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THE CARIBBEAN

*Antigua & Barbuda:  
Yesterday, Today &  
Tomorrow*



ANTIGUA  
&  
BARBUDA



## **PRB OCCASIONAL SERIES: THE CARIBBEAN**

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The data used in the preparation of the population estimates and projections were selected by the author. Their use in no way suggests their acceptance as official demographic statistics by the Governments of the Eastern Caribbean.

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# ***Antigua & Barbuda: Yesterday, Today & Tomorrow***

**by Leon F. Bouvier  
February 1984**

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# Antigua & Barbuda: Yesterday, Today & Tomorrow

## Antigua & Barbuda Yesterday

The first post-emancipation census in Antigua and Barbuda was taken in 1844, at which time 36,687 people were enumerated, including 509 living in Barbuda. Little change occurred between 1844 and the turn of the century. Indeed, the actual population of the two islands fell to 34,971 by the time of the 1901 Census (see Table 1).

This no-growth pattern noted in many of the East Caribbean British colonies undoubtedly reflected both a low rate of natural increase and a high rate of emigration. Fertility was high, but so was mortality. Crude birth rates of 45 per 1,000 population and crude death rates of 25 or even 30 per 1,000 were no doubt quite common. Additionally, net outmigration from the two islands must have been considerable, relatively speaking.

Between 1901 and 1921, Antigua and Barbuda continued to lose population. By the latter date, the total counted in the two

Table 1: Population of  
Antigua and Barbuda,  
1844-1946

Year	Antigua	Barbuda	Total
1844	36,178	509	36,687
1851	37,136	629	37,765
1861	36,412	713	37,125
1871	34,344	813	35,157
1881	34,321	643	34,964
1891	36,239	580	36,819
1901	34,196	775	34,971
1911	31,398	871	32,269
1921	28,864	903	29,767
1946	40,778	979	41,757

islands was 29,767—a decline of 5,000 since 1901. Such patterns of population loss were not uncommon in the region. With continued high levels of fertility and mortality, emigration too must have remained very high. It is quite likely that mortality, in particular, was high during the 1918-20 worldwide influenza epidemic.

During this same period, the Panama Canal was built and demands for Caribbean labour were substantial. Movements to the larger Caribbean islands must have remained high and the construction of the Bermuda dockyards, beginning in 1900, was a particularly important stimulus for job-seekers who left Antigua and Barbuda.

A dramatic change in population growth patterns took place after 1921. By the time of the 1946 census, the population of Antigua and Barbuda had grown to 41,757. This reflected an average annual rate of growth of 1.4 percent—by far the highest ever recorded up to that point in the nation's history.

How can such a demographic development be explained? Apparently both fertility and mortality rates fell over the 25-year period, with the latter falling more than the former. According to official statistics, births totaled 29,617 and deaths 18,441 for the total period. At the start of this 25 years, in 1921, it is assumed that these rates were high, with crude birth rates being around 40 and crude death rates around 20. By 1946, the birth rate was down to 37.0 and the death rate was 14.9 per 1,000.

At the same time, net international migration was positive, perhaps for the only time in the recorded demographic history of the nation. If the 1921 and 1946 censuses were comparatively comprehensive, net immigration amounted to 814 over the entire 25 years. This very small number sup-

*Table 2: Population of Antigua and Barbuda and Rates of Birth, Death, and Natural Increase, 1946-70*

Year	Population*	Crude Birth Rate	Crude Death Rate	Natural Increase
	(number)	(per 1,000 population)		(percent)
1946	41,760	37.0	14.9	2.2
1950	46,250	36.2	11.8	2.4
1955	51,530	36.9	10.1	2.7
1960	54,210	34.6	9.9	2.5
1970	64,794	26.0	7.5	1.8

\*1946, 1960, and 1970 are census counts. 1950 and 1955 are end-of-year estimates developed by Roberts and Harewood

ports the conclusion that net migration in fact closely approximated zero.

Such an unexpected turn of events, particularly with reference to migration, begs an explanation. Natural-born Antiguans and Barbudans perhaps returned to the islands after having lived elsewhere, such as in Panama and Bermuda; there may have been some movement to Antigua and Barbuda from neighbouring islands; finally, the extent of emigration undoubtedly dropped over that quarter-century.

As for mortality, the era was marked by substantial declines in most developing regions, not only in the Caribbean. This resulted from new cures, such as penicillin for infectious diseases, which led to meaningful declines in deaths attributable to, for example, influenza and pneumonia.

