


Report to the Congress
on Famine in
Sub-Sahara Africa

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Sub-Saharan Africa

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Introduction

Drought is becoming the routine in parts of Africa. Since 1968 and especially during the 1970's, the reality of droughts achieved massive proportions, with increasing costs - human and monetary - required to keep the consequences tolerably manageable. The lives of millions have been affected, the economic fabric of national governments has been deeply disturbed, and the future of large regions is now in peril.

The problem of drought has been most spectacularly manifested in the region known as the Sahel, comprising large parts of Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Chad, Upper Volta and Senegal. Separate drought problems have had a severe effect upon Ethiopia. More limited drought conditions have occurred in a number of other countries.

There has been a world-wide outpouring of concern about the drought in the Sahel, and more recently for emerging drought conditions in Ethiopia: The less dramatic drought conditions in other parts of Africa have been largely controlled by local government efforts; but it has become increasingly evident that some of these governments need help in lessening the problems which face their people.

The United States has been a major participant in providing assistance to those affected by drought in Africa. The Congress has played a key role in permitting the effectiveness of this United States effort. It supported the U.S. response to the critical needs in the Sahel through the authorization of \$25 million in special funding under Section 639(A) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1973. As the gravity of drought problems in Africa spread, the Congress acted further through the Foreign Disaster Assistance Act of 1974 which provided an additional \$85 million to meet drought needs not only in the Sahel but in other African countries - including a provision that \$10 million of this amount would be available for Ethiopia.

In authorizing the original \$25 million for Sahel emergency programs, the Congress requested, in Section 639(A) of the 1973 Foreign Assistance Act, that:

"The President shall report to the Congress as soon as possible on solutions to this problem of famine and further propose how any of these solutions may be carried out by multilateral organizations."

In proposing the 1974 Foreign Disaster Assistance Act, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee recognized that the full dimensions of drought problems in Africa were not yet known. In its Report Number 98-835, the Committee stated:

"The Committee notes that the testimony before it demonstrates that the full magnitude of the ongoing and spreading drought is not yet full known, and that it may well exceed the most pessimistic of current

projections. With this in mind, the Committee requests AID to report fully on the extent of the drought damage of each African country which is presently an AID recipient, the estimated amount needed to relieve this damage, and the amount of contributions scheduled to be made by the various local governments, by other donors, and by the United States."

The following report is intended as a first response to these requests.

It must be recognized, however, that the problem of drought continues in many areas in Africa. In particular, the drought in the Sahel has not yet been broken. The repercussion of these events can not, therefore, be fully told. In the Sahel, an immense emergency relief program continues to be needed. In Ethiopia, while drought in the north has eased, drought in the south is spreading. In both the Sahel and Ethiopia, major recovery programs will be required if the people of these regions are to regain hope for the future and achieve conditions where future droughts will have lesser impact.

This report, then, seeks to describe the situation in drought stricken regions of Africa as of June 30, 1974. The immediate drought impact is described, as are relief programs underway. An indication is given of what continued relief programs may be required, although the full dimensions of such need cannot be predicted. The report also suggests some of the longer term needs of the affected countries, as well as steps which are being taken to plan better how these long term needs can be met.

But given the contribution of the problems of drought, this must be looked upon as an interim report. AID will provide additional information to the Congress in the future as the situation develops and requirements are better defined.

Part I - Drought in the Sahel

A. The Situation - Past and Present

Over recent years, the world has become aware of a catastrophic drought in the sub-Sahara part of West Africa known as the Sahel. Following dry years between 1968 and 1971, a sharp decline in rainfall and agricultural production in 1972 and 1973 has left destitute large parts of the population of Senegal, Mauritania, Mali, Upper Volta, Niger and Chad.


The Sahel - an Arabic word meaning "border" and representing the shore of the Sahara Desert - is a two million square mile area of semi-arid lands extending roughly 2600 miles eastward from the Atlantic Ocean and lying between latitudes of 10 and 20 degrees north. An area of fragile ecological balance, inhabited largely by nomadic herdsmen and subsistence farmers, it is one of the least developed regions of the world. Existence of all life is heavily dependent on sparse and variable rainfall. Over a sustained dry spell, such as the present one, the threat of starvation and death becomes a reality.

The Sahel has experienced multi-year droughts before. A severe one occurred 50 years ago, and there have been periodic droughts since. But the present situation, now five or more years old, may well be the worst drought in history. It is certainly a major catastrophe. The Center for Disease Control undertook a nutritional survey in 1973 which estimated that as many as 100,000 may have died. International experts have estimated that perhaps 40% of the goats, sheep, cattle and camels, on which much of the economy and social structure rests, have fallen victims to the drought.

Lack of rain has not been the only factor in today's plight. The population of humans and livestock has grown greatly over recent decades, straining the limited resources of the Sahel. Levels of agricultural productivity have fallen, causing farmers to extend cultivation into more and more marginal lands in order to feed the increasing population. The Sahara has encroached on fertile lands - estimates suggest that 250,000 square miles of arable land have been lost to the desert over the past 50 years. Thus, even before the drought there was deterioration in the land and a weakening of the physical resources upon which the people depended.

With the coming of the drought, particularly with the sharply lower rainfall of 1972 and 1973, the situation abruptly became far more serious. Trees and grasslands were destroyed by overgrazing. Pasturages became barren and eroded. Lakes, rivers and wells shrivelled and dried up. Reserves of grain, including seed stocks, were consumed. Thousands of nomads, their livestock destroyed, congregated in cities or refugee camps - or perished. Farmers, unable to remain on their lands, moved desperately to the cities and feeding centers.


The desert continues to encroach in the Sahel. These trees in Mauritania are being engulfed by the shifting sands.



AID is helping livestock feeding centers, such as this one in Mauritania.

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
USG PL 480 CONTRIBUTIONS



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
FY 1973 EMERGENCY NON-FOOD ASSISTANCE

TOTAL: \$4,696,916




FY 1974 EMERGENCY NON-FOOD ASSISTANCE

TOTAL: \$8,686,658



FY 1974 NON-FOOD ASSISTANCE

TOTAL: \$25,000,000



AID had maintained modest technical assistance and food aid programs in the Sahel, with approximately \$119.2 million* being provided from FY 1962 through FY 1972. With the failure of the 1972 harvest (the harvest season ends in October or November), it was obvious that major food imports would be required. AID substantially increased its food aid programs. The situation became increasingly desperate and in March, 1973 the six governments jointly declared a regional disaster and called for international assistance. This call for help led to a massive, world-wide response, in which the United States has played a leading role. This response continues to this day.

The first concern of international action has been to save lives. Food, medicine, tents, blankets, medical teams, were shipped quickly, in quantities larger than the region had ever before known. On occasion aid moved faster than systems could be organized to control its flow. In the first year of operations, lack of knowledge and enormous problems of transport and communications meant that aid did not reach all those in need. This year, that aid effort is vastly improved. Donors and African Governments alike are working more efficiently and with greater coordination in their efforts. People are receiving the food and medical attention they need.

While relief efforts are essential, they are not enough if the Sahelian people are to have a decent way of life. The drought is having a profound effect on the region: a fundamental weakening of the ecological base; disruption of social and economic relationships; the changing of basic ways of life.

For this reason, the African governments and the donor community - while seeking to meet the immediate needs of the Sahel's people - have also begun to seek answers to the underlying ecological and economic problems of the region. Only if these answers can be found and investments made to bring basic change to the region, can a repetition of today's disaster be avoided in the future.

AID's approach, in consort with that of the Africans and other donors, has thus been - first, to provide necessary emergency relief; second to undertake activities that can help alleviate immediate shortcomings in agricultural production and infrastructure and lay foundations for future, comprehensive development.

B. Emergency Relief

AID began its emergency relief efforts in November, 1972 when the first allocation of relief grain shipments was made. Large additional food movements followed, as has provision of non-food aid. Through June 30, 1974, U.S. commitments reached a total of approximately \$130 million, of which \$100 million is in food aid (including costs of ocean

*This figure does not include Africa-wide regional programs or Peace Corps programs.

freight and inland transport). U.S. food shipments of 506,000 metric tons (256,000 tons in 1972 - 1973 and 250,000 tons in 1973 - 1974)* represent about 46% of the world-wide contribution, by tonnage, of food going to the Sahel. Total U.S. assistance of \$130 million represents about one-third of the world-wide drought response estimated at \$361 million.

There have been many problems in delivering emergency assistance to the Sahel. Most of the U.S. food contribution is sorghum, a grain which has fortunately been in relatively good supply in the United States. But in 1973 there were times when ships were hard to obtain because of massive, world-wide grain movements. Ports in West Africa are poorly equipped to handle these huge shipments and there have been port congestion problems, particularly this year. Railroads were often inadequate to move foods inland on a timely basis. There are few paved roads. Ferries are slow and inefficient. River transport is important but capacity has been inadequate for the amounts involved. Roads leading to many outlying distribution points where nomads congregated are difficult at best, impassable when the rains come. Few trucks, and problems of their maintenance, have often caused difficulties. Airlifts have been needed and provided by several donors - including U.S. Air Force airlifts in Mali, Chad and Mauritania last year and now another airlift underway in Mali. Lack of storage has been a problem. The complexity of managing relief operations of this nature, involving six recipient governments and a number of donors under extremely difficult physical conditions, is without precedent.

Despite these problems, relief operations in the Sahel are functioning far better now than they did a year ago, particularly in providing for the needs of "at-risk" populations. The situation varies, of course, from country to country. The three nations hardest hit by the drought are Mali, Niger and Mauritania. Mali has vastly improved administration of its relief program and has a well functioning system despite the problem of large numbers of nomads who have become refugees and the long distances over which distribution systems must operate. Niger's food needs are the greatest in the region and movement of this vast quantity of goods has caused enormous logistical and administrative problems. Despite earlier weaknesses, Nigerien efficiency in administering relief efforts has been made better in recent months and the system now seems generally well in hand. Mauritania is faced with major transport problems and weaknesses in government administrative structure. This has caused some disruption in the relief effort, although constant improvements have been made. Of the other Sahel states, Senegal has been least affected by the drought this year and has a well functioning relief program; Upper Volta has also been less touched and seems to have its problems under control. In Chad, the situation is more serious. Governmental weaknesses and attitudes have been such that the food distribution and relief effort are not yet meeting all national needs, especially the problems facing the "at-risk" population.

*These figures represent shipments per crop year. For fiscal year, shipments total 156,000 million tons for FY 1973; 350,000 million tons for FY 1974.

In general, starvation has been largely avoided this year. Serious epidemics and drought related ailments have been minimized and are less a problem than in 1973. Signs of malnutrition have been greatly reduced. Despite large livestock losses last year, conditions of livestock this year have improved. As a whole, while many problems continue to face African governments and donors alike, the relief effort is reaching those in need on a timely basis.

However, the drought is not yet broken. This year's agricultural season has begun, but rains are again spotty. If the rains fail again this year, vast food imports will continue to be needed. Even if reasonable rainfall occurs, the disruptions that have hit the region mean that important food programs will be needed over the coming year.

