


Report 21  
March 1988

## FEWS Country Reports **CHAD, MALI, NIGER and SUDAN**



Famine Early Warning System  
Africa Bureau  
U.S. Agency for International Development

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# CHAD, MALI, NIGER and SUDAN

Report 21, March 1988

Prepared for the  
Africa Bureau of the  
U.S. Agency for International Development

Prepared by  
Price, Williams & Associates, Inc.



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
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## Overview

The cereal balance estimates for *Chad* range from a surplus of 6,700 metric tons (MT) to a deficit of 71,100 MT, depending on the population total used in the calculation. USAID anticipates that emergency food needs currently foreseen can be met by a combination of food aid currently on hand or in the pipeline and cereals purchased in areas of Chad which now have surplus stocks. Pre-positioning of food aid stocks is well underway to the administrative centers of areas expected to require emergency food distribution (Abeche, Ati, Biline, and Mao Towns). The situation in *Mali* remains unchanged, with an estimated 156,000 people currently at risk throughout the country. In *Niger*, a lack of funding for internal transport of emergency food aid may significantly impede distributions in seriously food-short areas. The U.S. Ambassador has declared a disaster in *Sudan*. While the food situation remains serious, emergency food transport has improved.

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# Chad



⊗	National Capital		Will require food aid before rainy season
⊙	Prefecture Capitals		May require food aid before 1988 harvest
---	International Boundaries		Food reported to be scarce
—	National & Prefecture Boundaries		
	Currently require food aid		

0 50 100 200 300  
0 100 200 300

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# CHAD



## Preparing for the Lean Season

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### Summary

Chad's 1987 harvest was mediocre when compared to those of the previous two years, but in spite of serious food shortages in several areas, refugees continue to return to Chad both from the Central African Republic and from Sudan, implying that conditions in nearby areas of Chad are at least no worse than the areas the refugees left. The Systeme d'Alerte Rapide's (SAR) estimate at harvest of Chad's 1987 Sudanian zone production has been decreased by 11,800 metric tons (MT) net, following an update of the estimate of cereals harvested in Mayo-Kebbi Prefecture. This decrease drops the 1988 cereal balance reported in FEWS Report 20 to 6,700 MT when using the FEWS population estimate of 4,746,000 people, or minus 71,100 MT when using the Government of Chad's (GOC) population estimate of 5,295,000 people. While the 1988 cereal balance for Chad seems close to the break-even point, on-farm stocks following two good agricultural years in many parts of Chad probably tilt the national balance further to the positive side.

### Eastern Sahelian Zone

The GOC and the donor community are working to verify needed food aid levels in eastern Chad and pre-position aid stock there in as timely a manner as possible. The GOC Ministry of Food Security and Disaster Victims (MSAPS) ordered 620 MT of food (from stores already in Biltine Town) to be distributed in Biltine Prefecture during February and March. If the distribution points reflect the mid-February recommendations by the Systeme d'Alerte Precoce (SAP), some 36,000 people will be helped by this food distribution. A further 2,000 MT of food aid will be available for distribution in Biltine and Batha Prefectures starting in April -- enough to cover about 70% of probable food aid needs in Biltine Prefecture through August. An October 1987 assessment of food needs in Batha Prefecture had put April through August requirements for three cantons there at 1,075 MT. Because food needs in Batha are now being re-assessed, MSAPS will probably not finalize food distribution plans for the prefecture until late March or early April.

Emergency food aid needs are greater in Ouaddai Prefecture than in the other two eastern prefectures. According to a recent Mission cable, some 1,300 MT of food aid (55% of the planned amount) were distributed in Ouaddai during the months of November through January, although not all was distributed in the planned cantons. If MSAPS continues to follow the October food needs assessment for Ouaddai Prefecture, 2,220 MT of grain were required for February and March, and 6,625 MT of aid will be necessary to carry the at-risk populations there through August. Recent Mission cables report that 1,930 MT of cereals have been pre-positioned in Abeche Town, Ouaddai Prefecture's administrative center, for emergency distributions (as opposed to Food for Work, vulnerable groups support, price stabilization, or returned refugee support), and that another 1,700 MT will be procured soon for this purpose. It is not clear what amount of emergency stocks remain following the November

through January distributions. If the emergency stocks were drawn down completely, the emergency stocks available to cover at-risk populations in Ouaddai Prefecture through August would be short by 5,215 MT. While it is more than likely that this amount of cereal is now or soon will be available within Chad, pre-positioning that grain in Abeche Town before the start of the rainy season in June may still prove difficult.

### **Western Sahelian Zone**

The food needs situation in western Chad continues to be monitored by SAP, and food aid stocks continue to be pre-positioned at Mao Town, the administrative center of Kanem Prefecture. Over the November through January period, 1,430 MT of aid were distributed in two localities in central Kanem Prefecture. These areas will be revisited in March or April to assess whether further aid will be necessary. In the meantime, two cantons in the south of the prefecture were closely surveyed in February to see whether people there will also require food aid during the growing season. Last year, the people of this more southern area did not require outside assistance, as they were able to find adequate income source alternatives to herding and agriculture.

