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Title IX Division  
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- G. Final Report of the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, Preparatory Working Group of Experts on Methods of Inducing Social Change for Overall Development, Bangkok, Thailand, January 10-14, 1966. ..... 281

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I. CONGRESSIONAL MATERIAL  
ON TITLE IX

I. CONGRESSIONAL MATERIAL ON TITLE IX

A. Congressional Expressions Relating to Increasing Popular Participation in the Task of Development

1. Humphrey Amendment of 1961: Development of Cooperatives

a. Section 601(a), Chapter 1, Part III of the Foreign Assistance Laws and Documents of 1961

Sec. 601. Encouragement of Free Enterprise and Private Participation.

(a) The Congress of the United States recognizes the vital role of free enterprise in achieving rising levels of production and standards of living essential to economic progress and development. Accordingly, it is declared to be the policy of the United States to encourage the efforts of other countries to increase the flow of international trade, to foster private initiative and competition, to encourage the development and use of cooperatives, credit unions, and savings and loan associations,\* to discourage monopolistic practices, to improve the technical efficiency of their industry, agriculture, and commerce, and to strengthen free labor unions; and to encourage the contribution of United States enterprise toward economic strength of less developed friendly countries, through private trade and investment abroad, private participation in programs carried out under this Act (including the use of private trade channels to the maximum extent practicable in carrying out such programs), and exchange of ideas and technical information on the matters covered by this subsection.

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- b. Excerpts from "Development of Cooperative Enterprises, 1966, under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961." A report for the Subcommittee on International Finance of the Committee on Banking and Currency of the House of Representatives, 90th Congress, First Session.

Cooperative development started in a systematic and planned way after Congress passed Section 601 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, better known as the Humphrey cooperative amendment. This amendment provides in relevant part that: "\*\*\*it is declared to be the policy of the United States\*\*\*to encourage the development and use of cooperatives, credit unions, and savings and loan associations."

This amendment became a directive which encouraged a positive cooperative program, creation of a division in AID to look after cooperative projects, the use of cooperative specialists in AID's Regional Offices in Washington and its Missions abroad, and the direct participation of U.S. cooperatives in foreign aid ...

The Foreign Assistance Act of 1966 incorporates under a new Title IX, the Foreign Affairs Committee's recommendation that new attention and emphasis be given to attaining the largest measure of popular participation in foreign aid. Failure to do so, the Committee's report states, not only acts as a brake on economic growth, but neglects the basic causes of social and political instability which pose a constant threat to the gains being achieved on the economic front. The Committee enumerates some of the ways by which it believes AID could most effectively engage all of the available human resources for local programs of self-help and mutual cooperation, such as loans to small farmers, encouragement of cooperatives, labor unions and savings and loan-type institutions, utilization of voluntary agencies, and support of integrated programs of community development designed to promote stable and responsible governmental institutions at the local level. These Congressional recommendations strengthen the action program which was submitted to the AID Administrator by a cooperative advisory committee five years earlier, shortly before passage of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.

The contribution that cooperatives and nonprofit organizations can make, because of their unique ability to involve large numbers of people and to enlist their support and services, was also recognized in the report of the Advisory Committee on Private Enterprise in Foreign Aid. The report states:

We strongly urge AID, in reviewing and responding to a country's development strategy to place major emphasis upon the planning, host country commitments to, and the

execution of educational programs. In such programs we urge AID to use every means to tap the rich resources in U.S. universities, labor unions, cooperatives, business enterprises, professional societies, and other nongovernment entities which have something to offer to the educational process.

The report also places high priority on the export values of technical and professional services, of the kind provided by U.S. cooperatives, holding that they should be made eligible for this same financing and guarantee facilities from AID and the Export-Import Bank that exporters of tangible goods now receive.

There are many examples of the widespread support and enthusiasm that a successful cooperative effort can inspire, especially when the people feel strongly enough to become deeply involved in the planning, organization, and direction of such community-wide enterprises.

2. The Zablocki Amendment of 1962: Community Development

a. Section 461, Chapter 6, Part I of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended.

Sec. 461. Assistance to Countries Having Agrarian Economies.--  
Wherever the President determines that the economy of any country is in major part an agrarian economy, emphasis shall be placed on programs which reach the people in such country who are engaged in agrarian pursuits or who live in the villages or rural areas in such country, including programs which will assist them in the establishment of indigenous cottage industries, in the improvement of agricultural methods and techniques, and which will encourage the development of local programs of self-help and mutual cooperation. In such a country emphasis shall be placed upon programs of community development which will promote stable and responsible governmental institutions at the local level.\*

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## b. Excerpts from House Report 1788: Section 109, Community Development

Sec. 109 amends Section 461 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 which relates to assistance to countries having agrarian economies. The amendment directs that, in such countries, emphasis shall be placed, among other programs, on community development to promote stable and responsible governmental institutions at the local level.

During the past 10 years, through its foreign assistance programs, the United States has spent approximately \$50 million in support of community development programs in 30 countries. Almost one-half of this amount was allocated to help launch major programs in India, Pakistan, and the Philippines. Prior to 1955, U.S. assistance for community development emphasized equipment and supplies, such as vehicles for village workers. Since 1955, the emphasis has shifted to providing technicians and participant training in addition to small amounts of supplies and equipment.

Basically, community development approaches the local community as a whole and is directed toward helping the people, on the village level, to participate effectively and with knowledge in shaping the future of their own community and of their nation.

The product of successful community development is not only wells, roads, schools, other community facilities, and new crops; it is, more properly, the development of stable, self-reliant communities with an assured sense of social and political responsibility.

The Committee believes that community development can be a dynamic force leading to economic improvement, social advancement, and orderly political growth. The amendment proposed in this section has been approved by the Committee in order to encourage greater emphasis on community development in the less-developed nations.

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## 3. Title IX: Foreign Assistance Act of 1966

### a. Section 281: Title IX - Utilization of Democratic Institutions in Development

In carrying out programs authorized in this chapter, emphasis shall be placed on assuring maximum participation in the task of economic development on the part of the people of the developing countries, through the encouragement of democratic private and local governmental institutions.

### b. Excerpts from House Report 1651: Title IX - Utilization of Democratic Institutions in Development

Section 106 of the bill also amends chapter 2 of part I of the Foreign Assistance Act by inserting a new Title IX relating to the utilization of democratic institutions in development.

The language of the new Title IX directs that in carrying out programs of U.S. development assistance, emphasis shall be placed on assuring maximum participation in the task of economic development on the part of the people of the developing countries, through the encouragement of democratic private and governmental institutions.

Over the years, in exercising legislative oversight with respect to the administration of the foreign assistance program, the committee has observed that there is a close relationship between popular participation in the process of development, and the effectiveness of this process.

As a consequence, the committee has written a number of provisions into the Foreign Assistance Act and its predecessor statutes, urging that economic and technical assistance be used to stimulate the development of local programs of self-help and mutual cooperation through such measures as loans to small farmers; encouragement of cooperatives, labor unions, and savings and loan-type institutions; utilization of voluntary agencies; and support of integrated programs of community development designed to promote stable and responsible governmental institutions at the local level.

The committee finds that despite these periodic expressions, popular participation in the tasks of development is increasing at a very slow rate. The great potential for planning and implementation of development activities, contained in the mass of the people of the developing countries, is still largely untapped, which slows down

the achievement of the objectives of the foreign assistance program. On the contrary, it has become increasingly clear that failure to engage all of the available human resources in the task of development not only acts as a brake on economic growth but also does little to cure the basic causes of social and political instability which pose a constant threat to the gains being achieved on economic fronts.

For these reasons, the committee has proposed the language embodied in the new title IX. This language directs that new attention and emphasis be given in the administration of U.S. development assistance programs to the goal of attaining a larger measure of popular participation in development. This goal can best be achieved through the fostering of cooperatives, labor unions, trade and related associations, community action groups, and other organizations which provide the training ground for leadership and democratic processes; through making possible increased participation of such groups and of individuals in the planning, execution, and evaluation of development undertakings; through broader and more effective utilization of the experience and resources of existing private and voluntary organizations; and, generally, through the building of democratic private and public institutions on all levels--local, state, and national.

The achievement of the basic objectives of the new title IX may require: (a) change in the approach of the Agency for International Development and the assignment of higher priorities to the intermediate objectives outlined in the foregoing paragraph; (b) strengthening of the Agency's capability to identify, in cooperation with the governments of aid-receiving countries, the existing and latent democratic forces which can aid in the development process; and (c) increased reliance upon nongovernmental organizations with a demonstrated competence to enlist popular participation in the development process.

The committee plans to keep close check on the manner in which the intent of this new title IX is carried out. The committee expects the Agency for International Development to bear in mind the purposes put forth in this title in preparing specific projects and programs--and to develop, and use in its next presentation to the Congress, meaningful criteria for judging the results of this effort. Such criteria ought to include information about the extent to which the population and key groups of each aid-receiving country are involved in such institutional development. AID's reports should evaluate American assistance not only in economic terms, but also in terms of the extent to which our aid encourages democratic processes.

4. Title IX: Excerpts from House Report 551, Foreign Assistance Act of 1967, Section 281 (a)

FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1967

Report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

Title IX - Utilization of Democratic Institutions in Development

a. Section 281 (a)

Sec. 281. (a) In carrying out programs authorized in this chapter, emphasis shall be placed on assuring maximum participation in the task of economic development on the part of the people of the developing countries, through the encouragement of democratic private and local governmental institutions.

b. Sections 281 (b), (c), (d)

(b) In order to carry out the purposes of this title, programs under this chapter shall--

(1) recognize the differing needs, desires, and capacities of the people of the respective developing countries and areas;

(2) use the intellectual resources of such countries and areas in conjunction with assistance provided under this Act so as to encourage the development of indigenous institutions that meet their particular requirements for sustained economic and social progress; and

(3) support civic education and training in skills required for effective participation in governmental and political processes essential to self-government.

(c) In the allocation of funds for research under this chapter, emphasis shall be given to research designed to examine the political, social, and related obstacles to development in countries receiving assistance under part I of this Act.

(d) Emphasis shall also be given to the evaluation of relevant past and current programs under part I of this Act and to applying this experience so as to strengthen their effectiveness in implementing the objectives of this title.

c. Section 108 - Utilization of Democratic Institutions in Development

This section amends Title IX of the Act which relates to the utilization of democratic institutions in development, by adding a series of guidelines as follows:

The new subsection 281(b) of the Act provides that programs of economic assistance authorized in chapter 2, part I of the Act shall--

First, recognize the differing needs, desires and capacities of the people of the respective developing countries and areas.

Over the years, the committee has found that similar programs carried out in different countries frequently produced markedly different results, and that the effectiveness of economic assistance undertakings tend to vary in relation to their success in involving an increasing number of people in the development process. For these reasons, the committee believes that in the preparation and implementation of economic assistance programs, more attention should be given to the human resources of the individual recipient countries. The Agency for International Development (AID) should also strive to find new and imaginative ways of engendering in the masses of people of the developing countries the desire and interest to become involved in development--either individually or through group action.

Second, utilize the intellectual resources of the recipient countries and areas, in conjunction with assistance provided by the United States, so as to encourage the development of indigenous institutions which meet the particular country's requirements for sustained economic and social progress.

The development of an infrastructure of self-sustaining, viable institutions on the local, provincial, and national levels is necessary to achieve increased popular participation in development and to enhance the success of developmental undertakings. During the past two decades, public and private entities, including credit unions, cooperatives, labor unions and other voluntary associations, have helped to mobilize the human resources of the developing countries and to multiply the results of aid programs. Additional institutions, tailored to the conditions prevailing in particular recipient countries, can further advance this process. The committee hopes, therefore, that AID will begin to provide more support for the building of public and private institutions which can channel the vast creative energies of the people of the developing countries into constructive developmental endeavors.

Third, support civic education and training in skills required for effective participation in governmental and political processes essential to self-government.

The availability of such skills is critical to the success of institutional development mentioned in the above paragraph. The committee is of the opinion, however, that in this area of

development activity, both the initiative and the human resources should come primarily from the aid-receiving countries. AID's role should be that of providing support for locally initiated projects, encouraging educational and other institutions to become active in this field, and promoting joint collaboration between public and private institutions within the same geographical region. AID should draw upon the advice of individuals, both in the United States and abroad, who have had experience with civic education and politics, in exploring other approaches in this field.

The proposed new subsection 281(c) of the Act directs the Agency for International Development, in the allocation of research funds, to give emphasis to research designed to examine the political, social, and related obstacles to development in countries receiving economic assistance. Studies conducted by this committee (see, for example, "Rural Development in Asia," hearings before the Subcommittee on the Far East, 1967; "Modern Communications and Foreign Policy," 1967; and "Behavioral Sciences and the National Security," 1966, hearings before the Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements) suggest that improved knowledge of in-country conditions, including information about factors affecting the attitudes and motivations of the populations of the developing countries, could increase the effectiveness of aid programming in relation to Title IX objectives. Since the enactment of Title IX, initial research efforts have been undertaken with respect to countries where the opportunities appear especially advantageous for launching action programs, in cooperation with host governments, under the Title IX mandate. The committee hopes that these research efforts will be intensified.

Finally, the proposed new subsection 281(d) of the Act directs the Agency for International Development to give added emphasis to the evaluation of relevant past and current programs of economic assistance, and to apply this experience so as to advance the objectives of Title IX.

It is the committee's belief that increased emphasis on research and evaluation will assist the AID in determining what sort of democratic development, in which sectors of spheres, can be reasonably expected of particular countries, and what sort of activities it would be most feasible and justifiable for AID to undertake, to encourage other agencies or nongovernmental organizations to sponsor, in order to further the implementation of Title IX.

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## B. Title IX: Some Congressional Areas of Concern as Reflected in Committee Reports

1. Communications: "Modern Communications and Foreign Policy," Report No. 5 by the Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives. House Report No. 362.
  - a. Excerpts from "M. Recommendations: Communications with the Developing Countries," pp. 12R-13R.

Turning now to the task of communicating with the developing countries, particularly those which are or may become beneficiaries of our foreign assistance, we recommend the following:

First, that our Government employ modern communications on a broad scale to launch a frontal attack on the basic problems of the developing countries, altering as necessary the scale of priorities which until now has dominated the structure of our foreign aid program.

Testimony presented in the record of our hearings stressed time and again that the primary task confronting the less-developed countries is the development of their human resources. Until those resources come to be utilized in the processes of development, there will be no lasting solution to the problems of hunger, disease, and poverty which are the daily lot of nearly two-thirds of the human race.

There isn't enough food in the world, or enough aid that can come from the industrialized countries, to improve materially the condition of life of the majority of people of the developing countries. Only they can do that job. And modern communications offer us the opportunity to help them get started.

Modern communications can be used to stimulate achievement motivation, to spread innovation which is necessary for growth, to teach skills, and to help in the establishment of cooperative and community institutions which can multiply the product of development efforts.

Communications are being used for those purposes today--but on a very modest scale. During one recent period, more than 30 percent of our economic aid to Turkey, for example, was devoted to transportation and less than one-half of 1 percent to the improvement of communications. And the story apparently is not much different in other countries.

Last year, in enacting Title IX (Popular Participation in Development) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1966, as well as the related amendments to sections 211 (Assistance to Educational Institutions in the United States) and section 601 (Collection and Dissemination of Information Relating to the Development Process), the Congress pointed the way toward a new emphasis in foreign assistance.

This new emphasis is consistent with, even demands, greater support of communications in our foreign aid undertakings.

Second, we recommend that our Government exert special effort to make the content of our communications responsive to the aspirations and conditions of the people in the developing countries. We should also strive to discover and employ the combination of media best suited to promote the process of development in each given case. ...

b. Excerpts from "Summary: Statement of Dr. J.E. Stepanek, Consulting Engineer, Boulder, Colo.," pp. 89-92.

United States Communications with the Developing Countries:  
Dissemination of Innovation

For years we have been disseminating innovation to the developing countries through person-to-person communications by American technicians assisted by mass communication systems.

My proposal basically is that we revitalize the above communication aspect of the old Point IV concept by adding on the new concept of Title IX.

The following four suggestions come from sobering field experience as an engineer since 1947 in some twenty of the developing countries.

We should vastly multiply the number of communication sources in the U.S. which reach out to the developing countries--a Title IX in reverse. A multiplicity of channels from local groups over the U.S. would not only increase the volume of flow but would ensure its continuation. We would find a close relationship between popular participation in international development activities and sustained support for such activities.