Accurate food import requirements can be estimated only towards the end of the Sahel harvest season in October. It has been agreed that FAO will organize a Multi-Donor Food Assessment Study in October of this year - as was done last year - so that an estimate of food import needs can be made that is mutually acceptable to Africans and donors and can serve as a base for next year's donor food commitments. In the meantime, the United States is urging other donors to make new interim commitments to assure a continued flow of food beyond existing commitments which are based only on needs through October, 1974. For its own part, AID plans to announce additional contributions in July, 1974 of 100,000 tons of food - 40,000 tons to apply to the Sahel 1973-1974 crop year, bringing U.S. contributions in that period to a total of 290,000 tons; and 60,000 tons to be applied as a first phase of requirements in the 1974-1975 period.

C. Recovery and Rehabilitation Programs


With the \$25 million provided under the special Sahel section of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1973, the United States was able to supplement its food aid and immediate disaster relief response with a broader range of actions to cope with drought problems. AID determined that a set of Recovery and Rehabilitation programs should be initiated with the following key aims:

- a. Stimulating short term agricultural production, with emphasis on impact to be achieved in the 1974 and 1975 harvest seasons;
- b. Protection of livestock;
- c. Improvement of roads, river systems and other transport modes needed to assure delivery of relief supplies to remote areas;
- d. Improvement of storage in remote areas;
- e. Improvement of medical programs for at-risk populations.

Seedlings by the thousands are being grown in the Kombissiri nursery in Upper Volta. One aim is to supply firewood.



El Hadji Sow, Senegal farmer, displays crops made possible with well provided by AID and Peace Corps Volunteer Bob McGurn.




One barge was being made ready for Niger River traffic at Koulikoro, Mali. AID is helping to improve marine service.



Youngsters on a farm in the Matourkou rural development project in Upper Volta plow a field in preparation for planting. Peuhl herds-men are to be given the opportunity to participate in the project, operated by a UN agency and financed by AID.

Youngsters in the refugee camp at Tchín Tabaraden, Niger, dip into their daily bowl of high-protein porridge. Milk is furnished daily to the children in the refugee camps.



AID is financing airlifts of food supplies in Mali. This US Air Force plane is discharging its cargo in Timbuktu.



AID is shipping sorghum under the Food for Peace Program. The grain is shipped in bulk, bagged on the dock in Dakar, then trucked or sent by rail inland.



U.S. sorghum travels long distances and in strange ways. This bag was delivered to a destitute nomad family by camel. Although few nomads can read or write, they are aware of the origin of the food and recognize the AID symbol.



A youngster in Chad receives protection against measles. AID is supporting mobile health units in reaching remote areas.

AID sent specialized teams and task forces to the Sahel in the fall of 1973 to identify specific projects which could meet the criteria indicated above. This led to a series of project recommendations covering approximately \$15 million in activities which could be launched right away and have an early impact on easing drought problems. Most of the activities identified can be carried out in collaboration with other donors, the Peace Corps and U.S. voluntary agencies. A simplified programming system was established, specialized personnel were placed in the field to monitor the Recovery and Rehabilitation programs, and agreements were negotiated with the six Sahel governments. These programs are now underway.

In Mali, a major means for getting food into remote areas is use of the Niger River. But inadequate tugs, barges and cargo handling equipment limits the amount of food that can be moved. One of the Mali R&R projects is providing new motors for barges and improved cargo handling equipment - and all this equipment will be in operation by autumn, 1974.

In Mauritania, a potential source for increasing food production is better utilization of river in flood plains, and an R&R project in that country aims at stimulating an early increase in food production in these areas.

Throughout the Sahel, storage facilities in remote areas are limited, and several R&R projects aim at constructing new storage facilities, financing rental of temporary storage, and providing tarpaulins and other coverage for temporary storage in such areas.

In Chad, CARE plays an important role in distributing food and providing medical services to certain distressed areas and an R&R project in that country is supplementing CARE's capacity to carry out this distribution program.

AID currently has under consideration an additional number of R&R projects, potentially costing \$10 to \$15 million, which will be financed from the recent Foreign Disaster Assistance Act provision of \$85 million for drought stricken areas.

D. Planning for the Future

While actively pursuing emergency relief programs and short range Recovery and Rehabilitation projects, AID is also working with Sahel governments and other donors in planning for the medium and long-term development of the Sahel. Only if longer term development activities can be successfully planned and carried out over the coming several years will the conditions which underlay the suffering now occurring because of drought be changed in ways which prevent a re-occurrence of today's disaster.

The African Governments themselves, at a meeting of their heads of State in September, 1973, laid out the general lines for a long-range development plan the cost of which is estimated at \$800 million. But Africans and donors alike recognize that converting this general plan into an action program requires further study and the development of investment priorities.

To help in this long-range effort, AID has financed a contract with MIT to assess development alternatives available to Sahel governments. A number of scientific studies are underway to seek means to bring rapid technological change. These include studies on possible application of remote sensing and space technology to resource planning, climatological studies; studies on improved varieties of grain adaptable to the region and the like. Other donors are also undertaking studies of various development approaches. The African Governments, through an Inter-State Committee organized at their heads of State meeting in September, 1973, is seeking to organize and coordinate planning activities underway. It is anticipated that these various efforts will culminate in a series of international conferences in late 1974 to look at planning efforts undertaken to date and to chart how these can be brought together into a more comprehensive effort.

Even while this longer term comprehensive planning is proceeding, other steps are being taken to meet Sahelian development needs.

On the basis of the Foreign Disaster Assistance Act of 1974, AID has proceeded to work out with the Sahel governments a series of national projects aimed specifically at improving agricultural and livestock production. These activities are, in a sense, further extension of agricultural projects undertaken through the R&R program. They are intended to help agriculturalists and livestock herders improve their well-being while more comprehensive, regional development plans are being organized.

Also, a number of longer term regional efforts are being planned which will fit into more comprehensive longer term efforts. Mali, Mauritania and Senegal have joined together to plan major improvement in use of the Senegal River waters and have invited donors to participate in a multi-year river basin development program. The IBRD has organized a multi-country effort to control river blindness in the Volta River basin as a first step in exploiting the water resources of this area and AID is participating in this effort. The Lake Chad Basin Commission has plans for long term development in that region and as part of its medium term effort AID is considering some experimental work in development of low cost irrigation systems in the Chad Basin area.

Africans and donors alike recognize that more planning efforts are needed if the problems of the drought stricken Sahel are to be eased. This planning must take into account the relationships between the arid and semi-arid lands of the Sahel itself and the wetter, generally more productive countries to the South. There is increasing recognition by Africans and donors that only if comprehensive development programs are designed and financing found for them in years to come can one hope to avoid a repetition of the tragedy facing the people of the Sahel in 1974.

Part II - Drought in Ethiopia

Ethiopia, one of the least developed countries in the world, has often suffered adversity. This has become pronounced in recent years as low rainfall has led to drought and famine. Originally confined to the north, drought conditions have recently spread to the south as well. It is estimated that from two to six million people are affected by drought conditions at present.

Weak and sporadic rainfall is not uncommon in parts of Ethiopia. In the two worst hit areas of northern Ethiopia, Wollo and Tigre provinces, poor rains in 1971 were followed by good rains in early 1972 which then turned scant later in the year. The "small rains" of early 1973 were critical for this region - but the small rains failed throughout Ethiopia. At the same time, as in the Sahel, these provinces faced ecological imbalances related to increasing population pressure on steadily weakening physical resources.

In February, 1973, the FAO Early Warning System signalled probable food shortages in these provinces. In April, the Ethiopian government established a drought relief mechanism, banned exports of most domestic cereals and called for international help. AID responded promptly, diverting grain in country from other programs to relief activities. In anticipation of sub-standard 1973 harvests, AID committed 18,000 tons of grain, 10,000 through the World Food Program and 8,000 tons bilaterally. Other donors also responded.

By the end of 1973, it was evident food aid alone was not enough. In December, the U.S. Ambassador declared a disaster situation, permitting utilization of AID Disaster Relief Funds for non-food needs. Levels of U.S. food aid were also increased.

By June 30, 1974, total U.S. assistance to Ethiopia reached a value of just under \$18.0 million, \$15.6 million for the purchase and transport of 64,418 tons of relief food and the remainder for temporary storage facilities, in-country transport, blankets and tents, medical supplies, use of helicopters and the like.

The Ethiopian government also took further steps. Domestic cereals from surplus areas were provided to the drought region. Relief administration improved. Military trucks were organized to carry relief goods. Efforts were undertaken to clear stock build-ups in the ports, and these efforts were largely successful by June.

Other donor efforts also increased. Food and non-food commitments went up. Donors began consideration of recovery type programs proposed jointly by the Ethiopian government and the United Nations Disaster Relief Office.

At this time, while the situation in the north is still difficult, it appears to be easing. Rains improved this spring. Relief administration is much better. Plans for recovery programs are going ahead with good donor response.

But since early 1974, drought has spread to the south, an area of much larger distances, more scattered populations, with pastoral rather than settled groups. These vast distances and poor communications make it difficult to know the precise dimensions of the problem. For this reason, AID used three helicopters in the summer of 1974 to survey conditions in the south. The report which is being compiled as a result of this activity will give the government and donors a better idea of what needs to be done.

Current estimates for 1974, largely in the north, indicate still another sub-standard harvest. Donors have already committed 132,800 tons and are expected to pledge additional quantities in coming months. The United States is currently considering a new commitment of 20,000 tons. However, as surveys of the south progress, it is expected that estimates of overall national food needs will increase and substantial donor commitments again will be required.


AID has already initiated discussions with the government concerning participation in the medium term recovery program for the north jointly designed by FAO and the government (in which other donors are participating). In addition, it is clear that additional emergency actions and some recovery and rehabilitation activities will be required in the south as greater understanding regarding problems there emerges.

For these combined needs, in addition to food aid already committed and to be provided in FY 1975, AID now has tentatively identified uses of \$10 million available under the Foreign Disaster Assistance Act of 1974 for the following purposes:

1. additional short term emergency (non-food) requirements;
2. relief and rehabilitation programs, north and south;
3. medium term rehabilitation, largely in the north.

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One of the 31 U.S. trucks diverted to Ethiopia from Germany by AID. The trucks are urgently needed to distribute food.



The carcasses of cattle that have died from dehydration in southern Ethiopia are collected in a pile to be burned.



Instant CSM provided by AID is used at relief camps in special feeding program for severely malnourished children.



Kitchen staff at a relief camp prepare the morning meal. The ovens at left are used to bake njera, a traditional flat bread.

Part III - Drought Problems Elsewhere in Africa

There are three types of drought-related problems which are occurring in Africa outside the Sahel and Ethiopia.

a. "Spillover" effects of the Sahel drought in adjacent areas, where lower than normal rainfall is occurring in ecological conditions not dissimilar from the Sahel.

b. Other side effects in these countries, such as migratory movements out of the Sahel and extensive pressure on transport systems caused by massive food shipments to the Sahel.

c. Drought conditions in other areas with direct relationship to the Sahel/Ethiopia situation.

