babrak was recovering from his injuries. The monarchy had been successful in concentrating governmental decision-making and control within the ranks of the royal family. Still, a truly revolutionary course had been struck in the modernization of Afghanistan.

Conclusions

The preceding chronicle and analysis of events illustrates the complexity and inter-relatedness of the factors involved in the dynamic process of modernization. Two factors emerge from this description, however, as particularly significant in the political and socio-economic development of Afghanistan: (1) the modernization of the military and (2) the formation and role of a modernizing elite.

The cornerstone of policy in the modernization programs initiated by Afghan rulers has been the development of the military capabilities of the central government. Efforts to adopt modern weapons and military organization represented a defensive response by Afghan monarchs to secure the independence and territorial integrity of their country against the military threats and political and economic encroachments of foreign powers. This external stimulus was reinforced by the internal threat to the power of the monarchy posed by a multitude of competing and hostile tribal, clan, and ethnic power centers. The impetus and,

indeed, the means for the program of military modernization successfully implemented by Daud were provided by both external and internal conditions; but the crucial factor was the foreign assistance which the Soviets contributed to the Daud government. The Cold War confrontation and rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States induced the Soviets to contribute large-scale military and economic assistance to Afghanistan.

The contribution by foreign powers of military and economic support to enable Afghan monarchs to gain and hold power had been a recurring theme in the country's pattern of foreign relations. And foreign assistance to the rulers in Kabul has been the lifeblood of the central government's modernization programs. The competition between the Soviet Union and the United States was analagous to the international power struggles of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries when Czarist Russia and the British Empire directed their expansionist activities toward Afghanistan, thus molding the country territorially and shaping it internally.

The continuing influence of foreign powers on Afghan politics resulted in a decisive transformation in the country's internal political dynamics. Soviet Bloc military assistance to the Afghan Army and Air Force revolutionized the role of the central government and permanently altered the internal power structure. The result of Prime Minister Daud's unprecedented program of military modernization was that for the first time in its history, the military power of the tribes was no longer a dominant threat to the survival of the central government's power and authority.

The modern capabilities of Afghanistan's military forces were employed by Daud to meet the challenge to national unity presented by tribal

power. The extension of the central government's power into the autonomous tribal territories occasionally exploded into battles between the Afghan Army and the tribes. The government's suppression of the tribal uprisings and the destruction of tribal autonomy brought the formation of a new scale and kind of political organization, the nation-state, and the replacement of parochial loyalties with a sense of allegiance to the nation. The warfare which arose was apparently not primarily caused by the imposition of reforms such as the unveiling of Afghan women although such measures may have been factors, at least as they served to illustrate the growing power of the central government. The dynamics of tribal politics, which had once effected the overthrow of the militarily impotent Amanullah regime, operated to mobilize tribal power against the Afghan Army, not just to protest the content of a reform program, but to engage--as in the case of Amanullah--in a military conflict for political power.

A concomitant of the quest for national unity was the relentless effort led by Daud to resolve the territorial dispute and the question of national boundaries involved in the Pashtunistan issue. With Soviet support and a newly acquired military strength, Daud pressed for the satisfaction of Afghanistan's demands on Pashtunistan. The political stalemate which developed resulted in Daud's resignation and an implicit acceptance of the existing boundaries, although the Afghan government continues to press the case for Pashtunistan in diplomatic circles. By imposing a semblance of national unity and by tentatively settling the dispute with Pakistan, Afghanistan began to build a national identity and, in the process, to acquire a basic attribute of a modern polity.

An important consequence of the modernization programs initiated by the royal family was the placing of non-Muhammadzai leaders in positions of national importance in the military and civil bureaucracy. The modernizing efforts undertaken by Afghan monarchs to bolster the power and authority of the central government had gradually transformed the beliefs, values, and ideologies of these non-Muhammadzai leaders and resulted in the adoption of new, modernizing roles which mirrored the content, complexity, and differentiation of the roles that exist in industrialized societies. The expansion of these modernizing roles created forces (individuals and groups) that tended to be at odds with the traditional socio-political system's values and beliefs, particularly the ideological bases for the legitimacy of the monarchy's authority. The monarchy attempted to incorporate or absorb these new members of the elite into the traditional hierarchy of power and prestige which was represented by the monarch and was an expression of the tribal power and loyalties commanded by the Muhammadzai clan of the Durrani Pashtun tribe.

The modernizing orientation of the Amanullah era, accompanied by the attainment of independence, a heightened sense of nationalism, and a commitment to the values and goals of modernity, gave birth to a group of reformist leaders who were successful in forming an opposition movement that was later able to exert considerable political influence during the 1949-1952 period of the "Liberal Assembly" by advocating reformist policies both in the sessions of the National Assembly and in the independent newspapers then being published. This political opposition became a training ground for the future leadership and a seed-bed for development of a mass political movement. These modernizers contributed new articulations of Afghanistan's national policy,

and developed and propagated various ideological positions to mobilize the requisite political support for the achievement of their goals.

The expansion of the educational system, the growth of foreign assistance for economic and military development programs, and the increase in foreign study programs resulted in a cadre of highly-trained Afghans who had adopted modernizing roles. The effect of the above developments, particularly during Prime Minister Daud's exercise of power, was a radical restructuring of political forces in Afghanistan. As a consequence of the efforts to expand the educational system, for example, an accelerated increase in the student population occurred which was accompanied by the emergence of the secondary and university students as a potent and sometimes troublesome political force. The large-scale economic assistance from foreign governments that was funneled through the civil bureaucracy also generated an expansion of unprecedented scope in the structure, role, and importance of Afghanistan's bureaucratic institutions, and enabled the political factions and interest groups within the bureaucracy to exert a highly important influence on the course and rate of Afghan modernization. The most significant force that emerged in the domestic political arena was the Afghan military whose command positions were occupied by members of the royal family and by its most loyal and trusted supporters. These new political forces, principally the monarchically controlled military and the embryonic political parties with their various leaders and ideologies, became the major competitors for political power and, accordingly, the key political instruments for the formulation and implementation of Afghanistan's modernization policies.

The 1964-1966 period of extensive innovations in the political institutions and processes of

Afghanistan was a consequence of the political power and influence that non-Muhammadzai members of the modernizing elite had successfully been able to exert against the dominance of the monarchy. An accelerated pace of constitutional and political reforms stimulated the injection of new ideas into the political system, altered popular conceptions and expectations regarding the relations of citizens to the government, and resulted in an increase in the expression of political sentiments and in the organizational activity of factions and groups seeking political power. The voice of the private press disseminated modernity's values, beliefs, and ideologies and created new political orientations that became the bases for mass political movements. Embryonic party movements arose around three general groupings: (1) the monarchists, or government people; (2) the democratic reformers, or republican constitutionalists; and, (3) the leftists, or Marxist-Leninists.

As the power and prestige of the opposition movements and the members of the modernizing elite who led them grew, their demands for political reforms and for increased participation in the decision-making process posed a serious threat to the power and authority of the monarchy. The 1949-1952 "Liberal Assembly" and, particularly, the constitutional reforms and political innovations of the 1963-1966 period were characterized by the emergence of political leaders and groups that pursued competing reform policies and challenged the traditional authority and legitimacy of the monarchy. Any acquiesence or accommodation by the monarch to the reformist demands of these opposition elements for a more influential role would require an erosion in the status and power which was enjoyed by the monarchy within the traditional political system's hierarchy of power and authority. The

military, however, as the bulwark of the monarchy's power and authority, effectively demonstrated its capacity and potential for successfully responding to threats to the regime's hegemony such as those posed by tribal strife or the demonstrations of October 1965. The monarchy relied heavily on military and police power to guarantee the internal security and stability of the regime. With its long sought goal to modernize the military accomplished, the royal family faced the continuing imperative that it preserve and strengthen the loyalty and allegiance to the regime of an officers' corps which had been educated to operate a modern military organization and which, in the process, had also acquired modernizing perspectives and roles. In effect, those Afghan leaders who in the future would be able to secure the allegiance and control of the military establishment would be the individuals upon whom would devolve the power and authority to define the policies and goals of Afghanistan's modernization and to guide its destiny as a nation.

As Afghanistan approached the 1970's, the transforming impact of its intensive modernization programs on the values, beliefs, and ideologies of the traditional system had generated severe conflicts and tensions in the society and in the lives of its individuals. The formation of modernizing roles and the consequent emergence of new political forces had effected a redistribution of political power and profoundly altered--i.e. revolutionized--the character and content of domestic political activity. In sum, the impact of the modernizing elite on the political system had been explosive in the years of post-World War II innovation and reform; and the intense rivalries between the political factions that assumed dominant roles during this era, especially those forces involved in the

power struggles that occurred during the 1963-1966 reform period, were portents of the political confrontations that might develop in the future competition for control of the government.

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V

GERMANY, THIRD POWER IN AFGHANISTAN'S FOREIGN RELATIONS

By Ludwig W. Adamec

Introduction[1]

Afghanistan's international relations have been decisively influenced by her geographic location in landlocked isolation. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries this position was increasingly threatened by the forward moves of Russia and Britain. The danger of political extinction forced Afghan rulers to examine the power-political situation to find ways to defend their possessions. Abdur Rahman, Amir of Afghanistan from 1880 to 1901, first formulated a foreign policy that was based on a cautious alliance with Britain. In this alliance, Britain agreed to defend Abdur Rahman against foreign aggression and strengthen his power with aid in money and arms. As a quid pro quo, the Afghan ruler agreed not to have relations with any other foreign power. The problem with this arrangement was that, while it gave Afghanistan a certain measure of protection from Russian aggression, it did not protect the Afghan ruler from his powerful ally.

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Abdur Rahman, therefore, initiated a policy that served both him and Amir Habibullah, his son and successor, for almost forty years. This policy contained three essential elements: militant assertion of independence, defensive isolationism, and a manipulation or balancing of pressures by the mutually hostile powers, Russia and Britain. This policy has been described elsewhere;[2] it suffices to say that the assertion of independence aimed at discouraging the British view that they had established the Afghan ruler on his throne and were therefore entitled to exercise control over him. Isolationism effectively prevented peaceful penetration of Afghanistan by Britain as a concomitant of cooperation in military matters for the sake of their common defense. The balancing of Anglo-Russian pressures, for example, permitted Amir Habibullah to neutralize the section of the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 that affected Afghanistan.

The "Great Game," played by Russia and Britain for the acquisition of territories in Central Asia, came to an end with the advent of World War I, when Germany appeared on the scene prepared to challenge both powers. The rules of the game were now changed, and Afghan rulers were faced with new options as well as with new dangers.

The subject of this paper is to examine Germany's position in Afghanistan--to trace German activities from the first German-Afghan contacts to the post-World War II period and to define the factors that have been at work in maintaining Germany's role in Afghanistan, irrespective of the vicissitudes of international politics.

Before proceeding with this account, let me review certain events that preceded the appearance of Germany on the Afghan scene. The history of Afghan foreign relations can be conveniently divided into four periods: first, the expansionist period from the foundation of the state in

1747 to 1800; second, the period of foreign conflict from 1800 to 1880, which, in addition to Russia and Britain, involved Persia and the emerging Sikh nation; third, the period of defensive isolationism initiated by Abdur Rahman in 1880 and followed by Amir Habibullah to the end of his reign in 1919; fourth, the period of defensive neutralism that opened the country to foreign influences. It lasted from 1919 to the present and, mutatis mutandis, has remained essentially the same.

Only in the first of these periods was Afghan foreign policy expansionist rather than defensive. The formulators of policy during the eighteenth century believed it was Afghanistan's manifest destiny to expand into northwestern India and hold and consolidate her conquests. The first period ended with the diplomatic moves of Lord Wellesley in India. Wellesley, who was governor of Bengal (1798-1805), enlisted the Persians in the west to prevent Zaman Shah from executing his plans for the conquest of the Punjab. These moves were followed by more decisive action. Lord Auckland (1839-1842) initiated a forward policy that aimed at the control of Afghanistan through the agency of a British-appointed amir. Dost Muhammad, an able ruler who commanded the allegiance of a large sector of the Afghan people, was toppled from his throne in a military action that became known as the First Afghan War (1839-1842).

Shah Shujah, the British-imposed ruler, could not maintain himself in power after his protectors were defeated and the British evacuated their troops from Afghanistan. The debacle of this war discouraged British forward moves for the following forty years, until Britain again invaded Afghanistan during the Second Afghan War (1878-1879). The events of these two wars taught British officials in India that a British-imposed

Afghan ruler could not be maintained unless supported by occupation, and that the occupation of Afghanistan was both costly and dangerous. But British policy-makers had become convinced that some kind of control over Afghanistan was needed to ensure the protection of India. One possibility was to recognize the de facto ruler of Afghanistan and to tie him to Britain by strengthening his power with gifts of arms and money. The agreements of 1880, 1883, and 1893, based on exchanges of letters between Abdur Rahman and officials of the government of India, began a new era in Anglo-Afghan relations and formed a basis for the development of a rational Afghan foreign policy. Afghanistan was protected from Russian aggression and was recognized by Britain as being internally independent. It was Abdur Rahman's task now to keep Britain at a distance and to prevent Britain and Russia from agreeing to divide Afghanistan between them.

Abdur Rahman and Habibullah, his successor, performed this task well: but it eventually became apparent to Afghan rulers that a policy of isolationism might no longer be adequate. Even in Britain it was recognized that it was impossible to prevent Russia and Afghanistan from having direct relations. The change in the balance of power in Europe on the eve of World War I indicated that both Britain and Russia would be challenged in many parts of the world. It was during World War I that Germany first became a factor in Afghan foreign relations, and it is since that time that Germany has been the most important third European power in Afghanistan.

The Arrival of Germans in Afghanistan

During Habibullah's rule (1901-1919), Afghanistan cautiously opened its doors to foreigners. Experts of various nationalities, but still

predominantly from the British empire, were called to Afghanistan to advise Afghan rulers on projects of modernization, to construct roads, and to lay the foundations for industry. Before that period Germany had already seemed to an Afghan ruler to be a power capable of breaking the British monopoly on the supply of arms and ammunition. In 1898, Abdur Rahman sent E. T. Pack, his English chief engineer, to Germany to collect information about German arms manufacture and to hire a German Krupp employee. This man, Gottlieb Fleischer, was killed on November 7, 1904, while he was enroute to India on home leave.[3] The influx of other Germans was prevented by Britain, who exerted control of emigration to Afghanistan and found excuses for refusing Germans passage through India.[4]

When Germany finally appeared on the scene in August 1915, Germans established themselves as a political factor which, while fluctuating in strength, has continued virtually uninterrupted to the present. The importance of Afghanistan's strategic location was quickly appreciated in Germany at that time. But the initiative for establishing relations between the Central Powers and Afghanistan came, according to Enver Pasha, the Ottoman minister of war, from Amir Habibullah. Enver informed the German Foreign Office that information from Afghanistan indicated the Amir had expressed his solidarity with the Ottomans and inquired whether he should attack Britain or Russia.[5]

The Central Powers desired Afghan participation in the war because it would relieve British Indian pressure on the flank of the Ottoman empire, and it would make it difficult for India to send troops and other assistance to the European theater of war.

The Ottoman minister of war decided to send a mission to Afghanistan to establish contact with

that country and to see how Afghanistan could best concert her efforts with the activities of the Central Powers. As long as military action was not feasible, Pan-Islamic propaganda might be usefully employed to gain supporters among the Muslims in the Indian subcontinent. Enver Pasha invited German participation in this mission to give it greater importance and to emphasize that the resources of his allies would also be available to Afghanistan.

The idea of sending a Turco-German mission to Afghanistan was eagerly accepted in Berlin, and steps were taken to assemble a group who had visited countries bordering Afghanistan before the war. The Niedermayer and Hentig expeditions which resulted became exclusively German missions.[6] Niedermayer, who was to be attached to the Turkish mission, had no independent credentials; and when the Turks seemed unwilling to go ahead with the project, Niedermayer set out on his own. Hentig's mission was essentially diplomatic in character. He was to establish diplomatic relations with Afghanistan and assist Mahendra Pratap, an Indian nationalist, in making contacts with nationalists in India. The two groups met in eastern Iran and continued to Afghanistan as one mission. The expedition was to induce the Afghan ruler to join the Central Powers in their war with the Allies, or at least force both Russia and Britain to keep large forces on their frontiers. The German mission did not succeed in drawing Afghanistan into the war, but it did greatly disturb Afghanistan's neighbors.

To some extent the presence of the German mission served as a lever for Habibullah in his effort to gain complete political independence as well as territorial concessions from Britain. The mission offered the Amir a good opportunity to demonstrate his loyalty to the British, but

he never concealed the fact that he expected to be properly rewarded.

There was some willingness in India to grant Afghanistan money and greater, if not complete, independence in foreign relations; but India was unwilling to make territorial concessions, such as the cession of tribal territory or the granting of access to the Indian Ocean. The Germans, who had nothing to lose, supported the Afghans in some of their territorial claims.[7] Amir Habibullah agreed to initial a draft treaty with the Germans. This treaty confirmed Afghanistan's complete independence and political freedom. It provided for military assistance in personnel and equipment as well as financial aid of up to ten million pounds in exchange for the somewhat hedged Afghan promise to begin war against India after careful preparation and upon receipt of all German aid.

Thus Habibullah provided for the possibility that the Central Powers would win the war and at the same time registered his claims to complete independence and got German support for territorial acquisitions. The Amir had now only to sit back and see which side was winning the war. It soon became apparent that the Central Powers were not winning. Nevertheless, Habibullah did follow up on his promise to continue negotiations with the Germans and he sent an emissary to Iran and the Ottoman empire to discuss the conditions for a subsequent treaty. As the military situation deteriorated for the Ottomans in the Middle East, the Amir moved away from his previous stand and refused to sign a consular treaty with the Germans. There was no official contact between Germany and Afghanistan again until the Russian Revolution opened the way to Afghanistan through the Soviet Union.

After the war when the government of India showed itself agonizingly slow in rewarding the

Afghans(money was offered but not territorial concessions or independence from British suzerainty), Afghan disappointment was vented against Habibullah and he was murdered in February 1919.

Amanullah and the Establishment of German Influence

It was during the reign of Amanullah (1919-1929) that German influence became established. Amanullah succeeded to the Afghan throne over the rival claims of his uncle and one of his brothers. Some historians have seen in this struggle for power the reason for Amanullah's aggressive anti-British policy. While the internal Afghan situation may have been a factor, it seems to have been secondary to the Afghan desire to rid themselves once and for all of British control over their foreign relations.

When the Agreements of 1880, which defined Anglo-Afghan relations and allowed Afghanistan to deal only with Britain, were renegotiated in 1905, the British insisted that these agreements were made between the British government and the person of the amir. That is to say, these agreements were personal ones and had to be renegotiated with every subsequent Afghan ruler. Britain had preferred this interpretation in the past because each time a ruler died his successor was forced to negotiate for his recognition. In this manner, Britain had a lever on subsequent Afghan rulers who, being anxious to obtain recognition, could be expected to permit Britain some kind of concession in exchange. But by the time of Habibullah's death, the situation had changed. Russia was defeated and was no longer a threat, and Britain was faced with revolts and popular resistance in India.

Upon acceding to the throne, Amanullah informed the viceroy of India that he had become

amir and suggested that a new treaty be concluded between the "independent and free government of Afghanistan . . . and the mighty government of England." This was not the time for India to extract concessions from an Afghan amir. British delaying tactics were ended when Amanullah's general, Salih Muhammad, precipitated hostilities and engaged British troops in what became known as the Third Afghan War (1919).

A discussion of the events and causes of the Third Afghan War is not possible in this study. It suffices to say that as a result of it Afghanistan gained her complete independence after many months of negotiations at Rawalpindi, Mussoorie, and Kabul (1919-1921).

The recognition by Britain of Afghanistan's independence marked the end of the policy of isolation. As a completely independent country Afghanistan required formal diplomatic ties with as many countries as would care to be represented in Kabul. The old policy of balancing foreign influences, of keeping Russia and Britain away, could now be pursued conveniently in Kabul, where the representatives of these two states and those of other European and Asian states could form factions to counteract the preponderance of any one power. It now became Amanullah's most urgent task to bring foreign representatives to Afghanistan.

The task of announcing Afghanistan's independence to the world was not an easy one. At a time when the Allies were occupied with carving up the Ottoman and Austrian empires and dividing Germany's colonies, it was difficult for European diplomats to believe that Britain would let slip its hold over Afghanistan.

Amanullah delegated General Muhammad Wali Khan as his special envoy to travel to Europe and America by way of Russia to announce Afghanistan's independence and to establish relations with any state interested. Muhammad Wali's first mission

to Moscow in 1919 appears to have been simply an attempt to win Muslim-Soviet cooperation in case Britain renewed the Anglo-Afghan War. The Afghans also wanted to prevent Britain from gaining a hold on Persia by encouraging their neighbor to repudiate the Anglo-Persian Agreement of 1919. The Afghan mission failed to gain passage through the Baltic states to travel to Paris where the Afghans wanted to participate in the Peace Conference.

In 1921, Muhammad Wali Khan's mission returned to Moscow where treaties of friendship were signed with the Soviet Union, Turkey, and Persia. The mission then proceeded to other European countries and concluded agreements for the establishment of diplomatic relations. Although it was relatively simple for Afghanistan to establish relations with a number of European countries, it was quite difficult to do so with Germany. Germany had lost the war and was therefore unable and unwilling to challenge Britain in a sensitive area. Italy signed a consular agreement in spite of British intimations that she was about to conclude an agreement which would "admit the superior and predominant political influence of Great Britain" and that Britain still considered Afghanistan within the sphere of British political influence. Germany was of course much more susceptible to British pressure; furthermore, the Treaty of Versailles limited Germany in her foreign political ambitions. While Germany had eagerly initiated diplomatic approaches to Afghanistan during the war, after the war the German Foreign Office felt itself compelled to ignore Afghan diplomatic overtures and expected no good to result from the Afghan mission.

The Afghan mission left Moscow for Berlin on March 1, 1921, where their hosts were Hentig and Fritz Grobba, who was soon to be the German

representative in Afghanistan. Muhammad Wali Khan presented letters from the Afghan foreign minister to the German chancellor and from Amanullah to the German president. Both letters were more or less ceremonial, but nevertheless constituted cautious overtures for the establishment of diplomatic relations.

The Afghans awaited a reply to these letters, and Muhammad Wali presented the following wishes to the German Foreign Office:

1) Establishment of diplomatic relations between Germany and Afghanistan;

2) Training of Afghan students whom the Afghan government wanted to send to Germany;

3) Establishment of a German school in Afghanistan;

4) Sending of German engineers, technicians, and teachers to Afghanistan;

5) Purchase of machinery for industrial purposes, especially for the manufacture of paper and textiles;

6) Development of permanent trade relations between the two countries, especially for the development of the mining industry and the construction of German industrial plants in Afghanistan.

The reaction of the German Foreign Office, as expressed in a Note of April 18, 1921, was not altogether negative. The Note said that even though Afghanistan had become an independent state, its location as a buffer between Russia and India made it an area of special British interest and sensitivity. Germany, on her part, had hitherto had little interest in the area. The lack of communication within the country and Afghanistan's isolation offered little chance for profitable exploitation of her resources. In short, the benefits of Germany's involvement in the area did not outweigh the disadvantages resulting from British distrust. The Afghans were

therefore given a friendly but dilatory reply. Afghan diplomatic representation in Germany was welcome, but Germany reserved herself the right to an independent decision as to when a German envoy should be sent to Kabul. As to the other points, the Afghans were referred to private German institutions and organizations. The Afghans were made to understand that Germany wanted to avoid giving Britain the impression that it was pursuing in Afghanistan an active foreign policy that aimed at more than cultural and economic objectives.[8]

But the question of German presence in Afghanistan was more or less academic. Since the Hentig-Niedermayer expedition, Germans had been a force on the Kabul scene. Thousands of prisoners of war, mainly nationals of the Austrian empire, were interned in Russian Central Asia where they were not too strictly confined or efficiently guarded. Hundreds of these prisoners escaped and made their way into Persia and Afghanistan. At one time in early 1917, there were eighty-three Austrians in Kabul who organized themselves into the "Royal and Imperial East Indian Detachment"; but in spite of their military designation, they were not a cohesive force that could act as a unit in exerting pressures on the Amir. These Austrians enjoyed a measure of freedom in Kabul. They were employed in various city improvement projects or taught Afghan apprentices the skills of their trades.

When the German mission left Afghanistan in 1916, Hentig had delegated his authority as German representative in Afghanistan to Captain Schreiner, one of the Austrian officers in Kabul. The Austrian officers at Kabul maintained contact with the only German member of the Niedermayer group in Herat, Kurt Wagner, who in turn attempted to maintain open communications with Germans in Persia and the Ottoman empire. It was through

this channel that Germany sent Habibullah a second draft treaty for the purpose of establishing diplomatic relations--without the provisions for military cooperation contained in the first German-Afghan treaty of 1916.

Most of these Austrians and Germans had left by 1920, but others began to arrive in Afghanistan. The first of these Germans entered Afghanistan with various Bolshevik missions, but soon former members of the Niedermayer expedition reappeared, some in search of their belongings or buried money that they could not take with them when they left Afghanistan through British controlled territory. Others were emigrants who left an impoverished and defeated Germany in search of employment and new careers.

The foreign political situation had changed in the early 1920's. At the end of World War I Amanullah saw his chance to attain independence for his country and hoped to add independent Afghan tribal areas to his state, perhaps even getting access to the sea. Amanullah gained independence, but he could not prevent Britain from moving into the tribal areas and tightly containing the very tribes that had assisted Afghanistan so effectively in the Third Anglo-Afghan War.

Amanullah sought compensation in the north. He secretly supported the Amir of Bukhara and Enver Pasha and his Basmachi counter-revolutionaries in Russian Central Asia. These Afghan intrigues in Central Asia gave Soviet Russia a convenient pretext for reneging on territorial concessions which the weak Soviets were willing to make as late as 1921.

By 1923, Afghanistan's neighbors appeared to have overcome their temporary weaknesses and the power-political situation reverted to the familiar pre-war position: Afghanistan being a buffer between two essentially hostile powers. Afghan rulers were compelled to continue buffer-state

politics as before. But there was one difference. Whereas Afghanistan under Abdur Rahman and Habibullah had sought protection in a policy of isolationism, Amanullah initiated an open-door policy which sought to utilize foreign capital and technological know-how by permitting foreigners to participate in developing Afghanistan. To prevent either of her neighbors from gaining a preponderant influence, the help of a major power--one that could be a third, balancing force--was needed.

