

SOCIAL SOUNDNESS ANALYSIS: SMALL FARMER CREDIT AND AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE CASAMANCE

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Introduction

In the small farmer credit and agricultural extension components of the Casamance Development Project, USAID and the Government of Senegal have set several interrelated goals:

- To increase agricultural productivity
- To improve the standard of living of the more disadvantaged rural poor, among whom women and youths have been identified for special consideration
- To attract youths of both sexes back to their home villages from an uncertain employment situation in the cities

In order to reach these goals, the project design has to address itself to two separate sets of institutions: the national and local government on the one hand and the peasant community on the other. According to the Project Identification Document, this design has already adjusted itself to some of the better-known particularities of the former. In the better part of what follows, I would like to suggest some further adjustments more specifically appropriate to the peasant's own set of institutions. These adjustments are designed to facilitate the sociocultural feasibility of the original project goals. The social consequences of both their inclusion and their neglect will be explored at the end of this appendix.

Credit and Cooperatives in the Casamance

The monopoly of ONCAD (Organisation Nationale pour la Coopération et l'Assistance dans le Développement) on peanut and cereal purchases, as well as on the cooperatives through which inputs in their production are made, seems to be a given in any discussion of rural development in Senegal. Yet, it seems to have been recognized for some time, both within the Government of Senegal and elsewhere, that ONCAD works best where both a production and a marketing base have already been set up and are functioning well. In order to stimulate the expansion of ~~new bases of~~ agricultural production, the Government has seen fit to give regional

"sociétés d'intervention" powers and functions which duplicate, or reinforce, those presently under the jurisdiction of some of the other services, including ONCAD.

Since the "Société pour l'intervention" in the Casamance (SOMIVAC - Société pour la Mise en Valeur de la Casamance) is only just being organized, the Casamance Development Project design, in its present state, has looked for alternative ways to stimulate agricultural production which are not too dependent on the provision of ONCAD's services. As already noted, the latter has been found wanting where new and risky agricultural initiatives are being launched. In this search, the project design has found it convenient to take up the standard of women and youths: producers not usually included in ONCAD's credit cooperatives.

Because of the wide range of services which they are said to provide, the Service pour la Promotion Humaine has been selected to oversee the provision of producer's credit to these women and youths. Promotion Humaine itself has suggested that if the credit were channeled through a Governor's committee to the BNDS (Banque Nationale pour le Développement du Sénégal), they would be better able to guide ONCAD's provision of inputs and marketing services as these women and youths formed cooperatives in order to receive this credit. The ability of ONCAD to assure a market for such perishables as bananas has been stressed by many. Promotion Humaine describes its role in such a process as one of "animation", while that of ONCAD and the Agricultural Service involves "encadrement".

Other appendices to this report evaluate both (1) the ability of Promotion Humaine's personnel and organizational structure to genuinely "animate" the peasants in such a direction, as well as (2) the actualities of ONCAD's treatment of its low priority cooperatives. Here, I would like to turn to some of the assumptions about the peasant economy in the Casamance which this set of governmental pressures has encouraged the project design to make.

#### The Peasant Family in the Casamance

One reason why women and youths have not already shown up more frequently in ONCAD's cooperatives is because of the lack of collateral at their disposal. This results from the patrilocal and gerontocratic characteristics of the

compound production unit in the Casamance rural economy. Most compound assets are nominally channeled through the elder male member of the compound. However, major decisions are not taken without consulting other male members, overtly, as well as senior women, covertly. Cooperatives for women and youths, then, would certainly benefit a major portion of the population not presently addressed by ONCAD's services. But those family elders without sufficient collateral to interest ONCAD would remain neglected.

This is not to say that women and youths aren't important as agricultural producers, rather only that most of what they produce is redistributed at the level of the patrilocal family unit in which they work.

Kinship relations among peasant farmers in the Casamance play a much greater economic role than they do in populations more completely integrated into the market economy. It is not difficult to see why this is so. To survive, the Casamance peasant must produce a certain amount of food for auto-consumption regardless of the market value of the labor-time thus spent, relative to the market value of the food produced. This is not only because the market value of that labor, whether employed for wages or in cash crop production, fluctuates from year to year, or because the purchase price of food is usually so high relative to its sale price in the Casamance. Rather, this strain towards self-sufficiency also results from the fact that most peasants will not, as yet, be able to support themselves on the market value of their labor for their entire lives. Insofar as this Casamance Development Project changes this situation relative to farmer's monetary income, the claims of elders upon youths and women can be expected to relax.