In the first category, there appears to be inadequate rainfall in the northern parts of Guinea, Ivory Coast, Ghana, Dahomey, Nigeria, Gambia and the Cameroons. Somewhat similar conditions are occurring in Western Sudan. In these regions there have been increases in human and animal population as has occurred in the Sahel. Low productivity, limited infrastructure and weaker economic/social services exist in these regions than in the more southerly parts of the same countries. Because the afflicted regions are parts of larger economies, the ties to economically stronger regions are greater than for the Sahel and the impact of drought conditions on overall economies is less than for the Sahel countries themselves. For these reasons, these countries have been largely able to meet their needs with their own resources. However, in Guinea, Gambia, the Cameroons and, to a lesser extent, Ghana, food deficits were such that AID has been asked to provide PL 480 assistance. In all these countries, continuing analysis is needed to determine the extent both of immediate drought conditions and of longer term ecological deterioration which may be underway.

Population movement from the Sahel to the coastal states has occurred for many years. Until recently this was largely workers moving from the poorer Sahel to the industries in the south. With the onslaught of the drought, this migration has included nomads seeking better pastures and refugees seeking new food sources. This movement has particularly affected Nigeria, Ivory Coast, Dahomey and, in the other direction, Algeria. Each of these countries is burdened with caring for large numbers of totally dependent persons.

There has also been heavy pressure on transport systems in the coastal countries. Ports and railways have been heavily burdened with food movements. The coastal states have accepted considerable sacrifice

to their own imports and exports to assure movement of this food. Competition for trucking has driven costs up. Roads, rail beds, bridges and ferries have been worn by extensive movement and heavy loads.

Thus, the coastal states, in differing degrees, have been affected in two ways - by some drought conditions in their own northern regions, and by added burdens on their economies caused by the Sahel drought.

For now, the only other area in Africa experiencing drought conditions is East Africa. Here, the effect has been shorter and less severe than in the Sahel and Ethiopia. Tanzania has been most affected. This country - already among the poorest in the world and seriously affected by the energy crisis - has had to import large amounts of food and this has had deep balance of payments and budgetary effects.

Parts of Kenya were also hit by drought in 1973 and 1974, but recent rains, of about 80 per cent normal volume, have relieved the situation in most parts of the country. Kenya managed to meet most of the needs of its distressed people with its own resources. Somalia is always subject to variable rainfall and may be facing drought problems in coming months. Botswana is a drought prone area, although there do not now appear wide spread drought problems.

The only significant requests for AID assistance by countries outside the Sahel and Ethiopia have been for food aid. PL 480 responses have been made in Kenya, Guinea, Gambia, the Cameroons and, on a small scale, in Ghana. A request from Tanzania and another from Kenya is currently under study.

Reviews are currently underway with the countries indicated above to determine whether additional programs beyond food aid are appropriate. This may lead to some programming in these countries although AID's assessment is that highest priority must continue to go to the Sahel and Ethiopia. It is anticipated that the bulk of the \$85 million provided under the Foreign Disaster Assistance Act of 1974 will therefore be used in the Sahel and Ethiopia.

ANNEX I

ASSESSMENT OF SAHEL EMERGENCY, CURRENT SITUATION, AND RELATIONS WITH OTHER DONORS AND AFRICAN REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Part I - Emergency Situation Throughout the Sahel as of June 30, 1974

The Sahelian drought is continuing to have catastrophic consequences. The vast area's fragile eco-system, that was so seriously disrupted by lack of rain in the summer of 1972, was further unbalanced by the inadequate rainfall of 1973 and the continued displacement of people and their dependency upon relief. The most obvious results were that harvests of feed grains in the six countries to meet minimal survival needs were short about 550,000 MTs for crop year 1972-73 and 650,000 MTs for 1973-74. It is not known how many people lost their lives last year as a result of the drought conditions for firm data is almost impossible to obtain. However, based on limited sampling, the HEW Center for Disease Control estimated that as many as 100,000 people may have died. It is obvious that this year the cumulative impact of inadequate or bare subsistence diets will leave many more susceptible to disease. The loss in livestock is incalculable, as is the impact on the many thousands of nomadic families whose way of life depends on cattle, camels, goats, and sheep. Many of these nomad families have again crowded into relief centers in Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and around urban areas throughout the Sahel. It has been estimated that up to 40% of all livestock were lost last year, and it will take years to regenerate national herds. One consequence in Mauritania is that deliveries of grain in some remote areas must be by truck this year and additional distribution centers must be erected because the camels used for transport in prior years are gone. The cumulative impact of the drought can be seen in other ways, as more demands are made on the limited arable land, pasturage, and water sources for the survival of man and beast. For example, in Mauritania's most agriculturally productive region bordering the Senegal River, plantings this spring are 40% of the usual acreage because of sub-normal bottom land flooding. It is too early to tell how extensive this year's rains may be, but, even if they are heavier than normal, the Sahelian tragedy will continue with displaced persons seeking to reestablish their lives, those weakened by malnutrition more susceptible to disease, and grain production levels too low to meet the population needs.

The known amounts of grain allocated so far in 1973-74 by all donors to the Sahel totals over 620,000 tons, or over 90% of the estimated needs prior to the October harvests. The United States is providing 290,000 MTs, or 45% of the total. This total of 290,000 MT includes an additional 40,000 MT provided subsequent to June 30, 1974 from FY 75 availabilities. In addition, deliveries to the ports are earlier than last year, and significant efforts are being made to pre-position grain in areas of greatest needs. However, there are

critical short-term problems because important links in the coastal transshipment system are in jeopardy. Of particular concern is the capacity of the ports of Dakar, Abidjan and Lagos to handle the enormous deliveries of relief supplies from May-July.

The primary port of entry for supplies for Mali, Mauritania, and Senegal is Dakar. This critical link in the distribution chain faces great strain because of limitations on evacuation rates, particularly to Mali. The grain for this landlocked country is transshipped by railroad, which has so far reached maximum monthly shipment rates of 15-20,000 MTs. There is now a backlog of about 50,000 MTs of grain in port, including about 23,140 MTs of grain purchased commercially by the Government of Mali. About 4,500 MTs of this amount is US grain. Steps are underway to seek to raise rail shipment rates, as well as to redirect shipments to other ports, including Abidjan, Cotonou, and Algiers.

The secondary point of entry for Mali is Abidjan, which is now also strained with commercial imports and exports as well as donated grains. Fortunately, closed storage is not a problem at this time and US grain in this port is moving out on a regular basis.

There have been reports of spoilage in this port, but this appears to relate primarily to a commercial purchase by the Government of Mali of 11,000 tons of Pakistan rice which was apparently spoiled before it arrived in port.

The other critical external link is the Port of Lagos, through which a majority of over 250,000 tons of grain pledged by all donors for Niger and Chad is to be delivered. The evacuation rate of the port had been only about 12,000 MTs per month and the port problems have been exacerbated by Nigerian railway breakdowns and strikes by railway and port workers. Steps have been taken recently to augment use of truck transport from this port to Niger and Chad, and about 25,000 MT a month can now be evacuated to Niger and about 12,000 MT per month can be sent to Chad. Actual shipments to Chad have been lower due to bottlenecks at internal points. The U.S. had also contracted in Lagos with a bulk/bagging facility, which has enabled us to greatly accelerate our deliveries for Niger and Chad.

Two intermediate inland points in the transshipment train have also been of considerable concern: Rosso in Mauritania and Maiduguri in Nigeria (for grains going to Chad). US-donated grains for Mauritania are shipped via Dakar (because Nouakchott is already flooded with other donor grain) to Rosso. The river crossing is a problem because of poor ferry service, although early arrival of a British-donated ferry has eased the situation. However, internal distribution throughout Mauritania remains a problem. Maiduguri, which is the staging point for movement into Chad, is plagued by physical problems (rains, rutted roads) and differences on how to use Chadian and

Nigerian commercial trucking to move grains into Chad.

While these and other major problems remain to be dealt with this year, the United States and other donors, and most of the African Governments have learned and applied important lessons gained from last year's experience. For example, determination of grain requirements, donor commitments to meet these requirements, and the actual movement of grains (particularly American grains) has been accomplished far earlier this year than last. In October 1973, an FAO Multidonor Mission encouraged and participated in by the United States, visited the six most affected countries of the Sahel and assessed food requirements for the coming crop year. Donations by the United States and other nations were announced soon thereafter. In fact, commitments for most of the 620,000 tons of grains pledged to date were made by January 1974. The US is considering an additional allocation and delivery in the first quarter of FY 1975 which, with hoped-for further commitments by other donors, would mean that the revised FAO grain need estimate of 650,000 MTs will have been met. In contrast, last year there was only an informally coordinated assessment of need by donor states and the majority of grain commitments were still being sought in the late spring of 1973. The same range of improvement is evident in this year's deliveries. Specifically, only about 75,000 tons, or about one-third of the United States total commitment in the period prior to the 1973 harvest (crop year 1972-73) was actually delivered in Africa by June 30, 1973. This year, 185,000 tons out of our 290,000 ton commitment, or 65% will be delivered by June 30.

An additional 65,000 MT is being delivered in July and August with the remaining 40,000 MT to be delivered this fall. While shipments from other donors have not moved as quickly as those from the United States, there has been some acceleration, due particularly to the coordination efforts provided by the FAO Office of Sahelian Relief Operations in Rome.

Internal measures by the African Governments concerned have also proceeded earlier and more effectively than last year. These measures include better organization of distribution systems; pre-positioning of grains in remote areas that are inaccessible by road in the rainy season; mobilization of military and private truckers for distribution; and improved administration of relief camps. The United States and others have helped in this complex process by financing the enormously increased POL costs, truck purchases and rentals, key road and bridge repairs, deepening and repair of wells, additional storage facilities, vaccines and fortified foods, and management expertise in various sectors of the relief effort to strengthen the capacities of the Governments to deal with their problems.

While food distribution is underway, as are the other emergency actions noted above, the United States and others are seeking to come to grips more comprehensively with the interrelated problems of malnutrition, disease, and care of displaced and dependent families. We and others

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have provided vaccines, fortified foods, and support for relief camps. A medical team from Yale has examined medical needs and made recommendations for improved health delivery. The HEW Center for Disease Control has sent medical epidemiologists to the five countries to help establish nutritional surveillance among the most vulnerable of the population. We have also contributed \$1 million through the FAO Sahel Trust Fund to support WHO and UNICEF health programs and \$100,000 to the League of Red Cross Societies relief camp program. An AID task force has been organized to develop further guidelines and parameters to deal with the displaced persons problem in what will be a most critical aspect of drought recovery measures by all donors in the next two or three years.

In order to help resolve the critical port congestion problems in Dakar and Lagos, noted above, AID sent a task force to Dakar with a mandate to determine what exceptional measures might be undertaken. For example, we will finance the rental of such additional storage space outside the port proper as may be needed to protect grains from spoilage. The Governments of Mali and Senegal have been addressing the problem of augmenting the carrying capacity of their jointly-owned railroad and a Danish logistics team is helping in this effort. This has resulted in a recent agreement which could eventually lead to a doubling of transport on this rail line from 12-14,000 tons a month to as much as 28,000 tons of grain.

As for the port of Lagos, in early May an AID task force worked with specially-assigned UN logistics experts to negotiate a contract with Nigerian truckers to move all donors' grain to Chad and Niger at the rate of up to 1,000 MTs per week in addition to the 500 MTs per day normally scheduled to move by rail. While there have been problems in reaching the level of evacuation forecast, we are hopeful that these steps will significantly ease port congestion problems and in turn meet the supply needs of Niger and Chad.

