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Small Urban Centers in Rural Development in Africa

Edited by Aidan Southall

SMALL URBAN CENTERS
IN RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA

Edited by

Aidan Southall

African Studies Program

University of Wisconsin

Madison, Wisconsin

1979

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SMALL URBAN CENTERS IN RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA

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PREFACE

This study is devoted to an examination of rural Africa. We focused our efforts on small urban centers in rural Africa because we were convinced that they played an important role in the successes and the failures of development. Our approach is an interdisciplinary one based on the expectation that it would provide a clearer understanding of the problems of, as well as new insights into the subject matter. While recognizing the problems inherent in different terminology, focus, and training, we felt that the collective experience and knowledge growing out of the disciplines of history, sociology, economics, political science, geography, anthropology, and agriculture were essential to an understanding of small urban centers and their role in development.

The project grew out of the collective efforts of a number of scholars in the African Studies Program at the University of Wisconsin, Madison. The original working group included Marvin Miracle, Aidan Southall, Jan Vansina, David Wiley, and Crawford Young. They were later joined by Fred Hayward and had the assistance for part of the early period of Babatunde Agiri and Hezekiah Oluwasanmi. These early efforts were devoted to setting out the parameters of the study, a description of the project, and a list of tentative hypotheses (see Appendix I and II for summary statements and hypotheses).

Following preparation of the research design and hypotheses, a period of consultation began with a number of African, European and other scholars who had worked in this general area of study. Professor Aidan Southall, project director, traveled extensively in Africa to discuss the project with a number of interested scholars, many of whom joined us in this collective effort. This study is a product of that collaboration. The intellectual development and refinement of ideas can be measured in part by the changes that occurred from our early formulations in 1977 (Appendix I and II) to the final product in this volume. During this same period, Dr. Michael Schatzberg was employed as a research associate and worked to review existing literature and prepare an extensive annotated bibliography. The bibliography has been published as a companion volume. Because parts of the Small Urban Centers volume are appearing almost simultaneously in the British journal Africa, we have used both English and American spelling depending on origin of the authors.

To the extent that was financially possible, this study was a cooperative effort of American, African, and European scholars. The material and ideas presented here grow out of that collaboration plus

the wisdom and experience of each of the participants whose work appears here. It should be emphasized, however, that most of the participants have spent many years studying small urban centers on their own. It was that background which was so very vital to our common exploration--to building on our common experiences as well as learning from each other's insights. What resulted was a very intense and productive interaction which sets the stage for further enquiry.

The final phase of this project was a conference at the University of Wisconsin, Madison in November 1978, which brought the participants together for a lively and stimulating exchange of ideas and presentation of papers. Much of the intellectual ferment and stimulation which resulted is reflected in the collective works presented here.

We wish to express our gratitude to a number of institutions for their financial assistance. Major support for the early phases of the project came from the Ford Foundation with additional assistance for collaboration and the international conference in Madison provided by the Midwest Universities Consortium on International Activities. Conference support was also provided by the Anonymous Fund of the University of Wisconsin and the African Studies Program. Preparation of the papers and the biliography for publication was assisted by a grant from the Office of Urban Development of the Agency for International Development. Special thanks are due to staff of the African Studies Program: Paul Beckett, Marjorie Harris, Mary Ellen Rodriguez who helped shepherd this project through various phases, to Janet Ewald for editorial assistance, and especially Jennifer Lodde for editing and preparation of the manuscript. Finally, the project owes a special debt to David Wiley who helped pave the way for its inception and most importantly to Aidan Southall who pulled it all together through trying times and successes.

Fred M. Hayward
Chairperson
African Studies Program

Madison, Wisconsin
August, 1979

INTRODUCTION
RESULTS AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE PRELIMINARY ENQUIRY [1]

Aidan Southall

In choosing small urban centers for study and arguing that they were strategic for development, we did not suggest that small urban centers were at present generally playing a positive role in rural development, nor that it would necessarily be easy to get them to do so without major changes or even radical transformations of society. The argument was, that if effective rural development were achieved, small urban centers would certainly have to play a crucial part in it. They may therefore act as sensitive barometers of the adequacy of rura development efforts. Combing the literature on small urban centers in Africa, and in Asia and Latin America as well, has certainly convinced this writer that the instances in which small urban centers are playing anything like an adequate positive role are distinctly rare, and most situations convey the very strong impression that quite fundamental transformations of society--of political and economic structures--will be necessary if they are to have any serious chance of doing so. To study small urban centers without paying attention to the macro-economic and political context in which they are set may therefore be futile.

In a famous interview (New York Times 1977) the President of the World Bank illustrated the contrast between the large schemes of the past and the small schemes of the new emphasis by reference to a $29 million loan to raise the incomes of 400,000 people in northern Nigeria by small irrigation works, farm to market roads, extension services and seed and fertilizer purchasing. Small is obviously relative! When MacNamara said that 'the trickle-down theory of growth is an insufficient basis on which to expect human needs to be met in a reasonable period of time,' this was thought to be controversial because 'some ruling elites are not at all sure that the way to approach development problems is by going down to the grass roots in their countries.' One can well understand the anxieties of ruling elites on this score. Fortunately, it will always be easy to represent 'undesirable' grass roots projects as outside interference. Anyway, MacNamara made it plain that the World Bank will continue both large centralized projects and small localized ones. Indeed, while the latter may be quite numerous they only account for a minute proportion of the total sums spent.

Most small towns appear as the lowest rung of systems for the oppression and exploitation of rural peoples. There are some exceptions where this seems less true, and other situations, especially in much of Asia where, even apart from oppression and exploitation, the situation is one of dense populations up against the barrier of limited land and resources, with growing numbers dividing available production into smaller and smaller shares of increasing impoverishment.

The vivid accounts of small-scale, Igbo initiative and enterprise in Awka and Nsukka (Dike) and on the Kenya coast (Parkin) raise very significant questions, and the charming picture of the continuing strength of attachment to Akuapem (Middleton) as a cultural, as well as economic and political center, goes to the heart of the question of how to retain the loyalty and maintain the vitality of small town populations and institutions for purposes of local development, given propitious conditions in the wider system. However, in all these cases it seems that a large proportion of the population fails to benefit sufficiently from the cultural amenities and economic activities described. The positive features are correctly brought out and emphasized, but they remain within the wider framework of politico-economic inequality, overcentralization and neglect or suppression of local interests, which seems to set severe limits on the future prospects of such positive potentialities, as demonstrated by other studies, even in the same countries (for Nigeria, Wallace and for Kenya, Kabwegyere), as well as elsewhere (for Zaire, Schatzberg and for Sudan, Abdel Ghaffar Ahmed and Mustafa Abdel Rahman).

Hayward documents another aspect of the positive esprit de corps in some small local communities with his study of mass attitudes in Ghana. Despite the ruined economy and lessened sense of well-being (in 1970 a majority still saw a brighter future for their children but by 1975 most perceived it as darker) he found a remarkable reservoir of goodwill towards authority, with many trusting in the equity and confidence of government officials. But it is eroding, and whether the troubled Ghanaian state can arrest the downward trend remains a poignant question. Clearly no such reservoir of goodwill ever had a chance to become established in Zaire, where Schatzberg concludes that, since small towns act so pervasively as blockage points, the fewer of them the better for the ordinary people. This is a council of despair, which many Zairois followed with their flight into the forests and return to isolated auto-subsistence living, as happened in Amin's Uganda and in many other areas smitten by the same scourge.

Crawford Young gives a very able and balanced analysis to this situation in which recently 'promising' countries fall into profound crises and become perverted, malignant and parasitical states with disarticulated polities--hyperinflation and windfall profits at the center, withdrawal to subsistence, apathy or smuggling at the periphery. He concludes that the African state is quite vulnerable to perversion and that the hoped for developmental role of the small urban center is impossible in such conditions. He ends with an unanswered question. Dependency theory accounts very well for many aspects of perversion, but does not explain why some are not perverted. He clings to the faith that perversion is not inevitable and certainly not predestined. In the case of

Amin's Uganda, which I knew best and examined precisely from this point of view (Southall 1975) I was not so sure. Could the answer possibly be that some states are less perverted because they are less dependent?

If not such total blockage points, many studies show small towns and the development schemes associated with them leading to results diametrically opposed to those desired. The Kano River irrigation scheme near Chiromawa was officially intended to raise the general level of well-being of the local population, improving services, raising productivity and income, discouraging out-migration. Wallace shows that the consultants miscalculated grossly. The scheme is making the rich richer and the poor poorer. By mere luck, some lost their land in the resettlement, others had it irrigated for them. The wealthy have enough reserve to survive or even profit from irregularities and delays in the supply of credit and fertilizers; they can afford to wait and sell when the price is high, and buy or rent more land from the poor driven bankrupt. Many of the latter lost floodland farms and fishing grounds as a result of the dam construction. They are reluctant to send their children to school because it deprives them of family labor, and primary education for the poor leads only to unemployment. Besides, the teaching is very poor. The health services suffer from lack of drugs and their diversion to those who can pay. So the improved services intended fail to reach the poor. The scheme has indeed brought heavy spending to the area, and many new construction and laboring jobs, but the top jobs go to expatriates, and migrant workers from far afield are preferred as more amenable, while many of the local poor lack the resources to participate in the new opportunities. The effect of the scheme is to increase local poverty and out-migration, raising productivity for the minority of better off farmers, through highly mechanized, commercial agriculture, which does not improve local diet or average incomes, but goes to export and to feed the big cities.

Incredibly, despite the large-scale irrigation works, much of the local population is left without potable drinking water, to the point that they actually break the irrigation pipes for water which is far from pure. Similarly, Trabelsi shows how in central Tunisia the lack of potable water directly or indirectly prejudices so many aspects of desirable development: such as health, nutrition and education and, through the long hours of drudgery in fetching water, adds a powerful incentive to abandon the countryside for the big cities. In southern Tunisia, Lee shows how Medenine, the regional capital, till recently a very small town but now with a population of 16,000, has grown by a process perversely opposite to that desired for small urban centers stimulating their hinterlands. It is not self-supporting and has to import food from outside its desertic region. It has grown from the inflated bureaucracy centered there for a very large, sparsely occupied region, from typically large-scale and costly development schemes whose deployment artifically inflates its population further and by actually stimulating rural out-migration induces yet more unproductive urban population growth. It is the local bastion which mediates the policies of a very highly centralized national government to the vast region of the south. There are very few other

towns in the region of any size, other than resort towns on the Mediterranean coast such as Zarzis. The headquarters of the subregional délégations are small places like Ben Gardane, with a 1975 population of 6,593 and at the lowest level of the secteur the headquarters are very small indeed. Thus, the sector of Hassi Amor has a total population of 6,250 but the central agglomeration only about 100. The sector of Chahbania has a total of nearly 4,000 but the actual agglomeration of Chahbania has only 103. However, several hundred more people attend the weekly market in each of these small places.

Hjort's north Kenya study also shows small town growth increasing local inequality and actually exporting urban forms of poverty to rural areas. Urbanization does provide new jobs, but not all the most desirable, as with the ubiquitous urban prostitution. This latter varies with local cultural influences. Hannerz documents the diverse precipitating causes of prostitution in Kafanchan, where for the Hausa it is an integral phase in the life cycle for most women, while the Tiv and Idoma attribute it partly to the problems of high bridewealth, and the Igbo to the devastation of the civil war. The latter exacerbated prostitution in many towns where troops were stationed,and it persisted when the troops were withdrawn. It is rather surprising to find, as Dike states for Nsukka, that Igbo parents allow their daughters to practise in the home and even with their siblings.

The prostitution induced by unequal sex ratios, in centers to which male labor migrates, usually bears most heavily on the local women, while the local men may fail to benefit from local urban employment opportunities, as Siegel shows for the Copperbelt area of Zambia, where the local Lamba women were increasingly drawn to prostitution in the mine townships, while Lamba men failed to seize employment opportunities in the mines because of inhibiting traditional beliefs and the lack of any organized program to train and incorporate them. The Lamba rural economy became increasingly depressed and demoralized, in stark contrast to the booming urban mine economy nearby. The only significant developments in the countryside which could eventually lead to rurally rooted urban centers have been the progressive market gardening required of trained evangelists by the mission for the sake of self-support and more recently the influx of energetic Shona cash farmers from Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. They learned the hard way from white farmers in that oppressive regime, but blossomed under the freer conditions of Zambia.

Siegel shows how, in the very poor and sparse conditions of rural Zambia, where apart from the mines, nearly all urban centers result from direct government administrative action, a whole series of diverse and rather scattered activities and institutions are beginning to coagulate into a denser network leading towards urbanization.

Alao perceives a stark choice between maintaining the status quo of growth (at best) without development, with abundant wealth for a few urban elites, or of evolving an egalitarian society. Adalemo emphasizes the need to turn away from the big colonial cities and concentrate on the lower-level market networks, which accurately represent the people's own spatial preferences and could be developed into properly equiped small

agro-urban places where mobile health, postal and credit facilities could also easily be made available. He rejects the growth pole/urban hierarchy planning approach complacently retailed in so many countries and which simply leads to increasing dominance of parasitic, metropolitan cities mediating international market forces to the cultural detriment and economic decay of small-scale local communities. Agiri documents the striking empirical case of increasing dominance by Lagos. Early in the century the traders of the town of Ikorodu successfully monopolised the trade of the Yoruba hinterland to and from Lagos. But the pull of Lagos strengthened. After the 1930s six out of every ten rural adult men in Ikorodu district went to work in Lagos. Modern roads and vehicles overwhelmed the older and more widely spread lagoon traffic. Ikorodu became dependent on the Lagos growth point, failing to maintain itself as an effective service center in its own right, and by monopolizing 70% of the district population preventing the outlying villages from doing so either.

Thus many studies seem to document conclusively the overwhelming trends of centralization and international capitalist penetration, stifling the possibility of small urban centers themselves stimulating their rural hinterlands in a positive way. But an important modifying argument is made. Local factors and even conflicts can positively affect the pattern, speed and success of small-scale urbanization, which, as Cohen argues, is not wholly explicable by national and international forces, as an extreme dependency theory might seem to imply. Park also argues (as does Crawford Young from the political angle) that there is a degree of causality at the local, as well as at the national and international, level. His case from data published on the Moroccan souks is a very closely argued one, while Cohen's case of Biu in Borno is somewhat aberrant.

On this basis Cohen seems to question the entire validity of comparative analysis, but the Biu case can be logically and predictably interpreted. The ingredients of the situation are as follows. In the 'frozen north' of Nigeria Islamic society was hindered, not from development as such, but from the specific line of development offered by British colonialism, which required literacy in English through Christian education for effective exploitation of the new opportunities. Limitation of Christian mission penetration in the Islamic north was part of the original deal which established colonial indirect rule, but Christian missions were allowed in 'pagan' areas. Consequently, the previously dominant Muslims fell behind, while the previously subordinated 'pagans' forged ahead as mission educated Christians.

Biu was near the frontier between these two systems. Biu was marginal to the Islamic zone, but still the logical option for its elite seemed to be to build itself into an Islamic emirate on the powerful Borno and general northern model. This necessarily involved autocratic politics and falling behind in social, educational and economic progress. It was thus inevitable that the petty emirate capital city of Biu should come to stand for backwardness and oppression to the growing Western educated elites in its southern territories. Mission influence

actually turned the latter into the new 'tribe' of Bura by defining the Biu Pabir as quite distinct, despite their essential cultural similarity. So Biu town with its autocratic Muslim elite confronted the better educated, Christianized rural elite. But the long run result was that the latter, with mission and eventually higher administrative support, won more and more privileges in Biu, their leaders often co-opted by offers of jobs and scholarships, while many on both sides of the conflict began to see that sticking together was most advantageous for both in the desperate regional competition for prizes in independent Nigeria. Thus, the seemingly anomalous conflict between backward town and progressive countryside led to particularly rapid development in Biu, which became the arena for leaders of both factions and won more development inputs than any other center of comparable size in all of the northern states.

Here we have an unusual arrangement of factors, for easily intelligible reasons, while the factors themselves are quite familiar and given adequate analysis the outcome was not surprising but highly predictable.

Park shows that each souk network in northern Morocco is based on an urban center, and all urban centers have souks, yet the souk is not enough in itself to ensure twentieth century prosperity, unless the town is also on a big traffic route, not so near to a larger center as to be overshadowed by it, and in addition has an adequate administrative center and permanent salaried clientele. It is shown that an increase in average souk merchant's earnings is associated with decreased temporary out-migration (since there are more local earnings for potential migrants). Furthermore, the lower the ratio of other businessmen to wholesalers and the higher the average business earnings, the more the local investment and the lower the temporary out-migration. In other words , given rather rigorous assumptions, the volume of local wholesaling is a very sensitive indicator of the economic viability of small and medium-sized urban communities in their resistance to national and international penetration, local decay and loss of their own and their rural hinterland's population in migration to metropolitan centers and overseas.

The fact that in a similar study in southern Morocco a higher percentage of local wholesaling was associated with higher out-migration is interpreted as due to the fact that the colonial exploitation of the south was much more severe in the alienation of land to French settlers and the subversion of local institutions. The widely ramified urban and market network of Morocco is at least nine hundred years old, so we are here concerned with the contemporary viability of long established, indigenous urban structures, a factor also found relevant in Tunisia, Ghana, Nigeria and elsewhere.

Trager illustrates this further with her analysis of urban and market networks in Yorubaland. Here, unlike Morocco, ethnic homogeneity and kinship still outweigh class, as was also the case in Hopkins' contrast between Kita and Testour. Trager identifies a five-level hierarchy of markets in a network of towns and smaller places. The second level approximates the hexagonal pattern predicted by Christaller and consists of actual or potential small urban centers. The interesting and changing

relationship between the traditional politico-cultural hierarchy of places with obas or lesser rulers and the demographic and commercial hierarchy is explained. The second level market towns constitute a convincingly promising base for stimulating local development. They represent the spontaneous spatial preference of the local people. Most of the traders are women and the system seems relatively unexploitative. Some more isolated areas need better access, and improved services of all kinds could very appropriately be grafted on to the existing system. Indeed, it may well be that the area is already generally better serviced than areas which lack such indigenously established networks. It may be that the system works to some extent more in favor of traders in the larger centers, but there is very legitimate doubt that such disparity would be increased by ill-considered changes wrought from outside. All in all it seems a beneficial system, which could be improved by increased resources, which would necessarily have to come to some extent from the outside, if only they could none the less be purposefully deployed, as it were, from an inside perspective. However, all is not well even now, for the great centers of Ibadan and Lagos are already more attractive than any centers within this local system, so its overall viability is already threatened by the same basic national and international forces noted elsewhere.

Another valuable aspect of some urban markets in West Africa is that they sensitively reflect differences in ecological and cultural resources over very wide areas, as the Miracles show for Grand Bassam in the Ivory Coast, whose market constantly reflects the diversity of valued resources for hundreds of miles away in the interior, once more emphasizing how far away the indigenous urban communities are from any simple local self-sufficiency, especially in western and northern Africa.

The viability of local urban and market networks depends in part upon the appropriate blending by local people of the trading and use of local and imported products and of local and imported technologies. The destruction of local crafts by capitalist penetration is unquestionable. Abdel Ghaffar has recorded the local and regional richness of Shendi market in the nineteenth century, since disappeared, and the essential economic dependence of the new small centers he studied. Lament for the passing of local products may seem sentimental, as a necessary accompaniment of change which, it is usually argued, is potentially for the better. But this potential remains too often unrealized. Beauty, meaning and cultural richness has gone. This is not mere sentiment, for it involves local production and employment, local pride and self-confidence and the holding capacity of small urban centers as defences against runaway migration to bloated capital cities and to industrialized countries overseas. An imported marmite from France is less breakable than a locally produced cooking pot. An aluminum bowl produced in the capital is lighter on the head of a woman than a locally produced water pot. Why do some countries still roof their houses with locally produced tiles and other materials, while others are rushing to corrugated iron? Ironically, the former are not the poorest economies but sometimes the more advanced. It is not a rationally made independent choice. Local employment and income and national balances of payments are involved. These are the relatively well-rooted, locally produced intermediate and appropriate

technologies, many of them vanished or vanishing and once vanished, impossible to replace. Substitutes contrived by foreign experts in appropriate technology, on short visits with little or no local knowledge, have not so far fared very well. Such considerations are crucial to maintaining or increasing the rural development potential of small towns and vital to questions of economic decentralization without which small towns have little future as development agents.

In contrast with the locally rooted towns are the new towns of Egypt, described by Abou Zeid, which are direct creations of the government, sometimes single company towns. They are not so much designed to increase local employment and curb migration to the capital, as is usually the theory if not the practice in much of the rest of Africa, but rather to address a later stage of the process, at which out-migration has already led to intolerable levels of overpopulation in the greatest cities, so that new towns are aimed at drawing population away from them, rather than holding that which comes from the countryside.

The number of small urban centers in Africa and the Third World is obviously vast, and as fewer studies have been made of small towns than of great cities it is not surprising that the overall results are fragmentary. Given the well-known, built-in tendencies towards centralization, both political and economic, strengthened by forces both internal and external, whatever declared policies to the contrary may be, it is obvious that most small towns are less likely to be innovative local centers of stimulus for rural development than pawns in a larger contrary game.

As everyone knows, until very recently the Western theory of development was of stages of growth in imitation of the West, of capital investment, poles of development, demonstration effect and trickle-down. Two decades of effort in this direction have amply demonstrated that in practice it does not work. Many influential pronouncements from the top have explicitly recognized this. But to alter the practice in line with the declared theory is proving so difficult as to suggest that it may actually be impossible within the existing framework, and to entail the suspicion that it may not actually be desired despite the public pronouncements. The reasons why it may not be desired are stated dogmatically in Marxist theory, but may nonetheless be documented by empirically undeniable facts which require no ideological support. (A good example is Schatzberg's Zairian study.) It is simply a question of the common interests of the Western capitalist nations, the multinational corporations and the new nationalist elites. The interests of these three elements are by no means identical. There are times when the immediate interests of particular Western nations and particular multinationals are at variance. The African nationalist political elites are always at variance with both of these in so far as they are loyal Africans. But their personal economic interests, in the short run, are unquestionably in line with the centralizing, inegalitarian tendencies of the other two elements.

The positive development role of small urban centers conceived as possible and desirable by our research project presupposes the possibility of decentralization and deconcentration, permitting genuine grass roots participational input to the development process.[2] Despite some serious efforts in this direction it is doubtful whether this is a reality anywhere in Africa. The commonest form of decentralization effort is the devolution of planning and development decisions from the center, in the capital city, to regional or provincial capitals. Where such efforts have been made they often involve duplication, overlapping and conflict, with an increase in the bureaucracy rather than a decrease as might naively have been expected. They result in autocratic, top-heavy regional bureaucracies which are just as impervious to grass roots participational inputs as the centralized bureaucracies which preceded them. This is not considered to be genuine decentralization.

The project raised interesting questions of urban and spatial theory as well as highlighting problems of development and associated policies and ideologies. Questions were constantly raised as to the desirability and possibility of defining and distinguishing urban and rural phenomena clearly. Much attention was paid to the potential insights of central place theory and other time-honored spatial, locational and sociological formulations.

I have felt obliged to insist throughout on the essential relativity of all such definitions and distinctions if they are to be valid and useful cross-culturally. Constantly used labels such as city and town, market center, regional center, rural center, rural town can mean largely what any writer wishes to make them. They cannot be defined by clear-cut discontinuities which have cross-cultural constancy and consistency. They simply have to be dismissed by the anthropologist as 'emic', while cross-cultural definitions must necessarily be 'etic'. I have argued at length elsewhere (Southall 1973) for an elaborate perspective of relativity, in the light of which I am convinced of the futility of trying to compare what small towns are in one country and culture or another, in a static manner. It may be interesting to document how different cultures and governments differentiate between urban and rural, town and country, or town and city; how town in the United States denotes the essentially rural, while in most other cultures it denotes the essentially urban. But such studies will never lead to agreed cross-cultural definitions. What can validly be compared cross-culturally are processes of concentration, of persons, resources, and information. There will be levels of such concentration which most may agree to be urban, or rural, but precise definition of the point between the two is of no theoretical interest or importance. The small camps of migrant Urhobo palm wine tappers in Nigeria and their relation to nearby centers, provide an interesting case of how processes of concentration lead to the emergence and growth of small towns (Otite), as also does the burgeoning trade along the new roads on the Kenya Coast (Parkin).

In the prevailing circumstances of Western technical and economic assistance to Third World countries genuine decentralization and grass roots participation are inordinately hard to achieve. Even the most

idealistic attempts at foreign aid tend to exacerbate the problem despite their best intentions. Aid missions and their top-heavy staffs are concentrated in enormous numbers in the capitals, generating office work for themselves with Parkinsonian skill. They are precluded by their cultural and linguistic ignorance from generating effective grass roots participation even if they would. In fact, many of their practices, even unwittingly, tend to discourage and obstruct it. But, in any case, such attempts would fly straight in the face of the material interests of the local elites through whom alone they could have any possibility of being carried out. We academics, whatever we do, are only too likely to exacerbate the problem. As Westerners we enjoy the extra income and the excitement of short evaluation and consultation trips, all of which add to the top-heavy weight of central policy-making bodies. As African scholars we enjoy being lionized as delegates to international conferences, whose finances are inevitably tied up closely with those interests which accentuate centralization despite their public protestations to the contrary.

Is there any solution to this impasse, other than for us Westerners to bid a fond farewell to our African friends and wish them luck in the battle to defend themselves and their countries from outside interference until they can build up their internal resources sufficiently for 'another development' from within (SAREC 1978:22)? This is a melancholy prospect, recalling Thomas Hodgkin's command many years ago that Westerners should simply impose a self-denying ordinance upon themselves and stop studying Africa for a while. The snag was that if the virtuous would do so the rest certainly would not.

This is a position forced upon one by dispassionate study of the empirical facts. As in the case of Schatzberg (1979) it is not necessarily a Marxist position, although it may have been most forcefully and coherently, though also dogmatically, expressed by Marxists, and this undoubtedly has portentous implications.

The nation-states of Africa seem to be moving in the direction of the polarized political economy, which is not quite the same as the idea of the dual economy. The latter consisted principally of the distinction between a centralized exporting sector tied to the international market economy, associated with an expatriate or indigenous elite class, contrasted with a predominately subsistence economy enveloping the masses of the population. The polarized political economy is one which despite overall political though not economic control by the indigenous elite and despite some successful industrialization supporting the emergence of an affluent middle class of significant proportions (and impressive economic growth figures according to the deliberately misleading indicators used), masses of the people remain impoverished materially and effectively disenfranchised politically.

The most spectacular case is Brazil, which after what is often called a miracle of industrial growth has millions of children in utter poverty, many of them abandoned by destitute parents. Something like one-third of Brazilian youth is growing up in conditions so deprived that it may never be able to play a productive part in modern society. This mass

poverty and destitution was caused by the economic boom, which for over a decade sent millions of peasants fleeing from the backward countryside to the booming cities in search of factory jobs, which they usually failed to find and for which their lack of education skills in any case disqualified them. Meanwhile, the birth rate of 37.1 per thousand is expected to give Brazil a population of a billion in less than a century. Brazil followed the orthodox rules of capitalist economic development, as prescribed to the Third World until recently. It therefore provides some indication of what can be hoped for from success in this line of development, with its oppressive military regime, its urban guerrillas countered by police death squads, its exploding population and mass poverty in the midst of ostentatious luxury.

It is towards this Brazilian model of Pyrrhic success that those African countries generally perceived as successful by the Western powers are tending. Kenya, the Ivory Coast, Morocco and Tunisia are obvious examples. But, it may be countered, the trickle effect may still operate in the longer run despite such bitter disappointments so far. If new industries and state farms and elite latifundia can support a rapid industrialization it will then be possible to generalize the benefits to the entire population--as producers of food for the cities and industrial labor forces, raw materials for industrial processing, crafts for the tourist trade, and so forth. All the evidence available to date suggests that this will not occur. Too much of the benefit trickles into the sand before it reaches the recipient. The masses have to wait too long watching increasingly ostentatious elites before any significant affluence reaches them. It is more likely that they will create a situation of unrest in which, with however much reluctance, a military regime will take over, with the strength to impose acceptance of inequality more effectively, at least for a while, as in Indonesia (Hanna 1974; Grace 1977).

This is the macro-scenario within which small urban centers in Africa function, for better or worse in relation to rural development. There can be considerable dynamism in the emergence and growth of concentrations from the bottom, as some of the studies in Nigeria, Kenya and Zambia (Siegel 1979) show, but it is constrained within the limits of the macro-factors mentioned above, and population growth may render it nugatory in the not too distant future. Only a very strong idealistic and ideological commitment from the top can permit the decentralizing forces to win at the bottom against the very prestigeful and contradictory pressures in the direction of centralization. Centralizing pressures have not only dominated capitalist countries, but most of the more advanced socialist countries as well. In the USSR, as the first centrally planned socialist economy, centralization was particularly marked throughout the Stalinist era. There is still a tendency for state farms to expand at the expense of collective farms, and there is a strong technocratic vein which stresses the economics of scale in large cities as more favorable to development than small cities, although this runs counter to the Marxist goal of transcending urban-rural difference.

But since the mid-1950s there has been a definite change in the direction of decentralization, even in the Soviet Union, and much more in other socialist countries such as Hungary, Czechoslovakia and, above all, Yugoslavia. The change of emphasis is not a fortuitous product of the end of the Stalin era, nor is it evidence of a return to capitalism, as many fondly hope, but rather a logical and necessary evolutionary process to meet the needs of higher stages of economic development, as the phase of extensive gives place to that of intensive growth, for which central planning becomes wasteful (Wilcynski 1972:xv). With the possibility of different paths to socialism conceded by the 20th Congress in 1956, and emphasized by increasing disagreement and conflict between socialist countries in Asia as well as Europe, economics in socialist countries is no longer the mere regurgitation of dogma, but reflects serious thinking on the interaction between planning and the market, cybernetics and economic forecasting. Socialist ideas, successes and mistakes can provide guidance for choosing growth strategies best suited to the different stages of economic development--particularly in the developing nations determined to speed up their economic growth--for conditions in non-socialist underdeveloped countries are similar to those which prevailed under socialism in the past substantial labor reserves in agriculture and a small pool of competent managers and skilled workers (ibid.: xvi).

The progress of decentralization in the Soviet Union is somewhat ambiguous: replacement of most industrial ministries with regional economic councils in 1957; but centralization of banking in 1959 with savings banks taken over by the state bank in 1963; acceptance of the profit criterion in 1965 (a very big landmark) with greater independence of enterprises and farms, yet replacement of the regional economic councils by centralized economic ministries. However, in 1967 the system of producers' prices was reformed and commercial accounting in agriculture greatly extended.

By 1970 central planning played no greater part in Yugoslavia than in India or Pakistan. It was confined to a few large federal investment projects. The self-managed enterprises of Yugoslavia produce 60% of the national income. The workers' councils are elected by all members of the enterprise from the lowest to the highest, and have power to hire and fire the management and to take all crucial decisions relating to production, prices, profits and wages. They contract directly with other firms, decide on export and import policy and can even accept foreign investment capital. This is not a capitulation to capitalist mechanisms, as many capitalists wishfully hope and some die-hard Stalinists claim. It is in many ways far more radical (as well as democratic) than most other socialist systems and certainly a more convincing move towards the withering away of the state than can be claimed elsewhere. Naturally it has its detractors. It is said that workers are in fact dominated by the technical-managerial staffs, that self-management thus turns into managerial-technocratic management and participation is a failure, with

workers continuing to go on strike although the management and enterprise is theirs (Spulber 1971:16). However, it is recognized that successful stimulation of the market economy can be achieved by real workers' council management, just as well as by the shareholders' stake in capitalism, and there are good reasons for supposing that the labor-managed firm can be the most efficient in both volume and quality (Vanek 1971:373).

Although the Chinese and the Yugoslavs are far from ideological agreement and their systems are very different, they are nonetheless the two most decentralized systems in the socialist world. Although in China the broad framework of action is fairly rigidly defined and cannot be transgressed with impunity, and there is centralized direction in the party, the army, the People's Bank and other central institutions, the Chinese have succeeded in harnessing the energy, enthusiasm and participation of the people at the bottom into development from below. The three-tier model of the commune, production brigade and production team came to mind when we first began to think about the relationship of small urban centers to rural development and it has not been possible to exorcise it since.

Now that China is opening up to the West, the American media seem inextricably confused between decades old prejudices and personal experiences which belie them. Americans are so desperate to believe that the Maoist experiment failed (despite rather positive figures reported by the CIA) and that Deng Shao Ping is indeed a capitalist roader swinging China back to the right path, that any dispassionate assessment of what is actually going on in China is almost impossible. Clearly material incentives are being given more emphasis and some large-scale, highly capitalized, more Western style plants will be introduced. But the genuine element of decentralization in the communes will remain. China will continue to astonish by the cleanliness of its city streets and lack of urban tensions despite high density, the calm, relaxed attitude despite long hours of work and low pay, the honesty imposed by public ethic and the collective enforcement of self-criticism.

The Chinese experience is usually written off as irrelevant because of the uniqueness of Chinese history and character, but it is hard to see why the developmental success of the tiered, decentralized Chinese commune should be less relevant or compatible with the development needs of the rural masses of Africa than the equally remote and apparently unworkable methods of French, British, or Americans. At least the question is worth asking, now that the larger Western aid donors seem to have lost faith in their own methods and while proclaiming new goals and principles seem to carry on much the same in practice. For, as noted already, the aid organizations are themselves so top-heavy that the very idea of them converting African nations to decentralized development from below, by example as well as by precept, seems extraordinarily remote.

One hopeful positive instance is the remarkable directive of the Government of Papua-New Guinea that any government official may take one

year's leave of absence to go to his village and do whatever he can to help his people (SAREC 1978:22). One public health worker did this and got the people of his village discussing their problems and working together. They covered their wells to keep their water clean. But their water supply was limited and although there was a lake six miles away, there was a mountain in between. The public health worker went back to the capital and tried to interest engineers in the Public Works Department in solving the problem, but they were preoccupied with writing feasibility studies for the World Bank and other donors. So he went to the Army Engineering Corps and found a man from a neighboring village who agreed to help. He found that no sophisticated engineering was required, as had been feared. A simple windmill could raise water from the lake to the top of the hill and run it down to the village. The villagers built the windmill themselves and made a clean water supply for the village and a permanent source of water for agriculture. This is the way small urban centers can begin to develop from below.

A physicist at the American University in Cairo is developing simple solar batteries in the village where he was brought up, a hundred kilometers from the city, to fuel a communal baking oven, television set and other village services. He has aroused great excitement and enthusiasm in the village, which has spread to other villages nearby. He takes Egyptian officials from the development agencies to visit, but their aloof and condescending behavior towards the villages, as sophisticated members of the urban elite, drives home the lesson that it is the agents of development themselves who at present constitute a significant part of the problem.

Zambia is a particularly severe case of a polarizing political economy, with its one heavily capitalized primary mining industry on the Copperbelt, nationalized yet still essentially foreign run, in stark contrast with the rest of the country's impoverished agricultural environment, where sleeping sickness prevents cattle keeping in most areas and poor soil and erratic and inadequate rainfall permit only a sparse and constantly shifting population. The normal colonial primacy of the capital city at Lusaka, and the highly centralized mining industry on the Copperbelt, have given scant opportunity to Kaunda's vaguely socialistic humanism, whose ill-defined principles have not stood up well to the harsh confrontation of empirical reality. Outside the capital and the Copperbelt there are hardly any centers reaching the level of towns except the administrative headquarters of districts which are themselves of very small size. Yet Zambia is very highly urbanized by African standards, with 38.5% of the population in urban centers in 1975.

Algeria is the most important case in Africa of the attempt to exploit mineral resources and industrialize within the framework of a policy favoring self-management and decentralization. Large as Algeria is, there was little hope of it succeeding in insulating itself from dependence on the capitalist world's technological progress and from the insidious influence of externally derived values and influences. The need for technicians, engineers and bureaucrats for industrial development has remained so insatiable that they have been able to win income

privileges which endanger both the socialist development policy and the political structure. Private enterprise has recently tended to expand faster than the public sector and there has been a proliferation of centralized state owned companies (Knauss 1977:69). The share of self-management in major economic sectors other than agriculture and commerce has fallen from 13.2% in 1967 to 5.5% in 1971 (Leca 1975:150). There is a danger that an alliance of the new high consumption bureaucrats, technocrats and private capitalists may take over the state as they have done in Egypt (ibid.:152).

The most ambitous socialist development of decentralized small urban centers was the 'one thousand socialist villages,' which were to be mini-cities of 120-50 houses with running water and electricity, as well as marketplace, canteen-recreation center and mosque. Only 30-40 of the 1,000 to be established by 1976 were in operation by May 1974 (Knauss 1977:73). The ruling elite and the peasantry seem increasingly out of sympathy with one another, the latter seeing the result of the revolution as changing them from sharecroppers of large landowners into sharecroppers of the state, while the former have become increasingly impatient and patronizing towards the peasantry, referring to them as uncouth and threatening to withdraw confidence from them if it is abused (ibid.:75), whereas, in fact it has usually been bureaucratic incompetence and slowness, failing even to recognize the agricultural imperatives of the seasons, which has made it impossible for peasants to reach their targets.

Tunisia's brief flirtation with cooperatives in the 1960s was itself a highly centralized affair, but might perhaps eventually have led to some decentralization and the positive development of small urban centers, had it not been suddenly snuffed out as a threat to the dominant interests of the ruling regime and in deference to those of private landowning interests.

More fervent hopes have been placed in Tanzania's attempt at decentralized, participatory socialist development than in any other in Africa. It is therefore particularly disappointing that it seems impossible as yet for Tanzania's best supporters to find empirical evidence of economic success in the experiment. With such a profound human and social transformation as Tanzania was aiming at, it is quite unfair to expect results in a short time. What is most distressing is that some of the most important economic and organizational trends seem to be in the wrong rather than the right direction, although the distribution of services has been greatly improved (Maro and Mlay below).

President Nyerere's decision at the end of 1973 that all peasants must be in villages by 1976 led to the abandonment of communal farming as a fundamental basis of the village economy aimed at. Communal production in the ujamaa village development in the Rufiji Valley showed 700 acres under communal farming in eight villages in 1970-1, falling to only 55 acres in 1972-3, with no yield at all (McHenry 1977). As usual in such situations, farmers chose the worst land for collective fields, keeping the best for private plots and naturally devoting major

effort to the latter and not the former. Cooperatives, which should have been the explicit economic as well as social arm of ujamaa villages, were officially abolished in 1976. It is not clear what happened to the existing cooperatives, but it was certainly a move in favor of more centralized state economic agencies, thus rendering the official decentralization policy somewhat nugatory.[3]

Although mainly treated in the context of rural development, ujamaa village development is highly relevant to the emergence of small urban centers. Reported ujamaa populations vary from as little as 160 to as many as 8,000. We assumed in our hypotheses of two and a half years ago that 'local points of concentration will assume a tiered structure, in two and eventually three levels' the more comprehensively and systematically rural development is planned and assisted by the state and its regional agencies. This idea was suggested by the Chinese experience, in which large, single layer communes, averaging populations of 24,000 each, had to be structured internally by a second level of production brigades and a third level of production teams. Tanzania appears to be conforming to this rule, as I was informed in Dar-es-Salaam in December 1977 that a further decentralization of personnel and facilities was planned for 1978 from the District (Area) level to an intermediate Ward level consisting of clusters of four to seven villages.

The 'uncommitted' accounts of development experiments are unsatisfactory because they document the facts and circumstances of failure without suggesting any alternative, and the radical accounts are unsatisfactory because they put the blame on imperialism, colonialism and the international market system, again without committing themselves to explicit alternatives. At either end of the spectrum of approaches, from the Soviet Command system to the Western Capitalist system, we are confronted by mammoth systems in which centralizing tendencies seem almost irresistible, despite some protestations of reforming principle to the contrary and despite the decentralized form of, for example, American political democracy. In between lie a variety of decentralizing systems in Yugoslavia, China, Norway, Sweden and Denmark (Adizes and Borgese 1975:142-7). All these decentralizing systems have participatory self-management schemes as an essential component. Even in the United States some remarkable but little noted experiments in this direction have occurred. Lenin originally believed in workers' self-management and that no social revolution or collective planning is possible without the direct participation of workers' councils and their representatives (Gurvich 1966).

Present political constraints aside, a dispassionate assessment must surely find it unfortunate that the underdeveloped Third World should be forced to take its major advice, as well as aid, both civilian and military, from one or other of two giant superpowers, both of whose background, trends and experience for the past hundred years disqualify them as irrelevant to the immediate developmental needs of the Third World. How, in political reality, it could be otherwise is a matter requiring further thought.

There is one way which, while not seeming immediately likely, cannot be ruled out as inconceivable. That is to make the achievement of higher prices for Third World exports a substitute for direct economic assistance by grants or loans, according to the as yet unrealized goals of the North-South dialogue. As is well-known, a change of a few percentage points in the world prices of the relevant raw materials would be worth more than all the aid at present given. This is even more true when we remember that a large percentage of the money which is now officially counted as spent on aid to poor countries is in fact spent of the high salaries and expenses of foreign aid missions and consultants, whose activities are mainly verbal and bureaucratic, with a very minimal element of direct grass roots development action, as well as on the high technology which maintains the profitability of capitalist industry while increasing the dependence of the poor countries.

Achievement of the goals of the North-South dialogue would relieve us of many embarrassments. It would make the choice of paths of development more genuinely that of the poor countries themselves, and it would save Western countries from the farce of professing the ideals of liberal democracy and political freedom while all the time bolstering the most undemocratic, absolutist, corrupt, incompetent and brutally repressive regimes in the Third World as supposed bulwarks against Communism. Such bulwarks always prove to be made of broken reeds, even if resistance to Communism is accepted as a higher priority than world peace, and economic development and social justice. 'Curbing exchange leakage [by the IMF working inside the Bank of Zaire] will inevitably bring the [IMF] group into conflict with the powerful political figures who are involved in capital flight. The outcome is evidently uncertain'(Young 1978). Since this uncertainty has now persisted for over a year, one might rather say that an unsatisfactory outcome (for the people of Zaire) has become virtually certain.[4]

I conclude that the emphasis on small urban centers as local stimuli of rural development is a useful, concrete way of bringing into the limelight the difficulties of achieving this goal. There can be little hope of achieving it except in the context of serious policies of decentralization, which are unlikely to succeed unless backed and powered by local participatory democracy, both political and economic. The most important issue arising from these studies is the need for more precise definition and measurement of the exploitation which results from the development of small urban centers in the context of inability to decentralize effectively. We hope that this issue will be tackled by a second conference, to be held in Africa.

FOOTNOTES

[1]Thanks are expressed to the Ford Foundation and to the Midwest Universities Consortium on International Activities for providing financial assistance to this project. We are also grateful to the Editors of Africa for proposing the special number published in July 1979. Some members of the African Studies Program/University of Wisconsin-Madison, began meeting in 1975 to consider mutual research interests and priorities (Marvin Miracle, Aidan Southall, Jan Vansina, David Wiley, Crawford Young). Much attention was paid to how effective participation by African scholars from research institutions in Africa could be obtained, but financial limitations prevented an adequate solution. Hezekiah Oluwasanmi and Babatunde Agiri were able to participate for short periods. David Wiley left Madison in 1976 and Fred Hayward joined the group. Several seminars were run by Aidan Southall with the cooperation of the group and assistance from John AuWerter. Partial support was given to several field work projects. Michael Schatzberg worked for a year to produce an exhaustive annotated bibliography, and Aidan Southall visited African universities and research institutions to identify participants for the conference held at Madison in November, 1978; his contributions are here presented in revised form.

[2]The project paper originally prepared in 1976, with some later revisions of detail (Appendix I) now seems to have a somewhat too optimistic tone, perhaps natural at the stage of early endeavor in floating a new project. We already recognized the ubiquitous overcentralization accompanied by widespread rural stagnation. We defined rural development as 'a rising level of material well-being, achieved by rural populations through their own effective efforts, appropriately and properly supplemented by national and international assistance, in such a way as to further the complementary goals of liberty and equality.' This still seems valid, but we failed to mention explicitly that the stranglehold on local elites of the combined influence of the great industrial powers, multinational corporations and the international market in general, seems to make this type of rural development quite utopian in most poor countries at the moment. We hoped that disillusionment with the discredited theories of the first development decade could lead to new approaches such as advocated. Authoritative public pronouncements suggest this, but whether it is more than verbal rhetoric and will prevail in practice for more than a few token cases seems rather doubtful.

[3]In 1971 President Nyerere personally took up residence in Chamwino ujamaa village in a laudable if apparently ill-fated attempt to ensure the success of socialist village transformation in Dodoma District. This was to be a demonstration showplace in one of the districts regarded as most backward, economically 'marginal' to the national economy (Hill 1975:237), yet geographically central and the site of the new national capital. With the President in residence, as many as twenty-five government Landrovers appeared at Chamwino; three hundred trucks from other regions brought in the new residents; tractors cleared the village plot; the National Service built a new dispensary; high and low came to make bricks for modern houses and Chamwino was electrified, while some District Headquarters towns still remained without electricity. While the cost is not certainly known, it was estimated at $7,000,000, clearly a mockery of self-reliance and of all the most fundamental principles of ujamaa, as well as a serious diversion of national resources hardly subject to replication for the spread of development (ibid:343-244). At all events Chamwino seemed likely to explode into a small urban center of fateful significance.

[4]Crawford Young (1978) has produced the most blistering indictment of the moral, as well as economic and political bankruptcy of Zaire, which inevitably though doubtless not willfully, ends up as an equally damning indictment of the political bankruptcy of the West, which according to Young's argument has no option but to support this blatantly corrupt and rottenly oppressive state. Of course, Crawford Young endeavors to defend himself against this charge by including among his prescriptions several in favor of virtue: 'it would be intolerable to allow external support for Zaire to preclude any domestically generated political change.' It certainly would; however, it is just that, that the first three prescriptions inevitably accomplish. Or again, 'external assistance must aim at alleviating the distress of the mass of the population.' Admirable, but how, since none of the prescriptions address the problem--except for the suggestion that 'prices for peasant output must be sharply increased'? How is this to be achieved, since 'aid efforts must involve continued cooperation with the incumbent regime' and the difficulty of negotiating reforms is recognized, since President Mobutu is a proud and stubborn leader, quick to take affront,' who has already expelled two American ambassadors with impunity and 'publicly accused the CIA of trying to overthrow him.' Since Young's prescriptions involve the solution or alleviation of Mobutu's main worries, lightening and postponing the crushing debt burden and keeping the mining industry working and safe from attack, there is no likelihood that Mobutu will fall, as Crawford Young purports to hope, just when his position is

strengthened by obvious reaffirmation that he has the solid and material support of the West. As Colin Leys has reminded us (1973), governments may be the problem rather than the solution. Perhaps it is as difficult, professionally, for most political scientists to accept this as it is for most anthropologists to accept the demise of the tribe.

THE SMALL URBAN CENTER IN RURAL DEVELOPMENT: KITA (MALI) AND TESTOUR (TUNISIA)

Nicholas S. Hopkins

Introduction

This paper examines the role of the small urban center in promoting rural development through an analysis of two cases, one West African and the other North African. Kita (Mali) and Testour (Tunisia) are approximately the same size, have something of an urban atmosphere in contrast to their surrounding countryside, and play a roughly analogous role within the political economy of their nations. Both were in single-party states at the time of research; had had French colonialism for about the same period; and have modern institutions that owe something to the French pattern. Both have experienced attempts to build socialism.

They also differ. Private property in land creates a situation in Testour that is different from that derived from lineage and village control of land around Kita. Patterns of social organization are more intricate in Kita than in Testour. The major contrast in Kita is between town and country, while in Testour the cleavage follows class lines within the town. In Tunisia the state, whose boundaries have remained essentially unchanged for centuries, provides a pole of continuity, while Mali is a creation of the colonial period, so that continuity with the past is only at the local and popular level.

Testour illustrates the pattern of urban dominance over a rural hinterland that is not at all uncommon in North Africa (Prenant 1968). Something of the kind is present in such Moroccan towns as Azemmour (LeCouer 1969), Boujad (Eickelman 1976) or Sale (Brown 1976), and in such Algerian ones as Nedroma (Sari 1970). In Tunisia this pattern appears in such diverse towns as Hammamet (Boukraa 1976), Menzel Bou Zelfa (Zamiti 1976) and Gammouda/Sidi Bou Zid (Bonnenfant and Landy 1972). Within a general pattern of similarity, however, Testour differs from some central Tunisian towns like Thala and Sbeitla in that class relations are more fully developed. In central Tunisia, the countryside remains freer of domination by small urban centers; this reflects both the recent appearance of private property in land and the absence of a labor market so that farmers must rely on family labor only. In Mali the towns are mostly creations of the colonial period. Comparative information on other Malian towns is lacking or dates back

to the colonial period (Kamian 1959; Miner 1965; Pageard 1958), so it is harder to give an idea of Kita's typicality. The villages around Kita are smaller than the national average and the countryside is less developed than in south-central Mali, but there is nothing to suggest that Kita as a town is atypical.

History and Geography

Kita is a new town resulting from colonialism. It began when the French built a fort near the cluster of villages at the foot of Kita mountain in 1881, encouraging French and African merchants to settle. As eastern terminus of the railroad from 1902-4, more trade and traders were attracted and some Toucouleur supporters of El Hajj Omar created a settlement. Population growth was slow until after the Second World War, when it rose sharply. Nationalist activity organized by the Rassemblement Democratique Africain (Union Soudanaise) developed early in Kita, but by 1965 after five years of independence under the RDA many were becoming disillusioned and suspicious because of the government's inability to implement its development plans. People feared these plans were aimed at political domination, as force rather than persuasion was increasingly used to mobilize them and the established commercial role of the town was undercut. Kita's link with the countryside was weakened, and shifted from a commercial to an administrative style, as the government strove to build up areas which produced the cash crop of peanuts, and to communicate directly with rural population.

Testour is an old town that resisted colonialism. It was founded by Andalusian Muslims expelled from Spain shortly after 1609. It began under government auspices and has always been dependent on a centralized state. Despite its relatively small size, Testour always appeared as an urban center for its immediate hinterland. The colonial period after 1881 did not change this until land around Testour was alienated to French farmers who developed a mechanized, speculative, market-oriented agriculture after 1925. This coincided with the reduction in the scope of local self-government in the face of a rationalized administrative system. These two simultaneous pressures seem to have inspired Testour's early participation in the nationalist movement. Independence in 1956 resulted in the departure of the European farmers in the area. While some local farmers profited from this, the bulk of the land was acquired by the government which then tried a series of experiments with cooperatives and state farms as ways to farm this land. Testour regained a form of self-government through the workings of the party and the other institutions of independent Tunisia. During the 1960s the national government bypassed Testour in an effort to build socialism directly on agriculture. In the 1970s there has been a return to private agriculture, except on state land, and the farmers of Testour have come into their own again.

Kita lies in the savanna belt of West Africa, with a rainfall of around 1,250 mm concentrated almost exclusively between late May and late September. The basic crops are millet and sorghum, rice, and peanuts. Cattle and other animals are important. Peanuts are sold

for cash, and some grain and animals are marketed locally. Animal and machine power is largely lacking, so human energy channeled through an extended family structure is the basis of work. This subsistence agriculture is linked to the world market through the sale of peanuts to raise money for taxes and consumer purchases.

The hierarchy of urban places in Mali is dominated by the capital, Bamako. The six regional capitals are much smaller, and the circle (cercle) towns like Kita are about half the size of the latter. Kita is one of the larger circle towns, and with its population of 8,000 in 1965 was the largest town between Bamako and the regional capital of Kayès. Kita is the urban center for its circle; its population represents about 5% of the total circle population. Poor roads and communications mean, however, that much of the circle is isolated from Kita so the economic impact of the town is most heavily felt in the central arrondissement with around 45,000 people. The main market in Kita daily draws in supplies and clients from the central arrondissement and occasionally from outlying parts of the circle.

Testour lies in an interior prolongation of the Mediterranean coastal plain. The rainfalll averages around 600 mm and it falls mostly between October and May. This rainfall permits a crop in winter wheat or barley to be grown on the hills and plains around the town. Olives are common, and the amount of cattle, sheep and goats makes the agricultural pattern one of mixed farming. Testouris take pride in the fruits and vegetables of many kinds which are grown in the irrigated gardens along the Mejerda river.

Testour's place in the hierarchy of urban places in Tunisa was higher before the colonial period than at present, although its population was smaller--around 2,500 in the 1860s, and 7,375 in the 1975 census. Testour is one of a series of towns in Tunisia that have between 5,000 and 10,000 people and are the seats of delegations, the administrative divisions of the governorates which in turn are the basic divisions of the country. The urban population represents about 30% of the delegation's population of 26,000 people. At present Testour suffers by being located between two slightly larger towns, for the government since colonial days has assumed that Testouris will use the banks, schools and other institutions in these towns. Thus Testour fought for many years to get a high school, and still does not have a complete one, while both other towns have had this since independence. Testour's market is a point of contact between urban and rural spheres, though the townspeople turn to Tunis for many of their own supplies.

Economic Role of Kita and Testour

Both Kita and Testour played a marketing role for the rural areas around them, and both served as bases from which governments have tried to organize changes in agricultural and rural social structure. In Kita this took the form of efforts to organize the marketing of the peanut crop, and to improve the productivity of agriculture. During the colonial period, the emphasis was on a commercial marketing system. Merchants bought peanuts and sold consumer goods; the farmers used

their money to buy goods and pay taxes. Surplus was extracted both in the form of commercial profits and through taxation. Nonetheless, most productive activity was and is oriented towards growing food crops and cotton for local use within a subsistence framework. After independence the socialist government of Modibo Keita began to limit the role of merchants. Villages were formed into cooperatives which took charge of the marketing of their own peanuts and of the sale of certain essential consumer items. The peanuts were purchased by the state import-export company which sold them abroad. Under this administrative system, surplus was extracted through price manipulation as well as taxation; but an effort to organize production directly through 'human investment' in collective fields proved abortive. The decline in the availability of consumer goods after 1960 caused most farmers to withdraw into the subsistence economy, growing more food and less peanuts.

There was also a breakdown in the networks which supplied Kita with food. When there was a millet shortage in the towns in 1965, the government attempted to purchase as much grain as possible from the stocks the farmers were believed to be hoarding; it probably only skimmed a fraction of what was being kept in the villages. On the other hand, several villages tried to organize markets to entice shoppers out from Kita so they could dispose of their crops directly without going through government channels and away from easy government supervision.

Despite a division of labor between Kita and the countryside, the rural areas were largely self-sufficient in terms of their economic specialties. Though some urban based craftsmen catered to a rural market, either by waiting for rural clients in Kita or by touring the villages looking for work, the essential skills for rural life were always present in the villages: the smiths, potters, carpenters, weavers and others. This division of labor was partially organized through a caste system in which the numu were smiths, potters and carpenters and the jeli were 'praise-singers', dealers in words. At the time of my field work there were no developments in the rural areas that would have supported a trend towards a class system; the plows and other implements whose adoption has caused such trends elsewhere in Mali were absent from this area (Ernst 1973; Jones 1970, 1976).

The higher degree of division of labor in the town implies a different kind of sociopolitical structure, and perhaps the beginnings of some kind of class system. The specialized occupations found in Kita have emerged in the last century as a result of the changes triggered by colonialism. The approximate importance of different occupations is indicated by their percentages in the census rolls of family heads, although many active people who are not family heads are omitted. The two main categories are the self-employed (64%) and government employees (22%), the rest being unemployed or unstated. The self-employed include merchants (11%), farmers (37%) and craftsmen (16%). Among the craftsmen are smiths, tailors, weavers,

masons, leatherworkers, mechanics, carpenters, barbers, bakers, jewellers, photographers and mattress makers. The government is the major wage-paying employer in town. Its employees include everyone from the Commandant de Cercle to the railroad workers.

It is possible to analyze the relations between the merchants and the civil servants in the town, and between each of them and the farmers, as class relations (Meillassoux 1970). In this sense the RDA in the 1950s represented an alliance of the merchants and the bureaucrats, both of which stood to benefit by the overthrow of the colonial regime. This alliance broke down nationally after 1960, and thus locally as well, especially because of the changes in the organization of trade. Each group could be seen as having interests that were both complementary to, and opposed to, the interests of the farmers. Without one or the other, the farmers would not be able to market their crop and receive a cash income. On the other hand, without them the farmers would not have found themselves in a position where a cash income made any sense. If the merchants were trying to extract a surplus from the farmers for their personal gain, then the government and its petty bourgeois functionary class were interested in trying to extract a surplus from the farmers in order to advance the development plans which were generated by urban thinkers and whose benefits would chiefly be in urban areas. Thus there could be an antagonistic class relation between the farming population and one or the other of the two urban groups. But such a class relationship is masked by the existence of a dense network of personal relations of the patron-client type, expressed in a typically Maninka idiom (Hopkins 1972:64-7). The advantages in this relationship go both ways--rural people rely on townspeople for access to authority and for hospitality in town, and townspeople rely on rural people for food in times of shortage, for taking care of their cattle, and so on. The links can be inherited on both sides, and they are frequently solidified by marrriage. The flow of country brides into town means that many townspeople have country mothers' brothers; kinship ties link town and country.

A critical feature of the economic system for urban-rural relations is the absence of private property in farm land. The only significant relationship to the land is that mediated through labor and effort, and the only claim to land is based on the continued use of that land. The ability to mobilize labor, principally through kinship, is more important than any claim to a given parcel of land. This accounts for the continued vitality of the kinship structures, and also for the shallowness of any urban attempt to establish control over agricultural activities in the rural areas. For this control can only be exercised through control over people; there is neither technology nor the ideology of a private property system to bolster it. Indebtedness cannot cause a farmer to lose control of his land or his control of the means of production; it can only reinforce it because the creditor can only recover his loan by supporting the existing production system. The absence of private property in farm land means that wealthy urban people (merchants

or officials) cannot invest in land or otherwise establish direct control over production on a scale larger than they can manage in their own households. Around Bamako, there is private appropriation of land whose produce is marketed in the city, but this pattern has not yet reached Kita.

The distinguishing feature of Testour's economic role, on the other hand, is precisely the existence of a system of private land ownership. This colors the economic relationship between Testour and its hinterland because so many people resident in the town own and farm land in the rural areas. Private ownership of land allows some to control more of an economic resource than they can themselves utilize, and this sets up the conditions for the appearance of some kind of class relations between those who own the land and those who work it. In the past this gave rise to a pattern of sharecropping; the landowner took a large share of the crop, but the day-to-day production decisions remained in the hands of the sharecropper whose independence was a function of his physical distance from the owner. At present, when the pattern of individual ownership of land has been reinforced by the abolition of various collective forms of tenure and by the introduction of mechanized, market-oriented agriculture, farm workers are mobilized by owners who exploit their land directly, using machines, and hire workers by the day as they need them. The power of decision rests in the owners' hands (Hopkins 1977). Increasingly the social landscape is dominated by the presence of a class of large farmers and a class of workers.

The economy of Testour is closely linked to the agricultural patterns of its hinterland, and the emergence of a dominant pattern of market-oriented agriculture has had important implications for the urban structure of the market town and service center. Over the last century, the town has changed from a self-sufficient community to a link in the centralized organization of agricultural and other productive activity. The townspeople now face a rural economy including peasant farmers operating according to the domestic mode of production as well as the larger farmers and the Cooperative Production Units subject to the logic of the capitalist mode of production.

The point of articulation of these different modes of production and styles of life is the market of Testour. This market can be defined in a number of ways. First, it is part of a five-market cycle involving the neighboring towns, and many frequent these five markets in turn. Second, on market day (Friday), people from Testour's hinterland come into town to buy consumer goods, sell produce, deal in animals, transact business at the government offices, visit the bath, or attend the Friday prayer in the mosque. Many shopkeepers cater to rural customers, and they do much of their business on market day when the main street is full of country people shopping, gossiping, and dealing. Third, the market functions throughout the week for the townspeople, supplying them with food and other items.

Historically there has been more of a division of labor between town and countryside here than in the case of Kita. There are fewer civil servants than in Kita, perhaps about 50 altogether, the majority of them teachers. Another 30 to 50 work as wage laborers for the government, mostly in construction. There are approximately 200 shops for merchants and craftsmen in town, representing about 400 men who earn their living in this way (Hopkins 1978b:471). The remainder earn their living from a combination of wage labor and agriculture. There are about half a dozen wealthy landowning families, and many more that are comfortably off. Several hundred people work as day laborers in agriculture and construction.

Among the merchants, the grocers and greengrocers stand in the most intimate relation to the rural population, though they are also being absorbed into a national marketing system. Most grocers maintain ties with one or more hamlets in the countryside. This concentrated acquaintance allows them to calculate credit risks more accurately (a large proportion of their business is done on credit), and gives both sides a guarantee that the relationship will not be broken off gratuitously. The greengrocers also do a large share of their business with rural customers, although on a cash basis. Greengrocers purchase their wares at the Tunis wholesale market when they are not available locally. Local purchases are usually made from a privately operated consignment depot where farmers leave their produce on approval; the operator receives a commission if the produce is sold, in return for handling the paper work recording the sale that the government now requires. Other stores dealing in hardware, dry goods, shoes, etc., sell goods bought in Tunis to a rural clientele; townspeople prefer to shop for these items in the better stocked Tunis shops. At the bottom end of the scale are peddlers who sell ready-made goods, 'notions', and nonperishable food items by visiting rural folk at home.

The flow of agricultural produce to urban markets and beyond is also organized in Testour. Two of the main agricultural products are subject to government monopoly purchasing: grains and olive oil. The grain monopoly has a purchasing office in Testour. In addition, there are local dealers who buy fruits on the tree, then harvest and sell them either to the Tunis wholesale market or to a cannery. Others collect hides, fowl, eggs, beeswax, honey and other items and ship them to Tunis for sale. Still others deal in livestock, sometimes trying to increase their profit by fattening them in Testour.

Testour has always been something of a craft center, including especially the people who make the local agricultural tools--blacksmiths, carpenters, ropemakers, potters, weavers, tailors and saddlers. In the traditional agricultural technology, rural farmers relied heavily on urban craftsmen to produce their tools and a substantial part of the town's population lived from providing these tools. There is still a demand for shoeing horses and for the traditional tools of wood or metal, but it is the limited one of marginal peasant agriculture. Modern agriculture requires more complicated tools, and there are some

modern craftsmen in Testour who can repair these tools, but the more complicated technology has resulted in farmers becoming dependent on dealers and craftsmen in Tunis and other large towns.

We can thus isolate and discuss the gradual penetration of Testour and its hinterland by the capitalist mode of production in agriculture, trade and crafts. In agriculture, capitalist relations of production involving wage labor and the hierarchical control of work follow mechanization and permit its full development (Hopkins 1978a). Local traders are absorbed into national commercial structures centered in Tunis. The transition from artisan craftsman and petty producer to a subordinated cog linked to the central structures of capitalism works through credit and piece work arrangements, as in the case of tailoring where production for the household economy is shifting into production for Tunis wholesalers whose capital gives them access to a wider market (Hopkins 1978b). Testour seems anachronistic in having retained so many one- and two-man shops in the face of pressures to create larger units. Interestingly, these pressures have been more successful where women were involved; even though the effort to transfer domestic production of rugs to a large workshop collapsed after a decade of operation in 1976, there is now talk of establishing a factory where women would be employed making clothing.

Two different functions are presently localized in the small towns of Tunisia. On the one hand, there is the market with its merchants, peddlers, artisans and petty producers; this is the link between the market structure of the wider society and the social forms of the independent small farmers. One can perhaps extend this argument to say that the market is the point of articulation between the capitalist mode of production;and the family operating according to the domestic mode of production; as Meillassoux (1975:149) says, there are 'deux secteurs, capitaliste et domestique, l'un préservant l'autre pour lui soustraire sa substance, et le détruisant ce faisant.'

On the other hand, there is the administrative and political apparatus. This apparatus has orchestrated the changes in the mode of production of agriculture, crafts and commerce, and it will probably continue to do so. The vast revolutionary policy undertaken in Tunisia in the 1960s represents an extreme form of this policy of extracting surplus from the countryside through such administrative means as taxes and price manipulation. Though the policy was reversed in 1969-70, it had a lasting impact on the face of the land through its heritage of increased centralization of economic functions and control. In the 1970s however, the government has diversified its means of control and surplus extraction to include credit facilities and the lure of profit resulting from the sale of produce rather than its consumption at home. Economic incentives encourage farmers and craftsmen to work harder and thus essentially to exploit themselves by devoting extra time to productive activities. To some extent the workings of this administrative apparatus are localized in small towns like Testour, but increasingly they are gathered in at a national level. When the largest dam in North Africa was being planned for a site five km from Testour, no one thought that local opinion was worth consulting. Economic direction thus escapes from local hands.

Political Role of the Towns

The political structures of Kita reflected the desire of the national leaders to mobilize the entire country for development. This effort was temporarily successful in the town but had a good deal less impact in the countryside. Thus the political role assigned to Kita tended to set it in opposition to the political style and projects of its hinterland and even much of the urban population. This made the role of politicians highly ambivalent.

Traditional politics in the Kita area took the shape of rivalry between clans and lineages. The formal leader in any Maninka group was always the senior man of the dominant lineage, and seniority and age still play an important part in politics. Many of the political values are related to the traditional model of village structure, including a contrast between founding and stranger lineages, and distinctions among the different castes. The social and political patterns created by lineage, caste and village constitute a fabric which helps hold people together (Hopkins 1971).

These patterns remained unaffected by the functioning of the formal post-independence institutions including the administration, the party and the cooperative structure. On the one hand, these institutions were designed to reach out from Kita to encompass the rural sectors in a hierarchical structure. On the other, the high degree of popular participation mitigated the tendency for them to work from the top down for it meant that leaders remained very sensitive to pressures from below. Both the party and the cooperatives worked through a series of committees of from 5 to 18 members, and about one out of ten adult males held a formal role in these committees. Even villagers could occasionally exercise a real political weight as in the party elections held in 1962 when every vote counted. The most successful leaders were civil servants who combined local origins with formal education.

The government sought more consistently than the party to establish real links to the villages through periodic meetings of representatives of different villages at which decisions were passed on. But the villagers were little touched by these innovations despite the intent behind them. The biggest change was occasioned by the connection of their village cooperatives to the state trading system. Apart from that, they retained the traditional production system based on the lineage-household. The cooperatives even protected this system by serving as a buffer between the hierarchical structures of the lineage-household and the different hierarchical structure of the government (Hopkins 1976).

Despite their inability to diffuse urban forms of social organization into rural Kita, however, the townspeople kept a central political role. One reason for this has to do with communications. Written messages in Mali are only in French. Since practically no one in the rural areas could read French, written instructions could not be sent to the villagers, nor could messengers from Bamako visit every village in the country. The solution was to send written communications to Kita where people could read them and translate them from written French into spoken

Maninka. Translation was thus one of the principal functions of Kita's elite. Whenever the government wanted to communicate with the rural areas, it had first of all to mobilize the members of this elite who would then take the responsibility for informing the rural people. The elite would then make use of their personal links to different villages to deliver the messages. The elite had the task of translating these messages not only from French to Maninka, but also from government language to popular terms. In the process the content of the messages might also be modified to make it more palatable or because the elite itself found it uncongenial. Members of the town's political elite thus had a key political role and a real interest in maintaining it.

At the core of Kita's politics was a pattern of rivalry between big men competing for dominance. They sought to have themselves elected to the political bureau, the town council or the cooperative board, in order to exercise influence on the course of events and to be recognized as leaders in accordance with a traditional cultural pattern which defined this as a legitimate goal for an ambitious man. The rivalry within this arena, though it started out with a potentially unlimited field of unconnected rivals, consolidated itself into a pattern of bipartite factionalism as alliances reduced the number of competing cliques (Barth 1959). Thus there were two factions within the family which supplied the chief before 1959; there were two parties competing for power in Kita in the 1950s, both being sections of national parties; once one of these parties was eliminated at the national level, the local section of the winning party split into two factions each of which was associated with the names of one or two dominant figures (Hopkins 1972: 115-55). This factionalism was so byzantine that the national political leaders had difficulty fathoming and penetrating it despite both formal and informal ('spies') channels of communication. It functioned as an essentially independent sub-system within the national system to which it was linked most obviously by the personal ties that Kita figures had with national politicians. At the same time, this local political hotbed served as a buffer between the national government and the rural population. Local politicians were too busy fighting each other and too suspicious of government initiatives which might threaten their own position to devote a great deal of time to the task of mediating between Bamako and the villages. Hence the job of translation was compromised, and local infighting helped protect villagers from unappreciated policies.

Village leaders regarded Kita politicians with the same degree of suspicion that Kitans regarded Bamako. They valued the traditional model of village autonomy and interpreted government projects as a threat to that autonomy. So government projects would get bogged down in village politics that officials and Kita politicians alike did not understand, and villagers tried to keep it that way on the assumption that where knowledge is power, having others ignorant of you is bliss.

This is the paradox of popular government in Kita. The political system encouraged a high degree of participation, and ambitious leaders adopted popular positions to attract support and enhance their position, though they could not oppose the government too openly. Successful politicians had to steer between the risk of Bamako's disapproval

and the dangers of popular disavowal. This balance entailed a kind of legitimacy that was threatened by development programs when these programs proved unpopular. The reluctance of Kitans to endorse these programs with full enthusiasm eventually drove the national politicians to attempt to implement them by force rather than persuasion, but when they did they destroyed the basis of their own legitimacy and undermined the position of local leaders. They confirmed the suspicion that their real goal was political domination and not development towards general prosperity. Kitans would only accept programs they could control themselves, and that usually meant diverting their purpose to suit local interests. Bamako leaders feared that if they allowed local control in the interests of gaining compliance, they would soon no longer recognize their own programs. They fell back on the 'general mobilization' model (Badian 1964), but this was wearing thin. This dilemma is part of the background to the loss of public support which the Keita government suffered and which led to its overthrow in a military coup in 1968.

Testour's political structure also exists within the framework of a single-party state. Testour is more tightly integrated into the national structure, partly because communications are much better (Arabic is the basic language for politics of all kinds, though some written documents are in French), and partly because the town has always been linked to a strong national government. Town politics centers around the party branch whose antecedents go back to the anticolonial struggle in the 1920s and which is responsible for the town and its immediate environs, but not for the rest of the delegation, which is covered by other branches corresponding to the administrative subdivisions. A town council headed by a mayor is responsible for general administration and upkeep, and the youth organize themselves through the cultural committee and a Sports Club.

In Testour politics consists in trying to maneuver oneself into a position where one can demonstrate competence and efficiency while accomplishing tasks in the general interest. Examples of this include the annual festival of the patron saint, building a road or restoring a saint's shrine, or persuading the government to establish a secondary shcool in the town. The focus of political attention is very much on the relations between Testour and the Tunisian government because most local projects can only be carried out to the extent that they are supported financially by the state. Testouris frequently petition the state for projects and support.

There is a class aspect to politics in Testour which is missing in Kita. The party branch and the town council represent the interests of the large farmers, not those of the workers. When a severe flood damaged many gardens belonging to these farmers, the party branch leaders tried to represent them in their efforts to extract relief aid from the government, and at the same time tried to suppress an effort by workers to request government aid in the form of food and blankets for unemployed workers. No workers have ever been elected, or even been candidates for election to the party branch committee, renewed every other year; they only participate in the election when certain candidates need their votes.

An alliance between two segments of the middle classes is the key to the analysis of Testour's politics. On the one hand there are the

new intellectuals, typically schoolteachers but also including other civil servants in the western tradition. These people control the party structure, which favors literate people who have at least enough knowledge of French to handle any paper work. Most of these people come from shopkeeping or small landowning families; very few have enough wealth in land or trade to be considered in the upper strata. On the other hand, there are the farmers whose interests derive from commercial farming, and who control enough land to require hired labor. These farmers follow party politics, but on the whole they are not interested in party office. However, they dominate the town council, perhaps because of its power to make decisions concerning building permits and local taxes. The alliance between these two groups is based on the willingness of the farmers to support the political ambitions of the new intellectuals, while the intellectuals further the economic and social interests of the farmers.

The political domination of the countryside around Testour is based on the control of the party and state apparatus by this alliance, to the exclusion of the workers. The class opposition from which this alliance springs is rooted in the town's social structure, for both the farmer class and the worker class reside in the town, frequent adjacent cafes in the same market, and send their children to the same primary schools, although not always with the same results. The traditional small farmers and others who live outside the town do not enter into this arena, and are considered to be outsiders, country hicks. Since marriage follows class lines, there are practically no marriages between prominent townspeople and country people. The only kin links between town and country are those of the lower class. Hence the control of the countryside by the town's modern farmer class works not through a network of personal relations as in Kita, but through their control of the land and indirect domination of the town's political institutions.

Religious Role of the Towns

Both Kita and Testour are predominantly Muslim, and Islam serves to integrate the townspeople into wider sociopolitical entities through a shared cosmology and religious language as well as through such institutions as the pilgrimage to Mecca. Of the Jewish community in Testour of about 150 individuals only a handful remain. The Catholics in Kita amount to 5% or 10% of the population, and there are others who are primarily oriented towards earth shrines and other forms of traditional religion. For their followers both Judaism and Christianity serve the same function of integration as Islam for the majority.

In the rural areas around Testour there are saints' shrines but no mosques. Rural people who wish to pray in a mosque must visit town where they also find baths that permit them to be sure of their level of purity. The town's symbolic domination of the countryside is thus expressed through the mosque and the baths. The main mosque in Testour symbolizes the entire town, while the other mosques are associated with

the families that built and supported them. There are also several mosques in Kita, but they are associated with wards, not families. Some held that the town should only have one mosque, but they have had to accept a multiplicity of mosques at least unitl a new Friday mosque is built. In Mali cleanliness for prayer is associated with home bathing, not with public baths (there are none), and this makes it much easier for people to envision village mosques which are in fact quite common. Thus here the symbols of Islam are not used to express urban dominance.

A single family has been associated with the key religious roles in each town. In Kita the Cissé family are considered the founders of the Muslim community, and they have retained the imam-ship since then (Cissé 1970). In Testour the Ben Moussa family held the imam-ship, dispensed religious justice, controlled the religious lands, and were notaries all through the 19th century. They lost the imam-ship in 1911 in a bitter fight that was a precursor of the nationalist struggle, and the post of qadhi (judge) was abolished in 1903, but they continued to hold some of the other posts for another generation.

Two Islamic institutions which are central in Testour are absent in Kita. These are religiously endowed land (waqf) and the saint cult. Waqf land in Testour supported mosques, shrines and other religious activities; the way in which the land was used allowed urban families to extend their control of farm land. Waqf land is entirely absent in Kita and in fact in West Africa in general, where mosques and religious activities must be supported entirely by the Muslim community. In Testour the saint cult provides a major link between religion and social organization. 'Saints' are usually dead and buried; it is their alleged tomb which is the focus of ritual action as the power of the saints is invoked to heal, to protect, or simply to bless. Like mosques, the saints' shrines represent social groups in the ground, and allow for the expression of social solidarities. Most of these social groups are families who carry out an annual pilgrimage to a shrine, or who bury their dead in a cemetery protected by a saint. Testour also has a patron saint who symbolizes the unity of the town as a whole, and who is said to be the 'father' of everyone. The most important shrines in Testour are around the edge of the town while the mosques are in the middle, protected against outside evils by this rampart of holiness. Shrines are also common in the rural areas, where they symbolize the unity of lineages and hamlets. Some powerful saints have a more universal appeal, and are the subject of visits by urban people to rural shrines and vice versa. The system of shrines does not express the same urban dominance as the distribution of mosques. In Kita saints are not recognized, though living holy men may be; perhaps the functional equivalent of the shrines is the continued existence of earth and ancestor shrines.

Islamic brotherhoods used to be important in both Kita and Testour. In Kita they were the heirs of the Tijaniyya of El Hajj Omar and other religious-military-political movements of the 19th century. What remains in Kita is a struggle between a 'traditional' Islam associated with magic and amulets, and believed to be fostered by the brotherhoods,

and a more purist version devoted to the elimination of superstition and to the adaptation of Islam to modern life. The five brotherhoods in Testour that were once active died out about 1930 as the nationalist movement began to rise; before that time they were a vital part of local organization and were involved with politics and social structure.

Conclusion

Comparing Kita and Testour, each is a commentary on the other. 1) Kita was created by colonialism, while Testour resisted it, and paid the price while neighboring towns advanced. 2) Kita extracted rural surplus through trade, while Testour did it through property ownership and wages. 3) In Kita the basic split was between town and country, despite many connecting threads; in Testour it was between a dominant and a subordinate class within the town whose opposition spilled over into the country. 4) The fundamental aspect of Kita's politics was the alliance between civil servants and merchants which turned into rivalry after independence. In Testour, it was the emergence of an alliance between the new intellectuals and the modern farmers against the working class. 5) In Kita the basic unit was people living together in the same community (local organization dominated), while in Testour it was the family (kinship organization dominated). 6) In Kita crafts were decentralized, even out to the villages; in Testour they were concentrated, sometimes even in towns larger than Testour. 7) Kita avoided the capital and related to the country; Testour sought out the capital and scorned the country. 8) Religious symbolism in Mali does not stress urban dominance as it does in Tunisia. 9) In Kita the goal of politics is power, in Testour, reputation.

Both Kita and Testour have served as centers for the development of agriculture and a certain form of civil politics in the surrounding rural areas. The attempt has been more successful in Testour than in Kita. Centrally organized socialism has given way to centrally controlled free enterprise, while the process of development in Testour has been accompanied by an increase in class formation and potential for conflict. Centrally organized socialism in Mali failed to penetrate the rural areas effectively, in part for reasons having to do with small town politics. For the moment the rural social structure seems to offer few points of entry to people in either the small urban centers like Kita or the capital, and the countryside is drawing in on itself after the relative openness of the 1950s. Perhaps people in the capital will succeed in their efforts to bypass the small towns like Kita, or perhaps will prove able to draw country people into relations with the towns more readily than administrative or political sanctions proved able to open up a way for townspeople to penetrate the countryside.

NOTE

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SMALL URBAN CENTRES AND THE GROWTH OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT IN RURAL KENYA

T. B. Kabwegyere

Introduction

The 1970-4 Kenya Development Plan designated four levels of centres to stimulate rural development: urban centres as the main commercial centres for an entire district, mostly district headquarters though some like Kajiado, Narok and Kitui have not been so designated; rural centres to serve a population of at least 40,000; market centres to serve populations of about 15,000; and local centres to cater for populations of at least 5,000. Thirty-six urban centres, 140 rural centres, 231 market and 600 local centres were identified (see Kabwegyere n.d. ch. 6).

Apart from the coastal towns of East Africa, Mombasa and Dar-es-Salaam, urban centres in this region are a recent phenomenon. From Nairobi to the small urban centre, now designated a local centre for rural development purposes, we are dealing with urbanization induced solely through external influence. The large towns of Kenya developed either as commercial or administrative centres to serve the interests of the colonial system. They developed as centres of control. They were the 'daughter cities' of the metropolitan cities whose growth was very often unrelated to the development of their rural hinterlands apart from their exploitation. They developed as part of the internal trade system, part of capitalist development where the 'daughter citie' collected and exported raw materials and in return distributed manufactured goods from the commercial towns in imperial countries.

Towns like Nairobi, Nakuru, Kitale, Nyeri, in the Kenya Highlands and the Rift Valley have continued to serve the role for which they were established. One can therefore identify several stages in the process of Kenya's incorporation into the international capitalist system: Kenya is declared a colony of Britain, it produces raw materials which are essential for 'civilisation', develops habits of absorbing what is produced and imported from abroad; more has to be produced so as to keep people purchasing these goods; hence expansion beyond the White Highlands and the Rift Valley to even more remote areas--penetrating as far as possible the countryside where resources might be found. This is not a conscious logic of one man or twenty men. It is the logic of a system which was founded and entrenched on the basis of exploitation, a system in which underdevelopment was born and continues to be nourished. If

the large urban centres have not served the cause of development, how are the small ones going to do it especially when they are an extension and elaboration of the system which produced Nairobi?

Small Urban Centres and Development: Basic Assumptions and Definitions

Urbanization has long been used as one of the indexes of development and modernization. One of the basic assumptions is that the more people engage in industry, in secondary and tertiary economic activities, the more development comes about. An industrial change is a precondition for development. For the Third World countries the recommendation is small industries--the industrial estates in Kenya, cottage industries--because these countries lack the technology and know how to manage large concerns; instead there has to be a 'partnership', resulting in the expansion of multinational companies in the Third World countries. The Third World countries cannot afford to evolve complicated technology; they must therefore engage in 'intermediate' technology. Large cities in poor countries are too expensive to maintain not only economically but also politically. It is uncomfortable for the well-to-do to have around them the slums of the unemployed, which are also unsightly to the tourists. Especially since independence, the call to go back to the land has become fashionable and rural development has been the craze of the 1970s. Africa seems to be chasing its tail in search of development.

Southall (1977:1), like Kimani and Taylor (1973:12-13), assumes that small urban places are the vital interface between the developing rural system and developing urban system, which as growth centres could transcend the false dichotomy of rural and urban problems, concentrating on the interlinkages. The dichotomy is false, but the limitations of national planning and the supranational constraints are ignored. Rural populations are not homogeneous and abound in inequalities.

It is assumed that the small centres reflect local, micro-situations and specialized ecological niches and act as distributors of new technology and innovations, hence increasing productivity and inducing development. But who actually benefits and why is there rural poverty? The provision of roads, dispensaries, schools, railways, banks, credit facilities, electricity, water and services is seen as essential for development.

> The concentration of services in one place also facilitates interaction between them. Consequently, if all government services are concentrated in one centre a farmer visiting that centre is more likely to use more than one service. (Kimani and Taylor 1973:12-13).

There is no doubt that these services and institutions are essential for development but not irrespective of context (Kabwegyere n.d ch. 6). If the experimental farm has failed to conduce development; if the concentration on progressive farmers has not led to development in rural areas; if the large urban centres have not generated development in the countries of Africa and it is now assumed that small urban centres will

do it, we shall continue to chase our tails after development for a long time to come. Development does not occur under any circumstances. The conditions of underdevelopment which currently exist in most of Africa are not conducive to development.

Development is inevitably a normative term and must be seen to include the 'realization of the potential of human personality' (Seers 1973:6). It involves three components: growth, participation and distribution (see Kabwegyere and Adholla 1978). These are values and conditions at the same time. Development involves growth defined as an increase in certain capacities depending on what is to be developed. For example, if we talk of the development of health services, we must talk of an increase in hospitals, dispensaries, maternity centres etc. Besides, there must exist conditions that allow the population to have access to these services. People should not die of curable diseases when hospitals exist. Thus we are talking of growth not only in institutions and infrastructure but also growth in awareness of this growth by the people in the development unit. No development project can avoid growth in this sense and still claim to be pursuing the development goal.

The second component is the participation of the people in the development unit in the generation of this growth. Imposed growth cannot lead to development because it will not have meaning to the people in the development area. In this sense, development experience must be a personal, a group, a collectivity experience. Only then can this experience lead to self-actualization, collective good, sustenance and recreation.

> At the basic economic level, participation in society can be seen as employment in a profitable occupation. At another level, it is active involvement in decision making process with regards to plans and priorities for the development of resources and assets at the community and ultimately national level. Participation denotes an intimate involvement whereby people critically influence decisions about how, when and what form they acquire benefits; it implies power transfer to the target groups. (Mbithi 1973:26).

Participation is a value in the development process as well as a condition for development to take place. It has to be conscious, so that the participant is aware of the benefits of participation. He/she must have the means to participate autonomously. His/her participation has to be continuous rather than episodic. It has to be instrumental and social. It must be a response to an 'inner or general environmental stimulus rather than response to solicitation,' (Milbrath 1965:10). It has to be participation that is instrumental to the realization of the basic needs of the participant if it is to be a component of development.

The third necessary component in the development equation is distribution of the consequences of growth and participation. Benefits

may accrue to the individual as a result of participation. What matters, however, is what benefits accrue to the group, to the collectivity in the development unit. Development is a social rather than an individual experience. It is the unity of strength; the cooperative and synchronized effort that is generative of collective good. Sharing equitably in the results of growth as well as participation in the generation of growth must be a process of self-actualization.

There must be an equitable distribution of growth-generating resources and participation-enhancing resources. With equitable distribution one eliminates luxury goods. For what everyone has ceases to be luxury. Luxury exists because some have while others do not; some plant, others reap; some toil while others vegetate. If a community generates growth such that everyone can afford a car, a refrigerator, a full meal, these will no longer be luxuries but essentials in the continuing rise in the standard of living.

Small Urban Centres and Underdevelopment

> ...The development of central places and growth centres as part of national development strategy can in the present context of dependency be seen as merely aiding and abetting the perpetuation and intensification of the Third World exploitation and underdevelopment rather than contributing to a sustained and independent development effort. (Doherty 1975:14).

Colonial dependencies were established for a purpose. The colonial state was a managing agent of the dominant private capitalistic interests inside the colony. The dominant forces in the colonial system used their power to limit the indigenous people's involvement in autonomous development thus perpetuating the conditions of underdevelopment (see Rodney 1972; Frank 1969; Brett 1973). Colin Leys' study of Kenya after independence is an empirical demonstration of the above assertion, the case of neo-colonialism. As Leys puts it, the study of the neo-colony must focus on 'the interplay of economic and social forces originally generated by colonialism...' (1975:252).

If Kenya has not extracted itself from the cobwebs of colonialism and imperialist strategies, can we talk of development that will benefit its population? For some the answer is a clear yes. Kenya ranks as one of the most stable, developing nations in the Third World. Certainly a number of people have benefited. But the sceptic also has a point. If people could have gained ten points but have only gained three because some others, locals and outsiders, have taken the rest, which can be demonstrated, unless one believes that inequality is a necessary condition for development, the conditions for development as defined in this paper have not been met.

The small urban centres are a product of the large urban centres which developed as nodes in a transmission system of raw materials

from colonial Africa in return for goods from the manufacturing centres of the world in an externally oriented economy of what has been called 'periphery capitalism'. The small urban centres in the rural areas are agents of penetration in an ever expanding periphery capitalist system to sup the meagre surplus that is generated under precapitalist relations (Gerhard 1976:6) which still exist in rural Kenya and Africa at large. They are part of a 'solid foundation... laid for the country's transformation to a social formation in which the capitalist mode of production predominates, not as an equal to the colonisers, but as a dependent junior partner on the periphery of the international capitalist system' (ibid.:9).

With the introduction of a money economy in colonial Kenya, forced labour started. The settlers in the White Highlands and in the Rift Valley needed labourers to work on the farms and the factories that serviced the settler economy. Money had been introduced as a means to procure imported goods and with time naked force was no longer necessary. This has grown into a phenomenon that has been extensively studied--rural to urban migration. The village economy became impoverished with the loss of men; it was also impossible to make money there, given the subsistence character of the village economy, especially in Kenya where, for a long time, the Africans were not allowed to grow cash crops.

The second stage of colonisation, which came late in the case of Kenya, unlike Uganda, was to allow the people to grow cash crops in their land, combining subsistence agriculture with cash crops. Besides, even the surplus food produce could be sold to feed the non-food-producing labour in the urban areas or on settler farms. Rural monetization, therefore, went hand in hand with the growth of towns. Prices for food crops and even cash crops produced in the rural areas have always favoured the urban entrepreneur and those he represents beyond the national borders. Thus the urban areas have not only exploited the rural areas through taking able-bodied persons, productive labour, but also through the market and price systems.

The growth of small urban centres--trading centres other than those established formally through the administrative and commercial strategies--is a result of the rural folk trying to adapt to the increasing opening of the village to greater forces of socio-economic transformation. Some people have become permanent urban dwellers selling their labour to make a meagre living. Others have opted to engage in some form of trade in the small urban centres, an increasing phenomenon in rural Africa. Thirty-three percent of the people running businesses come from within a radius of five miles from the trading centre, so the small urban centres are intimately linked to the village economy. The shopowner, the bicycle repairer, the carpenter still obtains his food from his village plot of land. In most cases he does not even live in the centre (Kabwegyere 1977).

These urban centres below the level of district towns hardly produce anything themselves; they sell already manufactured goods. They obtain these goods from the district towns, provincial towns and Nairobi or Mombasa--the centres of international commerce. In Narok, Masailand, you will find Madame Rochas, the French perfume, Scotch Whisky and

Napoleon cigars among other consumables; there will be goods from Britain, Germany, USA, Japan, etc. Many of the businessmen who buy and sell these goods have no idea where they came from. Twenty percent of them have no formal education. Ninety percent of the rest have not gone beyond primary education. Most of the goods they sell are not manufactured in the country either. Mombasa is largely a depot receiving goods from the exporting ports of the world. By the time the goods reach these centres in remote rural Kenya the price has perhaps trebled because it carries government tax, transport costs and the handling charges of the middlemen who may be several. The importer himself did not make less than 10% commission. The heaviest burden of this price is borne by the least economically endowed, the urban poor and the rural population. The small urban centres have a distributing function but to the benefit of the dominant forces in the economy.

One hardly ever finds these small urban centres acting as direct agents of goods handled by the National Trading Corporation. Few of the businessmen would qualify as agents; the requirements are too high (Kabwegyere 1977). On the other hand agro-products sell very cheaply in the local markets most often held weekly and sometimes daily within these urban centres. A chicken may sell at 5/- to be transported to the large urban centres where it will cost 15/- a kilo, the same chicken finally costing over five times the original price. The bank has been introduced in some of these centres. Saving is encouraged. Sixty-six percent of the businessmen in these small centres keep a savings bank account for which they are paid a 3% interest. Only about 19%, however, have had a loan from banks and other loan giving agencies. This is because the general mass of the rural people do not qualify to get loans. Instead, when the money accumulates it is transferred to the larger branches which are in the larger urban centres to be rented at up to 13%. The bank is certainly not a developing agency in the rural areas. This is also true of secondary towns like Homa Bay whose savings are known to be transferred to Kisii where more competent customers are to be found. The rural savings are used to make more money, not in the rural areas but in the larger towns.

It becomes apparent that there are two dimensions to consider. One can focus on the underdevelopment of the rural areas as a result of the national system, i.e. the urban is exploiting the rural such that the growth that is generated is exploited in favour of the urban system. But these urban systems, as we have seen, are part of the larger periphery capitalist system. Ultimately the beneficiaries are also those who control the country's economic system.

