


Report Number 19
January 1988

FEWS Country Reports

CHAD, MALI, NIGER

and SUDAN



Africa Bureau
U.S. Agency
for International
Development

FAMINE EARLY WARNING SYSTEM

This is the nineteenth in a series of monthly reports issued by the Famine Early Warning System (FEWS). Chad, Mali, Niger and Sudan will be combined in one report until the crop cycle begins again in the Spring. This report is designed to provide decisionmakers with current information and analysis on existing and potential nutrition emergency situations. Each situation identified is described in terms of geographical extent and the number of people involved, or at-risk, and the proximate causes insofar as they have been discerned.

Use of the term "at-risk" to identify vulnerable populations is problematic since no generally agreed upon definition exists. Yet, it is necessary to identify or "target" populations in-need or "at-risk" in order to determine appropriate forms and levels of intervention. Thus for the present, until a better usage can be found, FEWS reports will employ the term "at-risk" to mean...

...those persons lacking sufficient food, or resources to acquire sufficient food, to avert a nutritional crisis (i.e., a progressive deterioration in their health or nutritional condition below the status quo), and who, as a result, require specific intervention to avoid a life-threatening situation.

Perhaps of most importance to decisionmakers, the FEWS effort highlights the process underlying the deteriorating situation, hopefully with enough specificity and forewarning to permit alternative intervention strategies to be examined and implemented. Food assistance strategies are key to famine avoidance. However, other types of intervention can be of major importance both in the short-term and in the long run, including medical, transport, storage, economic development policy change, etc.

Where possible, estimates of food needs are included in the FEWS reports. It is important to understand, however, that no direct relation exists between numbers of persons at-risk and the quantity of food assistance needed. This is because famines are the culmination of slow-onset disaster processes which can be complex in the extreme.

The food needs of individual populations at-risk depend upon when in the disaster process identification is made and the extent of the cumulative impact on the individuals concerned. Further, the amount of food assistance required, whether from internal or external sources, depends upon a host of considerations. Thus the estimates of food needs presented periodically in FEWS reports should not be interpreted to mean food aid needs, e.g., as under PL480 or other donor programs.

FEWS depends on a variety of US Government agencies, private voluntary organizations (PVO's), international relief agencies, foreign press and host government reports as sources of information used in the country reports. In particular, a debt of gratitude is owed to many individuals within various offices of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) who routinely provide valuable information: the offices of Food For Peace and Voluntary Assistance (FFP/FVA) and the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA). Additional useful information is also provided by the Centre Agrhyet in Niamey, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's National Environmental Satellite, Data, and Information Service (NOAA/NESDIS), the National Aeronautic and Space Administration (NASA), the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) Global Information and Early Warning System (GIEWS), the World Food Program, and other U.N. agencies.

Famine Early Warning System Country Reports

Chad
Mali
Niger
Sudan

Prepared for the
Africa Bureau of the
U.S. Agency for
International Development

Prepared by
Price, Williams & Associates, Inc.
January 1988

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SUMMARY

In at least one area of central Chad, production may be better than previously thought because of the larger than usual area planted in recession¹ crops. Food aid distribution in the eastern Sahel is progressing more slowly than hoped. An area of high risk of food crisis has been identified in Kanem Prefecture, contrary to the prevailing wisdom that people of this area have sufficient herds to buffer them from the effects of total crop failure. Severe regional food deficits exist in Mali. Poor local harvests and low on-farm stocks are likely to cause food shortages early in 1988 for approximately 87,000 people in Mopti Region, 47,000 in Gao Region and 21,000 in Segou Region. In Niger, although donors believe there is enough grain in-country to meet national needs, a modest amount of imported emergency assistance may be needed to address severe local deficits. The USAID Mission in Sudan has requested 50,000 MT of grain as a contingency against potential emergency requirements for the 13% of the population currently judged at-risk.

¹ Recessional crops are those planted on the moistened flood plains of receding rivers and lakes. Recessional crops are harvested well after the rainfed crops are harvested.

CHAD

Chad's 1987 agricultural production may be higher than previously estimated by the Government of Chad's (GOC) National Office of Rural Development (ONDR), owing to an increase in the area of recessional sorghum cultivated in some areas. An additional at-risk population has been identified in central Kanem Prefecture; the people of the area lack the herds or other economic resources necessary to cope with the total crop loss experienced in much of the Prefecture, and the area exhibits the highest child malnutrition rate found in Chad during 1987. Food aid distribution is progressing slowly in eastern Chad, but this is probably due more to problems in program start-up than to lack of grains available for purchase by donors within Chad.

