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THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE MUNICIPAL SYSTEM IN NICARAGUA:  
A DIAGNOSIS

Revised Trip Report

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Fernando Kusnetzoff

Department of City and Regional Planning  
University of California, Berkeley

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## A. Introduction

This Trip Report covers the activities of the Project since the end of February, 1981. The main municipal development issues in Nicaragua were outlined at the UC Project's First Annual Workshop, held on April 22, 1981, in Harpers Ferry, West Virginia. This report summarizes a diagnosis of Nicaragua's municipal system prepared by the INCAE/UCB core team. It also describes the design of the second phase of the SAMU assistance project and includes some additional notes. I will minimize my discussion of present conditions in Nicaragua, since these were analyzed in earlier reports by both Richard Harris and myself, but I will discuss some matters that touch on the dynamic process of change in Nicaragua and directly affect SAMU's performance and therefore our work.

## B. Diagnosis of the Municipal System in Nicaragua

When I arrived in Managua during the first week of April, our core team, consisting of Andres Perez (INCAE) and Charles Downs (UCB), had already completed the final draft of their diagnosis of the municipal system in Nicaragua, in accordance with the "Agreements and Terms of Reference" document of February 21. Their draft, entitled "A General Diagnosis of the Nicaraguan Municipal System, July 19, 1979 - March 19, 1981," describes and assesses in substantial detail the twenty months following the civil war. In addition, the report offers an interesting perspective on the evolution and problems of the municipal system inherited by the present regime. The report consists of an

eighty-page text and a forty-page appendix, which is mostly on municipal finances. I believe that this report is currently the most complete document available on Nicaragua's municipal development. It is being studied carefully by SAMU's executives and staff, and it has helped us define our project's future actions. I will try to synthesize its findings in this Trip Report.

### 1. Antecedents of the Present Municipal System

The territorial definition of Nicaraguan municipalities, or municipios, was legally confirmed in September 1978 and closely follows the previous legislation of 1967. Under that system each municipality was administered by a consejo of three members--an alcalde (a mayor), a sindico (a type of trustee) and a tesorero (a treasurer)--all supposedly elected by popular vote for three-year terms. The sindico was to be a member of the political party obtaining the second largest number of votes. The Decree established the economic and administrative autonomy of the consejos, limited only by the oversight of the central government. The main functions of the consejos were in traditional areas of local government, such as licenses and permits, and certain basic public services.

In 1973 INCAE carried out a study of the municipalities in Nicaragua, finding a situation much like that of 1979. Most municipalities were in a rather critical state. The main problems identified by INCAE were:

- a.) the municipios' very limited ability to generate

resources and provide services;

- b.) the unclear division of functions between the municipios and national government agencies;
- c.) the minimal participation of civic or community groups in municipal life;
- d.) the extreme differences in total and per capita municipio revenues, with the Pacific Zone municipios enjoying most of the income.
- e.) the excessive subdivision of the national territory into more than 130 municipios, many of them lacking a minimum economic base;
- f.) the inadequate tax structure and the insufficient devolution of central-government revenue to the municipios;
- g.) the disproportionate amount of administrative expenditures in most municipal budgets, as compared with capital investments and services; and
- h.) the municipios' need for and lack of assistance.

These factors help explain the vulnerability of the municipal system to the pressures and decisions of the central government under the previous regime. Even apparent efforts to redress the situation, like the creation of an Institute of Peasants' Welfare (INVIERNO) and the regime's declared commitment to municipal development, appeared to be geared more toward those regions of the country where the opposition to Somoza's government was active than to promoting balanced development.

## 2. The Present Municipal System

A variety of juridical actors are currently involved in municipal life, namely: 1.) the central government; 2.) the municipios; 3.) the municipalidades; 4.) the Municipal Juntas of Reconstruction; 5.) the councils charged with coordinating departments (counties) 6.) the base organizations; and 7.) the Secretariat of

Municipal Affairs (SAMU). These institutions have not yet been integrated into a definite decentralization program since they lack sufficient human and material resources. Nonetheless, we believe that the country has made incremental progress from the previous centralized pattern of social, economic and political life toward a more balanced and participatory society. What follows is an evaluation of each actor's role in this process of change.

