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Women and Work in the Third World:

The Impact of Industrialization and Global Economic Interdependence

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WOMEN AND WORK IN THE THIRD WORLD:

THE IMPACT OF INDUSTRIALIZATION AND GLOBAL ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE

Proceedings of two conferences held
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3399
164-5

Table of Contents

	Page
Acknowledgments	v
Introduction	vii
Part I: Current Issues of Women's Participation in Industrial Work: Theory and Research	
Women and the International Division of Labor Helen I. Safa	3
Segmentation of the Work Process in the International Division of Labor June Nash	9
Development in the Family: Third World Women and Inequality Sally Bould	25
Economic Development and Patterns of Female Labor Force Participation in Latin America Ruth Sautu	39
Women in the Labor Force in Latin America: A Review of the Literature Neuma Aguiar	51
Part II: Opportunities and Challenges of Global Economic Interdependence: Multinational Corporations and Women	
Employment of Women in Export Assembly of High Technology Electronics in Asia Lenny Siegel	71
Multinational Export Factories and Women Workers in the Third World: A Review of Theory and Evidence Linda Y.C. Lim	75
Panel Presentation on the Opportunities and Challenges of Global Economic Interdependence: Implications for Women Richard Holton	91
Panel Presentation on the Opportunities and Challenges of Global Economic Interdependence: Implications for Women Nancy Weir	95
The Multinational Corporations and Employment Opportunities for Women in Malaysia Anis Sabirin Ramzi	99
Part III: The Socioeconomic Context of Women's Work	
Discrepancy Between Guatemalan Women's Desires to Work and Actual Employment Patricia Lee Engle	103
Female Activity Within the Social Dynamics of Selected Middle Eastern Countries Hamida Kazi	117
Women and Work in the Middle East: The Regional Impact of Migration to the Oil Producing States Mervat Hatem	131
Women, Family Structure and Development in Jamaica A. Lynn Bolles	141
Women, Work and Infant Mortality: A Case Study from Northeast Brazil Nancy Scheper-Hughes	145

Page

Up From Slavery: Expanding Work Opportunities for Latin American Women
Evelyn P. Stevens 163

Part IV: Women and Industrial Work in the Third World: Case Studies from Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Middle East

Women and Work in Nigeria: An Historical Perspective
Nina W. Mba 169

Women Industrial Workers in Lebanon
Irene Lorfing 183

Women and Work in Morocco
May Rihani 193

A Recent Study of Women Workers in a Beijing Paper Mill
Judith Liu 199

Women and Factory Work in Punjab, Pakistan
Anita M. Weiss 207

Women's Work: Factory, Family and Social Class in an Industrializing Order
Janet Salaff and Aline Wong 215

Packaging the Product: Mexican Non-Durable Women Workers, 1910-1940
Dawn Keremitsis 235

Women and Work in Sudan: What is Alienated Labor?
Sondra Hale 245

Part V: Education and Training

Vocational and Technical Training for Women in the Arab States
Nagat M. El-Sanabary 253

Education-Employment Linkages for Women: A Comparative Analysis of South and Southeast Asian Countries and Egypt
Hanna Papanek 265

Non-Formal Education for Women in Asia: Examples from Bangladesh, Thailand and Korea
Elizabeth White 275

Part VI: Helping Women Workers: Programs By and For Women

The Labor Movement and Working Women in Zaire
Muadi Muamba 281

Women and Labor Unions in Egypt
Amina Shafiq 287

Work in Women's Survival Strategies in a Latin American Capital
Jeanine Anderson Velasco 291

Organizing Self-Employed Women in the Informal Sector: The Role of Innovative Credit Programs
Hilde Jeffers 299

Agenda for Research on Women in the Third World 311

Appendices

Notes on Contributors 325

Participants in the Working Sessions 329

Agendas of the 1982 and 1983 Conferences 331

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Introduction

The Center for the Study, Education and Advancement of Women at the University of California, Berkeley, with the assistance of a grant from the Women in Development Office at the U.S. Agency for International Development, sponsored two conferences on "Women and Work in the Third World: The Impact of Industrialization and Global Economic Interdependence." The first conference was held on May 6 and 7, 1982, and the second on April 14 and 15, 1983. Both conferences were held at the University of California, Berkeley. The main purpose of these conferences was to bring together U.S. and Third World scholars and practitioners to present research findings and to discuss ideas, information, and perspectives on women's work in the growing national and multinational industries and related jobs in African, Asian, Latin American and Middle Eastern countries.

Another purpose of the conference and the small group working sessions was the development of a research agenda indicating areas of needed research on women and industrial work in the Third World and suggesting methodologies for research. It was hoped also that the conferences would contribute to the development of a community of scholars who share research interests in this area, and facilitate networking between U.S. and Third World women scholars.

The conferences were unique in their focus on women's participation in industrial and related work. This focus resulted from the realization that, although growing industrialization in the Third World has opened up new employment opportunities for women, it has also created new problems. Women's paid industrial work in many Third World countries is not new since they have worked in the textile and garment industries, traditional areas of female employment, from the turn of the century. More recently, however, new "female" industries have cropped up, including the new electronic--and especially silicon--industries, most of which are owned and operated by foreign firms with products designed for export. In addition, women are hired in increasing numbers in the growing national industries producing materials for local consumption as well as exportation. Most women, however, continue to perform domestic functions, often unaffected by changes in the wider society.

Research presented at the two conferences and included in this publication indicates that the number of women workers in national and multinational industries has increased dramatically over the past few decades. While this situation has expanded wage-earning possibilities for women, it has also created various problems for them, their families, and the societies in which they live. For instance, while industrial work has enabled more women to support themselves and their families wholly or partially, most of the jobs held by women are underpaid, offer few if any benefits (health insurance, vacation and sick leave, child care, etc.), and sometimes expose them to unhealthy and stressful working conditions. Additionally, women workers are often restricted in their ability to join or organize a workers' union. Women are often seen not only as a source of cheap labor, but also as docile workers who are unlikely to rock the boat or cause trouble.

The stereotype persists that women are by nature fit for industrial work requiring manual dexterity, ranging from work in textile factories to the electronic industries. Several participants shared their concerns and presented their research findings documenting the increasing exploitation of women as the pace of industrialization increases in developing countries. In the 1980s, many Third World women workers suffer the injustices and discrimination their Western sisters suffered during the 1930s and 1940s. Today, the situation of women workers in electronic and silicon industries in many Third World countries offers striking parallels to the situation of women industrial workers in the industrialized countries. Local economic and cultural constraints often intensify these inequities. At the same time, occupational segregation by sex is emerging in striking similarity to the Western pattern. Several conference presentations included in this publication examine this growing division of labor in Third World countries as a result of industrial transformation and global economic interdependence.

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There are contrasting points of view among the various presenters, and these are reflected in the papers included here. The authors have different perspectives on the issues discussed during the two conferences and suggest different strategies for dealing with existing problems. For instance, speakers from the business community offered a more positive picture of the impact of multinational industries upon Third World countries in general and women in particular. They emphasized the new job opportunities and employment generation, and the relatively better working conditions than in most national industries. There are also numerous challenges facing the multinational industries in their Third World operations. The interplay of local and foreign conditions and terms of operation adds to the delicate nature of these operations, and the complex impact on the people of Third World countries in general.

The presentations also examined the socioeconomic and cultural constraints upon women's access to and persistence in industrial work, and the impact of this work on women, men, and children, as well as the wider society. The linkages between education and employment, and some programs and organizations which assist working women, were also discussed. Research presented covers a wide range of countries in Africa, the Middle East, Asia, and Latin America.

Time limitations do not permit intensive analysis of the wide range of issues included in this publication. Thirty-two of the 39 papers presented at the two conferences are included in this proceedings which combines the presentations from both conferences. The papers are grouped under six different headings. It must be pointed out that not all the papers deal with women's participation in the formal industrial sector; several papers deal with the role of women in the domestic and nonformal spheres.

Different processes were used in securing the papers for the conferences and this publication of the proceedings. This is reflected in different lengths and formats of the papers. Some of the 1982 presentations were written by the authors prior to the conference and revised afterwards for publication. Others were prepared from transcribed conference presentations mailed to the authors for review and revision. Final copy editing was done by the Center's editor, Ellen Matthews.

Papers from the 1983 conference were mostly written presentations secured by the conference coordinators either prior to or during the conference. Some were written well ahead of the conference, others shortly before. Minor editorial changes were made by Ellen Matthews in consultation with the authors. Due to time limitations, however, it was not possible for all the authors to review the final copy before publication. We regret that we were unable to include all conference presentations; a few were not returned to us in time to meet our publication schedule.

Included here also is the research agenda developed by the participants of the two conferences during working sessions held in May 1982 and April 1983. It is our hope that the entire publication will provide a basis for further discussion and action, and foster further research on the complex problems of women's participation in industrial work in the formal and nonformal sectors of Third World countries.

Nagat El-Sanabary

PART I

CURRENT ISSUES OF WOMEN'S PARTICIPATION IN INDUSTRIAL WORK: THEORY AND RESEARCH

Women and the International Division of Labor

Helen I. Safa

My talk will be based largely on the article that was recently published in Signs,[1] in which I attempt to discuss what industrialization means to women, both in an advanced industrial society such as our own, and in Third World countries. As an anthropologist I think that the industrial revolution in one respect will one day compare with the Neolithic Age in which human society moved from food-gathering to food production. The industrial revolution introduced a whole new sexual division of labor in human society, at the level of the family and the community and the nation as a whole. By removing production of work from the home, from artisans and peasant farms into factories and offices, it introduced a whole new set of sex roles for men and women. Gradually men became the chief economic providers, at least in most countries, and women became dependent on men for wage labor. We know this is not the exact picture, but it somehow has become the ideal role model not only in popular culture but in the social science literature as well. We know from Boserup's seminal work on women's role in economic development that women formerly played an important role in peasant farming, particularly in Africa and Asia, but with the advent of urbanization and industrialization this role has been considerably weakened. Thus, it is largely through industrialization that women have become dependent upon men for wage labor.

Now, why is this true? Why have traditional forms of industrialization been so disadvantageous to women? Again, here I can speak primarily in terms of Latin American data which I know better. Certainly if we begin with our own society, we know that in the beginning of industrialization women and children played a very important role in the industrial labor force of England and France and in the United States, and other advanced capitalist societies. There was a stage in the industrialization of Latin America as well where industry was primarily labor intensive and where women did play an important role in that industrial labor force. But two factors altered that. One is that you always had a much greater surplus male labor force in Latin American to draw upon, so that women become much more of a secondary labor reserve than they would have been even in the United States. For example, in New England, when they wanted to recruit workers for the textile mills, there was a deliberate attempt to recruit young girls because they did not want to take men off the farms and reduce the role they played in agriculture. This was not necessarily as much the case in the Third World, because you had a

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[1]Safa, Helen I. (1981) "Runaway Shops and Female Employment: The Search for Cheap Labor" Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society, Vol. 7, No. 2.

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greater surplus male labor reserve.

The second factor is that this early labor intensive stage of industrialization was radically eclipsed in most Third World countries because, although industrialization was an attempt to reduce dependence upon other advanced industrial societies, the result was quite different; in other words, particularly in Latin America, one had a period called import substitution industrialization. This was a deliberate attempt promoted by ECLA, the Economic Commission of Latin America, and other agencies, to reduce the reliance of Latin American countries on manufactured goods from the West and to start manufacturing goods on their own, particularly through the processing of primary products. In other words, most Latin American countries were, at that stage at least, primarily seen as exporters of raw material and importers of manufactured foods. Import substitution was an attempt to combat that problem and to develop the domestic industry by using a variety of tariff protections and other devices.

This policy ran into problems, though, fairly early, because Latin America and other Third World countries lacked the capital and the technology with which to develop industrially on their own. Their continued reliance upon capital and technology from advanced industrial countries meant that they were still dependent; so import substitution still fostered a form of dependent capitalism, although a different form. Since this industrialization was largely introduced from abroad, from the U.S. and Western Europe, these countries leapt quite fast into the capital-intensive stage of industrialization; in other words they did not go through the gradual stage of industrialization that had taken place in the U.S. and Western Europe.

Even in Third World countries where industrialization had taken place, as in India with its cotton mills, there was sometimes a deliberate attempt on the part of colonial powers to deindustrialize these countries in order to increase their reliance upon the colonial power. In a country like Brazil, for example, where import substitution industrialization started in the 1950s, between the 1950s and the 1970s there was basically no change in the percentage of women incorporated into the industrial labor force; it remained at about 10%, despite very rapid rates of industrialization. Capital intensive industrialization did not employ much of a labor force, male or female, but what it did employ was largely male. So it really did not offer many opportunities of employment for women.

What do women do, then? Women were expelled from peasant farming areas in Latin America at a much heavier rate than in the case of Africa and Asia. If they could not find jobs in the industrial sector, what could they do? That is when social scientists discovered the informal sector in which women play a very important role; women work in the informal sector as domestic servants, petty vendors, market women, and even as prostitutes. These were survival strategies that women tried to work out in order to eke out a living. Because rural women came from a tradition in which women were expected to contribute economically to the family, which was a very important tradition within the peasant household, they attempted to maintain this in some way in the urban area, even when there were not formal wage labor jobs available to them.

The only exception to this pattern was for a very small group of women who experienced considerable increases in labor force participation. These increases have largely been in white collar jobs, and if you look at the women who are getting those jobs--and again it is difficult to get that data--it seems to be primarily middle-class, high school-educated women. In other words, not the peasant women that are being expelled from the rural area, but a group of women who might not have worked previously. These class changes in the composition of the female labor force in Latin America parallel very closely the history of occupational changes in the U.S. and Western Europe. At a certain stage of industrialization and urbanization, white collar jobs open up, and middle-class women enter the labor force who would not have worked before because previously there were not jobs commensurate with their status open to them. Their entry into the labor force becomes a horizontal move, rather than a vertical move up for women of lower class status. Thus, the increase in white collar jobs does not really open up jobs for the women in the lower economic strata.

Now, what has this got to do with the international division of labor? Actually I would argue that we have always had a kind of international division of labor. In the early stage it was one in which Third World countries produced raw materials, and the advanced capitalist countries produced manufactured goods and that was the exchange. Then there was a second stage in which there was an attempt to combat this through import substitution; the Third World countries were beginning to establish some of their own industries, particularly in Latin America. Multinational corporations also go around this policy by agreeing to manufacture in Latin America for the export market rather than in the U.S. At least they agreed to assemble Fords in Argentina or Mexico in order to get around protective tariff regulations, but continuing to rely on U.S. capital and technology.

What is different now, which I think is fairly important for women, is that we have entered the new and third stage of the international division of labor, where Third World countries are now becoming producers of manufactured goods, not only for their own domestic market, but for export as well. In a sense I think these companies learned a lesson. They discovered that if they went to assemble Ford automobiles in Brazil, or manufacture garments in Mexico, it was much cheaper to do so than in the U.S. Labor was much cheaper. So they are now not only producing manufactured goods for domestic consumption, for domestic industries in these countries, but they are manufacturing them primarily for export processing. And it is this export processing that in a sense represents a new realm of this new international division of labor; in other words, these countries are becoming exporters of manufactured goods. However, I think it is extremely important to keep in mind that most of this is still largely controlled by advanced industrial societies. In some cases the production work may actually be done by subcontracting firms that are national, but they are sold to multinational corporations operating from an advanced industrial society.

I think export processing is an issue that links very closely the concerns of women from the First World and women from the Third World, because what it means is that women in the First World are looking for jobs and women in the Third World are getting jobs. And therefore this is an issue that joins both concerns.

Export processing represents certain kinds of advantages for Third World countries, because the capital is entirely provided from abroad and there is no need to develop an internal market, which is a severe limitation on the growth of import substitution industrialization. Since the goods are entirely designed for export, the primary criteria in export processing is to keep your cost of production as low as possible. And since export processing is primarily prevalent in labor intensive industries at this point, the primary cost is in labor, which is in this case largely female labor. Export processing has been predominant in the garment and in the electronics industries. It is now beginning to reach other kinds of industries, so that we hear about automobile plants going abroad and steel plants going abroad. And now one is beginning to hear a public outcry, because it is hitting basic industries which employ primarily males. It has been happening in the garment and electronics industries in the last 20 years and there wasn't very much public outcry about it. Unions, like the ILGWU, were complaining, but there wasn't a general public outcry. Now that it is affecting the industries employing primarily men, one is beginning to hear more about it.

Thus, if you are trying to keep labor costs cheap, it means that you keep wages as low as possible. The implication of this is also that in order to retain any kind of competitive advantage, countries that enter export processing--which has become the new development model for many countries, and is promoted by agencies like UNIDO (U.N. Industrial Development Organization)--must keep labor costs as low as possible.

Export processing is fostering the formation of a female industrial proletariat overnight, and its scope is considerable. One figure, which dates from 1980, suggests something like 750,000 workers worldwide in what are called free trade zones. They are like industrial parks with barbed wires around them that are set up so that goods or persons cannot leave free-

ly because their manufacturing is entirely for export in these particular zones.

Yet when one looks back at the history of labor intensive industries, such as the garment or the electronics industry--garments and textiles provide us with particularly rich history, at least in our own society--one sees that women were always used as a source of cheap labor in these labor intensive industries. This goes back to the textile mills of Lowell that I mentioned earlier, where the daughters of farm families, young single girls, were employed in these industries. However, as the textile industry burgeoned, the supply of these young single girls was not sufficient, and also it was quite costly, because you had to put them into boarding houses and provide them with supervision and adequate health care and working conditions.

So then the garment and textile industry turned to another source of cheap labor, which was provided primarily by immigrant labor. Immigrant labor has been and continues to be the primary source of labor recruitment in the garment industry in the United States to this day. It started with Irish, Italian, and Jewish workers coming into New York. Now it is Hispanic and Chinese workers and other immigrants who are employed in the garment industry. Immigrant women presented very distinct advantages in this regard, because they were cheaper to employ than native white American women; they didn't require boarding schools, and they also continued to work after they were married. Even if they couldn't work in a factory, they would take piece work in at home, a phenomenon which interestingly enough is recurring in many parts of the world.

While immigrant women initially provided a very adequate source of labor for the garment industry, in the 1960s this began to change. The sources of immigrant labor became more scarce with the passage of the Immigration Act of 1965. And the 1960s were a period of high wages, full employment, fringe benefits, and welfare benefits, all of which added to the cost of labor. Welfare benefits become important, because they also offer women an alternative to low menial wage labor. Thus immigrant labor turned out, in the 1960s at least, to not provide an adequate enough source of labor for U.S. industry--or even European industry, one could argue--to compete on a worldwide basis in areas such as the garment and electronics industries. And that was where the third stage in the international division of labor was reached. In short, the garment industry moved from native American labor to immigrant labor, moving south as well--for example to non-unionized labor in North Carolina and Alabama--and then jumping the border to look for sources of cheap labor among women in Third World countries such as the Mexican border and in Asia.

The results have been considerable loss of employment in the garment industry in the United States. For example, it is estimated that in New York City alone between 1960 and 1970, something like 40% of the jobs were lost in the garment industry; that is, in New York City alone about 12,000 jobs a year. A good percentage of that is due to imports. For example, in 1978, in the garment industry alone, imports totalled $8 billion or 22% of the U.S. market. To give you some idea of its importance, a country like Mexico accounted for 20% of all U.S. imports, 20% of its imports under tariff items 806.30 and 807--a total value of $1.1 billion. And for the Caribbean basis as a whole, the exports constituted $1.3 billion. This is also, I think, extremely important in terms of the recently-declared Caribbean Basis Initiative of President Reagan which will turn the entire Caribbean basis into one free trade zone, even though apparel is apparently exempt from the free trade provisions which the C.B.I. wishes to implement.

So women in the United States and other advanced industrial countries are losing their jobs. Some would argue that the United States is such a highly skilled and educated country that we should not have these types of marginal jobs around. They argue that marginal jobs don't belong in the United States, that these are the kinds of jobs we should be sending abroad to Third World countries, which in my opinion is a rather chauvinistic and racist judgment. But they forget that there are women who have spent 20 or 30 years at a sewing machine who really never learned anything else. And there are no other sources of employment available at this point for these women, and they don't particularly enjoy the prospects of going on welfare;

and at this point in Reaganomics it probably wouldn't be available anyway. So this does present a problem.

The movement of production abroad is now affecting major industries such as automobiles and steel; it is also happening in areas like agriculture, as business is moving across the Mexican border to grow tomatoes, making Florida tomato growers very upset. It's the same situation; in other words, if you can produce much more cheaply abroad, and as long as you can import these goods, why produce here?

One of the primary channels used by the unions to try to get some leverage on this issue has been that most of these goods are imported through tariff regulations 806.30 and 807. Under these regulations, as long as American firms are using them, a tariff must be paid, called the value added tariff, based on the value added to that product. This tariff is very small, because it is based on the labor cost which is mininal--23¢ an hour in Haiti, 55¢ an hour in the Dominican Republic. So these tariff regulations represent one avenue to attack export processing, because without these tariff regulations it would not be possible to import the same quantities of these goods.

One can argue that women in these industries in the United States have not been helped very much. What about women in Third World countries? At least one could argue that it is providing jobs for them and perhaps then ultimately it is a good thing. But when one looks at this, I think we have to see the kind of jobs that are provided, and what in fact is happening in these countries.

These are three areas that are important to look at. One is in terms of the sexual division of labor. Very often, one finds that these industries deliberately move into areas of high unemployment--unemployment not just for women, but also for men--because that is one way of also keeping wage levels low. Obviously if they are going to move into areas of high employment they would have to pay more. It is estimated worldwide that 80% of the jobs in these export processing industries are occupied by women. It is not reducing the male unemployment rate at all; therefore it is creating severe problems in terms of the normative ideal we have posited of the man being the primary breadwinner and the woman being the dependent. What happens when a woman ca get a job and a man can't? What does that do to your whole patriarchal tradition and male authority patterns? How has this been affecting family structure? Is it leading to an increase in the number of households headed by women?

Again we don't have conclusive data on this yet. One of the factors that becomes important again here is the degree of male unemployment. If there is severe male unemployment in an area and women can get jobs and men can't, and there is also not a tradition of women being the provider, there is likely to be a problem in family structure and the formation of female-headed households.

Another important factor--and one wonders whether industry has been conscious of this or not--is a distinct preference for young and single females. For one thing they are considered a more docile labor force, and the reason for that docility is something we are beginning to look at. The other factor is that they are single and therefore are not going to be as disturbing to the family structure as older married women. If a young single girl gets a job in a factory, it is not going to be viewed as negatively as if a married woman works while her husband is unemployed. In other words, it is not going to be seen as such a threat to the male authority in the household for the younger daughter to be employed and contributing to the family household or maybe even being the mainstay of that family household, than it would if she were older and married. So this becomes another, I think, important factor to look at--what are the ages and the marital status of the women who are employed, and what effect is that having on the family structure?

The other important thing to look at is that these jobs are very often low paid; they are relatively low status jobs. There is also a high degree of turnover in these jobs, partly

because they sometimes try to keep women on temporary contracts so they cannot be entitled to the kinds of fringe benefits--like severence pay, maternity benefits, etc.--that they would be entitled to were they permanent employees. High turnover is partly due to the very footloose nature of these industries, which tend to be very unstable; since they are labor intensive, they do not have a heavy investment in capital plants or other features and thus can move out and leave at a moment's notice.

This kind of low paid, unstable, low status job, then, does not seem in most cases to be adding very much to the women's status in these communities. In other words, while it does provide them with a certain amount of income and wage-earning capacity, it is not the same as a middle-class woman getting a career job through which she can advance in status. The other factor to remember is that if you've looked at any of these plants--in particular the garment plants that I have been in--the job situation replicates the very paternalistic setting of the household, and does very little to change that particular modus vivendi. Young single girls move from a highly paternalistic setting of their own household into a garment plant where the rank and file are girls--and they are always called girls, even when they are older women--and the management and union management tends to be male.

Another important factor to look at in this whole issue is the role of the state, because for export processing to function they must have state cooperation. Most of these industries move into large free trade zones--industrial parks--provided by the state, which also offers these industries tax holidays. The latter often means they pay no profits on their production for ten years or more (in Puerto Rico it can go to fifteen years and more). They pay no tariffs on goods they import, no taxes on the profits; they are provided with industrial parks which are installed with sewage and water and electricity (which these women do not have in their own homes); in other words, the government expenditures being spent on these industrial parks reduces the amount available to citizens in these countries.

So the role of the state becomes extremely important in facilitating this kind of export processing. The argument used by the state in this respect has been that they are trying to provide a source of employment. There is no question that this employment is very much needed; it certainly is. But decent wages and working conditions must also be provided. In addition, most governments are required, although it is certainly not written into the contract, to be able to control the workers in some way. In other words, they have to insure that this is going to be a dependable and docile labor force, which means that the government gets into the area of controlling unions, worker unrest, strikes, etc. Export processing thus brings pressure to bear on these governments in terms of trying to control worker militancy.

All of these factors, then, would tend to suggest that this is not necessarily an area which is going to lead to a great deal of consciousness-raising for women working in these situations. My expectations, based on the work we have been doing both in the United States and now in Puerto Rico, are not high in terms of this leading to the formation of a militant new industrial proletariat that is going to revolutionize the working class in these countries. While I would not argue against the export processing industries per se, I think it is important that governments take into account some of these factors before inviting these industries in, and be cognizant of some of the issues involved in promoting this type of industrialization.

Segmentation of the Work Process in the International Division of Labor[1]

June Nash

With the growing trend toward capital mobility in the international economy and the concomitant deindustrialization of old industrial centers in the United States, patterns of labor segmentation are in flux. The control that managers have exercised throughout the twentieth century in defining the job and determining who will enter it was a corollary of corporate capitalist organization of labor. Social historians and economists have defined three major transitions: (1) the shift from craft to routinized jobs that Braverman (1974) analyzed in terms of the debasement of labor; (2) the shift from a "homogenized" to a segmented labor force that Gordon, Reich and Edwards (1972, 1982) have developed from premises of a dual labor market (Doeringer and Piore 1971); and (3) the shift from assembly and even skilled machinist and toolmaker trades to automated or computerize work processes (Gorz 1982). These transitions affect a workforce, segregated by both achieved (training and education) and ascribed (sex, age and race) criteria, differently.

In this review of the changing work process in a New England community, I shall question the periodization of managerial strategy as well as an exclusive focus on the workplace. By analyzing the interplay between differentiation of status and role defined in the household and community and the division of labor in the workplace, I hope to gain a more dynamic sense of the emerging consciousness of workers. Even more important, by including firms that are differently integrated in the world capitalist system, I hope to show another level of variables conditioning the entry of the workforce into industry.

Gordon, Reich, and Edwards' analysis of the labor process treats the managerial strategies of debasement (or homogenization as they call it) and segmentation as successive stages in a historical trajectory (1982). This periodization is inadequate even when one focuses only on the advanced sectors of monopoly capitalism. And when we include other sectors of production that coexist in all industrialized countries--"core" as well as "periphery"--we find quite different relations of production in competitive capitalist enterprises, in government, and in the domestic arena where goods and services are still produced. Patriarchal policies, far from being relegated to marginal enterprises in the contemporary labor market, continue to define the entry into most production jobs in monopoly capitalist enterprises. These policies are often promoted by trade unions in the interest of restricting competition in the primary workforce (Hartman 1976; Kreckle 1980). Furthermore, Gordon, Reich and Edwards (1982) tend to take the spectrum of jobs as a given set of slots into which a differentiated workforce is channeled. But as we have seen particularly in offshore operations, the organization of work presupposes

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differential advantages in the labor market, and the job structure is designed to take advantage of these.[2]

Two assumptions underlying labor market segmentation deny the dynamic process in the formation of class consciousness and its activation. The first is the Parsonian notion of the nuclear family as "the molecular unit of the class system" (Middleton 1974:184), and the second is that the outlook and behavior of the workers can be equated with the slot they occupy in industry. When Gordon et al (1982:273) come to conclusions about the relationship of consciousness and segmentalized labor categories, they identify the worker with a household as though all members were a unit responding to a single wage earner. Thus they say, the "independent primary workers and their household" were seen as likely to focus on political issues concerning quality of life and individual autonomy; the "subordinate primary workers and their household"emphasized the importance of the economic growth and U.S. international dominance to ensure full employment, while "secondary workers and their household" are likely to place particular emphasis on access to government services. (Emphasis is added.) But what if, as I have seen most commonly, the primary worker comes home to find his secondary workforce wife, who has rushed home from her part-time job to cook him supper? And then what if his son drops in to advise them that he has to move back home with them because he just lost his job in McDonalds? Whose consciousness is going to prevail? With a theory of segmentation that assumes a unique tie to the labor market, the social scientists would have to leave a script that would sum up that consciousness to a TV sitcom writer.

Then, too, the failure to deal with the role of the government sector leaves out the special mediating role played by social service agencies in channelling the frustrations of workers blocked by a segregated labor market. As Sokoloff (1980) shows, the technical and professional employees excluded or pushed out of the monopoly sector were formerly absorbed in the competitive enterprises and the state sector. The task of this sector, both in generating employment and in compensating for inequities, is now threatened by national and state budgetry cut-backs just when it is most needed to overcome the stagnation in the economy and the widening gap in wealth distribution.

Segmentation of jobs and of the labor force channeled into them is not a new phenomenon. Differentiation between a core of preferentially treated workers and a temporary, lower-paid group usually assumed to be less skilled has been characteristic of industrialization since its origins. In the 1830s, when women were the majority of operatives, the few men employed in textile factories aspired to be foremen by virtue of "good conduct and obedience to the will of their employers" (Montgomery 1980). Gray (1974:19) writing about "The Labor Aristocracy in the Victorian Class Structure" found that "the inhibiting effect on working class consciousness of structural differentiation is, as social historians are well aware, a phenomenon visible throughout the history of industrial capitalism." While in nineteenth century textile and shoe mills segmentation was based on differential skills, job seniority and supervisory functions, by the twentieth century it was often related to the level of integration of the firm. Large corporations with multiple branches within the nation and overseas attracted a preferred workforce with higher wages and benefits won by unionized shops. Competitive firms in industry and services draw upon women and ethnically discriminated workers.

The current deindustrialization is destroying the privileged position of the "primary" workforce at the same time that it is eliminating the production processes organized by unions. As these formerly privileged workers fall into the ranks of the "secondary" workforce or of the unemployed, the relationships among members sharing the same household are changed. I shall describe some of the strategies of workers and management that are bringing about a restructuring of industrial relations in a New England city dominated by the electrical machinery industry.

The Rise and Decline of Industry in Western Massachusetts

I shall draw upon data collected in the study of a city of 50,000 people that I shall call Pontoosuc to talk about the emerging labor process in the present industrial restructuring. Industry developed in the western part of Massachusetts at an earlier date than on the east coast because of lack of transportation and access to markets trading with Britain. During the War of 1812, eastern mercantile capitalists dependent on trade with Britain did not support the war. In the western part of the state, however, where small manufacturers had developed independently, an early historian of the area stated, "The love of country and the hope of gain thus operated reciprocally upon each other, and harmoniously together, in the encouragement of manufactures" (Smith 1876:197). The fulling and dyeing mills that had assisted housewives with domestic production of wool since the turn of the century expanded their production to include woolen blankets and uniforms for the U.S. Army. The textile industry developed a competitive position even after the tariffs of 1824 attracted eastern mercantile interests to enter into production in Lowell and Manchester, New Hampshire. Segmentation of the labor force was a constant feature of these early mills. Listing the names of long-term employees, Smith (1876:479) commented, "A peculiarity in the management of the Pomeroy mills, which they share with that of other old Pontoosuc (pseudonym inserted) firms, is the long retention of faithful employees." Among those mentioned were Solomon Wilson, superintendent for 50 years, Joel Monthrop, a spinner for 40 years, and Wesley Hansen, a fuller for 35 years. Like the others listed, all were male, and apparently of English or Irish patronyms. The job was not in itself the determining factor in the preferential retention of this workforce, since fullers and spinners were found among the roving workforce sporadically employed in response to levels of sales.

Capital generated in the textile mills provided a base for electrical machine manufacturing. William Stanley, who invented the first alternating current generator, was able to raise $27,000 from Pontoosuc's banks and start his first plant in 1887. The rapid growth of the Stanley Co. plant, which employed over a thousand workers by 1903 and which had increased its capital investment tenfold, attracted the attention of Global Enterprises. Incorporated in the late nineteenth century, the corporation had two main plants in the northeast. From the very beginning of corporate control, local business and labor leaders feared that the company would be closed since it was believed "...that the main object of the Global Enterprises (pseudonym inserted) in acquiring control of the property was to remove what might have eventually developed into a formidable competitor" (Berkshire Eagle February 12, 1903). This did not come to pass. The new owners invested $1 million dollars and trained the young men in the plant on larger work.

Throughout the history of the corporation, the plant has had a segmentalized workforce. In the 1916 strike, it was the preferred workforce of machinists that led the protest for higher wages and shorter hours. It was their union, the International Association of Machinists, that took the lead in organizing the walkout. Machinists and toolmakers have always been the prima donnas of the workplace, taking priority over winders and other very skilled but industry-specific training. The fact that they had a skill that they could take to many other industrial plants gave them assurance to stand up to management, one very militant toolmaker told me. Many became strong supporters of industrial unions in the thirties and after World War II. Their history shows that managerial tactics dividing the workforce are not directly related to consciousness (Nash n.d.).

The workforce of 7,100 now employed in Global Enterprises is two-thirds of that employed up to the late sixties. The corporation is threatening to shut down an entire division if productivity does not increase dramatically. The present employment rate of 8.6% seems low in comparison with national rates of 10.5, but the city has lost over 7,000 young workers who have left in the past decade. In the period 1969 to 1975 Massachusetts lost 430,000 jobs, many of them in primary manufacturing (Bluestone and Harrison 1982)

Many of the products formerly manufactured in Global Enterprises are now produced in their overseas branches: radios, electrical bulbs, plastic housings and switches for electrical appliances, etc. The latest victim was an entire division producing gynal, which was developed by the corporation and recently sold to a Japanese firm. The most active unit is the Ordinance division where government contracts have increased the demand for workers bumped from other divisions. Paper manufacturing, plastic mold injection forms that grew out of divisions closed down by Global Enterprises, garment and textile plants are stable but declining employers in the same community. Members of the same family are often distributed in different occupational levels within the Global Enterprises and in smaller unorganized shops and service occupations. The differentiations within these firms and among workers employed in firms that are differentially integrated in the world market will be explored in terms of the "emic" categories--those used by the workers and managers themselves to describe their status--and the "etic" categories defined by social scientists. My thesis is that neither emic nor etic categorization is determinant of social consciousness and level of class mobilization; the relations in production that underlie the categories are conditioned by the way in which the firm is integrated in the world capitalist system. The workers' consciousness of their condition is qualified by their familiar relations within their household and in consideration of the levels of expectation that were activated in their family socialization. The most important distinction is that between corporate capitalist enterprise and competitive capitalist enterprises.

Corporate Capitalist Workforce

The reference points for managerial classifications for the workforce are (1) exempt, (2) ineligible for union membership, and (3) eligible production workers. Exempt workers are those whose skill and control of information put them beyond the application of government rulings regarding affirmative action or union rules related to seniority or "bumping" rules. Ineligible is a category that includes routine clerical and keypunch operators along with secretarial and other information processing workers who deal with "confidential" material. Eligible includes the bulk of production workers except for foremen who, like all supervisors and managers, are ineligible.

Exempt employees. Most of the jobs in this category are filled by men. It is a professional status requiring training and education that is subdivided into "individual contributors" and others who manage other people. When women broke into these higher positions after the implementation of the Equal Employment and Opportunity Act they were channelled into the former category to avoid gender confrontation in the management of men by women. Jane, an "individual contributor" with whom I spoke, said,

> The exempt category are strictly the professional people. When it comes to laying off in Global Enterprises, they rarely lay off people in the exempt category. The individual contributors may manage a contract or a project, but they don't manage people.

Job security is the principal benefit for this group but, in addition, there is apparently a trivial but in fact very potent distinction between exempt and other categories of workers: they do not have to punch in on the time clock. This symbolizes the fact that they are more in control of the management of their time in the plant. Competition exists among even these highly specialized workers. Managers will give the task of solving the same problem to two or more engineers and they will often be pitted against each other in coming up with a solution.

When opportunities for women opened up in the exempt category in the early seventies, some of the older personnel managers found it difficult to adjust to the new outlook. The young woman quoted above recounted her experience in being interviewed by the personnel manager accustomed to dealing with male applicants:

> I interviewed for one job at G.E. where even though you're not supposed to ask people certain questions regarding their intentions of having families or things like that, I was asked...Well, it used to be when I wasn't married, "Do you have a boyfriend? A pretty girl like you, you don't have a boyfriend?" I mean roundabout kind of fashion. The way they do it now is they come out and say, "Are you career oriented or family oriented?" It's the same damn question. I had one man come out and say to me, he mumbled something in the middle of an interview, something about a family, and I said, "I beg your pardon? I didn't quite get what you asked me." And he mumbled again and I said, "I'm sorry, I really don't know what you're trying to ask me." And he finally looked at me and he said, "Well, what about a family?" I said, "Do you mean, Do I want to have children and stay home for twenty years and take care of them? Is that what you're trying to ask me? He said, "I know I'm not supposed to, but that's what I'm asking you." I really was flabbergasted,and I said, "Well, you're right, you're really not supposed to ask me.

When the Equal Employment and Opportunity Act first opened up this category for women and racially discriminated employees, the company was out fishing for candidates. That wave crested in the late seventies, and management no longer urges individuals to upgrade themselves as they once did. However, the training courses are open to minorities and they have greater access to information about openings than formerly.

Ineligible employees. The company controls the designation of jobs as ineligible for union membership. Any supervisory employee is automatically designated as ineligible even when they are in charge of a small group. Because the corporation controls the definition of the job, management can write into the description that it involves the processing of confidential information, and they are the ones who decide what that means. As the white collar union Business Agent stated:

> We are excluded from doing "confidential work." So the company says it is confidential work and they can tell you every job in the Global Enterprises is confidential work. If a clerk key punches the boss's check, or a proprietary budget, that's confidential work. Well, everything in the Global Enterprises is confidential, and they have brought in the use of that word and we've lost our jobs throughout. Our bargaining unit went from 1296 people eligible twelve years ago to 371 today, and the employment in the ineligible rank went the opposite.

The fact that 86% of this unit is female gives one a new perspective of the problem of why women don't join unions. Their clerical functions, routine as they may be, are easily categorized as managerial, from secretaries all through the information processing chain. Some women have been reclassified as ineligible while working at the same job, but this is tantamount to grievance provocation. Most of the time, the reclassification comes with the introduction of new processing machinery which integrates them with other information processing units that are somewhere along the chain classified as confidential. Because so much of the basis for negotiations rests on knowledge of comparable wage scales in other plants, one can understand why management wants to control this information. The computer may become the instrument whereby workers can gain access to that information.

Job ratings. In contract negotiations carried out after World War II, job ratings were

worked out in production as well as clerical and exempt categories. In the clerical ranks, the lowest is a mail carrier, whose wage in 1982 was $325 a week, followed by general clerks, file clerks, keypunchers, typists, stenotypists, and payroll. Up to the seventies, women were never hired in ranks above this. The overt reason was that higher ranks should be able to read blueprints. The union fought for and won training courses in blueprint reading. Women now occupy up to grade 12 ratings where they figure out traffic routes for shipping the large utilities made by the company. The highest pay in this range is $500 a week.

The company has complete control over adding duties or taking away some tasks, lowering the rating on jobs or claiming that work doesn't exist. They are resorting more frequently to Kelly Girls, women employed by a private agency which sends in "temporary" workers. These workers are not unionized and work for about half the wage of regularly employed workers. One whom I met in the course of our random interviews, the spouse of a regularly employed worker, was actually earning one-quarter of the top ranking white collar workers in Global Enterprises.

The lack of information about future plans for technological change inhibits the union's ability to plan ahead and advise their workers. As the white collar union's business agent said,

> I'd like to see a good retraining program we can plan in advance. Say we're getting 19 computers two years from now, we could say, "How many of you people would like to do this at night, take some courses?" Or "We'll pay your tuition at B.C.C. to learn about this."

In the new contract the union has negotiated a retraining contingency for coping with technological innovation. This is a possible entry into information of the sort envisioned by the business agent if handled adroitly.

Production workers have up to 25 ratings supposedly based on skill, difficulty or hazard in the job, and special training. Women never rose above an R14 rating, which was chiefly testing, until the seventies. Following the passage of the EEOA, jobs were posted and several women applied and gained jobs as truckdrivers, cleaners, and big assembly. The only woman to sign up for the heavy assembly job was a woman in her thirties who had lost $45 in weekly pay when she and all the other workers were taken off piecework. She commented:

> To upgrade yourself after we lost piecework you had to take on a man's job. Foreman tried to discourage you there. It was tough to take on a man's job. "This is heavy, that is heavy; you've got to climb way up there." It was tough to take on harder jobs just to make up the money that you had lost. If you're working for yourself and your family, this is what you had to do.

Joan worked inside the tank loaded with PCB-impregnated oil. There were hundreds of men and she was the only woman on the night shift, which she took to get 10% extra in pay. She moved to an R19 rating, and with the "adder" which was compensation for the lost piece rate, she was making more than her husband, who did the same job. Her marriage went on the rocks after 15 years and 5 kids, but she denied that it had any connection with her new earning status. On the job she wore dungarees and shirts, covered with oil. But after work she changed to street clothes, the trim polyester pant suits with California-style blouses that she wears in her duties as shop steward. From this job she went to woodwork shop which had also been a male domain. Here she worked a swing saw. When she started work here, Joan said,

> The boss didn't want the other gal who came in with me because she was too small. As though size made a difference! Because there were little men in there. But we always had to prove ourselves, whereas a man just gets hired. There can be 20 guys in a

> shop and one woman on the job and the supervisor asks, "Is she doing it right? Why is she standing still? Give her a broom to sweep!" But you stand out.

The new system of posting jobs and advising the shop of possibilities led to several new women applying for jobs formerly held by men only. Women are driving trucks, cleaning tanks, and running fork lifts. But not all women wanted these changes. When layoffs came about, the company could fire them if they refused more than two of the jobs offered in bumping workers with less seniority.

Nelly belonged to the generation older than Joan that went to work just before World War II during the depression. She resisted being put on "men's" work during the war:

> I remember one time they came up with this job. It was something to do with a small bomber. It used to come off the presses in half, and then they'd put them together. And you used to have to buff, you know, with these wheels. And two or three girls had tried it and they couldn't do it, so he asked me to do it. You know, if those wheels went so fast, they could snap that right out of your hand. And I was short and I didn't reach that big wheel. You couldn't even hold it. A woman couldn't hold it. I told him I couldn't even hold the dishes they're so big. "It's dangerous. I'm not going to do it." So he said, "Well, you go home." So I said, "Well, I'm going home." He says, "You go home and come back when I call you." That was before the union. So I went home. Then he called me back on another job. They had hired men to do that work.

Production workers like Nelly could earn more than the foreman on some jobs:

> The minute they figured out what jobs paid well, they sent in a timer. The boss would always be watching and he could never make it out. So, anyway, he used to say, "You make more money than I do." I said, "Well, I work for it." And he'd say, "Well, I'll catch you yet. I'll find out which job is which." But he never did.

Because Nelly did several jobs she was able to mix the tally cards so that the boss was never sure where the money was. Nelly, who was Italian, was on good terms with her boss even though she "never brought in any tomato sauce to give to him" like some others did. He "took a liking to me," she said, adding "not a liking like you could bribe him."

In these years, even before the union, Global Enterprises had enough advantages over the textile and paper firms in the area that they could be selective about their employees. Girls who started to work before the age of sixteen had to be released one day a week to go to continuation school. This was the case for Vickie, an Italian Swiss who started work in 1923 in the North Adams cotton mills. When she turned sixteen she went to work in Global Enterprises in the porcelain plant that was replaced with plastics. Then she went to work on radio bases with 800 women in one department. That went to Concord, New Hampshire, and she went into fan motors. That was moved overseas. Then she was a winder in small transformers but that went to Shreveport. Her career is a record of capital flight. Although she never went beyond an R10 rating, she was able to make good money on piece rates. When day rates were instituted, she lost $14 a week. She felt that day work meant a big loss of motivation.

In her early years of work, she was subject to many layoffs. The first came when she got

married in 1926:

> It was the time that Global Enterprises laid all the married women off. It made no difference whether your husband was working or not, but mine happened not to be, but as far as Global Enterprises was concerned, that was the rule. If you were married, you got laid off.

When she was penalized for her marriage, she went to work at Sprague's in North Adams and worked until the birth of her child when she took three months off. She lived in a two-family house with her mother and so had no problem with baby-sitting. She always made more money than her husband, who was in construction. As the demand for workers rose during World War II, she returned to ask for a job at Global Enterprises. The manager said she would have to go to "Victory" school along with all the other "girls" to learn the machines. She had worked all of them before so she asked for a chance to demonstrate that she could run them and he hired her. The hardest thing for her was getting used to the swing shift and they kept alternating these each month. With a family to take care of, doing the cooking and cleaning, she found it hard to get to sleep. When the boys returned from war, she lost her job:

> They put the boys back on the machines and there were no women running them. They transferred them elsewhere. I went over on winding. I liked the screw machine because I happen to like machinery.

In the 49 years of active work, Vickie ended up with 28 years and seven months of service because her intermittent employment was subtracted from her cumulative credits. If she had been able to stay three more months beyond her 65th birthday when retirement was compulsory, she would have had a higher pension.

Competitive Capitalist Firms

Vickie was luckier than some women who dropped out of the primary workforce entirely when they married. Mitzie was born in 1922, just a year before Vickie came to America. She was the daughter of a silk weaver who kept moving the family as he went from Canada to the New England mills that closed successively. "You know how the mills are," she said, "they closed and moved South. We kept moving. Rocky Hill was one, Willowmatic was one, then Norwich. I was quite young and the mills didn't stay around all that long. Finally he came to work on the Adams wool mill."

Her older brothers were weavers working in wool, silk and cotton. Her sisters started out as weavers in the mills, but they got married quite young. Her first job when she got out of high school was in the Global Enterprises.

> When I got out of high school in 1939, jobs were hard to get. I had applied for an office job in Global, but there was nothing. I got a call from Global personnel who said there was an opening in the factory which I could take until there was an office opening. I took the job waiting for the office job, but when it came I didn't want to take it because the pay was so low--$16 and I was making $70.

She got married in 1943 but did not have to leave as women did before the war. In 1944 she had a still-born child and she went back to work until 1947. She was making $60 to $70 a week and knew she would be leaving soon for her second child. She left work in 1947 when the baby was born and stayed out until 1969 when the youngest of her six children went to college.

With her return to work, Mitzie dropped into the secondary workforce working in the school cafeteria. She unpacked and heated food sent from the high school. She started at $1.75 and never got more than the minimum wage. Proposition 2½ meant a cutback on jobs held by many women, and she and the others who remained on the job had to work harder. Parents had a hard time paying for the increase in prices for the lunches which went up to 60¢ but were then cut back to 50¢ because of the drop in sales. CETA workers are hired at wages above what these women are now getting, which is about $85 to $90 a week even though they supervise the work of these young people. She is head of her union which they organized four years ago.

> We get very few raises, but it is easier to get when we have the union to back us up. Before they were just talking to a bunch of women--take it or leave it. But with the union backing us, people will come in from Boston to fight for us.

Mary started in the workforce as clerk in her sister's store when she was fourteen. She gave all her wages--$5 a week-to her father who gave her 50¢. When she was married at the age of twenty she quit work to have three children in four years. When her husband proved irregular in his support of the family, she went to work as a spare hand spinning and doffing at the woolen mill earning $14 a week in 1932. She quit her job to follow her husband to Connecticut, but there he abandoned her and she was forced to go on welfare. The Connecticut welfare service escorted her and the children back to Massachusetts and there she went back to work in the factory.

In these competitive capitalist workshops, the work was hard, poorly paid, and there were few benefits. Women were constantly subjected to sexual harassment by foreman but felt they couldn't complain for fear of losing their jobs. Mary was never offered a job at the Global Enterprises like some of her companions, but even some of those who were offered a job stayed on at the textile mill, thinking that there might be more security in a small shop. However, the mill folded before they reached retirement and they had little more than Social Security after a lifetime of work.

Sue started work in a garment factory in 1971. She stayed with the same factory despite the low wage because her boss let her take time off for her pregnancies, which she considered a favor. She was also able to come in at 7:30, one-half hour later than her shift, because of baby-sitting problems, and her boss was good about letting her stay home when the children were sick. She never had a paid vacation and was just given Thanksgiving, Christmas and New Year's as paid holidays. She had no health insurance and no retirement plan. She was divorced and almost the only support for her children.

What broke her commitment to the job was when the boss called in a time rate man when he got a big order from the army to make parkas. The first week he set the rates, the women got much higher than usual wages. Then the boss, who had always set the rates arbitrarily, cut them in half. She earned only $65 and complained along with several workers. When he refused to respond, she and others called in the ILGWU. When the boss heard of it, he threatened to close the shop. So they decided to come out in the open and organize. The organizer entered the shop with cards and, when one of the women said hello to him, the boss came raging out and fired her. Sixty-one workers walked out with her, three-quarters of the entire shop.

The workers walked the picket line from May to September, when a court date with the NLRB was set in November. During this time, the owner tried to run down the pickets with his car, called them names, and threatened them. He continued to work with a reduced force and subcontracted some of the work to New Jersey.

Sue's answer to one of the questions raised in a forum as to why she picketed and exposed her children to the violence was as follows:

> Because I feel strongly about it as a worker, as a woman and

> as a mother. I feel I should be able to make a decent week's pay for my children to live. I felt very guilty the entire summer that I was not able to do a single thing with my children except to bring them to the picket line with me. As I said before, I cannot afford to send the children to a babysitter. My family is not sympathetic to this. My family has not made an offer in any way to help me, whether it is to watch the children for a day or to buy me groceries or anything like that. My mother, incidentally, works at Global Enterprises, but she will not belong to the union. She doesn't believe in unions. While I know that I don't like my children exposed to the language--I don't use this kind of language--I know that this kind of language is used. They don't repeat it; they understand what it is and where it's coming from. I just want them to know the kind of struggle that's involved.

During the discussion that followed, someone of Sue's mother's generation brought up Ronald Reagan's declaration that September 5, 1982, be declared Working Mother's Day in a preciation of the 18 million American women who work and raise a family. One woman commented, "That's a cheap shot! Where are the appropriations to back it up!" She was Sue's grandmother's age.

Just the summer before, the nurses at the medical center had gone out on strike and got more support than the garment workers. One nurse spoke at the same forum:

> I'm sure most of you have read the paper and realized the background of the nurse's strike. Nursing is professionally, traditionally, and historically mostly women, and the conditions are disgusting. That is the only way to describe them. Here in Pontoosuc we start at $6.64 an hour and the top of the scale is $7.52 an hour. They give us a title and call us registered nurses, but they don't give us the rights or the benefits of any of the male professional groups. Our working conditions are--- well we're continually short staffed, we have no input into making decisions, we have to work under staffing problems continually. When we meet with the staff, thew throw down a wonderful little shopping list to go through. They constantly refer to us as girls, "You girls got to be realistic." The main thrust of them sitting there calling us girls is that they don't think that we were serious; they didn't think that we would have the strength to get together and pull off a successful strike...
>
> We have very few scabs crossing our lines. We have only 18 out of 400 of our own nurses crossing the picket line, and then there are a sort of rent-of-scabs that the hospital hires from other areas... We had a negotiating session last week, and they are long and hard. I couldn't really understand what was the matter. It was my worst session. I went home and I thought about it and then I understood why I felt so bad. And finally for the first time I realized that I was absolutely being refused something that I deserved for no other reason than I was a woman. It hit home that day and I was angry and frustrated and hurt.

It is in these moments of truth, when workers confront the contradiction in their lives, that militant class consciousness is born. It may happen because the awareness of ascribed status contradicts the ideal of achievement, as in the case of the nurse and the Global Enterprise "individual contributor." Or it may arise directly out of the sense of class exploita-

tion on the job, as in the case of the cafeteria worker becoming aware of her extremely low wage rates compared to the CETA volunteers who were hired at a beginning rate higher than she was earning. However it occurs, the lack of logic in the system becomes visible, and management loses its credibility.

The Social Relations of Production and the Reproduction of Family and Community

These women experience in a multiplicity of ways a changing labor process, but their experience is not a passive response. They are reinforcing or transforming the category in which they experience the impact. Nellie refused to do what she considered to be a man's job during the war, while Joan scorned the superintendent's assumption that she couldn't do a man's work. Many like Mary and Sue, chose jobs in marginal factories because they thought that more personalistic ties with an owner-operated shop would permit greater latitude to accommodate their work with their family responsibilities. Other women chose work in hospitals or school cafeterias because the hours were more flexible and they could choose a shift that matched their children's schedules.

I have selected cases from female respondents because they are the ones who are balancing the conflicting demands of production and reproduction. In their movement in and out of the labor market, and from primary to secondary jobs, it is clear that any attempt to equate consciousness and status in the workforce at any one point in time and without consideration of employment of other family members is clearly inadequate. Heightening of consciousness came with an abrupt transition either in the job experience or in their home life. When women entered the jobs that had been sex segregated, they became aware of the stereotypes about them as women. Joan experienced this with foremen on the shop floor somewhat differently than Jane in management headquarters, but both of them gained a greater sense of their potential in challenging the stereotypes they encountered. Nellie liked the sense of being protected and treated as a woman even though she worked in the factory all her life. When she first went to work at the age of sixteen, her father saw to it that she was quickly transferred from the night shift where all these "rough Polish girls worked" to the day shift, and after she got married she deferred to her husband's concern that she shoulda't work on a dirty job. Vickie, who loved working on the machines during the war, was disappointed when she had to go back to assembly work, but she never fought management prerogative.

The women who really expressed and acted upon a class conscious basis were those who worked in the marginal factories and in service occupations. The fact that Sue was a divorced head of household supporting two children on a wage that was only a few cents above the minimal wage catapulted her into trade union activity when her boss arbitrarily cut piece rates. Mitzie's husband had always been the chief wage earner in the household when he worked for G.E., but when kids whom she had to supervise were getting higher hourly rates than she and the other women in the school cafeteria when they came in on a CETA program, she became an organizer for the union.

It is in these life cycles transitions when people are confronted with the many contradictions that exist in the system and how these affect their life chances that class consciousness is born. It may or may not become translated into collective action. In the declining industrial city of Pontoosuc this awareness of contradictions is occurring among workers in the marginal firms and service jobs more than in the workforce employed in the transnational corporation. In Global Enterprises the relatively higher wage rate--$10 to 12 an hour compared with $3.75 to $7--plus the better benefits won in the half century of labor organization has shielded them from some of the harsher economics of the labor market. But as the attrition in the labor force pushes them into the ranks of the unemployed, they are forced to reassess their position. Thus far the plant has not laid off many workers with seniority of more than a decade. Defense contracts in ordinance enabled that part of the plant to absorb workers laid off in other divisions except in the case of draftsmen who have been the main victims of computerized processes.

Women's work has always served as the shock absorber in a system subject to economic cycles of expansion and decline. The system has drawn on this labor force almost to the upper limit of its ability to compensate for fluctuations. Married women who worked part time are now almost fully employed. Their paycheck goes not just for extras but for the essentials needed by the family. Divorced women are the principal support for their children and their imperative to work is the greatest. These are the women who are most conscious of their class position and who have taken the most militant role in recent labor disputes. The women in the garment factory where Sue worked had the longest strike in Pontoosuc history in 1982; they walked the picket line despite aggravated assault by the owner of the firm, who at one time drove into the line with his Cadillac, injuring a picket who had to be hospitalized.

Bluestone and Harrison (1982) show that no one is immune to job loss in the current deindustrialization of America. However they indicate that more Blacks and women are likely to be laid off and to find it harder to get reemployed. We are not able to state this precisely for Pontoosuc since we are in the middle of the research. However, as men move into the service jobs that formerly hired youths and women, the latter have fewer jobs to find. In the major corporations the segmentation by sex is once again crystallizing as the pressure for equal employment is relieved. The very principle of seniority that is institutionalized in union negotiations makes it harder for women and other minorities to retain the jobs they were hired to fill in affirmative action.

To return to the original argument about the impact of a segregated labor market on organization of workers, I have chosen data from interviews with women in monopoly and competitive capitalist enterprises to challenge the argument that workers have never developed a serious political party because they are divided along economic, political and cultural dimensions, and further that this segmentation is a managerial technique of control representing the last resolution of the capitalist crisis (Gordon, Reich and Edwards 1982:2). In contrast, I found that segmentation was a continuous technique throughout the industrialization of Pontoosuc in the textile mills of the nineteenth century as well as in corporate capitalist concerns and competitive industries in the twentieth century. However it was often the privileged segments of the workforce who led the organization of unions in the early decades of unionization, and the organizations they formed united the masses of workers in industrial unions in the thirties.

The implication of a theory of segmentation determining worker consciousness and organization is that unity and collective action can be achieved only when the workforce is completely homogenized. That has never been true for one industry, much less for the many levels of production we find even in a small industrial city such as Pontoosuc. Workers have been able to achieve hegemonic alliances with a wide variety of differentially paid and stratified workers. What broke the unity of the workforce in the post World War II period was the campaign of anticommunism and redbaiting. The resultant split in the union was only partially overcome in the strike waves of the late sixties as the old division between the unions was overcome in the negotiations.

The divisive factor in the workforce is not only that of a primary and secondary workforce based on intrinsic features in the job-governing attitudes or behavior. The real divisions in the workplace are the management-created categories of ineligibles and exempt personnel that impede unionization. This direct manipulation of the workforce by determining who may join the unions is quite different from the creation of a preferentially treated hierarchy affecting class consciousness. Historically workers have been able to overcome cooptation resulting from the job differentiation in times of crisis. Some unions, including the Oil and Chemical Workers Union, have begun to challenge the ineligible classification on a job-by-job basis, but for the most part the consensual accord that characterizes worker management relations in industry (Burawoy 1979) accepts the managerial prerogative of control over information and definition of the job.

Anthropological monographs on the production process[3] testify to the importance of the

family and community in mediating consciousness of class relations in production. This is not just a "primitive" or "Pre-capitalist" conditioning of consciousness. Cultural historians[4] give equally persuasive evidence that working class movements do not begin and end in the shop, but rather are sustained by the mobilization of the community. Pontoosuc's own history indicates the importance of community support in the moments of class struggle that issue from the workplace but not necessarily begin and end there. The present struggles and the level of militant class action in Pontoosuc today would be completely unpredictable in terms of segmentation theory: nurses and women--particularly those with full responsibility for maintaining themselves and their children--working in competitive capitalist enterprises are the ones who have "hit the streets" in their demands for a living wage and the right to unionize.

Women who live in households with a second wage earner are less likely to recognize the exploitation they experience in workplaces where the wage is less than the subsistence needs of the family than women who are the only support of the family. When Mitzie's husband retired and received less than one-quarter of his former pay as a pension, her income became more important. When she realized how low it was in comparison with CETA employees who were recent graduates of high school, she started to unionize. Sue's moment of truth came when the New Jersey piece rate timer revealed the comparatively low pay the women in this unorganized shop received in the rates he put on their work, and when the boss reacted by arbitrarily cutting the rate in half. Their accommodation to subordinate jobs and wages came about not because of a change in their relations in production, but as they began to see their jobs and wages in a larger context. The unionized workforce in the Global Enterprises has so far accepted the attrition of jobs and a speedup designed to make them more competitive, but a recent four-hour walkout to show their objections to a "checker" system instituted to measure their productivity indicates a deep and growing resentment to corporate practices.

The context for these differentiated responses by workers to the present restructuring of the workforce is the world capitalist system and how it impinges on the production process. Marginally surviving enterprises, such as the garment shop in which Sue works, are in direct competition with offshore sweatshops, and management is demanding that workers make their labor competitive with that of low-paid operatives throughout the world. Except for one plant that was unionized, the small plastics are not organized and the highest paid workers receive less than a janitor in the Global Enterprises plant. Through subcontracting and eliminating entire processes that are relocated overseas, the corporation is cutting its operations down to the only division it considers to be sufficiently profitable--that of armaments.

A theory of working class consciousness and how it is tied to relations in production must take into account the mediation of family and community as well as the level of integration of the firm in the world market. It cannot ignore the active intervention of workers in shaping the categories that appear to govern their behavior: the privileges of the "primary" workforce were in great part won by the workers themselves. They were not just favors given by management in the interest of coopting a segment of the workforce. The task ahead is to weld those hegemonic alliances among differentiated strata of the workforce at a time when the very survival of industry is threatened by the flight of capital.

Footnotes

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[2]Among those who have studied the offshore plants are Linda Lim (1978), M. Patricia Fernandez-Kelly (1980), and Helen Safa (1981). Their work, along with that of researchers of electronics assembly plants in the Silicon Valley (Katz and Kemnitzer 1983, Keller 1983) show the preponderance of young female assembly line workers who are assumed to have the biological predispositions to do small, painstaking assembly work without rebelling.

[3]See Alverson (1978), Epstein (1958), Mitchell (1956), Nash (1979), Walker (1950), Warner (1941) and many others who have emphasized the significance of community in relation to the workplace.

[4]In particular Cumbler 1979, Gutman 1976.

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Development in the Family: Third World Women and Inequality

Sally Bould

The traditional capitalist development model with its emphasis upon economic growth has, in the past decade, been severely criticized with respect to its negative effects upon the poor as well as its negative impact upon women. The first and second development decades not only have failed to achieve "economic take off," but they also have failed to provide that improvement in the status of women which modernization is reputed to induce. (Bossen, 1975). The push for growth and modernization in the Third World may have led to a deterioration of the economic position of women as well as a deterioration in the absolute economic situation of at least the poorer third of the population (Adelman, 1975; Griffin, 1978). Furthermore, evidence suggests that the poorest of the poor are disproportionately women heads of households and their families (Buvinic and Youssef, 1978). One result of this negative impact of the development process has been a refocus of attention in development policy upon the poor (World Bank, 1975) as well as a mandate to integrate women in the development process in the "Percy Amendment" to the Foreign Aid Act of 1976. Nevertheless, this new emphasis upon "women in development" suffers from a flaw similar to that of the traditional development model. Each treats the family only in a superficial way: the first because of naive assumptions concerning women in the family; the second by treating women independently of the family constellation.

Traditional Development Theory

The traditional capitalist development theory referred to here is that of growth based upon a Keynesian economic model involving state and private cooperation in the investment of capital aimed at the highest profit. While there are a number of technical economic presentations of this theory, the most popular and influential statement (Brookfield, 1975: 43) was by W.W. Rostow in his The Stages of Economic Growth. More than any other early statement he discusses the nontechnical implications of growth, yet he refers to women only once in a parenthetical remark about their full-time duties in child care (1961: 91). His reference to the family occurs where he is discussing man's economic motivation and indicates that he is also "...concerned with his family..." (1961: 149). Traditional development theory, then, when it dealt with the family at all, dealt with it under the assumptions of the idealized family model of western industrialized societies, especially the United States during the 1950s.

This popular model of the 1950s involved a division of labor in which the wife in her expressive role was responsible for child care, cooking, housekeeping, and general nurturance

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while the husband in his instrumental role took responsibility for providing economic security. This division of labor within the family was assumed to be universal, and ethnographic research was interpreted to support the argument of universality (Zelditch, 1955). Hence, the traditional model of development included an implicit assumption that women in developing societies would be provided for by men. Often it was only men who were included in labor supply models. The traditional development theory, however, did indicate an additional role for the wife: that of consumer (deWilde, 1967: 211). This was viewed as essential to the development of internal markets. Harnessing the economic motives and family responsibilities of men and linking them to consumer training among women was to provide the incentives for increased production and consumption that growth was thought to require (UNZALPI, 1970, cited in Rogers, 1980: 159). Matrilineal systems were viewed as violating this essential thrust of development and deliberate efforts were made to suppress them (Rogers, 1980: 126ff). Even the more recent emphasis on women in development has led to "women's projects" which in effect try to teach poor women in developing countries how to be better homemakers (Rogers, 1980: 79ff). Such programs often appear to attract elite women who are interested in learning to make "proper wedding type cakes" (Kromberg and Carr cited in Rogers, 1980: 92).

Traditional capitalist development theory, then, contained some very ethnocentric and naive assumptions. The first assumption was the viability of the family form where the man was the sole economic provider and the woman was the nurturer and homemaker, an assumption which feminist critics have effectively questioned for developed societies (Bernard, 1972; Chapman, 1976). The second assumption was that this division of labor between husband and wife was both natural and universal. Historical research suggests, however, that this division of labor within the family was true for a majority of western families only for the post war decades of prosperity, and of course never among poor families.[1] A behavioral norm which prevailed for a few decades in the developed capitalist world could hardly be classified as natural or universal. Thirdly it was assumed that where such a natural family form obviously did not exist, such as was the case among matrilineal societies, change could be superimposed, and the "right" family form created.

Critics of Traditional Development Theory

The task of developing a more appropriate family theory is essential to the success of development policy, yet both the feminist and non-feminist critics of the traditional development theory have yet to develop one. The feminist critics have successfully attacked the western ideology of the family, especially its assumptions which justified discrimination against women. The non-feminist critics have successfully attacked the ideology of growth, especially as it affects the poor. The former argue for a reduction of inequality between men and women, while the latter argue for a reduction of inequality in one of the "growth-with-equity" models.[2] While both approaches call attention to the importance of social factors in development (Dixon, 1978; Weaver, et al. 1978) the former often treats women as independent of the family[3] while the latter virtually ignores them.[4]

The growth-with-equity approach, while presenting extensive documentation of growing poverty and inequality, fails to recognize that it is women alone with minor dependents who are disproportionately the poorest of the poor. In contrast, the feminist approach has been criticized by Third World Women at the 1975 United Nations Conference in the Year of the Women in Mexico City (Nash and Safa, 1980: x) for ignoring critical problems of overall inequality. It is important that these two critical approaches join together to develop a combined attack upon the still-powerful traditional model and its assumptions. But they can do so only with a better developed theory of the family, because it is the family which brings together the issues of inequality and the role of women.

The success of one of these new approaches depends inevitably upon the success of the other. In an effective policy of antidiscrimination women would have equal access to the more secure nonagricultural jobs which guarantee some level of financial security: jobs in the primary labor market or steady jobs in the secondary labor market or government service. The

implementation of such a policy, given that such jobs are not plentiful in developing countries, could lead to an increase in inequality because of the role of the family. From the literature on successful job search, especially for blue collar jobs in the developed countries with loosely organized labor markets, the good job is found through friends and relatives already on the job (Doeringer, 1969). It is likely that men, who have these good jobs, would successfully recommend their wives, daughters, mothers and sisters to such posts. Some families, then, would be able to dramatically improve their standard of living, while other families could find their opportunities even more limited. Women who head families without men would be less likely to obtain these jobs. The antidiscrimination approach in the setting of inequality, high unemployment, and a scarcity of good jobs would still leave many women and their families among the poorest of the poor.

A highly successful growth-with-equity strategy would require a 6% growth rate and a radical redistribution so that the poorest 20% of families received more than 10% of the total income (Griffin, 1978: 158). It would still fail to achieve equity between men and women, however, if that bottom 20% were predominantly women who were the sole support of their children. Even with equal wages, the inequality between men and women would remain due to the fact that women would still have to bear the disproportionate burden of the economic responsibility for children, not to mention the noneconomic responsibilities.

Towards an Appropriate Family Theory

The development of an appropriate family theory is necessary for the success of both the women-in-development and the growth-with-equity approaches. An adequate family theory could serve to effectively integrate these two approaches. Such a theory is necessary to provide a basis for a family policy essential for overall development planning as well as for specific development projects. For the latter, specific family policies must be developed and designed by on-site investigation of the family in each location and/or ethnic group. While it is not possible here to lay out the entire spectrum of possibilities, it is necessary to present some theoretical generalizations which would indicate issues which need to be examined.

The literature available in the area of the family is large, diverse, and often contradictory. It appears necessary, however, to proceed toward developing generalizations which can be incorporated into a more adequate family theory. The focus will be on families in pre-industrial societies, and families whose principal occupation is agricultural since these families more closely approximate the traditional situation before the intrusion of modern western ideology.

The initial elements of a definition of the pre-industrial family would include "reciprocal economic obligations" and the "rights and duties of parenthood" (Stephens, 1963: 8). This definition must be modified to include the possibilities of economic obligations of a male kin and a nonbiological parent. Families are the institution by which men and women are bound together to contribute labor towards the maintenance of the household and the children. In pre-industrial societies this bond of reciprocal economic obligations tends to derive its primary strength from the need of each sex for the productive labor of the other under a system of sex segregation.

For example, in one area of rural Panama, the men grow the rice and the women process it for home consumption (Gudeman, 1978). The division of labor is such that a man needs a wife to process his rice just as she needs a husband to provide the raw agricultural produce for processing. These reciprocal needs and obligations create a balance between the need of the husband for the productive labor of his wife and the need of the wife for the productive labor of her husband; it is inappropriate for women to do men's work as well as for men to do women's work (Murdock, 1937; Levi-Strauss, 1956).

The balanced nature of this reciprocity has been investigated by numerous observers since Arensberg (1937). Laurel Bossen (1975, 1979) has carried out a detailed economic analysis of

the balance between the sexes in terms of hours of work, labor productivity and cash values for the Maya-Quiche Indians of Guatemala. This balance may exist in interpersonal contexts ranging from husband-wife antagonism to cooperation and mutual respect; traditional systems, however, generally attach sufficient value to the wife's labor to provide for her effective bargaining in the relationship. Johnson and Johnson's analysis suggests that it is only where the woman's economic role is isolated from both her husband's role and other women's roles that sexual inequality is extreme (1975: 646). Even in a culture of male dominance such as that of the European peasant, the dominance of men is more myth than fact where the productive activity of the woman is essential. Rogers concludes that:

> The two sex groups, in effect, operate with partially divergent systems of perceived advantages, values, and prestige, so that the members of each group see themselves as "winners" in respect to the other. Neither men nor women believe that the myth is an accurate reflection of the actual situation. However, each sex group believes (or appears to believe, so avoiding confrontation) that the opposite sex perceives the myth as reality with the result that each is actively engaged in maintaining the illusion that males are, in fact, dominant (1975: 729).

The result is a balance between the husband and wife roles and a stable family system operating within the context of the myth of male dominance.

Even in traditional systems with high divorce rates, reciprocal economic obligations require remarriage and a new bond between husband and wife. Economic obligations between kin and in-laws through complex marriage systems, involving a brideprice for example, provide the woman with alternative rights and obligations in the household of her male kin. This situation is found in Augila where one out of four marriages ends in divorce (Moason, 1975). In other cases of high divorce rates, such as among the North Alaskan Eskimo (Burch, 1971) and the Kanuri (Cohen, 1971), the children are taken care of by a new husband-wife team although it may involve neither of the biological parents, as among the Eskimo, or only the father and his new wife, as among the Kanuri.

The Consequences of Development on Family Relationships

Under the ideological and economic pressures of development the reciprocal economic bonds give way. This is often a direct result of development projects which disrupt the traditional balance between the husband and wife. Rogers points to several instances where hostility and antagonism between the sexes were increased as the result of development projects favoring one sex over the other (1980: 101, 173-176). It is usually the man who gains due to the higher cash value of his labor as compared with his wife's labor. In other cases the balance is upset through an increase in the wife's total work load and/or its difficulty relative to her husband's. The most severe case cited was one in which violence erupted between husbands and wives because the wives were doing more than half of the work but receiving only a very limited amount of the cash return (Scoullar cited in Rogers, 1980: 181).

If a man no longer needs a wife's labor or a woman her husband's, then the bond between them becomes more one of individual choice on the basis of companionship, love and emotional ties to children. Parsons saw modern families becoming specialists in human relations management since economic production took place outside the family (Parsons and Fox, 1953). The basis for family stability and parental motivation shifted to romantic love (Parsons, 1949: 187-189). Parsons, as well as later observers such as Goode (1959), were generally optimistic about the success of marriages based on love. Other commentators have been much more pessimistic as to the effective nature of the love bond (Mowrer, 1927; Burgess and Locke, 1953). As Van den Haag puts it:

> Marriage was to cement the family by tying people together...in the face of the fickleness of their emotions...The idea that marriage

> must be synchronous with love or even affection nullified it altogether. (That affection should coincide with marriage, is, of course, desirable, though it does not always happen) (1962: 46-47).

In most traditional cultures marriage is not expected to be based on love (Stephens, 1963: 206). The cement of marriage was reliably provided by economic ties.

The western ideology of the male head as the primary provider not only denies the actual or potential contribution of women, but also inhibits the development of new norms of reciprocal economic obligations appropriate to the new conditions. Men may become contemptuous of women's work (Rogers, 1980: 176) and deny its importance. The effect of this ideology is most negative where men expect that they ought to be the principal provider, but are in a structural situation where they are unable to fulfill this expectation. Under these circumstances, women's work becomes a compensation for male inadequacy and status for the proliferation of women-headed families.

Blumberg and Garcia (1977) and Santos (1976-77) argue that where women can work and earn as much as the men in their class, the result will be a high proportion of women-headed families. The fear is that equality between the sexes leads to a disintegration of marital bonds. Adrienne Germain calls this fear a myth (1976-1977: 166). This analysis suggests, however, that equal access to resources creates no problem as long as there are reciprocal economic obligations. Could not two poor incomes add up to twice as much as one? Problems arise where the economic obligations for the family fall entirely on the man in a situation where low wages and unemployment prevent their fulfillment. This serves to explain the high incidence of women-headed families in areas like the Caribbean, where western family ideology has been strongly imposed but unemployment and low wages are rampant (Moses, 1977).[5]

An appropriate family policy for development would be one in which reciprocal economic obligations are stressed. Western cultural ideals of romantic love and of the male role as sole provider must be avoided because they undermine these reciprocal economic ties. Furthermore, reciprocity requires a balance between husbands and wives in terms of work load and labor productivity.

According to Lasch (1973: 36), the effect of the "industrialization of production and the bureaucratization of welfare" on the family was to "undermine the family's capacity to manipulate economic rewards..." While Lasch was concerned with the family's ability to control the children his point relates well to the control of the wife over the husband. The process of development has undermined the wife's capacity to manipulate economic rewards for the unity and economic well-being of the family. In addition to the disruption of the traditional reciprocal relationships, development has thus far introduced a profound disruptive effect on families by bringing about the deterioration of the family's economic position. Adelman (1975) estimates that 40 to 60% of the population in the poorest countries have become poorer in absolute terms.

Economics of Development

Buvinic and Youssef's analysis suggests that it is "poverty with development" which triggers the breakdown of stable family systems and an increase in woman-headed families (1977: 82). Evidence collected by Rogers (1980) and Dixon (1980) as well as ethnographic studies by Bossen (1979) and Clignet (1970: 281) also show that even where family systems continue to involve men and women, development leads to the lowering of the woman's socioeconomic status within the household. In many cases this is a result of discrimination against women under the ideological assumption that men are the primary providers. In these situations, he obtains the opportunity to provide through access to better nonagricultural jobs or technical advice and equipment for agricultural work. In other cases, however, the reduction in her status is a direct or indirect consequence of the emphasis on capitalist growth by developing cash economies linked to international capitalist markets. It is this process which has been implicated

in the increase in poverty and inequality (Adelman and Morris, 1973; Griffin, 1978; Brookfield, 1975; Murdoch, 1980).

This process emphasizes the development of export markets and the integration into the international capitalist marketplace; it does not build internal markets. Furthermore it puts the developing nation in a dependency relationship similar to that found under colonialism (Murdoch, 1980). The uneven development of capitalism is exacerbated by multinational banks, corporations and the national governments themselves. The export sector receives investments and subsidies which provide for growth in the small export sector, high income for the national elite and high profits for the multinational corporations. Other sectors of the economy, especially the rural sector, are drained of capital and land. This is particularly critical in the area of food production and processing, an area where women have traditionally had an important productive role. Yet is is precisely this area of women's traditional work roles which is being exploited in order to subsidize capitalist industrial and agricultural development which will benefit primarily the elite (Murdoch, 1980).

A recent publication of the Agricultural Development Council has concluded that "in the poorest countries, capitalist farming may bring some additional output, but it may also create unemployment and income inequality" (Hemmi and Atsumi, 1981: 9). Solon Barraclough, Director of the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, has reviewed the studies on the Green Revolution and concluded that the "emergence of a more capital intensive, higher technology farming..." creates a crisis in the

> accelerating dissolution of self provisioning agriculture both as a major element in peasant farming and as a subsistence base for the poorer rural strata... The food systems that have maintained humankind throughout most of its history are disintegrating before other forms of economic activity are able to offer alternative means of livelihood to the displaced peasantry (Barraclough, 1980: vii).

The effect of this kind of development, especially for families on the wrong side of the uneven development, is at best a relative decline in their economic position as the new entrepreneurs move ahead. Inflationary pressures resulting from development mean that such households must now purchase commodities at higher prices created by the new international market without themselves being in a position to benefit from those markets in terms of higher prices for their labor or products. Other development changes can remove traditional access to land for subsistence production as land becomes a commodity to be bought and sold.[6] Thus, what would have normally been provided through household production must be purchased in the marketplace, again at prices inflated by the pressures of developing international markets. Households increasingly have to compete in international markets for food exports and imports in developing countries (Burbach and Flynn, 1980: 105). Even families which are able to preserve traditional self-provisioning in agriculture may experience relative deprivation as new markets offer new commodities which they cannot buy and those few items which they must buy become too expensive.

A deterioration of the relative or absolute economic situation of families puts new and heavy stress on family relationships. One or both marital partners is likely to be blamed for failure to meet their economic obligations. Since it is the men who have been given most of the opportunities for more capital-intensive, higher technology farming, as well as off-farm industrial employment, and the women who have been responsible for a large proportion of the subsistence production for household use, it is more likely that the women will fail in meeting their economic obligations. Their access to land becomes more and more restricted as economic development involving cash economies, export markets and modern agricultural methods will tend to squeeze out subsistence production. Furthermore this process is often abetted by land reform because it allows the new owner, most often the man, to sell the land (Rogers, 1980: 138-141). With dualistic development poorer farmers and small landholders come under pressure from the market to sell their land to larger landholders. This process removes from women

their traditional means of subsistence production while they retain the responsibility for subsistence consumption. Their inability to make their customary contribution to the household economy will generally lower their relative status in the household. Thus, in both economic and non-economic terms the woman is more likely to see her household position deteriorate further than the man's under the process of dualistic development.

The man's position in the family is likely to be enhanced directly by government subsidies in the export sector as well as the investment by international capitalist organizations. The woman's position in the family, on the other hand, is undermined by these same processes, the result of which is that her subsistence agricultural products have been devalued. This is directly the result of government policies to provide cheap food for urban residents (Murdoch, 1980). Furthermore, she is likely to lose access to the land as her means of production and be compelled to enter the rural proletariat for low wages and/or seasonal work (deLeal and Deere, 1979). If her husband is a beneficiary of capitalist development in the rural area, she is likely to become a nonworking wife and lose her ability to bargain effectively since she becomes totally dependent upon him.

The introduction of relatively more cash into the household economy, moreover, is likely to create the illusion of surplus. Under traditional assumptions significant amounts of cash often reflected a real surplus which could be spent for nonsubsistence items. The introduction of cash in lieu of subsistence products often means that the family suffers for economic necessities. The disposition of the cash "surplus," moreover, is more likely to fall to the male, through his own individual wages or earnings from cash crops. The disposition of cash in the hands of men, thus, may very well not benefit the "family" but primarily the male head who wishes to purchase luxury items such as radios or other status items. And such expenditures may be made even to the neglect of the purchase of necessities; cash in the hands of men may be defined as "surplus" even where, for example, cash crops replace subsistence crops as the main agricultural products. The woman loses because she is failing in her economic obligations, and there is no normative basis for the man to assume the role of provider.

In other situations she may still fulfill those obligations but the process of agricultural development has made the work required of her either more difficult or more time consuming, or both. John deWilde generalizes this situation for much of Africa:

> The fact that the man in much of Africa keeps the income from cash crops usually causes the woman, who has the responsibility for feeding the family (through subsistence production) to insist all the more tenaciously on producing all the family's food needs (1967: 22).

Clearly women strive to fulfill their obligations even if it takes a greater imput of their labor. Time budgets for rural women suggest that in many cases they are working over 10 hours a day in subsistence production (Rogers, 1980: 157).

It is clear that in these cases in Africa and Asia there is no basis for the assumption that men will provide for women and children. There is also no basis for the more recent western feminist emphasis on shared roles and pooled resources. In both cases the western models assume that resources will be allocated towards family needs. These needs may reflect a joint decision-making pattern or one where the man alone makes the decision guided by the needs of the family. Families whose traditional division of labor segregates the sexes into separate spheres for production and consumption, however, have no experience of joint decision-making or even decision-making on the part of the male head to meet the overall family needs. Moreover, there is no tradition of the family pooling its resources.[7] Under sex segregation each sex provided those resources for which it was traditionally responsible. Under these conditions the introduction of more cash in the hands of men is not likely to be spent for family needs, especially where those needs were traditionally defined as the responsibility of women. She has no claim to her husband's support in those areas of family consumption for which she is responsible; yet the development process may make her less able to fulfull those consump-

tion needs herself.

One proposed solution, popular among feminist critics, is to provide women, whose economic roles are being displaced, with an alternative role through direct involvement in the cash economy by the provision of jobs. This solution, although apparently simple, ignores the fact that "economic relationships are embedded in social and cultural relationships" (Long and Roberts, 1978: 320). To provide jobs for women without a full understanding of family relationships and the need for a balance between men and women could create antagonism between husbands and wives as well as a situation of overwork for women, who have taken on additional burdens but have not been released from traditional obligations. Furthermore, if the customary division of labor in the household was one where the women engaged in subsistence production while men were involved in production for the cash economy through production of cash crops or labor market activity, then the normal expectation is that men control the disposition of cash (Dixon, 1980; Rogers, 1980) and that this control extends as well to cash earned by women (Rogers, 1980). This control is most likely to occur in cultures with a tradition of male dominance. Thus, without new norms regarding the division of labor in the household and/or pooling family resources, the women and their children are less likely to benefit from even their own productive activities.

The most severe consequences of capitalist economic development for women lie in the combination of economic pressures together with a breakdown of traditional reciprocity and a potential increase in hostility. These processes, singularly or together, result in a situation where women are increasingly left with the primary if not sole economic responsibility for children. In rural areas families headed by women alone are most likely to be the consequence of male out-migration. Young men are more likely to migrate when their own position is deteriorating and they see opportunities elsewhere. This process is, of course, exacerbated by uneven development whereby certain regions and sectors of the economy are better developed and offer more opportunity. Women and children are thus left behind in the less developed regions. In this situation the man may succeed in improving his economic position but there can be no assumption that the family will benefit. Women do not necessarily obtain support from men, especially where norms relating to the division of labor and resources have never covered the possibility that a man with a distant residence and a pay check should share that check with his wife and children back home. Under these circumstances it is more likely that the women will be left with the sole responsibility for the family, both economically and emotionally, with very limited opportunities to fulfill these responsibilities, especially the economic ones (Chaney and Lewis, 1980; Rogers, 1980: 170; Mueller, 1977).

An exclusive focus upon "women in development" does make sense in dealing with the severe economic problems of the households headed by women alone. In such households a woman would be more likely to retain control over her earnings and a concerted job creation program which could utilize the labor of these women trapped in depressed rural areas does have a great deal of merit. The flaw in this type of program is that it only treats the effect, without doing anything about the causes. Certainly it could make these very poorest households better off while leaving intact the social, cultural and economic relationships which brought about the problem of women alone with children in the first place. Furthermore, the vulnerability of this labor force and its identification with "women's jobs" will mean that here, as elsewhere, the job will pay little and such pay is not likely to keep up with the inflation generated by the introduction of further integration into the national and international economies. Moreover, the woman is left with all the problems of the single parent in developed countries in terms of a need for full-time child care and other support services which are not likely to be provided by state agencies. Thus, while jobs directed at poor female-headed families may provide some stopgap assistance, they are not likely to provide her with the support she needs, both economic and noneconomic.

The entire problem of development, and especially unequal development as well as "women in development," needs to be reviewed because of the fact that "economic relationships are embedded in social and cultural relationships." Furthermore the most important social relation-

ship for women and children is the family, including the economic and noneconomic contributions of men. The traditional development model in practice disrupts the expected economic reciprocity between men and women in the context of a deteriorating household economic position. Many families do not survive this stress intact, and women suffer most through their inability to perform traditional economic functions, their lack of traditional claims upon cash generated or controlled by men, and their limited opportunities in the modern sector.

The problem of traditional capitalist development is that it is unequal not only with respect to overall economic opportunities and outcomes but also with respect to men and women in families; women are currently forced to bear disproportionately the costs of development. Through women, children too are forced to bear these costs. Women, having had the least power to begin with, are forced to pay the highest price and have the fewest resources available with which to negotiate (Gans, 1972). Clearly the capitalist developmental model imposed by western nations must be censured for its treatment of women.

Substantial improvement in the position of women, however, requires more than attention "... to programs, projects and activities which tend to integrate women into the national economies."[8] Radical changes are necessary in the way the overall benefits and costs of development are distributed, both nationally and internationally. Integrating women into national economies with a high degree of inequality and poverty will still mean severe poverty for at least one-third of the women. Unless men and women are integrated into families where joint economic responsibilities are carried out, integration into the national economies will still leave many women with the primary economic burden of children. The success of the women-in-development approach depends on the success of the growth-with-equity approach and both jointly depend on an effective family policy which binds men together with women in their responsibilities for children.

It is unrealistic to assume, as traditional development models have, that family relationships can easily adapt unless attention is directed towards both male and female roles. A new division of labor is needed which can be the basis for new forms of reciprocity between men and women. This new division of labor would have to be built upon more traditional cultural expectations, while introducing changes which pay close attention to keeping or enhancing the bargaining position of the woman.