Next, we must build into our communication system a heightened sensitivity to the results of the signals sent out. Feedback is essential to effectiveness. ...

The technical subject matter of our present communication system is often inappropriate to the needs of the developing countries. This problem is now aggravated by the widening economic gap. We increasingly design to save labor when they face the serious problem of saving capital. We educate engineers from the developing countries for service to our economy--not theirs--and increase the probability of their staying here.

We communicate most readily with the few Westernized individuals in the metropolitan areas of the developing countries. We are not giving sufficient attention to a neglected communication target--the small city. Here there are innovation minded individuals who have left the village but not yet gravitated to the capital city. It is among this group that special opportunities exist for the application of Title IX. As these entrepreneurs initiate development activities they provide supplementary communication channels into the rural areas. They manufacture many of the products required by farmers, establish training schools, provide new banking services, and become the new

political leaders with a vested interest in democratic, stable governments.

### Introduction

Communication systems can provide entertainment, information, or induce innovation. Our concern is with the latter.

As a nation we first expressed this concern through the Point IV concept of sharing technical knowledge. We suggested that innovation leading to economic growth could be initiated by sending out American technicians as person-to-person communicators assisted by the audio-visual techniques of mass communication. Unfortunately such programs have been overshadowed in recent years by the commodity programs in our foreign assistance effort.

The substance of my suggestions in this note is that we revitalize the communication aspect of the Point IV concept by adding on the daring new concept of Title IX.

In early 1947, I joined U.N.R.R.A. as an engineer to help local businessmen in the interior of China establish manufacturing enterprises. Later I pursued the same objective in some twenty other countries.

These comments are based on that field experience--out in rural areas as well as in capital cities--under the sponsorship of American foundations, the United Nations, and the U.S. Government. Out of this sobering and often frustrating operating experience came the following four suggestions for improving communications for innovation.

### Communication sources

My first suggestion is that we vastly multiply the number of communication sources in the U.S. which reach out to the developing countries--a Title IX in reverse. ...

### Communication system design

Communication systems designed for innovation are more complex than those for recreation or information. We tend to forget how hard it is for even nontradition minded Americans to innovate. ...

We do not consider the feedback requirement and continue to send out inappropriate signals not realizing that no results are forthcoming. ...

### Communication subject matter

We have been most generous in sharing our technical knowledge with people in the developing countries. We anticipated that this sharing would assist the process of catching up. This has not happened for many reasons. As the economic gap has widened our technologies have become less appropriate to the needs of most of the developing countries. ...

We must recognize that a consequence of the widening economic gap is a need to reexamine the appropriateness of the subject matter relative to the particular needs of the receiver. ...

### Communication receivers

We communicate most readily with the relatively few Westernized, innovation minded individuals in the metropolitan areas of the developing countries. Many countries have only one such area and in most cases its economy is developing at a satisfactory rate. The relative ease with which we can communicate with this group makes us overlook the lack of communication between the elite minority and the majority of the population who are outside the urban center. With such strong ties with the outside world there may be little motivation for this elite, as has been observed in a number of countries, to establish communication channels deep into their country.

When we do recognize this problem we often attempt to communicate directly with the rural population--generally without much success.

Between the extremes of the rural village and the urban center lie generally neglected communication targets, the small cities in the population range of approximately 50,000 to 200,000. Here we are finding innovation minded individuals who have left the village but not yet gravitated to the capital city. Among this group we have opportunities to apply the concepts of Title IX.

Many towns among those I have studied in Colombia, India, Indonesia, and Peru have embryo private and public groups awaiting stimulation and ideas for application to their local development problems. New people are rising to the surface among these groups who are not tied to the old traditions. The potential for the formation of such groups even in South Vietnam can be realized if we design communication systems to reach them.

Our multi-source communication systems should be designed not only to reach down to these new growth centers but to particular people in the centers if Title IX is to be effectively implemented. The systems need to reach those relatively few decision makers who are primarily

responsible for economic growth. These entrepreneurs who initially may number no more than one out of a thousand in the population become the models for the actions of others. (For example, subsidized interest rates for business or farm loans tend to attract about everybody including speculators and those who could not remain in business without a subsidy. Higher rates screen out many and increase the probability that funds will reach those willing to take a calculated risk that they can use the loan profitably.)

As individuals in these small cities initiate economic development activities they provide supplementary communication channels out into the rural areas. They mix the fertilizers distributed to farmers and at the same time communicate to other farmers the benefits of using fertilizer. They provide the technical training facilities for rural artisans, the beginning of financial institutions, and the new political leaders with a vested interest in democratic stable governments.

c. Statement of Dr. Frederick Frey, Professor of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

#### MASS MEDIA AND THE PEASANTRY

Modernization or development, in its deepest meaning, implies change in the people of a society and in the way they interact. This especially true in the rural sector where: (1) decision-making is highly decentralized onto thousands of villages and millions of farm families; (2) many and repeated modifications of behavior are needed and single, one-shot changes are relatively ineffectual; and (3) resistances to change seem ordinarily to be greater than in other sectors. For durable development to occur the task is literally to get people to "change their minds."

The policy-maker must decide (1) what attitudes and behaviors constitute or are essential to the rural development goals that have been established; (2) what circumstances form and change these attitudes and behaviors--how they can be affected; and (3) what are the relative merits and drawbacks of the various strategies open to him for working the changes he desires.

The mass media, along with the educational system, credit and market mechanisms, direct governmental representatives such as extension agents, the transportation system, the police and courts, the military, organizations such as cooperatives, etc., are among the arsenal of weapons open to the policy-maker for affecting rural attitudes. The policy-maker must decide how, if at all, he is going to employ each of these devices, when and where. He must know the advantages and disadvantages of each.

The characteristic advantages of the mass media are: (1) extensiveness--they reach a greater portion of the rural population than most other instruments; (2) rapidity--they reach that portion of the population more rapidly than other means; (3) controllability--they are more easily controlled and are superficially more uniform than other means of communication; and (4) effectiveness--they are in some ways presumably better able to influence the population than are other devices. These qualities of the media are at the same time advantages and disadvantages. For example, controllability may permit the most efficient use of the best communicators with accurate reproduction of their messages; but it may also permit inappropriate elite domination of communications to the rural and mass sectors of the nation.

Most recent research has suggested that the mass media can be among the very few most powerful levers available to the policy-maker in promoting development. For example, my own research among Turkish peasants indicates that the mass media exposure of the villager is a better predictor of his basic attitudes toward development than his travel, his direct interpersonal communication, his wealth, his education, his literacy, and most other likely factors. Furthermore, we have uncovered little evidence that media exposure is significantly associated with some of its commonly asserted negative consequences such as greater attraction to the already

overcrowded cities or increased political dissatisfaction. It is clear, though, that media exposure is associated with increased political knowledge.

Most developing nations are now in the early throes of a communications revolution. The proportion of their populations exposed to the media is sharply increasing each decade. In most countries, this by no means entirely a government-instigated revolution, and governments will have to live with its effects regardless of their support. Most under-developed societies appear to pay scant explicit attention to using the media as a developmental instrument, and a strong case can be made that their public sectors under-invest woefully in the mass media and other forms of communications. Although media expansion is occurring at a striking clip in most developing societies, the progress is from a very low starting point and could clearly be accelerated through official encouragement. Crucial problems of coordinating changes in the communications field, both internally and with other areas, seem to be neglected in most developing societies. The result is that the mass media are not being adequately employed for developmental purposes, nor are other forms of communication such as direct interpersonal exchange; debilitating barriers to communication in vital agencies such as the bureaucracy are not being reduced.

The impact of the mass media on villagers in developing societies seems generally to be marked and to be in a modern direction. Moreover, the major media (newspaper, radio and cinema) appear to reinforce one another and be largely substitutable. Of course, radio and the cinema have the great advantage of being able to surmount the barriers of illiteracy and difficult terrain. However, one of the more surprising recent findings is the extent to which illiterate peasants can be exposed to and are influenced by the press through having newspapers read to them. Of the three major mass media, the cinema seems to be the most influential, followed by radio and then by the press, although differences are slight. The correspondence between this ranking and the degree of "abstractness" of the medium has been noted and needs to be investigated.

Many problems exist regarding the media in developing societies. All too often, these seem to be run for the pleasure of a small elite rather than utilized for mass improvement. Media personnel are haphazardly selected and poorly trained; local interests are rarely noted; research to furnish decision-makers with feedback regarding media effectiveness is seldom conducted; many outlets become political footballs; the media are not reinforced by planned discussion groups, farm forums, and other devices that are vital for turning images into action; and the mass media effort is rarely linked with related efforts in the field of education, agricultural extension, community development, and so on.

One of the most conspicuous problems confronting the mass media as a developmental instrument is that of pockets of "unreachables" in the society. Those villagers who are most in need of the quickening provided by media exposure, most lacking in exposure to a proper "climate for development," are the persons least likely to encounter

the media. If the egregious "dualism" of developing societies is not to be exacerbated, attention must be given to creating new media approaches for contacting these "unreachables." Policy-makers must realize that answers to this and other no less fundamental questions can only be obtained through a continuous, regularized, and institutionalized program of research. Sporadic, ad hoc forays into communications research, such as have been the rule up to now, will not furnish information adequate to these more profound questions.

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## d. Statement of Dr. H. Field Haviland, Jr., The Brookings Institution

Let me say at the outset that I am speaking here only for myself, and not for the Brookings Institution.

In a desperate effort to stay within my 5-minute limitation, which is cruel torture for anyone, I shall read my statement. This is on "Education as a Factor in Development."

Those concerned with the future of the developing countries have come to recognize increasingly that education is at the center of the developmental problem. It is the essential ingredient not only for providing skills for economic and social progress, but, what is more important, for establishing better relations among men so that they can deal with their inevitable problems in a more humane and constructive fashion. This latter aspect I call civic development, which is the aspect that I shall emphasize in this statement.

As one reviews the record of developmental efforts, by both the developing and more developed countries, I think that it is safe to say that substantial, though far from adequate, progress has been made in the field of education for economic and social advancement. But very little has been done to improve education for more enlightened civic behavior.

As one evaluates educational development programs, one should make clear the standards by which he judges performance. In this case, I want to state briefly the objectives that I believe do, and should, guide U.S. policy. As a minimum, we want to help the developing countries remain free of influences that will severely restrict their independence and the possibility of progressive and democratic development. Beyond that, we hope to foster positive cooperation between the more and less developed nations based on a growing consensus regarding economic, social, and democratic political progress.

In the field of education for economic and social modernization, which I believe is advancing relatively well, I shall simply say that there is continuing need for identifying the principal educational requirements in relation to national development plans, for developing more efficient educational programs for satisfying those requirements, and for spreading those programs more widely through various educational channels, including inservice training.

In the area of civic education, I want to make clear at the outset the general objectives that I have in mind. I think of such education as a major means of helping to foster values, knowledge, and skills that will provide a set of civic relations and institutions that will better enable the people of a nation to live together more harmoniously

and constructively in dealing with the severe problems with which they are inevitably going to be confronted for the foreseeable future. This is all the more necessary because whatever economic and social progress may be achieved will surely fall far short of the rising tide of aspirations. Furthermore, economic and social progress, by itself, does not guarantee humane, peaceful, and democratic relations among men. One need cite only the example of Hitler Germany to illustrate this point.

At the same time, I want to make clear that I am not proposing to export the U.S. system as the universal panacea or to impose any system that is not appropriate for, or congenial to, the inhabitants of the developing countries. The essential condition is that there must be a certain critical mass of leadership within the developing countries which is committed to, and willing to take the main initiative in fostering, the same general values that we espouse, or there can be no effective progress toward the goals that I mentioned earlier. Fortunately, in many developing countries, there is this local leadership with which we can collaborate. Because of the sensitive nature of civic education, it is important that this collaboration be one of true partnership, with our friends in the developing countries being the senior partners, and that much of whatever external assistance is desired by the developing countries flow through private rather than governmental channels.

Now let me say a word about the substance of civic education. The first problem is to cultivate values which will give motivation to the right kind of civic participation. These values have to do mainly with democratic rights and obligations and the concept of modern civic efficiency. Second, there is the need for knowledge as the basis for intelligent decisions; knowledge not only of one's own nation and its major problems, but of the civic systems and problems of other nations as a basis for understanding and cosmopolitan perspective. Third and last, there is the need for civic skills; mainly, the analytical skill of being able to think intelligently about the major policy issues facing the nation, and the participant skills of knowing how to take part effectively in civic life. I know that all of this sounds ambitious, and I present these goals only as ultimate aims. They have to be sought in different ways at different levels of sophistication within various groups in each nation, and among nations at different levels of development.

e. Statement of Edgar L. Owens, Chief of Planning Division  
for Latin America, AID

I would like to discuss briefly one example of how the public sector can be used to start building a modern communications system from the grassroots up. This is the rural development program of East Pakistan. The communications system is an inherent part of the rural program and was intended to begin solving two basic problems in subsistence agricultural societies--lack of facts that can be communicated and a lack of interest in collecting facts.

I am sure all of you know that one of the problems in the villages of the poor countries is that while the people know they are miserable, they do not know much about the facts of their misery. They know, for example, that they do not eat many eggs, but they do not know exactly how many they eat. They know that some of the animals in their village die each year, but they do not know how many. They know whether the number that has died "recently" is more or less than usual. If it happens that there have been more, it could be that there has been an epidemic in the area. But whether there has been an epidemic, whether it was small scale or widespread these things the villagers usually do not know. Many other examples could be given.

In East Pakistan, the first action to increase the villagers' knowledge about themselves and their local community, which is, in our terminology, a township, was a household survey designed to collect elementary information about mostly obvious things--the local population, land use, crops and cropping patterns, animals and animal mortality, irrigation, credit, marketing, literacy, school attendance, time of childbirth, drinking-water supplies, the local transportation system, personal incomes, local industries, and recreation.

From these surveys the people were able, for the first time in history, to describe with facts much about the nature of their local community and their personal lives. For the first time they learned, for example, how few eggs they ate and how many animals had died "recently," and many other facts.

This fact-collecting system was combined with the opportunity, unusual in the developing countries, for local governments to solve their own problems. The main purpose of the program was to transform traditional local governments into modern institutions of development.

The surveys were designed as a way of enabling villagers to begin defining and analyzing their local and personal problems with some degree of precision. The program began with a few of the simpler and more obvious agricultural problems. Today it includes most of the activities we associate with local self-government in rural areas in the Western democracies. As new activities were added, always

the first step was the collection and analysis of the facts of the problem, and always according to the same concept of economic and technical feasibility that the Congress added to the Foreign Assistance Act a few years ago in section 611.

To supervise this program, the provincial government has needed to develop among other things an efficient reporting system. All the facts collected and plans prepared at the local level are collated and summarized at higher levels of government. Just as the people are becoming informed about themselves for the first time in history, so are the higher levels of government becoming informed about the people for the first time in history.

This is a very cryptic description of the system, but let me summarize the results that have been achieved thus far.

(a) There is growing up a two-way dialog between the politicians and civil servants at the higher level of government and the councilors and people at the local level, based on facts and a logical and systematic analysis of problems;

(b) The people are learning how the different levels of government function, which they need to know if they are to judge and influence government action;

(c) The demand for facts and information and, hence, a better communications system, is growing as people learn how to use modern technology and as the traditional small world of the subsistence farmer is gradually being expanded into the much larger world of his province and his country.

If we turn for a moment to Taiwan and Puerto Rico we get a more advanced picture of what is possible. Both have tried to organize more or less all of the people for development, but beginning 20 years ago rather than 5 years ago. The number of newspapers and magazines and readership of both; the number of radios, TV sets, and telephones; the amount and kinds of technical literature--all these have multiplied many times over. There is now a great deal of private participation in the system. And, also, a great deal of variety in subject matter that one would expect to find in modern countries.

f. Excerpts from Ensuing Discussion

Dr. Haviland (p. 153)

I think in the economic and social field we have done fairly well. Still there is plenty of room for improvement. I think in the field of civic development or political development, as some people have called it, we have done very little indeed, and we are not at all well equipped, though the Government is making some progress right now, thanks, to some extent, to the prodding of the Congress.

Congressman Fraser and others have introduced Title IX, which was added to the foreign aid legislation. I personally think this is a great contribution. It has definitely served as a challenge to the executive branch to come up with some new thinking, new plans, and new staff. I think the agencies are sincerely and conscientiously trying to meet that challenge, but it is not easy. It is going rather slowly. ...