### 3. The Central Government

In its second annual development plan, the 1981 Programa Economica de Austeridad y Eficiencia, Nicaragua's new government presented a key policy concept--normative centralization and executive decentralization. This will be the means to achieve the Plan's goal, a threefold expansion of productive forces, public institutions and public services.

The departamento (an administrative and geographical unit roughly equivalent to a county) will be the administrative level at which central-government policies are implemented. Most of the central institutions dealing with rural issues--ACROMEC, PROAGRO, etc.--have subunits corresponding to the country's sixteen departamentos. At present, the departamentos are too weak to participate actively in making and implementing plans, which creates a risk of dependency on central structures. I will discuss this delicate situation further in Section 7.

For 1981, the levels and proportions of investments per

departamento have been changed considerably to produce a more even development of the country's different regions. This decision must be assessed not only in economic terms, but also within a more inclusive socio-political framework.

#### 4. The Municipios (Municipalities)

The municipio is probably the territorial unit with which Nicaraguans most identify. The revolution's triumph therefore created strong expectations that conditions would be improved through them. Municipal Juntas of Reconstruction were established by a government decree on January 31, 1980. In this law the political and administrative territorial divisions of Nicaragua were maintained but SAMU--a new institution dealing with municipal affairs--was created.

Our diagnosis summarizes the conditions of Nicaragua's present 136 municipios. Here we can see some of the tasks confronting new and pre-existing institutions. The imbalances that prevailed before the civil war persist, except in those cities receiving special war-damage relief. Since these imbalances are the result of historical patterns, they will not be easily changed. The municipalities facing the most critical problems include the capital Managua, where 43 percent of the total urban population is concentrated, the municipalities in the Atlantic Zone departments (Rio San Juan and Zelaya), where a special agency, the Nicaraguan Institute for the Atlantic Zone (INNICA), exists, and the "martyr cities" of Esteli, Matagalpa, Leon, Chinandega, Nivas and Masaya, which are all in the Central and

Pacific Zones. This last set of municipalities has received substantial assistance from international donors.

In most of these hard-pressed municipalities, the local governments have been overwhelmed by the nature and volume of their problems. The central government's direct involvement has therefore been necessary. The important question is whether this is a transitory situation during which local governments are being strengthened or whether it will continue after reconstruction. The answer will depend on how municipal institutions evolve.

#### 5. The Municipalidades (Municipal Governments)

The municipalidad is the institutional unit of Nicaraguan local government. Each municipal-government unit is presided over by a Municipal Junta of Reconstruction (JMR). The Law of January 31, 1981, provides for a moderate extension of the traditional functions of the municipalidades, but, as our diagnosis points out, most of them are limited by their financial capabilities. The meager budgetary resources of most municipalidades will not sustain even modest levels of personnel adequately.

To correct this serious problem, three kinds of remedies are being applied:

a.) Tax reform, or the more efficient use of existing local taxation authority. Tax rates for the various departamentos and within the municipios of each departamento are being equalized, and new efforts are being made to collect previously unpaid

taxes. Preliminary figures show an improvement in local tax collection, but this will not cover all the costs of municipal development.

b.) New municipal enterprises. These are usually confiscated somocista properties or investments that are now being used to satisfy specific local needs and create employment and which may eventually be used to generate income for the municipalities.

c.) The transfer of funds from the central government via SAMU. This is a temporary way to let the municipalidades develop the human resources and technical capacity necessary for performing their regular functions. This is certainly an important support mechanism at present, and specific foreign aid, primarily from the World Bank, is being earmarked for this purpose.

#### 6. The Municipal Juntas of Reconstruction (JMRs)

To cover emergency needs, some JMRs were established before the end of the war in areas already freed from Somoza's control. After the revolution, the new government created more JMRs to help revive municipal governments by using political and technical assistance. Many were functioning by the end of 1979.

Most Juntas consist of a three-member body (five in the case of cabeceras departamentales) whose responsibilities and operating procedures are defined in the January 1980 law. The participation of persons "involved in the previous regime's corruption" is prohibited by Article 5.

The Law and the creation of SAMU have helped legitimate the JMKS as well as establish proper channels of coordination with central-government institutions and programs. The conditions under which the JMKS were installed, together with the demanding nature of their functions, have led to a high turnover in their membership, a problem that persists to some extent, although SAMU is giving it special attention. The quality and efficiency of the different JMRs vary greatly. In general, however, their members can count on at least some support from the local population, based on the fact that they are well-known and respected community members and certainly are not the traditional representatives of previous local elites. In fact, the JMRs have been called "the face of the Revolution."