### **Southern Sudanian Zone**

A report of food shortages in southeast Moyen-Chari Prefecture was received in N'Djamena in early February. The report is surprising, considering the amount of rain received in the south during 1987 and the strong indications of good vegetative cover seen for the area in satellite imagery over the 1987 growing season. The explanation given was that much more cotton was planted in 1987 than is usual in that area, leaving less acreage available for food crops, and that food crops were planted late. One might expect that people in an area where cash crops are grown would be able to purchase enough food to make up for any food production shortfall. One piece of information that is missing from this analysis, however, is the price of cotton this year as compared to that of previous years. According to published maps, the area cited is near the extreme edge of the road network, indicating that larger markets are not as easily accessible to villagers there as they are to villages further west. If cotton prices have been depressed, the remoteness of this area could have combined with low prices to prevent villagers in this remote area from raising sufficient cash through cotton sales to purchase the food stuffs needed. Although other small, localized areas of crop failure are reported to exist in the Sudanian Zone, this is not seen as a cause for concern, as the overall 1987 cereal production in Chad's Sudanian Zone was fairly strong, as was the increase over previous years in cash crop production.

# Mali



⊛	National Capital
⊙	Regional Capitals
---	International Boundaries
—	National & Regional Boundaries
⋯	Possible food shortages later in 1988
▨	Immediate food shortage likely
▲	Displaced Malians provided emergency food aid

0 50 100 200 300  
0 100 200 300

FEWS/PWA, March 1988

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# MALI

## Situation Unchanged



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### Summary

The situation in Mali remains unchanged with 156,000 people estimated at risk throughout Mopti, Gao and northern Segou Regions. Another 900,000 people remain "under surveillance" by the Systeme d'Alerte Precoce (SAP) and could possibly require assistance prior to harvest 1988. The Committee for Drought and Rehabilitation (CNAUR) plans to distribute 9,900 MT (see Table 1) of emergency food aid in the coming months. It has received authorization to distribute 3,315 MT immediately in areas at risk. No new information has been received about the 1,000-3,000 destitute Malian families (mostly Touareg) displaced into Mauritania, and receiving food aid there.


**Table 1: Mali, 1987 Cereal Deficit and Populations At-Risk of Food Shortages**

Region	Cereal Deficits From 1987 Local Production (MT)	Estimated Number of People Currently At-Risk	CNAUR Response (MT)
Mopti	120,000	87,000	1,175
Gao	55,000	47,000	695
Tombouctou	71,000	5,000 - 15,000	600
Segou	10,000	21,000	200
Kayes	31,000	-	415
Koulikoro	82,000	750	230

*Source:* Regional Cereal Deficits -- FEWS Report Number 19. Number of People Currently At-Risk -- Estimates for Mopti, Gao, and Segou are from SAP November 1987 report; the estimate for Tombouctou assumes that each Malian family reported by the Mauritania Food Security Commission (CSA) has five members. National Committee for Drought and Rehabilitation Response -- SAF November 1987 report.

Map 1: Summary

# Niger



⊛	National Capital
⊙	Regional Capitals
-----	International Boundaries
—	National & Department Boundaries
⊘	Chronic food-short areas
▨	Poor 1987 harvest
▩	Areas of most immediate food needs

0 50 100 150 200  
0 100 200



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# NIGER

## Difficulty in Meeting Local Food Shortages



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### Summary

Niger, like other Sahelian countries, faces the difficult problem during 1988 of meeting serious local food deficits in some of its most vulnerable areas. Although the total national food supply appears in hand, a lack of funding for internal transport may impede the distribution of emergency food aid to food-short areas. Until funding for internal transport can be found in the already tight national budget, or until donors agree to subsidize this part of the emergency effort, as many as 500,000 people may be affected by a serious food supply problem.

### Locally Serious Food Supply Shortages

Despite an apparent national cereal supply surplus, the presence of severe local food deficits in parts of Niger is certain. The Food and Agriculture Organization/World Food Program/Multi-Donor Mission concluded in February that the emergency requirement in deficit areas could be as high as 101,000 MT. Many of the areas in which this year's shortfall will be the greatest are chronically food-short. This means that there may not be significant food stocks with which to meet current food needs, and there may be much greater reliance upon short-term coping strategies (especially migration to seek wage labor) to carry affected populations through the rest of the year.

### Donor and Government of Niger Response

The Government of Niger (GON) has approved a USAID donation of 15,000 MT of sorghum to meet some of these needs. This emergency assistance is scheduled to arrive in Niger by early June. Substantial additional pledges by other donors add up to at least 50,000 MT, and an informal survey by USAID/Niger indicates that as much as another 90,000 MT of cereals may be added in the coming months through pledged imports or local purchases by donors. The delivery schedule for many of the pledges is still uncertain, and so could still be a problem in assuring the availability of sufficient emergency food aid. Most importantly, there may also be a significant problem in getting this emergency aid from the main distribution centers to those who need it. The GON will find it difficult to cover the costs of internal transport and local administration of food distributions, and funding from donors for this purpose has been, to this point, limited.