> ...These economies...are distintinguished by the fact that they do not have the necessary, let alone sufficient conditions for the development of a vibrant indigenous technology--by which we mean a creative relationship of the people to their social environment (as reflected in their needs) and their material environment (as reflected in their resources). [It is an economic system]...which divorces domestic production from domestic resource use,

> and domestic demand from domestic needs.
> ...for an economic system to exist and function as a national economic system there must first exist such basic and dynamic domestic interrelationships as domestic resource-domestic resource use and production-domestic technology-domestic demand-domestic needs. It is the absence of a dynamic convergence of these which explains underdevelopment and dependent economic structures...(Thomas 1974:302).

The rural population in areas where small urban centres are mushrooming could hardly be referred to as autonomous participants in the generation of growth or as sharing equitably in its results. They are mere pawns on a stage that is managed by the forces beyond the rural setting and in part beyond the national boundaries of Kenya:

> What has been happening to poverty? What has been happening to unemployment? What has been happening to inequality? If all three of these have declined from high levels, then beyond doubt this has been a period of development for the country concerned. If one or two of these central problems have been growing worse, especially if all three have, it would be strange to call the result 'development' even if per capita income has doubled. (Seers 1973:6).
>
> The groups of persons who have failed to derive much benefit from the growth generally since independence include the majority of small holders, employees in the rural sectors, the urban working poor and the urban and rural unemployed. (ILO 1972:11).

These form the majority of the population in the country.

According to the study of trading centres already referred to, the potential for increased employment in places like Mbubuni, Machakos, Othaya or Nyeri, Kagwe, Kiambu and many other local centres to provide employment for a population of 7-8,000 persons is limited and will require a fundamental shift from current trends.

> ...It is clear that Kenya has relied upon private activity as the major development force in stimulating productive activity and in providing employment opportunities to the expanding population. This policy has changed little since 1964. (World Bank 1975:261).

Such a policy implies that the rural people are encouraged to come to these centres and engage in private businesses, and expand their businesses from an individual affair into an enterprise that employs labour. This might work if loans, training in bookkeeping, advice from trade development officers, easy terms for purchase of goods, etc. were available. To date, however, the businessmen in the small urban centres have to fend for themselves with little substantial support from above. (Kabwegyere 1977).

An alternative policy would be to ask the multinational corporation in the spirit of 'partnership' to expand into the rural areas. This would mean to call upon Lonrho, Mackenzie Dalgety etc. to open branches in the rural remote urban centres to build an employment base to absorb the unemployed. This would have to be done after generous concessions have been guaranteed. But is it not the case that multinational corporations are already part of the unemployment problem in the large urban centres? Are they interested in full employment when they want to benefit from cheap labour to minimize the cost of production so as to enhance their profits? Even if they accepted the idea of going rural, it is doubtful whether they would change their true colours. Instead the rural population would be more and more proletarianized and ultimately the rural will disappear to be replaced by the urban, thus entrenching the capitalist system. This has happened in the developed world already and is likely in the changing Third World countries.

What would result in any case, is not development but capitalist rural transformation further entrenching the periphery status of the neo-colony. Rural transformation unlike rural development can be achieved by a few progressive farmers, a few progressive businessmen, and small urban centres because what is at stake is to extend the capitalist system and its inequality. What is necessary is to introduce appropriate institutions, change the people's attitudes and values to make them more receptive; establish institutions of control (the administrative machinery, the police and prisons), that is, to bureaucratize the rural areas, perhaps with the intention of demobilizing the rural masses; meanwhile the land will increasingly fall into fewer and fewer hands. Those who cannot get jobs in the towns can be squatters on the farms. This is not novel to Kenya.

On the contrary development must be people centred. The people must participate meaningfully in the generation and sharing of the benefits of growth. This cannot be achieved if the people do not control the economy, when political power is concentrated in a few hands; when economic purchasing power is controlled by the fittest; when the country is a neo-colony. For Kenya the history of the past and of the period since independence clearly indicates that the conditions for development are lacking:

> A search for the causes of persistent inequalities and unemployment in spite of a rapid rate of economic growth since the attainment of national independence must start with the colonial situation. On becoming independent, Kenya inherited a very lop-sided economy, already organized for the effective maintenance of very different ways of life for a tiny minority on the one hand, and a very large majority on the other. With few exceptions, Europeans occupied the top of the income scale, the Asians the middle and Africans the bottom. Inequality was thus deeply embedded within the economy.

> Since independence, economic growth has largely continued on the lines set by the earlier colonial structure. Kenyanization has radically changed the racial composition of the group of people in the centre of power and many of its policies, but has had only a limited effect on the mechanisms which maintain its dominance--the pattern of government income and expenditure, the freedom of foreign firms to locate their offices and plants in Nairobi, and the narrow stratum of expenditure by a higher-income elite superimposed on a base of limited mass consumption. (ILO 1972:11).

The 1975 World Bank Country Report laments in similar terms Kenya's 'failure to distribute the benefits of development as widely as the government would like...growing unemployment and the continuing of poverty of...the working poor,' (p. 5). There is still hardly any sign of change in the mechanism, nor are small urban centres likely to bring about such a change.

Conclusion

The stress laid on small urban centres in the 'Small Urban Centres in Rural Development' project exaggerates their role in development in rural areas. Neither does the assumption that they are the 'most strategic key to problems of rural development' (Southall 1977) seem justified. If the experience in Kenya is any indication, the growth of small urban centres is in many ways an intensification of dependence relationships and underdevelopment--this time extended to incorporate the rural areas--and in no way concerned with development. The rural areas are adjunct and the small urban centres mere nodes in the process of the further impoverishment of the country. The rural people will continue to cope with this process of transformation but all the time benefiting less than their labour merits and suffering ever increasing inequalities. Nevertheless, small urban centres need to be studied, if for no other reason than to enable us to grasp the problems in pursuing the elusive goal of development in Africa.

SEDENTARY PASTORALISTS AND PEASANTS: THE INHABITANTS OF A SMALL TOWN[1]

Anders Hjort

This article concerns a small town, Isiolo in northern Kenya with roughly 6,000 inhabitants, and how this town is linked to surrounding rural areas which form the "umland"[2] of the town. I shall concentrate on some economic and social aspects which tie town and umland together. My purpose is to demonstrate some forms of a peasantization process where the small town represents the link between two economic systems. On the one hand Isiolo offers survival opportunities for poor sections of a rural population, and on the other hand presents opportunities for an economic exploitation of the townsmen.

Townsmen and Migrants

The economic opportunities available in the township for individual households are found within both subsistence sectors (predominantly irrigated farming combined with small stock rearing) and cash sectors (wage labor, other forms of employment and activities within an informal sector), or a combination of the two. Many of the poor townsmen make a living from hand to mouth. They earn cash incomes and produce food for subsistence from the irrigated fields (shambas), whatever combination proves possible. One-third of the households inhabiting the undemarcated sections of the township keep domestic animals (in a few cases for trading purposes). Equally many have some income from a shamba (the average size of which is a small as 1.6 acres). Out of the cultivators only 28% earn cash by selling some products, and no one has a yearly income from this above 1,500 KSh. As many as 40% of the mentioned households have some income from employment. The average monthly wage for an employed household member is 372 KSh with the median clearly below that. Townsmen are employed at various levels within local, district and provincial administration; in the form of laborers, messengers, drivers, typists, and so on. Herdsmen and guards are needed for the Livestock Marketing Division (LMD) which has a large holding ground outside Isiolo town. In commerce, labor is required for grinding maize in the mills, loading and unloading lorries, building houses and many other activities. Due to the game parks north of town, traders and craftsmen can make a living. With the occurrence of wild life also follows a considerable illegal trade in game trophies, and, hence, widespread poaching. All the wealthy households in towns, which are involved in commerce and administration, demand services, maids to do housework and suppliers of consumer goods and entertainment. Small-scale traders serve those Isioloans who have a regular cash income.

The structure of opportunities is on the whole complex, but based on the fact that Isiolo is a trade and administrative centre and situated along the route to several game parks. Access to these opportunities is strongly correlated with ethnic ascription. This is caused by the various roles that have been played by the four major groups in the history of the township, the pastoral Borana, Somali and Turkana, and the agricultural Meru.[3] As a result of this correlation between ethnic ascription and access to subsistence resources in town, the ascription becomes an asset in itself for a newcomer to town who seeks help from strangers. Once he or she has established contacts with the members of their own group, other, structurally more narrow, principles for claims on solidarity will emerge. For the actors ethnicity then ceases to be of relevance, while to "outsiders" the interaction still involves a solidarity on ethnic grounds.[4] The effect is an emergence of subsistence niches with restricted, seemingly ethnic, recruitment.

Access to the limited subsistence resources is restricted to members of particular ethnic groups, in many instances even more narrowly restricted as just mentioned. The bonds which are utilized for recruitment often refer to traditional solidarity principles. Hence, the "home area" [5] is of direct relevance, especially for a newcomer. This is how social bonds to the umland are brought into the picture. The more efficient social control within a group remains in town, the more important are the traditional solidarity principles. These are differently expressed between the various ethnic groups. On the one hand there are members of the various pastoral groups who are used to meeting strangers and have institutionalized ways of handling that problem. These ways are culturally specific; the Borana with their clan solidarity, the Somali with their segmentary lineages and the Turkana with more individualized principles based on stock associates.[6] On the other hand there are Meru farmers in town to whom meeting strangers is not part and parcel of everyday life. For them neighborhood is a strong principle for solidarity (in effect implying the relevance of subclanship, since landownership structure still reflects the former tenure system).

Differences between various cultural groups can explain fundamental issues in the economic and social structure of the small town. For example: members of certain groups tend to be recruited to town while others may be practically absent; newcomers will become incorporated into town life to various degrees; varying redistribution principles may have an impact on who are likely or not likely to succeed as businessmen. In order to reach beyond a more contextual study to grasp some fundamental mechanisms behind a development process in the case of Isiolo town and District, I therefore think the whole range of choices for an individual household needs to be accounted for as well as the alternatives that may be available in a particular situation. And this involves both town and umland.

In the sections to follow I shall restrict the discussion of differences and similarities to the role of Isiolo town for members of two ethnic groups, the Borana and the Turkana. These are the two largest groups of sedentary pastoralists in town. The reader who wants a fuller account for the various groups is referred to Hjort (1979).

The Borana are an Oromo people with their traditional home in southern Ethiopia where an estimated 250,000 Borana live. Before the turn of the century, those living in northern Kenya were mainly members of camel keeping and hunting subgroups. Small groups also reached and used the grazing areas around Uaso Nyiro River, which was used sporadically earlier by Maasai, Samburu and some Somali pastoralists. The expansion of the Abyssinian Empire and the concomitant exploitation of the local population by Amharic and Tigrean soldiers forced some groups of cattle keeping Borana to seek refuge in British territory around 1910. Some of these penetrated into Wajir District, but were later transferred to Isiolo District after clashes with Somali groups over water and were gradually cut off from their northern relatives, who still live at Marsabit, Moyale and north of the boundary with Ethiopia. The Borana in Isiolo District are also divided into subgroups which--in theory--represent different land use practices. The pastoral Borana Gutu, or "proper" Borana, are by ideology predominantly cattle herders. The Sakuye used to specialize in camels but lost virtually all of their herds in the 1960s. Today very many are destitute or small-scale farmers due, in equal degrees, to the war and the subsequent droughts.

The Turkana, related to people of the Karamojong cluster in Uganda and numbering about 200,000, inhabit the area to the west of Lake Turkana and southwards in the lowlands along the Rift Valley into Kerio Valley. They subsist by nomadic pastoralism, tending camels, cattle and small stock. Where possible these activities are supplemented by agriculture; millet or maize is grown especially along the Turkwell and Kerio Rivers. In the first years of colonization, the Turkana were in a process of expansion to the south. One major cause for this was severe droughts in Kerio and Turkwell Valleys around the end of the 19th century. This combined with the fact that during the severe rinderpest epizooty that struck most stock in northern Kenya in the 1890s the Turkana stock survived to a greater extent than those of their neighbors. Therefore, a considerable expansion became possible.

Since the early decades of this century Turkana looking for employment have immigrated into Isiolo Town, coming on an individual basis, often after being pushed out of the pastoral economy by local droughts, epizooties or other disastrous events. Isiolo offered an alternative for impoverished pastoralists, and Turkana men and women kept coming as the town grew and the labor demands of administrators and traders increased. Many Turkana men were employed either locally in town as manual laborers or recruited further south as farm hands on white farms, especially during the Mau Mau war, when the white farmers did not want to employ Kikuyu or Meru workers. Through this development the Turkana today have a reputation of being reliable workers, a fact of importance for understanding contemporary migration patterns.

Sedentary Pastoralists

The sedentary Turkana and Borana are among the many town dwellers who have immigrated more or less in desperation and settled permanently in town. There are former herdsmen (Borana, Samburu, Geri, Somali and Turkana) from the neighboring pastoral areas who have suffered large-scale

losses in herds and flocks of domestic animals. Others are farmers' sons from Meru with no farm lands or who have given up their claims. There are the widowed and divorced women who have been left without support in their home areas. Another category of poor, permanent town dwellers is the impoverished town Somali, who lost their wealth during a recent war. Many of these rely to a large extent on support from wealthier local clansmen or on remittances from relatives in other parts of East Africa. They remain attached to Isiolo town as one of the major social and cultural centers for Somali in Kenya.

For the sedentary pastoralist, shortage in land is yet another problem to that of livestock ownership. The general tendency in Kenya towards a limitation of access to grazing lands is felt also in the Isiolo area. Pastures have been lost through the establishment of game reserves and the LMD holding grounds. The game areas have often been dry season refuges, and the loss is therefore felt seriously. The extension of irrigated farming along Uaso Nyiro River, however, has as yet had little effect on access to water for the pastoral stock. Due to heavy losses in stock, the reduction of pasture areas is not yet a serious problem in the district from a management point of view (the losses of domestic animals are, of course, a vital problem for the population).

The high pressure on land in the farming areas in Nyambeni Hills also decreases the pastoralists' access to grazing lands. Resettlement projects are now being established on the lower slopes of Nyambeni Hills to the east, where farming before has been considered to give too low return. Settlements cause a rapid population increase through immigration, and pressure on land is building up.

Isiolo town as an asset for migrants has different meanings for a Borana and a Turkana immigrant. The Turkana male migrant (I shall mention the considerable female migration later) selects Isiolo town as one among several alternatives in a series of centers where the Turkana have a good reputation as laborers. If there is no future for him locally he may continue further south to work on ranches and big farms. Although he typically comes during a drought or some other disaster, such events only accentuate an impossible situation, and he would probably have come later anyway.

The attitude of the Turkana immigrant is almost invariably that he has left home for good. Migrants are usually unmarried and young; 70% of the male immigrants to the Isiolo shambas were 15-30 years old when they came. They are often younger brothers, which reflects the Turkana emphasis on the individual that is present also in the cultural significance for each man to establish his own genealogical [ekal] lines. This can be done only while the father is alive. Furthermore, the marriages of brothers have to be in genealogical order, so that the oldest son marries first, and so on. Since marriage ages are high and life expectancy low, the hope of a young brother to manage to form his own ekal may be small. On the whole, those Turkana households which have settled in Isiolo have cut off contacts with the "sender" areas. Relatives whom they should support with remittances have migrated to Isiolo as well, and no domestic animals have been left behind.

In contrast to the Turkana permanent and individually based migration, most Borana Gutu inhabitants still have close relatives active in pastoralism "at home." They consider themselves members of pastoral households. Their migration is looked upon by themselves as temporary, intended to relieve the household "at home" of a mouth to feed while the family herd is rebuilt. When this goal is achieved they will return home. A good illustration of the limited importance ascribed to living in Isiolo town is the disinterest in farming shown by many Borana Gutu. Although the establishment and development of a shamba is hard work (cutting trees and bushes, breaking up and rolling away stones), returning Borana Gutu have sold their shamba rights at incredibly low prices (30-40 Ksh) once the opportunity to "return home" has presented itself.

The difference in migration pattern between the Borana and the Turkana corresponds with a difference in the importance ascribed to the respective clan systems. Clan membership is of limited (mostly ritual) significance for the Turkana, and a "man has no relations with his clansmen qua clansmen" (Gulliver 1955:212). For the Borana, on the other hand, clan membership is of great importance (cf. Dahl 1979), and it transcends important aspects of the lives of the Isiolo migrants. Of immediate significance for this discussion is the fact that rights to property in terms of domestic animals are associated with the clan in the case of the Borana; much of the redistribution of domestic animals is based on clan solidarity. The Turkana instead build up sets of individually based stock associate re-relations, among whom most redistribution occurs.

The particular forms for devolution of property and inheritance and new establishment that are found in the Borana and Turkana pastoral societies also influence the migration pattern. Among the Borana there is a heavy emphasis on common property and keeping the family herd together when the father herd-owner dies, which implies a gradual partition of the common inheritance of the fraternal group (Dahl 1979a). Brothers' choice, if their total household is not viable, is often to send away one of them as an effort in a total fraternal strategy. The Turkana also emphasize the importance of solidarity within the fraternal group. However, there are significant differences between the Borana and Turkana societies, not only the redistribution principles just mentioned, but also in levels of bridewealth. This is generally higher among the Turkana, although in both societies it is set according to economic ability. According to Gulliver (1955:235) the bridewealth could typically be 28-35 head of large stock in Turkana District. The level in Isiolo town is considerably higher, of a magnitude of twice as much. In comparison, a young Borana man finds it less difficult to marry from this point of view. Bridewealth is low, from about five heads of cattle up to 30 (Dahl 1979a). A married Borana man can very well accept being subordinated to his father, and this is seen as the normal case, even though the relation is often loaded with tension. Should tension become acute, the son can appeal to the clan elders for settlement and be given a nucleus breeding herd with which to part from his father. For the Turkana, the clan plays no such role. It seems that the higher level of bridewealth again reflects a greater emphasis on the individual household among the Turkana. In the absence of clan solidarity for redistribution of property, fewer channels are available and more cattle need to be distributed on the occasion of marriage.

Of equally great importance to differences in family structures or in forms for devolution of property and inheritance are differences in social control. Again, social control in the Borana community is exercised through the great importance that is ascribed to clan membership. When two Borana strangers meet, they always seek a common denominator through kinship affiliation. Among the Borana Gutu in Isiolo town social control is even further strengthened by the fact that migrants come from geographically rather small areas. Isiolo town is therefore effectively integrated into their local community. The pastoral Borana Gutu have a direct influence over many of the job opportunities in town through the local government. Household members are often sent to Isiolo with the explicit intention to earn supplementary money. In contrast to the Borana society, there is little social control of the kind in Isiolo town for its Turkana inhabitants. They have migrated from a geographically vast area, and solidarity principles are other than clan membership. This makes the immediate economic transaction aspect of marriage even more important in town; with limited future social control it becomes less likely than in the rural areas that a man can contact his in-laws and "borrow" stock when needed. Hence, marriage in Isiolo town has the character of a once-and-for-all transaction, which explains a difference in levels of bridewealth between town and rural areas.

The limited social control in itself makes Isiolo town attractive for those societal members who want to leave their traditional society. For many women, Isiolo town offers a rare opportunity to earn an independent living. This is seen in the significant proportion of women, around half, among the immigrants who settle in the shambas. They are, in approximately equal proportions, either unmarried women who resent proposed marriages, or middle-aged women whose husband and close male relations have died.

The change in emphasis on subsistence by animal husbandry to farming or cash incomes also creates new forms of household composition and leads to changes in the conditions for the establishment of households. One reason for the difference is the fact that when a pastoral household is established, the domestic herd must have been built up to a size and composition sufficient for survival, granted limited alternative income sources. The acquisition of a shamba, in contrast, is not a gradual process. Among the farmers in Isiolo town, one can see a change in the Turkana community, the one longest established in farming, so that the ages of the male heads of households for those born in Isiolo are clearly lower than among those born elsewhere. Inheritance rules remain important for gaining access also to a shamba. It may even be that the young age for establishing the Turkana household is only a temporary phenomenon. The opportunity was opened up through a brief yet great supply of farm land when the irrigation schemes were established and when soon thereafter many Borana returned to their rural areas, selling their shamba rights hastily.

Who are the Peasants?

It may be tempting for the observer to regard urban and rural as opposite poles, but for most Isioloans they make up one single system

of opportunities in their struggle for survival. The economy of the region may appear to be a dual split into one "modern" monetary sector and one oriented towards traditional production for consumption, but these two parts are intimately tied together. In order to maintain their viability (cf. Stenning 1958:92), many households must have a high degree of flexibility and combine incomes from as many different sources as possible. People have small margins to starvation, and the need to spread risks is greater than the interest in increasing productivity. The high degree of unemployment forces down wages in the town to a level that is only possible through the existence of a supportive subsistence economy (cf. Leys 1975:183). Some of this food production of the Isioloans takes place within the boundaries of the township itself, but some is also made in the umland in the cases of split households.

Such a dependency on both cash and subsistence income is a main feature of what has been termed a peasantization process. Even though I do not intend to enter the discussion of peasant modes of production, I want simply to indicate a position by quoting Leys' (1975:170-171) perspective:

> [peasant modes of production are] modes of production characterized by the possession of land (and/or livestock) by households; by the production, on the basis of the labour of the household, of agricultural commodities (i.e. marketed produce); but in which land (or in pastoral areas livestock) remains 'natural' capital--i.e. it is seen as an indispensable means of providing successive generations of households with the basic necessities of life, and not merely one thing among many in which capital may be invested for profit.

There is nothing new with the situation of households depending on both monetary income and income in kind. One could argue that the early British policy with its hut tax and other efforts, in fact, aimed at creating such a situation. The settlers' dependency on cheap labor reinforced the administrations' efforts to introduce a market economy, until the late 1930s when it became more obvious that the subsistence portion of the labor migrants' household economy became threatened. Facing the possibility that large sections of the entire rural population might be forced out of the rural areas to migrate to the urban slum, the white community gradually became in favor of limited development efforts. Due to World War II the planning was delayed until 1955 and the Swynnerton Plan. With an increased productivity in the home areas of their employees, the settlers would have continued access to cheap labor. The "problem", in such a perspective, is to strike a balance. The household should be split so that migration is limited largely to the workers, in order to prevent an excessive (and costly) movement of people. Remaining household members ("at home") should take care of food production for themselves as well as for absent members to a considerable degree. Both parts of the split household become dependent on each other, one for food and the other for cash: cash "at home" to cover indirect

taxes, clothing and other needs for manufactured products; food for the worker. Hence, the household remains an economic unit and the traditional division of labor can be efficiently exploited, through access to an immense "reserve labor force" and a dependence of entire rural households on wage incomes, salaries can be kept at a minimum and the labor of all household members can be exploited. The minimum salary level is given by the point where the household "cracks" as an economic unit, that is when its members give up and migrate to the urban slum areas.

The essential point, also for the Isioloans' peasant economy, is that of a dependency on a capitalist mode of production for necessary cash incomes from either marketed products or from wage labor. The forms are many and the dependency is well established. Hence, the question in this section's heading, who the peasants are, is simplest answered with "practically everybody" in the Isiolo case. Nevertheless, more needs to be said about the forms. Previous sections revealed both economic and cultural differences, especially the various principles for solidarity and social control.

Some causes for pastoralists to move to Isiolo town are external to their economic system; disasters that cause severe death rates in the domestic herds, whether induced by drought, epizootic diseases, floods, locusts or war. They are to some extent part and parcel of the pastoralist s daily life in that there is a continuous stream of people migrating from home to relatives either in other camps or in town,[7] as a result of the necessity to maintain household viability at home. On another level of causes for emigration from a pastoralist area, however, are found such structural changes as loss of land and weakened redistribution systems. The immediate effects may be less severe, but over time the impact is abiding; a differentiation occurs between societal members who are forced to seek new livelihoods and those who remain with livestock rearing.

With increasing constraints such as those mentioned earlier, the pastoral economy becomes more vulnerable, a fact which is underlined by the tendency of impacts of drought to increase in severity (cf Dahl and Hjort 1979). One result is increased sedentarization of pastoralists. The entire food production system in large rural areas threatens to break down. For northern Kenya this has resulted in development efforts. One of these is an ambition to introduce "back-feeding," a kind of ranching system where the present pastoralists' herds should be composed solely of cows and calves. Breeding should take place elsewhere. We have argued elsewhere (op.cit.) that this proposal in reality is based on an access to cheap labor, labor provided simply by the pastoralists' need for a minimum cash income, involved as they are in an expanding market economy. In effect, their situation today in some respects reminds one of that of the farmers in the 1930s, with the emphasis of planners on increased productivity, underlining the necessity of keeping people in their rural areas.

The Turkana migrants to Isiolo town who settle there permanently have established one typical kind of peasant economy. They have left a nomadic pastoral livelihood altogether and base their economic activities

in town. Their situation is one of scarcity, and, hence, household economic activities need to be diversified into various economic niches within the town. Normally the Turkana husband seeks cash incomes while the wife caters for the shamba. Inheritance of shambas among these Turkana, at least so far, tends to be matrilinear rather than patrilinear. In this there is a resemblance with a tendency for the Jie, a farming people closely related to the Turkana, noted by Gulliver (1955:61) that "a woman may give or lend both land and produce to other women, even outside the house and family--e.g. her married daughters, her sisters, her mother's brother's womenfolk, etc."

To gain access to the opportunities of the town it is beneficial to have been long in Isiolo to learn the tricks of the game. This shows in that the Turkana born in Isiolo can acquire a shamba at an early age and establish a new household. The same goes also for the cash niches; those who have been around longest have the best opportunities. As soon as a man has got access to one source of income, it is important to marry, so that a combination of different economic activities can be achieved; any one source of income may be insufficient or highly unreliable.

With a development process in the area as I have outlined and a growing peasantry both among farmers[8] and pastoralists, the role for the small town can be seen as one of a supplier of alternative sources of income for those who need such, but equally as a sign of increased inequality in the rural areas. The emergence of the small town of Isiolo, therefore, indicates not only an expanding capitalist economy but also to some extent an exploitation of a rural area through unequal trade relations or the use of cheap labor. Another aspect of the small town, however, not least important, is its effect to "keep people in the rural areas." The sedentary pastoralist who might be waiting his entire lifetime for his herd to be rebuilt, subsisting on irrigated farming and maybe investing some small surplus in flocks of sheep and goats, remains in the region rather than migrating to the cities. In such respects the small town fulfills a function of slowing down the urban migration process, or differently expressed, it helps to disperse the poverty problems of the urban slum into the rural areas.

FOOTNOTES

[1]This article is based on one year of social anthropological work in the Isiolo area in northern Kenya 1973-74, financed by the Swedish International Development Authority (SIDA) and by the Scandinavian African Institute. Present tense in the article refers to these years. I wish to express my gratitude to these donors and to the Swedish Authority for Research Cooperation with Developing Countries (SAREC) who presently finance a research project "Pastoralism, Society and Ecology" within which this article has been written.

[2]The term "umland" is, I feel, more pregnant than, for example, "surroundings" which does not imply economic or social contacts but rather "within a convenient distance." "Catchment area" might be an alternative, but it seems to imply an urban to rural, rather than two-way communication. "Hinterland" suggests that the town is situated on its (the hinterland's) boundary. "Umland" is an established term within geography and there seems to be no English synonym (cf. Klimm et al. 1957:212).

[3]Members of a fifth group, the Samburu, live on the fringes of Isiolo town. Their relevance for the town and its history is, however, limited.

[4]The situation is similar to Harries-Jones' (1975:72) point about the Kalela dance, by Mitchell analyzed as "tribal" based, but in effect involving other tighter principles of home mates. The fact that ethnicity and economy are interrelated is, of course, a statement valid not only for the case of Isiolo town (cf. Parkin 1975:10). Such relationships are complex, but I feel that one fundamental reason for ethnicity to be perpetuated in the case of Isiolo town is the early ethnically based contacts that newcomers to town seek. Through these they become introduced to a discreet set of economic alternatives and, indeed, cut off from others. This issue is discussed in detail in Hjort (1979:175ff).

[5]Since the town is new, the bulk of its inhabitants are either migrants or the children of migrants. It is therefore appropriate to talk of a "home area" for many town inhabitants. These areas are associated with different ethnic groups. Members of the various groups have bonds of different qualities to their respective home areas, areas where one ethnic group dominates.

[6]I discuss these differences in some detail in Hjort I1979). The various solidarity principles in pastoral groups are compared in Dahl and Hjort (1979).

[7]This and other consequences of, and possible precautions against, a disaster are discussed in further detail in Dahl and Hjort (1976) and (1979).

[8]The Meru farmers or former farmers from Nyambeni Hills are caught in a peasantization process as well as the pastoralists. The emigration from these hills during the early 1940s and preceeding years, that was felt in Isiolo town in the settlement of the "early" Meru, was not only linked with new employment opportunities in Isiolo town, but also with the local situation in Nyambeni Hills. Pressure on land seems to have increased during this period, although detailed historical information is lacking. The recent migration after independence is directly related to the new systems of land tenure. Three aspects of the adjudication process are of importance for an understanding of the peasantization process under discussion; it now proves necessary for a young man to marry early in order to be allowed to meetings over land issues, the number of landless people is increasing, and with the land registration on the husband the woman's position has changed; see Hjort (1979: 161-171).

ALONG THE LINE OF ROAD
EXPANDING RURAL CENTRES IN KENYA'S COAST PROVINCE

David J. Parkin

Introduction

In a large area stretching north and west from Mombasa and inland from Kenya's coast, into Kilifi District, a number of small trading centres have come to express recent changes in the relationship of Muslims to non-Muslims. The area is generally divisible into three ecological zones, identified as fishing, farming, and cattle-herding. Until Kenya's independence in 1963 the coastal strip up to about ten miles inland fell under the suzerainty of the Sultan of Zanzibar and so was dominated by Muslims. In this coastal zone fishing was, and to a large extent still is, carried out by Muslims, and farmland was held in freehold tenure by Muslims, many of whom employed non-Muslims from the hinterland to work for them, often in exchange for the use of some fertile coastal land. Behind the ten-mile coastal strip, non-Muslims farmed and herded cattle on land held in customary tenure. The coastal zone was thus a Muslim stronghold, yet with many non-Muslims later identified as 'squatters', while the hinterland was a non-Muslim area. Since 1963 many non-Muslim 'squatters' have been given legal rights to the land they occupy in the coastal zone, in the form of settlement scheme plots. Non-Muslims have also, since the coastal strip ceased to fall under Muslim political control, moved into trade or house-letting in the small urban centres which have expanded or sprung up in the zone.

In short, the distinction between the coastal strip and the hinterland used to demarcate Muslim and non-Muslim spheres of political and economic control and influence. Now, however, Muslim and non-Muslim interests are expressed in the struggle for opportunities in the growing trading centres. The growth of these centres owes much to the paving of two new roads. The coastal zone generally has attracted investment in trade, building, and farming from up-country peoples of Kenya. They, too, figure prominently in some centres. In their internal systems of relations, and externally in relation to each other, the centres have therefore come to provide the stage for two, sometimes conflicting, sets of changing coastal relationships: between Muslims and non-Muslims on the one hand; and between all coastal people (including both Muslims and non-Muslims) and up-country newcomers on the other.

While geographers have described the growth of small centers in terms of their demographic and economic interrelation, such that the

development of one cannot be studied in isolation from the effects of others, I show in this paper their political and cultural interconnections. In Kilifi District the rural division between eastern coastal strip and western hinterland has ceded much of its importance in directing social relationships, including trade and intermarrying between Muslims and non-Muslims, to the centres growing in a generally north-south direction along the line of paved road. In providing in addition the contexts for up-country economic involvement in the coast, the centres have taken on even greater significance. The most visible evidence of capitalist penetration in rural areas may be found in these centres of growth, the incipient townships, among whose resident and immigrant populations the intertwined trading, farming and land-holding interests are unequally distributed. Even the less visible, large-scale purchase and development of land in the area by persons, including non-coastal ones, with little or no previous connection with the centres, normally depends on discreet brokers and overseers operating for them.

The People

The coastal population of Kenya is culturally, ethnically, and religiously complex. Much of the complexity has ancient roots and is not the kind reported for the recent migrant populations of large towns of modern creation. Kenya's coastland has for centuries experienced waves of immigration from within and outside Africa associated with settlement and trade, resulting in intermarriage, and cultural and linguistic borrowing (see Salim 1973).

The religious distinction among coastal people predicates different occupational specializations: Muslims deal in fish and own butcheries; non-Muslims do not, but do deal in the sale of liquor. The distinction is not nearly as sharp as that often described with regard to ethnic groups, for there is conversion to Islam and even departure. Though common ethnic membership may cross-cut the religious distinction, there are certain constant ethnic labels. Thus all persons 'emically' identified as 'Arab', 'Gunya' or 'Digo' are Muslim; 'Giriama' and 'up-country people' are then said to be non-Muslim. In fact there is a substantial minority of 'Giriama' (a term loosely applied by outsiders to a number of peoples sharing a common language and customs, but with dialectal differences, and nowadays together called by the term dating from the 1940s, the Mijikenda) who are Muslim, while a few 'up-country people' (watu wa bara) are also Muslim. Among the non-Muslims, there are those Christians who follow either the Catholic, CMS, or Pentecostal churches and those, certainly most of the Mijikenda (i.e. 'Giriama') who continue to follow their traditional religion which they identify as primarily concerned with ancestral spirits (koma, pl. makoma) but which also extends into a rich world of other spiritual phenomena. Few in number but of critical importance throughout the coast are the Asians (mostly Muslim) and Europeans (mostly Christian). The latter used to own extensive tracts of land but few now do; the Asians still do and continue to farm them.

The new development of up-country interests in the coastal area, and the spatial re-expression of Muslim and non-Muslim interests, can be seen in a description of the different histories of the following small centres: Kaloleni in the non-Muslim hinterland; and Shimo-la-Tewa, Majengo, Vipingo, and Kikambala in the (sometime) Muslim coastal strip.

Some indication of size and growth may be found in the relative numbers of buildings in these different small centres (see Table 1). The distinction between a building used for business and one for private use is difficult to draw. The sometimes many private mud-and-wattle dwelling houses 'dotted around' the shops may in fact harbour a tailor or carpenter working, often irregularly, from a room or verandah. Or one of its residents may sell small quantities of agricultural produce from the house. More importantly, most dwelling houses in these small urban centres include lodgers who rent separate rooms from the owner-occupant. A growing number of houses are built solely for letting by landlords who live elsewhere.

TABLE 1
Relative Size and Growth of Five Rural Centres in Kenya's Coast Province

		Kaloleni	Shimo-la-Tewa	Majengo	Vipingo	Kikambala
Number of buildings used primarily for business (including 'kiosks')	1969[1]	c.40 (including 8 market stalls)	c.5	c.15	c.33 (including 13 new houses)	c.5
	1978	94	35	21	26	13
Total number of buildings (both 'businesses' and houses)	1978	c.109[2]	140	103	141	42

That said, it may be instructive to compare the relative change over time in the numbers of buildings used primarily for business other than room-letting. I here include 'kiosks' (small huts not used for sleeping in) as well as larger habitable units (see Table 1).

The larger figure for Kaloleni in 1978 is partly accounted for by the large number of daily market stalls there which are lacking in the other centres. Nevertheless, the number of businesses in 'permanent' or 'semi-permanent' buildings has also increased considerably, with Kaloleni and Shimo-la-Tewa showing the most dramatic increase.

If we subtract the figures for businesses from those for buildings as a whole, then we get some idea of the extent to which a centre has also become important in attracting private houses for owner-occupation

and for letting. All except Kaloleni show a high proportion of such houses.

Kaloleni is different in that it is set in an area where land was until recently held in customary tenure as tribal trust land. The land around Kaloleni has recently been adjudicated as freehold plots varying in size from a few hectares to, in exceptional cases, twenty or so. The plotholders are the Giriama who have traditional rights to the land. Asians used to dominate commerce in Kaloleni up to the middle or even late 1960s (Parkin 1972:9). But since 1969 when they were not re-issued with rural trading licences, their place in trade has been taken by non-Muslim Giriama from the surrounding area and by Muslim Mijikenda and coastal Swahili (principally Gunya and Jomvu). Some of the market stall traders among the latter come into Kaloleni daily by bus from other centres in the coastal strip, a trip made much easier by the paving of the road in 1975. Since some Muslims travel in and most local Giriama traders can simply walk into Kaloleni from their nearby homes, the centre has no need to provide much rented accommodation. Kaloleni is thus very much a Giriama stronghold but has a significant number of Muslims: nearly a quarter of the 94 shops and stalls are run by Muslims of whom nearly a third are women.

The other four trading centres are set in an area with a quite different historical background of land ownership. This difference largely explains why so many resident and immigrant workers in these four centres need to rent housing.

In and around the four centres land was held in freehold under the suzerainty of the Sultan of Zanzibar by Muslims, principally Arabs and Swahili (including Gynya) but also some Digo, originally from south of Mombasa. In the case of Vipingo, the private sisal estate whose workers it caters for, has over the years obtained freehold rights to this land, while in Kikambala tourist and up-country commercial farming interests have done so. The result is that non-Muslim Mijikenda and up-country workers in the sisal estate near Vipingo, the two nearby tourist hotels and some large-scale farms near Kikambala are heavily represented among the resident population living in the mud-and-wattle houses round the businesses. But Muslims, mainly Arabs, nevertheless dominate commerce in Vipingo, except for two big bars owned by Kikuyu from up-country, while Mijikenda non-Muslims dominate the smaller centre of Kikambala. With the surrounding system of land-ownership now greatly changed and with a significant non-Muslim, wage-earning resident population, Vipingo, and Kikambala, and especially Kikambala, have moved further away than Shimo-la-Tewa and Majengo from the ancient social pattern of relationships until recently characteristic of the coastal strip for many generations.

The different histories of land use and tenure between Kaloleni in the hinterland and the four coastal centres also explain their divergent responses to dominant forces of religious competition. While Kaloleni remains predominantly Christian but with increased evidence of Muslim involvement, in and around the other four centres Christianity

challenges Muslim supremacy, in two cases successfully.

In the four coastal centres a number of Christian churches have been built or extensively renovated very recently. Thus, in 1976, the Pentecostal church near Kikambala, built in 1959, underwent expensive repairs and decoration. The longer established Catholic church there undergoes constant maintenance. Earlier in 1974, a new Pentecostal church was built near Shimo-la-Tewa, about three-quarters of the distance from Majengo. In 1977 a Catholic church was built just outside Vipingo. All four centres have centrally placed mosques, and the significance of the churches is really the fact that they stand outside the centres, in a state of ready challenge, so to speak, to the mosques. In Shimo-la-Tewa and Majengo, this challenge is easily met and their two magnificent recently built mosques continue to dominate. The Pentecostal church near Shimo-la-Tewa recruits almost entirely from the Mijikenda[3] living on the Mtwapa Settlement Scheme and not from the centres. But the churches near and just outside Kikambala and Vipingo recruit from within the resident population of these two centres as well as from the area outside them.

Kaloleni has moved somewhat in the other direction, namely away from the earlier absolute dominance exerted on it by the CMS mission which was the basis of its foundation in 1904, with a nearby site later chosen for the colonial administration. As a major hinterland commercial centre, it is no longer dependent on the patronage of the Christian mission, hospital and schools, and government administrative officials. A quarter of its traders are now Muslim, and an elegant mosque was built on a prime site in 1978, to replace or at least supplement the older, ramshackle, less centrally placed one.

Shimo-la-Tewa

Growth and Cultural Continuity

Let me now focus on Shimo-la-Tewa which, like Majengo, has most easily withstood the challenge from Christianity. These two centres illustrate most clearly the familiar paradox of the coastal strip: it has always had a numerically dominant non-Muslim population but has until recently been politically dominated by Muslims, whether Arab or African.

The west side of Majengo is on gazetted government land and it is on this that the new mosque (replacing an earlier one) and new Koranic school (opened only in 1978) are built. The other half of Majengo, on the east side of the Mombasa-Malindi road, comprises land owned by the same elite Muslim family which owns the land on which the whole of modern Shimo-la-Tewa is built, and on which this same family has built a mosque (also opened in 1978). Both centres have shifted from their previous focus as a result of a realignment of the road, slightly in the case of Majengo, and a few hundred metres in the case of Shimo-la-Tewa. The shift has brought them into the territorial domain of this elite Muslim family (partially in the case of Majengo), and so, in a modified manner, has perpetuated many aspects of the traditional relationship between Muslim landowner and Muslim and non-Muslim tenants.

As a contrasting development to those at Kikambala and Vipingo, where Muslim interests and influence are already on the wane, we can consider the case of Shimo-la-Tewa in some detail, for its history summarizes most fully the major forces working for change and continuity in the coastal area as a whole: there are overriding factors of ecological and political change through which Muslim culture and interests perdure.

It is in fact only about 1970 that Shimo-la-Tewa started to grow to its present size of 140 buildings. Most of these, as mentioned earlier, are houses built for onwer-occupation and letting, with the owners living in one or two rooms, while the rest are shops, bars, fish stalls, and hoteli (selling tea or food). There are also two maize mills, the second opened in 1977.

Before the road was realigned in about 1963 (with a connecting toll bridge over the Mtwapa Creek built in about 1962) the area was bush. The old dirt road and ferry continued to be used by buses and other local vehicles until the vehicle ferry ceased operating and the new road was paved in 1969. In a report based on research in 1969, Shimo-la-Tewa gets a brief mention as having a 'very limited commercial sector' (Ferns 1970), which residents today confirm. They also give the new road as the reason for its subsequent growth, recognizing that, in 1978, it was the largest and most rapidly expanding centre along the 40 kilometre stretch from the Mtwapa bridge, which it almost adjoins, to Kilifi, a fully-fledged township.

Residents themselves make a distinction between this urban centre which they call Shimo-la-Tewa sokoni (literally Shimo-la-Tewa market) and its predecessor, from which some of them have moved their businesses, called Shimo-la-Tewa mjini (Shimo-la-Tewa village). This latter is generations old, containing residents bound to each other by kinship and marriage, and is clustered together with the location chief's office, his 'court', and the dispensary along the old Mombasa-Malindi road, a few hundred yards from the Mtwana Creek where the ferry used to land and where, even today, the Ministry of Works employs a man to row people for free across the creek. The first part of the old Mombasa-Malindi sand road is also said by residents to have been the route of the slave traders.

The wealthy Muslim family which owns the land on which modern Shimo-la-Tewa market is built has entered modern politics with a highly educated son standing for his natal constituency in the 1974 Parliamentary elections. The family is descended from a great chief of Mtwapa who ruled in the time of the Sultan Seyyid Hamud in the late part of the 19th century. The family is referred to by the local people as 'Arab', but in fact also has Swahili El-Mutwaify as well as Mijikenda origins. It has skilfully developed its large inherited tracts of land by making informal leasehold agreements with Asian Muslims, who farm the land with annual crops. Developed in this way, the land, large though it is, cannot then be appropriated by government under the 'mismanagement clause' of the Land Act.

To repeat, then, all the 140 buildings on both sides of the newly paved Mombasa-Malindi road, stand on land owned by a Swahili-Arab family which has great history behind it and which, through intermarriage, is well connected even nowadays with both Saudi Arabia and people of the local area. This 'feudal-like' character of land ownership stands in stark contrast to the way in which relationships among the resident population of the new Shimo-la-Tewa are developing, and it is this contrast to which I now turn.

Continuity and Changes in Property Ownership

The monthly rent charged by the land-owning Swahili family for a building plot in Shimo-la-Tewa is 5/- or 10/- depending on whether a house or business is built on it, and 550/- deposit, with building plans having to be submitted for approval to the Kilifi County Council. Until the building is erected on the plot this rent is waived for the first six months and those who fall in arrears are given time to repay, each case being considered with the chief if necessary. To give an extreme case, one teacher who was in the middle of building a house, was sacked, remaining unemployed for two years and will only start repayment of rent arrears when he is re-employed. The rents are paid to an office and received by a full-time rent collector who also gives advice on building plans, liaises with the district administration and, as in cases of the above kind, with the chief whose own office is nearby. The Swahili land-owning family also owns one half of Majengo market and lets out plots there, payment for them being made to the same office in Shimo-la-Tewa.

Most of the house owners actually live in Shimo-la-Tewa with their families but also let out at least some rooms. A typical house is of mud-and-wattle construction and has six rooms. Each room can be rented for between 25/- and 60/- depending on its condition and on whether the mud walls have a cement and/or plaster covering and stone in-filling. A successfully plastered house, with cement floors, takes on the appearance of a permanent structure and can, indeed, last indefinitely if well maintained and protected from termites. The cheapest mud-and-wattle house costs about 3,000/- and the more elaborate house between 10-15,000/-. A truly permanent structure of stone blocks or bricks, treated timbers, specially made windows and a roof of tin rather than makuti (palm thatch) can cost 50,000/- and more.

Most of the 115 houses are of the cheaper mud-and-wattle kind. In most of these, owners and their families live, together with lodgers in different rooms. However, an increasing number of mud-and-wattle houses are being built entirely for letting. They bring upwards of 200/- a month for the owner for a capital outlay of at least 3,000/- for a house built up to mid 1976. Against this, however, is the fact that maintenance costs have recently risen rapidly as the demand for mangrove poles and other building wood and, especially, for palm thatch greatly outstrips supply: during the year 1977-8 the cost of the palm thatch 'tile' rose from 30/- to 50/- a hundred. These have to be renewed about every three years which, with a six roomed house using

about 3,000 of them, represents at present an expenditure of 1,000/- per annum, a rapid rise in maintenance costs that is already beginning to push rents up. There are as yet only a few cases of multiple house ownership and these tend to be shop-owners who have begun to diversify into house-letting. But such cases are increasing. Though costs of building materials have risen so much recently, demand for accommodation is still considerable and houseletting remains a reliable if not spectacularly profitable business. Even more recently a few premises have been let out whole as shops.

Though many lodgers are non-Muslim who have come from the often drought-stricken Giriama hinterland, most of those who own buildings come from nearby and so in effect carry on a previous relationship with the land-owning family, in some cases having converted rural tenancy-at-will into tenancy of the market plot on which they have now built a house, simply adding the latter to the continuing tenancy of their small-holding where they herd goats and grow a few crops for subsistence. This is why I speak of one aspect of the land ownership of Shimo-la Tewa as being feudal-like. In some cases the elite family also influences and even dictates marriage choices and arrangements among fellow-Muslims. It follows that most of the buildings are owned by Muslims, 69 out of 115. Thirty-two are owned by non-Muslim people from nearby. Most of these are former 'squatters' on the land then owned by Arab Swahili. That land has since been converted into settlement schemes which these non-Muslims now own: this venture into house-building in Shimo-la-Tewa is in addition to their cash-crop farming, though some have moved there as a result of extended family pressure on limited land.

Thus locally born 'coastal people' (watu wa pwani) own most of the buildings, and most of them are Muslim. The relationship between Muslim and non-Muslim has adapted in various ways to modern changing conditions, but nevertheless continues to have significance.

Let us first look at the Muslims. Though internally distinguished into a number of ethnic groups, there is a very tight and efficient system of communication linking them all. The Muslim-owned buildings belong to 55 families. At the top in terms of socio-economic status stands the elite land-owning family which is just completing the building of the market's magnificent mosque. Closely linked to them are the four Arab families who own the maize mills, the two most profitable shops and the two butcheries and who also let a few buildings, all of permanent construction. This local elite sponsors African Muslims wishing to enter trade, lends money at no interest, pays the salaries of the African Koranic school teachers and occasionally finances the visit of an Arab teacher from Arabia. Their kinship and business links spread throughout East Africa and they can afford to support the religious efforts of African Muslims who are at present themselves deeply concerned with the sanctity and spread of Islam.

These latter include the second socio-economic tier who number some five Muslim Mijikenda families, including two Digo, and own three shops, a hoteli and a dairy, and a few houses to let.

The third Muslim tier includes those Digo and Gunya and a few others who constitute most of the onwer-occupiers of houses in Shimo-la-Tewa market. Some of them, including the largest proportion of independent women, work from their houses or from a kiosk, as cycle repairers, tailors, selling dried and fresh fish, vegetables and coconuts, and, in the case of women, cooking Swahili foodstuffs for sale. But, to repeat, most of the houses are lived in by their owners who also let out some rooms. The third tier trace close ties of kinship with the second and many work for them or for wage employment in the nearby cement factory, in hotels or in Mombasa.

Turning now to the non-Muslims, 46 buildings are owned by 38 of them. The non-Muslims comprise two main categories: Mijikenda and 'up-country people' (watu wa bara), almost all of the latter being Kikuyu. The Mijikenda non-Muslims include three businessmen, one of them with interests, like the Arabs, extending way beyond Shimo-la-Tewa, who between them own three liquor bars, a shop, and some houses for letting. Otherwise the Mijikenda non-Muslims are like some of their Muslim counterparts and either work as teachers or run vegetable kiosks or, more usually, have wage jobs nearby or in Mombasa. A third of these non-Muslim Mijukenda are at least nominal Christians, the rest following their traditional religion.

Shops dealing in consumer articles and everyday foodstuffs are owned by both Muslims and non-Muslims, but trade in fish and meat is exclusively Muslim-owned, even though non-Muslims may be employed to sell it, and liquor bars are all owned by non-Muslims. Cases of conversion to Islam sometimes occur as a preliminary to entry into the fish and meat trade. In fact even the Mijikenda Muslim shop-owners once worked as assistants in Arab-owned shops, became Muslims and were then loaned capital by their Arab employers to set up on their own. Marriage between Muslims and non-Muslims does not occur. A non-Muslim man or woman is required to undergo conversion before marrying into a Muslim family on the few occasions when this is contemplated. These are all aspects of a basically traditional relationship of asymmetry in which Muslim status could be achieved by Mijikenda non-Muslims. Similarly, Mijikenda continue to regard Muslim ritual power as greater than most Mijikenda forms, just as among African Muslims themselves, Arab hegemony is associated with the greatest likelihood of religious piety through the Sharifs, the descendants of the Prophet. But there is one crucial respect in which the relationship between Muslim and non-Muslim Mijikenda has altered, and this is that the creation of settlement schemes has significantly reduced the number of so-called 'squatters' on Arab-Swahili land. On the other hand, the demarcation of settlement scheme plots has made some 'squatters' who could not press claims for entitlement, effectively landless, and some of them also live in Shimo-la-Tewa but as lodgers rather than house-owners.

In short, there is an ambivalence in the relationship among coastal people between Muslims and non-Muslims. Ritually and as regards intermarriage, the relationship carries on many traditional aspects. Economically, however, a small number of Mijikenda traders and entrepreneurs have emerged who have made their way independently of Arab-Swahili

patrons and so did not convert to Islam. They incline in support of Christianity. One of them, even though he is not himself a regular church-goer, has sponsored the building of a Catholic Church in his native area of Chonyi. The independent government's pledge to help 'African' businessmen with loans is effectively interpreted, certainly by the people themselves, as support for African non-Muslims including Mijikenda, with the special exception of fishing which is known to be a predominantly Muslim occupation. African Muslims continue to obtain help, if they need it, from Arabs and other well-off Muslims.

Thus, while Arab-Swahili patronage in the form of loans, subsidies, and sponsorship extends throughout the Muslim community, government patronage of a similar though more formal kind generally extends more into the non-Muslim community. It is not suggested that this is prejudice by government officers but more the preferences of members themselves of the two communities who see the two sources of patronage as each best befitting them. The former is, of course, embedded in a local network of ties going back over generations, as I have described. The latter, like the realignment and paving of the Mombasa-Malindi road which produced modern Shimo-la-Tewa is part of a national network of decision-making and fiscal control by which administrations such as that of Kilifi are authorized to allocate development loans. Neither is exclusively local or exclusively national: the Arab shopkeepers have their own informal network of national and international contacts but also depend on the generations-old local acceptance of Islam; the 'new' non-Muslim Mijikenda traders have no longer any need of Islam, nor to convert to it, having found a new patron and provider of loans for capital in government and its officers. They may convert to Christianity or simply encourage its advance but only insofar as they wish to win the support of those increasing numbers of Mijikenda who, after generations of having resisted it, are now turning to it.

Social Re-classification and the Alliance of Capital

Here, we may consider the second category of non-Muslim property owners in Shimo-la-Tewa: the up-country people (watu wa bara), most of whom are Kikuyu. These up-country owners are few, numbering only eight families or persons, but their significance is considerable. First, they own nine of the 21 shops or businesses of permanent structure, including beer bars and a bottle beer distribution depot for the whole district, and let out even more houses, also of permanent construction. Second, the goods in which they deal, e.g. bottle beer, dresses and other clothes, depend heavily on major urban and up-country contacts, even more so than is the case with the profitable Arab shopkeepers who, as well as selling a wide range of consumer articles, also sell locally made products, like brushes, baskets, rope, coconut shredders, and Swahili foodstuffs, which are brought and sold to them for credit or cash by Muslim and non-Muslim Mijikenda. Third, they, sometimes through wealthy relatives, have moved into the purchase of coastal farming land, not of small plots but of areas large enough at least for market gardening of vegetables. The relatives of some have also bought beach-land plots for building tourist cottages. Fourth, an increasing

number of those who rent rooms in Shimo-la-Tewa are themselves up-country people who have found wage employment nearby or in Mombasa and whose drinking and subsistence needs are at least partially catered for by the up-country shop- and bar-owners. Thus, where bars owned by coastal people sell only bottled beer and palm wine, the up-country bars also sell such up-country brews as matingas, busaa, and muratina. In an area in which Swahili and Giriama (and dialects of it) are the two main languages spoken, it is interesting to see, for example, Kikuyu and Luo migrant wage-workers with their distinctive and in some cases much more limited up-country Swahili, seeming to bury up-country rivalries and differences and tending to associate with each other rather than with coastal people, giving the up-country shop- and bar-owners a ready clientele. Given that one of the non-Muslim Mijikenda specializations has been to build liquor bars, there is not surprisingly clear competition between them and the up-country bar-owners for the custom of expanding numbers of up-country as well as coastal wage-earners. Similarly, with respect to certain of the goods they sell, the Arabs, especially, and to some extent all coastal shop-keepers, are at present in competition with the up-country owners.

We see, then, how common interests and competition in fact cross-cut each other. Out of this come the two major folk distinctions used by people to reduce this complexity to more manageable proportions, an abstraction which inevitably takes the form of sometimes prejudiced and unfavourable stereotypes and discriminations. The first folk distinction, the historical basis of which I have already given, is Muslim versus non-Muslim. This is known in the Swahili language as: 1) Waswahili, Waislamu, or Wajomba versus 2) Wagiriama (or, privately, for it is nowadays a word of intense abuse likely to result in a violent riposte, Wanyika) and is sometimes in conversations among Muslims at least associated with the even more discreditable distinction between 1) Waungwana, 'civilized people', (originally free-born) and 2) Washenzi ('barbarians') or even Watumwa ('slaves'). These latter words must be used with caution, while the first four may be used openly in public meetings.

The second folk-distinction is one that has taken on great significance in recent years, especially since Kenya's independence in 1963, and is that which I have already identified as between watu wa pwani, coastal people, including Muslim and non-Muslim, and watu wa bara, up-country people, mainly including Kikuyu, Luo, Kamba and Luyia.

Of course, people may also make use of the narrower ethnic distinctions. But in a socially complex, small urban centre like Shimo-la-Tewa, such ethnic origins are not always known precisely and the broader distinction is both more comprehensive and, what is more important, nicely summarizes the dilemma facing coastal people. On the

one hand, under the auspices of central and district government intervention, Muslims and non-Muslims are still working out the complex inherited problem of land ownership, and remain very much divided on certain issues: religion, marriage, and choice of patronage. On the other hand, all express concern at the easily visible evidence of up-country acquisition of land, whether small plots on settlement schemes, extensive farming tracts, or prime beach sites, and at the number of significant businesses set up in trading areas and Shimo-la-Tewa.

People are not blind to these problems and frequently discuss the possible virtues of coastal unity against up-country dominance, seeing the matter refreshingly in regional rather than ethnic terms. But, for individual families, the religious distinction and the associated archaic distinctions between those of high- and low-born origins obtrudes and dictates most marriages and informal networks of patronage, so perpetuating at a wider level the distinction between Muslims and non-Muslims.

We encounter what might well be the next extension of this unresolved dilemma, namely an alliance between the relatively wealthy Arab shop-owners and businessmen and up-country entrepreneurs. The following case may be representative of a growing trend. The main Arab benefactor of Islam in the area, the man who personally and through his family connections has done more for the religion than anyone else in the area, in 1978 concluded a deal with an up-country government senior civil servant to buy a choice beach plot from a Digo Muslim family and built a cottage on it. The up-country man also owns a farm nearby and runs a business in Mombasa. The Arab has a shop and business interest in two of the centres I have been describing. The deal between these two men and their families is of course perfectly consistent with the assumptions of capitalist achievement. The nature of the alliance, however, does suggest a possible new twist in relations between wealthy and poor Muslims, for the Arab trader is in effect acting as a broker between up-country property-seekers and local sellers of land. He can safeguard his own interests in this way but the cost is the loss of land held by other fellow-Muslims. Some argue that there is little else that, as an Arab (though a Kenya citizen), he could do. Beyond and apart from the intentions of individuals is the fact that the extension of the capitalist environment has brought with it wealthy property-seekers and traders from one region of Kenya to another. They have contributed substantially to the increase in commercial activities in the coastal region in other ways that I have not been able to document. But they are also playing a part, though not the only part, in transforming a feudal-like division into one based more on that between large farm owners and businessmen on the one hand and small plot holders, semi-urbanized, unemployed or underemployed, and wage earners on the other. The fact that this drama occurs in small urban centres like Shimo-la-Tewa and not just in a big city like Mombasa is because it is indeed every bit as much rural as urban. The road that shifted the focus away from the old Shimo-la-Tewa village and created a new one also brought from up-country the new people of commerce and property. Through such ecological change there is considerable continuity of past coastal relationships which may themselves be on the verge of change.

FOOTNOTES

[1]Some comparative data are available in a survey of small urban centres conducted in 1969 (Taylor 1970) and figures were given in that survey for Kaloleni and Vipingo. For the other three where figures were not given I have retraced the approximate number by asking current residents. The apparent decline for Vipingo is odd and may be due to the virtual barring of selling of foodstuffs during the 1978 cholera epidemic. That said, though the residential dwellings have increased at Vipingo, the centre has very few business buildings of recent construction and is nowhere near as well stocked as Kaloleni, Majengo and Shimo-la-Tewa.

[2]I am grateful to Martha Wenger for this information.

[3]Comprising some 200 Chonyi, including 150 women of all ages but mainly middle-aged, and 50 men, mostly middle-aged to elderly.

CENTERS ON THE PERIPHERY: RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN NDOLA RURAL CENTER[1]

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Discussions of the Zambian development situation are generally couched in the dialectic of economic dualism, contrasting the more productive line-of-rail areas with the greater rural hinterland. This paper follows suit in that it describes the small, emergent centers in the center of Ndola rural district, the rural portion of Copperbelt Province south of Luanshya and 30-40 km west of the railway and the Ndola-Kabwe highway.

Like Northern, Luapula and Western Provinces, the rural Copperbelt is a "less favored agricultural area." Its households are characterized by lower labor resources, limited access to draft power and lower annual crop incomes than households in Central, Southern or Eastern Provinces.[2] This is also an area of small, undeveloped rural centers, of which all are intrusive to the area, all are strung along the one improved gravel road from Luanshya, and all--as the lowest links in dendritic, town-centered service function chains--offer similar, lower-order services. Ideally one of these centers might grow to operate as a regional rural development center, but such is not the case. For given the centers' dependency upon town-based services and the dramatic decline in government development capital, it is unlikely that any one of these dispersed centers will grow to regional preeminence, or might in any way counter the overwhelming socioeconomic influence of the Copperbelt towns. The current rural development initiative here falls to relatively independent and self-endowed institutions and producers.

Copperbelt Dualism

Encompassing the extremes of rural and urban life, Copperbelt Province is a peculiarly Zambian phenomenon. Using mid-1977 population estimates, 85,000 people live on the 9,100 square miles of Ndola rural. This is 7% of the Provincial population on 73% of its land; the remainder consists of seven of Zambia's ten largest towns: Kitwe, Ndola, Chingola, Mufulira, Luanshya, Chililabombwe and Kalulushi. Unlike most rural districts, the population of Ndola rural is increasing, at the rate of 4.1% annually between the 1963 and 1969 censuses.[3] In this same period there was a 27.1% population increase in the district, of which Jackman attributes 9.4% to in-migration, most of it from the Copperbelt towns.[4]

District population density is also climbing--from 6.2 persons per square mile in 1963, to 7.9 in 1969, to 9.2 in 1977--though the population is unevenly distributed within the district. About 60% of these people are living in the areas of Chiefs Nkana, Chiwala, Mushili and Nkambo, in areas directly bordering the towns, the highway and line-of-rail. Perhaps two-thirds of the district is largely uninhabited bush, reflecting the convenience and attraction of life nearer the towns, but also the fact that parts of the district suffer from tsetse fly and lack of surface water. Parts of the district then are "dormitory suburbs," while areas to the south and west are rural in the extreme.

Early Centers and Town Dependency

Apart from chiefs' capitals, the earliest population centers on the Copperbelt were the trade, administrative and mission outposts of South African interests. Prior to this, the indigenous Lamba and Bulima Villages of the late nineteenth century were kept on the move by the pattern of shifting cultivation and by periodic threats of irregular rains and locusts, and of slave and ivory raiders.[5] Once the British South Africa Company adminstration (1899-1924) ended slave trading, the old stockaded villages fragmented into individual household "farms" and smaller villages of 20-30 people.[6] As elsewhere in Zambia, circumstances here precluded the development of indigenous centers.

The earliest center was the Company boma (post) at Kapopo Village on the Kafue Hook (about 30 km. WNW of Mpongwe) which opened in 1900. The site, home to an Mbundu elephant hunter and a Bavarian shopkeeper and laying astride the route to Kansanshi Mine, was reportedly chosen because it appeared on Cecil J. Rhodes' old Portuguese map of the territory. J. E. Stephenson moved the boma to Ndola in 1904 to better supervise a resettled village of Zanzibari slavers, and moved it again in 1911 to administer customs duties on the new Broken Hill-Sakania railroad, just a few miles away.[7]

The first Copperbelt mission was opened at Kafulafuta in 1905, now 16 km. SW of Luanshya. Clement M. Doke and the South African Baptist Missionary Society took over these operations in 1914, and with a printing press and Doke's ciLamba materials, the mission opened a boys' boarding school to teach gardening, carpentry, brickmaking and building skills, along with religion and reading in ciLamba. In turn, these school graduates became teacher-evangelists to a dispersed network of village day-schools.[8]

These earliest centers anticipated the growth of the mine towns at Bwana Mkubwa/Ndola in 1913; Nkana/Kitwe, 1921; at Nchanga/Chingola and Roan Antelope/Luanshya, both in 1925; and at Mufulira, in 1928. These towns became the sole focii of regional development as industrial, commercial, transport and related services were all sited with exclusive reference to lodes of copper sulfide ore. Offering lucrative wages, manufactured goods and an entirely new life, the mine towns sapped the countryside of its material and human resources. Neighboring Lambas moved as near as possible to the towns and line-of-rail to better profit from the urban Africans' demand for familiar foods, beer and women, while the Lamba and Bulima from more distant areas--at times up to 60% of the

able-bodied males--left their homes for wage labor on railway and road crews, on white farms, or as shop helpers, house or garden workers. Rural productivity suffered accordingly, as the urban drift of able-bodied men and women left the villages to the very young and the very old. In time, rural folk nearest the towns became dependent upon town-purchased rollermeal (maize flour).[9]

Rural livelihoods further declined after 1930, with the creation of the Lamba-Lima Native Reserve, when land was set aside for mining timber and a never-realized influx of white farmers. Chief Mushili's area thereby declined from 2200 to 242 square miles, and the dense concentration of citemene (slash and burn) cultivators on the northeastern boundaries nearest Luanshya and Ndola effected serious overcropping, environmental degradation and famine in 1940.[10] The 1943 Ndola District Resettlement Scheme added 550 square miles to the area, but this failed to revitalize village life, as the youths still preferred town life or fish trading to the onerous cultivation requirements imposed on participants in the resettlement scheme.[11]

The Colonial Administration (1924-1964) formally recognized the divergent interest of town and country when, in 1950, they separated the administration of Ndola urban and rural districts. The rural district was then viewed as an area of basically subsistence producers who had been demoralized by their proximity to the easy squalor of town life. Its people urgently required marketing and transport for their cash crops--vegetables near town and sorghum further south--, rural social centers and a centralized rural boma, which was first created in 1958. These, it was hoped, would arrest contined village fissioning, declining rural productivity, and urban drift, and thereby blunt the appeal of the independence movement.[12] These same problems outlived the Colonial Administration and persist today.

Ndola Rural Central and the Road

The Luanshya-Mpongwe road has considerable influence on the area of Ndola rural central, both as an artery of communication and trade, and also as a magnet of rural resettlement and urban-rural in-migration. It dates to 1936, when the Franciscan Fathers bridged the Kafubu River near Roan pumping station to cut their track to St. Theresa's Mission at Ibenga, just south of the Kafulafuta River. The road was extended to Mpongwe in 1952, then widened and improved in 1967. The centers listed below, except for Kafulafuta Mission, are all strung along this one good road. They are: Ndola Rural Council (or the Treasury), 17 km. south of Luanshya; Kafulafuta Mission, 9 km. west of the Treasury; Masaiti Boma, 24 km. south of Luanshya; Ibenga Mission, 27 km. from town; and Mpongwe Mission, 65 km. from town.

The road carries most of the traffic to and from Ndola rural central--up to 543 vehicles a day (27% of them heavy trucks) past Masaiti Boma and 161 vehicles (60% trucks) as far as Mpongwe.[13] Four to five public buses run daily between Luanshya nad Ibenga, and--outside the rainy season--another two go beyond to Mpongwe. These and a variety of bicycles, mini-buses and other private vehicles carry rural folk and their produce to

town, and return with villagers and their store-bought goods (especially rollermeal), and with women marketeers. These town women travel out to the gardens and farms where they pick and pack vegetables and relishes--usually rape, cabbage, tomatoes and onions--for resale in Luanshya, Ndola or Kitwe.

The road is also a settlement magnet, a ribbon of resited villages and individual settlements. These include an ethnicially heterogeneous mix of town leavers--retired or discharged workers and rural job seekers--who settled there to enjoy school and health facilities, and slightly lower living expenses all within easy reach of town.

Tables 1, 2 and 3 capture the demographic and socioeconomic profiles of this area. The character of the labor shortage problem is suggested by Table 1, which shows a mean sex ratio of 84 males to 100 females in the 15-49 year age group, that group of potentially able-bodied agricultural laborers. The missing males are presumably away at work.

Tables 2 and 3 are taken from Marter and Honeybone's sample survey of 100 households near Kafulafuta Mission. Households are divided into four groups. Most fall into Group 1, those with labor resource shortages, whose incomes are partially dependent upon non-agricultural activities. Group 2 are "typical subsistence farming households," those of nuclear families producing a saleable crop surplus. Group 3 are those households with slightly above average resources, often including full or part-time wage employment. And Group 4 are those with above average access to labor, draft power, farm equipment, financing and managerial skill. Group allocation was cross-checked against housing standards and ownership of such consumer durables as bikes, radios, watches and furniture. While the Kafulafuta Mission area is characterized by poor, sandy soils, I do think it is representative of the situation in Lamba and Bulima villages, homesteads and farms throughout Ndola rural central. A description of the five small centers follows.

Ndola Rural Council, or the Treasure

The Rural Council dates to the 1949 consolidation of the Lamba, Bulima and Swahili Native Authority Tresuries, when it became the central office for the fifteen district chiefs and repository for their dog gun, bicycle and court fees. The chiefs' appointed Financial, Agriculture and Livestock, Health, Education, and Public Works Councillors also lived at the Treasury and toured out from it to supervise agricultural practices and the cleanliness of villages and their latrines, and recommend sites for and request help in the building and maintenance of the few government schools, of wells, roads and bridges.

After independence, the Treasury came under the Ministry of Local Government and Housing, and surrendered many of its former localized functions to the appropriate departmental offices of national ministries at Masaiti Boma. It retains responsibility for the provision and maintenance of wells, roads and ferries, but most of its business centers on the meetings of the Ndola Rural Council, where locally elected ward councillors

assemble to discuss local development issues. As the nominal heads of their separate Ward Development Committees (where not moribund), they are to represent their constituents in local affairs, both in explaining current programs, in identifying and articulating their local problems, and in presenting their requests for help to the Council and to the District Development Committee and the District Secretary at Masaiti Boma.[16] These views are ultimately forwarded on to the Provincial Development Committee, which includes representatives of the Cabinet Minister's office, of Water Affairs, of Mechanical Services, of Agriculture, and Sr. Chief Mushili.

The Rural Council controls some local public expenditures--monies received from the Ministry of Local Government and Housing, and from personal and local levies, which include dog, fishing, gun and game licenses, Council housing rents, retail trading licenses, market fees, and seasonal fish levies on fish carried from the Lukanga, Kafue and Luswishi Rivers. The Council further receives a percentage of charcoal burning permit fees and of rates from the district's sixteen piped water schemes. Lastly, it operates the Rural Council Rest House and bar, and the petrol pump at Masaiti.

The Treasury includes the following service functions: the Rural Council, Masaiti Local Court (one of two in Sr. Chief Mushili's area), Masaiti primary school (seven classes of at least 40 students each), the Public Works camp (a road grader), and agricultural camp with two agricultural assistants, an outpatient rural health clinic (a medical assistant), the bus stop and its market and two concrete "tea carts," seven small shops, the Council houses (20 new houses leased to bus company employees), the rest houst and bar, a second beer bar and two chibuku (opaque beer) taverns, and five churches (Seventh Day Adventist, Catholic, Baptist, Kingdom Hall and New Apostolic). The Treasury has electricity, street lights and piped water. Two hundred twenty-eight people lived there in 1969; at least 500 live there now.

The Treasury is the site for one of the district's most promising development experiments. As few local folk have plow oxen or tractor, and the tractor mechanization scheme at Kafulafuta Union has but one irregularly operating tractor, district farmers have little access to any kind of draft power. As part of a national experiment, the Agricultural Finance Company gave a K 17,000 tractor and equipment loan to a locally prominent businessman and UNIP Trustee in 1978, on condition that he contract plow for the local people until his loan is repaid. In doing so he follows a plowing schedule prepared by the Treasury agricultural assistants, and moves between 30 acre blocks of fields to maximize use-efficiency.

Kafulafuta Mission

As described earlier, Baptist mission work in the district first began at Kafulafuta, but was extended to the companion station at Fiwale Hill (40 km. to the east, on the line-of-rail, south of Ndola) and the Scandinavian Baptist station at Mpongwe (see below) in 1932. Its service functions are few, but significant. Apart from the church, the mission

TABLE 1

Age and Sex Structures of Ndola Rural Central, 1969[14]

Years of Age	Males	Females	Males per 100 Females
0-9	2924	3034	96
10-14	919	930	99
15-49	3651	4362	84
50-64	992	618	161
65+	230	144	160
Not Stated	58	59	--
TOTAL	8774	9147	96

TABLE 2

Composition of Average Households in Each Group, Kafulafuta Mission, Ndola Rural Central, 1975[15]

	Group				
	1	2	3	4	All
Children below 8 years	0.90	1.67	2.00	2.00	1.25
Children 8-14 years	0.44	1.52	2.00	2.50	0.95
Male Adults 15-55 years	0.51	1.19	1.00	4.00	0.85
Female Adults 15-55	0.72	1.34	1.60	0.50	0.48
Men and Women over 55 years	0.51	0.48	--	1.50	1.00
Total (Household Size)	3.08	6.20	6.60	10.50	4.53
Males per 100 Females, 15-55 years	71	89	63	267	85

TABLE 3

Group and Per Capita Annual Crop Income Kafulafuta Mission, Ndola Rural Central, 1975[15]

Group	Number of Households	Population	Household Crop Income (K)	Per Capita Crop Income (K)
1	57	177	3.00	0.82
2	36	223	15.00	2.49
3	5	33	31.00	4.65
4	2	21	471.00	44.87
All	100	454	18.00	3.96

garage and grinding mill, there is a 38 bed health center (with two Australian nurses), and Kafulafuta primary school (7 classes with a minimum of 40 students each). The station has electricity and its own piped water, and is home to 50 people, excluding the surrounding villages.

Kafulafuta and Fiwale Hill Missions were also important in fostering the Lamba vegetable industry, as well as a group of elder, prominent mixed farmers. This began when boarding school students were encouraged to supplement their meagre stipends with vegetable sales. Mission support went even further near Fiwale Hill where, from 1943-1956, Rev. W. Rendall ran a vegetable purchase and marketing scheme in Ndola rural east to the mine messes and urban schools.[17] Even today, pastoral students continue to provide the greater share of their living expenses through market gardening and, when posted to outlying churches, become locally prominent farmers.

Masaiti Boma

The Colonial Administration was keen to open a rural boma to keep in touch with rural life and its problems: village fissioning, rural-urban drift, and declining productivity. And as this boma was to oversee agricultural development, it required more fertile soils than the sandy Treasury area offered. The Department of Agriculture settled on the Masaiti site in 1957 and opened an agricultural station there two years later. Masaiti Boma, sited between the Treasury and Ibenga, opened in 1962. Unlike the temporary boma at Mpongwe, Masaiti was nearer Provincial headquarters in Ndola, and was accessible throughout the rains.[18]

The boma remains an agricultural service center, as the demonstration farm was upgraded into Masaiti Farm Institute. This provides short courses to the public and to agricultural staff in domestic science, animal husbandry, horticulture and field crops. But as elseshere, funding cutbacks have reduced the number of courses given. Only eleven of thirty-nine planned courses were given for the September 1977 - August 1978 year: three for the public and eight for the staff. Near the Institute is the local National Agricultural Marketing Board (NAMB) depot, which supplies all (available) agricultural requisties and purchases all field crops in the area.

The boma's administrative services include a multitude of government offices, beginning with the Party posts of District Governor and UNIP Regional Secretary; the District Secretary and his staff; and district offices for the Ministries of Water and Natural Resources, Education, and Health; and for the Departments of Forestry, Agriculture, Veterinary, and Tsetse Control, Cooperatives, Water Affairs, Community Development, and Rural Information Services. Other government functions include the police and Criminal Investigation Division, the district post office (which provides savings facilities), and the nearby Water Affairs Project, which provides piped water to the Farm Institute, the boma, the Blind Centre, and to Ibenga Mission, its hospital and schools. The boma has

electric and telephone lines from Luanshya, but as of 1978 the phone line was useless, and effective communication with the Rural Council or any of the provincial offices in Luanshya, Kitwe or Ndola depended upon access to one of four old Landrovers. Motor transport was difficult to secure, so that the District Agricultural Officer, for example, generally had no means of visiting district agricultural camps.

The boma also offers educational, retail, entertainment and religious services. There is a primary school of 14 classes at the Boma, and a second school with 7 classes 5 km. to the NE, plus a bus stop market and tea shop, a small parastatal retail store (the Zambian Consumers and Buyers Cooperative) and a private general store, two beer bars and two chibuku taverns),plus a tobacconist, a tailor, a radio repairman and a mechanic. Nearby churches include one each for the Roman Catholics and African Methodists, two Kingdom Halls and three Baptist churches.

This is a densely settled area of villagers, boma workers, and job-seekers. The road-sited services continue to attract rural and urban immigrants, so that the boma already has its own emerging squatter settlement. The boma and Farm Institute alone must be home to 700 people, not including the clutter of neighboring villages and individual settlements.

Ibenga Mission

While the core of Ibenga is the Franciscan mission, its garage and carpentry shop, it also includes the Dominican Sisters' girls' secondary school of 520 students (one of two secondary schools in Ndola rural), a government primary school (21 classes of 1000 students), the mission's 117 bed hospital and clinic (staffed by an Italian doctor with expatriate and Zambian nurses), and the Franciscan Sisters' boarding home for handicapped girls, their small farm for lepers and homes for the abandoned elderly. The mission sells clothing from overseas, and uses the proceeds to subsidize their weekly rollermeal donations to the elderly and handicapped. The mission has also opened a church and social center--to teach nutrition, cooking and sewing--at nearby Gondwe Village, and hopes to provide three primary classrooms for the more than 300 unschooled children living there.

Gondwe Village--a village of an estimated 3000 people, located just behind Ibenga--was the New Jerusalem of the millenarian prophet, Jeremiah Gondwe, who led a Watchtower movement in Ndola rural from 1924 until his death in 1972. Gondwe's disciples worked among the Congolese Luba and Luvale, and their converts came to join his village in 1960-1966.[19] Following his death, succession quarrels and local antagonisms brought a ban on public worship. The village is now much like other rural Zambian townships, drawing resettled Zambians, and Zairois and Angolan refugees of no particular relitious or political affiliation. Together they constitute a land-short proletariat of artisans, petty traders, charcoal burners, pieceworkers and thieves.

Ibenga trading area hosts Chief Malembeka's Local Court, an agricultural camp (two agricultural assistants), a market, one general store and six smaller shops, a beer bar and four chibuku taverns, and an African Methodist church. The Catholic mission, and Catholic, Baptist and United Church of Zambia (Anglican/Presbyterian) churches are nearby. It is the terminus for the Luanshya-Ibenga buses, and is the best location in Ndola rural central for catching lifts on to town or to Mpongwe. It is a densely settled area of perhaps 4000 people, most of them relying upon town-purchased rollermeal. Rollermeal can either be exchanged for equal volumes of sorghum with the Gondwe traders, or can be bought at the small shops at K0.40 per 2 kg. amounts. (Rollermeal retailed at K9.04 per 90 kg. bag in town, or could sometimes be bought at K5.50 per 50 kg. bag from the mission.)

Mpongwe Mission

Though opened in 1932 as a mission, Mpongwe's dark, fertile soils made it the center for a variety of colonial projects: a demonstration farm and seasonal sub-boma in the 1940's, a peasant farming scheme, and a sorghum marketing cooperative in 1948. This was the rural boma from 1959 to 1962, and after independence the demonstration farm became the Farm Training Centre.

While including a primary school (13 classes), a Public Works camp (the second of two road graders), Chief Lesa's Palace and Local Court, and a NAMB depot, a general store, beer bar and chibuku tavern, the central service of Mpongwe is the mission, its garage and grinding mill, and its newly expanded, 110 bed hospital and clinic, staffed by Zambian and ciLamba-speaking Swedish nurses. The resident M.D., a son of the senior missionary, was actually born at Kafulafuta Mission and speaks fluent ciLamba. This is an excellent hospital. The mission is much like a town, with its own piped water, a paved road and its own hydro-electric generator.

Mpongwe is included here because it is the center of two new agricultural projects, the most spectacular being a K2.5m irrigated wheat scheme and commercial farming zone, funded by the European Economic Community. Sixty of 300 cleared hectares were cropped in 1978. Further expansion awaits consultants' studies on soil and water table response to borehole irrigation. But the most serious problem is that of finding suitably skilled farmers to occupy and develop the commercial farming zone, as the local cultivators--even the old peasant farmers--are incapable of managing the planned 30 ha. units.[20]

The second project is the hospital's own, a Swedish International Development Authority-financed production unit of 250 has. arable and 200 has. grazing land, plus poultry, pigs and vegetables. Once completed, the unit will make the hospital self-sufficient in its food requirements, allowing it an estimated K5000 p.a. savings on town-purchased foods. Local growers formerly supplied the hospital with some foodstuffs, but their production has fallen in recent years while the hospital's need has increased. Local poultry farmers, for example, were forced out of production

by the lack of feeds and vaccines.[21]

The Agricultural Situation

The lack of feeds and vaccines, indeed, periodic shortages of all material requisites plague farmers in Ndola rural and the rest of Zambia. While those in Ndola rural face additional shortages of farm family labor, draft power and credit, these problems occur elsewhere too. Inasmuch as the development problems of Ndola rural extend beyond the district, there is little the five small centers can do to ameliorate them as they are largely peripheral to these externally generated problems. But before evaluating these centers any further, let us turn to a discussion of the agricultural situation.

Prior to independence in 1964, the economy of Northern Rhodesia/Zambia was subordinated to white mining and commercial farming interests, and to their marketing and transport infrastructure along the line-of-rail. African agriculture prospered only among the cattle-keeping peoples of Eastern Province and, again, along the line-of-rail. Following independence, the government sought to extend market-oriented production beyond these areas to the greater rural hinterland, and to do so it created the National Agricultural Marketing Board (NAMB), a parastatal company separate and distinct from agricultural loan and extension agencies. To facilitate the creation of maize markets where none had formerly existed, NAMB received a monopoly over cotton and grains marketing, as well as over the provision of seeds, fertilizers and other requisites. Tractorplow services were provided through regional mechanization units, and generous farm loans were offered to farmers, particularly to those who applied as newly formed producers' cooperatives. The Credit Organization of Zambia (COZ) gave K22m in agricultural loans from 1966 to 1969, when it went broke.[22]

But this ambitious initiative failed and the loans were rarely recovered: first, because all the above services were scandalously inefficient in providing services in time; and secondly, because producers' prices and the eroding rural-urban terms of trade actually discouraged increased market production.[23] As the townsfolk enriched (and continue to enrich) themselves at the expense of their rural relations,[24] rural folk were expected to increase their marketable surplus in response to that least material of all economic incentives, appeals to their patriotism.

Given its proximity to the town and growing urban food demands, the agricultural development policy for Ndola rural emphasized egg, broiler, pig and vegetable producing cooperatives.[25] The most famous of these, Kafulafuta Cooperative Union (about 20 km. east of the Rural Council), was once considered the model Zambian cooperative. It began in 1968 as a resettlement scheme for both rural and urban folk, and was run by Israeli managers on moshav cooperative principles (i.e. collective ownership of machinery and capital goods, but farmers working their own individual plots separately) until 1973, when the Israelis were withdrawn.[26] Maize, poultry and vegetable production continue at Kafulafuta, but all suffer from critical shortages of mechanical spares and stockfeeds. Its prospects

are as uncertain as its members are demoralized. Those from urban areas have either quit the scheme, or have entered alternative non-agricultural occupations like fish trading or charcoal burning, or even the illicit emerald traffic. Other district farming and dairy cooperative resettlement schemes, most of them along the Kabwe-Ndola-Kitwe road, suffer similar problems. These were often begun as village regrouping experiments, and organizers fought to overcome fears of heightened witchcraft activity, or headmen's fears of losing status.[27] But the village regrouping initiative has lost all credibility, as participants never received their promised services.

Private producers suffer the same problems in obtaining material inputs. Except for poultry feeds, now sold by town millers, all inputs come through the NAMB depots at Masaiti and Mpongwe, and at two intermediary depots. Yet NAMB's monopoly over requisites does not insure the timely availability of seeds, fertilizers, pesticides or tools, as these--along with stockfeed components--are nearly all imported, and are thus subject to delays caused by foreign exchange restrictions and international transport difficulties. This does little for the confidence of the rural producers.

Ndola rural farmers also suffer a lack of credit, due to their own poor loan repayment performance in the past. Only 25% of COZ loans to the district were repaid by April 1968,[28] and its successor, the Agricultural Finance Company (AFC) has had similar problems. Most of the poultry loans given in 1969 to 1971 were lost when NAMB depots stopped stocking poultry feeds, and farmers suddenly had to buy as best they could in town Other loans were lost to improvident, even deceitful, managers. Even when these farmers could be traced, AFC had trouble collecting repayment after sales, as eggs, chickens, even pigs and vegetables can be sold most anywhere.[29] AFC policy now denies loans for poultry, piggery or vegetable operations--enterprises best suited to a beginner farmer.

Loans are available for NAMB-marketed crops, especially maize. But maize is not as well suited to the sandy soils or climatic variations of Ndola rural as is the traditional staple, sorghum. Maize is also an expensive crop to grow--repairing K70 per hectare for seed, pesticides, and fertilizers--and one which requires the sort of experience, labor and draft power resources which a new farmer is unlikely to command. And without these resources, a loan applicant cannot expect a recommendation from his agricultural assistant, nor approval from AFC officers in Ndola. In consequence, there is no credit for beginner farmers.

Crop marketing is a further hurdle to be overcome. NAMB alone handles cotton and grains, and will also handle groundnuts, beans and potatoes, though these are more profitably sold through private channels. As for vegetable produce, the greater share of it moves through private buyers, ranging all the way from truck-owning entrepreneurs to bus-riding market women. Producers near Fiwale Mission were organizing their own marketing cooperative as I was leaving the field,[30] and while it may provide better producers' prices, it must, I fear, ultimately run up against the lack of urban wholesaling and cold storage facilities.

Produce marketing in Ndola rural central is not as well developed. The more prosperous gardeners will haul their produce to town themselves. They may also hire out their transportation to neighbors, or give lifts to smaller gardeners waiting on the roadside for the buses. Others may take their produce to town on bicycles. But all producers will sell their bags, washtubs or tins of produce at wholesale prices to town marketeers. Rarely will a producer retail his own produce, as the retailer must break his bags, boxes or tins of produce into K0.05 - 0.10 piles, bundles, or saucers, and then spend most of his day at market. This the Lamba villagers are unwilling to do, perhaps because they are the butt of invidious ethnic stereotyping.

But market gardeners need not transport their produce to town for sale, for marketeers will buy produce from the farms and villages. Sorghum, sweet potatoes and cassava are generally bought from the villages by men from Gondwe Village, who later cycle to town to retail their produce. Most other produce is left to the women marketeers from town. Their very presence in the countryside is indicative of town demand, which in turn hinges on the seasonal availability of produce. The average bag of rape, for example, is K10, but the cold and late dry season price is K15 a bag or more.[31] At other times growers must take their own rape to town and sell them at K5 a bag or less. Tomatoes similarly range between K7 and K2 a box (17-19 kg. of tomatoes per box). Yet the very presence of the marketeer, even during a period of low prices, will cause the producer to raise his rape price to K7 a bag.

The marketeers, then, generally capture the difference between wholesale producers' and retail consumers' prices, and they are resented by both parties. Their gross profits are difficult to estimate, as produce is sold without reference to scales or to accurate counts of the number of retail units per box or bag. My own figures suggest a 100 to 150% markup over producers' prices, out of which marketeers pay their costs of transport, spoilage, wastage and lost marketing time. The remainder goes to support their urban families. While their profits are generally seen as exploitative, the current marketing system cannot do without them. And their small turnovers necessitate high markups which, from another perspective, serve as a kind of unemployment relief tax on urban wage laborers, whose incomes have more than doubled since independence.[32]

It is unfortunate that such "taxes" are not also enjoyed by the farmers of Ndola rural district who, in addition to shortages of on-farm labor, draft power, credit and material production inputs, also suffer disadvantageous trade relations with town marketeers and other town dwellers. Under these circumstances, the development initiative falls to relatively independent and self-endowed producers. It is within this context that we can best appreciate the success of the Mazezuru farmers of Ndola rural central.

The Mazezuru Farmers

The Mazazuru are Rhodesian African farmers who emigrated to Northern Rhodesia between 1953 and 1963, the period of the Central African Federation.

They are named after the Zezuru group of siShona speakers, but the term embraces all Shona groups and the Ndebele. Within Zambia, they are most heavily settled in Lusaka, Mumbwa and Kabwe districts.[33] Though some came to Ndola rural east in the early 1950's, the first Mazezuru to Ndola rural central--Zezuru and Karnaga--came in or after 1970. There are about 100 Mazezuru farmers in Ndola rural central alone; perhaps 800 to 1000 men, women and children in total.

They are experienced oxen and tractorplow farmers, and characteristically grow maize, groundnuts and cotton, the last of which they introduced to the district. Most came with their own oxen and plows, others with tractors, and pickup trucks are commonplace. These are "advanced management" or "semi-commercial" farmers, those who employ fertilizers to coax 20-30, rather than the usual 10, 90kg. bags of maize per acre. As plow farmers, they seek out heavier loams beyond the roadside ribbon of jealous villagers to settle individual, patriarchal family farms on the fertile soils beyond Ibenga, and to the north and west of Mpongwe. Yet others are primarily market gardeners, so settle along the banks of the larger rivers with their pumps and engines, again occupying choice sites which are outside the technical competence of village cultivators using hoe and watercan techniques. There are other "strangers" who have recently settled in the area, filling the gaps between "subsistence" and "semi-commercial" farmers. Some are local Lamba and Bulima peoples, while others are Mambwe, Bemba, Tumbuka, Inamwanga, Ngoni, Chewa, Lala, Luvale, etc. But the Mazezuru are conspicuous in their numbers, in their success, and by the fact that most are not Zambian citizens.

They are also conspicuous in that most are Vapastori wa Johanne Maranke, members of a Sabbatarian Independency church which enjoins polygyny, prophecy, and spiritual healing. They are forbidden adultery, tobacco, alcohol, or any of the abominable animals of Leviticus. They are easily identified, as the men wear beards but shave their heads, while their women are dressed in modest, below-the-knee skirts or dresses in plain colors. They do not wear citenge wrap-arounds. For Sabbath, all wear long white robes, with red headscarves for women and staves for men. Their religious doctrine and praxis isolates them from mainstream Zambian society, while reinforcing maximum contact, even religious endogamy, within their group.[34]

The Mazazuru are accurately regarded as industrious farmers who labor from dawn to dusk, pausing only for a midday meal. Local people recognize that the women are particularly hard-working--that they are "donkeys" --, and that their marriages are more like business contracts between a boss and his laborers, a reference to the large K700-1000 bridewealth agreements contracted by intermarrying families.

As experienced, industrious farmers with their own capital equipment and the skills to keep it operating, the Mazezuru are considered by AFC staff to be excellent credit risks. This easy access to credit, to draft power and on-farm labor, is a sore point between the Mazezuru and their hosts, especially as the Mazezuru refuse to plow for their neighbors.

Their overriding concern is for their own farms. They do not want to haggle over plowing charges, nor risk their equipment on unstumped lands.

In view of their industriousness and religious distinctiveness, it is easy to think of the Mazezuru as Protestant ethic entrepreneurs. But the Mazezuru, interestingly enough, reject this interpretation. Their church has little to do with their farming skill. They believe they are good farmers because they learned these skills from the Boers in Rhodesia. "You whites think [Mazezuru] Rhodesians are so clever," a friend told me. "We are not clever. Do you understand? We learned these things from the Europeans. They taught us, they beat us, and we learned. Now we will teach these [Copperbelt] Zambians."