For the period 1946-60, the seminal work by Caribbean demographers George Roberts and Jack Harewood\* is invaluable; they developed not only population estimates by single year but rates of fertility, mortality, and migration as well (see Table 2).

Between 1946 and 1960, Antigua and Barbuda's population grew at an average annual rate of 1.9 percent. By 1960, it had

reached 54,210. The period was marked by substantial declines in mortality and slight drops in fertility. The crude death rate was 14.9 in 1946 but only 9.9 in 1960. The drop in mortality was quite remarkable. By 1960, life expectancy approached 60 years at birth—not too different from many developed nations at that time.

The crude birth rate changed during these 14 years from 37.0 to 34.6. In 1946, women who had completed their reproductive years had had, on average, 4.6 live births. This rate, the total fertility rate (TFR), fell somewhat in this period, to perhaps 4.0 by 1960.

Net emigration is estimated to have been about 3,500 between 1946 and 1960, an average of 250 per year. However, most people who left from the nation did so between 1955 and 1960, when net emigration approached 3,000. Thus, net emigration was negligible between 1946 and 1955 but increased thereafter. These movements, it can be assumed, were principally toward the United Kingdom, although a few people undoubtedly migrated to other Caribbean countries.

The 1.9 percent average annual rate of growth noted between 1946 and 1960 was maintained over the following decade; according to the 1970 census, 64,794 persons lived in Antigua and Barbuda. The demographic patterns during this decade appear to have followed those noted in the previous ten years. Fertility kept falling,

\*G.H. Roberts and Jack Harewood, *Estimates of Intercensal Population by Age and Sex and Revised Vital Rates for British Caribbean Countries, 1946-1960* (University of West Indies, 1964).

from 34.6 in 1960 to about 26.0 per 1,000 in 1970. Similarly, the crude death rate fell from 9.9 to around 7.5.

Thus natural increase remained quite high and overall population growth was only moderated by some net emigration. However, such movements were far less dramatic than those noted for other East Caribbean countries.

In sum, growth in Antigua and Barbuda was non-existent between 1844 and 1921. Indeed, the population in the latter year was lower than 80 years earlier. Between 1921 and 1970, however, the population more than doubled numerically—the result of fairly high levels of natural increase coupled with relatively low net emigration.

## *Antigua & Barbuda Today*

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No census has been taken in Antigua and Barbuda since 1970. As a result it is extremely difficult to arrive at any definitive statements about the nation's population in 1980. This report relies on both the 1970 census and the United Nations' 1980 estimate to arrive at a base population for 1980. This, in turn, allows projections to be developed of the islands' future population size and distribution.

According to the census of April 7, 1970, a total of 64,794 persons lived in Antigua (including about 1,000 on Barbuda). The U.N. estimated the population in mid-1980 was 75,200. Failing to find any evidence to the contrary, this is assumed to be the best estimate of the population as of that date. A projection of this estimate agrees with the government's figure as of July 1, 1983—77,226. These figures, over both 10 and 13 years, yield an annual average growth rate of 1.5 percent.

Between April 7, 1970, and July 1, 1980, there were about 14,000 births and 4,000 deaths in Antigua and Barbuda. This suggests that the 75,200 total developed by the U.N. reflects natural increase with vir-

tually no net gain or loss through migration. Indeed, all informal discussions suggest that net emigration in the 1970's was relatively low in Antigua and Barbuda, although it was hardly zero. Nevertheless the U.N. estimate must be relied upon, as there is no other reliable source of information.

Fertility appears to have been quite low in Antigua and Barbuda during the last decade, although it is difficult to determine rates, given the lack of information on the total population. For example, in 1972 a total of 1,552 births were registered; therefore if indeed the total population that year was 68,000 (as the U.N. estimated), the crude birth rate then was 22.8 per 1,000. By 1977, using similar calculations, the rate was 20.4.

If the estimated total population has been exaggerated because of the failure to consider net emigration, then the crude rates were somewhat higher than indicated here. Nevertheless, it does seem quite clear that, irrespective of the size of the population, fertility was low and in fact fell from about 26.0 in 1970 to about 17.0 in 1980. The total fertility rate in 1980 has been estimated as 2.4 live births per woman, somewhat above the level needed to replace the population over the long run without migration.