However, to date the more able-bodied workers cannot support their elders and children on cash crop sales or wages. Thus most families are obliged to maintain a permanent food-producing establishment which must remain impervious, to some extent, to the fluctuating inducements of the market economy. This establishment for auto-subsistence is most easily kept separate from market pressures when its component relationships are based on a completely different "currency": kinship in this case.

In the Casamance, different peasant groups have developed some ingenious strategies for maintaining this permanent and separate food-producing establishment. In each case, they have set rigidly defined limits to the context in which

## Youth Groups

Among the Mandingized groups, on the other hand, the use of the compound in the management of peanut fields has somewhat obviated the need for these exchange labor groups. Only at the village-wide level is a youth "société" generally found among them. Because of the full-time commitment of these male youths to commercial production the compound granary has no claims on their labor in any case, thus there is nothing to prevent the members of these "sociétés" from splitting its profits among themselves. Even though this "société" is hired less frequently than its counterpart in the Jola area, its profitability to the individual member may explain why fewer of these Manding youth seek wage-labor opportunities elsewhere.

However, where male youths are held by their compounds to a certain degree of participation in subsistence production, they are not as easily released by them to form a "société" committed to the personal enrichment of its individual members. Thus the "sociétés" of various sizes among the Fula, Balant, Bainouck and Jola generally dedicate their earnings to communal feast or ceremony - among the Jola, going so far as to occasionally pay the taxes of destitute villagers. Such a communal emphasis enables these "sociétés" to complement rather than contradict the subsistence functions of the compound: a youth gains from participation in one of these groups only insofar as his membership in that group leads it to aid his compound. He therefore sees his participation in these youth groups as rewarded in the same "currency" as is his participation in the food production efforts of his compound. If the former provided a source of personal income, however, he might begin to favor it to the detriment of the latter. This in turn would cause friction within the compound production unit. If the youth is away, engaged in migrant labor, he can hire his group to assist his compound to cultivate. He might be more reluctant to do this if the money thus spent were not to be used for the public benefit.

Recently, however, these scattered "sociétés", particularly when they have been organized into "foyers de jeunesse" by Promotion Humaine or a related agency, while not going to the point of splitting up their profits, have tended to spend their "caisse" exclusively on themselves as a group

(dances, stereos, etc.). This tendency could be looked at in a positive light (when one is considering how these youths might be able to earn sufficient cash at home to keep them from seeking it in the cities so frequently) were it not for the dangers such a development boded for the food producing compound. Therefore the ultimate success of these "foyers" as production units would depend, as I hope to show, upon the simultaneous amelioration of the productive potential at the family compound, where the latter would not begrudge the loss of the youth's labor time. For this reason the youth group credit scheme holds greater potential for success inasmuch as it is associated with other agricultural development interventions in the same project (cf. PRUBAC).

Nevertheless, as long as these youths earn no direct personal income from these "sociétés" it is hard to consider them as a serious alternative to the "exode rural". Yet, once it is recognized that, in the same setting, the communal use of their youth group earnings is a function of the compound's control of the fruits of labor, and therefore of the laborers, a solution to this dilemma presents itself.

Most compounds are surrounded in the ward or quartier of their village by other compounds whose heads used to be "sons" in a single ancestral compound. Therefore, the smaller scale "société", often organized on a ward, or even on a more explicitly patrilateral kinship and/or affinal basis, could come closer to reproducing the redistributive prerogatives of the compound than could the larger village-wide "foyers". The income of these smaller sub-units could be more easily used by the individual members for their own personal needs. If more of the money were spent by one member in one year, his kinship ties with the other members would insure that they would not lose a claim on some form of future reciprocation. Yet, because these earnings would be primarily redistributed through kinship linkages, the ultimate authority of the patrilocal compound over these laborers would not be undermined.

