INSTITUTIONAL OBSTACLES TO EFFECTIVE FORESTRY FOR LOCAL COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT IN ASIA

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1. Purpose

Forestry and development in Asia bring together forest lands, foresters and poor people. Forestry and development only involves forests as they have existed in the past to the extent that they are appropriate means to the ends being sought in the future. The important parts of this puzzle are land, people and professional agencies. The purpose of this paper is to explore the institutional arrangements that relate these components and to show that the relationships that exist are generally mutually destructive: land productivity declines, agencies fail and poor people become increasingly impoverished. As failure deepens, the actors in this drama are brought into sharp conflict with their environment and with each other, and the conflict can escalate from mutual distrust and suspicion to outright fear or violence. The source of the conflict is basic: poor people with one set of objectives and nothing to lose have to confront professional agencies with a different set of objectives and much to prove. As a result of this conflict the capability of the land is depressed, often beyond the point where rehabilitation becomes practical.

The problems that this situation creates are immense but the challenge is immense, as are the potential rewards for progress. Ignorance abounds in all aspects of the problem - ignorance in technology, ignorance in economics, and ignorance in government. What should be done and how? Will it bring a benefit and to whom? What legal, administrative and policy changes can government make to create the conditions necessary for progress? This paper will attempt to discuss issues mainly in this latter area.

An important component of poor performance in forestry development is institutional failuure. Here the word institution refers to the broad set of rules and arrangements that govern individual and collective action and operate to transform policy into action. Institution refers to far more than the agency or organization charged with responsibility for programs or projects. But the agency is critical since it not only operates in the institutional environment that exists, but also creates the institutional framework that governs the behaviour of the members of the agency. How the members of the agency are organized,

2. The Role of Forestry: A Reaffirmation

While it ought to be redundant it is necessary at the outset to reaffirm that the purpose of forestry is to contribute as much as possible to sustainable growth in the welfare of society. Forests serve people; foresters serve society. Society is served to the extent that aggregate measures of welfare are increased and by improvements in the distribution of welfare between groups in society - rural and urban, rich and poor, upland and lowland, tribal and non-tribal, men and women. While there is great satisfaction to be obtained from the sight of a healthy plantation, true satisfaction is derived from the time stream of values contained in the products of the plantation and the utility of those products where it accrues. If foresters serve only forestry, society may not be appropriately served.

One of the principal sources of conflict in contemporary forestry, in countries of both the North and the South, is a basic disagreement on the role of the forest and role of the forester. An oversimplification of a conventional view states that forest lands are reserved for the large-scale scientific cultivation of tree crops as raw materials to industry for the good of the economy. When this albeit stereotyped view of forestry is combined with the long-term commitment demanded by classical tree culture, a powerful professional and sectoral force is created. This force meets an equally powerful and opposing force formed by the vast members of poor people who have come to depend on forest lands to meet many of their basic needs or see the forest as the only way of escape when squeezed out by changes in the lowland agricultural economy.

Forests have traditionally contributed to the well being of individuals, communities and the state. In rural Asia forests have provided fuel, food, forage, building materials and a range of organic products, from dyes and resins to pharmaceuticals throughout society. Claims on the forest existed in all strata of society. It is only in relatively recent time that forestry has come to connote large-scale, single species cultivated tree production for industrial purposes. However under pressure from population growth in particular, imported concepts

3. Conventional Forestry

Conventional forestry still features prominently and legitimately in the national economic development plans of most Asian countries. The transformation of the natural capital of the forest into other forms is still an important component of many economic strategies. However, while the planned transformation of the forest by industry is proceeding where possible on a broad scale, this is frequently followed by the unplanned destruction of the potential for regeneration by the actions of millions of individuals seeking their own survival. The vaunted renewability of the forest resource becomes an unfulfilled promise.

