


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**ZIMBABWE
NAMIBIA**

ANTICIPATION OF ECONOMIC AND HUMANITARIAN NEEDS

**Transition Problems of Developing Nations
in Southern Africa**

FINAL REPORT

**Dr. Samuel C. Adams, Jr.,
Project Director**

Sponsored by
The African-American Scholars Council

Under Contract with
**The Agency for International Development
(Contract Number C-1254)**

March 15, 1977

COVER

The carved soapstone is a replica of a bird discovered in the Eastern Enclosure of the ruins of the civilization of Great Zimbabwe by J. T. Bent and R. N. Hall in 1891.

The bird is about 14 inches high and surmount columns about 3 feet tall. This bird being carved from a soft, dark, green-gray soapstone or talc, outcrops of which are not uncommon in Mashonaland: the nearest to Great Zimbabwe is about 15 miles away.

AFRICAN-AMERICAN SCHOLARS COUNCIL SOUTHERN AFRICA PROJECT ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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CONSULTANT PAPERS (Appear under separate covers)

VOLUME I	Zimbabwe Occasional Papers Nos. 1-6
VOLUME II	Zimbabwe Occasional Papers Nos. 7-17
VOLUME III	Namibia Occasional Papers Nos. 1-9

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TRANSMITTAL MEMORANDUM

TO: Owen Cylke, Director
Office of Eastern and Southern
African Affairs

FROM: Samuel C. Adams, Director *Samuel C. Adams*
Southern Africa Project

SUBJECT: Transmittal of the Final Report

DATE: March 15, 1977

Enclosed herewith is the Final Report of the Southern Africa Project commissioned by the Agency for International Development to the African-American Scholars Council. This report represents a culmination of seven months of intensive research, consultation with the AID Africa Bureau, and an extensive effort to create a data base as well as a repository of information relevant to southern Africa. The Final Report is therefore an aggregation of the common knowledge and judgment of the Project's staff members and consultants in carrying out the tasks delineated in the technical scope of services of the AID-AASC contract.

Salients of the Final Report. With respect to the development and results of this study, the following points are salient:

- The two-fold purpose of undertaking this study was (1) to make southern Africa comprehensible to various audiences and publics; and (2) to

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supply data for use by professional planners and analysts who are concerned with the region.

- Although Zimbabwe and Namibia are both predominantly black countries in southern Africa ruled by white minorities, there are fundamental differences between them. Zimbabwe has a small but sophisticated economy while Namibia is administered as a de facto province of South Africa.
- A possible U.S. response to the transitional and development needs of Zimbabwe and Namibia would include manpower training programs, technical surveys, and funding of capital Projects for Zimbabwe; public administration training, and industrial and other capital development projects for Namibia. This response may be more effective if channeled through African or international organizations than if it were provided directly as bilateral aid.
- The facts developed and analyzed in the political, economic, and human resource sectors of both countries show a consistent violation of human rights and the permeation of racism throughout each culture. Eliminating racism and the effects of racism will be a dominant task during the transition and post-majority rule period.

Sector Comments. The economic sector receives prominence in the data base presented for both countries (Chapters I and II). Due to an embargo on travel to Africa and to our restriction to secondary sources, most economic data deals with the white-dominated economy in each country. Comprehensive and detailed data is needed on the subsistence economies for both countries and the economic development that will most serve the majority African population.

The political sector briefly outlines both the relevant political history and the current situation in each country. It makes no attempt to predict the political situation most likely to evolve at transition or the role that ethnicity might play during this period. There is no attempt to formulate political scenarios. While the question of ethnicity

is treated seriously, no determination is made as to the possible effect of contention among rival Nationalist groups.

The human resource sector emphasizes the crucial role of the wage-earning population. Human resource surveys and training programs will be needed during the transition period as well as attention to health and education programs.

What is obvious and overriding in the foregoing assessment is the integral and interdependent role played by the economic, political and human resource sectors for implementing development assistance in both Zimbabwe and Namibia.

The conclusion of this Project with the submission of its Final Report marks a significant effort to further our common knowledge and understanding about the two countries emerging to independence at a critical juncture for southern Africa. In spite of the commitment by all parties associated with this Project to this research endeavor the Final Report can only remain an initial assessment for Zimbabwe and Namibia.

On behalf of the Southern Africa Project staff members and the numerous consultants, whose dedicated labors are reflected in the twenty-six Occasional Papers contained in the accompanying three volumes under separate cover, there is a profound appreciation for this opportunity which has been both a humbling and gratifying experience.

INTRODUCTION

Purpose and Background of the Study. The African American Scholars Council, under contract with the Agency for International Development, has since August 9, 1976, sponsored research in the transfer of power in Rhodesia and Namibia when majority rule occurs. This research aims to: 1) make the southern African transition and development problems more comprehensible to various publics; 2) provide data for professional planners who may be called upon to respond to problems of human need arising from the transition; 3) anticipate requirements for development assistance; and 4) identify data sources that would be useful for more indepth future research.

The study does not aim to recommend United States southern Africa policy. It neither excuses, explains, nor applauds current United States policy. The study does not argue for or against majority rule. It assumes that majority rule will occur and begins there. The study does not predict which leadership will head the majority rule governments.

The newly independent majority rule government will face both a mix of transition issues (defined here as those occasioned by or incident to transfer of power) and development issues (those which exist independent of transition). It does not presuppose the priorities that majority rule governments will choose. Implications for donor assistance, where transition and development problems can be identified, are noted. The study did not draw up projects.

Methodology of the Study. This document, accompanied by its four Appendices and the twenty-six

occasional papers prepared especially for this study, constitute the African American Scholars Council's final report under the contract. Three interim reports, previously submitted by the Council to AID (October 15 on Zimbabwe; November 15 on Namibia; and December 30 on a draft final report combining Zimbabwe and Namibia) resulted under the contract.

A Southern Africa Data Baseline Library and Management Information System were established. Three public conferences were held (with participation of the United Nations Council on Namibia, representatives of the southern African Liberation movements, informed makers of public opinion and with scholars on Africa from the academic community). Difficulties of obtaining useful data and the frequency of the study report dates influenced the presentation of the research materials which did not lend themselves to independent indepth analyses. Valid current data about Rhodesia and Namibia were hard to come by. At no one location was there found a reasonably current and sufficiently complete accumulation of data to provide a base for research into the transition problems. Therefore, the study had to develop its own data base.

The report aims to be an initial informed assessment. It makes no presumption that it is the definitive study on southern Africa transition and development. It is a beginning exploitation of the data base developed to date. This document, its appendices, the twenty-six occasional papers, the three interim reports, and the organization of the southern African data baseline library and a management information system, represent the point reached by the study over the approximately six months of its operation.

Face to face contacts with the persons in Rhodesia and Namibia were not possible; the study did

not involve African travel. Baseline information collected both for this study and for further research includes official Rhodesian documents, United Nations documents; World Bank and World Health Organization documents; reports and testimonies before congressional committees and a vast array of primary and secondary publications available to the Project. 1/

Audiences of the Study. From the initial conception of the study, the research began with two audiences in view: AID and diverse American publics. The AID scope of work evolved to differentiate transition problems and development issues, with the former becoming defined as those likely to be incident to the transfer of power. AID desired to anticipate development assistance needs which might result from or arise as the consequence of the transition to

1/ The Southern Africa Project data base contained primary and secondary documents publications, unpublished manuscripts and papers; these publications include the Congressional Record, the Republic of South Africa Gazette, the Republic of South Africa Hansard, South Africa International, Habari, South Africa Foundation, and news clippings from: The New York Times, The Washington Post, The Washington Star, The Christian Science Monitor, The Manchester Guardian, The Rhodesian Herald, The Windhoek Advertiser, and the Liberation Support Movement News. Notable examples of other periodicals and magazines drawn upon include African Development, Africa Magazine, Rhodesian Viewpoint, Foreign Policy and Africa Report. Appendix I cites a resource bibliography in greater detail.

majority rule in an independent Zimbabwe and an independent Namibia. What opportunities are there beyond current U.S. Government assisted programs, if any, for additional assistance to training or to the development of human resources?

Few Americans were giving much thought to Rhodesia and Namibia when, on August 9, 1976, the Agency for International Development agreed to fund, and the African American Scholars Council joined to sponsor this study.

The world and domestic news media have since devoted constantly increasing coverage to events in southern Africa. Americans have been alerted to the commitment of the United States to majority rule and independence in Rhodesia and Namibia. Limited understanding exists of why the United States is willing to involve itself in southern Africa. Until recently there has been a lack of priority for a U.S. foreign policy commitment to African black majority rule. Some Americans believe "we want to prevent a repetition of our Angola experience" or "we must avert a racial war."

Public U.S. attention in southern Africa has only recently focused on the inequities of the extreme racial discrimination of Rhodesia and Namibia. The development problems which newly independent governments will face are not publicly discussed. The spectre of Cuban or Soviet intervention in Rhodesia and Namibia is seen as a threat to U.S. policy in those countries, but not an explicit risk in the Republic of South Africa. Some U.S. publics ask "Will not black majority rule and independence in Rhodesia mean the spread of Communism in southern Africa? Why should the Africans have what the whites have built up? What prevents blacks from becoming as rich as the whites have become, aren't they willing to work?"

In spite of the current world-wide publicity focused on the Rhodesian problem, the various publics and indeed the press's perceptions of the realities and the complexities of Rhodesian society demonstrates the vast ignorance which exists; creating a climate for understanding these realities for a contemporary Zimbabwe will present a formidable task to which this study may well contribute.

Many Americans believe that the nature of U.S. foreign policy interests in Africa are minimal. They ask, "What vital U.S. foreign policy interests are affected by transition in southern Africa except an increasing U.S. dependence on those African countries for certain vital minerals?"

The foregoing questions are not answered by this study. They are cited principally to explain the need for a more informed and sophisticated understanding of the very complex problem of transition in southern Africa. The study presumes informed public support will be necessary for the U.S. participation in development assistance responses which may be called for. Better informed publics, including the Congress and Executive Branch, will improve the content of public policy and the budgeting of resources.

Organization of the Study. Transition problems and development issues in Rhodesia and Namibia will be inescapably impacted by a heritage of problems of race: African and European.

The study begins with individual examination of the political factors, economic factors, and human resources in contemporary Zimbabwe (Rhodesia would become officially Zimbabwe under majority rule) and Namibia. The treatment of each country then focuses on transition problems, development issues, strategies and choices.

Finally the study, drawing upon the transition problems and development issues that have been identified, concludes with statements about development assistance considerations. Appendix I includes tables on population and demography, education, employment, and the economy, as well as maps and graphs and an annotated bibliography on Zimbabwe. Appendix II presents the same categories of information for Namibia. Appendix III is a summary of financial assistance to both Zimbabwe and Namibia. Appendix IV identifies institutions with capabilities for undertaking assistance programs in southern Africa. Appendix V identifies the various education and assistance programs for students, refugees and exiles operated by the United States, United Nations and non-governmental organizations.

Characterization of the Country Situations Under Study. When majority rule occurs in Rhodesia and in Namibia, these countries will join Africa's other developing countries led by a new African government. Neither Zimbabwe nor Namibia will fall among the poorest of poor developing countries. Both countries have substantial exploitable mineral resource deposits and other development resource potential.

To effectively anticipate human needs likely to be incident to transfer of power or to insure intelligent public support for budgeting resources or national policy, the improved understanding the study aims to achieve must occur in three areas relating to: 1) characteristics of the countries; 2) clear delineation of the relevant issues; and 3) the contexts for meaningful response.

There is so much emotion concentrated on the movement of these countries from their colonial status to majority rule that the fundamental fact that they differ may receive inadequate attention. Namibia and Zimbabwe do differ in many

basic characteristics from other African developing countries.

Rhodesia. The study starts with a view of Rhodesia as a considerably more sophisticated economy than the majority of the other developing countries in Africa. Rhodesia possesses significant amounts of minerals as well as a substantial infrastructure in mining, manufacturing, transportation and power development. Thus Rhodesia, at least for the white population, has a rather sophisticated, highly technical, quite modern social and economic system.

A newly independent black majority ruled Zimbabwe would face, regardless of the orientation it chooses, the management of a highly articulated set of physical facilities organized around a complex set of procedures, institutions, and skills. Customarily, the present Rhodesian physical capital functions within a highly structured capacity for inhouse maintenance work, a system of public contract letting and evaluation, and a relatively large, apparently competitive group of private entrepreneurs and engineering firms. Severe racial discrimination has denied full African participation.

Nevertheless, it seems likely that Zimbabwe will come into independence with a wider range of skilled educated Africans than the majority of other African countries at the time of their coming to independence.

The characteristics of the Rhodesian situation which have appeared since both UDI and the imposition of sanctions may have the greatest pertinence for understanding the problems incident to the transfer of power, as well as to suggest development issues a newly independent Zimbabwe black majority rule government may face. Much that happened to agriculture, manufacturing, mining, and government during this period better defines the present Rhodesia than the events of years before.

The modern economy of Rhodesia reflects a post World War II strategy. This also has been the period of strengthened movements toward independence such as the intensified African guerilla activity. The movement toward majority rule and independence has been fueled by a growing national consciousness and pressured by population growth on limited poor land resources, ethnic competition, increasing urbanism, and economic inequities between whites and blacks.

Namibia. Apart from differences in size of country, population, racial mix, and the distinguishing hallmark of a very poor and fragile ecology, the primary characteristic which defines Namibia and makes its situation distinctly different from Rhodesia is the overwhelming fact that Namibia exists as de facto province of South Africa.

Namibia is extremely rich in exploitable minerals. It controls none of its resources. The institutional arrangements, the civil service by which it is administered, its exports and imports and the revenues earned are controlled by the Republic of South Africa. Namibia would appear to be coming to independence with few skilled, trained, or educated cadres.

It would appear that the tax revenues and royalties generated by the mining industry can finance the creation of the new state, but in terms of collecting and administering these revenues Namibia would virtually have to start from scratch. The existing infrastructure has been created solely to serve the needs of the white minority. The transportation system is focused on the Republic of South Africa, to link Namibia's economic activity to the Republic's investment and trade.

The Republic's apartheid policy has been applied to Namibia. The African homeland policy deters

African mobility and excludes African participation in the economic benefits which it provides for the minority white populations. Namibia's political, social and economic organization reflects its historical experience which has been characterized by total domination, first by Germany, and then by South Africa.

In its modern context, Namibia's development has been like Rhodesia, a result of post World War II strategies. Namibia's immediate economic options may be limited. The new government might well center its attention on the revenue generating assets of the Namibian economy, individual and corporate income taxes, special levies on mining, customs and excise duties and post and telegraphy receipts.

The Namibian account will have to be separated from South African accounts. This relationship with South Africa extends to the dependence of Namibian agricultural and fishing exports. The modern economy depends almost totally on the Republic of South Africa for imports of consumption goods and for the supply of inputs for the agricultural and mining industries.

Contexts Which Give Rise to Problems of Transfer of Power. The respective transition issues occasioned by the transfer of power or to be faced by the newly independent Zimbabwe and Namibia governments derive, in a large measure, from the different characteristics of the two countries.

For Rhodesia, where the aim of government has been to maintain white income and consumption, the inequities experienced by the African majority will perhaps be the most virulent issue occasioned by the transfer of power. The management of the problem by the new government will impact on whether whites will stay or leave and in what numbers.

The majority rule government will face the task of discerning choices to be made in satisfying black expectations of what independence means. At issue will be the fact that development investments have to date provided the greatest benefit to whites. A black majority rule government, however, will lose by not taking steps to maintain the benefit of these investments, if they are seen as having a potential to increase the well being of Africans.

The role to be played by the multinational corporations and other major investors, who have heretofore been agents of the status quo, will prompt decisions on debt servicing, encouragement of African entrepreneurship, employment opportunities, skill development, the facilitating of technology transfers and continued growth of manufacturing industries.

Perhaps the area where transition issues will have their greatest impact will be in both the agriculture sector, where the African pressure on the land is so great, and in urban areas where the majority of wage earning Africans reside.

The transition and development issues for Namibia, as derived from its particular characteristic of being a de facto province of the Republic of South Africa, must start with the most elemental of basic concerns of a newly independent nation having the means for establishing its identity. New administrative structures will have to be created. It is not clear what fiscal resources it will have to start with.

Namibia's administrative management capacity hardly exists. It is run by South Africa - largely with South Africans. The institutional structures for skill development, health care, extension of agricultural knowledge, the control of the revenue generating assets of the Namibian

economy, individual and corporate income taxes, special levies on mining, custom and excise duties, and post and telegraphy receipts are again controlled by South Africa. There is the overriding problem of racial relations.

Human Rights in Southern Africa. The consideration of human rights will underlie all economic discussions likely to occur between representatives of newly independent nations and external assistance agencies -- non-governmental, bilateral and international. This will affect the structure and line along which development may proceed. Any program or form of cooperation foreigners may foreseeably undertake must take the human rights issue into account.

Perhaps one of the most important things the United States might do would be to push its nationals who will be operating in Zimbabwe and Namibia to the maximum extent toward furtherance of human rights. The most tangible expression that recognition of the importance of human rights might take would be in matters of jobs, wages, and the elimination of job classification inequities based on race. United States firms benefitting from investment guaranty programs could have their performance evaluated in bi-annual reviews.

The human rights issue cuts across the broad area of rights for both the majority and minority populations regarding the civil rights of all residents, elimination of systematic discrimination based on race, and the equalization of opportunities for economic and social betterment.

The Contexts for Meaningful Response. Zimbabwe's and Namibia's independence will produce a wide range of responses from outside southern Africa. Offers of assistance will come from church groups,

voluntary agencies, private investors, donor governments, and multilateral and international agencies. No doubt, there will be an inordinate surge of adventurers, peddlers, self-seekers, and do-gooders who will also seek to become involved.

The response of the peoples and governments of the newly independent countries to the diverse external interests will not have as their main focus the wishes of the United States nor any outsider. What they do, legitimately, will have little concern with the preferences of U.S. interests.

It is likely that majority rule governments will show deepest concern about the long term interests of African people. This will include such factors as the recipients of further development; the longer range issues of human or institutional development; the issue of short term growth energized by foreign investment versus development based on self reliance; legacies of apartheid, separate development, and other oppressive institutional systems; corporate social irresponsibility on wages paid to Africans; and exorbitant profits and rapid annual net outflows of capital.

External Assistance. For neither a newly independent Zimbabwe nor Namibia does it appear that a traditional external assistance approach would be appropriate. Were it not for the limitation imposed by the pervasiveness of South Africa's apartheid, the resource potential of Zimbabwe, Namibia and the other southern African countries (including the Republic) are so great as to by far exceed development opportunities in any other region of Africa.

Clearly external assistance programs can be anticipated as responses to transition problems and development issues for an independent Zimbabwe and

Namibia. For example, an external assistance requirement might be needed immediately to keep an independent Namibia operating, depending upon whether the separating arrangements from the Republic of South Africa provide any budgetary resources for foreign exchange costs or regular government operations.

There are several general observations about external assistance which can be said to apply to both Zimbabwe and Namibia. Reference is made here to all forms of external assistance; public, private, trade, bilateral and multilateral aid including assistance from international agencies, and investments. The newly independent governments are certain to be weak in government administration and experience. They are certain to face difficulties in sorting out or adapting to their own objectives and needs the diverse offers of public and private external assistance (trade, aid and investment). The southern Africa policies of the United States and other major powers, as they influence international trade, investment, and the operations of the multinational corporations, will do more to affect the outcome of transitional problems and the attack on development issues than might be achievable through traditional aid programs. Perhaps the most urgent needs are arrangements which accelerate the extension of human capacities.

The "Possible Governmental Response" section of Chapters III and IV delineate specific ways in which assistance can be provided.

Suggested Areas for Further Research

Listed below are several areas for further research which could use the data base developed by this project as a starting point to develop specific recommendations for the use of AID in its present or projected assistance to southern African countries.

- (1) Study of human rights in southern Africa in terms of the roles and impact of private organizations, international public organizations, and multinational corporations.
- (2) Analyses of socio-political-economic inter-relatedness of the southern African region; the prospects for competition, conflict, cooperation.
- (3) Analysis of the process for structuring new public administration in an independent Namibia.
- (4) External study of Namibia's relationships, concessionary agreements, with multinational corporations in particular areas of internal resources. (e.g., Namibia and world-wide uranium market)
- (5) Study of regional impact of contract labor usage with specific reference to pressures which prompt labor migration.
- (6) Study of the appropriateness of different methods of livestock management after constraints on land use and movement are removed.

- (7) Comparative study of previous African responses in assessing their educational needs and developing plans based on these needs.
- (8) Comparative study of integrated rural development schemes, particularly the educational component of these schemes.
- (9) Analysis of the capacity of African universities and institutions in all levels of manpower training.
- (10) Study of the necessities/effect of taking health services to rural areas.
- (11) Study of how southern African countries would continue to operate with an exodus of a significant number of white professionals.
- (12) Study of the role of the church in development in both Zimbabwe and Namibia.
- (13) Study of the development role of women in Zimbabwe and Namibia.
- (14) Study of economic debts (pre-UDI) Zimbabwe allegedly may be expected to assume.
- (15) Comparative analysis of dual wage structures (use of wage policy in other transition situations especially in central and South Africa).

- (16) Comparative study of the payoff/rate of return in multinationally owned investment (who should pay for development).
- (17) Preparation of economic planning models for simulating the overall Zimbabwe and Namibian economies and as regards critical sectors for use by the independent governments as possible aids to decision making and training in government operation.
- (18) Study to identify the most urgent technology transfer needs that an independent Zimbabwe and Namibia may have.

CHAPTER I

ZIMBABWE

Historical and Political Background

Zimbabwe was named after a great fortress of a highly developed Shona kingdom, from antiquity on an area of rich gold deposits. Although no European traders penetrated the African continent at the period of Zimbabwe's power, they transmitted hearsay descriptions of its massive granite walls. The ruins remain today, seventeen miles from Fort Victoria, and continue to amaze archaeologists by the precision of their mortarless construction.

It is this name, symbolic of past greatness, that African nationalists have chosen to replace "Rhodesia". The Shona people, which include seven ethnic subdivisions, are numerically superior to any other. They comprise 70% of the African population. 1/ The majority of the guerrilla leadership are Shona, primarily from the largest sub-ethnic group, the Karanga; the traditional homeland of the Karanga was in the area around Zimbabwe.

The other important population of Rhodesia is the Ndebele. They invaded the country in 1838 and conquered the Shona. The Shona civilization had by then become a fragmented collection of pastoral groups. Ndebele attempts to create a nation

1/ Harold D. Nelson et al., Area Handbook for Southern Rhodesia, Prepared by Foreign Area Studies (FAS) of the American University Washington, D.C., DA PAM 550-171, p.77.

were aborted by the arrival of English mining entrepreneurs in 1890. The British South African Company encouraged the immigration of white workers and farmers, who conquered the Shona and Ndebele. A turn-of-the-century letter to the editor of the Matabele Times, a newspaper for European settlers, indicates the conditions of European conquest; "The theory of shooting a nigger on sight is too suggestive of the rule of Donnybrook Fair to be other than a diversion rather than a satisfactory principle. We have been doing it up to now, burning kraals because they were native kraals and firing upon fleeing natives simply because they were black".

The first European settlers were accompanied by Christian missionaries, who established missions and mission schools. Initially the only pupils were children of European settlers, but the missions soon moved into the African areas. In 1907, the first mission schools for African children were opened, with a total enrollment of 4,000. By 1920, the system had expanded to an enrollment of more than 43,000. 1/ Mission schools taught only the first four grades; the goals were to impart basic literacy and mathematical skills with a largely religious curriculum. Government grants-in-aid paid teachers' salaries, but buildings and teaching materials had to be provided by the schools. In many instances, African villages organized group efforts to raise money for buildings and textbooks. 2/

In the 1920's and 30's, there was a steady influx

1/ Nelson, op.cit., p.138.

2/ Ibid.

of white immigrants, the majority coming from South Africa. 1/

By 1922, there were 35,000 European settlers who controlled a population of more than a million Africans. 2/ Africans served as laborers on farms and in the mines, and as household servants. The ready supply of cheap labor made investment in Rhodesia extremely profitable. Offered a choice of union with South Africa or a separate self-governing state, the European population chose the latter. They assumed the position of a British colony and the name Southern Rhodesia, in honor of Cecil Rhodes.

In 1929, European dominance was further strengthened by the passage of the Land Apportionment Act, which divided the country into two areas, roughly equal in size, one half being reserved for whites, the second known as the Tribal Trust Lands being the designated area for blacks. With slight modifications, the division remains the same today. The land occupied by whites is situated along the high plateau which runs across the center of the country on a diagonal line from southwest to northeast. It includes the farm land with the highest annual rainfall, the major cities, the primary mining centers, the railway and the greater proportion of paved roads. 3/

The slightly larger area for blacks, which measures 44 million acres is less desirable because of lighter rainfall and isolation from transport

1/ Nelson, op.cit., p.73.

2/ Central Statistical Office (CSO), Census of Population 1969, Rhodesia, p.6.

3/ International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), Racial Discrimination and Repression in Southern Rhodesia, Geneva, 1976, p.12.

and from urban markets for the products of the subsistence agriculture practiced there. Of the Tribal Trust Lands, 7.5 million acres were set aside under the title "Native Purchase Areas". 1/ In contrast to the traditional system of communal ownership of land by village, or kraal, individuals may own farms in the African Purchase Areas. The prospective owner must have capital assets and a certificate of proficiency in basic agricultural methods of crop rotation, fertilization and contour plowing. If he offers proof of these prerequisites, he is given title under free hold tenure, provided that he carries out capital improvements on the land immediately. The average size of a farm in the African Purchase Area is three hundred acres, of which less than ten percent is arable.

The Land Apportionment Act was an obvious manifestation of the domination of the European population. Colonial attitudes had changed, however, since the days of shooting Africans for sport. A sense of responsibility for the welfare and advancement of African populations had become part of the British colonial stance. Education was regarded as the best means of African progress. In 1928, the first system of teacher training for Africans was inaugurated. A Reform Party was organized, its philosophy being the reversal of policy toward Africans. In 1933, it won slim control of the legislature.

The Reform Party was led by Prime Minister Godfrey Huggins. 2/ Once in power, Huggins found

1/ Martin Loney, Rhodesia - White Racism and Imperial Response, Penguin Books, 1975, p.55.

2/ For a discussion of the Reform Party and Prime Minister Godfrey Huggins, see: Nelson, op.cit., pp. 29-35.

it impossible to implement the campaign promises of his party. The combined opposition of the other two parties, Labor and Rhodesian Party, effectively block all his efforts. Huggins forged an alliance between the less progressive elements of his party and the more progressive elements of the Rhodesian Party. Together they formed a new group called the United Party. A general election in 1934 gave the new party an overwhelming majority of twenty-four seats against Labor's five. The remnants of the Reform Party won a single seat.

Under Huggins' leadership the government began expansion of centralized, paternalistic control. The Department of Native Education encouraged a building program for village schools and instituted an itinerant teacher program. Efforts were made to unify Shona dialects. Medical services were also expanded, with primary attention going to a reduction in endemic diseases, such as yaws and leprosy. These efforts were small in scale, but they demonstrated a responsible trend. 1/

Huggins government also began an effort at political expansion. He envisioned a mutually profitable federation of southern African states, with Southern Rhodesia as the dominant partner.

World War II interrupted Huggins' preliminary efforts to gain support for his ideas. It also transformed Southern Rhodesia. War brought a major economic boom.

1/ Nelson, op.cit., p.31.

The first settlers had found little of the gold they hoped for, but the country was rich in other mineral resources. High-quality chrome and asbestos suddenly assumed strategic importance. Urban areas expanded in the vicinity of the mines, and much of the urban population was made up of African workers. In 1941, the first townships were created. These all-black communities consisted of utilitarian rows of huts or flats for workers. Many had electricity only for lighting the streets. A single pipe, fitted with a swivel, brought in cold water for drinking and washing. It could be swung around to "flush" the open-hole toilet of the room by pouring water into it. Employers paid the rent for their employees living quarters. This paternalistic system prevented Africans from completely cutting their ties with their village homes in the Tribal Trust Areas. If a worker lost his job, he lost his urban housing. Essentially, the worker was regarded as a temporary transient whose real home was elsewhere.

The wartime economy was not limited to mining. There was a rapid growth in manufacturing to replace items that could no longer be imported. By the end of the war, gross manufacturing output had more than tripled.

Educational facilities also multiplied. Mining companies opened schools for workers' children, and the missions inaugurated training for basic nursing and technical skills.

The end of the war did not mean the end of growth in Southern Rhodesia. On the contrary, it accelerated because of Britain's policy of limiting commerce to the Sterling area in an effort to offset its dollar shortage. Tobacco became a major source of income. The flourishing economy attracted more European immigrants and more investment capital to encourage further expansion.

White immigration reached a level of 10,000 new arrivals a year. 1/ Many new arrivals took up land for farming, particularly for tobacco farming, which required large areas. This displaced thousands of Africans who had been allowed to remain on land reserved for whites but unused by them. The Africans were forced to move into the Tribal Trust Areas. 2/ These lands were already trying to support a larger population than resources would allow. A 1945 report by the Native Production and Trade Commission defined 9 of the 62 areas as more than 150 per cent overpopulated; overpopulation in another 29 areas was described as between fifty to one hundred and fifty per cent.

Economic expansion during the war had produced an extraordinary urban growth. It had also produced more wage employment, and the number of African workers in urban areas had multiplied rapidly. In the postwar years, this multiplication continued. The townships did not have enough room to accommodate all the African urban population, even though new ones were built. Huts and apartments became overcrowded. Shanty towns appeared which offered rudimentary shelter without provisions for water supply or sanitation. Laws requiring segregation of Africans into townships were ignored, and white landlords rented commercial and residential space in white urban areas to Africans. The tenants were largely members of the African urban elite, made up of clerks, teachers, clergymen and store-owners. This group had begun to form in the earliest days of urban development. Educated in mission schools, then abroad, it included doctors and lawyers.

1/ Nelson, op.cit., p.33.

2/ Ibid.

The majority of the African urban dwellers, however, were workers earning small salaries. Many had been forced to the cities because of overpopulation in the Tribal Trust Areas. The land could not support their families, and they had to enter the cash economy to buy life necessities that could not be grown.

The urban townships created a cohesive community setting for growth of a Westernized African society unlike the traditional system of hereditary power. Using the structure of the white church mission as a model, black independent churches were founded. They offered a training ground for leadership to Africans. In addition, in 1946 the African (Urban Areas) Accommodation and Registration Act established advisory boards made up of elected Africans in each township. Their purpose was to advise the white municipal governments, actual owners of the townships, of African interests and needs. The white governments were not bound by the recommendations, but the system gave urban Africans experience in an electoral system. Members of the boards formed an elite and were invited to prestigious interracial social functions. 1/

Educational opportunity increased with the establishment by the government in 1946 of the first secondary school for Africans. Many mission schools followed the government's lead.

The formation of a small educated elite did not, however, represent progress for the mass of workers. There had been sporadic attempts to organize

1/ Nelson, op.cit., p.32.

labor unions for many years. Now they became more effective. Railway workers went on strike in 1946. They were not able to gain official recognition of the union, but they did obtain a modest wage increase.

In 1948, there was a general strike by non-unionized workers and domestic servants in Salisbury and Bulawayo. The purpose was more political than economic. It was a manifestation of dissatisfaction with existing conditions in the society as a whole. The strike was initiated by the mass of workers rather than by union leader agitation, and it represented the first effective mass action, since the 1896 uprising. The negotiator's success, however, was far less than worker expectations, and disillusionment with the effectiveness of labor techniques resulted. 1/

Government response was not repressive. Although many Europeans became nervous at the show of nationalism, the white population as a whole felt secure in their authority in spite of the numerical imbalance between the races. There was a population ratio of twenty-four Africans to one European, 2/ but the Africans were subject to European control, which was evident in the system of identification that each African had to carry with him at all times. His "pass" told who he was and gave him permission to be where he was. If he did not have a pass, or if he was in violation of the limits granted by his pass, the African was liable to arrest and prosecution. 3/

In 1951, the government directed its attention to the Tribal Trust Lands. Government planners re-

1/ Nelson, op.cit., p.33.

2/ CSO, op.cit., p.6.

3/ Nelson, op.cit., p.29.

garded the traditional methods and structure of the agricultural communities as the major cause of the insufficient productivity there. Large families and valuable herds of cattle represented prestige. The cattle were used primarily as work animals and ultimately as a food source. They overgrazed the communal lands of the village units and frequently destroyed the land's capacity to produce. Farming methods also exhausted the land through mineral depletion and erosion. In precolonial times, a community could move to new land when it had exhausted available resources. But, confined to the Tribal Trust Areas, the Africans now had no way of relocating.

In dealing with the problems of underproduction, the government tried to legislate rather than educate. Provisions of the Land Husbandry Act called for crop rotation, application of fertilizers, reduction of the number of livestock and family planning. ^{1/} It also took away the power of farm land allocation from the chief. In return, there was written into the legislation an implicit promise of better land in European farmers and the extension of credit facilities to African farmers who followed the dictates of the Act. Rural reaction was passively hostile. The measure was regarded as an attack on basic values, and the incentives offered were insufficient for traditional agricultural communities. There was very little effort to implement the provisions of the Act. Government attention had shifted to the larger issue of imminent formation of the Federation of Nyasaland, Northern Rhodesia and Southern Rhodesia.

^{1/} Leonard T. Kapungu, Rhodesia - The Struggle for Freedom, Orbis Books, New York, 1974, p.29.

The Federation was officially created in 1953 under the name The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. 1/ Discussions about the constitution which would govern the new entity had been held in London throughout 1952, with both African and European representatives of the three countries participating. One of the African representatives from Southern Rhodesia was the secretary general of the Rhodesia Railways African Employees Association, Joshua Nkomo. Later, in 1957, Nkomo assumed the leadership of the Southern Rhodesia African National Congress (SRANC), which was a member of two other groups - the City Youth League and the Bulawayo branch of the old congress.

The Federation, with Huggins as Prime Minister, had its capital in Salisbury. He was replaced as Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia by Garfield Todd. The Federation brought both power and prestige to Salisbury. It provided new markets and resources for Southern Rhodesian manufactured products in the protected tariff areas of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. It also provided a large impoverished African population in Nyasaland to serve as contract labor in Southern Rhodesia.

The Federal constitution reflected British concern for African participation in self-government. Elected African members served in the Federal parliament. Southern Rhodesian urban Africans, with a steadily growing political consciousness, regarded the parliamentary participation as a forward step at first. Soon, however, they began to see it as merely the establishment of another elite African group which had little connection with the mass of population. Importation of cheap African labor also served to depress wages in the labor market. Urban groups

1/ Nelson, op.cit., p.34.

formed, to make demand for higher wages, better housing and better working conditions. Most notable of these was the City Youth League, which was organized in 1955. 1/

Prime Minister Todd was a proponent of African progress. Like earlier administrators, he concentrated on education. Immediately after taking office, he added secretarial schools to the range of educational facilities for Africans, envisioning the growth of a white-collar labor force. He was also a strong supporter for the development of a multi-racial university, which was founded in 1957.

Economic expansion during the Federal period was phenomenal. There was an 8% annual growth in real output. Capital inflow from 1953-59 amounted to \$700 million. White immigration averaged 9,000 per year. 2/ There was a sanguine expectation that expansion would continue indefinitely, and capital improvements were structured to anticipate the growth. An enormous hydro-electric dam was constructed at Kariba on the Zambezi River, which formed the border with Northern Rhodesia. Roads were built in excess of utilization. This overbuilding would have dramatic effects in the future.

In 1956, at the height of the boom, political disaffection began to surface among Europeans. The City Youth League had already indicated its presence among Africans. It was apparent that majority black rule was imminent in the other

1/ Nelson, op.cit., p.36.

2/ G.M.E. Leistner (ed.), Rhodesia: Economic Structure and Change, Africa Institute of South Africa, 1976, p.18.

two partners of the Federation. 1/ Southern Rhodesia whites regarded the African nationalist activity in their own country as the beginning of the road to the same conclusion. They also considered Prime Minister Todd too liberal. In 1956, recent white immigrants joined with disaffected elements of Todd's party to form the Dominion Party. In the fall of 1958, they succeeded in ousting Todd. 2/

The same year, the City Youth League expanded and joined with SRANC, with Nkomo as leader. His two lieutenants came from the League. They were James Chikerema and George Nyandoro.

The Dominion Party made its position clear at once. In 1959, three new laws were passed. The Industrial Conciliation Act had provisions designed to prohibit the apprenticeship of Africans to higher skilled positions. The Native Affairs Act prohibited meetings of twelve or more Africans and established criminal penalties for public criticism of the government or any of its officials. The Preventive Detention Act provided for the arrest and the detention for up to five years of anyone who was considered a danger to public order and safety. 3/ This legislation was used at once. SRANC was banned and more than 400 members were arrested. Nkomo was in Ghana at the time, but Chikerema and Nyandoro were among those arrested. They were sent to detention camps.

The confrontations between African Nationalists and Europeans had begun.

1/ Leistner, op.cit., p.18.

2/ Kapungu, op.cit., pp.40-42.

3/ Kapungu, op.cit., p.46.

In 1960, the Dominion Party government extended its powers to subdue African protest. The Law and Order (Maintenance) Act legislated permission to the government to restrict any persons to any chosen locality for up to five years or to ban any person from any area. It also authorized searches and arrests without warrants and empowered censorship of newspapers and periodicals. Under the provisions of the act, Africans were forbidden to hold or to attend political meetings and to possess any offensive weapon. Penalties were set for: making subversive statements - five years in prison; intimidating another person - three years; possession of a weapon - twenty years. The definition of "offensive weapon" was left to the discretion of the authorities. A sharp stone might be included. 1/

This legislation was enacted against a background of continuous African nationalist activity. There were mass rallies and marches and outbursts of violence between rival African groups. Several leading groups united to form the National Democratic Party. Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia made it clear that they wanted to dissolve the Federation.

The British attempted to bring about a negotiated compromise, with representatives of the National Democratic Party as participants. The result was the Constitution of 1961, which contained a Declaration of Rights and language which specifically extended civil rights to all people, regardless of race. Because of qualifying provisions, however, the "rights" remained on paper. The Constitution served as an unofficial outline

1/ International Commission of Jurists, op.cit., pp.51-52.

of the direction Southern Rhodesia had to take before Britain would grant independence.

In May, the Dominion Party government organized a conference between government representatives and the most important traditional chiefs. They returned to the chiefs the prestigious control over land allocation, and a new alliance was formed. Black and white conservatives united against a common enemy, the nationalists.

In December, the National Democratic Party was banned. It reorganized immediately under the name Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU).

The following year, 1962, Northern Rhodesian elections gave majority rule to Africans. Southern Rhodesian minority whites united behind a newly developed political party, the Rhodesian Front, which was openly in favor of the maintenance of white power and which won the December election. ZAPU had been banned in October, and its leaders went underground or left the country. No one assumed that nationalist activity had ended, however,

In 1963, the British government presided over the dissolution of the Federation. Northern Rhodesia became Zambia, and Nyasaland became Malawi, both of which had African majority governments. European immigration into Southern Rhodesia numbered 7,000 in 1963; 1/ many of the immigrants came from Zambia. These "displaced persons" added a voice of urgency to Rhodesian demands for more white control over Africans. There was

1/ Central Statistical Office (CSO), Monthly Digest of Statistics - September 1976, Salisbury, p.3.

a net loss of European population that year. Nine thousand more whites emigrated than entered, making the minority group even more a minority. The Rhodesian Front Europeans blamed the British for allowing the breakup of the Federation, with its protected markets and cheap labor supply. They began to define the lines between attitudes among Europeans by rigid enforcement of the old laws against renting property to Africans in white urban areas. Pass laws were also more tightly observed, and many African urban shanty towns were burned to the ground.

Ideological divisions were not limited to Europeans. Followers of Ndabaningi Sithole, accusing Nkomo of elitist tendencies, broke away from ZAPU and formed a new group called the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU).

Unilateral Declaration of Independence and the Nationalists. In the 1962 election campaign, the Rhodesian Front (RF) promised to lead Rhodesia to independence under white rule by any means available. The RF won the elections and under the leadership of Prime Minister Winston Field, immediately began demanding Rhodesia's independence from Britain. The RF and a majority of cabinet ministers after a period of two years, grew dissatisfied with Fields' efforts to gain independence, and elected Ian Douglas Smith to the office of Prime Minister and leader of the Rhodesian Front.

In November 1965 UDI was effected to halt any advance towards majority rule in Rhodesia. Britain responded with economic sanctions, which cut trade with Rhodesia 95 percent by January, and proposed incentives for settlement, with the hope of luring the rebel regime in Rhodesia back into the British influence. The first of these proposed settlements which took place on the British ship TIGER in December 1966, was a meeting between

British Prime Minister Harold Wilson and Ian Smith, and subsequently named the Tiger Settlement. The Tiger Settlement was framed heavily in favor of the Europeans, practically guaranteeing them 50 seats out of a legislative assembly composed of 67 seats.^{1/} The Smith regime, however, rejected the Tiger Settlement on the grounds that it contained variables which they could not control.

In October 1968 Wilson and Smith met again on the British ship FEARLESS. Britain supported the Fearless Proposals, but once again the Smith regime rejected them, not wanting a settlement that even remotely opened a way to majority rule

^{1/} Of the 67 seats, 33 were to be called "A" roll seats, 17 "B" roll seats, and 17 reserved exclusively for Europeans. The "A" roll seats would be elected by voters with higher income, property, and educational qualifications. This arrangement would have assured that the "A" roll seats would have been voted for by a predominantly European electorate. Furthermore, there was no provision preventing whites from running for the "B" roll seats.

The "B" roll franchise extended to include all Africans over the age of thirty who satisfied the citizenship and residence qualifications as well as a provision for cross-voting for all seats. What this implied to the Smith regime was that 1) every African over the age of 30 would qualify as a "B" roll voter and 2) the cross-voting would allow the "B" roll voters to vote for the candidates for the 33 "A" roll seats, although four "B" roll votes would be equivalent to only one "A" roll vote. "A" roll voters were also to be [cont.]

in Rhodesia.^{1/} On November 25, 1971 however, the British government and the Smith regime arrived at an agreement. The Tiger and Fearless documents had been rejected mainly because they gave Africans over the age of 30 a vote. The new settlement, known as the Home-Smith Agreement, was acceptable to the Smith regime mainly because this requirement was restricted.^{2/} This agreement confirmed Rhodesia's independence under white minority rule. This could be accomplished because although Africans could be assured of additional seats in the House of Assembly as more of them became enfranchised, their franchise would still depend on their government-controlled income and education. Smith thought this settlement would be acceptable to both whites and blacks in Rhodesia, but as he found out a few months later, the Africans rejected it.

In January 1972, a twenty-four member British government commission, the Pearce Commission, was sent to Rhodesia to sample the public opinion of the Home-Smith Agreement at meetings held throughout the territory, for the Rhodesian government refused to hold a referendum. According to the Commission, the agreement was widely accepted by

[footnote continued from preceding page]

allowed to vote for the seventeen "B" roll seats with four "A" roll votes to count as one "B" roll vote (As delineated in Kapungu, op.cit., pp.73-74).

1/ Kapungu, op.cit., p.75.

2/ Ibid.

whites, and had the limited endorsement of Asians and Coloureds, but was resoundingly rejected by Africans. Taking advantage of the limited protection offered by the Commission, the African National Council (ANC) under the leadership of Bishop Abel Muzorewa, was formed in December 1971. Its purpose initially was to oppose the settlement, but it was the first organization resembling an African political party to appear since 1964. The sixteen member council was composed almost entirely of former ZANU and ZAPU detainees, several of whom remained under some form of detention. Local branches formed very rapidly. The government moved immediately and outlawed attempts by the ANC to hold public meetings in both rural and urban areas. Nevertheless, the ANC leaders decided to make the organization permanent. After the end of the Pearce Commission hearings, a much larger national executive body and 160-member General Assembly was created to serve as an annual party congress.

In late 1973 it became known that Muzorewa and several other key ANC members had been meeting secretly with government ministers to discuss a settlement. In July 1973, the ANC also held a meeting with the white opposition Rhodesia Party leader, Allan Savoury, the only white non-RF member in Parliament. In early 1974, despite continued harassment and arrest, Muzorewa and government ministers were still holding meetings.

A series of events and negotiations took place which are critical to an understanding of the current state of relationships among the Nationalists, the Smith regime and the British Government. These events include the transition of power in 1974 for Mozambique and the subsequent independence of Angola in late 1975. A series of discussions and negotiations took place between the Nationalists and the white minority government. The

cataloguing of all these events and their sequence of occurrence are important to current understanding:

- The Lusaka Manifesto of 1969 set the tone for African assistance to the struggle for independence in Zimbabwe; 1/
- Agreement by Portugal in September, 1974, for the independence of Mozambique by June 25, 1975. 2/
- Agreement by Portugal for the complete independence of Angola by November 11, 1975. 3/
- Formation of the expanded ANC under Bishop Abel Muzorewa formed by the ANC (Z), FROLIZI, ZANU, and ZAPU with the signing of the "Zimbabwe Declaration of Unity" in Lusaka, December 7, 1974; 4/
- Meeting at Victoria Falls, August 25, 1975, of President Kaunda (Zambia) Prime Minister Vorster (South Africa) Bishop Muzorewa and Smith; the meeting failed to bring about movement toward independence and majority rule; 5/

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- 1/ United Nations, Objective: Justice, Vol.7, No.3, July-Sept. 1975, New York, p.3.
- 2/ United Nations, Objective:Justice, Vol.6, No.4, Oct.-Dec. 1974, New York, p.9.
- 3/ United Nations, Objective:Justice, Vol.7, No.2, Apr.-June 1975, New York, p.20.
- 4/ United Nations, Objective:Justice, Vol.8 No.1, Spring 1976, New York, pp.23-26.
- 5/ Ibid.

- Follow-up discussions beginning in September, 1975, between Prime Minister Smith and Joshua Nkomo which were denounced by Bishop Muzorewa.

In April 1976, U.S. Secretary of State Kissinger delivered a speech in Lusaka pledging U.S. commitment and cooperation in resolving the Rhodesian problem. In quoting from President Ford, he said: "The United States is totally dedicated to seeing to it that the majority becomes the ruling power in Rhodesia." He pledged that the U.S. would seek to repeal the Byrd Agreement, permitting the importation of Rhodesian chrome, and indeed, follow the dictates of UN comprehensive mandatory economic sanctions against Rhodesia. 1/ The Senate Foreign Relations Committee held hearings on the repeal of the Byrd Amendment in February 1977, during which support for the repeal seemed substantial. Kissinger later in 1976 initiated shuttle diplomacy to help settle the problem of Rhodesia. Numerous consultations with black African leaders, Ian Smith, and mediation in the Geneva talks of late 1976 have however, produced no acceptable solution of the conflict to date. As 1977 began, Britain's delegate to the Geneva talks, Ivor Richard, assumed the role Kissinger held previously, namely the main mediator in the volatile dispute. Unfortunately, Richard has had no success to date in resolving the conflict. As the talks moved ponderously forward, without tangible result, the guerrilla war has intensified. Unless some peaceful resolution to the dispute can be found soon, it might well be expected to continue and increase in violence and loss of life.

