

PN-AAW-274
47989

FOUR COUNTRY STUDIES
on the
Adaptation of
Community Based Integrated Rural Development
SR LANKA
TUVALU
NEPAL
BANGLADESH

SAVE THE CHILDREN FEDERATION
ASIA/PACIFIC REGION
54 WILTON ROAD
WESTPORT, CONNECTICUT 06880
DECEMBER 1982

TABLE OF CONTENTS

- A. FOREWORD
- B. SRI LANKA
- C. TUVALU
- D. NEPAL
- E. BANGLADESH
- F. OBSERVATIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED

FOREWORD

This document contains a series of analytical reports on the application of Community Based Integrated Rural Development in four country programs within the Asia/Pacific Region. The reports are based on internal studies by the respective country field staff, partly in collaboration with regional staff. The exercise was carried out with certain objectives in mind:

- to examine the processes by which the basic components of the CBIRD approach have been adapted to the social, economic and cultural contexts of the urban, rural and island communities in Sri Lanka, Tuvalu, Bangladesh and Nepal;

and

- to extract meaningful lessons from the field experiments which might be useful to the Field Office teams in these countries and for the Agency as a whole.

An attempt has been made to maintain a self-evaluative, candid approach in analyzing the programs, and in identifying successes and failures.

Some of the lessons learned through these analyses are presented for further discussion in section F of this document. The collection of statements at the individual field office level has provided an invaluable opportunity to make comparative observations on the adaptation of CBIRD in four very different contexts. This exercise will continue over the coming months in an attempt to refine approaches to evaluation.

ADAPTATION OF
SAVE THE CHILDREN'S
COMMUNITY BASED INTEGRATED RURAL DEVELOPMENT
APPROACH
TO
THE URBAN COMMUNITY CONTEXT
IN
SRI LANKA
**
A SELF-EVALUATIVE STATEMENT

PREPARED BY

ASIA/PACIFIC REGIONAL
TEAM, WESTPORT,
CONNECTICUT. U.S.A.

SRI LANKA FIELD
OFFICE TEAM,
COLOMBO, SRI LANKA

APRIL 1982

SRI LANKA

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
A. The Historical Context	1
B. The Significance of the Statement on the Sri Lanka Program	2
C. The CBIRD Philosophy Applied in an Urban Context	4
1. The Community (1978)	5
2. Needs Assessment	8
3. The Planning Process	9
4. Community Participation	14
5. The Community Committee and Institutionalization	18
6. The Field Coordinator	21
7. Self-help	23
8. Training, Evaluation and Site Termination	24
9. Transfer of Responsibility	26
10. Replication	28
D. Is the Urban/Sri Lankan Adaptation Significantly Different? How and Why?	32
1. Special Problems of Urban Communities	33
2. The Intervention Strategy for Community Based Programming	34
3. The Intervention Strategy for Integrated Programming	35
Appendix: Log Frame	

A. The Historical Context:

The issue of the adaptation of Save the Children's approach (philosophy, methodology) to community based integrated rural development has surfaced prominently within the agency during the past few months. Partly, this has been due to a self-evaluative process as several new programs have been introduced and the older programs have shown a trend toward expansion within each country concerned or toward the phasing out of impact areas. Partly, the agency has been challenged by funding agencies such as PACT and US-AID at the headquarters as well as the mission levels to produce lessons learned through our experimentation in community development. Also, with a turnover of staff members within the agency, institutional memories often tend to evaporate and the meanings of concepts such as community based program, integrated program, the community committee, the field coordinator's role, the planning process tend to take on different colors and shades in different country programs and community contexts.

The principle of flexibility being a strong element in the CBIRD philosophy, the agency has encouraged program staff to adapt the concepts and methods to local cultural, political, economic and social contexts. With all this, any discussion on the CBIRD approach has often led to heated arguments and strong disagreements among the program staff although it is clearly understood that certain basic premises, assumptions, and structures tend to be a common basic thread through all programs of Save the Children around the world.

Although there is a wealth of written material on the CBIRD approach in general and individual programs in particular, no adequate attempt has been made by the agency staff to analyze how the philosophy/approach has actually been adapted to local contexts. It is often assumed that it is being adapted, and although it is clear in the minds of the participants heavily involved in the program design and implementation, it is not adequately verbalized for the purpose of self-analysis, justification, publicity or further education of the international development community.

Several Save the Children programs have been evaluated by outside experts or agencies. While they bring a fresh perspective and a level of objectivity, the obvious trade-offs are a limited level of historical perspective and a thorough understanding of the agency's perspective on CBIRD.

Within this historical context, the regional team for Asia/Pacific has prepared a regional strategy for program planning, monitoring and evaluation. As part of this strategy, the field office teams are being encouraged and assisted in analyzing the process through which the CBIRD methodology is adapted to the rural/urban/island community contexts in various country programs in the region.

The Sri Lankan team has taken an initiative in preparing the attached statement on how the CBIRD philosophy has been adapted during the first three years of the urban program in Kirillapone and what lessons have been learned in the process which could be applied as the urban program is expanded in Sri Lanka.

B. The Significance of the Statement on the Sri Lanka Program:

In its initial stages the urban program in Sri Lanka was recognized as one of the more successful programs. It has also been one of the most controversial programs for a variety of reasons:

- a. Although the agency has had some experience in urban program development in Korea, Lebanon, etc., the Sri Lanka program became the first major urban program from its inception, and the baseline study showed typical urban problems.
- b. Considering the high PQLI in Sri Lanka, the government subsidized services in health and education and their effect on high levels of literacy and educational achievements and fairly low rates of infant mortality, the advisability of a program in that country was questioned.
- c. The size of the urban impact area seemed to be unusually small, but this was a deliberate choice made in view of the relatively high costs involved in the housing project.
- d. The program has involved considerable amounts of project funds that have been raised and expended at a speed much faster than other programs. Those who tend to think of issues such as cost-effectiveness or per capita expenditures, have been somewhat alarmed by the amounts of funds spent in a small community of 2,500-3,000 residents.

- e. Although the proportion of field office administration to program expenditure has been relatively good (approximately 40% for administration in FY'81), the number of field office staff working with a small community has raised further questions.
- f. The level of program outputs in Kirillapone has been very high. The reporting on program developments has consistently shown an unusual regularity, a wealth of data on program benefits to the community and a style reflecting a human interest and deep involvement which captures the minds of readers.
- g. The field office staff, along with the field coordinator, have jointly taken a strong active role in planning and implementing the program, and have invited a high level of technical assistance from outside for individual projects. This has generated a fairly high quality performance in planning projects as well as a close follow up, implementation, institutional linkages and reporting.
- h. Although all of these positive factors have been recognized, many agency staff have felt that the roles of the field coordinator and the community committee have been minimized or at least limited due to a greater involvement of the field office team and outside technical experts. Questions, therefore, have been raised as follows: Is CBIRD philosophy truly being applied to the Kirillapone program? Is the field office team assuming too strong a role with a touch of paternalism? Is a dependence syndrome being created in the Kirillapone community? Are hand-outs being offered to the community? Is the community involved in the project planning process? Who is working with the community: the field coordinator or the university educated program staff at the field office? With this level of intensive inputs, how can Save the Children phase out of Kirillapone, and how can the program be replicated in other parts of Colombo?

While taking the criticism as well as the praise seriously enough, the regional team has deliberately played a "buffer" role by defending the field office team, examining program development carefully but giving sufficient freedom and flexibility to the local team with a clear recognition of the team's professionalism, an intimate knowledge of the local scene and an ability for self-evaluation.

The field office and regional teams have been sufficiently alert as PACT funding for three years has required an annual evaluation and proposal writing including a review of what has been achieved and what is planned. The PACT staff as well as the Project Selection Committee have shown a great deal of interest in the program and have raised tough questions on program strategy. This has created an atmosphere of challenge. In this professional dialogue within the agency; among the field office, the regional team and the program staff; with funding agencies including PACT and US-AID; and contributors such as the Public Welfare Foundation, the Wianckos and individual sponsors, nothing remains unnoticed and nothing is excused without a flow of questions and answers.

The enclosed statement (Section C) on adaptation of the CBIRD approach to the urban context in Sri Lanka has a special significance in this complex web of institutional relationships and program development.

C. The CBIRD Philosophy Applied in an Urban Context:

Save the Children's commitment to working with the poorest of the poor landed the organizations squarely on the horns of a dilemma when it considered initiating a program in Sri Lanka. Well before independence, the twin policies of rural development and welfarism had been nurtured and institutionalized to the point where their results had begun to be evident in the 1970s. The Physical Quality of Life Index (PQLI) placed Sri Lanka, with a score of 83, in a better position than countries with a higher GNP, like Iran and Saudi Arabia. On the other side of the coin, recent studies conducted by the Colombo Municipal Council, the Urban Development Authority and the Marga Institute showed that, although extreme poverty in rural areas had declined, a rapidly growing urban population and the increase, in particular, in the slums and shanties of Colombo, had made a mockery of the quality of life in the city. Whole settlements along canal banks, alleyways and on marginal lands in the city subsisted without amenities such as water and toilets, in makeshift houses made of materials such as packing cases, and with no visible source of income. While the increase in city crime was attributed to these new settlements, every epidemic of cholera, hepatitis, sore eyes and dysentery was traced equally directly to the same source. Moreover the Government's Master Plan drawn up for the city of Colombo in 1978 gave a fresh impetus to the nagging question, "what to do with the slums and shanties?"

Save the Children's entry into Sri Lanka in 1978 not only coincided with the revival of the issue, but gave it little choice in identifying a program for "the poorest of the poor". With the country's needs and the Sri Lanka Government's priorities so clearly identified, little time was lost, and the shanty of Kirillapone was selected in October 1978, for a baseline/needs identification study.

The program that unfolded in the two years following might well be dubbed "an orientation for freshers". Save the Children had had little experience in urban community development, as the term CBIRD* indicated. The Government of Sri Lanka, with a long tradition of rural development was, similarly, making its first thrust into urban development with no experience in dealing with urban squatter communities. The Sri Lanka Field Office was brand new and totally inexperienced. And the Kirillapone shanty had never experienced a program of development (or action) although it had been surveyed and studied twenty-three times before.

In the circumstances, what evolved was, of necessity, a process of trial and error. Allowing for the circumstances, Save the Children's Home Office in Westport gave the Sri Lanka Field Office an enviable autonomy in working out strategies with which to meet the challenge. Orientation in the philosophy of CBIRD was provided in infrequent visits by field staff to Westport and occasional visits to the Field Office by the Director/Training, Regional Director and other staff. A lively debate on CBIRD was always maintained in the Field Office, particularly through the forum of the semi-annual report, where the Field Office staff were encouraged to express their views and opinions. The dialogue with Westport was a continuous process. Field Office inputs received serious attention by the Regional Desk and in turn, generated considerable discussion in Westport on the philosophy of CBIRD and its applicability to urban squatter settlements. Evaluations of the Sri Lanka program from time to time also addressed the somewhat unique situation of the Sri Lanka Field Office in its attempts to forge a path for community development among urban low-income groups.

Nevertheless, there has not yet emerged a consensus on what might be called the methodology of urban community development, particularly in its application of the CBIRD philosophy. A recent request from government agencies for replication of the Kirillapone programme in Wanathamulla, the city's largest shanty, demonstrated to the Field Office the need to assess the first urban experience, to analyse the process and identify the critical elements of the broad methodology evolved in Kirillapone.

* Community Based Integrated Rural Development

The analysis, in the following pages, is rough-hewn, and represents the collective effort of the Field Office staff and the Community Committee of Kirillapone. It addresses itself to the major features of the CBIRD philosophy and attempts to demonstrate in what ways those assumptions may be applied to the urban environment, and in what areas they may be redefined. The analysis is also an attempt at self-evaluation. The section on Replication, in particular, identifies weaknesses of strategy and suggests alternatives for building a firmer foundation for community development.

1. The Community (1978)

The Kirillapone shanty was composed of five disparate "gardens" when the baseline survey was begun. Elakandiya, the oldest, had been settled 25 years before, along the banks of a canal on the grassfields of a wealthy landowner. One enterprising squatter began sub-letting little shacks on the land and thus evolved Assanar's Garden or Assanarwatta. The land was subsequently appropriated by the State. In 1976, preparations for the Non-Aligned Conference led to the clearing of assorted shanties in the vicinity of the Conference Hall. Two unrelated shanty settlements were re-settled on the appropriated land, and twenty or thirty shanty structures in the area were moved in to clear the shanty frontage for a market. Thus were settled Kumbikelle, Paspatiya and Kirula.

In 1976 the site was the scene of Civil War. Neighbouring shanty dwellers, resentful of the intrusion of "new" shanties into their territory, pillaged the new settlements. They received support from residents of Elakandiya, who had thus far been a law unto themselves. (When the baseline survey was begun in 1978, investigators were witness to a full-scale gang war in Elakandiya, in which a third of the gangs ended up in hospital, one third were arrested, on remand, leaving a third to represent the "leadership" in the community and liaise with Save the Children). During the two and a half months during which the baseline survey was conducted, investigators found that no resident of Kumbikelle would dare venture into Elakandiya. (The garden rivalry found its way into the structure of the Community Committee, which, even today has "Garden Representatives". However, suggestions made at the time that office bearers be rotated on a garden basis were strenuously resisted by Save the Children who insisted that the entire community vote for a common President, Secretary and Treasurer, a policy that has paid off in developing relationships among Gardens).

In this context, the identification of "community needs" was akin to a mathematical problem. The reference group of Elekandiya residents was the shanty across the south end of the Canal, in Pamankada. The reference group of Kumbikelle, the second largest garden, was Siddthartha Adi Para across the main road on the north, where other shanties from the Conference Hall had been newly settled. Wedged between them were the hapless residents of Paspatiya Assanarwatte and Kirula. While the residents agreed, for instance, on the need for an access road, Kumbikelle residents insisted it should lead to the new settlements, Elakandiya residents maintained that the existing footpath by the Canal could be widened, and there the matter rested until Save the Children produced a plan for linking an access road with minor access paths that would provide access to all five gardens.

Within gardens, investigators discovered a rampant individualism. Where resources were as few as those available in the shanty, access to the resources reduced itself to the survival of the fittest. Save the Children staff still recall with horror, the free-for-all which would ensue whenever food or items of clothing received from donors and well-wishers were distributed in the early days of the program. Adults competed with children for the spoils and the anticipated bloodied nose or bruised head required that the first-aid station be on hand to attend to the casualties.

In short, what Save the Children encountered in 1978/79 was a fissiparous collection of individuals, grouped in gardens, owing allegiance to an assortment of dubious social groups, preying on one another as and when necessary, and preying on the larger society whenever possible. Geographical contiguity, however, was a reality; and the leadership, if it was not entirely representative, was articulate. Moreover, apathy, so frequently encountered among the rural poor, was never a problem in Kirillapone. Wherever the investigators went, a crowd would gather. Despite the skepticism, and sometimes cynicism, that was voiced in discussions, there were always suggestions as to what might be done to improve the situation. Within neighbourhood groups (intra-garden) there was also clear evidence of social responsibility, as when neighbours would take in a child whose mother had deserted it, or the loan of one's house for a funeral when a bereavement occurred in a poorer household.

Although the absence of a cohesive community was a poser to a group aspiring to engage in community development, it was felt that the elements of good neighbourliness and social concern which surfaced frequently, showed potential. The

challenge then was to build a community. The fundamental assumption of the CBIRD philosophy, the existence of a cohesive community, with some degree of community awareness and common needs, was lacking in Kirillapone. The Sri Lanka Field Office staff were confident, however, that with the strengthening of other elements in the overall approach, the plinth would fall into place.

2. Needs Assessment

The baseline survey of Kirillapone performed a dual function in that it also served to identify community needs. This was done through open-ended questions in the questionnaire administered to 15% of the population, and through informal mass meetings with residents.

It became evident very early that the perspectives of Save the Children (working through the Marga Institute at that time) and the "community" (as expressed by respondents to questionnaires, and leaders who were vocal at informal meetings), differed on community needs.

The "community's" frame of reference at that time was twofold. One was the existing situation inside the shanty pertaining to Police brutality, lack of amenities, unemployment, and physical isolation from the larger urban society. The other was the enviable living condition outside the shanty, particularly among the affluent neighbourhoods surrounding the shanty. Their needs, in terms of this reference were very simply defined -- "get the Police out of the shanty; give us jobs, and give us houses, water, toilets, roads, a postal address and electricity as the rest of Kirillapone has."

Save the Children's perspective was that of the social anthropologist who saw the isolation as being more than physical. The degree of alienation was reflected in the cynicism that shanty residents displayed on matters such as authority, development, politics, social responsibility, etc. Moreover, the physical needs appeared to be as much symbols of social need as they were basic material needs. For instance, speaking of the lack of an access road into the shanty, residents complained bitterly that they could never bring a friend or colleague home, nor have a decent funeral. While there was no doubt in the minds of Save the Children staff that the physical, material needs were legitimate needs, it was evident that the more basic need was integration into the mainstream of society. Bearing in mind the emphasis laid by the CBIRD philosophy on self-help and community

responsibility, it appeared that no upgrading program would endure without meeting the larger need for self-confidence and a sense of identity.

A dialogue ensued, between the community and Save the Children investigators on a more appropriate definition of specific needs which might be incorporated into a plan for shanty upgrading. The discussion on housing needs turned out to be an actual lesson, in planning. Shanty residents expressed a desire for high-rise apartments.

"Why?" we asked.

"Because that is what governments have built in all housing schemes".

"Have you noticed that when the schemes are completed the middle classes move in because low-income groups cannot afford them?" we reminded them.

"And the low-income groups then get moved out of the city" someone chipped in.

That raised the question of tenure. There was general skepticism that residents would be allowed to remain on the land, Save the Children notwithstanding. We reminded them that this was a scheme coordinated by the government's Urban Development Authority. They would need guarantees, they replied, at least a 99-year lease. Someone in the group remembered that if they owned the houses, no one could take their houses away from them. The question of land tenure would then be moot.

The dialogue on needs proceeded in this manner, with Save the Children holding the mirror of long-term needs against each demand for short-term solutions. Not all the needs were articulated thus in the baseline survey, but the experience was a valuable tool in the planning exercises.

3. The Planning Process

The planning process envisaged in the CBIRD philosophy is a bottom-up movement, with the community graduating from planning simple project activities to sectoral projects and eventually multi-sectoral planning.

In traditional rural communities there exists a bed-rock of community activity which provides experience in the planning and implementation of daily and seasonal activities.

In Sri Lanka, the sowing of paddy, harvesting, water-management, are community activities even though land is individually owned, and the rotation of these activities on individual lands has a built-in planning mechanism. The capacity to plan in rural communities is the product of centuries of experience.

Urban squatter communities have no such tradition to draw on. If the settlements they occupy were planned, that planning was done with no reference to them, and very often in the face of resistance from the squatters. If they arrived in the settlement of their own volition, it was because they had nowhere else to go. The circumstances of their tenure preclude any efforts at planning, for they may be evicted overnight by any one of a multitude of government agencies. Indeed, the resources are so few among so many, that survival is their primary need.

Planning has no relevance in this context. If one thing impresses in an urban shanty, it is the lack of permanence -- houses are makeshift or semi-permanent; "marriage" alliances are transitory; families are unstable. The life-style of an urban shanty is summed up in the trite phrase, "day to day existence". It explains why able-bodied urban squatters are unemployed while construction sites in the city hang out "Labour Wanted" signs daily; why a three-year training course in carpentry has no takers; why a hundred-rupee Festival Advance (of salary) is busted, on one flamboyant shirt.

When Save the Children introduced its program in Kirillapone, this short-term outlook in the shanty was the greatest obstacle in needs assessment and planning, and continued to plague the Field Office in the first year. Shanty residents wanted jobs, but could not understand the rationale for training. When a house collapsed, the response was immediate. Someone would take the family in until they were able to reassemble the house. It is interesting that Save the Children's first demonstration house was the result of pressure from the Community Committee, when a widow's house collapsed in the rain. The Committee could not understand why, with the abundant financial resources of Save the Children, the organization did not rush to the aid of a poor widow. The rationale for securing title to the land, permission from the UDA, costing of houses, the principle of self-help, etc., etc., failed to impress them. When the Committee finally issued the challenge that they would donate their labour towards the house, Save the Children was forced to come up with the housing materials and technical assistance.

With such an ad-hoc approach to program activity, and the community's keen awareness of the charity potential, based on years of state welfarism, a community planning exercise, in this phase, would have been reduced to the most expeditious strategy to milk the cow.

Planning turned out to be a slow and tortuous process, with the initiative undoubtedly in the hands of the Field Office. It was also a learning experience, for both the community and Save the Children.

The planning process began with the baseline survey. The community's felt need expressed by children who would follow investigators around the shanty, and by importuning parents, was the opportunity to provide a formal education for the children. The Community Committee (elected during the baseline survey) identified the obstacles as the lack of birth certificates and the inability to negotiate with the schools for admission of the children. (Education is State-assisted and free in Sri Lanka). While the Community Committee identified the target group and collected lists of children, Save the Children staff talked to school Principals and were able to persuade one school to take the 66 children in, irrespective of language and age. Save the Children provided cloth for one uniform each, while community parents organized a shramadana (donation of labor) to repair desks and chairs in the school and level the school playground.

In this instance, the problem, target and strategy had been identified by the Community Committee. Save the Children merely played a supporting role in the exercise.

Within three months the shortcomings of the strategy became evident when it was found that 50% of the new enrollment had dropped out of school. It was a learning experience for Save the Children as well. The Field staff met with the Community Committee and evaluated the situation. It was found that non-enrollment in school was merely a symptom of more deep-rooted needs. Children did not go to school because they were hungry, or had no uniform or had suddenly been deserted by the breadwinner. The causes of non-enrollment and non-attendance were now identified as lack of access, malnutrition and hunger, lack of books and clothes, instability and disruption in the family, and parental ignorance.

A re-definition of needs emerged, which required an adjustment in planning, and a parallel movement toward multi-sectoral planning and strategies. At this stage, the initiative was taken by Save the Children.

Health had rarely surfaced as a priority in the baseline survey. Dubious home remedies were preferred by mothers to standing in free State dispensary queues; the community identified hunger as a problem among children, but malnutrition had little meaning for them; housing was the community's first priority, but the connection between damp floors and respiratory diseases was rarely made.

Independent of the Community Committee, Save the Children decided to select and train a cadre of community health workers. Their training would emphasize preventive health and nutrition education. (A family planning component was added later). Through the Health Auxiliaries, Save the Children introduced a feeding program, designed to change food consumption patterns and provide some nutrient fortification as an emergency measure to combat the severe malnutrition that the nutrition surveys revealed. (The long term plan was to transfer the management, financing and responsibility for the nutrition program to the community once the short-term goals had been fulfilled).

A second step in the multi-sectoral plan was to focus on educational needs, both formal and non-formal. Training programs for over-aged children who could not be absorbed into the formal education system, or could not profit from the system, were arranged by Save the Children with relevant government agencies; plans were also made to set up a carpentry training program which would service the housing project. Save the Children decided to encourage school attendance by providing school books and uniforms to school-going children. (The long term plan was to transfer the responsibility for these items, on an incremental basis, to the parents, to ensure that parents learned the value of an investment in education).

A third arm was the development of programs for women in an effort to facilitate family stability. Meetings were held with women in their respective gardens; Womens' Groups were formed and weightage was given to women in income-generation activities and employment. This component of the planning strategy actually met with some resistance from the Community Committee who complained that the Womens' Groups did not keep them informed of their activities and had a tendency to by-pass them (see Section 5 on The Community Committee). The women, however, were active participants in the planning process. Moreover, in the course of implementing activities they began to be involved in the program and soon came to play a dominant role in it. While assuming the initiative in planning, Save the Children nonetheless facilitated a broader participation among the community and provided some experience through which the community's own planning skills might be developed.

One of the intangibles implicit in this multi-sectoral approach was the planned change of values. The strategy was value change by demonstration. Save the Children assumed that if viable alternatives were offered to existing values and practices, the community could be weaned away from the prevalent life-style. The key, however, lay in demonstration.

It must be acknowledged that while Save the Children influenced the planning process considerably and assumed the initiative for the most part, the community, in turn, forced Save the Children to radically reorient program planning to accommodate the community's own values.

Urban squatter settlements, although occupying marginal land, are usually located among commercial centres or affluent neighbourhoods. Their income and their life-style are influenced by the proximity of these phenomena. As city folk, they are consumers; and their values are closely associated with the consumerism that pervades the city. Deprived though they are, their aspirations increase in proportion to the degree of deprivation they suffer. And although they are denied access to the normal avenues of material want fulfillment, the experience of competing for limited resources has sharpened their ability to devise alternative and deviant methods for fulfilling these wants. (Sophisticated electronic equipment found in the home of any pickpocket or burglar is testimony to this ability!) With this experience in "appropriating what is needed" and producing quick results via deviant routes, the community was understandably skeptical about prospects for improvement along the straight and narrow way of community development. The challenge to Save the Children was to demonstrate the same quick results that deviant behaviour had thus far produced.

This pressure to produce lured Save the Children into telescoping some long-term programs into intensive short term ventures. (The delay in housing construction, due to land tenure problems, was an added strain on the credibility of the program). Field Office staff not only spent long hours in the office debating the pros and cons of the strategy, but worked late in the field running a health clinic, helping the community to organize boy scouts, dancing groups, percussion band, story hours, shramadana and the like. This response, which a local evaluator likened to "batting all round the wicket", must be considered in the context of a fledgling organization's need to prove itself in some rather tough circumstances. It is not a strategy that Save the Children would recommend for replication.

Attached is a logical framework of problems, goals and strategies that sketches the program in some detail. The framework does not reflect the multi-sectoral approach in planning. Nor does it distinguish between the long-range and short-term planning. The short term plans served their purpose eminently well. They gave the community sufficient experience to enable them to undertake some short term planning exercises themselves. The Community Committee thus graduated from organizing shramadanas in the first year, to planning a Sports Meet and Save the Children Day activities in the second year, and is now in the third year, launching into multi-sector planning through an income-generating loan scheme (Community Fund) which will finance the nutrition program. Its frame of reference has significantly widened in a span of three years.

To summarize, the Sri Lanka Field Office began by accepting the assumption, inherent in the CBIRD philosophy, that a community is able to identify its needs and plan strategies accordingly. Experience in the urban shanty demonstrated that the assumption was not valid. There then developed a stage where Save the Children played a strong role in planning, with particular emphasis on multi-sector planning. Experience in implementing the plans was vital in providing a frame of reference for the community. The Community Committee and other representative groups were consulted on the plans and the implications of the plans were often discussed at Community Committee meetings. Through this process the community began to assume a more positive role in planning, trying its hand at a few projects and gradually assuming a partnership with Save the Children in planning strategies. This process has been paralleled by an increasing involvement by the Community Committee in fiscal management. (See Section 9 on the Transfer of Responsibility). It is the Sri Lanka Field Office's opinion that fiscal responsibility is a pre-requisite for planning ability, particularly in the context of the goals and objectives of the CBIRD philosophy. In the absence of that pre-requisite, training acquires a vital role in community development. Granted that a community has the potential to plan to meet its needs, that potential, nevertheless, does not develop unaided. Save the Children's role in Kirillapone has been that of the typical change agent, introducing, overseeing, and above all, assuming a partnership with the community in developing its potential.

4 Community Participation

In the sections on the Community, Needs Assessment and the Planning Process, we have demonstrated the constraints

inherent in community development among urban squatter settlements. One very positive feature of traditional Sri Lankan life, however, which penetrates all segments of society, whether rural or urban, and reinforces the most fragile social fabric, is the practice of shramadana or donation of labor. Shramadana has had a multi-dimensional history. From labor donated in the king's service for the construction of tanks and temples, through forced labor on roads in the service of the British Government, to volunteer agricultural labor in the service of the temple, or small-scale volunteer labor in maintaining amenities in the village, from shramadana in large-scale developmental "village-awakening" movements to political shramadana equivalent to barnstorming and log-rolling, shramadana has been a vital tool in social organization. Not only is it second nature to Sri Lankans to give their labor to a worthy cause, but in the process of working together, sharing meals cooked on site or provided by other volunteers, and celebrating the achievements of the day, a good time is had by all. Shramadana is a social occasion. Whether large-scale or small-scale, religious or political, urban or rural, shramadana always has takers.

Kirillapone was no exception. As interest grew in the informal meetings conducted by Save the Children/Marga investigators, the first positive suggestion made by shanty residents was "Let's have a shramadana".

Shramadana for what? Someone suggested building an access road, but with no material resources to support it, the idea was shelved. A second suggestion was to clean up the shanty. Beginning with sheepish excuses for the dirt and flies, the response generated sufficient enthusiasm for mobilizing about one tenth of the community.

Save the Children utilized this tool in a variety of ways. As the only major resource in the community, it was used to bring the community into closer contact with the neighbourhood, particularly the neighbourhood school. But its real value lay in developing community participation. The initial leadership which surfaced to liaise with Save the Children was a motley crew of muscle-wielding drunkards and criminals, the most vocal in the community. Law abiding residents of the shanty were wary of associating with such types. Disciplined shramadana activities helped to dispel their fears. When it became evident that the energies of anti-social elements were being harnessed positively in the service of the community, participation in shramadana began to increase. Shramadana soon became the barometer of the credibility and popularity of the program. When community

residents reported that Dasa, an usurious money-lender, or Milar, leader of a gang of toughs, or Violet, a tenacious landlord, had participated in a shramadana, they did so with great pride, recording the ever widening circle of participation.

To be sure, there have been, and still remain, groups in the community who participate in activities with reluctance and reserve, in an opportunistic attempt to make the best of a bad situation. There never has been and there never will be a hundred percent support within the community for "the movement" as the Sinhala term is translated. Criticisms of the program among the community range from the charge that some individuals and families monopolize the benefits within the program, to open disagreement with Save the Children's policy of transferring the financial burden to community residents. When Save the Children announced, for instance, last year that parents would have to meet half the cost of the annual school uniform, there were loud protests and the Community Committee was berated by some for going along with this policy. Eventually, all but one parent paid up, presumably under pressure from the children.

In this respect, the children have been the staunchest participants in the program. The Sponsorship program has helped to maintain the focus on children, and has involved the children in the program in a manner which has no parallel. Correspondence with sponsors has opened new vistas for the children; in addition, they receive occasional gifts from the sponsors, in cash or kind. In an attempt to encourage a more direct correspondence with the sponsor, Save the Children has conducted English classes twice a week for 350 children and the classes are well attended. Other activities, such as the library (where grown-ups assist the children with their homework) Boy Scout and Little Friend troops, the percussion Band, outings to the Zoo, etc., are all child focused. At the last shramadana to clean the shanty, children outnumbered adults. Appreciative of the changes in their lives, the children exert constant pressure on parents to participate in the program in a positive way. They are Save the Children's best bet in ensuring that community development can become a meaningful and enduring experiment.

There has been a clear transfer of initiative in the community participation over the three years. Initially, Save the Children organized community activities, with the Community Committee providing lists of participants for purposes of logistics. In these initial activities the physical presence of Save the Children staff was, if not

necessary, an encouragement for widespread participation and the smooth management of activities. That presence, and the parallel role in planning and organizing, has appreciably declined in the past year and a half. Shramadana activities, sil (a religious retreat), Community Committee meetings, hospital referrals, womens' group activities, the Funeral Assistance Society, garbage disposal, maintenance of sanitary amenities, are all conducted independent of Save the Children and often without reference to staff. In some areas, as in school admissions, the nutrition program, dealing with the bureaucracy for obtaining Birth Certificates and Identity Cards, specialized health care, family planning and state assistance to the indigent, Save the Children acts as a facilitator. (This is more a reflection on bureaucratic behaviour than on community responsibility). In a third area, notably in the Housing Revolving Loan Fund, the construction of septic-tank based latrines and training, the projects are managed by Save the Children. (Participation here, with the exception of the labor force involved in housing materials production and housing construction, is in the role of beneficiaries).