Mr. Owens (p. 153)

..... I think we need one thing more which we have talked around a little bit of this afternoon. In the several countries which I cited, and there are other examples that could be given, one of the most important characteristics of development has been a fairly effective local organization in which farmers and other groups of people are able to get together and use modern technology to improve themselves. In Taiwan the communications system in agriculture was set up between the central government agencies and the farmers associations. The local associations were responsible for keeping their members informed. In recent years the system has broadened into the widespread use of radio and printed materials of many kinds by the farmers. The local organization is a base that you can tie to with communications and a number of development activities. This is implicit in Title IX.

Dr. Haviland (p. 156)

Congressman Fraser and I have talked before about the balance between the central government and local government. I think you really have to look at the whole picture. You can't do one to the exclusion of the other. Just what the balance should be is frequently hard to tell and certainly varies from country to country. There is no question if you put the emphasis exclusively on the central government it would be a mistake and dangerous.

Another point has to be added. This is implicit in what Congressman Fraser is saying, that you can develop groups without giving adequate attention to what I would call the civic or political element. A lot of people run away from that word "political," because it sound dangerous and dirty. I mean "political' in the sense of enabling these groups not only to do a better job of trying to decide for themselves what they want and getting it, but also to give them a better knowledge of the various mechanisms, private and public, that they can resort to in order to satisfy their needs. ...

As in all of these things, I think what we can do is going to be marginal. We have some knowledge in our own society of helping co-ops, labor unions, et cetera, to do a better job within themselves, training leadership, thinking through their own interests, reaching joint decisions, on their own policy problems, and then doing something about it, using their power and influence through public channels, through elections, through getting in touch with their Congressman, through using the press, and allying themselves with other organizations in order to achieve their goals. This is what I had in mind when I was talking about civic skills. Not only knowledge, but also how to act.

Of course, again, many people are afraid of this because they are afraid that if you begin helping people to have a stronger voice in public affairs, democracy may get out of hand. This is a problem. If you just have each group out for itself and using its maximum influence to get what it wants, this can be dangerous, indeed. Ideally, what we would like to achieve is to get these groups to act in a responsible and realistic way so that they don't ask for the moon, so that they recognize what we have had to learn to recognize. If each group thinks exclusively of its own interests, the nation is going to fall apart. They have to recognize what are the realistic limits to their own aspirations, and what they have to do in cooperation with other groups. They recognize after a while that their interests are interdependent and they must work together or the nation as a whole will suffer and they will suffer with it.

2. Rural Development: Excerpts from "Rural Development in Asia." Hearings before the Subcommittee on Asia and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, February 28, March 1, 2, 8, 9, 1967, Part I.

a. Excerpts from Statement of Dr. Samuel P. Huntington, Professor of Government, Harvard University

... my primary concern has been with the more general relationships between political development and economic development and social change in modernizing countries in general, in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. ...

The most striking gap in American foreign policy toward the third world has been its failure until recently to deal directly with the problems posed by this mounting violence and instability. Along with other industrial nations and with international agencies, the United States has actively attempted to reduce poverty and to promote economic development in the nations of the third world.

It has, in contrast, devoted little attention to the problem of promoting political stability and political development in those countries. This failure is in part due to tendency of Americans to believe that instability is the result of poverty and hence that efforts to promote economic development will also promote political stability. In fact, however, no evidence exists which links the process of economic development with political stability. Nor does a correlation exist between poverty, disease, and illiteracy, on the one hand and political instability, on the other.

Indeed, there is much evidence to suggest that it is not poverty but rapid improvement in standards of living, not disease but the spread of modern health practices, not illiteracy but the expansion of education and mass communications which encourage political instability and the decay of political institutions. Economic expansion may increase absolutely the economic well-being of most groups in society, but it also almost always widens the relative gap between rich and poor. The spread of education and mass communications enhances expectations and hence vulnerability to extremist appeals. Industrialization and urbanization undermine or destroy traditional patterns of life and thus lead to alienation and instability. The appeals of communism are to be literates, not illiterates.

All this is not to argue that economic development should be avoided in order to preserve political stability. It is simply to point out that these are two independent goals and that progress toward one has no necessary connection with progress toward the other. In some instances, some measures of economic development may promote political stability; in other instances, they may seriously undermine such stability.

... By themselves, in short, programs of economic development promote only economic development. The promotion of political development and political stability requires different programs and the change or modification of programs designed originally simply for the promotion of economic development.

In the past few years the needs of political development have received increased attention from officials in the executive and legislative branches. One of the principal sources of interest and concern has been this committee, and I wish to congratulate the committee for the creative role it played last year in writing into the Foreign Assistance Act of 1966 Title IX, which gave concrete and explicit legislative recognition to the needs of political development.

### III. Political Development and Political Parties

Political development has two dimensions. First, it involves the expansion of political awareness, political consciousness, and political participation to previously apathetic masses of the population.

... This is the second dimension of political development: the creation of an institutional framework to provide for the peaceful participation of larger and larger groups of people in the political process. ... To maintain political stability, consequently, the construction of organizations and institutions for peaceful popular participation in government must go hand in hand with the expansion of political awareness among the masses of the population. ...

Political organization thus must go hand in hand with the expansion of political participation. This linkage was recognized by this committee when it provided in title IX that American foreign assistance programs should be administered to assure "maximum participation" by the people "through the encouragement of democratic private and local governmental institutions." In its report the committee explicitly recognized the role cooperatives, labor unions, trade associations, and community development groups can play in this process. In addition to these institutions, however, there is yet another which can play a crucial role in the organization of political activity. That institution is the political party.

Modern politics differs from traditional politics in that the masses of the people become involved in it. That mass participation has to be organized. Many organizations and groups serve this purpose. The most important of these is the political party. The political party is, indeed, the distinctive institution of modern politics. Traditional political systems may have bureaucracies, legislatures, and elections, but they do not have political parties. The political party as an organization is peculiar to modern politics, and it is the institutional means of organizing mass participation in politics.

The growth of peaceful political participation in modernizing countries requires the creation of strong political parties. ...

One crucial turning point in the expansion of political participation in a modernizing society is the inauguration of the rural masses into national politics. The timing, the method, and the auspices of this "Greek Uprising" decisively shape the subsequent political evolution of the society. It may occur relatively rapidly or it may occur slowly and proceed through several stages. The nature of the party system in the society largely determines whether it takes place peacefully or through revolution. ...

#### IV. The United States and Political Development

Obviously the United States can affect the political development of other countries only in a marginal way. Each society will choose its own forms of political organization or disorganization. All that foreigners can do is to advise its leaders on the prerequisites and requirements of political organization, even as they do for economic development, and give them technical and material assistance in the development of political organizations. We have already done much along this line, particularly at the local level. Under the mandate of Title IX undoubtedly much more will be done. It is, however, desirable for us to recognize political development as an important end in itself if the tendencies toward violence and instability in modernizing countries are to be reduced. More specifically, our existing efforts might be improved by action along the following lines.

(1) We should explicitly recognize that a major goal of American policy is the promotion of stable political institutions in modernizing countries and particularly the development of strong political parties. To this end, I would urge that the committee consider the desirability of amending Title IX by adding the words "and democratic political parties" to the existing language. In general, our support for and cooperation with political leaders or military juntas should depend upon their actively attempting to develop grassroots political organizations. If we do get irrevocably committed to any one leader, no matter how charismatic he may be, we should, like the Russians in Cuba, try to nudge that leader into the difficult task of political institution building.

(2) We should devote much more effort to the study of the conditions and patterns of political evolution and to the elaboration of new concepts and categories useful for the analysis of societies undergoing rapid social change.

(3) We should evaluate economic and technical assistance programs not only in terms of how they contribute to economic development but also how they affect political development. We should try to identify those types of economic assistance which may contribute to both forms

of development. We should develop criteria and guidelines for balancing prospective economic gains against political losses and political gains against economic losses.

(4) We should inaugurate new activities directed specifically toward political development. These might include assistance to political parties, programs to develop and train political leaders, assistance to more broadly based and public-oriented interest groups, and more widespread support for community development programs.

Finally, we should create some office in our own Government which would have primary responsibility for political development. Until recently, the Agency for International Development has been in effect, an agency for economic development. Somewhere, either inside AID or outside AID, but preferably inside, we need an office for political development. We need diplomats and economic planners, but we also need to recruit and train personnel skilled in the techniques of analyzing political change and promoting political organization. What we need, perhaps, is a new-style CIA, more skilled in building governments than in subverting them.

All this may seem highly adventurous. But it is actually a highly conservative prescription for political stability. The vacuum of power and authority which exists in so many modernizing countries may be filled temporarily by charismatic leadership or military force. But it can be filled permanently only by political organization.

b. Excerpts from statement of Dr. Gayl D. Ness, Associate Professor of Sociology, University of Michigan

... I should like to address myself to the problem of the relationship between central governments and the development of rural voluntary associations. I shall like to touch upon three aspects of this problem, and then suggest certain general policy implications. My remarks must necessarily be brief and general, especially since they deal with the complex and heterogeneous situation in southeast Asia, but perhaps they can be elaborated upon later. The three aspects concern first, the advantages and the dangers of such rural organizational development; second, the obstacles to such development in the rural scene; and third, the obstacles to such development in the postures and conditions of the central governments.

1. From our experience of the past two centuries of modern development in the West, we tend to be convinced of the advantage of the development of local voluntary associations, especially in rural areas. Such associations include consumer and producer cooperatives, religious organizations promoting education and mutual aid, farmers associations, business enterprises and even political parties. We have found in such organizations a great capacity to mobilize human energies, to direct them to the solution of local problems and the advancement of the interest of rural people.

. . .

Our Western experience also shows, however, that such conflict can be positive and creative; it need not be totally destructive. It shows that in balance the advantages of rural organizational development outweigh the disadvantages of conflict. It is also likely that by being more sensitive to these underlying bases of conflict in southeast Asia, we might strengthen the advantages and avoid some of the more destructive aspects of the conflict.

2. The physical and intellectual isolation of rural areas throughout southeast Asia is one of the major obstacles to the development of effective voluntary associations. Traditional patterns of organization provide for the total individual and the total village society. The types of organizations we seek to stimulate draw individuals into organizations on the basis of limited interests. The isolation of the village units of rural society supports the traditional form of organization. Such things as schools and roads break the isolation, weaken traditional structure and provide the basic social conditions for the widespread development of voluntary associations.

The isolation also makes rural peoples suspicious of the central government. Most rural experience has reinforced this suspicion as central governments and their officers have often been more interested in exploiting than in increasing the real wealth and welfare of rural peoples. Some modern leaders have been able to overcome this suspicion personally, but only by demonstrating great integrity and concern over an extended period of time.

This type of leadership cannot normally be mass produced in government development programs. Malaysia's experience demonstrates, however, that a truly effective program of rural infrastructure construction, which can be more or less mass produced, can break down this suspicion. It can go a long way toward convincing rural people that the central government is concerned with their welfare and capable of acting upon that concern.

3. Despite sometimes rather great efforts, central governments have been singularly unsuccessful in directly promoting the development of local organizations. Colonial governments experienced widespread failure in their attempts to promote cooperatives and other types of economic organizations. They often failed as well in attempts to transfer authority to chosen followers and organizations among indigenous peoples.

Cooperatives and other forms of economic organization were unsuccessful because they failed to produce significant returns to rural people. The costs in registration and formal control, demanded by excessively bureaucratic government programs, were generally not worth the meager, and even sometimes doubtful returns. The more political attempts failed because the "chosen" to whom authority was being passed were those who had demonstrated their ability to manipulate the colonial masters rather than to those who could mobilize rural peoples.

The new independent governments of southeast Asia have generally not been any more successful than their ex-colonial masters in stimulating local organization development. In some cases they have been less successful. This can be seen in both the public and private sectors.

In the public sector, the burdens of administration and the paucity of experienced administrators forces central governments to call to the capital rural leaders who show any organizational talent. In addition, the normal patterns of upward social mobility lead through the capital rather than through local organization. Most young elites in southeast Asia see the capital city as the place in which to get ahead.

Both sets of conditions provide the new states (and even Thailand) with powerful centripetal forces, which draw off rural leadership thus inhibiting the development of effective local organizations.

Finally, new governments often feel rather precarious and do not appreciate the difficulty of implementing new development programs. Local failures in implementation are often taken as indications of subversion and lead central governments to take over direct responsibility for specific programs. This removes from the rural people the ability to learn from their mistakes and further inhibits the development of local initiative.

All three processes are most critical together in that they tend to draw off existing supportive local leadership. What is left is at best a vacuum, at worst a training ground for exclusively oppositional leadership. The process intensifies the underlying conflict between rural areas and central government, and leads it in destructive rather than progressive directions.

I would submit we have seen a great deal of this lately in Indonesia.

In the private sector, the "socialist idiom" of the new states-- deriving from the understandable tendency of nationalist movements to equate capitalism, colonialism, and indigenous economic backwardness-- also acts to inhibit rural organizational development in some states. Suspiciousness of the private sector exacerbates the sense of precariousness of the central government, often causing it to adopt policies that obstruct the development of local economic organizations in the private sector. Where such an idiom has been absent or weak, as in the Philippines, Malaysia, and Thailand, we have found a rather rapid development of rural organization, primarily in small-scale businesses.

4. What appears to be needed, then, is a condition in which rural isolation is weakened and in which rural leadership can be trained and can gain experience in significant organizations. Local organizations will be significant only to the extent that they meet the needs and advance the interests of rural people.

Three lines of attack seem plausible. First, of great importance will be programs of physical infrastructure development, the building of roads and bridges, the extension of radio and press communication, and the development of widespread educational systems.

Second, a policy with a permissive posture and a highly generalized set of incentives will have the advantage of allowing local initiative to develop in types of activities that are most relevant to local conditions. Government officers, particularly in the capital, are seldom as knowledgeable of these conditions as are local people themselves.

Cooperative or community development programs that continue to demand formal registration and formal organization with double-entry book-keeping, constitutions and bylaws can probably expect no more success than they have had in the past.

Finally, it may well be that the leadership conditions noted above are the least tractable to formal policy change. "Decentralization" has been a goal in much AID policy in southeast Asia. It is doubtful, however, that this has been very effective in reversing the powerful centripetal forces of the existing central governments of the region.

We may well continue to promote such decentralization, with little expectation beyond that this may add in the long run to the development of local initiative, but we should certainly not expect to reverse processes that are apparently so deep seated in the political character of states of the region.

c. Excerpts from ensuing discussion.

Mr. Buchanan (Congressman from Alabama, p. 128)

... If we pursue the development of an AID program, thinking purely in social and economic terms, with no eye to political development, if indeed we follow a hands-off policy with respect to political development, would you say that we might be accomplishing good things with social and economic programs but contributing to political instability and be a contributing factor to political developments that might be the opposite of the kind that we would like to meet?

Dr. Huntington (p. 128)

I think this is a very real possibility. I don't think it necessarily follows, just as I don't think it necessarily follows that the promotion of economic development will produce political stability. I think, however, that with economic development which isn't planned with a very real eye on its political impacts and consequences, there is a high likelihood that this will not stabilize politics, and consequently it is very important in drawing up of economic plans for the promoting of economic growth that the political factors be brought in. If you look at the history of countries you can see that very often the periods of most rapid economic growth are accompanied by an increasingly unequal distribution of income among the groups in the population.

In some degree this may be a necessary aspect of economic growth, at least rapid economic growth. This is the sort of thing that has to be kept in mind because you may be raising the GNP per capita at a very satisfactory rate, but you may also be creating serious imbalances, regional, between one group and another within the society, and this can lead to various forms of political instability.

This was the reason why I emphasized that it seemed to me terribly important to develop the institutional channels so that people who are brought to political consciousness, people who do develop demands upon the government or upon the society, have some available institutional vehicle through which to express those demands and consequently will have less tendency to resort to terrorism or violence.

Mr. Buchanan (p. 129)

Then I gather--indeed it seems to me you clearly state that it is both possible and proper that we should have some hand in such political development or attempt to do so through our overall aid?

Dr. Huntington (p. 129)

I think that in drawing up aid programs we ought to give very careful attention to these political consequences and we ought to develop criteria, analyze very carefully the effects of the economic programs, and discuss with the recipient governments the destabilizing possibilities of one line of development against another. ...

Mr. Buchanan (p. 130)

I would like to pursue this further, but there is a second question perhaps related to it that I would like to ask Dr. Ness.

I would like your opinion of this from the point of view of the problem of central governments versus rural population, and I have had a little exposure to this problem in a visit to Vietnam last year. ...