For example, in the Philippines, the 1978-1982 Five Year Development Plan describes forestry in conventional terms and the slash-and-burn farmer in the uplands as the conventional foe. Contributions to growth in GNP, manufacturing sector employment and foreign exchange earnings are emphasised. However, meeting the projected short-run targets will mean that all old-growth forest will be eliminated before the year 2000 and future log and lumber production will be inadequate for domestic needs by early in the next decade. Projections indicate that the total area of productive second growth forest will not increase. What will increase will be the area of denuded public forest land in Palawan and Mindanao that form the present frontier territories. Conditions have to be created whereby investment can be made successfully in those areas of unproductive forest land that already cover one-third of the country. The present pattern of forest removal followed by the immigration of the landless onto freshly denuded watersheds leads to the steady attrition of an already diminished forest base.

It is ironical that the value of forest lands as catchment areas is only beginning to be recognized as the extent of the reduction in the effective catchment area becomes known. Despite its significance in national economic development, the value of water as a joint product of forest land has been slow to be recognized. The best use of land is both a technical and an economic concept and changes in technology and the values of goods and services cause the best use of land to change also. Just as the values of wood and forage have increased rapidly in recent years, so has the value of water changed. The value of forest land as

4. Forest Land Without Trees

Throughout Asia vast areas of land are designated as public forest lands. The designation is applied and vigourously maintained whether or not the land is forested. For example in the Philippines, 60 per cent of the total land area of the country is designated as forest land, but only 40 per cent of this is actual forest of any commercial value. The remaining 60 per cent is cut-over brush, mossy unproductive forest and Imperata - dominated grassland. Almost two-thirds of the land called forest land bears no forest. But all forest land is administered by the Bureau of Forest Development of the Ministry of Natural Resources of the national government as if it were forest. However, conditions are such that the majority of these lands will never be forest again. Investment in their improvement is precluded by the institutional arrangements through which they are administered and used.

In India half the land surface is uncultivated. Included here are lands variously described as fallow, village, Panchayat, revenue, waste, protected and reserved forest and other government lands. These are not private lands but lands held under collective title for common use or benefit. They are administered by local, state, or national authorities and emerge from a history as reserves or wastes to be used by the first claimant or at the will of a sovereign. The fact that the majority of these lands is unproductive is not a product of their inherent infertility. They are potentially responsive to investment but, like their Philippine counterparts, curcumstances prerequisite to making them productive don't exist.

This does not mean that denuded public forest lands in the Philippines or the uncultivated half of India have no economic value in current use. The illicit private uses of common-property lands have economic value of a magnitude that will not easily be replaced. In fact, the compensation of the losers when public lands do become a priority for new investment is one of the major obstacles to successful public land improvement. New practices will not be sustained if they prove to be of lesser benefit or greater risk to villagers and if the new arrangements leave some participants in the process worse off then before.

5. Occupied Forest Lands: Legal Jurisdiction and Actual Control

The public forests and the common lands of Asia are occupied by millions of poor people, and where they are not occupied they are surrounded. Poor people are dependent on forest lands for numerous products and the lands are used legally and illegally as needs dictate. While such use may not be the best use, it is the necessary use and it constitutes the de facto use. The pattern of use is the product of necessity. But when people's livelihoods come to depend on public lands, effective land management policies will only be those that promote equitable and sustainable improvements in the welfare of those who are dependent.

In occupied forest lands basic disparities exist between land capability and land productivity that stems directly from a divergence between the conditions required for investment in land and the conditions which actually prevail. History assigns the preponderant rights of control over public lands to governments and their agents. The assumptions are made that: (1) governments will make management decisions that are socially preferable to those that would be made if authority was largely in private lands; and (2) authorities can and do exercise sufficient control over land use decisions to be able to manage public lands in accordance with social objectives. These two assumptions form the operational principle that those who have authority and those who control actual use must be joined in a management unit with a common purpose and adequate incentives to invest and create the socially desired outcome. In the management of the occupied forest lands of Asia while the government has authority, the poor have control and these interests, public and private, are competitive. Neither party has sufficient control of the resource to motivate long-term investment and the result is the now familiar tragedy of the commons, the result of unlimited individual claims and minimal security for investment.