Growth-with-equity advocates, their critics,[9] and women-in-development advocates all need to re-examine their efforts in terms of the family and its critical role in the articulation of the individual and the economy. The position of women cannot be cogently analyzed independently of family relationships involving men. Any development model which lacks an appropriate family theory, therefore, will fail to benefit men and women equally. Although areas where there are already a high proportion of women alone with children need very specific programs, these programs should be viewed as stopgap measures. Women are, on the average, better off embedded in family relationships where responsibilities for children, both economic and noneconomic, can be shared with men. And families are better off where they are not subject to the deterioration of their economic position, and their incomes are not far below the median income of the society.

Footnotes

1. For a description of the various productive activities of married women in the United States after industrialization, see Smuts (1971).
2. A description of several growth-with-equity models can be found in Weaver et al. (1978). This paper will emphasize the approach which stresses the importance of a redistribution of income and assets (Adelman, 1975; Griffin, 1978; Murdoch, 1980).
3. Relevant exceptions to this statement include Tinker, 1976; Olin, 1976; Blumberg and Garcia, 1977; Papanek, 1978. Although each examines the role of women in the family, especially their economic activity, none of them point to the importance of a family theory or family policy.
4. Adelman and Morris (1973) mention the family only in terms of family income and family size. Recent labor supply models such as Barnum and Squire (1979) assume that men and women have identical labor supply functions.
5. This obviously does not apply where the woman has access to economic resources only if the man has left, such as is the case with Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) in the United States.
6. Economists stress the importance of developing a market for land which will increase effeciency in allocating resources (cf. Sen, 1966).
7. Evidence suggests that even fertility decisions are not joint decisions (Rogers, 1980: 113).
8. The "Percy Amendment" to the Foreign Aid Act of 1976.
9. Radical critics of the growth-with-equity approach argue that reform is impossible and revolution necessary in order to achieve equality. These critics must face the necessity for a family policy, however, even if its implementation is postponed until after the revolution.

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Economic Development and Patterns of Female Labor Force Participation in Latin America

Ruth Sautu

Introduction

The purpose of this essay is to discuss the different socioeconomic processes that explain the changing patterns of women's participation in the production of goods and services in Latin America after World War II. Some initial comments are necessary.

By patterns of female labor force participation we mean the type of lifespan behavior of females of a given population. At the individual's level this pattern may be defined as the age at which women begin to work, how long they remain working, and the age at which they retire. At the aggregate level it is defined as the expected proportion of women of different ages that may contribute to the production of goods and services. The distribution of activity rates by age is the best known graphic representation of the female labor force participation pattern, even though they fail to include many subsistence activities and family work. At least theoretically, we think of female work in an ample sense including any type of contribution to the production of goods or services, within a market economy or not, excluding house work such as cooking, cleaning, and rearing children.

Two types of processes will be considered in this analysis; on the one hand those related to the utilization of female labor--in a market economy they are designated as the demand determinants; and, on the other hand, those related to the availability of female labor--the supply determinants. Due to the macro approach of this essay, no specific consideration is given to motivational factors that affect women's behavior; therefore the expression "propensity to work," used in this paper, refers to the behavior most likely to occur among women of a given age and condition.

The paper is divided into two parts. First, a description of different patterns of female labor force participation; and second a discussion of the processes of change that affect women's propensity to work and the availability of opportunities of gainful employment.

Patterns of Female Labor Force Participation

Several studies have pointed out that in the early stages of development women's participation in the production of goods and services declines, whereas in later stages increased

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participation may be expected. Available evidence also indicates that in countries with a predominantly rural population female participation shown a "lifespan" pattern; i.e., whatever the overall level of participation is, no pronounced differences in activity rates are observed between different age groups. Labor is a lifespan endeavor; those who work at an early age remain working until old age. The differences between countries are due to differences in the overall level, not in the pattern of participation.

The second pattern, so far the most widely found in Latin America, is one in which participation is the highest at younger adult age--20 to 24 years old--and thereafter systematically declines. At the individual level this pattern indicates that those women who enter the labor force retire--most frequently--at marriage and with the bearing of children.

Finally, the third is the "two slopes" pattern. It indicates that women retire when they marry or have children and subsequently--some of them--in their middle age re-enter the labor force. This pattern is found in North America and Western developed countries and it is preceded by an increased participation among young women. So far Argentina seems to be entering into this pattern of participation.

Here we shall argue that in Latin America these different patterns of participation follow a sequence and they are associated with different processes of development and underdevelopment. Changes in the "lifespan" participation pattern take place when the old-aged cohorts of women retire in a chainlike reduction, beginning with the older age group and followed by a "one slope" pattern. At later stages, increased female participation begins with younger age groups who in successive periods enter the labor force in larger proportions and tend to remain longer. Nevertheless, they continue to retire at marriage and with the bearing of children. The "two slopes" pattern of participation is the result of both young women's increased participation and middle-aged married and divorced women re-entering the labor force--the proportion of re-entries increased with successive generations.

When rural-urban distributions of age-activity rates are observed, one finds out that decreased participation begins with elder women in rural areas whereas increased participation--in a later period--takes place among younger women in urban areas.

Social and Economic Change and Women's Labor

In societies organized on the basis of market economies and wage employment, it is possible to analyze changes in female labor participation in terms of changes in the supply and demand determinants of their economic behavior. With the exception of a few countries--such as Argentina, Uruguay and Venezuela where pre-capitalist modes of production have almost disappeared--in the rest of Latin America these concepts are not totally applicable. Therefore, in order to cover the variety of Latin American societies, it is more appropriate to speak of processes that affect the utilization of females in the production of goods and services and of processes that affect the availability of female labor. The first type of process includes changes in the units of production due to innovation in techniques, in production processes, organization, and in products. This includes the setting up of new enterprises and the disappearing of old ones, bringing about changes both in the sectorial distribution of production and in productivity, which affect the amount and quality of labor. Therefore in the course of development one observes the decline, or even disappearance of, many occupational groups and the emergence and growth of new ones.

The second type of process is better understood at an individual level, although the impact takes place at a macro level. Changes in fertility behavior, in the composition of the family, in female education and family income, are among the best known. Although the processes do not take place independently (they interact with each other), for the sake of clarity we shall discuss them separately.

From the perspective of the economy, the sequences of changes in female labor force participation in Latin America after World War II are the result of early industrialization efforts and subsequently of the more recent import substitution industrialization and of agricultural development. Processes that have affected the availability of female labor include, first, population change--namely marriage and fertility patterns, mortality and migration; second, the expansion of educational opportunities; third, for some urban groups, improved family income; and finally--in a later stage--changes in the patterns of family consumption.

The Income Effects. The effect of changes in income levels may be seen from both perspectives: the effect on the amount of labor demanded, and the effect on family decisions regarding the employment of its different members. Level of income is an interaction effect because the availability--and costs--of labor affect the demand for labor and, conversely, the availability of and remuneration of jobs affect the supply of labor.

At the family level, the effect of income levels on female economic participation is the least known. So far available data deal mainly with level of earning by sex and, in a few cases, income levels according to education; these data show that, at equal education and age, women earn less than men. No inference is possible regarding the effect of changing income levels on women's economic participation.

Regarding the decision to work, family income and the woman's income potential produce different effects. Family income may be expected to be negatively associated to female labor force participation, both in rural and urban settings, while the woman's income potential is positively associated. In the agricultural sector female work depends on the household's income which in turn depends on the size of the landholding and the system of land tenure. In the minifundio sector women work; in addition many peasant families--women included--engage in seasonal labor during the harvest season. Females of middle-sized and large farms do not participate directly in the production of cash crops, although they actually contribute to the farm's subsistence production. The exceptions are female administrators of farms (who are rare). In the urban sector the same type of relationship may be expected; in lower income households women contribute with their work to the survival of the family--the more so in those families headed by a female. At higher income levels one may expect a reduction in female participation up to a point at which the relationship is reversed; other things being equal, females of higher income homes show higher propensity to work (they are likely to be better educated and have higher income potential).

It is difficult to understand the relationship between family income and women's work outside the context of social classes. The behavior of working-class families is influenced by the need to reach a survival income (whatever its social definition may be) above which most probably there will be a trend towards lower participation of the family females, beginning with the elder ones. In middle- and upper-class families, considerations of self-fulfillment or the female's income potential exert higher influence on the decisions to work. It seems that, whereas in working-class and poor peasant families it is the family income that affects the need or decision of women to work, in middle-class and upper-class families the woman's own income potential seems to be more crucial as a determinant of economic participation.

The income bracket that divides the two populations has to be estimated empirically. At a macro level this dividing line establishes that below the line improvements in family income--such as increases in real wages--will reduce female labor force participation, whereas above this line--other things being equal--increases in the female's level of wages will increase female labor force participation. Such an aggregate behavior is compatible with the observed fact that in poor families, when real wages decrease, women's work increases--the additional worker in the family goes to make a living--and vice versa. However, in periods of a decline in women's wages, among middle-class jobs it is possible to expect a decline in women's work.

From the perspective of the demand, the level of wages affects the employment of females in different ways. In the long run, those occupations that are losing income potential tend to become feminine, either because in these occupations wages do not increase vis-a-vis other occupations and therefore do not attract male labor supply, or because with many women occupying these positions their income potential is reduced. The fact is that whenever an occupation lags behind as regards income, it will most probably employ a large number of women.

The expected opposition between "higher wages, reduction in labor demand" seems to work in Latin America in a slightly different manner. Before the supply of labor becomes really scarce, enterprises tend to resort to labor-saving technology. This is more evident in the case of plantations. For enterprises to retreat there is no need for labor to become scarce or wages substantially to increase. When the supply becomes unstable, enterprises prefer more secure conditions--in countries with high external protection, increases in costs are transferred to the consumer prices, whereas instability is untransferable.

Agricultural Change. What seems to be the main process behind the decline in employment of women has taken place in the rural sector where three main types of agricultural development may be distinguished: first, agrarian reform; second, the modernization of the hacienda or large agricultural exploitations; and third, the colonization of new lands. These three processes together with the deterioration of the peasant economy help to explain the declined absorption of labor--both male and female--in rural areas.

Agrarian reform programs were implemented in Mexico (1910) and Bolivia (1953) and subsequently in Cuba; in the latter country it was accompanied by a change in the political organization. In the sixties and seventies other countries also implemented programs of agrarian reform. These policies--with the exception of the Cuban--share several features: first, land was expropriated from the large landowners; second, they were allowed to keep part of the land, generally the most fertile and better equipped and situated; third, in most of the cases the plots received by the peasants were small, and fourth, landowners were compensated, although inflation did away with much of their compensation.

Agrarian reforms resulted in a better use of land (latifundio uses only a part of the total available land) and in improved employment as small holdings tend to be more labor intensive. In addition, peasant unionization and increases in marketable surpluses were also consequences of the agrarian reform. Nevertheless, these processes also negatively affected the creation of jobs in the countryside. Because of fear of the trade unions and of future expropriation, the trend has been for the landowners to modernize their farms and reduce the employment of permanent labor. Modernization consists mainly of mechanization, subdivision of land into smaller operative units, and a shift towards crops and activities less intensive in the use of labor, such as dairy farming, cattle raising and cereal farming. As an overall result, the capacity of the agricultural sector to absorb increases in the supply of labor has declined.

The original ideology of industrialization in Latin America conceived of the agricultural sector as a supplier of cheap food to feed the growing urban class; of raw materials to the infant industries; of exportable goods to provide foreign exchange for the industrialization policy; and, finally, as a reservoir of surplus labor to the newly developed industries. If things had worked as expected, the growth of manufacturing industry eventually would have absorbed the excess labor supply and forced technical change and increased productivity into agriculture.

In the sixties, disappointment with the outcome explains the greater emphasis given to the need to change land tenure systems. Alternatively many countries turned to specific policies of agricultural development: first, tax exemptions on the introduction of technological innovations--including artificial pastures and new breeds; second, credit facilities to support the introduction of innovations; third, the creation of extension and technical assistance agencies; fourth, home production of facilities to import machinery at subsidized prices;

fifth, state investment in road construction or irrigation projects; and sixth, subsidized home production or importation of fertilizers and pesticides. These politices, with the exception of the fifth, favor medium and large farms, and have resulted in a declining rate of absorption of labor. Therefore the number of the landless and jobless peasants is increasing as well as the movement out of the countryside.

Latifundia and minifundia constituted--and still do in some regions--an institutional device by which the minifundia sector supplied cheap seasonal and permanent labor; wage employment, sharecropping and tenancy arrangements (like those based on labor duties) with the latifundio were escape mechanisms for poor peasant families. The pressure of the growing population in many Latin American countries is now directed either towards lands of new colonization or towards the urban areas. New colonization programs exist in the countries linked to the Amazon Basin and in Central America. Although these programs absorb population from the highlands (the historically densely populated areas), their main achievement is increased agricultural production.

There are three main types of colonization projects and each has a different employment impact. Private large-scale colonization takes place on the basis of private initiative. This type of project, for example, plantations, is based on the farming of subtropical crops that absorbs scarce permanent labor as compared to the temporary labor employed during the harvest seasons (and to a lesser degree at planting and weeding). The second type of project is foreign--Japanese, Okinawa, Mennonites. From the point of view of the native labor force they operate very much like the privately owned projects of colonization. Third, state colonization is geared towards the resettlement of population on the basis of family-sized farms. State colonization and spontaneous colonization by individual farmers who clear the land for cultivation are labor absorbing projects.

Outside the capitalist sector of production and of the traditional latifundio, rural employment concentrates either in the minifundio sector or in provincial towns and villages where they engage in whatever gainful activity may be available (landless laborers or semi-urban proletariats). According to PREAL (Regional Employment Program for Latin America and the Caribbean), underutilization of labor affected one-third of the active population at periods circa 1970--with country variations ranging from 10% in Argentina and Uruguay to 46-47% in Mexico and El Salvador (PREALC, 1978); the areas of underutilization are the semi-subsistence minifundio and the traditional hacienda.

Population pressure and depletion of soil fertility are reducing productivity in the minifundia sector where land shortage has always been the rule but today can barely support a peasant family. In addition, the transformation of the hacienda and plantation, providers of temporary employment to the minifundio sector, is also increasing the pressure towards out-migration.

Whereas in the past migration from small villages and rural areas towards primary cities tended to be associated with growth in manufacturing industries, the most recent phenomenon--in the sixties and seventies--of rural out-migration is actually a transfer of underemployment and unemployment from rural to urban areas. This does not mean that pull factors have been totally replaced by push factors. Although at an individual's level migration is a movement to a place of higher job opportunities, at an aggregate level poor rural labor opportunities account for the migratory movements.

Looking at the consequences of agricultural development in Latin America, one observes that women are increasing their share of internal migration. While agricultural transformation and the deterioration of the traditional sector expel comparatively more women than men, the mechanical harvesting destroys as well a source of female employment in many regions. Thus, due to female predominant migration, the informal sector registers a large proportion of labor underutilization as female. Most of the young female migrants find employment in domestic

service, which is growing instead of declining as one might expect in a process of development.

Family and Education Effect. The effects of family composition and education on women's work have been widely studied, although, due to the census-taking nature of the data most frequently used, these studies are conducted at a micro level. They tell us about the association between family composition and education variables and women's work. That is, for different age groups according to level of education, marital status and number of children, the proportion of women economically active is computed. These measurements--the activity rates--exclude all types of work which in the census definition are considered non-economic.

In Latin America poorly educated women constitute the majority of the population and therefore make up the majority of the female labor force, although activity rates for the better educated are higher. In order to understand the effect of changes in family composition and education on the behavior of women at a macro level, it is necessary to observe the distribution of those variables in the whole society and their change over time.

In every country, other conditions being equal, single women have the highest activity rates. Divorced or separated childless women tend to have as high activity rates as single women. The presence of a husband--either legally or consensually--reduces the participation of women in economic activities. This is shown by the decline in activity rates--i.e., the reduction in rates--when married women are compared with single women of the same age. However, the effect of the presence of a husband is not the same among women of different educational backgrounds. Whereas among the less educated females the husband is the greatest deterrent to participation, among the highly educated, children--particularly after the second--produce the largest reduction in participation. Thus, at equal age, the lower the education of a woman the higher the reduction introduced by the presence of a husband; while--compared to the presence of a husband--children produce a larger impact among the better educated.

Poor women who are heads of households increase their participation particularly when they have young children. It is the absence of a husband that sends them back to work. The pattern of economic behavior of poor unmarried women is such that fertility and work are interwoven. If there is a husband present, most probably there will be a new child; when the husband is not present or cannot support the family, the woman has to find gainful employment--unless the children can themselves help in supporting the family. This pattern of behavior may explain why in some statistical studies female labor and fertility are negatively associated, while in others it is the opposite.

At a macro level we expect that a shift in the primacy of one type of marital or fertility behavior over others would affect the overall pattern of female labor force participation. Marital status affects the propensity of women to work, but its effect is not the same among all social classes. Its impact vis-a-vis other factors is stronger in the lower classes; in the middle classes education and women's income potential operate as well. Beneath the poverty line, an unstable economic pattern is likely--women go in and out of the labor market, or intermittently help the male members of the family according to the total family income and the need for their cooperation. Women are more flexible in their occupational possibilities; although their work conditions, payment and security are among the lowest, there is always some money to be earned in domestic or personal services.

In the middle and upper classes, high school and university trained women have a higher propensity to work than the less educated. It is the presence of children that eventually reduces their economic participation. They tend to have lower fertility (with the exception of very religious traditional families).

Age at marriage is considered a crucial variable in the determination of both fertility and female economic behavior. The lower the age at which women get married, the higher--other things being equal--the fertility. In addition, the postponement of marriage is associated with a longer permanence in the labor market. Therefore, changes in the average age at

marriage will affect the economic behavior of young women: those who are already working may stay longer (or because they are working they postpone marriage). This type of behavior differs according to the social class and level of education of the women; better educated women tend to marry at an older age than the less educated.*

At a macro level, changes in marriage and fertility affect the pattern of female labor force participation when women who are postponing marriage and reducing fertility become the majority. But, as we said, fertility does not operate by itself. Poor women with children may be forced to work, and the larger the number of children the greater the need to contribute to their subsistence. In the upper and middle classes, women, if they are working, will stop or not depending on the existence of domestic service and kindergartens and on the mother's education and income potential. When a pattern of lower average number of children and a shorter child-bearing period is combined with higher education and job opportunities for women, one can expect an increase in female economic participation--an increase that takes place among the middle classes.

At the individual level education, like family income, affects women's behavior differently according to their social class. If one compares families living below the poverty line with working-class families, the statistical association between education and work will be negative, because of the effects of the presence of a husband and/or family income. Beyond the poverty line, or in countries where the proportion of the very poor within the working class is not very high, one may expect a positive association between education and work. Nonetheless, it is only when education opportunities for women are drastically increasing that one can observe an impact on the overall pattern of female labor force participation. Young women enter the labor force in higher proportions and stay longer. The rate of retirement after marriage decreases as well and--in a subsequent period--many middle-aged women re-enter the labor force.

The Technology Effect. Technological innovation in agriculture works against women's chances of making a living. It has a similar effect in manufacturing industry: it reduces the rate of absorption of female labor--of all labor, indeed--and produces a shift from the employment of women towards male employment. Since World War II most Latin American countries have engaged in import substitution industrialization, beginning with the manufacturing of consumer goods. The process of industrial development has permitted many women to find gainful employment--particularly in agro-industries and textiles and garment industries. Lately, however, increased emphasis on the use of improved technology has led to an increase in labor productivity and a decline in the rate of absorption of surplus labor.

Contrary to all expectations, industrial growth has not completely compensated for the reduction of employment in the primary sector; although agricultural productivity has increased, the capacity of the sector to absorb growth in labor supply is decreasing. A similar phenomenon has taken place in manufacturing. New industries employ fewer workers and, in addition, when old factories modernize labor-saving technology is chosen.

In the fifties, industrialization was seen as the panacea for all economic and social problems. Increased productivity in urban areas would improve productivity in the rest of the economy, beginning with agriculture. But concentrated efforts toward the development of the manufacturing industry resulted in higher increases in productivity than in employment, while growth in population makes the need to create new jobs more crucial.

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*In countries with periods of high fertility and early marriage, there is not much difference among women of different educational backgrounds and social class. When the overall pattern of marriage and fertility begins to change, differences appear in behavior according to education.

There is agreement today about some aspects of the development process that have affected the capacity of the economic system to absorb the growing active population. First, state policy favored capital investment through the tariff, tax and credit policies--and frequently also with subsidized foreign exchange. Second, the efforts to attract multinational corporations together with the policies of cheap capital have favored the transfer of foreign labor-saving technology and growth in scale. And third, there has been a concentration on commodities that utilize labor-saving techniques--such as process industries and durable goods--and a decline in the share of consumer goods production--such as foodstuffs and textiles--that are intensive in the use of labor.

Textiles, garment, foodstuffs and other consumer goods industries employ women in great numbers, while automobile, metals, and other durable goods industries do not employ women except in administrative jobs. This concentration of women in certain industries has several consequences not only from the point of view of employment opportunities but also from the perspective of income potential.

Industries that traditionally employ females are more sensitive to changes in the distribution of income because they produce wage products. Increases in open unemployment and declines in real wages affect the level of activity of these industries. In addition, they pay on the average lower wages than the dynamic industries--metals, cars, and other durable goods, and processing industries. This is due to two things: first, in these industries there are many small workshops operating, which pay lower wages than large companies; second, with or without the presence of big corporations, wages in the dynamic industries are higher.

In the process of development there are two moments when the utilization of female labor declines. One is when the factory replaces the small family workshop and when the consumer goods industry modernizes; with the introduction of new techniques employment is reduced--affecting many women--and in addition there is replacement of women by men. Then, in later stages of development with the installation of dynamic industries, the demand for women also declines. Therefore, from the perspective of female labor absorption, with the passing of time industrialization decreases its capacity to employ a growing active female population. At the same time the capacity of agriculture to employ both women and men is diminishing.

The Growth of the Tertiary Sector. The growth of services is a feature shared by highly developed and underdeveloped countries. Although their inner structures and causes of growth are different, they share some characteristics. With the exception of a few activities and occupations (financing, insurance, university-trained professions), jobs in the service sector tend to demand lower qualifications, have lower productivity and lower wages, and absorb more women than the manufacturing industry.

The development of the tertiary sector is primarily in response to the increasing technological and organizational complexity of the economy and to the development of the welfare state--including not only the state services but also improved health and education and leisure. In today's developed countries this major complexity of the economic system and increased productivity of labor result in a reduction of personal services and intermediary activities. Increased productivity in agriculture and manufacturing industries increases the cost of labor and forces the introduction of labor-saving devices in commerce and services alike.

Such a process, however, is not taking place in Latin America at the rate needed to productively absorb increases in the labor supply. Therefore growth in urban employment is the result of higher organizational complexity in the economic system and the growth of the welfare state as well as the growth of less productive, lower paid personal services and intermediary activities. Improvement and expansion of the educational, health, social security and other state services, the development of finances, banking and in general more complex distribution and transportation systems, have increased the demand for labor, a proporation of which is feminine--and in some activities and occupations women are becoming the majority.

Several factors explain the increased employment of women in tertiary activities. First, there are many job categories which have traditionally been considered "feminine occupations" such as teachers, administrative employees, nurses and salesclerks. When the demand for this type of labor increases it is likely to absorb a good proportion of women. Second, many women received training in those skills connected with administrative jobs, health and teaching occupations. Third, the decline in income potential of many middle-class administrative jobs and in teaching shift male supply to more profitable occupations in manufacturing industries, professions, and technical jobs. Unlike the processes just described, the growth of many intermediary activities and personal services do not respond to a more complex economic system but to its incapacity to create jobs in sufficient numbers to productively absorb increases in the labor supply; that is, a regular job with a stable income large enough to support a family.

There is growing concern about the increased number of people underemployed; some estimates put it as high as 38.8% of the labor force in Latin America (PREALC, 1978b). Different types of underemployment have so far been distinguished: those self-employed who earn an irregular income; those who perform any odd job that may come up (occasional workers); seasonal laborers who work only part of the year, for example in the processing of fruits and vegetables; and finally, those in regular jobs earning very low wages with no social security coverage or with low stability jobs such as domestic service. Frequently people move between these categories or pass on to the formal sector.

Although instability of employment and low wages affect women and men equally, due to the processes previously described women are comparatively worse off in their urban employment. While agricultural development is reducing its absorption of women and the capacity of the manufacturing industry to employ them is declining, women are leaving the rural areas in growing numbers. The migration process of both sexes may therefore be seen as a transfer of underemployment from rural areas and small villages to urban areas. Rural surplus labor is transformed through migration into underutilized labor because migrants who cannot find jobs in the modern sector of the economy engage in a series of jobs in the informal sector.

Increased female labor force participation in the urban areas of Latin America is the result of both larger occupational opportunities in the tertiary formal sector and the growing dimension of the informal sector; which of these sectors a woman enters depends basically on her social class. Whereas middle-class women--who have better educational opportunities--may find employment as teachers, secretaries, salesclerks, administrative employees and in the professions, working-class migrant women have limited choices in domestic or other personal services.

Changes in the Consumption Patterns. Very little attention has been paid so far to the interaction between the style of economic development and consumption patterns and the increased female economic participation in urban areas. The concentration of the manufacturing industry on the production of durable goods--particularly cars--and the boom in middle-class housing construction in many of the largest Latin American cities, together with a trend towards a higher concentration of income in the middle and upper brackets, could be associated with the observed increased participation of women in middle-class jobs. In this way women could contribute to the improved living standards of the middle classes.

Changes in the Patterns of Female Labor Force Participation

The processes just described do not equally affect all women, nor do they produce changes in the same direction. Whether women reduce or increase their economic participation depends on the social class to which they belong.

An overall pattern of "lifespan" participation is found in countries and historical periods where peasant and traditional agriculture prevail. Except for the export sector, in this type of economy there is not a sharp differentiation between rural and urban activities,

as agriculture, handicrafts and trading frequently take place within the same unit of production--the peasant family. In addition, this peasant economy is linked to the export sector as a supplier of seasonal labor. When the "lifespan" pattern of participation prevails, the proportion of women working depends basically on the size of the peasant economy.

The process of agricultural change explains the reduction in female economic participation. A decline takes place beginning with the older generations as the first to retire, while younger women may compensate by moving to the towns and finding occupation in domestic or other personal services or in the petty trades.

Another process that operates in the transformation of this pattern of participation is the increase in family income that takes place among working-class families whose male members are engaged in gainful employment in the modern sector of the economy. Here, however, a distinction must be made between earlier stages of industrialization and the more recent process. In its earlier stages of development, manufacturing industry absorbed labor employed either in agriculture or in less productive urban occupations. For women, but to a greater extent for men, import-substituting industrialization represented an increase in income which in turn allowed the female members of the family to remain at home--or to retire after marriage. In later stages, the proportion of the increase in the labor supply absorbed by the manufacturing industry decreases while employment in the informal sector grows. Therefore, one may expect the fall in agricultural female employment to be accompanied not by an increase in retirement but by a transfer of labor to the informal sector, i.e., an increase in female economic participation in the urban areas.

The passage from "lifespan" to "one slope" participation takes place with the retirement of the older generations and with the reduction in the number of active years each successive generation works. Thus the overall pattern is one where the highest rate of participation is observed among the young single women who after marriage begin to retire--the participation rate of each successive age group decreases. Changes within this same pattern of participation take place when the proportion of young women who work increases, although they continue to retire at marriage or childbirth age. In earlier stages of industrialization these changes are associated with the development of light industries such as textiles and food-processing; in later stages when, due to the effects of technology the capacity of the manufacturing industry to absorb labor decreases, increases in female labor force participation may be explained by the growth of tertiary activities--both in the formal and informal sectors. Further changes in the pattern of participation consist of an increase in the proportion of young women who go to work and in the number of years they remain in the labor force before retirement. These changes are the result of two processes: on the one hand, due to female migration from rural areas, urban female employment in informal jobs increases; on the other, greater educational opportunities and postponement of marriage explain the increased participation of younger generations in middle-class occupations.

The "two slopes" pattern of participation is appearing somewhat in Argentina due to the re-entry into the labor force of middle-aged married and divorced women. These changes may be associated with several processes: the higher cost of raising teenagers; the need, or desire, to improve the family's standard of living; the opportunity cost of educated women remaining at home; the revival of piece-work in the garment industry that employs women who work in their own homes; and the availability of part-time--but low paid--jobs. Regarding prospects for the future, if these trends in Latin American development continue, one can expect that female employment in agriculture will decrease even further while the economic participation of young urban settlers will continue to increase, both because working-class families cannot afford to keep young women at home and because of the growth in job opportunities for middle-class women.

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Women in the Labor Force in Latin America: A Review of the Literature*

Neuma Aguiar

Analyses of the development of women's participation in the labor force in Latin America have applied the model of the Industrial Revolution, greatly emphasizing the impact of technological change brought on by the rise of capitalism in the social position of women in the productive apparatus.[1] This paper will focus on some of the propositions derived from the application of this model in order to provide a context for the modifications introduced by the articles reviewed here.

The classical perspective which will be discussed in this paper holds as presupposition that the transformation process of women in the labor force occurs in accordance with historical stages, as does the development of the labor force in general. In the first stage, subsistence activities give way to manufacturing and small-scale commerce (Madeira and Singer, 1973:2). In the second stage, the manufacturing and small-scale commerce are supplanted by modern factories, large-scale stores, warehouses and supermarkets (Madeira and Singer, 1973:2). Accompanying the stages of technological development, migration of population groups takes place. In the first stage, the work environment changes from the rural to the urban setting. In the second stage, the at-home work environment is supplanted by an out-of-the-home environment (Madeira and Singer, 1973:4).

Associated with the macrosocial tendencies, changes take place in the participation of women in the labor force. In the initial stages of the industrial process in which a large number of manufacturing and commercial activities exist, agriculture still constitutes the principal productive activity. All these processes enable the broad participation of women in the labor force, since housework activities can easily be accommodated with agricultural, commercial and manufacturing activities. In the second stage, the agrarian economy turns capitalist and a large segment of population starts to abandon the small-scale commerce and at-home industries while, simultaneously, the migration process from the rural to the urban areas intensifies. In this stage, men replace women on the large farms (Madeira and Singer, 1973:56; Miranda, 1977:262) and the participation of women in the labor force tends to decline (Madeira and Singer, 1973:3; Miranda, 1977:262). In the third stage, development of the productive forces reaches a point which allows the liberation of women from the domestic setting. The

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participation of women tends to increase again, principally in the service sector which grows as a consequence of industrial expansion (Madeira and Singer, 1973:3).

Nevertheless, Madeira and Singer (1973:56-57) are the first to conclude that, contrary to what is expected, the participation of women in agricultural activities tends to increase as a result of the growth of subsistence activities. The authors point out the inadequacy of data about the participation of women in the agrarian sector, an observation supported by research in Argentina (Sautu, 1978), Paraguay (Galeano, 1977; Vera and Laird, 1978), Uruguay (Prates and Taglioretti, 1978), Colombia (Leal and Deere, 1978), and Mexico (Rendon and Pedrero, 1975).

Vera and Laird (1978), using five points in time as references in the interviews they conducted with women, developed a precodified list of wage-earning economic activities in the rural setting, distinguishing between at-home work and housework. Through this measure, they identified that 86% of the women interviewed engaged in some cash activity in the reference week in 1977. The household survey, as well as the census of Paraguay, was conducted in the season of the year characterized by a decline in remunerated activities, while the census in 1972 classified only 24% of the women as economically active.

Madeira and Singer (1973) do not demonstrate their presupposition according to which craft and domestic occupations are eliminated by capitalist industrialization, expelling a substantial number of women from economic activity (Madeira and Singer, 1973:59). Jelin (1978:23-24) elaborates an account of numerous studies performed in specific cities of Latin America whose findings contrast with the presupposition mentioned above, since the participation of women in small-scale mercantile production, in ambulant commerce, and domestic employment is very high, including more than half of the workers in this sector. This leads us to infer that the activities in small-scale mercantile production and domestic employment remain significant for women with the growth of cities and the development of industrial capitalism. Madeira (1977) subsequently revised the thesis she had proposed with Singer (Madeira and Singer, 1973) by advocating the inclusion of domestic labor within the activities of the economically active population, since she concluded that the criteria, adopted by the data-collecting agencies of the developing countries and originating from the industrial capitalist countries, constitute one of the factors responsible for the obscuring of domestic labor as an activity which contributes to social production. With this analysis, the author modified the emphasis which the previous article (Madeira and Singer, 1973) conceded to the impact of the development of productive forces on the participation of women in the labor force.

Macro statistical analyses pursue the same interpretation which was jointly elaborated by Madeira and Singer (1973) when it postulates that the participation of women in the labor force is a consequence of the industrialization process, which could be described by a curve in the form of a "U" (Lattes and Wainerman, 1977:301-317). Regional analyses, as well as those which focus on particular countries, have used this same model, reviewed in detail by Lattes and Wainerman (1977:301-317) who seek to apply it in the case of Argentina. Dalma Del Valle Vargas (1977) points out that in the case of Peru the same tendencies are evident as in the Argentinian case, although in an attenuated manner, reflecting an initially elevated level of participation of women in the economically active population, followed by a sharp decline.

Cisneros (1978) develops a brief historical account of the developmentalist statistical model. He argues that the "U" curve can be extended to include Bolivia, despite the fact that its application in this case was viewed dubiously by the pertinent literature (Durand, 1975) which describes women's participation in the labor force (Lattes and Wainerman, 1977:310). Cisneros (1978) observes that, instead of promoting a greater social integration, the development process increases the ethnic cleavage, propitiating the rise of racial conflicts. Lélia Gonzalez (1978) provides a similar argument by interpreting that the effects of the textile industry modernization in Brazil expels women from this sector with black women being the first to suffer the process, thereby maintaining the dual discrimination--sexual and racial--generated by change.

Prates and Taglioretti (1978) also raise some questions about the "U" curve, observing that in the case of economic stagnation, as occurs in Uruguay, women can incorporate themseleves progressively into the labor force. The characteristics of the "U" curve model with the high initial participation of women in the agrarian sector followed by a progressive destruction of peasant and craft activities, substituted, in sequence, by an industrial development which again incorporates the activities of women, does not apply in the case of Uruguay. The authors also reject the hypothesis that a positive relationship exists between determined demographic characteristics and the levels of participation of women in the labor force, since neither age, civil status, nor fertility impede the activities of women. Analyses of other cases, however, such as those of Chile and Brazil, suggest that this could occur (Fucaraccio, 1978:135-159; Rato, 1978). Arakcy Martins Rodrigues (1978) also points to the relative nature of the hypothesis by demonstrating that women of working-class families who want to work outside of the home transfer the role of "mother of the family," or components of this role, to a daughter in order to be able to work. Cebotarev (1978), in the same sense, points out that in certain work situations women's participation is conditioned by the age of the oldest daughter and not by the youngest one, as was encountered in the developed countries.

Prates and Taglioretti (1978) observe that the participation of Uruguayan women in the labor force is low to begin with. This is because a cattle-raising economy requires a small amount of labor and limits the access to land, thus preventing the development of subsistence agriculture in which women maintain high activity levels as unpaid family workers, a characteristic of peasant societies. Parallel to this in the urban context, the development of manufacturing enables at-home work, favoring the participation of women. The manufacturing activities which arise are those related to the textile and garment industries, remunerated with low wages and propitiating an increase in women's participation. Industrial stagnation does not discourage the participation of women since skilled male labor migrates out of the country.

The critique of the "U" curve model presented by Prates and Taglioretti (1978) allows the formulation of theoretical alternatives for studying the participation of women in the labor force, permitting a view of other modalities of association between development or, inversely, stagnation, and the incorporation of women in the economically active population.

Another variable which is being correlated with socioeconomic development and the participation of women in the labor force has been the educational level of women, since industrialization creates a demand for skilled labor and increases the opportunities for participation for those with higher educational levels. Juan C. Elizaga (1974:526-528) observes that in Argentina and Chile the participation levels of urban women vary with the number of years of education, pointing out the same tendency in the case of Brazil. Glaura Miranda (1975:27-46) shows, however, that in the Brazilian case education levels lead to greater rates of participation in remunerated occupations. However, the activities in which they are engaged are often incompatible with the educational level achieved (Miranda, 1975:33-34). Maria Helena Rato (1978) indicates that there is a close correlation between the participation of women in the labor force and the level of education achieved, since there exists a lesser supply of workers in the levels of higher training. She concludes that the absorption capacity in the job marked diminishes with the educational level of the workers.

Barroso and Mello (1975:47-77) observe that access to higher level education signifies an increase in women concentrated in careers considered feminine, noting the interference of cultural factors which modify economic determinants. Bruschini (1978) demonstrates that this concentration exists for the entire spectrum of occupations and not only for those which demand education of a higher level. Barrera (1978:18) describes the same phenomenon in the case of Ecuador. Miranda (1975:33-34) considers, however, that access to education does not signify wage equality since women in liberal professions earn, on the average, less than half of a man's salary for the same job. In a case studied in Chile Barrera (1978:14-16) discovers that the principal determinant of working-class salaries is not education, since even when women have more schooling and training than men they receive less remuneration for their work. Maria Helena Rato (1978), analyzing the Brazilian case, observes that the majority of illiterate

persons are self-employed workers receiving, in recent times, up to the equivalent of one minimum wage salary. Employed workers, regardless of their level of training, net incomes lower than those of the self-employed workers. The only exception encountered is that of employed workers in the rural zone who have more than thirteen years of education and who receive more than the independent workers.

In other instances, the inadequacy of data about small-scale mercantile production, particularly in rural zones, could lead to generalizations which mask the participation of women in the labor force, points out Rojas (1978). He supports an observation of Standing (1976) about the unremunerated agricultural labor of women on family plots. The author, confirming a hypothesis derived from the Colombian case, observes that if we take the number of hours of remunerated labor as an indicator of women's participation in the labor force, we would encounter, in the case of Nicaragua, that the greater access to jobs, requiring a higher level of training and with higher salaries, does not represent the existence of a social structure which is more egalitarian in the opportunities it provides for both sexes. Women in the upper occupacional strata tend to work for income, on the average, a smaller number of hours (34 per week), while those from lower occupational strata tend to work an excessive number of hours (49 per week). In making assumptions about the impact of capitalist development on women in the Latin American labor force, it is evident that the activities of women are analyzed through categories such as the informal labor market, underemployment, hidden unemployment and marginality. This points out something this author considers important: the concepts are applied in a negative connotation, indicating that the condition of women's work does not have a form, that employment does not, or almost does not, exist for women, or that women's position in the labor force is not central.

The difficulty in using these concepts is their residual nature when they incorporate a heterogeneous variety of productive activities, thus connoting a certain degree of social disorganization relative to an organized sector of society which is opposed to them. One presupposes, therefore, an informal labor market without taking into consideration that the laws regulating the system of exchange including labor laws are not necessarily written and could be governed by convention, obliging researchers to discover them.[2] The categories of underemployment or unemployment, hidden or not, are characterized by taking an optimum of employment derived from the industrial and metropolitan sector as indicated by the number of hours of work remunerated in cash.[3] Types of productive activities short of this optimum, if complemented by other non-remunerated productive activities, receive the same classification. Also the concept of marginality is employed in opposition to a sector of production which is presumably central. Among other meanings, the concept refers to recent migration without integration into the job market, or to the areas where migrant populations settle, also signifying areas of deteriorated housing without legal occupancy. Legal, ecological or other criteria related to social organization are employed in order to denote the concept, which, although greatly criticized by some, still has not been sufficiently revised when one takes into consideration the position of the social groups which have been up to now encompassed in this notion or in its critique.[4]

Consequently, women in the labor force are frequently studied as participants in an informal market or as unemployed or underemployed or even as marginals in the productive process.[5] A small portion of research is devoted to examining the incorporation of women in the social organization of production, providing a positive connotation, that is, indentifying its form and defining its product and social contribution, despite the social discrimination which women undoubtedly suffer. Various articles reviewed in this paper are concerned with the social organization of production which, instead of being destroyed by the capitalist mode of production, coexists with it, as demonstrated by the analyses of Heredia, Garcia and Garcia (1978); Neto (1978); Hermitte and Segre (1978); Cebotarev (1978); Sautu (1978); Leal and Deere (1978); besides my own work (Aguiar, 1978).

The physical space of the home, that is the house, could be selected as a privileged setting for observation, because of the variety of positions it occupies in different productive

structures which coexist with capitalism.[6] The space of the house can be an instrument of production, a means of subsistence, or a means of coercion to labor. Household production can be organized for consumption by its residents as well as for external consumption. Reflection on the position of the house in distinct modes of production leads us to differentiate between the concepts of work and of employment, allowing the distinction between the following categories of activities performed in this context: domestic work, at-home work, domestic employment, and home industry.

When the household constitutes a productive unit where foodstuffs are prepared for commerce and for subsistence, as in at-home work, it becomes possible to conceptualize the work performed in this context as productive (Neto, 1978), since the parameters used as a reference are those of small-scale mercantile production. Marx, however, objects that, from the capitalist production point of view, at-home work should be considered unproductive. This qualification should be specified, given the perjorative connotation which the concept acquires in relation to the work of women. We observe, therefore, that work performed in the household is unproductive of capital, although it can contribute to capitalist production through the sale of labor time, generated by the sexual and generational division of labor in the domestic context (Aguiar, 1978; Cebotarev, 1978; Rodrigues, 1978; Neto, 1978).

The position of the house in the productive structure allows one to posit the activities of the domestic group and to analyze one of the principal topics of discussion about sexism in the statistics regarding the participation of women in the labor force (Barroso, 1978; D'Souza, 1978; Rodrigues, 1978; Leal and Deere, 1978; Aguiar, 1978), since the censuses and the national household surveys customarily use interviews with household heads as their main source of information. The patriarchal figure, present in various modes of production, assumes different characteristics in each one, possibly affecting the collection of statistical data itself which is an important source of information in modern society.

Analyses of the activities of the family group, in the household and outside of it, allows the elaboration of a model which can be adapted not only to peasant labor but also to small-scale mercantile production in urban zones, with the exception of situations related to the cultivation of land, and finally, to work in the capitalist sector. The delineation of space and the forms of utilizing time are dimensions which could be employed in a study of the various other configurations of labor, even in relation to the domestic dimension of working-class families (Arakcy Martins Rodrigues, 1978).

Heredia, Garcia and Garcia (1978) study the peasant household units, analyzing household work, making a contrast between work in the house and on the parcel of land rented for subsistence cultivation. Although the work in the house is considered women's responsibility, that which is performed on the family parcel, even if it involves women's participation, is considered men's responsibility. The parcel is divided into collective and individual spaces. Age is used as a criterion to allocate subparcels of land to sons and daughters, socializing them in the collective labor.

Responsibility for work on the family plot confers authority in correlation with the number of goods produced, and the cultivation of goods is considered a more essential activity for daily subsistence by the peasant families. Thus cattle raising and the production of manioc flour is the responsibility of the men, while the women are responsible for the production of green vegetables and small animals. The marketing of the products is primarily performed by men, while women are relegated to the domestic sphere by rigid standards of sexuality control.

Cebotarev (1978) points out that the performance of the conjugal, maternal and domestic roles constitutes a dimension which reinforces the identity of the peasant women, increasing their status and power since responsibility for the domestic sphere also confers family authority. For the performance of the domestic role, the author refers to the activities which more frequently revolve around the acquisition and preparation of foodstuffs for the family. Then follow the activities related to cleaning of the kitchen and dwelling. These are less

flexible because they require daily attention and occupy a large portion of the peasant woman's time. The activities of the maternal role and those related to the care and lactation of babies are considered more flexible by the author, since they are easily combined or alternated with other tasks, and assisted by children. The tasks considered the most flexible are those related to the laundering of clothes on specific days of the week which does not require daily attention. Another aspect which adds flexibility to these tasks is the fact that they can be delegated to third parties and performed outside of the household unit through contract. Rendon and Pedrero (1975) for the case of Mexico consider a collection of domestic activities quite similar to this set.

Cebotarev (1978) considers another set of activities not directly connected to the domestic role but which contribute to the sustenance of the family, such as those realized on a small scale in the home production of foodstuffs, as well as in home industries and services. The author includes, in conjunction with these, the raising of poultry and animals, the cultivation of a kitchen garden and the collaboration with men in thelarger-scale agricultural activities. Cebotarev (1978) points out that, although women collaborate with men in agricultural work which is considered an essentially male activity, men do not reciprocate by cooperating in the domestic work. These as well as the commercial activities, among which are included the acquisition of merchandise and the sale of products produced at home, are more sporadic than the domestic activities. These are part of the daily existence, and occur with greater frequency. Zahidé Machado Neto (1978), following the argument of Juliet Mitchell, adds to the dimensions selected by Cebotarev for the analysis of women's activities those of sexuality and socialization of children, as aspects which complete the dimensions of women's existence.

Arakcy Martins Rodrigues (1978) examines the capitalist mode of production including the domestic unit of the working-class family as the object of study. The author analyzes the roles in accordance with the stage of life, the age composition and the relationships between the maintainers and the maintained in the family group. Rodrigues observes that the roles of mother and those of the family head are not fixed, reasoning that the first could be examined in terms of duties, such as the preparation of meals and lunch boxes, the guarding of the house, the emotional support, the socialization of the children, among others, which are partially shared with the oldest daughter when the mother works outside of the home.

Enumeration of this collection of activities allows the specification of women's work, avoiding the above-mentioned limitations when the activities of women are considered residual. These difficulties are generated when faintly generic concepts are employed in relation to a large variety of situations which, given the heterogeneous grouping, appear undifferentiated in an analysis of women's work. Among these, we point out that women are frequently understood as constituting a part of the industrial reserve army of labor (Miranda, 1977:2; Beechey, 1978:187-195); or, in other words, through the extension of the concept for all types of capitalist activities, female labor is analyzed as a reserve army for capitalist production (Saffioti, 1978:19 and 51). A discussion of the concepts of relative surplus population, marginality and an industrial reserve army of labor has become a classic in the Latin American literature (Nun, 1969:178-236; Cardoso, 1972:140-165).

Not only in these works on regional analyses is interest shown in the debate related to the use of the concept for the study of labor force; the same interest is indicated in studies which discuss the inclusion of the contingent of women (Bruegel, 1979:12-13; Molyneux, 1979:26-27; Anthias, 1980:50-63). For instance, the critique developed by Cardoso (1972:140-165) about the ambiguity, lack of empirical reference, and utilitarian connotation of the concept of marginality is also applied to the concept of the industrial reserve army of labor by Anthias (1980:50-63).

The category, similar to the analyses of the development of the labor force in Latin America, is found to be closely associated with technological changes caused by industrial capitalism in the composition of labor. Marx coined the concept, arguing in opposition to the interpretations derived from Malthus about the effects of natural population growth on

employment and salaries (Cardoso, 1972:142; Anthias, 1980:51). The author points out that it is the technological development of capitalist production, independent of the natural growth of population, which is the factor responsible for the creation of a relative surplus population, or an industrial reserve army of labor, as opposed to the labor force regularly engaged in production, the active army (Marx, 1905:699). It must be observed, however, that the absolute growth of population can also affect the engagement of women in the labor force, since it is women who bear this natural development.

Marx considered three modalities of the industrial reserve army of labor: the fluctuating, the latent, and the stagnant (Marx, 1906:703). They will be reviewed here to point out their inadequacies for an analysis of female labor. Besides other limitations discussed below, the concept refers only to the economic level. The fluctuating army is represented by the alterations arising from the introduction of technological changes which, on one hand, cause the decline of some sectors of production, rendering them obsolete while, on the other, favoring the creation of new sectors. Two events within this dynamic are specified. In the first, part of the population is discharged, becoming unemployed or partially unemployed. In the second, modern sectors arise and absorb portions of the population available for capitalist employment. The population of the reserve is considered as fluctuating, given the movements of labor repulsion and attraction established by capitalist development (Marx, 1906:704).

The application of this concept to groups sexually or racially differentiated was criticized by Anthias (1980:50) who argues that it should be used exclusively in relation to the proletariat as a whole, without identification of subgroups within it. Nevertheless, nothing impedes the use of a concept to characterize specific, differentiated groups as a particular example of a wider condition. Specification of the groups involved in this process allows us to observe that, although the fluctuating industrial reserve army of labor can clearly be identified by the effect caused by the introduction of technological innovations (Bruegel, 1979: 16) which propitiate the constitution of unemployed populations, particularly women, the same cannot be done with the identification of the population contingent in reserve, which becomes absorbed in the active population and is more difficult to confirm.

The population displaced by technological change in a determined sector is not necessarily the same one which is allocated in new sectors created by the dynamic of capitalistic development. The attribute of fluctuation between the active army and the reserve does not apply to those who were permanently dislocated, and this could be the case of a large portion of the female contingent. In the case of Brazil, when the textile industry modernized, it affected the whole population, especially the women (Madeira and Singer, 1973:37). Black women were the first to be affected by the process (Gonzalez, 1978). The differentiation of the labor force by sex allows the observation that, in Brazil, there was a relatively constant growth of the male population in the secondary sector, while the participation of the female population declined in the same sector (Madeira and Singer, 1973:16,17; Bruschini, 1978). Phenomena related to the integration of women in the labor force could remain hidden in the more general dynamic, because the male participation is much greater than the female.

Bruschini (1978), for the Brazilian case, following the line of analysis formulated about the labor force in Venezuela (Schminck, 1977:1193-1227), points out that female labor is allocated in a much more restricted contingent of occupations than male labor. The latter occupies a great spectrum of activities. The creation of new jobs does not mean that women will be able to fill them. Ideological factors, among others, may impede their participation. Therefore the idea that they are components of an industrial reserve army of labor and candidates for employment in these sectors is not valid, unless other factors intervene making them conscious of these opportunities and hence available for social participation in these jobs.

Among the three modalities of the industrial reserve army of labor discussed above, it is appropriate to analyze, at this time, what Marx classified as latent (1906:705) in order to verify the appropriateness of using this term in relation to the Latin American female labor force. The term refers to the process, generated by the capitalist transformation of the

agrarian sector, in which rural labor is driven out and becomes available for work in manufacturing in the urban zones.

Some of the contributions reviewed in this paper are enlightening regarding the penetration of capitalism in the agrarian sector, the dislocations suffered by the rural workers which affect male and female labor, as well as the conditions of availability for employment which are experienced as a consequence of the migration process (Leal and Deere, 1978; Oliveira, 1978; Sautu, 1978). These articles permit an evaluation of the concept of the latent industrial reserve army of labor in relation to the social formations in Latin America developed in this paper, particularly in regard to an analysis of female labor.

Leal and Deere (1978), examining the conditions of the Colombian economy in relation to the world market, classify it as capitalist, although acknowledging that there exists a differential process of penetration of capitalism in the agrarian sector, since there are regions which insulate themselves more than others against market penetration, a substantiation which they elaborate through a comparative analysis of two rural regions in Colombia. The zone is also considered by the authors as having undergone a process of agricultural stagnation. Another dimension which they use to study the degree of capitalist penetration into agriculture is the labor force proletarianization indicated by salaried relations of production. The authors point out a phenomenon of particular importance when they distinguish the proletarian condition of the peasant, indicating the coexistence of capitalist and noncapitalist relations of production differentiated by the sexual division of labor, both in the more capitalist zone as well as in the more stagnant one.

The study by Oliveira (1978), done in an area of Brazil which underwent intense capitalist development, allows the observation that the existence of a commercial agriculture does not mean that a process of labor force proletarianization takes place simultaneously. The cultivation of coffee in the region which she analyzes is an example of this fact, since labor, fixed on the farms through the concession of residency, worked without wage remuneration. Laclau (1979) points out that although commercial activities can favor the growth of capitalism, they can also exist independently of it in relation to other modes of production.

In the case examined by Oliveira (1978), the change in these social relationships in the direction of a process of proletarianization is caused only when sugar cane becomes the principal commercial crop, supplanting coffee. This took place because of the possibility of agricultural mechanization propitiated by the introduction of the new crop. Sautu (1978) also points out the social organization peculiar to each farm, in the zone of intense agricultural capitalization, in Argentina.

In the work of Oliveira (1978), the change in the products allows the contracting of temporary labor for cultivation, causing the displacement of families who had previously resided on the farms to nearby towns. The category of residents, nevertheless, is not totally eliminated. The alternatives of employment offered by the urban sector provoke a change in the rural contracts of labor, since the farms begin to individualize and pay wages to the female labor force. Residency does not prevent urban labor from performing work in the rural zone, favoring the earning of salaries by the female labor force through the options which women encounter in remunerated domestic employment in the cities. Unless the family structure is destroyed in the process, this results in intensified hours of work for the female labor force because of the superposition of domestic work and salaried employment. Since the domestic activities confer family authority to women, observes Cebotarev (1978), peasant women resist giving up the domestic role; when they encounter opportunities to perform alternative roles they opt, therefore, for the superposition of roles. Nevertheless, the remuneration of female labor is differential and discriminatory in comparison with men's work of the same kind, points out another analysis of the same process (Allier, 1975:132-134).

The work of Sautu (1978) accompanies the migration of seasonal labor originating from Argentina, Bolivia and Paraguay. The author, as does Oliveira (1978), confirms the presence

of noncapitalist relationships in commercial agriculture, observing, as do Leal and Deere (1978), that wage-earning contracts are more common among the larger properties. The wage-earning contracts of the labor force, studied by Sautu (1978), are drawn up by contractors who preserve the family organization of work. In this manner, the women receive little or no individual remuneration, a situation different from the one encountered by Oliveira (1978). The analysis of Sautu (1978) indicates that the contracts of transient labor favor the circulation of laborers between properties and regions, depending on the harvest season.

Leal and Deere (1978) focus on the process of social differentiation in the peasant economy, pointing out that in more stagnant zones the participation of women in productive activities is greater than that in more capitalized zones, since a greater number of women heads-of-household exist in them. Comparing the sexual division of labor in the two regions which they studied, the authors observe that in the more capitalized zone, where the principal activity results in the sale of labor, the cultivation of production units by family labor constitutes a secondary activity; the men perform more of the salaried work while the women perform more of the peasant activities. In the more stagnant zones, where the principal activity is the cultivation of a production unit through sharecropping contracts, peasant activities are performed by men while the women dedicate themselves more to wage-earning labor, particularly domestic employment, a secondary activity in the region.

Describing dynamics so distinctly different for the two localities, Leal and Deere (1978) study the two activities of female labor as indicators of an industrial reserve army of labor. They reveal, therefore, the limitations of the concept, since the effort of differentiating and specifying the labor activities of rural women, undertaken by the two authors, remains hidden in suggesting that these women possess only a latent potentiality of participation in the active army despite the work they actually perform as peasants or proletariats. Besides this, two distinct processes are included within the same concept.

Sautu (1978) conceives of two conditions equivalent to those studied by Leal and Deere (1978). The author analyzes the family work in zones of more capitalized cultivation and in others where small-scale production predominates. She considers the small- and large-scale production as complementary, employing a strategy of analysis similar to that which was adopted by Moacir Palmeira (1979:71-88) when he studied sugar cane agriculture in Northeast Brazil. The author includes the following as part of the same production organization: small-scale production, large estates and the network of middlemen who link the peasant production with the industrial transformation of the product within the large estates, also included in the system. In contrast with the process of capitalist penetration in sugar cane agriculture encountered by Oliveira (1978) in South Brazil, Palmeira analyzes the cultivation of sugar cane in an impoverished region, considering it as a mode of production secondary to capitalism: the plantation system (Palmeira, 1971). The study of Heredia, Garcia and Garcia (1978) is part of a set of studies coordinated by Palmeira. The situation analyzed by these authors reveals yet another deviation from the findings of Oliveira's investigations. When the small-scale producers are obliged to leave the rural area and settle in the cities, instead of procuring salaried employment they seek to acquire land to assume subsistence cultivation.

Sautu (1978) does not consider the female labor in the more capitalized zone as constituting part of an industrial reserve army of labor, attributing this characteristic only to family labor in the minifundia zones, including both men and women. These areas provide seasonal labor during the harvest seasons on the estates of the neighboring regions. These are therefore considered as suppliers of labor, while the latifundia transfer the costs of maintaining the labor force through a noncapitalistic dynamics, since the cost of reproduction of the labor force is not included in the salaries. This issue will be brought again into the discussion since it limits the possibilities of using the concept of an industrial reserve army of labor for these sectors, whose population growth is not related to that of the capitalist mode of production but to that of other modes of production.

The analysis formulated by Sautu (1978) allows us to note that, although situations of crisis can be resolved through the classical capitalist process described by Marx, according to

which technological innovations introduced in agriculture render possible the exclusion of a portion of the labor force, noncapitalist solutions can also be put into motion by the fixing of labor through the use of coercion. The obligations with which the laborers are burdened by the landowners who fix them on land dismembered from the latifundia are examples of these coercive forms; they can also be derived from the writings of Sautu (1978) and aggregated with a suggestion presented by Nun (1969:182-184). According to the last author, each mode of production has its own means of constituting a relative surplus population (Laclau, 1969:19-56). Althusser, citing Marx, had already noted these forms of coercion in the feudal mode of production when he observed that the economic way of extracting overwork can also be considered a form of political coercion for the peasants.

Marx, in discussing the concept of the industrial reserve army of labor however, referred only to the capitalist mode of production, including the specifications of this category, such as what he terms the stagnant industrial reserve army of labor (Marx, 1906:705). The author characterizes this segment as those who have a longer than average work day, low salaries, and irregular employment. Therefore the workers who are included in this category sell their labor in exchange for salaries, denoting the presence of capitalist relations of production. Nun (1969:199) observes that one of the principal characteristics of modern capitalism is the capacity to incorporate scientific knowledge and technological innovations which prevent the rising absorption of the displaced labor force. The author notes that this takes place despite the growth of the economy; thus the process of constituting this relative surplus population differs from that discussed above which involves nonremunerated family labor, contracts of residency established by the large estates as a way of fixing labor, and even the manipulation of indebtedness of rural workers.

These diverse mechanisms may appear linked (Rey, 1973; Carter, 1978:47-77). They should be disentangled instead of being attributed only to the capitalist mode of production, as is done when the categories of the active industrial army and the industrial reserve army of labor derived from it are employed. Velho (1976:50-60) observes that the destruction of small-scale mercantile production by the capitalist mode of production occurs only partially, since what really takes place is a process of subordinating small-scale production by capital through the mechanisms of primitive accumulation. Bartra (1978:50) observes that home industries can organize themselves through the use of family labor, exploited through a process which Marx classified in stages before the constitution of industrial capital but which can be observed in Latin American nations to coexist with capitalism. Because of the continuity which it actually presents, Bartra (1978) called this a process of permanent primitive accumulation.

Schmuckler (1978) also demonstrates that the rise of large-scale commerce of food products brought about through the growth of supermarkets characterized by a capitalist organization does not eliminate the small-scale commerce of small grocery stores. Large- and small-scale commerce are linked. Small-scale commerce is thrust upon the low-income strata of the population, operating through mechanisms of indebtedness, which raise the prices of products instead of lowering them. The networks of personal relations, characteristic of small-scale commerce, are inoperative in large-scale commerce.

Hermitte and Segre (1978) point out that the work of women artisans they studied depends on financing through the mechanisms of usury, which operate in situations where capital is scarce. Sectors which are slightly better off provide credit in exchange for the final product and, when they market it, extract a surplus in the process. Since the major part of the risk is taken by the producers of the merchandise, the investment is considered compensatory, despite the low productivity of labor. Although the subordination of the groups continues, changes occur, such as those which take place regarding the role of the house: the female artisans of the past wove fabrics in the residences of the employers, while those in the present weave in their own homes.

The unit of small-scale mercantile production is the domestic group which cultivates goods for home consumption through the physical efforts of its members. They can also engage in other

activities such as handicrafts, home industry, and small-scale commerce. The principal resource of the domestic unit is its labor force, whose productivity varies with the size of the family, the number of members able to work, and the amount of labor expended by each member for the execution of a determined quantity of products (Chayanov, 1966:1-27; Thorner, 1971:202-218).

While in the slave mode of production the subsistence of slaves is propitiated by the owners, in small-scale mercantile production the peasants cultivate the land to provide their own subsistence. When access to land is limited either because of the quantity of land available (Chayanov, 1966:1-27) or because of political factors (Velho, 1976:193-223), the phenomenon of relative surplus population tends to occur (Chayanov, 1966:1-27).

Although Beatriz Schmuckler (1978) questions the thesis that economic crises result in the stagnation or elimination of small-scale mercantile production in observing that families manipulate female work roles in these occasions by dispatching the women into the market, she also observes that the crises which place small businesses at risk occur with illness in the family. This type of crisis could result in the diminishing of family consumption, if the activities performed by that member cannot be taken over by another.

Hermitte and Segre (1978) point out that not only illness but also death, marriage, and migration can affect subsistence or the consumption patterns of the family. Barroso (1978) points out the phenomenon also cited by D'Souza (1978), Leal and Deere (1978) and Schmuckler (1978), previously observed by Buvinic, Youssef and Elm (1978), that the households headed by women are closely connected to poverty. In Latin America as in the developed countries, notes Stan D'Souza (1978), heading a family constitutes a social condition of poverty which particularly affects women. This does not mean, however, that in Latin America the use of the concept of head-of-household, in situations where the two spouses are present, should mask the responsibility of the women, particularly for maintaining the home, which frequently is represented as help (Heredia, Garcia and Garcia, Jr., 1978). Variations in assessing female labor should not ignore women heads-of-household but recognize the effective contribution of women in maintaining the household.

We note therefore that demographic factors linked to the family organization of sustenance could result in the impoverishment of domestic groups. It can be observed that these components differ from those discussed by Marx also associated with the concept of the industrial reserve army of labor. The author associates impoverishment with unemployment or with the dislocation of the rural sector. Marx observes that the constitution of this impoverished class limits the wage aspirations of those who remain fully engaged in the active army (Marx, 1906:707). The author distinguishes various categories within the pauperized stratum: first, Marx identifies those who do not belong to the reserve but are children of those who belonged to this category, and therefore are candidates for this condition together with the orphans. Another includes those who are not capable--for physical reasons or problems of adaptation--of engaging in the active labor force, such as those with physical disabilities or the very elderly (Marx, 1906: 706-707). We can still add those who have undergone an intense process of professional disqualification without possibility of readaptation. Marx distinguishes, within this low income stratum, another group composed of criminals, vagabonds and prostitutes, the "dangerous classes" (Marx, 1906:707).

The work of Zahide Machado Neto studies a segment of an impoverished social class which performs at-home work: the girls residing in a slum area in Salvador, Bahia, Brazil. She points out that an important characteristic of the at-home work is the fact that it is easily hidden in domestic housework. The case of the girls is related to the production and marketing of goods which sometimes extends the production of foodstuffs or articles of clothing destined for home consumption. The transformation of these goods pertains to the category of at-home work. Domestic employment is also part of the arsenal of small-scale activities performed by the girls.

The concept of the industrial reserve army of labor is applied to innumerable work situations, even when substantive changes in the insertion of population contingents in the productive apparatus occur. These always result in a situation designated as a reserve, for example the dislocation of contingents of peasant families to the cities where they start to work in domestic service. Applying this concept would only result in the transfer of one position of reserve to another. If, in addition, a suggestion of Beechey (1978:190) is incorporated in which married women constitute a reserve army of labor for the capitalist mode of production, peasant women who migrate from the rural areas, become maids in family homes, and then marry and leave their employment never stop being part of the reserve army. If they shift to making lunches or clothes at home for commercial purposes, in a situation similar to the one studied by Zahidé Machado Neto, despite their varied occupational history they would never stop belonging to the same category. The concept of the industrial reserve army of labor has been extended to such a large degree, including such a complexity of situations, that it has become redundant, particularly in describing some modalities of positional dislocations of women within the productive apparatus.

The works incorporated in this review, although eventually employing notions linked to the concept of the industrial reserve army of labor or the informal labor market, offer alternatives for a social organization framework within which female labor fits. One contribution offered by this review has consequences for the political action of groups interested in elevating women's participation. It elaborates an analysis of the composition of the labor force, adequately framing the contribution of sectors whose activities have been poorly portrayed.

The participation of women in union activities has been notoriously low in Latin America, as indicated by the studies done in Peru (Balmaceda, 1976), Mexico (Leñero, 1976), and Venezuela (Schminck, 1977) analyzed comparatively in conjunction with the case of Chile, by Barrera (1978). The feminist movement has been concerned almost exclusively with the search for work outside of the home as one of the possible forms of participation which contribute to female emancipation. The movement needs to reflect on the forms of at-home work, including those oriented to the market. The importance of labor activities in this context, as demonstrated by the contributions reviewed in this paper, demand new forms of political action, possibly at the level of the community, neighborhood or district.

Neglecting these aspects could have this result: the proposal which elevates the female participation in the labor force using only the capitalist mode of production as a reference would include only women in an inadequate position, as portrayed by the concept of the industrial reserve army of labor. This could occur if the analysis considers only the possibility of incorporating women into the active army, as opposed to another analysis through which one verifies the actual contribution of women. If women are engaged in production at home, collective action must enable them to keep their productive activities, while at the same time removing them from the closed nature of their working environment and perspectives.

Notes

1. An abstract of these works can be found in the contributions of Abreu, Silva and Cappelin (1978) and Carvalho and Silva (1978).

2. See Marcel Mauss (1968: 145-269).

3. See the critique of Leite Lopes (1978) about the use of the concepts of unemployment and underemployment.

4. See the critique elaborated by Janice Perlman (1976) and Berlinck and Hogan (1979).

5. See the research articles presented at the Women and Development Conference, Wellesley, Massachusetts, 1976, in the session about the Informal Labor Market. See, for example, Lourdes Arizpe (1976). There are works such as that of Larissa Lemnitz (1975) which, despite taking the concept of marginality as a point of departure, use structural concepts to describe zones in the "barriadas" of Mexico.

6. Due to the connotations that the concept of the home assumes in our culture, I will use the concept of the house to make clear that I am referring to the physical space where production activities can be developed, besides the prevailing characteristics of a living space typical of a capitalist society. From this point of view, a house may or may not be a home.

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PART II

OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES OF GLOBAL ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE: MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND WOMEN

Employment of Women in Export Assembly of High Technology Electronics in Asia

Lenny Siegel

There are now somewhere between two hundred and fifty to three hundred thousand women working in semiconductor plants in Asia outside of Japan--South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, the Philippines, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand. There are one or two plants in India and at least two planned for Sri Lanka. A semiconductor is a transistor of integrated circuit. Semiconductors are found in modern computers, cars, radios, and missles. Basically, they are the universal blocks of modern industry. I have always found it ironic that some of the most sophisticated pieces of equipment--a tiny chip contains a hundred thousand to two hundred thousand circuit elements can be produced in conditions reminiscent of the early industrial revolution.

Semiconductors are in some ways an archetype of the international division of labor that we have been hearing about, largely because of their high value compared to their size. It is extremely inexpensive to ship them. Therefore, since the early years of production, semiconductors have been assembled almost half-way around the world. Literally, in the middle of the assembly line they are shipped to Asia. Producers seek locations with the lowest production costs and, of course, labor is probably the most important production cost in the labor-intensive assembly phase of production.

I will go over that again because I think that down in the Silicon Valley in the South Bay, we take a lot for granted about high technology. Semiconductor production takes place in essentially four steps. The first is called design. That's figuring out how to arrange various circuit elements on a silicon chip. The second step is called wafer fabrication. That is generally done in places like Silicon Valley and other parts of the United States. Photo-lithography and other forms of etching, as well as repeated exposure to chemicals, are used to imprint patterns on silicon wafers-thin disks about four inches in diameter. Fabrication uses a lot of chemicals. It is generally capital-intensive and requires the skill of numerous engineers, technicians, and scientists.

The third step in production is assembly. Each wafer of four inches in diameter is cut up into chips or die about a tenth of an inch square. The cutting or breaking may be done here or in Asia. The die are then attached to little plastic or ceramic packages about half an inch long, that look sort of like caterpillars. When you see them in photographs, there are twenty to forty wires leading down from each package.

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The work that is done most often in Asia is called bonding. The chip is attached to the package with a thread-like wire which is very tiny--smaller than a human hair. The wire is generally gold, sometimes aluminum. This work is generally done with the aid of a microscope, although in recent years manufacturers have been introducing "automated" assembly techniques which use video displays as well as microscopes. It is very monotonous and labor intensive.

The fourth step is testing, plugging the computer chips into sophisticated electronic equipment to find out whether they work. Though most was originally done in the United States, in recent years a significant portion of testing has been done in Asia. In fact, RCA recently set up some labs in Southeast Asia for testing chips so that they don't have to be brought back to the United States before shipment to buyers. They actually have a satellite link to computers, which evaluate the testing, in the United States.

Because production is distinguished by these four distinct processes, it has been possible for the producers, since the earliest stage of mass semiconductor production in the early sixties, to locate the various stages of production in different countries. Not only do we have a situation where companies are doing design and wafer fabrication in countries before sending them to Asia for assembly; we now also have a division of labor within Asia. Companies that assemble chips in the Philippines for instance, may ship them to Singapore for more capital-intensive and technology-intensive testing.

Historically, the first country to host offshore semiconductor assembly was Hong Kong. Hong Kong does not have export processing zones (EPZs) but in many ways the whole colony is an EPZ. Taiwan opened the first Asian EPZ in 1966. Since then a succession of countries have been opened up to semiconductor production by government policy. One of the most recent is Sri Lanka. In order to entice U.S. semiconductor firms like Motorola and Harris to Sri Lanka, the government built an EPZ and has moved to repeal a labor code which outlaw night work for women.

Producers have established semiconductor assembly outside Asia, but most of the plants have been shut down. There has been work in Mexico. Fairchild had a plant in Shiprock, New Mexico, on an Indian Reservation. Texas Instruments had a large plant in the Netherlands Antilles. However, high labor costs and strikes have led manufacturers to concentrate assembly in Asia. There are some assembly plants in Ireland and Scotland, inside European Economic Community's tariff wall. There are still a few plants along the Mexican border. Texas Instruments, in fact, has a plant in El Salvador, which apparently is still operating.

In looking at the semiconductor industry and its impact, there are three basic questions that I ask. What is the impact on the women in Asia who work in the industry? What is the impact on the economies of Asia? And what is the impact on the workers in the United States? We are talking primarily about U.S. based firms, but there are also some Japanese-owned offshore assemblers, and, particularly in the Philippines, there are a number of local sub-contractors who contract with the American companies. Typically sub-contractors work for several companies rather than just one.

In these countries, the companies specifically hire young, single women. The only exception--the major exception--is Singapore, which I don't consider a country; it is kind of an artificial corporate city with no hinterland. But the companies quite openly hire only young women. The companies say that young Asian women are extremely dextrous. Indeed, assembly requires a lot of dexterity. But, I think the evidence is that they find that young women are easiest to control in the factory.

Cultural factors and working conditions contribute to the fact that not very many women are allowed to stay on or are unable to stay on after their mid-twenties. Culturally, there is pressure for women to move back into the family and to not work anymore. Physically, their eyesight is gone. They are working over microscopes sixty hours a week or more for several years and their eyesight doesn't last. That may change because of the increase in automated equipment in Asia, but at this point it still seems to be the general characteristic.

There are also hazards, such as the use of chemicals, although more chemicals are used in the wafer fabrication stage within the United States. Solvents are used to clean components and equipment,but even in "clean rooms" workers are exposed to toxic fumes. So working conditions are a problem.

The wages are low. In fact, wages are necessarily low. That is, any export-oriented country in Asia-that is, one which wishes to attract U.S. semiconductor investment-must hold down wages. Groups working to improve human rights in Asia consider the export-oriented development strategy to be the cause of martial law and continued repression in countries such as Korea. If the government did not suppress strikes and crack down on opposition, then wages would go up. You can tell that Korean workers are upset at wages and conditions because even under martial law, there are strikes and other industrial protests. If the governments were not so strongly in favor of this export strategy--providing cheap labor to promote so-called development--then offshore assembly would not be so common.

I think it is true, within industrializing Asia, that many women workers do value some of the freedoms and some of the access to consumer goods that they may gain as a result of work in the factory. Those gains, however, are short-lived. In many cases, the traditional family structures which have held them down are merely replaced by factory paternalism. Some companies have made overt attempts to install the factory manager as a father figure. Instead of exploiting traditional culture, many companies distribute cosmetics and play rock-and-roll music to try to build up the loyalty of women. I don't think there is really any evidence that this implies any long term liberation of women, except perhaps in the workers' long range reaction to inadequate working conditions.

Asian semiconductor assembly has negative impacts beyond the political consequences that I mentioned before. Industry is heavily dependent upon foreign capital, technology, and markets. In the textile industry, at least, the producer of textiles can be locally controlled. It can ship to any one of a number of countries around the world. Semiconductor factories, however, are in the middle of an assembly line. They are entirely dependent upon the designs and the marketing of the multinational firms that control the industry. There is no way that a country can develop its own independent semiconductor industry. There are attempts to do that; RCA, for instance, has agreed to pass on some semiconductor wafer fabrication technology to Taiwan. There are a few plants in Hong Kong moving into wafer fabrication. But the technology that has been transferred in that manner is so far behind the state of the art that it is similar to countries setting up steel mills 20 years ago. They could fabricate steel, but that really didn't rank them in the international marketplace.

The only way that this export strategy can "work" is by not paying factory workers enough to consume their product. In general, my understanding of the history of economic development in Europe and the United States is that workers were paid enough to become a market. But the whole assumption of export assembly is that workers will never buy the products that use sophisticated chips. In some countries there is a small market for consumer items like transistor radios, but you won't find any women who produce chips buying personal computers.

Obviously, export assembly generates economic activity, but alternative strategies might be more effective. I believe that the resources that are used to build infrastructure and industrial estates for assembly plants, as well as the technical resources, including engineers and technicians, could be better used on more self-sufficient forms of development. One of the most interesting things to watch in the next few years will be whether China actually moves ahead on its strategy of free trade zones and joint ventures with multinational firms. It may place so many conditions on the transfer of technology that not many multinationals will do business there. I think it is a question still to be decided. Chinese politics are rather complex and it will be some time before we know what is involved.

Finally, we get to the impact on the United States. Unlike other industries, such as consumer electronics and textiles, the semiconductor industry has not been characterized by

what are called international runaway shops.

Within the semiconductor industry, domestic employment--primarily wafer fabrication and testing--has grown dramatically while assembly work has increased in Asia. In general, people have not lost jobs, although some production has been shifted to places like North Carolina and Oregon. However, for many years the companies have used the fact that they had cheap labor in Asia to tell the women who make up the bulk of the production workforce here that "We can get cheaper labor in Asia, so you better not join a union." In fact, managers have played off Asian workers against each other. They may tell Korean assemblers, "The women in the Philippines work twice as hard for half as much money," and they tell the women in Indonesia that " you women are inefficient, you ought to see how fast they work in Thailand." That kind of division has held up any kind of international cooperation. And cooperation could make a difference in helping to organize unions in these plants to work for higher wages.

Some observers predict that more assembly will be brought "back" to the United States with increased automation. Thus far, automated equipment is merely being introduced in Asia by most of the firms. Some of the big companies such as Western Electric and IBM, which make semiconductors for internal use, do have automated domestic assembly. As more automated assembly is introduced in the United States, employers may increasingly attempt to play off their Asian and American workers against each other.

The most important obstacle, however, in trying to encourage cooperation between workers in the United States and Asia is the fact that American semiconductor workers are not unionized. It is much easier to get U.S. garment workers to push for improved conditions for Asian and Latin American garment workers, since they are organized. So we are a step behind. However, as American semiconductor workers begin to organize, there is the opportunity to raise more international issues. We can say, "Don't buy what the company says. Your interests are not opposed to those of workers in Asia. You have a common interest and the company is playing you all against each other."

Organizing is very slow. No established union will commit sufficient resources to electronics workers, in part because the women are the primary work force that they need to organize and the unions are still dominated by men. But there are some interesting moves in that direction and we may see some results in the not too distant future.

I want to finish with one important point. When in 1971 or 1972 I wrote my first article about offshore electronics production, I sent it to American Report, a publication of Clergy and Laity Concerned about the War in Vietnam. The first editor who read it returned it to me and said, "What is the big news? Cheap labor is natural to Asia." But Americans, even those concerned about foreign policies, are really unaware of all of the different ways in which our government has acted to create a reservoir of cheap labor in the Third World. We support economic policies that drive farmers off the land; that's one way to enlarge the labor force. We help finance infrastructure which is built specifically to serve multinational corporations rather than the needs of the residents. We train national leaders to pursue export-oriented industrialization. And finally, as I mentioned in South Korea, the low wages of Asian countries, or in El Salvador or any other country where you find extremely low wages, are propped up by military or other forms of repressive rule. One of the most important things that the American labor movement, the American women's movement, and the American human rights movement can do is say, "We think that these imports to this country, this cheap labor, are a result of artificial factors, in particular the suppression of economic human rights in the Third World." There are some very simple policies, such as opposition to martial law in Korea and the Philippines, which would make an enormous difference, not only in guaranteeing the rights of the people in those countries, but in placing those countries in their proper competitive position.

Multinational Export Factories and Women Workers in the Third World: A Review of Theory and Evidence

Linda Y.C. Lim

Introduction

In recent years there has been a welcome proliferation of feminist and radical scholarship on women workers in labor-intensive multinational export factories in the Third World. From a series of excellent case studies, we now know quite a lot about the motivations and operations of these multinationals, about the women who work in them, and about the labor process in export factories.[1] My task in this paper is not to repeat, dispute or supplant the valuable empirical findings which have emerged from these studies.[2] Rather, it is to re-examine this accumulated evidence--including the most recent research findings[3]--in an attempt to advance our understanding of its implications for feminist and radical theory, and for progressive action by and on behalf of these women workers as an oppressed sex and exploited class in the Third World.

I will argue that the accumulated evidence challenges the currently dominant feminist and radical perspective which largely embraces dependency and world-system analysis in focusing on the multinational from "core" countries as the chief perpetrator of capitalist and imperialist "super-exploitation" of women in "peripheral" countries of the world-system--a process which some writers argue constitutes an increasingly important new international division of labor.[4] While this dependency/world system "paradigm" has for some time been under serious attack by Marxist critics on the level of abstract theory and on the basis of individual country histories and generalized empirical evidence for the Third World,[5] my aim here is the more narrow and modest one of suggesting the "paradigm's" weak logical and empirical foundations in a particular concrete topical case relating expressly to women.[6]

The Evidence: Causes and Consequences in the Third World

To begin with, it should be noted that multinationals investing in developing countries largely take existing labor market conditions as given. They do not <u>create</u> such observed features of women's employment as low wages and high labor turnover. If anything, multinational export factories pay <u>higher</u> wages and have <u>better</u> working conditions than alternative domestic occupations open to the women who work in them,[7] particularly indigenous competitors in labor-intensive export industries. The increased demand for female labor generated by multinational factories <u>raises</u> prevailing market wages and increases employment opportunities for women, such

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that the multinational is frequently accused in the same breath of paying wages which are "too low" for workers and "too high" for indigenous employers to match. This then "spoils the market" for local firms, destroying them through "unfair competition."

Even where the wage in multinational export factories is lower than domestic alternatives--such as prostitution in Thailand,[8] rubber tapping in Malaysia,[9] and domestic service in Singapore--it is frequently a preferred form of employment among women, because of better status and working conditions. Because of institutionalized seniority wage increases, as well as mandated fringe benefits, in formal factory employment, wages for long-term workers are often higher than in informal service sector jobs, wage-labor in export agriculture, and other unskilled and semi-skilled male or female occupations.[10]

In any case, low wages are only one and not necessarily the most important factor in influencing the locational decisions of multinational export factories. In Southeast Asia, for example, the earliest and still most popular offshore sites for labor-intensive multinational factories were Hong Kong and Singapore, whose prevailing wages are and have remained much higher than those of neighboring countries which have been equally--if not more welcoming to multinationals. Other costs and considerations--such as location, infrastructure, and local political and economic conditions--have been as important as, if not more important than, low wages in determining the investment decisions of labor-intensive multinationals.[11]

Where women's wages are depressed below proximate market levels and worker organization is inhibited, this is the result of wage controls and repressive or restrictive labor market policies enacted by host governments acting on their own initiative.[12] Are these host governments then simply "imperialist lackeys" brought to or maintained in power by multinationals whose interests they serve? I think not, for the following reasons.

First, while multinationals which invest in a Third World country to exploit its raw material resources or to manufacture for the local market are location-specific and frequently long-established with major investments and a major share of the local economy--and therefore have both the motivation and the influence to interfere in local politics--multinational export factories are new and mobile between different host countries, their investments in each country are small both for the individual company and for the total host economy. They have neither the need nor the clout to manipulate local governments, and there is no evidence that they do so.[13] An electronics factory in Malaysia accounting for less than 5% of its American parent's worldwide business and an even smaller fraction of its host country's export earnings is a far cry from the cases of copper monopolies in Chile or oil in Iran under the Shah.

Second, political repression and repression of labor where observed in countries which host multinational export factories reflect national insecurities--such as military and political threats from communist neighbors (South Korea and Taiwan), or internal insurgencies and unrest (Philippines)--at least as much as, if not more than, global corporate or big-power security interests. If repression coincides with the hosting of multinational export factories, it is because insecure states need to ensure political stability by stifling dissent and providing jobs for the poor at the same time.

Third, repressive, U.S.-dependent military states (Taiwan, South Korea and the Philippines) are often less popular with multinational export industries than less repressive constitutional democracies such as Malaysia and Singapore, which have never received U.S. political or military aid,[14] and Mexico. Labor-intensive export manufacturing in the repressive states is dominated by indigenous firms rather than by multinationals, while the opposite is true in the less repressive states. This is partly because military rule and repression are indicative of underlying political instability which discourages heavy long-term investments and may cause multinationals to prefer subcontracting to local firms instead of engaging in direct investments themselves.[15] Military rule and political repression also provoke internal dissent and unrest: for example, workers in export factories in the Philippines and South Korea are much more heavily, militantly and radically unionised than similar workers in Malay-

sia and Singapore, and strike much more frequently.

Fourth, to the extent that stable and docile labor and a cooperative host government are conducive to multinational investment in labor-intensive export factories, socialism may be a better alternative for the investing firm than either democratic or authoritarian capitalism. Thus in 1976 many American electronics multinationals with offshore plants in Southeast Asia were hoping that their own government would quickly normalize relations with socialist Vietnam, which was itself then hopeful of attracting foreign investment to rebuild its economy. The multinationals felt that a socialist government would be better able to control its workers (for example, unions if they existed would be branches of the communist party), and that since manual labor would be glorified, and wage and productivity differences among workers minimized, labor would be both productive and cheap, ideally-suited to labor-intensive export manufacturing and at no cost to the American taxpayer.[16]

In other words, political repression, military rule, U.S. aid and authoritarian capitalism, though in some (not all) cases correlated with (not caused by) multinational investment in labor-intensive export manufacturing, are neither necessary nor sufficient for this type of investment, or for the economic success of the countries which host it. In Latin America, for example, military rule and U.S. aid have been cited as the cause of unsuccessful capitalist development, whereas in Asia they have sometimes been cited as the cause of successful development in Taiwan and South Korea. In Southeast Asia, on the other hand, successful capitalist development (including improving income distribution) has been achieved without military rule and U.S. aid in the export-led economies of Malaysia and Singapore.[17]

If multinationals are not--directly, by lowering wage levels, or indirectly, by influencing host governments to be repressive of labor--responsible for the low wages of women workers in developing countries, who or what is?

The primary cause of women's weak labor market position in developing countries is the weak and underdeveloped nature of their national economies which results in weak labor demand. It is this weak development of productive forces--whatever its causes--which results in a large--as much as tenfold or more--national wage differential between developed and developing countries. This is much more important than the sex wage differential within the developing country, which is about half to one-third, and is a secondary cause of low wages in multinational factories. This sex wage differential reflects female subordination and the sexual division of labor in indigenous society, particularly the constraints of the reproductive role resulting in the short job tenure, low seniority and hence low average wages of women workers who, in these as in other predominantly female occupations, quit work when they marry and have children. Neither the national or the sex wage differential is the specific responsibility of these multinationals, though they take advantage of and in some cases may even reinforce them.[18] The less developed a Third World country, the lower its wages must be to attract multinational investment in order to compensate for the other high costs and risks of production--such as those imposed by inadequate or unreliable transportation, communications, utilities and other supporting services, political and financial instability, an undernourished workforce, etc. The more developed a Third World country, and the lower the risks and non-wage costs of investment, the more willing multinationals are to pay higher wages for the same work; this is the case, for example, in Singapore and Hong Kong.

If these are the causes, what are the consequences of multinational employment of women in labor-intensive export factories in the Third World? We often read in the literature about the related phenomena of "superexploitation" and "exhaustion." The "superexploitation" hypothesis argues that the wages paid in multinational export factories are so low that they are insufficient to cover the reproduction of labor-power expended by, and in some cases even the minimum physical subsistence of, workers employed in very intensive tasks.[19] This has two consequences which must to some extent be mutually exclusive: (1) factory workers must be subsidized by their families, or (2) they are inadequately subsidized by their families, so become rapidly "exhausted" and are laid off or forced to retire or resign prematurely. This

high turnover of workers is allegedly welcomed and even encouraged by the multinational employers because it keeps the labor force young, cheap, fresh, productive and flexible, reducing the need for layoffs during recessions.[20]

But the evidence in the literature itself shows that not only do the vast majority of workers cover their own physical subsistence and basic needs of food, housing, clothing and transportation, they have enough left over for small luxuries, savings and contributions to their families. The error of those who argue for the superexploitation thesis is that they ignore Marx's definition of the reproduction of labor-power as a function of specific historical and cultural conditions. It is inappropriate and ahistorical to define the level of reproduction for developing countries on the basis of developed country norms reflecting a much longer development of productive forces and generations of worker struggles which have not yet taken place in developing countries. Employer provisions for social security, for example, are a recent and by no means universal component of the level of reproduction in developed countries, and do not define the norm in present-day developing countries. In any case, the evidence shows that multinationals have if anything raised the historical level of reproduction in developing countries, and frequently offer better wages, benefits and working conditions than prevailing norms in the host country.