Dr. Ness (p. 131)

You raise, of course, a very fundamental problem, that of the past isolation and neglect of the rural areas. Can we help to break down that isolation? Can we induce the governments of urban elites to take a greater interest in their own rural peoples? The two questions are closely related, because a government that is concerned with its rural peoples will normally expend considerable effort to work for those peoples and will consequently break down much of the isolation of the rural areas. We have seen some very successful examples of this in Malaysia; we have seen failures elsewhere in the region.

Perhaps the easiest thing to do is to promote public works programs in the rural areas. These are normally popular programs, providing advantages for both the urban elites and the rural peoples. Thus there is likely to be the least opposition to this type of program. It is, further, the type of thing our technologically advanced society can provide quite easily. Such programs are, of course, rather corruption-prone. Considerable effort must be invested to insure that at least some of the work actually gets done and gets done in the rural areas, but I think these problems are not insuperable. ...

A more difficult type of program requires the extension of education to the rural areas. This works to break down further the intellectual isolation of the rural areas and tie them more securely into a larger network. I agree with Professor Huntington that this will not immediately bring political stability. Quite the contrary. It is likely to bring increased conflict, and it is also likely to be opposed or subverted by the existing elite. I do not think we should, or can, shrink from the conflict or the possibility of subversion. We are, after all, dealing with revolutionary situations and we are ourselves a

revolutionary nation. I should argue that we can promote educational programs, literacy programs, programs of increased communications. While these may not always turn out exactly as we like, they will provide the general conditions on which alone open and useful societies can develop.

Mr. Buchanan (p. 131)

Certainly it would seem that this is a very desirable thing to whatever extent it is a possible thing.

Mr. Zablocki (Congressman from Wisconsin, p. 133)

... You suggested in your statement on page 12 "that an office for political development be established in AID." I am wondering if this would not have an adverse effect. Although I have supported for years the proposals in Title IX and I am in sympathy, therefore, with the basic intent of Title IX, I would have some reservation as to the effect, the adverse effect it would have on the recipients of our aid if we did follow your proposal. Aid recipients are extremely touchy about any indication that the United States is interested in shaping their political affairs.

And further, it would also be more grist for the Soviet and Chinese Communist propaganda mills. They would say that the United States is attempting to interfere in the internal affairs of these developing nations. Would you care to comment?

Dr. Huntington (p. 133)

Yes. It seems to me, first of all, we do interfere in the internal affairs of nations throughout the world. The world is becoming a much smaller place. We are perforce playing a major role in world politics and inevitably we have an influence as to what goes on in many parts of the world, just as what goes on in many parts of the world has a corresponding reacting influence on what goes on in American politics and government.

I think the problem, Mr. Chairman, may concern the use of the word "political," which has certain sensitive and perhaps ideological overtones which other words do not. Certainly we are and have been influencing the way in which other countries have evolved politically through a variety of means, not the least of which has been our economic assistance programs.

We also influenced some of them through our military programs. In at least some instances we have had a very decisive effect on the future of a country through fairly large programs of military assistance which

have made easier the involvement and the participation by the military in the politics of their countries.

Consequently, I think what is involved in the general thrust of my remarks and suggestions is not an increase or a decrease in American involvement in world affairs and inevitably in the domestic affairs of other countries, but rather a more conscious concern with the political effects of that involvement. It seems to me that in some cases with our military assistance programs, in some cases with our economic assistance programs, in some cases with our other activities, we have not looked at the long-run political effects of those programs on the other countries.

In my suggestion for something like an office of political development in AID, I was really thinking of an office which would make this concern its primary responsibility. We have throughout AID and in the State Department, of course, individuals who are concerned with these problems, but it might well be desirable to institutionalize--if I may use a favorite word of mine--to institutionalize this concern, and one way of doing this would be through the creation of such an office. ...

Mr. Huntington, p. 136)

... On the second question--Can the countries in southeast Asia meet their own needs?--I would go very much along with what Dr. Tilman has just said. I think we face problems of defining what are these needs. There are certain types of needs which only they can meet. There are others where they can be helped with outside aid.

One of the most important needs in southeast Asia is the need to create some sort of sense of national identity in many of these countries. To meet a need like that it seems to me the only thing probably we can contribute is some material and technical assistance.

We obviously cannot create an identity for them. This is something which the people involved would have to do themselves. We may be able to help them with the physical infrastructure of which Dr. Ness speaks, but I would like to emphasize that I think one important aspect of the style to which he referred is this tendency to put a stress on things like physical infrastructure. But it seems to me that equally important, are developing and trying to promote the local organizations and groups which are going to use those physical facilities.

Unless the people in the villages think of them as their own, unless they become involved in some way, the physical infrastructure will not produce much in the way of continued development. I would think it much better to have almost every aid program on some sort of matching basis which requires a significant local input so that when the road

is built, or the schoolhouse is built, or the other improvements are made, the people in the communities have put some of their own time and sweat into it and it becomes identified with their own purposes. In many countries we have tended to go too far in terms of moving in and trying to do everything ourselves because in many cases we can do it quicker and more efficiently if we do it ourselves. I don't think this pays off in the long run. ...

Dr. Ness (p. 143)

I should like to make a couple of comments. One is I think you are quite right in that we need to get the motivation of local people. We have to be concerned about self-help type programs. Yet I think we have to be far less concerned with the motivation of the peasantry, and far more concerned with the motivation of the leaders themselves.

The general masses of rural people, the peasants in southeast Asia, will use very well the things that we are able to provide through technical assistance. More important, of course, is to get the self-help and motivation of the government leaders themselves. You then asked the very penetrating question of how this could be done.

Here I would claim to know very little and have very few ideas. Most people involved in the business of international relations and diplomacy would have better ideas of how to create specific programs to elicit local motivation. I would like to propose one kind of model that I think has been extremely successful for some very understandable and specific reasons. This is the model provided by the Joint Commission for Rural Reconstruction in Taiwan. ...

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## C. Selected Congressional Speeches Relevant to Title IX

1. Excerpts from the statement of 25 Republican Congressmen, Congressional Record, March 15, 1966.

Mr. Shriver: Congressmen have joined in a statement which I shall ask to have printed in the Record, which is the result of a 6-month study by this group concerning new directions and new emphasis in foreign aid.

This is a statement by the following Congressmen: Mark Andrews, of North Dakota; Silvio O. Conte, of Massachusetts; Peter H.B. Frelinghuysen, of New Jersey; William S. Mailliard, of California; F. Bradford Morse, of Massachusetts; Gerner E. Shriver, of Kansas; Alphonzo Bell, of California; William S. Broomfield, of Michigan; William T. Cahill, of New Jersey; Barber B. Conable, Jr., of New York; Robert J. Corbett, of Pennsylvania; Florence P. Dwyer, of New Jersey; Robert F. Ellsworth, of Kansas; Seymour Halpern, of New York; Frank Horton, of New York; John C. Kunkel, of Pennsylvania; Theodore R. Kupferman, of New York; Clark MacGregor, of Minnesota; Charles McC. Mathias, Jr., of Maryland; Joseph M. McDade, of Pennsylvania; Ogden R. Reid, of New York; Howard W. Robison, of New York; Henry P. Smith, III., of New York; Charles M. Teague, of California; and John W. Wydler, of New York.

... Mid-20th century communications have built not just an interdependent world but a world in which all men can and increasingly do know of the advantages which others enjoy. The deprivation of the people in the southern half of the globe and the prosperity of the people in the northern half of the globe are visible to all. And so the demands of the people in the developing countries, encouraged by the promises of their political leaders, have created a full-blown crisis in each developing country and a collective instability which may be an immediate threat to the security of the entire world.

...Unless the people benefit from development efforts, no meaningful progress can result from foreign aid. It is equally true that unless the people contribute to development efforts no meaningful progress can result from foreign aid. ...

The only reasonable measure of community progress--whether it be progress in social, cultural, political, or economic terms--is the degree of progress in which each individual in the community can share and benefit. Development which does not reach the people is not progress in human terms, and thus cannot significantly better the community. A grandiose economic infrastructure of transportation networks and physical plants and port facilities and industrial capacity is not by itself evidence of human progress or worthwhile development.

For progress the economic infrastructure must be an integral part of the community. It must provide direct benefits to the people; it must be compatible with the political, cultural, and social behavior of the people; it must be intermeshed with the people of the community it is designed to serve.

In short, an economic infrastructure cannot provide meaningful human progress unless it springs from a vibrant human infrastructure. The task of development might best be expressed not in sterile economic terms, but in terms of people--their awareness of the possible, their education and skills, their determination and participation--the impetus they provide and the satisfaction they receive.

A human infrastructure where the people are engaged and engage themselves in the process of development can assure progress--in social, cultural, political and economic terms. ...

The U.S. foreign aid program should place new emphasis on the need for the growth of popular participation in the development programs of the developing countries and the increased capacity of recipient governments to perform effectively in the broad spectrum of development tasks.

AID might appropriately consider, on a case-by-case basis, the transfer of specific industrial and economic development projects to multilateral management by the World Bank, the International Development Association or the Inter-American Development Bank when such a transfer is feasible in economic, political and administrative terms. Such a transfer would increase AID's capacity to concentrate on other aspects of development such as aid for civic institutional improvement and for popular participation in development. Project transfers to multilateral management should not involve any increase in U.S. aid expenditures. ...

The Agency for International Development should restructure its thinking to give new attention and emphasis to the need for effective governmental administration and greater popular participation in the development programs of aid recipients. Such an emphasis will require a new effort to enlist the support of the private voluntary associations in the United States and particular attention to the following seven recommendations.

Consistent with new emphasis on the administration of and popular participation in the development, U.S. foreign aid should be made contingent upon a defined set of basic criteria which conduce toward political growth. For example:

While we should not insist upon carbon copies of Western political institutions, aid which diminishes or tends to discourage popular participation in government is not justified. ...

New emphasis on the administration of and popular participation in development will require expanded AID attention to programs for community development, including health facilities, housing, schools, libraries, transportation, communications, sewage disposal facilities, and savings institutions. These programs in turn depend upon and encourage the growth of active political participation by the people in democratically organized popular efforts.

This emphasis in AID programming also requires increased concentration on facilitating the means of communications by which the government of a developing country can reach and engage the people, the people can make their desires known to the government, and the purposes of national and international development programs can be explained.

Because the tools and processes of assistance to the administration of and popular participation in development are not as yet well defined, AID must undertake and sponsor broad programs of research to develop the tools and methods necessary to create the human infrastructure in the developing countries which will encourage and accommodate orderly growth.

The U.S. Government, with the enthusiastic leadership of the White House, should make a broad effort to engage the private voluntary associations of the U.S. democracy in a people-to-people aid program so as to encourage the growth of participation by the people of the developing countries in their own development plans. ...

The foreign aid recommendations which we are discussing today are based on a careful study of past experience. It is our feeling that a new emphasis, and a change of direction, are needed.

Mr. Conte ...

#### The Role of the Aid Organization

The emphasis in foreign aid which we recommend will not be a completely new departure from prior and existing AID practice. It is true that the structure of the agency, its personnel, and the reporting of its statistics have been primarily geared to the essentially economic theories of growth. There have been exceptions, primarily in the Latin American Bureau, where there has been a growing realization that the creation of an economic base is meaningless without a human involvement to give impetus to change and without dramatic improvements in the governmental capacity to perform.

No doubt, AID has been hesitant to embark boldly upon programs to build the recipient government's capacity to administer development and to encourage popular participation in development out of fear of a misunderstanding of U.S. motives. To alleviate this fear and to allay

suspicion of our motives abroad, therefore, we have set out as our first recommendation that the administration issue a firm declaration defining the objectives of its foreign aid program.

It is imperative to understand that we are not proposing, and AID must never attempt, to interfere in the political processes of independent nations.

U.S. foreign aid should never insist upon or attempt to establish particular governmental institutions.

U.S. foreign aid should never be in league with political movements in opposition to government power.

The politics in aid recipient countries is their business, not ours.

What we propose is not interference in the domestic affairs of independent nations, but help to those nations to make their development programs more effective.

U.S. foreign aid must strive to help recipient governments attain the capacity to accommodate change, to administer development.

U.S. foreign aid must strive to help recipient countries to build the human base of popular participation which will create progress and allow the people to share in that progress.

If foreign aid ignores these tasks it cannot be effective.

It is true that in large measure the process of building participation on the part of the people, in the manifold institutions of a modern society, is a process which must be left to people-to-people aid relationships--this is, relations between the U.S. private sector, the professional societies, the labor unions, the churches, the private foundations, and similar institutions, on the one hand, and the people of the developing countries, on the other.

Even in this sphere, however, AID has a vital, if indirect, role to play. Community development projects, agricultural cooperatives, political science education, are all areas where our foreign public aid has a direct byproduct of encouraging the involvement and civic consciousness of the people.

AID can act directly, however, in the expansion of the developing countries' governments' capacity to perform. By increasing the efficiency of the government through training, education, and technical advice; by encouraging greater decentralization of administration; and by direct aid to government programs which increase the

the capacity of the government to communicate effectively with the people, the needs of development will be served. ...

#### Conclusion

We are emphasizing in our statements and our proposals, not a sweeping departure from prior and existing practices and programs of the Agency for International Development, but, rather, that this is the time to propose, consider, and implement solutions to the enormous organizational questions undermining the overall effectiveness of our assistance efforts, and to strike out in new directions to stimulate the development of the countries around the world looking to us for help.

#### TOWARD A THEORY OF EFFECTIVE DEVELOPMENT

Mr. Morse

Mr. Speaker, the recommendations we have made today for the conduct of our foreign assistance effort go beyond changes in administration. They are designed to provide an entirely new dimension in our programs to assist the developing nations. Development on the scale necessary if these countries are to become proud and stable members of the international community is principally a job for government of these countries: only government can provide the legal and institutional framework that is essential for the efficient application of technological and other tools of development. We can, I believe, help these governments develop the capacity to direct and shape development.

We must give our attention to two separate spheres. For a society to achieve growth it must, on the one hand, have a government with a highly developed capacity to perform. The government must be able to plan efficiently, to administer effectively, to communicate with the people easily and to engage the participation of the people in the development process.

Popular participation involves the ability to communicate with government, the capacity to organize and the competency to initiate and follow through on projects through techniques and instruments the people have developed for themselves.

The governmental capacity to perform: Many of the developing countries have only recently achieved self-government; many others have only recently become aware of the opportunities for advanced economic prosperity. It is understandable that they are still reaching for the capacity to effect change. They have experienced difficulties with various combinations of problems including a lack of a sufficient number of competent officials, inadequate knowledge of their own geography and

resources, rudimentary transportation and communications systems, and traditional political viewpoints and institutions.

If the foreign-aid program is to be successful, the United States must assist these nations in improving their performance. We should not seek to impose an institutional pattern, but rather to instill respect for a process of government that engages the people in decision-making. U.S. foreign aid must never be an instrument of uninvited interference in the domestic affairs of independent countries.

The United States has a number of opportunities to influence quite directly the establishment and growth of some of the most fundamental instruments of government. Our help is occasionally asked for in the drafting of national constitutions. Legislators in the developing countries can learn a great deal from U.S. experience in developing staff and research support for the legislative process. Our assistance in helping parliaments establish legislative reference services would be of important practical utility.

Decentralization of governmental functions and political power may also provide a constructive area for study. Formal federalism may not be appropriate for many developing countries, but our experience may be useful in emphasizing that decentralization will not bring benefits in governmental capacity or popular participation unless the people are involved in the government that decentralization brings closer.

Although the administrators of our foreign-aid program have recognized the importance of establishing effective, honest, and competent civil service and public administration, the United States has not given this field sufficient attention in our aid effort. Technical assistance in the development of merit systems, examination programs, and in-service training could be extremely useful. This is the kind of thing the Republican Task Force on Latin America had in mind last November when it recommended the establishment of an Inter-American Civil Service Academy.

One of the most important tests of any government's performance is its ability to maintain law and order. Both the armed services and the police have a role here if the civilian government employs these powerful tools with restraint.

The training of law enforcement officials in the use of power and restraint would be an appropriate use of foreign aid funds. Likewise in the military sphere, assistance in the form of hardware does not contribute directly to the development process, but assistance in the form of training can help transform the military of the developing countries from a feared vehicle of authoritarianism to a popular instrument of progress. Here again U.S. experience with the Army Corps

of Engineers and the use of the military to enforce civil rights is relevant.

