

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20523  
BIBLIOGRAPHIC INPUT SHEET

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*Batch 95*

*D*  
ARDA

1. SUBJECT CLASSIFICATION	A. PRIMARY Social sciences	SD00-0000-0000
	B. SECONDARY Political science	

2. TITLE AND SUBTITLE  
Communalism, bureaucracy and access to public services in Afro-Asia; an overview

3. AUTHOR(S)  
Von der Mehden, F.R.

4. DOCUMENT DATE 1978	5. NUMBER OF PAGES 32p.	6. ARC NUMBER ARC
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7. REFERENCE ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS  
Rice


8. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES (*Sponsoring Organization, Publishers, Availability*)  
(In Program of Development Studies. Paper no. 89)

9. ABSTRACT

10. CONTROL NUMBER PN-AAG-228	11. PRICE OF DOCUMENT
12. DESCRIPTORS Africa Asia Civil Service Public services	13. PROJECT NUMBER 93105200
	14. CONTRACT NUMBER AID/otr-C-1394 Res.
	15. TYPE OF DOCUMENT

ARDA  
PN-AAG-22E

**RICE UNIVERSITY**  
**Houston, Texas**



**Program of Development Studies**

PROGRAM OF DEVELOPMENT STUDIES  
156 Sewall Hall  
WILLIAM MARSH RICE UNIVERSITY  
Houston, Texas 77001

Paper No. 89

Communalism, Bureaucracy and Access to Public  
Services in Afro-Asia: An Overview

by

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Fall, 1978

The author is Albert Thomas Professor and Chairman of Political Science, and Director of the Program of Development Studies at Rice University. This paper was originally prepared for delivery at the 1978 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association in New York City, August 31-September 3, 1978. The research reported in the paper was supported by the Agency for International Development under contract AID/ocr-C-1394 on "Distribution of Gains, Wealth and Income from Development."

Program Discussion Papers are preliminary materials circulated to stimulate discussion and critical comment. References in publications to discussion papers should be cleared with the authors to protect the tentative character of these papers.

## Abstract

### Communalism, Bureaucracy and Access to Public Services in Afro-Asia: An Overview

by

Fred R. von der Mehden

This paper is an analysis of communal representation in bureaucracies of Afro-Asia and how it affects access to government services. An initial effort is made to show how most Afro-Asian political systems contain communally imbalanced bureaucracies. Malrepresentation may be in terms of the extent to which the entire administration does not resemble the general public in terms of ethnic, racial or religious characteristics. It may also refer to the composition of public services at particular levels or within particular organizations within which certain communal groups might concentrate.

Maldistribution has generally resulted from colonial policies, spatial distortion, postindependence communal strife and/or cultural characteristics. It has affected access to public services in terms of communal aid to kinsmen, sanctions against opponents and aid to those near urban centers. Two brief examples of how the communal composition of the bureaucracy affects access are provided. In the social security, social welfare areas communally imbalanced public servants benefit by administering the programs, residing in areas with the administrative and health infrastructures and often being the sole beneficiaries of the programs. Military and police also often display malrepresented membership which impacts on policy during periods of communal strife and military rule.

Communalism, Bureaucracy and Access to Public  
Services in Afro-Asia: An Overview

This paper seeks to survey communal representation in contemporary Afro-Asian bureaucracies and its impact upon access to government services. A communally representative bureaucracy is defined as one that resembles the general public in terms of ethnic, racial and/or religious characteristics. This analysis will cover three areas:

- 1) types of communal representation and factors responsible for disparities,
- 2) the manner in which these disparities may affect access to government services and,
- 3) two illustrative policy areas that would appear to be influenced by communal forces.

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The issue of communal representation in bureaucracy has been a latent but only incompletely studied phenomenon in Afro-Asia. To the extent that scholars of LDCs could take their intellectual keys from the West, the major questions of bureaucratic representation appeared to center on class rather than ethnic, religious or racial imbalance. Early analysis tended to reflect an emphasis on the role of the middle class as in J. D. Kingsley's classic Representative Bureaucracy: An Interpretation of the British Civil Service, W. L. Warner and colleagues' work on the

American executive; and T. Bottomore's and R. Kelsall's respective studies of French and British higher civil service. Even V. Subramanian's American Political Science Review article on "Representative Bureaucracy" stressed the role of class and gave little attention to communal factors (his writing on India on the other hand did focus in part on caste and religion).<sup>1</sup> Later work by K. Meier, B. Jones, and C. Kaufman admitted that little was known as to the influence of the social and professional background of the bureaucrat on patterns of service distribution.<sup>2</sup>

The initial Afro-Asian interest in communal representation came with the decline of colonialism. It was primarily related to Africanization, Burmanization, Kenyanization or whatever phrases were current to describe the movements to replace Europeans, and to a lesser extent, nonindigenous Asians, with local citizens. Work by A. Adu and others was the scholarly side to what became a highly political issue just prior to and following the European retreat from their colonial empires.<sup>3</sup>

With the achievement of independence a more subtle and intransigent problem arose--imbalance in terms of indigenous religious, ethnic, and racial categories. Questions regarding this type of representation

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<sup>1</sup>J. D. Kingsley, Representative Bureaucracy: An Interpretation of the British Civil Service (Yellow Springs: Antioch Press, 1944); W. Warner et al, The American Federal Executive (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962); T. Bottomore, "Higher Civil Service in France," Transactions of the Second World Congress on Sociology, 2 (1954); R. Kelsall, Higher Civil Service Servants in Britain (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1955); V. Subramanian, "Representative Bureaucracy: A Reassessment," American Political Science Review, 61 (December, 1967), pp. 1010-1019.

<sup>2</sup>K. Meier, "Representative Bureaucracy: An Empirical Analysis," American Political Science Review, 69 (June, 1975), p. 526; B. Jones and C. Kaufman, "The Distribution of Public Services: A Preliminary Model," Administration and Society, 6 (November, 1974), p. 350.