Foreign embassies were established in Kabul. The Russians came first, in 1919, followed by Persia in 1921. By 1922 Britain, Turkey, and Italy were also represented in Kabul. In 1923 France and Germany appeared in the Afghan capital. Amanullah and his council of advisers had little doubt as to who should be the third power in Afghanistan. Amanullah and several of his advisers, including Mahmud Tarzi, had been members of the pro-German party at the court of Amir Habibullah during the war and had advocated attacking India in support of the Central Powers.

But there were other reasons that made the Afghan government interested in seeing Germany established in Kabul. There existed a community of interest between Germany and Afghanistan which was both economic and political. Afghanistan was a backward country compelled to modernize or lose her independence. When the Ottoman Empire, defender of Islam for six hundred years, was destroyed, it was obvious that the political survival of Muslim states depended on the instituting of radical changes and reforms. As in other Islamic states, change began with the modernization of military forces. The weapons of the West had to be used, but these weapons required highly-trained personnel. Factories and schools were needed. Innovations had to be made if an Islamic state was to meet Western powers on their own terms

Afghanistan could not achieve these reforms by herself; European experts were needed in the task of modernization. But it had been seen in the past that opening a country to peaceful penetration by European nationals often resulted in a European power first gaining a predominant influence and then assuming political control. Therefore, Afghanistan could not permit either Russia or Britain to become an important factor in Afghanistan's task of modernization. It was against these two countries that Afghanistan sought to strengthen her forces. A first-rate Western power was needed both to provide assistance in Afghanistan's modernization and to offset whatever pressure Afghanistan's neighbors might exert. The Afghans were soon convinced that Germany was the power best suited for the task.

The United States and Italy were possible choices but both eliminated themselves from becoming a force in Afghanistan. The United States Department of State was reluctant to challenge Britain in this area. Trade with Afghanistan was of little importance, and the lack of capitulary agreements obstructed the establishment of Afghan-American relations. Law in Islamic countries was personal rather than territorial. Sunni Muslims followed the injunctions of the Koran and the traditions of the early Muslim period. Jurisdiction had been consolidated into four schools. It followed logically that protected non-Muslim minorities should be subject to their own laws which Muslim rulers assumed to be based on their respective religious books. Capitulary agreements, concluded in 1536 between Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent and Francis I of France, eventually permitted aliens to fall under the jurisdiction of consular courts. Gradually most Christians and non-Muslims or European nationals escaped the jurisdiction of courts in Muslim lands and soon enjoyed extraterritorial privileges

that included not only criminal and social adjudication but also matters of taxation and other areas normally reserved to the state. Afghan rulers had learned from the experience of other Islamic rulers and did not permit foreign penetration under the cover of capitulations. Another reason for the reluctance of the U. S. State Department to establish diplomatic relations with Afghanistan was that it might have encouraged American missionary groups to move into Afghanistan where their activities, because of the nature of Islamic law, would have amounted to subversion and would therefore be opposed by the Afghan government. Thus, from the initial contact in 1919, many years were to pass before the United States agreed to conclude a consular agreement with Afghanistan in 1935. But even after this period and until World War II, the United States did not maintain consular offices in Afghanistan.[9]

Italy's influence in Afghanistan had auspicious beginnings. A group of engineers came soon after diplomatic relations were established in 1922, and commercial activities resulted in which Italy offered arms, machinery, and a wide range of industrial products. But Italian influence came to an abrupt end in 1924 over the "Piperno Incident."[10] This incident is important because it was greatly distorted and was one of the reasons given by American State Department officials for their reluctance to establish diplomatic relations with Afghanistan. The Piperno case resulted when a group of Italian residents in Kabul was accused of rowdy behavior and the beating of an Afghan postal official. The Italians were summoned to police headquarters but failed to appear. Therefore on July 27, 1924, a police officer was sent with an escort of seven policemen to bring them to headquarters for interrogation. The police attempted to apprehend Piperno, but he

refused to be arrested and fled to his room. Thereupon, the police entered the house and one policeman apparently tried to break down the door. Piperno shot through the door and killed the policeman. A period of tension began for the European community. Grobba, the German representative in Kabul, reported that the Italians, whom he described as being rowdy Fascists, intended to liberate Piperno from prison or die in the attempt. It was only with difficulty that other Europeans persuaded them to give up their plan. The Afghans dismissed fourteen of their thirty-five Italian employees. In December 1924, Piperno was sentenced to death by a religious court, but in a dramatic scene the dead policeman's relations forgave Piperno on February 5, 1925. The relatives had secretly been paid blood money, and the affair seemed to be settled. However, Piperno was sentenced to ten years in prison since according to the Afghan law of the period the state also had the right and duty to prosecute. The affair finally had a tragic end when Piperno escaped from prison on March 27 and fled to northern Afghanistan. In Mazar-i Sharif, where he had sought work, presumably hoping to escape to Soviet Russia, he was one day arrested because of a quarrel he had in the bazaar, and he confessed to his identity. He was brought back to Kabul and secretly hanged on May 30, 1925.

The Afghans claimed that his flight had required the application of ta'zir admonition, in this case the capital sentence. It is more likely that Amanullah, who was engaged in suppressing the Mangal uprising at this time, was forced to show that he applied the law as strictly in the case of foreigners as he did against his own rebellious subjects. When Mussolini demanded an Afghan apology and monetary compensation, Afghan-Italian relations appeared to have reached the

breaking point. Finally on July 17, 1925, the Afghan government complied with the demands and paid a sum of £ 6,000 in gold. Afghan-Italian relations thus continued, but Italy ceased to be a major factor in Kabul.[11]

France was willing to move into Afghanistan and propagate French culture and influence, however, in spite of having certain sympathies with French culture, Afghans did not find France suitable. It was not forgotten in Kabul that France was a colonial power that had acquired large portions of the Ottoman empire, and in her dealings with Britain, France was suspected as being susceptive to pressures that might induce her to make common cause with Britain in Afghanistan.[12]

It must be emphasized that it was not necessarily by default of these powers that Germany moved into Afghanistan as a third power. We have seen that the Weimar Republic, torn by internal German conflicts, was unable and unwilling to conduct a foreign policy that might lead the German government to difficulties with her former enemies. But individual Germans had come to Afghanistan, and by 1922 their number had increased to over forty. These Germans clamored for consular representation, which they wanted for both their personal protection and the promotion of their commercial and other activities. The Afghan government also continued its pressure. After the mission of Muhammad Wali Khan left Germany, an Afghan chargé d'affaires remained in Berlin, and in October 1922, Ghulam Siddiq, the first Afghan minister, arrived in Berlin. These Afghan diplomats urged Germany to establish a legation in Kabul, pointing to the fact that a number of states, both big powers and small, were already represented in Afghanistan. The Afghans informed the German Foreign Office that they were ready to award important concessions in such areas as railroad

and highway construction, mining, and archeology and warned that these contracts could be negotiated only in Kabul. The Germans were told that especially in the exploration of mineral resources the Amir preferred Germans as they did not "follow any imperialistic tendencies." As an example of Afghan sympathies for Germany, the Afghans noted that a brother of Amanullah was among a group of fifty students to be sent to Germany in 1922.[13] The German government acceded reluctantly and only after profuse assurances to the British government of active cooperation and consultation. In December 1923, Grobba was sent to Afghanistan as the first representative of a permanent German legation.[14] The British now seemed to welcome the move because they were disturbed over Soviet influence in Afghanistan and saw in a German presence in that country a potential ally in containing Soviet influence.

In the eyes of Afghans, Germany was a natural ally. She had been the enemy of their traditional enemies, Britain and Russia, and, in concert with the Ottoman empire had appeared as a defender of the cause of Islam. Russia had been defeated by Germany, and the Allies, a powerful coalition of such colonial powers as Britain and France had come close to being defeated. Unlike the Ottoman and Austrian empires, Germany was not destroyed in World War I. With her heartland intact, and with the diligence, discipline, and technological know-how of her population of some sixty million, Germany continued to be a factor in international politics. Afghans considered Germany the power best suited to strengthen the precarious independence of Afghanistan and to provide the economic, technical, military, and diplomatic assistance it required for its development as a nation. Many German government officials saw in Afghanistan not only a potentially important trading partner, but also

an area of great strategic value and political interest. In times of war with Russia or Britain, Germany might hope to win an important ally; in times of peace, as for example between the two World Wars, an isolated Germany, deprived of her colonial possessions, might see in Afghanistan an area for peaceful penetration and fruitful activity. It was an area in which Germany's surplus of skilled and professional people would find employment. Here Germans could work in relatively lucrative positions, promote the political and economic influence of their country, and contribute to the development of a country that had only begun to emerge from the level of traditional feudalism. Although Germany's interests in Afghanistan were moderate and primarily economic, to the Afghan government German participation in the development of resources was of vital importance. At the same time the participation of other foreign powers, including Russia and Britain, was welcome and it was hoped that competition among European states for Afghan business and good will would prevent the establishment of a preponderant influence by any single power.

Once his power was consolidated and the task of establishing diplomatic relations with a number of European powers was accomplished, Amanullah turned to developing his country. One of his first projects was the building of a new capital, Darulaman, several miles from the center of Kabul. This was probably the most costly of Amanullah's construction projects and it was accomplished mainly with the assistance of German engineers and craftsmen. The Germans used equipment and machinery from their homeland, and the prospects of profitable trade and concessions led to the formation of a consortium under the direction of a Bremen firm that soon developed into the Dacom, the Deutsch-Afghanische Company.

In the field of education, Amanullah added to Habibia high school (founded in 1903), a modern French language school in 1922 and a year later a similar school where German was the language of instruction. Thus there existed three high schools with European curricula and many of their graduates were to be sent to France, Germany, or English-speaking countries for additional specialized training.

Amanullah's projects of reform brought a sizeable European colony to Afghanistan which by its very existence was an important factor of change in Afghan society. In the competition for influence in Afghanistan, the Germans had an advantage over their rivals which, however, they themselves did not appreciate. They were the best bargain for the Afghans because their salaries were usually the lowest. Britain, concerned with matters of prestige, did not want its nationals to work in Afghanistan below a certain standard of living. Sir Francis Humphrys, the British minister in Kabul, remarked that "the Afghans' disregard for the dignity and comfort of their foreign employees will render service in this country unpopular for some time to come." He demanded Rs. 1,200 a month for a British or Indian engineer, while Germans were willing to work for 300 rupees.[15] France was concerned with similar questions of status. Russia, willing to outbid the Germans, was to be kept at arms length. Still, there was a period in early 1926 when the size of the Russian colony exceeded the German colony of some seventy individuals.

It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss Amanullah's reforms, suffice it to say that in the field of Afghanistan's foreign relations they were a departure from the traditional policy. Afghanistan ended its policy of isolationism. The playing off of powers against one another and the fostering of an international competition for

the good will of Afghanistan now took place in Kabul. Another, and more serious, departure was that the expenses involved in Amanullah's reforms made Afghanistan indebted to European nations for the first time in its history and led to a continued technological and economic dependence on European assistance. Afghanistan's resources, although potentially rich, were not sufficient to pay for the imports from Europe. Independence from British tutelage also brought increased state expenditures for such matters as the establishment of embassies in foreign countries, while at the same time the British subsidy was discontinued.

Afghanistan's relations with her neighbors fluctuated between periods of hostility and crises and times of more or less cordial relations. Russia was feared because it was felt that she was planning the conquest of India, which would require passage through Afghanistan. Britain suffered from the consequences of the three Anglo-Afghan wars. Furthermore, once Britain had recognized Afghanistan as an independent state, she felt free to renew her forward policy in the de facto independent Afghan frontier belt. This policy was resented no less by Amanullah than by his predecessors, who sought either to include this area in their state or at least to preserve the independence of the Indian northwest frontier which was ethnically Afghan and the homeland of many tribes who lived on both sides of the Afghan frontier. The Afghans retaliated with increased raids across the Indian border which led to rumors of imminent war. A border incident with Russia in December 1925 led to a war-scare in Kabul. But peace prevailed in the end because none of the powers was willing to make war.

Amanullah's social reforms aroused the hostility of the religious establishment and led to tribal revolts, one of which, the so-called Khost

rebellion (March 1924-January 1925) seriously endangered Amanullah's rule. The fact that Abdul Karim Khan, a son of ex-Amir Yakub Khan, who was interned in India, managed to escape from his British guardians to put himself at the head of the tribal revolt was taken in Afghanistan as proof of British complicity in the affair. Even after British India sold two planes to Amanullah to assist him in his war with the tribesmen, the suspicion remained that Britain had supported the rebels to retaliate for Afghan resistance to Britain in the tribal area. The revolt was finally broken, Abdul Karim was again interned by the British, and the leaders of the revolt, including one Abdur Rashid, called Mullah-i Lang, the Lame Mullah, were captured and executed together with a number of their followers from the Mangal, Suleiman Khel, and Jadran tribes.

Amanullah was not deterred by this uprising and his plans for reforms now also included a number of projects to modernize Kandahar and other provincial cities for which Germany was to provide most of the experts and material.

Suddenly in November 1925, German-Afghan relations reached their first major crisis, one that appeared to endanger continued relations and again raised the question of capitulations. G. Stratil-Sauer, a German geographer and political economist from the University of Leipzig, came to Afghanistan by motorcycle on a research trip that included Turkey, Soviet Armenia, Persia, and India. On November 17, 1925, while he was traveling between Jalalabad and Kabul, he had difficulty in overtaking a mule caravan. In a race with one of the two riders who were leading the caravan, the Afghan fell from his horse, and when Stratil-Sauer stopped to assist the man, a fight ensued in which Stratil-Sauer, purportedly in self-defense, shot the Afghan in the back. Stratil-Sauer fled the scene, and on his arrival

in Kabul sought the protection of the German legation. The Afghan died a few days later but Stratil-Sauer was permitted to remain in the custody of the German legation after Sebastian Beck, the German dragoman, gave a written guarantee that Stratil-Sauer would not try to escape. When the Germans purportedly heard that the governor of Kabul, who was also in charge of prosecution and appeals, considered Stratil-Sauer's deed a capital crime, Grobba, the head of the German legation, decided to assist Stratil-Sauer's escape. Grobba took Stratil-Sauer, disguised in Afghan clothing, to the border, but they were prevented from passing through the Afghan customs. An attempt to bribe the Afghan officer did not succeed and Stratil-Sauer was brought back to Kabul.

Grobba denied his part in the affair, but the Afghans demanded his recall. The issue here was a violation of an important provision in the agreements on which Afghanistan insisted in her consular treaties. These agreements provided for Afghan jurisdiction in cases of criminal law, and the law of the land was (and is to this day) the Shariat as interpreted by the Hanafite school. Foreign embassies were obligated to surrender their nationals to the Afghan authorities and not to intervene in the process of law. The states represented in Kabul agreed to this provision because they realized that Afghanistan would not grant non-Muslims the privilege of extraterritoriality. An important factor in their considerations may have been that the Shariat was in fact increasingly confined to social and family affairs and that so extreme a punishment in criminal cases as the hacking off of a hand for theft was rarely if ever enforced. Foreigners were seldom affected by the law. If they were guilty of violating it, they were quietly told to leave. For example, shortly before the

Stratil-Sauer affair, one German had killed another and it appeared to be a case of jealousy over a German woman. The Afghans found no difficulty in accepting the German version that it was a case of self-defense. But the killing of an Afghan was another matter, as we have seen in the case of Piperno.

The Shariat, which is a combination of the customary tribal law of the time of Muhammad and new law as revealed in the Koran, demanded compensation for the dead, either in money or in the death of the culprit. Stratil-Sauer's defense hinged on the question of whether the killing was really in self-defense and whether the closest survivor of the deceased was willing to accept blood money. And even if an heir was willing to accept blood money, it was difficult for him to do so without bringing upon himself the odium of popular opinion. Moreover, the state reserved itself the right to prosecute, regardless of private arrangements between the parties concerned, though this right could be waived. The Piperno case was still fresh in everyone's memory, and it was feared that Stratil-Sauer might come to a similar end.

German diplomats in many countries were trying to save the situation. Although both Afghanistan and Germany regretted this incident which disturbed their hitherto cordial relations, they chose to believe the versions of the event offered by their own nationals. Gustav Stresemann, the German Reichsminister, conferred with the Afghan minister in Berlin and declared it unacceptable to recall Grobba before the Stratil-Sauer case was settled. He held that a German scholar could not with premeditation have shot the Afghan and should therefore be freed on the grounds that he acted in self-defense.[16] German diplomats in Paris, London, Ankara, Tehran, and other capitals attempted to find a face-saving

solution. Amanullah, beset by popular discontent over his reforms, could not easily pardon the German and thus arouse further opposition to his rule.

A united front of foreign diplomats in Kabul, as desired by Grobba, was out of the question. It was impossible to get the Russians and British to agree on anything concerning Afghanistan. The Italians, who had not succeeded in obtaining effective assistance in the case of Piperno, may not have felt obliged to act at this point. Turkey and Persia had in the past suffered from the abuses of capitulations and were now advising Afghanistan. Soviet Russia tended to support Afghanistan in this matter as a question of anti-colonial solidarity. In this case the alignment of powers could not be clearly discerned. G. V. Chicherin, the Soviet foreign minister, spoke with great sympathy of Stratil-Sauer's plight (Soviet Russia and the Weimar Republic enjoyed cordial diplomatic relations in spite of their differences in ideology), but it was not certain how helpful Russia could be. The Turkish minister in this case supported the cause of her former German ally by trying to mediate between Germany and Afghanistan to find a face-saving solution.[17]

Germany's threat of severing relations and canceling all existing contracts, if carried out, would have led to the loss of her influence in Afghanistan and might not have accomplished anything. There also existed fear in Kabul that Britain would take advantage of the situation by trying to restore British suzerainty over Afghanistan.

The Afghans permitted the affair to drift until it had somewhat disappeared from public attention and finally on July 19, 1926, Stratil-Sauer was sentenced to four years in prison, but was pardoned by Amanullah on August 3, 1926. Grobba was replaced by August Feigel, who arrived in Kabul in June 1926, and now pressing matters that had

been kept in abeyance could be attended to. Arrangements were made for the signing of a treaty of friendship between Afghanistan and Germany, and the two powers prepared to begin negotiations for a new commercial agreement.

The Afghan policy of radical reform continued unabated. Amanullah, the contemporary of Kemal Ataturk and Reza Shah in a revolutionary age, was unwilling to compromise with the traditional elements of his country until he was finally stopped by force. German participation in the projects amounted to providing about fifty engineers, physicians, teachers, artists, and craftsmen, as well as three officers, several pilots, and mechanics (monteure).

They were in charge of developing electric power, constructing the new capital, building roads and irrigation systems, and assembling several factories. In the German high school, seven German teachers together with Afghan educators were training some 400 students from first to twelfth grade following the curricula of German schools. Two hospitals were supervised by Germans, the German Junkers aircraft manufacturing firm was given the exclusive right to establish and maintain air service between Germany and Afghanistan via Turkey and Iran and perhaps on to China. This line was not to touch either Russian or British soil and was thus meant to free Afghanistan's air communications from control by her neighbors.

When Amanullah was finally deposed and left Afghanistan in May 1929, all he had created was suddenly threatened. Amanullah had toured Europe from December 1927 to July 1928. After his return, he was not to enjoy the benefits he expected from the treaties he concluded, the loans and presents he was given, or the purchases he made with a credit of four million marks he had received from Germany.

King Habibullah (the Son of the Water Carrier) and De facto Relations

It is not feasible here to discuss the causes of Amanullah's downfall. No doubt, the deterioration of Afghanistan's economy, caused by the enormous expense of his construction program, had led to popular discontent that was further aggravated by Amanullah's innovations and social reforms.

Popular Afghan opinion saw the rising of the Shinwaris and the success of Bacha-i Saqao as the result of British machinations. Many Afghans felt that Britain had never ceased to resent the fact that Amanullah had forced it to relinquish its hold over Afghanistan, and that Britain considered his policy pro-Soviet. In 1924, during the Mangal uprising Abdul Karim had escaped from Indian exile; now Sardar Muhammad Omar Khan, a rival to Amanullah's throne, managed to escape from British internment, making his way to the Afghan frontier to take command of the rebellion. Omar was reported by Afghans to have been assisted in his activities by an Airman Shaw, the Colonel T. E. Lawrence of Arabia fame. Lawrence was said to have crossed the Afghan frontier disguised as a pir named Sayyid Karim, and to have conducted anti-Amanullah propaganda in Mohmand territory while the guest of the Malik Masr Khan. Photos were said to have been distributed on the frontier that depicted the sixteen girls Amanullah had sent to Turkey on the arms of Englishmen. Pictures of Queen Soraya in an evening gown were also effective in arousing feeling among the tribesmen. It is safe to say that regardless of whether or not Lawrence was really agitating on the Afghan frontier, his usefulness and effectiveness in this regard was at best exaggerated. What was needed to arouse the frontier

tribes was not fiery words, but active support in money and arms. It required great skill and long experience to deal with the tribes, and the British had long-established channels and experienced agents for this purpose and would not require the help of an agent who had been on the Afghan frontier for only a few months.[18]

The period of Bacha-i Saqao (January to October 1919), like so many in Afghan history, is a complete blank to historians. It has been glossed over as a long night of reaction, cruelty, and oppression. History begins again nine months later when Nadir Khan, Amanullah's one time commander-in-chief, returned from exile in France and established himself in Kabul on January 17, 1929, as the new King.

In the field of foreign relations, the rule of Habibullah (Bacha-i Saqao) did not bring an absolute break. Although he was not formally recognized by any of the powers represented in Kabul, they nevertheless had to deal with him as the de facto ruler of Afghanistan. They believed that he would not be able to maintain himself in power and that Amanullah would be able to install himself again. If this was impossible, it was expected that a member of his immediate family would ascend the throne. It appears from Indian archival sources, however, that after Amir Habibullah died (1919), there were many in Kabul who saw in Nadir Khan a serious contender for the Afghan throne.

The era of the Brigand-King ushered in a period of diplomatic maneuvering that, in the eyes of the diplomatic community represented in Kabul, amounted to an attempt by Britain to return to the pre-Amanullah status quo, which would make Britain the sole power represented in Kabul and Afghanistan again an area of her predominant influence.

Humphrys, the British minister, tried to convince the Europeans represented in Kabul that Afghanistan was in the throes of a civil war that could last for years, and that in the course of hostilities it was likely the European community would face the danger of being massacred. At the same time, Humphrys offered to remain in Kabul to supervise the evacuation of all Europeans. This offer could not easily be ignored, especially since Humphrys stressed that after completion of evacuation procedures, British India could neither provide an air lift nor would it feel responsible for the consequences of the refusal by Europeans to be saved while it was still possible.

The German, Italian, and French, as well as other European representatives feared that after they had been evacuated, the situation would improve "miraculously" so that the British representative would not have to leave after all. What made British intentions even more suspect was that the British Indian authorities insisted that the evacuees immediately continue their journey to Europe, rather than wait in India to see whether the situation would improve enough for them to return.

Negotiations followed in a number of European capitals and several of the Western representatives suggested procedures that would provide for simultaneous evacuation, so that no one nation could remain at the expense of the others. It was suggested that first the foreign employees in Afghanistan be evacuated, next the diplomatic staffs, and last Humphrys and the heads of the other embassies. The British did not show themselves enthusiastic about such a procedure, but Humphrys' evacuation plans could not be carried out for reasons other than jealousy among the European powers.

First of all, there were Iran and the Soviet Union, who were contiguous to Afghanistan and did not depend on British assistance in evacuation. Furthermore, as neighbors they were able to exert sufficient pressure on any Afghan ruler to safeguard the security of their nationals. This group was joined by Turkey, who was unwilling to withdraw her representative as long as any other existed in Kabul.

In the German colony the problem of evacuation was complicated because several Germans refused to be evacuated regardless of possible dangers, and others, while being anxious to leave Afghanistan, were not permitted to do so. As previously mentioned, some Germans had come to Afghanistan as independent merchants and were engaged with Afghan partners in commercial transactions that were quite profitable. Several of these people feared a considerable financial loss if they were to leave the country at the time. Others owed money to Afghans and could not repay at the time Habibullah came to power. Several German employees of the Afghan government had gone to Europe to make purchases for various projects on which they were employed. The Habibullah government feared that with the disappearance of the foreign employees much of the money they owed would also be lost.

Even though Bacha-i Saqao represented a regime of reaction his policy was not hostile to continued relations with the outside world. On January 23, 1929, Habibullah's foreign ministry informed the diplomats in Kabul that the foreign missions could remain in Kabul. The new King promised to decide soon which of his foreign employees he would keep, and he promised to invite the foreign representatives individually to unofficial audiences. The foreign diplomats were not eager to deal with Habibullah, at first because Amanullah was still in control of Kandahar,

and later because it was felt that the Brigand-King would not be able to maintain himself in power. It was, however, impossible not to deal with the new King since evacuation, postal and telegraph communication, and many other matters of importance depended on Habibullah's cooperation.

Habibullah's council of state, composed mostly of religious leaders, decided at first that all schools were to be closed, Amanullah's projects stopped, and all foreigners and their embassies expelled from Afghanistan. This decision was, however, immediately revoked when it was explained, purportedly by Abdul Hadi Dawi, that the schools and the existence of foreign embassies in Kabul were needed to protect Afghanistan's independence from her powerful neighbors. Therefore, the teachers were paid their salaries even though the schools were temporarily closed. Habibullah took over most of the ministries with their staffs intact. Many of Amanullah's officials cooperated with the Bandit-King for fear of arousing his vengeance. Those Afghan officials who had had an opportunity to enrich themselves in Amanullah's service were arrested and forced to give up their possessions. The foreign embassies were provided with guards to protect them from theft and violence; capital punishment was proclaimed for looters, but this did not prevent a certain amount of looting; besides, the rich were just as fearful of being robbed by their King as they were fearful of looters.

The new government declared that it recognized all existing treaties and hoped that the Habibullah regime would be recognized by the countries represented in Kabul. Habibullah was said to have found about ₤ 750,000 in coins and paper money in the royal palace, and this enabled him to consolidate his power for a time. Additional funds were extorted from those who were

believed to have profited in the past, and the possessions of Amanullah's family and his closest followers were confiscated.

A certain measure of stability existed for a short time, so that Habibullah could consider having new silver coins minted in Germany. But rewarding his followers and conducting the affairs of the Afghan state required enormous amounts of money. It was therefore more a measure of economy than a feeling of xenophobia that prompted Habibullah to dismiss most of Afghanistan's foreign employees and to close the foreign schools in Kabul. Most of the Afghans employed in various ministries also left their jobs as they were no longer paid. But the situation seemed sufficiently secure to the Délégation Française en Afghanistan, the French group of archeologists active in Afghanistan, that additional scholars arrived in July 1929 to continue the research they had begun in 1923. Since the British refused to issue them transit visas through India, the group was compelled to take the more difficult and costly route via Herat and Kandahar.