Agricultural Production

The recessional sorghum crop near Lake Fitri in Ati Sub-prefecture, Batha Prefecture (Map 1), is reported to be excellent owing to a large increase in area planted (following the abysmal rainfed growing season). More grains will be available for local purchase than expected, increasing the food security of people in southern Batha Prefecture (assuming people there have the wherewithal to buy grains). Further information on Chad's recessional crops should be forthcoming as the recessional season progresses.



Western Chad

The prevailing wisdom about Chad's western Sahel is that most inhabitants are herders who are buffered from the effects of crop loss by strong herds and other income-generating activities. Socio-economic conditions are generally expected to be more fragile in the east. This theory was borne out through mid-1987 by in depth economic and nutrition surveys of potentially at-risk areas that are used by the GOC/PVO/multi-donor Food Aid Action Committee (CASAD) to pinpoint populations requiring food aid¹ (Map 2). Over the summer, a CARE funded study found people in the area of Nokou, Kanem Prefecture, to be highly dependent on crops, as their herds had not yet been rebuilt following the drought of 1984. A nutritional survey by AEDES and the CNNTA found fairly low malnutrition² in the area (Map 1). On the grounds that the economic situation was indeed poor, however, two months' food aid was provided for 14,000 people estimated to live in the immediate area (Map 3). Following further reports of crop failure-related distress in Kanem Prefecture, the AEDES/CNNTA team returned to neighboring Ntiona in November and found, unexpectedly, a child malnutrition rate of 14% -- the highest rate of malnutrition seen in Chad over the past year (Map 1). In response to these results and because, here too, herds are not yet rebuilt after the 1984 drought, three months' food aid for 25,000 people was sent to Ntiona

¹ These surveys are carried out by the EEC-funded early warning team from the European Agency for Health and Development (AEDES) with help from the GOC Ministry of Public Health (MOH) Center for Nutrition and Technical Assistance (CNNTA).

² Only 5.8% of the 260 children measured were severely malnourished, i.e., weighed less than 80% of the standard weight for their age.

Nutrition Findings 1987





% of Children Malnourished

	10 to 14
	4 to 6
	1 to 3

Source: AEDES/Chad; GOC/MOH/CNNTA
FEWS/PWA, January 1988

Nutrition Findings 1987





% of Children Malnourished


	10 to 14
	4 to 6
	1 to 3

Source: AEDES/Chad; GOC/MOH/CNNTA
FEWS/PWA, January 1988

Food Aid Distributed





Timing of Food Aid Distribution




Source: MSAPS; FEWS/Chad
FEWS/PWA, January 1988

MSAPS' December Food Aid Plan



Timing of Food Aid Plan



Source: MSAPS; FEWS/Chad
FEWS/PWA, January 1988

(Map 3), one of the strongest responses by the CASAD during 1987. Areas to the east of Ntiona have not recently been surveyed. While part of the area has a fairly high water table (along the Bahr el Ghazal depression) and, therefore, fair prospects for animal husbandry, there may be further pockets of people who require food aid.

Eastern Chad

Plans made by the Ministry of Food Security and Disaster Victims (MSAPS) during December called for monthly distribution to begin in December in northeast Ouaddai Prefecture (47,500 people) and in January in most other Cantons in northern Ouaddai (an additional 45,000 people) (Map 4). Food aid distribution in Ouaddai Prefecture has been slow to get underway, however. By the end of December, distribution had begun in only one of the nine Cantons designated to receive aid (Map 3) and only 1,790 MT of the 2,370 MT required through the end of January had been procured. More grain will be required in future months, as the original plan (recommended by AEDES) called for food distribution to continue through the growing season -- a further 7,770 MT for these nine Cantons.

The holdup is more likely caused by the inevitable start-up delays in programs requiring massive procurements and shipments over transport systems unaccustomed to such volume than by insufficient grain available for purchase for the December and January food aid needs. If surpluses nearby (in southern Ouaddai, Guera, and Chari-Baguirmi Prefectures) fail to meet donor expectations, there is probably sufficient grain available in the Sudanian zone to meet needs over the long term. The cost of transporting Sudanian grain may be greater to the donors than the cost of importing further food aid, however.