Thus, if the credit and the income of a village or multi-village-wide cooperative were regularly redistributed to such component sub-units (with 15-25 members each), the attainment of project goals would be facilitated in three ways:

1. The opportunity to earn significant amounts of money for a group within which kinship and/or affinal ties

were nearly as dense as they are in the compound, while it is still not a direct personal wage, could, nevertheless, induce more youths to seek a cash income at home engaged in agricultural production rather than in the saturated labor markets in the cities. At the same time the youths would feel the stimulation of working side by side with their contemporaries and equals. It has long been recognized at both the village and the governmental levels that this sort of stimulation has important possibilities when turned to agriculture.

2. The vitality of the family compound in insuring a constant output of subsistence surpluses (and, as among the Manding, considerable quantities of cash crops as well) would not be challenged by the "encadrement" of many of its members into production units animated by different, i.e., non-kinship, organizational principles. While at the same time, this sub-unit would offer the youth a distinct focus of economic ambition at the village level, one which gave him greater scope for authority than does the compound and, therefore, which could keep him from emigrating.

3. Net agricultural production could be increased by extending credit directly to these smaller "sociétés" or sub-units comprising a core of extended kin or affines, without at the same time absolving these youths of their responsibilities to the extraordinarily productive family compound. The status of the youths within these sub-units would also, to some extent, be mediated through kinship and marriage relations. Therefore a superior performance within the youth group production unit would be appreciated by compound members as well, since they too are bound by relations of kinship and marriage, even if they were to lose a laborer for a few days a week.

#### Promotion Humaine

To these ends, I would then recommend that Promotion Humaine be specifically charged with training these sub-units in the keeping of their own books and the management of their own caisse. As far as their composition is concerned, that should be left up to the youths themselves - the only stipulation being that they not be larger than approximately 20 members. I am confident that to the degree that they prepare themselves for sustained investments of labor, these sub-units will constitute themselves in a manner consistent with their ties to the family compound.

If the larger scale "foyer" were to remain as the final unit of bookkeeping and decision making, several dangerous developments should be anticipated: Promotion Humaine will not be thereby compelled to carry out their responsibility of providing an educational service to the peasants themselves. They will remain too often in Ziguinchor, as at present, and leave bookkeeping and organizational responsibilities to a fonctionnaire, often a school teacher, resident in the village in question. The school teacher will answer only to a single, untrained "president" of the "foyer". Elsewhere in Africa instances of tampering with a cooperative's accounts happen in just these circumstances, i.e., where differences in literacy are maintained between the organizers and the workers.

The large scale of the "foyer" as a unit of "animation" may suit the organizational goals of Promotion Humaine ("foyer" members are encouraged to buy political party cards) and their "jeunesse" movement, but it does not suit the agricultural goals of the project if the farming discipline of the family compound is sabotaged as a result. Nevertheless, while each sub-unit would keep separate books, village banks or "caisses" would be organized on the "foyer" level. Women's cooperatives in the area could be included in these "caisses populaires".

### Credit

Questions have arisen at many points in the course of this team's inquiries as to whether or not Promotion Humaine is the best organizational unit to coordinate and supervise ONCAD and the Agricultural Service in the "encadrement" of the proposed youth group cooperatives. The alternative is a special rural project for the Basse Casamance (PRUBAC) which, under the administrative umbrella of recently-formed SOMIVAC, could presumably mobilize better trained personnel and superior resources to "encadrer" the credit-receiving units themselves, or at least to coordinate ONCAD and the Agriculture Service more effectively in so doing.

I am inclined to prefer this alternative, in spite of its element of the unknown, for the following reasons:

- Promotion Humaine should be allowed to concentrate on its specific educational function: bookkeeping, alphabetisation (here I think they could provide a real service). I think it inappropriate for a foreign donor agency to support

this organization in a general way since this would include its political or ideological "sensibilisation" activities. Furthermore Promotion Humaine personnel are not trained to provide agricultural extension training in any case, even if they were to organize it. At present, their plans for Enseignement Moyen Pratique do not seem specifically geared to the broad-based concerns of increasing agricultural productivity.