The progression in the nature of participation may be summarized thus: Initial participation was based on isolated shramadana activities. However, the Community Committee was actively involved in the process of needs assessment, small-scale planning, organization and implementation of activities. As they acquired experience they undertook activities of a broader scope. However, as a counterpoise to limitations discovered among the Community Committee (see Section 5 on The Community Committee) alternate groups (e.g. Health Workers, Women's Groups, etc.) were trained and assigned responsibility in project activities. These groups were, at the time, more successful in mobilizing community interest and participation. Some synthesis of leadership was achieved by 1981 and the initiative in participation began to move more clearly to the Community Committee and its sub-groups. Simultaneously, responsibility for planning, implementing and maintaining sectoral projects, such as recreation, school amenities, and sanitation, was undertaken by the community. In the continuum of participation, community groups thus moved from largely passive to active, then to strongly active. The task of explaining the objectives of individual projects to the community, in relation to program goals, is now more clearly the responsibility of the Community Committee. The continuing participation in the program by the community, and the movement to the end of the continuum, will depend very much on the success with which that message is transmitted.

5. The Community Committee and Institutionalization

The Community Committee is identified in the Field Office Manual's Introduction to CBIRD as the "means for institutionalizing the CBIRD process". As the elected representatives of a community, the Committee is the Field Office's most effective link with the community and is inevitably closely associated with all aspects of program, from planning to evaluation and institutionalization.

The Manual goes on to state, "It is the Committees themselves which determine the pace and substance of change".

The first Community Committee in Kirillapone, elected uncontested during the baseline survey, represented the visible leadership in the community. All, save two, had criminal records. While this factor discouraged many in the community from participating in the program, the Field Office was relieved to have had the good fortune of neutralizing potential threats to the program.

The first year's experience, in retrospect, was a tug-of-war, between the Committee and the Field Office. The Committee, aware of Save the Children's "abundant" financial resources, and paying lip service to Save the Children's goal of transferring responsibility to the community, was anxious to control projects. The first efforts at full-scale participation were rather disastrous. Misappropriation of finances, misbehavior and a few cases of intimidation were uncovered. The Field Office's inquiries into these occurrences met with a barrage of ideological rhetoric.

Save the Children responded by encouraging other groups to mobilize the community and implement community activities. Women in the community proved an invaluable resource. Through Health Auxiliaries, women masonry trainees, sewing trainees, etc., community participation and interest in the program increased rapidly. The Committee protested that their powers and functions were being usurped by the women. Save the Children's reply was that if the Committee failed to serve the community, there were other leaders who could make the program a reality for their people. Participation by the Community Committee in the planning process was hardly feasible in the circumstances. The Field Office even decided to postpone training in finance and management, and resigned itself to the possibility that the transfer of responsibility would take longer in this situation.

The breakthrough came with the establishment of a Funeral Assistance Society in December 1980. Such associations are common to most communities, urban and rural. In recent times, however, the high cost of dying has put such a facility beyond the reach of the urban poor. The Field Office suspects (in retrospect) that members of the Committee, who proposed the project, felt they had a better chance of laying their hands on the community's resources than on Save the Children's resources. But the community outfoxed them. When it became a question of appointing custodians for their own monies, the community's indifference to the choice of leadership evaporated rapidly. A new leadership now emerged. The Funeral Assistance Society was Kirillapone's first real effort at self-help.

Shortly after, the President of the Community Committee, who was also a member of the housing construction workforce, threatened and abused Save the Children's site staff; the police were called in, and the member was expelled from the workforce. He subsequently resigned as President, but submitted his nomination for the position at the next election held soon after. He was challenged by the President of the Funeral Assistance Society. All other positions were also keenly contested.

The new Committee represented a major change of leadership. More educated, and of sober habits, a majority of them held steady jobs in either the State services or the private sector. Although they had less time to spare than the previous leadership, they recognized the potential of the program, and feared that with the initiation of a baseline survey in Meegoda, Save the Children would lose interest in Kirillapone. The new Committee also had close links with the Health Auxiliaries and other trainees within the program.

The nature and pace of the program changed radically thereafter. Community Committee meetings were no longer the forum for debate, but for a realistic dialogue and represented a genuine effort at planning together. The Committee would meet independently of the Field Office in the shanty. At monthly meetings with the Field Office they would present an agenda which had been agreed upon among themselves. They also assumed the role of arbiter in housing disputes, and acted as a tribunal in matters involving workforce discipline and neighbourhood conflicts. The initiative steadily passed into their hands. Within four months they organized a Sports Meet for Save the Children Day, matching Save the Children's grant with double the amount, raised among neighborhood commercial establishments and well wishers. They have also organized

project activities and planned small-scale projects on their own, and have regularly received training in project planning with some degree of financial management.

The Community Committee, in collaboration with the Health Auxiliaries, recently held a workshop on Community Development, for other shanty gardens seeking to join the program. (Four new gardens in the neighbourhood were subsequently added to the program). The Committee is thus beginning to impart the training received, to other communities. As one of the 73 Community Development Councils in the Colombo Municipality, they have acquired a positive image among other such councils and among Municipal officials.

Developing such linkages, both horizontal and vertical, they make fast progress towards the institutionalization which is the goal of CBIRD. With some assistance from Save the Children, they have established links with the Police and the Municipality and are able to lobby effectively for the release of a community member from unreasonable detention, or for the clearing of garbage by Municipal workers. Independent of Save the Children, they have successfully lobbied with their representative in City Hall to provide the access path to the shanty with a supply of electricity.

The Committee is now working on a proposal to set up a revolving Community Fund through which short-term small-scale loans will be given to community members, and which, through accumulating interest, will support the nutrition intervention program. The proposed project meets both the problems of indebtedness and malnutrition. This is only a beginning in multi-sectoral planning.

Institutionalization, however, does not depend entirely upon the Community Committee. The Committee, in turn, is elected by the community. If there is inadequate dilution of training and skills, and community awareness does not progress at the same pace as the Committee does, the experience gained by the present Community Committee (re-elected uncontested this year) will be lost. The Sri Lanka Field Office does not therefore concentrate entirely on training the Community Committee, but seeks to involve and train as wide a variety of community groups as possible, ranging from the largely illiterate workforce to Health Auxiliaries and preschool teachers trained in the most elevated institutions. The cumulative experience of this broad base will determine the significance of the Community Committee.

6. The Field Coordinator

The Field Coordinator plays a pivotal role in the CBIRD program. It is the Field Coordinator who transmits the CBIRD philosophy and the managerial skills to the Community Committee, working closely with them, advising and planning with them. As the Field Office Manual acknowledges, "Successful implementation of the CBIRD process probably depends more on the Field Coordinator's skill than on any other factor. To the villagers, the field coordinator is the program".

In Kirillapone, the partnership between Field Coordinator and Community Committee began with a total lack of experience. Both groped their way through ad hoc shramadanas, seeking to mobilize community interest and participation. In this situation, the Field Coordinator was an animator, explaining CBIRD objectives to the community, discussing their problems with them, exploring solutions, persuading them to join in activities.

As the program developed, and the capacity of the Community Committee did not appear to parallel program development, the Field Coordinator became something of a manager. (He recalls that in December 1979, when sheds were constructed for roof-sheet training and production, he was compelled to purchase materials himself for fear of misappropriation of funds by the Committee, and he personally supervised the construction of the sheds). When the building materials production unit was set up, Save the Children hastily appointed the Office Clerk as Site Supervisor, since the Field Coordinator had his hands full, resolving housing disputes, assisting the Architectural Consultant, purchasing building materials, etc., in addition to initiating field work in the Sponsorship Program. In time more project staff were added to the field, in the housing program which necessitated a foreman, masonry and carpentry instructors and later a full time Architect. Meanwhile, a Social Development Coordinator initiated training activities in addition to supervising economic and social development projects. As project activities increased and specialist field staff continued to carry out their respective functions, the Field Coordinator assumed the role of Program Coordinator at the head of a team. It must be mentioned that this phenomenon of many people performing a variety of functions developed largely out of the needs of the housing program which required a variety of specialized skills. Of necessity, also, the technical specialists became community animators, maintaining a very close liaison with the community.

As their commitment and involvement with the community increased, the Field Coordinator was able to pull back and work more closely with the Community Committee. His involvement in projects declined appreciably while his partnership with the Community Committee was strengthened. The Field Coordinator now began to plan strategies with the Committee. The postal service, the organization of procedures for obtaining Birth Certificates and Identity Cards, the planning of a campaign for legalizing marriages, were the product of this partnership. Linkages with State agencies were developed. The Community Committee began to receive formal training in project planning and financial management.

When planning activities were initiated in Meegoda, Save the Children's second Impact Area, the support staff on the field, with the exception of housing staff, began a gradual process of withdrawal. Project activities came to be handled by the Social Development Coordinator who liaised with the many community groups engaged in the activities.

The Field Coordinator continued to focus on the Community Committee. At this point his role was that of a trainer, preparing the Committee for the transfer of program responsibility. His actual involvement with project activities was minimal, while the Community Committee's involvement in project activities grew rapidly.

At present the Field Coordinator devotes around seventy percent of his time to Wanathamulla, Save the Children's Third Impact Area, and thirty percent of his time in Kirillapone, a good part of which is spent in training a successor. His assessment of the Field Coordinator's present role in Kirillapone is that he is simply a liaison between the Community Committee and the Field Office, with some additional backup work in the housing program.

His own evaluation of his role is that it evolved in the most natural way. He is emphatic that an initial intensive effort is required of a Field Coordinator in an urban community development program. Given the magnitude of problems, prevalent cynicism, the demand for quick results, and the total lack of experience in community action in urban squatter settlements, the Field Coordinator is required to play a dominant role, managing the project essentially, while he trains the community leadership in those managerial skills. While the housing project has given an added dimension to the process of community development, he believes that such a large-scale commitment is not a pre-requisite for a successful community development program. More important, he feels, is

the Sponsorship program which makes the children full-fledged participants of the program, and represents an investment in future leadership.

Our experience demonstrates that the Field Coordinator's role is determined by the community. He must be responsive to community needs; he must bend to the almost imperceptible responses of the community; he must needs be dynamic. In Kirillapone he has been, at different times, animator, manager, coordinator and trainer. His most important role has been that of trainer.

7. Self-Help

As discussions on shramadana in the foregoing pages indicate, self-help is a deeply rooted tradition in Sri Lanka. However, the political experience of the last 50 years has tended somewhat to erode this tradition. In the 1930s the British Government granted Sri Lankans some constitutional concessions through the Donoughmore Consitution, providing for an elected Cabinet of Ministers with power to decide policy but without fiscal power -- a classic case of power without responsibility. The Ministers, the first to be elected under the new universal suffrage scheme, and alert to the power of the enfranchised masses, embarked on a policy of welfarism, leaving it to their British rulers to foot the bill. Thus were initiated free education, free rice and free health; subsidized transport followed in the 1950s. Although governments have subsequently attempted to reduce these subsidies, the political disasters which consequently befell them have been influential in maintaining the level of State subsidies. Thus, even today, while sugar, infant foods and other such necessities are subsidized, the government operates a Food Stamp scheme for households with a monthly income of less than Rs 300/- (i.e. \$15) per month.

The present generation of Sri Lankans has grown up on subsidies. Kirillapone has been no exception. Save the Children's entry into Kirillapone coincided with the present Government's effort to wind down these subsidies, and in the first year of the program the organization was often looked on as a replacement for government assistance. The Field Office has had an extremely hard time combating this outlook. It was discovered very early that rhetoric could not be overcome by rhetoric. Demonstration, on the other hand, had a vital effect. The numerous shramadanas, though seemingly short-term activities, had a long-term objective, in that they were intended to revive the old traditions of self-help. Once this practice was established, the program was ready to move towards more substantial demonstrations of self-help.

Time and labor are the only real material resources available in a shanty community. To this one might add women. Despite the time-consuming household duties of shanty women, who have neither water on tap in their homes nor the basic amenities of a kitchen, and who have often to seek employment outside the shanty, the women have regularly given of their time to initiate and maintain community projects. Health Auxiliaries are paid \$15 a month, but are on call for 24 hours a day; volunteer women run the nutrition kitchen, often coming early to scrape coconut or perform some other chore before they leave for work; Nurse Aides who serve as volunteers in State hospitals use their contacts to obtain specialized services for a neighbor, and in a variety of very small dimensions, the self-help ethic is propagated by the women.

The community has more recently moved towards financial support of its program. This has been painful and difficult because money is hard to come by in the shanty. (We have often found instances where people will borrow a sum of Rs2/- (US 10 cts) on interest for a day to obtain bus fare to attend an interview for a job). Despite initial resistance, the community has now accepted responsibility for part-payment of the annual school uniform, complete payment of a wage for a toilet-attendant, complete responsibility for garbage disposal and maintenance of amenities; provision of food for shramadana workers, and operates a Funeral Assistance Society and a Postal System where the total financial commitment is met by the community.

Given the overall multi-sectoral scope of the programme, these are fragments. But they represent a beginning in a campaign against 50 years of a "handout" experience. The community is now experimenting with a self-supporting Community Fund to meet the problems of indebtedness and malnutrition. There is no doubt that there will be more steps backward than forward, before the project begins to move smoothly.

In the sub-soil of Kirillapone, this self-help component is a plant that needs careful nurturing and this is Save the Children's role. When the plant is sturdy and full-grown, it will provide grafts in plenty for propagation in similar soil.

8. Training, Evaluation and Site Termination

Training: Training has been a continuous process since the inception of the Kirillapone program, and represents Save the Children's greatest effort. The focus has been on training in self-help, developing self-confidence and a sense of

responsibility. Thus, even in skills training, that focus has remained constant. When Save the Children initiated the carpentry project on site for school drop-outs, the trainer's biggest problem was making sure his trainees remained within sight for eight hours. Gradually a sense of discipline was instilled into them and today they contribute a percentage of their stipend into a savings fund, while one of them has been appointed night watcher in the production unit. Enrollment of shanty youth in formal training courses outside the shanty was generally unsuccessful at the outset because the youth could not adjust to the formal discipline required. As they developed more confidence in themselves the adjustment has come easier.

The same applies to training programs for men and women, whether in masonry or practical dressmaking. Young women who had not been taught how to thread a needle are now able to earn an income through the sale of their needlework. The training in self-confidence perhaps outweighs the training in skills.

Evaluation: Evaluation is, similarly, an ongoing process, less formalized, and more confined. The Community Committee has not yet been trained in any formal evaluation process; however, every Committee meeting is an evaluation of an ongoing program. The Community Committee of the newly added shanty community of Nugagahawatta consciously follows this pattern. Committee meetings now often have on the agenda the preparation of FORS 02 applications (Save the Children's planning mechanism) which is preceded by evaluations of previous efforts. Members of the Community Committee also participated in the evaluation of activities funded under USAID's Matching Grant last year. This assessment of the CBIRD process also incorporates Community Committee inputs.

Site Termination: The concept of "phasing out" has often been discussed, not only with the Community Committee, but among diverse groups in the community. It was introduced very early in the program and has been presented as a corollary to self-help. However, there is no clear understanding of how complete this process will be. While the Field Office has set a target of 5-7 years as the limit of its involvement in a program, and has kept this objective in sight in planning programs, it has not yet worked out the mechanics of phase-out. The Housing Guarantee Fund, for instance, the mechanism by which the Community Committee will administer its ten percent of repayments, has not yet been established. Discussions have been held with the Urban Development Authority for institutionalization through this Fund with government collaboration, but the procedures move slowly. On the other

hand, projects have been taken over by the community with the clear understanding that this is part of the program's phase-out strategy. Considerable progress has been made in this effort and the community is beginning to feel a sense of pride in the degree to which it has organized and maintains its developmental activities.

The Field Staff had originally set 1985 as a tentative date for site termination. Delays in the housing program have postponed it by two years. Nevertheless there is a clear understanding that the community is now ready to assume responsibility for the program and phase-out has already begun. The introduction of a third Impact Area in Wanathamulla has made it a practical necessity and has helped put the process in easier perspective for the community.

Site termination does not, however, mean that Save the Children packs its bags and departs, leaving the community to sink or swim. A Board, comprising government officials and representatives of Save the Children will be associated with the Community Committee in monitoring fiscal management; the Field Office will always be available for consultation; a Field Coordinator will probably spend ten to twenty percent of his time as an adviser to the program. These tentative arrangements have been made in consultation with the Community Committee, and developed in response to the Committee's expressed anxiety about the implication of site termination. The pace at which they will be implemented will depend on how smoothly the housing repayment process develops.

9. The Transfer of Responsibility

This subject has been touched on in many of the foregoing sections but it would be useful to summarize the process developed thus far.

"Phase-out" and the transfer of responsibility received a great deal of emphasis when Save the Children first introduced the CBIRD philosophy to the community. It was a concept that the community found attractive, and it gave a sense of purpose and direction to the Field Office staff.

At the same time, there was no denying that the first Community Committee's performance in fiscal responsibility was dismal. Given the magnitude of funding involved with an extensive housing program, the prospects for a smooth transfer of responsibility seemed bleak.

At the end of the first year there was pressure from many quarters on the Field Office staff to increase the Community Committee's share of fiscal responsibility. However, it was evident to the staff that such a premature move would kill the program, for once misappropriation of funds began it would spread rapidly, and precedents would be established which would determine the direction of the program. It would take more years to undo the damage than would the staff's anticipated delay in the transfer of responsibility. This debate was reflected in the semi-annual reports of the period. Meanwhile, the Field Office held firm to its position and candidly explained the context of the debate to the Community Committee and groups in the community.

Perhaps the involvement of the community in this philosophical debate influenced responses within the community. It precipitated open conflict between the old leadership which dominated the Committee, and the Field Office, the vibrations of which reverberated in the shanty. A coincidental factor which cannot be over-emphasized was the establishment of a Funeral Assistance Society, with the community's own money. In the keenly contested elections of January 1981, only two of the outgoing Committee members were returned.

The initiative displayed by the new Community Committee has been discussed in Section 5 (The Community Committee). It encouraged Save the Children to speed up the transfer of responsibility. A cautious investment of Rs 1,000 (\$50) was advanced to the Committee for the Sports Meet. The Committee matched it with cash donations of Rs 2000 collected from entrepreneurs in the neighbourhood, in addition to donations in kind. The set of accounts they subsequently presented met the Accountant's most exacting requirements.

The community has subsequently assumed responsibility for many of the projects initiated in the first-two years (see Section 7, Self-help). It is now in the process of developing its own funding mechanisms to maintain existing projects and services. The direction of the nutrition and day-care programs will be determined by the arrangements that the community will be able to make for funding these activities.

An innovative component of this process of transfer has been the appointment of a community health worker as Community Development Officer to replace the field staff's Social Development Coordinator. She is responsible for the implementation of all social development activities. She is supported by her teammates among the health workers and works

in consultation with the Community Committee. Her salary of Rs 500 (\$25) a month is currently paid by the Field Office but will be transferred to the Community Fund incrementally.

The Community Fund is the community's first attempt to institutionalize this transfer. It will be reinforced by the Housing Guarantee Fund in which will accumulate ten percent of repayments in the housing project. It is anticipated that in 1983-84 these Housing Guarantee Funds will contribute towards the capital for approximately 14 housing loans. Thereafter the funds will be completely available for other community purposes, averaging at least \$20,000 per year.

Between 1982 and 1987 the community's financial resources will grow very slowly. During this period Save the Children will continue to strengthen the community's capacity to manage existing projects and develop longer-term plans for development. It is anticipated that by the time the Housing Revolving Loan Fund begins to make dividends available to the community, there will be sufficient experience in the exercise of program and fiscal responsibility to launch a new and more exciting experiment in urban community development.

10. Replication

Save the Children's shanty upgrading program (as it is defined by the Urban Development Authority) is one of five or six urban programs initiated by the UDA. There are three basic types of urban programs under the UDA umbrella - (a) sites and services, or provision of physical infrastructure. Such a program is Kolonnawa, which was implemented directly by State agencies with funding from the Government of the Netherlands. (b) Housing/infrastructure. A program in this category is operated by Redd Barna in Abdul Hamid Street and Alutmawatta. Building materials are provided on loan by the agency, with slum/shanty residents signing an agreement with the UDA for repayment of loans. (Redd Barna has subsequently adopted Save the Children's Housing Revolving Loan Fund Scheme with the People's Bank and is in the process of finalizing the mechanisms). (c) Community-based integrated development, including housing, infrastructure, economic and social development. Save the Children's Kirillapone project is the only one in this category.

In the first two and a half years of the program, Kirillapone attracted attention only on account of its housing technology and outreach health worker scheme. There was little interest in the total program. The UDA also tended to focus more specifically on the replication of programmes in

the first two categories. These yielded quicker results and did not involve such a long-term commitment as the third category did.

In the third year, however, Kirillapone began to show tangible results. Forty-two well-constructed low-cost houses and a Community Centre built by the community are visible signs of achievement.

It is interesting that the invitation to initiate activities in Wanathamulla, Colombo's largest shanty, with the heaviest concentration of disease and crime, came from both the UDA and the Colombo Municipal Council. What is more significant, however, is the UDA's expressed willingness to seek funds for housing and infrastructure independent of Save the Children, and to assume responsibility for those sectors.

The experiment in Kirillapone was posited on three interrelated and indispensable elements -- the community, the government and the private voluntary organization. The combination of resources -- the one in possession of the only enduring elements of a program, the other with the capacity to integrate the program, and the third with the financial resources and ability to carry out innovative approaches to the program -- offered prospects for far-reaching program activities and for rooting them deep enough to sustain themselves.

The venture in Wanathamulla is the first replication of this combined approach in an urban setting. The government has expressed its interest in providing integrated services; Save the Children has developed sufficient experience and confidence to undertake such a challenging program; discussions with community residents (some of whom have visited the Kirillapone project) have elicited favorable responses.

As the Field Office prepares to replicate strategies for community development in Wanathamulla, it has paused to take stock of its approach in Kirillapone. Among the questions that staff asked themselves were three basic ones -

- (a) What are the mistakes we made in Kirillapone?
- (b) What strategies will we keep?

(c) How will we change strategies for Wanathamulla?

The following represents a synthesis of the discussions that followed:

(a) It was commonly acknowledged that Save the Children was too slow in initiating economic development in Kirillapone. With the focus so heavy on the housing project, economic development was tied too closely to the housing project. Training in credit management should have come sooner and alternative approaches (beyond the conventional loan schemes operated by the banks) should have been explored. The problem of indebtedness was one that the Field Office was all too familiar with, yet in "thinking big", small-scale solutions to the problem were overlooked.

The staff also acknowledges the need to develop community-owned resources that will yield a quick income. The problem, however, has been that even with a strategy of "total immersion" it has taken the Field Office long to discover these resources.

While economic development was sluggish, social development programs developed rapidly, thanks to the interest and participation of the community. The strategy, however, has been somewhat akin to placing the cart before the horse, for Save the Children is now in the process of helping the community explore economic avenues for maintaining those social commitments. Had the costs of these commitments been transferred sooner to the beneficiaries, it is possible that the pace of economic development may have increased.

(b) There was general agreement that our strategies would remain basically the same. This will include an initial "token" acceptance of criminal leadership. It also will necessitate a preliminary widespread training program, with Save the Children taking the initiative in planning, and the community receiving training through the implementation of project activities. There will, above all, be a continuing need to be cautious in the transfer of fiscal responsibility, lest, to quote a staff member "CBIRD becomes a NO-BIRD".

(c) One of the strategies that will be strengthened and receive high priority will be the channelling of program planning and program activities through women's groups, for women are the most effective agents of change, as the Kirillapone experience has demonstrated.

Save the Children will also maintain a continuous sliding scale of target groups. (Staff recall that as each of them made their debut in Kirillapone they suffered such severe culture-shock that the instinctive response was to seek the immediate upliftment of everybody. This did have its long-term impact on the program).

The Sponsorship program will precede program activities. The Field Office's experience indicates that the participation of children in the sponsorship program, with both its demonstrable material benefits, and the intangible attraction of having a whole new world open up for the children, strengthens a community's commitment to the program immeasurably. From the Field Office's own perspective, the individual focus on the child and its family, as each case history is prepared, gives staff better insights into community problems than do the cold statistics of a baseline survey. (This experience has been confirmed in Meegoda as well).

It is anticipated that the Wanathamulla program will have fewer and more selective activities. Data collected thus far in the Sponsorship program indicates that education, primary health care, nutrition and economic development are some of the community's needs. In the case of economic development, for instance, it appears more feasible to focus on one viable income-generating activity and develop it, rather than seek multiple avenues for income-generation as was done in Kirillapone.

Development in Wanathamulla will be incremental, as it is currently in Meegoda. Activities will centre on one block or garden. As the community development process is tested and strengthened, other gardens will be linked to the process. This is a necessity in Wanathamulla on account of its size and extent. Its population is also more sophisticated than that of Kirillapone; demonstration, in these circumstances, becomes a key strategy.

One of the biggest constraints in the Kirillapone project in the past two and a half years has been the lack of a Community Centre. In the circumstances, the Field Office became, of necessity, the venue for committee meetings, planning activities, the community kitchen, etc. This in turn, has tended to distort the Field Office's role in the program. The construction of the Community Centre, now nearing completion, has helped to shift the focus more clearly to the community, and has given the community a clearer perspective of the range of activities and their significance

for the community. It strengthens the community's sense of identity while it facilitates community activities.

While felt needs have not yet been ascertained in Wanathamulla, the Kirillapone experience has demonstrated that a Community Centre plays a vital role in meeting community needs. The UDA has indicated its intention of constructing such a centre, and Save the Children will support the Community Centre, making it the hub of community activity. The Field Office expects to maintain a low profile in Wanathamulla, by contrast with Kirillapone.

There will also be a greater reliance on state institutions for meeting the needs of the community, insofar as such services are available. As in Kirillapone, the crux of Wanathamulla's marginal situation is the lack of access to services. In Kirillapone the Field Office played a crucial role either in providing access to those services, developing the community's own ability to secure access to those services, or occasionally replicating those services when access was not possible for one reason or another. It was a painful and long process and involved protracted negotiations with government officials of various levels in a variety of institutions. The groundwork, however, has been laid. New channels have been forged and these have been strengthened by the Colombo Municipality's own creation of Community Development Councils in shanty gardens. There is now an everwidening network of government officials through whom the Kirillapone CDC obtains services. It is in effect, a blueprint for horizontal and vertical integration which will be applied in Wanathamulla.

In sum, strategies developed the hard way in Kirillapone may be expeditiously trimmed in Wanathamulla. On the other hand, the intensive level of activities will be considerably diluted. The process of community development will take longer although the route will be shorter. Planning will be more long-term, training will cover a longer period, and although measurable results will be demonstrated regularly, the Field Office expects to see fewer milestones.

D. Is the Urban/Sri Lankan Adaption Significantly Different?
How and Why?

The previous section raises some interesting questions about the uniqueness of the urban/Sri Lankan program and the similarity with the other rural/island community programs of Save the Children.

Although this analysis could be made more accurately if similar statements on other rural/island programs in the agency were incorporated, it is possible to make some observations and comments at this stage.

1. Special Problems of Urban Communities

Whereas most of the rural/island communities indicate a historical binding accompanied by a sense of togetherness, a 'community feeling', and a level of cultural/economic interdependence, the urban community of Kirillapone is essentially a transient community. The urban context is marked with a typical sense of individualism, alienation, an awareness of the surrounding affluence, and survival of the fittest. Although the residents seemed to share the Sri Lankan tradition of Shramadana it existed more as a potential than a reality.

Although the rural/island communities are generally not quite free from crime, liquor, police records, gambling and prostitution, the urban community of Kirillapone showed a much higher degree of such problems at the outset of the program.

Some elements of power structures exist in all rural/island communities. However, their power structures seem to emphasize discrepancies of income, land holding, property, opportunities between the rich and the poor. In Kirillapone, almost all residents seemed to share a level of poverty but a few comparatively rich seemed to depend on crime, theft and muscular strength for acquiring their status, prestige and power.

The urban community, therefore, presented a unique challenge to the Save the Children team in Sri Lanka. Although the all-Sri Lankan team at the field office had an intimate knowledge of the local scene, there was an element of culture shock when the team with a professional, middle class orientation came in close contact with the shanty subculture.

There were some unexpected positive factors in the urban context.

The urban community appeared to be more manageable in terms of logistics as it was small, within the city limits and easy to reach. With a high level of literacy and proximity to the modern world of Colombo, the Kirillapone community was also more ready for change and did not seem to show traditional or attitudinal blocks to social or economic change. The community in fact was more demanding in terms of tangible

benefits from the "charitable" agency as they perceived Save the Children. People expected results and were not to be easily pleased with abstract promises or the passive educational role of an outside agency.

2. The Intervention Strategy for Community Based Programming

Although all community development programs involve some intervention, the Kirillapone program necessitated an intensive and comprehensive strategy of intervention which covered physical infrastructure as well as social and economic elements of the community's well-being. The change agents assumed a strong role in providing access for the community to the essential services, opportunities and facilities which the communities lacked. The situation also dictated that the team assume the role of social workers in rehabilitating criminals, and giving them a sense of self-confidence and acceptance in the larger society, and in the process helping to create a sense of community.

In doing so, the field office team prepared the groundwork for more active participation by the local community as indicated in the movement of the community along the continuum of participation from passive to active. While much of the style of intervention can be interpreted as essentially an urban adaptation, the intervention strategy also indicates the idealogical orientation of the field office team and a distinct school of thought.

Some other (Save the Children) programs have shown a more cautious approach to intervention, due to fear that strong intervention can lead to dependence. Field office teams advocating this strategy have emphasized the role of facilitator providing resources to the communities on a limited scale, as and when communities have shown signs of self-help and indicated a clear need for the agency's resources. The community committees and the field coordinators have assumed the major role in needs assessment and project planning/implementation while field office teams have remained in the background and, concurrently, technical assistance from outside sources has been somewhat limited. Visitors to these programs have seen clear signs of community participation although the quantity and quality of benefits to the community often remain obscured, at least partially because baseline data on conditions before and after project interventions are often not available.

The assumption that local community people can actively participate in assessing their needs, planning and

implementing projects is not limited to rural communities. What is implied by this assumption is that local communities have a traditional wisdom and an ability to survive in spite of adverse living conditions. Their experience, potential and capabilities must be challenged and nurtured slowly but deliberately if the self-help principle is to be a reality. In this sense, local peoples can participate at their own pace in all phases of needs assessment, planning and implementing projects. The question then is, to what degree, and at what point in the development process can they and do they participate?

In this respect the regional team for Asia/Pacific has so far outlined two modes of intervention: one more active and comprehensive, the other more passive and constrained. Further analysis is required before the comparative effectiveness of these two intervention strategies is more clearly understood. The Sri Lankan case study clearly points out that project benefits are being provided to the community, that the Kirillapone community is beginning to participate actively in its own development, and that the transfer of responsibility to the community is beginning to become a reality. Although this strategy is not seen as the only way to intervene, it has successfully shown a positive impact on the community's quality of life and on the participatory development process. As such, this intervention strategy provides a viable alternative which must be understood more clearly.

3. The Intervention Strategy for Integrated Programming

The baseline study clearly pointed out that the urban problem of poverty in Kirillapone was due mainly to a lack of access for shanty dwellers to services, facilities and opportunities commonly available to the more privileged urban families. In this sense the lack of services/facilities/opportunities is a typical phenomenon indicating a glaring contrast with the surrounding affluence in the urban setting.

In isolated rural or island communities, poor families also experience a lack of basic minimum services/facilities/opportunities due to distances, lack of transportation, bureaucratic inefficiencies or political power struggles. Whether the programs are urban or rural, the intervention strategy must be based on a clear understanding of the nature and scope of the problem of a lack of access, and must help provide that access through appropriate linkages.

The Sri Lankan strategy provides an analysis of the historical, socio-economic and political realities of urban development in Sri Lanka, and has made a deliberate attempt to establish institutional linkages. The Sri Lankan team has thus helped solve some of the more difficult issues of land tenure, housing loans, skills training, employment opportunities, health services, and educational opportunities. In essence, the shanty community, isolated in social economic and political terms from the city of Colombo, is being integrated into the larger society.

In addition to these horizontal and vertical linkages, program sectors of housing, sanitation, health, nutrition, child care, family planning, education and training, employment, and income are being integrated with one another. Women are recognized and encouraged as an integral part of the development process without labelling women's programs as a separate entity. Children are seen as a focal point and attempts are made to provide a better family and community environment and a hope for an improved quality of life as they grow into adulthood. Sponsorship management which is often handled separately from program structures, seems to be well integrated with the Kirillapone program. The broader community of Kirillapone seems to be closely linked with the community committee structure and its functioning.