Even so, the municipalidades need more than popular support and good will to deliver the services people expect. The municipios' lack of money and expertise, in particular, has hampered their effectiveness. To help them deal with their inadequate funding, SAMU has subsidized the salaries of the Junta coordinadores (the members of each JMR who assumed the role of Junta coordinator), who earn only US \$150.00 per month. Certain other problems, however, still lack specific solutions. Some of the more poorly equipped JMRs have had trouble handling the bureaucratic and sometimes excessively demanding nature of central government procedures and controls. Relying on the Junta in the cabecera departamental to transmit instructions to the rest of the municipal Juntas in the department has created some difficulties. SAMU and the central government are presently seeking remedies to

these particular problems.

## 7. Mechanisms of Departmental Coordination

The pace of reconstruction has stimulated the development of institutions to coordinate national and local efforts, to diminish overlapping functions and to develop mutual support at the local level. Three organizations deserve brief comment here: 1.) the Intermunicipal Leagues; 2.) the Program Committees of Regional Coordination; and 3.) the Departmental Councils.

In the various Intermunicipal Leagues, each JMR belonging to a specific departamento is represented by its coordinador. The Leagues' objectives are to encourage the exchange of information and experiences, to facilitate cooperation and to develop common initiatives vis-a-vis the central government. Although SAMU's participation in the Leagues appears necessary, it has not always been present and effective.

The Program Committees of Regional Coordination (CPCRs) have been conceived as means to integrate regional planning at the departmental level. They include a participant from the cabecera departamental Junta, a delegate from the central Planning Ministry (MIPLAN), representatives from specific government agencies, and delegates from popular base organizations. In most departments, there are five CPCRs--one each for Internal Trade, Infrastructure, Industry, Agriculture and Social Development. Each CPCr apparently coordinates government investment within a given sector at the local level.

The third body, the Departmental Council (CD), has a similar composition but includes a representative from the departmental committee of the Sandinista Front for National Liberation (FSLN). Its main role appears to be coordinating CPR activities at the departmental level.

This network of coordination is currently being tested. The diagnosis points out several problems. Activities are concentrated in the cabeceras departamentales, to the exclusion of the other municipalities in each department. Decision-making authority and the role of the central government delegates sitting on these coordinating bodies are unclear. What has arisen is a classic linkage problem. Somehow, the Intermunicipal Leagues must present their plans to the central government in an effective manner, and well-informed and authorized CPRs and CDs must act as effective coordinating and decision-making bodies in a decentralized manner. Accomplishing this is obviously difficult. SAMU will have to play a key role in developing a well-balanced structure to facilitate the necessary central-to-local and local-to-central interactions. Our Project intends to monitor and assist developments in this critical area.

#### 8. The Secretariat of Municipal Affairs (SAMU)

SAMU constitutes one of the most interesting elements of the Municipal System within the context of the Nicaraguan post-revolutionary process. This is because SAMU has expanded its responsibilities from an initial role of helping constitute the juntas municipales throughout the country to its present role of

providing technical and financial support to municipal governments. SAMU began as an organ of the Interior Ministry with a staff of only two persons. By October, 1979, it had become an institution with ministerial rank and direct responsibility to the Government Junta of National Reconstruction (JGRN). Its staff was expanded. Personnel from the previous Departamento de Desarrollo Municipal (DEMU) were assigned to it, and new positions were created. During 1980 and early 1981, SAMU has centered its efforts on providing financial and administrative services to the municipalidades and the JMRs. It has financed over 30 projects for markets, slaughterhouses, city halls, etc. It has also given 16 training courses in different departamentos to upgrade the skills of municipal personnel.

So far, SAMU has been guided by the general norms included in the January 1980 Law for the JMRs and by an anteproyecto (draft) of its Organic Law, which defined its main functions. A brief analysis of its internal structure at the beginning of 1981 helps illustrate what sort of work it does. It has four technical Direcciones (directorates): 1.) the Direccion de Proyectos y Asesoría (Project Planning and Advising Office, or DPPA), which is split into a Division de Arquitectura e Ingeniería (Architecture and Engineering Division, or DAI), and a Division de Planeamiento y Asesoría (Planning and Advising Division, or DPA); 2.) the Direccion Financiera (Finances Division); 3.) the Direccion de Legislacion y Organizacion (Legal and Organizational Division); and 4.) the Direccion de Relaciones con el Gobierno Central (Central Government Relations Division). These four

divisions are coordinated by a Secretary (Minister) and an Undersecretary (Vice Minister).