Over the short term, the slow start-up could mean real hardship in northern Ouaddai, especially among those people scheduled to begin receiving aid in December. The hardship may induce people to move to the Prefecture capital (Abeche) or to N'Djamena¹. Because Abeche is experiencing a water shortage, the inherent difficulties in caring for concentrations of indigent people will be compounded until the planned connection to a new water source is completed.

¹ Because the agricultural situation in western Sudan is currently worse than that in eastern Chad, it is unlikely that Chadians will migrate to Sudan.

MALI

Some regions in Mali will face severe food deficits in 1988. Local production met only a portion of cereal requirements in Gao (9%), Tombouctou (26%), and Mopti (51%) Regions. The Systeme d'Alerte Precoce (SAP) November report states that approximately 87,000 people in Mopti Region, 47,000 in Gao Region and 21,000 people in Segou Region are likely to face food shortages early in 1988 because of poor local harvests and low on-farm stocks. SAP has approximately 900,000 people throughout the country "under surveillance", implying that these populations may need assistance later in the year. USAID/Mali estimates that national 1987 cereal production plus stocks, imports, and food aid will fall 113,000 MT short of 1988 cereal requirements. However, using a lower per capita consumption rate, the Government of the Republic of Mali (GRM) Department of Information and Statistics (DNSI) and Department of Agriculture (DNA) estimate that the shortfall will be only 14,200 MT. Revised production estimates could reduce the size of the national deficit or eliminate it (as estimated by the GRM) entirely.

Populations At-Risk

In Mopti Region, local production fell at least 120,000 MT short of cereal requirements this year. According to SAP, populations in Bandiagara, Douentza and Youvarou Cercles (Mopti Region) experienced the worst harvests in the region and will require assistance early in 1988. In some arrondissements in these Cercles only 40% to 50% of the area seeded was harvested, on-farm stocks were reported low, and pasturage and water points were drying up as early as November. SAP recommends the distribution of 23,350 MT of cereals (in addition to current OPAM stocks) to Mopti Region by March 1988 to cover three months' consumption. The National Committee for Drought and Rehabilitation (CNAUR) plans on distributing 2,770 MT to Mopti Region from the National Security Stocks.

In Gao Region, FEWS estimates the 1987 harvest fell approximately 55,000 MT short of cereal requirements. Populations in Gao Cercle, though not at immediate risk of food shortages, are likely to face difficulties later in the year, according to SAP. The poor harvest already appears to be reflected in rising cereal prices and declining livestock prices. According to SAP, people in Ansongo Cercle are generally thought to have adequate food supplies, except in Talataye Arrondissement, where the harvest was poor. High herd concentrations on limited pasturage in Talataye will probably result in earlier than normal migration. In Bourem Cercle, SAP classified populations in Temera Arrondissement at-risk because of the poor harvest. In Almoustarat Arrondissement, the usual flood recessionary harvests are not expected because of the low river level. SAP recommends placing 11,279 MT of cereals in Gao Region. Of this quantity, 2,727 MT is meant to cover six months of cereal requirements for approximately 24,000 people in Almoustarat and Temera Arrondissement (Bourem Cercle), and for 8,000 people in Tidarmene (Menaka Cercle) where SAP concludes people are most at-risk of food shortages. The CNAUR plans on distributing 2,400 MT of cereals to Gao Region from the National Security Stock.

Although estimated local 1987 cereal production in Segou Region fell only 10,000 MT short of cereal requirements, the poor harvest in Nampala arrondissement prompted SAP to identify this area as at risk of food shortages. Additionally,

