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
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**POLITICAL LINKAGE IN KENYA:  
CITIZENS, LOCAL ELITES, AND LEGISLATORS**

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The American Political Science Association, Palmer House Hotel, Chicago  
September 1, 1974**

## I. Introduction: Central-Local Relationships and Political Linkage in Africa

Concern with central-local relationships and political linkage in the new states has become a recurrent theme in the literature as an increasing number of scholars have defined political development in terms of the capacity of central (i.e., national) political institutions to extend, and maintain their authority over the populations resident in these societies. Viewed in this manner, political development can be partially measured in terms of the degree to which the members of these societies participate in, and/or indirectly influence the making of public policy, and the degree to which they comply with public policy decisions. As such, political development is also a spatial phenomenon involving the progressive expansion of the boundaries of a national political system from one or more central locations, the ultimate end of which is to incorporate all of society's members within its ranks. It is consequently a process dependent on the creation and maintenance of linkages, or networks of exchange, between those who control and participate in the institutions at the center of the political system, and those on the periphery of the system, and beyond.

Explanations of how, and under what conditions political development occurs must therefore consider the conditions under which different types of linkages between the center and periphery are created and maintained. This is especially true when examining the process of political development in sub-Saharan Africa where the degree of vertical integration between those at the center, and those on the periphery is thought to be relatively low.

Systematic examinations of "linkage development" in Africa have been few although a number of interesting case studies of central-local relationships have appeared in the literature.<sup>2</sup> Most studies which have explored central-local relationships on the continent moreover have suffered from one or more of the following problems: (1) They consider these relationships from either the perspective of actors at the center, or those on the periphery, but rarely both at the same time. Studies of the former variety have focused mainly on aspects of development administration, a process almost exclusively concerned with the penetration of the periphery by agents of the center, while studies of the latter type have focused on the nature and function of micro-political (sub) systems. (2) They have frequently ignored the linkage functions performed by elected politicians, particularly legislators. Given the decline, or demise in Africa of parliamentary institutions on the one hand, and political parties on the other, little attention has been paid to the linkage roles played by political brokers where they continue to exist. (3) These studies have rarely involved any systematic attempt to trace, particularly in spatial terms, the extent, variation, and proliferation of linkage networks between individual agents of central political institutions, and citizens in the society at large. Rather than focusing on the patterns of exchange and communication between individuals, most studies of central-local relationships in Africa have concentrated on higher units of analysis, the central institutions and rural localities to be linked.<sup>3</sup> As a result, the

policies and activities of groups and institutions at the center vis-à-vis the periphery, and vice versa are often described in detail, but not the linkage networks connecting the two realms. Consideration of central-local relationships at this level, moreover, makes it all but impossible to determine how far down political linkages actually extend into society, and hence the boundaries of the political system itself. A given community acting as an aggregate through its leaders may or may not make demands on the center, and receive resource allocations in return, but this hardly tells us the extent to which individual members of that community have been incorporated into a national political system, in short the degree to which they have become "citizens" of the nation.

Given these considerations, this paper, which is an initial (and tentative) report of field research now being completed by the authors in Kenya, shall address itself to three questions: what are the spatial patterns of central-local linkages in Kenya in respect to the networks Kenyan citizens utilize to make demands on their central political institutions, and how far down do these linkages extend into the "grass roots" of Kenyan society? Second, what are the variables which bear on the creation, institutionalization, and decay of these linkages? Third, what are the prospects for further linkage development in Kenya, and what does this in turn suggest for the maintenance of political order, in that society, and others on the African continent?

In seeking to gather data to answer these and related questions, our research has been guided by two underlying hypotheses which need stating at this juncture. First, we have conceived linkage development to be a multi-dimensional process involving the creation of increasingly specialized sets of linkage chains manned by different, albeit sometimes overlapping, groups of political actors. In posing this hypothesis, we have essentially extended Huntington's argument that the creation of political order depends on the establishment of autonomous, coherent, stable, and valued organizations for the purpose of responding to increasing levels of political participation by society's members,<sup>4</sup> and concluded that the establishment of autonomous, coherent, stable, and valued linkages is part of this process. As such, separate linkage chains are likely to emerge for the purpose of representing local interests at the center, penetrating the periphery by the center and mediating between the interests of the two.

Second, in political systems such as those found in sub-Saharan Africa which are dominated by executive and administrative institutions, and where political parties and large corporate interest groups are nonexistent or weak, legislators, given favorable conditions may play important and unique linkage roles between the center and periphery even though they exercise little influence on the making of national policy. In this regard, African legislators seek both to create and to maintain linkage chains for the purpose of connecting their localities to the administrative state, in a manner which civil servants, as agents of the center, do not.

To test these hypotheses and answer the questions raised above, the authors have sought to observe the process of linkage development in

Kenya by exploring the creation of linkage chains from three points in Kenyan society -- at the grass roots level through a series of surveys of approximately 300 Kenyan citizens in each of fourteen parliamentary constituencies; at the level of the local power structure through a series of surveys involving 21 to 45 notables in each of these same constituencies; and at the center through a survey of the M.P.s of these constituencies, a group which included one minister and three assistant ministers. By simultaneously cutting into the Kenyan political systems at three levels, and by focusing on individuals as the primary unit of analysis we have sought to avoid some of the problems of earlier explorations of central-local relationships on the African continent. Before presenting an overview of our findings, however, it is useful to consider the historical factors which have affected the process of linkage development in Kenya prior to the present research effort.

## II. Political Linkage in Kenya: Historical Factors

Throughout the colonial period, linkage roles were the monopoly of the colonial bureaucracy, and especially of the provincial administration which provided the basic links between the grass roots and the central government. Although used initially as an instrument for maintenance of law and order, it also played an important role in the development and maintenance of the infrastructure used to stimulate production in both European and African areas. It was the steel frame of the colonial bureaucracy which experienced a rather rapid rate of growth between 1945 and 1955. These were also the critical years during which Africans fought for their freedom under the Mau Mau banner. The same period also saw the formulation and initiation of the Swynnerton Plan, a policy aimed at revolutionizing a land tenure system among the Kikuyu in order to create the framework for the growth of a landed African gentry. The size of the bureaucracy grew from 14,000 in 1945 to 45,000 in 1955.<sup>5</sup> This rapid growth was rationalized in terms of the need to have a system of closer administration of African areas partly to defeat the Mau Mau and to implement the Swynnerton Plan. As soon as the Swynnerton Plan became an integral part of an on-going system, the colonial bureaucracy was not reduced in size but continued to grow mainly to meet the expanding needs of an independent Kenya. By 1969, six years after independence, its size had reached a new peak of 77,000.<sup>6</sup> Except for the brief period of the Majimbo constitution, 1963-1964, the provincial administration had established its own capacity as the link between the people and their government. With this development, the necessity of creating a "development administration," that is, an administration capable of being the "agent for development" to distribute and administer the utilization of resources in the rural areas became more and more apparent.