However, by late in the summer Habibullah's power was challenged by Nadir Khan, who had come to India to deliver Afghanistan from the rule of the Bandit-King. Nadir Khan had sought the support of the Afghan frontier tribes, and it was increasingly feared that in the battle over Kabul, the European colony might be endangered. In August 1929, Baron von Plessen, the German representative in Kabul, left with most of the diplomatic corps (except for the representatives of Russia, Iran, and Turkey) for India. About eight Germans remained behind, and the physician of the German embassy became the unofficial German representative. Soviet Russia, who had assisted a number of Europeans in leaving Afghanistan via Russia, was entrusted with taking care of the

interests of Germany and with the protection of the Germans remaining in Afghanistan.[19]

From August 4, 1929, until May 1931, there was a break in official German-Afghan relations, although Germans continued to live in Afghanistan and continued to have a certain amount of influence. Dr. Pauschardt, the German embassy doctor, wrote regular reports to the German Foreign Office and acted as an unofficial intermediary between the powers in Kabul and the German Republic. The Habibullah regime entrusted Pauschardt with the medical care of members of Nadir Khan's family who were imprisoned in the palace. The Germans continued to enjoy a certain measure of prestige with the Afghan people, and Pauschardt reported that the German embassy was the only foreign establishment that was not plundered by one or the other of the Afghan combatants. The German physician also succeeded in delivering messages from Nadir Khan to his imprisoned relatives in the palace. By this dangerous activity he hoped to advance his own interests and those of his fatherland in the event Nadir succeeded in taking possession of the throne. As it turned out, Pauschardt was rewarded when Nadir became King, but he failed to realize his hopes to head a hospital staffed exclusively with Germans and adding Afghanistan's Department of Health to Germany's domain of monopolies.

It came as a great surprise to the Europeans residing in Kabul, when Nadir Khan, after several reverses, suddenly succeeded in capturing Kabul and defeating Bacha-i Saqao. Nadir Khan did not seem to have the funds to win the allegiance of sufficient forces within Afghanistan, and it was only due to the active support of Afghan tribes in India, that he prevailed in the end.

Nadir Shah, a Period of Consolidation

With Habibullah defeated and Nadir Shah the King of Afghanistan, a new era began in Afghanistan's foreign relations. Nadir Shah had long before shown his sympathy for the Germans. When he was Afghan envoy in France he had expressed his admiration for their country to German diplomats, and in an interview with a reporter of the Beliner Lokalanzeiger in May 1925, he publicly expressed similar feelings. He declared that no European power could as easily come to a fruitful working together (erspriessliche Zusammenarbeit) with Afghanistan than Germany. He offered Germany possibilities for expansion (expansionsmoeglichkeiten) and he invited the Germans to come to Afghanistan as her resources were waiting to be exploited. Enthusiastically he said Germany had the best physicians in the world, the best engineers, the best soldiers, and the most glorious army; and ruefully he added a "wish that Germany also had the best politicians."

Nadir Shah might have repeated this wish at the beginning of his rule when the hitherto harmonious German-Afghan relations seemed endangered by two major political factors. The new Afghan rulers feared that Germany, who had been Amanullah's best friend, might try to help Amanullah regain his throne. Another obstacle to relations as usual was the fact that in the liquidation of Amanullah's government, contracts were broken by both Germans and the Habibullah government, and the Afghans felt that in the rupture of commercial activities Germans found themselves with funds to which they were not entitled.

Amanullah settled in Italy, but the Afghan rulers were watching his contacts with the German, Turkish, Persian, and Soviet governments. Most of his ambassadors and diplomats were still in office. Turkey and Persia were governed by

men who, like Amanullah, were radical reformers. Their sympathies with Amanullah were therefore more than incidental. It was not far-fetched to assume that Reza Shah of Iran and Kemal Ataturk of Turkey would want to see the reformer King restored to his throne. Germany had enjoyed a privileged position in Afghanistan and might want to support the man who had been so hospitable to German influence. As for the Soviet Union, its leadership was ideologically closer to a radical reformer than it would be to a man who appeared willing to rescind these reforms. Furthermore, the Soviets suspected that Nadir Shah had attained power with British support and would now be under an obligation to conduct a pro-British policy.

And indeed, there are many indications that Britain had helped Nadir Shah, tacitly at first, but quite actively after he was established. According to one British observer,[20] the British had set up the rules of the game. It was maintained that Britain could not very well prevent Nadir Khan and his brothers from returning to Afghanistan. But Nadir Khan was told that having once crossed the Afghan boundary and commenced warlike acts against Habibullah, he would be interned if he were expelled from Afghanistan and he would not be permitted to try his fortunes again. This arrangement was, however, not strictly followed. One of his brothers, Hashem Khan, was detained when he was forced to flee the forces of Bacha-i Saqao, but he was permitted to return and refused to proceed by the route suggested by British officials.[21] Nadir Khan succeeded in rallying support among the Afghans on the Indian side of the boundary. It was with the help of these Afghans that he finally succeeded in capturing Kabul. It is understandable that the British would bend the rules of neutrality to help a respected and prominent Afghan to defeat

a bandit ruler; but in the various chancelleries it was expected that this British assistance would be given only for a price. And German, Soviet, and other diplomats contemplated what this would mean to their interests in Afghanistan.

It became evident that British assistance extended beyond the point of friendly neutrality when it was learned that Nadir Shah was in possession of large quantities of guns and apparently large sums of money. Rumors were current in Kabul about British assistance to Nadir Shah--and such rumors had never been conducive to endearing an Afghan ruler to his people. Leaflets appeared in Kabul and other areas accusing the King of being a British stooge, and the Afghan people were called upon to revolt because the King would not proclaim a jihad against Britain, who was at the time engaged in suppressing Muslim and Hindu rebellions in India. (This referred to Abdul Ghaffar Khan's Redshirts and independence agitation in India.) Revolts broke out in many parts of Afghanistan. An uprising in Kohistan, lasting from July to August 1930, could be crushed only with the aid of Waziri tribes from across the Indian border. In Afghan Turkestan, a revolt by Ibrahim Beg, the famed Basmachi leader, lasted from the fall of 1930 until July 1931. Herat was still under the rule of Abdul Rahim, who had become governor under Bacha-i Saqao.

The country was at a precarious peace when Nadir Shah defended his acceptance of British arms and money in a speech before parliament on July 6, 1931. He admitted that Britain had given a loan of £ 175,000 and some 10,000 rifles with five million cartridges, and he defended having accepted this aid by declaring that Amanullah had received similar assistance. (Amanullah had placed an order for 12,000 rifles with the British, but this was not a delivery of

Amanullah's order. Britain seemed to prefer to give Nadir Shah guns for his regular army, for whenever Nadir Shah had to call on the Waziris for assistance, they would be able to return to the frontier with thousands of guns that they would use in resisting British penetration.) Nadir Shah declared that he had also received weapons from Germany, and that France was about to deliver arms to Afghanistan. But Nadir Shah asserted that this would not influence in any way his conviction that Afghanistan must keep a "balance" and be friendly to both of her powerful neighbors. As to the independent border tribes, he declared his solidarity with them, saying that from the point of view of Islam and race, they were one with the Afghan people.[22]

The situation was normal enough by May 1931 so that a German representative, Herbert Schoerbel, was in Kabul. The number of Germans in the Afghan capital soon increased from thirty to fifty. Amanullah no longer seemed to be a threat, but there was the Charkhi family, which was powerful enough to challenge Nadir Khan's right to the throne. Its members had held high offices in Afghanistan, as well as ambassadorships in Moscow, Ankara, Berlin, and Paris. The three brothers Ghulam Siddiq, Ghulam Nabi, and Ghulam Jelani were related to almost every family of importance in Afghanistan. The father of these Charkhi brothers was Ghulam Haider Khan, the famous general who in the 1880's and 1890's helped Abdur Rahman to assume and maintain control over Afghanistan. Since that time the Charkhi family had enjoyed great influence and power.

It seems that the Charkhi brothers wanted to end their virtual exile. On July 21, 1932, Ghulam Siddiq, minister in Berlin, offered his allegiance to Nadir Shah and requested the King to receive one member of his family to arrange for

a reconciliation (marriage was one possibility discussed). His letter, published in Islah of July 21, 1932, was accompanied by a letter from Nadir Shah, requesting Ghulam Nabi to come to Kabul. Ghulam Nabi Khan came to Kabul, but when in late October 1932 a Mangal uprising occurred, he was accused of complicity in the affair and executed. His brother Ghulam Jelani and other members of his family were imprisoned.

There followed a series of events that put German-Afghan relations to their most severe test.

On June 6, 1933, a certain Sayyid Kemal entered the Afghan Embassy in Berlin and shot and killed Sardar Muhammad Aziz, the minister. Muhammad Aziz, who was the oldest brother of Nadir Shah, had been in Berlin only a few months. It was suggested at the time of the appointment that sending his brother to Berlin was an indication of the importance the new King was placing on his relations with Germany. It was to have marked a move to make Berlin the center of Afghanistan's commercial relations with the West. Muhammad Aziz replaced Ghulam Siddiq Charkhi (just as some nine years before, Ghulam Nabi had replaced Nadir Shah in Paris). The murder of Muhammad Aziz was recognized in Kabul as vengeance for the death of Ghulam Nabi.

A few months later, on September 7, 1933, Muhammad Azim, a teacher at the German high school in Kabul, entered the British Embassy in Kabul and shot the first three persons he met (an Englishman, an Indian, and an Afghan). The ambassador happened to be out at the time. Muhammad Azim admitted that by this deed he hoped to provoke British retaliation against Nadir Shah's regime (as had happened in 1879 when Afghans killed Sir Louis Cavagnari, the British representative in Kabul), which would lead to the new King's fall. This time, Ghulam Jelani, another Charkhi brother, was executed in prison.

Then, on November 8, 1933, Abdul Khaleq, a student at the German high school in Kabul, shot and killed Nadir Shah during the distribution of awards in the garden of the palace. Khaleq's father was an employee of Ghulam Nabi, and according to one version, the 16-year-old student killed the King in revenge for the execution of members of the Charkhi family. (According to other sources Abdul Khaleq was the son of Ghulam Nabi; but this does not appear to be correct.) The version published in the Kabul newspaper Islah accused Ghulam Siddiq, who was in Germany, of instigating the assassination and, furthermore, made the deed appear to be the consequence of an illicit love affair between the young Khaleq and the wife of Ghulam Siddiq.

Whatever the actual motivations, it is clear that these murders represented a struggle for power between the Musahiban and the Charkhi families. An element of international significance in the eyes of the ruling family was that all the murderers had attended German schools. Sayyid Kemal had been a member of the first group of students sent to Germany in 1922. He stayed until 1928, then returned to Afghanistan, leaving again during the civil war in 1929. Muhammad Azim was a teacher of German who had studied in Germany after graduating from the German high school and was about to be graduated when he committed the murder.

The regicide occurred while Muhammad Hashem Khan, whom many described as the real power behind the throne, was on a tour of inspection in the North. There was no struggle for power among the Musahiban, and Muhammad Zahir, Nadir Shah's son, became the new King of Afghanistan. In the opinion of the ruling house, there were strong indications that the recent events were somehow related to the German background of the assassins. Both Muhammad Azim and Abdul Khaleq

were quickly executed, and great pressure was put on the German Foreign Office to exact punishment for the deed in Berlin. The Germans were perfectly willing to extradite Sayyid Kemal, but this was soon discovered to be unfeasible. British India refused permission to transport the prisoner through India. The only alternative that remained was to press for execution of the culprit and this could not be accomplished with the speed some of the parties desired. Sayyid Kemal was sentenced to death by a German court on November 6, 1934, but it was not until January 14, 1935, that the sentence was carried out.

In the meantime, in November 1933, Kurt Ziemke, the new German minister, had arrived. New agreements and a number of contracts with Germans had been kept in abeyance until the execution of Sayyid Kemal. A break in diplomatic relations was not in the interest of the two countries. Only Germany was willing to grant Afghanistan sizeable credits, in spite of the risks involved in the investment. The Soviet Union was willing--and would gladly have outbid the Germans--but it continued to be an established principle in Afghanistan's foreign policy not to permit either of the big neighbors to exert a dominant influence. Afghanistan feared close reliance on any of her neighbors would result in peaceful penetration that could easily lead to foreign domination.

France and Italy did not appear willing to step into the third power position. When in 1935 Japan established a mission in Kabul, the representatives of France and Italy indicated to the German representative that they would cease their commercial activities if Japan succeeded in extending her market to Afghanistan. Czechoslovakia, Austria, Sweden, and other small states with interests in the Afghan trade, did not have the status that Afghanistan required of a third power to counter the political influence of Russia and Britain.

Germany therefore remained dominant in Afghanistan. The Germany of the Third Reich was more acceptable than the Weimar Republic because the Afghans considered it an implacable foe of the Soviets. In spite of ideological differences, the Soviet Union and the Weimar Republic had found it in their interest to conclude the Treaty of Rapallo which was supplemented by a commercial treaty in 1925 and remained in force until World War II. The Afghan rulers seemed to feel that both Russia and Britain were now preoccupied with the gradually deteriorating situation in Europe and could not exert undue pressures on Afghanistan. The invasion of Ethiopia by Italy in October 1935 and Japanese moves in China were watched with great concern in Afghanistan. The Afghans began to fear that the great powers, being unable to prevent one another from annexing foreign territories, might peacefully resume the task of dividing the world which had come to an end with the settlement of World War I. A powerful Germany was therefore a valuable ally for Afghanistan, especially since Germany was at a safe distance from Afghanistan and could not become a threat to her independence.

New Attempts at German-Afghan Relations

It was soon apparent that Afghanistan would have to reexamine her foreign policy in view of the rapidly changing situation that threatened the political balance of power in Europe. The question was what attitude Afghanistan should take vis-à-vis Germany, Britain, and the Soviet Union and with which, if any, power Afghanistan should seek a closer alliance.

On July 10 and 29, 1935, Georg Ripken, the German representative in Afghanistan, spoke in a "strictly confidential" report of an imminent change in the internal and foreign policies of

Afghanistan. Ripken said that Afghanistan intended to seek complete economic and political independence from her neighboring powers and had arranged for a series of policy conferences for this purpose. The King had invited members of the Afghan cabinet, a number of tribal chiefs, members of parliament, the president of the Afghan National Bank, and Afghan envoys from Moscow, Tehran, Ankara, and London. Those from Moscow and London were expected to bring offers of economic and military assistance, which the Afghans were however not to accept. The ambassadors were also to report about the political attitude of both countries toward Germany.

Ripken further reported the existence of several political currents competing in the shaping of future Afghan foreign policy. They were represented among the Afghan elite by pro-German, pro-British, pro-Soviet, and isolationist parties.[23] All these groups favored an "independent" national Afghan policy that would give the country a maximum of protection from foreign aggression and yet lead to the rapid development of Afghanistan. One of these groups, represented in the cabinet by Mirza Muhammad Khan, the minister of commerce, favored a policy of independence without foreign assistance. It wanted to continue more or less as before, because it represented the commercial classes who expected a greater material benefit from business as usual. Ripken found this group strong in parliament, among certain frontier tribes, and among middle-rank government officials. The second group was reported to include in the cabinet the ministers of foreign affairs and public works, who favored an independent foreign policy, but believed that this could be pursued only by seeking support from the Soviet Union. The third group, represented by the ministers of war, culture, and health, favored a pro-British policy.

The fourth group sought, with the help of a major power other than Britain and Russia, to conduct a policy of complete political and economic independence and wanted to initiate a crash program for the development of Afghanistan to the limits of her capacity. This was the dominant group, since it was headed by the King, the ministers of court, the King's uncles Muhammad Naim Khan and Muhammad Daud Khan, the president of the Afghan National Bank, a number of younger state secretaries, and directors in various ministries. The prime minister was reported to be tending toward this group. Representatives of this coalition told the German representative in Kabul that they favored exclusive cooperation with Germany and wanted to know whether Germany was prepared to assume the sole responsibility for the modernization of Afghanistan, which would require substantial credits to provide the means for Afghanistan's development. In the meantime, the members of this group attempted to convince the other groups of the advantages of a policy of close cooperation with Germany, and it was planned to transfer and replace those Afghans who held positions which they could use to counteract a pro-German policy. This Independence Group, as Ripken called it, intended to set up a central planning agency to coordinate and supervise all Afghan development projects. The agency could attempt to balance the national economy by controlling the volume of exports and imports. It would also examine all projects to determine priority and feasibility. Government purchases were to be examined to prevent the loss of funds owing to waste and corruption. The Young Afghans, a group of modernist-reformers who had been in political limbo as followers of Amanullah, were to be recruited to participate in the task of developing Afghanistan.

The German government was now faced with the task of reevaluating its Afghan policy to decide whether the prospect of exclusive participation in Afghanistan's economy and the resulting extension of her political influence was worth the enormous expenditures. Ripken wanted to know from the German foreign ministry whether an active Afghanistan policy would be in the German national interest and whether it would conflict with the policies toward other states.

It appears that Germany considered the Afghan proposal acceptable, but the details had to be worked out. Negotiations were initiated that extended over a considerable period of time. In the meantime, the last of the outstanding issues from the pre-Nadir Shah period was resolved. The Afghan government and the German-Afghan Company arrived at an agreement in December 1935 that settled their financial dispute and prepared the way for renewed commercial activities.

Some ten months later, on October 23, 1936, Faiz Muhammad Khan, the Afghan minister of foreign affairs, signed a confidential protocol for the delivery to Afghanistan of 15 million marks n war material. Germany credited eighty per cent of the amount for a period of seven years and agreed to take at least half the amount in Afghan products. Afghanistan, for her part, agreed to seek the help of German industry in developing the country and to encourage commerce by giving German firms additional orders.

Afghanistan's problem was of course that it depended on expensive imports for economic development projects and that it lacked an adequate number of export items to balance the expenditures with national income. Industrial nations supplied more than they were willing to buy from Afghanistan. The Afghan government therefore had traditionally pursued an economic policy that required a reduction of imports from such states as

Japan, India, and Soviet Russia. Imports would suddenly be stopped and resumed only when the need became pressing and when sufficient funds were available for new purchases. However, when Amanullah began his development projects in the 1920's, Afghanistan lost her economic self-sufficiency and became indebted to European states. Even before 1919, Afghanistan had depended on imports of arms and ammunition from India that were purchased mainly from Britain with the money Afghanistan received as a British subsidy. The fall of Amanullah taught the new Afghan rulers that Afghanistan needed above all a modern well-equipped and disciplined army to protect the state from the power of the tribes. Arms were urgently needed and so were the factories that could produce the requirements of an army. Aerial warfare was now feasible and increasingly important; machine guns and tanks could help an Afghan ruler to end forever the power of the tribes. As the new weapons became more effective, they had also become more expensive and taxed the limited resources of Afghanistan. Britain had traditionally exploited its near-monopoly on the arms trade to Afghanistan to put pressures on that country when needed.

With the end of Afghanistan's policy of isolationism in 1919, Germany and other states appeared on the scene and broke the British monopoly in the supply of arms.[24] Britain was distrusted in Afghanistan so could not be utilized to participate on a large scale in development of the country. But she was important because she controlled the most important access routes into Afghanistan, and could not be flouted nor could relations be terminated, unless Afghanistan was willing to ally herself with Russia. Since British-India did not want a hostile Afghanistan allied with the Soviet Union on her northwest frontier, she preferred to let the Germans fight her battle by

proxy. This was even felt to be the case by German diplomats who saw themselves as the Platzhalter of England. German participation in the development of Afghanistan would be more costly than that of the Soviet Union, but it would guarantee that Russia would not gain a predominant influence over the Afghan economy. Once Germany was involved in Afghanistan, both Britain and the Soviet Union could participate to a limited extent and Afghanistan would enjoy the advantage of being able to allot orders for purchases of equipment or contracts for construction projects piecemeal to various powers on a competitive basis, or, if desirable, grant them for political reasons.

The hopes for German-Afghan economic and political cooperation, more or less to the exclusion of Britain and the Soviet Union, did not materialize for a number of reasons. Most important, in the second half of the 1930's Germany had become too powerful and she was now distinctly hostile to Afghanistan's neighbors.

Germany was rearming in support of her demands for the cancellation of some of her losses at Versailles. A policy of economic self-sufficiency demanded the most economical use of Germany's resources. Afghanistan was far away and Hitler was more concerned with the unification of a Greater Germany then the acquisition of influence in distant areas. Afghanistan could be a pawn in Germany's strategic schemes against Britain and Soviet Russia, but just as in World War I, Afghanistan could not be won as an ally, unless Germany could establish a direct link with that Central Asian state.

For the Afghan government the situation became clear. A close collaboration with Germany was impossible if that country was hostile to Afghanistan's powerful neighbors. Afghanistan therefore continued her policy of allowing the competing influences of several powers.

The curbing of Soviet influence appeared relatively easy. Amanullah's treaties of Soviet-Afghan friendship of 1921 and neutrality and non-aggression in 1926 were renewed by Nadir Shah in 1931. Faiz Muhammad Khan, the Afghan foreign minister, negotiated a ten-year extension of the 1926 treaty in 1936 (the same year the Saadabad treaty of July 1937 between Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Afghanistan was negotiated). A commercial agreement could not be concluded at the time because the Soviets demanded extraterritoriality for their commercial representatives as well as other privileges. Furthermore, Soviet credits appeared to be too expensive for Afghanistan. An agreement was finally arranged in 1940.

Difficulties in the north demanded an open frontier in the south since Afghanistan was dependent on imports of oil and gasoline, spare parts and replacements for machinery and trucks, weapons and ammunition and other vital supplies.

In June and July 1939, shortly before the outbreak of World War II, a German commercial commission visited Afghanistan to discuss matters of German-Afghan trade. It was at about this time that the German Foreign Office contemplated the possibility of reestablishing Amanullah in Afghanistan so that he might assist the German war effort by forcing Britain to keep large contingents of troops on the Afghan border.[25] Neither Amanullah nor Italy was consulted in this matter. Soviet cooperation was needed, but Molotov was evasive, telling Peter Kleist, the special German emissary to Moscow, that he needed more information about the German plans, and the whole matter was permitted to drop. Thereafter, the Germans decided to cooperate with the actual Afghan rulers, while keeping open the option of cooperating with the opposition. With the beginning of war, German goods were shipped via Soviet Russia, but when Germany invaded the Soviet

Union in 1941, Afghanistan was cut off from direct commercial contact with Germany.

Some one hundred eighty Germans were left in Afghanistan, and history repeated itself as Germany began to consider how she could use Afghanistan in her military strategy, while the Allies endeavored to foil German activities there.

Von Ribbentrop could think of nothing more original than to appoint as the new minister in Afghanistan Otto von Hentig, who led the expedition in World War I, and to permit him to continue the task he attempted some twenty-five years earlier. It goes without saying that the Allies put great pressure on the Afghans to prevent the appointment.

Germany's objectives were primarily to gather intelligence about Britain's position in India and to cooperate with Indian revolutionaries and Afghan tribes to sabotage the war effort of British India. It was hoped that frontier agitation would force Britain to maintain a considerable number of troops on the Indian northwest frontier. In Soviet Central Asia, it was hoped that the Turkic Muslim population could be aroused to civil disobedience and similarly require the stationing of Soviet troops.

A clumsy attempt by members of the German Abwehr (military intelligence) to maintain contact with the Faqir of Ipi and to rally his tribesmen for sabotage activities failed when two German agents were captured and one of them killed by an Afghan military patrol. Germany and Italy did, however, succeed in greatly disturbing Britain and the Soviet Union. Both powers therefore demanded, October 9 and 11, 1941, respectively that the German colony be evacuated from Afghanistan. Afghanistan had declared her neutrality and saw in such a demand an infringement of her sovereign rights, but when Britain guaranteed the Germans unmolested passage through

India and Iraq to neutral Turkey, Afghanistan yielded to superior force and agreed to the plan. A German legation staffed by ten persons remained in Kabul. The embassy continued its intelligence activities, maintaining secret radio transmitters, but even these activities ended in October 1943 when it became apparent that the Russians had gained possession of the German code and had been informed about German activities.[26]

During World War II Afghanistan adopted a wait-and-see attitude just as she did during World War I. She curbed the tribes, guarded her borders, and maintained a strict neutrality. This did not prevent Afghan government officials from ascertaining whether a victorious Germany would agree to Afghanistan's aspirations of gaining the areas inhabited by Afghans and of obtaining an access to the sea. Remembering the experience of World War I, the Afghans were not rushing into an enterprise that might lead them to unforeseeable consequences. Their interests in an alliance with Germany waxed and waned as did the fortunes of the war. This time Islamic ideology was not involved as it was a war between "Christian" countries, and when it was all over, the Afghans could be contented that their policy had been right.

Germany's Role After World War II

For ten years after the war, Afghanistan pursued a closed border policy in the north. Contacts with the Soviet Union were kept to a minimum. But as in the old days, a closed border in the north required an open border in the south. Relations with Pakistan were not good. Afghanistan would not give up her hopes of settling the "Pashtunistan" question, and Pakistan was in no condition to yield on this matter. Afghan

agitation was answered by Pakistan's repeatedly cutting off Afghanistan's access to the sea. In 1954 Pakistan joined the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization. When in December 1955 Khrushchev and Bulganin visited Afghanistan, the stage was set for a rapproachment with the Soviet Union. Soon as many Russians were in Afghanistan as Americans and the balance of powers could operate under the new concept of "peaceful coexistence."

In the eyes of Afghanistan, Germany's role as a third power in Afghanistan's foreign affairs was ended after World War II. Germans and Austrians, nevertheless, did reappear in Afghanistan. Just as after the previous war, these Germans were glad to leave a defeated and impoverished homeland and emigrate to a country in which their talents and skills were needed. The Afghan government had bought American equipment and machinery for various projects, and Germans, again the most economical employees, were utilized to set up and install it. The German school continued to exist, and there were now several generations of Afghans who had received a German education and appreciated German culture. The Germans were as welcome in Afghanistan as ever. It was not long before the Federal Republic of Germany experienced its remarkable recovery; the Wirtschaftswunder showed the Afghans that the Federal Republic of Germany, would be an attractive trading partner for Afghanistan. The Federal Republic initiated its own Peace-Corps type project (Deutsche Entwicklungs Dienst) and Afghanistan was the first country to which it sent volunteers. To some observers it appeared that the Federal Republic enjoyed a measure of good will that had not been gained by other nations in spite of granting large-scale economic assistance.[27] But its political role as a third power was definitely over. By the mid-fifties it appeared that the Soviet Union had been put on the defensive

by the American policy of containment and it seemed that the threat to Afghanistan's territorial integrity was gone. Now big-power rivalry was expressed in terms of the conflicting ideologies of the Cold War, and Germany could no longer be a third force.