The common power structure of the urban shanties appears to have been gradually replaced in Kirillapone by the increasing involvement of new leaders. The program has essentially shown positive signs of integration at various levels in various forms.

The Sri Lanka program has operated within the framework of the agency's goals and the CIBRD philosophy. A deliberate and serious attempt has been made to adapt that framework to the local urban, social, and economic realities in Sri Lanka. The principle of flexibility has been emphasized consistently and necessary risks have been taken in spite of the criticism. The pilot experiment, although a small-scale one and not quite cost-effective in terms of per capita expenditure, has shown clear signs of dissemination of techniques and ideas, replication and institutionalization. The degree of success of the experiment in Sri Lanka must be determined within the Sri Lankan context through an examination of the transfer of responsibility to the Kirillapone community, the response of other urban shanty communities and the Government agencies, and the process of replication and institutionalization during the next few years.

The value of the Sri Lankan strategy of intervention for Save the Children must be determined through an ongoing comparative analysis of the agency's programs in the region and around the world. This is a preliminary attempt in that direction.

APPENDIX

LOG FRAME

U S SAVE THE CHILDREN - KIRILLAPONE COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

* Identified by community.

** SCF's perception of a felt-need.

PROBLEM	GOAL	STRATEGY
* Insanitary physical environment.	Improve community's ability to maintain better physical environment.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Involve community in housing upgrading. - Encourage community to assume responsibility for maintaining amenities.
* Lack of access to formal economic life.	Strengthen access to formal economic life.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Skills training. - Emphasise importance of and encourage formal schooling. - Develop discipline and self-confidence through SCF-sponsored training programmes.
* Inadequate resources for developing informal sector activity.	Strengthening links with informal sector activity.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Training in management. - Small business loans to individuals. - Develop group enterprise.
* Employment opportunities vitiated by child care problems and high cost of transport.	Strengthen community's ability to utilise employment opportunities.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Day-care centre to release mothers for work. - Develop employment opportunities within the shanty.
* Anti-social behaviour crime violence prostitution alcoholism gambling	Change values.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Build up civic awareness through non-formal education, scouting etc. - Provide training for employment. - Encourage community resistance to intimidation and thuggery. - Encourage Community Committee to arbitrate in neighbourhood disputes. - Integrate criminals into project activities. - Provide alternate avenues for income to moonshine distillers and prostitutes. - Encourage recreation activities for leisure hours and as outlet for energy.

52

PROBLEM	GOAL	STRATEGY
** Family instability.	Strengthen the institution of the family.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Legalise <u>ad hoc</u> marriages. - Provide income-raising opportunities for women.
* Juvenile delinquency.	Develop community leadership and change behaviour patterns.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Skills training. - Facilitate formal schooling. - Develop children's interest and participation in Sponsorship mechanism. - Inculcate discipline through training and employment on site. - Involve youth in community activities. - Develop recreation facilities.
** Transient families.	Create stability in the shanty.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Registration of occupants. - Housing upgrading and security of tenure. - Social and economic benefits through projects as incentive to permanent settlement.
* Lack of community spirit; garden rivalry.	Develop community spirit and sense of identity.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Structure of Community Committee to transcend garden identity. - Provide opportunities for inter-garden fraternising and cooperation. - Community programmes to develop sense of community identity. - Community recreation programmes to consolidate sense of identity.
* Overcrowding.	Planned and orderly settlement.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Lay-out plan. for housing. - Housing improvements. - Discourage immigration. - Family planning activities.
* Indebtedness	Reduce indebtedness.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Increase opportunities for employment. - Develop short-term credit facilities. - Encourage savings. - Non-formal education for better household income management.

II

16/1

PROBLEM	GOAL	STRATEGY
<p>* Criminal reputation.</p> <p>** Ghetto mentality.</p>	<p>Develop better image of shanty.</p> <p>Integrate community into larger society.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Develop community resistance to crime. - Maintain close liaison with Police. - Develop community liaison with Police. - Develop community liaison with neighbourhood. - Postal address. - Access road. - Obtain municipal amenities. - Community Centre. - Community health workers liaise with Municipal services. - Recognition of SCF Kirillapone Development Association as local Community Development Council of the Colombo Municipal Council. - Encourage community to develop neighbourhood ties through sports activities.

111

40

ADAPTATION OF
SAVE THE CHILDREN'S
APPROACH
TO
THE PACIFIC ISLAND CONTEXT
IN
TUVALU
**
A SELF-EVALUATIVE STATEMENT

Prepared by

Asia/Pacific Regional
Team, Westport,
Connecticut, U.S.A.

Tuvalu Field Office
Team, Funafuti,
Tuvalu, Central Pacific

October 1982

u'

TUVALU

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
I. Introduction	1
A. Background	1
B. Self-Evaluative Statement	1
C. Objectives of the Program	3
D. The Setting	4
II. The Program	6
A. Needs Assessment	6
B. The Island Councils	7
C. The Planning Process	8
D. The Household Water Catchment and Storage System Project	13
E. The Island Development Coordinator	16
F. Sectoral Program Development	18
G. Institutionalization	20
III. General Characteristics	23
A. Characteristics of Development in the Pacific	23
B. Implications for Nationwide Programming	26
C. Peace Corps/Save the Children Collaboration	27
IV. Direction of Future Efforts	30
A. Objectives for the Second Phase	30
B. Strategy	31
 <u>Appendices</u>	
Appendix I - Achievements to Date of Purpose and Output Level Goals	
Appendix II - Process Evaluation	
Appendix III - Process Evaluation Rating Form Case Studies: Nukulaelae and Vaitupu	
Appendix IV - General Project Criteria	

I. INTRODUCTION

A. Background

Save the Children's first phase of planning a program of community based, integrated development in the Pacific was initiated in Tuvalu in July 1979. With the approval of the Government of Tuvalu, an Operational Program Grant Agreement was signed with the U.S. Agency for International Development providing partial funding for the program in the amount of \$465,000 over a three year period. This amount, which was amended during the first year to provide an additional \$67,000, included funds for a "preparatory planning phase" which allowed Save the Children to carry out an extensive baseline study and needs assessment process on all eight islands of Tuvalu as a first step in program planning. The resulting strategy, based on the findings of the study, was planned in accordance with the agency's own philosophy of community based integrated development and with the island development policy of the Government of Tuvalu.

B. Self-Evaluative Statement

Although actual program activities were only begun in July 1980 at the conclusion of the preparatory planning phase, the three and a half year Operational Program Grant awarded by USAID became effective in July 1979. As the first three-year phase of the grant comes to an end in December 1982, the Tuvalu Field Office Staff and the Asia/Pacific Regional Team have taken an opportunity to assess the impact of Save the Children's program in Tuvalu thus far and to consider how best to direct the agency's efforts in the future.

From the start, Save the Children's involvement with community development activities in Tuvalu was unique for the agency in several respects. The Tuvalu program provided Save the Children with its first experience working in the context of the Pacific Islands. The program has served as an introduction to the culture and the people of the Central Pacific and has been a continuous learning experience in the traditions, mores, and value systems of the inhabitants of this unique part of the world.

As the total population of the country is small, approximately 8,000, the agency was encouraged to work on all eight islands from the beginning. This was the agency's first opportunity to conduct its activities on a nation-wide basis from the inception of a program. Formerly the Ellice Islands, Tuvalu separated from the Gilbert and Ellice Islands Colony in 1975. At the time when Save the Children first began discussing possibilities of an island development program with government

officials, the country had only recently, in October 1978, gained its full independence from Britain. This situation has allowed the agency to work closely with a young government at the helm of a new nation, striving at once to take its place among similarly emerging nations of the new Pacific, and to reaffirm its traditional values of self-reliance.

The U.S. Peace Corps, based in Suva, Fiji, had shown an interest in providing rural development volunteer couples to the outer islands. Discussions with Peace Corps, local Government officials, and representatives from USAID pointed to the benefits to be gained from a collaborative effort between Save the Children and the Peace Corps. The parties involved agreed to such an approach in program activities, and this collaboration has strengthened over time, in essence providing resource persons and expatriate counterparts to Save the Children's traditional community development worker, the Field Coordinator. After two years of joint programming it is for the most part impossible to distinguish between initiatives undertaken by Peace Corps and those undertaken by Save the Children. In the eyes of local government officials and island communities, the two agencies are partners in one program. This development,¹ too, is unique in the agency's overseas experience.

The above factors have all contributed toward making Save the Children's program in Tuvalu somewhat different from the agency's development efforts in other parts of the world. Save the Children's general approach to community development has as a basic principle the notion of flexibility, or adaptation to the specific context in which it is being applied. This means, in essence, that while all of the agency's programs spring from the same philosophy of development, no two programs are going to be exactly, or even necessarily closely, similar. Indeed, the differences in methodologies applied in dissimilar contexts can tell as much about the original "philosophy" as the easily recognizable similarities can.

The purpose of this self-evaluative statement, then, is two-fold: to serve as an assessment of program direction and programmatic progress to date in order to effect better programming in Tuvalu in the future, and to provide an analysis of Save the Children's adaptation of its community based integrated development approach to the Pacific Islands context in Tuvalu. This analysis, it is assumed, will contribute to the agency's own perceptions and understanding of its philosophy of development, thereby resulting in the increased effectiveness of its community development efforts around the world.

¹In Tuvalu the overall goal and objectives of the two agencies are the same. As Save the Children has overall responsibility for the results of the collaboration, statements referring to "Save the Children's program in Tuvalu", unless specified otherwise, denote the collaborative efforts of both Peace Corps Volunteers and Save the Children staff.

C. Objectives of the Program

Save the Children's stated goal is to assist the nation of Tuvalu in realizing its national goals of self-reliance and decentralization in social and economic development at the island level. In its Implementation Plan for a Community Based Integrated Island Development Program, the agency proposed to do this by working towards three primary, or purpose level, objectives: to enhance the skills and capabilities of island communities and Island Councils; to encourage the optimum use of local resources and small-scale technologies appropriate to the island setting; and to promote increased communication among islands and between Tuvalu and other parts of the world.

The first of these has emerged as the most fundamental and important of the three objectives cited above. The field office has concentrated its efforts on strengthening the capabilities of the Island Councils and individual community members, especially in the areas of needs assessment, and planning, implementing, and evaluating self-help programs. While the second two objectives (i.e. promoting the use of local resources and appropriate technology, and increasing communication links) are still valid objectives which contribute to the overall goal of the program, they are seen as serving as means of achieving the first. An example of this is a nation-wide water tank construction project that makes use of both local resources (human and material) and "appropriate technology". Its most obvious benefit is to provide improved quality and increased quantity of water to communities. By the very nature of the project (discussed in detail below) it contributes in a small way to the national goals of "self-reliance and decentralization in social and economic development".

Most important over the long term however, is that this project is helping communities successfully complete a fairly complex planning process to obtain impressive results, through their own efforts, in a timely manner. In the opinion of one of Save the Children's Island Development Coordinators, the water tank project has been especially successful and important to his island because it allowed people to see that they were capable of carrying out such a process. Most would agree that an attitudinal change of this kind is necessary if one intends to strengthen the overall capabilities of Island Councils and individual community members. As such, a project which addresses a felt need of a community and which uses local resources and appropriate construction methods to promote commitment and participation is an effective means of achieving this objective.

46

In its philosophy of community based development and in its institutional strengths, Save the Children's approach is based on the underlying assumption that development is the process of people (and communities) taking charge of their own lives. As the program enters into its third year the objective discussed above will continue to serve as the field office's motivating theme.

D. The Setting

The people of Tuvalu live on eight coral atolls spread over more than half a million square miles of ocean.² Each of these island groups has historically remained a distinct and cohesive unit. Individual community members only rarely traveled to islands other than those making up their own atoll, and the distinctiveness of these scattered communities is evident in handicraft design, dances and oral traditions, and dialectal variations.

Within this context, the concepts of self-help and community participation were deeply ingrained in the traditional life of the islanders. Communal projects such as the construction of churches and maneapas (meeting halls), boat building, and well digging were coordinated and implemented by the Matai, the male heads of extended families who, as respected village elders, were responsible for village leadership. The Matai, representing the views of their families, arrived at decisions on the basis of group consensus: issues could be hotly debated for hours or even days, but when consensus was reached, each member and each family was honor-bound to accept and help carry out the arrived at decisions.

Many manifestations of this community spirit are still prevalent today. The Matai are still important community motivators and decision makers, and the large number of youth clubs, women's committees, cooperative societies, fateles (traditional dances) and communal feasts attest to the importance still given to community endeavors. In some major respects, however, the advent of the colonial period provoked fundamental changes in the willingness of island communities to maintain their tradition of self-help. Island development projects, initiated, planned, and carried out by a centralized government, shifted the responsibilities for overseeing and managing these projects from local community groups, and for much of the past half-century, the responsibility for social and economic development in the outer islands has been perceived - not least in the eyes of community members - as belonging first and foremost to the Central Government.

A system of Local Government was set up in 1966 with the intention of enhancing grassroots participation in government.

²Funafuti, Nanumea, Nanumanga, Nui, Niutao, Nukufetau, Vaitupu, and Nukulaelae.

In spite of this system, responsibility for planning, financing, implementing, and evaluating development projects on the outer islands has tended to remain in government hands. Elected Island Councils, established under the system of Local Government, have responsibility for coordinating various administrative and development functions. Foremost among them is the idea of helping communities identify and prioritize projects to be implemented under Island Development Programs. Problems remain, however. As financing for development projects (including community labor costs) comes from external aid channelled through the Central Government, the Island Councils have taken on the role of solicitors of Central Government funds and management assistance in development projects. Having only very limited, if any, planning skills, project requests submitted to Central Government by the Councils tended to be more in the form of "wish lists" rather than well thought-out proposals which contained a realistic awareness of the actual costs of project implementation. This was enhanced by constraints identified in Tuvalu's Second Development Plan (1980-1983) which include limited training of staff and a shortage of technical expertise, and a lack of coordination at the national and island levels. The original objective of enhancing grassroots participation in government had not been adequately achieved.

The Second Development Plan stresses the continuing importance of the Island Councils as the main institution through which development programs will be channelled to the islands. As with the First Development Plan, the aims of Local Government continue to be as follows:

- to ensure the participation of people in decisions affecting the development of their islands;
- to ensure that all persons involved with island development are aware of the need to adapt projects as far as possible to the maintenance and protection of island culture;
- to ensure that all projects can be understood, operated, and services by the people themselves without complex, expensive, external inputs.

Save the Children's approach ties in squarely with the Tuvaluan Government's own desire to stimulate community based Island Development planning by working specifically with and through the Island Councils. Over the two year period since program activities began, an extremely satisfactory working arrangement with the Government has emerged. Working in close collaboration with the office of Local Government under the Prime Minister's office has allowed Save the Children, the US Peace Corps, and the Government of Tuvalu to work constructively and successfully towards achieving their shared goals and objectives in the area of island development.

II. The Program

A. Needs Assessment

Problems and needs identified during the baseline study/needs assessment process and a review of national development plans and other relevant documents provided the agency with both an understanding of many of the most important sectoral problems faced by island communities in Tuvalu, and an indication of the appropriate approaches which would most likely result in long term solutions to them.

The relative benefits and disadvantages of the method in which the original baseline study was carried out (most particularly the use of a chartered boat to transport U.S. Embassy, USAID, Peace Corps, Tuvalu Government, and Save the Children officials to each island over a two week period) are still debated in the country and within the agency, but there is no doubt that orientation to Tuvalu, the contact with the people and the identification of the six program sectors made possible during this process provided an overall sense of direction to the program.

This needs assessment process is of course an ongoing one. The initial training given to Save the Children field staff in Tuvalu, the Island Development Coordinators (IDCs), focused much of its attention on needs assessment as an important part of the overall planning process. As the Field Office began working more and more closely with the Local Government Officer and through him with Island Councils, assessing needs has been seen more as a process to be transferred to Island Councils and other community groups and individuals. Because Island Councils are required to submit Island Development Plans on an annual basis to Central Government, "needs assessment" has taken on properties of being both a means to achieve a goal, and a goal in and of itself.

In order to understand more clearly the needs assessment process, it is necessary to look more closely at the constraints which exist with that institution charged with the responsibility of carrying out the planning process on outer islands, the Island Council.

-
- 3 1. Public Works - water catchment and storage, transportation, and communications;
 2. Agriculture - land improvement, crop production, livestock, fisheries;
 3. Education - nonformal education and training, preschool education, educational materials and facilities;
 4. Health/Nutrition - latrines, waste disposal, preventive health care, nutrition education, health worker training;
 5. Social Infrastructure - cultural exchange; recreational activities;
 6. Small Industry and Commerce - crafts, credit facilities, management of small industries, marketing.

B. The Island Councils

Island Councils are made up of approximately 6 elected members, up to four nominated members representing special interest groups, and one or two ex officio members (Members of Parliament). As has previously been noted, Island Councils are responsible for certain administration and development functions, and have prime responsibility for identifying development priorities and implementing development programs. To assist them in these tasks, an Island Executive Officer (IEO) is assigned by the Central Government to each island to serve the Council as clerk, treasurer, and executive/ administrative officer.

Although the Island Council system was established 17 years ago, structural - and other - problems remain. Because they were created by the government, and possibly because of the important role that IEOs play in Island Council affairs, the Councils have generally perceived themselves to be more responsible to the government than to the people who elected them.

The existence of the Island Councils and of the traditional forms of leadership in some ways create a duplication of roles which can and often does result in conflicts of interest and power struggles. While the Island Councils are empowered according to the Laws of Tuvalu to pass laws and ordinances and to make decisions affecting the lives of community people, the fact is that for the most part these laws, ordinances and decisions are meaningless unless they have the support of the traditional leadership. For instance, while the Island Council may formally approve a community project, only the traditional leadership has the power to mobilize the voluntary labor necessary to implement it. Significantly many Island Council members, by virtue of their young age, are not even permitted to speak in the maneapa, the traditional place for discussion and decision making. This right is usually reserved for the elder male heads of households.

Unfortunately, many Island Councils have not always been able to attract the most committed, informed, and respected individuals in the community. Campaigning (presenting oneself as "better" than others) is not culturally acceptable. In any case, people do not tend to vote for the "best" person, but do so along family clan lines. Voter turnout has been very poor on most islands and this generally reflects the low esteem in which some Island Councils are held.

The government is aware of the limitations of the effectiveness of Island Councils, and at times has considered abolishing them in favor of working through traditional forms of local

government. When multi-year Island Development Plans were presented by the Local Government Officer and the Field Office Director to Secretaries of the various Ministries, they were enthusiastic but were in near unanimous agreement that the only chance the program had of being implemented effectively would be for the Matai, and not the Island Councils, to be given overall responsibility for the program.

Some of the reasons for which the Councils were initially created (such as to "open up" the decision making process in the community and to attempt to insure that island communities took part not only in their individual development but in national development as well) remain valid however, and the Government still appears firmly committed to working with and through Island Councils on development matters.

The situation is not as bleak as it would appear, and many of the strains which have existed between Councils and traditional leaders show signs of abating. Many of the Island Councils possess dynamic members who understand the important role that a council, working closely with the traditional leadership, can play in an island's development. Over the last few years some Island Councils, coming under new leadership, have gone out of their way to promote better relations with traditional decision-making bodies and the realization is taking hold that both the Councils and the traditional leadership have important contributions to make towards island development.

It can be anticipated that as Island Councils become more effective, and as their role is perceived as increasingly important, their "constituency" will make greater demands on them. This in turn will become a major contributing factor in the emergence of stronger, more committed, and more responsible Island Councils.

C. The Planning Process

Promoting new ways of thinking about community based programming through the introduction of concept papers, training sessions, and specific planning tools designed to increase the ability of communities and Island Councils to assess needs and to plan, implement, and evaluate self-help projects has been the overriding focus of the field office's efforts over the last two years.

Within the context of its community based approach to development, Save the Children sees the planning process as a "bottom-up" movement that ultimately places the responsibility (and control) of planning in the hands of communities. It seeks to promote this movement by building on the foundation of a rural community's own experiences in planning, developed over

generations in adaptation to local conditions and circumstances. The agency's methodology calls for a phased approach in which communities move from planning, implementing, and evaluating individual sectoral projects, to the development of multi-sectoral annual plans, and ultimately to the development of integrated, multi-sectoral, multi-year plans.

Save the Children found itself in somewhat of a dilemma with regard to the method it should follow in assisting communities in program planning. The phased approach advocated by the agency's community development methodology places emphasis on the transfer of planning skills as a process over time. Because Island Councils were required to submit annual and multi-year "development plans" to Central Government, the Field Office team saw time - at least, the amount of time necessary to lead the Councils and the communities in a measured way towards more sophisticated planning - as a luxury it could not afford. The Field Office decided to move more quickly towards sophisticated planning, and felt more comfortable doing so because it could, in most cases, rely on Peace Corps volunteers to help Island Councils and communities in developing planning systems.

Soon after IDCs arrived at their posts, they were asked to collaborate with Peace Corps Volunteers in helping Island Councils and communities assess their situations and devise a strategy for the coming year. Island Councils were to help determine what each island's ultimate goals were ("what kind of a life does the community want for itself?"), what major obstructions prevented the community from reaching those goals, and what projects the community was willing to undertake to deal with those obstructions. For each project identified that would make use of Save the Children funding, the Island Councils were requested to prepare specific plans on how it would be implemented. Based on Save the Children's own system (the FORS 03), specific steps for project implementation were agreed upon by the communities, and responsibilities for various aspects of each project were established.

The results of this initial attempt at producing a more comprehensive development plan were fairly crude, and the initiative and responsibility for this process clearly remained with the Peace Corps Volunteers and Island Development Coordinators. This first round was very useful, however, in that it helped Island Councils see the importance of undertaking projects based more clearly on the felt-needs of the community. It began to open the dialogue to a broader audience, and initiated a debate that was to prove extremely important in the development of more ambitious development plans begun the following year.

A change of government resulted in an administrative reorganization at this time. Save the Children and Peace Corps were to coordinate their activities even more closely with those of the Office of Local Government, which itself gained greater autonomy by virtue of being moved from the former Ministry of Works and Local Government to the Office of the Prime Minister.

Recognizing the significance of this development, Save the Children and Peace Corps, with the approval of the Local Government Officer, submitted a proposal to the Government recommending that it adopt Save the Children's community based integrated development approach as its own approach to outer island development. A revised version of this paper was eventually approved by the Cabinet.

The primary purpose of the proposed Island Development Program for Tuvalu was "to increase the capabilities of Island Councils and other community groups; to establish long range development goals and priorities; and to plan, carry out and evaluate self help projects and activities that will help them achieve these goals". In accepting this proposal, the Government of Tuvalu not only adopted the agency's methodology in conceptual terms, but requested the assistance of Save the Children and Peace Corps in putting these concepts into practice.

In response, Save the Children developed an approach to island development that included the following:

- a four year Island Development plan (IDP) containing long range goals in four areas (health; education/recreation; village improvement; and increased income) and specific projects designed to meet these goals;
- project application forms for projects requiring government or outside assistance;
- project review and approval by the National Development Planning Committee;
- project implementation;
- project monitoring through regular Project Status Reports;
- project evaluation on completion of project;
- yearly review of progress of IDP by Government and communities.

This process was initiated by Island Development Workshops conducted by Save the Children to provide training to Island Councils, the leaders of various community organizations, civil servants, and others involved in development activities on the outer islands. During the weeks and months following the conclusion of the one week workshops, these individuals, assisted by PCVs and IDCs, were to lead communities in developing their annual and multi-year Island Development Plans.

While the specific methods used on each island differed slightly, the results of these efforts were impressive. During most of these stages, discussion was open to the entire community. General meetings were held to discuss various aspects of the plan and the amount of community participation was extremely encouraging on almost all islands. The project plans presented to the Government presented clear and realistic objectives as well as detailed project plans. While it is clear that sophisticated plans were developed on each island, and that the planning process was opened up to the communities as a whole, the extent to which community members understood all aspects of the process they participated in is difficult to measure accurately at this stage. (Save the Children sees this as a process which unfolds over a period of years before communities prepare their own development plans.)

The objectives of the IDP were to increase the capabilities of communities in planning for their own future. In broader terms however, the goal of the program is to train community members in the skills and style of thinking that facilitate self-reliant activities, and to enhance the communities' desire and ability to improve their own situation. Evidence of these "process skills" can be found in changes in behavior on the part of community individuals and groups: as they take on more initiative in understanding their needs, planning improvements, and implementing these plans, their "process skills" can be seen to have increased.

Changes in process are gradual, and may or may not always be visible. In an attempt to determine the amount of this change, the field office borrowed and adapted a tool developed in another Save the Children Program.⁴ Process evaluation studies carried out retrospectively on some islands indicate that, especially in their ability to identify and analyze needs, in their appreciation of their roles and responsibilities, and in their willingness to be involved in all aspects of development programming, communities progressed a great deal from 1980 to 1982 as a result of the Island Development Program. As one Island Council President put it, while few people may have understood the entire process at this stage, most understood aspects of it; the hours of debate over various issues during different stages of the development of the IDP attest to that.

⁴Appendix 2 - Process Evaluation

⁵Appendix 3 - Process Evaluation -- Case Studies: Nukulaelae and Vaitupu

311

Discussions with Island Council Presidents, Women's Committee Presidents, and Government officials at the National level indicate that this program is causing major, and positive, changes in the ways both the communities and the Central Government approach island development.

For all of its success, the development of IDP is only the beginning of a very long process leading to true self-sufficiency in program planning. Whether the methods and tools used in developing the IDP were as effective as they could have been is difficult to determine. The Field Office Director realizes that some IDCs were not sufficiently prepared for the roles they were asked to play, and in fact has said that were it not for the presence of Peace Corps Volunteers on some of the islands, such an ambitious attempt might not have been attempted at this stage. If it were to be done over again, the Director feels that a more simplified version of the IDP would have been more effective.

These factors notwithstanding, Save the Children has been able to accomplish a great deal in a short period of time. Much work in this area still needs to be done, but a concrete and accepted framework and methodology for attaining the agency's primary goal is now firmly in place.

Two key and complementary elements at the local level have contributed to the ineffectiveness of Island Councils as initiators and overseers of the community development process: a sense of not really being responsible for development programming (as was mentioned, this role was seen as belonging to the Central Government), and an almost total lack of orientation and training in the planning process. The first Government, elected following Independence, naturally concentrated many of its efforts on building up strong national institutions at the center. The new Government, elected in 1981, was able - and anxious - to concentrate its efforts on outer island development. Its basic aim is simple: to promote improved living conditions on the outer islands and without destroying cultural traditions to generally make life on the islands more attractive to its inhabitants, especially its youth. For a country the size of Tuvalu, continued migration from the villages to the central capital would quickly become a recipe for disaster.

The Government realizes that for any program of outer island development to be successful, the development process must be community based.

55

D. The Household Water Catchment and Storage System Project

Because of its overwhelming impact on the daily lives of individual households, and because the water tanks are prominent and easily visible on most islands, the Household Water Catchment and Storage Project is the one thing most quickly and most often identified with Save the Children's Program in Tuvalu.

During the initial needs assessment process, problems related to the accessibility and cleanliness of water were consistently raised as being of major concern to community people on all outer islands. With this factor in mind, the agency moved during the earliest stages of program initiation to find appropriate solutions to the problems related to water. Keeping in mind the goals of self-help and self-reliance, it was agreed that a system which relied as much as possible on skills training and local construction would best serve community interests.

The project which emerged is already having a major impact, even though at the time of this writing less than half of the total number of approximately 900 systems to be constructed have been completed. The scope and popularity of the project is truly great, and the agency will be remembered for a long time for the success of this project alone.

Successful implementation of the Household Water Catchment and Storage project has not come without cost however.

By its very nature, the project has been incredibly time consuming. The amount of training received in ferro-cement tank construction by the IDCs and PCVs was greater than training received in any other single area. The awesome task of coordinating the orders of imported materials from abroad and making sure they were shipped to the outer islands in a timely manner was no light matter. The IDCs have spent most of their time over the past year coordinating and overseeing the construction of these tanks, and in many cases this has had the effect of diminishing their own perceptions of their roles as community development workers.

In addition, the great amount of enthusiasm exhibited during the initial stages on some outer islands pressured Save the Children into moving very quickly - more quickly than might otherwise have been the case - towards implementing the project on a nation-wide scale. Guidelines were set up which in effect encouraged IDCs to give this project the highest priority, and in some cases the islands adopted the project before being fully mobilized and fully prepared for the commitment and organizational ability the project would require. In a similar fashion,

Save the Children and the Government of Tuvalu perhaps moved a bit too quickly in soliciting partial funding of the project from the European Development Fund. While the provision of these funds has been instrumental in carrying out the project on a large scale, the generous amount of financial assistance provided has led to certain decisions (i.e. the purchase of aluminum roofing sheets to provide each household with a 10' x 12' catchment area) which might not have been taken had such funds not been available.

The above notwithstanding, it is generally agreed that the Household Water Catchment and Storage Project has greatly enhanced Save the Children's community development efforts in Tuvalu. This project, addressing as it did a major felt need of the community, has generated a level of enthusiasm and has attained a level of popularity seldom witnessed in island development projects in this country. This fact alone has given Save the Children an enormous amount of credibility, especially on the outer islands, which might otherwise have taken years to develop. More importantly, the project has allowed the agency to demonstrate in concrete terms many of the basic convictions inherent in Save the Children's approach to community development:

Participation: It can realistically be said that this project has elicited in some form or another the participation of members of virtually every household on the outer islands. Island Council members, heads of households, women's committees, and the traditional leadership were urged to come together on all islands to discuss and settle on an agenda for the implementation of the project, and to fill out work plans required by Save the Children prior to granting approval on individual islands.

During the actual construction of the water tanks, groups of 10 to 20 villagers - young men making up the predominant members - worked together for days on end. Other groups participated on a daily basis in providing sand and gravel to the construction site, and the recipients of each tank usually provided the midday meal for the laborers. Established village groups even contributed money towards the amounts agreed upon as community cash contributions (in Nukulaelae the Women's Committee and the Island Council each donated \$40 apiece to almost every household on the island, thereby providing the entire \$80 required from community members for each water tank).

Self-Help: As has been discussed elsewhere, the traditional values of self-help had been substantially eroded in recent history. During the initial stages of the program, it was at times very difficult to convince people used to receiving payment for labor connected with island development projects

that not only would this project require that individuals donate their labor and locally available materials (sand, gravel, wood, etc.), but that they would have to make fairly substantial cash contributions as well. Patience (and persistence) on the part of IDCs, PCVs, and enlightened community members convinced people that as this project would benefit them (and not Save the Children or the Peace Corps), it was only natural that they contributed freely.

Once this concept was accepted, it was adopted with fervor, resulting in actions such as those mentioned above. At times the acceptance and level of conviction was very high indeed: in one case, when a high level Government officer was being critical of the agency for not subsidizing the entire cost of the project, the Island Council President was moved to stand up in the Maneapa where the discussion was being held to declare that the community knew the difference between a gift and assistance, and, in this case at least, the community was in favor of the latter.

Skills Training in Appropriate Technology: After some experimentation, Save the Children decided to promote the construction of 1,000 gallon ferro cement water tanks. The choice of the design and material characteristics was based on the following major factors: the 1,000 gallon capacity would be sufficient to meet average household needs; the water tanks could be constructed wherever necessary rather than in a central location; the methods of construction were relatively simple and could quickly be taught to unskilled laborers; the construction costs were relatively low; only basic construction materials such as cement and chicken wire would have to be imported; the construction technique (ferro cement plastering) was judged to be useful in other applications; and the design allowed for maximum strength and longevity, as well as easy maintenance.

Ten to twenty volunteer laborers on each island have learned how to construct durable, high quality ferro-cement water tanks. In almost all cases the IDCs and PCVs now play only a minor role in supervising the construction of the tanks. The ten member construction teams have in some cases become so skilled and efficient in this undertaking that the original "experts" - the IDCs and PCVs who introduced the water tanks in the first place - sheepishly admit that they are now amateurs by comparison. Because these skills have been passed on to so many people, there is little chance that they will be lost over time. The islanders will not only retain the skills necessary to repair or construct additional tanks in the future, but they have also learned to use materials in new ways, and have obtained skills that are already being usefully applied to such things as communal cisterns in need of repair, smokeless stoves, and even a ferro cement canoe.