# Sudan



	National Capital
	Towns
	International Boundaries
	National & Regional Boundaries
	Areas receiving priority food aid distribution

0 50 100 200 300  
0 100 200 300

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# SUDAN

## Disaster Declared



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### Summary

The situation in Sudan remains serious, although emergency food transport has improved. On February 28th the U.S. Ambassador to Sudan declared a disaster due to food insecurity caused by drought, displacement, and disruption in western and southern Sudan. Food supplies continue to move with greater regularity to the Southern Region, but the situation there remains precarious. Urgent action is required to speed up deliveries of food aid to western Sudan. Sorghum prices have been stable, albeit high, in both Kordufan and (presumably) Darfur Region over the past two months. Insecurity could increase the numbers of people currently thought to be at risk in western Sudan as well as in the Southern Region.

### Food Availability

The most recent assessments of production and stocks in Sudan do not improve previous estimates of food availability. The latest official estimate of national sorghum production shows a decrease of 128,000 metric tons (MT) from previous estimates. Estimates of millet production have increased slightly to 153,000 MT, which leads to a total estimate of gross sorghum and millet production at 1,460,000 MT, only 41% of last year's gross production. Current Sudanese estimates of Agricultural Bank of Sudan (ABS) stocks showed a 20% decline from January estimates, to only 50,000 MT more than the mission's previous estimate of 650,000 MT. Combined stocks and production total only 2,165,000 MT.

The flow of emergency food aid to Darfur Region continues to improve. The delivery of the first tranche of food aid to Darfur Region has speeded up, although it is still slower than planned. Contracts for the delivery of the second tranche have been signed with private trucking companies. Previous reports of destitute families in North Darfur migrating to major towns have not been corroborated, although the original source appears to be the Regional Agricultural Planning Unit. Indeed, there are new reports that traditional labor migration to South Darfur has not occurred, with the expectation of free food aid in the north.

In other northern Regions, the situation appears in hand. There is no recent evidence of abnormal population movements out of North Kordufan Province, either spontaneous or promoted by traditional leaders. Contrary to previous reports, there are about 17,000 MT of ABS stocks remaining in Kordufan, although a recent report indicates that additional food aid for the Region will come from Kosti. The Relief and Rehabilitation Commission reports that the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the World Food Program (WFP) are expected to commit 39,690 MT of food aid to the Eastern Region (presumably the Red Sea Hills).

In the Southern Region the emergency food availability picture has improved dramatically. Barges carrying emergency food aid have arrived in Malakal. The exact amount of food is unknown as some was off-loaded enroute. Secured sorghum stocks totaling 1,300 MT were found in Raga and are available for distribution there and in Wau. Food aid (rice) is enroute to Wau, via Raga, from Nyala. In Juba, food stocks are currently adequate. Recent rainfall in the southern Regions has served to remind donors of probable transportation problems during the upcoming rainy season. There was an unconfirmed report that the long-awaited relief train had finally left (date unknown) Babanusa for Aweil -- a trip reported to last 7-10 days -- and that it may have arrived.

## Famine Early Warning System (FEWS) Country Reports

FEWS publishes monthly reports on Burkina, Chad, Ethiopia, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, and Sudan. These reports are designed to provide decisionmakers with current information and analysis on existing and potential nutrition emergency situations. Each situation identified is described in terms of geographical extent and the number of people involved, and the proximate causes insofar as they have been discerned.

It is necessary to identify or "target" populations in-need or "at risk" in order to determine appropriate forms and levels of intervention. FEWS reports will employ the term "at risk" to mean...

...those persons lacking sufficient food, or resources to acquire sufficient food, to avert a nutritional crisis (i.e., a progressive deterioration in their health or nutritional condition below the status quo), and who, as a result, require specific intervention to avoid a life-threatening situation.

Perhaps of greatest importance to decisionmakers, the process underlying the deteriorating situation is highlighted by the FEWS effort, hopefully with enough specificity and forewarning to permit alternative intervention strategies to be examined and implemented. Food assistance strategies are key to famine avoidance. However, other types of intervention can be of major importance both in the short term and in the long run, including medical, transport, storage, changes in economic development policy, etc.

Where possible, food needs estimates are included in the FEWS reports. It is important to understand, however, that no direct relation exists between numbers of persons at risk and the quantity of food assistance needed. This is because famines are the culmination of slow-onset disaster processes which can be complex in the extreme. The food needs of individual populations at risk depend upon when in the disaster process identification is made and the extent of its cumulative impact on the individuals concerned. Further, the amount of food assistance required, whether from internal or external sources, depends upon a host of considerations. Thus the food needs estimates presented periodically in FEWS reports *should not* be interpreted to mean food aid needs, e.g., as under PL480 or other donor programs.