<sup>3</sup>A. Adu, The Civil Service in New African States (London: Allen and Unwin, 1965).

developed first at the political level in those states where communal consciousness was high and perceptions of dominance of one group was present. Thus, tension rose over Brahmin overrepresentation in India, Malay control over upper echelons of the Malayan administrative services, Mainland Chinese monopoly in higher posts on Taiwan, the Javanese role in Indonesia, Tutsi domination over all levels of government in Burundi, Kikuyu strength in Kenya, Tamil power in Ceylon, etc. In time scholars came to investigate particular country problems such as the Malaysian work of R. Tillman and M. Esman, Subramanian's study of the social background of the Indian bureaucracy and D. Dresang's analysis of Zambia.<sup>1</sup> However, aside from a few such country studies, little substantial research has been published and there is a particular paucity of work on the possible impact of representation on policy.

In an attempt to sort out the first issue of the communal representation we can isolate three patterns of disparities, based upon the overall character of communal representation, levels of participation and the range of involvement. The first pattern relates to the degree to which the bureaucracy as a whole reflects the polity's communal makeup. An initial caveat must be inserted. There are not always reliable statistics giving percentages based upon ethnic, religious or racial characteristics, either because they are not properly collected in that manner or are not available (often because of the political sensitivity of the question). What evidence

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<sup>1</sup>R. Tillman, Bureaucratic Transition in Malaya (Durham: Duke University Press, 1964); M. Esman, Administration and Development in Malaysia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972); V. Subramanian, Social Background of Indian Administration (New Delhi: Ministry of Information, 1971); D. Dresang, "Ethnic Politics, Representative Bureaucracy and Development Administration: The Zambia Case," American Political Science Review, 63 (December, 1974), pp. 1605-1617.

we do have supports the contention that few bureaucracies in communally heterogeneous Afro-Asia reflect very closely the demographic composition of their citizenry.

A substantial number of examples can be forwarded to illustrate this imbalance. In Asia it has long been recognized that Brahmins traditionally held a high percentage of upper civil service positions in India and a quota system in Malaysia gives special consideration to Malays in the administrative arm of the bureaucracy where they maintain an approximately six to one ratio.<sup>1</sup> In Africa, Dresang has provided data showing past Bemba domination of upper echelons of that bureaucracy while Gordon Wilson's figures of the sixties show the Chagga of Tanzania, Baganda of Uganda and Kikuyu of Kenya each with a much higher percentage of the bureaucracies of their respective countries than was true of their place in the general populace.<sup>2</sup>

However, even where data are not necessarily so reliable, there is persuasive evidence of one or more communal group dominating the bureaucracy. Much of this information tends to support the other types of representation--the concentration of communities at particular levels of the public service or in special bureaus or organizations. Examples of this type of imbalance abound in Afro-Asia, although our best data are on upper levels of the bureaucracy. A few examples may suffice--at this time we have only illustrative evidence.

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<sup>1</sup>Subramanian, Social Background..., pp. 38-39; D. Gibbons and Z. Ahmad, "Politics and Selection for the Higher Civil Service in New States: The Malaysian Example," Journal of Comparative Administration, 3 (November, 1971), pp. 337-338.

<sup>2</sup>Dresang, op. cit., pp. 1615-16; G. Wilson, "The African Elite," in The Transformation of East Africa, ed. by S. Diamond and F. Burke (New York: Basic Books, 1966), pp. 443-448.

In immediate postwar Ceylon, Tamils and Christians held a disproportionately large percentage of higher civil service and educational posts (in 1946 in the university, Christians who were 9 percent of the population outnumbered Buddhists with 64 percent of the populace).<sup>1</sup> As of 1971 most of the high ranking posts in the Lao public service were held by Mekong Lao and less than twenty princely clans.<sup>2</sup> In Malaysia in 1968 Malays held 86 percent of the Malaysian Civil Service posts while Chinese were overrepresented in all levels of technical fields. In Rwanda, with 14-16 percent of the population, Tutsi had 231 of 264 key ministerial, bureaucratic and judicial jobs.<sup>3</sup> In pre-Bangladesh Pakistan, East Pakistanis were poorly represented throughout the bureaucracy. Almost a decade after Partition, of 42,000 central government employees, only 2900 (7 percent) were from the more populous East and in the upper civil service Westerners outnumbered Easterners five to one.<sup>4</sup> In India, Moslems with over 10 percent of the population have generally not found their way into the higher echelons of the bureaucracy. In 1971 they composed only 7 of 542 Grade I officers in the Central Secretariat Service and the total number

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<sup>1</sup>R. Harris and R. Kearney, "Bureaucracy and Environment in Ceylon," in The Dynamics of Modernization and Social Change: A Reader, ed. by G. Massanet (Pacific Palisades: Goodyear, 1973), pp. 518-520.

<sup>2</sup>D. Whitaker, et al., Area Handbook of Laos (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1972), p. 160.

<sup>3</sup>W. Weinstein and R. Shire, Political Conflict and Ethnic Strategies: A Case Study of Burundi (Syracuse: Maxwell School, 1976); J. Webster, The Political Development of Rwanda and Burundi (Syracuse: Maxwell School, 1966).

