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POLITICAL VARIABLES AND FOOD AND FOOD PRICE POLICY IN WEST AFRICA

By

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June 1980

Paper prepared for the United States
Agency for International Development/
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Political Variables and Food and Food Price Policy
In West Africa

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Initialed Abbreviations Used in Text

CMB	Cocoa Marketing Board
COMASUPO	Compania Nacional de Subsistencias Populares, National Staple Products Co.
CRED	Center for Research on Economic Development
FAO	Food and Agricultural Organization
IFPRI	International Food Policy Research Institute
LBA	Licensed Buying Agents
LDC	Less Developed Country
ONCAD	Office National de Cooperation et d'Assistance pour le Developpement, National Office of Cooperation and Assistance for Development
OPAM	Office des Produits Agricoles du Mali, Malian Office of Agricultural Products
OPVN	Office des Produits Vivriers du Niger, Office of Agricultural Products of Niger
ORD	Organismes Regionals du Developpement, Regional Development Organizations
USDA	US Department of Agriculture
WARDA	West African Rice Development Association

SUMMARY

This study examines a limited cross section of economists' writings pertaining to food and food price policy, evaluating their treatment of political variables influencing policy choice and implementation. This literature is all revelant to the production and distribution of food staples in West Africa, and particularly the role of the public sector. However, the subjects range broadly from debates concerning international food security systems and particular institutions in developed and less developed countries (e.g., marketing boards) to highly specific feasibility studies (e.g., rice production in a particular African state). The literature review is organized to proceed from the general to the specific, starting with the international system, moving to LDC's (Less Developed Countries), and then to the West African context. The literature discussed is thus grouped as follows:

I. International Food Crisis and LDC's

A. Basic Human Needs Approach and Other Writing from International Food Policy Research Institute.

B. "National and International Grain Reserves": U.S. Dept. of Agriculture (USDA) Conference Proceedings.

C. "Food for Development": AID Position Paper (treating the international food crisis, its impact on LDC's, and proposed solutions).

II. Food Marketing and Marketing Boards

A. "Improving Food Marketing in Latin America": AID Contracted Study by Michigan State University.

B. Marketing Boards in Developed and Underdeveloped Countries
(former making recommendations for modernization of food marketing structures in three Latin American countries; latter describing and prescribing various types of marketing boards and illustrating fiscal and political differences between marketing boards in Canada, Australia, etc., and LDC's such as Nigeria.)

III. Food Policy Studies of West Africa

A. "Rice Production in West Africa": West African Rice Development Association (WARDA) and Stanford Food Research Institute Study.

B. "Marketing, Price Policy and Storage of Food Grains in the Sahel": AID financed study for Club du Sahel/CILSS (Club International pour la Lutte contre La Secheresse au Sahel; International Club for the Fight against the Sahel Drought) by Center for Research on Economic Development (CRED), University of Michigan.

IV. Free Market Solutions to West African Food Policy Problems

A. Selected articles advocating liberalization of marketing structures, illustrative of economists' advocacy of free market reform where extensive state intervention is currently practiced.

Chapter One assesses the economists' arguments to determine the extent and adequacy of their political analysis. It finds that these policy critiques and recommendations generally fail to include any political considerations, although, in some instances, an "enlightened long term political rationality" is implied. Typically, these analyses overlook political forces highly likely to impinge upon and distort, or even block, the implementation of the policies proposed.

Chapter Two discusses whether and how political science can inform a political feasibility analysis which would ensure more realizable project and policy design. Thus Chapter Two necessarily includes a commentary and critique concerning the relevance of political scientists' work to the problem of policy design at hand. Thus following a summary listing of the five theses extracted from the literature review in Chapter One, subsequently elaborated in sequence, is a lengthy note on three pertinent areas of political science:

A) a critique of one recent school of political economy seeking an integrated model of political and economic optimality which this study rejects in favor of a less ambitious analysis of political constraints on proposed policies;

B) a comment on the usefulness and possible adaptation of recent work on public policy by students of American politics. This work recognizes and explores the very significant role of the executive branch and its subsidiary bureaucratic branches and agencies in the actual design as well as implementation of public policy. The correlation of distributive, regulative, and redistributive policies with distinctive political processes

and interest group patterns elaborated by Lowi is particularly germane. Also relevant is Lindblom's argument that a vision of centrally designed and coordinated public planning must yield to more realistic expectations of disjointed incrementalism which requires planners to readjust goals and means continuously as the policy process unfolds.

C) a note on the tendency of students of comparative politics (and thus of African politics) generally to seek broad distinctions between system types at the expense of detailed study of the policy process. Comparativists' broad distinctions between pluralist interest group politics and both corporatist politics and patron-client politics must be taken into account if American-based frameworks are to be adapted for political analysis of West Africa.

Frequent reference is made to this commentary on political science as well as the literature review and critique (Chapter One) in the remaining sections of Chapter Two. This final portion of the report elaborates the five theses extracted from Chapter One. These five theses fall into two groups: the first three concern specific aspects of the economic literature reviewed in Chapter One considered to be politically unsound, while the fourth and fifth focus on what an adequate political feasibility analysis would entail:

I. Designating a government's policy goals and prioritizing those goals is empirically unsound because it conveys an orderly deductive process which ill describes how policy is actually made. Policy typically emerges through an incremental process in which different parties both pursue dissimilar interests and have divergent views of policy goals.

II. Radical or extreme reformist redistributive development strategies (to attain equality, avert future famine, aid the

rural poor...) too often ignore political survival requirements of LDC (less developed country) leaders. Policy proposals must take into account a significant constraint on regimes: the maintenance of political support.

III. Proposals for extreme liberalization of economic policy lack political feasibility in some contexts. Actual implementation is more likely if a selective and measured approach to liberalization reflecting the origins, nature and tenacity of state interventionism is taken. Also, analysts should recall the varied historical paths to economic development, including notable successes such as the more statist Prussian model as well as the more liberal Anglo-American model.

These first three theses all emphasize the need for policy and project design reflecting a far greater awareness and knowledge of policy-making processes in the specified political context. Sections IV and V put forth and elaborate the guidelines of such an analysis.

IV. Interest group analysis is the framework proposed for anticipating how the policy selection and implementation process will effect a given project or policy. Such an analysis must go beyond the economists' projected impact of specified policies upon specified groups, to assess the variable political cohesion, organization and political access differentiating groups, the role of competing bureaucratic interests, and the nature of historical coalitions shaping group interests and goals. Such an analysis necessarily projects the response of relevant political interests to the policy proposal in question from their past political behavior. Thus feasibility studies entail the application to the appropriate context of formulations of interest group analysis (such as an adaptation of Theodore Lowi's work on policy types and the political process).

V. Institutional capacity, regarding parastatals and public corporations as well as public administrative structures, must be incorporated into policy and project design. A sketch of the dialogue between political science and public administration in the American context and in developing areas reveals many divergent trends, which have not produced a coherent body of tested theory to inform policy and project design. Thus the much needed guidance in institutional innovation must make selective use of this diverse literature; incremental gains in administrative capacity should be sought through micro-level change.

This study argues that political variables so significantly alter the selection and implementation of policy that policy

and project design can neither ignore them nor relegate them to subsidiary status. It does not undertake a feasibility analysis of any specific policy, but rather uses numerous West African examples to illustrate how political variables impinge on the policy process in this context. It also seeks to convey why and how political scientists' research on politics in the US, in LDC's, and specifically in Africa, informs or fails to inform the guidelines for political feasibility analysis which is the subject of this essay. Based on this overview of the discipline, the essay argues that a selective adaptation of specified political frameworks and analytic perspectives best serves our present purpose. Thus both a broad grounding in political science and a sound knowledge of politics in West Africa become the basis of informed judgments regarding probable political constraints on West African food policies.

POLITICAL VARIABLES AND FOOD AND FOOD PRICE POLICY IN WEST AFRICA

This study assesses a limited portion of the literature relevant to food policy and food price policy, with regard to its treatment of political variables influencing policy choice and implementation in West Africa. It argues that political variables are inadequately analysed in that literature: the perspective of economic optimality for the entire society is usually adopted, although an enlightened long term political rationality is sometimes implied. Five theses identified in the discussion of specific economists' works in Chapter One are elaborated in Chapter Two: 1) Over-schematic conceptualization of government's policy goals and priorities, 2) radical redistributive reformulations of development strategy neglecting real political constraints upon LDC governments, 3) low political feasibility of extreme liberalization proposed for relatively interventionist states, 4) the need for interest group analysis to inform political feasibility, and 5) the significance of institutional capacity in proposal design, and possible guidance from social science regarding institutional innovation.

Chapter Two attempts to integrate the explication of these themes of political critique with an accurate appraisal of how adequately and usefully the relevant analytic problems have been treated within the discipline of political science. Not a tour d'horizon of the entire discipline, the essay sketches and evaluates political scientists' treatment of interest groups' political influence, public policy and national planning,

public administration and bureaucracy with regard to their existing or potential application to food policy in West Africa. Chapter Two argues that students of American politics have achieved greater theoretical and methodological precision, while comparativists' great concern with typologizing national systems makes clear the need for adaptation when exporting analytic tools from the US to West Africa. Analysts need to borrow cautiously, and to adapt, because political scientists' research on the topic at hand, i.e., studies of public policy formulation and implementation in West Africa, are extremely few, and due to formidable barriers in data access, tend to be empirically weak. Thus, this essay has not offered a political analysis of food policy in West Africa, but offers West African examples to illustrate why and how political variables should be incorporated explicitly into policy formulation and implementation. It indicates the direction which political feasibility analysis can and should take, rather than offer a model or precise scheme for such an analysis. It also emphasizes the judgmental and inferential leap required to move from analysis based on necessarily very imperfect knowledge of the past political process regarding public policy (or more specifically food price questions), to prediction of the political forces likely to impinge upon, distort and redefine a proposed food policy or project.

CHAPTER ONE - Review of Political Analysis in Selected Literature on Food Price Policy (with particular reference to West Africa)

This literature review treats a very limited selection

of readily available material on topics relevant to food and food price policy in West Africa. It is not a systematic sample, nor a representative one. Our commentary and judgment are necessarily based on the particular works of the authors under review. However, they should be read as comments whose generalizability could and should be tested, rather than statements about particular individuals or research teams.

All of the literature is by professional economists, trained largely to evaluate the impact of different policy alternatives upon a range of specified material goals: increased production, distribution of benefits, etc. As such, the central focus of their work is not policy impact on political goals (political stability, popular participation, democracy, etc.). Nor is the feasibility or acceptability of policy alternatives typically evaluated in the light of key or influential political actors' willingness to support and implement given recommendations. Indeed, the economists' professional assumption is largely that governments are actors who seek specified economic goals in the public interest and that such actors are single purposed and capable of the implementation required.

The literature review does not evaluate the authors' economic expertise. Nor does it discount the importance or relevance of economists' working assumptions. But it does ask what kinds of political variables are likely to distort or block the actual adoption and implementation of policy recommendations. The central question is whether policy recommendations would be different if it were recognized

(1) that policy making is a process involving competing goals and numerous actors with varied private and public goals, many not more but less attuned to the "Collective Good" and (2) that implementation takes place via agencies equally characterized by diverse and divergent goals, as well as limited capabilities. Chapter One reviews the economists' writing in this light. Chapter Two discusses explicitly whether and how the professional assumptions and activities of political scientists might enhance policy design with reference to food policy for West African states.

It will become apparent that much economic analysis is guided by a choice to avoid the evident vagaries of how governments select and implement policies. The implicit qualifying phrase "if government were a single minded and effective actor" is thus recognizably something of a hortatory statement, and the subsequent economic analysis an educative effort regarding a specific and presumably better way to make public policy decisions. Thus failure to address a vast and indefinite range of "political" considerata is not an oversight. It is a strategic choice.

An alternative strategy is to anticipate ways the politics of policy formulation and implementation continuously redefine goals and alters outcome. This essay does not take the optimistic view that a workable decision-making model fully integrating political and economic optimality is currently available. But anticipation of political constraints can nonetheless guide policy choice. Thus this essay seeks to suggest the political reasons why the recommendation

of the economists' work under review are unlikely to be realized. Chapter One opens the analysis of economists' writings with questions and caveats; Chapter Two asks to what extent and how political considerata can be analyzed in a way that improves policy selection and implementation. In short, if Pandora's box is to be opened, how does the analyst, and more important, the policy architect, cope with its contents?

I. The International Food Crisis and Development Strategy for LDC's

A. The Basic Human Needs Approach and Other Writings from the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).

The small sample of articles from IFPRI serves as a starting point, because it provides an overview of the present and future situation regarding world food production and barriers to economic development in LDC's. A survey of world staple food production trends ("Food Needs of Developing Countries: Prospects of Production and Consumption to 1990") documents the grim expectations for increasing shortfalls in West African countries. As such, it sounds an alarm to all who influence national food policies in those countries, and to all members of the world community able to provide food stocks through famine aid and/or sale, as well as assistance to increase food staple production in West Africa. Such compilations of data are a plea for recognition and farsightedness: they are prescriptive statements directed to policy makers, designed to gain high priority among multiple demands.

John Mellor (director of IFPRI) elaborates the Basic

human needs approach to economic development, combining (1) an analysis of the failure of current and past developmental strategies and (2) recommendations for new priorities guided by acceptance of specified relationships between income generation and development (Mellor). The author remains silent on the different developmental outcomes possible, and the variable place of famine avoidance in these strategies. The implied reasoning is that any LDC decision maker desires economic development, whether moved by self-interest, political survival, nationalism, or humanitarianism. The apparent exposition of "facts" and relationships constitute an argument. In this sense, the writings are highly prescriptive, espousing certain ends and means.

Mellor's public advocacy in these writings appears directed principally at American leaders who are presumably able, if willing, to influence developmental options and constraints Thus, the author seeks to alter international resource allocation so that LDC leaders will be able, or will be constrained, to pursue his recommended strategies. Anticipating the criticism of particular American groups, he cautions American legislators that successful strategies in LDC's may require a trade off with civil liberties. He also warns of another potential burden for donor states: if policies which increase income among the poor are pursued successfully, food demand will increase. Thus the author attempts to educate his audience of American legislators of the political consequences of policies which he believes must be pursued if basic human needs in LDC's are to be met.

The rhetorical and didactic aspects of the IFPRI articles are striking. However there is a danger that donors (the articles' primary audience) can be more easily persuaded by humanitarian imperatives than can the recipients of aid. This is not to impute base corruption to leaders of recipient states, but rather recognizes their concern with political survival. The Basic Human Needs approach appears to make heavy political demands upon its converts, as well as to over-tax the state's institutional capacity to implement required policies. Yet political viability is a crucial question, because policy aimed at economic betterment of lower strata has an implied political rationale (political empowerment due to increased economic resources, political efficacy, organizational experience and resources) as well as economic and humanitarian ones. Perhaps the (enlightened) West is intended to alter LDC's constraints or opportunities by their economic assistance programs. However such an implied argument is not persuasive: the political viability of the Basic Human Needs approach needs to be considered directly. The policy analyst must address the problems facing decision-makers: why might they adopt and implement the proposed strategy and how can they gain political support or compliance?

In "The Welfare Implications of Grain Price Stabilization," Konandreas and Schmitz of IFPRI argue that US consumers and producers would benefit from domestic price stabilization (Konandreas and Schmitz). However this results in great instability for the rest of the world (witness the EEC's inflexible price policy which keeps domestic demand down when

world production is high, thus encouraging international sale of European grain and pushing world prices even lower. They conclude that international cooperation is needed to harmonize pricing policies and administration of adequate grain reserves. Again the essential political prerequisites pose a formidable barrier: national leadership must escape or manage the pressures of national groups to achieve stability in the international interest. This and other articles addressing national food price policy, international markets and the international political system all grapple implicitly with the imperatives of long range, "enlightened national interest." But supplying food staples to LDC's and averting famine can be expected, sadly, to elicit political obstacles of considerable proportions.

B. "National (US) and International Grain Reserves": US Dept. of Agriculture (USDA) Conference Proceedings

All of the papers on national (US) and international grain reserves in the USDA conference proceedings (Eaton and Steele, compilers) entail an (economic) analysis of how adequately the free market provides food supplies for famine relief. Some also discuss why LDC leaders will seek seriously to protect themselves from a food crisis. Hathaway argues that national leaders must protect themselves and their countries against the political disaster (in Eaton and Steele, p. 1, ff.) of a foreign exchange drain, wage-price spirals, loss of farm capital (livestock), and rural migration precipitated by great food production shortfalls. Leaders must, in the absence

of some international insurance system, seek to meet their own food security needs at great cost. Thus a disaster insurance system provides the best (least costly) protection with the least distortion to the market. Hathaway's proposed disaster insurance system has the advantage (over price stabilization) of minor intrusion into market mechanisms affecting food production. Exporters need only agree to supply the insured with needed amounts. But presumably this obligation must be absolute, not affected by the exporters' particular domestic supply and demand situation. This raises a potential political dilemma which the exporter and insuror must resolve to the detriment of the domestic producer, or taxpayer, when the insured state faces an internal shortage. A nation's greater wealth does not diminish domestic politics of self interest.

Sumner and Johnson, advocating grain reserves, note the political considerations which must enter the calculus regarding the amount and locale of buffer stocks (in Eaton and Steele, p. 56, ff.). Barriers to rapid and reasonable transport are infrastructural, geographic and political, the authors note, but they leave the nature of the calculus uncertain. Presumably existing trade barriers are easily identifiable. But it is more difficult to evaluate the risk to food-poor states that a neighboring state may block stock shipments--perhaps to harass or pressure the importing state, perhaps in response to some internal political pressures. In West Africa, a perennial political issue is <u>who</u> ships imports from the coast--transporters of the coastal states or those of the landlocked

state for which the imports are destined. During the Sahel drought Malian truckers appear to have effectively excluded Ivoirian shippers from the profitable business of trucking grains from Abidjan to Bamako, even though the Malian fleet of trucks was not big enough to do the job.

Several articles focus on the interrelationship between US food price and storage policies and the international system's capability to respond to famine. Cochrane and Danin advocate a reserve stock grain model in which grain prices would be allowed to vary, but in which stabilization objectives and stock decision rules would be known to all, individual firms and governments. Thus a more "fair game" (in Eaton and Steele, p. 77, ff.) would presumably lessen resistance, because it would forestall politically motivated decisions favoring certain parties. The authors state that, while complete agreement on prices and stock release rules would be most effective, there are considerable (political) barriers to such agreement. In some countries, consumer interests, favoring lower target prices, will dominate, while in others, producers will dominate, supporting higher target prices (p. 88). Implicitly the scheme rests upon the achievement of a political agreement sufficiently satisfying to all parties to ensure compliance.

The author's argument for US initiative regarding an international grain reserve (rather than permitting full rein to internal pressures for programs responsive to domestic symptoms) rests on predicted US policy. In periods of sharply rising food and farm prices, the probable political

response is ceiling prices on foods, increased programs to assist the poor, export limitations, and sporadic attacks on monopoly practices of big business and labor in the food industry. When prices fall, the US will maintain or raise commodity loan rates, impose production controls, expand foreign food aid programs and make supplemental income payments to small and medium farmers (p. 90).

Other authors in the volume include some political analysis of US agriculture. Johnson notes urban pressures for low prices (witness the experience of the 1960's) as a political barrier to be (somehow) circumvented in the realization of his proposal (in Eaton and Steele, p. 157, ff). Brandlow goes the farthest in placing food stock policy in the larger American political context (in Eaton and Steele, p. 92, ff.) He underlines the likelihood that reserve stock issues will resuscitate "old controversies about the function and integrity of government," with the "usual clashes of different economic groups, sharply different valuations of food aid and US responsibility abroad" (p. 96). He predicts that many grain producers and the largest American farm organizations will oppose reserve stocks because they oppose government meddling in markets, on the grounds that stocks are used to placate consumers and reduce the average prices to producers (p. 96). Like Cochrane and Danin, he favors reserves with objective rules for stock management, permitting anticipation by the private sector. Brandlow's brief political analysis suggests to political scientists an analysis of the relatively predictable responses of the highly visible and active US agricultural

interest groups on the establishment of such "objective rules."

The international buffer stock question immediately engages both analyses of domestic and international food markets and the political task of interstate agreements with each party procuring political compliance of relevant internal groups. Economists studying the problem generally acknowledge the political task. Indeed they venture tentatively into the analysis of political opposition when they suggest that certain solutions are unacceptable, or qualify their arguments by noting political barriers. But more political analysis is needed. Such interest group politics requires an analysis including factors such as the organizational resources, political alliances and interest priorities of the concerned groups.

C. "Food for Development": AID position paper

"Food for Development: A Food Aid Policy" builds upon new development theory and strategy in which agricultural growth plays a central role. This new departure seeks to correct the harsh experiences of the recent past in which capital intensive urban industrial strategies have not adequately increased employment or growth or forestalled worsening crisis in food staple production. Resembling Mellor's goals and arguments in several regards, this position paper rejects past policies furthering cheap food for urban populations at the cost of lowered incentives for food producers. It also argues that food and agricultural input subsidies have increased inequity among agricultural producers. While recognizing the disastrous role which food aid has played and can play in

depressing domestic agricultural production, the author maintains that food aid and agricultural assistance, can, if correctly used, serve humanitarian needs without discouraging domestic agricultural food production.

Like the IFPRI articles, this policy proposal outlines the widening food gap in numerous countries, implying that anticipated disasters will compel their governments to reorient development strategies to give primacy to agricultural development. As noted above, it is not clear that governments in societies suffering such downward spirals will or can redirect policy or implement the very different programs proposed. The author ventures onto still shakier ground when arguing that food deficit countries will increasingly <u>have</u> to concentrate on the well-being of the poor (Stepanak, p. 6, emphasis mine.) This is questionable, because the threat of civil disorder and overthrow does not clearly come from the poor or starving (see discussion of Joan Nelson, p. 89 below). If indeed the many individuals and groups which make up governments are to be collectively mobilized to respond to pending disaster, the impetus is more likely to come from the politically active and organizationally effective among the not-so-very-poor. (This is discussed below with regard to Diori's overthrow in Niger at the height of the Sahel drought: see p. below.)