Individual and Community Pride: As the previous discussion on self-help indicates, the people involved in the water tank project have come to recognize the difference between being given something and being assisted in developing a project for themselves. Community contributions in cash and in kind amount to well over 50% of the total project costs, and the significance of this too is understood by the communities. In talking to individuals who already own a tank, or in being shown the techniques involved by a work crew in the process of building one, the feelings of satisfaction and pride are clearly evident. This is seen most vividly in the example of one volunteer laborer in Vaitupu who had been part of a work crew since the beginning of the project: when given the opportunity to accept a salaried job, he turned down the offer rather than cede his place on the voluntary labor force.

This project has provided a clear demonstration of the fact that when strongly felt needs of community people are addressed in an appropriate manner the concepts of self-help and self-reliance are not a thing of the past.

E. The Island Development Coordinator

The field worker, in this case the IDC, plays a key role in Save the Children's community development methodology. These field workers are charged with the crucial task of working on a day-to-day basis with communities, transforming development theories and concepts into practice. The skills required of a good field worker are many and varied, and the responsibilities placed on his or her shoulders can be great. In many communities around the world, the field worker is Save the Children.

Given the isolated nature of island communities in Tuvalu, the importance of the IDC as representative of Save the Children in the eyes of the community can be very high. Yet it can be argued that overall, the development of the role of the Island Development Coordinator remains the most disappointing aspect of Save the Children's program in Tuvalu.

Seeing the eight islands as separate "impact areas", the original planners of the program proposed to select one individual from each to fulfill the role of IDC. Once the selection process was completed, the eight IDCs were given four weeks of training in development of "process" skills, and four weeks training in technical skills. The IDCs participated enthusiastically in this training program and while the process skills came with more difficulty than the technical skills, by the end of training each IDC had gained an understanding of and a commitment to self-help development.

After two years in the field, the enthusiasm and commitment of the six remaining IDCs remain high.⁶ However, the IDCs have, generally speaking, fared rather poorly in their originally intended roles as motivators and facilitators in the development process. As was mentioned earlier, they have tended to gravitate toward those areas in which they feel more comfortable (i.e. as technical advisors and construction supervisors), leaving it up to PCVs (where posted) to assume the role of CD worker in the broader sense of the term.

There are probably many reasons for this:

- to a certain extent, the overall educational background of most IDCs is somewhat limited. Throughout much of their lives, IDCs held practical jobs as seamen, carpenters, bookkeepers, etc., and their experience in human development programs is limited;
- the emergence of the water tank project, and the additional skills training it necessitated, tended to reinforce certain aspects of the job and downplay others, thrusting the IDCs into technical roles;
- due to their age and the prevalent cultural traditions, many IDCs are hesitant to speak in front of groups, especially in the maneapa;
- the advisability of assigning IDCs to work on their home islands is open to question. Although the average age of IDCs is around 40 years, they are still looked upon as young men by the people of their community, and any faults or past indiscretions are known by all. In addition, considerable pressures are sometimes exerted by family or village members which make it difficult for IDCs to remain impartial. Their training, which gives them a higher status in their communities, and their dedication to their jobs, have helped some of the IDCs overcome these factors, but it remains a problem for others.
- Because of the difficulties of coordinating travel arrangements among islands, it has been difficult for the field office to provide sufficient follow-up support and in-service training to the IDCs. On islands which have had a Peace Corps couple, much of the responsibility for providing this support was delegated to PCVs, and in some cases, the field office tended to rely too heavily on PCVs to carry out the "process" side of community development (this aspect will be discussed further under Peace Corps/Save the Children Collaboration".

⁶Two of the original IDCs have been replaced. One was asked, on reasons of performance, to submit his resignation, the other, the widely admired and respected Panapa Panapa, has recently retired in order to follow his own pursuits.

- Transportation problems have made it difficult for the Field Office team from Funafuti to visit the outer islands on a regular basis for constant program support to IDCs although attempts are made for as many field visits as possible.

During the Island Development Plan process, a number of the IDCs, not having had sufficient preparation themselves, were unable to effectively lead the communities and the Island Councils in the preparation of the plans that followed the week long workshops. To a certain extent, the preparation of IDPs was as much a learning experience for them as it was for others.

This is not to say that IDCs have generally shown themselves incapable of fulfilling the role of dynamic leaders of the development process envisioned for them. It does mean that during the first two years of the program, the technical requirements of the water project and the lack of opportunity for sufficient in-service training have led the IDCs into a somewhat narrow view of their roles. It is clear that additional training and some amount of reorientation is necessary. Most of the IDCs now have two years of experience behind them, and for the most part have proven their worth to communities and Island Councils. Their development into true community development workers should now be feasible.

F. Sectoral Program Development

At the community level, the program is a true collaboration between Save the Children, the Peace Corps, and the Government of Tuvalu. Individual projects carried out by communities most often emerge not through the initiative of any single one of these groups, but through the combined efforts of all three influencing a project at different stages and in different ways. For this reason, it is extremely difficult to isolate Save the Children's own programmatic impact on the daily lives of community members in Tuvalu.

This said, it is still possible to discern strategies initiated and developed by Save the Children staff members, and to begin to assess the effect these specific strategies will have on the national and local development situation in Tuvalu.

As has been stressed, the Field Office sees its major efforts going into the development of training strategies to increase the ability of Island Councils and communities to effectively plan and implement projects. Through the introduction of various planning tools, many of them adapted from those used by Save the Children in its programs around the world, the Field Office is coordinating the development of a systematic and comprehensive approach to project and program planning that is

already having a great deal of impact at both the national and community levels. By their very nature, these tools and systems are promoting self-help, encouraging communities to take a more long-term view of their needs, encouraging integrated programming, and provoking a more widespread discussion within communities on community needs and solutions to problems.

In addition to helping develop planning skills however, Save the Children also sees that part of its role is to introduce new concepts and ideas to contribute to sectoral program development on outer islands. The Household Water Catchment and Storage Project, a major infrastructural project that will continue over the next 1½ to 2 years, will eventually provide a clean and adequate water supply to 90% of the households in the country. To help alleviate the problem of isolation, an internationally respected designer and builder of multi-hulled sailing craft has conducted a study on the feasibility of utilizing such craft for transportation and fishing in Tuvalu. A proposal for the development of outrigger canoes for intralagoon transport and fishing, and of larger catamarans for deep sea fishing and inter-island transport has been accepted by the Cabinet. The construction of these boats is scheduled to begin in the early stages of Phase II of the program (early 1983). The Field Office staff hope that, in addition to providing fuel-efficient fishing and work boats, these sailing craft may make the islands of Tuvalu much less inaccessible, contributing to increased communication and exchange.

Due to extreme overcrowding and a desire on the part of the community to obtain durable housing in less need of continuous repair, Save the Children hired an Architect/Planner from England to assist in developing a plan for a model village on the island of Nanumanga. With the crucial involvement of Peace Corps Volunteers (one of them himself an Architect/Planner) a plan which incorporated improved layout and housing design was developed with community members. Better spacing and more area around each house for water tanks and latrines will soon have a marked effect on the sanitation and health situation on Nanumanga. In addition to these efforts in the areas of health and sanitation, clinics or maternity wards have been constructed on Namunea, Vaitupu, and Niu. Vaccine cold storage boxes were made available on all islands to help in the Health Department's vaccine inoculation campaign.

Livestock programs, especially pigs and poultry, are becoming widespread on many islands. Communities are being encouraged to build pig styes and chicken coops well away from villages in an effort to decrease the number of flies in inhabited areas. Eggs are forming a larger part of daily diets, and home vegetable gardens, promoted primarily by PCVs, will also slowly begin to improve the nutritional standards on outer islands.

⁷The use of one of these tools, Save the Children's "General Project Criteria" form (Appendix 4), is helping Councils and communities focus more clearly on essential characteristics of successful community development projects.

On Nukufetau, the first market center on an outer island has been constructed. Local produce and crafts will be available for sale, and if this pilot project is successful, such centers will be developed on other islands. In Funafuti Save the Children has been heavily involved in supervising the construction of a National Craft Center through which the National Women's Council will coordinate the local sale and export of handicrafts from all islands in Tuvalu. In Nui, the Island Council has obtained a choir-string making machine with Save the Children's help. Although not yet operational, the sale of string will provide additional revenue that the Council will use in implementing other island development projects.

Save the Children has also financed studies on the use of a small coconut oil expelling plant and a portable coconut timber mill. If eventually proven successful, these projects will contribute significantly towards reducing certain imports (wood for construction, and cooking oil, kerosene, and even possibly diesel fuel) to outer islands.

The Field Office's Program Officer for social development has been involved in supporting and helping coordinate the efforts of Community Workers, nurses, female PCVs and Women's Committees on outer islands, and has worked closely with the National Women's Council. In an effort to enhance the quality of pre-school teaching, 6 pre-school leaders were enrolled in a course through the University of the South Pacific. Because the status of Community Workers has remained unclear, it has been difficult to coordinate women's activities as effectively as possible. This situation is now beginning to clarify itself, and in any case women have proven to be the most actively motivated workers on many islands and have often been in the forefront of successful project planning and implementation.

The water tank construction project has taken up a great deal of energy and time on the part of IDCs, PCVs and community members. Many of the projects discussed above are only in the initial stages of implementation, and it is too early to properly evaluate the impact they may ultimately have. The diversity of these activities do show however that Save the Children has, in a very short time, been able to introduce a wide range of creative ideas and possible solutions to many of the problems revealed during the agency's needs assessment process.⁸ A great deal more work, by all parties involved in island development in Tuvalu, is yet to be done before all of these problems are solved.

G. Institutionalization

The Save the Children Field Office is effectively, if not yet legally, a part of the development structure of the Government

⁸Appendix I - "Achievements to Date of Purpose and Output Level Goals"

of Tuvalu. Within the Government structure, the Field Office Director reports on a regular basis to the Local Government Officer within the Office of the Prime Minister. The size and makeup of the country preclude the possibility of forming separate structures and then "institutionalizing" them in the generally accepted sense of that term. In the original Implementation Plan the agency makes clear its goal of "Institution Building", i.e. "strengthening the Island Councils and other local level organizations involved in the process of island development" (p. 24). When Save the Children's activities in Tuvalu are eventually terminated (the long range goal of all of the agency's programs), various systems and perhaps even personnel functions will most probably be taken over by the Government, irrespective of whether or not a private Save the Children movement is established in Tuvalu.

This transfer of responsibility (and even the transfer of several Save the Children systems) is already taking place. Project application forms, modeled on the agency's "FORS 03", were at one time submitted to the Field Office Director for review. They are now submitted directly to the Local Government Officer, whose responsibility it is to approve or not approve project applications submitted from the outer islands. The format of Island Development Plans is the result of a collaborative effort between the Field Office Director and the Local Government Officer. In the same way, Save the Children has just entered into agreement with the government to fund, and help define, a "Women in Development Officer" position that will have responsibility for overall coordination of women's activities on the islands. Save the Children has agreed to fund this position for a period of three to five years, at which time the Government will provide the resources necessary to maintain it.

These are but a few examples of the ways in which this "transfer of responsibility" has already begun to take place. While it is too early at this point to speculate on when the program will be "successful enough to be phased out" (Government officials feel that an additional three to five years is the minimum amount of time necessary), the form of transfer is an important issue which will require further attention in the next phase of the program.

During the early stages of the program, the Field Office Director tried unsuccessfully to identify a local counterpart who could be hired by Save the Children and be trained to take over responsibility for the program. There are very few privately employed individuals available who had suitable qualifications: those that did were quick to receive longer term (and more secure) positions with the Government. As the relationship with the Office of Local Government became more

clearly defined however, the Field Office Director realized that he did have counterparts after all: his counterparts (that is, the individuals who would eventually assume some of his responsibilities which the Government decided to maintain) were in fact the Local Government Officer and his Assistant.

Working even more closely with the Local Government Officer at the national level mirrors what will be taking place at the local level: as IDCs (and PCVs) transfer their technical and planning skills to communities and Island Councils, they should be able to "work themselves out of a job". A concrete example of this process at work has already been demonstrated by the water project. The true test of this transfer of responsibility will be met when communities look to the Island Councils for leadership and guidance in their development efforts, and when Island Councils are fully prepared to meet those expectations.

III. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS

A. Characteristics of Development in the Pacific

There are a few key characteristics of the development setting in the Pacific which have had a significant effect on the agency's program in Tuvalu. While not all of these characteristics or traits can be said to apply in equal measure to each island nation in the region, they can all be seen as broadly relevant to community development programming in the Pacific.

1. Isolation: During the needs assessment process the related problems of insufficient transportation, inaccessibility, and isolation were identified as major constraints in an island community's ability to improve its social and economic development situation through self-help. In the First and Second Development Plans, the Government stressed the importance of overcoming the isolation of the outer islands in advocating (among other methods of dealing with the problem) the continuation of shipping services to all islands even though "no service existing or proposed could be justified in purely economic terms" (DP II p. 90).

Insufficient transportation and inaccessibility are by no means restricted to nations in the Pacific. The nature of the situation there, however, with small islands separated from each other by miles of ocean, makes the resulting sense of isolation more acute.

These characteristics affect Save the Children's program in different ways and on different levels. In an obvious way, coordinating the flow of construction material is in itself a major undertaking. Ordering supplies from abroad, breaking-down shipments when they arrive and insuring that they are delivered to their ultimate destinations on the outer islands in a timely manner consumes one's time and energy. Disruptions in air or sea transport frequently undermine the best-laid plans, and project schedules often become meaningless. Logistical considerations, then, take on an importance rarely seen elsewhere.

The isolation affects not only the flow of project materials, but relations between Field Office staff and Island Development Coordinators. Communication is minimized, feedback in either direction is relatively infrequent and done mostly through correspondence. Field visits are themselves necessarily kept to a minimum. Most importantly, the opportunities for training sessions for IDCs as a group are lessened considerably by the difficulties inherent in juggling sea and air transportation schedules from seven outer islands. IDCs have not been able to have enough opportunity to share their experiences with one

another, and to develop fully the kinds of team spirit and shared enthusiasm that can lead to greater motivation and creativity.

2. Size: In addition to the isolation of communities, Save the Children's experience in Tuvalu has been greatly affected by the very small size of the population. While Tuvalu represents an extreme case, many of the effects of a small population on a community development program can be generalized for many parts of the Pacific.

Small population size has its most immediate effect in the proportionately small size of the government bureaucracy at both local and national levels, and in the small number of outside institutions and agencies available as resources. Institutional collaboration is thus facilitated, as is collaboration with various departments of the government. The Field Office staff are more quickly able to understand each person's duties and responsibilities, and in a situation where "everyone knows everyone else", the overall dynamics of the government structure becomes more readily apparent. Within these circumstances, inter-personnel relations become exceedingly important, but access to crucial individuals is heightened (some of these aspects will be discussed further in Implications of a Nation-Wide Program).

In a less concrete way, small, close-knit (and therefore relatively less diverse) communities enable the field office staff to have a greater overall "grasp" of the situation. Without pushing too far the thesis that "small size means less complex", it still can be argued that the small size of the population and communities allow many of the problems - and hence, some of their solutions - to be seen more readily and clearly. Being able to see problems or situations in their "totality" has allowed the program designers to pinpoint with greater accuracy those crucial levels in the hierarchy of interrelated problems whose solution will have an overall effect on the development situation. In addition, the small size of the populations makes any impact that much more visible, providing feedback to program managers at earlier and more frequent stages of the program. Although this factor is somewhat lessened by the degree of isolation discussed previously, it is still less difficult to monitor impact, and therefore to "fine tune" the program accordingly.

The effects of the small populations at the field level are not always so benign. IDCs, working on their home islands, find themselves working among people they have known very intimately - and who have known them - all of their lives. As was discussed earlier, this can tend to make it more difficult for the IDC to be perceived, and to perceive himself, as an "agent of change".

3. Human Resources: As was seen in previous discussions, the availability of qualified personnel in a small subsistence economy such as the one in Tuvalu is lessened. Educated or otherwise well qualified individuals are quickly absorbed into government service (although of course this will not always remain the case). Few other "training grounds" than the Civil Service exist for individuals with potential, and those that do work for the Civil Service receive benefits (most importantly in the form of job security) that act as a disincentive for working with a private agency such as Save the Children. Rather than being able to hire individuals who can bring relevant experience to the program, the Field Director must instead attempt to identify individuals whose experience is generally less relevant but who show a greater potential to learn on the job. The effect this situation has on the amount of time necessarily spent on orientation, training, and supervision of staff, and on the overall quality of the program during its early stages, can be important.

4. Living Standards: Speaking very generally (or at least more specifically of Tuvalu) living conditions in these island communities are not as poor as they are in many other areas of the world. The society is highly egalitarian, and "pockets of poverty" are virtually nonexistent. Land acts as a sort of social security system: as long as one has land, food and shelter are obtainable. The sea, which belongs to everyone, can also be an ample provider. This is not to imply that there are no social or economic problems, or that the problems that do exist are less important and less in need of attention. What becomes apparent however is that many of these problems are both different in nature and in degree from those that exist in other countries, and that they are unique to the specific conditions found in the Pacific.

One immediate example of this can be seen in the small size, and therefore the fragility, of these island communities. The influence of outside social and economic conditions over the last century is having its effect on the delicately balanced social systems which evolved to compensate for the fragility mentioned above. Migration to the urban center, a problem in many countries, takes on awesome proportions when viewed in the Pacific context. A Funafuti cannot long sustain increasingly large numbers of disaffected youth from the outer islands seeking employment; a Nukulaelae cannot long maintain its fragile social and (subsistence level) economic stability if its youth is flocking to Funafuti and Suva. Creating employment opportunities and more desirable lifestyles on outer islands is, under such circumstances, not merely desirable but crucial.

Describing Pacific nations as paradise islands not only masks fundamental problems, but does those countries a disservice.

For an agency used to working with "the poorest of the poor", however, the Pacific context calls for a shift in perspective.

B. Implications of Nation-Wide Programming

Working on a nation-wide basis in Tuvalu from the onset of program activities has been unique in Save the Children's experience. The implications of this situation have been tremendous and far-reaching. The impact of the agency's program on National policies, in just over two years, has been far greater in Tuvalu than in any other country in a similar amount of time. Save the Children has been thrust on the National scene from the start, and this combined with the relaxed and informal nature of government in Tuvalu has allowed the proponents of its methodology and philosophy of community based integrated development to find avid listeners and active supporters.

The responsibilities of a nation-wide program are great, however. Admitted mistakes, as well as successes, are easy for all to see, and this can make it more difficult to acknowledge them and to chart new directions. The highly visible nature of the program can influence its pace as well: heightened visibility both cautions the careful approach and fuels the drive for making the big splash.

Working on a nation-wide level naturally ties the agency strongly with the National Government's policies and objectives. With its stress on vertical integration, including the strengthening of linkages between community groups or organizations and regional and national government, Save the Children's methodology has no quarrel with this on an ideological level. But these stronger ties to the National Government can make it more difficult to distinguish the agency's ultimate constituency. Should the Field Office help fulfill the Government's short term requirements, or seek to address the long term needs of the community? The obvious answer (whose implementation strategy is by no means so obvious) is to effect a delicate balance between the two, while endeavoring to convince the Government of the ultimate importance of the long term needs of the communities.

As has been mentioned, working with the entire population in Tuvalu has allowed the Field Office to have at least some impact on National policy in a very short time. On the other hand, the fact of working in equal measure throughout the country has in some ways served to obscure and therefore diminish the agency's impact. This seeming paradox can be explained by the fact that because no specific areas of the country are formally or informally viewed as "Save the Children Impact Areas" (as often happens in other countries), and because the agency works along side myriad other government and (less frequently)

nongovernment agency personnel, the program is much less autonomous and the effects of the agency's methodology are more subtle. Save the Children staff may be playing to a National audience, but they are just a few of the many actors on the stage. And the scene is one that is scripted for many (interrelated) parts. Under such circumstances, dialogue, and interpersonal relations between various actors become paramount.

The Field Office is now firmly situated within the structure of the Government, and its mandate and sphere of operations is thus made very clear. Initially, the agency acted a bit like a new kid in town with some good ideas, but with big feet that sometimes got in his and other people's way. The first two years have allowed Save the Children to grow more gracefully into its role, and to find its place as an important and effective advocate for community based development in Tuvalu.

C. Peace Corps/Save the Children Collaboration

The US Peace Corps does not maintain an administrative office in Tuvalu, and Peace Corps Volunteers assigned to that country are in fact the administrative responsibility of the Peace Corps Director based in Suva, Fiji. While the programmatic relationship between Peace Corps Volunteers and the Save the Children Field Office has been an important one, it was not formalized until July 1982. Under a new agreement, all Peace Corps Volunteers are responsible to and are supervised by the Field Office Director (and through him the Local Government Officer) in all matters relating to program. For purely administrative concerns, a Peace Corps Associate Director based in Suva serves as Desk Officer for Tuvalu. Save the Children and Peace Corps now have more than two years of shared programming in Tuvalu behind them. The relationship has been an evolving one, and is seen by the Peace Corps, Save the Children, and the Government of Tuvalu as a highly beneficial one to all concerned.

Although a collaborative Peace Corps/Save the Children effort was agreed to by both agencies and the Government of Tuvalu from the program's inception, the actual implementation of collaboration was initially undermined during the preliminary stages of the program. The factors leading to this early strain had to do with personality conflicts between past Directors of the programs, and a desire on the part of the Peace Corps to maintain its own identity as an agency. The Government's understanding and position on the relationship of the two agencies has always been quite clear: it has acknowledged that Peace Corps is an agency distinct from Save the Children, and it has seen Save the Children as being responsible for supervising Peace Corps Volunteer activities within the country.

Within the framework of its methodology, Save the Children does not advocate the use of expatriate community development workers at the field level, other than for occasional short term training assignments. The question of whether or not the advantages of expatriate field workers outweigh the potential disadvantages, however, is not one to be answered here. In point of fact, Peace Corps Volunteers (PCVs) are assigned to work in community development in Tuvalu, and Save the Children is given responsibility for coordinating their activities with its own efforts and with those of the Government. It is important, however, to understand how this Peace Corps/Save the Children collaboration has affected the agency's program.

It can be said that almost without exception, the work that PCVs do is highly appreciated by the Government and island communities of Tuvalu. The Volunteers bring many valuable technical and planning skills to the communities in which they work as well as a very generous amount of commitment and enthusiasm for the community development process. Their language skills are generally excellent, and more than most expatriates in Funafuti, they become a part of the communities in which they live. Indeed, their willingness to live at the same level as others on the outer islands, and the respect for the life styles and cultural traditions of Tuvaluans that this implies, has been a primary reason for their wide acceptance and the respect in which they are held. On the outer islands especially, no distinctions are made between Peace Corps and Save the Children, and the reputations PCVs have earned for themselves, have certainly enhanced Save the Children's own credibility and effectiveness.

Peace Corps Volunteers serve as primary resource persons within their communities and, along with Island Development Coordinators, have been instrumental in introducing new skills and techniques to many outer islands over the last two years. Working on a daily basis with the IDCs, volunteers provide on-the-job training and act as motivators in the development process.

Because of their educational backgrounds and training, PCVs are often more quickly able to understand the development objectives being pursued by Save the Children and the Office of Local Government. In addition to providing skills training to communities, their contributions to the process of developing planning skills among Island Councils and other community groups has prompted Save the Children to introduce planning systems more rapidly than might otherwise have been the case. In addition, they have been instrumental in providing encouragement and support to IDCs and Island Councils alike. Their ability to help carry through Save the Children initiatives has greatly extended the agency's reach and influence.

IDCs seem to be very appreciative of the training and support provided by the volunteers. As one IDC put it "after all, this is all new to me too, and training is important". One obvious consequence of this situation, however, is that some IDCs have become overly dependent on the volunteers, especially in terms of motivating communities and initiating project activities. The increased pace of the program, made possible by the existence of PCVs, has in some instances allowed the program to move ahead of the IDC's ability to keep up with it. With the rise of the importance of the water tank project, many IDCs were content to perform supervisory roles in the construction process, and to follow the lead of PCVs in other aspects of the program, rather than take on the overall development responsibility for themselves. In a similar fashion, the Field Office staff have, in some cases, themselves relied too heavily on the PCVs both to provide support to the Island Development Coordinators, and to carry out program initiatives. The development of Island Development Plans is a case in point: while IDCs had received training in the planning process as part of their initial orientation to community development, some PCVs felt that the IDCs were being asked to help train communities and Island Councils in a process that the IDCs themselves understood only partially.

It is difficult to determine to what extent an IDC's performance is conditioned by a relationship with Peace Corps Volunteers. In the cases in which IDCs work on islands that do not have a Peace Corps couple assigned to it, the results are inconclusive: some IDCs have done extremely well in their jobs and are given very high marks in terms of their own professional development, and others have fared very poorly.

It is beyond question that PCVs have contributed extensively to the overall success of the program, and that the collaboration has been a positive one for the agency. As the program moves into its second phase, the nature of this collaboration is being looked at more closely. Now that some of the dynamics mentioned above are better understood, the role of PCVs can be tailored to more effectively enhance the professional development of the Island Development Coordinators who, as permanent members of the community, will remain as resource persons to the islands long after Save the Children and the Peace Corps have gone.

IV. DIRECTION OF FUTURE EFFORTS

A. Objectives for the Second Phase

-From the beginning, the Tuvalu Field Office has perceived its major role to be that of a trainer in the areas of needs assessment, project planning, implementation, and evaluation. The Government of Tuvalu has accepted Save the Children's community based planning methodology as its own, and is anxious to see it applied successfully in the development of Island Development Plans. The training provided to Island Councils and communities during the first two and a half years of the program has already produced impressive results. Island Councils have been assisted in producing improved Island Development Plans, which more clearly and more realistically represent the needs of communities. For their part, communities have demonstrated their own commitment to greater self-help development. This process, however, is only in its infancy. Entering the second phase of its program, the Field Office still sees that the most important role it can play is to continue to focus its efforts on providing training to Island Councils and communities in the planning process.

-The Field Office's experience in Tuvalu has led it to understand another, related, role. Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand, and other countries have been generous with their contributions to the development of the country. The Government for its part has provided support to the communities by establishing positions for nurses, sanitation aides, youth coordinators, women's coordinators and other sectoral specialists on many of the islands. According to Government officials, however, development tends to be multisectoral rather than integrated: the lack of coordination of and among these diverse resources leads to ineffective programming. Save the Children, working closely with the Local Government Officer, is uniquely situated to play an important role in this area of need. Within its integrated approach to community development it can help design and implement strategies that will promote greater coordination of the human and financial resources that already exist at the community level. Sectoral strategies will be strengthened through coordination, and this in turn will help communities achieve their island development goals.

-Project funds, as is indicated above, do not constitute the greatest need in Tuvalu. While the Field Office has come to the conclusion that providing project funds per se to communities should not be a major objective of the program, it does recognize that areas of need exist which are not, for one reason or another, being effectively addressed by the Government or by other aid donors. Save the Children, with its more "flexible" financial resource base, proposes to identify such areas and help initiate special projects that would otherwise remain unfunded. Experimental in nature, these pilot or demonstration

projects, if proven feasible, can then be replicated through the use of more traditional funding sources.

B. Strategy

The Field Office hopes to attain its broad objectives by concentrating on the following program strategies during the second phase of its program in Tuvalu:

1. Training:

- o Reorient and expand the role of Island Development Coordinators;
- o Provide specific training workshops for Island Councils, other community leaders, Island Executive Officers, and other Government officials who play a role in development;
- o Promote women in development through training and support of Women in Development Officer and Community Workers;
- o Provide further training to individual community members and to community groups in technical and community development process skills;
- o Continue the Island Development Plan process.

2. Coordination:

- o Work more closely with National Women's Council and with women's committees;
- o bring individuals on outer islands together for informal and formal discussions on ways to work towards common goals;
- o encourage the formation of Development Sub-Committees to develop individual sectoral strategies in the areas of health and nutrition, education and recreation, income generation, village improvement, etc.
- o Greater emphasis on needs of youth, possibly through support of a Youth Program Coordinator.

3. Special Projects:

- o Continuing support for sectoral projects developed as part of IDP process;
- o investigate further appropriate solutions to interand intra-island transportation problems;
- o revolving loan funds for Home Improvements; income generating schemes.

Achievements to Date of Purpose and Output Level Goals

Purposes*

Indicators*
(at the end of 3 years)

Progress to Date
(2 years and 2 months)

1. To strengthen the capabilities of the Island Councils and local people on their respective islands to assess local needs, to plan, implement and evaluate self-help projects, and to coordinate island development activities efficiently and effectively.

1. a) At least 4 Island Councils will have developed a multi-year (2-4 year) plan which will be in harmony with the Government of Tuvalu's development plan.

1. a) All 7 islands have submitted 4 year IDPs which will be integral part of National Development Plan III (1983-1986)

b) At least 6 Island Councils will have developed an annual implementation plan with specific objectives, projects, schedules and budgets.

b) Covered above.

c) At least 6 Island Councils will have established development funds for supporting, through grants or loans, priority projects identified by the Council, other organizations on the island, and individuals.

c) None established: materials generally purchased by Gov't. or aid donor and shipped to islands. Islands have no access to imported materials at bulk rates, and shipping negotiations not feasible.

d) At least 6 Island Councils will have developed criteria and guidelines for approving development grants and loans and for monitoring and evaluating projects.

d) As Island Council applies for funding and Local Gov't. officer or Nat'l. Development Planning Committee approves projects, first part does not apply. A project monitoring system has been introduced by which Island Councils and the Gov't. can monitor development projects.

*From "Implementation Plan for a Community-Based Integrated Island Development Program" (1979)

Achievements to Date of Purpose and Output Level Goals

(Page 2)

Purposes

Indicators

(at the end of 3 years)

Progress to Date

(2 years and 2 months)

Island Executive Officer (IEO) responsible for completing monthly Project Status Report introduced by SCF which is submitted to Island Council and Local Gov't. Officer.

e) At least 6 Island Councils will have managed a minimum of 5 self-help projects to the completion of their stated purposes.

e) Not totally achieved. Water project has dominated self-help efforts of communities. This 2 to 3 year project is on schedule and community contributions have exceeded original estimates.

f) At least 6 Island Councils will have actively participated in the evaluation of community projects and at least 3 in an end-of-year evaluation of their overall development plans.

f) For same reasons, no end of project evaluations have yet been conducted. A yearly community evaluation has been built in as integral part of the IDP process on each island.

2. To encourage optimum use of local resources and technological methods appropriate to island conditions.

2. At least 50% of the households on six islands will use at least one new appropriate technology method that maximizes local resources.

2. Practically all households being touched by water project which has introduced several new technologies. The ferro-cement process has also been applied to roofs, stoves, water jars, and even one boat.

Achievements to Date of Purpose and Output Level Goals

(Page 3)

Purposes

Indicators

Progress to Date

3. To promote increased cultural exchange, economic interdependence and communications among Tuvaluan islands and with the outside world.

3. a) At least 6 community leaders will visit projects on islands other than their own, and disseminate these project results to their councils with a view to replicating successful results and avoiding repetition of failures.
- b) At least 2 islands will participate in a joint planning or training endeavor that promotes inter-island cooperation and exchange.
- c) Island Coordinators will participate in joint training sessions in which the problems each island encounters will be discussed and solutions designed.

3. a) Because all islands are essentially involved in same projects, and because an SCF technical assistant travels to all islands, there has not been a felt need for this. As island projects diversify, this will be implemented.
- b) Not achieved (no appropriate occasion has presented itself).
- c) In addition to initial training/ orientation session, the IDCs and male PCVs have participated in one joint training session (connected with water project). PCVs recently attended Community Health Care Seminar sponsored by WHO which also involved Island Council Presidents, Women's Committee Presidents, nurses, community workers and sanitation aides. Another joint training session for IDCs is scheduled for October 1982.

21

Achievements to Date of Purpose and Output Level Goals

(Page 4)

Outputs

Indicators

Progress to Date

1. Save the Children administrative and programmatic systems in place with trained personnel.

1. a) Annual implementation plan submitted on yearly basis
- b) Accurate financial and program inputs submitted on schedule.
- c) Save the Children funding mechanism in place.
- d) Inter-institutional relationship established and maintained.
- e) Annual evaluation conducted.
- f) 8 island coordinators recruited and trained at end of 6 months.