Administratively, Kenya is divided into eight (8) provinces each headed by a provincial commissioner who, is responsible for law and order and coordinates all development activities in the province. Each province is divided into a number of districts (there are a total of 41 districts in the country as a whole) each headed by a district

commissioner. The district commissioner is a very important link in the chain of command because he is much closer to the people than the provincial commissioner. But like the provincial commissioner, he combines control functions with development tasks. He is the chairman of all development committees in the district. He is therefore a very valuable officer to the provincial commissioner. The provincial commissioners and district commissioners are personal representatives of the President (the Executive) in the field and report directly to him or through a Deputy-Secretary in charge of Administration in the Office of the President on matters which have to do with the government of the rural areas. Each district is further divided into divisions each of which is headed by a district or divisional officer subordinate to the district commissioner. Each division is in turn divided into locations and sub-locations headed by chiefs and sub-chiefs respectively. The sub-location is the smallest administrative unit in the system. The location chiefs and sub-chiefs are important elements in this chain of command since they are the ones who are in closest contact with the grass roots. They collect taxes with the aid of the administrative police. Thus although the district commissioner is responsible for tax collection, he does it through this network of subordinates amongst whom the chiefs are the basic link. Thus the role of the chief becomes crucial insofar as linkage factors are concerned especially in a political process in which self-help now plays a very key role. This administrative structure was, as we have said, built to effect a closer administration of rural areas especially during the Mau Mau period as a device to defeat the latter. Once created, however, it has become the main channel through which rural development is managed.

Thus as the Chief Executive's agency for control and built on the premise that closer administration of rural areas facilitates more rapid rural transformation, the provincial administration enjoys a superior status in the political process; a status with which no other institution is fully equipped to compete. While it is true that the provincial administration has played both control and development roles over the years, it is, however, not quite certain whether or not it has been the main mobilizing instrument among peasants in the process of development as Gertzel once asserted.<sup>7</sup> The momentum behind mobilization of the country side behind development schemes came effectively with the initiation of self-help activity as a complement to the efforts of the administration. Although administrative officers have become associated with self-help programs at the local level, the major initiative has come from the people themselves and from members of parliament who have been very important instruments in the growth of this new initiative as we shall see below.

While the administration grew steadily after 1945, there was no corresponding development of African political life during the same period. Except for welfare associations which mushroomed all over the country, political associations were banned until June 1955 when an Act of the Legislative Council was passed to enable Africans to form political associations whose activities were confined to districts, the boundaries of which coincided with those of tribal habitation. From

1922, it had been an established practice of the administration, with missionary support, to confine African political activities within ethnic boundaries. Local Native Councils became the centers of this activity and were considered to be the most appropriate sectors in which African political life could meaningfully develop. The councils were also used as training grounds for Africans in public affairs. In pursuance of this practice, Sir Philip Mitchell, the then Governor, advised Jomo Kenyatta upon his return from England in 1946 that "he [Jomo Kenyatta] should begin by seeking election to the Local Native Council of the area where he proposed to live and make a start in local government" if at all he wished to take part in politics later on.<sup>8</sup> The emphasis on local government for future African leaders was to enable them to develop a strong interest, usually economic, in district and in tribal affairs. In the future, so argued colonial authority, the Local Native Councils would form the constituency basis for future national political activity for Africans. The June 1955 Act of the Legislative Council was thus intended to reinforce this practice. With the promulgation of this Act, tribal voluntary associations, where they existed, were immediately converted into district political associations by educated Africans who saw them as vehicles to national political leadership in the future. These district political associations played a major role in the 1957 election when Africans were for the first time elected to the Legislative Council on a common roll. To prepare for this election, constituency boundaries were drawn to coincide with district boundaries. This enabled the district political associations to become the first organizational expression of constituency parties in the African population.

In 1960, when the first national political parties emerged, district political associations were already fully established as the most viable units of local party organization. There was a strong sense of local participation built around a single local leader who used the organization as a personal political machine. The best known of these was Mr. Oginga Odinga's African Political Association in Central Nyanza which was grafted onto the Luo Union, a powerful voluntary association in the area.<sup>9</sup> Similar organizations in other districts varied in their degree of local influence which was directly related to the degree of their internal structural constituency. However, when the Kenya African National Union (KANU) and the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU) were formed in 1960 as the first nationwide political parties, the district political associations were not dissolved but were converted into district branches of KANU and KADU respectively. This enabled them to retain a good measure of autonomy within the larger political organizations to which they were affiliated. Right from the start, therefore, KANU and KADU were cartels composed of autonomous district political associations over which the national party leadership had little influence. Most of the original leaders of the district associations, moreover, continued in office as branch office bearers of the new parties with only very minor exceptions. Their first loyalty was to the district political bosses rather than to the executive leaders of the national political parties. Thus Kenya became independent in 1963 with an extremely fragile party system completely incapable of effectively playing a linkage role between center and periphery. The Kenya African National Union (KANU) developed with an enigmatic personality. On the one hand, it had as

dynamic a leadership as any party could have in a country approaching independence. The late Tom Mboya, James Gichuru, Oginga Odinga and later on Mzee Jomo Kenyatta himself provided a very strong team which by working together was capable of building a sound basis of party politics. On the other hand, KANU had built-in structural anomalies which the leadership always papered over but which became evident after independence in the form of a crippling personality struggle amongst political bosses over whom the party had little control. As Gertzl writes:

Once in power, however, they (Africans) modified their position. During their first year in office they faced a series of difficult situations that could not be resolved through party political channels. Authority in the party was too diffuse and branches too independent to permit the central government easily to control their own party members particularly in the Central Province. To centralize the authority structure in the party immediately was difficult in the light not only of the strong local loyalties and the enduring pattern of boss politics, but also of the continuing leadership conflicts within the top ranks of the party.

These historical factors, the Majimbo Constitution, an ineffective party, and personality conflicts in the top ranks of the party, among others, made it inevitable for a strong executive to emerge in personage of President Kenyatta who immediately took advantage of the situation to assert his personal power. He immediately re-established the central administration as the only viable link between the central government and the grass roots.

By putting greater and greater emphasis on the administrative infrastructure as a vehicle for control and development, the Executive soon became dependent more on it than on the Legislature. By so acting, Kenyatta deflated the status of the National Assembly and of legislators as well. The latter began to criticize the administration which they thought still evinced all the characteristics of its colonial heritage as a vehicle of control. Many went to the extent of suggesting that provincial commissioners be made subordinate to elected representatives at the provincial level. The schism between administrators and parliamentarians continued throughout the life of the first parliament. They could not use the party machinery or Parliament to assert their position and to gain access to the inner circles of government.