1/ Address by the Honorable Henry A. Kissinger, Dept. of State, Press Section, No. 205, April 27, 1976.

Political Factors In Contemporary Zimbabwe

Events in Africa defy any pattern. Things seem to sort themselves out. Africa moves not according to the pulse of any other continent. She moves according to her own pulse. She is the only one who can know where the shoe pinches. Those who had thought it would take many centuries before Africa became independent have been proved wrong. They made the fatal mistake of judging her by their own standards which were external and irrelevant to her. What determined and still determines the course of events in Africa is the African's own definition of his own situation, not the foreigner's definition of Africa's situation. This has been the fundamental fact underlying the course of events in Africa....1/

This evocative view of the African past and present experience delivers a valuable and humbling warning about "outsiders" attempts to understand the complexities and subtleties of contemporary Zimbabwe. The particular, dynamic perspective of African nationalism should be recognized, even if not fully comprehended, as an integral component of the following

1/ Ndabaningi Sithole, African Nationalism, Oxford University Press, London, 1968, p.4.

delineation of the Zimbabwean political scene.

Profile: The People of Zimbabwe. The size and growth of population to some degree determine the scale of national politics and determine the demand load on the political, administrative and economic systems.

At the end of 1975, the population of Rhodesia was nearly 6.5 million persons. Africans constituted about 95 per cent of the total population (6,100,000). Whites ("Europeans") were an exceedingly small minority (278,000). And the Asian (10,000) and Coloured (20,900) populations were even smaller.1/

Population growth, especially among Africans, has become a discrete factor in politics and development in Rhodesia. In this century total population has increased thirteen-fold, from 511,000 persons 2/ to approximately 6.5 million. Since 1901, the white population has increased from about 11,000 3/ to 278,000; the African population has burgeoned from 500,000 4/ to 6.1 million persons. The present rate of natural increase in African population is 3.6 per cent per annum. It is impossible to understand the politics and development prospects of Zimbabwe, without recognizing the central role of "race"

1/ See Appendix I, Tables 1 and 2.

2/ Nelson, op.cit., p.61.

3/ Ibid.

4/ Ibid.

in Rhodesian political history. The foremost fact is that a small white minority has dominated a much larger African majority. (See population chart on next page).


Although the ethnic composition of the African population needs also to be recognized, it is much less important than the white-black dichotomy in the population.

The most recent national census was in 1969 and therefore does not reflect changes in the white population within the last decade. These changes may have major significance. In 1969, Rhodesian-born whites comprised 41.2 per cent of the European population. The proportion of South African-born whites was 21.3 per cent. United Kingdom-born accounted for 23.9 per cent, and the number of persons born in yet other countries made up 13.6 per cent. This distribution of whites by origin may have changed considerably in the last decade. According to the International Commission of Jurists, as much as 40% of the white population has immigrated to Rhodesia since UDI (1965). Several thousand Portuguese have entered the country from Mozambique and Angola since 1973.^{1/} The indication is that the white population is now less rooted and perhaps less homogeneous than it was as recently as the 1969 census. On the other hand, white immigrants from other formerly colonial African countries may have an exceptionally cohesive position in terms of resistance to African majority rule because of resentment and the sensation of having been backed up against a wall. In view of some confusion about African ethnicity,

^{1/} International Commission of Jurists, op.cit., p.10.

POPULATION AND ETHNICITY FOR
ZIMBABWE AND NAMIBIA
FOR 1975


ZIMBABWE ¹



Total Population

Rhodesia Monthly Digest of Statistics,
July 1976, Central Statistical Office,
Salisbury.

NAMIBIA ²



Total Estimated Population

Die Suidwes-Afrikaner: October 7, 1975. These
estimated figures have resulted from international
pressure on South Africa in revising its statistical
figures upward for the African populations in
Namibia (South West Africa) from the published Population
Census of 6 May, 1970.

ethnic origins of individual Africans are difficult to ascertain because of the assimilation and blending that began with Ndbele invasion in 1838 and continued under European rule and the development of the cash economy. 1/ Assuming a great deal of actual assimilation between Ndbeles and Shonas, therefore, the 1969 Census identified African groupings by language. It established that 71 per cent of the African population (3,433,960) identified themselves as speaking "Shona" and/or one or another of the Shona dialects. Twenty-six per cent of these identified themselves as simple "Shona" speakers. 13.4 per cent as Zezeru speakers; 7.2 per cent as Manyika speakers. About 16 per cent of the African population identified themselves as Ndbele or Nguni speakers (764,190). Another 5 per cent spoke other indigenous languages, and 8 per cent spoke languages of neighboring countries. 2/

The role of African ethnicity in the future politics and development of Zimbabwe is likely to be a matter of continuing concern. Zimbabwe nationalists resent the tendencies of outsiders to define their politics primarily, if not solely, in terms of "tribalism." While they recognize that the nation-building tasks ahead will require the integration of diverse sub-national groups, they are also resistant to the efforts of the white government in Rhodesia and some outsiders, to reinforce traditional and ethnic groupings at the expense of a Zimbabwean national consciousness. It is to them the

1/ Harold Nelson, op.cit., p.74.

2/ Ibid., pp.74-75.

familiar colonialist tactic of "divide and rule." In this connection, the International Commission of Jurists has observed: "The 1969 (Rhodesian) constitution, by 'formalizing' tribalism, emphasizing the differences between various tribal communities, had the effect of permanently impeding the development of African consciousness."1/

There are, in fact, some grounds for worry that ethnic competition or even conflict could be a problem in the equitable development of Zimbabwe. There has been open inter-ethnic conflict in African townships from time to time and some such conflict has been reported in the guerrilla forces in Mozambique. Ethnicity is not, however, regarded as a major issue by such knowledgeable observers as the Zimbabwe social scientist Leonard Kapungu, who wrote:

At no time in Zimbabwe has the split of the political movement been on the basis of ideology, since the various groups in the struggle have not had an ideology until very recently (reference to early seventies). Furthermore, although the Shona and Ndbele tribes have historically had their differences, tribalism has never been predominant in Zimbabwe. ZANU and ZAPU were never split on a tribal basis until the polarization of both parties in 1970, when it can be said that tribalism

1/ International Commission of Jurists, op.cit., p. 98; Appendix I, Table 3 - Language by Province African Population - 1969, for population distribution.

became a factor. Joshua Nkomo, the national leader of ZAPU, is a Karanga (Shona group in western Rhodesia) and identified himself with the Ndbele; yet the majority of his executive council and of his followers were Shona. Nbabaningi Sithole, the national leader of ZANU, speaks Ndbele more fluently than he speaks Shona and on his executive council there were men, like Enos Nkala, who were not Shonas. Here and there a few individuals with frustrated hopes have appealed to tribal feelings, even dividing the Shona tribe into its dialectic composition as a basis of political organization. They have tried to establish tribal bureaucracies to promote their personal interests.1/

A relatively large number of foreign Africans have resided in Rhodesia for many years and have constituted an impressively large proportion of the total African work force.

According to one estimate, 174,000 persons or 20 per cent of the 870,000 Africans in paid employment were non-Zimbabweans in 1972 2/ although many have been long time residents of Rhodesia.

With majority rule it is possible that the new government will be confronted by the issue of

1/ Kapungu, op.cit., pp.161-162.

2/ Nelson, op.cit., p.74.

foreign labor competing with the indigenous labor work force.

Asians and Coloureds form distinct minorities. They have been subject to racial discrimination, but they have higher social and economic status than Africans, which is source of worry to Africans. Their political situation is not unlike that which comparable groups have experienced in transition periods elsewhere in Africa. It is difficult to anticipate how they will be affected by majority rule; but it is reasonable to assume that as groups they will not affect political outcomes very much.

The distribution of population has both political and developmental implications.

In 1975 an estimated 82 per cent of all whites (228,600) lived in urban areas; and a majority (186,700) lived in either Salisbury or Bulawayo.^{1/} The main concentration of white rural and small town population is in northeastern Rhodesia along a line from Karoi via Salisbury to Umtali near the Mozambique border. This includes the most productive mineral resource areas and land, much of the choicest in the country, for intensive or semi-intensive farming. Except for the irrigated areas around Chiredize in the south, there have been widespread reductions in the white rural population in recent years.

The largest single concentration of white urban and rural population, therefore, extending from Salisbury and eastwards into the most productive farmlands, lies relatively close to the growing guerrilla activity originating in Mozambique.

^{1/} See Appendix I, Table 2, for urban population distribution.

The majority of Africans, roughly five million, live in rural areas of the country. About 350,000 Africans live and work in white rural areas, even after a period of rapid decline in the numbers employed there. The balance live in the Tribal Trust Lands (TTL's), which constitute about 52 per cent of the total land area of Rhodesia, except for the 155,000 Africans who live in the African Purchase Lands (APL's), where private rather than common land-holding is practiced.1/

The TTL's are scattered, but most are clustered together in the outer reaches of the country off the highveld. They tend to be "remote" in the sense of having poor communications and of being distant from major urban areas. Two-fifths of all Tribal Trust Land is over 80 kilometers from a railway, and three-fifths of all of TTL and APL land combined is over 80 kilometers from any large town.2/

A central political fact is that over one million Africans are in the wage sector. Many more Africans now in rural areas have experienced or will experience urban living. These persons are more or less removed from traditional life, values, controls and organization. In many respects they have urban "modern" values, and generally higher aspirations than their rural counterparts. They are more politicized.

In 1975 an estimated 13.2 per cent (804,000) of the African population lived in urban areas.3/

1/ A.J.B. Hughes, Development in Rhodesian Tribal Areas, Tribal Areas of Rhodesia Research Foundation, 1974, pp.12-13.

2/ Ibid., p.12.

3/ See Appendix I, op.cit.

Of the total population of Salisbury (569,000) approximately 430,000 were African. Within the last six years the number of Africans in Salisbury has increased dramatically by 150,000 persons.^{1/} The rapid influx of Africans into Salisbury and other cities has been of major concern to the Rhodesian government. It may be supposed from the experiences of other African countries that migration to the towns and cities will be an immediate and growing challenge for a new Zimbabwe government. Majority rule may indeed accelerate migration to urban areas.

Under a succession of land apportionment and urban areas acts, Africans have been thoroughly if not completely segregated into "townships" and "locations" adjacent to the cities. In 1973 the Municipality of Salisbury listed twelve such townships and locations in Salisbury, ranging in distance from city center between four miles (Harare) and eighteen miles (Tafara).^{2/} African life in these townships, and especially migration to and from them is closely regulated. Urban areas and registration acts control even more closely the Africans residing in white residential areas as servants.

Distribution within the Economy. The distribution of persons within the economy has political and developmental implications in several respects: that distribution indicates something about the effectiveness of the existing political system in providing (or denying) an equitable economic base from which capacities for political and other development must be drawn.

^{1/} See Appendix I, Table 2.

^{2/} V.S. Cubitt and R.C. Riddell, The Urban Poverty Datum Line in Rhodesia, 1974, p.18.

Wage and Subsistence Sectors. Most of the population of Rhodesia is divided between the "wage" and subsistence sectors of the economy. All whites are in the wage (or cash) sector of the economy. About one million Africans are employed in the wage sector, the largest groups in 1975 being in agriculture and forestry, domestic work and manufacturing. Approximately two million Africans of working age remain in the residual sector where subsistence agriculture is their primary support.^{1/} The TTL's form the bulk of the residual economy. A large amount of the TTL land is of marginal or sub-marginal quality for agriculture. Traditional shifting of cropping patterns has been halted and the rapidly rising person-to-land ratio is not being offset by compensating advances in land and technological usages.

Something over four million persons (including families of working age persons), therefore, reside in a residual economy which is already poor and likely to become more so unless appropriate measures are taken. The unemployed in the wage sector, in addition, often have to fall back on the residual sector. An overlapping phenomenon is the circulation of Africans between urban and rural areas, or more broadly, between wage and residual economies.

Within the wage sector the largest single grouping of Africans is in agriculture and forestry (379,000). About 130, 600 Africans are employed as domestics, mostly by whites.

1/ Estimated deduced from: The whitsun Foundation, A Programme for National Development, Salisbury, 1975, Section 1, p.1.

The third largest grouping is in manufacturing (129,000). It can be safely assumed that the vast majority of the workers in these categories are unskilled or modestly skilled laborers.1/

The distribution of Africans within the income spectrum suggest significant political and developmental data. The following observations from the Directorate of the Whitsun Foundation are well founded:

(a) In the residual sector, average income per working age member of the population appears to be in the range of \$45-55 per annum (using data for 1972-74).

(b) There is a marked differential, which has apparently widened in recent years, between the average earnings of white and black wage and salary earners. In 1974 average white earnings were \$4,333 per annum, i.e., 10.8 times that in the black wage sector (in 1975 they were \$2,580 or 10.3 times greater.) 2/

Even allowing for the weaknesses in this kind of income distribution analysis, it appears abundantly clear that most Africans are extremely poor by European Rhodesian standards. A new Zimbabwe government will confront pervasive poverty among Africans in a political context in which gross inequality of income between whites

1/ See Appendix I, Table 18.

2/ Whitsun Foundation, op.cit., Chart #3.

and Africans is present. It is probable that African expectations of rapid economic improvement for themselves will be high.

Nearly 120,000 whites (figure includes modest numbers of Asians and Coloureds) were employed in the wage sector in 1975. The largest categories of employment were "manufacturing" (22,990) and "Distribution, Restaurants and Hotels" (22,920). Some 4,760 persons were employed in the agricultural/forestry sector.1/

Political inheritance and underdevelopment - An overview. The new Zimbabwe leadership will inherit a political and administrative system which was primarily developed by and for the benefit of Europeans.

That system has been effective in fostering an impressively modern, technologically advanced, and wealthy economy, albeit one which benefits whites primarily and which co-exists with a subsistence and underdeveloped economy populated by the majority of Africans. The system has shown resilience in meeting the challenge of international sanctions for over a decade but is now confronting mounting nationalist guerrilla operations. Above all, the white political and administrative system has so far been effective in controlling the African majority in regulating African land occupation and residential patterns according to white preferences; in thwarting African nationalism which has otherwise swept the continent; and in assuring an allocation of national resources more favorable to Europeans than to Africans.

1/ See Appendix I, Table 18.

So far as Africans are concerned, the political and administrative system can be said to be "undeveloped." Africans have been denied full participation and rights in the political and administrative system. Most are completely outside the system although subject to it. Although many Africans - many more than in Zaire at the time of its independence - have developed modern political and administrative skills and values (in nationalist politics, union organizing, education, policy-making and administration, and so on), the vast majority of Africans have not had opportunities to develop politically.

The inherited political and administrative system is also underdeveloped in the sense that it is primarily directed to the needs of the European minority and to those of the modern sector of the economy. If the needs of all people of the Zimbabwe nation, including the rural majority, are to be of concern, then one must imagine a major revamping of the political and administrative system to decide and work towards national development goals. It is not a foregone conclusion that the new Zimbabwe leadership will seek an egalitarian society and equitable national development - elsewhere it has frequently happened that a "new class" simply takes over the privileges of the ancien regime - but if it does, it follows that the country must be developed politically and administratively, just as in material and other respects.

Governmental System. Since 1890 Rhodesia has evolved from rule by the chartered British South Africa Company, through a period of qualified self-government as a British colony beginning in 1923, and finally to a period of de facto independence (Unilateral Declaration of Independence) which has not been recognized by any government (including South Africa).

Today Rhodesia is governed by a self-imposed "republican" constitution (1969) which came into effect on March 2, 1970. This constitution formalizes "independence", but it departs substantially from the 1961 constitution (recognized as presently operative by the British) in strengthening racist and anti-civil libertarian features present to varying degrees in the past.

It provides for a bicameral legislature. The Senate, or upper house, consists of twenty-three members. Ten of these are designated for Africans to be elected by members of the "tribal" Council of Chiefs. Further underlining the divisive ethnic orientation of the 1969 constitution, five of the ten African seats are reserved for Ndbeles, who constitute about 16 percent of the African population, the other five for Shonas who constitute 71 percent.

The House of Assembly, the lower house, has 66 members, of whom 50 are white members elected by the white electorate. Eight Africans are elected by eight "tribal" electoral colleges and eight by registered African voters. Ordinary legislation is passed by both houses, but the House of Assembly initiates legislation and has the power to reverse any veto of a bill by the Senate.

The 1969 constitution nullifies any possibility of majority rule. It provides that the number of African MP's may increase as the African population contributes a greater share of tax revenue, but even then only to a point of parity with white membership. One estimate is that the achievement of parity alone would take about 1,000 years. 1/

1/ International Defense and Aid Fund (IDAF), Zimbabwe Quiz, London, 1975, p.7.

Hence, a new Zimbabwe leadership will inherit a parliamentary system, but one that has largely excluded or subordinated Africans and which recently has elevated the role of traditional leaders to offset mounting nationalist influence among the African population.

Primary measures of African participation in the political system are franchise qualifications and African voter registration and turnout. The 1969 constitution, as others before, set African franchise qualification (based upon income, property ownership and education) which are beyond most Africans for the long-term future. Under the 1965 franchise, which is similar to the 1969 franchise, it is estimated that approximately 150,000 Africans were eligible to vote: Few choose to register under a system so clearly rigged against major African participation. In the 1974 general election only 2,362 Africans voted.^{1/}

Executive. Executive authority is vested in a parliamentary cabinet (and an executive council of roughly the same membership) led by the Prime Minister (currently, Ian Smith). The number of cabinet members is not determined by law, but usually there have been fourteen ministers, each responsible for one or more departments of government. Each minister has as his first assistant a ranking civil servant with the title of ministerial secretary (permanent secretary in British parlance). These secretaries have enjoyed considerable autonomous power in the past but the Rhodesian Front government has moved in recent years to curtail it.

^{1/} International Defense and Aid Fund (IDAF), op.cit., p.8.

In transition to majority rule the Africanization of the central political leadership will almost certainly be a first priority. In the fall of 1976 Prime Minister Smith appointed three or four African junior ministers from the traditional African leadership, but few Africans have had ministerial experience, and of course, the leading nationalists have yet had none. To promote political development, an emergent Zimbabwe leadership may have responsibility for making a range of decisions concerning relationships between executive and legislative authority, between parties and representations, and so on.

Public Administration and Civil Service. National administration and civil service are potentially primary agencies for development in Zimbabwe. The Rhodesian government, through an array of ministries and the civil service, has a central role in providing services (including education and health), in directing and supporting the economy and in regulating the society.

White civil servants constitute a formidable group in the wage sector of the economy and a substantial political bloc. In the early 1970's there were some 24,000 whites in central government service, who with their spouses were one-third of the white electorate. Together with the members and families of the military and police, they provided a majority of the white electorate.1/

Africans have been systematically excluded from the middle and higher ranks of the civil service. The Government List of 1967 indicated that only one African held senior rank.2/ In 1972, it was

1/ Nelson, op.cit., p.156.

2/ International Commission of Jurists, op.cit., p.99.

estimated that only 829 Africans held one or another of 13,000 tenured positions. Only three of these could be considered of senior rank.1/

It is clear that Zimbabwe leaders will face demanding tasks of reordering the priorities of government and national administration, and also formidable tasks of Africanizing civil administration.

Defense and Police Security. Assuring defense and public order is a primary responsibility of any government. The Rhodesian governmental system has had to commit increasing sums to its national security forces to control the African population inside the country and to counter mounting guerrilla intrusions from outside the country. In the decade 1965-1975 governmental expenditures on security (defense and policy) quadrupled from about R\$20 million in 1965 to R\$80 million in 1975.2/

The British South African Police (BSAP), still bearing its nineteenth century name, is a para-military force of about 8,000 men and 60,000 reservists. It has conventional police functions, but also the responsibility for enforcing strict laws to control the African population. Two-thirds of the regular BSAP force is African; all reservists are white. All officers are white.

The defense forces include a regular army force of about 3,500 officers and men. Among

1/ Nelson, op.cit., p.156.

2/ IDAF, op.cit., p.33.

these is a white-officered battalion of 1,000 Africans in the Rhodesian African Rifles. The Rhodesian Air Force has 1,200 regulars. Africans are only permitted to serve as ground personnel.

Reliable data on the composition and strength of the security forces are not available. Reportedly, the Karanga sub-group of the Shona people are present in disproportionately large numbers in both the Rhodesian African Rifles and the Mozambique-based guerrilla force. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), most of the Rhodesian African Rifles are Vakaranga.^{1/}

The Legal System. The Rhodesian legal system is based on Roman-Dutch common law although much of the applied law is statutory law. At the apex of the national court structure is a High Court, with two divisions, both presided over by a chief justice. The Appellate Division of the High Court is the court of final review; the General Division has original and appellate jurisdiction. Magistrate courts hear most criminal and civil cases involving whites under original jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeals for African Civil Cases is at the top of a separate but interlocking structure of African courts. This court only considers appeals from District Commissioner's courts. District Commissioners, although primarily administrative officers, have their respective courts to consider African civil cases of specified types. These courts may retry cases heard in the 59 chiefs' courts which hear civil cases within chiefdoms. The Rhodesian Front

^{1/} Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Southern Africa: The Escalation of a Conflict, New York, Praeger, 1976, p.151. (The study makes no attempt to gather military/security data for analysis or implications.)

has been seeking to devolve more authority on traditional leaders; this has including legislating modest criminal jurisdiction for the chiefs' courts.

Zimbabweans will probably begin majority rule with deep misgivings about a legal system which in so many ways has treated them unjustly and extra-legally. They will necessarily face questions concerning the constitutional role of the courts and the law. These will be particularly difficult in a situation in which a pervasive system of legal discrimination and inequality must be dismantled.

A sampling of discriminatory laws, suggests that it is difficult to exaggerate the just grievances of the African people.

The Africans (Urban Areas) Accommodation and Registration Act tightly restricts African residency in urban areas. In 1971, for the Salisbury area alone, 1,730 Africans were imprisoned for violations of this act.

The Africans (Registration and Identification) Act requires Africans to carry a registration book, registration certificate or identity card. Failure to produce a pass on demand by the policy is punishable by a fine or three months in jail.

The Law and Order (Maintenance) Act of 1960 effectively denies Africans the right of assembly, regulating public meetings and processions.^{1/}

The government has almost unlimited power to ban any organization. The Unlawful Organisation Act

^{1/} International Commission of Jurists, op.cit., p.36.

No. 55 of 1971 declared ten named organizations to be unlawful, including all the African liberation movements and parties to date.^{1/} Under Part II of the Act, several African-oriented periodicals have been banned, e.g., African Daily News, Moto and Mambo Press. The national press (Argus Company) has been limited and censored.^{2/}

Normal criminal procedure allows detention of suspects without warrant for periods up to 48 hours. The Emergency Powers (Maintenance of Law and Order) Regulations allow for the indefinite detention of a person if it appears to the Minister that such detention is "expedient in the interests of public safety or public order." As many as 600 - 1700 persons, mostly Africans, have been detained at any one time over the last decade.^{3/} Most African nationalists have been detained or restricted at one time or another. Messieurs Nkomo and Sithole have each been held arbitrarily for ten years.

With the rise of guerrilla activity, a whole series of "anti-terrorist" laws have been enacted. There are severe penalties for failing to report terrorists, for assisting them or for possessing arms. Nearly 100,000 Africans, mainly of the eastern sector of the country have been forcibly moved to other areas of Rhodesia as punishment for collaboration with guerrillas, or into "protected villages," or "consolidated villages" to prevent contact with them.^{4/}

^{1/} International Commission of Jurists, op.cit., p.36.

^{2/} Ibid., pp.38-40.

^{3/} Ibid., p.47.

^{4/} Ibid., pp.54-66, 65-87.

Local Government and Administration. The type of local government useful for the preservation of colonial rule and the exercise of authority by the minority white government will surely prove inadequate for the rapid economic and social development of a predominately rural population, not to mention the unmet development needs of urban Africans.

Local government for urban areas and for all white rural areas has been under the aegis of the Ministry of Local Government and Housing. There is a system of elected local government bodies (mayors and councils) for municipalities in the larger towns; Town Management Boards in the smaller towns and Local Boards in rural areas. Municipalities are self-supporting and have considerable power to tax property. They manage urban public services, except education and health services, which are provided by the central government. They also manage the adjoining African townships and locations through Superintendents.

African urban areas, the townships and locations which adjoin white urban areas and accomodate most of the one million urban Africans, are administered by municipal white governing bodies. Africans have no voting rights there and are generally deemed to be in the urban areas. The pass system has been invigorated. Although there are urban amenities evident in some of the townships, and occasional decent housing, the general scene is one of relatively poor services and of delapidated and crowded housing. Many residents through their jobs as domestic servants, are inescapably reminded of the dramatically higher living standards enjoyed by whites in the neighboring residential areas.

District Councils and Chiefs. Local government for over 5 million Africans who live in rural areas is under the Ministry of Internal Affairs

(formerly African Affairs). The 165 separate areas classified as Tribal Trust Lands are grouped together into some 51 geographical districts under the administration of European District Commissioners. The DC's have considerable powers. Just under the district level are 252 separate chiefdoms under chiefs, about 1,000 wards under headmen, and an indefinite number of kraals ("villages"). Individual family homesteads are the constituent units of the kraal.

The present role of the traditional rulers in Rhodesia is complex and controversial, partly because the Rhodesian Front Government has chosen to increase their powers as a counterweight to nationalist influence. Beyond this there are differences of viewpoint over whether these leaders command enough allegiance and have enough ability and education to be effective agents of local rural development. The chiefs are responsible for tax collection, crime prevention and the maintenance of order.

Since 1957 a system of representative councils has been developed to complement the leadership of the chiefs. They include chiefs and elected members. In 1974 there were 188 councils with others planned. In 1972-73 all councils had a total income of R\$8,622,500 from tax collections and central government grants. The largest amount of revenue received by a single council was R\$378,776. The smallest was R\$5,552.1/ The plan has been that councils should assume as many governmental functions as possible in their respective areas. Thus far, Council functions have stressed the provision of services: management of African primary

1/ Hughes, op.cit., pp.138,138A.

schools, the provision of facilities for correspondence study groups, the control of cattle dipping services, numerous health services and the provision of water supplies.^{1/}

Political Capacities and Development. The central idea of the preceding pages was that the inherited Rhodesian political and administrative system is "under-developed" for the purposes of the future Zimbabwe. The system has not been directed to the needs of the whole society; Africans have been denied full political participation and opportunities to gain administrative experience and expertise; and the administrative capacities of the country are, to a great extent, presently insufficient for equitable national development.

The new Zimbabwe will have political and administrative resources at its disposal which are very promising by the standards of other nations passing to majority rule. There is an extensive political/administrative infrastructure already, even if much of it must be changed to represent all Zimbabweans and to serve their needs. There are substantial economic resources to fortify the political and administrative system. There is a possibility that the political system can be opened and the administrative system expanded without serious lapse during the process of Africanization. Many Europeans may choose to carry over and redirect their political skills and administrative expertise. There is an extensive transportation and communications system which can be more effectively utilized to meet national needs. There is no recognizable danger of the regional separatism or irredentism that has plagued other African countries after

^{1/} Hughes, op.cit., pp.138,138A.

independence. Despite the severe limits on African education, thousands of Africans have completed all or part of a secondary education; and over one thousand hold baccalaureate and/or advanced university degrees. There are, in short, political and administrative assets which will be at the disposal of the new Zimbabwe leaders.

Zimbabweans have gained their political education and experience primarily through a succession of modern nationalist political parties beginning with the African National Congress in 1957. The history of African nationalist parties is long and intricate.^{1/} For more than twenty years, hundreds of Zimbabweans have gained experience in organizing and recruiting for modern parties; many thousands more have participated in or have been politicized by the activities of the parties.

Political Party Developments. Between 1957 and 1964 five African political parties were formed and subsequently banned by the Rhodesian government:

African National Congress of
Southern Rhodesia (formed 1957;
banned 1959)

National Democratic Party (formed
1960; banned 1961)

Zimbabwe African People's Union -
ZAPU (formed 1961; banned 1962)

^{1/} For a good account of the evolution of African nationalism and parties, see Eshmael Mlambo, Rhodesia: The Struggle for a Birthright, London, C. Hurst and Company, 1972.

Zimbabwe African National Union-
ZANU (formed 1963; banned 1964)

People's Caretaker Council-PCC
(formed 1963; banned 1964)

Through most of the sixties and early seventies ZAPU and ZANU functioned as parties in exile, with headquarters in Lusaka, Zambia. Their respective leaders, Joshua Nkomo and Ndabaningi Sithole, languished in Rhodesian prisons or restriction areas between 1964 and 1974.

In December, 1971, members of both ZAPU and ZANU joined together in the African National Council (ANC), under the leadership of Methodist Bishop Abel Muzorewa, to mount a successful opposition to the Home-Smith settlement proposals, which provided for recognized Rhodesian independence.^{1/} Following talks in Lusaka in 1974, ZAPU, ZANU and FROLIZI merged into a reconstituted ANC headed by Muzorewa, with Sithole, Nkomo and others on the executive council. Subsequently, ANC has broken down into Nkomo (internal) and Muzorewa (external) groupings. Sithole has been supplanted in leadership of ZANU (a large segment of the party never accepted the ANC) by Robert Mugabe, originally the secretary general of the party.

From 1966 ZAPU and ZANU mounted guerrilla incursions from Zambia into Rhodesia. By 1972, the guerrillas themselves were growing dissatisfied with their political leadership. After revolts in guerrilla camps in Zambia and Tanzania, Sithold and Muzorewa tried to reassert political

^{1/} Eshmael Mlambo, op.cit., pp.297-298.

control by the establishment of a 21-member Zimbabwe Liberation Council (ZLC). Nevertheless, most of the guerrillas did not accept the ZLC and proceeded instead in November, 1975, to establish the Zimbabwe Peoples Army (ZIPA). ZIPA, based in newly independent Mozambique, is reportedly under the leadership of Rex Nhongo, an experienced ZANU guerrilla leader. The Third Force was formed partly out of disenchantment with the Zimbabwean political leadership and has become a separate political factor in its own right. If any political leader has substantial influence on the ZIPA High Command, it is apparently Robert Mugabe of ZANU.^{1/} Estimates of ZIPA force levels range as high as 10-20,000. Intensified engagements with the Rhodesian army across the Mozambique border are in progress, and Rhodesia has made reprisal ground and air strikes against ZIPA and refugee camps in Mozambique. The status and role of the guerrilla leadership and forces may be a real test for the new Zimbabwe political system.

Africans have also acquired organizational and administrative experience in a wide range of religious, union, welfare, education, business and professional organizations. The Christian churches, for example, which at the beginning of the century were given primary responsibilities for African education and health services, have had considerable impact upon the lives of Africans -- an impact which many Africans, especially nationalists, view with ambivalence. Most educated African adults received some or all of their education in schools sponsored by

^{1/} For a discussion of the emergence of ZIPA and its relationships to the Zimbabwe political leaders, see Africa, August 1976, pp.10-11.

missions or voluntary groups. Virtually all of the present nationalist leaders are mission graduates.^{1/} Two of the four main nationalist leaders, Muzorewa and Sithole, are Christian ministers.

Thousands of Zimbabweans are currently members of various Christian denominations. In 1971, for example, over 300,000 Africans were Catholic communicants. About 110,000 were Methodists.^{2/} African separatist churches, "Ethiopian" (African churches which break away from white control) and "Zionist" (syncretist churches which fuse Christian and traditional religious beliefs), claim many thousand more members.

Nationalist criticism of the Christian churches is severe. Primarily the churches are faulted for participating in and abetting the development of a racist society. They have failed, the Rev. Nabaningi Sithole has said, to teach the lesson of human fellowship and the oneness of mankind.^{3/} Yet some missionaries have been penalized by the Smith regime "for aiding the guerrillas".

Labor Unions. In some African countries labor unions have fostered nationalism and have been "schools" for political organizers and administrators. In Rhodesia African unionization efforts have been strictly limited by legislation and by the resistance of white workers. Less than 10 per cent of the African work-force is

^{1/} See biographies of nationalist leaders in Mlambo, op.cit., Appendix A, p.305ff.

^{2/} Kapungu, op.cit., p.88.

^{3/} Sithole, op.cit., p.5.

organized into unions; agricultural and domestic workers are expressly denied the right to organize by the Masters and Servants Act.

The present umbrella union organization of African labor is the National African Trade Union Congress (NATUC), which claims nine registered unions with a total of 36,418 members. Another 11 unions representing 13,200 workers are not presently registered under NATUC. The three largest of the twenty unions are unions for rail workers (10,000 members) hotel caterers (9,000) and Bulawayo municipal workers (9,000).

Joshua Nkomo began his organizational career in 1947 as organizing secretary for the Rhodesian African Workers' Union. Without more detailed studies of the links between the unions and African politics, however, it is impossible to assess their role in providing leadership, support and organizational infrastructure for the African nationalist movement.

Another past and potential source of political and administrative expertise is that of the professionals, especially educators. The African education system has been the single major employer of Zimbabwe's most educated Africans. Again many political leaders are former teachers. Of the over 1,000 Zimbabweans in exile many are teachers and researchers, or otherwise professionals with advanced education. This alone, besides the educated already in the country, is an impressive talent pool. The nature of the political settlement and the predispositions of the new government will determine how and to what extent educated Zimbabweans are actually effectively utilized under majority rule. Whether exiles will return to an independent Zimbabwe will depend largely upon the encouragement they receive from the new majority government as well as upon their disposition and commitments to remain in their adopted countries.

Racial Discrimination and Inequality in Development. Another effective way of analyzing the Rhodesian political system and the prospects for development under majority rule in Zimbabwe is to focus on the racial discrimination and inequality which pervade the political and economic life of the country. Presumably a new Zimbabwe government would move quickly to dismantle the extensive array of discriminatory and repressive laws. It is more difficult to anticipate how and when the government will attack each of the gross income, health, education, housing and other inequalities which result significantly, but not exclusively, from racial discrimination. More extensive and extreme inequality exists in Rhodesia than existed in, for example, Tanzania at its independence, partly because a highly developed sector of society has so far out-distanced the under-developed sector. Whatever the predispositions of a Zimbabwe government, it may find it easier to end racial discrimination per se than to create a more egalitarian society.

Other African countries have come to independence with prevalent inequality; but none, unless perhaps Algeria, has had racial inequality on the scale and to the degree that characterizes Rhodesia. One observer has spoken of a "crisis of expectations" which will demand substantial increases of social expenditure on housing, schools, hospitals and so on.^{1/}

Examination of the economic and human resource factors of contemporary Rhodesia will provide a clearer understanding of the possibilities and limits for meeting that "crisis".

^{1/} Africa Confidential, November 19, 1976, p.7.

Economic Factors In Contemporary Zimbabwe

Characteristics of the Economy and Resources - An Overview: That the Rhodesian economy and its development resources have demonstrated resilience and strengths inspite of the application of external sanctions there is little doubt. The following characteristics indicate both the dynamics of a highly organized and sophisticated infrastructure as well as areas of vulnerability in this unique economy:

- Public and private sector management have created an administrative arrangement reflecting a skill-intensive, high-cost, highly structured administrative sector designed for a modern economy but serving a largely high income community;
- Real growth between 1967 and 1974 for gross national income rose 68 percent;
- Great disparities of income and service distribution between Rhodesian whites and the majority of Africans demonstrate the gross inequities supported by governmental action, laws, and both public and private organizations;
- Rhodesia's growth has taken place in all areas but particularly in the manufacturing and commercial sectors. It has been dependent on the skills of white immigrant technicians recruited by both the domestic and foreign-based industries currently operating in Rhodesia.
- The wage sector represents the most crucial factor of the Rhodesian economy claiming 52% of the Gross Domestic

Product in 1974; managerial and highly skilled technicians are generally Europeans. Africans are concentrated at the lower end of the skilled job spectrum and comprise all workers in the unskilled and semi-skilled category.

- Current distribution of arable land favors European ownership of the most productive areas of the country; increase of access to productive lands by Africans will remain an overriding issue for resolution by an incoming African government.
- Multinational corporations play a major role in the manufacturing/industrial sector with a current listing of 105 such firms.
- Transportation and Energy Resources. Rhodesia has a highly developed transportation system designed to serve the European area and economy. Currently, because of sanctions, rail transport to South African ports is the only economic way of exporting minerals and other products. The Kariba Dam hydroelectric system supplies over 80% of all Zimbabwe's kilowatt energy needs. The system is modern, sophisticated and very vulnerable to sabotage because of long transmission lines that stretch across the country.

Dynamics of the Economy

Economic Management. Public management in Zimbabwe has been organized mainly to serve the European economy and the needs of the European population. It is a transplanted European system different than that found in other colonial situations. It was designed to run European

affairs. In other countries the British administrative system was designed with its emphasis on organization of the affairs of the indigenous society; it adopted a quasi-parental, caretaker role. Nigeria, ten times as large as Rhodesia in population and twice its land area, never had any more than a thousand British administrators and technicians during the colonial period. In Rhodesia now there are 13,000 European administrators -- in general administration alone. ^{1/} Administrative adaptations of of great magnitude will thus be required in Zimbabwe, greater than was demanded in other transitions. A skill-intensive, high-cost, highly-structured administrative system designed for a modern economy and servicing a high income community, will need to become truly indigenous in focus, newly responsive to the needs of Zimbabwe's majority. It will have to do this under special handicaps: an environment generating immense new demands; and the failure of Rhodesia's minority rulers to systematically prepare Africans for administrative responsibility.

It must be recognized that the new leaders of Zimbabwe may choose an economic structure that differs markedly from the present system, with its emphasis on an export-oriented consumer economy. It is not within the scope of this report to envision alternatives. Rather, the economy is considered as it is and an assumption is made that, at the time of assuming control, leaders of the new government will, for a period of unpredictable duration, concern themselves with Africanization of the existing system.

^{1/} Elliot Berg, "Growth, Structure and Prospects of the Zimbabwe Economy", Center for Research on Economic Development, University of Michigan, 1976, p.28.

Under pressure, first from the break up of the Federation and then UDI and its related influences, the economy has exhibited considerable resilience. Real growth since 1967 has been substantial with gross national income in constant 1965 (Rhodesian) dollar terms rising 68% between 1967 and 1974. 1/ This is no mean achievement when measured against the back drop of one of the highest population growth rates in the world.

This economic growth has produced a demand for skilled labor in almost all economic sectors. Africans have been employed or upgraded into these skilled job openings generally only when there were no indigenous white immigrants from Kenya, or Portuguese from Angola or Mozambique available.

Who the Economy Serves. Zimbabwe under white rule is and has always been a racist society, with a well-known array of discriminatory policies and traditions. Equal access to education, equal access to skills, worker rights to bargain collectively -- all have been denied to Africans. Public services provided for African consumers and producers have always been far inferior to those provided for Europeans. Public policies have not been designed for stimulation of African agriculture. In fact, the 10% tax on African marketed output, other price policies, and agricultural extension policies have discouraged African production for sale. All of this has encouraged the flow of wage labor from the traditional sector. Furthermore, the predominant view in Rhodesian public policy has always been that African wage earners are transients, so the

1/ Central Statistical Office (CSO), Monthly Digest of Statistics - September 1976, p.41.

public overheads required for a stable urban population have never been forthcoming.

The result of this pattern of development has been to make Zimbabwe one of the most unequal societies in the world, with a high-income white population well remunerated and abundantly provided for, and an African population with much lower income and few social services. Thus the average African wage income (in current Rhodesian dollars) was R\$ 463 in 1975 while average European wage income that year was R\$ 5,020. ^{1/} The rapid growth of the recent past has not changed the relative earnings of whites and blacks, though it has led to a significant increase in African real wages. The pattern of unequal access to services is symbolized by the enormous differentials in school attendance: 25,000 whites and 40,000 blacks attended secondary schools in 1975 while there were more than 20 blacks for every white in the population as a whole. ^{2/} There has been dramatic recent growth in the government reported statistics for African students in secondary schools. According to these statistics African students doubled from 1969 to 1975 increasing from 19,658 to 40,002. During the same period, European secondary schools students increased from 25,133. ^{3/}

Another means of assessing who is served by the economy of Zimbabwe is to examine the industrial origin of the Gross Domestic Product. Chart 1

^{1/} CSO, op.cit., pp.11-14.

^{2/} Ibid., p.9.

^{3/} Ibid.

which follows compares the GDP of Zimbabwe and Namibia. The breakdown (see Table 1 below) shows that manufacturing is the largest economic sector with a 24.9% contribution to the GDP.

TABLE 1

INDUSTRIAL ORIGIN OF GROSS DOMESTIC
PRODUCT IN ZIMBABWE - 1975 1/

<u>Industry Sector</u>	<u>R\$ millions</u>	<u>%GDP</u>
Manufacturing	474.5	24.9
Agriculture and Forestry	311.5	16.3
European, Asian, Coloured	(216.3)	(11.3)
African	(95.2)	(5.0)
Distribution, Hotels and Restaurants	260.5	13.6
Mining and Quarrying	132.5	6.9
Public Administration	122.8	6.4
Construction	106.7	5.6
Transport and Communication	102.6	5.4
Other Services	101.9	5.3
Education	64.9	3.4
Electricity and Water	49.1	2.6
Domestic Services	48.8	2.6
Real Estate	45.0	2.4
Finance and Insurance	40.9	2.1
Health	30.5	1.6
African Rural Household Services	<u>17.4</u>	<u>0.9</u>
Gross Domestic Product 1,909.5 (a)		100.0


Note: One Rhodesian dollar currently equals U.S.
\$1.55 according to the Treasury Department.

(a) As reported; figures actually total R\$1909.6 million.

1/ CSO, op.cit., p.9.

ZIMBABWE
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT – 1975

Total GDP = R\$ 1.9 Billion



(a) Includes Distribution, Hotels and Restaurants, Construction, Real Estate, Finance and Insurance, African Rural Household Services, Domestic Services.


(b) Includes Public Administration, Transport and Communications, Other Services, Education, Electricity and Water, Health.

SOURCE: Compiled from Economic Survey of Rhodesia, 1975, Ministry of Finance, April, 1976; p. 12.

Chart 1

NAMBIA
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT – 1973

Total GDP = R 615.6 million



SOURCE: United Nations, E.C.A., Economic Summaries, Namibia: 1974; United Nations, Report of Special Committee on Granting Independence to Colonial Countries, September 30, 1975 # A/10023/.

As noted below, manufacturing is concentrated in the large firms with white management. European total agricultural output is twice that of all African agricultural output including all the subsistence farmers. Items such as education, domestic services and health combined total 7.6% of GDP.

While a relatively large share of economic activity is thus privately organized, the modern private sector is highly concentrated. In manufacturing over 80% of total output is produced by some 320 large firms (those employing over 100 workers). 1/ Marketed agricultural output is produced mainly by the 7,000 full and part-time European farmers; of marketed agricultural output valued at R\$ 381 million in 1975, only \$30 million was African in origin - less than 8%. 2/ Mineral production, which formerly was characterized by "smallworker" operations, has become increasingly the domain of large mining companies, most of them multinationals.

In 1974 the majority of gross national income went to European residents who comprised less than 4% of the population. European income recipients (including Asians and Coloured who are grouped with them in the national accounts, but are not quantitatively important) accounted for about 64% of gross national income of corporations, out of total 1975 gross national income of \$2.0 billion. 3/

1/ Berg, op.cit., p.12.

2/ CSO, op.cit., p.16.

3/ Ibid., p.41. (This assumes that all corporate enterprises are European, Coloured or Asian in ownership, which is not true. But the error is probably not large.)

Areas of Dependence. One might describe the Zimbabwean economy as small, highly diversified dual economic system that is heavily dependent on foreign trade. Rhodesia has a most unusual economy for a developing country. It is heavily dependent on the primary industries of mining and agriculture, but it has developed a highly diversified production base in both fields.

It has a very small domestic market by international standards and yet has succeeded in establishing a broadly based consumer goods manufacturing sector. Its service industries are sophisticated and efficient and provide Rhodesia with a service infrastructure which would be the pride of many larger states.

The prime determinants of growth within the Rhodesian economy are conditions prevailing in the major markets for commodity exports. In this respect Zimbabwe is very open to influences from conditions on world markets in general and in South Africa in particular.

Therefore, the Rhodesian economy remains very dependent on conditions on international markets and on imported skills and manpower. For this reason the primary determinants of growth will, to a large extent, be in these two fields: (1) the demand and value for exports and the relative terms of trade; and (2) conditions in the skilled labor market.

The growth of exports was a major factor in the past decade's development. Between 1966/1967 and 1972 exports grew from about R\$ 170 million to R\$ 322 million. As a share of GDP, exports have remained stable at about 25% over the period in spite of international trade sanctions. 1/

1/ CSO, op.cit., p.41; Harold Nelson, op.cit., p.211.

The intensive, relatively advanced infrastructure of Zimbabwe is especially vulnerable in several respects. It is a highly articulated set of physical facilities organized around a complex set of procedures, institutions and -- in particular -- skills. Rhodesia has, for example, a highly organized budget process, making regular allocations for maintenance; a highly structured capacity for in-house maintenance work; a system of public contract-letting and evaluation, a relatively large apparently competitive group of private entrepreneurs and engineering firms -- the combination of which makes the maintenance system work. Every one of the elements mentioned, however, is vulnerable to transition stresses. Maintenance of the physical capital of Zimbabwe will thus require enormous effort, both internal and external.

To maintain its current level of production, Zimbabwe will need to maintain its export markets while replacing skilled whites who leave during the transition period. The extent to which the economy will remain productive will depend on the extent of white flight, the success of training programs to develop skilled African manpower, the integration of local and returning exiled Zimbabweans into appropriate managerial and supervisory positions, and the ability of the new government to maintain political stability.

The Wage Sector

The wage sector is crucial, for it provides people with a stake in the system and its success. Unless the wage sector is broadened and developed rapidly, people cannot become economically self-sufficient. The resultant social costs (in terms of welfare costs, social dislocations and possible disorganization, leading to increased costs for police, health services and welfare programs) become prohibitive and can contribute to discontent, political instability and the creation of conditions that undermine continued development. These factors are of particular current interest

since the wage share of GDP was 51 percent in 1974. ^{1/} This is a high figure for a less developed country, but it is the lowest figure for Zimbabwe in twenty years.