"Food for Development" argues for an extensive and central role of (host) governments by "setting policies, providing production inputs and services and supplying food to the poorest in the society" (p. 18). The resulting food policy must encompass incentives for agriculture, stabilize and

increase the income of agricultural producers, as well as achieve humanitarian goals regarding nutrition, health, and starvation.

The document stresses the breadth of the key concept, "food for development" and its dependence upon a specified strategy for growth:

> food for development is not one policy, program or agreement . . . (it) includes each country's total food and agricultural system. Furthermore, unless a developing country is simultaneously pursuing an equitable growth strategy, developmentally-oriented food policies by themselves may not stimulate growth in basic staples, increase rural income or reduce malnutrition." (p. 20, emphasis mine).

While all social scientists like to enumerate endless interconnections, interdependencies and contingencies, a strategy which truly requires a comprehensive assault for even partial success should evoke great reservations. The barriers to implementation of any given aspect of such new departure, are predictably, considerable. It will certainly elicit opposition from interest groups whose favored status will be undermined or threatened by the new order. Also, the bureaucratic (administrative) capability required to attain a given rural development goal (or even the implementation of programs such as free food for the urban poor) has certainly proved wanting thus far in the Sahel. There are great barriers to synoptic and comprehensive planning for any contemporary society, and on even greater barriers to planning in LDC's (see Caidan and Wildavsky). Therefore, a strategy which does not permit partial gains and incremental successes seems foolhardy.

This reservation must be sharpened in light of the (implied)

political radicalism of the proposal: giving high priority to a previously low priority sector, seeking food and work for the rural poor, circumventing private distributors to distribute free food to the very poor . . . these are not activities to be welcomed by the elite and middle strata which have enjoyed privileged access to public goods. Implementation will be foreseeably difficult.

Like any food policy proposal, this one must negotiate the Scylla and Charybdis of public bureaucracies (including parastatals and public corporations), and their aspirations for increased effectiveness and/or control, on the one hand, and the competing interests of the private sector on the other. The characteristic American predisposition for private sector solutions is particularly pronounced at present. "Food for Development" speaks to this preference by arguing that the private sector is efficient, and thus government should "guide and control rather than supplant (it)" (p. 29). It recommends that the public sector should effect the market via credit and foreign exchange regulations, improved rural infrastructure and removal of commercial grain storage and shipment restrictions. Administrative agencies in recipient states will hopefully accept such indirect policy action, as they will be rewarded by more active "guiding" roles in food price stabilization. Government grain stocks may be sold on the open market and government (purchases) at harvest must follow announced ceiling and floor prices (p. 29). A substantial role can be reserved for the private sector, while government activity (having

pacified urban consumers) can gradually increase producer prices and profits.

Doubtless the resistance to implementing this particular balance between public and private sectors and market activities will vary with the past roles and institutionalized practices of particular LDC's. Perhaps the terms of foreign assistance can furnish constraints and incentives sufficient to achieve the required changes. The problem and the solution are undeniably political.

A major aspect of the food for development strategy is to avoid the price depressing effects of P.L. 480 aid with its accompanying disincentives for domestic food producers: this is to be achieved by targeting food aid for the very poor. The rationale, laudably humanitarian, is that enormous growth must be achieved before the market alleviates the food deficit endured by the very poor. The paper argues that such a free food program will infringe little upon the private distributive sector's interests because the poor will receive less desirable foods (i.e., sorghum, not rice, p. 44). The humanitarian imperative may well justify the policy, but that it will not evoke opposition from the private sector seems improbable. Indeed, inasmuch as public and parastatal distributors have been very active in the food markets selling to the more privileged (e.g., the Office du Niger selling rice at lower than market prices exclusively to Malian civil servants) or to the income-earning urban middle strata (e.g., imported rice distribution in several West African states), research might reveal that the indigenous private distributor has regular

business largely among the less privileged. Nor is it clear that such food aid recipients will not cut back their market purchases, as the paper argues (p. 44). Such small indigenous merchants will probably not succeed politically in blocking implementation of such a program, so perhaps political feasibility is not the issue. But "food for development" policy goals do appear certain to elicit conflict.

II. Food Marketing and Marketing Boards

A. "Improving Food Marketing Systems in Latin America": Michigan State University Study for AID

"Improving Food Marketing Systems in Latin America" differs from the literature reviewed thus far in that it does not address the apocalyptic realities of famine, nor prescribe global or even national shifts in development strategy. It does not address the West African problems of food security and food self-sufficiency. However, its focus on improving marketing systems to permit better prices for producers and/or consumers makes it relevant to West Africa.

The major recommendations of the study concern ways in which marketing costs can be decreased, and labor in the marketing sector can be made more efficient. The specific innovations include greater specialization with economies of scale, more effective quality control, and grading and sorting and other means of decreasing the cost and improving the quality of the produce delivered to the consumer. Much of the case for projected gains rests upon little documented statements about the inefficiency of small traders, and about small farmers who

deal in diverse products on an unpredictable basis. The traders' presumed inefficiency is rooted in his small scale business and low level of formal education, and his (undefined) "traditional business methods" (Chapter 4). He is unable to anticipate (or unable to capitalize on) the advantages of large-scale buying, or to reap the gains of predictability. The authors argue that innovations such as contract buying from producers and routinized non-tacit relations with wholesalers would improve communications about markets, and yield the gains of chain operations. The report emphasizes the necessity of solutions which deal with the whole chain, from producer, through wholesaler, to consumer.

The prescribed system is modern and familiar. But beyond characterizing the existing system as inefficient, the study gives no clear picture of how the system currently operates. The authors note the widespread bias against private middlemen, and note, for instance, that national laws discourage maintaining stocks. But there is no evidence offered to disprove the negative stereotype regarding either the credit terms merchants give their suppliers or merchants' profit margins. And more importantly, recommendations are not designed with adequate concern for existing conditions--a requirement of innovations which are to be effectively implemented.

The report alludes to existing institutional and practical constraints, and notes the need for their further study, as well as continued communications among concerned groups and institutions, during implementation. The principal institutional constraint is, state the authors, the administrative fragmentation

ill matched to their proposed "farmer to consumer" scheme of reform. The Ministries of Industry, of Commerce and of Agriculture would all need to be mobilized and other spatial jurisdictions modified (such as municipal governments' regulation of transport and commerce) (Chap. 6). The task is, however, pictured largely as one of education and coordination. These different bodies have "different perspectives" on "the marketing problem," and at a minimum, some structure for continued consultation among the concerned units is needed (p. 112). However, the authors imply that the problem may go beyond communications and diverging perspectives, for their optimal solution is reorganization permitting an authoritative and overarching role for the Ministry of Planning.

Secondly, the authors note that the "seriousness" of the government desire for change must be determined, for they suggest that existing laws, administrative decrees and policies usually defend "particular interests" (p. 106-108). There is no elaboration of what these interests are and how they manifest themselves except for the familiar observation (not central to the marketing process) that rural development efforts tend to benefit large landholders. That the political obstacles are perhaps not trivial or easily negotiable is suggested by reference to the Bolivian experiment with substitution of the Armed Forces as transporter and distributor (p. 23). In this light, centralization of planning into one agency in charge of food systems, rather than a number of ministries, suggests a <u>political</u> overhaul of the "Legal Administrative and Policy Environment" (Chap. 5) or dramatic

proportions. This bespeaks far more than a smooth coordinated implementation of prior political decisions. (Note discussion of pluralism and corporatism p. 78 below, especially regarding O'Donnell's Bureaucratic Authoritarianism.

The profound nature of the political transformation required to achieve the liberalization and coordination-integration of the food system recommended would, I suspect, be substantiated by more information on the current system, particularly the extent of government involvement. The report is as thin regarding the political administrative structures regulating and even managing the food system as it is regarding the micro-system of farmers, small traders, assemblers and marketers relations. For example, Colombia is said to have a federal agency with "broad and sweeping power in agricultural marketing . . . active in price support, storage and low cost outlets in small neighborhoods, and Bolivia to have price supports and anti-speculation (anti-hoarding) regulations (p. 23). The economists' observation that these government interventions (designed to meet common problems of price fluctuations, etc.) suffer from a range of shortcomings including disruption of market mechanisms is indisputable. But the political administrative task of dismantling or restructuring these structures to achieve the "competitive balance" (p. 50ff.) recommended between government owned retailers, private wholesalers heading voluntary chains, private chains and retailer coops is imposing. Much more information on the relationship between larger public interventions and the current retail-wholesale food chain is required for the analyst to begin to see the

nature of the political task entailed in modernizing and integrating the food marketing chain.

Two other reservations, less sweeping in nature, concern the implied expectations about bureaucratic behavior. Let us assume the possibility of isolating and insulating the implementors/bureaucrats from the larger system. First the role increased expertise in marketing would play is left unexplicated. It may be regrettable that the countries provide inadequate educational resources in this regard, but just how and where the expertise sought would be utilized is not clarified. Secondly students of bureaucratic behavior are likely to question how centralization of food systems planning would facilitate problem solving.

These criticisms do not consider the date of the report (1974) or the mandate its authors were given. Nonetheless, the study's approach results in recommendations which appear to be socially as well as politically unrealizable: it proposes a system which fits the researchers' apparent view of what should be (and should work), without grounding that system in existing conditions. More attention to the current system--for example, how the formal public institutions in fact interact with farmers, wholesalers and retailers, discussion of specific regulations and the particular interests behind them--would provide the basis for more contextually derived, less formalistic solutions. This more desirable strategy takes existing conditions as a point of departure and seeks incremental improvements which appear realizable.

B. Marketing Boards in Developed and Undeveloped Countries: Articles by Abbott, Abbott and Creupelandt, Sadan, Campbell, Agarwala, Riscocks, Olayide and Essang

Marketing Boards play a long standing, central, and highly visible role in food price and marketing policy in West Africa. Their earliest and most widespread use in West Africa occurred in the post-war colonial period in the marketing of agricultural export crops: their foremost proclaimed purpose was to ensure producers stable interseasonal prices and to provide efficient links between producers and the world market. More recently, governments have often instituted similar organizations for marketing domestic food stuffs.

Casual observers and non-economists generally consider West African marketing boards' political importance to be great. They are widely believed to serve far less as price stabilizers than as a major source of government funds, and often as the public coffer supporting both development programs and the political campaigns and/or personal lifestyles of politicians and their retinues. And, particularly when they deal with domestically consumed food staples, they are associated with prolonged conflict with private intermediaries: such marketing agencies are often protected from competition in the private sector and are chief protagonists in the government struggle to control black market trading and smuggling. Thus both their pre-eminent market role and their political notoriety lead us to explore organizational and functional types of marketing boards in the larger global context. The resulting comparison should reveal the extent of their variation across settings,

and factors explaining that variation.

The diverse writings surveyed show marketing boards to be common in developed countries such as Canada, Australia, and Great Britain, as well as LDC's. In general, marketing boards are defined as bodies constituted by government legislation or decree, with powers of compulsion over producers and handlers of defined commodities. Their activities cover a broad range, variously categorized. One source defines and describes in great detail six types: advisory and promotional boards, regulatory boards, boards stabilizing prices without engaging in trade, boards stabilizing prices by trading alongside other enterprises, expert monopoly marketing boards, and domestic monopoly marketing boards (Abbott and Creupelandt, p. 705). Another classification suggests five types: advisory and promotional, quality control and coordinating, price stabilizing, export monopoloid, and domestic monopoloid, with a second distinction between trading boards and non-trading boards (Sadan, p. 66). These authors pay most attention to boards' economic functions,--as vehicles to achieve orderly and/or efficient marketing or price stabilization (intra or inter-annual). It is also noted that marketing boards are thought to restructure markets, i.e., to increase the bargaining power of producers and consumers vis a vis intermediaries, because the individual farmer or consumer has such a small market share that his marketing decisions are insignificant.

The latter function (i.e., altering the bargaining power of producer and/or consumer) leads us directly to an important political question: how these boards actually function, i.e.,

how these groups are in fact represented, and how they affect the interests of the different publics or groups concerned. Here the literature provides little guidance. Two studies suggest that marketing boards actually improve producer prices little. Agarwala applies simulation technique to egg marketing in the United Kingdom to conclude that marketing boards affect prices little, and Campbell concludes that farmers are naive, despite contrary empirical evidence, about marketing boards' ability to solve problems (which are not marketing problems but rather structural disequilibria). Campbell is provocative in his stalwart defence of the "public interest" and his concern that governments should "not be led" by marketing boards representing producers: he argues that government commissions are better equipped "to deal with the problems of marketing than are the traditional type producer-controlled market boards" (p. 184). Campbell argues that statutory marketing boards antedate large scale government intervention in agriculture, and thus are, in response to the question posed in his title ("State Market Board--Relic or Prototype?"), more relic than prototype. He comes directly to central concerns of political scientists in noting the "malaise" in the US and UK, where government statutes support marketing boards and also oppose monopoly. He argues that the illegitimacy of monopoly makes marketing boards vulnerable to attack for monopolistic price setting due to the rise of the "new consumerism" (p. 186).

However, Campbell's disapproval of farmers' political pressure activities shows a desire to separate political and economic questions which many political scientists would not

share. Campbell decries farmers' quest for "private power" to overcome "political anomie" and their use of political avenues to get price supports enacted (p. 184 ff). Campbell asserts that greater government vigilance should and can define, and achieve, the "public interest." In this, Campbell addresses a major concern of many political scientists: the near certainty that political pluralism affords representation of groups with political organization and access, at the expense of other less politically favored groups. This constitutes a major critique of pluralistic democracy. However, Campbell takes farmers' excessive political power as given, and does not demonstrate how farmers (in specified developed countries) exercise such control, or the historical circumstance through which that has emerged. Thus he does not help in explaining the variable political power with which marketing boards provide farmers in developed countries and in LDC's. Nor does he make clear how government will "know" and define the "public interest." Although Campbell appreciates the politics which impinge upon public policy making institutions, and implies a critique of interest group pluralism, his solution is a pure and free market untainted by the political process. Yet how such a recommendation is to be implemented is unclear. Occupational groups will predictably pursue their economic goals by all available means, including political means. (See Chapter Two, Section IV, on interest group influence in policy implementation.)

The question of origins, producer initiative and producers' continued role in marketing boards is of great importance in distinguishing marketing boards in developed and underdeveloped

countries. But the authors reviewed make only passing reference to the difference in origins and in the subsequent evolution of these important structures which, while perhaps semi-autonomous from government, are undeniably in the public domain. Abbott and Creupelandt note briefly but suggestively that marketing boards originated in Canada and Australia to increase farmers' bargaining power when farmers' cooperatives proved unable to combat falling prices in the 1920's. In certain LDC's they were initiated by the British during World War II to protect West African cocoa farmers, to keep industry alive (p. 3, Abbott and Creupelandt). We need not here choose between Abbott and Creupelandt's benevolent colonizer and others' interpretation portraying the Boards solely as extractive devices of colonizers (see for example, Fitch and Oppenheimer, regarding the Gold Coast--now Ghana-Cocoa Marketing Board, and more generally, Hopkins' Economic History of West Africa). However, Abbott also raises the same question later when observing that marketing boards, initiated by colonial governments in LDC's often met with "strong opposition of traders and producers" (Abbott and Creupelandt, p. 12). He does not elaborate upon the sources of this opposition.

That the political initiatives of marketing boards in developed and developing countries were very different does not prove their impacts to be malevolent or benevolent toward certain groups. Nor is it clear that farmers have always initiated in the developed countries; one paper disseminated by the Rural Learning Association of the Canadian Government

addresses farmers regarding the multiple services marketing boards provide, but ends by gently suggesting that farmers organize or be organized (Hiscocks, p. 13). Some fairly straightforward political and institutional history and analysis of board representation and decision making is needed to determine the relationship between interest groups and marketing board price and marketing policies on producer, intermediary and consumer. Such analysis should surely be incorporated into the further research on marketing boards' actual functioning which Abbott pleads for (Abbott, 1967). Indeed, such research is essential for the feasibility analysis I discuss below (see Chapter Two).

Two Nigerian economists' simulation study of the Cocoa Marketing Board (CMB) in the (then) Western Region of Nigeria suggests that political events were intimately bound up with the performance (and inadequacy) of that particular board. Oladjide and Essang test some performance hypotheses first suggested by Bauer's 1954 criticism of marketing boards (Bauer, 1964). They conclude that the marketing board has proved relatively ineffective in its purported market functions: it has proved effective only in stabilizing prices interseasonally (with the exception of 1961), but not intra seasonally. Furthermore its efficiency level has been very low, with its cost climbing steadily while producer prices have been falling (p. 290). Nor has its establishment of Licensed Buying Agents (LBA's) reduced purported abuses by private traders. The LBA's often pay farmers less than the CMB's published price, manipulate grades and weights, and call in short-term

loans from producers at several times the loans' value. Thus the LBA's ensured sole access to villagers by legislation, have used their privileged position for their private ends. Olayide and Essang concur with most observers that the Board has provided a welcome source of patronage appointments at all levels. They note that it has been associated with improved quality of exports and with relative order, in contrast to the chaos, strikes and boycotts of the pre-World War II periods, but also cite P. T. Bauer's argument that monopoly/monopsony necessarily created conditions of exploitation for consumers (p. 290-291.

The authors side-step the question of whether marketing boards should be abolished, presumably because they recognize that such a reform is politically unthinkable. And their discussion of political events suggest that contextual explanation cannot be ruled out (at least in a case study). The Nigerian case is certainly a prime example of the inseparability of political life and the Board's evolution. The regionalization of marketing boards in 1955 constituted perhaps the greatest single victory for federalism; Olayide and Essang note that the Cocoa Marketing Board became the biggest fiscal weapon of regional governments and the stabilizers of regional government revenues, not stabilizers of producers' incomes. Political analysts have gone much further, arguing that capturing the marketing board was the primary objective of political parties. This ensured the regionalization of Nigerian politics, and meant that parties victorious in a region became virtually unbeatable because of the patronage they could distribute. The parallel with single-party systems in other non-federal West African states is clear.

One should also remember that in these pre-oil days it was the cocoa-rich Western region of Nigeria which threatened secession (see Sklar).

To argue that West African marketing boards are the linch-pin of much national politics is fairly straightforward, given their prominence as revenue sources. This alone could be seen as differentiating them from marketing boards in developed countries. Perhaps such booty (marketing board revenues) could not possibly have stayed sheltered from legislative oversight and the great redistributive battles of national politics. Thus marketing boards in LDC's could not be regulated by administrative agencies (relatively autonomous from legislative oversight) working closely with the farmers as their client group, as they are in some developed countries. (See especially Lowi on "private governments" buried within the US federal bureaucracy; and Sam Beer on interest group politics in the collectivist age in Great Britain.)

Abbott and Sadan both note that marketing boards in LDC's have a primary role as public revenue sources, given the paucity of other taxable revenues. Use of such revenues for national development should raise a political red flag as well as a normative question of whether the farmers ought to be able to retain that share of the national wealth which they have produced. The use of such revenues is a complex and vital public policy question. Abbott sides with the central government as guardian of the national interest, arguing that the farmers ought not begrudge what will in any case return to them directly or indirectly. Olayide and Essang also avoid defending the

particular interests of producers. They argue that board revenues should return to the rural sector in order to revitalize agriculture, and achieve national growth along lines of recent development theory opposing extraction of rural wealth for rapid urbanization and industrialization. They also present a powerful empirical critique of the older model, observing that in the Western region, the Cocoa Marketing Board contributed only 3% of the revenues spent under development plans, due to the board's heavy and increasing operating costs. Given the margin between the producers' price and the f.o.b. price, very considerable amounts of money have clearly been oiling the political machine. Thus the resistance to reform can be presumed to be considerable.

In the literature surveyed here, Olayide and Essang are the only economists presenting evidence on the political role of marketing boards. This and their policy prescriptions are thus welcome, although much more attention needs to be given to the marketing board's institutional functioning and political uses. Essentially Olayide and Essang seek greater autonomy for the marketing board with strict and explicit regulation of fund use. Cocoa marketing board surpluses should be limited, and windfalls redistributed to producers. Export duties, produce sales taxes, investments of CMB surpluses and producer prices should all be controlled by the Federal Government and dispersed in the "development interests of Nigeria." The political goal of undermining the autonomy of the Western Region political machine is both clear and consistent with the political agenda of the post-war military governments. The authors also argue that the Licensed Buying Agents be abolished and replaced by

producers' cooperatives. The latter proposal raises the familiar question of cooperative functioning, and begs for analysis of the scope of collective action and self-management among farmers, and the mode of linkage with the overarching board administration as well as local politics. The nationalization of Board profits for development efforts puts the whole issue squarely and perhaps inevitably back into the arena of federal politics and conflict regarding revenue redistribution to regional as well as class interest groups.

The contrast between the analyses of the two Nigerian economists and Abbott and Creupelandt's much earlier handbook is instructive. Olayide and Essang address the marketing board's performance in its political context, while the FAO handbook enumerates board types with reference to their economic activities, ignoring the variable of political context. Olayide and Essang's recommendations fall into two domains--internal organizational reform and the interaction between marketing board administrators and the larger political environment. This distinction is central to the analytic guidelines presented in Chapter Two below (see Sections IV and V).

III. Food Policy Studies in West Africa

A. "Rice Production in West Africa" WARDA and Stanford Food Research Institute study

The several documents, both country studies and syntheses, completed under contract to AID by the Food Research Institute of Stanford and the West African Rice Development Association,

focus on the advisability of national resource allocation to increase rice production. Each of the governments concerned--Senegal, Sierra Leone, Ivory Coast, Liberia, and Mali--is committing (or is considering committing) major government resources to stop importing rice, to promote self sufficiency in food staples or perhaps to become rice exporters.