As for "exhaustion," there is no evidence that either hours worked or the intensity of work in multinational export factories are greater than in equivalent unskilled or semi-skilled female occuaptions in the developing host country.[21] Health hazards are probably worse in multinational factories because of the use of chemicals and machinery in modern industrial technology. Nevertheless, in all long-established factories there is an often sizeable core of long-term workers who have worked as many as ten years or more and do not appear to be exhausted. This raises the question of why some workers become exhausted and others do not. The superexploitation hypothesis predicts that long-term workers must be from more well-to-do families who can better afford to subsidize the reproduction of their labor-power. Yet both logic and evidence suggest that in many cases these workers are from poorer families who most require their incomes for survival and therefore can least be expected to subsidize their labor-power.[22]

High labor turnover, sometimes deduced as "evidence" of "exhaustion," in fact reflects the influence of the sexual division of labor in indigenous society, where women are assigned full responsibility for the reproductive role which in turn constrains and conflicts with their participation in wage-labor. Most of the women workers who quit multinational export factories do so not because they are physically or mentally exhausted--with the possible exception of new recruits who are both paid lower "probationary" wages and are less used to the type of labor required--but rather to marry and have children.[23] Few quit to look for other, presumably less "exhausting" jobs. There is also no evidence that women factory workers retire sooner than women in other predominantly female occupations, even though factory labor is less accommodating of the reproductive role than self-employment or family labor which can often be more flexibly scheduled. Rather, the evidence suggests that employment for women in multinational export factories prolongs their working life and delays marriage and child-bearing[24]--presumably because it is less compatible with the reproductive role than more flexible traditional women's occupations, even though factory labor is less accommodating of the reproductive role than self-employment or family labor which can often be more flexibly scheduled. Rather, the evidence suggests that employment for women in multinational export factories prolongs their working life and delays marriage and child-bearing[24]--presumably because it is less compatible with the reproductive role than more flexible traditional women's occupations.

Although high turnover does keep average wages down in very labor-intensive factories without depressing productivity where learning curves are short, it becomes a major problem for employers in times of labor shortage, for example at the peak of the business cycle and in rapidly-growing economies, and where technological upgrading lengthens learning curves--for example, in Hong Kong and Singapore.

While there are individual cases where "superexploitation" and "exhaustion" doubtless occur, they are not general enough to be a motivating or necessary condition for multinationals' employment of women workers.

What about the security of employment, given all that is said about "footlooseness," "runaway" behavior,[25] and cyclical fluctuations in export industries? The evidence indicates that so far at least--and in some countries this is as many as ten or twenty years--multinational footlooseness among developing countries is much less common than a few highly-publicized cases might suggest. The degree of mobility varies with the nature of the industry, the firm, and the process being relocated, as well as among host countries. Where firms do relocate, this is usually due to reasons other than the commonly cited rising wages or expiring tax holidays--for example, corporate takeover or reorganization of the parent company, business failure of the company or of a particular division or product-line, or extreme political and economic insecurity in the host nation. The costs and risks of constant relocation are not insubstantial, and may be sufficient to deter moves to potentially more profitable locations.[26] Whereas multinationals may use their potential or actual mobility to discipline workers in their developed home country,[27] in developing countries they are just as likely to emphasize that they are "here to stay" and to publicize reinvestments as a sign of their commitment to the host country--if only to win favor with the host government and perhaps to obtain more tax concessions.[28]

Layoffs, pull-outs and plant shut-downs are no more frequent among multinational than among indigenous export factories--which are if anything more vulnerable to recessions and more likely to shut down from business failure. Employment in export-oriented agriculture and mining in developing countries is often even more vulnerable to cyclical layoffs. In export manufacturing, cyclical layoffs from multinationals attract more attention because multinational subsidiaries are much larger than local firms. Having a bigger capacity, they have to cut down more in a recession and lay off larger numbers of workers because they employ large numbers to begin with. Even so, the majority of workers in multinational export factories quit "voluntarily" rather than are laid off involuntarily, and it is not clear if their employment is any less secure than in alternative occupations.

Multinational employers are frequently accused of using psychological manipulation and cultural indoctrination to control workers and keep them weak and unorganized.[29] Ironically, one of the tactics they are often accused of is "buying off" workers' support by paying them "higher than market" wages, resulting in an inherently unprogressive "labor aristocracy" which suffers from "false consciousness." Multinationals do indeed engage in various devious labor practices. But it should be noted that, first, workers often support, enjoy and themselves initiate the organization of such "Western bourgeois feminine" cultural activities as fashion and make-up classes, beauty contests and formal dinners with ballroom and disco dancing. "Factory culture," and factory workers' tastes and aspirations, are little different from the pervasive urban-modern culture and other young women's aspirations in the indigenous society beyond this sector.

Second, although women workers in multinational export factories--especially those in American electronics companies--may occupy a privileged position relative to other young working and non-working women in the host countries, they are by no means an "elite" group or a "labor aristocracy." They are still more poorly paid than male workers in their own countries, and than male and female workers in the developed countries, and vulnerable to health hazards and other work-related problems.

Third, any cultural indoctrination by multinational employers has not been successful in buying workers' complacency. Women workers in these factories are in many cases highly organized-often with rates of unionization surpassing those found elsewhere in the host or even the home economy.[30] They recognize exploitation, and especially in repressive states like South Korea and the Philippines, are militant, radical, with strong grassroots organization, and frequently initiate labor actions such as go-slows, sit-ins and strikes, even where these

are forbidden and punishable by law.[31] Where union organization is forbidden--for example, until recently, in Malaysia--some researchers suggest that acts such as mass hysteria and industrial sabotage which disrupt production are nascent class actions.[32] Wildcat strikes are also common.

In short, class formation, class consciousness and progressive class action are all developing in multinational export factories, though their progress depends more on individual national situations than on any homogenous cross-national factory culture.

What is the impact of multinational factory employment on women's position in the family and indigenous society? It has been argued that this employment does not offer women in the Third World more than an at best temporary, superficial and illusory liberation from male domination in their own families and societies, and may even reinforce such domination. However it does improve their lives--increasing their freedom, independence, worth, status, contribution to family support, access to experience outside the family, to small luxuries and the companionship of other women--all of which are highly valued by the women themselves.[33] It also enables young women to delay marriage and child-bearing, and to choose their own marriage partners.[34] As more women continue working after marriage, the traditional sexual division of labor within the family changes. Working wives and husbands increasingly share the power and responsibilities of housework, child care and family financial decision-making.[35]

The Evidence: Global Implications

What are the global implications of women's employment in multinational export factories in the Third World? Studies show that the loss of jobs in developed countries from industrial relocation to developing countries has been greatly exaggerated in numbers and significance.[36] Where this has occured it has, first, been mostly in industries facing stagnant or declining market demand, such as textiles and garments. In a growth industry like electronics, on the other hand, there has been a net expansion of jobs in the developed countries, though their composition has changed.[37] Second, job loss in developed countries has been mostly the result of import competition from Japanese and indigenous Third World manufacturers rather than multinational subsidiaries. Third, job loss caused by relocation to developing countries has been quantitatively less significant than the job loss created by mechanization and competition among developed countries. Fourth, the price and income effects of relocation to developing countries have contributed to at least partly compensatory increases in demand, and resulting job creation, in the developed countries. Multinational export factories in the Third World buys inputs from their home countries, their workers buy consumer goods imported from the developed countries, and cost and price reductions made possible by the move to cheaper production locations expand final market demand for the relocating industries. Fifth, further relocation of labor-intensive manufacturing from developed to developing countries is expected to decline overall in the 1980s due to protectionism in the developed countries and continued technological change in the direction of increased integration, process automation, and higher skills.

In any case, from a global viewpoint, more jobs have probably been created in developing countries, where production is more labor-intensive, than have been lost in developed countries as a result of relocation, which is at least partly a substitute for mechanization. There is also a positive shift in income redistribution, since employment has shifted to the poorest workers in the world--women in the Third World, whose income and employment opportunities and access to public social security support are far inferior to those available to displaced workers in the developed countries. There is no reason why Third World women should be denied jobs which workers in the developed countries either refuse to do or are so keen to preserve for themselves, and which are better than other women's jobs in the Third World. Employment created for women is also no less valuable than employment created for men.

The global significance of multinational export factory employment of women workers in the Third World has also been much exaggerated as a major "New International Division of La-

bor"[38] and a major means by which Third World women are integrated into wage-labor and the circuit of international capitalist production and exchange. First, labor-intensive export manufacturing remains a very small proportion of multinational investments in the Third World, most of which are still concentrated in resource exploitation and manufacturing for the local market. New investment is expected to decline, rather than grow. Second, multinationals account for only a minor portion of production and jobs in all export manufacturing in the Third World, which is dominated by indigenous Third World firms.[39] Third, export manufacturing by both multinationals and local firms is only a small proportion of total output and employment, and a minor part of the industrial sector, in most host countries and the Third World at large. Fourth, export factory employment accounts for only a small proportion of female wage employment in developing host countries, even within the urban-industrial sector alone.[40]

Thus, in quantitative terms, multinational export manufacturing in the Third World is a phenomenon of small significance for multinationals, for export manufacturing, for developing countries, and for women, and hardly qualifies as a major new international division of labor.

Conclusions: Implications for Theory and Policy

The dependency and world-system perspective which dominates radical and feminist analyses of export manufacturing in the Third World, at its most simplistic and didactic, sees the multinational perched at the apex or "core" of a hierarchical world-system, ruthlessly "superexploiting" Third World women workers at the bottom or "periphery" of the system, with few if any progressive consequences. Actors in the Third World itself are caricatured and dismissed as "dependent comprador puppets" (the Third World state), "agents" (Third World capital) and "victims" (Third World women) of the all-powerful multinational.

Although space limitations prevent a full analysis here, the actual experience of multinational export manufacturing in the Third World is a more complex one, with the Third World state, Third World capital, Third World women workers, Third World domestic economy, and Third World indigenous patriarchal systems having a more autonomous and important role to play in determining the occurence, form and impact of this multinational investment and employment than the dependency and world-system perspective allows.[41] Depending on the particular configuration of these Third World national forces and their specific articulation with international forces--which differ from country to country--the phenomenon of multinational employment of Third World women in export factories can be and, the evidence suggests, in many cases is progressive, both in the Marxist sense of developing the forces and relations of production (including class formation, class consciousness and militant class action), and in the feminist sense of weakening female subordination and the sexual division of labor in indigenous Third World societies.

Thus far from being merely "puppets," the Third World state and ruling classes may manipulate and "use" the multinational to serve their own domestic interests.[42] Far from being only "comprador agents," Third World capital can and increasingly does present an independent competitive challenge to the multinational, in some cases forcing it to relocate to the Third World to meet this challenge.[43] Far from being pitiable, "superexploited," "victims," or a useless "labor aristocracy," women workers both benefit from their employment in multinationals and use it to organize themselves and take action as a class against capitalist exploitation. Far from being "marginalized" by their employment, they are integrated into the modern industrial proletariat more than other women--and most men--in the host country, and in some cases may even function as a progressive "vanguard."

A materialist, class and feminist analysis must thus lead us to reject the analytically sterile emphasis on relations of dependency between "core" and "periphery" countries of the capitalist world-system. As I have argued elsewhere,[44] capitalism, imperialism and patriarchy are separate though connected agents of women's exploitation in Third World countries, and imperialism by multinationals--at least in this case--is sometimes the weakest of the three. Theoretical perspectives on this phenomenon must therefore shift their focus from assigning a

dominant role to the multinational in capitalist and patriarchal exploitation to a more accurate emphasis of domestic social formations, the domestic mode of production, domestic classes and the domestic sexual division of labor in the Third World--in other words, an emphasis on the primacy of more Marxist- and feminist- rather than dependency-and world-system-oriented analysis. International forces are important, but they are conditioned by national forces in the Third World--by nation, state, class and sex. It is these national forces which must explain the observed differences among host countries in the extent, structure, behavior and impact of multinational export manufacturing, since they are presumably subject to the same international forces emanating from the "core" of the world-system.

This theoretical shift also implies a shift in policy away from the implication inherent in the dependency and world-system perspective that multinational export manufacturing should be prevented or removed from the Third World. This is an inherently unprogressive strategy if it takes place in the absence of offering concrete alternatives for women's employment. First, it will undermine women's already tenuous economic position by depriving them of one of their few sources of wage employment in underdeveloped, patriarchal, capitalist economies. Second, it will remove a focal point for organizing workers against capital in general and international capital in particular. Third, it will reinforce indigenous patriarchy by yielding to the pressures of conservative groups--such as fundamentalist male religious leaders--in the Third World who are opposed to women's employment outside the home, especially in foreign factories which might expose them to sexually liberating alien cultures.

On the other hand, accepting the multinational's presence but insisting on the application of developed country norms with respect to wages and working conditions--for example, through international agencies, international codes of conduct for multinationals, etc.--is equally flawed. First, it is ahistorical and "core-centric," ignoring the differences of developing countries from each other and from the developed countries. Second, it is utopian and unlikely to succeed, given the international mobility of capital in these industries. Third, if successful, this strategy might be divisive, further isolating these women workers in a privileged enclave sector as a "labor aristocracy," rather than integrating them into the national economy as a segment of the national working-class and part of its class struggle.

This does not mean that improvements can not or should not be made in the position of Third World women workers in multinational export factories, rather that they should be attempted in the context of three interrelated progressive struggles. The first is a national struggle to develop the national economy and create more jobs for both men and women--including by means of socialist revolution if that is historically appropriate, and bearing in mind that socialist countries like China also can and do host labor-intensive export-oriented manufacturing industries.[45] The second is a class struggle to enhance workers' consciousness, organization and action, and to improve their wages and working conditions, especially health and safety conditions --which is already going on in multinational export factories. The third is a feminist struggle to reduce sexual inequalities in the ideological superstructure and production relations of indigenous society and economy;[46] this struggle is currently the weakest of the three.[47]

These nationally-based struggles not only focus more clearly on the root causes of women's exploitation in multinational export factories and other forms of employment, they are also more promising in terms of delivering results to the individual worker than a vague focus on international connections. For example, international labor solidarity and cooperation against the multinational is unlikely to develop unless a strong independent national labor movement exists--which in turn is unlikely to develop if women remain short-run workers uncommited to the labor force because of their responsibility for the reproductive role. Whereas the dependency and world-system perspective locates all power at the "core" or center of the world-system, which then becomes the focal point of radical attack--an essentially top-down strategy--the Marxist and feminist analysis I suggest recognizes that Third World women in the "periphery" have the power for progressive action to change their situation themselves, from the bottom up.

Labor-intensive export manufacturing by multinationals is not the best or the only co text in which these national, class and feminist struggles can or should proceed, but neithe is it the worst or the most important. Wittingly or unwittingly, directly or indirectly, actively or passively, the multinational may well have a progressive role to play in these struggles, depending on specific local historical conditions. Women workers in the Third Wo already recognize and exploit the contradictions and the progressive aspects of their employ ment by these multinationals--a reality which radical and feminist theorists inbued with the dependency and world-system perspective ignore at the peril of being not only wrong, but irrelevant to the cause of those they would champion.

Notes

1. Although not all of them deal specifically with women workers in multinational export factories, the following are some key references: Kung (1975), Salaff (1976), Paglaban (1978), Lim (1978b, 1980a, 1983b), Grossman (1979), Snow (1979), Ackerman (1979 and n.d.), Arrigo (1980), Jamilah (1980), Fernandez-Kelly (1980 and 1983), Elson and Pearson (1981), Safa (1981), Heyser (1982), Ong (1983).

2. Although a superficial reading may suggest that my analysis in this paper significantly deviates from that contained in my earlier writings on this subject, Lim (1978, 1980a, 1983b), it in fact represents a development of many ideas contained in these earlier works, revised and updated according to the latest evidence (nothing is static). The analysis here is very similar to that presented in Lim (1983b), a more theoretical article, while Lim (1978b, 1980a) have a different focus--describing and analysing the phenomenon--from this paper, which is more concerned with evaluation. See also Lim (1980b).

3. In addition to the references cited in note 1 above, see also Castro (1982), Datta-Chaudhuri (1982), Ramayanake (1982), Edgren (1982), Wong (1982), and other sources cited therein and below.

4. A prominent exponent of the dependency perspective is Frank (1967, 1969); for his comments on export manufacturing from developing countries, see Frank (1979, 1982). The leading exponents of world-system analysis is Wallerstein (1979); for an application of this general perspective to export manufacturing in developing countries, see Snow (1980). The chief proponents of the "new international division of labor" thesis from a radical perspective are Frobel, Heinrichs and Kreye (1977/1980). See also Landsberg (1979). None of these writers specifically analyzes the position of women workers, but their general perspective is incorporated into many of the works cited in note 1 above.

5. One example is the Marxist critique of Bill Warren (1980). See also Chilcote (1982), and various articles in Latin American Perspectives and Journal of Contemporary Asia.

6. Because of space constraints, I will not be analyzing multinational export manufacturing as a strategy of development for the national economy, on which see, however, Lim (1978a), Lim and Pang (1982), and papers in progress. For works by other writers (not necessarily espousing the same point of view), see, for example, Helleiner (1973a and 1973b), Nayyar (1978), Landsberg (1979), Sivandandan (1980), Frobel, Heinrichs and Kreye (1977/1980), Bello, O'Connor and Broad (1982).

7. See, for example, Castro (1982), Datta-Chaudhuri (1982), Ramayanake (1982).

8. Phongpaichit (1982a).

9. Ackerman (n.d.).

10. Wong (1982).

11. See, for example, Lim (1983c).

12. See ibid. for country examples.

13. Even if there is evidence that in specific instances multinational managers put pressure on host governments to be repressive, this does not mean that the governments would not have been repressive in the absence of such pressure, or would yield to such pressure if there were no other compelling domestic reasons to be repressive.

14. Democracy is limited in these countries in comparison with the Western industrialized nations, but they are not military regimes, do not receive military aid from other governments, do have opposition parties represented in parliament, and do hold regular elections at which the governments are at least partly accountable to the electorate.

15. In periodic business surveys of international investors' confidence in different countries, military-ruled countries in the Third World always rank quite low on political stability even if they have not recently experienced domestic unrest--the system itself is unstable. For example, in 1976 several American electronics companies told me that they preferred to invest in Malaysia rather than in lower-wage South Korea and the Philippines because in the latter two dictatorships, "one bullet could end it all." These two countries also have less direct multinational investment and more indigenous enterprises, including subcontracting ventures, than more "democratic" countries like Malaysia, Singapore and Mexico.

16. Information from my company interviews, 1976.

17. This is not the place to analyze these economies; however, for a partial analysis of one of them, see Lim (1983d).

18. See, for example, Lim (1978b), Grossman (1979).

19. Frobel, Heinrichs and Kreye (1977/1980), especially p. 359. See also Grossman (1979), pp. 10-11.

20. Frobel, Heinrichs and Kreye (1977/1980), Ong (1983).

21. Castro (1982), Datta-Chaudhuri (1982), Ramayanake (1982). In Singapore, many multinational export factories work a five-day week (at the workers' behest) against the national norm for all other sectors of the economy of five-and-a-half days.

22. There may be a "threshold" of time worked beyond which higher wages due to seniority adequately cover the labor-power expended in very intensive tasks; but we must still explain why only some workers, and not others, can reach this threshold without becoming exhausted. The level of reproduction also rises over time with the development of the forces and relations of production, so that it covers more than mere physical reproduction/exhaustion. For example, in Singapore many long-term workers remain in the labor force after marriage because they belong to the upwardly-mobile, two income working-class family, and the opportunity costs of quitting are high, given their high wages and rising expectations. See Wong (1982).

23. Many women work to occupy themselves between leaving school and getting married, and to save for marriage. See Ackerman (n.d.), and other studies.

24. For example, Snow (1979), and other studies.

25. For example, Safa (1981).

26. For example, several multinational electronics firms in Singapore in 1982 said that they stayed although it was very costly to stay (given high and rising wages and other costs), because it was even more costly to leave. The costs of relocation include, among other things, retrenchment benefits based on workers' wages and years of service--both of which are higher the longer the firm has been operating. In other words, high wages have a <u>discouraging</u> as well as encouraging effect on relocation.

27. For example, the case of "Global Enterprises" cited by June Nash in her keynote address to this conference, "Segmentation of the Labor Force and the Changing International Division of Labor."

28. Of course, the fact that these firms are potentially, though not actually, footloose (as indeed, are many other businesses, both foreign and local), may be an element in host governments offering them extensions of tax concessions for reinvestments.

29. Lim (1978b), Grossman (1979).

30. This is true even in countries where union menbership is not compulsory and/or controlled by the government. Where unions are "government unions"--for example, in Singapore, and one of the union federations in the Philippines--they are still workers' representatives, and do not always accomodate to the employers' and governments' wishes.

31. See, for example, Urban-Rural Mission of the Christian Conference of Asia (1981).

32. Ackerman (1979), Ong (1983).

33. Most studies report this. See especially Ackerman (n.d.).

34. Kung (1975), Snow (1979), and other studies.

35. Wong (1982).

36. Edgren (1982).

37. Snow (1983).

38. Frobel, Heinrichs and Kreye (1977/1980). These authors have been frequently criticized. One recent criticism is that of Petras (1982).

39. Nayyar (1978), de Castro (1980).

40. Phongpaichit (1982b). For example, the number of women working in export factories in all the five ASEAN countries of Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines is probably less than the total working in prostitution in Thailand alone. Even in Singapore, where employment in export manufacturing is proportionately most significant for women workers, it grew less rapidly than female employment in the commerce and services sectors in the 1970s.

41. See, for example, Lim (1982b).

42. For example, to divert attention from an inadequate national development strategy and appease the working population by quickly providing a large number of low-wage jobs; to provide opportunities for corrupt gains, as in the construction of export processing zones which do not attract sufficient investment but benefit regional land-owners, local politicians and contractors (Philippines); to provide an alternative to indigenous capital of a different ethnic group, usually the Chinese minority (Malaysia), etc.

43. It was originally import competition from Japanese and Third World capital which first forced many American and European firms to relocate to developing countries in search of lower-cost production. See Reynis (1976). For analysis of the evolving relationship between multinational and indigenous capital in the Third World, see Lim and Pang (1982), Lim (1983e). See also Kumar and McLeod (1981).

44. Lim (1983b).

45. Paine (1982).

46. For an analysis of the interaction of capitalism and patriarchy in the area of the world which has been most popular among multinational export manufacturing investors, see Lim and

Pang (1982), Lim (1983e). See also Kumar and McLeod (1981).

44. Lim (1983b).

45. Paine (1982).

46. For an analysis of the interaction of capitalism and patriarchy in the area of the world which has been most popular among multinational export manufacturing investors, see Lim and Gosling (1983). See also Lim (1982a).

47. For an elaboration of what these struggles might concretely involve, see Lim (1983a).

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Panel Presentation on the Opportunities and Challenges of Global Economic Interdependence: Implications for Women

Richard Holton

To begin our discussion, I will simply make a few points rather quickly about the international operations of multinational corporations, points which might have some relevance for the topic of this conference. I should preface this by saying that I am not an expert on multinationals and women in the Third World. I am familiar with a number of the problems that multinationals have as they address the opportunities and difficulties that are found in Third World countries.

The first point I would make is that it is a mistake to picture the multinationals of the world as all being American-based; this is no longer the case. Many other countries, including some developing countries, now have multinational corporations that are based in those countries.

A second point concerns perhaps the most common complaint about multinationals and women in the Third World, namely that the multinationals "exploit" labor in the Third World by paying low wages. This complaint is found, for example, in the Barnet and Muller book, Global Reach.

The economist looking at that problem would say, what is our definition of "exploitation"? Presumably in any kind of exchange, if you have a willing buyer and a willing seller with no constraints on either side, the exchange will not take place unless both parties consider themselves to be better off after the exchange than before the exchange. The real question is, how are the gains from trade divided between buyer and seller? The "gains from trade" is a term that is used mostly in international economics when talking about trade between countries, and without getting into the technicalities of that, one can see that, yes, the exchange will take place only if both buyer and seller see themselves as better off after the exchange than before the exchange. But there is the question of equity in the division of this gain from trade; one party might gain far more than the other, so we might then say that the latter is "exploited" by the former.

If a U.S.-based multinational establishes an operation in the Philippines, for example, and pays the going rate of about three dollars per day, our initial reaction might be that the multinational is exploiting local labor. But should the multinational pay U.S. wage rates in the Philippines? A Milton Freedman would say no; paying more than the local wages is immoral in itself because by doing that you are raising the cost of producing in that country, that lowers profits, and lower profits mean that additional investment is less likely to be attract-

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ed from abroad (or by local investors), and hence economic growth is slowed and growth in employment is slowed.

So by paying a high wage to people in an existing operation, you are reducing the amount of additional investment that would be made in that country, thereby reducing the number of additional jobs which might have been provided. And who are you, Milton Freedman might well ask, to play God and decide that the people who are working for you should get this higher wage, while others who would be willing to work for lower wages are denied jobs?

The multinationals, I think one can say, typically want to be considered "good citizens" by the host community. After all, they later might want permission to make additional investments in the country or in other countries. So there is some motivation to provide jobs certainly at no less than the prevailing wage rates, but one can understand that normally they do not want to pay a big premium over the local wage rates.

A third point which might be relevant here is that certainly U.S.-based multinationals, and I think others as well, pride themselves on having their subsidiaries in other countries run by people from those countries. This is certainly a laudable objective. However it does mean that if we want the U.S.-based multinational to be a vehicle for carrying abroad our value system regarding the role of women in society or any other set of values, then the multinational has a difficult educational job on its hands. It must persuade the local management, born and raised in that local culture, that whatever value system the U.S. parent company thinks is proper should be instituted. One can see that this might not be easy.

A fourth point concerns the complaint that U.S.-based multinationals are often used as tools of U.S. foreign policy. The famous case of ITT in Chile is always cited. Needless to say, multinationals can be criticized for participating in any such efforts.

But the ITT affair involved covert activities. Foreigners, and Americans, can be excused for complaining that even overtly we use U.S.-based multinationals as instruments of foreign policy. One of the early illustrations of this caused real trouble in our relations with Canada in the 1950s. Under the Trading with the Enemy Act, we were not at that time permitting American companies to export to the Communist countries. The People's Republic of China approached the Ford Motor Company of Canada about their possibly buying a large order of trucks from Ford of Canada. Ford of Canada called Ford headquarters in Detroit, and were told in effect that no, you can't sell trucks to China because of the Trading with the Enemy Act. This incident was reported in the Canadian press and the country was outraged, understandably; Canadian jobs were lost, they reasoned, because of U.S. foreign policy. Many Americans are embarrassed because we try to use the U.S.-based multinationals as a vehicle for enforcing American policies on others.

Interestingly enough, many people are criticizing American multinationals because they do not enforce American policies in other countries. Thus many Americans want our multinationals with the operations in the Union of South Africa to ignore local laws and customs and to apply U.S. policies there. I am not saying that we are wrong in taking that position. The point is that we should recognize that each of us individually probably wants the multinationals to be a vehicle for carrying abroad the values and policies we like, but we do not want them to carry abroad the values and policies we do not like.

A final point is that a number of the unattractive things which one encounters in international business are not caused by the existence of multinationals. Let me illustrate with an anecdote which does concern women in the Third World. A few years ago in the Philippines I visited a ceramic tile plant on the outskirts of Manila. They were producing four-inch and six-inch floor tiles and wall tiles. About 70% of their product was being exported to Australia, Canada and the United States.

The last room we visited in this plant was perhaps half as large as this one. About thirty women there were sorting the tiles by shade. They were running "cocoa brown" that day,

I remember. But it seems that even in a modern tile plant, which this one was, it is impossible to control the shade of the glaze with real precision. The women were sorting the cocoa brown tiles into six different shades of cocoa brown so that any one shipment could be of cocoa brown four, for example.

The chap showing us through the plant pointed out proudly that in one end of the room they were installing some new equipment which would do all of this sorting electronically, with just a few people. Obviously many of those women would no longer be needed. I asked, "How much are you paying those women?" It was about three dollars (U.S.) per day. He did not know how much the new equipment was costing, but I would be surprised if the new method would reduce operating costs. Why were they doing this? Because, he explained, they think the market is very sensitive to the consistency of shades in the tiles that are shipped, so they want to be absolutely certain that they have the very best quality control in place. And that means electrical equipment.

I found that rather curious, but who am I to say that their judgment was wrong? The point I want to emphasize here is that the tile company was not a multinational company. It was wholly owned by a local Philippine group. So it was the force of competitive conditions in world markets, in their view at least, that was causing the change which would put those women out of work.

Presentation for Panel on the Opportunities and Challenges of Global Economic Interdependence: Implications for Women

Nancy Weir

Most everyone seems to know the company, Levi-Strauss, one way or another. At the very least it may be that you simply own a pair of blue jeans, so it's familiar for that reason. But people who have studied about different corporations know that Levi-Strauss has a very good reputation for the way it treats its employees and for the kinds of humanistic and progressive programs it has. We're trying to apply those programs internationally, and sometimes, due to cultural differences, it takes much time and planning to get a program implemented. We're as guilty as anyone else when it comes to thinking we have a very good idea that, of course, the world welcomes. Sometimes we find out that we're trying to introduce something that is culturally inappropriate. That's one of my challenges, finding out what will fit the people's needs and also help to promote business in a profit-making corporation.

I've worked with the company for three years, training managers and developing training programs. While a lot of my experience is here in the home office of San Francisco, in the last six months I've been working with personnel and company managers in each of the countries around the world, to try to get programs developed that will train managers and other employees. Sometimes I just help them understand what the company is and what we're intending to do in our jobs. Sometimes I help people who've been transferred from the U.S. adjust to different cultures, or simply develop their own skills and figure out what kind of work and careers would be best for them and not keep them pigeonholed into one job. We're trying to help them think about what their skills are and how they can learn more from other people within the company and sometimes from training institutions outside the company, and from the community, so that they can develop their careers. Of course, the bottom line is that if they're more satisfied with the jobs they have, they're going to feel more creative and productive, and also more dedicated to the company. So everybody wins in the long run.

Levi-Strauss and Company, which is much bigger in the U.S., sells about three billion dollars worth of goods each year, and has about fifty thousand employees. Levi Strauss International is smaller. We're about one-third of the whole company with around thirteen thousand employees who are spread throughout twenty-four countries worldwide. There are only one hundred employees in the home office in San Francisco who are running the international part of Levi-Strauss.

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Previous Page Blank

We're organized geographically. Basically, the biggest part of the international group is in Europe. There are also quite a few in Canada. We're in the Asia-Pacific area in Hong Kong, the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand. In Latin America most of the people are in Brazil and Mexico, but we have people in Argentina and a small business in Chile. That's basically where we are.

Many of the policies are the same. In other words, the direction for running the company in other countries comes, of course, from the U.S. The bottom line is always to make some money doing what we're doing. But the company is also known for being very socially responsible, and many of the policies that we do apply overseas include being able to operate within a certain frame of ethics and values that the company shares. Company policy is a humanistic one; employees should be satisfied with their work and not feel they are being used just to make a profit.

Each company in other countries operates quite independently. Many international companies do try to have managers who have been born, raised and educated in the countries of operation. We do that wherever possible. Still, there needs to be some liaison with the U.S. and with all the other countries' companies. So, we do have quite a number of people who are expatriates or who are raised in one country and then spend two or three years working in another. We may have someone who comes from the United Kingdom and then spends a couple of years working in the United States. They may then go to Argentina for three years or so--take their families there--and then move on to Australia. (Some people think that sounds like a very glamourous way to go, but there's a lot of stress involved in moving families from one country to another, as I'm sure you're aware.)

We have our U.S. people working with consultants in each country to find out what is being done by other companies in those countries--as we try to give employees wages and benefits consistent with what is typical for that country. Sometimes what we think is helpful, others think is an imposition of our values on another country. But when there are dangerous materials, chemicals or equipment that people are working with in another country, we impose our own safety standards and send people from here to check it out in a real effort to reduce hazards in that country. We impose some of our paper work systems and make sure that people are complying in order to provide a safe work environment.

That applies, of course, to all workers there. While there are males and females at all levels of jobs, there are many more women who are working as operators, who are trained to sew the garments that we're producing, than there are in management positions. There are still many more men in our our Third World countries in management positions.

The people who are free to move from one country to another are the ones who will end up with the higher level positions. I don't know the percentages of women who are in management positions. Of course, it's higher in some countries than in others but, for example, we have a few women who have gone from the U.S. to Brazil and to Hong Kong just over the past year. They tend to be people who are very fluent in a couple of languages and who have had some education in the United States.

One thing we're trying to do is see that women who are trained as sewing machine operators are encouraged to accept positions as supervisors, and work their way up within the company. That's happening. To move from sewing machine operator up to a higher level of management is something that takes a long time to do. It's not happening very rapidly, but the opportunity is there and examples have been set to serve as role models.

We do not produce a lot of goods in the Orient and ship them to the U.S. The company's philosophy is that we want to be as self-contained in each country as possible. So we'll buy fabric, buttons and zippers in a certain country and try to produce the whole garment there hiring local people to produce the garment and to sell it to stores in that country.

That's good because it supports the communities; it doesn't just rob resources from one country and move profits to another. It's good for the company's reputation, but it also makes sense for business. Delivery from within a country is much more reliable than shipping garments across a border with potential duty or customs problems. Frequently laws will change and greatly affect imports and exports, so it simply makes good business sense to produce a garment in a country and sell it right there.

Briefly, the kinds of employment opportunities we offer for entering into higher level positions, for men and women, include moving into highly specialized jobs. There are always opportunities for people who work in finance, and for people who have strong analytical skills. Much of our business is numbers-crunching, that is, being able to think of volumes of fabrics in units--so many pairs of jeans, shirts or skirts can be produced--and seeing that they get ordered, shipped and produced according to certain deadlines.

People who want to move into those jobs can often enter a management training program at a plant or factory level where they may work as a supervisor for a time. If they want to get exposure to other functions of the business, they may move into sales to get some experience in the marketing function. Another opportunity would be in the division headquarters, where they may move into a staff job, finance or marketing. Sales experience is very helpful. People who have worked in direct selling or even in a retail environment like in a department store or boutique, bring good background for moving into the garment manufacturing business.

At the plant level, supervisors are often promoted from within. That's something we really work at. Plant sizes are rather small and it's possible to work from supervisor to manager, which is a job that would bring in the U.S. $25-35,000 a year.

As for high level jobs, anyone with an MBA is looked upon favorably, but it is not necessary to have an MBA. Many people who have good plant experience and very practical down-to-earth kind of orientation are going to go just as far as the person who starts out with an MBA. It's the ability to be practical and to produce that really counts in the company.

I'll just make one more point about the company's involvement with local communities. Something that's different in Levi Strauss is that our companies always promote community involvement. We give employees at all levels opportunities to use some of their job time to meet with groups who are trying to do some good in the community. It may be a fund-raising event. In the U.S. we have set up child abuse programs, programs to help battered women, and programs for senior citizens, to get some community centers going for them. These are some of the projects that our employees are given time and money to develop. Overseas, whatever that country happens to need would be the project that employees get involved in. It provides a link between the company and the community, and we've had positive feedback from people about these contributions and about employees having the opportunities to do community work in addition to their regular jobs.

The Multinational Corporations and Employment Opportunities for Women in Malaysia

Anis Sabirin Ramzi

Malaysia is a rapidly developing country and is today one of the most prosperous countries in Southeast Asia. Within a decade, the per capita income has increased from M$1,142 in 1970 to M$3,532 in 1980 (currently US$1.00 = M$2.20), ranking behind only Japan, Hong Kong, Singapore and South Korea. Malaysia's wealth comes from its position as the world's leading exporter of tin, rubber and palm oil, as well as the principal exporter of tropical hardwoods. The country has significant reserves of oil and natural gas, and is now a net exporter of crude petroleum.

In the process of modernization, Malaysia has consciously aimed for structural change to create a more balanced economic system. The manufacturing sector, although still small in relation to the rest of the economy, has grown substantially, while that of agriculture has shrunk. The move towards urbanization also accelerated during the decade, as indicated by the fact that in 1980 about 35% of the population lived in urban areas compared to 29% in 1970. The Malaysian government attributes this rapid rate of urbanization to the growth of construction, manufacturing, utilities and the service sector and the job opportunities they offered.

Manufacturing is projected to grow at a faster rate than other sectors in the coming decade. As in the past, this sector will lead in terms of employment with about 267,000 new jobs between 1980-85, or slightly over a third of new employment created. In the past decade, employment expanded at a rate of 4.1% a year, with 1,697,000 new jobs, while the labor force grew at 3.95 per year, adding 1,698,100 new entrants into the labor market. The unemployment rate dropped from 7.8% to 5.3% between 1970-1980. The share of manufacturing in this employment creation was 24.5%, compared to 20.7% for agriculture, 18.3% for government services, and 16.3% for wholesale and retail trade, including hotels and restaurants.

I am dwelling at length on the growth of the manufacturing sector in the Malaysian economy because it plays a crucial part in increased employment for women. The Fourth Malaysian Plan in 1980-85, in its survey of the labor force and the creation of employment, links the rapid growth in manufacturing and the accompanying process of urbanization with increased participation of women in the labor market. In the sixties, industrial growth was associated with growth in domestic demand and import substitution in such industries as textiles, footwear, food processing and car assembling; but, within the last decade, outward-looking export expansion has become dominant, featuring such industries as electronics and office machinery.

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Previous Page Blank

A substantial part of this expansion came from free trade zones, where multinational corporations dominate. Electronics assembly firms accounted for at least 90% of exports from free trade zones in 1974 with such items as circuit fittings, office machine parts, television and radio parts, air conditioners and electric calculators. The manufacture of such export products was labor-intensive, thus explaining the high rate of growth of employment in the manufacturing sector. Malaysia is host country to multinational corporations from around the world. In Malaysia, the major foreign investors are Japan, Singapore, the United Kingdom and the United States. Such household names as Hewlett-Packard, Texas Instruments, Intel, ITT, Dunlop and Advanced Micro Devices have assembly plants in Malaysia.

Many multinational corporations locate abroad so that production can be carried out more efficiently, whether because of the existence of a large market, the nearness of supplies, or to take advantage of low-cost labor. In the case of Malaysia, the latter is probably the most persuasive factor, since wages and salaries are definitely much lower than those in the industrialized countries where the multinational corporations are based. Basic wage rates for unskilled workers in the manufacturing industry vary from M$4.00 per day upwards according to the type of industry and location. These apply to unskilled workers performing simple and routine light or heavy tasks such as packing, lifting, moving, stacking, and so on. Semi-skilled workers earn between M$4.50 to M$6.50 per day. Skilled workers are paid upwards of M$15.00 per day.

A crude survey of some U.S. firms in Malaysia reveals that approximately 60% of their labor force are women. Figures are not available on how many of these women are doing unskilled or semi-skilled work, and how many are in supervisory or management positions. But, after looking at picture after picture of assembly work at the plants of most of the multinational corporations, one gets the impression that the assembly work force consists mostly, if not wholly, of women, mostly young girls in their late teens and early twenties. It does not take much imagination to see that young women are preferred, since their wages are low and they can be depended on, for the most part, to work patiently and conscientiously in the assembling of delicate components and parts.

Since hard figures about employment and wages at specific multinational corporations are not available, I would like to suggest that the process of development and the rapid growth of industrialization outlined above shows that Malaysia, as part of the current globalization of business activities, holds a fundamental attractiveness for investors, both foreign and domestic. The country's political stability provides incentives and protection to the manufacturing sector. The presence of the multinational corporations provides employment opportunities for young girls who would otherwise work as domestics or help in the small-holder rubber plantations and rice fields in the villages.

I have been assured by the executives of the multinational corporations I talked to that they do not discriminate on the basis of sex in placing personnel in management positions. Knowing that most multinational corporations are anxious to behave as responsible corporate citizens, I do not doubt that qualified women would find a place in the higher corporate hierarchy. The Malaysian government wants its citizens of both sexes to utilize their talents and their abilities to the utmost, and the multinational corporations, sensitive to such national aspirations, will not knowingly go against this policy. The opportunities open to women in Malaysia are clear for all to see. Malaysia has two women cabinet ministers and a number of deputy ministers, as well as increasing numbers of women doctors, lawyers, engineers, scientists and businesswomen. In the multinational corporations, women are hired as supervisors, engineers and managers, as well as assembly line workers.

The presence of women in the labor force in Malaysia is a phenomenon both inevitable and tradition-shattering. Increasing awareness of the socioeconomic value of education means that more women are going to receive a better education and the means of making a livelihood, independent of the economic support of a father or husband. Malaysian society is changing, and this change is reflected in the labor market. The multinational corporations, with the employment opportunities that they offer to women, are part of this process of change in Malaysia.

PART III

THE SOCIOECONOMIC CONTEXT OF WOMEN'S WORK

Discrepancy Between Guatemalan Women's Desires to Work and Actual Employment

Patricia Lee Engle

As we explore the effects of economic changes on patterns of women's work, we often find ourselves defending women's right to work to those who would argue that women with small children generally do not wish to work, and if they chose to work, children would limit their participation. My paper today is an analysis of the opinions of over 300 Guatemalan women with small children about working and their perceptions of impediments to economic activity.

Whether income-generating activities are of mutual benefit for both the employed mother and her young children is an issue of much concern in the U.S. Recent research has begun to pinpoint issues which must be taken into account in evaluating the outcome for both, such as maternal satisfaction with the chosen role (e.g., Hoffman, 1979; Hock, 1978; McBride and Hock, 1983; see also Engle, 1981 for a review). Evidence suggests that there are costs and benefits to both mother and child of this employment.

In a Third World setting, these issues are just beginning to be addressed. We would make grave errors of generalization if we were to apply the findings in a post-industrialized society, where concerns may be centered on adequate health, nutrition, and even survival itself (Levine, 1980). Moreover, the tradition of income generation and child care patterns are quite different in traditional peasant societies. Before examining women's expressed desires to work and their perceived limitations to working, typical patterns of work and child care in rural and urbanizing Guatemala will be outlined.

In most traditional societies, a high proportion of women are involved in food or money-procuring activities (Fagley, 1976). This economic role provides women with status, a sense of security, and perhaps companionship. It may also have real benefits for the children, as food procurement may be a female responsibility. Several recent studies have found positive effects of maternal income-generation activities on children's nutritional status or health (e.g. Blau, 1981; Tripp, 1981; Engle, 1983). Kumar (1977), in India, found that children's nutritional status was related more to the mother's income than the father's. These effects may be more evident if the male wage earner fails to contribute economically to the family, perhaps as a function of alcoholism, absenteeism, or disinterest.

Child care patterns in traditional rural families also differ from the Western model. Greenfield (1981) suggests that in these traditional societies child care is shared by many menbers of the family, principally older siblings. The extreme role specialization of child care (the mother's job) seen as a cultural ideal in the U.S. does not hold in other cultures.

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Further, the sibling caretakers gain experience in responsibility and nurturance from being caretakers (Whiting & Whiting, 1975).

Urbanization tends to disrupt both the economic and child care patterns of these women. (Leavitt, 1972; B.B. Whiting, Note 1). As women become urbanized, their traditional agricultural activities such as raising a small plot of tomatoes for cash, or selling the fruit from a mango tree in the nearby town, will disappear. A woman who has few activities or works outside the home may, according to Whiting (Note 1), find herself unhappy, powerless, and longing for the country. Whiting also noted that children in urban areas tended to be given fewer responsibilities for siblings, so that child care becomes more of an exclusively maternal activity.

Given the changes which occur as a consequence of urbanization, do women who move to a stepping-stone community become involved in economic activities? If they wish to be economically active but do not become income generators, what factors are they perceiving as limiting? These questions are important for determining what kinds of women should be targeted for income-generation programs and what kinds of support needs to be offered to women who are working for earnings in either the formal or informal sectors.

Child care is usually assumed to be the greatest limitation in a population like this one. However, given the somewhat different patterns of responsibility for child care in many Third World cultures, we may find that women have solutions to the child care issue, and perceive other factors, such as lack of training, as more critical. The purpose of this paper, then, is to examine five questions about the income-generation activities and perceived limitations of urbanizing Guatemalan women with children.

a. What kinds of occupations are they currently employed in?

b. Do women wish to increase their income-generation activities?

c. What factors do they perceive as limitations to that increase?

d. On a daily basis, what child care strategies do they use if they leave the house for a period of time?

e. What factors do they perceive as limiting their choice of daily activities?

Method

Sample. Two overlapping samples were used in the paper. Reports of daily activities (Time Use Survey) were collected on 384 women who had a child of less than three years of age (including pregnant women) living in villages on the outskirts of Guatemala City. Attitudes and Expectations were assessed for 269 women, 172 of which were the same women questioned in the Time Use Survey (mothers of children under three years), and an additional 97 female heads of families, randomly selected.

Description of the study. The study, funded by the Rockefeller Foundation, was a cross-sectional survey of women in the four rural villages and, in addition, two peri-urban villages to assess the effects of the perceived economic value of children of family planning decisions. An extensive body of information relating to income, family constellation, maternal characteristics, and children's schooling was collected during the survey period of 1975 and 1976.

The peri-urban villages. The two peri-urban communities are located about 20 minutes from Guatemala City (city buses run regularly) in a fairly industrial and rapidly urbanizing zone. The combined population is about 4,800 people. The peri-urban communities represent a transitional zone from the country to the city. They share many socioeconomic and cultural character-

istics of the capital, and many inhabitants work in Guatemala City. Few houses have dirt floors; over half the houses have electricity; and practically all have some sanitary facilities. Streets are paved and cars, buses, motorcycles, and bicycles are a common sight. One of the two villages is an older, established community. The other is a new colonial development for rural villagers just arriving from the country. The mean per capita income was around 200 quetzales in the semi-urban communities in 1974, about twice that of rural communities. A major source of income is wage work; about three fourths of total household income in the semi-urban area was from wages. A larger percentage of females in the semi-urban area work as domestics, merchants, and factory workers than do women in the rural areas. Inhabitants in the semi-urban communities have more schooling on the average than their rural counterparts. Both parity and child mortality are somewhat lower in the semi-urban communities. In the semi-urban area overall, socioeconomic differences between families are apparent, for the upper quintile of families received 32 percent of the income.

Instruments. The Attitudes and Expectations instrument surveyed women's opinions about fertility, family size, contraceptive knowledge and usage, and women's work activities, desires, and perceived impediments to work. The Time Use Survey summarized women's reports of their own and their children's activities during the previous 24 hours. This information was collected on four different rounds or days, but the data from only one round are reported here. Each interview was conducted in the woman's home by a trained Guatemalan female interviewer.

Variables of interest collected from each instrument were:

Attitudes and Expectations Survey:

-woman's current economic activity (type and amount, and income);

-woman's desired economic activity (type);

-perceived limitations to economic activity;

-demographic data (marital status, age, number and sex of children);

Time Use Survey:

-activities outside the home on the previous day;

-what was done with the child when the mother left the home;

-activities forgone during the previous day;

-reasons that the activities were not done;

-current economic activities (type and hours in previous week worked);

-desire for additional economic activity;

-reasons that additional economic activities were not done.

Results

Description of women's work. Table 1 summarizes the types of work that women report on the Attitudes and Expectations survey. Every mother is a working mother; the distinction being made here is between those who work for income versus those who work in the home. Almost half of the women reported doing something to earn some money.

The most common occupations mentioned were domestic work, either in one's home or in the

local community, transitory merchant in the community (selling door to door), or stationary merchant in the community (running a small store, for instance). Women reported surprisingly heavy workloads. Of those who worked during the previous week, the average woman worked 6 hours per day for five days a week (Time Use Survey). On the Attitudes and Expectations Survey, workers spent an average of 31 to 40 hours a week in economic activities (with merchants working 70 to 80 hours a week) for over 40 weeks a year, or about 6 hours a day for 6 days a week. Income for these activities tended to be low (median income per worker/$200 per year.)

Demographic characteristics of women who work for income. Working women did not differ from those who work in home production on total number of children ($\bar{x}$ = 3.8 for both), number of children aged 3-5 ($\bar{x}$ = .7 for both), percent of children in school ($\bar{x}$ = 55% for both), or expectations for years of children's schooling. Both groups expected boys to attend school longer than girls ($\bar{x}$ = 4.1 years for boys, $\bar{x}$ = 3.1 for girls). Working-for-income mothers had fewer children aged two and under ($t = 2.51$, $df = 263$, $p < .05$) and were less likely to be in a union with a man (hereafter abbreviated to marital status, although many couples were not formally married). ($x^2 = 10.76$, $df = 1$, $p < .05$). Women who were unmarried were much more likely to be working for an income (73%) than married women (43%).

Women's desire for additional work. Data from both surveys suggests that between 60 and 70% of the mothers interviewed wished to initiate or increase their income-generating activities (Table 2). The most common reason offered for wanting additional economic involvement was to "help oneself" or increase economic security (68% of those desiring to work). Another 20% reported a desire to be competent, and the remaining 10% wanted employment which would enable them to be at home more. As expected, economic issues were primary.

As Table 3 indicates, the most popular choices of types of work were domestic employment, factory work, and merchant activities. The most marked difference between the work women were currently engaged in and what they desire was factory work, which appears to hold significant appeal to this urbanizing group.

It is noteworthy, also, that only one person in one survey and three in the other wished to make products to sell inside their own homes, although that is one of the most common types of income-generation projects sponsored by international agencies. Most of the women would like to work in the home (probably domestic work) or in the nearby capital city. Furthermore, 84% believed that opportunities existed.

Are these women reporting desires to work simply because the response is socially desirable? It is noteworthy that the women responded in similar ways on two different surveys administered on two occasions several months apart. In the Time Use Survey, women were asked whether they had ever considered working for income previously. Eighty-three percent reported that they had considered it before. The depth of this desire was evident in one interview I recall vividly. When the interviewer asked the woman if she had ever wanted to earn a little, she glanced at her husband and said firmly, yes, she wished to earn some income. I felt sure that some harsh words would follow that announcement, since the husband indicated surprise and displeasure at her answer.

The women who wished to work more (or at all) tended to be married (78%) or in a union, whereas only 58% of the unmarried women wished to work more. The association between marital status and desire to work was only marginally significant ($x^2 = 4.63$, $df = 1$, $p = .10$).

Perceived limitations to working. Table 4 shows women's perceptions of the limitations to increasing their income-earning activities. Data are shown for both the Attitudes and Expectations and Time Use Surveys. Answers differ by questionnaire; in the former, 41% of the women who feel limited attribute the limitation to the children, whereas on the latter questionnaire, the most common response is that her husband will not let her (50%). The difference between the two is at first puzzling, because the sample of women in the Time Use Survey are all women with children two and under, whereas there are a number of women with older children in

the Attitude and Expectations Survey. One of the differences may be the specific question used. For the A and E Survey, women were asked whether they would like to "work more" (trabajar), whereas in the Time Use Survey, women were questioned about their desires to "help themselves a little", which may have brought to their minds a greater range of economic activities. In any case, the relatively large importance of the husband's opinion, compared to the normally assumed child care limitation, is striking.

Using the Time Use Survey date, the association between type of work desired and perceived impediments was explored.

Perceived impediments to working. When perceived limitations are examined within occupations desired (Time Use Survey), striking differences appeared. Domestic work was seen as limited equally often by husbands and children. However, both merchant selling and factory work were perceived as limited primarily by husbands (60 and 64%, respectively) rather than children (12 and 14%, respectively) or other reasons. The two latter jobs are less role-stereotypic than domestic work, and for that reason the husband's opinion may be seen as a greater limitation.

The women's feelings that husbands would not approve of their job choices were substantiated by another survey of 98 men in the same villages. When asked a series of five questions concerning whether women who are mothers should work, or their wives should work if they wanted to, or occasionally, only 8% felt that women should be able to work in all these circumstances. Forty-one percent felt that they should not work under any circumstances.

Daily patterns of child care. We have seen that, in general terms, the husband's or partner's attitudes are perceived as a limitation on economic activity as well as child care responsibilities. Whether husbands and children would also be seen as limiting women's daily activities was assessed with the Time Use Survey.

As Table 5 indicates, only 40% of the women surveyed reported leaving the house the day previously for more than an hour. This particular survey occurredduring the rainy season when people were more likely to stay in the home. Of those who went out, 45% did not take their younger children (under seven). As Table 5 again illustrates, the most common patterns were to leave the children in the care of an older sibling (26%) or the grandparent (24%) or alone (19%). The husband was rarely used (7%). In sum, a large proportion of women did not leave the house, and those who left their children were equally likely to leave them with siblings, grandparents, or alone.

Perceived limitations in previous day's activities. The final question in the Time Use Survey was whether the mother had wanted to do something the previous day that she was unable to do (a typical American question). The results are in Table 6. Over half of the women reported no activities forgone. Of those with desires to do other activities, 62% expressed desire to do more or different kinds of domestic activities (cleaning, mending). Only 11% expressed the interest to engage in more income-generating activities, and not surprisingly, 17% wanted more sleep.

Table 6 also presents the women's opinions as to why they were unable to do the activities that they had wished to do. Again, children are seen as the major limiting factor (46%), with household responsibilities a second (23%). Only 2% saw the husband's opinion as limiting, but their extra activities desired were certainly all role-stereotypic responses which were unlikely to cause the average husband discomfort. It is surprising that illness was not an important consideration.

Discussion

The present study was designed to test, on a micro-level, the assumption that the major impediment to economic activities of women with small children is the presence of the children.

Whereas the data presented here suggest that in general the most frequently cited impediment is the presence of children, husband disapproval and lack of finances also limit women's involvement. Further, the limiting influences appear to depend on the type of employment, with non-stereotypic occupations being most disapproved of by husbands.

The study also found that women who work for income are quite similar to those who work in the home with the exception of union status (marital status) and number of children age two and under. This similarity is not surprising since many of the "working" women in the sample are engaged in domestic work which is similar to their normal home production activities.

Third, the study found that a surprisingly large percent of women wish to increase the amount of income-generation activities that they do. The effect is more apparent among the married than the unmarried women. However, this appears to be an abstract desire; when women were asked whether they would have liked to do any particular activity the day before which they had to forgo for some reason, relatively few mentioned income-generation activities.

Some important differences between current work and work desired emerged. Merchant and domestic work were the most common economic activities and the most desired. However, factory work is desired by a surprisingly large number. In spite of the emphasis of cottage industries and handicrafts cooperatives, almost no women in the sample desired that type of work.

Finally, these results do confirm the generally held view that the presence of small children is a significant factor inhibiting women's greater economic involvement. As noted earlier in the paper, this limitation is also shared by American and Western European women. On a daily basis, siblings, caretakers, and leaving the child alone were the major child care strategies. Whether women would tend to use child care centers, or perhaps a community-based type of child care network, in order to work is unclear. Perhaps the most important finding from this study is that the type of work which child care centers are designed to facilitate, formal sector employment, is seen as limited <u>not</u> by children, but by husbands' attitudes. On the other hand, domestic work, which is often considered as low-pay, no-future work, would perhaps be facilitated by the provision of child care opportunities.

TABLE 1

Types of Work For Earnings Reported
by Peri-Urban Guatemalan Women

OCCUPATION	QUESTION: "do you work?" Peri-Urban N	%	% of workers
Agricultural labor in community	1	.3	1.0
Agricultural labor out of community	3	1.1	2.0
Farmer on family land	0	0	0
Farmer on own land	1	.3	1.0
Non-agricultural day laborer	16	5.9	12.5
Domestic	28	10.4	22.2
Manufacturing, home crafts	3	1.1	2.3
Merchant for family agriculture	1	.3	1.0
Sells what she produces	0	0	0
Stationary merchant in community	24	8.9	18.8
Transitory merchant in community	30	11.1	23.4
Specialized labor	10	3.7	7.8
Factory worker or laborer	6	2.2	4.7
Blue collar or office work (e.g., police, teacher, secretary)	5	1.8	3.9
Total Workers for Income	128	47.1	
Total Sample	269	100	

Women with a child less than 3 years old plus a sample of never-married women 14-49 (Attitudes and Expectation sample)

TABLE 2

WOMEN'S DESIRES TO WORK OUTSIDE HOME

Peri-urban community

Do you work outside home? (Attitudes and Expectations)

	N	%
NO	139	52.3
YES	126	47.4
	265	

Do you wish to work (or work more)?

Attitudes and Expectations

	N	%
NO	61	23
YES	202	76
	263	

Time Use

	Not Working		Now Working	
	N	%	N	%
do not want more work	70	37	73	43
want more work	117	63	97	57
	187		170	

TABLE 3

TYPE OF WORK DESIRED

TYPE OF WORK DESIRED	Attitudes & Expectations		Time Use	
	N	%	N	%
Agricultural	5	2	8	3.6
Domestic	70	34	64	28.9
Merchant-stationary	35	17	29	13.1
Merchant-transitory	21	10	8	3.6
Specialized trade	19	9	28	12.7
Factory, laborer (non-agric.)	44	21	65	29.4
Blue collar (e.g., police)	5	2	9	4.1
White collar (e.g., secretary, teacher)	4	1	7	3.2
Making products in home	1	.5	3	1.6
	204	100	221	100

WHERE WOULD YOU LIKE TO WORK?	(Attitudes & Expectations)	
Home	92	43
Community	46	22
Surrounding area	3	1
Capital	57	27
Other	13	6
	211	

TABLE 4

PERCEIVED LIMITATIONS TO INCREASED WORK ROLE

FOR WOMEN

Attitudes and Expectations Survey

	N	% of all women	% of those who wish to work
Because of the children	85	32.0	41.8
Because of pregnancy	2	.8	.9
Because of my husband	36	13.5	17.7
Have not found work	13	4.9	6.4
Lack of money	35	13.2	17.2
Lack of training	4	1.5	1.9
Ill/handicap	5	1.9	2.4
Other	23	8.6	11.33
No desire to work	63	23.7	
	266		

Time Use Survey

Cannot watch children	45	7.6	24.3
Husband will not let her	93	15.7	50.2
No one to do household tasks	12	2.0	6.4
Lack of money or training	31	5.2	16.7
Other	4	.7	2.2
No desire to work more or already working	190	32.1	
	375		

TABLE 5

PATTERNS OF CHILD CARE from the

Time Use Survey

Did you leave the house yesterday?

	N	%
NO	242	60.5
YES	158	39.5
	390	

Did you take younger children? (under 7)

	N	%	% who went out
did not go out	250	61.3	-
yes, all	48	11.8	30
yes, some	38	9.3	24
no	72	17.6	45
	408		

Who did you leave them with?

	N	%	% of those left
did not go out or not left	311		
older sibling	24	7	26
husband	7	2	7
grandparent	22	5	24
other family	5	1	6
neighbor	3	1	3
servant	7	2	8
other	4	1	4
alone	17	5	19
	400		

TABLE 6

ACTIVITIES FOREGONE YESTERDAY AND REASONS GIVEN

Was there some thing you wanted to do but couldn't?

	N	%	% of those wishing other activity
No	194	52	-
Routine housework	54	14	30
Special housework (mending)	58	15	32
Housework, help, family	7	2	4
Work in home to earn $$	5	1.3	3
Help farm outside home	2	.5	1
Work outside for wages	5	1.3	3
Walk, shopping	18	4.8	10
Sleep, rest	31	8.3	17
Read	0	0	0
Recreation, visit	0	0	0
	374		

Why were you not able to do it?

	N	%	% of those with desires
Not want to do anything	192	51	-
Children	86	23	46
Husband not o.k.	3	.8	2
No money	17	4.5	9
Responsibility in house	42	11.2	23
Child sick	3	.8	2
Self sick	4	1.1	2
Other	28	4.7	13
	375		

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Female Activity Within the Social Dynamics of Selected Middle Eastern Countries

Hamida Kazi

Introduction

Since the subsistence economies of the Third World began to move toward industrialization, women's participation has gained tremendous attention from researchers in various disciplines. It is a usually accepted point of view that female participation and its composition in economic activities are correlated with industrialization. But the truth is--and this is often overlooked by researchers--the economies of many Third World nations are structurally at similar levels of development, with some variation in their industrial progress,[1] yet female participation in the labor force varies significantly among them. To cite a few examples from Latin American and Middle Eastern countries, in 1970 women's participation in the total labor force of Argentina was 24.7%, in Chile 22.1%, and in Peru 20.7%, whereas in Egypt it was 7.2%. The highest proportion among Middle Eastern countries was in Lebanon, where it was 17.4%,[2] while Syria, with its 10.5% participation rate, could be considered the highest among predominantly Muslim Middle Eastern countries. Needless to say, these two groups of nations have two different social structures and religions: Christianity and Islam.

There is an internal consistency in the rate of female employment in the two groups. Table 1 represents a detailed view of this phenomenon. One may therefore argue that

> the low level and particular character of female involvement in the work force can be explained largely by institutional arrangements contingent upon aspects of social structure which do not have much to do with either development level or the specific organization of the economy (14).

This is, however, debatable. A closer examination of the social structure of various Third World countries distinctly reveals the fact that most of the societies influenced by colonial culture and education began to experience effective changes in all aspects of life, including those concerning women, while for the other Third World nations this process either started very late or had little impact. Latin American countries are an example of the first category. An interesting contrast exists in India, where Hindus enthusiastically took up modern education, and several social reforms came into effect during the British period of colonialism. Yet the Muslims in India were for a long time opposed to any new kind of education or change, particularly for women.[3] They are still suffering the repercussions of this reluctance in economic,

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Previous Page Blank

political and other fields.

The Muslim reluctance to allow women equal participation in society is evident among Muslims in other countries, too, and highlights some distinct characteristics of Muslim society. In this paper we intend to analyze these features and elaborate our analysis to include other factors that together are responsible for the very slow rate of economic activities of Muslim women in Middle Eastern countries. We will also attempt a discussion of some of the remarkable changes women are experiencing in some sections of Muslim society and their implications for society as a whole.

We propose to show the following:

1) Social dynamics significantly influence the involvement of the female labor force in a nation's economy;

2) Religion is an extremely important factor affecting women's occupational role in society;

3) The extent to which a country was shaped by a colonial power has a direct bearing on the present condition of women's employment;

4) Neocolonialism is directly linked with the Third World in general and women in particular.

An Overview of the Rate of Activity in Middle Eastern Countries as Compared with Other Third World Nations

As cited earlier, the employment rate for women in Middle Eastern countries is strikingly low when compared to the rates of other Third World nations: the average rate is about 30%, compared with a world average of 42%, and 40.7% in the developing countries.[4] Although this rate is as high as 40% in the Gulf nations in the ECWA region, it can be attributed to the migrant workers employed in those countries. Thus the female participation rate for these countries was as low as 2.6% of the total labor force in Jordan in 1971.

A percentage of working women are found in agriculture and service industries. Table 2 illustrates this situation. As we are mainly concerned with the social constraints that impede the development of women and their integration into a nation's economy, all our statistics represent the total female labor force. Also, it is an observed fact that the majority of women work in agriculture on their family's land. Thus, their activities in agriculture can be regarded as part of their family responsibility. All of the female workers on the eight large farms we studied in three villages in Jordan were from the families that owned the farms. Considering this situation, it is not surprising to note that even the highest rate of female employment in Middle Eastern countries was lower than that of any Latin American country.

Social Dynamics: Two Different Worlds of Men and Women. In the process of industrialization and economic development, a crucial problem confronting Muslim society is conflict between the rights and laws granted to its people by the Koran and the realities of present conditions. In fact, during the last few decades (since the discovery of oil), Middle Eastern countries have been pouring money into industrial development--or, rather, establishing industrial complexes--but have hardly touched such a significant issue as women's development and their integration into this one-sided industrialization. What Muslim society has failed to realize so far is that, as Moir Shakir writes,

> laws do not make a society, but are the products of the requirements and demands of the existing social and economic structure. It will therefore be inappropriate to depend exclusively on the

Koran or Hadilh for guidance in the innumerable novel situations. This is a point to remember in dealing with the rights of women (9).

Muslim society has been able to resist social changes for the last fourteen hundred years by virtue of the fact that for a long time Islamic rulers remained in control, and it was easy to preserve the traditions with glory and pride. After Western imperialism took hold, the Islamic leadership crumbled, leaving Muslims nothing to hold on to but their traditions which, of course, did not allow them to look beyond the narrow horizon of their traditional culture, and denied them any of the benefits of progress enjoyed by the rest of the world. After most of the Muslim countries--especially those in the Middle East--achieved their independence, the discovery of oil led to some significant programs of industrialization based on foreign technology, foreign experts, and foreign labor. This unnatural development did not have much room for changes relevant to industrial growth, particularly in the social sphere. Also, the gap between the rulers and the masses in Middle Eastern countries is wider than elsewhere, and a vast majority of the population still lives in a feudal atmosphere.

The role of women in Islamic society is vastly different from that of men. Although it is claimed that no other religion has given such rights as property, marriage and education to women as has Islam, this statement is misleading, for these rights are under the "protection" of men. As a result, a strong and archaic patriarchal family system exists in Muslim society, blocking every avenue that could lead to the development of women at an equal level in all walks of life.

Roles assigned to women make their position even more tenuous. Strangely enough, as a child you hear elders saying that "heaven lies under the mother's feet," while at the same time a Muslim woman is told that if God wished a human being to worship another human being, he would have commanded women to worship their husbands (the husband in Islam has the status of a pseudo God).[6] This submissive role supersedes any rights ordained to women, and results in women's confinement to the family, forcing them to lead a secluded lifestyle, and depriving them of any activity other than housework and raising children.[7] This creates two entirely different worlds for the two sexes, not on an equal basis but giving one charge of the other. Muslim men, hence, have remained the sole wage earners; the very concept of female employment was never nurtured, let alone considered essential for a developing economy.

Islam arose in a tribal society, and pre-Islamic society was characterized by complete male domination in which a woman was considered of less property value than a male slave. The rights accorded to woman by the Prophet certainly enhanced women's status at the time. The subsistence economies of tribal societies have now entered into the advanced market economy in which wage labor is bought and sold under a sophisticated monetary system; while excluding half of the population (women) from economic activities may not hinder the establishment of industries and commercial centers, it certainly will not help the industrialization of such nations.

Muslim society has been extremely slow to realize the impact on the economy of keeping women out of the labor force. Few Muslim scholars have articulated this issue. Qasim Amin is one of those few who have "attributed the decadence in the Muslim world to ignorance and the ignorance of the female in particular." He has advocated, among other things, the education of women in both secular and religious sciences so that they could eventually be free from the tyranny of the male sex and then throw off the veil and join the ranks of wage earners for the family (3).

Ideas about women's freedom of development are not usually encouraged by the majority of scholars who enjoy the confidence of the rulers and the ruling class, and whose task it is to defend Islam at any cost. This reluctance on the part of the scholarly community to address women's issues makes the task of any genuine social reform impossible, specifically anything to do with changes in women's position. Women's exclusion from public life, especially from

modern occupations that bring them in contact with men, is the criterion of family honor. Consequently, in Muslim society a woman's conduct, her behavior, and her involvement outside the family are heavily guarded.

This attitude towards women is manifested in the low rate of participation of Muslim women in modern occupations. Women grow up with the idea of being a wife and a mother, and the concept of a career beyond these roles is hardly conceived. The majority of women consider economic activity of secondary significance. Sometimes women themselves show their disrespect and distrust toward career women, be they nurses, lawyers, or factory workers. This peculiar tendency comes out of a self-inflicted psychological inhibition towards extra-familial activities, which is a direct result of socially imposed constraints on women.

A working woman has many fears to overcome before she decides to go out for work: for a single girl it is the fear of remaining a spinster all her life (this researcher has witnessed such cases among Muslims in India), since employment reduces her chances of marriage; for a married woman it is an atmosphere of mistrust and suspicion that could result in a disrupted family life or even jeopardize the marriages of her sisters. Moreover, under a legal system which gives the right of divorce to a man at any time, these women's fears could become a reality, and a divorced woman is not a particularly appreciated member of Muslim society.

Religion and Female Employment

It is difficult to separate the issue of religion from that of society at large when discussing Muslim countries. Islam is regarded as having granted a complete way of life to its followers. Thus, social aspects of Muslim society are inseparable from Islam, as is politics. Islam, for a Muslim, is the last religion on earth and the Prophet Mohammed is the last of the prophets, hence the unchangeable state of Islamic laws that govern every aspect of a Muslim's life. Even in Muslim countries where Islamic laws have been reinterpreted, the situation has not changed much, particularly where women are concerned.[8]

We mentioned earlier that Islam arose in a tribal society and women have been accorded a somewhat humane status within the context of pre-Islamic tribal society. Yet Arab society has now entered into an "oil age" with a modern market economy on a par with the rest of the world. While automobile rides are now preferred over camel rides, there is no acceptance of the fact that women, too, need a change in order to sustain a balance between the technological growth and structural development of the society. As early as 1968, Mohammed Qutb, although a defender of Islam, wrote:

> The woman of Islamic countries is generally backward, with neither respect nor any grace. She lives a life similar to that of animals; her whole existence is but another name for mean earthly desires; she suffers privations more than she ever tastes happiness; she is made to surrender more than she is given; and seldom does she rise above the level of a purely impulsive existence (8).

Islam considers women the "weaker sex" and the one that distracts a man's attention from the serious duties he is responsible for performing in life. It would not be out of context here to mention Uthman B. Fudi's ideas on the position of Muslim women. He "did not consider it appropriate to allow women to attend court while in session because this would expose men to the danger of being enticed by beautiful women" (6).

It is therefore essential that women be kept under control; control mitigated, of course, by "respect and love." Naive concepts about women's nature enforced by social institutions (in the interests of male domination) have kept Muslim women far behind their sisters in other parts of the world in terms of education, employment, politics and other fields. It becomes

even more problematic when we find Muslims in general and Muslim men in particular suffering with their own inherent contradictions on several occasions. For them, Islam is the ultimate in every respect--whether it is a social, economic, or political problem--and yet at the same time they find themselves perplexed when dealing with present conditions in an advanced technological era. For example, the majority of nurses in Saudi Arabian hospitals are employed from other Third World nations, while an entire Saudi women's population may be sitting at home. The one occupation for women that faces the least resistance from Muslim society is teaching, it it is confined to girls' schools!

It has always been difficult to bring about changes in a society. Islam itself had to face extreme resistance before it became a popular religion among Arabs. However, centuries have passed and Muslim nations have already given way to a modern economy and industrial expansion. Yet the whole social structure is stagnant; it has not only left Muslim societies with a very slow rate of development, but it has also kept them dependent upon migrant labor power. This gap for the most part could be filled by its female population, giving it a solid foundation in its structural development.

The Impact of Colonization and Present Conditions of Female Employment in the Middle East

European powers always adopted varying policies in their colonies to suit their interests. Looking at different developmental levels of Third World nations, it becomes obvious that after their so-called independence, some nations are more heavily dependent on advanced countries than others. Some have started on industrialization too late to really liberate themselves from ongoing problems of poverty, illiteracy, and a weak economy. For example, India developed an educated middle class during the British reign which served the colonial administration of Britain not only in India, but in other British colonies as well, where they formed a low or middle administrator class surpassing the native population of that colony. The British introduced modern education and advocated reformist policies. They passed several laws affecting Indian social structure: for example, Sati, a custom whereby a woman throws herself on the funeral pyre of her husband on his death, was banned in 1829. Establishing railways was another policy which promoted Indian development of its transportation system earlier than many other Third World nations. India's present development has its roots in its colonial period.

The British had a different policy in Africa. They did not encourage native populations to enter the fields of education and technology as such, but did create urban, administrative pockets, or manmade safaries into large African countries. Consequently, for many African nations, independence (whatever it may be) came very late and in some cases they are still struggling.

With the Arabs in the Middle East, the British adopted a different style. The Ottoman Empire had crumbled, and Arab society was still in a feudal stage, mostly absorbed in tribal loyalties or tightly closing its eyes against the fast-changing world. The colonial masters did not feel it worth spending their energy on the betterment of Middle Eastern people. It was easy to relinquish their responsibility to a few rulers and put them in power when the time came to leave. The result of such policies is evident in the present Middle Eastern problems and crises.

No Third World nation is in a remarkably good position today, but some have realized their potential and are aware of their backward state of affairs. Women in other Third World countries, despite many social constraints, national and political problems, have made progress in terms of employment, education and active life, although they remain a minority.[9] Middle Eastern women have not even had the opportunity for such awareness or participation in the newly independent nations. They remain in their static position, under a monarchical, patriarchal system which works in the disguise of modernity.

Neocolonialism and its Impact on Muslim Women in the Middle East

Neocolonialism is, in fact, an extension of colonialism. During their rule over their colonies, European powers stayed long enough to drain off the resources of these nations and then honor them with "independence," declaring that now the nations were ready to undertake the responsibility of a "democratic government." It is obvious that all the native populations in any country have in abundance is manpower; for technical assistance, expertise, scientific equipment, etc., they have one alternative--their old masters, the advanced nations. Not only economically, but in its true sense, "neocolonialism" frequently denotes the economic, political, and sociocultural relationships of dominance and dependency by an independent nation that was a former colony (such as Jamaica, Kenya, or Senegal) with the former colonizers (such as the British and French) (4).

Women are directly affected by neocolonialism in two ways. First, the industrialization process requires urban development. In the Third World nations, because technology is not indigenous, its development and use has been uneven and imbalanced, resulting in a few urban sectors with overpopulated cities full of ghettos, suffering with unemployment, unhygenic conditions, increasing crime rate, etc. At the same time, agriculture is neglected for lack of modern agricultural methods. This in turn has caused rural urban migration on the one hand, and, on the other hand due to the introduction of new methods in farming that require large amounts of land, has turned small independent farmers into wage laborers. Women who used to work on farms independently in subsistence economies now work for wages. In villages, farming was the main economic activity for women who had a "user's right to land" (12) that gave them substantial independence. With industrial modernization not only have they become wage earners, but their very insufficient wage forces them to migrate to urban areas in search of employment where their cheap labor runs indigenous industries as well as multinational subsidiaries.

The second way in which Third World women are affected by neocolonialism is that they are given a false concept of modernization through which they can develop a "full personality." They are thus tempted to sell their labor cheaply to national and multinational industries to obtain consumer goods. Thus, to attract women's labor, companies do not hesitate to adopt exploitative techniques such as "beauty contests, cosmetics classes, production competitions, singing competitions, monthly show sales, and so on" (9).

Unlike other Third World nations, women in Middle Eastern countries have not come so directly under the neocolonial subjugation which perpetuates the oppression of women, along with the national and social oppression. This condition may be attributed to the peculiar set-up of Muslim society in which women are excluded from economic activities. It is little wonder, then, that the greater part of the female working population is to be found in agriculture. The majority of working females would be found working on their family farms or those of their kinfolk. Thus very few women are engaged in non-agricultural activities.

It is not our purpose to overlook the policies of Middle Eastern countries which emphasize modernization, and promulgate the need for women's participation in education, employment, social and political life; but the limited extent to which actual efforts are being made in these directions are obvious, as was seen in the figures presented earlier. As recently as 1976, the economically active population of women in Jordan was 4.4%! Middle Eastern countries, despite their oil assets, are no exception to neocolonialism. But due to their expansion of economic activities, these countries are giving way to women's participation in economic activities within a sociocultural setting that expects, by divine law, women to be subservient to men. In this situation and with the exploitative nature of neocolonialism, women in Muslim society have a long way to go toward equality with men.

The Perspective of Female Employment in Muslim Society in Middle Eastern Countries

To this juncture we have attempted to analyze the constraints imposed upon women within the sociocultural structure of Muslim society. It would not be inappropriate to further this analysis with a view of the future prospect of female participation in economic activities in those Middle Eastern societies engaged in the process of industrialization at a rather fast rate. However well knitted the family and kinship system may be, although it has divine law on its side, industrialization is bound to have "profound social and political effects" (11). The industrialization of European countries produced "decisive changes in social structure and political action with the emergence of new social classes--an industrial working class, and another of industrial capitalists and entrepreneurs" (11). It also had an impact on the extended family system with its typical characteristics of rural urban migration and congested city dwellings, with all the attendant problems of the working class. Eventually, this situation gave rise to the nuclear family. Growth of industrialization required a greater supply of labor and wage earners who needed income for their subsistence. Thus in the early period of industrial revolution, the newly emerging working class was forced to allow their women to be wage earners, and even mandatory child labor prevailed for a long time.

A similar situation already exists in many Third World nations. Of course, it should be recognized that the industrial revolution and the process that followed in European countries are not completely comparable, for the Third World nations are industrializing alongside the already established industrialized countries, and are influenced by their scientific innovations, technology and culture.[10] In fact, culture has more impact than any other aspect. In our view, Middle Eastern societies cannot resist such impact for long. Thus, particularly in oil-producing nations, migrant workers from Third World countries and experts from advanced nations have been employed in order to keep the social system unchanged. Nevertheless, people who have so far been living in a feudal environment are becoming aware of their own potential, and sooner or later they will have to be absorbed into the economy, including women as well.

University education is now producing a young generation of graduates in most Middle Eastern countries, and a large middle class of professionals appears to be emerging which did not exist before. This particular class is influenced by the culture of industrialized societies. The middle class generally does not approve of changes in the social structure, especially in the case of women, but prefers individual changes to suit its purposes. Nevertheless, no society can sustain itself forever without dynamism, willingly or unwillingly. The great problem facing Muslim society today is the failure so far to reconcile the divine laws which regulate the personal and social lives of its members with the changes brought by time.

Women's problems are crucial to Islamic society because Muslims are especially sensitive on this issue. In order to maintain their cultural balance they have already begun to give the kind of education to women that suits their purpose. For example, the majority of women in Middle Eastern universities major in arts, languages, and home economics; they are not encouraged to study science or technology. Women are not considered to be persons equal in ability and intellect to men, nor are they thought capable of being equal partners in building a new nation. In this regard, an exceptional case among Middle Eastern countries is the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen where "members of the women's union are represented in the leading bodies of party and state. There is at least one member of the women's union at every level of the policy structure" (5).

So far we have compared female participation in the workforce in Middle Eastern countries to that of other Third World nations. It would not be inappropriate at this juncture to further discuss the situation in South Yemen, an unusual example of a Middle Eastern country with the same religion and social structure, but with a different style of ecopolitical development that has resulted in some positive changes at the social level, too.

South Yemen, based on a socialist model, has been able to create new avenues for its fe-

male population in the fields of employment, education and social affairs. Since 1967, the State has intervened in a number of ways to confront the more oppressive traditional and religious practices; at the same time the powers of religious leaders have been transferred to the State (5). The liberalization of the family code included the abolishing of divorce by repudiation, allowing divorced women to become eligible for the custody of their children, and banning early marriages and marriages without both party's consent.

We proposed earlier that the status of Muslim Middle Eastern women cannot be held in check forever. There are several factors influencing the social attitudes of sections of Muslim society in the region. In our view the very slow rate of women's development in general and in employment in particular is due not only to the perpetuation of a male-biased, tradition-dominated society. The problem is aggravated because of the exploitative nature of the neo-colonialist system under which Middle Eastern countries are becoming an integral part of the global economic system, and which does not allow complete equality between the sexes. To the contrary, the system has helped to build a social structure that is based on inequality of the sexes. This helps to explain that, while economic and industrial development in the Middle East is running at a faster rate than that of other Third World nations, the female participation rate has not risen correspondingly.[11]

However, there exists another example in the Middle East where social attitudes are moving toward encouraging female participation in the economic activities of the society. This change, although it is not yet so remarkable, is still noticeable. It has been found that, compared to women in other parts of the Middle East, Palestinian women show more social awareness of their problems as women.

> Individual Palestinian women in the cities have been able to accelerate their transformation from a dependent adjunct in the traditional Arab family structure to independent contributors to the society as a whole, through education and employment opportunities (2).

Table III indicates that the rate of female participation in the labor force in the occupied West Bank rose from 8.3% in 1968 to 12.7% in 1871 which is strikingly high. This increase, however, could be attributed to the economic responsibility that fell on Palestinian women after the Israeli occupation of the West Bank in the 1967 war. Most of the men outside of the West Bank could not immediately return to their homes, while a large number of the working men found themselves out of a job after the war. Consequently, Palestinian women who were forbidden by tradition to work outside of the home were now forced by economic necessity to break such traditions and join the labor force. Another contributory factor was the urge to continue with children's education in order to secure a better future for their families. Palestinians were thus compelled to accept some social changes in the position of women that led to their increasing participation in the labor force. Although these changes have emerged out of an imposed political situation, they have also generated social awareness among Palestinian women. From 1971 until 1978 (as shown in Table III) the rate of female participation in the labor force in the West Bank seems to have stabilized between 12.7 to 12.8% with the exception of 14.3% in 1974.

In comparison to the involvement of Palestinian women in economic activities, other Middle Eastern countries show a very low rate of participation of female labor. In 1975 for example, it was 2.6% in Jordan; in Lebanon, 9.5% in 1970; and in Iraq, 5.6% in 1977, whereas it was 6.0% in 1978 in Egypt.[12] Thus, the statistics at the bottom of the Table III summarize our qualitative contention about the rate of participation of Palestinian women in the labor force in the West Bank. It is, however, hard to find economically active women in large numbers in villages for the reason that traditional bonds are stronger and more tightly knot. Nevertheless, "women have sought strength in numbers and in systematic work to combat village attitudes that tie women to a life in the home" (2).

The high rate of female employment among Palestinian women may be attributed to the unusual political situation that has forced them to enter into economic activities. However, the striking fact is that this economic force has also reinforced the social dynamics in this segment of the Muslim society.[13] Women do not appear to be working as robots. They are involved in their work activities with full social awareness that they are just as able-bodied as men. Also women are conscious of their state of educational development and of the nature of exploitative jobs that the society and system stigmatize as suited to women, such as secretarial work, sewing and other unskilled labor.

Conclusion

Since the discovery of oil, the Middle Eastern countries have been fast developing their urban industrial sector including the educational infrastructure. However, a close examination of this developmental process reveals that the female population has been deliberately kept out of this new process in these countries. This exclusion of women from the productive activities and public life is conspicuous in Muslim society that is governed by Koranic laws and a strong patriarchal family system. Consequently, any social change in the position of women that may disturb the existing social order is obviated.

The evidence presented earlier confirms our view that, as compared to other Third World countries such as Brazil, Mexico and Chile, the rate of female employment in the Middle Eastern countries is extremely low. Besides the effect of long-term colonialism and the influence of neocolonialism, social and religious factors have been significantly responsible for the lack of women's participation in the economies of the Middle Eastern countries. Only in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen and in the occupied West Bank do Muslim women manifest a high rate of participation in extra-familial activities, specifically in the field of employment and education. A slow increase in the rate of female employment is also observed in other Middle Eastern countries such as Jordan, Iraq and Lebanon, mainly in the service sector. It may be noted here that these countries have recorded exceptional growth rates in their economies in recent years (1). However, the female rate of participation in economic activities in these countries has not kept up with the economic growth when compared to the countries in the same region that are going through social changes.

TABLE 1: Some Statistical Indices of Female Economic Activity in Three Sets of World Nations

Middle East and North Africa	Percentage of Women in Total Labor Force 1960	1970	East Asia and Pacific	Percentage of Women in Total Labor Force 1960	1970	Latin America	Percentage of Women in Total Labor Force 1960	1970
Egypt	7.3	7.2	Hong Kong	28.6	33.8	Brazil	17.5	20.4
Iraq	3.6	3.9	Indonesia	27.9	31.0	Chile	21.7	22.1
Jordan	5.3	5.5	Malaysia	27.0	31.4	El Salvador	17.8	21.8
Lebanon	13.4	17.4	Philippine	34.4	33.1	Mexico	17.4	18.5
Morocco	10.6	15.4	Singapore	20.3	26.1	Peru	20.7	21.9
Syria	9.4	10.5						
Tunisia	6.1	7.7						
Mean	7.96	9.66		27.64	31.08		19.02	20.94
Range	13.43	13.5		14.1	7.7		4.3	3.6
Std. Deviation	3.38	5.06		5.05	3.02		2.03	1.52
Variance	11.44	25.66		25.24	9.1		4.11	2.31

For source of data, see (13).

TABLE 2: Female Labor Force and Activity Rates

Country	Crude Activity Rate (percent)		
	Total	Male	Female
Bahrain			
1965	29.1	...	...
1971	27.9	49.0	3.3
Democratic Yemen			
1970	23.1	...	...
1973	25.8	42.4	9.4
Iraq			
1957	24.4	...	...
1970	28.2	...	...
1973	28.4	...	...
Jordan			
1961	22.9	42.4	2.6
1971	23.1	43.1	2.6
Kuwait			
1965	39.4	61.3	4.8
1975	30.6	49.5	7.8
Lebanon			
1970	26.9	43.8	9.5
Oman			
1972	25.0	...	...
Qatar			
1970	43.5	...	...
1975	47.2	...	...
Saudi Arabia			
1966	14.6	...	...
1975	17.8	...	...
Syrian Arab Republic			
1970	24.8	43.4	5.5
1975	24.8	38.9	10.5
United Arab Emirates			
1968	43.3	...	...
1973	38.0	...	...
Yemen			
1972	29.0	...	...

Source: ECWA, based on data compiled from national and international sources (1).

TABLE 3: Palestinian Arab Females by Type of Activity and Rate of Participation in Labor Force in (000) (West Bank) 1968, 71-78

Years	Rate of Participation in Labor Force	Economically Active Females		
		Unemployed	Employed	Total
1968	8.3	0.9	13.0	13.9
1971	12.7	0.4	21.5	21.9
1972	11.0	0.1	19.2	19.3
1973	10.8	0.1	19.2	19.3
1974	14.3	0.5	26.0	26.5
1975	12.8	0.4	23.9	24.3
1976	12.8	0.3	24.2	24.5
1977	12.0	0.3	23.3	23.6
1978	12.8	0.1	25.6	25.7

Mean 11.9
Range .6
Standard Deviation 1.72
Variance 2.9

For source, see (7).

Footnotes

[1(a)]What is generally known as economic development could be regarded as mere economic and industrial growth with borrowed technology and no solid foundation of its own. Consequently, overall structure of the economy remains weak and dependent upon industrially advanced countries. We will henceforth be using both the terms interchangeably.

[1(b)]Among the Third World nations, some have started industrialization earlier but at a slow rate, while oil-producing countries began the process at a later stage but at a faster rate. In both cases, women's participation in non-agricultural occupations varies.

[2]Almost half of the population of Lebanon are Christians.