As noted earlier, racial discrimination has kept African wage-earners in low skill jobs, but the growth of manufacturing and other sectors has created pressure to move Africans into more highly skilled jobs despite the government's desire to reserve these jobs for whites.

Under majority rule, assuming an exodus of some skilled whites, there will be many openings for skilled Africans, pressure for training programs to teach these skills, and the immediate need to temporarily staff those vacant positions that can't wait for this training.

Maintaining the level of economic production is necessary to create the expected skilled job openings. As whites leave, the demand for manufactured products will shrink. To maintain jobs, this slack in demand must be taken up by exports or other means.

The racial inequality of participants in the wage sector is demonstrated in Table 2. In industries such as financial, insurance and real estate, whites hold over two-thirds of all jobs. At the other end of the scale such as in mining and agriculture, Europeans hold a fraction of total jobs, but this includes virtually all the administrative and managerial positions.

With regard to particular skill levels, it would appear that most of the African workers who can

^{1/} CSO, op.cit., p.41.

be called skilled, perform functions which are, at best, on the lower end of the range of necessary skills. This, however, can only be used as an approximation of the actual potential for African workers to replace skilled non-Africans. It would also appear that in the past 10-15 years, there has not been any meaningful number of Africans entering into apprenticeship programs. 1/ As a result, there is no expected increase in the actual level of skills among African workers.

TABLE 2
PERCENTAGE OF WHITES IN RHODESIA'S
ECONOMIC SECTORS 2/

<u>Sector</u>	<u>Percent of Whites</u>
Finance, Insurance and Real Estate	68.5
Transport and Communications	33.5
Health	31.7
Public Administration	30.6
Other	26.1
Distribution, Restaurants, Hotels	25.8
Electricity and Water	24.5
Education	20.8
Manufacturing	15.0
Construction	11.8
Mining and Quarrying	5.8
Agriculture and Forestry	1.2
Private Domestic	0.0

1/ David Fasenfest, "Observations on the Labor Force in Zimbabwe"; Center for Research on Economic Development, University of Michigan, 1976, p.22.

2/ Leistner, op.cit., p.57.

Non-African skilled workers most often appear in industries with a relatively low African to non-African worker ratio. This implies that these industries are heavily dependent upon their skilled non-African workers.^{1/} Unless there was a situation of a relative surplus of skilled Africans, or of large numbers of underemployed Africans with the necessary skills but not permitted to work under the present regime, one can assume that in the short run at least, a loss of these skilled non-Africans will result in serious problems in those sectors under consideration.

One impetus to upgrading the skill levels of Africans has been industry growth. This unprecedented growth required increases in the quality and quantity of labor which was provided in a number of ways. White labor which had gone to Zambia during the federation returned after UDI. There was a reasonable amount of white skilled and unskilled immigrants from Europe and especially Britain over the period. More importantly, in spite of the racist policies of the white worker-agrarian coalition which had taken power and which was now pushing for the rapid industrialization program, the sheer demand for skilled positions was so great that African workers were given on-the-job and some apprenticeship training. As a whole their skills improved tremendously as they came to fill a lot of the semi and high-skilled positions with white workers increasingly taking on more supervisory and management posts. This process has been accelerated within the last two years, when, as a result of white manpower requirements for fighting the escalating guerrilla war or as a result of the stepped-up white emigration, the African worker has become the only dependable work force on the industrial site.

Table 3 on the next page shows the pre-UDI distribution of jobs by skill level for Africans and non-Africans for the top three categories of skill

^{1/} See Table 2 (previous page).

TABLE 3

HIGH LEVEL MANPOWER IN RHODESIA - 1961 1/

<u>Category</u>	<u>AFRICAN</u>		<u>NON-AFRICAN</u>		<u>Total</u>
	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent of Total</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent of Total</u>	
Professional - Administrative	35	0.8%	4,230	99.2%	4,265
Technical - Executive	143	0.9	15,770	99.1	15,913
Skilled	<u>14,387</u>	<u>22.5</u>	<u>49,630</u>	<u>77.5</u>	<u>64,017</u>
Total	14,565	17.3%	69,630	82.7%	84,195

1/ Compiled from UCRN Manpower Survey Subcommittee, The Requirements and Supplies of High Level Manpower in Southern Rhodesia, Occasional Paper #3, Department of Economics, University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Salisbury, 1964, pp.5,6.

level: Professional administrative, technical executive, and skilled. The fourth level, semi and unskilled, is composed entirely of Africans. While there are a few Africans employed at all levels, only the "skilled" category shows any significant penetration.

The total of 14,565 skilled Africans amounts to only 2.2 percent of the 650,000 Africans in the wage sector in 1961. This total grew to 955,000 by 1974 while African wages increased 28 percent in constant dollars from 1964 to 1974 (from R\$ 238 to R\$ 304 in 1964). 1/

The Agricultural Sector

Zimbabwe has two separate agricultural systems. The European system produces over twice the dollar volume of the African system even including African subsistence agriculture. European production is provided with government subsidies and extension services, is largely exported, provides foreign exchange and is of little benefit to the African population. 2/

The African system provides food for subsistence. African farms are often maintained by the families of wage earners who return to their farms during peak work times. A variety of taxes and other costs effectively prevent African agricultural products from competing with European products.

The wages paid to African workers on European farms are kept at a minimum level, and most Africans in the wage sector prefer work in areas other than agriculture. For many years, European farmers imported African workers from other

1/ Bert, op.cit., p.8.

2/ See Tables 4 and 5 and Chart 2 for delineation of dual agricultural sectors.

countries, who were willing to accept the low wages. This practice has been curtailed somewhat. However, the availability of cheap labor is one of the important ingredients in the high profitability of European farming. Others are: the advanced degree of mechanization for large holdings; specialization in export crops such as tea, sugar and -- most notably -- tobacco; and sophisticated business management.

For the millions of Africans living in the Tribal Trust Areas land is a means of sustenance and a source of emotional and traditional security. Many men now working in the wage sector were driven there by the need to supplement inadequate returns from the limited farmland available to their families.

Because of the millions of Africans directly involved in the agricultural sector, the issue of land reform will certainly be a pressing consideration of the independent government. Decisions made and the change -- or unchanged -- conditions that result from these decisions will have far reaching effects on the economy in terms of export income, possible costs of relocation, availability of foodstuffs and costs of support services such as irrigation projects, land-utilization education, fertilizers and pesticides. Land reform may well prove to be the thorniest problem of all. It will also affect the wage sector through the availability of manpower for industry.

Land Reform and Agricultural Productivity. Land reform depends on two factors: the agricultural production policies of the new government and the political pressures brought by African farmers who have been largely excluded from the agricultural cash economy. This pressure will center on access to better land and government support for an improved marketing system for African products. As noted above, under minority rule, government

taxes and other regulations have been used to restrict African agricultural productivity and provide a surplus of cheap labor.

Among the Zimbabwe populations little is known about their traditional forms of social organization and land-tenure systems, and the extent to which these have been shaped, modified or complicated by colonial rule. In addition, how these systems and their personnel will react to new land reform policies under African majority rule is equally unclear.

European agriculture is in the hands of approximately 7,000 full and part-time farmers settled along the railway line running from the Eastern border at Umtali, through Salisbury to Bulawayo, with branches to Sinoia in Mashonaland and Fort Victoria in the Victoria Province. ^{1/} The major crops are tobacco and maize with livestock and dairy products coming from intensive farming in the north and ranches in the south. Table 4 shows the breakdown of European farms by size while Table 5 demonstrates how the most valuable land for agriculture, ranked in order from Category I to VI with Category I being the best land, is reserved for Europeans. The land distribution in Table 5 is shown graphically in Chart 2 which follows.

Depending on the source of information, a wide variety of opinions exist regarding the availability of arable land for distribution to African farmers. Much European land is apparently underutilized, but would require significant capital inputs and trained labor to convert it into economically productive farmland.

^{1/} Mudzuviri Nziramasanga, "The Agricultural Sector in Rhodesia", Center for Research on Economic Development, University of Michigan, 1976, p.2.


TABLE 4
ANALYSIS OF EUROPEAN FARMS BY SIZE, 1965 1/

<u>Size of Farm (Acres)</u>	<u>Number of Farms</u>	<u>% of Total Acreage</u>
Under 51	52	----
51 - 100	151	0.04
101 - 250	318	0.2
251 - 500	317	0.3
501 - 1,000	612	1.45
1,001 - 2,500	1,895	9.73
2,501 - 5,000	1,562	16.03
5,001 - 7,500	518	9.38
7,501 - 10,000	222	5.72
over 10,000	<u>619</u>	<u>57.15</u>
Total	6,266	100.0

1/ CSO, Census of Agricultural Production in Rhodesia, 1965, 1966.

CHART 2

DISTRIBUTION OF LAND IN ZIMBABWE



SOURCE: Data from Hughes, A J B., Development in Rhodesia: Tribal Areas - Table 1
Category I - heavy rainfall, tea, coffee, citrus fruit estates, located in Eastern Highlands
Category II - 3,000-5,000 feet in altitude, mean annual rainfall 44 inches - grains, pasture, tobacco
Category III - 3,000-4,000 feet in altitude, mean annual rainfall 22-28 inches - millet, forestry, ranching
Category IV - mean annual rainfall of 18-24 inches, dry spells, cropping needs irrigation, some ranching
Category V - lowveld land, effective annual rainfall of 16 inches, some crops with irrigation
Category VI - unsuitable for agriculture

TABLE 5
 DISTRIBUTION OF EUROPEAN AND AFRICAN LAND
 BY AGRO - ECONOMIC REGION 1/

<u>Categories 2/</u>	<u>European Land</u>	<u>African Land(a)</u>	<u>National and Unreserved Land</u>	<u>Total</u>
I	71%	13%	16%	100%
II	69	25	6	100
III	45	43	12	100
IV	28	54	18	100
V	26	51	23	100
VI	2	50	48	100

(a) African Purchase Land and Tribal Trust Land

1/ Compiled from: A.J.B. Hughes, op.cit., Table I.

2/ Land ranked in order from best to worst land - category I is best.

In addition to the underutilization of European farmland is the crowding and overuse of African lands. As early as 1945 the Native Production and Trade Commission reported the overpopulation figures in the Reserves. 1/

- 9 Reserves were more than 150% overpopulated
- 10 Reserves were 100-150% overpopulated
- 19 Reserves were 50-100% overpopulated
- 21 Reserves were 10-50% overpopulated
- 3 Reserves were 1-10% overpopulated

In Matabeleland alone there was an excess population of 100,000 people and 111,000 livestock in 1959. 2/ It is estimated that overstocking amounts to 12 percent on the average in the African areas. In both Mashonaland and Matabeleland overstocking and overpopulation have been characteristic features of the Reserves. 3/ An examination of other Reserves shows that this is the trend in all the Tribal Trust Lands even today. Grazing land in most Reserves is now between four and five acres per beast. An agricultural officer's

1/ Report of the Native Production and Trade Commission, Salisbury, 1945 (N.S.A. File No. S23474/74), (As quoted in William A. Shack, "Land Reform in Zimbabwe: Problems and Prospects," University of California, Berkeley, 1976, p.17).

2/ J. Prescott, "Organization in Native Areas," Geographical Journal, Vol. 127 (1961). (As quoted in Shack, op.cit., p.17).

3/ R.W.M. Johnson, "An Economic Survey of Chiweshe Reserve," Human Problems in Central Africa, Vol. 36 (December, 1964), p. 93. (As quoted in Shack, op.cit., p.19).

report has estimated that in good rainfall areas fifteen acres should be the minimum grazing land per beast. 1/

It is likely that the new government would not support the current level of agricultural subsidies, nor would it be economically desirable to do so, because they have not proved to be efficient nor have they substantially improved the position of the African farmer. Under such circumstances the current production pattern would not last and some crops that flourished under subsidized prices could not be produced economically. There would most likely be a reduction in the level of beef, wheat and soybean production, and most likely increased production of flue-cured tobacco by those farmers remaining on tobacco land. Urban areas could face an uncertain supply of maize because production from soils in African areas is more vulnerable to fluctuations in the rainfall. If maize production prices were allowed to increase, the shortfall would not necessarily be crucial, but there would be a substantial, if not complete, decline in exports, not only of maize but of beef as well. Since citrus fruit, sugar and tea are produced on corporate estates, it is unlikely that they will be affected.

Where possible, irrigation schemes should be started. Zimbabwe has excellent land for irrigation projects such as in the Sabi, Limpopo and Zambezi Valleys. Under these irrigation projects as many as four crops can be grown on one relatively small plot of land per year. The principal reason why irrigation projects have not been successful in the past is that the government has taxed African farmers who hold plots in

1/ See Sister Aquinn, "The Social Background of Agriculture in Chui Manzhi Reserve," Human Problems in Central Africa, Vol. 36 (December, 1964), p. 32. (As quoted in Shack, op.cit., p. 19.)

irrigated land as much as \$70 per year for one acre. 1/ This means that the small cash earnings by African farmers have been earmarked for taxes to be paid to the Government. An African government may wish to abolish the practice of excessive taxation on irrigation projects, to be replaced by incentives for greater production.

The breakup of the irrigated estates into small holdings would be an economic disaster. The very layout and design of the irrigation enterprise, the size of irrigated blocks of land, the use of overhead spray equipment, the central headquarters, maintenance and repair shops, are predicated on integrated management. Operating the corporate estate as a small holder irrigation project would require effective central direction with considerable enforcement power. It would also require a great deal of discipline and expertise from the small holder farmers themselves. Small holders would come to regard themselves as creatures at the whim and call of management, not as free yeoman farmers. Experience at Chisumbanje and elsewhere has shown that this is an unacceptable way of life, and volunteers to take up small holdings may not be forthcoming.

The always great uncertainties of markets for commercial non-food crops make African farmers reluctant to risk a large share of their agricultural activity on these. The first priority of the smallholder must be a harvest of subsistence food crops, lest his family starve. Smallholders on irrigation projects in the lowveld feel bound to grow maize and sorghum for their

1/ See Southern Rhodesia Government Circular No. 85, Section 6, Government Notice 6/79/70, Salisbury, July 1973. (As quoted in Shack, op.cit., p.36.).

own consumption rather than sugar cane and cotton. The effects on profitability of the projects for the national economy can be imagined, since these food crops can be equally effectively grown without irrigation.

Marketing. The present marketing arrangements for African produce are grossly inadequate. Since the 1930's, the marketing of African products has been geared to discourage Africans from maximizing production efforts and to eliminate competition with white farmers. Thus, because of differential pricing schemes, in 1957 the government prescribed price for a bag of maize was 40 shillings, but the net amount received by the African producer was about 35 shillings. 1/ African produce was subjected to more deductions than that of whites. These deductions occurred in such categories as the Development Fund Levy, Transport Charges, Handling Charges, etc. As late as 1973 European producers were being charged two pence per bag of marketed grain while Africans were charged 22 pence for the same. In 1959 the total value of African agricultural products was £14,700,000, but because of the differential marketing practices only £3,400,000 reached the market. On the other hand, of the £52,400,000 worth of European agricultural produce, £49,900,000 worth reached the market and only £2,500,000 was retained for domestic consumption. 2/

Extension services to Europeans are currently provided by approximately 110 white officers supervising 1,700 African extension personnel. Distrust of

1/ Southern Rhodesia, "Chief Native Commissioner's Report", Salisbury, 1957, (As quoted in Shack, op.cit., p.33.).

2/ Southern Rhodesia, Legislative Assembly, Second Report of the Select Committee on the Resettlement of Natives, Salisbury, 1966, p.84, (As quoted in Shack, op.cit., p.34.).

government extension personnel runs deep because of conflicts over suitable livestock herds, and their advice is regularly ignored. 1/

The Manufacturing Sector

Manufacturing dominates the Rhodesian economy, with a 24.9 percent share of GDP. 2/ After UDI, manufacturing grew at an average annual rate of 12 percent. Africans probably have moved into more skilled jobs in this sector in recent years than in other economic sectors.

A two-tier system also exists in manufacturing, but this system is not based on race. Production is dominated by larger firms, many of them multinationals. Some 320 firms which employ over 100 persons produce over 80 percent of manufactured products in Zimbabwe. 3/

A large number of small firms have sprung up since UDI to provide products blocked by sanctions. Sixty-five percent of products sold in 1970 were monopoly products protected from foreign competition. When sanctions are removed, the viability of the firms which produce these products will be a potential source of instability for the new government.

Industry Growth. Between 1965 and 1974, total gross fixed capital investment in manufacturing amounted to nearly R\$ 400 million (over US\$ 600 million). 4/ Manufacturing grew to an annual

1/ Nziramasanga, op.cit., p.3.

2/ See Appendix I, Table 21.

3/ Berg, op.cit., p.5. See also Rhodesia, Census of Production, 1972/73, Tables 9 and 10.

4/ CSO, Monthly Digest of Statistics, Dec. 1975, Table 54.

average of about 12 percent per year. Starting in 1965 with a percentage contributing share of 19.7 percent in gross domestic production against a combined share of 24.1 for agriculture and mining, manufacturing increased its share to 24.9 percent against a relatively static 23.2 percent for agriculture and mining in 1975. 1/

The number of enterprises almost doubled and the number of locally manufactured products increased from 1,059 to 3,837 between 1966 and 1970 as indicated by the register of the Association of Rhodesian Industries. About 2,500 of the 3,837 products in 1970 were monopoly products and this has been reinforced by the rigid import controls which effectively outlaw foreign competition. 2/

Many of the new manufacturing units are small-scale. About 60 percent of all units employed 50 or less employees, although production continued to be highly concentrated in the older pre-UDI enterprises. In recent years mergers and take-overs have occurred. Employment in manufacturing grew from 83,900 in 1965 to 157,430 in 1976. 3/ This produced a demand for skilled labor which could not be met by the numbers of Europeans available in the country. The extent of African penetration into skilled positions is not documented. It is certain, however, that

1/ CSO, op.cit., Table 52.

2/ J. Kombo Moyana, "The Political Economy of of Sanctions and the Future of Zimbabwe," (unpublished manuscript), 1976, p.36.

3/ CSO, op.cit., pp.11,12.

it did occur to some degree, even if official recognition of the improved status did not extend to supervisory titles and wages equal to whites' salaries for similar jobs. This phenomenon of greater skill development has been accelerated by the need to replace whites who have been called to military service in recent years. The result is an optimistic expectation that there will be, in Zimbabwe, a larger work force with highly developed skills than officially released statistics would indicate.

Post-Transition Pressures. There can be no doubt that Zimbabwe will inherit a large and flexible manufacturing sector. Whether it will prove efficient when the country is once again opened to the post-sanction winds of trade is not so certain. But there are hints that it will be viable. The recent growth is not sudden, but it is part of a longer-term trend; some exporting eastward and southward has been occurring despite the sanction-induced encouragements to prefer the internal market; the "industriousness" of Rhodesia, while well above "normal" for such an economy, has not drastically diverged from its long-run proclivities during the sanction years; and there is evidence that there have been few import-substitution excesses in the sanctions period.

Nevertheless, even if the overall industry legacy to Zimbabwe is sound, it would not be surprising if particular plants, and even sectors, proved unviable. It is here that the new government must be careful; while it may be sensible to support such firms during the transition period, their ultimate demise must be planned if they are not to become permanent parasites to Zimbabwe's budget.

It is critical to an assessment of Zimbabwe's industrial transition problems, therefore, to examine the international competitiveness of

Rhodesia's manufacturing establishment. This is especially needed for the new kinds of production during the past decade; since it is unlikely that Zimbabwe will ever receive the privileged access to markets in Zambia and Malawi that Rhodesia did during the Federation period.

It is evident that, within manufacturing as a whole, only a few industries will probably suffer seriously from loss of non-African staff. Whether these limitations will be of a short-run or a long-run nature, and to what degree they will affect overall output and productivity is something which cannot be accurately determined from the information at hand. There has been a rising trend in the ratio of Africans to non-Africans over the past ten years in the manufacturing sector, but it is likely that this trend reflects the increased hiring of African workers at jobs of relatively low skill requirements and the supervision of these new employees with skilled non-Africans.

Those industries with many, well-paid non-African workers include, beer, wine and spirits; fertilizer, insecticides and pesticides; iron and steel basic industries, and machinery and engineering except chemical engineering. ^{1/} These firms would be hardest and longest affected by the departure of non-Africans,

^{1/} Fasenfest, op.cit., p.10.

Letting more Africans enter the higher levels of the wage sector will create economic demand for manufactured products which will tend to counter-balance demand lost by departing whites. The specific products demanded, however, would probably show significant changes.

Dependence on Multinational Corporations. As noted earlier, the larger firms (those with more than 100 employees) produce over 80 percent of Rhodesia's manufactures and most of these firms are probably multinationals, integral parts of the world economy. Multinationals are, therefore, very important in the manufacturing economy.

On the assumption that numbers indicate importance, those sectors which contain the greatest number of multinationals are examined (metals and metal products, chemicals and petroleum products, and transport equipment and workshops). The non-Africans in these industries do not earn significantly more than elsewhere in manufacturing. 1/

Table 6 below ranks manufacturing industries by the number of multinationals in that industry. Table 7 shows a more detailed breakdown of the number of United States, United Kingdom and South African firms in the manufacturing sector.

The Mining Sector

While the manufacturing sector will be subject to the important potential alterations, the mining sector, which is the major foreign-exchange earner in the country, is likely to continue with little alteration in its day-to-day activity. Dominated by foreign corporations, mining produces gold and copper

1/ Fasenfest, op.cit., p.15.

TABLE 6
 NUMBER OF MULTINATIONAL FIRMS
 IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES 1/

<u>Industry</u>	<u>Number of Multinationals</u>
Transport equipment and workshops	22
Chemical and petroleum products	21
Metals and metal products	20
Non-Metallic Mineral Products	12
Beverages and tobacco	10
Paper and printing	8
Clothing and footwear	6
Foodstuffs	4
Textiles, including cotton ginning	1
Wood and furniture	1
Others	<u>0</u>
	105

- 97 -

1/ U.N. General Assembly, Report of the Special Commission on the Situation with Regard to Implementation of the Declaration on Granting Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, New York, 1976, (As quoted in Fasenfest, op.cit., p.14.).

TABLE 7

NUMBER OF UNITED KINGDOM, SOUTH AFRICAN
AND UNITED STATES FIRMS IN THE ZIMBABWE
MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES

<u>Industry</u>	<u>Number of Firms</u>		
	<u>U.K.</u>	<u>S.A.</u>	<u>U.S.</u>
Other food products	3	0	1
Beer, wine and spirits	0	1	0
Soft drinks and carbonated water	1	0	2
Tobacco industries	5	1	0
Cotton ginning, weaving, finishing textiles	0	1	0
Wearing apparel	3	1	1
Footwear	0	1	0
Saw mills and wood manufacture	1	0	0
Pulp, paper, paperboard	2	2	0
Printing and publishing	2	1	1
Fertilizer, insecticides and pesticides	1	0	0
Paints, varnishes, and filling materials	1	0	1
Soap, detergent, pharmaceuticals	1	1	3
Matches, inks, candles, glue and polishes	1	1	0
Basic industrial chemicals, petroleum products	4	0	2
Rubber products	1	0	1
Plastic products	0	0	3
Glass, cement (other non-metal products)	6	5	1
Iron and steel basic industries	4	1	0
Non-ferrous metals basic industries	3	1	0
Metal products (except machinery and vehicles)	7	4	0
Machinery and Engineering except chemical	5	0	2
Electrical machinery and equipment	8	2	1
Manufacturing and reconditioning of motor vehicle	3	0	0
TOTALS	63	23	19

1/ From UN Report of the Special..., 1976, Tables 12,
13, 14, pp. 122-147, (As quoted in Fasenfest, op.cit.,
p.13.).

in moderate amounts and holds a strategic international position in the production of asbestos and chromite.

The mining sector's share of GDP (now 7 percent) is down sharply from former times, but recently has been the fastest growing economic sector. A significant amount of vertical integration has taken place in mining so that products are now marketed at a higher stage of processing. This change occurred in part because of government forced reinvestment of profits in Zimbabwe by the mining corporations.

The activity of foreign multinational corporations in Rhodesia largely accounts for the dramatic expansion of the mining industry and the ease with which mineral exports have slipped through the United Nations sanctions, first imposed in 1965 after UDI. The multinational corporation are at once investors, producers and consumers. An important government policy in this period has discouraged the outflow of profits from foreign firms operating in Rhodesia. In 1973 the government instituted a 15 percent tax on profits taken from the country. As a result most industrial firms found themselves with considerable funds in trust and have chosen in time to reinvest those monies, thereby diversifying industry. 1/

The result with regard to the mining industry has been that mine profits have been invested in mineral processing operations. Therefore now instead of exporting all chrome, copper, nickel and tin in their crude ore states, much

1/ R. Anthony Black, "The Mining Sector of the Rhodesian Economy," Center for Research on Economic Development, University of Michigan, p.1.

is processed into products such as ferrochrome, copper electrical cable, electrolytic nickel cathodes and tin solder. Most of these products are exported to world markets where they compete successfully. Some are utilized as feedstocks for Rhodesian industry.

The mining sector of the Rhodesian economy is completely dominated by foreign economic interests which have been attracted by the high profits to be derived from these activities. Since the imposition of economic sanctions reduced the significance of tobacco and sugar as foreign exchange earners, the importance of minerals to the Rhodesian economy has increased.

Africans composed 94.0 percent of all employment in the mining industry in 1976. 1/ These jobs were all at the less skilled part of the job spectrum. It has been reported that only a handful (perhaps 30) of top jobs in the mining industry require extensive preparation, but these jobs are particularly critical in pricing and marketing industry output. Table 8 compares African and European employment in the mining industry.

Other Sectors

Commerce. The commercial sector covers the wholesale and retail industry including the marketing and distribution of manufactured products and the hotel and restaurant industry. In 1973, this sector accounted for 13 percent of GDP. 2/ In recent years, virtually all the

1/ CSO, Monthly Digest of Statistics, Dec. 1975, pp.11,12.

2/ G.M.E. Leistner (ed.), op.cit., 1976, p.117.

TABLE 8

MINING INDUSTRY EMPLOYMENT

<u>Period</u>	<u>African Employees</u>	<u>European Employees</u>
Monthly average:		
1956	45,700	3,140
1957	47, 300	3,230
1968	48,400	3,340
1969	50,400	3,450
1970	53,300	3,740
1971	53,900	3,670
1972	54,300	3,650
1973	54,500	3,560
1974	58,100	3,620
1975	60,300	3,820
1976	62,600	4,000

1/ CSO, Monthly Digest of Statistics, Sept. 1976,
pp.11,12.

the increase in jobs, as the sector has grown, has been taken by Africans.

Although this sector is often given a low priority, it will be essential in the transition period to maintain the distribution of necessary goods such as food to all parts of the population. This distribution system, of course, will depend on economic policies of the new government.

Transportation. Zimbabwe has a relatively highly developed transport system that depends primarily on rails and secondarily on roads. Particularly in rural/African areas, roads are often neither paved nor maintained. Recently, the transport of exports through South Africa has become a major constraint on the economy. Because of sanctions, rail transport to South African ports is the only economic way of exporting materials and other products.

The relatively high level of development in the transportation sector can be measured by such factors as the extent of road and rail networks, volume of freight moved by various modes and number of road vehicles in use. Available information suggests that the transport sector accounted for approximately 20 percent of total expenditures on fixed capital formation between 1955 and 1965. 1/ The contribution of transport and communication services amounted to 5.4 percent of GDP in 1975 (See Table 1).

The transport-communication infrastructure covers railways, roads, inland waterways, air and pipeline facilities. It includes postal, telegraph and telephone services.

1/ Annette Pinckney, "A Preliminary Survey of the Transport Communications Sector," Center for Economic Development, The University of Michigan, 1976, p.1.

The land-locked, mineral-exporting countries of the southern Africa region have invested heavily in rail transport. Rail is the principal mode of transport for exports. Because of its location, Rhodesia served as a transit route for the regional trade in mineral exports, and the country's primary rail system ran west-eastward to seaports in Mozambique.

Since UDI external trade has been the major emphasis of transport policy with the following consequences: 1/

- Railways have received a disproportionate amount of resources in comparison with other forms of transport.
- Railway capacity has been built up in areas where it is not certain that the quantity and type of freight hauled after removal of sanctions will make recent investments profitable.
- The inferior transport system has been affected by inadequate funds for maintenance and replacement. Road transport, particularly in rural areas, has been underfinanced.

In general, the removal of sanctions should permit shorter, more efficient routes to be utilized for external trade, lowering transport costs of imported and exported commodities. The lifting of sanctions, however, does not guarantee that physical facilities formerly used will be available.

1/ Annette Pinckney, op.cit., p.11.

The employment pattern in transportation reflects the same discrimination found in other sectors. Table 9 shows European and African employment in the three major transport sectors broken down by skill level.

Energy Resources. The Kariba Dam hydroelectric system supplies over 80 percent of all Zimbabwe's kilowatt energy needs. ^{1/} The system is modern, sophisticated and very vulnerable to sabotage because of long transmission lines that stretch across the country.

In Zimbabwe, power is overwhelmingly dependent on the Kariba Dam. Other units are older and of small capacity. The Kariba system and the related total system are sophisticated. In a transition situation, the absence of African management and technical people would necessitate substitute expatriate staffing.

The Kariba Dam and the country's transmission/distribution system are extremely vulnerable to acts of violence. Adequate protection is impossible should any side choose to disrupt all or part of the system. It might be feasible to protect limited major capital installations such as the dam, major substations or switch-gear and secondary thermal generation stations. The sabotage potential is still overwhelming. The transmission infrastructure will always, if viewed in this way, offer convenient targets. Restoration of dependable service might range from days to months, at the option of the saboteur.

^{1/} Theodore Wolff, "Electric Energy and the Transition," Center for Research on Economic Development, The University of Michigan, 1976, p.1.

TABLE 9
TRANSPORT SECTOR EMPLOYMENT 1/

<u>Road Motor Service</u>	<u>European, Asian, Coloured</u>	<u>African</u>
Management and Specialist Branch Heads	6	0
Executive Staff	3	0
Enginemen/Drivers	132	30
Others	<u>0</u>	<u>208</u>
Total	141	238
 <u>Rhodesia Railway Network</u>		
Management and Specialist Branch Heads	267	0
Executive Staff	345	0
Enginemen/Drivers	911	45
Guards, Shunters, Brakemen, etc.	795	477
Artisans	5,591	411
Other	<u>0</u>	<u>10,959</u>
Total	7,909	11,892
 <u>Airways</u>		
Pilots, engineering staff, administrative staff, all largely white.		
 <u>Urban Road Passenger and Freight Services</u>		
European owned with European management and technical services, African drivers and crews.		

1/ Southern Africa Study Data Base Estimates.

The Electricity Supply Commission (ESC) is a government chartered body responsible for the supply and distribution of power in Southern Rhodesia. In 1972 it had 4,500 employees, 3,031 African and 1,469 European, Asian and Coloured. ^{1/} Some 80 percent of the country is covered in ESC's charter; it supplies most of the townships and substantial populated areas of the country, as well as nearly every operating mine and industrial enterprise. It is linked through a national grid.

The profile of the country's power sector departs significantly from that of a typical underdeveloped country: there is a large national power grid, and little independent industrial or isolated generating capacity. Primary in-plant capacity or large stand-by units are exceptional. The ESC system offers dependable, low cost promotional rates that made higher cost in-plant capacity unnecessary. It is a matter of highest priority to maintain this system. In-plant generation of capacity in industrial plants is 4.3 percent of installed national capacity. Some 81 percent of the total national kwh generated is of hydroelectric origin, the remainder thermal.

In all sectors of the Rhodesian economic structure, one pattern is immediately apparent. Africans have been excluded from control, from skill development and thus, from wage incomes that would allow them to participate significantly in the middle-class consumer orientation of the economy. The Rhodesian government has systematically denied to the country the inestimable wealth that lies in the potential of the African population. It is customary to speak of a country's natural

^{1/} Wolff, op.cit.

resources as a source of strength, meaning specifically natural mineral and productive land resources. For Zimbabwe, one of the richest natural resources to be developed will be that one which Rhodesia has kept untapped, the African population.

Human Resources In Contemporary Zimbabwe

Demographic Realities. What is obvious is that given the current 3.6% annual rate of the African population increase, the African population will double within the next 18 years. 1/ While population statistics for Rhodesia has been alluded to earlier, it is repeated here to underscore demographic realities.

The 1975 population of Rhodesia is 6,240,000; Africans account for the overwhelming majority of 6,100,000. Europeans number 278,000; Asians and Coloureds are 10,000 and 20,900 respectively. 2/ This high population growth rate for Africans portends serious implications for both economic and human resource needs for an independent Zimbabwe, particularly in view of the fact that approximately 46 percent of the African population are children.

1/ UN General Assembly, (Report 26th Session, UN Supplement No.23A (A/8423/Rev-1/Add-1), 1975) Activities of Foreign Economic & Other Interests which are Impeding of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in Southern Rhodesia, Namibia & Territories under Colonial Domination and Efforts to Eliminate Colonialism, Apartheid and Racial Discrimination in Southern Africa, p.151.

2/ See Appendix I, Tables 1 and 2 - Population, 1954-1975.

3/ U.N. General Assembly, op.cit., p.151.

Secondly, it is evident that while the majority of the African population is distributed throughout the country in largely rural areas, the white population is largely concentrated in the urban centers, including Salisbury, Bulawayo, Umtali and Gwelo. Even so, Africans outnumber whites in urban areas by substantial ratios as indicated by the population tables.

Thirdly, while Shona-speaking Africans dominate the ethnic spectrum, which includes seven other different language groupings, a 1969 population census indicates a wide distribution of the eight African groupings throughout the interior of 195,820 square miles comprising Southern Rhodesia today.

The distinction of Africans in language groups by Province is reflective of their history under British colonial rule. 1/

Manpower Assessment - Wage Sector Reality. The overriding reality for contemporary Zimbabwe is the degree of dependence of the African population on the wage sector for their survival. While only fifteen percent (15%) of the African population can be identified in wage employment, it must be remembered that approximately fifty (50) percent of the population is of school age and another ten percent of the workforce is made up of females. Thus, it is calculated that between 50 and 60 percent of Africans currently are dependent on wage income as the main source

1/ See Appendix I, Table 3, Language by Province of African Population, 1969.

of survival. 1/ A sectoral analysis indicates that 955,000 are affected across sectoral lines while only 118,000 whites are thus affected. 2/

Brief Sectoral Analysis of the Workforce. (While the analyses which follow are in some measure repetitious of the previous Chapters, the emphasis on human resources is formed herein).

Agriculture. The 379,700 African workers identified for the "Agriculture and Forestry" sector in Table 18 represent wage earners on European farms (as opposed to the majority of Africans, who are on subsistence farms occupying Tribal Trust Lands). Food production and processing employ the bulk of wage-earning Africans in large agri-businesses which are capital intensive, highly mechanized and efficiently operated through an internal marketing system which can absorb the products.

The contrast in agricultural productivity between the African workers in the European sector and those working in the Tribal Trust lands is dramatic. 3/ The maintenance of high productivity levels on European farms has depended on white technicians, agricultural specialists, such as farm extension specialists, and upon the reinvestment of profits by white owners. Africans

1/ Harris, Peter S., Black Industrial Workers in Rhodesia. Gwelo, Rhodesia, Mambo Press, 1974, p.9.

2/ See Appendix I, Table 18, Sectoral Distribution of Labour by Race.

3/ See Appendix I, Table 23, Production Rates 1975-1976.

trained in technical and agricultural institutes have been successfully employed on farms. According to knowledgeable Zimbabwean sources, all agricultural technical expertise is not limited to whites. This view is supported by D.H. Reader, who wrote in 1972:

Vocational training is seen at its best in five agricultural training schools which are to be found in Rhodesia (Chibero, Mlezu, Esigodini, and Gload which is Presbyterian, and Kukwanisa operated by the Courtauld Trust). As far as we can tell, of their graduates are finding employment, largely with farmers, and there is considerable optimism about their future expansion. 1/

Nevertheless, inspite of the supply of skilled Africans to replace some categories of white technicians, it is doubtful that the total number of trained Africans in the agriculture sector is adequate to meet future needs for agronomists and specialists should there be a major white exodus. 2/

1/ Reader, D.H. "African Education and the Rhodesian Employer A Sociological Perspective", The Rhodesian Journal of Economics, Vol.6, No.2, June 1972, p.7.

2/ University of Houston staff discussions with Zimbabweans and other knowledgeable personnel developed a consensus that, while a pool of Zimbabweans exists, the magnitude of white exodus would determine the number and level of skilled personnel needed.

There are several reasons to explain the lack of African skilled workers:

1. There are informal government pressures on the hiring policies of Rhodesian industries.
2. White labor unions have insisted on the principle of equal pay for equal work, but they have resisted permitting Africans to compete with them for the top jobs.
3. Trade and technical schools, which had nearly 1,800 African students in 1961, had fewer than 800 in 1970 due to the closing of Luveve and Mzingwane on government orders, and
4. The African apprenticeship program, instituted in 1969 by Sir Edgar Whitehead, collapsed because of pressure by the white unions in 1963 after the accession of the Rhodesian Front government; it is worth noting the construction industry's output fell 30% in 1973 largely because there were not enough white apprentices.

Concomitantly, systematic discrimination against Africans by white employers and unions and by governmental pressures has resulted in the wide disparity between earnings of white employees and African employees. Thus, a 1974 survey indicates that the average African earnings per annum were at R\$ 359 while the non-African earnings were R\$ 3,901 outside the manufacturing sector. Within manufacturing, 1972 averages were R\$527 for Africans and R\$ 4196 for non-Africans. 1/

1/ See Appendix I, Tables 16 and 17.

All too often it is assumed that whenever new employment opportunities appear, qualified workers will emerge to fill the void. However, it is unlikely that this will be the case in Zimbabwe in the event of any white exodus. With or without white flight, there is a need for comprehensive planning and for technical training programs to upgrade the skills of Africans currently in the labor pool.

Skilled and Unskilled Africans in the Workforce.

Peter Harris has estimated that there are only some 20,000 semi-skilled African workers in the labor force (the criterion being effective on-the-job training that has taken up to a year), and no more than an additional 10,000 skilled artisan and skilled administrative and professional Africans. ^{1/} In contrast, the majority of whites fall into these two categories. Although a breakdown between semiskilled, skilled and managerial occupational groups is not readily available from official statistics, government figures indicate a total of 118,800 jobs held by Europeans, Asians and Coloureds in 1975. ^{2/} While many Africans might have the capacity to handle these jobs, very few have received the necessary training to ensure the maintenance of current professional standards. The extent of the training needed in terms of numbers alone is consequently staggering.

There is limited apprentice training for Africans,

^{1/} Harris, op.cit., pp.15,16.

^{2/} See Appendix I, Table 18, Sectoral Distribution of Labour by Race.

with the heaviest concentration in building skills. This may reflect the drop in output in the construction industry. The total recorded number of African apprentices in building, aircraft, electrical, motor, mechanical engineering and printing amount to only 210, still a very long way from possible African self-sufficiency in technological maintenance. 1/

In a recent study, Cheater and Mathobi 2/ observed the practices of seven different Rhodesian companies--one government organization and six manufacturing companies of various size. They found that there was one African for every six Europeans in managerial roles and one African for every 11 Europeans in technical and highly skilled jobs. In supervisory positions, Africans outnumbered Europeans four to one; while in the semiskilled and unskilled categories, all the workers were African. These figures substantiate the conclusion that training is imperative.

Mining. As indicated previously, mining production which doubled from 1965 to 1973 currently provides over 6% of Rhodesia's gross domestic product. Profitable production is associated with a high degree of mechanization, which is dominated by white technicians to the exclusion of Africans. Thus, any sizable flight of white technicians would possibly result in reduced production and would pose a serious problem for Zimbabwe's earning of

1/ See Appendix I, Table 20, Enrollment of African Apprentices in Specific Program.

2/ Irvine, S.H. Review Article, Science and Advocacy: "A Review of Education, Race and Employment in Rhodesia," Rhodesian Journal of Economics, Vol.9, No.4, December 1975, pp.157-175.

revenues during the transitional period. 1/
"African employment in 1972 was still below
the 1957 level, and the history of mining in-
dicates that profits depend upon an increasing
degree of mechanization, 2/

African experiences that could act as references
for problem solving capacity are Zambia (copper),
Tanzania (diamonds), Ghana (gold and bauxite),
and Botswana.

Transportation and Communication. Although ra-
cial imbalance has resulted from discriminatory
practices of both management and union (white)
pressures, Africans and Asians are trained in
skills pertinent to operating the railroad and
trucking industries efficiently, and a greater
manpower resource exists here than in other in-
dustries. 3/ On-the-job training of high level
African personnel, drawn mainly from the ranks
of the leadership of the very powerful Railways
Associated Workers Union, which has 11,000 mem-
bers can be a resource for training immediately.
Middle-level African employees are probably
capable of maintaining a skeleton system of
priority services in the short run, but expanded
training at all levels will be a long-term neces-
sity and might escalate to emergency status should
there be a major white exodus.

The reliance on railroads is emphasized, not
only for the maintenance of international trade,
but also for the very important role they serve
in the distribution of foodstuffs, particularly

1/ Black, op.cit., p.6.

2/ Nelson, op.cit., p.324.

3/ See Appendix I, Table 19 - Workers in
Transportation by Race.

the provision of supplies to the urban dwellers. The maintenance of the system in good, operating order is crucial during the transition period. In this regard, the experiences of railroad management in East Africa, Nigeria and Ghana act as relevant models for Zimbabwe.

The road system, postal and telephone services and airline operations pose the same problems as the railroads, so that adequate provision must be made to mount training programs for both high and middle-level management and technical skills. Each of the former British colonies are possible models for developing communications and roads (although the latter have played a minor role in African Commerce until recently), and the unique experience of Ethiopian Air Lines (in affiliation with TWA) could provide expertise in airport management, aircraft maintenance and pilot training.

Government and Public Administration. There have been no programmed efforts to train Africans for positions of responsibility in the public sector, and the upper echelons of the civil service are all Europeans. There are, however, a number of Africans in the ranks of middle management, mainly in the Ministry of African Education as Provincial or Deputy Provincial Education officers, lecturers at the Gwelo Teachers' College or Inspectors of Schools. A few Africans serve as apprentice journeymen in other ministries, such as Roads and Traffic.

In spite of the small numbers, Zimbabweans consulted believed that there will be no real problem in maintaining the smooth operation of the governmental structure, at both the central and local levels. This confidence is based on their observation that the structure of the British ex-colonial bureaucracy has survived the tests of ethnic strife and military coups in several

other African situations. Nigeria and the Sudan are obvious examples. Administrative continuity is, therefore, not seen as an immediate problem. Of more concern is the strong likelihood that popular pressures to open up government jobs to large numbers of previously unemployed high school and university graduates will create a burgeoning bureaucracy, which may be counter-productive. Also, there is no doubt that managerial training at all levels will be as important in the long term as has previously been indicated for the commercial sector. Effective government and public administration is central to national stability and crucially affects the economic and social sectors. There is a plethora of willing and able political leaders at the decision making level. There might be, in fact, an oversupply of contenders for the top positions unless strong central leadership emerges to incorporate the various factions. Each new African government faces a similar problem once the common uniting goal of achieving independence has been removed. Africanization of the civil service will almost certainly remain a political imperative for a new Zimbabwe government.

Location of Manpower. Likely sources for personnel, exclusive of those presently employed in the civil service, with useful training exist in the police force, with 4,000 literate Africans and in the Zimbabwe Liberation Army. These groups have highly trained cadres who represent a valuable source for literate and disciplined manpower and for potential leaders.

In addition, existing church and social-service organizations may make valuable contribution in providing:

- Educational and vocational training services;

- Leadership identification and training services;
- Delivery of social services in the major cities and rural areas (medical services, food distribution, education, training and counseling services).

Another reservoir of talent for governmental administrative personnel is found in the educated men and women now serving as teachers. Unfortunately, this situation places the needs of the government in conflict with the needs of the educational system.

As more attractive and responsible jobs open up to Africans in both governmental (civil service) and private industry sectors, men and women now working in education may move to new jobs. Thus, shortfalls in educational personnel, certified teachers and administrators may result during the transitional period.

Education is such a crucial element in the development of a country's population that it deserves closer analysis than almost any other aspect of human resource capacity. It is through education that the business, service and government leaders of the future will be identified and nurtured.

The current Rhodesian educational system 1/ is best summed up by Murphree, et al. in the

1/ Data baseline and assessments in the following section on education are drawn from the University of Houston occasional paper by Dr. Brian Wilks, "Educational and Training Opportunities Within Zimbabwe and in Neighboring Countries During and After (continued on next page)

following description:

Although the European and African Education Departments are administered by a single Ministry, and share certain common services, and are housed in the same building, they have developed as distinct and different systems...

...the inequities...have resulted from the maintenance of the two systems because of the...policy...that those who contribute most in terms of taxation to the available resources must receive most of the benefits from such taxation.

The government thus spends nine times more on each European child than it does on each African child in the primary grades. Because of this expenditure, a European child has a "right" to education which is compulsory to the age of 15. He automatically goes to secondary school and if he is bright enough, carries on to the sixth form where tuition is free. On the other hand, the African child enters a system that is voluntary and highly selective. Whether he continues or not at certain levels depends upon his ability to pass examinations and his parents'

(continued from previous page)

the Transitional Phase to Majority Rule", University of Houston, Center for International Education, January 20, 1977. A more detailed treatment will be found in the paper.

ability to pay his fees, If he is bright and fortunate he may be among the top 2.2 percent who complete Form IV or among the 0.2 percent who complete the sixth form. 1/

There is little doubt that such a dual development of the African and non-African educational systems has developed a system that is inequitable in terms of both educational opportunity and training development, with the African population coming out the losers.

The inequity is further reflected in the small number of Africans in positions of leadership and who are employed by the Division of African Education of the Ministry of Education. The Secretary and Undersecretaries are European. There are only two Provincial Educational Officers and six Deputy Provincial Educational Officers who are Africans. Additional indications of inequity are found in a statistical analysis of Rhodesian government expenditures for primary education: the per capita annual expenditure for African children is R\$ 27.00; for European children it is R\$ 321.93.