Both the SAMU executives and our team feel this organization should be changed soon. The following is a summary of the diagnosis's analysis of each Direccion's experiences.

The DPPA has been giving technical support through the DAI to the municipios in response to their demands. This situation is changing toward a more planned approach in which the other division, the DPA, submits proposals. Some activities, such as urban planning, have not yet been initiated. Meanwhile, the DPA has been designing strategies and programs for short-, medium- and long-term municipal development, preparing municipal budgets, training municipal personnel in law, accounting and finance, analyzing local needs and collecting demographic and socioeconomic statistics. Some of these functions have brought the DPA into close contact with the local JMRs. The DPA has absorbed a heavy load of problems and demands even in areas properly pertaining to other branches of SAMU, which suggests the need for clarification of responsibilities or additional personnel.

The Finances Division and the DPPA have some overlapping functions. These have arisen through the Division's role in providing municipalidades with funds for salaries and other purposes, through its responsibility for supervising the financial aspects of municipal programs and through its efforts to exercise financial control over SAMU's projects.

The Legal and Organizational Division began its work about three months after SAMU was created. It deals with municipal rights and problems with tax collection, recovery of municipal land, and new legislation and regulations. This last task is particularly complex because of the special circumstances operating since the end of the previous regime.

The Central Government Relations Directorate has assumed a unique and delicate role mediating between the JMRs with their many demands for services and the different central agencies. In the beginning JMR representatives frequently visited Managua, where Division personnel helped them make the necessary contacts in the central ministries. Later, with the introduction of the Intermunicipal Leagues and other regional structures, these trips decreased. Now, however, SAMU must be actively present at the departmental level.

The Administrative Division oversees all the other structures of SAMU and is under the direct supervision of the Secretary and the Undersecretary. This division must address SAMU's clear need for better administrative procedures.

The executive officials of SAMU, it should be noted, were extremely helpful with the diagnosis's preparation. They consistently supported our team's work and provided a clear perspective on SAMU's need to improve in its key role as advocate and promoter of municipal development.

## 9. A General Assessment of SAMU

Some important considerations have clearly appeared throughout this review of SAMU's structure and functions. To begin with, SAMU has been properly perceived by the JMRs as their main means of support. SAMU's response, considering its lack of experience and resources, has been generally very effective in areas like municipal projects, investment and personnel training. But their activities have almost always been reactions to immediate demands and problems. SAMU still lacks an overall strategy and needs to design better information and control procedures. Last January, some of these problems were internally analyzed. SAMU's inadequate inter-divisional coordination, its insufficient participation in municipal affairs, and its budgetary constraints were given special attention. Its need to develop a better relationship with other central government institutions was also noted. SAMU now appears to be the key coordinator of central and municipal efforts in local development.

The diagnosis concludes with some basic recommendations concerning the central government's commitment to decentralization. It strongly recommends formulating a municipal-development policy which involves SAMU and other institutions in this aspect of development. The diagnosis also points out the country's regional disparities and the need to strengthen local government's administrative, technical, economic and political capabilities. Finally, it suggests methods for developing local organizations that will make municipal development beneficial for

all sectors of Nicaraguan society.

C. Second Phase of the SAMU/INCAE/UC Berkeley Project on Municipal Development in Nicaragua: April-July 1981

The original agreement with INCAE and SAMU (included as Appendix 2 in my February Trip Report) called for a workshop following the preparation of a preliminary diagnosis of Nicaragua's municipal system. During my April visit, I had several meetings with both INCAE and SAMU executives to define the project's next stages. Many new factors had emerged. Reflecting the dynamic change in Nicaraguan national policy, the government now planned to increase SAMU's personnel substantially, an important factor for the future of the institution and the municipal system as a whole.