Table 1: At-Risk Populations and Food Aid Plans By Region

Region	Cercle	(1)	(2)	National	SAP	(2)
		Population At-Risk	OPAM Stocks (MT)	Security Stocks (MT)	Stock Recommendations (MT)	CNAUR Response (MT)
Mopti	Bandiagara	29,836	See	See	1,253	See
	Douentza	29,618	Below	Below	1,244	Below
	Youvarou	27,370			1,149	
	Total	86,824			3,646	
Gao	Anaongo	14,186			596	
	Bourem	24,468			2,066	
	Menaka	7,996			672	
	Total	46,649			3,323	
Segou	Niono	21,288			894	
Population Under Surveillance						
Kayes	Kayes	98,459	620	1054	4,136	
	Diana	13,403	333		563	
	Total	111,862	853		4,698	
Koulikoro	Kolokani	33,329	826		1,400	
	Nara	29,115	683		1,223	750
	Banamba	10,811	441		454	
	Total	73,255	1850		3,077	750
Segou	Niono	42,128	393		1,769	145
Mopti	Mopti	107,306	616	6954	4,507	630
	Djenne	78,787	165		3,309	600
	Bandiagara(3)	38,646	111		1,539	840
	Douentza(3)	104,850	179		4,404	500
	Tenenkou	24,820	227		1,045	
	Youvarou(3)	49,816	57		2,061	400
	Koro	67,823	122		2,849	
Total	469,108	1,467		10,704	2,770	
Tombouctou	Goundam	43,277	94	3900	1,818	500
	Niafunke	71,285	40		2,994	250
	Total	114,562	134		4,812	750
Gao	Gao	94,612	111	4518	3,949	500
	Anaongo(3)	39,010	244		1,833	1000
	Menaka(3)	21,606	446		907	400
	Kidal	34,814	454		1,462	500 (4)
	Total	189,442	1,709		7,956	2,400
TOTAL		1,165,118			40,879	6,815

¹ At-risk figures are from the Systeme d'Alerte Precoc (SAP) and are based on the 1987 census.

² Totals shown apply only to areas determined by SAP to be at risk or in need of further surveillance. As of November 1987, OPAM stocks totaled 7,648 MT. The total CNAUR response is 9,925 MT.

³ Whereas SAP recommends three months worth of stocks for all other Cercles listed, SAP recommends six months worth for these Cercles.

⁴ It is possible that information received contained a typographical error and that CNAUR plans to distribute 50 rather than 500 MT in Kidal Cercle. If this is the case, the total CNAUR response would be 9,475 MT.

SAP reports that conditions in the Niono (population 9,800) and Sokolo (population 4,600) camps for displaced people are poor. Food distributions of 14 MT to Nampala and 8 MT each to the two camps alleviated immediate food needs, but, according to SAP, an additional 824 MT will be needed by March 1988 to supply approximately 21,000 people in these three areas for three months. The CNAUR plans to distribute 145 MT of cereals to these three areas from National Security Stocks.

NIGER

According to donor calculations, Niger has enough grain in-country to meet national food needs in 1988. Nevertheless, the Government of Niger (GON) indicates that a substantial amount of emergency assistance (274,000 MT) will be required to meet severe local shortages. Although the presence of large local food deficits is not contested, there is some uncertainty over the amount of grain that these areas require, and their ability to acquire it from in-country stocks. Available data (harvest estimates, grain prices, and other geographic factors) suggest that a much more modest amount of imported emergency assistance may be required to cover needs that will remain after distribution of current Government-controlled stocks, and to allow for the typical market inefficiencies in redistributing grain to deficit areas.

Food Needs

In trying to determine the amount of emergency food assistance required in Niger, one is faced with the classic problem of setting the appropriate level of aggregation. That is, on the national level there appears to be less of a problem than on the local level, where there may be severe deficits. The essential questions now in Niger are to what degree can the Government of Niger (GON) and the "invisible hand" of the market make food available to food-short rural areas and, therefore, what level of external assistance is required.

On a national scale, most donors feel that on-farm and other stocks will supplement the mediocre 1987 cereal harvest to meet most of Niger's national needs. In their food need calculations, the donor analyses differ from GON analyses in using a lower yearly per capita requirement, in the inclusion of private stocks in the national cereal balance, and in other less significant areas. The GON, while using different assumptions for some of these factors, stresses a single basic issue in its insistence on the need for substantial emergency assistance: production surpluses and cereal stocks will not be available for purchase in food-short rural areas.

Clearly, pre-existing private and commercial grain stocks will not suffice to make up the shortfall from meager harvests in many parts of Diffa and Agadez, as well as in northern Niamey and Tahoua Departments (Map 5). Even after relatively good harvests, local shortages have occurred, and probably will continue to occur, in many of these areas; food has been distributed recently in some. Nevertheless, adding 274,000 metric tons of imports to 1987 production would raise the amount of cereal available nationwide to a level almost comparable to the record 1985 and 1986 net harvests. It is not likely that such great amounts of imported emergency assistance are required in order to assure that food needs are met in the food-short areas.