With the availability of the \$25 million provided under the special Sahel provision of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1973, the United States has been able to undertake a broader range of actions addressed to easing the problems caused by the drought. In particular, AID has organized a set of Recovery and Rehabilitation programs in each of the six Sahel states. These R and R programs are addressed at meeting critical needs in the immediate future and are designed to assist the people of the Sahel to improve their capacity to deal with the pervasive problems posed by the drought. The R and R programs include actions to improve movement of foods into more remote areas, such as road maintenance, rental of trucks, and the like; improvement of grain storage in remote areas by new construction and rental of special facilities; actions to stimulate agricultural production in the short term, such as provision of seeds and handtools; protection to existing livestock through provision of vaccines and supplemental foods; and assistance in medical programs, particularly in refugee camps and remote areas, through provision of medicines, vaccines, and similar


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actions. The R and R program has been designed to have as much impact as possible prior to the harvest period of September-October, 1974, and with full impact within 18-36 months. These programs will be continued and augmented with the additional funds made available on July 8, 1974, by amendment to the special Sahel Act.

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TOTAL FY 1973-FY 1974 ASSISTANCE TO SAHELIAN AFRICA

\$129,000,000



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Part II - Current Situation in Individual Sahel States

Mali: Mali is among the more seriously affected of the Sahel states: a majority of the country having suffered from prolonged drought. Mali lists close to 1.9 million victims of the drought within its estimated 5.2 million population. Some 40 relief camps have been structured to care for the most severely affected, mostly nomadic families. Mali's grain production, as well as its cotton and peanuts for export, was heavily reduced by the continuing drought, thus intensifying Mali's already serious budgetary and balance of payments problems. The expanse of the country, coupled with the lack of rail and road infrastructure and its landlocked position, makes Mali both difficult to reach and difficult to traverse.

The FAO Multidonor Mission has estimated total crop year 1973/74 requirements at 258,000 metric tons (MT) of grain and 22,890 MT of protective foods. A total of 314,914 MT of grains has been committed (including a pipeline of 46,117 MT and commercial purchases of 77,000 MT). While current year grain requirements will probably be met, there is still need for an additional 50,000 MT buffer stocks. The protective foods situation is far more serious; only 9,867 MT has so far been committed, and requests for special foods such as soy-fortified-grits (SFG) have not been forthcoming. Of the total commitments (donations and purchases) about 236,000 MT had arrived in Africa by late July.

The United States donated 94,000 MT of grain and 8,550 MT of protective foods to Mali during this period. By the end of July, 89,000 MT had been delivered to Africa.

Most grains moving into Mali travel the railway from the port of Dakar to the Mali terminal point at Kayes (or on to the capital at Bamako). Before the drought, no more than 6-7,000 tons of goods per month moved in one direction over that rail link. At present, the railway is averaging the movement of 15,000 tons of grain per month, and in a recent two-week period reached 9,000 tons. Still this has proved insufficient in light of Mali's substantial needs. As a result, grain destined for Mali is tending to accumulate in Dakar faster than the railway can move it. A recent agreement between the Senegalese and Mali Governments aims at eventually raising the evacuation capacity of the rail line to about 28,000 tons a month. If this can be achieved (and it can be done only at substantial expense to Senegal's own traffic diversions from the railway to other more expensive means of transport), Mali's food problems will be substantially eased. In addition to Dakar, substantial food deliveries can be made through Abidjan and donors are increasingly seeking to move food to Mali through this port, although its evacuation rate also has limits.

In general, the internal transport of grain is moving well. However, the Sixth Region (Gao area) is a traditional problem, as supply

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movement is normally dependent upon river transport. Thus, unlike the other regions, or countries of the Sahel, Mali's Sixth Region becomes more, rather than less accessible during the rainy season. The drought accentuated the drop in river level and last year, the period for river traffic to the Sixth Region was less than normal. Airlifts to the region became essential; the United States Air Force alone flew 7,122 tons of food to outlying areas from May to October 1973. There continued heavy demands in this region for relief supplies and by spring 1974, it became clear that airlifts would be needed again this year. The U.S. Air Force began operations out of Bamako on May 17 and so far have flown over 3,000 tons to the deficit area.

Special steps have been taken by the Mali Government to increase the flow to the Sixth Region. The United States is presently assisting with experimental deliveries from Cotonou (Dahomey) through Niger to Gao in the Sixth Region and from Abidjan through Niger to Gao. Some 1,600 tons of grain are being shipped via convoy through Algeria. Barge traffic is to be speeded with the use of diesel engines especially designed for truck turn-around at off-loading points.

Outside of transport problems, the internal distribution system is excellently organized. The relief camps in general are reported in much improved condition from this time last year: good management, rotating medical personnel, personal health records, inventories, special child-feeding, and in some a stress on food production, education for the young, and crafts. There were some serious medical problems last year; these appear to be well in hand now. Supplies of medicines and vaccines appear to have substantially reduced disease problems. The U.S. earlier this year rushed measles vaccines to Mali, and has committed additional vaccines to be supplied upon request.

Eventual evolvement from relief to rehabilitation to self-sufficiency for Mali's relief dependents will depend in large part upon rebuilding a compatible environment for peoples who are currently destitute. The European Development Fund, for example, estimates Mali lost close to 40% of its 5.3 million cattle, with losses up to 60% in some areas. The Mali and United States Governments have agreed to approximately \$3.1 million in recovery and rehabilitation activities in addition to relief. These activities are moving ahead rapidly. They include development of water resources for villages and rural health programs, and agricultural/livestock needs; improvement of road maintenance on routes to remote distribution points; and improved grain storage facilities. Emphasis has been given to improvements in transportation infrastructure to ensure that conventional systems can meet requirements next year without resort to airlift. An integrated program including supply of vehicles, road repair/construction, road and vehicle maintenance, river barge improvement and augmented storage are some of the investments already made. An effort has been made in all cases to also ensure that transportation investments are coordinated with non-drought related requirements thereby adding even greater

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dimension to the returns. Humanitarian concerns including health, nutrition and support to displaced populations will constitute an increasingly important aspect to the program.

Chad: The situation in Chad continues to present serious problems, mostly related to the vastness of the country, its weak administrative structure, political fractionalization, and lack of internal communication. Inadequacy of data and statistics make it difficult to determine with precision the real impact of the drought on all parts of the country.

The FAO Multidonor Mission estimated Chad's grain deficit for crop year 1973/74 at about 100,000 MT. Because of serious logistic problems, they felt that only 50,000 MT could be brought in. They also recommended between 3,150 and 8,350 MT in protective foods be donated. By the end of June, 61,878 MT of grain had been committed, of which 15,600 was pipeline. However, buffer stocks of about 50,000 MT may still be needed. The protective foods situation is less favorable; only 1,833 MT is available. Of the total committed less than 40,000 had arrived by the end of June.

During this period, the US donated 25,500 MT to Chad; all but 2,500 MT has arrived at port. Some of this grain has been diverted to Niger due to Chad's transport problems. It will be replaced from August shipments. The US also donated 702 MT of ICSM (through UNICEF), all of which has arrived.

Chad depends almost entirely on Nigerian ports for grain movements, since large ships cannot enter the alternate gateway at Douala Port, Cameroon. A breakdown in Nigeria railways operations in April/May, plus strikes by railway and port workers, have threatened the movement of grain into Niger and Chad. Through the use of supplementary trucking, movements of grain to both countries have improved substantially, and it is hoped that this can double or even treble monthly evacuation rates. However, a conflict between Chad and the Nigerian trucking associations regarding movement of grains past the Chad border has been difficult to resolve. The problems included the use of Nigerian trucks in Chad and increasing the trucking capacity to reduce accumulation of foods at the Nigerian border point at Maiduguri. To overcome these problems, the World Food Program provided an officer to special duty in Maiduguri.

Distribution within Chad is hampered by the multiple problems cited above. To this must be added the general security problems in the areas considered the worst affected. At base, however, there is no general plan of relief action. The drought relief coordinator relies upon requests for assistance from prefects and sub-prefects throughout the country. Each request means mobilizing supplies, personnel, transport and fuel. Requests are apparently not forthcoming until the situation has reached crisis proportions - as is the case of Mongo

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and encampment areas in the Guera Province to the north. There is currently a major effort underway by the Government and donors to resolve this situation. But there is little known about the possible presence of similar pockets of serious deficiencies elsewhere. The long distances, poor or no roads, limited trucking capacity and lack of relief communication network compound the difficulties of effecting timely requests and response.

Donors have been responding to emergencies on a case-by-case basis as well as by providing direct aid as possible to local groups (voluntary agencies and Red Cross) and/or through UNICEF and WHO. AID and the Government of Chad recently worked out a distribution by truck program involving CARE, which should help the immediate situation in the Guera Province as well as for the longer term. The two volunteers from the League of Red Cross Societies (LICROSS) returned in Geneva in July after being unable to resolve with the GOC the problems related to administration of grain distribution programs. The GOC believed that a separate Red Cross system would not be compatible with the existing distribution channels used by all other donors and volunteer agencies.

Medical services in Chad are fairly limited to urban centers, and the full range of medical and disease problems which face the population are not clear. However, AID has provided additional measles vaccines, the WHO and UNICEF are providing assistance, and Chad has recourse to regional health organizations. The Center for Disease Control conducted a nutritional surveillance survey in 31 villages - 20 in Kanem prefecture and 11 in Lac prefecture. CDC has written a preliminary report and expects to have its final analysis and tabulation report completed by late August. The preliminary report indicates that 22.5 per cent (175 of 779) of children examined were below the acute malnutrition threshold; 14.5 per cent of nomads were below threshold and 24.1 per cent sedentary and semi nomads (people who move around in one area and who usually have small farming areas) were below threshold. Thirty-nine per cent of the villages (12 of 31) reported measles epidemics in the past year, 10 of these in the Kanem area.

AID and the other donors also are considering the strong possibility of another airlift to the outlying areas in Chad. Last year, the U.S. Air Force missions flew 668 tons to the remote areas and back-hauled seeds brought into Chad from Sudan by an FAO-sponsored airlift. The Chad Government has indicated a need for an airlift again this year. However, the conditions of the landing fields are reportedly much deteriorated from last year and such an airlift would require smaller aircraft with lesser carrying capacity. An on-site assessment of facilities is now underway.

However, security is a problem: all official relief ground convoys must be accompanied by military escort. The disaffection and diffusion

of populations in the areas considered most affected by the drought only compound the administrative and logistic problems, as requirements for these regions tend to assume a lesser priority in the eyes of the Government. Our Mission in Chad is continuing to press the Chadian Government, in concert with other donors, to allow planning assistance as well as increased direct support to the relief action. AID's Assistant Administrator for Africa, Dr. Samuel C. Adams, Jr., recently discussed the situation with Chadian President Tombalbaye in an effort to increase government awareness and concern for the relief requirements. The U.S. Mission will pursue this to effect a more adequate relief response.