After some discussion, the parties involved in the project all agreed to a program for the second phase of the project that encompassed stages 3, 4 and 5 of the original agreement with some modifications. This second phase will consist of three main elements: 1.) work preliminary to developing a municipal-development policy; 2.) support to SAMU for possible modifications in its present structure to make it conform to the emerging municipal-development policy; and 3.) strengthening the municipal system. These three elements will be supported by field work carried out in some six departamentos during April, May and June and directed toward enriching the project's understanding of the organizational, financial and participatory capacities and limitations of Nicaragua's local government. This field work will require

considerable SAMU participation, but its increased staffing will make that possible. What follows is a brief description of the expected main contents of each element.

1. Antecedents for a Policy of Municipal Development

The diagnosis of the present municipal system in Nicaragua emphasizes the need for a comprehensive and coherent policy of municipal development. Such a policy should describe:

- a.) its conceptual framework;
- b.) inter-institutional linkages and relations;
- c.) the existing judicial system and emerging legislation;
- d.) municipal financial resources, internal and assigned;
- e.) human and technical resources;
- f.) regional, rural and urban contexts;
- g.) institutions for popular representation and participation; and
- h.) municipal administration.

Progress in elucidating these eight areas will depend substantially on SAMU's contribution, especially from top-level personnel. Once the basic studies in these areas are completed, consultation will take place with the affected government institutions, municipal officials and base organizations. Of course, progress in each area will probably be uneven, and the ratification of a comprehensive policy in the near future cannot be assured. This work should, however, help SAMU improve its direction and coordination of municipal-development activities.

## 2. Review of SAMU's Organization and Operations

Many, if not all, of the above parts of a municipal-development policy are already among SAMU's concerns. In fact, the more SAMU commits itself to stimulating local initiatives and coordinating them with central policies, the more it must commit itself to policy analysis. We have already helped SAMU analyze its organizational and operational arrangements at various levels. We began with an immediate review of the actual structure of SAMU. Based on this review, SAMU's personnel will try to systemize and strengthen the institution's activities. These efforts are important because SAMU is at a juncture where the success of most short-term municipal programs will depend on its ability during the following months to provide the needed direction and/or coordination.

## 3. Strengthening the Municipal System

The above two elements of the second phase pose the risk of overly centralizing municipal development by expanding the central government's grip on most factors affecting the municipios' future. The problem here is not how to avoid central governmental involvement. Under the present circumstances, that would be illogical. The problem is rather how to develop a reciprocal involvement on the part of the municipalidades so that they will share responsibilities and decision-making authority. This will require carefully balanced action but will be the measure of SAMU's success.

The experience of other countries in this difficult area shows that even when central and local public officials share the same goals, their perceptions of particular issues can differ greatly. We believe that simultaneous measures to strengthen the municipalidades must be taken as part of an explicit municipal development policy and as part of immediate training and support activities. The project therefore includes a field-research element, notwithstanding considerations that argue for concentrating on SAMU itself.

#### 4. Specific Work on Selected Municipalities

The diagnosis contends that national laws and policies are really tested at the level of municipal practice. Some policies may be followed, others ignored, depending on how well they take local conditions into account. To study this problem, one needs to do field work.

In our field work we intend to consider a specific set of questions for a representative sample of municipios. Presumably, we will find variations in the coordination of central government initiatives, the relative efficiency of the municipalidades, and the involvement of the people in community activities. To assess qualitative differences within the departamento, we will analyze both a cabecera departamental (the "head" municipality in each department) and a smaller municipio. To assess qualitative differences within the departamento, the selection of the particular departamentos will be completed during April and will take into account SAMU's priorities and the availability of personnel.

The results of this field work should enable SAMU to tailor its policies to local conditions. Contact with local realities should also help identify areas for further applied research and action, some of which may be germane to the project's goals and therefore worth pursuing.

D) Some Tentative Remarks

As the analysis in this Trip Report suggests, I believe that local government in Nicaragua has already moved toward a "consolidation" stage. Of course, this is based on limited and fragmentary evidence collected during my brief visits and on the Downs-Perez diagnosis summarizing six intensive weeks of analysis. Even so, I believe one can see a pattern of progress toward the revitalization of municipal life, a pattern that is becomingly increasingly clear through such indicators as the steady growth of municipal income in most municipalidades, the changes in tax schedules (planes de arbitrios), the frequency of training seminars, intermunicipal meetings and other interactive events, and the development of SAMU as a stimulator of local development. Obviously, considerable activity surrounds municipal affairs in Nicaragua.

At the same time I believe that some critical issues will arise in the near future, partly as a direct consequence of the government's emphasis on municipal development, but also partly as a result of contextual factors beyond the control of the municipalidades or even SAMU itself.