[3]Sir Syaad Ahamed Khan was the great Muslim reformer in India who, despite extreme opposition from the majority of Muslims, found the Anglo Mohammedan School in the mid-19th century. This was later developed into a college and today stands as Aligad Mushin University.

[4]Except for Jordan, most of the Middle Eastern countries produce oil but, although the rate of literacy and indigenous labor involvement is increasing with time, these countries are still largely dependent on outside elements for their industrialization.

[5]By new progress we mean scientific innovations and discoveries, and technological development with which most Third World societies were familiar before they became independent.

[6]These are not only common expressions. A Muslim woman grows up on such ideas and is prepared for the role of mother and wife accordingly.

[7]In our view, housework and raising children is just as important a contribution to a nation's economy as any other productive activity. A housewife also contributes to the economy of the household. However, it is not the only job for women.

[8]Fatima Mernissi, in her book Beyond the Veil, explains how Moroccan family law passed just after independence remained in accordance with Muslim ideology, bringing no facsimile of independence to women. In India, Muslim personal law is as hotly debated today as it was a decade ago.

[9]The researcher worked in Jordan for one year in 1980. Education at school is free and the number of girls in the two universities has increased over the past few years. The development, however, is oriented toward bringing women into service industries as typists, clerks, teachers and so on, with an implicit implication that these are the suitable professions for women.

[10]For European countries in the 19th century, a whole world market was available for their products, while today Third World nations have to face a very competitive world market full of goods from industrialized nations.

[11] Women have not achieved equal development. Even in advanced countries, however, the difference in the level of development is highly significant.

[12]The examples of percentages for Jordan and Lebanon are derived from Table II and the figures for Iraq and Egypt are borrowed from the Year Book of Labour Statistics, 1981, ILO Geneva.

[13]This observation is the outcome of a survey carried out by the researcher.

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Women and Work in the Middle East: The Regional Impact of Migration to the Oil Producing States

Mervat Hatem

Theoretical Statement of the Research Problem

Modernization and Marxian approaches to the question of women and development stressed the importance of the incorporation of women in the work force as the way to equality/liberation. Despite their disagreement on the oppressive vs. the reformist character of capitalist/modern society, they seem agreed on the importance of education and employment in significantly changing the images and roles of women. Once the material conditions leading to the oppression of women were changed, successful social change was to follow, allowing women more access to new domains and an improved position in the social system.

In this respect, the study of the changing work roles of women in the labor-importing and the labor-exporting states of the Middle East presented an interesting theoretical anomaly. Despite significant improvements in educational and work opportunities, the largely segregated social systems of the Gulf survived the change. Similarly, increased dependence on women's work in the labor importing economies also had not, in general, significantly changed women's position in the family or vis-a-vis men.

In short, while changes in women's work roles could be observed regionally, they did not constitute a sufficient basis for challenging the character of the existing patriarchies. Social/sexual relations maintained their autonomy and succeeded in adapting the new roles to the existing patriarchal value system. On a more general theoretical level, efforts at modernization do not necessarily lead to the disintegration of traditional social relations. In this case, they reinforced instead of challenged patriarchal control.

Introduction

Large-scale migration from the non-oil producing economies to the rich Gulf states is a phenomenon that is gaining the attention of the students of the area. In the various macro and micro studies done of the phenomenon, the impact that migration has had on the lives of Middle Eastern women outside and within the oil producing states has not been studied. This paper attempts to be a first approximation in the effort to examine the connections that exist between large-scale worker migration to the Gulf and the sexually segregated social arrangements that prevail in the Gulf states. It will also try to show how this large-scale worker

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migration to the Gulf had, in its turn, an impact on the redefinition of women's work roles in the receiving as well as the supplying states.

As a starting point, let me state that labor migration from and to other Middle Eastern economies, in the search for employment and/or better wages, was a relatively new regional development.[1] Its beginnings went back to the 1960s after OPEC was created and began to contribute to the improved earnings of its member states. The astronomical rise in oil prices after 1973 allowed the oil producing states to embark on very ambitious development plans. With their sparse and relatively unskilled populations, they had to depend to a very large extent on migrant labor. Arab labor migration to the oil producing economies of the Middle East rose from less than 680,000 before 1973 to 3 million by 1980[2]--a sixfold increase in less than a decade.

As the post-1973 labor migration expanded, different Arab states (and their workers) were brought into intense nonformal contact with each other; labor from the Arab non-oil producing economies of Tunisia, Egypt, Sudan, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, North and South Yemen migrating to the oil producing economies of Algeria, Libya, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.). In an attempt to be very concrete in the study of the impact that labor migration had on women's work roles, this paper will specifically discuss changes in these roles in Egypt, Jordan and North Yemen as leading labor exporting states, and Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the U.A.E. as the major labor importing Gulf states.

Methodology

There were a number of reasons why this was a good sample of states that could serve as a basis for discussion. First, even though six states might seem too many, there were not sufficient studies made of any one or two states to justify limiting the sample for the sake of in-depth and/or rigorous study. At the same time, the six states selected were those mostly studied in the literature on Middle Eastern migration. What I tried to do was to use intensive studies when available and to supplement them with available extensive general studies of the labor exporting and labor importing states.

Second, as was mentioned, the reason why Egypt, Jordan and North Yemen were selected from among the labor exporting states was because they are the largest exporters of labor in the region. The large-scale migration from these particular states generated significant pressure for a change in gender work roles and the training of women to play a role in new sectors of the economy. Similarly, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the U.A.E. were selected from among the labor importers because they are the largest labor importers. Their small populations and oil wealth they had accumulated made them less likely to suffer from the short-term decline of oil prices. In their case, one could assume a more sustained development effort with the continued flow of migrant labor. In other words, this regional subsystem was developmentally a more solid base for generalizations about the continuing connections among migration, women and work in the supplying and the receiving states.

Last, while Egypt and Jordan are relatively more urbanized and modernized among the Arab states, the Gulf states had segregated sexual arrangements that affected the role that their women were to play in their economies and the functions that male and female migrant workers were to perform in these societies. This division of the Middle East into distinct types of societies with different levels of urbanization, modernization and sexual segregation allows one to deal with the regional social/sexual structure in a differentiated manner while testing for the generality of particular changes in Middle Eastern female work roles.

Sexual Segregation and the Social Structure of the Gulf States

While nomadic and peasant women in the Gulf were more free and more active in economic life,[3] urban women, who constitute the numerical majority in present Gulf states, suffered from economic exclusion. The newly urban Gulf societies (whether oil producing or non-oil

producing) were distinctly homogeneous within the Arab Middle East in their practice of the general segregation of men and women in most spheres of life (social and economic). Segregation could be partly attributed to Islam's puritanical attitude towards relations between the sexes and its suspicion of their interaction outside of the marriage institution. More importantly, segregation seemed to be the general historical response to sexuality in societies slowly beginning the process of urbanization.[4] The initial stages of urbanization in pre-Islamic Judaic and Greek societies brought the practice of various forms of sexual segregation as well as the veiling of women. Male honor in these new urban settings was determined by the sexual chastity of the female relatives. In Arabia, where a highly urbanized society developed under the rule of the orthodox Caliphs (successors of the prophet Muhammed), the Ummayads and the Abbasids, sexual segregation was not enforced and relatively liberal relations between the sexes allowed for their frequent interaction. In other words, there were just as many striking resemblances between the responses of the slowly urbanized non-Muslim Judaic and Greek societies and the Gulf states of the early 1960s as there were striking differences between the early urbanized and the present day Muslim Arabia. Degrees of urbanization--not Islam--accounted for the adoption of segregated sexual relations.

If segregation was a conservative reaction to societal change, it also coincided historically with the strengthening of property as an institution. In such societies the control of women was one way property relations manifested themselves.[5]

In contemporary Gulf societies, segregation was connected to the rigid definition of sexual and social roles. Women were confined primarily to the household as mothers and wives. Like other societies, the demarcation lines between the public and the private spheres coincided with male vs. female domains. Unlike other societies, however, women had a formally separate female world. It is important to stress here that, in this separate female world, women did not lead isolated fragmented existences as was typically the case in western nuclear families. As one careful observer of those societies put it, in the segregated societies of the Gulf there was a "system whereby the female relatives of a man--wives, sisters, mothers, aunts, and daughters--shared much of their time and living space. (This) further enabled women to have frequent and easy access to other women in their community, vertically, across class lines, as well as horizontally."[6]

Even though the male and female worlds were separate, one was not less differentiated or less serviced than the other. "All or almost all activities performed in the world of men for men and by men must also be performed in the world of women for women by women."[7] This structural separation of men and women led to the duplication of tasks and skills necessary to satisfy the needs of both sexes. Depending on the availability of a large enough resource base, this separate female world could potentially allow women guaranteed access to all the professions needed to socially service women.

There is agreement among the students of Gulf societies on the concrete repercussions that this social sexual arrangement had for their contemporary political economy. The exclusion of women from employment in the formal economy gave way to the structural dependence of the Gulf economies on expatriate labor. In 1975, nonnationals constituted 43% of the labor in Saudi Arabia, 69.4% in Kuwait, and 84.8% in the U.A.E.[8]

Even though Gulf women began to appear in the ranks of particular professions in the 1970s, their participation in the labor force remained limited and very often symbolic. Unfortunately, figures for the economically active female population in those societies did not give the breakdown between the indigenous and expatriate labor. For 1975, the percentages were 11.6% for Kuwait and 3.4% for the U.A.E. The size of the expatriate female labor force for the same year was estimated as less than 2% for Saudi Arabia and the U.A.E. and about 13% for Kuwait.[9]

Connected to indigenous female economic exclusion were rigid ideas about women's work and roles inside and outside the household. Child rearing was considered the primary function of women. As was the case in other societies, this explained low female participation in the

labor force. In addition, there were strong Islamic injunctions for female support in their roles as mothers. This weakened the strength of the economic motives behind female work outside the household. Under Islamic law, lack of support by a husband was sufficient ground for allowing women to sue for divorce. Provision of female economic support within the kinship system was also one very effective social mechanism for continuing sexual control of women.[10] The social cost of opting for economic independence through public employment in these conservative Gulf societies was to compromise a woman's (as well as her family's) reputation and social standing. For many women, this was a very high price to pay.

The relative economic prosperity brought about by the oil boom had contradictory effects on women's work in Gulf societies. It led to the expansion of the state service sector. As such, it served as a material basis for changing some of the antagonistic social attitudes towards women's work. With the Gulf states' adoption of a strong advocacy role in favor of female education and employment, tremendous pressure was exerted on the population to change its previous views concerning female participation in public programs. At the same time, the relative economic prosperity prevailing in those societies in the last decade undercut the appeal of employment. While female education had expanded,[11] female employment lagged.

It might be worth mentioning here that the expansion of female education in female segregated schools and universities fitted into the previously existing social arrangement. The fact that in actuality it did not lead to expanded participation in the labor force meant that the whole modernization drive did not pose a challenge to the dominant conservative ideology regarding the definition of the boundaries of a woman's world.

The expansion in Gulf education of women and its projected employment goals concentrated on what were seen as "socially acceptable" female occupations. Women's work was encouraged in areas considered to be extensions of traditional female functions outside of the family, i.e., education, nursing, medicine and social work.[12] Thus it might not necessarily be considered as representing a basic change in ideas about women's work. In those modern professions, women were still responsible for the traditional tasks of teaching the young and taking care of the ill and the weak. In all of these new roles, they could only service women. While this meant that women began to see themselves in new public arenas, their presence was safely isolated in a small part of the service sector. This new presence, even though significant, was not pervasive enough to radically alter men's attitudes to women and their place in the public world.

Segregation and the Need for Arab Female Labor in the Gulf States

As mentioned, the education, health and other social service systems of the Gulf states were segregated. This created a demand for Arabic-speaking female personnel to directly operate these programs and to directly train nationals to eventually take over. Also, communication between client and professional was necessary for the successful delivery of various services, whether in education, health or nursing.

It was common in the literature on Gulf societies to exaggerate the social impact that Arab female labor would have on Gulf women. One could certainly not ignore the power wielded by the use of Arabic as a common language and the sharing of Islam as a dominant value system in facilitating the communication of new attitudes and ideas. Given the fact that most of the expatriate female labor came from desegregated and relatively modernized societies like Egypt and Jordan and occupied important authority positions as teachers and doctors, it was not unrealistic to expect this particular group to introduce some new role models for women and/or to act as a catalyst in effecting some important social changes and ideas.

Without rejecting the potential social significance of Arab female labor in Gulf societies, one could not discount the fact that the work relationship between expatriate and indigenous female labor was structurally antagonistic. First, as long as the participation of the indigenous women in the work force was limited, the need for expatriate labor was large.

Conversely, the larger the participation of the indigenous women in the labor force, the more limited the need for expatriate labor. As independent working women who came from emancipated Arab societies, they were admired by Gulf women. With expatriate female workers sometimes occupying authority positions over nationals, there was resentment generated against paid outsiders who were given so much power.

Socially, the relationship between expatriate and national women was equally tense. As working women who migrated in search of better salaries, they were looked down upon. As emancipated women (i.e., unveiled and educated in their original societies), they were envied. Finally, as possible competitors for indigenous male attention and interest, they were rivals.

The work conditions under which Arab female workers operated in those segregated societies were difficult. Unmarried female workers could only be employed if they were accompanied by a female blood relative (maharam). This relative was to protect the single woman from advances by indigenous males and also prevent women from having the liberty to enter into any relationship with those males. In other words, if female migration elsewhere allowed women to live independent lives free of immediate male and family control, the conditions of work in the Gulf served to reassert male control over women.

While Arab female workers were unveiled in their own countries, they were forced to be veiled in the Gulf states. In other words, instead of bringing emancipation from veiling to the Gulf women, they were forced to give up their right to go unveiled. Married female migrants were sometimes accompanied by their husbands who did not have a job in the Gulf. In many of those cases, the income that a female worker might earn in the Gulf was sometimes larger than the income the couple would earn in Egypt. This role reversal of women becoming the breadwinners often created stress within those families.[13]

Last, there was a smaller percentage of working-class women who worked as maids and nannies in the Gulf. There were no reliable statistics on these women or on the conditions under which they worked.

Blocked Development, Labor Migration and Women's Work in the Labor Exporting States

While the oil price revolution was taking place, development efforts in the non-oil producing states of Egypt, Jordan and North Yemen had reached a deadend. In Egypt, this was particularly highlighted by a switch to the "open door" policy which declared an end to the Nasserite effort toward autonomous development. The new model was based on the important role played by international and Arab/Gulf capital. Since Arab capital continued to be reticent to play the role assigned to it in the region, non-oil producing states saw in their role as suppliers of labor a compensating reward.

Despite the original optimism with which the labor export function was greeted as a solution to some of the problems of blocked development (e.g., limited foreign currency earnings and un/underemployment), large-scale supply of labor to the Gulf had numerous adverse effects on the economic and the social structures of the non-oil producing states. The following section will focus its attention on the examination of two of these significant effects which had particular relevance to changing women's work roles.

Large-scale supply of migrant labor created serious dislocations in the labor exporting economies by denying them manpower and skills needed for the continuation of their development effort. In 1975, Egypt exported 3.8% of its active labor force to the oil producing economies of the Gulf, Yemen 24%, and Jordan-Palestine 40%.[14] Since most of the migrants tended to be adult males, one response to this labor shortage might conceivably be to train women to take over those tasks that used to be performed by men.

If one looked at the cases of Egypt, Jordan and North Yemen for confirmation, one would be struck by their divergent responses to the problem. As a starting point, one must distinguish

between short-term and long-term policy responses. In Jordan and Yemen, where a relatively small labor force existed, the large-scale migration of skilled and unskilled labor to the Gulf had dramatic implications for the economy. Given the short-term inflexibility of the labor markets (i.e., the lack of personnel who could be reshuffled to meet the needs of different sectors), the short-term response was to import Egyptian male workers to substitute for the indigenous migrants. In Yemen, the import of labor was accompanied by greater reliance on women in agriculture.[15]

The Jordanian government's long-term response to the problem was aimed at attracting women to the work force through an effective use of the educational and employment policies.[16] In the Jordanian case, this might be a question of structural necessity. Many of the Palestinian migrants (with Jordanian passports) were most likely to settle permanently[17] in the Gulf and hence would constitute a long-term loss to the Jordanian economy. Whether or not this set of constraints was going to allow for significant change in women's economic participation is something that remains to be seen.

In Egypt, which is the most populous Arab state and which exported both skilled and unskilled labor, the use of more women in the formal sector had not been discussed at the policy-making level. Given its large population (45 million) and the availability of surplus university graduates, the tendency had been to replace those migrants with others from the existing pool regardless of sex. It was not clear if there was, as a result of migration, a noticeable feminization of the professional labor force. In fact, there might be a consequent female exodus from the labor force that was intimately connected to male migration. Skilled professional migrants tended not to remit their earnings because, more than any other category, they tended to take their dependents with them.[18] Their middle-class position allowed them to finance the preliminary travel expenses. Good incomes in the Gulf helped them to afford expensive living conditions. The financial aspect aside, the segregated and private nature of social life in Gulf societies make this a personal and a social necessity.

As a result, Egyptian middle-class families with two working professionals were often transformed into families with one working professional. Since female migrants constituted a minority of the total labor force supplied, migration to the Gulf had a regressive effect on previously employed females. It reduced the number of the females in the active employment pool in the non-oil producing economies without making any use of their skills in the oil producing ones. One must also add that, once those migrant professional families return to Egypt, women resume employment in their original societies.

Migration to the Gulf affected unskilled women differently. The Egyptian countryside had been transformed by the migration of peasants to Iraq and the Gulf states. Migration to Iraq had been for the purpose of permanent settlement of peasant families at the invitation and the encouragement of the Iraqi government. In contrast, migration to the Gulf (especially to Saudi Arabia) was more transient. Unskilled peasant migrants tended to work in construction which was one of the most expanding sectors of those economies. Most of the migrants were adult married males who left their families behind in search of better incomes in the Gulf. The result was the appearance for the first time of female-headed households in the Egyptian countryside.

Large-scale evidence gathered from the study of this phenomenon in the Third World suggested that it did not particularly improve the conditions of women. Rather, it led to what has been commonly described as the feminization of poverty.[19] Migration of the male wage earner could be expected to lead to increased poverty, at least until work could be found in the labor importing economies. Women already burdened with work tasks in the household and the fields had to assume the added work load of the men. The immediate results were larger work responsibilities, deteriorating living standards and lowered agricultural productivity.

Even though women had taken over many new agricultural tasks, the tendency had been in Yemen (and one would suspect in the Egyptian and Jordanian countrysides as well) for them to

work under the auspices of younger or older men.[20] In other words, the adoption of new work roles did not necessarily lead to greater independence, but substituted the missing head of the household with the next male in line, whether a son, father or brother-in-law. More importantly, the decision on how to spend the money from the remittances was often made either by the migrant himself or his family.[21] In other words, women might not necessarily gain any new decision-making power within the family as a result of the absence of the male head of the household and/or the availability of new sources of income.

Conclusion

Development efforts in the labor importing and labor exporting economies were affected by migration to the Gulf states. Women's participation in the labor force was influenced by changing material conditions such as the expansion in education and employment of women in the Gulf and the absence of the male heads of family in Egypt, Yemen and Jordan. Still, the existing patriarchal social systems resisted significant changes in the relations between the sexes. Despite mounting developmental pressures within the labor importing and labor exporting states, the general promotion and acceptance of work as a societal response to change did not materialize. As a result, women's interest in active participation had been limited. The social and material rewards for women's involvement continued to be weak.

Finally, while participation by women in their economies had a liberating potential, it did not necessarily challenge the structure of segregated societies. Its success in undermining that system required an ideological confrontation that would have prevented the co-optation of the new by the old. The economic prosperity of the Gulf economies might have postponed this confrontation temporarily. The continuing discrepancy between material and social changes could be expected, however, to pave the way for that confrontation and change.

Footnotes

[1]Before 1960, there were two relatively old regional precedents of labor migration movements. First was the immigration of North African workers to France. This phenomenon was connected to the economic crisis of the colonial system. It continued after decolonization and up to the present as a symptom of persisting underdevelopment. Jacque Berque, The Maghreb in the Modern World.

Second, the Egyptian government in the 1940s and the 1950s paid its own professionals to work in what is now the oil producing economies of Libya, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates. The various Egyptian governments saw this as part of their contribution to Arab unity and one way of securing for Egypt a leadership position in the region.

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[10]Nadia Youssef, "Differential Labor Force Participation of Women in Latin American and Middle Eastern Countries: the Influence of Family Characteristics," Social Forces, vol. 51 December 1972): 146.

[11]Shamlan Y. Alessa, The Manpower Problem in Kuwait (Boston: Kegan Paul International, 1981): 27; Soffan, chapter 3.

[12]Alessa, 16 and Soffan, 69-75.

[13]Saad Eddin Ibrahim, The New Arab Social Order (Boulder: Westview Press, 1982): 93.

[14]Ismail Serageldin, James Socknat and John Birks, "Human Resources in the Arab World: the Impact of Migration," Arab Resources: the Transformation of a Society, Ibrahim Ibrahim, ed. (London: Crom Helm, 1983): 29.

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[16]Joan Clarke, "Jordan: A Labor Receiver--A Labor Supplier," paper prepared for AID/Near East Bureau Seminar on Labor Migration in the Middle East (September 20, 1979).

[17]Janet Abu-Lughod, "Social Implications of Labor Migration in the Arab World," Arab Resources: the Transformation of a Society, Ibrahim Ibrahim, ed. (London: Crom Helm, 1983): 237-65.

[18]J.S. Birks and C.A. Sinclair, "Country Case Study: Arab Republic of Egypt," International Migration Project (University of Durham: England, 1978).

[19]Nadia Youssef, Mayra Buvinic and Ayse Kudat, "Women in Migration: Third World Focus," (Washington, D.C.: International Center for Research on Women, 1979): 59.

[20]Rebecca Swanson, "The Role of Women in the Yemen Arab Republic," paper prepared for the Yemen Desk, Agency for International Development, Washington, D.C., 1975. Mimeo: 77.

[21]Zafer Ecevit and K.C. Zachariah: 36.

Women, Family Structure and Development in Jamaica

A. Lynn Bolles

In my own work with urban working-class women in Jamaica, I have been particularly struck by the fact that to understand the situation of women as a whole, one has to begin by following the general process of change which has occurred in household structure over the years, and then specifically to those units under study. What happens to someone today and the way they live--the opportunities or lack of opportunity--is a result of a whole historical process, which family history can aid us in understanding in the contemporary context.

We have to keep in mind that households are units composed of members whose relations of production to domestic organization are affected by what happens in society. In this case I will be referring to Jamaican society; and Jamaica, as a Third World country, is directly and indirectly affected by the movements of international capital. In the whole history of Jamaica, this principle is applicable at every point in time, whether one is talking about mercantile plantation capitalism, post-war industrial expansion, the Puerto-Ricanization of Jamaica, the destabilization of the Jamaican economy due to problems of a "red scare" with the Michael Manley administration, or whether we are talking about the present effects of the Caribbean Basin Initiative--C.B.I., to use State Department jargonese. We must keep in mind the interrelatedness of domestic, national and international activities in all these instances.

There are two major tasks to be accomplished here. First, I would like to present an overview of a series of historical issues pertinent to the study of family history in Jamaica. Second, I would like to present, using this perspective, a case study of a group of urban Jamaican working-class households. Here a focal point will be the place of employment of the women involved in this work, that is, in factory jobs. In this manner, I will illustrate the usefulness of a perspective which shows the interrelatedness of women's productive and reproductive activities, and their value in studying household organization.

To begin, let us discuss some of the current historical issues in the region. It is obvious that the formation of slave societies in the Americas is a crucial factor to take into account in understanding the history of black families in the Americas. However, we must also acknowledge that the existence of black people continues past dates of emancipation, and that other factors have also had significant influence. In our Jamaican case, let me present four elements--products of social historical research which are currently under discussion in Jamaica.

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First, specifically in terms of the Jamaican situation, we have to look at the different kinds of production systems that utilized slave labor. Not all enslaved people worked on sugar plantations, though that was the most prevalent type of forced labor use; we also have to look at the different types of roles that women played in the various systems of production during the slave period. For example, smaller estates that grew coffee or spices may have used female labor more discriminately than the larger sugar estates did. Perhaps there were other situations as well where black women were recognized for, and could use, their talents as healers, midwives, and gardeners, and have a degree of value applied to those abilities.

Second, the manner in which household structures evolved from their formation during the slave period is indicative of contemporary familial patterns. For example, the mother and child household unit was present during the slave period and is also found in the current population. Our task entails an investigation of the range of variation in household composition from the emancipation period through contemporary times. For too long, social scientists were tied to the concept of what they felt to be the most prevalent situation during the days of slavery, i.e., the mother/child household. As a result, that concept formed the basis of their contemporary emphasis in the current population, which they saw as having structures identical to those of the earlier period.

Next, we should think about using the perspective that American historian Herbert Gutman utilized in realizing that, yes, there were black nuclear families during and after slavery. However, one should be careful not to regard these nuclear families as the ideal simply because they were present in the population.

Another focal point for analysis, especially in dealing with black societies in the Americas, is the whole process of internal and external migration. When we hear current debate concerning Nicaragua's black population, a series of basic demographic questions comes to mind: How did a significant number of black people come to live in that country? Under what circumstances did they arrive in Nicaragua? The presence of large numbers of blacks in Central America underscores the widespread practice of external migration for Caribbean societies, and Jamaica is no exception. Men have migrated to jobs throughout the Caribbean area from the post-emancipation period onward. The remittances, absences, experiences, and, inevitably, emigration from Jamaica of women joining their men in Nicaragua, Costa Rica or Panama, have all had a tremendous effect on both sending and receiving countries.

In the course of this sort of analysis, we must look also at the political economy of Jamaican society. After emancipation in 1838, the economic history of Jamaica can be roughly divided into six phases. This begins with (1) plantation capitalism, and then there is a transition to (2) a more mercantile capitalism. The changes begun with this transition increase, leading the economy through (3) the whole period of commercialism in the crown colony of Jamaica. The next phases are (4) the pre-war period, and (5) decolonialization (1930-1944). The changes begun in this last phase finally bring about the transition to (6) the post-war development phase and its emphasis on the industrialization-by-invitation model which forms the basis of the modern economy. This Jamaican (and Puerto Rican) industrialization-by-invitation plan is the prototype for the industrial development models currently in operation in Singapore, Malaysia and other Third World countries, as export processing plants and free trade zones. Those of us who are engaged in a global analysis of the movement of international capital, as that movement pertains to export processing plants and free trade zones, have to look at the prototypes of these institutions and take into account what happened during the tenure of these models in the Caribbean.

For the remainder of my discussion the focus of attention will be on the incorporation of the working-class household into this larger national economic framework. In addition, reference will be made to the Reagan administration's Caribbean Basin Initiative, and how this plan could affect working-class households and the national economy. Here mention will be made of the households included in this study, and on the places of work where these women are employed.

Industrialization in Jamaica after 1949 was based on foreign investment incentives and tax holidays. Again, the structures of foreign investment that we speak of currently in Southeast Asia and the Mexican-U.S. border, etc., were instituted then. Jamaica and Puerto Rico were testing grounds for this type of development plan. As a result, Jamaica experienced, between 1950 and 1970, enormous economic growth, the annual growth rate averaging 8%. This expansion period also gave rise to ever-increasing disparities in income, with the complementary social and economic indicators of inequality. The increase in steadily employed working-class members was, however, comparatively small--especially for those engaged in the growing economic sectors of mining, construction and manufacturing.

In fact, the women who were involved in this research could be considered part of this sector of the working class. It would be straining the term to call them "labor aristocracy," but when we take into account the fact that the unemployment rate in Jamaica for women ranged between 20 and 35%, it is clear that these working women were not among the most destitute. Even at the height of this expansionist period, these female industrial employees composed the majority of the women involved in that process. Female factory workers were those members of the working class who were occupied in the operative, unskilled, and semi-skilled jobs. Moreover, they never accounted for more than 8% of the entire female working-class population. Therefore, even though we are talking about the expansion of a whole economy that was based largely on labor-intensive operations in terms of the differential labor inputs by gender, women clearly had comparatively low participation in the entire process.

Beginning in the late 1960s, it became apparent that Jamaica could not sustain its level of expansion, nor withstand the increasing social and economic disparities in the population. Michael Manley was elected in 1972 on the platform of providing policy to remedy the social ills facing the nation, including a growing national debt. When the Manley administration ended, the country had been beseiged by a "red scare," political destabilization, intrusion of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and gun warfare. The end result was the election of Edward Seaga in November 1980. All this is very reminiscent of the destabilization and eventual downfall of Salvador Allende's Chile, a scenario too often repeated in international politics.

The men who form the Seaga administration have made all of their money from the labor-intensive work of women--in garment industries and food processing. Clearly, for their own margin of profit, these business/political men want to reintroduce the more blatant measures of the former plan. Perhaps you have heard the commercials, "Welcome to Jamaica, welcome to things they way they used to be." This is exactly what the business/political faction desires, and not just in tourism. The government wants to go back to the economic model of the 1950-1970 era. Their goal is to return to the way it was back when people were very happy--or when, at least, they were very happy, along with all the others who were investors in the whole process. They want to go back to the days when minimum wage was 35 cents (U.S.) an hour. (The current minimum is U.S. 87 cents an hour.) Of course, this new policy is unencumbered by rules of equal pay for equal work, or any of the other social and economic reform measures that were so vital to the Manley administration.

This is where the Caribbean Basin Initiative fits into the picture--and not coincidentally. We have to remember that Mr. Seaga has a close association with the Reagan administration. He was the first foreign dignitary to visit the Reagans in the White House, in January 1981. The general Seaga strategy was to secure funds to ease Jamaica's foreign debts. Ultimately, the "solution" worked out to this problem was the Caribbean Basin Initiative. Unfortunately, Jamaica needs a bit more than the $30 million that is its part of the regional kitty.

Aside from the geopolitical aspects of the Initiative, the question is, how will this "solution" affect the people of Jamaica, for example, the women involved in my research? These women worked in about sixteen firms--tobacco, garment, pharmaceuticals, and so forth. All of the firms utilize Jamaica's domestic market because it has a strong consumer identification. These firms also tend to export, servicing the rest of the Caribbean. For instance, the pharmaceutical firm is the only subsidiary of the multinational located in the Caribbean. Its

market share comprises Jamaica and all of the other English-speaking Caribbean islands. It will be interesting to see how free trade will allow those floundering firms in Jamaica to survive against the international onslaught of imported goods. It will certainly be a first if it works. It seems more realistic to expect the obvious: Jamaica's firms, including the subsidiaries of multinational corporations, will lose their competitive edge in the regional marketplace.

Clearly, the $30 million earmarked for Jamaica in the Initiative cannot be effective in curing economic shortcomings, domestically or internationally. It will be an influence determining which consumer goods are available and will certainly lead to some heightened expectations. However, as cheaper imported goods become available, they will displace locally produced items. The inroads of the Initiative are already beginning to be apparent in Jamaica. For example, two years ago supermarket shelves were bare of imported luxury goods and even imported necessities, due to the tremendous balance-of-payments problem. Now you can buy caviar or anything else in the world you desire--if you have the money--but, more than ever before, the poor are getting poorer and the rich are getting richer.

The steadily employed working-class group that we have been discussing has been tremendously affected by this change, of course. Their buying power has been dramatically reduced. Even though they are earning more than other members of the working class, their efforts to catch up with the middle class standard of living are being severely retarded.

In closing, there is one additional factor to keep in mind while utilizing the evolutionary historical approach to understanding household organization. And that is, we cannot lose sight of the way in which women, men, children and other household members are affected by international capital. In fact, working-class households were affected by IMF policies. The Caribbean Basin Initiative is going to affect household organization by altering or eliminating jobs and by reorganizing the domestic marketplace.

We have to be aware of what options there will be for people in their employment, of how people will be able to feed themselves, of how they will be able to clothe themselves. When social scientists deal with a small-scale economy such as Jamaica, the interrelatedness of these socioeconomic factors becomes clear. They present difficulties that we North Americans may not readily grasp, accustomed as we are to the invisibility allowed in the large-scale economy of the United States. Each factor has its own impact; its effects over the course of time constitute a history of facts which must be incorporated to provide an integrated approach to study. What happens out there on an international scale has severe effects down at the grassroots level. One of our tasks has to be to show linkages between all these levels of action, not to separate events on one level but to connect all the levels together.

Women, Work and Infant Mortality: A Case Study from Northeast Brazil

Nancy Scheper-Hughes

I have seen death without weeping
The destiny of the Northeast is death
Cattle they kill
But to the people they do something worse
Repentista Singer

Northeast Brazil is a region of vast proportions and of equally vast social, economic and developmental problems. It is an area twice the size of Texas with 36 million people, more than half of them still living in rural areas on fazendas and sitios (farms and ranches) and on engenhos and usinas (sugar plantations and mills). "O Nordeste" has captured the imagination of poets, writers and film makers and, more recently, of anthropologists. They are drawn to the remarkable contrasts: a land of cloying fields of sugar cane, of periodic droughts and floods, and of many kinds of hungers; a land of authoritarian landlords and libertarian bandits; of penitential Christianity and of ecstatic messianic movements.

Although the Northeast has been the focus of numerous development programs since the 1960s (see Robock, 1963; Aguiar, 1979), the area is still characterized by staggering, unmet human needs. The most recent World Health Organization data (1979) indicate that 58% of the Nordestino population is illiterate and that life expectancy is forty years. The president of the Brazilian Pediatric Association announced last summer that approximately one million children under the age of five die in Brazil each year, largely as a result of parasitic infections interacting with chronic undernutrition. Ironically, the so-called Brazilian Economic Miracle of the past two decades, while markedly increasing the GNP of Brazil, has not had a correspondingly favorable effect on childhood mortality which has been rising steadily in the eight major urban centers of Brazil since 1967 (Silva-Paim, personal communication, and Valente, unpublished epidemiological data and manuscripts).

A recent Pan American Health Organization investigation of childhood mortality in a dozen rural and urban sites in eight Latin American countries found the city of Recife in Pernambuco, Northeast Brazil, to have the highest infant mortality of all urban centers sampled (Puffer and Serano, 1973). The PAHO data can be reduced in order to present a profile of the woman most likely to have suffered the loss of an infant or young child. She is illiterate, a rural migrant to an urban area, and marginally employed. She is also likely to

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have had a previous experience of infant mortality and to have given birth to four or more other, living children.

One frequent response of women worldwide to infant death is renewed pregnancy--an attempt, some epidemiologists conclude, to replace relatively quickly that which was lost (see Ware, 1977, WHO 1980; Chowdhury, Khan and Chen, 1976; Taylor, Newman and Kelly, 1976). If so, the high rates of infant death represent (in addition to other problems) gross reproductive waste, draining the physical, economic and psychological resources of women who bear such vulnerable offspring.

The bulk of existing literature on infant mortality has been conducted from the perspective of population demography and policy-oriented maternal and child health. The demographers come up with balanced equations of high childhood mortality and high fertility and wonder, I am sure, what might be the consequences if appropriate public health interventions were found and all those seemingly excess children who were born lived.

Both perspectives tend to interpret the extremely high rates of death and disease characteristic of young life in the developing world as the almost inevitable consequences of largely impersonal ecological, climactic or demographic conditions such as, for example, the droughts of Northeast Brazil or the exposure to tropical infectious diseases, or of overpopulation leading to food shortages and malnutrition.

What both these approaches frequently obscure is the role of economic relations in the social production of morbidity and mortality--in other words, the "macroparasitism" of class relations and exploitation. They have also largely neglected the micro-perspective, the extent to which psychocultural factors come into play as Third World women, mothers and workers, may be cast in the role of family strategists, necessarily allocating scarce resources so that some of their children may be more or less favored in the struggle for survival. I am referring here to the recently developed hypothesis of "selective neglect" (Scrimshaw, 1978), variously called "benign neglect" (Cassidy, 1980), "masked deprivation" or "passive infanticide" (Harris, 1977; Rosenberg, 1973; Pough and Harlow, 1966), all suggesting the possibility that highly stressed mothers may themselves indirectly contribute to the high rates of infant death as a form of post-partum abortion or family planning. "Selective neglect" implies the gradual elimination of one newborn or toddler from the circle of protective custody, and minimal nurturance and care necessary to survival under already extremely adverse conditions. According to the paradigm, the inequitable distribution by mothers of food, medical care, attention, love and nurturance may be based on cultural preferences concerning sex, birth order, physical traits, constitution or temperament.

The evidence, however, upon which the "selective neglect" hypothesis has been based is largely circumstantial (as in the analysis of population demography statistics) or else ethnographically anecdotal. Worse, preliminary analyses are marred by an inexcusable ethnocentrism, such as references to Latino barrio mothers' lack of "appropriate demonstration of grief" at the death of an infant, and their "fatalism" and "resignation" to infant death as evidence of passive infanticide, when the socialization of affect is, of course, so highly variable culturally. Furthermore, without careful attention to the larger socioeconomic and political context within which poor mothers reproduce and nurture, the selective neglect hypothesis could be readily interpreted as yet another variant of the tendency among social scientists to blame the victims of misfortune, as well as of the even more general tendency to blame the gamut of human problems on "bad mothers" and "bad mothering."

What I am attempting to do in this current research project is to field test the validity of the "selective neglect" hypothesis within a single hillside shantytown, a favela of rural migrants called O Cruzeiro (Crucifix Hill). I will do this, however, without losing sight of the larger framework of power and class relations that limit the options available to poor women. As both a feminist and an applied psychological anthropologist, I am concerned not only with raising the question do these women selectively neglect some of their

infants and hence place them at a risk of death, but also the questions how and why they might do this. What does infant death and loss mean to them? How do they explain and interpret their motives and behaviors? And, finally, what external forces place them in situations where they must make such decisions, albeit less than fully consciously?

Over the next several years I will undertake a rather broad "social epidemiology" of infant mortality in Northeast Brazil, using infant death in very much the same way I used schizophrenia in rural Ireland (see Scheper-Hughes, 1979) as a kind of master symbol or master metaphor of dynamic tensions in Nordestino social life: between rich and poor, male and female, old and young. Like Ivan Illich (1982), I am trying to build toward a history (and geography) of scarcity and human needs, and I will use infant death as a means of learning something about the effects of scarcity and deprivation on women's lives and on their abilities to nurture, to give, and to love.

In the following pages I will briefly discuss some preliminary results from the first and exploratory stage of research conducted during the summer of 1982. The primary focus of the research was the collection of full reproductive histories and in-depth interviews with 72 women of Cruzeiro Hill, the largest of three hillside shantytowns overlooking the interior market town of Ladeiras, located just two hours from Recife, capital of the state of Pernambuco. The reproductive histories elicited demographic information including birthplace, education, migration history, work history, marital status, and history of marital and other significant relationships. This was followed by a discussion of each pregnancy and its outcome, including miscarriages, abortions, stillbirths, and all live births. For each live birth the following information was recorded: location of, and assistance with, the delivery; mother's perceptions of the infant's weight, health status, temperament; infant feeding practices; history of early childhood illnesses, how treated, and outcomes, including mortality. Following the reproductive history I asked each mother a series of open-ended, provocative and evaluative questions, including: Why do so many infants die here? What do infants need most in order to survive the first year of life? What could most improve the situation of mothers and infants here? Who has been your greatest source of comfort and support throughout your adult life? How many children are enough to raise? Do you prefer to raise sons or daughters and why? etc. In addition to the collection of these reproductive histories, I also conducted interviews and observations of health professionals, mothers, and children in the primary clinical settings of Ladeiras: pharmacies, clinics and health posts, and the hospital. I was able to work efficiently during this brief period because the field site was the same location where I had previously lived and worked as a health/community development Peace Corps Volunteer in the early 1960s. In fact, several of the older women and their adult daughters (now mothers themselves) in my sample were the very same young mothers and toddlers with whom I had worked seventeen years ago in the operation of a cooperative day nursery for working mothers.

The Context

The political and agrarian problems of Northeast Brazil extend back to the earliest days of colonization when the patterns of latifundia, monocultura, and paternalismo were first established.[1] I am referring to the creation of large plantations devoted to single cash crops at the expense of diversified and subsistence-based agriculture, and to the maintenance of essentially feudal, paternalistic and exploitative relations between landowners and workers.

The market town of Ladeiros (a pseudonym) is located in the heart of the largest sugar cane producing area of the Northeast. The town's population has more than doubled to 34,000 over the past two decades due to the exodus of rural workers from the interior resulting from the industrialization of the sugar industry and the introduction of minimal rural labor legislation in the late 1950s. Forced to conform to minimum wage laws, many usina and engenho owners responded by radically reducing their work force. Cut loose from the paternalistic bonds to a particular landowner and his sugar mill, the rural laborer of the Northeast has been proletarianized and has become a "free agent" and wage laborer who moves from engenho

to engenho in search of seasonal employment. His "home base" tends to be a town. The low wages and frequent unemployment of the cane worker places him outside the consumer market and at an additional disadvantage for he must buy virtually everything that his family uses.

Ladeiras, centrally located within the zona de mata and within commuting distance (by bus and truck) to many small engenhos and two large usinas, attracted hundreds of displaced plantation families. For some rural migrants Ladeiras represented only a first stage, a "toe hold" in the migration process that later took them to Recife, Rio, Sao Paulo, and even Manaus. For the majority, however, the original "invasion barrio" of Alto do Cruzeiro has become a permanent home, and the initial makeshift straw huts of the early 1960s have been replaced by taipa (mud) and still later by brick homes. Alto residents are no longer squatters; today they rent the land on which they build their homes from the municipio which owns each of the three large hills that have become shantytowns overlooking the "downtown" of Ladeiras. Pirated electricity has been replaced by the extension of municipal electrification and each of the shantytowns has as least one municipal elementary school. The public water supply, sanitation and sewage, however, remain precarious and life-threatening to the residents of O Cruzeiro, especially to babies and young children who, virtually from birth, are afflicted with parasitic and other infectious diseases. The families of rural and seasonal workers are excluded from the national health insurance program of Brazil; they have access to free medical services at two health posts (one state and one municipal) which are, if not iatrogenic, at the very least wholly inadequate.

The Sample

The 72 mothers who formed the research sample were not selected in a controlled fashion. Rather, they represented the first ones to volunteer following a meeting which I called in the community's school and social center. Many more volunteered for the research than I could possibly have interviewed during the brief period of my stay. The only criterion for inclusion in the sample was that the women had experienced atleast one pregnancy. All understood that I was studying reproduction and early childhood. I did not stress to them my focus on infant and childhood mortality for fear of biasing their responses.

The 72 mothers ranged in age from 19 to 71. The median age of 39 means that most had not yet completed their families. Two-thirds of the women in the sample were migrants to Ladeiras from rural areas, and many had spent a considerable portion of their lives in seasonal migrations before arriving at the Alto. Education and literacy were minimal: 31 of the women had never been to school, and 47 of them could not even sign their name. Sixty-five percent of the women were currently in a stable, long-term marriage or common law relationship, 17% had a history of brief, shifting relationships to a series of men, and 18% were single at the time of the interview (six as widows who had not remarried, and seven as women who were recently abandoned).

The prevailing pattern of family subsistence was based on the cooperation of all household members over 13 or 14 years of age. Most of the women (57%), like their husbands and grown children, had been working at least seasonally and part time in a variety of marginal occupations, although the women were less likely than their spouses to work in agriculturally related jobs. Of those women who worked, the majority performed domestic services as cooks, washerwomen and nursemaids in the homes of the wealthy and middle-class families of Ladeiras, although this work was particularly disvalued. Older women rented small garden plots outside of town (roçados), while younger women did piecework for a small cottage hammock industry. Only five women in the sample were able to obtain work in one of the several shoe, textile and pottery factories of the municipio. Two of the mothers lived by begging in the street on market days.

There was considerably less diversity in the work available to men of the Alto: agricultural wage labor, construction and road repair, civil police, and self-employment through odd jobs and the resale of fruits and vegetables at the marketplace accounted for most

male employment. Adolescent children worked whenever possible in the factories and the hammock industry, but boys were often unemployed or worked seasonally cutting sugar cane, which (like domestic work for girls) represented the most disvalued work. Some mothers encouraged their very young sons to scavenge in the marketplace and "looked the other way" when they came home with filched items. Daughters as young as five or six years were used as infant tenders and babysitters.

The combined family income during the summer of 1982 was about Cr$ 5,000 a week, or $25, testifying to the widespread unemployment and underemployment of Alto residents. Virtually all family income was spent on the weekly marketing for food. Other necessities and purchases came out of the food "budget."

Reproductive Summaries: Childhood Mortality Patterns

The 72 women reported a total of 686 pregnancies, an average of 9.5 per woman. Of these pregnancies, 98 ended in spontaneous or induced abortion or stillbirth, an average of 1.4 per woman.[2] Of the remaining 588 live births reported, 254 offspring (43%) died between the ages of birth to five years (3.5 per woman), and another five children died between the ages of six and twelve years. There were, then, a total of 329 living children at the time of the study (4.5 per woman), but many of the infants and toddlers were reported by their mothers to be "very sick" or frail at the time of the interview, and at least some of these could be anticipated not to survive their fifth year. (See table 1.)

Most studies of childhood mortality in developing and Third World countries have identified the period of highest risk and vulnerability at about one and a half to two years, the time when another sibling may have been born or is "on the way." More important, this is the age when wearning from the breast to "table food" is likely to have been completed, and the toddler is therefore confronted with dramatic changes (as well as protein and calorie deficiencies) in the diet, and increased contact with contaminated foods and utensils. The fact that breastfeeding is an extremely attenuated pattern of infant care among migrant women of the Alto (for reasons to be explored later in the paper) contributed, I believe, to the statistic that these children are at greatest risk during the first nine months of life. Seventy-one percent of the reported deaths occurred between birth and six months, and 82% of the deaths had occurred by the end of the first year. (See table 2.)

Not reflected in the above statistics is the fact that the majority of Alto do Cruzeiro infants (those who survive as well as those who die) generally suffer their first "crisis" (as mothers term it) of vomiting and diarrhea by the time they are a month old. The average Alto infant suffers four or more such "crises," lasting from a few days to several weeks, during the first year of life.

The Selective Neglect Hypothesis: Sex and Birth Order

Previous studies of "selective neglect" have tended to begin with correlations of sex and birth order and childhood mortality (see Scrimshaw, 1978). My reproductive history data from this relatively small sample of women demonstrated no clear sex or birth order linked mortality. Of the 254 childhood deaths reported, 129 were of boys and 125 of girls. Given the greater physical vulnerabilities of male infants worldwide during the first few years of life, the female death rate is higher than what would be expected but not sufficiently high to justify or support a possible selective neglect effect. Moreover, despite sexist ideologies within the larger culture, there was no consensus among the impoverished mothers in my sample regarding preferred sex of offspring. While individual mothers stated personal preferences (some for sons, others for daughters), all the women agreed that a mother would want to have at least one (and preferably two) children of each sex. Closely spaced boy-girl pairs ("casals," the term for a married couple) of children were considered "beautiful." There was no doubt that both sexes were cherished although for quite different reasons: boys because they were easy to care for, were independent at an early age, and could be sent out to "forage"

at an early age. Boys were also admired for their skill at street games and sports, an important aspect of public life on the Alto. Girls were desired because they grew up to be a mother's lifelong support and confidant.

With respect to birth order and mortality, two minor patterns emerged within a generally random larger picture. There were several cases of what I will call deaths in runs, that is, either a sequence of initial childhood deaths followed by a few successful outcomes, or a sequence of initial successes followed by a "run" of subsequent childhood deaths. In most cases extremely adverse conditions in the mother's life during the period covering the sequence of deaths (such as abandonment by spouse, serial migrations and unemployment, lack of access to any medical care, birth complications, etc.) were sufficiently explanatory. There were no discernible patterns of favoritism based on primogeniture, but the last born to survive, the "casula," was often particularly indulged and cherished by both parents.

The most consistently expressed preferences among the sample women concerned infant and childhood temperament and constitution. The mothers expressed a decided preference for children who evidenced early on the characteristics of "fighters" and "survivors." Quick, sharp, active, verbal and developmentally precocious children were much preferred to quiet, docile, passive, inactive or developmentally delayed children. Mothers spoke most warmly and fondly of those toddlers and preschool-aged children who were a little "brabo" (wild) and who were "sabido" (wise) and, above all, "jeitoso" (skillful with both objects and tasks and in interpersonal relations). The expressed disaffection by Alto mothers for their less animated and slower children is particularly unfortunate in an area where malnutrition, chronic hunger, and parasitic infections interact with what appears to be maternal "distancing" to further contribute to these least favored traits. I will return to this subject later in the discussion of medical selective neglect and patterns of "ethno-eugenics."

The Emic Perspective: Mothers' Interpretations and Explanations of Infant/Childhood Mortality

In this section I will analyze Alto mothers' interpretations of the causes and meanings of their *own* children's deaths, as well as their responses to a series of questions following each reproductive history on the causes of childhood mortality in the shantytown in general.

With reference to their own children's deaths, mothers' explanations loosely fit the following etiological categories: *naturalistic* (including both biomedical and folk interpretations that explain sickness and death in impersonal or systemic terms); *supernaturalistic* (whenever childhood death was explained as a result of God's will or as the inevitable fate or destiny of the child); *social relational* or *personalistic* (whenever childhood death was explained in terms of individual or interpersonal behavior such as through uncontrolled and malignant emotions or through the willful neglect of an infant thought to be suffering from an "ugly" and permanently disabling folk illness). Table 3 summarizes the mothers' explanations.

Underlying and uniting these etiological notions is a world view in which all of life is conceptualized as a *luta*, a power struggle between the strong and the weak. Death can be stronger than young life. Thus mothers can speak of a child who "wanted" to die, whose will and drive toward life was not sufficiently strong or well developed. Likewise specific medicines and treatments are described as "stronger" or "weaker" than the diseases they are supposed to fight. Individual constitutions of mothers as well as of children are described as weak, strong, resistent. A pregnant woman's innate weakness, for example, can be communicated to her child *in utero* so that the infant is born frail and unfit for the long *luta* ahead.

For a mother to say that her child suffered many crises during infancy but survived in any case is to give no credit to modern medical science (which, incidentally, is seen as a very mixed bag of tricks); rather it is to testify proudly to some inner drive within the child. If a child succombs to *dentição* (teething) and dies, it is said that it was the *força de dentes* (the power of the emerging teeth) that overcame the little person. The folk

intestinal illness gasto is an always fatal pediatric disease because the infant's body offers no resistence, and is quickly reduced to a hollow tube or a sieve. Whatever goes into the infant comes out directly in violent bouts of vomiting and diarrhea. The infant incomes "gasto"--spent, wasted, used up, his vital energy gone. The etiological system and body imagery used here can be seen as a microcosm of the hierarchical social order in which strength, force and power win out.

When asked in general why babies and young children of O Cruzeiro die, mothers project the struggle onto the social and political arena. Mothers say: They die because we are poor; because we are hungry; because the water we drink is filthy; because we have no "conditions" to rear healthy children; because we have no safe place to leave them when we go off to work; because we get worthless medical care.

When asked what it is that infants need most in order to survive the first year of life, the Alto mothers in my sample invariably answered "good food, proper nutrition, milk, vitamins." I soon became bored with its concreteness. The irony, however, was that not a single mother had stated that either a lack of food or insufficient milk was a primary or even a contributing cause of death for any of her own children. Perhaps they must exercise this denial because the alternative--the recognition that a child is slowly starving to death--is too painful.

Infant Feeding: Decline of Breastfeeding

A fairly direct correlation has been established between infant survival and breastfeeding in the developing world. The recognition that the transition from breast to bottle and finger foods is a period of great risk for the child certainly contributed to this conclusion. Yet it is also widely documented that each generation of new mothers in the Third World is less likely to nurse their offspring. This is especially true among rural migrants to urban centers where the kinds of work available to women are inimical to successful breastfeeding, where there are strong pressures to abandon traditional ethnomedical beliefs and practices, and where powdered milk is one of the most readily available commercial foods, sold in large economical sacks as well as in tins.

Alto de Cruzeiro mothers of the current generation use the breast as an early and not very dependable supplement to the staple infant food called mingau, a thin gruel of fine manioc flour, sugar, water and powdered milk that is cooked for several minutes. Mingau could be offered to an infant as early as the second day of life, and was invariably introduced by the second week. Alto mothers are very responsive to infant cries, but do not necessarily equate crying with hunger. A crying infant will be picked up, spoken to, sniffed lovingly (kisses are thought inappropriate to babies) and then, frequently, handed over to another household member. If it is close to "feeding time" (see below for explanation), the infant will be given mingau first, and then only after he or she has taken his full will the breast be given if, that is, it is offered at all.

Many young Alto mothers cannot afford sufficient quantities of commercial powdered milk to make mingau, and in these cases they either sharply decrease the amount of powdered milk or eliminate it altogether from the formula. A thicker, grosser substitute, called papa, is made from manioc flour, sugar and water. Alto mothers recognize that not all infants can tolerate mingau or papa, and when a first crisis of diarrhea or vomiting occurs, attempts are made to substitute rice or corn starch for the offending manioc. In very severe cases of gasto the infant will be taken off mingau entirely and given mild herbal teas. No mother in my sample reported using breastmilk as an alternative when mingau and papa offended an infant. Total weaning from the breast is completed as early as the second week, and only rarely any later than the third month of the infant's life. First and earlier born children are more often breastfed than later born children, and more than one-third of all children represented in the sample were never breastfed at all. These later "bottle babies" were, with very few exceptions, born within the past decade, and virtually all were born in the municipal hospital.

This contemporary pattern deviates markedly from the infant care and feeding practices of the oldest women in the sample (55+ years), all of whom reared their children on rural engenhos and fazendas where breastfeeding and women's work were less incompatible, and where cow's milk was plentiful and free to plantation and farm workers as part of the traditional and informal terms of rural labor in the Northeast. The older women had commonly breastfed their babies for at least one year and as many as four years. Mingaus and papas, made from whole fresh cow's milk was even than an integral part of the baby's diet, but they were introduced later (rarely before six months) and were used as a supplement to maternal milk in such a manner that few of the oldest women in the sample could recall problems with an insufficient milk supply.

Nonetheless, the radical erosion of breastfeeding witnessed among this small sample of mothers occurred during a very brief historical period. Eighteen years ago when I first lived and worked on Alto do Cruzeiro, breastfeeding was still normative, and the only readily available powdered milk substitute was distributed freely under the Food for Peace Program. The women of the Alto readily accepted the milk (which I myself distributed weekly), but told me that they only used it for their older children and for cooking. There was a rather elaborate mythology surrounding the powdered milk, only parts of which I recall today. I do remember, however, that the American powdered milk was thought to be produced from plants, and that it sometimes made infants blind, and that it could even kill babies. I thought that the Alto women were certainly mistaken and I encouraged the use of the powdered skimmed milk (minus Vitamin A), as did the health post doctors, hospital workers and many political and ecclesiastical leaders of Ladeiras, each for our own somewhat self-serving ends. This was long before I and others in the town learned about "night blindness" caused by Vitamin A deficiency.

Similar Food for Peace powdered milk campaigns were waged during the 1960s throughout the interior of Northeast Brazil and these contributed, at least in part, to the current situation of what I can only call "powdered milk dependency" among rural and urban migrant women. Nestle nd other commercialized versions of powdered milk merely stepped into the vacuum created when Food for Peace milk was no longer available by the early 1970s. I doubt that the free foods ever did very much to foster international understanding and peace, but they certainly fostered future profits for multinational corporations like Nestle. The ultimate irony is that only two decades later Brazil has belatedly launched a national breastfeeding promotion campaign that seems to have achieved some limited success among the educated middle classes in São Paulo (see Hardy et al., 1982), but which has not penetrated to the poor, rural and migrant populations, like those of Alto do Cruzeiro, at all.

The question remains, however, why did women of the Alto (impervious to most public health campaigns) so readily give up their original resistence to powdered milk? How were they turned into consumers of a product that they do not need and which they cannot afford, and which, I suggest, significantly contributes to the high infant mortality of the community? If we return to the reproductive histories and the mothers' own explanations of their behaviors, we have a few clues. The younger mothers stated time and again that they had not so much "weaned" their infants as they had simply run out of milk. Gussler and Briesmeister (1980) cite a number of surveys (including a World Health Organization study of infant feeding patterns in nine countries) which indicate that, worldwide, "insufficient milk" is given by mothers as the most common reason for discontinuing breastfeeding. Breast milk insufficiency was not necessarily correlated with presumed undernutrition of the mothers, since women in urban and industrialized areas characterized by adequate nutrition (such as the United Kingdom) were even more likely than women in underdeveloped areas to complain of insufficient milk.

I challenged the younger and seemingly more healthy mothers on their explanatory model: "Your own mothers had no difficulties in breastfeeding; why yourselves?" One mother responded defensively. "Look," she said, pointing to her breast. "They can suck and suck all they want, and all they will get from me is blood." "But why?" I insisted. She replied, "Because we are weak, totally finished (acabada), spent, wasted, no good. We have nothing left to give our babies, not even our own milk."

A second explanatory model offered by mothers to account for early weaning was that the child had rejected the breast. Here the explanations focused on the many negative evaluations mothers have of their own milk. I was told by dozens of the younger mothers that their breast milk was "no good," and for many different reasons. The milk was either "salty" or "bitter" or "watery" or "sour" or "infected" or "dirty" or "diseased." In all, breast milk was commonly seen as unfit for the infant, and therefore it is not surprising that the babies so often rejected the breast. My research assistant, Irene, herself an Alto mother, explained to me that if an infant dies suddenly before it is baptized, mothers take some consolation in the belief that an unbaptized infant, if it had never been breastfed, still stands a chance of going directly to heaven as a little angel because original sin is transmitted to the "bexinha" (the little animal) through the very carnal act of sucking.

With breast milk so seemingly inadequate and qualitatively disvalued, it is obvious that many Alto mothers will readily seek the alternative of mingaus, papas, and powdered milk despite its cost and the frequency with which many infants sicken on it. But what, then, accounts for the near universal negative evaluation of breast milk among the younger women in my sample? Do these women deceive themselves about the quantity and quality of their own milk and their ability to adequately nurse their babies? Certainly women living in even more marginal areas of the world continue to breastfeed their children adequately, even during periods of widespread food shortages when the mothers are, themselves, malnourished.

I am, first of all, convinced that the young mothers in my sample do, indeed, run out of milk for reasons to be explained below. I am, however, less convinced that they correctly perceive all the negative attributes of their breast milk, although rather frequent breast infections in the population probably contribute, in some cases, to the perception of their milk as salty, diseased and infected. The negative evaluations of their milk as sour, thin, and bitter, however, spring from a more psychological source. I was, for example, surprised to discover that many young Alto mothers are as unfamiliar with the natural quality of breast milk as are many urban, middle-class American women (see Scheper-Hughes, 1973). One young mother demonstrated the point that her milk was "weak" by showing me how thin, watery and "blue" it was, so unlike rich and creamy goat's and cow's milk, not to mention the thick paste-like papa which mothers trust will more readily quiet a seemingly insatiable and disturbing hungry infant's cries.

These young Brazilian mothers are (like their urban "sisters" in the United States) heir to some of the more iatrogenic aspects of "modernization"--i.e., the loss of traditional "mother wit" and ethnomedical pediatric beliefs and practices through exposure to "modern" (largely American) pediatric conceptions. Virtually all the younger mothers in my sample spoke with all the authority of dated pediatric textbooks of the importance of scheduled infant feedings ("un horario certo"), of the expectations that an infant would learn to sleep through the night, and of the necessity of introducing solid foods such as mashed bananas, vitaminas (meaning a "health food" drink of fruits, ice and a great deal of sugar blended into a pulp), and cereals as soon as possible. While these once standard American pediatric notions and practices have obvious advantages, especially for working mothers in a fairly affluent industrialized society, they can only be described as iatrogenic and maladaptive in the Brazilian shantytown context. Each of these pediatric notions deviates from the biological conditions necessary to the development of an adequate milk supply during the crucial first few weeks following birth when frequent, uninterrupted and "on demand" sucking not only triggers the hormones related to milk production but also helps to establish the psychobiological reciprocity between mother and infant that makes nursing a mutually satisfying experience. In self-consciously modernizing rural towns like Ladeiras where acculturation pressures are particularly strong and where traditional ethnomedical beliefs and practices are criticized and ridiculed by doctors, nurses, pharmacists and schoolteachers, young mothers soon learn to conform to urban mores, and to discredit the hesitant suggestions of their mothers and rural women migrants of their generation. In this way the whole "culture" of breastfeeding is lost within a single generation.

One result of the above process is the "insufficient milk syndrome," a social and biomedical artifact. When their milk supply begins to radically decrease (because it was never fully established in the first place), the women of the Alto are fully prepared to blame themselves--it is because they are weak, diseased, no good. Nursing failure plays into and reinforces these young women's already deeply eroded sense of self-worth and self-sufficiency. What has been taken from these very poor and, I dare to say, exploited "soldiers" of the urban industrial reserve army, is their belief in the "inner goodness." Among mothers this inner goodness is most immediately symbolized in the autonomous act of suckling a newborn. When this milk of human kindness is scanty or is perceived by nursing mothers as curdled, bitter and sour, it is only a metaphor for the bitterness of their own lives. In addition to many other factors, a psychology of deprivation contributes to nursing failure and hence to infant mortality in this highly stressed human community.

Ethnoeugenics: Medical Selective Neglect

The only evidence of a form of maternal selective neglect to emerge from the reproductive histories and interviews was related to mothers' responses to a category of childhood illnesses that are greatly feared and which therefore mothers do not actively seek to treat. These sicknesses are referred to by a generic term--"sickness of the child" (doença da crianca or doença do menino)--in order to avoid repeating the actual and anxiety-producing names of the many folk illnesses subsumed under the term. A child believed to be suffering from a doença da criança is best left to die a gradual death "a mingua," meaning a child allowed to wither away without care or attention.

Doença da crianca refers to any sicknesses which, while not necessarily life-threatening, are believed likely to leave a mother with a permanently disabled child: crippled, mad, epileptic, or severely retarded. The symptoms that immediately alert mothers are fits and convulsions, extreme lethargy and passivity, retarded verbal or motor development (e.g., a child who neither speaks nor is able to walk by age two), a bizarre animal-like or ghost-like physical appearance, social withdrawal and fear of normal interaction, disanimation and lack of energy. The etiology is multicausal. Teething is thought to produce many of these symptoms, as is pasmo (magical fright), evil eye (olhado), or even severe gastroenteritis. A rather mundane case of teething or measles can turn into doença da crianca if the necessary ritual and folk medical precautions (resguardas) are broken by the mother.

What prompts a folk diagnosis by mothers of a doença da crianca seems to be a host of very severe symptoms that place the child beyond hope of a normal recovery. So a mother simply shakes her head and says, "Nao teve jeito" ("there was no solution") and everyone understands. Thirty-nine children were said to have died of a doença da crianca, but the folk explanation may be inferred in other cases where untreated diarrheas, sustos, and "teething" were said to be the causes of death. The following statements are illustrative:

> There are two diseases we don't like to talk about because they are the ugliest things in the world. So we just say "doenca da crianca" and leave it at that. One of these is what some people call "gotas de serena" (literally "evening mist") which is a kind of madness, like rabies in a dog. The other is pasmo, a kind of paralysis that the child gets from a bad shock. His skin turns black and he just sits there still and dumb in the hammock, really lifeless. We are afraid of these sicknesses of the child. It is best to leave them die. (Interview #11).

> Doença da crianca? It's the same thing as malfabria (literally an "evil-made" thing), a sickness that is ugly, ugly. People don't want to take care of such a child. They don't want to treat it. There may be a cure that the doctors know of, but we would be afraid to give the medicine because a child with this sickness is never right again. He will grow up twisted and lame or crazy. Sometimes they have fits in the middle of the

street. No poor person can take care of a child like that. (Interview #17)

(Doença da crianca) can come from many different things. It can come from a fright the child has, but also from dirty laundry, or from strong germs that enter through the fingernails. Look, we don't like talking about all this. We don't mention its name. We are afraid of calling it up. (Interview #34)

If the symptoms occur very early in a child's life, he may not be baptized or given a name until death is inevitable and a hurried private baptism without ceremony is accomplished. It appears that the mothers themselves decide on the ultimate fitness of their babies, although a female relative or neighbor may occasionally intervene on behalf of such a child and ask to adopt it. Nilza spoke fondly of her now seven-year-old "filha de criacão" (adopted daughter):

She was a sight! A real monkey but without any hair, and skinny like this (she holds up her pinky). She was a nasty thing, too. She didn't like to be bothered by anyone. I thought to myself, here's a child not even a mother could love! They said she had one of those ugly diseases, but I thought, what do I care? I lost all of my children, and I could see that she was not going to live in that house. So I said to her mother, "Dona Maria, give me that girl of yours and let me see if I can't raise her. You won't even miss her, and I have pity on her, poor little thing." And look, did you ever see a prettier thing? I have never regretted it. She's never given me a moment of trouble.

It became readily apparent to me the more I heard mothers describe the traits and characteristics of doença da crianca that they were often describing symptoms produced by malnutrition and parasitic infections interacting with physical and psychological neglect. The more malnourished the baby, the more lethargic and less responsive the child was, and consequently the more likely he or she would be left alone for long periods of time on the dirt or cement floor of the house or in his hammock. Untreated diarrheas and dehydration contributed to the child's social withdrawal, the disinterest in food, the inability to balance a bloated belly on spindly legs, and the failure to imitate sounds. High fevers often produce the fit-like convulsions that many mothers perceive to be harbingers of future madness or epilepsy. Because such marasmic children are so quiet and make so few demands, mothers are able to withdraw their attention and affections and to "distance" themselves from what appears to be a less than fully human creature. I saw many such children left in their hammocks while their mothers were gone, working in their roçados (garden plots) outside the town or washing clothes in the schistosome-infested river. The small child or neighbor woman who is requested to check in on the baby from time to time is often not within earshot when the baby's feeble cries signal a final crisis, and it dies alone and unattended, "a mingua," as people say.

Conclusions

There are many conditions on the Alto do Cruzeiro that are hostile to child survival. Most serious are the ones I scarcely mentioned here: the lack of uncontaminated water; unchecked infectious disease; the lack of day care facilities for working mothers; the absence of minimally adequate and free medical care. I chose, instead, to focus on aspects of maternal beliefs and behaviors that may also contribute to infant and childhood mortality in order to address the indignities and inhumanities forced upon poor, migrant women who must at times make choices and decisions that no woman and mother should have to make. It should be clear from the foregoing that the "selective neglect" of children is a direct consequence of the "selective neglect" of their mothers who have been excluded from participating in the "Economic Miracle" of Brazil. Studies of the pathogenic effects of urbanization and capitalist industri-

alization on women's lives have tended to focus on the public sphere (the factory and the workplace) to the neglect of the private and domestic sphere. It is hoped that others may follow the example offered in this paper and begin to study the home as the locus where human relations are most immediately and profoundly affected by economic processes.

Table 1

Reproductive Histories Summary

N = 72 women
Ages 19-71
Median age = 39

Total Pregnancies	686 (9.5/woman)	
Total Living Children	329 (4.5/woman)	
Deaths (birth-5 years)	254 (3.5/woman)	
Deaths (6-12 years)	5	
Stillbirths	13	98 (1.4/woman)
Miscarriages, Abortions	85	

Table 2

Ages at Death (Birth-5 years)

N = 254 deaths

Postpartum (1 day-2 weeks)	39 (15%)	209 (82%)
15 days-3 months	90 (36%)	
4 months-6 months	49 (20%)	
7 months-1 year	31 (12%)	
13 months-2 years	26 (10%)	
25 months-5 years	19 (07%)	

Table 3

Causes of Infant/Childhood Deaths
(Mothers' Explanations)

N = 254 deaths (birth-5 years)

I. Naturalistic (locus of responsibility: natural forces)		
A. Gastroenteric		
disenteria (dysentery, simple)	43	
disenteria (plus other complications)	16	
intestina ("hot intestines")	12	
(see also gasto under III)		
B. Infectious, Communicable		
serampo (measles)	18	
fevers (various)	10	
grippe (colds, flus, chills)	5	
other (including hepatitis, smallpox)	8	
C. "Teething"		
dentição (teething, simple)	10	
dentição (plus other complications)	3	
(see also dentes recolhidos under III)		
D. Naturalistic: Other		
carocos, pareba (various skin lesions resulting from "hot blood" when infant is exposed to the sun)	6	
enxacão (child "swells up")	5	
anemia or "white" sickness	2	
		Total 138
II. Supernaturalistic (locus of responsibility: God, fate, destiny)		
A. Fraquesa (born weak, dying) (includes 3 sets of twins, 1 set of triplets)	33	
B. Born without the will or desire to suck or with "desgosto" (aversion) to milk, food or nuture	4	
C. De repente (died suddenly, taken by God/saints without warning)	9	
D. Castigo (born weak, sickly and dies as a divine punishment for sins of the mother)	3	Total 49

Table 3 (continued)

III. Social Relational/Personalistic (locus of responsibility: humans, including primary caretaker)		
A. Malignant emotions (uncontrolled envy, fright, anger, sadness)		
olhado (evil eye, envy)	5	
susto/choque (fright or shock to a mother, her fetus, or an infant, often resulting from anger and discord among family members)	12	
(see also pasmo below)		
B. Resguardo quebrado (death resulting from broken "precautions" necessary to sustain life of mother and infant during liminal periods)		
postpartum precautions broken	2	
measles precautions broken	3	
C. Mal trato (death resulting from poor care due to uncontrollable events: poverty, frailty of the mother, poor medical care)	6	
D. Ethnoeugenic: medical "selective neglect" (infant or child is said to have died without care through a gradual withdrawal of attention, love, and routine care because of a sickness that will leave a child mentally or physically disabled)		
doença da crianca, doença do menino (various qualities including all those "ugly childhood diseases" such as gasto, a rapid wasting away; dentes recolhidos, emerging teeth retracting into the gums; pasmo, a crippling disease caused by shock; and malfabria, a kind of madness)	39	
	Total	67

Notes

[1]For a fuller discussion of the history and structure of Northeast Brazilian plantation economy, see Andrade, 1980; de Castro, 1969; Forman, 1975; Goodman, 1977; Moraes, 1970; Palmeira, 1979.

[2]It is my guess that the women in the sample have underreported miscarriages, abortions and stillbirths both from natural forgetfulness as well as perhaps a reluctance to discuss illegal abortions.

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Up from Slavery:
Expanding Work Opportunities for Latin American Women

Evelyn P. Stevens

I have titled this paper "Up from Slavery" because I want to begin with a discussion of the lowest of low occupations, the one that most nearly approximates slavery in the modern world: female domestic service. I am tempted to place a question mark after the title, for reasons that will be seen as the discussion proceeds. The nearest thing to this type of work for men is agricultural peonage, but even in that case, a man has the advantage of going home after a hard, long, day's work, being waited on by his wife, and even beating her to relieve his frustrations.

Relatively few individuals in any given population are free to abstain from seeking paid work for at least part of their lives. Data collected by Elizaga (1974) indicate that the mean number of years worked by Latin American women between the ages of 15 and 65 is low compared with the participation rates of women in other regions generally and particularly in the industrialized nations. But work means different things to different people, at different times and in different political, geographic, or cultural areas.

Each of the Latin American nations varies in some ways from all of the others, and many of the variations make it difficult to generalize about even such a universal phenomenon as the subject of this paper. Where appropriate, the particular area to which a datum refers will be mentioned by name. But even within the same city, wide differences can be observed. In one case, I noted that a female servant was required to wash the family automobile as part of her everyday work, while a mile away, in a collective of professional women, the domestic employee was treated as an equal compañera in every respect.

From the historical perspective it might be appropriate to confine the discussion of the <u>development</u> of work opportunities for Latin American women to the period beginning about 1950, that is, the post-World War II era. The first decade of that era, 1950-1960, marked a watershed in modernization of Latin American economies, beginning with a dramatic and continuing decline in the importance of agricultural production as a proportion of the total GNP and growth of other sectors of the economy. The decline of agriculture is reflected in another phenomenon: an increasingly heavy flow of internal migration <u>within</u> Latin American nations, especially rural-urban migration; and, according to Orlansky and Dubrovsky, the predominance of women in that move from the countryside to the towns and cities.

I have chosen to start my description of women's work by referring to the fact that the

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number of women employed as domestic servants, expressed as a percentage of all women in non-agricultural employment, is far greater in Latin America than in Asia or Africa (Orlansky and Dubrovsky, Youssef, Dixon, Beck and Keddie). Rubbo and Taussig have commented that

> live-in female servants form such an important part of many Third World societies as to almost merit thinking of them as servant-based societies, founded on a servant "mode of production." Domestic service forms a main occupation for lower class women. The middle and upper classes are dependent on their female servants for the intimacies of their daily care, leisure, and stylish existence. Above all, this institution is important in actively reproducing the basic patterns of oppression that disfigure these neocolonial societies as a whole.

The living and working conditions of female domestic servants have often been the cause of horrified astonishment for people from First World nations living in Latin America. Traditionally, the woman servant, especially of the live-in kind, was treated as a slave. In cities such as Cali, Colombia, and Lima, Peru, for a miserable wage and a miserable room or "cell" under the stairs, next to the kitchen, or even a shack on the roof (Rubbo and Taussig, 1977; Smith, 1974), and food consisting mainly of leftovers from the family meals, a servant was (and still is, in many areas) expected to rise early, prepare meals and snacks for the family, wash dishes and do the laundry, clean the house, run errands, and be at the beck and call of all the family members, including the children. She will have no regular working hours and will consider herself lucky if she has one regular day a week of free time. In addition, if she is young and even minimally attractive, she is likely to be the object of sexual advances from the "master" of the house and from any male children over the age of twelve who are encouraged by their father to "get experience" by practicing on the maid. If she becomes pregnant she may find herself summarily discharged by the "mistress" of the house (International Center, page 61).

I should point out here that this description portrays a "worst case" situation. It resembles the conditions that were almost universal until quite recently. Many women servants in large cities today have learned to protect themselves to some extent from the worst abuses, and legislation adopted in some countries is aimed at eliminating some of those abuses. But most of the conditions just described can still be found in areas outside of the large cities.

Foreign women, to whom I referred as being horrified by these conditions, also employ female servants. They often pay them twice or three times as much as do the local employers, and provide them with decent living quarters, ample food, regular days "off" and more courteous treatment than the local people, who complain that "the foreigners are spoiling the girls." (All female servants are referred to as girls, regardless of their age.) Nevertheless, the mistress-servant relationship under the prevailing conditions in Latin America exerts an insidious influence on foreign women. They view themselves as extraordinarily generous employers and get accustomed to having even the smallest tasks performed for them, so that when they must return to their home countries they make every effort to take their servants with them. If they are unable to do so for legal or other reasons, the deprivation often causes discontent and temporary depression. An acquaintance of mine, a businessman who had lived in Mexico for many years, complained to me that although he wanted to retire and return to Paris, his French wife objected strongly to the prospect of giving up her leisurely existence.

Although working conditions for women servants are still bad, there are indications that change--even some improvement--is taking place (International Center; Wiarda, Lomnitz). Upper-middle-class families have always been able to afford more than one servant, each specialized in a particular type of work, such as cook, laundress, housemaid, and nursemaid--the four basic types. But it is now quite difficult for affluent families to obtain a full complement of

domestic help.

Wages are rising, in some cases faster than inflation; experienced servants are demanding and getting better treatment, and middle-class families in large cities are encountering increasing difficulty in finding a "muchacha" to work as the household drudge. In the large cities especially, servants are learning how to bargain, as knowledge of their relative scarcity and commensurately higher worth spreads through the informal information network described, for example, by Smith.

In very general terms we can describe the entry into domestic service, the trajectory through it, and the exit from it in the following sequence. Studies show that most servants in large cities come from the ranks of recent migrants. They are young, predominantly between the ages of 17 and 24 years (although some begin as young as 12 years) and they come from smaller towns or even villages, arriving with few work skills and little knowledge of alternative employment opportunities which, in any case, are few for unskilled workers. They get their first job at the lowest end of the work scale, that is, in households where the pay is least and the conditions most oppressive. They learn what is expected of them and how to negotiate for and obtain positions in other households that offer higher pay and better working conditions. At the end of about seven years they leave domestic service to establish families or to take up another kind of work.

At a conference on economic modernization held in the 1950s, the keynote speaker observed that one of the first signs of incipient industrialization was the widespread complaint of middle-class women about the inability to find "good" (that is, docile, hard-working, low-paid) servants. The reason for this was--and still is--the expansion of opportunities for other types of employment. This expansion is a result of what Singelmann and Tienda call the sectoral transformation of employment in postwar Latin America; that is, the diversification of economic activity from a commodity export base into (1) manufacturing, (2) distributive and producer services, and (3) social and personal services. These structural changes favor an increase in the number of women employed in other than domestic service occupations.

In order to simplify--perhaps oversimplify--a very complex set of interrelated factors, we might note that the effects of industrialization on women's employment vary widely from country to country. Thus almost any generalization is vulnerable to challenge in a number of particular cases. Still, it is possible to state that increasing numbers of women are finding work as operators in newly established light industries such as food preparation and clothing manufacture; in producer services such as clerical and sales work; in personal services in other than domestic work; and in social services such as paramedical occupations, elementary school teaching, and others.

We noted earlier that women who work as domestic servants usually begin at about age 17 and drop out at about age 24. This is also true of women in some other kinds of work, for example, those in the maquiladora plants in Mexico (Fernandez) where employers find ways of terminating the women's employment before they achieve legally prescribed guarantees of job benefits such as pension rights, seniority preference, etc. But even if such practices were not prevalent, the participation rate of women in the labor market might still reflect a decrease after age 24 because of the general tendency of Latin American married women to drop out of the formal labor market.

Where do older women go? Many enter one of the various forms of marriage and establish families, but their need for earning money seldom ceases with such a development. Former domestic workers often enter the informal labor market as small-scale entrepreneurs, marketing some of the skills they have acquired in food preparation, sewing, laundering, or child care under flexible working conditions that they can adapt to the needs of their families (Arizpe, Lomnitz, Lobo). In some cases, if they can make arrangements for care of their own children, they may return to the market as "day ladies," that is, "puertas afuera," returning each evening to their own homes to continue the round of tasks that make up the other half of their

double day.

If the structural transformation of the Latin American economies follows the evolutionary pattern observed in the more advanced industrial nations, two effects can be predicted:

(1) There will be an increasing demand for skilled women workers, especially in categories 2 and 3 referred to by Singelmann and Tienda; and,

(2) Because of inflationary pressures on family incomes, more women will remain in the formal labor force after marriage.

In the Latin American nations whose economies showed high rates of growth during the decade 1960-1970, there was a significant rise in the number of years worked by women. If and when those nations recover from their current economic regression, it may be expected that the employment figures for all women will show a corresponding increase, to around 25 to 28% of the total adult female population. However, the diversification of economic activity as described by Singelmann and Tienda will least benefit women of the lowest economic strata unless opportunies for education and training are made available for them.

It would appear that the women likely to benefit most from the expansion of opportunities will be those of the lower middle class with more than eight years of formal schooling and resident in major urban areas. Fernandez gives the example of the application form for employment in a maquiladora plant which requires a comparatively high level of education. Educational levels in Latin America continue in the low ranges, and levels for women lag behind those for men. Women with less than five years of education, who have only basic homemaking skills, will still be at a disadvantage in the labor market; their choices will continue to be severely limited.

Unless educational opportunities for women are expanded, men will continue to benefit most from the modernization of Latin American economies, thus tending to confirm aspects of Boserup's thesis. Like women in similar situations in more advanced industrial nations, they may find it necessary to work as "day ladies" for middle class families. Because of the need for their services, they will be able to demand and get better working conditions and pay than their counterparts of former years. They will still be at the bottom of the heap, but they will have risen somewhat from abject slavery.

It is in the large cities that the demand for female labor in the expanding sectors of the economy can be seen. Inflationary pressures are beginning to force more and more women of middle-class families out of the home and into the workforce. What we are beginning to see is a shift of the burden of housework onto the employed middle-class housewife and grown daughters--a creep upward of the double day. There is a corresponding gentrification of housework reflected in more purchases of electrical appliances to help make that work less physically taxing.

As these pressures become greater we can expect to see increasing discontent on the part of these middle-class women. There will be attempts to alleviate the problem by more "eating out" at fast food establishments, where women formerly seeking jobs as servants will find employment.

If the economies of Latin American nations resume their expansion, we can expect to see within the remaining years of this century a new consciousness in middle-class women of their disadvantaged status vis-a-vis the men of their class. When that happens we may see a ground swell in the direction of what has been called "women's liberation" in the highly industrialized countries.

PART IV

WOMEN AND INDUSTRIAL WORK IN THE THIRD WORLD: CASE STUDIES FROM AFRICA, ASIA, LATIN AMERICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST

Women and Work in Nigeria: An Historical Perspective

Nina E. Mba

The Pre-Colonial Period

It is generally appreciated that the effects of colonialism and modernization upon women in any society cannot be assessed without an understanding of the position of women in the pre-colonial period of that society. However, there is a tendency to project an image of women in a "traditional/pre-colonial" society which is pictured as static and then contrast it with the image of women in a fast-changing colonized society. What is not generally appreciated is that the pre-colonial societies were not static but were often undergoing internally generated changes resulting in basic structural modifications. Furthermore, even within one major ethnic group there was such variety of social, political and economic organizations that it is sometimes misleading to present a "model" society.

The position of women in pre-colonial Nigerian societies altered over time, in response to changing historical circumstances, and varied considerably between and within ethnic groups. For instance, among the Yoruba, the division of economic activities was related to the settlement pattern. The Yoruba lived in towns with the farmlands some distance beyond the walls of the town. These areas were under periodic threat of attack and therefore farming could not be left to other than those who also had the responsibility for defending the society against attack, that is, the men.

Farming was done by the men with the women only assisting in the harvesting while women were engaged in marketing in the local town markets. Long distance trade was undertaken by both men and women who traveled in caravans for protection. Up to the end of the 18th century, the Oyo kingdom dominated Yorubaland. A few women, on the basis of birth into the royal lineages, were involved in the Oyo palace administration and rites but not with the economically profitable trade outside Oyo which was controlled by the male palace chiefs.

The Yoruba wars of the early 19th century not only transformed the political structures of Oyo and the other existing states but led to the creation of the new states of Ibadan and Abeokuta. In these new states, chiefs wielded more executive power than the Oba (king) and chiefs were appointed on merit rather than lineage affiliation. Military prowess was far more esteemed than royal birth. Where women were able to contribute to military strength and success, they also were rewarded by enhanced political power. The protracted warfare provided much greater economic opportunities for women traders. Arms and supplies for the soldiers had to be provided, often by trading with the Europeans in Lagos. A number of Ibadan and Abeokuta

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women rose to the occasion and became leading traders in their societies.

The achievements of the two most famous of these women, Efunsetan in Ibadan and Tinubu in Abeokuta, have been documented (Biobaku, 1957 and 1966; Awe, 1974; Johnson, 1921). Both were bestowed with the title Iyalode, the female equivalent of the highest warrior title, in recognition of their contributions to the defense and strength of their towns. It was the period of historical change which made it possible for outstanding women to gain unprecedented economic power, rewarded with political power.

In contrast to the Yoruba, among the hinterland Igbo it was the women who generally did the farming. The men farmed only yams; the women planted their own crops such as vegetables, coco-yam and cassava. Women produced palm oil, salt and cotton cloth and traded in the local markets, while men controlled the long distance trade. But among the riverain Igbo on both sides of the Niger River, the situation approximated much more to that of the Yoruba. There the women did no farming but controlled the markets and dominated long distance trade while men did the farming.

Like the Yoruba and Igbo, before the early 19th century, Hausa women were farmers and traders. The Islamization of Northern Nigeria after the Fulbe conquest of the Hausa states in the early 19th century resulted in the gradual introduction of the seclusion of women (Kulle) among the elite, thus leading to the withdrawal of elite women into the "hidden trade" of household activities (Hill, 1969).

The Colonial Period

The introduction of the externally oriented economy from the early 20th century accelerated some existing indigenous tendencies and transformed the division of labor between men and women. In Northern Nigeria, the process of seclusion of wives spread from the elite to the majority of Muslim Hausa. The economic diversification and expansion in the colonial economy made it possible for many more men to afford to keep their wives in seclusion. Seclusion became a sign of economic affluence and accordingly, as M. Smith (1954:22) observes, was sought by the women themselves, who no longer wished to farm. Moreover, as Hill (1969:398) points out, women in Kulle engaged in domestic production which was very profitable. However, because of seclusion, the women did not invest this wealth in the world outside the house. Instead the profits were directed to conspicuous consumerism (Cohen, 1969:64).

The ways in which the pre-colonial sex division of economic roles was altered will now be examined according to economic sectors.

Agriculture. The colonial government promoted the improved and extended production of those cash crops needed for the metropolitan market, such as cocoa and rubber (Western Region), kola nuts and groundnuts (Northern Region), and palm produce (Eastern Region). Plantations were set up for production of cocoa and cocoa growing, and trade became a source of rapid wealth. Since traditionally the men, not the women, were the farmers in Yorubaland, it was the men who took over the production of cocoa whether on plantations or on their private farms. Cocoa production and the marketing of cocoa for export became a male preserve.

Even in areas where women traditionally were the farmers, the colonial administration ignored the women and directed its investment in agriculture (in terms of subsidies, extension services, provision of fertilizers, etc.) towards men. A new form of division of labor by sex in agriculture developed whereby women did subsistence farming of low productivity and profitability while men were engaged in cash farming of high productivity. The channeling of assistance and mechanization towards cash farming meant that the work load of men remained constant or was reduced while the work load of women was increased (Boserup, 1965). New agricultural technologies, credit facilities and training were reserved for men, yet it was the men who initially migrated in large numbers to the urban areas to take up new employment. The fact that, throughout Nigeria, ownership of land was vested in men and that women had only

usufruct, also handicapped women's farming. Since the British colonial administration insulated the Muslim North from the socioeconomic changes in the South, there was no breakdown of the seclusion of women. Hausa women did not return to agriculture. This remains so in the present.[1]

Food Processing/Production. There were two main areas of food processing which women had controlled in the pre-colonial economy: the production of gari from cassava by women throughout Southern Nigeria and the production of palm oil from palm kernels by Igbo and Ibidio women. When the colonial market economy made these two areas lucrative ones and demanded higher production and greater efficiency, women were displaced by men from the "commanding heights" of the production. With palm oil, this displacement began from the early 19th century when palm produce started to replace the slave trade as the major export to Europe. Women still largely carried out the actual extraction of the oil and sold the oil in local markets, but the men took over the long distance and external trade in palm oil. However, in most areas the women retained the palm kernels which were used for household consumption and in local trading (Ukegbu, 1974:31-36).