Transport

An understanding of the relative difficulty with which cereal can be moved from one area to another is critical in establishing how Niger's deficit areas can be served. As shown in Maps 6 and 7, most arrondissements with food deficits are found to the north and east of most surplus areas. This pattern is what would



Map 5: NIGER

Cereal Production

Rural Deficit in '000 MT*

Department

Niamey	87
Dosso	4
Tahoua	55



Department


Maradi	5
Zinder	72
Diffa	46
Agadez	30

(Cross-hatched)	20 or more
(Diagonal lines)	10 to 20
(Horizontal lines)	0 to 10


*Does not include major urban centers

FEWS/PWA, January 1988

Map 6: NIGER



Map 7: NIGER



normally be expected, and implies that the situation is not different in nature, though perhaps in degree, from what has been seen in recent years. It thus appears that Niger's recent experience in distributions, and the existing distribution points may be useful this year. There may, however, be some organizational problems within the OPVN (Office des Produits Vivriers du Niger) which could adversely affect its ability to assist in the distribution of emergency food. Niger is relatively blessed, in that there are few heavily populated areas that are far from serviceable roads, even at the height of the rainy season (Map 8).

Local Anomalies in Supply and Demand

There are two areas with unusual 1987 cereal production figures¹ that may lead to a misinterpretation of local and national needs. The cereal surplus in Tanout Arrondissement (37,000 MT) is quite high compared to recent years, and could possibly be overestimated. The very large deficit in Magaria Arrondissement (51,000 MT) is also worthy of note, as Magaria is frequently a surplus-producing area. Given the good harvests in 1985 and 1986, the impact of any local shortfall, while serious, might be partly absorbed by on-farm stocks, and not translate directly into the need for an equal amount of emergency assistance.


Prices

A useful indicator to watch in several of these food-short areas would be the price of millet on the market. These prices should suggest the relative availability of grain, and a measure of its affordability. Indeed, the most recent arrondissement reports from late in 1987, show relatively low prices, and do not suggest any immediate stress on the availability of grain in most areas.

¹ Source: Bulletin de Suivi Agro-Alimentaire au 11 Novembre, 1987, Direction des Etudes, Programmation et Statistiques Agricoles. The deficit and surplus figures used here reflect this agency's alternate hypothesis about the cereal balance if using yearly per capita cereal needs of 220/190 kilograms (220 per agro-pastoralist, and 190 per pastoralist and urban dweller). Using the GON-preferred requirement of 250/220 kilograms decreases the surpluses, and increases the arrondissement deficits described in this section.

Major Roads and Urban Cereal Requirements in '000 MT

== Roads
• Towns



SUDAN

The quantity and quality of grain stocks held by the Agricultural Bank of Sudan (ABS) is still uncertain. It is unclear whether those stocks will be sufficient to last until harvest 1988. The USAID Mission in Khartoum has requested a contingency grain reserve of 50,000 MT to meet likely additional emergency needs in western and southern Sudan, provide assistance to anticipated Ethiopian refugees and meet "other unforeseen crises for which Sudan is noted". The Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC) confirms a gross decline in sorghum and millet production since the 1986 harvest, to levels close to those estimated in last month's (December) FEWS report. Grain prices are at very high levels in the west and especially in Southern Region; as expected, the normal decline has not occurred as a result of the poor harvest. In western Sudan, farmers are selling animals and other resources to obtain cash for grain purchases. Traditional leaders in North Kordufan Province are reportedly counseling people to move to Khartoum against the advice of political leaders. High sorghum prices, come June 1988, should fuel increased planting of sorghum in the mechanized sector (both demarcated and undemarcated) of Sudanese agriculture. Nevertheless, even if acreage planted increased to 1986 levels during 1988, yields would have to be higher than the historical average to leave Sudan barely self-sufficient in grains in 1989. Unfortunately, 1988 grain production in both North Darfur and North Kordufan Provinces is likely to again be inadequate to meet local requirements in 1989.

Issues

- o While an overall decline in childhood nutrition levels, especially in rural areas can be expected during 1988, no plans to monitor the rural population (other than in North Darfur and North Kordufan) have been announced.
- o News reports of drought-affected populations in the Southern Region, especially Equatoria Region, are not supported by available satellite imagery of vegetative conditions. Food shortages in these areas are probably attributable to insecurity in combination with a marginal decline in production.
- o Very high grain prices in Bahr El Ghazel suggest a more extreme situation than previously believed. Mortality is reported very high among malnourished children.

