


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Report 20
February 1988

FEWS Country Reports CHAD, MALI, NIGER and SUDAN



Famine Early Warning System
Africa Bureau
U.S. Agency for International Development

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CHAD, MALI, NIGER, and SUDAN

Report 20, February 1988




Prepared for the
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Overview

Only three percent of the planned November through January aid for 92,500 at-risk people in Chad's eastern Sahel had been distributed by mid-February, yet food distribution for that area was recommended through August. *At the current rate that emergency aid stock is being transported to storage sites in Ouaddai Prefecture, there will be a crisis in that area by the middle of the rainy season,* assuming that the upcoming harvest of recessional crops does not appreciably change the October 1987 evaluation of populations at-risk. Chad's net cereal production will be at least 13% higher than the Government of Chad's preliminary estimate, according to the recent assessment of the harvest of rainfed crops in Chad's Sudanian zone. In Mali, the Systeme d'Alerte Precoce estimates that 156,000 people are currently at risk of food shortages in Mopti, Gao, and northern Segou Regions. In Mopti Region people are abandoning their villages and displaced people are forming camps. Up to 3,000 destitute families have migrated to southeastern Mauritania and have been provided food assistance. In Niger, in-country stocks and donor pledged assistance will meet most food needs in 1988. The targeting and actual delivery of assistance to food-short areas remain a problem. In Sudan it is likely that food aid to North Darfur will not arrive in time or in sufficient quantity to halt migration or keep malnutrition at or below current levels. The Agricultural Bank of Sudan (ABS) will be unable to supply the second tranche of food aid to Kordufan from ABS stocks in the Region, and private stocks are said to be inadequate. The population of the Southern Region continues to be at high risk. While food aid flows to centers of displaced populations (Aweil, Malakal, Raga, Wau, and Juba) are inadequate, there are signs of improvement.

Summary Map



<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ★ National Capital ○ Prefecture Capitals ----- International Boundaries — National & Prefecture Boundaries □ Less than 3% of planned aid distributed 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▨ Production estimate at harvest much higher than preliminary estimate <p><u>Food Aid and ONC Stocks</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> □ 40 to 150 MT □ 790 to 2,000 MT ● 4,500 and 18,000 MT
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CHAD

Food Distribution in East Slow

Summary

In Chad, at-risk populations were identified and emergency food aid levels designated by the AEDES Systeme d'Alerte Precoce (SAP) team ¹ before the New Year. Their findings were reviewed and accepted by the multi-ministry-donor-PVO Action Committee for Food Security and Emergency Aid (CASAU) at that time. The implementation of Ministry of Food Security and Disaster Victims (MSAPS) distribution plans based on these findings has run into difficulties, however: in Chad's eastern Sahel, only three percent of the aid planned for November through January has been distributed. Further aid was recommended by AEDES/SAP to cover at-risk populations in the eastern Sahel through August, but even the total of public cereal stocks in that area is insufficient to meet the recommendations. The area's recessionary crop, ² reported to be bigger than originally expected, may mitigate the situation somewhat. The degree of mitigation is unknown, however -- appraisals beyond the qualitative "good yields" and "increased area planted" have either not yet been made or have not been made public. A recent assessment of the Sudanian rainfed cereal harvest upgrades Chad's total net cereal production to 550,000 MT, 13 percent higher than the Government of Chad's (GOC) preliminary estimate. The Sudanian crops are not easily accessible to at-risk areas in the Sahelian zone, however.

¹See note 1 at the end of the Chad section for explanation of acronyms used.

²In flood recession agriculture, crops are planted in soil left moist by receding river levels. Such crops are generally planted toward the end of the rainy season and harvested from January through March.

Food Security

The five Sudanian prefectures' net cereal production is 19 percent greater than expected by the GOC, according to the recent Systeme d'Alerte Rapide (SAR) harvest assessment of rainfed crops in that zone. Addition of the Sudanian recessional crop harvest will further increase net production over the original estimate. There has been no quantitative update of Sahelian zone production, although there have been reports of increased area planted in recessional crops in Batha Prefecture (compared to last year) and decent recessional crop yields in Biltine Prefecture.