1. a) Operating under 3 Year Plan developed in May 1980.
- b) While financial inputs can be improved, regular monthly activity reports have kept SCF and AID informed about program.
- c) Not achieved. In 1981 Gov't. felt "time not ripe" for sponsorship program.
- d) Excellent collaboration with Peace Corps. Good relations established with EEC, ILO, WHO and other UN organizations.
- e) Not achieved. Project activities actually began in June 1981. This is first evaluation conducted.
- f) Achieved.

17

Achievements to Date of Purpose and Output Level Goals

(Page 5)

Outputs

Indicators

Progress to Date

	g) Comprehensive orientation on Save the Children's history, organizational structure, goals, and development philosophy and methodology conducted for all new staff.	g) Achieved.
	h) Periodic performance evaluations conducted on all new staff.	h) Achieved.
	i) Ongoing training for all new staff based on performance evaluations, expressed needs and interests.	i) Achieved to some extent. IDCs need additional training in process skills and need to meet more frequently to exchange ideas, discuss problems, etc.
2. Training of Island Councils, island organizations and individuals undertaken in following general areas: -project planning, implementation and evaluation -technical skills -social awareness	2. a) Island Council members and other organization leaders trained in needs assessment, project planning, implementation and evaluation. b) technical training of community members required for project implementation identified and conducted.	2. a) One week training session in needs assessment and project planning, implementation and evaluation conducted on all islands for Island Council members, other community leaders and workers in development. b) Achieved. Community members fully trained in all aspects of building and maintaining ferro-cement water tanks.

25

Outputs

Indicators

Progress to Date

	c) training conducted to heighten community awareness of problems related to health, nutrition, sanitation, etc:	c) This accomplished through IDP workshop and follow-up activities (communities identified present and desired conditions and constraints)
3. Self-help projects identified and implemented in the following:	3. By the end of year 3 a minimum total of 28 projects will have been initiated in	3. Because of major water project, this indicator not achieved.
a) Public works	a) At least 6 projects dealing with water catchment or storage.	a) Achieved. Will eventually provide convenient potable water to over 80% of population.
b) Agriculture	b) At least 4 projects dealing with improved agriculture techniques and/or the introduction of new crops.	b) Partially achieved. 3 projects deal with improved livestock production (chickens and pigs).
c) Education	c) At least 2 projects related to pre-school education and 2 projects related to youth and adult nonformal education.	c) 2 pre-school buildings completed. Support given to pre-school teachers through PCVs and Nat'l. Pre-School Committee through SCF Program Officer.
d) Health/Nutrition	d) At least 4 projects focusing on health, nutrition or sanitation.	d) Partially achieved through PCVs (gardens, nonformal education.
e) Social Infrastructure	e) At least 4 projects related to sports, recreation and cultural exchange.	e) Some recreation/sports equipment provided to all islands. Otherwise, not accomplished.
f) Small Industries and Commerce	f) At least 4 income-generating projects.	f) Partially achieved: Two income-generating projects (market center and small string production operation) completed.

Note: Many inputs have been provided by SCF/Peace Corps on an informal basis which do not fit in the category of an officially approved project.

Process Evaluation

Seven process factors have been identified as significant in the context of CBIRD. Indicators, and possible methods of identifying them, are suggested which may help guide field staff and program administrators in judging a village's level of progress in these different process factors. These factors, once evaluated, will give program staff and community members an idea of where communities stand relative to the ideals or objectives of the CBIRD methodology. It is suggested to rate the performance of a particular village on a scale of 0 (lowest) to 5 (highest) on each factor. This gives both the program staff as well as community members an idea of where they stand relative to the ideals or objectives of the CBIRD methodology.

Once the staff has gone through the exercise of rating a village's performance on all seven of these process factors, it is possible to place that particular community on a continuum which extends from dependency on the one end to self-sustaining development on the other.

1. Needs assessment/diagnosis - the community's ability to identify needs and to collect and analyze data upon which problem identification is based.

- 0 - No capacity to diagnose development needs
- 1 - Slight capacity to diagnose development needs
- 2 - Some capacity to diagnose development needs
- 3 - Moderate capacity to diagnose development needs
- 4 - Considerable capacity to diagnose development needs
- 5 - Fully capable of diagnosing community's development needs

This factor seeks to determine the community's ability to identify its problems and needs and to collect and analyze data as a part of this identification process. If a community is expected at some point to be able to carry out development activities on its own, it must have the capacity to diagnose its own development needs to ascertain this capacity at the program onset and to measure change over time is a crucial factor in any determination to reduce field staff input in this area.

Possible indicators of this factor are:

- a demonstrated ability to identify problems;
- a demonstrated ability to verbalize or explain the causes and effects of these problems;
- a demonstrated ability to prioritize problems and to provide a rationale for these priorities;
- the type of activities or methods that are used for needs assessment: intuition, informal agreement, informal information collection, discussion, data collection, etc.;
- the level (amount of spread) of participation in assessing needs:

Type of Meeting

SCF	F.O. staff	F.C.	Indiv.	Leadership	Mixed group	Representative group	Open meeting
-----	---------------	------	--------	------------	----------------	-------------------------	-----------------

Within an open meeting, how decisions and priorities are made:

Type of Decision

F.C.	Individual	Leaders	Special groups	Representative groups	Consensus
------	------------	---------	-------------------	--------------------------	-----------

- Needs/problems which are not recognized by communities.

2. Consciousness (orientation) - Alternative terms for this component are orientation, understanding and comprehension. The community's appreciation of its roles and responsibilities as well as rights, not only in the program but in the development process in general.

- 0 - Completely unaware of roles and responsibilities
- 1 - Slight consciousness and awareness
- 2 - Some consciousness and awareness
- 3 - Moderate consciousness and understanding
- 4 - Considerable consciousness and orientation
- 5 - Fully conscious and oriented in the development process

This factor pertains to the amount of understanding or comprehension a community possesses with respect to its responsibilities and rights, as well as to its appreciation of its role within the development process. A primary objective of any group wishing to promote a process of self-help and action within a community is to raise the level of consciousness and awareness of the roles individuals and groups in the community must play for any such process to be self-sustaining. Being able to chart this change in consciousness provides key indicators of the success of the program in this larger sense.

Possible indicators include:

- a. Zero-Sum
Mentality: Do the wealthy/elite believe that they must give up something if the poor are to have more benefit?
Do they believe they must compete with the poor for limited resources?
- b. Self-sufficiency: Is the concept of self-sufficiency and self reliance relevant or do people exhibit a welfare/dependency mentality?

- c. Future Orientation/Marginality Is the mentality of future planning common, so that working for future benefits and surplus is accepted, or is the expectation only a continued marginal existence?
 - d. Fatalism: Do people look to outside forces as controlling their lives or do they believe they can have a significant effect on the outcome of their lives by their activities?
 - e. Orientation to Change Is the attitude one of openness to change or rigid adherence to past ways? Is there a desire for change or not?
 - f. Cooperation and sense of community: Is the social structure conducive to cooperation and the right of all groups to participate and benefit? Or, is it a rigid social structure hierarchy?
3. Programmatic Involvement - Refers to the willingness and ability of the community to be involved in all aspects of development programming from planning to implementation to evaluation to reformulation of program and projects.

- 0 - Completely devoid of programming capacity
- 1 - Slight programming capability
- 2 - Some programming capability
- 3 - Moderate programming capability
- 4 - Considerable programming capability
- 5 - Fully capable of planning, implementing and evaluating community-based development program/projects.

When the larger process of community development is kept in mind, a "successful" project is not always simply one which is effectively completed on schedule. In this context community involvement at various levels, not just as recipients of services or products, is equally important. CBIRD theory has as one of its assumptions the ability of community members to become active participants in their own development. While not all individuals will be equally involved at all levels, a basic goal of our approach is to help individuals and groups to move over time from passively receiving the effects of benefits of projects to becoming actively involved in designing, running and evaluating them.

Possible indicators include:

- a. Planning projects; do members of the community demonstrate

an ability to:

- identify objectives and their time frame
- identify resources
- detail steps in sequence to achieve objectives
- identify indicators that mark progress and link them to objectives - are they measurable and understood?

b. Implementation of projects:

- selection of workers, the methods and criteria for recruitment
- supervision of workers, the mechanisms for accountability, the allocation of responsibility and the effectiveness of the follow through
- attitude of workers.

(The capacity for implementation must be judged in relation to the unique requirements of individual projects.)

c. Evaluation as an ongoing process; do members of the community demonstrate the ability to:

- understand/produce evaluation indicators
- collect indicator related data (as specified in planning)
- evaluate and analyze performance on the basis of data including how data relates to objectives
- disseminate evaluation results
- reformulate project or program objectives in light of these results.

4. Organization - Refers to the process of establishing strong community leadership and viable support system. The process includes: the acceptance and smooth transfer of power (from the elite to the masses, SCF to VDC, VDC to subcommittees). The involvement of a broad-based, actively involved power structure including people from all interest groups.

- 0 - No organizational capacity
- 1 - Minimal organizational capacity
- 2 - Some organizational capacity
- 3 - Moderate organizational capacity
- 4 - Considerable organizational capacity
- 5 - Fully capable of running a viable organization

Assessing a community's capacity to organize itself effectively can be crucial in determining which kind of structure or process is likely to be most effective at various stages.

Possible ways of determining this capacity include the following indicators:

- existence of community committees or local committees

organizations:

- number of membership
- percentage of community involved
- composition of membership (women, influentials, poor, etc.)
- selection of membership, if any
- existence of subcommittees
- selection of members of subcommittees

leadership:

- selection of leadership
- responsiveness of leadership
- openness of leadership to new ideas
- amount of information shared with member-committee

functions:

- mandate of committee;
- degree to which mandate reflects community support;
- extent to which mandate is carried out;
- ability of organization to administer funds, collect debts, keep accounts, etc.;
- level of altruism/self-interest of leadership and/or organization;
- amount of cohesiveness and cooperation vs. divisiveness and infighting

5. Comprehensiveness - Basically it refers to the breadth of participation in the community's development effort and the equity in the distribution of program benefits.

- 0 - Exclusively elite male dominated
- 1 - Minimal equity in distribution/participation
- 2 - Some equity in distribution/participation
- 3 - Moderate equity in distribution/participation
- 4 - Considerable equity in distribution/participation
- 5 - Fully equitable in distribution/participation

This factor refers both the the breadth of participation in the community's development effort as well as the equity in the distribution of program benefits. As with programmatic involvement, it is expected that intervention will be such that participation will both increase and become more broad-based over time. Assessing the equity in the distribution of program benefits allows planners to

design methods of reaching the most disaffected members of the community.

Possible indicators include:

Participation in meetings:

- Composition according to SES categories;
- attendance records;
- active vs. passive participants;
- individuals/groups who ask questions;
- individuals/groups who make demands;
- individuals/groups who make decisions.

Participation in community-wide activities:

- distribution of benefits;
- involvement of lower SES groups in projects;
- amount of benefits received by lower SES groups.

6. Finances (self-help) - In the CBIRD lexicon this process factor is referred to as self-help. Here we give it a slightly broader definition, including cost recovery and community-based income generation activities. It is expected that a community's willingness and capacity to contribute increases as its development capacity matures. If this is so, it must be measured.

- 0 - No community financing capacity
- 1 - Minimal community financing capacity
- 2 - Some community financing capacity
- 3 - Moderate level of financing capacity
- 4 - Considerable financing capacity
- 5 - Fully self-supporting

This factor refers to the community's desire and ability to contribute financial resources to its development process, and includes such aspects as cost recovery abilities and community-based income generating activities.

It is expected that a community's willingness and capacity to contribute increases as its development capacity matures. If so, this can be assessed.

Possible indicators include:

- amount of community contributions in various sectors
- activities/projects maintained without labor, land, produce,

- in-kind contributions, cash, and other resources available in community;
- proportion of cost of activities/projects contributed locally (by SES)

7. Linkages - The identification and utilization of existing outside resources and the capability of the community to make demands for these services.


- 0 - No linkages established
- 1 - Minimal linkages established
- 2 - Some linkages established
- 3 - Moderate level of linkages established
- 4 - Considerable linkages established
- 5 - Linkages fully established

The ability to identify and effectively call upon these outside resources, and the quality of the linkages formed with them, is a strong indication of a community's ability to be self-sustaining.

Possible indicators include:

- amount of outside inputs;
- demonstrated ability to ascertain possible organizations and resources;
- level of awareness on the part of the community of these resources;
- resources currently used, and to what extent;
- level of capability: contact sources, present proposals, record of demands met;
- government and agencies' perceptions of community.


3. PROGRAMMATIC



Examples:

In 1980 only the minority mentioned in number 1 (the Councillors) participated in planning and other stages of the program for development. The bulk of the community was only involved in implementation of certain development projects, not all groups being represented evenly. The situation was only slightly improved in 1982, when even those individuals who understood the IDP process (i.e. Council members and those who'd attended the workshop) still didn't attend the more important IDP meetings held later on.


4. ORGANIZATION



Examples:

In 1980, the Island Council was felt to have inadequate communication with both Central Government and with various groups on the island. This was due to the newness of the Island Council as well as to its makeup. In 1982 the situation was felt to be quite good, in that private organizations were strong and working for what the community perceived as priority needs (a primary example is the purchasing of roofing sheets by the two dance clubs on the island whose membership covers nearly the whole island). The Island Council is much better and is aided by a new development committee with great potential.


5. COMPREHENSIVENESS



Examples:

In 1980, as mentioned before, the Island Council sent "wish lists" which included only a limited part of the island's development needs. Although most of the power lay in the hands of the Council and the old men (taupulega), this was the system for achieving total representation of the island with one matai (head of household) representing each household and its views. In 1982, the situation was thought to be much the same. The Council tries to involve the community, but as yet has not had much success. The taupulega still remains the same as before, as this is the traditional form of government on the island.

6. SELF-HELP



Examples:

In 1980, using the construction of the CTC as an example, the work force expected to be paid for everything. However, many things were provided by the island (labor, local materials) but because of this some substantial delays were experienced due to lack of support by the community. An example in 1982 of the improvement of this matter is the water tank project, where the community has proven that it is willing to make a fair contribution to something that is truly perceived as a priority need, and especially something that touches the lives of individuals.

7. LINKAGES



Examples:

The community was not able in 1980 to identify and thus utilize existing linkages to achieve their development goals. Most often, projects were dumped on them due to Central Government obligations to utilize outside aid in specified fashions. One example was given of the new store and copra shed, the former of which was asked of the Fusi, and the latter of which was given in the aforementioned fashion. In 1982, however, the existing "official" linkage was utilized, although only a small portion of the community had any awareness of it as this early stage.

PROCESS EVALUATION


RATING FORM

NAME OF ISLAND: VAITUPU

NAMES/TITLES OF PEOPLE PARTICIPATING IN EVALUATION:

Panapa - IDC
Lee - PCV
Vicki - PCV


1. DIAGNOSIS



Examples:

- 1980 - Showed ability to identify need for new hospital ward, but didn't do needs assessment for building features such as screens, toilet, water tank.
- 1982 - Showed moderate ability to identify sanitation needs within building projects such as covering all village cisterns, but have prioritized public toilets relatively far into the future.


2. CONSCIOUSNESS



Examples:

- 1980 - Community Volunteer Labor showed enthusiasm and williness to work on Community Projects.
- 1982 - Community is in transition of defining its relationship with the Island Council, the Chief's Voluntary Labor. It has accepted its responsibility for equal local contribution but organizing themselves to work voluntarily or to pay higher taxes for paid labor is yet to be defined.


3. PROGRAMMATIC INVOLVEMENT



Examples;

- 1980 - Community attended Island Council meetings for viewing and criticism of Island Council planning. The community organized themselves effectively to implement projects such as Sea Wall, CTC building, etc.
- 1982 - More people from outside the Island Council have wanted to become more involved in the community planning. During the IDP post-workshop committees interest came a great deal from non-IC members. If the people become more involved in the initial planning for Development they could progress to a 4 in our evaluation.


4. ORGANIZATION



Examples:

There are more than 20 local organizations that have exhibited in the past and today the ability to organize themselves to do relevant, viable community works such as digging pulaka pits, raising funds to build schools, maternity wards, water tanks, village labor and buying and settling of an island near Fiji.


5. COMPREHENSIVENESS



Examples:

The women, men and young adults have shown an ability to participate in the community's Development by contributing labor, money and time. Organizations like the Women's Committee have public and personal inspections that everyone participates in and benefits therefrom. The Scout group has done projects to benefit all community members and has a voice on the Council, as do the women.


6. SELF-HELP



Examples:

In the past the community contributed all of the necessary resources to some projects such as the maternity wards, Pastor's house, V.K. store. In 1982 there is a reluctance to contribute to community labor and money to development projects.

7. LINKAGES



Examples:

- 1980 - A great deal of the linkages were established by the Government and not the local community.
- 1982 - Transportation and communications have improved in the last 2 years to help improve the linkages. People have made good use of the sea plane -- people traveling to do business and sending goods back and forth. On the island also linkages have improved -- communication between the Agriculture Station and villagers; IDC and PCVs to the community members.

SAVE THE CHILDREN
GENERAL PROJECT CRITERIA

Experience has indicated that successful CBIRD projects contain most, if not all, of the following elements. These criteria should be considered in planning, approving and evaluating Save the Children projects.*

1. The project addresses a felt need of the community. _____
2. The project purpose is clearly defined and has indicators and procedures for evaluation. _____
3. The project has the support and involvement of a large and broadbased segment of the community. _____
4. The project benefits a cross-section of the community and improves the lives of children. _____
5. The project purpose is realistic in terms of available resources. _____
6. The project utilizes local resources (human, material and institutional) to the greatest extent possible. _____
7. The project is undertaken in collaboration with appropriate governmental and/or private agencies. _____
8. The project is consistent with local/regional/national development plans when feasible. _____
9. The project emphasizes human resource development (i.e. skill, management, leadership training). _____
10. The project is cost effective and has a high probability for replication. _____
11. The project is capable of becoming self-sustaining. _____
12. The project is integrated with other community projects or activities. _____
13. The project is sensitive to local culture, traditions and values. _____
14. The project is consistent with existing sectoral strategies. _____

*Please rate each criterion on a scale of 1-10, 10 being the highest. In addition, take an average of the total and report this number on the Project Application and Description form where indicated.

ADAPTATION OF
SAVE THE CHILDREN'S
COMMUNITY-BASED INTEGRATED RURAL DEVELOPMENT
APPROACH
TO
THE NEPAL FIELD OFFICE PROGRAM

* *

A SELF-EVALUATIVE STATEMENT

PREPARED BY

ASIA/PACIFIC REGIONAL
TEAM, WESTPORT,
CONNECTICUT, U.S.A.

NEPAL FIELD
OFFICE TEAM
KATHMANDU, NEPAL

NOVEMBER 1982

95

NEPAL

CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
A. INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT	1
B. COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION/LEADERSHIP/PARTICIPATION	1
C. THE PLANNING PROCESS	6
D. INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND REPLICATION	7
1. INSTITUTIONALIZATION	7
2. REPLICATION	9
E. THE ROLE OF WOMEN IN THE NEPAL FIELD OFFICE PROGRAM	10
Efforts to Date	11
Recommendations	12

A. INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT

Save the Children's community development program is based in the Gorkha District, Gandaki Zone in the Western Development Region of Nepal. Deurali Panchayat, SCF's first impact area, is one of 63 village Panchayats in the Gorkha District. The Panchayat is divided into nine wards covering 30 villages, with a total population of approximately 3,500.

Nepal has established the Panchayat system of democracy which rises from the grass roots institutions of the village Panchayats through the district Panchayats to the national level. The village and district Panchayats function as electorates and also have developmental roles in the areas of agriculture, industry and social services.

In the early stages Save the Children had envisaged working with the Panchayat Committee in Deurali instead of duplicating a "community committee" structure, but as described in the following section, community plans followed a different direction.

B. COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION/LEADERSHIP/PARTICIPATION

Although in theory community organization in Nepal revolves around the Panchayat System, Save the Children experience to date indicates that development activities at the ward and individual village levels may have a better chance of success. In this section of the Nepal Field Office's CBIRD Analysis, initial community organization procedures will be reviewed, and suggestions made to broaden and enhance participation as the program matures.

One of the earliest issues Save the Children faced in designing this program was whether or not it was necessary to form a new community structure -- in this case, a Panchayat Development Committee -- since a Panchayat Committee already existed, with its elected Pradhan Pancha (local mayor). Save the Children planners felt that it might not be necessary (and might even be harmful in some situations), to encourage a parallel community committee which would have access to and control of far greater resources than the established Panchayat Committee. The final decision was left to Save the Children's collaborating government entity, the Social Service National Coordination Council (hereinafter referred to as SSNCC), the villagers of Deurali, and their Panchayat representatives.

To the surprise of Save the Children staff, the Member-Secretary of the SSNCC strongly preferred to establish an independent Panchayat Committee, for Save the Children's program. Panchayat representatives at a subsequent meeting in Deurali concurred that an independent committee be established. The Member Secretary and Panchayat representatives felt that the existing Panchayat Committee was too political, and that development work would be more successfully accomplished by a separate committee. Ward Chairmen serving on the Panchayat agreed to return to their respective Wards

to hold discussions and nominate a person from each Ward to serve on the new Panchayat Development Committee.

The Community Services Coordination Committee of the SSNCC established the rules for the new committee's composition. The committee was to include:

1. One representative from each of the nine Wards;
2. Two representatives from the poorer ethnic groups;
3. Two representatives from the elite ethnic groups;
4. Two representatives from Save the Children; and,
5. Two representatives from the Lions Club of Pokhara.

(The SSNCC requires that every foreign agency working in Nepal be assigned a local sponsoring agency -- The Lions Club of Pokhara was assigned to Save the Children.)

One final requirement of the SSNCC was that the Pradhan Pancha of the Panchayat also serve as Chairman of the new Panchayat Development Committee. Save the Children staff were initially concerned that outsiders could exert too much influence on the Development Committee, but so far this has not caused any problems. Save the Children staff have only acted as advisors and not voting members of the committee, and the Lions Club representatives have only attended one meeting during the initial 20 months of activities.

To date the Panchayat Development Committee has met on a regular basis and has shown some ability to identify priority problems. The Committee has also sought resources outside those of Save the Children and has worked harmoniously with the established Panchayat. Much of the Committee's work is due to the enthusiasm of its Chairman. His foresight and lack of favoritism have been major reasons that project activities are widespread throughout Deurali Panchayat. He has also been able to counter-balance the influence of some of the less community-minded and more political village members.

Having such a dynamic personality co-ordinate development activities as the program was initiated was extremely helpful in proving, from the outset, that villagers and an outside institution can work together. After only a year and a half of operation, tangible examples of this cooperation were clearly evident throughout Deurali. Improved water resources, drinking water systems, daycare centers, a school lunch feeding program, fruit tree propagation, smokeless ovens, a health clinic, and trained Community Health Leaders are just some of the activities already underway.

There are two important reasons for the rapid initiation of so many different project activities. First, the Panchayat Development

Committee Chairman clearly understood how the agency program could assist his community and was motivated by his own personal political ambition to win the Gorkha District Panchayat Chairman's position. Citing the accomplishments in Deurali based on his own knowledge of working with foreign agencies he was able to place third in the District election.

The second reason can be attributed to Save the Children's relationship with the Community Services Coordination Committee (CSCC). Different interpretations of Save the Children's working agreement with the SSNCC meant that the CSCC Chairwoman was critical of Save the Children's proposed program before it ever began. This placed Save the Children in a difficult, defensive situation which was further complicated by the numerous and lengthy delays in getting the program underway. (The country agreement with the SSNCC was signed in November 1980, yet staffing was not completed until March 1981, and the USAID PVO Co-Financing agreement not signed until late August 1981). In an attempt to solve political difficulties, the Field Office chose to accomplish as much as possible together with the newly established Panchayat Development Committee. It was felt that by supporting the Development Committee's initiatives, Save the Children would subsequently gain the support of the villagers and the Member-Secretary of the SSNCC. The active support of the CSCC and the designated sponsoring agency, the Lions Club of Pokhara, is still a question that remains unanswered.

Using our experience to date, it would be useful to look at some of the drawbacks of the current leadership in Deurali and to consider possible ways to encourage more participation in the future.

A major disadvantage in having an outstanding leader is that he overshadows all other members of the Panchayat Development Committee. Given that most committees in Nepal operate on a consensus basis, it is most unusual for disagreement or opposition to be expressed. Thus, it is always possible that problems identified and projects selected may not, in fact, be the decision of the entire committee. In the early stages of the program meetings in Deurali villages, decisions that were made were mostly encouraged by the Committee Chairman with the participation of only a few others, but there has been an increasing amount of popular participation as more and more meetings have been held.

Certain difficulties were also caused by the rapid initiation of so many development activities. Traditional communities are not always capable of absorbing and operating specific projects. An example of this can be cited in the Daycare Project underway in Deurali. While there is a widespread desire to have Daycare Centers functioning in individual communities, the villagers are beginning to realize that the skills necessary for the construction of a physical daycare facility are vastly different than the skills and background necessary to conduct such a program on an everyday basis. The villagers, Committee members, and staff now have a better understanding that to maintain a Daycare Program is far more

complicated and difficult than previously imagined during the early planning stages.

We now realize that the numerous activities undertaken have left the staff and villagers somewhat overextended. We must now strengthen and upgrade the supervisory systems for each project. For example, with the Daycare Project we found that the Daycare teachers were in need of more supervision than our own Save the Children staff could provide. After a careful search in Deurali, we identified a responsible village woman who is now providing ongoing supervision to some of the Daycare Centers. In retrospect it is clear that this supervisory position should have been filled at a much earlier date.

A second and more important problem created by starting so many activities is that this has automatically reinforced the impression that Save the Children has an unlimited source of financial resources. Perhaps, if project activities had evolved at a more moderate pace we may have been able to avoid the very high expectations of the villagers in Deurali. Although the Save the Children staff have been careful not to emphasize available resources, other individuals have fostered "The Wealthy Foreign Agency" idea by citing, incorrectly, the unlimited budget of Save the Children.

In an effort to broaden participation and improve communication in the Panchayat, Save the Children staff have decided that at this point in the program's development it is important to try and upgrade and closely monitor activities at the individual village level. Using the former Pradhan Pancha as a role model, Save the Children staff would like to try and develop stronger village leadership. Only a few of the Panchayat Development Committee representatives appear to be explaining the overall activities of the Committee to the majority of their constituents. Through more frequent meetings with villagers and their representatives, Save the Children staff feel they can gradually encourage representatives to the Panchayat Committee to express the villagers' views at Panchayat Development Committee meetings. The projects now underway in most villages provide good discussion material for village meetings. By attending and observing such village discussions our staff can encourage and assist Panchayat Committee members when they are attending the Panchayat Development Committee meetings.

When the program began it was agreed by field office staff that all decisions would be made by the Panchayat Development Committee. Now, with the experience of 20 months to reflect upon, we have a slightly different outlook. The Panchayat Development Committee's main functions will be to review and prioritize problems brought to its attention by its members, identify potential candidates for training courses, contact government and private agencies, and monitor activities undertaken in individual villages, while village level activities will be handled by Sub-Committees formed for specific purposes.

This procedure was followed when the Drinking Water Project was implemented in Yangkot village. After the Panchayat Development Committee approved the project, a meeting was held in Yangkot and a Water Committee was established to coordinate village responsibilities. Most of the normal problems that occurred during construction were resolved by the villagers themselves. However, when larger problems arose which delayed completion of the project, representatives of the Panchayat Development Committee visited Yangkot to offer assistance.

An example of differing levels of participation can be found in the Child Daycare Project in Deurali. Sunar Gaon village in Deurali, located adjacent to the Save the Children Field Office building, was the first group to express an interest in beginning a Child Daycare Project. With the consent of the Panchayat Development Committee, the project commenced on an experimental basis. Prior to the opening of the first Daycare Center certain pre-conditions were discussed and agreed upon. The Sunar Gaon villagers were responsible for providing firewood, paying a monthly registration fee, and insuring that the children enrolled attended school on a regular basis.

The people in Sunar Gaon also managed to provide a building where classes could be held. After a few weeks of operation other parents began sending their children to the Daycare Center. With the addition of these children the building soon became over-crowded. This issue was discussed in Sunar Gaon and at a Panchayat Development Committee meeting. The villagers agreed to provide the land and local materials (wood and stones) to construct a building if Save the Children would pay for the skilled labor costs. After about four weeks of work and with the building 50% completed, work stopped. There was disagreement among the parents of the children attending the school about the division of responsibilities for the project. There were three or four different ethnic groups involved, and it was not an easy problem to solve. Although work on the new building ceased, classes continued, even in such overcrowded conditions.

The field staff maintained the position that work would resume when and if the villagers were interested and ready. Nothing happened for one year, and it was not until September 1982 that the villagers were finally able to resolve their interpersonal issues to complete the building. It was a useful opportunity for staff to observe the difficulties in undertaking development activities in communities where there is no respected leadership and little trust between members of different ethnic groups. However, in spite of these differences the Daycare Program remained operational.

It was a very different story in Aansikot, in Ward 7 of Deurali. From the moment of decision to completion of the building, construction of a Daycare Center took about one month. With the strong leadership of the Chairman of the Panchayat Development Committee who resides in Aansikot, and very good participation from all villagers, this project served as an example of what is possible. Aansikot also has different ethnic groups living there, but strong

and dynamic leadership helped the people overcome some of their traditional distrust.

Although none of the staff enjoys seeing such lengthy delays in project implementation, these experiences tend to highlight some of the essential components of participation.

It is important to remember that most village Panchayats in Nepal have little, if any, experience in such development efforts. Although the Panchayat System does provide some resources they are extremely limited, and have often gone to those areas with the more adept political leaders. Even in these instances the allocation of resources is done at the District Panchayat level, since Village Panchayats do not have their own budgets for development activities. Some Village Panchayats have experience in school construction and trail repair, and perhaps the construction of a Panchayat building. With the exception of those Panchayats which have been selected to receive Health Posts or Drinking Water Systems in Gorkha District, there are few exceptions to this model of development. Keeping this in mind is helpful when one reviews the activities which have occurred to date in Deurali.

As the Nepal program evolves, its aim is to be operational and effective at two levels. During the next few years the staff will be placing more of its time toward the supervision and monitoring of activities at the individual village level. At the same time it is the Field Office's intention to work together with the Panchayat Development Committee to increase its skills in project analysis and resource allocation.

C. The Planning Process

Improved planning at the village level in the Deurali Impact Area should be viewed as a very long range objective. With limited literacy and only a few village elders having formal education, it is not practical for the field staff to expect written project plans. At this stage of the program's development Save the Children has focused its planning efforts on encouraging an in-depth discussion of issues brought before the Panchayat Development Committee. This has been difficult, because the solutions are often discussed before there is agreement on what the problems are.

Another drawback to the planning process is the confusion which occurs when any and all village problems can be brought before the Committee. Although this has its positive side in that committee members bring up many issues for discussion, it has been difficult for the Committee to sift out and deal with the most pressing and urgent problems. This situation has been somewhat improved by preparing agendas for the Committee meetings.

In planning projects the Committee has worked well with the staff in determining what the contributions of Save the Children and the villagers will be. This is done orally, with the preparation of

planning documents *(FORS 3's) left to the field staff. FORS 3's will probably continue to be prepared by the Save the Children staff, though they may begin to use a translated version as a contract to be signed by the Panchayat Development Committee Chairman and/or members.

Another issue which concerns the Field Office team is the Committee's tendency to focus on immediate, shortterm problems. Given the social and economic conditions of Deurali villagers, this is understandable but the Field Office is seeking ways to help address critical, long range issues, such as Resource Conservation (deforestation) and Family Planning. It is difficult for staff members and villagers to discuss the effects of deforestation and unchecked population growth when the local environment poses the immediate problems of minimal food supplies and limited health care. Save the Children has worked with the Panchayat Committee on the deforestation issue but feels that programs such as smokeless oven construction and reforestation have been accomplished because of the availability of Save the Children and outside resources, rather than a thorough understanding of the issues involved. The problems facing a large family are quite apparent so there has been slightly more recognition of the importance of family planning, but assisting the Committee to address these long-term issues in their village plans is a challenge that remains to be faced by the Field Office.

D. Institutionalization and Replication

1. Institutionalization

Save the Children's commitment to institutionalization and replication has been interpreted quite broadly by the Nepal Field Office team. Because of Nepal's extremely limited resources, the minimal supervisory capacity of His Majesty's Government, and the country's geographical constraints, the Nepal Field Office has followed a flexible policy with respect to institutionalization and replication.