<sup>4</sup>S. Akanda, "East Pakistan and the Politics of Regionalism" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Denver, 1970).

of appointees into the Indian Civil Service they attained was 16 out of 1113.<sup>1</sup>

While the vast majority of communally heterogeneous states of Afro-Asia possess bureaucratic imbalance of a greater or lesser degree, there have been rare cases where some form of proportional representation has been attempted. The most noted example historically has been Lebanon where sectarian divisions within the society have been approximated within the public service. The table below shows this pattern from 1946 to 1974 for upper posts. The Lebanese case also illustrates one of the major

TABLE 1: Distribution of Class I Civil Service Posts  
(Ambassadors and Director Generals)<sup>a</sup>  
Among the Confessional Communities

	<u>1946</u>	<u>1962</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1974</u>
Maronite	12	18	28	39
Greek Orthodox	6	11	10	14
Greek Catholic	1	7	9	8
Christian Minorities	0	2	2	9
(Christian subtotal)	(19)	(38)	(49)	(70)
(Percentage Christian)	(61%)	(54%)	(52%)	(50%)
Sunni	9	24	23	31
Shiite	1	2	15	29
Druze	2	6	7	10
(Muslim subtotal)	(12)	(32)	(45)	(70)
(Percentage Muslim)	<u>(39%)</u>	<u>(46%)</u>	<u>(48c)</u>	<u>(50%)</u>
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>94</b>	<b>140</b>

<sup>a</sup>D. and A. Smock, The Politics of Pluralism: A Comparative Study of Lebanon and Ghana (New York: Elsevier, 1975), p. 127.

SOURCES: 1946 figures from Pierre Rondot, Les Institution Politiques du Liban (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1947), p. 89.

1962 figures are from Michael Hudson, The Precarious Republic (New York: Random House, 1968), p. 320.

1972 figures are from official sources within the Lebanese government.

1974 figures are from L'Orient-Le Jour, February 19, 1974, p. 12.

<sup>1</sup>K. Gauba, Passive Voices: A Penetrating Study of Muslims in India (New Delhi: Sterlings, 1973). This is not an unbiased study.

difficulties confronted by those who seek a more representative bureaucracy in the new states. It is one thing to desire some form of proportional involvement. It may be quite another to discover sufficiently trained personnel in all elements of the system. As we shall note shortly, one reason for imbalance has been unequal educational opportunities and in the Lebanese case this, combined with traditional mores, has led to difficulties in finding competent individuals from some communal elements. There have been frequent sacrifices in quality for communal considerations and government agencies have complained that they have not been able to hire the best personnel. For example, in November, 1962, the Ministry of Agriculture reportedly had too many trained Moslems applying, while key diplomatic posts in Paris and Moscow were left vacant because there were not enough qualified Moslems applying in that area.<sup>1</sup>

If Afro-Asian bureaucracies tend to be unrepresentative of their citizenry, then the next question is how this situation came into existence. While this question is not central to our study, a brief review of the relevant factors is important to an understanding as to how this imbalance has affected services. Basically four somewhat interlocking factors have been responsible: colonial policy, spatial distortion, postindependence communal conflict and cultural choice.

Colonial administrations were prone to develop their native bureaucracy from particular communities either because they were perceived as more trustworthy and capable or they were handy, i.e., near centers of

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<sup>1</sup>Smock, Politics of Pluralism, pp. 126-129; R. Crow, "Religious Sectarianism in the Lebanese Political System," Journal of Politics, 24 (August, 1963), p. 511.

commerce and government.<sup>1</sup> Thus, a tendency to accept Christians was based upon their missionary education and the expectation that they would be more loyal to fellow believers. Christians thereby held an inordinate percentage of civil and military posts in colonies such as Ceylon, Burma, Chad, Indonesia, Nigeria, Vietnam and India. Colonial prejudices were also a factor as groups were perceived as less than capable or dangerous and thus excluded from higher or sensitive posts. Administrators came to consider Moros, southern Sudanese, Dyaks, etc., as educatable or, as was the case of the Northern Nigerians, better left out of the Western learning pattern.

Finally, those populations residing near the centers of European power were the beneficiaries of better education than more isolated groups, more familiar with Western customs and language and close to where the jobs were. Thus, without necessarily trying to advantage a particular community, the Europeans by their very presence provided an infrastructure that afforded some groups a competitive edge.<sup>2</sup> This was the case of elements of the Ibo and Yoruba of Nigeria, Chagga and Kikuyu of East Africa, urbanized Chinese of Southeast Asia and Chewa of Zambia. As a result of these mutually reinforcing factors certain communities entered the independence era with more knowledge, power and position than their compatriots. It was

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<sup>1</sup>F. von der Mehden, Communalism, Wealth and Income in Afro-Asia (Houston: Program of Development Studies, 1977), p. 37-92.

<sup>2</sup>For empirical reinforcement of this situation in education, see R. Clignet and P. Foster, The Fortunate Few: A Study of Secondary School Students in the Ivory Coast (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966) and P. Foster, Education and Social Change in Ghana (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968).

not always a permanent dominance, however, as some groups such as the Christians in Burma, Ceylon and Indonesia were viewed as lackeys of the imperialists and lost their positions when representatives of the dominant culture took power.

A second general reason for bureaucratic imbalance relates to the spatial distortion developed or maintained during the colonial era and continued after the Europeans left. By spatial distortion is meant uneven geographic provision of goods and services within a polity.<sup>1</sup> Given the uneven pattern of European expansion in Afro-Asia there were some communities left out of the development process or beneficiaries of fewer services than others. In the postindependence period geographic obstacles, political conditions and a paucity of resources meant that new states were not always able to redress the balance. Lacking a proper educational, health and administrative infrastructure, outlying groups, who were often not part of the dominant culture, were less able to compete equally for jobs in the modern sector. This problem was most apparent in the field of education where insufficient schooling made entrance into higher levels of the public service difficult if not impossible.

Thirdly, the politics of many Afro-Asian states have been bound up in communal strife. In part due to a weak nationalizing process during the colonial period, the postindependence years have seen communally-based civil wars or insurgency in Sudan, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Burma, Indonesia, Philippines, Burundi, Israel, Thailand, Malaysia, Zaire, Rhodesia, and India among others. Losers have found bureaucratic positions limited

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<sup>1</sup>One of the best analyses of spatial distortion is C. Elliott, Patterns of Poverty in the Third World (New York: Praeger, 1975).

and victors have availed themselves of the spoils. As well, fear of disloyalty has at one time or another closed some doors to Ibos in Nigeria, Karens in Burma, Bugandans in Uganda, Ambonese in Indonesia, etc.