Table 1: Chad, FEWS Cereal Balance for 1988

1988 Population	4,746,000
Net Production	551,030
Stock In-Country	
Food Aid and ONC	33,934
Commercial Stock	80,000
Food Aid Pipeline	8,000
Commercial Imports	75,000
Commercial Exports	(60,000)
Total Supply	688,000
Consumption	(669,500)
Cereal Balance	18,500

Source: GOC/MADR/DSA & ONDR; BUCEN; FEWS/Chad; USAID/Chad

Table 1 updates the national cereal balance to include the new production estimate and more recent information on cereal stocks in-country.¹ The balance is understated because figures for on-farm stock are unavailable for this analysis, although there have been two years of good harvests in much of the country. A key to whether Chad is judged to have an overall surplus or deficit is the total population one chooses to use. Because there has never been a census in Chad, estimates of population vary widely. Based on last year's USAID estimate, Chad will contain 4,746,000 people in 1988, the GOC estimates Chad's 1988

¹See note 2 at the end of this section for an explanation of the numbers used.

population will be 5,295,000. When one uses the GOC population estimate in the calculation, the 1988 cereal balance becomes an overall deficit of 59,300 metric tons (MT).

Table 2: Food Needs Met by Local Production and Current Stocks

Prefecture	1988 Population (000s)	Food Needs MT	Net Production at Harvest MT	Food Aid and ONC Stock MT	% of Food Needs Met
BET	96	7,680		2,005	26.1
Batha	381	51,435	17,040	1,756	36.5
Biltine	191	25,785	8,350	1,625	38.7
Chari Baguirmi	744	100,440	44,210	15,984	59.9
Guera	224	30,240	45,200	1,796	155.4
Kanem	216	29,160	5,640	2,523	28.0
Lake	145	19,575	12,500	-	63.9
Ouaddai	372	50,220	30,460	4,566	69.7
Salamat	108	14,580	6,700	1,125	53.7
Sahelian	2,381	321,435	170,100	29,375	62.1
Logone Oriental	328	49,200	45,010	1,032	93.6
Logone Occidental	317	47,550	105,600	-	222.1
Mayo Kebbi	740	111,000	75,990	151	68.6
Moyen Chari	561	84,150	78,720	1,371	95.2
Tandjile	323	48,450	75,610	-	156.1
Sudanian	2,269	340,350	380,930	2,554	112.7
Total	4,746	669,465	551,030	33,934	87.4


Source: GOC/MADR/DSA & ONDR; BUCEN; SAR/FAO-DIAPER/CILSS; FEWS/Chad; USAID/Chad (1986/87 data)

The overall balance hides regional variations in the amount of food grains available. Table 2¹ shows how much cereal should be available at the prefecture level, ignoring on-farm stocks, local commercial stocks, and inter-prefectural trade (see also Map 2). Only Guera, Logone Occidental, and Tandjile

¹Refer to note 2 for an explanation of the numbers.

Prefectures will have enough cereal on hand to meet local needs. BET, Kanem, Batha, and Biltine Prefectures have less than half the needed cereal when using either the GOC or the FEWS population estimates; Salamat Prefecture falls below 50 percent of cereal needs met only when the GOC population figure is used.

Map 2: CHAD




Distribution Problems

Prefecture-level cereal balances still hide local variations in food availability. People in the Sahelian prefectures use their herds as buffers against poor crop production. Some localities have on-farm and commercial stocks which cover shortfalls in low production. The AEDES/SAP assessment of populations at-risk in these prefectures takes such factors into account. Their current estimate (developed primarily before the strength of the recession harvest in the Sahel was known) is that 168,250 people in 17 cantons will require food aid at some point before the 1988 harvest, and that of these, about 150,000 people require immediate food aid. The MSAPS directed that aid be provided to 117,500 people -- 92,500 people in the eastern Sahel and 25,000 in the western Sahel. The grain is to be purchased within Chad and transported to needy areas with donor assistance. This approach was taken both to maintain farmers' incentive

to grow cereals and because there is an expectation of surplus saleable grain stocks in the Sudanian and southern Sahelian zones following the excellent 1985 and 1986 harvests.