Total primary and secondary school enrollment is 831,648 for the African population of over six million. For the European, Asian and Coloured populations of slightly over 300,000 people, school enrollment is 69,580. At the secondary school level, discrepancies become even more extreme. Four percent of African students go to secondary school Post-secondary school edu-

1/ See Appendix I, Table 10, African Student Enrollment in Secondary Schools (1975).

cation figures are 10.46% for Europeans. At the university level, nearly 7% of European students continue higher education. Slightly more than one percent of African students enter universities. 1/

Elementary Education. As early pioneers in elementary education, the mission schools provided the major opportunity for the education of Africans; however, since UDI, there has been a deliberate attempt to phase these schools out by denying adequate financial support. The 1966 Ten Year Plan for Education allocated only 2% of the Rhodesian Gross National Product to this sector. Hitherto, the government had paid 100% of teachers' salaries. This was reduced to 95%, with the requirement that the schools pay the balance. Many could not bear this burden, and could not pass it on in the form of fees to African enrollees, because of their extreme poverty.

In 1971, which was the latest date for which separate elementary school statistics could be found, the total expenditures on elementary education in the African Education System was \$11,931,625 (compared to \$6,631,336 for European education). 2/

Indications are that there is an adequate network of schools in the urban areas, and also in the Tribal Reserves. (Exceptions are the

1/ See Appendix I, Table 10.

2/ N.W. Murphree, B.V. Dorsey, G. Cheater, and B.D. Mothobi, Education, Race, and Employment in Rhodesia, Salisbury, 1975, p.54.

sparsely populated regions of the Zambezi and Limpopo Valleys, the areas of the lower Sandveldt of the west and southwest, and the forested, mountainous regions of the Mozambique borderlands.)

There is, however, a wide variation in the standards of the instructional units. Well constructed buildings and modern educational environments have been provided by mining companies, by some plantation operators, by mission schools, and by the government in urban African residential areas. At the other end of the spectrum are the many rural, community-supported schools (some, but not all of which, were former "satellites" of missions), which have a very inadequate local financial resource base. In the opinion of Zimbabweans consulted, the worst facilities are those associated with the "schools" located on privately owned European farms. Here in many cases, the motives of utilizing child labor and providing a "sop" incentive to retain African parents interested in educating their children have resulted in the setting up of so-called "schools", which are housed in meager shacks and possess completely inadequate facilities.

With regard to the availability and supply of educational materials, there is relatively little difficulty. Both locally produced and imported textbooks and materials are available. This does not imply that they have been or are relevant to the education of Africans, since on the whole, they have been produced and ordered with the European sector in mind. In the African schools, certainly in comparison with their European counterparts, there is a paucity of educational technology hardware in the form of science and mass media equipment. This is especially the case in the rural areas. Many children have to walk long distances to school, some as many as 10 miles each way each day. In

the former and existing mission schools, the health services tend to be good. Much of the school maintenance is performed by students, in part payment for their education. Generally, the support services are better organized and more comprehensive in the urban areas than in rural areas. The following table lists African enrollment in government and aided primary schools for 1975. 1/

Grade 1.....	158,322
Grade 2.....	145,294
Grade 3.....	132,608
Grade 4.....	118,584
Grade 5.....	104,618
Grade 6.....	83,133
Grade 7.....	68,652

A 1969 survey indicated that 45% of African school age children were attending school, that 38% had never attended school and that 15% had attended school at one time, but had left. 2/ It is unlikely that percentages have altered significantly since that time.

Many African schools offer only the first five grades. The absence of grades six and seven automatically eliminates

1/ CSO, Monthly Digest of Statistics, Dec. 1975, p.9.

2/ Murphree, op.cit., p.50. (As quoted in the 1969 Population Census Interim Report, Vol.II, p.29).

any opportunity of progressing to the secondary level from those schools. In addition, there is a severe selection process for promotion at the end of each school year. These influences result in an extremely high drop-out rate of 50 percent before entering grade six. Zimbabweans refer to it as the "elimination rate".

There is an adequate supply of teachers, almost all of whom, at the elementary level, are women. This is because teaching was one of only a few professions that the Government has allowed them to enter (another is nursing). Not all of them are well trained.

The greatest weakness is the inability of most teachers to teach modern concepts in math. There has been insufficient in-service training of primary teachers in the past, so that teaching methodology tends to be stereotyped and out-dated.

In the lower level, the concentration is on English, Arithmetic, Social Studies, Agriculture and Crafts. Religion continues to be a strong subject area in mission schools. The curriculum was designed to prepare African children for functional literacy in lower level skills in the agricultural and industrial labor force. In the upper level, the main concentration is on preparation for the national leaving examination, which involves largely academic subjects, as a feed-in mechanism for the secondary education sector.

Secondary Education. The structure of the secondary school follows the British pattern. It is a six-year program, with the first four years (Form I-IV) offering basic, generalized instruction, and the last two years (Forms V and VI) being more specialized and designed as a college preparatory course. The emphasis is on English, Social Sciences, Languages and the Humanities in general. Mathematics and pure sciences hold

a secondary place. The largest area of weakness is the almost total lack of any instruction in applied mathematics and science and in technology. An alternative two-year junior secondary program designed to prepare students for entry into primary teacher training institutes, agricultural colleges and vocational (craft) schools was introduced by the Smith government, but as Murphree observes:

The new policy instead of producing dramatic expansion has merely produced a shift of direction from primary to secondary education and specifically to vocational preparation type junior schools. The fact that expansion in this new direction has not really progressed very far would seem to be due to a number of factors. The most important factor is the unrealistic expectations of the government that such an ambitious program could be financed by the poorer sector of society and local African communities--who, in addition, were not convinced that this was the best type of education for their children. 1/

More advanced technical vocational schools operated at Luveve and Mzingwane until 1969, when they were closed by government order. It has been suggested that the schools were opposed by white trade unions, which effectively blocked job opportunity for their graduates and thus

1/ Murphree op.cit., p.50.

made them useless.

In the standard secondary system, there is an adequate supply of teachers, with a high degree of competence. The same is true of the administrative level, where a growing number of Africans serve as headmasters. The fact that education has been virtually the only field open to African high-level advancement has been a major strengthening influence.

Government expenditure at the secondary level is also different for African and non-African children although 1971 figures show almost the same numbers enrolled (26,077 African; 26,839 Europeans). On a per-capita basis, European children benefit from expenditures of R\$ 214, twice as much as the R\$ 107 spent on African children. 1/

Nineteen seventy-five enrollment figures show an increase in the total number of students to 37,731. Expenditures figures are not available. Comparison with the 1974 primary school figures shows that almost half of those finishing elementary school do not continue to secondary school. This is due to the limited number of places available and to the location of most of the schools in urban areas. 2/ Students from rural areas must board. Almost every city and large town has a secondary school as do some of the mining company camps. For the most part, the standards of the schools are high.

In addition to internal promotion examinations at the end of each year, there are national ex-

1/ Report on Education, 1971, p.26, Table 1; Annual Report of the Secretary of African Education, 1971, p.25, Table 14 (a report of the Rhodesian government).

2/ Murphree, op.cit., pp.96,98,104.

aminations at the end of Forms II, IV and VI. There is a drastic enrollment drop at these levels 1/ in spite of outstanding performance. In the highly competitive examination at the end of Form IV, approximately 4,000 students obtain a pass each year. In 1974, out of a total pass number of 3,981, 1,128 obtained first class passes and 1,624 had second class passes. 2/

These children have, however, no place to go in the discriminatory employment sector. Even those children who have survived the highly selective education system and have passes in the ordinary level and/or in the advanced level of the General Certificate of Education, have little chance of obtaining any employment, let alone employment consistent with the investment in education. Six months after finishing their studies, 11.6 percent of school leavers had managed to obtain employment; 50.2 percent were unemployed, while 25.6 percent had decided to continue their studies (many by correspondence). 3/

University Education. The few who pursue higher education in the country usually compete for the limited places available at the University of Rhodesia in Salisbury. Founded in 1957, the multiracial university is the major institution of higher learning in the country. It is predominantly supported by a government grant, as are the majority of European students. In con-

1/ See Appendix I, Table 10 - African Student Enrollment in Secondary Schools.

2/ World University Services, Education in Rhodesia, 1976, p.4.

3/ Murphree, op.cit., p.150.

trast, more than half of the African students are supported by non-government sources. 1/

A 1976 University report points out the difficulties facing African graduates after they have completed their studies and attempt to enter the job market. The most striking feature is their dependence on the teaching profession for employment: 75 percent of University graduates in 1968-1972, and 61 percent in 1973-1974. 2/ The report emphasizes this is not by choice but as a result of economic necessity, since so many other work opportunities have been denied to Africans by the government and private concerns.

Further demonstration of this situation can be seen in Appendix I, Table 13, African and European Graduate "Destinations" and in Appendix I, Table 14, a list of departments at the University, which shows that engineering and science instruction is available, if there were any purpose in pursuing it.

It is worth noting, also, that while the University of Rhodesia, is, to outsiders, a commendable symbol of progress because of the roughly equal racial division of the student body, it is regarded by Zimbabweans as an outpost of white superiority. This judgment is attributable largely to the composition of the faculty, which is 95 percent European and to the fact that only one of the 25 administrative positions is held by an African. 3/

1/ See Appendix I, Table 14.

2/ Principal's Report to Council, Salisbury Rhodesia: University of Rhodesia, Appendix 2, Paril 27, 1976, p.3.

3/ World University Service, op.cit., p.6.

There are, it is estimated, more African university students abroad than there are in Rhodesia. Current University of Rhodesia African enrollment is 865; foreign-based students are estimated at 1,000. They will, upon graduation, bring the pool of Zimbabwean graduates to almost 4,000, a sizeable reserve of valuable talent.

Outside of the formal educational system, with its traditional academic emphasis, there are few avenues for higher education. Agricultural colleges at Chikero and Gwebi were organized specifically to train agricultural extension officers for the Tribal Trust Areas. Total enrollment in both colleges was 159 in 1975.

The Teachers' College in Bulawayo is also all-African, with a 1975 student body of 438. It has been mentioned that the competence of teachers in the African secondary schools is excellent. Most of them come from Bulawayo.

In Bulawayo, there is also a Technical College, with another in Salisbury. Their contributions to African education are less impressive than those of the Teachers' College. Only 10 percent of the students at the technical schools are African, and descriptions of the training are not overly impressive:

- Full-time training of 39 weeks (13 weeks X 3 consecutive terms) for the electrical, auto and printing industries.
- Part-time training on the block-release system (6 weeks X 6) for the mechanical engineering industry (except for mining industry apprentices who are on full-time training at the Bulawayo Technical College).

- Thirteen weeks X 2 consecutive terms in the first year of training and 13 weeks X 1 term in the third year of training for the building industry (except for the trade of plumber/drainlayer, which is on full-time training).
- Day release for aircraft maintenance and hair-dressing industries. 1/

As a whole, the Rhodesian educational network offers more to start with than many African countries had at the moment of independence. There are good buildings, a fairly large supply of teachers, and a considerable pool of highly educated Zimbabweans. Nationalist leaders have expressed the opinion that because the school system has worked reasonably well in the past, it can be allowed to continue as is without being considered an urgent priority. Considering the pragmatic realities of the complicated tasks that will face the independent African government, that opinion is generally respected. Professional educators add, however, a cautionary note: the need for educated men and women will continue; the number of school-age children is expected to rise dramatically. Most important, the school system as it is today does not

1/ Data and assessments in the following section are drawn primarily from the occasional paper "Health Consequences of Transition in Zimbabwe" by James C. Watson, M.D., M.P.H. (October 15, 1970). A more detailed treatment can be found in the paper.

really reflect nor respond to Zimbabwean realities. It is a transplanted British system which has heretofore served the European population well. At the earliest moment, these professionals advise, the entire structure should be examined and possibly reorganized.

In the context of immediate transitional or post-independence education needs, it is recognized that skilled technical and administrative manpower will be needed. There exist, in other countries, programs and institutions that might offer useful, immediate opportunities for Zimbabweans. A catalogue of them is found in Appendix IV.

While education and technical training needs are immediately obvious in independent Zimbabwe, there are even more basic considerations for the well-being of the country and the entire population. Students and workers cannot function at maximum levels if they are in poor health. An African government, concerned with a better life for all Africans, will need to address itself at an early date to improved health care and conditions.

Health Care and Health Delivery. The health care system in Zimbabwe is segregated in accordance with all other phases of life in the country.

The maintenance of two separate hospital facilities or health centers in the same area is not uncommon.

The African and the European populations are subjected to completely different disease-risks. For Europeans, the leading causes of death are those of all industrialized Western nations - heart disease, malignancy, stroke and automobile accidents. Africans, in contrast, suffer

and die from pneumonia, measles, dietary deficiency, tetanus and tuberculosis. Because the European population has been in control of medical care planning and implementation, the emphasis has been on cure, a typical industrial-nation response to illness. For the largely rural African population, prevention and education would be a more effective approach to health problems.

Existing Health Service and Personnel. The existing structure of health services in Rhodesia includes government hospital in Salisbury and Bulawayo, small district/general hospitals in other urban areas, and rural hospitals and clinics; mission hospitals; industrial medical facilities; and private enterprise hospitals.

As near as can be determined, there are from nineteen to twenty-one governmental hospitals with a total bed capacity of 1,500-2,500.^{1/} The manner in which these beds are distributed between Central, general, district and rural hospitals, as well as the distribution of the types of beds (acute care, chronic care, maternity, TB, etc.) is not explicit from the literature.

There are eight industrial (mining) medical hospitals with a total of sixty beds for whites and nine hundred eighty three beds for Africans. In addition, there are sixty four African beds in a total of thirteen clinics operated by the mining companies. Eight hospitals and clinics with two hundred eighty six beds are operated by other industries.

The number of hospitals and clinics which are operated by local authorities and councils (towns, rural and African) is not available.

A total of 890 medical practitioners appear

^{1/} Both African and European.

on the 1975 registry maintained by the Medical Council of Rhodesia. 1/ It should be noted that the fact that these names appear on the registry does not mean that they actually live and/or practice in Rhodesia. However, assuming that these figures are correct, the physician to population ratio is 1:7090. This ratio might appear quite favorable in comparison with other African countries such as Nigeria (1:25,550), Burundi (1:45,950) or Kenya (1:16,290) and Spanish Sahara (1:1820), Rhodesia does not compare favorably. 2/ But the ratio for total population is misleading because 89 percent of the doctors are located in the 12 largest towns, leaving only 11 percent in rural areas. Only 18 percent of the population is urban; therefore 89 percent of the physicians provide care for 18 percent of the population.

The ethnic proportion of physicians in Rhodesia was not available in the literature surveyed. However, Gelfant indicated that as of November 1975, 39 Africans had graduated from medical school in Rhodesia. None of these graduates has opened a private practice in Rhodesia. Ten are studying for higher diplomas in pediatrics, surgery and pathology; one has become a specialist in preventive medicine. About five African doctors are in permanent employment in the Government Medical Service. 3/

1/ Rhodesia, Report of the Secretary for Health for the year ended 31st December, 1975, p.46.

2/ James C. Watson, M.D., M.P.H., "Health Consequences of Transition in Zimbabwe", October 15, 1976, p.80.

3/ Ibid., p.81.

The number of registered physicians by speciality was not available in the literature surveyed.

The number of students entering medical school at the University of Rhodesia is expected to reach 80 students per year when the new medical school teaching hospital complex at the Andrew Fleming Hospital is completed. 1/ It is reported that there will be an emphasis on the production of general practitioners who will locate in rural areas.

Approximately 40 physicians are on the staff of grant-aid medical missions; 22 work either full time or part-time for local authority health departments; four physicians work for non-grant-aided medical mission; 48 for industrial medical facilities, and two for town, rural and African councils. 2/ The number of physicians employed by government hospitals (teaching, research, patient care) and the number of private practice are not available.

There is a growing shortage of doctors in the Ministry of Health. On December 31, 1975, there were vacancies for ten government medical officers, three district medical officers, three anesthetists, two TB officers; and 11 hospital medical officers. 3/

As of December, 1975, there were 4,146 registered nurses in Rhodesia (of that total, 151 are classified as mental nurses, 70 as fever nurses and 31 as sick children's nurses. 4/

1/ Ibid. (Student enrollment is both African and European)

2/ Secretary's Report, op.cit., pp.19 and 37.

3/ Ibid, p.39.

4/ Leistner, G.M.E. (ed) op.cit., p.239

State registered maternity nurses and midwives totaled 1,943. 1/

Medical assistants, maternity assistants and nursing assistants totaled 4,934 in 1975. 2/ These types of auxiliaries have been African "boys and girls" and have been employed in rural medical facilities, African hospitals and mission hospitals.

The ethnic profiles of registered nurses and midwives are not available.

One hundred ninety two nurses are employed by grant-aided medical missions, 11 by non-grant-aided medical missions, 136 by local authority and 63 by town, rural and African councils. It might be assumed that all other nurses work in government hospitals, with private physicians, in private hospitals or are unemployed.

Dental care is provided by 144 registered dentists.

Responsibility for the administration of health services rests with the Minister of Health. In actual operation, however, mining companies and other industries play an almost equal role in the most visible areas of hospital and clinic support. Mission-supported clinics are also an important source of medical care.

All of the major structural components (agencies) of the Rhodesian Health Services System cooperate to some degree in the delivery of personal

1/ Leistner, G.M.E. (ed) op.cit., p.239.

2/ Ibid.

and environmental, preventive health services. These agencies are the Ministry, the local authorities, mission hospitals, voluntary organizations, industrial clinics and private practitioners.

The major municipalities have their own public health departments. Outside the major urban areas, preventive services are supervised and coordinated by the Provincial Medical Officers of Health for each of the five provinces. Both the public health departments and the Provincial Medical Officers utilize the following personnel in the provision of medical services to their respective target populations: health inspectors, public health nurses, auxiliary staff, health educators and health assistants.

The types of personal preventive health activities which are conducted are: inoculations against communicable diseases, distribution of prophylactic or suppressive drugs, ante-natal care, post-natal and infant care, family planning clinics, food distribution programs to the needy, periodic medical and dental inspection of school children and health education programs in home hygiene and home economics. The extent to which these services are available and/or utilized and a measure of the degree to which these services impact on the population were not available in the literature reviewed. It is reasonable to assume that they are insufficient, because of the prevalent disease and malnutrition from the African population.

In December, 1975, the Secretary for Health reported the following figures for selected infectious diseases among the African population during the year.

SELECTED INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1/
(African)

<u>Diseases</u>	<u>Cases</u>
Pulmonary Tuberculosis	3,198
Non-pulmonary Tuberculosis	480
Trachoma	8,659
Infectious hepatitis	325
Leprosy	364
Malaria	9,698
Cholera	546
Bubonic Plague	66

(NOTE: Statistics on disease are recognized as vulnerable because of incomplete figures and non-uniform methods of reporting.)

Among the European population, there were only 91 cases of malaria, none of the other diseases. It is believed that preventive medicine has been concentrated in areas where there is an economic concern - as in mining locations - and where there is a relatively dense European population.

The two major causes of disease and death in the majority rural population are malnutrition

1/ Secretary of Health Report, op.cit.,
December, 1975, p.9.

and the absence of safe water supplies and waste control systems. These conditions also affect the urban African population, though to a lesser degree. It has been reported that cereals and other carbohydrate foods account for approximately 75 percent of the caloric equivalent of the diet for most Zimbabwean blacks.

Milk and milk products do not constitute a normal part of the diet for most of the African population. Milk, along with meat, is looked upon as a special food for important occasions, especially among the less prosperous rural people.

Because eggs are thought to cause sterility, they are seldom eaten in more rural areas, but the abstinence from their consumption is declining in the urban areas. Urban blacks consume less corn and more vegetables, but still have not widely accepted the consumption of wheat. Wild fruits, sweet potatoes and honey also contribute to the diet. The supply of fish is not plentiful. It is reasonable to assume that on the average the urban family with regular income is somewhat better nourished than its rural counterpart. To support this contention, a 1967-68 report from the Harare Hospital can be cited which indicated that patients with disease resulting from inadequate nutrition most often came from rural villages, less frequently from private white farms and the smallest number came from urban areas.

Surveys of school children and of children admitted to hospitals showed consistent majorities of protein deficiency and insufficient calorie intake. Surveys of adults are not available. In both children and adults, there is a high incidence of goiter; as much as 80 percent in some areas because of diets deficient of iodine.

This type of widespread malnutrition is common to the history of all underdeveloped countries. So, also, is the high incidence of water-borne disease.

Need for Safe Water and Waste Disposal Systems.

The availability of safe water supplies and sanitary waste disposal methods is one of the most basic measures of preventive medicine. There are numerous examples that demonstrate the extent to which water-borne diseases can be reduced by supplying safe piped water to areas where drinking water has formerly been obtained from unsafe sources. Following water supply development, intestinal disease morbidity rates fell markedly in Japan; 1/ Uttar Pradesh, India; and in Latin America notably Cuba, Peru, and Columbia. It is reasonable to predict that the enteric disease rate in children could be reduced by 25 percent to 50 percent in Rhodesia, if safe water supplies were available.

Disease attributable to unsafe water supplies contributes significantly to the mortality and morbidity status of the African population. Water-borne disease is the leading cause of death in children under five. It is also a major source of morbidity and mortality in older children and young adults.

Water disposal facilities in Rhodesia are extremely poor. The problem of unsafe water

1/ Dieterich, Bernard H. and Henderson, J.M., "Urban Water Supply Conditions and Needs in Seventy-five Developing Countries," World Health Organization, 1963.

supplies is multiplied where proper sewage treatment is also not available. Large cities and towns, such as Salisbury, Bulawayo, Gatooma and Umtali have water-borne sewers that serve most, but not all residents. In some towns, septic tanks are used by Europeans and Asians, while the Africans use the "bucket system".

Sanitation in the rural areas is rudimentary. In many villages, pit latrines are common. The indiscriminate disposal of human waste is not uncommon and is a major contributing factor to the high incidence of schistosomiasis.

In discussions of health care delivery, the argument has been encountered that the African does not appreciate the value of health education and preventive medicine since many methods are foreign to their traditions and customs. This concept is erroneous since Africans have always believed in "preventive" measures to avoid illness. ^{1/} Because the measures taken by Africans frequently adopted non-European forms, such as wearing amulets, Europeans have tended to overlook the kind of thinking behind the custom.

The apparent resistance to the advice of government health officers may also be due to a different ordering of priorities among the African population.

Dr. Carl Smith of the Department of Social and Preventive Medicine of the University of the West Indies undertook an extensive study on

^{1/} Munyaradzi, O.M., "The African Attitude to Disease," CAJM, June, 1975, p.138.

health priorities in underdeveloped countries. He found, in assessing priorities by village people in health programs, that they usually want improvement in socioeconomic status and the quality of life, then environmental changes, such as water supply and waste disposal, and finally organized health services, as a last priority. 1/

Recognition of the probable cause of non-utilization of professional recommendations does not, in any way, deny the very real need for health education in Zimbabwe.

Health education is not taught as a course of study in Rhodesian schools at any level. It is extremely important to change attitudes regarding health in early years in life. In turn, children may have direct influence on explaining and changing attitudes in adults with, one hopes, a resultant behavioral change.

At the same time, recognition of indigenous values and goals would be a major asset in gaining the confidence and cooperation of the people most in need of health education and health services. A recent development in the health-delivery system in Rhodesia has been the occasional enlistment of traditional "doctors" of the ethnic populations as partners in the treatment of illness. The effectiveness of such authority figures in alleviating symptomatic distress is not specifically docu-

1/ Smith, K.A., "Health Priorities in the Poorer Countries," Social Science and Medicine, Vol.9, p.121.

mented, but with the increased recognition of the possible psychogenic origin of disease, cooperation between traditional and European Medical practitioners is a method which merits further exploration.

Another largely experimental development in Rhodesia which has worthwhile possibilities for consideration as part of the Zimbabwean health system is the recent emphasis on the medical assistant and the advanced clinical nurse. Goals expressed by the present government are to train the medical assistant in data collection, diagnosis and treatment of simple diseases. The nurse is to be heavily trained in the clinical specialities of Obstetrics/Gynecology, Medicine, Surgery, Anesthetics and Pediatrics, during a two-year course at Mpilo Central Hospital in Bulawayo. It is hoped that the advanced clinical nurse would be used as physician's assistant at a regional hospital, or to man one of the rural hospitals, with a physician making visits periodically. The immediate aim would be to get these two medical trainees into the small villages and rural areas where they would be readily available.

In health care, as in all other areas, Zimbabwe will face the need for trained manpower. Implementation and expanded utilization of the recently stated plans for cooperative effort with traditional healers and for trained, non-physician medical personnel might offer a valuable approach to answering that need. The long-range goals of improved nutrition, safe water and disease eradication will require decisions by the new government about structuring medical care and assignment of priorities.

The Education of Refugees From Southern Africa.

(This section contains a description and analysis of both Zimbabwean and Namibian refugees, exiles and students who are currently living in Africa or abroad. Statistical data concerning Zimbabwean and Namibian refugees and students are found in Appendix V). Southern Africa has seen considerable movement of refugees in recent years, particularly from areas dominated by white minority governments. This section focuses on the identification of refugees and exiles (both students and non-students) who can provide a pool of talent and manpower available to an independent Zimbabwe and Namibia. It relies heavily upon the work of Dr. Mabel Smythe of the Phelps-Stokes Fund and the on-going training of the African American Institute. 1/

Refugees in Mozambique, Botswana and Zambia.

After the end of the Portuguese colonization, voluntary repatriation of refugees to Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and (to a lesser extent) Angola, reduced one source of concern, but 1975 saw an increase in refugees from Zimbabwe, Namibia, and South Africa. A group of some 15,000 fled from Zimbabwe into Mozambique; by mid-1976 the United Nations High Commission for Refugees reported 25,000 Zimbabwean refugees there, and estimates 30,000 of this writing. Individual refugees from all three have asked for asylum

1/ Dr. Mabel Smythe travelled extensively in Africa, and parts of Southern Africa in order to develop data and resources for her report to the Scholars Council concerning the problems of training and education in Southern Africa.

in Botswana, which held an estimated 2,500 at the end of 1975. 1/

Resettlement opportunities for refugees in other African countries have been very limited. Highly educated persons from southern Africa can be found on the faculties of a number of universities in West and East Africa; it is reported that a Zimbabwean, Nathan Shamuyarira, is the Dean of the University of Dar-es-Salaam. But such arrangements are frequently viewed as temporary, rather than as "settlement"; there is an assumption that the dispersed academic talent will, in many instances, return to an independent country.

Zambia is strategically located for receiving refugees from Zimbabwe and Namibia as well as South Africans escaping via Botswana, not to mention those from Zaire and Angola; Lusaka is a point of major concentration. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees reported in August of 1976 that Zambia had a refugee population of 36,000. At the end of 1975, there were 3,400 Namibian refugees in Zambia. 2/

Refugees in Swaziland were reported in 1976 to be almost entirely South African. There were 50 at the end of 1975, when the total for Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland was given as approximately 2,750 with 2,500 reported for Botswana and 200 for Lesotho. 3/

1/ U.N. General Assembly, Report on UNHCR Activities in 1975-1976 and Proposed Voluntary Funds Programme and Budget for 1977, A/AC.96/526. 16 August 1976, pp.7 and 30.

2/ Ibid., p. 75.

3/ Ibid., p.7.

At the end of 1975 there were an estimated 4,000 refugees of various origins in Benin, the Gambia, Ghana, the Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mali, Nigeria, Niger, Sierra Leone, Togo and Upper Volta. The total number represents no change over the previous year since new arrivals from Namibia and Zimbabwe were offset by departure of refugees from other countries. No figures are available on the number of refugees by countries of origin. 1/

As a matter of personal observation, it has been reported that the faculties of the several West African universities visited in October and November, 1976 included members from Southern Africa. 2/

Refugee Training and Educational Assistance.

The UNHCR, a cooperative agency, depends on the cooperation of governments of the host countries and missions or other voluntary agencies with which the host countries may wish to work. In practice, these include such instrumentalities as the Botswana Council for Refugees (established in 1974), Lutheran World Federation, Swaziland Refugee Committee, Tanganyika Christian Refugee Service, and Zambia Christian Refugee Service.

The American Friends Service Committee, the African Student Aid Fund, and the African-American Institute are additional American voluntary agencies which have for years had a role in providing or facilitating vocational training or educational programs for refugees and others.

1/ U.N. General Assembly, op.cit., p.64.

2/ Dr. Mabel Smythe, op.cit.

While complete and precise data are not available from all agencies concerned with refugee education, the following fragments indicate something of current efforts. (Information dealing with Namibian refugee programs are inserted here since they involved program coordination with the United Nations and supportive efforts for Zimbabwean refugees, exiles and students.)

Role of the UN Institute for Namibia. The UN Institute for Namibia in Lusaka, a program sponsored by the United Nations for five years to provide education for Namibians preparing for the independence of their country, has now enrolled approximately 150 students. Expectations of expanding the student body to 1,500 and of developing a nucleus for a future university in Namibia were articulated on November 23, 1976, by Sean McBride, UN Commissioner for Namibia. 1/

Nkumbi International College in Zambia is another educational institution providing post-primary education to refugees from Southern Africa; 34.1 percent of its 270 students fall in that category. Its latest available figures (August, 1974) showed 6 Namibian and 38 Zimbabwean students enrolled.

The United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa provides funds to UNHCR for assistance to South African refugees. The High Commissioner's Education Account, special trust funds, and donations by governments and voluntary agencies

1/ Briefing on Namibia provided by Commissioner Sean McBride and staff members, November 23, 1976, Russell Office Bldg., U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

also help to finance educational programs.

African-American Institute (AAI) Listing of Alumni. The African-American Institute tally of students who have completed academic studies under its ASPAU, AFGRAD, SASP, SAREP, SATP, and other programs indicates that 306 Zimbabwe and 46 Namibian students have earned diplomas, certificates, or degrees through its efforts. / Unfortunately data concerning the profiles and characteristics of all students assisted were not available to the Southern African Project.

The pool of Zimbabweans thus trained includes 29 economists, 19 engineers, 19 in business and business administration (not including 9 in accounting and 2 each in data processing and commercial/secretarial studies), 19 in education, 15 in biological sciences, 14 in chemistry, 11 in other sciences, 10 in agriculture (including agronomy and animal husbandry), 10 in public administration, 9 in medical allied fields (including public health), 7 each in medicine and mathematics, and others in law, social work, industrial arts, broadcast technology, library science, home economics, and urban planning, as well as a variety of other academic disciplines. In six cases one person earned more than one degree or certificate, thus overstating the talent pool by slightly under two percent.

Since Namibians were fewer, their pool is less diverse. They suffered somewhat more terminations (25 percent, as compared with 13 percent) without completing their study programs and earned a small proportion of degrees (44 percent)

1/ See Appendix V, Tables 2d/3 for delineation of the training program and student enrollment under the auspices of the AAI.

than did the Zimbabweans (79 percent). Nevertheless, the programs produce 6 educators, 4 economists, 4 in business and business administration (not including 2 in accounting and 2 in commercial/secretarial studies), 3 in animal husbandry, 2 in biological sciences, 2 in journalism, and others in broadcast technology, electronics and mechanics, medical allied fields, and public administration, as well as in studies of lower priority in economic development.

Programs of Training and Education for Manpower Requirements. Identifying the number of persons from Zimbabwe or Namibia trained in specific fields is exceedingly difficult. However, some programs can be identified and a sense of the resources for training can be generated. The following are examples.

1. The African Student Aid Fund, a division of the Phelps-Stokes Fund, offers emergency assistance to individual undergraduate applicants from Africa who have already successfully completed at least a year of study towards a bachelor's degree in an American college or university. Its grants are typically small (supplementary in nature). The Fund does not generally specify fields of study nor require refugee status; however, a new program for students from Southern Africa will give preference to those whose studies are in fields of relatively high priority in terms of economic development.

2. The UNITAR (United Nations Institute for Training and Research) program has made a useful contribution to the training of diplomatic representatives from developing countries. Because it has dealt generally with newcomers to missions in New York and Geneva, it typically serves member nations, rather than not-yet-independent territories; however, UNITAR is

able to mount especially planned courses wherever they may be needed. Davidson Nichol, Director of UNITAR and Under Secretary of the United Nations, is said to be sympathetic to the need; and a course for Namibian and Zimbabwean potential diplomats could be held at a convenient site in Southern Africa at relatively low cost. 1/

Human Resource Pool. What constitutes the human resource pool for Zimbabwe and Namibia is difficult to identify, especially since there is no accounting of those trained in the United Kingdom or Europe. According to the African-American Institute report, 49 percent of Zimbabweans and 42 percent of Namibians trained under their auspices have returned to Africa. 2/ AAI reports twelve African universities and institutes on whose staffs they serve. Presumably a substantial number of Zimbabweans and Namibians who are now working in other African countries would be available for suitable employment at home as Africanization of the government and the economy progresses. Similarly, trained persons who have achieved a somewhat precarious accommodation in the United States or the United Kingdom are likely to be responsive to employment opportunities in a transitional or independent Zimbabwe or Namibia. The AAI experience supports this presumption. 3/

1/ Conversation with Gordon Hawkins, Director of Training, United Nations Institute for Training and Research, December 1, 1976.

2/ The information on AAI programs was obtained from AAI personnel and is valid to November 1, 1976.

3/ Ibid.

The AAI tally does not include unsponsored students who have over the years obtained scholarships through individual institutions or from missionaries, Peace Corps Volunteers, or other personal contacts. Many of these have managed by their own efforts or the help of the Phelps-Stokes Fund and its African Student Aid Fund to obtain degrees or useful training.

Inquiries into training for refugees suggests that the emphasis has been on literacy, secondary education, and higher education, with little organized effort to develop persons trained in the skilled trades. Accordingly, the pool of trained electricians, plumbers, carpenters, mechanics, glaziers, electronics specialists and others in a great variety of technical fields must be expanded as quickly as possible. There is an urgent need for training programs in these skills, not now available to African workers in Zimbabwe and Namibia. In view of the fact that literacy is not a prerequisite for a high level of competence in a number of these, the opportunity is all the more significant.

CHAPTER II

NAMIBIA

This chapter outlines the political, economic and human resource factors of contemporary Namibia. Its aim is to provide a brief data base for these factors which serve to support the transition problems and development issues discussed in Chapter IV.

Political Factors

History

From the first moment of German white entrance into Namibia, the early history was marked by African resistance to conquest.

An early German governor responded to this resistance by calling for the extermination of every man, woman and child among the Herero. Sixty-five thousand of 80,000 were killed. 1/ Another group, the Nama, lost two-thirds of its population.

The Germans, in turn, were conquered by South African forces at the beginning of World War I. 2/ At the end of the war, German military personnel were repatriated. Civilians, however, were allowed to remain and were, in 1924, granted South African citizenship.

1/ Gail-Maryse Cockram, South West African Mandate, Juta and Company Ltd., South Africa, 1976, pp.11,12.

2/ Ibid., p.25.

South African control was recognized by the League of Nations in the postwar settlement. It designated Namibia, then called South West Africa, a "C" mandate. Control was "...conferred upon his Britannic Majesty to be exercised on his behalf by the government of The Union of South Africa..." 1/ South African control has continued ever since, although South Africa's request to incorporate South West Africa as a province was denied by the United Nations after World War II, when the UN assumed the responsibilities of the League of Nations.

In 1964, the South African government's plans were spelled out in the Odendaal Report (Commission of Inquiry into South West African Affairs). It was the stated policy to encourage ethnic division by the development of eleven "African Nations", which would gradually become self-governing. Those "nations" would be located in the so-called "homelands"--areas in which African populations were located at the time of white settlement, or to which they were moved when settlers displaced them on the more desirable farmlands. None of the territories allocated to the "nations" contained any of the large mineral deposits that constitute the primary source of wealth for Namibia. 2/

Partially in response to South Africa's stated objectives, the United Nations ruled, in October, 1966, that the original mandate was cancelled. South Africa had, said the UN, failed to fulfill the terms of the mandate that it "...promote to the utmost the material and moral well-being and

1/ Randolph Vigne, A Dwelling Place of Our Own, International Defense and Aid Fund (IDAF), London, 1975, p.15.

2/ See Appendix II, Maps 2 and 4.

the social progress of the inhabitants of the territory."

South West Africa became, by international law, a territory under the control of the United Nations. South Africa ignored the ruling. In 1968, the UN changed the name of the country to Namibia, after the Namib Desert, which is the most distinctive physical feature of the country, and passed resolutions declaring the illegality of South African administration. ^{1/} Nevertheless, that administration continued, and is still in firm control.

Thus Namibia is unique in its international status. Virtually all governments in the world recognize that South Africa's occupation of Namibia is illegal, and a majority acknowledge the UN Council for Namibia's de jure administration and legislative primacy in the territory until majority rule can be instituted by UN supervised elections.

Contemporary Overview

Nevertheless, South Africa remains in control of Namibia, which is a de facto province, and until very recently continued to implement the plans outlined in the Odendaal Report. Six of the "nations" were granted recognition, by South Africa, as separate entities. In 1975, two of these nations, Ovamboland and Kavangoland, were granted "self-governing" status under the leadership of local traditional authorities. Real control is exercised from Pretoria, which directs foreign affairs, defense, police, railways and harbors, mining, administration of African affairs,

^{1/} South African Department of Information, South Africa 1975: Official Yearbook of the Republic of South Africa, Second Edition, p.945.

communications and even the prevention of cruelty to animals.

In September, 1975, the Turnhalle Conference began at Windhoek, the capital of Namibia. Its stated purpose is to set a date for Namibian independence and to allow the "peoples" of Namibia to decide the constitutional future of their country. 1/

The effectiveness of the Turnhalle Conference is severely compromised by the absence of representatives from the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO). Established in 1969, SWAPO is the leading nationalist organization and is recognized by the UN as the spokesman for Namibia self-determination.

Since 1966 SWAPO has mounted guerrilla operations against the South African regime in Namibia, without major successes thus far, but with enough effectiveness to provide an anxious and large-scale military build-up by South Africa in the northern part of the country.

Namibia's historical background has been reasonably constant since the first instance of white incursion. First under Germany, then under South Africa, it has been controlled from without its own borders. At this moment, the most significant developments for Namibia are still being directed from without by the UN, by SWAPO and by South Africa. 2/

1/ International Defense and Aid Fund, All Options and None--The Constitutional Talks in Namibia, Fact Paper No. 3, August 1976, p.1.

2/ It is vital to note at the beginning that almost all data about Namibia is subject to question. Few statistics are (continued)

Namibia is a small country. In 1975 its population totalled only 917,000. Of this total, whites numbered 107,100, Africans 792,900 and Coloureds 17,100. Statistics for recent years show a rapid growth rate for the Namibian population. From 1970 to 1975, the total population increased by 154,916 persons or an annual increase of 4.1 percent. 1/ This increase includes migration into Namibia. The chart on the next page compares the total population of Namibia with that of Zimbabwe including breakdowns for major ethnic groups.

The climate is harsh. In over 70 percent of the territory, which measures 318,261 square miles, including 434 square miles for the Walvis Bay Coastal enclave, technically part of South Africa's Cape Province, rainfall is insufficient for agriculture. 2/ Nevertheless, using the remaining 30 percent of the country, agriculture has become a major part of the national economy, providing export income and jobs. The country is, as a whole, rural. There are only two major cities--Windhoek, the capital, and Walvis Bay, the port city. Windhoek is the larger, but in 1970 (latest available figures)

(footnote continued from preceding page)


available; those that are available come primarily from South African government sources and have been termed unreliable by the United Nations. At the same time, figures provided in the reports of different UN agencies frequently disagree. The statistics appearing in the following pages are those that seemed to have the most validity in terms of logic, other evidence and--in some cases--sole availability. (Southern Africa Data Baseline).

1/ See Appendix II, Table 1--Namibia Population 1970, 1974, 1975.

2/ Irving Kaplan et al, Area Handbook (continued)

POPULATION AND ETHNICITY FOR
ZIMBABWE AND NAMIBIA
FOR 1975


ZIMBABWE ¹



Total Population

Rhodesia: Monthly Digest of Statistics,
July 1976, Central Statistical Office,
Salisbury.

NAMIBIA ²



Total Estimated Population

Die Suidwes-Afrikaner: October 7, 1975. These
estimated figures have resulted from international
pressure on South Africa in revising its statistical
figures upward for the African populations in
Namibia (South West Africa) from the published Population
Census of 6 May, 1970.

its population was only 64,700.

The central highlands in the area around Windhoek contain the majority of the European population and are largely used for farming, with the emphasis on raising beef for export and sheep for export of karakul pelts. As in many other colonial situations, whites took occupancy of the most valuable farm land after dispossessing the Africans they found there.

Ethnicity

Ethnicity is an important factor in Namibia, in both the white and the African populations.

The white population is composed of three groups with different national backgrounds and languages. Nearly half of them are South Africans working in Namibia for the South African government. They make the Afrikaans-speaking segment of the population the largest, at 61,600. ^{1/} The next largest group consists of German-speaking descendants of the pre-World War I colonials. It is an extremely cohesive group. One of the few urban communities in Namibia is Swakopmund, a town that is almost exclusively German. Ten thousand of the 20,000 German-speaking people of Namibia ^{2/} hold German passports. It is possible that this

(continued from preceding page)

for the Republic of South Africa, Foreign Area Studies (FAS) of the American University, 1971, Washington, D. C., DA PAM 550-93, p.768.

1/ Peter Fraenkel, The Namibians of South West Africa, Minority Rights Group, 1974, p.7.

2/ Ibid.

figure excludes women and children. If so, German nationals would exceed one-half of the German-speaking Namibian population.

English-speaking whites number 7,250, including more missionaries than settlers. 1/

Interpretations of the significance of African ethnicity vary according to the source. Ethnicity is, in any case, a major contemporary political issue in the struggle for power and identity among the Africans. The South African Government does not deny its systematic encouragement of African ethnic identity; on the contrary, it expresses absolute conviction that its promotion of ethnicity through the institution of "African nations" is a positive good for the African people of Namibia.

To many Africans, South Africa's policies are simply a method for weakening the Africans of Namibia and for preventing the growth of any national identity. This is the view of SWAPO, which refuses to participate in any talks organized on ethnic lines, including the Turnhalle Conference, which has 140 delegates representing Namibia's ethnic populations.

Regardless of perspective on the merit of ethnicity, the fact of ethnic identities cannot be ignored. Who, then, are these populations? (See Map 1 - Proposed Homelands, in this Chapter).

The largest is the Ovambo, which constitutes approximately 50 percent of the African population. 2/ Its territory is in the north, on the border with

1/ Fraenkel, op.cit., p.7.

2/ See Appendix II, Table 1.

Angola, and Ovamboland is one of the "self-governing nations" created in 1975. The Ovambo settled there in the 16th and 17th centuries, having migrated from central Africa. Described as a "sedentary" people by anthropologist William Shack, 1/ the Ovambo were farmers and herdsman who remained isolated in the north until 1915, when the South African Army entered to advise the chiefs that South Africa had conquered the Germans and was now in control. The Army had a second message: the chiefs were invited to encourage their people to come out for employment.

When South African control expanded to include taxation and restriction of Africans to designated "homelands," the Ovambo had every incentive to respond to the encouragement. Ovamboland covers only 6.5 percent of Namibia's land area but contains half its population. Approximately 20,000 Ovambo leave home and work in the southern regions, sending money to their families to supplement the inadequate production on their farmlands, 2/ The majority are migrant workers signed up for one of two years on contracts that are frequently renewed again and again for the duration of a man's strongest years.

Not all Ovambo who go south to work are contract laborers. Some are in the civil service, the police, commerce and industry. The Ovambo constitutes 63 percent of Africans classified as skilled and

1/ William A. Shack, University of California (Berkeley), November 15, 1976, p.3.

2/ Department of Foreign Affairs, Ovambo, Republic of South Africa, 1971, p.20.

77 percent classified as semi-skilled. 1/

The Ovambo were the first Namibian Africans to express an organized national political consciousness. In 1958, Ovambo laborers in Cape Town formed the Ovamboland People's Congress, which later became SWAPO. Sam Nujoma, SWAPO's leader, is Ovambo. There have been reports that some Namibians are apprehensive about possible Ovambo control of the country after independence. SWAPO denies any specifically Ovambo allegiance; it is a "nationalist" party.

The Damara is second in numerical size to the Ovambo and constitutes 10.5 percent of the African population. 2/ It is also a significant part of the wage economy and holds 15 percent of the skilled jobs, 11 percent of the semi-skilled. 3/

The Damara is followed numerically by the Herero, which constitutes 9.5 percent of the population. The Kaokovelders is approximately the same numerical size as the Herero. 4/ The Herero migrated to Namibia from Angola in the 18th century. A small group of them stopped in the north and became known as Kaokolanders. The Herero continued into the central highlands where they competed with the Nama and Damara for the grazing land there. German occupation ended the competition, ousting the Damara and killing the great majority of Herero and Nama. Herero and Nama in the labor force hold almost 18 percent of skilled and 11 percent of semi-skilled jobs. 5/

1/ Shack, op.cit., p.3.

2/ See Appendix II, Table 1.

3/ Shack, op.cit., Appendix I, Table 5.

4/ See Appendix II, Table 1.

5/ Shack, op.cit., Appendix I, Table 5.

The Kavango is another northern population with approximately the same numbers as the Herero and Kaokovelders. Their territory has also been declared "self-governing." The Kavango remains relatively isolated, with little participation in the southern wage economy. This isolation is explained by the abundant natural food in their territory. The fish, game and wild fruits, it is supposed, are sufficient to feed the population, and Kavango do not have to earn money to buy food. 1/

There are other small African populations which play a minor part in Namibia. They include the East Caprivians, who occupy an isolated, artificial appendage-like corner which is cut off from Namibia by large areas of swamp.

The non-African ethnic populations are the three European groups, a small number of Asians, the Oorlams, or Coloureds, and the Basters.

The Asians and Coloureds are predominantly urban peoples, absorbed by the industries, administrations and small businesses of Windhoek, Walvis Bay, and Luderitz, Namibia's second port city.

The Basters are unique in Namibia's history because of their successful preservation of near autonomy. A mixture of Khoi and white stock, the Basters entered Namibia in the late 19th century and established themselves at Rehoboth on the highland near Windhoek.

When South African troops conquered the Germans during World War I, the Basters made demands for independence but desisted when they realized the

1/ J. H. Wellington, South West Africa and Its Human Issues, London, 1967.

futility of resistance to the overwhelming numbers and armaments of the South Africans. Nevertheless, they somehow retained a position of chosen self-isolation and self-sufficiency. They are primarily an agricultural people, although their city, Rehoboth, is diversified and sophisticated for its size. The Basters, who speak a language that is predominantly Afrikaans, numbered 16,474, or 2.2 percent of the total population, in the 1970 census. ^{1/} They have their own spokesman for a united, independent Namibia. He is the head of the Rehoboth Volkspartei.