The final factor is somewhat difficult to support with hard evidence and has been developed primarily from observation, sometimes systematic and often anecdotal. It is argued that cultural characteristics of particular groups may have an influence on the composition of bureaucracies. Generally the argument has been presented along two lines. The first is that in some societies an emphasis upon family and tribal loyalties leads to the employment of kinsmen and weakens the merit system. Various authors have commented upon the "familistic orientation" in LDCs whereby widespread nepotism is at least tolerated.<sup>1</sup> In Africa numerous observers have noted the importance of tribal considerations in obtaining positions within the public service. In his survey of higher public servants, businessmen and politicians in Nigeria, P. Harris asked whether the respondents agreed with the statement. "Tribal loyalties and extended family relations influence to a considerable degree the everyday operations of the public service." From 44.7 percent in Northern Nigeria to 60.9 percent in the East higher civil servants agreed.<sup>2</sup> R. Bates in his stimulating paper, Ethnicity in Contemporary Africa, points to the competition among tribal groups for the fruits of modernity,<sup>3</sup> while A. Kirk-Greene wrote that:

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<sup>1</sup>See F. Nigro, Modern Public Administration (New York: Harper, 1970), p. 62; P. Hauser, "Cultural and Personal Obstacles to Economic Development in the Less Developed Areas," Human Organization, 18 (Summer, 1959), pp. 78-84.

<sup>2</sup>R. Harris, "The Role of the Higher Public Servants in Nigeria, as Perceived by the Western-educated Elite," in Studies in Nigerian Administration, ed. by D. Murray (London: Hutchinson Educational, 1970), p. 306.

<sup>3</sup>R. Bates, Ethnicity in Contemporary Africa (Syracuse: Maxwell School, 1973), pp. 27-33. Also see W. Schwartz, "Tribalism and Politics in Nigeria," World Today, 22 (November, 1966), pp. 460-467.

I am inclined to doubt whether it is possible absolutely to reconcile the accepted civil service code of behavior with the traditional African way of life. Aside from any question of attitudes, one other reason will suffice: family obligations.<sup>1</sup>

While these forces have and will weaken over time, most appear to agree that they remain a factor of importance.

The second issue relevant to cultural characteristics can only be discussed briefly (I have written on this extensively elsewhere).<sup>2</sup> A highly debatable question is whether religious and traditional influences inhibit particular societies from competing effectively in the modern sector. It has been argued that certain groups have developed priorities that make some areas or aspects of the bureaucracy less attractive. These attitudes may have been molded by colonial policies, maintained by spatial distortion that engendered less contact with the outside world and reinforced by family and religious forces. For example, historically non-indigenous, educated Chinese and Indians in East Africa and Southeast Asia sought commercial and professional occupations rather than administrative posts. In part this was due to exclusionary policies, but other historic influences were also important. On the other hand, Malays in Malaysia have been drawn to administrative posts but generally shunned the technical training necessary to obtain positions requiring such background. The Table below sharply illustrates this pattern.

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<sup>1</sup>A. Kirk-Greene, "Bureaucratic Cadres in a Traditional Milieu," in Education and Political Development, ed. by J. Coleman (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 392.

<sup>2</sup>F. von der Mehden, Communalism, Wealth and Income in Afro-Asia (Houston: Program of Development Studies, 1977), pp. 175-190.

TABLE 1: Ethnic Composition of the Freshman Class  
by Faculty for Three Selected Years,  
University of Malaya<sup>a/</sup>

Faculty and Ethnicity	Year		
	1960-1961	1965-1966	1969-1970
<b>Agriculture</b>			
Malay	1	21	25
Non-Malay	18	26	70
<b>Arts</b>			
Malay	66	294	722
Non-Malay	140	359	505
<b>Engineering</b>			
Malay	3	3	5
Non-Malay	63	98	109
<b>Science</b>			
Malay	7	13	79
Non-Malay	61	169	228
<b>Pre-Med.</b>			
Malay	--	11	26
Non-Malay	--	31	14
<b>Medicine</b>			
Malay	--	4	24
Non-Malay	--	76	102
<b>Economics and Administration</b>			
Malay	--	--	197
Non-Malay	--	--	308

<sup>a/</sup>Gibbons and Ahmad, "Politics and Selection for the Higher Civil Service in New States: The Malaysian Example," Journal of Comparative Administration, 3 (November, 1971), p. .

SOURCE: Towards National Harmony (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: Government Printer, 1971), pp. 11 and 12.

Given these widespread disparities in communal representation in Afro-Asia, what has been the impact on access to governmental services? Recently we have seen a plethora of studies in the United States dealing with the representativeness of our bureaucracy,<sup>1</sup> followed by fewer investigations of its impact on access to services and an even smaller number of analyses of the communal aspect of the bureaucracy as it relates to access to services.<sup>2</sup> No such sizable basis of analyses exists in the Third World. We do have studies of programs initiated to aid specific disadvantaged communities such as the Malays<sup>3</sup> and Scheduled Castes,<sup>4</sup> reports on alleged pogroms against groups such as the Karens, Arakanese, Hutus, Ibos, Moros, Southern Sudanese, Kurds, et al., and descriptions of efforts to incorporate a broader communal membership into the bureaucracy. A few theoretical and empirical observations have appeared assessing aspects of communal representation as they affect policy, most notable

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<sup>1</sup>K. Meier, op. cit.; C. Levine, "Unrepresentative Bureaucracy," Bureaucrat, 3 (April, 1975), pp. 90-98; D. Clausen and J. Jones, "Increasing Minority Representation in Public Bureaucracies," Bureaucrat, 2 (Summer, 1973), pp. 178-188; A. Hebert, "Minorities in Public Administration," Public Administration Review, 34 (November/December, 1974), pp. 519-25; F. Mosher, Democracy and the Public Service (New York: Oxford, 1968).