Ordinarily Save the Children programs focus on linking village needs to government and private agency resources. In Nepal there are very few private agencies, and government services in the health, education, and agricultural sectors are available on a very limited basis. Although His Majesty's Government has made great strides to extend services to the predominantly rural population, the needs are far greater than available resources.

The Nepal Field Office has accepted this as a reality and has proceeded to maximize village level participation and practical training in developing its program. In the absence of a system with which to link, Save the Children has attempted to balance the Panchayat Development Committee's stated priorities with the plans and policies that His Majesty's Government hopes to implement in the future.

The Community Health Leader Program operating in Deurali is an example of how Save the Children has handled this issue. From the initial baseline survey in 1979 to the present the villagers have focused on health care as the major priority for Deurali. In the process of formulating a health care program Save the Children representatives sought advice from Government Health Officials. During these meetings it became clear that the villagers' request for a Government Health Post in Deurali would not be possible because the neighboring Dhuwakot Panchayat already had a Health Post though it was some four to five hours away from most parts of Deurali. Government Officials suggested to Save the Children that a Community Health Leader Program be considered as an alternative.

This program, whose details are fully explained in Save the Children's PVO Co-Financing Grant Proposal to USAID, is an experiment; an effort on the part of His Majesty's Government to provide ambulatory health care to the rural residents of Nepal. However, it is only operational in a few of the districts of Nepal (Gorkha is not one of these districts). His Majesty's Government agreed that Save the Children could introduce such a program in Deurali. Although His Majesty's Government would assist Save the Children with some technical materials and training, it was clear from the outset that all financial costs of the program would have to be borne by Save the Children. Health Officials were also careful to point out that there would be no guarantees from the ministry on whether or not the official program would be continued, and if so, when it might be extended to the Gorkha District. In brief, Save the Children had the consent of His Majesty's Government to model a program paralleling their own efforts, but with no secure guarantee that institutionalization might occur.

With no better alternatives for delivery of health services to Deurali residents, Save the Children and the Village Development Committee have initiated this Program with emphasis on the training of Community Health Leaders and motivation of the village population to utilize Family Planning methods.

It is unlikely that the Government will pick up this program in the near future, but Save the Children will continue its efforts to institutionalize this system within the Panchayat itself.

There is another example of an attempt to institutionalize a Government service in the agricultural sector. Prior to Save the Children's program the villagers in Deurali had not received any agricultural extension services. The Panchayat Development Committee initiated a request to the Gorkha District Agricultural Office for a Junior Technician (J.T.) to provide extension services in Deurali. This request was approved and a Junior Technician was assigned to work in Deurali for 15 days each month.

Since the first J.T. was sent to Deurali over one year ago three different extensionists have been assigned, resulting in a very minimal contribution to agriculture, a sector which is given a high

priority by almost all the villagers. This puts Save the Children in a most difficult situation. Should the Panchayat Development Committee and Save the Children be content with the mere physical presence of the J.T. and with the fact that some degree of institutionalization has occurred, or should Save the Children and the Panchayat Development Committee consider securing its own extension worker to be hired and supported by the project? The performance of the three J.T.'s who have been assigned to Deurali is not atypical considering the very limited amount of supervision and support they receive. Without any doubt the agricultural sector is the one area which needs much more attention. How this should occur is a question which must be addressed by the Field Office team and the Panchayat Development Committee.

An example of institutionalization which the Field Office team feels is appropriate in Nepal is occurring with the Daycare Project. Presently, six Child Daycare Centers are functioning in different villages of Deurali. Save the Children is providing teachers' salaries, materials, and training. Skilled labor costs for the construction of Daycare Center buildings were provided by Save the Children. Villagers whose children attend the schools pay a monthly registration fee of one Nepalese rupee, and provide firewood. The firewood is used to prepare powdered milk and wheat soy blend cereal donated to the project by the Nepal Children's Organization, an indigenous private voluntary organization. The parents of the children at each Daycare Center are responsible for the portering of these foodstuffs to their villages. Although the entire staff has had reservations about utilizing the imported milk and wheat soy blend, there is general agreement that the provision of these items has helped to create better cooperation and sharing of responsibilities at the village level. Secondly, the institutional link with the Nepal Children's Organization and the Daycare Project was instrumental in the Nepal Children's Organization selection of Salangiri village in Deurali as a test site for a rural school lunch feeding project which directly benefits approximately 90 children.

In conclusion, institutionalization must be viewed with an extremely open and long range view to what might possibly occur at both the village, inter-village, and national level. A strict and narrow interpretation of an institutionalization strategy is not appropriate for the type of village level development work the Nepal Field Office is currently implementing.

2. Replication

Replication can be considered on two different levels. On the macro level one of Save the Children's goals is to interest Government Officials in the CBIRD methodology in the hope that all or part of its components can be applied to the national community organization and/or development efforts. On the micro level it is hoped that individual villages will replicate work or projects being implemented in other nearby areas.

Given the development environment of Nepal it is unlikely that the Government would have the financial resources or manpower to replicate the Deurali program. However, on an individual project basis, replication might be possible.

Officials of the Social Service National Coordination Council have shown interest in the Child Daycare Program in Deurali. Although Daycare Projects exist in Nepal, few are conducted in the rural areas, and even fewer are staffed and managed by villagers. Although the SSNCC does not implement its own programs it is trying to encourage public and private Nepalese institutions to expand daycare services to remote rural areas. By promoting such activities in Deurali, Save the Children can perhaps assist in wider replication of Daycare activities in Nepal.

At the Panchayat level Save the Children is trying to replicate the fuel efficient smokeless chulo (oven). This chulo is designed to reduce firewood consumption and also eliminate the smoke that fills most Nepali homes when meals are prepared. A third benefit is that children are less likely to suffer burns as people change from the traditional open fire to a covered smokeless chulo.

In order to replicate this simple technology Save the Children constructed two demonstration chulos. The interest of the villagers was aroused and over a 20 month period over fifty stoves were constructed.

Replication has occurred throughout the Panchayat with each family paying for a small part of the chulo's total cost. This project is ongoing, with chulos being constructed by Deurali residents themselves. Thus, replication has occurred in both numbers of chulos as well as those individuals now capable of constructing a chulo on their own.

E. The Role of Women in the Nepal Field Office Program

Within the context of Save the Children's philosophy of community development, the community committee is normally the main vehicle for mobilization of resources and ideas. In ideal terms this committee is to be representative of the community and able to reflect the needs and problems of all groups and minorities. The nature of the community development process encouraged by Save the Children is designed to be participatory, with each community member having equal access to the process and resources.

Although this is the stated goal in Save the Children's CBIRD philosophy, different traditions, customs and circumstances constantly create unique adaptations.

In Nepal one of the needs to be addressed is the role and participation of women. As in many other areas of the world Nepali women do not have access to the formal decision making mechanisms in their communities. Therefore, when the selection of the Panchayat

Committee took place, only one woman was included. As a result the program to date has been determined and administered by the male population of Deurali.

In Nepal this exclusion of women from the community process is not unusual. However, since Save the Children is committed to being an agency of change, this is one aspect of the status quo which needs to be strongly challenged. Disenfranchised by the local practices and mores, Save the Children must discover alternative methods of incorporating women into the development process in Deurali.

Efforts to Date

Identification of capable, appropriate female candidates to work with Save the Children has been a challenge. Since most village women have had little or no exposure to community affairs and limited formal education, they remain ignorant and unaware of the process of community development and the promise it can hold for them. In recognition of this limitation, Save the Children has attempted to introduce more village women to various training programs. To date approximately 25 women have participated in Kathmandu-based training sessions which have covered topics such as health, hygiene, literacy, family planning, communications, etc. More important than the learned skills is the exposure and enhanced status which the women gain as a result of this training. It is Save the Children's hope that in such a way a cadre of trained village women can be created who can then serve as a voice for the women of Deurali.

Lack of access to formal education is an acute problem for the women of Deurali. Out of 100 women, perhaps 5 can read and write. This need prompted Save the Children to introduce a series of evening literacy classes which aim to upgrade the basic literacy skills of interested adults. A prime objective of Save the Children staff has been to encourage maximum participation by Deurali women and approximately 150 women have participated so far. As with the skills training sessions mentioned above, an important by-product of such training is increased self-confidence. As the women grow and mature in this process, an awareness and recognition of their situation should emerge which, if nurtured and tapped by Save the Children staff, can be a voice for women's participation.

Most young girls are rarely given the opportunity to extend their formal education beyond grades 2 or 3. Their help is needed at home, many times for the care of the younger children while the mothers are at work in the fields.

To encourage maximum female enrollment beyond grades 2 & 3, Save the Children is offering financial assistance to the parents of those girls who are allowed to continue their education. These scholarships will be in the form of financial recompense given at the completion of a grade.

Another effort to enlist the participation of women and to address their needs is the establishment of daycare centers. During the first year of the Save the Children program, 6 daycare centers have been opened with an enrollment of over 200 children, ages 2-5 years. In addition to the obvious benefits to the children, this project allows the women and older girls to have more free time. In addition to the 6 established centers, additional daycare centers are planned for other areas of the Panchayat.

To staff the daycare centers 30 village women were selected for teacher training. A staff of 14 is now in place and employed by Save the Children. Additional training has been given and more is planned to upgrade these women's capabilities.

When reflecting on the daycare project's first year of activities, it was clear that a person was needed to supervise the centers and personnel on a daily basis. A village woman, who had attended the teacher training session, was appointed to fill this position. This serves as an example to the women that training can upgrade their skills to make them eligible for employment and participation in the development process.

Recommendations

A most obvious need is the addition of a full-time Nepali female staff member to be responsible for the design and implementation of programming activities with respect to the women's sector. Although various candidates have been interviewed, many women will not agree to travel to or live in the field for the necessary time requirements. Nevertheless, the commitment has been made to continue to search and fill the Social Development Coordinator's position.

From reports and surveys taken to date, women are interested in income generating projects, and this should be a major focus for Save the Children's women's program. At present women enjoy little, if any, access to the financial resources of their families. It is customary for the male to handle the money and allocate the cash, even though it may be the woman's labor which has earned or produced the cash income.

Feasible income generation projects for women, therefore, should be identified, and suitable training provided. Also, it would be essential to ensure to whatever extent possible that the women be able to maintain control over the earned incomes. Alternatives, such as cooperatives, group committees, etc. could be set up to maintain fiscal control.

Women in Nepal are responsible for more than 50% of the agricultural labor; in some cases (millet is an example) they manage the crop production from start to finish. Yet when agricultural training is given, women are rarely included. Save the Children should plan to provide agricultural training to women as well as to men. A

concerted effort should be made to include women in the present on-going training, and then to provide speicalized training for those tasks performed mainly by women. It would be very advantageous if a suitable female JTA candidate could be hired to work with Save the Children and the women of Deurali in agricultural production.

The task of animal care is also given over to the women and girls. Possible training in animal health care should be provided and extended to those charged with the task.

Women and girls are responsible for a major portion of the time-consuming tasks in village life. Examples are: collection of firewood, fodder collection, carrying water, milling of grains, etc. Some of these chores could be alleviated and time saved if applications of appropriate technology were used. One example of this has been the introduction of water systems in various parts of Deurali which have greatly reduced the time needed to collect water for many women. Other examples of appropriate technology need to be introduced.

Special attention should be given to the fact that when and if an appropriate technology device is introduced, women should be involved in the training and control of the technology. Approximately 50 smokeless chulos (stoves) have been installed in various homes in Deurali with villagers receiving specialized training and education in their design and construction; but even though cooking is a female task and it is the women who would have to be convinced of the value of such a device, the training and decisions on the chulos were conducted for and by men.

In summary, although the Field Office has been able to involve women in most of the on-going projects, much more remains to be done to bring them into the decision making process and the mainstream of participation.

This concludes the sections completed so far for the Nepal Field Office statement on the adaptation of CBIRD. Further sections will be prepared early next year and will include Self-Help, Needs Assessment and the Transfer of Responsibility.

BANGLADESH

ADAPTATION OF CBIRD IN BANGLADESH

Page

Glossary

Map


I.	INTRODUCTION	1
A.	Purpose of Self-Evaluative Statement	1
B.	The Bangladesh Field Office: Historical Perspective and New Directions	1
C.	The Bangladesh Context	3
II.	ADAPATION OF CBIRD	5
A.	The Village Development Committee	5
1.	The VDC Structure	5
2.	Participation and Self-Help	7
B.	The Impact Area Team and Human Resource Development at the Village Level	9
C.	The Women's Program as One Example of Program Development	11
1.	The New Support Structure	13
2.	Consolidation of H/N/FP and Women's Programs	13
3.	Progress and Impact	13
4.	Problems Encountered	15
D.	Integrated Programming	17
1.	Sectoral Integration	17
2.	Vertical Integration (linkages)	18
E.	Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation	19
1.	The Planning Process	19
2.	Monitoring	20
3.	Evaluation	22
F.	Transfer of Responsibility	23
III.	LESSONS LEARNED AND FUTURE CHALLENGES	26

Sources

Appendices

GLOSSARY

BFO	Bangladesh Field Office
CBIRD	Community-Based Integrated Rural Development
CDF	Community Development Foundation
CP	Counterpart Worker
FC	Field Coordinator
OA	Office Assistant
OPG	Operational Program Grant
PDW	Para Development Worker
PHC	Primary Health Center
PVO	Private Voluntary Organization
SCF	Save the Children Federation
SDC	Social Development Coordinator
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VDC	Village Development Committee
VDF	Village Development Fund



I. INTRODUCTION

A. Purpose of the Self-Evaluative Statement

This document is one in a series of self-evaluative statements prepared by the field staff of established Asia/Pacific programs. It traces the application and evolution of Save the Children's (SCF) approach to community development in Bangladesh. On a country level it analyzes how community-based integrated rural development (CBIRD) has been implemented, and what has been learned about goals, strategies and program structures within that context.

B. The Bangladesh Field Office: Historical Perspective and New Directions

As most other international agencies in Bangladesh, SCF began its operations there in 1970 with relief work following a devastating cyclone. In the intervening years SCF has seen floods, famines and a civil war ravage the country and her people. In addition, military coups and martial laws have upset the bureaucracy and social order from time to time. SCF too has experienced many changes. Between 1972 and 1978 there were six different expatriate directors, and at one point an interim management team composed of field office and visiting home office staff took charge for four months. The rapid turn-over stemmed in part from SCF's program transition from disaster relief and rehabilitation to CBIRD within a two year period; and in part from the expatriate staff's personal and professional frustration in contending with local conditions. This atmosphere of uncertain leadership meant that the program suffered from lack of systematic planning and analysis.

Bangladesh was also one of the first programs to initiate a CBIRD program as outlined by the agency in 1974. The challenge was to introduce a community-based program in which villagers of diverse class, religion and sex would participate together to improve their social and economic living conditions within a conservative, stratified cultural context. Despite the Field Office's internal problems, the commitment to CBIRD as such was unquestionable. The major components, which will be discussed individually in this paper, include:

- community representation and participation (in the form of the Village Development Committee and self-help)
- program support and human resource development
- sectoral and vertical integration
- monitoring and evaluation
- transfer of responsibility

Initially, three elements of CBIRD almost exclusively dominated the model: the VDC, the Field Coordinator (F.C.), and specific project implementation (instead of overall integrated program development). When the model was being introduced, the VDC was seen more as a structure for

implementing projects than a means of engendering broad-based participation. There was little emphasis on the CBIRD process (identifying problems, obtaining the confidence and necessary abilities for villagers to understand and control their environment), and minimal understanding of the dynamics of working with community power structures (factions). Standard projects in agriculture and infrastructure were implemented at the behest of the F.C. with little adaption or innovation among the nine villages. Villagers outside the VDC were rarely brought into the project planning process, and those within the VDC were often dominated by the elites (see the VDC and Planning Process).

By 1976, the BFO had identified program areas which needed strengthening, and submitted a proposal to USAID/Dhaka for Phase I of an Operational Program Grant. Ambitious output indicators were identified; for instance:

- "With double and triple cropping, agricultural employment of day laborers will be increased by 25%. CDF plans to establish twelve kinds of small scale community industries (carpentry, handicrafts, weaving, mechanical repairs, processing of spices and other products) in the village and one rural industry in the project area to increase employment of day laborers in rural industries by 100%."
- "Through a concerted effort on agricultural production, increased credit availability and employment opportunities, CDF expects a 40% increase in per capita income."
- "To improve nutrition, CDF plans to increase the production/consumption of pulses by 50%, of fish by 30%, poultry by 25% and vegetables by 25%."
- "CDF expects, through a continual emphasis on improved schools and quality of teaching, that 90% of primary school age children and 60% of secondary school children will be attending school at the end of the target year and that the number of primary school drop-outs will be decreased by 75%."

At that stage, however, no systems had been developed to monitor these targets.

One of the present director's first tasks in 1978 was to amend the grant proposal so as to focus and define the objectives of the program more precisely. Instead of concentrating on specific development accomplishments and targets, the program stressed process (i.e., get the CBIRD approach working). The purpose of Phase II of the OPG was to "strengthen and improve the major components of the project wherever necessary, and also to give attention to better integration of the different components, so that the project can be brought closer to the ideal of community-based integrated rural development (CBIRD)." This document provided a framework for stressing linkages with outside resources, establishing planning and monitoring systems, and establishing a women's program with trained outreach workers. Since that time SCF has devoted much time and

attention to improving and modifying the CBIRD approach, as elaborated in this report.

C. The Bangladesh Context

Bangladesh provides an extremely difficult and challenging environment in which to achieve the objectives of CBIRD. There are four factors which must be considered in a discussion of SCF's program in the country, and which must be contended with when attempting to carry out the CBIRD approach there.

- Lack of Organizational Infrastructure. There is no existing modern or traditional organization functioning at the village level. Some attempts were made by the government to institute a gram sarkar (village government) in each village in the late 1970s, but this movement to provide a basis for community organization was suspended in 1982 when martial law was declared. It has, therefore, been necessary for SCF to begin from nothing to establish viable community organization in the form of a VDC. To do this and nurture it to the point where it is able to carry on equitably without outside assistance is a challenging and time-consuming job (see VDC and Transfer of Responsibility).
- Factions. Not only is there a lack of village infrastructure, but as in most other Asian societies there are commonly factions within villages vying for control. Usually family-based, one group often rejects and even sabotages projects or activities supported by the opposing faction, regardless of their merit. For instance, in one village a mari-mari (mob fight) broke out when one faction gained a majority membership vote in the VDC. In another case a Joint Farming project involving 130 people was suspended for a year as the two factions could not come to agreement on the size or scope of the project.

While inter-group rivalry is common, the power structure between the rich and the poor (essentially the landed and landless) is another important element to deal with in the Bangladesh context. The elites control employment in businesses and in the fields, as well as loans (they are often moneylenders, charging as much as 100% interest); the poor often fear their livelihood will be cut off if they attempt to upset the existing power structure. Therefore, the Village Development Committee as a forum for people of all classes to group together in their common interests was (and is) an alien concept. Personal interest dominates for the most part. The poor view it as an arm of the rich; one of SCF's greatest challenges is to change this perception through involving them to a greater degree (see VDC and Planning Process).

- Male Domination. CBIRD is ideally development for all members of the community, regardless of religion, class or sex. But to include women in the development process and insure they play an

integral role in the community's future within a conservative Islamic society is no easy task. SCF must devote considerable attention to women's development issues; to make matters more difficult, the communities themselves do not identify these issues as a need. To change deeply ingrained customs which restricted women to their villages and in many cases their homes takes intensive effort and perseverance (see Women's Program).

- Poverty. Bangladesh has been referred to as the basket case of the world, conjuring up images of destitution. Problems abound, not only low per capita incomes (\$90) but also the entire range of associated problems, making development, especially the community-based variety, that much more challenging. Landless laborers, who make up approximately half the male population, are dependent on the landed for employment, as 85% of the rural population is involved in agriculture. The majority of children still drop out of school after the first year, thus ensuring that low literacy rates (20%) will persist for years to come. The high rate of population growth (2.4%) not only makes it difficult to achieve development impact since progress is "eaten up", but also exacerbates the already poor quality of life of the villagers. The poverty, in turn, is the underlying cause of the poor health and nutritional conditions among the population.

These four factors have posed problems and challenges in implementing a CBIRD program. This paper elaborates on the specific adaptations that have been made by the Field Office in an effort to make the approach more suitable to the Bangladesh context.

II. ADAPTATION OF CBIRD

A. The Village Development Committee

SCF regards local community organization as one of the key elements in its community based approach. One central element of this approach is a representative committee -- the VDC. It provides the institutional framework for communities to take responsibility for their own development by establishing linkages with other resources in the area, by helping organize self-help, and by planning, implementing and managing development projects with the assistance of SCF field staff.

CBIRD is based on the assumption that a) the community's leaders will be responsive to all groups' problems and needs, and will help plan projects to meet those needs; and b) that these leaders will understand that it is to their benefit if everyone benefits. Not surprisingly within the Bangladesh context, the Field Office has seen programmatic involvement and benefits skewed toward the more powerful community members. In the past four years several modifications in the structure of the VDC have been initiated in order to strengthen the process of participation.

1. VDC Structure

In the early stages, the committee consisted of 15 members, all of whom were elected by the villagers themselves. These members would in turn appoint 27 others spread amongst six sectoral subcommittees (health, education, agriculture, women, landless and youth) making a total of 42 subcommittee members. Experience as well as internal and external evaluations, however, indicated that the VDC was little more than a vehicle for personal gain by and for the influential members themselves. Many times proposals from the landless or women's subcommittees would be vetoed by the main VDC itself, which had full authority. In this way, the needs and problems of the more disadvantaged groups were not being met.

When the present director took charge in 1978 he realized that the imbalance of power at the community level meant that SCF staff would have to take an active role in introducing changes. After discussions with local staff it was decided that the six sectoral subcommittees would be formed first, and that these subcommittee members would in turn elect representatives to the main body. To promote a fairer class distribution, SCF field staff as impartial outsiders were given the authority to appoint three out of the seven subcommittee members, and seven out of the fifteen VDC members. In making these appointments, all field staff were encouraged to consider the importance of paras* in the social structure of the village. While merit and representation of the weaker groups (women, landless) were the primary consideration when making selections, whenever possible all paras were also represented.

Despite these efforts, it was apparent that the changes were superficial; the VDC as a decision making body still remained under the

* Bangladesh villages are divided into paras (a hamlet or cluster of houses of which a village may have four or five), and within each para, baris (compounds consisting of four or five closely related households).

control of the village elites. In other words, the poor were physically represented, but were inhibited from expressing their opinions or needs due to the traditional deference between the rich and the poor. Therefore, as one component of a 1981 Field Office internal evaluation for USAID, a conference of all field and Dhaka staff, all of whom are Bangladeshi except the Director, was held to analyze the strengths and weaknesses of the VDC. Small group discussions led to the identification of the following points:

V.D.C. Strengths:

1. Acts as village coordinator.
2. Helps resolve village conflicts and problems.
3. Helps in decision making process.
4. Helps in loan realization.
5. Represents all levels of people.
6. Organizes village meetings.
7. Provides logistic local support and helps to reach a large number of people.
8. Helps in needs assessment, planning and implementation.
9. Provides an institution for administrative and financial management.
10. Helps in process of motivation, organization and social change.
11. Helps in receiving government attention.
12. Helps create leadership in the community.
13. Provides a safeguard for the proper utilization and handling of funds.
14. Will serve as an institution after SCF's phaseover.

V.D.C. Weaknesses:

1. Poor people have no real voice in the VDC and the influential elites dominate the poor.
2. Participants/individuals are only aware of their own interests.
3. Prevents Field Staff from implementing their ideas.
4. Village politics are closely related to the VDC which hampers development activities.
5. Subcommittees are dominated by the VDC.
6. The VDC consists of the same group of villagers every year, in different positions of authority.
7. Misuse of money by VDC members.
8. Local power structure repeatedly hampers the policymaking process and even distribution of project benefits.
9. Field staff have less contact with the general mass as they become dependent on the VDC.
10. Good plans for some projects cannot be approved or implemented if they do not benefit the powerful.
11. Concentrates on beneficiaries; non-beneficiaries do not come forward.
12. Proper importance not given to the subcommittees and as a result they are less active.

13. VDC secretary over empowered in financial and program authority.

While some of these points are contradictory, reflecting the diverse views held by field staff, the concept of a representative village committee was found to be sound. Further modifications were identified, and three follow-up conferences have since been held. In this manner, input from both field and Dhaka staff combine to create and modify policies, serving to reinforce ownership of the program.

Four essential issues have been identified as requiring attention (representation of the VDC; role of the VDC and subcommittees; relationship between FC and VDC; and financial management and the Village Development Fund), but financial decentralization was seen as the most urgent priority in order to stimulate subcommittees into a more active role. Under the new system, which will be introduced in November 1982, all loan funds will be controlled by the individual subcommittees themselves, rather than the main VDC as before. The VDC itself will have no control over subcommittee projects. Money will be drawn from one account by the VDC and passed on to the subcommittee secretary without veto power. Similarly, separate account books are maintained for each subcommittee, and a service charge (based on the prevailing interest rates) paid on all loans. This service charge will in turn be divided 30%/70% amongst the subcommittee and the VDC itself.

In an effort to streamline the VDC, the health and education subcommittees have been eliminated, reducing the number of subcommittees to four and the total number of members to 28. Financial responsibility for community infrastructure, education and health projects will now be assumed by the main VDC, and ad-hoc project committees will be formed to implement and manage these projects. The membership of these committees will be decided by the VDC and field staff on a project-by-project basis, and may include an individual who is outside the VDC itself.

After the new system was finalized, teams of Dhaka and field staff held question/answer sessions with each VDC. The VDC subcommittees responded enthusiastically to the decentralization concept, while the VDC secretaries remained fairly quiet. In effect, the system vastly reduces the power of the VDC secretary, in that he is bypassed for financial authority. SCF will have to wait and see how the system itself unfolds at the VDC level; it is expected that the changes will enable a greater degree and diversity of participation. If successful this will be a breakthrough in terms of broadening the decision making process and power base at the community level. (See Appendix 1 for Procedures for Forming Village Development Committees and Subcommittees)

2. Participation and Self Help

Another key element in the CBIRD approach to development is the community's ability and willingness to contribute to its own

development. This is associated with an attitudinal change achieved through a SCF influence and orientation which supports self-reliance and rejects the "let them do it for us" attitude. Community participation - such as VDC involvement as well as labor, cash and materials donated towards infrastructure projects - is a significant indication of process, and one which offers confirmation of sustained growth of a village.

SCF has developed a system of categorizing the population of each program village according to socioeconomic status (A through D; rich through poor). This was introduced in Rangunia in the mid-1970s as a way to structure medical costs--people would pay according to their ability (e.g., 100% for rich, 75% for middle income, 67% for poor, 50% for very poor). The same approach was then utilized in the Mirzapur health scheme. More recently, the populations of Ghior and Nasirnagar impact areas were categorized during the socioeconomic surveys.

Such a categorization system makes it easy to determine the breadth of participation in local program leadership and activities. The most intensive study of participation has been carried out in Ghior Impact Area. The proportion of population in the highest socioeconomic category varies from five to nine percent, while some 20 percent are in the middle group and approximately 35% in each of the two lowest categories (the poor and very poor).

Further analysis was carried out to determine the extent of participation by the various socioeconomic groups in the operation of the development program in the village. The figures demonstrate that the percentage of seats on the VDC subcommittees held by the upper two categories varies greatly--from 37.5% in Baniajuri village to 62.5% in Kakjore/Tarail village. One cannot see outright domination by the higher socioeconomic groups as might be expected in most non-project villages. By itself, however, this means little; the role played by the various categories must be determined. Are the poor merely tokens or do they take an active part in the community's development? The question is one of quality of attendance, i.e., what part is played in meetings, something which can only be ascertained by SCF field workers and long-term observation. A system to measure this participation has recently been developed for the F.O. (See monitoring section).

A higher percentage of the A group responded in the survey that they had participated in village development meetings. The percentage decreases directly with the socioeconomic class. Despite the fact that the lowest rate of participation is among the very poor group, it is encouraging to see that some 14% of this category has attended meetings.

Another important type of participation at the village level is in-kind material or cash donations towards developing community infrastructure. Some of the more impressive tangible results are roads built in the Rangunia area and the six and one-half mile

irrigation canal in Nasirnagar. The latter effort to irrigate 2,936 acres was difficult to accomplish because the people were accustomed to having the government carry out the projects for them. In this case, however, the villagers contributed the labor, most of it in a food-for-work arrangement. The project was successful in that it will allow the use of high yielding variety crops on 1,000 acres in the winter season, and the cultivation of 236 acres that would otherwise lie fallow. The total value of rice cultivation in the project area is expected to increase a substantial 38% as a result of the project.

Overall, the Field Office has had some success in cultivating self-help contributions from the communities, but is aware that the quantity and quality of participation from all socioeconomic groups must improve. This can be promoted by orientation efforts as well as structural changes to bring about broader-based participation. This was the underlying reason behind SCF's new policy of financial decentralization mentioned above. Previously the VDC, usually run by the elite, was fully responsible for administering the money, and this led to concentration of power and misuse of money. Now power, as it relates to finances, will be dispersed so that more people can participate more meaningfully in the development process.

B. The Impact Area Team and Human Resource Development at the Village Level

Field and village staff are key structural elements of the CBIRD approach. Field Staff are paid SCF staff, while village staff are considered VDC staff, and receive monthly "honorariums" rather than salaries. Field staff (male Field Coordinators and female Social Development Coordinators) are university graduates for the most part. Their role is to function as motivators and resource agents for the villagers, first helping them to identify needs, and then helping them to plan and manage projects to meet those needs. Village staff, on the other hand, are local, usually literate, multi-purpose outreach workers.

Over time, SCF's staffing structure at the field and village levels has changed both in size and composition. New positions were added to meet the demands of new villages as well as to increase the worker/population ratio for more effective coverage. For instance, in 1976 there were five Field Coordinators (and no Social Development Coordinators) for a program population of approximately 21,000 (1:4200); today there are 7 Field Coordinators and 7 Social Development Coordinators for a total population of 42,667 (1:3047). In addition, in 1976 there were 12 sectoral health/nutrition/family planning workers (for four out of the nine villages only). Today a whole new support structure for an integrated health, nutrition, family planning and women's program has been established at the village level in the remaining 14 villages, which is more appropriate to SCF's integrated development philosophy. The present structure, which has ensured complete coverage of all households by outreach workers, consists of Social Development Coordinators (SDCs) at the Impact Area level; a CounterPart (CP) for each village; and a Para Development Worker (PDW) for every 200 or so families. All of these workers are women and have the dual responsibility in promoting women's

development as well as delivering social development services (see Women's Program Development section).

In the past year, emphasis has been placed on developing village worker skills. Training has taken place in the field and, appropriately, has been divided into four phases. Each is a week long, covering specific topics: orientation and basic aspects of Maternal/Child Health (MCH); practical information and interventions; family planning; protection against common diseases. Spread out over a 6 to 9 month period, this approach has been found most effective in other programs as well, as workers are unable to absorb and retain material presented in an intensive course lasting a month or more.

The training of the new village workers (CPs and PDWs) deserves comment as an example of a training approach that has been most successful. First, they are trained together. This fosters a team orientation and strengthens esprit de corps. Secondly, the supervision is supportive in nature, reinforcing and educational at the same time as it monitors the work of the village worker. Training, therefore, is not restricted to the training period alone; rather, it is a continuous process. The information presented to them is limited to that required to achieve program objectives. The health-related activities are focused on the under-fives and pregnant/ lactating women, hence the subjects covered in the training are primarily those dealing with MCH. Concentrating on priorities allows the workers to focus their efforts and become more effective in skills that will result in maximum impact. This not only increases cost-effectiveness but also reduces the chance of overloading them.

The technical aspects of training are important. Of equal importance, however, is the self-esteem and self-confidence inspired in these women workers. SCF's village level workers are not only willing but eager to discuss the program. Even most of the PDWs are able to answer questions about family planning acceptance rates in their para and are acutely aware of the poorest families and their needs. The training seems to have given them a positive self-image which has been reinforced by the Social Development Coordinator. A supporting indicator is the low turnover rate of the female village workers; only one of the 45 (32 PDWs and 13 CWs) has resigned (due to her husband's disapproval), which is extremely low compared to the experience of other village-based programs.