- Whether or not SOMIVAC will have such a power, it is clear that Promotion Humaine does not have the power either to circumvent ONCAD or to mobilize it for a superior performance in the extension of credit facilities. The Governor's Council, through which Promotion Humaine proposes to coordinate its activities with ONCAD, would seem to be an awkward decision-making body for the detailed supervision that would be required. Such a council, however, should be encouraged to exercise an overseeing role.

- I hope the thrust of my entire discussion has made it clear why I feel that the peasant producer will respond to improved agricultural returns more reliably than he will to the animating vitality of the agents of Promotion Humaine, many of whom know very little about agriculture. It will be the agricultural extension officer who, if he remains in touch with the farmer, will necessarily come to understand the economic importance of the peasant family in relation to the independent male or female producer. Thus no matter through what route credit comes to the youthful farmer, it will be to his agricultural extension officer to whom he will turn for advice and assistance. Judging from the performance of the Seidhou project, one can suppose that SOMIVAC, under the former PRS (Projet Rural de Seidhou) director, will provide (directly or through PRUBAC) an extension agent more likely to remain in contact with that farmer than the present local representatives of the Agricultural Service are able to do. Or at least SOMIVAC could insure, more effectively than the non-agronomists in Promotion Humaine, that the agricultural representatives improved their performance.

### Women

The very fact that all peasant compounds in the Casamance are patrilocal makes married women permanent strangers in their very children's homes. However, this gives them greater flexibility than male youths in pursuing petty

commercial enterprises (spices, tomatoes, onions, bananas, cashew nuts) in the compound situation. The fact that employment opportunities for women outside the village are virtually non-existent leads them further to insist on the pursuit of commercial production side by side with their subsistence responsibilities. If a male, on the other hand, were permitted to pursue market opportunities side by side with his subsistence production schedule, there would be the danger that the former would absorb his entire effort when the market was ripe, leaving food production to languish. This, as we have seen, would have dangerous consequences for continuity of those family relationships so necessary to the peasant's lifetime margin of survival.

The Manding, of course, have given this commercial freedom to the male core of the patrilineal compound, but at the price of placing such a subsistence burden on the women that they would have little time for petty commercial ventures even if the Manding brand of Maghrebian Islam permitted it. A further sign of the subjection of Manding women is their reluctance to participate in cooperative labor groups which could ameliorate each of their rice cultivating burdens. This can be attributed in part to the tendency of these women to be married outside their natal village, leaving them with fewer female kin in adjacent rice fields. With the return of the men to rice cultivation, where there have been technological and marketing incentives, women can be expected to have more time for petty commercial initiatives. But whether they will also be free to form cooperative labor groups with women from outside their husbands' compounds will depend, it seems, on the kin or quasi-kin links binding them to the neighboring women.

Among the Jola, on the contrary, the percentage of women who marry into their natal village is much higher. Specific cooperative groups of in-marrying women are formed not only to assist in each other's husband's rice field but also to cultivate a collective rice field, the proceeds of which are used to augment a collective cattle herd which is tapped for feasts, funerals and sacrifices. In response the out-marrying women, those wives born in another village, form a similar organization. Smaller cooperative groups of kin, affines, age-males and mothers of dead babies were also found among Jola women. All these women cooperate in the commercial production and sale of pottery, salt and tobacco.

Even where the compound has more unitary functions, such as among the Fula, the women are freer than the men to form cooperative groups specifically dedicated to the personal enrichment of each member. This is even the case when they cooperate in laboring compound rice fields, since Fula women are permitted to sell some of that rice for their own profit. This is possible since the men are responsible, either in a nuclear family or a compound capacity, for a certain amount of subsistence production (sorghum). Fula women assist each other in selling milk.

Furthermore, these married women do not, as yet, have the distraction of being organized through Promotion Humaine into "foyers" with many non-agricultural functions. Thus when they do form cooperative "sociétés" they will be able to orient their profits more directly towards agricultural investments. Therefore, in sum it should be much easier to find cooperative sub-units among the women big enough to accept credit and small enough to be able to redistribute profits from its use among the members. These women are often freer than male youths from the compound's rigorous subsistence-oriented discipline, while at the same time having many kin around them who could make reliable cooperative partners. This is not the case as much among the Mandingized groups, as has been seen. However, since these groups are concentrated in the Moyenne Casamance they are not the initial target group of PRUBAC and much of the credit scheme. In that zone the Seidhou project (PRS) has found Manding less responsive than Fula or Jola, generally speaking, in any case.