Forest authorities behave as if the two assumptions made above apply. However: (1) government authority seeks ends that are desireable but different from those sought by poor people dependent on public lands; and (2) authorities do not have the necessary degree of control over land use decisions to carry their purposes through. While legal authority is invested in the government, actual control frequently rests

6. Institutional Failure

Policy states the purposes which guide government action, and institutions set the rules that operate to transform policy into effect. The purposes of policies and their effects correspond to the extent that intitutions are effective. Forest land degradation in much of Asia represents a chronic case of institutional failure.

Institutional failure exists when, within the range of production possibilities, the means for production and distribution do not produce results in accordance with collective preferences. There is a gap between what society aims for and what society receives that is not attributable to the inherent capability of the resources available to work with or the technology of production.

In forestry and in other areas of development, resource use is intensifying at a more rapid rate than development of the appropriate means to regulate it. Regulatory institutions - customary, commercial, administrative, legal and political relationships - and the technologies and skills they require appear to be growing more slowly than other determinants of resource allocation. This difference in rates of development affects sustainable levels of resource productivity and the associated patterns of distribution.

While institutional failure is recognized, society seems to be far more willing to invest in the physical aspects of enhanced resource productivity than in the institutional and managerial aspects. The question as to what the optimum balance between physical and institutional investments in development has generally been answered in one of two ways. First, to rely on bureaucratic models and accept their prescription. Second, to assume that technological development will somehow stimulate appropriate institutional change and do nothing. These responses have proved inadequate. The failure of the bureaucracy to respond to the needs of the poor and to the needs of the environment are becoming increasingly well-documented. The result of this is a growing interest in a range of pragmatic alternative combinations of technology and new institutional arrangements for forestry in development - learning lessons for investment and choosing from among them.

The lesson of the success stories suggests that achievement of the three required levels of fit identified above is a function of the process followed in program implementation. Beneficiaries and agencies had to learn how to be mutually successful, and the institutional rules that guided the transformation of policy into effect had to be rewritten, or at least reinterpreted. Successful programs advanced through a locally-based process of trial and error and correction. Agencies first redefined their roles as implementors to be assisting organizations and learned to be effective through locally-based pilot action. This was followed by learning how to be efficient by simplifying actions and eliminating non-essentials. Finally, assisting organizations learned how to make the process expand - which did not necessarily include their own expansion. No blueprint was followed, learning came through continuing local action, analysis, reflection and correction.

in their jurisdictions. Effective participatory approaches to forest land management appear to threaten forestry bureaucracies at the hearts of their reward systems - (licit and illicit) lawful and unlawful.

Expansionary activities of bureaucracies don't have to meet the private sector test that new values generated must exceed costs since their budgets are derived from taxes or transfer payments, domestic or foreign. Bureaucrats have incentives to ignore or exaggerate the economic efficiency and equity aspects of the projects they propose and administer. Especially in developing world contexts, the clientele or user groups are often sufficiently remote or inarticulate that failure to meet their needs can be safely ignored. The bureaucrat administers the "transfer economy" - government grows apace with antigovernment sentiment.

In the forestry sector in developing economies a parallel situation exists in the relationships between forestry departments and national treasuries and between national economic development agencies and the donor community. Each agency ultimately is tempted to work in its own interest and the supposed beneficiaries - the rural poor - become almost incidental.

9. Interagency Relations

Typically, individual agencies have their own aims and objectives, jurisdictions and clientele which determine their own investment priorities. Forestry agencies may show little interest in staple food production for upland forest occupants. Agricultural agencies may show little interest in fuel wood production. Range management groups may have little interest in tree seedling survival for any purpose. Alignment of interest, authority and capacity requires the investment of resources in administrative and political processes.

The collective organization of agencies in an operational area, and the mechanisms for collaboration and exchange among them, determine actual management. The way an agricultural and an irrigation agency relate to one another in the uplands and their interests in enhancement of lowland productivity will have a bearing on the incentives they offer to reduce upland erosion, even though uplands may not fall under the jurisdiction of either.