In comparison with marketing boards of export goods, increased rice production is an import substitution activity. While export marketing boards serve as sources of government revenue at the expense of producers, increased rice production requires subsidization by consumers, producers of other agricultural products or taxpayers. Domestic rice production is attractive because, like export crop production, it will increase foreign exchange. Politically, it contrasts with agricultural export production because it will presumably require initiating a political process aimed at economic redistribution in favor of at least some agricultural producers.

Most of the study is devoted to data on the different types of rice production existing or projected in each country, and the extent and manner in which each draws upon public resources. The study's major component, a comparative advantage analysis, reveals that (with the exception of Mali and Sierra Leone) domestic rice production is far more expensive than imports of Thai rice. The authors appear fully aware of the WARDA member states desire to achieve food suffiency, and the major place envisioned for rice production in achieving this end. Thus the authors, dedicated to economic rationality, seek

to persuade member states to recast and reassess their aspirations. The study is also, or should be, an explanation of this declared commitment to rice production.

The individual country studies show scant evidence of research on the origins and evolution of government commitment to rice production (WARDA; also listed in our bibliography under Spencer, Pearson, Humphreys, McIntire, Craven). The comparative analysis by Pearson, Humphreys and Monke does ask why all members seek self sufficiency, despite its high cost. They tentatively offer several competing hypotheses. (1) The first is the possibility of an "information gap" which the authors define as ignorance of the realities of comparative advantage, or an overreaction to the '73-'75 drought. Of these (in reality, two different explanations) hypotheses, government overreaction has some face validity, given the confluence during the drought of unusually low food supplies at home, and the surge in world prices. That Senegal found herself unable to locate <u>any</u> rice for purchase at one juncture during the drought, and that food aid distribution was difficult, slow, and unavailable in some areas of great need lends credibility to a panic hypothesis. (2) Possibly governments believe that they can be competitive producers in the future. (The study argues that there is no bases for such a belief.) (3) Despite the absence of any comparative advantage, other trade-offs or objectives may tip the balance in favor of such expensive production. (The generation of income for certain less privileged regions, such as the north of the Ivory Coast or the north in Sierra Leone, or the desire for food security, as in Senegal, are very credible

examples of this motive.) (4) The availability of foreign aid for rice production, while it is unavailable for other kinds of projects, could make an otherwise costly venture attractive. (In this case the "irrationality" lies with the donor country.) None of the hypotheses is explored and no preferred hypothesis selected.

Given the apparent educative thrust of the study, some clearer explanation of national decision maker beliefs and motives regarding the advantages of rice production is needed. These would appear to be relatively easy to research. Although more substantive illustrations appear in Chapter Two, the Ivoirian and Senegalese cases can be usefully discussed at this point.

Senegal seeks food security for many reasons, including the declining world price of Senegal's primary export crop, peanuts. Her dependence on imported rice goes back to colonial days, when France promoted rice imports to Senegal from Indochina while France purchased Senegalese peanuts. The early import substitution of peanuts for domestically produced food staples has become increasingly costly to Senegal. Since the Indochinese war, Senegal has been forced to purchase rice from other sellers on the world market. And the price Senegal has commanded for her peanuts has declined. The most recent blow to peanuts' revenues was caused by France's entry into the Common Market, which has forced France to terminate the privileged trading status she had previously extended to Senegal. Thus the food security question in Senegal both symbolizes the colonial legacy and is a pressing daily problem.

There are regional considerata in Senegal as well. One which is surely important is the political status of the Casamance region, located to the extreme south beyond the Republic of Gambia. In addition to its physical separation, there is a substantial ecological and cultural gap between the Casamance and the rest of Senegal. The Casamance is surely that region least well integrated into Senegal, and has manifested discontent and latent separatism since before independence. In addition it has never fulfilled the role of "rice basket" which the government in Dakar has slated for it. How this important and complex political problem fits into the puzzle of policy choice should be made clear. Noting that the Senegalese government has projected enormous investments in elaborate irrigation projects in a much drier region on the Senegal River, the trade-offs are not self-evident.

In the Ivory Coast, the underdeveloped status of the north has long been a serious political issue. The impressive wealth of the south has fostered massive in-migration (particularly among the dioula to the north-west, who are heartily resented by local populations when they move into urban commercial activities and form large stranger quarters in Southern towns) and political restlessness in the north (particularly among the Senoufo, who are reputed to be a disciplined and unified people with a considerable role in the armed forces). The drought years, while not as disastrous for the Ivory Coast as for some of her neighbors, caused serious deprivation in the north, as well as political friction between cultivators and herders

forced south in search of forage. Destroyed crops and several incidents of violence threatened national order and even relations with northern neighbors.

The Ivoirian president responded with a decisive, even flamboyant, voyage through the north. He apparently saw in the international food crisis a rational impetus to channel major development funds to the north, for he promised repeatedly that the north would be developed and that through the production of food staples, the northern peasant could become the envy of his southern counterpart. Expectations were thus extremely high. As the WARDA Ivory Coast analysis notes, by 1978 the government had lowered the very high support prices for rice which it had instituted two years before. Faced with the great budgetary burden of the rice program, the government decided to pay a heavy price in popular confidence and political support. Now one must ask whether the government should or will further reverse the policy by withdrawing other production subsidies. Any policy alternative should be appraised not only in terms of its economic costs, but also the political costs. A political analysis of the initial and subsequent decisions, including whose support was sought and how, should suggest the latitude national leaders have in regrouping their support.

In going beyond a unidimensional explanation of government policy preferences, one needs to examine both the alignments of political and bureaucratic groups, and the process by which that alignment changes as policy develops, shifts, and clashes with other policies.

The WARDA analysis makes note of the distinct goals implied by food self-sufficiency and applies them briefly to the countries under study. Three categories--(1) generation of income, (2) distribution of income and (3) security of food supplies--are then parsimoniously ranked from primary to tertiary importance for each country. This exercise captures the important distinction, for example, between Mali and Senegal's serious plight during the drought (security of food supplies is ranked highest for these two) and the greater importance of developmental priorities for the three forest countries. The rank-ordering then provides the authors with the criteria for a more refined economic feasibility analysis.

Such orderly ranking and differentiating clearly facilitates rational systematic analysis. Indeed it does so precisely because it imposes an intellectual framework on a much less tidy process of expression of discontent, particular interest definition and alliance formation. There is, unavoidably, an information loss in the defining and ranking process, but optimally the loss is minimal because the categories minimally distort the processual reality. In the case at hand, the distinction between security of food supplies and generation of income is easily grasped and probably captures differences of emphasis and intent which were present in actual policy-making process in each country. However, the distinction between income generation and income distribution, while logically definable, seems likely to have been much less evident in the political process. That it ought to be clear in policy makers'

minds is another argument; any analysis can be evaluated as an educational document designed to alter behavior and improve decision-making. But because the studies do not make clear the empirical grounds for this tripartite characterization of government preference, the ranking of priorities does not seem credibly to reflect government positions. It is doubtful that it reflects the perceptions of relevant policy constituencies, or that such constituencies are likely to be reache' by a policy paper's educative thrust.

The capacity of the public sector to intervene (Pearson, Humphreys and Monke, p. 10) is a most important variable in assessing policy alternatives. The WARDA study operationalizes this by presenting summary performance statistics for the entire economy in the recent past, and by presenting figures on advanced education and foreign assistants in the country. These are useful points of departure, but such measures make no distinction between the type of project at hand and the availability of managerial skills suited to that task. A meaningful manpower analysis needs data on kinds of skills. More difficult, but also important, is an evaluation which goes beyond number of years of education. For example, Leonard finds that less educated rural development personnel in Kenya are more efficient than the more educated--because of self-image and expectations which foster social distance and disinterest between peasant clients and themselves (Leonard). My observations are that this analysis applies well to the Ivoirian agricultural extension network.

The WARDA study touches little upon a related, but complex, matter: institutional capacity. Most of the country studies give a brief rundown of agency acronyms and their full names, and brief functional descriptions of relevant bureaucratic and parastatal organizations. Yet some means of appraising the "track records" of such organizations is surely essential. Past development success or failure at the national or sectoral level is clearly related to their past performance, but again the summary indicators offered are far too indirect, imprecise and uninstructive regarding possible improvements in decision-making and, especially, implementation. While Chapter Two discusses how institutional capacity can be better built into policy selection, some substantive examples from West Africa showing the weak areas of the WARDA study are usefully presented here.

The shortcomings of the Senegal country study are illustrative. The authors not only failed to undertake field research on how the actual bureaucratic process differs from the formal blue print; they also failed to take advantage of existing high quality research. (Admittedly such documentation is not always available, which can make the analysts' task particularly difficult.) Edward Schumacher's book examines Senegalese bureaucracy and development, and documents the efforts at bureaucratic reorganization accompanying policy shifts (Schumacher). Schumacher traces Senegalese agricultural development administration, focusing principally on the production of peanuts, Senegal's primary cash crop. His analysis traces the ideological shifts between social development stressing participation and the ideals of

African socialism, and a more instrumental emphasis on production. The book shows the manner in which changing views in the party and governmental elite impinged upon the various national development agencies, altering their mandates, perogatives, and relative power. Such background material provides significant insight into the performance capability of various branches of the development bureaucracy, including the expertise, loyalties and attitudes of its personnel.

Similarly the Sierra Leone country study briefly notes a dramatic change between from the agricultural program of 1961-67, and policy of subsequent years. But this crucial bureaucratic experience and how it affects administrative capability regarding proposed programs is never discussed, although such past experiences must effect current bureaucratic effectiveness and reliability.

Mali's bureaucratic history is particularly central to an understanding of the preferences of national decision-makers, and the bureaucracy's capacity to implement new policies. In her initial, post-independence, most socialist phase, Mali set up a vast state apparatus and a marketing structure which both squeezed and was very hostile to the private sector. This engendered political conflicts and encouraged institutional vested interests which, while certainly a powerful reality in most of West Africa, appear most marked and enduring in Mali. Not only does OPAM (Office des Produits Agricoles du Mali, Mali's state marketing structure) lose money, but its price policies are such that Mali has a vast illegal market which operates parallel to the state's official trade. This heritage is a great problem for planners, whether they prefer free market solutions or wish to entrust

marketing functions to an (efficient) national agency: how to dismantle or reform such structures, clearly built into the country's political fabric is a problem which concerns social scientists, although they have not found the solution.

Such institutional factors seem also to be powerful variables in the explanation of current government choices. The authors note that Malian planners have earmarked considerable resources for the further development of state development projects such as the Office du Niger and the Segou and Mopti irrigation schemes. Given the established antagonism between the Malian bureaucracy and small farmers, government preference for the far more controlled and structured state corporations may well be rooted in government realization that only in this setting do the bureaucrats have a slim chance of controlling output (See Pol. Econ. p. 42). The author also notes that certain buyers get rice from these "cooperatives" that is not available on open market. It does not note that these buyers are all civil servants, a fact which (as stated above) suggests direct pursuit of immediate material self-interest by Malian bureaucrats.

"Institutional capacity" is not a variable which is easily defined, but it is surely essential to the design of any development project (see Chapter Two, Section V). It should include some statement of the relevant administrative body's current structure (both formal structure and as it actually functions), available personnel, and access to government resources (relative to other agencies). Far less objective factors include a longitudinal analyses of an agency's development, and its competitive and collaborative relations

with other groups, governmental and private. Such a grasp on the ability of public institutions (usually bureaucratic agencies) to implement policy is not just a cost or efficiency factor which must be taken into account. Such judgments must be a major factor in selecting or rejecting a given project strategy. For example, a subsidy may be channelled directly to producers as input or output subsidies, or it may be achieved by using import tariffs to influence prices paid both for imports and locally produced rice. Among the considerations which would influence the policy selected (assuming that the goal of subsidizing rice is desirable) is the practicability of the means or the likelihood that the agency in question can effectively accomplish its task. One alternative--economy-wide increases prices for rice--may cost far more than direct subsidy to a small number of producers. But if the administrative apparatus for the latter is wanting, it is no longer a desirable or low cost option, because dependence on that agency may imperil the entire project. Thus a crucial variable is implied by the WARDA study's authors when they note that policies vary in how easy they are to administer ("The Political Economy of Rice in West Africa: A Summary...," p. 45). The choice lies only in part in the nature of the policy; it is also a function of the particular nature of institutional development, and must be addressed as such (see Chapter Two, Section V below).

Finally, means of increasing production may be evaluated in terms of the political opposition or support they will elicit. From a public interest perspective, low costs are of course

preferable to high costs. The authors of "The Political Economy of Rice in West Africa: A Summary..."note that "universal incentives such as tariffs, fertilizer subsidies, and paddy price supports may bring about large transfers among economic groups, such as all rice consumers and all rice producers, that are both unintended and unwanted" (p. 45). They then name the groups advantaged or disadvantaged by other specific policies. For example, producers favor output rather than input subsidies (because they are then free to allocate inputs themselves) while those responsible for government budgets prefer trade policy over government expenditures for any kind of direct subsidy (p. 46). But this embryonic interest group analysis is not pursued.

Such an analysis must go beyond the logical deduction of how specified policies impact upon specified populations. Factors such as the direct or indirect nature of the cost, the organizational resources of the group paying the cost, and their political affiliation (to other groups and overarching ideologies) will effect the political response of the different groups. Also, some consideration of the autonomy of interest groups in the national political system in question, such as suggested by the distinction between pluralistic, corporatist, and patron-client systems, is also germane (see pp. 79ff. below). In short, an adequate analysis of interest group pressures and national government response cannot be deduced from the economists' analysis of policy impact, although such an analysis is a fruitful point of departure (see Chapter Two, Section IV).

B. "Marketing, Price Policy and Storage of Food Grains in Sahel" Club du Sahel/CILSS report by the Center for Research on Economic Development, Michigan University

"Marketing, Price Policy and Storage of Food Grains in the Sahel" is a two-volume study (one volume of country studies and one of synthesis) by the Center for Research on Economic Development (CRED) at the University of Michigan. It is explicitly oriented toward policy rather than the critique or elaboration of specific projects or programs. Its authors were mandated to provide an etude diagnostique which is, as they note, difficult to translate, but clearly indicates a general evaluation not concluding with a set of substantive recommendations. However, despite these contractual limitations on the scope of the study, it in fact makes some direct criticisms of existing policies and leaves little doubt as to the direction which the authors believe policy should take. The study's material on food storage is slight, as this section was a belated addition based upon scant existing documentation rather than field research. Thus my comments are limited to the extensive description and analysis of food marketing and price policy, particularly the interplay between the private and public sector. The authors' preference for markedly decreased state intervention in food staple marketing is supported by their evidence regarding the current poor performance of the public sector and their conviction that these deficiencies are not "tractable" or reformable.

Where public sector policy has been most ambitious and its direct involvement in marketing the most extensive, its

failures have been greatest. In Mali, Senegal, Niger, Upper Volta, Chad (far less in Gambia and Mauritania), government has strived to maitriser (master or dominate) food marketing and food prices. Yet these declared governmental monopolies actually handle a third or less of food produced and marketed domestically. However, the private sector which handles the remaining two thirds of produce marketed, has been impeded in its development by the public sector against which it struggles.

Barriers to private sector development predate national independence. Colonial policy and practice favored French commercial houses and Lebanese merchants and also set up public institutions (i.e., cooperatives and marketing boards) which limited the scope of private African merchants. Following independence, most of the governments surveyed have expanded the role of public agencies in commerce and thus decreased private traders' market share, and at times reduced them to largely clandestine activity. Thus the private trading system remains underdeveloped in terms of specialization, quality control, and market integration. Not only have African traders not been able to achieve their potential, but food stuff producers have been deprived of a fully responsive marketing network, including credit and prompt payment at market prices for their produce.

While the authors clearly have little praise for governments' efforts to improve upon the private market, they recognize the empirical data gaps that limit their diagnosis. They assert that there is no evidence that private traders make excessive profits, that grain markets are monopsonized, or that

speculation is rampant (Vol. I, p. 11). They strongly suspect that the "prudent peasant-competitive market" model fits far better than the "imprudent peasant-monopsonized market" model, but concede that no-one has adequate knowledge of how Sahelian grain markets really function. A review of available literature reveals considerable debate regarding the degree to which peasant producers in the Sahel are integrated into the market or simply sell only their "disposable surplus" (Vol. I, p. 6, also pp. 11, 39). This and other information gaps suggest the problematic nature of designing policies intended to increase food production (e.g., price rises). In addition, these unknowns would presumably effect the speed and adequacy of the private sector's response to (the proposed) liberalization of the food staples market.

One of the study's strengths is an avoidance of over-schematic statements regarding government goals and priorities. Far more than the WARDA study, this report conveys a clear sense of the variable and even obscure processes of national policy making and the always tentative nature of declared policy goals. Rather than asserting that government policy is X or Y, and then assessing the policy critique, the CRED authors cite specific government agencies, offices or persons as sources regarding governments' policy goals. Thus the report implies, or at least allows for, a lack of governmental consensus as to policy priorities as well as diverging perception within governments regarding the nature and impact of public policies. For example, with typical caution the authors state that food self sufficiency "now appears to be high priority," given

statements by the Senegalese Ministry of Rural Development. Similarly, the chapter on Chad notes the difficulty of knowing how, in the public sector, marketing and price policy is made, and what the input of different interest groups into policy-making is (Vol. II, Chad, p. 47). Such statements do not inform the reader about the political process. However, they do constitute a reminder that there is a process, and one in which policy choice, implementation, and evaluation are overlapping and inseparable.

Nor are the authors willing to make blanket statements about the favored position of urban consumers, particularly with regard to the impact of existing food price policies. There is no disagreement with the view that marketing boards of export crops have since colonial times served as a means of taxing producers, rather than acting as producers' representatives (Vol. II, Gambia, p. 72), or that the use of such funds have clearly favored urban groups (Vol. I, p. 119). Mali is perhaps the clearest case in which producers have been penalized by low prices (Vol. II, Mali, p. 31). However the failure of OPAM to deliver quotas to urban areas has meant that "these consumers do not benefit from the guaranteed price and are obliged to make their purchases on the free market" (Vol. II, Mali, p. 70).

The study makes clear that Mali has longest sought a total monopoly of food purchasing; in other cases the policy has evolved more recently and, apparently, with less clear goals. Niger permitted private free trade until 1969, when direct market intervention was undertaken via OPVN (Office des Produits

Vivriers du Niger, Office of Agricultural Products of Niger). But the common belief that urban wage earners have benefited more from economic growth than have the rural masses is not empirically supported. A comparison of the urban legal minimum wages with

> "official producer-food prices and estimated farmer revenues does not indicate a tendency for wage earners to have done better than farmers in recent years. In Mali the figures are sharply in favor of farmers. In Niger, Senegal and Upper Volta, there are no clear and consistent tendencies" (Vol. I, p. 143).

The authors argue that the FAO Etude Perspective finds a widening urban-rural gap, and wrongly concludes that food grain prices are "too low," because the FAO representatives did not disaggregate the impact of food price policy and the prices farmers received for export crops (Vol. I, p. 119). In Mali, for example, OPAM (Mali's State marketing agency) buys food produce at lower prices than the private sector offers, but the failure of OPAM to deliver quotas to some urban areas has meant that "these consumers do not benefit from the guaranteed price and are obliged to make their purchases on the free market" (Vol. II, Mali, p. 70.

The study's exploration of the complexities of Sahelian states' food policies' actual effects does not directly address the political motives or intent of policy makers. That the impact may not favor consumers does not disprove the argument that urban or consumer interests have dominated policy making. It leaves open the question of political interests in public policy formation, although it may prove that policy intent is not realized in reality. The political analysis remains to be

undertaken (see guidelines for such an analysis Chapter Two, especially Sections IV and V).

The CRED study offers two important considerations for an analysis of the politics of policy formation. One is that the designers of food policy may well get caught in a spiralling effort to maitriser or dominate the market (in order to achieve the goals which they believe their policies ought to achieve). The second is the reoccurrence of the anti-private sector theme; private traders are speculators and profiteers to exploit the peasant. This rationale for intervention becomes the explanation of policy failure and thus the reason for still greater intervention.

Mali has been the state in which the government has tried the longest and hardest to implement a monopoly of food crop purchasing. Niger followed in 1969 when direct market intervention was undertaken by OPVN (Niger's State marketing agency). OPVN was initially intended to buy only 25% of market produce in order to stabilize prices. But costs far exceeded expectations because the market proved more competitive than had been anticipated (Vol. II, Niger, p. 61). By the time the CRED study was undertaken, Niger's marketing policy was based on government monopoly of food marketing, although OPVN has succeeded in obtaining a market share of no more than 30%.

In Upper Volta, the same conflict between state and traders is apparent. In 1974, the Voltaic government decided to give the ORD's (Organismes Regionals du Developpement, Regional Developments Organizations) a monopoly in food purchasing. This led to popular rural opposition as well as confusion and conflict

over the scope of authority of several public agencies involved. In 1976, there was a de facto withdrawal of the ORD's from the cereal market. The report comments that in government circles there was no consensus of what course to adopt. However, one relatively official source echoed the familiar rationale and response: the draft report of the Planning Commission subcommittee confirmed that action is needed to remove present "uncertainties and contradictions." The sub committee continues that the State must intercede between state and private trader, suggesting that, while the ORD's should be excluded from primary purchasing, village "groupings" (i.e., cooperatives?) will fill the gap. The determination to maitriser the market is thus deeply intertwined with the state's purported rescue of peasants from traders.

The CRED study does not undertake an analysis of the political interests or forces which result in this nearly constant interventionist tendency. The evidence they do provide is consistent with an explanation based simply on expansionist and monopolistic propensities of state bureaucracies. However this study does not emphasize, as others have, that the state-as-rescuer-of-oppressed peasant rationale is belied by the fact that (in Mali) OPAM's profit margins were intended to be as great as those imputed to the private sector, and profits were to be channelled into industry (William I. Jones, Ch. 4). The exploitive trader theme is not described as a subterfuge for state extraction of rural surplus. Rather the authors of the CRED study attempt to show the state errs in its assessment of private sector marketing as speculative and exploitive. Thus

the importance of ideology, institutionalized response, or particular interests as explanations of the exploited peasant rationale and resulting interventionism are never sorted out. And yet, if liberalization of marketing is to occur, an ability to understand and thus respond to the beliefs and/or interests of African decision-makers is essential.