Thus for the first six years after independence the power of the Executive pre-empted the role of the M.P. as a link with the periphery, a factor which reacted against the majority of legislators in the 1969 general election when 60 per cent of them were defeated at the polls mainly due to the fact that they had done little to develop their constituencies. Further, administrators who knew that the stability of the system depended for the most part on them tended to separate too sharply the purely political roles from administrative ones. As a result, the role and activities of individual M.P.s tended to be completely ignored by civil servants as if their role ceased to be

important the moment they stepped outside of the parliamentary buildings. This led naturally to constant and, often, to crippling conflicts between the two wings of the governmental process. But as President Kenyatta began to emphasize self-help as a priority exercise in rural development, the role of the legislator began to take a new turn towards the end of the 1960s. Self-help provided a basis for direct involvement by legislators in local development efforts as never before. It gave them access to resources controlled by administrators. Most importantly, self-help put some limitations on the extent to which civil servants could involve themselves in local politics without violating the code of impartiality. The change in the role of the legislator has been further enhanced by other factors the most significant of which are briefly examined below. This change has been more noticeable since the first post-independence election in 1969.

When we compare the first Parliament (1963-69) with the second (1969-74) the linkage role of the M.P. becomes more apparent. The two parliaments shared a relatively free atmosphere of public debate in which, on occasions, backbenchers performed the functions of a loyal opposition when they criticized the Executive on major policy issues. Although much of this debate would have taken place within the party structure which could not provide a forum, the tradition has now been established as an essential part of Kenya's legislative process. Throughout the life of the first legislature, the President, consistently emphasized to individual legislators that they must play a role as the main link between the people, parliament, and the government. He saw the legislator as the interpreter of the policies and decisions of the government to the people. This, he argued, gave the legislator a chance for serious involvement as well as a significant developmental role in his own constituency. Besides, it would also advertise parliament as an important national institution. To the contrary, the majority of legislators in the first Parliament were more concerned with personal image building through public utterances in the legislature and in the press despite the fact that the majority of their constituents are illiterate. As one author has put it, "they were [unwisely] aware that their own future depended to a large extent on the kind of reputations they created for themselves in Parliament as the representatives of the people. This is one reason why they challenged any Government measure that touched upon issues such as land or trade. These were issues on which there was bound to be a public response."<sup>11</sup> But public response was for the most part restricted to the small group of the intelligentsia concentrated in the urban areas. Peasants were more concerned with whether or not a particular legislator was able to contribute to the economic development of his own constituency rather than with external affairs.

What then is the significance of the 1969 elections? Briefly, they were held in an atmosphere which was far from normal. This was accounted for by two main reasons. First, the assassination of Tom Mboya in July 1969 created a general atmosphere of instability and diverted political consciousness from national to purely tribal issues. "They have killed our native son." Thus the vote against all the incumbents in Nyanza in this election can be traced to this general atmosphere.

The second major incident occurred in Kisumu in October 1969 where violence broke out when President Kenyatta came to open the Russian built Nyanza General Hospital. Police opened fire on the crowd killing ten people. Immediately thereafter, the Kenya People's Union (KPU), the socialist opposition, was banned and its leaders detained only about two months before elections were held. The atmosphere was therefore full of resentment arising from the assassination and fear derived from the government's treatment of the opposition party. These two incidents were further reinforced by mass oath-taking amongst the Kikuyu throughout 1969, a development which reminded other Kenyans of the Mau Mau, and made them afraid that something more serious might be about to happen. Despite the tense atmosphere in which the 1969 election was held, it underlined many significant developments in Kenya's political process.

Most importantly, it underlined the primacy of local politics as well as the role of the parliamentarian as the purveyor of pork-barrel benefits for his constituency. In their study of that election, Hyden and Leys state that the effectiveness of a legislator in his constituency was directly proportional to the amount of benefits he extracted from the government during his term of office. His role as a lawmaker and explainer of government policies to the electorate seemed to be unimportant. Hyden and Leys write:

All the constituency reports without exception emphasized the priority accorded by voters to the candidates' tribe (in urban seats) and clans (in rural seats). Ascriptive group membership was still seen by nearly all voters as the sine qua non of acceptability and trustworthiness. Subject to this criterion the next test to be applied to a candidate was his probable performance in securing government services for the constituency. Here, the past record of incumbents tended to tell against them because they had not been able to secure enough benefits, either from lack of influence or because they had not tried hard enough.<sup>12</sup>

The historical factors discussed above, particularly the emergence of self-help and the elections of 1969, significantly altered the role of the M.P. in Kenyan society. Given these developments, what are the relationships existing between M.P.s and their constituents, and what does this signify for the process of linkage development in Kenya today?

### III. Linkage Development in Kenya: An Overview of Research Findings

If linkage development is a multi-dimensional process involving the mutual penetration of center and periphery by their respective agents, the structural evolution of Kenyan politics and administration since the 1950s and especially since 1969, suggests that the linkage networks forged by M.P.s may be an important aspect of this process. The extent to which such linkages actually exist, and their prospects for becoming institutionalized across the Kenyan political system largely depends on the existence of two conditions: (1) A mutually congruent set of role expectations by Members of the National Assembly and the constituents they purport to represent, particularly local elites, which specify a

set of desired relations that is functionally different from that existing between constituents and agents of the Provincial Administration. (2) A series of activities, resources, and sanctions through which these mutually congruent sets of role expectations are both substantively and symbolically fulfilled and maintained.

To determine the presence or absence of these conditions in Kenya, the authors conducted a series of surveys in fourteen parliamentary constituencies in the country between April and June of this year. As noted above, these surveys were designed to simultaneously observe the process of linkage development from three points along the potential linkage chain in each constituency by considering the attitudes and behavior of citizens, local elites, and the M.P. for the district. Due to the near impossibility of listing dwelling units in rural Africa, members of the citizen sample in each constituency were drawn on a quota rather than a random basis according to their age and sex. Quotas for age/sex combinations (which were limited to adults over 20 years) were based on the results of the Kenyan National Census of 1969.<sup>13</sup>

The samples of local elites interviewed for the study were determined by a combination of positional and reputational criteria. Included in these samples were all sub-chiefs, chiefs, district councilors, headmasters of secondary schools, senior officials of KANU, and the chairmen of all cooperative societies and other associations residing in the constituency, and any other individuals who were considered to be important citizens by at least five respondents of the citizen sample.<sup>14</sup>

The fourteen constituencies chosen as research sites were also selected on a stratified basis as this was the most efficient way to obtain a representative sample of Kenya's 158 parliamentary constituencies that was logistically feasible to study.<sup>15</sup> In selecting these constituencies, controls were introduced to account for variations in ethnic composition, geographic location and accessibility to the capital city of Nairobi, level of economic development, and whether the constituency was represented in the National Assembly by a backbencher, assistant minister, or cabinet member.<sup>16</sup> Because of the limited data processing facilities in East Africa, this paper shall consider citizen and elite samples from only four constituencies: Starehe, an urban district of mixed ethnic composition located in Nairobi; Laikipia-West, a rural district in the Rift Valley approximately 110 miles northwest of Nairobi which is predominantly populated by Kikuyu migrants who have recently settled on farms once owned by European farmers; Nyakach, a rice growing area in Nyanza Province whose population is almost entirely Luo; and Ikolomani, an area of high population density in Western Province, the home of the Abaluhya people. Given the small sample, no claim is made here regarding the representative nature of this group of constituencies. In respect to ethnicity and geographic location, however, they are typical of more than 60 per cent of the constituencies in the country.