<sup>2</sup>For example, E. McGregor, Jr., "Social Equity and the Public Service," Public Administration Review, 34 (January/February, 1974), pp. 18-28; B. Jones and C. Kaufman, op. cit.; D. Nachmias, "Bureaucracy and Ethnicity," American Journal of Sociology, 83 (January, 1978), pp. 967-974.

<sup>3</sup>F. von der Mehden, "Communalism, Industrial Policy and Income Distribution in Malaysia," Asian Survey, 15 (March, 1975), pp. 247-261.

<sup>4</sup>L. Dushkin, "Scheduled Caste Policy in India: History, Problems, and Prospects," Asian Survey, 7 (September, 1967), pp. 626-35; D. Chauhan, "India's Underprivileged Classes and the Higher Public Services," International Review of Administrative Sciences, 42 (1976), pp. 39-55.

Dresang's study of Zambia and various discussions of patron-client relationships by J. Scott, R. Lemarchand, and C. Lande.<sup>1</sup> However, a combination of poor data, a paucity of surveys and the sensitive nature of the analysis have all made this an area characterized by little systematic investigation. What we have in considerable supply are observations of discrete activities or events in particular countries by scholars, journalists and administrators.

Within these limits we can note several patterns in which communal representation appear important determinants in access to public services. Differing treatment of those coming before the bureaucrat for action based upon the applicant's religion, ethnic origins or race have been widely observed. We previously noted how communal loyalties have helped to imbalance membership in the public services and Harris' telling survey that found a majority of Western-educated Nigerian public servants admitting that tribal loyalties affected day to day operations.<sup>2</sup> There have been countless references to bureaucrats giving special attention to their own kind in terms of jobs, information and services.<sup>3</sup> With the expansion

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<sup>1</sup>R. Lemarchand, "Political Clientelism and Ethnicity in Tropical Africa: Competing Solidarities in Nation-Building," American Political Science Review, 66 (March, 1972), pp. 68-90; J. Scott, "Patron Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia," American Political Science Review, 66 (March, 1972), pp. 91-113; C. Lande, "Networks and Groups in Southeast Asia," American Political Science Review, 67 (March, 1973), pp. 103-127.

<sup>2</sup>Harris, op. cit., pp. 518-520.

<sup>3</sup>L. Thomas, "Bureaucratic Attitudes and Behavior as Obstacles to Political Integration of the Thai Muslims," Southeast Asia, 3 (Winter, 1974), pp. 545-68; R. Rotberg and A. Mazrui, Protest and Power in Black Africa (New York: Oxford, 1970); Area Handbook for Saudi Arabia (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1971), p. 55; C. Young, The Politics of Cultural Pluralism (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1976); R. Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi (New York: Praeger, 1970), pp. 354-55; A. Gerteing,

of government and the move toward modernization, communal groups have sought aid from brothers in positions of power. Modernization gave impetus to collective action and it is not surprising that a high percentage of tribal organizations were formed in urban centers, often some distance from the tribe's own territory. And, as Bates commented, "Ethnic groups persist largely because of their capacity to extract goods and services for the modern sector and thereby satisfy the demands of their members for the components of modernity."<sup>1</sup> Bureaucrats became the targets of such demands. Although they were often limited in what they could do along general policy lines, they could do favors for fellow communal members.

Not only has there been this intracommunal pressure, but groups underrepresented in the bureaucracy have banded together to gain advantages for their own communities. Thus, in Southeast Asia and East Africa non-indigenous Asians have used their business and social organizations to obtain special privileges.<sup>2</sup> Often shut out of the normal political process, they turn to the employment of economic rewards to get bureaucrats

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Maurentania (New York: Praeger, 1968), pp. 151-155; J. Pettman, Zambia: Security and Conflict (New York: St. Martins), pp. 87-88; H. Hodson, The Great Divide: Britain-India-Pakistan (New York: Atheneum, 1971), pp. 406-407. S. Decalo, Historical Dictionary of Chad (Metuchen, N.J.: Scarecrow, 1977), pp. 16, 17, 132; H. Werlin, "The Consequences of Corruption," Political Science Quarterly, 88 (March, 1973), pp. 76-77; I. Markovitz, Power and Politics in Africa (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1977), p. 119.

<sup>1</sup>Bates, op. cit., pp. 27-39; and Bates, "Ethnic Competition and Modernization in Contemporary Africa," Comparative Political Studies, 6 (January, 1974), pp. 467-468.

<sup>2</sup>For example, see G. W. Skinner, Leadership and Power in the Chinese Community in Thailand (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1958), pp. 109-126.

to act favorably upon their requests.<sup>1</sup> Thus, the two groups most likely to gain advantages from communal loyalties have tended to be those who could abstract favors from bureaucrats because of their employment of communal relationships or an ability to unite in the use of political or economic power.

This pattern has meant that two other groups have been less fortunate, opponents of those in power and those disadvantaged by location, social background or language. Easier to prove have been blatant examples of prejudice against individuals and groups not part of the dominant culture. There have been numerous complaints and observations of ill treatment, rudeness, an unwillingness to act, demands for excessive payments and prejudicial decisions regarding minority groups in Burma, Zaire, Kenya, Ethiopia, Thailand, Sudan, Philippines, Uganda and others. In addition, those who fought against elements in power such as the Hutu, Ibos, Karens, Katangese, etc. have at one time or another been victims of systematic discrimination. In both cases bureaucratic actions may reflect the attitudes of the politically dominant community. In some cases it may be a demand for some form of retribution, but often it reflects a view that minorities are inferior. Examples of such alleged prejudicial action are multitudinous, even if we do not survey the most prominent examples such as South Africa. As illustration we can note Hutu charges that in Burundi Tutsi judges have made it difficult to win court cases involving land disputes between the two groups<sup>2</sup> and in the Philippines Moros have complained that

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<sup>1</sup>F. von der Mehden, "Interest Groups and Government Policy in Malaysia," in "Issues in Income Distribution," Rice University Studies, ed. by R. Soligo and F. von der Mehden, Vol. 61 (Houston: Rice University, 1975), pp. 49-61.