The third force to which Afghanistan now turned for her protection and moral support was the Afro-Asian bloc in the United Nations. Afghanistan, who had pioneered buffer-state politics, now pioneered a new type of foreign relations: peaceful coexistence, in which she managed to win the mutually hostile powers of East and West to cooperate in the development of Afghanistan.

NOTES

1. This article traces in outline the story of Germany's involvement in Afghanistan. It is based on material in the archives of Britain, India, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the United States and is a preliminary step toward a more comprehensive, book-length study which is now being completed. I am obligated to Professor G. E. von Grunebaum, director of the Near Eastern Center at UCLA, for financial support during my overseas research. Mrs. Teresa Joseph, publications editor with the Near Eastern Center, read the manuscript and made valuable editorial suggestions. A number of other people have read the manuscript and offered suggestions and corrections. I would like to thank Mr. John Bedrosian; Dr. Malcolm Yapp; Dr. Arnold Fletcher; Fritz Grobba, German chargé d'affaires in Afghanistan from 1923 to 1926; and Dr. Werner Otto von Hentig, whose mission in 1915 initiated German-Afghan relations and who during a long career as senior diplomat has been concerned with Afghan affairs.

2. Ludwig W. Adamec, Afghanistan 1900-1923. A Diplomatic History (Berkeley, 1967).

3. Various writers take a conspiratorial view of the killing of Fleischer. Fritz Grobba quotes the Russian professor Sokolov-Strachov in a context that seems to imply Fleischer was killed because of his connections with Krupp. See Fritz Grobba, Maenner und Maechte im Orient (Zurich, 1967), p. 11. Angus Hamilton suggests a personal vendetta caused the death of the German in Afghanistan (London, 1906), pp. 358-60. Nothing of this is reflected in British Indian archival documents. In 1907 the Amir granted Fleischer's widow a sum of money, but insisted that this was no indemnity or blood money because the killing was justified as Fleischer had insulted the Afghan religion. National Archives of India (N.A.I.), For. Pol. Sec. Frontr. A, Feb. 1907, Nos. 143-48; Sept. 1907, Nos. 9-25.

4. N.A.I., For. Pol. Sec. Frontr. B, July 1892, Nos. 185-87; For. Frontr. B, June 1914, Nos. 12-13.

5. Deutsches Auswartig Amt (D.A.A.), Afghanistan 1, Jan. 1, 1909--May 10, 1918. Band 17. Wangenheim Telegram 1562, Istanbul, Dec. 8, 1914; also Afghanistan, Weltkrieg lle, Baende 1-2, Aug. 1914-Sept. 7, 1914. Dr. W. O. von Hentig expressed to me his disbelief of this version in view of the Amir's attitude toward his mission of 1915-1916.

6. This German expedition later became known as the "Niedermayer Expedition." It might also have been called the Hentig Expedition or the Hentig and the Niedermayer Mission. The latter designation was the one used by both Niedermayer and Hentig in their reports to Berlin. When the Turco-German project fell through, Niedermayer continued the Afghan mission as a German project with the vague objective of inducing the Afghan Amir to attack India. Hentig's purpose was to

accompany the Indian revolutionary Mahendra Pratap to India and to establish German-Afghan diplomatic relations. Niedermayer wanted to assume leadership over both missions, but Hentig refused to be integrated into Niedermayer's group and he was supported in this by Arthur Zimmermann of the German Foreign Ministry. The genesis of the German expedition has already been discussed in detail by Ulrich Gehrke in Persien in der Deutschen Orientpolitik (Stuttgart, no date).

7. According to Hentig, the German concessions consisted only of promising a link with the sea over the "free" port of Karachi.

8. D.A.A., Politische Beziehungen Afghanistans zu Deutschland, Politik 2, Band 1, March 1920-March 1923.

9. United States National Archives, Afghanistan 890.00/118-169 and series. The history of the establishment of U.S.-Afghan relations will be examined in my forthcoming publication.

10. The name of the Italian is spelled Piperno in German, American, and some British sources. In other British sources it appears as Piparno as it does in Arnold Fletcher, Afghanistan: Highway of Conquest (Ithaca, N.Y., 1965).

11. D.A.A., Politische Beziehungen Afghanistans zu Italien, Piperno, Politik 3, Jan. 1920-Nov. 23, 1923.

12. Ibid., Diplomatische und Konsularische Vertretungen Afghanistans im Ausland, Politik 8, Band 1, Apr. 1920-Nov. 13, 1935.

13. This was one of the many step-brothers of Amanullah who did not enjoy the same status as Habibullah's sons by his recognized wives.

14. Grobba, op. cit., has recently published his memoirs which include a sketchy account of German-Afghan relations, but for the Afghanistan period he fails to report from his own experience. He quotes a Russian historian who obviously knows less about it than Grobba.

15. This was the case in the early post-war period when Germany experienced its inflation. It did not affect the rupee which was pegged on the sterling value. For Humphrys' quotation see London, India Office Library-India Office Records, Pol. Sec. Dept. File, vol. 45/1922, pp. 1239 and 1381.

16. D.A.A., Afghanistan, Stratil-Sauer, Politik 2, Baende 1-3, Nov. 1925-Oct. 1933. Also see published version by G. Stratil-Sauer, From Leipzig to Kabul (London, 1929), p. 194.

17. The Turkish minister in Afghanistan was Fahreddin Pasha, the Defender of Medina, who had continued to fight the British even after the Ottoman Empire capitulated. For this the British had kept him interned in Malta two years beyond the end of the war.

18. References in the archives of the government of India do not show any material that would support the suspicions expressed in non-British sources.

19. D.A.A., Innere Politik Afghanistans, Politik 5, Band 4, Feb. 25-April 1929.

20. W. K. Fraser-Tytler, Afghanistan (London, 1950), pp. 220-22.

21. N.A.I., For. Pol. F. 540-F/31.

22. D.A.A., Innere Politik Afghanistans, Politik 5, Band 7, May 1, 1931-March 1936. Also Ikbal Ali Shah, Modern Afghanistan (London, 1938), pp. 226-37.

23. D.A.A., Innere Politik, Parliaments--und Parteiwesen, Band 7, May 1931--March 1936.

24. The Treaty of Versailles prohibited Germany from exporting arms and military equipment, but eventually Germany joined other European states in selling weapons to Afghanistan.

25. In a Note, Reichsleiter Rosenberg discusses the "Taetigkeit des Gesandten v. Hentig im Auswartigen Amt" and claims that this plot had originated with Hentig. Hentig denies this categorically and claims that it represented an effort by Rosenberg to slander him before Hitler. ("Dies ist eine verleumderische Behauptung des Reichsleiters Rosenberg, die er aufgestellt hat, um mich bei Hitler anzuschwaerzen." Letter from Hentig to author, dated Nov. 1, 1968.)

26. Furthermore, Mussolini had been deposed on July 25, 1943, and it was feared that the Badoglio regime would reveal previous Axis operations in Afghanistan and India.

27. Fraser-Tytler, op. cit., Fletcher, op. cit., Louis Dupree, American Universities Field Staff Reports.

CHRONOLOGY

This chronology of Afghanistan's foreign relations and political, economic, and social development covers the 220-year period from 1747 through June 1968.

It is divided into two sections. The first runs from 1747, the date many scholars consider the beginning of Afghanistan's history as a nation, to 1919, the year to which Afghans trace their independence. Only enough entries were selected for this section to provide the necessary background for understanding the twentieth century events which are the focus of the Afghan study project.

A much more detailed chronology, with most entries listed by exact date rather than by year as in the first section, is given for the period from 1919 to 1968. The majority of entries here come from the latter part of the period because more written information is available and, from the point of view of development and foreign relations, more has apparently occurred in Afghanistan during the past fifteen years. However, improved recording exaggerates this increase in activity.

Sources of information on Afghanistan during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries range from memoirs of monarchs and screeds by their scribes through tales of travelers to careful records kept by the British rulers of India. This sporadic recording continues well into the twentieth century. Newspapers have been

published in Afghanistan continuously since 1911. There are now government newspapers in Dari, English, and Pashtu--which daily report new efforts toward "development"--as well as a growing private press. Nevertheless, accurate, complete information remains scarce. In a nation where at least nine-tenths of the people cannot read and where the languages have been tuned by the poet rather than the reporter, communication still depends mainly on word of mouth, and style is often preferred to fact.

The scholars and reporters in Europe and America have seldom seen advantage in compiling materials on Afghanistan. Near the beginning of the twentieth century Western scholars founded journals concerned with the Orient, but it was not until after World War II that some Western journals began to carry regular reports on Afghanistan. Chronicles kept on British India are one of the few sources which follow earlier events in Afghanistan.

In compiling the chronology, project participants examined available reference and source materials and selected the entries which they thought would be of most interest to scholars studying Afghanistan.

General works consulted included the standard histories and descriptions such as those by Fraser-Tytler, Wilber, and Fletcher listed in the bibliographical commentary (p. 346); the Russian histories, Istoriia Afganistan by V. M. Masson and V. A. Romodin and Svremmennyi Afganistan by N. A. Dvoryankov et al.; and reference works such as the Cambridge History of the British Empire, Chronology of Modern India 1494-1894, and the Encyclopedia of Islam.

Newspapers and journals were the source of many entries for the twentieth century. The Kabul Times was surveyed from September 1964 through June 1968 and the New York Times Index from 1913

to June 1968. Also used were reports from newspapers and other sources cited in Keesing's Contemporary Archives (since 1931), the Asian Recorder (since 1955), Cahiers de l'Orient Contemporain (since 1946), and the Middle East Journal (since 1947). More specialized publications such as the Middle East Economic Digest provided occasional entries for recent years.

Perhaps two warnings are in keeping for users of the chronology. First, the fact that a decision has been made or a project begun, in Afghainstan as in any other country, does not mean that it has been successfully carried out. For example, the government may ban the growing of opium but enforcement may be difficult. Second, the listing of the appointment of an official or the signing of a trade agreement does not mean that information about all similar events has been included. Consequently, it is not possible to compile a complete record of cabinet changes or trade relations, for instance, from the chronology alone. The chronology should provide a guide for those interested in such areas, however.

1747 Ahmad Shah begins 26-year rule during which he united Afghan tribes under Saddozai dynasty.

1761 Afghans defeat Maratha confederacy at Battle of Panipat, marking greatest extent of Ahmad Shah's empire which included Kashmir, the Punjab, and parts of Baluchistan.

1773 Timur Shah begins 20-year rule. Moves capital from Kandahar to Kabul. Campaigns in Sind and Bukhara.

1793 Zaman Shah begins six-year rule.

1798 Britain, fearing Afghan invasions of India, initiates policy of containment by urging Persia to keep Afghanistan in check.

1799 Zaman Shah deposed by Mahmud and goes into exile in India.

1803 Shah Shujah deposes Mahmud.

1805 Persian attempt to invade Herat fails.

1807 At Tilsit, Alexander II and Napoleon plan joint Russian-French invasion of India through Persia.

1809 British envoy Mountstuart Elphinstone and Shah Shujah sign defensive alliance in first official contact between Afghanistan and a European power.

Mahmud defeats Shah Shujah at Gandamak and rules until blinding of Fateh Khan, his Barakzai wazir, causes Barakzai revolt and Mahmud's downfall in 1818.

1816 Persian attempt to invade Herat fails.

1818 Civil war results in division of Afghanistan into virtually independent states until 1835.

1819 Ranjit Singh conquers Kashmir.

1826 Dost Muhammad, ruler of Ghazni, takes Kabul.

1834 Dost Muhammad defeats Shah Shujah and captures Kandahar.

1835 Dost Muhammad begins his first rule of Afghanistan. Takes title of Amir ul-Muminin in 1837.

Persians attack and besiege Herat for three years but fail to take city.

1837 Alexander Burnes arrives in Kabul on diplomatic mission for British. Jean Witkiwicz, emissary from Russia, arrives in Kabul.

1838 British break relations with Dost Muhammad. Tripartite Treaty signed in July by Ranjit Singh, the British East India Company, and Shah Shujah to restore the latter to the Afghan throne.

1839 First Anglo-Afghan War begins. British take Kandahar, Ghazni, and Kabul. Shah Shujah rules Afghanistan with British support.

1840 Dost Muhammad attempts to regain power, is defeated at Bamian, and goes into exile in British India.

1841 British envoys to Afghanistan assassinated--Alexander Burnes in November and William Macnaughton in December.

1842 British forces decimated on retreat from Kabul in January. British send punitive expedition led by Generals Pollock and Nott in August. British leave Afghanistan in October.

Dost Muhammad restored to throne and rules for 21 years.

1855 Treaty of Peshawar reopens diplomatic relations between Britain and Afghanistan.

1856 Persians capture Herat in October.

1857 Anglo-Afghan treaty signed in Peshawar in January provides subsidy to Dost Muhammad. Means peace on India's northwest frontier during Sepoy rising in May.

British send Major Lumsden to Kandahar and appoint agent to Kabul.

Treaty of Paris calls for Britain to mediate disputes between Persia and Afghanistan.

1858 Khanikoff, Russian envoy, arrives in Herat.

1863 Dost Muhammad dies. Shir Ali ascends Afghan throne. During next two years Shir Ali put down revolts by half-brothers, Azim and Afzal and his brother, Muhammad Amin. Abdur Rahman and his uncle, Azim, attack Kabul, liberate Afzal, Abdur Rahman's father.

1866 Afzal becomes Amir. Shir Ali flees to Kandahar.

1867 Afzal dies.

1868 Azim becomes Amir.

1869 Shir Ali defeats Azim. Abdur Rahman goes into exile in Russia. British recognize Shir Ali as Amir but refuse to recognize his son, Abdullah Jan, as successor.

1869 Amballa Conference held between Shir Ali and Lord Mayo, viceroy of India.

1872 In Granville-Gorchakoff Agreement Russia assures Britain that Afghanistan is outside Russia's sphere of influence.

British commission marks Seistan boundary.

1873 Abdullah Jan named heir to Afghan throne. Shir Ali's oldest son, Yakub Khan, revolts, flees to Herat.

Russia takes Khiva.

1874 Yakub Khan imprisoned in Kabul.

1876 Lord Lytton sends British mission to Kabul.

British occupy Quetta.

1877 Shir Ali's prime minister, Nour Muhammad, and British representative, Sir Lewis Pelly, reach no agreement at Peshawar conference.

1978 General Kauffman, governor of Russian Turkestan, threatens invasion of Afghanistan and India.

Russian mission under General Stolietoff arrives in Kabul in July.

British representative, Major Louis Cavagnari, refused permission to proceed to Ali Masjid on Sept. 20 and 21. Earlier in September Shir Ali refused to allow British mission under Sir Neville B. Chamberlain to enter Afghanistan.

Colonel Grodekoff arrives in Herat from Samarkand in November.

Indian viceroy, Lord Lytton, denounces alliance with Dost Muhammad.

Second Anglo-Afghan War begins as British armies cross border into Afghanistan on Nov. 22. Shir Ali flees.

1879 Shir Ali dies in February. Yakub Khan ascends throne.

Yakub Khan signs Treaty of Gandamak with British in June, allows British agent to come to Kabul.

1879 British representative, Cavagnari, assassinated in Kabul in September; General Roberts occupies Dakka and enters Kabul with British troops.

1880 British recognize Abdur Rahman as Amir.
On July 27 Ayub Khan, governor of Herat, defeats General Burrows and British troops at Maiwand near Kandahar.
General Roberts enters Kandahar in September.

1881 British leave Kandahar under control of Abdur Rahman in September.

1882 Muslim agent appointed to represent British in Kabul.
Prince Lobanoff and Lord Granville discuss Gorchakoff's circular of 1873 during Anglo-Russian contacts.

1883 Russia occupies Tejend Oasis.
Britain annexes Quetta district.
Abdur Rahman occupies Shignan and Roshan.
Britain grants Abdur Rahman subsidy of twelve lakhs.

1884 Britain and Russia open negotiations on northern boundary of Afghanistan. Sir Peter Lumsden leads British mission to Herat.
British again start building Quetta railroad.
Russians occupy Pul-i Khatun.

1885 Russians occupy Zulfikar and Akrobat and move toward Panjdeh.
Russians win battle against Afghans at Tash Keprion on March 20. Occupy Panjdeh. War scare in Britain over fear of Russian advance to Herat.
Rawalpindi Conference held between Viceroy Lord Dufferin and Abdur Rahman in April.
British and Russian boundary commissioners meet again in November.
First boundary pillar formally erected along Afghan-Russian frontier.

1886 British construct Bolan railway to Quetta.

1886 British boundary mission returns to India by way of Kabul in October.

1887 Russia occupies Karki.
Britain and Russia make final settlement and demarcation of Afghan-Russian frontier.
Ayub Khan escapes from Persia but rebellion in Afghanistan fails and he surrenders at Mashhad and is exiled to India.

1888 British extend Quetta Railway to Kila Abdullah in January.
In July Ishaq Khan, son of Azim, revolts in Turkestan, retreats to Samarkand.

1891 Abdur Rahman introduces oath of allegiance on the Koran among his councillors.

1892 Uprising of Hazaras suppressed.

1893 Afghanistan and Britain sign Durand Agreement on Nov. 12. Sets northern, eastern, and southern borders, increases Abdur Rahman's subsidy by six lakhs, and permits Afghanistan to import munitions.
British occupy New Chaman as railway terminus.

1894 Illness prevents Abdur Rahman from accepting Queen Victoria's invitation to visit England.

1895 Abdur Rahman abolishes slavery in Afghanistan.
Abdur Rahman accepts oath of allegiance from whole state of Afghanistan.
Abdur Rahman adopts title of Zia-ul-Millat-wa-ud-Din.
Nasrullah, second son of Abdur Rahman, visits England.
Russia and Britain agree on Wakhan border.

1896 Kafiristan brought under Afghan control by Abdur Rahman, renamed Nuristan.

1900 Russia presses for direct Afghan-Russian relations along northern Afghan border in memorandum of Feb. 6 to Britain.

1901 Abdur Rahman dies on Oct. 1. Habibullah proclaimed Amir on Oct. 3. Rules 18 years.

1902 British envoy, Sir Henry Dobbs, supervises reerection of boundary pillars on Afghan-Russian border during 1902 and 1903.

1903 A. H. McMahon leads British mission in demarcating Seistan boundary.
Habibia College, first secular high school, opened in Kabul.
British begin construction of Quetta-Nushki railroad.

1904 Prince Inayatullah visits India.
Orenburg-Tashkent Railroad opens.

1905 British agreements of 1880 and 1893 with Abdur Rahman confirmed by treaty with Habibullah.

1906 Shah of Iran rejects McMahon arbitration award.

1907 Habibullah visits India in January.
On Aug. 31, Britain and Russia sign convention concerning spheres of influence in Afghanistan, Persia, and Tibet.
Construction of hydroelectric station begun at Jabul Seraj.

1909 Plot on Habibullah's life fails.

1910 First telephone line in Afghanistan built between Kabul and Jalalabad.

1911 Mahmud Tarzi begins publishing the newspaper Seraj ul-Akhbar.

1912 First schools for general education founded in Peshawar and Mardan regions as enlightenment movement begins among Afghans on India's northwest frontier.
Popular unrest.

1914 General Muhammad Nadir Khan named commander-in-chief of the Afghan Army.
Habibullah declares Afghanistan's neutrality in World War I.

1915 Niedermayer-Hentig mission from Germany arrives in Kabul in September and remains nine months.

1916 Pashtu language courses introduced at Habibia College.
Unrest in Waziristan.

1918 Kabul Museum opened.

1919

Feb. 20 Habibullah assassinated in Laghman. Nasrullah named Amir in Jalalabad.

Feb. 25 Amanullah proclaimed Amir in Kabul.

Feb. 28 Nasrullah arrested.

March 3 Amanullah suggests new Anglo-Afghan agreement to viceroy of India.

April 7 Amanullah sends messages to Japan, Soviet Union, and other powers.

April 28 Afghanistan sends protest to India regarding Rowlatt Bill.

May 3 Third Anglo-Afghan War begins.

May 21 General Nadir Khan crosses Indo-Afghan boundary, marches to Thal.

May 28 Muhammad Wali Khan arrives in Tashkent on way to Moscow and Europe as Amanullah's envoy.

June 3 Afghanistan and Britain agree to cease-fire.

August 8 Preliminary Anglo-Afghan treaty signed at Rawalpindi peace conference.

September Soviet envoy arrives in Kabul.

Oct. 10 Muhammad Wali Khan arrives in Moscow.

1920

April 17 Mussoorie Conference opens. Mahmud Tarzi represents Afghanistan and Henry Dobbs, Britain.

July 18 Mussoorie Conference ends.

1921

Amir of Bukhara seeks asylum in Afghanistan.*

*Entries without more exact dates are placed first under each year.

Jan. 20 Kabul Conference between Afghanistan and Britain opens.
Feb. 28 Treaty of friendship signed by Afghanistan and the Soviet Union.
March 1 Treaty of friendship signed by Afghanistan and Turkey.
May 30 Fundamental law of government of Afghanistan goes into force.
June 3 Treaty of friendship signed by Afghanistan and Italy.
June 22 Treaty of friendship signed by Afghanistan and Persia.
Dec. 2 Kabul Conference ends. Britain recognizes Afghanistan as independent in internal and external relations. Diplomatic relations established between two nations.

1922

March 21 Statute governing commerce issued.
April 28 Treaty establishes diplomatic and commercial relations between France and Afghanistan.
August 4 Enver Pasha killed.
Sept. 9 Agreement gives France rights to make archeological excavations in Afghanistan.

1923

January Isteqlal high school founded in Kabul.
April 10 First Constitution adopted.
June 5 British-Afghan trade convention signed.
September Statutes governing sale of state lands and right to own, buy, and sell private land issued.
September French legation opened in Afghanistan.
October Criminal code adopted.
November Statute governing marriage issued.
December Statute on civil servants confirmed.
December German legation opened in Afghanistan.

1924

Nejat high school founded.
January First hospital for women and children opened in Kabul.
May Uprising of tribes in Khost.

1926

Afghani introduced as new monetary unit. Ten afghanis equal eleven Kabuli rupees.
March 3 Treaty of friendship signed by Afghanistan and Germany.
June 7 Amanullah adopts title of King.
August 15 Soviet Union agrees to cede Urta Tagai islands in Amu River to Afghanistan.
August 31 Treaty of neutrality and mutual non-aggression signed by Afghanistan and Soviet Union.

1927

Anis founded as fortnightly. Now major Dari daily newspaper.
Nov. 3 Afghanistan and Poland sign treaty of of friendship.
Nov. 27 Treaty of neutrality and mutual non-aggression signed by Afghanistan and Persia.
Dec. 1927 -July 1928 Amanullah visits India, Egypt, Italy, France, Belgium, Germany, Switzerland, England, Poland, Turkey, Soviet Union, and Persia.

1928

May 25 Treaty of friendship and collaboration signed by Afghanistan and Turkey.
May 30 Treaty of friendship signed by Afghanistan and Egypt.
July,Sept. Amanullah introduces reforms in dress.
November Uprising of Shinwari near Jalalabad.
December Bacha-i Saqao leads uprising in Kohistan.

	Islah newspaper founded. Now major Pashtu daily.
Jan. 14	Amanullah renounces throne. His brother, Inayatullah, abdicates after three days.
Jan. 18	Bacha-i Saqao proclaimed Amir under name of Habibullah.
Oct. 14	Kabul seized by Nadir Khan's troops.
Oct. 17	Nadir Khan proclaimed King.
Nov. 3	Bacha-i Saqao caught and shot.

1930

May	King Nadir Shah confirms validity of 1921 and 1923 Anglo-Afghan Agreements and other international agreements.
Sept. 20	King Nadir Shah confirms statute governing elections of members of National Assembly.
Nov. 19	Treaty of friendship signed by Afghanistan and Japan.

1931

June 24	New treaty of neutrality and mutual non-aggression signed by Afghanistan and Soviet Union.
July	Literary Society founded in Kabul.
July	Nadir Shah opens National Assembly session.
July	Revolt in Afghan Turkestan crushed.
September	Ibrahim Beg, Basmachi leader, driven across border to Soviet Union.
Oct. 31	New Constitution confirmed by King Nadir Shah.

1932

	Medical school founded. Other schools closed by Bacha-i Saqao reopened.
May 5	Treaty of friendship signed by Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia.
August 24	Statute setting up new administrative divisions issued. Five major and four minor provinces formed.

October	Uprising begins in Khost.
Nov. 8	Ghulam Nabi executed on charge of complicity in Dari Khel Ghilzai revolt.
Dec. 20	Treaty of friendship signed by Afghanistan and Iraq.

1933

	Road over Shibar Pass to north completed.
June 6	Muhammad Aziz, Afghan minister to Germany, assassinated in Berlin.
Nov. 8	King Nadir Shah assassinated. His son, Muhammad Zahir, becomes King, and brother of Nadir Shah, Hashem Khan, acts as prime minister.

1934

Feb. 16	King Zahir Shah orders general election for National Assembly.
March	State begins to control purchase and export of karakul skins. Bank-i Milli formed.
August 21	United States formally recognizes Afghanistan.
Sept. 23	Birth of Prince Ahmad Shah to King Zahir Shah and Queen Homaira.
Sept. 25	Afghanistan joins League of Nations.

1935

April-May	W. H. Hornibrook in Afghanistan as representative of United States.
May 6	Afghanistan and Soviet Union sign agreement for joint control of locusts.
May	Turkish arbitrate Afghanistan's boundary dispute with Persia.
June 8	National Assembly session opened by King Zahir Shah.
September	Mohmand uprising
November	Japanese legation established in Afghanistan.

1936

Pashtu made national language of Afghanistan.

Feb. 1 First group of students reported to have left for higher studies in Japan.

March Treaty on commerce and non-interference signed by Afghanistan and Soviet Union.

March 26 Treaty of friendship signed by Afghanistan and United States.

1937

Lufthansa starts weekly service between Berlin and Kabul, first regular air link between Afghanistan and Europe.

March 27 Eleven Turkish officers begin acting as military advisors to Afghanistan.

July 7 Treaty of Saadabad signed by Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, and Turkey. The four nations agree to respect common borders and refrain from interference in each other's affairs.

1938

May Afghan Air Force expanded by purchase of planes from Italy and Britain. Officers sent to Britain, Soviet Union, and Italy for training. Arms bought from Britain and Czechoslovakia.

June Shami Pir fails in attempt to regain throne for Amanullah.

June 24 Report says treaty of friendship between Afghanistan and Turkey renewed.

Sept. 16 Afghanistan recognizes Italian empire.

1939

Feb. 11 Afghan government plans to spend Af. 8 million (£ 1.7 mil.) for industrial development. Cotton raising to be encouraged and textile company founded.