The human displacement and dependency is closely related to the country's loss of livestock, principally during the past two years. On the basis of limited data, the European Development Fund study indicated that 21-38% of Chad's 4.7 million cattle and unknown percent of its sheep and goats have been lost (with some areas recording up to 90% loss). Women and children seem to comprise the majority in the groups of relief dependent populations in the north; the men believed to have left with the remaining herds for southern pastures, markets and/or work. An undetermined number (estimates range from a few hundred families to several thousand) of displaced peoples have gathered in squatters' camps around the capital of N'djamena, where they appear to be able to find food and work. The families are victims primarily of herd losses. However, reports indicate many of the displaced families have followed their herds to Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Niger and Nigeria.

Chad's livestock industry was very adversely affected by the drought losses. Because of the importance that livestock has played as a foreign currency earner for Chad, these losses in the livestock sector have had a very serious impact on the budgetary and balance of payments situation of the country.

The Recovery and Rehabilitation program in Chad is somewhat more modest than in other Sahel countries, not because of need, but because of limited government capacity rapidly to absorb special aid programs. To date, \$1,967,000 of R and R programs have been agreed upon. These include grain storage in deficit areas, establishment of cordon sanitaire (animal health), accelerated grain and vegetable production under irrigated conditions in the Lake Chad area; construction and repair of village wells; and road repair work. We are hopeful that these activities can serve as a demonstration to the Government of the concern of the US Government and may open opportunities for increasing assistance to this very distressed country. A recent addition of a transport project with CARE may be a significant opportunity for improving transportation systems.

Mauritania: The situation in 1974 remains as precarious as last year, despite considerable improvement in relief management and increased capacity to handle emergency relief shipments. The current major

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problem is internal distribution.

Mauritania's ability to receive, store and distribute relief food-stuffs has not been keeping up with increased donor flows.

Livestock losses have been substantial and agricultural production seriously reduced. Not only has dry land agriculture been diminished, but there have been substantial reductions in production on river flood plain areas due to lower river levels.

The revised estimate of the Multidonor Mission of crop year 1973/74 requirements is 200,000 MT of grain and 10,000 MT of protective foods. About 143,063 MT of grains (including a 39,300 pipeline) and 8,837 MT of protective foods has been committed. About 83,000 MT has been delivered.

U.S. commitments during this period are 51,000 MT of sorghum and protective foods: 38,103 MT of sorghum; 7,004 MT of soy-fortified grits (SFG); 4,631 MT of corn-soy blend (CSB); 1,262 MT of instant corn-soy-milk (ICSM). The ICSM is provided via UNICEF. Mauritania has taken a special interest in protective foods. All but 1,800 MT has been delivered.

Priorities related to the drought in Mauritania are now geared toward the problem of internal distribution of foods. Arrivals have been timely and regular. But evacuation of stocks from Rosso and Nouakchott to the outlying areas have been seriously hampered by sandstorms, limited transport availabilities (military and commercial), length of travel time to the various regions and lack of administrative capacity in logistic/transport management.

Areas receiving the grains are getting too little for inland pre-positioning prior to the rains. AID recently found bags disintegrating from the direct sun rays and has provided new bags for rebagging. Tarps and polyethylene film have also been provided for stockpile protection, and donors have been advised of the need for similar action regarding Nouakchott stocks.

It should be noted that much of the food shipments (non-US) have been made through the port of Nouakchott, which has limited facilities and is presently strained to capacity. The US and some other donor food shipments are made through Dakar and transported by rail-barge or truck-ferry to Rosso, the major storage point in Mauritania. The ferry system was slow at best; when one of the ferries sank recently, it caused a disruption in the flow of food into the country. The British Government has provided a replacement ferry.

To assist the internal distribution system, donors agreed to provide more than 80 trucks and are, with AID assistance, planning a vehicle maintenance facility. This will bring Mauritania's total truck capacity to 250. Of this total, the 110 government-owned 10-ton trucks

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have been assigned to transport grain from Rosso and Nouakchott to the deficit areas of the First, Second and Third Regions. The goal is total evacuation of these ports by the end of July. While the Mauritanian Government achieved this goal, the maximum haulage capacity of trucks in use appears less than needed. Nevertheless, significant evacuation is possible and donors remain willing to provide further assistance in the transport area, including manpower to assist in the management of storage/distribution resources.

Whether an airlift is required may depend on the rate of evacuation coupled with the rainy season and possibility of reports of severe deficit in the outlying areas. While the situation seems generally improved this year and Mauritania is paying careful attention to the human requirements, an airlift to the Eastern Regions has been requested. Mauritania's requirement for an airlift would be at the end of August/beginning September. The US stands ready to provide the assistance as last year, and may call upon the currently operating King Grain Operation in Mali to conduct the airlift in Mauritania. Whether this could be staged from Bamako is presently under study.

While the overall financial situation of Mauritania has been less drastically affected than other Sahel countries because of the importance that mining plays in the economy, the Government still faces important budgetary and balance of payment effects resulting from livestock and crop losses, much higher import needs and the heavy costs of relief and rehabilitation programs. The recent European Development Fund study estimated cattle losses in 1971-74 at up to 90% in some areas; sheep and goat losses at 10-20%.

Approximately \$2 million in recovery and rehabilitation projects have been approved for Mauritania this year. Emphasis again is on the strengthening of food distribution systems (transport and storage). Others include short-term programs for increasing vegetable production and increasing cereals production in flood plain areas; construction of grain storage in outlying areas; animal health programs; short-term transportation improvements; and provision of tarpaulins for grain protection while in movement. Given the capacity of the Government and the development base, these R and R activities may constitute the only significant opportunity for US assistance beyond emergency requirements.

Senegal: Senegal's greater diversity of economic activity, its geographic position as a coastal country and its relatively sophisticated infrastructure have contributed to the country's generally better condition than the other Sahelian nations. Only a portion of Senegal lies in the arid areas. Nevertheless, Senegal attracts its share of the nomadic herdsmen, and the areas to the northeast have been severely affected by the drought, although there has not been the development of relief camps as required in other Sahelian countries.

There have been important shortfalls in cereals and peanut production

for export. Livestock, which plays a somewhat less important role in Senegal than in other countries, has also registered a loss. For example, an estimated 20% of the 2.5 million cattle and 10% of the 2.7 million sheep and goats have been lost.

Revised estimates place Senegal's total grain need at 132,000. This has been met by 88,928 MT of donations and 87,200 commercial purchases, enabling Senegal to meet her deficits and build up a better stock. Of this total of 176,128 MT, about 150,000 had been delivered by the end of July. The U.S. shipped 24,248 MT of grain and protective food to Senegal during this period, and all has been delivered.

Senegal has played a crucial role in assisting Mali and Mauritania to meet their cereals import needs by accelerating and expanding the use of Senegal's internal port, storage and transport facilities. Much of the imports for Mali and Mauritania pass through Senegal. The facilities are generally in good condition; rail and road capacities seem able to absorb both the requirement for internal distribution as well as transfers to other countries, as long as port receipts are fairly constant and regularly spaced.

Relief measures in Senegal are therefore well in hand according to the Government and WHO and ORANA (nutritional institute in Dakar); nutritional surveys in the most affected areas tend to confirm a relatively good status of the populations in need. Sufficient additional medicines and vaccines are being provided, including measles vaccines from the United States.

Approximately \$1.5 million in recovery and rehabilitation projects have been agreed to between the United States and Senegal. Those have included provision of pumps for wells in agricultural villages, work on range rehabilitation, provision of livestock vaccines, improvement of agricultural production in flood plain areas; and the provision of human medicines and vaccines. Emphasis in Senegal has been on initiating innovative small agricultural production activities. With management of emergency requirements under sound management, the U.S. Government has taken the opportunity to explore small but high impact production projects. These activities may be precursors of more substantial development activities to be designed.

Upper Volta: Only a small part of the country lies in the true Sahelian area. Thus, while the drought has had a severe effect on northern sections, the overall impact on Upper Volta is somewhat less than in other Sahel nations.

The revised crop year 1973-74 food requirements for Upper Volta are 128,000 MT of grains. The estimate includes anticipated shipments to meet reserve requirements. An additional 7,000 MT of protective foods is needed.

Commitments of donations and purchases are 114,000 MT food grains and

7,455 MT of protective foods. About 80,000 MT has arrived in port.

The United States donated 28,500 MT of food grain to Upper Volta plus 4,596 MT of instant corn-soy-milk (ICSM) through UNICEF for this crop year. About 18,000 MT had arrived by the end of July.

The movement of food into Upper Volta is proceeding fairly well. A.I.D. has been using the ports of Lome (Togo) and Tema (Ghana) to service Upper Volta and the evacuation rate from these ports to Upper Volta has been steady. The other donors have been mainly using Abidjan (Ivory Coast) as the port of entry. While evacuation from Abidjan has been slower than from Lome and Tema, enough grain has moved into Upper Volta to allow the GOUV to pre-position food in remote areas before the start of the rainy season.

Internal distribution is being handled in an efficient manner by the Army of Upper Volta. Road and bridge repair programs along the distribution routes has been undertaken with the assistance of A.I.D. and the European Development Fund. Upgrading and repair of important links in the northern regions between Dori and Gorom-Gorom will greatly assist distribution in these most affected areas. Recent heavy rains, however, have temporarily isolated this region and an airlift may be required.

There are relatively few displaced persons in Upper Volta compared to other Sahelian nations. Current estimates number the displaced at 3 to 4,000, all in the northern region and mainly nomadic families. Last year Upper Volta faced disease outbreaks of sizeable proportions; this year the situation is reportedly much improved. An A.I.D.-sponsored nutritional surveillance activity administered by the Center for Disease Control in conjunction with the Government of Upper Volta, is being completed and should provide more detailed information.

The multiple programs of A.I.D. and others has and will continue to assist Upper Voltan efforts to cope with medical and health needs. Large amounts of medical supplies have been provided by donors. UNICEF, the Red Cross and voluntary agencies are providing health/nutrition care to the at-risk populations in the North. WHO and regional health organizations are further resources. A.I.D. has provided additional measles vaccines and supplies as well as prepackaged hospital unit.

As the emergency phase of the drought has come under greater control in Upper Volta, efforts have turned to expanding the capacity of the people to cope with living in a situation which has been made more fragile by the changes in their environmental and social conditions. A recent European Development Fund reported estimates of 16-20% loss of the 2.6 million cattle (although the percentage ranged to 90 in certain areas), and 15% loss of the 4 million sheep and goats. These losses were especially significant to families dependent upon their

herds.

The U.S. recovery and rehabilitation program (R/R) is in anticipation of response to near-future needs. To date \$2,762,000 in R/R activities have been agreed between the U.S. and Upper Volta. Activities include digging of 600 wells, earthen dam repair and construction, expansion of animal traction by fabrication of low-cost farm machinery, production of trypano-resistant oxen, supplementary feeding of livestock, herd replacement and improvement, reforestation in Kombissiri, seed multiplication and production, grain storage facilities, repair of key food distribution roads, and rural public health activities. Involved in these endeavors are other donors, international organizations and U.S. voluntary agencies. Here again, control of the emergency situation has enabled the Government to launch a rehabilitation program directed to the re-establishment of populations on farms. These activities will help assure a more significant planting this crop year and will hopefully facilitate greater marketings this fall. Such activities, of course, are the beginning of solutions as against the necessary but only positive significance of most emergency investments.