Unfortunately, the logistics of donor purchase and transport of local grains have proven difficult for areas distant from N'Djamena (Map 3). Only three percent of the November through January aid requested for cantons in the east have been distributed as of mid-February (65 out of 2,370 MT), leaving some 90,000 Chadians without scheduled food aid. An additional 100 MT were distributed by the regional office of a donor in eastern Chad to cantons not targeted by MSAPS, although in part identified by AEDES/SAP. Logistics will continue to be a problem: of the prefectures with a current production surplus, only Guera is close to the areas in need; the largest prefecture harvest is in Logone Occidental Prefecture, far from those areas which are experiencing an emergency food aid shortfall; the road network within Chad is not strong, and many roads are impassable during the rainy season

Map 3: CHAD



In October, AEDES/SAP recommended 11,600 further MT of emergency aid for Batha, Biltine, and Ouaddai Prefectures for the months of February through August. A quantitative assessment of the area's recession crop is necessary to

determine whether AEDES/SAP's early estimate still holds. There are enough public food stocks in Batha and Biltine Prefectures to cover the recommended distribution levels (Map 1 and Table 2), although much of that stock is designated for food-for-work projects or for resale by the GOC National Cereals Office (ONC) to stabilize market prices. The emergency needs in Ouaddai Prefecture estimated by AEDES/SAP are not covered by half by current stock, even when considering stock not designated for emergency aid.

The donor community is not alarmed about the situation, perhaps because the official lean season (starting in May and June) has not yet begun and the recessional crop is said to be good in some of these areas (although the possible quantities and locations have not been indicated). There is a May or June deadline, however, after which the rainy season will greatly impede the transport of grains to the east from N'Djamena or from surplus areas further south. Emergency allocations of transport funds may allow the donor community to move needed quantities to the east before the start of the rains, should sufficient food to cover the east's lean season emergency food aid needs not have been placed in the intra-Chad pipeline by the end of March. If sufficient food has not been transported by the start of the rains, the food-for-work and ONC stock already in place would be adequate to meet emergency aid shortfalls in Biltine and Batha Prefectures if ONC's and the various donors' procedures allow for "cross" use of stock, but further aid would have to be flown in or trucked across flooded roads for Ouaddai Prefecture.


Notes

(1) Acronyms used in this report include AEDES/SAP (the European Economic Community-funded Association for Health and Development/Système d'Alerte Précoce team in Chad), AID (US Agency for International Development), BET (Borkou-Ennedi-Tibesti Prefecture), BUCEN (US Bureau of the Census), CASAU (the multi-ministry-donor-PVO Action Committee for Food Security and Emergency Aid), CILSS/DIAPER (the Permanent Interstate Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel/Permanent Diagnostic Project), DSA (the GOC/MADR Division of Agricultural Statistics), FAO (UN Food and Agriculture Organization), FEWS (AID's Early Warning System), GOC (Government of Chad), MADR (Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development), MSAPS (Ministry of Food Security and Disaster Victims), MT (Metric Ton), ONC (National Cereals Office), ONDR (National Office of Rural Development), SAR (the FAO funded Système d'Alerte Rapide), PVO (Private Voluntary Organization), and USAID (AID's Chad Mission).

(2) The population figure used is the USAID/Chad 1987 estimate increased by 2.8%, as recommended by the US Bureau of Census. Net production is the sum of the GOC preliminary estimate for the Sahelian zone excluding recessional sorghum; an estimate for Sahelian zone recessional sorghum based on the preliminary GOC estimate of area planted and the final 1986 recessional sorghum yield, to reflect reports that the 1987 recessional sorghum yield is better than originally thought; and the SAR harvest assessment for the Sudanian zone. Food aid and ONC

stocks were estimated at the prefecture level from the base of November 1987 USAID/Chad figures adjusted according to reports of food aid imports and internal stock movement through mid-January. The national commercial stock estimate is from the ONC. The food aid pipeline number was derived from USAID cables NDJAMENA 87-06550 and NDJAMENA 88-00687. The USAID/Chad estimates of 1987 commercial imports and exports were used as rough estimates of 1988 values. The expected cereal consumption was calculated by assigning annual per capita consumption rates of 80 kg to the Saharan population (BET Prefecture), 135 kg to the Sahelian population, and 150 kg to the Sudanian population, as done by USAID/Chad in previous years.