In the synthesis and in the country studies, the report spells out three possible avenues of change: a government can (1) increase its share of the produce market, (2) retain its level of intervention (and improve institutional performances) or (3) markedly decrease government intervention in marketing. The authors' preference is again very clear. Increased intervention--particularly given the structure of domestic food staple marketing, in contrast with exports such as peanuts--is either impossible or extremely costly. Such a choice would lead to surveillance and policing of the innumerable periodic markets as well as transportation routes, and involve measures such as registration and permits for trucks and even carts, etc. Sufficient coercion would probably be unattainable, but corruption in private and public sectors would increase as would the costs of private sector (black market) transactions. Any efforts to improve existing systems rely on "excessive" optimism about the tractability" of the public sector regarding its deficiencies in marketing activities (Vol. I, p. 13). About the third option, light intervention, the authors seem to limit state action to indirect measures such as increased expenditures on roads, and increasing information dissemination to farmers about current prices. Elsewhere the authors' summary

notes the acceptability of price intervention for buffer stocks only and direct state sales in emergencies. In the Upper Volta chapter the author (and director of the CRED research team) appears to concede, rather than recommend, that the state could encourage (village) cooperatives, absorb transport costs to poorer regions, and subsidize food sales to low income residents (Vol. II, p. 66). But how even these forms of light intervention could be made most workable is not addressed. Nor do the authors expand their statement that light intervention is slow to produce a positive market response and is "politically and doctrinally unattractive" (Vol. I, p. 17). The overriding theme is the positive stimulative effect which light interventionism would have on the private sector.

It is perhaps this private sector advocacy and the associated pessimism about tinkering with bureaucratic reform which results in scattered and unelaborated observations about public sector performance. Each country chapter contains a section on institutions providing the names and official functions of relevant ministries, commissions and agencies. But these descriptions are largely formalistic, and are largely silent regarding these organizations' actual operations, their origins and evolution, or the overlap or conflict between them. It is regrettable that more description and analysis of these public institutions is not provided to support the authors' claim that the "ameliorated status quo" argument (of other studies) "rests on an optimistic interpretation of the tractability of public sector marketing deficiencies" (Vol. I, p. 14). Although the

authors' own description does not persuasively argue that all the deficiencies cited are beyond reform, they are clearly persuaded that the public sector cannot or will not remedy these deficiencies.

The report presents an extensive catalogue of these deficiencies in support of their preference for a private sector alternative. For example, the report states that current government thinking in Senegal sees ONCAD (Office National de Cooperation et d'Assistance pour le Developpement, National Office of Cooperation and Assistance for Development) as "too centralized and too inefficient," but comments that the "problem is deeper," for ONCAD is a "superfluous middleman." Farmers avoid selling to ONCAD because they fear they may be paid with credit or be taxed, because they get better prices from the private sector, and because they must transport their own produce to ONCAD pickup locations (Vol. I, p. 218). ONCAD buyers are generally unattractive to farmers, and official price policy is ineffective, because price setting commissions meet rarely, make decisions with inadequate data, are usually overruled by higher government bodies, and are typically chaired by the Minister of Economic Affairs or of Commerce, who "represents consumers" (Vol. I, p. 83). A major source of error in price setting is the construction of baremes (compilations of cost factors to guide the establishment of official food staple prices). These too are based on "administrative and political bargaining," with true costs arbitrarily cut so that they are often "fictitious" (Vol. I, p. 83). In Mali, OPAM funds for transport have been so inadequate that the agency has had to

requisition trucks, with the reported outcome that owners send their vehicles out of the country during the harvest season (Vol. I, p. 108).

At another point, the authors name three structures which can replace the private traders when government monopoly is enacted. Available public sector functional equivalents are (1) cooperatives (nonexistent or weak, lacking management and accounting skills), (2) development agencies (dependent on foreign assistance, potentially unable to increase production because of probable conflict with producers over its marketing activities) and (3) the national grain agency itself (lacking in knowledge of localities and in credibility among producers, likely to run large deficits, and unable to compete with the numerous local traders (Vol. I, p. 17). These shortcomings are presented as evidence supporting advocacy of the private sector.

The report summary states that some of the deficiencies in public sector marketing could be resolved. Among these, it lists consumer bias, badly timed official price publication, inaccurate baremes or cost calculations, uniform pricing not responsive to quality or geography. The report then states that "It is only a question of how to overcome the political or administrative constraints on reform" (Vol. I, p. 16). However, the authors apparently believe these constraints to be, in effect, absolute.

The report is persuasive regarding the deficiencies in current marketing systems; indeed, the CRED authors raise a most significant problem with which any study of West African food policy must come to terms. But its conclusion that the

political and administrative constraints are likely to block reform leaves the reader puzzled regarding how the free market solutions recommended are to be enacted. If indeed the political forces are "intractable," one wonders why they would yield to sweeping liberalization of the economy. A stalemate appears inevitable unless some leader can act as a deus ex machina (i.e., a force wholly independent of the state bureaucracy's interests). (See the following section and Chapter Two, Section III below for further discussion of free market solutions to problems in marketing systems dominated by the public sector.)

IV. Free Market Solutions to West African Food Policy Problems

A. Selected Articles Advocating Liberalization of Marketing Structures

The literature review now focuses on three examples of the numerous works addressing the negative effect of state intervention and, particularly, the role of statals and parastatals in food marketing. While all economists addressing this question touch upon the "political," in that they touch upon state activities, few address the political questions in a manner illuminating the origins and institutionalization of interventionism, or the feasibility of reform.

Elliot Berg in his numerous publications, as well as in the CRED study discussed at length above, makes clear his preference for light intervention in food marketing. As observed above, he documents very well the poor performance of statals and parastatals, and notes the bias against private sector

middlemen among state planners and bureaucrats. He argues that the private sector is competitive rather than exploitive, and if given the opportunity to develop its potential, the private sector could develop to the benefit of producer and consumer alike. But he inadequately explores the partial or incremental reforms which could be undertaken, and tends to dismiss resistance to liberalization as "doctrinally unattractive" (CRED study; see preceding section).

Tickner's "New Directions in food marketing policies in LDC's" shares a great deal with Berg's analysis of public sector intervention in food marketing, although Tickner is perhaps less emphatic regarding the need for liberalization. He emphasizes that food marketing policy has received inadequate attention by researchers, international agencies, development theorists, etc. . . Like Berg (regarding marketing in the Sahel), he notes the relatively superficial nature of economic research on markets. He also calls for more attention to marketing from other social scientists. Anthropologists have much to contribute regarding the dynamics of change by which "largely subsistence producers move into marketing systems," and producer-trader contacts (Tickner, p. 305). Geographers have been more adventurous, and political scientists have lagged regarding analysis of the "numerous and conflicting pressures on food policy" (Tickner, p. 305). Berg states that political and administrative constraints "alone block economically feasible reforms," and Tickner says economists see that "economic objectives cannot be achieved until political differences have been resolved"

(Tickner, p. 305). Although it is unlikely that political analysis "resolves political differences," certainly understanding the nature of state action and the political interests in marketing policy must precede marketing policy design (see Chapter Two, Sections III and IV).

Peter Bauer, an astute, long-time analyst of marketing practice and marketing policy in LDC's, particularly in West Africa, has written an article which purports to address the political problems confronting liberal food marketing reform. But his "The Market at the Dock" is disappointing because it mystifies more than it illuminates. In a loosely articulated and hyperbolic discussion of the sources of hostility to the market in LDC's, Bauer lumps together a diverse band of conspirators against an ill-defined victim--"the free market." The result is the spector of the market economy as hopelessly embattled with mass conversion as the only and improbable source of ameliorative change. While pessimism may well be in order, the ahistorical mode of analysis obscures the social and political processes with operate within any given context.

Bauer depicts a surge of market hostility following World War II in which Westerners of various professions spread hostility to capitalism in the (colonial and ex-colonial) Third World. National planning has been embraced as the sol[illegible]ath to economic development, and development economists have preached about "market failures." People of "socialist persuasion... are influential or even predominant in international reporting, the wire services, documentary films and even the arts and entertainment. Academic contacts between the West and the

Third World are dominated by these people. They enjoy a virtual monopoly in the local commissions and delegations of the United Nations and its specialized and affiliated services, in the research institutions..." (Bauer, 1979 p. 106). The Third World political elite (intellectuals and civil servants) feels isolated from their own society, and feels the need or duty to control economic activities (p. 110). Ideologues find the messianic creed of Marxism-Leninism appealing (p. 111), churchmen are hostile to the market (p. 117), and romantics envision the market as destructive invader of "secure and snug" subsistence societies (p. 118). Politicians use economic controls to enhance their personal power, and even "producers and businessmen everywhere are prone to prefer (state) controls to restrain competition" (p. 120). And the Third World intellectuals can only debate whether the Soviet or Chinese Model is preferable, ignoring, as Bauer points out, that

> It is perhaps revealing of living standards in the Soviet Union that in September 1970, three men were sentenced in Moscow to prison sentences of ten, four, and three years for black market trading in second hand clothes and chewing gum bought from Western tourists (p. 107.).

Our summary is unkind, but not inaccurate. The article leads the reader only to the barricades, ending with a quote from Hayek. A more useful development of the numerous interesting themes Bauer raises would include: (1) Definition of the many different phenomena Bauer lumps together, including statism, anti-establishment and anti-authority sentiments, romantic communal nostalgia, the role of big business and big labor in producing big government in the West (and in the colonies?);

(2) A shift from a bi-doctrinal view of the world to an understanding of ideological variation and its social context; (3) An analysis of the political processes resulting in any given political economy. (In this last Bauer's own earlier writings provide a considerable corrective).

It is not necessary to detail here the distinctions in causation and goals among the social currents which Bauer treats solely as sources of hostility to the market. However, Bauer's arguments are in some instances flawed, as Glazer notes in his (otherwise sympathetic) comment on Bauer's article. Glazer argues that Western universities have not, in fact, been feeding socialist pap to Third World students since World War II. The rise of youthful leftist sentiments in the last decade is <u>not</u> explained by economics courses which were in fact dominated by Samuelson's conventional views or sociology courses in which Marx was explicated as "monistic,naive, time-bound, limited..." (Glazer, p. 125). The loss of social identity and community, which Bauer also cites, is arguably manifested in dogmatic civil libertarianism, religious and political messianism, and wife-swapping, rather than the rejection of liberalism. The loss of community is a problem of real concern to political philosophers, but is ill-addressed by a nostalgia for a mythical stateless world. The rise of the "administrative state," political over-centralization, and the failure to see the limitations of synoptic planning is not the monopoly of the political left. Equally important from a political perspective is the diversity of goals characterizing the various groups Bauer lists.

Communalists are doubtful allies of the administrative state's bureaucrats, nor are churchmen the allies of Marxist-Leninists. Finally the victimized free market is too elusive and abstract to become a political cause around which people will rally. Reformist movements, if they can possibly succeed, will occur when specified groups stand to make fairly specific gains.

Secondly students of ideology distinguish between (1) diffuse and non-systematic world views, shared assumptions or taken for grantedness (Berger) and (2) a set of much more closely-interconnected and operational beliefs about the world and desirable courses of action within it. This range of variation in the organization of social ideas can be identified with and related to different social groups and political purposes. Also a distinction is needed between apparently socialist ideology rooted in intra-societal class conflict and statist nationalism rooted in anti-colonial sentiments. Concomitant variations in internal politics and public sector performance need to be understood for appropriate diagnosis to be achieved. Thus socio-political ideas are multi-dimensional, and their analysis cannot accurately be reduced to a single dichotomy.

Thirdly, a careful historical analysis of state-private sector relations must precede global generalizations. Here, paradoxically, Bauer's own writing on English-speaking West Africa provides important insights which correct and improve upon his more recent and less happy foray into the analysis of ideas.

As Tickner notes, middlemen are not everywhere blameless regarding charges of exploitative or monopsonistic behavior.

However, Bauer's work on West African commerce (as distinct from the very few British trading companies dominating the import and export trade) argues, as does Berg's more recent research, that there is no evidence to support this view of West African traders. Certainly Bauer is on solid ground in arguing that numerous political forces converged at African independence to produce extensive state interventionism. Political leaders' desire to control economic and political processes favor the creation of state firms. The distinct identity of trading groups in many areas set them politically apart from the rural producers they served. Their (often well-grounded) suspicious avoidance of government officials augments the tensions between bureaucratic planners and revenue collectors, and the petty traders. Curiously, in his empirical studies, the predominance of economic interest explanations leads him to overlook other causes (which are closer to the "doctrinal" or ideational analysis in his 1976 article).

The intellectual appeal of synoptic planning, of master-minding societal transformation, merged well with the African nationalists' desire to redefine their societies at independence. Wartime central planning in Britain and the successes of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development in restoring economic prosperity to post World War II Europe enhanced expectations of national planning. The transfer of methods and assumptions to under-developed societies was subsequently to reveal great differences in the task confronting planners. Thus the European enthusiasm for planning did indeed converge with the rise of nationalism and the aspirations of

African governments in favoring highly interventionist development strategies. Also Western donors, particularly the government bureaucrats administering aid, were and are far more at ease collaborating with Western educated African bureaucrats than with African petty traders. These convergent social forces are inevitably overlooked by the narrow economic interest arguments of Bauer's otherwise very important work on African trade. Unfortunately, his later work leads to an assumption of doctrinal politics on the part of all relevant actors. This obscures what is probably a range of perspectives and interests among West Africans currently supporting various public sector activities.

Directly contradictory to Bauer's later assertion that "colonial rule was not unfavorable to the market system" is his earlier article "Origins of the statutory export of monopolies of British West Africa." (first published in 1954; in Bauer and Yamey, p. 138-154.) Here he gives an excellent analysis of the preindependence emergence of state marketing boards' domination of agricultural export trade. The very few British firms trading in West Africa demanded market sharing agreements in the 1930's on the (undocumented and improbable) grounds that they lost money in the cocoa trade. Bauer argues that as early as 1940 colonial officers were aware that the wartime system was a victory for the Association of West African Merchants (an association of British firms). This realization was significant in the subsequent decision of the colonial governors to establish statutory export controls to restrain the power of the larger firms.

Bauer's 1954 analysis suggests a classical big government response to big business and makes very clear the early establishment of government involvement in production and marketing of export crops. Bauer also affirms that the marketing boards functioned as a tax extraction mechanism under colonial rule. As argued above, the tradition was not altered by the independent West African governments; in most cases state intervention in markets was increased, including the introduction of statal monopolies in produce buying from producers, and the creation of similar structures in the marketing of food staples for domestic consumption. The political motives of extended government and the use of marketing revenues for political patronage are also clear. The contention is not that there are no very appreciable barriers to economic liberalization and decreased state intervention, but that the undifferentiated cataloguing of doctrinal biases is not instructive. A better approach is a contextual analysis of the historical processes involved, the institutions established, and the interest thereby both promoted and frustrated (see Chapter Two, Section IV). The critique of Bauer thus repeats much of the commentary above on the CRED study.

. . .

The principle thrust of the various comments and critiques above is that economists' analyses and policy proposals are insufficiently grounded in the given political environment. Excessive formalism regarding government decisions and assertions of goals and national priorities, not adequately substantiated

empirically, are misleading. Solutions are suggested which take little account of existing political configurations and administrative capabilities and interests. (The latter is particularly essential where extensive administrative innovation is implied or where radical redistributive policies are recommended.) There is sometimes an apparent temptation to assume a tabula rasa upon which solutions will be imposed when current institutions and their performance are found defective. In short the economists rarely address directly the political dilemma of planning: how to have an impact where (as in any social organization) innovation is sharply limited by all the interests, habits and expectations which inevitably ensure a tenacious continuity. This essay argues that the optimal approach is piecemeal change building on maximum compatibility with existing political forces.

The strong free market preference is a salient feature of much of the literature reviewed. Several of the studies eloquently portray the poor performance of existing bureaucratic solutions, particularly regarding the commercialization of agricultural products. But how this eloquence will ensure the decisive liberalization proposed is not clear: one wonders if the proposed changes and existing structures and interests will not simply separate, like oil and water. Radical redistributive strategies are likely to suffer from a similar political incompatibility between existing conditions and proposed alternatives. The search for politically acceptable solutions must start with a thorough grasp of the interests and ties among

national actors. Because truly transformative change is extremely rare, the analyst must search for avenues of adaptive incrementalism.

The literature review makes frequent reference to political feasibility--essentially the problem of political support for policies proposed. National leadership is presumed constrained by the groups and interests upon which it depends, and interest group analysis is the analytic framework suggested. Also salient is the unduly cursory treatment which institutional and administrative capacity receives.

This critical commentary and proposed analytic guidelines is summarized in five propositions set forth, and then elaborated, in Chapter Two.

Chapter Two - Integrating Political Analysis into Policy and Project Design re Food and Food Price Policy in West Africa

Chapter One has discussed a variety of works on food and food price policy with reference to West Africa. It has not critiqued their economic analysis, but has rather suggested lacunae from the perspective of political analysis. We turn now to the question of whether and how political scientists can meet the criticism that political and administrative variables must be built into an analysis which guides policy or project design. The commentary in Chapter One is grouped into five theses (listed below) each of which is elaborated in turn. But preceding the elaboration of these five theses is a commentary on relevant aspects of political science: A) a statement distinguishing the framework from that espoused by political economists (e.g., Uphoff and Ilchman); B) a comment on how the work of some political scientists researching American politics is theoretically and conceptually useful and C) a number of caveats about across-system differences to be considered in applying insights and concepts drawn from American-based research.

The five theses elaborated in Chapter Two are summarized as follows:

I. Designation and prioritization of a government's policy goals can be misleading because it conveys an orderly deductive process which, while perhaps desirable, does not describe the policy making process.

II. Reformist or radical redistributive reformulations of

development strategy (to attain equality, avert famine, to reverse past trends by channelling extensive resources to the rural poor. . .) are highly political. The leadership in LDC's will predictably respond not to moral imperatives but to the imperatives of political survival. This maintenance of political support constitutes a constraint on regimes of which policy proposals must take account.

III. Analyses which propose extreme liberalization of economic policy will encounter significant political resistance. The range of possible liberal reforms can be better assessed by analysis of the origins and development of state intervention in marketing and current private-public sector relations. Political feasibility will doubtless require a selective and measured approach to liberalization

IV. Political feasibility analysis requires study of relevant interest groups' responses to a given policy or project and their probable influence upon the selection/implementation process. A policy's economic impact upon specified populations is a point of departure, but political influence is importantly affected by the cohesion, organization and access of groups, as well as regime expectations. Studies of American public policy and the interest group process serve as guides, but longitudinal and contextual knowledge of West African politics will provide the bases of an informed judgment regarding a policy's political feasibility.

V. Institutional capacity, regarding parastatals and public corporations as well as public administrative structures, must be incorporated into policy and project design. A sketch of the

dialogue between political science and public administration in the American context and in developing areas reveals many divergent trends which have not produced a coherent body of tested theory to inform policy and project design. Thus the much needed guidance in institutional innovation can be furnished by selective use of this diverse literature and incremental gains in administrative capacity should be sought through microlevel change.

Before elaborating these five theses and drawing lessons for the political analysis of food price policy in West Africa, some general remarks about political science as a discipline and its utility for the problem at hand are in order.

A. Regarding political economy: First a disclaimer. This essay does not seek to develop or apply that type of political economy analysis which synthesizes political and economic analysis by (1) borrowing the formal intellectual instruments of economics and (2) analysing the interaction of political and economic effects in order to evaluate trade offs. Such an approach, as advocated by Uphoff and Ilchman, seeks not only to build political factors into the evaluation of policy alternatives, typically undertaken from an economic perspective, but to move beyond treatment of political variables as constraints on economically optimal choices. Its goal is to achieve a rigorous and systematic analysis which indicates how any given alternative is weighted in terms of political and economic optimality or acceptability.

In Chapter One, it was argued that the writings of economists fall short in (1) failing to consider whether policies are

politically feasible at all, or (2) failing to go beyond cursory allusions to political constraints or impediments to policy enactment or reform. An approach promising the synthesis of political and economic goals and constraints is thus extremely seductive. It promises the policy problem-solving relevance of economics and the intellectual appeal of reaching beyond the conceptual limitations of "economic man" to include the more diverse needs and wants of "political man." However, in its present form, this type of "political economy" analysis suffers from theoretical and operational inadequacies. Current formulations attempt to expand the analysis of material resources and rewards which constitute economic analysis to include political and psychological resources and rewards, and thus to make familiar economic decisional and resource allocation models more inclusive. However the analogy between economic, and political and psychological variables is only partial and thus troubling. Legitimacy and authority cannot, like power or coercion, be envisioned as exchange relations. Indeed, Uphoff and Ilchman note that legitimacy is not exchanged, not overtly observable and thus difficult to measure and analyze (Uphoff and Ilchman, eds. p., 77). Decision models applicable to material resources are thus less suitable to many political and psychological variables. An actor cannot measure or weigh affection, security or legitimacy in the same manner he can weigh material resources; thus his decisional processes cannot be objectively rational in the same manner his economic decisions can, and will often, be. As a result the analyst

cannot apply the same decisional model for affection, security or legitimacy that he can, with good predictive results, apply to material goods. Thus more rigorous models of political trade-offs remain heuristic rather than operational.

Having said this, it should be noted that many of the analogies and heuristic devices which Uphoff and Ilchman draw from economic analysis are useful. A term such as "political entrepreneur," indicating a person who changes "the political parameters of a society, whether by reformist or revolutionary strategy" (Uphoff and Ilchman, p. 84) is a useful reminder that innovators are as essential in political as in economic life. Actors and regimes certainly make trade offs regarding political support and attempt to minimize political costs in policy selection. The exchange concept illuminates the patron-client ties familiar in West Africa, as it does pork-barrel legislation familiar in Washington, and peasants are far more usefully seen as making choices in specified contexts than as creatures of exotic values (see Norman Nicholson, 1975, p. 5). However the approach adopted here remains less rigorous and more eclectic than that of the ambitious synthesizers of political economy. It seeks a guide or framework for the study of political constraints and latitude of political feasibility to specified policy choices (see Coleman in Uphoff and Ilchman, eds., p. 36).