Given the number of ethnic populations in Namibia and their relative isolation from each other, because of language and cultural differences among Europeans and Coloureds and geographic separations between Africans, ethnicity is a political reality that cannot be ignored. One cannot gauge the relative strength of traditional loyalties compared with the pull of national identity as an independent country. It may be that the two are not mutually exclusive. But it must be recognized that: Europeans have parallel "national" ties to South Africa, Germany and the United Kingdom; Coloureds may be concerned with protecting their urban and civil-service jobs from African competition; the Ovambo are dominant in numbers, which is reflected in the percentage of skilled jobs they hold and of participation in SWAPO; pressures for resettlement and territorial expansion are most acute among the Ovambo; leaders of the recently created "self-governing nations" may lose prestige and power after national independence. The ingredients for conflict over allocation of power, land and limited employment opportunities are present. Division along ethnic lines in such conflict cannot be ruled out.

Present Political Situation

Perhaps the most fundamental problem with which the Namibians will be faced is the problem of

^{1/} Fraenkel, op.cit., p.7.

"inventing" a whole political structure to fill the vacuum created by the removal of South African control. (See Chapter IV) Whether their responses are national or traditional-ethnic, no one can predict. Namibian Africans have had few opportunities to develop political and administrative skills. Nonetheless, they will have to build a governmental administration from the ground up. The territorial government, as it is now constituted, is in fact only a branch of the South African Government. And it is all-white.

The present territorial government is made up of the Legislative Assembly, which consists of 18 European members elected by Europeans. A deputy minister for South West African Affairs is appointed by the South African Government. The deputy minister is assisted by an Executive Committee of four persons selected by the South West Africa Legislative Assembly. 1/

At the beginning of 1949, the South African Government approved the South West African Affairs Amendment Bill with the object of giving direct representation to South West Africa in the House of Assembly and Senate by means of electing six members to the Assembly and four members to the Senate. 2/

Africans do not sit in either the Territorial Assembly or the South African Parliament; and they are denied the franchise for both legislatures. They are allowed to vote for the small proportion of elected members in their homeland legislative councils (if their homeland has such a council). 3/

1/ The Republic of South Africa, op.cit., p.760.

2/ Gayle-Maryse Cockram, op.cit., p.248.

3/ Elizabeth S. Landis, Human Rights in Namibia, prepared for the International Conference on Namibia and Human Rights, January, 1976, p.40.

Towns are run either by European Municipal Councils, (or Village Management Boards) or, in certain mining towns, by corporations. Although Africans form a substantial proportion of the population, in such urban areas as Windhoek, they do not participate in municipal governance.

Civil administration is exercised predominantly by South Africa, which employs 20,000 officials within Namibia. Approximately 11,000 of these officials are non-European, but few of them hold posts with substantial responsibility. 1/ In addition to the South African civil service, there are the less important Administrations of South West Africa, Ovamboland, Kavangoland and East Caprivi.

The judicial system as it affects Africans takes two forms, and is divided by region. In the north, the chiefs and councils of headmen hold full civil and criminal jurisdiction for violations of traditional laws. Serious crimes (murder, rape, treason) are dealt with in the South African courts. A parallel system in the north consists of District Courts, a Tribal Court, and a Court of Appeal advised by a Bantu Commissioner. In the south, Bantu Affairs Commissioner's Court hold concurrent jurisdiction with the courts of magistrates (both run by Europeans) and hear civil disputes in accord with African customs and with the assistance of African assessors. Ultimately, Roman-Dutch common law (as in South Africa) prevails. After passage of the South West Africa Affairs Act in 1969, widespread efforts were made to bring laws of the territory completely into line with those in South Africa. According to the International Defense and Aid Fund, "virtually all the repressive legislation of the Republic and many other laws besides--are today enforced in Namibia just as if it were part of South Africa."2/

1/ South Africa Department of Information, op.cit., p.952.

2/ IDAF, op.cit., p.8.

For instance, "almost any action displeasing to the South Africans or to the Territorial Administration is included under the definition of 'terrorism' in the Terrorism Act of 1967 (Act. No. 83, as amended), and subjected to severe penalties. Terrorism is so broadly defined, and so freely applied by the South African courts that virtually anything from forcible resistance to the government to obstructing traffic can be prosecuted as "terrorism.'" 1/

In the "self-governing nations" of Ovamboland and Kavangoland, leadership is vested in local authorities whose rule has been characterized as harsh. These "nations" also have their own police forces in contrast to territorial police who are controlled by Pretoria (see "Proposed Homelands" map).

The locally controlled police are equipped with modern weapons by the South African Government and play a major role in controlling movement across the border. This activity is particularly evident in Ovamboland, which borders Angola. The border line was drawn by agreement between colonial South African and Portuguese administrators.

That agreement did not take the local population into consideration and the borderline passed through the center of Ovamboland. Therefore, Angolan and Namibian neighbors along the border have traditional ties and a common language. The extent of unity between the divided Ovambo is questionable.

Angola provides a staging point for guerrilla raids into Namibia by the forces of SWAPO, and the majority of SWAPO members are Ovambo. Reportedly, the Ovambo police seem to show no hesitancy in fighting guerrilla incursions.

Some observers postulate an identity of interest between the South African Government and the chiefs who have united against the growing power of SWAPO.

1/ Landis, op.cit., p.40.

The outstanding feature of the contemporary Namibian political sector is its virtual non-existence, because of Pretoria's dominance. When independence is granted, the visible political ties to the South African government may be severed. The actual degree of self-determination for Namibia, however, may rest on the extent of economic independence. Economic ties are equally pervasive and may prove much more difficult to dissolve. One of the most sensitive is the status of Walvis Bay, Namibia's only deep-water port.

Walvis Bay was annexed by Great Britain in 1878 in response to requests from European traders in Namibia for assistance in establishing a trade route that would bypass African-dominated inland areas. "Ownership" of Walvis was passed on to the British-controlled Cape Colony. German occupation of South West Africa a few years later had no effect on Walvis Bay. A second port was opened by the Germans. When, at the end of World War I, South West Africa became one of the former German colonies to be distributed among the allied nations, the League of Nations mandate to South Africa included all the territory except Walvis Bay. The Bay was already a legal part of South Africa, the successor to the Cape Colony. Namibia, therefore, has no legal jurisdiction over its major port and an area of 434 square miles around it. This situation exists de jure, in spite of the fact that the Bay and the land around it is separated by no natural division from the rest of the country.

As the center of the fishing industry and a valuable source of customs revenue, Walvis Bay is economically important. Its status as a part of Namibia or of South Africa is an intricate political problem. As is so often the case, politics and economics are mingled in a subtle, intricate web. As is always the case in Namibia, the question of South Africa's future role is primary. The overwhelming significance of South Africa's position is demonstrated even more clearly in the economic sector than in the political.

Economic Factors

Overview

In GDP economic terms, Namibia is not a country -- it is part of South Africa. Its minerals and other economic resources have been used for the benefit of South African and international investors with little benefit to the local African population. In fact, this population has been crowded onto "homelands" or native reserves where the only means of support is to work as a migrant laborer for the white population. Africans are prevented from owning land or engaging in commerce in any way other than that of a low-skilled worker. While the African economic status discussed in this section is bleak, there is great potential for development and improvement once it is politically possible.

Maintaining the current level of economic production means continual dependence on exports and on South Africa. All economic administration, transportation links, and international trade are intermeshed with the South African economy. It will require a major effort for Namibia to assume control of the structure of government. This is due to the centralization of the major ministries and government bureaus in Pretoria. The UN Institute for Namibia is in the process of training Namibians to take over these governmental functions. However, the smooth running of any organization requires experienced personnel and Namibia will benefit from international assistance in this area following independence. Private sector management and organization will also be vulnerable areas.

Infrastructure linkages will be a constraint to growth and will condition political choices in the post-independence era. All major roads and rail services presently lead to South Africa.

There is also the issue of Walvis Bay, the major port city on Namibia's Atlantic coast. This area was not part of the German mandate territory taken over by South Africa in 1920. However, it has been administered and developed as a natural part of the national, geo-political unit. Namibia's fishing industry has been developed around this port. Without Walvis Bay, Luderitz, farther down the coast would become the only port facility. However, this harbor cannot handle the shipping needs of the mining industry or other exports.

There is concern with the current rate of exploitation of mineral resources. This concern has been raised by Chief Clemens Kapuuo at the Turnhalle Talks in progress in Namibia under the sponsorship of the Southwest African Nationalist Party. The implication of this concern is that limitations may need to be placed on new mineral-extraction operations.

Namibia has few people. Like all countries with small economies, its development strategies and economic policies will be closely constrained in size. Namibia cannot develop by turning inward, given the small size of the domestic market. It cannot anticipate much "import-substituting" industrial development. Its industrial growth will have to come mainly from processing raw materials for export. Its economy must necessarily be integrated into a wider regional or world economy. Moreover, Namibia will never fully enjoy fiscal and monetary independence. Not many countries enjoy this kind of independence, and certainly not small ones.

Given the size and power of the South African economy, it is inevitable that the most powerful influence will continue to come from there. But fiscal and monetary policies, price policies, and exchange rate policies in Angola, Botswana, and perhaps even Zimbabwe, will also affect and constrain Namibian policies.

Dynamics of the Economy

Economic Parameters. In 1966, Namibia's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was at a level of 258 million rand. 1/ By 1973 the estimated GDP was at 615 million rand, an annual growth rate of 19.8 percent, with the mining sector accounting for an estimated 60 percent of the total value of output. 2/ The composition of the GDP is given below in Table 1. Figures after 1966 are UN estimates, since the Government of South Africa has prohibited the release of information on the composition of output in Namibia since that date. Chart 1, which also follows, compares the composition of GDP of both Namibia and Zimbabwe. Chart 2 shows the rate of growth of major economic sectors from 1963 to 1973.

Average per capita figures hide the vast differences among population groups who benefit from this economic production. Namibia's per capita GDP is about the same as South Africa's and is only exceeded by Libya on the African continent. Table 2 shows per capita GDP by different population groups.

1/ Unless indicated to the contrary, all figures and rates are in terms of current rather than constant rand.

2/ Elliot Berg, et al., Namibia: Economic Growth, Structure and Prospects, Center for Research on Economic Development, University of Michigan, 1976, p.49.

TABLE 1

COMPOSITION OF GDP AT CURRENT FACTOR COST, 1963 - 1973
(in millions of Rand)


	(%) 1963	(%) 1964	(%) 1965	(%) 1966	(%) 1970 (U.N. estimate)	(%) 1973 (U.N. estimate)
Total GDP	193.0	226.0	244.0	258.0	373.1	615.6
1. Agriculture, Forestry Fishing	(22) 43.0	(18) 42.0	(16) 40.0	(17) 43.0		(20) 123.0
2. Mining and quarrying	(37) 59.0	(38) 85.0	(40) 100.0	(43) 110.00		(60) 369.0
3. Manufacturing	(8) 16.0	(7) 16.0	(7) 18.0	(6) 16.0		
4. Construction	(2) 5.0	(3) 6.0	(3) 8.0	(3) 8.0		
5. Electricity	(1) 2.0	(1) 3.0	(1) 3.0	(1) 3.0		
6. Transport and Communications	(9) 17.0	(8) 18.0	(7) 18.0	(8) 20.0		
7. Wholesale and retail trade	(8) 15.0	(9) 20.0	(7) 19.0	(7) 18.0		
8. Other and unallocated	(19) 36.0	(16) 36.0	(19) 38.0	(15) 40.0		

Sources: United Nations, E.C.A. Economic Summaries, Namibia: 1974.
 United Nations, Report of Special Committee on Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries, September 30, 1975 OA/10023/.
 (from Berg, op.cit., p.49).

ZIMBABWE
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT – 1975

Total GDP = R\$ 1.9 Billion

CHART 1




(a) Includes Distribution, Hotels and Restaurants, Construction, Real Estate, Finance and Insurance, African Rural Household Services, Domestic Services.

(b) Includes Public Administration, Transport and Communications, Other Services, Education, Electricity and Water, Health.

SOURCE: Compiled from Economic Survey of Rhodesia, 1975, Ministry of Finance, April, 1976; p. 12.


NAMIBIA
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT – 1973

Total GDP = R 615.6 million



SOURCE: United Nations, E.C.A., Economic Summaries, Namibia, 1974; United Nations, Report of Special Committee on Granting Independence to Colonial Countries, September 30, 1975 # A/10023/.

COMPARISON OF NAMIBIA'S GROWTH OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT WITH MAJOR ECONOMIC SECTORS FROM 1963 TO 1973



SOURCE: United Nations, Economic Commission on Africa, *Economic Summaries Namibia: 1974*; United Nations, *Report of Special Committee on Granting Independence to Colonial Countries*, September 30, 1975 (A/100/2)

Table 2
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT PER PERSON IN NAMIBIA 1/

	1965 (Official Figures)	1970 (Estimate)
Total Population	US\$ 504 (a)	US\$ 752 (a)
Whites only	2,243	4,250
Southern Sector (Africans and Coloureds)	321	468
Northern Sector (Africans)	85	124
All Africans	N.A.	250

(a) Converted at 1 rand = US\$1.40

The main revenue sources for financing governmental expenditures in the territory have been individual and corporate income taxes, special levies on mining, customs and excise duties, posts and telegraph receipts. Under the South West Africa Affairs Act of 1969 the Union of South Africa took over all revenue arising from major levies, leaving Namibia

1/ Reed Kramer and Tami Hultman, Tsumeb, a Profile of United States Contribution to Underdevelopment in Namibia, Corporate Information Center, National Council of Churches, April, 1973, p.5.

with minor local levies. In return for this take-over of revenue sources, Namibia has received an annual appropriation from the South African government for its own use. 1/

The major revenue sources assumed by the South African Government include taxation of mining income, other company taxes, undistributed corporate profits tax, the diamond export levy, the diamond profits tax, marketable securities tax and transfer duties. Revenue from these sources flow into the South African Consolidated Revenue Fund. Under this fund a special account called the South West Africa Account has been established which is used to defray direct South African expenditures in Namibia and to provide untied revenues to the territory on an annual basis. 2/

A functional allocation of the annual appropriation received under the South West Africa Account by the Administrator of the Territory, which forms the bulk of local revenue, is unavailable. In fact, no public accounting of the disposition of funds is required. Presumably, a large proportion of this appropriation serves to finance salaries and maintenance costs of South African personnel who reside in Namibia. In a report to the UN Security Council on Namibia, the government of South Africa indicated that the post office and other communication personnel in the country were mainly South African nationals; administrative personnel and skilled workers in transport and construction industries are also South African nationals. 3/

1/ Berg, op.cit., p.50.

2/ Berg, op.cit., pp.50,51.

3/ UN, Security Council Official Records, 1970, S/9463, (As quoted in Berg, Ibid.).

Information on expenditures since 1969 indicates that the greater proportion of investment expenditure on infrastructure has been in Namibia's export sector. The South Africa railways, harbors and roads have received substantial sums. New water development to meet mining sector requirements and power projects have also been initiated, the Cunene hydro-electric scheme being an example of the latter. 1/

International Trade. The collection of separate trade statistics for Namibia was suspended in 1967, so there are currently no official figures for trade flows between Namibia and other countries. Namibia forms part of the Southern African Customs Union. It is believed to contribute 10 percent of the customs union's exports. In 1970, total exports were estimated at R200 million, imports at R150 million. South Africa purchases about 40 percent of Namibia's exports, including diamonds, cattle and fish, and provides an average of 80 percent of Namibia's imports (R120 million in 1970), mainly fuel, food products and manufactured goods. The U.S.A. and the U.K. have been the most important overseas export markets. 2/ Minerals (diamonds, copper, lead, zinc, etc.), karakul pelts, cattle and fish products provide the main exports of Namibia.

UN estimates of Namibian exports are shown in Table 3. In 1973, mining provided 53.9 percent of Namibia's exports with diamonds alone accounting for 41.0 percent. The most recent official detailed breakdown of Namibian exports is for 1966. Table 4 shows this breakdown of total exports and that part of the total

1/ Berg, op.cit., p.51.

2/ United Nations, Food and Agriculture Organization, A Preliminary Note Towards A Country Development Brief--Namibia, 1976, p.12.

TABLE 3

PATTERN OF TRADE: EXPORTS BY VALUE 1966-1973
(in 000's of Rand) 1/

Commodities	1966	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973
Karakul Pelts	15,375	19,200	21,900	20,100	27,500	32,500	32,000
Livestock	16,640	25,100	24,600	29,000	30,000	35,000	40,000
Fish Products	48,900	40,000	36,000	33,000	36,000	45,000	65,000
Diamonds	85,014	80,000	90,000	75,000	80,000	90,000	127,000
Lead, Zinc and Copper Concentrates	40,405	35,000	42,000	39,000	37,000	31,000	40,000
Other Exports n.e.c.	3,459	5,700	3,500	3,900	4,500	4,500	6,000
Total Exports	209,793	205,000	218,000	200,000	215,000	238,000	310,000

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1/ U.N., Economic Commission for Africa, Summaries of Economic Data--Namibia 1973, M75-9, 1974
(As quoted in Berg, op.cit., p.62).

NOTE: This table consists of trade external to the South African Customs Union (Namibia, South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland). It does not include trade within this area.

Table 4

PATTERNS OF NAMIBIAN EXPORTS - 1966 1/

	<u>Total</u> (R.000)	<u>Exports to SA</u>
<u>Agriculture</u>		
Karakul Pelts	15,375	-
Livestock	14,115	14,089
Livestock Products (dairy, wool)	2,525	1,811
Other (teak, wood)	<u>120</u>	<u>120</u>
Sub-total	32,135	16,020
<u>Fish Products</u>		
Fish Meal	22,400	4,480
Canned Fish (Pilchards)	14,000	2,800
Other Fishery Products	<u>12,500</u>	<u>980</u>
Sub-total	48,900	8,260
<u>Minerals</u>		
Diamonds	85,014	85,014
Blister Copper	19,242	-
Refined Lead	12,287	2,100
Lead/Copper/ Zinc/Concentrates	8,876	-
Other (Vanadium/Lithium, etc.)	<u>3,339</u>	<u>1,288</u>
Sub-total	128,758	88,402
TOTAL:	<u>209,793</u>	<u>112,682</u>

1/ Based on: Department of Foreign Affairs, South West Africa Survey 1967, Republic of South Africa, p.102.

exported to South Africa. In 1966, that portion amounted to 53.8 percent of total exports. Chart 3 diagrams 1973 exports by value.

Foreign Investment. Murray's research has identified the presence of 88 foreign firms in Namibia of which 35 are South African, 25 are largely British, 15 are largely American, 8 are largely West German, 3 are largely French and 2 are largely Canadian. In a valuable appendix to his paper (The Role of Foreign Firms in Namibia) he describes the basic features of these firms' operations in Namibia. He establishes that out of a total known capital investment of \$92.5 million in Namibia, the contribution of foreign firms (other than South African) amounts to 53 percent. Of this investment over 60 percent is invested in mining and manufacturing enterprises. Approximately 90 percent of the territory's mineral output (which accounts for over 60 percent of the country's total exports) is produced by two companies -- De Beers Consolidated Diamond Mines (CDM) and the Tsumeb Corporation. 1/

In 1971 the total U.S. investment in Namibia was about \$45 million. Despite the official steps taken to discourage U.S. companies from extending their investments in Namibia, Murray's research indicates that American investment--in common with British, West German, French and Canadian investment--is still increasing. Although these figures are comparatively small, they are very large indeed within the context of the Namibian economy. The Gross Domestic Product for 1969 was only R370 million. 2/


1/ Jorgen Lissner, Namibia 75: Hope, Fear, Ambiguity, Lutheran World Federation, Geneva, 1976, p.94; Roger Murray et al., The Role of Foreign Firms in Namibia, Africa Publications Trust, Uppsala, Sweden, 1974, p.89.

2/ Lissner, op.cit., p.94.

CHART 3

NAMIBIA

NAMIBIA: 1973 EXPORTS BY VALUE 1



Total Exports = R\$ 310 million

SOURCE: United Nations, Economic Commission for Africa, Economic Summaries, Namibia, 1974; p. 11.

Consists of trade external to the South African Customs Union.

Some indication of the profitability of foreign investment is shown by the fact that the three major mining companies in Namibia generated gross profits in 1972 of US\$92 million, of which US\$9.8 million went to U.S. nationals and US\$1.3 million to U.K. nationals. Over half of the total went to U.S., U.K. and South African investors. The Klein Aub Mine, for example, was able to recoup its R4.5 million initial capital investment within two years.

1/

Employment. A fact of the Namibian economy is that the highest economic production occurs in the sector that employs very few people: mining. Employment is concentrated in the agricultural sector. If economic development is viewed in terms of providing jobs and an increase in livelihood to Namibians rather than in terms of increased GDP, development in the agricultural sector takes on additional significance. Mining, however, is needed as a producer of foreign exchange and a vehicle to fund growth in other sectors.

One estimate among many of the total labor force in the early seventies in Namibia is as follows:

Table 5

NAMIBIA LABOR FORCE 2/

Subsistence Agriculture	87,000	42.2%
Modern Agriculture (on white farms)	36,000	17.4%
Civil or Domestic Service	33,000	16.0%
Commerce and Finance	25,000	12.1%
Mining	18,000	8.7%
Fishing	<u>7,500</u>	<u>3.6%</u>
TOTAL	<u>206,500</u>	<u>100.0%</u>

1/ Lissner, op.cit., p.94.

2/ Ibid., p.85.

The Relationship With South Africa

Administrative Control. An institutional void will characterize the Namibian transition. Because of its political and administrative integration with South Africa, there exists in Namibia itself, only a skeletal administrative organization and a thin set of institutions that can be called "governmental." This again is very different from other colonial situations. In the typical case, there were autonomous institutions and organizations, focused narrowly inward. They were run by colonizers, but they did exist. In Indonesia, in Algeria, and even in Rhodesia, there were, and are, structures such as health, railway and postal services, ministries of finance, etc. They maintained records and files and had established ways of doing things. There were, even in the worst cases, a few indigenous people in each agency who could act as carriers of institutional or social memory.

The Namibia case is different. The institutions of administration and government are extensions of Pretoria. The communications system, including posts and telegraphs, and the economic services, such as railways and revenue collection are all operated from Pretoria. Namibia is a province in a state organized mainly along unitary lines, with little administrative decentralization. An independent Namibia will thus have to start virtually from zero in matters of administration. It will have to create an entirely new governmental structure, just as the American colonies had to in 1776.

Thus, the basic feature of the public sector in Namibia is its absorption into the financial and administrative system of South Africa. This policy was recommended by the Odendaal Commission 1/ in 1964 and implemented in 1968-69. The recommendation on finances contained in the Odendaal Report led in 1968-69 to the South West Africa Affairs Act. This act provided for a financial rearrangement of

1/ Odendaal Commission of Inquiry into South West Africa Affairs, 1962-63.

revenues and expenditures between Namibia and the Union of South Africa and a reallocation of governmental functions.

This law, said to repeal the hated pass laws imposed in Namibia, actually only curbed their use in the "homeland" areas. The major function of this legislation was to consolidate the administration of Namibia within Pretoria, as if it were a fifth province. The act transferred areas of public authority formerly exercised by the South West African Legislative Assembly to the South African Parliament, including water affairs, social welfare, police affairs, monuments, archives and museums, mining, companies and corporations, trademarks, patents, designs and emblems, weights and measures, explosives, fish and fishing, supplies and facilities for South African government departments in Namibia, censorship; labor relations, all major tax levies, and vital statistics registration. 1/

Under the South West African Constitution of 1968, legislative authority for the following areas had already been reserved for the South African Parliament: Native Affairs, railways and harbours, the public service; the constitution, jurisdiction and procedure of the courts, posts, telegraphs and telephones; the military organization and the police force; movements and operations in the Territory of the South African defense force; customs and excise, and currency and banking. 2/ Clearly then, 1969 represented a consolidation of all policy-making, resource control and power-centers within the South African Parliament and its Ministries. The South West African Legislative Assembly exercises

1/ U.N. General Assembly, Report of the Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, (Chapter X, Namibia, A/10023/Add 3, 30 September 1975, p.7), (As referred in Berg, op.cit., p.6).

2/ Ibid.

civil service and encouragement of such endeavors by the private sector. (These efforts can be coordinated with current training and student assistance programs taking place both in Africa and abroad as well as with the multinational corporations.)

Eradicating Racial Discrimination

It is evident from the inquiry of Quénet Commission that eradicating racial discrimination will not be easily achieved through a stroke of the pen or by simple legislative action. ^{1/} While the political imperative for an emergent Zimbabwe government will require immediate redressing of discriminatory practices and blatant inequities through legislative and executive actions, eradication of such discrimination lodged in institutions and processes will require greater tenacity and administrative followup during the post-transition period.

- Salaries for teachers and other job classifications held by Africans may not be equalized immediately without increased budgetary allocations, and additional training for certain supervisory positions;
- Admission of African students to all levels of education without regard to the current quotas or restrictions will entail greater resources allocated to primary secondary, vocational and higher education;

^{1/} The Quénet Report, op.cit.

- Eventual integration and acceptance of African teachers on an equal basis with whites will depend on developing flexible certification processes along with the new priorities established by the incoming government;
- Revocation of the Land Tenure Act concerning the ownership of lands as well as the individual pass laws restricting African urban settlement and residency will develop from the negotiated political settlement; it will require thoughtful planning and actions of the various ministries (Internal Affairs, Lands and Natural Resources and Local Government) as well as with regional and local officials. Finally, legislation which will repeal discriminatory authorization which prevented open purchase of lands by Africans, particularly of urban, commercial and industrial land in the urban complexes. New laws will require an end to public segregation of all facilities.
- Discriminatory practices with respect to the taxation on African products, to providing subsidies to white farmers, and preferential treatment of whites in providing health and consumer services at the expense of Africans can all be redressed through both administrative and legislative action. However, providing essential services for both urban and rural African needs will rely on the availability of adequate resources, both financial and human.

Insuring the Stability of Financial Institutions.
The government will have to move immediately at the outset of its coming to power to insure

economic stability of its currency and of the financial institutions:

- An incoming government will have to address the debt question and financial obligations which it will inherit and choose to deal with this question in a manner to insure stability of its currency and its financial institutions;
- Loan assistance to provide financial liquidity may have to be considered initially;
- An incoming government will no doubt rely heavily on the current financial infrastructure and the cooperation between the public and private sectors, particularly with regards to financial and investment institutions;
- An incoming government will have to indicate to multinational and foreign controlled corporations its attitudes and developing policies under which these corporations would be allowed to continue their operations during the post-transition period.

Migration and Initiation of a Land Reform Program.

Because of pressures in African held areas, migration may occur rapidly. In relieving population pressures in the densely Tribal Trust Lands or in other areas occupied by Africans, an incoming government may have limited options in planning its transitional policies with respect to the occupation of the more productive lands:

- In view of the large acreage owned by Europeans, an incoming government may

have little choice in the acquiescence of migration and occupation of some of the productive acreages by Africans;

- Shortage of food or dislocation of the food distribution system during the transitional period may cause migration to the urban areas where severe pressures could then develop and adversely affect the health, sanitation and livelihoods of urban dwellers.

Therefore, the possibility of migration from the TTL's is real and governmental planning and preparation for maintaining food production and distribution as well as for providing critical health and related services cannot be understated. The government will surely face long-term resettlement problems in the development of its land reform program.

Possible Role for U.S. Assistance. A newly independent Zimbabwe would not appear likely to call for the usual U.S. developing country assistance approach as it has occurred elsewhere in Africa. The sophistication of the Rhodesian economy, the extraordinary adaptiveness of its managerial capacity and its resilience under stress, the substantial numbers of university trained Africans, and the extensiveness of its potentially exploitable resources--tend to suggest that except under calamitous circumstances the usual AID Africa program situation would not exist in Zimbabwe. An AID Director with all the paraphernalia he entails, such as diverse technical assistance bureaus, should not be anticipated as a first response.

Nevertheless there may be another role for the U.S. before the transfer of authority and, during the transition period, in the new government's attack on development problems.

The potential for African mobility into managerial roles must be maximized. Current U.S. assistance has not met the need for Zimbabwean training scholarships. There are Zimbabweans with competence who desire funding for research on Zimbabwe problems such as manpower assessment. U.S. corporations now operating in Rhodesia might be willing to select from among the talent reservoir in the U.S. possible candidates for jobs in their companies. They could be provided on the job training, further specialization, or readaptation of present skills to meet the skill demands of available managerial and technical positions.

Among the Zimbabwe representatives who have participated at the Geneva conference, the heads of the liberation groups are supported by technically trained talent. This talent could be utilized in task forces, with the approval of the groups concerned, to undertake studies appropriate to the transfer of power. This would be invaluable to the new government leadership. The U.S., along with other donors, might provide the funds to meet the costs of Zimbabwe task groups, themselves examining likely problems, under disinterested sponsorship. They could be assisted with technical or consultant help as they deemed necessary. These task groups might offer an extraordinary opportunity to enable a new government leadership to be better prepared to anticipate problems to be faced with the transfer of power. Task groups might look at problems of the University during a transition period, for example.

Among the troubling transition problems a new Zimbabwe government will face is, for example, the likely movement of some Africans from the overcrowding of the Tribal Trust Lands on to white owned farms; this study does not presume that the U.S. possesses any particular competence about the problem. Whereas the nationalization

of the land tenure situation to allow for necessary land reform will require detailed studies, planning, and agriculture sector analyses. The transition problem can not be met by this approach.

The general character of transition problems now foreseen, and about which external assistance can help, suggests perhaps a need which might arise for short term budgeting support to avoid stalling of the economy and to finance special contingency capacities for the new state.

The U.S. might also play an instrumental role in facilitating the financial underpinning of an African government during the immediate period following independence if a crisis resulted in lack of working capital or foreign exchange.

Responses to Development Issues. A Zimbabwe government will have limited resources to carry out its priorities for long term development; however, initial planning and assessment of development needs can be undertaken upon assumption of government authority. It may choose to assess its own capability and resources as well as seek external sources of long term financial assistance in the following areas:

- Encouragement of foreign investments and joint business ventures with equitable returns for revenue earnings to Zimbabwe for investment in its economic development;
- Development of viable long term manpower training, upgrading and placement programs for both its public and private sectors; initiation of a comprehensive manpower study, particularly for determining its future needs for managerial, skilled, and supervisory personnel will become an immediate priority in cooperation with the private sector;
- Development of taxation and business subsidy policies may require careful planning and orchestration in order to create a balanced approach to its initial development efforts, thereby insuring adequate sources of revenue as well as insuring support for its large wage sector;

- The incoming government through its Ministry of Transport may wish to undertake a major regional study and consultations concerning the long term development of reestablishing a regional transportation network; support from neighboring African countries and possible assistance from prospective donor countries or world organizations (World Bank, United Nations) may be sought.

Possible U.S. Response to Development Assistance.
The likelihood of a U.S. response to the development needs of an independent Zimbabwe will inevitably be determined by the African government's philosophy and outlook on such external assistance. This study makes no prejudgment about the orientation or development philosophy it will choose.

The significant facts about Zimbabwe's development resource potential are that an argument for long term concessional development assistance would appear difficult to make. This does not mean that Zimbabwe can effectively continue recent levels of economic growth, support the costs of remedying inequities between Africans and Europeans, and valorize the potential of its exploitable resources without recourse, at times, to substantial external investment.

Short term external aid may be required to prevent stagnation in the overall economy or to manage growth in particular sectors.

The most troubling constraint on economic growth apart from the complications of race, are likely to become skilled manpower shortages. The U.S. should seek particularly to extend opportunities

for a newly independent Zimbabwe to have access to U.S. skill training, the further development of scientific capacity, and the transfer of technology.

Nonetheless, should U.S. assistance be requested, a constructive response by USAID is reflected in the cataloguing of areas of such possible assistance.

Cataloguing of Possible U.S. Responses
to Zimbabwe's Development Needs

<u>Sector or Area</u>	<u>Possible U.S. Response</u>
1. Public Administration	<ul style="list-style-type: none">● Fund managerial and technical training programs.● Consulting services to temporarily staff technical positions.● Assistance in repatriation of exiles and refugees.
2. Transportation	<ul style="list-style-type: none">● Regional transportation studies.● Provide funds to purchase rolling stock.● Roads to rural African areas to market agricultural products.

3. Education

- Plans and structure development of a Zimbabwean education.
- Establish teacher training institutes.
- Continued student scholarship and leadership programs.
- Internship programs.

4. Health

- Assistance on development of curative medicine and health education.
- Assistance for development of water and waste disposal systems.

5. Manpower

- Assistance in funding comprehensive manpower surveys for high skilled and managerial personnel needs.
- Development of selected manpower training programs (mining supervision, accountancy, etc.)

6. Agriculture-Land Reform

- Surveys and assistance in planning agricultural development if technical skills are needed.

7. Manufacturing

- Develop export markets through trade relations.
- Creation of new jobs - studies and trade.

8. Mining

- Technical and managerial training.

9. Commerce

- Small business assistance.
- Establishment of credit facilities.

Educational and Training Program Assistance.

One of the most urgent needs for which the U.S. will exercise a preponderance of experience and knowledge to assist an incoming African government is in the programmatic area of education, manpower and training. With respect to the substance and variations of educational and training programs recommended after assessment by the Project's team of consultants, ^{1/} the following cataloguing of programmatic efforts are suggested:

- (1) Survey of requirements for educational and training programs
- (2) Programs for educational and training institution linkages
- (3) Manpower survey requirements
- (4) Pre-independence internship programs
- (5) Emergency manpower projects
- (6) Rural agricultural/skills training projects
- (7) Clerical/administrative training projects
- (8) Teacher corps
- (9) Health corps
- (10) Internal and external scholarships programs

1/ Education consultants from the Phelps-Stokes Fund and the University of Houston contributed to analyses and programmatic recommendations contained herein. Recommendations appear in a regional context of assistance to Southern Africa.

- (11) Faculty recruitment programs
- (12) Educational construction training projects

(1) Survey Requirements for Educational and Training Programs. The basic effort to offer educational and training programs in the transition would be enhanced if there were available a thorough analysis of persons currently in the United States from countries in southern Africa. Since the enumerations provided by the African-American Institute and by other sources were confined to persons who had gone through their training programs, it was not as comprehensive and useful in this regard. ^{1/} Greater profile data and characteristics of educational needs are essential. In the immediate future there should be a more complete census of southern Africans now in the United States, Europe and Africa from Zimbabwe, Namibia, South Africa. Many have been unable to obtain appropriate employment at home for financial or other reasons and have found it difficult to complete training in preparation for employment. Those persons now available in the United States perhaps for middle level technical training, higher education, or internship should be analyzed with some care. Age, employment experience, educational background, and general willingness to serve at home are as important as career aspirations in determining how successful such persons might be as personnel in the transition.

^{1/} See Appendix V, Tables 2a-e, and analyses for Zimbabwean and Namibian Students.

(2) Institutional and Training Linkages. Institutional linkages could be established between educational institutions or training agencies in southern Africa and their counterparts in the United States. Even before the transition begins, relationships could be established between such colleges and universities as Tennessee State University, Hampton Institute, Tuskegee Institute, or Southern University in Louisiana, with polytechnics or newly established training centers in Namibia or Zimbabwe. There are several colleges and universities which have unique training programs in such fields as business administration, nursing, laboratory technology, animal husbandry, veterinary medicine, farm management, communications, or in areas related to manpower development. American agencies which work with colleges and universities could begin now to establish informal relationships between such institutions and African training centers, even if the basic institutions are not similarly conceived or on the same educational level. There are a great many precedents for this kind of cooperative relationship, (e.g., Doshisha University in Japan and Amherst College, or between Tuskegee Institute and the Booker T. Washington Institute in Liberia). Even a new organization like the Phelps-Stokes-sponsored National Center for College and University Planning can be associated with an institute which is intended to develop leaders in government management with a capacity for planning. The experimental work which was done by Meharry Medical College, particularly in maternal and child care and family planning, could easily be shared with African institutional training people for health careers.

(3) Manpower Survey Requirements. One of the first requirements for a sensible economic development plan is an estimate of manpower requirements along with available manpower (womanpower may seem less visible in their more retiring cultural role despite their hard work on the farms). Because the management of the manpower surveys should be African from the inception as far as possible, steps can be taken now to train key persons in economic planning and the evaluation of manpower requirements and in conducting an appropriate survey of talent and skills already in existence. A key group of perhaps ten to twenty people should be trained in economics and statistics, as well as in planning. A group of perhaps twenty persons in the United States should be given extensive experience with carrying out surveys and participating in related research programs. The training should include research design for those who show an aptitude for it, as well as internship in a business or governmental agency charged with responsibility for planning manpower to carry out a given project. The cadre of trainees should also be exposed to the records of other small nations which have made manpower surveys to see how they set their objectives, determined strategies, and evaluated what they had accomplished. There is a great deal which they can learn through the experiences of others.

(4) Pre-Independence Internship Programs.

In spite of the need for extreme caution in setting up internships, in selecting persons to serve as interns, and in pairing them with persons they are to emulate, the internship arrangement has great promise. It can be used to great advantage in the pre-independence period with southern Africans currently in the United States who may have completed educational programs but who lack on-the-job experience. Since experienced management leadership is needed for government, business, educational institutions, and other agencies, plans could be initiated immediately to institute a system of internships in various kinds of management:

- Below the managerial level there are other opportunities for internship. Persons trained in health careers, for example, could be placed in small hospitals for service in their laboratories, offices, and wards. Accountants who have completed their training could be placed variously in offices, in accounting firms, and in fiscal units of government. Persons being trained for farm management could serve as apprentices in a variety of sizes and kinds of farm situations. Persons studying the management of complex institutions could be given experiences on a variety of levels in such institutions so that they would understand the operation from bottom to top.

● Business organizations have an enormous range and variety of possibilities currently in Rhodesia. A bank could have interns serving at every level from teller and bookkeeper up to bank treasurer and president. Manufacturing institutions chosen for their smallness and relative adaptability to local circumstances could be extremely valuable placements. So would internships in multinational companies already doing business in southern Africa which presumably would want to have African management available for new units which may be contemplated in the near future.

(5) Emergency Manpower Projects. Certain types of crash projects can be designed and developed. Roadbuilding, for example, could be taught in more than one way: (1) recently graduated engineering students in the U.S. from southern Africa could be given an internship in planning and building highways of a size and variety suitable to their needs in Zimbabwe; (2) teams could be developed so that the variety of technical personnel required for roadbuilding could be represented in a single team committed to return home when training is completed. Similarly, crash programs in developing personnel for traffic supervision at airports, for planning the parking of aircraft at terminals, for designing the movement of luggage, for handling the ticketing of passengers could all be made the subject of a crash program.

The maintenance of electrical motors and appliances of various types could be taught in crash programs by carefully selected staffs from United States industry.

- In any given situation an evaluation will need to be made regarding the advantages of establishing a program in southern Africa as opposed to other sites. There are already in existence Africans in Nairobi and Accra, for example, who are well equipped to handle repairs of electrical equipment; and such equipment is used on a sufficiently widespread scale to make either a possible location for such training.

(6) Rural Agricultural Training. Much can be said for training for such skills as farm equipment maintenance or the development of improved farm techniques. Such crash programs may be attached to a government school; but where they involve adults, there are advantages in having a training center which is not part of the formal education of younger children.

(7) Clerical Staff Training. A crash training program in office skills would be relatively simple to start, although its aim should not be too ambitious. Executive secretaries cannot be developed without participants who have a high level of language skills. Nevertheless, it would not be difficult to take persons who have completed eight years of primary education and train them in

such office skills as filing, managing supplies, doing simple bookkeeping, census taking, management of vital statistics records, prison management and control, keeping health records, keeping school attendance registers, ordering supplies, and taking inventory; some could also be taught to keep a registry of job openings and qualifications and to assess qualifications for employment.

(8) Teacher Corps. One of the most important crash programs to be developed would be a teachers' corps for the sudden expansion of the educational programs which will be required as southern Africa prepares for independence and majority rule. Teachers for southern Africa (TSA) might be modeled partly on the Teachers for East Africa of the early 1960's. Beginning with a core group of persons who have earned degrees in the United States and who will be returning to southern Africa for the first time, it should be possible to add to their number a great many teachers who have been considered supernumerary in recent years to supply teachers at the primary and secondary levels in the common branches and in other specialties. Prominent in the teacher corps should be people capable of teaching auto mechanics, plumbing, irrigation, laboratory analysis, and other technical and practical subjects. The corps should also include a number of persons with training and experience in the management of schools, who understand that a good school in southern Africa is not the same as a good school in the United States. For this reason

much of the orientation and training of the teachers should take place in the African environment in which they are to work. Zambia, Malawi, and Swaziland might be good sites for the orientation of teachers, probably on a university campus. In the transition the University of Zimbabwe would presumably be an appropriate place. When the Teachers for Southern Africa program is planned, a careful study should be made of the experience of the TEA program so as to avoid its pitfalls as well as to capitalize on its success.

(9) Health Corps. One urgently needed crash program could be organized throughout the region in rural community centers. This would be a health corps staffed by persons trained in nutrition, sanitation, preventive medicine, home management, child care, safety, and local anthropology. While a number of persons in the cadre of staff leaders and teachers might have been trained in the United States, much training can and should take place in the region. Health training centers could develop broadly informed health workers. After training, teams of health corps workers could be sent to staff local health centers. If they should provide first aid and first aid training as well as baby clinics, the health corps would be assured of the clientele some of whom might be trained through apprenticeships to join the local staff. Properly done, the health corps could be a crucial element in the maintenance of a sound and healthy work force.

(10) Scholarships In and Outside Africa. A well organized counseling and vocational guidance system is needed for

recruiting and directing candidates for middle level technical training and a variety of secondary and higher educational career training opportunities. Even before the manpower survey and development plan can be prepared, there will be need for basic training in a variety of fields thus preparing people for civil service supervisory occupations in the private sector, a variety of office work assignments, basic crafts such as carpentry, plumbing, machine maintenance, electrical repairs, modern construction, roadbuilding and maintenance, and numerous other occupations. The preparation for an expanded corps of teachers, particularly in the field of technical education and agricultural training, will be vitally important. While a number of these prospective teachers may be students from the region already in the United States, a thoughtful plan for students living in African countries other than their own countries aware of opportunities for preparing themselves in these and other appropriate fields.

(11) Faculty Recruitment. In view of the importance of establishing opportunities for middle level technical training programs, particularly in rural areas so that urbanization is not viewed as the only route to development, faculty from other countries may have to be recruited. A temporary influx of persons skilled in vocational training in the broadest sense will be important. A particularly vital component of the cadre of expatriate trainers should be persons thoroughly conversant with African education who can improve the training of teachers for elementary and secondary schools.

Recruitment of Africans can be assisted through current institutional liaison programs sponsored by the U.S.

(12) Housing New Agencies of Government Or For Community Service Facilities.

Building construction, for example, for schools, for government offices, for health centers, for community centers, for rural training centers, need not be conventional. Economic planning requires assessment of costs and benefits of various ways of providing buildings, determining how buildings should be sponsored and paid for (whether by self-help, with central government providing out-of-pocket costs and local people contributing their labor and local supplies available in nature, or whether building materials are to be purchased and, if so, at whose expense). A program in actual building construction using the techniques which provide the most economical coverage and the broadest use of readily available materials would enable new African-owned construction companies to develop. Whether these would be government sponsored or privately owned, this entire issue might be handled as a task force with a group of persons knowledgeable about building construction, economics, politics, the management of the local community and the needs of the community, yet they could be handled on a relatively small scale. This area should be developed with somewhat more thought and explanation.

African Presence and Participation. The above programmatic considerations assume the presence and participation of African counterpart educators and manpower training specialists within the Zimbabwe Ministry of Education. Design, methodology and coordination are critical components to successful implementation which can

be assured only through African participation
which will ultimately reflect new priorities
of an independent Zimbabwe.

CHAPTER IV

TRANSITION PROBLEMS AND DEVELOPMENT ISSUES IN NAMIBIA

Introduction

With independence Namibia will be faced with two types of problems (a) those deriving immediately and directly from changes arising from the fact of independence and transfer of governmental power and (b) problems of the future growth and development of the country deriving from fundamental conditions such as its size, resources, climate, and historical and potential external relationships and dependencies. The first are described as "transitional problems" and the second are described as "development issues."

Transition problems consist of (1) establishing institutional structures and financial and other arrangements where none have existed before except as an integral part of the institutional structure of South Africa; (2) maintaining the operation of the economy during a transition period; (3) dealing with the immediate political necessity for removal of limitations and restriction based on race; and (4) dealing with dislocation such as unemployment and movement of people arising from the transition.

Development issues include the direction of the future development of Namibia; its relationship with South Africa; the relative roles of the various economic sectors in that development; and the need for manpower development.

The short and long-term problems which follow are those with which a new African government

must concern itself in order to provide for the human needs of its people and begin or continue the process of economic development. The issues are based upon the underlying political, economic, and human resource data provided in Chapter II.

Transition Problems

Removal of Racial Barriers and Limitations

The restoration of human rights will be one of the paramount issues in the transition period. The existing legal and institutional racial barriers in Namibia permeate the system for allocating land, the educational system, the contract labor system and virtually all areas affecting the lives of the African population. These issues also have long-term development impact. Land reform is discussed both below (as a transition problem) and under agriculture in the development section. The effects of racism in the wage sector are transition problems discussed under "Dislocations". Needed changes in education are discussed in the section on development issues.

There are two basic issues in the general topic of land reform. The first is ownership or control of the land. There will be immediate pressures upon transition to make changes in this area. The second issue, the use to which the land should be put, is discussed in the development section.

The political pressures at transition will undoubtedly cause changes in who controls the land. As noted in Chapter 2, farming currently contributes 20 percent of Namibia's gross domestic product. More than 60 percent of the white farmers in Namibia are South African by origin; the rest are German by origin. Nearly one third of the white settlers are farmers. The commercial farming sector, functioning on the land taken from Africans, is controlled by whites. Commercial agriculture consists of some 5,000 farms or ranches. The South African government has also started implementation of a plan for establishing white farmers in "under-developed

areas" in the Kavangoland and Ovamboland bantustans. 1/

The new government may be called upon immediately to undertake a program of government ownership, cooperatives, redistribution and other means of assuring Namibians that their heritage in the land has been returned to their control. While there will be some governmental initiatives and some spontaneous movement of people during the transition period, a detailed resettlement program may or may not be undertaken as a development issue. In any event the future use and ownership of existing white farms will be a concern of the new government.

Establishment of Structure and Operating Arrangements

One of the most immediate concerns of the new government will be simply to establish the structures, policies and administrative procedures by which it will operate. This necessity will be both a handicap and an opportunity for the new black government. Because Namibia is administered from South Africa there is no framework on which to base new departments such as foreign relations, treasury or the postal service. On the other hand, there is no entrenched bureaucracy to attempt to change or overcome.