The performance of a government will also be reflected in the strength of its mechanisms for channeling popular support. The political party structure need not follow a two-party pattern. The experience of Mexico demonstrates that a single party coalition can be a major instrument of development; in a multi-party system competition between parties for popular support can provide impetus for reform, communication between people and government, and a popular voice in governmental decisions about development.

To be sure, many political leaders need greater understanding of the concept that elections involve not only victory, but a mandate from the people for the conduct of policy in their interests. New techniques for the training of leaders and the organization of support must be brought to their attention; much can be done even with simple programs of instruction in how to run a meeting, how to operate a mimeograph machine, and how to raise funds for political action.

Political participation of the people: It is at the point of governmental mobilization of support and opinion that the problems of governmental capacity and popular participation merge. I think that our experience with development over the past 20 years has demonstrated that sound development depends on the participation of the people.

Alexis de Tocqueville commented more than once on the vitality of U.S. local government and private voluntary associations. Of local government he wrote:

Local assemblies of citizens constitute the strength of free nations. Town meetings are to liberty what primary schools are to science; they bring it within reach; they teach men how to use it and how to enjoy it. A nation may establish a system of free government, but without the spirit of municipal institutions, it cannot have the spirit of liberty.

For a variety of reasons, both historic and philosophic, many developing nations have extremely strong central governments. It is difficult for a government that is distant to win the allegiance of the people. Yet even a government that is close must involve the people in its decisions.

We cannot urge a drastic realignment of administrative and political power in the developing countries, but we can make available to them the benefits of U.S. experience with strong local government. We can suggest techniques of developing leadership in the villages and rural areas; we can assist in the development of recruitment programs that will provide the government with a source of personnel to be trained

in the techniques of public administration and then set to work among their own people.

We should certainly improve our knowledge of the attitudes of people toward government. What steps should be taken to increase their belief in their own ability to effect change? How can government encourage and assist in the exercise of popular initiative? These questions may best be answered through the efforts of the private voluntary institutions and associations which contribute to the initiative, achievement and accommodation of change. De Tocqueville commented on the range and effectiveness of such groups in the United States:

As soon as several of the inhabitants of the United States have taken up an opinion or a feeling which they wish to promote in the world, they look out for mutual assistance; and as soon as they have found one another out, they combine. From that moment they are no longer isolated men, but a power seen from afar, whose actions serve for an example and whose language is listened to.

Such associations are practically unknown in the developing world. Too often the kinds of associations, such as trade unions, which we know as both supporting and opposing participants in the democratic process, may be, in some of the developing countries, an instrument by which the government controls workers.

Our foreign aid effort should recognize the significance of private groups in change and development and make an effort to bring to the developing countries the concepts of democratic participation, education, equality and public service that have informed U.S. private groups.

The natural groups of society--labor, students, professional people, farmers, women, and so forth--must be encouraged to organize to serve their common purposes. They must be encouraged to recognize and analyze their common interests, and the advantages of joint action and self-discipline on behalf of the greater national development purpose. The sensitive teaching of these lessons and responsive understanding of them will contribute to the consciousness of group capacity to shape the future.

Aside from political parties, one of the most obvious areas for voluntary association is in labor--industrial labor in the cities and agricultural labor in the rural areas. The Communists know this lesson and have been busy. They have perceptively applied the Marxist doctrine that the source of revolution was to be found among industrial wage earners to a theory of agrarian revolt. Che Guevara has written:

In underdeveloped America the countryside must be fundamentally the locale of the armed struggle.

This was also the burden of the Chinese Defense Minister's statement of last fall on the inevitability of conflict between "the cities of the world" in North America and Western Europe and "the rural areas of the world" in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

We began too late in this area, but we do know that in a very literal sense the modernizing of a society begins with the work of the labor force; those who work in the development process will be most attuned to its potential and its failure. Their participation can be enlisted for the national program, or for those who promise a brighter future.

Organization is particularly vital and far more difficult in the rural areas. The organization of agricultural workers to initiate, administer, and support agricultural reform and technological advance is imperative. Per capita agricultural production in most of Latin America has actually decreased in the past decade. Cooperatives and other voluntary associations should be encouraged, not only as desirable vehicles of civic action but as sources of technical education as well.

Rural development requires, as AID Administrator David Bell has said, not just better agricultural techniques, but "improvements in marketing and transportation arrangements, in education and health facilities, in better institutions of local government, and of private cooperation." It requires housing, schools, libraries, hospitals, and savings and credit institutions. The development and channeling of initiative on the part of the rural population is a proper area for U.S. support.

Engaging the American people in foreign aid: In light of the tremendous impetus that has been given to reform by various forms of citizen groups in the United States throughout our history, it is ironic that this should be a missing ingredient in our foreign assistance efforts.

The Watson Committee recently recommended:

The role of the nongovernment groups--of business enterprises, labor unions, professional societies, and all the rest--must be greatly expanded.

While the committee had words of praise for AID officials, it pointed out:

Private organizations are generally capable of greater speed, flexibility and incisiveness than government agencies.

In fact, it continued, without restraints of bureaucracy, "private organization can out perform official agencies."

Not only would a greater involvement of U.S. private groups increase the quality and volume of our foreign aid effort, it would help to create a larger constituency for the foreign aid program here in this country. Decentralization of the aid process would involve sustained enthusiasm from the White House and a constant determination at AID to utilize the task of promoting and sustaining a network of voluntary associations in the developing countries. ...

Conclusion: We believe that the recommendations we have made here today will contribute to the strength and effectiveness of our efforts to assist the developing countries. Insofar as they reflect a sharp break with the past, we recognize how little we really have learned about the development process. We have learned a good deal about programs and policies that will not work; we have learned a good deal less about those that will.

We really do not know to what extent the experience of U.S. voluntary agencies will be transferable to a situation which differs so sharply from our own. We really do not know just what it is that will give people in the rural backwaters of Latin America, Asia, and Africa a sense of their own political effectiveness.

But we do know that there is a revolution going on. Either we will use our resources in an effort to channel that revolution in a direction that promises freedom, or we will leave it to those for whom freedom has no value. If we truly believe that the principles of freedom, liberty, equality, and self-government have relevance for all people in the modern world, we must as a matter of national interest and moral conscience, move in the direction we have proposed today.

2. "The Trick is People." Remarks of Congressman F. Bradford Morse, as inserted by Congressman Fraser in the Congressional Record, February 27, 1967.

THE TRICK IS PEOPLE

(Mr. FRASER (at the request of Mr. KAZEN) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Speaker, a penetrating analysis of the process necessary for modernizing society in the developing nations was presented last weekend by the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. MORSE).

His emphasis on the strategy and techniques for involving people in running their own affairs deserves careful reading by all Members as a basis for shaping foreign aid legislation for fiscal 1968.

The remarks follow:

THE TRICK IS PEOPLE

(Remarks of Congressman F. Bradford Morse, Republican, of Massachusetts, before the conference on "Societal Change in Developing Countries: Alternatives to Revolution" Institute of International Relations, Stanford University, February 24-26, 1967)

It is most impolite for a guest to criticize the topic of his host's conference. Nevertheless, I feel I must take issues with the "Alternatives to Revolution" portion of the conference theme, for I am convinced that there is no alternative to revolution. The problem for the developed and the developing society alike is to encourage that revolution to be a quantitative increase in political effectiveness rather than a cycle of violence, coup and instability.

The deficit in our thinking about development has been that we have concerned ourselves principally with but one aspect; economics. Increasingly we are discovering that this is inadequate. It is not enough merely to provide more economic resources. This must be done, of course, but more money, more dams, more transportation networks will not in themselves bring about the broad-gauge development that is necessary to put the developing societies into the 20th century as effective nations.

We must give equal attention to the development of human resources, in short, with political development. Because as John Plank of the Brookings Institution has put it, "political development in the last analysis is something that occurs in individuals."

It is time to stand some of the traditional theories about development on their heads. One need look only at Germany of the 1930's and South Africa today to demonstrate that economic progress does not necessarily lead to political enlightenment. Fortunately, there is evidence, of which this conference is a leading example, of a new interest and attention to the political dimension of development.

Another evidence is the enactment of a

new Title IX in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1966. The text of Title IX is short and simple. It provides that "emphasis shall be placed on assuring maximum participation through the encouragement of private voluntary organizations and strengthened local government institutions." Both elements are virtually unknown in much of the developing world.

The co-author of Title IX, Congressman Donald Fraser of Minnesota, has stated the thrust of the legislation this way: "The Problem of the developing nation requires attention to the social and political structures. These must be changed to release the energies—where they exist—of individual men and women who want to improve their lot. This will lead to economic progress." I would argue that we can even go beyond this to help create energies for development. We can help instill the idea in individual men and women that their action, especially when combined with that of their neighbors, can bring change for the better.

I want to make it clear that by turning our attention to political development, we should in no way insist upon any particular political system, nor attempt to impose any particular political institutions. The encouragement of involvement, of popular participation, is the key. Nor do I suggest that we fight the cold war between free and communist societies in the developing world. To be sure, this is still a significant concern as the famous country/city conflict formulation of Lin Piao demonstrates. It has always been a problem for Americans to understand why, despite generous outpourings of money and material goods, the developing nations are not more stable, their people not more committed to the "democratic way of life", and the appeal of communism is still so great.

Part of the problem is inherent in the moderation and pluralism of the democratic approach. Part lies in the relative stages of historical development. C. E. Black has put the contrast well:

"The societies that modernized relatively early were able to adopt a pragmatic approach to their problems and did not bother to think in general terms about what they were doing. When it comes to presenting a succinct statement of their experience and its relevance to other societies, they are at something of a disadvantage as compared with a communist leadership that has gone to great trouble to conceptualize and rationalize its program. In many instances where rapid modernization is taking place with the methods and assistance of the advanced societies, the indigenous political and intellectual leaders are lacking in ideological goals and incentives."

What is the framework in which we will be operating in any effort to contribute to the political maturity of developing nations? Many of our historians and political analysts have listed the characteristics of the mod-

ernizing society. They include: consolidation of local authorities, creation of a relatively large and effective bureaucracy, increase in citizen participation in government, increased use of a common language, heightened nationalism, urbanization, levelling of income, education and social differences, growth of mass media, mechanization of agricultural and industrial activities, higher standards of health, disintegration of traditional family and tribal units, increased application of violence, and atomization of the individual from his traditional sources of security.

These characteristics are found in varying degrees and in varying combinations, but to a large extent they reflect the pattern of development of the western societies more nearly than the patterns we have seen so far in the developing world. The nations of Latin America, Africa and Asia have experienced more of the negative than the positive factors of development thus far. The disintegrative factors have outpaced the integrative ones. And the job of achieving broad economic and social progress is proving far more difficult than imagination and expectation are prepared to accept. This makes political development all the more necessary and urgent. As one scholar has said, "It is the past and prospective inadequacy of economic and social progress that argues strongly for more direct action to develop political systems than can enable developing societies to contain and manage the explosive tensions being generated by continuing and inevitable economic and social frustrations."

Without the existence of political leverage through democratic institutions, frustrations will mount; the people will become more susceptible to demagogic appeals; and violent efforts to smash the machinery of society can be the logical result. The government must then be preoccupied with security rather than development and the vicious cycle of constitutional instability and lack of growth continues.

#### STRATEGY

The key to the strategies we adopt to help achieve political development must be the determination of what kind of nation and society is to be the product. The strategies will vary according to the traditions and needs of the country involved, but I think it is possible to formulate some possible goals at three levels: at the level of value, at the level of the structure needed to implement those values, and at the level of the performance of the institutions in the structure.

At the value level, political development involves:

1. A sense of community. This includes the integration into the nation-building process of disparate language, tribal, ethnic and geographic groups.

2. Honest, efficient administration. A government riddled with corruption and inefficiency cannot hope to command the support of its citizens.

3. Democracy. By this I do not mean the institutions of federalism and separation of powers as we know them, but rather rights for all individuals, and the correlative obligations of citizenship, including participation

in the political process, respect for law, and the tolerance of dissent.

4. The opportunity for civic participation. This involves the freedom for voluntary associations to exist and flourish. deTocqueville recognized the importance of such associations in our own development when he wrote:

"As soon as several of the inhabitants of the United States have taken up an opinion or a feeling which they wish to promote in the world, they look out for mutual assistance; and as soon as they have found one another out, they combine. From that moment they are no longer isolated men, but a power seen from afar, whose actions serve for an example and whose language is listened to."

At another level, it has been argued that certain structural features are necessary. One such listing includes:

1. An effective executive, including a responsible bureaucracy with an imaginative planning capacity.

2. Enforceable limitations on government to guarantee civil liberties.

3. The mechanism for the participation of the adult citizenry in the decision-making process. In practical terms this would involve an elected representative body, especially at the municipal level.

4. The existence of general rules that apply to all citizens, in all regions, at all levels of economic and social achievement.

5. An independent judiciary.

6. Effective decentralization of governmental authority and performance.

7. Political parties and other voluntary groups.

It would be a mistake to insist that each and every one of these institutions be included in our political development model. It is possible to foresee a variety of combinations, suited to the circumstances of the particular nation involved. And we must always resist the temptation to talk about government, politics, or development as a product rather than a process. It is one thing to create a democratic constitutional structure. It is quite another, as our Latin American neighbors have found out, to make it work.

And now we are brought right down to the level of the individual again. In this connection, I would insist very strongly on the existence and support for free voluntary private associations at all levels of government. As we know from our own experience, such organizations are channels for individual expression, teachers of cooperation, and vehicles for economic, social and political change.

The mere existence of such organizations will not ensure liberty, however. They must be democratically run, responsive to the needs of their members, and recognize that opposition to one government may mean responsibility for the next.

This is particularly true of political parties. In many countries, parties have not served as vehicles of change, but as vehicles for personal gain. A responsible political party must recognize its role as an agency of civic education, as a training ground for future leaders, and as the potential resource of responsible government.

To this end, it has an obligation to provide accurate and honest information to its members and the public at large, to build for consensus not division, and to define the issues fairly so that the voters have a meaningful choice between relevant alternatives.

#### TECHNIQUES

As a politician, I am realistic enough to admit that it is one thing to state the goals of a politically developed society. It is quite another to achieve them. As members of a society that is sometimes deficient at one or another, or all of these levels of values, structure and performance, what do we have to offer the developing world? What are the techniques of political development?

It is here that we are most sadly lacking in information, not only about what techniques will be successful, but about what is already being done. I have been amazed by the number of programs and organizations that have come to light since public encouragement was provided by the enactment of Title IX. One of the other amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act last year called for greater use of the private sector to achieve development goals. These two commands of the law should be closely coordinated.

Whatever our deficiencies as a nation, I am convinced that we have a great deal to offer, perhaps primarily at the private level. I do not think that it is only traditional Republican policy that persuades me of the crucial role that private enterprise, the free trade union movement, universities, women's groups, and trade associations have played in our own development. There is much that these groups can do to help in Latin America and elsewhere. Many of them are already engaged in exciting programs; we need the organizational capacity to collect the results of their efforts, and share their conclusions with others.

In 1966, we tried to institutionalize this process by requiring AID to: "establish an effective system for obtaining adequate information with respect to the activities of, and opportunities for, nongovernmental participation in the development process, and for utilizing such information in the planning, direction, and execution of programs carried out under this Act, and in the coordination of such programs with the ever-increasing developmental activities of nongovernmental United States institutions;"

I feel sure that the Congress will inquire carefully into the results that have been achieved thus far when the 1967 bill is before us.

But while I am the first to agree that we need far more research, I would be the last to admit that we cannot act until that research is accomplished. And I think that there are ongoing programs that bear me out.

Some of the most important programs involve the training of leadership. In Latin America there are a number of outstanding statesmen, but lacking are the leaders at the middle and lower levels with the capacity to mobilize public energies and establish the institutions needed to permit effective

realization of economic and social goals. Sensitive Americans are engaged in a variety of efforts, using local instructors and specially prepared materials, to help train the community development workers who will go out into the rural areas and attempt to integrate those elements in the national economic and political life.

But, training is only one aspect of the political development process. The structure must be able to provide an outlet for the leader's desire to change and improve the lot of his followers. Expectations inevitably aroused must have a realistic hope of fulfillment. One of the key questions raised in the recent hearings of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on International Organizations on the role of communications in the foreign policy process was, motivation for what? As Congressman Fraser pointed out, the motivation of a farmer to grow more may have a destructive impact when his increase ends up in the hands of a corrupt tax collector.