B. Public policy in the study of American politics: As the advocates of political economy correctly point out, political science has lagged far behind economics as a policy science. The recent resurgence of public policy as a subfield within

political science has attempted to correct this absence of direct problem-solving techniques. Thus there has been a departure from the previous concentration on public opinion, voting, legislative behavior and other inputs into the law-making process. Scholars are now looking far more closely at the internal structure and functioning of the executive branch, including the extensive discretionary powers enjoyed by sector-specific bureaucratic agencies. Students of public policy vary in their approval of federal and state bureaucrats' role in policy making. But they certainly agree that civil servants play a great role not only in the implementation of policy, but also in determining the substance of policy.

Students of American as well as French or British politics now recognize that legislatures play an ever weaker role in actually defining policy. Parliamentary systems generally formalize executive responsibility for proposal as well as implementation. But similarly in American politics the great scope of government activities, and legislatures' lack of time and expertise, have resulted in legislative decisions which are broad and imprecise, and thus the definition of policy is mandated to the executive. The central executive in turn delegates considerable decision-making power to lower level specialized bureaucratic agencies. Inevitably means of policy attainment affect, alter, and define the ends of policy. Critics of this phenomenon charge that the legislative function has been coopted by non-elected civil servants; their principal concern is that legislatures regain control over public policy. Legislative

activism in policy delineation and legislative oversight of implementation must be restored to remedy defective democracy, they argue.

A second critical voice, more germane for our purposes, notes the fragmentation of the policy making process such that coherent planning and purposive, rational policy formation are unattainable. In this view, both the legislative and bureaucratic processes reveal the mythic nature of formulae delineating phases such as policy goal selection, strategy selection, implementation, evaluation and informed redefinition of policy goals. The process is much more diffuse, with selection and implementation virtually inseparable. On the legislative side, the absence of party rule, the strength of special interests and lobbies, and the delegation of legislative functions to the executive branch contribute to the incoherence, because numerous forces within the executive bureaucracy undermine purposive integrated policy definition and implementation. Bureaucracies tend to delegate and compartmentalize tasks, so that the over-arching purpose is obscured or lost (Lindberg). Agencies and bureaus within the bureaucracy seek to aggrandize their budgets and power at the expense of the "public interest" (Niskanen; see discussion in Binswanger and Rutann, p. 343-346).

Another source of policy distortion is the permeability of bureaucratic agencies to outside political pressures: interest groups establish clientage relations with relevant agencies, by which they make policy definition and implementation responsive to their particular needs. And legislative oversight tends to fall to committees staffed by legislators sympathetic to the same

interests, completing a triangle of "private government" by special interests supported by bureaucratic subgroups and lobbies (Lowi).

Thus many students of American politics find little empirical grounds to believe that coherent public planning is possible. "Muddling through" or disjointed incrementalism better describes a process in which the purpose of specific policies is subject to constant redefinition, and integrated or synoptic planning is impossible. The best that can be hoped is that public planning can occur through constant readjustment as the policy process unfolds. The planner pursues a moving target, and must readjust strategy accordingly (see Lindblom, 1979).

To the extent that the policy process in West African states undergoes similar continual distortion, endeavors at project design are extremely problematic. The international expert's recommendations cannot be assumed to bear a great resemblance to policy outcomes. Efforts to ensure coherence in policy implementation appear to mean considerable and constant involvement in the political processes of the recipient state. Alternatively, or complementarily, the analyst's task includes an effort to anticipate and predict the forces which will impinge upon the project's implementation.

This task of anticipation and prediction may be guided by efforts to typologize the political relations emerging from different types of policies. One such framework, by Lowi, argues that policies can be grouped into distributive, regulative, and redistributive policies (see the interpretative chart, p. 74

below). Thus the substance and scope of policies mobilizes certain interest groups based on their perception of their costs and benefits. According to Lowi, in the United States redistributive policies (such as the welfare state issues of the 1930's) affect broad categories of persons and thus mobilize a broad cleavage in the political system, because the aim is the control of "property itself" (Lowi, 1964, p. 688). Such policy questions are the primary preoccupations of "peak associations" (such as aggregative political parties or other representatives of "class" interests). The interests at stake are stable and over time and typically echo the broad ideological debates in the society. The conflict is institutionalized and it will be reflected through the legislative and executive branches. The central executive is most likely to attempt to elaborate policy in such cases, rather than delegate the task to lower levels of the bureaucracy.

Regulatory policies are, according to Lowi, less controversial, and concern questions such as access to public good (air waves, water resources) and ensuring public health and safety. They are most likely to elicit the responses of the groups upon which they impact directly. Thus they elicit coalition politics, in which subgroups of the legislature compete and bargain to protect their particular interests. Regulatory policies do not alter the distributive patterns and power bases in a society; in fact government's role can, in this case, be argued to legitimate the exercise of private interests.

Distributive policies are essentially those distributing assistance to particular sectors, or functional areas, and

Table I

Characteristics of different policy types

Domestic policy type	*Main feature*	*Primary actors*	*Relationship among actors*	*Stability of relationship*	*Main decision makers*	*Visibility of decision*
Distributive	Short-run, disaggregated decision; no losers	Congressional subcommittees and committees; executive bureaus; small interest groups	Logrolling	Stable	Congressional subcommittee or committee	Very low
Regulatory	Application of a general rule; some win, some lose	Full House and Senate; executive agencies; special interest groups (e.g., trade associations)	Competition; bargaining	Unstable	Congress	Moderate
Redistributive	Long-run reallocation of resources among classes; winners and losers clearly defined	President and his appointees; committees and/or Congress; "big" interest groups (e.g., AFL-CIO and U.S. Chamber of Commerce); "liberals and conservatives"	Ideological and class conflict	Stable	Executive	High

Source: Starling, p. 393. Adapted from Ripley and Franklin; originally from Lowi (1964)

includes national parks, health research and subsidies to specific groups. The tendency is for those not directly involved to practice logrolling and then to assume a position of non-interference vis-a-vis the recipient group. This is the classic case of sub-system (or "private") government in which implementation is delegated to agencies or bureaus and policy shaped by the triangle of concerned legislators, bureaucrats and those in the public directly effected by the policy. (See chart of Lowi's categories adapted by Starling, p. 75 above.)

In the United States, because agricultural interests lost under Bryan's leadership, farmers turned to government for specific programs such as credit, agricultural extension, and parity programs which are administered by specific agencies within the bureaucracy. Because of the extreme decentralization of the policy process regarding this agricultural question, there is little consistency of purpose and impact in the agricultural sector. Many agricultural policies in the US are thus distributive according to Lowi's typology.

Lowi's scheme is an example of an American-based framework which appears extremely promising for application to the politics of food price policy in West Africa. It reaches beyond the identification of interest groups and their efforts to influence public policy to the relationship between type of policy, type of political conflict and type of bureaucratic involvement.[1] But such a framework cannot

1. Nor is Lowi's framework beyond criticism. His three categories are admittedly sometime difficult to distinguish; Lowi himself notes that "in the long run, all government policies may be considered (to be) redistributive...some people pay in taxes more than they receive in services"(Lowi, 1964, p. 690). Lowi has also suggested a fourth category, which is something of a catchall. For an elaboration of Lowi's policy types, see Ripley and Franklin; for a critique and an alternative typology, as well as a good summary of the recent American literature on interest groups and public policy, see Michael Hayes.

be "exported" without determining whether the American political system differs significantly, <u>for the purposes of this type of analysis</u>, from that of, for example, the Ivory Coast or Mali. Do interest groups have a similar impact in such countries? Do the same characterizations regarding the fragmented nature of public policy formation and implementation apply? One must thus ask how and whether work on comparative politics in under-developed countries, and in particular, studies of West African politics informs these questions.

C. <u>Comparative politics, African politics</u>: Comparative politics has generally sought to elaborate broad national system types, and thus has focused upon the characteristics of whole systems rather than the study of sub-national systems and processes. When subsystems have been studied, the tendency has been to use the micro-study to illuminate the nature of the national system rather than to seek explanations of the range within that sub-system. For example, the failure or success of cooperative schemes is attributed to the national party's success in political mobilization rather than structural conditions favoring the formation of cooperatives. This concern with whole systems has often meant that concepts used are umbrella concepts or over-arching concepts which encapsulate several variables or complex multivariate processes. Such concepts tend to be continuously reformulated without sufficient operational definition or testing. For example, Africanists have long applied the terms "reconciliation" and "mobilization" political systems to African states (Rosberg and Coleman, intro.).

Such dichotomies suggest important differences in the response of African regimes to the colonial experience and the developmental problems they have faced at independence. They have also elicited counter-analyses underlining the broad similarities among African political systems regardless of their more or less radical political rhetoric and official ideologies. Thus Huntington argues that it is not "the form of government, but the degree of government" that matters. Both Bienen and Zolberg stress the limited scope and effectiveness of the national state, arguing that distinctions such as "mobilization versus reconciliation systems" and "revolutionary-centralizing versus pragmatist-pluralist" obscure the central paradox of government in Africa. Zolberg notes "that the party state is authoritarian in its domain, but at the same time this domain is very limited. and that on the whole the regime has little authority" (Zolberg, 1966, cited in Schumacher, p. 219).

In response to this paradox, African governments have attempted ambitious programs of social, economic, and political transformation including state sponsored industrial, commercial and agricultural programs, abolition and replacement of local political authorities, massive programs of education and public health, and the adoption of sweeping civil code reforms. In nearly every case, the Africanization of the civil service and the mushroom growth of administrative personnel is directly tied to attempted implementation of these developmental programs. Another characteristic is the relative lack of continuity (or incrementalism), for the ambitious nature of government aspirations has also resulted in attempts to rethink

and to alter government strategy dramatically. Here the gap between government pronouncements and actual change is marked, suggesting that governments have as much political difficulty in dismantling old administrative structures as in creating or reforming administrative structures to ensure goal attainment. Such distinctions regarding the weakness of the central state, and the expansive responses to such weakness must be carefully taken into account if analytic schema such as Lowi's are to be fruitfully applied to the states of West Africa.

Students of comparative politics, particularly those working in Latin America, have explored differences between Western democracies (pluralist systems) and what have been termed corporatist systems. This distinction is directly relevant to the nature of interest group politics, and thus to any research on policy making drawing on American-based analytic frameworks. Corporatism has been described as "a non-pluralist system of group representation, in which the state encourages limited numbers of officially recognized non-competing, state supervised groups" (Collier and Collier, p. 967). Collier and Collier rightly argue that, because government manipulates groups in "pluralist," systems and groups bargain with government in "corporatist" systems, corporatism should be seen as falling at one extreme of the same dimension on which democratic pluralism all falls. Thus state-group relations are corporatist to the extent that (1) the state structuring of groups produces a system of officially sanctioned, non-competitive, compulsory interest associations, (2) the state subsidizes these groups and (3) the state imposes constraints on group demand-making,

leadership, and internal governance. Some applications of corporatism have emphasized its characteristic political stratification or class cleavage, noting that the corporatist state establishes close and rewarding ties with a like-minded coalition of interest groups, but simultaneously blocks political action and political access to an opposing set of interests.

The corporatist-pluralist dimension thus indicates the degree of freedom of interest groups in a system, as well as variation in access to the policy making process. The widespread cooptation of associational groups in West Africa by single-party regimes and the official insistence on organizational unity within a sector (e.g., a single, state-sponsored labor union, student union, or civil servants' union) certainly suggests that corporatism is an important aspect of interest group-regime relations. And yet, if the state in West Africa is indeed weak (even granted its presumed "authoritarianism within its domain"), one should not assume that interest groups associated with the regime are voiceless in policy elaboration. Indeed, their bargaining power may be considerable. A second consideration is the political position of non-sponsored or non-favored groups (organized or latent). If the central state is weak, one cannot assume the capacity to repress groups apparently excluded from the favored coalition. Regimes may be more or less responsive to anticipated demands, seeking to avert political mobilization and conflict. Neighboring states may well be wary following the 1979 urban riots in Liberia triggered by the government's announced intention to increase the official price of rice. And regimes dependent upon peasant agricultural

production certainly pay a price in low productivity for non-responsiveness to peasant producers' perceived needs (from which regimes enjoying considerable mineral wealth are surely more insulated).

Patron-client politics is a third perspective used by many students of politics in less developed countries, (as well as by anthropologists) relevant to the adaptation of American-based interest groups theories. James Scott stresses that "neither class analysis nor communalism" adequately address systems in which politics are dominated by "informal groups of leader-center cliques and factions linked by a panoply of more or less instrumental ties" (Scott in Uphoff and Ilchman, ed., p. 177). Patron-client relations are a special form of dyadic exchange (i.e., between two persons) based on inequality, face-to-face relations, and the flow of a wide range of goods rather than the highly specific concerns of most formal organizations in the West. Unlike groups or associations, patron-client networks are not based on common action by peers (or equals), but upon a certain competition between them because the vital link is between strata, that is, between patron and client. Thus it may be that patron-client ties cross-cut the articulation of common interests by peers.

Patron-client ties are said to occur (1) in conditions of marked inequality, (2) in the absence of impersonal guarantees of security and wealth, and (3) when kinship can no longer serve as an effective vehicle of personal security (Scott, in Uphoff and Ilchman, eds., p. 178). Many students have found the West African environment of scarcity conducive to clientelistic

politics, and have noted the symptomatic factionalism and the predominance of personalistic ties in place of formalistic roles in the public and private sectors (see Foltz, Price). What is less clear is whether they are the expression, in a less familiar form, of interest articulation, enhanced, perhaps, by official barriers to meaningful associational group political action. In addition, clientelistic politics subsumes a range from the more instrumental (and flexible) to the more affective (and permanent) and from the more specialized to the more diffuse. Clientelism may be a personalistic style or strategy for gaining access to a bureaucracy, or it may indicate the broad range of brokerage functions which a religious or ethnic notable fulfills for his local clients. Thus whether clientelistic politics renders an interest group framework inapplicable depends upon an empirical exploration of the society and the policy question under consideration. However, it is anticipated that clientelism alters the style, more than the content, of political interests at stake.

The study of politics in developing areas tends toward the elaboration of general systemic characteristics in contrast to the narrower, more focused research questions and more clearly specified concepts employed by many students of American politics. Single country studies predominate, and the wholistic nature of conclusions is not very useful in differentiating processes in different political arenas or in different substantive policy areas. However there is no doubt that comparativists' work raises important caveats about the differences between systems, and thus the adaptations required in

concepts and methods borrowed from research on American politics. Thus this essay argues for the selective and cautious borrowing from frameworks elaborated in the American (and European) context.

These comments on political science as a discipline are the frame of reference for the explication of the five theses summarized at the end of Chapter One and discussed in detail below.

1. Designation and prioritization of a government's policy goals

Chapter One queried the basis and meaning of the WARDA study's prioritization of food policy regarding food security, income redistribution and income generation. It also noted the greater realism implicit in the CRED study's avoidance of blanket statements about regime commitment to specific policy goals. The critique rests upon the thesis (see discussion of Lindblom above) that policy selection and implementation is not a formal and well delineated process. Rather the content of policy is constantly altered across time and as it undergoes inevitable redefinition in implementation.

This is not to deny the analyst's (and donor's) legitimate desire to assess the clarity, salience, prioritization of a given policy goal and the government's commitment to that goal. These are surely variable, and the more accurate the analyst's expectations, the more effective planning will be. But to speak of a "government's commitment" is to personify and to individualize a complex and fluid process; thus such designations are likely

to convey a false sense of certainty. The analyst should carefully evaluate official statements about priorities and commitment. For example, planners and politicians of the country in question will doubtless seek to accomodate the donor's desire for certainty and their own need to see themselves in control of an orderly, rational process. Thus they are likely to exaggerate (perhaps unwittingly) the level of consensus and commitment to a specified policy. Reflection will also suggest that perhaps the last time an unambigious commitment to a widely shared priority existed in the United States was during World War II!

But one need not simply take any evaluation of regime commitment with a "grain of salt." Informed judgment should rest upon a contextual analysis which includes the regime's previous record, the political stake of leaders in the policy and the extent of consensus among major political actors regarding the nature (meaning, impact) and the desirability of such a goal. Clearly one must first consider the source of a pronouncement. For example, one would not weight the assertion in the 1978 FAO (Food and Agricultural Organization) policy study of Mali that Mali is committed to liberalization in food marketing as heavily as the Prime Minister Diouf's promises for ONCAD's reform in his important speech to the National Assembly of Senegal:

> ONCAD (the state marketing structure) will undergo a profound reform apart from the imperatives of improvement in management. Certain activities have been or will be transferred to structures better able to master them, that is, to cooperatives and to the private sector" (speech of Dec. 19, 1979, my translation).

Diouf clearly has some significant stake in such a claim, and he has also made a direct appeal for political support to proponents of the cooperatives and of the private sector. Given the highly significant declarations of President Senghor that the new Prime Minister will henceforth have real power in domestic policy, any such declaration must generate real interest. On the other hand, a knowledge of Senegalese political history, and particularly the attempts well over a decade long to reform ONCAD, lessens the weight of the claim. The Sengalese leadership has long been vocally concerned with ONCAD's visible failures, and has also adopted a similar conciliatory tone toward the private sector since the mid-sixties (see Schumacher). In contrast, an assertion (re Malian liberalization) from the FAO study tells us little until we know the documentation and political analysis underlying that assertion.

Because any political system may be assumed resistant to policy innovation, even a leader's public declarations may be a poor guide to future policy. However, a leader's credibility within his government, and particularly the executive bureaucracy, is a significant variable. Diouf's ascent to the Prime Ministership of Senegal may be regarded as marking less of a change than, for example, Echeverria's election to the Presidency of Mexico. Diouf is an old hand in Sengalese ministerial politics and has himself been Minister of Agriculture under Senghor, while Echeverria's election marked a real change from the predecessor's politics. Thus the bureaucrats in Mexico's CONASUPO (Compania Nacional de Subsistencias Populares; National Staple Products Co.) reportedly believed strongly in President Echeverria's

commitment to policy change regarding marketing and agricultural assistance, and acted upon their belief that the President's political support of new policy meant that their career advancement depended upon team implementation of that policy (see Grindle). This suggests that bureaucratic implementors of a policy must believe in leadership commitment and that their professional interest must be dependent upon implementation of the policy in question.

The analyst of regime commitment to a policy must also recall a leader's need to assess continually the political support he has for a particular policy. In addition, moderately divergent expectations about the policy's ramifications and impact may well favor the formation of a coalition favoring the necessary resource allocation. For example, the president of the Ivory Coast maximized the visibility of his 1975 pronouncement that achieving Ivoirian self-sufficiency in rice production would not only protect all consumers, but that it would permit the (previously disfavored) northern peasant to enjoy profits equivalent to those of the prosperous southern coffee and cocoa producer. Yet elaboration of the plan subsidizing rice production made clear that more prosperous residents in the southern Gagnoa-Daloa region could, by growing rice, benefit as much as the residents of the Korhogo region in the north. Thus the policy is not clearly aimed at either income generation or income redistribution. This ambiguity may well have generated wider political support for the considerable subsidies required than if the plan had been seen as benefiting the north alone. Stated in another manner, an unambigiously redistributive

policy favoring the poorer north well might have generated a political cleavage which was avoidable by pursuing a distributive policy (see the discussion of Lowi above). Because the Gagnoa-Daloa region has been politically recalcitrant toward President Houphouet-Boigney's regime, considerable political gain may have resulted from their inclusion in the rice program. Simultaneously, the purported redistributional nature of the policy gained the support of northerners and others believing that attention to the regional imbalance in Ivoirian development was long overdue.

To some extent, these considerations turn the question of regime commitment around to an assessment of political feasibility. Asking what the policy's enactment will mean in terms of resource allocation, who will foot the bill, who benefits, and how directly, introduces an element of political realism to the commitment question. Clearly a politically "easy" policy will require less mobilization of political resources than one generating political opposition. Furthermore, leadership may define the policy in a way less than optimal for the planner seeking an unambiguous definition of the policy, or an economist calculating maximum social profitability, because that definition decreases his political costs or risk. Such politically guided behavior may indicate commitment and effective leadership (or political entrepreneurship) favoring policy implementation in the long run.

II. Radical redistributive reformulations of development strategy

The Basic Human Needs approach described in the IFPRI articles and the argument in Food for Development: A Food Aid Policy (see Chapter One, p. 5,8) are examples of radical departures in development strategy. The CRED study's recommendations for marked liberalization of food marketing in the Sahel is also a case in point, to the extent that it advocates the complete dismantling of state marketing structures (rather than modifying state activities). It is argued in Chapter One that (1) the asserted imperative that leaders must respond to the threat of starvation is unconvincing and (2) that policies dependent for success upon the complete reversal of current national policy are self-defeating, because substantial alterations in the current allocation of resources, social status and political power are improbable.

The argument that leaders must adopt a radical response to pending disaster is ambiguous. It is perhaps a humanitarian plan, or perhaps an argument that leaders will see the imperative that they must reallocate resources to avert future famine and disaster in order to avoid overthrow by the victims of starvation. And yet it appears that the very poor and those most devastated by famine are not those capable of bringing political pressures forcing a radical change in regime policy. To the contrary, a regime's political survival acts as a limitation upon leaders' "humanitarian" response regarding the avoidance of future disaster. Revolutions and violent overthrow of regimes are

rarely caused by the response of the very poor to catastrophic conditions. Starvation is not a likely precedent of political activism, and its more usual manifestation is physical debilitation, the spread of disease, and death for the young, the old, and the least healthy.

The devastation of economic disasters, particularly droughts, are clearly unequally distributed. In the Sahel it was the pastoralists inhabiting the most marginal lands and the urban populations whose food supply was most threatened. The pastoralists had apparently neither the internal organizational resources nor the ability to ally with other less privileged groups in the society to mount a political or military threat. The urban poor appear also to have lacked the political capability to effectuate change.