A related issue concerns the characteristic patterns of accommodation between agencies and specific types of communities under their jurisdiction. Irrigation agencies, populated by engineers, tend to develop relationships with lowland communities, different from those that forestry agencies populated by foresters develop in the uplands. For example, in S.E. Asia irrigation agencies tend to accommodate the needs of the farming community to a greater extent than do forestry agencies. But in watershed management, the interests of the upland and lowland communities are interdependent. Agencies must learn to work more effectively with their respective client groups as well as with each other. For example, in the Philippines the formerly forested uplands are under the legal authority of the Bureau of Forest Development. These areas comprise 60 per cent of the nation's land surface, including virtually all the upland watershed areas. The lands are designated as forest land strictly on the basis of slope (18 per cent slope and above) not on the basis of capability of cover type.. Other public and quasi-public agencies vie with the BFD for control of these lands on the grounds of their interests in energy development, watershed management or the management of tribal and minority group affairs. As jurisdictional competition and interagency rivalry proceeds, the

interests in human welfare through improving land productivity becomes submerged and energies are dissipated.

As the bureaucratic competition proceeds, millions of residents (new and long-established) press their tenuous claims to these same lands. Public administration does not have the capacity for upland regulation. There is little relationship between formal statements of authority and actual powers of enforcement and management. This is both a failure of public administration and a reality in densely-populated, socially and ecologically complex upland areas. It is also related to the roles uplands play in the national context as safety values for democratic and political pressures which encourage the maintenance of institutional fluidity. As such a public agency, constituted on the assumptions of low population pressure and an equivalence of authority and capacity cannot regulate the growing intensities of upland use. Control is exercised by upland communities or concessionaires.

The dominant institutional issue is the relationship between public agencies and residents, and the divergences of capacity and authority between them. The agency has authority but limited capacity: the public has capacity but limited authority. The consequences are inappropriate destructive management and ineffective action. The crux of the problem is security of tenure. Forest land occupants with a sense of permanence will have a greater incentive to make long-term investments than those facing the prospect of forced migration. Long-term investments are more likely to produce good results for individuals that are congruent with the public interest, diminishing the need for public regulation. Tenure can be secured through statutory adjustments, community organization and through the development of viable upland technologies. Viable technologies can increase the identity between public, community and individual interests, and reduce institutional requirements for upland regulation.

Weak security of tenure reduces incentives for long-term investment. Public policy, with the stated rationale for protecting the interests of future generations, creates conditions where residents maintain a very short-term planning horizon, shorter than would be the case where security of tenure existed. Local organization can help establish such security

10. Community Management of Resources

If the aim of forest development is to produce sustainable improvements in human welfare for people dependent on forest lands, the community has to be an active participant in the process. Centrally planned programs implemented by government personnel for the benefit of villagers typically fail to deliver. There are a number of commonly found reasons for this:

(i) governments have limited reach. Lack of human and financial resources means that supervised professionals cannot reach even the majority of villages.

(ii) governments lack capacity for sustained local action over the long-term. New facilities may be developed but their operation and maintenance over time is frequently precluded.

(iii) governments generally can adapt in only a limited way to local circumstances. Centrally-designed programs are generally unable to adapt sufficiently to the range of conditions where they are to be applied.

(iv) centrally-planned and implemented programs tend to create dependence not independence. Government programs frequently provide a formal service that people previously performed for themselves in an informal way, and a measure of self-sufficiency is lost.

These reasons and others present a strong case for the participatory management of natural resources by the community and agencies in the local and broader public interest. Only in this way are development programs likely to achieve a high degree of fit between local social structures, technologies, and micro-environments that result in productive, equitable and sustainable production systems.

that the local agent become known, respected and gain substantial knowledge of local conditions. This problem becomes especially acute in the more remote locations where the process of change will take the longest and where the living conditions for the agency representative may be the poorest. This has important implications for personnel recruitment and reward systems.