The colonial administration tried to increase the output of palm oil, which was required by the metropolitan economy, by mechanizing the production process, first by nut cracking machines and hand presses (from about 1912 until the 1930s) and then by oil mills in the 1940s. The mills, operated by steam, used the shells of the kernels as fuel. Therefore, the women were faced with the prospect of losing their trade in kernels as well as the oil. From 1946 until 1952 there were mass demonstrations by women in Eastern Nigeria against the installation of oil mills (Mba, 1982:105-114). The women were not opposed to mechanization as such--in fact at Ndiya, Uyo division, the women proposed to the district officer that the mill be owned or run by women using the hired labor of men (Mba, 1982:108)--but to the interference by men in their traditional economic sphere and to the loss of a measure of their economic independence. However, this resistance to modernization was ultimately futile in the face of the irrevocable mechanization of the production process.

The women's opposition finally ended because they found that the mills left them with more time for farm work and, being freed from the labor of processing oil, they were able to enter into more diversified trading activity. That is, women abandoned the attempt to preserve their traditional economic role. They continued to produce palm oil in areas where there were no mills but only for subsistence, not commercial trade. The new technology had been appropriated by men, for their own advantage, instead of being utilized for the benefit of the women.[2]

Cassava was grown by Igbo and Ibibio women and was very popular because of its ease of production. Furthermore, it provided another staple crop which could replace yams during the famine period. It could be used for trade as well as consumption. P.V. Ottenberg described cassava for Afikpo women as a "symbol of women's independence and potential wealth" (1958:9). In Yorubaland, cassava was grown by the men since women did not farm, but as it was largely the women who carried out the processing of cassava into a coarse powder (gari), "it led to a closer identification of women with farming activities" (Agboola, 1968:384).

The growing of cassava was promoted by the colonial administration, not as an export crop but as a means of providing a cheap staple food for a rapidly growing urban population. As the gari trade became more profitable men began to trade in it. This tendency increased during World War II when, with government-imposed food and price controls, the gari trade became most lucrative. Women in Lagos and in Uyo province organized protests against government interference and competition by men (Mba, 1982). While they were successful in getting government controls eased, women lost their exclusive control over the retail trade in gari.

They also lost their control over production of gari. The mechanization of gari production has gone through several stages, as did the mechanization of palm oil, and likewise has displaced women. The traditional process of gari-making is long, arduous, very labor intensive, and the rate of production very low. The process had to start within three days after the

harvest of cassava by first peeling and washing the cassava tubers. The tubers were then reduced to pulp by grating them manually over perforated tin sheets. The pulp was put into bags and the water from the pulp was gradually removed by pressing the bags. The pulp was then sifted through baskets to remove coarse fibers and dried in clay pots over firewood. Finally the gari was put into bags. It has been estimated that average daily production rate per woman was 15 kg. of gari (Kaine, n.d.).

However, until after World War II, this method and rate of production satisfied the demand. Thereafter the rapid growth in population, especially in the urban areas, led to a consumption rate which exceeded production. The existing traditional methods were inadequate to meet the demand and, since gari production was becoming big business, several of the expatriate firms investigated means of mechanization. The first stage was the introduction of diesel engine grating machines. These machines required manual strength and technical competence to operate and much money to buy, so these machines ended up being owned and operated by men.

The second stage was the mechanization of the drying process by the use of a lorry hydraulic jack, which again ended up being operated by men only. That was the extent of mechanization until the 1970s when, through the work of Federal Government Research Institutes, several huge gari processing plants were set up in which nearly all phases are mechanized. These plants are owned either by foreign companies or by very wealthy Nigerian businessmen. Their cassava is supplied through huge plantations and the labor employed on the plantations and in the plants is mainly male, though generally women are still used in peeling the cassava (Kaine, n.d.). In other words, the more mechanized the production, the more women were excluded.

Markets/Trade. The colonial administration wrested control of the markets from the women's market associations and vested it in local or municipal councils. Thus the Omu (queens) in riverain Igbo areas not only lost control of the markets but were not even represented in the town councils.

In the early stages of colonialism, women traders, especially in the riverain areas of Eastern Nigeria, profited from the trade with the European firms who preferred to trade with women.[3] However, at the same time as the women traders in Onitsha were reaping the benefits of their contacts with the European firms, other forces were at work which were to undermine the women's ascendancy. Even within Onitsha itself, the traditional proscription on direct trading by men was gradually lifted. Men became produce buyers, and a few took up trading as a full-time occupation, taking space in the market to sell imported goods. Women resented their intrusion into an activity which had always been reserved for women, while other men taunted them for doing women's work. However, after the pioneers had demonstrated that trading could be a lucrative occupation for men, more and more of them entered the market.

Once Onitsha became a district headquarters in 1905, Igbo men from the interior came to Onitsha for jobs and to trade. These immigrant Igbo built up trading networks with their home towns which began to bypass the indigenous Onitsha women traders. The depression brought an influx of men to the distributive and retail trades, and the rise of professional men traders was greatly accelerated after World War II, when large numbers of ex-servicemen returned with some capital, eager to branch out on their own. They entered the import trade directly and succeeded in forcing some expatriate firms to stop trading in some imported items. The men traders showed greater initiative and innovativeness than the women traders. Igbo women traders were not as quick as men to respond to the shift in supplies from agricultural to manufactured goods; they were by and large traditional entrepreneurs holding to established trade practices. Profits were often used for their children's education rather than ploughed back into the business (Katzin, 1964:187).

Yoruba women traders held their own more than other Nigerian market women. They continued to exercise considerable control over the markets, especially in Lagos, and were represented in the Lagos town council. During the colonial period Lagos market women resisted successfully

attempts by the government and male chiefs to interfere with prices and distribution (Mba, 1982).

The colonial economy led to the development of a dual market system: one may be described as the internal market system and the other as the external market system. The latter was dominated by expatriate firms involved in the import-export of cash crops, raw materials and manufactured goods. The internal market system was controlled by indigenous men and women who were engaged in buying and selling, standardizing and grading produce, debulking, displaying merchandise, pricing, gathering and disseminating market information on supply and demand, establishing market rules, and extending credit to each other.

Mintz (1971:262) describes "the neat separation of the internal market system from the channels by which agricultural commodities reach the export houses," by which female traders in the internal markets were cut off from the marketing of export crops. In Lagos and Ibadan, Yoruba women traders continued to control the internal market system which expanded as a result of huge increases in population. As Mintz explains, the internal market systems may expand rather than contract, though the percentage of total economic activity represented by marketplace trade is declining (Mintz, 1971:264). The women traders contribute to the economy by forming essential links in the distributive chain: they link the subsistence sector and the commercial economy.

What do the market women themselves get out of this role? It is interesting to note that trading as a profession is increasing in popularity among Nigerian women. In the 1963 census, women constituted 60% of the category "sales workers," whereas they constituted 9% of farmers and 14% of professional technical and related workers. A survey of Ibadan women in 1974 found 72.8% of a total of 521 respondents were engaged in commercial activities (Di Domenico, 1980: 734). The scale ranges from subsistence to wholesale trading. At the lower level, the popularity of trading is due to the ease of entry, lack of educational requirements and child care facilities. At the higher level, where many educated women are traders, the great attraction is the independence and potential for wealth which self-employed trading offers.

Indigenous Manufacturing. Many of the crafts and locally manufactured goods which were highly valued by the pre-colonial societies and which provided a source of wealth and prestige for women were devalued with the rapid importation from Europe of cheap mass produced goods. The women's hand-produced mats, baskets, pottery, soap, salt and dyed cotton cloth could not compete with the cheaper-to-produce factory-made imported products and were eliminated. Furthermore, when the colonial administration (and later the independent governments) mechanized and modernized some of these manufacturing processes within Nigeria, men were employed in much greater numbers than women. Textile factories in Nigeria, which use some locally produced cotton but import the bulk, and use imported thread, employ a majority of men. The General Cotton Mill, Onitsha, for instance, currently has a labor force of 4,000 of whom 200 are women. In 1965 the Textile Mill at Ado-Ekiti employed only 62 women out of a labor force of 1,200, while at the Nigerian Textile Mills, Ikeja, there were only 100 women out of a labor force of 1,578 (Afonja, 1976:12).

Attention so far has been focused on how colonialism transformed the pre-colonial economic roles of men and women. It is necessary now to examine briefly what opportunities the colonial system offered women in the new "modernizing" sectors, that is, in education and employment in government service.

Education introduced a new principle of differentiation into Southern Nigerian society. Education led to salaried employment, prestige, and access to positions of responsibility, while lack of education generally became equated with lack of prestige. The differentiation was partially sexist in character, since far more boys received education than girls.

Once the value of education was generally recognized, parents preferred to send their more favored and privileged male children to school rather than their female children. Neither the

Christian missionaries nor the colonial government made concerted efforts to change these attitudes because they had their own prejudices against the education of females. The government, in particular, maintained that it should not go faster than the people wished in the education of girls. Once the people saw how few girls received good jobs, they were reinforced in their prejudices against educating their daughters. Thus a self-fulfilling prophecy was generated.

The Christian missions took the initiative in establishing schools in Nigeria. Education was seen as a means of evangelization and as a way of training clergymen and teachers to uphold the church. Since women were not admitted to the clergy and did not become teachers until the 1920s, the education of girls was regarded as less important. The proportion of girls to boys in the mission primary and secondary schools was very low.

The colonial government entered into education in order to ensure for itself the educated personnel needed for administering the country. Its provisions for the education of girls were grossly inferior even to those of the missions. Girls were not seen as potential civil servants. The first government secondary school for girls was set up in 1927 and then only in response to pressure from Nigerian women who had raised money for the school. The curriculum for girls was different from that of boys: until the 1950s the emphasis was on vocational training in domestic science. However, the 1950s witnessed a rapid growth in the number of girls' schools and in the enrollment of girls at schools and, for the first time, some recognition was given to the need for technical and vocational education for girls. The number of girls receiving tertiary education also increased. In 1948, when the University College of Ibadan was founded, there were only four female to 100 male students; in 1952, 11 female to 377 males. By 1961, the number of females had increased to 92 (Ajayi and Tamuno, 1973:37).

The colonial administration totally excluded women from its political agencies and offices. There were no women in the court, in the police, in the administration. In the civil service, the first female civil servant was employed in 1930; by 1944 there were seven and, by 1954, 23 women were in the senior civil service. In 1955 women were admitted for the first time to the police force. With regional self-government in 1956, conditions in the regional civil services for women were greatly improved, although women's representation in government service remained marginal.

The Post-Colonial Period

The pattern of economic development in Nigeria since the political termination of colonialism represents a continuation of the colonial economic pattern. Nigeria remains dependent on the international capitalist system, on foreign investment and on foreign expertise. The economy has been consistantly oriented to the expansion of the small foreign-controlled modern sector, while neglecting the indigenous sectors. Government promotes externally financed extractive processing and manufacturing industries which are capital intensive and secondary in nature. Agriculture remains stagnant and has the lowest annual growth rate of all sectors of the economy. Agricultural production can no longer satisfy basic subsistence, hence an annual rise in the volume of imported foodstuffs to meet consumer needs while the exportation of cash crops has declined drastically. Palm oil, for instance, is now imported. The post civil war (1967-1970) "oil boom" financed the construction of grandiose infrastructure in Lagos but has not generated economic development throughout the country. Gross disparities in levels of development are glaringly evident from one part of Lagos to another, from city to village, from state to state. Within both the indigenous economy and the state supported externally oriented economy, women are disadvantaged. Or, as Remy concludes, "The pattern of economic development in Nigeria under colonial and indigenous rule has generated and perpetuated structural inequalities between sectors of the economy, between tribes and between sexes" (Remy, 1975:358).

The political structure of post-colonial Nigeria contributed to the maintenance of gross inequalities in the society. From 1960 to 1965, there were three main political parties, each in government in the three regions of Nigeria in which the parties were based: the Hausa-dominated NNPC in the North, the Yoruba-dominated AG in the West, and the Igbo-dominated NCNC

in the Eastern Region. At the federal level, the parties played a violent game of numbers--two versus one--in which they changed partners as the political "music" dictated. Regardless of political party affiliation, the rulers at both the regional and federal level were committed to securing political power for themselves, indefinitely, by any means. Political power was seen and used as a means of economic aggrandisement by the politician, his extended family, his political party and his ethnic group.

The political parties competed for mass support by offering political patronage. In an underdeveloped economy, where government was by far the biggest employer and biggest income earner, patronage could only be offered by the party in government, whether regional or federal. In order to have meaningful patronage to offer, the party governments politicized many of the functions previously performed by the colonial public service, such as construction, road and bridge building and maintenance, and supplies of everything from stationery to tractors. These services were handed over to a new class of persons--the contractor class--which was totally dependent on party patronage and which was obliged to return the party's favors by the statutory 10% kickback. Government contracts became the most lucrative source of income, far more so than the burgeoning indigenous manufacturing and the declining agricultural production.

Where did women fit into this new economic activity? The position of women in Nigerian political parties has been discussed extensively elsewhere by this author (Mba, 1982). Here it is necessary only to note that women played no role in the NPC, and only marginal roles in the NCNC and AG executives. There were women's wings in both the NCNC and AG, but these were merely ancillary bodies. Since women were not important in the political parties, their rewards in terms of party patronage, especially in the award of contracts, were meager. Thus in the First Republic of Nigeria (1960-1965) most women were denied access to a new and important source of economic power.

Historical events after 1966 changed this position somewhat. First, the Nigerian civil war (1967-1970) provided some Igbo women with the opportunity to play a more important economic role in a manner reminiscent of the way the 19th century Yoruba wars affected Yoruba women. It was noted above that hinterland Igbo women were primarily farmers and that the riverain women traders were eclipsed by men traders in the colonial period. During the civil war, this division of roles was modified because of the conditions in Biafra (the former Eastern Region of Nigeria which had seceded unilaterally from Nigeria). Nigeria mounted a blockade against Biafra which cut off the importation of all kinds of supplies, most crucially foodstuffs. As the territory of Biafra was reduced by successive Nigerian military victories and consequent occupation, access to large areas of farm land was lost. The getting of food and other vital supplies was desperately urgent for both the Biafran army and the civilian population. At the same time the recruitment of additional soldiers was regarded by the army as crucial so all able-bodied men were liable to arbitrary conscription.

Therefore, many men who were not in the army and not engaged in any of the non-military "war effort" organizations were afraid to leave their compounds for fear of being conscripted. The onus of getting food through trade, which often had to be over long distances, fell on many women. Igbo (and Ibibio) women dominated internal trade with the food-producing areas which were not occupied. Furthermore, courageous women undertook what was known as "attack trade," that is, crossing through enemy lines into Nigerian occupied territories to purchase goods. The Biafran army gave out innumerable contracts to women to provide foodstuffs for the soldiers as well as to prepare them. By the time the war ended, countless women who had been farmers, primary school teachers, typists and domestics had been converted into traders and contractors and found these occupations more lucrative and satisfying.

Second, under the successive military governments from 1966 to 1979, political parties and activities were proscribed. The armed forces became the source of patronage through contracts, and this time women were not excluded. In the East-Central state, which constituted the Igbo area of the defunct Biafra, the task of reconstruction of the severely damaged areas provided a flood of construction contracts, many of which were given to women who acquired the

nickname "emergency contractors." Such contracts offered a means of making quick money. Many women who had become the heads of their families due to wartime deaths, injuries or dislocation of families, were in dire need of that money.

It was not only women in the former Eastern Region but women throughout Nigeria who benefited from contracts awarded by the military government which spent freely the "oil boom" money. The sobriquet "cash madam" became much in vogue to describe wealthy women contractors and suppliers. With the return to civilian government and the multi-party system in 1979 came the return of the patronage system, but on a much higher scale, reflecting the expansion of the economy since 1965. Currently contracts are worth millions rather than thousands as in the First Republic, especially in the construction of the nation's new capital city, Abuja. However, since women's political power in the parties and in the legislatures has not increased markedly since 1965, this source of economic power remains largely inaccessible.

Apart from the "contractor class" the position of women in other sectors of the economy has not improved. In education and government employment, women remain very underrepresented, although the federal governments have been committed to promoting the education of girls and currently use sex-based admission quotas to favor girls in federal institutions. A few statistics will illustrate the discrepancies between males and females in education at all levels. At the secondary school level in 1972, girls constituted 33% of the total enrollment in the country, at the primary level 39%, and at the university level 14% (concentrated in the faculties of education and arts) (Annual Abstract of Statistics, 1973). In 1978 females constituted 16% of the total number of university students (Nigerian Universities Commission publication).

Women represent about 6% of university lecturers in Nigeria, but in the faculties of education and medicine they account for over 10%. However, they are clustered in the lower academic levels (Fapohunda, 1981). In 1977 women constituted 12% of the indigenous teaching staff in polytechnics and colleges of technology, 16% of the advanced teachers and technical teachers' colleges teaching staff, 19% of teachers in secondary schools and teacher training colleges (Federal Ministry of National Planning, 1980:42).

The problem of underrepresentation of women in public service is not unrelated to their relative lack of educational opportunities, particularly post-secondary education. In 1972, among the 9,243 officers in the Federal Civil Service from the rank of assistant executive officers and above, only 5.1% were female. In administration there were 175 or 98.3% male officers against 3 or 1.7% female officers. In executive cadres, 98.4% were male as opposed to 1.6% female (Odesanya, 1973).

Table I shows that in 1977, women constituted 12% of the total number of employees in the Federal Civil Service and 17% in the State Civil Services. A detailed breakdown of the occupation categories in the overall public sector in Nigeria shows that women account for a rather small proportion (generally less than 5%) of most of the occupational categories; but among such traditional feminine categories as nurses, librarians, confidential secretaries, and stenographers, the proportion of women was much higher. In the technical occupations, women's participation was negligible (Federal Ministry of National Planning, 1980:23-26).

The proportion of women in the private sector is much smaller (10%) than the proportion of women in the public sector (see Table I). Detailed statistical information on female employment in the private sector is difficult to locate. Much of the official data either fails to present a sex breakdown of statistics or projects figures which are misleading. For instance, the 1963 census listed women as representing 93.8% of "workers not classified by occupation." The ILO report on Nigeria in the 1974 Yearbook of Labour Statistics (cited by Makinwa-Adebusoye, 1980) stated that 61% of those who have no wage-earning employment are women and quoted women as constituting only 5.7% of the commercial sector in Nigeria.[4] Yet there is no doubt that (a) nearly all Nigerian women are economically active and earn money and (b) the majority of women in the private sector are found in commerce.

A much more accurate report in provided by the "Report of the Labour Force Sample Survey 1974" (Federal Ministry of National Planning, 1979:37) which concluded that in the commerce sector there were more females than males and that this sector provided employment for almost two-thirds (57.8%) of the females in the private sector. As noted above, the majority of these women are self-employed.

The Report found that the other main sectors which provided employment for women were: agriculture, 10.5%; manufacturing, 15.4%; and services, 13.3%. The relatively low proportion of Nigerian women engaged in agriculture (and this proportion has declined since similar figures were reported in 1966) and in the services sector contrasts sharply with the position in most other Third World countries. Since in agriculture women are cultivators not laborers, the proportion of Nigerian women in wage labor in the private sector is small.

The number of women employed in manufacturing and industries is increasing (15% in 1977 compared to about 10% in 1965), despite barriers to the entry of women in that sector. For instance, employers in industries generally prefer men because the Nigerian Labour Code Ordinances regulate the hours and conditions of work for women (e.g., no night shifts) yet stipulate equal wages. Child care is another constraint for women entering industries because the introduction of universal primary education in 1973 has made domestic labor a scarce commodity. Boserup (1965) noted that many husbands were reluctant to have their wives enter into many urban occupations because they objected to their women being subject to the authority of unknown males. Certainly, men do constitute the "bosses" along the production lines because women's lack of vocational/technical training renders them unqualified for the skilled jobs. They are restricted by virtue of their low level of education to the semi-skilled and unskilled jobs which have low pay and low status. There is thus a segmentation of labor by sex in the industrial sector.

The above discussion has focused on women employed in the industrial sector; have women penetrated the ranks of the employers of labor in that sector? The industrial/manufacturing sector of the Nigerian economy is controlled largely by government through its parastatals and by the multinational companies which, by law, are incorporated in Nigeria with Nigerian equity participation. The petroleum oil industry constitutes Nigeria's largest source of revenue and its most valuable export commodity. (Nigeria is the seventh largest oil-producing country in the world.) Nigeria experienced a "boom" in oil production and export from 1970 until the recent oil glut in the world economy and it was the oil money which financed rapid heavy industrialization and construction in the same period.

The control of oil exploration, extraction, refining, distribution and export is shared between the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), a federal government agency, and the world's major multinational oil companies. The involvement of women in the Nigerian oil industry is marginal. There are a few women who are directors in the boards of several of the companies and a handful of women in the lower level management of the companies and of the NNPC. But oil is "a man's game" in Nigeria (and all over the world) from which women are excluded.

The same pattern is repeated in the mining, iron, steel, cement and petrochemical industries in Nigeria. It is only in what may be termed the indigenous part of the private manufacturing sector that women play more than a token role. Since 1970 Nigerians have entered into secondary and tertiary manufacturing in diverse areas, often either in partnership with foreign firms or employing foreign expertise. The main areas are the manufacturing of rubber, leather, plastic, polythene and paper products, cement, textiles, breweries, food processing, and pharmaceutical industries. Nigerian manufacturers and employers have formed associations such as the Nigerian Employers Consultative Association and several of their members are women manufacturers.[5]

On a smaller scale, there are a number of women who are manufacturing garments, shoes, handbags, plastic goods, food and beverages, and who own printing plants. Their enterprises

are small-scale and are very vulnerable to the fluctuations of the Nigerian economy and the vagaries of government policies concerning the importation of raw materials and foreign exchange.

These women who are trying to integrate themselves into the nontraditional sectors of the economy need government support. Unfortunately, Nigerian women in the urban areas, outside of the markets, are no longer organized in the kind of collective associations which characterized their economic activities in the pre-colonial and colonial periods. Women lack an effective lobbying power with government. The one national woman's organization which government recognizes as representing women (the National Council of Women's Societies, NCWS) is not politicized effectively, its objectives are ill defined, and it is more concerned with social welfare than with promoting women's economic and political interests.

The Nigerian federal and state governments are committed in principle to the integration of women in economic development. Several of the state governments in the Muslim Hausa areas are promoting the education of girls and the gradual phasing out of seclusion. Progress is slow but steady. The federal government is less innovative; it is one of the few governments in Africa which has not set up a government agency to handle women's affairs and which has not promulgated an articulated national development program for women. This neglect of the interests of women as a class is a further reflection on the lack of political and economic power in contemporary Nigeria.

Conclusion

This paper has attempted to show how the nature of the work done by women in Nigeria has been influenced by historical changes before, during and after colonialism. The general pattern is that of women's involvement in work and the lack of a western-type separation between the public and domestic spheres. The specific changes in women's economic roles resulted from historical changes as Nigeria moved from a subsistence economy through an exploited colonial economy to the present level of a neo-colonial capitalist economy.

Colonialism altered the traditional sex-role economic stratification. Indigenous men and foreign capitalism displaced women from those areas of the economy which they had previously controlled and denied women a place in the new foreign-controlled economic sector. A new division of labor resulted: in agriculture, men engaged in cash farming, women in subsistence farming; in trade, women remained in the internal market system while men went into the external trade; and in wage labor men constituted the high income earners and women the low income earners.

Colonialism first brought Nigeria into dependence on the global economy, a process intensified by Nigeria's post-colonial debut as a major oil-producing country. Oil fueled industrialization and accelerated the development of the new economy far beyond the reach of women. Lacking education and political power, women remained in the traditional indigenous economy, primarily in commerce. Thus alienated from "modern development," the gap between men and women has widened.

The priority for government and society now is to close that gap by integrating women into the modern economy and thus generating more even development for the whole society. Education and technology can be used to restore women to their rightful place in Nigeria's historical development.

Table I

Distribution of Total Employees by Type of Employer: All States

Type of Employer	Total Employees				
	Male	Female	Total	Females as % of Total	% Share of Employees
Federal Government (Civil Service)	154,099	22,468	176,567	12.7	17.4
Federal Government (Corporations)	93,715	16,059	109,774	14.6	10.8
State Governments (Civil Service)	159,717	33,631	193,348	17.4	19.0
State Governments (Corporations)	54,112	9,520	63,632	15.0	6.3
Local Governments	53,225	9,571	62,796	15.2	6.2
Private Sector	366,718	42,504	409,222	10.4	40.3
TOTAL	881,586	133,753	1,015,339	13.2	100.0

Federal Ministry of National Planning, Study of Nigeria's Manpower Requirements, 1977. Lagos: 1977, p. 20.

Footnotes

[1]Baba (1980) examined the case of the Kano River Irrigation Project to see whether female farm labor was used. He found that adult males constituted the farm labor; only in the most remote areas were women used. Baba concluded that "after 10 years the project has not altered the basic structure of the traditional labor division"(Baba, 1980:1011). Amechi (1980) found that only 5.7% of the women she interviewed in Zaria worked outside the home.

[2]There is a more recent example of this in the case of the introduction of a hydraulic oil press in Ghedum village of Ibadan (Obibuaku, 1977). It was introduced by the government for the benefit of the women producers of palm oil. Initially 72% of the 75 women adopted the innovation during the first six months of its introduction, but subsequently this proportion dropped to 24%, while 16% never adopted the oil press at all. These results were in spite of the fact that all the women knew about the new technology and the majority were convinced that it yielded more oil and saved much time and labor. They explained their withdrawal on the basis of a time schedule which did not coincide with their available time, the size of the mortar which was designed for men, and, above all, the fact that the increase in quantity of oil benefited only the husbands who traded with the oil while they themselves lost the palm kernels.

[3]Ekejuka's study of Omu Okwei (1967) provides an excellent case study of one of the outstanding women traders.

[4]I suggest that the enumerators were blind to the existence of the masses of women petty traders and food processors and sellers in the rural and urban markets and in the streets. No doubt they also failed to count the multitude of Muslim Hausa women working in their homes. Thus these women were wrongly classified as either economically inactive or as having an unclassifiable occupation. There is a great need for changes in the methodology of "counting" and measuring women's economic activities and for what statisticians call "sex disaggregated" data.

[5]One, the managing director of a plastics factory in Lagos, is also the treasurer of the Chemical and Nonmetallic Products Employers' Association. Another is the chairman of a huge polythene manufacturing plant.

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Women Industrial Workers in Lebanon

Irene Lorfing

Introduction

The extent to which women participate in and are affected by economic growth is usually determined by the traditional systems of social organization and production. It is known that economic change has disrupted the assumed social roles between the two sexes and has introduced potentially new economic activities for women.

Between 1972 and 1975, women in Lebanon represented 48.1% of the total population. The economically active women represented 17.5% of the female population, and 18.4% of the total labor force. The majority of the employed females were aged between 20 and 25 years (PAL,1972). In 1972, 7% of the married women were employed. (LFPA, 1972). The largest groups of working women were: agricultural workers 22.6%, servants 22.5%, professionals (mostly teachers) 21.3%, industrial workers 19.6% and office employees 10.3% (PAL, 1972).

Female occupations in Lebanon are traditional. Women work in jobs that are seen to befit their sex. In 1972, 77% of the professional women were teachers; 61.6% of the women working in the commercial sector were secretaries and typists; 66.9% of those working in services were servants; and 69.5% of the women industrial workers were employed in the textile or tailoring industries. In the agricultural sector, women were classified as agricultural laborers or unskilled workers. In other words, educated and professional women take those traditional jobs which fit the expectations of their culture. The uneducated women join the services sector or work in very simple industrial jobs, such as textiles, clothes manufacturing and food processing. As for the rural women, they have always contributed to agricultural production, but the majority are still considered as "familial aids", and, therefore, they are not remunerated for their work.

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In 1975, one person out of four provided for the needs of the population; women accounted for less than 20% of the total workforce. The majority of the economically active females were made up of young and single women. The low activity rate of the female population can be explained by cultural, demographic, educational, and economic factors. One cultural factor that discourages women from joining the labor force is the high value society places on marriage and raising a large family. This factor which favors high fertility naturally influences population composition. The lack of education in general, and the lack of vocational training in particular, keeps the majority of women in low status jobs. On the other hand, the few job opportunities offered to skilled female labor are determined by traditional patterns, which hold them to the traditional bias in feminine professions.

At the same time that the Lebanese population is characterized by rapid growth, youthfulness, and large scale rural-urban migration, it is also characterized by low female activity rate, low rate of economically active population, and a large rate of school dropouts amoung unencouraged females.

This situation implies that, due to the rapid population growth and the youthfulness of the population, the potentially active portion of the population (15-65 years) is going to increase, and will number around 2 million people in 1985 (Hamdan, 1970). On the other hand, the large scale rural-urban migration is draining the rural areas of their inhabitants and filling the towns, especially Beirut and its suburbs.

Women Workers of the Lebanese Industry

The latest available demographic statistics indicate that Beirut and its suburbs constitute 75% of the urban population of the country, and like many other Arab primary cities, it is being slowly "ruralized" by the migrants who are in turn "urbanized" by the city (Tabbarah, R. 1981, p. 20).

In 1974, a survey conducted by Nasr revealed that the majority of the unskilled Lebanese workers, and especially the female labor force in the industrial and the services sector, come from this huge reservoir of poorly qualified manpower. Over two-thirds of Lebanon's industries and industrial workers are found in the larger Beirut area. Most factories are small, employ less than 24 workers, and are characterized by a low productivity level per person, reflecting poor technology and unskilled manpower (CERMOC, 1978).

One out of five industrial workers is a woman, usually young, single, with minimal education and skills, and most often a recent migrant from the remote rural areas of South Lebanon or the Beqa's valley. These workers come from large families and are compelled to work in order to supplement familial income. This female protelariat has a high rate of turnover; staffs are renewed almost every year, especially in the textile and clothes manufacturing industries, which look for cheap labor.

In 1979 a survey conducted by the Institute on women industrial workers of Beirut's suburbs (Lorfing, I and Abu Nasr, J., 1980) confirmed the previously reported characteristics of the female workers in industry. Among the 205 randomly selected female workers, 83% were single and their ages ranged from 10 to 50 years; the majority (73%) were under 25. Seventy percent of those unmarried reported to have started working before age 17, and among these, 31% started working before age 14. On the other hand, almost half of the women who had ever been married entered the labor force after the age of 30. Forty-seven percent of the married women were illiterate as compared to 14% of the single; the large majority of the women had not gone beyond primary school. Eighty-eight percent of the workers performed jobs that required few or no skills. The rest were engaged in occupations requiring limited technical skills, such as ironing, sewing buttons, using a sewing machine, and only very rarely cutting patterns, a job that is usually given to men.

In this respect, preliminary results of a recent study conducted by the Institute on tasks of women in industry (1983) reveal that for employers perseverance, honesty and patience are more important than formal or vocational education. Observation of women's tasks on the production line in some semi-mechanized industries reveals that female workers' "tasks" are situated at the beginning of the line for feeding the machine and at its end for checking the quality of the produce and ultimately packing. Within the prerogatives of their tasks is the surveillance of these processes. For example, women can stop the machine if at the feeding stage the thread breaks or the product does not flow well. However, they are not allowed to touch the machine or fix it. This task is reserved for men. When asked why they preferred women to men in these posts, the majority of the employers said that men are not to be trusted with surveillance because they have no patience and no dexterity. Employers further stated that, although mechanization may take over the place of many male and female workers, women will always be needed at the initial and final stages. Moreover, they insisted that they prefer young women, around age 18, because they are more trainable and more patient. Similar results on employers' hiring preferences were reported in the study on the Employment Status of Women in Lebanon (Richards, 1980).

In the study of the female industrial workers, (Lorfing, I. and Abu Nasr, J., 1980) working conditions and attitudes of industrial workers towards work, education and vocational training were also investigated. Data on working conditions, reveals that sanitation standards, lighting, ventilation and toilet facilities are adequate in the large factories studied. Rest rooms are made available in half of the plants and eating quarters and kitchen facilities are found in most of them. Eight of the ten plants reported to have registered their workers with the government social security program. However, only six plants guaranteed insurance for industrial accidents. Other benefits extended to workers by the two large textile factories included transport, loans, cooperative shopping facilities, nursery and kindergarten services to

children as well as adult literacy classes. It should be mentioned here that enterprises of this size are few, and the majority of industries employing women are of the artisan type. In this context Richards remarks: "Like salaries, benefits vary from only the Government minimum to include additional items such as transportation or uniform for workers. It is significant that no organization out of the 240 interviewed provides child care facilities." (Richards, 1980, p.27). We have no statistics on working conditions in these enterprises. However, field observations of some clothes manufacturing workshops reveal that the noise of the sewing machines, bad ventilation and lighting in addition to overcrowding make the atmosphere almost irrespirable.

Women workers have to work eight hours daily, but individual schedules differ from one factory to another. Around 40% of the workers (all the married and 30% of the single) report to duty in one of two shifts, one starting at 6:00 a.m. and ending at 2:00 p.m., with no lunch break, and the other starting at 7:00 a.m. and ending at 4:00 p.m. with a one hour lunch break. The most common reported complaints, in addition to family problems caused by their absence from home, are low pay, fatigue and inadequate transportation. This double burden imposed on working women is mentioned by most married workers (78%), who say that household chores consume most of their free time, a situation also found among 31% of the single. The majority of the workers indicate spending most of their free time in activities in and around the house.

When asked about their attitudes toward work, 94% of the married and 75% of the single report joining the labor market because of economic need. On the question of whether they would continue to work after marriage, six percent of the single answered in the affirmative, 52% in the negative and 42% gave conditional responses such as: "It depends if I need the money or not." "If my husband has a good job, why should I bother." When women industrial workers were asked whether they would be willing to attend special training sessions in order to supplement their knowledge and skills, over 95% of them responded positively to the idea. Married women indicated that they would like to continue their general education and learn more about childcare, while single women expressed the desire to acquire more knowledge in family planning, occupational skills, childcare, family health, labor legislation, and formal education. Their interest was genuine and 60% of the workers in both groups were ready to follow special training sessions after working hours.

In summary, the following characteristics are apparent in the reported studies. Unmarried women industrial workers are younger than their married counterparts, who usually join the labor force due to divorce or widowhood. Single workers leave the labor force at around age 24, the average age of marriage for women in Lebanon. Married women have a lower level of education than the single workers, but both of them have little formal education and no skills. For most single industrial workers, employment after marriage is not perceived as an option; they responded that only unfavorable economic conditions would force them to reenter the labor force.

Most of the women interviewed emphasized the following hardships: long working hours, little pay, transportation difficulties and familial problems due to their absence from home.

Factors Affecting the Employment of Women in the Lebanese Industry

This recent survey of the life and working conditions of women industrial workers in the suburbs of Beirut has brought to light three main factors that are still operative in limiting and shaping women's economic participation in the job market. These three factors are the prevailing value system regulating sex-role attitudes and behavior, the lack of psychological preparation of women, and the economic structure of the society.

The findings of the reported studies reflect the persistence of social organization and social values that reinforce the traditional role of women as mothers and wives. These findings are partially corroborated by the results of other studies, results which indicate that certain segments of society, especially the young and educated, are beginning to question the established value system, and are searching for alternatives to it. A survey on sex-role orientation of Lebanese University students (Lorfing, I. et al., 1982) revealed that the average sex-role orientation score of the sample was transitional, and that girls were more liberal in their orientation than boys. Similar results were reported by Hammoud (1981), who studied Lebanese youth of different socio-economic and educational levels.

Preliminary results of a survey of 400 working and non-working women of the larger Beirut area (IWSAW, 1983) indicate that married working women seek employment mainly because of economic necessity. Other stated reasons were the desire to acheive a better social position, to pursue a career and to secure economic independence from the husband. Single working women, on the other hand, emphasized economic need, establishing contacts outside the family sphere, gaining experience and filling one's free time. In addition, the latter indicated that parental agreement was necessary for joining the labor force. In the same study, married women said that in order to take a remunerated job and keep it, the husband's attitude, woman's prior work experience, availability of jobs, children's age, existence of nurseries and husband's help at home were of importance.

The effect of male attitudes in reinforcing the sex-segregation of jobs is manifested by employers' preference for young girls to be trained in jobs that befit their feminine nature and which do not require vocational skills. They believe that these jobs can be performed by any girl, and that education and training are not necessary, since women are not expected to stay long on the job. This preference of employers operates to the detriment of female industrial workers, because it fosters a set of expectations that blocks any improvement in pay or position in work (Newland, 1979).

These expectations are also ingrained in little girls through socialization. A study on the socialization of Lebanese preschoolers (Abu Nasr, et al., 1980), indicates that little

girls are strictly socialized to sacrifice and care for others. They are expected to be obedient and self-sacrificial, attributes considered by society to be basic to the formation of a "good mother".

This primary socialization by the family is complemented by schools which reinforce this stereotyped image (Kallab, et al,. 1982). The findings reveal that the most frequent roles attributed to women are those of mother, little girl and grandmother. The few times where women are depicted in workers' roles, they are identified as poor single girls and widows, maids, dressmakers, nurses or agricultural laborers. The sex-role traits attributed to females, and more so to mothers, center around love, care, self-sacrifice and dependency. The image of women thus presented to children reinforces the status quo and creates inhibitions within the woman herself, even among the educated ones (Zurayk, 1979, p.28).

This observation is supported by the responses of a sample of recent war widows on their future plans with respect to the economic support of their families. Their responses reveal the lack of psychological preparation among these destitute heads of households (Lorfing, I. and Abu Nasr, J., 1980). These women had no skills, were illiterate, had never worked for pay before and had an average of 4.84 children. Only 37% of the sample expressed their desire to work, but none of them indicated industrial employment as a possibility. The majority thought that taking a job outside the home was not a solution due to the presence of young children, their lack of skills and the unavailability of job opportunities with decent pay. However, they welcomed the idea of learning new skills that would help them perform activities at home for pay. As for their daughters, they were willing to encourage them to work after being trained as teachers, dressmakers or childcare workers, jobs accepted by society as feminine.

This attitude concerning education and training of women is also stressed in a survey, conducted by UNESCO in 1974, on the relationship between educational opportunities and employment opportunities for women in Lebanon. It was found that, although the level of education of Lebanese women has been rising, that rise is due to increased enrollment in studies traditionally accepted as feminine. Women continued to enroll in such studies in spite of the rapid growth of the services and industrial sectors, opening new employment opportunities requiring technical and vocational training.

The maintenance of the present situation of the life and work conditions of the women industrial workers in Lebanon will also depend on the industrial sector and on its interdependence with the other economic sectors of the country.

In 1978 a report by CERMOC advanced some hypotheses with respect to the situation and future perspectives of the industrial sector in Lebanon. One of the assumptions put forward, and one which will most probably materialize, is that industrial growth is going to continue to be conditioned by the predominance of the services sector. In such a case Lebanese industries

will continue to adapt their production to the demands of the services sector and try to cope simultaneously with the internal and regional markets.

According to CERMOC (1978) the limits of this assumption are that it will perpetuate the existing situation. With respect to social development, it makes no place for transformations in the social structures or in the economic system. The latter will still be dominated by services and will keep industrial growth within short-term perspectives.

The prospects for positive developmental changes in the case of the Lebanese female industrial worker are not encouraging, and the prevailing problems of limited and sex-segregated job opportunities, lack of skills, lack of psychological preparation and exploitation will continue to afflict the female industrial work force.

In view of the above-stated problems, and on the basis of the findings of the specific country research program on women and work in Lebanon, the IWSAW has decided to undertake a non-formal education campaign which will focus on illiterate and semi-literate women, particularly industrial workers. The preparation of innovative and comprehensive educational materials on health, nutrition, child rearing, family planning, general education, civic and labor education and vocational skills is now underway.

We firmly believe that small action programs of this nature can create awareness on the individual and community levels, which may eventually transform observable adjustive changes in society into basic ones. We hope through the program to develop in female workers in general and industrial workers in particular a positive image of themselves as workers, and an attitude which may convince employers that education and vocational skills are more important requirements for the employment of women than patience, perseverence and dexterity. We also hope that increased awareness of female workers will lead to the elimination of the negative and very often exploitative attitude of employers and bring about a more professional type of interaction between them. We also hope that the trained workers will become trainers themselves and bring forth a conscious feminine working class, proud of its achievements.

However, the efforts of a single institution are not sufficient to bring about the desired changes in terms of social and economic development. There is a pressing need to involve governmental and non-governmental organizations in action programs in order to improve the status of women in general and working women in particular. Therefore, we recommend the following:

1. All international labor law conventions, especially those related to women workers, should be ratified and enforced by concerned governments.

2. Compulsory education should be enforced in order to increase female school enrollment, increase the number of non-segregated vocational schools, and create vocational schools in different regions of the country which could be encouraged to introduce innovative skills in their curricula.

3. Business organizations and industries should be helped, materially and technically, to institute on-the-job-training services for their female employees.

4. Career counselling should be instituted at all educational levels.

5. The presence and active participation of women in labor unions should be strengthened.

6. The media should be utilized intensively to make people aware of the situation of women in general and to inform women of their rights and duties as equal citizens of the country, and as equal partners in development.

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Women and Work in Morocco

May Rihani

Morocco, like many other societies in the Third World, has difficulty providing enough jobs for its labor force, and like those societies which have difficulty providing enough jobs for its men, it tends to define women as having no economic function outside the family. However, within the family the economic reality or the economic needs often make it necessary for the woman to find a job or to generate income to supplement her husband's or father's income. This situation is prevalent in Moroccan cities and the conflict is creating some changes the male-female relationships as well as in the female economic role.

According to a non-official commentary on the 1971 census, the number of working women in Morocco exceeds 2 million; working women account for 25% of the female population and 37% of the working class. According to the official census, while the employment rate for men is rather stagnant, the women's rate has shown a tremendous increase. In the period between 1960 and 1971, in the urban areas where women's labor is more easily assessed, the number of working women has doubled. Out of every 100 active individuals, 30 are young women.

The most striking factor of Moroccan female employment is it's youth; 44% of the working women are under twenty-five, and 15% are less than fifteen years old. The corresponding figures for men are 29% for those less than twenty-five and 6% for those less than fifteen.

Another characteristic of Moroccan's female labor is women's subordinate positions under men's supervision, a similar situation to their traditional one. A major sector where female labor is predominant is the service sector, basically in two areas: the civil service and helpers in domestic work or maids.

The 1971 census lists four areas of concentration for women's work other than civil servants and maids; four areas of concentration of economic activities are textile and ready-made

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cloths industries for the urban areas, and agriculture and cattle raising for the rural areas. It is important to highlight that the '71 census defines women working within the household as inactive, or rather as economically inactive, so the census does not make an attempt at considering the contribution of the 2,800,000 women working within the household.

The above was an attempt at describing briefly the general situation of women and work in Morocco as it appeared in the literature and in the different census up to 1971. The following will be a more focused in depth, analysis of the economic activities of a specific segment of the Moroccan female population.

In 1981, the New TransCentury Foundation and the Promotion Feminine jointly undertook a national census of all the participants in the 350 Foyers Feminins in Morocco. Promotion Feminine is a nationwide women's organization that has centers in both the urban and rural areas of Morocco. These centers attract women of all ages who spend two to three years on the average to learn some skills. Promotion Feminine had very little data or information on the women who participated in these centers, so the census was carried out as a socio-economic survey and will serve as a basis for further description and analysis on women and work in Morocco in this paper. The census has been undertaken with the aim to define clearly the socio-economic situation of the participants, their level of schooling, their experience in marketing hand made products, their family situation and their support systems and resources. The census is supposed to serve as a basis for future action by Promotion Feminine, whose objective is to improve the economic situation of the participants by introducing training aspects which will help women either generate more income or find employment.

According to Promotion Feminine and the Ministry of Plan in Morocco the census is the first survey in Morocco that collects data in a systematic fashion on such a significant number of women. It was the first time all the foyers feminins participated in a data collection, with 350 Foyers Feminins sending in 20,783 completed questionnaires and 2,404 non response forms.

Who are these women? What are the characteristics of the 20,783 women who answered the questionnaire? Among the socio-economic characteristics of the profile of this population are the following trends:

The majority of the participants in the foyers are young; 72% of the participants are between 10 and 19 years, and 87% are only 24 years old or younger. Eighty-nine percent of the participants are unmarried, 2% are engaged and only 8% are married. Ninety-two percent of the participants have no children, and those who do have them are between 20 and 44 years old. The participants who have five children or more are between 30 and 44 years old.

The largest number of participants belong to families where there are from 2 to 5 brothers and from 2 to 5 sisters. In general, in the participant's family, it is the father who earns

the income, followed by the brother and then the husband; however we find it significant that 8.3% of the women participants in the centers have the largest income in their family. Among these, more than half of them, 53%, know how to read and write. A quarter of the women who participate in the centers, 25.2%, market their products and 6.8% manage to save money.

Eighty-seven percent of the mothers of the participants are housewives, 2% work in the crafts industry, and 2% are nursemaids or do housework for other families.

In analyzing the involvement of the participants in the curriculum of the Foyers, the following tendencies were discerned:

1. The largest number of women in both the urban and rural areas are interested in courses such as sewing, cutting and embroidery.

2. In the cities the number of women attending what are called modern courses or modern sections such as typewriting, hair-dressing and governess training is growing.

3. The largest number of the participants in the modern courses are women between the age of 17 and 24 years of age.

4. The typing classes attract 25% of the participants who have had 3 or 4 years of secondary school and 19% who have had 5 to 7 years of secondary school.

5. Aside from special classes, such as the typing ones, the level of schooling does not make a great deal of difference as far as participation in the Foyer is concerned.

6. The level of baccalaureat (approximately grade 13) is an exception, as only 19 participants fall into this category; the 19 baccalaureat graduates attend urban centers.

In order to analyze the degree of involvement of the participants in the areas of employment and economic life, our questionnaire contained several questions on issues such as their work experience, jobs they would look for after they leave the foyers, their sales experience, their savings, etc.

One of the conclusions of our survey is that the participants who left the centers because they found employment are not numerous. Out of the over 20,000 participants interviewed, only 829 women left the centers because they found a job. Among these, 16% work as seamtresses or do alterations, 16% work as embroiderers, 15% are typists, 8.5% are knitters, 7% work as hairdressers and 7% are cleaning women.

The participants who are illiterate are more numerous in the trades of seamstress and embroiderers, also in the trades of knitters and cleaning women.

Greater number of illiterate participants do farm work than is the case with literate women; they constitute the largest percentage of rug-weavers as well.

The participants who have gone to primary school, on the other hand, are more numerous in

the jobs of typists, hairdressers and governesses. An unexpected finding was that the participants who have received a secondary education are not among those who leave the center to seek employment.

In comparing the reasons for not returning to the center with the marital status of the participants, we don't find a significant difference between those who will get married and stop coming to the centers and those who get married and continue coming to the centers and those who get married and find a job. The significant difference we found is within the category of engaged girls. The engaged girls fall only into 2 categories: those who stop coming to the centers and work at home, and those who continue coming to the center; the categories of those who are looking for a job or those who are working outside their home do not exist within the category of engaged girls. This can be explained by traditional customs.

With regards to the participants of the centers who have sold something, a product; again the findings indicate that the percentage is not high. Out of the 20,783 participants, only 4,386 have sold something. Their chief means of selling is through orders received.

A high percentage of what they sell goes through the channel of individuals; relatives or others; placing orders for specific items, 77% of the sales follow that procedure. The rest of the items sold are either sold at the souk or at the annual exhibition in the Foyers Feminins. The articles sold consisted mainly of sweaters, table cloths and other embroidered articles.

In comparing the sales experience, the educational level and the age, we noted that literacy did not affect their sales experience. The participants who have been able to sell something are almost equally divided between literates and illiterates. Concerning age, the women between 17 and 24 are more numerous as far as sales experience goes than are the women of the other age groups.

With regards to what they had done with the money they earned, the majority, 28%, expressed "preference for buying clothing", 19% give the money to their parents, and the rest are nearly equally divided between those who buy more material for production such as wool, cloth or yarn; and those who use the money to live on; and those who save the money. It was noticed that, although the married women are smaller in number when compared to the total number of participants in the Foyers, they, the married women, have a greater tendency to participate in the economic activities.

In comparing the distribution of things purchased with the marital status of the participants, we note that, of the women who will buy a piece of land or a house, 75% are married. A large number of those who will buy gold or silver, sewing or knitting machines, wool, cloth or yarn, clothings, or books and magazines have never been married.

An interesting observation came as a result of a comparison between the women who work

such as seamstresses, embroiderers, knitters, cleaning-maids, and rug-weavers, and the women who work by producing items and selling them, comparing these two groups of women with the possessions of the family, and the access of the participants to means of production, we observed that the women who produce items and sell them have more possessions and also more often have electricity and running water than those women who have the above mentioned jobs.

Among the women who work and who responded to our question on the amount of hours they work 40% answered that they work full-time, 24.8% work part of the year and 31.1% from time to time.

It was noted that the girls/women start working at a very young age, it is essentially the women between 13 and 24 who work; and those who work mainly full-time are those between the ages of 14 and 24.

It was also noted that the living situations slightly affected employment. The girls or young women who live with their mothers rather than with both parents, are more frequently those who work than those who do not; and the participants who live with their husbands constitute the biggest percentage of those who can save.

This in-depth survey of a significant segment of women's population in Morocco leads us to conclude that there are trends and characteristics that pertain to the issue of women and work in Morocco; that these trends and characteristics carry with them certain specific problems that require some interventions to improve the working situation of women in Morocco.

Women do work and contribute to the national ecoromy of their country, but most of the time their work is not accounted for; women's work is not accounted for because most of the time it is not salaried.

When women's work is salaried in Morocco the following trends become apparent:

a) The women's labor force is very youthful -- a high majority of the women that have salaried jobs are 13 to 24 years of age;

b) Women are at the lowest level of the wage scale;

c) Upward mobility is nearly non-existent for women;

d) The turn-over of women within the labor force is very rapid, which leads to keeping the women at the apprentice level;

e) Even though women are found within various sectors of the economy, these sectors represent those that are considered traditionally women's sectors, such as sewing and embroidery, small industries; the service sector: typing, teaching; housework and rug-making;

f) These sectors that are considered traditionally women's sectors are the least well paid;

g) As long as women's wages are looked at as supplementary, women's wages are going to be

lower;

h) Women in Morocco both in urban and rural areas, specifically women that are either illiterate or dropouts (both primary and secondary), are not well trained to enter the labor force; this explains why they keep entering the women's traditional sectors that also are the lowest paid sectors;

i) There is very little on-the-job-training for women in Morocco which is one of the reasons why there is a very low rate of upward mobility for women workers;

j) Urban women face different income problems than rural women, basically because they are detached from the means of food production, which explains why urban women, especially the urban women who belong to the low income section of the population, find it imperative to have a job in order to supplement their husband's income to be able to feed the family;

k) The number of working women in the labor force especially in the urban areas will continue to increase, but it is not sure that the wage scale, the training or the upward mobility of women within the labor force will improve. Somehow women in urban Morocco represent the cheap labor, that is unprotected and easy to replace. It would be interesting to compare women in the urban labor force of Morocco with the cheap labor force in industrial countries that is usually drawn from a huge pool of foreign labor.

Finally, there are needs for many serious measures on behalf of both the public and private sectors in Morocco to increase the participation of women in the labor force as well as to improve the social and economic situation of women in the labor force:

1. better and more appropriate training for women;
2. training that meets the markets needs;
3. a radical revision of the wage system;
4. a radical revision of the upward mobility system;
5. providing day-care centers at the work place whenever women are above a certain percentage of the total labor force of that specific workplace;
6. provide literacy classes and on-the-job-training for women;
7. provide vocational education programs that train the women in skills other than the women's traditional ones.

One could already speculate that the number of women in the labor force, especially in the urban labor force, will continue to increase, but unless there are some radical revisions concerning the whole social and economic structure of the labor force and the work place, the Moroccan women will remain in subordinate positions, unprotected, easy to replace and in a position similar to cheap foreign labor in the industrialized countries.

A Recent Study of Women Workers in a Beijing Paper Mill

Judith Liu

Few Western researchers have been given the opportunity I was. I initially planned to go to China to visit and interview friends and relatives concerning life in China during the 1930's. As an overseas Chinese, I could do this without any government approval, but through a series of fortuitous coincidences involving renewed friendships and repaid debts, I was able to conduct sociological research on modern Chinese urban life without any of the usual constraints placed upon foreign students and researchers. That is, I did not have to live in foreigners' housing; I was not overseen by any Chinese university; I did not have translators and guides assigned to accompany me; and finally, I was virtually unrestricted in my travels.

When I arrived in Beijing in March 1982, I obtained, through an old family friend, housing in a recently completed workers' complex that was affiliated with a small State-owned paper mill. Because I lived in the same housing as many of the workers, I befriended many of them, participated in their lives, and gained their confidence. Through these initial contacts from the housing complex, I entered the factory and interviewed a number of women workers through August 1982. Thus, as my sample snowballed. I gained insight into certain aspects of modern factory life. As will be shown later, these aspects, while applicable to this mill itself, can be applied to other Chinese factories only in terms of generalities.

Historically, the mill was constructed in a suburb of Beijing by the Japanese in 1939 as part of their Far-Eastern Co-Prosperity Sphere effort. One hundred Chinese workers were hired to operate the imported Japanese machinery, but the mill, because of the unstable conditions caused by World War II, never went into actual paper production. With the Japanese surrender and concomitant confiscation of their machinery as war reparation, the mill was to be run jointly by American and Nationalist Chinese forces. Again, however, no paper was manufactured. While the one hundred workers continued to draw their wages, mismanagement and corruption led to the virtual stripping of the mill. Much of the heavy equipment was either moved to other mills or simply dismantled for scrap. Not until 1949 when Beijing was "liberated" and the Chinese Communists took over management of the mill did production actually commence. With a small workforce and little usable machinery, production amounted to 200 U.S. tons in 1950. Over the years, the mill has been modernized with Chinese-built machines (augmented by one remaining Japanese-built unit), the workforce has been expanded tenfold, and production reached 6,000 U.S. tons by 1981.

Lacking the machinery necessary to mass produce paper, the mill was originally operated as an experimental paper factory to develop various types of wallpaper. It was so successful

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that production was moved to another larger, more modern facility. Although one of the smallest of twelve branches comprising the greater paper company, it is one of the most profitable. The mill has never failed to meets its production quotas. Despite its success, however, the mill has reached its maximum growth potential. It cannot expand physically.

In recent years, the vast fields which surround the mill have been transformed into large, concrete housing complexes designed to help alleviate Beijing's massive housing shortage. However, the mill reached its production potential years before this change occurred because it is located too far from its necessary natural resources: wood and water. Water is present, but obtaining the quantities needed is always a chronic problem in northern China. Wood, in the form of wood chips and shavings, is still carted to the mill from local furniture-making shops by horse and mule-drawn wagons. Further, high quality pulp must be imported from Canada, the United States, and Finland. Without this additional expensive pulp, the paper produced would be of inferior quality. The mill now produces kraft paper, white cardboard stock, white food and cigarette wrapping paper, and typing paper. It is through the future exporting of this typing paper that the mill hopes to be able to increase its profitability and to obtain much needed international currency for the country.

Over the years various methods have been used to run the mill, starting with Japanese managers and Chinese workers. Today, overseeing all the activities of the factory is the unit. In fact, when one speaks of a Chinese factory, one must speak in terms of a unit. While the unit in essence refers to one's place of employment, it is more than that. The unit is the basic administrative level that oversees most aspects of Chinese daily life. When government policies are enacted, their implementation is done through the unit. That is, the unit is the main administrative level that exists between the government and the people. Thus specific policies exist concerning employment opportunities, a basic wage package, minimum medical benefits, and implementation of a recent single-child policy. How these minimum government mandated policies are met (or exceeded in terms of a highly successful enterprise) is the function of the unit.

China, as with most managed economies, has sought to maximize the number of persons employed in the country. This factory, however, has reached its maximum number of workers since it can no longer expand physically. Employment has stabilized at 1,006 workers of which roughly 50% are women. Consequently, new workers can join the mill's workforce only when a vacancy exists. Several methods are utilized by the unit to fill these vacancies.

Originally, children of workers were guaranteed employment in the mill at the retirement of one of their parents; however, with the societal dysfunctions caused by the Cultural Revolution, this is no longer automatic. The ten year shutdown of schools and universities throughout China during the Cultural Revolution has resulted in a generation of underskilled, undereducated youths who must now pass qualifying examinations in order to fill their parents' slot in the factory. Only children of workers are guaranteed the possibility of getting a job; children of cadres are not. While this seems discriminatory against those children, this is not the case. Cadres' children are given access to better schools and a better education which increase their chances of passing the college entrance examinations. Workers' children do not receive these crucial benefits. Further, college graduates are guaranteed job placement, and they have a limited say as to where and into what job they will be employed. Since only college graduates are guaranteed employment, those high school graduates who can neither pass the college entrance examinations nor be assigned to a permanent position join the vast numbers of the so-called "youths awaiting employment."

The mill is participating in a nationwide effort to help alleviate the problem of too many people for too few jobs. As a stopgap measure, this unit has established service cooperatives such as restaurants, hotels, and repair shops to offer employment to the youth of their employees with the hope that they will be successful enough to become self-sufficient and establish their own units, or be fortunate enough to be assigned permanent employment elsewhere. Until they are, they receive a minimal wage of 1 yuan (approximately .50 U.S.) per working day with

absolutely no benefits since, contrary to popular belief, medical care and other benefits are not socialized throughout the country, but are, rather, under the auspices of each and every unit to establish and carry out.

Those youths who are fortunate enough to find work within the factory are, on the basis of their entrance examinations, ranked according to the skill required in a position. Once assigned a position, reclassification to another ranking is almost impossible unless one is made a cadre or retrained to a new position--both extremely rare occurrences. Positions (other than administrative) are classified as skilled or unskilled. Unskilled positions exist on levels of one to four; skilled positions exist on levels of one to eight. The first five levels within the skilled positions can be considered, in actuality, semi-skilled positions and will be discussed as such. Both skilled and semi-skilled positions require an apprenticeship period. Semi-skilled positions have apprenticeship periods ranging from six months to one year while skilled positions range from two to three years. Unskilled work is normally categorized as "see and do" and includes such work as counting and sorting paper, hauling, and loading pulp or paper. Semi-skilled jobs include watching the pulp flow and checking paper consistency. Skilled positions take the form of either the technical aspects of paper production or machinery repair functions within the factory.

With regard to women, they are normally assigned predominantly unskilled or semi-skilled positions. Thus, relegated to the less physically demanding of the "see and do" occupations, women primarily count and sort the final paper products while men primarily do the heavy hauling, loading and unloading of the pulp or paper. Women, with rare exception, are also employed in all the nontechnical (skilled) aspects of the paper-making process and are predominant in the filing and secretarial sectors within the administration.

While differences clearly exist in employment between men and women, equality is supposed to exist; however, this is not the case. A form of subtle discrimination exists toward women with regard to government regulations concerning retirement. Women workers are required to retire at age 50 and women cadres at age 55; their male counterparts are both required to retire at age 60. Women are required to retire earlier because the government feels they have undergone the rigors of child-bearing. While these requirements can be seen as a reward for women, in reality it becomes difficult for women to reach grade levels five and above and become skilled workers. Thus, no more than a handful of women in this mill have ever reached grade five.

This unit is also not willing to invest the additional time and money it takes to train women to be skilled workers since they must leave the workforce so much earlier than men. The return on the mill's investment in time and money is just too little vis-a-vis the return for ten more years of employment that males provide. Furthermore, before a woman worker reaches age 50, she is normally transferred from production work to clerical and support work which further militates against women advancing to higher grade levels. The only benefit is that the work is physically less demanding.

Just as retirement age is dictated by the government, a basic wage package is also mandated. Each and every occupation throughout China is ranked according to its degree of difficulty and, consequently, has a basic wage associated with it. Assignment to a position is based upon qualifying examinations. Depending upon how one does and whether or not the position is skilled or unskilled, the worker can be placed at any one of the eight skilled position levels or any one of the four unskilled position levels. In this unit, no woman worker is presently above a grade level five and none has ever attained a grade level eight. Unskilled labor starts at less than 20 yuan per month ($10.00 U.S. at the present exchange rate of 2 yuan per dollar), and skilled at 20 yuan per month. The scale is variable according to job classification with maximum grade level pay slightly in excess of 100 yuan per month. Thus, unskilled labor occupies the lower grade levels with advancement determined by length of service; semi-skilled labor occupies the middle grade levels with advancement based upon length of service and ability; and skilled labor occupies the higher grade levels with advancement based upon

length of service and technical knowledge.

Advancement from unskilled to semi-skilled and from semi-skilled to skilled status is virtually impossible. Thus how one does on the national qualifying examinations and the first job assignment becomes exceedingly critical. In the case of "youths awaiting employment," many of their various cooperatives have hired "old masters" to teach them the necessary technical skills. Qualifying examinations for workers are both tests of literacy and of natural aptitude; apprenticeships can only be gained if someone has an aptitude for the job. Consequently, the "old masters" play a pivotal role in training young Chinese workers outside the factory itself: on-the-job-training is virtually unknown. Further, positions tend to be for life--transfers are nearly impossible; therefore, one has to maximize one's potential before seeking employment.

While wages are low, the government has sought to raise China's standard of living through various wage bonuses and supplements. Basic bonuses, which are awarded monthly, are largely determined by attendance even though the criteria for receipt of them are supposed to be based upon work performance, workmanship, attitude, and attendance. Each unit has its own attendance policy with either partial or, in some cases, complete deduction of bonuses beginning with the first day of absence regardless if it is due to illness. However, in this mill, only after three days of sick leave or personal leave per month is there no bonus. Wages are deducted for personal leave as well, but special days are given for deaths in the family or for marriages. Prolonged illness necessitates medical proof; with it a worker is given up to six months with basic wage and, after six months, half basic wage.

The basic monthly bonus ranges from 5 to 20 yuan per month depending upon the level of skill and, obviously, the higher the skill, the higher the bonus. The monthly bonus is so taken for granted by workers in this unit that they invariably include it when asked their wages; in fact, workers had to consciously think what their basic wage actually was. Additionally, individual and factory overproduction bonuses are given. Individual bonuses are given quarterly, semi-annually, or yearly. With this particular unit, individual overproduction bonuses are given semi-annually. Should the factory exceed its yearly production quotas, all workers receive an additional year-end bonus which happens to coincide with Chinese New Year when money is traditionally given as gifts and debts are repaid.

In addition to these bonuses, wage supplements are also given. Workers are given a washing supplement for bathing and haircuts. Men receive 4.7 yuan per month; women receive 5.4 yuan. Women receive 70 fen (the Chinese equivalent of a cent) more to cover the cost of paper to make sanitary napkins. All workers who joined the labor force prior to 1966 get a supplementary wage ranging from a few fen to a maximum of 5 yuan per month if they live farther than three bus stops away from the mill. Also, workers who deal with dangerous chemicals or labor in adverse conditions such as extreme heat are given hazard pay.

Hazard pay is a way by which the unit mitigates complaints since safety regulations are nearly non-existent. While a union exists in theory, its major functions are political education, encouraging production, and administering social services such as distributing free movie tickets or passes to cultural events to workers and providing emergency funds for needy families. Since the Union's primary concern is ideological indoctrination and not occupational safety, workers may labor with job security but little else. In the mill, hypochlorite is used as a bleaching agent and male workers transport heavy sacks from a holding area to the bleaching vats. A fine powder fills the air, yet the workers wear no masks and little protective clothing because of the intense heat generated by the pressurized bleaching vats. Although uniforms (a shirt, pair of slacks, hair cap, and cloth gloves) are issued to all workers, they are not always used, and such items as safety glasses and rubber gloves and boots are not to be found. Consequently, large bleached areas of skin, chronic coughing, runny noses, and bloodshot eyes are constant companions to these workers.

One woman who is one of the handful of skilled women workers in the factory is a 34-year old who does highly specialized soldering work. The work involves soldering the exceedingly

intricate wire mesh that determines the quality of the paper. While soldering, she does not use safety goggles and, on occasion, sparks fly perilously close to her eyes as small burn scars attest. Given this and the intricacy of her work, she is slowly going blind. When questioned about why she takes such risks with her eyesight, she replied that she was encouraged to request crystal safety goggles on several occasions. Only after a serious near miss did the mill actually purchase a pair of safety glasses for her, but they were of such poor quality plastic that the distortion caused by them gave her such headaches that she chose not to wear them. Complaining would be useless; in fact, if she complained too much, she was afraid she would be regarded as having an "attitude" problem. She has the security, however, of knowing that eventually she will be assigned to another position once her eyesight precludes her from continuing her current skilled work.

While safety regulations are sorely lacking, benefits do exist for workers. Since the unit has been able to meet its domestic market quotas and hopes to expand into the international market, it is highly successful. Consequently, it has been able to finance such facilities as a day care center, a small medical clinic, and worker housing. The two-story, eight-room day care center was recently completed and serves 91 children from fifty-seven days old to seven years. The clinic and its eight member staff handle minor factory injuries. Because the mill is located in an area of new housing developments, there are as yet no major hospitals located in the near vicinity. In case of injury, consequently, workers are transported to a hospital with which the unit has a health insurance contract. This is significant since only employed persons and their families are eligible for hospitalization because no national health care plan exists. With the exception of food costs and a nominal registration fee (from 5 to 10 fen), all expenses are covered. Women workers receive their yearly Pap tests and gynecological examinations at the clinic, and emergency medical care for workers' children is also administered there. Further, the unit, with Ministry of Light Industry approval, has recently completed four new housing complexes and eventually hopes to be able to provide housing for all workers and their familes.

While the clinic handles many day-to-day health care problems, its chief function lies in family planning. The government instituted a national single-child policy in September 1980 with each unit responsible for developing its own particular program. Successful ones are subsidized by the government. Contraceptives are given free of charge to all married workers, but the real success of the program depends upon the acceptance by the workers of its material rewards. By enrolling in the program through their units, women are given extended maternity leave of six months as opposed to the normal fifty-six days or seventy days in the case of Caesarian sections. Other incentives for joining the program include a 5 yuan per month single-child bonus. Each parent receives 2.5 yuan from his/her respective unit for a total of ten years. This mill gives an additional 3 yuan per month to further subsidize the cost of raising a child. Also, the mother is given a 4 yuan per month nutritional supplement while nursing. Should a woman decide to have a tubal ligation at the birth of her child, she is given a one-time 50 yuan reward and all her medical expenses are likewise paid.

The basis of this policy is to try and curb China's enormous population and, consequently, tremendous pressure is placed upon families to join. China's population is so great that pressure is applied to unmarried persons as well. Delayed marriage is strongly adhered to--males should marry before age 28; females before age 24. Fraternization between young persons of the opposite sex is discouraged, and premarital sexual relations and co-habitation are censured by the government. As with all policies, of course, the government is not totally successful. There are severe sanctions placed upon families that fail to live up to their single-child contractual agreement. These include repayment of all benefits as well as deduction of both parents' wages for the extended maternity leave. Both parents are penalized because the government feels that it is not solely the woman's decision or responsibility for becoming or continuing the pregnancy since birth control devices are readily available. Males can easily have vasectomies, and abortions are given on demand with the unit even providing or paying for transportation to and from the hospital.

Once a child has reached the age of fifty-seven days, he or she is eligible to be placed in the factory's day care facility which is located near the housing complex. Children are able to remain at the day care facility until they begin school at age seven. Twenty-five women work at the facility: twenty-one assistants, three teachers, and the director. With the exception of a meal charge of 7 to 12 yuan a month depending upon the age of the child, and an additional incidental fee of one yuan per month, parents are liable for no other costs. Children are fed three meals and a snack of fresh fruit (in season) each day. These meals are planned by a nutritionist and prepared on the premises.The children follow a daily regimen of exercise, meals, classes, play, and rest. Caring for the children is a particularly demanding task in light of the single-child policy. Parents become overly concerned about their only child and, as a result, want only the best nutrition, best education, and best training for that child. This places tremendous pressure and responsibility upon the staff, particularly the director who must design the programs. Even so, most parents wish to send their child to the day care facility rather than have their parents or some other relative watch the child because of the advantages it provides in nutrition and education. Thus, while the facility handles 91 children, a waiting list of 20 more does exist.

Even more critical than health or day care facilities is basic housing. A critical housing shortage exists in China and since urban mass transit is grossly overcrowded housing close to one's unit is necessary. The Ministry of Light Industry has helped to alleviate this problem by providing this unit and others nearby with the funds to construct the massive new housing complex where I lived; however, it is not nearly enough. The mill hopes to use the export of its typing paper as a means of accumulating the reserves necessary to construct enough housing to eliminate the need for some of its employees to commute to work.

Not only does the unit provide housing, a day care facility, and medical coverage, but, as is the case with most other units, there are also dining and bathing facilities available to all workers. Workers must purchase meal tickets; for rationed items (rice and wheat) they must also turn in the appropriate ration coupon to obtain food. This enables workers to exchange meal tickets for food items that range from 10 to 40 fen in price. This unit is one of the few that has separate showers for men and women which allows workers to bathe every day rather than on an alternating day basis. Showers are open from 6:00 a.m. to 8:00 a.m. and from 3:00 p.m. to 6:00 p.m. On Sundays the showers are open to all family members of workers.

While these benefits help alleviate many of the serious concerns of life, the standard of living in China is so low that both spouses are virtually compelled to work. If both do not work, anything over the bare necessities of life become impossible; however when both work, it contributes to the lack of available jobs for younger people.

Once employed, workers labor six days a week, eight hours a day with a half-hour for meal time. The work day begins long before the 8:00 a.m. starting time, though. Generally, the housing complex comes to life by 5:00 a.m. with many of the workers rushing to make the day's purchases before going to work. Even with the unit's dining hall, most families prefer to prepare meals and eat at home. Despite the fact that the dining hall is subsidized, it is still cheaper to prepare meals at home. Workers further complained that the food was "too oily." Since the vast majority of workers do not own refrigerators--foreigners and high level cadres are the privileged few who can afford such high-priced luxuries--meals are a daily struggle. Queuing in line for food (as well as any consumer item) is a way of life; therefore, purchasing food has an egalitarian nature. Since various food items must be purchased from stalls that sell only that item, both husbands and wives--and later children--must be willing to divide the tasks or the long lines make it impossible to accomplish them all. This tends to continue into meal preparation and housework as well; however, once the woman is transferred to an administrative post or retires, traditional roles come to the fore, and she takes charge of household duties.

Queuing in line is further exacerbated since all workers receive the same five holidays a year and the vast majority have Sunday off. Further, women workers receive an extra half-day

off in celebration of International Women's Day, March 8. This particular mill operates on a three-shift basis with the vast majority of workers getting Sunday off. Sundays are far from being a day of rest, however. Just as workdays are filled with necessary activities for day-to-day survival, so is Sunday. While workers relish the idea of being able to "sleep in" until 6:00 a.m., early rising is still required in order to go into Beijing proper to shop for food and other needed purchases. Days off are spent shopping primarily for staples and personal goods with the majority of time being spent battling the ever larger crowds and standing in even longer lines than work days produce. On top of all this, cleaning, visiting relatives, washing, and family recreation are all reserved for that precious "day off."

While day-to-day life tends to be a struggle for Chinese workers, Chinese women workers at this unit receive many of the benefits that concern the women the world over. Admittedly some traditional sex stereotyping in employment exists, but the benefits are superior to those found in other developing countries. While joining a unit means an employee receives child care, health care, and subsidized housing, it also means receiving lifetime employment. The security this provides cannot be understressed--worker's jobs are not, as in most countries of the world, at the mercy of the vagaries of a market economy. Although employment is no longer guaranteed and workers can now be fired, presumably, for incompetence, it is extremely difficult to do so in the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution. No one wants to take the responsibility for actually firing someone. The only way a worker can realistically lose his or her job is by being absent from work for a specified length of time without a legitimate excuse. For this unit, the time is three consecutive days. This rarely happens because lifetime employment is a two-way street. If you are guaranteed employment, when you lose it your possibilities for ever receiving employment again are virtually nil.

While government policies dictate what benefits units are to provide their workers so they are relatively consistent throughout the country, the working conditions in this unit should not be regarded as prototypical of <u>all</u> Chinese factories. Living within the same housing complex were numerous women who worked in other larger State-owned factories. The picture that emerged concerning working conditions was significantly different from that of the paper mill.

The majority of these workers labored for a light bulb and fixture factory that employs over 4,000 workers, predominantly women. While these women enjoy the same basic benefits as those in the mill, regulations are far more rigidly enforced. Both factories have regulations regarding late arrivals and early departures, but slight infractions of these rules do not normally result in bonus deductions at the mill. Women at the light bulb and fixture factory, however, have portions of their bonuses deducted each and every time they arrive late or leave early. After three days of absence, not only is the monthly bonus lost, but portions of succeeding bonuses, as well as any yearly overproduction bonus, are likewise affected. Party supervision is also more stringent. Weekly meetings on political studies are mandatory with one day's wage, in most cases, deducted for absence. Such meetings are held at the paper mill, but only when government documents are issued or when new government policies are announced. While supposedly mandatory, wage sanctions are rarely employed against transgressors.

In addition to the usual work team leaders and Party members who penetrate all levels of Chinese factories, the light bulb and fixture factory also has numerous group activists. They are workers who primarily are or wish to become Party members and permeate the entire factory urging fellow co-workers to attend meetings, promoting the current political campaign, and, of course, serving as "positive" examples to others. In these ways they exert enormous social control over other workers and seek to ingratiate themselves to both team leaders and Party members; consequently, far more "flattering and fawning" of leaders is reported by the women at the light bulb and fixture factory than by workers at the paper mill.

Political and social controls that make working conditions at the light bulb and fixture factory far less desirable than the paper mill are further exacerbated by a requirement to work overtime. While the paper mill can successfully meet its domestic requirements and still have reserves enough in capital, materials, labor, and time to contemplate expanding into foreign

markets, the light bulb and fixture factory, which is rapidly attempting to do the same, does not have the reserves to do it and places tremendous pressure on its workers to work overtime. Workers are supposed to be paid by the hour, but since there are not sufficient monetary reserves to pay overtime wages, conpensatory time-off is given. Compensatory time-off, however, is only one-quarter; that is, a worker receives only one hour off for every four hours of overtime worked. Exceptional workers are further compensated by being sent to a seaside resort in Beidehai with all expenses paid for a few weeks, but this comes only afters years of dedicated service and untold hours of overtime. Workers at the paper mill also work overtime, but there it tends to be by choice, not by command.

From the above discussion, it is clear that Chinese workers, and particularly Chinese women workers, have significant advantages over workers in other developing countries. They have child and health care, subsidized housing, and job security that are enviable. Gross exploitation at the expense of a market economy has been mitigated; however, new policies that have been politicized recently show a change in this, making profit more important. Clearly, with the promulgation and retreat that have characterized Chinese industrial policy since 1949, only time will tell what will happen. While the obvious differences between various units should be studied in greater detail, the recent controls on foreign researchers make this far more difficult. Until these controls are relaxed, the day-to-day life, particularly of Chinese urban workers, will continue to be shrouded in mystery with only brief glimpses of light shining through. It is my hope that this brief study has provided one of those all too infrequent glimpses.

Woman and Factory Work in Punjab, Pakistan

Anita M. Weiss

Throughout the developing world, social relations and institutions are experiencing far-reaching changes in social identity, largely because of the impact of modern forms of technology and the influence of western culture. In Muslim countries, people are caught between the pull of economic developments resulting from ties to the advanced capitalist states and traditional Islamic ways of life, especially in social relations.

The position of women in industrial activity in the area now Pakistan is a striking instance of this pull. Historically, women in this area did not work outside of the home unless they were from the very lowest classes. The movement towards incorporating women into industrial activity is a phenomenon not more than a decade old. The purpose of this paper is to investigate how modernity and tradition are reconciled in women's work in a modern factory setting: how beliefs and needs are adjusted to each other, especially the accomodations made to purdah.

Traditional Role of South Asian Muslim Women

Historically, there have been few respectable options for those women forced to seek work outside of the home. In the rural areas women could work in the fields, raise animals, and do sewing or handicrafts in others' homes. In the cities, however, the only employment open to women was to work as a maidservant or da'i (midwife) for another woman. Some would turn to singing, dancing or prostitution and thus place themselves outside the parameters of respectability.

For a woman to work outside the home meant that the men of the family were unable to provide for her. As the culture outside of the home revolved entirely around the actions of men, it was considered dishonorable and shameful for men to have "their women" work. A woman leaving her home to work--leaving purdah--is an act of great seriousness.

Purdah, (seclusion), has developed into a formalized separation of women from the world of men in South Asia. Though the word literally means "curtain" in Urdu, it has come to connote both the physical and practical separations between the activities of men and those of women.

Whether in rural or urban areas, the man's world has concerned external activities including providing food and shelter for his family, maintaining social relations within the community, and performing religious obligations in the mosque. In rural areas, women have been able

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to perform such functions as rice transplanting, cattle herding, and other tasks common to an agrarian subsistence economy. However, urban women were left without such options. They would spend their time with their children in the zenana, a separate section of the house where men would rarely enter.[1] Here, all the women in the family would live communally, stitching their clothes, preparing food, and tending the children. Generations of women would live together, including all the wives of each male family member.[2]

Until relatively recent times, if a woman from a fairly well-off family had to leave her house, she was carried out on a palanquin, absolutely concealed from the outside world.[3] In the nineteenth century, women began to don the burqa (fitted body-veil) or chador (large cloth which drapes over the body) when they had to leave the house, a portable purdah. While Islam enjoins a woman to cover her hair and "bodily ornaments," South Asian Muslim women would customarily cover their face with the veil as well, so that they could not be recognized. Even today, a woman rarely goes out alone even in the veil, so that there can be no question regarding her virtue. If a woman comes into contact with any strange man or distant relative by accident, she observes "eye purdah," looking down and away to avoid eye contact.[4]

Women, Work and Development

The initial stage of development in Pakistan (1947-58) was based primarily on import substitution and the control of financial institutions, directed by the large industrial communities of Karachi.[5] The subsequent decade of Ayub Khan's rule (1958-68) is considered by many to have been the "Golden Age of Industry," when massive industrialization was attempted through a package including foreign aid and government assistance under the auspices of martial law. However, through the end of the 1960s, women in the Punjab were excluded from the industrial workforce. There were no precipitating forces which caused their employment to become necessary. There was an abundant and willing supply of unskilled male laborers. In addition, literacy levels among women were low at this time, thereby increasing their unattractiveness to industry. The proportion of economically active adult females has been reported as between 6.3% and 10.5% in the period 1961-75.[6]

It was not until the Bhutto era (1971-77) that women entered the workforce in large numbers, as Nasra Shah shows in her research on trends in labor participation among women in Pakistan.[7] Lahore, the capital of the Punjab (the largest of Pakistan's four provinces), had become by then the locus of the national industrial strength, setting the stage for similar growth patterns elsewhere in the country. Lahore's growth epitomizes the type of growth occuring on a smaller scale in other industrializing cities such as Wazirabad, Gujranwala and Faisalabad. Although women had been hired in industry in Karachi earlier, this had little effect elsewhere in Pakistan. However, the employment of women in factories in Lahore has had important implications for industry throughout the country.

It must be stressed that women have only been working in factories in Lahore during the last ten years. In 1973 it was estimated that merely 2% of the female population in the Punjab was employed in non-agricultural occupations.[8] Women in 1980 were noticeably more active in the urban labor force.

Women are generally employed in two types of industrial situations: cottage and light industries. Women in cottage industries work at home at piece-work rates. This labor does not cause them to have to undergo the experience of leaving the household. Though they may now have their own incomes (which is often used first to buy burqas and then is put towards their dowry), little else changes for them. In contrast, women in light industries, who primarily pack and repackage goods, do come to the factory to work. Tradition and modernity must be reconciled in women's lives in this context, as will be shown in the experiences of the pharmaceutical industry of Lahore.

The Pharmaceutical Industry

The indigenous pharmaceutical industry in Punjab largely dates from partition. Since 1947, this import-substitution industry received development assistance from foreign transnational corporations in the form of joint ventures and from the government of Pakistan through import licenses and bonus schemes. In Lahore, an indigenous elite emerged in this field, operating their own factories which mainly mix, pack and repackage basic imported materials. The employment of women in this industry is not yet widespread (not quite 25% of local units employ women), but from interviews with both owners and laborers, it seems to be a growing trend.

There is always an initial impetus which causes people to act against the dictates of custom. As a result of Ayub's thrust towards mass literacy, there are more educated women suddenly available for the workforce. Though in absolute terms the numbers of educated women remain low (13.7% in Punjab),[9] there has been a relative increase in female school attendance (and therefore literacy) during the past decade:

% Increase in Enrollment by Sex in Punjab
by School Level between 1971-78[10]

	Females	Males
Primary Schools	24.5	15.6
Middle Schools	32.7	19.5
High Schools	60.5	43.3
College	35.7	5.7

Women appear more attractive as workers not only because they can read and write, but also because they have an understanding of time and punctuality developed as a result of their school experience. Because women are now more educated, they are putting off marriage for a few years, and often welcome the chance to be able to work to further increase their dowry. Though the institution of dowry has been officially outlawed, in practice the size of a girl's dowry remains a prime factor in selecting a daughter-in-law.

Women have also been employed in this industry as a response to the deteriorating labor relations between employers and unions which began in the mid-1970s. Bhutto's popularist government, using the slogan of "Islamic Socialism," gave much power to labor unions during that time. Workers were paid higher wages, could not be fired without substantive cause, and their unions were able to shut down factories when engaged in labor disputes. Women were then hired for political reasons, as they are considered easier to control and they do not join unions. The fact that they can be paid less becomes incidental to factory owners. If any woman says anything about a union, she will usually be fired immediately. One industrialist says, in response to why he has begun employing women:

> No, no union here now, because in Pakistan, you know, these girls, they have no problem in Pakistan. They're deserving ones, they're in need of work and jobs, and they don't indulge in the politics at work.[11]

Another factory owner, whose union had burned down his plant in 1975, gives his reason for hiring women:

> Women, I must say, don't create a lot of problems. They don't form unions, they don't put you into trouble.[12]

The general consensus among factory owners is that women are more concerned with family issues and their own impending marriages, and their employment can therefore be used as a tactic

against the power of labor unions.

Due to Pakistan's considerable balance of payments deficit--Pakistan has no oil--the Bhutto government encouraged large numbers of laborers to migrate to the Middle East. These men would then send their hard currency wages back to their families in Pakistan. This practice has now become Pakistan's largest "export" (1.5 million males out of a total population of 80 million in 1980). However, this has caused a shortage of educated male laborers within Pakistan, since they can earn substantially more in the Gulf states. Now that the dominant male (or males) of the family was abroad, the newly educated, unmarried women found employment opportunities and felt that they should--or were compelled to--make some contribution towards both their livelihood and their dowry.

Women do the packing in pharmaceutical factories, which consists of affixing labels on jars and then putting them into cartons. They are rarely given the more important jobs of mixing, preparing, shaping or processing the chemicals. Their wages tend to be half that of men, averaging Rs. 280 per month for performing work equivalent to that of men earning Rs. 500 (in 1980).

Most of the women working in these factories[13] have either a brother or father working in the Middle East, or else that relative is deceased and the family destitute because of it. When these women were in school, they had never thought they would ever work in a factory. They feel that they must put up with the occasional abuses from the men in their plants, many of whom still regard women who work as dishonorable. If conditions were different, most of them would quit. They find solace in the fact that they are earning money for their dowries, and therefore will be able to have some say regarding who they will marry. This is a major transformation that is developing in Punjabi culture, because previously a woman was always told who she would marry by her elders; since she is supplying much of her own dowry, her opinion is now considered.

In interviews with small groups of women at three factories, a number of similarities in backgrounds and orientations were revealed. Most of these women had been educated through the eighth grade, with many of them being matriculates (equivalent of high school graduates). Nasra Shah found that "currently married women" made up the smallest proportion of urban working women;[14] all of the women interviewed by me in this study were unmarried. Therefore, they work in factories after schooling is completed but before marriage.

In terms of their political orientations, many of these women firmly supported the Bhutto family and the Pakistan People's Party (PPP), which is strongly supported by labor groups throughout the country. Because of the fragile economic circumstances which these women face, they refuse to become involved in unions, feeling that there is too much to risk: disapproval from both the martial law government and their prospective in-laws.

Another striking characteristic of these women is that most tended to be purdah-nashin (purdah-observing women). This connotes a certain class level which has been attained, since the poorest classes rarely can indulge in the luxury of observing purdah. These women always live with their families; an elder family member has usually met the factory owner.

The women prefer working conditions where purdah can be observed. They leave home in their burqas, often commuting to the factory by bus or on a bicycle driven by a male relative. Once at the room where they work, generally the packing room, they remove the veil. Both women and factory owners alike prefer segregated working areas. In effect, the room where these women work is a zenana. Extremely close relations develop among the women working together, which extend beyond the workplace and usually become lifelong. This is interesting in that this is not characteristic of the relations which develop among factory workers in western cultures, but rather is an extension of traditional values. Women have no alternative of developing relationships with other women except for those very close to them, for in traditional society they have little opportunity to meet strange women. Their lives are confined to

their own extended family and the families which have had close relations with their own for generations. Close, lifelong relationships often develop between girls attending school together for many years; their relatives come to regard these schoolgirl friends as extended family members. In a similar manner, acquaintances made at the factory are woven into this familial network. The girls play important roles at each other's weddings and exchange gifts among themselves during festivals such as Eid-ul-fitr.