Following Long's reappraisal of his work on the Jehovah's Witness entrepreneurs in Serenje district,[35] I would argue that the Mazezuru's success is not the consequence of a Protestant work ethic--though their ideology may explain their evangelical approach to farming. Instead it is best understood in terms of the alternatives their religious affiliation presents to them. Quite exclusive of their beliefs, the Mazazuru have considerable practical farm experience, the sort of experience which cannot be taught at farm institutes or training centers. Secondly, the Zambianization of urban employment makes it difficult for their children, even though Zambian citizens by birth, to find jobs in town. Their children thus have little incentive to leave profitable farming enterprises, and stay on the farm, providing additional trained labor, until such time as they take their own farms. The bapastori faith reinforces this pattern by discouraging schooling beyond Grade 7. As these people are polygynous, they enjoy abundant household labor resources as compared with serially monogamous or divorced Zambian farmers. Adding these together with consideration of the constraints other local producers must struggle with, it is not difficult to understand the success of the Mazezuru.

Evaluation of the Centers

Having considered the agricultural situation in Ndola rural district and its most prominent farming successes, let us return to evaluate the central district's five centers and their role in improving livelihood opportunities. Three of the five centers are principally missions. They are religious centers which built additional health and educational services, now under government control. The missions provide, in addition, various social welfa[illegible]services, such as grinding mills, or garages where broken pots or bic[illegible]can be brazed or welded. Ibenga also stocks rollermeal and chicken [illegible] for local purchase--vital assistance to local households and poultry [illegible]ers.

The two remaining centers, the Rural Council and Masaiti Boma, are politico-administrative centers. They themselves can do little to promote district development as long as such programs are externally funded. At best they can articulate local needs to the provincial offices in the Copperbelt towns. On the local level, the Rural Council tries to maintain wells, bridges, and roads, and encourages self-help construction projects,

but its notable achievements are with external institutions, as in securing bus service to the area, or the new AFC tractorplow loan-hire scheme. The Boma also works to encourage harder work and increased production. The Governor continually tours the district and exhorts people with the slogan "Ndola rural, cilangililo: Tulime, Tulye, Tushitishe (Ndola rural, all together: Let's grow, Let's eat, Let's sell!)!" Yet exhortation alone cannot solve the district's agricultural problems.

Boma officials, for example, worked hard to popularize district resettlement cooperatives, which then failed because the promised services were not provided. The Boma officials also lack such services, lack of transport for the agricultural, livestock and veterinary officers for one. Boma officials had no control over NAMB delays in 1977-78 maize crop payments; the checks arrived so late as to prevent some farmers from the timely purchase and application of basal fertilizer to the 1978-79 crop.

On the positive side, the Boma did help local market gardeners petition NAMB to provide a short-lived vegetable purchase scheme to the area. And real material assistance followed Boma staff complaints to the provincial UNIP office in Ndola of their lack of shopping facilities. This brought, in 1978, a ZCBC parastatal retail store to Masaiti--a real coup, for the ZCBC is a cheap, relatively well-stocked, and a conveniently extra-urban source of rollermeal and other store goods, usually only available in town.

Considered together, each of the small centers is sited within a cluster of villages, farms and individual settlements. These centers have in the last decade achieved minimal indices of centrality as knots in the ribbon development of the Luanshya-Mponge road, knots which provide schools, clinics, shops and bus stop access to lifts and other transport. People do not want to live without these services, and have congregated near them. Certainly other rural areas are less well endowed.

These centers also provide limited wage employment, marketing, shopping and entertainment services. General laborers at the Treasury or Boma, domestic servants and clinic dressers, carpenters, bricklayers, tailors and shoe repairmen can all find more or less regular work at or near these centers. They also serve as minor marketing outlets for vegetables, fish and game meat. Bus stops, bars, chibuku taverns and schools provide additional markets for women's prepared snacks.

If they are lucky, these sellers can turn around and use their cash to buy rollermeal, bread, biscuits, coca-colas, milk, sugar, salt, cooking oil, washing powder, candles and other consumer staples at the local shops, and thus contribute to local prosperity. The unfortunate likelihood (at least in 1977-78) is that local shopkeepers themselves have trouble stocking such items, forcing the rural shopkeepers and their customers to depend upon the towns for basic consumer goods. As a consequence, the existing centers--each with essentially similar, lower-order services--have little opportunity for locally initiated self-aggrandizement. None of these centers can grow to regional prominence through the up-grading of their private, retail service functions. Short of further public

sector investments--in a boys' secondary school, an improved hospital, or a tarred road--these centers will remain small bus stops on the road to the Copperbelt towns.

What of the future? The prospects are clearest for Mponge. It is the only sizeable center in the southern end of Ndola rural central and, at 38 km. from Ibenga, it does not share the dispersal of equivalent services we have seen at the Treasury, Kafulafuta, Masaiti and Ibenga. Recent hospital improvements have already raised its medical services to regional preeminence, treatment that rivals that in any of the towns. Moreover, the nearby wheat scheme might turn Mponge into an agricultural service center with its own irrigation, tractor, motor vehicle and agricultural implement servicing provisions.

We must also consider Third National Development Plan (TNDP) proposals for Ndola rural central. These call for the tarring of the Luanshya-Mponge road, and improvement of the de facto regrouped village situation at Ibenga. Plans include full electrification and streetlighting, borehole wells, a butchery and bakery, and even a sewage treatment plant. Yet these prospects are not so clear. The cost of TNDP is yet to be determined, and its implementation may ultimately hinge on revitalization of the national economy. The paved road, which alone would open the area up to many more vehicles, delivery vans and commercial enterprises, has been promised, discussed and examined for well over five years and, in the last analysis, is not seriously expected anytime in the near future.

In the preceding pages, I have described the development situation in the center of Ndola rural district with reference to its five small centers. These all provide basic health, education, shopping and transport services. Yet they remain fundamentally peripheral to district development problems--to shortages of on-farm labor and draft power, agricultural requisites, credit and marketing provisions, and to disadvantageous exchange relations with the towns--, and to the all pervasive primacy of the neighboring Copperbelt towns, which are both regional and national population and service centers. Given some degree of local autonomy, small centers could be vitally engaged in a regional rural development process. But such is not the case in the center of Ndola rural district--and, I suspect elsewhere in Zambia--where the small, emergent centers offer essentially similar, lower order service functions and remain dependent upon the centralized services of the Copperbelt towns.

FOOTNOTES

[1]This paper is written from materials gathered in the course of fieldwork in Zambia in 1977 and 1978, while I was a Research Affiliate of the University of Zambia's Rural Development Studies Bureau. My work was conducted with the generous support of Fulbright-Hays fellowship number G0076-04035 and National Science Foundation grant number BNS 76-94100. I would extend my sincere thanks to these three organizations.

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[4]Mary Elizabeth Jackman, Recent Population Movements in Zambia (University of Zambia, Institute of African Studies, African Papers No. 8, 1973), pp. 7-9.

[5]Clement M. Doke, The Lambas of Northern Rhodesia (London: Harrap, 1931), pp. 35-48.

[6]Lambaland (A Quarterly Missionary Record published by the South African Baptist Missionary Society from Oct. 1916-Oct. 1956), 47, (April 1928); J. F. Stephenson, Chirupula's Tale (London: Bles, 1937), pp. 100-102, 114-119; Henry and Walter E. Masters, In Wild Rhodesia (London: F. Griffiths, 1920), p. 213; Northern Rhodesia, Ndola District Tour Report No. 4 of 1938 (National Archives of Zambia, SEC 2/1102.)

[7]J. M. Moubray, In South Central Africa (London: Constable, 1912), pp. 103-104; Ndola District Notebook (National Archives of Zambia, KSN 2/1).

[8]Masters and Masters, op, cit. Lambaland, 2 (Jan. 1917). passim.

[9]Ndola District Tour Reports Nos. 4 of 1949, 1 of 1952, 3 of 1952, 6 of 1956 (National Archives of Zambia, SEC 2/1106, 1110, 1114).

[10]William Allan, Studies in African Land Usage in Northern Rhodesia (Capetown: Oxford University Press for Rhodes-Livingstone Institute, Rhodes-Livingstone Institute Paper No. 15), pp. 25-46.

[11]Ndola District Tour Reports Nos. 9 of 1949, 1 of 1952 (National Archives of Zambia, SEC 2/1106, 1110); also William Allan, The African Husbandman (Edinburgh and London: Oliver and Boyd, 1965), pp. 452-59.

[12]Ndola District Tour Reports Nos. 3 of 1951, 8 of 1952 (National Archives of Zambia, SEC 2/1109-1110).

[13]Zambia, Ministry of Public Works, Roads Branch, "Traffic Survey of D469, 6-8 September 1977" (unpublished). This was an unusually heavy flow of traffic, as the survey period coincided with transport of the 1976-77 maize crop, and with hospital construction at Mpongwe.

[14]Zambia, Central Statistical Office, Census of Population and Housing, 1969. Final Report, Vol. IV(b1)--Ndola Rural District (Lusaka: CSO, 1974), pp. 2-3. Ndola Rural Central is taken to consist of Masaiti, Malembeka North and South, Kalunkumya East and West, Lesa, Lesa/Mwinuna, and Ndubeni Polling Districts.

[15]Marter and Honeybone, op. cit., p. 111.

[16]Though formed to devolve power to the local setting, Ward Development Committees have little control over public expenditures, and act, as does the Rural Council, in an advisory capacity. In this their role is duplicated by the UNIP constituency branch chairmen, who report to the Party Regional Secretary and to the District Governor, both appointed Party officials located at the Boma. Many Ward Development Committees are moribund, and meet or suspend meetings at the initiative of the wards' elected councillors. See Michael Bratton, "The Social Context of Political Penetration in Rural Zambia: Ward and Village Committees in Kasama District," paper for a joint seminar of the School of Humanities and Social Sciences and the Institute for African Studies, University of Zambia, August 1976.

[17]Northern Rhodesia, African Affairs Annual Reports for the Years 1949-1956 (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1950-57, passim; Lambaland, 102-103, 109 (Jan., July 1943, Jan. 1946).

[18] Ndola District Notebook (National Archives of Zambia, KSN 2/1).

[19]Sholto Cross, "A Prophet Not Without Honour: Jeremiah Gondwe," in C. Allen and R. W. Johnson (eds.), African Perspectives (Cambridge University Press, 1970), pp. 171-184.

[20]Times of Zambia, Mondya, 28 August 1978, p. 5; also M. Antoine de Haulville (for Landell-Mills Consultants), A Study of Potential Farm Settlers and Farm Labour, I, Mpongwe Area (Zambia, Ministry of Lands and Agriculture, Commission of European Communities, European Development Fund, Mpongwe Pilot Project, Oct. 1978).

[21]Times of Zambia, Monday, 23 Jan. 1978, p. 1; Tuesday, 18 April 1978, p. 5; Tuesday, 16 May 1978, p. 5.

[22]Robert H. Bates, Rural Responses to Industrialization (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1976), pp. 116-124, 145, 150-156.

[23]Doris F. Dodge, Agricultural Policy and Performance in Zambia (Berkeley: University of California, Institute of International Studies, Research Series No. 32); also see C. E. Young, "Rural-Urban Terms of Trade," and Fabian J. M. Maimbo and James Fry, "An Investigation into the Change in the Terms of Trade between the Rural and Urban Sectors of Zambia," in African Social Research, 12 (Dec. 1971), pp. 91-94, 95-110. Also see Patrick Eze Ollawa, "Rural Development Strategy and Performance in Zambia: An Evaluation of Past Efforts," African Studies Review, 21 (2) (Sept. 1978), pp. 101-124.

[24]Young, op. cit., p. 94. But this urban bias is a general trend in economic history, as rural produce is valued cheaper than town processed and manufactured goods, and the countryside is regarded by planners as a labor reserve, and an employer and residence of last resort. See Wyn F. Owen, "The Double Developmental Squeeze on Agriculture," American Economic Review, 56(1) (March 1966), pp. 43-70; or more recently, Michael Lipton, Why Poor People Stay Poor (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1977).

[25]D. M. Pudsey, "Farming Cooperatives in the Copperbelt Province," and Brian Dawtrey, "Copperbelt Province Farming Settlement Schemes," both in Ian D. Elgie (ed.), Kitwe and Its Hinterland (Lusaka: Zambia Geographical Association, Handbook Series No. 3, 1974), pp. 63-70, 133-147.

[26]P. Martin, "An Example of Co-operative Mixed Farming in the Zambian Copperbelt," Geography, 59(3) (July 1974), pp. 264-266.

[27]Times of Zambia, Tuesday 17 March 1970, p. 2; Sat., 19 Nov. 1977, p. 7; Monday, 23 Jan. 1978, p. 5; Sat., 4 Feb. 1978, p. 5; and Zambia Daily Mail, Sat. 19 Nov. 1977, p. 5.

[28]Minutes of Credit Organization of Zambia Staff Meeting, Ndola, 18 October 1968, from the personal papers of Mr. William Mutesa, former COZ Credit Officer, Luanshya.

[29]Interviews with Messrs. Chiwela, AFC Provincial Manager, Ndola, and V. M. Muyambo, AFC District Manager, Ndola, 25 August 1978.

[30]Times of Zambia, Thursday, 23 Nov. 1978, p. 4; Thursday, 30 Nov. 1978, p. 4; Tuesday, 5 Dec. 1978, p. 2; Wednesday, 6 Dec. 1978, p. 4.

[31]The standard 50 kg. maize, rollermeal or fertilizer bag, when packed with other produce, is a unit of volume. The weight of produce packed per bag varies significantly, depending on whether the marketeer or grower has packed it.

[32]Fabian J. M. Maimbo and David H. Evans, The Supply and Marketing of Vegetables in the Lusaka Area (Lusaka: University of Zambia, Rural Development Studies Bureau, 1976); Guy Scott, "On the Land," Times of Zambia, Thursday, 26 March 1970, p. 6.

My own figures follow: a K6 box of tomatoes will retail at K20-25, even K36: a K10 5kg. bag of rape will sell at K20-25; a K3.50 50kg. bag of sweet potatoes will sell at K8; a K1.50 4gallon tin of sorghum will retail at K3-4.50; a K1.50-2 bag of charcoal will sell in town at K.50, or K4 if sold on monthly credit. At the time of this research, the exchange rate was a Zambian Kwacha (K) equalled US$1.30.

[33]R. J. Mutsau, "The Shona and Ndebele Settlements in Kabwe Rural Area, 1953-1963," in R. Palmer (ed.), Zambian Land and Labour Studies, Vol. 1 (Lusaka: National Archives of Zambia, Occasional Paper No. 2), pp. 41-7.

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
Luanshva
Kafubu
Co-operative
Ndola
Fwale Hill
Mission
Kafulafuta
Mission
Ndola
Rural Council
(Treasury)
Power Line
Kafue River
Masaiti
Boma
Kafulafuta
Co-operative
Ibenga
Chinondo
Kanyenda
Mpongwe
Mpongwe
Wheat Scheme
Tarred Road
Improved Dirt Road
Dirt Track
Power Line
N
0
5
10 Km
NDOLA RURAL
DISTRICT
Area of the Map
Z A M B I A

RURAL MIGRANTS AS CATALYSTS IN RURAL DEVELOPMENT THE URHOBO IN ONDO STATE, NIGERIA

Onigu Otite

Although there is a plethora of works on migratory processes and migrant organizations, few of these deal with the contribution of rural-to-rural migrants to socio-economic development and the emergence of small urban centres. Migration involves permanent or semi-permanent changes in residence and takes account of factors which intervene between the economic opportunities and social conditions of the place of origin and those of the destination (Lee 1966; Otite f.c.; Udo 1975). Economic and non-economic calculation of cost are important in all decisions to migrate. Rural-to-rural migration (with which we are concerned here) involves those who because of their low education and incentives decided to move to exploit familiar resources in new rural environments. Perhaps it is through in depth anthropological studies that the best light may be shed on the contributions of such migrants to development in the particular place to which they migrate.

Development in this sense is both a stage and a process referring to increasing structural differentiation and standards of living. An important consequence of this differentiation is the evolving social and spatial complexity. Migrants link emerging urbanizing situations to the socio-economic organizations of their natal homes, by ties of kinship and cultural symbols as well as those of cash and the impersonal relations of a growing population with diverse occupations. In this context, development is more than increases in per capita income and investment per head; it involves the problems of access to economic opportunities and the recognition of local social institutions as either assets or constraints.

The strength of the social and cultural ties to natal homes and the impermanent form of the architectural structures and social organization of the immigrants at their destinations in the Nigerian case under examination suggest a framework of target migrancy. As I have pointed out elsehwere (Otite forthcoming) a target is two-dimensional, that is, it consists in the choice of a particular destination and in the achievement of some material wealth, defined or undefined, with an element of time for the possible return to the natal home. There may be some intervening targets such as the purchase of implements, bicycles

or vehicles, not only to promote one's business but also acting as symbols of progress. A migrant may achieve his target of reaching his ideal destination, but may or may not acquire money for a new wife or radio, train his child at college or university, build a house and equip a shop. Even more important is the development of successive targets as the result of wider experiences and new aspirations in a small developing urban centre. In the process and while retaining the hope of returning home, migrants contribute commodities and services to meet changing consumption patterns which help in creating and sustaining small urban centres in otherwise rural environments.

It is therefore suggested that immigrants' access to land and other vital economic resources are important conditions for the emergence and maintenance of small urban centres and the development of the national economy. In examining this hypothesis, I use my study of Urhobo migrants from the Bendel to the Ondo State of Nigeria. The Urhobo population was 517,000 in 1963, being the largest of twelve ethnic groups in the Bendel State population of 2.5 million. The host society in Ondo State was mainly Ikale. I make some reference also to non-Urhobo immigrants.

The Ikale and the Urhobo

Since Nigeria came into being in 1914, the country has been successively divided into three Regions (1947), four Regions (1963), twelve States (1967), and nineteen States (1976). The Ikale are a Yoruba people in Okitipupa Division, formerly part of the Western State of Nigeria, but now (from 1976) in Ondo State.

An Ikale nuclear family is part of an extended family headed by the eldest patrikinsman. The local kinship system recognizes complementary matrifiliation and thus a person retains kinship connections with his or her patrikin and utilizes ties with those people whom the mother regards as her patrikin group and matrilateral kinsmen. These links are vital particularly in economic crises involving land use and dependency situations.

An extended family or lineage is a corporate unit in the political and economic organization of the Ikale. The Ikale are politically organized into eleven main town units, many of which are headed by a ruler called the Abodi or Oloja, none of whom determines the economic activities and decisions of the 'subjects'. While the Abodi/Oloja may have granted farmland or houseland to the earliest immigrants this role has now shifted to lineage heads as the actual owners/users of their inherited land. However, an Ikale may offer presents (money or part of his harvest) voluntarily to the Abodi/Oloja.

Land and its resources traditionally constituted the most crucial item in the economy of the Ikale. Land was not scarce in the 15th century when the Ikale occupied their present territory but more recently population increase has altered this situation and individual families have gradually asserted their rights over particular areas of the territory. The Ikale strengthened their interests and stake on their land

not only because of its central importance in their agriculture-based livelihood but also because of the contingent assertion of the ownership of the oil palm trees which in later times the Urhobo immigrants have exploited as licensed tenants. The individual Ikale family also took decisions to lease farm and house land to the Urhobo immigrants.

The Urhobo themselves are a patrilineal people organized in their homeland in Bendel (previously Mid-West) State into twenty socio-political units, most of which have kingdom structures. The government of an Urhobo town, like that of the Ikale is gerontocratic. However, although this government can decide on the seasons for palm oil manufacturing processes (the opening and closing periods for cutting oil palm regimes or bunches of fruit), it does not determine the other economic activities--such as farming--engaged in by individual Urhobo families/households. The ownership of land is distinguished from that of oil palms. While the unit of ownership of oil palms is either the ward or town, that of the land itself is generally a collateral family unit of a man, his wife/wives, their children and grandchildren. No family can be deprived of its rights to exploit the land for farming and other subsistence purposes. Yet while the rights of individuals are temporary, those of the patrilineage, as an ongoing though changing organization, are permanent and supersede those of the individuals that compose it. As among the Ikale, the bilateral nature of kinship permits requests to use land for subsistence purposes from any category of kinsmen including those of the wife/wives. In any case, the right to use the land does not involve exclusive right over the oil palm trees growing wild on it. Similarly, the right to exploit palm trees in a given area does not confer indiscriminate farming rights. The Urhobo are primarily oil palm producers, an ethnic and culture-bound occupation. Any Urhobo migrant was socialized in this economic and cultural context, each had a full knowledge of the technology for palm oil production.

The destination of the Urhobo migrants with whom this study is concerned was determined by the abundance of oil palm resources. The Urhobo chose to travel 272 km, in stages, to reach Ikaleland rather than move to the urban areas of Warri and Sapele within their territories or go to Benin City which was a few kilometres away. This choice was determined by the fear of possible failure in the competition for urban employment on one hand, and on the other by the availability of similar rural life experiences and the expectation of survival and prosperity through their known palm oil technology.

By 1931 the Ikale occupied an area of about 1,261 square km, and out of a population of 60,902 in this territory, 25% were Urhobo. Apart from Ikale there were Ilaje (also a Yoruba people) and Ijo indigenes in Okitipupa Division. Although new economic activities have since attracted more people to the Division, with a consequent population growth from 150,185 in 1952 to 275,709 in 1963, the Urhobo migrant element in the Division, which had been coming in since the 19th century, dwindled from 22.3% of the population in 1952 to 14.7% in 1963. This variation in the figures has to do with the economic changes in the environment and the achievement of migrant targets and the consequent re-migration or return to home. Besides the Yoruba majority of 74.4%, there were

8.2% Ijo, 1% Igbo, and less than 1% each of Bini, Isoko, Itsekiri, Hausa, Efik, Ibibio, and other small elements. The Division was largely rural. By 1963, only 6.4% of the population was urban. In the absence of reliable figures one can hardly speak of any urban population before the 1952 census.

The Structure of Immigrant Villages

Urhobo migrants conceptualized their target in terms of going to 'Ukane' (a corruption of Ikale) or 'going to the sea' (mi kpu rhie), indicating the route used. Both concepts signified at the same time the migratory trip, the destination, the socio-economic motivation, and the expectation to return after accomplishing their targets. On reaching their destination, the migrants sought village-camp tenancy positions from Ikale landlords through their kinsmen or friends with whom there had been some communication. Six such village-camps were studied in detail. Each comprised men, women, and children with a functional physical layout designed for convenience. Each house was built typically after the Urhobo fashion but without the dignity and the semblance of permanence. All the physical structures, including the trough-factory (oko) and wells were kept within calling distance. In this way, wives could go straight from the kitchen to serve meals in the production centres, children be sent on quick errands from one place to another, and possible outbreak of fire attacks faced quickly.

Each village consisted of an average of seven family/household units, with a total of forty people often having kin relationship with one another. A household was the smallest unit of social organization in a village. Each village was exclusive to the Urhobo immigrants. Its government was gerontocratic and the head ensured peace and cooperation through timely intervention in quarrels; without these, palm oil production could hardly be successful. The interest of immigrants in the maintenance of law and order was basically economic and tied to the achievement of individual family targets.

Basic Immigrant Economic Activities

Rural migrants in general have several sources of income. They may exchange their labour for cash during weeding or harvesting periods, become fishermen, or exploit local cash crops such as wild oil palm trees, or engage in non-agricultural industries such as blacksmithing and shoemaking. Since these occupations do not require prolonged special training, there is often an easy combination, or a conversion of skills from one to another as determined by changing demands and relative profitability.

The Urhobo immigrants whose ages ranged between twenty and forty years engaged almost exclusively in palm oil production. They therefore needed the basic technology and access to land and wild oil palm trees. An immigrant required minimal investment to begin his occupation: his own strength, a cutlass, an axe, and a ropegirdle, called efi, which he could manufacture from parts of an oil palm tree. Other investments were the village trough, an important communal property in the economic collaboration. In addition to these an immigrant paid to an Ikale landlord about ₦1.20 and a bottle of gin as a settlement fee and ₦6 (about US $10)

after a year. The landlords exploited this relationship to their own advantage and began to develop ideas of rural capitalism.

A married immigrant arranged for his wife to follow him if the family did not travel together. On the other hand, an unmarried immigrant arranged for a wife to join him almost at once: a wife or wives and children were an essential part of the work force.

A normal working day began at 7 or 8 am and ended by 4 or 5 pm. Immigrants rested on Sunday, if Christian, or their traditional resting day called edewo. Oil palm production required searches through rough bush on footpaths and (nowadays) motorable roads for ripe palm fruits. A typical immigrant working intensively for twelve days in a month and resting every three days, cut an average of 1,080 regimes in one year. It took a household 21 days to complete the process of extracting oil from the palm fruits. On average, a kerosine tin of 18.2 litres of oil was produced from 18 regimes of palm fruits, thus giving a total of 60 tins of palm oil produced yearly by a typical immigrant. In addition to this an immigrant's wife or wives got 1,097.2 kg of palm kernel a year. These figures were diminishing each year owning principally to the ageing trees and to their destruction through fire and lack of manure.

There were fluctuations in prices and immigrant income but by 1970-72, a typical immigrant earned ₦150 from palm oil and ₦64.50 from palm kernel, hence a total of ₦214.50 from his oil palm produce From this amount he maintained his household of about six people on the average for one year.

An immigrant household spent the whole day labouring, producing palm oil or kernel or working in the farm, except on rest days. Every member of the household was involved in some kind of economic activity. In a normal distribution of labour, male adults were responsible for cutting and slicing oil palm regimes, fermenting and treading oil palm nuts, selling palm oil and the initial farm clearing, while adult females carried the processed palm nuts, extracted and sold kernel from oil palm nuts, manufactured soap and pomade from palm oil and kernel, weeded the farm, produced and marketed garri, starch, and other farm crops. Males, females, and children were all involved in carrying oil palm regimes between cutting and slicing, as well as in miscellaneous palm oil production activities. Women and children were also responsible for carrying and nursing babies.

Immigrant household-heads emphasized production for sale rather than for consumption. A household that consumed all or nearly all that it produced was considered unwise and could hardly achieve its targets. Immigrants households therefore planned their consumption habits to avoid paralysing their sales in the periodic markets or to visiting middlemen. Immigrants discriminated between buyers on the basis of their ability to pay high prices for the produce rather than on the basis of ethnic origin. From cash returns on a market day, an immigrant bought the needs of the household.

Immigrants derived satisfaction from their perception of wealth and progress. Their criteria in this respect included the ability to run the household expenses 'without tears', pay children's fees at colleges, build a personal house at home in the Bendel State, buy a vehicle (taxi or lorry), open a shop in the town, or buy cracking and grating machines. Immigrants invested their savings in the locality on moveable property such as taxis or the contents of a shop. In general, both Urhobo and non-Urhobo immigrants contributed immensely not merely to the concentration of population but also to the development of middlemen trade, shopkeeping and the diversity of occupational groups.

Trading Activities

Middlemen in the Oil Palm Trade

The position of the middlemen in the Division began with village camp founders. The British colonial government officers in the locality standardized this middleman position of the village heads by authorizing them to buy the produce of all other household heads in the camps and to sell these to the European firms. However, this system broke down and a new group of middlemen emerged with or without previous experience in the oil palm industry. This group like the producers-sellers themselves, were subject to the new regulations of the colonial Government Produce Department and Inspection Officers which required that the oil and kernel produced were of the best quality.

The middlemen, some part-time,others full-time, formed part of a relay trade in oil and kernel from the villages to the most profitable markets in urban or other areas. Palm oil was consumed locally or exported. The fact that there were surpluses and a middleman group to syphon these away encouraged the commercial development of the locality before and after Nigeria's independence. Under colonial rule, foreign companies which included Messers W. B. MacIver and Co. Ltd., Miller Brothers Ltd, Anglo-Guinea Produce Co. Ltd and John Holt & Co. Ltd, established themselves in the locality as from 1921 to trade in palm oil and kernel. Two main shipments were made overseas by the United Africa Company through the port of Koko in the Bendel State, and Messers John Holt and Company Ltd, through Lagos port.

Cash relations were developed as a consequence. Buying and selling oil and kernel were in terms of cash relations and while they lasted they superseded other kinds of relationships. It was a normal practice for a middleman's kinsmen to prefer selling his produce to a non-kin middleman, thus marking the early beginning of impersonal relations, socio-economic differentiation, and indicating the development of tastes for the new commodities imported by the foreign firms. In addition, Yoruba and Hausa immigrants were attracted from Abeokuta, Epe, Ibadan, Ijebu and other large Yoruba towns.

Between Nigeria's independence and 1972, British firms backed out of the trade in palm produce. Instead middlemen connected the village-camp producers with Government Licensed Buying Agents who in turn sold

their purchases finally to the Marketing Boards on whose behalf the Nigerian Produce Marketing Company Ltd in Lagos made shipments. Buying Agents were given minimum purchasing prices of both kernel and oil by Government every marketing year and were required to purchase produce from gazetted buying stations. These regulations helped to minimize the exploitation of village-camp producers, since each knew the gain a middleman made on him/her. The middlemen were themselves interested in the continuation of the palm produce trade that sustained their livelihood and hence they made just enough profits to encourage more production to start the chain in the village-camps.

Of twelve middlemen studied, ten were immigrants to the Ikale area. Four had been involved in the palm oil business before, four were Urhobo, including both the least and some of the most active in visiting camps (the frequency varied from 3 to 60 camps weekly), the rest were Isoko or Yoruba (including Ijebu and two Ikale). The year of their arrival in the Division varied from 1922 to 1965.

Immigrants engaged in other kinds of relationships than those in market situations. For instance middlemen lent money to immigrants in the villages to meet sudden or urgent expenses such as hospital bills, taxes and children's school fees. Repayments were in cash or a quantity of produce. Such a scheme was a powerful means of retaining customers. But it also led to a complicated system of indebtedness in situations where high interests were demanded. Similarly, a middleman was allowed by the village-camp producer to carry produce away on credit until he received money from a Buying Agent for the lots purchased. Hence, the role of middlemen created a new type of cash and commercial relationship which incorporated the traditional locally-specific and personalized relations.

Shopkeeping

Like everyone else, an immigrant considered shopkeeping as a stage forward from the drudgery of palm oil and kernel production. There were two ways of leaving the village-camp system behind to attain this stage. A household could decide to quit oil palm produce and to start a shop when they had a good year's income to add to previous savings. Secondly, particularly in large and well established households, it was a common practice for the combined proceeds of two or more seasons of oil palm production to be given to one member of the household, usually a fairly educated elder son, to begin a shop. In this latter case, the other members of the household stayed behind in the village-camp, working harder for additional savings to increase the capital and the content of the family enterprise. The keeper's parents visited this shop frequently to watch the progress.

Immigrants refrained from setting up shops in the village-camps themselves for a number of reasons. The demand-population was too small, hence payments for commodities if made in full at once would result in small turnovers. A shop would therefore suffer too great an accumulation of unsold commodities. Another reason was that village-camp inhabitants were so busy with enervating and regular work that neither

sellers nor customers would be available until late in the evening when everyone had returned from the day's work. A shop would in addition attract thieves to the village and would present management problems.

Therefore, once capital was acquired, immigrants proceeded to establish shops rather in such growing centres as Okitipupa. In this way the villagers around helped to concentrate population in one place and shopkeeping was both a cause and a consequence of such concentrations of human, food and other material resources. Unlike the village organization, the new concentration was increasingly heterogeneous with a population that had a more 'shop-oriented culture' in which commodities were effectively demanded and a more frequent turnover ploughed back to expand the shops in order to cater for diversified tastes and demands.

This is not to say that the history of shopkeeping began with the arrival of Urhobo immigrants, or that without immigrants there could not have been shops in Okitipupa and other towns in the Division. The fact was that both the oil and kernel produced by the Urhobo could satisfy more than local consumption: some of the oil and virtually all the kernel demanded a chain of economic activities which included middlemen, buying agents, and cash transactions, and this led to the investment of savings in shops. There were some Ikale and other Yoruba as well as other Nigerian shopowners. But these got their capital from such other sources as loans and farming proceeds.

With continuing increase in the population the tempo of shopkeeping in the urban centres also increased, with about 90% of the commodities being brought from Lagos. In the case of the indigenes almost every dwelling house that opened into a street had the parlour turned into a shop of some sort. Such shops required little capital. For example, each of the 117 Ikale-owned shops in Okitipupa and 51 in Igbotako (another growing small urban centre in the locality) was worth approximately ₦531 and 309 respectively as against each of the other Yoruba-owned shops (₦986 and 531) and the Urhobo shops (₦1,234 and 628 respectively). Although the Ikale owned about 66% of the shops in Igbotako, their contents accounted for only 49% of the total value of the shops. On the other hand three of the shops owned by the Ijebo (Yoruba) in that town accounted for only 4% of the total number of shops and yet up to 10% (i.e. ₦3,290) of the value of ₦31,772 for all the shops in Igbotako.

Immigrant and non-immigrant shopowners maintained several occupations principally because no one of them alone attracted such demand and yielded such income as could sustain the family. Hence a shopkeeper was also a goldsmith, a bicycle repairer, a shoemaker, etc., all in one room. Prices of commodities were generally moderate when compared with those in Ibadan and Lagos, taking transport costs into account.

Of the 35 types of enterprise in Okitipupa town in 1972, the most numerous were textiles and clothes (36), beer and drinks (21), and tailors and seamstresses (16). Nearly all these shops engaged from one to five persons. Only one bakery, one weaving, one textiles, one

radio/electrical shop, one tobacconist and two tailors employed from six to ten, and one textile shop employed from eleven to fifteen. Those enterprises that engaged less than five persons, often members of the household, rewarded them with periodic gifts as members of the owning unit. Throughout the opening time, wives, children, husbands, relatives and apprentices assisted in one way or the other. Breakfast, lunch and supper were served and consumed in a part of the shop, interrupted only by buyers. Some of the shopowners combined farmwork with shopkeeping; they left for their farms at about 5-6 am and returned between 12 noon and 2 pm to open their shops. Farmwork was an inevitable supplement to shopkeeping.

Although shops were managed in the rural setting, their processes contributed the semblance of an urban life, of a definite daily lifestyle different from that of either farmwork or oil palm production. The shopkeepers did not face complex organizational problems; shops were managed by common sense, checking off the profits and ploughing some of these back. Immigrants shopkeepers visited their natal homes for leisurely visits, told their kinsmen and friends about their progress and surveyed the market demand for the kind of commodities they stored in their shops in Ikale land. Some of the immigrants negotiated in advance for either an urban or a rural base for their shops and returned finally to the Bendel State whenever they felt that their gains and savings were adequate for their immediate expenses and for the transfer of their shopkeeping activities.

Increasing Diversification into Other Occupational Groups

The concentration of population and development efforts have produced economic growth poles as well as centres into which the Government injected development projects. The most important of these centres in the Ikale area was Okitipupa (a meeting point by the river side for those living in the rural hinterland and on the creeks), where the Government set up branches of its ministries such as the Local Government Council/ Divisional Office, the Customary Court, the police, agricultural stations, farm settlements and experimental oil palm plantations. Part of the Government efforts was the construction of roads and the establishment of postal services to link the area with other parts of Nigeria especially with Ibadan, the former Regional Headquarters.

By 1963, there was a large number of occupational groups. There were 114,085 employed persons in Okitipupa Division, 56.2% male and 43.8% female. The largest categories were 'farmers, fisherman, hunters and loggers' (67,875), craftsmen (16,626) and sales workers (16,394). In the latter there was a higher percentage of women than men, and a significantly high percentage of women (24.2% out of the 43.8%) in farming and fishing, but only a minority in the categories which included professional, administrative, clerical, transport and service workers. Some of the workers had no direct dealing with immigrant oil palm producers except as consumers or in bargaining relations in palm oil and kernel transactions. The presence of such a diversity of occupational groups contributed to the transformation of rural life in the direction of an urban system. But the rural base and the immigrant-indigene socio-economic relations gave the emerging urban centres their own distinct characteristics. Hence, places like Okitipupa and

Igbotako could never be replicas of Ibadan or Lagos even though these latter towns had an impact on the form which urban processes were taking in the smaller centres.

The Implications

This study supports Richards' suggestion (1956:222) that certain occupations and the technology for economic activities are culture-bound. The wider implication of this observation is that the richer the diversity of economic resources in any given region, the greater the influx of immigrants with different talents to participate in their exploitation. Hence, without this mixed population and variety of technological know-how certain economic resources would hardly be fully exploited. A necessary condition for local population concentration to promote socio-economic development and the emergence of urban features is therefore the access which immigrants and indigenes have to local resources.

This condition is met in the Okitipupa situation, the Division being made up of rural hinterlands which surround and contribute to growth centres and emergent urban concentrations from which the villagers in turn derive various incentives. The Urhobo and other immigrants not only helped to develop the national economy through their production for local use and for export but also contributed to the concentration of both population and elements of urban life.

The direction of this development was towards greater intensification of an urban system in which indigenes were centrally involved. The Ikale, for example, not only learnt from the Urhobo to climb the tall palm oil trees (before the arrival of the Urhobo immigrants they only cut regimes for food from low oil palms) but also developed the habits of shopkeeping and trade and became employed at the low levels of unskilled labour in plantations, government agricultural extension works, farm settlements and in the local Government Council. So that even after a majority of the immigrants had left the host society, a sustained system of urban life had been created. Government investments and participation in this urbanization process can hardly be withdrawn.

All the immigrants studied expressed a strong desire to return to the Bendel State at some stage on the attainment of their targets. Although a full study of the return-migrants has not yet been made, preliminary enquiries show that from both ends--the natal and destination points--we can apply a development theory, rather than development in one and decay in the other (natal), to rural migrant organizations and their consequences.

Hence, rural-to-rural migration should be encouraged by Government as a desirable strategy for rural development and for the emergence of socio-economic growth centres. In this respect an important obstacle which requires national policy is the land tenure system and the discouragement of the dual nature of local citizenship. Immigrants in Ikaleland were regarded as Nigerians but not as citizens of the local areas. This

discrimination is real and has socio-psychological consequences for immigrants; it also places them at a political disadvantage if any of them wish to participate actively in the politics of the local councils and the state.

However, whereas a full integration of immigrants would lead to their greater involvement in the development of their host society, the fact that they are pushed away and attracted back to their natal homes, principally by ties of kinship and an enduring share in a common system of symbols, renders immigrants able to spread the investment of their acquired wealth and skills to their natal homes. Hence, in both cases, rural migrants are powerful agents of the concentraion not only of population and development efforts but also of the elements of urbanization.

NOTE

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SMALL URBAN CENTRES: VANGUARDS OF EXPLOITATION TWO CASES FROM SUDAN

Abdel Ghaffar M. Ahmed
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Introduction: Against Dualism

'As theories of development, dualist interpretations have difficulty in accounting for the origin and the dynamics of a system which is, on the surface, dichotomous'.[1] Our acceptance of a dividing line between 'rural' and 'urban' sectors in African societies and the sectoral approach to issues of development allows for the continuing dominance of dualist assumptions in all fields. With the introduction of a differentiation in scale between 'urban centres', and 'small urban centres' and rural areas it appears that we are in a position where the introduction of the idea of continuity between rural and urban sectors may be accepted:

> Societies in transition are often a source of controversy, as they characteristically abound in ambiguities of both form and content. Historically they represent a dramatic juxtaposition of continuity and change.[2]

The small urban centres are the most ambiguous points in the rural-urban dichotomy since they represent the major point at which continuity and change meet. With characteristics that emphasize the contradictory nature of their position they can be seen as not fitting into either of the two sectors. Their presence as a justified third element shows that the sharp dichotomy that the dualist theories and model emphasize does not hold.

It is at the level of small urban centres that the involvement and contribution of the subsistence sector to the development of the export enclave in the economy of African countries can be seen. Being the marketing centres they are the points at which the contribution of African peasants to the cash crop industry crystallizes and the bond between the African hinterland and the world economy is sealed. When the dynamic of interplay between institutions and factors involved in the structure of the two poles is investigated, the polarity becomes clearly a complementary rather than an oppostional one.

Small Urban Centres

Congregation of people from a diversity of ethnic groups into small centres is not a new form of organization dating from colonial rule during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Such centres have been growing in Africa for centuries, and from the earliest days they have been associated with trade. In the case of central Sudan such centres date back to the Meroitic Kingdom. Their important role as representatives of the administrative expansion of the state, as well as major stopping stations on the caravan routes, appeared most clearly during the Funj rule (1504-1821).[3]

With the growing trade between Africa south of the Sahara and the Mediterranean, such centres came into being at strategic points on the caravan routes and large groups of people gathered around the markets that came to be established. Burckhardt's account of Shendy town (on the Nile between Atbara and Khartoum) is 'the most complete picture we have of life in Central Sudan as it was on the eve of Muhammed Ali's invasion.'[4] Its fabulous market every Friday and Saturday was the attraction, with its spices and sandalwood from India, antimony to blacken the eyelids, medicines, German swords and razors, saddles and leather goods from Kordofan, writing paper and beads from Genoa and Venice, cloth, pottery and basket-ware of every kind, soap from Egypt, cotton, salt and Ethiopian gold, monkeys trained to do tricks, wooden dishes, Dongola horses, camels and other beasts for desert transport. Shendy linked Africa to the Mediterranean from north to south, as well as lying on the east-west route for pilgrims to and from Mecca. Interacting intensely with its rural hinterland which supplied it with subsistence as well as craft and trade goods, it also concentrated political, bureaucratic, religious and military activities.

Its population was heterogeneous, mainly dominated by outsiders and involving a diversity of ethnic groups. Internal migration between the centre and its hinterland existed but the centre was not that effective as a labour market due to the fact that most of the work that demanded manpower was done by slaves and the commodity manufacture elsewhere. Thus, internal migration was of individuals who attached themselves to the centre until they finished whatever job might have brought them there. Many of the commodities were luxury goods which the long distance caravans brought. Food was the major supply of the countryside together with the products of local craft industry. Due to the complexity of the transactions luxury goods ended up in the hands of the inhabitants of the centre itself and did not penetrate the countryside, except to a few local leaders.

By contrast, the small centres of the colonial period extended their dominance over the countryside. New relations began to be established through taxation and the appropriation of land in the centre itself, together with the introduction of money as the only medium of exchange, gradually penetrating the existing modes of production in remote regions.

This had a major influence on the relations then operating in these remoter rural regions. For the first time the land which had been communally owned, the basic means of production for the majority of the population in the countryside, started to be privately appropriated--alienating manpower from this resource. Taxes (which represented the main local revenue for the colonial administration) were to paid in money which became a necessity and in turn created needs for other goods and utensils which substituted for the local industries.

With the abolition of slavery towards the end of the nineteenth century a need for labour started to arise. Hence, with the support of measures on land ownership and pressure from the collection of taxes, labour was changed into a commodity, especially in these small urban centres, but also in the countryside itself. It was at this point that the real penetration of the new mode of production, a capitalist mode, assumed full control of the economy in the centre and most of the countryside. The exploitative nature of the relations of production was promoted by these centres and in such a setting they became vanguards of the exploitation of the countryside, since they produced the first and closest centre for labour purchase.

The elite groups that controlled the various positions of power and authority in the countryside established themselves in these centres by sending a representative to stay there. In this way such a representative created an alliance with the representatives of the state and the mercantilists, which placed him in the position of serving himself, his patrons and his allies rather than the mass of the population of the countryside. The exploitative nature of the role of the elite in this situation was recognized by the masses but not rejected, because of their inability to make direct contact with the administration.[5]

It is obvious that small centres play a very important role as strategic points for the extension of services and welfare to the countryside. However, this role is played within the structure of the dominant relations and with the aim of promoting them, that is, all services provided have to serve the purpose of more effective exploitation.[6] At the same time the indigenous system of relations of production is being destroyed except for those that can be transformed to serve further exploitation. For example, the collective aspects of work are discouraged while the political dominance of exploitative elite leadership is supported. The redistribution system that follows from collective work ceases to exist, giving way to a system of accumulation on an individual basis. This is an inevitable consequence of the sale of labour and its individual rewards.

With the process of transformation of social labour into a commodity, internal migration from the countryside into the small centres started. But since the process of appropriation of good lands went on, the movement of the alienated population from the countryside reached

a point where the small centres could not cope. The small centre could neither provide adequate services nor necessary jobs. When this stage was reached the small centre turned into a major stopping place in the process of interregional migration. Here it is necessary to notice that even if there were a possibility, in small urban centres or indeed in the large urban centres, of giving enough services and jobs to such migrants, it could never happen. This is built into the capitalist mode of production which is interested in maintaining a flow of migrants and an underdeveloped countryside that provides this cheap labour in excess of the jobs available, in order to keep wages low.[7] The whole population in the countryside is kept migrant, on a waiting list, the main body of the reserve army of unemployed. The seasonal migration into large schemes such as the Gezira and its persistence over the years through the collection of labour during cotton picking only, can be meaningful only within such a frame.

Their physical location and strategic position in relation to communication routes has allowed for the dominance of small centres. The population in the countryside has come to consider them the 'seat of authority' since their own leadership and the government agencies have their courts and representatives there. This is accompanied by their role as centres for education since schools are usually located in them. Set in the small urban centre and organized and run by the dominant class of administrators, the educational system has become a very useful tool for the promotion of the political and ideological dominance of the economic mode of production that controls these centres. The educational system thus effectively deprives the countryside of the younger generations that are necessary for its development; it is being geared to the needs of the small and ultimately of the large urban centres.[8] Small urban centres are strategic in that they transmit labour migration information and tax revenue onward from villages to larger urban centres while also transmitting orders, decisions and market goods in the reverse direction.

Case Study 1: Radoam

The village of Radoam, 238 km south of Nyala, capital of the present Southern Darfur Province, illustrates the development of the resources of a remote area into an administrative and trade centre. Completely cut off from the rest of the world during the rainy season, it provides opportunities for cultivation, hunting and collection of forest products, fishing and nomadic pastoralism to the local Dongo-Kreish and the Kara and Binga who migrated there several centuries ago.

The Dongo used to concentrate around Jebel Dongo, 2.4 km to the north of the river (see fig. 2) and the Kreish used to occupy the area to the south with their centre around Kafia Kingi village. The Binga, Yulu, Kara and others were residing in the same area. Invasions from Zande to the south-west and slave traders from what is now the Central African Empire and the north had driven those people to that area. Yet they all lived in widely spread settlements and each group had its own



Figure 1: Location of the two case study areas.

chiefs and leaders. During the Fur Sultanate they were invaded by the Fur Sultans, turned into subjects and tribute was exacted annually. The resources of the area enabled the Sultan to obtain the equivalent of one hundred units of ivory tusks, spear heads, lumps of copper, ostrich feathers and fish. The young were taken to work as soldiers for the Fur Sultan. The village of Kafia Kingi developed into a trade centre with brick and mud shops.

When the British established their rule after defeating the Fur Sultan, they changed the administrative boundaries and determined to stop the slave trade and turn the ivory trade into a state monopoly. During this time traders were able to establish themselves and create a market for imported consumer goods and ornaments, especially beads. They were able to bribe the chiefs of the groups and hence to extract considerable profits. In 1928-30 the British decided to evacuate Kafia Kingi and move the Arab population--mainly of the Habbanya 'tribe'--to the north of the confluence of the Umblacha and Ada rivers. The groups were forced to settle around what is now Radoam. Those who opted to move northwards with the Arabs represented all the previously mentioned groups. Administratively the area was annexed to the Habbanya Nazirate



Figure 2: The Radoam area.

(the centre of which was Kalaka or Buram). The Umda of Radoam then was a Habbani but was succeeded by a Dongo. This movement led to inevitable disruption in the age structure through migration of the able bodied to other towns, and through a fall in the birth rate coupled with increasing infant mortality.

It is clear that the system that came into existence was one of subjection to outside forces with the creation of a new administrative and trade centre. These new attributes led to the idea of extending services to the area, and in the 1950s a boys' primary school was established followed by a girls' in the 1960s. A police station was also established at Radoam, backed up by a one man post in Kafia. Songo also came into existence at this time. A court with limited jurisdiction to look after some cases was formed of traditional leaders headed by the old Habbani Umda. Other governmental offices are those of the Game Department, the Forest Department, and a small clinic with a medical assistant assisted by two male nurses. Veterinary services are represented by a clinic also staffed by a veterinary medical assistant and two others who extend services to the nomadic groups that visit the area during the summer season. This form of government presence, however meagre, has given Radoam the image of a semi-urban area.

Education has created a class of people who consider life in Radoam incapable of meeting their new aspirations, so they migrate to other towns or cities, e.g. Buram, Diein, Nyala, El Obeid or Khartoum, to work as messengers, or join the police force or the army, depriving the area of its able-bodied population , who thus contribute very little to the family by way of remuneration. Forest and Game Departments offer some summer hired labour opportunities. The former employs more permanent workers than the Game Department, which uses temporary labour only in early summer to re-open roads for the different reserved areas, although it also employs some hunters, on a provincial appointment basis.



Figure 3: Radoam market, government offices, orchards and residential area.

A cooperative flour mill and village elders' councils have also been formed, dominated by the traditional leaders and merchants of local origin. Youth and Sudanese Socialist Union organs are dominated by the educated who were once migrants.

Traditional Subsistence Production

The new forms of trade and administration have had an adverse effect on traditional production activities based on subsistence consumption with equal access to communal land and collective labour by relatives and friends for cultivation, hunting and collection of wild game meat and honey from the forest. These activities still continue, however. Women also collect inlu nuts, and press them into oil for consumption. They have their own fields known as jubraka around the house, where they cultivate quick maturing varieties of dura (sorghum), millet, corn, sesame, okra and pumpkins.

Market Production

a) The resources of the area were conductive to profit seekers who started trading in slaves, ivory, feathers, game animals' skins--lion, leopard, python and crocodile. When the slave trade was abolished they continued trading in these other items, though often illegally, for licences were now required, which were issued to merchants to deal in a restricted number of reptile skins.

The importance and organization of this activity appeared in the 1950s when a tannery was established in Khartoum. Financiers advance cash to agents in Radoam for hunting expeditions, food for the trip, donkeys and traps. This money is advanced on credit for the hunting parties, agad, which are still organized on traditional lines. The return of this credit is supposed to be in kind, i.e., a number of skins in return for the amount advanced. Since the agreement has been made in advance of the hunt, the outcome is usually favourable to the creditor who appropriates all the profit margin that ought to go to the producer. This may be seen by comparing the amount of credit received by the hunters and the prices for the products received by the financier. The money and other expenditure advanced amount to about £S8 to each member of the agad. (£S1 = US $2.50.) The repayment required is the equivalent of one crocodile skin of 2-3 lbs (pound weight). However, the market price of that crocodile skin is £S14, and for a python's skin weighing 1 lb, the market price is £S7.500mms. The profit margin per pound thus varies from £S6 to £S11. This assumes that the hunting trip takes about three months on pay of only £S8-10 per month with a return to the hunter of £S30. The same applies to meat and honey. So the financier may get up to 300% and more on what he originally paid in financing the trip.

b) The other market product is bongo (hashish) and Radoam became a flourishing centre for this trade in the late 1960s. The outcome has been the return of young migrants back to the area to cultivate and deal in this illegal item. These people do the marketing

themselves, taking their produce to other towns to sell it. The prices they get are often not sufficient to cover the expenses for the trip and stay in these towns, and even if they are, the proceeds are spent on luxury consumer goods (fancy clothes, bicycles, radio and recorder sets). Other producers of bongo in the area get loans from merchants on the same basis as for hunting. They receive £S1 or the equivalent in consumer goods and repay it with 1 lb of bongo. The market price of 1 lb of bongo varies between 50 piastres, in September and October, and 350 piastres in December and January. (10mms = 1 piastre). This variation is attributed to the fact that the time of year when the area is most difficult for merchants to reach coincides with the period of most need on the side of the producers. When comparison is made with market price in Nyala, where bongo costs £S10, and Khartoum, where it varies between £S15-25 (it may sometimes exceed £S45), it becomes quite evident that a big profit goes into the hands of the merchants. This profit margin coupled with the advance credit system places the producers in a hired labourer's status with their conditions worsening both on the individual level and community level since none of this profit is geared towards investment in the area.

c) Production by merchants on big farms is a newly emergent trend gaining momentum. The products grown are mainly groundnuts, dukhn (millet) and sesame. The first and the last are a response to the demand for them created by the establishment of decortization plants and oil mills in Buram, Diein and Nyala. The area for this is mainly on the land surrounding Jebel Dongo. Plots as big as 10 and 15 mukhammis (about 58 m x 87 m). have been opened up by these merchants.

A trend towards the establishment of orchards started in 1962. Land was purchased from the previous inhabitants, at £S5 for each piece of land in the river banks. Those people then had to find other plots. In these orchards mango, guava, watermelon, lemons and tomatoes are grown which are mainly exported to Buram market. Hired labour was obtained from Dinka migrants at first, but nowadays local women and some men are also starting to hire out their labour.

Conclusion

The description has attempted to show how the area has emerged, or rather been deliberately developed into an administrative and trade centre through external factors. These changes have contributed adversely to the development of the area, with Radoam producers falling into the grip of the credit system which is known as shail in other areas of the central Sudan. The result has been an expansion of cash or market oriented production and a strong link, through the introduction of consumer goods and extraction of the resources of the area, between the population of the area and the wider economic system.

Case Study II: Kongor[9]

Kongor centre is a strategic point on the Malakal-Bor dry weather road in the area of eastern Dinkaland to be affected by the Jonglei

Canal (see Fig. 1 above).[10] Its court serves approximately 36,000 Twic Dinka and is the headquarters of the newly established Kongor People's Rural Council. On the fringe of the area of which Kongor is the centre lie the toich plains which extend up to the river proper and provide the population of Kongor centre with its dry season grazing lands. To the east lie the wide, uninhabited, grass plains referred to by the Dinka as aying. These plains used to be grazed by the livestock from Kongor area just after the rains and during the early dry season, in the years prior to the intensification of the Murle raids.[11] The area round Kongor is largely a low plain with limited high ground, known as the 'highland'. The term highland is arbitrary since these lands rise only a foot or two above their surroundings. The Dinka permanent settlements are located on these highlands as also is Kongor centre.

During the rainy season the whole area is subjected to flooding which has been disastrous in some years, inflicting great loss in human life and property, for example, in 1918, 1950 and 1961-4. These floods, especially the last ones, have deforested the area resulting in the disappearance of the relatively dense woods of acacia and balanites aegyptica which used to cover large parts of the area. This has led to a scarcity of wood for fuel and building material, destroyed some of the indigenous grasses and introduced others which are a menace to cultivation.

The Kongor Dinka economy is largely one of subsistence, seasonal and migratory, based on grain, meat, milk, and fish together with wild game and edible wild plants. Climate and topography make cultivation precarious, with sorghum as the main crop, cattle providing insurance for bad years as well as being objects of exchange and symbols of prestige. Tobacco and gourds enter petty trade in years of surplus.

From 1899 to 1919 the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium Government of the Sudan avoided interfering with local customs and values, ruling directly from military posts and facilitating the work and message of missionaries. Kongor emerged as a centre after 1919 with the recognition of 'tribal' units as bases of administration. It had its court and market by 1922, dispensary in 1935, tube-well and rest house after 1949, but no government school till 1953, since education had until then been in the hands of the missionaries with their centre at Malek. These services came almost to a standstill from 1955 to 1972 with floods and political upheavals caused by military activities of the civil war. Villages between Jalle and Kongor were completely annihilated by the destructive floods of 1961-4. Schools, dressing stations and police posts were cut off from supplies and deserted. Life only started again in centres like Kongor after the Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972. Services now provided are: administrative, judicial and security (area rural council, native court, police post); boys' primary school, adult education class; dispensary, dressing station; church, veterinary dispensary, bore-hole and well; rural market with shops, crop market and livestock market. The distribution of these services clearly reflects the graded importance of concentration points. Thus, in Kongor 10 of these services are represented, in

Duk fawiel and Duk padiet 9, in Anyidi 8, Paliau 7, Paker 6, while eight other small places have 5 services each and a few others 4 or less.

The Exploitative Nature of the Centre

Kongor's subsistence economy has a dominantly kin-ordered mode of production. Kinship looms large and involves jural and political obligations, as well as ecological, economic and organizational aspects. Rather than being egalitarian, societies like the Dinka, built up in the kin-ordered mode are replete with real inequalities and plagued by resulting tensions. They, using Wolf's words:

> attempt to cope with conflicts by atomizing them or by generalizing and displacing them on to the supernatural; or by breakup and fission. They lack the ability to marshall social labour apart from particulate relationships, in the manner of societies built up on the tributary or capitalist mode; and they lack therefore also the means of holding a society together internally, by internal and external violence which ensure the continuity of class domination and contradiction.[12]

However, floods and civil war have led to some modifications within this mode. Migration and the impact of the government forces from the centre in Kongor produced elements that brought the society together. At the same time other conflicts have been generated with the change within the basic production and consumption unit, the extended family. Those who migrated and came back with savings or sent home part of these savings to be invested in cattle, demand full rights in disposing of the animals on their return, something that runs contrary to firmly held values and customs which put such authority in the hands of the family head. Some of them even engage in large-scale cattle trade which is a new practice for the eastern Dinka and some have started small shops in their homesteads that are connected to the marketing centre in Kongor.

It is at this point of changing relations and the transformation which is taking place in the kin-ordered mode of production that the role of the centre at Kongor becomes very important. Kongor centre is seen by the Twic Dinka as the seat of authority where the court lies and the other representatives of the government live. Looking at the sketch in figure 4 it is readily apparent that the residential area is arranged around the court building and other services' houses.

Court activities are one of the two major functions that attract people to the centre, the other being the marketing facilities. The court through the system of payment of fines has introduced cash into the Dinka economy, normally not through direct sale by the individuals but through auction after an animal has been handed over by its owner to the court and its police. The remaining cash if any may be used



Figure 4: Sketch of Kongor village. The sketch was drawn, not to scale, by M. O. El Sammani, 1978.

to buy goods in the shops or local beer.

The presence of elites like the government employees in charge of services such as the dispensary and the school together with the merchants (the majority of whom are from the North) has led to the creation of job opportunities. Since some people lost their cattle herds during the flood, and others had to move to the centre for security during the civil war these opportunities are far fewer than the number who are forced to sell their labour. Looking at the rate of migration it seems that Kongor now only acts as a stopping station for migrants. But it is a point of attraction for those who have returned for sometime since it is the only place where they can spend part of the money that they have saved.

With the new relations created and developed among the residents of the centre and between them and their neighbours in camps and homesteads we can see the clear difference between the two dominant modes of production that are interacting: the kin-ordered mode of production, which is by now deformed, and the newly emerging capitalist relations within the centre, having full support from outside the region, not only in the form of governmental positions of power and authority, but also in the commercial sector.

Marketing Facilities

Market places of limited economic activity are to be found in most court centres in the area. They are focal points for social interaction where people of the same group meet to converse, attend court deliberations, and participate in social occasions and festivals. Apart from the shops, which are signs of economic activity, auction places for the selling of animals are also found in most of these markets.

Kongor market lies in the centre of the small agglomeration of huts making the village, surrounded by the few service facilities comprising the court, the dispensary the school, the water yard and the police post. Fifteeen shops have been built there, of which eight are functioning at present (see Fig. 4). Up to ten years ago trade in this area was wholly in the hands of merchants from the Northern parts of the country. Recently change has touched this aspect of life as more citizens from the area have entered into business. In Kongor centre six out of eight shops are manned by traders from the North and two by Dinka.

In a sample shop, owned by traders from the North, goods exhibited and their price in piastres were: sorghum (dura) 50; cooking oil (mba)30 (per lb); dates 15 (per lb); empty sacks 25; matches 2 (per packet); sewing thread 25; sardines 25 (tin); onions 10 (per lb); washing soap 9; tea 100 (per lb); biscuits 2 (packet); aluminium cooking pot 160; powdered milk 75 (tin); dyed cloth 60 (per metre); torch 60; damuriya 25 (per metre); sandals (250); sugar 17 (per lb); khaki cloth 65 (per metre); table salt 5 (per lb); blue wash 1; small mirror 5; zip 10; razor blade 2. Most of these commodities are common daily requirements of the population settled in the centre but less so in neighbouring homesteads

or camps. The prices of the commodities are higher than current prices in the towns of Malakal and Bor, a difference which is attributed to the cost of transport.

Of the eight shops in Kongor, the enterprises of the traders of Norhtern origin are bigger than those of traders from the South. This is due to the fact that almost all of the former run joint business with partners in one or each of the supply centres. The trader from whose shop the above table was made migrated from the White Nile area in central Sudan and started his business in Kongor in 1973. He is running this shop in partnership with another merchant residing in Malakal who was himself in Kingor some years back. This shop was started with a capital of £S3,000 approximately. In the first four years the capital almost doubled. The shop owner in Kongor being the manager of the business receives 50% of the profits. Usually the goods come to the shop in large quantities as a precaution against the blockage of roads during the rainy season and scaricty of goods even in Malakal. Prices are often affected by middlemen, as some merchants obtain their goods from Khartoum through the same partnership system and whatever the increase may be it is shifted to the consumer at the end of the chain.

Apart from cattle, the local inhabitants sell only a few goods to the merchants in these shops, such as skins, hides and tobacco. It was reported that about 600 head of cattle were sold to the merchants in Kongor market; they are also taken to markets as far distant as Bor, Juba and Yambio. There is a growing trade in livestock, part of which is managed by Dinka traders, who started by accumulating capital through labour migration. The selling season for cattle, other than those auctioned by the court, is usually July when all cattle return from the toich to the settlements, and when the dura (sorghum) shortage is most sharply felt.

Labour Migration

The percentage of migrants is greater among the economically active section of the population, which as an adverse effect on the local economy and its kin-ordered mode of production. The experience of the school started in 1953 shows that those pupils who go to school are lost to the homestead and the camp. While the vast majority of the economically active as a whole have occupations within their home region, as many as 17.8% of the 20 to 29 year age group are outside the region.

Concluding Remarks

The economy of the area, being still subsistence, generates a limited purchasing power, yet prices for the various commodities tend to be very high compared to many other parts of the country. Apart from the economic factors which govern supply and demand, such as the scarcity of goods, and the costs of transportation and storage, there is a tendency for local merchants to monopolize the situation and exploit the inhabitants. In this activity the Northern merchants and the Southern ones, whose number is growing through the involvement of some of the elite of the urban area in business, are equal in their exploitative role. With the

work on the Jonglei Canal now in progress the role of merchants and chiefs in exploiting the inhabitant is increasing every day and Kongor centre is extending its influence wider over varied homesteads and camps.

Conclusion

As clearly shown, the rural-urban imaginary dividing line does not hold in the two cases presented here. The role of the centre has been to draw its surroundings into active participation in the national and international economy. The kin-ordered mode of production is being transformed and the penetration of the capitalist mode of production and its exploitative relations under the merchant and 'tribal' elite is gaining dominance. The extension of services facilitates this process of exploitation since all the services rendered clearly in the long run serve the interest of the leading classes in the centre. The way planning of development goes in Africa it may be expected that the rural centres will continue this exploitation and will assist external powers to do likewise.

FOOTNOTES

[1]R. Leys (ed.), Dualism and Rural Development in East Africa, Institute for Development Research, Copenhagen, 1973.

[2]A. Mafeje, Science, Ideology and Development: Three Essays on Development Theory, Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Uppsala, 1978, p. 47.

[3]R. S. O'Fahey and J. L. Spaulding, Kingdoms of the Sudan, Methuen and Co., 1974

[4]A. Moorehead, The Blue Nile, Harper and Row, New York, 1962. J. L. Burchhardt, Travels in Nubia, J. Murray, London, 1819.

[5]Cf. Talal Asad, The Kababish Arabs: Power, Authority, and Consent in a Nomadic Tribe, Praeger, New York, 1970. I. Cunnison, Baggara Arabs: Power and the Lineage in a Sudanese Nomad Tribe, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1966. Abdel Ghaffar M. Ahmed, Shaykhs and Followers: Political Struggle in the Rufaᶜa al-Hoi Nazirate in the Sudan, University of Bergen, Department of Social Anthropology, Bergen, 197..

[6]Veterinary and agricultural services, for example, are intended to increase the production of the area concerned for the national economy, rather than to benefit the local people.

[7]The most notorious case of this is South Africa, but in other African countries the practice, if not the explicit theory, is the same.

[8]Colonial education systems were geared to the policy of creating cheap labour. Today's systems should rather be geared towards creation of equity and self-reliance, but few have been radically changed.

[9]This section has been based on the work of the socio-economic survey team working in the area since 1976. Most important among the reports used here are: Existing Services in Kongor and Bor Districts and Demographic Characteristics of Kongor Area, by M. O. Sammani and others, and Integrated Rural Development. Problems and Strategies: The Case of the Dinka and the Nuer of Jonglei, by Abdel Ghaffar M. Ahmed, 1978.

[10]The Jonglei Canal Project aims at the reduction of water losses in the Sudd region of the Southern Sudan to increase the Nile yield and the capacity for agricultural development of the Jonglei region which is not feasible without the relief of the swamps from the present excessive flooding. Studies for the utilization of the Upper Nile Swamps have been going on since the beginning of this century. In 1938 the Egyptian Government submitted to the Sudan Government a proposal for the Jonglei Canal Project. The proposal comprised storage of water in the Equatorial Lakes and the construction of Jonglei Canal having a discharge capacity of 55 million cubic metres per day. The control of the water requirements of Egypt during the timely period in the low flow season would provide an extra yield of seven milliard cubic metres of water. The proposed project would have resulted in reversing the natural cycle of the river's fluctuation during the flood and low flow periods, and would have consequently led to radical changes in the livelihood of the inhabitants of the affected region.

This project was modified in 1948, reducing the discharge capacity to 35 million cubic metres in normal years and 55 during high years. This was again modified in 1974 for a project not governed by storage in the Equatorial Lakes. Most important among the physical works that comprise this phase is the execution of the main canal having a discharge capacity of 20 million cubic metres per day, and a total length of 280 km from Jonglei village up to the mouth of the Sobat River, near Malakal. Recently the starting point has been moved to Bor.

[11]The Murle occupy the area south-east of the Eastern Dinka and hostilities existed for a long time between the two groups. The government exploited these hostilities during the 1955-72 civil war and supplied the Murle with modern arms during the 1960s to fight the Anya-nya forces. The Murle waged bloody raids on the Dinka of this area and other peoples, killing men and capturing women and children. This situation stopped the Dinka from using their eastern plains for grazing.

[12]Eric R. Wolf, "The Mills of Inequality." Paper presented to Burg Wartenstein Symposium No. 80 on Social Inequality: Comparative and Developmental Approaches, August 25 - September 3, 1978.

THE POTENTIAL ROLE OF SMALL URBAN CENTRES IN RURAL DEVELOPMENT

J. Adebanji Alao

Introduction

Rural development has been variously defined in the past by many people. However, most definitions seem to contain a generalised notion of quantitative and qualitative changes (improvements) in the patterns of life of a specified rural population. The UN/ECA report (1971) on integrated approach to rural development in Africa, defined rural development as "the outcome of a series of quantitative and qualitative changes occurring among a given rural population, and whose converging effects indicate, in time, a rise in the standard of living and favourable changes in the way of life of the people concerned". It does not mean, the report continued, "isolated programmes of 'community development', 'rural animation', mass education', 'agricultural extension', 'health and nutrition extension', or any other terms applied to sectorial programmes, it means, rather, a comprehensive development of the rural area". The World Bank report (1975) remarked that rural development "is a strategy designed to improve the economic and social life of a specific group of people--the rural poor". The report noted further also that "the objective of rural development, extends beyond any particular sector. It encompasses improved productivity, increased employment and thus higher incomes for target groups, as well as minimum acceptable level of food, shelter, education and health". Uma Lele (1974 gave three key elements in her definition of rural development:

(a) Improving the living standards of the subsistence populations which in turn involves setting priorities in the mobilization and allocation of resources in order to obtain a desirable balance over time between welfare and productive services available to the subsistence rural sector.

(b) Mass participation requires assuring that resources are allocated to low income regions and classes, and through the choice of institutions, that the productive and social services actually reach the mass of the subsistence population.

(c) The process must be self-sustaining. This requires the development of appropriate skills and implementing capacity, and the presence of institutions at the local, regional and national levels to ensure effective use of existing

resources and to foster mobilisation of additional human and financial resources for the continued development of the subsistence sector.

For many decades, the academic community, national and international agencies, and indeed the whole world have tried to find appropriate formulae for rural development. The stated goal has always been the same but the means or the process have always been contentious. In the following pages, I shall discuss the importance worldwide need, review some of the strategies that have been used in the past for rural development and discuss the potential role of small urban centres in rural development. The last section of the paper will outline the research needs of this approach.

There is a need in every nation of the world for rural development. Granted this need is more pervasive and more urgent in most of the developing countries where rural development becomes the focus of development effort. But even in each of the developed countries of the world, the absolute size of the population that is classified to be under abject poverty is far in excess of the population of several developing countries in Africa put together. Therefore, there is a need for a carefully thought out policy and principles upon which action programmes aimed at equitable distribution of goods and services of a nation could be based.

First, many nations with abundant resources have discovered that their antecedent development policies and strategies have tended to favour certain sectors (and more often than not this is usually in the minority) of their society than others. Such a policy has a dual effect of making the minority influential, wealthy, strong and powerful while it has rendered the majority voiceless, poor, deprived, weak and forgotten. In some countries, there is a deliberate policy of the power holders to deprive others of the benefit of sharing equitably in the resources of the nation based on ethnicity, race and/or creed. There is, therefore,a need for a conscious effort to redress the situation.

Second, in those nations with a limited amount of resources and where there is the positive will, the greatest problem facing policy makers is how to efficiently spread the 'limited good' so that some groups or areas are not found wanting, while some groups and some areas have all things in abundance. This requires rational planning to ensure a fair distribution of the nation's resources.

Third, in some countries, where the official policy favours equal participation and equal opportunity for all irrespective of race, colour and religious persuasion, the type of economy which encourages individual achievement tends to leave a sector of the society behind deprived and poor.

Fourth, in many so called developing nations, the majority of the population still eke out their existence under unbelievably intolerable

conditions of subsistence economy coupled with seasonal hunger, with no good drinking water, without the bearest minimum health-care facility, poor shelter, no roads, no modern forms of communication, and lacking in the basic social institutions. In most cases, the countries themselves are small both in terms of total area and in population which scattered in small close-knit villages with poor access between them either by road, air or water. Most of the countries depend on single or few export crops or commodities for their foreign exchange earnings and the internal markets are not large enough to attract foreign investment that can boost the economy.

Most of them share a common recent past of being a colonial territory of one or more European contries. As a consequence, they are politically and economically immature. Before the political independence of these countries, efforts of the foreign powers were concentrated in developing a few ports and trade centres which linked these countries by trade and commerce with the metropolitan country. Invariably the towns and villages in the hinterland were left undeveloped, since they were not important for the objectives of the colonial government.

After independence, these poor countries are faced with evolving a social policy which either favours the maintenance of the status quo of growth without development, a situation where there is abundant wealth for the few urban based new elites or of evolving an egalitarian society where there is guaranteed good satisfying life for everyone.

Several approaches and policies have been used in the past for rural development in the developing countries. At the middle of this century, the countries in Africa and in India adopted what was popularly known as the community development approach. The Report of the Ashridge Conference in 1954, held under the auspices of the Colonial Office, gives the original short definition of community development as "a movement designed to promote better living for the whole community, with the active participation and, if possible, on the initiative of the community..." Community development covers all forms of development activity in the field. Economically, it includes such subjects as agriculture, cooperation, communication and forestry; socially it includes health, welfare and education. The major emphasis in this type of approach is self-help on the part of the individual communities. The projects are locally initiated, locally based and community financed without or with little assistance from the outside. The critics of community development have argued that the initial enthusiasm generated for popular voluntary participation in the programmes often fails to carry throughout the life of the project, resulting in high failure rate, and that such projects often suffer from lack of required financial capital. Except perhaps in India, where community development means much more than self-help community projects, earlier efforts at community development have sunk into oblivion in many countries.

About two decades later, the notion of integrated rural development was born. It came out of the discovery that no single problem exists in isolation in the social world. Efforts made at solving one problem

invariably lead to the uncovering and perhaps the precipation of other problems which need to be solved before the solution of the initial problem could be meaningful. Through this approach, it is also possible to deal with the problems of several communities together. Hence in an integrated rural development project, one could deal with agricultural, health, educational and many more problems of a set of communities simultaneously.

Another approach has been referred to as regional development, whereby efforts are made to tackle the problems of development of a geographical region with discrete population in a concerted way in order to achieve a measure of economics of scale.

All these approaches and many more have been experimented with in many countries in their effort to find the most appropriate method to achieve equitable distribution of foods and services and to achieve a satisfying life for all. But for many countries and for many places, this goal has eluded even adroit planners. This has led to revisiting old theories and notions about how communities relate naturally to one another.

Berry and Harris (1966) have put together in the International Encyclopaedia of Social Science, the work of many authors on the central place theory. According to them, central place theory is fundamentally concerned with the patterns through which wholesaling, retailing services and administrative functions, plus market oriented manufacturing are provided to the consuming population. By nature, central places tend to have a more or less uniform dispersed distribution over an area with homogeneous physical and economic characteristics, and are basically centres performing commercial functions.

The classic central place theory begins by considering two conditions that affect the variety of goods and services which are to be provided to consumers. These are (a) the conditions of entry (thresholds), the minimum market sizes (in quantity of size) necessary for the support of each kind and (b) maximum distances which consumers are willing to travel to each kind of establishment (outer ranges of goods)--(Berry and Harris: 1966).

Within the whole concept of central places, one would expect a hierarchy of central places. That is, in terms of functional relationships one would conceive of a system of central places within central places or systems within systems.

Ideally, a small community, or part of a larger community, may constitute a central place for certain goods and services for its members. Such services may include simple elementary things such as drugstore, a post office, grocery store, etc. A large central place may include larger services such as a hospital, a secondary school and banking facility.

One may also look at this problem from the structural-functionalist point of view. Durkheim, nearly an hundred years ago, postulated his theory of organic solidarity which characterizes the units of the society

as becoming increasingly dependent on one another because each unit has taken on the performance of qualitatively differentiated functions. He further proposed that "the division of labour (functional differentiation) varies in direct ratio with the volume and density of society, and if it progresses in a continuous manner in the course of social development, it is because societies become regularly denser and generally more voluminous" (1933:262). If there would be more specialised functions performed by specialised centres, then there must be more cooperators, and they must be related to cooperate. In Durkheimian clarification of this notion, it is not that the complexity of societies permits, but that it necessitates a greater division of labour. In other words, it is not an instrument by which the division of labour in society is realised, it is its determining cause.

Eisenstadt (1964:375) viewed social differentiation as the way through which the main social functions of the major institutional spheres of the society become disassociated from one another, attached to specialized collectivities of roles and organized in a relatively specific and autonomous symbolic and organizational framework within the confines of the same institutionalized system. Young (1964) conceptualized differentiation as a social systems capacity to process a diversity of information types or a diversity of meaning areas in a symbolic structure. This can be operationalized in terms of meaning sectors that have been publicly discriminated. In a study carried out in Nigeria (Alao 1971:58-59), thirty-two publicly discriminated items (meaning areas) were included in a Guttman Scale (coefficient of scalability 0:66), to demonstrate the relative degree of differentation of ninety communities (see figure 1). This in effect shows in many instances the capacity of each community to provide certain kinds of services to the population. In a more recent study by Young and Schlegel (1976), it was shown that there was a strong correlation (0.62) between measures of local level development, as indexed by such publicly discriminated structures as primary schools, high schools, union democratic councils, telegraph offices, police stations, post offices, dispensaries, and tubewells, in each thana (small county-like units), and the size of population of each thana. On the other hand, the correlation between distance from Calcutta and the geographical centre of a thana is -0.41. This is an indication that the further one goes away from Calcutta, the less is the level of development in the regional centres. The last result is not surprising as repeated systematic research will validate cursory observations of this phenomenon is many developing countries. In a recent discussion of dependency theory by Young (1977), he opined that the Third World countries can be divided into core and peripheral regions and that the core is linked to and favoured by the metropolitan countries that are the home base of multi-national corporations that dominate the economy of the subordinate countries. The core region is typically centred in a large port city--Lagos, Accra, Rio de Janeiro, etc.--that manages the flow of exports from the periphery. These periphery regions tend to stagnate because the core region exploits them and because it truncates or distorts attempts to establish an independent agricultural industrial base. This is one of the reasons why it is crucial that the developing countries should find an appropriate system to undertake rural development upon which depends their economic and social progress. According to a recent I.U.C. Report (1976:56) several points were made in support

FIGURE 1

1970 Scale of Structural Differentiation

Scale Step	Content	Percent Discriminated	Error
1	Community has a name	100	0
2	There are at least two tailor shops Community has a primary school Five-day market held in the community There are at least two barber shops There are at least two food canteens	99	1
3	Community has a bicycle repair shop Community has a carpenter shop	98	2
4	Community has a blacksmith shop	97	5
5	Community has at least two retail shops	93	6
6	Community has an orchestra-band	90	
7	Community has a shoe repair shop	83	2
8	Community has photo studio	81	2
9	Community has a grain grinding mill	78	9
10	Community has at least a Grade C Customary court	71	6
11	Community has a dispensary that opens daily	67	9
12	There is at least one store that sells patent medicine	61	7
13	Community has at least one Cooperative Society Store	58	12
14	Community has a maternity center with regular staff	54	12
15	Community has at least a postal agency	52	12
16	Community has a post-primary school	48	9
17	Community has a rediffusion radio network	43	7
18	Community has a newspaper agent or vendor	37	5
19	Daily market is held in the community	30	12
20	Community has an abbatoir (slaughter house)	29	9
21	There is one petrol station in the community	24	6
22	There is a motor mechanic shop	22	7
23	Community has a public motor park	19	7
24	Community has a Nigerian Police Station	13	2
25	Community has a cottage hospital	1	0

Coefficient of Scalability = 0.66.

of this above view:

(a) The prosperity and the well-being of most developing countries will depend on appropriate and effective action to promote change in the rural sectors of their economies.

(b) The pattern of successful rural development is both complex and diverse. The developing countries and their peoples differ from one another in respect of natural environment, history, race, culture, density and growth rate of population, social and political organization, national objectives, resources, and economic development.

Since the resources available in each country are seriously limited, a rational means of spreading the available resources for rural transformation has to be evolved. Herein lies the important role of small urban centres.

In a country like Nigeria, and I expect it will be so for many other countries especially in West Africa, there are communities that naturally relate to one another because of several factors. These are the relative sizes of the communities, their proximity to one another, their historical, cultural, political, and economic and even religious ties.

In 1968, after the University of Ife had moved to its permanent site, the Department of Extension Education and Rural Sociology, one of the five departments in the Faculty of Agriculture, was desirous of bringing about rapid improvement in the agricultural productivity of farmers near the University, by bringing to them proven results of research from the Faculty of Agriculture. Consequently the staff members of the department visited the neighbouring farming villages within a fifteen mile radius of the University and discussed this plan with the members of the respective communities. Based on the discussion with people in each village for voluntary participation, ten communities accepted to be included in what came to be known as Isoya Rural Development Project which was conceived as an integrated rural development project.

We discovered after several years that the chosen centre for the project and all the facilities provided there, which included a project house, drying and storage facilities, classrooms, and educational materials, were not being used by some of the villages in the project; that some communities are more apt to attend meetings and participate in extension programmes than others. A closer study revealed to us several years later that (a) some of the communities are in fact satellites of other larger communities which were not included in our project villages; (b) there are more historical and traditional links between some communities than others, as in the case of three communities descended from three brothers of the same patrilineal descent; (c) there had been long standing feuds between some of our chosen communities unknown to us at the

commencement of the project which had militated against cooperation between their members. Also there were physical barriers--such as absence of direct road linkages between some of these communities and where roads exist, they are impassable during the major part of the wet season of 8-9 months which renders contact between these communities difficult.

Oftentimes, political arrangements of communities have tended to be superimposed on a stronger but more subtle division between communities in different states. For instance, Ekiti Division is split between Kwara and Ondo State. Or worse still, as it happens in some boundary towns, members of the same community may find themselves under two different political administrations.

In most parts of Nigeria, communities are arranged in nucleated fashion. An example of this could be found in most parts of the Northern States and Southwestern Nigeria. In the northern parts of Nigeria, the Fulani Empire had established its rule before the arrival of the British. All towns and communities are related to one another in a hierarchical manner, and all their rulers are Fulanis related by blood. At the lowest level is the village, where the village head derives his power and authority from the District head who is in charge of several communities. The head of the village may be a direct brother, son, or cousin of the District head in that order of preference. In turn, District heads owe their allegiance and authority to the Emir who is the ruler of the emirate, and all Emirs owe allegiance to the Sultan who is the supreme head of the Empire. The British administration was simply superimposed on this system during the colonial period.

Also in Southwestern Nigeria there are several Yoruba kingdoms ruled by an oba. Each kingdom is made up of several towns and tributary villages. The head of each village pays tribute to the oba of the kingdom although a village head is in no way related to the king of the kingdom.

These last examples point to a complex, well-integrated political structure where every community has its assigned role and function in relation to one another. We need:

(a) To identify those factors that naturally group certain communities together and consequently draw social and geographical boundaries around these to constitute them into functional units.

(b) To identify the centres of such units and to relate them in a hierarchical way.

(c) To determine the appropriate level of central services which each of these units can competently and most efficiently incorporate.

(d) To determine the population of each unit as a means of determining the adequacy of each of the incorporated services.

(e) To determine the optimum distance which consumers are willing to travel to use the services in a central location.

(f) To identify existing and potential linkages between various central places and how to effectively strengthen these.

(g) To identify the processes involved in the differentiation or increasing complexity of hierarchical organisation.

(h) To design new functions which the central places might serve for the benefit of their contributing communities.

Research efforts in this area need to be taken at two levels, at the national and cross-national levels. Within the same country, there could be regional comparisons along the outlined research areas listed above. In order to facilitate cross-national comparisons, equivalent concepts and terminologies have to be developed in the research process.

In conclusion, let me hasten to add that answers to the questions posed above and the organisation of a country or region into distinct hierarchies of central places providing goods and services is not yet a panacea for development. Suppose, for the purpose of argument, that the government of a nation has established an agro-service centre in a central location that is accessible to all potential users in the area, the provision of adequate and timely supply of the services becomes crucial to the success of the centralised services. If the improved seeds, fertilizers, chemical, etc. meant for distribution to farmers are not supplied on time and at the right amount, the potential users will soon lose confidence in such services and seek for assistance elsewhere or do without them. A maternity centre constructed for use between two communities might just as well not have been built if there will be no drugs to administer to patients and no personnel to handle the problems referred to the centre. One of the criticisms of central functions (Young: 1977) is that it addresses itself to only a slice of the actual complexity of such places required to function efficiently. Therefore administrative functions have to be taken into account and effectively coordinated for the efficient performance of the central functions. Uma Lele gave three preconditions which might facilitate the realisation of the goal of rural development. These are, first, appropriate national policies,e.g. on land tenure systems, pricing and marketing systems, wage structures, technology policies, etc. Second, effective administrative systems; too much centralisation of governmental structures leads to rigidity and lack of responsiveness to demands from the periphery - outstations. Third, overall institutional development, including distribution of developmental responsibility among the regular governmental structures, the semi-autonomous structures, private commercial and traditional institutions and elective bodies. I believe these and several other factors undergird the success of any strategy that may be adopted for rural development in the Third World countries.

SMALL URBAN CENTRES IN NIGERIA'S DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY: THE ROLE OF RURAL MARKET CENTRES

Isaac Ayinde Adalemo

Introduction

In two earlier papers (Adalemo 1972b, 1977), I have advocated the adoption of a deliberate policy of urbanisation in which small and medium-sized urban centres will be provided with necessary facilities to enable them to function as centres of development for the surrounding rural areas with which they are socially and economically linked. I have also argued that it is necessary to discontinue the (over) concentration of functions in a few urban centres and instead pass on some of these functions to medium-sized urban centres located throughout Nigeria. By doing this, we can promote spatial linkages and consequently rapid and systematic development of the spatial economy. The aim of this paper is to examine the role that rural market centres can play in this developmental process. Specifically, our discussion should lead us to some policy recommendations with respect to the identification of development centres within rural areas especially as Nigeria's current development strategy envisages comprehensive development of rural areas.

Rural Market Places as Extensions of the Urban System

Stine's paper, "Temporal Aspects of Tertiary Production Elements in Korea", a pioneering work in the study of rural market systems, was appropriately included in a volume entitled Urban Systems and Economic Development (Pitts, ed. 1962). Bromley (1971, p. 125) recognises the marketplace as "one of the fundamental focal points of economic life". Eighmy (1972) relates the rural market system more explicitly to the process of urbanisation when he states that "the evolution of an urban system such as exists in western Nigeria represents a similar, albeit larger scale and more complex version of the processes which govern the founding, spacing, growth and economic functions of a rural market system" (p. 314). One may add to Eighmy's observation the assertion that the traditional market system represents an articulation of spatial linkages which the later development of post-European contact cities and their connecting transport routes has not taken into consideration. This neglect shows up in the fact that in the development of linking transport routes, instead of first providing local links on which interstate road networks can be super-imposed, what has happened is a concentration on the development of national trunk roads without suitable connecting links with the rural production centres. One consequence of this as reported by Ogundana (1972, p. 87) is that "a substantial proportion of agricultural production is left to rot in the producing areas with the result

being high prices in urban areas and a depression of production and living standards in the rural areas".

While the pattern of development since colonial times has failed to recognise their importance, recent studies (Adalemo 1972a; Bromley 1971; Filani and Richards, 1976; Gana, 1976) have shown that rural market centres continue to play important roles within their areas of location and to some extent in the national economy. They perform integrative functions by providing the link between the production and consumption centres of the economies within which they are located. This link does not stop with the mere transfer of goods. It includes the transmission of vital developmental information as these market centres act as centres of the diffusion of information to the surrounding areas. Not all market centres can be regarded as urban centres. Many of them would not qualify as such. With respect to the functions they perform, however, the comments by Thomson and Taylor (1978, p. 5) become pertinent. Market centres are seen to fit into "the concept of the 'invisible' town defined as a location where many functions of a town are carried on but where there are fewer, if any, permanent structures associated with these functions than observers used to a western concept of towns might expect". Market centres in rural areas of developing economies take on added functional importance if we agree with Thomson and Taylor that the growth centre model of development is inapplicable to a Third World country whose urban development has evolved in response to the needs of colonialist powers and whose towns often have a parasitic rather than a generative influence on their surroundings. More appropriate would be a model based on development centres which are more likely to be small agro-urban places properly equipped to provide innovative cultural, social, employment, trade and service functions for itself and its associated rural hinterland.

Market Centres as Focal Points

Bromley (1971, p. 125) describes the marketplace as one of the fundamental focal points of economic life. Adejuyigbe takes this idea further in his discussion of community focal points. According to Adejuyigbe (1977, p. 204), a focal point within a rural area could be the seat of the traditional leader of the community or the location of its main traditional commercial centre--in this case a rural market centre. He argues further that since "in almost every community, the seat of the traditional community leader was also the location of the main commercial centre i.e., the market", the intensity of movements to markets would indicate the traditional focal point and this is likely to be greatest where the seat of the traditional community leader coincides with the location of a market.

The relevance of Adejuyigbe's work to our own present concern is that he has not stopped at identifying focal points with market centres. He has gone further to delineate what he calls 'community of interest'. A community of interest is delimited by allocating each rural settlement to the focal point with which it has the greatest volume and intensity of interaction. Interaction with existing large urban centres

was not included in the bundle which was used to delineate rural communities of interest. In this way, the distorting effect of the influence of existing urban centres was avoided. His purpose for delineating communities of interest is to identify which of the focal points have the potentials to function as development centres. In applying his idea to the Ife/Ijesha area of western Nigeria, boundaries of communities of interest were delimited and mapped. The similarity between the two maps is very striking. It is very tempting to infer from this that market centres could serve as surrogates for the development centres which we wish to identify for the rural areas. This realisation would suggest that people in rural areas already identify market centres as potential development centres. The location of marketplaces within certain settlements already indicates that a selection process is at work, a selection process in which the rural inhabitants have given expression to their spatial preferences. We can only ignore these revealed spatial preferences at the peril of our developmental efforts.

Selection of Development Centres for Rural Areas

The presence of market centres makes it unnecessary to go into the trouble, as suggested by Shah (1974), of gathering both inflow and outflow data to determine how all settlements relate to each other in order to deduce how the systems and social institutions which they include can best be structured and spatially located. What will be necessary is to establish for each market centre its pattern of interaction with the surrounding villages with a view to establishing market centre tributary areas and consequently their order of importance as service centres. The information obtained from such an exercise will enable us to rank the market centres in the order in which they are prefered by the communities they serve. In addition to this, consideration can and should be given to the relative advantage of each centre in terms of the availability of resources that could provide the base for the development of specific projects whether industrial or agricultural or both.

Spatial Linkage

One of the major shortcomings of the existing urban centres in developing and formerly colonised countries is their failure to promote linkages in the developmental space. In attempting to distinguish between 'growth pole' and 'development pole', Harrison Church (1977) made the following remarks: "Where there are few or no backward or forward linkages within a country, and little or no structural change, the growth pol becomes one of disequilibrium rather than of development." We have however pointed out earlier that the growth pole model is unsuited to the developing countries precisely because the urban centres (often referred to as growth poles) have been to a large extent structurally separate from the general spatial economies of these countries. Unlike the system of marketplaces which articulate and is intricately tied in with the indigenous socio-economy, the larger urban places are superimposed and to a large extent alien. The linkages in the traditional economy provided by the network of market centres should be exploited for

the benefit of the rural areas which have so far been left out of the process of development because of the dualistic nature of economic development in the larger urban centres.

Effective Distribution of Services and Goods

Most of the discussion to this point has assumed the provision of facilities at locationally fixed centres. Often, the argument for not providing socio-economic facilities in rural areas centres around the high threshold requirement and the low demand in each rural centre. One lesson we can learn from the characteristics of rural markets is their ability to provide some of these facilities at periodic intervals when aggregate demand will justify the cost of providing them. There is no reason why health, postal and credit facilities could not be provided on a mobile basis. Good quality service can be provided in this way within the rural areas.