Part of the success of the women's training program is due to the innovative techniques employed by the Womens Program Officer. Role playing, for example, was used to teach the principles underlying the new monitoring system (see monitoring section). For the purposes of orienting the PDWs, the Women's Program Officer and Counterparts developed a set of flash cards on women's development issues (See Appendix 2). This provided an effective tool for training as well as a means of orienting and raising the consciousness of village women to their status and potential. They have succeeded in presenting an abstract concept in a powerful yet simple, easily comprehensible manner.

As mentioned earlier, the Field Coordinator was originally the only support staff at the impact area level when the program began. Realizing

that this support structure was inadequate in terms of effectively covering the given population, however, a cadre of Social Development Coordinators was brought on board, the first in 1977. Initially, the SDC was placed under the FC in terms of authority. It became evident very shortly thereafter, however, that this was a less than ideal situation. As the new Women's Program evolved and the SDC's responsibility grew, these two field workers have been posted together on an equal basis. This created such an unpleasant situation - loss of face for the FCs in the eyes of the VDCs - that a decision to rotate all FCs was made in 1980. In this way, each of the FC's did not have to readjust to treating their former subordinate as an equal and each was able to form a new relationship with the SDC in the new impact area. Today problems arise from time to time, as in any other organization, but seem to be under control for the most part. A ratio of 1 FC/SDC to roughly 3,000 population has evolved as the optimum one. Areas of program responsibility are divided among the two workers. The SDC, as elaborated in the Women's Program Development section below, is responsible for supervising the integrated H/N/FP and women's program, including the Counterparts and PDWs. The FC, on the other hand, is responsible for public works/infrastructure, agriculture and education without being a technician himself. The two share responsibility for children's recreation.

The FCs, who are all born and educated outside the local communities, are regarded by villagers literally as foreigners. While it might have been advantageous to employ locals, the logistics of finding an appropriate person who is acceptable to all the elites and other community members were very difficult. The FC's original neutrality is very important. Responsible to both SCF and the VDC, he must walk a tightrope between the two. He provides checks and balances - for instance he countersigns the financial report, and appoints VDC members. Many times the VDCs resent his presence and role; even worse, factions of the VDCs commonly vie for his support. Corruption of FCs has surfaced from time to time, but has not been a major problem.

In the past, the FCs have been heavily involved in technical development issues (i.e., giving advice on specific projects) rather than concentrating their efforts on community development activities. As a result, the advantage of having a worker exclusively for community orientation and organization purposes has been lost. SCF has recently moved towards hiring more technical experts to plan and support specific development projects, which should permit the FCs to devote their time more exclusively to community development process issues.

C. The Women's Program as One Example of Program Development

In the early stages of SCF's community development program in Bangladesh strong emphasis was placed on establishing the components of CBIRD (such as VDC, FC, project implementation) with less concern about their suitability to local needs. As a result, standard projects were implemented but individual area-by-area program direction was slow in evolving. In recent years, however, concerted efforts have been made in developing strategies to address such priority problem areas as agriculture, health,

nutrition, family planning and women. This section explains how one particular emphasis - women - has developed within the Bangladesh context.

In May 1980 the first comprehensive women's program plan for the Bangladesh Field Office was developed. A women's program had been operating since 1977 but it was narrow in scope, limited to a small segment of the population, and largely controlled by the Village Development Committees. By 1980 one female field worker (SDC) was operating in each of our four impact areas with a total estimated women's population of 11,500. The SDCs worked almost exclusively with the existing VDC women's subcommittees to organize income-generating projects. In 1979 it was estimated that 400 women (or 4% of the total) had been involved in such projects and no other types of activities (e.g., social) were envisaged. While economic benefits were undoubtedly derived, the projects were basically planned, funded and managed by the all male VDC body. Women were not getting the chance to develop their own leadership skills, and the basic concept that women could manage their own affairs was not accepted.

With the hiring of a Women's Program Officer (WPD) in 1979, SCF made a statement of commitment to the women's sector. The 1980 Women's Program Plan envisaged a broad based, grass-roots, multi-sectoral approach, based on the belief that the only way to increase the number of participants is by going to them.

It was felt that an approach which is appropriate to the Bangladesh cultural context must adjust to the following factors:

- Fatalism is deep-rooted, running through the whole fabric of society.
- It is a male-dominated society, which, although not an absolute deterrent, should be taken into consideration.
- A village woman's day-to-day life from beginning to end is circumscribed by the boundaries of her home (the bari): first her father's, then her husband's, and finally her son's.
- Within the home, however, women are far from passive. There is scope for expression, manipulation, growth, and on occasions such as weddings, for exercising leadership and organizational ability.
- Village women in the bari are already active participants in their agrarian society, with many demands on their time and energy, not only domestic, but also agriculture-and craft-related.
- There are no existing traditional women's groups from which to build in SCF's villages.

In consideration of these factors it was felt that SCF needed an approach which was low-profile, non-threatening, and which avoided unnecessary conflict. This approach must recognize that development in the women's sector will be slow and gradual, one which does not view women as targets, but is concerned with the whole woman, who is first and foremost an individual. Women's needs are on many levels; personal, maternal, familial, societal, economic and cultural. A plan for reaching them must take this into account. Finally, the approach needed to begin where the women are; in the home.

1. The New Support Structure

In the three areas where the new program has been implemented a special three-tiered support system has been established to reach all women and their children under five, the two target groups (see Women's Program Organizational Chart, Appendix 3).

The number of SDCs was increased from three to six. Counterparts (CPs) to the SDCs were recruited locally, one per village or thirteen in all, and received one week's orientation from the WPO in February 1981. These two types of workers are responsible for helping to plan, implement, and supervise the day-to-day work of the women Para Development Workers. They are also responsible for organizing weekly meetings of savings groups at the para level, as well as monthly meetings with PDWs, CPs and group leaders at village level. With these three structures in place - the SDC at the impact area level, the Counterpart at the village level, and the Para Development Worker at the para level - there is now a cadre of women working together as a coordinated team.

2. Consolidation of Health, Nutrition and Family Planning Program with the Women's Program

Since most of SCF's sectoral health, nutrition and family planning workers (one of each per village) were women, and since most of the beneficiaries were women and children, it was decided in April 1981, to consolidate the health, nutrition and family planning (H/N/FP) program with the women's program. In this way duplication, which occurred when different categories of specialized workers visited the same household for different purposes, has been eliminated. In addition, workers are now more accepted and appreciated by their fellow villagers, as they provide a variety of services, not just a single one such as family planning.

3. Progress and Impact

In the 20 months since the plan's introduction, the organizational base has been established, and orientation/training has taken place for the Counterparts and the Para Development Workers. A quarterly activity monitoring system, implemented in 1982, but retrospective to July 1981, gives the following summary of activities:

Savings Groups: Savings groups meet regularly in all the paras, and members discuss their problems and solutions as well as plan projects. The CPs and PDWs guide and facilitate the group discussions, along with the group leader. With the formation of these groups SCF is reaching more women in several ways. In addition to the economic aspect, information on nearly every aspect of daily life is discussed, such as nutrition, growing food at home (kitchen gardening), sanitation, home improvements, child care, causes and prevention of common diseases and simple cures, and so forth. In all, 99 such groups with 1,282 members have been formed, or 15% of the women's population.

The economic role of the groups, however, may not be as important as other factors such as leadership identification and development, nonformal education, and social unity. Having women from the same area and with homogeneous backgrounds come together regularly presents a unique opportunity to raise their consciousness and awareness about social and development issues. The groups, ranging from 5 women to as many as 26, provide mutual support as well as a source of peer pressure. Demonstrations and educational messages on health and nutrition support the program's social development activities. It is around these groups that the Women's Program Officer plans to center the efforts to improve the social and economic life of the women and, at the same time, the community as a whole.

Income-Generating Activities: Ongoing women's projects are live-stock raising; fishnet making; fish cultivation; bamboo crafts; processing of rice, pulse, and mustard; and flattened and puffed rice preparation. In FY 1983 women's projects will be implemented directly through the women's subcommittees of the VDC, ensuring that women will be directly involved in funding and managing their own books for the first time. SDCs and CPs have received bookkeeping training from SCF's accountant which will be a big help in this regard. Women's groups are increasing their savings by storing paddy, pulse and mustard and selling these at inflated prices later in the season. At present, some groups are using their own savings in addition to capital from SCF. To date 37 projects have been undertaken, involving 458 women (or 6%).

Playschools: One of the objectives of the women's program plan is to help preschool children (the 3 - 5 year age group) by establishing playschools, of approximately 20 - 25 children each, in all our program areas. The premise is that children learn through play - that their physical, intellectual and social development is nurtured and enhanced in a nonformal environment. We have begun by establishing two playschools in the poorer sections of two villages, as test sites, and if the idea proves successful and replicable, one in every village and para will be started. In both paras there is community enthusiasm and support; a site for the playschool has been offered and a teacher selected and trained. A fee of TK. 1 (16¢) per child per month is being charged to the parents. SCF will pay the difference between this and the teacher's honorarium. SCF has also provided a latrine and tubewell for the children's hygiene and sanitation. The playschools are open two hours a day, six days a week.

Health, Nutrition, and Family Planning: Each PDW covers a population of approximately 1,000 (about 165 families) visiting each family at least once a month. These workers target families which need special attention such as new family planning acceptors, pregnant women, malnourished children, or individuals with particular health problems. Follow-up care and interventions include oral rehydration demonstrations, first aid, weaning food preparation, child care advice, etc. In terms of impact, the

following indicators give a comparative picture of the two health/nutrition/family planning programs currently being followed by SCF in Rangunia and Mirzapur areas (1982 figures):

	<u>National</u>	<u>Rangunia</u>	<u>Mirzapur</u>
Population	89,940,000	9696	5420
Birth Rate	41/1000	25/	27/
Death Rate	17/1000	9/	11/
Growth Rate	2.4%	1.5%	1.6%
F.P. Acceptance (modern methods, % eligible couples)	10.9%	32.3%	34.1%
% children 0-5 yrs. less than 70% int'l arm circumference/age standard (Harvard)	n.a	14.9%	11.7%
Tubewell: Pop Ratio	1:250	1:45	1:80
Sanitary Latrine Usage by Family	n.a	14%	24%
Medicine subsidy by SCF		45*	54%
Medicine cost recovered from villagers		55%*	47%

*except in Kulkurmai, where villagers pay 100% cost of medicines.

4. Problems Encountered in Implementing the Women's Program

The WPO identified the following issues as the most noteworthy:

- o 1980 was a transitional period from the old women's program to the new one, and program staff both at Dhaka and village levels were confused, anxious and doubtful. Before, the SDCs were under the supervision of the Field Coordinators and the change to equal status rocked the boat. The Program Chief in Dhaka at the time did not support the concept, and as a result the FCs and VDCs of all areas thought the women were starting a separate and independent program only to be free of male domination. The present Program Chief and Deputy Director, however, in the course of their field visits have done their best to explain the rationale, goal and objectives of the program.

- o Consolidation of H/N/FP with the women's program meant the abolition of all male village health worker positions which along with the hiring of women para level multi-purpose workers, confused, disappointed and angered many influential men in the villages (and even at Dhaka). The women faced many difficulties and nasty criticisms.
- o While sessions were held with all VDCs to explain the new program, not all members were present. As a result, many members were not accurately informed, and out of ignorance or spite continued to harass the women leaders and workers. Gradually most of the influential men as well as our male colleagues have understood that our women's program activities are carried out not as an arm of "women's liberation" but with the motive of development.
- o Religious and conservative villagers found it especially difficult to accept the idea of women's mobility and development. The WPO, SDCs, CPs, PDWs and subcommittee members are the ones who explain the strategy - that SCF helps and facilitates women to grow and develop from where they are (home). These men now seem convinced that we are not bringing their women out of purdah and muslim society, but that instead we try to help develop them first through home-based activities, and then gradually through broadening their horizons within acceptable customs.
- o The high temperament and impatience of some SDCs also created problems with FCs and VDCs. It was explained to the SDCs that they will have to face many, many questions and doubts before the concept of women's development is fully accepted.

As change agents they must have the patience, strength, courage and conviction to face all these obstacles. Two SDC's who were unable to adjust to the pace and style of the program were let go. The other SDC's have realized the value of a cooperative and non-threatening stance.

It is evident that significant increases in women's mobility, participation, leadership development, economic productivity, (savings groups and income-generating activities), and food production (kitchen gardens) have taken place not to mention the vital health, nutrition and family planning services being offered to all villagers by CPs and PDWs where there was none before. The support structure is functioning smoothly, and the problem areas identified by the WPO are under control. In two areas where the SDC's positions are temporarily vacant, activity is continuing strongly under the CP's watchful eye, and with the help of the male field worker.

Attitudinal, economic and social changes are taking place, exploding some of the myths about women's roles in Bangladesh: they have shown themselves to be economically productive, capable of handling

financial responsibilities, willing/eager to leave their bars for meetings, resourceful, self-confident and receptive to learning and new ideas. These women are deeply concerned about their children's immediate survival, as well as their future. They have been extremely responsive and enthusiastic about SCF's program. In large part this can be attributed to the previous isolation of women; the sincerity and non-threatening approach adopted by the WPO, SDCs, CPs and PDWs; and the concrete social and economic benefits derived from involvement.

D. INTEGRATED PROGRAMMING

Most PVOs in Bangladesh focus either on specific target groups, (usually women or landless), or on a specific sector (health/nutrition, agriculture, credit, education or family planning). In contrast, Save the Children advocates an integrated development approach which focuses simultaneously on the many diverse problems that affect the well-being of people in a community (sectoral integration). For example, the SCF approach to the reduction of infant mortality calls for a series of integrated actions: training in health, nutrition and family planning for mothers and local opinion makers; construction of a potable water system and latrines; and training and credit for farmers to increase and diversify their crop production.

The women's program described above is another example of integrated programming in order to improve the target population's standard of living. The Para Development Workers are multi-purpose outreach workers, replacing the specialized sectoral workers previously employed for health, nutrition, and family planning. This realignment of staff makes extremely good sense for several reasons. First, the target group for all the services is women of child-bearing age. Instead of having three different workers visiting the same person infrequently, for their respective purposes, now one person will be in contact with a small number of women. Secondly, all three of the activities are naturally linked and overlapping, thus one person can and should handle them together. Finally, to affect long-term behavioral change, intensive interaction between the change agent and the target group is required, and the recently introduced Para Development Worker gives SCF this capacity.

Integrated programming also entails identifying and involving potential resources at all levels. Individuals and committees at the village level, as well as banks and other development institutions at the thana and district levels are resources to be utilized (vertical integration). These established linkages provide local and national level support and contribute towards a self-sustaining program.

1. Sectoral Integration

In the Bangladesh program there has been considerable emphasis on individual development projects per se, such as construction of a community center or a loan for a productivity project. This tendency has been reinforced by the reporting and financial record keeping systems required by the SCF headquarters. Village planning which

would facilitate a broader understanding of integrated development has not to date been implemented. The overall integrated impact of the program has therefore been obscured and neglected. The newly introduced impact monitoring system (see next section) has been another important step in facilitating a transition from the unfocused project-specific effort to a more tightly directed and efficient integrated development program. The six indicators that compose the monitoring system (births, deaths, family planning acceptance, education, nutritional status and agricultural yields) represent a disaggregation of SCF's stated goal -- "improving the quality of life" -- in order to verify if indeed we are reaching this goal. Progress can be monitored and measured, e.g. increased literacy, reduced birth rates, improved health and nutritional status, and increased food availability. By limiting attention to these several crucial impact indicators, the villagers, field staff and program administrators are constantly aware of and striving to achieve program objectives upon which the indicators are based. As such, the monitoring system serves to provide a constant direction and orientation to the overall program and in a sense helps "drive" the development effort. For instance, the health and nutritional status of the vulnerable groups gives a good indication of how both the income-generation and social development efforts are succeeding.

Another important addition slated for FY 1983 is a comprehensive orientation to each and every VDC. This will be conducted by teams of Dhaka and Field Staff, and will cover village planning, including problem identification, sectoral strategies and integration. This advance from planning specific projects to a coordinated view of project impact will, it is hoped, bring the program closer to the principle of integrated programming.

2. Vertical Integration (Linkages)

Vertical integration is the linking of VDCs and communities with local, national or non-governmental institutions. The intent is to organize people and establish linkages with resource providing institutions in a manner that supports sustained development. SCF sees this as a vital step in ensuring continuation of the development process after SCF phases over development responsibility to communities themselves. This facet of the CBIRD approach has received increased attention in the past 2-3 years, especially as the phase-over question becomes a more pressing issue (see Transfer of Responsibility).

Linkages are evident in many ways in the communities with which we work. For instance, the VDCs contact the Thana Family Planning Officer directly for contraceptive supplies (which are then distributed by our village staff) and also arrange for sterilizations for interested villagers. In like manner, field staff and VDCs collaborate with local UNICEF and Department of Public Health Engineering officials in procuring tubewells for safe drinking water and latrines for improved sanitation, with SCF's Health Officer following up at the Dhaka level. Finally, in two areas an extensive

collective farming endeavour has been financed by a national bank, replacing SCF funds entirely. The staff in Dhaka worked with the Bank Headquarters and field staff worked with local branch officials in securing the bank loans. This has developed a significant sense of confidence among the community members, in that they now feel secure in dealing with outside financial resources on their own. SCF initiated the linkage, but the community is maintaining it.

At thana level and below government linkages have provided much needed material and human resources. At the upper levels, however, cooperation with government ministries has been limited. SCF, a relatively small program, has limited financial resources, and works with people at the village level. As one of literally scores of programmatic approaches to development in Bangladesh, government ministries have not been actively pursuing linkages with SCF. As documentation of the programmatic impact increases, we expect to generate increasing cooperation.

E. Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation

1. The Planning Process

The bottom-up approach to planning and community development is a fundamental dimension of CBIRD, though how this is realized in different settings is dependent on the socio-cultural context. In Bangladesh, organization and planning had been minimal at the village level. There was no history of functional government organization or other local formal structures, and self-help initiatives had been eroded by foreigners' "assistance". This meant that Save the Children was establishing an innovative kind of infrastructure and leadership in the VDC.

As described in the section on the Village Development Committee, these structures have been less than ideal as they were originally organized and have recently gone through transitions. These constraints clearly influenced the realization of an ideal planning process. The majority of the members in the community had no expectation that they should be involved in planning or that their ideas had any value. There was little experience of the benefits of joining together; rather the common outlook was one of dependency, fatalism and only seeing the short term. The stage was set for a difficult nurturing process if SCF was to achieve wide participation and self-sustaining community development.

Project planning and implementation has taken place in Bangladesh as a joint effort (some might say "tug of war") between the VDC (especially secretary and Chairman), sub-committee members and the SCF field staff. Early on, the field coordinators took the most active lead in suggesting projects that they felt would benefit large portions of the community. Often they found themselves walking a tight line. Too much advocacy of certain projects would alienate them from the VDC which had its own agenda. This conflict between FC ideas and those of the VDC members (who sought to use the available

resources to further projects in their own interests) made it difficult to find harmonious compromises. Consequently, the problems that debilitate the poor were not identified as high priorities. Many times a VDC would veto proposed projects of this type coming from sub-committees (landless, women, etc.). Gradually, however, the VDCs have shown signs of change at the urging of field staff and as a result of modifications in composition that produced a broader based leadership.

In part, this has come about through a method of gentle persuasion. When rival factions in the community or on the VDC came to an impasse or refused to cooperate, the program has been suspended in that village until a solution is worked out locally. For example, in the village of Rasideohata (Mirzapur) one powerful family disrupted the program, forcing the VDC to take action against them. This indicated a growing level of consciousness and resulted in the "touts" (exploiters) finding it more difficult to operate. But what will happen when SCF is no longer involved is a serious concern and while alternative arrangements have been suggested the ultimate answer rests in the community's and its leaders' understanding and appreciation of the requisites for effective and equitable development (see Transfer of Responsibility).

As the VDC is becoming somewhat more responsive to the needs of all villagers, the roles and powers of the sub-committees in suggesting, planning, budgeting and implementing projects have been increased. This dilutes the power of the elite, with their control no longer absolute or unchallenged.

It is also extremely important to promote and encourage independent groups such as women and youth clubs which can provide additional support systems for the development program and projects. The greater the number of viable support groups, the greater the chances of development continuing and being effective. They are potential organized forms of pressure on the VDC to perform effectively as well as alternative means of independent development activity. They also provide an ideal practice setting in which to develop new community leaders. In other words, not all development eggs are put in the VDC basket.

2. Monitoring

"Monitoring" for the Bangladesh Field Office has, in the past, been limited almost exclusively to fiscal monitoring. In 1979 a Field Office Reporting System (FORS) was introduced to all SCF Field Offices, including Bangladesh. The system includes Project Application Forms, Project Registration Forms and Project Expenditure Forms. Although the Project Application Form provides a useful planning framework at the village level, the reporting forms themselves focus entirely on financial inputs. Aware of the deficiencies inherent in depending upon this system alone, the Asia/Pacific region has promoted the establishment of programmatic monitoring systems over the past two years. The Bangladesh Field

Office has introduced three distinct monitoring systems in the past year, as described below, to address the needs of our integrated development program.

In early 1982 a monthly impact monitoring system was developed and implemented at the village level. The system incorporates six indicators to measure the impact (as opposed to input) of our efforts at the village level. The system itself includes six indicators reported on three separate forms (see Appendix 4). The Social Development Form (M1) reflects information on births, deaths, nutritional status and family planning acceptance. Form M2 collects information on Joint Farming Projects and any other significant agricultural projects implemented on a seasonal basis. Finally, information on school attendance for 6-15 year olds is collected by field staff on an annual basis on Form M3.

Several recommendations to increase the effectiveness of the monitoring system have recently been made. The first is a greater use of percentages in place of numbers. This concept may present a little problem for the village workers, but it is hoped that after education and continuing reinforcement the concept can be comprehended and utilized.

The second recommendation is the posting of one or two of the most significant indicators, such as the number of infants dying, in a permanent place in the village (e.g., VDC office). This will focus local people's attention on an important issue around which other development activities can be centered. The percentage of eligible couples contracepting might be another appropriate piece of information. Comparisons between villages might stimulate healthy competition which would improve program performance.

The information derived from the impact monitoring system (when consolidated by village or impact area) gives the field worker as well as the headquarters administrators an accurate picture. Feedback of what is or is not being accomplished in a particular location or by a specific worker, "Management by Objective" and "Management by Exception", can then be used to improve the effort. Monitoring in such a fashion becomes a management tool that helps direct and drive the program. Time-consuming, expensive and often inconclusive (in terms of determining cause and effect and attribution) special studies or surveys are no longer required to determine if the program is achieving impact. After almost a year of use the Field Office has compiled the values of the comprehensive list of impact indicators for 1982. This will provide benchmark data and a concrete means of assessing program performance in the future.

A women's program activity monitoring system (see Appendix 5) was also introduced in early 1982. Information such as the number of savings and income-generating groups, the number of kitchen gardens and tubewell and latrine sites is being collected on a daily basis by the Para Development Workers in the course of their household visits. This monitoring system represents an initial step to help the Women's

Program Officer meet her management and reporting needs, although it needs to be streamlined and more sharply focused. Suggested modifications include using intermediate impact indicators such as the percentage of women involved in savings groups or the percentages of homes with no kitchen gardens, with unimproved kitchen gardens, and with improved kitchen gardens. The first of these two indicators would inform the local field workers and administrators in Dhaka how well the program is doing in terms of its goal to enroll all women in savings groups (which serve as the foundation of the women's development activities). The second indicator pertains to the nutrition program and reinforces program objectives. Households without kitchen gardens should be encouraged to begin them and the numerous existing kitchen gardens should be improved to include crops which respond to identified nutritional deficiencies and needs of the target population (protein, Vitamin A and iron) Monitoring indicators may have to be developed which specify this information.

Finally, a Project Monitoring/file folder system (see Appendix 6) has recently been implemented to improve data collection procedures and records at the village level. A file folder is made for each individual project approved by Dhaka and sent back to the field with appropriate forms. The system ensures that all information for a particular project is summarized in one place, thus meeting program feedback and evaluation/documentation purposes.

The Bangladesh Field Office has come a long way in the past year in developing and implementing effective monitoring systems. These have already begun to improve program quality, as field and Dhaka staff have become more aware of impact indicators' usefulness and importance in managing a responsive integrated development program. As this work goes on the systems will continue to be refined and perfected. In addition, other agencies in Bangladesh have demonstrated an interest in learning how to design and institutionalize similar impact monitoring systems. For instance, UNICEF has requested the Field Office to participate in a workshop in evaluation as they are considering adopting a similar system in their own social development program, which could have revolutionary results.

3. Evaluation

Evaluation is described in the Introduction to CBIRD as an integral and respected ingredient of the CBIRD approach. "Evaluation is a serious, constant and ongoing process. As much as a formal procedure, it is a thought process, a way of approaching work." (from Field Office Manual). Although the value and necessity of evaluation is explicitly stated, there is no detailed discussion of evaluation, i.e., definition, information on what data should be collected, or how it should be interpreted and analyzed. In the past, evaluations have been conducted by visiting consultants and, in fact, one was recently completed for the Bangladesh Field Office, to meet end of OPG requirements. While this has been extremely useful, the impact monitoring system described above is an attempt to

institute a built-in evaluation mechanism for the field office rather than outside agencies. As time progresses and data accumulates, it will be possible to establish trends and demonstrate more clearly the program's performance. The other two monitoring systems will in like manner provide useful data for periodical internal or external evaluations.

CBIRD emphasizes not only tangible impacts but also the intangible changes -- the process -- that occur as communities and their members become increasingly self-reliant. A new Process Evaluation system has recently been developed for the Field Office. This attempt to analyze seven vital "process" factors inherent in the CBIRD process (needs assessment; consciousness; programmatic involvement; organization; participation and distribution; self-help; and linkages) is a welcome first step in the effort to define and assess non-tangible elements of CBIRD. Rating scales are used as a means of placing individual villages on a continuum from "dependent" to "self-sustaining". Each village is scored on each of these seven factors annually by the field staff/VDC. The results are discussed with the villagers and field staff and problem areas will be easily identified. (Villagers' involvement in the system is also an important learning and feedback mechanism.) The information will also be of great help in relation to phase-over criteria (See Transfer of Responsibility section). The Field Office plans to orient the field staff to the process evaluation system, and institute it on a yearly basis at the village level, commencing the end of this fiscal year.

F. Transfer of Responsibility

The culmination of CBIRD's development process is phase-over, when the village has the ability to carry on development by itself. This self-sustaining capacity is the ultimate objective of any CBIRD program. Unfortunately, this issue was not addressed in the entry stages of program development, but has recently become a pressing issue as a decade of work in Bangladesh has elapsed. Regarding conditions for phase-over, general criteria for both the process and the social/economic development outputs, which will be more sharply defined case by case, have been established as follows:

- at least one primary school
- adequate health services
- adequate water supply for drinking
- adequate sanitation system
- major roads constructed
- increased agricultural production
- evidence that all social and economic groups have benefited
- income-generating projects for VDC
- income-generating projects for women
- sufficient funds in the Village Development Fund

- demonstrated capacity to plan, implement and manage projects
- demonstrated capacity to utilize outside resources

The process evaluation system, scoring the seven process factors on a yearly basis, will also be used to determine a particular village's development on a continuum scale ranging from dependent to self-sustaining.

One out of the seventeen program villages appears ready for phaseover. Appropriately, Kulkurmai is the first village in which SCF began to operate. While Kulkurmai meets all the socio-economic criteria, two things still remain to be done before phase-over can take place. First, a thorough impact/process review must be carried out. Not only will this substantiate the appropriateness of phase-over, but it will document the case for organizational posterity. Being among the first SCF attempts to phase over responsibility, Kulkurmai assumes more than the normal significance. Secondly, the village should prepare a two-year plan in the near future to detail what they plan to do and how. These two activities should be completed by the end of 1982, making phase-over in January 1983 possible.

Phase-over does not mean a complete break between SCF and Kulkurmai. Programs will continue in three neighboring villages, and field staff will be available for advice and counsel. The villagers see the FC as a development expert who can advise them on whether what they are doing makes good development sense. In addition, a Thana Advisory Committee composed of local government agency and bank officials as well as SCF field staff will most probably take over some of the functions previously performed by SCF. Monthly financial statements would be sent to the committee for review, as would project proposals.

Leadership of the VDC itself is stable. Mr. Chowdhury, Chairman of Kulkurmai's Village Development Committee, spoke about the changes that have taken place in the past ten years. In addition to the concrete benefits identified (establishment of infrastructure base; education, health and family planning services; involvement in income-generating projects; and a revolving Village Development Fund of their own) he stressed the changing attitude of villagers. Before, the village was splintered and there was little, if any, inter-group/faction dialogue. Today, the VDC is composed of all socio-economic and occupational groups, and they sit together to discuss needs/problems, and plan projects. Outcast groups (such as fishermen) have been brought into the mainstream, participating in and benefiting from Save the Children's program, a significant aspect of the development process.

Financially speaking, Kulkurmai's revolving development fund presently stands at \$2,865. The loan repayment rate for mature loans is 81%, as compared with a 28% average in the other areas. This is an encouraging sign that the villagers take their collective responsibility seriously. Service charges on productivity projects will be one means of sustaining this fund; other possibilities include investing in fish cultivation, dairy cows and rice processing.

In short, SCF will continue to have a presence in Kulkurmai after phase-over, even though direct funding would be terminated. Looking back, the F.O. feels that phase-over should be addressed in the initial stages of program development, and not left until "the last minute". One obvious concern in the Bangladesh context is whether a community has the capacity to maintain a well-balanced and equitable program on its own. SCF feels that the process evaluation and Thana Advisory Committee are two important mechanisms in this regard. The next step is phase-over itself.

III. LESSONS LEARNED AND FUTURE CHALLENGES

As a result of the stable leadership within the Field Office, the past two years have evidenced a change of direction in many ways. Staff have been able to devote time and energy towards improving the management and implementation of SCF's development program at the village and Dhaka office levels. Women's program implementation, information collection and analysis, monitoring, evaluation and village worker health training have been areas of priority attention. Most important, however, has been the constructive analysis of the VDC by all staff as more than just a model or structure. Strengths and weaknesses have been identified, and modifications made in order to include villagers of all socioeconomic backgrounds in the development process. Movement towards decentralization in order to reach the poor and disadvantaged has altered some of the traditional CBIRD structural dimensions that the program began with. The power of the VDC has been contained, the subcommittees have been strengthened, and new field roles have been created for female multi-purpose workers. Although the outcome of these changes remains to be seen, the Field Office is very positive about these essential steps that have been implemented to date.

The Field Office recently completed a planning exercise which resulted in a three-year strategy. One year implementation plans will be developed and targets and objectives established, which will facilitate a sense of direction and focus for staff and community. The major challenges for the coming year have been identified in the first year implementation plan. These include decentralizing the VDC financial system; strengthening village workers through training and follow-up; phasing out of Kulkurmai village; orienting VDCs and field staff; implementing the process evaluation system; targeting poor and landless for involvement in income-generating activities; following up on productivity projects; and developing large productivity projects with technical assistance as necessary. Future challenges include having communities assume responsibility for the social development programs (village staff salaries, medicines) presently assumed by SCF; having the development process continue in an equitable manner after phase over occurs; and involving communities themselves in any future modifications of CBIRD that might be necessary.

The Bangladesh Field Office has proved its ability to learn and to apply the lessons of experience to improve program effectiveness. The monitoring systems indicate that progress has and is being made in terms of program objectives, i.e., reduced birth rates, increased family planning acceptance, increased food production, etc. In many respects the program is in the midst of a transition stage, going from a project orientation (focusing on individual development inputs) to a program orientation (concerned with the overall impact of their development inputs). The original dimensions of CBIRD are not, therefore, seen as rigid ends in themselves, but rather as flexible, adaptable means by which the broader goals of CBIRD can be reached within one particular context.