All interviewing of citizens and local elites was carried out in the appropriate vernacular language or Kiswahili, while interviews with M.P.s were conducted in English. Given the low N of the latter sample, an

additional 32 M.P.s were randomly selected to augment this group. Interviewing of these M.P.s is still in progress. In this report we shall present data for the fourteen representatives of the constituencies serving as research sites for the citizen and local elite surveys, plus another eleven legislators who were interviewed during the past month.

### Role Expectations

Perhaps the first prerequisite for the development of institutionalized linkages between center and periphery is the emergence of congruent and mutually reinforcing sets of role expectations on the part of those on the periphery, those at the center, and those attempting to link the two. As noted in the previous section, elective politics in Kenya evolved along highly parochial lines based on personal machines in which local interests were repeatedly stressed and debated over the articulation of national goals. Despite this local orientation, the role of the M.P. as a linker between his constituents and Kenya's central political institutions did not fully manifest itself until after the election of 1969. Whereas prior to the election most M.P.s saw themselves as parliamentarians whose first duty was to deliberate and legislate national policy, members of the Second Parliament primarily define their jobs in terms of constituency service.

Though we do not possess longitudinal data to measure the degree to which members of the Kenya National Assembly have redefined their roles, their current thoughts on the matter are quite clear, and are highly consistent with the expectations of their constituents. When asked what types of problems occupied most of their time, 88 per cent of the M.P.s in our sample reported that problems in their constituency were their main concern. Only 4 per cent reported that general problems of a national scope drew most of their attention. Another 8 per cent said they divided their time about equally between local and national issues. Of the M.P.s emphasizing their preoccupation with local issues, all but two were backbenchers, while all but one of the legislators concerned with national affairs or a combination of national and local issues were Ministers or Assistant Ministers in the Kenya Government. Each of the latter explicitly cited his ministerial duties as the reason for his dividing his time between national and local problems. Each also indicated, however, that he could better serve his constituency because of his ministerial status, and that he took steps to insure that a "fair" share of his ministry's resources reached his constituency.

The local orientation of M.P.s is more clearly revealed by their answers to the question of what specific activities occupy most of their time. When asked to rank six activities which are widely considered to constitute the legislative role in Kenya, the mean ranks accorded each activity by backbenchers and members of the Government were as follows.

Table 1  
Activities on which M.P.s Occupy their Time  
 (mean ranks)

<u>Backbenchers (N=20)</u>		<u>Frontbenchers (N=5)</u>	
<u>Rank</u>	<u>Activity</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Activity</u>
1.8	Obtaining resources and projects for constituency	2.0	Obtaining resources and projects for constituency
		2.2	Explaining policies to voters
		2.5	Formulating government policy
		2.6	Expressing views of constituents
2.8	Interceding with civil servants on behalf of constituents		
2.9	Formulating government policy		
3.3	Expressing views of constituents		
		3.6	Interceding with civil servants on behalf of constituents
3.9	Explaining policies to voters		
5.4	Resolving conflicts in constituency		
		5.6	Resolving conflicts in constituency

As indicated by the table, frontbenchers and backbenchers allocate their time to similar activities. While ministers and assistant ministers are more inclined than backbenchers to spend time explaining government policy to the public, and less likely to intercede with civil servants on their constituents' behalf, both are primarily concerned with obtaining government resources and projects for their districts. Indeed, getting "the goodies" for one's district in terms of government expenditure for schools, roads, agricultural projects, etc. is the name of the game in Kenyan politics, and the criterion on which virtually all members of the M.P. sample expected to be judged in the

parliamentary elections scheduled for October of this year. When probed as to whether they should spend more or less time on each of these same six activities, 81 per cent said they hoped to do more to obtain government projects for their district, while another 63 per cent felt they should be more active in pressing the civil service to respond to constituent demands. No other activities were mentioned by more than a quarter of the sample as deserving more attention.

Constituents' role expectations of Kenyan M.P.s, and the expectations held by local elites are highly congruent with the role definitions M.P.s set for themselves, though the conceptions most citizens hold of what a member of the Kenya National Assembly actually does are often diffuse, and frequently emphasize symbolic as well as substantive aspects of the job. Role expectations held by citizens and local elites were probed by two sets of questions, a series of open-ended queries which asked the respondents to describe how legislators handled community problems in contrast to civil servants, party leaders, and judges, and a series which asked the respondents to specify the relative importance of seven activities in which legislators are most frequently engaged. Responses to the former indicate that most citizens do not perceive their representatives as performing any specialized functions other than that he is a person whose first duty is to serve the community, and that in contrast to senior officials of the Provincial Administration, is a long term resident of the community. More than half of the respondents could not formulate more precise answers to these questions other than noting that M.P.s participate in making laws. These diffuse conceptions of a legislator's duties can pose difficulties for an M.P. When asked whether their constituents perceived their job in the same manner as they defined it, 72 per cent of the M.P.s in our sample stated that their constituents expected them to deliver far more than was possible in terms of attending to their personal (as contrasted with community) problems, and that they did not appreciate the limits of an M.P.'s power.

When presented with a list of specific activities with which M.P.s are concerned, members of the citizen sample were more precise and consistent in their pattern of response. As indicated in Table 2 citizens and local elites alike perceive their M.P.s as a means to communicate the needs of their community to the national government, and as an agent for obtaining resources for development. Particularly significant is the low emphasis citizens and local elites place on the explicitly legislative duties of deliberating and passing bills in the National Assembly, and on explaining government policy to constituents, an activity repeatedly stressed by President Kenyatta. Put differently, both M.P.s and their constituents primarily define their roles as agents of the periphery whose main duty is to penetrate the center. Legislative roles as conventionally defined are decidedly viewed as less important than linkage roles. On the other hand, the linkage roles expected of M.P.s are qualitatively different from those played by civil servants in the Provincial Administration.

Table 2  
Perspectives of the Most Important Job of an M.P.