New Structures and Policies. First, there is the problem of the transfer of government operations itself. This is due to the centralization of the major ministries and governmental bureaus

1/ United Nations, General Assembly, Report of the United Nations Council for Namibia, Vol.1, Supplement No.24 (A/10024), 1976, pp.31,32.

in Pretoria. The UN Institute for Namibia is in the process of training Namibians to take over functions in the new government. However, the smooth running of any organization requires experienced personnel and Namibia will require international assistance in this area following independence.

A parallel problem is the institutional void that will characterize the Namibian transition. As noted in Chapter 2, The Relationship with South Africa, Administrative Control, the situation in Namibia is very different than that in most developing countries on the eve of independence. Namibia will need to create a wholly new governmental structure.

As soon as the new government begins to respond to any of the pressures that will come when it assumes power, it will begin to form economic and fiscal policy. This will include the determination of priorities in investment needs (physical capital and administrative apparatus) and the establishment of mineral extraction policies - regulation of exploitation, investment policies and employment policies.

The establishment of new structures and policies will also require negotiations with South Africa. Although some issues, such as the transfer of revenue collecting mechanisms, will need to be negotiated in the transition period, most of the negotiations concern longer term development issues. These are discussed in the following section on development issues in this chapter.

Agreements with Private Corporations. Since mining dominates the Namibian economy (60 percent of GDP), the relationship of the new government to mining corporations - the degree to which operations are controlled by the government and the extent to which profits can be

expatriated, for example, will be an immediate concern. These negotiations will focus on the three companies which control 95 percent of all mining production in Namibia: Tsumeb (U.S.), Consolidated Diamond Mines (S.A.), and South West African Company (S.A.).

Mining, fishing and almost all agricultural production is exported. Returns on investment go to the white minority in Namibia and South Africa. The Namibian people benefit very little from the riches of their country. The African subsistence economy contributes only 3.5 percent to GDP.

Most of the profits derived from foreign-owned companies are sent abroad. At least 30 percent of Namibia's gross domestic product is repatriated as profits or wages by foreign companies and workers. It was estimated that by the beginning of 1975, this amount, as measured by the discrepancy between the gross domestic product and the gross national product would constitute about 50 percent. At the same time, taxes paid to South Africa by foreign-owned companies serve to strengthen the illegal occupation regime in Namibia. As noted above, the rate at which the irreplaceable resources of Namibia are being depleted is very high. 1/

The continuing role of these corporations in Namibia will, of course, depend on the policy of the new government. Suggestions range from requiring mining companies to provide middle and upper level technical and supervisory training

1/ United Nations, General Assembly, op.cit., p.26.

for African employees to a government take-over of mineral exploitation with management contracts offered to the former owners. In any event, the new government will undoubtedly be cognizant of the feelings of persons like Clemens Kapunno, noted in Chapter 2, who oppose the unrestricted exploitation of Namibian minerals.

Financial Matters. The structures and agreements noted in the above two sections are essential to simply providing the revenue which Namibia needs to govern. Currently virtually all revenue is collected by South Africa who then finances the particular projects and needs of Namibia that fit within its own development priorities. The basic mechanics of fiscal and monetary policies (taxes, accounting, revenue collection and disbursement, funds for initial cash needs, balance of payments and other policies) will need to be quickly implemented. Initial operating capital will need to be assured - probably from external assistance funds. It is assumed that, at least in the initial stages of the new government, Namibia's currency will continue to be the South African rand. Whether Namibia should establish its own currency at a future date would be a development issue.

There is currently considerable concern in the South West African Assembly about the state of Namibia's finances. Financial reserves built up over the years in the Territorial Development and Reserve Fund have been all but exhausted. The stage has been reached where loan funds had to be raised in South Africa to supplement revenues. This is in addition to the annual subsidy paid from the South West African Account (largely revenue from taxation of diamond, mineral and fishing industries) in the South African Consolidated Revenue Fund. The main reason for this

is the large increase in expenditures of capital works, notably the Cunene hydro-electric scheme and the development of the "homelands". The consequences of this financial stringency primarily affect facilities planned for the urban African population. 1/

Although South African development expenditure currently exceeds revenue collected, this is made up in other directions. Namibia is a part of the South African customs area and its annual exports of R220 million (approximately one-tenth of the total area) provide income. South Africa also controls the fishing industry at Walvis Bay with its annual haul of about R\$34 million. 2/

Public Safety. Although chiefs and councils of headmen have held jurisdiction for violation of traditional laws in Namibia, serious crimes have been dealt with by the South African courts (see Chapter 2). Namibia will need to establish its own police force and system for maintaining order and administering justice at all levels. These roles are currently in the hands of South Africans.

Maintaining the Economy

The primary economic sectors - mining, agriculture and fishing - will probably continue to run themselves during the transition period unless the new government initiates dramatic changes in its relationships with the international investors noted earlier.

1/ United Nations, Food and Agriculture Organization, "A Preliminary Note Towards a Country Development Brief - Namibia", 1976, p.11.

2/ Ibid.

The role of these sectors in the development of Namibia is discussed later in the development section. There are two issues, however, that will deserve particular attention during transition. These are maintaining the currently good transportation network and undertaking negotiations with Angola to benefit from the Cunene dam project.

Transportation

Namibia's transportation network is vital to maintaining economic production. The maintenance of internal transportation will require both technical training of Africans to avoid dependence on whites and negotiations with South Africa regarding transfer of assets and operational know-how. (See Chapter 2, The Infrastructure, for a description of the road and rail network in Namibia.

The Cunene Dam Situation

As noted in Chapter 2, the Cunene dam and power station is a unique situation that has great potential for supplying water and energy for Namibia's development, but requires the cooperation of Angola. Thus successful negotiations leading to the use of the Cunene Dam are important for Namibia's further development.

Dealing With Dislocations

Potential dislocations caused by land reform have been dealt with in previous sections. A second major cause of dislocations during transition will be the desire of the new government to maintain jobs and eliminate racism in the wage sector with corresponding changes in the contract labor system.

Whether in administration, agriculture, mining or manufacturing, progress in building Namibia as an independent nation rests in part upon the capacity of the new government to redistribute scarce job resources.

Unemployed Namibians could be a source of strife. The trend among Africans in Namibia is for stronger competition for jobs, travel documents, entrepreneurial opportunities, water, and land. The labor market is tight, fed by pressures on land and a lack of sufficient jobs in the wage sector. The transition period, because of the foregoing considerations may also show evidences of inter-ethnic strife.

There is little doubt that pressure will be great for the new African government in Namibia to replace Europeans with Africans in all sectors of economic life and at all levels. This will be especially so at the level where Africans are already trained to do the job and have only been prevented from doing so by restrictive labor laws and union discrimination. For example, with the exception of 50 percent of the jobs in the lowest range of civil service, these jobs are held entirely by whites.

Considerable dislocations of manpower may accompany independence in Namibia. Economic activity may decline, at least initially, resulting in even greater unemployment among Africans than at present. To these physical dislocations ought to be added the attitudinal changes that many Africans are bound to experience as the discriminatory structures of the past are stripped away. Both forms of changes are likely to result in serious social tensions in the early days of new government, when the leaders are least experienced and least able to cope with such situations. Enthusiasm, frustration and dashed hopes will be associated with job opportunities or the lack of them. This situation will be exacerbated by the fact that there is a very high level of disguised unemployment in the rural areas, in addition to the obvious high level of unemployment among urban skilled and semi-skilled workers, and among the educated as well as the less educated.

One reason for presumed labor disruptions in Namibia upon the transfer of power will be changes in the migrant labor system. This system of forced labor restricts Africans to specific jobs in specific areas and allows them no effective voice in determining their wages or type of job.

Even though the contract labor system would be restructured to eliminate racism and coercion upon independence, the fact that virtually all GNP economic activity is based on it shows its necessity. It will require major attention by the new government in the early stages of its administration in order to provide a high level of job opportunities during the transition period.

Development Issues

General Situation and Potential

As noted in the data base presented in Chapter 2, Namibia has a variety of liabilities as it moves towards independence. But Namibia also has a number of assets that will help its birth as a new country. Primary among these are its mineral deposits. These deposits can fund many of the internal structural changes and sector development which Namibia will undertake upon independence.

Exploitation of Mineral Resources. The exploitation and development of Namibia's mineral resources can be the engine for further national development. Chapter 2 details the mining sector in Namibia. The next step in the development of this sector would seem to be vertical integration into raw material processing. This would provide greater employment and would begin to build on the small manufacturing base as was done in Zimbabwe.

A crucial element in this issue is the new government's relationship to the foreign investors who dominate this sector, as noted earlier in the transition section of this chapter.

Agriculture and Land Reform. Although Namibia has great wealth in its mining sector, agriculture has unrealized potential in the northern sector of the country both as a source of food and a source of needed increased employment. The rural farmer often remains on a subsistence level while other sectors of a nation's economy grow and become more sophisticated.

Agricultural development issues in Namibia relate to improving production in the overcrowded traditional farming areas such as Ovamboland, tackling the issues of land reform and the

migrant labor system noted earlier, and maintaining beef and karakul production on the present Afrikaner and German farms in the south.

It will require major investments of capital in the north for irrigation systems and technical training to counteract the fragility of the agricultural sector for crop growing purposes. In the south and central portions, the land is again limited by climate and geography. Livestock ranching is the most common form of land use (almost 70 per cent of the total land area). Only a small percentage of land is considered to be suitable for dryland farming, although evidence from neighboring Botswana suggests that by using appropriate techniques, much larger areas may be productive.

Grazing land generally has a low carrying capacity, with the lowest in the southern ranching areas. The rapid growth of the karakul sheep industry from an export value of 8 million rand in 1960 to 55 million rand in 1972 (1 rand equaled U.S. \$1.40 in 1976), is partly a result of improving world prices for pelts but is also a reflection of the adaptability of this animal to the conditions and vegetation of the central and southern plateau areas. If this level of production is to be sustained, the effects of the animal on the veld must be monitored and flexible systems need to be developed to overcome a series of drier than average rainfall years.^{1/}

Manufacturing. Namibia's manufacturing sector is also described in Chapter 2. Forms of

^{1/} Drs. Sholto Cross and David Gibbon, "A Short Evaluation of the Agricultural Resources of Namibia", FAO, 1975, p.8.

assistance from technical training to trade policies can help Namibia build on this small industrial base. The small size of the internal market limits major development of this sector to areas where export markets can be established. Therefore the development of this sector would appear to play a relatively minor role in Namibia's foreseeable future.

Transportation. Southern Africa has a well established transportation network which flows through and is dependent upon South Africa. New transport links that are not dependent on South Africa may be needed to satisfy political demands for lessening this dependence. It appears, however, that those links cannot be justified economically.

Relationship with South Africa

Regardless of the new government's political position towards South Africa, it will need to negotiate a complexity of issues simply because the two countries are so intermeshed politically and economically. Currently, South Africa controls Namibia's imports, exports, transportation links, currency, public revenues and expenditures and many of the multinational corporations that dominate the Namibian economy. One step that would assure Namibia a greater degree of economic independence would be the establishment of its own currency. This would, for example, allow the government to keep profits inside Namibia rather than being siphoned off to savings accounts in South Africa.

About 80-90 per cent of Namibia's imports originate in South Africa, and about the same percentage of its exports go overseas, either directly or through South Africa. South Africa itself purchases about 50 per cent of

Namibia's exports, much of which is re-exported.^{1/}

South Africa holds the dominant position vis-a-vis all foreign investment in Namibia. South African companies have the primary role in each economic sector.

Therefore, South Africa has a sizable stake in the Namibia economy. It has invested heavily in providing the infrastructure necessary for the investments by South Africa in her economy. Extensive road and railway investments were made to service the major mining areas and the areas of European population. Very little has been done to develop the African areas. Water resources were developed to assist white settler farming and ranching operations with little assistance for the African farmers. The Cunene hydro-electric project was begun with the intention of serving the mines and cities with lower cost electricity and to make investment more attractive; the uranium operation is especially dependent upon an adequate supply of water and electricity.

In some of these areas such as foreign investment, the new government will need to draft operations agreements as noted earlier. Other areas such as roads and railways are currently dependent on South African maintenance. Water and energy resources are dependent on South African expertise. While any of these operations could be undertaken by Namibians over time, in the months immediately after the change of power the easiest and least expensive means of maintaining these functions would be to negotiate continuing assistance from South Africa.

^{1/} Roger Murray et al., The Role of Foreign Firms in Namibia, Africa Publications Trust, Uppsala, Sweden, 1974, p.32.

Economic Sectors. Namibia's three basic economic sectors, mining, fishing and livestock, are currently dependent in various ways on South Africa as noted in Chapter 2. Multinational corporations also play an important role, particularly in the mining sector. Needed steps in this sector were also discussed earlier in the section on "Agreements with Private Corporations."

In addition to the canning factories and other assets in Walvis Bay, South Africa owns the fishing vessels and provides the skilled labor. Thus an independent Namibia, particularly without control of Walvis Bay, would have little influence over the contribution of the fishing industry in providing jobs for its people or revenue for its economy. Negotiating the basis for the continuation of this sector would be a development concern of the government.

The livestock sector consists of a cattle industry and karakul sheep produced for their pelts. While karakul sales of both Namibia and South Africa are increasing, Namibia's proportion is growing smaller. If Namibia and South Africa were to become competitors, South Africa would have an advantage in squeezing an independent Namibia out of the market.

Walvis Bay. Walvis Bay is the major port city on Namibia's Atlantic coast. This area was not part of the German mandate territory taken over by South Africa in 1920. However, it has been administered and developed as a natural part of the national, geo-political unit. Namibia's fishing industry has been developed around this port. Without Walvis Bay, Luderitz further down the coast would become the only port facility. However, this harbor cannot handle the shipping needs of the mining industry or other exports.

The UN Council for Namibia and others have argued that this area rightfully belongs to Namibia, but the legal basis for this argument is much weaker than for the territory under the UN mandate. South Africa has always maintained that Walvis Bay is an integral part of its country. The use of Walvis Bay would be another issue requiring negotiations with South Africa.

Manpower Development

Managerial and Technical Training. Permeating virtually all areas is the long-term need for technical, administrative and managerial skills. This need is a characteristic of all developing countries, but is particularly true in Namibia where the learning and development of these skills by Africans have been forbidden by South African government policy. The need for the training of Africans in management for both planning and decision making functions is critical. This is equally important for both the public and private sectors.

From a purely economic standpoint, mining is the most important sector with regard to the need for manpower training. Namibia relies on mineral production for 60 percent of its export earnings. Africans have been consistently denied technical training in mining activities. The main problem concerns the future roles of the largely foreign corporations in the new circumstances of African political control. There is no certainty that the leaders of Namibia will wish to maintain and increase mineral production, even though this is the most certain source of financing national development as noted earlier. They will insist on a much greater share in ownership of their natural resources and in the distribution of profits. An increased emphasis on the Africanization of the work force, particularly at the middle

management and eventually upper management levels, will be demanded. Pressures will be applied to companies to extend technical training to indigenous people.

The Namibian economy relies heavily on rail communications, particularly for the export of minerals. The upper echelons of personnel are entirely staffed by Europeans. Therefore, there will be a need for training programs for Africans in planning and programming. The same is true of airline operations. Namibia is highly dependent on the port of Walvis Bay, which is at present controlled and operated by white harbor masters and ancillary white staff.

In these fields of transportation, and in the area of posts, telegraph and communications, the ranks of middle level technicians are almost entirely filled with non-Africans. Consequently the need for urgent training in all aspects of transport at both the high and middle levels is obvious.

Education. Revamping the educational system is development issue directly affecting manpower. The inadequacy of the current system, the social pressure for change that this will generate once change is politically possible, and the need to avoid continuing the essentials of the current system simply because of inertia, are necessary concerns of the new government. Education systems in Namibia have not reflected indigenous needs, aspirations and environmental conditions. The systems have been manipulated to promote white superiority and to ensure that the African populations were trained for the economic role that best suited a European dominated society. There are many indications of this situation in the administrative structure and organization, curriculum content, enrollment patterns, drop out rates and teacher training.

The danger in the post-independence period will be that lack of financial resources and other more pressing political and economic problems, not to mention the likelihood of social tensions, will persuade the government to carry on with the old system. Changes would be limited to certain adaptations, such as eliminating differential per capita expenditures for white and black children, promising universal education opportunities, and taking over former white school buildings. While understandable, this would be a most dangerous policy decision because it would "lock in" an alien system when what is really needed is a complete reappraisal of educational philosophy and the development of a new system that is relevant to national needs. In-depth needs assessments must precede the adoption of any educational plan for development. Ad hoc decision making with regard to the educational process, especially in response to "crisis" social demands can be harmful, simply because education is a very long term process. The results of questionable decisions about educational policies can haunt a system for decades. The formulation of a national plan for education is, therefore, seen as a fundamental governmental objective. Such a reappraisal of educational aims, goals, and objectives, based on national needs, must emerge from a process of African evaluation of African needs and must be consistent with African value systems.

Health. The lack of incidence and prevalence data on Namibia understates the true disease situation, but can provide some insight into the disease patterns that currently exist. Most reports of disease patterns in this region of Africa deal almost exclusively with South Africa. According to a 1974 survey, the leading causes of morbidity in Namibia are malaria, tuberculosis, meningitis and, most recently, cholera. Data regarding age and sex distribution were not available.

Malnutrition contributes heavily to the mortality of the population from preventable diseases due to the debilitating effects of the lack of food.

According to South African references, a great deal of the food for Namibia is imported from South Africa. Certainly Namibia, in a re-ordering of priorities and with skillful manipulation of the economy, could supply its relatively small population with a greater proportion of home grown food of sufficient protein and calorie content. Obviously, an undernourished population cannot participate fully in the further development of the economy.

In comparison to other areas of Africa; with the exception of South Africa, Namibia is reported to have the most favorable proportion of physicians to population. The health manpower problems which face Namibia are: to ensure the availability of doctors to Africans, to develop meaningful education programs for the medical, para-medical and nursing personnel, and to commit the necessary funds to manpower development. The most apparent problem stemming from Namibia's weak continuing education programs is the failure to use para-medical personnel to their maximum capabilities.

Possible Governmental Response

Transition Problems

The problems of transition will be a primary concern of the new majority government. The new government will want to deal with some of these problems entirely by itself and it may request assistance from other African states, international agencies, the U.S. and other nations.

A number of statements and proposals have been put forward by various groups concerning new government structures. The most articulate statement to date of the form that Namibia's new political structures might take appears to be a "Discussion Paper on the Constitution of Independent Namibia" drafted by SWAPO in August, 1975. ^{1/} The paper sets out a constitutional framework for a republic with a president and single-chamber legislature called the National Assembly, and an independent judicial system. The paper advocates a constitution and bill of rights and goes into considerable detail to outline the content and purpose of these political structures.

The new government will need to respond in these ways to meet this need for new structures. First will be the planning of governing structures themselves such as the different ministries of Treasury, Commerce and Foreign Relations. This will include the establishment of a system to collect revenue, an accounting and budgeting system, an organizational framework for the civil service, and a means of collecting and categorizing economic and demographic information.

^{1/} Jergen Lissner (ed.), Namibia 1975, Hope, Fear, and Ambiguity, Lutheran World Federation, Geneva, 1976, p.41.

The elimination of racism will be a second needed response in the development of new structures. Since racism is built into the current social and political fabric of Namibia, its elimination will be a problem of development as well as a transition.

The third response will be training institutes, scholarships, and other means to train civil servants in administration and management. This is an area where external assistance could be profitably used. Intensive training courses in strictly defined fields of prioritized need such as civil service, public administration, industrial management, accountancy, urban planning, commercial finance, customs control, and business law are badly needed. A small number of target study groups, each with a small number of participants, would be a prudent format to most quickly meet immediate needs. The real problem likely to develop is an oversized but undertrained bureaucratic structure and organization. Although it will be extremely difficult to communicate this concern to African nationalist leaders both presently and in the period of transition, the civil service remains one of the most crucial resource for manpower training at both the high and middle level. This is particularly true in Namibia where, because of South African policies of apartheid, there are extremely few African civil servants in the true sense of the term. There is little chance that the chiefs and headmen, through whom the South African government has channeled "homeland" policy since the Odendall Commission, can serve in this capacity because they are already politically discredited in African circles.

At the middle level supervisory and technical training level, the issue devolves into deciding

whether it would be desirable to encourage Europeans to stay, either on a temporary or permanent basis, or to encourage rapid Africanization through the promotion of crash training programs of supervisory and technical skills. The ideal solution would be that many European technicians and supervisors would remain, but on the strict understanding that their role would be to maintain production and act as on-the-job training agents for Africans who would ultimately take over middle level responsibilities. The likelihood is that some Europeans would stay, but it can be expected that there will be a serious shortfall at the supervisory and technical level in all sectors of the economy.

Another response to the transition by the new government would be a review of existing relationships with multinational corporations and the role these corporations should play in the future - particularly with regard to mining. Assuming there is to be a continued role, the government would need to determine tax rates, extent to which, repatriation of profits would be permitted (Rhodesia fueled the growth of its manufacturing sector, in part, by instituting a 15 percent tax on repatriated funds making it more profitable to reinvest in Rhodesia), nature and composition of management, wage and benefit policies and other policies of benefit to the majority which have been ignored by South Africa.

The new government will need to initiate immediate discussions with Angola to insure gaining the rates and power benefits of the Cunene dam. This contribution to the development of Namibia should be included in the initial planning and organization of governmental structures.

Problems caused by the new social mobility, search for new or better jobs, and movement to urban areas, will need to be anticipated by the new government. Planning and social assistance programs will need to be undertaken to deal, to the extent possible, with this issue.

U.S. assistance could be made available in the form of underwriting training efforts or providing short-term consulting assistance, as requested, to keep government services operating while Namibians were being trained.

One example would be the prevention of livestock disease. If South Africa were to terminate its external assistance program in livestock disease control upon majority rule, U.S. agricultural experts could provide this assistance until the Namibian government was able to establish its own program. Other areas such as the maintenance of the transportation system could benefit from the same type of external assistance.

U.S. trade relations with Namibia is an area where the U.S. could increase jobs and provide support to the new government by the purchase of Namibian products in addition to its minerals. Because foreign investment plays such a large role in the Namibian economy, the U.S. could review its support of such investment with a view to how it will affect the human rights and standard of living of the Namibian people.

If South Africa sharply severs its relationships with Namibia upon majority rule, Namibia will need immediate working capital to meet its civil service payroll and initial government expenditures. This need would continue until tax and other revenue collection mechanisms begin to operate. The U.S. might play a useful role in supplying part of these initial capital needs.

Possible U.S. Response to Development Assistance

The following table lists possible U.S. responses to Namibia's development needs:

<u>Sector or Area</u>	<u>Possible U.S. Responses</u>
1. Public Administration	<ul style="list-style-type: none">● Provide initial working capital, foreign exchange.● Fund training programs in administration, accounting, information systems, etc.● Establish economic data base.
2. Infrastructure	<ul style="list-style-type: none">● Training in road and rail maintenance.● Develop irrigation systems.● Build commercial Botswana road link.
3. Education	<ul style="list-style-type: none">● Undertake sector analysis based on local values and input.● Establish teacher training institutes.● Provide capital funds for buildings and equipment.

4. Health
 - Paramedical training.
 - Control programs for major diseases.
 - Nutrition studies.
5. Mining
 - Show means of encouraging further vertical integration of industry.
 - Encourage human rights emphasis by U.S. corporations.
 - Encourage African training by U.S. corporations.
6. Agriculture - Land Reform
 - Develop irrigation systems.
 - Possibilities for reform of ownership/management of large white farms.
 - Development of agricultural training colleges.
7. Fishing
 - Increasing export markets.
 - Providing equipment if South Africa pulls out.
8. Manufacturing
 - Small business incentives and training.
 - Local African credit facilities.
 - Develop export markets.

9. Commerce

- Small business incentives and training.
- Local African credit facilities.

As indicated earlier, the development of Namibia will depend on its three main economic sectors, agriculture, fishing and mining, the development of irrigation and power from the Cunene Dam, the use of Walvis Bay and the development of human resources by restructuring its education and health systems. Many of these areas involve either the negotiated assistance of South Africa or a substitute for this assistance. In many areas the U.S. can provide assistance by undertaking technical studies that will show the Namibian government the costs of different development alternatives and allow for better development planning.

The primary implications that can be drawn from an analysis of agriculture development include the following:

1. The necessity to organize training for African herders if ranching techniques are reorganized in response to white exodus and Africanization of agriculture.

2. The risk that after independence South Africa might refuse to import Namibian cattle. In that case, there will be a need for studies to identify new markets. At the same time, there should be a search for investment monies for setting up Namibian controlled organizations for marketing and plants for processing and packaging meat.

3. The opening of new lands in the Northern Zone for irrigated agriculture and herding which implies provision for training, credit, road construction, market incentives, and price stabilization.

4. Anticipating the requirements for the financing and administration of emergency assistance to subsistence farms. Drought is perennial, crop failures are frequent. Institutional credit to promote black African farm settlement is non-existent. In addition, demand for redistribution of land can be anticipated as noted earlier.

5. Developing a system to replace departing veterinarians and South African extension services. This is particularly important given the importance of modern cattle raising in the Namibian country.

6. The importance of establishing agricultural training colleges for Africans in Namibia.

To support all these efforts, a variety of more detailed specific studies will need to be undertaken. One example of such a study is the effort currently underway by the South African government in the development of irrigation in northern Namibia.

Owambo's irrigation potential has been studied for some years. Reconnaissance surveys have indicated that only some of the available soils are readily suitable for normal irrigation. Other potentially irrigable soils would demand special and probably expensive preparation of the land as well as the cautious application of water. The first of a number of pilot schemes to facilitate further irrigation research is already in operation at selected sites.

In view of increased demand and the requirements of development planning, a "master water plan" for Owambo has been drawn up which makes provision for water requirements until the year 1990.

The water plan calls for the development of local sources of water to the optimum point which will involve the drilling of about 800 boreholes, of which 550 can be expected to be successful. This would involve a cost of roughly US\$6.73 million (including equipment), and the construction of some 300 new storage dams.

A R595 million "master water plan" for the whole of Namibia up to the year 2000 was announced in 1974 which appeared to be complementary and additional to the Owambo plan. It calls for construction of a grid of canals and pipelines throughout the country. Plans include 500 kilometers of canals from dams on the Fish River in the south to Windhoek; pipelines and canals stretching 1,500 kilometers from Cunene to Walvis Bay; canals from the Okovango River on the north-east border to Tsumeb/Groo-fontein/Otavi; and pipelines and canals from underground sources near Tsumeb and Windhoek. 1/

U.S. assistance could be useful in meeting the above agricultural needs and in providing data on the larger question of the most economic use of Namibia's vast areas of semi-arid land. In order to be economically viable, the fragile nature of the southern land may not permit certain methods of raising livestock that might otherwise be politically desirable.

Experience elsewhere in Africa has shown that education and training are areas where technical assistance is most needed and appreciated. For example, the viability of a new educational strategy, as noted earlier, would be en-

1/ United Nations, FAO, op.cit., p.43.

hanced by a sector review of education. This would include relevance to indigenous conditions, assessments of national constraints and resources, projections of future manpower needs for development, the effects of population growth rates, and the economic and social objectives of the future Namibia. Other aspects of educational planning that should be considered are:

1. The role of formal and non-formal patterns of education, based on an evolving indigenous philosophy and on cultural heritages.
2. The place of integrated rural development and community education.
3. The career role of vocational and technical education in urban areas.
4. The need to preserve and extend quality education to train teachers of higher learning and adult education.

One place where this training is currently taking place is the UN Institute for Namibia. This institute, located in Lusaka, runs a program sponsored by the United Nations (for five years) to provide education for Namibians preparing for the independence of their country. It has now enrolled approximately 150 students. Expectations of expanding the student body to 1,500 and of developing a nucleus for a future university in Namibia have been articulated by Sean McBride, U.N. Commissioner for Namibia. 1/

1/ Briefing on Namibia, Russell Office Bldg., U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C., November 23, 1976.

The development of stronger continued educational programs will ultimately provide a better system of health care. A shift of emphasis away from the physician is needed, with more attention paid to non-physician personnel. It is recognized that the physician of today, paradoxically, is overworked professionally, although as a supervisor of health workers, he is underemployed. An extreme example of this situation is the inverted pyramid that exists in some African countries, where the number of physicians, small as it is, far exceeds the number of auxiliaries. Sometimes the situation is further complicated when the auxiliary is not allowed to function except under the direct supervision of a physician so that the provision of medical care still depends primarily on the physician.

The list of environmental hazards is headed by malaria, a disease whose prevention requires one hundred percent surveillance in endemic areas such as the Northern Territory and the Caprivi Strip. Administration sources state that the incidence is below two percent as determined, probably, by blood smears.

Any lapse in tuberculosis control would be devastating as this is another major disease in Namibia. There must be a continuing program of detection, vaccination and treatment of the disease.

Namibia may be classified as being the southern terminus of the "meningitis belt" and therefore surveillance must be maintained for control of this disease as well as for the ever-present threat of cholera from the north. Yellow fever must be kept from Namibia by surveillance and vector control.

The Caprivi is located in the tsetse fly area. Constant vigilance must be maintained to control the parasite as well as the vector, since the disease affects cattle as well as man.

Immunization programs must be maintained to prevent epidemics of polio, tuberculosis, diphtheria, tetanus and pertussis.

To undertake all these health programs would, of course, require prohibitive amounts of resources and trained personnel. This is another area where Namibia's long-term development could profitably use U.S. and other external assistance.

Namibia has a good internal transportation network with links to South Africa as noted earlier. Secondary road links to Angola and Botswana (one each) exist, but would need considerable upgrading to be dependable for trade purposes. A study of the Namibia-Botswana road estimates that 850 km. of the existing road would need to be improved at a cost of US\$25 million. Currently such an expenditure would need to be justified on a political rather than an economic basis. 1/

As outlined above there are a variety of ways in which the U.S. can make a creative response to the development needs of Namibia. Trade and investment policy, though not often viewed as development assistance, has a great effect on developing countries. The U.S. may also find that funding the effort of another African

1/ U.S. Agency for International Development, "Southern Africa Transportation Program Planning Study", September 1976, p.IV-20.

country to provide direct assistance to Namibia could result in more effect assistance than direct bilateral aid. In any event, any U.S. response would depend on the desires and priorities of the new majority government.

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United Nations Development Program

United Nations International Childrens' Emergency Fund

World Council of Churches

Missions:

Brethern in Christ Mission

Central Africa Mission

Evangelical Alliance Mission

Foreign Mission Board of the Southern Baptist Convention

General Conference of the Seventh Day Adventists

World Division of the Board of Missions, United Methodist Church

United Church Board for World Ministries

United Nations Institute for Namibia

Swedish Government

United Nations High Commission for Refugees

United Nations Fund for Namibia

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**American Graduate School of International
Management**

Boston University

**Center for Research on Economic Development
(University of Michigan)**

Development Alternatives

Duquesne University

Howard University

Indiana University

**International Management Development
Institute**

Kalamazoo College

Michigan State University

Northwestern University

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Rutgers University

State University of New York / New Paltz

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African Methodist Episcopal Church

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Agricultural Aids Foundation

American Friends Service Committee

Association of African Universities

Association for the Advancement of
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National Council of Negro Women

National 4-H Foundation

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Opportunities Industrialization Center

Transcentury Corporation

Union Carbide

U. S. Committee for Refugees

University of Zambia

Volunteers in Technical Assistance

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APPENDIX I

PART I. POPULATION AND DEMOGRAPHY OF ZIMBABWE

TABLE 1 - POPULATION, 1954-1975

<u>DATE</u>	<u>AFRICANS</u>	<u>EUROPEANS</u>	<u>ASIANS</u>	<u>COLOUREDS</u>	<u>TOTAL*</u>
1954	3,000,000	158,000	4,800	7,200	3,170,000
1964	4,120,000	209,000	7,800	12,100	4,350,000
1974	5,900,000	274,000	9,900	19,900	6,200,000
1975	6,110,000	278,000	10,000	20,900	6,420,000

* Totals have been rounded to the nearest thousand.

Note: The African population increased 96.7% from 1954 to 1974; the European population 73.4% during the same period.

Source: Rhodesia: Monthly Digest of Statistics, July 1976. Central Statistical Office. Salisbury: Government Printer.

TABLE 2 - POPULATION OF MAIN TOWNS

<u>TOWNS (including townships)</u>	<u>1969 CENSUS</u>					<u>ESTIMATES: DECEMBER 1975</u>				
	<u>African</u>	<u>European</u>	<u>Asian</u>	<u>Coloured</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>African</u>	<u>European</u>	<u>Asian</u>	<u>Coloured</u>	<u>Total</u>
Bulawayo	187,000	49,700	2,410	5,650	245,000	270,000	59,700	2,700	7,800	340,000
Gwelo	37,000	8,300	320	670	46,000	53,000	9,400	400	900	64,000
Salisbury	280,000	96,000	4,060	5,140	386,000	430,000	127,000	4,500	7,100	569,000
Umtali	36,000	8,400	520	420	46,000	51,000	9,800	600	600	62,000

Note: Salisbury has by far the largest number of Europeans of any city, as well as the largest African population. Bulawayo is second, followed by Gwelo and Umtali. Over two-thirds of the European population is concentrated in the towns.

Source: Rhodesia: Monthly Digest of Statistics, July 1976. Central Statistical Office. Salisbury: Government Printer.

APPENDIX I

PART I. POPULATION AND DEMOGRAPHY OF ZIMBABWE

TABLE 3 - LANGUAGE BY PROVINCE OF AFRICAN POPULATION - 1969


LANGUAGE	MANICALAND	MASHONALAND	PROVINCE MATABELELAND	MIDLANDS	VICTORIA	TOTAL
Ndebele	1,960	13,210	564,330	119,460	7,870	706,830
Nyanja	15,940	193,100	21,180	15,360	6,670	251,800
Sena-Chikunda	24,650	62,690	3,650	1,000	490	92,480
Shona (dialects)	700,270	1,367,950	149,350	565,160	651,230	3,433,960
Sotho-Tswana	180	410	28,100	270	390	29,350
Tronga-Hlengwe	2,870	1,360	4,420	1,110	50,100	59,860
Tonga (Tonka)	170	5,280	46,020	8,370	120	60,260
Venda	10	120	36,470	40	1,090	37,730
Other	9,250	81,960	37,620	6,520	2,260	137,610
Language unidentified	3,020	13,410	7,470	4,520	5,820	37,050*
Total	757,870	1,739,490	898,910	721,810	726,040	4,846,930*

* Totals do not include 2,810 railway travelers.

Note: By far the largest language group is the Shona, nearly five times larger than the Ndebele, followed by Nyanja speaking peoples.

Source: Census of Population 1969, p. 17.

MAP OF LANGUAGE GROUPS IN ZIMBABWE



Source: A. K. H. Weinrich, Chiefs and Councils in Rhodesia, p. 30.

APPENDIX I

PART I. POPULATION AND DEMOGRAPHY OF ZIMBABWE

TABLE 4 - BIRTHS AND DEATHS OF EUROPEANS

<u>PERIOD</u>	<u>BIRTHS</u>	<u>DEATHS</u>	<u>NUMBERS NATURAL INCREASE</u>	<u>BIRTHS PER THOUSAND</u>	<u>DEATHS PER THOUSAND</u>	<u>NATURAL INCREASE PER THOUSAND</u>
1954	4,223	1,084	3,139	27	7	20
1964	4,017	1,306	2,711	19	6	13
1974	4,528	2,122	2,406	17	8	9

Note: European population rates have declined since 1954. No figures are given for African births and deaths. Only estimates are available for the African population, which are as follows:

Births: 48 per 1,000 population in 1954, rising to 52 in 1969.

Deaths: 19 per 1,000 population in 1954, falling to 16 in 1969.

Natural Increase: 30 per 1,000 population in 1954, rising to 36 in 1969.

Source: Monthly Digest of Statistics, July 1976, p. 2.

TABLE 5 - MIGRATION OF EUROPEANS, ASIANS, COLOURED

<u>PERIOD</u>	<u>EUROPEANS</u>			<u>ASIANS/COLOURED</u>			<u>TOTAL NET MIGRATION*</u>
	<u>Immigrants</u>	<u>Emigrants</u>	<u>Net Migration</u>	<u>Immigrants</u>	<u>Emigrants</u>	<u>Net Migration</u>	
1955	14,000	6,000	+8,000	-	-	-	- -
1965	11,128	8,850	+2,280	178	172	+6	+2,290
1975	12,425	10,500	+1,930	127	133	-6	+1,920
Jan-Jun 1975	6,573	4,980	+1,590	55	59	-4	+1,590
Jan-Jun 1976	4,799	7,070	-2,280	55	50	+5	-2,270

* Totals rounded.

Note: The most striking statistic is the marked decline in total net migration during the period from June 1975 to June 1976 among Europeans. The monthly rate for 1976 has been a net emigration over 700.

Source: Monthly Digest of Statistics, July 1976, p. 3.

APPENDIX I

PART I. POPULATION AND HEALTH

TABLE 6 - MIGRATION OF FOREIGN AFRICAN MEN BY COUNTRY OF BIRTH (Thousands)

PERIOD	MALAWI			MOZAMBIQUE			ZAMBIA			TOTAL (INCLUDING OTHERS)		
	Immigrant	Emigrant	Net	Immigrant	Emigrant	Net	Immigrant	Emigrant	Net	Immigrant	Emigrant	Net
1954	42	33	+9	50	46	+4	11	15	-4	111	100	+11
1964	26	26	0	10	11	-1	3	10	-7	40	49	-9
1974	3	4	-1	3	1	+2	0	0	0	7	6	+1

Note: Net migration of foreign African men has declined substantially since 1954, although immigration from Mozambique has shown a marked increase during the period from 1973 to 1974.

Source: Monthly Digest of Statistics, July 1976, p. 4.

TABLE 7 - HOSPITAL ADMISSIONS (ANNUAL)

PERIOD	AFRICAN			GOVERNMENT HOSPITALS	TOTAL	EUROPEAN	ASIAN AND COLOURED	TOTAL*
	MISSION HOSPITALS Grant-aided	Non-Grant-aided	Total					
1954	N.A.	N.A.	57.6	236.5	294.1	18.5	2.1	314.7
1964	N.A.	N.A.	111.9	336.4	448.3	27.2	3.3	478.8
1974	137.5	19.5	157.0	291.1	448.1	36.3	4.3	488.7

* Exclusive of European, Asian, and Coloured patients attending non-government hospitals.

Note: Hospital admissions for Africans have declined since 1964 in Government hospitals but have risen since that period in mission hospitals. Admissions for Europeans and others have nearly doubled over the period from 1954 to 1974.

Source: Monthly Digest of Statistics, July 1976, p. 6.

APPENDIX I

PART II. EDUCATION IN ZIMBABWE

TABLE 8 - SCHOOL ENROLLMENTS

PERIOD	AFRICAN			EUROPEAN		
	Primary	Secondary	Total*	Primary	Secondary	Total*
1966	656,698	13,645	673,726	31,173	20,214	52,027
1971	656,170	28,031	687,110	33,386	23,115	57,549
1975	824,881	40,002	868,689	32,950	25,133	59,108

* Including others.

Note: African primary and secondary enrollment rose slowly from 1966 to 1971 and increased markedly to 1975. Not until 1971 did African secondary enrollment surpass that of European. European primary and secondary enrollment has remained fairly constant, rising slightly from 1966 to 1975.

Source: Monthly Digest of Statistics, July 1976, p. 9.

TABLE 9 - ENROLLMENT AT OTHER EDUCATION INSTITUTIONS

PERIOD	BULAWAYO TECHNICAL COLLEGE	CHIBERO AGRICULTURAL COLLEGE	GWEBI AGRICULTURAL COLLEGE	SALISBURY POLYTECHNIC	TEACHERS' COLLEGE BULAWAYO	UNIVERSITY OF RHODESIA
1966	1,729	41	72	1,559	374	717
1971	1,477	80	85	1,751	468	993
1975	1,678	82	77	2,355	438	1,355
1976	1,973	-	-	2,499	455	1,506

Note: Enrollments at the two technical colleges far exceeds that of the teachers' college, the agricultural college, and the university.

Source: Monthly Digest of Statistics, July 1976, p. 10.

APPENDIX I

PART II. EDUCATION IN ZIMBABWE

TABLE 10 - AFRICAN STUDENT ENROLLMENT IN SECONDARY SCHOOLS (1975)

Form I	12,600	Form IV	4,863
Form II	12,126	Form V	417
Form III	7,352	Form VI	373

TOTAL ENROLLMENT: 37,731

SOURCE: Monthly Digest of Statistics. Salisbury, Rhodesia:
Central Statistical Office, December, 1975.

APPENDIX I

PART II. EDUCATION IN ZIMBABWE

TABLE 11 - UNIVERSITY OF RHODESIA ENROLLMENT FOR 1975

	<u>EUROPEAN</u>	<u>AFRICAN</u>	<u>ASIAN</u>	<u>OTHER</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Enrollment by race	1,061	865	99	39	2,064
Percentage of total	51.4	41.9	4.8	1.9	100

Note: Total enrollment figures for 1975 presented in these tables differ substantially from those given in Table 9 (2,064 as compared with 1,355). One explanation may be that these figures represent enrollment at the end of the academic year, whereas those in Table 9 are taken from the beginning of the year. European enrollment is still more than a majority, although the University prides itself on being one of the few inter-racial institutions in Rhodesia.

Source: Principal's Report to Council (27 April 1975), p. 5.

TABLE 12 - NEW FULL TIME STUDENTS BY FACULTY AT UNIVERSITY: 1975

	<u>FACULTY</u>						<u>GRAND TOTAL</u>
	<u>Arts</u>	<u>Education</u>	<u>Engineering</u>	<u>Medicine</u>	<u>Science</u>	<u>Social Studies</u>	
1971:							
African	63	42	-	16	46	22	189
Total	108	95	-	44	100	83	430
1976:							
African	66	48	11	27	87	136	385
Total	107	117	35	65	133	242	699

Note: The only Faculty showing an increase in European registration is Education, whereas the only Faculty showing a decrease in African registration is Arts. The largest enrollment of African students is in Social Studies, followed by Science and Arts.

Source: Principal's Report to Council, 27 April 1976, p. 5.

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PART II. EDUCATION IN ZIMBABWE

TABLE 14 - FINANCIAL SUPPORT OF STUDENTS - UNIVERSITY OF RHODESIA

SOURCE OF SUPPORT		AFRICAN		EUROPEAN		OTHER	
		Amount	Number of Students	Amount	Number of Students	Amount	Number of Students
World University Service	1974	\$ 80,000	107	\$ 0	0	\$ 1,350	2
	1975	134,000	181	0	0	2,042	3
Churches	1974	48,000	80	0	0	850	2
	1975	68,000	101	0	0	0	0
Government	1974	80,000	107	139,000	252	20,000	35
	1975	97,600	127	161,000	275	21,000	35
University of Rhodesia	1974	54,000	86	33,000	36	10,000	17
	1975	67,000	90	28,000	39	10,000	31
Other Sources (e.g., Beit and Schimelpennik Trusts)	1974	8,500	14	27,000	81	6,000	22
	1975	20,000	23	46,000	94	5,600	17
Total	1974	\$272,500	394	\$199,000	369	\$38,200	78
	1975	386,600	522	235,000	408	38,642	86

Note: Many students receive assistance from more than one source, such as Government and WUS. In 1976 scholarships, grants and bursaries from the above sources have been awarded to 656 African students, 360 Europeans and 70 others. The majority of African students are fully supported; the majority of European and other students are partly supported. World University Service, the largest source of scholarships for African students, received equal proportions of funds (21%) from the Canadian, Danish, and Swedish International Development Agencies, and 37% from the U.K. Overseas Development Ministry and other U.K. sources. For 1976, the total number of students supported by WUS increased markedly to 316, with sources of funding from the same agencies as in 1975. The total cost of the program in 1976 will be close to R\$295,000.

Source: University of Rhodesia. Principal's Report to Council (12 May 1975, p. 6 and 27 April 1976, p. 8).

APPENDIX I

PART II. EDUCATION IN ZIMBABWE

TABLE 13 - LIST OF DEPARTMENTS AT THE UNIVERSITY OF RHODESIA

<u>Faculty of Arts</u>	1	African Languages	<u>Faculty of Science</u>	28	Agriculture
	2	Classics		29	Biochemistry
	3	English		30	Division of Bio-
	4	Geography			logical Sciences
	5	History			and Department of
	6	Linguistics			Zoology
	7	Modern Languages		31	Botany
	8	Theology and Philosophy		32	Chemistry
<u>Faculty of Education</u>	9	Department of Education		33	Computer Science
	10	Institute of Adult Education		34	Geology
	11	Institute of Education		35	Institute of Min-
	12	Science Education Center			ing Research
<u>Faculty of Medicine</u>	13	Civil Engineering		36	Mathematics
	14	Electronic and Power Engineering		37	Physics
	15	Mechanical Engineering		38	Accounting
	16	Anaesthetics	<u>Faculty of</u>		
	17	Anatomy	<u>Social Science</u>	39	Center for Inter-
	18	Medical Microbiology			Racial Studies
	19	Medicine		40	Economics
	20	Obstetrics and Gynecology		41	Law
	21	Pediatrics and Child Health		42	Political Science
	22	Pathology		43	Psychology
	23	Pharmacy		44	Sociology
	24	Physiology			
	25	Psychiatry			
	26	Social & Preventive Medicine			
	27	Surgery			

SOURCE: Principal's Report to Council, 27 April, 1976, University of Rhodesia, Appendix 1.

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PART II. EDUCATION IN ZIMBABWE

TABLE 15 - AFRICAN AND EUROPEAN GRADUATE "DESTINATIONS"

	African 1968/72	European	African 1973/74	European
	%	%	%	%
Graduate certificate in education	50	17	38	27
Uncertificated teachers	25	5	23	4
Doctors	10	12	17	18
Postgraduate (other than P.C.E.)	4	16	-	-
Civil service or municipal- ities	3	17	4	15.5
Commerce & industry (private sector)	3	17	7	10.5
Unemployed (us- ually temporarily)	5	-	5	-
Other*	-	16	6	24

*Other: national service, emigration, housewives, employed at U.R. etc.
(In 1973/74 table "others" includes postgraduates, other than P.C.E.)

SOURCE: Principal's Report to Council, 27 April, 1976, University of Rhodesia, Appendix 2, p.11.