Oct. 3 Afghan armed forces mobilized as precautionary measure.

1940

Jan. 12 All men over 17 obliged to do national service. Special taxes imposed to pay for arms, build radio station. Radio Kabul gets 20 kilowatt medium wave transmitter.

May Joint stock company formed to handle ginning, spinning, and weaving of cotton. Sugar beet raising to be encouraged.

July 29 Trade agreement by Afghanistan and Soviet Union signed.

August 17 King Zahir Shah declares Afghanistan's neutrality in World War II in statement to National Assembly.

1941

January Afghanistan announces goal to provide 50 per cent of the country's need for textiles and 80 per cent of its need for sugar in five years.

July 28 Afghanistan reaffirms its neutrality in World War II.

Oct. 19 Afghanistan agrees to expel German and Italian residents at request of Britain and the Soviet Union.

1942

April 27 Cornelius van Engert, consul-general in Beirut, named U.S. minister to Afghanistan.

Nov. 5 Afghanistan reaffirms neutrality in World War II.

1943

May 16 Afghan consulate opened in New York.

June 5 Abdul Husain Aziz, first Afghan minister to United States, presents credentials.

Dec. 28 Saadabad pact reported automatically renewed after five years.

1944

March 5 Treaty of friendship signed by Afghanistan and China.

1946

Kabul University established by combining already existing faculties such as medicine and law.

January Ministry of Public Instruction creates commission to determine words to be used in Persian for technical expressions in law, politics, sociology, psychology, logic, ethics, philosophy, economics.

Jan. 22 King Zahir Shah orders election of deputies for session of National Assembly to meet April 21.

Jan. 29 Abdur Rahim, along with several friends and relatives, arrested, accused of anti-government activity.

May 9 Muhammad Hashem Khan resigns as prime minister, citing poor health as reason. Mahmud Khan, minister of defense, asked to form new government.

June 13 Boundary treaty signed with Soviet Union. Soviet Union gets Kushka River water rights.

Nov. 9 United Nations General Assembly approves entry of Afghanistan.

Nov. 19 Abdul Husain Aziz, Afghanistan's first representative to United Nations, takes seat.

1947

April 13 Agreement on wireless communication signed by Afghanistan and Soviet Union.

April 24 Afghan delegation arrives in Tashkent to start demarcation of Afghan-Soviet border.

June 13 Afghanistan sends note to British and Indian governments saying that inhabitants of region between Afghan-Indian border and Indus River are Afghans and must decide themselves whether to join Afghanistan, Pakistan, or India or become independent.

July 3 Britain replies it holds to Treaty of 1921 by which boundary was recognized by both nations and asks Afghanistan to abstain from any act of intervention on northwest frontier at time of transfer of powers to Indian government.

July 10 Afghanistan reiterates views on Pashtuns in second note to Britain.

July 26 Prime Minister Mahmud arrives in London.

August 3 Prime Minister Mahmud arrives in New York City.

Sept. 18 Iran says diversion of Helmand waters in Afghanistan causes crop failures in Seistan.

Sept. 30 Afghanistan casts only vote against admitting Pakistan to United Nations on grounds that Pashtuns have not had fair plebescite.

November Najibullah discusses position of Pashtuns east of Durand line with Pakistani leaders.

Nov. 29 Afghan troops moved east to quell fighting between Safis and Nuristanis.

1948

Jan. 22 At Kashmir conference, Abdul Husain Aziz says Afghanistan should be

consulted on future status of tribal area.

April 1 Muhammad Naim named Afghan ambassador to United States.

April 23 Sir Giles Squire named British ambassador to Afghanistan.

May 6 Faiz Muhammad named Afghan ambassador to Britain.

June 5 United States legation elevated to embassy. Ely E. Palmer presents credentials as first U. S. ambassador.

June 16 Pakistan arrests Abdul Ghaffar Khan and other Khudai Khetmatgar leaders. Afghanistan begins press and radio campaign for independent Pashtunistan.

Sept. 29 Afghan-Soviet mission completes demarcation of border. Agreement signed fixing revised boundary.

1949

March 24 Foreign Ministry says statement of Pakistani governor general that tribal territory is integral part of Pakistan is contrary to pledges of Jinnah in 1948.

April 2 Chargé d'affaires in Karachi recalled after Pakistani bombings in Waziristan.

April 20 Louis G. Dreyfus named U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan.

June 4 Afghanistan restricts movement of vehicles along border with Pakistan.

June 12 Pakistani plane bombs Moghalgai (inside Afghan territory), killing 23.

June 20 Alfred Gardener named British ambassador to Afghanistan.

June 23 Faiz Muhammad, Afghan ambassador to Britain, says Afghanistan will ask British aid in dispute with Pakistan. Pakistan replies that statement is interference in its internal affairs, says fair plebiscite was held.

June 30 Afghan National Assembly opens 7th Session. Known as "Liberal Assembly."

July 11 Pakistani foreign minister says Pakistan will discuss economic cooperation with Afghanistan but rejects Afghanistan's claims to tribal territory.

July 26 Afghan National Assembly repudiates treaties with Britain regarding tribal territory. Pakistani spokesman says move invites claims by Iran and Soviet Union.

1950

Jan. 4 Treaty of peace and friendship signed by Afghanistan and India.

Jan. 13 Afghanistan recognizes Chinese People's Republic.

Jan. 26 Sultan Ahmad presents credentials as Afghan ambassador to Soviet Union.

March 8 King Zahir Shah begins visit to Egypt.

March 27 King Zahir Shah begins visit to Iran.

May 26 Recall of Pakistan embassy staff member for violating Afghan laws, requested by Afghanistan.

June 22 United Nations technical assistance mission arrives to advise on development projects.

July 11 Agreement signed by Afghanistan and UNICEF for $100,000 program to lower infant mortality rate.

July 18 Four-year trade agreement signed by Afghanistan and Soviet Union.

Oct. 14 New cabinet announced by Prime Minister Shah Mahmud:

Daud	Defense
Ali Muhammad	Foreign Affairs
Abdul Ahad	Interior
Muhammad Nauroz	Finance
Mir Sayed Kasim	Justice
Abdul Majid	Education

Mir Muhammad Haider	National Economy
Ghulam Faruk	Public Health
Muhammad Akram	Public Works
Muhammad Naim	Mines

October — Emigration of Afghan Jews to Israel authorized by Afghan government.

Oct. 24 — Afghanistan denies Pakistan allegations that Afghan tribesmen and soldiers violated frontier Sept. 30.

1951

Feb. 9 — Agreement for technical assistance under Point Four program signed by Afghanistan and United States.

March 19 — George R. Merrell appointed U. S. ambassador to Afghanistan.

April 25 — Prime Minister Shah Mahmud arrives in United States.

May 28 — United Nations assists in drilling exploratory oil wells in north.

August 9 — Treaties of friendship have been signed by Afghanistan with Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria, it is reported.

1952

Jan. 15 — United States suspends economic and technical aid to Afghanistan until bilateral agreement under Mutual Security Act signed.

Sept. 23 — Soviet note expressing concern over activities of United Nations technical assistance experts in areas near Afghan-Soviet border rejected by Afghan government.

1953

Jan. 8 — United States extends loan of $1.5 million for emergency purchase of wheat and flour from United States.

March 18 — Sultan Muhammad named foreign minister to succeed Ali Muhammad who remains deputy prime minister.

Sept. 6 — Shah Mahmud resigns as prime minister, citing poor health. King Zahir Shah asks cousin, Daud, present defense and interior minister to form new cabinet.

Sept. 20 — Prime Minister Daud announces cabinet members:

Ali Muhammad	Deputy Prime Minister
Muhammad Arif	Defense
Muhammad Naim	Foreign Affairs
Abdul Malik	Acting Finance
Abdul Hakim	Public Works
Abdul Majid	Education
Ghulam Faruk	Public Health
Muhammad Yusouf	Mines
Shamsuddin Majruh	Tribal Affairs
Mir Muhammad Yousuf	Agriculture
Salahuddin Saljouqi	Press

Oct. 26 — Muhammad Hashem, prime minister from 1929 to 1946 and King's uncle, dies in Kabul.

November — United States Export-Import Bank makes loan of $18.5 million for development of Helmand Valley.

Dec. 30 — Prime Minister Daud describes proposed U. S. military aid to Pakistan as a "grave danger to security and peace of Afghanistan."

1954

Jan. 27 — Soviet Union makes loan of $3.5 million for construction of two grain mills and two silos. Soviet technicians to help carry out projects.

Feb. 8 — Muhammad Atiq Rafiq named Afghan ambassador to Pakistan.

Feb. 8 S. A. Hussein named Afghan ambassador to India.

April 20 Afghanistan becomes member of United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East.

Sept. 17 Foreign Minister Naim arrives in Karachi to continue talks begun in Kabul on improving relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Oct. 28 Foreign Minister Naim arrives for week's visit in Saudi Arabia.

Nov. 7 Foreign Minister Naim says Pashtunistan issue is not question of territorial adjustment but of giving Pashtuns an opportunity to express their wishes.

Dec. 19 Treaty of friendship signed by Afghanistan and Yugoslavia.

1955

Jan. 14 Former Prime Minister Shah Mahmud meets Pakistan prime minister.

Jan. 19 Afghanistan and the Chinese People's Republic establish diplomatic relations at embassy level.

Jan. 25 Legislation strengthening armed forces approved by upper house of parliament.

Feb. 15 Cement factory bought from Czechoslovakia.

Feb. 25 Japanese company agrees to invest in porcelain industry in Kunduz.

March 2 Fine arts college opened under A. G. Brishna.

March 29 Prime Minister Daud warns Pakistan of "grave consequences" if Pashtun areas of the Northwest Frontier province are included in unified West Pakistan.

March 30 Demonstrators march on Pakistani embassy and ambassador's residence in Kabul.

March 31 Demonstrators march on Pakistani consulate in Kandahar.

April 1 Demonstrators march on Pakistani consulate in Jalalabad.

April 1 Afghan consulate in Peshawar attacked.

April 4 Britain, Turkey, and United States protest attack on Pakistan embassy in Kabul.

April 12 Pakistan rejects Afghan replies to its protests, evacuates families of diplomats and nationals, closes Jalalabad consulate.

April 18 Foreign Minister Naim goes to Bandung Conference.

April 24 Treaty of friendship signed by Afghanistan and Indonesia.

April 29 Col. Gamal Abdul Nasser, prime minister of Egypt, visits Afghanistan.

April 29 Afghanistan says it is willing to apologize, pay compensation for damage, and make amends for insult to Pakistani flag if similar amends are made for insult to its flag.

May 1 Pakistan demands closing of all Afghan consulates in Pakistan, says it will close its consulates in Afghanistan.

May 4 Afghanistan mobilizes troops.

May 13 Afghanistan and Pakistan accept Saudi Arabian offer of mediation.

June 21 Five-year agreement signed with Soviet Union allowing goods of each nation free transit across territory of other.

June 28 Saudi Arabian mediator announces his proposals have been rejected.

July 5 Thin Kuo Yu, ambassador to Afghanistan from Chinese People's Republic, presents credentials.

July 14 Afghanistan tells Pakistan it will be held responsible for any loss or damage to goods held up in transit to Kabul or Quetta.

July 14 Afghanistan becomes member of International Monetary Fund and International Bank.

July 28 State of emergency ended; Afghan Army demobilized.

August 14 Postal agreement signed by Afghanistan and Soviet Union.

August 17 India agrees to export four Dakota planes to Afghanistan for internal service.

Sept. 9 Foreign Minister Naim and Pakistani ambassador negotiate agreement to stop hostile propaganda.

Sept. 13 Afghan and Pakistani officials join in raising Pakistani flag over Pakistani embassy in Kabul.

Sept. 14 Pakistani flag raised over consulate in Jalalabad.

Sept. 15 Afghan flag raised over consulate in Peshawar.

Oct. 11 Afghan leaders request meeting with Pakistani leaders on condition one-unit act can be postponed. Pakistan says postponement impossible.

Oct. 17 Afghanistan recalls ambassador from Karachi.

Oct. 18 Pakistan recalls ambassador from Kabul.

Nov. 8 Afghanistan protests further restrictions by Pakistan on transit of goods to Afghanistan.

Nov. 20 During five-day session, Loya Jirgah* gives its approval to resolutions calling for plebiscite to decide future of Pashtun area disputed with Pakistan, recommending government find means to reestablish balance of power upset by Pakistan's decision to accept arms from the United States, and refusing to recognize Pashtunistan as part of Pakistan.

* Great Council

Dec. 6 Defense Minister Muhammad Arif resigns.

Dec. 15-18 Soviet Prime Minister Bulganin and Soviet Communist Party Secretary Khrushchev make official visit to Kabul.

Dec. 16 Soviet Union backs Afghanistan in Pashtunistan dispute.

Dec. 18 Three agreements signed by Afghanistan and Soviet Union: a loan of $100 million, a protocol extending 1931 treaty of neutrality and non-aggression, a statement of foreign policy matters. Foreign Minister Naim says agreements do not weaken Afghan determination to remain neutral.

Dec. 21 United States confirms it has offered to mediate Pashtunistan dispute between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

1956

Jan. 8 Afghan consul in Quetta recalled at request of Pakistan. Pakistan military attache requested to leave Afghanistan.

Jan. 24 Soviet economic delegation begins talks with Afghan government on use of $100 million loan.

Jan. 24 Cabinet changes announced:

Abdul Hakim	Interior
Sayed Abdullah	Acting Justice
Abdul Zahir	Acting Public Health
Muhammad Hashem	Foreign Affairs Deputy

Jan. 30 Soviet Union presents Ilyushin 14 to King Zahir Shah.

Feb. 18 Technical cooperation agreement signed by Afghanistan and the United States for 1956.

March 1 Technical assistance agreement signed by Afghanistan and Soviet Union for building of hydroelectric plants, highway through Hindu Kush, air fields, motor repair shop, and reservoirs.

March 6 SEATO powers declare region up to Durand line is Pakistani territory and within treaty area.

March 21 Afghanistan formally protests SEATO decision to uphold Durand line as Afghan-Pakistani border.

March 26 United States International Cooperation Administration announces grant of $997,000 to Teachers College of Columbia University to set up English language program for Afghan secondary schools and train English teachers.

March 31 Gift of 15 buses and equipment for 100-bed hospital to Kabul municipality from Soviet Union arrives.

April 4-18 Afghan military mission visits Czechoslovakia.

May 7 Regular air service available to Europe through Karachi after air agreement signed by Afghanistan and Pakistan.

June 27 Agreement for $14 million to develop Afghan civil aviation signed by Afghanistan and United States.

July 26-30 Turkish Prime Minister Adnan Menderes visits Kabul.

July 26 Soviet Union agrees to carry out Nangarhar irrigation project.

August 4 Trade agreement signed by Afghanistan and Poland.

August 7-11 Pakistani President Iskander Mirza visits Kabul.

August 25 Prime Minister Daud announces military arms agreements with Czechoslovakia and Soviet Union.

Sept. 12 Pan American to supervise pilot and ground crew training of Ariana Afghan Airlines. $2.5 million contract to be part of $14 million program announced earlier which also includes $5.5 million for Kandahar airport.

Sept. 24 Air service to Iran inaugurated.

Sept. 27 First installment of arms from Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia arrives.

Oct. 17-30 Prime Minister Daud visits Soviet Union.

Oct. 28 Afghan Air Force receives 11 jet planes from Soviet Union.

Nov. 5 Afghans call attention of United Nations to Israeli-British-French attack on Suez as violation of Charter.

Nov. 8 Treaty of friendship signed by Afghanistan and Burma.

Nov. 10 Gen. Muhammad Omar named Afghan ambassador to India.

Nov. 16 Afghanistan offers troops for United Nations police force in Suez.

Nov. 24 -Dec. 2 Prime Minister Daud discusses Pashtunistan question with Pakistani leaders during visit to Karachi.

1957

Jan. 8 Trade protocol signed with Soviet Union.

Jan. 19-23 Chou En-lai, prime minister of Chinese People's Republic, visits Afghanistan.

Jan. 27 M. C. Gillett named British ambassador to Afghanistan.

Jan. 30 Kabul University Senate recommends founding of Institute of Economics.

Feb. 4 Afghanistan's United Nations representative deposits Afghanistan's instrument of ratification of opium control agreement.

Feb. 10 Radio Moscow inaugurates Pashtu program.

March 31 -April 3 United States Special Ambassador to the Middle East James P. Richards visits Kabul. Joint Afghan-U.S. statement says Afghanistan welcomes U.S. President Eisenhower's program of economic aid to Middle East.

April 14 -May 19 Prime Minister Daud visits Turkey, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Austria, and Egypt.

April 14-29 Foreign Minister Naim visits Turkey and Pakistan.

April 27 Agreement for increased aid from Czechoslovakia signed by Afghanistan.

June 8-11 Pakistani Prime Minister Suhrawardy visits Kabul. Afghanistan and Pakistan agree to restore diplomatic relations broken in October 1955.

June 15 Afghanistan ratifies statute of International Atomic Energy Authority.

June 30 United States makes loan of $5,750,000 for Helmand Valley and $2,860,000 for building roads, training personnel.

July 7 Minister of Finance Abdul Malik relieved of his office and accused of corruption and incapacity.

July 11 Unsuccessful plot against King Zahir Shah and Prime Minister Daud reported.

July 17-31 King Zahir Shah visits Soviet Union. Communique says Soviet Union will aid Afghanistan in prospecting for oil, that a special commission to regulate boundary questions will be created, and that an agreement was reached regarding use of waterways crossing the two countries.

July 28 Trade agreement signed by Afghanistan and Chinese People's Republic.

August 10 Ghulam Muhammad Sherzad, Afghan ambassador to France, named commerce minister.

August 31 Foreign Minister Naim says Afghanistan to receive about $25 million in military assistance under arms agreement signed with Soviet Union in 1956.

Oct. 22 Prime Minister Daud begins visit to Chinese People's Republic.

Dec. 21 Andrei Gromyko, Soviet foreign minister, meets Afghan mission in Moscow to negotiate new frontier agreement.

1958

Jan. 8 Soviet Union agrees to survey oil deposits in Afghanistan.

Jan. 11 Prime Minister Daud supports Soviet proposal for summit conference.

Jan. 18 Treaty regulating Afghan-Soviet border signed by Afghanistan and Soviet Union.

Feb. 1-5 King Zahir Shah visits Pakistan.

Feb. 11-26 King Zahir Shah arrives in India for two-week visit.

March 30 Cultural agreement signed by Afghanistan and United Arab Republic.

May 6 Afghan United Nations representative announces that Afghanistan will prohibit growth and export of opium.

June 26 Cultural agreement signed by Afghanistan and United States.

June 26 Protocol on utilization of Amu Darya signed by Afghanistan and Soviet Union.

June 30 Prime Minister Daud begins U.S. visit.

June 30 United States agrees to help Afghanistan improve highway from Spin Boldak to Kabul and makes $7,708,000 grant to Pakistan to improve its transport lines with Afghanistan.

July 17 Agreement on transport of goods by road signed by Afghanistan and Pakistan.

July 26 Afghanistan recognizes new government of Iraq.

Sept. 2-5 Czechoslovak Prime Minister visits Kabul.

Sept. 11 Czechoslovak firm to install telephone exchange in Kandahar.

Oct. 1 Afghan United Nations representative denies Afghanistan planning confederation with Iran, Turkey, Pakistan.

Oct. 1-5 Marshal Voroshilov, president of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union, visits Afghanistan.

Nov. 7 Barter and trade agreements between Afghanistan and Czechoslovakia and Poland renewed, it is reported.

Nov. 18 Foreign Investment Law promulgated.

Dec. 7 Af. 2 and Af. 5 coins put in circulation.

1959

Jan. 1-6 Foreign Minister Naim visits Soviet Union.

Jan. 12 United States agrees to ship 50,000 tons of wheat to Afghanistan.

Jan. 20 Henry A. Byroade named U. S. ambassador to Afghanistan.

Feb. 5-13 Prime Minister Daud visits India.

March 9 Prime Minister Daud calls Baghdad Pact aggravation of international tension.

March 22-24 United Nations Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold visits Kabul.

April 23 Afghanistan and Soviet Union sign protocol on exchange of goods.

May 18-22 Prime Minister Daud visits Soviet Union.

May 28 Afghanistan and Soviet Union sign agreement on building of 750 km. Kandahar-Herat-Kushka highway.

July 15 Afghan military mission visits Turkey and United Arab Republic.

August 23 Soviet Union agrees to provide assistance to complete Nangarhar irrigation project

August 31 Afghan women appear unveiled in public at Jashen celebration.

Sept. 5 Foreign Minister Naim begins visit to Chinese People's Republic.

Sept. 14 Indian Prime Minister Nehru visits Afghanistan. Afghan women appear without veils at dinner for Nehru.

Oct. 11 Foreign Minister Naim visits Washington. Confers with representative of Pakistan's new government under Ayub Khan for the first time.

Oct. 20-28 Foreign Minister Naim visits Yugoslavia.

Oct. 28 Afghan-Soviet Friendship Society founded.

Nov. 7 Cultural agreement signed by Afghanistan and Turkey.

Dec. 1 Afghanistan and Soviet Union to begin joint survey of Amu Darya for construction of dam to provide electricity and water for irrigation.

Dec. 9 U.S. President Eisenhower spends six hours in Kabul. Assures Afghanistan of continued economic support.

Dec. 21 Police and army units suppress rioting in Kandahar. No official figures of casualties given. Radio Kabul blames on element trying to evade payment of overdue taxes. Other reports say religious leaders oppose government measures of allowing women to remove veil and accepting Soviet assistance.

1960

Jan. 6 Agreements signed by Afghanistan and Yugoslavia on trade and economic and technical cooperation.

Jan. 10 Foreign Minister Naim visits Pakistan.

Jan. 19 Afghanistan and Soviet Union sign agreement for construction of irrigation and power project on Kabul River.

March 2-5 Soviet Prime Minister Khrushchev visits Kabul. Inspects Soviet aid projects, signs cultural cooperation agreement, assures Afghanistan support on Pashtun question.

March 6 Pakistan calls Soviet support of Afghanistan on Pashtun question interference in Pakistan's internal affairs.

March 6 Soviet Union announces gift of 50,000 tons of wheat to Afghanistan.

March 7 Prime Minister Daud says Pakistan is putting out propaganda against reforms in Afghanistan such as the emancipation of women. Says Afghan monarchy has decided to give Afghans complete freedom to choose form of government and to organize political parties.

March 17 Prime Minister Daud arrives in Iran.

April 3 Construction work begins on Kandahar-Herat-Kushka highway.

April 26 Former King Amanullah dies in Switzerland.

April 27 Yugoslav Foreign Minister visits Kabul.

May 6 Jagan Nath Dhamija named Indian ambassador to Afghanistan.

May 13 Prime Minister Daud meets Soviet Prime Minister Khrushchev while in Moscow for medical treatment.

May 18 Foreign Minister Naim protests to Pakistan and United States the violation of Afghan airspace by U.S. U-2 plane.

June 26 Barter agreement signed by Afghanistan and Iran.

July 2 Jangalak auto repair shops opened. Built with Soviet aid.

July 15 Soviet prospecting team announces discovery of petroleum and natural gas deposits in northern Afghanistan.

August 4 Czechoslovakia announces £ 100,000 technical assistance grant to Afghanistan.

August 8 Diplomatic relations between Sweden and Afghanistan raised to embassy level.

August 10 Two-year Afghan-Soviet barter agreement signed.

August 13 Two Pakistani aircraft violate Afghan airspace, land at Kandahar. Pakistan says it was error. Planes and pilots returned to Pakistan September 17.

August 18 Darunta Canal opened. Built with Soviet assistance.

August 21-29 Chen Yi, foreign minister of Chinese People's Republic, visits Afghanistan.

August 26 Treaty of friendship and non-agression signed by Afghanistan and Chinese People's Republic. Commercial and payments agreement renewed.

Sept. 2 U. S. Development Loan Fund makes $100,000 loan to Ariana Afghan Airlines for DC-6c airliner.

Sept. 19 Commercial and technical cooperation agreements signed with Poland during visit of Polish Prime Minister.

Sept. 29 Kabul Radio denies Afghanistan has massed troops along Afghan-Pakistani border.

Sept. 30 -Oct. 3 Ludwig Erhard, minister of economic affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, visits Kabul.

Oct. 22-31 King Zahir Shah visits United Arab Republic.

Oct. 31 King Zahir Shah arrives in Yugoslavia.

Nov. 30 Foreign Ministry sends note to Pakistan protesting attack by Pakistani military forces on Tumankhail.

Dec. 3 Agreements on trade and transit signed with Iran during visit of Iranian Prime Minister to Kabul.

1961

Feb. 15 Agreement signed by Afghanistan and India to increase trade.

March 1 Kabul Radio reports Pakistan is bombing Bajaur.

March 15 Afghanistan signs technical assistance agreement with Japan.

April 5 Prime Minister Daud confers with Soviet Prime Minister Khrushchev in Moscow on return from Rome where Daud underwent

a spinal operation. Pravda article says Pashtun situation is not a matter of indifference to Soviet Union.

April 18 Cultural agreement signed by Afghanistan and Federal Republic of Germany.

April 24 Cultural agreement signed by Afghanistan and Czechoslovakia.

May 19 Afghanistan denies Pakistani reports that Afghan soldiers are taking part in border fighting.

June 3 Trade agreement signed by Afghanistan and Bulgaria.

June 6 Prime Minister Daud says Pakistan has savagely bombarded Afghan populations with aid of arms furnished by United States and has confined more than 1,200 leaders of Pashtunistan in Peshawar in past five days. Denies that Afghanistan has pushed Pashtun tribes to revolt.

June 8 King Zahir Shah opens National Assembly session with speech stressing economic development and self-determination for Pashtunistan. Dr. Abdul Zahir named president of Assembly.

June 15 Pakistan protests acts of provocation and aggression in note to Afghan government.

June 18 Afghan jet bomber lands in Peshawar because of bad weather in Kabul. Pakistan allows plane to return to Kabul.

June 20 Radio Kabul says Afghanistan has suggested meeting between King Zahir Shah and Pakistani President Ayub Khan.

June 22 Pakistan says nomads will no longer be allowed to enter Pakistan without valid passports, visas, and international health certificates.

June 23 Pakistan says friendlier atmosphere should exist between Afghanistan and Pakistan before any summit meeting held.

June 23 Agreement signed with United States providing for delivery of 50,000 tons of wheat to Afghanistan.

June 26 Prime Minister Daud confers with British Foreign Secretary Home and is received by Queen Elizabeth during visit to London.

June 26 Report from Bajaur says Pakistani soldiers attacked several villages in Kurram area.