Mortality, too, was reduced during the 1970s. Life expectancy in 1970 was around 62; by 1980 it appears to have been about 65 years at birth. The crude death rate also fell slightly—from 7.5 to 6.0 per 1,000 by 1980. Again, of course, these rates could vary somewhat depending on the true size of the overall population. Infant mortality also dropped in recent years—from about 40 per 1,000 live births in 1970 to 32 in 1980.

As noted above, net migration into and out of Antigua and Barbuda over the past decade may have been close to zero. A reported 5,373 residents of Antigua and Barbuda emigrated to the United States during the 1970s (see Table 3) and perhaps another 500 moved to Canada. On the other hand, the nation has become home to immigrants from neighbouring is-

*Table 3: Permanent Antigua- and Barbudan-Born Immigrants Admitted to the United States, 1960-79*

Year	Number
1960-64	866
1965-69	1,535
1970-74	1,896
1975	435
1976	529
1977	835
1978	908
1979	770

lands and Guyana. It seems doubtful, however, that enough people entered the nation permanently to compensate for those leaving.

What is the exact annual net migration into or out of Antigua and Barbuda? That cannot be ascertained given the paucity of current information; for this report the U.N. estimated population of 75,200 for 1980 has been accepted, which suggests very little net migration over the decade.

Even without any net migration over the decade, the reduction in fertility as well as the improvements in life expectancy contributed to some changes in the age distribution of the population of Antigua and Barbuda (see Figure 1). In 1970, the median age was about 17 and the proportion of the population under 15 amounted to 44 percent. At the other end of the age spectrum, 5 percent of the population were elderly, that is, 65 or older.

By 1980, the median age was estimated to be 21; the proportion under the age of 15 was thought to be 32 percent and that of the elderly, 6 percent. Overall, then, the population aged slightly. This normally occurs when fertility falls, as it did in Antigua and Barbuda during the 1970s.

Such changes tend to lower the dependency ratio—that is, the number of persons of dependent ages (under 15 and over 64) per persons of active ages

(15-64). In Antigua and Barbuda, this ratio appears to have changed from 96 dependents per active persons in 1970 to 62 in 1980—a remarkable decline in a relatively brief period.

Although changes in percent distribution in various age-groups are important, for policymakers the changing number of people in the respective age categories is perhaps even more relevant. For example, the number of school-age children (5-14) totaled 6,810 in 1980 according to the U.N.; in 1970, there were 18,900 children in that age-group. Again reflecting declining fertility in recent years, the school-age population has declined. On the other hand, the elderly population seems to have grown from 3,270 in 1970 to 4,417 in 1980—an increase of 35 percent in just ten years.

The demographic uncertainties due to the lack of a 1980 census in Antigua and Barbuda mean these statistics must all be interpreted with caution. They are approximations of reality and nothing more. Nevertheless, there seems to be some empirical evidence that fertility is falling and that life expectancy has been increasing in recent years. Net migration remains uncertain but all evidence suggests that it is not as great as that noted in some neighbouring countries, such as St. Kitts/Nevis and Dominica.


The overall rate of growth for the 1970s was still quite high, given the size of the nation and its carrying capacity. As Antigua and Barbuda faces the future, it is clear that population growth cannot continue indefinitely. How such growth can be curtailed is the main theme of the remainder of this report.

## *Antigua & Barbuda Tomorrow*

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It should be made clear that this report does not provide predictions of the future size of Antigua and Barbuda; rather, these are projections that stem from various assumptions about demographic behaviour—fertility, mortality, and migration.

Figure 1: Age-Sex Distribution of Antigua and Barbuda, 1970 and 1980




From these projections it is possible to anticipate what the population would be in the year 2000 or the year 2030, for example, if certain demographic patterns are followed. In that way policymakers will be better able to decide what steps to take, if any are deemed advisable.

**Demographic Assumptions:** Two patterns of fertility behaviour are projected. One extends the present level for the next 50 years. It assumes, that is, that women continue averaging 2.4 live births from now on. The other set assumes that fertility will fall to 2.1 live births per woman by 1990 and remain at that level thereafter. This is the level needed to eventually halt growth in the absence of migration.

Only one set of mortality assumptions is used: that the current life expectancy of 66 years at birth for females and 63 for males will rise linearly to 75 and 71 years, respectively, by 2020 and remain at that level thereafter.

Two patterns of migration are postulated. One assumes no net migration—that is, that as many people will enter the country as leave it. The other model considers the possibility that some net emigration will occur in the future. Under this model, it is assumed that net emigration will amount to 250 per year from 1980 forward to 2030. The age distribution of these emigrants is assumed to be the same as noted for other Caribbean nations.