APPENDIX I

PART III. EMPLOYMENT IN ZIMBABWE

TABLE 16 - AVERAGE EARNINGS BY RACE

	<u>African</u> <u>(per annum)</u>	<u>Non-African</u> <u>(per annum)</u>
Average earnings	R\$359	R\$3,901
Earnings of mining workers	142	5,335
Earnings of teachers	820	3,630
Earnings of medical personnel (doctors and nurses included)	720	2,930

SOURCE: World University Service, 1974

APPENDIX I

PART IV. ECONOMY OF ZIMBABWE

TABLE 17 - NUMBERS EMPLOYED AND EARNINGS BY SECTOR (1972)

SECTOR	NUMBER OF AFRICAN EMPLOYED	AVERAGE AFRICAN EMPLOYED	AFRICAN INCOME AS A PERCENTAGE OF AVERAGE AFRICAN INCOME FOR ALL MANUFACTURING	NUMBER OF NON-AFRICAN EMPLOYED	NON-AFRICAN AVERAGE INCOME	NON-AFRICAN INCOME A PERCENTAGE OF AVERAGE NON-AFRICAN INCOME FOR ALL MANUFACTURING	AFRICANS AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL SECTOR WORK FORCE	RATIO OF AFRICANS TO NON-AFRICAN WORKERS WITHIN EACH SECTOR
1. Slaughtering and meat processing	3204	512	97.15	502	3954	94.23	86.45	6.38
2. Dairy products	2567	515	97.72	416	3764	89.70	86.05	6.17
3. Canning and preserving	585	342	64.90	56	4000	95.33	91.26	10.45
4. Grain milling and animal feeds	2971	516	97.91	519	4064	96.85	85.13	5.72
5. Bakery products	3310	526	99.81	426	3218	76.69	88.78	7.91
6. Chocolate and sugar confectioning	995	404	76.66	68	4162	99.19	93.60	14.63
7. Other food products	2029	564	107.02	314	4818	114.82	86.60	6.46
8. Beer, wine and spirits	2058	689	130.74	472	4922	117.30	81.34	4.36
9. Soft drinks and carbonated water	1396	569	107.94	219	5096	121.45	86.44	6.37
10. Tobacco manufactures	3938	502	95.26	662	4746	113.10	85.60	5.95
11. Cotton ginning, weaving, finishing textiles	8943	473	89.75	619	4205	100.21	93.53	14.44
12. Knitted products	3349	528	100.19	351	2786	66.40	90.51	9.54
13. Other textile products	492	455	86.34	63	4048	96.47	88.65	7.81
14. Wearing apparel	12763	497	94.31	1145	3730	88.89	91.77	11.15
15. Footwear	3045	558	105.88	323	4034	96.14	90.41	9.43
16. Sawmills and wood manufacture	5763	307	58.25	429	4268	101.72	93.07	13.43
17. Furniture and fixtures (non-Metal)	4647	451	85.58	459	4409	105.07	92.83	12.94
18. Pulp, paper, paperboard	1910	636	120.68	552	3848	91.71	77.58	3.46
19. Printing and publishing	1856	751	142.50	1876	3839	91.49	49.73	0.99
20. Fertilizer, insecticides and pesticides	1220	685	129.98	549	4876	116.21	68.97	2.22
21. Paints, varnishes and filling material	502	612	116.13	171	3965	94.49	74.59	2.94
22. Soap, detergents, pharmaceuticals	1965	683	129.60	653	4149	98.88	75.06	3.01
23. Matches, inks, candles, glue and polishes	462	710	134.72	186	3914	93.28	71.30	2.48
24. Basic industrial chemicals, and petroleum products	968	475	90.13	268	3937	93.83	78.32	3.61
25. Rubber products	1055	828	157.12	360	4097	97.64	74.56	2.93
26. Plastic products	1417	573	108.73	235	4276	101.91	85.77	6.03
27. Structural clay products (including bricks)	3525	376	71.35	115	4374	104.24	96.84	30.65
28. Glass, cement (other non-metal products)	4263	530	100.57	726	4193	99.93	99.93	5.87
29. Iron and steel basic industries	5955	628	119.17	1607	5113	121.85	78.75	3.71
30. Non-ferrous metals basic indus- tries	1397	490	92.98	145	5372	128.03	90.60	9.63
31. Metal products (except machinery and vehicles)	11456	551	104.55	2376	4131	98.45	82.83	4.82
32. Machinery and engineering except chemical	3130	663	125.80	1097	4256	101.43	74.04	2.85
33. Electrical machinery and equipment	3277	563	106.83	608	4653	110.89	84.35	5.39
34. Manufacture and recondition motor vehicles	2606	620	117.65	814	3998	95.28	76.20	3.20
35. Manufacturing and repair of other vehicles and equipment	2984	572	108.54	1874	4108	97.90	61.42	1.59
36. Other Manufacturing	2097	446	84.63	371	3838	91.47	84.97	5.65
Total Manufacturing Industry								
1966	68592			15559			81.51	4.41
1968	78529			16890			82.30	4.65
1970	95456			18921			83.46	5.04
1972	114160	527	100.00	21526	4196		84.14	5.30

SOURCE:

Census of Production, 1972/1973, Table 6, pp. 67-81;

APPENDIX I

PART III. EMPLOYMENT IN ZIMBABWE

TABLE 18 - SECTORAL DISTRIBUTION OF LABOR BY RACE

<u>SECTOR</u>	<u>AFRICAN</u>	<u>EUROPEAN, ASIAN, COLOURED</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Agriculture and Forestry	379,700	4,760	384,460
Mining and Quarrying	58,100	3,590	61,690
Manufacturing	129,900	22,990	152,890
Electricity and Water	5,500	1,780	7,280
Construction	64,800	8,670	73,470
Finance, Insurance and Real Estate	4,000	8,700	12,700
Distribution, Restaurants	65,800	22,920	88,720
Transport and Communications	22,800	10,960	32,760
Services:			
Public Administration	28,400	12,530	40,930
Education	27,300	7,160	34,460
Health	8,600	4,000	12,600
Private Domestic	130,600	-	130,600
Other	30,400	10,740	41,140
TOTAL	954,900	118,800	1,073,800

Note: The preponderance of African workers is in the Agriculture and Forestry sector, with Manufacturing a distant second. In the service sector, more than half the African workers are engaged as private domestics. The largest sectors for Europeans are Manufacturing and Distribution.

Source: G. M. E. Leistner (ed.), Rhodesia: Economic Structure and Change. Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa, 1976, p. 57.

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PART III. EMPLOYMENT IN ZIMBABWE

TABLE 19-WORKERS IN TRANSPORTATION BY RACE

	European, Asian Colored	African
Road-Motor Service		
Management, specialist and branch heads	6	0
Executive staff	3	0
Engineer men drivers	132	30
Others	0	208
TOTAL	141	
Railway		
Management and specialist	267	0
Executive Staff	345	0
Engineer men drivers	911	45
Guards, shunters, brakemen, etc.	795	477
Artisans	5,591	411
Others	0	10,959
TOTAL	7,909	11,892

SOURCE: Southern Africa Project Data Baseline.

APPENDIX I

PART III. EMPLOYMENT IN ZIMBABWE

TABLE 20 - ENROLLMENT OF AFRICAN APPRENTICES IN SPECIFIC PROGRAMS

<u>Industry</u>	<u>Numbers</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Industry</u>	<u>Numbers</u>	<u>Total</u>
Aircraft		1	Motor		34
Aircraft fitter	1		Motor mechanic (including diesel and tractor)	32	
Building		105	Auto Electrician	1	
Bricklayer	52		Panel Beater	1	
Carpenter/joiner	36		Printing		3
Plumber/drainlayer	5		Machine binder	2	
Painter/decorator	6		Printer's mechanic (including envelope and stationery)	1	
Plasterer	5				
Shopfitter	1				
Electrical		17			
Electrician	12				
Electrical fitter	1				
Instrument mechanic	3				
Lift mechanic	1				
Mechanical Engineering		50			
Boilermaker	6				
Diesel plant fitter	8				
Fitter (including machining)	5				
Fitter and turner (including machining)	18				
Moulder (including core maker)	2				
Plating/welding	4				
Roll turner	2				
Turning (including machining)	3				
Welding	2				

SOURCE: Southern Africa Project Data Baseline

APPENDIX I

PART IV - THE ECONOMY IN ZIMBABWE

TABLE 21 - INDUSTRIAL ORIGIN OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT IN - 1975

<u>Industry Sector</u>	<u>US\$ millions</u>	<u>%GDP</u>
Manufacturing	664.3	24.9
Agriculture and Forestry	436.1	16.3
European, Asian, Coloured,	(302.8)	(11.3)
African	(133.3)	(5.0)
Distribution, Hotels and Restaurants	364.7	13.6
Mining and Quarrying	185.5	6.9
Public Administration	171.9	6.4
Construction	149.4	5.6
Transport and Communication	143.6	5.4
Other Services	142.7	5.3
Education	90.9	3.4
Electricity and Water	68.7	2.6
Domestic Services	68.3	2.6
Real Estate	63.0	2.4
Finance and Insurance	57.3	2.1
Health	42.7	1.6
African Rural Household Services	24.4	0.9
Gross Domestic Product	2,673.3	100.0%

SOURCE: Compiled from: Economic Survey of Rhodesia, 1975, Ministry of Finance, April, 1976, p.12.

APPENDIX I

PART IV. THE ECONOMY IN ZIMBABWE

TABLE 22 - LAND DISTRIBUTION BY NATURAL ZONE & RACE, 1973

Land Classification	Total Area (Acres)	European Area (Acres)	African Area (Acres)	Of which Purchase Areas (Acres)	Purchase Area as % of African Areas	Purchase Area as % of Total Area	European Area as % of Total Area
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(4)+(3)	(4)+(1)	(2)+(1)
I	1,515,000	1,235,000	280,300	15,000	4.63%	0.08%	81.52%
II	18,144,700	13,987,000	4,157,700	609,122	14.65	3.36	77.09
III	16,683,600	10,790,000	5,893,600	220,344	3.75	1.32	64.67
IV	32,020,200	16,775,000	15,245,200	1,275,461	12.30	5.86	52.39
V	25,805,000	11,417,000	14,388,000	1,757,400	12.21	6.81	44.24
XX	3,015,000	1,030,000	1,985,000	--			34.16

Note: Prof. Nziramasanga constructed this table from the following sources:
 Rhodesia. Agro-Economic Survey of Central Midlands, 1973. Agricultural Development Authority (March, 1974), p. 135.
 Rhodesia. Agricultural Production in Rhodesia, 1965. Central Statistical Office, 1966.

Source: Mudziri Nziramasanga, "The Agricultural Sector in Rhodesia", Paper #2, CRED, Submitted under contract with Southern Africa Project on October 14, 1976.

APPENDIX I

PART IV. THE ECONOMY IN ZIMBABWE

TABLE 23 - PRODUCTION RATES 1975-1976

<u>Production (in tons)</u>	<u>European</u>	<u>African Purchased Area</u>	<u>Tribal Trust Lands</u>
Maize	1,260,000	53,480	435,000
Ground nuts	5,783	6,286	110,000
Wheat	125,567	325	0
Milk	139,617	0	50,400
Tea	6,989	45	0
Beef	90,000	0	62,000
Sugar	280,000	0	0

SOURCE: Southern African project data baseline.

APPENDIX I

PART IV. THE ECONOMY OF ZIMBABWE

TABLE 24 - ANALYSIS OF EUROPEAN FARMS BY SIZE, 1965

<u>Size of Farm (Acres)</u>	<u>Number of Farms</u>	<u>% of Total Acreage</u>
Under 51	52	--
51 - 100	151	0.04
101 - 250	318	0.2
251 - 500	317	0.3
501 - 1,000	612	1.45
1,001 - 2,500	1,895	9.73
2,501 - 5,000	1,562	16.03
5,001 - 7,500	518	9.38
7,501 - 10,000	222	5.72
over 10,000	<u>619</u>	<u>57.15</u>
TOTAL	6,266	100.00

Source: Census of Agricultural Production in Rhodesia 1965.
Central Statistical Office, 1966.

APPENDIX I

PART IV. THE ECONOMY OF ZIMBABWE


TABLE 25 - NUMBER OF MULTINATIONAL FIRMS
IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES

<u>Industry</u>	<u>Number of</u> <u>Multinationals</u>
Transport equipment and workshops	22
Chemical and petroleum products	21
Metals and metal products	20
Non-metallic mineral products	12
Beverages and tobacco	10
Paper and printing	8
Clothing and footwear	6
Foodstuffs	4
Textiles, including cotton ginning	1
Wood and furniture	1
Others	<u>0</u>
TOTAL	105

Source: U.N. General Assembly, Report of the Special Commission on the Situation with Regard to Implementation of the Declaration on Granting Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, New York, 1976.

APPENDIX I - ZIMBABWE
Central Africa, c. 1890

Map 1




Note: The British South Africa Company, founded in 1889 by Cecil Rhodes, was the instrument of European incursion into Central Africa. The inevitable clash between the European pioneers and the Matabele occurred in 1893. Shortly after Chief Lobengula's death in that year Matabele resistance crumbled.

Source: George Kay, Rhodesia: A Human Geography, London, University of London Press, 1970, p. 38.

APPENDIX I - ZIMBABWE

African Peoples

Map 2




Note: About 40 distinct ethnic groups have been identified in Zimbabwe. The two largest groups are the Shona-speaking peoples who comprise a loose federation and the Ndebele.

Source: George Kay, Rhodesia: A Human Geography, London, University of London Press, 1970, p. 27.

APPENDIX I - ZIMBABWE

European Population 1969

Map 4




Note: The European population tends to be clustered in and near the towns, the largest centers being Salisbury and Bulawayo. The largest area with a dense rural and small-town white population is in the northeast, along a line from Karoi via Salisbury to Umtali.

Source: George Kay, Rhodesia: A Human Geography, London, University of London Press, 1970, p. 70.

APPENDIX I - ZIMBABWE
Population Structure

Map 5




Note: The entire European population is involved in the money economy whereas roughly half the African population is. Europeans are centered in the urban areas, with less than 20% living in rural areas. Asians and other non-Africans are relatively small groups.

Source: George Kay, Rhodesia: A Human Geography, London, University of London Press, 1970, p. 60.

APPENDIX I - ZIMBABWE

African and Non-African
Annual Earnings by
Industrial Sector

MAP 6




Note: According to this chart the average earnings of Africans is nearly 9 times less than that of non-Africans. African earnings are highest in transport and lowest in agriculture.

Source: George Kay, Rhodesia: A Human Geography, London, University of London, 1970, p. 56.

APPENDIX I - ZIMBABWE

African Male Employees by
Industrial Sector and Country of Origin

Map 7




Note: Although the percentage of African males employed in the agricultural sector has declined in recent years, it is still by far the largest sector of employment. While aliens comprised only 25% of the total African population in 1961, alien workers accounted for almost half of those at work for wages. Rhodesia has a long history of dependence on alien workers and 1961 was the first census year in which they comprised less than half of the male work force.

Source: George Kay, Rhodesia: A Human Geography, London, University of London Press, 1970, p. 63.

APPENDIX I - ZIMBABWE

Land Apportionment, 1911-1965

Map 8




Note: It is readily apparent from this chart that the percentage of land allocated to Europeans (37% in 1965) far exceeds the percentage of European population (about 5% for the same year).

Source: George Kay, Rhodesia: A Human Geography, London, University of London Press, 1970, p. 50.

APPENDIX I - ZIMBABWE
Land Apportionment, 1958

Map 9




Note: The greater part of the highveld is owned by Europeans. The middle veld is dominated neither by Europeans nor by Africans. The northern parts of the lowveld are predominantly African whereas the southern parts are more evenly distributed between the races. Most land near the main towns and railways is European-owned.

Source: George Kay, Rhodesia: A Human Geography, London, University of London Press, 1970, p. 52.

APPENDIX I - ZIMBABWE

Selected Crops and Commercial Forests, 1965

Map 10




Note: Since 1965 the most dramatic development has been in cotton production and is considered a suitable cash crop for African areas. Other crops that have seen increased production are wheat, tea, coffee, and sugar, as well as paddy rice, fruits, and vegetables.

Source: George Kay, Rhodesia: A Human Geography, London, University of London Press, 1970, p. 115.

APPENDIX I - ZIMBABWE

Land Use and Crops on European
Farms, 1965

Map 11



Note: European farming offers marked contrasts to African agricultural land use. African land use is related mainly to subsistence requirements and differs little from region to region. European farming is primarily commercial and exhibits marked regional variations. Irrigation is concentrated mainly in the southwest region. The two main crops are maize and Virginia tobacco, the latter being the more valuable crop commercially. Mashonaland provinces account for fully 72.7% of all cropland.

Source: George Kay, Rhodesia: A Human Geography, London,

APPENDIX I

A SELECTED AND ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY ON SOUTHERN AFRICA

POLITICAL - ZIMBABWE

AUTHOR

TITLE OF PUBLICATION

SYNOPSIS

Arrighi, G.

The Political Economy of Rhodesia, Institute of Social Studies, The Hague, Mouton, 1967, 60 pp.

The purpose of this paper is to provide a theoretical framework for the analysis of forces that have shaped the Rhodesian social system as well as to address certain methodological issues. Completed in 1965, the study is based on Marxist categories of economic base, class structure and superstructure. The author argues that class analysis is appropriate to Rhodesian society, that in the 1930's a class structure centered on a "national agrarian bourgeoisie" and became institutionalized.

Baker, Donald

"Rhodesia, Settlement and Southern Africa," Rand Daily Mail, September 9, 1976.

This article is part of a longer paper which examines the antecedents of the Kissinger-Vorster talks. Focusing on the "internationalization" of the Rhodesian issue, the author concludes that a policy of "inducements" (economic and development assistance from the U.S. and other countries to Southern Africa) could contribute to (though not necessarily insure) political and economic stability. The first step must be the resolution of the Rhodesian problem.

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POLITICAL - ZIMBABWE

<u>AUTHOR</u>	<u>TITLE OF PUBLICATION</u>	<u>SYNOPSIS</u>
Bond, George	"Local Government and Political Integration," New York, October 6, 1967, 17 pp.	This paper was submitted under contract to the Southern Africa Project. Its primary purpose is to describe elements of the "traditional" system of indigenous government. The author concludes that in transition to majority rule in Zimbabwe "it is highly likely that European government officers will be retained" because of the factual conflict within the independence movement.
Davies, Dorothy	<u>Race Relations in Rhodesia: A Survey for 1972-73</u> , London, Rex Collings, 1975, 458 pp.	Research for this study was conducted at the Centre for Interracial Studies of the University of Rhodesia. It is intended "neither as a justification nor critique of the circumstances of daily life affecting race relations." The study includes chapters on the constitutional dispute, political parties, foreign relations, and demography.
Gibson, Richard	<u>African Liberation Movements: Contemporary Struggles Against White Minority Rule</u> , London, Oxford University Press, 1972, 350 pp.	<u>African Liberation Movements</u> was published for the Institute of Race Relations in London. It is the product of ten years' research in Africa and is sympathetic to the cause of African liberation. There are chapters on South Africa (Azania), South West Africa (Namibia), and Zimbabwe. Each movement is viewed in its geographical, economic, social and historical context.

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<u>AUTHOR</u>	<u>TITLE OF PUBLICATION</u>	<u>SYNOPSIS</u>
Gjerstad, Ole (ed.)	<u>The Organizer: The Story of Temba Moyo</u> , B.C., LSM Information Center, 1964, 88 pp.	The Liberation Support Movement publishes materials supportive of liberation groups of varying persuasion, from a Marxist perspective. This is the narrative account of a Zimbabwe freedom fighter, one in a series of such narratives entitled "Life Histories from the Revolution."
Holleman, J.F.	<u>Chief, Council and Commissioner: Some Problems of Government in Rhodesia</u> , Assen, The Netherlands, Royal van Gorcum, Ltd., 1968, 391 pp.	Written from the perspective of an anthropologist, this volume centers on the contact between the foreign (European) and imposed upper part of government hierarchy and the lower part which is the indigenous "tribal" authority. The role of the traditional chief is of critical importance since he has been expected to function as the link between the two parts. The Rhodesian government has turned increasingly to the chiefs in the attempt to legitimize the existing order.
International Commission of Jurists	<u>Racial Discrimination and Repression in Southern Rhodesia</u> , London, Catholic Institute for International Relations, 1976, 119 pp.	This study was undertaken at the directive of the national Commission of Jurists toward the end of 1974. Its main task was to update information on legal developments in Rhodesia since UDI. It catalogs the implementation of laws and values of the apartheid system in South Africa. Discriminatory legislation has been applied to virtually every aspect of social life: in education, land apportionment, labor unions, voting rights, personal freedoms, etc.

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<u>AUTHOR</u>	<u>TITLE OF PUBLICATION</u>	<u>SYNOPSIS</u>
International Defense and Aid Fund	"Civilized Standards in Rhodesia," <u>Fact Paper in Southern Africa</u> , No. 1, May 1976, 16 pp.	This article focuses on the Law and Order (Maint- ence) Act, one of many discriminatory laws, dating from before UDI. The law's purpose is to preserve the privileged position of whites and to avert armed resistance. It gives sweeping powers to the armed forces and police. The text of this act is appended.
International Defense and Aid Fund	<u>Zimbabwe Quiz</u> , London, IDAF, 1975, 41 pp.	Zimbabwe Quiz is a small booklet which gives basic facts and figures about Rhodesia. It follows a question and answer format, on such issues as relations with Britain, political participation, denial of rights and freedoms, etc.; there are several charts and maps.
Kapungu, Leonard	<u>Rhodesia: The Struggle for Freedom</u> , New York, Mary- knoll, 1974, 177 pp.	The author is a Zimbabwean political scientist who writes from the perspective of an African patriot. He traces the roots of black-white confrontation, describing the legacy of "liberalism" as "paternal- istic." He then chronicles UDI and the responses to it, with particular reference to the dilemma of the churches and problems of the revolution. He submits six requisites for revolution, includ- ing development of a revolutionary ideology.

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<u>AUTHOR</u>	<u>TITLE OF PUBLICATION</u>	<u>SYNOPSIS</u>
Petersen, Charles W.	"The Military Balance in Southern Africa," in Christian Patholm and Richard Dale (eds.), <u>Southern Africa in Perspective</u> , New York Free Press, 1972, pp. 298-320	This article outlines and describes six factors to be considered in terms of military balance, including the terrain and climate, the combatants, probable neutrals and the probable future of armed struggle. The author concludes that armed conflict will continue in the region and increase in intensity. The portion on Portuguese territories is now outdated by the independence of Angola and Mozambique.
Palley, Claire	"Law and the Unequal Society: Discriminatory Legislation in Rhodesia under the Rhodesian Front from 1963 to 1969," (two parts), in <u>Race</u> , July 1970, pp. 1-47	The author shows how the law can be utilized to achieve, perpetuate, and extend racial inequality. The article attempts to describe the systematic use of discriminatory laws on a society-wide basis. The most significant change was the extension of the scope of legislative power afforded the Rhodesian Parliament under the UDI "constitution" in 1965.
Rogers, Barbara	<u>White Wealth and Black Poverty: American Investments in Southern Africa</u> , Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press, 1976, 331 pp.	Ms. Rogers writes from the premise that social change in South Africa, and by extension other white minority regimes, will only come about from outside political pressure. She argues that American business investments are substantial enough to affect change if they can be pressured to withdraw. Included is a chapter on Rhodesia (pp. 217-229).

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<u>AUTHOR</u>	<u>TITLE OF PUBLICATION</u>	<u>SYNOPSIS</u>
Mlambo, Eshmael	<u>Rhodesia: The Struggle for a Birthright</u> , London, Hurst and Co., 1972, 333 pp.	This volume is rather more analytical and more thorough than the Kapungu book previously cited. It is written for a British audience and is highly critical of white paternalism. It includes a short biographic sketch (pp. 304-311) of key liberation leaders.
Murray, D. J.	<u>The Governmental System in Southern Rhodesia</u> , Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1970, 393 pp.	This study was inspired by the earlier work on politics in Rhodesia by Colin Leys, <u>European Politics in Southern Rhodesia</u> , published in 1959. The author takes issue with some of the basic premises of the Leys study, in particular his prediction that after the 1962 general elections there will be a swing toward "the more extreme racialists among Europeans." Such was not the case, according to the author. There are chapters on the structure of government, Rhodesian society, and various economic sectors, electoral politics, and African affairs.

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<u>AUTHOR</u>	<u>TITLE OF PUBLICATION</u>	<u>SYNOPSIS</u>
Shack, William	"The Multi-Ethnic Factor in Namibia," University of California at Berkeley, November 15, 1976, 46 pp.	This paper was submitted under contract to the Southern Africa Project. It examines ethnicity as a factor in the socio-economic structure of Namibia and in the political parties and leader- ship. It includes several demographic tables and maps as well as a chart on political parties and tribal groups in Namibia.
Sithole, Ndabaningi	<u>African Nationalism</u> , New York Oxford University Press, 2nd Edition, 1969, 196 pp.	The author is one of the founders of the Zimbabwe African National Union and is a Methodist minis- ter. When it was first published the book was hailed by Africans as their "nationalist Bible." Sithole has since seen his political influence decline. However, he has recently served as one of the four Zimbabwe representatives in consti- tutional talks in Geneva.
SIPRI (Stockholm International Pace Research Institute)	<u>Southern Africa: The Escalation of Conflict</u> , New York, Praeger Publishers, 1976, 235 pp.	SIPRI, an independent institute for research into problems of peace and conflict, pays particular attention to disarmament and arms regulation. This study is political and military. It seeks to determine the sources of conflict, examines the military power of South Africa and Rhodesia, and finally analyzes the changing balance of power since the demise of the Portuguese. The appendix includes charts on arms imports, UN resolutions, and UN embargo votes (pp. 205-229).

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<u>AUTHOR</u>	<u>TITLE OF PUBLICATION</u>	<u>SYNOPSIS</u>
Sprack, John	<u>Rhodesia: South Africa's Sixth Province</u> , International Defense and Aid Fund, London, 1974, 88 pp.	As the title would imply, this booklet is an analysis of the links between South Africa and Rhodesia. These links are historical, economic, and founded on feelings of "kith and kin." In sum, the author maintains that a resolution of the conflict in Rhodesia is hard to envisage except insofar as radical changes occur in its relationship to South Africa or in the political orientation of South Africa itself.
U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations	<u>The Political and Economic Crisis in Southern Africa</u> , Staff Report to the Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance, 94th Congress, 2nd session, September 1976, 51 pp.	This is one of a continuing series of staff reports prepared for the Sub-committee on Foreign Assistance. It followed shortly after Secretary Kissinger's trip to Lusaka in April, and was written by Frank Ballance of Senator Javits' staff and Constance Freeman of the Foreign Relations Committee staff. Based on interviews embassy personnel and many Africans, the report concludes that "the needs of southern Africa are vastly in excess of the assistance currently under consideration."

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<u>AUTHOR</u>	<u>TITLE OF PUBLICATION</u>	<u>SYNOPSIS</u>
Venter, Denis	"The Rhodesian Constitutional Dispute: Black Majority Rule or Meritocracy?" in <u>Bulletin of the Africa Institute</u> , No. 4, 1976, Pretoria, pp. 116-136	Mr. Venter observes that the parties concerned with the Rhodesian constitutional dispute have adopted widely divergent viewpoints during 13 months of negotiations (previous to the Geneva talks). He contends that South Africa cannot escape involvement in the resolution of the Rhodesian problem with "the attainment of an acceptable settlement with Blacks in Rhodesia is of primary importance for...the policy of detente in Southern Africa."
Weinrich, A. K. H.	<u>Chiefs and Councils in Rhodesia, Transition from Patriarchal to Bureaucratic Power</u> , Columbia, S.C., University of South Carolina Press, 1971, 252 pp.	This volume provides useful ethnographic information on the Karanga, one of the largest and historically most significant Shona groupings. The author draws upon a Weberian Schemata for the framework of her materials. She argues that "many Karanga are more willing to accept true democracy and bureaucracy than their chiefs." The government's protection of the chiefs, however, has arrested the political evolution of Karanga society.
Windrich, Elaine	<u>The Rhodesian Problem: A Documentary Record 1923-1973</u> , London and Boston, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975, 312 pp.	A total of 56 documents are presented in their entirety with editorial comment. They range from the early period of self-government (1932) to the constitution of 1961, to documents, speeches, and articles on the present UDI regime. There are sections on apartheid, the independence issue, external relations, and the liberation movement.

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<u>AUTHOR</u>	<u>TITLE OF PUBLICATION</u>	<u>SYNOPSIS</u>
Berg, Elliot	"Growth, Structure and Prospects of the Zimbabwe Economy," Center for Research on Economic Development, University of Michigan, October 14, 1976, Paper #1, 32 pp.	This is one of nine papers submitted under contract to the Southern Africa Project by the Center for Research on Economic Development (CRED). It presents an overview of the prospects for development upon majority rule. There are several economic advantages, but disadvantages include the economic inequality between the races and lack of black representation in technical and managerial roles.
Black, Anthony	"The Mining Sector of the Rhodesian Economy," CRED, Paper #9, 9 pp.	This paper gives a brief overview of the mining sector with emphasis on its structure and composition, but little detail. The mineral industry has played a crucial role in the economy. Although it represents only a modest portion of total GNP, the mining sector in recent years has been the fastest growing sector.
Cross, E. G.	"Outlook for the Rhodesian Economy," in <u>Prospects for the Southern African Economy with Special Reference to Rhodesia</u> , ACCOR Symposium, Monomatapa Hotel, Salisbury, 8 July 1976	This article is a summary of the symposium on the Rhodesian economy which consisted of papers on trends in the mining, agricultural, manufacturing, and distribution sectors. Its theme is that Rhodesia is heavily dependent on primary industries of mining and agriculture. It has shown considerable resilience since UDI, although it remains dependent upon conditions in international markets and on imported skills and manpower.

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<u>AUTHOR</u>	<u>TITLE OF PUBLICATION</u>	<u>SYNOPSIS</u>
Fasenfest, David	"Observations in the Labor Force in Zimbabwe," CRED, Paper #6, 31 pp.	In this paper the focus is on the work force in manufacturing, with special attention to the level of skills of African compared with non-African workers. The critical question is to what extent an exodus of whites will affect the various sectors of manufacturing. Industry relies heavily upon skilled non-African workers. Their departure would occasion a severe shortage of skilled Africans necessary to replace them.
Hughes, A. J. B.	<u>Development in Rhodesian Tribal Areas</u> , Tribal Areas of Rhodesia Research Foundation, Salisbury, 1974, 324 pp.	This study is primarily a report to the trustees of the Foundation, based on published reports, documents and interviews. In the first section the author seeks to define "development" in its local context with reference to the "tribal" areas. It includes a description of the agrarian base and land tenure system, followed by a summary of development agencies. Part III deals with development efforts in community councils, "tribal" development groups, irrigation schemes, marketing institutions, and credit finance.

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<u>AUTHOR</u>	<u>TITLE OF PUBLICATION</u>	<u>SYMPOSIUM</u>
Leistner, G. M. E. (editor)	<u>Rhodesia: Economic Structure and Change,</u> Africa Institute of South Africa, Pretoria, 1976, 239 pp.	A compilation of seventeen articles on various aspects of the Rhodesian economy, this volume is a timely and useful source of information. Most of the contributors are Rhodesians either in the university or government. There are chapters on the general economy, agriculture (African and European), mining, manufacturing and construction, banking and finance, commerce, tourism, transport and power, water resources, and education (African and non-African).
Nelson, Harold, et al	<u>Area Handbook for Southern Rhodesia,</u> American University, Washington, D.C., 1975, 394 pp.	<u>The Area Handbook for Rhodesia</u> is among the most up-to-date in the handbook series. The section on the economy (pp. 235-326) includes a discussion of patterns of growth, transportation and communications, agriculture, industry, and labor. United Nations and Rhodesian government sources are drawn upon. Treatment of the subject is of a general nature.
Nziramasaanga, Mudzuviri	"The Agricultural Sector in Rhodesia," CRED, Paper #2, 41 pp.	This paper examines patterns of land settlement, agricultural production and marketing, effects of sanctions on agriculture, and effects of the eventual transfer of power to majority rule. Progress in agriculture will depend on improvement of African productivity and will certainly involve some form of land reform.

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<u>AUTHOR</u>	<u>TITLE OF PUBLICATION</u>	<u>SYNOPSIS</u>
Pinckney, Annette	"A Preliminary Survey of the Transport-Communications Sector," CRED, Paper #7, 13 pp.	The Zimbabwe transport-communication sector is relatively highly developed compared with other African countries in terms of road and rail networks, volume of freight moved, and number of vehicles in use. The country relies heavily upon rail transport, much of it through Mozambique until recently. Road transport, particularly in rural areas, has been under-financed. Removal of sanctions should permit more efficient, shorter trade routes.
Porter, Richard	"The Effectiveness of Economic Sanctions Against Rhodesia," CRED, Paper #4, 15 pp.	This paper includes a discussion of the theoretical aspects of economic sanctions with application to the Rhodesian case, with reference to relevant literature on the subject. It concludes that some short-range damage to the economy is due to sanctions, but that real GNP per capita has fallen only slightly since 1965. Removal of sanctions will not guarantee an enhanced growth rate but will open many policy options.

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AUTHOR

TITLE OF PUBLICATION

SYNOPSIS

Porter, Richard
and Jacqueline
Sherman

"Rhodesian Manufacturing
and UDI," CRED, Paper #5,
24 pp.

The size and structure of the manufacturing sector in Rhodesia has changed considerably since UDI, showing rapid growth and diversification. This paper describes those changes in historical context and examines their causes, shows how the pattern of manufacturing development was affected by UDI and the resulting sanctions, and speculates about the international competitiveness of manufacturing. Zimbabwe will inherit a large, growing, and flexible manufacturing sector, although severe problems of manpower shortage can be anticipated in the event of the departure of skilled whites.

Roder, Wolf

"White and Black Irrigation
in Rhodesia," CRED, Paper
#3, 40 pp.

This paper examines environmental conditions, African and European irrigation, and regional development. African irrigation projects date from the earliest decades of white occupation but have not been expanded much since UDI. Greatest opportunities for African agricultural settlement exist, not in irrigation, but in the underutilized European farms of the high rainfall areas.

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<u>AUTHOR</u>	<u>TITLE OF PUBLICATION</u>	<u>SYNOPSIS</u>
Rhodesia	<u>Economic Survey of Rhodesia</u> , Ministry of Finance, Salisbury, Government Printer, April 1976, 23 pp.	This is a very useful profile of the Rhodesian economy for 1975. It includes a brief summary of balance of payments, national income, industrial production, construction, banking, government revenue and expenditures, population, migration, employment, and consumer prices. There are tables to accompany each of these topics.
Rhodesia	<u>Monthly Digest of Statistics</u> , Central Statistics Office, Salisbury, 78 pp. (the most recent issue available is September 1976)	This is a basic source of information on the Rhodesian economy. Published monthly, it includes a summary of data for most tables going back to the 1950's. Every sector of the economy is presented: population, health, education, employment, consumer prices, agriculture, mining, manufacturing, construction, engineering, energy, transport, trade, balance of payments, national accounts, and banking. Figures on external trade are sparse due to the Rhodesian government's concern to keep secret its sanction-breaking trade ties.
Rhodesia	<u>The Census of Production:</u> 1973-74, Central Statistical Office, Salisbury 1975, 116 pp.	<u>The Census of Production</u> lists summary tables for the mining, manufacturing, construction, and energy (electricity and water supply) sectors. For comparative purposes, the tables include results of the previous nine annual censuses. Tables 1 and 13 summarize the long-term growth pattern since the first census in 1938. African industry in the "Tribal" Trust Lands is not included, nor is African industry in the urban areas in any detail, due to "collection difficulties."

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<u>AUTHOR</u>	<u>TITLE OF PUBLICATION</u>	<u>SYNOPSIS</u>
Adam, Heribert	<u>Modernizing Racial Domination, The Dynamics of South African Politics</u> , Berkeley, University of California Press, 1971, 203 pp.	For an understanding of the racial dimension that underlies social relations in white minority regimes this volume is a good source. The Adam thesis is that industrialization produces certain divergent interests among whites which carry the potential for limited short and mid-term changes within the system, short of radical revolution. Variants of this thesis have been applied to the Rhodesian society (see Murphree).
Clarke, D. G.	"The Economics of Underdevelopment in Rhodesia: An Essay on Selected Bibliography," in <u>A Current Bibliography on African Affairs</u> , Summer 1973, pp. 293-332	The author is one of the leading economists writing on the problem of human development in Rhodesia. This essay provides an overview of the literature on economic development with particular reference to Rhodesia. A lengthy bibliography includes sections on the economics of education, infrastructural development, and race relations and economic growth.
Clarke, D. G.	<u>Contract Workers and Underdevelopment in Rhodesia</u> , Mambo Occasional Papers, Socio-Economic Series No. 3, Gwelo, Rhodesia, 1974, 132 pp.	This paper is meant to critique the policy of importing foreign workers into a country which itself has serious unemployment problems. It focuses on the impact of foreign and contract labor in the relationships between the centers of production and the peripheral areas of labor supply in the regional economic system. This policy, which was a foundation stone of the colonial era, persists under the present regime.

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AUTHOR

TITLE OF PUBLICATION

SYNOPSIS

Gubitt,
Verity S.
and Roger
Riddell

The Urban Poverty Datum
Line in Rhodesia: A Study
of the Minimum Consumption
Needs of Families,
University of Rhodesia,
Salisbury, June 1974,
139 pp.

This study examines the concept of the poverty datum line in Rhodesia and applies it to the cities of Salisbury, Bulawayo, and Fort Victoria and concludes with a country profile. Emphasis is on minimum needs of the average family. It concludes that "very many Africans are receiving a wage considerably less than the PDL relevant to their family size." Over 90% of all African employees outside the European agricultural sector receive less than \$70 cash wages a month.

Craig, R.

Principal's Report to the
Council, University of
Rhodesia, May 12, 1975, and
April 27, 1976.

The reports of the Principal (chief administrative officer) of the University of Rhodesia provide information on the enrollment of students by faculty and by race, as well as figures showing sources of financial support for students, general University revenue and expenditures, and statements on the role of the University as seen by the Principal. It is noted that the University is one of the few inter-racial institutions in Rhodesia.

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<u>AUTHOR</u>	<u>TITLE OF PUBLICATION</u>	<u>SYNOPSIS</u>
Dube, John J.	"Education and Training Programme Relevant to the Manpower Requirements of an Independent Zimbabwe," text of speech delivered in March 1976	Mr. Dube is President of the recently created National African Trade Union Congress (NATUC) in Rhodesia. NATUC claims to represent the majority of workers in the country. This speech indicates a concern for the effective development of human resources through manpower planning, and specifically through education and training programs. Mr. Dube expresses the desire of his organization to work with various trade unions in this effort.
Harris, Peter	<u>Black Industrial Workers in Rhodesia: The General Problems of Low Pay</u> , Mambo Occasional Papers, Socio-Economic Series No. 2, Gwelo, 1974, 70 pp.	In this paper the author, who writes regularly in the field of labor and managerial economics, presents a general profile of the Rhodesian employment structure, analyzes the personal problems of black industrial workers, and suggests some of the institutions that could be active in working for changes in the employment structure. He concludes by indicating a number of obstacles to reform, such as the hostility of employers and the government's policy on labor.

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ECONOMIC - ZIMBABWE

AUTHOR

Shack, William

TITLE OF PUBLICATION

"Land Reform in Zimbabwe:
Problems and Prospects,"
University of California
at Berkeley, October 15,
1976, 57 pp.

SYNOPSIS

In the first part of this paper the inequities in the present system of land allocation are described and in the second a model for reapportionment is proposed. An attempt is made to describe traditional social organization and land-tenure systems, although little hard ethnographic data is available. The author addresses the issue of availability of arable land for redistribution to Africans, prospects for "white flight," and experiments in other African countries.

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<u>AUTHOR</u>	<u>TITLE OF PUBLICATION</u>	<u>SYNOPSIS</u>
Kay, George	<u>Rhodesia: A Human Geography</u> , London, University of London Press, 1970, 192 pp.	This is an essential text for an understanding of the demography of Rhodesia. Chapter 1 provides a description of the physical setting and natural resources. Other chapters include human and historical background, population structure and distribution, and the economy. The author is generally sympathetic to the maintenance of an important role for whites in the Zimbabwean society.
Mswake, T. E.	"African Unemployment and the Rural Areas of Rhodesia," in <u>Rural Africana</u> , Spring 1974, pp. 59-73.	The thesis of the author is that "the rural areas of Rhodesia provide a cushion for African unemployment and a subsidy to the wage economy of the country." He examines the factors which have conditioned unemployment and the determinants which force the unemployed African to seek temporary refuge in the rural areas. He concludes "that rural areas of Rhodesia have...emerged as a grandiose carpet under which the 'dirt' which white society does not want to see can be swept."

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<u>AUTHOR</u>	<u>TITLE OF PUBLICATION</u>	<u>SYNOPSIS</u>
Murphree, Marshall	<u>Employment Opportunity and Race in Rhodesia</u> , Studies in Race and Nations, Vol. 4, Study No. 2, 1972-73, Denver, Colorado, 39 pp.	This monograph, prepared under the auspices of the University of Denver's Graduate School of International Studies, draws upon the sociological thought of Berghe, Kuper, and Adam and its relevance to Rhodesia. He identifies the basic factors inhibiting equal opportunity for blacks in employment. He applies the Adam thesis to Rhodesia in arguing that "the dialectical dynamic for immediate mutation" lies in the cleavages within the white population.
Murphree, M. W. (editor)	<u>Education, Race and Employment in Rhodesia</u> , Salisbury, Artca Publications, 1975.	The theme of this volume is the inequality of the Rhodesian education system resulting from the maintenance of separate facilities for blacks and whites. Government expenditures on white students are far greater than for blacks and has increasingly taken over control of mission schools. Employment prospects for blacks are much less encouraging as well.
Rhodesia	<u>Monthly Digest of Statistics</u> , Central Statistical Office, Salisbury.	This is an official publication of the Rhodesian government. Sections particularly relevant to human resources are as follows: population and vital statistics, migrants, health statistics, education, and employment.

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<u>AUTHOR</u>	<u>TITLE OF PUBLICATION</u>	<u>SYNOPSIS</u>
Rhodesia	<u>Report of the Secretary for Health for the year Ended 31st December, 1975, Salisbury, 1976, 49 pp.</u>	The Secretary for Health annually presents a report to Parliament which is in narrative form with numerous tables and charts. It includes sections on communicable disease, hospital and clinical services, preventive health services, and administrative staff.
Rhodesia	<u>Annual Report of the Secretary for African Education for the Year Ended 31st December, 1975, Salisbury, 1976, 53 pp.</u>	The report on African education complements the one for European education. It covers most aspects of primary and secondary education as well as teacher education. Examination results, finance, legislation, and administration are also covered. The emphasis is on the many advances made on behalf of the African population in the last year.
Rhodesia	<u>The Rhodesian Journal of Economics: Quarterly Journal of the Rhodesian Economic Society, Salisbury.</u>	The <u>Journal</u> first appeared in 1967 and continues to the present. There are frequently articles related to education and manpower. The December 1972 issue carries a special symposium on labor problems in Rhodesia. Other issues with education-related articles include June 1971 and June 1972. Many of the contributors are affiliated with the University of Rhodesia.

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<u>AUTHOR</u>	<u>TITLE OF PUBLICATION</u>	<u>SYNOPSIS</u>
Smythe, Mabel	"Human Problems of Transition in Zimbabwe and Namibia," Phelps-Stokes Fund, October 1, 1976, 20 pp.	Ms. Smythe submitted this paper to the Southern Africa Project under contract. In it she assesses the capacity of the two countries to manage the human problems of transition in terms of skilled labor, race relations, ethnic rivalries, and "compensation" of whites. She submits a proposal for an internship program for Zimbabweans and Namibians on a crash basis.
Van Heerden, J.	"The Labor Force," in G. M. E. Leistner, <u>Rhodesia: Economic Structure and Change</u> , pp. 57-64.	The author gives a brief overview of the African labor force in Rhodesia, observing that the heaviest concentration is in agriculture and forestry, domestic labor, and finally in manufacturing. Managerial and skilled occupations have been and continue to be taken up largely by whites.
Watson, James	"Health Consequences of Transition in Zimbabwe," October 1976, 84 pp.	Dr. Watson's paper was submitted under contract to the Southern Africa Project. He anticipates problems in the health system in the event of "white flight" and examines African attitudes toward "preventive" measures. It is noted that separate development in health care systems is "costly not only in terms of money, manpower and facilities, but in terms of human dignity."

APPENDIX I

A SELECTED AND ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY ON SOUTHERN AFRICA

HUMAN RESOURCES - ZIMBABWE

<u>AUTHOR</u>	<u>TITLE OF PUBLICATION</u>	<u>SYMPOSIUM</u>
Webster, M. H.	"Health Service," in G. M. E. Leistner, <u>Rhodesia: Economic Structure and Change</u> , pp. 217-239.	The author is recently retired as Secretary for Health in Rhodesia. In this article he traces the historical development of health services, the structure of the health care system, and the general condition of health in the country. In rather paternalistic style he concludes that "the African people of Rhodesia should by now have realized that with peace, good law and order, and health services, they can survive."
Wilks, Brian	"Educational and Training Opportunities within Zimbabwe and in Neighboring Countries During and After the Transitional Phase to Majority Rule," University of Houston, 61 pp.	This paper was submitted under contract to the Southern Africa project. It assesses possibilities for educational and training opportunities within Zimbabwe and in neighboring countries during and after the transition to independence, provides some indicators of educational development in the country, and suggests some institutional linkages for educational and training programs, both long and short range. These include labor organizations, institutes, and multinational corporations.

APPENDIX II

PART I. POPULATION AND DEMOGRAPHY OF NAMIBIA

TABLE 1 - NAMIBIA POPULATION 1970, 1974, 1975

POPULATION GROUP*	NUMBER			% OF TOTAL	
	1975 ^{2/} Estimates	1974 ^{1/} Estimates	1970 ^{1/}	1974	1970
Bushmen	25,400 - 32.2%	26,000	22,830	3.0	3.0
Damaras	75,300	75,000	66,291	8.8	8.7
Caprivians	29,000	29,000	25,580	3.4	3.0
Coloureds	32,800	32,000	28,512	3.8	3.7
Hereros	57,000	56,000	50,589	6.6	6.6
Kaokovelders	57,500	7,000	6,567	0.8	0.9
Kavangos	57,500	56,000	49,512	6.6	6.5
Namas	38,100	37,000	32,935	4.3	4.3
Ovambos	396,900 - 50%	396,000	352,640	46.5	46.3
Rehoboth Baster's	19,100	19,000	16,649	2.2	2.2
Tswanas	4,300	5,000	4,407	0.6	0.6
Total African	792,900 - 86.4%	738,000	656,512	86.6	86.1
Others	17,100 - 1.9%	15,000	15,089	1.8	2.0
Whites	107,100 - 11.7%	99,000	90,583	11.6	11.9
TOTAL	917,100	852,000	762,184	100.0	100.0

Note: Statistics for Namibia are often incorporated with South African statistical data. Prompted by international pressure, South Africa has revised upwards its population statistics for Namibia several times in past years, most recently in October 1975. The population of the Kaokoveld shows such an increase from 7,000 to 57,500.