June 28 Foreign Minister Naim tells news conference that Pashtun self-determination is only problem in Afghan-Pakistani relations which requires negotiations. Says Pakistan's sovereignty and territorial integrity are not at issue but that Pakistani punitive actions in Pashtun tribal areas are real.

June 29 Afghanistan and Mexico establish diplomatic relations at ambassadorial level.

July 1 Afghanistan and Nepal establish diplomatic relations at ambassadorial level.

July 3-8 Prime Minister Daud visits Federal Republic of Germany.

July 8 Soviet delegation of atomic engineers meets Foreign Minister Naim.

July 23 Muhammad Hashem Maiwandwal, ambassador to the United States, expresses his government's grave concern over Pakistan's use of American arms against Pashtun tribes during meeting with President Kennedy.

July 31 Civil air agreement between Afghanistan and Czechoslovakia announced.

August 2 Civil air agreement signed by Afghanistan and United Arab Republic.

August 23 Pakistan announces it is closing Afghan consulates and trade offices in Pakistan and is considering prohibiting transit facilities given to Afghanistan.

August 30 In reply to Pakistani note of August 23, Afghanistan says it considers decision to close consulates an inimical act and threatens to break diplomatic relations.

August 30 Prime Minister Daud leaves for Belgrade Conference of Nonaligned Nations.

Sept. 2 Pakistan publishes white book accusing Afghanistan of following policy of expansionism and interfering with Pakistan consulates in Afghanistan.

Sept. 3 Afghanistan seals border. Transfer of merchandise suspended between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Sept. 6 Afghanistan breaks diplomatic relations with Pakistan.

Sept. 7 Afghanistan rejects proposal that Great Britain represent Pakistan's interests in Afghanistan.

Sept. 12 Islamic Congress of Jerusalem appeals to Afghanistan and Pakistan to resolve their differences.

Sept. 16-20 Foreign Minister Naim visits Soviet Union.

Sept. 17 Afghanistan denies Pakistani allegations that it is imposing blockade on its own trade by refusing to find alternative ways of providing services for its trade crossing Pakistan. Says Pakistan deliberately tried to establish economic blockade by closing Afghan consulates and trade offices.

Sept. 18 Pakistan accepts Iranian offer of mediation in Pashtunistan dispute.

Sept. 19 Saudi Arabia agrees to look after Pakistani interests in Afghanistan.

Sept. 21 United Arab Republic agrees to look after Afghan interests in Pakistan.

Sept. 27 Foreign Minister Naim says Afghanistan will not allow its transit trade to pass through Pakistan unless its trade offices and consulates in Pakistan are reopened.

Sept. 29 Pakistani President Ayub Khan rejects possibility of reopening Afghan consulates and trade offices, says they were used for subversive activities.

Oct. 4 U. S. President Kennedy sends messages to King Zahir Shah and Pakistani President Ayub Khan suggesting the United States might make proposals to help improve relations.

Oct. 9 Radio Kabul denies report that Afghan troops attacked two villages in Bajaur. Says Pakistan bombed area.

Oct. 11 Soviet Army delegation arrives in Kabul for 11-day visit.

Oct. 16 Afghan-Soviet technical and economic cooperation agreement signed.

Oct. 19 Afghanistan welcomes appointment of Livingston Merchant as United States President Kennedy's personal representative to carry out the President's offer of good offices to help rectify the dispute between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Oct. 24 Soviet Deputy Minister of Public Works arrives in Kabul to inspect projects carried out with Soviet assistance.

Nov. 2-8 Livingston Merchant, special representative of U. S. President Kennedy, visits Afghanistan and Pakistan. Finds no solution to Pashtunistan dispute. Good offices to continue through regular diplomatic channels.

Nov. 5 Trade protocol signed with Czechoslovakia increasing Afghanistan's export of fruit.

Nov. 12 Afghanistan and Pakistan accuse each other of massing troops on border.

Nov. 14 Prime Minister Daud says Afghanistan will continue its policy of neutrality but warns Pakistan against provocation.

Nov. 19 Supplementary transit agreement, providing expansion of facilities for Afghan foreign trade, signed with Soviet Union.

Nov. 23 Prince Ahmad Shah, eldest son of King Zahir Shah, married to K'atool Omar Zikria at Dilkusha Palace.

1962

Jan. 9 Afghan United Nations Representative says Afghanistan ready to receive fact-finding mission on Pashtunistan. Says Afghanistan will bring problem to United Nations only if direct negotiations fail.

Jan. 20 Iranian ambassador to Pakistan suggests confederation of Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan.

Jan. 23 Four-year agreement signed with Soviet Union to develop Afghan meteorological services.

Jan. 24 John M. Steeves named U. S. ambassador to Afghanistan.

Jan. 29 Afghanistan opens border with Pakistan for eight weeks to allow entry of U. S. aid goods.

Feb. 27 Chester Bowles, personal representative of United States President Kennedy, visits Kabul.

April 14 Prime Minister Daud announces Second Five Year Plan. Calls for spending Af. 31.3 billion for economic

development: One-third on mines and industries, one-fourth on agriculture and irrigation, and one-fourth on communications and transportation.

April 20 Five-year transit agreement signed by Iran and Afghanistan.

May 6 Pul-i Khumri power station opened. Built with Soviet assistance.

July 1 Pakistan accepts Shah of Iran's offer to mediate its dispute with Afghanistan.

July 12 Afghanistan accepts Shah of Iran's offer to mediate its dispute with Pakistan.

July 27-31 Formal talks held in Kabul between Shah of Iran and King Zahir Shah and in Rawalpindi between the Shah and President Ayub Khan in effort to settle Afghan-Pakistani dispute.

August 1 Joint communique issued in Tehran and Kabul says that Shah of Iran will continue efforts to normalize relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

August 6 During meeting in Quetta, Pakistani President Ayub Khan suggests a confederation of Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan. Says their peoples have much in common and can resist outside pressures only by uniting.

August 6-15 King Zahir Shah makes visit to Soviet Union.

August 15 Pakistani President Ayub Khan repeats suggestion of confederation of Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan. Says high officials of three nations may meet soon in Tehran.

Sept. 12 Meeting of foreign ministers of Afghanistan and Pakistan scheduled for Tehran reported canceled for "lack of time."

Oct. 19 Iran protests that dam built by Afghanistan has cut flow of water into Iran and imperiled crops.

Oct. 24 Agreement signed by Afghanistan with Federal Republic of Germany for loan of DM 200 million to finance construction of a power station and a sewage network, improve drinking water, and develop industry.

Oct. 28 Pakistani foreign minister says proposed meeting of Afghan and Pakistani representatives with Shah of Iran has been put in abeyance.

Nov. 10-30 Afghan trade mission confers with Iranian officials on difficulties in carrying out transit agreement such as insufficient storage in Khorramshar and Mashhad.

Dec. 14 Foreign Minister Naim blames Pakistan for continued dispute.

1963

Jan. 18 John M. Steeves, U. S. ambassador to Afghanistan, discusses dispute between Afghanistan and Pakistan with President Kennedy.

Feb. 5 Cabinet approves establishment of nation's second university--Nangarhar University, to be started in Jalalabad with a medical school.

Feb. 12 United States decides to ship all its foreign aid goods to Afghanistan via Iran because of the continuing dispute between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Feb. 25 Trade and assistance agreement signed by Afghanistan and Soviet Union.

March 10 Resignation of Prime Minister Daud announced. Cousin of King Zahir Shah in office for nine and a half years to be replaced by commoner.

March 14 King Zahir Shah asks Muhammad Yousuf, former minister of mines and

industries, to form new government. Prime Minister Yousuf's first cabinet includes:

Ali Ahmad Popal	Deputy Prime Minister Education
Abdullah Malikyar	Deputy Prime Minister Finance
Sayed Abdullah	Interior
Gen. Khan Muhammad	Defense
Shamsuddin Majruh	Justice
	Tribal Affairs
Abdul Hai Aziz	Planning
Muhammad Azim	Public Works
Abdul Rahim	Health
Sayed Qasim Rishtya	Press

Prime Minister Yousuf to serve as own foreign minister.

March 22 By agreement with the International Monetary Fund, cabinet decides to abolish Afghanistan's complex system of multiple exchange rates and to introduce uniform rate of 45 afghanis to a U.S. dollar. The parity of the afghani in terms of gold is 0.019782 gram of fine gold per afghani. The International Monetary Fund agrees to a drawing by Afghanistan of $5,625,000 to strengthen its foreign exchange reserves during the period of readjustment.

March 25 Prime Minister Muhammad Yousuf says in an interview with a representative from a press agency in the Federal Republic of Germany that it was King Zahir Shah himself who decided that the government would no longer be composed of members of the royal family and that the Constitution promulgated 32 years ago would be modified and the

question of formation of political parties considered.

March 28 Constitutional Review Committee named. Headed by Minister of Justice Majruh.

April 17 Afghanistan to purchase petroleum, cigarettes, and cement under agreement with Iran which also sets up transit arrangements.

April 18 At press conference Prime Minister Yousuf says introducing democracy and improving economic conditions are major aims of the government. Says French jurist is advising on modification of Constitution. Adds that Afghanistan will encourage private investment but needs foreign assistance. Estimates United States has furnished about $252 million and the Soviet Union an equivalent amount plus arms.

April 26 United States grants loan of $2,625,000 for purchase of a DC-6 and two convairs for Ariana Afghan Airlines. Purchase will bring Ariana's fleet to nine planes.

April 29 Cultural cooperation agreement signed by Afghanistan and Soviet Union.

May 11-15 Indian President Radhakrishnan visits Afghanistan.

May 25 Afghan and Pakistani representatives begin meetings in Tehran to resolve dispute over Pashtunistan.

May 28 Shah of Iran announces that Afghanistan and Pakistan have agreed to reestablish diplomatic and commercial relations. Agreement calls for reestablishment of embassies in each other's capitals, reopening of Afghan consulates in Peshawar and Quetta, temporary reopening of Afghan trade agencies in Pakistan until railroad extended into Afghanistan, regularization of transit

and trade arrangements, and limitation of duties of representatives to official functions under international law.

May 29 Joint Afghan-Pakistani communique confirms reestablishment of relations. Afghan representative says Afghanistan will continue to use transit route through Iran to increase trade and points out that Afghanistan still does not recognize the Durand line.

June 14 Prime Minister Yousuf forecasts a period of strict economic austerity and says all-out effort will make Second Plan success.

June 14 Prime Minister Yousuf says at press conference that United States was asked to contribute $60 million to Second Plan, has promised $16 million.

July 18 Afghan delegation, led by Dr. Abdul Zahir, president of the National Assembly, visits United States. Dr. Zahir tells press conference that Afghanistan is planning a new form of government with distinct separation of legislative, executive, and judicial powers.

July 20 Afghan consuls reopen consulates in Peshawar and Quetta. Communication reestablished on Afghan-Pakistani border.

July 25 First trucks cross Afghan-Pakistani border in 22 months. Ariana Afghan Airlines resumes flights halted at same time.

August 3 Prime Minister Yousuf announces members of delegation to visit the United Arab Republic, India, and Sweden to study political parties in preparation for writing laws regarding the formation

of political parties in Afghanistan.

August 6-14 King Zahir Shah visits Federal Republic of Germany. Queen Homaira accompanies him on official visit abroad for first time.

August 12 Afghanistan and Pakistan exchange ambassadors. Muhammad Hashem Maiwandwal named Afghan ambassador to Pakistan and Lt. Gen. Muhammad Yousuf named Pakistani ambassador to Afghanistan.

August 15 Shah of Iran says confederation of Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan is good idea but cites many obstacles.

August 17 Pakistan agrees to ship 4,000 tons of wheat to Afghanistan. United States agrees to send 47,000 tons of wheat to Afghanistan.

Sept. 2-19 King Zahir Shah and Queen Homaira visit United States. Communique issued September 7 by King Zahir Shah and President Kennedy says United States supports Afghanistan's territorial integrity and stresses Afghanistan's policy of nonalignment.

Sept. 6 United States grants $125,000 to Afghanistan for surveys of several industrial projects.

Sept. 6 Afghanistan and Soviet Union sign agreement for construction of atomic reactor in Afghanistan and training of specialists in peaceful use of atomic energy.

Sept. 7 Muhammad Hashem Maiwandwal, ambassador to Pakistan, complains to Pakistan government that trade is being obstructed in Chaman.

Oct. 12-17 Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev visits Afghanistan, lays cornerstone for new polytechnic institute in Kabul.

Oct. 16 Agreement signed with Soviet Union for technical assistance in extraction and exploitation of natural gas in northern Afghanistan.

Nov. 8 United States makes loan of $2 million to Afghanistan for trucks, tires, spare parts.

Dec. 2 Border treaty signed by Afghanistan and Chinese People's Republic.

Dec. 10 Protocol covering technical aspects of Aeroflot service signed by Afghanistan and Soviet Union.

1964

Jan. 4-12 Afghan economic delegation visits Iran.

Jan. 11 Diplomatic relations between Afghanistan and Switzerland raised to embassy level.

Jan. 14 United Nations makes grant of $1.2 million for survey of underground water in 26,000 sq. km. area of Kabul and Katawaz.

Jan. 16 United States agrees to send 100,000 tons of wheat to Afghanistan.

Jan. 24 Air agreement between Afghanistan and Pakistan allows Pakistan International Airways to fly Peshawar to Kabul, Quetta to Kandahar, and Kabul to Tashkent and Ariana Airlines to fly Kabul to Peshawar, Kandahar to Quetta, Kabul to Lahore and Delhi, Kabul to Karachi and Bombay.

Jan. 28 Afghanistan and Lebanon raise diplomatic relations to embassy level.

Feb. 2 Prime Minister Yousuf goes to Soviet Union for medical treatment.

Feb. 7 Prince Muhammad Nadir marries Liluma Husayni.

Feb. 29 Consultative Constitutional Commission, headed by Abdul Zahir, begins sessions which last through May 14.

March 8 First issue of Rasmi Jarideh, which will print texts of decrees, laws, and treaties, published by Ministry of Justice.

March 19 Afghanistan becomes twenty-second member of Colombo Plan.

March 21 Ministry of Interior announces division of country into 28 provinces.

May 12-26 Representatives of 20 nations and international agencies attend two-week seminar on human rights in Kabul.

May 23 Agreement signed by Afghanistan with Iranian company for aviation fuel.

May 31 King Zahir Shah opens new Aliabad campus of Kabul University, built with United States assistance.

June 1 Prime Minister Yousuf meets Soviet Premier Khrushchev before returning to Kabul after medical treatment in Moscow.

June 24 United Nations Special Fund agrees to make loans for surveys of direct Kabul to Herat highway through Hazarajat and development of Hari Rud and upper Kabul River basins.

June 29 -July 14 Afghan military delegation visits Soviet Union.

July 1 During one-day stay in Kabul, Pakistani President Ayub Khan discusses ways to improve Afghan-Pakistani relations with King Zahir Shah and Prime Minister Yousuf.

July 3 Federal Republic of Germany loans Afghanistan DM 40 million to cover cost of importing petroleum products and communication equipment and building storage for foodstuffs.

July 4-5 Anastas Mikoyan, deputy prime minister of Soviet Union, visits Kabul.

July 8 Dr. Muhammad Anas, ambassador to India, named minister of education replacing Ali Ahmad Popal who becomes ambassador to Federal Republic of Germany. Sayed Qasim Rishtya named minister of finance replacing Abdullah Malikyar who becomes ambassador to France.

July 13 Soviet Union makes loan of $25.2 million for Pul-i Khumri-Mazar-i Sharif-Shiberghan highway.

July 15 Restricted list of imports published. Crackdown on smuggling promised by Afghan government.

July 21 King Zahir Shah sets Loya Jirgah session for September 9. Its 450 members will include members of National Assembly, Cabinet, High Judicial Council, and Constitutional Commission, 173 specially elected representatives, and 27 members appointed by King.

July 26 Prime Minister Yousuf cautions students against engaging in political activity.

July 27 Cabinet approves new Constitution.

July 27 Prime Minister Yousuf instructs governors to visit all parts of their provinces three times a year, make sure taxes are properly collected, and encourage building programs.

August 4 Proposed content of new Constitution announced in press. It allows freedom of speech and press and formation of political parties, calls for two-house parliament and independent judiciary, and bars members of royal family from serving as prime minister, cabinet member, chief justice, or parliament members. King appoints

prime minister and commands armed forces.

August 26 Prime Minister Yousuf opens Radio Afghanistan's new studio, offices, and auditorium.

Sept. 3 King Zahir Shah and Soviet Deputy Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin open Kabul-Doshi highway over Salang Pass. Built with Soviet assistance.

Sept. 6 Delegation returns from demarcating 90 km. border with Chinese People's Republic.

Sept. 7 Prime Minister Yousuf dedicates new building to house Institute of Public Health.

Sept. 9-19 Loya Jirgah debates and approves Constitution after adding that members of royal family cannot become members of political parties nor renounce their titles to participate in politics. Also approves resolution saying that Afghanistan has a religious, national, and historic duty to support rights of Pashtuns and is waiting for a settlement on the basis of the true aspirations of the Pashtuns.

Sept. 21 Federal Republic of Germany Credit-Anstalt loans DM 400,000 for dental and maternity clinics in Afghanistan.

Sept. 22 Reception given by embassy of Chinese People's Republic marks founding of Afghan-Chinese Friendship Society.

Oct. 1 King Zahir Shah endorses new Constitution. National Assembly dissolved. Transitional government to govern for year.

Oct. 4 Prime Minister Yousuf appoints Commission to study administrative, financial, judicial, and security matters in Hazarajat.

Oct. 6 Prime Minister Yousuf announces Afghanistan's recognition and support of the Palestine Liberation Organization while attending Cairo Conference of nonaligned nations.

Oct. 21 Siemens Co. of the Federal Republic of Germany signs contract to install 8,000 line telephone exchange for Kabul which will bring total number of lines to 13,000.

Oct. 25 Protocol on exchange of goods for 1964 and 1965 signed by Afghanistan and Chinese People's Republic.

Oct. 27 Soviet Union agrees to loan $6.2 million to build polytechnic institute in Kabul.

Oct. 29 -Nov. 12 King Zahir Shah, accompanied by Queen Homaira, makes first visit to Chinese People's Republic by any Afghan head of state. Communique says the two nations have agreed to develop economic and cultural relations and expand technical cooperation.

Nov. 4 Prime Minister Yousuf, acting under Art. 35 of Constitution, asks Ministries of Education and Press and Information to prepare comprehensive program to promote and develop Pashtu language.

Nov. 8 Government officials and adviser to French Foreign Ministry discuss possibility of setting up television station in Kabul.

Nov. 18 Discovery of first Greek city to be found in Afghanistan announced. French archeological team says city at confluence of Kokcha and Amu Rivers was abandoned in 130 B. C. and never reoccupied. Site now known as Ai Khanum.

Nov. 22-29 Walter Scheel, minister for economic cooperation in Federal Republic of Germany visits Afghanistan, assures Afghanistan of expanding economic assistance particularly on Pakthia regional project and urges protocol to improve atmosphere for foreign investment.

Dec. 5 Princess Bilqis and Prince Abdul Wali return from three-week visit to Bulgaria.

Dec. 6 International Development Association makes $3.5 million loan to build seven vocational schools in Kabul, Kunduz, and Herat.

Dec. 12 Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, Pashtun leader, arrives in Kabul for medical treatment.

Dec. 19 Muhammad Hashem Maiwandwal, ambassador to Pakistan, named minister of press and information.

1965

Jan. 10 Prime Minister Yousuf opens prefabricated housing factory built with Soviet assistance and receives 25-year plan for Kabul from Soviet city planners.

Jan. 12 United States agrees to loan $7.7 million for construction of 121 km. Herat-Islam Kala highway.

Jan. 18 Soviet Union agrees to loan Afghanistan $11.1 million over three years for import of consumer goods.

Jan. 20 United Nations Special Fund makes grant of $7,178,200 for soil and water surveys, Hazarajat highway survey, telecommunication and teacher training schools.

Jan. 22 Water supply network to serve 110,000 of Kabul's residents completed with Japanese assistance.

Jan. 26 Britain makes loan of £ 650,000 to pay for machinery to extract oil from cottonseeds at Lashkargah plant.

Jan. 31 Yugoslavia agrees to finance three irrigation and three industrial projects.

Feb. 6 Nour Ahmad Etemadi named Afghan ambassador to Pakistan.

Feb. 11 Prime Minister Yousuf tells ambassador from Chinese People's Republic that Afghanistan favors reconvening 1954 Geneva Conference to bring peaceful settlement in Vietnam.

Feb. 12 Ministry of Mines and Industries reports surveys show large reserves of iron ore at Hajigak and in other parts of Bamian.

Feb. 15 Protocol on exchange of goods and prices for 1965 signed by Afghanistan and Soviet Union. Increase of 20 per cent expected in reciprocal goods deliveries.

Feb. 24 Gen. Muhammad Arif named Afghan ambassador to Soviet Union.

Feb. 18-28 Prime Minister Yousuf holds talks with Indian Prime Minister Shastri on Vietnam, trade, and expansion of economic, technical, and cultural cooperation during visit to India.

March 2 New five-year trade transit agreement, replacing 1958 agreement, signed by Afghanistan and Pakistan. Provides increased storage space and clearance concessions for goods in Karachi in transit to Kabul.

March 2 U. S. Ambassador-at-large Averell Harriman meets King Zahir Shah and Prime Minister Yousuf during stop in Kabul.

March 11 King Zahir Shah and Soviet Deputy Prime Minister Dmitri Polyansky open Nangarhar irrigation and power project

built with Soviet assistance.

March 18 Law reorganizing the judiciary published.

March 22-25 Chen Yi, deputy prime minister and foreign minister of Chinese People's Republic, confers with King Zahir Shah and Prime Minister Yousuf during a three-day visit. Boundary protocol, cultural agreement, and economic and technical cooperation agreement signed. China to make loan of $28 million for development projects.

April 3 British firm agrees to build four vegetable oil plants in Afghanistan's northern provinces. Extends £ 840,000 loan over five years.

April 4 Pakthia Regional Development Authority formed.

April 4 Provincial Councils formed to administer national and municipal laws. Include governor, deputy governor, revenue officer, attorney general, security commandant and department heads. Have no judicial powers.

April 5 High schools start requiring entrance exams to give all students equal chance, avoid overcrowding, keep educational standards high.

April 5-17 Prime Minister Yousuf tours Kandahar, Helmand, Farah provinces urging businessmen to invest in new industry, telling students their education does not guarantee a government post but gives them responsibility to help develop country, and suggesting reassessment of Helmand Valley targets.

April 17-23 At first Farmers Congress, 300 representatives of landowners, cattle breeders, and farmers and Ministry of Agriculture officials discuss ways to increase production.

April 18-20 Cultural agreement signed by Afghanistan and Britain during visit of Lord Walston, British parliamentary under secretary of state for foreign affairs.

April 18 World Bank agrees to finance foreign exchange cost of $350,000 to survey Kunduz and Khanabad basins for possible irrigation and agriculture projects.

April 20-26 Floods cause 15 deaths and millions of afghanis damage in eight provinces.

April 21-30 Prime Minister Yousuf makes official visit to Soviet Union. Gets assurance of Soviet help with Third Plan.

April 28 Kunduz airport completed. Built with U.S. assistance.

May 5 King Zahir Shah approves proposal by Farmers Congress, endorsed by cabinet, to raise land taxes 100 per cent.

May 11 New electoral law, providing for universal, direct vote by secret ballot for all Afghan men and women over 20, goes into effect.

May 23 United States agrees to provide 3,000 tons of vegetable oil.

May 23 Ariana Airlines begins weekly flight to Tashkent, its first to Soviet Union.

June 1-3 King Zahir Shah and Queen Homaira visit France. Communique says cultural and economic cooperation will be expanded.

June 2 Badakhshan man, convicted of murdering two German mountain climbers, hanged.

June 5 Mazar-i Sharif airport completed. Built with U.S. assistance.

June 6 First of three regional appellate courts established in Kabul. Others to be in Mazar-i Sharif and Kandahar.

June 17 International Monetary Fund agrees to place $6.7 million at disposal of Da Afghanistan Bank in next year to help

stabilize foreign exchange rate. Afghanistan agrees to reduce reliance on loans from banking system by limiting public sector expenditures and increasing revenues by trade incentives.

June 22 Jangalak smelts its first iron ore mined in Afghanistan.

July 1 Land survey and statistics law goes into effect.

July 7 King Zahir Shah announces plan to rebuild old city of Kabul.

July 15 United States agrees to help increase wheat production and provide up to 150,000 tons of wheat; make $2 million credit for machinery purchase available; make long-term loan to build Kajaki power plant; provide credits up to $800,000 to import diesel generators; increase project planning in Helmand Valley to 20,000 acres a year and make $5 million long-term loan to construction unit of Helmand Valley; provide long-term credit to drain Baghestan area.

July 18 Prime Minister Yousuf lays cornerstone for Jangalak technicum for 700 students being built with Soviet assistance.

July 20 Cadastral survey of Kabul province begins.

July 20 Direct telephone link between Kabul, Rawalpindi, and Lahore inaugurated.

July 24 Soviet Union agrees to build 97 km. pipeline from Shiberghan gas fields to Soviet border and 88 km. line from fields to fertilizer and power plants in Balkh province.

July 28 Soviet Union agrees to extend payment on loans to Afghanistan by 30 years and provide teachers for Polytechnic Institute.

July 29 Federal Republic of Germany agrees to make DM 10 million long-term loan to finance imports and another DM 10 million loan to finance industrial and water supply projects in Afghanistan.

July 29 Carpet Export Board formed to regulate and develop production and export of Afghan carpets.

August 3-14 King Zahir Shah and Queen Homaira visit Soviet Union. Afghanistan and Soviet Union agree to extend treaty on neutrality and mutual non-aggression of 1931 for ten years.

August 8 First census of Kabul finds population of 435,203.

August 26 -Sept. 28 Election of parliament members held. Over 1,000 run for 216 seats in Wolesi Jirgah* and 100 for 28 elective seats in Meshrano Jirgah.** All run as independents since no political parties yet.

Sept. 5 Ministry of Health says 4.5 million people have been inoculated against cholera. Estimates there have been 139 deaths, 500 cases.

Sept. 9 New press law goes into effect allowing Afghan citizens freedom of expression while safeguarding the fundamental values of Islam and the principles embodied in the Constitution.

Sept. 12 Iran agrees to deliver 20,000 tons of gasoline to Afghanistan immediately.

Sept. 14 Afghan Foreign Ministry expresses "great concern at Indian bombing of Pashtunistan."

Sept. 15 Quarantine because of cholera at Afghan-Soviet border ended.

Sept. 16 Gas rationing, in effect for week because of Indo-Pakistani conflict, ends.

* House of the People.