As a consequence political development techniques must operate at a number of levels. On a visit to Chile in 1965 I was much impressed with the efforts of a Dutch agronomist and his wife to instill self-help attitudes through the establishment of an agricultural cooperative for the farming of vegetables. As I pointed out in my report upon my return, "they have had grave difficulties in obtaining a truck to help market the produce—an item that could spell the difference between success and failure of the project, and between hope and despair for the people of the area." I was disturbed that our aid program did not seem to be able to meet this minimal, but important need. Economic significance rather than potential political implication has seemed to govern the attitudes of our AID missions.

Ways must be found to incorporate the political development component into our planning and programming of economic and social development. I have seen, for example, an excellent attempt to do this for Brazil through the development of a grid indicating the program goals in the country, the specific output targets in terms of numbers of teachers, quantity of investment, etc. and the items of self-help input that will work with the necessary aid from external sources to achieve the desired goals. Popular participation is included at every level. This is the kind of thinking that must move beyond the staff level to the highest levels in AID.

One of the most ambitious efforts at political development has been the East Pakistan experience with the creation of local governmental institutions. The traditional highly centralized governmental structure was replaced with an integrated township-country-regional system. Wide latitude for decision making was permitted at local level with provisions for regional networks and systems to avoid duplication and uncoordinated effort. The results, as described in the forthcoming book "The Strategy of Democratic Development" by Edger L. Owens, have been remarkable, both in terms of citizen participation and in terms of economic performance.

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As these examples demonstrate the task of political development involves education, the improvement of public administration, and the increase of political leverage for change at all levels. It involves the participation of far more people and resources than is now contemplated by our foreign aid program. It means the resources of U.S. private groups, public programs, and the efforts of our friends in the other developed countries as well. It requires the commitment and resources of the developing countries themselves.

Having set ourselves such an enormous task, what progress are we making? I am both encouraged and discouraged by the degree of attention that is being given to the implementation of Title IX by the Administration.

Vice President Humphrey clearly understands the nature of the challenge. In a speech at the Pan American Union last fall he said:

"Economic and social development can help significantly to provide the basis for civic advancement, but it will not guarantee it. The past and prospective inadequacy of economic and social progress argues strongly for more conscious action to develop political systems that can enable rapidly changing societies to contain and manage explosive tensions within them."

Yet there was no reference to Title IX or to the concepts of political development in the President's Message to the Congress on

foreign aid. Political development may be an idea whose time has come only to Congress. To some extent the time lag is one of personnel. Some of my friends have argued that you have to be a politician to understand and implement Title IX. Others point to the large number of economists, some of whom date back to the Marshall Plan, in policy-making roles in our aid program. Others note once again how little we really know about the developmental process.

All of these obstacles can be understood, but they do not persuade me that a start, however limited, cannot be made now toward the achievement of democratic development goals. We need more research; in particular we need case studies of successful political development efforts. Perhaps most of all we need more people with political skills directing the development effort.

As a layman in the field, I have not attempted to provide definite answers to the riddles of economic, social and political progress. Nor have I been precise in defining my terms. What I have attempted to do in these brief remarks is to draw upon the analysis of some of the most thoughtful individuals I have encountered to stimulate your thinking and your discussion.

Our success has not been so great, nor is our time span so long that we can afford to close our minds to new concepts and new techniques.

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3. Excerpts from the Speech by Dr. John A. Plank as inserted in the Congressional Record, May 8, 1967, by Congressman Fraser.

Mr. Fraser

Mr. Speaker, an unusually thoughtful speech on the subject of political development in Latin America has been brought to my attention. The speech was delivered by Dr. John A. Plank, a senior staff member at the Brookings Institution. The occasion was the January 12 annual meeting of the trustees of the Overseas Education Fund of the League of Women Voters in Washington.

Dr. Plank described the "profound political change" that is in the air of Latin American nations. He stated his opinion of the situation as "being full of opportunities to be seized rather than as being laden with risks and dangers to be suppressed or evaded." And he developed a strong case for active U.S.-involvement in the political development of Latin America, with particular emphasis on the involvement of the private sector. ...

(Excerpts from the speech)

... Today what we see in Latin America is not "revolting," but profound revolution in the most comprehensive and profound sense. It is needless here to detail the revolutionary forces at work in the region, for they are now commonplaces to you. ...

#### Change in the Air

The old order is breaking up with amazing rapidity in Latin America, and if Whirl is not King, Whirl is ever-present as a lurking possibility. Upon only one thing is there fairly universal agreement in Latin America today; the old order is unsatisfactory, the old institutions, the old ways of doing things, the old relationships both within societies and among them are inadequate to present and emerging requirements. Change is in the air and it must come, profound political change.

My own disposition--and, I am persuaded to believe it is also the disposition of increasing numbers of Latin America's elite groups--is to regard the present situation in Latin America as being full of opportunities to be seized rather than as being laden with risks and dangers to be suppressed or evaded. This is the time, if ever there has been a time, for innovation and invention, boldness and imagination, not for fear and trembling. The future is open in Latin America as it has never been before, everything is up for review and questioning. Latin America which in the past has contributed little to the world's

store of constructive and political and social invention is today presented with its opportunity to make major contributions to political development, to demonstrate that political invention did not cease in 1787 or 1789, in 1917 or 1949, to demonstrate that it is indeed possible to have the Revolution in Freedom in which President Frei of Chile so devoutly believes.

I am far from suggesting that the political development task Latin America confronts is an easy one. For one thing, both the pace of change and the magnitude of the forces impelling change have no historic parallels--Latin American leaders today cannot do what their forefathers used so casually to do--reach out into the grabbag of constitutional and political experience elsewhere in the world (the United States, France, Germany) and blithely pick up a device and incorporate it formally if superficially into their political system. Latin America's political development task is new, and neither we nor they--nor, for that matter, the communist powers--have ready answers for them. For another, the challenge of political development is intrinsically a formidable one. For consider: what is required is the reconciliation of three not easily compatible elements: domestic order, rapid and effective growth in respect of the provision of social and economic goods and services, and meaning, and meaningful democracy--or to put the matter in alliterative terms what is required is peace, progress, and participation. ... As Vice President Humphrey recently expressed it, I know of no responsible Latin American who does not assign importance to each of these, although the priorities he establishes among them vary from situation to situation, country to country.

#### Meaningful Democracy

In Brazil, for example, highest priority has been assigned to efficiency measured in growth terms, even at substantial cost--in view of most of us--of meaningful democracy. In Argentina immediately after the overthrow of President Illia last June first priority went to order: the integration of the Argentine nation, the assertion of authority, the establishment of hierarchy. In Chile President Frei has not equivocated in assigning first importance to participation, meaningful democracy for all who live in Chile, to distributive justice.

Had we time we could consider other approaches to political development in Latin America, the approaches of President Belaunde Terry in Peru, of President Carlos Lleras Restrepo in Colombia, of President Leoni in Venezuela. The approaches differ in accordance with the temperaments and experience of leaders, with the nature of the societies they govern, with the immediate problems they feel themselves obligated to meet. But I think it can be said and said persuasively that there is scarcely a leader in Latin America today who does not consciously think of

himself as trying to lead a political revolution. There are no status quo Presidents in the region, no "Keep cool with Coolidges," no "back to normalcy" advocates.

It does not need to be stressed here that the task of political development in Latin America pertains overwhelmingly to the Latin Americans themselves. These are their societies, it is they who must and will develop, they who will find their own ways. It would be not only inappropriate, it would be impossible, for us in the United States to relate ourselves to their development process in other than marginal ways. Nevertheless there is a role, and a crucial one, for us in their political development process, and it is to that subject that I want to turn.

#### Four Premises

Let me before going further, set out a handful of premises that underlie my thought. First, then, it seems to me we should quite consciously and unabashedly accept that political development is a deeply moral enterprise, infused with value. What we are concerned about is the quality of human life, the life of persons, individual persons. We are ourselves products of the Judaic-Christian tradition, and the Latin Americans are too. We need not equivocate or dissimulate with respect to what our values are. Our political development activity should be consciously biased toward facilitating the emergence in Latin America of political systems that are meaningfully participant constitutional democracies, the emergence of governmental systems that are responsive, responsible, and effective. I stress this because a number of my academic colleagues are pushing hard for a "value-free" approach to political development, either on the ground that any other approach constitutes cultural imperialism, intolerable ethnocentrism, or on the ground that it is intellectual unrespectable to let values intrude in one's activity.

Second, I believe that we in the United States do have political knowledge, political skills, political experience that are relevant to and exportable to Latin America. I stress this because there are numbers who say that our experience is basically irrelevant to the contemporary situation in the developing world, or who say that any attempt to export is unwarranted interference or is too risky, of all areas, say they, the political is the most sensitive.

Third, it seems to me that although we live during a time of intense nationalism when the assertions of the perquisites of national sovereignty are frequent and vociferous, never has there been a time when national frontiers were more permeable. The revolution in communications insures this, a revolution for which we are largely responsible. We are flooding Latin America, not only as increasing

numbers of us in public and private capacities move around in the area, but much more significantly through our domination of the media. The question, then is not whether we shall or shall not breach "national" frontiers; the question is whether we shall breach them with conscious political development ends in view, or whether we shall breach them indiscriminately, non-purposefully. This situation is one to be viewed as full of opportunities to be exploited rather than of risks to be avoided or minimized.

Fourth, it seems to me that there is receptivity in Latin America to any constructive political development assistance we may be able to provide. The Latin Americans are confronting new situations for which little in their own experience has equipped them. They will accept help--why should they not? What is important is the way the help is offered and the assumed motivation that underlies the offer. I say this in full awareness of the ambivalence of attitude toward us in Latin America--on the one hand it is widely recognized that we do indeed represent "success" as success is measured by most relevant indices in mid-XXth century and therefore, in important ways, as something of a model to be emulated; on the other hand, national self-identification in Latin America is felt to depend upon differentiation and independence from the United States. But the kinds of political development assistance I have in mind and the kinds for which I believe there is receptivity do not imply subordination to the United States or conventionally defined United States interests.

#### Role of Private Sector

So much by way of premises. What can our role in Latin America's political development process be? I should say at once that my concern here is exclusively with the role of the private sector. I do not want to minimize the role of the United States Government in political development activity. It is important and will continue to be so. Moreover, with the inclusion of Title IX in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1966, the Agency for International Development is now expected to give specific and systematic attention to one critical aspect of political development, popular participation both in decision-making and program implementation, in its assistance to developing countries. ...

#### Plea for Involvement

My plea, then, is for private sector involvement in political development. ...

4. Edited Remarks by Congressman Fraser at the Meeting of the Society for International Development, Washington Chapter, June 1, 1967 on "People And Hunger."

I would like to pick up the theme that is in Herb Waters' excellent statement, try to sharpen certain aspects of it, and tie in the Title IX development. I begin with the basic theme which is in Herb Waters' speech, that mobilization of people is required to win the War on Hunger, not only because it is probably the only effective way to achieve that goal, but because it also relates to the quality of the political and social evolution of that society, which turns out to be our ultimate interest in these societies. That is to say, that while we are interested in how well fed people are, the national interest of the United States lies in the quality of the social and political aspects of the developing societies we are seeking to help.

I start with the conviction that food production cannot be separated or isolated from the concept of rural development. In addition to the problems of technology of agriculture which may vary according to circumstances--geography, soil conditions, and all kinds of things that involve that technology--there need to be things such as incentives for farmers, marketing and purchasing mechanisms, credit sources, roads, schools (especially at the elementary level), local government, tax collection, and so on. All of these are intimately related to the problem of rural development which is the broader context in which a farmer may or may not produce efficiently and be able to become a part of the market economy. Now, where is all this going to come from, if this is indeed the requisite for rural development?

In the less developed countries one of the most striking common characteristics that we find is the disinterest that characterizes the Establishment and the elites in the large cities--the disinterest that they share for the rural people and for the interests of the rural people. This is evidenced in very obvious ways and often in subtle ways--such as the problem of land tenure, the question of where credit can be obtained and under what terms, the problem of marketing mechanisms, and so on. When we deal with developing countries we have customarily dealt with them through their central government. We've said to ourselves that if we work with the central governments and persuade them to do things in the rural areas, then we are going to have the kind of change that needs to take place. The problem is that central governments, for the most part, are made up of the same people--the establishments and the elites--who really don't care too much as to what happens in the rural areas. The closest analogy I can give you is the benevolence which the United States Government has always shown toward the American Indian.

One need only look at the American Indian's fate to see how effectively the central government of the United States has been in advancing their welfare over the years. I think if one looks at history,--and there is much to be learned from history if it is perceived with some precision,-- that groups who do not have an adequate place in society, an adequate political voice or share in the economics or social status, rarely get that circumstance corrected except through their own efforts. I suggest that this needs to be pondered very, very carefully.

I would just point to the problems the farmer in the United States has had, and the great efforts he has had to make in the political side in order to achieve the things he has needed, not the least of which has been some kind of market protection. Organized labor didn't come along and get handed the Wagner Act or the right to collective bargaining. They had to fight for it. There were riots; there were strikes; there were social tensions; there was violence; and this is characteristic of social change because social change is painful for societies. Women--I don't know that there were riots--but they struggled very hard to get the right to vote. And, lastly the American Negro. One of the things that always struck me is the fact that both political parties over the years have said they were for civil rights, just as central governments say "we are for reform of land tenure and we are for giving people in the rural areas a break." Just exactly the same and with exactly the same results--nothing. It wasn't until the American Negro took to the streets in the South and the conflict broke out that the conscience of America was awakened, and even then, without the organized support of the religious community in the United States, there would have been little progress. When Mao Tse-tung says that the revolutions of the future will come from the rural areas, he has, I think, a great deal of evidence which supports his thesis and one that we should look at very carefully.

Title IX proposes to recognize that popular participation--that is, letting people become effective in their own right, to pursue their own goals,--may be a major development technique. This was enacted in 1966, and it reads

"In carrying out programs of United States development assistance, emphasis shall be placed on assuring maximum participation in the task of economic development on the part of the people of the developing countries through the encouragement of democratic private and local governmental institutions."

As for the practical implementation of this concept, AID is moving. I would like to read from their first annual report dated May 5, just this last month. I am just going to read one paragraph. This is a report on the implementation of Title IX. They say:

"Title IX requires AID not only to consider new types of activities, but to view the development process in different and much broader terms than before. ...Whereas our activities since 1961 have been directed largely to quantitative less developed country growth targets, Title IX focusses on the less quantifiable institution-building characteristics of the modernization process. Its purpose is to involve an increasing number of people in the development process, which means we have to find new and imaginative ways of eroding the essentially "enclave" nature of these societies, not only in the economic, but also in the social and political spheres. Such a "new approach" on the part of AID will require greater understanding of the ways in which the attitudes of the masses of people in the less developed countries can be changed so as to engender a desire and interest on their part to become involved in development,-- either individually or through group action."

Well, this report is a first rate report. The only question that we have to face is whether we have got some talented people in one office who are able to put this report together, but whose impact on the main stream of AID operations is somewhat less clear.

Let me now draw a couple of inferences which may flow from this larger conceptual approach. Should we concentrate in rural development on the larger, more efficient farmer? Well, if all you were interested in is food production, you might say yes, but if you also recognize that you can't have very much of a society unless most of the people somehow have a voice and a share in it, and you are interested in the political responses and so on, then you would say no, you can't afford to concentrate on this aspect, you must look at the wider implications of what we are doing.

Let me pursue that with a specific example. In Greece, we cut off aid because we said by dividing the number of people by the annual output per capita, production was growing and it had reached the take-off stage. If we look inside of the society, many people in the rural areas of Greece have not at that time and still are not today general participants in the economy. Now, that ought to have been our interest and we ought to have recognized, it seems to me, that this is the kind of thing we want to look at, not some set of statistics which obscure the realities of the tensions, inequities and imbalances that exist in that society.

The last example I want to give is the Philippines. We have a long historical interest there. AID has helped a lot. My impression is that we worked a great deal through the central government, and what this did was to reinforce an already unfortunate pattern of over-centralization so that today in the Philippines society, I would

just way it is a very sick society. The rural areas apparently have very little to look forward to, increasingly alienated from their government, with corruption a common feature. In other words, what we do with our aid may have an impact on the patterns and tendencies within these governments. So much for that.

I now just want to close with raising three questions: (1) Is our conceptual approach to the War on Hunger truly adequate and responsive to the size of the problem? Are we, with our mountain of rhetoric, producing only a mouse in response? (2) Are we bringing together enough of our resources, are we devoting enough resources to this problem? and (3) Is our Government adequately organized to develop fully both the conceptual approach and to mobilize the resources now existing and those that may have to be generated in order to tackle this problem?