Figure 2: Population of Antigua and Barbuda, 1980–2030



Based on these various sets of assumptions about fertility, mortality, and migration, three alternative scenarios have been created (see Figure 2; for supporting data, see Appendix Table A):

**Scenario A**—current fertility (2.4) and net migration of zero

**Scenario B**—current fertility (2.4) and net emigration (250 per year)

**Scenario C**—declining fertility (2.1) and net migration of zero.

**Population Projections:** Under Scenario A (a continuation of current fertility and no migration), the population would grow by about 26,000 between 1980 and 2000—an increase of 35 percent in 20 years. In turn, that total of 101,248 would continue to grow to nearly 138,200 by 2030. This represents an annual rate of growth over 50 years of about 0.6 percent.

By 2030, the population would have increased some 63,000—just about the number of people in Antigua and Barbuda in 1970. In 2030, under this scenario, the crude birth rate would be 16.5 and the death rate 10.6, resulting in a natural growth of 0.58 percent per year.

Clearly, such growth cannot long continue. A country as small as Antigua and Barbuda must necessarily set limits on its eventual size. Its carrying capacity is obviously quite constrained. For the purposes of this report it is assumed that an eventual population of 110,000–120,000 is a reasonable goal, by which time zero population growth should be reached.

Short of increasing mortality, an alternative not to be even considered, population growth can be limited in only two ways: through reducing fertility and/or through increasing emigration. Scenarios

B and C illustrate these alternative patterns of demographic behaviour.

Under Scenario B, fertility is assumed to remain at its current approximate level of 2.4 live births per women for the next 50 years while annual net emigration is assumed to total 250 persons. That is to say, 250 more people would leave the nation each year than would enter it. This may well approximate what could indeed transpire in future years. Growth would be substantially lower than under Scenario A. For example, at the turn of the century the population of Antigua and Barbuda would stand at about 94,000 under B, some 7,000 (7 percent) less than under Scenario A. By 2030 the population would top 112,500, at which time growth would cease, to be followed by an approximately stationary period. (Extending these assumptions 20 more years shows that in 2050 the population would be close to 111,900.) Such a pattern of demographic behaviour would meet this report's stated goal—the attainment of zero population growth at about 110,000–120,000.

If such a scenario is deemed appropriate, close monitoring of both fertility and net migration will be required. Maintaining fertility at 2.4 live births per woman is quite reasonable, given the continued and increased acceptance of family planning on the part of young Antiguan and Barbudan couples. The assumption of a low level of net emigration also appears to be quite reasonable. Indeed, it may in fact reflect the current situation, although this is not certain.

Scenario C illustrates another path to follow if zero growth is to be attained in the relatively near future. This assumes no net emigration but that the fertility level will be reduced to 2.1 live births per woman. The TFR of 2.1 has been deliberately selected because that is the level that must be reached if population stabilization is to be attained eventually, assuming no migration. In other words, each couple has, on the average, 2.1 live births. (This, rather than 2.0, is the number needed for eventual replacement because not all women live to have children and because there

are always more male than female births.) Despite replacement-level fertility beginning in 1990 and no migration—in or out—to consider, the population of Antigua and Barbuda would nevertheless continue growing for some time before leveling off.

Future population sizes would be slightly larger under Scenario C than under Scenario B. By the year 2000, the nation's population would be 96,450, and by 2030 it would approach 120,000, after which no further growth would be recorded. Thus even with low fertility, Antigua and Barbuda's population would still increase by about 45,000 (59 percent) before it stopped growing in about 50 years. This somewhat perplexing situation is due to the youthful age distribution of the current population. Because there are a fairly large number of young people today, the number of births would increase until 1995 before falling once again. This is what demographers refer to as "built-in momentum."

Following the demographic behaviour suggested in Scenario C would meet the goals stated above—that is, zero growth around a population of 110,000–120,000. Furthermore it would not require any net emigration. It would, however, necessitate a reduction in fertility to 2.1. Given the fact that the fertility rate in nearby Barbados has already fallen below 2.0, such a development in Antigua and Barbuda is certainly within the realm of possibility.

As both the scenarios above meet the stated goal of ultimate population size, which is more beneficial to the nation—Scenario B or Scenario C? Of course, it is important to bear in mind that these are only models and that reality can never be as exact. More likely, some combination of B and C would be followed and result in the same ultimate zero-growth population. What is particularly important is that the goal of a population of 110,000–120,000 within the relatively near future is not an unreasonable one for Antigua and Barbuda to follow. Constant monitoring of fertility and migration is, of course, necessary.