** House of the Elders.

Sept. 20 Federal Republic of Germany agrees to make aerial magnetic survey of 150,000 sq. km. of southern Afghanistan as part of exploration for oil.

Sept. 25 Prime Minister Yousuf expresses satisfaction with ceasefire between India and Pakistan.

Oct. 1 Winners of seats in parliament announced.

Oct. 7 Afghan Foreign Ministry spokesman expresses regret at statement by Indian minister refusing to recognize Pashtunistan's right to self-determination but says Afghanistan favors peaceful settlement of such disputes.

Oct. 10 Wolesi Jirgah elects commission to check credentials of members and investigate complaints about election.

Oct. 12 Dr. Abdul Zahir elected president of Wolesi Jirgah. King Zahir Shah names Abdul Hadi Dawi president of Meshrano Jirgah.

Oct. 13 King Zahir Shah's appointees to Meshrano Jirgah announced.

Oct. 13 Prime Minister Yousuf presents report of interim government and offers resignation. King asks him to form new government.

Oct. 14 Parliament officially opened by King Zahir Shah.

Oct. 14 Afghan United Nations representative reminds General Assembly of Pashtunistan problem, says his country hopes it will be solved by peaceful means.

Oct. 16 Soviet Technoprom Export signs contract to extend power lines 92 km. from Pul-i Khumri to Kunduz.

Oct. 16 Afghanistan and Pakistan abolish taxes and duties on fresh fruit imported from each other.

Oct. 17 Britain makes loan of £ 200,000 to Afghanistan for commercial vehicles and spare parts.

Oct. 19 Wolesi Jirgah decides proposed cabinet members should submit lists of property they hold before vote of confidence is taken.

Oct. 24 Prime Minister Yousuf's presentation of his cabinet to Wolesi Jirgah postponed when spectators crowd into deputies' seats and refuse to leave.

Oct. 25 Wolesi Jirgah decides 191-6 to hold vote of confidence in secret session. Student demonstrations are dispersed by force by police and army. Schools are closed and public meetings banned. No official reports of arrests or casualties made at this time.

Oct. 25 Wolesi Jirgah approves Prime Minister Yousuf's cabinet. Vote reported to be 198 in favor and 15 abstaining. Ministers are:

Sayed Shamsuddin Majruh	Deputy Prime Minister Foreign Affairs
Gen. Khan Muhammad	Defense
Muhammad Hussein Masa	Interior
Abdullah Yaftali	Finance
Muhammad Anas	Education
Mir Muhammad Akbar Reza	Agriculture
Ghulam Dastagir Azizi	Public Works
Muhammad Hashem Maiwandwal	Press, Information
Nour Ali	Commerce
Abdul Samad Hamid	Planning
Abdul Majid	Public Health
Muhammad Haider	Communications

Justice, Mines and Industries, and Tribal Affairs left to be filled later.

Oct. 26 Wolesi Jirgah discusses demonstrations and asks government for information about cause and handling.

Oct. 27 King Zahir Shah receives cabinet.

Oct. 29 In wake of demonstrations Prime Minister Yousuf resigns, giving poor health as reason. King Zahir Shah asks Muhammad Hashem Maiwandwal to form cabinet.

Oct. 30 World Health Organization's Regional Committee for Southeast Asia meets in Kabul.

Nov. 2 Prime Minister Maiwandwal presents cabinet to Wolesi Jirgah and gets vote of confidence 190 to 7 with 3 abstaining and 16 absent. Entire proceedings broadcast over Radio Afghanistan. Cabinet members are:

Nour Ahmad Etemadi	Foreign Affairs
Gen. Khan Muhammad	Defence
Abdul Satar Shalizi	Interior
Abdullah Yaftali	Finance
Abdul Hakim Tabibi	Justice
Mir Muhammad Akbar Reza	Agriculture
Ahmadullah	Public Works
Nour Ali	Commerce
Muhammad Osman Anwari	Public Health
Abdul Samad Salim	Mines and Industries
Muhammad Haider	Communications

Maiwandwal is to act as his own minister of education and press and information. Planning and tribal affairs to be filled later.

Nov. 3 Prime Minister Maiwandwal consults Wolesi Jirgah on student petitions.

Nov. 4 Prime Minister Maiwandwal makes unexpected appearance at condolence ceremony on Kabul University campus for those killed during Oct. 25 demonstrations. Brings King's message of

sympathy and promises to consider student demands.

Nov. 4 Toryali Etemadi elected president of Kabul University by University Senate.

Nov. 6 Ministry of Interior announces three people died during demonstrations on Oct. 25.

Nov. 7 List of property belonging to ministers debated and accepted by Wolesi Jirgah members.

Nov. 7-25 Prince Ahmad Shah makes official visit to Iran.

Nov. 15 King Zahir Shah and Kirill Mazurov, first deputy prime minister of Soviet Union, open 680 km. Kandahar-Herat-Torghundi highway built with Soviet assistance.

Nov. 27 Kabul University Senate refuses to accept student demands for a lower passing grade and postponement of exams.

Dec. 1 Prime Minister Maiwandwal announces five cabinet appointments:

Muhammad Osman Anwari	Education
Miss Kobra Nourzai (first women in cabinet)	Public Health
Muhammad Osman Sidky	Press, Information
Abdul Hakim Ziayee	Planning
Muhammad Khalid Roashan	Tribal Affairs

Dec. 2 Federal Republic of Germany agrees to provide teachers and supplies for five schools in Khost, Kabul, and Kandahar.

Dec. 4 Afghanistan joins Asian Development Bank.

Dec. 7 National Welfare Fund established.

Dec. 13 Kabul University's College of Science closed because of continued disturbances. Math instructor sentenced to two years in jail for provoking students.

Dec. 14 Ministry of Interior forbids public gatherings after two days of demonstrations.

Dec. 16 Seven U. S. Senators meet King Zahir Shah and Prime Minister Maiwandwal during visit to Kabul.

Dec. 20 Government stops collection of inheritance tax.

Dec. 28 Of 450 College of Science students 330 register for exams despite earlier protests.

1966

Jan. 1-2 President Ayub Khan of Pakistan makes stop in Kabul on way to Tashkent talks.

Jan. 10 Indian Prime Minister Shastri, who was to have stopped in Kabul on his way back to Delhi, dies in Tashkent. Prime Minister Maiwandwal goes to India for funeral.

Jan. 12 Scientific and cultural agreement signed by Afghanistan and Soviet Union.

Jan. 14-15 Soviet Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin stops in Kabul for talks on way from Delhi to Moscow.

Jan. 14 Muhammad Kabir Lodin, Afghan ambassador to India and former minister of public works and ambassador to Britain, the United States, and United Nations, dies in Delhi.

Jan. 17 Kabul University's College of Education graduates its first 58 students.

Jan. 31 Wahdat publishes first edition. The Dari and Pashtu weekly edited by Khal Muhammad Khasta is the first privately owned newspaper published in Kabul in 14 years.

Feb. 1-10 Prime Minister Maiwandwal visits Soviet Union.

Feb. 3 Prime Minister Maiwandwal suggests a committee of nations acceptable to both sides try to find peace in Vietnam.

Feb. 6 Ministry of Press and Information becomes Ministry of Information and Culture and takes over administration of Historical Society and museums from Ministry of Education.

Feb. 10 Ghulam Muhammad Suleiman named Afghan ambassador to Pakistan.

Feb. 11 Payam-i Emroz, a twice weekly Dari newspaper published by Ghulam Nabi Khater, first issued.

Feb. 15 Dr. Muhammad Asif Sohail named Afghan ambassador to Chinese People's Republic.

Feb. 15 Kabul Traffic Department reports 56 traffic accidents in past year. City has 40,000 bicycles, 1,251 motorcycles, 2,850 trucks, 850 buses, and 5,735 cars.

Feb. 23 Nasir Zia named Afghan ambassador to India.

Feb. 23 New departments of food procurement and administration of government property formed to work directly under Prime Ministry.

Feb. 24 Prime Minister Maiwandwal says collection of livestock tax has been halted as a step to eliminate bribery and corruption and to give incentive to livestock raisers.

March 1 Commission appointed to review curriculum of Kabul University's Colleges of Law and Theology and the religious schools.

March 2 New Kabul University constitution approved by cabinet.

March 3 Minister of planning, meeting with Soviet and United States planning experts, says Third Plan will be based on statistics and will balance infrastructure projects with consumer industries.

March 5 Ministry of Agriculture becomes Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation and takes over Department of Water and Soil Survey.

March 6 Cabinet approves draft law to govern municipalities.

March 7 Agreement on exchange of news signed by Novosti Press Agency of Soviet Union and Bakhtar News Agency of Afghanistan. Earlier in year Bakhtar signed a similar agreement with Ceteka in Czechoslovakia.

March 8-13 Prime Minister Maiwandwal makes five-day tour of Pakthia province.

March 13 Cabinet removes Af. 7 currency tax a dollar on karakul, decides karakul will be taxed only if sold at over $8.24 a pelt. Private non-profit Karakul Trade Development Institute opened.

March 15 Khalilullah Khalili named Afghan ambassador to Saudi Arabia.

March 17 Fire in gas well at Yatim Taq extinguished after two years.

March 17-20 Petar Stambolic, chairman of Yugoslav Council of Ministers, makes official visit to Kabul. Communique says Yugoslavia will cooperate in Third Plan.

March 22-27 Prime Minister Maiwandwal visits Balkh, Jozjan, Fariab, and Kunduz provinces.

March 27 Planning Ministry reorganized. Supreme Economic Council formed to decide general economic and financial policy.

March 29 -April 3 Prime Minister Maiwandwal visits Kandahar, Uruzgan, Farah, Helmand, Chakhansoor, and Zabul provinces.

April 4-9 Liu Shao-chi, president of Chinese People's Republic, makes official visit to Kabul.

April 5 Afghan Millet, a Pashtu newspaper owned by Ghulam Muhammad Farhad, starts publication.

April 10 Afghanistan to contribute $4,078,000 to Asian Development Bank.

April 11 Khalq, a Pashtu and Dari newspaper published by Nour Muhammad Taraki, puts out first issue.

April 12 Prime Minister Maiwandwal attends first Wolesi Jirgah question hour.

April 13-14 Prime Minister Maiwandwal visits Parwan and Kapisa provinces.

April 13 Wolesi Jirgah begins consideration of political parties draft law.

April 18 Prince Shah Mahmud married to Princess Mahboub Ghazi, daughter of late Shah Mahmud Khan Ghazi, King's uncle, in private ceremony.

April 20-27 Gherman Titov, Soviet cosmonaut, makes visit to Afghanistan.

April 21 Private bus drivers strike as Ministry of Interior takes over administration of Kabul Traffic Department and new regulations go into effect setting safety standards and specifying routes.

April 24-30 U. S. business mission discusses investment proposals and expansion of trade during week's visit to Afghanistan.

April 28 Prince Mahmud leaves to study in Britain.

May 2 Wolesi Jirgah elects committee to investigate possible misuse of funds in Naghlu project.

May 4 After debate on Khalq Meshrano Jirgah passes resolution saying any publication against values of Islam should be halted.

May 5-8 Prime Minister Maiwandwal visits Kunar province.

May 11 Ministers of justice and information and culture testify before secret session of Meshrano Jirgah about Khalq.

May 18 Wolesi Jirgah passes resolution saying private buses should be allowed to run on routes they wish.

May 21 First cottage industry shop opened by Ministry of Mines and Industries.

May 22 Wolesi Jirgah passes resolution asking Government to take action against Khalq for not following values of Constitution. Meshrano Jirgah resolution also asks government action against Khalq saying its national, religious, ethical and legal dangers are evident.

May 23 Government bans distribution of Khalq under Art. 48 of the Press Law.

May 24 Cultural agreement signed by Afghanistan and Chinese People's Republic.

May 24 One judge convicted and one cleared as open trials by High Judicial Council of judges accused of bribery and corruption continue.

May 25 Payam-i Emroz newspaper stops publishing on instructions from Ministry of Information and Culture which says according to Press Law, it cannot publish again until it has an editor. Previous editor resigned.

May 28 India agrees to help build children's hospital and set up cottage industries in economic and technical cooperation

agreement with Afghanistan.

May 29 Private bus drivers end boycott and meet with Interior Ministry officials to discuss routes on which they may run their buses.

May 31 Sayed Shamsuddin Majruh named Afghan ambassador to UAR.

June 1-3 Prime Minister Maiwandwal visits Baghlan province.

June 8 United Nations Special Fund to assist Afghan City Planning Department with grant of $920,000 over next five years.

June 10 World Food Program agrees to provide food worth $1,791,240 for Pakthia Development Corps and Helmand resettlement and to extend its programs for Naghlu workers and Kabul boarding school students.

June 16 Chinese Prime Minister Chou En-lai stops in Kabul for talk on way to Rumania.

June 20 Prime Minister Maiwandwal names Foreign Minister Etemadi and Interior Minister Shalizi first and second deputy prime ministers respectively. They are to continue to serve their ministries as well.

June 20 Five-nation seminar on translation opens two-week session in Kabul.

June 22-27 Adam Rapacki, Polish foreign minister, visits Afghanistan. Cultural cooperation agreement signed by Afghanistan and Poland.

June 22 United States makes $2 million commodity loan to Afghanistan.

June 25 Agreement for first railway link between Pakistan and Afghanistan signed.

June 26 Supreme Economic Council gives education, agriculture and rural development priority in Third Plan. Sets ceiling of Af. 33 billion on five-year development budget.

July 1 King Zahir Shah observes army maneuvers in Logar.

July 7-10 Prime Minister Maiwandwal visits Ghazni.

July 10-14 Indian Vice President Zakir Husain visits Afghanistan.

July 11-28 Prince Ahmad Shah visits Soviet Union.

July 11 Austrian parliamentary delegation visits Kabul.

July 14 King Zahir Shah opens 483 km. Kabul-Kandahar highway. U. S. Secretary of Agriculture Orville Freeman represents United States which helped build highway.

July 18 Contract for feasibility study of iron ore smelting plant in Afghanistan signed with Soviet Union.

July 19 Wolesi Jirgah approves political parties draft law.

July 20 Czechoslovak Techno-Export agrees to survey possibility of Herat cement factory.

July 20 Foreign Ministry spokesman reiterates Afghanistan's opposition to nuclear testing after French tests in Pacific Ocean.

July 26 Pakistan agrees to open Lahore-Amritsar route, closed since September 1965, for Afghan-Indian trade.

August 2-14 King Zahir Shah visits Wardak, Bamian, Ghor, Uruzgan, and Farah provinces. Education, health, agriculture, and planning officials accompany him.

August 6 Chinese People's Republic agrees to build six projects by 1972 with $28 million loan: Parwan irrigation project, Sia Sang textile mill, Darulaman silkworm raising center, poultry farm, fish hatchery, lapis lazuli cutting and polishing plant.

August 11 Kabul University signs four-year affiliation agreement with universities in Federal Republic of Germany.

August 15-22 Seminar of scholars from five nations marks 286th anniversary of death of Khushal Khan Khatak, the seventeenth century Pashtu poet.

August 17 Prime Minister Maiwandwal appoints Muhammad Haider minister of justice and Abdul Karim Hakimi minister of communications.

August 17 Sweden agrees to help build tannery in Kabul.

August 20 Supreme Judiciary Committee set up as foundation of future supreme court.

August 23 Radio Afghanistan puts into operation two new 100 kilowatt transmitters.

August 24 Prime Minister Maiwandwal gives speech on eve of Jashen on Radio Afghanistan in which he explains his philosophy of progressive democracy.

August 28 Former Prime Minister Yousuf named Afghan ambassador to Federal Republic of Germany.

Sept. 5-22 Prime Minister Maiwandwal makes official visit to UAR.

Sept. 20 Abdul Rahman Pazhwak, Afghan representative to the United Nations, elected president of the UN General Assembly.

Sept. 21 Cultural agreement signed by Afghanistan and UAR.

Sept. 22 Prime Minister Maiwandwal begins visit to Turkey.

Sept. 23 Prime Minister Maiwandwal admitted to Ankara hospital for abdominal surgery.

Sept. 27 Federal Republic of Germany makes DM 22 million credit available for extension of Kabul's electricity distribution grid.

Sept. 29 ECAFE approves plan for survey and preparation for construction of Hazarajat highway.

Oct. 13-16 Iranian Princess Ashraf Pahlavi makes visit to Kabul.

Oct. 19 Robert G. Neumann named U. S. ambassador to Afghanistan.

Oct. 20 Prime Minister Maiwandwal returns from Turkey after surgery and visit.

Nov. 1 Ministry of Agriculture announces six experimental farms to distribute improved wheat seed.

Nov. 13 Prince Ahmad Shah and Deputy Prime Minister Mikhail Yefremov open 214 km. Doshi-Sherkhan Bandar highway.

Dec. 1 Prime Minister Maiwandwal opens Mahipar hydroelectric plant which will provide electricity for Kabul.

Dec. 14 Sweden gives Afghanistan 1,000 tons paper for textbooks.

Dec. 25 Promising gold discovery reported near Moqor by Ministry of Mines and Industries.

1967

Jan. 5 Prime Minister Maiwandwal opens Surkhan bridge over Kabul River. Bridge links Laghman province to Kabul-Torkham highway.

Jan. 14 U. S. Peace Corps Director Jack Vaughn meets Prime Minister Maiwandwal during visit to Afghanistan.

Jan. 15 Afghan Rural Development Department says by March it will have 28 projects serving 280,000 people in 4,689 villages.

Jan. 19 Asadabad bridge over Peich River opened. Connects northern and southern parts of Kunar province.

Jan. 25 Prime Minister Maiwandwal shuffles cabinet, names Abdullah Yaftali minister without portfolio, Abdul Karim Hakimi minister of finance, Muhammad Hussein Masa minister of interior.

Jan. 28 -Feb. 6 King Zahir Shah and Queen Homaira visit India.

Jan. 29 Afghanistan signs treaty regulating exploration and use of outer space.

Feb. 1 Prime Minister Maiwandwal stresses academic freedom during speech at commencement exercises for 1,790 graduates of Kabul University in past five years.

Feb. 7-13 King Zahir Shah and Queen Homaira visit Pakistan.

Feb. 12 Abdullah Malikyar named Afghan ambassador to United States. Abdul Majid named Afghan ambassador to Britain.

Feb. 20 New law regulating foreign and private investment published.

Feb. 21 Finance Minister Hakimi announces proposed budget for year 1346 S. H. (1967/1968) of Af. 5.75 billion, Af. 275 million over previous year. Forty per cent of budget is for development. Does not include foreign assistance.

Feb. 21 Price of cotton raised Af. 8.52 a seer (16 lb.). Means Af. 53 for top grade, Af. 38 for fourth grade.

March 1 Women get identity cards under new law. Previously only given to men.

March 4 Cabinet approves draft census law calling for census every ten years starting in two years.

March 15-19 President and Mrs. Heinrich Luebke of the Federal Republic of Germany visit Afghanistan. Luebke lays cornerstone for new Nejat high school, announces gift of drinking water supply system for Khost, and promises help with Third Plan.

March 15 Air agreement signed with Norway which will enable Scandinavian Airlines to fly to Afghanistan. Agreements were earlier signed by Afghanistan with Sweden and Denmark.

March 21 Prime Minister Maiwandwal announces end of Second Plan and beginning of Third Plan which emphasizes agriculture, private investment in short term projects, just distribution of national income, balanced development of health and education in all parts of the country with special attention to poorer areas.

March 25 -April 9 Prime Minister Maiwandwal visits United States. President Johnson promises U. S. assistance for Third Plan and offers study group to suggest ways to make Afghanistan self-sufficient in agriculture as soon as possible.

April 2 Abdul Hakim Tabibi named ambassador to Japan.

April 5 Ministry of Mines and Industries reports 29 new companies formed by private investors in past year and Af. 157 million invested in them.

April 8 Protocol for construction of 200-room international hotel signed by representatives of Melma Pal Company of Afghanistan and Taylor Woodrow Company of Britain. Cost Af. 500 million. Intercontinental expected to manage hotel to be built near Bagh-i Bala in Kabul.

April 10-15 Prime Minister Maiwandwal visits France. President DeGaulle promises French assistance for Third Plan.

April 16-17 United Nations Secretary General U Thant visits Kabul.

April 23 Heidelberg University signs affiliation with Kabul University anthropology department.

April 29 UNESCO conference asks Afghan Historical Society to serve as liaison for archeological research on Kushan period.

May 1 Telegram from Afghan student association in United States assures Afghan government of student loyalty and calls "vicious slander" allegation by ex-Afghan student in Ramparts magazine that Afghan Finance Ministry official worked for CIA. Association also cuts ties with Asia Foundation and American Friends of the Middle East.

May 10 Protocol on export of natural gas signed by Afghanistan and Soviet Union. Afghanistan expected to earn over $320 million in next 18 years from export of gas which is to reach 3 bil. cu. m. a year by 1971.

May 14 Afghan Tourist Bureau opens branch in Herat.

May 17 France agrees to build 60-bed hospital at Kabul University.

May 30 -June 2 Nikolai Podgorny, chairman of Presidium of Supreme Soviet of Soviet Union, visits Afghanistan.

May 31 Meshrano Jirgah passes political parties draft law.

June 1 King Zahir Shah opens Naghlu power project at confluence of Tagab, Panjsher, and Kabul rivers 70 km. east of Kabul.

June 5 Prime Minister Maiwandwal tells Wolesi Jirgah that government is deeply concerned about Middle East situation and has expressed its support for the Arabs. Wolesi Jirgah recommends measures to be taken to aid Arabs.

June 6 King Zahir Shah sends message of support to Arab leaders and meets representative of United Arab Republic. Students express support of Arabs at rallies.

June 11 Foreign Minister Etemadi says Israel is aggressor and should not escape responsibility for recent events. First step should be a pullback of troops to where stationed before outbreak.

June 12 Wolesi Jirgah asks government to arrange to send material aid to Arabs.

June 13 Abdul Rauf Benawa named minister of information and culture. Muhammad Osman Sidky named secretary general in Foreign Ministry.

June 14 Prime Minister Maiwandwal appoints committee to organize aid for Arabs.

June 18 -July 2 Prime Minister Maiwandwal attends emergency United Nations General Assembly session. Urges withdrawal of Israeli troops.

June 20 Afghan Red Crescent Society sends five tons of relief supplies to Arab refugees.

June 29 UNICEF allocates $669,000 for health services, malaria eradication, and education projects in Afghanistan.

July 2 Afghan Institute of Archeology formed to find and preserve historical monuments.

July 4 New U. S. chancery in Kabul dedicated.

July 13 Afghan Tourist Bureau switched from Ministry of Information and Culture to Air Authority.

July 16 King Zahir Shah observes maneuvers of rocket troops near Moqor.

July 19 United States makes loan of $4,337,000 to provide Afghanistan with 4,000 tons edible oil and 40,000 tons of wheat.

July 25 Japan loans Afghanistan $2 million for water supply systems in Kandahar, Herat, and Jalalabad.

July 26 Finance minister tells deputies livestock tax will be collected during next year. Efforts will be made to make sure it is fairly collected. Minister suggests there must be more direct taxes which now account for only 13 per cent of government revenue.

July 26 Air protocol signed by Afghanistan and Britain. Ariana Airlines plans weekly flights to London.

July 27 Prime Minister Maiwandwal appoints Abdullah Yaftali minister of planning, Dr. Muhammad Anas minister without portfolio, and Muhammad Ehsan Taraki minister of justice.

July 27 -Aug. 5 King Zahir Shah visits western Ghazni and Bamian.

July 30 -Aug. 5 Scholars from 11 nations attend seminar on oriental manuscripts.

Aug. 5 United States makes $4.6 million loan to Afghanistan for Helmand Valley.

Aug. 19 Soviet Union makes $5,030,000 loan to Afghanistan to bring 32,500 acres in Nangarhar Valley under cultivation.

Aug. 20 Federal Republic of Germany makes DM 400,000 grant to Afghanistan for survey of lead and zinc mines near Tolak.

Aug. 20 Direct telephone link between Kabul and Herat completed.

Aug. 22 Kabul Zoo opened by Prince Nadir.

Aug. 27 Prime Minister Maiwandwal undergoes abdominal surgery in Kabul.

Aug. 28 Afghan Academy unites Historical Society, Institute of Archeology, Public Library, Book Publishing Institute, Pashtu Academy.

Sept. 4 Institute for development of handicrafts formed with branches planned for Ghazni, Bamian, Farah, and Badakhshan.

Sept. 18 Prince Ahmad Shah lays cornerstone of first of five boarding schools for nomads built by a donation by Bank-i Milli.

Oct. 11 Prime Minister Maiwandwal resigns because of poor health. Leaves for United States for medical treatment. King Zahir Shah names Abdullah Yaftali acting prime minister.

Oct. 15 King Zahir Shah inaugurates Supreme Court (Estra Mahkama). Names four justices, Maulawi Abdul Basir, Dr. Mir Najmuddin Ansari, Obeidullah Safi, and Ghulam Ali Karimi, and chief justice, Dr. Abdul Hakim Ziayee.

Oct. 22 Wolesi Jirgah passes marriage law forbidding childhood engagements.

Nov. 1 King Zahir Shah asks Nour Ahmad Etemadi to form new government.

Nov. 13 Etemadi submits cabinet to Wolesi Jirgah.

Ali Ahmad Popal	First Deputy Prime Minister, Education
Abdullah Yaftali	Second Deputy Prime Minister
Gen. Khan Muhammad	Defense
Muhammad Omar Wardak	Interior
Muhammad Asghar	Justice
Muhammad Anwar Ziayee	Finance
Nour Ali	Commerce
Muhammad Hussein Masa	Public Works
Muhammad Anas	Information, Culture
Muhammad Azim Gran	Communications
Miss Kubra Nourzai	Public Health
Abdul Samad Salim	Mines and Industries
Mir Muhammad Akbar Reza	Agriculture, Irrigation
Abdul Samad Hamid	Planning
Abdul Wahid Sorabi	without Portfolio
Said Masoud Pohanyar	Tribal Affairs

Nov. 15 Prime Minister Etemadi gets vote of confidence 173 to 7 with 6 abstentions after three-day debate in which 183 deputies spoke. Entire proceedings broadcast over radio. Etemadi pledges to work against bribery and corruption.

Nov. 25-26 U.S. Ambassador-at-large Averell Harriman discusses U.S. assistance during Third Plan with King Zahir Shah and Prime Minister Etemadi.

Dec. 7 Chinese People's Republic to send Afghanistan experts on growing tea.

Dec. 17 Exchange of scholars with Turkey marks 694th anniversary of death of mystic poet Jalaluddin Balkhi.

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Jan. 7-10 Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia visits Kabul. Yugoslavia agrees to participate in Third Plan.