Thank you very much.

DONALD M. FRASER  
5TH DISTRICT, MINNESOTA

OFFICE BUILDING  
222-4756

D'LE MACIVER  
ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT

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June 13, 1967

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Mr. William Gaud  
Director  
Agency for International Development  
New State Department Building  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Bill:

I have had an opportunity to read two documents related to Title IX. I read the aerogram circular sent to the missions some months ago and I have read the report to the Congress on the implementation of Title IX.

I want you to know how pleased I am with both of these documents. Both of them have caught fully the philosophy and spirit which lies behind Title IX and have helped to translate it into the criteria and approaches which are of practical value.

The approach which the Agency is taking to Title IX is a sound one. I believe that progress will be best when it is made carefully and with the benefit of adequate study and research. On the other hand, there will be a need to continue to work these concepts into the ongoing programs with AID.

Insofar as these initial documents, however, represent the first step on a long journey, they are absolutely first rate and those who have helped to develop them surely deserve congratulations. I think they reflect credit on you and your staff.

With best wishes.

Sincerely,

Donald M. Fraser

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6. Excerpts from "Additional Views of Honorable Donald Fraser" from the Report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs - Foreign Assistance Act of 1967, House Report No. 551, August 11, 1967, 90th Congress, First Session.

## The Myth of Economic Growth Determining Political Course

Another danger which flows from the rationale of a worldwide confrontation with communism is the degree to which our programs of economic assistance are justified on these grounds. Here there are two myths. One is that by economic progress we lessen the likelihood of a Communist (or radical) movement taking hold in these nations. While it is dangerous to generalize about the developing nations, a reasonably safe observation is that most of these nations will require fifty to a hundred years to make the kind of progress which begins to close the gap created by "rising expectations." Knowledge about how others live in the world is growing far more rapidly than is the capacity of nations to teach the skills and advance the organization of their societies sufficiently to fulfill the resulting expectations.

The process of growth and concomitant change itself is painful and disruptive. In our own Nation we have learned that change is painful, and that disruption and conflict are likely to become most acute as those who are disadvantaged comprehend what forceful leadership may offer to them. In the developing nations the sterility of western ideological efforts has assured that the most aggressive and militant leadership will be trained or supported by Communists or by far left groups.

Moreover some economic growth will not occur at all until there is a dramatic change in leadership and political ideology.

Disillusionment may well follow within the United States as it becomes increasingly clear that economic assistance is having only a marginal impact upon the conduct of other nations. By seeking public support for economic aid on the grounds that it will dramatically influence political behavior of other nations, we are headed for a fall. The public will become disenchanted, and the legitimate and useful ends to be served by well constructed aid programs will be lost in the withdrawal of public support.

## Myth of Economic Aid Stopping Communism

The second myth is that when a Communist threat exists, economic aid provides an effective answer. ...

## Giving the People the Right to Organize

A more positive approach to the world can be far more productive. The United States and the West are most generously endowed with creative concepts about the ways in which societies can be organized to advance the welfare of people. We have much to share with other nations, although we also have much to learn.

The ideology of the West is a positive one. The principle of giving people the right to organize for social, political, and economic ends is sound and productive. Decisionmaking powers conferred on those who face the problems stimulates the growth of responsibility and the skills of social organization. The right of majority rule and the protection of the rights of the individual have universal appeal. The understanding and application of these ideas is at the heart of ideology. Ideology in turn is the lifeblood of politics and political movements. Yet we eschew communication and dialog at this level. We carefully strain out politics and political controversy in our relations with other nations. Only the Communists organize a Havana conference to beef up the motivation and commitment of political movements.

This current bill urges in a modest way that the Executive consider ways in which the skills required for political work might be encouraged. The report suggests that the initiative come from the developing nations themselves. The administration should pursue this with energy and imagination.

Economic aid can play a constructive role in our relations with other nations. Especially at the technical assistance level, but also through judicious use of concessional loans, we can help governments meet the needs of their people. But this should be undertaken in the spirit of assistance to the people of those nations, not as a self-serving effort on our part. We should look neither for friendship, votes in the U.N., nor for support on international policies as rewards for our aid. We should have only one main criteria for our aid efforts. Do they advance the welfare of the people of the recipient nation and do they advance it in such a way that the capacity of the people to continue to work at their own problems is enhanced? If our aid policies were undertaken in this spirit, we would build durable relationships with other societies which could survive the vagaries of political leadership and policy changes which from time to time may not be to our liking. In other words, if we seek to help the people of these nations we should accept the political realities which from time to time may generate political leadership which sees the world and their own national interest in a different light than we see them. Our aid should be concentrated on building the institutions and political and social infrastructure as well as the physical infrastructure which offers the best hope to the people of these societies for meaningful participation in all phases of their national life.

## Educating Congressmen in International Affairs

Finally, I want to acknowledge that in part the deficiencies in our international policies are contributed to by actions of Congress. Here, however, the executive must bear major responsibility. Under the U.S. political system, Members of Congress come from diverse backgrounds with little opportunity (for the most part) to be knowledgeable or experienced in international affairs. In almost every other field of national concern Members of Congress bring practical experience derived from their earlier careers. ...

No comparable effort is made by the agencies in the international field. No effort is made to contact members and encourage them to make studies of international programs or even of a single country. The traditional attitude of distrust and concern about congressional views on international problems continues to be accepted as an inevitable reality within which our international policies are formulated. ...

Members of Congress are practising politicians. With adequate briefing and background they can communicate with politicians in other countries on a realistic basis. Politicians share a common experience of the problems found in almost every nation. The executive has an enormous responsibility to harness this resource to advance our national interest. It would pay rich dividends in more enlightened understanding and support for those policies which will best serve the interests of the people of the United States.

II. AID MATERIAL ON TITLE IX

**MISSING PAGE**

**NO.** 72

A. Title IX Material Sent Missions to Date

1. AIDTO CIRCULAR LA51, October 4, 1966  
Subject: "Title IX - Utilization of Democratic  
Institutions in Development."
2. AIDTO CIRCULAR 1063, November 8, 1966  
Subject: "Promotion and Utilization of Democratic  
Institutions for Development."
3. AIDTO CIRCULAR XA 2015, February 24, 1967  
Subject: "Promotion of Youth Corps for Development."
4. AIDTO CIRCULAR LA 150, March 24, 1967  
Subject: Title IX
5. AIDTO CIRCULAR LA 161, April 14, 1967  
Subject: "Promotion and Utilization of Democratic  
Institutions for Development" - Title IX
6. AIDTO CIRCULAR A-220, May 24, 1967  
Subject: "Promotion of Democratic Institutions  
for Development."

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT MANUAL	ORDER NO. M.O. 1022.2	PAGE B-1
SUBJECT  ANNEX B  Political, Social, and Administrative Appraisal	TRANS. LETTER NO. Gen. 1110. X-4 SUPERSEDES	EFFECTIVE DATE Aug. 27, 1962

The following outline is intended to suggest relevant areas for political and social analysis and should not be viewed as instructions or as a rigid format. Those working on each IAS analysis must judge whether these or other questions are most pertinent to the individual country.

For each area of analysis, the IAS submission should indicate the source and estimate the reliability of the data presented; e.g., whether it is based on direct Country Team observation, host country academic or other specialist opinion, books or articles, the host country press, etc.

1. Survey of broad social, political and administrative characteristics.

a. What are the broad social characteristics of the country?

(1) Attitudes toward change:

For each major group within the population (e.g., government leaders, bureaucrats, student groups, military, commercial and manufacturing community, urban labor, and major groupings within the rural population an effort should be made to assess the nature of attitudes toward change, even where not articulated. What kinds of change do they desire, and how intensely? To what degree are their aspirations internally consistent and realizable within their life-span? How do typical members of the group view their own role in development? If they believe they have an active role to play, what is it? What do they believe to be the major blocks to progress --e.g., the attitudes or behavior of other groups in the country, the colonial inheritance, adverse foreign markets?

(2) Cultural, Educational and Related Factors Affecting Development:

Estimate to the extent possible the capacity of the population to participate in and respond to development activity. This evaluation might include a survey of the level of education in key groups in the population; the extent and rate of growth of urbanization; access to mass media; labor mobility; prevalence of malnutrition and/or debilitating disease; etc. The discussion might make use of available quantitative data such as literacy rates; proportions of school age children in elementary and secondary schools; infant mortality rates, life expectancy, morbidity and mortality tables, number of hospital beds or doctors per 1000 population, and similar health data; proportion of population in towns of over a stated size and rate of growth of urban population; etc.

(3) Stratification:

Are there clearly discernable stratifications within the society?

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How wide are the gaps, and how rigidly defined? What major tensions, if any, are created?

(4) National unity:

How broadly and deeply accepted is the concept of national unity? How divisive are ethnic, regional, linguistic, religious, tribal, or comparable groupings? What are the trends promoting unity or disunity? To what degree and through what channels are these groupings affected by and concerned with national affairs?

b. What are the general political characteristics of the country?

(1) The relationship between the political leadership and important segments of the population:

- a. Is the government reasonably responsive, within the constraints of counterpressures and limited resources, to demands for improved services; a more equitable distribution of income, wealth, land, opportunities; fuller participation in national political processes?
- b. Does existing leadership exercise sufficient influence over important segments of the population to inspire sacrifices and elicit participation in development activities? Has it been able to inspire a feeling of participation among local elites and among the people in general?
- c. How does the attitude toward government of key groups in the population affect the government's ability to implement major development activities?
- d. Does the political relationship between central and regional and/or local government support both increasing local initiative and reasonable central co-ordination of development?

(2) Political recruitment and competition:

- a. What groups exercise political leadership at the local level? How representative and how open to newcomers are these groups? What is the nature of local leaders' relation with their "constituents"?
- b. At the national level, how broad and how open are the groups from which national political leadership is drawn? How competitive are elections? Is significant potential competition being suppressed?

(3) Articulation of popular demands:

What role do each of the following play in the formulation of

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popular demands? What influence do they exert?

- a. the press
- b. the military
- c. political parties
- d. religious organizations
- e. labor unions; business associations, farmers' organizations, etc.
- f. hereditary or traditional nobility or aristocracy

(4) Strength and stability of the present government:

- a. Is the ruling group united?
- b. What other groups are likely to challenge the government during the next few years, either by assuming power or by strongly influencing policy?
- c. Are there threats from abroad to normal governmental functioning?
- d. Does the government's strength rest on the popularity, prestige or competence of one or a very few individuals? How stable is his (their) position?

(5) Ideology, competence, and integrity:

- a. Does the political leadership, or influential segments of the public, hold strong ideological biases which shape policy so as to impede development? Support it?
- b. In what fields or for what kinds of problems do the decision-makers have the firmest grasp of policy issues? The least firm grasp? What are the prospects in the next few years for adequate staff work (indigenous or foreign) to increase the sophistication and soundness of policy decisions?
- c. Is corruption in top political echelons at a level which could significantly retard or divert development efforts?

c. What are the general administrative characteristics of the country?

(Specific analysis of planning organization and procedures is discussed in Annex D, Section 4.)

(1) How adequate to the tasks of development is basic administrative organization and procedure?

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- a. Are there agencies responsible for the planning and implementation of important development activities, or are there serious gaps in the organizational structure?
  - b. Is responsibility for major activities fragmented among different agencies? How adequate are the coordination channels and procedures among different agencies and ministries, and to what extent are responsible officials aware of the need for co-ordination? Do semi-autonomous agencies or provincial or local governments control important segments of development activity? If so, are they responsive to central government direction? On the other hand, is there sufficient delegation of responsibility and authority to local levels to permit adjustment to local conditions and exercise of local initiative?
  - c. Are there key government procedures or practices (e.g., the budgeting process; financial control mechanisms; standard procedures for review of decisions; etc.) that are so ill-suited to effective development activity that they constitute major blocks?
- (2) How adequate to the tasks of development are the caliber and attitudes of administrative personnel?
- a. Which key development activities are most severely handicapped by lack of trained personnel? Is the problem primarily one of training, or in addition, would extensive reform in recruitment, placement and promotion practices, salary scales, or other factors be necessary to attract and effectively use trained people? In recently independent former colonies, what is the attitude toward retaining metropolitan or other foreign administrators and professionals for a period of years?
  - b. Do middle and lower level civil servants demonstrate initiative? Are decisions taken at the operating level, or "bucked upstairs"? How ingrained and permanent is lack of initiative? Does it reflect established procedures, lack of delegation of responsibility by superiors, heavy penalties for error, low caliber, inexperience, traditional respect for authority, lack of reward or recognition for outstanding performance, or other factors?
  - c. What attitude do civil servants commonly take toward the public and toward their jobs? How are they viewed by different segments of the public?
  - d. Is corruption sufficiently widespread in development agencies to seriously hamper effectiveness? Does the public condemn or condone official corruption, or is it indifferent or cynical about it?

(3) What is the political climate of public administration?

- a. What is the nature of the relationship between politicians and civil servants? Do politicians view the administrators as the lackeys of an earlier colonial regime, or of political opponents? Do they feel that they represent different class or ethnic groups than do the civil servants? How do the civil servants view the political leadership?
- b. Does factionalism or instability at political levels result in stalemate or indecisiveness in the administration of development programs? How often do ministerial portfolios change-hands? Do politicians frequently intervene directly in operating details?

d. What are the country's major social and political goals, within the next several years or decade?

- (1) What are the major social and political goals of the host government? (The response to this question should be related to the conclusions reached in Section I-D of the LAS, which analyzes Plan objectives.) To what extent do these goals coincide or diverge from the kinds of change desired by major groups in the population, as described above in this section?

2. Statement of LAS social and political goals and relation to total country strategy.

a. Within the context of 1 above, what should U.S. strategy view as the most important social and political goals in the country?

(1) Political and social goals:

What social, political or administrative changes would be feasible within the next five or ten years in order to alleviate major problems identified above, or to start or accelerate desirable trends? (Identification of desirable social and political goals for another country and culture inevitably requires making some value judgments. While particular U.S., British or Western European institutions or practices may not be either feasible or desirable models for other countries, the United States is not indifferent to the direction of social and political development in AID-assisted countries. Since judgments of some kind are essential, it is preferable that they be systematic, considered, and prior to events rather than ad hoc in response to events.)

(2) Political and social impediments to economic growth:

What social/political trends or situations are severe impediments to rapid economic growth in general or in particular regions or sectors? Which of these impediments are amenable to direct government action, and might therefore warrant priority attention even if they do not directly relate to major social or political

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goals? (Some major social or political blocks to economic growth e.g., the kinship system, particular religious beliefs, strong ethnic prejudices --are extremely difficult to alter by direct government action.)

(3) Relationship between U.S. and host country statements of goals:

To what extent does the Country Team definition of feasible and desirable social and political goals in (1) and (2) above coincide or conflict with the host government definition? With the definition of various major groups in the population?

- b. What is the optimal balance for the total country program between more immediately productive types of economic investment, and use of resources to promote social/political goals which may have only indirect and long run economic impact?

(The appropriate role for U.S. assistance within the total country program is discussed under Part II of the LAS analysis: "U.S. Assistance Strategy".)

(1) Conflicting and complementary goals:

To what extent do the social and political goals identified above complement economic targets? To what extent do they compete for scarce resources and limited technical and administrative ability (See M.O. 1011.3 for a discussion of ways in which more and less immediately productive types of investment may conflict with or complement each other.) This should consider recurring operating costs and contribution to or drain on future revenues, as well as immediate investment costs. Reference should be made to the H and P tables as appropriate.

(2) The level of social investment where demand is intense:

- a. Are there strong pressures for improved social services (schools, clinics, urban housing, etc.) or social reforms (land redistribution or improvement of tenure laws; minimum wage; elimination or imposition of discriminatory treatment of particular groups)?
- b. Are these pressures so intense that failure to respond would cause unrest and impede development?
- c. How great a response is required to prevent this, and will the response create new pressures? What responses can be devised which will lead to longer term solutions to the problem? What means can be devised to foster popular understanding of the choices involved?

- (3) The level of social investment where demand is not intense:

Where little pressure for increased social investment or reform exists, or is anticipated during the LAS period, is this due to extensive government activity in these areas, or is it because public expectations as well as government activity are minimal? In the latter case, is it desirable to stimulate public demand and/or government interest and capacity to respond to that demand? If so, how could this be done?