The Gambia: The situation in The Gambia, which was only partially affected by the drought, has become somewhat more serious this year. Food production has dropped and there have been some livestock losses.

The Government of The Gambia has made a request for external donor help in providing up to 6,000 MTs of grain, although there is some question whether this full amount is needed. Several countries are considering small donations of grain to meet The Gambia's needs. The United States is providing 2,000 MTs of this need through a special contribution to the World Food Program and 2,500 MT directly.

Internal distribution of donated grain is being handled in cooperation with WFP and appears to be well organized. Transport problems in getting food to needy recipients has not so far been an important concern.

Initial contacts have been made with the Government of The Gambia about a range of possible Recovery and Rehabilitation projects. AID has approved food production and related activities valued at \$675,000 and implementation will begin in September.

Niger: Niger continues to be in a precarious situation. One of the countries most seriously affected by the drought, Niger's harvests in 1973 were very low. Poor food production led to requirements for substantial food imports. Reduced production of cotton and peanuts for export had a major effect on Niger's budgetary and balance of payments situations. Livestock losses were very heavy, particularly within migrating herds. Increasing numbers of nomads and sedentary farmers became dependent upon Niger for food and relief. The northern part of the country suffered increasingly from the drought.

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Niger's problems, from a donor viewpoint, are compounded by the difficulties of shipping grains into the country and by the limited transport and poor routes within Niger for moving needed grains to remote deficit areas. The above factors are neither cause nor effect of the change in government by a military coup in April.

The FAO Multi-donor Mission revised estimates of Niger's grain needs at 268,000 MT, including a 50,000 MT buffer stock for the early post-harvest period. Protective food needs were estimated at 21,280 MT. A total of 205,482 MT have been committed, including a 'pipeline' of 27,782 from earlier commitments and 23,000 MT from commercial purchases. A total of 7,826 MT of protective foods have been committed.

The United States has committed 112,515 in food grain and 6,609 in protective foods: instant corn-soy-milk (ICSM) through UNICEF. Over 90,000 mt had been delivered to port by the end of July. Overall deliveries have been somewhat slower. Of a total of 205,482 MT committed, approximately 160,000 arrived in port by the end of July.

There are several routes used from ports to landlocked Niger. Food flows from Cotonou (Dahomey) into western Niger are moving at a relatively steady pace, and were recently increased as a result of the Niger Minister of Rural Economy, Ali Saibou's trip to Dahomey to arrange additional heavy trucks on the Dahomey-Niger route. However, while U.S.-donated food seems to be moving well and adequate storage facilities have been arranged for its protection, other donor food stocks are neither moving well nor well protected. A food transportation meeting, called by the FAO's Office of Sahelian Relief Operations (OSRO), took place recently in Cotonou to address this problem.

Donors have also increased food shipments through Nigerian ports for transshipment by rail and truck directly into some of the more seriously affected areas of Niger to the east and north. Although breakdowns on the Nigerian railroad and strikes by railway and port workers in late spring significantly hampered the flow, evaluation from Nigerian ports has doubled overall in the past few months and is no longer considered a problem. Extensive use of private trucking firms have helped movements of grain from Nigerian ports to both Niger and Chad. Shipments by truck are expected to increase from an average of 500 tons to an average 1,500 tons per day. If this rate can be achieved and maintained, distribution within Niger will be considerably eased. To increase the capacity of Nigerian ports, A.I.D. contracted the Flour Mills of Nigeria in Lagos to bag bulk grain shipments. Bagging in Lagos facilitates local truck transport, storage and handling, and allows increased bulk shipments. The mills can absorb up to 2,000 MT per day, although start-up current dispatch is running unevenly, from 200 to 800 MT per day. In addition, the United States will begin a trial run of grains by truck through Algeria in mid-July. Mali as well as Niger will benefit from the Trans-Sahara

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shipments.

Internal food distribution is steadily improving, although the continued utilization of the foods in the deficit areas have left no opportunity to pre-position stocks or build local reserves prior to the rainy season as planned. Margin for survival in the outlying areas is still considered very thin and any lengthy interruption in the delivery system could result in the need for temporary airlifts to isolated areas.

Present distribution is expected to be greatly strained in the next several months as the rainy season gets underway. Poor or non-existent roads outside main urban areas take a heavy toll on all vehicles, bridges frequently wash out and roads (or tracks) become impassable. Four-wheel drive vehicles are considered the only method to reach many of the remote areas overland during the rainy season. To date the donor community has pledged close to 90 four-wheel drive vehicles of which the majority have been delivered. These, in combination with existing transport however, are insufficient to handle food requirements for remote areas. The anticipated deficit (counting current and projected donor contributions) may be 5,500 MT in grains unable to reach the remote areas. The U.S. has initiated two courses of action: (1) OSRO has been urged to coordinate a multi-donor effort to purchase or lease additional four-wheel drive vehicles, and (2) the Trans-Saharan shipment. OSRO is moving ahead on procurement of 12 trucks in Algeria at a cost of about \$600,000, with funds being guaranteed by the U.S. These 15-ton vehicles should add 4,000 MT capacity to the current distribution system. The Trans-Saharan shipment should provide about 1,000 to 1,500 MT to Agadez. Barring breakdowns, it is hoped that the various actions to increase internal transport and delivery capacity will reduce or obviate the need for an airlift.

Niger has approximately 250,000 displaced persons dependent upon relief camps, according to FAO/OSRO. Substantial efforts by the Government of Niger and the donor community are underway to reorganize food and relief distribution as well as to encourage the encamped populations to resume more normal activities. For example, OSRO and the League of Red Cross Societies in conjunction with WHO and UNICEF, are providing personnel trained in relief work and supporting equipment and supplies for up to ten field teams. Coordination in country is being handled jointly by the UN Resident Representative and the Ministry of Health. In addition, WHO and UNICEF are redoubling their efforts to ensure adequate food, preventive health, water and sanitation measures are extended. The U.S. recently provided for additional measles vaccine, \$100,000 for medicines and supplies, and \$10,000 for two portable hospital units.

Resettlement is one of the Government's major concerns. A "return to the village" campaign is underway, whereby drought-stricken farmers congregating in relief camps and towns are being urged to return to

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their land for the planting season. Incentives, such as provision of seeds, hand-tools, and two-months' supply of food per person within a family group are being offered. The Lazaret camp just outside Niamey, for example, has been partially dismantled as people have returned home or are moved to other areas. Reports indicate that adequate food supplies are being distributed in the remaining camps. The destitute nomads, who have no land, herds or other means of self-sustenance will continue to require special attention.

Efforts are already underway to move from relief to rehabilitation; to expand the capacity of Niger residents to cope with the change in their socio-economic condition. The U.S. is assisting in a recovery and rehabilitation (R/R) program to respond to near-future needs. The program emphasizes activities in the fields of agriculture and livestock production, simple infrastructure repair and maintenance, and public health. To date, about \$2.6 million in R/R activities have been developed between the Government and A.I.D. Heavy emphasis in Niger has been on pre-positioning of donor grains and augmentation of permanent storage associated both with drought requirements and our earlier grain stabilization program. It is generally believed that limited storage has been the major factor affecting food distribution efforts and that the next season will find sufficient capacity to ensure the orderly marketing of domestic grains and/or distribution of donated foods. Activities also include reforestation of Gao trees in Maradi and Dosso; the acceleration of rice production; pasture reseeding; date palm rehabilitation; agricultural development; animal health; supplementary feed for livestock; repair and maintenance of important food distribution roads; construction of storage facilities in food deficit areas; village development in the Dollo Bosso Valley; and the training of Ministry of Health teams for rural areas. Other donors, UN organizations, U.S. voluntary agencies and the Government of Niger are participating in these activities.

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Part III - Relations with Other Donors and African Regional Organizations in the Sahel

A. Emergency Relief

While Africans and donors alike agree that major responsibility for coordination of emergency relief lies with the African governments themselves, many of the logistical problems involved go beyond the capacity of individual governments to resolve.

The UN Secretary General designated FAO to oversee UN relief programs. FAO established the Office of Sahel Relief Operations (OSRO) to do this job and set up a Sahel Trust Fund to receive financial contributions. Despite a shaky initial start, OSRO has increasingly gained the confidence of Africans and the donor community. It plays an increasingly effective coordinating and information exchange role.

Key activities of FAO/OSRO have been:

- (a) Establishment last year of a Multi-Donor Food Assessment mission through which Africans and donors alike reached agreement on anticipated import levels. A similar mission is to be undertaken this fall;
- (b) Establishment of an information exchange service which has helped guide donors in scheduling food shipments and recognizing potential port and transport difficulties. However, lack of inclusion in reporting systems of Russian, Chinese and Sahel commercial imports has been one cause of today's port congestion problems;
- (c) Highlighting specific logistical problems and seeking donor support in resolving them (e.g. arrangements with Nigerian Government to speed up food flows; identifying truck needs and getting donor support in meeting these needs; organizing donor/African committees to deal with port problems).

A.I.D. fully supports OSRO and urges other donors to work with it.

A.I.D. plans the following steps to help strengthen OSRO:

- (a) Continued provision of staff support;
- (b) Continued financing for special operations through the Sahel Trust Fund;
- (c) Consideration of ways in which OSRO information system can be improved, including possible computer programming techniques;
- (d) Full support to and participation in this year's Multi-Donor Food Assessment Mission.

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For direct liaison with other donors on Sahel emergency programs, as well as other concerns regarding the Sahel, A.I.D. and State maintain liaison officers in Paris, Brussels (for the Common Market), Rome (for FAO) and London.

B. Longer Term Development Needs

There is need to improve understanding between donors and Africans on how best to proceed with planning longer-term recovery and development programs. All agree the focus must be on the Africans themselves but more needs to be done to strengthen collaboration between Africans and donors.

The African Governments have established the Interstate Committee of Fight the Drought in the Sahel (CILSS) as a regional coordinating organization. While CILSS still has limited staff resources and needs a clearer mandate from the participating governments, it has played an effective role in drawing donor attention to Sahel development needs. It has also been a focal point for a series of technical meeting and seminars dealing with subjects such as development of regional and national livestock strategies, consideration of ground water development, review of potential use of remote sensing techniques and the like. However, considerably greater effort will be needed if CILSS is effectively to play a role in giving meaning ful shape and priorities to potential development programs for the region.

The UN has established a Special Sahel Office under Deputy Secretary General Brad Morse to orchestrate UN programs for medium and long term development in the Sahel. In addition, the SSO is seeking to help African organizations, especially the CILSS, identify gaps in development planning and helping find means of closing those gaps. In order to achieve this latter end, SSO is moving its headquarters this summer from New York to Ouagadougou, where CILSS headquarters are also located.

While seeking to reach agreement on improved longer term arrangements for development planning, most donors currently work on a bilateral basis with Sahel governments on recovery and medium term development programs. They are also working through established regional organizations such as the Senegal River Development Organization. So far, this has not yet permitted the elaboration of an overall, mutually agreed upon development strategy between Africans and donors.

All agree the present situation is inadequate to deal with longer term needs and that the time is ripe to improve interrelationships. The United States is in regular consultation with African leaders and other donors on how this can be achieved.