Nelson's research on the urban poor offers a relevant if gloomy argument and explanation (Nelson in Uphoff and Ilchman, eds., p. 197; also Nelson, 1979). She attacks two theses predicting political violence and extremism among the urban poor in the Third World. First, Nelson finds little empirical grounds for the thesis that migrants to urban areas, suffering from shock and the disorientation of urban life, become victims of anomie, and turn to violence. Anomie produces extreme individuation (and possibly individual destruction) rather than the social organization required for political action. A second thesis looks to the urban born among the very poor as the source of radical political action. Here too Nelson argues that the empirical evidence is not persuasive, and that the propensity to political violence is not indicated by macro indices of

poverty. It is variables of social organization (particularly the ability of the urban poor to establish ties with established political organizations) which are predictors of political action. Thus the urban poor are not the probable source of urban turbulence and extremism; rather it is the middle strata, and often organized labor, who are precisely not the desperately poor.

Although a fuller political analysis is needed, Diori's overthrow by the military in Niger appears to be a case in point. Certainly the drought precipitated the coup, but it is certainly arguable that the population most devastated by the drought was not the immediate or proximate source of the upheaval. The politically relevant discontent was more probably due to profound dislocations in markets and the economic free-for-all among those seeking food for sale. Profound economic dislocations render regimes extremely vulnerable. But regime overthrow is very probably the result of disunity and breakdown among the rulers, which in turn provides an opportunity for a new group to take power. The ascendant group is not characterized by its objectively deplorable or oppressed condition, but rather by its organizational capability, permitting it to move into the political vacuum.

Whether the military intervened because of its outrage at mismanagement and corruption, at the fate of the starving, or the profiteering among the privileged and politically well situated may never be determined. Certainly moral outrage plays some role, and in this sense the military may act <u>for</u> the starving. But the combination of the regime's profiteering and

corruption, that is, its illegitimacy, and its disunity and inability to rule, provide the conditions essential to its overthrow. The starving poor are thus passive observers of the change.

This is not to argue that leaders in the Sahel were unimpressed by the '74-'75 drought. Both Diori's overthrow in Niger and the demonstrated inabilities of the other regimes effectively to meet the disaster provide very strong motivation to re-examine development strategies. Thus the drought provides conditions amenable to very significant changes in national development strategies. But leaders are very unlikely to embrace strategies which endanger their political support and survival by dramatically reallocating resources away from the privileged to the poor. A more probable (and politically rational) response is for a leader to attempt to retain the support of his past and present political coalition <u>and</u> to attempt to redirect resources toward food security. Political survival is thus a limitation upon a purely "humanitarian" response.

To argue that leaders will attempt to retain crucial political support is not to say that they are virtual prisoners of a privileged elite intolerant of any change. The "ruling class" or "dominant coalition" is unlikely to be a perfectly united, cohesive and inflexible body. It is best seen as a tentative arrangement among political actors with some divergent, if not competing, political interests. Thus the dominant coalition may be redefined. To the extent that leadership (or political entrepeneurship) finds ways to recruit new adherents while dropping some old ones, development strategy may be

altered to serve previously excluded groups. But no leader is capable of totally redefining his sources of political support in order to implement a radical departure in public policy.

Foreign aid should be considered among the political resources available to the leadership of recipient states. To the extent that aid permits the leader to channel resources to currently excluded groups without directly depriving major political supporters, aid broadens the political alternatives available to leaders. For example, the government of the Cameroon has accepted an AID project to develop a very poor region in the north of the Cameroon, although it is difficult to envision the government using its own scarce resources for the development of this area.

In summary, political survival places a limit upon dramatically redistributive policies and policies aimed at big shifts in economic strategy. Regimes are responsive to political demands, but these are not likely to come from the very poor. Nonetheless disasters like the drought are likely watersheds for change, prompting leaders to seek the political coalition required for an economically adaptive strategy. Foreign aid may provide a sorely needed resource with low internal political cost permitting reformist, but not radical, changes in resource allocation.

III. The political feasibility of liberalization and political analysis of private-public sector relations

Advocates of free market economics (e.g., the CRED study and the Bauer and Tickner articles discussed in Chapter One)

are often eloquent spokesmen concerning the ills of state intervention in West African states, especially in food markets. But these recommendations are not elaborated regarding how political support for liberalization can be mobilized. Rather than awaiting the dawn of economic rationality, contextual analysis of state interventionism and private-public sector relations would better inform the political feasibility and possible strategies of liberalization of marketing structures.

The economists' strong preference for decisively decreased state involvement appears compelling, given the generally poor performance of statal and parastatal structures in West Africa, particularly in domestic food markets. While political scientists are certainly not in agreement regarding the desirability of state intervention in markets, there are a substantial number of political scientists concerned with the sometimes stifling, monopolistic and unresponsive nature of contemporary centralized governments. Although it is far from clear that political scientists can invent recipes for "rolling back the state," much current research is exploring the political dynamics of state-private sector relations.

Whether we call it socialism or corporatism, the extensive economic role of ex-colonial new states (including those in West Africa) appears to contrast sharply with our own development experience. And many of these governments clearly use economic policy and state monopolies to generate revenue as well as to ensure the political dependence of economic sectors and groups, thus repressing centers of political competition. The "exploitive trader" theme, energetically debated by Bauer, Berg and Tichner

(see Chapter One) is used by political leaders, whether cynically or sincerely, to ally with popular sentiment among consumers and peasants against commercial middlemen.

The social marginality of middlemen in Africa appears to give this conflict a particularly tenacious character. Traders are often ethnically distinct from the local populations, and they often appear to use communal or ethnic ties to enhance reliability within the commercial sector, at the expense of increasing hostility among those who depend upon the economic functions they perform (see Abner Cohen). The antipathy between local populations and trading communities was perhaps enforced by the protection colonial governments provided for traders, and the trading communities' ties with the colonial commercial houses.

Yet, the political vulnerability of middlemen is not new or peculiar to the contemporary Third World. The ethnic component may be contributory, but the vital function middlemen play and the immediate nature of popular dependence upon them (for credit, for food staples, or for cash income) are surely as significant as cultural factors. Charles Tilly's analysis of food supplies and state formation in post-Renaissance Europe provides rich evidence. He opens with a quote from Manzoni's novel about seventeenth century Milan describing the consequences of the miserable harvest of 1628:

> ...And this particular harvest was not yet in when the provisioning of the army, and the waste that always comes with it, made such a dent in the harvest, that the shortage was felt at once, and with the shortage its unhappy, useful and inevitable effect, a rise in prices. But when the price rise reaches a certain level,

> people always begin to think that scarcity is not its cause. They forget that they discussed and predicted it; they suppose all of a sudden that there is enough grain, and that the trouble results from the fact that not enough is being sold...The hoarders of grain (real or imagined), the landlords who don't sell everything in one day, the bakers who buy, everyone who has a little, or is said to have a little, take the blame for the shortage and for the rise in prices...People implored the magistrates to take measures, measures which the crowd considers simple, just and certain to bring out the hidden, walled-up, buried grain, and to bring back plenty. The magistrates did do something: fixed the maximum price for various foodstuffs, threatened to punish those who refused to sell, and other edicts of the sort. Since such measures, however vigorous, do not have the virtue of diminishing the need for food, growing crops out of season, or attracting supplies from areas of surplus, the evil lasted, and grew. The crowd attributed that effect to the incompleteness and weakness of the remedies, and shouted for more generous and decisive ones (Manzoni 1966:311-313 quoted in Tilly, ed., p. 381).

Manzoni appears to agree with many economists' appraisal of unrealistic price fixing, for he says of the grand chancellor of Milan, who set the price at 33 lire instead of the actual market price of 80, "He acted like an old woman who makes herself young by changing her birth certificate." (Tilly, p. 381). Such historical analysis of state action does not provide cures, but it does illuminate the interrelationship of political and economic process.

During the 1960's political scientists studying the Third World were preoccupied with the relationship between economic development and political development--usually understood as pluralist democracy. General theories of modernization tended to see the political pluralism and economic liberalism of the British experience as inherent in successful economic growth, at least as it had occurred in Europe. The central concern with

political democracy as the dependent variable perhaps reduces the usefulness of this line of inquiry for our purposes; we shall not elaborate the ensuing debates about the meanings of democracy. More relevant here is the critical literature which suggests that the liberal state has been erroneously over-generalized into a theory of economic development, and that such a view was simply atypical of many contemporary industrialized states (although historically linked to pluralist democracy). Barrington Moore's Democracy and Totalitarianism: Lord and Peasant in the Modern World is among the best of these early dissenting views. Seeking to explain the emergence of democracy in Europe he describes early conflict between the landed elite and commercial forces. Liberal England is unquestionably very different from Prussia (or France), for rather than producing a nineteenth century conservative alliance between rye and steel supported by a conservative and defensive peasantry, England very early revolutionized small holding agriculture via the enclosures and gained a commercially-minded landed gentry. Thus England's industrial and commercial bourgeoisie did not become the secondary partner in an alliance with conservative landed interests as it did in Prussia.

Gerschenkron emphasizes the very much greater role of the central state among the "late developers" in his analysis of German and Russian development (Gerschenkron). Perry Anderson and Immanuel Wallerstein (although differing in some regards) emphasize the differences between Britain and the continental powers in the size, power and range of functions of the central state and its bureaucratic agents (Anderson, Wallerstein).

Thus economic development is not characterized in many (most?) cases by a "night watchman state" dominated by an ideologically liberal bourgeoisie protecting the free market. Rather the liberal state is the result of a particular confluence of historical circumstances in a few states where the absence of a consolidated alliance among particular groups produced a limited state and liberal economy. The historical relationship between economic liberalism and pluralist democracy is debatable, but it is certain that liberalism is not a prerequisite of economic success.

The writings of the 1970's focusing on the failures and inequities of Third World development (often grouped under the rubric of "dependency theory") are sharply critical of the liberal and/or Anglophilic assumptions underlying much of the development theory put forth in the 1960's. Some of this work in "dependency theory" draws upon the critical and revisionists writings on European economic development discussed above. However, to date most of such writings on Africa focus on the constraints (and even coercive forces) on African development imposed by industrialized states, MNC's (multi-national corporations) and the international market. If earlier work concentrated on political dynamics within African states, many dependency theorists have over-corrected in their emphasis on international forces. This concentration on the "commanding heights" of the national political economy and relations between national elites and international actors (MNC's, Western governments and, sometimes, Eastern bloc governments) is not irrelevant to the purposes of the essay. Such a perspective usefully directs the

political analyst to look for international actors which exert pressure on national policy makers, in support of, or opposition to, the policy goals or strategies under scrutiny. Nonetheless, for our purposes, most works applying dependency theory to Africa generalize prematurely and/or inadequately explore national level or subnational political processes.

The dependency theory debate has produced some pertinent research on the relationship of economic processes and political structures. Among Latin Americanists, the early dependencia views of scholars like Andre Gunther Frank (that foreign ties and investments block Third World economic progress) is now rejected by some arguing that the current international market and external economic ties can produce economic growth, but that this will occur under the tutelage of a politically conservative bureaucratic state (Frank). Thus economic success is not correlated with the liberalization of the state, or the reduced role of the national bureaucracy and its agents.

For example, O Donnell traces phases of economic development and their political correlates to discern the maturation of a relatively personalistic patrimonial political system into a "rational bureaucratic state." This bureaucratic state is deeply involved politically and controls access of private groups to national policy makers and national resources. In line with the analysis of the corporate state discussed above (p. 79), under this "bureaucratic authoritarianism," the national technocracy firmly regulates political access of new domestic challengers or represses them. The necessary leverage is provided by its interventionist role in the national economy. Thus for O'Donnell, the absence of liberalism and the night watchman state appears to

explain the failure of pluralist democracy, but not to explain the failure of economic growth. While O'Donnell's work has not been related explicitly to the European development experience, its emphasis on the state as economic innovator and manager is consistent with the greater role of the state among late developers in Europe such as Prussia.

O'Donnell's analysis concerns relatively developed states (Argentina and Brazil), and his theory is based upon the political response of these states to past international economic shifts (the 1920's, the Depression, World War II, the Korean War boom). Thus, because of the very low level of economic development in West Africa, no test of O'Donnell's long-term prognosis regarding the evolution of the authoritarian bureaucratic state in that region is possible. But O'Donnell's approach directs attention to the role of bureaucratic structures in defining government response to changing economic conditions and, through its protection of particular economic sectors and groups, in shaping subsequent political stratification. Thus, rather than treat government intervention as a single, unidimensional variable, analysis should examine government bureaucracies as determinants of differential political access.

Students of African politics have not typically focused on this type of question for a number of reasons. Initially Africanist political scientists explored the fate of competitive democracy and democratic procedures within the dominant single-party state. They generally took for granted the argument that the states must assume a major role in fostering and financing economic development because the private sector lacked capital savings. And they have typically debated broad strategies of agricultural versus industrial development, without exploring the

differences in state resource allocation within this broad dichotomy. Other analyses have focused on the success or failure of projects or sectors favored by government development strategy, or lamented the fate of the largely forgotten "traditional" producers. The political process leading regimes to select particular sectors has been inadequately addressed, although the material deprivation of "forgotten" sectors has received increasing note. There has been more description of the gap between regime rhetoric and promises, and performance, than explanation of it. The "facts" of government ineffectiveness and economic and political stagnation have been documented. But the process of regime resource allocation has received little detailed treatment. For example, a study of bureaucratic corruption generalizes to the entire system, rather than seeking explanation in the particular role of the given bureaucratic branch (Price).

The concern with political economy and dependency has attracted considerable attention among Africanists only recently. Thus Africanists' analyses of dependency have lagged behind Latin Americanists'. Africanists too often fail to go beyond Andre Gunther Frank's highly rhetorical but empirically questionable type of analysis, or an over-narrow emphasis on international forces and actors as determinants of LDC national elites' purportedly anti-development behavior. Discussions of the political impact of the international market and MNC's have failed to distinguish the situation and options of elites in countries with major petroleum or mineral export resources, and those dependent largely on agricultural exports for foreign exchange. Thus there has been a tendency to generalize inappropriately from the nexus of economic resources and political

privilege in Zaire or Zambia to all African states.

Agricultural exporters have not been unaffected by the preferences of international investors or seduction by international forms specializing in agro-industry. But the absence of a mineral-based gravy train has kept these regimes more dependent upon the rural producer. The bureaucratic structures and interests generated to promote agricultural growth are very different from the state's intervention in mineral extraction. The greater dependence on agricultural producers has certainly not made them everywhere effective in the agricultural sector, but the impact of such failures is inevitably very different when no lucrative mineral export insulates the regime.

Agricultural producers such as Ghana, Kenya, the Ivory Coast and Senegal need more careful comparative analysis with respect to the public and private sector's role in different areas of economic activity, and the political relationship between economic sectors. The Ivory Coast and Ghana have been usefully compared, but the primary emphasis has been on the conservatism, neo-colonialism, or gradualism of the Ivory Coast, and the contrasting virtues or vices of Ghana's political leadership (see Foster and Zolberg). "Leadership strategies" tend to be taken as given, or explained by leaders' personalities, rather than explored as the result of political processes.

The often proclaimed "liberalism" of the Ivory Coast ill describes much of that political economy. "Liberalism" is a useful designation if it is understood to mean the leaderships' willingness to rely on individual economic self-interest as the motor of development and the choice to maximize economic

growth at the expense of alternative goals such as political transformation of the "colonial mentality." But "liberalism" does not describe other significant (conservative) traits of the country's leadership: a pronounced political paternalism, a willingness to sacrifice Third World political purity to trade with South Africa, or an extensive dependence on French technical assistance in the bureaucracy and French management in much of the private sector. Most importantly, the term "liberalism" is highly misleading if it is understood to mean a low level of government investment, a preference for private sector Ivoirian firms over statals and parastatals, or a low level of civil service growth or low visibility of the national bureaucracy throughout development efforts. The economic success of the Ivory Coast does appear to be explained by the absence of the most destructive aspects of political patronage, the pilfering of public coffers, and the bureaucratic chaos observed in early post-independence Ghana. Doubtless, Ghana continues to suffer from the overnight Africanization and dramatic economic ventures introduced by Nkrumah; the relative absence of these phenomena in the Ivory Coast is better attributed to Ivoirian gradualism than to liberalism. This gradualism needs to be analytically separated from state intervention per se in economic affairs. An examination of Ivoirian development strategy reveals extensive use of centralized national planning and numerous parastatals in industry, commerce and agriculture. This is not to say that Ivoirian statism has always served economic development, but rather that the country's relatively impressive economic record must be analyzed in the light of this interventionism.

The politics of economic planning and the political ramifications of state activism in the economy creates the conditions in which a vision of unified "rational" centralized decision-making process must give way to a certain fragmentation or pluralization of political forces. A favored sector, in which productivity results from the allocation of scarce resources, is very likely to become a source of heightened political demands. New political forces thus undermine the central planners' ability to redirect resources toward other less developed sectors or regions. This fragmentation or pluralization of interests is not peculiar to the liberal economy; it occurs both within government bureaucracy and in the private sector. In American politics, the triangle of "private government" (described by Lowi, see above) includes the private sector lobby, the relevant administrative agency and sympathetic congressmen. Where central planning is far more ambitious, the dominance of executive over legislative branches unquestionable, private sector interest groups are more dependent upon, and more closely tied to, the national bureaucracy. Here the arenas of activity will differ, as will the relative political clout of the members of the alliance. But the politics of resource allocation will certainly undermine the cohesion of the best-laid national plan or development project. This then is the direction which political feasibility analysis should take regarding agricultural production and price policy in West Africa.

In summary, the liberal state has not, even in Europe, been the only framework within which economic growth has occurred,

and economic development today appears still more likely to take place within the context of extensive state intervention. This general argument does not address the particular problems of food staple marketing. Nor is it intended to deny the very significant barriers to development posed by the poor performance of public institutions in West African food markets. However, wholesale liberalization is not a practicable solution; policy recommendations should be based upon realistic expectations about the marginal nature of feasible liberal reform.

Project design should thus be guided (1) by comparative research on government's role in economic development and (2) better analysis of the political forces favoring interventionism in West Africa. Comparative research on markets and marketing may reveal a range of marketing arrangements in mixed economies, and thus possible marginal reforms to be pursued. (For example, Yugoslavia and Poland have experimented with varying private-public combinations in food production and marketing (see Horvat, also Bergmann). The analysis of past and present food price and marketing policy and practice in West African states will suggest the nature and strength of political ideas and group interests (inside and outside public bureaucracies) impinging upon food policy reform. This dual approach will yield insight regarding strategies of partial liberalization which are compatible with institutional and political interests in West African states.

IV. The analysis of interest groups' impact upon a given policy or project is needed to anticipate the probable alteration of the policy/project through the selection/implementation process.

The incremental nature of policy formation due to the inevitable delegation of decision-making to bureaucrats and resultant fragmentation of initial intent has been discussed above (see pp. 71-73). Students of American politics such as Lowi are highly suggestive regarding the variable relationship between policy types and (1) the political forces and conflicts these policy types will evoke and (2) the arenas in which these forces will be manifest. In the studies of American politics, emphasis is predictably upon the relationship of policy formation both to political parties and narrower interests, and to the role of Congress as distinct from the executive and its administrative agencies. It has been noted that Third World legislatures are much less vital and significant in this process, and that regimes may play a far greater role in sponsoring (and thus defining) or repressing the groups and interests which participate in decision-making (see p. 79 re corporatism above).

Defenders of pluralist democracy and the legislative branch emphasize the essential nature of group freedom and access to the decision-making process for effective, representative government. Critics of democratic pluralism often lament the resulting fragmentation and incoherence of policy, and long for some effective, authoritative, and rational central structure which can mastermind public affairs. But, while the problems of

group repression, freedom of organization, etc. may be essential preconditions of democracy, whether less pluralist/democratic systems achieve greater coherence in policy formation is far from clear.

The policy process in West Africa is not adequately known, but several informed guesses may be made about forces impinging on policy. The proponents of the one party state have argued for unity of purpose, but the evidence suggests that imposed unity breeds factionalism. In other words, the unified party has ever greater difficulty in aggregating interests into broad programs or options than do two-party or multi-party coalition systems. (This is presumably because they try to encompass a greater diversity of interests and because the absence of competition removes the incentive to aggregate interests within political parties or coalitions). Secondly the evidence is persuasive that in West Africa the single party (or no-party) governments are far less able to impose an effective definition of national purpose than more effectively centralized one-party systems in which the Leninist model of party as elite (or vanguard) prevails (e.g., in China and in the Soviet Union). Thus in West Africa it is certainly anticipated that diverse and particularistic interests play a significant role in the policy process.

Interest groups in West Africa are less likely to be formal, public, and visible groups. Regime efforts to limit and structure political interests through the affiliation of specified associational groups to the national party appear to render such groups ineffective as representatives of members'

interests. "Workers," "merchants and traders," and "women" are categories too broad and deficient in social cohesion meaningfully to express their members' concerns. Thus one may expect these groups to be dominated by subsets of each designated membership category, and that such interests generally seek influence by unofficial, informal channels. Therefore the difficulty of assessing <u>who</u> is being represented by a particular argument or position will be particularly great. However, this problem concerns the analyst of democratic representation more than it does the analyst of predictable policy distortion. More significant in the present context is that the <u>diversity</u> of views and interests impinging on the political process is expected to be considerable. These pressures will be manifested within the councils of the national party and throughout the executive branch and its ancillary agencies.

"Interest group analysis" suggests a seductive simplicity if we assume that relevant actors are visible lobbyists (thus organized and representing relatively specific interests) seeking to persuade legislators by trading funds and votes for support. In such a multi-sided tug of war, the determination of each interest groups' resources (size and zeal of group membership, material resources) would permit a vector analysis in which the direction and force of every interest results in the direction (i.e., policy content) of the combined forces. However, as suggested above, complicating factors must be taken into account. The analyst must define interests or group goals and the parameters of relevant groups, political resources and thus political access. This analysis must be performed in a

context in which popular voting is not even a partial constraint on actors, and the arena or point of political access is located somewhere in the maze of executive structures and administrating agencies.