The provision of mobile services does not in any way obviate the need for locationally fixed centres within the rural areas since even the mobile facilities would have to take off from and return to a locationally stable centre for replenishment and repairs. In order to ensure effective distribution of services and goods a centre must be selected for each rural area to serve as developmental headquarters. Such a centre must be provided with infrastructural facilities to link it with its hinterland and the rest of the spatial economy. The subsidy needed to make such provisions is likely to be lower than those now being used to combat the problems consequent on over concentration of facilities within the large urban centres. They are also likely to pay richer dividents.

Conclusion

Part of the structural change which has become necessary for the development strategy of a developing country such as Nigeria is the abandonment of a colonial urban system and the encouragement of the development of an indigenous system of smaller-sized urban centres which are sure to promote development in the rural areas of the country. This paper has tried to argue that the system exists in the network of rural markets which abound throughout the country and which represent a spatial articulation of the local economy. What is necessary is to recognise these nodes of socio-economic activities, identify those of them which are potential centres of development and direct necessary investment to them to enable them have the infrastructural facilities so sorely needed. With the linkages already established, the provision of facilities will enable these smaller urban centres to perform within a modern economy in such a way as to positively affect development within their hinterlands.

THE CHANGING SOCIO-ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN IKORODU AND ITS NEIGHBORING VILLAGES 1950 - 1977*

Babatunde Agiri

An important trend in the theory of economic development for the Third World countries in recent times is the adaptation of concepts and theories of growth poles and growth centers. Arguing the case for India, Misra 1971,[1] suggests the establishment of a hierarchy of local, subregional, regional and national growth foci that will ensure a spatially balanced natural development. At the apex of the hierarchy. Misra advocates the establishment of growth poles at the national or macroregional level. These will be urban centres of between 500,000 and 2 1/2 million people. They will have predominantly tertiary functions and lesser secondary and primary functions.

Next to the growth poles in the hierarchy are growth centers of population between 50,000 and 500,000 serving regions of about 2 million people each. The growth centers are full urban and industrial centers although they may have some primary and tertiary functions depending upon the economic structure of the regions they serve. They are expected to provide both forward and backward linkages for agriculture and to have all the facilities of modern industrial centers--radio/television, banks, post offices and post-secondary institutions.

At the subregional levels are growth points that are of crucial importance in rural development. The most important economic functions of the growth centers will be the production, handling and processing of agricultural and dairy products as well as providing employment for the majority of rural migrants. From their functions, the growth centres will provide for social and economic integration of their respective subregions. They will provide many facilities for their subregions, i.e. markets, banking, telecommunications (post office etc.) primary, secondary, and technical education, technical repair and service stations for agricultural implements and warehouse for fertilizers and improved seeds.

The growth points will be connected one to the other by interstate highways and each have population range of between 10,000 and 50,000 serving a subregion of 100,000 to 200,000 people.

At the local level are service centers with populations between 5,000 and 10,000. They are supposed to be focal points for the exchange of ideas and from where developmental information will spread to the surrounding

villages and hamlets. Each service centre will provide some modern facilities such as a branch post office, primary schools, health centres and local markets. The service centres will be linked to the growth points by good district roads.

Misra's hypothesis is open to a number of criticisms. His suggestion of growth poles that will possess tertiary functions predominating over the secondary and primary does not reckon with the realities and practicalities of the urban and industrial development process. Such centres if they exist will lead to unbalanced spatial development. Secondly, it is not clear what are his criteria in determining the optimum and minimum population sizes for each growth focus and of the region each serves.

If the idea of growth poles is rejected and the population sizes of the remaining growth foci are taken as mere suggestions, Misra's hypothesis does provide a working paradigm for the examination of the process of urbanisation and rural development in Ikorodu division of Lagos State in Nigeria from 1950 to the present.

In 1950, Ikorodu district (as it was then called) was merged with Western Nigeria. This act temporarily severed its administrative links with Lagos that dated back to 1894. In fact, the town had from about 1900 to the 1930s fulfilled the functions of a service centre to the other towns and villages in its district. It performed this role partly because of some traditional advantages that it enjoys and partly because of the British colonial policy.

Traditionally, Ikorodu has remained the largest and most populous town in the district (see table below) while its markets have remained the most important in the traditional hierarchy among the local markets.

Population of Ikorodu and Some Other Towns
in Ikorodu District 1931-1963

Towns	Population			
	1931	1952	1963	1973
Ikorodu	14,000	9,000	20,000	
Agbowa	5,000	1,800	8,000	
Imota	3,000	1,300	6,000	
Igbogbo	n.a.	800	4,100	
Ijede	n.a.	300	4,777	

Sources: H. B. Cox, Census of Nigeria 1931, Vol. III, London: Crown Agents, 1932.
Population Census of Western Region of Nigeria, 1952, Lagos: Federal Government Printer, 1954.
Population Census of Nigeria, 1964.

It achieved its commercial supremacy since the nineteenth century when its inhabitants controlled and monopolised the trade between the Yoruba hinterland and Lagos. To ensure the supremacy, Ikorodu operated a three-fold tier market ring. Two of the markets operated on the same day. In the afternoon at a market located north of the town, Ikorodu traders bought most of the commodities brought down by Yoruba traders from the hinterland. No Ikorodu trader was allowed into the town until the market demands of Ikorodu traders had been met. The next stage of the commercial transactions occurred that same day in the late afternoon and evening at Iworo market located in front of the ruler's palace. Here the remains of the commodities from the afternoon market were sold by their purveyors while Ikorodu traders sold their wares (including those obtained from Lagos) to traders from the hinterland. The next morning, the most important market at the Ikorodu beach was held. Ikorodu traders again acted as brokers and middlemen between their counterparts from the hinterland on the one hand and those from Lagos on the other. The Ikorodu beach market was an eight-day market. When Imota and Agbowa fixed their own market days to coincide with the market days in Ikorodu, this led to a war in which Ikorodu forced these other towns to change their market days.

The British reinforced the traditional economic status of Ikorodu by making it the administrative headquarters of the new district although it was not centrally located in relation to the other towns and villages. In 1904 the colonial government established an agricultural station in the town to sell cocoa, coffee, rubber and cola nitida seedlings to the local farmers so as to monetise and diversify the economy by encouraging export production. While the government's experiment had a demonstrative effect on the farmers, a similar effort by the Reverend John Edwards Ricketts, a Jamaican from the Colony Bay Institute, to introduce plantation agriculture to Agbowa in 1895 had collapsed by 1907. Sugar cane cultivation and the manufacture of molasses and sugar that had been introduced by Mr. Ricketts were not adopted by Agbowo farmers because there was not enough good land for the crop while the capital and technology required for the success of the sugar manufacture were lacking. The failure of the Agbowo experiment ensured the continued success of Ikorodu as a service centre from which knowledge about the cultivation of the new crops, cocoa, coffee, and cola nitida reached the other villages and towns.

The 1920s witnessed the beginning of a series of events that reduced the role of Ikorodu as a service centre and encouraged a much greater socio-economic pull of Lagos upon the villages and towns in the district. In 1922, Mr. Joshua Ricketts, son of the Reverend Ricketts, began a motor launch service from Lagos to Ikorodu and the lagoon posts east of Ikorodu. No longer did the villages have to carry their commodities to Ikorodu beach for evacuation to Lagos. Furthermore, again under the influence of Joshua's brother, the people of Agbowo intensified the cultivation of cocoa, cola nitida and food crops that were taken to Lagos in the Ricketts' motor launches through the posts of Ikosi and Ijede. The activities of the Ricketts brothers, therefore, undermined the economic ascendancy of Ikorodu during the 1920s. In reaction, Ikorodu people assisted by the British

administrative officers built the Agbowo-Ikorodu road in 1926 by communal efforts. Meanwhile a native of Ikorodu, Osinubi, introduced a new motor launch service in competition with the Ricketts'. Known as Owotowu Launch Service, the new motor launch service concentrated on encouraging more trade links between Lagos and Ikorodu.

The 1930s further weakened Ikorodu as the service centre to its district. The depression forced many people out to Lagos. Some of them found employment in the Ikorodu Trading Company, a singlet manufacturing industry founded by Mr. S. O. Kamson from Ikorodu. Others established petty trading on their own. It was the inability of the town to provide employment opportunities for its rural migrants that exposed its economic structural weakness as a service centre. Thereafter, the pull to Lagos was stronger as almost six out of every ten adult males from the rural district migrated to Lagos in search of employment. Lagos then emerged as the growth point in relation to Ikorodu.

The merger of Ikorodu with Western Nigeria in 1950 tried to arrest the rural-urban migration from Ikorodu to Lagos and to give a new role, that of a growth point, to Ikorodu. Within ten years after the merger, two industries were established in Ikorodu--a ceramic industry and a singlet factory. In addition, the government established a farm institute in the town, and a farm settlement in Imota. Other economic forces were also at work. The motor launch service had fallen into disuse with the construction of the Lagos-Ikorodu road. Thereafter all trade commodities from the villages and smaller towns went through Ikorodu to Lagos. The significance of the new economic opportunity was not lost upon Ikorodu women. They dominated the local markets in the district from where they purchased the local foodstuffs (usually gari-processed cassava and fish) and transported them in their own lorries to Ikorodu markets and in some cases, onwards to Lagos and Ibadan.

In 1964, the Western Nigerian government introduced a programme to encourage cocoa production and organise farming cooperatives in Ikorodu district. For effective organisation, four agricultural zones centred on Ikorodu, Imota, Ijede and Igbogbo were created. Each town or village was to serve as a service centre and small-scale experimentation farms were established in each zone near the service centre. Ikorodu was expected to serve in addition as a growth centre. This arrangement was inherited by the government of Lagos State upon the creation of the state in 1967.

Ten years after the creation of Lagos State, however, the new arrangement can hardly be described as successful. Ikorodu is now a big town whose population by 1973 is estimated to have been about 70% of the total for the division. It did not possess any labour intensive primary industries that could have absorbed rural-urban migration, especially to Lagos. Although accurate figures are lacking on the migration of people from Ikorodu township and Ikorodu rural area to Lagos, an estimate has put it at about 40%. The fact that Ikorodu township has an insignificant percentage of unemployed (see table below) supports the view that the majority of the category of people have migrated to other towns, in particular Lagos, which provides industrial employment.

Occupational Classification
of Ikorodu Town 1973

Occupational Category	Male	Female
Administrative and Professional	2.4	0.5
Clerical	13.3	2.8
Petty Trading and Selling	13.7	43.1
Farmers	6.5	1.4
Craftsmen	9.9	1.7
Students	53.4	50.0
Unemployed	0.8	9.5
TOTAL	100.0	100.0

Ikorodu, therefore, is not fulfilling its role as a growth point.

Neither can it be said that Ijede and Igbogbo have served as effective service centres. Igbogbo is only 1 1/2 miles from Ikorodu and therefore does not enjoy spatial independence from its larger neighbour. In fact, the two settlements are now almost interlocked. And perhaps this is why the Lagos State Government is considering merging Igbogbo and other smaller settlements around Ikorodu to create a new Ikorodu metropolitan township. And secondly, the villages around Igbogbo are fishing villages which regard agriculture as a minor occupation.

Ijede also is a fishing village. It owed its importance before 1950 to the fact that it was a port for the evacuation of agricultural produce from neighbouring villages to Lagos. The attempt by its inhabitants to go into cocoa cultivation between 1964 and 1966 incurred the ire of the neighbouring agricultural villages. These villages boycotted Ijede market for the greater part of 1965 through 1966. When the quarrel was finally settled in 1967, Ijede was only a shadow of its former economic prosperity.

In January 1977, the Institute of Cultural Affairs, a non-profit intra-global research, training and demonstration group with an office in Chicago, initiated the Ijede Human Development Project aimed at renewing the Ijede community. Sixteen programmes were designed to be implemented simultaneously and they covered areas of economic self-sustenance, human self-confidence and social self-reliance. A series of industrial enterprises were being implemented in 1977 and these included the fusion of the various fishing societies into the Ijede Fishing Company, the reinauguration of cooperative farming devoted to the cultivation of food

crops and vegetables and the establishment of a brick making industry. In addition, bore holes had been drilled to supply the community with pipe-borne water, while a 3.5 megawatt electricity generating plant supplies the village with electricity. The villages are organised to supply labour for the schemes and to take active part in the decision making processes. The funds for the schemes have come in part from the ICA and in part from some Nigerian companies.

It is yet too early to assess the impact of the project on the village itself and on its neighbours.

*An expanded version of this paper will appear in the Nigerian Geographical Journal.

[1] R.P. Misra et al. Growth Poles and Growth Centres in Regional Policies and Planning (Seven Case Studies), Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, 1971.

SOILS IN IKORODU DIVISION



REFERENCE

- .... Reddish and brown loamy soils
- .... Fine sand and silty soils
- .... Sandy and swampy sandy soils
- .... State boundary
- .... Div. "
- .... Main roads
- .... Other "
- .... Rivers

MARKET CENTERS AS SMALL URBAN PLACES IN WESTERN NIGERIA

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Introduction

Rural development has been increasingly emphasized in recent years as a means of dealing with some of the problems which became apparent in the modernization approach. With the recognition that large primate cities are growing ever larger and more unmanageable, that industrialization efforts have not had the expected "trickle-down" effect, and that African populations are predominantly rural, there has been a shift from large, urban-based development projects to rural and agricultural projects. In this process, an interest has developed in identifying centers which can provide a focus for such projects and which have strong links with the rural areas. For example, R. J. Harrison Church advocates the development of medium-size towns in West Africa:

> The towns should now be brought into rural, agricultural and national life, instead of draining so much rural manpower into inadequate employment in cities with few positive linkages with the rural masses (1977:1419).

Yet, others would question whether even the medium-size towns and cities have sufficiently strong links with rural areas to provide an adequate focus for rural development.

Western Nigeria is an excellent locale in which to examine the issue of the role of small and medium-size centers in rural development. Unlike many other parts of Africa, western Nigeria has long had a rather well-developed hierarchy of centers, ranging from small farm hamlets and villages to the large metropolitan centers of Lagos and Ibadan, with a number of levels in between. Yet there has been relatively little discussion, either in academic research or in development planning, of the actual or potential roles of lower-level centers in this area. These centers provide the links between the rural populations and higher-level administrative and economic centers.

Within western Nigeria, one can identify a number of centers which can be considered medium-size towns or cities (cf. Harrison Church 1977), most of which functioned as pre-colonial capitals of Yoruba kingdoms and have continued to have large and active populations. Ilesha, seventy miles east

of Ibadan, is one such center. The capital of the Ijesha kingdom, Ilesha has both political and economic ties with the settlements surrounding it. Ijeshaland (see Map 1) may be considered a functional region (C. Smith 1976:6).

By examining the regional structure of Ijeshaland, a set of places can be identified which may be considered actual or potential small urban centers, providing a link for the rural areas with Ilesha and with other urban centers in western Nigeria. However, the simple identification of such places is not sufficient. Of greater importance are the ways in which rural people use those places.

Finally, if rural development strategies are to focus on currently existing small urban centers, the likely impact of such strategies must be considered.

The Ijeshaland Region: An Approach to Identifying Small Urban Centers

Ijeshaland is an area in eastern Yorubaland extending for a radius of about fifteen to twenty miles around Ilesha; its current boundaries are essentially the same as those of the traditional Ijesha kingdom. At present Ijeshaland is divided into two administrative districts, Ijesha North and Ijesha South, with Ilesha as the capital of Ijesha South.

The region is predominantly agricultural. Food crops include yams, maize, and cassava, as well as secondary crops such as rice, plantain, and vegetables. Cocoa is the major export crop, although kola nuts are also grown extensively for export to other parts of Nigeria. Cocoa is a more important crop in Ijesha South than in Ijesha North.

Although the largest occupational group in the region is farming, crafts and trade are also major occupations; 40% of the women are engaged in trade activities. (See Table 1). Not surprisingly, much of the non-agricultural employment is located in Ilesha. There is an extensive network of marketplaces and a relatively extensive network of both tarred and untarred roads, as well as many dirt tracks.

Map 1 indicates the large number of settlements within Ijeshaland with populations ranging from a few hundred to well over 20,000. Ilesha itself had a population of 165,000 in 1963.[1] It is, then, a rather densely populated region with many nucleated settlements. Which of these settlements should be considered "small urban centers"? Which are linked to their rural hinterlands in such a way as to provide a focus for rural development?

Two problems are at issue here. The first is to delineate a regional hierarchy, as the existence of small urban centers implies larger centers as well as non-urban places. Secondly, we need to show that these centers actually have links with their rural hinterlands.

Several approaches may be taken to determine a regional hierarchy. One interesting, but rarely used, method is to examine indigenous place classifications . The Yoruba themselves have a set of concepts which describe different types of places. While Western researchers have been



Map 1. Ijeşaland

primarily interested in the large, dense settlements with populations of over 100,000[2] and in the controversy over whether those settlements are truly "urban" (Bascom 1955, 1958, 1959, 1962; Lloyd 1959, 1973) the Yoruba classification system is not primarily related to population, but rather to the role of a place in the traditional political system. Yorubaland has a number of kingdoms,[3] each governed by an oba and his council of chiefs. Each kingdom has a capital, or metropolitan town, where the kingdom's most important oba resides, and a number of subordinate towns. The various types of settlements are distinguised in Yoruba terminology: the ilu alade or olu ilu (crowned town or capital town) are the capitals of the kingdoms, where obas permitted to wear beaded crowns reside. Settlements seen as either dependent on the ilu alade or deriving from them are known as ilu ereko (literally, on the fringe of farmlands) (Ojo, 1966: 127). According to Ojo, the ilu ereko are then further classified as "ilu oloja (market town with a ruler who must not wear a crown at all), ileto (village), abule (hamlet) and ago or aba (camp settlement)" (1966:127).

The most important distinctions are those between the two types of ilu--capital town and subordinate town--and between the ilu and the villages and hamlets, which are basically places where people sleep while at their farms. Often the latter settlements are referred to simply as oko (farm) and the people living there as ara oko. As Krapf-Askari has pointed out, the Yoruba "distinguish sharply between the statuses of ara oko, 'farm people'--most commonly used in contemptuous contexts where it could be translated as 'yokels' or 'country boors'--and ara ilu--those who are by birthright members of an ilu" (Krapf-Askari 1969:25).

In Ijeshaland, Ilesha is the ilu alade, the capital and the residence of the king, the Owa Obokun of Ijeshaland. Some of the subordinate towns were founded directly from Ilesha and have rulers known as oloja, while others were founded about the same time as Ilesha. In addition, there are a number of settlements, especially in Ijesha South, that were founded in the early years of this century, by individuals and families seeking land for cocoa production. These settlements are considered villages or hamlets.

Yoruba concepts of place do provide a discrete hierarchy of hamlets and villages, subordinate towns, and capital towns, but it is difficult to use these concepts in the contemporary setting. The political status of a settlement in the traditional system bears little relation to its current size or importance. For example, Ipole, one of the seven subordinate towns headed by an oloja, is located on a minor road and had a population of only 1,565 in 1963. On the other hand, Igangan, not a subordinate town but a "village," had a population of 3,138.

A second, and more widely used, method of examining regional hierarchies is central place analysis, which makes it possible to compare places in terms of their centrality, or the extent to which they serve the population of the surrounding area. There are various ways to carry out a central place analysis. One approach is to use a single measure, such as telephone service or newspaper distribution. There are obvious problems with such measures in the African context. Therefore, in two studies of urban central place hierarchies in southwestern Nigeria, Abiodun used a wide variety of functions to measure

centrality (1967; 1968). These included economic activities such as banking and wholesale stores; judicial and administrative functions, such as courts and police stations; medical and educational facilities such as hospitals and grammar schools, and entertainment facilities such as cinemas.

By using these measures, Abiodun was able to describe the urban central place hierarchy of two provinces in southwestern Nigeria. In both, she found a five-level hierarchy. In Ijebu Province she found a hierarchy resembling one of the models of central places proposed by Christaller (Abiodun 1967:365; Christaller 1966), whereas in Abeokuta Province she found a hierarchy which deviates from the Christallerian models (1968:69).[4]

A major problem with Abiodun's analysis is the necessity to weight the various functions used. With so many different measures to incorporate into the determination of centrality, it was necessary to judge which were more important and to weight those more heavily (Abiodun 1967:351-354). Such an a priori judgement by the researcher clearly affects the results.

A second, more serious problem from our point of view is the omission of a major economic institution--periodic markets. Abiodun argues that, as she is interested only in a hierarchy of urban places, periodic markets are not of interest, for they are "characteristic of rural settlements [while] it is the daily markets that characterize the urban settlements" (1967:351).[5] Such an assumption about the role of marketing in different types of places is unjustified, especially in an environment like western Nigeria, where most markets are periodic. By omitting market activity of this sort from the analysis, it may be easy to overlook places which would function as small urban centers, especially in terms of their links to their rural hinterlands.

I would argue, in fact, that marketplace activity can form the basis of a central place analysis in western Nigeria. By utilizing one activity that is found in many types of places and which is easily measured, it is possible to avoid the problem of weighting functions. Further, by using market place activity as a measure of centrality, a place does not have to be judged "rural" or "urban." Having once determined the hierarchical pattern in terms of that function, we can then examine other actual or potential functions of those centers.

Regional Analysis of Ijeshaland Marketplaces

In recent years, central place analysis has been used by anthropologists and geographers in a large number of studies of marketing systems in various parts of the world (cf. Smith 1974, 1976; Skinner 1964; see also Bromley 1974 for a bibliography). This work has been based largely on the work of Christaller (1966) who was concerned with explaining the distribution of towns in terms of the degree to which they offer central goods and services for the surrounding areas. As Smith has noted, central place analysis is particularly useful in the study of marketplace location:

> The only towns that could be expected to have a relatively uniform distribution would be towns sited to provide goods and services to a surrounding, contiguous, and packed rural

> farm area. The uniform distribution of rural people engaged in trade would give rise to a hexagonal lattice of market centers, and the relative regional self-sufficiency of farm trade centers would give rise to a closed step-wise pyramid of service centers. In short, central place theory as set forth by Christaller is designed only to explain the distribution of retail market centers, the purest examples of which are periodic 'peasant' marketplaces (Smith 1974: 171, italics in original).

Although some have argued that marketplaces in western Nigeria are not amenable to central place analysis (e.g., Hodder 1969), others have suggested that "it is logical to expect that markets [in western Nigeria] would yield themselves to a hierarchical treatment of the Christaller or Loschian type" (Alao 1968:16). A central place analysis of marketplaces in Ijeshaland demonstrates that Alao's suggestion is correct. Such an analysis provides us with a regional framework in which to identify small urban places having close ties to their rural hinterlands.

There are 28 marketplaces in Ijeshaland, of which Ilesha is the only daily market. The others meet either on a two-day, four-day, or eight-day cycle. The following analysis refers to the 27 periodic markets; Ilesha, having a daily market with over 1,500 stalls and all of the commodities sold in the periodic markets, plus others, is clearly the highest-level market in the system.

In order to demonstrate that there is a hierarchy of central places, we must determine the centrality of each place in relation to others in the system. Tables 2 and 3 demonstrate several ways of ordering the Ijeshaland marketplaces: in terms of (1) the population of the center, (2) the number of central functions (types of commodities available), (3) the number of establishments, regardless of type (see Table 2), and finally (4) an index which combines the number of commodities with the number of establishments (i.e., sellers). (See Table 3).[6] Although all of these ways of ordering the markets suggest a hierarchy, it is only the last index, known as the centrality index (cf. Marshall 1969), which allows for grouping of the markets on the basis of centrality.

Table 3 groups the Ijeshaland marketplaces into five levels, the highest of which is Ilesha. Six markets are on the next highest level, which form an irregular hexagonal shape when mapped. Most of the lower-level centers are located either between Ilesha and one of the higher-order markets, or between two of the higher-order markets, but some fall outside of the area defined by these markets. (See Diagram 1). When we place these centers on a map showing transport routes (Map 1), we find that all of the markets are located on these routes, and that in general, the roads link higher-order markets to one another.

Small Urban Centers in Ijeshaland

Clearly not all of the market centers considered in the above analysis should be viewed as small urban centers. In fact, many would not want to

refer to any of these centers as urban, given our usual terminology of "rural periodic markets" as well as our snap judgements of the characteristics of such places, based on appearance ("village-like"), traditional social organization, and so forth. How, then, can the analysis provide a basis for discussion of small urban centers?

It is my contention that those places at the second level of the market hierarchy (Oshu, Ifewara, Ipetu-Ijesha, Ijebu-Ijesha, Imesi-Ile, and Oke-Ibode) are either actual or potential small urban centers in the Ijeshaland context. While this is based on the economic role of these centers--as a link between smaller, rural centers and higher-level urban centers--I will argue that these six places have other attributes of small urban centers. Further, and perhaps most important, they have the potential for taking on other functions which they do not now have.

I am focussing on the six second level centers rather than Ilesha for several reasons. Ilesha, in the context of western Nigeria, is a medium-sized city. Elsewhere in Africa, a center with a population of over 100,000 might well be the largest center in the region. But in the vicinity of Ilesha, two other centers (Ife and Oshogbo) are similar in size, while the much larger centers of Ibadan and Lagos are not far away. Thus, although Ilesha is the largest center in the Ijeshaland region, it is certainly not the largest in the overall regional context. On the other hand, it is clearly not at the lowest end of the urban hierarchy either.

If we are concerned with considering centers which may serve as foci for rural development, we need to find those places which serve somewhat smaller populations and which have closer links with the rural hinterlands. As we shall see below, the second level centers are places to which the rural population have regular and continued access. While those populations also use Ilesha as a center for certain activities, it has a large and dense population of its own, which demands much of the services provided there. The smaller centers are more likely to be able to serve surrounding rural populations.

The six second level centers may be referred to as market centers. Ilesha may be considered a regional center, while the lower level centers with marketplaces can be considered rural market places. The six market centers are not necessarily small urban places at present, but they have the potential of becoming so. In order to consider the roles they can or could play in rural development, it is useful to discuss first the economic roles of these centers, vis à vis their hinterlands, and secondly, their non-economic functions.

Economic Functions of the Centers

The six market centers play an important role in movements between different levels of the hierarchy. They provide an economic link in two directions: they link the small centers and rural areas with the larger urban centers, and they link the small centers with their rural hinterlands.

These links may be considered both in terms of the way traders operate within the system and in terms of the ways that farmers and consumers utilize the markets.

For traders, the markets are both retail distribution points for those selling manufactured goods, as well as places where farm produce may be purchased and bulked for redistribution elsewhere. Traders based in the larger centers of Ilesha, Ibadan, and other cities such as Oshobgo, travel to the smaller centers to sell manufactured goods--cloth, shoes, provisions, etc.--in the periodic markets.[7] Likewise, traders from the small centers go to Ilesha and Ibadan to obtain goods which they then bring back for resale in their home area. Table 4 indicates some of the major source areas for a variety of goods sold in the six centers; it suggests the range of places at which goods are obtained. It does not show sources for agricultural goods, but it should be noted that certain commodities--such as rice and beans--not produced in the Ilesha area also obtained by traders in the larger centers.

These market centers are also redistribution points for locally produced agricultural commodities. For example, Ilesha traders regularly purchase yams in Ijebu-Ijesha and kola nuts in Oshu. Each of the six second level centers supplies at least one agricultural product to the larger centers. As in retail distribution, the traders involved in bulking activities include individuals from the market centers as well as middlemen from regional centers such as Ilesha.

If we examine the role of the six markets from the viewpoint of farmers in the area, we find the converse of the functions described above. That is, in each market farmers may sell some of their produce as well as purchase consumer items that they need. This aspect of the role of these centers must be considered in some detail, as it indicates the <u>access</u> which people in rural areas have to markets.

Surveys taken in the two centers of Oshu and Ijebu-Ijesha provide data on utilization of the markets by farmers, including those residing in the centers as well as those living in villages and hamlets outside the centers. One survey, taken early in the morning on a market day, when producers and their wives are selling to middlemen traders,[8] determined the source of goods and residence of those selling.

Tables 5 and 6 show the results of this survey. Those surveyed in Oshu were selling pepper, cocoyams, tomatoes, yams, maize, <u>gari</u> (made from cassava), and green vegetables of various types. In Ijebu-Ijesha, likewise, maize, vegetables, and <u>gari</u> were being sold, but yams predominated. Both marketplaces serve as outlets for farm produce, both for residents of the town and for those from surrounding villages and hamlets. In Oshu, respondents named seventeen different villages from which they had come, with between one and three individuals from each village.[9] Twenty-two of the respondents who came from villages to sell their own produce came on foot; only two traveled by lorry. Ijebu-Ijesha respondents also came from a number of places, most of which are farm hamlets rather than actual villages. These hamlets are considered part of either the town of Ijebu-Ijesha or the

neighboring town of Esa-Odo. As in Oshu, the majority of those selling their own produce from the hamlets (10 out of 15) had traveled on foot to the market. For producers in areas surrounding the market centers, then, these centers provide an important access to markets for their produce.

The market centers also provide a locale for farmers and others to purchase consumer items. In a second survey focussed on consumers, an attempt was made to interview as large a number as possible buying a variety of goods. Twenty-three of the 44 interviewed in Oshu came from a village outside Oshu. Of those, 12 had come to sell earlier in the morning, seven had come just to buy goods, and four did not answer the question. Items being bought by villagers included beans, dried fish, dried and fresh cow's skin, frozen fish, shoes, and second-hand clothes. In Ijebu-Ijesha, only eight of the 36 interviewed came from villages, but seven of those had come to sell produce earlier that day. Again, they were primarily buying food items--fresh cows's skin, chicken, soup ingredients, fish, and packaged provisions.

These centers clearly have important economic functions, both in the bulking of farm produce from rural areas and in the distribution of consumer goods to those areas. Farmers in the Ijeshaland region are heavily involved in the market system. They use the market centers both for selling their own produce and for purchasing other goods and services. There is considerable access to these market centers, at least for the nearby villages. Since most people walk to the centers, access may be somewhat limited, especially for those living some distance away.

Periodic Markets or Small Urban Centers

It could be argued that all I have discussed so far is activity common to any rural periodic market. The issue, then, is what kinds of other functions characterize the six market centers such that they should be considered small urban centers. Or, if they do not constitute such centers now, what functions could they potentially have?

All six centers have a variety of other functions which may be considered characteristic of low-level central places. Examination of the three centers of Oshu, Ijebu-Ijesha, and Ipetu-Ijesha, located in different parts of Ijeshaland, indicates some of those functions. All three are located on tarred roads, with Oshu halfway between Ilesha and Ife, and Ipetu-Ijesha and Ijebu-Ijesha on less important routes.[10] Transport services--lorries and intertown taxis--serve each community. In terms of other central services, Ipetu-Ijesha had piped water in 1973-74, and now has electricity as well. Oshu and Ijebu-Ijesha were less well served in these respects--neither had electricity in 1974; Oshu had a rather irregular water supply, and the water system for Ijebu-Ijesha had not been completed. All three had post office branches.

Commerical activity outside the market place includes permanent shops, selling basic provisions, hardware and so on. Two-story houses indicate that members of the community who are working elsewhere are investing in

Diagram 1 Central-place analysis of Ijesaland marketing system



Group 1--Ilesha highest-level central place

Group 2--second order central places

Group 3--third order central places

Group 4--fourth order central places

Group 5--fifth order central places

their hometowns. All three towns have such homes, although both permanent shops and two-story houses are most apparent in Ijebu-Ijesha.

All three centers have several churches, and a large mosque is located opposite the marketplace in Ijebu-Ijesha. Each of the three towns not only has a primary school but also a secondary school.

Other basic services are lacking, however. While Ipetu-Ijesha has a dispensary, the nearest hospitals for all three communities are the two in Ilesha. Oshu and Ijebu-Ijesha residents have only a short ride to Ilesha, but Ipetu-Ijesha is nearly an hour's drive on a winding road. Nevertheless, Ipetu-Ijesha residents did utilize the services of the Ilesha hospitals, especially the post-natal clinic at the Wesley Guild Hospital.[11]

There are few government officials and representatives in the three communities. Ijebu-Ijesha, the headquarters for the Ilesha Northern District Council, has some local government offices. One agricultural extension officer was in Ipetu-Ijesha in 1973, working with cocoa farmers. In addition there are, of course, the local and traditional leaders who play important roles as community leaders.

In some respects, then, these communities have functions--such as secondary schools--which one might expect only at higher-level centers. However, other services, such as piped water and electricity, do not exist. The three places described probably have more services than the other three places identified as potential small urban places. In part, this is due to location: Oke Ibode is off the main road between Ilesha and Oshogbo; Ifewara and Imesi-Ile are at the end of tarred roads (see Map 1). In other words, while all six centers are important as <u>market centers</u> for their surrounding populations, some provide more of the other central services which characterize small urban places.

All of these centers could potentially have such services, however. Perhaps they are even more important to residents of areas such as Imesi-Ile and Ifewara than to those of Oshu and Ijebu-Ijesha, since the latter have relatively easy access to Ilesha. If the concern is rural development, among the most important services which could be provided in such areas are those relating to agriculture. This would mean 1) agricultural extension agents (a government service), 2) storage facilities (provided either by government or private interests), 3) a satisfactory market network, which already exists but which could be improved.[12] In Oshu, for example, there are cocoa storage facilities, but none for other crops. Market distribution could be aided by better access to market information (regarding prices, conditions elsewhere, etc.) as well as by improved roads and transport facilities. Agricultural services, however, are only one aspect of rural development. Access to education, health facilities, and other basic social services may be of equal or greater importance.

Given that there are already far more services currently available in Ilesha than in the smaller centers, won't there be a tendency to develop still more services there rather than in other locales? Ilesha

now has several banks, seven secondary schools and numerous primary schools, two hospitals, several churches, water and electricity, a large market, agricultural facilities such as cocoa storage and rice mills, government offices, and so on. Even with these facilities, Ilesha is generally viewed as less attractive than larger centers such as Ibadan or Lagos. What is the likelihood, then, of much attention being given to even smaller centers? It seems unlikely that individuals or corporations will show much interest in developing small urban centers, unless it becomes government policy.

Secondly, even if such centers were to be developed, would all parts of the region be served by them? Given the locations of the six centers that I have identified, there are still some rural areas which do not have easy access to any of them. In the southern part of Ijeshaland, for example, Etioni and Iperindo are rather isolated. Iperindo farmers bring corn to Ipetu-Ijesha to sell, walking about seven miles to do so. This suggests that the development of small urban centers would require the establishemnt of better access routes to them. Undoubtedly many other technical questions might be raised. More entral, however, are questions concerning the decision-making process and the actual impact of the development of small urban centers.

Who would be involved in decisions to develop these centers? If rural development is considered a process of working from the local level upwards, then it should presumably be those at the local level who are involved in such decisions. But the power to make and enforce policy is generally located at the higher-level centers. If left to private interests, it is unlikely that many would see small centers as places of concern. If these centers are developed as a result of government policy, then issues of how such policies are made and implemented are raised.

Even if such policies are pursued, the issue of who would actually benefit from the development of small urban centers still remains. Would it be residents of the centers themselves, people in the rural hinterlands of the centers, or those from higher-level places who would take greatest advantage of increased access to the rural areas? We have, for example, discussed the importance of trade in Ijeshaland. Yet it is possible that the location of marketplaces primarily benefits traders and business people from the larger centers such as Ilesha. As I have noted, traders who buy and sell in the market centers include both Ilesha middlemen and people from the centers themselves. There are, however, few traders from the rural hinterlands of the centers. Further consideration of this issue would require examination of the price system and income differentials. In general, it seems to me that traders are less exploitative than is often charged. When a marketplace system is already extensive, as it is in Ijeshaland, it is questionable whether another system would be more efficient or of more benefit to farmers.

The complexity of the issue becomes even more apparent when we consider that most of the traders in Ijeshaland are women. Women function as middlemen in buying and selling both agricultural produce and manufactured goods. From the perspective of farmers, they may seem exploitative. From the

perspective of a concern with the role of women in development, displacement of women as traders could be viewed as one more example of their removal from traditional--and income-earning--roles.

A simple prescriptive approach to the development of small urban centers is not sufficient. We cannot simply identify "small urban places" and state that, if they are the focus of rural development, all will be well for all members of the population. However, such an approach can be used as the basis for raising a number of major issues. We can examine specific places, such as the six market centers in Ijeshaland, and inquire into their relationships with larger centers and with rural hinterlands. We can also ask questions about political processes of development of such places. We can consider the way in which different groups within the population--farmers and traders, men and women, and so on--utilize these centers, and make suggestions about the possible impact of development policies on those groups.

TABLE 1

Labor force by occupational groups. Ilesha Division.[a]

	Males		Females		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Professional, technical and related workers[b]	4,856	3.8	2,004	1.8	6,860	2.9
Administrative, executive and managerial workers[c]	769	.6	127	.1	896	.3
Clerical workers	4,159	3.3	472	.4	4,631	1.9
Sales workers[d]	16,151	12.8	44,595	40.6	60,746	25.8
Farmers, fishermen, hunters, loggers, and related workers	68,297	54.4	2,569	2.3	70,866	30.1
Miners, quarrymen, and related	323	.2	6		329	.1
Transport & communications	3,651	2.9	65	.05	3,716	1.5
Craftsmen, production-process workers and laborers[e]	21,929	17.4	11,897	10.8	33,826	14.3
Service, sports, and recreation workers	2,732	2.1	2,156	1.9	4,888	2.0
Inadequately described occupations[f]	1,954	1.5	45,390	41.4	47,344	20.1
Total employed	124,821		109,281		234,102	
Total unemployed	517		333		850	
Total labor force	125,338		109,614		234,952	

[a]Population Census of Nigeria 1963.

[b]Describes primarily "modern" occupations but also includes herbalists.

[c]Includes business managers; of the 127 women 126 are in this category.

[d]Almost all are in the category "street vendors."

[e]Includes a wide variety of occupations, such as mat maker and seamstress for women.

[f]There is no explanation of what this term means.

TABLE 2
Number of Sellers and Number of Commodities in Each Marketplace.

Market	Total Sellers (Establishments)	Total Commodities (Functions)	Number of[a] Food Commodities	Number of[a] Non-Food Commodities	Population of Town
Ere	35	17	11	6	2,637
Erin Odo	106	33	17	16	5,525
Erin Oke	75	22	16	6	5,430
Erimmo	93	28	17	11	5,747
Esa Oke	91	22	12	10	13,454
Eti Oni	176	50	23	27	1,205
Ibodi	230	38	21	17	1,927
Ibokun	333	37	23	14	8,312
Ifewara	280	57	28	29	4,780
Igangan	131	38	22	16	3,138
Ijebu-Ijesha	354	49	27	22	14,262
Ijeda	43	10	6	4	4,753
Ikeji-Ile	112	32	21	11	5,369
Ilasha	308	47	22	25	4,575
Imesi Ile	385	51	26	25	10,011
Ipetu-Ijesha	671	55	27	28	20,983
Iperindo	109	28	16	12	3,379
Iwara	188	47	27	20	2,051
Iwaraja	42	15	9	6	1,510
Iwoye	76	21	11	10	4,860
Kajola	236	46	24	22	714
New Ikeji	71	31	17	14	5,034
Odogbo	63	24	14	10	1,276
Oke Ibode	245	56	27	29	3,819
Oshu	455	51	24	27	6,169
Otan	144	31	14	17	7,810
Owena	370	43	22	21	1,408

[a]Food and non-food are essentially equivalent to the categories of 1) agricultural commodities and food and 2) manufactured commodities and services.

TABLE 3

Centrality Index

Town	Index	Group
Ilesha	a	I
Ipetu-Ijesha	1228	
Oke-Ibode	1037	
Imesi-Ile	985	
Ifewara	918	II
Ijebu-Ijesha	829	
Oshu	807	
Kajola	564	
Ilashe	493	
Etioni	460	
Ibokun	446	
Owena	411	III
Iwara	398	
Otan	377	
Ibodi	336	
Iperindo	320	
Igangan	316	
Erinmọ	251	
Ikeji-Ile	239	
Esa-Oke	224	IV
New Ikeji	207	
Erin-Odo	192	
Odogbo	170	
Iwoye	140	
Iwaraja	66	
Erin-Oke	57	V
Ijeda	40	
Ẹre		

[a] Ilesha market was not included in the calculation of centrality. However, as the only daily market in the system, with over 1500 stalls and all of the commodities sold in the periodic markets, plus others, it is clearly the highest-level market in the system.

TABLE 4

Sources of Some Commodities Obtained in Large Centers[a]

Place	Commodity	Source
Ipetu-Ijesha	cloth	Lagos
	enamel	Oshogbo
	shoes	Ibadan
Oshu	cloth	Ilesha, Ibadan
	second hand clothes	East Central State
	provisions	Ilesha, Ibadan
Oke Ibode	cloth	Igadan
	provisions	Oshogbo
	shoes	Ibadan
Imesi Ile	frozen fish[b]	Ilesha
	cloth	Ibadan
	provisions	Oshogbo
Ifewara	cloth	Oshogbo, Ilesha
	provisions	Ilesha
	shoes	Ibadan
	ready-made clothes	Ibadan
Ijebu-Ijesha	cloth	Ibanda
	provisions	Ilesha, Ibadan

[a]Source: Fieldwork, survey of Ijeshaland market places.
This is not an inventory of all goods being sold, but rather an example of where certain types of goods are obtained.

[b]Frozen fish is distributed from Lagos to Ilesha, and out to other markets from there.

TABLE 5

Source of Goods and Residence of Those Selling Farm Produce in Oshu

Source	Residence: in town	village	other towns[a]	total
buy[b]	18	4	0	22
own farm	11	24	3	38
total	29	28	3	N = 60

[a]One of those from another town came from Ife; the other two came from Ibodi, a nearby rural marketplace.

[b]Some of those interviewed were not selling their own produce, but had bought it from others and were reselling it.

TABLE 6

Source of Goods and Residence of Those Selling Farm Produce in Ijebu-Ijesha

Source	Residence: in town	village	other towns[a]	total
buy[b]	7	5	5	17
own farm	10	15	0	25
total	17	20	5	N = 42

[a]All from another town were from nearby Esa-Odo (off the main road); they sold yams bought from farmers there.

[b]Some of those interviewed were not selling their own produce, but had bought it from others and were reselling it.

FOOTNOTES

[1]The most recently published Nigerian census is from 1963.

[2]By 1963, nine Yoruba settlements, excluding Lagos, the capital of Nigeria, had a population over 100,000; there are a large number of settlements in the 25,000 to 100,000 population range.

[3]I use the present tense here, for although there is a contemporary administrative system which overlies the traditional political organization, there are still obas and places identified as capital towns and subordinate towns.

[4]One of the most interesting aspects of current work on central place hierarchies is the investigation of reasons for deviation from regular central place models (cf. Smith 1976; Appleby 1976). Abiodun notes that the deviation in Abeokuta Province "is a consequence of both... historical and geographical conditions" (1968:69). Further discussion of this issue would be interesting.

[5]In fact, in the 1967 study, market activity is omitted entirely as a measure of centrality.

[6]The data are based on surveys in all 27 marketplaces, during January and February 1974, as well as on research in the Ilesha market during 1973 and 1974. For more details of the central place analysis, see Trager (1976).

[7]However, there is not as much actual travelling from one market to another as might be thought from discussions of "market rings." Rather, some Ilesha traders may go to one or two other markets, as well as sell regularly in Ilesha.

[8]There is practically no selling from producer to consumer.

[9]The survey also asked for hometown. Of the 24 from villages, eight stated that Ilesha was their hometown, but the others named places like Ife, Modakeke, and other places some distance away, indicating considerable rural-rural migration to the Oshu area.

[10]The main road east to Benin used to pass through Ipetu-Ijesha, but no longer does so.

[11] There was talk of establishing a hospital in Ipetu-Ijesha, but I do not know how far plans have progressed.

[12] Service such as agricultural extension might be provided on a periodic basis, coinciding with market periodicity.

TEMPORARY MIGRATION AS AN INDEX OF URBAN UNDERDEVELOPMENT IN MOROCCO

Tad Park

If rewarding and suitable employment were available for the migrants to Third World urban centers, most urgent problems of development might be readily resolved.[1] Since such employment will not be feasible in the near future, but most migrants will continue to go to the largest cities, we urgently need alternatives to the current emphasis on investment in major urban areas with its resultant stimulus to migration. Decentralization has long had the ring of a solution. Yet, short of referring to a massive investment in administrative or economic reorganization, it is a vague prescription. This fault is particularly serious because the costs of political and economic changes seem to increase with the degree of urbanization already present. It is at least plausible that in many countries a preferable alternative to national level reorganization is to develop a way of indicating priorities for investment so that a government can set up local incentives which will have a maximum effect on employment and migration at a minimum cost. This paper provides some of the basis for developing such an incentive structure.

To examine migration from an urban point of view is to try to elucidate how migration is related to existing patterns of urbanization. It is an alternative to focusing either on individual migrants and their earnings or on the employment structure of the destination points. By narrowing our concern, initially, to temporary migration, I hope to take advantage of its exclusively economic nature and compare variations in migration to relevant variations in the urban economies of the points of origin. If these two sorts of variation can be casually connected, a case can be made for deciding priorities in regional development on the basis of which areas seem to be least adequately providing opportunities for urban employment.

A distinguished scholar of North African urbanization once astutely noted that the variety of North African urban centers was such that no single theoretical approach could suffice to explain their genesis or development.[2] This study supports this claim. It would, therefore, be rash to propose a complete theory of rural-urban migration. Instead, we will concentrate on a particular period. Duchac and Bentahar have suggested that one of the major functions of middle-sized towns is as a "<u>pôle de fixation de la population</u>." They argue that any analysis of rural-urban migration must begin with a study of the economic alternatives offered at the point of departure by middle-sized urban centers.[3] This will be our starting point.

If we narrow the focus to temporary out-migration, most of which has been to Europe, we can look at the demographically stabilizing influence of urban centers of all sizes in the 20th century. This leads us to examine economic causes whose loci are urban centers rather than seeking the definition, or specific character, of middle-sized towns. To say economic causes for migration have their loci in specific towns may seem a maliciously ahistorical position--one denying larger causes.[4] Yet, this is not actually implied. We can consistently argue that there is a degree of causality both at the local and the national or international level. The two are not mutually exclusive alternatives.

Thus, we will accept as a partial explanation of rural-urban migration that it is a result of an evaluation of the expected level of income in the rural and the urban situation.[5] Here, "expected" would mean the average size of the income times the probability of obtaining it. Within this framework we will need to distinguish enough detail in the economy to have a statistical basis for an explanation of temporary out-migration.

Although more than a local economy will determine temporary out-migration, by focusing on one factor in northern Morocco it will be possible to indicate (a) that the local urban economy has a significant and sizeable impact on the rate of out-migration and (b) that the degree to which the urban economy affects out-migration differs from county (cercle) to county. The latter leads to the conclusion that rather than speaking in blanket terms about "underdevelopment" we need more precise local studies to understand the impact of industrialization or of the world economic system. Despite my not emphasizing, in what follows, an historical explanation for the heterogeneity of the urban impact on migration, there is no question but that such an explanation would be essential to any full analysis.[6]

If we study the economy of urban centers in Morocco, we need to make an initial distinction between the periodic market (souq) system and the permanent business community because both are integral, and distinct, parts of the local economy. Ideally, our discrimination between towns on the basis of quantitative differences should represent both aspects of the economy. On this basis it may be possible to find quantitative differences between towns that reflect perceivable changes in employment opportunities which are important to local potential migrants. Our concern will be to justify the claim that we can delineate specific economic characteristics which cause out-migration. In order to make this plausible we begin by detailing relevant characteristics of urban centers in northern Morocco.

*

The north is the most highly urbanized area in Morocco: in 1971 it encompassed 53 small centers (defined as those with populations from 1,000 to 50,000 and having at least 100 shops) as well as a number of larger cities; Fes, Meknes, Oujda, Rabat-Sale, Taza, Tanger, and Tetouan.[7] Few of these towns are economically isolated. In fact, the linkages between

many of them are extensive and have been strengthened over the years. The degree to which the economies of different urban centers are interdependent is of some concern because we want to use statistical techniques to test the value of the local urban economy as an explanation of out-migration. Though of concern, it would be critical only if the degree of interdependence was directly related to the level of temporary out-migration.

The most relevant study, in this respect, of urban centers in northern Morocco found five fairly closely linked groups of cities on the basis of an analysis of commercial links and transportation routes. These (partially reflected in Figure 1) were:[8]

1) Tanger, Tetouan, Asilah, Larache, Ksar el Kebir, Ouezzane, and Chechaouen.

2) Kenitra, Souk el Arba, Sidi Slimane, and Sidi Yahia.

3) Karia ba Mohammed, Mouley Yakoub, Fes, Bhalil, Sefrou, and Imouzzer Kandar.

4) Mouley Idriss, Meknes, El Hajeb, and Azrou.

5) Oujda, El Aioun, Taourirt, Guercif, and Debdou.

Each of these groups represents at least two counties and the first spans five counties. This means that, ideally, we would measure the importance of local economic opportunities provided within a county by Moroccan inter-urban linkages. But since we are confining attention to temporary out-migration, which is overwhelmingly to Europe, we would expect county-level economic variations to be important in their own right. This latter is in fact all we can examine here because data is available for temporary out-migration only at the county level.

It is difficult to imagine what the local impact of a fairly close inter-urban economic linkage ought to be on decisions to migrate. Still, it should depend on the quality of that linkage; for example, whether we mean that wholesalers tend to reside elsewhere or merely that many intinerant merchants travel from one city to another. This means that while it is impossible to directly measure the effect on migration of this interdependence, we can and will attempt to measure its indirect influence at the local level by assessing the proportions of resident wholesalers and retailers.

A less ambiguous set of influences can be easily discerned in the degree to which periodic markets are linked. Souqs are organized by their merchants into a set of almost completely distinct networks (Figure 2). Each network involves a set of regular markets and a center market which is the residence of the great majority of that network's merchants. In every case this residence is an urban center, but it is not infrequent that some of the regular markets of a network are located in rural areas with little or no construction at their sites.

Figure 2, summarizing merchant activity for an average year in the mid-1960s, indicates that northern Morocco is divided into commercial

regions dominated by souq merchants residing in particular urban centers. Occasionally, markets are shared by two or even three neighboring networks, but the overwhelming majority of commercial space is unambiguously dominated by individual network centers. Figure 2 also suggests that this dominance is, at times, maintained by doubling or tripling the number of days of the week on which the market in the network center is convened; no non-network centers have markets more than once a week.

One theoretical support for examining migration at the county level is that each of these souq networks is located entirely within a single county--except for the few markets that are shared with other networks in adjacent counties. The number of these is so small that the county is unequivocably an appropriate unit of analysis. Nevertheless, there are influences across county lines that will escape us as we focus on the county. The centers with a plurality of markets per week are often those whose merchants dominate in one or more commodity monopolies throughout the north: such as, olives (Fes), cattle (Oujda), and grain (Khenifra).[9]

Although we are constrained by the availability of data to use the county as our unit this focus has some general justification as well. Morocco is administratively organized by county (within provinces) and the county is relevent to out-migration in as much as identification cards or work visas are obtained through the administrative system and both earnings and news are funneled back to relatives through the county postal apparatus. In addition, it is at the county level that policy might most effectively be implemented. We are primarily concerned with studying one aspect of out-migration which is likely to be amenable to fairly simple control by way of economic incentives.

*

A more detailed description of the economic characteristics of urban centers in northern Morocco is presented in Figures 3 and 4. These figures show the economic importance of each of the centers according to several quantified criteria. Though we take these criteria to be valuable explanations of migration, they are themselves the end products of a complex set of factors. This large set of historically documentable influences on the economic prosperity of Morocco's urban centers is encouraging because it implies that change for the better can be made.

Moroccan souqs can be traced at least to the 11th century[10] and so have had longer to entrench themselves in the urban economy than markets in most parts of Africa. Still, if one had to guess the amount of radical change in the souq networks or urban hegemonies during early periods, a surmise that a significant level occurred would be inescapable. The only basis for extrapolation is the modern period and the influences operating recently do not appear much different from those that would have been important in earlier periods.

The division of Morocco between Spain (far north) and France (the rest) in 1912 established an international border through the center of what had been northern Morocco. Because this was contrary to local common sense, the border became, from the administrative point of view, an insecure


REGIONS DOMINATED BY WHOLESALERS
CENTERED IN SELECTED CITIES
Spain
MOROCCO
Algeria
Atlantic Ocean
Mediterranean Sea
N
TANGER
TÉTOUAN
Asilah
Larache
Chechaouen
Ksar El Kebir
Ouezzane
Sidi Arba Du Rharb
KÉNITRA
Sidi Slimane
SIDI KACEM
RABAT
SALÉ
Kénitra
Rommani
MEKNÈS
FÈS
Sefrou
El Hajeb
AZROU
Boulemane
KHENIFRA
Midelt
Taounate
'Ain 'Aicha
Karia Ba Mohammed
Taineste
Taza
Guercif
Taourirt
Tahala
Tarquist
Al Hoceima
Midar
NADOR
Segangane
Zaio
Berkane
OUJDA
Adapted from
Aires D'Influence Commerciale
Planche Numéro 23 Tome Volume 2 1971
AREA OF DOMINATION
Each city's area of domination denoted by area with similar pattern
Area of Overlapping Influence
Number of Wholesalers or "Semi- wholesalers"
100
500
800
CARTOGRAPHIC LABORATORY UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN - MADISON

Figure 1


URBAN SOUQ NETWORKS
Spain
MOROCCO
Algeria
Mediterranean Sea
Atlantic Ocean
TANGER
Asilah
LARACHE
KSAR EL KEBIR
Chechaouen
Ouezanne
SIDI KACEM
KARIA BA MOHAMMED
Rabat
KHÉMISSÈT
EL HAJEB
Sefrou
Boulemane
KHÉNIFRA
Midelt
Taounate
Tahala
Taza
GUERCIF
Targuist
Zaio
Al Hoceima
NADOR
TAOURIRT
OUJDA
ETWORK FOR URBAN CENTERS
Area of Overlapping Influence
Day of Week On Which Market Occurs
1 Sunday
2 Monday
3 Tuesday
4 Wednesday
5 Thursday
6 Friday
7 Saturday
CARTOGRAPHIC LABORATORY UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN - MADISON

Figure 2



CARTOGRAPHIC LABORATORY, UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN – MADISON

Figure 3


NUMBER OF VENDORS IN
URBAN SOUQS AND URBAN SHOPS
Spain
MOROCCO
Algeria
Mediterranean Sea
Atlantic Ocean
N
TANGER
KSAR EL KEBIR
Ouezzane
SEL 'ARBA DU RHARB
KÉNITRA
SALÉ
RABAT
SIDI SLIMANE
SIDI KACEM
KHÉMISSÈT
MEKNÈS
FÈS
El Hajeb
Sefrou
Karia Ba Mohammed
Taounate
'Ain 'Aicha
Tanaïa
Taza
Guercif
Taourirt
Targuist
Rommani
Azrou
Boulemane
KHÉNIFRA
Bourma
Midelt
Moulouya River
TYPES OF VENDORS
Vendors in Souqs
(Merchants, Artisans, Service Sector)
Vendors in Urban Shops
(Permanent establishments in towns)
Number of Vendors
50
200
400
500
1,000
3,000
10,000
Adapted From
Commerces Forains Des Souks
Planche Number 26 From Volume 2 1975
CARTOGRAPHIC LABORATORY UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN – MADISON

Figure 4

area and extensive efforts were necessary to secure it. By the end of the Protectorate period (1956), these efforts had amounted to a large-scale reorganization of the urban economy involving the permanent location of mobile souqs, the amalgamation of smaller souqs into larger ones, and the relocation of souqs into the neighborhood of administrative posts.[11]

In all, 100 souqs were moved, 90 ceased functioning, and 20-30 mobile souqs were permanently located. After independence (1956), 33 new souqs appeared as a response to local demand but only 3 of these were completely successful, 10 were partially successful, and the rest quickly disappeared. These latter figures reflect the refusal of merchants who had adapted to the economic and political structure of the two Protectorates to cater to the new souqs even after the political justification for the economy was gone.[12] The recent period, thus, unambigously suggests that both political and mercantile factors have important influences on the prosperity of individual markets as well as on the economic structure in general.

A similar set of factors have influenced the growth and prosperity of Moroccan established urban businesses. Although all souq network centers are urban and almost all urban centers have souqs, the prosperity of a souq has not been enough to make a town prosper. For northern Morocco at least, the location on a moderately frequented traffic route at a relative distance from larger urban concentrations and the presence of a core clientele of salaried consumers as well as a permanent administrative unit have also been essential to the growth of a prosperous urban community during the 20th century.[13]

Figures 3 and 4 provide us with the means of distinguishing one urban center's economy from another. Figure 3 gives the average weekly sales for each of the network centers in northern Morocco. Adding the values for all counties with more than one network gives a number that reliably reflects the gross level of the souq economy for each county. This number is more appropriate than the sum of sales in all markets of the county because it minimizes duplication. Many goods are sold more than once within the county, but the dominant merchants of the network center sell a representative portion of all commodities at the souq in their town of residence.

Figure 4 provides the average number of people engaged in commerce in each souq and in the established shops of each urban center. Unfortunately, no data is available for the actual value of sales and services furnished outside the souq. Values derived from Figure 3 plus the relevant values from Figure 4 make it possible to calculate the average per merchant sales in each of the network center souqs. Given this ratio an appropriate testable hypothesis would be that:

1) An increase in the average souq merchant's earnings will cause a decrease in the rate of temporary out-migration.

This is to claim that higher expected earnings will be attractive to

potential migrants and tend to discourage them from migrating.

The hypothesis is fairly trivial and, more importantly, somewhat naive. It fails to suggest any explanation for variations in the level of average earnings. Twentieth century Morocco has a high rate of both unemployment and underemployment, so there is little prima facie reason that merchants should not long since have increased to the point that average earnings across Morocco equalled out.

The question of variations in local land tenure or in the productivity of land has an obvious importance. Farmers who can expect a valuable crop will behave differently in the market than farmers who can barely expect to survive. The impact of such differences is likely to be the short term cause of a major portion of the variations in the average earnings of souq merchants. Rural economic power is one factor. More within the scope of the present study is a different question: that of the influence of economic power at the merchant level. In Morocco, one form this takes is the control of the market exercised by large and small wholesalers. One might expect, therefore, that a high incidence of wholesalers might tend to raise the level of the average earnings--both in the souqs and in the downtown business districts.

Figure 1 (above) gives the number of wholesalers residing in the urban centers of northern Morocco. It shows a simple head count and does not indicate the economic importance of the individual wholesale enterprises. These data can be combined with the Figure 4 numbers of people engaged in trade from established shops (wholesalers cannot be strictly itinerant) to form a ratio. This will give an indication of the relative preponderance of wholesaling in each urban center. The ratio will be interpreted consistently. On these lines, an appropriate hypothesis would be that:

2) The lower the ratio of businessmen to wholesalers, the higher will be the average business earnings, the more local investment there will be, and the lower the rate of temporary outmigration will be.

This particular hypothesis assumes that wholesalers will tend to invest locally. In some circumstances this might not be an accurate expectation, even on average; according to the classical Marxist version of the colonial situation all levels of wholesaling would be foreign dominated and most profits would flow back to the home country of the expatriate firms or to finance further expansion in the major urban areas of the colonized country. We will find that this is not the dominant characteristic of northern Morocco, but it may be a more accurate representation for areas of southern Morocco.[14]

If local investment by wholesalers is the norm, then increases in average souq merchant earnings will tend to incorporate a contribution from any increases in the relative level of local wholesaler populations. Wholesalers supply souq merchants with items such as clothes, hardware, tea, and sugar while their agents buy up rural produce for resale and

transhipment. A combination of tests for Hypotheses 1 and 2, therefore, has an advantage over separate tests of either because Hypothesis 1 can stand as a partial proxy for the data we have not been able to incorporate into Hypothesis 2.[15]

In combination the two types of local urban data will explain that portion of temporary out-migration which could be most easily made responsive to policy. Tax incentives for local investment and residence, reflecting local need as expressed by the rate of out-migration, would not only slow out-migration and help urban slums, but would also focus attention on those areas of Morocco most adversely affected by the current economic structure.

Before considering the actual form in which these two hypotheses were tested, they can be usefully compared to three hypotheses of the relationship between wholesaling, urban structure, and migration put forward in 1971.[16] Though these were not then subjected to statistical tests they were based on an incomparable first-hand knowledge of the data and are worth reviewing for numerous reasons. In brief, they amounted to the following claims:

a) A high level of wholesaling per capita plus a high level of urban services per capita tends to stabilize the population.

b) Any level of wholesaling without a high level of urban services per capita tends to destablize the population.

c) A high per capita level of urban business tends to stabilize the population.

For two of these the distinction between urban businesses and urban services is critical. Unfortunately, the data for levels of urban services (bakeries, turkish baths, and mosques) were not sufficient to cover the 35 counties of northern Morocco at all levels of urbanization so the first two hypotheses could not be directly tested. The second could, however, be shown to be improbable by demonstrating a direct relationship between levels of wholesaling and migration: provided that we accept as unlikely the possibility that in every case studied the levels of urban services correlate exactly with levels of wholesaling. A confirmation of our second hypothesis, using the number of businessmen per wholesaler, will thus suggest that Hypothesis (b) may be put too strongly. The third hypothesis (c) was tested and did not seem to be a significant explanation of temporary out-migration.

These negative findings support the claim that income levels and the qualitative make-up of the business community are more important than its size. The more exclusively economic character of temporary out-migration allows the possibility that the economic component of permanent out-migration, or of general rural-urban migration, may have a slightly different basis.

***

In order to test the two hypotheses proposed as well as the general conception that the economic structure of urban centers has an important influence on the rate of out-migration, we need to formulate a fairly precise model. Its purpose will be to indicate, as exactly as possible, what portion of out-migration can be traced to the influence of the local urban economy and what aspects of it are the most critical. In a regression model, such as the one we will formulate, any factors which are not explicity considered are held constant and the results indicate the average influence of those variables incorporated in the model under ceteris paribus conditions. Comparison of the values for each county could then indicate in which areas a given policy would be most appropriate.

We need to examine three variables: first, the rate of temporary out-migration (where this is calculated as the number of migrants from a county divided by the total county population), second, the average daily income of souq merchants or purveyors of services, and third, the ratio of downtown businesses to wholesalers. We would like the second and third ratios to be determinants of the first.

Put this way the relationship is still slightly ambiguous. We should like to argue that a change in the independent variables will cause a proportional change in the rate of temporary out-migration. In other words, we would claim that changing by 10% the average income of souq merchants will change the rate of out-migration by a certain percentage. Using the bare ratios does not serve this purpose because a change from an average of 30 dirhams to 31 dirhams would be equal to an increase of 1 dirham, just as a change from an average of 300 dirhams to one of 301 dirhams. In contrast, taking the natural logarithm of each variable expresses our real claim in an unambigous fashion that is immune to monetary inflation and correctly relates the three variables. When we write this as an equation that can be tested, and which we expect to be statistically true to some degree, we have:

$$\ln\left(\frac{O_i}{P_i}\right) = B_0 + B_1 \ln\left(\frac{D_i}{M_i}\right) + B_2 \ln\left(\frac{E_i}{W_i}\right)$$

Where: O_i = the number of temporary out-migrants for the i-th county.

P_i = the population of the i-th county.

D_i = the average weekly value (dirhams) of sales in central souqs in the i-th county.

M_i = the average weekly number of sellers of goods and services in the central souqs of the i-th county.

E_i = the number of merchant establishments in the urban centers of the i-th county.

and W_i = the number of wholesalers residing in the urban centers of the i-th county.

The data in Figures 1, 3, and 4, plus population and migration statistics, provide a means of testing this relationship.[17] By regressing the right hand side against the left we get numbers in place of the coeficients (B_1 and B_2), the degree to which the rate of migration is explained, expressed as a percentage, and an estimate of the value (significance) of the explanation or model. These statistics indicate whether the data are sufficient for reaching a judgement and can confirm the reliability of the data itself if the results are mathematically significant.

For the 35 counties of northern Morocco, the data available produce significant results and seem to confirm both our general and particular hypotheses. We get the following specification of our mathematical model:

$$\ln\left(\frac{O_i}{P_i}\right) = B_0 \underset{(1.46)''}{-.881} \ln\left(\frac{D_i}{M_i}\right) \underset{(3.46)*}{+.983} \ln\left(\frac{E_i}{W_i}\right)$$

$R^2 = 42.3\%$ $R^2 = 38.6\%$ $F = 11.71*$

" - significant at .1 level, * - significant at .01 level

The F-statistic of 11.71 confirms the superlative quality of Troin's economic data, on which much of this regression is based, and indicates the variables we have examined are almost certainly important determinants of temporary out-migration when taken together. The percentage of variation in temporary out-migration that is explained by the two variables is close to 40%. This establishes beyond doubt Duchac and Bentahar's suggestion that smaller urban centers are important in stabilizing migration because the vast majority of the towns included in the sample were not major urban centers.

It is also worth noting the confirmation of both Hypotheses 1 and 2. The coefficient of the first variable (-.881) indicates that a percent increase in the average merchant income in a county's souqs will tend to decrease the rate of temporary out-migration by a little less than a percent. The second coefficient (+.983) implies that a percent increase in the proportion of downtown businessmen to local wholesalers will increase the rate of temporary out-migration by about a percent. Conversely, a decrease in the proportion of businessmen to wholesalers will decrease out-migration. The statistically high significance of this particular result (t-statistic = 3.64) is of importance because it emphasizes the critical nature of wholesaling in the Moroccan economy.

The most obvious policy implication of this result is that by decentralizing wholesaling, perhaps by tax incentives for local investment in areas of high out-migration, a significant decrease in the rural flow to major urban centers might be possible. Our assumption here is that because temporary out-migration has an almost entirely economic basis, it will indicate in an unambiguous fashion the behavioral implications of most other forms of out-migration.

Table 1 illustrates the variation in rates of temporary out-migration

TABLE 1

Cercle	Migration	Rate	Rank (lowest first)
1. Oujda	550	.00227	15
2. Berkane (Bni Snassane)	3500	.02223	29
3. Taourirt	950	.01217	25
4. Sengangane (Guelaia)	6500	.05871	34
5. Zaio (Leuta)	3350	.04001	33
6. Midar (Rif)	11300	.08216	35
7. Guercif	700	.00813	24
8. Aknoul	1500	.02802	30
9. Taineste	1250	.01356	26
10. Taza	1200	.00764	23
11. Tahala	0	.0	1
12. Boulemane	200	.00352	19
13. Midelt	100	.00129	8
14. Ajdir (Al Hoceima)	3400	.03419	32
15. Khemis Bou Ifrah	450	.01856	28
16. Tarquist	2000	.02949	31
17. Taounate	1150	.00691	21
18. Karia Ba Mohammed	1050	.00593	20
19. Fes	10000	.00296	18
20. Sefrou	50	.00054	5
21. Chechaouen (Bahria)	2550	.01633	12
22. Tetouan (Jebala)	1950	.00763	22
23. Tanger	350	.00213	12
24. Asilah (Larache)	250	.00209	11
25. Ksar el Kebir	250	.00216	13
26. Ouezzane	500	.00270	17
27. S'el Arba du Rharb	500	.00223	14
28. Sidi Slimane (Kenitra)	400	.00127	7
29. Khemisset (Zenmour)	300	.00151	9
30. Rommani (Zaer)	0	.0	1
31. Rabat	50	.00008	3
32. Meknes	50	.00017	4
33. El Hajeb	100	.00117	6
34. Azrou	150	.00186	10
35. Khenifra	300	.00253	16

* from Noin 1971 and census - see Royaume du Maroc

(from zero to over 8%) among the 35 northern counties of Morocco. At present temporary out-migration brings a sizeable flow of foreign currency back to Morocco and is an important asset to the economy while permanent rural-urban out-migration is an ever increasing problem to Moroccan planners. It is crucial to note, therefore, that the actual distribution of temporary out-migration may not be similar to that of permanent rural-urban out-migration. We cannot look at Table 1 to find the trouble spots of the economy. Rather, if we had a similar table for permanent rural-urban out-migration per county, it would provide a basis for a policy of decentralized investment.

Postscript

Although space does not permit me to include it here, the paper presented to the Conference included an analysis of a similar model for the Tensift region of southern Morocco. There, the model also proved significant and explained roughly 40% of the variation in out-migration. This result in a different region implies that the model may have more general relevance. More interesting to Moroccanists, perhaps, is the finding that temporary out-migration tended to increase as the proportion of local wholesalers increased. I have claimed that this inversion of the results for the north reflects the special dominated conditions still prevailing in the south because of recent historical processes.

The divergence of the two results indicates that we should be careful to discover to what extent underdevelopment is a result of national, international, or local level dynamics. We can no longer just assume that reference to the macro- or micro- level is enough because the real question is to determine the degree of causality that, in a given situation, should be associated with each level. There is no reason this need be constant in time or space.

FOOTNOTES

[1]For a perceptive analysis of this problem see P. Bairoch, Urban Unemployment in Developing Countries. Geneva, International Labour Office, 1973.

[2]R. Cuchac, Villes et Sociétés au Maghreb. Paris, Centre National de Recherches Scientifiques, 1974, pp. 5-7.

[3]Duchac and M. Bentahar, "Fonctions des villes moyennes: contributions à une sociologie des migrations au Maroc", Bulletin Economique et Sociale du Maroc, #22, 1971, pp. 84-5.

[4]This is the opinion of at least one scholar: S. Amin, Modern Migrations in Western Africa. Oxford, International Africa Institute, Oxford University Press, 1974, pp. 90-91.

[5]M. Todaro, "A model of labor migration and urban unemployment in less developed countries", The American Economic Review, March 1969.

[6]The Postscript indicates the important differences between northern and southern Morocco. It is my contention that these are based on the degree to which the south was exploited, first to bolster up an undermined dynasty in the 19th century and then from 1912 to 1956 to support a French colonial policy of large-scale land concessions to colons.

[7]J. F. Troin, "Essai methodologique pour une étude des petites villes en milieu sous développé", Annales de Geographie #441-LXXX, 1971, p. 514, and R. Escallier, "La croissance urbaine au Maroc", in R. Duchac, 1974, above.

[8]Figures 1, 2, 3, and 4 are adapted from Plances 23, 5, 12, and 26 in the second volume of J. F. Troin's magnificent, Les souks du Nord marocain. Aix en-Provence, Edisud, 1975.

[9]J. F. Troin vol. 1, 1975, pp. 181, 207, 174 (above).

[10]Ibid. pp. 240-5.

[11]Ibid. pp. 255-6.

[12]Ibid. p. 268.

[13]Ibid. pp. 393-4, 292.

[14]See the Postscript and note 6 above

[15]This was checked by regressing each variable separately as well. The influence of other major factors--land tenure, population density etc.--prevent the two hypotheses from being closely correlated or redundant. The mathematically inclined may also want to be reminded that there are no statistical drawbacks to including only a few of the relevant variables in a model if those excluded are uncorrelated with the ones included; J. Kmenta, Elements of Econometrics. New York, MacMillan, 1971, p. 394.

[16]J. F. Troin, 1971, op. cit., pp. 526-8.

[17]The data not found in Figures 1, 2, 3, and 4 were published as follows: Data on temporary migration in D. Noin, La population rurale du Maroc. vol. II, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France 1970, pp. 303-5. Census Data (1960): Royaume du Maroc. Ministère de l'Economie Nationale, Division de la Coordination Economique et du Plan. Recensement Démographique. Population Legale du Maroc. D. Noin claims that the quantitative data on migration he presents are quite accurate. Our analysis bears him out.

COMMERCIAL LINKS BETWEEN GRAND BASSAM, IVORY COAST, AND RURAL POPULATIONS IN WEST AFRICA

Marvin P. Miracle and Diane S. Miracle

The field work reported below was done in 1965 as part of a study of local marketing in the Ivory Coast in which we attempted to follow all the major commodities found in the town of Grand Bassam back to the producer or on to the final consumer, if consumers were located elsewhere. This required study of far more commodities than we first anticipated--well over 100--and travel over far greater distances. In fact, several commodities took us as far as Niger, Upper Volta, Mali, and Senegal. In addition, one of us visited the Grand Bassam marketplace each day observing and interviewing in French, or if necessary in one of the local languages, using an interpreter. Appendix 1 contains a fuller description of our research methods.

Selected Characteristics of Grand Bassam

Although Grand Bassam's population is not large--estimated at 16,500 in 1965[1]--the town's strategic location has rendered it of commercial importance since the turn of the century when it was the first French colonial capital of the Ivory Coast.[2] Located on the ocean and at the confluence of the Mé and the Comoé Rivers and connected with coastal areas by lagoons and canals for at least 150 kilometers to the east and west, it has long been a point of considerable transshipping. Today it is linked with inland areas by hard-surfaced roads for at least 50 kilometers to the east and west and north as far as the border of the country with Upper Volta.

It appears that most of the residents of Grand Bassam have some involvement with commerce (either as participants in commercial ventures or as relatives or employees of the commercial community); and, although there are no quantitative data, it is clear that the population is extremely diverse ethnically. In our interviewing we encountered 111 ethnic groups of which 67 could be identified. Of these, there were ethnic groups from almost all of the countries of West Africa, with groups from Nigeria, Niger, Togo, Ghana, Upper Volta, Mali, Mauritania, Senegal, and Guinea being the most conspicuous.

Major Findings

The findings which are perhaps most relevant for the study of small centers concern the amount of specialization and exchange; the role of Grand Bassam as a center for bulking, breaking bulk, transshipping, storing and processing commodities; and the importance of Grand Bassam as a financial center for the population in much of its hinterland.

Specialization and Exchange

Perhaps because specialization sometimes involves exotic commodities or unfamiliar services, much of the specialization within and between communties may go unrecognized by outsiders. In the Grand Bassam area it appears that all the crops cultivated, and indeed, most of the commodities gathered and caught (wrapping leaves, snails, and fish, to name a few), have some commercial component--and many are almost exclusively commercial ventures.

Early in our field work the commonly accepted stereotype of African rural economies being characterized by "subsistence" agriculture was shattered. Nowhere in the immediate hinterland of Grand Bassam, nor in its distanct hinterland--which extended from the onion growers near Niamey, to the nomadic cattle producers all across the desert fringe of West Africa, to the urban kola nut consumers in Dakar--did we find evidence of producers who were even nearly self-sufficient. In the Grand Bassam marketplace, there were at least 112 commodities (Table 1) and a great number of services which were purchased almost everyday (although some were seasonal), and as we probed into the matter we consistently found good reasons for the striking amount of specialization encountered.

To begin with, there were compelling ecological reasons for a good deal of the long distance trade. The rainfall of Africa tends to be lighter and less reliable as one moves away from the equator toward the Sahara Desert and the vegetation becomes progressively sparser, ranging from dense forest in some coastal areas to thick bush, then scattered bush, grass, and finally desert. In the areas of denser vegetation, which include Grand Bassam, the testse fly, a carrier of trypanosomiasis, prevents substantial production of cattle (see Appendix 2). And being relatively prosperous, the coastal areas have a demand for animal protein that is considerably greater than local supplies. On the other hand, the desert fringe and adjacent savanna in the north do not suit the tsetse fly, and there is a large livestock industry there. The northern people, however, cannot grow kola nuts--a commodity much in demand in the north but which grows only in a humid forest climate, such as that found in the hinterland of Grand Bassam (Appendix 3). In addition, the coastal areas, though blessed with ocean, river, and lagoon fishing, cannot supply the quantities of fish demanded by local populations nor can they supply certain species of fish found in the Niger River which are popular among some coastal peoples (Appendix 4). Thus, considering only three commodities--fish and cattle from the northern savanna and kola nuts from the forest areas along the coast--there is a strong basis for long distance trade.

A second reason for Grand Bassam's trade with areas a considerable distance away are seasonal variations in production of the same commodity. For example, Grand Bassam is an importer of mangoes when the mango harvest is in full swing in the northern Ivory Coast and adjacent countries, but exports to these areas when its own mangoes are ripe, a period when they have no mango production. Differences in varieties of crops found in one area as opposed to another provide a similar impetus to trade. Early varieties of yams and maize tend to come from one area of the Ivory Coast and later varieties from another, although it is not clear that the area immediately around Grand Bassam ever produces enough of either of these to be an exporter as they are with mangoes.

A good deal of the local trade in foodstuffs seems to be related to specialization by producers of perennials, particularly tree crops such as cocoa, coffee, coconuts, kola nuts, and oil palm products. Most producers of these commodities hire labor or engage them as sharecroppers, and frequently buy most of the foodstuffs they and their laborers consume. Even though they could produce their own foodstuffs they probably perceive the returns from tree crops to be higher enough to justify specialization, but there are no data on cost and returns that are sufficiently reliable to verify this.

As specialized, if not more so, are fishermen (see Appendix 4) who seem to represent a large part of the population within a radius of 50 kilometers from Grand Bassam. Fishermen commonly have no economic activity other than fishing, and buy all of their foodstuffs and other consumption goods. We were not surprised at this since it fits our experience with fishermen in Zambia and Zaire.[3] We were, however, not prepared for the amount of specialization we found in the production of starchy staples--mainly plantain, yams, and manioc in the area within 50 kilometers of Grand Bassam. As a group, starchy staples typically make up over 80 percent of the calories consumed in tropical Africa,[4] and although no dietary studies have been done in the Grand Bassam area, there is nothing to suggest it is an exception in this. Travelling with traders along the roads in the immediate hinterland or on boats in the lagoon or up the river we repeatedly saw villagers selling one starchy staple and in turn buying others as the vehicle or boat stopped. A similar pattern was to be seen in the household activities in and adjacent to Grand Bassam itself; it appears a number of the women daily buy one starchy staple and process it into a final product--often some sort of dough ball, cooked and/or fermented--most of which is sold. The result is that many women specialize in making one starchy dish (Table 2), the production of which is the most laborious part of making a meal. They sell enough of their output to obtain the money required to buy other prepared products and perhaps have a net profit as well. This is similar to the pattern found in some, if not all, Yoruba areas of western Nigeria,[5] and we suspect widely in other parts of Africa, as well.

Bulking and Breaking Bulk

For a number of commodities, Grand Bassam is the base of operations of assemblers or bulkers who buy from producers and perhaps perform the function of cleaning, grading, sorting, conditioning for shipment, and storage. Some or all of these operations can be found for all of the commodities exported out of the southeastern forest zone (see Table 1)--most notably kola nuts (Appendix 3); for most of the other tree crops; for ocean fish and other ocean products; for snails; and for most of the locally produced starchy staples (see Appendix 5 on one of these--plantains).

For a much larger group of commodities, one finds breaking of bulk in Grand Bassam, the size of unit most convenient for transport and storage being reduced one or more times to smaller units which are more suitable for wholesaling and retailing. Perhaps the most extreme example of this is the distribution of cigarettes, which may be separated from cartons into


8°
6°
4°
MALI
UPPER
VOLTA
10°
Odiénné
GUINÉE
Korhogo
Ferkéssédougou
Katiola
8°
Bouaké
Man
Danané
Daloa
Dimbokro
Abengourou
Oumé
GHANA
6°
Gagnoa
Agboville
LIBERIA
Divo
Abidjan
Aboisso
Grand
-Bassam
Sassandra
GULF OF GUINEA
4°
6°
4°
2°
International Boundary
Paved Roads
All-weather Unpaved Roads
Forest
0
100
Miles

Table 1. Commodities Sold in and Around the Grand Bassam Marketplace

Commodity	Producing Areas or Sources Reported	Consuming Areas Reported
Overseas Trade		
Cloth	Industrialized countries (mainly France)	Grand Bassam and nearby villages
Second-hand clothing	" "	" "
Metal pots & pans	" "	" "
Matches	" "	" "
Knives	" "	" "
Salt	" "	" "
Rope	" "	" "
Nails, hinges, screws, bolts	" "	" "
Irish potatoes	" "	" "
Tomato paste	" "	" "
Trade with Other African Countries		
Kola nuts	Southeastern forest zone of the Ivory Coast	Sahel and savanna zones of West Africa from Dakar (1,700 km) to Niamey (1,000 km)
Mangoes	" "	Savanna zone (mainly Mali & Upper Volta)
Oranges	" "	" "
Limes	" "	" "
Tangerines	" "	" "
Coconuts	" "	" "
Peanut oil	Dakar (over 1,700 kilometers)	Grand Bassam and nearby villages
Mats	" "	" "
Dried and smoked fish	Niger River--mainly the hinterland of Mopti, Mali (1,000 km)	" "
Shea butter	Savanna zone (mainly Mali & Upper Volta)	" "
Cattle	Sahel & savanna from Mauritania to Niger	" "
Sheep	Sahel & savanna (mainly Niger & Mali)	" "
Goats	" "	" "
Onions	Eastern Niger River (mainly Niamey)	" "
Chickens	Savanna zone (mainly Mali & Upper Volta)	" "
Guinea fowl	" "	" "
Eggs	" "	" "
Finger millet	" "	" "
Bulrush millet	" "	" "

Table 1. Continued

Commodity	Producing Areas or Sources Reported	Consuming Areas Reported
Fonio	Savanna zone (mainly Mali & Upper Volta)	Grand Bassam and nearby villages
Sorghum	" "	" "
Honey	" "	" "
Tobacco	" "	" "
Peanuts	" "	" "
Bambara nuts	" "	" "
Calabashes	" "	" "
"Sumbara" powder[a/]	" "	" "
Trade with the Savanna Zone of the Ivory Coast (200-700 km)		
Kola nuts	Southeastern forest zone of the Ivory Coast	Savanna zone of the Ivory Coast
Mangoes	" "	" "
Oranges	" "	" "
Limes	" "	" "
Coconuts	" "	" "
Ginger	" "	" "
Chickens	Savanna zone of the Ivory Coast (especially Korhogo)	Grand Bassam and nearby villages
Guinea fowl	" "	" "
Chicken cages	" "	" "
Maize	Savanna zone of the Ivory Coast (especially Bouake & Katiola)	" "
Maize flour	" "	" "
Sorghum	Savanna zone of the Ivory Coast	" "
Yams	Savanna zone of the Ivory Coast (especially Korhogo)	" "
Mangoes	Savanna zone of the Ivory Coast	" "
Rice	" "	" "
Clay pots	Savanna zone of the Ivory Coast (especially Katiola)	" "
Trade within the Southeastern Forest Zone of the Ivory Coast (5-200 km)		
Bananas-plaintains	Forest zone	Grand Bassam and nearby villages; sometimes Abidjan
Yams	" "	" "
Manioc	" "	" "
Taro	" "	" "

Table 1. Continued

Commodity	Producing Areas or Sources Reported	Consuming Areas Reported
Sweet potatoes	Forest zone	Grand Bassam and nearby villages; sometimes Abidjan
Rice	" "	" "
Maize	" "	" "
Wheat flour	Abidjan	Grand Bassam and nearby villages
Manioc products[b]	Farms near Grand Bassam	" "
Maize products[b]	" "	" "
Rice products[b]	" "	" "
Coconut products[b]	" "	" "
Bread[b]	Grand Bassam or Abidjan	" "
Beef	Cattle purchased in Abidjan	" "
Mutton	Sheep purchased in Abidjan	" "
Goat meat	Goats purchased either in Abidjan or in villages near Grand Bassam	" "
Snails	Forest zone	Grand Bassam, nearby villages, and Ghana
Dried snails	" "	" "
Ocean fish	Coastal villages, forest zone, or Abidjan	Grand Bassam, nearby villages and sometimes Abidjan[c]
Crabs	" "	" "
Smoked or dried fish	" "	" "
Smoked squid	" "	" "
Chickens	Forest zone	Grand Bassam and nearby villages
Eggs	" "	" "
Oil palm fruit	" "	" "
Palm oil	" "	" "
Palm wine (from oil palm tree)	" "	" "
Bottled beer	Abidjan	" "
Ice	"	" "
Bottled home-made medicines	Forest zone	" "
Kola nuts	" "	Grand Bassam, nearby villages, sometimes Abidjan[c]

Table 1. Continued

Commodity	Producing Areas or Sources Reported		Consuming Areas Reported	
Tomatoes	Forest zone		Grand Bassam and nearby villages	
Fresh okra	"	"	"	"
Dried okra	"	"	"	"
Eggplant	"	"	"	"
Fresh peppers (4 kinds)	"	"	"	"
Dried peppers	"	"	"	"
Shallots	"	"	"	"
Lettuce	"	"	"	"
Cabbage	"	"	"	"
Garlic	"	"	"	"
Cucumbers	"	"	"	"
Squash	"	"	"	"
Squash and other cur-cubit seeds	"	"	"	"
Green beans	"	"	"	"
Dry beans	"	"	"	"
Black-eyed peas	"	"	"	"
Avocados	"	"	"	"
Ginger	"	"	"	"
Oranges	"	"	"	"
Limes	"	"	"	"
Tangerines	"	"	"	"
Grapefruit	"	"	"	"
Papaya	"	"	"	"
Guava	"	"	"	"
Pineapples	"	"	"	"
Tamarind	"	"	"	"
Coconuts	"	"	"	"
Mangoes	"	"	"	"
Sugar cane	"	"	"	"
Mint	"	"	"	"
Coffee	"	"	"	"
Earth (eaten by pregnant women)	"	"	"	"
Wrapping leaves (for wrapping food and food-stuffs)	"	"	"	"
Henna	"	"	"	"
Hand-dyed cloth	"	"	"	"
Gourds (for use as uten-sils--6 types)	"	"	"	"

Table 1. Continued

Commodity	Producing Areas or Sources Reported	Consuming Areas Reported
Kapok	Forest zone	Grand Bassam and nearby villages
Home-made brooms	" "	" "
Baskets	" "	" "
Tables	" "	" "
Home-made soap	" "	" "
Home-made mattresses	" "	" "
Carved wooden combs	" "	" "
Teeth-cleaning sticks	" "	" "
Firewood	Forest zone (especially Aboisso area)	" "
Charcoal	Forest zone	" "
Wooden pestles	" "	" "
Wooden mortars	" "	" "
Scrubbing fiber	Forest zone (especially Aboisso)	" "
Roofing squares from palm fronds	Forest zone	" "
Building materials from palm frond ribs	" "	" "
Wooden cooking spoons	" "	" "
Jewelry	" "	" "
Stew[b/]	" "	" "

a/ An orange powder made from the fruit of a wild tree; used as a flavoring.

b/ See Table 2 for description of these products.

c/ Source varies because of price fluctuations. For example, when prices are relatively low in Abidjan,it is a source; when relatively high there, this commodity is likely to come to Grand Bassam from other sources and be resold to traders who resell it in Abidjan.

the component packs; the packs may be further broken down into individual cigarettes; and sometimes the cigarettes are even cut in half to get to the unit that some consumers prefer. Another example is the marketing of imported tomato paste from Italy, which, in the Grand Bassam marketplace, may be sold a teaspoon at a time to housewives who lack refrigeration and often want to purchase only enough for a single stew. Breaking of bulk is characteristic of all of the manufactured goods, whether from factories in Abidjan or other countries, and for a number of commodities travelling long distance, for example dried fish, onions, shea butter, peanuts, millet, and sorghum.

Transshipping and Storage

Because of its relatively well-developed network of roads and its location at the junction of waterways, Grand Bassam is well situated as a center of transshipment and storage. Many commodities produced in its immediate hinterland come in by boat and are eventually shipped on by truck. Commodities which are imported often come in by vehicle--from countries to the north or from the port in Abidjan--with part of the shipment being transferred to boats as it moves on to smaller towns and villages. Similar transshipping may take place with other modes of transportation. Goods may come overland by headload, bicycle, taxi, or truck, and be repurchased and/or bulked, sorted, or processed before making their way on to the final consumer.

Processing

We have already touched on the processing of starchy staple products. Probably more conspicuous is the processing of fish. Many women resident in Grand Bassam buy fresh fish--sometimes from their own husbands--and slowly smoke the fish on simple racks over outdoor fires until a product is obtained which can be kept unrefrigerated two or three days, sometimes twice as long. Other examples of local processing are charcoal, produced in the surrounding forest for local consumption and sometimes for export to other areas, various types of bread, hand-dyed cloth, and homemade soap (see Table 2).

Grand Bassam as a Center of Finance

At the time of our field work, there was no bank in Grand Bassam, but if there had been one all evidence suggests it would have been little used by the local population.[6] Nevertheless, all those we interviewed suggested that Grand Bassam was the center of an extensive credit network which served not only local residents but also much of the rural population in the hinterland within about 100 kilometers of Grand Bassam, and in some cases more distant populations. In fact, although there were no local banks, many rural Africans, without realizing it, had links to the banks in Abidgan, links which might involve several intermediaries, beginning with a local crop buyer and extending to other merchants, eventually to relatively large merchants in surrounding towns, then to Syrian or Lebanese merchants who were in a position to get credit from banks in Abidjan. Such credit chains involved successive relending of money by individuals or organizations in a position to assess the next party in the chain but not able to reliably assess the creditworthiness of more distant participants. Thus the bankers in Abidjan could get the sort of collateral and information on creditworthiness they desired from the Lebanese and Syrians but not from most African merchants.