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ANNEX II

THE DROUGHT IN ETHIOPIA

Ethiopia, the tenth largest country of the African continent with a population numbering approximately 26 million - larger than the combined population of the drought-stricken Sahel countries - is facing the most serious tragedy of its recent history. Although adversity has been a way of life for the Ethiopian people even in normal times, only nominal rainfall, noticed in some areas as early as 1970, has resulted in increasingly severe drought and famine over large areas of the country. Originally confined to the northern provinces, the drought has recently spread to five southern provinces as well, with the number of people affected estimated to number anywhere between two and six million.

The earliest signs of drought became evident in the 1970-71 period when the significance of intermittent rains was noticed. The Imperial Ethiopian Government (IEG) began sending supplemental food grains to sections of five provinces (Gemu Gofa, Wollo, Kaffa, Gojjam and Tigre) from time to time in the years 1970-1972. But this appeared to conform to the usual pattern of intermittent droughts hitting one district this year, another district another year and a third district yet another year. In Wollo Province, for example, probably the worst hit, there was drought in 1971 but the rains in the first part of 1972 were good. Later in 1972 the rains were scant.

In these remote areas where such a pattern is common and where fragmented information is rarely quickly assembled and the communications system is difficult anyway, the potential scale of the problem can escape the attention of even those directly involved in the areas. Further, what was occurring was not simply a failure of rains, but a climatic alteration of major proportions. Throughout Tigre and in many parts of Wollo, as well as elsewhere, the ecological balance has been seriously disturbed.

The provinces most seriously hit by the famine are those with a long history of settled agriculture - unlike those of the lowlands of the northeast where nomadic existence prevails, or those of the south and southwest where tropical and sub-tropical forests exist. Long settlement has meant progressive deforestation and soil erosion. While the capacity of the soil to sustain both humans and livestock has been diminishing, the population has been growing, creating an imbalance which directly augments the effects of the failure of the rains.

As the period of only nominal rainfall lengthened, reports of food shortages became increasingly widespread and serious. By 1973 it

was becoming clear that the "belg" rains (the small rains for short maturing crops planted in February or early March and harvested in May, June or July) would be especially significant in determining the extent of the drought. But the early 1973 belg rains were a failure almost uniformly throughout the country. With a few exceptions in only two provinces, precipitation was at the lowest recorded level in 20 years - and this after a significant and steadily decreasing rainfall pattern over a period of consecutive years. Precipitation measurement throughout most of the country was minimal or non-existent. Throughout the belg season, Tigre and Wollo Provinces, for example, had only four days of rain. For the country as a whole, the IEG reported the magnitude of the loss of the belg crop reached between 75 and 80 percent of the normal harvest.

At the end of February 1973, the FAO's Early Warning Food Shortage Report carried the signal of a possible severe famine. In March the IEG began planning to mobilize domestic resources and such external assistance as could be quickly obtained. In April 1973 the IEG appointed a high-level inter-ministerial National Drought Relief Committee (NRC) headed by the Minister of National Community Development and Social Affairs and comprised of representatives of all involved ministries and national agencies. Similar committees were appointed at the provincial level. On April 13 a ban was imposed on the export of cereal grains, except under license to limited traditional markets, mainly in the adjoining Territory of Afars and Issas which was also experiencing a drought. Also in April, IEG officials began urgent consultations with representatives in Addis Ababa of the UNDP, FAO, WFP, UNICEF and USAID on ways and means of organizing international relief support. In May 1973 the U.S. Government made its first emergency drought relief commitment.

An analysis of in-country Government food stocks in the first part of 1973 revealed that the stocks were down to an insufficient 20,000 tons. Immediately, already-programmed U.S. food stocks in Ethiopia were redirected to emergency purposes. Anticipating a substandard harvest in 1973, the IEG also approached the U.S. Government and the World Food Program (WFP) for additional assistance and in May the U.S. committed an initial 18,000 metric tons of wheat, 8000 of which were pledged on a government-to-government basis and 10,000 of which were pledged by the WFP from a contribution to the Agency for International Development. The AID Mission in Addis Ababa also agreed to release additional wheat which had been destined for on-going "food for work" projects in Ethiopia. On December 3, 1973 the then U.S. Ambassador, E. Ross Adair, declared that a disaster situation existed warranting U.S. Government assistance. In the period FY 1973/1974, the U.S. Government provided a total of 64,418 metric tons of emergency food grain assistance to Ethiopia at a value of \$15,578,150 including ocean freight costs. Over the same period,

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the U.S. Government also provided nearly \$2.4 million in emergency non-food aid for such items as temporary storage materials, in-country transportation expenses for relief supplies, truck tires and tubes, cotton cloth, blankets, three helicopters for a medical/nutrition survey in the southern areas, medical drugs and supplies, airlift of trucks, technical assistance, and other items. Thus, over the period FY 1973/1974 to date, the U.S. Government has provided nearly \$18 million in food and non-food aid.

Ethiopian institutions and private individuals also responded to IEG appeals for donations. Government officials, army, police, university professors and students, private firms, the Ethiopian Orthodox Church and other religious bodies, the Ethiopian Red Cross, and many other groups and individuals were donating cash, food and other assistance. The value of these contributions is estimated at well over \$3 million.

In the beginning of 1974, the IEG appointed a Commissioner for Drought Relief and Rehabilitation. Reports and comments from the AID Mission in Addis Ababa and from other international donors indicate that the new Commissioner, Ato Simeles Adugna, is doing a highly effective and dedicated job. Although a fully comprehensive report has not yet been compiled, a preliminary estimate in February 1974 from the Commissioner's office puts the IEG contribution at upwards of \$10 million for famine relief.

Numerous international donor organizations and foreign governments have become involved in the Ethiopian relief effort. Overall coordination for these donors is handled by the United Nations Disaster Relief Office in Geneva and in Addis Ababa by the United Nations Development Program Resident Representative. The WFP has provided an officer to assist the Commissioner for Relief and Rehabilitation and the FAO Office of Sahelian Relief Operations (OSRO) provides technical and other assistance. The U.N. Disaster Relief Office (UNDRO) in Geneva estimates that as of March 31, 1974 international donor contributions (including the U.S.) totalled far more than \$60 million, with many contributions reported with no dollar value given.

Whereas the Ethiopian and international donor response to the relief effort has been substantial and greatly appreciated by the people and Government of Ethiopia, much remains to be done.

For one thing, drought conditions and continuing substandard rainfall persist in both north and south Ethiopia. Even if rains were good, of course, the years of increasing famine which have already occurred and the climatic/ecological changes which have taken place mean Ethiopia will stand in need of continued outside assistance for

drought relief for some time to come. The UNDR0, in an assessment made as recently as the middle of May, stated "General situation: situation remains critical in nomadic area, with problems compounded by inaccessibility and related logistic difficulties. Authorities consider emergency phase will continue at least until end 1974, with relief emphasis on nomadic areas and increasing attention recovery programs being given other areas".

The United Nations estimates donor commitments for 1974 external food grain requirements at 132,800 tons. It is expected that international donor pledges will be required to meet still another sub-standard harvest in 1974, and the U.S. Government has programmed already another 20,000 metric-ton contribution in FY 1975 to help in meeting this requirement.

Other needs immediately identified by the UNDR0 include high-protein foods, truck and jeep transport, human shelter, blankets and cotton cloth. The U.S. Government has already made substantial contributions in these areas and, as a result of Congressional appraisal of the Foreign Disaster Assistance Act of 1974, which included a \$10 million figure for Ethiopia, will continue to do so.

As in the Sahel, drought relief activities in Ethiopia have been viewed as those involving (a) immediate relief, (b) short-term relief and rehabilitation and (c) medium-to-long term rehabilitation. The U.S. Government effort to date has been concentrated in immediate emergency relief efforts such as the food and non-food aid described previously.

In contemplating additional assistance required for the future, AID estimates that in addition to food aid, the U.S. Government should be prepared to anticipate CY 1974 immediate relief requests totaling approximately \$2.6 million for such items as transportation costs for in-country food movement, grain storage facilities, seed, medical supplies and follow-up of the medical/nutrition survey undertaken in southern Ethiopia.

In addition to the question of immediate relief operations is that of the need for the recovery and rehabilitation of the drought victims. When the inter-ministerial committee was appointed in November 1973, it requested the FAO to provide a team of specialists to assist in the preparation of a short-term recovery program. The program, consisting of 21 projects requiring a total of \$15 million, was produced and circulated through the FAO to prospective donors internationally. Of the \$15 million total, approximately \$12.5 million was requested from external sources. The program called for the emergency supply of varying quantities of seeds, work oxen and other livestock and tractors, the construction and repair of access roads, the implementation of emergency afforestation and rural water supply programs,

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provision of transport facilities, and the provision of technical assistance. Response from the international donor community was encouraging, with most of the proposed projects receiving offers for funding and with the remainder expected to receive funding as well.

The IBRD has completed negotiations with the IEG for a rehabilitation IDA credit of approximately \$10 million with the precise projects, dealing with recovery and medium- and long-term rehabilitation, concentrated in the northern provinces of Wollo and Tigre.

In contemplating future U.S. Government assistance in the area of short-term relief and rehabilitation activities, AID is considering (a) supplementing the World Bank effort in the areas of rural penetration roads, rural water development, health and sanitation and reforestation, and (b) assisting UNDRO-identified short-term rehabilitation projects.

In considering possible medium-term rehabilitation assistance activities, AID has engaged in a medical/nutrition survey in the southern provinces and is also financing a feasibility study to identify two areas in the south suitable for resettlement by people from other overcrowded areas of the country. It is anticipated that regular appropriations may be utilized for most of the physical infrastructure in the areas.

In addition, we expect that substantial assistance will be required in areas in the southern provinces now occupied by nomadic herdsmen. Preliminary estimates of the three provinces of Bole, Harrarge and Sidamo indicate that no less than 500,000 people and perhaps 750,000 are now in need of assistance and in some cases, especially Sidamo, cattle losses have been as high as 50%.


On the basis of existing knowledge and anticipated results of surveys now under way we would expect requests for financing medium-term rehabilitation assistance characterized by the following:

- Rural low-cost road construction
- Water supply and small-scale irrigation
- Range management and pond construction
- Drought area resettlement
- Grain storage construction
- Animal husbandry activities including restocking
- Medical assistance
- Agricultural research activities
- Extension and credit programs
- Marketing technical assistance

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
U.S. GOVERNMENT DROUGHT EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE TO ETHIOPIA

PL 480 FOOD AID



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U.S. GOVERNMENT DROUGHT EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE TO ETHIOPIA FY 1974 NON-FOOD AID



TOTAL — \$2,387,794

ANNEX III

OTHER AFRICAN COUNTRIES

A. Nigeria

The drought in the Sahel has affected Nigeria from the 12th parallel north (the 12th parallel passes through the city of Kano), with some peripheral effects a little further south. To date, estimates are that perhaps four million Nigerians have felt the impact of the drought directly, many moving southward (together with refugees from Niger and Chad) in search of better pastures and farming land. Live-stock losses have run as high as 10% in some areas and both food and commercial crops have suffered. Estimates place last year's harvests in the affected area at 0% to 50% of previous years with up to \$100,000,000 in agricultural losses in the Kano and North Eastern states alone.