To better consider the relative merits of

*Table 4: Percent Distribution of Population by Age-Group in Antigua and Barbuda, 1980–2030*

Scenario	1980	1990	2000	2010	2020	2030
<b>Scenario A</b>						
Under 15	32	30	28	25	24	24
15–64	62	64	66	69	67	63
65 or older	6	6	6	6	9	13
<b>Scenario B</b>						
Under 15	32	30	28	24	23	22
15–64	62	64	66	69	67	62
65 or older	6	6	6	7	10	16
<b>Scenario C</b>						
Under 15	32	28	26	23	21	20
15–64	62	66	68	71	69	65
65 or older	6	6	6	6	10	15

the various scenarios, the impact of alternative demographic behaviour on the age distribution of the nation must be examined (see Table 4). Changes in fertility, mortality, or migration that took place in the 1950s and 1960s will affect the age distribution for many decades to come.

Irrespective of scenario, the proportion of elderly in Antigua and Barbuda will increase in future years. Indeed, that proportion will go from an apparent 6 percent in 1980 to between 13 and 16 percent in 2030. To a considerable extent this change will be at the expense of the younger people in the population, who will fall as a proportion of the entire population from 32 percent in 1980 to between 20 and 24 percent in 2030. Interestingly, the so-called active population (that is, those between 15 and 64) will not change much, proportionately speaking. From being 62 percent of the population in 1980, that group will increase to around 70 percent in 2010 before falling once again to approximately its current proportion in 2030.

In sum, Antigua and Barbuda is aging. As noted earlier, this seems to have been the case during the recent decade and it seems bound to continue in the future. Such a situation is typical of nations exhib-

iting low levels of fertility and relatively low levels of migration, whether into or out of the nation.


The small projected change in the population in their active years means the dependency ratio is not expected to fluctuate widely over the next 50 years, though there will be temporary significant variations. Now 62 per 100, the ratio should be around 50 per 100 at the turn of the century and be once again approaching 60 by 2030. Because of relatively low fertility levels over the past ten years and because fertility is projected to remain low, dependency ratios in Antigua and Barbuda are far more favourable than in some other Caribbean nations.

While changing proportions of the population are of interest, as indicated earlier the changing *number* of people in various age-groups may be even more important, particularly for policymakers. Substantial variations in the number of individuals enrolled in school, looking for jobs, and 65 or older will result from changes—past, present, and future—in fertility, mortality, and migration.

**School Enrollment:** Despite being an ever-smaller proportion of the total population, the number of children between the

Figure 3: School-Age Population (5–14) in Antigua and Barbuda, 1980–2030

Population



ages of 5 and 14 (the school-age group) would increase if fertility remains at 2.4 and net migration is zero (Scenario A). In 1980 there were estimated to be 16,809 persons in that age-group in the islands (see Figure 3; for supporting data, see Appendix Table B). That number would grow to 19,265 in 2000 and to nearly 21,500 by 2030 under these assumptions about demographic behaviour.

If, however, either Scenario B or Scenario C more closely approximates the demographic future, then school enrollments would hardly change at all. In both instances the number of children between 5 and 14 would peak at around 17,000 at the turn of the century and then fall ever so slightly to just above 16,000 in 2030—about the same number as in 1980. School enrollments should not, therefore, cause any major problems for the nation at least for the foreseeable future. This will be par-


ticularly true if fertility falls a little or if net emigration increases slightly.

**Labour Force:** For an estimate of the number of persons in the labour force between the ages of 15 and 64, the projected labour force participation rates for the East Caribbean developed by the International Labour Organization were used. The built-in momentum for growth referred to earlier in this report is especially noticeable here. Because of earlier high fertility, the number of persons between 15 and 64 will grow significantly in future years, regardless of scenario (see Figure 4; for supporting data, see Appendix Table C).

Between 1980 and 1990, some 10,000 jobs will have to be created just to maintain the current level of employment. If an unemployment rate of 15 percent is assumed, the number out of work but looking

Figure 4: Labour Force in Antigua and Barbuda, 1980–2030

Labour Force



for a job will grow from 4,400 in 1980 to 5,800 in 1990. Here is a problem that was at least in part demographic in causation but that demands a nondemographic solution. In other words, the large number of entries into the labour force over the next few years reflects the relatively high fertility of 1965–75. As that cohort passes through this crucial stage of life it will prove troublesome for the economic health of the nation.