Summary Map



- ⊗ National Capital
- ⊙ Regional Capitals
- International Boundaries
- National & Regional Boundaries
- ▨ Possible food shortages later in 1988
- ▧ Immediate food shortage likely
- ▩ Reported locust swarms & breeding areas
- ▲ Displaced Malians provided emergency food aid

FEWS/PWA, February 1988



MALI

A Deteriorating Situation

Summary

Assessments of Mali's national cereal deficit (including stocks, imports, and food aid) range between 14,200 metric tons (MT), as estimated by the Government of the Republic of Mali (GRM), and 113,000 MT, as estimated by USAID/Mali. The primary reason for this discrepancy is that USAID/Mali estimates per capita cereal consumption at 188 kg/year, while the GRM estimates it at 167 kg/year. Although the national deficit is not great (according to the GRM), some people in Gao, Tombouctou, Mopti and northern Segou Regions are experiencing serious food shortages because of severe droughts during the growing season. There are increased reports of abandoned villages and displaced people forming camps. USAID/Mali requested 10,000 MT of food aid under the Title 206 program in December and is expected to request 5,000 MT of Title II emergency food aid. A more complete donor/GRM response to the regional shortages is anticipated.

Populations At-Risk

Late and localized rains, a dry period during July and low September harvest estimates prompted the Systeme d'Alerte Precoce (SAP) to estimate that approximately 156,000 people throughout Mopti, Gao and northern Segou Regions would be at risk of food shortages by February (see Summary Map). In addition to people currently at risk, SAP placed 900,000 people throughout Mali "under surveillance," implying that they may need assistance later in the year. SAP recommended that approximately 50,000 MT should be distributed throughout Mali for people at risk and "under surveillance." The National Committee for Drought and Rehabilitation (CNAUR) plans to distribute approximately 9,900 MT (see Table 1) in the coming months. Of this quantity, the CNAUR has been authorized to immediately distribute 3,315 MT to areas at risk of food shortages.

SAP's concern already appears well founded in Mopti, Gao, Tombouctou and possibly northern Segou Regions. In many areas of Mopti Region, people are abandoning villages. Camps of displaced people seeking food are currently being formed in Bankass Cercle (Mopti Region). In Tombouctou Region, people may be experiencing food shortages. Approximately 130,000 people in Goundam Cercle (Tombouctou Region) are dependent upon five intermittent lakes for agricultural production. Only two of these lakes filled up this year. According to Mauritania's Food Security Commission (CSA), between 1,000 and 3,000 destitute families (mostly Touaregs) from Mali have migrated to Nema, Adel Bagrou, Fassala, and Bassikounou in southeastern Mauritania, and have been given food aid (see Map 2). According to the CSA, these families have no resources. Based on the locations in Mauritania where the displaced Malians arrived, it is likely that they came from southwestern Tombouctou Region, the northwest corner of Mopti Region and/or northern Segou Region.

Table 1: Mali, 1987 Cereal Deficit and Populations At-Risk of Food Shortages


Region	Cereal Deficits From 1987 Local Production (MT)	Estimated Number of People Currently At-Risk	CNAUR Response (MT)
Mopti	120,000	87,000	1,175
Gao	55,000	47,000	695
Tombouctou	71,000	5,000 - 15,000	600
Segou	10,000	21,000	200
Kayes	31,000	-	415
Koulikoro	82,000 (Surplus)	750	230

Source: Regional Cereal Deficits -- FEWS Report Number 19. Number of People Currently At-Risk -- Estimates for Mopti, Gao, and Segou are from SAP November 1987 report; the estimate for Tombouctou assumes that each Malian family reported by the Mauritania CSA has five members. National Committee for Drought and Rehabilitation Response -- SAP November 1987 report.


Displaced Malians in Mauritania

Estimated Number of Refugee Families

Nema	150
Adal Bagrou	200-245
*Bassikounou	450
*Fassala	1,987





*A trip report from the chief of medical service at the national hospital estimated the total number of refugee families at Bassikounou & Fassala at 650.