<sup>2</sup>Weinstein and Shire, op. cit., p. 31.

Filipino judges have been more sympathetic to Christians in land issues.<sup>1</sup> The author has no way of ascertaining the validity of these cases although he has witnessed similar patterns in Southeast Asia.

However, access to government services also coincides with the relative isolation of various communal groups. In the United States studies have shown that the urban poor have a greater proportion of public services than other elements of the society in terms of government supported health, housing, police, unemployment and social welfare programs. In the LDCs most of the poor are rural--in Asia approximately 74 percent and in Africa about 75 percent in 1978. Spatial distortion results in communities residing in the countryside being those disadvantaged. With the concentration of administrative offices and officialdom in urban areas (in most Afro-Asian countries the capital is the single primate city), the more isolated rural communities have little opportunity to contact officials to make their needs known. The author's research in Northeast Thailand found major differences between the number of government officials and vehicles between outlying districts and the capital city.<sup>2</sup> A recent survey of Africa experts on 26 countries sought to discover variations in service levels between the capitals and other areas.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>L. Noble, "The Moro National Liberation Front in the Philippines," *Pacific Affairs*, 34 (Fall, 1966), pp. 405-424.

<sup>2</sup>J. Hoath, F. von der Mehden, and T. Yatsushiro, The Impact of USOM-Supported Programs in Northeast Thailand (Bangkok: USOM, 1967).

<sup>3</sup>From a survey by K. Hill and F. von der Mehden. Other results of the survey may be found in their "Data Reliability in Cross-National Research: A Test Employing Black Africa Experts," paper delivered at the Western Political Science Annual Meeting, Los Angeles, 1978.

We are interested in the extent to which there might be disparities in the levels of public services and programs provided throughout the nation geographically.

In regard to this issue, would you say that the capital city tends to have superior public service levels generally when compared to the remainder of the nation? Which description below is more appropriate?

Much better services in the capital city 19  
Somewhat better services in the capital city 4  
Service levels are about the same there as in other cities 1  
Service levels there are about the same as in the rest  
of the nation 0  
Service levels are somewhat worse there 0  
Service levels are much worse there 0  
Don't know 1

With regard to types of services consult Table 3. Of course, it should be recognized that variations do exist among rural areas as well, although communal groups residing near cities or transportation networks tend to be advantaged.<sup>1</sup>

It may not only be geographic isolation that limits access. Language presents a similar barrier in many Afro-Asian states. Given the multiplicity of tongues in these polities, there are often groups unable to communicate properly with officialdom. In most Black African states the maintenance of the colonial languages as the lingua franca has disadvantaged tribes isolated from modern educational facilities. In states which have adopted the language of the dominant community other linguistic groups have complained that they find it difficult to make their needs known. A number of examples can illustrate this point. The original acceptance of Urdu in Pakistan hurt Bengali speakers in the East.<sup>2</sup> In Mauretania and the Sudan

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<sup>1</sup>The most recent and vigorous charge of urban bias can be found in M. Lipton's Why Poor People Stay Poor (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977).

<sup>2</sup>S. Akanda, op. cit., pp. 71-94.

**TABLE 3: Types of Service Levels  
in Selected African States (by %)**

	<b>Primary education</b>	<b>Secondary education</b>	<b>Health clinics</b>	<b>Hospitals and major medical facilities</b>	<b>Social Security</b>	<b>Community infra- structures</b>
<b>Rural areas have better services</b>					13	8.7
<b>Roughly comparable service levels are available in urban and rural areas</b>		4.3			13	8.7
<b><u>Some</u> urban areas have generally better service levels than typical rural areas</b>	21.7	17.4	21.7	73	17.4	17.4
<b><u>All</u> major urban areas have generally better service levels than typical rural areas</b>	52.2	39.1	47.8	43.5	30.4	30.4
<b>All major urban areas have extraordinarily better service levels than typical rural areas</b>	17.4	39.1	30.4	43.5	26.1	13
<b>Don't know or didn't answer</b>	8.7					21.7

the employment of Arabic by public servants led to conflict with non-Arab speakers.<sup>1</sup> In southern Thailand Malays have complained about difficulties in communicating with government servants who could not speak the local language,<sup>2</sup> and linguistic politics have long been a source of tension in India.<sup>3</sup>

Not only do language factors inhibit the ability to make demands on the state and to understand what is going on, but they affect the educational system that is the entry way to advancement in the bureaucracy. Those not fluent in the dominant tongue find it difficult to compete in schools and thereby are shut out of higher civil service positions. This in turn limits the ability of linguistically disadvantaged groups to find their own spokesmen in the bureaucracy. Given the urban bias of education this reinforces the element of spatial distortion.

It is more difficult to show that the composition of the bureaucracy affects communally-oriented policies. Admittedly, the process of decision-making in most Afro-Asian states is not an area about which we have much reliable evidence. It can be stated that most bureaucracies in Afro-Asia have been more heavily politicized since independence and that the influence of party or military rulers is strong. To the extent that they are not independent or professional, the bureaucrats can only implement the orders of the political authorities. Of course, public servants may offer

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<sup>1</sup>J. Sommer, "The Sudan: A Geographical Investigation of the Historic and Political Roots of Dissension" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Boston University, 1968), p. 107; Gerteing, op. cit., pp. 151-152.

<sup>2</sup>Thomas, op. cit.

<sup>3</sup>J. D. Gupta, Language Problems and National Development (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), pp. 33-68.

advice, expedite policies they support, attempt to hinder those they oppose or try to mold them to fit the needs of their communal constituency. We can partially understand the role of the bureaucrat by very briefly reviewing two policy areas.