- c. b. above relates to the optimal levels of social/political and of economic investment. What do the political and social goals identified in a. above imply as to the direction and pattern of economic investment?

- (1) Increasing complementary measures:

Are there areas of development activity which contribute significantly to both major economic and major social/political goals? Should such areas be given higher priority because of their dual contribution than they would warrant on either economic or social/political grounds alone?

- (2) Reducing conflicts:

Are there development activities which contribute to major economic goals, but only at the expense of setback to social or political goals? If so, can the undesirable effects be avoided by undertaking auxiliary activities, or by redesigning the desired economic activity? (For example, do planned industrial development projects exacerbate a growing problem of over-crowded urban areas? If so, can proposed plants be relocated, or can auxiliary urban development activities be undertaken to ease anticipated pressures?) If development activities contributing to major social or political goals compete severely for scarce resources, can the activities be redesigned to contribute also to economic objectives? If so, along what lines?

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## PROMOTION AND UTILIZATION OF DEMOCRATIC

### INSTITUTIONS FOR DEVELOPMENT

#### I. Introduction

Within the broad framework of U.S. foreign policy, AID is charged with promoting economic and social progress in developing countries. We believe that this is the correct role for AID and that economic and social development should continue to be the primary focus of AID activities. At the same time, we believe that it is important for AID to be more concerned than it has been with improving the governmental and political framework within which economic and social development takes place, both because of the increasing evidence that economic and social progress often depend in large part upon factors that are not essentially economic, and because in the last analysis the desired result of U.S. programs goes beyond economic development.

Our attention must be directed to three separate but related needs:

- (1) the need for more systematic identification of weaknesses in the governmental and political framework which impede economic and social progress;
- (2) the need for more attention to and analysis of the impact of our assistance programs as a whole on progress toward administrative competence, national integration, and the development of legal and democratic institutions;
- (3) the need for more imaginative consideration of specific ways to strengthen and animate public and private institutions of authority and power, and to increase popular participation, for long-run developmental ends.

#### II. Discussion

Section 102 of the Foreign Assistance Act states that one major objective of the aid program is to "help make an historic demonstration that economic growth and political democracy can go hand in hand to the end that an enlarged community of free, stable, self-reliant countries can reduce world tensions and insecurity." Development is not so much a series of independent activities labeled economic, social, and political, but a whole cloth, requiring an overall approach.

The need to give more attention to the non-economic factors of development, e.g., democratic institution-building and popular participation, has

assumed increased importance and priority for AID with the inclusion in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1966 of a new Title IX - Utilization of Democratic Institutions in Development. This title reads:

In carrying out programs authorized in this chapter, emphasis will be placed on assuring maximum participation in the task of economic development on the part of the people of the developing countries, through the encouragement of democratic private and local governmental institutions.

According to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs (See Attachment I) this title's intent is to direct AID to: 1) strengthen its capability to identify, in cooperation with the governments of aid-receiving countries the existing and latent democratic forces which can aid in the development process and to promote the building of democratic private and public institutions on all levels -- local, state and national; 2) place increased reliance upon non-governmental organizations with a demonstrated competence in enlisting popular participation in the developmental process; 3) develop, and use in its next presentation to the Congress, meaningful criteria for judging the results of this effort and specifically evaluate US assistance not only in economic terms, but also in terms of the extent to which our aid encourages democratic processes.

In brief, AID has been directed by Congress to sharpen and extend its analytical capability in, and to give new program emphasis to, some of the major non-economic factors of development.

There are at least four areas in which the governmental and political framework of many of the less developed countries could be strengthened:

(1) Administrative Competence. Administrative development is obviously necessary for democratic evolution and national integration. Efficient administrative organizations as such, however, can also support authoritarian or even totalitarian polities. Previous work has been done in this area, but we must continue to help, and to become more effective, in developing government which is not only efficient, but honest and just as well.

(2) National Integration. Almost every newly emerging country needs to develop a national identity. In so doing, it must both reduce centrifugal conflicts, and inequities among diverse geographic regions, social classes, and ethnic, tribal, linguistic and religious groups, and positively fashion a consensus which transcends parochial loyalties and interests.

(3) Legal Institutions. Economic, social and political progress in the developing countries requires the development of modern, progressive legal skills and institutions. This kind of development is important to facilitate commerce, encourage investment, and rationalize property and contract relations and practices. It is essential to the fostering of government which affords its citizens a reasonable measure of justice and to the evolution of the rule of law. It is also necessary to insure that the legal system is a viable means of achieving change by orderly methods.

(4) The Development of Democratic Institutions. The political institutions which have been developed in Western Europe and the United States, albeit imperfect, have been demonstrated to be the best means of reconciling stability with economic, social and political change. This does not mean that these institutions per se should be (or can be) introduced in the developing nations, but it does mean that these institutions contain elements which are worthy of being woven into the lives of the developing nations. Such elements are those which seek to develop: 1) Availability of information and freedom of its exchange; 2) Non-violent procedures for expressing individual and group opinion; 3) Freedom of dissent, within recognized boundaries; 4) Governmental responsiveness to public interests, hopes and preferences; 5) Considerable citizen participation in government; 6) Local and regional government as well as national government; 7) Orderly transfer of power with popular review and sanction of governmental performance; 8) Voluntary associations, i.e., professional organizations and specialized interest groups, which cut across traditional economic, social and political barriers; 9) A broad distribution of authority and power to act among groups and institutions in economic, social, and political fields; and a viable balance between the rights and duties of the citizenry.

Such institutions and processes are not only compatible with individual dignity and orderly conciliation of differences among groups, but also encourage wide popular participation in the process of development and the effectiveness of this process. A corollary of popular participation is a pluralistic society which likely will multiply political and economic decision-makers, foster self-help incentives and quicken the pace of the development process.

Further, whenever our aid succeeds in bringing about changes in a country, it inevitably fortifies or undermines particular groups and affects their role in the society. Such effects may be entirely unintentional. But since our influence will not be neutral regardless of our intentions, plainly it is our responsibility to try to anticipate and guide our impact on governmental and political evolution to the extent possible.

In each country where we conduct sizeable assistance programs, we should be asking systematically as part of the programming process: Are there major

weaknesses of governmental or political organization, processes and attitudes which interfere seriously with economic and social progress? What measure might address these problems? Can we encourage or support such measures as part of the economic assistance program? The particular problems of each country are unique, and different combinations of activity must be designed to meet them. There are some countries, for example, where current governmental structures and processes give adequate support to economic and social progress. There are other countries where, despite grave weaknesses, there is little we can do. But the scope for action may be much wider if we take a longer time perspective and consider not only how to encourage greater self-help now, but also how to create attitudes and build institutions which will support increased self-help later.

In the past such efforts have been concentrated in a few areas -- labor-leadership training, public administration, public safety, local government, youth leadership programs, cooperatives and community development. All these are important approaches to improving administrative competence and fostering national integration, the rule of law, and democratic institutions. Often these are the most appropriate means of attacking key problems in particular countries. But the justification for such previous efforts has often been inadequate because we failed to assess their importance and priority against a more broadly-defined development approach. By so doing, a wider range of new activities, or modifications of current activities, may be indicated if only to maximize the impact of economic and social projects in the four major areas to which this communication addresses itself. The criteria for programming and evaluating such activities should not be simply their direct and/or short-term contribution to economic growth, but their importance to the work of building viable democratic governmental structures and process and of broadening the avenues of popular participation as key elements of a healthy foundation for economic and social progress. In other words, a deeper and more penetrating analysis within the Agency's program planning system of the considerations relating to the political dimension of development is required.

### III. Special Considerations

In acting to improve the governmental and political framework for development careful attention is obviously essential to the appearance as well as the actuality of what is done. It is not intention to interfere improperly in host country governmental and political processes or to attempt to manipulate or manage local political activity or the fortunes of particular leaders. Our basic approach should continue to be one of working constructively together with the government and people of host countries for the solution of serious developmental problems.

It should be noted that action of this sort normally would not be identified as distinct from economic and social development activities. For example, the highly successful rural works program in East Pakistan and the Joint Commission for Rural Reconstruction in Taiwan have led to dramatic increases in local participation in decision-making. The community development program in Nepal is directed to similar ends. Each of these efforts contributes to economic and social progress as well as to long-run democratic evolution.

Moreover, not all aspects of governmental or political development are particularly sensitive. With the full cooperation of host governments, many of our traditional assistance activities have directly contributed to these ends. And AID has frequently been requested to undertake projects which directly affect the governmental structure of host governments in the areas described above.

We wish to be clear, however, that we do not have in mind actions designed to meet current political crises or to change the political scene in the next year or two. Sometimes AID actions do effect short-run politics. But this is not our intention, and such efforts are risky and likely to prove ineffective. Rather we are calling for the systematic and imaginative use of more gradual, long-run institution-building and training efforts in developing attitudes, relations between groups, and effective legal, governmental and private institutions which will continue to the achievement of self-sustaining growth and human progress.

## FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1966

### Report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

#### Title IX - Utilization of Democratic Institutions in Development

Section 106 of the bill also amends chapter 2 of part I of the Foreign Assistance Act by inserting a new title IX relating to the utilization of democratic institutions in development.

The language of the new title IX directs that in carrying our programs of US development assistance, emphasis shall be placed on assuring maximum participation in the task of economic development on the part of the people of the developing countries, through the encouragement of democratic private and governmental institutions.

Over the years, in exercising legislative oversight with respect to the administration of the foreign assistance program, the committee has observed that there is a close relationship between popular participation in the process of development, and the effectiveness of this process.

As a consequence, the committee has written a number of provisions into the Foreign Assistance Act and its predecessor statutes, urging that economic and technical assistance be used to stimulate the development of local programs of self-help and mutual cooperation through such measures as loans to small farmers; encouragement of cooperatives, labor unions, and savings and loan-type institutions; utilization of voluntary agencies; and support of integrated programs of community development designed to promote stable and responsible governmental institutions at the local level.

The committee finds that despite these periodic expressions, popular participation in the tasks of development is increasing at a very slow rate. The great potential for planning and implementation of development activities, contained in the mass of the people of the developing countries is still largely untapped, which slows down the achievement of the objectives of the foreign assistance program. On the contrary, it has become increasingly clear that failure to engage all of the available human resources in the task of development not only acts as a brake on economic growth but also does little to cure the basic causes of social and political instability which pose a constant threat to the gains being achieved on economic fronts.

For these reasons, the committee has proposed the language embodied in the new title IX. This language directs that new attention and emphasis be given to the administration of U.S. development assistance programs to the goal of attaining a larger measure of popular participation in development

This goal can best be achieved through the fostering of cooperatives, labor unions, trade and related associations, community action groups, and other organizations which provide the training ground for leadership and democratic processes; through making possible increased participation of such groups and of individuals in the planning, execution, and evaluation of development undertakings; through broader and more effective utilization of the experience and resources of existing private and voluntary organizations; and, generally, through the building of democratic, private and public institutions on all levels -- local, state and national.

The achievement of the basic objectives of the new title IX may require:

(a) change in the approach of the Agency for International Development and the assignment of higher priorities to the intermediate objectives outlined in the foregoing paragraph; (b) strengthening of the Agency's capability to identify, in cooperation with the governments of aid-receiving countries, the existing and latent democratic forces which can aid in the development process; and (c) increased reliance upon non-governmental organizations with a demonstrated competence to enlist popular participation in the development process.

The committee plans to keep close check on the manner in which the intent of this new title IX is carried out. The committee expects the Agency for International Development to bear in mind the purposes put forth in this title in preparing specific projects and programs -- and to develop and use in its next presentation to the Congress, meaningful criteria for judging the results of this effort. Such criteria ought to include information about the extent to which the population and key groups of each aid-receiving country are involved in such institutional development. AID's reports should evaluate American assistance not only in economic terms, but also in terms of the extent to which our aid encourages democratic processes.

J. ACED Issues Paper: Session on Utilization of Democratic Institutions for Development. Meeting of March 4, 1967.

ACED ISSUES PAPER

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Meeting of March 4, 1967  
Action Officers: R.L.Hough  
J.R.Schott

Session on  
Utilization of Democratic Institutions for Development

Background

The Office of Program Coordination is presently in the process of developing definite proposals for the implementation of Title IX of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1966. This legislation calls upon AID to place emphasis upon "assuring maximum participation in the task of economic development on the part of the people of the developing countries, through the encouragement of democratic private and local governmental institutions."

In developing these proposals we are engaged in two separate but related undertakings:

1. performing a review and analysis of the field responses to Circular Airgram XA-1063 (attached) and establishing a continuing dialogue with individuals in regional bureaus and related offices to develop a set of action proposals, tailored to particular country situations, which will meet the objectives of Title IX;
2. preparing a presentation to Congress which will a) set forth our interpretation of this new provision; b) describe a brief strategy for its implementation within which - and in terms of which - country programs or parts thereof can be designed or redesigned; c) specify a set of initiatives of a staffing, research and program nature which will be taken over the next year; and d) establish evaluative criteria by which to judge our success in implementing Title IX.

Materials for Distribution

1. Initial policy statement to field on Title IX:

Circular Airgram XA-1063 of November 8, 1966 ("Promotion and Utilization of Democratic Institutions for Development")

2. Four selected responses to above Circular:

TOAID A-308 of January 5, 1967 from Nepal  
TOAID A-1200 of January 18, 1967 from Thailand  
TOAID A-416 of December 15, 1966 from Liberia  
TOAID A-298 of January 25, 1967 from Guatemala

3. Address by Congressman Donald M. Fraser of February 7, 1967

4. Talk by Marian Czarnecki, House Foreign Affairs Committee, of October 20, 1966

Issues

In interpreting Title IX, the following four basic propositions represent the intent of the Congressional proponents of this new provision:

1. that the implementation of Title IX does not necessarily require the commitment of additional funds to certain specific types of new or on-going activities, but rather involves initially and primarily "a change in the approach of the Agency" such that political development is viewed as a legitimate and vital concern of the Agency;
2. that this "change in approach" entails an expanded and more operationally-significant emphasis upon activities and programs of an economic and politico-social character which enables the people of LDCs to benefit more directly from our assistance and to participate more actively and constructively in the development process both in the public and in the private sector;
3. that greater consideration than hitherto be given the selective encouragement and promotion in aid-recipient countries of those institutional reforms in their governmental and political framework pivotal to wide participation in economic growth and orderly democratic progress;
4. that to evaluate our success in achieving these more broadly-gauged developmental objectives - particularly as they relate to the evolution of democratic institutions - it will be necessary to develop and utilize a substantially different set of criteria than traditional economic indices.

In light of these propositions representing the Congressional intent of Title IX, six major questions - or "issues" - arise which require our immediate attention:

1. How do we cause Title IX to become an important element or dimension of our country programming strategies while preventing from becoming a vehicle of particular project fields of the Agency which, by themselves, inadequately comply with the instructions of Title IX? The usual response to a new provision in our Act is the development of specific projects to meet its requirements. Title IX, however, asks for a "new approach" and hence a more interrelated and strategic, rather than ad-hoc and tactical, response. How should this be devised?

2. How do we best inaugurate an action program under Title IX? If we are not simply to intensify and multiply certain traditional activities, should we narrow our focus of attention to four or five selected countries where a systematic redefinition of key country objectives and a redesigning of relevant parts of country programs would be feasible? Or should we try to react to as many opportunities as financially possible in as many different countries as possible?

3. How do we distinguish between activities in the field of political development which AID can directly undertake, and those which might best be undertaken by nongovernmental - private and voluntary - groups or host governments? Many activities in this important area of development might prove inadvisable or impolitic for AID to undertake; but should this preclude the Agency developing its capability to identify relevant and effective nongovernmental groups or institutions which can act in these areas to encourage them to do so? What institutional mechanism would be required to do this?

4. How do we best go about developing criteria by which to evaluate our performance in this essentially nonquantifiable area of development? Can guidelines for such evaluations be established which will have general applicability, or must this be done on a country-by-country basis? To what extent could the development of these guidelines serve as a vehicle by which to commence a working dialogue between AID/W and our overseas missions?

5. How do we determine priorities in research and analysis in the area of political development? Should initial emphasis be given to evaluations of ongoing and/or past AID projects and programs, to studies of serious developmental problems in host-countries where significant opportunities for US assistance may exist, or to broad-gauged country-studies designed to determine what sort of democratic development can be reasonably expected of a particular country and to identify ways in which the US could encourage and promote such development?

6. How do we develop a sufficient expertise within AID/W and our missions so as to deal systematically and realistically with this new dimension of our responsibilities? To what extent, and by what means,