The roles which I have postulated for Promotion Humaine, PRUBAC, SOMIVAC and the Agricultural Service in regard to the youth cooperatives are equally appropriate for the women's cooperatives. However, for the latter the marketing problem becomes particularly acute. While male youth can be "encadré" for the use of intermediate technology (moteurs) and small-scale irrigation labor for improved rice production, the women are more likely to turn in the fruit-vegetable direction with their credit incentives. The market for these perishable items is necessarily more unstable than that for rice.

If there were a cannery in the Basse Casamance, or if ONCAD were willing to provide a reliable marketing facility as far as Dakar for these items (assuming that these women

could produce a sufficient bulk to warrant their attention), then this would not be such a problem. However, since both of these are unlikely, perhaps a further function for PRUBAC or Promotion Humaine should be envisioned: the installation and coordination of a fruit and vegetable storage and market facility in Ziguinchor. From this center trucks could be commissioned on a regular basis to seek the products and their producers in the villages. Likewise these trucks could carry surpluses on to Dakar. The major buyers of this sort of produce in Ziguinchor would thus be obliged to pay prices set in this marketplace rather than to strike the more advantageous bargains presently made with isolated producers.

The expanding tourist industry should not be looked at as a long-term focus for this sort of gardening. A project design with such a focus would not hold too much promise for "spread effects" to other parts of the Casamance or Senegal.

#### SPREAD EFFECTS AND SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES

My recommendation of a smaller credit-receiving and book-keeping sub-unit within the proposed youth and women's group cooperatives gains a further saliency when one proceeds from questions of sociocultural feasibility to those of social consequences and spread effects.

As regards the former, I have already suggested how the functioning of these smaller credit-receiving sub-units would enable the individual laborer to remain true to his compound responsibilities, at the same time, since his membership in both of these units would depend upon kinship or quasi-kinship links. Furthermore, insofar as these credit-receiving sub-units could enable youths to realize an attractive personal profit, if not always immediately for themselves, at least for a group on which they had important claims, they might be less inclined to seek sources of cash away from home. These credit-receiving sub-units could also undertake, on a collective basis, the cultivation of the larger rice fields envisioned in several development schemes. (Six of the 10 now given responsibility for the large Chinese rice field at Goundoump are close agnatic kin; the other four are affines of the former, themselves close agnatic kin from another clan. However of them are from the same compound.) Thus a labor unit appropriate to the size of these larger rice fields could be stabilized without at the same time destabilizing the rice-producing capability of the family compound.

When spread effects of this initial credit intervention are considered, my stipulation of these credit-receiving sub-units can be seen to present further advantages. Additional such smaller units could form themselves and seek admission to an already existing umbrella cooperative, without another foreign donor having to give Promotion Humaine or PRUBAC more vehicles to go out and organize another sizable cooperative from the top down. Since the heads of these smaller units in the original cooperative would already know bookkeeping, they could teach it directly to these new applicants without another Promotion Humaine agent having to be sprung loose from Ziguinchor. Furthermore, since much of this bookkeeping will be handled at the sub-unit level, following my plan, the umbrella cooperative will be able to handle a larger volume of members.

### Integrated Rural Development

It has already been intimated that the success of the credit scheme as directed towards women and youth's groups, primarily in the Basse Casamance, depends upon the simultaneous amelioration of production constraints upon the family compound. Therefore, it is extremely propitious that in the same "envelope" as this small farmer credit comes the assistance to SQMIVAC-PRUBAC and the farm to market roads.

The research and extension to be provided by SQMIVAC-PRUBAC, particularly for rice production in its initial phases, should be seen as compensating the family compound, to some extent, for the labor they will be losing to the credit-receiving youth groups. Furthermore, where the guidance provided by SQMIVAC-PRUBAC calls for larger scale irrigation works, these youth groups will have to be called in. The labor of these youths groups will be had more cheaply for this purpose, if they are allowed to farm a dry season crop on this improved land. With their credit they could finance the necessary inputs, including the services of a pump which would require such a group investment in any case. As dry season farmers, of course, these youths could still fulfill their farming responsibilities to their compounds in the rainy season. Thus, if compounds were to release this improved land to the youths in the dry season, the latter could participate in the credit scheme without withdrawing any of the labor presently given to the compound in the rainy season.