Table 2. Processing in the Vicinity of Grand Bassam

Product	Source of Raw Materials	Other Relevant Information
Food and Drinks		
Garri (a type of manioc meal)	Farms near Grand Bassam	Made by Togolese, consumed principally by the Togolese, Nigerians, and Ghanaians
Attiéké (a manioc product resembling cooked rice)	" "	
Sweetened, cooked rice	Nearby farms or Grand Bassam market place	
Fried coconut balls	" "	
Fermented, steamed maize loaves	" "	
Steamed maize loaves	" "	
Apiti (a mixture of plantain and rice)	" "	
Sweet wheat bread	Flour purchased in Abidjan or Grand Bassan market place	Made by Senegalese women using earthen ovens
French bread	Abidjan	Made by a mechanized bakery
Peanut butter	Savanna zone	Locally roasted and pounded into paste
Roasted plantains	Nearby farms or Grand Bassam market place	Prepared by Ghanaian women
Stew	" "	Many types prepared using various combinations of vegetables, meat or fish, and condiments
Distilled drinks (made from palm wine)	Forest zone	
Palm wine (from oil palm)	" "	
Palm wine (from raffia palm)	" "	
Foodstuffs		
Dried fish	Forest zone	
Dried snails	" "	
Smoked fish	" "	
Smoked squid	" "	
Dried manioc	" "	
Dried okra	" "	
Dried peppers	" "	
Palm oil	" "	

Table 2. Continued

Product	Source of Raw Materials	Other Relevant Information
Other Items		
Leather sandals	Grand Bassam	
Rubber sandals	" "	Made by recycling tires
Hoes and knives		Made by local blacksmiths
Carved wooden combs	Forest zone	
Carved wooden cooking spoons	" "	
Wooden stools	" "	
Game boards	" "	
Brooms	" "	
Mattresses	" "	
Home-made soup	" "	Made from palm oil
Roofing squares	" "	Made by folding palm fronds
Palm building materials	" "	Made from ribs of raffia palms
Charcoal	" "	Made by a cartel which controlled all charcoal sold in Grand Bassam
Jewelry		Mostly gold items made by local craftsmen
Baskets	Forest zone	
Tables	" "	
Pestles	" "	
Mortars	" "	
Home-made medicines	" "	Many types made
Sewing	Mostly from overseas	Most tailors had sewing machines

In turn many Syrians and Lebanese knew sufficiently well the reputation of some of the African traders in the Grand Bassam area to make loans to them. These Africans perhaps loaned the money on to other Africans or maybe directly on to farmers in which case the loan commonly was secured by pledging crops.[7]

A second link with overseas capital markets was through importing firms. In this case, African traders--particularly those in the cloth trade according to our informants--might obtain goods from an importing firm partly or entirely on credit, sell the goods before repayment was due--sometimes, it is said, even at a loss to get money quickly--then invest the money obtained in some other commodity or operate as a moneylender and lend it out. In the latter case, a chain similar to the one we just described by which money ultimately reached the village level was possible, although we found no cases of this that we could clearly verify. (That may not mean much, however, since money matters are delicate and reliable information often cannot be obtained through direct questions. Frequently we had to resort to asking people "What is generally done in this area?", rather than asking them specifically what they had done.)

Another channel of credit linking Grand Bassam merchants with those in smaller towns or villages, or linking merchants in Grand Bassam with peddlers who circulate on foot or bicycle throughout the rural areas, was the practice of selling on consignment, with merchants in Grand Bassam giving goods to smaller traders partly or entirely on credit.

Apart from the credit arrangements already discussed, which all involved merchants or crop buyers, there were apparently also individuals who made loans of money that were not linked to business transactions, but they appear to have been relatively unimportant.

Many of the traders we interviewed had at some time in their career obtained capital from a relative or spouse. The practice of husbands lending money to wives, or vice versa, was reportedly widespread, as was that of an established kinsman helping one of his affines by providing credit for trading. In such cases, any profits made from the trading venture were often divided, usually either 50 or 67 percent going to the individual who had provided the capital for the venture.

Cartels may also have been of some importance as a source of credit. For a number of the more important commodities passing through Grand Bassam, trading was tightly controlled by cartels,[8] and the extension of credit was clearly an important adjunct for some of them.

A Final Note

Grand Bassam has enjoyed in some degree a number of advantages which have fostered the development of local enterprises and the mobilization of indigenous resources. Located at the hub of a transportation network and inhabited by an ethnically diverse and relatively prosperous population, it has a consuming public with sufficient wealth to provide a ready market for the numerous locally processed and manufactured products.

It is likely that in many small commercial centers like Grand Bassam the magnitude and scope of economic activity is far greater than generally recognized. Urban officials are often concerned primarily with institutions and commodities with direct links to the industrialized world,[9] and published statistics on employment, production, and trade usually either ignore or underestimate the production which is primarily for local consumption.[10] Our evidence suggests that it is in the smaller centers like Grand Bassam as much as in the better studied, larger towns and cities that indigenous entrepreneurs are developing their talents and expanding their local institutions to meet the changing economic needs of their societies.

APPENDIX 1

Methodology

In our effort to trace all major commodities found in Grand Bassam back to the producer and on to the final consumer, we were hampered by lack of written records, such as warehouse, railway, or tax receipts. The only alternative was to interview knowledgeable persons. We started with traders, asking them about the origins and destinations of the goods they dealt in and the conditions of sale, e.g., whether credit was involved; if so, the terms; and if use was made of brokers.

Ultimately we conducted some 200 interviews using French or English; and another 300 or so were conducted by our assistants in African languages.

Two techniques of checking responses were used. The first was to return to the same trader at later times for further discussions and to note discrepancies. The second was to check with other parties with whom traders dealt. Since there are always two parties to a transaction we could always use producers, consumers, or other middlemen to verify information about a given transaction, and in some cases there were third parties, such as transporters, porters, or innkeepers who were in a position to witness transactions in which we were interested.

Since we did not know what the universe of traders was, we could not use usual statistical sampling techniques to determine how representative the traders interviewed were. This was especially troublesome because there were so many commodities that we often did not have time to interview more than a few traders in each--sometimes only two or three. We were able, however, to devise a technique for getting some check on how representative were the traders interviewed. And, by interviewing on the other side of a given transaction, we were also able (1) to check the reliability of a given informant and (2) to get additional observations in some cases.

For example, to check how representative traders were when they named a given area as one supplying a particular commodity to Grand Bassam we visited the area in question and asked sellers of the commodity where it was being shipped to. Thus, when there were few traders available for commodity X in Grand Bassam during the time period we were working on it, and we were concerned that the time period was not representative, we could use information from the customers of absent traders although we obviously could not get information from the absent traders themselves. The same interview sometimes provided a check on the reliability of responses. When our sample of Grand Bassam traders gave widely divergent answers we could, in principle, again use their customers to give duplicate observations on the same transactions.

Interviewing Techniques

We always managed to be present at interviewing even if an assistant

did the actual questioning. In many cases, persons we contacted spoke French and we could question them directly, but even when interviewing had to be done in an African language we made a point of being present. In part this was to make sure the interviewing was actually done but it was also because answers often yielded unanticipated information which required further questioning along lines that had not been planned. (For example, after we had been in the field almost three months, reference in one interview with the "queen" of the trade led to a line of questioning which revealed buying rings and other cartel arrangements we had not asked about before because the large number of traders seemed to preclude such attempts to restrict competition.)

Being present at interviews was also useful in other ways. Even though we could not follow all the conversation when working through an interpreter, we could sometimes catch enough words to determine the drift of the conversation--important if for no other reason because when the subject turned out not to be what we had expected the explanation given for the departure sometimes yielded important new information (as in the case of the cartels above). Moreover, besides the words we comprehended, useful information could sometimes be obtained by observation of the physical surroundings and the activities encountered. For example, observation of physical surroundings gave information on how commodities were stored, some idea of quality differences, and clues as to processing methods, all of which are important in understanding commerce.

Notes were not taken nor was a tape recorder used in the presence of persons interviewed. Since discussion of trading can touch on a number of delicate matters that respondents might not want rivals, tax collectors, or relatives to know about, we concluded that making an obvious record of what they had divulged was likely to strongly bias information obtained. Therefore, we made no notes during the interview itself, but after it was concluded and we were safely beyond observation by the respondent, we then made a record of what we had been told.

APPENDIX 2

Organization of the Cattle Trade

Cattle consumed in Grand Bassam typically came from the sahel and adjacent savanna zones and were slowly driven the 700 to 1,000 kilometers to market, a trek that commonly took over a month. The forest zone produces almost no cattle because of trypanosomiasis[11] as noted earlier. In addition, the amount of beef demanded is higher in the forest zone because of relatively large concentrations of population and higher purchasing power per consumer which in part reflects the prosperity generated by tree crops for overseas export, particularly cocoa and coffee.

In producing areas brokers played a key role in transactions between producers and cattle buyers partly because cattle are sold on credit but for other reasons as well. Cattle producers usually brought their animals to small market centers where they contacted, or perhaps were contacted by, a broker who was in touch with buyers. The latter reportedly often do not speak the language (or languages) of the producers and are said to usually never speak with them directly. The broker not only moves between the two parties with offers and counter-offers, but also arranges credit. Typically the producer receives only a fraction of the total price at the time of sale, the balance being guaranteed by the broker.

The buyer hires a herder who is then in charge of moving the animals to markets in consuming areas. As with the fish trade from the Niger River, some animals may be sold en route if prices are attractive. Those that reach Grand Bassam must first pass through wholesalers in Abidjan who control trade at the wholesale level throughout the coastal area of the southeastern forest zone. The Abidjan wholesalers also pay only a fraction of the price they negotiate with the middleman who has brought the animals from the producing areas. The wholesalers sell the animals, again largely on credit, to Grand Bassam butchers who finally get cash from retail sales. When the butcher pays his debt to the Abidjan wholesaler the string of debts begins to be repaid, the middleman who arranged the cattle drive receiving his payment from the wholesaler perhaps within two or three weeks of the time he arrived on the coast, if he is lucky. Thus, at the earliest it is likely to be two months after the animals left the producer that the buyer is back in the sahel to make final payment.

As with the kola and fish trade, cartels are not uncommon. The cartel of wholesalers in Abidjan had seven members who followed common policies so far as prices paid and received for animals and terms of credits were concerned. The butchers' cartel in Grand Bassam had two members.

APPENDIX 3

Organization of the Kola Nut Trade

A kola nut (cola nitida), about the size of a chestnut, contains roughly as much caffeine and theobromine as a cup of a coffe and tea combined and is a convenient stimulant. Like candy, kola nuts can be carried in one's pocket or purse, and chunks can be bitten off and munched whenever desired. The nuts may be either white or red--the white having a milder flavor--and both colors grow on the same tree. The kola tree requires the climatic conditions of the humid, tropical forest and the sort of soils preferred by cacao; hence it is limited to part of the forest zone of West Africa and thrives in much of the forested hinterland of Grand Bassam.

For local consumption kola is generally purchased in forest towns and villages or directly from farmers and then is sold in the Grand Bassam marketplace, or by street vendors or hawkers. Occasionally supplies for local consumption are purchased in Abidjan. This occurs when a glut in the Abidjan market temporarily drives down their prices.

Grand Bassam is also a major bulking center for kola shipped to the savanna zones in northern Ivory Coast, Senegal, Mali, Upper Volta, and Niger.

Our apartment in Grand Bassam was across the street from one of the main kola warehouses, and we frequently talked with the kola dealers. They were organized into a cartel, sometimes pooled their funds, and allocated buying zones to each of the members. Members usually bought directly from farmers in their designated buying zones, then, once a truckload was accumulated, transported the kola to a Grand Bassam warehouse for sorting, conditioning, wrapping for shipment, and possibly short-term storage (while dealers waited for prices to improve in savanna and sahel areas). As with most commodities moving in long distance trade, the larger kola traders got frequent reports by letter or telegram on prices in consuming areas from their agents.

Kola is shipped in baskets lined with fresh leaves[12] and carefully wrapped to maintain humidity. While kola is being sorted by size and color each nut is inspected for evidence of insects or disease. Unless all wormy or diseased nuts are removed before each basket is sealed, an entire basket may be ruined by the time it reaches the consumer. Besides skills in sorting and grading, kola shippers must also have knowledge of the pattern of kola preferences in each of the northern consuming centers so that each area is sent the mix of white and red nuts it prefers. This knowledge of consumer preferences was usually cited first by informants as a reason why kola trade in Grand Bassam is entirely controlled by "stranger" ethnic groups from the northern consuming centers.

Kola dealers reported that in most consuming centers they had to sell to a sellers' cartel--a fact we were able to verify for the major cities of

Mali, Upper Volta, and Niger. Local kola dealers knew a great deal about most of the sellers' cartels--entrance fees, fines for selling below the cartel price, etc.--and presumably could have joined at least some of these cartels if they had thought it profitable to do so, although none of them reported belonging to cartels in consuming areas at the time we were in the field.

Kola shipments from Grand Bassam to Dakar were sent by sea. Shipments to Upper Volta and Niger reportedly went directly by truck to large wholesalers in the consuming centers. Those to Mali typically went by truck to Tingrela, a small Ivory Coast village near the Mali border about halfway between Odiénné and Korhogo, where the bundles of kola were transferred to donkeys and smuggled into Mali. Because Mali's currency was not convertible, trade with Mali was usually done on a barter basis with sheep and goats received in payment for the kola.

APPENDIX 4

Organization of the Fish Trade

The fish trade has two major segments: (a) trade in fish caught on the Niger River and (b) trade in fish from the ocean and waters of the forest zone.

Trade in Fish from the Niger River

The inland delta of the Niger River, located largely in the section of the river immediately upstream from Mopti, Mali, appears to provide abundant supplies of fish and types of fish not available from forest and coastal sources. Along the Niger River fishermen are typically specialists who spend most of their time in isolated fishing camps catching, drying, or smoking fish. Their food supplies and equipment are typically provided through credit arrangements with fish dealers in urban centers, principally Mopti, which bind them to sell only to their supplier. This reportedly allows dealers substantial control over the prices fishermen receive, the amount of fish for sale at Mopti, and the price they in turn receive from traders who move the fish to distant consuming centers.

Fish bought at Mopti typically go by truck south, traders sometimes selling from their load along the way as they come to areas where prices are attractive. They may know in advance where to stop, because, like kola dealers, they employ agents to regularly send them price information. The fish which reach Grand Bassam are sold to the fish wholesalers' cartel, which in turn sells--often on credit--to local middlemen or retailers, or to those who sell in neighboring towns, villages, and hamlets. They may be shopkeepers, traders who move principally from one village market to another (for example, selling one day in a village where the market day is Tuesday, then moving the next day to a village with a Wednesday market), or hawkers who transport their wares by bicycle, selling from farmstead to farmstead.

Trade in Fish from the Ocean and from Forest Zone Waters

Forest zone fishermen, unlike those on the Niger River, usually are not involved in processing. Fresh fish may be bought by a trader[13] to whom the fisherman is obligated to sell because of credit ties, as on the Niger River, then sold at wholesale, and later at retail in Grand Bassam. Some traders bought fish in the market at Adiaké (near Aboisso), a market which was held on Wednesdays and Saturdays, then immediately resold their fish in Grand Bassam and neighboring towns. Others first smoked part or all of their purchase before selling it.

The amount of fish processed fluctuated with the size of the catch and probably depended on, among other things, the quantities and prices of other fish and other sources of protein as well. Although there were no reliable quantitative data it appeared that the bulk of fish caught was processed. Grand Bassam appeared to be far the largest fish processing center within the eastern forest zone bounded by Abidjan in the west and by the Ghana border

in the east. Processers typically bought fresh fish--sometimes from Abidjan if prices were relatively attractive there, sometimes from as far distant in the other direction (the Aboisso area, as we have seen)--and slowly smoked them on metal grills fueling their fires with wood bought in Grand Bassam from firewood sellers (the firewood itself often came from areas 50 kilometers or more distant).

Fish for local consumption were usually smoked 8 to 10 hours which was said to be sufficient to give them a shelf life (unrefrigerated) of as much as 36 hours.

APPENDIX 5

Organization of the Plantain Trade

Plantain, along with manioc, yams, and maize appeared to be the base of the diet in Grand Bassam, although no dietary surveys have been done and there is no quantitative data. However, local consumption appears to explain only part of the trade centered on Grand Bassam. A large volume of plantain passed through Grand Bassam en route to other consumption centers.

The trade was entirely controlled by women organized into a cartel which had 42 members in April, 1965. The head of this cartel allocated locations in the market place and collected fines if members were caught buying or selling at prices other than those that had been agreed on by the group. She also extended credit to members who needed it. Members stated that if neither fines nor withdrawal of credit were sufficient to discipline a member she would be physically driven from the marketplace, although no one cited a specific instance in which that had actually happened. Members of the cartel often extended credit to producers to prevent them selling their harvest to buyers from other areas.

The cartel sold plantain to local retailers and to wholesalers from Abidjan. (We were told the Abidjan wholesalers also operated collusively which prevented the Grand Bassam plantain sellers from themselves selling in Abidjan.)

The Grand Bassam plantain dealers commonly traveled as much as 150 kilometers from Grand Bassam, not infrequently going beyond Abidjan for supplies, some or all of which might later be sold to wholesalers from Abidjan. Credit ties with producers could explain this phenomenon, but other factors may be involved. Abidjan wholesalers saved much time by buying in quantity from the Grand Bassam cartel.

For plantain, as kola, Grand Bassam was a point where the commodity was graded and stored. Plantain is fairly perishable, spoiling within a few days of the time it is harvested if not dried or cooked. The Grand Bassam plantain sellers said that just as they were prevented from selling stocks in danger of spoiling in Abidjan by collusion among Abidjan plantain sellers, local collusion among Grand Bassam plantain processors meant processing was also denied them as a means of disposing of such surpluses.

FOOTNOTES

[1] Bastiaan A. den Tuinder, Ivory Coast: The Challenge of Success, Baltimore, 1978, p. 308.

[2] Grand Bassam was estimated to have a population of about 1,000 in 1910, a population which is thought to have grown to 7,000 by 1921 (Ivory Coast, Min. des Finances, Service de la Statistique, Inventaire Economique et Social de la Cote d'Ivoire 1947-1958, Abidjan, 1958, p. 37).

[3] Marvin P. Miracle, "The Copperbelt Trading and Marketing," in Paul Bohannan and George Dalton (eds.), Markets in Africa, Evanston, Illinois, 1962, pp. 724-728.

[4] Hiromitsu Kaneda and Bruce F. Johnston, "Urban Food Expenditure Patterns in Tropical Africa," Food Research Institute Studies, Vol. II, no. 3 (November, 1961), pp. 238-240.

[5] R. Galetti, K. D. S. Baldwin, and I. O. Dina, Nigerian Cocoa Farmers, Oxford, 1956, pp. 489 and 598.

[6] Informants repeatedly told us that the nearest banks in Abidjan were not good places to deposit money, because relatives were likely to learn too much about one's assets from bank employees.

[7] At the time the loan was made, repayment was negotiated between the farmer and crop buyer in terms of so many units of harvest from an immature crop at a predetermined, and lower than normal, price, the difference between the agreed upon price and the normal price being in effect an implicit interest on the loan.

[8] For further discussion of the organization of cartels and other collusive groups see Appendices 2-5 and Marvin P. Miracle, "Market Structure and Conduct in Tropical Africa: A Survey," in Sayre P. Schatz (ed.), South of the Sahara: Development in African Economies, Philadelphia, 1972.

[9] Ivorien government officials initially tried to steer us away from research on locally consumed commodities arguing that the only significant commerce was to be found in crops for overseas export.

[10] The omission or underestimation of economic activity in the informal sector is not necessarily a purposeful bias; it may merely reflect the difficulty of keeping records of transactions which are not regulated by--i.e., taxed, subsidized, financed or in some way channeled through--government agencies or other large institutional bureaucracies (e.g. banks).

[11]Efforts are under way to develop breeds that are resistant to trypanosomiasis, but thus far these efforts have made almost no contribution to the supply of beef in the forest zone.

[12]The particular leaves used for wrapping kola are gathered from the forest by members of another cartel which sells to local shopkeepers and vendors as well as to the kola shippers.

[13]The trader may be the fisherman's wife. If so, credit arrangements between the two may also be involved.

CONFLICT AND DEVELOPMENT IN A SMALL URBAN CENTER

Ronald Cohen

Introduction

Right or wrong, valid or invalid in theoretical terms, the practical issue posed by this symposium--that of the nature, impact and determinants of small urban centers in Africa--is obviously an important frontier of knowledge. Anyone who has any experience whatsoever in such towns knows how central they are to the success or failure of rural development schemes. If upwards of 80% of Africa is rural, then rurally-based small urban centers are the major, often the only, means by which rural people interact with enterprises and policies directed at the improvement of their productive capacities and the raising of their overall standard of living.

On the other hand, it is now widely accepted that urbanization is a mixed blessing, possibly not a blessing at all. Urban centers are said to "exploit" their rural hinterlands, to be correlated with and most likely to cause falling agricultural productivity and to be part of a network of collection nodes through which foreign interests aggregate the expoitable resources of the poorer and weaker nations of the world. Research on this dependency paradigm indicates enough support for it to have become the new traditional wisdom. Such a theoretical orientation points away from internal factors towards relative inequalities in the world system and their effects on the social and economic organizations of the poorer countries. It also points to policies that would counteract the large-scale forces creating underdevelopment by giving greater stress to rural programs and an ideological bias against increased urban development. In its most radical form--the Cambodia Solution--it involves strident anti-urbanization combined with coercive mobilization of the rural sector in order to increase agricultural productivity.

The point of view adopted in this paper rests on the proposition that urbanization is not simply a function of the exploitative nature of class formation and its assumed or real relation to a world system characterized by inequality. Education in a modern school system, the development of a national and local administrative structure, internal political competition, and a host of other social, economic, and political factors predict the increased urbanization of Third World populations. Large urban centers will get larger, and smaller nodes based on commerce, transport, and/or administration are bound to appear and grow. Urbanization

and its spread into the rural areas is as inexorable as the coming of the seasons. It can vary from year to year, and from place to place, but it cannot be stopped.

In what is to follow I wish to show how urban development in one particular part of Nigeria has been a function of local conflict and the relation of that conflict to the wider political forces of the Nigerian nation. Although urbanization is an ubiquitous event across all Third World countries, some centers grow and develop much more rapidly than others, even though all may be subjected to similar world system forces. The explanation of this variance, I contend, is to be sought in the factors affecting local, not national or international, levels of interaction.

One more point is important in assessing the weight, or lack of it, in the following argument. My field work in Biu, Nigeria was directed primarily at understanding a set of semi-differentiated local political and social institutions which have evolved over an extended time period. I collected material on twentieth-century change from the National Archives in Kaduna and from local peoples, mostly older people, as it bore on this particular set of issues. As a resident of a small town, as a person interested in, and committed to, Nigerian development, I observed a number of events and factors relevant to rural urban centers. On the other hand, I did not set out to specifically research the nature and impact of Biu as a small urban center. What follows, therefore, is at best the interpretative impressions of an interested observer and at worst the biased musings of someone who believes that there are no simple solutions to complex problems.

The Historical Background

Pre-Colonial Differentiation

At the southern edge of Borno and due north of Yola lies present-day Biu Division of Borno State in northeastern Nigeria. The area is a physically uplifted basaltic plateau which rises steadily from the Chad basin to a height of two to three thousand feet above sea level, then falls rapidly on the south as the land gives way to rivers flowing towards the Benue. Over the centuries people from further east, and possibly from Borno as well, have sought refuge and/or expanded naturally into the area. The highlands, better watered than the surrounding country, form a tongue of relatively high population density extending from the Cameroon mountains.

The people of the region--which I call Buraland--speak a common language, Bura, and share a large number of culture traits having to do with marriage, family, technology, and non-Islamic religious beliefs and practices. They are basically patrilineal, patri- or viri- local, with named exogamous clan segments. They live in villages and hamlets in which ward-segments contain an owner-founder set of genealogically related patrilineages plus later comers. The founder or his patrilineally related descendant acted as village head, while ward heads and other

respected lineage elders formed a council that met daily at the village head's compound to discuss public policy, adjudicate disputes, and decide on the best ways and means to administer policies within and between their own and the other villages of the region. Villages varied in size from a few dozen people to several hundred (Cohen, 1977).

The northern 25% of the people call themselves Pabir and have over the past few centuries differentiated sharply from this non-urbanized Bura background. Population units compacted into larger walled towns of up to several thousand people. Basic ward and household organization was similar to that of the smaller Bura villages as was the local shrine cult and the cult of the ancestors. However, in a number of cases there was a chief, or Kuthli, whose authority and status greatly exceeded anything practiced by the Bura. The Kuthli ruled his own town and some surrounding hamlets from a large centrally located compound. There he held court with titled nobles made up of princes and heads of leading lineages and town wards. This expanded and full-time government settled disputes and made decisions about defense, public works such as roads, walls, war, and the apprehension and punishment of wrongdoers. There was no revenue system as such, but people brought gifts to court when they used government services; gifts from first crops, hunts, and trading expeditions were also customarily given to the monarch.

Elsewhere (Cohen, 1977) I have described and analyzed this differentiation. Pabir centralization was a response to raiding and incursions into northern Buraland, first by Bornoans and then in the nineteenth century by expansionsist Fulani jihadists, some of whom actually settled in the area as conquerors. They were finally defeated and forced to leave by the combined efforts of the Pabir under the leadership of the Kuthli of Biu (Cohen, 1977:204-5). This campaign resulted in the growth of Biu preeminence and the beginnings of a more centralized state in which local Pabir town heads were referred to as thlerima, under or subordinate to the Kuthli of Biu.

These are the essentials of the historical forces operating when colonial forces arrived in the area at the beginning of the century. Buraland was peopled by two semi-differentiated groups whose roots were similar if not identical. Over a long period of time northern parts of the region were threatened by incursions from nearby Muslim states. This resulted in more compact towns, class society, centralized rulers, and the beginnings of a unified political organization among a number of northern towns under the leadership of a central and more powerful government at Biu.

Differentiation as Conflict: The Colonial Intrusion

When the British first arrived (1902-3), they found a series of relatively large walled towns stretching across the northern part of the area. To the south of these were less powerful groups living in smaller settlements and often related historically and ethnically to their northern neighbors. The British chose two of these largest towns--Biu in the Bura-speaking area and Gulani among the Tera-speaking groups--

as district headquarters. Each town was planned as a future center of administration and development for its own area. However, constant problems and friction between the leaders at Gulani with the British on the one hand and the southern people on the other finally forced a change. After 1914, the Gulani chieftancy was split up, the eastern portion coming under Biu. In the meantime, the "chief" at Biu had been named head of all "Babur" (Pabir) and Bura; his administration and his town rapidly emerged as a central node of power in the area (Nak-Biudist).

In Biu town the Kuthli (referred to in official reports as "Emir" from 1918 onwards) set up a close working relationship with the local British District Officer. The Emir realized very soon after the British arrived that superior Western military power and British desire to set up a single-tiered hierarchy in the region could be used to advance the power of Biu far beyond its pre-colonial borders. The initial impact was felt through the imposition of taxation collected by the emerging emirate at Biu. After 1919, this led to an emirate (Native Authority) treasury at Biu which was financed from 50% of the revenue. It also led to armed and bitter resistance by the Bura. Evidence of extortion and misuse of tax funds is well-documented for this early period (Wakawa 1974:46-47). Many Bura refused to pay; some ran away to the south across the Hawal river in Yola Province. For their part, the British and the Pabir met force with force. Eleven armed "patrols" were sent into Buraland from 1908 to 1918 to quell resistance and burn villages. These events built a legacy of bitterness that has remained fresh in people's memories to this day.

In summary, the first phase of Buraland's incorporation into colonial Nigeria involved the setting up of a plural emirate with headquarters at Biu in which northern Nigerian emirate-type government was forcibly placed over a non-Muslim majority whose traditions of village autonomy stimulated a wave of armed rebellions. Biu town became the recognized center of this new control. It symbolized taxes, a new centralism, armed coercion, arrests, and the loss of an independent way of life.

The Missionaries

The next phase of Buraland history began in 1923-4 with the arrival of the Church of Brethren Mission (CBM). Although both the British District Officer and the Emir at Biu tried to stop the missionaries, they were finally allowed to set up a station at Garkida in 1924 (Thomason 1974). Once established, the missionaries referred to the Pabir and the Bura as quite distinct "tribes." They emphasized Bura ethnicity and its "pagan" nature in order to keep the area open to mission work. To get around other restrictions hampering their work and to spread their effect as far as possible across the region, the missionaries trained lay preachers who then returned to their home villages to teach hygiene, some literacy, and of course, the Gospel. At Garkida across the Hawal River they set up a primary school, a dispensary, somewhat later a hospital, and still later more advanced schooling.[1] By the mid-1930s, lay preachers were working throughout the Bura area, and there were three accredited primary schools in operation in as many of the larger Bura villages.

These developments had two important results. First, a tradition of Western education began which aided and abetted a tendency for migratory labor or more or less permanent labor outside the home area--and all of this is still quite common in the Bura region.[2] Bura literates or semi-literates with some beginning knowledge of English started going to the Jostin mines voluntarily instead of having to be persuaded or forced into going. During these same years, it also became customary for Bura men to obtain jobs as stewards and cooks for the European colonial households, for the most part because of knowledge of English. Second, a sense of Bura-ness was developing in relation to Biu political control over Bura villages. Informants speak of letter writing, meetings, class reunions, and other gatherings in which Bura migrants met at home and in other centers wehre they sought each other out. Often as not, they discussed common problems back in Buraland.

Biu Town

As already noted Biu was a major walled town of the area in the precolonial period, rising in power and influence. Other Pabir towns whose heads were on occasion organized by Biu recognized its leadership at least in matters of defense. Once Biu was chosen as divisional headquarters of "Pagan Division," Bornu (now Borno) Province, its continued importance was assured.

Up to the time of World War II development was slow but steady. The old town walls were pulled down in the 1920s to allow for growth which doubled the population (from approx. 3,500 to 7,000) from the 1920s to 1940s. During that time Biu became a crossroads with north-south and east-west roads joining at the market site in town. The population around the Emir's palace was made up of the older Pabir core while at the peripheries there grew up Bura sections and, on the west side of town, a small section for northerners who came in as skilled workers and transporter/traders. Many of these were Ibo-speaking groups who left during the Nigerian civil war, but who have begun to slowly return in the 1970s.

By 1942 the town boasted one local government primary school, a prison, a central office building, court house, veterinary clinic, local works department repair shops, government rest house, and the Emir's palace which contained the Treasury. The prison had been rebuilt once, as had the market, there was a postal service, and ten to fifteen local Native Authority police served as messengers to and from the districts and into the provincial capital at Maiduguri.

Rapidly increasing tax revenues and income after 1946 were reflected in a wealth of development projects and new buildings. Another school and boarding facilities were set up in town. Many new public buildings developed. The central office expanded, as did the Emir's palace, a new dispensary was built in town, market stalls were expanded, and piped water was initiated at stand pipes along the main streets.

Local government in Biu was characterized for the colonial period by direct rule masquerading as indirect. Biu Town was first called a district

with a district head and ward heads under the Emir. The Emir in close consultation with the District Officer and later on his own, personally guided the work of government. Until the late 1940s the Emir was head of all Native Administration departments and appointed Native Administration Councillors from among his close, titled courtiers. In 1948 a Biu Town Council was appointed by the Emir made up entirely of Pabir members. This changed only slightly in 1952 when Council representation was given to non-Pabir groups in the town through an appointed member. This has changed slowly in the 1960s and 1970s first to a more differentiated, but still appointed, council under a chief councillor, and more recently to an elective system, all under a provincial and state government structure

Today Biu has a population of over 10,000 and is expanding rapidly. The two roads into town are now both paved and the town stretches linearly along these two arteries from a radial older core. Within this area there are over a dozen wards and a central plaza which includes administration buildings, a bank and post office, a large market, and a number of small canteens The state offices and a number of government buildings, plus a set of European-style houses, form the southern extension. To the west and north are modern housing and schools, and to the west of the town center is the small southern Nigerian ward or quarter and a Catholic church. A number of expensive houses are already built, and others are planned. For the most part, however, construction is of mud-walled compounds built in typical northern Muslim urban style. There are also four secondary level schools, dispensary (small hospital is under construction), a small airfield, a decent hotel, a large, modern, architect-designed mosque, modern governmental office buildings, and many other services not usually associated with such small centers. If all of the former Northern Region is included, there are a large number of towns (over 100) of equivalent size to that of Biu. Only a half dozen or fewer have been so well-developed from the point of view of housing, governmental and other services, and transportation.

Given the validity of this comparison it is theoretically important to ask where the development inputs have come from. Using the 'dependency' model we must look to rural/urban relations and the extraction of surplus by Biu from its rural hinterland. Using a more traditional approach we can instead treat Biu development itself as a dependent variable and ask inductively what factors, from anywhere, contributed to Biu's rapid growth especially in the past few decades.

The Dependency Relation

Biu town growth and development has occurred in three quite different periods; pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial. Exact data are lacking for the pre-colonial, but it is clear that the town developed at first as a defensive reaction to raids and an attempted conquest by Fulani jihadists (Cohen 1977). Overall population densities in all likelihood remained the same except that the people compacted into larged walled settlements, leaving areas in between empty or less populated. On the other hand they used less farmland (Cohen 1977) per capita, increasing the pressure on land around Biu. The pre-colonial rise of Biu was therefore in

response to outside pressure. The result was that the town grew by providing safety and services not available in small, rural, dispersed wards and hamlets.

In the colonial period the need for Biu's defensive functions disappeared. Its development proceeded slowly in response to in-migration, and most visibly because of tax revenues. Population growth in Biu was not spectacular. Starting with approximately 3,000 in 1900, it has come close to doubling every 30 years, i.e., 6,000 in the 1930s and 10,000-12,000 in the 1960s and 70s. There has been movement into Biu from the rural areas of Buraland but Biu's proportion of the area's population has been a steady 5% to 6% with no sign of significant increase in any period. Presumably migration out of Buraland and Biu to larger urban centers has stabilized the local urban/rural relations over the past decades. Whatever the reason, Biu's proportion of the local population has not increased over the past half century.

In terms of infrastructure development calling for capital investment the pattern for Biu during the colonial period closely resembled that of northern Nigera as a whole. Development was slow or non-existent for almost the entire colonial period up to 1945-60. The revenues from taxes started low in the 1920s (£5,000) and rose very slowly to double that figure during World War II. Quite suddenly during 1945-60 revenues rose to £60,000 and levelled off. Exact figures per annum are available only to 1960. After that, the district office in Biu reported, the figure rose and fell, then rose slowly in the 1970s with inflation. I conclude that local government revenues followed a typical S-curve of growth with the steep growth period occurring in the 1945-55 decade after which revenues stabilized or grew slowly.

This was very closely correlated to colonial infrastructure development. The vast majority of Biu town improvements made prior to independence occurred as a direct result of post-war windfalls in tax revenues suddenly appearing in the local government Treasury. Annual reports from Biu during this period confirm the impression as do the early building improvements, market expansion, and even the founding of Biu Town Council (1948), all of which date back to the 1945-55 decade. Since these revenues came from the rural population, it is accurate to conclude that Biu's pre-independence development was based on surplus taken from the rural area to finance town growth.

Trade and commerce have never been very highly developed in Biu. From the very beginning of the colonial period other towns in this general region, Nofada, Yola, Gujba, Gombe, and above all Maiduguri, served as the major commercial nodes to which local products were taken and import goods broken up for retail sales. Agents from these towns, today mostly from Gombe and Maiduguri, come to buy export crops and bring in import goods. Markets along the road in Buraland are supplied partly by Biu traders, but to a much larger degree by trucked goods coming from outside the area altogether. A few small traders in Biu and some wealthy businessmen do act as middlemen between the rural areas and larger urban centers. There is now one large warehouse and two canteens with smaller warehousing

capacity. However, all of these have developed in the post-independence period. Biu also has skilled construction and carpentry workers and some capacity exists to repair automobiles and lorries. These latter specialities are not found in the rural areas, but again most of them except carpentry date from after independence. Biu did not, then, develop as a small urban center in response to its nodal position in an export/import network. Such economic features are now emerging and will contribute to town growth in the future, but Biu's initial impetus was its function as an administrative center for Buraland and several adjoining chieftaincies (Shani and Askira).

In the post-independence era, as already noted, revenues did not appreciate significantly in real income value, especially from the rural areas.[3] On the other hand, except for the Civil War period (when local Igbo people left), Biu town has burgeoned, especially since 1968. This is the period when paved roads and a modern bus service came into the area and when two of the four secondary schools were added[4], as well as the post office, bank, enlarged government office, hotel, and almost all of the modern European-style houses on the outskirts. The hospital, mosque, and plans for electrification of the town also date from this period. In the latter instance this meant routing the towers carrying electricity through Biu rather than taking a shorter route straight to Maiduguri. Thus bringing electricity to the town has involved extra expense and almost surely a special policy decision to do so at top State and Federal levels of the Nigerian government. Since these extremely visible and rapidly expanding services and projects are financed for the most part from State and Federal funds, it is hard to see how Biu's economic relations to its own rural hinterland could account for such developments.

What Really Happened?

What happened in Biu is that a number of factors from several sources combined to create an abnormally high rate of local urban development. More specifically local intergroup relations and their incorporation into Nigeria-wide political competition led to increased politicization of these relations and many attempts to mollify local grievances through development projects.

As already noted, the pre-colonical differentiation of Buraland into Babir and Bura was exacerbated by colonialism and the coming of missionaries. Unlike the more northerly emirates, the rural mission-run schools for Bura were large and well-staffed, and English was taught in the larger centers by native (usually American) speakers. The result was a cadre of well-educated Bura Christian teachers and lay preachers who formed the core of what came to be called the Bura "intellectuals." Later when a University was founded in Zaria (1960s) mission-trained Bura took up a large portion of the entire pool of state scholarships while those from the Muslim emirates were under-represented. The missionaries thus constituted a form of early rural development among the non-Muslim Bura, creating grounds for elite formation (Cohen 1979) and a sense of Bura identity on the part of this emergent educated class.[5]

At the same time colonial rule expanded the Biu Emirate to include the

Federal government was pressured by Biu leaders to put extra development inputs into Buraland to show the Bura that if they remained within the emirate and within Borno Province (later Borno State) they would be rewarded.

In the 1970s the process has continued. The Pabir-Biu elite are still dominant. Bura leaders who go to Biu are often accused of becoming "Pabirized" and the fact that all non-Muslim Bura members of the local government council have converted to Islam is given as evidence. Pabir elites in State government in Maiduguri and in Federal government in Lagos have continued to press for greater than normal amounts of development inputs. Highway paving, an army barracks, the hospital, and electrification can all be attributed to such pressure. As one high placed Pabir state government said, "If we stay together we can be a powerful pressure group" ("we" meaning Pabir and Bura).

On the other side the Bura elites seem split between a more radical and a more integrative or compromising division. The more radical groups are mostly university-based or university graduates. They use a Marxist-like rhetoric and speak of Pabir and Biu town exploitation of rural Bura people. They emphasize lack of Bura participation in town-based government and denigrate present day Bura leaders in Biu as "Pabirized," i.e. coopeted by the Pabir "ruling class." The more moderate elites are university trained, but also include civil servants, salaried workers, and local village heads, elders, and ward leaders in Buraland itself. A number of their leaders are now Muslims, speak either Hausa or Kanuri or both, and are willing to join with Pabir leadership and others in an attempt (a) to keep the development inputs flowing into the area, (b) to maintain stability and social order. The radicals want Pabir and Bura divided into two separate administrative regions of the Borno State giving Bura local self-government outside of Biu's authority.

In 1977 agitation over taxation and other matters plus radical leaders who were giving speeches and organizing opposition to Biu led to outbreaks in the Bura districts. Troops were sent in to quiet the area but the lesson was clear; Bura peoples do have grievances and the future of Biu authority is in question.

As matters stand today, a leading Bura moderate working in the State government represented all of Borno State at the Constitutional Assembly. He defeated a university-based radical for the seat with the support of both Bura and Pabir votes. Radicals still feel that Bura local government should be split off from Biu and there is local support for such a separation, although by no means unanimous. Biu and its supporters feel the area should remain unified and that the tension over local divisiveness will stimulate the continuation of extra development inputs.

Conclusion

The Biu case indicates that the dependency paradigm applies more readily to the colonial relationship between the urban and rural areas.

previously autonomous Bura. Pabir district heads were appointed from the Emir's court in Biu to head Bura districts, and the main mission station across the Hawal River was given over to a different provincial administration at Yola. As early as 1936-7 the new Bura "intellecturals" led a move to recruit a Bura district head. The attempt failed but was repeated successfully a decade later. This conflict over Bura vs. Pabir district heads, really one of Emir-appointed district heads from Biu vs. local Bura leaders, resulted after 1946 in Buraland becoming one of the very few areas of northern Nigeria in which district heads were (and are) elected. The Emir does, however, put up candidates, and until the 1960s the vote was by indirect election so that local leaders, who were often influenced by the Emir's views, made the final choices.

In the 1950s the Bura, led by their new elite, agitated for and won a place for a Bura Council member on the Biu-based Local Authority Council. At the same time national party politics came to Buraland and fed on the Pabir/Bura differentiation. I have discussed the details of party strife elsewhere (Cohen 1977; 1979) and need summarize it only briefly here. By the 1950s the Bura educated elite and many Bura living outside the area were organized into an ethnic union, the Bura Tribal Union (BTU), to represent Bura interests and further development of Bura culture and society. Biu town was the center of Emirate government and the Islamic emirate interests of northern Nigeria allied to it under the Northern Peoples Congress (NPC) led by the Sardauna of Sokoto. The weak link in NPC support was the southern rim of the north or "middle belt" of Nigeria in which Muslim emirates mixed with Christianized non-emirate groups like the Tiv or the Bura (Cohen 1977). Tiv and Bura exemplified the two types of interrelations of non-Muslims to the emirates. In Tiv the local people were organized as a separate administrative unit under their own chief (Tor Tiv). In the other, Bura, they came under the authority of a town-based emirate administration. In both cases, however, southern Nigerian political parties, especially the Action Group (AG), gained supporters by linking to the northern opposition, Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU).

In Buraland the leadership of the BTU split over whether they should support the AG or stay out of party politics. When the president decided in 1957-8 to go it alone and join the AG and BTU, the ensuing internal conflict destroyed the organization. In the area as a whole an AG-linked Bura won in Biu South and a Pabir won in Biu North in the regional elections and the Emir was demoted in rank and pay. The 1964 elections saw Buraland reduced to only one seat in the Federal House. This pitted Pabir against Bura so that an NPC Biu person ran against an elite Bura. The campaign ended in violence and the withdrawal of the AG-backed Bura who fled the area and whose chief subordinates were jailed. Several attempts were made on the Bura candidate's life, and he could only come to Biu secretly. The NPC won, and the Emir's authority was reinforced.

However, to mollify the losers a number of things were done. First, Bura leaders all received offers of scholarships, jobs, and a secure future if they came over to the NPC side. A number did so and ultimately became successful members of the northern state-based public service administration. Secondly, throughout the 1960s and into the 1970s the State and

Under the colonial regime the growth of Biu as a small local urban center was linked directly to "surplus," i.e. taxes gained from the mainly rural population of Buraland. Once Nigeria became independent, indeed on the way to independence, the competition among political groupings at the State, Regional, and National levels incorporated local political conflict and used these conflicts to help advance their own ends. In the process Biu gained a disproportionate share of national development inputs. The conflict that precipitated Biu's capacity to exploit "upwards" as well as "downwards" was a function of colonialism itself which expanded emirate control over non-elite peoples, creating grievances, and the local conflict that led to later problems as well as missionary education of rural people. The latter was in effect an early extra development input that paved the way for later conflict and more than normal inputs from outside the area.

In systematic terms dependency relations between rural and urban, or urbanizing, areas predicts that surpluses are drained off for the sustenance of urban elites and urban growth as one goes from small to larger population centers. Finally the world capitalist system extracts surplus from the largest Third World centers in which Third World resources are exploited in exchange for manufactured goods. Reverse benefits, often referred to as "trickle down" effects, are generally discounted as too little to consider seriously. However, the Biu material indicates that local conflict can act as a catalyst to produce very consequential "trickle down" effects in which dominant groups outside the conflict try to mollify or "buy off" a threat of withdrawal of support from the conflicting area. These are very significant intervening effects that create the specific local relations between small urban centers and their rural hinterlands. To overlook such factors is to overgeneralize.


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ADMINISTRATIVE MAP OF BIU DIVISION



FOOTNOTES

[1] Garkida was originally under Biu, but was switched in 1924 to Adamawa Province in an unsuccessful attempt to separate the missionaries from the emirate government of Biu.

[2] Bura girls say that a man who has not been to the city for work is backward and not attractive as husband, even if he is handsome. Balami (1972:52) comments that Bura labor migration was well engrained by the 1940s due primarily to lack of local jobs and the over-production of school leavers. He also discussed Pabir overlordship and family problems as other reasons, but stresses education as the most important cause of this patterned activity.

[3] This generalization is based on interviews with the Local Authority officials and the District Officer in Biu. Actual tax figures were not available.

[4] It is not unusual for a town of 10 - 12,000 to have one secondary school. It is very rare, almost unheard of, for a small urban center of this size to have four post-primary level institutions. Indeed, such a concentration would attract attention in most countries.

GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT PATTERNS OF AWKA AND NSUKKA, NIGERIA

Azuka A. Dike

The growth and development of a town are mainly reciprocals of population growth, location of industries and specialization of the inhabitants. Nsukka and Awka represent two points on our developmental scale. Their growth and development while comparable in some ways are functions of different variables.

Awka is more centrally located in the core area of Igboland, four miles from Nri from which some scholars consider Igbo culture derived, whereas Nsukka is seven miles off the major road. Nsukka and its surroundings produce a large food surplus in fertile areas near the Anambra River. Awka has always depended on its surrounding villages to supply it with food, permitting occupational specialization of Awka itinerant tradesmen.

After the Nigerian civil war many Igbo moved very close to their towns or cities of origin to practice their trade, build industries and promote general development. Awka smiths and metal merchants moved back to Awka; Nnewi motor parts specialists made Nnewi their headquarters, so that all within the general area requiring rare parts now travel to Nnewi, the only alternatives being to have them made by PRODA industries at Enugu or to import them from Europe or Japan.

The location of a large labour-oriented industry is the primary factor in the growth and development of Nsukka. Before the establishment of the University of Nigeria, Nsukka was mainly a farming town whose inhabitants travelled to Enugu, Awka, Onitsha and other places as farm or unskilled labourers. The growth of Awka stems mainly from its pre-European urban structure and its present commercial role in its central location in the non-riverine, land-locked Igbo area.

Pre-Industrial Awka

We know from travellers at the turn of the century or before, that some towns of the former Eastern Region were already densely populated, permanent and diversified, well-defined units of compound land and woodland, sometimes ringed by defensive earthworks as at Awka and Ishiagu, distinctively urban in size, with a proportion of secondary occupations (generally over 15%) and marketing facilities.[1] Despite

their apparent straggling dispersal the density within their encircling earthworks approximated that of the Yoruba cities, if account was taken of the large unoccupied areas within the latters' walls (Morgan 1957:24,26).

Towns like Awka probably had not changed greatly for several centuries and remained much the same until well after the Second World War. Awka was a continuous stretch of adjoining compounds separated only by earthen walls, with rectangular, well-built houses of clay and thatch. There were no well-marked streets. Paths wound about and ran in from different directions, ending in open spaces in the centre of each ward that were used for markets, playgrounds and festivals. The carved wooden doors of the compounds opened into them and the townsfolk could sit on wooden settles in the cool of their shady shrubs (Basden 1921:245-6).

Rich and titled men often had round or square towers some thirty feet high, built up in very thick courses of clay to withstand wind and rain, serving as strong storehouses and watchtowers, with upper floors reached by ladders inside. Holders of the highest title (ozo) were allowed two large carved compound doors, those of the next grade (ajaghija) one. The compound head's house (obu) was in the centre, with his family shrines, trophies and symbols of authority and status, including carved panels if he had taken a high title, while his wives' houses were nearer the compound walls (Basden 1921:120; Johnston 1923: 189; Bridges 1932; Jones 1937:169).

Occupational Specialization and Smithing

Pre-European Awka had a variety of specialists: carvers, native doctors, and smiths who travelled to the Niger delta, Yorubaland and Igala County (Basden 1921:170-2; Alagoa 1971:299-300; Leonard 1906:406). Of all the occupations smithing, in which the people demonstrated considerable skill, is the best known. This is most evident when the tools are considered (Basden 1921:172).

The tools were simple by modern industrial standards. There was the anvil, a flattened round-headed piece of iron driven into a wooden stem, osisi-ama, fixed to the ground. The main hammer, otutu, the principal ritual instrument in the male rite of passage from apprenticeship to full-fledged tradesmanship, was reserved for the master tradesman. The two smaller and identical versions of the otutu were used by the apprentice. For the refining, improving and finishing touches there were anyu-nka, a variety of otutu, and akika-oyighoyi, a form of chisel. The bellows, eko, consisted of a pair of hollowed, conical, V-shaped pieces of wood some three feet long with a softened goat- or sheepskin fastened to an eight-inch diameter end (Basden 1921: 1972). The apprentices took turns pumping the bellows. The charcoal icheku, used as fuel was made mainly from araba or other specified hard woods. Other implements included fire-hooks and files.

Although iron was autochthonous to West Africa (Davies 1966:470-1), it was a rare commodity; the earliest smiths produced their own iron. Stones with iron-ore were selected and deposited in an oven made of mud

and clay structured so that when the stones were intensively heated the iron-ore flowed through a tunnel into a small pot hole where it soon solidified. This kind of iron was known locally as igwe-aga. Bronze was also known and used.

Among the implements produced by the smith with the accoutrements described above were needles of various sizes, hoes, knives, cutlasses, ear-rings, anklets, armlets, swords, spears, regal and honorific staffs, iron gates with designs that might seem to require the skills of a welder, the essential parts of a gun and door locks of various kinds (Basden 1921:174). The smiths were and are superior craftsmen of unusual ingenuity. Nowadays these smiths who have no training in any modern industrial workshops and often cannot read or write, build collapsible iron beds and chairs and reproduce parts of many machines as well as making keys to any lock after an examination of the key hole.

Apprenticeship and Recruitment

The continuation of the smithing trade has been accomplished through the system of apprenticeship. Apprentices were primarily recruited from Awka, mainly among close relatives, and sometimes but infrequently from non-Awka people. In the old days apprenticeship began at about the age of thirteen or fourteen, when the adolescent was able to walk long distances with a relatively heavy load on his head. Becoming an apprentice also meant separation from close parental care, the end to extended childhood, and an assumption of new responsibilities. The apprentice, mindful that his success and position in life hinged on how much he demonstrated his capabilities during this period, that the measuring of his achievement began with his first year of travel, left home with a mixture of determination and trepidation. This has now changed: smiths are now resident in Awka; the younger smiths mix traditional smithing with modern welding; and they recruit their apprentices from any available source.

The Guild System and the Secret Language

Apprenticeship, ipa-otutu, the male rite of passage, icheuno, the system whereby able young men stayed back at Awka as homeguards, and the guild system were all culturally linked. The cultural network was so webbed that a disruption of one of the lines invariably weakened the cultural line of contact and communication with others. For example, because of the disappearance of the custom of icheuno, the traditional rituals connected with the male rite of passage are no longer in existence. The modification of the rules of ipa-otutu to include non-Awka persons dilutes the rigid guild system. So, apart from the pecuniary gains, Awka people had latent reasons for jealously guarding and limiting membership in the trade to citizens of the town. The town culture is, of course, the regulating force as well as the recipient of the aforementioned interlinked processes.

Smithing as well as other trades has been limited and regulated by the guild system and as such has been mostly confined to Awka people. Trade guilds were to some extent semi-secret societies. Each guild corresponded in large part to a subvillage group in Awka. Each developed

a secret language of ivuaba (as they are locally known) learned by the trainees in the process of apprenticeship. Those sub-village groups or guilds who travelled mainly among other Igbo-speaking people developed an entirely new structure of verbal communication that was incomprehensible to their hosts. The secret languages in effect functioned to deny potential interlopers any knowledge of the trade.

Other Trades Practised in Awka

Other trades had similar processes. To become a native 'medical' doctor' an apprentice accompanied professionals in their itineration for about ten years, serving both as a domestic servant and a student. As a student of the trade he meticulously watched the master as he walked through the bush. The apprentice noted the leaves and the tree bark the master selected and the tree roots the master asked him to dig. At home the careful student watched and noted how the herbs were mixed. This process was repeated for every illness encountered, whether a psychosomatic or germ-caused disease. Of course, in the process of apprenticeship the student also learned the proper mode of relationship between the tradesman and his clients.

Understandably the medical field was the most secretive trade. Since some of the herbs used in curing diseases could be found around the corner, there was a need to create an aura of scarcity and difficulty to impress the client, who was often made to believe it was a magical operation. In order to retain the illusion of supernaturality, it was also important to keep the non-initiated away from some of the operations, such as adjusting broken bones or removing the scales from the eyes of a man with a certain kind of blindness to enable him to see. This nearly supernatural image has been the chief security of the 'medical doctor' and the smith, who cultivated the same aura of the supernatural.

Monetary Economy

Full time specialization required tradesmen to invent easier means of exchanging their products for food and other commodities. This was probably why a money economy developed in Awka. Like most itinerant people who travel to distant lands, Awka people were familiar with different currencies. As observed by Basden two kinds of currencies were circulating in pre-European Awka: cowries and umumu "arrowhead" currency. One umumu was equivalent to two cowries (Basden 1938: 339-40). Other currencies with which the people of Awka were familiar included brass-rods and manillas (ibid:337-8). They measured the value of different currencies according to the supply and demand of each currency. The core Igbo[2] have always had an efficient monetary system or table of monetary value (Jeffries 1948:49. Note the elaborate monetary table.) This enabled the rich to keep accurate acount of their money. The elaborate table of monetary value also shows the extensive use of money as a medium of exchange.

A linguistic study of Jeffreys' table (1948:49) also reveals the method of counting large sums of cowries and methods of carrying specific

amounts of money. Several thousand cowries could be measured without going through the tedious process of counting each one.

Contemporary Awka

Physical Features

Most traditional towns or cities follow a similar pattern of physical growth and development. One finds that even in London and Paris the streets are winding, and even when houses have been torn down to make way for new highways, the rectangular blocks and straight roads that are found in a city like New York, north of 14th Street, are still not created. So, looking at a map of contemporary Awka you would find roads running haphazardly in different directions. Instead of roads determining the position of houses, as in gridiron planned towns, the compounds dictate the direction of the roads. The exceptions are in the new layout, in parts of three sub-villages, where some attempt has recently been made to impose a grid pattern.

Four types of house are common: 1) concrete cement walls with pan or asbestos roofing; 2) red soil walls with pan roofing; 3) baked clay or burnt brick walls with pan roofing; 4) red soil clay walls with thatch roofing. The first and third types are increasing in number while the second type shows a marked decrease. The fourth type continues to persist. In effect, some sections of contemporary Awka retain the physical features of the old. Many show clearly the impact of European or foreign influence in the building materials and construction, which have changed from clay and thatch to mainly cement and corrugated iron or asbestos sheets. One striking resemblance between contemporary and traditional Awka is the location of houses. Paternal relatives live as close together as possible. The physical relationships remain basically traditional, while the clustering of kin groups in one geographical area is gradually dispersing because of land scarcity and movement from the old centres to the new roadsides. The earthworks have largely disappeared, and the encircling woodland has been cut down in many places. Even so the kin villages are still distinguishable; members of villlages who have moved to other areas still return to their home, the centre of the extended family, for important socio-cultural riturals and ceremonies.

Despite changes in the physical structure of the houses and their movement away from the original geo-physical kin group area, each compound sociologically functions with its kin groups, observes the exogamous and funeral mores, and attends extended family meetings whenever called by the elders. As in traditional times, the rich and the poor live in close physical proximity and have the same rights (not necessarily privileges) in all kin-based associations. In short, the patterning of human interaction in Awka remains fairly traditional with modification in the housing structure allowing for denser population.

Economic Change

The population of Awka has increased from about 35,000 before the Nigerian civil war to approximately 90,000.[3] The phenomenal increase

is attributable to the push factors of the civil war which forced the mass return of many people originating in the Awka area to make Awka their permanent residence. The massing of two brigades at Awka with the concomitant purchasing power of these soldiers attracted a large number of petty merchants who had insufficient capital to resume their usual business. At the end of the war non-Igbos monopolised all the trades. Returnee Igbo petty traders initially bought their articles of trade on credit and sold them at a very minimal profit. The fixed and exorbitant prices of other traders resulted in their displacement by Igbo petty merchants within two years of their return. The large influx of people into Awka created a need for a large daily market and Awka became a market town.

After the war Awka itineration had virtually come to a halt. Most of its smiths, carvers and other tradesmen now reside and practise their trade at Awka. The result is that a form of industry based on ironworking became a feature of the town. People within the area looking for different kinds of iron crafts now travel to Awka to purchase them. Many kinds of small-scale consumer industries have developed. These include construction, electrical and engineering works, food processing and catering, textiles and other industries. The effect of such industries on the growth of a town is dwelt upon in depth below in the discussion of industries in Nsukka because of the much more concrete data obtained on that town. The fact that a considerable amount of money changes hands at Awka is shown by the establishment there of three banks: Barclays Bank of Nigeria, the Co-operative Bank and the African Continental Bank.

Awka has always been a District Headquarters, the home of a District Officer and his staff, a post office, the judiciary and other government agencies. At the end of the civil war a large post office was built in the town, most of the government agencies were enlarged to meet the demands of the population, and a year ago a College of Education was established. The impact of this higher educational institution is already being felt in the town, the most apparent effect being rocketing house rents.

Nsukka

Nsukka serves to illustrate how a town completely dependent on traditional occupations such as farming, and cloth and basket weaving is being transformed into a city by the establishment of a university, a large labour-oriented industry.

Traditional or Pre-European Industries in Nsukka

Some villages distinguished themselves in specific trades: weaving, basket making, wood carving, and palm wine tapping, most of which was done during the non-farming season. Some locally grown cotton, purchased from the adjoining Igala areas to the north, constituted the base for the cloth weaving industry. The women did the spinning and weaving on simple looms. The woven materials varied appreciably both in pattern and function. The best products are still used by elderly

women as garments while others are used for the decoration and construction of local masquerades. Their prices range from about ₦6.00 to ₦20.00 depending on the quality and demand. As can be expected, with the introduction of good, manufactured cloth the demand for locally woven cloth has declined, and there are now very few women in this occupation.

The existence of a basket industry in Nsukka depended on many factors. These included local availability of the requisite raw material and the need for baskets. Oil palms, the raw materials, were abundant in the area. Baskets were in demand for many farming activities and for marketing of various commodities at all seasons of the year. Men between the ages of 25 and 50 supplemented their income by making baskets when farming activities were at a minimum and particularly after harvests. The prices of the baskets still made range from 50 cents to ₦3.00 depending on size and quality. The trade is in decline as the older people interested in the trade die, leaving the younger people who are deserting the rural areas for urban centres in search of regular incomes in the newly developed consumer industries and the university. The basket industry is not likely to disappear completely though, given the continued need for baskets in many activities. In fact, there is a general rise in the price of baskets as in other commodities because of the decline in production. Male students in primary and secondary schools, who do this as their long vacation job (during July and August) to earn enough money to buy books and other school necessities for the following school year, are increasingly the main producers of baskets.

The palm wine industry in the Nsukka area has been both a necessity and a luxury. Before the establishment of the University at Nsukka water was a very rare commodity. People therefore used palm wine as a source of water. Palm wine tapping is primarily a rural, male occupation usually undertaken by those within the age range of 30 to 50. The palms are climbed using either a pair of specially designed ropes or a similar device made out of palm fronds. This process is not completely without risk: occasionally the ropes break or slip or the climber misses his grip, resulting in injury or death. The palm wine industry is a very productive trade even today. Because of the small number of tappers, the cartel formed by the local tappers, the middlemen and the retailers, the demand for palm wine for social functions and its use by urban men as a means of spending the evenings away from their congested homes, the price of palm wine is sometimes higher than that of beer and other kinds of liquor. Even though the number of tappers is on the decline, the market is on the increase. For this reason, the Biochemistry Department of the University of Nigeria, having discovered the means of producing a variant of palm wine synthetically, is putting out feelers for its commercial production.

Carving is another important local industry still carried on in rural Nsukka. Carving is done by very skilled men using the adze, handaxe and knives. The local demand for masks, the primary products of the carvers, is limited to use in masquerades; foreign visitors,

intriqued by the sophistication of fashioning several adjoining figures from a single piece of wood without the use of glue, also purchase masks. The prices range from ₦5.00 to ₦80.00 apiece. Other products of the carvers include pestles and mortars, the wooden V-section of a hoe and wooden spoons.

Farming, however, remains the mainstay of the economy of most of the population of Nsukka and its environs. The farmer works both patches of land around his compound and distant fields. Farming remains a productive enterprise since prices of foodstuffs have quadrupled since 1973. The mainly non-literate farmers appear to make reasonable profit from their products.

The Impact of the University on the Community

The above description of the indigenous occupational structure of Nsukka, while still partially current, fits more exactly pre-1960 Nsukka. Before the establishment of the University in 1960, Nsukka was one of the most obscure and unimportant towns of Nigeria. This in spite of the fact that as far back as the period 1920-39 the town had a Divisional Officer (and his staff) in charge of all the government agencies such as the Native Court, the Divisional Prisons, and Postal Agency (1929). There was a field medical unit, a mission maternity home (both introduced in 1935) and a dispensary (in 1936). Untarred roads linked Nsukka with neighbouring towns. When lorry services began in 1939 there was a gradual movement of petty traders into the town. This notwithstanding, the Divisional Officer of Nsukka reported to his superior officer, the Resident at Onitsha, in 1948, that 'there are no urban or semi-urban centres in this Division'.[4] The population of Nsukka grew from about 9,000 in 1931 and 14,674 in 1953 to 26,206 in 1963.[5]

The year 1960 therefore introduced a new phase in the development of Nsukka with the establishment of the University. The construction of offices, lecture halls and residential quarters for the staff between 1960 and 1962 created considerable job opportunities for masons, carpenters, plumbers and other artisans, who migrated into the town in large numbers. The University attracted various grades of workers ranging from professors down to unskilled labourers. As Okoye put it 'by 1963, not only was there a great increase in the non-rural population of Nsukka,' but there was considerable improvement in the population in 'both quality and quantity, thereby becoming more cosmopolitan and more sophisticated than before,' (1974).

The University began with a student population of 220, 13 members of the academic staff and a commensurate number of junior and menial workers. As of January 1976 there were 655 academic staff, 443 senior administrative staff and 4,726 junior staff. There were approximately 4,522 students at Nsukka campus.[6] By January 1976 Nsukka had a total of over 10,000 people needing, depending and engaging in a variety of technical, mercantile and social services. This large number of partly transient population heavily dependent on the University has brought modern amenities such as pipe-borne water, electricity and many small-scale industries into Nsukka. These amenities and industries have their own multiplier effect.

Modern Small Industries in Nsukka

Nsukka has most of the consumer industries found in any big city, though on a different scale. They may be classified as follows: construction, including carpentry, sawmilling, welding, block moulding, cabinet making; blacksmithing and tinsmithing; electrical and engineering works, including repair of equipment, motors, bicycles, typewriters and radios, battery charging and tyre vulcanizing; food processing and catering, including bakeries, grain mills, hotels and bars; leatherwork, including shoes, bags, car seats and chairs; tailoring, sewing and mattress making; services such as photography, printing, watch repairs, insurance, lotteries, barbers, dry cleaning; goldsmithing and art work.

According to Kilby, 'small scale production entails labour intensive technologies, with capital as the scarce factor' (1969:309). Managers of small industries in Nsukka do not use Government or bank loans; they rely on their own accumulated capital and that of friends or relatives. The scale of capital and employment in Nsukka's small industries range from Jenik's Bakery of 1971, with a capital of ₦120,000 from relatives, 52 employees and ₦100,000 capital output and Nsukka Concrete Cement Ltd (N.C.C. Ltd) of 1972 with ₦50,000 capital from friends and individuals, 130 employees and ₦100,000 capital output, down to Ezugwu carpentry workshop of 1960 with ₦30 capital from relatives and ₦150 capital output or Paragon Tailors of 1974 with ₦20 capital from friends and one employee and one apprentice. Most firms have only a few hundred Naira output and less than a dozen employees and apprentices. Significantly all of these industries were established at the time of and after the founding of the University in Nsukka.[7]

Small industries such as tinkering, leatherwork, bicycle repairs, mattress making, carpentry, motorcycle and autorepairs, operate with small capital investment of ₦40 to ₦200. Some of these industries, such as tinkering and mattress making, function as utilisers of discarded materials from other sources to fabricate essential products to satisfy the increasing demand of the urban consumer. As Kilby observed, 'small industry taps latent savings and skills and other sources of capital that could not otherwise be mobilised' (1969:40). As a result of the use of scrap raw materials by many small industries, their purchase cost is so reduced that the entire cost of production is low, making their products accessible to the low-income groups who make up a substantial part of the population of Nsukka. As such, the small industrialists help to improve the general welfare of the low-income groups, who could not have afforded the more refined mass-produced products without incurring undue hardship.

Some 61.9% of the tertiary workers come from Nsukka, 14% from the Awka area and 24% from other communities.[8] This indicates that small scale industries induce migration to the urban centres where the beginner tradesman gains by cooperating with existing industries instead of working in isolation in his village, where there is a paucity of materials or demands for his products. The urban migrants and village commuters, such as local hands working in the bakeries and block industries, are of

financial advantage to their villages in that most of them plough their money back into their villages by building houses and helping parents and relatives who are not as fortunate. The ploughing back of money into the villages has a multiplier effect: it generates other types of employment in the villages. For example, a good number of masons, carpenters and metal smiths are village-based as a result of the housing construction activities in the rural areas since the Nigerian civil war.

Some of these small-scale industries provide semi-skilled manpower. As Kilby pointed out, 'the apprenticeship system provides the sole institution for developing labour skills of the urban-oriented migrants in the small industrial sector,' (1969:95). Large numbers of skilled auto-mechanics, who in cases of scarce auto-parts forge duplicates, welders who construct iron beds and chairs, electricians who mend 'dead' batteries, wire workers for electrification and many other semi-skilled tradesmen in the country are products of these small industries. The point then is that small-scale industries contribute directly to employment and the development of industrial skill, the production of cheap goods, capital accumulation and urban as well as industrial expansion, while encouraging the training of apprentices and entrepreneurs.

It was not easy to assess the wealth of many of our informants. We discovered, though, from some of the owners of small industries that many of them--depending on their welding jobs, auto electrical work, autorepairs, block moulding and bakery--own motorcycles, cars and landed property in Nsukka or their native village. They have also been instrumental in securing their younger brothers with the initial capital with which to start in their own trade. The relationship between capital accumulation, and industrial or economic expansion need not be emphasized. We have already dwelt on the generation of employment, development of labour skills and production of cheap goods by small-scale industries. From all indications, while most of the small industries in Nsukka are dependent economically on the extra population generated by the establishment of the University, they have in themselves engendered other economic and social activities.

Prostitution is a social as well as an economic activity. The growth of this profession is indirectly connected to the establishment of a large labour-oriented industry in the town. Before the establishment of the University of Nigeria the prostitutes had very few clients to depend on. Even with the University the surplus money that goes to such industries, which are usually the first to fold up in times of scarcity, was not plentiful until after the Nigerian civil war when a large army was quartered in Nsukka, primarily because of the fear of the 'regrouping' of University intellectuals.

Although prostitution is typically an urban phenomenon, the case of Nsukka is slightly different from others in Nigera. It is very unusual in Nigerian urban centres for natives of the area to practise prostitution with the parental home as the base of operation. Before the growth of Nsukka as a result of the University, many Nsukka women

were found in other Nigerian cities practising the trade. However, a recent survey by my students of Urban Sociology shows that about 85% of the prostitutes in Nsukka now come from Nsukka town and its immediate environs.

Many prostitutes engage in the trade from their parents' compound or are visited in their brothels by siblings, an indication that Nsukka parents approve or are indifferent to the extra sexual activities of their unmarried daughters or daughters separated from their husbands.

The survey, based on the responses of 54 prostitutes, revealed that several factors were responsible for prostitution in Nsukka. One of these was marital instability resulting from the common Nsukka practice of child marriage, childlessness, cruelty on the part of the husband and pre-marital sexual practice with a variety of partners. Poverty is a related cause in that it contributes to marital instability. The need for money is also a primary lure to the trade. Parents are indifferent to their daughters' activities partly because the daughters are the main source of sustenance for the family. Most of the respondents, in fact, come from very poor homes and lack the formal education which would qualify them for other jobs. A third factor is the Nigerian civil war and the quartering of a large army at Nsukka. This is responsible for the increased rate of prostitution in many areas of Nigeria, as in Germany and Japan after the Second World War.

As most of those interviewed were unwilling to reveal their average income a month, we cannot properly place the gross output of this profession. Nevertheless, based on the general discussion the interviewers had with them it was discovered that a significant number of them are the sole bread-winners for their families. Some of them have bought old cars and given them to their male relatives to use as taxi cabs; some have built houses for their parents; and none of them are dependent on any member of their families for food and clothing.

Conclusion

Growth and development, as noted earlier, are functions of various factors. Nsukka and Awka are two different towns, one at the periphery of Igboland, the other almost in the centre. The development of Nsukka as a city is mostly dependent on the University. The growth of Awka is primarily a function of its pre-industrial urban nature, its central location, and, in the seventies, the massive movement of Awka tradesmen and people from the surrounding area into Awka at the end of the Nigerian civil war. The civil war also affected Nsukka. In addition to ensuring 'peace' the soldiers contributed to the financial growth of the towns. Both in Awka and Nsukka they were factors in increased prostitution. But more important they provided the needed cash for the accumulation of capital which made it possible for the indigent citizens to recover from the demonetization and the lack of acceptable currency caused by the Nigerian Government's immediate proscription of Biafran money following the war.

I have viewed development in terms of population growth, commercial activities and the general economic growth of the communities. In this regard it can be said that there is some measure of growth and development in Nsukka and Awka. But as we know, growth and development have their concomitant problems, one of which was touched on in discussing Nsukka. Slums are integral parts of the growth and development of most Nigerian towns. Towns are usually not planned for normal growth. Most of the indigenous towns constituted the nucleus of the big cities, thereby making planning difficult. The result is concentration of sub-standard houses in many parts of the town. In Awka many good houses with modern utilities stand side by side with sub-standard houses. The pre-industrial narrow pathways, sometimes motorable, still predominate. In Nsukka the residential area of the University is the only part of town that is properly planned. There are scattered standard houses in the town. Like Awka, the city roads are pathways, some recently widened to two-lane streets. Despite the lack of physical beauty the indigenes generally speak of the towns in glowing terms. This is understandable. Nsukka, which was not much more than a typical Igbo village, is now a centre of national importance. Awka has grown from a pre-industrial urban centre to a semi-modern community where the recent establishment of a higher institution has opened further opportunities for development.

FOOTNOTES

[1]See, for example, Basden 1921:245; 1938:xx; Bindloss 1898:294; Jones 1963:30; Johnston 1923:189; Leonard 1906:418; Talbot 1926: IV 9-10 (Table 4); Morgan 1957.

[2]See the writings of Henderson (1972:39); Rubin (1971:113-23); Karmon (1966:28-9).

[3]See Nigerian Government Census Report, 1963. The approximate figure for the present population was supplied by the Secretary, Awka Local Government Area.

[4]Onitsha Resident's Office file no. Ns. 351/8. 11 February 1948.

[5]See Nigerian Government Census Reports of 1931, 1953 and 1963.

[6]University of Nigeria Office files UNP/G. 26 Vol. 5 (Personnel) statistics pp. 4a and 4b.

[7]This statistical information is based on the collective research of my class on Urban Sociology.

[8]Ibid.

TOWN AND COUNTRY IN SOUTHERN ZARIA: A VIEW FROM KAFANCHAN

Ulf Hannerz

By road, Kafanchan[1] is some 65 miles from Jos and about twice as far from Kaduna. The town owes its existence, however, to the railway. It was established in 1927, on the new main line between Kaduna and Port Harcourt, at the junction with the branch line to Jos. The Nigerian Railway Corporation built up rather extensive technical facilities in the town, and it has continuously been the major employer.

Southern Zaria (part of Zaria Province,[2] mostly not in the area of the traditional Zaria emirate) is inhabited by a number of small ethnic groups: Kaje, Katab, Kagoro, Kafanchan (from whom the town got its name), Kaninkon, Kagoma, Jaba, Moroa, Attakar, Ninzam and others. These are the groups commonly referred to as southern Zarians, or in Hausa, yan kasa, "sons of the land"; they are all agriculturalists of similar traditional culture. Beside these, pastoral Fulani have long been in the area. In the early nineteenth century, these Fulani established a Muslim emirate known as Jemaa in the area, under a Hausa dynasty--the reverse arrangement, that is, to what was occurring in the larger and older emirates at the time. Jemaa was small and rather weak. The yan kasa largely remained non-Muslim and were not easily controlled by the emirate. The relationships between the Hausa-Fulani regimes and the other groups tended to be conflict-ridden in the precolonial period, not least since the former engaged in extensive slave raiding. As British colonial government was established, the system of indirect rule strengthened emirate control.

Direct European involvement with southern Zarian local society in the early twentieth century was comparatively slight. There was no significant production of cash crops. Scattered attempts at tin mining in the Jemaa emirate had no impact at all comparable to what was being built up on the Jos Plateau. As Kafanchan was established, then, it stood as a rather isolated enclave in traditional society.

Its population was almost entirely composed of migrants from other parts of the country and a few from abroad. There were considerable numbers of Ibo, Yoruba, and Hausa, with more limited representation of other northern and southern groups. Southern Nigerians, more often in possession of European-type skills, could occupy a wider range of positions on the railway, in the administration, and in other institutions controlled by Europeans, while the Hausa in wage employment were more

often in unskilled work. Other Hausa and southern Nigerians, however, came to Kafanchan as self-employed traders and craftsmen. The headquarters of the Jemaa emirate were transferred to a site just next to Kafanchan in 1933 and gradually merged with the rest of the town.

The Ibo influx had been somewhat late getting started, but then accelerated. The 1952 Nigerian census, which offered a breakdown by ethnic groups, showed the population of Kafanchan, by then totalling 7,016, to be about 44% Ibo. The Hausa were some 30%, the Yoruba approximately 10%. No other northern Nigerian urban center had such a high proportion of Ibo.

In the same census, the yan kasa, were lumped with a category of "other northerners" which would have included also some stranger groups. Still, the entire category only accounted for about 4% of the town population. As urban residents, the people of the area were thus an almost negligible number. It is obvious, however, that the southern Zarians were in other ways gradually taking a greater part in relationships with the townspeople. New settlements were coming closer to the town, farm produce was sold on its market, as village markets became more lively they attracted town traders as well, and village people could be recruited for more or less occasional labor.

Yet Kafanchan was not alone in transforming southern Zarian society. A major influence during the period since the town's first existence has been the Christian missions. The Sudan Interior Mission (SIM) was first to enter the area. Through churches and mission schools, and through the evangelists and teachers it trained, it extended an efficient network throughout much of southern Zaria. Other missions, especially the Roman Catholic Church, came in later. No doubt Christianity, in becoming the strongest religion in southern Zaria, served at the same time as an organizational and symbolic vehicle for the old opposition of the yan kasa to Hausa domination. As party politics began in the area, a number of individuals strongly linked to the missions became prominent in the party best known as the United Middle Belt Congress (UMBC), which was quite strong in southern Zaria.

This takes us up to that decade of heated Nigerian political life between the late 1950s and the establishment of military government and the northern anti-Ibo disturbances of 1966, leading to Biafran secession and civil war. In this period Kafanchan had a population about half Ibo; economically this group was even more significant. The Ibo played a major role in the railway system all over the country, and Kafanchan was a railway town. They were strong in the administration and in the marketplace, and had a greater than proportionate share of whatever more significant businesses existed in the town. Of 521 plot leases registered in Kafanchan in the period 1955-66, 303 were to Ibo (judging by names), i.e. some 58%. In early 1966, 38 out of 58 townspeople wealthy enough to be required to pay personal income tax, almost two-thirds, were Ibo. The Ibo Union ran the only secondary school in Kafanchan.

Like their people elsewhere in Nigeria, the Kafanchan Ibo were

supporters of the National Council of Nigerian Citizens party; the Yoruba were similar similarly aligned with Action Group; among the Hausa, the Northern People's Congress had strong support, but the more radical Northern Elements Progressive Union had the allegiance of a noticeable number as well.[5] The surrounding area, despite shifting personal alignments among politicians, was a stronghold for the UMBC. Neither town nor countryside, then, was much to count on for the NPC government of the Northern Region. Their inhabitants tend to interpret this as a reason for the rather weak interest of that government in the development of Kafanchan and southern Zaria. Roads were poor, and most of the town lacked electricity. As new roads were built in the early 1970s, putting Kafanchan on a tarred road in 1975, and as the town got its electricity supply in the same year, many people saw the progress as the achievement of a government where people of the "Middle Belt" (a concept no longer in frequent use) for the first time had a significant say. But the general economic boom of Nigeria in recent years undoubtedly also played a part.

Strong as the position of the Ibo was in pre-civil war Kafanchan, challenges to it were being mounted. In line with the "northernization" policy of the regional government, contracts for supplies and construction work were increasingly often awarded to upcoming Hausa and southern Zarian entrepreneurs, and jobs in administrative and educational establishments were being taken up by the people coming out of the mission schools. Most of all, however, Kafanchan changed with the events of mid-1966. There were no outright attacks on the Ibo in Kafanchan, such as took place in more northerly cities and,at first, the local Ibo were not convinced that they would have to leave. Then rumors began to reach the town that lorryloads of men were coming to repeat the scenes which had taken place in the far north; the exodus had to start.

For some time, Kafanchan became something of a ghost town. Then things started picking up again. The railway recruited new personnel, and the trains ran once more. Some new people moved in from elsewhere in Nigeria, but there were also opportunities for the townspeople, and for yan kasa of nearby areas, to try out some of the niches vacated by the Ibo. As Biafra seceded and war broke out, many southern Zarians went off to join the army; a number of foodstuff traders profited from supplying the front. Some of the abandoned Ibo housing, under the temporary administration of the local government,found new inhabitants.

When the war came to an end and the Ibo began trickling back into Kafanchan, they thus found a community which had learned to do without them. On the other hand, they experienced no particular hostility. Some of them, who had lived in the town before the war, were still determined never again to take up residence outside the Ibo home areas. They reclaimed their properties when they could, and promptly sold them and left the town. Others began a new life in Kafanchan; among those were some who had been there in the pre-war years, and an apparently greater number who had not.

This Kafanchan of the 1970s, on which we will concentrate here, is clearly not quite the same town as it had been before 1966. The new Kafanchan for one thing, relates differently to southern Zaria. In

some ways, it has changed from being an enclave to being a nodal point for this region.

In the ethnographic present of the mid-1970s, Kafanchan has a population which I would estimate very roughly to about 15,000. There is still, of course, the railway, with its station, maintenance facilities, and staff housing. Since road communications improved, the car park has become another lively center of movements in and out of town. Commerce centers on the large daily market, with a number of shops, streets, stalls, and craftsmen's working places in other streets. On the outskirts of the town are two post-primary educational establishments, a secondary school for boys, and a co-educational teachers' training college.

There are five primary schools in the town. A bank and a government rest house belong to the new amenities of the middle 1970s, and a post and telegraph station has been present since earlier days. The rule of law is represented by the new, relatively large police headquarters four courts of law (a legacy of the composite judicial system developed during the colonial days), and a small, rundown prison yard. Government establishments also include various local authority offices, offices of the state government, and a branch office of the Northern States Marketing Board. Some fifteen Christian denominations are present, their church buildings ranging from quite large to very small. Apart from the central mosque, the Ahmadiyya and Ansar-ud-Deen movements have their own mosques, and some Hausa merchants also have small mosques attached to their compounds. About half a dozen bottled-beer bars (some of them with rental rooms for prostitutes), a larger number of palmwine and burukutu (guinea-corn beer) bars, and a soccer ground provide recreation. A private hotel is operated by an entrepreneur of midwestern (Bendel State) origin, who has a similar establishment in Zaria, as well as a string of book and stationery shops in different towns of Kaduna State, including one in Kafanchan. The town no longer has a cinema, although there was one in the past. There are three petrol stations, out of operation much of the time in the mid-1970s due to the chronic fuel shortage in northern Nigeria.

All in all, it would seem that, apart from the railway complex perhaps, Kafanchan is a very ordinary African town of the kind which came into existence in the colonial period. It has a great deal in common with the "type C" towns of East Africa sketched by Joan Vincent (1974). What we are concerned with here is where in this townscape are the income opportunities for southern Zarians, and where are the urban services offered to the region.

Beginning with the ways Kafanchan affects the chances of making a living for the local people, it may be useful to categorize occupational pursuits, however coarsely, into some limited number of sets:

(1) The public sector may be taken to include all branches of government, government corporations, and quasi-official organizations linked to them. In the idiom of Kafanchan English, the people employed here are "workers," people with a steady income, whether they are in "white-collar" or manual occupations. The category includes railway

personnel, teachers, hospital staff, policemen, personnel in administrative offices, road workers, and various others.

(2) Modern entrepreneurs include people with an expansive outlook on business, tying the local society to the growing national industrial economy. They are in touch with larger commercial organizations in bigger cities, they run transportation, petrol stations, and beer bars, and may try, for example, commercial poultry farming or baking. They may own substantial urban properties. Probably most significantly, however, they are engaged in business with the bureaucracies as contractors for work or supplies; they build schools and offices, supply food, furniture and other materials for institutions, and so forth. Their concerns, in other words, are diverse, and they have a standing interest in adding new ones to their lines.

(3) Wholesale trading in local rural produce has two major components in Kafanchan: the ginger trade and the pig trade, under the auspices of private business. For a couple of short periods, the ginger trade has been taken over by the Northern States Marketing Board, but in these periods the same traders seem to have acted as buying agents instead. The role of the NSMB in buying up other produce, such as benniseed and jute, has been less conspicuous. As far as other private trading is concerned the wholesale/retail distinction soon tends to become blurred, as varying numbers of distributive links are involved and the same people trade in large as well as small quantities.

(4) While retail trade, as noted above, has its natural focus on the Kafanchan marketplace, it is more thinly spread out over the rest of the town as well, and we may consider this daily market as a major component of a network of otherwise weekly markets in a number of lesser communities in the area; those at Ungwar Rimi, four miles away, and at Kagoro, six miles away, being the larger ones most closely linked to that of Kafanchan. Even very small villages have their own weekly markets, as much for sociability and burukutu drinking as for commerce. With regard to trading, however, one may see all these markets as having two major sectors: those of industrial and rural produce.

(5) Craftsmanship may in some ways not be very different from retail trading, and some artisans have their stalls in the market in Kafanchan as well as in the smaller communities. Organizationally, however, there are differences. Here again we may find one simple distinction useful, between the crafts based more on tradition such as butchering,

blacksmithing, leatherwork, and calabash carving, and those introduced through European cultural influence: carpentry, tailoring and barbering of a "western" kind, watch repairing, radio repairing, photography, etc.

(6) In the minor services, mostly to be described as unskilled or low-skilled, we find the variety of self-employed or loosely allied people who one might choose to see as Kafanchan's miniature lumpenproletariat--shoeshiners, nail cutters, load carriers, truck pushers, water carriers, prostitutes. Although what they do can hardly be labeled a service, the handful of thieves and fences can perhaps be appended to the category as well.

(7) Symbolic specialists, finally, include people primarily engaged in the manipulation of symbols, as diverse as pastors, catechists and other officeholders in Christian churches, Muslim learned men, healers, musicians, and praise singers. The officials of the emirate may seem to overlap between this category and the public sector.

The above categorization is only to be understood as a heuristic device. Some occupations, inevitably, are borderline cases, certain people mix involvements in different categories, and some individuals perform in one category in a manner reminiscent of what seems more typical of another. In their careers, of course, people can also move between categories.

In the public sector, southern Zarians have made considerable inroads in the last 10-15 years. Especially in the case of work requiring less in the way of education, such as some railway work and employment with the Public Works Department, this has allowed some men from villages around Kafanchan to continue agricultural pursuits while also earning wages. Others, however, have moved into the town itself. This pertains more often to the people from somewhat more distant communities, who are at the same time more frequently white-collar workers since wage labor in Kafanchan tends not to draw people from any very wide area of southern Zaria. These, consequently, form one group helping to populate Kafanchan increasingly with yan kasa. The major part here is not played by the railway, which still has comparatively few people from the area in more skilled work. As a national corporation, it recruits its staff more widely. The old predominance of the Ibo has thus been replaced by a greater diversity of backgrounds. This has played some part, for instance, in the growth of the local Tiv and Idoma communities. Recruitment to the police force follows similar lines.

There is evidently a greater chance for southern Zarians to find local employment with agencies of the local and state governments. In the latter case as well, there is of course a pattern of wider recruitment. It would seem, too, that in a state as heterogeneous as Kaduna State, with the Hausa of the Katsina and Zaria emirates to the north

and the various minority ethnic groups to the south, and given the historical conflict between the two parts, the state government has seen some benefit in trying to integrate them by having a fair number of people serving away from their areas of origin.

Given an opportunity to work elsewhere in the state, not every southern Zarian would prefer to be in Kafanchan. Kaduna, for example, may seem like a more exciting place, and there may be some advantage in getting away from local pressures. Occupational advancement may also be more likely in larger offices. Even so, there is room for a rather considerable proportion of southern Zarians in white-collar public service in Kafanchan--in the bureaucracy, in the schools, in the hospital, etc. And undoubtedly this proportion is influenced by the fact that, by Kaduna State standards, southern Zarians are relatively well educated due to the influence of the Christian churches, which originally ran most educational institutions in Kafanchan as well.

In modern entrepreneurship as well, as mentioned above, what used to be Ibo niches have been partly taken over by yan kasa, with Hausa of long residence in Kafanchan also performing a part. If there is some tendency for the educational and administrative elite of southern Zaria to become Kaduna-based, the modern entrepreneurs, remaining at home, are the business elite, together with some wholesale traders. These two indeed shade into each other.

One may discern two major paths leading into this category. One of them begins in the public sector. We can find a number of southern Zarians who have started out as teachers or bureaucrats; then, after finding the business they have been doing on the side reasonably promising, resigning to devote themselves full-time to it. One Kagoro businessman may serve us as an example. He was the first teacher in the local government primary school at Kagoro and was then elected to the local council, with some executive responsibilities. Later he applied for recognition as a contractor, taking on minor construction work in the Kagoro area. In the early 1960s he resigned from teaching, using the pension he received to start a poultry farm. During the 1966 crisis, however, this enterprise failed due to a lack of transportation facilities. Our man then went into transport instead, on a small-scale. This field is now getting crowded, so that when his only present lorry breaks down, he may not replace it. Meanwhile, he continues as a construction contractor on an increasing scale. During the war years, he also entered the wholesale and retail provisions trade in Kafanchan. In a new undertaking, he is setting up a sawmill with several southern Zarian and Kafanchan Hausa partners.

The second path begins with petty trading. An example here is a Jaba businessman from Kwoi, the major Jaba community. This man's father was himself a long-distance trader, taking locustbean cakes (daddawa) to northern markets. But the father died when his son was a child. The latter farmed, married, then entered the mission school at Kwoi, and used Saturday and Sunday to trek to Kafanchan to buy kerosene for a Kwoi trader. With the money he thus earned, he bought sweets in

Kafanchan which he sold in Kwoi. After some time, he was able to take up trading in kerosene and cloth himself. The business had its ups and downs, as he tried new lines, and his teacher suggested that he leave the school, as too often he would be absent on market days anyway. He began going straight to Jos instead of Kafanchan for his supplies, selling petrol in Kwoi, and got a licence to sell beer there as well. Some time later, the years of national crisis began. He took over a popular Kafanchan beer bar which had been abandoned by its Ibo proprietor, and when she returned to claim it he opened first one, then a second quite large new bar in the town. By then he was also the major wholesaler of beer and soft drinks, operating out of Kafanchan and Kwoi with a number of large lorries which were also used for other transportation.

Both these men are typical of the southern Zarian modern entrepreneurs in not shifting the focus of their business interests entirely to Kafanchan in the post-crisis years. They still reside in Kagoro and Kwoi respectively and retain an interest in agriculture. When many Ibo sold their properties in Kafanchan after the war, however, men like these bought a great many of them and are now also among the major landlords in the town.

The Hausa entrepreneurs, on the other hand, live in Kafanchan, where their families often arrived in the early years of the settlement. They, normally, have entered modern entrepreneurship (where they are important not least in transportaion and contracting) through trading; and here we should note the particularly important part played by the ginger trade, in which most of the them are also involved.

Ginger, perhaps the only really significant cash crop of southern Zaria, has long grown in the area, but it used to be cultivated only on a small-scale and sold through the northern Nigerian market network. Since the late 1950s improved treatment techniques have been introduced, and southern Zaria ginger has entered the world market. Cultivation is particularly intensive in the Jaba area, but Kafanchan Hausa are the major wholesale merchants. Just how they established their hegemony is not very clear. It may have been because of their involvement in the older local trade, but perhaps it was also to some extent a matter of chance that the buyers coming in from major urban centers first made contact with them. Before they had mostly been petty traders, some of them in kola nuts. Now they are the best-known people in the town, in a highly competitive business which they jealously guard against outsiders.

The Ibo were never in the ginger trade. It developed, and gave some Hausa families a push, in the last decade or so of Ibo dominance in Kafanchan. In so doing, it also allowed these families to take on an important part in other businesses. With the pig trade, on the other hand, it was a matter of a largely Ibo enterprise being given up. Pigs had been introduced into the area by one of the missions, and it was the southern Zarians who raised them. Ibo buyers, however, went around to the markets to purchase them for transport to southern Nigeria, where

they were butchered. These buyers often bought directly from the producers, but some local people also inserted themselves as middlemen, buying pigs at the more inaccessible bush markets and reselling them to the Ibo at the larger markets. Some of these locals were already expanding their involvement in the early 1960s, but as the Ibo buyers disappeared with the crisis, and since the Hausa seem never to have taken any interest in pig trading (apparently mostly for religious reasons), they had the opportunity to take over the trade more or less as a whole. Our example is a Kaje man who began in trade by taking locustbean cakes to Jos and other plateau mining communities, then switched to grass mats for Kano, and then again started buying pigs directly at the farms or in small markets to resell them to Ibo buyers at Ungwar Rimi. In the war years he began to take them to Lagos himself. This trade has now made him, by local standards, fairly affluent. He has bought four properties in Kafanchan from former Ibo residents of the town. One is a beer bar, which he now leases to another man. He has also set up a beer bar in Ungwar Rimi village, which he runs himself. He remains settled in Ungwar Rimi.

For some people, it can be seen, modest beginnings in retail trade have led on to larger-scale commercial undertakings. But for a great many, trading obviously continues to be of rather limited scope, even if one certainly does not ignore the variations in turnover found, for example, on the Kafanchan market.