<u>A. Citizen Perspectives</u>				
	<u>Starehe</u>	<u>Laikipia</u>	<u>Nyakach</u>	<u>Ikolomani</u>
Explain government policies to constituents	3%	17%	8%	9%
Take part in National Assembly debates and pass bills	4	8	21	7
Tell government what constituents want	35	34	18	30
Obtain development projects for district	39	9	29	20
Help constituents who have problems with government	4	4	9	10
Help solve community conflicts	2	3	3	4
Visit district as often as possible to determine people's problems	12	25	11	19
N=	(270)	(169)	(286)	(254)
<u>B. Local Elite Perspectives</u>				
	<u>Starehe</u>	<u>Laikipia*</u>	<u>Nyakach</u>	<u>Ikolomani</u>
Explain government policies to constituents	-		12%	
Take part in National Assembly debates and pass bills	5%		7	5%
Tell government what constituents want	5		74	5
Obtain development projects for district	58		7	58
Help constituents who have problems with government	-		-	-
Help solve community conflicts	-		-	-
Visit district as often as possible to determine people's problems	32		-	32
N=	(19)		(42)	(19)

\*Data for Laikipia were unavailable for processing at the time this paper was written.

What clearly emerges here is the notion of the M.P. as an instructed delegate whose primary duty is to labor on his constituents' behalf. This view is further supported by responses to a series of questions as to whose beliefs M.P.s should follow when trying to decide their position on an issue. When asked whether "your M.P. should do what the people of this district want no matter what his own opinion is," 78 per cent of the Starehe citizen sample, 91 per cent of the respondents in Laikipia, and 98 per cent of those living in Nyakach answered affirmatively. Similar feelings were expressed by 100 per cent of the elite sample in Laikipia, and 98 per cent of the local leadership in Nyakach. The concept of the M.P. as an instructed delegate is further supported by the responses of citizens and local elites to the question of whether they thought their "M.P. should follow his own judgement, because he knows what is best for you." Eighty-five per cent of the constituents in Laikipia, 68 per cent in Nyakach, and 69 per cent in Starehe rejected this proposition as did 100 per cent and 69 per cent of the elite samples in Laikipia and Nyakach.<sup>17</sup> And when asked whose views an M.P. should follow when faced with a decision on a controversial issue in the National Assembly, both constituents and local elites contended that the views of constituents should take priority, especially over those of the M.P. Their answers, which are reported in Table 3, are also interesting in respect to the relative saliency of the Kenya African National Union as a source of public policy in the minds of local elites. Although the Party's organization at the local level has been moribund since the late 1960s, the government of Mzee Jomo Kenyatta still refers to itself as "the KANU Government," a concept which still strikes a responsive chord among a significant proportion of the local leadership group.

Table 3

When an M.P. faces a controversial issue in the National Assembly, whose views should he follow?

	Starehe		Laikipia		Nyakach		Ikolomani	
	Constituents	Local Elites	Constituents	Local Elites*	Constituents	Local Elites	Constituents	Local Elites
Constituents	70%	57%	40%		69%	69%	64%	67%
KANU	9	33	19		11	21	10	33
Views of civil service	3	10	15		3	-	5	10
Interest groups	1	-	11		5	-	4	-
Advisors and friends	6	-	9		1	3	14	-
Own beliefs	11	-	1		8	8	14	-
Other	-	-	10		3	-	1	-
N=	(274)	(21)	(183)		(275)	(21)	(262)	(21)

\*Data for Laikipia elites were not available for processing at time of writing.

Although constituents, local elites, and M.P.s all stressed constituency service in their expectations of the latter's role, the concept of the M.P. as a mere agent of local opinion does not fully describe the role M.P.s feel they play. While Kenyan legislators certainly regard themselves as accountable to their constituents, most members of our sample felt they were better equipped (usually because of their superior education and experience) to articulate and define the interests of their constituents than the people themselves, and considered this to be one of their main tasks as leaders. All saw themselves as opinion leaders who, though bound to represent the wishes of their constituents, played a role in determining what those wishes were. This was especially true in respect to the specific content of the demands M.P.s were asked to make on their constituents' behalf. For example, an M.P.'s constituents might repeatedly express a general demand for better health or educational facilities but it was up to the M.P. to specify what types of schools or health centers were feasible, and to take the initiative in organizing the members of the community to realize their goals. As a result, most M.P.s also define their roles vis-à-vis their constituents on the one hand, and the central government on the other in entrepreneurial terms. Both present the M.P. with a set of demands and resources which, if properly combined, will result in service to his constituents, enhanced political stature for himself, and the further development of linkage networks between center and periphery. The activities of M.P.s as entrepreneurs for their constituencies will be discussed further in the next section.

#### Activities and Resources

If the first prerequisite for linkage development is the existence of congruent sets of role expectations on the part of those on the periphery, and the center of the political system, a second requirement is the existence of behavioral patterns and resources through which these role expectations find expression. Turning first to the activities of those on the periphery, most constituents, and virtually all members of the local elite samples are highly aware of the problems facing their communities, and discuss these problems on a regular basis. A similar finding was obtained in respect to national issues as shown by Table 4 which suggests that at a minimum, most Kenyans are members of a national political system in respect to the rhetorical dimensions of the term.<sup>18</sup> Voting turnout among members of our samples were also high as 46 per cent of the constituents in Starehe, 64 per cent in Laikipia, 71 per cent in Nyakach, and 67 per cent in Ikolomani reported that they had voted in the parliamentary elections of 1969.<sup>19</sup> Respective figures for the elite samples were 86 per cent, 100 per cent, 100 per cent, and 94 per cent. If we thus define minimal membership in the political system in terms of regularly discussing public affairs on a weekly basis, and participating in national elections, roughly half to two-thirds of the adult population make the grade. Such a definition of the boundaries of the political system is, of course, quite arbitrary and includes no measures of popular support for the system's major institutions, or of the degree of consensus on the system's rules of the game, two conditions which must be fulfilled if the system is to persist. These figures, however, are highly suggestive of the parameters within which linkage networks forged by legislators can develop.

Table 4  
Frequency of Discussion of Local and National Problems

	<u>Starehe</u>		<u>Laikipia</u>		<u>Nyakach</u>		<u>Ikolomani</u>	
	Constit- uents	Local Elites	Constit- uents	Local Elites	Constit- uents	Local Elites	Constit- uents	Local Elites
<b>LOCAL ISSUES</b>								
One of more times per week	63%	90%	60%	88%	40%	81%	64%	90%
Once a fortnight	14	10	12	8	22	12	19	10
Less than once a fortnight	18	-	11	4	31	2	10	-
Never	6	-	17	-	8	5	7	-
N=	(289)	(21)	(296)	(24)	(290)	(42)	(248)	(21)
<b>NATIONAL ISSUES</b>								
One or more times per week	65%	84%	62%	96%	53%	88%	69%	84%
Once a fortnight	12	16	11	-	13	7	15	16
Less than once a fortnight	15	-	11	-	29	5	8	-
Never	8	-	16	4	5	-	7	-
N=	(293)	(19)	(290)	(24)	(210)	(43)	(299)	(19)

Though a majority of our samples discussed issues of public policy on a regular basis, and sought to at least indirectly influence the making of public policy via the electoral process, the number who have sought to develop more extensive linkages to the central arenas of decision-making is substantially less. When asked whether they had ever talked to a government official about the problem they had previously named as the most important in their community, 5 per cent of the Starehe sample, 21 per cent of the Laikipia respondents, 33 per cent of those in Nyakach, and 12 per cent in Ikolomani said "yes." As one might expect, the corresponding figures for the local elite samples were substantially higher -- 30 per cent in Starehe, 76 per cent in Laikipia, 77 per cent in Nyakach, and 50 per cent in Ikolomani. The general magnitude of these figures is not particularly surprising, though it is significant to note that the lowest level of communication between citizens and officials, and local elites and officials was in Starehe, the only urban constituency considered by the authors.<sup>20</sup> Of greater significance is the fact that different types of officials were contacted respectively by citizens and local elites, for a clear pattern emerges as to the nature of political linkages at the grass roots of Kenyan society. This pattern, however, is also affected by the behavior of the M.P. vis-à-vis his constituents.