Of course, the youths could also use their credit to expand banana, pineapple, orchard, and vegetable production in the dry season as well. However, with these products not only will they be competing with many women's groups but they will be addressing a smaller market than that for rice. If the demand for these fruits and vegetables in Senegal expands as a result of this project, it will be because the increased production has brought down their price. Therefore, this sort of production does not have the same potential for diffusion as does ameliorated rice production.

But if youths do not abandon their food-producing responsibilities to their compound by producing dry season rice, they still may come into conflict with it over questions of land tenure rights to this land.

### Land Tenure and Equity

The disruption of land tenure relations remains one of the peasants' main apprehensions as regard development interventions in the Casamance.

In the Kolda area the scarcity of wet-rice land has obliged local villagers to be very careful about its allocation. To date, the emphasis has been upon redistributing this land equitably, rather than accumulating as much as possible for oneself. This is often done

through private arrangements such as when a woman uses her mother's rice land when her husband cannot provide her with a fair share. When necessary, however, the village elders or marabout will intervene to see that every community member has some wet-rice land. This is done in order to reinforce the community-wide cooperative relations which these Fula compounds use in sorghum-millet farming and in cattle management. Where SATEC has improved some of these rice perimeters for a second crop these Fula have become more rather than less attentive to this equitable distribution of rice field space. This is because all of the community's cattle graze around and drink in these perimeter zones in the dry season. Any villager who did not have a vested interest in this second rice crop might let his cattle wander into one of these rice fields.

In the Basse Casamance, the Jola do not seem to have their rice-land tenure situation so well under control. There is no central village authority to ensure that private arrangements lead to an equitable re-distribution of the available space. Furthermore, without this local, village authority there is no structure which can prevent strangers from coming to infiltrate their land holdings once it has been improved. In Kolda, the village chiefs and elders as well as certain marabouts can ensure that powerful strangers do not pre-empt the land use rights of any villager.

The Jola, on the other hand, express the fear that outside investors, allied with government connections and the Domaine Nationale Law of 1964, will gain access to their neighbor's land. One Jola has no authority over another Jola to prevent the latter from "renting" his land out to a wealthy stranger. These outsiders are particularly feared in the Basse Casamance because of the larger wet-rice fields which could be developed there. Such a large field could prove attractive to a wealthy stranger capable of investing in a tractor, for example.

If the technicians feel that such larger rice fields are the best way to ameliorate production in the first stages of PRUEAC, then the youth groups, with their consolidated resources, may have an important role to play in keeping such land under local control. In this sense youth groups reinforced by the credit scheme might facilitate the execution of this other component of the Casamance Development Project. Youth groups could provide not only the labor but also the capital investments necessary for making these larger rice fields profitable. Certainly the compound heads should prefer losing their rice land to their own village's youth group than to a wealthy stranger. This could prove particularly acceptable to these elders if their parcel and those of their close relatives from neighboring compounds passed into the control of a sub-unit (cf. above) of the village youth group made up of all of their sons.

However, if rice field improvements are made with more intermediate technology in mind, the compound will be able to make a stronger case for retaining control over its parcel. Here they may come into conflict with the designs of the credit-receiving youth groups and women's groups (although some of the latter already control their own rice fields in the Jola area), particularly in regard to the rainy season cultivation of this land.

In this land tenure instance, as well as in the instance concerning the compounds is the "société"'s control over a youth's labor discussed above, the problems for cooperation between the family compound and these other groups so that a solution can be reached in each particular case. There is no necessary reason why a compound and a youth group should become jealous of each other's efforts. But there is that danger. Such a jealousy grows out of the fact that they need each other. If carefully designed the project can take advantage of this fact, rather than succumbing to it.

#### Conclusion

To recapitulate: youth and women's groups credit cooperatives can be more successfully launched:

- if their efforts are concentrated in the dry season so as not to conflict with the demands on their labor by the subsistence producing family compound;
- if their profits are realized at the level of sub-units made up of individuals having some extended kinship, affinal, neighborly, or consociational relations with the compounds from which most of the other individuals in the sub-unit have come;
- and if sufficient integrated rural development is offered by the project so that the compounds make progress at the same rate as the women's and youth groups.