Relations with fellow male factory workers are also integrated into a familial pattern. Women avoid dealing with male workers as much as possible, but when they must encounter them, they do so without the veil. This is similar in practice to a woman's relation with a fairly close male cousin: while not in purdah from him, she avoids contact with him. If there is some reason which causes them to meet and talk, they do so without restrictions. Men working in the factory tend to be regarded in this manner, for occasions arise when these women must converse with them. Though the men are no longer strangers, they are not in the category of husbands and brothers in front of whom the women can freely walk. In some instances, men have also come to regard the women working in their factories as "their" relatives. Suddenly, the obligations of izzat, honor, apply to the workplace. Men will adopt a respectful, protective attitude towards these women. However, this relationship does not exist in all factories in which women are employed; some men continue to assume inveterage attitudes towards working women and harass them.

Unlike working women in Cairo, Egypt, who often marry their fellow factory workers, Pakistani women rarely arrange their own marriages. Instead, they are arranged by the families, with the assumption that the two partners have never previously met (unless actually related). Any hint that a woman has met her future husband alone would bring reprimands and severe condemnation. Therefore, women do not view their fellow male workers as potential mates. Since marriage is often the key which releases women from having to work, they will do nothing to jeopardize their chances.

As stated earlier, women work in factories after leaving school and before marriage. It is percieved that a family "gives" a daughter to another family in marriage. Therefore, it is considered far more disrespectful to have a new daughter-in-law of the family work, who was just "given" to the family, than to have one's own daughter work out of economic necessity. Married women may do piece work in the home but they will rarely work outside.

There are many contradictions inherent in women's working in factories, though often they are resolved in a traditional manner, as shown above regarding relations with fellow male factory workers. Less westernized factory owners remain hesitant to hire women because they feel that men and women should not intermix. One Urdu-speaking owner recounts:

> I did employ women, but no longer. In Lahore, I think, especially in Punjab, though perhaps not in Sind (Karachi), the time hasn't come where we can employ women workers and they can do it okay. Being a small company with limited space, we don't think that both co-workers can work together properly. If they can have a separate section, they can do all right. They can do such things as packaging, injectibles and ointments. All this is possible. The problem arises from intermixing, which is just not good. The workers weren't working properly, they were never in a working mood. The men realized that the women had to work due to hardships at home, such as the father dying or the like, and they began to take advantage of those women's situations. In Lahore, women work when conditions force them to work. Here, the male workers wanted to exploit the women, to test their reactions. This leads to an unhealthy atmosphere.[15]

Another factory had employed women in their packing section prior to the 1974 Drugs Act,

which caused them to temporarily close down. After they reopened, their production was greatly decreased, and they chose not to rehire the women workers.

Conflicts have also arisen between male and female workers on the issue of unions. The unions realize that a major reason why factory owners are hiring women is to weaken their power. One owner wanted to employ women but claimed that his union would not allow him to do so.

Finally, it is worth noting that for all of the above reasons, factory owners tend to treat their women workers differently than their male workers. It is a common practice to give large bonuses to workers on the occasion of their marriage of the birth of a child. However, these traditional employer/employee obligations are sometimes practiced to the extreme with female workers: one factory owner actually arranged the marriages for three of the women working for him. He had made the initial and subsequent contacts with the prospective bridegrooms' families. Many industrialists noted that they felt a strong sense of responsibility towards the women working in their companies. Most employers paid for the weddings of their female workers, knowing full well that the woman would no longer be working for them after her marriage. These men are playing roles in much the same manner that a zamindar, rural landlord, would in carrying out his reciprocal obligations in a more traditional context.

Although prospects for women in industry in the Punjab are increasing, obstacles remain before they become fully integrated into the workforce. When they do, they will have more power to control their lives. While the zenana imprisoned them in the past, separate rooms in the factories where women can work are short-term solutions to some of the difficulties which women face. To paraphrase Virginia Woolf, in order to achieve independence women in Pakistan truly need to have their own income and a room of their own.

Footnotes

[1]The Zenana was often the darkest, coldest section of the house, rarely providing a healthy environment. Mazhar ul Haq Khan gives a descriptive account of life in the zenana in his Purdah and Polygamy (Peshawar: Imperial Press, 1972), particularly pp. 102-146.

[2]A Muslim man is allowed to have four wives simultaneously, with the provision that he cares for them equally (a rare feat).

[3]Prakash Tandon gives an interesting, informative account of Punjabi women being carried in a palanquin in his Punjabi Century: 1857-1947 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: U.C. Press, 1961). This biographical account of his family in the Punjab, though focusing on Hindus, illustrates much of traditional Punjabi culture during the British Raj.

[4]For a provocative account of the many restrictions imposed on a woman when she wears the veil, see Patricia Jeffrey Frogs in a Well: Indian Women in Purdah (London: Zed Press, 1979).

[5]For analyses of Pakistan's early development experiences, see Rashid Amjad Pakinstan's Growth Experience: Objectives, Achievement and Impact on Poverty: 1947-1977 (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1978); Gustav Papanek Pakinstan's Development: Social Goals and Private Incentives (Boston: Harvard U.P., 1967); and Pervez Tahir Pakistan: an Economic Spectrum (Lahore: Arslan Publications, 1974).

[6]Nasra M. Shah and Makhdoom A. Shah compiled data from three Censuses of Pakistan (1951, 1961, and 1972), the Labour Force Survey (1973), the National Impact Survey (1968) and the Pakistan Fertility Survey (1975) and reported their findings in "Trends and Structure of Female Labour Force Participation in Rural and Urban Pakistan" (Women in Contemporary India and South Asia, 1980), pp. 98-99. Some samples reported up to 20% of the female population had ever worked.

[7]Ibid., pp. 95-123. Hanna Papanek discusses the "separate worlds" in which women's work has been conducted and the opportunities which existed for women in Pakistan in the early 1970s in "Purdah in Pakistan: Seclusion and Modern Occupations for Women" (Journal of Marriage and the Family, Vol. 33, No. 3, August 1971), pp. 517-530.

[8]Out of a total female population of 11,980,500 in 1973, 1,100,100 (9.2%) were considered in the civilian labor force. However, of those, 59.1% (650,200) were considered unemployed while 40.9% (450,000) were employed. Of those women who were employed, 59.8% (269,000) were employed in agricultural occupations; 40.2% (180,300) were employed in non-agricultural occupations. These statistics are reported in Bureau of Statistics, Government of the Punjab Development Statistics of the Punjab: 1978 (Lahore, 1979), pp. 259. Their source is the 1973 "Housing Economic & Demographic Survey" conducted by the Census, Government of Pakistan.

[9]Ibid., p.155. Only 27.5% of the total adult population in 1978 were considered literate: 38.9% of the male adult population were literate; 13.7% of the female adult population were literate.

[10]Planning and Development Board, Government of the Punjab, Punjab Development Review and Prospects (Lahore, Eighth Issue, 1979), p. 312. Their source is the Government of the Punjab, Bureau of Education, Lahore.

[11]From an interview with Mohammad Irshad Butt of B.I. Drugs Company by the author in Lahore on September 12, 1979.

[12]From an interview with Mian Rhazes Maqsud of Maqi Chemical Industries Ltd. by the author in Lahore on January 20, 1980.

[13]The following information on women in pharmaceutical factories was garnered from many interviews conducted with women working in three pharmaceutical plants between August 1979 - February 1980 by the author in Lahore. There was no formal format to the interviews, nor can statistics be corrolated, since the sample was relatively small. These were qualitative in-depth interviews; anonymity was requested by the respondents.

[14]Nasra M. Shah and Makhdoom A. Shah (op.cit.), p.99.

[15]From an interview with Mohammad Siddiq of Unison Chemical Works by the author in Lahore on January 21, 1980.

Women's Work: Factory, Family and Social Class in an Industrializing Order

Janet Salaff and Aline Wong

Introduction

Early models of the transformation from pre-industrial agrarian or mercantile orders to industrial society stressed the falling away of social group support as individuals sought their place in the factory and market. Such a model, now termed "modernization theory," believes that development requires the individual to achieve apart from the group. Social class and kin ties in fact obstruct advancement in the industrial order.[1] More recent studies of the structures and processes of industrialization, however, greatly alter such an individual-centered view.[2] Studies find instead that social class, occupational group relations[3] and kin[4] structure the developing order.

This paper contributes to the debate on the nature of group supports to the work force in the process of development through the study of workers in a nation that has undergone rapid growth: the Republic of Singapore. Singapore is an important case because its state deliberately pursues policies to aid the penetration of capital and extend the market, and to reduce class cleavages.

Singapore's rapid development demonstrates the effects of capitalist development on social relationships,[5] the topic of this study. If modernization theory predicts accurately the demise of group ties, then the increased demand for wage workers should draw upon women from all classes at the time of the take-off to industrialization. Workers will then move forward in the labor force at equal rates, regardless of the structural position of their industry. They will pay little heed to kin claims, which will in fact appear onerous.

If, on the contrary, group ties become crucial links from the pre-industrial to the industrial order, then we would expect workers' opportunities to remain class-based. Their position in the work force at the outset will determine their progress under the development regime. Even more, kin and other group supports will contribute to the workers' adjustment to the new system.

Respondents

We base our analysis on 100 young married Singapore Chinese couples from a range of

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social classes. The entire sample was interviewed in "Phase 1" (the mid-1970s) and 45 of the couples were reinterviewed in "Phase 2" (1981). We term these reinterviewed couples our "Panel" and the years between Phases 1 and 2 the "Interphase." We contacted our Phase 1 sample of women when they were aged 20 to 30, with at least one child, through factory rosters and district maternal and child health clinics. Each Singapore mother is registered in the clinic that serves her district, and we drew respondents' names from clinic records in settlements of varied economic environments. Our study sample consists of a series of quotas for husband's occupation to coincide roughly with the socioeconomic structure of the populace as indicated in the 1970 census, and includes couples whose husbands hold farm, menial, average, and above average working-class jobs; white-collar workers; and entrepreneurs and professionals.

We divide our couples into strata based on their parents' occupational status and on the couples' joint income, educational level, and occupational status. We call our ordinary working-class families Group I; affluent working-class couples are Group IIa and middle-class couples are Group IIb.[6]

We oversampled working wives to ensure adequate cases for analysis. Most of our full-time wage earning women worked in factories, and their rate of employment exceeded that of the Singapore populace as a whole.[7]

Phase 1

Class and Women's Work

The median gross monthly wage for all Singapore women in 1975 was under $200 a month.[8] This low wage could not fully support a worker and forced her to leave the wage labor force when other family demands became pressing. Our married women employed full time tended to earn more than the median women's wage, since the lowest earners had already left the labor force. Our women divide into a minority of poorly paid workers, mainly Group I, who earn the low median wage; the bulk who earn between $200 and $300; and a minority who earned higher women's wages (mainly Group II) (see Table 2).

Wages of our working women were also closely linked to the structural position of the industry. Low earners were mainly found in the "peripheral sector," which are industries outside the key growth areas of the economy.[9] These include service sector workers and operatives in small and medium-sized, locally capitalized firms with limited mechanization, such as textile and garment, pottery and toy manufacturing firms. Of our 12 low-waged women, eight in fact were textile and garment workers. They had low education and lacked English-language schooling and could not compete for the higher paid women's jobs. By contrast, only two of the 13 women who received relatively high wages of $300 or more toiled in these two industries, and both had skills and authority: a tailor who taught dressmaking at home and a section leader in a sizeable textile firm.

In contrast, the better capitalized transnational firms, termed here "core sector" firms, such as electronics and electrical machinery firms that held a strong position in the export market, paid their workers somewhat more. Of the 27 Phase 1 women who worked in this key industry, only a single woman earned under $200, and she was employed in a local television firm. In fact, eight of the 13 best-paid women, who earned over $300 monthly in Phase 1, worked in foreign-owned electronics firms. However, some had experienced a temporary four-day work week due to the recession in this industry in 1974. Thus, the nature of the industrial product, its source of capitalization and market share and skill level of the worker all bore on their wage levels.

It should be emphasized, however, that few of our women were high earners: only three Group II women with semiprofessional positions regularly commanded over $400 as a basic wage. Only two blue-collar women raised their approximately $300 basic wage above $400 with overtime

or moonlighting. The structural position of the industry and gender relations combined to limit women's training, mobility and wages.[10]

Group I full-time working women worked primarily to make ends meet, next to invest in a better family future, and only last for individual interests. The average basic monthly wage of our Group I husbands was $347. However two-fifths of these men earned less than the 1975 median wage for all Singapore men ($319 a month), and one-quarter earned below the poverty line of $250, an insufficient family wage. Since there is little public assistance in Singapore, our low-waged men depended not only on their overtime labor and a second job, but also on their wives' full or part-time wage work. The following cases make this clear.

Case Study 1. A hardworking man who depended upon his wife's income to support the household was Chua Teo Hwa, a bus conductor who earned below poverty line wages of $220 and whose peripheral sector firm provided him with scant advancement opportunities. His wife Ah Geok was an experienced electronics assemblist in the American-owned Hewlett Packard firm, who was expecting their second child. Ah Geok was the daughter of a washerwoman and a bus conductor who helped Teo Hwa land his Phase 1 job. After completing primary school, Ah Geok entered domestic service in the home of an expatriate family, and around 1969 took up employment in her present firm. Her $246 monthly wage more than doubled their household income and hence was essential. Ah Geok was among the few of our Group I women who believed that a working woman could expand her horizons and knowledge at work, but she maintained she used this information to benefit her family. She explained why she worked:

> Prices and inflation are so high nowadays that I have to work. I also like to socialize with my workmates and I like learning from them and others on the job.

Ah Geok beamed as she pointed to her recently purchased layette of pillows and blankets in the far corner of the room. Her mother-in-law still looked askance at her daugher-in-law's employment, but Ah Geok had convinced the whole Chua family that everyone would benefit. Indeed, the Chuas were one of the minority of Group I couples that purchased a new apartment by our Phase 2 reinterviews. Ah Geok's wages helped bring about this family upgrading achievement.

Other men who had just entered core sector firms but lacked seniority earned below the median, and their wives' earnings helped eke out the family wage.

Case Study 2. Choo Hoey, a secondary school educated technical assistant in a small soil testing firm earned only $300, but he expected to double his wages within three years with the growth of the firm and seniority. His wife, Poh Tee, had worked for four years soldering electronic components in the television section of Roxy, a locally capitalized firm. At $6.20 a day, she received the lowest wage of our electronics and electrical machinery workers. The Choos paid a family to foster their son during the week and this expense left them with a small net gain from Poh Tee's earnings. Nevertheless, the Choos represented a poor but aspiring Singapore family that in this difficult Phase 1 period spent 88% of their income on basic items but entertained hopes for a better future. Choo Hoey told us,

> There isn't very much left over from Poh Tee's salary, but whatever remains still helps. Even though Poh Tee's income is very small, I don't want her to leave her job because she would have a lot of trouble getting it back again later. We need $1,000 to furnish our new flat, and we have already saved $400. We borrowed the rest from my employer and friends, and we'll repay them a little each month and they won't charge interest on the loan.

This is a family which, because of the importance of Choo Hoey's industry to the development

program and his secondary education, could be expected to prosper with economic restructuring. The wife's income was central to the couple's survival, and they were one of the few Group I couples who purchased their own flat in Phase 1.

Another common reason for Group I women to work despite their often low wages was the inability of their husbands to hold a steady job, or to bring home a regular paycheck.

Case study 3. An example was Tan Soo Lee whose husband, a skilled fitter, gambled his wages in Phase 1. She dramatically illustrates the dynamic interrelationship of women's work with their families' need for their wages and wider family assistance. Before her marriage at age 18, Soo Lee worked next to her mother in a laundry as an ironer, and followed this position three years later with an assemblist's job in a foreign-owned factory where she worked for nearly 10 years. In Phase 1, Soo Lee's husband, Tuan Kwok, was an irregular worker by choice who gambled part of his paycheck and gave Soo Lee little for the household maintenance. Soo Lee's father was a low paid warehouseman, who also gambled away part of his wage. Soo Lee's mother had left her washerwoman position to obtain a food vendor's license in an army camp to support her family of 11 children. Angry at her husband's irresponsibility, Soo Lee moved with her two children into a three-room rented flat, which she shared with her parents and younger siblings. Tuan Kwok eventually followed, and for several years continued his erratic work habits. The two families then lived in a single household and were essentially supported by Soo Lee and her mother.

Soo Lee was a conscientious worker who acquired skills rapidly and in Phase 1 earned $10 per day in the transformer section of the electronics factory. She frequently helped newcomers with their tasks and performed some of the lead-girl activities on her own initiative. Soo Lee told us proudly in Phase 1 that she was under consideration for promotion to section head (indeed several years later she was offered this lower supervisory position). During a 1974 production slump at her electronics factory, rumors circulated of an imminent factory shutdown. At that time Soo Lee formulated plans against her possible dismissal. She withdrew $1,000 from a chit fund in which she participated, and used her mother's hawker permit. With her starting capital, Soo Lee purchased the equipment to sell laksa, a popular, pungently spiced vegetable and sea food soup with coconut milk base in a six-table stall in the new market in her housing estate. Her mother taught Soo Lee to prepare and serve laksa, and recruited two of her sons as work assistants. The entire household backed Soo Lee's ambitious scheme.

The electronics factory did not close its doors after all, and Soo Lee maintained her position there and moonlighted at the stall for some time. She awoke at 5 in the morning to prepare the laksa ingredients in her kitchen. Her younger brothers left home first and by daybreak set up the tables. Soo Lee cooked at the stall until after lunch. She then returned home to rest until her 3 p.m. factory shift. Her brothers remained behind to shut down the stall and wash up. While Soo Lee was at the factory, her younger sister cared for her two children, and her father cooked their meals. Soo Lee was still responsible for the family laundry and tidying the flat, although her wider family aided her with many of the homemaking burdens. Soo Lee gave part of her close to $800 combined earnings each month to her mother for the household expenses, and gave $30 to her father for pocket money. Soo Lee's substantial earnings guaranteed not only family survival, but also education for her younger siblings and rent for the family flat. They assured her of a central and powerful role in her household.

These cases show how family survival, coupled with rising cash needs and hopes of improving family living standards through the market, all required wages and drew these women into the labor force.

Group I women who did not work full-time differed from our full-time wage-earning women mainly in their low education and a set of work experiences almost entirely limited to peripheral sector work. Although 31 of these 33 women had once worked for a wage, their employ-

ment experience was limited to low-waged labor in small shops and factories, such as peanut packagers, manufacturers of soya sauce, and of paper money, incense and other religious paraphernalia. Most had worked only intermittently, and were called back home to mind younger siblings so that their mothers could work. Some had assisted the family's hawker enterprise, small store, or barnyard or vegetable plot without pay. Many were domestic servants between factory stints, and few accumulated seniority on the job. Nearly all our homebound mothers referred to their weak market position as the reason they were homemakers after their children were born. Only two of the 33 homemakers had some secondary education and a higher earning potential, but were not employed because their husbands wished them to maintain the home and care for their children. The rest could not obtain a living wage.

Nevertheless, many Group I mothers with little education or training who were unable to command salaries at or above the $200 level desired to supplement their families' income and sought informal part-time working arrangements that enabled them to care for their children while they worked. As an alternative to the formal labor market, some Group I women took in sewing or washed clothing for neighbors while caring for their children in their homes and attending to the other duties of family maintenance that fell to them. Government workforce tabulations reveal few formal part-time positions for married women. However, our study suggests that undocumented part-time tasks may be underreported in the work force statistics.

It was still, however, often difficult for Group I women to manage piecework garment stitching part time or other paid work from their homes because of the many activities they attended to which helped their families to survive. A number of women had to suspend their home seaming while their children were small. Some considered taking up home labor when their children went to school. Others nurtured the hope of reentering the labor market in a more flexible role of hawker or part-time domestic servant. But it is nevertheless true that most well paid jobs are found in large-scale organizations, while opportunities for self-employed entrepreneurs are rapidly decreasing in Singapore. And we were later to find these women had great difficulty returning to work.

Other low educated Group I women were unable to enter wage employment if their unpaid labor were needed on a family farm, in a store, or to release higher earning women from domestic chores for work outside the home. An example was the wife of a charcoal dealer in a family firm. She helped her mother-in-law in the home, keeping the household running while other family members operated the shop. Thus, our homebound Phase 1 women because of structural reasons of class and gender lacked education or core sector work experience, and were doomed to low wages. They therefore remained outside the labor force and instead performed crucial domestic tasks for their families and kin, which allowed these others to work.

Group II full-time working women earned higher wages than many Group I women because they possessed the essential education, training and job tenure necessary for core sector work and lower-level supervisory positions, and thus reasonably good women's wages. Table 2 shows that 25 of the 27 Group II wives who worked in the formal sector at the time of our interviews earned $200 or more. Eleven of these Group II women grossed more than $300, most as electronics assemblists, lower-level supervisors and semiprofessionals. The two low earners worked in garment and pottery factories.

Group II women also worked to aid their families. Most Group II husbands earned above the male median wage. Nevertheless, seven earned under the median (they formed 17% of Group II); three of them earned under poverty level wages. All of the wives of these low earning men made a substantial contribution to family survival: six worked full time and the seventh had recently done so and now seamed from her home. The working wives of these men had solid education and earned above $200. Thus they substantially raised the family wage.

More important than these few that toiled to raise their families above poverty, however, and in contrast to most Group I women, were those who worked for long-term betterment. Group

IIa women primarily devoted their wages to fuller utilization of government social services and the purchase of market goods: a public sector flat, appliances, and furnishings for the new home, tuition for their children. Without the wages of the women, few Group IIa couples could meet their goals of family upgrading.

Case study 4. Goh Chee Boon, a Group IIa seamstress, shows how their somewhat higher wages reinforced Group IIa women's labor force commitment and helped their families toward economic achievement. Chee Boon benefited from the help of her in-laws with whom her family of four (husband, wife, 6-month old daughter, 3-year old son) lived. When we first met Chee Boon in July, 1974, she earned just $200 per month sewing woolen jackets and other outer garments in a medium-sized factory capitalized by Hong Kong Chinese. She was married to Min Ti, who read electricity meters for the Public Utilities Board and earned $500 monthly, a good working man's wage in Phase 1. Chee Boon, who believed she would never be able to earn more than $200, planned to end her employment. She looked forward to the opportunity to spend full days with her son. By 1976, however, Chee Boon who had nearly 10 years of service in the factory, had advanced to the position of recorder of the output of each worker's finished garments on her work floor; her wages had risen to nearly $300. The couple then decided that Chee Boon should continue to work and contribute to the payments for the apartment they planned to purchase. In mid-1976 the Gohs moved into their new flat, and their two children remained in the care of Min and Ti's mother during the day, thereby enabling Chee Boon to continue work. The couple chose this avenue of family upgrading through the wife's employment because her seniority at work increased her value to the family economy.

Group IIb consists of families in the lower-middle and middle-class range, although the options of the lower reaches of this socioeconomic group shade into those of Group IIa families. In Phase 1, Group IIb working women could invariably aid their families to purchase consumer goods that seemed luxuries to Group I families.

Group II women who did not work full time. Employed women in Group II earned solid women's wages, while below-par earners generally quit the labor force. Their small earnings were not crucial to support their families. Homemakers in Group II thus consisted of two sets of women: those who were undereducated for their class with mainly peripheral sector work experience and those who chose to apply their better education to upgrade the educational skills of their children (mainly Group IIb wives).

Group II homemakers also sought to perform wage labor at home. They tended to pass up the least renumerative home-based toil, such as laundering, or the poorest paid garment seaming that their Group I counterparts were forced to accept to make ends meet.

Better educated Group IIb women used their time and skills to help their children advance in the school system. Some of these women decided to leave the labor force while their children were growing up in order to improve the quality of home life. Middle-class families expressed to us their hesitation about entrusting the complete moral and practical education of their children to poorly educated grandparents, and discussed their willingness to forego short-term income for the benefit of their children.

Too, the middle-class living standard required an expensive child care arrangement and substantial work-related expenses of lunch and transport. Thus, Group IIb women would not work for the ordinary Group I wage of around $200, and held out for $300. If they could not obtain this sum owing to poor education, they quit work.

Still other Group II women assisted their husbands' work and could not themselves enter the labor force.

Case study 5. Tok Sor Ngee had held a blue-collar job in a printing shop, where she met her husband Kim San, nephew to the owner. Her wages were low and she quit work upon marriage.

In Phase I, Kim San operated his own driving instruction car, and Sor Ngee helped him keep his books and answered the telephone. Additionally, she managed the family budget of food, shelter and savings. Sor Ngee told us,

> I am a hard-working woman, and I am good at economizing. I handle all of our household finances, I make sure that food and clothing for the children comes first, and that we save a little each month. As a result of the planning I've done, we were able to pay cash for this flat and the driver training car as well!

She continued matter-of-factly,

> My husband calls me his "minister of finance" and his friends call him a "model husband" because he has relinquished all of his financial power to me. I'm not trying to dominate him, but he is poor in handling money, while I am a much better planner.

Sor Ngee described her daily routine and explained that she spent considerable time in the preparation of nutritious, well-balanced meals for her children and supervised their homework. These family upgrading activities took up so much of her time that she felt it was better to remain in the home than to work outside for low pay.

Thus, earning options were grounded in class background in Phase 1 for all women in our sample. Since married women had to assume the burdens of childrearing and preparing family members to enter the labor force, they found it difficult to work at the prevailing below subsistence women's wage. Low wages meant that most married women would drop out of the labor force, while those that remained were the better educated of their Group, who could at the same time find an inexpensive alternative to their homemaking roles.

The Familial Community and Support for Wives' Work

Our married women's labor force activities were grounded not only in class background, but also in their family structure. The following discussion shows how women in the familial community fielded other women into the wage labor force. We also learn how the familial community support is itself shaped by market considerations.

Since the Singapore government provides few collective services to assist domestic labor, the family unit enters the development effort. Our young mothers can work only with the help of a supporting network of women to undertake parenting tasks and household chores. In Phase 1 this was facilitated by residence in an extended household. Married women who lived with parents and other adults benefitted from the larger number of hands and obtained increased opportunities for wage labor.

The key feature of the Chinese patrilocal household is the family economy to which all sons contribute their productive labor or an agreed upon substantial proportion of their monthly pay packet.[11] The household head, traditionally the manager of inherited family property with the authority of the religious patriliny, redistributes the family income. The income is given out in kind, in the form of food, clothing, and other essentials, and in cash for members' expenses, including education and medical fees for the children. The members of the household practice equality of consumption, and when there are several nuclear families living under one roof, families with more dependent members and greater expenses receive a larger allowance than others. The size of the members' share may be set by the elders without consultation.

The patriarch or matriarch of this extended family determines the division of labor. When several married women reside under one roof, production and consumption benefit from economies of scale, and the division of labor frees some of the women from homemaking tasks. Only then can these married women remain in the wage labor force. Under such circumstances, it is understandable that the decision for a young married woman to work for a wage is made by common counsel. In most of the families in this study the willingness of others in the familial community to relieve young mothers of their homemaking chores was the precondition of their Phase 1 labor force participation.

Women who remained in the wage labor force after their children were born tended therefore to reside in households which contained close kin. Half of all our Phase 1 families lived in homes that contained a member of the grandparent generation. Women who worked full-time for pay were more likely to reside with relatives than were the rest of our women: two-thirds of the full-time working women lived in such enlarged households, whereas only one-third of the homemakers did so.[12] Such enlarged households helped our women to work. But other options nevertheless were sought to expand the circles of helpers with a flexible combination of paid and unpaid relatives and neighbors.[13] Some couples lived near one or both sets of parents to facilitate grandparental relations and services, dined daily at the home of the seniors and thereby reduced homemaking time, and left their infants there during the week. The senior generation fostered their grandchildren, returning them to the parents on the weekends. Some grandparents who could not themselves watch their grandchildren were able to visit the neighborhood care-giving family to ensure that the youngsters were content.

Many social programs designed by the Singapore government to deepen families' involvement in the market and raise living levels have as their outcome the partial separation of young couples from their community of kin. Seventy-three of our Phase 1 families lived in public sector Housing and Development Board (HDB) apartments, and 27 in private homes. Public housing entails resettlement from village-type kampong homes that often house large, extended families. Thus, HDB housing encourages a trend towards smaller households, stem families, and neolocal residence. Only 41% of our HDB residents lived with their elders in Phase 1, compared with 70% of those in private homes. This constraint of housing did not in itself isolate parents from their married children who lived apart, because we have seen that young married couples attempted to select apartments in close proximity to their parents. They were not always successful, however. Moreover multiple three-generation extended families, with their wider assortment of kin, allowed economies of scale that freed wives for work outside the home far more readily than could stem families.

Group I support for women's work. The following examples of family and neighborhood assistance point up the complex interpersonal relationships that women enter and create in order to remain in the labor force after marriage.

Case study 6. Sim Soo Kee seamed garments six days a week in a small four-woman garment workshop located near her apartment. Her husband Man Hwa operated a small kiosk in the Golden Mile Shopping Center where he sold popular music cassettes and earned an above median Phase 1 men's wage of $400. The couple lived with their two children in a rented one room improved[14] HDB flat in Bukit Ho Swee Estate. Soo Kee earned $5.50 daily at her sewing machine, well under the median for women. She obtained help at low cost with her children from kin while she worked. Soo Kee was able to put in a full working day, but the $100 total she paid her mother and aunt for assistance in child care and the $30 paid to a domestic servant who washed her laundry and floors every week exceeded 80% of her monthly income. Soo Kee explained,

> By working I can afford to pay people to do things for me, and I have a little left over for pocket money. I enjoy my work. It's easier to pass the day and I'm more relaxed than before. I've even put on a little weight.

The Sims told the interviewer that they were discussing the purchase of an apartment in a new housing estate, and Soo Kee's work might add a few dollars monthly towards this goal. Without the help of kin, Soo Kee could not afford to work for the low wage she earned.

Poorly paid wives of even lower paid men could only work if they were fortunate to obtain free help from kin.

Case study 7. This is illustrated by Loh Bee Hwa, married to Kok Dan, a bus conductor who earned a poverty level wage of $250. The Lohs had two small children. Bee Hwa served tables at a canteen outside a Sembawang military base seven hours a day, and brought home $120 a month with lunch and transportation provided in addition. Bee Hwa's father was deceased, and her mother lived in a single room flat a short distance from the Loh's apartment. Since the two families were neighbors they shared household tasks. Bee Hwa and her children lived in her mother's apartment from Monday through Friday, and her mother minded the two children without charge. Kok Dan dined at his mother-in-law's home, and visited with his children, and then returned to the Loh family's own flat for the evening. Bee Hwa and her children joined Kok Dan at their own apartment on the weekends, when Bee Hwa performed all of the household chores.

Bee Hwa's canteen job was the fifth position she held. After completing primary school she worked for two years in a radio assembly factory. She was then employed at $200 per month on three rotating shifts at a semi-conductor plant, which laid her off after two years. After that she worked for several months at two different factories, and at age 20 married Kok Dan; their first child was born in 1972. Bee Hwa recalled,

> I didn't look for another job, and stayed home to care for my newborn child for two years. My mother was working as a domestic servant then, and I had no one to help me with child care. Mother stopped work, and so in 1973 when my second child was a few months old, I decided to return to work because my life was relatively easy at home then with Mother to help me. I'm quite used to working and I'm not accustomed to staying at home. The semiconductor company offered me a new job on shift work, but I don't like those odd hours and so took the job at the canteen instead.

The interview was conducted at the home of Bee Hwa's mother who joined the conversation.

> It's lucky that my daughter gets her lunch and a ride to work in addition to her wage, otherwise it's not worth working for only $120 a month. We're also lucky that I can look after her children because we could never afford to pay someone $100 a month to look after the youngsters.

The mothers of Soo Kee and Bee Hwa in Phase 1 engaged in no other time-consuming or remunerative tasks, and they enjoyed fine health. In fulfilling their role as child-care givers they often obtained some economic support from their daughters, and performed a useful social role. These young mothers were fortunate to obtain help although they earned a low wage.

When there was more than one working daughter or daughter-in-law, the choice of which the senior woman would help depended partly on the younger woman's education, marketable skills and her earning power. Those Group I women who earned under $200 monthly then found it quite difficult to convince their relatives to help them care for their children so that they could remain on the job when the senior women had other claims on their time.

The great effort to which such low-earning couples in serious need of two incomes went to in order to obtain support was further revealed in the frequent housing moves of some couples.

They often moved to homes near kin in order to obtain help. If they had been able to command a higher wage, they might have been able to strike a better bargain and obtain more continuous cooperation from husbands, family, and neighbors. If there were low-cost day-care facilities, such problems would be further eased.

The familial community itself created tensions that often forced young women out to work. In the household-wide family ecomony, economic control centered in the household head. The head gave greater recognition to the needs of the household than to each nuclear unit of which it was comprised. The young daughter-in-law thus often felt in need of funds. The struggle over funds typically occurred between the daughter- and mother-in-law, with the husband/son as an ineffective intermediary. This was particularly so in Group I homes, where the total sum of money available was low, and husbands were beholden to their familial community for jobs. As poorly educated men, they rarely supported their wives in conflicts with their parents. Many women thus felt compelled to work to obtain funds of their own. In a family like this, a young wife considered it important to control a portion of her earnings, which she could dispose of in ways she herself felt important.

In Group I homes women spent their wages first to buy clothes and toys for their children and next to maintain the families' enveloping networks of kinship connections, such as allowances to the members of the older generation and gifts on the occasion of visits, marriages, birthdays, and religious festivities. Remaining funds were used for personal clothing and other household essentials and to enable these women to share a modest social life with workmates, other peers, and relatives in their leisure time. Women openly expressed their filial desire to help their aging parents with occasional funds. For these purposes it was important for Group I women to possess private funds. In the socioeconomic circumstances of Group I families however, unless the wives worked full time it would be impossible for them to budget $100 monthly for support contributions to a needy mother or aunt. Thus, Group I working women, in both formal and informal sectors, earned incomes which, while often small, definitely contributed to family survival. Their wages even provided that extra margin that enabled them to participate in their rather limited and cultural milieu. These women-centered transactions were crucial for the formation of the female labor force in the initial period of industrialization.

Group II support networks. Better-off Group II families had greater resources at their disposal. Some were embarked upon an upward trajectory, and their families undertook strenuous efforts to assist them to enlarge the wage packet, and were rewarded for the effort.

Case study 8. Chia Siok Yen, an electronics assemblist who earned $8 per day, was married to policeman Teng Cheong. The couple had two children and lived with Teng Cheong's family. Teng Cheong's father was deceased and Teng Cheong had a deaf-mute younger brother who remained at home and was never trained for employment. As eldest son and the only one with offspring, Teng Cheong was the breadwinner and mainstay of the household. His mother, however, for years took in washing for families in the neighborhood to augment her income and gain a measure of independence for herself.

Saving for the future was important in the Chia family. When Siok Yen was pregnant with her first child she asked her mother-in-law to care for the child so she could continue to work. Teng Cheong's mother declined, since she preferred to continue her independent occupation of laundress. At this point Siok Yen undertook a bold step with Teng Cheong's support. The couple moved into a rented room some distance away from the Chia fmaily home. Siok Yen refused to return until after her mother-in-law agreed to care for the newborn child. Teng Cheong's endorsement of Siok Yen's demarche caused her mother-in-law to relent, and she gave up her washerwoman job to care for the infant.

Siok Yen gave this account of her monthly finances:

> I spend $25 on bus fare and pay $90 to Mother-in-Law for child care. That leaves aroung $80 for my own use each month. I buy clothes and other things for myself and my children and I still manage to save a little. Every time my savings reach a couple of hundred dollars, I put this cash into my bank account. We will use the money for the education of our children.

This case shows that how this couple which was intent on saving for the future exercised determination and ingenuity in a desire to maintain the wife's work force participation. Likewise, other Group II working women received some help from kin. They differed from Group I women mainly by their ability to command higher wages and therefore to obtain solid family support.

Phase 2

Class and Women's Work

Over the Interphase, work opportunities increased in Singapore's dynamic industrial order. If modernization theory is correct, we would expect that in Phase 2 many women who formerly did not compete for jobs would now respond to the emerging industrial opportunities. Class origin and early work experience or family support need determine neither the ability to work nor the sector of employment.

We found, however, that class origin still shaped work options. Table 3 shows that full-time labor force participation of our young mothers was remarkably stable. Only seven of the panel women changed their full-time employment status over the Interphase: four quit while three others joined the labor force. However, many others took up part-time piecework seaming at home. The stable formal sector labor participation and the intensified informal sector work are both due to continued class and gender structures. Poorly educated women who had quit work due to pressing home burdens faced even higher barriers to entering the labor force for a living wage in Phase 2. But there was continued demand for the labor of our better educated women in core industries who had remained on the job.

In 1981 our blue-collar women aimed for $400 as their basic monthly wage, which represented a doubling of their Phase 1 salary goals. Indeed, 16 of our 19 Phase 2 wage earners drew over $400 a month, 14 of them factory women. Inflation accounted for some of their wage improvement over the semidecade. In addition, their increased wages reflected seniority (over 10 years on the job), accumulated skills, steady work habits, and their schooling which exceeded that of most women.[15] Their firms promoted some to lead girl positions. These Phase 2 factory women can thus be considered the elite of the Singapore labor force. They no longer were compelled to compete with lower-paid unskilled or semiskilled school leavers for assembly line posts. Their Phase 2 earnings even more aided their families.

Group I panel women. Our Group I panel workers were thus reluctant to leave the labor force.

Case study 1. An example is Chua Ah Geok, the well-paid electronics assemblist, married to Teo Hwa, a former bus conductor and in Phase 2 a warehouse worker who earned only $320. Ah Geok's considerable experience in the flourishing electronics industry enabled her to command a higher wage than her husband, who was unskilled and without seniority. Ah Geok had during her 13 years in the factory elevated her position from the novice category "A" to the highest category "C" worker. Overtime pay and good attendance bonuses regularly raised her basic wage of $500 to $570 a month. She emphasized that she held a "responsible" position, and was the only worker on her shift that applied epoxy to the pieces. She proudly pointed

out that the speed of production depended upon her. Because of her key position, however, she found it difficult to apply for leave when her children were ill or there was a family need. Nevertheless, the supervisor tried to accommodate her as an "old girl" in the factory. Ah Geok had continually to balance home and work obligations, and was never certain that she could perform all that was expected of her.

When asked, "What do you like best about your present job?" Ah Geok emphasized her seniority which commanded recognition and respect. The younger women called her "Auntie" and consulted her when they encountered problems. In fact, she said, sometimes "my co-workers are jealous of my popularity." This caused some conflict. Her supervisor also tried to learn from Ah Geok's informal leadership style, which gave further satisfaction. Other advantages were proximity (she pointed out the factory rooftop from her balcony), and the suitability of her afternoon working hours. She did her housework in the morning and walked to the factory for the 3 o'clock shift. Most important, since Ah Geok's income exceeded that of her husband, it was only when she added her pension to his ($8,000 from Ah Geok and $9,500 from Teo Hwa) that in 1979 the family was finally able to quit their one-room rented flat and purchase a three-room apartment. They each saved $50 monthly in a chit fund and for their housing move they withdrew sums for the flat renovation and purchase of basic appliances. Ah Geok's earnings thus raised their family resources to a modest but comfortable standard of living, and the couple's combined basic income of around $1,000 matched that of a Group I skilled male worker in the core sector. Her husband could never attain that sum by himself.

Mature women like Ah Geok were in great demand. When two Group I women quit the labor force over the Interphase because their kin could no longer help them with child care, all were urged by their former supervisors to return to the factory. The same was not true for those of our panel women who were not employed outside the home in Phase 1. They lacked extensive and recent industrial labor force experience, seniority, or education and were unlikely to have worked in core sector factories. Their networks of job location were limited to service sector work introduced by neighbors, or entry level jobs advertised by fliers posted on fences. Women who were not employed in Phase 1 found it difficult to enter the labor force at a good wage in Phase 2.

Two modestly educated Group I panel women joined the labor force over the Interphase. Neither had work experience since marriage, and both had long planned to enter the job market when their children were in school and needed less care. They entered low capitalized jobs, one as an assemblist in a local toy factory and one as a hawker's helper. Neither earned more than $200 a month, less than half the earnings of our experienced panel women.

The dim market position of our women who were homemakers in Phase 1 goes far to explain the small number of new entrants to the labor force in Phase 2. The low earnings they could command as new workers could not compensate for the many costs of employment. Also, women who remained outside the labor market over the years entered into numerous social arrangements for the familial community that enabled others to work. Women found these arrangements difficult to change. Since their pay would be low, they lacked a rationale for giving their homemaking chores to others. Finally, the limited part-time positions in the formal sector deterred women from combining domestic and wage labor.

Nevertheless, the need for cash led nearly half of our Group I homemakers into the informal labor force, mainly as home seamstresses but also as child-minders for other working women. They could thus work while they ran their households. For example, one woman returned to her home sewing machine, and her piecework stitching netted her $50 a month. Her husband, a bookstore clerk, earned a low $550 in Phase 2. With his wife's small pittance, he could still bank $50 monthly towards the furnishing of a flat they hoped to purchase. Thus, even our home pieceworkers added their share to the family income.

Our panel men included low earners occupied in the labor intensive peripheral sectors,

whose products were in limited demand. Through their wives' earnings these families could raise their income well above subsistence level to around $600 (Table 4). One wife's piecework stitching augmented her husband's bookstore clerk earnings. With her wages, a domestic servant raised her husband's $650 tinsmith wage to a total of around $900. The low beginning pay of the toy factory worker, when combined with her seaman husband's income, gave them a total of $900.

Men who held skilled working-class jobs in such growing industries as construction or shipbuilding and repair earned substantial wages by Phase 2, but in many cases their wives' wages were still required. Some men worked out-of-doors and suffered from erratic pay when the weather was bad. Personal irresponsibility, such as gambling, plagued the families of these men. Under these circumstances, wives' wages compensated for shortfalls in the husband's earnings. And, when both spouses were working at full capacity, they could upgrade the family living standard considerably.

Group II panel women. Women in the higher class Groups also increased their family earnings to attain an improved living standard. Our Group II respondents believed their families needed from $800 to $1500 to consolidate and advance their position. This included purchasing and furnishing a new HDB flat. We reinterviewed 17 Group II women, 11 of whom had been full-time workers in Phase 1. Eight of these 11 women were still active workers who were applying their earnings to improve the family livelihood.

Case study 4. Goh Chee Boon, still a Group IIa garment factory piecework calculator in Phase 2, brought in over $400 monthly. Her husband, Min Ti, who earned around $1,000 as a Public Utilities Board meter reader , felt that they needed $1,400 a month to maintain the household, and that Chee Boon's earnings was a crucial input. The Gohs furnished splendidly their three-room flat purchased in 1976 for $17,000, with marble floors, a large desk, three-piece sofa and easy chair set, large color and smaller black and white television sets, and other house fixtures that cost over $6,000.

As workers with on-the-job training, our mature Group II women also were in great demand. Four Group II panel women quit the labor force to care for their young children when they lost parental help. All were urged to return to the factory by former supervisors.

Case study 9. Only one, a primary educated lower-level supervisor in a garment factory, returned. Lee Kee Chu, this Group IIa garment factory ironing supervisor, entered a newly opened branch of the factory near her residence. "My boss wanted me to come back," she proudly told us. Kee Chu solved her child-care problems by asking her downstairs neighbor to care for her 8-year old daughter after school, while her 11-year old son engaged in extracurricular school activities. She resumed her former position for about $400 a month.

Three Group IIb panel women who quit the labor force did not return. All sought to care for their children and prepare them for the better primary and secondary schools and upgrade their family future in this manner.

Group II panel women without lengthy work experience could not easily join the labor force in Phase 2. Thus, only two obtained work: a worker in a Chinese press and a seamstress. The former woman quit this low-paying job after three months in favor of home seaming, child-minding for pay, and extensive neighboring. Her mother would not quit her own service sector job to help with child care due to her daughter's low entry wage. Her husband's $900 earnings as manager and shareholder of a small trucking firm also sufficed to support the family. Only an experienced seamstress, who returned to the factory where she had worked after marriage, obtained a $400 wage and was satisfied.

In Phase 2 the wages of many Group IIa panel men greatly improved. Yet wages of several men in the peripheral sector without industrial skills fell behind the core sector men of

their class Group: a meter reader, an accountant, a vegetable wholesaler. They especially felt they needed the added help of their wives.

In response to new market opportunities for skilled peripheral sector men with funds, Group II contained several newly launched businesses. Their wives' wages insured against the difficult times encountered as petty businessmen in a competitive milieu.

At the top ranks of our Group IIb panel sample were two semi-professional women, a teacher and civil servant, each of whom earned around $1,000, considerably more than any factory woman. These two applied their wages towards vacations for themselves abroad and investment income as they had earlier done with their comfortable earnings in Phase 1. Their husbands could maintain a high living standard with their wages alone, and the substantial addition of the earnings of wives who were employed helped this class further to maintain their lead.

Table 4 examines the wages of our Phase 2 panel couples by the level of the husbands' basic earnings. It shows that where wives were full- or part-time income earners (Row 2), their wages were of considerable inportance, especially when married to lower-earning men. In the case of couples whose wives worked full-time (Row 3), their combined income then approached or exceeded the earnings of men in the next highest earning group whose wives did not work for a wage (Row 1). We note, however, that as the wages of the men increased from $900 to $1500 and above, the wives' full-time earnings decreasingly helped their husbands close the gap between themselves and the higher male earners. This was due to the sheer magnitude of men's wages at the higher class levels, and the fact that wives earned no more than two-thirds of their spouses' wages.

Decline of the Familial Community and Support for Wives' Work

Family support for women at work declined due to the spread of HDB housing. Only 10 of our 45 panel couples lived with a member of the older generation.[16] Life cycle advance further reduced the exchange of services related to child care. The senior generation was aging and unable to muster the energy for caretaking roles. Their grandchildren had grown and become more active, and furthermore their needs changed. As infants and toddlers, the care they required had been seen as custodial. By Phase 2, however, they reached school age and required education, tutoring, and play. The older generation was considered insufficiently literate to perform these crucial roles.

Determined and sufficiently well-paid Phase 2 women who were not frequent interactors with their families continued to work because their children had matured; they availed themselves of new forms of child-care arrangements. Whereas in Phase 1 our respondents' young children required constant care, in Phase 2 they attended school half day. Our panel mothers obtained part-time child care from sisters or neighbors for pay, and arranged their shift hours so that they could work. Others used the "latchkey" method and locked their children in. Keen on remaining in the labor force, our working women sought a variety of options and consequently seven of our 18 non-interacting women succeeded in working full-time outside the home for a wage in Phase 2.

Group I panel women. Without family assistance, however, these women continued to work at some cost.

Case study 3. We recall Tan Soo Lee, dynamic Phase 1 electronics factory worker, who alone of our female sample held two full-time jobs. Her family and household demands had eased considerably by Phase 2 of our interviews, and Soo Lee reduced her grueling work commitments while assuming more of the housekeeping burden. Tuan Kwok, a fitter in a core industry, was earning substantial working-class wages, and he had improved his work habits. He stopped gambling, and although his work attendance was still uneven, he contributed half his paycheck to his family. The advancement of the family cycle further benefitted Soo Lee. Her younger

siblings were old enough to operate the laksa stall by themselves, and she needed only to assist them during the weekends. Soo Lee and her family moved into their own one-room flat, and she relaxed her high work level. She informed us that she had twice been offered promotions, but turned them down, preferring the role of an ordinary assemblist. With her seniority Soo Lee's pay exceeded $500, and she often added overtime pay. At ages 9 and 12 her two children were old enough to heat up the lunch that she prepared for them and to remain in the flat after school until she returned from her factory shift. Indeed, Soo Lee felt free enough to enjoy a stroll and window shop several afternoons a week with her co-workers before returning home. Thus, while still a hard-working employee, Soo Lee reduced her earlier extraordinary work output when her family situation no longer demanded it.

Soo Lee's case illustrates several conclusions about women's work commitment and family roles. First, the young mother with infants (Phase 1) who was keen to improve the family finances and living standard often integrated herself into an extended family household to free herself from household duties in order to punch a factory clock or work in another occupation during the day. Next, a woman had the best chance to locate such supporting networks when her extended family contained an older woman who encouraged her employment and frequently was herself once employed for a wage. Moreover, the young working mother whose wages exceeded $200 a month in Phase 1 and $400 in Phase 2 commanded more respect and tangible support for her continued employment than the woman whose earnings were too meagre to augment the family purse in any significant manner. Finally, in Soo Lee's case, her high level of work motivation was prompted by the need to solve pressing family problems, and when these were resolved in Phase 2, she resumed a more conventional work pattern. Although not career-oriented, Soo Lee continued substantially to aid her family. While Soo Lee's case was somewhat unusual in our sample -- no other woman simultaneously held two full-time jobs -- these interrelated family and work patterns recurred among our Group I panel in Phase 2.

Group II panel women likewise suffered from loss of family support. Six of our Group II panel women held lower-level supervisory factory positions in Phase 1, but three of them abandoned these supervisory posts due to loss of kin support and family demands. Two women quit the factory outright. The third lead girl, because suitable child-care help was no longer forthcoming, was unable to work the late shift, and she became a rank and file worker. All three regretted their loss of lead girl positions, but, as one admitted sadly, "This is a sacrifice I must make for my family."

Summary

Our study finds that deep-rooted ties and relationships remain central to the Singapore female work force. We first note that in the early stages of capital accumulation, as in other new nations, industry consists mainly of labor intensive, low-waged goods and services. In Singapore, low-waged female labor enables the city-state to supply goods and services to the world market. But we learn that, even within this narrow range of jobs, the female work force is stratified with respect to family background and industrial niche at the time of development. We further find that the low wage structure compels the female work force to depend closely on its familial community to supplement purchased goods and services.

However, as the economy becomes integrated into the market, families are drawn into a single stratified hierarchy, based on access to market resources. The domestic groups themselves are no longer purely affective but are grounded in market considerations. Class and social groups do not disappear. Instead, social groups promote their members in the new order.

Table 1. Employment Status of Respondents.

	Phase 1			Phase 2		
	Full-time	Part-time*	Housewives	Full-time	Part-time*	Housewives
Group I	25	5	28	10	8	10
Group II	27	3	12	9	3	5
Total	52	8	40	19	11	15

*Informal sector employment only

Table 2. Women's Wages by Class Group.
Full-Time Wage Earners, Phase 1.

Women's Wages (Singapore $)	Number of Women Group I	Group II	Total
-$199	10	2	12
$200 - $299	13	14	27
$300 +	2	11	13
	25	27	52

Table 3. Labor Force Experience of Panel Women Over Time.

Employment Status in Phase 1	Employment Status in Phase 2: Full-time	Part-time*	Housewives
Full-time	16	--	4
Part-time	--	3	--
Housewives	3	8	11
	19	11	15

*Informal sector employment only.

Table 4. Couples' Income when Wives Work, Phase 2 Average Basic Wages (Number of Couples)

Average Income of Couples Whose Wives: ***	$500-599	$600-900*	$1000-1100**	$1500-2000	Total
1) earn no wages	433	725	1033	1600	(15)
2) earn some wages	738	958	1354	2833	(30)
3) are full-time wage workers	800	1042	1466	3000	(19)
4) Total Number of Couples	(9)	(18)	(13)	(5)	= (45)

Notes: *No panel men earned $901-999.

**No panel men earned $1101-$1499.

***Row (2) includes full-time, part-time, and homebased wage-earning women.

Row (3) excludes part-time and homebased wage-earning women.

Row (4) is calculated from Rows (1) plus (2).

Footnotes

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5. On the development program of the 1970s, see Singapore National Trades Union Congress (ed.), Towards Tommorrow: Essays on Development and Social Transformation in Singapore (Singapore: Eurasia Press, 1973); C.T. Goh, "Restructuring the Economy Through Higher Wages," Speech given at 47th Annual Dinner of the Singapore Manufacturers' Association, Singapore, June 29, 1979 (typescript); Lim Chee Onn, "The New Industrial Development Strategy -- the Whys and Wherefores", Singapore Economic Bulletin 6 (N.S.)(November 1979): 9-15.

6. The partition of the families into Group I and Group II is based on scores for the following variables:

   i) Status of the couple's parents;
   ii) Couple's educational level;
   iii) Occupation of couple;
   iv) Combined income of couple;

Group		Number of Couples in Each Group	
		Phase 1	Phase 2
Ia	Lower working class	17	6
Ib	Average working class	41	22
IIa	Upper working class	19	9
IIb	Middle class	23	8
		100	45

7. In 1973, only 29% of a larger sample of women aged 25 to 34 with one child, and 18% with two children, were full-time wage earners. Singapore Family Planning and Population Board and National Statistical Commission, Report of the First National Survey on Family Planning in Singapore, 1973 (Singapore: authors, 1974): 30.

   Data on all Chinese women, married and unmarried, show that the proportion of women aged 15 and over in the labor force was: 1975, 32%; 1979, 42%. Ministry of Labour, Report on the Labour Force Survey of Singapore (Singapore: author, 1975, 1979).

8. In Singapore dollars. Henceforth all money is expressed in Singapore currency. In 1975, $1USD = $2.45S; in 1981, $1USD = $2.25S. Median gross monthly wages for men and women in

1975 are calculated from published data that are grouped in 7 income categories. We made the following assumptions: employees who were earning "under $200" earned $200; those who earned "$1,500 and over" earned $1,500. The midpoint of each income interval gave us the median for that earning group. The same assumptions for calculating the median earning were followed for 1979. In 1979 the upper open-ended wage bracket was $3,000, which accounted for only 1% of the total Chinese male labor force, and .2% of the Chinese female workers. Ministry of Labour and National Statistical Commission, Report on the Labour Force Survey of Singapore 1975 (Singapore: authors, 1976), p. 95, Table 51, and Report on the Labour Force of Singapore, 1979 (Singapore: authors, 1980), p. 99, Table 55.

Poverty-level income is established by estimating the minimum monthly household requirements by household size in 1973; a 4-person family needed $253 in 1973. See Chieh Hock Beng, A Study of Poverty in Singapore (Singapore: University of Singapore, Department of Sociology, unpublished MA thesis, 1977): 36. For the underdeveloped world generally, see Folker Frobel, Jurgen Heinrichs, Otto Kreye, The New International Division of Labour (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).

9. Robert Bibb and William Form describe stratification in the labor force in the U.S. and distinguish between core and peripheral sector industries, occupations, wages, and workers. "The Effects of Industrial, Occupational, and Sex Stratification on Wages in Blue-Collar Markets," Social Forces 55, (1977): 974-86. The Singapore government also describes its key growth industries which coincide with our "core sector" industries. See Economic Development Board, Annual Report (Singapore: author, 1979).

10. Females constitute 44% of the manufacturing sector but only 3.3% received training by employers. Yu Foo Yee Shoon, in seminar on "Women in Employment", cited in Straits Times (Singapore), January 12, 1981: 10.

11. Myron Cohen, "Development Process in the Chinese Domestic Group", pp. 21-36 in Maurice Freedman (ed.), Family and Kinship in Chinese Society (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970); House United, House Divided: The Chinese Family in Rural Taiwan (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976); Maurice Freedman, Chinese Family and Marriage in Singapore (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, Colonial Research Studies 20, 1957).

12. Comparison of the Residences of Phase 1 Full-Time Wage-Earning Wives and Homemakers in Per Cent (Number of Women)

Form of Residence	Wives' Employment Status: Wage Earners	Homemakers	Total
Stem or Extended	65	31	49
Neolocal	35	69	51
	100 (52)	100 (48)	100 (100)

13. We classified our respondents into "interacting" and "isolated" families. An interacting couple lived with one or the other set of parents, lived apart but visited them two or more times weekly, or had its children cared for by the older generation. An "isolated" couple visited parents once a week or less. Interactors helped each other considerably in homemaking tasks, whereas isolated couples exchanged far fewer services with kin and lacked the crucial social assistance to abet women's labor force participation. There were few isolated women and even fewer isolated working wives in our sample in Phase 1: 90% of the full-time wage earners were interactors, which makes clear the importance of family support to these young working mothers.

Interaction Patterns of Phase 1 Working Wives and Housewives in Per Cent (Number of Women)

	Wives' Employment Status: Wage Earners	Homemakers	Total
Isolates	10	35	22
Interactors	90	65	78
	100 (52)	100 (48)	100 (100)

14. A one-room improved flat is one standard-sized room and a hall.

15. The following table of the educational levels of our 45 panel women shows that it was more likely for women with higher education to work full-time in Phase 2 than it was for those with lower education.

Full-Time Work Status and Educational Attainment, Phase 2 Women (Number of Women)

	Educational Level			
Work Status	Less than Primary 6	Primary 6	Secondary 1 or Higher	Total
Not full-time wage earners	16	4	6	26
Full-time wage earners	5	6	8	19
	21	10	14	45

In Singapore as a whole in 1980, 93% of the female homemakers had no more than primary schooling, but fully half were illiterate. Population Census of Singapore, 1980: 10.

16. There was further a reduction in the number of total "interacting" couples (coresident plus frequent visitors) to 27 of the 45 panel families. Of these 27 interactors, 12 wives worked full-time for a wage, suggesting the continued importance of family assistance for wives to work. Indeed, three of the four women who joined the full-time labor force between our interview rounds made use of their increased ability to win services from their mothers and unemployed sisters to do so, although one low-waged woman subsequently quit.

Packaging the Product: Mexican Non-Durable Women Workers, 1910-1940[1]

Dawn Keremitsis

Industrialization brought women out of the house and into the factory where their traditional roles of providing food and clothing were maintained. Most studies of factory women have, therefore, concentrated on those fields in which the majority have been employed. The factory system also created new occupations for women, as capitalism drew from the lowest class of reserves in order to supply cheap, often seasonal, labor for a variety of new processes which were not transferable occupations, including commercial packaging. In the United States by 1900, 82% of the boxmakers were women who came primarily from immigrant families.[2] Because Mexico had few foreign immigrants to work as factory hands as commercial production expanded, women filled these marginal, low-paying jobs. Although the idealized Mexican woman never left the home, many poor Mexican women did, for low wages and under poor working conditions. Mexico's political changes in the early twentieth century contributed to the increase of workers to supply the demands of modernizing industry. This paper investigates the process in commercial packaging of the product. A small proportion of women worked in the production of paper, more finished and packaged products in cardboard boxes, and others cut matches to size, made boxes to fit, and packed the final product for sale.

Saffioti claims that female labor is employed when a society undergoes a rapid spurt of economic growth and needs to build up a labor supply, there is little capital accumulated, and low wages are needed to keep down production costs.[3] Mexico met these qualifications between 1920 and 1940 as demonstrated in packaging, classified by the government as non-durable production. A labor supply developed which could produce the product.

Occupations in Packaging

Women employed by the Mexican paper mills usually were either traperas (rag processors) or recibadoras, who ran the machines which finished the paper and stacked it for delivery. Outside the mills, illiterate and unskilled women searched for rags or discarded cloth which could be used in the paper-making process. With big sacks tied to their backs and aided by their children, they rummaged through rat-infested, disease-breeding garbage dumps. They collected scraps from the waste containers outside clothing workshops. At the local mill, the bags of rags were weighed in and the women paid. The pittance they received might buy subsistence food for the women and their children. Within the factory, the traperas sorted, washed, dried and cut to size the rags for processing into paper. Processing itself was man's work, except for the finishers, the recibadoras, who ran the huge cylinders which turned out the paper.[4]

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Men also processed the matches. The substitute for wood in the factories was pabilo, a heavy yarn which first was stiffened and then dipped into phosphorous to make it combustible. In one building, men worked with the dangerous chemicals and in another building, women operated the machines which cut the matches to the right size for packaging, and others made the small and large boxes which the women then assembled. The matches were packed by hand into small boxes and then aggregated into larger containers for distribution.[5]

In the cardboard box workshops, men maintained and repaired the machines which made the boxes and also supervised the warehouse where boxes were stored for shipment. Women ran the box-making machines and then packed them with merchandise, much as they did in the match plants. About three times as many women made and assembled the boxes as packed them, and a large number of minors aided or substituted for the women.[6]

Effect of Political Changes on Working Conditions

When Porfirio Diaz, president of Mexico, was overthrown in 1910, different groups in Mexican society contended for political and economic power. The alliance of the early leaders of the labor movement with the victorious politicians led to the first national Labor Department, staffed by union supporters. Inspectors surveyed industries and accumulated statistical data which reinforced the union's efforts to organize the workers. A women's division also opened within the department which publicized the poor working conditions by undertaking city-wide inspections of plants employing a majority of women and children.

It was reported that the minimum factory work day in 1913 was from 7 a.m. to 12 noon, and from 1:30 p.m. to 6 p.m., or nine and a half hours. However, because pay was based on piece-work, workers often put in longer hours in order to produce more and increase their take-home pay. Wages in the box plants were based on the size of the box assembled and packed, or the weight of the packed containers. Men were paid by the day as a rule, and averaged about two pesos. Women earned from 37 centavos to one peso and minors, classified as apprentices, made 25 centavos.[7]

There was serious disruption of the economy by the middle of the decade, partly because of military hostilities which disrupted transportation, and plants closed periodically for lack of raw materials. The paper mill of El Batan in Guadalajara, Jalisco, opened only four days a week in 1915. Women workers who averaged only 20 to 30 centavos a day in the mill complained bitterly when they had to take in handsewing or laundry because they could not work in the mill.[8] In many plants throughout Mexico during these years, employers distributed a daily ration of corn and a weekly ration of beans as payment in kind rather than wages. Inflation and an unstable currency brought private money changers to a shop when wages were paid in bank notes. For a fee, workers exchanged the notes for cash which could be used in the marketplace, further reducing their income. As wages continued to decrease in value because of the unreliable currency, firms even provided a yearly allotment of clothing to faithful workers. In 1916 employers granted loans at 2% interest so that workers could meet urgent expenses; repayment was deducted from wages.[9] To maintain a work force, employers had to assume paternal responsibilities.

Results of Government Stabilization on Work Force

By 1917 military confrontations lessened and a new economic and political power structure obtained control of the government. A constitution was adopted with broad provisions benefiting the labor force, but a decade passed before these laws were enforced. A new national labor organization, CROM (Confederacion Regional Obrera Mexicana), established connections with the government and took over control of the Labor Department and Labor Courts. CROM's policies appeared to be concerned primarily with expanding its membership through strikes and subsequent organization of the labor force while preserving the capitalistic structure of the economy.[10] Between 1919 and 1928 when CROM fell from power, inspectors surveyed small and large operations in order to determine organizing possibilities which would increase the

income of labor leaders.

Among the shops surveyed were the packagers, but data appears incomplete. The 1921 census[11] listed no women either in paper or box operations, although the department itself mentioned several in individual shops surveyed. The El Batan paper mill in Guadalajara, Jalisco, reported paying traperas 50 centavos a day and recibadoras 75 centavos, three of them women who had started at the plant at least twenty years before. Guadalajara box-making shops paid 1.54 to men and women received 40 to 60 centavos.[12] A Mexico City labor inspector reported that the box plant La Union was the pleasantest he had seen in his survey of several shops which employed mainly women. Run by the widow Susana Luna, it had 36 men, 18 women and 8 minors in 1919. By 1922, 30 women composed the entire work force, and the 1.63 paid was the highest for women workers in any box plant in the city.[13] Although some shops reported women's earnings as low as 50 centavos, 1.4 was reported as the citywide average. Men working in the box plants were paid an average of 2.34 a day, considerably less than the 2.95 reported as the male wage in industry for Mexico City. Government statistics that year concluded that 1.80 a day was the minimum necessary for the subsistence of an adult with a child to support. Women obviously could not survive alone, nor could men in the plants support a wife and child. Wages were so low in the box factories that it was frequently the practice to pay half the earned wages daily so that the worker could buy basic daily necessities. The remaining wages could be collected at 6 p.m. on Saturday afternoon, the end of the work week.[14]

The wages were reportedly better in the industrial north. The box-making plant adjoining the beer factory in Monterrey, Nuevo Leon, Cerveceria Cuahtemoc, paid women 1.25 and men 1.65. In 1922 there were 25 men and 19 women working there.[15]

The production and sale of matches had not been an important industry at the turn of the century. Even the artisan state of Puebla in 1905 employed only 14 men and 140 women in the several small shops then operating.[16] Working conditions in the processing of matches continued to be dangerous into the twentieth century, as workers were exposed to phosphorous, a chemical causing necrosis, a deadly disease. Although the use of phosphorous was outlawed in Mexico in 1913, few protective labor laws were then enforced. The 1920 census included only 78 men and 35 women in the match industry, but the Labor Department in Mexico City reported on several plants in the capital. The largest, La Central, in 1919 had 219 women and minors, slightly down from 1910. By 1924 the number of workers had increased to 431, 313 of whom were women. More capital investment in the match factories and improved machine production resulted in an increase in the proportion of men employed. In 1922 men averaged 2.44, women one peso, and minors 70 centavos.[17]

The Workers

Surveys of worker backgrounds by the Labor Department in 1919 and 1923 indicated women in the packaging plants (especially box-making) were young and single, and probably lived at home with their parents. Women box-makers were in their prime working years, from 13 to 35, mostly in their early twenties. Almost all were illiterate; few had even a year of schooling and fewer women than men could read or write. In Catholic Mexico, 80% of the women were reportedly single, with a third of these having children (undoubtedly illegitimate) to support. Inspectors concluded that they came from the poorest elements in the cities. Most lived in available housing on the outskirts of town which rented for six to eight pesos a month, about as much as the average woman in these occupations could earn in two weeks. Inasmuch as most of a worker's income went for food, no woman in the packaging occupations could have lived alone and been self-supporting.

Sanitary facilities did not exist within the homes, but factories, landowners, and occasionally the government were supposed to provide neighborhood public toilets and drinkable water in central locations. Showers were rare, but public baths had started in the cities where soap and towels were provied for a fee. Employers claimed that it was an unwarranted expense to provide bathing facilities, libraries and recreation rooms for workers, as few used them.[18]

Economy and the Work Force in the 1930s

The worldwide depression caused further deterioration of working conditions. The first published industrial census of Mexico was undertaken in 1930 and reflected some basic economic changes since the 1910 revolution. Seven paper mills were reported with 2,217 men and 110 women. The El Batan plant in Guadalajara had six women out of 25 workers, or 24% of the work force. A total of 456 women and 257 men composed the labor force in the 49 box plants in the country. Thirty-two of the 49 were located in the Federal District; others with more than 15 workers were primarily in the states of Guanajuato, Nuevo Leon and Jalisco. Obviously, Mexico City had already become the major distributor of commercial products for Mexico. Match plants employed 1,164 women, 493 men, and 11 minors, the highest percentage of women in packaging.

Wages also indicated considerable variation depending on the branch of the industry. Paper production paid the highest, 3.55 for men and 2.02 for women. Men in the match factories averaged 3.35 for the chemical processing, and the women who cut and packed the matches made 1.31. The box-making operations paid the lowest wages to both men and women: 2.21 for men and 1.03 for women.[19] In spite of this low pay, in 1930 an inspector reported that early in the morning three men and 27 women waited outside a Guadalajara box plant hoping that a job might be available. In order to keep expenses down as consumption dropped with the depression, some shops hired more women and fewer men. A Guadalajara plant with 37 men and 44 women working in 1923 had 58 women and 25 men in 1930.[20] Eighty-two percent of women working in box-making and 83% of those in match production gained the lowest wage listed for workers, two pesos a day or less. In the national statistics, 74% of women in all industry were paid this low wage, and the best-paying of the packaging operations, paper mills, had 77% of the women listed in that category.[21]

In 1935 the Jose de Sandi plant in Guadalajara had 18 women earning less than two pesos a week, 50 making between two and four, and the smallest proportion--11--earned from four to six pesos for a six-day week. All earned less than the national minimum wage of seven and a half pesos. Women working in the plant were no longer young, and one out of three declared she was married. The nine minors employed in the plant were undoubtedly children of the workers. Piecework continued to determine pay, and anyone who assembled less than 25 boxes an hour was classified as an apprentice (regardless of age or length of time on the job) and was paid less for the completed work. Of the 70 workers at the Sandi plant, 44 were classified as apprentices.

The government frequently fined violators of the minimum wage law and, as employers were prohibited by law from dismissing workers, employers blamed low wages on the decline in demand for their product and the surplus of workers for the amount of available work. Eduardo Diaz of the Jose de Sandi plant and Walter Frank of the Fabricantes de Carton y Cajas de Carton de Guadalajara suggested that the regional labor court give them permission to fire inefficient workers (apprentices) and maintain a smaller work force which could then earn an adequate wage. The Labor Court instead recommended that the work day be shortened and the employers exempted from paying the minimum wage.[22] The Court apparently assumed that underemployment was preferable to unemployment and that workers would find other part-time work to supplement their income.

In spite of these problems, the Jose de Sandi plant continued to increase its work force, hiring three men in 1937 to counterbalance an increase from 24 to 38 women. Men in the national work force increased by 1940, and the percentage of women in box-making had declined from 63% in 1930 to 51%, according to the national census figures.[23]

Although almost every shop and factory in the major cities was pressured by labor organizers, improvement in working conditions was minimal. In a box plant in Guadalajara in 1937 which operated in a private home, the women workers stayed at the workplace and slept on the dirt floor at night. Neither sanitary facilities nor drinking water were provided. If a worker became ill, she was discharged without compensation. The women and children employed there assembled about 200 boxes a day, about the same as someone classified as an apprentice at

the Jose Diaz de Sandi plant a year or two earlier.[24]

Unions

At the start of the upheavals in government, union organizing efforts shifted from concentration on the early textile factories and mines to a variety of other activities, including packaging. The labor provisions of the 1917 Constitution combined with government support of unions brought a rash of strikes throughout the urban centers. In Mexico City 70 women, 30 men and 20 minors walked out of the La Antorcha match plant and closed it down for a day in 1918. Employer pressure forced them to open the shop the next morning, but militant men blocked the plant entrance. The men were fired but the women complied with the order and kept their jobs, supposedly because their wages were so low that they could not survive longer without pay.[25] When another employer attempted to install a higher production quota for the workers (it would take longer hours to earn the same pay), militant women led another walkout in a match plant. They, too, were fired. Employer compliance with the provisions of the Constitution and the domination of the labor movement came slowly.

Employers also tried to avoid dealing with militant workers by starting company unions (called blancos or "whites" in Mexico) under employers' control. In 1925 Maria Diaz, a feminist and an early union organizer in the Guadalajara textile factories, tried to unionize men and women workers at the El Batan paper mill. She called a meeting in a private home and explained to the workers the necessary legal procedure to form their union. Before they could complete the required procedures, the employer had registered the Union de Obreros y Similares de la Fabrica de Papel El Batan as the company's official bargaining agent.[27]

Labor disputes represented struggles not only between employers and workers, but also between national and regional labor leadership. Workers found it difficult to decide which group to support in order to retain their jobs[28] and, hopefully, to improve working conditions. Unions organized by the workers were considered socialist and therefore called rojos or "reds." In centers where the Catholic church was especially strong (such as Jalisco) these unions were considered threats to religion and Catholic support was given to company unions. Political conflict was brought into union disputes.

The company union at El Batan was challenged in 1935 when the new national organization of CTM (Confederacion de Trabajadores Mexicanos) used its political influence to replace other unions.[29] The 1934 election of Lazaro Cardenas as president brought an affiliation with CTM which continues today. CTM became especially powerful in new expanding urban centers such as the state of Jalisco, even though it came in conflict with the Catholic church, also powerful in that area.

At the El Batan plant, Maria Refugio Vasquez moved from the board of the company union onto the new executive board formed by CTM. She was joined by eight men and another woman, Rebecca Gutierrez. Vasquez and Gutierrez had started with El Batan in 1931 and 1932, were probably young, and had grown up during the union agitation of the 1920s. The three older women, who by then had been at El Batan for forty to fifty years, did not become involved in the labor movement. When the firm of El Batan recognized CTM as its bargaining agent, and removed its company union, the work force increased from 25 to 41 men and from 6 to 12 women in 1936. The mill closed in 1937.[30]

A similar situation occurred at the Jose Diaz de Sandi box plant in Guadalajara. The first union to represent the workers was organized by the employer's son who headed it, and Maria Munoz was the only woman on the first executive board. Once CTM took over the union movement in Jalisco, Munoz was apparently replaced, as her name never reappeared. In 1935 the Sandi plant suspended Beatriz de la Torre and Elisa Garibay for three days because of their attempts to organize the workers, and the son of the owner, Ladislao, was kidnapped and held by labor leaders in the fight over union recognition. Even Maria Diaz wired President Cardenas asking for intervention to stop the violence. By 1936 a citywide CTM union had become official

in the box industry with Josefina de la Torre (probably Beatriz' sister), Maria Barrera and Francisco Rodriguez on the first executive board. The CTM union was registered at the Sandi plant, and in 1937 fourteen of the women who worked there and had not supported the union were fired.

Victoria Chavez Garcia became a CTM organizer for the box-making industry after 1935. She sent appeals to the Labor Court accusing employers of assigning union members to the lowest-paying jobs in a shop. She had even more difficulty with the issue of labor cooperatives. President Cardenas had supported the concept of both rural and urban workers' cooperatives, and employers used them as a refuge to avoid dealing with the Labor Department and unions. A cooperative was not subject to inspections nor to compliance with the minimum wage, because the workers were supposed to share in the profits. Because workers and unions could not complain to the Labor Department or their courts of appeal, the presidential office was flooded with letters describing poor working conditions in cooperatives. One woman in a box-making plant cooperative tried to organize the workers into a union in order to improve working conditions and she was fired. Another woman had been blacklisted by CTM and could not get a job in a city plant so she started a cooperative in her own home. In response to government demands for information, employers said that admittedly profits were small, but eventually workers would receive their share. Chavez Garcia was only one of the labor activists who found herself unable to combat this employer strategy.[31]

In Mexico City, two women owned match plants in 1937 and tried to keep the CTM unions from taking over their labor force. They were unsuccessful and had to watch as the victorious men organizers destroyed boxes which had been made by the women in the shop and were ready for delivery. The women workers and owners were threatened with bodily harm for continuing in a non-union operation and they all lost when the two shops closed.[32]

ALthough packaging is considered to be a non-durable activity in Mexico, the women who took the low-paying jobs must have been made of tough material in order to survive. They had to face society's rejection of a woman who left the home and worked outside it in a non-traditional occupation. Society also valued marriage, but few of these women were able to procure husbands, although many produced children which they had to support. The Mexican Revolution of 1910 resulted in political control of the nation's economy supported by a male-oriented union movement which promoted industrial expansion. One aspect was commercial packaging which brought many impoverished women into the labor force, but the development of a male labor supply forced them out, probably into the informal labor market. Women had provided their service as a transitional work force and were returned to a growing labor reserve. Why did they endure it? What were their alternatives?

Table I

Number of Workers and % Women in Mexico City Match Factories, 1919 and 1922

Plant Name	1919 Total	1919 Men	1919 Women	1919 Min.	1919 % Women	1922 Total	1922 Men	1922 Women	1922 Min.	1922 % Women
La Central	235	0	219	16	93	357	95	257	5	72
La Corona	164	0	112	52	68	193	35	150	8	78
La Perla	20	6	12	2	60	20	6	12	2	60
Total in City	575	42	437	96	76	644	158	465	21	72

Source: AGN, Dept. Trabajo, 1919 and 1922.

Table II

Numbers of Men and Women in Work Force by Branch of Packaging Industry

Industry	Total	Men	Women	Minors	% Women in Force
Paper mills	2,217	2,025	110	82	5
Cardboard box	721	257	456	8	63
Match shops	1,668	493	1,164	11	70
All industries	262,264	220,934	33,188	8,142	13

Source: Sria. de la Economia Nacional, Direccion General de Estadistica, Primer Censo Industrial de 1930. Mexico, 1935.

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[1]I wish to acknowledge my debt to Suellen Huntington, who read and criticized an early manuscript and helped me organize the statistical tables.

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[3]Helieth I.B. Saffioti, Women in Class Society (New York and London: Monthly Review Press, 1978), 182-83.

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[5]Mexico has a small reserve of wood to be used for industry and must substitute with other products. T-AHJ, 1915; Departmento de Trabajo, Archivo General de la Nacion (hereinafter cited as T-AGN), 1919.

[6]T-AHJ, 1915.

[7]T-AGN, 1913.

[8]T-AHJ, 1915.

[9]Comandante Militario del Estado de San Luis Potosi, letter to Departamento de Trabajo, T-AGN, 1916.

[10]See: Benjamin Keen and Mark Wasserman, A Short History of Latin America (Palo Alto and London: Houghton Mifflin, 1980), 284.

[11]Departamento de la Estadistica Nacional (hereinafter cited as DEN), Censo General de Habitantes 3 nov. 1921 (Mexico City, 1928).

[12]T-AHJ, 1922.

[13]Informe de Inspector Berraza, 11 abril 1922, T-AGN, 1922.

[14]Secretaria de Industria, Comercio y Trabajo, Boletin Mensual del Departamento de Trabajo, febrero y marzo, 1922.

[15]Legajo 6, Censo industrial, T-AGN, 1922.

[16]Departamento de Fomento del Estado de Puebla, Boletin de Estadistica (Puebla, June 1905).

[17]DEN, Censo de 1921, whose figures were obviously inaccurate and Informes de inspectores, T-AGN, 1919, 1921, 1922, 1923; Legajo 1, Censo industrial T-AGN, 1924.

[18]Censos industriales and asuntos administrativos, T-AGN, 1919 and 1923.

[19]Sria. de la Economia Nacional, Direccion General de Estadistica (hereinafter cited as SEN, DGE), Primer censo industrial de 1930 (Mexico City, 1935).

[20]T-AHJ, 1930.

[21]SEN, DGE Censos industriales de 1935 and 1940 (Mexico City, 1941 and 1952).

[22]Expedientes 93, 929, 982, T-AHJ, 1936.

[23]SEN DGE Censos industriales de 1935 and 1940 (Mexico City, 1941 and 1952).

[24]T-AHJ, 1937.

[25]Huelgas, T-AGN, 1918.

[26]Huelgas, T-AGN, 1921.

[27]T-AHJ, 1925.

[28]Maria Concepcion Flores protested to the Labor Court that a foreman, whose sexual overtures she had refused, had fired her in an act of revenge during a labor dispute. Junta de Conciliacion y Arbitraje, T-AGN, 1926.

[29]CROM lost its leadership position when its head, Luis Morones, was accused of participating in the assassination of incoming president Alvaro Obregon. Between 1928 and 1935 many unions vied for power, locally and nationally.

[30]T-AHJ, 1935 to 1937.

[31]Informe, Inspector Ojeda, 1938 and T-AHJ, 1937.

[32]Huelgas, T-AGN, 1937.

Women and Work in Sudan: What is Alienated Labor?

Sondra Hale

There are certain basic assumptions behind this paper, ones I went into the field with. One is that the very areas of the Third World where "development" has been most capital-intensive are those where women are most alienated and, conversely, contribute least to development. Female urban workers are visible in the formal sector but frustrated in the private sphere where they are held to traditional roles. For an analysis we are forced to look not only at Marxist theory (i.e. Engels) which points to the growing gap between the public and private sphere, but also at a patriarchal ideology which perpetuates the devaluation of women's contribution to social production. The aim of my ongoing research is to examine socialist feminist theory and practice as it relates to the Third World and to create a broader theoretical understanding of the oppression of women as workers and as women.

This paper is a brief introduction to the results of fieldwork I carried out among women wage earners in Khartoum, Sudan, during the summer of 1981. The National Endowment for the Humanities-sponsored research project was entitled "Urban Sudanese Women: Illusion of Autonomy in the Public Domain." It was my fifth trip to Sudan, for a total of six years spanning a twenty-year period. The data have not been completely analyzed, so these thoughts will be incomplete although, I hope, provocative and suggestive.

In my research I have focused on the urban areas of Muslim Northern Sudan, attempting to contribute to our broader theoretical understanding of the exploitation of women under capitalism by exploring the personal aspects of women's loss of autonomy in the public and private domains of a "developing" society. I want to contribute to our understanding of the subjectivity of oppression, ultimately to be able to make the connections between the emotional components of consciousness (Rowbotham, et al, 1979) and the material base. Part of that research is to question whether or not Sudanese women have gained in social, political, or economic autonomy by moving into the public sector (e.g. paid labor force). By examining various mechanisms of decision-making--both domestic and public--I started out to show that women in Khartoum in the 1980s are making fewer and smaller decisions about events and conditions which directly affect them, although they may have false consciousness about their autonomy and power.

As the research proceeded, however, I began to examine another hypothesis: women in the wage labor force of a society beginning to feel the effects of the penetration of capital are beginning to devalue their own domestic labor; concomitantly, domestic labor, in general, would be devalued. As a corollary, because the contribution of women to the public sector is also not highly valued, women are losing out with the advent of capitalism. Consequently, the very

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Previous Page Blank

areas of Sudan where "development" has been most capital-intensive are those areas where women are least autonomous.

Sudan, a poor, mainly agrarian /pastoral country with a population of some 17,000,000[1] (comprised of some 582 ethnic groups and 110 separate languages), in area is Africa's largest country. It was colonized by the British from 1899 until 1956. Much of Northern Sudan's population is Muslim, with only 10-25% Christian. As a divide and rule policy and administrative expediency, the British divided Sudan into "North" and "South" and basically left it to the Sudanese to integrate after independence. The artificially imposed boundaries incorporate under one political unit, a mainly Muslim, Arabicized North and a mainly Black African South.

This paper addresses itself to the Northern two-thirds of the country, the Arab-African area known as "Northern Sudan"--Muslim, patrilineal, patriarchal--but more relaxed than most Muslim areas. The population of the North is approximately 9.7 million, around 5 million of whom are women. It is these 5 million women who are the focus of this paper.

Some 72% of Sudan's population is engaged directly in agriculture (International Labour Organization, 1976: 15). As we would expect, rural women comprise some 60-64% of the rural labor force and 10-12% of the official urban work force, but women, of course, earn money or goods/services in kind in a variety of ways, usually on the margins of urban markets, and these women are rarely enumerated as wage earners. The very fact of wage-earning women being undercounted further points to their marginality.

The bulk of these women wage earners are in Greater Khartoum[2] where more than 75% of all socioeconomic investments are poured. Yet, for all the capital-intensive investment centralized in the capital, Sudan, as a whole, is relatively poorer than in centuries past, and ranks as one of the world's poorest countries (Roden, 1974).

Class formation in Sudan during the last two centuries has been the logical outcome of the Turkiyya (Ottoman capitalist exploits) and the Mahdiyya: these periods witnessed the emergence of the merchant/administrative class and landed aristocracy. The British nourished both of these classes and the former ". . . played an important role in the process of encapsulation of the Sudan into the economic and political structure of the British empire" (Barnett, 1975: 203). The Mahdists (Ansar sect) still draw much wealth from central riverain estates and the Khatmis dominate the peasants of the northeast. Second only to the landed aristocracy in this North-Central riverain area are the urban elites--the commercial, industrial, bureaucratic. and petit bourgeoisie. This class now controls the commercial sector of the economy and maintains the various external links to outside capital (see Collins, 1976 and O'Neill, 1978).

Political organization in Sudan in this century has consisted of early nationalist groups and then the eventual formation of strong, sectarian-based conservative political parties, including the Muslim Brotherhood. These have competed, sometimes effectively, with Sudan's military, which has been in power a total of twenty of the twenty-seven years Sudan has been independent.

Let us look at the position of Sudanese women in relation to Sudan's power structure. When one reads about women in Islamic societies, one gets two simplistic, seemingly contradictory pictures: (1) Women have no significant autonomy in the public sector; or (2) women wield enormous power in the private/domestic sphere. Two other simplistic, seemingly contradictory views are that (1) women in Africa and the Middle East have always been oppressed and the one way to change this is through "development," e.g. getting women out into the work-force; or (2) the position of these women was better in the past, but declined as a corollary to colonialism. As for Sudanese women--some look upon them as among the most emancipated in the Arabo-African culture areas, whereas others see them as among the most oppressed, a corollary to the economically oppressed condition of Sudan itself.

The particular form of increasing underdevelopment which Sudan is experiencing serves to

combine the constraints of Islamic-reinforced patriarchy with the inherent structural inequalities of capitalism and the multicorporate variant of neo-colonialism. These factors serve increasingly to marginalize Sudan's male and female workers. However, men often have their economic options widened, giving them greater personal autonomy, whereas women become increasingly restricted to "appropriate" jobs, losing in competition to men (Remy, 1975: 370), often after having lost their previous "rural" skills. Religion often reinforces these structural inequalities.

As we would expect, many women workers in Khartoum are channeled into dull, repetitive jobs with low pay. Concomitantly, their personal lives simultaneously reflect a rigid division of labor in that domestic work is still women's work. Yet, the areas of her life where she might achieve some power or have her role valued more highly have been assumed by other agencies or have lost their importance. For example, there has been the decline of homemade crafts in favor of imports. Also, the socialization of children is now carried out more equally by men or assumed by the schools, media, or child care centers. Urban workers are more isolated from other women or, often, from their own extended families--having the effect of reducing their potential for solidarity and raised consciousness.

Ironically, the Sudanese woman may have less control than ever over her reproductive rights--a reflection of the liberal milieu of sharing these decisions with the men, but also as a result of the development of the nuclear family as the most effective economic unit for a capitalist, urban milieu. Furthermore, living in the heart of fundamentalist Islam with the capitalist requisites of the family unit has captured the urban woman in other ways. What she has been "freed" from (e.g. housework to some small extent), she has also been alienated from. She has fewer and fewer products she owns, controls, or sees in their whole state. In this sense and others, this case follows another story of how capitalist patriarchy underdeveloped women (see Remy, for example, 1975).

In assessing the extent to which and in what forms urban women are alienated from their domestic and wage-earning labor, I interviewed in depth some sixteen women who ranged in ages from 24-44; who had been in the labor force from two to ten years (i.e. fairly recently); whose salaries ranged from 27 to 400 pounds monthly; whose jobs ranged from unskilled plant work to specialized cultural organizer; whose educational level ranged from intermediate school to university graduate; who were married, unmarried, and divorced; and who had from 0-2 children.

The interview questions were phrased to elicit attitudes about domestic work and their wage-earning job and attitudes which would give us clues about self-esteem; power in the family (or lack of it); division of labor within the household and the like. A great deal of comparison was made between the respondents and their mothers, none of the latter of whom were educated and only one of whom earned money outside the home.