1. The Timing of the Reconstruction Effort

Periods following dramatic events such as natural disasters or revolutions are often characterized by exceptional activity, involvement and investment. The public sector assumes exceptional power and responsibilities, but the entire population also mobilizes previously unknown resources to overcome the immediate problems that affect most if not all people. The international community manages to deliver human, technical and material aid of consideration magnitude, usually on generous terms. For a time the concurrence of such factors produces a vibrant rhythm that hopefully will endure long enough to permit the country to advance toward a higher level of social development. Usually, however, this is not the case. Once the immediate emergencies have been more or less successfully faced, life returns to a sort of business-as-usual state. This is true particularly in those cases where the crisis does not follow any structural or historical effort to modify the country's basic foundation. The society merely shows the flexibility necessary to adapt to or absorb the main effects of the crisis.

In the case of Nicaragua, the very severe physical and human cost of the civil war has been accompanied by a whole set of ideological, social and political factors. Nicaragua is involved not just in rebuilding after a disaster, but also in creating the basis for a more just society. This second aspect is the best guarantee of a long and persistent period of "social reconstruction."

Obviously, Nicaragua faces formidable difficulties. With regard to decentralization and local development, the transition from an emergency situation toward a more planned municipal-development effort raises certain questions. Are we, for example, looking at the beginnings of a municipal-development policy or are we simply seeing the final stages of an emergency period, which will be followed by a decline in municipal efforts? We must examine Nicaragua from a national perspective to shed light on such a question.

## 2. A Period of Fiscal Retrenchment

The very difficult conditions that Nicaragua faced in July 1979 required a mobilization of the country's resources to restore the level of economic activity to that of previous years and from there to develop the productive and social forces considered most important for the population's well-being. Some impressive progress is evident and recognized by observers both inside and outside the country.

For Nicaragua, 1981 seems to be an even more difficult year. Again, without elaborating on the complex causes of this situation, it appears that both external and internal factors have created a climate of uncertainty in Nicaragua. This probably explains the government's cautious "austerity program." If we extrapolate from the experience of other countries, Nicaragua will need to concentrate its efforts in the economy's key productive areas while postponing many social expenditures. Considering the nature of the government's bases of support, however, it

may choose to do otherwise even though it may have fewer resources for municipal development. It will have to find non-economic ways to compensate for this shortage.

### 3. The Popular Character of the Nicaraguan Process

While I am assuming some relative constraints on municipal development as a result of the factors already mentioned, I believe that the level of popular involvement in both the civil war and now the post-revolutionary period has been of such intensity that the situation poses opportunities as well as problems for the central government. The regime needs not only to maintain but to expand its bases of popular support. Since easy material rewards are not available, the only other realistic way to secure massive support during this period of austerity is to involve the population in the presentation, choice and implementation of new social and economic programs. The municipal level of government offers an important institutional channel for this effort.

### 4. SAMU: The Test of Using a Central Institution for Local Development

Born without a clear structure or specific policies, SAMU has grown rapidly in response to both national and local demands. SAMU is now approaching a level of internal organization, experience and power where some risks and options should be considered. Bureaucratism is possible if routines and personnel are consolidated in such a way that they later resist needed transformations

and eventually hinder the development of municipal governments. Similarly, SAMU could enter into competition with other national bodies, ministries, corporations, etc., whose responsibilities may overlap with those of SAMU in some areas of local interest. In fairness, this does not yet appear to be the case. SAMU has been supported by both the municipios and the other agencies within the central government. But for the future, the sooner a clear municipal-development policy is developed and SAMU's role is defined, the better the chances are for a rather exceptional case of well-balanced decentralization. This is, I think, one of SAMU's immediate concerns and a need which our Project must monitor with special care in the coming months. Here, our field work will be invaluable, since it will permit us to assess the effects of the present municipal-assistance efforts at the grass-roots level.

#### E. Acknowledgments

Even though I consider most of the contents of this Trip Report a result of my own reading of the Nicaraguan situation, I have relied heavily on information provided by the Nicaraguan authorities, the USAID Mission in Nicaragua and my colleagues Andres Perez and Charles Downs. Back in Berkeley, the UCB Project members again have been very cooperative and interested in our progress, particularly Kenneth Phillips, Richard Harris and Manuel Castells.