Table 5  
 Officials with whom Respondents Discussed the  
 Most Important Problem in their Community<sup>a</sup>

	Starehe <sup>b</sup>		Laikipia		Nyakach		Ikolomani	
	Constit- uents	Local Elites <sup>c</sup>	Constit- uents	Local Elites	Constit- uents	Local Elites	Constit- uents	Local Elites
Sub-chiefs	-		15%	-	59%	-	43%	-
Location chiefs	-		51	47%	79	40%	63	33%
D. C. or D. O.	31%		8	53	44	100	27	83
Other officials at district level	31		13	-	23	20	13	66
Provincial officers	2		2	-	13	10	-	-
Government officials in Nairobi	2		1	6	-	-	-	-
M. P.	-		49	88	11	23	3	-
Minister	-		-	6	-	-	-	-
Other	2		10	-	8	-	7	-
N=	(13)	(7)	(61)	(17)	(71)	(30)	(30)	(12)

<sup>a</sup> Percentages total to more than 100, because the respondents who discussed problems with government officials often talked to more than one.

<sup>b</sup> In Nairobi there are no chiefs, and the Provincial Administration and District Administration are combined under the Provincial Commissioner.

<sup>c</sup> Number of cases for Starehe elite sample is too small for meaningful computation of percentages.

As suggested by the results presented in Table 5, contact between citizens and government officials is most likely to occur with the lowest members of the district administration, the sub-chief and chief. The pattern is present in all constituencies except Starehe where chiefs are not part of the urban administration, and underscores the highly parochial orientation farmers in the rural areas have towards their government. In contrast, local elites rarely deal with sub-chiefs, and approach location chiefs less frequently than the average citizen. Local elites are far more inclined to press their demands on senior officials of the district administration, the D.C. and D.O.s. Neither citizens nor local elites, however, are likely to contact administrative officials at the provincial level, and the extent of their approaches to their M.P. is highly variable.<sup>21</sup>

The variable rate of contact between constituents and M.P.s suggests that linkage development along this dimension is not nearly as uniform as that involving the Provincial Administration, but that the perceived utility of such linkages where they do exist, as in Laikipia, can be quite high on the part of citizens and local elites alike. Linkage development along this dimension, moreover, is a function of how the M.P. is perceived by his constituents, which in turn is a function of his frequency of contact with, and activities in his district; in short, his performance.

Although most citizens in our samples do not approach their M.P. about community problems, most are aware of who he is (an average of 80 per cent of the citizen samples could correctly identify him by name), what he does, and as suggested above, what he should do. However, when asked how many times they had seen their M.P. within the last six months, considerable variation was again reported across the four samples as Table 6 reveals.

Table 6  
Number of Times Respondent Has Seen his M.P.  
within the Last Six Months (November 1973 - April 1974)

	<u>Starehe</u>		<u>Laikipia</u>		<u>Nyakach</u>		<u>Ikolomani</u>	
	Constit- uents	Local Elites	Constit- uents	Local Elites	Constit- uents	Local Elites	Constit- uents	Local Elites
None	74%	5%	20%	-	47%	76%	59%	5%
Once	4	-	4	-	27	-	15	5
Twice	10	-	46	-	14	17	11	5
Three or four	7	-	17	4%	8	5	9	-
Five or more	5	-	12	21	1	-	3	20
"Many"	-	95	-	75	-	2	-	65
N=	(243)	(20)	(74)	(24)	(270)	(41)	(245)	(20)

As expected, members of the local power structure were far more likely to see their M.P. than the average citizen, a pattern present in all constituencies except Nyakach, and which reflects the conscious decision by most M.P.s to contact as many local leaders as possible each time they return to their constituency. More interesting is the apparent correlation between the number of times an M.P. has been seen in his constituency by the general public, and their tendency to approach him about community problems. Thus in Laikipia where 75 per cent of the citizen sample reported seeing their M.P. at least twice within the past six months, 49 per cent had also spoken to him about community problems, while in Starehe where only 26 per cent had seen their representative, none had talked to him about such issues. A similar relationship holds in Nyakach and Ikolomani as shown by Table 7.

Table 7  
 "Correlation" between Frequency of Seeing M.P. and  
 Speaking to Him about Community Problems

	% of public who has seen M.P.	% of public who has spoken to M.P.
Laikipia	80%	49%
Nyakach	53	11
Ikolomani	41	3
Starehe	26	0

Citizens who regularly see their M.P. are also more likely to favorably evaluate his performance in his job. Space does not permit a systematic presentation of this relationship, but when asked whether they felt their M.P. was "very active," "somewhat active," or "not active" in respect to each of the seven activities considered in Table 2, the percentage of citizens and local elites who rated their representative as "very active" was highest in those districts where he was most frequently seen, and lowest where he was not. The rating M.P.s received in respect to each activity, moreover, tended to be the same. If he was rated as "highly active" on one, he would most likely be "highly active" on all. For this reason, only the mean ratings are presented in Table 8.

Table 8  
 Citizen Evaluation of M.P.'s Performance (Mean Ratings) by  
 Level of Constituency Contact with M.P.\*

	LEVEL OF CONTACT WITH M.P.		
	High (Laikipia)	Medium (Nyakach)	Low (Starehe)
Highly active	41%	16%	5%
Somewhat active	36	44	51
Not active	23	40	44
N=	(295)	(224)	(227)

\*Data for all samples of local elites and for Ikolomani citizens were unavailable for processing at the time paper was written.

The apparent inter-correlation between the number of times constituents see their M.P., their propensity to approach him about community problems, and their general evaluation of his performance suggest several conclusions about the prospects for linkage development along this dimension.<sup>22</sup> First, linkage development, whether by the Provincial Administration, or by the M.P. depends on the physical presence of "a linker." In rural areas where facilities for mass communication are non-existent or poor, there are no substitutes, and it is for this reason that the Provincial Administration in Kenya, through its network of chiefs, has been so effective in penetrating and controlling those on the periphery.<sup>23</sup> M.P.s must therefore circulate among their constituents on a regular basis if they are to maintain their support, and create parallel linkage structures of their own. Given the difficulties of this task, and the absence of local party organizations, M.P.s must also attach themselves to the chief's network, and/or create their own personal machines composed of prominent local leaders.