The potential for fruitful cooperation between the compound structure and the youth group structure can best be visualized when considering the managerial needs of large, irrigated rice fields. The former would give the land, the latter the labor. The former could receive credit for seeds and fertilizer, the latter for a motocultour and a rice mill.

ANNEX I :

Ethnic Groups in the Basse Casamance

Total Rural Population: 227,000

Bainouck	6%
Balant	1%
Jola	80%
Mancagne	2%
Manding	5%
Mandjak	3%
Wolof	1%
Peuhl	2%
Saka Kolé	(less than .5%)
Toucouleur	(less than .5%)

adapted from H. Van Loo & N. J. Star  
La Basse Casamance, Sud-Ouest de Senegal

données de basse démographiques et socio-économiques  
Ley de Julliet 1973

ANNEX II:

Individual and Compound Farming in the Haute Casamance

Kolda Department

Department of Velingara

	Nanding-Pula Village Balancountou F'aoundé		Pula-Village Bagadadgi		Toucouleur Maraboutic Village Sané-Bossédié	
	Compound	Individual	Compound	Individual	Compound	Individual
Wanuts	92.73 %	67.22 %	7.5 %	92.5 %	6.84 %	93.15 %
Loton	-	-	-	-	-	100 %
Rice	37.01 %	62.96 %	53.7 %	46.2 %	-	100 %
Sorghum	63.40 %	36.57 %	100 %	-	53.65 %	46.93 %
Sonio (millet)	63.88 %	35.88 %	53 %	46 %	39.87 %	59.90 %
Total Food Crops	65.88 %	14.12 %	78 %	22 %	31.17 %	68.94 %
Total Surface Area	42.5 %	57 %	35 %	65 %	22 %	78 %
Average per Compound	2.10ha	2.33ha	1.70ha	2.83ha	1.18ha	1.73ha

From:

Développement de la Riziculture en Casamance - Rapport d'Enquêtes des Terroirs,  
Campagne 1973  
SATLD

Tome I, P.41  
Rapport de Synthèse

Summary of the Social Organization of Production in the Rural Casamance  
(only major trends identified)

	Kaute		Moyenne		Basse	
	Fula	Manding	Balant	Mandjak Wancagne	Bainouck	Jola
Net Cash Income	Rice	Husband	Spices Vegetables	Vegetables Fruits	Vegetables Fruits	Pottery Tobacco Spices
Net Cash Income	Peanuts Cattle	Peanuts	Peanuts	Peanuts Wages	Peanuts	Peanuts Palm-wine
Land Tenures	Compound	Compound	Compound	in Guinea Bissau	Individual	Individual
Field Management	Individual Female	Individual Female	Individual Female	Compound	Individual	Married Couple
Field Ownership	Compound Male	Compound male; chiefly juris- diction	Compound male	Borrowed	Individual Chiefly juris- diction	Individual male
Field Labor Organization	Cooperative Female	Individual Female	Exchange labor Female	Compound	Exchange Labor	Cooperative
Field Ownership	most Compound	Compound	Compound	in Guinea Bissau	Individual	Compound
Field Management	Hamlet- Village	Compound	Compound Hamlet	?	Confided to	Ward
Peanut Field Management	Individual male	Compound male	Individual male	Compound	Individual male	Individual
Peanut Field Labor Organization	Cooperative male	Compound male	Compound male	Compound	Cooperative male	Cooperative
Village-wide Youth Group Organization	age-sets	Weak age-sets	Undifferent- iated	Rarely Participate	Undifferent- iated	Circum- cision or Initiation Group
Disposition of Youth group Profits	Communal Feast	Divided among Members	Community dance or Construct- ion		Community dance or Construct- ion	Feast Ceremony, Grant-in- aid
Use of Youth Group Labor	millet	peanuts	millet peanuts		rice	rice
Seasonal Labor Migration	North for peanut harvest	Gambia	East for cattle	Home to Guinea- Bissau	Zinguinchor	East for palm-wine
Permanent Labor Migration	some	slight	some	Casamance	heavy	heavy

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