● Location of refugee families

Source: Government of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania Food Security Commission (CSA) and CSA trip report from the chief of the medical service at Mauritania's National Hospital, January 1988
 FEWS/PWA, February 1988

Summary Map





NIGER

Need For Targeted Food Aid

Summary

Despite a relatively poor 1987 harvest, there is an emerging consensus between donors and the Government of Niger (GON) that Niger has enough additional grain available from public and private stocks, commercial imports, and emergency aid to meet most national cereal needs in 1988. While early food balance estimates released by the GON concluded that a substantial amount of emergency assistance (274,000 MT) would be required to meet severe local shortages, there is now little support for this level of need. A Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)/World Food Program (WFP)/Multi-Donor Mission to Niger has just concluded that there is a national cereal surplus (74,000 MT) for 1988. Despite the apparent national cereal surplus, the presence of severe local food deficits in parts of Niger is certain. Nevertheless, the amount of grain needed by people living in these areas and their ability to acquire it from in-country stocks are in question. Estimates of the amount of emergency assistance required in these areas differ principally on three issues: the location and number of people involved, the amount of cereal required per person per year, and the size and availability of on-farm cereal stocks. The FAO/WFP/Multi-Donor Mission estimates that the emergency requirement in deficit areas will reach a maximum of 101,000 MT.

USAID is negotiating GON approval to provide 15,000 MT of sorghum to meet some of these needs, and additional pledges by other donors add up to at least 50,000 MT. An informal survey by USAID/Niger indicates that as much as another 110,000 MT of cereals may be pledged in coming months for imports or local purchases by donors. The primary problem for Niger during 1988 will be one of getting food to those who need it. The GON must develop a distribution plan that effectively targets the destination and disposition of the food that will be imported or bought in-country. The GON will find it difficult to cover the costs of internal transport and local administration of food distributions. Funding from donors for this purpose has been, to this point, limited.

Summary Map



- ⊛ National Capital
- Towns
- - - International Boundaries
- National & Regional Boundaries
- ▨ Areas receiving priority food aid distribution



SUDAN

Food Aid Flows Begin

Summary

Food aid flows to Darfur Region had been postponed by the discovery that scheduled grain was unfit for human consumption. While the first truckloads of aid have now been dispatched, it is likely that food aid to North Darfur will not arrive in time or in sufficient quantity to halt migration to urban centers or keep malnutrition at or below status quo levels. Pressures for migration from North Kordufan Province appear unabated. The Agricultural Bank of Sudan (ABS) will be unable to supply the second tranche of food aid to Kordufan from ABS stocks in the Region. Private stocks there, available for purchase by the ABS, are said to be inadequate. The population of the Southern Region continues to be highly vulnerable to a food emergency. The security situation there limits information. While food aid flows to centers of displaced populations in the Southern Region (Aweil, Malakal, Raga, Wau, and Juba) are showing some signs of improvement, they are still inadequate. Much of the blame for slow deliveries has been laid to the absence of military escorts for barges, trucks and rail transport as well as to labor difficulties. There are reports that food aid is increasingly being used as a tool for the control of civilians in the Southern Region. Relief vehicles have been commandeered for military use in Equatoria Region. Increasing numbers of displaced people from the Southern Region are arriving in South Darfur and South Kordufan Provinces. Newspaper correspondents continue to report massive exploitation of Southerners in these provinces.

Food Aid

ABS stocks that are fit for human consumption are apparently much lower than previously estimated. Official figures suggest that northern Sudan has adequate cereals supplies until harvest 1988, but only if ABS stocks are drawn down to zero. Since actual supplies are apparently low, northern Sudan will be unable to feed its entire population from existing stocks. In any case, there will be no

national or regional food buffers available to ameliorate the effects of a poor 1988 season.

The World Food Program reports that 8,000 MT of the first tranche of 10,000 MT for Darfur Region have been released from ABS stocks in Kosti (just arrived from Renk) and 450 MT have been dispatched to Darfur Region. The remaining 2,000 MT of the first tranche is said to be on its way to Kosti from Renk. The WFP also reports that the 18,000 MT scheduled for the second tranche is to come from Kosti. While this appears to contradict the need to ship grain from Renk to meet the first tranche, it might be due to the longer term effort to extract grain from underground storage in Kosti. Originally all of the first tranche was to come from Damazine in Blue Nile Province, but it was declared unfit for human consumption. The ABS had previously reported about 100,000 MT in stock in Damazine.