Linkage development by M.P.s in Kenya thus requires a two pronged effort involving the establishment of downward linkages into one's constituency, and upward linkages with the center. Most M.P.s seek to achieve the former through frequent visits to their districts, and participation in self-help projects. As for establishing linkages with the center, most do so by lobbying with agencies of the central administration for support for local development projects, and by occasionally attaching themselves to nationally prominent leaders where such men control the purse strings to the resources an M.P. needs. Law making and participation in parliamentary debates are increasingly treated as a low priority item, a fact underscored by low attendance in the House.<sup>24</sup> There is considerable variation, however, in the way individual members approach these activities, and the degree of success achieved.

Although 96 per cent of our M.P. sample reported that they visit their constituency at least once a week, these visits vary both in quality and in the number and type of people each M.P. sees. About a third of those interviewed indicated that they were content to make themselves available to their constituents at their homes, while two-thirds made systematic attempts to canvass members of the local elite, especially the chiefs. About half attended public meetings once or twice a month, but only 11 per cent reported doing so on a weekly basis. Only 8 per cent maintained offices in their constituency, though another 8 per cent had done so in the past. Of the M.P.s representing the four constituencies considered above, it is instructive to note that only the member for Laikipia maintained an office, and held regular weekly meetings with his constituents.

Perhaps the most important activity contributing to linkage development is the organization and active participation in self-help projects.<sup>25</sup> Such projects, or "Karambee" as they are popularly known, present M.P.s with a wide range of opportunities for organizing support at the grass roots, and extracting resources from the center on their constituents behalf. It is not surprising, therefore, that 96 per cent of the sample claimed to be involved in such projects. The degree of participation, however, varies from token involvement to major

entrepreneurial efforts which can consume large portions of an M.P.'s time. These projects, which usually involve the construction and establishment of a school, health center, irrigation system, etc. are officially sanctioned and encouraged by the Government of President Kenyatta, and as such provide a legitimate vehicle through which an M.P. can simultaneously respond to his constituents' demands, press for resources from central authorities, and create a personal patronage system for himself. The "rules of the game" which govern these projects, moreover, have become sufficiently well defined that in many cases the government ministry under whose jurisdiction a project falls will promise to take over the project, or provide matching funds if a specified minimum standard of development is reached. For example, if a community builds a secondary school, and hires enough teachers to provide four years of education for its students, the Ministry of Education will, depending on the educational needs of the area (a question also subject to lobbying by M.P.s), absorb the school into its system. Government assistance for "Harmabee" projects is not automatic. The prospect of such assistance, however, is a powerful incentive to both a community considering a project, and to its M.P. Both are prodded into action, because the potential payoffs for both are very real.<sup>26</sup>

A final stimulus to linkage development by M.P.s which needs mention, if not elaboration, is the existence in Kenya of periodic elections through which constituents can remove those M.P.s who fail to perform. As suggested above, it was primarily the results of the 1969 election in which 60 per cent of the incumbents were turned out of office that redefined the roles to which M.P.s are supposed to conform. We might therefore speculate that as time goes by the election process will further institutionalize the role of the Kenyan M.P. as a development entrepreneur with the result that the linkages M.P.s forge between the center and periphery will become institutionalized as well. In this regard it will be interesting to see which M.P.s are returned in the forthcoming elections on October 14th, and whether the electoral process itself will continue on a continent where this mechanism of political recruitment is no longer the rule.

#### IV. Summary and Conclusion

This paper began with the premise that if political development involves the establishment of autonomous, stable, and valued organizations for the purpose of responding to increasing levels of political participation, the establishment and maintenance of autonomous, stable and valued linkages between a society's central political institutions, and its people is an essential component of the process. Given this premise, we then hypothesized that Kenyan legislators might play a unique role in the developmental process by creating linkages between the center and periphery that are functionally different from those already established by agents of the Provincial Administration. Having presented an overview of our findings, can we now conclude that this is so?

Our conclusions in respect to this question must be tentative given the limited data considered herein, and the high variability of the performance of linkage activities by M.P.s which these data suggest. We would nevertheless contend that M.P.s do constitute a unique set of political actors in the Kenyan political system in respect to the process of linkage development, and that they have the capability of establishing linkages between the center and periphery which are autonomous from those established by the Provincial Administration with the possible exception of those networks established by the chiefs. Whether most Kenyan legislators will ultimately exercise this capability is an empirical question. Clearly it is in their own interests to do so if they wish to maintain themselves in office.

As indicated by our data, the first prerequisite to linkage development by M.P.s, a well defined set of role expectations that is mutually shared by the potential members of the linkage chain, is widely fulfilled. Citizens, local elites, and M.P.s all define the latter's role in terms of constituency service, and see linkage as the mechanism through which the M.P. obtains resources from the center to facilitate and achieve this end. These expectations not only define the duties of the M.P. as a linker between center and periphery, but also recognize the sanctions which will be applied to those M.P.s who fail to carry out their assigned role.

That many M.P.s do not fulfill this model is due mainly to a lack of entrepreneurial skills on their part, and a failure to recognize the magnitude, if not the nature, of the task. As we have seen, some M.P.s clearly work harder, and are more systematic than others when it comes to establishing contact with both the local elite, and the public at large. Others, quite obviously, have superior access to those who dispense resources at the center. We have not, however, explored the degree to which an M.P.'s success in establishing downward and upward linkages is contingent on other factors beyond his control such as the topography, level of development, and communications infrastructure of his district, his ethnic background, the presence or absence of rival leaders in his district, etc. Nor have we considered in any precise manner the actual amount of resources available to M.P.s as a group, except to contend that present resources are sufficient to stimulate linkage development by M.P.s, and that an increasingly specific set of rules are evolved regarding the conditions under which they are dispensed. An "eyeball" review of the situation existing in all fourteen of the constituencies considered in this study, however, suggests that these factors are of secondary importance to the level of entrepreneurial skill of the M.P. himself.