3

Social Welfare and Security

Nowhere do the factors of communalism, spatial distortion and imbalanced bureaucracy appear to interact more to affect who gets government services than in the social security-welfare areas of health, unemployment, housing and old age insurance. To reiterate three patterns previously noted:

a) Bureaucrats tend to come from the more modern urban sectors and to reside near the capital city and other urban sites.

b) Afro-Asia is highly rural in population (at the time of independence less than 6 percent of tropical Africans lived in towns over 20,000).

c) Many communal groups live in regions geographically isolated from modern centers although individuals from these communities are becoming more mobile. Given these elements we can understand why this particular policy area presents a different picture than in the United States. Social Security and welfare programs reach only a small minority of the people of Afro-Asia. On paper this is not readily apparent since laws may appear on the books but either remain unimplemented or cover a small proportion of the populace. In 1969, 24 African and 15 Asian states had

systems dealing with old age, sickness and survivors and by the mid-1970s a large majority of countries had these programs (See the Appendix).<sup>1</sup>

However, the mere existence of these programs does not tell the whole story. Most such services reach only the urban and plantation workers. In the first place, the social service infrastructure is generally very weak outside the cities where administrators, doctors, nurses, and

TABLE 4: African Social Security Programs and Pensions (1970-71)<sup>a/</sup>

Country	Population 1969-1972	Employees Registered for Social Security or provident funds	Pensioners
Burundi	3,800,000	26,256	1,111
Cameroon	6,000,000	95,668	229
Ivory Coast	4,900,000	200,195	4,328
Gabon	485,000	67,294	3,525
Madagascar	6,656,000	176,980	2,258
Mali	5,700,000	40,000	4,714
Morocco	17,500,000	294,000	17,000
Niger	4,000,000	33,498	592
Nigeria	64,560,000	807,008	--
Somalia	3,200,000	20,000	--
Tanzania	12,557,000	470,910	--
Togo	1,900,000	30,000	970
Tunisia	4,533,000	198,000	--
Zaire	17,900,000	139,532	--

<sup>a/</sup> M. J. Sharpston, "Uneven Geographical Distribution of Medical Care: A Ghanaian Case Study," Journal of Development Studies, 8 (January, 1972), pp. 180 and 213.

<sup>1</sup> A. Hervo-Akendengue, "Social Security as an Instrument in Economic and Social Development in African Countries," International Social Security Review, 25 (1972), pp. 191-192.

hospitals tend to be concentrated.<sup>1</sup> Secondly, these programs usually affect only regular wage earners who form a small minority and are also to be found mainly in the cities and on plantations--as of the early 1970s less than 5 percent of the people of Africa were under some sort of social security program. Table 4 starkly illustrates this pattern.

The bureaucracy has a special role as recipient of various health housing and social security programs. First, it is they who have the jobs entailed in administering them. Secondly, they live primarily in the urban centers where the infrastructure exists. Thirdly, many of the original systems were established to cover only public servants. Even as of the mid-1960s only public servants were covered by government old age programs in 16 African states. The relation of communal representation to access becomes clearer when we note that these included such imbalanced bureaucracies as Ethiopia, Uganda, Sudan and Malagasy.<sup>2</sup> As of 1970 state maternity care insurance was only for public servants in 19 African states, sickness in 17 and there were special programs for them in 10. We should also observe that state supported housing projects in Afro-Asia were generally first started for government workers and for years remained only for those favored few.

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<sup>1</sup>For an example of maldistribution of medical care see M. J. Sharpston, "Uneven Geographical Distribution," op cit., pp. 205-22.

<sup>2</sup>A. E. Ali, "Social Security in Africa with Special Reference to the Sudan," (unpublished MBA thesis, University of California at Berkeley, 1966), pp. 15-16. He points out that only 8 of 27 African countries at that time had old age insurance and they were all former French and Belgian colonies.

Thus, social service and security benefits have gone disproportionately to an often nonrepresentative bureaucracy and/or urban workers who may not reflect the communal patterns of the country. Rural populations not only have been unable to participate in such systems, but the administrators and professional personnel necessary to implement them have been absent.

#### Military and Police

The military and police, like the civil service, also tended to be communally nonrepresentative in the colonial period, and have generally remained so in spite of some noteworthy attempts to change the former pattern. Under the Europeans these units tended to come from Christian or minority peoples who were more "secure"--a factor that often made them outcasts after independence. Thus, the British kept strong communities like the Buganda, Kikuyu and Ashanti from their colonial military, the French maintained northern tribes in West Africa and the Belgians Hutu rather than Tutsi. The armed forces and police of the new states have generally reflected the dominant community. For example, in Malaysia 65.4 percent of the officer corps was Malay in 1969, and the police were disproportionately Malay; at the beginning of independent Nigeria most of the military was drawn from the south and remained so in spite of a rigid quota system in the Academy; in Uganda the army originally came from the north and east and now it comes from those attached to Idi Amin.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>For analysis of the role of the military in LDCs, see G. Kennedy, The Military in the Third World (New York: Scribners, 1974); H. Dienen, ed., The Military Intervenes (New York: Russell Sage, 1968); W. Gutteridge, The Military in African Politics, London: Cass, 1969); D. Austin and R. Luckman, eds., Politics and Soldiers in Ghana (London: Cass, 1975); J. Johnson, The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962); M. Dent, "The Military in Politics: A Study of the Relation between the Army and the Political Process in

The communal character of the army and police has considerable impact on access to government services on two major accounts. First, both are called upon to deal with domestic disturbances which have often proven to be frequent and communal in nature. We have previously taken note of the wide variety of such strife--as of 1973 violence had resulted in 22 African and 14 Asian countries since independence due to communal factors. Thus, a bias in the armed forces can lead to prejudicial action for or against particular groups and police protection can not only be unavailable but positively dangerous. For example, the Sino-Malay riots in Malaysia in May, 1969, allegedly involved prejudicial acts by Malay units. Similar accusations have been made regarding police and army forces in Uganda, Burundi, Nigeria, Israel, Lebanon, Ethiopia, Sudan, Iran and South Africa among others.