Prospects

While high grain prices will limit the ability of people (especially rural people) to purchase food during 1988, they will also motivate farmers, especially mechanized farmers, to plant more acreage in sorghum than was planted during 1987. This was the experience in 1985, when high prices prompted record sorghum acreage, which combined with merely adequate rains for a record sorghum harvest. Sudan could be self-sufficient in sorghum in 1989, if adequate rains support crop growth in 1988 and if acreage expands to record 1985 levels.

There is nothing to suggest that grain production in 1988 will be adequate in North Darfur and North Kordufan Provinces. If grain prices decline drastically in 1989, then a good production of cash crops in these areas could contribute to the purchase of sufficient grain to improve local diets to nutritionally adequate levels.

Stocks

The amount of ABS and other stocks available for emergency food aid distributions is still controversial. Government figures suggest stocks are sufficient to meet the food requirements of northern Sudan. Nevertheless, previous reports of large quantities unfit for human consumption, coupled with known export commitments and other, lower, estimates of ABS stocks, create concern over whether Sudan can be self sufficient in sorghum in 1988.

The USAID Mission has requested a contingency reserve of 50,000 MT of sorghum, partly as a response to the controversy over the quantity and quality of ABS stocks. This reserve is believed to be especially necessary because of potential US responsibilities for additional emergency food aid (that might become manifest) for western and southern Sudan, as well as for new Ethiopian refugees.

Controversy erupted when the ABS released only 8,000 MT of sorghum from plentiful stocks in Kordufan Region for emergency food aid distribution within Kordufan. The remaining 12,000 MT scheduled for the first tranche of food aid to Kordufan was said to be unavailable due to previous export commitments. This issue was ultimately resolved, but not before the ABS offered to release stocks from Renk and have donors pay for its transport into Kordufan Region.

The first tranche of food aid for Darfur Region, to total 10,000 MT, was still awaiting release on January 8, 1988. Reports of delays in providing grain from Kosti, due to the difficulty in extracting it from underground storage, suggest that Darfur Region grain might ultimately come from points farther to the east.

Indicators

The Relief and Rehabilitation Commission reports high grain prices, the selling of resources by farmers and the possible movement of large numbers of people from North Kordufan Province. Interestingly, the RRC's estimate of emergency food aid requirements is less than half that estimated by the regional governments of Darfur and Kordufan.

The RRC reports that the price of millet rose between 20% and 53% during November in El Obeid, Nyala, Umm Ruwaba, Wad Medani and Omdurman markets. Sorghum prices rose between 3% and 29% during the same period in these markets. In years when harvests are expected to be good, prices fall from October to November. The general rise in prices suggests a common belief that the 1987 harvest is relatively poor and could prompt hoarding among those holding significant stocks.

The RRC reports increasing sales of animals and other resources by farmers in western Sudan, to get money for food. Of greater concern are unconfirmed reports

that traditional leaders in North Kordufan Province are encouraging people to move to Khartoum, where food aid will be available. The already strained resources of Khartoum and the national government would be pushed even further with the arrival of large numbers of displaced people from relatively nearby districts in North Kordufan Province.


Food Aid and Logistics

The RRC estimates there are a total of 3,182,000 people at risk in Sudan, over 13% of the population. This is comparable to the proportion of people at risk in Ethiopia. Darfur and Kordufan Regions are estimated to account for over 50% of the total, with 750,000 and 1,000,000 people at risk, respectively. The Sudanese government has made plans with donors to ship emergency food aid to Darfur and Kordufan Regions to meet the emergency food requirements of those areas. While the regional government of Darfur requested 110,000 MT of emergency food aid, and the government of Kordufan requested 200,000 MT, the RRC and donors have accepted working estimates of emergency requirements at 55,000 and 71,000 MT, respectively.

The RRC and donors have acted to complete the organization of these deliveries. The first tranche of 20,000 MT for Kordufan is to originate from Kordufan ABS stocks and the first tranche of 12,000 MT for Darfur is to originate from underground ABS stocks in Kosti. The second tranche of two is to be organized prior to January 31. If surveys, currently underway in Darfur and Kordufan regions, indicate greater need than currently estimated by the RRC, arrangements could be made to deliver additional quantities prior to the onset of the rainy season.

SUDAN:

Numbers At Risk (Approximate)



The RRC probably underestimates the numbers at risk in the southern Provinces.