After the turn of the century, increasingly larger differences in the number of persons in the labour force would develop under the various scenarios. By 2030 the labour force would number nearly 62,000 if fertility is maintained at its present level and there is no net emigration (Scenario A), compared with 29,335 in 1980. With reduced fertility and no net emigration (Scenario C), the number would top 55,000. With continued fertility of 2.4 live births per


woman and net emigration of 250 per year (Scenario B), the labour force would have grown to over 49,600 within 50 years.

From this brief examination of the impact of the various alternative forms of demographic behaviour on the need to create jobs in Antigua and Barbuda it seems that Scenario B is most suitable for the future socioeconomic health of the nation. A small number of emigrants contributes more to lowering the number of persons in the labour force than a reduced level of fertility does. Nevertheless, it is important to remember that regardless of scenario the number of individuals either working or looking for a job will grow substantially in the near future. Such a projection is sure to be correct—these people have already been born.

**The Elderly:** In 1980 the estimated elderly population of Antigua and Barbuda

**Figure 5: Elderly Population (65 or Older) in Antigua and Barbuda, 1980-2030**

**Population**



was 4,418, representing 5.6 percent of the total population. Under all scenarios a massive increase in the number of elderly can be expected over the next half-century (see Figure 5; for supporting data, see Appendix Table D). (The projections of the elderly population are the same for Scenarios A and C, as in both cases there is no migration and fertility levels are irrelevant, for even in 2030 the population 65 or older would have been born prior to 1980.)

Growth will be slow at first, reaching between 5,500 and 6,100 in the year 2000. It is only after 2015 that numbers increase dramatically, to over 11,000 in 2020 and over 18,000 in 2030. Such a sudden increase reflects the high fertility in the islands before 1960. People born then will become 65 after 2020 and their numbers will pose a major problem for the society.

A similar situation exists in many other

East Caribbean nations. The large cohorts born before family planning was widespread and accepted will cause problems as they go through life, culminating in the gerontological growth noted above. Thus policymakers should begin planning for a substantial increase in the number as well as the proportion of elderly in Antigua and Barbuda in about 30 years.

**Conclusion:** Because of the paucity of data for Antigua and Barbuda, due in large part to the failure to hold a national census in 1980, the United Nations estimates must be relied on for the base population estimate in 1980. Furthermore, total fertility rates as well as levels of migration are necessarily tentative in nature for the same reason. Nevertheless there is substantial evidence suggesting that fertility is quite low; life expectancy is fairly high and net emigration is assuredly low. Antigua and Barbuda must soon arrive at a situa-

tion of no further growth in population. A total of 120,000 people seems about as reasonable as possible, given the geographical limitations.

Such a goal can be met if fertility is lowered or if net emigration is maintained,

even at a relatively low level. Irrespective of population size, however, Antigua and Barbuda soon has to face two problems directly related to past demographic behaviour—future needs for jobs and the problems associated with increasing numbers of elderly citizens.

## **Appendices**

*Table A: Current and Projected Population of Antigua and Barbuda, 1980–2030*

Scenario	1980	1990	2000	2010	2020	2030
A	75,200	88,305	101,248	114,166	127,485	138,155
B	75,200	85,315	94,084	101,767	108,912	112,598
C	75,200	85,964	96,450	105,923	114,566	119,678

A: TFR of 2.4, net migration of zero  
 B: TFR of 2.4, net emigration of 250  
 C: TFR of 2.1, net migration of zero

*Table B: Current and Projected School-Age Population (5–14) in Antigua and Barbuda, 1980–2030*

Scenario	1980	1990	2000	2010	2020	2030
A	16,809	16,457	19,265	18,841	20,191	21,447
B	16,809	15,524	17,469	16,000	16,314	16,467
C	16,809	15,335	16,856	16,018	16,038	16,262

*Table C: Current and Projected Labour Force in Antigua and Barbuda, 1980–2030*

Scenario	1980	1990	2000	2010	2020	2030
A	29,335	39,015	42,742	54,981	57,538	61,950
B	29,335	38,057	43,374	48,871	50,401	49,634
C	29,335	39,334	47,335	52,658	55,294	55,058

*Table D: Current and Projected Elderly Population (65 or Older) in Antigua and Barbuda, 1980–2030*

Scenario	1980	1990	2000	2010	2020	2030
A and C	4,418	5,267	5,554	6,165	11,165	18,325
B	4,418	5,653	6,091	6,663	11,454	18,108

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