The situation in northern and north eastern North Darfur is deteriorating, with more and more families becoming destitute as they exhaust their resources. Rural people are beginning to move to the major centers of El Geneina and El Fasher in North Darfur and to Nyala in South Darfur. Grain prices have increased to over 200 Sudanese pounds per 90 kg sack; this is more than five times last year's post harvest price. Where one goat would purchase 1.6 sacks of grain in December, in February it would only purchase .8 sacks.

The first tranche of grain is to be distributed primarily in El Geneina, Mellit and Umm Keddada Districts in North Darfur. Some of the second tranche and the third tranche will go to Buram, Ed Daien, Garsila and Idd El Ghanam Districts in South Darfur, to beat the onslaught of early rains in May. Although this last point suggests that the situation in South Darfur is far more serious than has been explicitly reported, the population of North Darfur is still at greater risk. Therefore, the people of North Darfur are likely to once again receive less assistance relative to their needs than the people of South Darfur.

Kordufan's first tranche of 20,000 MT of food aid has been handed over to the regional government for distribution. The second tranche of 20,000 MT must be purchased outside of Kordufan, probably in Kosti, suggesting that ABS estimates of its Kordufan stocks were exaggerated. The ABS reports no substantial private stocks available in Kordufan for its purchase. The WFP reports that the crop and food situation in North Kordufan is as bad as previously assumed, suggesting that traditional leaders will continue to foment migration.

Southern Region

Anxiety over food and food aid flows to the Southern Region of Sudan has lessened slightly due to recent improvements. Some concern has been expressed over the unknown effects of drought on the east bank of the White Nile in Upper Nile Province. A drought there last year, if it occurred, would have exacerbated the effects of the deteriorating security situation.

Barges loaded with commercial and relief food for Malakal, Upper Nile Region, have finally departed Kosti. These barges were due to arrive February 25, over a year since the last outside supply of Malakal. It is unlikely that much other food has reached the city, given the astronomical prices of foodstuffs there. This good news is partly soured by the news that relief goods aboard are consigned to the governor of Malakal, currently under indictment for corruption. Reports of new Sudanese refugees in Ethiopia, from Upper Nile Region, suggest that the food situation in eastern Upper Nile Province is the worst of the current fighting. The food shortages prompting migration are probably mostly attributable to the security situation in the Province. The government of the Region estimates 255,000 of its residents have been displaced into northern Sudan.

A total of 97,000 people are estimated to be displaced within Equatoria Region. Convoys and airlifts to Juba have lessened the risks to both residents and displaced people there. The army commandeered the bulk of relief trucks for use in military actions to retake Kapoeta, and this has led to a suspension of relief flights from Entebbe, Uganda. Recent convoys overland from Kenya should maintain food aid stocks in Juba at an adequate, if currently precarious, level.

In Bahr El Ghazal Province, displaced people in Aweil (which has been without any assistance since October) await a trainload of emergency assistance (800 MT) from Babanusa, South Kordufan. The WFP suggests that the situation in Aweil should be precarious. This train has been long delayed, due to the absence of a military escort, and its imminent departure long predicted. When and if it does depart, the actual trip will require up to three weeks due to the condition of the track between Babanusa and Aweil. A train of relief supplies disappeared on this route in 1986.

Reports of 3,000 MT of USAID-supplied food aid unaccounted for in Raga has led to some consternation. This food was to be available for transfer to Wau for emergency distributions there. Movement of 1,350 MT of rice from Nyala, South Darfur, to Raga has been delayed by reported fuel shortages. A convoy from Raga to Wau managed to deliver only 28 MT of cereals for emergency distributions. A convoy is enroute to Wau from Tambura in Equatoria, where it was assembled. Little food, at very high prices, is reported in Wau. Newspaper reports of civilian casualties in Wau, due to military reprisals against Dinka tribesmen, have further generated concern over the future of displaced people in that city.