MAP: FEWS/PWA, JANUARY 1988


SOURCE: RELIEF AND REHABILITATION COMMISSION

Administrative Units

(Prefectures & Sub-prefectures)

<u>Sub-Prefecture</u>		<u>PREF</u>
1.	Abeche	OUA
2.	Abou Deia	SAL
3.	Adra	OUA
4.	Am Dam	OUA
5.	Am Timan	SAL
6.	Am Zoer	BIL
7.	Arada	BIL
8.	Ati	BAT
9.	Baibokoum	LOR
10.	Bebedjia	LOR
11.	Beinamar	LOc
12.	Benoye	LOc
13.	Bere	TAN
14.	Biltine	BIL
15.	Bitkine	GUE
16.	Bokoro	ChB
17.	Bol	LAK
18.	Bongor	MK
19.	Borkou	BET
20.	Bouso	ChB
21.	Djedaa	BAT
22.	Doba	LOR
23.	Ennedi	BET
24.	Fionga	MK
25.	Gore	LOR
26.	Gounou-Gaya	MK
27.	Goz Beida	OUA
28.	Guereda	BIL
29.	Haraze Manguaigne	SAL
30.	Iriba	BIL
31.	Kelo	TAN
32.	Koumra	MCh
33.	Kyabe	MCh
34.	Lai	TAN
35.	Lere	MK
36.	Mangalme	GUE
37.	Mao	KAN
38.	Maro	MCh
39.	Massakory	ChB
40.	Massenya	ChB
41.	Malfi	GUE
42.	Moissala	MCh
43.	Mongo	GUE
44.	Moundou	LOc
45.	Moussoro	KAN
46.	N'Djamena	ChB
47.	N'Gouri	LAK
48.	Nekou	KAN
49.	Oum Hadjer	BAT
50.	Pala	MK
51.	Sarh	MCh
52.	Tibesti	BET

<u>PREF</u>	<u>Prefecture</u>
BAT	Batha
BET	Borkou-Ennedi-Tibesti
BIL	Biltine
ChB	Chari-Baguirmi
GUE	Guera
KAN	Kanem
LAK	Lake
LOc	Logone Occidental
LOR	Logone Oriental
MCh	Moyen-Chari
MK	Mayo-Kebbi
OUA	Ouaddai
SAL	Salamat
TAN	Tandjile




o Main Town in Sub-prefecture
 — Prefectures
 - - - Sub-prefectures



Source: Prefecture boundaries from 1960
 IGN-Brazzaville; Sub-prefecture boundaries
 from undated map in Fr., map author unknown

FEWS/PWA, June 1987

Administrative Units: Regions & Cercles



REGIONS and CERCLES

KAYES

1. Kayes
2. Bafoulabe
3. Diema
4. Kenieba
5. Kita
6. Nioro
7. Yelimane

SIKASSO

1. Sikasso
2. Bougouni
3. Kadiolo
4. Kolondieba
5. Koutiala
6. Yanfolila
7. Yorosso

MOPTI

1. Mopti
2. Bandiagara
3. Bankass
4. Djenns
5. Douentza
6. Koro
7. Tenenkou
8. Youvarou

GAO

1. Gao
2. Ansongo
3. Bouron
4. Kidal
5. Menaka

KOULIKORO

1. Koulikoro
2. Banamba
3. Dioula
4. Kangaba
5. Kati
6. Kolokani
7. Nara

SEGOU

1. Segou
2. Baraoueli
3. Bla
4. Macina
5. Niono
6. San
7. Tominian

TOMBOUCTOU

1. Tombouctou
2. Dire
3. Goundam
4. Gourma-Rharous
5. Niafunke

Other Int'l Boundaries

Region Boundary


Cercle Boundary

● National Capital
○ Regional Capital

200 km

NIGER: ADMINISTRATIVE UNITS (DEPARTEMENTS & ARRONDISSEMENTS)

MAP A3: NIGER



FEWS/PWA

DEPARTEMENTS NIAMEY ZINDER DOSSO DIFFA TAHOUA AGADEZ MARADI		——— DEPT. BOUNDARY ——— ——— ARRON. BOUNDARY ——— ● DEPT CAPITAL ● NAT'L CAPITAL	OTHER ARRONDISSEMENTS 1. KOLLO 8. BIRNI N'KONNI 2. BIRNI N'GAOURE 7. MADAOUA 3. CAYA 8. GUIDAN ROUNDJI 4. DOGONDOUTCHI 9. MADAROUNFA 5. LOGA 10. TESSAOUA 11. MATAMEYE
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