On one day in November 1975, 1,337 sellers were enumerated in the Kafanchan marketplace. The sellers were divided into 44 categories established on the basis of previous familiarity with the market, but for our purposes here the most important distinction is, roughly, between foodstuff sellers and others. This line is not precise, for in the latter category we will also include such items as canned foods and packaged sugar, biscuits, and sweets, i.e., goods of the industrial world. With such a breakdown, we find that slightly less than two-thirds of the people doing business in the market on this day were selling foodstuffs, slightly more than one-third sold other goods.

Data on the origins of the sellers could not be collected at the same time as the enumeration was made. An estimate based on category-by-category considerations, however, would be that about half the foodstuff sellers, some 400, would not be Kafanchan residents, but people--overwhelmingly women--bringing produce from nearby villages. Among the people selling other goods, hardly any would be non-residents of the town.

We may now look at the Kafanchan market from a slightly different vantage point. There is great unanimity among witnesses that the Kafanchan market suffered greatly when the Ibo left in 1966. Here as well, the yan kasa in time tried to fill some of the empty spaces. The Ibo who came to the town after the war, however, managed to recapture the retail market more successfully than any of their other old economic niches. There are now very few southern Zarians left selling other things than

foodstuffs in the marketplace of Kafanchan, and among sellers of such goods the Ibo now again outnumber also the Hausa and the Yoruba.

One may see several reasons why the southern Zarian entry into Kafanchan retailing was a limited success. As a first generation of traders, the individuals involved had little know-how compared to the Ibo, who could usually learn the ways of the market from some senior member in the family. The yan kasa in business could easily be distracted from the rhythms of the marketplace by kinsmen and friends in other pursuits, while the Ibo again have much more of a shared commercial focus. And the former could not as easily deny credit to other southern Zarians with whom they had personal relationships, as could the Ibo.

There is a further reason, it would seem, why southern Zarians are disadvantaged in much retail trading in Kafanchan. Supply lines are often quite personalized. It helps to have some familiarity with the place where goods are acquired and a relationship of trust with the supplier. For industrially produced merchandise Jos is the nearest important entrepot, and many traders go there especially for Nigerian produced goods. But Onitsha is a more important wholesale center especially for imported goods, with somewhat lower prices and a wider range of merchandise. Ibo traders in Kafanchan tend to go there, as it is in their home territory. Few others do, expecting to feel out of place and uncertain about what treatment they will meet. The Onitsha connection also seems to favor Ibo traders.

The same argument fits for rural produce brought to the Kafanchan market from more distant areas. Vegetables such as peppers, onions, and tomatoes come in mostly from the distant north and northeast; they are sold in the market mostly by Hausa traders. A number of food items also come in from southeastern Nigeria, and are offered for sale in Kafanchan largely by Ibo sellers. Although palm oil from the same area may be bought and resold by traders of various ethnic groups in Kafanchan, the wholesalers are usually Ibo.

The southern Zarians in retail trade in Kafanchan, whether residents or non-residents of the town, thus deal mostly in local produce, and by far the greater number of them are women. A large proportion of those coming in from neighboring villages (especially in the period following upon the harvest) bring only what is grown on their own family farms, or bundles of firewood. (There are also the Fulani women bringing in dairy products to the town.) Some, however, both town residents and others, are middlepersons. And this brings us back to considering not only the Kafanchan market but the network of markets of the region as a whole.

In the rural communities with large weekly markets, there are normally some resident traders in industrially produced merchandise, whose stalls remain open also during the rest of the week while the marketplace is otherwise largely deserted. These traders, often, form small stranger colonies of Ibo, Hausa, and Yoruba in these communities. The closer these markets are to Kafanchan, however, the more attractive are they also to town traders, who on the respective days make the trip out instead of remaining in the town.

While such mobile trading may be seen to increase the market services available in the rural communities, it can also play some part in restricting the commercial opportunities of local people. One may consider the case of the Jaba, the only southern Zarian group with any reputation for trading. The Jaba appear to have had relatively close relations with Hausa traders in early colonial or even pre-colonial days, when the involvement of most southern Zarians in commerce was negligible. Before mission influence became strong, a number of Jaba had already become Muslims, one sign of these contacts. This group could thus have had a head start in trading over other southern Zarians.[4] It also seems noteworthy, however, that in the period before the civil war, Kwoi, the Jaba center, was sufficiently insulated from the influence of Kafanchan to be able to develop a trader class of its own. It was far enough away, under difficult travel conditions, to attract few commuting Kafanchan traders with their goods, and at least one of the past chiefs of Jaba is reputed to have actively discouraged Ibo settlement in Kwoi. Thus Jaba traders developed their own connection to suppliers in larger urban centers. It is significant that in the period immediately following the Ibo exodus from Kafanchan, people from in and around the town often had to come to Kwoi to secure utensils no longer available in the town. It is also significant that Jaba people, like our bar owner, beverage wholesaler, transporter, and petrol station owner introduced above, are rather prominent among the yan kasa replacing the Ibo entrepreneurs in Kafanchan in the current period; they had already been able to build up sufficient resources to get into relatively large-scale commercial undertakings.

As far as rural produce is concerned, prices tend to be lower in the weekly markets than in Kafanchan. Townsmen who have opportunity to visit these markets thus make a point of doing some shopping for foodstuffs there to meet the needs of their own households. But there are also people--southern Zarians and others--who buy on a larger scale for resale elsewhere, in other places and/or at other times. Indeed, some of the foodstuff traders in the Kafanchan market have acquired their stock in village markets, so that these indirectly also serve the town.

It should be noted also that not all the exporting of foodstuffs from the weekly rural markets for resale elsewhere is to Kafanchan. Administrative reports from the colonial period suggest that the food needs of the Plateau mining communities played some role in the growth of markets in southern Zaria from an early point in time. The varied ecology of the region has also allowed some specializations of agricultural production which meet a wider demand. Ginger is the most conspicuous of these, and one where the distribution is channeled through Kafanchan. The sale of rice especially from the riverain area around Jagindi, or of locustbean cakes particularly from Ungwar Rimi, on the other hand, to a great extent bypasses the town. On a smaller scale, one might mention, there is that little quantity of fresh palm wine which regularly leaves Ungwar Rimi destined for Jos.

We come next to the category of artisanship in the town. A distinction was suggested above between crafts of a rather more traditional nature and others of European origin. Its significance lies not least in their different modes of recruitment. The former are a part of Hausa culture, and the skills involved tend to be transmitted within kin groups. Consequently, one would rarely find a southern Zarian involved in any of them. On the whole, these occupations form a closed segment of the urban opportunity structure. Watch repairing, tailoring, photography, and the like, on the other hand, are occupations where recruitment is arranged through a relatively open apprenticeship system; boys and young men stay with a master and, for a fee, learn the trade. The fee and the time involved vary with the maturity and readiness to learn of the apprentice and with the complexity of craft tasks. Occupations like these were mostly brought to Kafanchan by southern Nigerians, Yoruba and particularly Ibo, and they still make up a significant number of the practitioners. But due to the manner of recruitment, a number of southern Zarians have also been able to learn the jobs and set themselves up in business. Some of these are in the larger villages, but not least due to the departure of the Ibo room was made for quite a few of them in Kafanchan as well.

We may sketch one particular example again. This man is the first southern Zarian photographer in Kafanchan, a Kaje from a nearby small village. After finishing six grades of primary school, he helped on the family farm for a while and was then apprenticed to an Ibo photographer in Kafanchan. Since establishing himself in business, he has had eight apprentices of his own, six of them Kaje, one Kaninkon, one a Birom from the Plateau. Most apprentices stay for two years, those with little schooling perhaps for three. Photography is an expensive business to set oneself up in, which may be a major reason why so far only two of his former apprentices seem to have been able to go into business for themselves.

The extent to which craftsmen take on apprentices obviously varies a great deal. Many have none, and most of those who are thus engaged in the transmission of their know-how have only one or two at a time. Very occasionally one finds a tailor or carpenter who has six or eight simultaneously. Where a substantial payment is involved, this can be an obstacle to recruitment.

The presence of artisans and the apprenticeship system in Kafanchan has allowed some southern Zarians to learn new skills, and has also made possible some diffusion of artisan services to other communities in the region. The picture, however, should not be made to look too simple. Not all apprenticing in Kafanchan entails the transmission of skills from strangers to yan kasa. Some masters who are immigrants to the area have apprentices who are also strangers. By now we also have the occasional case of a southern Zarian artisan with an Ibo apprentice. Moreover, not all who learn a trade are eventually able to set themselves up in it. Furthermore, one finds a number of southern Zarians who have served their apprenticeships not in Kafanchan but in Jos, Kaduna, or more distant urban centers.

The last two categories of income opportunities in Kafanchan are, for different reasons, quantitatively unimportant for southern Zarians. Neigher of them involves particularly large numbers of people. The men in casual minor services (truck pushers, shoeshiners, etc.) are mostly Hausa migrants from the far north. Some have permanently left farming. Others are yan cin rani, dry season migrants, who will return home when the time for farm work begins. These tend to be the ones doing heavier work. In Kafanchan, their stay coincides with the ginger trading season, and the merchants involved in the trade give employment to some of them in loading and unloading, taking the sacks of ginger to the railway station, and so forth. (But there are some yan cin rani in other pursuits as well--men who make and sell embroidered caps, for example, and cultivators who come to raise vegetables on the river beds.) The women in the minor services category are primarily the prostitutes, and here again there seem to be hardly any southern Zarians in Kafanchan. Hausa prostitutes seem, as elsewhere, to be an integral part of the Hausa community, in separate quarters and cohesively organized; other prostitutes at the beer bars are of varied ethnic origin, not so few Tiv and Idoma (reputedly due to high bride prices in the home area) and, evidently because of the disruptions of war, more Ibo than there used to be.

Symbolic specialists, lastly, form a small category in Kafanchan, but some southern Zarians are in it. On the secular side of the spectrum, among the musicians in the burukutu bars are some local people, and others of mixed northern origins--not least Hausa gogge players. In the Islamic complex, the yan kasa are hardly present. With rare exceptions, the learned men, praise singers and emirate courtiers are Hausa. In the Christian churches, however, the southern Zarian presence is greater. The various denominations in Kafanchan often have, or have had, an ethnic base. A number of them were brought by southern Nigerian migrants, and some still very clearly reflect this origin. But some of them also proselytized among the southern Zarians. In certain cases the local converts formed congregations of their own. In others, churches became increasingly multi-ethnic. And during the war years this in a few cases meant that church leadership passed from Ibo to southern Zarian hands. In some instances, these various churches have full-time ministers. At other times, their servants had to find all or most of their support in other ways.

Our overview suggests that while Kafanchan has become more of a southern Zarian town than it used to be, local people are still much more visible in some pursuits than in others. Moreover most of the people who can claim to be both yan kasa and native-born Kafanchan townspeople are still young. To fill out the picture, we may ask if a place like Kafanchan meets the needs of southern Zarians for urban employment. Evidently it does not. We have seen already that the people with a higher education are drawn to administrative and clerical jobs in larger centers. But southern Zaria has its migration of less skilled labor to these centers as well, not least to Jos and to Kaduna where a suburb like Kukuri has a large proportion of southern Zarian inhabitants (cf. Peil 1975a, 1975b). Joining the truck pushers and shoeshiners in Kafanchan is not an attractive

alternative to these people, and what the town does not offer (except insofar as the railway can be said to be something like this) is the chance of regular employment in a larger-scale industrial concern, such as the mines on the Plateau or the textile mills in Kaduna.

We have listed a number of amenities which the town makes available to country people as well as townspeople, and noted briefly how the town is a market for rural produce. It is clear that Kafanchan facilitates access to various material goods and a number of services for inhabitants of the countryside, too. Having done field work, so far, from the urban rather than the rural perspective, I would not at this point attempt to offer a more detailed picture of what role the urban amenities play in the life of village people.

Kafanchan has perhaps been rather less important for its range of services than one might expect a town to be. Educational, and to some extent also health, services have been provided on a significant scale, we have seen, by certain Christian missions, and it can be argued that larger mission centers have taken on some of the functions toward rural areas which a town might otherwise have. Possibly because of the historical character of Kafanchan as a stranger settlement, and perhaps to some extent due to an anti-urban ideological bias on the part of the missions, the latter have placed several of their major establishments in other locations. These institutions do not only offer health and educational services. At Kagoro, for example, one finds another number of southern Nigerian artisans, originally brought by the SIM mission, who now play a part in diffusing occupational skills within the local society.

I have sketched some aspects of the changing relationship between Kafanchan and southern Zaria. A main theme has been partial take-over of the old stranger settlement by the yan kasa. This process of rural-urban integration may suggest one major question to be posed of general interest in the comparative study of African towns: in what ways does it matter to a rural population if the personnel providing urban functions is of the same or a different ethnic and cultural background?

I will not attempt to answer the question here. It may be that urbanites sharing a cultural background with the rural population and tied to it through multiplex links are more responsive to its needs. It is also possible that due to their culturally defined needs they make up a better market for local rural produce than an alien town population would. And it would seem that entrepreneurs with one leg in the town and the other in a nearby village may distribute their investments in other ways than businessmen whose original attachments are to some other part of the country (or another country altogether). But these possibilities require further study. And here a time dimension should be considered as well. The linkages between the yan kasa of town and country may have certain characteristics when the townspeople are themselves recent migrants, and other characteristics at a later point when they are the children and grandchildren of migrants, but themselves urbanites born and bred.

FOOTNOTES

[1] Field work in Kafanchan and Southern Zaria was carried out in 1974-5 as part of the Plural Societies Project, Department of Social Anthropology, University of Stockholm, funded by the Tercentenary Fund of the Bank of Sweden and the Swedish Social Science Research Council. A research associateship with the Department of Sociology, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, during the field period is gratefully acknowledged. The presentation here of Kafanchan occupational categories is partially parallel to that in an earlier unpublished paper (Hannerz 1976a). Aspects of the methodology of research in Kafanchan are discussed in Hannerz 1976b).

[2] The historical notes here draw in part on research in the National Archives, Kaduna; for the purposes of this paper, I have not regarded it as necessary to give detailed references to the particular files used. There has been little modern anthropological research on the southern Zaria ethnic groups with which we are concerned here. Published studies are more or less limited to a few papers by M. G. Smith (1953, 1960, 1969) on the Kagoro. The ethnographic survey by Gunn (1956:65-121) on the Katab group draws mostly on early and extremely uneven sources. There is a somewhat inexact sketch on the history of the Jemaa emirate in Hogben's and Kirk-Greene's (1966:551-556) volume on northern Nigerian emirates.

[3] I assume here some general familiarity with past Nigerian national politics.

[4] In line with our argument concerning the stranger traders in Kafanchan, one might suppose that these Hausa traders would have established a commercial hegemony in Kwoi. This was not the case, however; presumably their trading interests have rather been complementary to those of the Jaba.

THE IMPACT OF A LARGE-SCALE IRRIGATION SCHEME ON TWO WARDS IN A SMALL TOWN IN KANO STATE, NIGERIA: ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR RURAL DEVELOPMENT

Tina Wallace

Introduction

Chiromawa is a small town in northern Nigeria, located sixty kilometers south of Kano on the main Kano to Zaria road, in a densely populated agricultural area known as the Kano Close Settled Zone. It is an old walled Hausa town, divided for administrative purposes into four wards. Three wards are located in the town itself; the fourth is a rural hamlet five kilometers away, off the main road and unreachable by car. This town has recently been affected by the introduction of a large-scale irrigation scheme, the Kano River Project. This scheme was started in 1970 with a pilot area of 2,000 acres. It presently covers 5,000 acres and will expand to 44,000 acres in the first phase; a further 56,000 acres will be included in phase two.

In this paper I want to look at the impact of this irrigation project on two of the wards in Chiromawa: Waziri, the largest ward in the town, and Kwari, the hamlet. The data raise some vital issues about this project approach to agricultural change with its accompanying emphasis on small urban centres as a focus for rural development.

The Setting for the Research

Waziri is the largest ward in the town, with a population of 1,660 people living in 307 compounds. (Chiromawa itself has over 500 compounds with a population of 3,500). The compounds stand close together along narrow streets. Some are built of mud surrounded by high mud walls which are often decorated, while other houses are constructed of cornstalk and thatch and contrast noticeably with the most recent signs of affluence, cement block houses which are being built at a significant rate in the town. In the centre of the town there is a large Friday mosque, for the population here is Muslim. Close to the mosque is a Friday market where a wide range of goods are sold, from meat to kerosene lamps, from cloth to cooked foods. In addition to the weekly market there is a daily evening market along the main street where small traders sell foodstuffs to the local population.

On the edge of the town there is a primary school built of breeze blocks. There are several wells in the town and a wind pump for water which is now defunct. Close to the road there is a dispensary and a busy motor park where taxis and lorries to and from Kano stop and pick up people and goods while passengers buy refreshments.

There are several shops in Waziri and along every street tailors can be seen in the late afternoon working their treadle machines. A lone weaver sits under his shelter weaving strips of cloth. There are men repairing bicycles and radios, and in the evening groups of gamblers collect to play cards.

The women are kept in seclusion, doing little or no farm work and staying within the compound walls making cooked foods or other small items, which their young children carry around the town to sell. The men do most of the farm work and the fetching of water and firewood, keeping their women away from the gaze of other men. Few women are to be seen on the streets, except the ladies from the local brothels who are allowed to wander at will.

Several men in Waziri now have motor vehicles, and tractors, trucks and lorries from the irrigation project move in and out of the town.

Before the introduction of the scheme the men in Waziri were primarily wet season farmers, growing food for consumption and a range of crops, particularly groundnuts, for sale. Like all men in Hausa society they also undertook non-agricultural occupations including butchery, tailoring, weaving, trading, and, in the past, weaving and dyeing of cloth.

The picture in the hamlet, Kwari, is rather different. There are very few mud buildings; most men live in houses built of cornstalk, encircled with flimsy stalk walls. The houses are scattered, situated along narrow paths with small farms in between. Here the women are more visible, pounding grain together outside their houses, fetching water and sometimes going to help on the farm. People here are less affluent and need their women's labour for planting and harvesting especially. There is no centre to the hamlet, no mosque, no marketplace. There are no tailors or repairers in the hamlet, though recently one grinding machine has been introduced, owned by a man in Waziri. Signs that the hamlet is located near to the Kano River are the fishing nets hanging up to dry and the pervasive smell of drying fish.

The men here, as well as being wet season farmers and fishermen, used to grow crops in the dry season along the river banks.

The population is small, around 400 people living in twenty-eight scattered compounds. A few men have bicycles, more have donkeys and there are only three or four radios in the hamlet. While occasionally a motorbike manages to reach the hamlet, no cars can drive there and communication is mainly on foot.

The Kano River Project

It was into this environment that the Government (originally the State Government, although now it is a Federal project) brought a large-scale irrigation scheme with its multi-pronged approach to rural change. The intentions behind the scheme have been clearly articulated in the Consultancy reports, third Five Year Plan, and newspaper articles.[1] The Kano Close Settled Zone is fertile, well-populated and a key area of

grain production in Nigeria. But because of the limited rainfall, production is only possible once a year, between May and September. Drought is not uncommon. By introducing irrigation it is possible to grow a second crop in the dry season, which because of the ever rising food import bill Nigeria needs to do. The Kano River Project is one of several planned irrigation schemes designed to produce wheat from October to March, primarily for sale to the urban population as bread. The priority for this scheme is certainly to grow food for towns, but the planners, assume (hope) that as rural productivity is increased the farmers will earn more money and thus raise their standard of living. In addition this project also aims to improve rural welfare by resettling some of the farming population into larger units where better facilities can be provided, such as schools, markets and hospitals.

But what are the realities of introducing a new technology, run by a modern bureaucracy into this situation? How does this priority of growing food for sale, this increased commercialisation of farming using expensive inputs, actually affect the rural population? Do incomes automatically rise? How does moving people from scattered to concentrated units affect their land tenure and their other occupational activities? How does the new technology affect the organization of labour? How many facilities are in practice provided in these growing centres?

This paper will look at some of the assumptions and statements behind this increasingly popular approach to agricultural and rural change, and the unfolding realities.

Some awkward issues emerge which raise questions about this approach, this imposition of urban needs and values onto rural areas with little understanding or concern about how this will affect the local population, or that it will affect them differently if they are wealthy or poor, according to their occupation or the size of their farms. The contrast between the impact on the two wards in my study will emphasize further the differential impact of this approach.

Stated Intentions for this Project

The Consultants, Nedeco, presented a very detailed plan to the Nigerian Government, and as all other documents essentially echo the ideas laid out in their report I will use this to briefly detail the thinking and aims behind the irrigation project.

The overriding consideration in the plan is the irrigation infrastructure and the technological demands of this new agriculture. Essentially the farmers in the area have to change their lives to fit in with the demands of the scheme. They must be removed from their scattered homesteads if the land they occupy is irrigable, or is needed for new roads, canals, or housing for the experts who will run the scheme (the irrigation engineers, agricultural officers, extension staff). The population must be reorganised "to meet the requirements of efficient irrigated agriculture," [2] it must now be concentrated into units so that the essential inputs and services farmers need to carry out this farming can be more easily and cheaply provided.

The Consultants recognize that this is a very densely populated area (densities of over 500 people per square mile) and that only 35% of the population lived in towns prior to the scheme. Although there has been no major drift to the towns, Nedeco claims that the benefits of resettlement override the factors that previously kept the population scattered, e.g., the distance a man has to walk to the farm, land tenure and land use. These benefits are to be improved water supplies and new social services. The time-worn argument that services can only be provided to population concentrations is used. They say that farmers associations, credit societies, and processing agencies will all work better "if they operate in a modern rural infra-structure brought about by concentration of services." [3]

The Consultants give details for primary, secondary and tertiary urban centres, each having a different action radius, to serve minimum populations.[4] The services in these centres will outweigh the disadvantages caused by the scheme to farmers: loss of farmland, small financial compensation, social and economic disruption.

It is the Consultants and the needs of the project that determine what is best; the farmers were not consulted about their priorities or their needs. Thus Chiromawa is designated as a full primary centre to provide health care, schools, new markets, and agricultural facilities. In the rest of this paper I want to look at the impact of this approach on the two wards in the town and highlight the contradictions between the needs and priorities of the scheme and the needs and priorities of the farmers in the two areas. Firstly, we can look at the reorganization of land tenure and land use required by the scheme with its changing labour requirements and altered occupational structure. Secondly, we can look at the compensations the farmers were to get in terms of improved urban facilities, especially education and health.

Altering the Relations of Production to Meet the Needs of Irrigation

Land

Before the scheme started, land in this area was intensively farmed with little use of fallow and the nutriment in the soil was boosted by the application of animal manure and household sweepings known as taki. Land was individually held, or owned by families, it was inheritable and divisible, and it could be bought and sold, pledged and loaned. Strangers could buy land or be allocated land by the village head, though with increasing pressure on land that was dying out.

The introduction of the scheme affected the land situation of the people in the area in different ways. Thirteen thousand were removed from their land to make way for Tiga Dam and were resettled in new villages outside the scheme. Others were removed from their scattered villages and resettled in small urban centres within the scheme. While some farmers within the project boundaries lost much of their land for the building of roads and canals, others had their land irrigated and were enabled to undertake dry season farming.

While those whose land was irrigable had ₦ 3,000 per acre invested in their farms, only ₦ 80 per acre was paid in compensation to those who lost their land. Because of the land shortage in the area and rising price of land resulting from irrigation, these farmers found it almost impossible to buy new land to replace their losses. As irrigation infra-structure absorbs 25% of productive land anyway, this population is being pushed onto less land. For example, in Waziri 80 local men have lost some or all of their farmland, and a further 33 men who had recently moved into the ward had lost their homes and farms to the scheme. Only ten of these men have managed to buy new farmland; most were, at best, only able to rent plots for farming. They felt very bitter about this, and in the first year of our survey (1976) their concern about being deprived of farmland dominated our research. A few quotations from the fieldworkers who interviewed the farmers will serve to emphasize how deeply this loss of land affected them and was undermining their agricultural productivity:

> "Almost all the people I interviewed lost some fields to the scheme. They were given compensation for every field lost. In most cases the compensation is very inadequate for it could not enable a person to buy a new field in place of the one lost, therefore the people are bitter against acquisition of their fields."

> "They said that the government has confiscated their farms and given them a small amount of money, too small for them to buy something which will be equivalent to their farms. By their thinking, they hoped we would be able to get their farms returned....these people were complaining too much because of the compensation given to them."

> "This man had a lot to say about the confiscation of a mighty farm. He got ₦ 300 for it, but he could have sold it for ₦1,000. He complained to the Village Head and the District Head, but nothing happened. He used some of the money to buy another farm, but it is very small compared to his huge, good gado (inherited) farm. He said he cannot benefit from the project because they took his farm and he is not interested in those who have benefited."

At the other end of the spectrum, farmers have had their land irrigated. As landholding is unequal (from 1/2 acre to over 20 acres) farmers have benefited differently, the larger farmers having the potential to gain most from irrigation. Simply undertaking irrigated farming, however, does not necessarily lead to increased incomes. In order to gain from this farming a man must have access to adequate labour, money for the expensive inputs of seeds, water, fertilizer, sprays, and the ability to ensure that tractor drivers plough his field on time. The farmer has to invest a lot of money in this farming, (about ₦ 166 in 1976 for an acre of wheat), and he is dependent on good inputs

from the bureaucracy for an adequate yield. If yields are poor due to lack of money for labour, water etc., or because of poor scheme management he can lose heavily.

The evidence from Waziri is that while some farmers have profited greatly from irrigated farming, particularly the Village Head and other "big men," many smaller farmers have tried and failed and are now forced to rent out their land to the more successful farmers. Twenty out of 49 farmers with irrigated land in Waziri had to rent it out in 1977; in 1978 46 rented out land mainly because of financial problems. These men tended to be those with limited land whose other jobs were unremunerative, such as washermen, fish fryers, donkey carriers, and firewood sellers. They were men are unable to grow enough grain to last them a whole year--an indicator of general poverty. Many farmers who do not own irrigated land try to rent it, but 97 farmers in Waziri had never even tried, with over 50% of them saying they do not have enough money and the risks are too high. No one, except the Village Head, in Kwari had even tried to rent land on the scheme, and none owned irrigated land.

The farmers in Kwari have been affected by the scheme in yet another way. Not only are they excluded by distance and poverty from getting land on the scheme, but their own land has deteriorated. In the past they had fadama farms, land which could be farmed in the dry season due to the flooding of the Kano River. In the past Kwari was an exporter of sugar cane and vegetables in the dry season, but since the damming of the river the flooding has ceased and most men have lost their dry season farms. Kwari now imports sugar cane. Their fishing has also been adversely affected. This is true for villages located all along the Kano River.[5]

The relationship of the farmer to his land has been drastically altered. Many have lost fertile land and been resettled in poor areas. Others have had the size of their farms reduced. Still others who are excluded from the scheme have lost their access to traditional dry season farming. For those with irrigated land, some can make money, while others lose, but all of them are increasingly dependent on an external bureaucracy and are required to grow primarily for the market; they are no longer allowed to grow their staple food, guinea corn.[6]

Labour Migration

As the agricultural base is being altered, so are patterns of labour use and migration. While historically there is little evidence of a rural exodus to towns (Chiromawa only grew from 1,700 in 1909 to 2,643 in 1971[7]), this is changing rapidly. Waziri ward is expanding fast under the impact of the scheme, as the planners intended. The nature of the growth, however, is not according to their predictions. While 33 households from scattered compounds have moved to Waziri, the bulk of the expansion is made up of temporary migrant labourers, men who have come to get work in construction and agricultural wage labour.

At the time of the survey 121 migrant labourers were resident in Waziri. They differ significantly from the dislocated farmers and the

host population along many dimensions, including the reasons why they came, their ages, marital status, farming and work situation.

The migrants predominantly come to work on the project, either for the scheme or for individual irrigation farmers, for wages of ₦2 or more a day. They are significantly younger than the rest of the male adult population in the town, and 40% of the them are unmarried. Only half of those who are married have their wives living in Waziri with them.

Unlike the permanent population they are not all Muslim; 23% of them are Christians. Also, educationally they are different. While only six men in Waziri have primary school education, 49 (40%) of the migrants have been to primary school, and some have attended secondary school. All the jobs in the town which require formal education, e.g. the dispenser, school teachers, extension workers, are filled by men recruited from outside the village.

While virtually all the long-term migrants come from within Kano State, over 40% of the casual migrants come from States outside, especially Kwara, Plateau, and Oyo. Unlike the resettled and permanent population in the town, the majority of the migrant labourers (86%) live in rented, not owned, accomodation. There are now twenty houses just for renting in the ward, all built in the last few years to cater to the influx of labour. Previously--and still in Kwari today--when a man came on cin rani[8] he would be accommodated by a compound head who would provide shelter and often food in return for some of the man's labour. This was the case in Waziri until recently, but now the majority of labourers pay for their rooms and only work for cash.

The influx of migrants to Waziri has been in response to the new economic opportunities on the scheme for wage labour. While the project has created demand for labour, it has also commercialized that labour, which has had an important impact on family labour in the area, and on the economic structure of the ward.

Migration patterns in Kwari have also changed, but quite differently. With the undermining of fishing and dry season farming, young men have had to leave the village. Some have moved on a semi-permanent basis to the Tiga Dam to fish, coming home occasionally to see their families and help on the farms. Others have started to migrate south in the dry season, seeking wage jobs in Zaria, Jos, or Lagos. A few have found jobs on the scheme, but very few and they (like farmers in Waziri) were vocal about the problems of finding work on the project, complaining of the need to bribe the headmen, the constant sackings, and the preference given to outside labourers.

The scheme has undoubtedly altered the migration pattern, making Waziri a focus for incoming temporary migrants, and Kwari a place of less economic opportunity and outmigration.

Occupations

This evolving migration pattern highlights several key issues about the changing labour demands and occupational structure on the scheme. The influx of wage labour illustrates some miscalculations made by the consultants.

Firstly, Nedeco assumed that men were underemployed in the dry season and that householders, plus their free family labour, could meet all the new labour demands of irrigated farming. Secondly, they said that the wage jobs in construction and farming would be done by local men who had lost land. But men in Hausa society have other calls on their time in the dry season, and family members refuse to work for no financial return in that season. The whole structure of family labour is further eroded under an agricultural system designed for profit rather than food self-sufficiency.[9] Thus farmers on the scheme find they need to buy a good deal of expensive labour, cutting into their profits and causing many to give up irrigated farming. Local farmers are clearly not getting first preference for scheme jobs as the following table shows:

TABLE I

Persons doing a wage job on the scheme by whether they are a household head, a son, or a migrant labourer (Waziri only)

Person doing the job	Type of wage job		
	Unskilled	Skilled	Total
Household Head	64 (45%)	16 (26%)	80 (40%)
Dependent Son	24 (17%)	7 (12%)	31 (15%)
Migrant Labourer	53 (38%)	38 (62%)	91 (45%)
TOTAL	141	61	202

Of course this influx of migrants, the cash wealth generated by the successful irrigation farmers, and the money from the wages earned on the scheme, have stimulated the volume and velocity of cash in Waziri, which has greatly expanded the market for goods and services.

Certain occupations particularly are thriving in Waziri: house building and house renting, tailoring, butchery, shopkeeping, trading, selling prepared foods, bike and radio repairing. Economically the town is expanding.

But all this economic activity appears to have left Kwari untouched. The income earning activities there remain farming, Koranic activity and travelling out to fish. The immense government input of money into

altering the agricultural base of the farmers on the scheme has left the economy of the hamlet unaffected. Kwari people can go to town and enjoy the benefits of the changes, but they lack the income to fully participate, as indeed do many people in the town. The outward signs of change and prosperity can delude the outsider into believing that all farmers are involved in this, but many are left untouched by the new wave of plenty.

It is perhaps apt at this point to turn to the more specific benefits that accrue to the population involved in a rural development project through the small urban centres, namely education, markets, health and the provision of vital agricultural inputs. These are the non-productive aspects of rural development. The issues here are whether these facilities are serving the felt needs of the people and how many people these services actually reach.

Services to be Provided as Part of the Rural Development Project: Education, Health, Agricultural Inputs and Markets

Education

According to the Consultants, at least one full primary school should, ideally, be established in each primary centre (Chiromawa).[10] This accords well with the Government's aim of introducing Universal Primary Education (UPE), a programme launched in 1976.

Chiromawa already had a primary school in Waziri, and in 1977 the first set of children took the primary leaving exam. But the school has been under-utilized, with only 217 children attending in 1976, and only 44 of them were girls.

There are several possible reasons for this reluctance to send children to school. Firstly, it is a Muslim society where to a large extent women are removed from crucial areas of the work force, farming and marketing. Children engage in farming and marketing, trading particularly for their mothers, who undertake some economic production at home and rely on their children to carry goods to and from the compound and to sell the finished products. Children are an integral part of the economic system and one reason why women are able to stay in seclusion. The removal of children into school would have very far-reaching implications for the economic role of women and the labour force.

Secondary Koranic education is of key importance in this society. While the Consultants fail to even mention it, most children attend Koranic school every evening, and the older boys often travel to other States to study with reputable mallams. It is not clear how far this education conflicts with primary schooling, but it does appear to play an inhibiting role.

Thirdly, there is the crucial problem of what the primary schools in the rural areas actually do. While UPE has been introduced and there

is a great emphasis on constructing buildings and getting children to school, the issues of what they will learn, who will teach them and how they will be taught have been neglected. While UPE colleges have been set up to train teachers, the education level of people entering such colleges has been poor--often they are primary school failures.

While some household heads want to educate their children in school, the majority do not. Many of the enrolled children are only there because of coercion from the Village Head, and very few families send more than one child. One man in Waziri convincingly expressed the feelings of many of the farmers--after seven years of education his son has not found a job. Though he may find a job later his father doubts it. Meanwhile he has lost years of the boy's labour and feels very 'used'; he has received no return from his son. Moreover the boy is almost useless on the farm, and he cannot work the hard and long hours which the other uneducated children do. The father is concerned about how the boy will actually make out if he cannot find employment outside of farming. His other sons can farm well now, and one has accompanied him every dry season on trading expeditions and can trade also. This father only sent his son to school under protest, and the experience has confirmed his negative perception of it.

The aim of providing schools, of putting people together in towns to enable them to be within reach of school, is not really the key issue here. The people in Kwari use the distance to the school in Chiromawa as an excuse for keeping their children at home, but in fact many farmers expressed great hostility to the Ward Head over the proposal to build a school in the hamlet. Many of them see it--and in this context probably quite rightly--as a waste of time. As the children will not go to secondary school due to poor teaching, their education does not appear to be of immediate value in the rural areas.

Because only about 10% of the population attend school in this State--at least until complete implementation of UPE--and none of the older men in the rural areas have gone to school, very little work has been done to determine the impact of education and its relation to trading, farming and getting into wage jobs in this area. As long as there are opportunities for economic return in trading and land to farm, one suspects that education will not become a priority to the people here.[11]

Health

While the Consultants stressed the need for health and adequate water supplies, especially wells, the Government has concentrated on health centres only. The provision of good, plentiful drinking water has been neglected. While there is a health centre in Chiromawa and a new small hospital at Tiga, these are under-utilized by the population which appears far more concerned about the lack of drinking water in the town.

Health centres in the State suffer from a lack of drugs and often

a shortage of staff. For religious reasons, many men are reluctant to take their women to the clinic, and almost none of the women in Kwari or Waziri had ever had pre- or ante-natal treatment, and delivery was at home with local midwives. Infant mortality remains very high in this part of the world, and it seems again that the content of the health programmes has failed to capture the imagination or the needs of the people. The presence of a clinic in the town seems to contribute little towards raising the standards of health care.

The population in Waziri is much more concerned about the lack of decent water; they are worse off for water than the people in the hamlet. In Chiromawa the town has outgrown the water supply and while water is piped past the town for irrigation purposes, nothing has been done about the domestic water supply by the scheme. Only the senior staff houses on the project are supplied with treated drinking water, water for washing etc. The villages located within the project have to use the canal water with the obvious hazards of malaria, bilharzia and increased pollution from using water which is also used for washing clothes, for cattle etc. In Chiromawa itself the people have gone part way to solving their water problems by consistently breaking the irrigation pipe and collecting water in tins, selling it for about 15K a tin.

The emphasis on putting people together and providing health centres comes from the Consultants. In practice this population concentration is causing water shortages and forcing people to use polluted canal water. The very major hazards brought by irrigation of increased malaria and bilharzia are not even mentioned in the plans.

Delivery of Inputs

Again the planners' concern with delivery of inputs stresses physical access, that people must live conveniently close to a distribution centre. This focus conceals some of the more serious problems relating to provision of agricultural inputs. There is a basic shortage of inputs such as fertilizer, and inefficient delivery of existing supplies exacerbates the problem. Fertilizer, for example, often arrives at the stores too late for the planting season. Distribution through the traditional hierarchy tends to be corrupt, with people close to the Village Head obtaining easy access to scarce resources and the majority getting nothing. These problems of inadequate supply or delivery and distorted distribution are harder to remedy than that of giving farmers easy physical access to a farm centre, and they have been documented by many different projects in Nigeria, including the World Bank and Operation Feed the Nation.

It is interesting to note that in the one project where fertilizer has been more equitably distributed and reached all interested farmers (the Guided Change Project,[12]) the project was based in several scattered villages, and the actual collecting of the fertilizer involved quite a lot of travelling. This caused very little hardship to the

farmers, compared to the problems created in Chiromawa by the diverting of precious inputs to the Village Head, Ward Heads and other notables. The people of Kwari and non-scheme farmers in Waziri, especially have found it almost impossible to buy any subsidised agricultural inputs.

Markets

Marketing is also an integral part of this approach to development. It is questionable whether this is for the benefit of the rural people, as control of marketing is often the point at which projects recoup their debts and regulate prices. As well as providing places for the farmers to sell goods, the planners feel it is important to provide them with markets for purchasing consumer goods in small urban centres. This concern to build new markets is, however, irrelevant in Kano State. Trading had been well established here for centuries and included trans-Saharan trading in cloth, grains etc. There is a well-developed system of rotating markets throughout the north. In addition there is house-trading where a man or woman buys and sells certain goods from the home.

While undoubtedly Waziri has a far greater number of services and trading activities available, such as shoe repairing, bike repair, photography, shops, daily selling of meat, tailoring, etc. the people in Kwari (and many in town) do not have cash with which to purchase them. The creation of well-stocked markets in small urban enclaves has little bearing on many farmers who are too poor to participate, men who have to borrow money or food from the others when food prices are high and repay at harvest when the prices are low. Clough's work shows that this system leads to a creaming off of wealth from the weakest to the more wealthy, leaving the poorest farmers in debt. It is this poverty and inability of many farmers to sell their crops when prices are high that should be the focus of concern, not the spatial reorganization of an already sophisticated marketing system.

Concluding Discussion

The Kano River Project has much in common with other projects in Africa in its concern to promote a certain kind of rural development. An integral part of approach is the stress laid on the importance of small urban centres to provide services for the rural population, in return for the production of agricultural surplus. The questions raised by studying this project approach to rural change are for whose benefit is productivity raised, and whose needs are being met by this emphasis on developing urban centres and their related services.

It is my contention that the main aim of the Kano River Project is to commercialize farmers, to increase their productivity in order to meet urban needs. This involves altering substantially the technological base of agriculture, plus shifting the control of production out of the hands of farmers who are no longer able to choose what to grow, how and when to grow. The dry season crop (wheat) is for export, and is in direct competition with the staple food (guinea corn). Farmers

are required to alter their whole approach to production; self-sufficiency in food is now relegated to second place. The farmer should grow crops for cash and with cash buy his food.

> "These are new requirements, imposed on the farmer by the market society, making it necessary for them to become businessmen competent in market operations and small-scale farming and receptive to science-generated information about cropping practices in place of being 'artisan' cultivators obtaining family livelihood direct from their production, with variable surpluses offered on the market, on the basis of tradition." [13]

In an area prone to drought, where the relief systems are known to be inefficient and the scheme management unpredictable, this places the scheme farmers in a potentially vulnerable position.

The need for the Nigerian Government to boost agricultural production, feed the growing urban population and keep down the food import bill is what is primarily involved in this approach to rural development. This does not necessarily improve rural welfare. In fact, increasing production for an urban market may be in direct conflict with needs of the farmers on the basis of which crop to grow and concentration of all agricultural inputs on one group of farmers to the exclusion of others.

While some farmers certainly get rich under the scheme, others lose their land or find that the cost of such farming forces them into debt.

An integral part of this approach to rural development is the emphasis on introducing certain institutions into the rural areas, such as primary schools, clinics, and marketplaces. Three points should be stressed here. Firstly, the institutions deemed essential by the Consultants are less crucial to the farmers who do not necessarily feel a need for them, but are concerned rather with retaining access to their land, gaining more control over erratic scheme management and securing a decent water supply. Secondly, the focus on providing cooperatives, clinics, and stores may miss the crucial problems; for example the real problem of fertilizer is not where to distribute it, but who controls the distribution. Thirdly, the emphasis on small urban centres seems to create enclaves within the rural areas, as does the whole project approach. Because the farmers outside the scheme or the urban centres have very differential access to resources they are largely excluded from participating in these centres. Moreover, small urban centres in this region must remain limited according to how many people can live in such centers and still have access to land, which is the basis of production for the area.

This approach to rural development in my view has less to do with improving the lot of the rural people and creating wealth for the rural

areas than with getting some farmers to increase their production for export to meet the needs of non-rural people. Increasing rural productivity does not necessarily relate closely with improving rural welfare; providing certain institutions in small urban centres does not necessarily meet the needs of the rural people.

FOOTNOTES

[1]Nedeco, 1976. Kano River Project. Eight volumes. The Hague, Netherlands. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1975. Third National Development Plan. 1975-80. Central Planning Office, Lagos.

[2]Nedeco, 1976. Kano River Project. op.cit. Part 6, Vol. 1, p. 31

[3]Ibid., p. 35

[4]Primary centres were to cover a minimum population of 1 1/2 - 2,000, secondary centres were for 5 - 1,000 people and tertiary centres were for more than 10,000. The action radius of each centre was to be 2 miles, 5 - 10 miles, over 10 miles respectively.

[5]R. Stock details other examples of downriver losses in "The Impact of the Decline of the Hadejia River floods in the Hadejia Emirate" in J. Apeldoorn, ed. The Aftermath of the 1972-4 Drought in Nigeria. 1977. Center for Social and Economic Research. Zaria, Nigeria.

[6]Because wheat has to be planted by early November and guinea corn is not harvested until late November, irrigation farmers have to stop growing their staple food in the wet season. They are to grow maize instead, and this is not a popular food in this area.

[7]Figures taken from Kano State tax records. The population distribution in Kano State is discussed in detail in P. Hill, 1977, Population, Prosperity and Poverty: Rural Kano, 1900 and 1970. Cambridge, CUP.

[8]Cin rani is migration to find wage jobs in the dry season.

[9]For a detailed discussion of family labour and changes see, T. Wallace. 1979. Rural Development through Irrigation: Studies in A Town on the Kano River Project. Center for Social and Economic Research. Zaria, Nigeria. Chapter 5.

[10]Nedeco, 1976. op. cit. p. 9.

[11]The relationship between interest in education and declining rural economic opportunities is discussed in T. Wallace and S. A. Weeks, 1976. Success or Failure in Rural Uganda. Makerere Institute of Social Research. Kampala, Uganda.

[12]For an account of this project see, B. Huizinga, 1979 "An Experiment in Small Farmer Development Administration Amongst the Hausa of Nigeria." Institute of Agricultural Research, Zaria, Nigeria. Mimeo.

[13]A. Pearse, "Technology and Peasant Production." Development and Change. 1977. No. 8. p. 129.

MEDENINE: REGIONAL CAPITAL AND SMALL URBAN CENTER IN THE TUNISIAN SOUTH

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Tunisia stands as an example of a unique experience in political and economic development in the Maghreb. Its transition from a protectorate to a republic was remarkably tranquil. It did not suffer the convulsions of political and economic changes often seen in new countries; and it has been, since 1956, under the political direction of Habib Bourgiba and his Neo-Destour Party.

But Tunisia is not a monolithic economic and political structure. Regional disparities have appeared as a result of historical events and local ethnic factors. Despite the central government's attempts to develop a well-integrated and balanced country there is no doubt that political priorities have dictated a disparate allocation of resources, beneficial to the northern and more fertile areas of the country and have resulted in a phenomenon of marginalization of the areas farthest removed from the center and therefore less interesting in terms of political potential.

This paper is the result of an exploration into the questions of generation and implementation of development policy in one of Tunisia's less favored regions and of the function of a small center in regional development efforts.[1] The investigation is based on the premise that a center such as the one described here should constitute an effective locus of articulation and integration between the larger centers and the rural areas which form its hinterland. But in Tunisia, the effectiveness of the articulation is determined by the characteristics of national-level political structures which restrict and guide policy and establish the framework for local level political participation.

The city of Medenine is the capital of the gouvernorat of the same name in the south of Tunisia (fig. 1). As regional capital it acts as an administrative center, one where some policies affecting the rural areas are generated and where the mechanisms for policy implementation are based. The center today has a population of 16,000 and has become the hub of the economic and transportation networks in the region by virtue of its location in relation to the larger city of Gabès to the north and the Libyan border to the east.



FIGURE 1: Map of Tunisia and the Gouvernorat of Medenine.



FIGURE 2: Main urban agglomerations in the Gouvernorat of Medenine.

The entire southern region of Tunisia, of which the gouvernorat of Medenine forms the largest part, is the least densely populated area of the country because of its desertic environment.[2] Due to a lack of natural resources the population of the gouvernorat depended on a subsistence agriculture traditionally organized and unmechanized. Its characteristics were those of small gardens with some cereal and tree production in the central mountain area and livestock production in a semi-nomadic economy in the coastal plains area.

During the period of the French Protectorate, from 1881 to 1956, the region of the south which includes Medenine was under military rather than civilian control. Medenine became the base for the French military, a decision that was based not on Medenine's past history as a storage and exchange center for the inhabitants of the region, but rather because of its strategic location at a defensible point yet one within easy reach of the Tripolitanian border. As a result of the French presence in the area Medenine became significant economically. While the town lacked the luster and magnitude of some of the northern and coastal commercial centers, Medenine became an important distributive center in the south and the only link to centers of secondary importance such as Beni Khedache, Ghoumrassen and Tataouine (fig. 2). Medenine, however, was not designed as an extractive center influencing its hinterland, rather it continued to operate during the Protectorate period as one of a series of places where small weekly markets were held and local products exchanged.

The growth of Medenine and other centers like it in the south was slow until immediately after the Second World War when the tempo began to accelerate and then increased even further after Independence in 1956. The growth spurt was due to increased rural-urban migration and to specific policies of development that began after Independence together with administrative readjustments. A comparison of the populations of the small urban centers in the gouvernorat shows the relative magnitudes of populations and their evolution.[3] The differences in population growth attest to a greater availability of exploitable resources in the coastal zone which has favored a more stable population residing in those areas as well as a migrant flow towards them. In recent years an expanding tourist industry on the island of Djerba and the coastal center of Zarzis has provided a focal point for migrants from all areas of the gouvernorat.

The ecological potential of the region has made the northern and coastal areas of the gouvernorat the most favored for agricultural production, yet statistics indicate that Medenine is continually dependent upon imports from other parts of Tunisia to meet even the basic requirements of food for its population. Changing patterns of exploitation of the region's natural resources coupled with national-level changes in commercial structures have increased the dependency of Medenine's population on cash wages and revenues. Where once the population was dispersed over wide areas of the region and relied primarily on agriculture for self-maintenance one finds today a situation of increased movement towards small centers where basic products as well as services are found. This movement is also partly due to national policies that seek to concentrate the population in centers that allow for more efficient control

and dissemination of services such as schools and infirmaries. As this trend continues the small centers forming the hinterland of Medenine begin to assume increasingly important commercial and social functions yet are truncated in their potential by the particular perspective and definition of development and by institutional mechanisms which operate to implement policy decisions.

Medenine as the capital of the gouvernorat continues to occupy an important place as a commercial, distributive, and administrative center. As regional capital Medenine is the seat of the bureaucracy as well as nerve center where policies immediately affecting the entire region are generated. Thus Medenine is an intermediary structure between the central government and the rural areas that lie within its administrative sphere. This implies a verticality in the operations of government. In Tunisia, despite a framework which theoretically supports decentralization of government operations, these are nevertheless still subject to an institutional framework where the ultimate approval for programs and policies depends on the central government agencies in Tunis. In order to appraise the significance of Medenine as a policy-implementing center one must first examine the nature of development efforts in Tunisia.

The economic planning programs began in Tunisia in 1962 and were designed to establish general development goals for the entire country until 1971, giving special emphasis to those areas most in need of attention: the border gouvernorats. The basic objectives of the programs were the decolonization of the Tunisian economy as well as reform of socio-economic structures and eventual economic self-determination. Agricultural development was, at least theoretically, the kingpin of the development efforts. To accomplish the goals set by the program the cooperatives were instituted as the basic units of production, accelerating development and at the same time promoting all social elements at the local level (Plan 1965:89). The entire development program was stated in Neo-Destour socialist doctrine terms without special attachment to any one politico-economic theory, espousing rather the trial to find the most suitable methods for the Tunisian economy and people: "une création continue, une recherche permanente" (Ben Salah, Plan 1965-68, Introduction).

The policies which had been established during the first Four Year Plan came to a sudden end with the ouster of the Minister of Planning, Ahmed Ben Salah in September of 1969. With his ouster came a change in policy and administrative structures. The era of economic growth under the direction of the Prime Minister Hedi Nouira began, and with it ten years of what many in Tunisia have called the era of "uncontrolled liberalism" marked by an expansion in private capital and business and increased dependence of the Tunisian economy on foreign capital and imports.

The consequences of Ben Salah's removal from office were the immediate dismantling of the cooperatives as units in economic development and a reconsideration of the goals stated in the development plans. The general goals of professional training, generation of employment and betterment of living conditions are continued regionally under the guidance

of the Ministry of Planning in Tunis, their effectiveness tied to it and the internal organization of each gouvernorat.

The plans of the 60s for the economic restructuring of Tunisia did not touch the Gouvernorat of Medenine as much as they did the coastal and northern areas of the country. The plan's effects were felt locally at those points which were most interesting to the State in terms of extracting resources from the area i.e., commercial establishments, crafts, and later, with the creation of a special agency to instigate southern development, tourism. According to local informants, this brief period of planning in the 60s did mark the beginning of a wider participation of the people in the development efforts which had previously never been the case.

The feeling of alienation from power and regional isolationism which had traditionally prevailed in the south since the time of French military control had just begun to thaw with the creation of commercial cooperatives when the fall of Ben Salah occurred. With the end of this period the traditional frigidness of the people regarding the central government was reinstated and in the rural areas the perception of the government as a machine unresponsive to local needs, and remote and inaccessible, if not unfair, continues.

An examination of the manner in which the government is structured and the channels which must be followed in the creation and implementation of policy indicates why the feelings expressed by the masses are justified.

The recruitment of personnel for government posts in Tunisia is based on the premise that the state needs bureaucrats capable of carrying out certain tasks of government, and that they must serve the needs of the party. At the level of the governor's offices the highest administrative posts are not filled by people from within the gouvernorat. In Tunisia governors are appointed to serve in areas other than their gouvernorats of birth or residence. The higher administrative posts are filled by individuals trained in the National School of Administration and the National School of Cadres. This nearly automatically guarantees obeisance to the central government. At the level of lower bureaucratic posts there was in Medenine, in 1977, a mixture of people from within Medenine as well as outsiders. The central government retains control over the allocation of resources, and at the local level their distribution is guaranteed to be in line with the party objectives by a system of bureaucrats adherent to the Destourian Party (PSD). The operation of this dual branch system, one political, the other administrative, is illustrated in figure 3. In such a system the governor is the supreme decision-maker in the territory and acts also as President of the political arm, the Regional Coordination Committee. But he is held in check by the Secretary General of this committee whose main function is to oversee the smooth running and implementation of all party policies. The dual system envisions the politicization of the masses as an integral part of the development efforts. While in theory the participation of the people in policy and politics is assured by the organizational

FIGURE 3

PARTY AND STATE OFFICE DIVISIONS



features described, the realities of personnel recruitment at various levels of political life and the channels of communication and participation make politics a closed affair.

The local party cell (cellule) is the lowest level of political organization found in communities however small where there may be agglomerated populations (usually found at the center of the rural sectors). They function to execute the party programs, to educate the people in the principles of Destourian Socialism and to generate projects of social and economic benefit to the community. Thus in theory, the goals and needs of the people at the lowest administrative level can potentially be included in the rural development plans. In fact, given the patterns of organization and participation at the cell/citizen level, there is little input of any value.

Membership in the local cell is open to everyone and nearly all the men in the sector are pro-forma party members. At this level monthly meetings are usually held on market days and thus a fairly high attendance rate is almost insured. The social organizational features of individual rural sectors, and the factions that form as a result, tend to determine local leaders. The inputs and suggestions that emanate from

the local party cells often are the reflection of the interests of the dominant kinship or residential group in position of political control rather than those of the entire population of the rural sector. In the communities observed around Medenine the local entrepreneurs were often also the holders of party posts at the cell level. The participatory base of rural development efforts then becomes restricted to those individuals who are in position of access to higher levels of government. If a single individual combines the roles of president of the party cell, administrative official of the rural sector (ommda) and is an entrepreneur as well, the channels of communication and information (and most often the resources) between the community and the next higher level of government (deputy or délégué) will be effectively controlled, often to the benefit of a single kinship group--if not a single individual.

The district commissions for the elaboration of the rural development plan have as their main function the assessment of the basic needs formulated at the cell level (fig. 4). The deputies by virtue of their position are also in a stronger position to make their suggestions heard before the governor and the regional planning commission. The

FIGURE 4

FLOW DIAGRAM OF POLICY PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION

(Rural Development Program - Medenine)



specific suggestions put forth by the deputies often reflect their priorities and interests and do determine the priorities of allocations of services and new facilities to rural areas. The district level however, is but another step in the formulation of a regional plan and it is really at the level of the governor's offices and the regional party headquarters that the ultimate decisions are made and priorities formulated, after this level the programs and policies are subject to approval and funding from the Ministry of Plan in Tunis.

It is evident that while the government pays lip service to decentralization efforts, the manner in which regional plans are formulated, the degree of participation possible at the lowest levels, and the centralized allocation of resources emanating from the ministries in the capital, are all open contradictions to the stated aims.

The specific features and programs of the regional development plan for the Gouvernorat of Medenine are echoes of the national--and very general--goals. There is a lack of a unified and long term strategy of development of real significance to the gouvernorat. There are two reasons for this. First, there is the nature of political control exerted over the formulation of the regional development plans and the centralization of decisions. Second, there is the specific idea of what constitutes development that practically precludes from consideration a grassroots evaluation of needs and available resources. The decisions at the community level, I have indicated, are filtered through individuals in positions of power and therefore already represent very selective needs. The district commissions continue this trend and favor their own districts; the governor's offices at the summit of the process of decision-making both assimilate the district level wants and impose programs that are usually the most ostentatious and not always the most beneficial and well coordinated in the long run. Important sums are allocated to projects which are either too vast and unrealistic or else extremely costly. There is, most fundamentally, a lack of emphasis on the in-depth assessment of the social and economic characteristics and potential in any region of the gouvernorat. In addition, the regional development policies emphasize programs that almost are guaranteed to continue the flow of manpower from the countryside into the urban areas.[4] There is no real attempt made in the programs to incorporate manpower trained and available--and idle--in the rural areas through the stimulation of small-scale enterprises in the small centers now extant. In addition, in a gouvernorat where the population has depended on agriculture and where agricultural commissions should have the greatest input and coherence of programs, these organisms remain institutions operating in the capital of the gouvernorat with little technical aid consistently interacting and reporting on conditions in the rural areas.

There seems to be a process of institutional and bureaucratic involution whereby specific institutions created for the formulation and implementation of regional development programs operate out of centers such as Medenine, and once there, the effective ties of the institutions and

personnel in them rupture the ties to the population they were designed to serve. The problem to be solved then, is not simply the one of creating a reasonable and well-balanced program of development, but rather the one of institutionalizing an ideological commitment to regional development at the level of the bureaucratic contingent in charge of policy implementation. It is this idea of true commitment and widespread political participation that must be the ultimate measure of true development. At the level of the gouvernorat it is apparent that the continued adherence to an extremely formalistic and inflexible system of political organization and administration constitutes a hindrance to the effective formulation of policies and cannot but result in the continued stagnation of the regional economy.

Medenine as an administrative center will doubtless continue to grow. It constitutes the most effective catchment area for migrants from the rural countryside who see in Medenine an alternative to the economic options of the countryside. As long as the resources continue to be concentrated in the administrative centers and the entrepreneurs in the rural areas are oriented towards investments in them, the disparity of growth between urban centers such as Medenine and the smaller urban agglomerations cannot but continue to increase.

The efforts that have been made by the Bourguiba regime in the years since economic planning began must not be discounted. These plans have been responsible for an increase in programs of vocational and technical education and have bettered the infrastructure and general level of services of the country. But Tunisia is at a stage now where a much more concentrated effort of real integration is called for. This study has tried to summarize some of the main lines of the institutional framework responsible for the generation of policies and programs, and has pointed out the structural disadvantages that must be overcome before more realistic and efficient development plans can be generated. But it must be recognized that the potential for change and true development cannot come as a result of official fiat alone; it must have the accord and participation of the people in order to match politically stated goals with effective and beneficial human action.

FOOTNOTES

[1]The study of Medenine was carried out in 1977. Material included here was gathered through interviews with government officials and offices in the Gouvernorat of Medenine instrumental in formulating regional development plans. It included survey data from a small center 15 kms away from the city of Medenine as well as material gathered during fieldwork in a third center 30 kms away from Medenine.

[2]The Gouvernorat of Medenine extends through 67,000 kms^2, nearly half of the Tunisian territory and has a total population of 293,000 inhabitants. The population density is calculated at 4.3 inhabitants $/km^2$ compared to $33.7/km^2$ for the rest of Tunisia.

[3]Comparative data on urban populations in the centers surrounding Medenine is as follows:

Year	Medenine	Zarzis	Tataouine	Ben Gardane
1931	1,752	7,157	n.a.	439
1936	1,562	7,461	n.a.	777
1946	5,964	9,160	1,820	611
1956	5,350	10,829	2,442	1,275
1966	8,058	10,986	4,773	5,274
1975	15,826	14,420	10,399	6,593

[4]Specific policies and programs cannot be detailed here, but in general, vocational and technical training programs are located in the larger urban centers and are designed to train people for jobs located in urban agglomerations. Despite the fact that the V Plan has now turned to building infrastructure and services in the rural areas, without emphasis or programs that might revitalize these hinterland regions there is little hope of stemming the flow of manpower into urban centers without being able to assimilate them into the labor force there.

THE PROBLEM OF DRINKING WATER IN SMALL AGGLOMERATIONS AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN SILIANA, TUNISIA

Mohsen Trabelsi

Urban planning cannot be conceived in isolation: rural development is also essential for solving urban problems (Trabelsi 1977). Nor can rural development be achieved without an accompanying urban development policy and both must be integrated into a framework of regional development planning, itself part of the national social development plan (Trabelsi 1978). The modern conception is of a region evolving in an organised space around at least a second order town as a pole of development.

In Tunisia the rural population is not very far advanced in its restructuring around secondary urban centres as development poles at the micro-regional level. Regional development aims at simultaneous promotion of small urban centres and rural zones as a micro-regional unity. The region of Siliana is a typical example of the importance of the services provided by small centres for regional development, and an indication that rural development is actually blocked if they are lacking.

By the law of June 1974, Siliana became the centre of a governorate, in order to promote the seven delegations into which the 575,825 hectares of the governorate are divided. Siliana is one of the least favoured regions of Tunisia, with dispersed population only 17% urbanized. The supply of drinking water to eleven localities in the different delegations is one of the most urgent projects for improving living conditions. To measure its success, we must describe the present system of distribution of drinking water and the general conditions of living, and evaluate the direct and indirect results of the project.

The Supply of Drinking Water in the Siliana Region

Seven out of the eleven localities have some houses connected to the distribution network of the National Company for Water Development and Distribution (SONEDE), but it is becoming old and costly to repair. These seven are Bou Arada, El Aroussa, Le Krib, Siliana, Robaa, Rohia and Sidi Bourouis. Five of them are seats of delegations, intended to act as local level poles of development. Bou Arada is served by a small quantity of drilling water (7 litres per second) situated near the town,

while that of El Aroussa is further away, with badly placed pipes often out of order because they cross a river. Le Krib receives water from two sources, Ain Gharsallah and Ain Bridaa, estimated at 2ℓ/s and adequate for present needs. Siliana is connected to two drillings, ten kilometres southeast of the town, giving 10ℓ/s, which is inadequate to its growing importance as capital of the governorate. Robaa receives 5ℓ/s from Ain Mzat, and Rohia is connected to the network of Sbiba, which provides sufficiently for Sbiba, Rohia and Jedliane. The problem with Rohia's supply is lack of pressure. At Sidi Bourouis the drilling produces 5ℓ/s, which have to be stored in a 100 cubic metre reservoir. Additional works rather than new networks are planned for these small towns.

The four small centers of El Kantara-Ennouhoudh, Sidi Hamada, Hammam Kesra and Kesra have no houses connected to the mains and their whole population is supplied from one fountain, while the small centre of Ennouhoudh has two fountains linked to a well but only one works. When water runs short, these two places have to rely on the irrigation water of Oued Lakh. Sidi Hamada has two fountains connected to two springs which gush from the mountainside. The fountains supply those up as well as downstream, for the houses are on a steep slope.

Hammam Kesra has two wells, neither of good drinkable quality, one being 500 metres from the village and used for drinking, the other for animals and other domestic purposes. A solution is thus required to the problem of carrying water 500 metres. Kesra has three natural sources, giving a liberal supply of drinkable water. It is a small agglomeration of three rows of houses, rather inaccessible on the side of the mountain. The water runs in the open, or in pipes ending in public fountains. In all these places people have a difficult job going to fetch water in the hard terrain and unsettled climate.

The age of the equipment even where piped water is available makes both production and consumption uncertain. For the seven places supplied by SONEDE consumption in 1975 was 345,628 cubic metres: Siliana 109,019, El Aroussa 23,802, Rohia 21,251 and Sidi Bourouis 5,957. Priority is given to domestic consumption up to 160,153 cubic metres, about half the total annual consumption. The public fountains supply 62,578 cubic metres annually. The remainder goes to business premises, small factories and hotels, totalling 122,897 cubic metres. These seven places have 1,643 connections all together, of which 1,577 are domestic, and the rest divided between public fountains (12), business (60), industrial (5) and one for private usage. Siliana has nearly half the connections, because it has the largest population as well as the most businesses.

There is a big loss between production and consumption, amounting to 50% at Le Krib and El Aroussa and nearly 30% elsewhere. The SONEDE administration accepts a loss of 20% under such conditions, but here the actual loss is excessive, because of poor maintenance and poor adaptation of the system to the nature of the demand. If the system

was in good condition, it would be adequate for the population.

The last four year plan included a project for the distribution of drinking water. The review committee concerned stated its objectives as: to increase the rate of distribution in order to reach 65% in each governorate capital, 55% in each delegation capital and 40% in other places, and to satisfy 10% of the need in underdeveloped areas and 6% of the national average. For localities in Siliana governorate these objectives were not realized and the 1976-81 five year plan includes the same estimates, emphasizing the need to increase the number of consumers connected to the network, distribute to new localities and develop the industrial, touristic and urban sectors.

In the seven agglomerations linked to the distribution system described above, the average distribution to houses is 34%, ranging from 58% in Siliana to 11% in Rohia (see Table 1). Siliana and Bou Arada, with the largest number of consumers, are respectively 7% and 3% below the average estimated in the national plan. The other agglomerations which are delegation headquarters are far below the national average (Robaa by 6%, Le Krib by 21%, Rohia by 44%), as are the two which are not delegation headquarters (Bourais by 13% and El Aroussa by 20%). Siliana, Bou Arada, Le Krib, Robaa and Rohia are all communes and therefore considered urban centres.

TABLE I
Present drinking water provision:

	Total population	Population connected to drinking water supply	Percentage of houses supplied
Siliana	8,230	4,750	58
Bou Arada	5,487	2,854	52
Robaa	2,070	1,033	49
Bourouis	424	114	27
Le Krib	2,978	570	24
El Aroussa	1,143	228	20
Rohia	2,281	260	11

If the planned project is realized, all eleven localities will be linked to a distribution network, with more consumers and more water per head, raising the rate of distribution from 34% to 64% for the centres already connected. Between 1975 and 1980 their population is expected to increase from 22,650 to 28,584, and the number of consumers from 9,809 to 18,273. In the now unconnected centres 676 out of 5,743, or 12% are to be connected to the distribution network

and for all eleven agglomerations the distribution rate will rise from 34% to 55%, with 18,949 consumers out of a total of 34,327.

In the seven centres which have a supply, the quantity available is now 50 litres per day per inhabitant. When the project is completed all consumers will get 62 litres a day. The first goal of the project is to provide the whole population with a domestic water supply, which should not be reduced by the requirements of industrial development.

Living Conditions in the Region

The availability, adequacy and convenience of the water supply are a good measure of the standard of living: without running water in the home, daily life remains arduous.

The 1975 survey of the 4,800 dwellings in the target district distinguished three categories: 1) superior dwellings (88.5%) including dar houses of one or more rooms and a courtyard, complete Arab houses of several rooms generally surrounding a courtyard, spacious borj dwellings in the centre of a garden, luxurious villas in gardens and apartments within larger buildings: 2) common hotels and work premises, such as porters' rooms, not intended for family occupation (1.9%); and 3) makeshift dwellings (9.6%) including gourbi huts constructed of mud and wattle, maamra, an improved gourbi in rectangular form with partitions, kib made of branches, wooden shanties and caves in the hillside.

Table 2 shows that all of category II and a majority of I have access to running water and toilets, but the vast majority of III have not. Most of I have kitchens, but most of II and III have not. Washrooms and bathrooms are a rare luxury, entirely absent from II and III, and present in a mere 7.43% of I. Some dwellings have appropriate fittings installed yet have no running water: for example, 0.47% of category I have wells and some of the others have cisterns. With running water, a drainage system also becomes important: it is present in 40.1% of category I dwellings, 57.1% of II and 16.6% of III.

TABLE 2
Facilities in different categories of dwelling in relation to water supply, Siliana, 1975
(in percentages)

	I Superior dwellings		II Public buildings		III Makeshift dwellings		Total	
	with	without	with	without	with	without	with	without
Running water	55.92	44.08	100	-	14.29	85.71	51.92	47.08
Toilet	84.46	15.54	100	-	26.20	73.80	79.58	20.42
Kitchen	72.86	27.14	28.58	71.42	35.72	64.28	68.95	31.05
Internal washroom	1.86	98.14	-	100	-	100	2.08	97.92
External washroom	1.16	98.84	-	100	-	100	1.04	98.96
Internal bathroom	4.41	95.59	-	100	-	100	3.96	96.04

The greater the density of occupation, the more serious is the lack of an adequate water supply. Rohia has the highest density, 10.22 persons per dwelling, and the worst water supply. Robaa has the lowest density at 5.76. Overcrowding is also associated with two or even three households living in one dwelling. Multiple households consume far more water than single households of equal size.

The income of the population is generally low, as is adequately indicated by levels of expenditure found in a survey in 1975, when Siliana governorate was included with Beja, Jendouba and Le Kef as forming a relatively homogeneous part of northwest Tunisia which is poorer than the national average; 53.3% of households spent less than 80 dinars per persons annually, and two thirds less than 160 dinars. Only 17.6% of households spent more than 160 dinars per person annually. Only 57.7% of the population own the dwelling they inhabit; 23.7% of expenditure is on housing, making 23 dinars per person annually, of which 9% goes towards rent and 3% towards buying the house.

A poor water supply also affects health conditions, school attendance, employment levels and population stability.

When water comes from public fountains, as in the four agglomerations where there is no piped water, they become meeting places of animals, barefoot people and vehicles. Lacking any drainage, the spilled water produced an infected pool, mingled with food and animal detritus. Drainage is thus essential to improve public fountains and preserve their cleanliness. When water comes from natural springs, as in Kesra, clean water should be kept in a separate channel, otherwise people downstream drink the dirty water in which people upstream have washed. The use of irrigation water for drinking, as at El Kantara-Ennouhoudh, is another source of illness, as well as being subject to interruption. An extension campaign is necessary to ensure safe and sanitary methods of domestic water storage where there is no running supply.

With two thirds of the population in these eleven localities having no running water, the daily burden of water carrying falls most heavily on the children. Some are kept away from school entirely to fetch water. In any case, they waste a lot of time waiting at the fountain to fill their pails, and they are tired out by the long distances they have to carry them, so that their homework suffers. The rate of schooling for those of school age is 83.34% for boys and 72.5% for girls. The literacy is 36.07%. Adverse conditions cause a high failure rate and in 1975 only 13% succeeded in the first year of high school.

On leaving primary school children are not adequately prepared for working life. Most of them go and help their parents in the fields. In Siliana governorate the active urban population is 23.3% of the whole and the percentage in urban employment is 19%. Thirty-nine percent are employed in agriculture and other employment consists mainly of artisan trades--partly in relation to rural products, in wool, carpet making, milling and woodwork, while commercial activity relates mainly to consumption products, especially food selling (sugar, tea, spices, etc.).

The lack of adequate drinking water symbolizes the difficulty of life in these small places where, paradoxically, children are taught in school to aspire towards human dignity, with the result that many want to leave their homes. It is especially those of greater skill and enterprise who leave these places where such gifts are so desperately needed. Out-migration from Siliana is intense, with 8,830 leaving the region and only 3,770 coming in, according to the 1975 census. They went mainly to Tunis, where 3,500 people from the region were living, but also to neighbouring governorates, (710 to Kef and 710 to Kairouan), and some to other governorates. There are not enough jobs for them in the Siliana region.

Any development activity must aim at social improvement. But, as long as the primary conditions for a satisfactory life and health are lacking, no development effort can succeed. Social improvement must mean amelioration of living conditions in the home, not the realization of costly projects which pay no attention to disinherited families and deprived localities. It is in this contect that bringing water to the eleven agglomerations of Siliana is significant.

DECENTRALIZATION AND THE ORGANIZATION OF SPACE IN TANZANIA

Paul S. Maro and Wilfred F. I. Mlay

> When all power remains at the centre therefore, local problems can remain, and fester, while local people who are aware of them are prevented from using their initiative in finding solutions. (Nyerere 1972:1)

Introduction

Most independent nations in Africa believe that the state is the 'indispensable agency' for creating the necessary conditions for rapid socio-economic transformation which will bring about a more equitable distribution of the benefits of development, especially in rural areas. But few countries are agreed on the institutional and organizational structures for bringing this about.

The use of capitalist models of private enterprise and 'growth pole' theories has led to lop-sided development in which urban centres (especially the primate city) have received a large portion of the national investment with exiguous trickle effects to rural areas. The result of such development can be seen in countries such as Kenya, the Ivory Coast, Zaire and Morocco where there is "growth without development" and increasing exploitation and impoverishment of the rural areas.

The alternative model of state-planned development through decentralized institutions has already proved successful in countries such as Yugoslavia and China. The decentralization model provides opportunities for creating hierarchical points of concentration of human activities (villages and small urban centres) through which spatial interaction and equitable development can be pursued from the lowest level. It also provides for grass-roots participation in planning and local resource utilization. Few countries in Africa have adopted this model. Tanzania is the one country where a serious attempt is being made to use this model in national development planning, which makes the country an interesting case to study.

Decentralization was introduced in Tanzania in 1972 as a logical step in the implementation of the policy of socialism and self-reliance. It has led to a greater concentration of points of human activities and to more efficient linkages and interactions at different levels

among these points in the country. The following hypothesis will provide a general framework of analysis:

> The more comprehensively and systematically rural development is planned and assisted by the state and its regional agencies the more certain it is that local points of concentration will assume a tiered structure in two and eventually three levels... [2]

In Tanzania this emergent three tier structure includes the village (sub-ward) at the lowest level, the ward, district headquarters, the regional headquarters at the intermediate level and the capital city (Dar es Salaam and Dodoma) at the apex.

Spatial Structure before the Arusha Declaration of 1967

The spatial structure of Tanzania over the last 30 years reflects the cumulative changes which have taken place in the concentration of human activity throughout the country. The national space as it appears today was greatly influenced by the colonial administration which provided administrative units within which control was exercised. The organization of human activity was centred around plantations and small scale peasant cash crop, food crop and livestock farming areas and was controlled from 8 provincial urban headquarters and 20 urban and proto-urban district centres. There were thus about 30 main centres of concentration of administrative, political and commercial activities, most of which were in the northern half of the country.

Spatial differentiation based on disparate ecological endowment was increased by the transport network established by colonial governments. Railways were built to link the areas of export production with the ports and for effective administration and military control of the country. Export-producing areas with transport facilities developed rapidly due to continued attraction and generation of economic activities. Examples include the Arusha-Kilimanjaro-Tanga corridor with coffee and sisal; the Coast-Morogoro-Kigoma, and the Mwanza-Shinyanga corridor with sisal and cotton. Although these two 'zones' of development cover less than 10% of the national area, together they concentrate 25% of the national population, contribute 40% of the GDP, and include the most dynamic and largest towns, namely Dar es Salaam, Tanga, Mwanza, Moshi, and Arusha (Map 1). Areas surrounding these export-producing zones specialized in food production, while areas farther away supplied migrant labour or stagnated in isolation from the territorial economy (Iliffe 1971). The relative backwardness of the whole of the southern part of the country is partly attributable to lack of transport facilities, for rainfall, soils, and the level of education are all comparable to those obtaining in the more developed north.

Service centres developed along the transport routes. Up to 1967 there were three types of service centres at the subdistrict level: a) small administrative centres and minor settlements with a population of 1,000 to 9,000. Some of these have been upgraded to district

headquarters, for example, Kisarawe, Korogwe and Ngara; b) mining centres with a population of less than 5,000. Though most of them have declined, except those mining diamonds, they have acquired other functions and act as important service centres. Examples of these are Chunya, Geita, Uvinza and Butimba. Mwadui is a special case because diamond mining has continued to thrive and the population (estimated at 10,000 is increasing rapidly and the town is also a district headquarters and an educational centre; c) roadside townships. This category includes all those townships which grew along the transport networks, at the intersections and terminals of major routes. These are the most numerous and their number has been swelled by the development of new roads and the opening of the Tanzania-Zambia (Uhuru) railway and the new highway from Dar es Salaam to Zambia.

The three types of service centres together form the nerve centres of social, economic, cultural and public life in the country. They serve as market centres, administrative and judicial posts, commercial sub-centres and communication nodes. Their development and spatial distribution in the country is a reflection of the degree of control and economic development the country has attained. Until 1967 they exerted little influence on the development of their more rural spheres of influence. Decision-making and financial control was still vested in Dar es Salaam and given the extensive nature of the national space, their development was stunted and their influence limited. Only in the areas of export crop production with virile transport mobility did these centres thrive. There were only 30 of them in 1935, 45 in 1946, 93 in 1949 and 145 in 1962. Then under the stimulus of Independence, the Arusha Declaration and the decentralization reform they rose to 180 in 1967 and over 500 in 1976.[3]

Spatial Restructuring under Decentralization

The decentralization reform introduced new elements in the planning and organization of space aimed at: providing more popular participation in plan formulation and implementation by decentralizing control and decision-making from Dar es Salaam and vesting such powers in the sub-district, district, and regional centres; providing greater financial control to the local centres and general equitable development throughout the country by allocating money for development to the districts and regions; providing the institutions, personnel and technical assistance to the local centres to facilitate implementation of the national objectives of socialization and self-reliance from the grass-roots.

Spatial Interaction through Planning

Before decentralization but after the Arusha Declaration, planning for rural development was through deconcentrated organs of the central government and local governments. The central government organs were the Regional Development and Planning Committee (RDPC) operating from the regional urban centres, and the District Development

Planning Committee (DDCP) which had several subcommittees. The regional committee drew up and assessed development projects and allocated funds from the Regional Development Fund (RDF) to districts. The district committee was the coordinating link between central government bodies in the district and local government (Chart 1). At the sub-district level the Ward Development Committee discussed the welfare, self-help and defense activities in the ward; and the sub-ward committee dealt with village and community programmes.



Chart 1: Decision-making procedure for rural development before 1972.

The greatest shortcoming of these planning arrangements was that they did not encourage popular participation in plan formulation and implementation.

With decentralization, especially after the 1975 Villages and Ujamaa Villages Act and the establishment of technical and managerial posts in wards and villages in 1977, the centre of planning activity moved further down from the ward to the village. Chart 2 shows the lines of communication within the decentralized planning process. Villages, through their elected representatives in their different committees, draw up plans and discuss them before these are forwarded to the Ward Development Committee for more processing and transmission to the District Development and Planning Committee which sends the plans to the District Executive Committee of the Party (TANU) for vetting in line with national objectives. The district plans and programmes are then sent to the Regional Development Committee which coordinates all the district plans into a regional plan which is then sent to the Regional Executive Committee of the Party, and on to the



Chart 2: Lines of communication with Tanzania's decentralization structure (the planning process).

Prime Minister's Office. This office collects and assesses all regional plans before sending them to the Ministry of Finance and Planning which assesses them and incorporates them into the national annual plans. The Economic Committee of the Cabinet discusses these plans before they are sent to the National Executive Committee of the Party for approval. Funds approved for projects and programmes are disaggregated through the same channels at all levels to the Regional Development Fund for project implementation in districts, wards and villages.

Chart 2 represents not only a hierarchical flow chart of human activities (in this case, planning), but also a hierarchy of 'nodes' in the spatial organization of Tanzania; for, at each level there is a 'seat', a headquarters where offices and residence of the people involved are located. Secondly, because all the committees at all levels are manned by elected representatives, there is a provision for a high degree of popular participation at all levels. Other types of interaction are through telephones, mail, and road transport. Telephone communications take place especially between district, regional and national headquarters. At the level of the village, ward and district, road transport is the most common method of interaction, although the frequency of contact by road varies from area to area and from one season to another. Communications between and within the southern and western district of Songa, Mtwara, Sumbawanga, Kogoma and Kibondo are generally poor particularly during the rainy season.

Development of Ujamaa Villages as Service Centres

Establishment of Villages

The development of the villages as the centre of human activity was first stressed under the Arusha Declaration. However, it was not until the decentralization reform that the village was identified and established as the lowest tier in the organization of space in Tanzania. A systematic creation of villages nationwide was thus vigorously pursued with the objective of bringing people together into nucleated settlements where through cooperative endeavour they would be able to utilize available resources more efficiently and produce more, and where social services could be provided to the largest number of people at least cost. By 1976 two out of every three persons in Tanzania resided in villages. But there are interesting spatial variations in the distributions and size of villages (Table 1). The regions with sparse populations and uninhabited land such as Dodoma, Mtwara, Lindi and Iringa had more people moving to new villages, while in the more densely populated regions such as Kilimanjaro, West Lake and Morogoro, relatively fewer new villages were formed.

Development of Services in Villages

The most immediate impact of decentralization on the development of ujamaa villages was not only in the large number of villages created all over the country but also in the spread of basic services to a large

number of people in most rural areas. An index of service provision was calculated for each of the 12 districts in which research was undertaken (see Appendix). The services considered were primary education, health facilities and piped water. The proportion of each service available per thousand people was calculated for each of the districts and a cumulative index for the three services for each district was arrived at by adding together the district index for each of the services. The changes in the proportion of services per thousand of the population between 1970 and 1976 are illustrated in Map 3.

TABLE 2
Progress of Villagization 1970-6

Region	Number of Villages						
	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976
Arusha	25	59	92	95	110	180	310
Coast	56	121	185	188	258	238	303
Dar es Salaam	-	-	-	25	25	53	52
Dodoma	75	246	299	336	354	388	392
Iringa	350	651	630	659	619	464	475
Kigoma	34	132	129	129	123	193	194
Kilimanjaro	9	11	24	24	14	16	535
Lindi	185	572	626	589	339	315	315
Mara	174	376	376	271	111	303	315
Mbeya	94	493	713	715	534	933	581
Morogoro	19	113	116	118	96	397	397
Mtwara	465	748	1,088	1,103	1,052	773	459
Mwanza	28	127	211	211	284	153	103
Rukwa	-	-	-	121	121	385	385
Ruvuma	120	205	205	242	188	315	277
Shinyanga	98	150	123	108	134	369	386
Singida	16	201	263	263	317	258	276
Tabora	52	81	148	174	156	324	398
Tanga	37	132	245	245	255	302	499
West Lake	24	46	83	85	77	72	492
Total	1,859	4,464	5,556	5,701	5,167	6,431	7,144

Source: Maendeleo ya Vijiji vya Ujamaa, Prime Minister's Office, June 1976.

Primary Education

Taking the development of each of the services in turn over the six years, the provision of primary schools seems to have changed most dramatically. By 1976 all large villages (with an adult population of over 500) had a primary school within the village area. Except for Mafia, all other districts showed a minimum of 25% increase in primary schools per 1,000 of the population between 1970 and 1976. The increase in primary schools was greatest in the districts where villagization was most widespread for example in Mtwara, Songea and Dodoma.



Map 2: Distribution of service centres in Tanzania, 1977.

Health Care

Between 1970 and 1976 improvement in health care was taken as one of the objectives in the formation of new villages. The national goal is to provide a health service in rural areas such that no one will be more than 5 kilometres from a health service. Villagization therefore included building of dispensaries in areas of population concentration, and moving isolated settlements near existing health facilities. In eight of the sampled districts there was a marked increase (30%) in the proportion of dispensaries per 1,000 people during this period. The other districts showed no increase in relative terms.

Water supply

It was not possible to obtain similar data on water services in rural areas. However, 65% of the villages surveyed had a permanent piped water supply within 5 kilometres by 1976. In six out of nine districts (Ukerewe, Dodoma and Mtwara) there was no significant change in



Map 3: Cumulative index of social service provision in Tanzania, 1970-76.

the provision of water supply points when compared to population increase over the same period.

Overall, there was a real change in provision of services at the village level between 1970 (before decentralization) and 1976 (4 years after decentralization). This achievement is a result of the focus in planning new villages as service centres and points of concentration for human activities. There is in every large village a school, a water supply system, a market place, a retail shop, and, in addition, for

every three large villages, a health service, usually a dispensary. As each of these villages develops into fully-fledged cooperative units with greater purchasing power the number of services will increase, thus making the village not only a producing entity but also an important service centre in the structural organization of the national space. The decentralization of services will also lessen by a fraction the distance which up to the present still makes some services inaccessible to people in remote rural areas. When feeder roads reach each major village an important transport and communications network will evolve to enhance rural-urban interactions from the smallest service centre, the village, to the national capital, and vice versa.

Conclusion

At independence in 1961 there were 8 administrative provinces (regions) and 20 districts. By 1969 there were 16 regions and 62 districts. Four years after decentralization (1976) the increase in the number of administrative units led to a corresponding increase in the number of towns and service centres. Existing sub-centres were elevated to townships and new centres were created where none had existed. Between 1967 and 1976 the number of service centres in the country increased threefold, while most of the rural population (over 13 million) moved into planned villages. This structure is interconnected by an expanding network of roads and telecommunications and through a hierarchical planned process. This is the framework within which socio-economic transformation is taking place in Tanzania.

FOOTNOTES

[1]The data discussed in this paper are the findings of the interdisciplinary decentralization study of the Faculty of Arts and Social Science, Dar es Salaam, started in 1976. Field research was conducted in thirteen districts in mainland Tanzania. These districts were selected by a stratified random sampling procedure such that both the different agro-economic zones (see Conyers 1973) and the grouping or spread of districts within the country were considered. Data collection was undertaken between April and June 1976. Seven different schedules were utilized to gather data on spatial aspects, village characteristics, agricultural planning, recurrent services, small scale industries, project case histories, and leadership aspects in wards and villages.

[2]Statement of Hypotheses for Small Urban Centres Project, African Studies Program, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1977.

[3]Mascarenhas (1973:97) identifies 204 centres, 31 of which are towns and former townships. In addition there exists a lower level of urban development consisting of 101 centres of less than 2,500 people each. His definition of a service centre includes any place that offers at least two services.

APPENDIX

Service indices (no. of services per 1,000 people) (see also Map 3).

District	Population	Education Index	Health Index	Piped Water Index	Total
		1970			
Arumeru	236,000	0.063	0.008	0.013	0.084
Dodoma	339,000	0.015	0.006	0.006	0.027
Kibondo	142,000	0.092	0.035	0.007	0.134
Kilosa	207,000	0.077	0.034	0.005	0.111
Mafia	18,000	0.222	0.111	-	0.333
Magu	283,000	0.106	0.026	0.007	0.139
Mtwara	143,000	0.042	0.014	0.104	0.070
Nzega	323,000	0.015	0.006	-	0.021
Sumbawanga	238,000	0.025	0.025	-	0.050
Tukuyu	382,000	0.025	0.003	-	0.028
Ukerewe	113,000	0.150	0.018	0.018	0.186
		1976			
Arumeru	283,000	0.099	0.014	0.025	0.148
Dodoma	379,000	0.071	0.024	0.005	0.100
Kibondo	152,000	0.118	0.046	0.020	0.186
Kilosa	236,000	0.191	0.051	0.030	0.272
Mafia	19,000	0.211	0.105	-	0.316
Magu	311,000	0.190	0.029	0.019	0.238
Mtwara	161,000	0.180	0.012	-	0.192
Nzega	369,000	0.087	0.024	-	0.111
Sumbawanga	286,000	0.067	0.014	0.003	0.084
Tukuyu	431,000	0.058	0.002	-	0.060
Ukerewe	120,000	0.225	0.042	0.008	0.275

NEW TOWNS AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN EGYPT

Ahmed M. Abou-Zeid

In a poor and densely populated country like Egypt, where most of the people are engaged in agriculture and where cultivable land is limited, first priority in any development policy is usually given to agricultural projects for the reclamation of semi-fertile lands and the construction of settlements near the newly opened up areas. A large number of such projects have been executed in Egypt in the last twenty years or so: the cultivation of large areas in the oases of Kharga and Dakhla using subterranean water and the emergence of what is presumptuously called 'the New Valley'; the reclamation of semi-desert lands in the coastal zone in the Western Desert and the digging of a long canal to carry the much needed water for irrigation from the Nile. The inhabitants of new settlements are usually drawn from the thickly populated provinces and are selected according to age, marital status and number of children. The construction of these settlements is thought of as an effective means for relieving the overcrowded provinces of their excess population as well as developing neglected regions.

Whatever may be the results achieved by this policy it is clear that not enough land has been reclaimed to accommodate all, or even the majority of the poor landless peasants of Egypt, and that the rural areas still suffer from a very high degree of 'masked' unemployment. Large numbers of peasants migrate to the cities, especially to Cairo and Alexandria searching for work. Uncontrolled migrations of unskilled peasants lacking the minimum requirements of urban life create many problems in the city, such as slum areas at the outskirts where peasants cluster together and lead their own traditional life, the lowering of the standards of living, the expansion of the size of the city, with all the consequent administrative problems, and the insufficiency and inadequacy of the social, health and educational services. Instead of being assimilated into city life, migrants succeed in imposing their own way of life on large sectors of the city and city-dwellers. Developing villages into towns (such as industrial Kafr-el-Dawwar which has now become famous for its textile industry) and building 'new towns' in the undeveloped regions will provide more varied job opportunities and a better way of life than that prevailing in the traditional communities or in the slum areas in the large cities. The inhabitants of these towns will not necessarily come from rural areas. Large numbers will certainly be 'drawn' from the more congested urban centres and thus the construction of these 'new towns' will

help reach a more even distribution of the population. Also, their construction is regarded by the government as the only effective way of accommodating the ever growing population in Egypt.

It is estimated that by the year 2000 Egypt's population will have increased by about 25 million. These people will need to be provided with suitable housing, jobs, food, social and health services and recreational facilities. Three new towns have already been built in the last few years in the desert areas to accommodate new industries. The Ministry of Reconstruction and New Communities, established only in 1978, is now envisaging, with the help of the universities, designing a master plan for building a large number of 'new towns' in the less developed regions and more particularly in the deserts, and large sums of money have already been allocated.

These new towns are envisaged as self-contained communities in which people both live and work. Thus, the term 'new towns' does not apply here to 'communities which are satellites of suburban towns', nor to 'housing estates in which people travel from the outer edges of large cities into the centre or other parts of the large towns for their employment.' [1] Nevertheless, some of the new towns are on the fringes of metropolitan cities, like the industrial steel-town of Helwan near Cairo. But most have been built on relatively undeveloped sites on the assumption that they may give impetus to the development of the area. All have been laid out by the central government or by government-sponsored organizations and industrial or agricultural undertakings. In most cases, however, new towns are built with a specific purpose and are designed from the beginning to fulfill certain requirements. In this respect they differ greatly from traditional towns which develop naturally and gradually.

Mersa Matrouh is a small but rapidly growing town of about 30,000 inhabitants (27,857 according to the 1976 census), which lies some 250 kilometres to the west of Alexandria, and almost half way between Alexandria and the Libyan border. But small as it may be, it is nevertheless the administrative capital and the largest town in the Western Desert Governorate.

It is not a 'new town' in the strict sense of the word. Its modern history goes as far back as the end of the last century when its site was chosen as a coast-guard post to protect the Egyptian fishing area from illegal fishing by Greek seamen, as well as to prevent Libyans from crossing the border and penetrating deep into Egypt to find richer grazing grounds for their sheep and even Egyptian livestock to smuggle to the then poor Libyan territories. The first permanent dwellings built on that site were a few small houses which were built in 1908 for the guards and their families. In 1927 the post was inhabited by no more than 930 persons, but this number grew rapidly to 3,362 in 1947. In 1960 the population of Mersa Matrouh was 7,254 and in 1966 it reached 11,039. This number increased rapidly again so that in 1976 the population was 27,857, with an annual increase of 15.24%, which is the highest in Egypt. The annual rate of growth in

Egypt, as a whole, was 2.19% between 1966 and 1976.