The responses to the interview questions led to many seeming contradictions. It is these contradictions with which I am currently working. For example, all the women said they liked working outside the home for money, although in many cases they wanted a "better job," i.e. more money. All but a couple expressed respect for their public job, but most of the white collar, clerical or civil service positions were thought of as easy or "not difficult." Only one thought of her job as challenging and that same one, plus two others, saw themselves as making a contribution to society. With the exception of one or possibly two, they were disdainful of domestic labor, but nearly all of the white-collar workers (12 of 16) expressed a desire to "return to the home" (i.e. quit their jobs) at some future point. The industrial workers would not imagine going back to the domestic sphere.

Their reasons for working were stated as wanting independence, which was expressed as broader than economic independence, i.e. freedom, often as simple as getting out of the house. Although they would <u>not</u> say they were "working for fun," or "to pass the time," they also would <u>not</u> say they absolutely needed the money, although in some cases this was obvious.In most cases they would indicate that their salary was "supplemental." Often no cash flows from the wo-

man worker to the other members of her family. Instead, she often buys household goods which she (and others in her family) label "unessential" or "luxury items." Even in middle-class families these may, in fact, be relatively essential (e.g. bed linens and dishes). The males of the family are described as the central providers--that is, usually as the ones who pay for the food.

The women I interviewed at length and the ones I have been talking with for twenty years look upon wage earning as a panacea. I began to use the slogan "wages are the opium of women" because my respondents all looked upon women working outside the home as one of the positive trends in a liberalizing environment. Although their descriptions of their alienating, impersonal bureaucratic jobs contrasted with their descriptions of their non-alienating, personal, direct-reward domestic labor, they still described themselves as "happy" to be wage earning outside the home. This was the case even when they earned thirty pounds monthly, had a dull repetitive unskilled job, and traveled long distances on public transport to reach the work site. The admitted fact that their economic fortunes were declining (as a concomitant of Sudan's deteriorating economy) did not mitigate their positive attitudes toward their jobs. They did not see themselves as marginal in any sense--at home or in the economy. For certain, then, they had high self-esteem but a low level of consciousness about their increasing marginalization under capitalism. The reality of their material lives--that they carry the society on their backs in terms of production and reproduction and that they hold down two full-time jobs--does not dampen nor alter the subjectivity of their condition. The liberal ideology of capitalism has been effectively disseminated throughout urban Sudanese society. A woman with a wage is seen as an enlightened, progressive important element in the society. It is, perhaps, too early in the development of capitalism in Sudan for women to reject this liberal ideology.

At this point it is my conjecture that the emotional components of consciousness and the material base are not integrated--that such an integration may require even more extreme alienation from domestic labor and the reproductive role. Yet, when one views western capitalist societies one sees that women are led to believe (through the bourgeois media and liberal schooling) that the cause of their alienation from domestic labor is their public labor. At a profound, subjective level this is the process Sudanese women workers are going through and accounts for their desire to return to the partially "abandoned" domestic roles in that ideal future when their money will no longer be needed. In this sense and in others women are a reserve army of labor, a manipulated class. Even their domestic labor is not seen as reproducing the society and has been undermined. Meanwhile their options are disappearing. Their domestic labor is becoming mystified and romanticized; their work in the formal sector increasingly mandatory.

Notes

[1]The International Labour Organization estimated the population at 14.7 million in 1973 (1976: 14), but, through personal communications, a number of demographically-oriented Sudanese and Sudanist geographers--among them El-Sayed El-Bushra, Salih El-Arifi, and Gerry A. Hale--all estimated the population at a few million more. We are reliant on estimates because the last census figures (from 1974) were never published in any complete form. Figures in this paper have been aggregated from old census figures (Sudan 1960; Sudan 1965); the comprehensive International Labour Organization report (1976); scattered references (e.g. Bushara, 1975); and personal communications.

[2]"Greater Khartoum" refers to Khartoum, Khartoum North, and Omdurman--Sudan's tripartheid capital which is located at the confluence of the Blue and White Niles.

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PART V

EDUCATION AND TRAINING

Vocational and Technical Education for Women in the Arab States

Nagat M. El-Sanabary

I would like to state at the outset that nowhere in the Third World or, to a certain extent, in the developed world, do women receive the type and level of education that allows them to develop their potentialities fully and contribute to society in whatever capacity they choose. In the Arab states, as in all Third World countries, women still suffer from various forms of educational inequities including disparate access to technical and vocational education. There, the potential of women remains an untapped and underutilized human resource for lack of adequate education. High illiteracy rates, lack of adequate technical skills and basic education limit women's options to domestic functions, or relegate them to the ranks of unskilled or semiskilled workers. To play an active role in modern industrial and other economic sectors, women must acquire the necessary skills, knowledge, and training. Technical and vocational education thus become prerequisites for women's access to, and advancement in, skilled and paraprofessional jobs upon which development depends and on which some women's livelihood may rest.

This paper provides a brief overview of the access of girls and women to technical and vocational education in the Arab states, and analyzes the barriers to the development of this education and women's participation in it, and in related industrial employment.

Two types of barriers to female access to technical and vocational education and to a wider role for women in development during periods of industrial transformation, can be identified: first, barriers that operate on the governmental level affecting policy decisions regarding the supply of vocational and technical education facilities for women; and secondly, barriers operating on the parental and student levels and thus affecting the demand for girls' technical and vocational education. These must be understood within the general socioeconomic and cultural context of Arab countries since, as Ghannam has noted (in reference to the 1970 meeting of the Ministers Responsible for Economic and Educational Planning in the Arab States in Marrakesh):

> The discussion of the access of girls to technical and vocational education involved the whole issue of the status of women and their right to equality with men in work and education and thus placed the problem in a broader perspective. The discussion also revealed dominant attitudes and beliefs and concepts concerning women: their nature, their aptitudes, and the types of work and

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Previous Page Blank

occupations for which they are suited.[1]

Thus, before I discuss female access to technical and vocational education in various Arab states and the barriers that have hindered the development of this education in the past, I would like to make a few observations on the general socioeconomic situation of Arab countries to provide a basis for further discussion and analysis.

- The Arab states share a common cultural, religious, and historical background which has shaped the development of their educational systems, and their cultural attitudes towards women, their status and role in society.

- Contrary to popular belief among Westerners and some educated and non-educated Muslims, there is no Islamic bias against women's education. According to Islam, the search for knowledge is the duty of every Muslim, man or woman. However, differences exist among the various states, and within various segments of the population in each state, as to the purpose, function, and form that female education should have.

- Arab countries are lands of contrasts. Against a background of massive female--and male--illiteracy, millions of girls and women are enrolled in all levels and types of education. Ironically, in countries like Egypt, there is a serious problem of unemployment and underemployment among university educated men and women. And in some states, notably Iraq, Egypt, Tunisia, and Jordan, there are women who have occupied high level cabinet positions.

- Arab states differ in their industrialization level and the level of their commitment to the utilization of the talents of women in nontraditional fields of employment. For instance, while the history of industrialization in Egypt goes back to the nineteenth century, the industrialization and general economic diversification began in the smaller Arab states of the lower Gulf in the 1960s and 1970s. These differences are reflected in differences in educational development in general, and in the development of technical and vocational education in particular. These differences are in turn reflected in different levels of female access to technical and vocational education.

Access of Girls and Women to Technical and Vocational Education: A Brief Overview

Following are a few observations on the access of girls to technical and vocational education with special focus on the secondary education level:

- In several Arab countries, vocational and technical education for women is a product of the 1960s and 1970s. Despite considerable expansion of female enrollments in this education over the past two decades, their participation is still much more restricted than that of males. Generally, girls have benefited from the general expansion of vocational and technical education facilities except in Saudi Arabia, Yemen, the United Arab Emirates and a few other states where this education is still in its infancy.

- Currently, most Arab states provide some vocational education for women; however the scope and diversity of the type of curriculum offerings differ considerably from one Arab country to another. In most states, the highest concentration of female vocational education enrollment is in the "technical education for women" which provides training in domestic sciences and related fields, and commercial education with emphasis on clerical skills. Enrollment in industry related "industrial education" is restricted to males in most Arab states.

- Major differences exist among the various states in the level of female participation in vocational and technical education. Egypt, Tunisia, and Morocco have the highest rates of female participation in this education. In these three countries, the proportion of girls enrolled in this education to all female secondary students is higher than corresponding

proportions for males, i.e., girls are more likely than boys in these three countries to enroll in vocational education programs. Tunisia and Egypt have expanded their vocational and technical education facilities considerably over the past two decades for both males and females. They are the only two states in the region with explicit policies to expand and diversify female access to technical and vocational education, as well as labor force participation. Additionally in Tunisia, over the years, there have been more girls than boys enrolled in private fee-charging vocational schools. For instance, in 1975 Tunisia had 6,216 girls enrolled in private vocational schools as compared to 1,690 boys.

- At the other extreme, one finds that in the Gulf States of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qutar, and the United Arab Emirates, girls do not have access to vocational and technical education beyond the domestic sciences.

- Vocational education in the medical sciences designed to train paramedical personnel is provided for women in most Arab states. This type of education will not be discussed here since it does not have much to do with women's participation in industrial work in these countries.

- Vocational and technical education at the secondary and lower educational levels is unpopular and is generally accorded a lower status due to several reasons I will discuss later.

- In several Arab states, women pursue technical and professional education in relatively large numbers in colleges and universities. Unlike secondary technical education, university level education is prestigious and leads to highly paid jobs mostly in research and administrative government posts. Very few women with professional and technical college education, however, work in research and management positions in industry. Therefore the discussion that follows focuses on vocational and technical education at the secondary level, the determinants of the supply and demand for this education, and its relationship to industrial employment in the Arab states.

Determinants of Female Access to Technical and Vocational Education in the Arab States

Various socioeconomic and cultural factors affect the supply and demand for technical and vocation education for girls and women in the Arab states. These forces may act at the macro level and affect government policies regarding the supply of vocational education facilities for girls and women. They also operate on the individual and family levels thus affecting the demand by girls and their parents for this and other types of education. The following discussion focuses on six factors: (1) high illiteracy rates and low female participation rates in primary education; (2) the general emphasis on academic education for both sexes; (3) sex-specific factors, namely the prevailing sex-role stereotypes and the attitudes towards women and their place in society; (4) the general level of female participation in the modern economic sectors and particularly in the industrial sector; (5) the low status of vocational and technical education at the secondary level; and (6) the low employment prospects for vocational education graduates. Following is a discussion of these factors and their impact on the access and participation of girls in technical and vocational education.

High illiteracy rates and low female participation rates in primary education. One major barrier to greater access for girls to technical and vocational education in the Arab states is their unequal access to primary education which is a prerequisite for admission to secondary education, either vocational or academic. With the exception of Lebanon, Tunisia, Kuwait, and Jordan, fewer girls than boys enroll in primary education at grades one through six. In all the Arab states combined, there are over 10 million children of primary school age who do not have access to schooling. Most of these are girls from peasant and working class families who are potential vocational education students if they can acquire an education at the primary level and obtain the necessary requirements for admission to vocational secondary education.

The main educational problem in most of the Arab states is the failure of their educational systems to absorb all children of primary school age (ages 6-12 years). This, in addition to a high rate of absenteeism and dropout among girls, compounds the serious illiteracy problem in these states, especially among women. Today, almost 10 million girls of primary school age do not have access to school education and have to join the ranks of the illiterate female masses. Because they lack a basic education, they cannot gain access to technical and vocational education programs which in most instances require six to nine years of prior schooling. Unless some vocational training programs are provided for them, their opportunities for gainful employment are usually extremely limited.

Since those who need skills training the most are the ones without any schooling, this situation poses serious limitations on formal schooling as a means of providing girls and women with the necessary skills for industrial and related modern sector employment. It is thus reasonable to argue that girls who do not have access to formal schooling be provided with informal training before or after employment in factory and related work. This becomes a matter of economic necessity as well as social justice and equity since informal education and training then become the only means for poor girls to acquire training for gainful employment.

General emphasis on academic education. Despite shortages of skilled labor, Arab countries continue to place greater emphasis on college-preparatory secondary education at the expense of the job-related vocational and technical education. This is due to several reasons. First, it is a continuation of the traditional bookish Islamic schools with their emphasis on rote learning. Second, the colonial legacy helped perpetrate the academic orientation of Arab education through an elitist orientation which viewed education as a means of training a few elites for government service. One further reason is the higher cost of technical education which requires expensive facilities and equipment. Thus in all Arab states there are fewer secondary and technical schools, especially for girls as indicated in table 1.

Available educational statistics document this imbalance in student enrollment between academic and vocational education. In the various Arab states, the proportion of students enrolled in academic secondary education out of all secondary students ranged from approximately 78% in Tunisia to 99% in Algeria and Libya. In all States, with the exception of Egypt and Tunisia, girls are more likely than boys to be enrolled in an academic as compared to a vocational secondary education program. In these two countries the proportion of girls enrolled in vocational education in relation to all female secondary students was 22% in Egypt and 28% in Tunisia. Not only do these two countries have the highest female representation in vocational and technical education, they also have the most diversified curricular offerings in the vocational education track. There, girls are enrolled in the most technical as well as in the feminine sectors. These two countries also have the highest number of female students enrolled in vocational education. Four other Arab states--Syria, Iraq, Morocco, and Jordan--have relatively high female enrollment in vocational/technical education, but they constitute a small proportion of female secondary students. Although the history of female vocational education in Jordan goes back only to the mid-1960s, enrollment has been growing steadily due to the Jordanian government's expressed policy of expanding vocational and technical education opportunities for women. Five other countries provided no vocational and technical education facilities for women. These are mostly the preindustrial Gulf states, namely, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. Although some industries have been introduced in the oil producing states, notably Saudi Arabia, these have been capital-intensive industries that relied heavily on expatriates males.

Prevailing sex-role stereotypes. Another determinant of the supply of and demand for vocational and technical educational opportunities for women is the prevailing sex-role stereotypes. The prevailing notion is that woman's place is in the home, thus obviating the need for job-related technical and vocational education. Therefore the so-called technical education for women emphasizes homemaking and child-rearing skills. Consequently, in addition to the three types of vocational schools that exist in all Arab states--industrial, commercial,

and agricultural--there is a fourth type designed solely for women, the "technical education for women" formerly known as "feminine education." This education, together with commercial education, are the two types most accessible for women in all Arab states. Access to industrial and agricultural education is extremely restricted if allowed at all.

Thus existing vocational education opportunities for women in most Arab countries tend to perpetuate the sexual division of labor between men and women, as they prepare women for work in the home not the marketplace. There have been numerous criticisms of this "technical education for women." A report by UNESCO voiced serious reservations about it, stating:

> This type of women's training does not always deserve to be called "technical education, " a word which implies... preparation for employment in well paid and skilled work in sectors of the economy undergoing modernization...Thus, domestic training for use in family life and routine handicraft training without any employment openings cannot really be included in technical education. [2]

Since some of these feminine schools (technical education for women) offer classes in dressmaking and tailoring, they do have the potential of preparing some of their graduates for income-generating activities in small-scale cottage industries. In Egypt for instance, this type of education has been integrated with what is called industrial education for women and includes education in electronics as well as domestic work. Graduates are sometimes employed in garment factories as supervisors of the more experienced and older but uneducated women workers. The majority of the graduates in Egypt and other Arab states, however, do not seek paid jobs and assume their responsibilities as homemakers.

Several states have recently taken steps to reform this education and widen the course offerings to provide graduates the option of working in the traditional industries such as textiles. In Egypt, the curriculum of this education has been expanded to offer a wide range of subjects in traditional and nontraditional areas. Similar changes have been made in Tunisia. These two countries have made the most progress in relating vocational education for women to the needs of the economy. There female student enrollment has expanded enormously over the past decade, and wider options are open to the graduates.

Commercial education also falls within the traditional sex-role definition of the kinds of work suited for women in the more modernizing states. This is especially true in those states where women have gained access to clerical and other office jobs. Over the past two decades, commercial education at the secondary level has attracted large numbers of women who desire office work. Thus, commercial schools claim the second highest number of girls enrolled after the technical education for women. In all Arab states with commercial education schools for girls, the number of female students is quite high. Even in Bahrain, one of the small Gulf states, more girls than boys are enrolled in commercial education programs at the secondary level, more girls sit for the commercial examinations than boys, and their success rate is even higher.[3] Bahrain has also admitted women to the Gulf Technical College since 1970/71, and the number of women enrolled has been increasing constantly over the past decade. In that country, women's banks have been open for several years, thus providing employment opportunities for women. However, Bahrain is a small country and the number of students involved in these programs is rather small. An important factor encouraging female participation in commercial education in Bahrain is the resentment of foreign labor and the desire to replace foreign clerical workers with indigenous women.[4]

Commercial secondary education now attracts increasingly large number of girls in most the Arab states. A study by UNESCO found that the subjects commonly chosen by girls were typing, stenography, accounting, bookkeeping, and other secretarial office skills. Employment opportunities in these traditionally female fields have been good, especially in the private sector.[5]

Low level of female participation in industrial work. The third factor that accounts for the limited access of girls to technical and vocational education in the Arab countries is their low participation rates in skilled industrial work requiring special training. Not unlike many Third World countries, the participation rates of Arab women in modern industrial sectors are very low. Actually, the Arab states have some of the lowest modern sector female labor participation rates in the world. However, major differences exist among the various Arab states in the level and type of female participation in modern economic activities and particularly in the industrial sector. These differences are due not only to differences in their industrialization level, but also to differences in their commitment to the utilization of the potential of women, especially in nontraditional female employment.

Women's participation in industrial work, especially factory work in Arab countries, is strongly related to the history and level of industrial development in these countries. For instance, in Egypt where the process of industrialization began in the 19th century, women's factory and industrial work is nothing new. From the mid 19th century, Egyptian women were involved in textile industries within the newly developed factories or in their own homes on hand looms. They also participated in the sugar and tobacco industries. As early as 1914, Egyptian women constituted 14% of the industrial workforce. However, over the past 70 years, the proportion of women employed in industries compared to all industrial workers declined and their percentage of all industrial workers fluctuated between 3 and 5 percent.

An Egyptian government report issued in the mid-1960s stresses the role that Egyptian women play in industries, and claims that Egyptian women participate in all industries. In the military factories which produce mostly nonmilitary materials, 500 women were employed in the early 1960s. Among them was a woman engineer doing the first Ph.D. degree in metallurgy. Other women were reported to be working in moulding, carpentry, forging and other occupations which were traditionally reserved for men.[6] Despite these proclamations, and the increased access of women to nontraditional industrial occupations, the majority are still to be found in traditional industries such as textile and garment industries and plants that process tobacco, sugar, beverages, and other foods.

Generally, Arab countries with large labor-intensive industries and a long history of female participation in industrial work have a more favorable climate for female participation in vocational and technical education. Governments in these states are more cognizant of the need for women's education and training in skills needed for industrial production. They are short of natural resources and are more likely to harness their human resources for the development of the individual and society.

For instance, the highest level of female participation in vocational and technical education at the secondary levels occurs in Egypt, Tunisia, and Morocco where women have a long history of participation in industrial production. Available statistics show large numbers of women participating in industrial work in these three countries. Egypt, the most populous Arab state with 40 million inhabitants, recorded 80,000 women factory workers in 1978, or approximately 5% of the total industrial workforce. In Tunisia in 1975 there were 16,000 women industrial workers, or 12.6% of the industrial workforce, thus making it the state with the highest proportion of female industrial workers. Next came Jordan where 1,500 women made up 11% of the industrial workforce in 1978.[7] These are just a few Arab states where data is available on women's participation in industrial work. Poor in natural resources, they have to rely on their human resources for development, and they have made some effort to draw women into the industrial process. Whether all these women workers have the training they need for skilled work is not known. Available research suggests, however, that many of them do not have any specialized training. Research on women industrial workers in Egypt for instance, has shown that most of them did not complete the first education cycle.

In contrast to Egypt and Tunisia, we find Arab countries where the history of industrialization is recent and there is not much involvement of women in industrial production. This

is the case in most of the states of the lower Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula where women's participation in industrial production is negligible. The old economic activities that existed in these countries, mostly pearl diving and sea trading industries, were not the type of activities which might involve women either in an Arab or a non-Arab country. The newer industries that have been developed in some of these states over the past two decades are based on their natural resources of gas and oil, capital-intensive industries which have relied heavily on expatriate male workers. They are not considered suitable for female employment. Due to the nature of the industries and the generally more conservative traditional and cultural climate, women are not drawn into industrial production in these states, and are not expected to be in the near future. Women's employment is still limited to the traditional services of teaching, social work, and medicine. In some states like Bahrain, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, some women have gained access to office work through training in commercial schools but their number is still small.

The above differences in the extent and level of female participation in the industrial labor force is reflected in differences in female access to technical and vocational education.

Lower status of technical and vocational education. Girls and women tend to shy away from the technical and vocational secondary education because of its lower status, its association with lower admission standards, manual work and working class background, as well as historical factors.

In most Arab countries, the admission criteria for vocational and technical education are lower than those for academic secondary schools. Thus it is considered suited for the less talented students, and a catch-basin for those who cannot make it into the academic secondary schools. Since most of the girls who pursue their education up to the secondary stage are generally highly motivated and academically oriented, most prefer to enter the more prestigious secondary schools which prepare for college admission. Vocational schools, on the contrary, are terminal for most of their graduates except for a very few in the most technical specializations.

In addition to bearing a lower academic stigma, technical and vocational education suffers from a class stigma. Because of its association with manual and blue collar work, it has a working-class association. In the Arab states, as in other economically underdeveloped countries, manual work is considered undignified, degrading, and menial. This is a remnant of the colonial era when manual work was reserved for the natives, and office and professional work was reserved for the foreigners or the national elite. This lower-class association of vocational and technical education discourages aspiring young women from seeking such an education. Vocational schools are thus often reserved for working-class girls and boys who wish to receive training for factory or trade jobs. Middle-class girls and their families are very sensitive to this stigma because of the persisting belief that only girls from needy families work because their families cannot support them. It is unlikely that middle-class families would consider vocational and technical education for their daughters.

There is also an historical basis for this working-class stigma associated with vocational and technical education. It goes back to the early days of girls' education when the early vocational training programs for women were provided by charitable organizations for orphans and poor girls. There they learned sewing, embroidery, knitting, and other handicrafts that would enable them to earn an income. Such programs are still provided in many Arab states by women's unions and cooperatives. However, with increasing industrialization and with the increased access of girls to formal schooling, more structured and institutionalized types of vocational and technical education programs were introduced. Their association with the older skills training programs continues, however, and the demand for them is not as strong as the demand for academic programs that train for higher-level education and higher status jobs. Thus Arab educational systems, with their strict division between the prestigious academic

track and the lowly vocational track, serve to accentuate class distinction.

The concern over this discrepancy in the demand for academic and vocational /technical programs is reflected by Mr. Ahmed Nazzir, Director of Planning at the Ministry of Education in Syria, who said, "Everybody here wants to become a doctor or an architect just when we are short of skilled workers."[8] Clearly, the revolution of rising expectations has permeated all strata of society. For most men and women, education has become the main avenue to upward social mobility. Indeed, in Egypt, Syria, and many other Arab countries, the aim of every young man or woman is to become a doctor, engineer, or other professional. The majority of young women and men shun any jobs that have to do with factory or agricultural work.

It is suggested, however, that recent socioeconomic changes in many Arab countries have brought about changes in attitudes towards industrial work. Qubain identifies several factors responsible for this change:

> Although the prejudice against manual work still prevails, its strength has declined. Other developments have brought about a considerable rise in the status of workers so that industrial employment is far more attractive today than it has been in the past. The rise of industry for modern armies has brought about not only an expanding demand for industrial labor, but a considerable rise in both the absolute and relative wages, so that, today, in some cases, the wages of workers are higher than those of office employees...[9]

This rise in wages, however, may not apply to women workers due to their concentration in the traditional female employment in textile and other low-paying industrial work, rather than in the modern heavy industries connected with armaments. Several studies of parental and employer attitudes indicate that vocational and technical education is still relegated to a lower status and provokes negative attitudes among employers. Even graduates prefer office jobs to factory work, and employers still prefer academic school graduates to those with vocational education degrees. An exceptional situation is found in the Gulf states of Bahrain and Qatar where a vocational/technical education is of superior quality to a general secondary education.

Seen from the perspective of working-class women, vocational and technical education may provide an important means of some limited social mobility especially if it leads to a job and an income. It may even increase their marriage prospects. However, as working-class families adopt middle-class values, due mainly to the influence of the media and modern education which is based on middle-class values, working-class girls will also shun vocational education and industrial employment. It is expected that, as the educational and aspirational levels of women incerase, their participation in vocational and technical education and industrial production will actually decline.

Low employment prospects for technical and vocational education graduates. Because of the low status accorded to vocational and technical education, due to an association with lower academic standards and lower class status, the employment prospects of graduates are limited. Employers prefer to hire academic school graduates, especially in jobs that do not require specific skills training. Ironically, the type of education that is supposed to be job-related for middle-level manpower is not valued by employers who do not have faith in the type of education and training provided in these schools or in the type of students who receive such an education. In Sudan, for instance, the vocational education degree of a potential job candidate has to be accredited whenever the graduate seeks employment. This uncertainty about employment prospects, and the negative attitudes of employers towards vocational and technical education graduates, discourages students from pursuing this type of education.

Little information is available about the employment rates of secondary vocational and

technical education graduates. Only few studies in recent years have examined the educational background of women industrial workers. We have stated earlier that countries with relatively high rates of female participation in industrial work also have high rates of female participation in vocational and technical education programs. But we have no evidence that education is directly linked to employment. We even have some evidence suggesting that vocational education may not be strongly linked to employment since several studies of women industrial workers, in Egypt and Sudan for instance, have shown that most of the women workers did not finish high school and did not pursue a vocational technical education program. In a study of women industrial workers in a textile factory in Egypt, Hamman found that 91% had received some primary education, 54% had completed the primary stage, almost 10% had attended preparatory school, and 0.7% had obtained their preparatory school certificate. Of all the women workers in this study, 33% were illiterate.[10] Another study of women in a spinning and weaving factory in the Sudan revealed that the majority were young women between the ages of 20 and 25 years with elementary and intermediate secondary education.[11] In Jordan, however, the educational level of women workers was found to be relatively high compared to the level of women factory workers in either Egypt or the Sudan. This is due in part to a higher education level among the Jordanian population. In a study of women factory workers in Amman, Jordan, Linda Layne found that 38% of the women workers had completed elementary school, 38% had completed preparatory schools, and 34% had received some vocational training. None had completed vocational secondary education.[12]

Limited information is available on where most graduates of secondary vocational and technical education graduates in these countries work. In Egypt, for instance, the graduates of female industrial education are hired as foremen in textile and garment factories, and others are hired as primary school teachers. My discussion with some of these women in Egypt suggests that hiring young secondary vocational education graduates to supervise older and more experienced workers often poses some problems for both. Problems among the young graduates arise, and often force them to quit their factory work and opt for some office job or primary school teaching.

Conclusion

I have discussed the constraints on female access to technical and vocational education in the Arab states, and the limitations of this education as a means of providing women with the skills and training necessary for active participation in skilled occupations in the growing industrial sector in these countries. Over the past two decades, economic necessities have forced many women into factory work without appropriate training. They tend to be concentrated in the traditional unskilled and semiskilled factory work which is considered appropriate for women, and which is an extension of the work they do in the home. As such, they constitute a cheap source of labor. At the same time, secondary vocational and technical education facilities for women are extremely limited in all Arab states with the exception of Egypt and Tunisia, and most of those who receive such an education do not use their skills in jobs in the industry and related occupations. This means that existing educational opportunities in the technical areas are not related to the needs of women or the requirements of the economy. It is an imbalance which is harmful to the socioeconomic development of these countries, and constitutes an obstacle to women's more active involvement in modern economic activities. Major changes are needed to expand vocational and technical education for women at the secondary level and diversify its curriculum offerings for women.

Certain conditions must prevail, however, if female access to technical and vocational education is to lead to a corresponding increase in women's contribution to industrial work and other modern economic sectors. These conditions include (1) a change in cultural attitudes toward manual labor and industrial work through publicity campaigns and improvement in the status, working conditions, wages, and benefits of industrial and related occupations; (2) relating vocational and technical education to the needs of the economy and general development plans; (3) developing adequate vocational guidance programs in the schools to direct stu-

dents toward programs suited to their interests and talents regardless of socioeconomic background; and (4) placement programs to locate graduates in occupations which utilize their skills and talents.

Another very important measure is to intensify efforts to universalize access to primary education for all girls and boys of school age. This will help provide basic skills of literacy and a foundation for social and intellectual development, and further skills training. The existing imbalance in Arab educational systems in favor of higher education at the expense of mass education helps widen the gap between an educated female elite whose ranks continue to grow, but the gap between them and the masses of illiterate women continues to widen.

There is also a great need to develop and expand nonformal skills training for girls and women who have missed the opportunity of formal schooling or who have dropped out of school without developing the necessary skills for gainful employment beyond the traditional economic sector. Several Arab governments, with the assistance of international agencies, have introduced such nonformal training programs for women. Model projects have been set up in Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia, and other states. However, the number of women benefiting from such programs is limited and much more needs to be done to provide access for girls and women who need skills training for gainful employment. Shortages of skilled labor are being aggravated by the migration of skilled Arab workers from the poorer nations to the OPEC nations. This intensifies the need to train women to satisfy the demand for skilled workers. The burden of this training must be shared by governments and employers for a more equitable allocation of resources.

I conclude by quoting a leading Egyptian educator, Mohammed El-Ghannam, who presents the consensus of the ministers of education and ministers responsible for economic planning in the Arab states during their meeting in Marrakesh in 1970 in the following statement:

> Equality of access of girls to education, particularly technical and vocational education, is not only an ethical and humanitarian principle, but is also, and above all, a necessity for economic well-being which emplies the harnessing and utilization of all human resources for increased production and social progress.[13]

Table I. Distribution of Male and Female Students in Secondary Education 1979 in Selected Arab States

Country	No. of Students in All Types of Sec.Ed.		No. of Students in Voc./Tech. Educ.		Percentage of Students in Voc./Tech. Ed. to All Secondary Students	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
Egypt	1,623,541	969,423	340,833	211,318	21.0%	21.7%
Tunisia	168,016	96,376	52,425	26,976	31.2	28.0
Syria	377,657	211,208	17,866	6,574	4.7	3.1
Iraq	672,705	297,282	38,915	15,111	5.8	5.0
Morocco	416,953	245,081	10,210	6,548	2.4	2.7
Algeria	579,698	353,637	11,135	3,034	1.9	0.9
Sudan						
Libyan A.G.	137,841	86,726	5,455	812	3.9	0.9
Jordan	138,406	110,237	6,656	3,224	4.8	2.9
Lebanon	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Kuwait	76,405	63,832	403	--	0.5	--
Saudi Arabia	206,433	120,072	4,557	--	2.2	--
Sabah	36,323	29,354	667	56	1.8	0.2
Bahrain	13,009	11,224	1,435	613	11.0	5.5
Oman	6,824	1,710	456	--	6.7	--
Qatar	7,316	7,044	382	--	5.2	--
United Arab Emirates	15,233	12,031	392	--	2.6	--
Yemen	21,968	2,854	1,148	--	5.2	--

Source: UNESCO, Statistical Yearbook, 1981. Paris: UNESCO, 1982.

Notes

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Education-Employment Linkages for Women: A Comparative Analysis of South and Southeast Asian Countries and Egypt

Hanna Papanek

The impact of global economic and political change in many less industrialized nations is being mediated through mechanisms that are still poorly understood and not well integrated into social science analyses of development and change. Gender differences play a particularly important part in these processes. Because they are so often overlooked in studies of the dynamics of change -- at both macro and micro levels -- the importance of gender differences to public policy is also not well understood. The purpose of the present analysis is to indicate some of the broader implications of gender differences in the processes of sociopolitical and economic change affecting the nations of South and Southeast Asia, in addition to Egypt, on the basis of recent research. Public policy, particularly with respect to development planning and development assistance, could be more effective if recent research on women were better integrated into the broader context of development research.

Recent trends in several countries of South and Southeast Asia and in Egypt indicate changing linkages between women's education, employment, class position, and family structure. To summarize a complex situation briefly, the following patterns have become apparent in the last two decades; recent research in India (Towards Equality 1974) and Egypt (Papanek and Ibrahim 1982) provide relevant data for this analysis.

Summary of Trends

(1) In all countries of the region, there has been increased labor force participation by highly educated women. Although each country has a long history of higher education for women -- sometimes going back 100 years -- the paid employment of highly educated women in significant numbers is a more recent phenomenon. While it is clear from many sources that the rate of female participation in higher education (High School and University) has also increased significantly, the rate of highly educated female employment has generally increased at an even faster pace. In Egypt, for example, the proportion of high school and university graduates in the measured female labor force increased from 12% in 1960 to 47%in 1976. Such a change, in less than two decades, is of course highly significant and deserves careful examination of causes and effects. In Indonesia, 1971 Census figures showed that high school and university educated females made up less than 2% of the measured female labor force. By 1980, highly educated women were still only 2.4% of the measured female labor force in rural areas but in urban areas they comprised over 15% of the total.

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(2) The increase in recorded economic activity by highly educated women in these countries has been accompanied by another phenomenon which has extremely serious public policy implications. At least as measured by available statistical sources, the labor force participation of uneducated women has declined dramatically. This decline has not been found among males. Egyptian figures indicate the change most clearly (Papanek and Ibrahim 1982):

Uneducated Males and Females in Population and Labor Force (Egypt)

("Illiterate" and "read/write only" combined)

	Males		Females	
	Population	Labor Force	Population	Labor Force
1960	89.6%	92.9%	96.5%	86.3%
1976	71.1%	82.9%	85.6%	46.4%

In other words, while the proportion of uneducated women in the population of Egypt has declined only slightly over this 16 year period, the proportion of uneducated women in the measured labor force has dropped by almost half. Indian researchers have found evidence for an overall decline in female labor force participation, which they attribute to causes that may be more widespread throughout the region. While they note that female participation rates have increased somewhat in education-dependent occupations (mainly technical and professional occupations), they show that the proportion of women in the total labor force has been steadily declining from 34.4% in 1911 to 17.4% in 1971. Female workers as a proportion of the total female population have also declined correspondingly, from a high of 33.7% in 1911 to a low of 12% in 1971 (Towards Equality, p.153). The Indian researchers attribute this decline to technological changes, the rationalization of production, reduced demand for "unskilled" labor, and a declining role of household industries (cottage production), in addition to a declining importance of the intermediate marketing system, in which women had played an important role. Variations in census and survey methodology over this period vastly complicate this picture but micro-studies corroborate the analysis of Indian trends in a variety of locations and occupations.

(3) Although there are significant differences among the countries of the region in this respect, the decline in female illiteracy has generally been much slower than the decline in rates of male illiteracy. More women than men still remain illiterate throughout the region. This is coupled with continued rapid population growth in most of the countries of the region; here again, there are significant variations among nations in rates of population increase. However, since levels of women's education are often correlated with the adoption of family planning measures (not always and not necessarily), family size is frequently large in the illiterate sector of a given population.

(4) Changes in the demand for female labor are an especially important feature of recent trends and are central to the present analysis, as follows:

(a) Perceived increases in the number of educated women have stimulated greater demand for them even in occupations such as factory work, hotel or tourist service staff, etc.) not previously thought to require much schooling.

(b) Introduction of technological changes in some occupations (agricultural production and processing, artisanal and crafts production) through which labor-intensive methods used by women are replaced by more capital-intensive methods, usually utilized by male workers. The new technology may be very simple and "appropriate" but, even so, may require changes in customary division of labor and shifts in the location of the workplace from workers' homes to central locations. As a result, the demand for

uneducated female labor declines, often very sharply and suddenly.

(c) Increased demand for workers with middle levels of education in newly introduced industries; high-technology employers may even seek highly educated female workers. Women's wages in these occupations are often lower than those customarily paid to men. These new industrial workers, with considerable education, are a new feature in countries where factory work for women was either non-existent or reserved to poor, uneducated women workers.

(5) Drop-out rates from primary school for both girls and boys have risen again in several countries of the region, after previous declines, in spite of growing availability of primary education. This probably indicates a growing need for additional earners in poor families as a result of the displacement of adult females from traditional sources of earning.

(6) Increased participation in part-time work, low-wage occupations, self-employment at low rates of return, especially in the "informal sector," by women with little or no education. This phenomenon has been noted in many countries of the region but systematic studies are still very few, by the nature of the case. Workers in these types of occupations are much harder to locate than those in regular wage employment. Their work is often carried out in contravention of existing wages and hours legislation; neither they nor their employers are eager to report it. On occasion, workers may even "rent" a regular job from someone who officially has it; while the regular worker collects the salary, the person who actually does the work may be entitled to keep the tips, in addition to a small portion of the regular pay.

(7) At least in Egypt and possibly in other countries, there has been a decline in urban domestic service employment of uneducated women, as a result of changes in the supply as well as the demand. Rising agricultural wages and remittances from migrant workers have led many families to decide against letting young women take domestic service employment in urban areas. Increasingly, such work is now part-time, without live-in housing, and working conditions make it even less desirable than under previous arrangements. However, the declining availability of uneducated domestic service workers often leads to the perception that "illiterate women don't want to work anymore" and that no provisions need be made to create employment opportunities for them.

In short, the composition of the female labor force has changed even though there has been no marked change it its size, as a proportion of the growing population. As the numbers of uneducated women have declined as a result of changes in methods and location of production, there have been some increases in the numbers of educated women. Where latter numbers are very small in relation to the total population, one can observe overall declines in female labor force participation (as in India).

Although there is obviously no direct competition for jobs between women with university educations and those who are illiterate, the perception by employers that there is a large supply of educated women seeking jobs has led to an inflation of educational requirements for many occupations. In the middle range of formal schooling (e.g. upper grades of primary school, some high school education) there may, therefore, be some more direct competition for available jobs, as in industry.

Data Deficiencies, Conceptual and Methodological Issues

Many researchers in recent years have commented on problems in the analysis of women's economic roles that are the direct outcome of methodological and data-collection procedures. According to Ruth Dixon, for example, gender-related "biases in labor force statistics lead planners wrongly to assume that women's economic contributions...are negligible...(and) distorted statistics can impede efforts to analyze the theoretical bases of the sexual division of labor..." (Dixon 1982, p. 561). Survey methods have definitely been shown to be closely

related to the extent to which women's work in agriculture is effectively overlooked by analysts and planners (see, for example, Wainerman and Recchini de Lattes 1981; Jain, Singh and Chand 1979, among others).

In all of the nations examined in the present analysis, women working in agriculture comprise the largest single sector of the female population that is both working and earning. Yet there is a clear difference in the extent to which women's actual work in agriculture is counted as evidence of "economic activity" and the extent to which women in conventional paid jobs are enumerated in both census and survey figures. This makes it very difficult indeed to draw meaningful comparisons between this large group of women workers and the generally much smaller group of urban women in regular paid employment. It is even more difficult to arrive at an integrated analysis of the total female population, including not only women in regular jobs but also those working in the "informal sector" in urban or rural areas and those women whose work in agricultural households is indispensable to the family's ability to grow, store, and process crops.

These distinctions raise an important conceptual matter, which is central to future work on this issue. To what extent are families aware of women's economic contributions to production, well-being, and social mobility? To what extent are family strategies predicated on a clear perception of women's actual work contributions? Even if heads of household (or women themselves) report female family members as "not working" or "not economically active" in response to direct questions, to what extent is this perception reflected in the economically and socially rational strategies of families for survival and, if possible, advancement?

In many of the countries included in this analysis, for example, the fact of having gone to school, of being formally educated, confers considerable prestige on both an individual and a family. Jobs that require formal education, therefore, are immediately more desirable and more prestigious than work which does not. This difference, based on the educational prerequisites for a particular job, may play an important role in whether it is reported to a questioner. The process of data-collection, after all, is a social (and often a political) interaction that must be seen in the terms applied to such interactions more generally. Jobs that require formal schooling, especially in the case of women, may also confer on such women more power in the decision-making process of the family than would be the case for other types of economic activity. The family's willingness to permit innovation -- i.e. more advanced schooling, a non-traditional type of paid work -- is usually closely related to these considerations.

It is not clear from available data whether and how wages and salaries reflect these differences, but they must. Is an education-dependent job with low pay more desirable than a better paid job that can be done well by an uneducated person? Does this differ for men and women? For example, a housewife (i.e. a woman whose work is confined to home and family and is not directly remunerated in cash or kind) who belongs to a high-status family does not require high levels of formal schooling in these societies. Yet she may be highly respected, both within and outside the home, for her domestic skills and the status position of her family. An equally uneducated women from a poor, low-status family may work in the fields or in a factory job. Her personal status in the society at large -- and the respect and pay she can command -- are closely related not only to the fact that she herself is unschooled but also with low family status. Many questions arise here. If a woman from an uneducated, low-status family gets a high school education and an office job in the city (both prestigious), will she benefit herself as well as her family? If the housewife from a high-status family chooses the same education and employment, will she and her family benefit or will they both incur a status loss?

In other words, research on women makes some of these methodological and conceptual problems much clearer -- not only because women and men pursue different mobility strategies, but also because the conventional social sciences are so closely linked to perceptions of men that it is much more difficult to ask important new questions about men than about women.

Income Distribution, Class Differences and Women's Work

Reported trends in the changing composition of the female labor force in the countries discussed here are particularly important with respect to their implications for income distribution and class differentiation.

A real understanding of these implications, however, requires the rejection of conventional social science notions of the importance of women's work (e.g. as "supplementary earners") and the development of more accurate concepts and theories based on recent research on women. Some of these new concepts, in fact, are simply more concise statements of what appears to be common sense. For example, it is only common sense to assume that in poor families, where workers have only their labor to sell and the returns to labor are small, more family members will have to work and earn. In middle-class families, on the other hand, it is usually possible for the family to live according to its standards on the earnings of one person, usually the male head of household, possibly supplemented by contributions from adult sons, e.g. in an Asian joint patrilineal family.

In other words, the earnings of adult women are proportionately more important in poor families than among the better off. Many recent studies support this notion with hard facts. Gillian Hart (1979), in Indonesia, showed that the women and girls of poor landless village families devoted almost as much time to wage labor as men and boys. In upper-income families in the same village (defined as families with enough rice-land to meet all their yearly needs and provide some surplus), adult men and young boys spent about as much time on agricultural production as middle-level and poorer males but more of their work was on "own production." Women and girls, in these better off families, did not do much wage labor or own production -- with the exception of those few women in upper-income families who were active market traders and spent long hours earning significant amounts that they contributed to the family income pool. Studies carried out in India demonstrate very clearly that poor female agricultural workers, urban self-employed women, and many others among the poor make highly significant income contributions and often are the major supporters of dependents (e.g. Gulati 1980, Jain 1980, Mencher 1982, Bhatt 1979). In Bangladesh, where conventional notions assume village women to be passively unemployed in their homes, time-allocation studies (e.g. Martius von Harder 1978) demonstrate that, on average, about half of the working time of adult women is devoted to agricultural production, seed storage, primary processing, and the production of processed foods. These findings are, of course, profoundly contradictory of those labor force statistics that find minimal levels of "economic activity" for females in these nations and indicate the importance of new concepts and theories.

Given the relatively more important economic roles of women in poor families than among the middle and upper classes, demonstrated trends in the composition of the female labor force in these countries leads to an inescapable conclusion. Declining labor force participation by uneducated women means lower incomes for poor families -- unless it can be demonstrated that other sources of family income have compensated for the loss of the women's contributions.

For example, it is probably true that rising agricultural wages in Egypt and remittances from male family members working outside the country have, in many cases, sustained family incomes at acceptable levels even without the incomes formerly earned by women in domestic service or very low-paid rural factory labor.

On the other hand evidence that drop-out rates are rising in many countries (e.g. India, Egypt) can be interpreted to mean that more children in poor families are earning because young boys may be able to obtain work more readily and at better wages than illiterate adult women.

While there is not yet sufficient research evidence on the operation of the informal sector in these nations, preliminary work already suggests that adult women, if they are unedu-

cated, may be increasing their informal earning activities in order to substitute for lost earnings from more regular work.

In many countries of the region, middle-class families are also experiencing severe economic pressures. As the result of the increasing availability of luxury consumer goods, these families may have raised their aspirations for what constitutes acceptable middle-class living standards. Slow rises or stagnation in the real incomes earned by men in occupations receiving fixed salaries (clerical, professional, and some technical jobs) account for the perception of increasingly strained economic situations. This perception makes it easier for families to encourage educated young women to enter paid employment, even if this has not been customary at this class level in past generations. The creation of new "education-dependent" occupations and the newly encouraged suitability of these jobs for women, in the society as a whole, makes their entry more acceptable, at least in the period before marriage. Since they are also new entrants to the world of paid work outside the home, in terms of the long-term strategies of their families, expectations of what constitutes an acceptable wage may also be quite low. Parents who anticipated no monetary returns from their investment in daughters' educations, or who did not expect any earnings contributions at all from their daughters, may encourage them to enter the labor force at wage levels that would be unacceptable to young men -- as long as working situations are such that they do not damage the marriage chances of the young women.

Even if wage legislation sets equal pay requirements for the same job for male and female workers, there is sufficient evidence of occupational segregation by gender in these countries to support the interpretation that women, on average, earn considerably less than men. If more educated women, in turn, are willing to work for quite low wages, employers are encouraged to raise the educational requirements for jobs previously open to illiterate and poorly educated women.

Finally, a point underscored by many recent studies (although not in this particular region) is the possibility that a much larger proportion than usually assumed of all households is supported by the earnings of women (e.g. Buvinic and Youssef 1978, Youssef and Hetler 1983, Merrick and Schmink 1983). In South and Southeast Asia, it is generally assumed by most people that women whose husbands have died or are otherwise incapable of supporting women and children will be taken back by their families of origin or cared for by their husbands' patrilineage. While this may be the culturally prescribed norm, recent studies of crisis conditions (e.g. after civil war) show that these norms cannot be observed by many of the poor. Precisely in those critical times, such as war or famine, where family disruption is most common, poor women are most likely to be thrown on their own resources. Existing statistical conventions -- derived from common cultural norms -- then make it very difficult to become aware of such women in the aggregate. For example, even where a widowed mother may be supporting the family and making all relevant decisions, census-takers will return an adolescent son as the "head of household" in countries with strong patrilineal traditions. Or -- as is clearly the case in Indonesia -- female domestic servants, who are supporting themselves and their children by working for pay, are not returned as "heads of households" in detailed household statistics but as "dependents" of the head of the household where they work and receive room and board.

In conclusion, therefore, I have argued that current trends in women's education and employment are very closely linked to changes in income distribution and class differentiation in South/Southeast Asia and Egypt. Time does not permit detailed examination of differences among these countries but there is no doubt that these must also be taken into account. For example, it appears that the much broader range of occupations customarily open to women in Indonesia (including commercial and marketing activities, as well as education-dependent jobs) accounts for the much slower decline in the labor force participation of uneducated women and the relatively slower increase in the proportion of highly educated women in the measured female labor force.

There should be no doubt in anyone's mind that women's economic contributions to family income, welfare, and social mobility are much more significant than is generally assumed by conventional social science and development planning based on conventional disciplines. Poor women earn a proportionately larger share of family income in most of these countries than is true for middle and upper-income families, on the whole, in spite of some exceptions. Socio-political and economic changes that affect the capacity of uneducated women to earn regular incomes, therefore, have more serious consequences for the poor. Since increasing female participation in education-dependent occupations is also typical of these trends, one of the most important questions that researchers and policy-makers need to ask with respect to income distribution and class differentiation is the relationship between class, status, and female educational participation.

Educational Investment and Family Strategies

Since very little research has so far focused on these relationships in the region, it is useful to offer several relevant hypotheses for further investigation.

First, it must be assumed that absolute levels of female literacy in a given nation, location, and class play an important role in determining the strategy of individual families with respect to supporting the formal schooling of daughters and sons. These differences are based on the way in which educated and uneducated persons participate in the labor force. For example, where absolute levels of female literacy are very low (about 20% or less of the female population over age 10), we must assume that patterns of female labor utilization are fundamentally different from those of nations in which female literacy is high (e.g. 80% or more). In nations with very low levels, most of the work done by women requires little or no schooling or literacy; work done by the small proportion of well educated women is fundamentally of a different sort. In short, literacy and schooling have very different meanings -- in terms of the persons who customarily seek it and how it is used in making a living.

Second, male and female literacy do not necessarily move together in the same society. There may be reasons, such as the prevalence of sex segregation and female seclusion, why females are deliberately kept out of public institutions (including schools) and do not receive equivalent education at home. Highly educated men may be married to illiterate or uneducated women, although this phenomenon is decreasing in the region. In other words, female illiteracy is not necessarily an indication of poverty, although that linkage is the most likely.

Female primary school enrollment levels also influence family choices and female labor utilization. For example, two South Asian countries -- India and Sri Lanka -- have dramatically different patterns of primary school enrollment, as shown in the following figures. When the poorest and richest households were compared, the differences between them in Sri Lanka (for both boys and girls) were much smaller than in the Indian state of Gujarat, which is not untypical in this respect from some other Indian states although there are some exceptions.

Primary School Enrollment

	Boys (aged 5-9)		Girls (aged 5-9)	
	Poorest households	Richest households	Poorest households	Richest households
Sri Lanka (1969-70)	70.3%	89.8%	65.8%	81.9%
India:Gujarat (1972-73)				
rural	22.7	53.9	8.6	50.9
urban	42.1	77.7	30.8	69.5

Source: World Development Report 1980, p.47, Table 5.2

In this instance, the current generation of Sri Lankan children, to whom these enrollment figures apply, will have a wider choice of occupations in the future than the Indian children, especially poor rural girls. The low enrollment rates for Indian rural girls reflect not only available resources in poor families but also the expectations associated with the girls' future economic roles.

Class differences in educational investment for girls and boys are assumed to be highly significant in the present analysis. Particularly in countries with very low absolute levels of female literacy, the decision to send a girl to school is clearly restricted to certain sectors of the population by both custom and available income. There may even be negative connotations to educating a girl, particularly if this involves her residence away from home or a long daily trip to and from school. Since marriage is still the most important way of assuring a woman's economic future, in societies where there are few alternative methods of earning an independent income, decisions to send a girl to school may carry heavy costs in both community censure and injury to marriage chances. As a result, significant proportions of highly educated women are likely to be found only in the tiny elite and the small middle class, particularly in urban areas, even though all of the nations in the region under review have a history of female higher education that may go back a hundred years. It is not the absence of female education as such that is characteristic, therefore, but the absence of high levels of female participation in higher education. Here again, female patterns may be very different from those typical of males.

In this respect, it becomes important to examine the educational levels at which increases in female employment are most marked. In Egypt, for example, the most important shift has occurred among female high school graduates. In 1960, only 24% of women with this level of educational attainment were counted in the measured labor force. By 1976, this proportion had risen to 38% -- a highly significant increase in a relatively short period of time. By contrast, the proportion of female university graduates in the labor force had dropped slightly, even though nearly three-fourths of the women with this level of education were counted as "economically active" in 1976.

This could mean that women's chances of improving their earning capacity through education are not very significant unless they can achieve levels, such as high school or university completion, at which modern sector employment becomes a possibility.

Although it is clear that even a few years of primary education can make a tremendous difference in a woman's self-confidence, in her capacity to assure the survival of healthy and relatively well-nourished children, and in her ability to protect her economic and political rights even without a male, these few years of school apparently make very little difference in women's ability to get regular paid employment. There is no clear linear relationship between years of education and labor force participation for women in these countries. Instead, there are sharp breaks -- points at which women can gain access to education-dependent modern sector employment, if they wish to do so. For families that cannot aspire to educate their daughters to these critical levels, the motivation to send them to school at all may be quite poor. In this respect, the provision of employment for women with limited schooling might be a very important factor in increasing female educational participation.

In short, educational outcomes in terms of achievement and employment are very different for males and females in the nations studied. Since, as I have argued, they are also closely linked to class and family income, analyses of education-employment linkages need to conceptualize them in terms of at least four separate labor markets. Defined in terms of educational attainment, these would be:

1. educated males
2. uneducated males
3. educated females
4. uneducated females

Although there is little overlap between the educated and uneducated sectors for both males and females in the countries under review, these nations also differ considerably in the extent to which there exists occupational segregation between males and females. The extent of segregation may also differ quite considerably between the educated and uneducated sectors in a particular country.

To summarize the basic argument of the paper, I have tried to indicate those elements that I consider important in exploring the linkages between women's employment, women's educational attainments, and the class position of their families of origin and of procreation. In several of the South and Southeast Asian countries mentioned, as well as in Egypt, the declining access of uneducated women to regular employment must be considered a factor in increased income inequality and class differentiation. Public policy must address these issues much more directly than has been the case so far. Research related to public policy, however, must also begin to transcend the terms of reference set by the conventional social sciences because these disciplines are not adequate to understand what is happening. Research on women and gender differences offers one of the more promising possibilities to gain a better understanding in order to begin solving serious social and economic problems throughout the region.

Non-Formal Education for Women in Asia: Examples from Bangladesh, Thailand, and Korea

Elizabeth White

I thought I would bring to you this afternoon some examples of nonformal education in Asian countries at different levels of development, particularly nonformal education organized by voluntary women's groups, to illustrate what it is they see as necessary in response to the need for greater income for women, and the pressures of social change, urbanization and industrialization. A review of a few of these nonformal education programs reveals that people within Asian countries design programs to answer the problems as they perceive them; some of the programs might not appear very logical to an outside observer.

The three countries from which I picked my examples are at very contrasting levels of development, in which women's roles are quite varied. The first is Bangladesh, one of the poorest countries in the world--generally ranked among the five poorest--in which all the indicators of women's status are extremely low. For example, of the women who are reported active in the labor force, 90% are active in agriculture, almost 75% of the women are married before the age of nineteen, only about a third of the girls of even elementary age are in school, and less than 10% of the adult women are literate. And women's life expectancies are even shorter than men's--that is not true in very many countries in the world.

The second country, at sort of a middle level, is Thailand. In rankings of countries of the world, Thailand ranks about fortieth or fiftieth, not among the very poorest countries. It is one in which a much larger percentage of women--46%--are reported in the labor force, although again a large number of these are in agriculture, perhaps. About only 18% of women are married before the end of their teen years; some 75% of the girls are in school; and slightly over half of the adult women are literate. So you see a very different level of some basic indicators of women's status.

Korea, on the other hand, has almost entered into the ranks of developed countries, with a high rate of employment of women--some 33%--and less than half of those in agriculture; 100% of the children are in school, both male and female; somewhere close to 80 or 85% of the adult women are literate; and there is a much higher economic level overall.

Yet in all three countries voluntary organizations, community organizations of men and women, have felt the need for supplementary education programs to answer some of their evident problems. In Bangladesh the programs usually focus on the very poor, on increasing literacy in adult women, on the need for basic survival, on at least some minor increase in family wel-

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fare through either additional income or health information, such as providing nutritional information that will actually improve the physical well-being of families and women who are on the borderline between surviving and not surviving. In Thailand it seems that nonformal education programs focus on the problems created by Thailand's particular socioeconomic and geographical position--problems created by refugee movement; by the proximity to warfare in neighboring countries, which has caused not only an influx of refugees but a movement of large parts of the Thai population to avoid war; and rapid urbanization and social change, which has brought with it, as you would observe in Bangkok, all the ills of modern urbanization and few of the advantages. In Korea nonformal education programs have also been in response to the pressures of their very rapid industrialization and the potential conflicts between traditional Korean society and modern society.

I will give some practical examples from each country. In one district of Bangladesh, an education and health center describes the aim of their program as the uplifting of life for the rural poor. They see in the desperation of poverty and illiteracy a spiritual aspect; yet the activities of the program are very practical: processing of jute, cane, and bamboo products for sale in the open markets; teaching women how to make fish nets, which are used in the fishing community; spinning cotton; and teaching basic literacy and numeracy, which is a need as soon as women even start to learn how to deal with written numbers. Even road repair has been an activity, involving both men and women. Through this nonformal education, community development will improve.

The center has tried to improve the lot of women in their community as a whole. At one time their program was so successful in increasing literacy that the government wanted them to put up a sign, reading "National Literacy Training Program", and offered to lend them a teacher. They put up the sign, but, two years later, the government still has not given them a teacher. Yet the government is trying to take the credit for the program, which is run by a very small local nonprofit organization.

A much larger-scale nonformal education program in Bangladesh came into being in response to the needs of women following the War of Liberation. In Bangladesh not only do women marry very young but they tend to marry men who are considerably older. So even in the best of times there are a large number of widows. The War of Liberation in Bangladesh, which was a brutal and desperate period, created an even larger number of widows. Thus in the very traditional, very poor society of Bangladesh, there are large numbers of female headed households. So several organizations were created to answer the immediate needs of women after the War of Liberation. The largest of these is the Bangladesh Women's Rehabilitation Foundation, which focuses on earning activities for war-affected women, whether they are widows, orphans, or women who had been abducted and perhaps raped by the invading army and therefore were not able to return to their families or villages, being outcasts. They opened fifty seats in their training program and ten times as many candidates applied for each seat.

However, they had a high dropout rate because the program is designed and based upon formal education--six hours a day, six days a week. During the training program there is a very small stipend provided to women involved in the program, but many of them--the very poorest, the ones with the largest family responsibilities--simply had to drop out. There was no way they could participate in what was almost a formal education program, because, as has been revealed by the studies of people like Ruth Dixon, there are many constraints on their time. These women have at the most one or one-half hour a day that is really free to invest in something like nonformal education, between all the food processing, food preparation, child care and other activities they have to do for mere survival.

The training which the Rehabilitation Organization provides lies in a few basic areas. One is food, because this is an area where women are active. They prepare spices for sale in the market, pickles, and jams. Sometimes they even include rolling cigarettes in the food category. (Supposedly it is associated with agriculture; I would not call it food preparation.) A second area includes traditional activities associated with clothing--weaving, knit-

ting, sewing, printing of cloth, and some handicrafts. There was no real effort to train women for any kind of new or different industrial work, but there isn't much opportunity for that in Bangladesh anyway.

The problems associated with this educational program were that it was too time consuming and the very women who could most profit from the program could not attend because the stipend provided didn't compensate for the time taken away from the other activities they needed for survival. They found that many of the women who dropped out could get work as domestic servants, laborers or maid servants, which would pay them more than would one of the handicraft skills. So the program was a mixed blessing. The Organization learned from it, but it shows that even the most well intentioned nonformal education program managed by people who understand the needs and the normal constraints is not always as successful as it should be in reaching the population to which it is targeted.

Other programs also have problems. Another nonformal education program in Bangladesh trained young women to be family welfare visitors, a sort of paramedical worker. But the young women whose parents were willing to let them live in a hospital and get training found hospital life so preferable to village life that they didn't want to go back to their villages and provide the health care the program was designed to give. Even though it was answering a very real need both for some kind of semi-professional activity for girls who had had some education, and for providing basic health services to villages where there was none, the training program changed the aspirations of the participants so they were then unwilling or unable to return to the very place where they were supposed to utilize their skills.

The most successful programs in countries like Bangladesh have been those that provided in short time periods, (which are the only amount that women can sacrifice there), things like literacy and basic numeracy which can be used for other activities. Some of the mothers' clubs and organizations like Concerned Women for Family Planning have had quite successful programs which included intensive literacy training and then small income earning activities that women could do piece work at home, such as making bags out of waste paper. But as far as training that answers their most basic need for increased earning capacity, it appears that nobody has been terrifically successful yet.

By contrast, in Thailand a number of programs have been more successful but again not aimed as far as they deal with women, at making them skilled for modern industrial trades. The ones that I have reviewed focused on rural women either in villages where they have been displaced by refugee movements, or where the rural area has experienced a severe problem of young people leaving the rural area for the cities--for the bright lights and the opportunities that exist for short periods of high earnings in entertainment and prostitution. The Girl Guide Association of Thailand has had for many years a program where they tried to bring skills training and community development to rural youth, both boys and girls, in order to discourage this steady migration to the city with its usual drifting into illegal activities or low level employment--domestic service, begging, errand running, etc.

As in Bangladesh, they have focused on traditional skills that they feel are important for women to know--sewing, dressmaking, weaving, and handicrafts--with the goal that eventually these skills would lead to income enhancement for the individual and her family. Unfortunately parents of participants in some of the programs became discouraged when training didn't result in immediate earnings. In many cases the people organizing the program were discouraged to see teenagers pulled out of the training programs by parents who said, "(They) might as well go into the city and earn a little fast money."

They did find in some villages women eager to learn sewing, particularly in villages which had previously had a tradition of wood carving, now dying out because the supply of wood had diminished with deforestation. In those villages women were very interested in learning dressmaking and increasing marketing through making things like school uniforms for which there is a constant and fairly assured demand.

A similar program was organized in Chang Mai Province by monks and by a group of nuns, the Meditating Nuns Foundation. They also taught cloth weaving and found that young women could earn, after a period of about six months of training, a substantial income by weaving items based on their traditional patterns, mostly for sale to the tourist trade. But again, both in the case of the Girl Guides and the monks' and nuns' groups, there was a considerable spiritual aspect to the nonformal education. It was hoped that it would improve the outlook on life, prevent sinking into the rather degraded immediate earning opportunities in the city, and increase traditional values or respect for traditional religion.

I will very quickly describe a couple of cases in Korea. Around an area in Pohang where one of the largest steel corporations in the world is located, a group of women recognized considerable potential conflict between traditional families and recently-arrived families associated with the huge steel mills. The new families in which both women and men had employment in some way connected with the steel company, lived in a different way. The nonformal education program addressed the need for community understanding and tried to instill in the modern workers an appreciation for the traditional values of Korean life, and in the traditional Korean people a respect for the advantages and the importance that the modern steel mill was bringing to their area.

The adult education concentrated on very much the same things as in Bangladesh--food, nutrition, child care, family health, and some general education, although of course the women participating had been through high school, unlike the Bangladesh women. They thought that it was very important for women to be educated in good citizenship, good values, and leadership. They also tried to instruct the women who were working in their rights as workers, providing information about trade unions and about the opportunities for women in industrializing societies. Those education efforts were originally somewhat discouraged by the factory owners until they realized that the women's group--it was a local group backed up by the Korean League of Women Voters--was politically safe to deal with.

What I think is interesting in all these cases is that when local people form their own programs to make up for what is lacking in formal education or other opportunities provided by government or public sources, they address them both to economic needs and to what they see as social or spiritual needs; they are not completely job oriented.

PART VI

HELPING WOMEN WORKERS: PROGRAMS BY AND FOR WOMEN

The Labor Movement and Working Women in Zaire

Muadi Muamba

I. Organization of the National Labor Union of Zaire

A) Introduction

The National Labor Union of Zaire (UNTZa) was formed on June 23, 1967, from the unification of three large trade unions that had previously divided the laborers' support. The Union has four types of activities:

-Trade union activities (defending workers' rights);

-Mutual aid;

-Workers' savings;

-Workers' training.

The UNTZa, Zaire's only labor union, is defined as an organization of manual workers and intellectuals, laborers and farmers, without respect to sex or national origin.

The Union has developed within the framework of the People's Revolutionary Movement (Mouvement Populaire de la Revolution), Zaire's sole political party. The Labor Union complies with the call of the Party for active participation, direct or indirect, of men and women in public debate on problems of their common life. The Party also calls for continuing examination of the interests and rights of workers through collective bargaining with the aim of improving working and living conditions of laborers. In respond to these calls, our trade union participates in formulating the national policies of socioeconomic development.

B) Structure and means of action

The various strategies of UNTZa are carried out through its occupational federations and its specialized departments.

1. Occupational federations, which defend workers' rights, unite salaried workers according to economic sector. Membership in the Union is compulsory, a fact that allows the Union to withhold union dues automatically from each worker's salary. There are nineteen economic sectors, each with its own federation, for example, transportation, health education,

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post office-telephone-telecommunications, metalworking, the press, public administration, textiles, commerce and food, banking and insurance, farming, and so forth.

2. Specialized departments cut across the lines of occupation and economic sector. They are the means by which the Union acts in the interest of non-salaried working people, who are not actually affiliated with the Union but who make voluntary contributions and benefit from the following services and organizations:

- social and welfare services through the Workers' and Farmers' Mutual Aid Fund (CASOP);
- rural development activities through the Department of Rural Development and Cooperatives (ARCOOP);
- education and training of workers through the Department of Workers' Training and the Institute of Trade Union Studies (IDES);
- socioeconomic programs for women and the investigation of their special problems through the Department of Working Women.

II. Activities of the Department of Working Women

Formed under the title Bureau for Women's Problems (or BUPROF), this department encompasses all the working women of Zaire, and is concerned with the specific problems linked to their living and working conditions. In the quest for ways and means to improve the situation of women, BUPROF's calling can be summarized in two principal roles, corresponding to two of the Union's branches of activities: defending rights and promoting participation in the socioeconomic development of the nation.

A) Defending rights

At the level of employment, our department endeavors to combat inequalities and discrimination based on sex. In various occupational settings, women encounter a deep "divorce" between their legally recognized rights and the concrete situation in which they live. Men and women do not benefit from identical conditions in their occupational life. That is why our department examines the problems of inequality in the framework of daily activities. The search for equality is found at each stage of trade union negotiations. The integration of women at the heart of business should lead to the general improvement of women's circumstances and to the end of every kind of worker exploitation.

Zaire's social legislation is very favorable in its protection of working women. In practice, though, sociocultural prejudices "chain" the minds of those who must apply the law. Let me illustrate this point. In our country which does not yet have a system of health insurance, employers are required to provide medical care for employees and their families. Often, however, a working woman is denied the privilege of having her family taken care of, while her male colleague has the full right to do so. I will take the example of a woman nurse working in the medical clinic of a private business. Every day she treats the children and the wives of her male colleagues, but she does not have the right to bring in her own children or her husband for the same treatment. The unfairness is even more frustrating for her if she knows that in her clinic the health care is better than in the other clinics where her family has to go.

The same inequalities exist in housing allowances, school fees, family allowances, and other benefits that women enjoy partially or not at all. This situation, so detrimental to the output of women, is at the center of our concerns. Our struggle has allowed us to score victories slowly but surely. Three-quarters of the private and parastatal companies have granted women housing allowances, and half have granted family health care and children's school fees.

One other case worth citing is that of travel passes granted free by airline companies operating in Zaire to their agents and their families. Until recently, this benefit was accorded only to the families of men employees, not to the families of the women. Not long ago, thanks to our intervention, the companies agreed to offer a 75% reduction on the ticket price for the families of women employees. The campaign continues to win the full benefit for women.

The analysis of this state of affairs leads us to believe that employers or administrators of public services are ignorant (voluntarily or involuntarily) of the physiological nature of women and of the new system of sociocultural values characteristic of today's world. Here is the place to mention the status of mother linked to the "social function" of childbearing. The main issue which arises is reconciling successfully occupational obligations and family (or maternal) responsibilities.

In Zaire, the labor laws provide a total of 14 weeks' maternity leave, 8 weeks before delivery and 6 weeks after. These provisions, though, do not really meet the full need for the care of nursing infants and young children of working women. Then problems arise for businessmen or administrators. They see the profits and production of their business or department threatened by the absenteeism or the irregular hours of female employees, who are busy taking care of their infants or sick children, especially the women who are single parents.

On their side, the women, whether employees or independent workers, face the threat of losing their jobs or their customers and of sacrificing the health or the education of their family. Furthermore, there is a reticence among employers to entrust to women responsible or technical jobs requiring the more or less continuous presence of the job holder.

Some landmarks have been established in this field. We have gained some concessions which allow a pregnant woman to decide with her employer how she wishes her 14 weeks of maternity leave divided, before and after delivery. Collective negotiations now emphasize the organization of day nurseries in workplaces so as to avoid the problems mentioned above. It is evident that this problem of child care is widespread among salaried women and also those in other types of work. Nowadays families can no longer count on cousins, nieces, and other young female relatives in the extended family, because we are struggling toward the fulfillment of all women by assuring that every girl gets the basic education and training she needs. Nor are grandmothers available for child care, since they too are occupied, in the country with farm work and in the city with selling items at the market. Only a very small part of the population can afford the luxury of paid babysitters. The children are often left to fend for themselves.

Another stumbling block in these battles is the frequent practice of denying annual vacation when a woman takes maternity leave during the same year. Sometimes maternity leave is cancelled immediately if the newborn dies. I should point out that this inhumane treatment occurs more often in the public sector than in the private.

B) Promoting women's participation in development.

Raising the consciousness of women and sensitizing them to their own problems is the first step toward their participation in programs promoting their interests. The prejudices suffered by women are often due to their absence from trade union delegations and negotiations. Men, despite their good will, cannot by themselves search for solutions to the special problems of their female co-workers. Here is evidence of the powerful role of education, training, and information for women in all matters linked to their social status, their living and working conditons, and their own physiological nature.

To remedy the lack of female representation in the trade union agencies, BUPROF convenes women in committees at the levels of the company, the sectors, and the inter-occupational departments. Within these committees the women become familiar with the analysis and resolution of work-related problems. Thus they are introduced to the spirit and founding ideals of

trade unionism. They begin to see clearly that change in social conditions is possible through actions available to them, namely legitimate trade union efforts. Also, it has proved necessary for women to realize the special nature of their situation before they can recognize their rights and defend their interests objectively, without recourse to fatalistic arguments. Nowadays women no longer play merely a decorative role in negotiations but participate actively.

In addition, our department sensitizes working people through concrete programs that motivate women to participate effectively in national development:

1) Educational programs. Here can be seen all the efforts made by BUPROF to permit women to identify their own needs. Before the first National Symposium of Working Women in December 1980, a series of meetings brought together the working, intellectual, and political spheres for debates on the situation of women at work. The subject of the debates were the following problems:

-- the social and legal status of working women in Zaire;

-- motherhood and family well-being;

-- continuing education;

--social conditioning and its effects on the fundamental rights of working women.

This experience has been reinforced by the participation of women of different spheres in national and international conferences and in study tours of unions and other organizations concerned with the employment and situation of women.

The programs for training and informing women have allowed us to make our presence felt in several domains. As illustrations, three recent conferences are cited: a seminar on "the role of the woman educator in the educational choices and occupational training of women"; a seminar on "women in the world of broadcasting"; and a workshop of "feeding infants and young children in Zaire." Political authorities have taken into consideration the conclusions of these conferences. Results are seen in educational reform, management policies in public institutions, and in health care programs. Since that time, we have noted with satisfaction:

-- the effective participation of women in collective bargaining between employers and employees, initiated within BUPROF committees;

-- the increasingly noticeable presence of women in trade union delegations (now an average of one or two women in a six-person delegation);

-- the interest and aid from international labor organizations and others.

We are hoping to initiate programs to intensify the integration of women into civil administration, to develop their capacity to respond to the challenge of modern society, and to encourage them to use their political and social rights. We can claim to have begun a process of consciousness-raising which is evident in women's work-related behavior. Women have understood that their rights can legitimately be demanded only if they fulfull their occupational obligations in harmony with their family responsibilities.

2) Social service programs. Our concern with the health of mothers and children has led us to organize social projects to protect the health and work of women and at the same time the well-being of the families of all workers. These projects are consistent with the goals of the trade union to improve the living conditions of working people through solving their problems and meeting their needs.

The maternal and child health service of BUPROF has functioned for one year now. It

is undertaking the following activities:

- -- Health education, which includes teaching about food and nutrition, cooking demonstrations, and preventive health measures;
- -- Regular weighing of young children (from birth to five years) to monitor their physical growth;
- -- Laboratory tests;
- -- Child immunizations;
- -- Gardening and raising small animals with available technology;
- -- Layette program which offers clothing and linens for pregnant women and newborns at reasonable prices, in line with the earnings of the average worker.

The first pilot center now serves 800 mothers and 1000 children each month. This project is to be extended throughout the country.

Family planning service. I mentioned above that the responsibilities of motherhood are often a stumbling block in campaigns on behalf of women. Employers complain that workers' pregnancies are too frequent and too close together, and that they handicap the production and profit of the business or the smooth functioning of the office. At the same time the woman worker, often through ignorance, suffers the ill effects of clo ely-spaced pregnancies both in her health and in her precarious socioeconomic situation.

These facts led us to come to the aid of both sides in establishing a program of education and contraceptive services for the spacing of pregnancies. While giving priority to women workers, the program also meets the needs of men workers and their wives. The program is operating today in thirty Kinshasa companies that have medical services. Other companies will soon be selected for an extension of this experiment. The program, financed by Family Planning International Assistance, allows us to counteract exploitation by physicians who try to commercialize family planning services.

Pre-school service. Here we face perpetual problem of the care of infants who should have maternal attention and who should breastfeed. BUPROF's action has a triple purpose: to reduce the distance separating working mothers and their infants, to reduce costly spending on artificial milk, and to reduce the risks of a poor environment for children entrusted to persons ill-suited for the task of child care. BUPROF now has a pilot project of day care and pre-school education for ninety children under age five. The pilot center has inspired some companies to establish their own pre-school program; the national bus company is a notable example.

3) Economic and rural programs. These projects seek ways and means to boost the income of working women, either through participation in profit-earning associations, or through reudction in their expenditures for certain necessities.

In the semi-urban areas, women do both farming and other work to supplement the family income. A study tour took us throughout Zaire to evaluate and identify the specific needs by region. The members of our Regional Committies have taken the initiative themselves to launch economic projects in some localities. BUPROF is deeply interested in these projects, since working women are often overburdened by farming duties in addition to their salaried jobs.

In the Bandundu Region, part of the population suffers from malnutrition due to a lack of protein-rich foods, especially animal proteins. Concerned with the health of their families, working women have started a project of family fish ponds. The family eats part of the fish and sells part, thus boosting the family income and contributing to community services for women.

In the Equateur Region, the women of the city of Mbandaka are experimenting with a sewing cooperative to provide low-cost clothes and uniforms for school pupils and workers in local businesses. Other projects in other regions are also under study.

In the city of Kinshasa, we are thinking of creating an association of women to make and sell donuts enriched with soya flour or other nutrients. This project would accomplish two things: first, help the women stock the ingredients (flour, oil, sugar, etc.) and sell the donuts and, second, attack malnutrution among children, the main consumers of donuts. Someday we hope to see this project become a reality.

Rural women are the largest category of workers in Zaire and thus merit special attention. We are very concerned with the situation of the farming woman, since she carries the weight of the agricultural work that assures the survival of her family. Mother, wife, child-rearer, and producer of goods and services, she is ignored and left out of marketing activities that produce cash income. It is not unusual to find a rural cooperative where the women participate in the farm work but are then relegated to cooking duties. They are denied access even to simple technology such as operating a grinding mill. The continuing education of these women is one of the ways to help their integration and participation in programs of national development. Community activities directed at women's education through literacy programs are seen by BUPROF as a basic element. We are also considering community workshops where women can receive occupational training.

III. Conclusion

Meetings, study tours, broadcasts, publications, and the exchange of views with colleagues (such as this conference), all reaffirm women's partnership and motivate action for change among persons engaged in a common cause. Our modest contribution to the struggle for the improvement of working conditions for women in only one stage in a lengthly effort which must involve every labor movement worthy of its name.

Throughout this presentation, I have not pretended to display a finished product, the final outcome of the campaign for the improvement of women's situation. I hope, nevertheless, that our accomplishments will be signposts for the establishment of a new social order in our societies, equally favorable to women and to men. The modern world must be led to reflect on the problems of women who, after all, make up more than half of the population of our world.

Women and Labor Unions in Egypt

Amina Shafiq

Egypt has a population of 44 million inhabitants, of whom half are women. Children under the age of fifteen account for 44% of the entire population. By excluding those over the age of sixty, the Egyptian Ministry of Planning estimated the labor force in 1976 as 11,100,000 persons. These facts illustrate the high dependency rate of Egyptians.

The female labor force in urban and rural areas grew from 625,344 in 1960 to 987,904 in 1976, with an annual increase of 2.9%. The difference is particularly large, however, between rural and urban growth; in rural areas the growth rate was only .2% while in urban areas it reached 5.1%.

In 1976 women counted for 6.4% of all wage earners in Egypt, in both the private and public sectors, while they were 18.9% of salaried employees in both the public and government sectors. This fact shows a clear tendency within the female labor force toward being white collar rather than blue collar. Certain conditions have created and encouraged this tendency. The first is the deteriorating educational system both in poor urban and in rural areas. The second lies in the economic policy followed, which gives greater opportunities for investments in non-productive sectors such as banking, tourism, the export-import trade, etc.--fields of economic activity that provide work opportunities only for university graduates.

As for the educational level of the female labor force, the population censuses (by sample) of 1976 stated that 30.4% of the female labor force was illiterate, 8.8% could only read and write, 2.8% finished primary school, 38.8% finished secondary school, 13.7% graduated from a university or higher institute, and 5.2% chose not to indicate.

In Egypt there are two kinds of union organizations. The first is the worker union. These unions include all those working for salaries and wages in the private, public and government sectors, including industry, agriculture, services and government, and those who are white or blue collar, both men and women. No conditions prevent any employee or wage earner from affiliating with any local union (plant union).

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On the other hand, it is compulsory for all professionals to affiliate with the second kind of union organization, called in Egypt professional syndicates. These syndicates, which are called unions in other countries, organize professionals--doctors, journalists, teachers, accountants, engineers, lawyers, etc.--on the basis of their particular profession, following the latest advancements, settling relations between them, etc., with little interference in what is called industrial or work relations.

Women workers, white or blue collar, have complete liberty in affiliating or disaffiliating with worker unions. They are equal to men in this respect. However, on the side of the professional syndicates, although they are equal to men, women are obliged by law to join and never quit or they will lose their jobs. It can therefore be said, without any hesitation, that as many female journalists as there are in Egypt, the same number are in the Egyptian syndicate of journalists. And the same is true for doctors, lawyers, etc. In addition, female professionals are comparatively active in their syndicates, primarily because these organizations are influential in their daily contact within their professions. Thus these women are not what we might call activists or active trade unionists, those who practice their roles with a certain conviction or drive or enthusiasm.

Regarding the workers unions, however, to which "all" are affiliated, matters change. Here we find a majority of members, both male and female but only a minority of activists, mainly male. Very few women have ever been elected to the bodies of trade unions. There are scattered examples, but never a numerical representation proportional to the number of female members. Even in those industries or economic fields with a considerable number of working women, such as the textile or chemical industries, the picture is the same, position in affiliation and negative in participation.

In agriculture the picture is even worse. In this field women are still typically employed as unpaid family workers. They are treated with children as a single category. Since women and children often work together as a team under the supervision of the mother, it is not possible to separate the two categories. In these backward economic conditions (as opposed to industry, services and government where women have received equal pay for equal work for a long time), affiliation with agricultural trade unions is nonexistent.

We can now put forth a question and attempt to answer it: Why do working women, whether professional or manual workers, not participate in the trade union life and activities with more energy and enthusiasm? In responding to this question, I shall mention two categories of conditions that create a barrier to massive female participation of Egyptian public life whether political or unionist.

The first is the general political atmosphere in the country. Egypt is a country in a state of martial law where private and public liberties (the right of assembly, the right of organization) are always violated. This atmosphere has its own influence on the activities of all people, men and women. When people are afraid or threatened, they do not engage in daily protest; they try to create or invent their own methods of resistance. Since trade unions need daily participation, they usually avoid resistance in order to defend themselves against any violation of the law. Thus, if we want to encourage our women to share or participate in trade unions, we must change this political atmosphere and replace it with a more liberal one. In this way all workers will benefit, and women will take their place.

Second, I come to the subjective conditions that prevent women from being active in trade unions:

--the high rate of illiteracy (30.4% plus another 8.8% who can only read and write) is a barrier to the participation of many women in public life;

--the lack of better services (housing accommodations, transportation) prevents the working

woman from giving her time or efforts to trade union activities;

--the lack of child care facilities is another barrier to the participation of working w men (in spite of the fact that every plant employing more than 100 women is required b law to provide child care);

--the high fees necessary to place a child in a nursery school or kindergarten (when pri vate ones are available);

--the short working life of the majority of working women (most women industrial workers began their careers with the erection of new plants in the early '60s) makes it diffic for them to conceive of the idea of public life and participation in trade unions.

Finally, how can we resolve this dilemma? From our experience in Egypt (which is very s milar to a great number of developing countries), we propose the following:

1) Restoration of a better political atmosphere where private and general liberties are not violated. In such an atmosphere trade unions would start to play a more active role (in collective bargaining, strikes, etc.) and thus affect the lives of the work ers.

2) Recognition of the importance of a political and economic policy that is directed toward building a modern economic sector (especially in agriculture) that would prov jobs for the currently unemployed (both men and women) and restore their social labo rights (wages, housing, services). It was evident throughout the '60s and '70s that the social rights of the working people could never be restored by small enterprises whether in industry, trade or services.

3) The state in developing countries should be granted a margin of interference directe towards planning, sharing in investments, and developing services (in particular, - education, child care, transportation, etc.).

4) In education, the history of the working class and the beginning of collective actio should be part of the general history taught to school children and university stu- dents.

Work in Women's Survival Strategies in a Latin American Capital

Jeanine Anderson Velasco

The concept of survival strategies is increasingly being used to order our knowledge about the urban poor in Latin America. The term is euphonic and catchy, whether in English or Spanish, and the idea is attractive as a replacement for another concept which, twenty years ago, was being put forth in a similar way to explain what closer anthropological observation was discovering about marginal urban sectors; I refer to the concept of a "culture of poverty." Survival strategies suggest an active, individual, intelligent, flexible, imaginative response to conditions of poverty in a way the earlier notion did not. I will argue in this paper that women in the barriadas of the City of Lima do indeed design and carry out plans that can legitimately be characterized as strategies. I will also argue that work, in the sense of paid employment, does not play a very large part in them.

The concept of survival strategies has been used to analyze certain marginal groups in developed countries--Blacks in a large northern U.S. City, for example. It is not as intuitively convincing in such a context as it is intuitively convincing in underdeveloped Third World countries. This is so not only because survival is so much more likely in cities in developed country than it is in Third World cities; it has to do as well with the incomplete penetration of capitalist modes of production and of market relations in the social and political context. For most Latin American writers on survival strategies, inherent in the very notion is the no more than partial involvement of the elaborators of these strategies in the capitalist economy. They are women and men who participate in several different cycles of production, exchange, and consumption simultaneously. By definition, then, a paying job in the capitalist labor market--the "formal sector"--is not their only source of income or only means to acquiring goods and services necessary to survival.

Two Ecuadorean writers speak of multiple "circuits" which can be "plugged into" by the poor to achieve fulfillment of their needs.[1] These can be grouped into those that belong to the capitalist sector and those that are pre- or noncapitalist. In the first group are the private capitalist sector and opportunities offered by the capitalist state. In the second are state assistance programs, private charity, pre-capitalist relations of exchange, the domestic economy, and the subsistence economy.

[1]Saenz, Alvaro and Jorge DiPaula. "Precisiones teoricos-metodologicos sobre la nocion de estrategias de existencis." Demografia y Economia XV: 2 (1981), p. 151

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Previous Page Blank

It is easy to jump from such a conception to the conclusion that, if subject "X" is elaborating a successful strategy within any one of these "circuits" and gaining access to sufficient resources, she or he will be less likely to seek to exploit others of them. Over time the person may shift from one to another, but at any given moment there will be one which predominates in drawing the major part of the resources which that person is managing to obtain.

The study on which this paper is based, an investigation of women's survival strategies in contrasted types of marginal neighborhoods in the City of Lima--for which I must thank the Ford Foundation for support--took to be one of its principal hypotheses that women would be found to be choosing among three basic alternatives. They would be resolving most of their problems of survival through remunerated work (whether in the "formal" or "informal" economy); they would be resolving most of their problems by exploiting their possibilities of access to public services or at least investing in this strategy with an active participation in the barriada organization which collectively struggles to obtain infrastructure and social services in the community; or they would devote most of their time and energy to developing and maintaining the informal social networks which provided a third option for resolving problems of daily living and overcoming emergencies. I predicted that there would be differences in the opportunities for using the second and third alternatives--that of access to social services and that of informal networks--according to whether a woman lives in a tugurio, a deteriorating inner-city slum neighborhood, or a barriada, a squatter settlement on the outskirts of the city. I did not anticipate fully to what degree the type of neighborhood influences possibilities of exploiting the first alternative, that of paid work.

An important confounding factor in such a study in the Peruvian context is ethnicity. Most people living in tugurios in Lima are Lima or coast born; many are black, descendants of slaves which were used on coastal haciendas but rarely transported to the Andes. Most people living in the outlying barriadas are Andean migrants or their sons and daughters. There is good reason to believe that work has a very different meaning in the coastal, dominant, criollo, Spanish-influenced culture, and in Andean culture. Andean women are traditionally valued not for physical attractiveness but for their capacity to work and manage. The inner-city neighborhoods are more mixed than are those of the more than 300 barriadas at the edges of the city. Many migrants live a time in the callejones and quintas of these areas before they learn of an opportunity to occupy a plot in a barriada--entire families in one room, sharing a toilet with perhaps twenty or thirty other families, the women washing at one or two common spigots in the central passageway.

The notion of survival strategies implies several strong assumptions. It implies that the individual or family/domestic unit--the most frequent and probably the most natural unit of analysis--which elaborates a strategy has clear, relatively conscious objectives in mind; that the person or members of the family/domestic unit act in ways which are more or less congruent with those objectives; and that the individual or family unit tends to achieve its objectives. The strategy would not be a strategy were it not relatively clear, rational, and successful.

Others have suggested that it is dangerous to prejudge the issue whether women's and men's objectives are identical, particularly in machista Latin America. It has been shown, for example, that in the past few years of severe economic crisis in Peru (inflation of over 70% annually, a severe drop in real income, a severe rise in un- and underemployment), the size of domestic units in poor strata has increased. Families seem to be trying to add more adults to the domestic unit so as to increase its earning power, probably at the expense of increasing the domestic work load of the one or two women who remain responsible for all the cooking, washing, cleaning, and child care. Might these women perhaps not prefer a strategy which would give them greater access to the labor market rather than forcing them into an ever greater investment of time and energy in domestic labor?