Determining the context of group interests is sometimes seen as logically deducible from the impact of a given policy on specifiable publics. Thus the WARDA study suggests that consumers, taxpayers, farmers and governments dispensing budgets have certain preferences or interests ("The Political Economy of Rice: A Summary," p. 46, also Chapter One, above). This deduction of the parameters and the political goals of interest groups from the policy's projected impact may err in two ways. First, the content of group preferences may not parallel the economist's projected impact of the policy because group preferences emerge through political processes. Second the cohesion of affected groups will be variable (e.g., consumers vs producers) and the politically relevant groups may be a subset of the population effected (e.g., progressive farmers as a subset of all farmers).

A group's political preferences will not always be deducible from a group's objective situation. Politics involves a longitudinal process; political coalitions involve compromises by member groups, and past decisions and political alliances limit the range of possible coalitions, and thus the policies coalitions can pursue. Gourevich examines the international recession of the 1870's and 80's and the subsequent tariff acts in Germany, France, Great Britain and the US, to explore the explanatory power of economic ideology, economic interests and group political

behavior (Gourevich). He argues persuasively that (1) no interest group got its best outcome (e.g., for Prussian industrialists, high industrial tariffs and low agricultural tariffs), and (2) that a particular groups' interests are subject to variable definition (e.g., William Jennings Bryan would have done better with potential allies in eastern cities if he had selected a party platform plank other than Free Silver). The author elaborates the variable role of leadership in coalition formation (Bismarck and leaderless France), and emphasizes the long term impact of the political coalitions formed in this watershed period. His rich analysis shows how the political process shapes not only political outcomes, but the interplay between a groups' political opportunities and its perceived (or politically relevant) "interests."

Gourevich's findings apply to a "grand policy question," one which was highly visible throughout the society, affecting every group in the society and requiring political coalition for resolution. Certainly many policy questions involve far fewer interests, and are settled in contexts permitting a pork barrel decision, which minimizes the need to redefine or compromise interests (see discussion of Lowi above). One need not discard the economists' objective definitions of group interests, but rather use them as a point of departure to be shaped by knowledge of a group's past and probable future perception of the impact of the policy in question.

The analyst must not assume that all groups upon whom the policy will impact are those which will be politically activated. "Bureaucracy," "consumers," and "producers" are not on equal political footing. Indeed the designated categories may not

accurately define the parameters of politically relevant groups. Interest groups may be variously defined by the sociological characteristics of members, their shared attitudes and, their organizational characteristics (Thompson in Golembiewski, et. al., pp. 576-602). A good illustration of this ambiguity is the "civil servant" group reputed to have a considerable impact on policy (particularly the maintenance of low producer prices) in West Africa. In terms of social characteristics, they are an educated urbanized group, sometimes predominantly drawn from the ethnic group or region which enjoyed early access to European schooling. Secondly, such characteristics may be presumed to result in shared attitudes--regarding, for example, taxes on income and imported consumer goods, public housing. Thirdly, civil servants in most African states are an organized and officially recognized group. However their professional organization may be sectioned in grades, or occupational groups, such as pedagogues, health workers, etc.

Group organization, actual presence, pressure exerted on decision makers, and policy outcomes reflecting the group's interest are the most satisfactory evidence of political influence. But such evidence may be difficult to obtain, so that the analyst must depend upon indirect measures to infer political influence. Shared social characteristics and shared attitudes are such indirect measures because they are pre-conditions of group pressure. But the analyst must take account of decision makers' possible anticipation of group response. This may include anticipation that latent groups will become manifest (e.g., urban rioters). More likely the anticipation will lie with decision-makers' response to past experience of a group's

active presence at the "bargaining table." In these two instances, organization and an active political presence may not be required for a group to influence decisional outcomes.

The analytic confusion in determining the interests and impact of a group enjoying as many attributes favoring political access and responsiveness as do civil servants is suggested by their frequent designation as a "class." While this designation leaves ill-defined the nature of processes by which political influence is achieved, the evidence that African civil servants are privileged abounds. They enjoy job security and often subsidized housing. The expansion of bureaucratic structures ensuring employment for their children and relations may be the source of policies virtually ensuring that individuals attaining a certain educational level obtain government employment. Senegal's proposed 1980 fiscal reforms include a [illegible]% increase for the lower civil service, contrasting with a single SMIG (or minimum guaranteed salary) increase of 25% for private sector employees (Prime Minister Diouf's speech of Dec. 19, 1979). Food price policies favorable to consumers are often attributed to civil servant pressures (although the CIRD study debates the assumption that food price policies have been favorable to urban consumers).

Are there examples in which public policy is unfavorable to civil servants as a group? Can one trace policy bias to specific intervention by the Civil Servants Association? Or to evidence of protest by civil servants? Or can one assume that because civil servants are the administrative branch, public policy will reflect their interests without manifest political pressure? Or

is it rather that powerful groups need not always actively articulate specific interests, because decision-makers anticipate their response?

The examination of outcomes is certainly one source of evidence regarding the presence or absence of group influence. If a group is consistently favored in a particular policy area, it may perhaps be assumed that such a bias will impinge on future policy. But this assumption does not explain the source of bias (e.g., organized political threats, pressure, or anticipation). In addition, whether or not a policy favors the group in question and other group introduces new questions about the causes. For example, urban food price policy effects all urban residents. Does this mean that they all are politically organized? That governments anticipate and fear urban protest and violence (Joan Nelson's argument notwithstanding; see p. 89 above)? That civil servants have protected themselves politically, so that other urban groups are getting a "free ride"? As noted above (p. 41, Chapter One), in Mali, civil servants alone can buy low-price rice from the Office du Niger via cooperatives: thus here they are privileged relative to other urbanites as well as producers. Such an outcome is stronger, although still indirect, evidence of civil servants' influence on a policy favoring a larger group of which civil servants are a part. But evidence of actual intervention in some public or private decision-making, or a statement by a decision maker regarding his concern with a group's response, would be a direct, and thus preferable, indicator of causality.

The several criteria of political influence by "interest

groups" are all useful, but none determining. Shared sociological traits are only preconditions of political influence, as are shared attitudes and goals. Common attitudes and goals must culminate in political organization in order for political influence to occur. Thus political organization is a far more significant precondition of influence.

Interest group organization is notably difficult to achieve. Political science and sociology are rich in material on the difficulties of attaining on-going organization. The relationship between membership and individual benefits (Olson; Binswanger and Rutann), the salience of group goals to individuals and the individual effort or cost required by membership, the barriers of membership participation within hierarchical organizations and the possible decline of leadership responsiveness (Mosca) are some of the variables effecting internal group cohesion and organizational effectiveness. External political access--whether through coalition or independent action--also affects internal group processes and group maintenance by providing incentives for continued group membership. Finally multi-functionality probably enhances group maintenance. Thus a group providing social and affective rewards to members, or facilitating the conduct of business, in addition to lobbying political decision-makers, puts less weight on the group's ability to deliver material political rewards to the group and to the individual.

These criteria can be usefully applied to West African categories other than civil servants. For example, farmers share certain objective characteristics. Attitudinal unity will

also be present, although economic characteristics varying by region are likely to introduce some diversity of politically relevant goals. Organization of an inclusive nature is unlikely because of the absence of social interaction, diversity of economic needs, and cultural (often ethnic) diversity. Researchers agree that marketing boards in West Africa do not respond to farmers' interests, and that cooperatives have not become a base of political action for farmers.

The apparent absence of a agricultural agency--constituency political alliance in African marketing boards has been noted above (Chapter One, Section B, pp. 22-30). However this may vary between states, and within states, between regions. (For example, richer regions, contributing more to the national budget, are less likely to be forgotten; and their far greater representation among the educated, urbanized, and particularly among bureaucrats, may give these farmers an advantage over farmers in poorer and subsistence farming regions). Thus the politically relevant groups are likely to be limited at the outset by socio-cultural and ecological boundaries. More probably political access is through locality-specific personalistic patronage ties, which tend to increase the competitive rather than collective dimension of interests and tactics.

In summary, farmers' political influence is generally expected to be low, an expectation supported by policy impact or outcome indicators. However an analyst of project or policy feasibility should explore the nature and strength of rural patronage networks. Political access by locality is likely to

be highly variable, dependent on the presence of patrons with political access, whether politicians, ethnic or religious notables.

Middlemen are a third category directly affected by food price policy. Here a distinction must be made between large European firms, indigenous wholesalers and buyers. The conflict between these private sector groups and the statal or parastatal firms created to displace them has been discussed above (p. 49,C). The private sector is generally regarded as politically weak, although its internal organization and the extent of state-private sector conflict appears variable between states. In the Ivory Coast the commercial sector is relatively favored, although competitive relations between African traders and truckers, Lebanese merchants, and European firms overshadows shared interests they might have. In Senegal the regime has tried regularly to reassure the private sector, both Senegalese and European, while pursuing monopolistic buying policies. However, the nature of formal organization or political unity in this sector is not known. Mali is surely the political environment most hostile to private commercial interests. French firms are practically non-existent, although an American firm has financed a public sector trucking "cooperative." The dioula (commercants or traders) were directly attacked by Kieta's regime. They have fared only marginally better under the successor regime, and, as noted above, are reported to have played a role in the most recent coup.

The analyses of middlemen as an interest group should be carried beyond policy impact and evidence of bureaucratic bias

against them. Their presence or absence as a pressure group in decision-making should also be determined. Because of the economically critical nature of their activities, truckers and traders are likely to have some official representative structure (there are often two, one for truckers, one for traders). The internal cohesion and representational effectiveness of the organization will be a function of internal factors and the responsiveness of the national political environment in question. For example, because of relatively easy entry, high social status among the uneducated, and high bankruptcy rates, trucking is conducive to strong individualistic competition not always compatible with collective action. However, truckers' mobility lends them a social identity and social networks conducive to shared goals and group action. In contrast, small traders buying grains from peasant producers in the Sahel constitute (according to the CRED report) a sector of easy entry and high marginality. Many farmers engage in part-time trading. These conditions are expected to be unconducive to a collective identity and collective action.

Such internal structural variation among truckers and traders interacts with government responsiveness to the group to determine their political effectiveness. In the Ivory Coast, government's greater dependence on private sector trucking and trading makes the government more open to such groups' demands than in less liberal neighboring states. Government responsiveness becomes an incentive to group organization. Where state marketing policy is monopolistic or monopsonistic, this incentive for middlemen's collective action is absent. This does not mean,

however, that middlemen do not affect policy implementation. Individual truckers and traders will surely seek to divert government policy through collaborative arrangements with local administrators--a form of interest representation, although individualistic and competitive rather than organized and collective.

The varied ways in which civil servants can influence policy have been discussed above. However, the range of specific interests held by sub-groups (ministries, public corporations, agencies) within the executive bureaucracy deserves emphasis. Where the executive branch clearly dominates the legislature and party in both proposal and elaboration of policy (as well, of course, as implementation), its relative impact increases. And where the bureaucracy is large and differentiated, one may presume the number of sub-agency interests to increase accordingly.

A politically informed chart of national public administration must be elaborated on the basis of the past performance of administrative structures in a particular state. One can only estimate the probable response of particular ministries or agencies to the policy question at hand on the basis of past behavior, particularly past behavior regarding policy questions similar to that at hand. But some important relationships can be anticipated and thus explored empirically. For example, the Ministries of Finance and of Plan, because of the scope of their responsibilities, are strongly competitive in France and in West Africa. In France and the Ivory Coast, the trend has been for the Ministry of Finance to undercut the power of the Ministry of Planning; the extent to which this is true in Senegal

or Mali--or anglophone Gambia--is not known. The functionally specific ministries concerned--Agriculture, Industry, Commerce, Transport--can also be expected to have divergent interests, resulting from their divergent views about "what works best" as well as their concern with maintenance and increase of their respective "territories."

In addition to inter-ministerial competition, internal ministerial politics will impact upon policy choice. One ministry frequently houses agencies which compete regarding resources, and thus policy definition. Agricultural ministries will vary in the relative power of their internal agencies like public corporations or parastatals involved in agro-industry and extension work to peasant farmers. A state marketing agency or commercial chain may be the primary "asset" of a functionally specific ministry or a vehicle of the Ministry of Finance (e.g., the foodstore chain, Agripac, a client parastatal of Finance in the Ivory Coast). Ministries sponsoring and controlling such parastatals are likely to be hostile to competition from the private sector. However, ministries may champion the private sector in one context, while in another context they and their dependent agencies are likely to compete for control of the public sector, as illustrated by the chaotic overlap between agencies in the implementation of the 1974 reforms in Upper Volta.

Analysis will usefully focus on the political clout of "superagencies" (like Senegal's ONCAD and Mali's SOMIEX /Societe Malienne d'imports et d'exports, Malica Import and Export Company/) and the locus of their competitors. SOMIEX,

because of the range of its functions in produce purchasing and distribution of imports (consumer items and agricultural inputs) appears to have numerous detractors. Its board of directors' lament in 1974 implies perception of an opposing coalition.

> To manage an entity like SOMIEX in the Malian context is an external struggle...-a struggle with administrative authorities who intrude themselves into the management of SOMIEX's affairs...Not satisfied with their given task of inspection and surveillance, they want to take the place of our own agents in dealing with problems which they are not trained to handle. We are treated like thieves, traffickers in stolen goods, wreakers of starvation, and everywhere threats proliferate... (CNRD, Vol. II., p. 65).

The identity of these opponents, their locus in (as well as outside) administrative structures, and the real extent of shared goals among them begs for analyses. Finally it is possible (although unlikely) that "superagencies" may happily drop certain functions, because of their chronic deficitory condition or because of the political hostility the superagency's performance has elicited.

A recapitulation of the discussion of interest group analysis thus far reveals many obstacles to "hard" empirical findings and thus to prediction. The parameters defining an interest group may be indirect and inferential (i.e., shared characteristics or attitudes). Furthermore, an organized presence is not always a prerequisite of political influence, as decision makers may anticipate opposition. The content of a group's politically relevant "interests" may or may not reflect the economists' (impact-based) objective deductions, depending on the nature of preceding political alliances and internal group structure. Also where open opposition is not

tolerated (as in much of West Africa), dissenters are likely to re-define and moderate their demands so that they are approximately consistent with regime rhetoric and policy preference.

"Integrated policy analysis technique" (INPAT), proposed by a noted student of American public policy, provides a useful guide, provided that the user grasps the dangers of over schematization (Starling, p. 386, see p. 121). Like most analytic charts, it tends to conceal the overlap and the constant feedback between categories. Secondly applying it to West African settings may be more misleading or difficult than its use in the American context. Who "participants" or actors are (see INPAT Chart) is not always self-evident. Unless the policy type fits Lowi's "distributive" category (short run disaggregated decisions with no losers in a logrolling process), "participants' issue position" will be a function of past political alliances and the larger cleavages within the polity (see INPAT Chart, also the adaptation of Lowi, on p. 75). The boundaries of groups constituting the "participant" category may be deceptive because many organizations represent not the collective interests of all members, but rather than the goals of a more powerful subset in the group. (This distortion will be greater in West Africa, where officially recognized groups are notably artificial). Similarly an administrative participant, such as a ministry, may defend the interests of one or another agency under its direction. Nor is political power solely the outcome of a group's calculated "natural, physical, symbolic, informational and skill resources," but also of actors' decisions to mobilize those resources and to use them in alliances.

Integrated political analysis technique (INPAT)

Table II

Participants*	Analysis of motivations, beliefs, and roles	Issue position (A)	Issue relevance (B)	Analysis of material, physical symbolic, informational, and skill resources	Political power (C)	Total support (A) × (B) × (C)

Participants may also be "silent," i.e. groups whose responses are anticipated. Their "silent presence" will not be recognized or equally weighted by all actors in the process. In West Africa, the possible response of latent groups (such as food rioters) is almost certainly less salient than the threatening and volatile armed forces. Also, participants may be active in several different arenas (again, a greater problem for analysis in West Africa, where salience of the American bargaining process between the executive and congress has no clear analogue).

One could elaborate further the complexities of each category and the interrelations between them. But it should be clear that the possibility of assigning weights to each category, and then totalling them, as INPAT's creator intends, is far from self-evident. INPAT is heuristically useful if used as a check list and a spur to critical reflection regarding overlap and feedback of categories when applied to the empirical data at hand. But prediction will still be necessarily tentative because analysis depends upon extensive knowledge of the politics of past policy questions, judgment and inference regarding empirical indicators (again more elusive in West Africa), and then extrapolation to the policy issue at hand. Feasibility analysis can hardly be a "scientific" process under these conditions. But it is nonetheless vitally important if policy goal attainment is to be maximized.

V. Institutional capacity, particularly in public administrative structures, parastatals and public corporations is not adequately treated in the studies reviewed. In one case, national

levels of education are given as an index of administrative capacity with regard to agricultural extension and other specific functional structures (WARDA study). Such a macro-index is not a sound indicator of the depth and strength of personnel in a specific sector, and certainly does not assess the performance of specific agencies relevant to policy goals. Other studies discuss the inefficiency and even counter-productive nature of state structures such as domestic food purchasing and marketing agencies (see discussion of CMED study, also Bauer, Chapter One, Sections IIIB and IVA.). Their continual deficits and negative impact on private commerce as well as their unpopularity among farmers lead some economists to the conclusion that they must be abolished or their functions drastically reduced. Whatever the merits of this perspective, the political barriers to massive liberalization of the economy render these harsh evaluations of limited use to the project designer. As noted above, bureaucracies are everywhere very tenacious and they will prove particularly so in West Africa. Originating under colonial administrations in order to maximize control, they have been reformed and expanded in response to a new governments' desire to transform society according to the visions of synoptic planners and political nationalists. They now furnish secure employment for the largest privileged urban strata in these societies which will predictably resist their abolition. Thus a realistic project design should seek to alter and perhaps limit market functions of such structures, but not seek their dissolution.

Nor is there grounds for confidence that the questions of

institutional capacity will be adequately treated in project design, once the economists have completed their studies of the sector in question. Although a statement of institutional capacity is required in AID projects, it tends to be perfunctory and superficial. An examination of agencies' recurring costs is typically used as the measure of the adequacy of its performance, with the resultant proviso that if technicians are needed, training will be supported by the donor. This procedure does not assess the internal functioning and external impact of the institution, and thus does not adequately provide for internal remedies or for redefinition of functions. Secondly, once the "institutional capacity statement" is taken care of in the project paper, the tendency is to assume that the question is resolved, and the entire problem is not reintroduced.

Economists' thinking on this matter appears somewhat contradictory. They argue that the policy study and recommendations should be done first, and once the optimal strategy has been determined, the appropriate institutions should be located or created. This trivializes the significance of administrative agencies in project implementation. If Uma Lele is correct that "administrative services are all too often a bigger restraint than finances" (quoted in Tickner), institutional capacity should be a primary and significant concern in project feasibility study and design. Although political scientists have not been oblivious to the problems of inadequate administrative capacity, they have not established a coherent theoretical literature or a tested body of problem solutions. Political scientists writing on LDC politics have long lamented the widespread corruption and/or

inefficiency of LDC bureaucracies. But they are not in agreement regarding what would be desirable and how to attain that end. Some prefer a British sytle civil service. But such a model cannot readily be achieved because its presumed political neutrality is seen as the fruit of a very long and gradual development which is the antithesis of the rapid bureaucratic growth and changing tumultuous environment of ex-colonial states. Others reject this quest for an a-political civil service, and, stressing the privileged status and conservative bias of civil servants, seek a Leninist solution. Pretense of neutrality is thus to be replaced by profound commitment to revolutionary goals with the civil service as part of the vanguard leading the society. This is attainable only through a thorough revolutionary upheaval. Still others have been optimistic about the potential of military regimes to implement plans necessary for economic and social transformation. But, despite their presumed virtues of hierarchy, discipline, and identification with the nation, the empirical evidence generally proves military regimes to do no better than their civilian predecessors.

If a coherent view of bureaucracies capable of generating practical ameliorative measures has not been developed in comparative politics, neither has the field of public administration been united and unidirectional in its development. Public administration is an ill-integrated sub-field of political science. It is marked by an ambivalence leading it to seek autonomy from political science at one time, to seek to participate fully in and influence the development of political science at others. A very brief and necessarily incomplete sketch of the development

of public administration as a discipline will suggest its internal diversity. It will also show the range of sub-fields which should be explored in the search for insights and solutions to Third World administrative problems.

The 1930's were a period of confidence and prestige for "administrative science" in the United States. The belief that the study of human organization yielded principles of a technical nature, "irrespective of the purpose of the enterprise, the personnel comprising it, or any constitutional, political or social theory underlying its creation" (Urwick, 1937, quoted in Henry, p 32). The seven principles of administration yielded the anogram POSDCORB, standing for Planning, Organizing, Staffing, Directing, Coordinating, Reporting, and Budgeting. This certainty of purpose was exploded in 1947 by Herbert Simon's landmark critique of public administration, Administrative Behavior. Subsequent dissenters followed two reinforcing avenues set forth by Simon: first, that politics and administration could not be separated, and second, that the "principles of administration" were logically inconsistent (Henry, p. 33).

Since that time, public administration has drawn upon sociology, economics, social psychology, business administration, and political science. Numerous debates have included 1) the advocacy of "value free administrative science" versus those arguing that public administration served the rich and the powerful, and 2) the nature of the "internal processes of the public policy process (the focus of public administration) and the "external" pressures of the polity (the domain of political science). The study of internal processes examined the

individual within the bureaucracy as well as the internal dynamics of groups such as agencies, and inter-agency competition, stratification and the problems of hierarchical control, organizational flexibility, and effective communications. Sociology provided the concepts of role and role conflict, economics the concepts of exchange and resource maximization.