The Nigerian Government (FMG) has made no appeal to international organizations for assistance, apparently intending to meet the crisis themselves. Funds in excess of \$50 million have been provided to the governments of the states affected for the purchase of food for both people and livestock. Additional resources are available from the FMG if required. The FMG has banned all exports of groundnuts in order to add to the supply of foodstuffs available. (This is a particularly significant step because Nigeria is traditionally the largest exporter of groundnuts in the world and this was once a major source of foreign exchange.)

The indirect results of the drought are being felt throughout the economy in the form of higher food prices, reduced raw materials for local industry (cotton and groundnuts for example) and increased unemployment in the affected industries (textiles especially). In addition, the drought has served to reemphasize the heavy dependence of the states on the FMG for financial support, for without federal resources there is little the states could do to ameliorate the situation.

Recent discussions here at AID/W with officials from the four northern states reflected some optimism for this year. According to them, some promising rains have already fallen in three of the four states (much earlier than last year) and they are hopeful the dry cycle has ended.

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B. Sudan

The effect of the drought on the Sudan's internal production capacity is becoming a major concern to Sudanese authorities in the Sudan-Chad border area. Normal food and grain supplies are being severely taxed by the continuing influx of refugees from another drought stricken area (Chad). Although these shortages have been largely confined to areas with a small percentage of the country's total population, the Church World Services representative in Sudan now estimates that between 400,000 and 500,000 people are in need of immediate assistance. There are also reports of losses of cattle due to insufficient rainfall and lack of pasturage. Darfur Province in the West and Bahr El Ghazal in the central-southern region have traditionally received scant rainfall to support agricultural development. It is reasonable to assume that the present food shortages are in part due to deficiencies in the transportation and distribution system and the influx of refugees rather than from the absence of favorable weather conditions.

The World Food Program (WFP) sent its Juba representative to the stricken areas in June 1974. The WFP representative concluded that the food situation in Northern Darfur and Northern Kordofan was critical, with severe famine potential. His report recommended airlift of 200 tons of grain to these areas, immediate transport of up to 10,000 tons to Northern Kordofan and a self-help, food for work project in the areas of reforestation, water development, desert control, etc. CWS, in cooperation with Caritas are in the process of developing a program of assistance to needy Sudanese and refugees in the northwest provinces. In May 1973, the Government of Sudan requested and was granted permission to use 56,000 Sudanese counterpart pounds to cover the costs of transporting food commodities from Port Sudan to those stricken areas. The Government of Sudan during 1974 has not requested U.S. assistance to ameliorate the effects of the drought in the northwestern areas. In fact, Volags operating in Sudan, citing food transportation and distribution problems, have requested that the initial call forward for PL 480 Title II commodities be postponed to the second quarter of the current fiscal year.

C. Ghana

Northern Ghana borders on the Sahel area. Neither the Ghana Government nor the U.S. views the situation in Northern Ghana as comparable to that in six Sahel states. As yet there is no definite indication that the Sahel Drought has spread to Ghana although there are pockets where rainfall has been inadequate. Over all, food production in Northern area Ghana is satisfactory. Food supplies are readily available in main markets, although supplies in those villages in Northeast affected by shortage of rainfall are inadequate. There is some economic impact from Sahel situation. Grain is moving illegally over the border into Upper Volta in response to higher prices. This has caused pressure on availabilities and prices in Ghanaian markets. The Ghana Government has moved to ease this problem by establishing controlled government



purchase from others parts of Ghana and transport to Upper Volta. Government has also shipped grain into Upper Region markets. Limited movement south of people and livestock into border areas has been observed.

While the situation in Northern Ghana is not comparable to that in the Sahel, the preliminary report of a consultant financed by A.I.D. at the request of the Government of Ghana, indicates that the process of desertification is indeed occurring in Northern Ghana. This consultant has made a number of recommendations which, if implemented, would assist the Government of Ghana better to understand this problem and take preventive measures. A.I.D. is now working with the Government of Ghana to develop a plan of practical actions to be implemented over the next several years which would protect the ecological balance in the region and arrest the process of desertification.

D. Central African Republic (CAR)

The Central African Republic is a landlocked country of 2.2 million inhabitants more than 300 miles from the sea and located almost at the precise center of the African Continent. While the effects of the drought in CAR have not been as serious as in the Sahelian countries, there have been some deleterious effects. Rainfall during the past four years has been on the average 25% below normal causing river levels to drop. The Oubangi River, CAR's major trade route was so low during 1974 that there were 73 days during which the river was not navigable. In normal years there are usually less than 50 days of non-navigability. The low rainfall has had its repercussion on hydroelectric power supplied to the capital, Bangui, from Boal Falls. Flow over the falls dwindled to the point that ENERCEA, the government-owned power company was obliged to reduce power to its industrial customers by 50%. As a result some companies, including the textile company and the beverage company, have experienced production losses. Production losses and food spoilage experienced by other local concerns have been considerable and ENERCEA's power cutbacks have cost the company \$1 million per month since January 1974.

All major agricultural crops have been effected by the drought. The peanut crop, the second most important food crop after manioc, dropped from 75,000 metric tons in 1969-1970 to 40,000 in 1971-1972. Cotton, CAR's major export crop dropped about 15% to 45,000 tons last year. This year's rainfall has been sufficient to permit planting on schedule but the size of the harvest will depend on a continuation of the rain. In any case there will be an overall shortfall in production, and food reserves in the north are on the low side because of prior years' poor harvests.

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The general overall effect has been to slow up all sectors of CAR's fragile economy. This includes cutting back the volume of exports and imports which causes a rise in price levels, reducing industrial production and increasing unemployment. The average CAR subsistence farmer, particularly in the northern part of the country, has suffered from the drought. Although there are no reports of outright starvation, people in northern CAR are contracting water born diseases at a high rate because they are dependent on stagnant pools for water. The water table is so low that some people must go to wells at midnight or travel great distances to find water. Some disease has been brought into CAR from the north by drought-affected Chadians in search of better grazing conditions. Aside from this, Chadian southward migration, which apparently is not great, has created no serious resettlement problem in this relatively underpopulated land.

In summary, the direct consequences of reduced rainfall over the past several years are mainly visible in the field of transport and power over the whole country and water supply for people and cattle in the north. In agriculture, the input of the drought, while not gravely serious, has resulted in reduced agricultural production. There are no reported cases of famine or even near famine and no refugee problems in CAR.

E. Cameroon

Until recently, the situation in Cameroon did not appear to be affected significantly by the drought in the Sahel. However, last year's food production in northern areas was somewhat deficient and the Government has begun to analyze requirements for possible food imports. On the basis of preliminary information available to the Cameroon Government and ourselves, an agreement was reached to provide 1,000 tons of Title II foods for the people of the northern areas.

This year's harvest is still difficult to predict. The rains started a month earlier than normal (in April) and continued at a good rate until June. At that point there was a break of 2-3 weeks before the rains started again. In some areas farmers lost their first planting and have had to replant. Predictions being made by the Government of Cameroon are that the harvest will be average, except for the north.

At a major health conference held in Yaounde in July, which included health workers from every part of Cameroon, no outbreaks of disease or serious health problems were brought up. Informal discussions indicated that the general health outlook in the north, although low, was not deteriorating. There are reports that a small group of nomads from Niger have moved into the north but they pose no particular problem at this time.

F. Tanzania

The 1974 drought situation in Tanzania is the result of lower than normal rainfall during the past several years. The areas most affected by the drought are centered in North Masailand and along the Kenya border. Estimates as of late March were that 25,000 cattle had died because of the drought and that some 350,000 more were affected by the lack of adequate range, grass and water. Increased sales as a hedge against starvation helped prevent even greater losses. The initial long rains in 1974 were heavy and benefited livestock production areas. The rangeland then appears to be recovering from the drought. Although it will take some time for cattle populations to recover, prospects appear good.

The situation pertaining to food crops is not as sanguine due to the drying up of early plantings and/or the washing away or failure to germinate of later plantings which coincided with the onset of the long rains. The winter wheat crop in the main growing area east of Arusha, which came to market in March, was estimated at one-third of the normal harvest. The next wheat crop in that area, planted in late March for harvest in August, is estimated to be 50% of normal. The maize crop throughout Tanzania is estimated to be 40-50% of normal. Rice is expected to be about 50% of the normal harvest.

The Government of Tanzania reacted to the drought situation somewhat belatedly, but with vigor, and has initiated major procurement programs with neighboring countries as well as with major exporting nations. As of May 27 funds have been committed for the purchase of 390,500 tons. The National Milling Corporation estimates Tanzania's food requirements for the above commodities at 872,000 tons between March 1974 and September 1975. It is estimated that Tanzania will spend up to \$100 million for grain imports during 1974 alone (as compared with less than \$2 million spent for the same purpose during 1973), which will constitute a severe drain on Tanzania's foreign exchange reserves. The Government is actively seeking concessional terms for food grain imports and related assistance to augment purchases of food. Discussions with our Embassy in Tanzania are in process.

The U.S. Embassy in Tanzania is of the opinion that the Government of Tanzania will be able to meet its 1974 food needs from local stocks and increased food purchases. The situation for 1975 can be assessed following the harvest later this year. The U.S. Ambassador did declare an emergency in May 1974, and \$25,000 in Disaster Relief Funds have been made available for humanitarian requirements. A continuing assessment is in process, and requirements for external assistance will be considered as they are identified.

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G. Kenya

Until March 1974, large pastoral areas of Kenya were affected by two years of very light rainfall. In late March of this year the long rains began and are continuing with fairly good volume and distribution throughout the country. The arrival of the rains is expected to assure a reasonably good crop growing season this year.

Kenya's current problem is dealing with the aftereffects of the drought. Large numbers of herdsmen, particularly the Masai, are in need of food assistance. Cattle losses, and therefore the milk upon which pastoralists are greatly dependent, have been sizable in some areas. While it is difficult to determine the extent of the drought, estimates are that perhaps as many as 300,000 persons may be in need.

While Kenya has not yet requested assistance specifically in meeting drought problems, the Government has encouraged charitable organizations to proceed with relief in hard struck areas. A.I.D. has made available to Catholic Relief Services 250 tons of corn-soya blend for distribution in the hardest hit areas of the country. The Catholic Secretariat is paying all inland transport costs, and the Government of Kenya of course is permitting duty free entry of the commodities. If the Government of Kenya's expectation that the current rainy season and in-country food stocks will be adequate to meet drought needs prove to be false, A.I.D. is prepared to consider additional assistance.

For many thousands of Kenyans recent drought conditions certainly have exacerbated their precarious existence. While the situation may improve with the arrival of rainfall, the country continues to suffer the after-effects of two years of drought, and it can be expected to again face problems of rainfall failure. The U.S. is prepared to assist Kenya, and is currently carrying on discussions with the Government and its Disaster Relief Office as well as several concerned international agencies. Assistance activities for the short term could include improvement of drought surveillance and alert capabilities, placement of foodstuffs including storage and transportation, minor road repairs, repair of reservoirs and ground water supplies, and immediate production inputs such as fertilizer and seeds. In turn, this assistance could be followed up with production inputs for livestock and crops, especially relating to water management and land use controls.

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