(2) Obstacles within the community:
Common obstacles to effective people's participation in the community include lack of appropriate local organizations, lack of leadership and organizational skills. From the agency perspective there is a need to provide for effective local organizations that form around the technology being developed. Local organization and improved technology have to evolve together, since one is ineffective without the other. From the community perspective the need is for competence in organizing meetings, choosing leaders, holding meetings, reaching agreements and handling money. In order to increase accountability and build a broader base of leadership, these skills have to be learned by large segments of the local organization and this is not accomplished quickly or easily where community facilities are poor, where local elites are encouraged to continue to dominate local affairs, or where factionalism is rife. In some communities such an effort should not even be attempted, in others it must be built slowly with modest expectations. In still other communities effective local organizations may require the exclusion of potentially destructive elements from the outset.

A further obstacle that exists in all societies is corruption and the tendency for individuals in positions of power or authority to take advantage of situations for their personal benefit at the expense of others. Most developments have an inherent bias in favour of the more able or those with more assets and greater security. If this is combined with tendencies to corruption, the net impacts of programs will continue to be inequitable. Agencies working in a participatory mode must develop mechanisms to limit corruption within their own ranks and within the local organizations they foster. One mechanism to ensure this is good public information to enable every beneficiary to understand the full extent of the program - aims, methods, resources, and obligations. Agency procedures must be clearly stated and

are also more powerful, and power to this new force will only grow as the power of pre-existing forces is diminished. The appropriate strategy to follow here is to avoid explicit identification and to concentrate efforts on developing local capacities to perform certain necessary functions that constitute the objectives of the group.

With respect to law, this can represent a very serious obstacle to the development of effective people's participation expecially in the field of forestry. For centuries forest lands have been armed and protected by governments and the sparse populations that occupied the lands were tolerated because their numbers were small and their impacts were minor. In some situtations the traditional forest occupants have moved into remote quarters of the forest to escape contact with lowland society and have come to regard the lands they have settled, cultivated and buried their dead in as their own. But now that the populations of these areas are expanding and the downstream consequences of degradation are being acutely felt, the legitimacy of the occupancy of forest land peoples is being challenged. Modern law has made forest occupants into illegal squatters in many Asian societies and governments have attempted to implement the law through force. The results have often been disastrous. Police power fails to protect forest lands for long and the solution lies in creating for the forest occupant a long-term stake in the land and promoting investment in that secured land. But the law stands in the way of the creation of a mutual interest in forest land management by forest occupants and agencies. Alternative legal frameworks have to be created to supercede monolithic national policies that can never be made fully operational except in a police state.

The final major obstacle in society rests with the bureaucracy itself. National policies constrain individual agencies, and agency policies constrain divisions and branches. Whether the constraints focus on production targets, productivity, or budget allocation, bureaucratic systems frequently preclude the flexibility required to adapt well to local conditions. As the bureaucracy evolves it comes to define its own objectives and adapts to serve these ends with efficiency. Successful participatory approaches to development in this environment calls for the kinds of creative and imaginitive solutions that are not called for or rewarded in the bureaucracy. Success requires reorientation

12. The Learning Organization

Agencies which desire to develop successful participatory approaches to resource management which produce sustainable benefits for the rural poor must be capable of self evaluation and open to learning. The capacity to manage social learning is a form of knowledge learned through problem solving, and not easily transmitted through text books or conventional training.

The scientific method which all of us have been taught is based upon a process of analytical reduction, which takes complex problems and reduces them to small component parts, isolating causality and placing the researcher in the role of observer of quantifiable effects. Relationships or laws learned in this way are applied by specialists to the design of systems for various purposes.

When this method is transferred from the realm of the physical sciences to the social, complex problems are reduced to a series of technical computations. In rural development this task is performed by analysts in the bureaucracy, far removed from the communities to whose needs the analysis was originally directed. The analyst refines the definition of the problem, identifies potential courses of action, estimates the associated costs and benefits, recommends a preferred solution and designs an implementation plan. Once the plan is prepared the role of the planner generally ends and responsibility is transferred to an implementing agency to take the plan and apply it faithfully.