At this point we should examine some rather suggestive facts about the participation of women in the urban labor force in Peru. A basic fact is that the overall rate of participation has been decreasing since the 1940 census. As is well known, this kind of information regis-

ters women in factory work and white collar occupations relatively well; those in domestic service, petty commerce, household production, put-out factory work, and "helpers" in family enterprises such as corner stores, are severely underregistered. The falling labor participation of women in Peru means, then, that they are less involved in the formal labor force and more involved in the informal sector. An apparent contradiction is that, according to Ministry of Labor studies, the demand for domestic servants is currently exceeding the supply of women willing to take on this work. Theory would have it that in times of extreme economic need women flock into occupations such as domestic service which at least guarantee them a roof and enough to eat.

A study in 1975 of working women in the four largest female occupations in Lima--factory workers, domestics, street vendors, and market stall vendors--found that the factory workers set themselves apart from the others to a large extent. They tended to have domestics to cover the housework; some depended on a mother or a sister to fill that role; many had help from their husbands. Interestingly, the factory workers shared this last pattern with the market stall vendors, a fact which seemed to relate to the relatively high income the woman was drawing in, frequently exceeding her husband's income. The domestics worked the longest hours, with a long and grueling bus trip from home to workplace; however it was not this fact, but the level of the women's economic contribution to the household, that persuaded their husbands and compañeros to help with the housework.

Women industrial workers sometimes had benefit of company buses to transport them. They could use company lunchrooms and company social services to a certain extent. The women were usually aware of legislation that obligates employers to provide child care at the workplace where more than 20 adult women are employed. Rights to child care and nursing breaks were traded off for a ration of canned milk monthly--a cheap way for the employer to avoid the obligation often pacted with male union leaders who, in Peru no more than anywhere else, were not champions of benefits related to reproduction. Most women in this 1975 study did not participate in unions for lack of time. They could not stay after work for union meetings.

This kind of knowledge of how a woman industrial worker organizes her time is necessary in understanding the relation of this type of work to survival strategies. Before continuing, I would like to elaborate upon the other possibilities a woman has: working the levels of her personal relationships or of public and community services available or potentially accessible to her.

In the two inner-city neighborhoods of my study, there was a range of services available to the women. There were health services consisting of public clinics, the large city hospital emergency health centers, and private M.D.s, sometimes of dubious competence, no more than five or six blocks away. The neighborhoods were served by relatively large and complete open markets, and for afternoon and evening purchases there were small stores on practically every corner. Tricycles came through daily with bread, seasonal fruits, and some prepared foods. Both neighborhoods were served by several different transportation lines. One was only a fifteen-minute ride away from the central plaza of Lima, the principal government buildings, and the main offices of the public utilities.

One neighborhood had a number of schools, from preschools to a secondary school, while in the other children walked to primary school and took buses to second-level schools outside the area. The first neighborhood boasted a sort of central promenade, and two large churches, and a convent, all heritages of the colonial era and early republican times when this part of the city was the prosperous, prestigious residence of criollo families. For some of my informants the police station was just half a block away, and a fire station occupied one of the main thoroughfares. This did not stop fire in the house from being one of their greatest fears in terms of unexpected disasters which might have to be dealt with, nor did it prevent robberies in the labyrinths of rented rooms that had become the destiny of the formerly huge and splendid colonial houses.

The outlying barriada presented a very different picture with respect to available services. It was a cut above many others in that it had managed to get electrical installations, potable water, and a sewer system. The residents had contracted with the utilities company to finance the installations, and were investing an enormous amount of time and energy to complete the negotiations, for long-term payments for the materials and installation as well as their monthly consumption, even in summer months when, due to a water shortage in the entire city of Lima, their supply could be cut for days on end. Needless to say, these payments were extremely onerous for many families. The representative community organization--the "central committee" --could do no more than try to influence matters to keep the costs and injustice at a relative minimum.

The cases of water and electricity illustrate an important fact about the services available in the barriada: usually they are the product of a great deal of mobilization of the community and of investment of time and energy of the part of community leaders, frequently with costs paid in terms of their credibility and support afterwards. It is difficult to persuade barriada residents that they must pay for the installation of services that other sectors apparently get free.

Here then is one very absorbing category of women's work. Women attend the block meetings in representation of their households, sent by their husbands to bring back news of what was discussed at the meeting. Community leaders complain that this practice slows all their projects since the women do not have authority to make decisions for their families. The meetings go on indefinitely until the week when, by good luck, there is a quorum of men present in the session.

The distance from the barriada to most centers of work is a factor which encourages this assignment of community voluntary work to women. Men in construction work, street vending, or garbage collection (the largest male occupational categories) arrive home at 8 or 9 at night, exhausted from a wait of as much as an hour to get onto a crowded bus, probably with a good leg of the trip on foot. Their possibilities of working at two or more jobs simultaneously are much more limited than for men in the inner-city neighborhoods, and their community participation is typically limited to whatever activities take place on Sundays.

Women in the barriada had invested countless hours towards getting other social services installed there. One of the first projects of the Consejo Femenino--the women's representative committee parallel to the men's central committee--was a preschool. Donors had to be found for building materials and equipment and volunteers for teaching. Negotiations had to be carried out to have a plot of community land designated for this particular use. After the preschool came a milk program for the very poorest of the children, a lunch program which eventually expanded into a community kitchen and meals program, a health post complete with psychiatric and dental services, besides occasional cultural activities and celebrations of Mother's Day and patriotic anniversaries.

In all of these projects there is a common element of investment of women's time and attention. Neither the implications of this--nor the quantities of time involved--should be underestimated. A study of child development in the same community in 1980 found, contrary to hypothesis, that the more participatory women had children whose development lagged behind that of children of women more exclusively dedicated to their own households. (This negative relationship was not found with the variable of mothers working at a remunerated job.) This result was obtained in children of one and three years of age but no longer held for five year olds. The measures of child development were admittedly weak and culturally biased, but the conclusion nonetheless seemed forced that high levels of community participation entered into direct conflict with adequate care of very young children--given the very limited sharing of child care with any adult other than the mother.

Another element common to most of the services available in the barriada was the presence

of "outsiders"--individuals or agencies--as instigators, providers of resources, or controllers and managers of them. These individuals or representatives of assistance agencies were part of the informal network of some of the women. Obviously their presence changed the social dynamics of the communit, and helped to give the theoretically public or communal services there a rather personalistic style of insertion in the community and style of operating.

Let us take health services as an example. The "centro medico" or health post was the result of an act of charity of a Dominican priest who paid for the construction with funds donated by church organizations in the U.S. The facility was exceptionally clean, pleasant, and efficient in comparison to the public health posts which served the barriadas. The community signed a ten-year contract at the end of which control of the center will pass to the central committee; a condition imposed by the priest was that he have the opportunity of selecting and training a local person as administrator to guarantee continuity. The entry into the community in this case was made through a Maryknoll nun, however. She had been working as a sort of advisor and stimulator of the women's committee for some years before. The centro medico then became a project of the women who controlled the Consejo Femenino in 1979, when construction began.

About this time a grave conflict arose between the central committee and the woman's committee. The men said that the women were getting out of line and were no longer obedient to the central committee nor bothering to submit all their projects for prior clearance there. The fact is that the men were disorganized, without proposals which could have mobilized the community behind them, whereas the women were scoring impressive successes in their assigned sphere of education, children, and health. The central committee entered into agreement with a private institution to undertake a program to train one woman on each block of housing as a health promotor for her block. Meantime it took measures to insure that the annual elections would result in women's delegates and a governing board which would be responsive to the men's will and accept a subordinate position.

At this point there were two health services in the community--one more curative and professional, and one more direction to prevention and health education, using the rather weak vessel of voluntary health promotors. There was and continues to be a complete separation between them. Women who were associated with the Consejo Femenino post-1980 talk as if the community had no health post whatsoever. If they have need of services beyond the shots and advice that the promotors can offer, they go out of the community to a public health center a bus ride away or they use a parochial mother-child health facility which also implies paying a bus fare.

Before returning to this problem of how informal networks in the barriada setting closed off access to certain services in a way they did not in the inner-city neighborhoods, I would like to sketch what the women's informal networks were and how they functioned in resolving day-to-day problems.

The women's networks were small, typically including some ten to fifteen persons in both types of urban setting. Tests of network membership in other contexts--for example with whom does the person talk a great deal, what persons are "important" to her, which are her "intimate friends, are practically replaceable in poor sectors of Peruvian society with the simple observation of help flowing back and forth. Frequently it is very material help: money, food, child minding, meals for the other woman's children, loans of a pot or pan or piece of clothing. Older women's networks tended to be more exclusively kin than the younger women's, but my prediction that the networks would be dominated by other women with men practically absent did not prove correct. The male members of the networks were, however, almost always male relatives or were assimilated to kin relationships (the "father" or pastor of a pentecostal church; a stand-in for brother who watched over a woman and her household while the real brother established himself outside the country to be all the better positioned for helping his sister).

In patterns which have been well described in other studies of informal social networks and survival strategies--for example, Larissa Lomnitz's study of a Mexican barriada, Como sobreviven los marginados, or Susan Lobo's study of Lima, A House of My Own--the exchanges of visits and aid among the members of the informal network were continuous, practically daily events, especially in the inner-city tugurios where the sharing of the water spout made it almost inevitable that the women were informed of any new problem in a neighbor's household. Kin were likely to live close together making it all the more likely they would be almost constantly involved in each other's lives.

The value of the help exchanged in the form of information and advice should not be discounted. Survival in a large, disorderly, and sometimes desperate city such as Lima depends on having the urban savvy that is not taught in schools but passes by word of mouth from those who have had bitter experiences. Conversations the women had often revolved around a kind of mental testing of probable outcomes of different courses of action. The role of the informal network in mediating the relationship which the woman maintained to formal helping agencies--public or community services--was very clear. Members of the informal network helped the woman to arrive at a definition of her problem and the kind of expertise she needed to solve it. Members of the network were usually on a similar economic level (one of Lomnitz's basic postulates) such that their suggestions were very much tuned to what they knew was an objectively feasible alternative for the woman in question. I did not find many cases of patronazgo in my study: that is, very wealthy or very powerful people affiliated with the social network who channeled aid on a large scale for emergency situations.

A central problem for the women in elaborating their survival strategies was precisely how to avoid emergency situations and major disasters that would exceed the total amount of resources they could muster from all possible sources. In this sense their strategies were very much defensive. On a daily level they were concerned with avoiding expenditures wherever possible and avoiding wear and tear on what possessions they had. Clothes could be kept presentable by the simple expedient of not wearing them, for example. Some families seemed to be reducing the total food intake by the erratic scheduling of meals at hours when children were no longer hungry or perhaps couldn't be found. They might be scavenging food on the street or hinting to a generous neighbor that they hadn't had any lunch.

Women's attitudes towards child care show much of this defensiveness. A 1980 survey of spontaneous exchange of child care in a large sample of women from several different kinds of marginal neighborhoods in the city of Lima verified the important interplay of problems of security with the disposition to use either formal or various informal child care services. In the first place children are frequently left behind to guard the house if all adults must go out (otherwise this is a function that women normally fill). Someone must insure the security of the house and whatever belongings are inside. At the same time women fear for the safety of their children walking to and from a preschool or day care center even in the company of older siblings. They fear they may be stolen or raped, boys or girls. Notorious child molesters can be loose in these neighborhoods without anyone's being able to get them arrested in the same way that people will not denounce robbery to the police, who are too slow and uncertain a means of dealing with them. The accused rapist's or robber's retaliation would be much swifter and more drastic than any police action. There are many Andean myths about elves that spirit off children, and these traditions may have contributed to the frequency of tales which this survey picked up of day care centers that open and later disappear with all the children.

Defensive strategies require that a woman do all in her power to diminish the chances that any of these disasters occur. In that they demand her very constant watch over the home and all of its members, they are directly opposed to working in any other location, or, if in the household, in any kind of activity which restricts the woman's flexibility.

Work appears by contrast to be an offensive strategy. It presupposes a willingness to risk a certain investment (in having shoes, for example, in more mobility) in order not to

avoid expenditures and disasters, but to build up a stock of resources which will permit meeting them should they arise. It involves coming into contact with more people outside the personal network and the neighborhood and thus risking claims that they make.

Let us look then at which women in my study of three contrasting urban neighborhoods were working, that is, in other than housework and the kind of unpaid community labor we have described earlier. The women in the inner-city areas were not working, with very few exceptions. Even the few exceptions were women who occasionally did some household production: dressmaking, frozen ices in summer. Only one woman, who owned a sewing machine and was very skilled in its use, had a regular and--relative to her husband's--considerable income from her labor. Many of these, especially the Lima-born women with their greater sophistication and higher educational level, had worked in factories or as shop girls before they were married. One had worked for some years with her husband as unpaid family labor, dyeing and stamping T-shirts in their tiny living quarters. She was, of course, simultaneously giving birth to and caring for their four children in rapid succession. This woman had been trained as a nurse. When her husband abandoned her she did not go back to this occupation. She did what all other women heads of households in these neighborhoods did: she became dependent on her brother, with heavy contributions from a sister until the second woman married and moved out of the household.

One of the clearest patterns that this study established was the crucial role which brothers played in the women's survival strategies. Even women living with husbands or compañeros received support from their brothers: financial, emotional, gifts and services. This was a brother's obligation to his sister but was likely to be thought of even more as an uncle's obligation to his nieces and nephews. The pattern is that of the classical anthropological Mother's Brother. The uncle was expected to provide the support to his abandoned sister which would permit her not to work, in favor of being at home giving a good quality of care to the nieces and nephews--fostering and supervising closely their school careers, among other absorbing tasks.

Whatever the ideological dress, the women in the central neighborhoods were, in their great majority, placing their bets on men's access to income. Whether husbands or brothers, the men had far better opportunities to get income than did the women. Certain resources--certain investment opportunities or credit--simply were not accessible to women because of their sex. Men adding a second job--moonlighting as a taxi driver with a rented car, as did one man, for example--could obtain more income than would be true if the wife took on a job. The families in the inner neighborhoods had in fact a higher material level of living than the families in the barriada: more appliances and furniture, although at the cost of extreme crowding, deterioration, and even danger to their houses.

The men in the barriada had far less probability of getting stable work in formal employment. In large part this was a consequence of their migrant status and the particular moment in the evolution of the Lima labor market when they had sought entry. In this situation women had equal if not better possibilities for obtaining income and, indeed, in 1981-82 it was the rare woman who was not earning money through one activity or another, or who was not at least participating in a food-for-work brigade. Research indicates that levels of participation had not been as high in the same area both five and ten years before, so it is undeniable that the women were responding to a situation of great incentive and great need. Some women were domestics or cooks. Many were street vendors or had market stalls. Some were doing piece work for textile or toy factories. One sold magazines to her neighbors and, when they could not afford the purchase, rented them for reading on the spot in her house.

A majority of my informants, however, were obtaining money or food from sources which take us directly back to the discussion of informal networks and community services. The network of the health promotors had served to recruit women who became door-to-door salepersons of a cosmetics company with a marketing style modeled on Avon products. Some promotors had received prizes for bringing others into the business. The women's committee overlapped in part with the delegates to the food-for-work brigade which then had a gardening and weaving project and

which had raised the walls of a structure destined to become a handicrafts and training center for community women. No one knew how it would operate if donations were found to complete the building, but there was a strong assumption that no active member of the women's committee would be left out. Finally, the former 1979 board of the women's committee had its own income-generation project, involving the production of high quality hand-knit alpaca sweaters for export.

There are two important lessons in this. First, the income-generating implications which community participation had taken on contributed to the patterns of exclusiveness in the access to services theoretically of benefit to the entire community. Instances of organization which originally existed to place at the disposal of all community members resources and services which depended on a collective effort were, under pressure of severe economic crisis, being converted into closed projects for channeling income to their members. The women's informal networks lay at the basis of these patterns, since the possibility of participating or making use of the available services depended--as I have shown in the case of health services--on there being the requisite preconditions of confianza, friendship, and the access to information that the informal networks gave.

The second lesson which can be drawn from the study of work, services, and networks in marginal neighborhoods is the tendency toward aggregation of these different strategies for resolving problems and insuring survival and a certain level of comfort and security. I began this study with the hypothesis that a woman would, at any given momemt, be primarily dependent on one or another of these three alternatives. If she were working, for example, she would have neither time or necessity for seeking resources from the members of her informal network. Rather than use public services or organize to get them, she would pay for services in the market with her earnings.

This hypothesis was not confirmed. In my study, work was a means of reaffirming and expanding ties in the informal network. Sometimes it gave access to services: minimal child care services or health insurance, for example. Projects to obtain services coalesced with projects to obtain work. Informal networks buttressed the groups that mobilized on both levels, were themselves reinforced through the confidence gained through working together, and filled the interstices of needs not covered through other means.

Industrial work, factory work, or formal sector employment is what did not fit into these three-pronged, additive survival strategies. None of my informants had such work and none expressed interest or took any iniciative to get it over the entire period of the field work. It might be argued this was only realism: their chances of finding were exceedingly slim. Nonetheless it is easy to see that an activity which took them away from home for eight or ten hours a day, five days a week, and still was incapable of resolving all their problems of survival, could not be an attractive alternative.

Organizing Self-Employed Women in the Informal Sector: The Role of Innovative Credit Programs

Hilde Jeffers

Introduction

The informal sector of the economy is a major source of employment in Third World cities. Work opportunities in the informal sector will play an even more important role in urban economies in the future as the growth in the modern formal sector continues to lag behind a rapidly increasing urban labor force. Definitions of what constitutes the informal sector are many and varied, and I will not attempt to review them in this report. Rather my aim is to describe the very lowest level of informal economic activity where women workers are found in the greatest proportion and to analyze the role of credit in improving their condition.

In the urban informal sector, the majority of women workers enter market work in the overcrowded services and petty trades occupations. Some women are unpaid workers in family enterprises, and others do piece rate production work in the home. A large proportion of women workers, however, are self-employed--vending or hawking on the streets or operating services among their neighbors. Nearly all tend to be confined to the lowest end of the trading hierarchy. Typically, the women trade in only a single item or good at the level of one hand-carried basket. They receive very low earnings for long hours of work. They often suffer indignities of sexual harassment, being jostled away from prime selling spots, and lack of access to public water or toilet facilities. These businesses, more properly called "micro-enterprises," can be contrasted with the more lucrative male-dominated operations of stall or shop owning, institution supply and wholesaling outlets.[1]

Despite tremendous problems, poor self-employed women have begun to organize into large-scale urban and rural based unions to cooperatively improve their condition and treatment within the home, the market and the community. Several large grassroots women's organizations have emerged in India over the last decade which have as their primary focus the organizing of self-employed women in the informal sector.[2] These groups have utilized innovative credit programs to attract members by first addressing their most critical need--access to credit in order to keep afloat or expand their marginal business. Once organized to secure bank loans, the women workers are ready to address other common social and economic problems.

In this paper, I will highlight key findings from my nine-month study of Working Women's Forum, located in Madras, India. Working Women's Forum has recently been reconstituted as the National Union of Working Women (NUWW) as a result of its expansion into neighboring states.

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My main research goal was to evaluate the impact of NUWW's key economic program, the loan scheme. Before presenting my findings on the credit program impacts, I will first briefly describe the organization and the workings of the loan program, and report on key characteristics of the woman worker and the work activity. I will conclude with a few observations on the constraints facing self-employed women and organizational attempts to remove them.

My findings are based on a large scientific survey of members of Working Women's Forum (hereafter the Forum) who have received loans under the credit program. In a two-tier random sampling process, I selected 300 women from 48 loan groups which were located in 26 different slum and squatter settlements throughout Madras city. The sample represents an 8% coverage of the total number of loans secured under the program (406 out of 5,000) and 8% coverage of the total number of loan recipients (approximately 3,700) as of March 1981.

The Organization

Working Women's Forum is an interesting development model for several reasons: first, its size and rapid rate of growth at very low funding levels; second, its grass roots character, and absence of elite women, with poor women taking on organizing and leadership roles; third, its exclusive focus on women and strident inter-caste ideological stand; and, last, its primary emphasis on income-earning activities rather than social welfare services.

The idea for Working Women's Forum arose from the frustrations of a few women political party workers who eventually became the organization's founders. In the process of mobilizing poor women for political rallies, the leaders observed the low economic and social position of the women and noted that few government programs really benefited them. Tired of asking for the women's political support while providing nothing in return, one remarkable woman, Jaya Arunachalam, left the Women's Front of the Congress Party. She then brought together several co-workers in order to build a truly responsive woman's organization, based on self-participation, with leadership coming from the poor themselves.

The former political leaders had extensive networks of women in slum communities upon which to build the Forum membership. Through these neighborhood contacts a survey was made to determine specific problems and needs of the poor women. A clear picture of social and economic exploitation emerged from the field survey.

There seemed to be three arenas of problems: the business, the workplace, and the home. The greatest constraint which the women experienced was supply of credit to re-invest in the business. Most of the women were heavily in debt to money lenders, losing much of their already meager income paying exorbitant interest charges. At work, the women endured sexual harassment and the low status accorded to women who work in these trades. At home, the women suffered social tensions of insecure common-law marriages, bigamy, desertion, dowry pressures and the responsibility of child care and housework.

An organizational set-up was devised which would bring the poor women together to work collectively for their own economic and social improvement. Preserving the grassroots character of the group was the only method which would assure the organizers that benefits would actually reach the neediest. All of the organizers, program staff and loan group leaders are members drawn from the same poor communities who have been specially trained for organizational work.[3]

In order to overcome the barriers to the mobilization of women caused by the divisions of caste, religion and politics, the Forum has taken strong ideological positions. The organization is anti-caste, working actively to weaken the system by arranging mass inter-caste marriages. Founded on secular Ghandian principles, the Forum encourages integration among different castes and religious communities in the composition of the neighborhood loan groups. The Forum carefully avoids contact with political parties, yet it prepares its members for

political action with regard to issues affecting women and the urban poor. They have organized mass demonstrations against the dowry system and commented on pending reform bills dealing with rape and divorce.

The Forum seeks to empower women at home and in the community through the exclusive mobilization of women rather than the family unit. The entire loan program, training and education activities are operated and controlled by the women themselves. Meetings of all types are expressly closed to husbands and male community members.[4] In this way, the women gain confidence in their own cooperative power, and the benefits received are directly connected by the larger community to the women's own effort.

Working Women's Forum has grown from a small Madras base of several hundred members to a multi-state organization with urban and rural wings of over 20,000 members in a short span of five years. Poor rural women in neighboring districts and states, hearing about the Forum's success in Madras, asked the organization for assistance in organizing their areas. The Forum responded by establishing three rural wings in Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh and a second urban base in Karnataka. The image here then is not one of a single building or a top-heavy organization where a few women go to get loans. Rather the organization, now called the National Union of Working Women, is composed of women meeting in small neighborhood loan groups in hundreds of slum communities in Madras (16,000 members in 60 trades) and in Bangalore (1,000 agarbathi workers) and in dozens of villages in Dindigul district (2,000 in animal husbandry), in Tanjavur district (500 fisherwomen) and Naraspur (3,000 lacemakers). The back and forth exchange of semiliterate urban organizers and rural leaders--a situation of very poor women traveling long distances to other districts and states to organize other poor women--is truly exceptional.

The Loan Program

Under the loan program the Forum acts as an intermediary between women workers and the nationalized banks in securing loans for business investment purposes. An existing government credit program designed to aid the urban poor had been underutilized due to the reluctance of the bank to process very small loans to large numbers of borrowers. The Forum stepped in and organized the women into small neighborhood loan groups, streamlined the loan administration process, and reduced time and money costs to the banks. Poor women having no assets are able to secure small loans of 100 to 500 rupees at a 4% interest rate per year. At an exchange rate of approximately ten ruppes (Rs.) equal to one U.S. dollar, these loans are extremely small, ranging from $10 to $50. The corresponding rate for an unsecured loan from a moneylender is 120% per year. For a Forum loan of Rs. 300 or $30, the woman makes 10 monthly payments on the principal and her interest payment at the end is only Rs. 12 compared to Rs. 360 on a moneylender loan of the same amount.

A woman receives a loan in her own right without consigning by husband, son or father. A loan is given on the guarantee of other women in the loan group who trust in the woman's ability to earn and repay the debt. Repayment rates are high, well above 90%. If a woman is behind on loan payments, usually because of a family crisis, her group members will cover her installment until she can catch up. In loan group meetings which have become support groups, the women are encouraged to handle the details of their business, utilize the loan correctly, take responsibility for repayment and retain control over earnings. Through the joint effort of several loan groups in a small area, the women have organized balwaldis and creches (day care), evening coaching classes and sewing training centers.

In the next sections, some key findings of the survey of 300 loan beneficiaries are presented. The first section analyzes the importance of the woman's income-earning role in family survival. The second section examines occupational choice and aspects of women's seclusion. Next, a micro-economic study of five common enterprises is summarized. Last, the impacts of the loan program and additional constraints operating against self-employed women are discussed.

Women's Income Earning Role in the Family

Based on mean averages from the survey of 300 self-employed women, a composite picture of a typical Working Women's Forum member can be described. She is 33 years old, married, with three to four children. She lives in a thatch home in a slum or squatter settlement, possessing only clothes, mats and a few cooking vessels. Her husband is a casual laborer employed only three to four times per week. She, however, works every day of the week at her trade or business which may be vegetable vending or operating an idly snack shop or cut-piece cloth trade among her neighbors.

The woman earns Rs. 6 per day or Rs. 180 per month. This accounts for 45% of total household income from all earning members. The mean monthly per capita income of the household is Rs. 87. The urban poverty line in outdated '77-'78 prices is Rs. 88. The income of the woman, therefore, brings the household to just under the poverty line.[5] Women who have received multiple business loans who have been with the organization for a longer period earn 50% of total family income. Nine percent of the women are providing 100% and are sole income earners. Eighty-five percent of sampled women give all their income to the family pool compared to only 70% of men. The reasons for women holding back earnings are most often for chit fund savings, while the men who hold back a portion of their earnings do so in order to buy beedis (cigarettes) and other personal items.

The findings suggest that the independent source of income of the woman plays a critical role in the family. A comparison of the woman's earnings with other household members reveals that being self-employed in many cases is more remunerative than being a wage worker in the informal sector. The self-employed woman's income is not a mere supplement; rather, it is the backbone of family income. Without it the family would fall far below the poverty line and be vulnerable to the swings in income of the casually employed male.

Women's Seclusion and Occupational Choice

Although the women in the sample are employed in 32 different trades or businesses, a majority of 70% are concentrated in only five occupations: cut-piece cloth trading, 19.5%; vegetable vending, 17.6%; idly snack shop, 16.2%; wire bag making, 8.9%; and flower hair garland stringing, 7.3%. The number of cases in the sample in each of these occupations was statistically large enough to permit meaningful analysis. Key characteristics of the women entrepreneurs with respect to age, life cycle stage, and education were correlated with choice of business. The findings are summarized in Chart 1.

The data reveals a pattern of young, more educated women tending to choose home-based businesses, cut piece and wire bag, which have lower earnings, require less work effort and have the least amount of contact with the public. The older uneducated women predominate in the vegetable and idly snack trades in which work is more strenuous, requires greater start-up capital, daily or biweekly resupply trips, and the greatest contact with the public. The flower trade, a traditional family occupation, shows a balanced pattern in terms of age. The low-skill activity, however, involving fairly easy work effort but evenings hours of mobile peddling away from home, attracts mostly uneducated women. There is no prominent pattern of business selection along caste or religious community lines except for a number of Muslim mat makers residing in one colony.

The data also reveals an inverse relationship between family asset level and job choice which involves greater work effort, more contact with the public and higher earnings. It appears that women whose families have attained more than the barest minimum in assets (level A or B), take up work which can be done at home and does not involve much contact with strangers.[6] They seem to be able to afford the lower earnings which characterize these trades, while the pressures of poverty force the less fortunate, and often less educated, into strenuous but higher earning work involving more contact with the public. The difference in monthly earnings between the two types of work is quite wide--approximately Rs. 90-100 per month in

earnings or a nearly 100% increase from the lower earning "secluded" jobs to the higher earning "public contact" jobs.

A Micro-Study of Five Occupations

Economic characteristics of the five most common enterprises are summarized in Chart 2. Generally, the businesses required little training and few tools or equipment. The daily value of production was low, ranging from Rs. 8 to Rs. 40 and providing daily returns of Rs. 2 to Rs. 8. The low-earning trades were cut piece cloth vending and wire bag makers, and the higher earning trades were vegetable vending, idly snacks and flower stringing. Despite the low level of start-up and working capital needed, most women, 78%, began their business by taking out a loan, either a Forum low interest loan, for 33% of the sample, or one from a moneylender, 44%. Only a very few, less than 5%, began their business using their husbands' income as a primary source of start-up capital. Most women believed they could expand their business by approximately 50 to 90% over current levels. The major constraint mentioned was supply of credit to re-invest in the business. Despite the small amount of money needed to expand, very few women entrepreneurs, less than 20% in any trade, are re-investing a portion of their profits. This suggests that the daily earnings, averaging Rs. 6 across all trades, is critical to daily household consumption and cannot be reserved for re-investment and possible increased earnings in the future.

In three of the businesses the women tend to purchase supplies or trade goods from wholesalers, while in the other two they purchase from retailers, in either case using cash payment. Except for the flower traders who sell to the middle class, the women sell the goods to their poor neighbors in the colony for both cash and credit. Buying on cash and selling on credit puts a drain on the woman's operating capital. Also, the negative effects of inflation, when wholesalers increase their prices, cannot be completely passed on to the poor consumers by way of higher prices or lower quality, thus causing the businesswoman to suffer some loss in earnings. These findings underscore the value of the woman petty trader or producer not only in terms of the earning role in her own household but also in the provision of services to the poorest working classes in the urban area.[7]

Impacts of the Loan Program

The analysis of the major impacts of the loan program reveals, first, that the women are full participants as opposed to being fronts for male family members. The women have a good idea of the workings of the program and take full responsibility for repaying their loan. The loan program has been responsible for the start-up of 54% of the businesses, or 102 jobs among the sampled women. For the entire membership, newly created jobs due to the Forum's effort is estimated at 35%, or 2,800 jobs in the first three years. For women who were previously working, 70% experienced an increase in earnings with a mean average increase of 93% as a result of loan investment. If a woman had been earning Rs. 4 per day, her income might have risen to just under Rs. 8 per day. This works out to an average increase of Rs. 120 per month or Rs. 90 in income after the 30 rupee monthly repayment on loan principal is deducted.

The effect of the earnings gain on increases in expenditure for various items is generally low. Because so many women are at such a desperate level to begin with, the extra earnings are primarily spent on essential items of food and clothing for the family, with 53% and 58% of the sample reporting increased expenditure. The most common benefit of the loan reported by the respondents is that their families are eating better (twice instead of once daily, or better quality or assortment of foods). There is, therefore, a clear link between women's income and family nutrition and welfare. A significant number of the women, 35%, report that their role in household decision-making has increased as a result of receiving the loan and expanding their economic role. This was particularly true of young unmarried girls living with their parents. A higher percentage of the sample, 70%, at least report that they have an increase in feelings of income security.

Despite the benefits of the business credit program, women have not become free from the exploitation of moneylenders. Sixty-two percent of the loan recipients are still in debt to moneylenders who most frequently charge an interest rate of 120% per year. The continued reliance on moneylenders is due to the need to borrow for consumption purposes. Women having so few assets and low earnings are forced to borrow for marriages, flood damage, sickness and often basic items such as food during periods of dull business or unemployment.

The credit program loans are granted for business investment purposes only. The analysis of loan diversion away from business use in the sample reveals that the overwhelming majority, 97%, utilized the loan to some extent in their business. Despite the low level of earnings and assets among these women, over half used the loan entirely for business purposes. The remaining half diverted part of the loan to critical consumption or debt repayment or both.

On one hand, the analysis of loan utilization reveals very high levels of full or partial investment of loan into the business. The extent of diversion to consumption purposes was less than 20%. Yet the most common pattern of loan diversion among multiple loan beneficiaries is full investment of first loan in business and partial diversion of the second to consumption. This finding, coupled with the low level of business re-investment from profits or other sources, might imply a satisfaction with current levels of production or reluctance to expand once a minimum Rs. 6 per day return is securely established. The Forum business loan program, and others like it, would then essentially become a consumption loan program after the first loan.

It is not clear, however, whether the woman is actually satisfied with current trading levels or constrained from expanding for other reasons. An older woman vegetable vendor, for example, may not be able to increase her volume of trade due to limits of her physical strength to lift or carry more vegetables. A flower seller may not be able to string more flowers in a given day or sell them without building a stall and securing a larger cut of the market. She may already be operating at the maximum trade level given her resources--a basket of jasmine, a street corner pavement spot, and her own labor power. Finally, an idly seller may not be able to fully utilize the loan in business expansion due to heavy competition from other sellers in her area. Given these constraints of labor, facility or market, the women may be able to only partially utilize the Rs. 300 loan in business.

There are other constraints against full loan utilization. At the time of receiving the loan, a vegetable vendor, for example, needs to repay debts to wholesale suppliers and replace the thatch roof of her home. She uses one-third of the loan money for each of these needs and gradually ploughs the remaining third into the purchase of the same volume of vegetables, perhaps recovering from a spoiled lot or taking advantage of a special buy. She is better off in terms of debt removal and improved housing, but her business has remained unchanged or improved only marginally. Therefore, the main utilization of the loan is to repay debts, meet critical consumption needs and replace business operating capital, as opposed to purchasing tools or equipment or increasing stock in order to increase returns. The constraint in this case is urgent consumption needs or indebtedness. Perhaps if these needs did not exist, the vendor could have invested in the business by buying better quality or assortment of produce or a cart in order to carry greater volume.

Constraints Facing Self-Employed Women and Organizational Responses

Credit is only one of many constraints which women face in operating their businesses. Some additional factors which keep women in the lowest trade positions and inhibit their rise in the trading hierarchy include time limitation due to the demands of child care and cooking, lack of business skills, physical weakness in carrying greater loads, and in several instances saturated markets as more and more women crowd into these static female occupations within the informal sector. If women are able to overcome these personal and market constraints, they may still be unable to make the leap from pavement peddling to the higher earning and higher

status stall owning because of municipal restrictions against building wooden stalls. Women vendors have more difficulty with municipal authorities and experience greater harassment, perhaps due to their perceived marginal importance as income earners and the general low status accorded to women who work outside of the home in these high public contact trades.

Probably the most significant constraints restricting women's ability to move on to more profitable activities are the norms of female behavior, especially regarding limitation on mobility and interaction with men. Women are handicapped in the current centralized wholesale market set-up controlled by men. Their ability to bargain aggressively for the lowest prices without losing respect or to secure better credit and supply positions from male wholesalers is severely limited.[8]

Opportunities for improving women's market positions and expanding income-earning activities look promising. As these relatively new working women's union continue to gain in experience and resources, more significant programs will be developed.

The National Union of Working Women has recently founded their own women's bank, so that more timely business and also consumption loans can be extended. The Union has also proposed an alternative wholesale marketing system for women in cloth and sari trades so that exploitation by the middlemen can be avoided. Similarly, a rural beltway development scheme has been modified to link rural producer with urban vendor so that both can share equitably in the exchange of produce. Also, cooperative production units are being researched that would utilize the higher skill and education levels of the Union's younger members who are often the daughters of older members.

Some problems which remain involve moving away from the more saturated female trades and learning to compete more effectively with men for more profitable shop owning and institution supply. Improving the dignity accorded to women workers by the community is a first step. The Union has negotiated with city officials for obtaining public latrines, covered markets and an end to harassment of women traders in an attempt to improve women's treatment in the market.

In the community, the Union's ideological mobilization--including anti-dowry marches, arranging mass inter-caste marriages, and program services of health, family planning, education and child care--have had a positive impact on women's status. It seems, however that a key organizational resource in promoting change is the loan program and the neighborhood loan group.

First, the impact of the delivery of perhaps 50 loans in the same one or two block urban area is significant. The women's access to prestige institutions such as banks does not go unnoticed. Several loan group leaders, while being unable to point to any terrific success stories of the loan's impact, able to relate a general improvement in the women's lives as a result of the support and counseling of the neighborhood loan group. The women become more aware of details of profitability, accounting, importance of savings, and the use of their scarce time. The loan group motivates women on work issues and teaches business competance. Consequently, as the data reveals, earnings have risen along with the respect of husbands and the rest of the community. Leaders report a drop in wife beating incidences after women have become organized. A frequent comment made was that the women have begun to take better care of themselves, "...they are walking taller these days and people have noticed this."

In conclusion, Working Women's Forum is an exciting development model for meeting critical economic needs, supporting feminist and human rights issues, building up leadership and self-confidence among poor women, and making visible changes in women's treatment and progress in the community.

CHART 1

ASPECTS OF FEMALE LABOR SUPPLY

	CUT-PIECE	VEGETABLE	IDLY	WIRE BAG	FLOWERS
Characteristics of Business Women	young married with children Educated	older, often widowed uneducated	older uneducated	young, unmarried living w/parents more highly educated	all ages uneducated
Asset level of the family	A fair - 20% B low - 34% C very low - 46%	A - 8% B - 27% C - 56%	A - 4% B - 35% C - 60%	A - 12% B - 65% C - 23%	A - 6% B - 36% C - 59%
Location of Business	home-based	Fixed on pavement in market/ mobile in neighborhood	home-based	home-based	Mobile away from home
Type of Work	semi-durable good trade	food item trade	food item production	semi-durable good production	non-durable trade
Role of Helpers	No housework help, husband helps restock, woman sells alone	Daughters help in household work Woman resupplies and sells alone	Daughters help in household work Woman resupplies and sells alone	Sisters help with home chores, brother buys supplies and markets bags	Entire family helps in housework and flower stringing. Woman sells alone.
Characteristics of work	Least work effort high start-up costs low contact with strangers, lower earnings	Most strenuous work, daily resupply, long hours selling. Most contact with public, highest earnings	Most equipment needed, long hours cooking, selling, bi-weekly resupply much competition high contact with public, higher earnings	Tedious work low start-up costs least contact with public, lowest earnings	low skill, evening selling, daily resupply low start-up costs high contact with public higher earnings

CHART 2

SUMMARY OF ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF FIVE TOP BUSINESSES

	CUT-PIECE	VEGETABLES	IDLY	WIREBAG	FLOWERS
Number of cases/ percent of sample	59 (19.5%)	53 (17.6%)	49 (16.2%)	27 (8.9%)	22 (7.3%)
Source of Start-up Capital	Other loan	WWF loan	Other loan	WWF loan	Other loan
Source of Training	Self	Self	Self	WWF	Family
Needed tools/ Equipment	None	Basket (Rs 10)	Plates (Rs 50) Vessels (Rs 85) Grinding Stone (Rs 25)	Scissors (Rs 15)	Basket (Rs 10) Knife (Rs 2)
Desired tools/ Equipment	Scissors (Rs 25) Measuring Tape (Rs 2) Storage Cupboard (Rs 250)	Weighing Scale (Rs 25) Cart/Stall (Rs 500)	More Vessels (Rs 100)	None	Stall (Rs 500)
Source of Inputs/ Payment	Buys Wholesale With Cash	Buys Wholesale With Cash	Buys Retail With Cash	Buys Retail with Cash and Credit	Buys Wholesale With Cash
Market for Trade/Output Payment	Sells to Poor Cash and Credit	Sells to Poor Cash and Credit	Sells to Poor Cash and Credit	Sells to Retail Shops, Cash	Sells to Middle-class, Cash and Credit
Inputs, Quantity Price	pre-cut cloth pieces, 5-15 doz. Rs 515 per month	vegetables 12 kg Rs 40 per day	rice, 5 kg. Rs 14 dahl, ½ kg. Rs 2.5 oil, ¼ kg. Rs. 3.7 Firewood, 1 bn. Rs 2 Spices, etc. Rs 1.5 per day	wire, 2 bun Rs 10 per day	Jasmine, basket-full Rs 23 per day
Production Level (Rs)	445 per month	40 per day	24 per day	223 per month	23 per day
Gross Sales (Rs)	556 per month	48 per day	30 per day	315 per month	30 per day
Net Earnings (Rs)	114 per month	8 per day	6 per day	92 per month	7 per day
% return on investment	25.6%	19.5%	26.7%	41.6%	31.7%
% Potential Expansion	92.5%	83.1%	92.9%	50.6%	92.4%
Expansion Constraint	credit only	credit, cart or stall	market saturated credit for equipment	labor operating at maximum output	credit for stall
Mean Monthly Plough-back Capital	Rs 436	Rs 1105	Rs 73[illegible]	Rs 226	Rs 744
% Re-investment from profit	16%	12%	20%	8%	10%
Effect of Inflation	raised price some loss earnings	earnings loss, some price increase	reduced idly size some earning loss	earnings loss raised price	earning loss raised price

Footnotes

[1]For a more detailed typology of "micro-enterprises" developed by Susan Sawyer, see U.S. A.I.D. report, "The Pisces Studies: Assisting the Smallest Economic Activities of the Urban Poor," 1981.

[2]In March, 1981, representatives from ten women's organizations attended a "National Workshop on Organizing Self-Employed Women in India." The conference was hosted by SEWA, Self-Employed Women's Association of Ahmedabad. SEWA, with over 25,000 members, has a unique status as an official trade union with legal bargaining power for women workers drawn from 300 different occupations in the informal sector. See bibliography for more information on these groups.

[3]At the time of my study, the only elite woman and fluent English speaker in the organization was the founder, Mrs. Jaya Arunachalam. She plays a key role in securing project resources and negotiating with banks, government officials, donor agencies and other institutions. She clearly takes the main policy-making role as well. But she stresses leadership and self-reliance so that once programs are designed, the task of organizing women and implementing the program are almost entirely decentralized to the elected leaders, staff, and the members themselves.

[4]This explicit "women only" policy is meant to prevent cooptation by male community leaders, political parties, and husbands who elsewhere have been observed to use women-oriented development programs for their own benefit. In those cases women gained little in economic security or status in the community. More importantly, women remained in seclusion and did not develop in organizational or political power.

[5]The annual mean per capita income of the urban sample is Rs. 1020 compared to a Tamil Nadu statewide average of Rs. 1030 in 1979.

Mean monthly family income $\bar{x}$=Rs. 393, s=Rs.204 and the 95% confidence interval is Rs.370-416.

Mean monthly women's earning $\bar{x}$=Rs. 180, the 95% confidence interval is Rs. 165-Rs. 195.

Woman's contribution to family income, $\bar{x}$=45.2% s=25.9%, the 95% confidence interval is 42%-48%.

[6]The asset bases of the household were classified into 3 levels based on the following criteria:

Level A: Possession of stone-built house and either a vehicle, cycle or animal, and either a machine, clock, or radio.

Level B: Thatch house or stone-built but any of the following: vehicle, cycle, animal, clock, radio, or piece of machinery equipment.

Level C: Thatch house and none of the above assets.

[7]Very often the idly-seller would provide the noon meals of other working women such as vegetable vendors or they would serve to the young children of vendors who were left at home while the women worked.

[8]For an excellent analysis of social taboos and norms of female behavior affecting market women, see Johanna Lessinger's "Women Traders in Madras City," Department of Anthropology, Barnard College, March 1980.

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Agenda for Research on Women in the Third World

Prepared by Nagat M. El-Sanabary*

Participants in the 1982 and 1983 conferences on Women and Work in the Third World met after their public presentations to discuss needed research on women and industrial work. Sixteen scholars from the first conference met on Friday and Saturday, May 7-8, 1982, and twenty from the second conference met on Saturday, April 16, 1983.** They engaged in discussion and dialogue regarding research areas and focus, methodologies, sources of funding and other related topics. The agenda that follows has been developed from taped discussions and notes taken at these meetings. Due to time constraints, it was not possible to consult with the participants about the final content or format of the agenda. Additionally, it must be noted that for a full-fledged agenda to have been developed, more meetings of the participants would have been necessary.

Proposed Audience for the Agenda

At the beginning of the meetings in both 1982 and 1983, the participants expressed the need to identify potential target groups to whom the agenda might be addressed. They discussed various possibilities including individual scholars, funding agencies, national and international organizations, feminist groups, trade unions, the business community, and policy makers. It was then decided that they could develop a research agenda directed to all these groups and individuals, one that could be equally beneficial to individual scholars, funding agencies, and policy makers. A desire was expressed to bring the agenda to the attention of the business community as well so that national and multinational industries might identify areas of concern and direct their attention to improvements. For individual scholars, the agenda could help identify research topics for individual or collaborative projects. It might also serve as a guide to funding agencies in defining and identifying research priorities, and in allocating resources accordingly.

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** For names of the participants in the working sessions, please refer to the list included at the end of this publication.

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Additionally, participants urged that the agenda be brought to the attention of national and international organizations that have an impact on policies, especially monetary policies and the unequal distribution of income that is intensified by industrialization; that pressure be placed on international organizations to include poor urban women as an issue; and that ways of having more productive access to dissemination media be explored for the purpose of wider distribution of research findings.

Research Focus

There were differences of opinion among the participants in the working sessions as to which issues should receive greater priority in research and funding. There were contrasts among scholars in various disciplines, and contrasts in perspective among younger and older scholars, among Third World and U.S. scholars, and among women of various political and ideological orientations. For instance there was a clear divergence between the classical Marxists and those of other political orientations which were discernible throughout the conference and the small group meetings. Some of these differences were discussed briefly during the working sessions held in April 1983. At this time participants stressed the need for women scholars to appreciate the diversity among various members and groups in the feminist communities in the U.S. and abroad.

There was also a distinction between the participants in the 1982 and 1983 working sessions. Most of those who met in 1982 favored a limited focus in the agenda on women and the multinational industries. This was due mainly to the research interests of members of that group. Those who met in 1983 were interested in an agenda with a much broader focus. They stressed the need for research on both the informal and formal sectors relating to women's work during the economic transformation periods in Third World countries. It is important that we do not lose sight of the fact that only a small proportion of Third World women are affected by multinational industries; the majority are still concentrated in the informal sector. Since the following agenda focuses on the areas of general agreement among the participants in both sessions, it may not reflect this diversity of opinions and perspectives among the various participants in the meetings.

Growing Research on Women and Industrial Work in the Third World

As participants discussed the growing body of literature on women's work in national and multinational industries, reference was made to several completed and ongoing projects both in English and indigenous languages.* Note was made of the difficulty facing Western scholars in obtaining access to studies conducted in the indigenous languages of various Third World countries unless they are proficient in the language or collaborate with an indigenous scholar on a project of mutual interest. There is a need to bring the findings of this body of research to the attention of Western scholars through review articles published in English as well as the indigenous language of the research, and to set up a program to select appropriate studies for translation and dissemination in English.

ISSUES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH ON WOMEN AND INDUSTRIAL WORK IN THE THIRD WORLD

Socioeconomic Context of Women's Work

Growing industrialization in Third World countries is having a major impact on women workers and their families. Often women join the industrial workforce because of economic need. How effective is this kind of work in meeting the economic needs of women and their families, and what are its implications? It was deemed important in this connection to de-

* Space limitations do not permit us to include these here.

velop profiles of women workers. A general profile would include personal data such as age, marital status, family size, educational level, religious and ethnic background, place of residence, and general socioeconomic background. Beyond these general characteristics we have identified some specific concerns which we feel are significant in terms of clarifying the socioeconomic context of women's industrial work.

Participants expressed the need for more studies of work conditions in factories and their effects on women's health. For instance, what is the long-term effect of extended work in electronic industries? What types of equipment are used and how do they affect women's health? How do working conditions differ from national industries? Are any hazardous materials used and what protection do women workers have (e.g., what happens to the woman whose eyesight is damaged or lost because of her factory work)?

Research should also focus on the psychological effect of industrial employment, and factory work in particular, on a woman's self-esteem, self-image, and the relationship of the woman worker to her family. For instance, what is the impact of women's work on interpersonal relationships within the family, and on the external relationships of the family within the wider community? What is the psychological and economic impact of temporary employment upon working women? What about the stereotypes of female jobs in various countries? How can these be changed?

The employment patterns of women industrial workers in various national and multinational industries is an important area of study. Questions to consider include the following: What type of woman do the multinational industries employ? Is she different from the working women in national industries? Do women tend to move from one economic sector to another, for instance from agriculture to industry, from domestic work to industry, or even from cottage industries to factory work? What cultural or economic considerations prompt women to decide upon one type of work rather than another? How many options do women workers really have? Do economic circumstances force some women to work simply out of necessity? What alternatives are there for women who do not wish to hold a factory job?

By dint of their biological and societal-imposed role as mothers, women often stop working to have children and raise a family. What can be said about the phenomenon of interrupted employment, i.e., is it more common to certain classes or regions than others? Who are the women who interrupt their employment to raise a family? Are their differences by class or educational background? What are the implications of interrupted employment on salaries, promotion prospects, and on a woman's commitment to her work? What differences are there regarding continuous and interrupted work patterns?

In studying women workers, researchers should take into account the marital status of the worker and how it affects and is affected by her employment. For instance, is there a difference in pay or benefits for married and unmarried women? Between men and women? What level and types of child care are provided and who pays for them? What are alternative child care arrangements in various countries? Attention should also be paid to women's status as provider for her family -- is it primary or secondary and how does this relate to her work? What does this mean in terms of poverty reduction?

Research might also address ways that women factory workers can advance in their jobs or develop subsistence work into a career. Are there any perceived pattern shifts here? What alternatives are there for women who do not wish to hold a factory job?

Regarding the relocation and dislocation of women workers, what is the impact of rural-urban migration (due to employment opportunities) on women's lives? How does change within industries affect women and their families? Are women trained or retrained? How is it done and by whom? (See also questions under Education and Training.) It is important to study the conditions and impact of plant relocation on women and their families. What criteria does

management use for a decision on relocation (e.g., labor cost, government stability, availability of docile workers)? The suggestion was made here to link up those who are doing the plant relocation with those who are studying the conditions of women's work as a means of bringing about change.

Do women tend to move from one economic sector to another, for instance, from agriculture to industry, from domestic work to industry, or even from cottage industries to factory work? What cultural or economic considerations prompt women to decide upon one type of work rather than another? How many options do women workers really have? It will be important in this regard to analyze the employment or unemployment patterns in the community. How can women retain, or even increase, their share of the labor market in the face of rising unemployment and no-growth or slow-growth policies?

It was also suggested that studies be made of women in management in industries and other modern sectors. What are the motivation, education, socioeconomic background, and career patterns of women in industrial management jobs? What specific problems do women managers face in industrial firms? What is the relationship between women managers and workers? Are there avenues for women workers to advance into management positions? How can this process be facilitated?

The Political Context of Women's Work

The political context and its impact upon women workers is another important area of concern since collective action is basic to empowering women and bettering their lives. Interchange and solidarity between women workers helps create a positive work environment and facilitate the securing of workers' rights. Among the areas that should be studied are the following.

The political behavior of women workers may be examined in terms of the kinds of existing organizations that can stimulate linkages among women workers; the political structures or "prefigurative political forms" upon which this type of organization can build; the circumstances under which women can be mobilized; the conditions that make it difficult and how these can be changed; differences in the political behavior of married women and those who are single. Another important area is how the employer views collective political activities in general and among women in particular.

Researchers have noted several types of resistance strategies that women workers use to express their dissatisfaction with working conditions. Some are active resistance and others are more passive. Some of the observed tactics include absenteeism, turnover, and intentional inefficiency. How common are these forms of resistance and how do employers deal with them? Who are the women who use these strategies as compared to more active forms of resistance?

Labor unions may be very important in protecting women's rights. Among the questions that may be asked are: What opportunities are there for women to join labor unions or form their own unions? Are unions equitable in their treatment of women and men workers? What are the organizational and administrative structures of existing labor unions, the level of centralization or decentralization? What have unions done for women? Are unions genuinely interested in women's welfare? Are they influenced by the existing societal and patriarchal structure? An analysis or comparison of successful and unsuccessful labor unions in a region might be helpful in determining what factors are important to successful organizing.

It is very important to study national labor policies regarding working women by asking the following questions: What are the policies of national government regarding women workers in that country? Are they equitable or discriminatory against women? Who sets those policies and to what extent are they implemented? Are there national labor laws that discriminate against working women? Are there laws that protect the interests of women workers?

There is a wide range of issues that may be examined regarding international labor standards. The suggestion was made to concentrate on a few issues and their implementation rather than to investigate all international standards and their implementation. Then the question arises: What criteria should be used for selecting these issues? The best way is to urge scholars who have expertise in this area to come up with a list of items to be used as criteria for selection. These should be made available for scholars to study. They may include research on women workers' expectations or needs and how they are, or are not, met through ILO stands.

Research on the Informal Sector

The informal sector of women's work and its relationship to the formal sector needs to be studied. The work that women do in their homes as homemakers and producers of goods for their families, as well as the work they do for the garment, plastic and electronic industries must be examined. The latter has grown considerably over the past few decades, and has important implications for factory work and for women's paid and unpaid work in the home. The following questions may be addressed. What differentiates the women who work in their homes from those who work in the factory (e.g., age, marital status, ethnic and religious background, etc.)? What motivates women to work at home instead of doing factory work? What are the levels of pay for these people in various industries and countries? Are there any laws regulating the relationship between employer and workers? Do these women have access to formal or informal worker organizations?

Recognition of the work of the homemaker as an important social and economic activity that contributes to the needs of the family and the economy is important, the economic value of women's work in the home must be examined. Some of the participants also suggested that additional research should focus on the situation of domestic workers and the interrelationship between domestic work and factory work. Some felt that neglecting domestic work would help perpetuate the division between the public and private spheres. An emphasis on domestic work is also important since some women tend to move between industrial employment and domestic work depending on their needs and level of satisfaction with their job. This is an important way in which women allocate their resources. Therefore the factors underlying this resource allocation should be examined.

It was also suggested that the interrelationship between industry and agriculture be studied, particularly the types of contracting between industries and sharecroppers, cooperatives, plantations, etc.

THE EDUCATION OF WOMEN FOR INDUSTRIAL WORK

Participants expressed their concern over the scarcity of published research on women's education in Third World countries, and acknowledged that much of what is available about women's education and workforce participation in these countries consists of reports, conference papers, and other documents which are difficult to obtain and therefore not of much use to researchers. There is a need for more information, both descriptive and analytical, on women's education in Third World countries, the impact of education on women's lives, the linkages between education and employment, and socioeconomic and political forces that determine the type and level of women's educational and workforce participation. They stressed the need for more research and better ways of disseminating research findings among Western and Third World scholars, policy makers, funding agencies, and the general public. Following are suggestions for research focus, methodology, and dissemination of findings.

Relationship between education and employment. How are various levels and types of education linked with type and level of employment? What is the impact of social class on employment of women with varying levels of education? For instance, in some societies women with Ph.D. degrees may be clustered in middle-level positions whereas women with less educa-

tion but who belong to upper classes are found in high level positions because of their class privilege. In general, what educational opportunities are available for the educated with various degrees? What jobs are available? Do they utilize their education on their jobs? What are the differentials between occupational opportunities for women and men with the same level and type of education? We tend to assume that the connection between education and employment is universal, i.e., that more education leads to more employment and that the higher the educational level the better the opportunities for finding employment. This may be true for some countries and not for others, for some classes and not for others. The issue should be studied, preferably cross-culturally and comparatively.

Basic impact of education on women's lives. With major socioeconomic upheaval, labor needs are shifting, and unemployment continues to affect both the educated and the uneducated. Additionally, because of the limited absorptive capacity of Third World economies, the problem of unemployment among the educated may become intensified. Educated women are more likely to be unemployed than educated males. Studies of unemployment among educated women with differing educational attainment should be undertaken. The general effect of education on women must also be studied, because the majority of women in Third World countries continue to assume the major responsibility of the home and do not become wage earners. Thus there is a need to examine the value of education beyond employment preparation. General education may develop literacy and basic skills which have a more lasting value than specialized vocational skills which tend to become obsolete fairly quickly. The differential impact of general basic education on women and men should be investigated to provide clues and guidelines for educational development and policy decisions.

Vocational and technical education of women. Despite problems of inefficiency and other drawbacks of technical and vocational education, it is still one means, if not the only means, of training women for industrial and other employment. Studies should be undertaken to examine the following: the kinds of vocational and technical education available for women including differences among countries and between various regions in one country; the content and orientation of vocational and technical education; the differences caused by sex role stereotypes; the extent to which skills training is based on gender.

Many women do not take advantage of existing vocational educational programs. Why? How can this be remedied? Are there structural constraints and, if so, what are they? What occupations are available for women with specialized skills? What are the attitudes of employers toward graduates of vocational education programs in general, and towards women in particular? Are the skills taught in these programs related to the needs of the economy? How can vocational and technical education for women be more responsive to the needs of women and the economy as well?

The cost of vocational and technical education programs must be examined in connection with the output of these programs to determine their cost effectiveness. How can these programs be made more effective? Is formal vocational and technical education the best way to prepare women for employment? What are alternative programs, formal and nonformal? Who should pay the cost of this education -- governments, industry, students, unions?

Nonformal education for women. Due to limited access and high cost of formal vocational and technical education, participants recommended that greater attention be paid to nonformal training programs for women workers. The nonformal education sphere could be as general as the socialization process or as specific as trade union organizing. More information is needed on the types of nonformal education programs that exist in various countries and regions, their structure and organization, funding sources and effectiveness. Also, alternative means of support for such programs should be examined. The participants felt not enough attention has been directed to the study of nonformal educational programs and their impact on women. Such programs are less expensive and may be closely linked to income-generating activities. They also provide general skills for the enhancement of family life for those who do not wish

to engage in income-generating activities.

Nonformal education programs are especially important when they serve illiterate women and school dropouts. Research is needed to find out what vocational training opportunities are available for those girls who drop out of school. What jobs are available to them? What are their chances of employment? Do female school dropouts have greater or fewer options of obtaining gainful employment than male dropouts?

A concern was expressed also about the orientation and philosophy of some nonformal training and literacy programs. The nature of these programs, their orientation and the philosophy behind them are additional areas for study.

The question of funding nonformal training programs also arises. Who funds these programs and how cost effective are they? Comparative studies on the cost effectiveness of both nonformal and formal training programs should provide useful information to guide the development and allocation of resources among various programs. Foreign assistance agencies are now involved in the funding of various nonformal educational programs; studies of the effectiveness of these programs and how they have evolved over the years should help the host country as well as the assisting agency.

Political and economic forces affecting women's education and workforce participation. The political economy of education in general and as it relates to women's labor is a broad field which may be explored from numerous angles. What are the political and economic forces behind change in demand for women's labor? What is the connection between industry and government? To what extent are government-sponsored vocational training programs a subsidy of certain industries? What is the decision-making process within ministries or departments of education?

Education is a powerful shaper of world views, including work views. Needed is an analysis of various institutions such as the state, the family, political parties and trade unions as contenders for educational control. How much of instructional content is propaganda or dogma and for whose purposes?

RESEARCH METHODOLOGIES

Participants discussed the types of studies that may be undertaken to address the questions raised above. The following recommendations were made regarding research methodologies.

1. Comparative research on women workers in various countries within a region, or several countries in different regions. Also, comparative studies on women workers in Third World and more economically developed countries. An example is the research on women in electronic industries in the United States, Asia, and elsewhere.

2. Both macro and micro research are needed. For instance, it is important to study various aspects of women's work at the nation or regional level as well as at the level of a single factory or individual worker.

3. Intensive country studies of women's work, especially industrial employment.

4. Historical research -- the historical context of women's work.

5. Case studies of individual workers: life histories, oral histories, etc.

6. Team approach: collaborative research by native and foreign scholars. There was much discussion of this and of the need for the equitable allocation of resources between foreign and national researchers. Some of the ideas suggested for redressing the imbalance between First and Third world researchers were further developed by Jeanine Anderson Velasco based on discussions started at the group meeting on April 16, 1983. They are included here as guide for future discussion and action.

a) Every effort should be made to involve a local researcher from the first stages of development of the project, to be considered a co-researcher for the purposes of making the proposal to a funding agency, with clear specification of and agreement on the tasks to be carried out by each.

b) The tasks assigned to the local researcher should wherever possible involve a major part of the writing of the report, which should first be done in the local language and as a second step be translated to the language of the foreign researcher (or the language of the grant proposal). Every effort should be made to achieve earliest possible publication in local scholarly or other appropriate journals, and there should be clear agreement on preliminary articles to be submitted to academic journals in other countries. Wherever possible, publication should be sought in international journals (such as Current Anthropology) rather than national ones (American Anthropologist). If book publication is planned, every effort should be made to achieve simultaneous publication in the local and foreign researcher's countries and languages.

c) The foreign researcher should expect to bring with her:

A library consisting of the most recent relevant books on the topic to be researched, broadly construed;
Copies of relevant articles, for leaving in the host country;
Examples of relevant journals (or have journals to which she subscribes reach her at her field site during the research) for examination by the local researcher and others;
Funds for translation into the local language of especially pertinent book chapters and articles, by local translators at local prices, up to an amount of 500 to 1,000 pages.

d) The foreign researcher should arrange affiliation with a local institution (academic, women's organization, or action group as appropriate) and should share responsibliity there for a course or seminar on topics related to the research with her co-researcher or another person, even if this must be unpaid teaching.

e) All further analysis of the information collected after the foreign researcher has left the field should be cleared with the local co-researcher and other collaborators or consultants there, giving them full opportunity to participate actively in the planning of the analysis and elaboration of conclusions or ininterpretaions on the basis of it.

f) All local persons contacted by the foreign researcher for discussions about their work should be given full information about the research: the institutional affiliation of the foreign researcher in her own and the host country, the sponsorship and financing of the research, what use is expected to be made of the results (consulting, publication, where and when the paper(s) will be presented, etc.). Local scholars should be put in a position to do their own monitoring of the future use of the information.

g) Where the product of the research is a conference paper, the local co-researcher should have first option for making the presentation, unless language restrictions or financing of travel absolutely prevent it.

h) The local co-researcher should have a decisive vote on issues of political sensitivity regarding the information being collected and protection of local informants and collaborators.

Regarding data, the participants posed questions about the usefulness and validity of international data such as the statistics compiled by the United Nations and other international agencies. How useful are these data for comparative research of women's education or workforce participation between countries and regions? Concerns were also expressed about the inaccuracy and inadequacy of national census data. How can researchers use these national and international data while realizing their limitations?

The participants discussed briefly the political and ethical questions involved in data gathering, and various ways of gaining access to women workers, either in the home or in the factory. What are the ethical issues involved, for instance, in participatory observation of women factory workers without their knowledge? What about access through factory management? Can this be done without the risk of biasing the data gathering and reporting of the findings? These are complex questions that must be seriously considered by scholars undertaking field research.

Interaction and networking among researchers would help indigenous and foreign scholars deal with these and other problems pertaining to data collection, conducting research, and disseminating research findings. Research networks are being developed and should help strengthen the linkages among women scholars in the field of women in development. The Association of Women in Development (AWID), for instance, could be very helpful in this area. Journals which focus on international women are also making major contributions in disseminating research findings. Mention may be made here of Women's Studies International Forum; the International Supplement of Women's Studies Quarterly; and Signs. Some Third World countries have also started to issue journals addressing women in development and broader feminist issues. These journals and groups should help bridge the gap between Western women and their Third World sisters, and foster the development of a scholarly community that works to promote the welfare of all women of the world.

Funding sources for research and publications were discussed briefly, and some suggestions were made. A recommended source is the publication entitled Funding Resources for Women in Development Projects by Marilyn W. Richards (Washington, D.C.: Secretariat for Women in Development, New TransCentury Foundation, July 1978). For those concerned about proposal development and evaluation the following publication should be helpful: Evaluating Small Grants for Women in Development by Judith F. Helzner, January 1980, distributed by the Office of Women in Development, U.S.A.I.D., Washington, D.C.

We also include at the end of this agenda a brief selected bibliography on women and work in the Third World that was developed for dissemination at the conference. Since it focuses on materials available at the library of the Center for the Study, Education and Advancement of Women, U.C. Berkeley, it is not comprehensive.

In conclusion we must state that the women in development field in general, and research on women in industrial work particularly, are still very young. Much more needs to be done in identifying areas of needed research and appropriate research methodologies, and conducting numerous studies of the types suggested above in order to expand our knowledge about the com-

plex issues pertaining to women and work in the Third World. This should also deepen our insights into the situation of working women in the industrialized countries as well. Needed also is action by individual scholars, feminist groups, development planners, bilateral and multilateral assistance agencies, and governments in the First and Third worlds to improve the conditions of working women, enhance their status, and expand their roles in society so that they can become active participants in, and beneficiaries of, the development process. It is hoped that this agenda and the research included in this publication will help stimulate further discussion, research, and action toward the achievement of this objective.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX I: **Notes on Contributors**

** NEUMA AGUIAR is currently the coordinator of the Women and Development Project at the Women's Studies Research Program, University of Wisconsin, Madison. A Brazilian sociologist, she is affiliated with the Instituto Universitario de Pesquisas in Rio de Janeiro, and has extensive research and teaching experience in the area of women in the labor force in Latin America.

* A. LYNN BOLLES is director of Afro-American Studies and an assistant professor of anthropology at Bowdoin College, Brunswick, Maine. Her dissertation research was on working-class women in Jamaica. She has also done comparative research on women factory workers in the U.S. and Brazil, and has published on the topic of women, family structures and development.

** SALLY BOULD is an associate professor of sociology at the University of Delaware. Her major research interests are in the areas of social policy, poverty and the family. She is an associate editor of the Journal of Applied Behavioral Science.

* NAGAT EL-SANABARY is an associate director of the Center for the Study, Education and Advancement of Women, University of California, Berkeley, and coordinator of both conferences. She has done extensive research on women's education and work force participation in the Arab states, and has spoken on the subject at several national and international conferences in the U.S. and the Middle East.

* PATRICIA LEE ENGLE is an associate professor of child development at California Polytechnic State University in San Luis Obispo.

** SONDRA HALE is a lecturer in women's studies at California State University, Long Beach. Her particular research interest is political anthropology. She has spent six years teaching and doing research in Sudan where her most recent project explored the personal aspects of women's loss of autonomy in the public and private domains of a "developing" society.

** MERVAT HATEM is an assistant professor of political science at Howard University, Washington, D.C.

* RICHARD HOLTON is a professor of business administration at the University of California, Berkeley. His primary areas of research are marketing, economic development, international business and antitrust problems. He served as Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Economic Affairs under President Kennedy and was chairman of the President's Consumer Advisory Council under President Johnson.

** HILDE JEFFERS is a doctoral student in City and Regional Planning at the University of California, Berkeley. She has spent a year in India as a visiting foreign scholar at the Delhi School of Econonics, Delhi University, where she researched female labor force participation in the urban informal economy and evaluated a major credit program for self-employed women.

* HAMIDA KAZI has worked extensively among Asian women in England and has been advisor to the Department of Health and Social Security on these women's economic and social problems. In 1973 she received a Social Science Research Council Scholarship to work on immigrants in

* Participant in the 1982 conference.
** Participant in the 1983 conference.

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British industries. She is currently working toward a Ph.D. in sociology at Birkbeck College, University of London.

** DAWN KEREMITSIS is the chair of the Department of History at West Valley Community College in Saratoga, California.

** LINDA LIM is affiliated with the Economic Research Centre at the National University of Singapore. She has done extensive research on women electronics workers in Singapore, and was recently a Rockefeller Fellow and research associate with the Center for South and Southeast Asian Studies at the University of Michigan.

** JUDITH LIU is a doctoral candidate in sociology at the University of California, San Diego.

** IRENE LORFING is a sociologist and research associate with the Institute of Women's Studies in the Arab World, Beirut, Lebanon. She has done several projects at the American University of Beirut and at Beirut University College where she also teaches a course on women in the Arab world.

** NINA E. MBA is a principal lecturer in history at the Institute of Management and Technology, Enugu, Nigeria. Her research and writing has focused on women in southern Nigerian political history.

** MUADI MUAMBA is the director of the Women's Office of the National Labor Union of Zaire.

** JUNE NASH is a professor of anthropology at the City College of the City University of New York.

** HANNA PAPANEK is a senior research associate with the Center for Asian Developmental Studies, Boston University. She has lived and worked in South Asia for a total of six years, and has been actively involved in several large international conferences on women. She currently chairs the Committee on Women in Asian Studies of the Association for Asian Studies and is on the editorial board of Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society.

* ANIS RAMZI is a marketing officer with the Malaysian Trade Commission.

** MAY RIHANI is vice president of the New TransCentury Foundation, Washington, D.C., and was prior to that director of the Foundation's Secretariat for Women in Development. She has broad experience in the planning and design of technical assistance programs, and in the past four years has managed and executed programs in sixteen countries including eight Middle Eastern countries.

* HELEN I. SAFA is the director of the Center for Latin American Studies and professor of anthropology at the University of Florida, Gainesville. She has been a consultant to the Inter-American Housing and Planning Center of the Pan American Union in Bogota, Colombia, where she helped to set up a study of the resources of rural migrants to the urban centers of Latin America, and has also served as consultant and information analyst to the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.

* JANET SALAFF is an associate professor of sociology at the University of Toronto. Her areas of research include family formation in the People's Republic of China, the effects of labor force participation on women factory workers in Hong Kong, and public policy and family structure in Singapore. She has recently been appointed Country Representative for the Committee for World Sociology, American Sociological Association, Singapore.

* RUTH SAUTU is on the humanities faculty of the Universidad de Belgrano in Buenos Aires, Argentina. In 1982 she was a visiting Fulbright scholar at the Center for Latin American Studies at the University of Florida, Gainesville. She has done extensive research on women and the labor force in Argentina.

** NANCY SCHEPER-HUGHES is an associate professor of anthropology at the University of California, Berkeley. She specializes in medical and psychological anthropological research. Her work includes a study of the changing patterns of ethnomedical beliefs and practices among Spanish Americans in New Mexico and Texas and a study of schizophrenia among bachelors in rural Ireland.

** AMINA SHAFIQ is a journalist and editor of the trade union column in El-Ahram, a Cairo daily paper. She is also the representative of the Egyptian Journalists' Syndicate on the National Trade Union Council.

* LENNY SIEGEL is the director of the Pacific Studies Center in Mountain View, California. His research deals with the employment of women in export assembly plants, especially in high technology electronics in Asia.

** EVELYN STEVENS is a research associate with the Center for Latin American Studies, University of California, Berkeley.

** JEANINE ANDERSON VELASCO is a project director for the Asociacion Peru-Mujer, Lima, Peru. She has extensive research experience on women in Peru, and recently taught a course on the anthropology of women for the University of Lima's Extension Department.

* NANCY WEIR is an organization, development and training specialist with Levi-Strauss International, San Francisco, California.

* ANITA WEISS, at the time of the first conference (1982), was a lecturer in the Department of Sociology at the University of California, Berkeley.

* ELIZABETH WHITE is the area director for South Asia of the Asia Foundation. a development funding agency with headquarters in San Francisco, California.

APPENDIX II: Participants in the Working Sessions
May 7-8, 1982

Rae Lesser Blumberg, Associate Professor of Sociology, University of California, San Diego.

Augusta Lynn Bolles, Assistant Professor of Anthropology and Director of Afro-American Studies, Bowdoin College, Brunswick, Maine.

Nagat El-Sanabary, Associate Director, Center for the Study, Education and Advancement of Women, University of California, Berkeley.

Patricia Lee Engle, Associate Professor of Child Development, California Polytechnic State University, San Luis Obispo.

Sondra Hale, Lecturer, Women's Studies Program, California State University, Long Beach.

Hamida Kazi, Program Intern, Center for the Study, Education and Advancement of Women, University of California, Berkeley.

Maria-Patricia Fernandez-Kelly, Research Fellow, Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego.

Helen Safa, Director, Center for Latin American Studies, University of Florida, Gainesville.

Janet Salaff, Assistant Professor of Sociology, University of Toronto, Canada.

Ruth Sautu, Visiting Professor, Center for Latin American Studies, University of Florida, Gainesville.

Lenny Siegel, Director, Pacific Studies Center, Mountain View, California.

Anita Weiss, Ph.D. Candidate and Instructor, Department of Sociology, University of California, Berkeley.

Elizabeth White, Area Director, Asia Foundation, San Francisco, California.

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Participants in the Working Sessions
April 16, 1983

Neuma Aguiar, Director, Women in Development Project, Women's Studies Research Program, University of Wisconsin, Madison; and Instituto Universitario de Pesquisas, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.

Linda Gail Arrigo, Ph.D. Candidate in Sociology, State University of New York, Binghamton.

Sally Bould, Associate Professor of Sociology, University of Delaware.

Nagat El-Sanabary, Associate Director, Center for the Study, Education and Advancement of Women, University of California, Berkeley.

Sondra Hale, Lecturer, Women's Studies Program, California State University, Long Beach.

Mervat Hatem, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Howard University, Washington, D.C.

Hilde Jeffers, Ph.D. Candidate, City and Regional Planning, University of California, Berkeley.

Suad Joseph, Associate Professor of Anthropology, University of California, Davis.

Linda Lim, Rockefeller Fellow and Visiting Research Associate, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor; and National University of Singapore.

Judie Liu, Ph.D. Candidate, Sociology, University of California, San Diego.

Irene Lorfing, Research Associate, Institute of Women's Studies in the Arab World, Beirut, Lebanon.

Nina Mba, Principal Lecturer, Institute of Management and Technology, Enugu, Nigeria.

Muadi Muamba, Director, Women's Office of the National Labor Union of Zaire.

June Nash, Professor of Anthropology, City College of the City University of New York.

Hanna Papanek, Senior Research Associate, Center for Asian Development Studies, Boston University.

May Rihani, Vice President, New TransCentury Foundation, Washington, D.C.

Nancy Scheper-Hughes, Associate Professor of Anthropology, University of California, Berkeley.

Hamideh Sedghi, Postdoctoral Fellow in Political Science, Graduate Center, City University of New York.

Amina Shafiq, journalist and editor, El-Ahram, Cairo, Egypt.

Kumud Sharma, Associate Director, Center for Women's Development Studies, New Delhi, India.

THE CENTER FOR THE STUDY, EDUCATION
AND ADVANCEMENT OF WOMEN
Present a Research Conference on

WOMEN AND WORK IN THE THIRD WORLD:

The Impact of Industrialization and Global Economic Interdependence

THURSDAY AND FRIDAY
MAY 6 & 7, 1982
Booth Auditorium, Boalt Hall
University of California, Berkeley

Thursday Morning Session

8:00-9:00
REGISTRATION AND COFFEE

9:00-9:15
OPENING REMARKS
Nagat El-Sanabary, Associate Director, CSEAW
WELCOME
Doris Calloway, Provost of Professional Schools and Colleges, UC Berkeley

9:15-10:00 KEYNOTE ADDRESS
Helen Safa, Director of the Center for Latin American Studies, University of Florida at Gainesville
"Women and the International Division of Labor"

10:00-12:00 PANEL I
CURRENT ISSUES OF WOMEN'S PARTICIPATION IN INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION IN THE THIRD WORLD

Moderator, Arlie Hochschild, Associate Professor of Sociology, UCB

Lenny Siegel, Director, Pacific Studies Center, Mountain View, CA
"Employment of Women in Export Assembly of High Technology Electronics in Asia"

Janet Salaff, Assistant Professor of Sociology, University of Toronto
"Women, Work & Family under Conditions of Rapid Industrialization: Singapore Chinese Women"

Maria Patricia Fernandez-Kelly, Research Fellow Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, UCSD
"The Impact of Mexican-American Border Industries on Women"

Hemalata C. Dandekar, Assistant Professor of Urban Planning, University of Michigan
"The Impact of Bombay Textile Industries on Women's Work in Village Sugao"

12:00-2:00 LUNCH

Thursday Afternoon Session

2:00-3:45 PANEL II
SOCIOECONOMIC AND CULTURAL CONSTRAINTS ON WOMEN'S FULLER INTEGRATION INTO THE MODERN ECONOMY OF THE THIRD WORLD

Moderator: Naomi Katz, Professor of Anthropology San Francisco State University
Patricia L. Engle, Associate Professor of Child Development, California Polytechnic at San Luis Obispo
"Discrepancy between Guatemalan Women's Desire to Work and Actual Employment"

Ruth Sautu, Visiting Professor, Center for Latin American Studies, University of Florida at Gainesville
"The Process of Development and Women's Work in Latin America"

Sondra Hale, Director, Women's Studies Program, California State University at Long Beach
"Cultural Reproduction: The "Invisible" Domain of Sudanese Women"

Hamida Kazi, C.S.E.A.W., UC Berkeley
"Women's Work Within the Sociocultural Structure in Selected Middle Eastern Societies"

3:45-4:00 BREAK

4:00-5:00 PANEL III
EDUCATION AND TRAINING OF WOMEN FOR INDUSTRIAL WORK IN THE THIRD WORLD
Moderator: Sheila Walker, Associate Professor of Education, UCB
Nagat El-Sanabary, C.S.E.A.W.,
"Vocational and Technical Education of Women in the Arab States"

PANEL III (cont.) 4:00-5:00

Elizabeth White, Ph.D., Area Director, Asia Foundation
"Non-Formal Education for Women in Asia: Examples from Bangladesh, Thailand, and Korea"

Doris Elbers, read by Maresi Nerad, Ph.D. Candidate in Education, UC Berkeley
"Observations on Vocational Education of Women in Africa"

Friday Morning Session

8:00-8:30
REGISTRATION AND COFFEE

8:30-10:15 PANEL IV

IMPACT OF WOMEN'S INDUSTRIAL WORK ON THEIR LIVES, FAMILIES AND WIDER SOCIAL STRUCTURE

Moderator: Ann Markusen, Assistant Professor, City and Regional Planning, UC Berkeley

Rae Lesser Blumberg, Associate Professor of Sociology, UC San Diego

Anita Weiss, Instructor of Sociology, UC Berkeley
"Women and Factory Work in Punjab, Pakistan"

Lordes Beneria, Associate Professor of Economics, Rutgers University
"Subcontracting and Gender Roles"

Augusta Lynn Bolles, Assistant Professor of Anthropology and Director of Afro-American Studies, Bowdin College
"Women, Family Structure and Development"

10:15-10:30 BREAK

10:30-12:00 PANEL V

OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES OF GLOBAL ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE: IMPLICATIONS FOR WOMEN

Moderator: Lee Novick, former co-ordinator of the Commission on International Women's Year, 1980.

Richard Holton, Professor of International Business, UC Berkeley

Nancy Weir, Organization, Development and Training Specialist, Levi Strauss International, San Francisco

Anis Sabirini Ramzi, Marketing Officer, Malaysian Trade Commission, San Francisco

PANEL V (cont.) 10:30-12:00

Carmeli Adad, Manager, Personnel and Administration, Interlek, San Mateo

OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH CONFERENCE:

- To investigate the impact of global economic interdependence on women's work in developing countries;
- To examine some of the global problems affecting working women in these countries; and
- To increase awareness of the opportunities and challenges of global economic interdependence and the role of multinational corporations.

Boalt Hall is located on Bancroft Way between College and Piedmont Avenues and is easily accessible by public transportation. There are several Fee Lot parking structures nearby where you may park by paying 75¢ at the slot machine at the entrance. A permit may be obtained at one of the campus entrance gates. There are also several restaurants in the vicinity of Boalt Hall.

Research Conference Coordinators

Center for the Study, Education and Advancement of Women

Nagat El-Sanabary, Associate Director
Hamida Kazi, Intern
Kathleen Wothe, Program Representative

We gratefully acknowledge the support of The Center for Latin American Studies, UC Berkeley.

THE CSEAW-U.C. WOMEN'S CENTER PRESENTS:

WOMEN AND WORK IN THE THIRD WORLD:

The Impact on Industrialization and Global Economic Interdependence

Thursday and Friday, April 14-15, 1983
University Y-House
2600 Bancroft Way, Berkeley

THURSDAY MORNING SESSION, APRIL 14

8:00-9:00	REGISTRATION
9:00-	OPENING REMARKS Nagat El-Sanabary Associate Director Center for the Study, Education and Advancement of Women, U.C. Berkeley
9:15-	WELCOME Margaret B. Wilkerson Director Center for the Study, Education and Advancement of Women, U.C. Berkeley
9:30-10:15	KEYNOTE ADDRESS June Nash, Professor of Anthropology, City College of New York "Segmentation of the Labor Force and the Changing International Division of Labor"
10:15-10:30	BREAK
10:30-12:30	PANEL 1 CURRENT ISSUES OF WOMEN'S PARTICIPATION IN INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION: THEORY AND RESEARCH Moderator: Suad Joseph, Assistant Professor of Anthropology, University of California, Davis Linda Lim, Rockefeller Fellow and Visting Research Associate, University of Michigan "Multinational Export Factories and Women Workers in the Third World: A Review of Theory and Evidence" Neuma Aguiar, Director, Women in Development Project, Women's Studies Program, University of Wisconsin, Madison "Women in the Labor Force in Latin America: A Review of the Literature"

Mona Hammam, United States Agency for International Development
"Women and the Division of Labor in the Middle East"

Rae Lesser Blumberg, Associate Professor of Sociology, University of California, San Diego. "Theory and Research on the Links between the World Economy and Third World Women's Lives"

12:30-1:30 LUNCH

THURSDAY AFTERNOON SESSION

1:30-3:15 PANEL II
SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL FACTORS AFFECTING WOMEN'S WORK

Moderator: Arlie Hochschild, Associate Professor of Sociology, University of California, Berkeley

Nina Mba, Principal Lecturer, Institute of Management and Technology, Enugu, Nigeria
"Women and Work in Nigeria"

Mervat Hatem, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Howard University
"Women and Work in the Middle East: The Regional Impact of Migration to the Oil Producing Countries"

Hamideh Sedghi, Post Doctoral Fellow in Political Science, Graduate Center, City University of New York and Asst. Prof. of Social Science, New York University
"The Subordination of Women in Iran's Division of Labor"

3:15-3:30 BREAK

3:30-5:00 PANEL III
HELPING WOMEN WORKERS: PROGRAMS FOR AND BY WOMEN

Moderator: Susan Lobo, Program Coordinator, Center for Latin American Studies, UC Berkeley

Amina Shafig, Reporter, Al-Ahram,
"Women and Labor Unions in Egypt"

Muadi Muamba, Director, Women's Office of the National Labor Union of Zaire
"The Labor Movement and Working Women in Zaire"
In French with English interpretation

Hilde Jeffers, Ph.D. Candidate, City and Regional Planning, University of California, Berkeley
"Organizing Women Petty Traders and Producers: A Case Study of Working Women's Forum, India"

WOMEN AND WORK IN THE THIRD WORLD

Friday, April 15, 1983
2600 Bancroft Way

Revised Agenda

FRIDAY MORNING SESSION, APRIL 15

8:30-9:00 REGISTRATION

9:00-11:00 PANEL IV
IMPACT OF INDUSTRIALIZATION AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY ON WOMEN, THEIR FAMILIES AND THE WIDER SOCIAL STRUCTURES

Moderator: Clair Brown, Associate Professor of Economics, UC Berkeley

Sally Bould, Professor of Sociology, University of Delaware
"Women and the Family: The Division of Labor in Rural Areas"

Nancy Scheper Hughes, Assistant Professor of Anthropology, University of California, Berkeley
"Women, Work, and Infant Mortality: A Case Study of Northern Brazil"

Sondra Hale, Director, Women's Studies, California State University, Long Beach
"Women and Work in the Sudan: What is Alienated Labor?"

May Rihani, Vice-President and Director, Transcentury Foundation
"Women and Work in Morocco"

11:00-11:15 BREAK

11:15-12:15 CONCURRENT SMALL GROUP DISCUSSIONS LED BY CONFERENCE PANELISTS

Group I Women in the Middle East: May Rihani
Irene Lorfing, Mervat Hatem, and Amina Shafiq

Group II Women in Latin America, Jeanine Anderson Velasco,
Neuma Aguiar, and Nancy Scheper Hughes

Group III Women in Asia: Kumud Sharma, Linda Lim, and Hanna Papanek

Group IV Women in Africa: Nina Mba and Nuadi Muamba

12:15-12:45 LUNCH BREAK

12:45-1:15 Film, "The Price of Change"
A film about Egyptian Women, produced by Elizabeth Warnock Fernea

1:15-1:30 Discussion about "The Price of Change"
Discussant: Nagat El-Sanabary, CSEAW

335

FRIDAY AFTERNOON SESSION

1:30-3:00 PANEL V
WOMEN'S EDUCATION, TRAINING, AND INDUSTRIAL WORK IN THE THIRD WORLD

Moderator: Geraldine Clifford, Professor of Education, University of California, Berkeley

Hanna Papanek, Senior Research Associate, Center for Asian Development Studies, Boston University
"Education-Employment Linkages for Women in Low-Income Countries: A Comparative Analysis of Egypt, Pakistan and India"

Irene M. Lorfing, Research Associate, Institute of Women's Studies in the Arab World
"Women Workers in the Lebanese Industry: Their Education and Work"

Dawn Keremitsis, Chairperson, History Department, West Valley Community College
"The Packagers: Non-Durable Women Workers in Mexico"

3:00-3:15 BREAK

3:15-5:00 PANEL VI
IMPLICATIONS OF INDUSTRIALIZATION FOR WOMEN

Moderator: Laura Nader, Professor of Anthropology, University of California, Berkeley

Evelyn Stevens, Research Associate, Center for Latin American Studies
"Up From Slavery: Expanding Work Opportunities for Latin American Women"

Kumud Sharma, Associate Director, Center for Women's Development Studies, New Delhi
"Women's Work in India's Fields and Forests"

Linda Gail Arrigo, Ph.D. Candidate in Sociology, University of California, San Diego
"Economic and Political Control of Women Workers in Multinational Electronic Factories in Taiwan"

Judie Liu, Ph.D. Candidate in Sociology, University of California, San Diego
"A Recent Study of Women Workers in a Paper Mill in Beijing

FRIDAY EVENING

7:00-9:00 p.m. "Mothers of the Desert" and "Rasd: Fighters of the Western Crescent"
Two award-winning documentaries about women in North Africa. Dialogue in Tuareg, Arabic, and Italian, with English subtitles. Film maker Gaia Ceriana will be present to discuss the films.