Jan. 13-17 King Zahir Shah visits Kandahar, Chakhansoor, and Helmand Provinces.

Jan. 14 United Nations Development Program allocates $2 million for agricultural development in Kunduz-Khanabad region and to set up water management office.

Jan. 25 Education Commission organized to decide national education policy for Afghanistan.

Jan. 31 Soviet Prime Minister Kosygin stops in Kabul to discuss economic questions.

Feb. 4 Chakhansoor province renamed Nimroz, name given to area in Pahlavi literature.

Feb. 7 Cottonseed oil mill, built with British help, opened in Lashkargah.

Feb. 14 Protocol on surveying Amu River near Tashgozar and Termez signed by Afghanistan and Soviet Union.

Feb. 18 Prime Minister Etemadi sets up Administrative Reform Commission.

Feb. 18 Bakhtar Airlines makes first flight to Ghor province. In five years the domestic airline plans to have 19 small planes.

Feb. 19 Muhammad Haider named adviser to Prime Ministry.

Feb. 20 Afghan Polytechnic Institute, built with Soviet assistance, completes first year of instruction. 224 students in first class.

Feb. 24 Bakhtar News Agency and Agence France Press sign agreement on exchange of news.

Feb. 28 Nangarhar University medical school to move from Jalalabad to Darunta to use buildings built for Nangarhar Canal project.

Feb. 28 Cotton price raised Af. 20 a seer to encourage farmers to raise cotton to meet needs of textile and edible oil mills. Prices for cotton now range from Af. 73 for a seer of top grade to Af. 57 for fourth grade quality.

March 14 Herat-Islam Qala highway opened by Second Deputy Prime Minister Yaftali.

March 21 Prince Abdul Wali returns from six-week tour of United States military installations.

March 25 Afghanistan and Soviet Union agree to regard diplomas from their secondary, vocational, and higher educational institutions as equivalent.

March 27 Ariana buys Boeing 727-100c Trijet airliner.

April 1 King Zahir Shah and Queen Homaira go to Europe for medical check-ups.

April 4-6 Prime Minister Etemadi visits Nangarhar.

April 15 FAO agrees to grant credit of $793,000 for agricultural extension program.

April 21 Indian Airlines introduces weekly jet airline service between Delhi and Kabul.

April 22 Shiberghan gas pipelines officially opened by Second Deputy Prime Minister Yaftali and Skachkov, president of Soviet Union's Council of Ministers Committee of External Affairs.

April 24 Queen Soraya, wife of late King Amanullah, buried in Jalalabad. She had died a week earlier in Rome.

April 24 Thirty blocks of Nadir Shah Maina, prefabricated apartments built with

	Soviet assistance, opened in Kabul.
April 28	King Zahir Shah returns from Rome.
May 1-4	Turkish President Cevdet Sunay visits Kabul.
May 1	Afghan-Pakistani border quarantined after cholera found in Pakistan.
May 7	United Nations Development Program grants $49,000 to help Bakhtar Airlines select air strips and set up management and traffic control.
May 7-11	French Prime Minister Georges Pompidou visits Kabul. Communique expresses broad agreement on international issues and French willingness to participate in Third Plan.
May 14	United States loans Afghanistan $12 million for Kajaki power plant.
May 16	Soviet Union loans Afghanistan $1,669,380 for equipment for natural gas extraction.
May 18	Seismic station built with U. S. assistance opened by Kabul University.
May 19	Museum opened at Hadda archeological site.
May 19	Education minister tells demonstrating students doors of ministry are open to hear complaints and urges that demonstrations be halted.
May 30	Queen Homaira returns from medical treatment in Munich.
June 3-13	King Zahir Shah and Queen Homaira visit Soviet Union.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Lack of sources is a reason often cited for not studying Afghanistan. However, at least one scholar has pointed out that, contrary to the usual assumption, material on Afghanistan is so complex (in variety of languages and difficulty of access, for example) that compiling a complete bibliography could be a monumental task.* The Afghanistan Project did not attempt a comprehensive bibliography. Instead members concentrated on recording recent material, particularly the growing (but still limited) resources on twentieth century Afghanistan.

The results have been organized into (1) a commentary and (2) a citation section consisting of four specialized bibliographies. In the commentary participants survey bibliographies and the types of primary and secondary sources available in various languages. Contributions were made by: Mark Slobin, discussion of Russian sources; Dunning Wilson, information on bibliographies and libraries; and Ludwig W. Adamec, report on archives.

The citation section explores several sources of material omitted or only skimmed in other bibliographies on Afghanistan. The first and second specialized bibliographies indicate the nature of work done in Persian and Russian in recent

*Charles Keiffer, "Les Problemes d'Une Bibliographie Exhaustive de l'Afghanistan," Afghanistan, XIII, No. 3 (1958), 30.

years. The brief list of articles and books written in Persian in 1966 and 1967 shows that, while important work may be expected from Afghanistan and Iran in the future, little is yet published, and much of what has appeared is not easily obtained. The extensive list of Russian works illustrates the increasing interest of Soviet writers in the culture and development of their southern neighbor. The third bibliography notes a number of books and articles published in English, French, and German from 1966 through 1968. The fourth lists the holdings on Afghanistan in the United States Agency for International Development, a collection of reports which helps fill the need for information on agriculture, education, and public administration.

Commentary

Bibliographies and General Reference Works.

Bibliographies may be divided by place of publication and language: (1) those listing publications from Afghanistan, primarily in Dari (Afghan Persian) and Pashtu and occasionally in English and French; (2) those listing items published in the Soviet Union, primarily in Russian; (3) those listing material published in Western Europe and the United States in English, French, German, and Italian. Some of these bibliographies include some material in other languages.

Afghanistan.--Although there is not yet a comprehensive bibliography of works published in Afghanistan, there is a growing number of selective bibliographies of recent publications. Two were published in Kabul in 1965. Mayel Heravi lists about 450 titles issued between 1951 and 1965 in Fehrest-i kutub-i matbu-i Afghanistan az sal 1330 ila 1344. Ahmad Farid lists 256 titles published between 1955 and 1965 by the

University and government organizations, in his Bibliyugrafi.

A bibliography covering about the same period as did Farid and Heravi but in French is planned by May Schinasi of the French Archeological Mission. It will be annotated and will stress scholarly works and journal articles published in Afghanistan from 1955 to 1965. She describes plans for this bibliography and discusses the general bibliography of Afghanistan in the Kabul Times Annual 1967, pp. 156-158.

Of particular use to historians is the list of publications of the Afghan Historical Society compiled by Serge de Laugier de Beaurecueil. It appears in Mélanges de l'Institut Dominicain d'Etudes Orientales du Caire, Vol. 7, 1962-1963, pp. 236-240. Also valuable is the winter 1968 issue of Afghanistan, the Afghan Historical Society's journal in English and French, which contains a complete index to articles published in the magazine since it was started in 1946.

Such bibliographies indicate that scholarship in Afghanistan is still largely concentrated in history and literature and languages. In these fields modern techniques of research are beginning to be used. Abdul Hai Habibi's first volume of the projected series on the history of Afghanistan in the Islamic era (see p. 354) illustrates this trend. Unlike some histories written in Dari, it is documented and includes an index and bibliography. No mere chronicler of dynasties, Habibi describes economic, social, and cultural affairs and offers some general interpretations. Critical editions of poetry are also appearing. For instance, the works of the seventeenth century mystic poet, Mirza Abdul Qadir Beidil, edited by Fekri Saljouqi, were publlished in Kabul between 1961 and 1963.

Although little original research is published in the social sciences in Dari and Pashtu, some

Afghans have written in other languages on topics such as economics. Abdul Ghanie Ghaussy collaborated with Eberhard Rhein in a history of economic development in Afghanistan from 1885 to 1965 (Die Wirtschaftliche Entwicklungen, Koln/Opladen: C. W. Leske, 1966). The Afghan government is taking steps to provide the essential raw material for social scientists by conducting pilot surveys to collect statistics.

Histories concerning the last century or two are not abundant, but S. Q. Rishtya's Afghanistan dar Qarn-i Nuzdahum, first published in 1950, is one of the exceptions. Rishtya uses wide variety of sources for this history of Afghanistan in the nineteenth century put out by the Government Press.

Much of the effort of Afghan scholars has gone into compiling basic reference works; a three-volume Persian-Pashtu dictionary (Afghan Qamus) appeared in 1957 and a geographical dictionary (Qamus-i jughrafiya-ye Afghanistan) in 1948. An encyclopedia is being published in Dari and Pashtu and a linguistic atlas of the country is nearing completion.

Soviet Union.--All materials on Afghanistan published in the Soviet Union before 1965 are listed in Bibliografia Afganistana: literatura na russkom iazyka. Compiled by T. I. Kukhtina, its 5,680 entries testify to the deep-seated interest of Russian authors in Afghanistan. (The entries for the last three years, 1962-1964, are translated on pp. 355-384 of this volume.)

The Central Asian Research Centre in London has issued in English translation 160 titles of books and articles published in the Soviet Union before October 1956 in Bibliography of Russian Works on Afghanistan. The Centre's Bibliography of Recent Soviet Source Material on Soviet Central Asia and the Borderlands is a biannual publication which was begun in 1957 and includes a section

on Afghanistan, and its journal, Central Asian Review, regularly reports Soviet comment on Afghanistan. In the United States, Russian publications on Afghanistan are listed in the Library of Congress's Monthly Index of Russian Accessions which indexes both monographic and periodical literature.

An examination of the themes of the Russian material shows that histories, particularly of the period since 1819, constitute about sixty per cent of the total material. There are several possible explanations for this: 1) Czarist and later Soviet Russian interest in Afghanistan was and is prompted primarily by a concern with the state of affairs along a critical 1,200 mile frontier; 2) until the mid 1950's Russian writers had little chance to do first-hand research in Afghanistan (except for unusual trips like that of the Vavilov mission in the 1920's) and concentrated of necessity more on historical studies based on their own and British archival and published sources.

An analysis of writing from the years 1954 to 1967 would probably show a quite different set of percentages. Studies of the Afghan economy, for example, have appeared more frequently. Several thorough studies on Afghan literature, a previously neglected area, have come out in the past decade. Writings since the Khrushchev-Bulganin visit of 1955 have tended to emphasize Pashtun culture at the expense of non-Pashtun peoples of Afghanistan. A book on literature of Afghanistan, Literatura Afganistana, by A. S. Gerasimova and G. Girs (Moscow: Izd-vo vostochnoi literatury, 1963) devotes all but ten of its nearly two hundred pages to literature in Pashtu, touching only briefly on Persian literature.

Useful historical studies, of course, still appear. For the Western scholar, perhaps the most valuable historical publications are

duplications of material of which unique copies are found in the Soviet Union. An example is A. D. Davydov's article "Imeniya medrese Subkhan-kuli-khan v Balkhe," Kratkie Soobshchenie Instituta Vostokovedeniia 37 (1960), 82-128, which contains over twenty-seven pages of facsimile reproduction of a late seventeenth century document dealing with land-holding patterns in Balkh.

For those who do not read Russian, the best single book providing the Russian orientation towards modern Afghanistan is the English translation of R. T. Akhramovich's Outline History of Afghanistan after the Second World War (Moscow: Nauka, 1966). This book covers the period from 1945 to 1964 and describes socio-economic and political conditions in Afghanistan, drawing on a variety of sources and including copious citations from Afghan newspapers.

Western Europe and the United States.--The first attempt to compile a comprehensive bibliography of Afghanistan was made just over twenty years ago in Paris. Mohammed Akram's Bibliographie Analytique de l'Afghanistan, Vol. I, Ouvrages parus hors de l'Afghanistan was published by the Centre de Documentation Universitaire in 1947. It cites about 2,000 works under subject headings. Akram completed only the first volume which lists mainly works in European languages.

A more recent bibliography is Donald N. Wilber's Annotated Bibliography of Afghanistan, published by the Human Relations Area Files in New Haven. It first appeared in 1956. A second edition with a supplement was put out in 1962, and a completely revised third edition was published in 1968. The current edition lists 1,600 titles under nine subject headings and has an author index. Wilber concentrates on books although he does include some reports and articles

as well. While this bibliography is more selective than Akram's, it covers a wider range of languages, listing some works in Arabic, Dari, Pashtu, and Russian as well as those in English, French, and German. Most items are annotated and those essential to gaining an understanding of a particular subject are marked by asterisks.

For publications issued between 1945 and 1967 a good source is the Afghanistan Bibliography compiled at Ruhr University in Bochum in cooperation with the German Orient Institute's Center for Documentation of the Modern Orient in Hamburg. This comprehensive bibliography, which includes material in all languages, is a project of the multidisciplinary "Working Group on Afghanistan."

Bibliographies on single subjects are also beginning to appear. An example is Lloyd Pickett's Bibliography of Material Dealing with Afghanistan Agriculture put out by the College of Agriculture at Kabul University in 1967.

Periodical literature in European languages including Russian is listed in J. D. Pearson's Index Islamicus. The first volume covers from 1906 to 1955. Supplementary volumes appeared in 1962 and 1967. References to Afghanistan are found under subject headings such as architecture, epigraphy, Pashtu, and numismatics as well as under the heading Afghanistan which includes the material on geography, history, and ethnology. Many of the citations are to articles in the Afghan Historical Society's journal Afghanistan. The Middle East Journal, put out by the Middle East Institute in Washington, D. C., regularly notes both articles and monographs on Afghanistan. Many other journals such as Cahiers de l'Orient Contemporain, published at the University of Paris, review books on Afghanistan.

A large amount of the writing by Americans and Europeans on Afghanistan consists of travel

memoirs which portray Afghanistan as an exotic, remote mountain kingdom. However, histories are now beginning to focus on Afghanistan itself rather than dealing with it incidentally as a pawn of larger powers. Vartan Gregorian's The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan: Politics of Reform and Administration 1880-1946 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969) is a recent example. Ludwig W. Adamec's Afghanistan 1900-1921. A Diplomatic History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967) is another instance of this trend. Covering a much wider time span are three other volumes: W. K. Fraser-Tytler, Afghanistan: A Case Study in Political Development (3rd ed.; New York: Oxford University Press, 1967); Arnold Fletcher, Afghanistan, Highway of Conquest (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1965); Max Klimburg, Afghanistan: Das Land im Historischen Spannungsfel Mittelasians (Vienna: Osterreichischer Bundesverlag, 1966).

Writing in the social sciences appears mostly in journal articles. Donald Wilber's Afghanistan: its People, its Society, its Culture (2nd ed.: New Haven: Human Relations Area Files, 1962), however, has chapters on ethnology, government, economics, and sociology as well as history and languages. Six specialists contributed including Peter G. Franck and A. Aloys Michel who have done considerable work in economics and geography in Afghanistan respectively.

Louis Dupree's reports over ten years for the American Universities Field Service are unparalleled as they range over anthropology, archeology, government, history, foreign relations, and other fields.

Research Materials and Their Location.

Afghanistan.--In Kabul, the Ministry of Information and Culture Library, now consolidated with the Kabul Public Library, is the starting point

for research on twentieth century Afghanistan. The materials are extensive but poorly catalogued and permission to remove them from the premises is difficult to get.

Much of the recent material appearing in Afghanistan such as publications of the Government Press, the Education Press, the Historical Society, and Kabul University is in this library.

These include publications of the various ministries and parliament. Texts of laws, decrees, treaties, and cabinet decisions are printed in Rasmi Jarideh, started in 1964 by the Ministry of Justice. The proceedings of the Wolesi Jirgah (the lower house of parliament) are recorded in a journal of the same name, Wolesi Jirgah. The three Five Year Plans (1956, 1962, and 1967) have all been issued by the Ministry of Planning in English as well as in Dari and Pashtu. Surveys of progress on these development plans have been put out annually, occasionally bi-annually, since 1959 under various titles.

Bound files of Afghan newspapers and periodicals are also kept here. Anis and Islah, the country's largest Dari and Pashtu newspapers respectively, were founded in the late 1920's and are now run by the Ministry of Information and Culture along with the Kabul Times, a daily in English begun in 1962. The latter frequently prints translations of new laws and speeches by government officials and visiting statesmen. The Ministry also publishes newspapers in some ten provincial capitals. These are received and stored by the library but not arranged in a serviceable manner. Private newspapers have appeared at various times. Seraj ul-Akhbar, founded by Mahmud Tarzi in 1911 and published for about eight years is the best-known. A number of private papers were put out in the early 1950's and some twenty have been published for varying periods of time since the 1965 press law went into

effect. The independent press is important as a voice for political factions. At least one of the newer newspapers also promises objective reporting.

Almanacs are another source of material found in this library. Salnamah-ye Kabul was started in 1933. Its name was changed to Da Kabul Kalani in 1940, and it has been published as Da Afghanistan Kalani since 1952. Its articles range widely and are written in Dari and Pashtu with occasional contributions in French and English. The Kabul Times published its first annual in 1967. Written in English, it includes a record of the government's activities in 1966, descriptions of the nation's twenty-eight provinces, a beginning of a who's who in parliament and the executive branch and the English version of the 1964 Constitution.

A good source for material on Afghanistan's economic affairs is the library of Bank-i Milli. Commercial reports, financial statistics, and surveys are included in this well-organized collection which has valuable older material. The Ministry of Finance also has a library.

Reports by experts serving with the United Nations and the U.S. Agency for International Development are an important source for scholars studying recent development. The Kabul University Library has copies of these technical assistance reports. This library is a large modern structure on the Aliabad campus with a collection centralized from the libraries of the various colleges. It has an excellent general reference collection, mainly in English. Persian and Pashtu materials are now being given more attention; the library has begun extensive buying of Persian publications from Iran. It is also a depository for United Nations documents.

At the Afghan Historical Society there is a small reading room collection which includes the

publications of the Society. Most of the materials are in Persian and Arabic.

Archives Outside Afghanistan.--Since Afghan primary source material is relatively limited and Afghan archival sources are not generally open to the public, historical research on Afghanistan now depends largely on sources found in the archives of other countries. It is these archives which contain records of foreign political negotiations, agreements, treaties, and a host of other material which form a basis for writing a reliable history of Afghanistan's foreign relations.

Until 1919, Britain enjoyed a predominant influence in Afghanistan, and therefore most publications about Afghanistan were written by the British. The empire's interests required information about the "Gateway of India," and numerous government officials, globetrotters, explorers, and agents of all sorts collected information about Afghanistan that later found its way into the archives of India and England. As a result, the most important non-Afghan sources about Afghanistan before 1919 lie in the National Archives of India in New Delhi and the India Office Library and India Office Records in London. The British Museum and the Public Records Office in London also have material concerning Afghanistan.

The National Archives of India are accessible to any bona fide research student, graduate or post-doctoral, who has an introduction either from his university in India or, in the case of an alien, from his embassy. Foreign and Political Department files relating to Afghanistan are open for inspection up to 1938. Records of the Home Political Department of the Government of India up to 1948 are open to inspection, except those on Kashmir and certain frontier areas.

By special permission from the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, it is possible to gain access to material included in the normally closed period. This permission cannot be taken for granted and must be secured in advance. Even after permission has been obtained, adequate time must be reserved for research because the Ministry's Historical Department scrutinizes all files before they are released to a scholar. Department officials are usually overworked and some delay results. Once a scholar has a file, he takes notes that are also checked by the Historical Department officials. Closed period documents may not be photographed.

The material in India is printed. The indexes are not only printed but also thoroughly cross-referenced, so that it is possible to work faster and more efficiently in New Delhi than in London where research begins with the study of unnecessarily complex, handwritten indexes. Another advantage of the Indian archives is that its foreign political files contain, in addition to the dispatches from the viceroy of India to the secretary of state for India in London, the secret consultations and discussions of the viceroy's council. These consultations are included in notes, keep-withs, memoranda, resumes, and précis, reflecting opinions within the viceroy's council. This information is not always found in London. The National Archives of India has excellent microfilming equipment, and material falling within the open period can be reproduced quickly and economically. Since film is scarce, scholars should bring their own.

In London the India Office Records and Library of the Commonwealth Office (formerly India Office, then Commonwealth Relations Office) have a wide range of materials on Afghanistan. These records have been transferred from the British Foreign Office to 197 Blackfriars Road, London S.E. 1.

Most of the material in India can also be found here, but the complicated system of indexing and the fact that no more than three files or documents may be taken out at a time (three more may be kept in reserve) make research more time-consuming. A valuable source in London is the Private Archives Bearing on Indian and British-Indian History. These private papers of about sixty government officials, including viceroys, secretaries of state, political department secretaries, and others, contain anything from scraps of paper with scribbles to complete sets of foreign and political files of the government of India as well as personal correspondence. In the area of printed secret publications London has more important sources than Delhi. These are: Political and Secret Department Library, Books A and B, Cupboards 7 and 8, (under B there are some 300 publications that are now open for inspection) and Political and Secret Department Memoranda, 1858-1947, now unclassified up to 1938.

Foreign researchers need letters of recommendation from their embassies in London to use these materials. The India Office Library reproduces material on microfilm or by xerox process, but because of the volume of work there is a wait of about two months.

The National Archives in Washington, D. C., are the most important source for material on Afghanistan in the United States. The Archives hold the General Records of the Department of State which include the Diplomatic and Consular Instructions and the Diplomatic and Consular Dispatches. The material concerning Afghanistan has not yet been reproduced on microfilm and must be examined in the original. The Archives are secret for a period of thirty years and are now open through 1938; by special permission it is possible to examine material up to World War II.

If only the American diplomatic records concerning Afghanistan were available, the National Archives would offer little to the student of Afghan history. The United States was not represented in Kabul before 1942 and most of the consular reports before that time were written by American representatives in countries other than Afghanistan. But the National Archives is also the depository of Seized Enemy Records, Files and Microfilms of German Foreign Ministry Archives, as well as reproductions of the Personal Papers of Benito Mussolini.

All Tripartite Project microfilms of German Foreign Ministry files from 1920 to 1945 are available in Washington. Microfilms of the files for the years between 1867 and 1920 are also being acquired so eventually the Archives will have a complete collection.

As an additional or alternative source, volumes 1 through 18 (1885-1920) of the German Foreign Ministry files, which deal specifically with Afghanistan, are reproduced on reels 69-71, 139-142, and 150 of The University of Michigan (UM) microfilm project. These volumes can be obtained in microfilm copy from the Library of The University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan.

Catalogs available in major U. S. libraries list the German Foreign Ministry files by various topics and give the price of microfilm copies of documents that can be purchased by mail.* However, not all documents were photographed by the Allies before the records were returned to the Foreign Ministry in Bonn. There is one catalog for materials produced during the period 1867-1920, and there are three catalogs

*A Catalog of Files and Microfilms of the German Foreign Ministry Archives, 1867-1920 (American Historical Association, Committee for the Study of War Documents, 1959) and A Catalog of

for the 1920-1945 records. A fourth catalog is being prepared which will list available microfilms of the records of German missions abroad.

Because of adequate research and reproduction facilities, it is possible to work rapidly, if not inexpensively, at the National Archives. The microfilm reading room has reader-printer apparatus on which it is possible to reproduce material quickly at $.50 per page. Self-service is permitted.

The Archives of the Foreign Ministry of the Federal Republic of Germany are the ultimate source for German records pertaining to Afghanistan. In Bonn, there are many records concerning Afghanistan that cannot be obtained elsewhere, even on microfilm. The most important of these are the files about Innere Politik Afghanistans. Portions of this material may also be found in files located in American, British, or French archives.

Because of the limitations of space, it is necessary to make reservations for admittance to the research library about six months in advance. The Foreign Ministry does not provide reproduction facilities, but microfilm copies are made by a commercial photographer, at a rate of five cents per frame. Just as in England and India, a letter of introduction is required for admittance to the West German Archives.

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Abbreviations

Az. i Afr. Segod.	Azii i Afrika Segodnia
Biul. Inost. Kommer. Inform.	Biuluten Inostranyi Kommercheskoi Informatii
Dekor. Iskusstvo	Dekorativnoe Iskusstvo SSSR
Druzh. Nar.	Druzhba Narodov
Ekonom. Selsk. Khoz.	Ekonomika Selskogo Khoziaistva
Geograf. v Shkole	Geografia v Shkole
Inost. Liter.	Inostrannaia Literatura
Komm. Tadzhik.	Kommunist Tadzhikistana
Krat. Soob. Instit. Narod. Azii	Kratkii Soobshchenie Instituta Narodov Azii
NAiA	Narody Azii i Afriki
Nauch. Rab. i Soob.	Nauchnye Raboty i Soobshchenie
Nov. Vrem.	Novoe Vremia
Obshchest. Nauk. v Uzb.	Obshchestvennye Nauki v Uzbekistane
Sel. Zh.	Selskaia Zhizn'
Sov. Kul.	Sovetskaia Kultura
Sov. Ross.	Sovetskaia Rossia
Sov. Kras. Krest.	Sovetskii Krasnyi Krest'
Sred. Spets. Obraz.	Srednec Spetsialnoe Obrazovanie

Stroit. Raboch.	Stroitelnyi Rabochii
TVNIGRI	Trudy Vsesoyuznogo Nauchnogo Isledovatelskogo Geologicheskogo Razvedochnogo Instituta
UTKVIGMP	Uchenye Trudy Kafedr Vseobshchei Istorii Gosudarstva I Mezhdunarodnogo Prava
UZAGU	Uchenye Zapiski Azerbaidzhanskogo Gosudarstvennogo Universiteta
UZDGPI	Uchenye Zapiski Dushanbinskogo Gosudarstvennogo Pedagogicheskogo Instituta
UZTGPI	Uchenye Zapiski Tashkentskogo Gosudarstvennogo Pedagogicheskogo Instituta
UZTSKhI	Uchenye Zapiski Tadzhikskogo Selsko-Khoziaistvennogo Instituta
Vech. Mosk.	Vecherniaia Literatura
Ved. Verkh Sov. SSR	Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR
Vest. Stat.	Vestnik Statistiki
Vnesh. Torg.	Vneshnaia Torgovlia
Vod. Trans.	Vodnyi Transport
Vop. Ekon. Afgan.	Voprosy Ekonomiki Afganistana
Vop. Iazyk.	Voprosi Iazykoznania
V.P. Sh.	Vsemirnyi Puti Shestvennik
Zdrav. Beloruss.	Zdravokhranenie Belorussii

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The following list includes AID's holdings as of June 1967 plus a few more recent acquisitions. Under each subject heading, there are two major divisions. The first notes reports generated by the Agency itself; the second lists materials the Agency has collected but which were prepared by other U.S. government agencies, assistance groups from other nations or international organizations, or the Afghan government. About 130 citations fall in the first category and 65 in the second. Complete bibliographical information was not available for many of the entries.

The materials listed here are available to scholars under the provisions of the 1967 Public Information Act from the Agency for International Development, Department of State, Washington, D. C.

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