The region itself is poor in natural resources, and apart from the extensive grazing grounds there has been little cultivation, and what there is depends either on the scanty rains (barley) or on underground water (vegetables). Very few and rather primitive handicrafts, especially rug-weaving, are practised by Bedouin women. Animal husbandry is thus the main economic activity of most of the Bedouin outside the town, and this forces them to move, sometimes very deeply into the desert in search of water and pasture. Till very recently the population in the area was highly in excess of the available economic resources, so that most of the basic needs of the people had to be met from outside the Western Desert.

The desert has never been an attractive place for people, and even its long-term inhabitants, the Bedouins, often fled to the Nile Valley in years of drought and famine. There, they would settle down in the countryside and engage in agriculture and land tilling, which they despise when they live in the desert. But the village of Mersa Matrouh at certain periods of its history attracted various groups of people who came either for trade in the village or with Libya (Libyans and Greeks) or as refugees from the Canal Zone who came in large numbers after the 1967 war. But in spite of this growth of population Mersa Matrouh did not, and in fact could not, play any effective role in developing the region. It was too undeveloped and backward.

The prospects were unpromising. Efforts to introduce formal education were usually met with resistance from the Bedouin, perhaps because of the nature of their nomadic life which would not allow them to settle in any one place long enough to benefit from systematic education. And after all, what was the importance or the use of modern education for a nomad? The same applied to health services. The Bedouin had their own traditional medicines and their own medicine-men in whose knowledge and skill they had great belief. Moreover, they liked their way of life and enjoyed their freedom and thus did not wish to settle down lest they should be subjected to the authority of the government and modern judicial systems.

It was against this general background that the change under discussion took place. It began in 1961, when the system of local government was introduced in the desert, and for the first time Mersa Matrouh, which was selected as the administrative centre and capital of the Governorate, got its own Town Council which was responsible for developing the old village into a modern town.

At the same time, the General Desert Development Organization was established as the organization responsible for developing the desert areas, reclaiming lands, tapping the underground and subterranean waters as well as for settling the nomadic population on the reclaimed land. Before the establishment of the GDDO the Cairo Desert Institute showed interest in the same problems and carried out many intensive studies.

But its efforts led nowhere because its aims were purely academic.

By the time of the introduction of local government and the establishment of the GDDO large numbers of people from the Nile Valley had come to the new town so that by 1966 some 40.2% of the population were 'Egyptian ', i.e. people from the Nile Valley, while 51.5% were Bedouin and the rest came from various ethnic groups (Libyans, Sudanese, Nubians, Greeks, etc.). In 1976 the in-migrants from the Nile Valley constituted some 50.3% of the population. This shows the diversity, heterogeneity and complexity of the population structure and the different cultural backgrounds represented in the town, a feature which hardly appeared in the old village.

Not all the Bedouin inhabitants of Mersa Matrouh were born in the town. A certain percentage came from other parts of the desert and succeeded in getting themselves engaged in paid jobs or established their own private business. In 1977 about 7.5% of all the in-migrants in Mersa Matrouh came from the desert, and they represent most of the more important ethnic groups. This should be taken as an index of the change that has been taking place in the desert, for it is a well known fact that Bedouin are usually reluctant to settle, especially within urban surroundings. It is true that the Bedouin inhabitants of the town still keep small herds of sheep and still consider husbandry an important source of income. But they almost never herd their animals themselves; they take an equal pride in their urban jobs, in belonging to an urban community, and at the same time in their membership in a certain group which is becoming more or less urbanized. What is important here is that Mersa Matrouh is not the Bedouin 'village' it used to be before 1961.

As one would expect, at first the majority of the officials in both the governmental departments and the GDDO came from the Nile Valley while the Bedouin occupied jobs which needed no specific skills or long experience. There is no doubt that the 'urban Bedouin' were not happy about their situation and that they felt bitter towards the 'foreigners' and the 'intruders', as they referred to the officials who came from outside the desert. But they found the change sufficient impetus to alter their attitude towards education and to send their children to schools and to the university, since education seemed to be the only way that led to highly paid and respectable jobs. Now there are about 300 young men from Mersa Matrouh studying in Egyptian universities, and at least 50% of them belong to Bedouin families.

There is still one point on this particular town which deserves discussion. To what extent and in which way does the development of Mersa Matrouh into an administrative town influence the development of the whole desert? As has already been said, the development of the Western Desert has been the responsibility of the GDDO which is regarded as an autonomous organization although it reports to both the Ministry of Land Reclamation and to the Governor of the Desert. The Organization has one main objective: to change the Bedouin from nomadism to agriculture. A number of sedentarization projects

have been launched in different parts of the desert and a canal has been dug to carry fresh water from the Nile to the fields. In some cases houses were built to accommodate the Bedouins who would like to settle down. Primary schools, clinics and social welfare units were built and equipped to extend badly needed services to the settlers. But the response of the nomads was rather poor, and only a relatively small number of semi-nomads accepted the idea. There is now a serious suggestion of transferring large numbers of peasants from the Delta and the overcrowded provinces in the Nile Valley to the desert to till the land on behalf of the Organization. This would be only a preliminary step towards granting them the right to own the patches of land which they cultivate. This may encourage more Bedouin to settle down for fear of losing their 'tribal' lands to the 'Egyptian' peasants. The cultivation of the extensive areas which the Organization plans to reclaim will make the desert for the first time in its modern history contribute to the national income. By settling down and mixing with the peasants who are transferred to the desert the Bedouin may in the end by assimilated into Egyptian society and culture.

Mersa Matrouh has become in the last few years one of the best summer resorts in Egypt, and the Bedouin of the town have gained much experience in the hotel and restaurant business and services. The Town Council has an ambitious plan to build a number of villages on certain sites along the sea coast to serve as summer resorts for the increasing numbers of holidaymakers who have discovered the charm of the sea-and-desert holiday. These villages may develop in due time into small towns in the same way as Mersa Matrouh did.

My second example comes from Aswan Province which has always been regarded as one of the most undeveloped regions of Egypt. Because of its remoteness at the southern extremity, and the lack of adequate means of communication, Aswan has been physically, culturally and socially isolated from the rest of the country. Till very recently Aswan did not attract people to live in it. On the contrary, large numbers of its population used to leave and migrate to the large cities and more particularly to Alexandria and Cairo. The Egyptian government used to send to Aswan only second rate officials and those whom it wanted to punish, or 'to banish,' as the people of Aswan liked to put it. The valley near Aswan is rather narrow and the agricultural land is rather limited. When the government wanted to move the Nubians from their homeland which was to be flooded and covered completely by the Nile waters after the construction of the High Dam and the formation of Lake Nasser, they were moved to Kom Ombo, some 60 kilometres to the north of Aswan City. This was the nearest place to Aswan where enough land could be found and reclaimed and made ready to accommodate 50,000 Nubians.

The construction of the High Dam raised great hopes about the future of the region and its development, and the Aswan Regional Planning Board was established to make the necessary plans for the development of the city and the region. A number of action research projects were carried out by both the Planning Board and the universities and some have already been executed by the government and the authorities

concerned. It was the intention of the government, however, to introduce new industries in the region as an effective means for rapid and solid development. Two such industries were introduced: the extraction of iron ore which is facing tremendous difficulties, and a chemical fertilizer industry which is meeting with great success. In 1956 the Egyptian Chemical Industries Corporation (Kima) was established with its headquarters to the south of Aswan City.

Kima was not just another industrial plant. It was constructed as a single-industry town to fulfill certain well-defined objectives. In fact, it was envisaged from the beginning as an integral industrial community where people could live and work under 'ideal' conditions which would provide them with all basic needs and services so that they would dedicate themselves to work and production. Thus equal care was given to the construction of the factory, the building of the residential area with its various types of housing that would meet the varied requirements of the different categories of officials and workers, and to the provision of educational, health, recreational and other services and facilities which the inhabitant-workers might need.

The two main objectives which Kima had to fulfull were, firstly, the production of chemical fertilizers needed badly for Egyptian agriculture. The Aswan area is an ideal place for this kind of industry for the factory can use the electric power generated from the High Dam and depend for the limestone it needs on the extensive quarries in the Kom Ombo area. The second objective was the establishment of a 'new town' which could play the role of an urbanizing force in the region. For in spite of the fact that Aswan is officially recognized as a city, it is nearer in its general set-up, the homogeneity of its population and culture and the modes of behaviour of its people to a village, or at most to a very provincial town whose economy is mainly based on agriculture, some trade with the Sudan and, to some extent, on tourism. As an industrial town, Kima would attract people from different provinces, ethnic origins, and strata of the society, with different kinds of education, skills, experience, and cultural background. This heterogeneity might affect Aswan and the whole region and to help to overcome their social and cultural isolation.

With these two objectives in mind, Kima was established as a 'well-balanced community' which should, as far as possible, sustain itself and provide its moderate-sized population with their material needs and services. But at the same time, it had to be organically connected with an old and well-established 'city' (Aswan) on which it could depend for extra satisfaction of some of these needs (e.g., extra recreational activities, more advanced levels of education such as secondary schools, etc.). In fact, Kima provides a full range of services to its residents, and through its community associations it gives them an opportunity to affect decision-making relating to the conditions of work as well as to the development process.

About 1,400 workers and technicians work in the factory, most of whom are highly skilled. To guarantee the provision of efficient

workers and technicians the factory has established its own high vocational training centre (the Kima Institute of Technology) which accepts young people who have finished their high school education and offers them academic teaching and practical training for four years. Classes are held in the morning and the students are expected to work in the factory in the afternoons. They receive wages for their work which is regarded as a contribution to production. The most promising of these trainees are usually sent abroad, especially to West Germany, for further training as engineers and technicians. Moreover, vocational training centres in Cairo usually provide the factory with its needs of skilled and semi-skilled labour. Workers are trained in these centres for two years. Most of the technicians, engineers and skilled labour, to say nothing of the scientists, come from outside Aswan. There is now, however, a growing trend among the inhabitants of Aswan to send their children to these centres which they used to look upon with much disdain before the construction of the factory.

The residential quarter, which is usually referred to as 'Kima Industrial Town' is built on about 800 acres. It has 200 blocks of flats which comprise some 1,200 'residential units', (apartments), besides a number of 'villas' and rest-houses. The town also has a central hospital, clinic, cooperative society, primary school, and mosque which is at the same time a cultural centre. There are also two clubs with swimming pools, a cinema, and a theatre. It has its own bus service which links it with Aswan.

The economy of the town depends on the wages and salaries of the workers and officials, and since Kima is a 'company town' one should not expect to find any real effort for capital investment or any private enterprise. Most of the workers, however, undertake some extra economic activity in the city of Aswan after the working hours in the factory. This brings them extra income, but what is more important here is that it gives them an opportunity to mix with the original inhabitants of the city and establish strong relations with them, which means in the end the creation of social interaction between the new town and the old traditional city. It also allows for the introduction of new and more advanced techniques than those already known in the city, for there is no doubt that the workers in Kima factory are better trained, more exact, and more efficient than the ordinary workers of Aswan. Local workers and craftsmen gain much knowledge and proficiency from those 'foreigners', and in this sense it can be certainly said that Kima exerts tremendous influence on the quality of workmanship in Aswan.

The recent trend in Egypt of building towns in rural and desert areas as a means of developing those areas reflects the widespread concern about the conditions under which their populations live, the desire to raise their standards of living, providing decent shelter as well as a decent community. In fact, the construction of these towns is regarded as a partial solution of some of the problems which face Egypt as a result of its rapidly growing population and its limited agricultural land (e.g., the flow of migrants from the countryside to the larger cities, with the consequent appearance of slum areas and the

deterioration of living conditions in these cities). Instead of going to the large cities where it is difficult to find a suitable job, unemployed peasants can find work more easily in these towns as unskilled labour or as workers in the construction and building activities. Thus the new towns will absorb large numbers of the excess population in the congested villages, and cities as well, especially if the new industries are built there instead of being concentrated in Cairo and Alexandria as has always been the case. This may lead in the end to a more even distribution of the population.

The construction of new towns in Egypt and the development of villages into towns have always been the responsibility of the government or government sponsored organizations. The people have no say in the construction of the town, the organization of the neighbourhoods or the distribution of houses. They are not given a chance to express their ideas, views or aspirations about the sort of community they would like to have. This creates many problems. In Mersah Matrouh there is a tendency to organize neighbourhoods on an ethnic basis, on the assumption that there should be a certain degree of homogeneity within a neighbourhood, and that people who come from the same sub-culture or the same place of origin are more likely to live peacefully together and to feel secure. This may be true, but it leads in the end to lack of social integration and social interaction between the various groups who live in the town. This equally applies to Kima where the houses are built in four different categories and are distributed among the officials and workers in the factory according to their position and status. But since all the executives and higher ranks of officials, technicians and engineers come from Cairo and Alexandria, while almost all the unskilled workers come from the Aswan area, the division of the neighbourhoods according to ethnic, cultural and economic differences has become a most salient feature of the town. Each residential group, which is more or less an ethnic group, has closed in on itself to a great extent. What makes the situation even worse in Kima is that each ethnic group has its own exclusive 'association' which looks after the interests of its own 'members', organizes special services to them and helps solve their problems. Members of one association behave and act as one integral body against other similar associations or groups, and this leads to a great deal of tension, if not open strife in the society. The total population of Kima is about 8,000 inhabitants, and there are six 'major' associations and at least eight secondary or smaller ones which serve the interests of people coming from the same place of origin (the same village, or neighbouring villages). In any case, there is a lot of mutual suspicion between the various groups as a result of this system of separation and distinction of the neighbourhoods and the consequent lack of mixing. It is significant that since the construction of Kima not one single marriage between two different groups has taken place. Marriage is always within the group, and a young man who does not find a suitable girl in his own ethnic group in Kima prefers to bring a wife from his original village or town rather than marry someone from another ethnic group in Kima itself.

The emergence of new towns gives an opportunity for the intentional selection of people from different sub-cultures to become members of the same community as in the case of Kima; or to encourage migrants from different cultural and ethnic backgrounds to come and settle down as in the case of Mersa Matrouh. But the way in which neighbourhoods are organized and houses are classified and distributed puts severe checks on the freedom and frequency of interaction. Such a situation results from bad planning and short sightedness. It may be that the central government should be responsible for decisions concerning the 'broad issues of land use and urban location', but the decisions about neighbourhoods should be in the hands of local groups, and popular participation in local government should be regarded as a precondition for lively and highly integrated communities.[2]

This raises the question of the division of roles between the central government and the residents. For in spite of what has been said about local government and the 'town council'--at least as far as Mersa Matrouh and other similar towns are concerned--it seems that the town council is nothing but an instrument, or rather a tool, in the hands of the government, and that it adopts and executes its policy regardless of what the people themselves think about this policy. The 'participation' of the people in decision-making is only theoretical, if it exists at all, and thus many of the projects, activities and plans implemented by the town council fail to meet the desires or the needs of the people. The town council may be more interested in innovations for their own sake whereas the people are certainly more interested in real and effective services.

One is thus tempted to ask whether these new towns really play an effective role in developing the backward regions in which they are built. It seems that there is some exaggeration about the influence they have exerted on the undeveloped surrounding areas. It is true that they attract labour from nearby poverty-stricken areas, and that the migrant workers adopt, at least to some extent, urban ways of life and urban values, although they in turn may have some disturbing effect on the quality of urban life. Nevertheless, the local communities in the vicinity are hardly affected. Mersa Matrouh, for example, attracts large numbers of people both from the urban communities in the Nile Valley and from the desert localities. The GDDO has tried to execute a number of sedentarization projects in the area, but all these projects have been met with tremendous resistance from the Bedouin. The traditional social system still prevails. It is not that the twenty years existence of Mersa Matrouh is too short a time for social change to occur. Rather it is the town's lack of potential to play this role. There have been no detailed plans from the beginning for Mersa Matrouh to exert such an urbanizing influence on the surrounding area. Any social or cultural change that has occurred has come without previous planning and without deliberate implementation of a detailed and well-studied plan.

The same applies to a great extent to Kima. For, in spite of all that has been said about its influence on Aswan community, it is rather a limited influence, and mainly in the field of workmanship and proficiency. Kima itself is an artificial community and to a great extent

a closed one. It is socially isolated from the rest of the region. The lack of social interaction puts severe checks and limitations on the role it can efficiently play in developing or changing the attitudes of the people towards life, for this is more important than any material changes that may occur. One cannot compare the situation in Aswan with the role played, for example, by another company-and-single-industry town like Kafr-el-Dawwar, which was established within a rural area near Alexandria in the 1920s as a textiles factory and residential area for the workers. Most of the unskilled and semi-skilled labour were drawn from Kafr-el-Dawwar village itself and other nearby villages. The workers carried the seeds of change back to the village. Most of the peasants found themselves an unskilled job in the factory; and gradually they gained training and skill so that a few of them now have their own independent enterprises in the village which has become a town. Lack of rural manpower forced the farmers to use machinery in various agricultural processes. Peasants are sending their children to schools and to the universities; some of those who graduated work in the factory itself and others have their own work or activity in the town. Now the town is influencing other villages in the area which are themselves developing into small industrial and trade centres. Will Mersa Matrouh, Kima and other recently established 'new towns' play a similar role in the near future?

FOOTNOTES

[1]UN Public Administration Problems of New and Rapidly Growing Towns in Asia. ST/TAO/M/18, p. 4.

[2]Campbell, Carlos (1976) New Towns, Reston, p. 12

BLOCKAGE POINTS IN ZAIRE: THE FLOW OF BUDGETS, BUREAUCRATS, AND BEER

Michael G. Schatzberg

The question of how rural development might best be achieved has occupied both scholars and statesmen for a considerable time. In recent years, some theoreticicians have turned their attention to the role which small urban centers could play in overall strategies of national development. These small towns are often perceived as "missing links" in the chain between the primate cities and the rural areas. For example, E. A. J. Johnson has argued that small, market-based urban centers are not sufficiently developed in poor countries, and that building up these places would constitute a viable development strategy. Similarly, R. J. Harrison Church has urged the decentralization of industry to small cities. One result of this would be the creation of jobs in more remote areas and, as a result, the absorption of the rural-urban flow.[1] Narelle Townsend has cogently expressed many of these concerns in her work on hintertowns. In her view, these hintertowns "will constitute a network of 'central places' to support and promote development in the rural areas. Their objectives would be primarily to raise the income level of the active population to insure a self-sufficient food production for the inhabitants." Secondarily, their functions would be to increase the production of crops for export, and reduce rural migration and rural underdevelopment. They would, in effect, form a bridge between the overburdened cities and the ignored agricultural populations. In sum, the hintertowns would promote " a more equitable balance between rural and urban living" as well as a focus for "a spatial and economic strategy for the decentralization of industry and its accompanying infrastructure, integrating the rural areas into national development schemes."[2]

Most of these theoretical hopes for the role of the small urban center in African rural development are undergirded by several assumptions: first, that African leaders and government officials do wish to develop the agricultural areas of their countries; second, that the presence of small urban centers in the hinterland contributes to the development process; and third, that it therefore makes sense to build up these small towns because through them resources will filter down to the countryside and alleviate the plight of the farmers. So much for the theory, what of the practice?

In November 1977 President Mobutu offered the delegates at the opening session of the Second Ordinary Congress of the Mouvement Populaire de la Revolution (M.P.R.) a remarkably candid dissection of the

problems currently besetting Zairian society. Mobutu indicated that three-fourths of Zaire's money supply is concentrated in the capital, and imported gasoline, foodstuffs, and pharmaceutical products rarely find their way to the rural areas which provide the wealth to purchase them.[3] This problem--the failure of resources to trickle down to the countryside--is also reflected in the statements by two administrative service chiefs. "Kinshasa has promised us, but we are waiting," and "the funds are in Mbandaka, but we have received nothing," are the frequently-heard refrains of administrative personnel in the farthest reaches of the country.[4]

In this chapter I shall argue that small urban centers, at least in Zaire, may be viewed as blockage points which inhibit the flow of resources from the capital to the countryside, and that they therefore constitute an essentially negative element in the developmental equation. To elaborate this hypothesis, primary attention will be paid to the relationships of the town of Lisala with its regional capital, Mbandaka, on the one hand, and its hinterland, on the other.[5] More specifically, we shall examine the flow of budgetary resources and salaries, the distribution of administrative personnel, and the commercial distribution of beer throughout Equateur Region. In addition, I shall offer brief observations on why Lisala and other small urban centers in Zaire act as blockage points rather than conduits by focusing on the phenomenon of politico-commercial interaction and by analyzing the widely-used administrative term, "interior."

Budgets and Salaries

Since 1970, the Zairian budgetary process has been decentralized at the regional and subregional administrative levels. There is, however, some question as to exactly how effective the decentralization to the subregions has been, for the regional commissioners have resisted the flow of funds away from their control. Quite obviously, they wish to oversee as many of the resources as they can at the regional level. It was therefore with little glee and much covert resistance that they greeted the decentralization measures in 1970. The result of this opposition has been that some monies destined for the subregions have failed to reach them.[6]

The supposed decentralization has another dimension as well. In theory, the regional and subregional commissioners must further decentralize the funds received from Kinshasa to the benefit of their administrative service chiefs. Once again, though, there has been a great reluctance to do this, and repeated warnings to the commissioners have not had substantial salutary effect. Consequently, although the service chiefs are responsible for preparing yearly budgetary documents and previsions, there is every chance that they may never see the funds which the officials in the central government have approved for their use. It would be understating the case to say that this a negative impact on the delivery of services to the hinterland.

As a case in point, let us examine the fate of funds destined for

the Department of Political Affairs. These monies arrive in Lisala, having come directly from the capital. They fall under the control of the subregional commissioner--their principal manager--who is responsible for delegating some of them to the five zones which compose his subregion. When asked how much money he delegates to each zone to cover monthly operating costs, he replied that it was generally around Z 150-200.[7] But the situation is rarely this regularized. One experienced territorial commissioner said, "It varies enormously. In general, it was around Z 60 a month for the Zone of Lisala when I was there. Before the visit of the President, however, we were given Z 800. Sometimes there are no funds for two or three months." Similarly, the current Zone Commissioner of the Zone of Lisala affirmed that he received Z 150 in cash each month for the operating costs of the zone administration. But when pressed, he admitted that in all the time he had been at Lisala (fifteen months), this had happened but once. Naturally this situation and the concomitant lack of funds can pose serious problems. One assistant zone commissioner noted "There are sometimes urgent problems. We haven't got the money and that makes the work drag. We can't rent a truck for job-related questions." Most territorial officials are acutely aware that funds do not trickle down to the zone authorities.[8]

A large part of this problem is the direct result of the way the funds are managed by the subregional commissioner. To a certain extent, he does have the latitude to rob Peter to pay Paul, to take funds destined for one service and allocate them to another. Similarly, he is supposed to see that the zone commissioners receive their monthly subventions, but this does not always happen because of sloppy management. The subregional commissioner is technically required to get the approval of his budget officer before he spends the money. This official has been largely responsible for elaborating the subregional budget and knows where, and for what, the money is to be spent, but he is rarely consulted. The subregional commissioner dispenses the funds as he sees fit, regardless of what the budget might dictate. Lisala's budget officer noted with a shrug that "He undertakes expenses without speaking to me about them. I wash my hands of it. He's an authority." In effect, the commissioner himself observed, according to the well-consecrated Zairian formula, that "There is only a single chief. It is I who manage the funds." There is thus some tension between the budget officer and the subregional commissioner. Not only does the budget officer usually fail to get the commissioner to respect the budgetary previsions and delegate funds to the zones comprising the subregion, he is equally unable to see that he delegates funds to the administrative service chiefs present in Mongala Subregion. This problem is by no means restricted to Lisala, and the difficulty probably stems from the fact that commissioners have far more power than budget officers. These latter officials are, at best, councillors to those in power. For the most part, they are simply ignored.[9]

In spite of these difficulties some money does eventually reach the subregional administrative service chiefs. What happens to it at that point? It was not until February 1975 that Mongala's administrative service chiefs were instructed to divide their own funds among the five

zones which make up the subregion.[10] There had never been a requirement that this happen, so the money was usually spent at the subregion and rarely filtered down to the zones. Of course, there had been complaints, and it was in response to these that the service chiefs were required to divide formally the funds at their disposal among the outlying zones. Interestingly, however, by July 1975 only three of nine services dependent on the subregion had complied with this directive. In general, there is a marked tendency for funds not to leave the subregional headquarters. Thus, in the case of agriculture, some 57 percent of the funds were absorbed by the subregion in Lisala. Naturally, this caused numerous complaints on the part of the agronomists in the outlying zones. The case of the sports department is quite similar. Here, 76 percent of the funds were destined to be spent either at the subregion, or in the Zone of Lisala--to all intents and purposes, the same thing since money for the zone almost never flows to the more distant centers.[11] Morever, we can probably assume that such inequities were even more striking for those departments that did not formally delegate at all and that an even greater percentage of the total funds never left Lisala, the subregional headquarters. People in the outlying areas, therefore, were not receiving a proportionate share of the available funds.

Thus far I have dealt primarily with the decentralization of funds from the subregion to the hinterland. It would be a mistake, however, to assume that all of the administrative services present in Lisala receive their operating expenses through the intermediary of the subregional commissioner. Indeed, most of them do not and the budgetary arrangements for these other services vary widely. Some receive funds directly from Kinshasa; others directly from the regional capital in Mbandaka; and still others obtain parts of their funds from Kinshasa, the region, and the subregion. Whatever the source, the prevalent pattern usually holds; the officials who control the coffers at each administrative level are reluctant to loosen the pursestrings so that money might flow down to the farthest reaches of the country. In 1972, for example, the State Commissioner for Public Works decided that he would devote part of his budget to rebuild some of the hospitals which had fallen into disrepair. He divided the funds for Equateur Region in the following way: Z 6,750 for the regional capital; Z 3,120 for the headquarters of the four subregions; and Z 10,625 for the seventeen zone centers in the rest of the region.[12] Thus, although only about 5 percent (134,000) of the region's population lives in Mbandaka, the capital was to receive 33 percent of the hospital funds. It is thus fairly easy to see where the regime's priorities lie.

The lesson to be drawn from all this is that budgetary revenues do not trickle down into the Zairian hinterland. In addition to the budget data cited above, the same arguments could be made for the flow of salaries from the capital, through the regional centers, to the subregional centers, and down into the countryside. Indeed, this is a national problem which has reached serious proportions. In 1970, only 19,500 of the 26,000 permanent civil servants on active service were paid; in 1971, 13,200; in 1972, 16,000. The situation was so acute that the Civil Service Minister had to ask his colleagues in Kinshasa and the

regional commissioners to correct the problem. Much of the fault lies with the officials in the various informatiques in Kinshasa who are responsible for programming the computers which draw up civil service pay lists. These computer guardians require numerous "considerations" before the name of a bureaucrat appears on the official salary roles. Even if these demands are met, there are almost always lengthy delays--especially for those who work in the remote areas of the country and cannot afford to go to the capital. The human dimensions of this imbroglio are tragic and should not be overlooked. One lower-level clerk in Lisala told me, "In 1973 I was not paid for seven months. I am still not paid. I owe friends; I write I.O.U.s How can manage to live well?"[13]

Some money does filter down after making its way through the maze of inefficient computers in Kinshasa. Often, though, it does not arrive when expected in the outlying areas, and the administrative files are packed with correspondence complaining about the failure of the funds to arrive on time, or, even if they do, to cover the legitimate claims of those waiting to be paid. In 1969 an Equateur Region inspection team noted that in Ubangi only 13 of 241 chiefs had been paid; in Mongala, 64 of 295; and in Tshuapa, 101 of 198. For the three subregions, only 178 out of 734 had been paid--roughly 25 percent.[14]

In March 1975 this problem still existed in Mongala. The subregional commissioner's justification to his superior illustrates some of the difficulties thus far observed. "The delay in payment of the locality chiefs in my jurisdiction is not a result of my management. My predecessor, because of the lack of funds projected, had used the available monies for the upkeep of the residence of the President of the Republic, the repair of the houses of several functionaries, and the organization of cheerleading seminars in preparation for the official visit accomplished by the President of the Republic during the month of April 1974."[15] The failure of subregional officials to rectify these budgetary and salary irregularities a full eleven months after the visit of the President bespeaks a possible lack of zeal and a definite lack of funds. In the interim the locality chiefs were not receiving their salaries regularly and were undoubtedly seeking other, and probably far less legal, means to make ends meet.[16]

One conclusion which should emerge from the foregoing analysis of salary flows is that, in general, the closer a bureaucrat stands to the source of the funds, the better his chance of getting paid. As was the case for ordinary budgetary revenues, salaries seem to meet some resistance on their way down the pipeline. They may appear quite irregularly, often after a long delay, and occasionally not at all.

Bureaucrats

In some ways the distribution of civil servants throughout the Republic of Zaire parallels the flow of financial resources, for bureaucratic assignments in the hinterland and the flow of salaries are obviously related. Moreover, attention to the distribution of civil servants in Zaire may give us a clue as to some of the regime's priorities. Personnel should be considered as much of a developmental resource as

money, and the dominance of the state sector in the management of the Zairian economy indicates fairly clearly that those who work for the state have been chosen as leaders on Zaire's long march toward economic development.

In 1974 there were some 10,000 bureaucrats in the capital and another 12,000 in the regions. It must be emphasized that these data significantly understate the total number of bureaucrats in Zaire since they deal only with those who are known as sous-statut (permanent). The vast majority of those who work for the state fall under another category, sous-contrat, and are not technically career civil servants, but merely work for the state on a short-term, job-related, and ad hoc basis. Over the years, they have in fact acquired a degree of permanency, but they can, in theory, be let go when there is no longer a need for the services they provide. Unfortunately, it proved impossible to secure similar data for the distribution--or even the number--of those nonpermanent workers. Best estimates, however, indicate that there may be as many as 150,000 of them scattered throughout Zaire.[17]

Other data reveal a tendency toward relative over-representation of high-ranking bureaucrats in the capital and low-ranking ones in the regions. This is important for a number of reasons. First, the fact that high-level civil servants are scarcer in the regions than in Kinshasa means that new development policies are less likely to bubble up from the bottom than be imposed from the top. This is certainly no surprise, but it might be argued that development plans and schemes would have more impact and a greater chance of successful implementation if they came from the regions themselves, rather than from Kinshasa. In addition, the over-representation of lower-level bureaucrats in the hinterland means that many of those assigned to monitor or initiate developmental actions may not feel that they have sufficient authority to do so effectively. What might be called an "implementation mentality" is rife throughout the lower levels of the administrative structure, and field administrators will often pass problems along to the next highest level rather than actively and creatively try to solve them on their own. The third consequence results from the fact that, in general, those in the region are less well paid than those in the capital. Many studies of small urban centers have shown that administratively-based towns often seem to depend on the salaries of the local bureaucrats to motor the local commercial and economic systems. This was certainly the case in Lisala.[18]

The failure of high-ranking bureaucrats to filter down (or, more correctly, be assigned) to the regions closely parallels the distribution of bureaucrats within Mongala Subregion. The same pattern is not only prevalent regarding administrative rank (that is, the high-ranking tend to be assigned to the subregion rather than the zones), but also in terms of absolute numbers as almost one-half of the state bureaucrats in Mongala work in Lisala.[19] This has several important consequences which deserve mention. In the first place, many services are represented at the subregion but not in the zones. This heavily influences the delivery of administrative and social services to the vast majority of the population of the subregion who live outside Lisala. In the remoter

zones where the representatives of a particular service are not present, it means that the daily supervision of such tasks is left to the already over-burdened representatives of the territorial administration, the commissioners. With their heavy political and administrative responsibilities, these officials do not often have the time to monitor fields like social affairs, justice, or veterans' affairs. In addition, the exceedingly poor state of the local roads means that the officials in charge of these services who reside in Lisala are often unable to get out and supervise their administrative responsibilities in the zones. Local officials often profit from this lack of supervision by appropriating funds for their own personal use.

In the educational sphere this problem can be particularly acute. Lisala is a local learning center of some importance ; there are ten primary and an equal number of secondary schools with a combined total of about 10,000 pupils. This represents approximately 35 percent of the town's total population. Nonetheless, it is extremely difficult to obtain teachers in this town, and serious staff shortages are normal. At the start of the 1973 school year, six of the local secondary schools had to begin classes without the necessary manpower. Of a total of eighty-one teachers actually needed, only fifty-one (63 percent) responded to their assignments and appeared in Lisala. When asked to explain this chronic problem, one education official noted that young teachers "do not find the means to live here [Lisala]. They leave because no one takes care of them. They are not well paid; they are not housed; there is no transportation [to get to school]. There is the question of salaries which do not arrive." In sum, they prefer to remain in the large cities where both amenities and salaries are likely to be far more regular.[20]

If the shortage of educational personnel in Lisala is acute, then it is catastrophic in the smaller centers like Businga, Mobayi-Mbongo, and Bongandanga. The high school principal in Bongandanga, for instance, had to make do with no books, no desk, and no chairs, and when he complained about the problem, he was told "débrouillez-vous." There has never been a full complement of teachers in his school. In 1974-75 the ministry in Kinshasa assigned eleven, but only two actually appeared. The situation was so tragic that the Zone Commissioner detached one of his college-educated assistants to give courses part-time. The subregional commissioner was aware of this tragedy, but soon found that the funds promised to ameliorate conditions in this school were centralized in Mbandaka and could not be pried loose.[21]

Beer[22]

I have elected to include a brief section on beer in this article in the hope that it might prove illuminating to examine the distribution of a commercial and nonadministrative resource to see if it conforms to the pattern already observed for both budgets and bureaucrats. As we shall presently see, in some respects it does and in others it does not. In general, the percentage of the population living in the various subregions does not correspond to the percentage of beer sales in each area. The regional capital, Mbandaka, has only 5 percent of the region's total

population, but it nevertheless consumes close to 57 percent of the local bottled beer. In part, of course, this can be attributed to the fact that the brewery itself is located in Mbandaka and that, therefore, the local bar owners are not dependent upon the whims and inefficiencies of the state-owned river transportation agency. It is also in part explained by the high concentration of administrators and civil servants in the capital who form a fairly regularly-paid clientele. (The official price of beer is high and is certainly not within easy reach of the vast majority of the agricultural population). Merchants in Equateur Subregion buy approximately the amount of beer that one would be led to expect on the basis of its population alone, holding all other factors constant. On the other hand, traders in the Ubangi, Mongala, and Tshuapa Subregions do not purchase the amounts of beer that we would expect, or that their people demand.

At first glance, then, it would appear that the distributive pattern of beer in Equateur Region is roughly congruent with the pattern of resource flow for administrative personnel and budgetary funds: a tendency for the higher administrative levels to absorb the lion's share of whatever there is to be had. But a closer look at the four subregions provides a slightly different impression. The Tshuapa and Ubangi Subregions are far removed from Mbandaka and its brewery in terms of both absolute distance and ease of transportation. In Tshuapa, Boende (the subregional headquarters) absorbs most beer sold in the subregion. While it is impossible to be certain why this is the case, we may speculate that it has to do with the fact that it is linked to Mbandaka by river, and that the presence of many bureaucrats provides a market which can be exploited. That very little beer consumed in this subregion seems to filter beyond Boende tends to confirm the basic hypothesis that resources do not trickle down into the hinterland.

Ubangi Subregion is quite similar in this respect. Gemena, the subregional center, absorbs some three-fourths of the beer sold in the subregion. The only other even moderately important center of beer consumption in this part of the country is Libenge, and this town is located along the Ubangi River and is thus directly linked to Mbandaka. Here, too, the more remote towns of Budjala, Bosobolo, and Kungu do not receive any beer directly from Mbandaka (although some probably does arrive via independent traders). Thus, as far as the distribution of a commercial resource is concerned, the towns in the remote and inaccessible parts of the subregion find themselves at a disadvantage.

But the distribution of beer sales in Equateur and Mongala Subregions provide data which do not support the basic hypothesis. In Equateur Subregion, contrary to our expectations, Basankusu--the main administrative center--does not account for anywhere near the lion's share of the beer sales. Instead, there is a fairly equal distribution of beer sales among Basankusu, Bomongo, Ingende, and Bolomba, while about 50 percent of the total is accounted for by the zone center of Bikoro. The difference between the distributive pattern here and the one prevalent in the Tshuapa and Ubangi is explicable largely in terms of proximity and transportation.

Equateur Subregion is the closest of the four to Mbandaka, and its headquarters (Basankusu) and other zone centers are connected to the regional capital by either road (Bikoro) or river. The merchants thus deal directly with the brewery in the capital. They do not have to pass through a chain of distributors--most of whom choose to locate in the subregional centers, as is the case in Ubangi and Tshuapa.

The distributive pattern in Mongala Subregion does not conform to the hypothesis either. In this case, however, transportation rather than proximity is the key factor. Lisala, Bumba, and Businga are linked to Mbandaka by river. Lisala's administrative pre-eminence is therefore not reflected by figures on the distribution of beer sales in this subregion. The commercial markets in Bumba and Businga are at least as important as the one in Lisala and, in the case of Bumba, probably more so. As far as the two very remote centers are concerned (Bongandanga and Mobayi-Mbongo), little or no beer reaches these areas. These towns have no direct transportation links with Mbandaka, and merchants there have to go to either Businga, in the case of Mobayi-Mbongo, or Lisala, in the case of Bongandanga. By the time they reach these places, the beer has already evaporated.

That the data on two of the four subregions in Equateur Region do not support my hypothesis perhaps suggests a partial solution to the trickle-down problem. Where road and river transportation are available and link far-flung centers with the regional capital, commercial distribution of resources is not dependent on, and does not seem to follow, the administrative hierarchy. Where transportation facilities are lacking, on the other hand, the commercial patterns closely reproduce the administrative ones because merchants desire to locate in towns where there is a bureaucratic clientele. The lesson to be drawn from this is that although many of the small urban centers in this part of Zaire are administratively based, commercial markets do exist--and probably can be created--without a significant administrative presence. Beer sales statistics for small centers such as Businga, Bumba, Libenge, Monkoto, and the zone centers in Equateur Subregion all support this assertion. To dissolve the administrative blockage points, therefore, it will probably be necessary to develop further regional and subregional transportation networks. This is far from an original conclusion, but the banality of the observation does not make the strategy less imperative.

The "Interior" and the Bourgeoisie

I have thus far argued that administrative centers, rather than facilitating the flow of resources to the rural areas, are likely to impede it. Why should this be the case? To answer the question I shall analyze both the way field administrators perceive the more remote parts of their nation and the way in which they deal with whatever funds or resources do happen to come their way. Both elements are essential if we are to understand why resources do not trickle down in Zaire.

The term intérieur, or interior, is often heard in Zaire. It is used by people in everyday settings and is an integral part of Zairian political discourse occurring in newspapers, bureaucratic documents, and conversations among administrators in the field. It is a symbol which categorizes perceptions about space in Zaire and, since it is a categorization, "it is also

a political tool, establishing status and power hierarchies."[23]

In general, there are two connotations attributed to the word interior : one, the less widely used, is spatially absolute; the other, and more commonly used, is relative. The absolute connotation was best expressed by a bureaucrat who noted interior "comes from a language which is not exact. It [the interior] is situated in relation to Kinshasa. Everything which is not at Kinshasa is in the interior; because at Kinshasa you can leave the country for the exterior." [24] More widespread, however, is the relative use of the expression. One administrative service chief in Lisala put it this way: "When you are in Kinshasa, the interior means [those places] outside of the capital--the regions including their headquarters. When you are at the regional headquarters, it means the subregions and zones. When you are at the subregional headquarters, it means the zones and the collectivities. One is never in the interior." [25]

More specifically, though, the term interior has a relative meaning which reflects the administrative hierarchy of the country. One of Lisala's magistrates mentioned that "it is a question of the places where one finds institutions that are administratively inferior to me. Lisala is a subregion. A zone comes after a subregion. At Lisala we consider the zones as inferior and, therefore, in the interior. If I was at the zone, the collectivities would be administratively inferior in relation to the zone, and thus would be the interior and so on. We go on tour in the interior. It is relative. It depends on the authority who is speaking. The judicial institutions at Bumba, for example, are inferior to the Parquet at Lisala. It is therefore the interior." [26] Explicit in this view is the idea of inferiority, of administrative subordination. Implicit in this perception is the belief that administrative units and locations which are bureaucratically subordinate, the interior, are somehow not as important and far less valuable.

There is almost a negative connotation accompanying the term interior. When asked, one service chief replied that the interior was composed of all those people who did not live in either Kinshasa or the other large urban centers; another bureaucrat dismissed the interior, quite simply and pejoratively, as "la brousse, quoi." More often than not, the use of the word interior establishes a definite symbolic representation of the social hierarchy. A territorial commissioner expressed this hierarchical dimension as follows: "The people who are accustomed to the life in the city are afraid to come to the interior. The interior equals people who live far from the city...The people of the subregional headquarters have marked themselves off a bit from the people in the zones." There is thus the very real implication that people in the interior are somehow different from, and perhaps inferior to, those who live in the urban centers. Since the idea of the interior is quite relative, the notion of social hierarchy implicit in the term stretches all the way from the capital in Kinshasa to the lowliest village in the hinterland. Indeed, one collectivity official informed me that "Here we are in the urban center. The interior is those who live in the villages themselves." [27]

I have dwelt on the connotations of interior because they are far more important than a mere linguistic sidelight on administrative jargon and

perceptions. Policy debates and decisions are partially structured by these cognitions, and it is thus crucial to be familiar with them. In earlier parts of this article we have seen that administrative resources--notably budgetary funds and bureaucratic personnel--do not reach the outlying parts of the country. Or, when they do, it is usually too little and too late to have a positive developmental impact on the lives of the village farmers. A factor contributing to this failure is the view of the rural areas which the term interior conveys. Although never stated explicitly as such, it might be tentatively argued that the perception of the interior as subordinate helps to create a climate in which it does not seem quite so important for funds to reach the lowest levels of the administrative hierarchy.

While some symbols (administrative subordination, lack of importance, relative backwardness) evoked by the term interior contribute in a small way to the failure of resources to reach the countryside, there is another reason which is probably even more important. Put directly, endemic corruption characterizes all levels of Zairian polity and society. President Mobutu's brand of patronal pork-barrel politics has incubated and nurtured a rapacious politico-commercial bourgeoisie. Public office and access to public funds are used at all levels of the administrative system to create new opportunities for capital accumulation and commercial aggrandizement. The situation has become so serious that it can no longer be considered functional--as many political scientists did until fairly recently. Indeed, in his November 1977 speech before the opening session of the M.P.R. Congress, Mobutu spoke openly and critically of the "impôt invisible," an invisible tax, a required consideration, which is necessary before even the most ordinary sorts of administrative services will be performed. But we must now ask whether President Mobutu's condemnation of these corrupt practices is sincere. Local-level corruption is openly modeled on the behavior of the president and his entourage. Most Zairians are aware that Mobutu's personal profits while in office have been enormous. Furthermore, in May 1976 he told a mass rally in Kinshasa that while it was not good to steal too openly, it was permitted to "yiba na mayele," or steal shrewdly.[28]

The regime's toleration, and indeed encouragement, of the misappropriation of public funds has had a direct and dramatic impact on the frequency with which resources reach the remote areas of the countryside. In 1975, for example, it was discovered that a shipment of gasoline destined for the Zone of Bongandanga had been waylaid by the local zone commissioner. In theory the gasoline was supposed to have been used to keep the vehicles of the Public Works Department on the road, but the commissioner intervened and sold it to a private plantation at an enormous personal profit. The local head of the Public Works Department complained to his superiors, and the commissioner's indiscretion cost him a two-month suspension without pay. This "punishment" did not even have the force of a mild slap on the wrist since the commissioner had cleared much more than twice his monthly salary with this illegal sale. Significantly, no one asked him to return his ill-gotten gain.[29] Such events were common coin throughout Equateur Region and go a long way toward explaining why the various administrative services in the remote parts of the country never seemed to have enough gasoline to get around. As a general rule, then, those who have access to

funds or resources of any kind are most reluctant to let them slip through their fingers.

In some ways, the beer situation is quite similar. In areas which suffer from recurring or quasi-constant beer shortages due to the vagaries of the distributive system, beer is a scarce resource and those with positions of power and authority immediately purchase the few bottles which do appear. If, as often happens, some of the state bureaucrats and commissioners themselves own bars, it is reasonable to assume that their establishments will be more likely to have beer than the bars of ordinary traders.

Thus, when resources do arrive in the small, up-country towns, more often than not, they will somehow be appropriated by those members of the local politico-commercial bourgeoisie and used for their own ends. Although for the sake of illustrating a pattern I have considered civil servants a resource and have argued that the lack of trained bureaucrats--particularly educational personnel--is a drawback for the rural areas, this line of reasoning presupposes that the administrators in question are both dedicated and honest. Unfortunately, it is no longer possible to maintain that the majority of Zairian functionaries are either. There are exceptions; some officials in the hinterland are doing their best and are struggling to keep their services going against almost impossible odds. But there are far too many gluttonous members of the politico-commercial bourgeoisie intent on appropriating whatever resources do trickle down into the Zairian countryside, and this is the key reason why resources are blocked at the level of the small urban centers where these officials are most likely to be found.

Final Thoughts

The argument throughout this article has been that resources in Zaire do not filter down into the rural areas. Most wealth which flows down from the capital in Kinshasa never reaches its intended destinations. Instead, the resource flows are interrupted at various points along the way and only rarely reach the farmers in the villages. The blockage points which impede the flow of resources correspond to the cities and small urban centers which are dominated--politically and economically--by members of a politico-commercial bourgeoisie. The members of this social class are adept at absorbing funds and other resources and at putting them to their own selfish uses. The data presented on the allocation of budgetary funds and on the distribution of bureaucrats in the hinterland tend to support this "blockage point" hypothesis. The data on the commercialization of beer, on the other hand, support it only in some cases. It was seen that where small towns are linked directly with the source of the beer supply in Mbandaka, they are not dependent on the whims of suppliers and depositors in other commercial centers. In these cases, the flow of beer to the hinterland does not resemble the flow of budgets and bureaucrats and is probably far more equitable. The key in establishing such direct links to the source of supply is probably the river and road transportation systems. Where these can be, or are already, developed, it may be possible to avoid having beer pass through larger urban centers (blockage points) on its way to the consumers. But where these systems are nonexistent, beer must pass through the urban and small urban bottlenecks and usually fails to reach

consumers in the hinterland.

The lesson for development planners ought to be reasonably clear: avoid the blockage points and channel resources directly into the rural areas. This, alas, is more easily said than done. The small urban centers in Zaire are dominated by members of a politico-commercial bourgeoisie who have a personal stake in seeing that resources do not trickle down into the villages. As long as resources are directed through these urban-based administrative structures, there is little hope that they will reach their rural destinations. Indeed, to the extent that it might prove possible, I would argue that Zairian administration should be divorced from participation in further developmental initiatives. The data on beer commercialization has at least suggested that where free, or moderately free, markets can be created in the rural and semi-urban areas, there is a chance that some resources will eventually find their way into the poor parts of the country. But this, I realize, is a suggestion and a hope--not a solution.

Finally, this study has shown that, at least in Zaire, the assumptions which have guided theoreticians are simply not supported by the realities of the situation. In Zaire we can no longer assume that government officials and political leaders genuinely wish to develop their country. In situations of scarcity, they probably perceive that funds committed to development schemes in the rural areas cannot be applied to the proliferation of their own commercial enterprises. It is a zero-sum situation and, thus far, the politico-commercial bourgeoisie has played the game to its own advantage. Moreover, since the small urban centers function as blockage points, it is difficult to see what positive role they currently play in stimulating development in the rural areas. Lastly, it simply may not be viable strategy to build up small urban centers. If the blockage points were to become larger, and more bureaucratized, even fewer resources would filter down to the village population. The plight of the farmers remains acute, and solutions must be found. But given the administrative base of most Zairian towns, it seems highly unlikely that small urban centers will have much to contribute to the amelioration of life in the rural areas.

FOOTNOTES

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[1]E. A. Johnson, The Organization of Space in Developing Countries (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970); and R. J. Harrison Church, "Some Problems of Regional Economic Development in West Africa," Economic Geography 45 (January 1969): 53-62.

[2]Narelle R. Townsend, "Hintertown Strategy for Regional Development in Tropical Africa," Pan-African Journal 9 (1976): 184-185, 190-191.

[3]Mobutu Sese Soko, speech before the Second Ordinary Congress of the M. P. R., Kinshasa, November 1977, p. 13.

[4]Interviews, Lisala, 27 February 1975, No. 12, p. 3 and 18 February 1975, No. 10, p. 3.

[5]Lisala is an administrative town in northwest Zaire with a population of about 27,000 people. It is the site of subregion, zone, and collectivity levels of administration and is headquarters of the Mongala Subregion. For more details, see Michael G. Schatzberg, Politics and Class in Zaire: Bureaucracy, Business, and Beer in Lisala (New York: Africana Publishing, 1979, forthcoming), chapter 1.

[6]Administrative correspondence, 11 August 1972. See, also administrative correspondence, 21 January 1971 and 20 January 1973. Archives, Mongala Subregion, Political Affairs Department, Lisala. Unless noted otherwise, all administrative correspondence comes from this source.

[7]Interview, Lisala, 12 August 1975, No. 45, p. 4; and administrative correspondence, 17 June 1975. At the time of my research Z 1 = $2.00, U.S.

[8]Interviews, Lisala, 3 May 1975, No. 37, p. 8; 18 July 1975, No. 43, p. 4; and 22 March 1975, No. 36, p. 7.

[9]Interviews, Lisala, 28 March 1975, No. 5, p. 6; 12 August 1975, No. 45, p. 4; and administrative correspondence, 21 January 1971, 23 January 1973.

[10]Field Log, 1 February 1975, p. 34.

[11]Administrative correspondence, 17 June 1975, 18 February 1975.

[12]Administrative correspondence, 25 May 1972.

[13]Administrative correspondence, 2 May 1973; David J. Gould, "Disorganization Theory and Underdevelopment Administration: Local 'Organization' in the Framework of Zairian National 'Development'," African Studies Association, 1977, pp. 13-14; and Interview, Lisala, 27 November 1974, No. 26, p. 4.

[14]Administrative correspondence, 30 October 1969.

[15]Administrative correspondence, 3 March 1975.

[16]Schatzberg, Politics and Class in Zaire, Chapter 4.

[17]Serge A. Vieux, L'Administration Zairoise (Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1974), p. 46; and Commission permanent de l'administration publique, 24 October 1974.

[18]For example, J. Henderik and J. Sterkenburg, Anatomy of an African Town: A Socio-Economic Study of Cape Coast, Ghana (Utrecht: Department of Geography of Developing Countries, Geographical Institute, State University of Utrecht, 1975), p. 123. They note some 32 percent of the town's work force is employed either in education or publication administration, and that these public sector salaries form the main base for economic activities in the fields of retail trade, repair, and construction. Similar pictures are presented by the towns of Mokolo, Cameroun; Bouna, Ivory Coast; and Kinkala, Congo-Brazzaville. See B. Steck, "Mokolo dans ses relations avec le milieu rural environment." Cahiers ORSTOM, science humaines 9 (1972): 306; Jean-Louis Boutillier, "La ville de Bouna: de l'epoque precoloniale a aujourd'hui," ibid, 6 (1969): 13; and Alain Auger, Kinkala: etude d'un centre urbain secondaire au Congo-Brazzaville (Paris: ORSTOM, 1973), p. 60.

[19]Mongala Subregion, bureaucratic rosters, 1974.

[20]Schatzberg, Politics and Class in Zaire, Chapters 1 and 3; administrative correspondence, 8 September 1973; and interview, Lisala, 23 April 1975, No. 47, p.

[21]Field Log, 1 March 1975, pp. 49-50; administrative correspondence, 18 June 1975.

[22]Much of this section is based on data provided by Bralima brewery, Mbandaka.

[23]Murray Edelman, Political Language: Words that Succeed and Policies that Fail (New York: Academic Press, 1977), p. 62.

[24]Interview, Lisala, 4 June 1975, No. 22, p. 2.

[25]Interview, Lisala, 12 March 1975, No. 16, p. 2.

[26]Interview, Lisala, 16 June 1975, No. 23, p. 2.

[27]Interviews, Lisala, 28 February 1975, No. 13, p. 2; 20 February 1975, No. 11, p. 3; 17 April 1975, No. 37, p. 4; and 27 March 1975, No. 54, p. 2

[28]Mpinga-Kasenda, L'Administration publique du Zaire: l'impact du milieu socio-politique sur sa structure et fonctionnement (Paris: Pedone, 1973), p. 305; Crawford Young, "Zaire: The Unending Crisis," Foreign Affairs 57 (Fall 1978): 169-185; Mobutu Sese Soko, op. cit., p. 12; and David J. Gould, "Local Administration in Zaire and Underdevelopment," Journal of Modern African Studies 15 (September 1977): 359.

[29]Administrative correspondence, 4 February 1975, 8 July 1975.

THE STATE AND THE SMALL URBAN CENTER IN AFRICA

M. Crawford Young

> A central postulate unanimously shared by political elites, planners and advisers is that the state must organize and direct the development effort. Agricultural growth will not come from the occult workings of an invisible hand, but through the guidance and stimulation of the political and administrative structures. This, then, poses an important set of questions, which are asked all too infrequently: What are the capabilities of the polity in fulfilling these tasks? What boundaries upon policy choice are placed upon the policy makers by the limitations in system capability?
> (M. Crawford Young) [1]

> These small town centers are points of distribution of agricultural implements, fertilizers, and new crop expertise to the rural population. From the rural producers, these small centers aggregate market and cash-crop produce for export to urban populations and foreign markets; therefore, they are key points of articulation of incentives for greater productivity with the complex socio-political interests of the rural poor...
>
> They are what some would call 'modernizing centers,' source of innovation, politicization, mobilizations, and national integration.
> (Small Urban Centers Committee)[2]

The statements quoted above constitute a developmental creed, not always explicitly articulated, which served as axiomatic bedrock for policy analysis within African governments, international agencies, and the academy. Disconcerting recent trends in a number of countries begin to raise questions as to whether the beneficent role of the state may be assumed as postulate. In extreme cases, such as Amin's Uganda or Equatorial Guinea, it is evident that the state is little more than a predator upon society. In others, such as Zaire, a self-seeking politico-mercantile ruling group extracts so much from the periphery, and

returns so little, that a desperately disarticulated polity, society, and economy is the result.[3] Our promises of departure on the small urban center have been subjected to persuasive challenge by Schatzberg, on the basis of his own research, as well as a systematic inventory of monographic material on the subject.[4]

The object of this paper is to explore the impact of new doubts about the validity of the first assumption (the state) upon the now-challenged orienting hypothesis concerning small centers. In so doing, we focus primarily upon the changing pathology of the state; for this we can draw upon our own current research materials. We will then suggest the implications for the possible role of the small urban center.[5]

We will draw primarily on three polities as sustained examples: Ghana, Uganda, and Zaire. This choice is not governed by an presumed representativeness of these three states of the broader universe of African countries; it is rather dictated by the adventitious fact that our own current research has concentrated upon them. While the three countries were accidentally and not randomly selected, they did all exhibit common trends in state pathology not at all anticipated at the beginning of the research. A few short years ago, all three seemed to be evolving in a relatively promising direction. Ghana appeared to have escaped from the torments of the final Nkrumah years; its excellent public service and solid infrastructure seemed to promise at least a respectable future. Uganda in the final Obote years of 1969 and 1970 had record coffee and cotton harvests, and was groping toward a constitutional formula which showed promise of joining national integration to political legitimacy. Zaire appeared to have miraculously risen from the ashes of an aborted decolonization and a conflict-ridden first republic, and to be on the verge of realizing the manifest destiny prescribed by its scale and remarkable resource endowment. Yet by 1978 all three were gripped by a profound crisis, partly attributable to the vagaries of an Acheampong, an Amin, or a Mobutu, but yet going beyond the immediate conjunctural impact of a given leader. Beyond the regime, there was a crisis of the state itself, with far-reaching and long-run implications. This common outcome, in the face of the evident differences of political history, cultural parameters, and economic structure, invites a search for comparative explanation beyond the configurative peculiarities of a given polity.

We must insist that, at least at this juncture, the convergence in crisis of these three cases does not imply an inexorable set of forces pushing all other states into the same rendezvous with disaster. No such simple reading of historical determinism is justified by current political facts. Indeed, it is striking that states as dissimilar in ideology and politics as Tanzania, Mozambique, Cameroon, Ivory Coast and Algeria are very far removed from the calamities which beset Ghana, Uganda and Zaire. At the same time, the similarity of fate, at this historical moment, of three polities not condemned by geographical fate to tragedy, like Chad or Djibouti, commands our attention. Something beyond the merely bizarre must be in operation.

Schatzberg provides convincing evidence that a large fraction of small centers owe their existence essentially to the role of administrative outpost--hence the state.[6] This is particularly true of Uganda, where the standard pattern was the establishemnt of a state boma, around which nucleus an Asian trading center grew; however, Buganda, and to some extent Busoga, did have sufficiently dense rural trade that secondary marketing centers were of some significance. In Zaire, well over 80% of the towns between 10,000 and 100,000 in the 1970 census were either zone or sub-regional seats; Table I provides evidence of this, as well as illustrating the remarkable pace of growth of these communities. Southern Ghana, with its long-established mercantile tradition, was perhaps less decisively affectively by the state in central place formation.

TABLE 1
Growth of Smaller Centers, Bandundu and Equateur Regions, Zaire.

Town	1970 Population	1958-70 Growth Rate	1958 Population	1948-58 Growth Rate	1948 Population
BANDUNDU					
Kitwit	111,960	19.4	14,530	9.1	6,057
Bandundu	40,000	12.0	10,918	8.0	5,079
Mangai	15,232	7.3	6,797	4.6	4,325
Bulungu	14,658				
Inongo	14,432	12.6	3,700	7.5	1,787
Kenge	14,351				
Mushie	13,732	10.2	4,487	3.5	3,167
Masi Manimba	12,000				
Bolobo	10,356	1.1	9,003	3.4	6,415
Kutu	10,026	6.2	5,039	6.0	2,802
EQUATEUR					
Mbandaka	107,910	7.7	45,845	13.6	10,137
Gemena	37,261	9.5	13,156		
Bumba	34,705	11.0	10,447	8.2	4,758
Lisala	28,652	10.8	8,810	12.7	2,656
Boende	12,758	10.4	4,081	15.3	982
Libenge	12,000	7.3	5,361	2.1	4,352
Businga	10,987	7.6	4,717		
Basankusu	10,708	8.9	4,014	7.9	1,880

Source: Leon de St. Moulin, "Perspectives de la croissance urbaine au Zaire," Zaire-Afrique, 111 (January 1977), pp. 50-51

Herein lies the connecting link between the state, as a phenomenon, and the small urban center. The administration, and derivative functions (public works departments, schools), supply much of the dynamic for growth of these centers. Before World War II, the regional functions of the state were quite limited, and most small centers were of miniscule size. After the war, for diverse reasons to be noted below, the social and economic role of the state expanded swiftly, bringing in its train a remarkable enlargement of the small centers. After independence, the motor force of the state is even more dramatic, as this population concentration occurred in the face of a general shrinkage of the rural economy in Zaire; agricultural exports, about 40% of total value in the late 1950s, fell to 10% in the 1970s, while food imports, negligible in 1959, rose to $300,000,000 in 1977, or a third of all imports. Only state employment increased, with the greatest rise recorded in the educational sector, where the number of teachers shot up from 37,100 in 1960 to 143,400 in 1975. There was a corollary expansion in the numbers of students; Schatzberg shows that in 1974 36.15% of the Lisala population was composed of pupils.[7] It follows that the nature of the state, and the character of its relationship with the rural periphery, would largely define the role of smaller centers, as either magnets of development, or poles of extraction.

To grasp the changing nature of the state, we need first to turn to the sea changes which occurred in its role on the heels of World War II. In Ghana, public expenditures were still only £6,630,000, a figure which had doubled over the previous 35 years. In the final colonial decade, state outlays expanded ten-fold.[8] In Zaire, government expenditures, a mere 788 million Congo francs in 1939, shot up 15-fold by 1950, then tripled again in the final decade of Belgian rule.[9]

These fiscal figures translate into a ramifying state apparatus at all levels. The skeletal, order-maintaining apparatus of earlier years became a vast administrative machine, with proliferating specialized departments. Social services were a major part of the expansion; the school network multiplied, and regional and rural health services appeared. A motor vehicle-based communication system spread across the territories; Ghana and Uganda acquired excellent road networks in this period, with large public works departments to construct them. An array of technical services aimed at regulating and promoting the rural economy were put in place. Agricultural extension was heavily promoted, and in Ghana and Uganda cooperative departments as well. Zaire had a more pronounced paternalistic tradition, which saw the state control (with partial success) population movement, impose minimum acreages of various crops, and fix market prices of not only farm commodities, but consumer goods.

At the same time, the state assumed a very active mercantilist role in critical sectors of the economy. The disappearance of free markets for major exports during World War II was transformed into permanent state trading through marketing boards in cocoa, coffee, and cotton. The marketing boards also proved to be highly effective mechanisms of

fiscal extraction from the rural sector. In Ghana, the Cocoa Marketing Board had accumulated a £76 million surplus by 1951; in most of the postwar years, the producers received only from 37 to 67% of the export value of their cocoa.[10] The Uganda marketing boards accumulated £47 million in surpluses, over half of which were diverted to capital expenditures. From 1945-1960, marketing board quasi-taxation plus export taxes removed from growers 27% of the income that would otherwise have accrued to them.[11] In Zaire, where the private corporate sector was far more powerful, administered marketing of rural production was jointly managed by the state and European firms.

The transformation of the terminal colonial state occurred through the confluence of several forces. With the colonial system for the first time on the defensive, metropolitan powers sought to justify imperial policies in terms of its welfare return to the subjugated populations. The emergence of nationalism as a serious political force played an important part in this process; the state had to respond to popular pressures for expansion of services. In Ghana, nationalist forces from 1951 had important if not wholly decisive, influence at the center through responsible government. In Uganda, populist pressures were expressed through serious disorders in Buganda in 1945 and 1949; the district councils were critical arenas for the articulation of local claims.[12] In Zaire, though nationalist activity appeared very late on the scene, the incubus of much postwar colonial policy was the desire to prevent its emergence through pre-emptive satisfaction of its potential claims in the social sphere.

The cry for amenities was everywhere heard. The critical linkage between education and social mobility had become generally recognized, and local communities demanded school facilities. Access to health facilities and medical supplies was a second major thrust of regional and rural pressures. The importance of the road in reducing marketing costs, and eliminating time-consuming, head-loading of goods to market, was also a general demand, as was the desire for convenient water supply. The new career of "politician" was open to those who could effectively articulate these concerns, and especially secure their satisfaction.

The radical change in the revenue situation of the state need also be noted. The remarkably high levels of commodity prices in the first postwar decade was crucial. Through the indirect taxation of marketing board surpluses, and stiffened export taxation, the state was in a position to finance its rapidly expanding outlays, without resort to deficit spending, or significant external indebtedness. For Ghana and Uganda, the device of cocoa, coffee and cotton taxation was critical; these levies were made exceedingly simple to collect by the mercantile policies of the state, and the magnitude of their burden was not fully apparent to the rural producers upon whom they fell. In Uganda, one author has shown that state fiscal extraction in the 1950s amounted to 2/3 of peasant revenue.[13] In Zaire, more of the fiscal resources came from the mineral sector. In all three instances, eleemosynary taxation levels were maintained for expatriate residents and enterprises.

Signs of impending difficulty in the fiscal realm appeared as independence neared. The major commodities of the three countries entered a period of much less favorable price levels, which brought a sudden halt to the surge of new revenue. In Uganda, though much less in Ghana and Zaire, the colonial administration sought to defuse rural unrest by allowing cotton and coffee prices to rise, eliminating marketing board surpluses as a fiscal device. At the same time, the momentum of amenity-expansion was now self-fuelling, especially in the educational realm. New secondary schools had to be built to accommodate the torrent of primary school leavers, and higher educational facilities thereafter. Least of all could the new nationalist political generation, pledged above all else to redoubling the pace of service expansion, contemplate negating the new hopes kindled by their campaigns. Uganda and especially Ghana had the cushion of comfortable foreign exchange reserves as independence dawned, though the current balance of state revenues was precarious. In Zaire, a balance of payments deficit appeared in 1956 for the first time since the depression; the following year the state budget surplus disappeared. By 1960, the fledgling republic was faced with a large current account deficit, vanished reserves, and a $1 billion external debt.

In the early years of independence, through somewhat different pathways, the state-centered expansion of services and amenities did continue, sustaining in its wake the swift enlargement of the regional towns which were administrative central places. The circle of apparent contradiction between the tremendous pressure for amenities, on the one hand, and stagnating fiscal resources on the other, could be closed, most believed, through vigorous, planned development. This premise was rooted in the belief in the rationality, probity, effectiveness, autonomy and intrinsically disinterested nature of the state; in 1978, for Ghana, Uganda, and Zaire, at least momentarily, all facets of this assumption were shattered.

In Ghana, government expenditures rose from £60.5 million in 1957 to £113.7 million in 1961. Cocoa prices were in a steady downward spiral, to bottom at the catastrophic figure £90 per ton in 1965, compared to £247 at independence. Nkrumah concluded that the evaporation of foreign reserves and looming financial impasse originated in conspiratorial machinations of malignant forces at home and abroad: neo-colonialist designs of Western powers, the inherent character of the Western capitalist economy; the incurably bourgeois attitudes of the civil service, retrograde chiefs and ethnic interest groups serving as unconscious allies of imperialism. Quitte ou double: the CPP regime embarked on an even more ambitious scheme to rapidly create a state-managed industrial sector. New fiscal charges were placed on the cocoa sector, with a "development tax" in 1959, "forced savings" in 1961, and a 24% price slash in 1965; in the 1957-1965 period, the real prices paid to cocoa producers fell by 75%; at the same time they were forced to market through the venal CPP monopoly, the United Ghana Farmers Council (UGFC).[14]

The era of the National Liberation Council and the Busia government from 1966-1972 marked a pause in state expansion, and indeed a retrenchment in some economic sectors. More orthodox public finance orientations led to efforts to contain state outlays. A portion of the public corporation network was sold or abandoned, and the UGFC was dismantled. What continued, however, was persistently unfavorable pricing for cocoa farmers. Growers continued to receive consistently less than 60% of the export value, usually by a large margin. Returns to farmers in the immediate postwar period did improve in absolute terms, even while the fiscal burdens were expanded; this generated a momentum of new planting which carried higher harvests forward until 1965, with an all-time record crop of 575,000 tons. By the 1960s, new planting dwindled, and from 1966 on production totals began to fall, with the 1977-78 crop no more than half the 1965 total. By the end of the Busia era, farm surveys showed that crops such as yams, cocoyams, and rice brought higher returns to the planter than cocoa, essentially because the state had no easy way of taxing them.[15]

In Uganda, the Obote years 1962-1971 saw a relative equilibrium between state-building and revenue capacities. Foreign exchange earnings doubled between 1960 and 1970, as did coffee production. The 1938 cotton output record, a permanent official target, was finally exceeded in 1965, 1966, 1967, and again in 1970. The state aimed at greater managerial control over its agricultural sector, through an ambitious expansion of its extension services, and steady moves toward cooperative marketing monopoly for the key crops, combined with an escalating supervisory and control role over the unions exercised by the administration.[16]

Political sequences in Uganda had been different, with the most important focal points of African political activity situated at the district levels till virtually the eve of independence. For the first half-decade of independence, district politicians had real leverage over the central government; Leys in a study made at that time argues that there was a net flow of resources toward the districts, essentially in the amenity field.[17] However, the central government gradually attained ascendancy, with 1966 and 1967 constitutions sharply reducing the autonomy of the district governments.[18]

These processes had an important impact on the growth and character of smaller centers. The second largest town in Uganda, Jinja, had only 8,400 inhabitants in 1948, but by 1970 had grown to 100,000. Mbale, the third town, expanded from 8,433 in 1959 to 23,539 a decade later. The swift changes in the profile of such communities is revealed in the quite different findings of two monographs dealing with the latter center. Jacobson, in a study of Mbale carried out in the mid-1960s, found that only 100 Africans earned over $1,680, almost all either civil servants, or employees of the quasi-public Bugisu Cooperative Union.[19] Bunker, a few years later, found the African elite expanded significantly in this period, through linking in "spiralist" fashion public and private careers in the district administration, the cooperative, business ventures, and coffee farms. By the end of the 1960s,

however, possibilities of social ascension through autonomous locally centered structures had sharply contracted; clientelistic ties with the central state apparatus, through influential notables, or the ruling political party, were becoming the indispensable channel.[20]

Developments at the end of the Obote era foretold a coming crisis of the state. The somewhat improvised "Move to the Left" in 1969, with announced plans the following year to acquire 60% state control of 81 major firms, promised a vastly enlarged public sector--though the tortuous negotiations on the modalities of state takeover had been completed with only six by the time of the Amin coup. The leakage of private capital, which had occurred since the 1950s, became a torrent; between 1966 and 1971, some $100 million of capital flight occurred, most of it during the final year.[21]

In Zaire, the experiment in instant decolonization had a profound impact on the character of the state. The formal structure of the state remained, and indeed was considerably enlarged; state employment rose from 29.9% of all jobs in 1960 to 46.2% in 1967, or from 167,900 to 290,500 in absolute terms.[22] The disorganization of public finances meant a sharp fall in revenues collectable by the state; this problem was met by resort to deficit finance; in 1965, state revenue covered only 60% of expenditures. From 1960-1962, there was no state budget at all; thereafter some control was reasserted at the center, but Kinshasa during the first republic could never restrain the outlays of the proliferating provinces. These cash flows were certainly related to the extraordinary growth rates of the 15 secondary centers briefly elevated to provincial capital rank during the 1962-1966 period.

While the form of the state appeared similar, and its normative assertion of its objectives quite comparable to that of its colonial predecessor, its capacities for order-maintenance, regulation, and service delivery were sharply diminished by the dislocations of the "Congo crisis." Government offices in smaller centers had a full complement of personnel, maintaining the routines and rituals of administration, but lack of vehicles, supplies, and sometimes authority made it virtually impossible for public works departments, agricultural extension, or state dispensaries to fulfill their theoretical role. The one amenity which did expand remarkably was education; here the state shared responsibility with the Catholic and Protestant mission networks, which had been far less disrupted than the government apparatus.

The early Mobutu years brought important changes. The state apparatus was overhauled and recentralized, and interpenetrated with a regime-centered political party, the Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution. A remarkably effective stabilization program in 1967 brought the state budget into balance, and tamed inflation until 1973. The intense politicization of the state apparatus brought about by the highly fragmented first republic was diminished; Zairians began to flow out of university faculties at home and abroad, in significant numbers. Many had diagnosed the disabilities of the first republic as traceable to lack of skilled human resources; if this were the problem, the solution was evidently

at hand. The state, in its epic battle with the copper giant Union Minière du Haut Katanga in 1967, won only a partial victory, but did succeed in greatly increasing its fiscal levies on the mining sector. Tax payments by UMHK in 1965 were only $78 million; by 1974, they totalled $450 million, or 43.5% of gross revenues of the successor nationalized corporation, GECAMINES (and 41% of all state receipts).[23] Though the actual improvement in service delivery to the societal periphery was not as great as the apparent restoration of th administration as control mechanism, there seemed reason at the time to believe that the reforming impulses of the Nouveau Régime would ripple into the amenities field in due course.

To recapitulate the argument thus far, in the quarter century following World War II, profound changes in the nature of the state had occurred in all three countries. The relative weight of the state with respect to society, by 1970, had vastly expanded. The state was both engine of development and purveyor of amenities, both ardently desired. Many pressures combined to produce this outcome: defensive efforts at self-justification by the with-drawing of colonial powers through "welfare colonialism"; populist pressure for extension of amenities; employment pressures from school leavers faced with a stagnant private sector job market; aggrandizement by the nascent politico-mercantile bourgeoisie which became visible in the 1960s, for whom the state was the essential instrument of capital accumulation. Nor was this trend controversial. Within the countries, no voice was raised to dispute the logic or necessity of state expansion. Western agencies and radical critics of African development patterns alike regarded the state as the indispensable instrumentality of change, however different their visions of the latter might be.

It is not clear whether, at this point there was an "overdeveloped post-colonial state."[24] There were some disconcerting trends: the deterioration of the cocoa economy of Ghana, and the rural economy generally in Zaire, was already unmistakable, and it was becoming apparent that a fundamental structural cause was the relatively low, state-fixed producer prices on the one hand, and the comparatively high fiscal burden imposed on export crop producers on the other. However, Uganda was an exception in agricultural output; not only had both the key crops, cotton and coffee, reached all-time record levels, but significant expansion was occurring in such fields as tea and dairy farming. In Ghana and Uganda, state growth was to a reasonable extent translated into service delivery and more amenties; survey data at this period in both countries reflect a generally positive attitude to the state and a favorable judgement on its activities.[25] Zaire is the deviant case here; a sharp drop in the quality of state services occurred in 1960, and was never really remedied, even at the zenith of the Mobutu era.

Patterns in the 1970s in all three polities yield more somber conclusions. A far-reaching perversion of the state occurred, which made its burden heavy and its impact on the periphery clearly negative. In Ghana, the military regime of Colonel Ignatius Acheampong, after an initial period of apparent success, began from 1974 on to exhibit morbid

symptoms. Corruption had already become a cancerous growth on the state, and constituted a major justification for both the 1966 and 1972 coups. Commissions of inquiry had no difficulty in documenting the magnitude of of the sins of ousted regimes; the Anin Commission, which delivered its final report in 1975, concluded that "Corruption is endemic throughout the whole society," and affected "practically every sector of public life where the possibility of corruption exists." No less than 38 factors conducive to official dishonesty were identified; an 18-page linguistic appendix catalogued the special vocabularly which had grown up around corrupt acts ("your pocket will decide," "utter a hornbill cry," "cry like a sheep" were phrases inviting informal payment for government services). A distraught Bishop was moved to quote Isaiah in commentary: "The devout have vanished from the land; there is not an honest man left."[26]

Rather than coda, the chronicles of malfeasance of earlier regimes were only an overture. The Acheampong regime at once created a set of conditions propitious to corruption by adopting as idée fixe an unsustainable official value for the Ghana cedi. A cornerstone of the justification for the 1972 overthrow of constitutional government was undoing a severe devaluation imposed by Busia in December 1971. Though initially popular, Acheampong fiat was insufficient to command the tides of erosion of the international value of the cedi to recede. Strong balance of payments pressures compelled restoration of import licensing, which in turn became a source of windfall profits for the military-mercantile complex. Inflation, which never exceeded 40% during the Nkrumah period, began to gain momentum, fuelled by acute shortages of consumer goods as well as government deficits. By 1976-1977, inflation reached an annual rate of 112%, and was running at 145% at the time of the Akuffo takeover in July 1978. These ruinous inflation rates pauperized, among others, the public service, and became a veritable detonator of dishonesty as state employees struggled for survival. The exercise of authority, in these circumstances, became a sliver of capital from which some additional income could be leveraged.

The impact of these developments was extremely serious. The generalized disaffection by 1978 had become evident in the recurrent strikes by professional classes; the brutality, unparalled in Ghana, of the encounters between students and soldiers on the University of Ghana campus; the inability of the regime to secure referendum approval by a convincing margin for its cherished "Union Government" formula, despite the scale of resources deployed to assure it. The national economy was in constant hemorrhage; at the grass roots level, cocoa smuggling became a way of life for those close enough to Ivory Coast or Togo to make it possible. It is estimated that as much as 70,000 tons of the 1977-78 crop disappeared in this way, worth $300 million. We might argue that this was much less serious than what was skimmed off cocoa proceeds at the top; at least returns from smuggling accrued in part to the farmers, and lower level state personnel and traders who facilitated the trade. Recent indications are that corrupt diversion of cocoa funds at the summit may exceed state revenue losses from smuggling. The Cocoa Marketing Board has not published accounts for six years; there are very large differentials between world market prices for cocoa prevailing since 1973, and foreign exchange earnings

which appear in trade statistics. Official figures record £775 million of cocoa earnings for Ghana in 1976-77; according to West Africa, at prevailing price levels, the returns should have been £1,268, a diversion of funds which thus totals nearly £500 million. For a GDP which was only £2.2 billion in 1965, this is a colossal loss. Some believe that Acheampong may have squirreled away in overseas accounts as much as $100 million. The loss to Ghana of skimmed cocoa revenues, apparently expropriated by the military-mercantile entourage of the Acheampong regime and their external partners, is total, because these funds go directly into overseas bank deposits.[27]

The perversion of the state followed a somewhat different trajectory in Uganda; the successors to Amin are left with the tasks of reconstructing polity and economy virtually from scratch. Idi Amin seized power in January 1971, and was faced from the outset with divided security forces, with some elements still loyal to the ousted President Milton Obote. The insecurity of power for the first two years was also sustained by armed camps of Obote loyalists in neighboring countries. At first, Amin sought to present his government as a predominantly civilian, apolitical, technocratic regime. He initially generated some populist support by his earthy style, and measures such as the expulsion of Asians in 1972. However the whimsical nature of policy determination by Amin, his brutality, and proclivity for identifying whole regions as enemies began to breed disaffection and dislocations, reflected in periodic coup attempts.

The permanent insecurity of the regime, as well as the ruthlessness of the ruler, perhaps explain the emergence of a three-pillared structure of terror. Invoking the excuse of widespread armed violence in the countryside (kondoism), he quickly established a Public Safety Unit, recruited in his West Nile homeland, and neighboring southern Sudan. A second lethal organism was the misnomered "State Research Bureau," located in the Presidency. The Military Police were transformed into a third lawless instrument of intimidation. To these sinister agencies was added the army itself, despite the recurrent purges and bloody internal crises to which it was subject.

Initially, the targets of assassination were primarily within the security forces themselves. Not many months passed before violent repression began to spill over into the civilian realm. A spiral of brutality and disaffection took hold; as the socio-cultural support base for Amin steadily eroded, the recruitment pool for the central core of the regime shrank. The regime became a terror-ridden ethnocracy, dominated by Muslims, Nubis, and Kakwa.

Initially, the civil administration, especially in its technical and service functions, was not greatly affected by the character of the regime. However, as time went by, terror began to ooze and seep outward from the security core, and ultimately pervaded all sectors of the state. At the same time, there was a progressive militarization of the state (unlike Ghana and Zaire). While Amin named only one military minister in his first government, by 1977 there was only one civilian

minister left. By 1974, all ten provinces were headed by soldiers, a trend which extended into lower levels of the administrative hierarchy. No less than 728 soldiers were named to chiefly office in 1974.[28]

The negative impact of the Amin state began to appear in the economic realm by 1973, when a negative growth rate was recorded. The extraordinary coffee price boom of 1975-1977 provided artificial respiration, but at the same time exposed the pathology of the system. Whereas coffee accounted for only 41% of exchange earnings in 1960, it was over 90% by 1976. Cotton had dwindled to less than a quarter of the 1970 level, copper to less than half, tea to an eighth. Coffee had become an enclave, with an important part of the proceeds expropriated directly by the presidency for patrimonial distribution in cash and kind (imported consumer goods otherwise unavailable) to his entourage in the military ethnocracy.[29] The state, to all intents and purposes, had become a simple predator upon society.

In Zaire, the crisis of the state began to become clear when the break in copper prices in April-May 1974 produced a foreign exchange and state revenue impasse. By 1975, a series of unfavorable trends, earlier concealed by the success image of the Mobutu regime at its peak, began to stand out in bold relief. The drain of the state upon national resources had become exceedingly heavy, to begin with; in 1975, its outlays were 44.3% of GNP, and 56.3% in 1976. Increasingly, these expenditures represented only payrolls and prebends, and are not reflected in actual services performed.[30]

Corruption, which as in Ghana was a major legitimating argument for the 1965 coup, has become deeply entrenched in the polity. Mobutu himself gave eloquent voice to a universally felt distress over what he termed the "mal zairois" in a November 1977 speech:

> To sum it up, everything is for sale, everything is bought in our country. And in this traffic, holding any slice of public power constitutes a veritable exchange instrument, convertible into illicit acquisition of money or other goods, or the evasion of all sorts of obligations.
>
> Worse, even the use, by an individual, of his most legitimate right is subjected to an invisible tax, openly pocketed by individuals.
>
> Thus, an audience with an official, enrolling children in school, obtaining school certificates, access to medical care, a seat on the plane, an import license, a diploma, among other things, are all subject to this tax which is invisible, yet known to the whole world.
>
> Accordingly, our society risks losing its political character, to become one vast marketplace, ruled by the basest laws of traffic and exploitations.[31]

The scale of corrupt diversion of state resources is enormous. One 1971 estimate claimed that 60% of the operating budget had been lost, or diverted to purposes other than the official ones.[32] Zaire, like Ghana, saw huge leakage of returns from a commodity boom, in this case coffee; an official document suggests that state-recorded coffee export receipts were only 80 million Zaires in 1976, but should have been 272 million.[33] A recent study showed that the Shaba Regional Commissioner was grossing $100,000 per month in 1975, though his nominal salary was no more than $2,000.[34] The presidential fortune is alleged to rival that of Acheampong.[35]

The impact of distortions originating in the state sector is difficult to exaggerate; above all it is reflected in the pauperization of the mass of the populace. Real wages in 1978 were estimated to be no more than 10% of the 1960 levels. A comparable deterioration has occurred in real price levels paid to rural producers; both urban wages and agricultural prices, one may recall, are fixed by the state. It has been estimated that over half the meager revenues of the peasant are extracted by the state and its officials, through legal and extralegal taxing mechanisms.[36]

At the same time, the erosion of services is massive. The usable size of the road network has dwindled from 140,000 kilometers to 20,000. The agricultural service, imprisoned in the coercive mentality inherited from the colonial system, and paralyzed by lack of transport, essentially performs only paper work; research stations have been transformed into centers of administration. A recent study showed that 75% of the rural population was not served by any health facilities; half the national health budget goes to a couple of large medical installations in Kinshasa. While the number of doctors is roughly the same as before independence, their deployment is very different; in 1972, 303 of 334 Zairian doctors, and 40% of all, worked in the capital.[37] The major functioning state service is the educational system; here as well quantitative expansion has not been matched by qualitative performance.

Despair and cynicism are the mood of contemporary Zaire. The "money-eating" neo-Leopoldian state of Mobutu levies its visible and invisible taxes, and provides little in return. To speak of the state as "engine of development," in such circumstances, would bring forth mingled jeers and tears.

Thus, while the balance sheet on the "over-developed" post-colonial state of Nkrumah-Ankrah-Busia, Obote, and early Mobutu is ambiguous, the bottom line of the perverted state of Acheampong, Amin, and later Mobutu is disaster. In the cri de coeur of two Ugandan scholars, "The longer the Amin regime lasts, the more deeply violence, cynicism and opportunism become entrenched in national life, and the more corrupt society becomes."[38] In a different way, perversion is also now deeply embedded in the Zairian polity, and an alternative regime will have enormous difficulties in altering the existing habits and expectations of the army and the politico-mercantile class, on the one hand, and overcoming the far-reaching dependency engendered by the $3 billion in foreign debts, and a development

strategy hopelessly subordinated to costly copper-energy schemes. Perversion of the state is most reversible in Ghana, which indeed does have at least the possibility of a new departure since July 1978. Uganda, also, enjoys the renewed hope of destruction of the Amin regime in April 1979. From the wreckage of the predatory state, a new order will need to be constructed; the negative legacy of the Amin era will make this a costly and arduous task.

To what extent should we locate the essential dynamics of state perversion in the broader setting of the international political economy? The analytical framework elaborated by scholars of the dependency school has made an important contribution in recent years.[39] The hobbling constraints of volatile commodity markets whose movements are wholly determined in the West, and whose swings, especially for copper, tend to be exacerbated by speculative futures trading; the need for Western-controlled capital and, increasingly, technology; the elusive structure and international market power of the multi-national corporation: all of these factors impinge quite directly upon the political economy of the post-colonial state. The dependency paradigm seems most evidently applicable as a part of any overall frame of explanation for Zaire, where external capital holdings are over $1 billion (mainly Belgian). The role of Western capital is much smaller in Ghana, and quite marginal in the Uganda of Idi Amin since the Asian expulsion and subsequent takeovers of a number of British enterprises, though a netherworld of unscrupulous firms have participated in scavenging what remained of the Uganda economy.

Verhaegen, arguing that the current Zairian crisis should be seen as the consequence of "technological imperialism," notes that since independence very little long-term investment has occurred. The influx of funds has been primarily in the form of bank loans to the Zairian state, or contractor-financed projects. The object is to secure short-term and guaranteed return, with the basic risks as to long-term viability and returns on projects thus financed devolved upon the Zaire state. The other end of the nexus Verhaegen maintains, is the "technocratic" elite of university graduates who dominate the upper strata of the state apparatus; their interest, too, is short-term, in the resource flows related to these huge projects.[40]

There can be no doubt that the top level of the hegemonic political-commercial class in Zaire is enclosed in a web of linkages with external economic interests. The recent political vulnerability of the regime has reinforced the political dependency of the Mobutist state on the West. Private bankers, since the virtual default of Zaire in 1975, are preoccupied with the uncertainties of successor regimes, and tend to exert pressure on Western chanceries to back Mobutu *in extremis*, as the alternative to "chaos" (and uncollectable debts). Financiers, such as those who mounted the SMTF copper project in 1970, owe their access to the Zairian economy to quite personal ties with Mobutu, and also may shudder at the thought of developing new relationships with a new regime, as do the backers of the mysterious German rocket launching enterprise, OTRAG.

At the same time, there are important limitations to the capacity

of the dependency perspective to explain the state-perversion process. On the trade relations dimension, perversion has been accompanied by unparalleled good fortune in cocoa and coffee prices. Had previous regimes in Ghana and Uganda enjoyed the revenue windfall available to Amin and Acheampong, remarkable opportunities would have existed to sever some of the threads of dependency.

Secondly, one must impute truly perverse motivations to the "international capitalist system" to imagine that it would have willed situations where, as in the Zaire of 1978, the client state is totally incapable of protecting its most critical installations (Kolwezi), will be unable to repay its debts for years despite a coffee revenue bonanza which would have largely compensated for the copper price calamity, and is creating a social atmosphere so poisonous that a dissolution of the fabric of social order cannot be excluded.

Thirdly, this view assumes that regime choice is entirely conditioned by the external system, and that there is little divergence of interest between the dominant politico-commercial bourgeoisie and international capital. In fact, the perverted dependent state as well as its post-colonial predecessors have frequently demonstrated autonomist nationalist inclinations. In Ghana, the most important international cocoa trading firms, Cadbury's and UAC, had been pushed into withdrawing from cocoa dealing within Ghana during the Nkrumah period. Under Acheampong, the Cocoa Marketing Board and its satellite, the Produce Buying Authority, achieved total monopoly control over cocoa. Few could match the bull-dog tenacity of Acheampong in rejecting advice from Western financial institutions, in particular the International Monetary Fund. Fewer could rebut the frequent assertion by Amin that his policy was neither capitalist nor socialist. In the Zaire case, the relations between Mobutu and by far the biggest bloc of capital, the $700,000,000 of Belgian holdings, have frequently been stormy. At a time in 1973-74 when Zaire was not a mendicant, bankrupt state, Mobutu in his "Zairianization" and "radicalization" measures undertook one of the most extensive seizures of foreign assets without real provision for compensation yet to be undertaken by any third world regime--later to be retroceded when neither the politico-mercantile class nor the state proved able to digest such an improvised expropriation. Indeed, it could be argued that Mobutu has been more skillful than his patrons in manipulating the diplomacy of dependency to extract support and further resources.

Finally, the dependency framework cannot explain why these three polities become perverted states, while many others--Tanzania, Mozambique, Ivory Coast, Cameroon, for example--have not. These critical variations in outcome suggest that the common setting of unequal economic relationships with Western systems cannot be the sole or primary causal force. We tend to believe that perversity is situated predominantly in the pathology of given regimes; their impact is then catastrophic because of the sheer scale of the state in relation to society.

What can then be said, by way of conclusion, concerning the impact of this new form of state on the small urban center? We are necessarily

on speculative ground here, as the phenomenon we are describing--if our analysis is correct--is quite novel. Only since 1975 has the scope of the crisis been apparent in Ghana and Zaire--a little earlier in Uganda. There is thus no solid empirical base on which to construct a secure set of hypotheses.

The perverted state, we would suggest, yields a disarticulated polity. The presumably beneficent linkages between the state and its periphery are partially ruptured, as the mass withdraws in sullen apathy, and the rural sector seeks to evade the state circuits through such devices as smuggling its production out of the country or shifting to crops such as yams in Ghana which escape the control of state marketing mechanisms. Services to the periphery erode, and the state is no longer able to expand amenities; however, it continues to draw most of its resources from the periphery, in a flow which has become unidirectional. Rather than an instrumentality of positive change and a better life, the perverted state is a malignant, parasitical growth.

Within the disarticulated polity, the small urban center--or at least those whose existence and growth revolves primarily upon state activities and post-primary education--lies at the point of disjuncture. It becomes as Schatzberg argues, a focal point for extraction. The scale of government activity, and the satellite informal sector which forms around it, are sufficient to continue to attract population influx, particularly in the face of the impoverishment of the countryside. State-based small centers may thus continue to expand rapidly in population. This may continue even in the absence of productive activity, in the classic sense; a dramatic example is Kananga, which, 25 years ago, was still a very small center: in 1973, with a population of 429,000 there were only 10,000 enumerated jobs.[41]

A common consequenct of the perverted state is hyperinflation. As noted earlier, the inflation rate was over 100% in the final two years of Acheampong; in Zaire, since 1975, the rate was hovering around 80%. No precise figures are available for Uganda, but the same trend is visible. The only systematic study of inflation in Africa (covering the first republic era in Zaire) shows, among other things, that consumer goods are drawn out of the countryside toward the capital and larger centers. Traders can dispose of scarce goods at higher returns and low marketing costs in the major centers, which means in turn that goods in smaller places are either wholly unavailable, or sold at even higher prices.[42] Windfall profits are available for those who can acquire foreign exchange, credit or luxury consumer goods. The tendency for the concentration of wealth and cash in the capital is strongly reinforced.