Sources

- Alam, N. and A. DuVal, "Kulkurmai: A Test Case for Phase-Over"
(Dacca: drafted 1982).
- DuVal, A. and A. Hossain, "Save the Children's Health, Nutrition
and Family Planning Program in Bangladesh" (Dacca: 1982)
- DuVal, A., H. Khan, and P. Forman, "Save the Children's Women's
Program in Bangladesh: (Dacca: 1982)
- Pyle, D., "An Impact Monitoring and Process Evaluation System
for Save the Children (USA) - Bangladesh (Cambridge, MA:
MIT, 1981)
- Pyle, D., "Evaluation of USAID Operational Program Grant to Save
the Children (USA) - Bangladesh (Cambridge, MA: MIT, 1981)

Appendices

1. Procedures for Forming Village Development Committees and Sub-Committees
 - A. Prior to 1979
 - B. 1979 Modifications
 - C. 1982 Modifications
2. Women's Program Flash Cards
3. Women's Program Organizational Chart
4. Impact Monitoring System
 - A. Form M1: Social Development
 - B. Form M2: Agriculture
 - C. Form M3: Education
5. Women's Program Monitoring Form
6. Project Monitoring Forms

Procedures for Forming Village
Development Committees and Sub-Committees

A. Prior to 1979:

1. VDC main body of 15 elected by villagers themselves.
2. These members in turn appoint 27 other villagers for six sectoral sub-committees.
3. The field staff has no say in election/selection of VDC members.
4. VDC main body controlled financial matters and had veto power over project proposals developed by sub-committees.

B. 1979 Modifications:

1. Sub-committees will be formed first and then VDCs. This was a major change from previous practice.
2. There are six sub-committees as before: Agriculture, Landless, Youth, Women, Education, Health. Each sub-committee had seven members, including a Chairman and Secretary.
3. After sub-committees have been formed each of them chose one or two of their members to serve on the VDC, according to the following formula:

Agriculture subcommittee	1	member
Education	"	1 "
Health	"	1 "
Landless	"	2 "
Women	"	2 "
Youth	"	1 "

Total : 8

4. The VDC is composed of these eight sub-committee representatives, plus seven more appointed by the FC and SDC, making a total of 15 members (including Chairman and Secretary).
5. The seven VDC members appointed by the FC and SDC must all be appointed from the subcommittees. Thus the entire VDC membership will be made up of members of different sub-committees.
6. In appointing seven VDC members, the FC and SDC should make their selection on the basis of merit. It's not necessary that they appoint someone from each sub-committee.

Sub-committee formation

1. The FC and SDC have the authority to appoint three persons to each subcommittee. The other four members will be elected according to the former procedure.
2. The Chairman and Secretary of each sub-committee will be elected/selected by the subcommittee members.
3. No one who resides outside the village may be a member of the sub-committee.
4. Each subcommittee member must take his responsibility seriously and must be prepared to devote a fair amount of his time in meeting this responsibility.

VDC formation

1. All 15 members of the VDC will be involved in the selection/election of the Chairman and Secretary.
2. The Secretary and the Chairman must both be able to read and write.
3. Each member of the VDC, including the Chairman and Secretary, must be a resident of the village which the VDC serves and must spend at least 50% of his time in this village.
4. A person who is Chairman or Secretary of a subcommittee cannot also be Chairman or Secretary of the VDC.
5. A person who holds the position of Union Parishad Chairman is not eligible to be an office bearer (Chairman or Secretary) in the VDC at the same time. However, it is permissible for him to be a member of the VDC.

C. 1982 Guidelines for New, Decentralized System of Financial Management for Village Development Committees:

In order that the funds provided by Save the Children (USA) for village development activities may be better utilized the following changes are to be introduced in the financial procedures presently being followed by Village Development Committees. These changes supercede some of the procedures described in the Guidelines for Village Development Committees of 1977.

1. The present centralized system of VDC management is to be changed to a decentralized system. Henceforth, all loan funds will be controlled by VDC Sub-Committees. All other funds will be controlled by the main VDC.
2. The number of Sub-Committees will be reduced from six to four. The four remaining Sub-Committees will be Agriculture,


Landless, Women and Youth. The existing Education Sub-Committee and Health Sub-Committee will be eliminated, and their responsibilities will be transferred to the main VDC. For the time being, until the new system of financial management goes into effect, existing Health and Education Sub-Committee members will continue to be considered as VDC members.

3. Loan funds will be under the control of the four remaining Sub-Committees. Control of funds for non-loan projects which are not included in any of the Sub-Committee sectors, such as education, construction projects, water supply, curative health services, etc., will remain with the main VDC.
4. The procedure for obtaining approval and funding for Sub-Committee loan projects is as follows: 1) prepare project application in duplicate, signed by the Secretary of the Sub-Committee and the Save the Children Field Coordinator (SDC's signature is required in the case of Women's Sub-Committee projects); 2) forward one copy to Save the Children Dacca office for approval, and retain one file copy; 3) after receiving approval from Save the Children Dacca office one copy of the approved project application will be presented to the VDC, with a request for an advance; 4) the VDC will advance the amount requested to the Sub-Committee by check, within the shortest possible time.
5. No control may be exercised by the main VDC over the planning, implementation or disbursement of funds for loan projects. However, information regarding loan projects will be shared between the Sub-Committees, Save the Children Field Staff and the main VDC.
6. Sub-Committees will be responsible for collecting loans as well as issuing them. Help may be taken from the VDC in loan collection, if required. The Sub-Committees and VDCs will have joint responsibility for collecting any loans which are outstanding at the time the new system of financial management is introduced.
7. Separate books of accounts will be maintained for each Sub-Committee. The books which are to be maintained are: Advance Register, Loan Register, and separate Receipts and Payments accounts for each project. If necessary, a separate almirah will be provided in the VDC office for keeping the Sub-Committee account books.
8. Initially, Office Assistants will be responsible for maintaining the Sub-Committee books of accounts. However, Sub-Committee Secretaries will be given training in bookkeeping, and eventually will take over responsibility for maintaining the books of accounts for their respective Sub-Committees.

9. The FC is the main person responsible for seeing that all the elements relating to loan projects are properly coordinated and properly implemented. This responsibility includes all Sub-Committees except the Women's Sub-Committee which is the responsibility of the SDC. The FC's responsibility includes supervision and guidance in preparing project applications, selection of participants, disbursement of funds, maintaining project files and account books, follow-up activities with participants, loan recovery and reporting of expenditures. Although the FC bears the main responsibility for these activities they are to be carried out with the active participation of the Office Assistant, Sub-Committee members -- particularly the Sub-Committee Secretary.
10. The non-loan funds controlled by the main VDC will come under one of five categories in the Village Development Fund: 1) Non-Loan projects; 2) VDC Administration; 3) Village Staff Payments; 4) Repairs & Maintenance; 5) Emergency Fund. Information as to the amount of funds available under each of these five categories and guidelines for their use will be provided by Save the Children. At the time the new financial system is introduced any loan funds in the VDF which are required for existing loan projects will be transferred to the appropriate Sub-Committees. After this, whatever funds are remaining in the VDF will then be divided among the five VDF categories. If more funds are required for any category a project application may be prepared and submitted to Save the Children.
11. It is recommended that ad hoc 'project implementation committees' be formed by the main VDC and the FC to implement the non-loan projects which are under the VDC's control. The membership of these ad hoc committees will be decided by the VDC and the Save the Children Field Staff, project by project. An individual who is outside the VDC may be a member of an ad hoc committee.
12. Instead of interest, an annual 'service charge' which is equivalent to the current interest rate for bank loans will be charged on all loan projects. Loan repayments will go to pay this service charge first. After the service charge is fully paid additional repayment installments will be recorded against the loan itself. As an incentive for early repayment borrowers will be refunded a portion of the service charge they have paid if they repay their loan before the specified time. Refunds will be calculated on a monthly basis (annual service charge).
13. Funds received as service charges on loan projects will be divided between the Sub-Committee which issues the loan and the main VDC. Thirty percent will go to the Sub-Committee and 70% will go to the main VDC. The VDC's portion will be divided among the five categories in the VDF, and will be used to pay for service costs and for non-loan development projects which

benefit the community as a whole. How the VDC's share is divided will be decided by the main VDC and the FC, with the approval of SCF Dacca office. In the case of the Sub-Committees' share, the service charges will be added to their loan funds.

14. Service charges received by the Sub-Committees and the main VDC will be shown in their respective books of accounts, in such a way that they can be clearly identified.
15. Although financial responsibility will be divided between Sub-Committees and the main VDC under the new system, the number of bank accounts will remain the same as before. Whatever funds are required by Sub-Committees for loan projects will be withdrawn from the bank by the main VDC. The difference is that the funds controlled by each Sub-Committee will be clearly identified, and separate books of accounts will be maintained for each Sub-Committee. Loans must be repaid to the Office Assistant, as usual. He will issue a receipt to the loanee and deposit the money directly into the Village Development Fund account. The deposit will be recorded in the account books of the Sub-Committee, as well as in the main VDC's account books.
16. It is not necessary that all of the funds for a particular loan project be withdrawn by a Sub-Committee at one time. Funds may be taken in installments in some cases. If this is done the Sub-Committee must submit expense vouchers to the main VDC for the previous installment before another advance can be issued.
17. Sub-Committees are required to submit all project expense vouchers, signed by the Sub-Committee Secretary and the Save the Children Field Coordinator (SDC in the case of the Women's Sub-Committee), to the VDC before the end of each month for inclusion in the VDC's regular monthly financial statement to Save the Children, Dacca.
18. All other instructions contained in the 1977 Guidelines for VDCs, except those which are affected by the new, decentralized financial system, remain in force. The new system will be introduced early in FY 1982-83, as soon as the necessary preparatory steps have been taken.








WOMEN'S PROGRAM ORGANIZATIONAL CHART (3 OPERATING AREAS)

Chief, Program Section

Women's Program Officer



TOTAL SUPPORT STAFF: 6 SDCs, 13 CPs, 35 PDWs

TOTAL SUPPORT COST (SALARY, TRANSPORT)
PER CAPITA: Tk. 8.8

IMPACT MONITORING FORM

(AGRICULTURE)

VILLAGE:

IMPACT AREA:

CROP	ACRES PLANTED	AVERAGE YIELD PER ACRE OF PROJECT	PER ACRE THANA FIGURES	NUMBER OF PARTICIPATING FARMERS OWNING:				CULTIVATION LOAN FOR:						
				LESS THAN 50 DECIMALS	%	50-150 DECIMALS	%	OVER 150 DECIMALS	%	TOTAL	IRRIG.	FERT.	OTHER*	TOTAL

Country:

FC:
DATE OF SUBMISSION:

15/2

SAVE THE CHILDREN (USA)

IMPACT MONITORING FORM

(EDUCATION)

VILLAGE:

FISCAL YEAR:

IMPACT AREA:

PARA	- PRIMARY SCHOOL -			- SECONDARY SCHOOL -		
	TOTAL NUMBER 6-12 YEAR OLDS	NO. ATTENDING PRIMARY SCHOOL	%	TOTAL NUMBER 13-18 YEAR OLDS	NO. ATTENDING SECONDARY SCHOOL	%

132

FC:

DATE OF SUBMISSION:

**WOMEN'S PROGRAM ACTIVITY
MONITORING FORM**

Appendix 5

VILLAGE : _____
 PARA : _____
 MONTH : _____

DATE OF SUBMISSION : _____
 BY SDC : _____
 CP : _____

OBJECTIVE	ACTIVITY	QUANTIFICATION
1. INCREASE PARTICIPATION	Khana visits Informal Group meetings a) Introducing SCF's Program b) Preparation for Group formation	# Khana # meetings # meetings
2. INCREASE MOBILITY	POW Bari to Para visits Weekly meetings of Staff (village level) Monthly meetings of Staff (Impact Area level) Para-based meetings Training Individuals seeking first aid or project involvement Visits outside the village to the Bank	# POW # women attending # women attending # meetings # meetings (# participants) # women # women
3. FACILITATE FREEDOM FROM DRUDGERY	Pump site selection	# sites
4. INCREASE FOOD PRODUCTION & PROCESSING (CONTRIBUTING TOWARDS VILLAGE SELF-SUFFICIENCY)	Vegetable gardens Fruit production	# gardens # tons
5. INCREASE INCOME-GENERATING ACTIVITIES	Cow raising Goat raising Fish cultivation Small Fish Business Mustard Processing Rice husking Dal/Pulse processing Puffed rice Pounded rice Rice cultivation Hoarding/commodity Brokers Sewing	# projects # participants # projects # participants

OBJECTIVE	ACTIVITY	QUANTIFICATION
5. (CONTINUED)	Spinning Net-Making Mat-Making Paper-Packet Making Knitting Pottery Rope-Making Small Business	# projects # participants # projects # participants
6. GROUP FORMATION	Savings Groups Teenage Groups	Group No. # Members 1. 2. etc. 1. 2. etc.
7. DEVELOP LEADERSHIP AMONG WOMEN	PDW CP (if from that para) Group Leaders Group Sub-Committee, members Volunteers (related to activities)	
8. FOCUS/IMPACT ON THE UNDER-FIVE CHILD	Nutrition/Cooking Demonstration Identifying "at-risk" children Play School	# Demonstrations # Children # Schools/ # Children
9. HEALTH/NUTRITION/FAMILY PLANNING	Identifying Pregnant Women Identifying Nursing Mothers Identifying Fertile Women Identifying Birth Attendants Distributing Family Planning Supplies Accompanying women for Ligation Administering First Aid Emergency Health Assistance Demonstrating Oral Rehydration Disaster Relief Health Education Meetings Identifying families for latrines Collecting money for latrine program	# Women # Women # Women # Attendants # supplies # women # cases # cases # demonstrations # cases # Meetings # Families # Families

YOUTH FOR DEVELOPMENT (Y.D.C.)

प्रकल्प संहिता

वर्षीकरण
Fiscal Year:

प्रभाव क्षेत्र
Impact Area:

वर्षीकरण
V.D.C.

प्रकल्प क्रमांक
Project Number:

प्रकल्प नाव
Project Name:

সেভ দি চিলড্রেন (ইউ এস এ)
SAVE THE CHILDREN (USA)

FORM-1/A

প্রকল্প বাস্তবায়ন বিষয়ক ট্যাবল
PROJECT MONITORING FORM

অনুমোদিত বাজেট : মোট _____ টাকা (সামাজিক উন্নয়ন/সামগ্রিক কাঠামো)
Approved Budget Total : Tk. _____ (SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT/INFRASTRUCTURE)

এস সি এফ : _____ টাকা। গ্রাম তহবিল : _____ টাকা। অন্যান্য : _____ টাকা
SCF : Tk. _____ VDF : Tk. _____ Other : Tk. _____

নিষেধের সহযোগিতা : শ্রম _____ সহায়ক _____ নগদ অর্থ : _____ টাকা
Self-help : Labor _____ Material _____ Cash : Tk. _____

উপকৃতের সংখ্যা : _____
Number of Beneficiaries : _____
সামাজিক শ্রেণী : _____
Socio-Economic Class : _____
প্রকল্পের কাজ আরম্ভের তারিখ : _____
Date Project Began : _____

মাস Month	পরিকল্পিত কার্যক্রম Activities Planned	সম্পাদিত কাজ Activities Carried Out	ব্যয় EXPENSES			নিষেধের সহযোগিতা SELF-HELP			মন্তব্য REMARKS
			এস সি এফ SCF	ডি ডি এফ VDF	অন্যান্য Other	শ্রম (ঘণ্টা) Labor (hrs)	সহায়ক (টাকা) Materials (Tk)	নগদ অর্থ Cash	
জুলাই July									
আগস্ট August									
সেপ্টেম্বর September									
		মোট Subtotal							
		অম Balance							
অক্টোবর October									
নভেম্বর November									
ডিসেম্বর December									
		মোট Subtotal							
		অম Balance							
জানুয়ারী January									
ফেব্রুয়ারী February									

৩৮

সেভ দি চিলড্রেন (ইউ এস এ)
SAVE THE CHILDREN (USA)

FORM I/B

অনুমোদিত বাজেট : মোট _____ টাকা।
Approved Budget Total : Tk.

এস সি এফ : _____ টাকা।
SCF Tk.

গ্রাম ভব্বিল _____ টাকা।
VDF : Tk.

অন্যান্য : _____ টাকা।
Other : Tk.

প্রকল্প বাস্তবায়ন বিষয়ক তথ্যাদি
PROJECT MONITORING FORM

(উৎপাদন-সম্পর্কিত)
(PRODUCTIVITY)

পরিশোধের পদ্ধতি : সাপ্তাহিক / মাসিক / ফসল কাটার পর / অন্যান্য
Method of Repayment : Weekly/Monthly/Post-Harvest/Other

পরিশোধের মাধ্যম : নগদ টাকা / ধন্য
Repayment in : Cash / Kind

অংশগ্রহণকারীর সংখ্যা : _____
Number of Participants :

আর্থ-সামাজিক শ্রেণী : _____
Socio-Economic Class :

সুদের হার : _____ সুদ : _____ টাকা।
Rate of Interest : Tk.

মোট পরিশোধ্য অর্থ : _____ টাকা।
Total Amount to be Repaid : Tk.

মাস MONTH	বার EXPENSES			পরিশোধ লক্ষ্যমাত্রা Target Repayment	কৃত আদায়ের পরিমাণ Actual Repayment		এ-পর্বত মোট কৃত আদায়ের অংক Cumulative Repayment	বকেয়া কৃত Loan Outstanding	কৃত পরিশোধে বার্ষিক ব্যক্তির সংখ্যা Number of Defaulters	মন্তব্য REMARKS
	এ সি এফ SCF	ভি ডি এফ VDF	অন্যান্য OTHER		মূল Capital	সুদ Interest				
জুলাই July										
আগস্ট August										
সেপ্টেম্বর September										
অক্টোবর October										
নভেম্বর November										
ডিসেম্বর December										
জানুয়ারী January										
ফেব্রুয়ারী February										
মার্চ March										
এপ্রিল April										
মে May										
জুন June										
মোট TOTALS										

সেভ দি চিলড্রেন (ইউ এস এ)
SAVE THE CHILDREN (USA)

FORM-II

প্রকল্পে অংশগ্রহণকারীদের সম্পর্কে তথ্যাদি
PROJECT PARTICIPANT INFORMATION

ক্রমিক সংখ্যা Sl.No.	অংশগ্রহণকারীর নাম Participant	পিতা/স্বামীর নাম Father/Husband	পাড়ার Para	পরিবার নং Family No.	পরিবারের নির্ভরশীল সদস্য সংখ্যা No. of Family members Supporting	আর্থ- সামাজিক শ্রেণী Socio-Economic Class	পরিশোধ্য অর্থ Amount to be Repaid		ঋণ আদায় REPAYMENT												মোট Total	
							মূল Capital	অর্থ Interest	জুলাই July	আগস্ট August	সেপ্টেম্বর Sept.	অক্টোবর Oct.	নভেম্বর Nov.	ডিসেম্বর Dec.	জানুয়ারী Jan.	ফেব্রুয়ারী Feb.	মার্চ March	এপ্রিল April	মে May	জুন June		
১																						
২																						
৩																						
৪																						
৫																						
৬																						
৭																						
৮																						
৯																						
১০																						
১১																						
১২																						
১৩																						
১৪																						
১৫																						
১৬																						
TOTALS									Per Month	প্রতি মাসে ঋণ আদায়												
									Cumulative	ধারাবাহিক মোট ঋণ আদায়												

সেভ দি চিলড্রেন (ইউ এস এ)
SAVE THE CHILDREN (USA)

FORM IV

নোট কার্ড
NOTE CARD

ক্রমিক নং Sl. No.	পরিদর্শক Person Visiting	পদ Position	তারিখ Date	পর্যবেক্ষণ Observations

OBSERVATIONS AND
LESSONS LEARNED

Observations and Lessons Learned from the Community Based Integrated Development Programs

The four case studies presented here, together with observations in other field programs, clearly indicate that the regional and field office teams in the Asia/Pacific Region do not see CBIRD as a "fixed model" to be transferred in a packaged form to different social, economic and cultural contexts around the world. It is instead seen as a loose framework consisting of several concepts and ideas about community structures and programming procedures which are suggested as practical guidelines for improved results in "community based" and "integrated" community development.

The four case studies represent the evolution of the CBIRD methodology in the Asia/Pacific Region. The Bangladesh report represents the approach used in the "older programs" initiated in the mid-70's when the CBIRD methodology was first introduced. The other three programs in Sri Lanka, Tuvalu and Nepal were launched in 1979 and 1980, and they represent the "new generation" of programs in the region.

Our observations in Bangladesh and Indonesia (Aceh), for example, indicate that the field office teams were strongly committed to the "CBIRD model" and its implementation. With this approach, the staff established Village Development Committees, appointed field coordinators and seemed to give a great deal of responsibility to the committees and field coordinators in planning and implementing projects, and managing funds. Very little information was gathered on local communities, their social, economic life, or development needs. Projects were planned and implemented each year but the questions of needs assessment and priorities, broad based community participation, organizational development and leadership development, community education, skills training, technical assistance and program support to field coordinators did not receive as much critical attention in the early stages of these programs.

The newer programs on the other hand have made a greater attempt at adaptation of the CBIRD concepts to local contexts. At times they have taken the liberty of "deviating" from the "norms" and exploring new ways of solving problems according to local conditions and needs. The original CBIRD framework which concentrated more heavily on rural communities has recently been extended to urban and island communities. These trends have raised new questions about the evolution of the CBIRD methodology and the styles of programming, and some people have wondered if there is such a thing as a common CBIRD framework after all.

In an attempt to stimulate a dialogue on some of these ideas and program developments, the following summarizes some of the lessons learned and observations made in Asia/Pacific field programs.

a. Community Committee

The CBIRD framework originally referred to a multi-village, subdistrict level community committee structure as one of the essential components of the methodology. The committee was seen as the central body performing

the important functions of planning, decision making, leadership, management and monitoring of funds including community revolving funds.

In the early years, therefore, many of the field office teams undertook the responsibility of establishing multi-village community committees as the first step in the development process. Once the structure was in place, the responsibilities for planning and implementing projects, managing project funds and local bank accounts were left to the community committees.

While some committees have worked more efficiently and effectively than others, the cumulative experience and several evaluation reports have shown that the community committee structure at the multi-village, subdistrict level tends to encourage participation of the elite; often tends to concentrate efforts on central villages; cannot truly encourage broad based community participation; and the poorer sections of the community do not necessarily receive project benefits nor do they participate actively in the community development process. (See report on Bangladesh.)

Recognizing these limitations, many of the program teams have attempted a further "decentralization" of the committee structure. To ensure broad based participation, the team in Bangladesh, for example, has encouraged subcommittees of women and subcommittees for sectoral programs, para level community workers and their training for outreach services, and financial decentralization. The Indonesian team in Aceh finds the Mukim based programming in Lam Teuba to be more functional as compared to the Kecamatan level community committee in Tangse; and "working subcommittees" and village level committees are seen as more successful. The Nepal team observes that community organization has a better chance of success at the ward or individual village level as compared to the multi-village "Panchayat" level for Daurali Panchayat as a whole. In a two-pronged approach, the ward level subcommittee coordinates local activities whereas the Panchayat Development Committee is used as a review committee to approve projects, to resolve problems, etc.

While the Tuvalu program continues to work toward strengthening the Island Councils, the women's subcommittees have been encouraged to undertake special projects. The program in Kiribati has been designed in such a way that it will begin to work closely with women's groups, youth groups and individual village groups before it begins to move toward the multi-village island community structures and large scale island projects. In the small urban community of Kirillapone in Sri Lanka, the use of special sub-groups has led to more successful community mobilization. and in the new program in Wanathamulla - the larger urban shanty in Colombo - the neighborhood unit is recognized as a more effective means to reach the shanty families before covering the entire shanty in a phased manner.

As the field office teams concerned began to emphasize broad based community participation and to measure program impacts on local families, each team has, independently, moved closer to the multi-family, single neighborhood, individual village unit although multi-village units have not been discarded. What is emerging is a process of decentralization and

a multi-tier structure at the village and multi-village levels. Looking at the development activities from the perspective of the individual villager, islander or shanty dweller, this decentralized approach seems to make greater sense as it is likely to bring the concept of community participation to the individual and his/her family in a truly "grass roots" manner.

The regional team sees a great variation among the field programs in dealing with existing, traditional community organizations. We have an example in Tuvalu where the structure of the Island Council, recognized by the Government as the island level representative committee, is used as the focal point of the program. In Nepal and the Province of Aceh in Indonesia, for example, the existing structures of the Panchayat and the LKMD (respectively) have not been used due to possible political implications or questions about their effectiveness, but instead separate community committees have been established to work on project activities. The settings in Bangladesh and in Colombo, Sri Lanka, did not seem to offer traditional committee structures and the field office teams chose to encourage the establishment of community committees for Save the Children programs. These varying strategies and their implications need to be examined further before conclusive comments can be made.

b. Community Leadership

Community leadership along with the community committee structures has shown some common patterns in diverse program settings around the region. Strong leadership at the multi-village level has often contributed to the rapid pace of community acceptance of the Agency's program as well as project implementation. Corrupt, partisan leadership on the other hand has created problems of skewed distribution of project benefits and occasional mis-use of funds which requires a great deal of correctional effort on the part of the community and the field office staff.

As programs mature, field office teams and the communities recognize the importance of developing leadership to correspond with increased organization at the neighborhood, village, and subcommittee levels. Factors such as broad based community participation, training of community members and leaders in organization, planning and management; regular elections; and continuing program support from the field office staff at the grass roots level all seem to help strengthen local leadership.

c. Women as Participants in Community Development

In widely diverse cultural settings in Asia and the Pacific, women emerge as active and important participants in community development. The Sri Lankan team recognizes women's groups as "the most effective agents for change" and gives a high priority to women's groups. The Bangladesh program has emphasized women's activities as a major challenge in the traditional Islamic communities. The women's subcommittees have shown a tremendous potential for community organization, income generating activities, loans and cooperatives as well as social development in a style that suits their traditional roles and special conditions. The

Tuvaluan women have recently emerged as a special force at the national level; the National Crafts Centre was completed due to their initiative and organization as well as their skills in crafts; and the Government of Tuvalu now plans to recruit a Women in Development Officer at the national level to work with women's groups and with female community workers on all islands. The Acehnese team in Indonesia sees women as a "primary group of participants who are most responsive to community activities". The Nepal team views women's role as very important in the family's well being and plans to recruit a women's program officer - a Nepali woman - who could help extend women's activities to income generation, training in animal husbandry and agriculture as well as child care, health, nutrition and education.

The women's program activities indicate a strong trend toward organizational and project development in economic and social sectors, with the active involvement of women.

d. Broad Based Community Participation and Self-Help

In a retrospective analysis, some of the older programs appear to have emphasized "projects" without examining their cumulative impact on the community's well being or on the process of community participation. This dilemma of project vs. process orientation is one of the most difficult and complex issues for a community development agency to deal with.

On the one hand, the community people are generally anxious to see some project activity and some tangible benefits after waiting for months during the Agency's negotiations and program design. The program teams, on the other hand, see a high degree of dependence among local people on outside agencies, including their own governments, and want to emphasize the principle of self-help through community training, thereby changing their high expectations. The communities tend to make short term demands on free or subsidized services and the field office teams are often faced with the dilemma of showing quick project results for the sake of the Agency's image and to satisfy funding agencies while keeping in mind the long term process of community self-help.

The field office teams have developed different strategies in these recent experiments. Some of the teams have attempted to tap local traditions in appealing to communities to make their contributions of labor such as the "shramadana" tradition in Sri Lanka. Many of the teams have helped local communities to identify their own priority needs to win their confidence as well as community participation. The water catchment and storage project in Tuvalu became a major successful activity because it addressed a felt need and allowed people to see that they were capable of carrying it out; it used local materials and appropriate construction techniques. The Bangladesh team has learned to shift its attention from the older "project orientation" to the process of community organization, leadership, use of local village workers, and involvement of local women, youth, farmers, landless laborers as well as poorer families.

In the two older programs in Bangladesh and Aceh, the field office teams seemed to feel in the early stages that the CBIRD framework

"required"/dictated that projects be planned and funds be managed by the committees in the interest of "community based" programming. The newer programs, on the other hand, while recognizing the importance of local organization and the need to transfer skills, have seen this as a long term goal. The Sri Lankan team, for example, made deliberate attempts to strengthen committee members' skills before increasing responsibility.

This has added a greater degree of emphasis on community training, program support from the field office staff, technical assistance, program monitoring and evaluation.

This shift naturally has led to internal debate regarding what is "community based" programming and what is "top down" programming. It is believed that the process of experimentation and the search for answers generated through this series of case studies is likely to lead to an improved understanding of the "optimum" level of intervention from outside to achieve the long term goals of community participation and self-help.

e. Institutional Linkages

In the process of program maturation, Save the Children teams in the field have increased their efforts in establishing and maintaining linkages with local, regional and national level government agencies as well as other private, international or multilateral agencies.

Even in cases such as Bangladesh and Nepal where the process of working with government agencies tends to be quite complex and often difficult, the field office teams have consistently explored all possible means of institutional linkages. In Sri Lanka, the Prime Minister's office, the Urban Development Authority, the Ministry of Housing, Construction and Local Government, the Ministry of Health have shown a great deal of interest and support to Save the Children's shanty development program. In Tuvalu the Agency's program has been incorporated into the Government's own program of island development in the most unusual manner.

Many of the programs have also undertaken collaborative activities with technical assistance agencies or funding agencies such as the Intermediate Technology Development Group, London; the Tarawa Technical Institute in Kiribati; the Industrial Development Board in Colombo, Sri Lanka; the Krishi Bank in Bangladesh; and in Tuvalu the Peace Corps and the European Economic Community. While the UN Agencies and the World Bank have shown an interest in Save the Children's programs, UNICEF has offered a greater degree of support, and some interesting examples of collaboration have been seen in Bangladesh and Korea.

The institutional linkages with government agencies have generally helped avoid duplication of effort and have created a triangular pattern of relationships among local communities, governments and Save the Children. In strengthening access to government services for isolated communities, the programs have increased the chances for self-sustaining development while creating the initial groundwork for the Agency's transfer of responsibility to local communities.

f. Multi-Sector Project Activities

Early programs in the region showed a tendency to isolate health activities from family planning projects or nutrition projects from agriculture and food production. Village workers in Bangladesh, for example, were trained to handle health/nutrition activities while others were trained for family planning work. In a multi-purpose program strategy introduced recently in Bangladesh, village workers are beginning to consolidate health, nutrition, family planning and women's programs in a meaningful way. Newer programs such as Sri Lanka and Nepal have introduced integrated health and social development programs from the beginning.

The multi-sectoral approach has generally been quite successful in the area of health/nutrition. In Indonesia, for example, there is an on-going tofu production project run by women and closely integrated with child health/nutrition and soybean production.

Some useful experiments have also been conducted in income generating activities, credits, cooperatives and skills training and special attention is being given to the procedures which could help develop economic activities to strengthen the community's resource base with which they could maintain social development projects including primary health care on a self-sustaining basis. But it is recognized that this area of integrated, multi-sector projects shows great potential for maximizing program impact and self-sufficiency in the next phase of program development.

Conclusion and Summary

On the basis of these analytical reports we make the following observations:

Our field office teams tend to be successful in implementing community development programs if they:

- follow a decentralized approach to community development and work with family/neighborhood/village units where participation can be meaningful for local people;
- take the community's felt needs as a main factor in planning development activities, and motivate community people to participate in the development process;
- emphasize an educational/training approach to provide opportunities for community groups to learn by doing, as well as to develop the skills and knowledge required for participation in development;
- help mobilize local human and material resources to supplement government resources;
- bring appropriate technical assistance, resources, and management support to local communities at appropriate stages of program development;
- help develop local leadership and local organizations for participatory development;

- develop access and links between local community and government/non-government services, facilities, opportunities and resources;
- transfer skills and hand over development responsibilities to local groups on an increasing scale over time and at the community's own pace;
- encourage women's involvement in the development process within the local cultural framework both at the community level and also at the field office level;
- make a deliberate attempt to train community workers for outreach services to children and families in the social development sector;
- encourage communities to cover costs for social development services by increasing family incomes through income-generating activities and increasing the levels of community revolving funds;
- encourage the trainer, facilitator aspect of the field coordinator's role, with heavy emphasis on on-the-job training and program support from the field office staff;
- encourage a triangular relationship for the community, the government and Save the Children through a pooling of resources.

The four field programs represented here have emerged, through their own analyses, with many things in common and have followed similar directions, but each one has acquired an individual style through emphasizing the adaptation of CBIRD to locally specific contexts.