But the transfer of the scientific knowledge paradigm to the realm of social problem solving has proved inadequate. Human behaviour involves both values and purpose, features absent from physical phenomena. In developing countries, the application of the paradigm by technicians (often by foreigners in short-term assignments) effectively eliminates meaningful participation in the process by the implementors and the intended beneficiaries. The result is a mismatch of need and purpose, poor execution, bureaucratic growth but little beneficial impact on the target community whose needs justified the exercise in the first place.

13. Evaluating Organizations: Common Diagnoses and Misleading Conclusions

Ideally all organizations should be self-evaluating, composed of intelligent individuals committed to specific modes of problem solving. Organization, procedures and efficiency should only matter if they contribute to meeting social needs. But this rarely, if ever, exists. When rural development organizations evaluate their own behaviour four diagnoses are made and misleading conclusions are drawn.

(1) There is a shortage of high-level manpower. While agency failure in the past could be safely attributed to a shortage of skilled manpower this is becoming increasingly untrue. Substantial numbers of highly competent national exist in forestry agencies throughout Asia in positions of authority. However, many of them are in the wrong places - in their offices in national and regional capitals - and their performance is low.

(2) Field staff are poorly motivated. However, examination of the work environment reveals that they react rationally to the situation they find themselves in. Initiative is not rewarded, sudden disruptive changes of location are frequent, constant and conflicting instructionsand requests for information are received. The field worker finds himself bombarded with activity or totally ignored in a backwater.

(3) Programs are not sufficiently "integrated" or "coordinated". Integration and coordination has had substantial costs as well as benefits. The integrated approach has come to mean to many the simultaneous implementation of many different activities in the same location with a wasteful concentration of resources. The detail of locally important relationships and potential benefits goes unappreciated. "Integration" and "coordination" do not ensure complementarity between agencies, do not eliminate duplication of competition for resources, nor do they guarantee the use of scarce resources sparingly.

(4) There is something wrong with the structure of government. This usually resulted in the creation of new organizations and the proliferation of agencies and resultant expansion of bureaucratic organizations and costs. An alternative result has been the almost continuous realignment of ministerial responsibilities and the transfer of departments from one jurisdiction to another. After the music stops the same people are

14. Bureaucratic Reorientation - to facilitate self-help.

Large governmental organizations concerned with natural resources management have to become more responsive to their constituencies. But this is asking a lot. As bureaucracies grow and mature they come to adopt their own goals and objectives and orient their operations and incentive systems to meet them. The goals and objectives that become important are related to the success criteria of the agency itself and it's members, not the client group the agency was created to serve. The reorientation of bureaucracies to facilitate, and not hinder participatory approaches to natural resources management should be a subject for comparative analytical study.

Individuals have historically relied on their communities for survival. Because of this dependence, communities have traditionally been the source of people's values. But as governments...have assumed responsibility for the provision of human needs, they have also begun to shape human values, fostering dependency, helplessness, and powerlessness. The psychology of dependency is based on depersonalized relationships between people and institutions and leads to an imbalance of power in society. As individuals and communities give up control over the issues that affect their lives, political power becomes more firmly concentrated in the hands of the state and corporations. A restoration of self-reliance and collective competence is required leading to an increase in community problem solving. Success in self-help leads to further success, through experience in the direct exercise of individual and collective energies. But the process cannot begin unless the existing power structure encourages it to begin.

(3) Supervision is poor. Field staff are subject to rare and unpredictable visits or totally neglected in their field locations. When staff meetings do occur they are frequently preoccupied with the discussion of terms of service, conditions and other personal matters. The supervisor may have as much difficulty with transport to field locations as the field staff have.