We would thus conclude this paper with the contention that the development of valued and autonomous linkage systems between M.P.s and their constituents in Kenya, and between M.P.s and central government institutions is a reality if not the rule. The stability and level of institutionalization of these linkages has yet to be tested as they are of relatively recent formation. As such, the extent and durability of these linkage systems does not equal, and is unlikely to equal, those of the Provincial Administration. These linkage systems serve a different purpose, however, and where they

exist are extensive and highly routinized networks of communication and exchange. Given the continued availability of resources from the center, and the perpetuation of Kenya's present electoral system, we expect the linkage systems developed by M.P.s to become a permanent, and increasingly important feature of Kenyan political life



## NOTES

1. Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 8, 12.
2. To cite but a few examples: The work of Martin Dornboos and Joan Vincent on Uganda, Richard Stryker and Michael Cohen on the Ivory Coast, Maxwell Owusu on Ghana, David and Audrey Smock on Eastern Nigeria, and Goran Hyden on Tanzania.
3. Notable exceptions to this trend have been studies of patron-client relations. For a particularly good example, albeit not dealing with linkage in Africa, see James C. Scott, "Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in South-East Asia," American Political Science Review, March 1972, pp. 91-113.
4. Huntington, op. cit., pp. 8-24.
5. See Goran Hyden, R. Jackson and John Okumu (eds.) Development Administration: The Kenyan Experience (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 8. The figures shown here are rounded since those recorded in various documents do refer to different months of the year.
6. Ibid., p. 8.
7. Cherry Gertzel, The Politics of Independent Kenya (London: Heinemann, 1970), p. 26.
8. See John Nottingham, "The Development of Local Government in Kenya" (n.d.), p. 6. Also see further discussion of this point in John J. Okumu, "The Problem of Tribalism in Kenya," in P. L. Van den Berghe (ed.) Race and Ethnicity in Africa (1970).
9. See John J. Okumu, "Charisma and Politics in Kenya," East Africa Journal, February 1968.
10. Gertzel, op. cit., p. 29.
11. Gertzel, ibid., p. 138.
12. Goran Hyden and Colin Leys, "Elections and Politics in Single-Party Systems: The Case of Kenya and Tanzania," British Journal of Political Science, 2, p. 401.
13. To increase the prospects of obtaining a representative sample in each constituency, the quotas for each age/sex combination to be included in the sample were randomly allocated across thirty sampling plots of approximately a quarter mile in diameter. These plots were in turn randomly distributed across the constituency on the basis of aerial photographic maps of the area. The procedure substantially reduced the bias normally inherent in quota samples by insuring that all areas of the constituency were represented in

the survey. Given the authors' concern with linkage patterns this consideration was especially important as citizens living in highly developed sections of the constituency and along line of communication would obviously be more likely to be linked into the national political system than those who did not.

14. There was a considerable overlap between the list of leaders included in the local elite by virtue of their formal positions, and those selected according to reputational criteria. Approximately 90 per cent of the latter held formal positions in the local power structure, the major exception being approximately two to four prominent businessmen and farmers in each district. Conversely, 50 per cent to 70 per cent of those included in the elite sample because of their positions were regarded as influential by at least five members of the citizen sample. Given the distribution of the citizen sample across thirty sampling plots, the reputational method also facilitated a spatial analysis of the breadth of each leader's influence. As one might expect, there was a direct correlation between a leader's position and the size of the area in which he was regarded as influential. Individual sub-chiefs were thus regarded as leaders by far fewer members of the citizen sample than location chiefs, and the M.P.
15. For example, constituencies in Northeastern Province, and Turkana, and Marsabit districts were excluded as possible research sites because of the inability of the authors to supervise interviewing in these areas due to weather and road conditions in these areas.
16. Constituencies included in the study were as follows: Kilifi-South (Coast Province), Embu-South and Mbooni (Eastern Province), Githunguri and Kirinyaga-West (Central Province), Kajiado-North Laikipia-West, and Kericho (Rift Valley Province), Kitutu-East, Mbita, and Nyakach (Nyanza Province), Busia-East and Ikolomani (Western Province), and Starehe (Nairobi).
17. Data for Ikolomani and Starehe were unavailable for processing at the time this paper was written.
18. No data are presented here for nomadic people living in remote areas of northern Kenya and Masailand. The level of political discourse in such areas, particularly in respect to national issues, is undoubtedly lower than that reported here. The authors hope to consider the significance of this pattern when analyzing the data from the surveys in Kajiado-North, a constituency of some 5,000 square miles populated by 20,000 nomadic members of the Masai tribe. People residing in such areas, however, account for less than 12 per cent of Kenya's population.
19. The relatively low figure for Starehe is a reflection of the fact that many people residing in the area vote in a rural constituency from which they have migrated to Nairobi, while others, because of their transient existence do not vote at all.

The low level of communication in Starehe is probably explained in terms of the highly transient nature of the population in the constituency, and that in an urban area government officials are not as visible to the general public as in the rural areas where such officials do not compete for the public's attention with a host of other leaders.

21. It should also be noted that people who contact officials usually do so on their own without the use of intermediaries. As a follow-up to our question as to which officials, if any, they had contacted about the problem they regarded as the most important facing their community, the members of all the samples were asked whether they ever sought to establish contact via an intermediary rather than making a direct approach, and if so, who the intermediary was. Less than 5 per cent of the respondents in each of the citizen samples reported using intermediaries, while none of the local elite respondents reported such contacts.
22. Because of the unavailability of data processing equipment the authors have been unable to systematically validate this relationship through either cross-tabulation or correlation analysis. It is hoped that this omission will be corrected in a future draft of this paper.
23. The authority of the chiefs should not be underestimated. While this network is a remnant of the colonial state, and was consequently viewed with great suspicion by politicians preceding Kenya's independence, it is an important institution which our data suggest has been too frequently ignored by observers of contemporary Kenyan politics.
24. During the course of our field research in Kenya, attendance in the House varied between 20 per cent and 30 per cent of the membership. As tempting as it is to conclude that members stayed away to do their constituents' bidding in other locales, it should also be noted that many M.P.s run businesses of various types in addition to tending to their legislative duties. Attendance during this period was also a bit lower than normal as many M.P.s were already back in their constituencies to mend the fences prior to the forthcoming election campaign.
25. For a more detailed analysis of the political significance of self-help in Kenya, see E. M. Godfrey and G. C. M. Mutiso, "The Political Economy of Self-Help: Kenya's Institutes of Technology," Canadian Journal of African Studies, Vol. 8, No. 1, 1974, pp. 109-33, and Frank Holmquist, "Toward a Political Theory of Self-Help Development in Africa," Rural Africana, No. 18, Winter 1972.

26. A case in point is the M.P. for Laikipia. In addition to systematically contacting his constituents, this man's high performance rating can be directly attributed to his entrepreneurial abilities at organizing self-help projects and other ventures. Particularly noteworthy is this M.P.'s efforts to set up a company to purchase large European farms in his area which are then divided among landless Kikuyu. In one such venture (he has done this three times), the M.P. arranged for land distribution to some 7,000 individuals. Needless to say, this man's political stock is rising. At 32 he is already an Assistant Minister, and in many ways represents the model of what an M.P. as linker should be. It is also worth noting that this M.P. usually only attends sessions of the National Assembly when the question period pertains to his Ministry, for in his own words "the Assembly is not the place to get things done."
27. A major exception to this conclusion is Starehe. While the M.P. for this constituency is a successful politician in terms of extracting resources from the center, few of his constituents are aware of this fact, because of the highly transient quality of the population living in his district.

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