Another dimension of diversity in public administration was the divergence between those seeking grand theory (elaborating systems theory, cybernetics, and structural functionalism), and others seeking more practical and less theoretical conclusions through case studies of specific agencies and bottlenecks. The field of public administration was both internally highly diverse and peripheral or minor in the view of most political scientists. The point is made well by one study which surveyed five major political science journals from 1969 to 1970 and found the following percentages by subject: political parties, 13%; public opinion, 12%; in contrast to bureaucratic politics broadly construed with region/federal government, 4%; chief executive, 3%; and urban/metropolitan government, 2% (Walker, cited in Henry, p. 39).

As has been argued above, in the 1970's an increased concern with governmental outputs (as opposed to the inputs of voting, parties, and legislatures) has included the political forces permeating attempts at central planning and policy implementation. Branches of public administration such as organization theory and management science, with their focus on efficiency, effectiveness, budgeting and administrative techniques, have been

challenged by those who argued that the public in public administrative is of utmost importance. A relatively pessimistic body of theory developed suggesting that the public interest is inevitably diverted as individuals in public bureaucracies seek career maximization and agency aggrandizement (Niskanen, Olson; see also Binswanger and Rutann, pp. 344ff.). A more hopeful normative emphasis characterized the "New Public Administration" movement. Recipes for bureaucratic reform sought to make the bureaucracy 1) more humane for the individual employee (stressing a new collegiality, openness of communications between hierarchical levels, more flexibility in individual tasks) and 2) more responsive to the public or clients of bureaucratic agencies (emphasizing the needs of clients over hierarchical control, efficiency, predictability and routine). Proposed reforms included 1) the creation of ombudsmen, 2) recruitment by quota (to increase the voice of groups under-representated within or outside the bureaucracy) rather than merit, 3) the passage of "sunset laws" requiring that agencies disband after a specified time period (to avert ossification and the generation of agency-specific interests within the agency) and, 4) the creation of new agencies mandated to sponsor the interests of unorganized or unrepresented groups. Such "anti-bureaucratic" bureaucratic reforms paralleled the pursuit of better communications and task performance via structural alterations, procedural reforms, encouragement of collegiality among experts apart from hierarchical control in problem solving.

If the 1960's were a period of internal fragmentation and relatively low integration into political science among those

depreciatingly termed "P. A. types" by political scientists, it was a period of flourishing grand theory among political scientists concerned with public administration in Third World countries. During the 1950's, development administration, focusing largely on India (African states were not yet independent), had generated numerous handbooks on procedure, budgeting, personnel, etc. There has followed a re-evaluative phase of complex critiques, negativeness and uncertainty regarding the techniques needed or whether technical assistance was needed at all (Shaffer in Colin Leys, p. 183). In 1962, with the foundation of the CAG (Comparative Administration Group) funded generously by the Ford Foundation, development administration took a decisive turn which endured for a decade. Noted above are both the tendency of comparative political scientists to address the nature of national systems, and the widespread enthusiasm among political scientists concerning general theories such as systems theory, and structural functionalism. The CAG, lead by Fred Riggs, shared both of these characteristics. Borrowing from optics (rather than physics or biology), he set forth The Theory of The Prismatic Society which contrasted LDC's to the "refracted" nature of modern industrial states (Riggs). The absence of structural specialization (legislative, executive, administrative) and of role differentiation (acting as an administrator as opposed to a family member or ethnic group member) led to the pervasiveness of politics and particularism in LDC's which impeded policy implementation and diverted the public purpose. The Ford Foundation had apparently funded the CAG in order to improve governmental efficiency in poor nations and to stem the spread

of communism. To the Ford Foundation charge that such general theory was "the pursuit of knowledge for knowledge's sake," the CAG argued that adequate theory must precede policy intervention and problem solving (Henry, Chapter 2).

The the Riggsian analysis failed to produce the practitioner-oriented insights which interested the Ford Foundation as well as the "P.A. types" dominant among Americanists in public administration. Aside from the shortcomings of the grand theoretical enterprise itself, the gap between the "P.A. types" and the CAG was enhanced by Riggs' emphasis on the cultural differences which separated "developed" from developing societies, and the anti-bureaucratic bias in Riggs' imbalance theory. Riggs argues that the poverty of legislative structures and associational groups relative to the bureaucratic proliferation produced an imbalance between the two, resulting in the politicization of the bureaucracy. This formulation resulted in an analytic emphasis on the whole system (bureaucracy-society relations). And to the extent that any practical intervention was envisioned, it was the strengthening of structures outside the governmental bureaucracy rather than its internal reform.

This approach to development administration dominated comparative research in public administration, mirroring the low salience of problem-solving research focused on government outputs in political science generally. Only in the 1970's did the more theoretically narrow and practitioner-oriented concerns of the "P.A. types" re-emerge: political scientists had become disillusioned with grand theory. The Ford Foundation ended its support of the CAG in 1971. In 1973 the CAG disbanded

and merged with the International Committee of the American Society for Public Administration and, in 1974, The Journal of Comparative Administration ended publication.

This sketch of public administration should amply suggest the diversity of the field and the absence of any accepted body of general theory and derived applications for problem-solving. Liberal economists have counterparts among political scientists who despair of bureaucratic reform and favor returning numerous functions to the private sector. Other political scientists see bureaucracies as "here to stay," and thus continue to explore avenues of marginal reform both within bureaucratic structures and in the interface between the administration and the public. These political scientists see the utility of public administrators' straightforward formulations for the evaluation of organizational effectiveness; analysts of foreign assistance programs should also use and adapt such schemes.

Public administrators have delineated several factors affecting an organization's ability a) to generate recommendations and decisions based on expertise, b) to implement policies and programs, and c) to evaluate program effectiveness. These factors can be grouped under 1) personnel recruitment and remuneration, 2) budgeting, and 3) responsibility and accountability. The relevant questions are briefly outlined below.

1) Under personnel are grouped job classification, recruitment and pay, and training. One should ask whether jobs are defined in a manner ensuring the use of available expertise (particularly important where expertise is very scarce) and

whether job holders are paid equally for equal service. Given the existing recruitment base in the population, one must ask whether the organization is capable of attracting quality personnel and whether recruits are politically or socially hostile due to (their perception of) the actual reward distribution in the system. The organization must be able to train and retrain employees.

2) Budgeting: To what extent is the budget process formalized, and what, if any, overseeing bodies examine and consolidate local requests for funds? What means are used by the central budget office (if one exists) to evaluate outputs:

--line item budgets (to check for legality of expenditures);

--performance budgets (efficiency accountability to ensure maximal output for minimal input);

--program budgets (to examine programs in terms of fulfilling agencies' goals).

3) Responsibility and accountability: Are responsibilities and lines of accountability formally stated so that

--missions are clear to agencies;

--agencies perceive themselves to be, and are, required to report formally to designated officials; and

--designated superior officials possess the ability to sanction the agency and to squelch agency activity.

Such a diagnostic check list will clearly reveal some weaknesses in organizational effectiveness which are general in West Africa (and other LDC's), and others for which West African states vary. For example, the level of expertise is surely low throughout West Africa. But the prosperous foreign-owned private sector

and the parastatals in the Ivory Coast appear to attract employees away from the civil service, while the civil service jobs in the poorer countries of the interior have little private sector competition and thus are greatly sought after. This should lower the quality and morale of the Ivoirian civil servants. However, bureaucrats in the states with very little economic growth (and thus few elite private sector jobs) face a severe bottleneck in available promotions which has a negative effect on morale and motivation. The training function is relatively well performed in the West African francophone countries by French-style national schools of public administration. But the formalism and didactic style of these institutions make retraining difficult, thus reducing the bureaucrats flexibility and adaptiveness.

The evaluation based on such a check list must be undertaken with awareness of the broad differences between the West African context and the American context in which it originated. Thus it may become clear that the concern with responsibility and accountability which is perhaps appropriate in the US has already been applied in excess in West Africa. There appears to be a trade off between local level flexibility and central control. The optimum will vary depending on the particular task at hand. Thus, as Leonard points out, road building is a highly routine activity in which narrow central guidelines are desirable, while agricultural extension probably requires more local, bureaucratic autonomy in order to mesh effectively with local social organization.

Lastly, remedies and solutions will be limited by the peculiar circumstance of the countries in question. For example, one might

ask whether bureaucrats trained in several Western European countries or in Western and Eastern Europe provide a dynamism and flexibility absent in the state where public administrators' training is monopolized by French-style institutions. Thus the American public administration literature will provide a starting point, but must be complemented by the comparativists' sense of history and context if it is to be productively used by foreign program assistance analyst.

The analysis of the "institutional capacity" component in food policy project design requires a broad grasp of the literatures generated throughout the checkered career of public administration charted above. This effort at analysis of processes internal and external to government bureaucracies should find useful material in current American research interests. Among political scientists, a modest boom in scholarly concern with governmental outputs, including the lines of inquiry suggested by Lowi on policy definition and by Lindblom on synoptic planning versus strategic incrementalism (see the discussion above in Chapter Two, Section B, p. 73). Also relevant are policy impact studies and the growing analytic concern with the muted boundaries between public and private illustrated by Lockheed, Chrysler, and the New York transit strike. Schools of "administrative science" have decreased by more than half, while professional schools of "public management" have grown markedly in number and quality.

Comparative research in bureaucratic behavior and the development of administrative institutions also provides an essential antidote to the wholesale exportation of insights and

remedies drawn from the American context. Analysis of cultural differences should, however, be replaced by specificity regarding institutional patterns. Undeniably, important differences exist between the US, Europe, and West Africa. Raup's discussion of more and less centralized administrative systems is suggestive regarding the political risks of attempts to decentralize relatively centralized systems (Raup in Uphoff and Ilchman). In such centralized systems, the leaders at the apex bear greater responsibility for mismanagement and failure. Thus in the decentralized United States, Raup states, the Billie Sol Estes affair is perceived as a trial of the man, while the Crichel Downs affairs in more centralized Great Britain was seen as putting the system on trial. Raup argues that this dynamic is hard to reverse, for public expectations put pressure on leaders in centralized states to deny, cover up and depreciate defects (Raup in Uphoff and Ilchman, eds., p. 441).

A Latin American example illustrates that public pressure and fear of exposure in centralized systems is not dependent upon a democratic environment: managers of local grain storage facilities "sit on" unsold rotting grain stocks rather than risk exposure of mismanagement by destroying them, and thus compound the potential scandal. They do nothing in anticipation of the response of their bureaucratic superiors, who themselves will be politically attacked in turn. Efforts to increase local level initiative thus confront a dynamic in which superordinates try to increase control of subordinates, who in turn conceal important information out of anticipated disapproval and

discipline from superiors.

But such a focus on the decentralization/centralization dimension may also be misleading. Raup also argues that Ministries of the Interior tend to be very conservative and resistant toward reform, and must therefore be by-passed if development is to occur. Such a conclusion may be valid in both France and her ex-colonies. And yet, in West Africa, some prefects appear to act with considerable independence. In the Ivory Coast, variation among prefects' goals and tactics is very great. Some have political ties independent of their posts in the Ministry of the Interior which permit them to dominate other agencies in their prefectures and use that power in dynamic, if autocratic, ways inconsistent with the administrative conservatism hypothesized by Raup.

Rutann is a rarity among agricultural economists in his concern with the understanding and explanation of institutional change. A long-established student of technologically induced change, he has recognized the importance of concurrent institutional change for successful policy implementation. Such institutional change stands in "dialectical relationship" to technological change, he argues, rather than necessarily preceding or somehow adaptively following technological change. Rutann hypothesizes that because scientific knowledge of institutional change has increased, the "costs" of using that knowledge has decreased (Binswanger and Rutann, p. 338). However, as argued above, the discipline of public administration is not as theoretically integrated or empirically well tested as the areas of induced institutional change researched by Rutann.

But we have no disagreement with Rutann regarding the necessity of building induced institutional change into policies aimed at increased productivity.

Although Riggsian wholism has tended to dominate political scientists' work on administration in developing countries, there are notable exceptions. David Leonard's book on Kenya's agricultural extension-service, Reaching the Peasant Farmer, makes excellent use of sociological and political theories to explore intra-agency relations as they impinge upon its effectiveness at the grass-roots (Leonard). He is able to draw upon broad institutional change (e.g., the colonial administrators' authoritarian individualism contrasted with the greater group orientation and concern with legitimacy of Kenyan administrators) to analyze particular problems in agency performance. His analysis of a specific problem--extension workers' tendency to reach only the more prosperous farmers--is theoretically eclectic. Explanations offered include 1) the "squawk" factor (the prosperous farmers' greater political efficacy), 2) the greater pay-off for time spent with prosperous farmers (their greater responsiveness to suggested innovations is both gratifying, and produces better evidence of success in the agents' job evaluation), and 3) agents' informational and perceptual gap regarding the number of poor farmers in their districts (agents' under-estimation of the number of poor farmers). In addition, Leonard documents regional variations necessitating programmatic flexibility by agents. He recommends decentralization in programming decisions, but argues that this must not mean a weakening of central authorities' role in agent

re-training and provision of technical services. Leonard diverges from the current emphasis in administrative research in recommending not a closer relationship between performance criteria and career rewards (in line with widespread economistic emphasis on individual incentives, as in Scott and Popkin), but rather underlines the importance of procedural concerns and organizational planning.

In addition to Leonard's focus on a specific nexus in a specific agency, his selective use of administrative research done in the US and in Third World countries is exemplary. He refuses to simply deduce micro-applications from general principles regarding developing areas. Like the qualification of the centralization/decentralization dimension noted above, he argues that routine and procedures have an important place in developmental programs. Thus Leonard uses the early realization that bureaucratic styles are more compatible with routine activities like tax collection and application of statutes than to change-oriented and innovative activities associated with development (Shaffer, p. 183ff. in Leys, re development administration in the 1950's) as a point of departure rather than a general law. Leonard notes that while new roads may initiate broad social changes, road building still requires routine (Leonard, p. 213).

In conclusion, social science literatures on administrative performance and reform in American, European, and Third World contexts must be searched for insights regarding administrative performance in West Africa and possible tactics for its change. Induced institutional innovation is as essential to policy realization as technological innovations; it cannot be a

secondary concern, and the problem of appropriateness to a given context is a difficult one. Experience and research from different contexts can be a source of insight, but adaptation will always be necessary.

There is no specific strategy of induced innovation that can be designated. Thus the type of expertise most suited to such an analysis must be broad-based and capable of judgment rather than applying formulae. The role of the public sector in food marketing varies across settings. While the extreme interventionism in most of West Africa appears to have been unproductive, the public sector will continue to be actively involved both because of historical institutionalization and because altering past trends in favor of food security and buffer stocks will require public action. The only single rule of thumb must be marked caution with regard to grant renovations. The disastrous results of the bureaucratic proliferation in Ghana of the early 60's surely has many causes. But the combination of extreme and rapid change and the (inevitable) absence of coordination between ministries, agencies, and associational groups fostered *ad hoc* decision making in Ghana. The result was the loss of incentives to attempt coordination and to exercise budgetary discipline. An exaggerated individualism, in which ministries, agencies, and individuals strived to "keep up" with one another in the control of bureaucratic, fiscal, and clientelistic resources, resulted in the antithesis of the tightly organized, centralized government which Nkrumah sought (Levine).

Despite the attraction of sweeping solutions in the face of

great deficiencies, incrementalism appears to be the best guide which can be recommended. Highly specific change at any given point may well trigger adaptive adjustment at other points in the larger system, as wholistic interpretative theory and research suggest. But the temptation to elaborate an inclusive scheme with built-in remedies for every resultant stress point must be avoided, for adequate anticipatory planning will prove elusive, and the ambitious plan will only generate an "adaptive chaos." The planner must understand the tentative nature of his efforts and anticipate the need for continuous innovation.

Recapitulation and Conclusion

The central argument of this paper is that economic optimality is an insufficient basis for policy and project design. The consideration of political realities in the recipient state will produce a design more likely to be implemented as envisioned with the anticipated impact. The five theses drawn from commentary and criticism of the literature reviewed in Chapter One and elaborated in Chapter Two all address this concern with the appraisal of political and administrative constraints. These theses fall into two groups: the first three theses all concern specific approaches found to be misleading and unsound, while the fourth and fifth concern the elements of a sound political feasibility analysis.

The reader will recall the first three theses: 1) over-schematic conceptualization of government policy goals and prioritization of policy goals, 2) radical redistributive

development strategies, other strategies necessitating major new departures in resource allocation, and 3) proposals of extreme liberalization of marketing structures where state intervention is long established. All three of these give a misleading or unsound view of the politically feasible. Personification of regimes as if they were rational and purposive actors belies the diffuse and indeterminate nature of the governing process. Concepts like "prioritization of goals" and regime "commitment," unsupported by adequate analysis, conceal the continuously changing pressures to which decision-makers must respond. Although some assessment of goal rankings and commitment is perhaps useful, it must be made clear that such characterizations rest upon an indeterminate and fluid process. Similarly, proposals requiring sweeping changes in current practice and institutions are deceptive in their simplicity. Persuasive as they may be *in vacuo*, their adoption depends upon actors in the polity constrained by immediate pressures to which they respond in largely institutionalized ways.

These three objections are rooted in a frankly incrementalist bias regarding the probable impact of innovations, and particularly innovations sought by parties *outside* the national system in question. The analyst who views the system from without with the apparent possibility of influencing resource allocation also originating outside the system is perhaps doubly tempted to paint in broad bold strokes. But such an analyst's impact may be negatively related to his distance from the system: persuasive simplicity and vividly painted alternatives are effective only to the extent that they mobilize actors. The

foreign analyst is least well situated to achieve that end.

The fourth and fifth theses, interest group analysis and administrative capacity, speak directly to the recommendations regarding political feasibility studies. Guidelines for the identification of interest groups likely to influence public policy must go beyond delineation of a policy's projected impact, to determine which of the affected populations possess social cohesion, political organization, and access to regime decision makers. Yet a mechanistic empiricism including only manifest and visible groups can lead to exclusion of regime anticipation of group responses and the numerous implementing structures through which a group may influence outcomes.

Three populations particularly relevant to food policy questions have been identified and discussed. 1) Bureaucrats are likely to be an articulate and powerful subset of the usually quiescent consumer population. And bureaucrats may also emerge as specific subsets of the national administrative structure which seek to protect the "territory" and budgets of their agencies and their jobs. 2) Farmers are generally assumed to be politically weak, although subgroups of the farming population may have political access because of regional characteristics. In contrast to poor subsistance areas, prosperous highly commercialized regions may enjoy both the government's greater dependence on their production and kinship, ethnic, and patronage ties with the urban educated elite which dominates many key decision-making structures. 3) In general, middlemen appear to be on the defensive politically. To the extent that they compete with administrative marketing structures

they are at a disadvantage. But, although their legitimacy may be low, their economically crucial function may provide a political "backdoor." Thus analysis of their political influence must not stop with anti-middleman rhetoric furnished largely by administrators; it must explore their internal organizational resources and look for their political access not only to central decision-makers, but also within the administrative structures implementing public policy.

Two resources for interest group analysis have been presented in some detail: INPAT or "integrated policy analysis technique" and Lowi's scheme of public policy analysis. INPAT (see table on p. 121) serves as an approximate guide for interest group analysis, providing that the analyst not lose sight of the feedback and overlap which blurs and redefines the categories presented. The qualifications discussed regarding interest group identity and behavior have made clear why INPAT's use is largely heuristic.

Lowi's scheme of distributive, regulatory, and redistributive policies is promising because it predicts specified relationships between types of policy and the nature of group interaction (logrolling, collaborative; competitive, bargaining; and conflictual, mobilizing broad societal cleavages; see p. 75). One of Lowi's strengths is his appreciation of non-legislative decision-making in the US. We anticipate an even lesser role for the legislative arena in West Africa, but the specification of relevant arenas and the role of various bureaucratic actors remains to be empirically determined in each West African state.

Lowi's policy typology could be productively applied, for example, to the alternative modes of subsidizing rice production (as introduced in the WARDA study). Identification of the different populations benefiting under alternative schemes (all rice farmers, those in a specific region, small or big farmers... taxpayers, rice consumers...), followed by analysis of these populations as political groups should suggest the nature of probable political conflicts associated with different types of subsidies. The analyst could then see why political leaders opt for certain subsidy types as well as gaining predictive insight into the outcome if certain subsidy types were to be adopted.

The fifth and final thesis, concerning administrative capacity, clearly overlaps with the preceding in that interest group action is not limited to policy formulation; interested groups will predictably affect the implementation process. But administrative capacity also entails the informed estimate of the administrative structure's probable delivery of project requirements. Whether administrators can provide the needed services and complete the required tasks is analytically separable from the interests of specific actors.

The analysis of administrative capacity and proposal of ameliorative innovations cannot be drawn solely from the research of political scientists. The sketch of public administration in its various phases and sub-fields makes clear that weak administrative capacity is not a problem peculiar to LDC's and that possible incremental gains may be inspired by a variety of literatures. Indeed the political scientist's tendency to

reject "technocratic tinkering" must be avoided: marginal changes, procedural reforms, improved skills must all be considered by analysts--with their political eyes open. Thus we have not proposed a model for analyses of administrative capacity and induced innovation, but remain convinced that these considerations must gain a central place in feasibility analysis.

Guidelines for data collection and analysis permeate the preceding discussions. But there is no established matrix which the analyst can fill out from existing data banks. The required information must be searched out in existing academic research, feasibility studies, and impact studies of prior projects and policies as similar as possible to the proposal at hand. Field interviews will complement and cross-check existing written sources. These should focus initially on specific past policies and projects, not on anticipated responses to the projected policy or generalizations about political groups and administrators. Written sources will doubtless contain generalizations, and interviews will probably yield general reputational indicators. But every effort should be made to ensure that referents are as specific as possible.

The analyst undertaking such a political feasibility study should have extensive knowledge of the political system in question as well as the critical perspective and personal entries likely to accompany past study and contact. But the analytic tools and awareness of the imprecision inherent in data collection and inference must be rooted in the analyst's professional training as a political scientist. As the importance of data evaluation and methodological discretion increases, the importance of the analysts' intellectual and professional qualities also increase.

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