Secondly, since the military has been involved deeply in domestic political processes in the region, army officers have become the primary decision-makers at one time or another in the majority of Afro-Asian states. To the degree that the military takes over the duties of the party and bureaucracy, it both makes and implements policy. Unlike the civil bureaucracy it thus becomes an independent actor although it has usually retained the administration and worked through it. Thus, communal biases of the army elites become reflected in programs limiting the activities of unfriendly communities and helping those with their own background. Examples of such policies include actions against the

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Nigeria," in Nigeria: Modernization and the Politics of Communalism, edited by R. Melson and H. Wolpe (Ann Arbor: Michigan State University Press, 1971), pp. 367-399; C. Enloe, "Ethnicity and the Myth of the Military," Ufuhama, 4 (Fall, 1973), pp. 35-56; and S. Decalo, "Regionalism, Politics and the Military in Dahomey," Journal of Developing Areas, 7 (April, 1973), pp. 449-478.

Arakanese in Burma, Bengalis in old Pakistan, non-Moslems in the Sudan, Buganda in Uganda and Katangese in Zaire. As well, nationalist-oriented military bureaucrats have promulgated and implemented pogroms against nonindigenous Asians in Southeast Asia and East Africa. In these policies they have not been that unlike many civilian regimes. The difference has been that unlike their civilian bureaucratic counterparts they can be both policy instigator and implementor.

In conclusion, we have analyzed how, why, and where communally imbalanced bureaucracies can affect racial, ethnic, and religious groups in their efforts to gain access to public services. It would be remiss to leave with the reader the caricature of all bureaucracies of Afro-Asia as organizations basing their decisions on communal loyalties and all minorities as frustrated in their demands. We have noted that communalism has not disappeared as many optimists of the independence era expected. Nor do we have proof that ethnic, racial and religious tensions have waned. On the contrary, events during the last decade in Pakistan, Philippines, Nigeria and the Middle East would appear to give evidence to its continuing strength. However, these widely publicized events would appear to becloud some trends that may ultimately dim the effect of communalism on the bureaucracy.

a) Today there are Afro-Asian states where communal forces do not play an important role either because such divisions are weak in the society (Egypt, Japan, Korea) or the heterogeneity of the public service has balanced off groups (Tanzania to a degree). It is argued that where such diverseness exists hierarchical authority has a better opportunity

to make itself felt.<sup>1</sup>

b) The slow development of a rural infrastructure when combined with greater mobility of people from the more isolated communities should ultimately lead to both a more representative bureaucracy and minorities more capable of making their needs known.

c) The pattern of religious secularization which has been developing in Afro-Asia may ameliorate sectarian tensions that influence both the bureaucracy and body politic.

However, the pessimist would state that meanwhile the competition for scarce resources in mobile societies may first engender tension and sharpen communal loyalties.

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<sup>1</sup>For an interesting discussion of tribalism and authority within the bureaucracy, see D. Leonard, Reaching the Peasant Farmer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), pp. 233-238.

APPENDIX I

Provisions Applying in the Social Security Field,  
According to the Nature of Schemes  
(Schemes applicable to Nationals in the  
general nonagricultural private sector)  
(as of 31 December 1970)

Country	Family benefits	Employment accidents	Sickness		Maternity		Old age	Invalidity	Survivors	Unemployment
			Medical care	Allowances	Leave	Allowances				
Algeria	I	I	I	I	.	I	.	I	I	.
Botswana	.	E	EP	.	P	.	.	.	.	.
Burundi	.	I	EP	.	.	.	I	.	I	.
Cameroon	I	I	EP	.	.	I	.	.	I	.
Gen. African Republic	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	.
Congo	I	I	EP	E	E	I	.	.	I	.
Ivory Coast	I	I	EP	E	E	I	I	I	I	.
Dahomey	I	I	EP	E	E	I	I	I	I	.
Egypt	.	I	I	I	.	I	I	I	I	I
Ethiopia	.	E	P	.	.	.	.	.	.	I
Gabon	I	I	EP	.	.	I	I	I	I	.
Gambia	.	.	P	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Ghana	.	E	P	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Guinea	I	I	.	I	I	I	I	I	I	.
Kenya	.	E	P	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Lesotho	.	E	P	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Liberia	.	E	P	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Upper Volta	I	I	EP	E	E	I	I	E	E	.
Libya	.	I	I	.	.	.	I	I	I	.
Madagascar	I	I	EP	E	I	I	I	I	I	.
Malawi	.	E	P	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Mali	I	I	IP	E	I	I	I	I	I	.
Morocco	I	I	EP	I	I	I	I	.	I	.
Mauritius	G	E	P	.	.	.	G	.	.	.
Mauritania	I	I	EP	E	I	I	I	I	I	.
Niger	I	I	EP	E	I	I	I	I	I	.
Nigeria	.	E	P	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Uganda	.	E	P	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Rwanda	.	I	EP	E	E	I	I	I	I	.
Senegal	I	I	EP	E	E	I	I	I	I	.
Sierra Leone	.	E	P	.	.	.	N	N	N	.
Somalia	.	I	P	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Sudan	.	E	P	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Swaziland	.	E	P	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Tanzania	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Tanganika	.	E	P	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Zanzibar	.	E	P	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Chad	I	I	EP	E	I	I	I	I	I	.
Togo	I	I	EP	E	I	I	I	I	I	.
Tunisia	I	I	EP	I	I	I	I	I	I	.
Zaire	I	I	EP	E	I	I	I	I	I	.
Zambia	.	E	P	.	.	.	.	.	.	.

I = Social insurance  
E = Direct obligation on the part of the employer  
P = Public service  
F = Provident fund  
G = Non contributory general scheme  
N = Private insurance schemes (IPRAO)

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