All of these are quite disagreeable conclusions, which we put forward quite tentatively and hesitantly. It seems very doubtful whether the dynamic developmental role assigned to the small urban center at the outset of our collective research can occur within the framework of the perverted state. At the present state of history, the African state seems quite vulnerable to perversion, if the accidents of coup leader recruitment so dictate; in every corporal's knapsack, said Napoleon, lies the field marshal's baton. Certainly nothing in the history of

Ghana and Uganda, in particular, would seen to have predestined these polities to their recent fates. The social costs of the predator state make all the more worthy of esteem the polities such as Tanzania and Ivory Coast--whatever criticism may be levelled at their developmental strategies or achievements--which stand in such obvious contrast to the unhappy cases examined here.

FOOTNOTES

[1]Crawford Young, "Agricultural Policy - Uganda: Capability and Choice," in Michael F. Lofchie, The State of the Nations (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), pp. 141-142. These assumptions also characterized scholarly analysis.

[2]Statement of hypotheses for small urban centers project, African Studies Program, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1976.

[3]For dispiriting detail, see David J. Gould, "Underdevelopment Administration: Systematic Corruption in the Public Bureaucracy of Mobutu's Zaire," presented at Conference on Political Clientelism, Patronage and Development, Bellogia, Italy, 1978.

[4]Michael G. Schatzberg, "Islands of Privilege: Small Cities in Africa and the Dynamics of Class Formation," typescript, 1978.

[5]We will draw heavily on materials collected in drafting manuscripts on agricultural politics in Uganda and Ghana (with Tim Rose and Neal Sherman) and political change in Mobutu's Zaire (with Thomas Tunes). We should stress that our own work has not focussed on the small urban center per se; hence the somewhat speculative nature of the analysis.

[6]Schatzberg, "Islands of Privilege."

[7]Ibid.

[8]F. M. Bourret, Ghana: The Road to Independence (London: Oxford University Press, 1960), p. 28.

[9]Le Congo Belge (Brussels: Inforcongo, 1959), II, pp. 60, 82, Joseph Segers, "L'économie congolaise hier, demain, aujourd'hui," Documents pour l'Action, III, 15 (May-June 1963), pp. 146-152.

[10]Bob Fitel and Mary Oppenheimer, Ghana: The End of an Illusion (New York Monthly Review Press, 1966), p. 41, Bourret, op. cit., p. 232.

[11]These calculations are documented in Rose, Sherman, and Young, Agricultural Politics in Ghana and Uganda, forthcoming.

[12]On this issue, see Bjorn Beckman, Organizing the Farmers (Uppsala, Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1976), Dharam Ghai, Taxation for Development: A Case Study of Uganda (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1966).

[13]E. H. Winter, Bwamba Economy (Kampala: East African Institute of Social Research, 1955), pp. 34-35.

[14]Beckman, op.cit., provides convincing evidence as to political and economic failure of this organ. See also R. A. Kotey, L. Okali, and E. E. Roarke, The Economics of Cocoa Production and Marketing (Legon: University of Ghana, 1973).

[15]Kotey, et al., op. cit., p. 53.

[16]This process is well analyzed in Stephen G. Bunker, The Uses and Abuses of Power in a Uganda Farmers' Marketing Association: The Bugisu Cooperative Union Ltd., doctoral dissertation, Duke University, 1975.

[17]Colin Leys, Politicians and Policies (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1967).

[18]Documentation of this trend may be found in Uganda District Government and Politics (Madison: African Studies Program, University of Wisconsin, 1978).

[19]David Jacobson, Itinerent Townsmen: Friendship and Social Order in Urban Uganda (Menlo Park: Cummings Publishing Company, 1973).

[20]Bunker, op. cit.

[21]Neal P. Sherman, A Political Economic Analysis of the Ugandan Dairy Policy, doctoral dissertation, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1975, pp. 44-50.

[22]Banque du Zaire, Rapport annuel, 1967, pp. 66-69. The largest increases were in soldiers, teachers, and casual workers.

[23]Kamitatu Massamba, Problématique et nationalité dans le processus du cuivre en Afrique Centrale: Zaire (1967) et Zambia (1969), doctoral dissertation, Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris, 1976, p. 545; Mulumba Lukoji, "La commercialisation des minerais de la Gécamines," Zaire-Afrique, 94 (April 1975), p. 212.

[24]The phrase is from Colin Leys, "The 'Over-developed' Post-Colonial State: A Re-evaluation," Review of African Political Economy: 5(1976), pp. 39-48. Leys, we should add, is arguing a very different point.

[25]Fred M. Hayward convincingly demonstrates this judgement for Ghana with 1970 data. See inter alia "Political Expectations in Rural Ghana," Rural Africana, 18 (Fall 1972), pp. 93-103. For Uganda, our own survey materials in 1966-1967 yields similar conclusions.

[26]On the Nkrumah period, see Victor T. LeVine, Political Corruption: The Ghana Case (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1975); on the NLC and Busia periods, Ghana, Final Report of the Commission of Enquiry into Bribery and Corruption (Anin Commission), 1975.

[27]West Africa, with its characteristic understatement hints at these developments, and supplies figures, 3191 (11 September 1978), p. 1775; 3183 (17 July 1978), p. 1373; on the Acheampong fortune, see Washington Star, 2 September 1978).

[28]Africa Contemporary Record, 1973-74, 8291.

[29]The nature of the Amin regime is well recorded in David Martin, General Amin (London: Faber and Faber, 1974); David Gwynn, Idi Amin: Death Light of Africa (Boston: Little Brown, 1978): International Commission of Jurists, Uganda and Human Rights (Geneva: 1977); Ali Mazrui, Soldiers and Kinsmen in Uganda (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1975); Henry Kyemba, State of Blood (New York: Ace Books, 1977).

[30]Graphic demonstration of the state as a self-enclosed entity, short-circuiting within its walls resources it succeeds in extracting, may be found in Nzongola Ntalaja, Urban Administration in Kananga, doctoral dissertation, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1975; Michael G. Schatzberg, Bureaucracy, Business, Beer: The Political Dynamics of Class Formation in Lisata, Zaire, doctoral dissertation, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1977.

[31]Mobutu Sese Seko, address to MPR Congress, 25 November 1977.

[32]J. Ph. Peemans "The Social and Economic Development of Zaire since Independence: An Historical Outline," African Affairs, April 1975, p. 162.

[33]"Le café et l'économie zairoise," cited by Professor Kawata Bualum Elima, Eliwa, 4 November 1977.

[34]Gould, op. cit.

[35]The figure of $105 million is cited in To the Point, 7 July 1978.

[36]Further detail on these points may be found in Crawford Young, "Zaire: The Unending Crisis," Foreign Affairs, LVII, 1 (Fall 1978), pp. 169-185; Jean Rymenan, "Comment le régime Mobutu a sapé ses propres fondements," Le Monde Diplomatique, May 1977.

[37]U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Syncrisis: The Dynamics of Health, XIV, Zaire, 1975.

[38]Lutakoine A. Kayiira and Edward Kannyo, "Politics and Violence in Uganda," Africa Report, XXIII, (January-February 1978), p. 43.

[39]Classics in the African sphere are Colin Leys, Underdevelopment in Kenya (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975); E. A. Brett, Colonialism and Underdevelopment in East Africa (London: Heineman, 1973); Samir Amin, Unequal Development (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1977) (and other works).

[40]Benoit Verhaegen, "Universities, Social Classes, and Economic Dependency," Rockefeller Foundation conference on the African university and development, Bellagio, Italy, August 1978.

[41]Nzongola, op. cit., p. 77.

[42]Indépendence, inflation, développement (The Hague, Mouton, 1968).

THE GROWTH AND EROSION OF DEVELOPMENT POTENTIAL: CHANGING MASS ATTITUDES IN THREE GHANAIAN SMALL URBAN CENTERS

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I. Introduction

Small urban centers are a vital link in the development process. We have suggested that they are the crucial interface between the state and its institutional structures and the rural populace; the point at which rural interests are aggregated and expressed to government; the focus of rural expressions of need as well as discontent and resistance to government policies; sources of politicization, mobilization, and national integration; points of enforcement of national policy and distribution of national services.[1] In this context, the links between individuals in small urban centers and the national government, have a profound effect both on government policy options and reactions to them in the small urban centers and the surrounding villages and towns which are tied to them. This paper explores these links by examining attitudes in three small urban centers in Ghana over a five-year period (1970-1975) using data from two systematic surveys carried out by the author (See Appendix for description).

II. The Centers

All three of the towns in this study are centers of education, all are involved in government agricultural extension demonstration projects of various sorts (rice, cocoa, cotton), two of them have government agricultural offices, one is adjacent to an agricultural manpower training station, a crop research station, and a mechanization project. One has a post office and several cocoa marketing and buying offices. In 1975 two of the centers had pipeborne water, one had electricity, and two were on paved roads. While the largest proportion of the population in each of the centers was involved in agriculture, more than half the population had other occupations which included: traders and businessmen (12%), artisans, technicians, and industrial workers (15%), and professionals (14%). By 1975 more than half the populations had at least primary education and three percent had college education. Furthermore, by 1975 almost one-third of the population were judged to have a comfortable[2] economic position--a considerable improvement from 1970 (see TABLE 1).

The three centers in this study have populations in the 2,000 to 3,000 range. Two are located in the Eastern Region, one in the North. The oldest of the communities is Apirede, an Akuapem town founded in the

TABLE 1

Economic Position
in Three Small Urban Centers
(percent)

	1970	1975
Near subsistence	65	48
Marginal cash economy	26	17
Comfortable	6	32
Very well-off	2	1
Extremely prosperous	1	2
	100	100
	(N=195)	(N=196)

TABLE 2

Length of Residence in Center
(percent)

	1970	1975
One year or less	10	11
2-5 years	11	28
6-10	9	14
11-20 years	7	12
20 or more	11	9
Born in center	52	26
	100	100
	(N=195)	(N=196)

17th century. It is primarily an agricultural and educational community. There are three schools, one primary and two secondary. Some cocoa is grown, but the main crops are foodstuffs which are sold as cash crops. The government had established a nursery in Apirede to introduce new cocoa varieties and encourage the reintroduction of cocoa on a large scale. There are a number of villages (including an Ewe settlement) which are part of the hinterland of Apirede.

Akorabo is also in the Eastern Region. It is mainly a center of cocoa production and education. The government is very actively trying to rebuild cocoa production in this area which was badly devasted by swollen shoot disease. The town also has a substantial population involved in the large-scale production of local gin. There are four schools in the town which service Akorabo and the surrounding villages. These villages (numbering at least six) look to Akorabo for leadership and pay their respects to the traditional leadership periodically. Akorabo is a settler town which was initially peopled by Shai[3] who purchased the land from the Akim. While there is some debate about when this happened (some claim the 17th century) my guess is that Akorabo was settled in the latter part of the 19th century. The town is still dominated by Shai but is quite ethnically diverse with significant populations of Awuapem, Ashanti, Fanti, Ewe, and a few non-Ghanaian (mostly Nigerian).

Nyangpala, in the north of Ghana, is also an educational and agricultural center. It has two schools, a number of small businesses, including tractor repair, pito brewing, and bicycle repair. It is the focal point of a number of agricultural development efforts including increased rice and cotton production, agricultural mechanization, and crop research. During the past five years the center has moved from a largely subsistence economy to one in which about 60 percent of the agricultural production is cash crops. As in the other centers, Nyangpala is the focal point for a number of smaller villages and settlements which are in the vicinity.

These centers demonstrate the high levels of mobility we expected to find in small urban centers. Over 80 percent of the respondents in 1975 had lived in another town at some point in their life (up from 68 percent in 1970) and more than 40 percent of them had lived in towns larger than 30,000. The changing nature of geographic mobility was particularly striking in the data on length of residence in the center. From 1970 to 1975 the percentage of the population born in the centers dropped from over 50 percent to slightly more than 25 percent (see TABLE 2) and the number of newcomers to the communities also increased substantially.

Direct experience with government agencies was extensive in these three small urban centers. Eighty percent of the respondents reported direct personal contact with government agencies or their representatives in both 1970 and 1975. While there were some variations between centers, the pattern was relatively uniform and in every case approximately 60 percent or higher. In addition, by 1975 the three towns had each benefited from at least one general development project since 1970--

water in Apirede and Nyangpala, paving or improving the road in Akorabo and Nyangpala, electricity in Apirede. Furthermore, all three centers had been the targets of extensive agricultural development efforts.

In short, these centers were involved in many types of interactions with the government and had extensive contacts with other areas of the country. They also were the focus of a variety of commercial, educational, and other activities which served the centers and the surrounding areas. All were involved in development projects sponsored by the government. Given this background, let us examine the ways in which the government and development were viewed.

III. Mass Attitudes in the Small Urban Centers

What is particularly striking about the attitudes of Ghanaians toward government in both 1970 and 1975 is their generally positive evaluation of government and development efforts. This is in particularly marked contrast to places like Zaire, where the mistrust and cynicism are very great,[4] and somewhat surprising given the serious deterioration of economic conditions in Ghana by 1975.[5] To be sure, the problems of the latter period are reflected in lower evaluations of government performance and growing frustration about individual well-being. Nonetheless, in 1975 the level of faith in government had not fallen as far as one might have expected.

A. Evaluation of Government:

The generally positive evaluation of government is illustrated by the responses to a number of questions posed in surveys in the three centers. Most individuals expressed confidence that government would do what was right.[6] In fact the level of confidence increased slightly in 1975 (see TABLE 3).

Citizens in the small urban centers felt that they would be treated fairly when dealing with government officials. They expected (on the whole) neither better nor worse treatment than others.[7] In the context of their general expectations and faith in government it should be added thay they did expect reasonable consideration. In 1970, however, more than one-fourth of the sample expected worse treatement (see TABLE 4). This reflected a feeling among Northerners and Ewe, in particular, that they would be discriminated against. This view was not without some basis in fact. By 1975 such concerns had been largely eliminated--for the Ewe a perceived benefit of the departure of Busia, for Northerners primarily as a result of extensive development efforts by the military government.

TABLE 3

Confidence in Government
(percent)

	1970	1975
Yes	69	73
No	29	22
Don't know	2	5
	100	100
	(N=195)	(N=196)

TABLE 4

Treatment by Government Officials
(percent)

	1970	1975
Better than others	4	9
Same	63	58
Worse	27	9
Don't know	5	22
	99	98
	(N=195)	(N=196)

Those respondents who had personal experience with government agencies were increasingly pleased with the help they received. In 1970, almost 40 percent had not had contract with government. Of those who had contact, almost twice as many respondents felt that such contacts were useful as did not (see TABLE 5).[8] That ratio increased five-fold by 1975. By that time, most Ghanaians in the centers had personal contact with government officials and were pleased with the quality of that relationship.

People were asked what they felt to be the best features of government. Their answers ranged from political freedom (13% in 1970, none in 1975) to rural water and electrification (2% in both years). What is striking in 1970 is that 49 percent of the sample could not think of any "best feature" of government. Some respondents went so far as to say there were none. The item receiving the highest response was political freedom. By 1975, the "none" and "don't know" category had dropped to 24 percent. Furthermore, 39 percent of the respondents said that agricultural policy was the best feature of government--up from 7 percent five years earlier.[9] In short, we see a marked improvement in positive reactions to government over five years with clear indications that in these three small urban centers agricultural policy, followed by perceptions of government "concern for the people" (11%) played a major role in creating this shift.

Finally, people showed a relatively high level of political integration which was stable over the five-year period. Political integration, as conceptualized and measured here, focused on orientations about the political system, values it represents, and the degree of congruence between national and individual political values. On a scale of zero to four, respondents' scores averaged close to three in both 1970 and 1975.[10]

There were also some indications of growing concern about government policy, the ability of government to deal with important problems, and its record in comparison with previous regimes. Ghanaians in the three centers were asked what troubled them most about government.[11] In 1970, 51 percent reported that nothing troubled them while by 1975 only 37 percent were as sanguine. For most of the respondents in 1975 the major problems related to economic policy (see TABLE 6).

The loss of faith in government was most clearly demonstrated by the decline in the number of people who felt government would help deal with important problems.[12] In 1970, 81 percent of the populace surveyed felt that government was likely to help them. By 1975, only 50 percent felt this to be the case. By 1975, there were also signs that in comparative terms the government was not faring as well as its

TABLE 5

Evaluation of Personal Contacts with Government
(percent)

	1970	1975
Helpful	39	70
Not helpful	21	7
No contact	38	23
Don't know	2	1
	100	101
	(N=193)	(N=196)

TABLE 6

What Troubles You About Government
(percent)

	1970	1975
Agricultural policy	7	1
Economic policy	30	41
Corruption	--	3
Inaction	1	1
Lack development	1	4
Political system	1	2
Other	6	5
Nothing	51	37
Inapplicable	4	6
	101	100
	(N=71)	(N=140)

predecessor. While in both 1970 and 1975 a majority of respondents felt that the incumbent regime was better than, or the same as, the previous one, almost one-fifth of those responding in 1975 felt that it was worse.[13] While positive responses were still dominant, the negative evaluations suggest a collective memory of better times which was of sizeable proportions (see TABLE 7).

The picture of government that emerges from an examination of mass attitudes in these small urban centers in 1970 and 1975, while somewhat mixed, suggests several clear patterns. The citizenry had a great deal of confidence in government and its equitable treatment of the population. They had grown increasingly pleased with the quality of the contacts and services received from government, especially in the area of agriculture. At the same time there was evidence of growing concern about government (especially in the economic area) which may have been partly a function of increased experience but was also a reflection of a mounting feeling of unease about the operation of some sectors of government. Even in 1975, before the extensive public manifestations of concern with the Acheampong government,[14] there was clear evidence that a crisis of confidence was developing among sizeable segments of the population and that people were increasingly troubled by some aspects of government policy and operation. Nonetheless, the link between the government and the centers was both clear and positive. Even with the erosion which took place between 1970 and 1975, the ties were strong and the evaluation generally positive.

B. Sense of Political Competence:

If small urban centers are to be points of aggregation and expression of rural interests and needs, we would expect to see this reflected in some collective sense of political competence.[15] Any shift in political competence over time would reflect perceptions of success in the past as well as expectations of success with the incumbent regime. To what extent do people in the centers feel that they have a role in planning and effecting government policy?

In order to assess political competence we asked individuals what they thought they could (and would) do about government policies and directives with which they disagreed, and how they would respond to a law they felt was harmful or unjust.

When asked what they would do if they disagreed with a government directive, 60 percent of the individuals in 1970 said that they would comply with it anyway.[16] Only about one-third of the respondents in 1970 reported they would try other actions, such as protest or refusal to comply. By 1975, however, a majority of respondents stated they would

TABLE 7

The Incumbent Regime v. Its Predecessor
(percent)

	1970	1975
Better	36	38
Same	23	16
Worse	6	19
Too early to say	10	1
Don't know	21	17
Inapplicable	4	8
	100	99
	(N=195)	(N=196)

TABLE 8

Response to Directives with Which Disagree
(percent)

	1970	1975
Refuse to carry out	7	2
Avoid doing it	6	11
Complain to govt. official	24	29
Other actions	1	10
Do it anyway	60	48
Don't know	1	--
	99	100
	(N=68)	(N=126)

take action to counter such a government request (see TABLE 8)

When asked if they would carry their disagreement further if this action failed, only 18 percent said they would do so in 1970, 24 percent in 1975.[17] In both 1970 and 1975 there was relatively little willingness to go beyond an initial effort in expressing opposition to directives with which one does not agree. All of this was said, it should be noted, in a context in which most people agreed that such opposition and protest was legitimate.[18]

Respondents in the three centers were also asked what they thought they could do about a law being considered which they felt to be unjust or harmful.[19] In both 1970 and 1975 about one-third of the samples felt they could do something about it.[20] Sixty-three percent in 1970 and 58 percent in 1975 felt they were either powerless or could do nothing to alter policies which were under consideration. This item plus two other indicators of political competence were put together to create a political competence scale.[21] In both 1970 and 1975 more than 60 percent of the sample scored zero--they had no responses indicating political competence.

While there was a small core of individuals in the three centers who felt politically competent, it is clear that such feelings were not widespread. There is certainly no collective sense of competence--something we would expect to find on an individual basis even if individual concerns were expressed primarily by those who felt more competent. It is possible, of course, that those who feel most competent only look out for themselves rather than expressing collective concerns. In either case, it is clear that the level of political competence is low in these centers. What that suggests is that as centers of articulation, evaluators of government policy, and guardians of rural interests, these centers fall far short of expectations. To the extent that this link in the chain is weak, potentially vital inputs are missed and development potential may not be realized.

On the other hand, there is evidence to suggest that this is not the case, that individuals do look to those who feel most competent, and they in turn try to express the common will. Who were the politically competent? To what extent did people turn to them for help?

If we look at political competence by occupation, it becomes clear that the differences are considerable (see TABLE 9). These differences are remarkably constant over the five-year period.

Professionals and students have the highest levels of competence followed by workers, while those in agriculture have a negative association with political competence. What is striking is that the two groups with the lowest levels of competence are those traditionally associated with the rural sector, the farmers and traders. It is those new to rural areas, those who give the small urban centers their distinctive character, who also have the highest level of political competence--the teachers, agricultural agents, industrial workers, technicians, and students.

To what extent do the citizens of the small urban centers turn to these individuals for assistance? In 1975, people in the three centers were asked a series of questions designed to tap this question. Respondents were asked what they felt was their most important problem.[22] Responses included economic problems (53%), jobs (7%), health (5%), agriculture (9%), education (2%) and a variety of others. Individuals were then asked if this was a problem they could work out themselves or one for which they needed help.[23] Most respondents (65%) felt they could not work it out themselves. When asked to whom they would turn, respondents answered as shown in TABLE 10.

Most individuals in the centers said they would seek help from government officials. These officials made up a sizeable percentage of the professionals in the centers--those who also had the highest sense of political competence. It is very clear that these officials were seen as a vital link with the government. It is also clear from events elsewhere in Ghana, that professionals other than civil servants often do not think of themselves as government officials, even when their salaries may be paid by the national government--as is the case with many teachers, doctors, and nurses. In fact, throughout the recent history of Ghana, the professionals, students, and workers have been in the forefront of criticism of, and pressure on, government. We see the basis of that tradition of activism and confidence in the small urban centers as well.

C. Perceptions of Well-Being

Individual perceptions of well-being and expectations about the future affect how people view themselves, how they perceive others (and their own position in comparison), and how they view government. In the five-year period from 1970 to 1975 there were marked changes in both perceptions of well-being and expectations of future well-being.[24]

The inhabitants of the centers viewed their relative position as becoming increasingly homogeneous over the five years.[25] In 1970 the distribution of perceptions covered a very broad spectrum with 15 percent of the populace seeing themselves as much better off than others while more than one quarter of the sample felt they were in much worse condition (see TABLE 11). By 1975, however, the extremes of perception had been reduced to negligible proportions, while almost 40 percent of the respondents felt they were about as well-off as others. While such perceptions do not speak to the actual economic position of individuals (see TABLE 1 for such estimates) they do suggest public feeling about inequalities of well-being. By 1975, citizens of the small urban centers increasingly felt that their situation was similar to that of other Ghanaians.

Overall perceptions of well-being in both 1970 and 1975 were low and reflected the view that the situation was deteriorating. At least half of the respondents in the three centers felt that their position at the time of the survey was worse than it was when they were children.[26] By 1975 that percentage had increased to nearly 60 percent of the population (see TABLE 12).

TABLE 9

Correlations Between Political Competence and Occupation

	1970	1975
Agriculture	-.44*	-.29
Workers	.22**	.11
Business and Trade	-.01	-.11
Professional	.47	.64**
Student	.57	.20
(Correlations are gammas)	(N=193)	(N=191)

*Significant at the .01 level.
**Significant at the .001 level.

TABLE 10

Who See for Help with Major Problem
(percent)

Chief	2
Doctor	2
God	8
Government	55
Friend	1
Family	16
Don't know	4
	88
	(N=89)

TABLE 11

Relative Position as Perceived by Respondents in Small Urban Centers (percent)

	1970	1975
Much better	15	7
Better	9	23
Same	24	38
Worse	23	37
Much worse	26	5
Don't know	2	--
	99	100
	(N=195)	(N=196)

TABLE 12

Conditions Today v. Childhood (percent)

	1970	1975
Better	33	26
Same	13	12
Worse	50	59
Don't know	5	4
	101	101
	(N=195)	(N=196)

Perceptions about the possibility of improvement were also pessimistic and growing more so by 1975 when over 40 percent of those surveyed in the small urban centers felt that their childrens' position would be even worse than their own[27] (see TABLE 13). In neither year was it possible to muster even a majority of individuals who thought that Ghana was moving toward a better life for its young people. While there were those who saw a brighter future for their children, their number was dwindling by 1975.

Are these perceptions of the deteriorating condition of well-being tied to government in the minds of individuals in the centers? It is clear that they are. Following the two questions about well-being, respondents were asked if they felt government affected any changes they foresaw in well-being.[28] In 1970, a majority thought government would not. By 1975, however, close to 60 percent thought that government would affect well-being, while only 20 percent felt it would not. From 1970 to 1975 individuals increasingly came to see a link between personal well-being (or lack of it) and the government. As perceptions of well-being move downward, demands for government action to remedy the situation are very likely to increase.[29] This puts great pressure on government--pressure which may have serious consequences if the situation continues to deteriorate

IV. Conclusions

The citizens of the small urban centers studied here have become increasingly aware of the major role of government in their daily lives and in the development of their area. The inhabitants of the centers saw government as much more a part of their lives in 1975 than they did in 1970. Furthermore, they increasingly looked to government to solve vital problems. There was evidence of growth in public confidence in government and in level of satisfaction with its services. In part, these responses are a recognition of facts of life--that the role of the state is growing as is its impact on almost every sphere of life. As the state has grown, so has its potential to become the "perverted state," as M. Crawford Young has suggested.[30] There is evidence to support the possibility that Ghana is approaching that fate, including: the level of corruption (and its phenomenal growth in magnitude in recent years);[31] an inflation rate approaching, and at times exceeding, 100 percent a year; extremely low wages;[32] and political instability. What is striking in the face of these difficulties is the positive attitudes expressed about the government and its programs. We do not find the levels of political cynicism and hostility that has existed in Zaire for sometime. While we are seeing a recognition of the extensive growth and impact of the state in Ghana, the state was not seen as perverted nor was its intrusion in peoples lives unwanted. Quite the contrary--people looked to the state for help. It is clear that in 1975 there was a vast reservoir of good will toward government in these three small urban centers in Ghana. That in turn was reflected in receptivity to government development efforts. This was not the predatory state that Schatzberg and Ewert[33] have so cogently described in Zaire. At the same time, there were signs that some people were beginning to question the prevailing views--that a crisis of confidence was in the making.

TABLE 13

Childrens' Well-being v. Own
(percent)

	1970	1975
Better	45	38
Same	11	5
Worse	27	41
Don't know	17	13
Inapplicable	--	3
	100	100
	(N=195)	(N=196)

Part of the crisis had its basis in the growing feeling that the level of well-being was declining and that government was partly responsible for this downward spiral. In addition, there were the failures of a number of government policies like price controls and import substitution.[34] Price controls primarily kept food out of the rural areas (since legal mark-ups did not reflect transport costs) and encouraged smuggling to Togo and the Ivory Coast. Import substitutions meant restriction of imports, shortages in the rural areas and in the small urban centers--shortages much more severe than in the somewhat better supplied cities. With little to buy, the incentive to produce decreased and one saw parts of the rural economy moving rapidly back towards a mere subsistence economy.[35] In short, a dual economy was developing in which many rural areas became increasingly divorced from the nation's capital and major urban centers. Efforts to reverse that trend with increased prices paid the farmer for cocoa and other products did not help. While higher prices resulted in more money for the rural farmer, there was little if anything to buy with it.

In spite of these difficulties, the small urban centers remained repositories of development potential in the sense that people continued to be receptive to government initiatives.[36] As we have noted, some benefits had been realized from government development efforts in agriculture and provision of general benefits like water, electricity, and roads. The small urban centers served as focal points for the aggregation of interests and provided the small core of individual leaders who were looked to by the populace to articulate their interests. As of 1975, the professionals and other elites continued to have the confidence of most citizens. Ghana is in some respects unlike Zaire and other predatory states in terms of its elites. The lower-level elites, and the professionals in general, have clearly seen it as their mission to serve as the conscience of the people. While the level of corruption and capriciousness at upper levels seems as bad as the most predatory states, the doctors, teachers, students, lawyers, and others have demonstrated a phenomenal willingness to stand up for general public rights even in the face of extreme intimidation and force. This action seems to have forced major changes in government policy even under military rule. It certainly contributed to the fall of Colonel Acheampong, and the revision of a number of government policies opposed by major segments of the population. Such successes help maintain the belief that "right" will prevail.

However, there are a number of disquieting problems which remain. It seems likely that Ghana is now at a crucial turning point which could lead to an erosion of support destructive to development. Indeed, I would assert that there is a point below which public confidence cannot be maintained. Once that threshold is crossed it becomes very difficult, if not impossible ,to reverse the process. Ghana is now very close to that point. If the downward trend which we have seen from 1970 to 1975 has continued (and there is every reason to believe that it has) the erosion of some attitudes might well lead to a flood of reversals of perception which would move through the small urban centers and their hinterland with a domino effect.

Among the problems which could weaken or rupture the links between the state and the small urban centers are those already noted: inflation, corruption, shortages of foodstuffs and other necessities. If these difficulties cannot be ameliorated in some degree, it will be difficult for any

amount of goodwill to counter their negative effects. Other problems loom on the horizon as well. Large tracts of land are being alienated by the elites--in some cases in contravention of traditional land law and convention. In the north in particular government protectorate status in the colonial era is being used to alienate land for private (in some cases foreign) mechanized farms and state farms.[37] The inhabitants of the land see themselves being dispossessed of their traditional rights. Similar patterns have happened in the south where several state farms have all the appearances and effects of the exploitation of the haciendas of Latin America.[38] While the state farm is not a new idea in Ghana, the notion of large-scale farming as a way of dealing with food shortages seems to have grown in popularity in government circles in spite of past failures.[39] For the rural masses, these efforts often spell disruption, loss of land and livelihood.

Another problem apparent in 1975 was the feeling of loss of contact with government. Part of this was a function of the demise of the parliamentary system, which for all its problems established a clear point of contact in the person of the M.P. One at least knew who to talk to.[40] This sense of loss of links was exacerbated by the move to centralize local government--to consolidate the many small units into a few larger ones. While consolidation may have been seen as a key to less corrupt and potentially more efficient local government, it also removed important contacts with government from many of the small centers to the regional capitals. Among the themes expressed again and again in 1975 by respondents was concern about the loss of representations and the sense that centralization meant fewer services in the small centers and more in the large ones. As one respondent put it, even the most corrupt local council left a trail of crumbs for the rest of us.

The most important problem facing the populations of the small urban centers is clearly the economy--a problem which in one way or another encompasses most of those mentioned above. There is a sense in which Ghanaians in the rural areas (including the centers) have survived better than one would have expected given the economic problems of the nation. Most were able to protect themselves better than the average worker in the city and thus their relatively better position. Overall there was a slight improvement in their economic position between 1970 and 1975. However, their survival is primarily a tribute to the indestructability of the rural economy. When times were hard and the cedi [41] brought little, one could and did revert to a subsistence or dual economy.

It is economic problems which worry citizens of the small urban centers the most. This feeling is echoed in the deterioration of the sense of well-being from 1970 to 1975. Continued erosion of public satisfaction is a potentially explosive problem. As Hadley Cantril found in his thirteen-nation study of human concerns: "People denied a scope for their lives...are less satisfied and by and large by no means resigned to their situations." He concludes: "Satisfaction comes from attaining a goal through action based on choice--a never-ending process of transforming a potential desire into an experiential reality." [42] It is clear that real possibilities for development and satisfaction still exist in the small urban centers in Ghana. Whether the state can reverse the downward cycle in a manner which will allow it to build on what remains of a remarkable reservoir of goodwill in rural Ghana remains to be seen.

APPENDIX

Two surveys were conducted in Ghana under the direction of the author, one in 1970, the other in 1975. Approximately 380 people were interviewed in each survey. The surveys were carried out in the same six communities on both occasions. Three of them were small urban centers and form the basis for analysis in this study. The samples in each village were randomly selected and comprised approximately 8 percent of the adult population. The sample was drawn from randomly selected households after each household in the village/town had been numbered. Two individuals, 18 years or older, selected by means of a table or random numbers, were interviewed in each of the households in the sample.

Interviews averaged 45 minutes in length. Some took more than an hour and a few as little as 30 minutes. The interviews were structured, although approximately 5 percent of the questions were open-ended. Interviews were carried out in the local language by interviewers trained at the University of Ghana at Legon. All but one of the interviewers had previous interviewing experience, and most were familiar with social science techniques and had previously used quantitative materials. Three of the interviewers worked on both surveys. Most of the questions used in this paper were asked of the total sample. Some, however, were given to approximately one-third of the 1970 sample and two-thirds of the 1975 sample. This was done to limit the length of the interview so that it could be completed in one sitting while at the same time allowing a broad enough scope to explore a wide range of interests.

FOOTNOTES

*I wish to acknowledge the very generous assistance of the University of Ghana and the University of Wisconsin. In particular this study reflects the cooperation and wisdom of the citizens of the three small urban centers in Ghana. I also wish to acknowledge support from a Fulbright Hays Research Grant, the Mid-Western Universities Consortium for International Affairs, and the Ford Foundation. My research assistants, Kojo Yelpaala and Mathew Zillig, made vital contributions to the preparation and analysis of data.

[1]These propositions are spelled out in greater detail in Southall, Hayward, Miracle, Young, Vansina, and Oluwasanmi, "Small Urban Centers in Rural Development in Africa," African Studies Program, July 1977, pp. 2-4.

[2]Evaluations of economic position were made by the interviewers in the course of the interview. "Comfortable" was defined as the standard of an experienced school teacher.

[3]For an excellent analysis of migration and cocoa farming see: Polly Hill, The Migrant Cocoa-Farmers of Southern Ghana. London: Cambridge University Press, 1963.

[4]See D. M. Ewert, "Social Structure and Critical Consciousness: An Analysis of the Applicability of Freire's Theory of Conscientization to Rural Zaire." Ph.D. Thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1977, and M. Schatzberg,"Bureaucracy, Business, Beer: The Political Dynamics of Class Formation in Lisala,Zaire." Ph.D. Thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1977

[5]International Labour Review, May-June 1976, p. 353.

[6]Respondents were asked: I usually have confidence that government will do what is right.

[7]The question was: If you a problem which you took to a governmental official, do you think you would get the same treatment as everyone else?

[8]Respondents were asked: Have you dealt with any of the following agencies, their officials or representatives? A list of ministries and agencies followed. They were then asked: Have you found them helpful?

[9]People were asked: What do you feel is the best feature of the government today in Ghana?

[10]For further discussion see Fred M. Hayward, "Correlates of National Political Integration: The Case of Ghana." Comparative Political Studies, vol. 7, no. 2, 1974, pp. 165-92. The mean scores were 2.85 in 1970 and 2.79 in 1975. The scale was based on responses to the following questions: Do you feel that what the national government does is important? When government does something with which you disagree, do you feel responsible? Does the government stand for methods and ideals you value? Given your conception of the ideal political system, are we getting closer to this ideal of government?

[11]The question was: What troubles you most about government?

[12]Respondents were asked: Does it seem likely that government will help you as you wish?

[13]People were asked: How does the present government differ from previous governments?

[14]Strikes by professionals against Acheampong's policies and opposition to Union government played an important part in policy changes during 1977-78 and in the eventual removal of Acheampong.

[15]For an extensive discussion of political competence see G. Almond and S. Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963, Chapter 8.

[16]People were asked: What would you do if you disagreed with a government directive?

[17]The question was: Would you carry your disagreement further if you had no results?

[18]In 1975, more than 60 percent of the sample felt that one should be free to disagree with government.

[19]Respondents were asked: Suppose a law was being considered by government that you thought unjust or harmful. What do you think you could do?

[20]The same question was asked by Almond and Verba in the United States, United Kingdom, Mexico, Italy, and Germany. The results in the small urban centers in Ghana were about the same as responses in Germany and Mexico, considerably lower than the United States and U.K., and somewhat higher than the level of competence in Italy. See especially p. 219.

[21]Political competence was measured using a scale based on the following questions: Suppose a law was being considered by government that you thought unjust or harmful. What do you think you could do? In such a

case, is it likely that you would actually try to do something about it? Have you ever done anything like that? This scale is a summated rated scale with respondents scored on the basis of responses indicating the presence or absence of a sense of competence.

[22]The question was: What do you think is the single most important problem that you face?

[23]People were then asked: Do you think this is something you have to work out on your own, or is there someone who ought to help you with this? If they answered no, they were asked who they would turn to for help.

[24]For greater detail on well-being see Fred M. Hayward, "Perceptions of Well-being in Ghana: 1970-1975." African Studies Review, Vol. XXII, No. 1, April 1979.

[25]Respondents were asked: In thinking about your work and economic position, do you feel that in comparison with other people you are: much better-off than most people, above average, about the same, slightly less well-off, much less well-off.

[26]The question was: Think how life is today and how life was when you were a child. Are conditions better or worse than when you were a child?

[27]They were then asked: What about your children, will their lives be better or worse than yours?

[28]Next they were asked: Will government affect these changes?

[29]For further discussion see R. A. Easterlin, "Does Economic Growth Improve the Human Lot? Some Empirical Evidence." In P. A. David and M. W. Reder (eds.) Nations and Households in Economic Growth. New York: Academic Press, 1974.

[30]See M. C. Young. "The State and the Small Urban Center in Africa" in this volume.

[31]For a detailed view of corruption in Ghana see: Victor LeVine, Political Corruption: The Ghana Case. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1975.

[32]As noted above in International Labour Review.

[33]Ewert, Ibid.

[34]Operation Feed Yourself was one government attempt to carry out import substitution in agriculture. It had some successes in its early years, especially in rice, but soon ran into a number of difficulties.

[35]The problem of the food supply is discussed in George Benneh, "Population Growth and Food Supply in Ghana." Peasant Studies Newsletter, Vol. IV, No. 4, October 1975.

[36]An interesting perspective on development potential is presented by Norman Uphoff and Warren Ilchman, The Political Economy of Development, Berkeley: University of California, 1972.

[37]For a useful discussion of the land tenure question in Northern Ghana see: L. C. Bourne, "A Question of Ownership," West Africa, 22 May, 1978, pp. 978-79.

[38]This process has been superbly described in John Womack, Zapata and the Mexican Revolution. New York: Random House, 1968.

[39]On the state farms and their problems see: Adu Boahen, Ghana: Evolution and Change in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, London: Longmans 1975, Marvin P. Miracle and Ann Seidman, State Farms in Ghana, Land Tenure Monograph No. 43, University of Wisconsin, Madison, 1968.

[40]On political information and identification of one's representative see: Fred M. Hayward, "A Reassessment of Conventional Wisdom About the Informed Public: National Political Information in Ghana," American Political Science Review, Vol. 70, No. 2, 1976.

[41]The cedi, the Ghanaian currency, is now worth about 70 cents after having been devalued from $1.20.

[42]Hadley Cantril, The Pattern of Human Concerns, New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1965, pp. 273-4.

HOME-TOWN: A STUDY OF AN URBAN CENTRE IN SOUTHERN GHANA

John Middleton

The Town and Its Setting

Southern Ghana has for centuries been a region marked by continuous movement of population, both of groups and individuals; by ever changing forms of social stratification; by urban centres of various kinds and sizes; and by trade with the outside world. Yet tradition and 'custom' are of great importance for the people. And despite marked economic and political development, kingship, matrilineal descent, and urbanism have remained central in most of the area in both national and local social systems.

In this paper I consider some aspects of one urban centre, Akropong-Akwapim, and try to answer the question of why the town continues to be so important in the lives of its people, who regard it as their 'home-town' (as they say), whether they actually live in it or not. In crude economic and political terms (such as are loved by 'planners') it may appear outdated and no longer an independent unit. Yet it continues to be important, the scene of a great annual festival, and the focus of clan and family life.[1]

Akropong is the capital of the state of Akuapem, which lies some thirty miles northeast of Accra in the Akwapim Hills some 1,500 feet above sea level, and has a resident population of about 70,000.[2] It is usually counted as an Akan state because the kingship is Akan, from Akim, but most of the population is in fact Guan.[3] It was founded in 1733, and the present capital was established some years later. There are 17 'traditional' towns set along the two north-south ridges of the hills. Five, including Akropong, are inhabited by matrilineal Twi-speaking people. The remainder, all patrilineal, include both Guan-speaking and Twi-speaking towns. All these are of ethnically mixed origins. In the lower-lying plains to the west are many villages and several townships; one of these, Nsawam is the largest town in the state with a population of 20,000, but it lacks the status of the ridge towns.[4]

Akropong is the seat of state administration under its king, the Omanhene, who is also the focus of the royal cult of the dead. The Omanhene's role need not concern us here in detail. Although his traditional authority has declined, the kingship remains at the centre of

town life, the focus of cohesion and sense of perpetuity. Even though today the great majority of the people are Christians, the royal rites are performed regularly, culminating in the annual festival of Odwira. The town is also the seat of the queen-mother and of the Krontihene, who is the senior divisional chief of the state and who acts as regent during the king's absence.[5]

The town of some 700 houses, is about a mile across, although the traditional centre where stand the palace and the more important 'family houses', is only a quarter of a mile square. The houses of the town vary greatly in size and design. Many are large 'family houses', usually of two storeys of 'swish' and plaster built in the great days of the cocoa boom at the beginning of the century; others are of more traditional one-storey design; there are also modern concrete block dwellings, and many decrepit structures of corrugated iron and wooden planks. Roofing today is mostly of corrugated iron. The main through road and the new by-pass are of tarmac, but most other roads and alleys are of beaten earth. At the highest point stands the Presbyterian church with its tall spire, the large buildings of the Presbyterian Training College behind it. There are several other Christian churches of various denominations, and the town is surrounded by church and clan cemeteries. The town is divided into named wards or quarters. Today these have lost much of their former significance and need not concern us here.

The everyday population of Akropong is about 6,000. This number is doubled on most weekends when many Akropong people who live elsewhere come home for family, funeral and other gatherings. During the Odwira festival in September-October and at Christmas it is swelled by four or five times the everyday number, every house being filled by visiting kin. Wherever they may live they regard the town as their 'home-town' and return whenever they can, ultimately at their death to be buried with as elaborate a funeral as can be afforded.

On the plains between the narrow ridge on which the town stands and the River Densu there are many villages. Each is 'owned' by a particular town, and those attached to Akropong are 'owned' by the particular subclans of the town. Before the abolition of slavery at the end of the last century the villages were largely occupied by slaves, growing food and palm oil for the benefit of the owning subclan. Most villages are small, with only a dozen or so houses. Other plains settlements are larger, having been trading centres during the cocoa boom. Between the two world wars some of them were flourishing places, but since the decline of cocoa in the 1940s most have become little more than straggling villages. Those on the main roads have survived, with populations of several hundred people, mainly traders and farmers. Although these plains settlements are physically separated from Akropong they should be regarded as its satellites, with little independent viability.

Something should be said of the economy of the town. Like most other towns of southern Ghana, Akropong has an electricity supply from the Volta dam, most houses having at least one or two electric bulbs.

There is a piped water supply. Drainage of surface water is by drains and gullies, that of sewage being by domestic buckets collected at night by immigrant workers from northern Ghana. There are two private clinics and a private maternity home; but the main governmental health facilities are eight miles away at Mampong hospital.

Transport runs from Akropong to most other ridge towns, to Accra, Koforidua and elsewhere. Besides a regular and efficient bus service to Accra, based on the nearby town of Mamfe where there are garages and mechanics, there are many trucks and taxis that ply along the ridge. The villages are outside this road network and lack piped water, electricity and other services.

Market trade is important. There are two markets. One, on the edge of the town near the neighbouring Guan town of Abiriw, is large, with some hundred women traders, and is held twice weekly. There is also a small daily market near the centre of the town. The town has about a dozen shops, of various sizes and with consumer items of all kinds, and many stalls set outside individual houses, selling foodstuffs and everyday goods. In the evenings many street stalls sell cooked food. There are several bars. Specialist shops and stalls sell pots, fish, bread, drugs and herbal remedies, funeral items, and so on. There are two maize mills, several hairdressing salons, and many seamstresses and cloth sellers.

The important aspect of this trading system is that most goods sold are brought into the town from outside and consumed locally, brought with money that is also brought into the town by its members who work elsewhere. The local population cannot provide all its own food, let alone feed the weekend and other visitors, due to shortage of farm lands on the ridge. Foodstuffs are brought to the main market by wholesalers who buy them from producers elsewhere, in particular the highly productive farms of Krobo a few miles to the north. The items are brought by truck and sold to local traders. These sell to local women, who may consume them themselves, sell them from their own petty stalls and houses to other housewives, or sell them to women traders from other ridge towns. Certain other goods and services are available, but they are also from elsewhere (fish, meat, salt, firewood, drinks, etc.). And some important services come from outside. These include water, electricity, transport, and undertaking. This last is important: as a 'home-town', weekends are marked by many funerals. The nearest undertaker is at Larteh, some six miles away, and the nearest mortuary is at Mampong: and although a local shop deals in funeral items such as tents and chairs for the mourners, items such as the necessary brass and other bands for big funerals come from outside.

The people of Akropong (except for those of northern and Ewe origin, who comprise perhaps 10% of the population) belong to the matrilineal clans found throughout the Akan Twi-speaking area.[6] The distribution and relative sizes of clans in Akropong differ from those in other towns, reflecting the particular history of historical immigration into the state. I refer to parts of clans found in the town itself as 'subclans'. A subclan is divided into 'houses', there being typically two or three in a



Map 1: Ghana, showing location of Akropong, other Akuapem towns, and main neighbouring settlements. The ring shows the historic cocoa-growing areas. (From Polly Hill, The Migrant Cocoa-Farmers of Southern Ghana, 1963).

subclan. A 'house' is distinguished from other 'houses' of the same subclan by its different immigration history rather than by genealogical segmentation. A 'house' properly occupies a literal 'family house', and this was certainly the residence pattern until some fifty years ago. It is still found today and occupancy of a 'family house' is eagerly desired. The membership of a 'house' includes full members of the subclan by birth, spouses (although customarily spouses reside in their own family houses), resident affines, and the descendants of slaves and pawns. Before the abolition of slavery almost half of the town's population consisted of slaves, and their economic role was a crucial one.[7]

Each subclan has both a female head and a male head selected from the 'houses' in rotation. Each subclan owns its own lands and houses; is exogamous; takes care of its own inheritance matters; and has its own villages both in the plains and also west of the state in the rich cocoa lands of Akim and beyond. Although some younger people today think little of subclan affiliation, they are in a minority, and the sense of subclan identity and cohesion is very strong; election to subclan offices is much sought after and the object of perennial discussion and conflict. Each subclan in the town sees its central 'family house' as the nucleus of a web of subclan ties that spreads out across the state and indeed across all southern Ghana.

Land and Cocoa

The most important events of the 19th century following the coming of the Basel Mission in 1835 were the advent of cocoa, the abolition of slavery, and the assumption of colonial overrule. The main developments from 1900 to the present, as far as social process and organisation are concerned, have included change in the power of the king; the growth of new forms of stratification due to differences in wealth and education; an increase in the mobility of people during their lifetimes and in the range of the social region centred on the town; and changes in the composition of the network of settlements in the state and beyond it.

Before the development of the cocoa industry there were many contacts with the outside world: Akropong has never been an isolated settlement. There was much trade, in slaves, palm oil, rubber, cloth and other commodities, with Akwamu, Akim, Asante, the north, and the Ga, Danes and British of Accra.[8] The people who were involved were mostly royals, slaves, Basel Mission adherents, and a few important subclan leaders. A system of ranking (royals, chiefs, commoners, pawns and slaves) was both simple and also relatively unchanging.

Cocoa was introduced into Akuapem by the Basel Mission in the 1880s. It became an important crop after about 1890, and until swollen shoot disease in the 1940s was the mainstay of the national economy; it is still of great importance today. Most of the early cocoa farmers and traders came from Akuapem, first opening farms in the plains and then moving westwards into the Akim states, Asante, and farther west still.[9]

Akuapem has always been an agricultural area: there are no mines. Before the advent of cocoa, food was produced on farms along the ridge, and palm oil, the main export crop, on village plantations in the plains. The income from oil, grown mainly by slave labour, was considerable and led to a high standard of living for the free population of the town, with large houses, many slaves, elaborate funerals, and so on. The coming of cocoa both increased the income and widened its distribution. The first ventures into cocoa growing and trading were made by men and women who had already amassed capital by trading in slaves and palm oil. The first cocoa farms were opened in the plains on lands belonging to the town-based subclans, but after the turn of the century more farms were opened up west of the Densu. In the case of Akropong, lands were acquired in Akim with the help of fellow-clansmen resident there. These lands were bought by groups of people known as 'companies' formed from members of a particular 'house'. The 'company' bought the land which was then divided among its members.

After the abolition of slavery most former slaves became tenants or clients on the newly opened cocoa farms, transmitting one-third of their profit to the subclan head in Akropong, a pattern that remains today. A man bought a plot through being a member of a 'company'; he opened and cleared it with the help of his wives and children; he then moved to new farms purchased with the profits of the first, leaving tenants to work the existing one. Many tenants later bought their own farms, working them with migrant labour from the north; but few such men became as wealthy from cocoa as did the 'proper' members of the Akropong subclans. There is not space here to discuss the system of land inheritance, but it is clearly of the utmost importance in the growth of stratification. The principle is that a man owns a farm as the representative of his subclan, and at his death most of it is inherited by his subclan kin. But if it has been developed by his efforts and those of his wife and children, the children are left a portion which is theirs and their children's in perpetuity. In this way people can become landowners independently of their matrilineal kin, and can sell land, which is virtually impossible in the case of subclan lands. Of course, most such men are also members of Akropong subclans, although they tend to live on their farms outside the town rather than in it if most of their wealth comes from a paternal inheritance. This is especially so for those of slave origin who have inherited paternally, since they usually lack any real clan or kin ties with families in Akropong.

The Network of Migration

The people who live on farms to the west maintain social, economic, and familial ties with Akropong. Those living in the western parts of the Akim states and beyond may visit the town only once or twice a year, normally at Odwira, Christmas, and perhaps Easter; they also visit for funerals of close kin. Those living not too far from Koforidua and the plains of Akuapem itself visit much more often. But they use other towns for everyday trading and visiting. The largest are Koforidua, the capital of the Eastern Region of Ghana and some 25 miles west of Akropong, Nsawam, Suhum, Mangoase and other relatively recently founded towns on and near the railway line from Accra to Koforidua and Kumasi.

Akropong is thus the nucleus of a complex network of relations between members of its population who are migrants of various kinds who, wherever they move and work, regard it as their 'home-town'. A nuclear town of this kind appears to be important in that role largely because of the nature of the migration. It is not migration such as is found among the northern peoples of Ghana and neighbouring Sahel countries who move to the richer lands of the south: those migrants move mainly because of the poverty of their home areas. But the migrants of Akuapem are educated and sophisticated farmers, teachers, traders, businessmen and others who in the last hundred years have come to take leading economic, political, educational and religious roles in Ghana. The places to which they move, especially the larger centres, the seats of government and business, are seen as the places where individuals may acquire greater wealth than they can in Akropong itself, and where they may become members of various occupations, associations and networks which will give them higher status and in many cases even new identities (this is particularly significant for those of slave ancestry).

Migration from Akropong is of two kinds. In the first people simply leave the town permanently and become lost. Ultimately they forfeit rights in family houses, land and offices. There are many known cases of this migration but it is regarded as improper and is always a subject of adverse and often distressed comment. Many (though not all) cases of this kind of migration are people of slave ancestry who find that they can make a new life without the stigma of that ancestry. They are soon forgotten.

The second kind is a period of migration as the central part of an average life career. Due to lack of opportunity to acquire either a money income, a high social status or political office in the town itself, most people work outside it. This means either working as a farmer in the plains or farther west, or as a labourer, teacher, trader or businessman in Accra, Koforidua, Kumasi, Nsawam or more distant places that can offer opportunities. Most people spend much or all of their earning lives working elsewhere, but returning to Akropong at regular intervals. They are typically married during this period, the women also bearing children. Spouses living in Akropong have the choice of following the traditional pattern of separate residence for spouses, or the modern 'elite' one of co-residence. When living outside the town, whether in a city or in a village, spouses tend to share residence; but when visiting Akropong they may choose the traditional pattern instead. Which is chosen depends on many factors. The more important include having enough wealth to obtain living space for co-residence, level of education and ability to be accepted as members of a modern elite, the nature of subclan and family affiliation (those of high family status being likely to select the traditional pattern), and religious affiliation (those who are active in the Presbyterian Church being more likely to follow the modern pattern).

During migrants' working lives outside Akropong, most try to send

their children back there to school, under the care of the mothers' kin. The schools of the town are famous throughout southern Ghana and an education there is a good investment for a child's future in the modern world of government, business and education, as well as giving him or her a reputation as a potentially influential member of the subclan if he behaves well when at home.

After a normal working life, whether in a city or on a farm, but especially the former if in a well paid position, a migrant retires to Akropong. If possible he will occupy the room in his 'family house' which has been allocated to him during his working career for his visits to the town, and his wife will be given a room in her own natal 'family house'. If there are no rooms available, or if he has made much money, he may build himself a new concrete house. During retirement he may acquire high prestige by taking a responsible part in subclan affairs, and will try to do the same politically by taking part in palace affairs. Or he may do the same within the Presbyterian Church, the Order of Oddfellows, or some other association of which there are several in the town.

Home-Town, 'Custom' and Moral Community

Akropong itself is in many ways an important and flourishing centre. Building materials have been scarce for several years, and corrugated iron for roofs and paint for walls and doors virtually unobtainable by ordinary people. But the dinginess and air of dilapidation in much of the town are misleading: behind them a vigorous and wealthy social life continues.

Economically Akropong is hardly viable as an independent unit. It can produce some of its food, but certainly not enough to feed its normally resident population, as I have shown earlier. Weekend and more irregular visitors and the large schools must import most of theirs, a situation which has always existed within living memory. The visitors bring a great deal of money to the town, distributed through their kin by the many customary gifts made at visits, funerals, and other family occasions. And those who do not visit often send remittances which are similarly distributed.

Politically, Akropong is not of great national importance, although as the seat of the ruler of a state it is nationally represented and has great local importance. During the colonial period the administration of the state (then a district) was from Mampong, eight miles south, and not at Akropong, the seat of the kings (who often opposed colonial overrule). This choice has always annoyed Akropong as being traditionally incorrect, but Mampong is still the seat of many governmental agencies. Recently, however, due largely to the ruler's efforts, the new offices of the Akwapim Local Government have been established in the town. Although the judicial roles of king, queen-mother and chiefs have been weakened in past years, they still have important jural roles. The king today is rarely formally concerned with cases other than those to do with chiefship and the kingship itself. Chiefs carry out a great deal of largely

informal judicial work but their sanctions are slight compared to those of the past. But the chiefs, queen-mother and the king are highly regarded: they are all powerful people and respected by their subjects.

In what ways, then, does Akropong remain significant to its residents and those (far greater in number) who do not live there continually but regard themselves as 'Akropong people'? There are three main factors that are relevant: the sense of tradition, loyalty and cohesion offered to a dispersed population; the fact that it is a largely Christian town; and the fact that the subclans of the town continue to play centrally important roles in the lives of their members, wherever they may live.

Akropong is for its people the place where they and their ancestors have come from. In the past, this was a basic way of distinguishing free people from slaves, who were not free members of the 'home-town' even though partially absorbed into their owners' subclans. Today this aspect has fallen into desuetude. But Akropong is also the place of origin of 'custom' (amanne) which marks it off from other towns. Mere residence is not enough (northern immigrants and spouses from other towns may never be as real citizens even if born in the town), the essential factor being willing acceptance of a particular body of 'customs'. Allegiance to this 'custom' (which includes complete mastery of the prestigious Akropong dialect of Twi, an important factor)[10] is the most obvious and effective means of defining individual and group identity, especially since the same clans, personal names, and language are found throughout the whole Akan area of southern Ghana.

The second factor refers to the Presbyterian Church and its schools, from primary level to teachers' college, for which the town is famous. Most townspeople have been educated in these schools and their parents and even grandparents may also have been educated there and connected with the church. This factor distinguishes Akropong from most towns of similar size in Africa.

The third factor merits some discussion. It is often claimed, in Ghana and elsewhere, that the matrilineal clan and lineage are in some rather ill-defined way outmoded groupings in the modern world of trade, industry and large scale population movements, and that the family group based on them are fragile and ineffective, with high divorce rates and great instability.[11] Apart from there being a high divorce rate, none of the these claims are justified by the evidence. There are two questions here: what is the persistent role of these descent groups, and is the fact that they are matrilineal significant or not?

The 'house', a constituent part of the subclan, is a corporation in which are vested responsibility for allocation of land and houses, the determination of succession to offices concerned with this allocation, the settlement of internal disputes, the inheritance of rights in these forms of property, and the arrangement of marriages and funerals. The history of original immigration and settlement of subclans and their 'houses' is a central aspect of their sense of continuity. In addition,

the fact that most modern wealth (from cocoa and business) has sprung from investment in land and trade made many years ago by subclan representatives using 'house' capital, adds to the sense of importance of the 'house', which may be likened to a business corporation whose shares are held equally by its members. With the high degree of movement of their members throughout southern Ghana the persistence of 'houses' enables a sense of identity and cohesion to be maintained among their members, who would otherwise face ever-changing modern conditions as isolated individuals without effective support for their efforts being provided by subclan kin.

The second question is that of matriliny per se. I suggest that a matrilineal descent group is fully as effective as is a patrilineal one, and that, indeed, since under this particular matrilineal system filial inheritance is permitted and indeed expected, so that the interests of spouses and children as well as of siblings and sororal kin are fully recognised, matriliny is flexible as a basis for activities of many kinds.

It is as the nucleus of networks of subclan and 'house' links that the town--or more accurately, perhaps, the 'family house' situated in the town--retains its significance. It is only within the town that the relations between 'houses' of a subclan, and between subclans, are easily ordered and controlled, largely by the observance of subclan ties and obligations at funerals and family meetings.

At a death messages are sent to the heads of all family branches throughout Ghana and even beyond, and their members converge on Akropong for the funeral and inheritance ceremony. Funerals are held on Saturdays so that those working elsewhere can attend; and an agreed distribution of property of the deceased between the 'house' and the children is made on the following Monday. These meetings are extremely important. Although there is in one sense a break in 'custom' between Christians and non-Christians, it is not generally considered important in the context of family 'house' meetings--or perhaps more accurately they are temporarily forgotten at them. The Christian Presbyters attend the funerals and the meetings to determine inheritance in the case of the death of a Christian, and confirm it by its public recording in a Church record book. By this means the subclan and 'house' are assured of continuity; disputes over succession and inheritance are dealt with formally (thought not always finally, as disputes may fester for years); and the identity and cohesion of the family and networks of kinship of all kinds are reconfirmed and reinforced.

Finally there are meetings held during the week of the Odwira festival, when the subclan and 'house' elders account for their stewardship during the past year and when discussions are held on the groups' future welfare and advancement. These meetings are held in private and are regarded as extremely important: not to attend is tantamount to opting out of 'family' concerns.

One point should be made here: it is that although Akropong acts as a centre for the settlement of family and subclan disputes, including those over chiefship and related matters, this does not mean that

it is thereby in some way 'backward looking' or 'bound by tradition' in any negative sense. Although most people consider themselves bound by 'custom' it is in fact very noticeable that at family meetings to settle matters of succession and inheritance both traditional rules and personal wishes as expressed in testaments are carefully considered and accommodation made between them. As people say, 'it is the living who matter', and the known wishes of the deceased as well as traditional rules may be disregarded if it is considered that they would result in injustice to the interests of any one category of kin. The essential aim is always to make for personal equity within the framework of family and group continuity. This is exemplified particularly in the interests of widows and children being balanced against those of matrilineal kin.

So far I have discussed only Akropong, but it is, of course, only one of the seventeen ridge towns, although politically the most important. Most of its features are shared by the other towns: each is the seat of a chief, three of whom are divisional chiefs; each has its own set of subclans and 'houses', some those of the Akan and others being Guan; each has its own lands and its own farms and villages; each has its own annual festival and is the 'home-town' for its members who use it in the same way as do the people of Akropong; each has its own pattern of succession and inheritance; each has its own distinctive immigration histories, its own spirit cults and priests, and its own dialect of either Twi or Guan. There are, in short, seventeen town-centred networks of relations, of which Afropong is only one.

Akropong differs from the others in two important ways. It is the seat of the king and the main Christian and educational centre. As the seat of the king, the court is of great importance: chiefs and subchiefs are expected to assemble there on many occasions. These include regular state councils, individual visiting to pay respect to the ruler, and especially the great 'Durbar' of the Odwira festival, when they pay public homage to the king. But little of this affects the internal organisation of local subclans and the settlement of their internal disputes. The facts that the Twi-speaking groups of Akim ancestry are in a minority and that the state was founded only as late as the early 18th century, have meant that there is always great political fluidity. From the viewpoint of other towns, especially those that are large and remote, such as Larteh, Akropong is of little everyday importance. This is expressed in the almost continuous efforts to achieve autonomy and even secession that have featured in Akuapem's history.[12]

Reference must be made here to the ritual or moral topography of Akuapem culture. Like all peoples, the people of Akropong hold a particular view of their moral universe. All the people in Akuapem hold that the state is a single moral unity, maintained by the proper ritual behaviour of the Omanhene and his subjects: it is at the centre of the world. Each of the seventeen ridge towns, even the smallest of two hundred people only, is a 'town' of the same order in cosmological terms as all the others. Each town sees itself as at the centre of this 'map', with the sixteen other towns and its own satellite settlements close to it, with the satellites of other towns and the surrounding non-Akuapem

towns lying beyond this closely linked and morally bounded circle. For example, even though Nsawam is by far the largest settlement in all Akuapem, it is new and is regarded as merely one of the satellite settlements of Aburi. In a very real sense, it has no proper inhabitants but only members of other 'home-towns' who happen to live and work in it. Few of its members wish to bear their children or to die there: these are proper only in one's 'home-town'. This moral or ritual topography gives a sense of historical unity and persistence to the ever-fluid actual population of the state, helps to explain the importance in both cultural and structural terms of the ridge towns.

The 'home-town' is thus a ritual centre, the nucleus of a 'moral community': but how can it be defined with greater precision and with greater comparative reference? We may discern two ideal types of town, at least in Akuapem (and I suggest elsewhere also). They mark the ends of a continuuum and perhaps of an historical process of growth. These two types may be represented by Nsawam and by Akropong.

Nwawam is not a 'home-town', but a 'centre of articulation'. Such a centre is a meeting place, typically founded as a trading or administrative settlement. It is a centre of articulation between two systems or modes of production or of two levels of government. Its population--or most of it--is recently immigrant, changing by continual in- and out-migration, and of mixed origins, whether in ethnic, clan or other terms. There is no need to enlarge on its other qualities, but they include such features as the possibility of rapid individual mobility and change of status irrespective of descent and family ties; landlordism in place of house ownership by descent group; often an imbalance in the 'normal' demographic ratios of sex and age; and the beginnings, at least, of an urban proletariat.

In contrast, we have the 'home-town', the centre that has developed an organic solidarity and a single structure. In the words of the people of Akropong, it is a place of 'custom' (amanne), the seat of ancestors. The 'home-town' has developed an internal authority structure which is centred upon the royal or chiefly 'stool', with its ordered succession and its control of hierarchy, and its many symbols of corporateness. We return here to the notion of 'custom.' 'Custom' not only identifies a stable population, it first creates it; and it is never static but is always developing so as to incorporate further population elements and to include them in the common identity. The populations of the 17 'home-towns' of Akuapem are each of disparate ethnic origins, but each has been welded into a single urban community by observance of the town's 'custom.' It also enables its adherents to accept and use historically changing opportunities without internal disruption, by permitting new organisations to appear with new aims but with existing and effective sanctions for their achievement: it is surely significant that the people of Akropong and Akuapem have been among the most adaptive, innovative, and risk-taking entrepreneurs in West Africa, despite holding traditional 'custom' in such a high regard.

Part of the welding of a diverse population into a structured community involves economic and political patronage, forms of protection

for incoming groups. I suggest that a 'home-town' is always one in which there is social stratification and hierarchy: there is not space to discuss this here but this development is a crucial one. Competition between subclans, ethnic and other elements, and between strata in the system of hierarchical differentiation, leads to conflicts and contradictions in the structure. These are controlled, inhibited or resolved by the operation of periodic and other rituals in which 'custom' is reaffirmed. In the case of Akropong this is achieved particularly by the annual performance of the Odwira ('purification') ritual cycle. It is largely for this reason that such towns may be known as 'ritual centres'.

A final distinction is in the context of growth. Rapid growth--in crude terms of size--would seem to occur mainly in the centres of articulation; in the 'home-towns' the 'growth' is rather in complexity of structure, and indeed the everyday population may often decline over time (although balanced by the 'real' total population, as in the case of Akropong). We may therefore distinguish two processes of urban growth: in the case of centres of articulation, growth is by a process of incorporation of discrete elements into a single settlement bound only by mechanical solidarity; in the case of 'home-tonws', it is by a process of structuration and concomitant ritualisation. We may suggest that the former may develop over time into the latter, but there is no space in which this may be discussed here. It leads to problems of the nature of the socio-economic region of which a 'home-town' such as Akropong is the nucleus or node. We cannot fully understand the functions and development of the latter without consideration of the former. This consideration is crucial, but must be made elsewhere.

FOOTNOTES

[1]This paper is a revised version of that presented to the conference on small towns in Africa. For inclusion in this volume it has had to be shortened considerably, and one section, on the place of the town in social development, has been omitted entirely. A much longer account of the town is in preparation. I am fully aware that this article is essentially a paper presented to a seminar and as such is merely an outline statement offered as a basis for discussion. Many points in it merit much longer consideration than can be given in the space permitted here.

I carried out research in Akropong for a total of twenty months during 1976 and 1977. The work was financed by grants from the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, and the Social Science Research Council, London. My stay in Ghana was under the auspices of the Department of Sociology, University of Cape Coast. I wish to express my gratitude to these institutions. I owe thanks to many people in Akropong. Here I mention only Nana Addo Dankwa III, Okuapehene; Nana Boafo Ansah II, Krontihene; and Mr. Ofori Owusu-Ansa: the many others who helped me so generously will be thanked in my forthcoming book on social change and stratification in Akropong-Akuapem.

The term 'home-town' is that used by Ghanaians when speaking English when referring to the Twi word kurom and the complex set of meanings of that word. It has already been used in reference to the Akuapem towns by Brokensha (1972).

[2]I use the spelling Akuapem for the state, as being that generally adopted in the standard orthography for Twi; but I retain Akwapim for the geographical area, as the conventional orthography used in maps.

[3]The Akan include the Asante (Ashanti), Fante and many other groups in Ghana and the Ivory Coast (see Manoukian 1950). The Guan, the indigenous occupants of southern and central Ghana, are today represented by various scattered populations of which the Guan of Akuapem and the Gonja are numerically the most important.

[4]For the history of Akuapem, see Kwamena-Poh 1973. For a general account of the state, see the collection of essays by various authors edited by Brokensha (1972).

[5]A recent study of the royal rituals of Akuapem has been made by Michelle V. Gilbert; it is as yet unpublished. An earlier study, of the value system, was made by Helaine Minkus (also unpublished).

[6]The best account of Akan clans (abusua, pl. mmusua) is by Fortes (1969). The clan system in Akropong and Akuapem differs from that in Asante as described by Fortes and, earlier, by Rattray (1923,1929).

[7]Akuapem slavery differed in many important respects from that found in Asante and other Akan areas, but details need not be given here.

[8]See Reynolds (1974).

[9]The astonishing story of the Akuapem cocoa-farmers has been told by Hill (1963, 1970) and Johnson (1964/5).

[10]The Akropong dialect of Twi was that adopted by the Basel Mission in the 19th century and so has become the standard dialect in the literature.

[11]See Douglas (1969) and also, for a somewhat contrary view, Fortes (1971).

[12]See Brokensha (1966).

APPENDIX I

SMALL URBAN CENTERS IN RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA

SUMMARY PROJECT STATEMENT

July, 1977

The following pages provide a brief introduction to this interdisciplinary research project and a general description of the salience of small urban centers. This general theoretical introduction to the study will be amended and supplemented as the project proceeds.

The project is directed by Professor Aidan Southall, in cooperation with a committee consisting of Professors Fred Hayward, Marvin Miracle, M. Crawford Young, Jan Vansina, and H. Oluwasanmi.

Description of the Small Urban Centers Project

The key elements in the focus of the project are Rural Development and Small Urban Centers. For many Africanists in the social sciences, as well as men of affairs involved in development-oriented activities, Rural Development, though a very old idea, has come to stand for a new approach: which seeks to understand the human and social (political, economic, psychological) problems which most experts now agree are more fundamental, more complex and more intractable than technical problems of training manpower, fertilizing crops or supplying capital. Rural Development thus impoles a new appraoch which has learned from disillusionment with the discredited theories which dominated the first Development Decade. By Rural Development we understand most essentially a rising level of material well-being, achieved by rural populations through their own effective efforts, appropriately and properly supplemented by national and international assistance, in such a way as to further the complementary goals of equality and liberty.

Small Urban Centers are the most neglected and most strategic key to problems of Rural Development. One of the most glaring gaps in the analysis of contemporary African societies and the problems of the rural poor is at the level of the small towns which dot the countryside as points of articulation between the national systems of marketing, distribution, and policy development on the one hand and the interests and productivity of the rural poor on the other. Many studies of rural societies and economies by social scientists relate to areas which include these centers, yet the studies usually ignore them to concentrate on the strictly "rural" population. On the other hand, nearly all the urban studies concentrate on large cities, usually the national and industrial capitals.

The small centers, however, are strategic for an understanding of both the inputs into rural societies and economies from outside agencies and the outputs of needs and interests of these rural societies. They also reflect local, micro-situations, and specialized ecological niches, which cannot be interpreted or understood by the analysis of aggregate statistics. They require intensive study, of which the face to face, participant observation method of social anthropology is an important component.

These small town centers are points of distribution of agricultural implements, fertilizers, and new crop expertise to the rural population. From the rural producers, these small centers aggregate market and cash-crop produce for export to urban populations and foreign markets; therefore, they are key points of articulation of incentives for greater productivity with the complex socio-economic interests of the rural poor. At the distribution level, they dispense the goods provided by the national politico-economic system--the consumer goods (small shops and stores), medical care (dispensaries, clinics, and sometimes, hospitals), education (the first level of non-village senior primary schools which track students to secondary levels), dispute arbitration and law enforcement (the first level of police and court appeal outside the village-headman or junior chief level). Furthermore, they are points of meeting between "customary" and national law. Recently, some of these places also witnessed dramatic change from expatriate (principally Asian and European) shopkeepers to indigenous African operators. In the political sector, these small urban places normally include the lowest level of petty bureaucracy, i.e., the organs of agricultural extension, cooperatives, police, and party. Thus they are points of enforcement of national policy and of distribution of national administrative services.

Conversely, they also are points at which local rural interests are aggregated and expressed to government and party. They are the loci of rural expressions of need and of discontent or resistance to policies. Socially, the lowest scale urban places are threats to the legitimacy of the authority figures of rural societies (fathers, husbands, headman, chiefs) and therefore points for the congregation of those who seek to escape those societies--principally the youth and sometimes wives. They also are sources of new ideas and belief systems through adult education, the modeling of semi-urban life styles and assumptions, and the overt proselytizing of new religious systems (principally Islam and Christianity). They are what some would call "modernizing centers," source of innovation, politicization, mobilizations, and national integration. Social stratification and the emergence of elite interests occur dramatically in these communities through the social mobility that is possible there--both through acquisition of more renumerative occupations, statuses, and incomes and through onward migration to national capitals and industrial centers. They are points of penetration of new languages and more cosmopolitan cultures and of the penetration of the norms and values of these new cultures into the kinship order. On the other hand, they may also be loci of ethnic identity and covert or overt opposition to the policies of the nation state.

While these small centers of incipient urban culture perform such important functions for village and nation, they often remain "rural

places" in official statistics and frequently are termed "villages." Indeed, they do have very diverse origins. Some began first as very large villages at crossroads, especially in densely populated areas such as Eastern Nigeria. More typically in East, Central and Southern Africa, they began as railway depots, cattle and grain marketing board offices, cotton stores and ginneries, coffee curing works, general markets, cattle-watering and innoculation centers in nomadic and semi-nomadic areas, mission stations, school, hospital, and administrative centers in rural districts. From diverse origins, they have become local towns whose raison d'etre remains the agrarian economy. They lie below the level of the district headquarters and rarely contain more than 7,000 - 8,000 persons. There is, of course, a variety and hierarchy of such small centers rather than any single unique type. Nevertheless, in spite of their diversity, they perform common functions in channeling inputs into rural small holding societies and economies; therefore they are a very important but relatively under-researched aspect of the rural poverty problem. It is at this level that the problem of migration from rural to urban areas begins. If small urban centers, at several levels, can be given the services and amenities required to hold an appropriate part of the population in them, the problem of out-migration swelling the numbers of unemployed in the larger cities would be solved. In every country there is a critical threshold below which small towns are losing their population and above which they are holding it.

The project will focus on the interaction of these small urban places with their rural hinterlands. This focus emerges from our conviction that an investigation of rural poverty or rural development policy alone is inadequate: rather, the investigator must research the extent to which policy and the delivery of services (production, health, educational, and administrative) through the political and bureaucratic structures provide incentive or disincentive for increased rural production of goods and services. It is these services and goods which are so highly desired as sources of food and foreign exchange for the nation and of increased welfare for the rural producer. Our study will concentrate on the impact of these small urban places on that process, and on rural and national influences on the small centers as well.

APPENDIX II

SMALL URBAN CENTERS IN RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA

PERSPECTIVES, DEFINITIONS, HYPOTHESES

Aidan Southall
July, 1977

Definition of Rural Development

1. Raising the level of material well-being of the rural population as a whole through their own efforts appropriately assisted by external official or voluntary action.

2. Differences of opinion center upon a number of aspects and implications of the processes which should be included in the definition. If the well-being of the rural population as a whole is to be improved, this inevitably means a more equitable distribution of the benefits of development than in the past. In fact, achieving more equitable distribution is an accelerating factor in itself, hastening the emergence of a mass market, which will make internal industrial production profitable and permit continuous growth. It is only if improvement results from the successful efforts of the people themselves, facilitated in all appropriate ways by outside assistance, that such development can become self-sustaining and progressive. Some would include the improvement of social services for education, health, and nutrition. But it is axiomatic that without good education, nutrition and health, well-being cannot improve. In some areas better health and nutrition is an absolute prerequisite, while in others it will inevitably be an accompaniment of the process. It is likewise to be assumed that the attainment of other social and cultural goals and satisfactions will be impossible without a rise in the general level of material well-being, but with it will also require improvements in organization and institutions. Nor can these goals be attained without the achievement of an appropriate balance between population, natural resources and productive capacities.

3. Self-sustaining development of this kind cannot occur without increased production and exchange of goods and services from within rural localities for those imported from without.

Definitions and Characteristics of Small Urban Centers

4. To the extent that such development does occur, points of concentration of functions, processes and the persons who operate them are bound to emerge (see chart, p. 372).

5. It is to such points of concentration that we refer as small urban centers in rural development.

6. They are the crucial interface between the state and its institutional structures and the rural population.

Contextual, Institutional and Trend Propositions

7. Given the nature and composition of the new nations of Africa, the state is the indispensable agency for creating certain necessary conditions of rural development, beyond a low level relative self-sufficiency or subsistence, by ensuring order and security for the rural society itself, as well as for the national institutions, by providing the new infrastructure of roads and railways, schools and health facilities and supplying credit, marketing, seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, and advisory services. These services have been provided both directly by the state and also by expatriate voluntary agencies and foreign entrepreneurs under the umbrella of state protection and approval.

8. Since political independence, power has been increasingly centralized in the national institutions, progressively eliminating regional autonomy, replacing locally constituted institutions at the base of the governmental pyramid with hierarchically subordinated appendages of the centralized state.

9. Explicitly political mechanisms for integrating rural populations into the political process, through elected representative local government councils and services, parties and cooperatives, have tended to shrivel or disappear.

10. The resulting stagnation of the rural sector, combined with the expansion of civilian bureaucracy and military forces at the center, has compelled the latter to impose ever heavier pressure on the rural economy to produce more and more exportable commodities for their support.

11. The fiscal burden of central governments on rural populations has likewise increased.

12. Centrally formulated policies for rural development have tended to concentrate on sporadic, spectacular initiatives, such as group or state farms and mechanization, whose costs have been underestimated and whose benefits to the rural population have been disappointing.

13. There has been a concentration on urgent short-term results where long term perspectives were needed. Major policy innovations can only gradually be diffused, and short deadlines may subvert otherwise valid policies by outstripping the institutional capacity for implementation, leading to coercion, resistance and disorganization.

14. Coercion by the central government agencies has usually been counterproductive in rural development.

15. The centralization of power and the starving of locally autonomous political institutions have inevitably led to a lack of efficiency and responsiveness on the part of the latter, accentuated by the low qualifications of administrative personnel and their liability to frequent transfer.

16. In the absence of explicit measures to the contrary, the normal delivery of government services to the rural areas tends to benefit the rural elites disproportionately.

17. The rapid expansion of education at the local level has not been integrated with the other agencies and policies of rural development.

18. The failure to supply adequate credit leads to the exploitation of farmers and consumers by the traders in the small centers, who can restrict entry and gain monopoly power. This is more evident for commodities which require substantial capital in the marketing process because of long storage, transport costs or complicated processing. Competition is further eliminated by crop buyers dividing up producing zones and agreeing not to trespass into one another's territory.

19. Cartels and other forms of restraint of competition often work successfully among both male and female traders in the small urban centers because of the social pressure which can be brought to bear against those who attempt to break the economic discipline of the trade group.

20. Where non-African merchants dominated the small urban centers they provided wholesale services and access to world capital markets. Their stranglehold was bitterly resented, but where they have been expelled, access to world capital markets has been cut off and wholesale channels have not been adequately replaced, although a new class of African businessmen has benefited.

21. Merchants' loans to small farmers frequently charge interest at 200% per annum or more. They are typically secured by unharvested crops. On the other hand, West African farmers in effect extend credit to merchants in the yam and livestock trades by taking deferred payment on their deliveries. Government agricultural credit banks and cooperatives remain too centralized and remote. They reach few farmers and suffer default rates of 30% or more. Cooperatives provide a valuable mechanism for articulating and supplying rural needs, as well as for mobilizing and stimulating rural productive forces. They are one of the institutions whose organs contribute to the clustering tendency which can crystallize in small urban centers. They have been mismanaged both from above and below, with too much as well as too little control. They need training, experience, and the gradual test of responsibility in order to succeed, and their great potential is still unrealized.

22. Given the fact that rural development efforts so far have been in general so disappointing, it is obvious that empirical studies will document the causes of failure more than those of success. However,

the circumstances of the former are the best indication of the requirements for the latter. It follows from this that most hypotheses on rural development must take the form of assuming conditions which do not now prevail. It has therefore been necessary to state some of the most pervasive characteristics of the present economic and political condition of rural areas, on the basis of which to formulate positive hypotheses on the requirements for successful rural development and the part which the small urban centers must play in it. Nor can it be forgotten that all this occurs in a context of rapid population growth. If this is allowed to cause increasing pressure on land, employment opportunities and services at a pace which economic growth cannot surpass, then the goals of rural development will recede further and be impossible to attain.

23. Our hypotheses concern the internal structure, institutions and functions of small centers, their relationships to one another and spatial distribution, the optimum type and quality of relationships between them and the rural population on the one hand and on the other with the larger centers--the regional and provincial capitals, the national capitol and the central government. If the general picture is bleak, there are important areas of relative prosperity nonetheless and although the success of these is sometimes at the expense of less successful (and often more remote) areas, careful analysis can extract from the criteria of success which can be generalized to the rest.

General Hypotheses

24. Many local operations and services are necessarily tiered, because they concern decreasing numbers at successive levels, as in the school system and because successively more specialized and scarce personnel and more expensive equipment is involved (see chart, p. 372).

25. The more comprehensively and systematically rural development is planned and assisted by the state and its regional agencies, the more certain it is that the local points of concentration will assume a tiered structure, in two and eventually three levels, as the practical experience of countries as diverse as Israel and China has already demonstrated.

26. In contemporary discussions of development, the Chinese model obtrudes more and more, till one is moved to ask how seriously official development agencies from good capitalist countries can take it. Are certain structural, organizational and procedural features of it valid independently of the ideology? This is one of the most important questions to be answered. For the moment we assume that the basic structure of the three-tiered commune--production brigade--production team hierarchy is a valid model even without the Maoist ideology, though with markedly different types of organization and role. The interrelation of units at adjacent levels may vary from the ✳ star model, in which interaction is mainly with the center of the next higher level, to the ⊛ wheel model, in which more interaction is between neighboring centers of the same level. Of course, the distinction is a matter of degree.

27. Our general hypothesis is that the three-tier structure of small centers is inadequately developed in Africa and that rural development is inhibited thereby.

28. Large parts of rural Africa are not adequately served by small urban centers at all. Some areas may approach a three-tier system, with the District H.Q. as the tertiary level at the top, but the secondary and primary centers below it are inadequately formed, too few in number and poorly distributed.

29. The accompanying schematic chart (p. 372) indicates the various services and functions which may appear at each of the three levels.

30. Through progressive examination of the literature, and eventually through further fieldwork devoted purposively to this end, we shall build the three-tier model into a much more refined diagnostic measure of success or failure, from which it will be possible to diagnose the change necessary for successful development in any particular area.

31. During the early stages of development, in the relatively sparse conditions of most of Africa, it will be more efficient the more all necessary functions are integrated within a single tiered hierarchy in any locality, rather than haphazardly distributed, or dispersed through separate points. The movement of services downwards may thus represent positive developments.

32. At a later stage, or under conditions of much higher density, as perhaps in parts of West Africa, such concentration may reach the point of diminishing returns, and greater dispersion may be necessary to avoid undue friction and overload.

33. It is to be noted, however, that the development of an adequate three-tier structure is itself probably the most successful way to achieve that decentralization which is now so necessary.

34. The pattern and hierarchy of concentration points will approximate closely to the principles of central place theory the more fully responsive the central government is to local needs and, of course, the more evenly natural resources are distributed over the landscape in the first place.

35. The transformation of local society will be more successful the more closely the local managers and power holders can identify with the local community. This requires optimum balance between the level of local identification and the level of specialized training and competence.

36. (a) The more laissez-faire the national economic policy, the more rural development will depend upon the stimulus and demonstration effect of successful individual entrepreneurs, both in commerce, small industry and farming, making it all the harder to secure equitable distribution of the gains of development and to raise the level of the rural poor.

(b) Its responsiveness to the expression of local needs, while transcending obstructive local vested interests, related to its ability to identify with local people and the adequacy of its representative institutions.

(c) Its capacity to transmit central policy acceptably, while contributing to its adaptation to local needs, and providing brokers in face to face contact with the people at the grass roots. This capacity in turn depends upon the presence of a certain critical mass of individuals, with a kind of collective experiential base, which enables them to act as an evaluative filter for government policy, with sufficient confidence to oppose it if necessary.

(d) Its coordination of all processes flowing between center and locality to minimize friction, whether from distance, lack of contact, or misunderstanding.

(e) The efficiency of the basic services provided:

Water, irrigation works, electricity, postal facilities, banking and credit, roads, bus lines, goods transportation, marketing, consumers' goods, retail and wholesale supplies, storage for crops and merchandise, bicycles, tractors, drugs, seeds, fertilizers, grading facilities, local processing, bicycle and auto repair, small labor intensive industries;

Adequate land under appropriate tenure;

Crafts: building, furniture, tailoring, shoemaking and repair, plumbing, pottery, basketry, metalworking, tourist materials;

Schooling and health;

Conflict resolution and protection, decision-making and problem solving procedures;

Recreation and leisure facilities and activities: radio, television, cinema, library, bars, dance halls, festivals, drama, farmers' clubs and competitions;

Religion: churches and mosques.

38. (a) In general, the hierarchy of points of concentration will more effectively assist rural development: the more confident the population feels of satisfying rewards for its labors;

(b) the more equitable the distribution of resources, crop receipts, and of tax burdens between town and country, rich and poor, bureaucrats, traders and farmers;

(c) the more secure the population feels from arbitrary oppression, violence or exploitation by police, army, local chiefs, landowners, businessmen, or political bosses;

(d) and from inflation and price fluctuation (short-term seasonal or longer-term international);

(e) the more opportunity is provided for local craft production and intermediate processing by appropriate national policies of import control and local production of suitable items of intermediate technology;

(f) the more flexible the local kinship system and other deeply rooted bases of solidarity, to aid in the mobilization of capital for investment, of self-help, labor and entrepreneurship for increased production, while avoiding the inhibiting effects of excessively rigid or parasitic obligations;

(g) the more opportunity is provided for social mobility within and for migration without, consonant with maintaining a population of numbers and quality appropriate to the stage reached;

(h) the more stimulus is provided by way of transmitting new ideas: techniques, activities, organizations, games, amusements, crops, foods and ways of cooking, drinks, dress, shoes, hair-styles, ornaments, dances; that is to say, increasing both consumption and satisfaction as well as production, while at the same time inhibiting counterproductive influences such as excessive alcoholism.

39. It is the optimum combination of all these factors (rather than simple maximization since there are potential conflicts between one goal and another here and there) which is most likely to bring success. Further investigation may reveal that certain key factors may be taken to subsume the others.

40. The more successfully material development harnesses the energies of the population, the less destructive ethnic conflict will be, for there is evidence that more positive ethnic accommodations are being worked out in the small centers than on the national scene.

Theoretical Perspectives

41. The obvious problem throughout is that the factors are so numerous, the possibilities of situational variation so multitudinous, as to make the hope of any kind of effective generalization or prediction seem remote.

2. The appropriate theoretical model which can comprehend such a field must be one which sees no permanent or rigid systemic or structural boundaries in what are obviously interlinked chains of phenomena, but which can empirically determine discontinuities in the situation, which justify the strategic temporary isolation of one problem area after another, followed by study of their interlinking and overlap, each successive perspective permitting the estimation of its own particular inputs and outputs and the type of feedback within and between them.

We firmly believe and firmly assert that the problems of rural development can never be solved by the attempt to isolate key causes and thus to find simple answers. This type of theoretical model is particularly appropriate because it deals with goals of change and development, not of equilibrium, demonstrating how restraints present in a situation

operate to reduce the abstractly possible number of alternative eventualities, so that a particular sequence of change can be indicated as most likely to follow a particular stimulus, given the conditions of the system under consideration, because it is one of the few which could occur within a relatively indeterminate situation. Of course, there must be hypotheses which can be tested and for this to be so they must be explicit and precise, but since the fundamental problem of rural development is rooted in the total social situation, it is on this dimension that it must be tackled head on, if long-term progress is to be made.

Accurate specification of relevant factors is not enough. It is accurate specification of the crucial variants in the relationship between the various factors that will provide the key to successful prescription in concrete situations. That is why theories, concepts, definitions and hypotheses have to be interdisciplinary and why our interdisciplinary team is peculiarly appropriate to the task. This is not a case of naively attempting to change everything at once, desirable though that might be, but rather that what can be most strategically and successfully changed first can only be determined by proper analysis of total situations.

The goal of the first phase of research will be to examine the multitude of variables, endeavour to identify those which are most strategic, and explore and experiment with the most fruitful ways in which they can be built into models which will effectively further the analysis required.*

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* In these hypotheses, we deliberately have excluded all bibliographic references for the sake of brevity, but can supply them if desired. Perhaps the closest work in comparative relevance to our interests is that of E. A. J. Johnson in India, to name only one.

Similarly, our emphasis on hierarchies of points of concentration may seem to cry out for critical reference to central place theory. While not denying the power and stimulus of this model, we would stress that central place theory, like economic theory, has omitted some of the deeper social forces and motivations now seen to be highly relevant; the problem of relative weighting for the factors which are included has never been adequately solved and requires empirical evidence for its solution, especially in combining factors such as marketing, provision of services and the more intangible yet critical amenities; furthermore, central place theory has been closely tied to laissez-faire assumptions of liberal capitalism and needs careful modification in other situations.

POSSIBLE COMPONENTS OF TIERED CONCENTRATION POINTS

PRIMARY LEVEL c. 9-10 mile radius	Crossroads Ferry Bridge Bus Stop Cycle Paths	General Shops Local Market Piped Water Electricity Maize Mill Hand Hullers	Cultural/Linguistic Homogeneity "Headman" Moot Development Cmmt.	Bush School Descent Grp. Cncls. Work Groups Beer Clubs	Carpenters Tailors Cobblers
SECONDARY LEVEL c. 18-20 mile radius	Post Office Church Mosque Main Road	Specialized Shops Central Market Gas Station Cycle Repair	Cultural/Linguistic Heterogeneity "Chief" Lower Court Local Council	Primary School Dispensary Police Post Recreation/Dance Hall Library	Plumbers Builders Extension Workers Co-op Branch
TERTIARY LEVEL c. 27-30 mile radius	Sewerage Repair Garage Bus Depot Railway Station	Wholesalers Cotton Ginnery Coffee Curing Silos/Storage	Mayor Magistrate's Crt. Higher Council Planning Cmmt. Administration	Secondary School Farm/Vocational School Hospital Police Office Tax Office	Credit Bank Co-op Office Agric. Office Vet. Office Water Office Fishery Office

N.B. This scheme is inclusive. Only some, but not all components would probably be found in any empirical situation. It is a representation of the possible rather than the actual, but of course it is not exhaustive.

Central government advice, instruction, command, finance, personnel, enforcement, flows through tertiary and secondary to primary centrs, each level acting as a filter on the way. Complementarily, demands, representations and tax payments flow the other way. Non-governmental supra-local institutions of all kinds, especially economic, provide downward flows of goods and services, while rural production is passed upwards from primary through secondary and tertiary centrs towards the national center or national outlets, with various stages of processing occurring on the way. While the different levels are bound together by such upward and downward flows, within each one persons are bound together in networks of relationships, roles, institutions, and factions in complementary opposition generating frictions as well as internal solidarities. The primary level, nearest to the grass roots, is represented at the top to emphasize the importance and the problems of communication flow from the locality towards the center.

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