Junior field staff are just like villagers - rational people, making decisions in order to cope with the pressures they face with only limited resources. Innovation is considered too risky, it makes you conspicuous and does not guarantee promotion or reward. But incentives could be arranged as rewards for better performance in order that the potential and abilities of staff are not kept dormant. The answer lies in positive incentives in the form of increments and promotions related to performance, plus reforms in transport, allowances, housing, uniforms, and so on. But even these don't guarantee success. The content of field programs is the critical element. Improvements in all the areas identified above are useless unless the program delivers benefits to villagers.

land productivity affected by the closeness and vigour of the administration of the law? While there are a variety of experiments addressing these and related questions there has been too little systematic interpretation of the underlying tenure-productivity relationships and the intensity of enforcement. Tenures that provide a high degree of security to villagers over future land productivity and that require minimal levels of enforcement effort will provide measures of public and private benefit substantially greater than many of these arrangements that we currently attempt to uphold in vain.

(2) Administration - Three characteristics of social or community forestry call for administrative arrangements quite different from conventional forestry. First, the aim is to serve people and not to control land, and effectiveness will depend more on manpower/population ratios than manpower/land area ratios. Second, social forestry systems have socioeconomic, agronomic, horticultural and livestock components, in addition to forestry. Implementing officers must have multiple skills, the ability of a generalist, and this will have significant implications for recruitment and professional training. Third, success in forestry for local community development is to be measured in terms of what people are encouraged to do, not what they are prevented from doing.

At present, virtually all social and community forestry organizaitons are in a fledgling condition and observation, analysis and interpretation of their progress is required. We know that more police power cannot succeed for long and that self-policing systems are required. We know that responsiveness to local conditions is required and this means decentralization, the abandonment of blanket prescriptions, and the creation of a large number of small organizations in preference to a small number of large ones. But we also know that recommendations of this kind mean totally new approaches to management, a willingness to experiment and to make mistakes and learn from them. The bureaucracy is being asked to be creative and that is asking a lot. At the same time the experiments that are underway will provide some of the answers we are looking for if we are prepared to accept them.

(3) Policy - Other areas of policy, in addition to land tenure and administration, are likely to be equally important to success in social and community forestry, but so far have commanded little attention.

negotiation of acceptable shares will depend both on the capability of the land in question and the degree of certainty shared by villagers concerning the receipt of their agreed share. Again, this is a special concern since stable and productive cropping systems for forest and common lands frequently involve crops that mature only slowly. Present consumption is being foregone by poor people who can ill afford to live on promises. Unless future comsumption alternatives look sufficiently large and certain, and unless short-term subsistence is assumed, villagers will be unable to wait for promises to be realized and will sacrifice the future again in the search to survive the present.

obstacles within agencies, within the community, and within society itself. Effective participation represents both a transfer of power and a transfer of resources to previously powerless and resource-poor people. As such, effective participation requires a major transformation in the management of public resources, in particular in the bureaucracy.

Agencies that wish to support or assist participatory approaches to resource management have to learn how to be effective through open processes of trial and error. There is no blue print for success. The learning process has been characterized as following three stages: learning to be effective, learning to be efficient, and learning to expand. Learning to be effective involves learning through an action research process that develops programs well-adapted to local needs. The program is developed to fit the local conditions. In learning to be efficient, the emphasis is on maximizing program output per unit of input, and the emphasis shifts to finding a fit between the requirements of the program and the capacity of the organization. In learning to expand the emphasis shifts for a second time to building a supporting organization capable of moving the program to a scale large enough to have a significant impact. Substantial change is required in bureaucratic agencies that plan to collaborate with local organizations to build effective participation in development.

When rural development agencies fail to achieve the development goals set for them a number of problems are commonly diagnosed: there is too little skilled manpower and resources; field staff are poorly motivated; programs are not well coordinated; or, there is something wrong with government structures and new organizations are required. In fact, the problem generally lies in the pattern of incentives faced by the rural people and the agency staff involved, and the inattention paid to management in rural development. In the implementing agencies, if terms of service are not good, if working conditions are hard, and if supervision is poor, results will be poor. But even when conditions in the agency are conducive to good performance by field staff, programs will not succeed unless villagers feel that their long term benefits are secure. This can only be accomplished through reform and reorientation in the areas of land tenure, administration of public land resources, other

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