Sources: 1/ Population Census of 6 May 1970, Republic of South Africa, Department of Statistics.
2/ Die Suidwes-Afrikaner, October 7, 1975.

These figures and a discussion of the South African Government's alleged manipulation of demographic statistics are found in a paper entitled "Namibia's population: South Africa's Misleading Estimates," UN Council for Namibia, internal memorandum.

APPENDIX II

PART II. EDUCATION IN NAMIBIA

TABLE 2 - EDUCATION: SCHOOLS, TEACHERS, AND PUPILS

YEAR	ALL GROUPS				COLOURED AND BLACK GROUPS			
	Number of Schools	Number of Teachers	Number of Pupils	Total Population	Number of Schools	Number of Teachers	Number of Pupils	Total Population
1960	376	1,976	59,881	526,004 ^{1/}	313	1,310	43,624	452,540 ^{1/}
1966	492	3,050	98,188	610,100 ^{2/}	415	2,071	78,295	514,100 ^{2/}
1970	606	3,836	134,355	762,184 ^{3/}	526	2,713	112,006	671,601 ^{3/}
1973	677	4,685	162,085	827,000 ^{4/}	592	3,453	138,890	735,000 ^{4/}

Notes: These tables make no distinction between primary and secondary school enrollment. The educational system emphasizes "The recognition of the importance of national cultures in the education of youth." Official South African Government figures for the number of schools (1973) do not correspond with the total given in Table 4, from the Bantu Education Journal for the same period.

Source: Cited in Southwest Africa Survey 1974, 1975, p. 62.

1/ Official Census

2/ Estimate

3/ Official Census

4/ Estimate

APPENDIX II

PART II. EDUCATION IN NAMIBIA

TABLE 3 - SCHOOL ATTENDANCE

(Shows number of pupils and
the percentage of school
population at each grade.)

Grade	PRIMARY		Grade	SECONDARY	
	Number of Pupils	% of School Population		Number of Pupils	% of School Population
Sub-Std A	30,103	30.34	Form I	938	0.95
Sub-Std B	18,281	18.43	Form II	654	0.66
Std I	14,742	14.86	Form III	368	0.37
Std II	11,284	11.37	Form IV	106	0.11
Std III	9,163	9.24	Form V	44	0.04
Std IV	5,788	5.84	Sub-total B	2,110	2.13
Std V	4,021	4.05			
Std VI	3,714	3.74			
Sub-total A	97,096	97.87			
Total Number of All Pupils: (A & B)	99,206	100.00			

Note: Of African school children, 97.87% leave school before Std VI grade, while 68% of all white children stay on to secondary school and above. Less than 1% of African children even reach the first form of secondary school.

Source: Bantu Education Journal, April and June 1973, cited by M. Horrell, SA Institute of Race Relations Survey, 1973, p. 351, cited in Murray, et al, Role of Foreign Firms in Namibia, 1974, p. 168.

APPENDIX II

PART II. EDUCATION IN NAMIBIA*

TABLE 5 - NUMBER OF PUPILS PER
TEACHER IN WHITE AND BLACK SCHOOLS

	<u>1960</u>	<u>1966</u>
White	1:24	1:20
Black	1:35	1:40

Note: The teacher-to-pupil ratio from 1960 to 1966 is increasingly more favorable to white children than to black. In Ovambo-land, the ratio is 1:35 and the general trend of a widening teacher/pupil ratio for blacks suggests that the disparities in the rest of the territory will be even larger now. The South West Africa 1974 does not provide comparable statistics after 1966.

Source: SA Department of Foreign Affairs, SWA Survey, 1967, cited in Murray, et al, Role of Foreign Firms in Namibia, 1974, p. 169.

APPENDIX II

PART II. EDUCATION IN NAMIBIA

TABLE 6 - QUALIFICATIONS OF AFRICAN TEACHERS IN NAMIBIA

		<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>PERCENT</u>
PROFESSIONALLY QUALIFIED WITH:	University degree	6	0.32
	Matriculation or equivalent	27	1.41
	Junior Cert. and Std. VI	1,187	62.12
	Other qualifications (e.g., technical)	1	0.05
NO PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS- BUT WITH:	University degree	0	0
	Matriculation or equivalent	1	0.05
	Technical or other qualifications	2	0.10
	No matriculation or other qualifications	687	35.95
TOTAL:		1,911	100.00

Note: This table indicates the appallingly low standard of education of African teachers. The average African teacher earns 46% of the salary paid to whites with similar qualifications.

Source: Calculated from South African Hansard 3, 18 February 1971, cols. 204-5, cited in Murray, et al, Role of Foreign Firms in Namibia, 1974, p. 170.

APPENDIX II

PART II. EDUCATION IN NAMIBIA

TABLE 7 - TRAINING INSTITUTES

<u>INSTITUTE</u>	<u>NUMBER OF STUDENTS IN 1973</u>	<u>NUMBER OF STAFF IN 1973</u>	<u>NUMBER OF STUDENTS ACCOMMODATED IN BOARDING ESTABLISHMENTS 1973*</u>
Ongwediva Training Institute, Owambo	658	35	650
Augustineum Training Institute, Windhoek	496	37	500
Cornelius Goroseb Training Institute, Khorixas	303	15	300
Rundu Training Institute, Kavango	348	17	350
Okakarara Training Institute, Hereroland**	286	9	300
Caprivi Training Institute, Katima Mulilo	214	13	160
Dobra Training Institute, Windhoek	359	15	360
TOTAL	2,664	141	2,620

* These figures have been rounded off.

** Teacher and vocational training will commence as soon as the building construction programme is completed.

Note: These institutes are described as "boarding schools offering academic tuition up to matriculation level" (Secondary). They are considered to be "post-primary training" for black and coloured pupils.

Source: Southwest Africa Survey 1974, Department of Foreign Affairs, Republic of South Africa, 1975, pp. 64-65.

APPENDIX II

PART III. EMPLOYMENT IN NAMIBIA

TABLE 8 - AFRICAN WORKERS IN NAMIBIA

(Excluding domestics in private service and persons engaged in agriculture and farming.)

<u>OCCUPATION</u>	<u>MALE</u>	<u>FEMALE</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>PERCENT OF TOTAL</u>
Professional, semi-professional and technical	1,743	244	1,987	3.7
(Student nurses)	(0)	(143)	(143)	(0.3)
(Teachers)	(1,683)	(43)	(1,726)	(3.2)
(Others)	(60)	(58)	(118)	(0.2)
Managerial, executive and administrative, etc.	----- NONE -----			
Clerical	530	24	554	1.0
Sales and related work, etc.	681	76	757	1.4
Actual mining and quarrying	7,625	2	7,627	14.3
Transportation, delivery and communications	2,884	24	2,908	5.5
Processors in any industry and operatives in motor industry (excluding artisans and apprentices)	1,141	0	1,141	2.1
Operators and semi-skilled workers in building and/or construction work	1,778	0	1,778	3.3
Processing of wood furniture, etc.	150	0	150	0.3
Manufacturing of clothes and textiles, etc.	68	105	173	0.3

(Continued)

TABLE 8 - AFRICAN WORKERS IN NAMIBIA (Continued)

OCCUPATION	MALE	FEMALE	TOTAL	PERCENT OF TOTAL
Manufacturing of food, drink and tobacco	4,038	65	4,103	7.7
Leather and shoe process work	7	0	7	0.0
Manufacture of glass, cement, lime and bricks, tiles	78	0	78	0.2
Skilled and semi-skilled in processing and manufacture of chemicals	41	4	45	0.1
Printing, processing and paper manufacture	24	0	24	0.1
Supervisors, skilled and semi-skilled	2,592	7	2,599	4.9
Service sectors	3,310	1,057	4,367	8.2
Labourers	24,828	189	25,017	46.9
TOTAL	51,518	1,797	53,315	100.0

Note: The most striking fact revealed in this table is that there are no Africans in the managerial, executive, and administrative sectors. Nearly half of all Africans are classified as "Labourers."

Source: Manpower Survey No. 9, Department of Statistics, South Africa, 30 April 1971, cited in Murray, et al, The Role of Foreign Firms in Namibia, 1974, pp. 176-177.

APPENDIX II

PART IV. THE ECONOMY IN NAMIBIA

TABLE 9 - GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT PER PERSON IN NAMIBIA

	<u>1965 (Official figures)</u>	<u>1970 (estimate)</u>
Total Population	\$ 504 (a)	\$ 725 (a)
Whites only	2,243	4,250
Southern Sector (Africans and Coloreds)	321	468
Northern Sector (Africans)	85	124
All Africans	N.A.	250

(a) Converted at 1 Rand = \$1.40 U.S.

Source: South West Africa Survey, 1967, p. 71.

APPENDIX II

PART IV. THE ECONOMY IN NAMIBIA

TABLE 10 - NAMIBIA EXPORTS BY VALUE 1966-1973
(in 000's of U.S. Dollars*)

Commodities	1966	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973
Karakul pelts	21,525	26,880	30,660	28,140	38,500	45,500	44,800
Livestock	23,296	35,140	34,490	40,600	42,000	49,000	56,000
Fish Products	68,460	56,000	50,400	46,200	50,400	63,000	91,000
Diamonds	119,020	112,000	126,000	105,000	112,000	126,000	177,800
Lead, Zinc and Copper Concentrates	56,567	49,000	58,800	54,600	51,800	43,400	56,000
Other Exports n.e.c.	<u>4,843</u>	<u>7,980</u>	<u>4,900</u>	<u>5,460</u>	<u>6,300</u>	<u>6,300</u>	<u>8,400</u>
Total Exports	293,710	287,000	305,200	280,000	301,000	333,200	434,000

* South African Rand converted to U.S. Dollars by the constant rate 1R = \$1.40 U.S., representing an average value for the period cited.

Note: This table consists of trade external to the South African Customs Union (Namibia, South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland). It does not include trade within this area.

Source: U.N., E.C.A.; Economic Summaries - Namibia: 1974 (from Berg, op.cit. p. 62).

APPENDIX II - NAMIBIA
 Tribal Groups of South West Africa Before 1904

MAP 1





FIG. 15. Tribal Groups of South West Africa before the 1904-5 rebellions (mainly after K. Weule).

Source: "Issue on Namibia," in *Decolonization*, United Nations Department of Political Affairs, Trusteeship and Decolonization, Vol. 1, No. 3, December 1974, p. 57.

APPENDIX II- NAMIBIA

Homelands and Communication Lines

MAP 3



Note: According to official South African reckoning, Namibia's rail and road transport facilities are the most comprehensive in Africa, measured in distance per 10,000 inhabitants. It should be noted, however, that there are virtually no lines of communication with neighboring African countries.

Source: South Africa 1974: Official Yearbook of the Republic of South Africa, Department of Information, Johannesburg, 1974, p. 962.

Communications and Mines

MAP 4




Note: It is evident from this map that the system of communication in Namibia is directly linked to the mining industry. The mines are located almost exclusively in the European areas.

Source: Roger Murray, et al, The Role of Foreign Firms in Namibia, African Publications Trust, Uppsala, Sweden, 1974, p. 17.

APPENDIX III - NAMIBIA
Agricultural and Industrial Activity

MAP 5




Note: African nomadic grazing is concentrated in the northern region. European intensive livestock breeding and farming is centered in the central region around Windhoek, as is the animal products industry. The extractive industry is scattered throughout the central region and along the coast.

Source: Food and Agriculture Organization, Namibia: A Preliminary Note Towards a Country Development Brief, March 1976, p. 111.

APPENDIX II - NAMIBIA

Agricultural Regions

MAP 6



Region	Dry-land Cropping ¹	Irrigation	Stock Farming ²	Timber
1	Normal to marginal; soil fertility low to moderate	Good	Large stock, extensive	Extensively exploitable
2	Marginal; soil fertility moderate	None	Large stock, extensive	Some exploitation possible
3	Submarginal; soil fertility low	None	Large stock, extensive	Extensively exploitable
4	None	Extremely limited	Large stock, ultra-extensive	Negligible
5	None	Extremely limited	Large stock, and small stock, ultra-extensive	None
6	None	Limited	Small stock, ultra-extensive to marginal	None
7	None	Extremely limited	Marginal small stock farming in better parts	None

¹ See Map 7a.

² The following limit values are applied in describing the potential intensiveness of pastoral land-use in Southern Africa (vide Wellington, J.H. "A Tentative Land Classification of Southern Africa", *The South African Geographical Journal*, Vol. XXXV, (1953), p. 17):

Intensive: One large stock unit to 2 Ha. or less. *Semi-intensive:* One large stock unit to 2-4 Ha.
Extensive: One large stock unit to 4-8 Ha. *Ultra-extensive:* One large stock unit to 8 Ha. or more.
 One large stock unit equals 1 cattle unit or 5 sheep or goat units.

Source: Food and Agriculture Organization, Namibia: A Preliminary Note Towards a Country Development Brief, March 1976, p. 33.

APPENDIX II

A SELECTED AND ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY ON SOUTHERN AFRICA

POLITICAL - NAMIBIA

<u>AUTHOR</u>	<u>TITLE OF PUBLICATION</u>	<u>SYNOPSIS</u>
Baker, Donald	"Namibia: An Overview of Problems and Prospects for Development," Occasional Paper No. 1, <u>Interim Report on Namibia</u> , 61 pp.	In this paper an initial attempt is made to isolate the major features of Namibian society with particular attention paid to factors considered to be of crucial importance for development. The second part of the paper explores the contemporary political situation in Namibia, with emphasis on transition issues, group views, and possible implications for development of an independent Namibia.
Butcher, Goler	"Namibia: U.S. Policy Choice," Washington, D.C., Occasional Paper No. 7, <u>Interim Report on Namibia</u> , 108 pp.	This paper was submitted to the Southern Africa project under contract. The author's thesis is that, given all of the factors that condition U.S. relations in the region, the international legal obligations of all states regarding Namibia, and African suspicions concerning U.S. motives, "the scope of U.S. freedom of bilateral action regarding Namibia is narrow." The paper further examines U.S. foreign policy interests in terms of possible programs of assistance.

APPENDIX II

A SELECTED AND ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY ON SOUTHERN AFRICA

POLITICAL - NAMIBIA

AUTHOR

TITLE OF PUBLICATION

SYNOPSIS

Landis,
Elizabeth

Namibia: The Beginning of Disengagement, Studies in Race and Nations, Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver, Vol. 2, No. 1, 1970/71, 47 pp.

The author is among the most knowledgeable students of Namibian developments, having written regularly on the subject during the past several years. In this monograph she analyzes the evolution of South African control over Namibia and outlines what the U.S. position has been on the Namibian issue. She concludes that this position has been only a promise to disengage the U.S. from direct and indirect support of the South African government. Suggestions as to how and when the U.S. might carry out this policy are put forth. These suggestions are no less applicable in 1976 than at the time of writing of this monograph.

Landis,
Elizabeth

"Human Rights in Namibia," International Institute of Human Rights (a document for the International Conference on Namibia and Human Rights), Dakar, 5-8 January 1976, 73 pp.

The Dakar Conference was held under the sponsorship of the United Nations Commissioner for Namibia, at the invitation of President Senghor. This paper documents the denial of human rights in Namibia under South African occupation, and in direct contradiction to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The paper juxtaposes articles of the Declaration with articles in Namibian law which directly contravene those articles.

APPENDIX II

A SELECTED AND ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY ON SOUTHERN AFRICA

POLITICAL - NAMIBIA

<u>AUTHOR</u>	<u>TITLE OF PUBLICATION</u>	<u>SYNOPSIS</u>
Lazar, Leonard	<u>Namibia</u> , London, The Mandate Trust of the African Bureau, 1972, 107 pp.	This is a very useful source which traces the League of Nations Mandate from 1919, the South African Mandate to 1966, and the period since the historic decision of the General Assembly to revoke that mandate, placing Namibia under UN jurisdiction. It examines the South African reaction to the revocation and submits proposals for action in the interest of the Namibian majority. The appendices provide numerous resolutions of the UN and South African legislation regarding Namibia.
Rogers, Barbara	<u>White Wealth and Black Poverty: American Investments in Southern Africa</u> , Westport, Connecticut, Greenwood Press, 1976, 331 pp.	The focus of this study is on the inequality of separate development policies in white dominated southern Africa and the complicity of foreign interests in those policies. There is a chapter on the role of U.S. investment and separate chapters on each of the countries of the region. The chapter on Namibia (pp. 170-216) outlines the legal status of Namibia, African contract labor, and the operation of U.S. companies in the country.

APPENDIX II

A SELECTED AND ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY ON SOUTHERN AFRICA

POLITICAL - NAMIBIA

<u>AUTHOR</u>	<u>TITLE OF PUBLICATION</u>	<u>SYNOPSIS</u>
Rotberg, Robert	"Namibia: Politics, Ecology, and Society," Occasional Paper No. 2, <u>Interim Report on Namibia</u> , 47 pp.	This paper sets out the "ecological deficit" of Namibia, which is substantial by comparison with Zimbabwe. It describes the administrative structure and its relation to local politics and the mechanisms of South African control. The section on political economy reveals the extent of foreign dominance of the economy. There is treatment of the liberation groups as well as a statement of research findings for each of the topics studied.
Shack, William	"Namibia: The Multi-Ethnic Factor," Occasional Paper No. 3, <u>Interim Report on Namibia</u> , 48 pp.	In this report the relations between Namibia's major ethnic groups are examined as is their relative integration in the socio-economic and political system. The historical and political factors that have lined and divided these groups is a major consideration. The report also outlines the probable effects of interethnic relations on the political process involved in transition to majority rule. A listing of political parties and leaders is appended.

APPENDIX II

A SELECTED AND ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY ON SOUTHERN AFRICA

POLITICAL - NAMIBIA

AUTHOR

TITLE OF PUBLICATION

SYNOPSIS

United Nations
Office of
Public
Information

A Trust Betrayed: Namibia,
New York, United Nations
Publication, 1974, 43 pp.

The United Nations has become intimately involved in the Namibian question. This pamphlet summarizes the steps that led to the Court Decision of 1966, subsequent to the Odendall Commission of the South African government in 1962. It concludes with an account of the founding of the UN Council for Namibia in 1967 and the Court Opinion of 1971 holding that South African presence there was illegal. South Africa has ignored the opinion, proceeding with plans to extend the "homelands policy" to Namibia.

United Nations
General Assembly

Report of the Special Com-
mittee on the Situation
with Regard to the Imple-
mentation of the Declaration
of the Granting of Indepen-
dence to Colonial Countries
and Peoples, 26th Session,
Supplement No. 23A
(A/8423/Rev.1/Add.1), New
York, 1975, 187 pp.

The Special Committee was mandated by General Assembly resolution in December 1970 to examine the activities of foreign economic and other interests which were impeding independence in colonial areas, among them Southern Rhodesia and Namibia. This report includes the text of the conclusions and recommendations adopted by the Committee. The working paper on Namibia (pp. 11-85) shows the extent of foreign investment in the various sectors of the Namibian economy: mining, fishing and stock raising.

APPENDIX II

A SELECTED AND ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY ON SOTHERN AFRICA

POLITICAL - NAMIBIA

AUTHOR

United Nations
General Assembly

TITLE OF PUBLICATION

Report of the Special Com-
mittee on the Situation
with Regard to the Imple-
mentation of the Declaration
on the Granting of
Independence to Colonial
Countries and Peoples, 31st
Session, A/31/23/Add.3,
29 September 1976, 43 pp.

SYNOPSIS

Chapter IX of this report concerns Namibia, the subject of the Special Committee's attention during May and June of 1976. The national liberation movement of Namibia, SWAPO, was invited to participate in an observer capacity in the Committee's deliberation of this issue. Among other decisions adopted by the Committee was its reaffirmation of SWAPO as "the authentic representative of the people of Namibia." The report summarizes the political developments beginning with Security Council resolution 366 of 1974 which condemns the illegal occupation of Namibia by South Africa. It also traces South African policy in Namibia (the establishment of homelands in Ovamboland, Kavangoland, and East Caprivi) as well as giving a brief account of the liberation struggle.

United Nations,
Department of
Political Affairs,
Trusteeship and
Decolonization

"Issue on Namibia," in
Decolonization, Vol. 1,
No. 3, December 1974, 59 pp.

Decolonization is an official publication of the UN Department of Political Affairs. The special issue on Namibia gives background information and traces the history of United Nations Involvement in the Namibia question. It also includes extracts from statements and letters submitted at the 29th session of the General Assembly, such as representatives of SWAPO and the United Nations Council for Namibia.

APPENDIX II

A SELECTED AND ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY ON SOUTHERN AFRICA

POLITICAL - NAMIBIA

AUTHOR

United States
Congress, House
of Representa-
tives

TITLE OF PUBLICATION

Critical Developments in
Namibia, 93rd Congress,
Washington, D.C., Govern-
ment Printing Office,
1974.

SYNOPSIS

This is a collection of testimonies and statements on Namibia before the Congress. It includes numerous tables and charts as well as assorted articles and reports. It is the most comprehensive single U.S. government publication on Namibia alone, and focuses on American investments in that country.

APPENDIX II

A SELECTED AND ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY ON SOUTHERN AFRICA

ECONOMIC - NAMIBIA

AUTHOR

Berg, Elliot,
et al

TITLE OF PUBLICATION

"Namibia: Economic Growth,
Structure and Prospects,"
Occasional Paper No. 4,
Interim Report on Namibia,
60 pp.

SYNOPSIS

This paper was submitted under contract to the Southern Africa Project by the Center for Research on Economic Development. It provides a summary of recent economic growth as well as political evolution. The body of the paper focuses on three key economic sectors: mining, agriculture, and fishing. It points out the extraordinary disabilities to be faced by an independent Namibia such as the limited pool of skilled African labor and the institutional void. Most prominent of its advantages, however, will be its abundance of mineral resources.

Corporate
Information
Center

Church Investments,
Corporations, and Southern
Africa, published for the
Corporate Information
Center, New York 1973,
241 pp.

The CIC has been active in collecting information on investments in Southern Africa for several years and has testified before Congress, arguing for restriction on U.S. investments. This study provides profiles on the investments of American firms in the region. It includes appendices on Congressional actions, United Nations actions, resources, liberation movements, and support for disengagement.

APPENDIX II

A SELECTED AND ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY ON SOUTHERN AFRICA

ECONOMIC - NAMIBIA

<u>AUTHOR</u>	<u>TITLE OF PUBLICATION</u>	<u>SYNOPSIS</u>
Courtney, Winifred and Jennifer Davis	<u>Namibia: U.S. Corporate Involvement, The Africa Fund, New York, March 1972, 32 pp.</u>	This pamphlet was published in cooperation with the World Council of Churches and the Africa Fund. It is critical of the disparity between American statements in support of African aspirations and the realities of U.S. investments in Namibia. It describes the role of several key American firms and the working conditions of African laborers.
<u>Financial Mail</u>	"Desert Deadlock: South West Africa," in <u>Financial Mail, Special Survey, Johannesburg, March 2, 1973, 67 pp.</u>	This special issue of <u>Financial Mail</u> centers on the relationship of Namibia to South Africa. "To lose SWA would be to lose a limb," it has been said. The article tells why South Africa has held on so tenaciously to the territory over the last 27 years.
Gervasi, Sean	"The South West African Economy," in <u>South West Africa: Travesty of Trust, Ronald Segal and Ruth First (editors), London, Andre Deutsch, 1967, pp. 128-149</u>	Although this paper does not trace the history of economic growth in Namibia, it does present the pattern of development in the late 1960's as the outcome of the past. It contests the conclusion of the Odendaal Commission that economic development under the Mandate had proceeded rapidly and evenly. On the contrary, economic policy has been such as to ensure economic dualism, that the backward sectors remain backward.

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A SELECTED AND ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF SOUTHERN AFRICA

ECONOMIC - NAMIBIA

<u>AUTHOR</u>	<u>TITLE OF PUBLICATION</u>	<u>SYNOPSIS</u>
Investor Responsibility Research Center	"Withdrawal from Namibia," Analysis No. 5, April 3, 1973, Washington, D.C., 20 pp.	The IRRC conducts research on corporate responsibility of American firms operating in Southern Africa. It issues reports alerting shareholders of these corporations as to the issues surrounding their presence in Namibia. IRRC analyzes the likely consequences of following resolutions such as a halt to investment activity.
Jepson, Trevor	<u>Rio Tinto Zinc in Namibia</u> , London, Christian Concern for Southern Africa, May 1976, 19 pp.	This pamphlet examines the activities of the British-based group of mining and industrial companies known as Rio-Tinto Zinc. Its focus is on the uranium mine which is being developed at Rossing in Namibia, a project which raises both legal and strategic questions since it concerns South Africa's nuclear capability.
Kramer, Reed and Tami Hultman	<u>Tsumeb: A Profile of U.S. Contribution to Under- development in Namibia</u> , New York, Corporate Information Center, April 1973, 35 pp.	American Metal Climax and Newmont Mining Company each have substantial shares in Tsumeb Corporation. These two companies control and substantially own the major American investment in Namibia through Tsumeb, which is itself the territory's leading producer of base metals as well as the largest private employer. This paper raises questions about the implication of Tsumeb's employment practices and its complicity with the system of apartheid.

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A SELECTED AND ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY ON SOUTHERN AFRICA

ECONOMIC - NAMIBIA

<u>AUTHOR</u>	<u>TITLE OF PUBLICATION</u>	<u>SYNOPSIS</u>
Lissner, Jorgen	<u>Namibia 1975: Hope, Fear and Ambiguity</u> , Geneva, Lutheran World Federation, February 1976, 130 pp.	The Lutheran church is among the most active in Namibia. This book, which is a collection of articles, was published by the Federation's Department of Studies in Geneva. The chapter on the Namibian economy (pp. 84-102) includes four excerpts from speeches and articles on the present and future aspects of economic life.
Murray, Roger, et al	<u>The Role of Foreign Firms in Namibia: Studies in External Investments and Black Workers' Conditions</u> , Africa Publications Trust, Uppsala, Sweden, 1974, 220 pp.	The Study Project on External Investments was established under the joint sponsorship of five institutes and centers concerned with Southern Africa. Its task was to determine what relationship exists "between external investments and the socio-economic situations of South Africa and Namibia." This volume seeks to answer that question, first with a discussion of the various sectors of the Namibian economy and then an examination of black workers, followed by a summary of the legal aspects of investment in Namibia.
Rogers, Barbara	<u>Foreign Investment in Namibia</u> , New York, United Nations Council for Namibia, March 5, 1975, 134 pp.	This study was prepared for the UN Council for Namibia by Ms. Rogers as a consultant. It draws upon the work of the UN Secretariat as well as individuals. The first several chapters cover the role of foreign investment, African workers and a survey of investment by country. The final chapter centers on investment in Namibia as an international issue. There are appendices on the financial relationship between South Africa and Namibia and other economic indices.

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A SELECTED AND ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY ON SOUTHERN AFRICA

ECONOMIC SECTOR - NAMIBIA

<u>AUTHOR</u>	<u>TITLE OF PUBLICATION</u>	<u>SYNOPSIS</u>
Rogers, Barbara	<u>Namibia's Uranium: Implications for the South African Occupational Regime</u> , June 1975 (mimeograph), 100 pp.	In this paper the author focuses on the critical question of uranium production and South Africa's nuclear weapons capability. She shows the importance of the Rossing Uranium mine, run by the Rio-Tinto Zinc Corporation and its vast potential. It is expected to be the biggest opencast mining project in Southern Africa. The role of foreign interests in uranium mining is further documented.
South Africa Department of Foreign Affairs	<u>South West Africa Survey: 1974</u> , Pretoria, Government Printer, 1975, 70 pp.	The Department of Foreign Affairs allots considerable attention to the South African point of view on Namibia's legal status and the political debate surrounding it. The Survey also includes a section on the territory's government and administration, general economic development, and human resources.
United Nations, Economic Commission for Africa	<u>Summaries of Economic Data: Namibia</u> , figures for 1973 compiled in December 1974, 17 pp.	The Namibia country profile for 1973 gives summary statistics on each sector of the economy, some of it out of date. Often it is necessary to extrapolate Namibian data from South African sources since Namibia is not listed as a separate entity. Tables include employment, mineral production, agricultural production, manufacturing, transport, education, etc.

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ECONOMIC - NAMIBIA

AUTHOR

United Nations
Food and
Agricultural
Organization

TITLE OF PUBLICATION

"Namibia: A Preliminary
Note Towards a Country
Development Brief (Revised),"
March 1976, 51 pp.

SYNOPSIS

Chapter I of this country brief outlines the national economy. The second chapter focuses upon the agricultural sector: livestock, land settlement, crop production, nutrition, forestry, wildlife, tourism, and fisheries. The appendix includes several maps showing population growth, rainfall, crops, and water development.

APPENDIX II

A SELECTED AND ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY ON SOUTHERN AFRICA

HUMAN RESOURCES - NAMIBIA

<u>AUTHOR</u>	<u>TITLE OF PUBLICATION</u>	<u>SYNOPSIS</u>
Fraenkel, Peter	<u>The Namibians of South West Africa</u> , Minority Rights Group, Report No. 19, London, 1974, 48 pp.	The Minority Rights Group is an international research and information unit registered in Britain. This study provides a brief background on Namibia, recent developments, and a section on how South Africa uses Namibia. Part V examines the myth of separate development, including a useful description of the labor situation and the causes of the 1971 strike.
Kaplan, Irving, et al	<u>Area Handbook for the Republic of South Africa</u> , American University Foreign Area Studies, Washington, D.C., 1971, pp. 755-782	The appendix of this handbook provides an overview of Namibia, including population and ethnic groups, education, the economy, labor, and transportation.
Murray, Roger, et al	<u>The Role of Foreign Firms in Namibia</u> , Africa Publications Trust, Uppsala, Sweden, 1974 (previously cited in the economic section)	Of particular relevance to human resources development and manpower is the chapter on black workers in Namibia. There is treatment of the composition of black workers, wages, labor legislation, life in the urban locations as well as the rural areas, and reference to the educational and health systems (pp. 130-180).

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HUMAN RESOURCES - NAMIBIA

<u>AUTHOR</u>	<u>TITLE OF PUBLICATION</u>	<u>SYNOPSIS</u>
South Africa	"Regulations for the Establishment of Employment Bureaux in the Territory of South West Africa," in <u>Government Gazette</u> , (Proclamation No. R. 323, 22 December 1972), pp. 1-11.	This proclamation by the President of South Africa provides for the establishment of an unemployment bureau for every Native Commissioner's area of jurisdiction and stipulates the functions of the employment officer. A special permit is required of the worker to seek employment within the "non-proclaimed areas" (i.e., an African seeking employment in white areas).
South Africa	"Dissolution of the New South West Africa Native Labour Association (PYT) and Establishment of Fund and Administration Thereof," in <u>Government Gazette</u> (Proclamation No. R. 69, 14 March 1975), pp. 1-4.	According to the proclamation the object of the Labor Promotion Fund is the "promotion of the general labor interests, labor relations, training and education of Native laborers and matters directly connected therewith." This represents the South African government's belated attempt to bridge the manpower gap in skilled African labor.
South Africa	<u>South West Africa Survey 1974</u> , Department of Foreign Affairs, Pretoria, 1975, 70 pp.	Before publication of the official <u>Survey 1974</u> , the only previous publication had been the <u>Survey 1967</u> . Considerable attention is paid to the South African position on its supposed mandate and the history of the International Court of Justice decisions. The Survey does include sections on government administration, economic development, education, and health services in Namibia.

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HUMAN RESOURCES - NAMIBIA

<u>AUTHOR</u>	<u>TITLE OF PUBLICATION</u>	<u>SYNOPSIS</u>
South Africa	<u>South West Africa Administration: White Paper on the Activities of the Different Branches for 1975</u> , 99 pp.	The information presented in this document by officials is largely self-servicing, sprinkled with doses of trivia to pad the statistics. It gives a picture of a smooth-running bureaucracy in each administrative branch: education, health services, law, local government, tourism, and communications infrastructure.
United Nations General Assembly	"Establishment of the Institute for Namibia," United Nations Council for Namibia, A/AC.131/34, 7 October 1974, 6 pp.	The United Nations Council for Namibia adopted a plan for the establishment of the institute for Namibia on September 27, 1974. The Institute is located in Lusaka, Zambia. Its purpose is to undertake research, training, planning and related activities toward assisting Namibians to attain independence. This document describes the functions and curriculum of the Institute.
United Nations, General Assembly	<u>Report of the United Nations Council for Namibia, Vols. 1 and 2</u> , 29th Session. Supplement No. 24, A/9624, New York, 1974; also 30th Session, Supplement No. 24, A/10024, 2 volumes.	The Report of the Council for Namibia provides a comprehensive source of information on Namibia, including political developments, foreign economic interest, South African legislation on Namibia, and activities of the Council. Volume II consists of annexes describing the organization of the work of the Council, monitoring of UN resolutions on Namibia, reports on political prisoners from Namibia held by South Africa, as well as a lengthy guide to foreign companies operating in the country.

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A SELECTED AND ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY ON SOUTHERN AFRICA

HUMAN RESOURCES - NAMIBIA

<u>AUTHOR</u>	<u>TITLE OF PUBLICATION</u>	<u>SYNOPSIS</u>
United Nations General Assembly	<u>Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</u> , 29th Session, Supplement No. 12, A/9612 New York, 1974, 53 pp; also 30th Session, Supplement No. 12, A/10012, 1975 63 pp.	The Report of the UNHCR's activities includes a summary of material assistance to refugees in Africa in the areas of voluntary repatriation, resettlement, local settlement, education and training, and counseling. The country report on Zambia indicates the presence of Zimbabwean and Namibian refugees in UNHCR programs. The report further shows the relationship of UNHCR programs with other UN agencies. The annexes contain tables on sources of funding and allocation of funds.
United Nations General Assembly	<u>Report of the Secretary General</u> , United Nations Educational and Training Programme for Southern Africa, 31st Session, agenda item 89, A/31/268, 26 October 1976, 17 pp.	The UN Education and Training Programme for Southern Africa was established by a resolution of December 19, 1967, integrating earlier programs to assist southern Africans. The report indicates the amount of contributions of member nations, the number of scholarships awarded and the country of origin of the recipients, and includes a table of the countries and fields of study of scholarship holders. Figures for Namibia and Rhodesia are included.

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A SELECTED AND ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY ON SOUTHERN AFRICA

HUMAN RESOURCES - NAMIBIA

<u>AUTHOR</u>	<u>TITLE OF PUBLICATION</u>	<u>SYNOPSIS</u>
Watson, James	"Health Consequences of Transition in Namibia," Occasional Paper No. 6, <u>Interim Report on Namibia</u> , 40 pp.	This paper was submitted to the Southern Africa Project on contract. It is an assessment of the health care delivery system in Namibia. Among its conclusions is that an acute manpower shortage is becoming increasingly evident in Namibia, that health services are not keeping pace with the needs of the population, and that the present system is fragmented and unbalanced. The paper identifies problems of an immediate nature posed by the transition.
Wilks, Brian	"Outline of the Main Aspects of Manpower and Education Needs for Namibia in a Situation of Transition to Majority Rule," Occasional Paper No. 5, <u>Interim Report on Namibia</u> , 16 pp.	This paper was submitted to the Southern Africa Project on contract. It notes that there are "only superficial human resource parallels between a nascent Zimbabwe and Namibia." The magnitude of manpower and educational problems to be faced by Namibia is smaller, due to the small population and less sophisticated economy, particularly the absence of a significant industrial and manufacturing sector.

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A SELECTED AND ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY ON SOUTHERN AFRICA

HUMAN RESOURCES - NAMIBIA

AUTHOR

World Health
Organization

TITLE OF PUBLICATION

Conference on Health
Coordination and Coopera-
tion in Africa, Report of
the Yaounde Meeting, 25-26
September 1975, WHO,
Regional Office for Africa,
Brazzaville, 261 pp.

SYMPOSIUM

WHO has yet to undertake programs in Namibia or Rhodesia. Nevertheless, its activities in other parts of the continent provide an indication of the types of programs which could be initiated in Southern Africa. The report of the Yaounde meeting provides a definition of the problems in health: planning and coordination, disease control, manpower training, and research. It indicates which agencies, both international and private, are working the field of health services and the types of programs funded.

APPENDIX III
SOUTHERN AFRICA PROJECT
INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE TO ZIMBABWE AND NAMIBIA (Public and Private)

(The financial data collected concerning the past and current expenditures for the two countries represents the data available to the Southern Africa Project as of December 1976)

Name/Location of Program and Funding Agency	Funds Allocated	Operating Agency	Description/Comments
Southern Africa Project, Washington, DC/ U.S. Dept. of State / AID Africa Bureau, Eastern and Southern Africa <u>1/</u> Development Training for Southern Africans, U.S. Dept. of State / AID Africa <u>2/</u> (Cont. next page)	\$340,000 FY 1977 \$ 677,000 FY 1976 \$1,139,000 FY 1977 \$ 551,000 FY 1978 \$ 248,000 FY 1979 \$ 128,000 FY 1980 \$2,742,690 TOTAL	African-American Scholars Council Washington, D.C. African-American Institute and Phelps Stokes Fund in cooperation with CU/AF	In anticipation of majority rule, will identify potential political, economic, social and human resource problems arising from the transition to majority rule and suggest appropriate programmatic responses. To provide and supplement development-related training for African nationals from countries presently under minority rule in preparation for filling priority manpower development needs upon majority rule. Funding provided for the training of approximately 50 Zimbabwe students in the U.S. and 20 in Africa; ten Namibian and

1/ Agency for International Development. Appropriations/Legislation. AASC Contract #AID/Afr-C-1254.

2/ Agency for International Development. Project Paper Facesheet. Project #690-11-690-063.

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SOUTHERN AFRICA PROJECT

INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE TO ZIMBABWE AND NAMIBIA (Public and Private)

Name/Location of Program and Funding Agency	Funds Allocated	Operating Agency	Description/Comments
<p>Bureau, Eastern and Southern Africa <u>2/</u></p> <p>United Nations Education and Training Program for Southern Africa <u>3/</u></p>	<p>\$9,707,260 Total Income for the programme since January 1, 1968 - includes voluntary contributions from governments and the public, subventions from the regular budget of the (cont. next page)</p>	<p>The Office of Technical Cooperation and UNDP</p>	<p>Southern African refugee students in the U.S. and 20 in Africa, and to supplement CU/AF programs within South Africa and Namibia. Training in the U.S. to emphasize graduate work.</p> <p>Established by the General Assembly in resolution 2349 (XXII) of December 19, 1967 by integrating earlier special programs to assist persons from Namibia, South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and territories under Portuguese rule. First award given in 1968.</p>

2/ Agency for International Development. Project Paper Facesheet. Project #690-11-690-063.

3/ United Nations Educational and Training Program for Southern Africa. U.N. Personnel. New York, New York. December 3, 1976.

APPENDIX III
SOUTHERN AFRICA PROJECT
INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE TO ZIMBABWE AND NAMIBIA (Public and Private)

Name/Location of Program and Funding Agency	Funds Allocated	Operating Agency	Description/Comments				
United Nations Education and Training Program for Southern Africa (cont'd) ^{3/}	U.N. and interest income. \$194,954 in pledges are outstanding and not included in the total figure above.		<u>Academic Year</u>	<u>Zimbabwean Scholarships</u>		<u>Namibian Scholarships</u>	
				<u>Holder</u> s	<u>Awards Completed</u>	<u>Holder</u> s	<u>Awards Completed</u>
			70/71	111	37	67	3
			71/72	148	45	78	9
			72/73	191	41	81	21
			73/74	268	59	73	25
			74/75	389	52	157	11
			75/76	363	66	163	30

^{3/} United Nations Educational and Training Program for Southern Africa. U.N. Personnel. New York, New York. December 3, 1976.

APPENDIX III
SOUTHERN AFRICA PROJECT
INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE TO ZIMBABWE AND NAMIBIA (Public and Private)

Name/Location of Program and Funding Agency	Funds Allocated	Operating Agency	Description/Comments
<p>United Nations Development Programme: Assistance to National Liberation Movements (NLM's) ^{4/}</p> <p>A. <u>Zimbabwe</u></p> <p>ANC (ANC/75/001) Zambia</p> <p>ANC (ANC/75/002) Zambia</p>	<p>\$3.31 million funded to date for NLM projects in the course of implementation. The Funds are allocated for 3 year periods and are revised upward each year if required.</p> <p>\$223,000</p> <p>\$272,530</p>	<p>UNDP and Specialized Agencies</p> <p>UNESCO</p> <p>UNESCO</p>	<p>The NLM Trust Fund covers \$2.4 million, the balance being financed from the general resources of the Programme and the Programme Reserve. The Namibia Institute cooperates in funding the Namibia projects.</p> <p>The educational assistance programs take the form of teachers, salaries, stipends for support personnel and equipment.</p> <p>Educational Assistance</p> <p>Educational Assistance</p> <p>Steps are being taken to merge these two projects and establish improved channels</p>

^{4/} United Nations Development Program. Division for Eastern and Southern Africa. U.N. Personnel. New York, New York, December 3, 1976. The majority of project titles and descriptions were taken from: United Nations Development Programme. Assistance to Colonial Countries and Peoples, Report of the Administrator. December 9, 1975. DP/163.

APPENDIX III
SOUTHERN AFRICA PROJECT
INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE TO ZIMBABWE AND NAMIBIA (Public and Private)

Name/Location of Program and Funding Agency	Funds Allocated	Operating Agency	Description/Comments
UNDP Assistance to NLM's (cont'd)			of communication in order to accelerate implementation and meet new needs.
ANC (ANC/74/001) Zambia	\$ 31,200	ILO	Administrative Organization and Training
<u>B. Namibia</u>			
SWAPO (SWP/75/001) Zambia	\$151,500	UNESCO	Educational Assistance
SWAPO (SWP/75/002) Zambia	\$250,000	UNESCO	Health Projects
<u>C. Multi-NLM Projects</u>			
NLM/74/001 Nkumbi International College, Zambia	\$229,715	UNESCO	Educational Assistance

4/ United Nations Development Program. Division for Eastern and Southern Africa. U.N. Personnel. New York, New York. December 3, 1976. The majority of project titles and descriptions were taken from: United Nations Development Programme. Assistance to Colonial Countries and Peoples, Report of the Administrator. December 9, 1976. DP/163.

APPENDIX III
SOUTHERN AFRICA PROJECT
INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE TO ZIMBABWE AND NAMIBIA (Public and Private)

Name/Location of Program and Funding Agency	Funds Allocated	Operating Agency	Description/Comments
UNDP Assistance to NLM's (cont'd) C. <u>Multi-NLM Projects</u>			
English Language Training in Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania	Funded (in parts), from NLM/74/001 and FNLA (FNA/75/001). The latter being an educational assistance project to FNLA.	UNESCO	English Language Training
Multi-purpose health center/ Morogora, Tanzania	\$600,000	WHO	A newly established health facility assisting the education of NLM's in all facets of health
UNICEF programmes in favor of NLM's	\$500,000 from the NLM Trust Fund	UNICEF	UNICEF has failed, as of this writing, to implement any programs and UNDP is considering withdrawal of its funds.

4/ United Nations Development Program. Division for Eastern and Southern Africa. U.N. Personnel. New York, New York. December 3, 1976. The majority of project titles and descriptions were taken from: United Nations Development Programme. Assistance to Colonial Countries and Peoples, Report of the Administrator. December 9, 1976. DP/163.

APPENDIX III
SOUTHERN AFRICA PROJECT
INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE TO ZIMBABWE AND NAMIBIA (Public and Private)

Name/Location of Program and Funding Agency	Funds Allocated	Operating Agency	Description/Comments
World Council of Churches, 475 Riverside Drive, New York, New York <u>5/</u>	\$83,500 FY 1975	ANC/Zimbabwe	These monies reflect contributions for educational or humanitarian purposes to be used at the discretion of the liberation groups.
	\$30,000 Total FY 1970, 1971, 1974	ZAPU/Zimbabwe	
	\$30,000 Total FY 1970, 1971, 1974	ZANU/Zimbabwe	
	\$83,500 FY 1975	SWAPO/Namibia	
	\$80,000 Total FY 1970, 1971, 1973, 1974		

5/ World Council of Churches. Personnel. December 7, 1976.

APPENDIX III
SOUTHERN AFRICA PROJECT
INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE TO ZIMBABWE AND NAMIBIA (Public and Private)

Name/Location of Program and Funding Agency	Funds Allocated	Operating Agency	Description/Comments
Churches <u>6/</u> Brethren in Christ Missions/Zimbabwe Central Africa Mission/Zimbabwe Evangelical Alliance Mission/Zimbabwe Foreign Mission Board of Southern Baptist Convention/Zimbabwe General Conference of Seventh Day Adventists/Zimbabwe	\$ 460,000 * \$1,407,393 * \$1,520,000 * \$2,249,885 * \$1,094,000 *		For medical, educational and humanitarian remittances. No more specific breakdowns in the funds allocated are available at this time. [Same as above] [Same as above] [Same as above] [Same as above]

6/ U.S. House. Implications for U.S. International Legal Obligations of the Presence of the Rhodesian Information Office in the U.S. Ninety-Third Congress (1st Session). May, 1973. pp. 136-139.

*NOTE: The above mentioned contributions comprise a partial list only representing substantial contributions for the period of time covered between July 29, 1968 to May 15, 1973. A complete listing may be found in the Hearings.

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SOUTHERN AFRICA PROJECT
INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE TO ZIMBABWE AND NAMIBIA (Public and Private)

Name/Location of Program and Funding Agency	Funds Allocated	Operating Agency	Description/Comments
<p>Churches (Cont'd)</p> <p>World Division of the Board of Missions of the United Methodist Church/Zimbabwe</p> <p>United Church Board for World Ministries/Zimbabwe</p>	<p>\$3,904,000 *</p> <p>\$1,825,000 *</p>		<p>For medical, educational and humanitarian remittances. No more specific breakdowns in the funds allocated are available at this time.</p> <p>[Same as above]</p>

6/ U.S. House. Implications for U.S. International Legal Obligations of the Presence of the Rhodesian Information Office in the U.S. Ninety-Third Congress (1st Session). May, 1973.

*NOTE: The above mentioned contributions comprise a partial list only representing substantial contributions for the period of time between July 29, 1968 to May 15, 1973. A complete listing may be found in the Hearings

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SOUTHERN AFRICA PROJECT
INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE TO ZIMBABWE AND NAMIBIA (Public and Private)

Name/Location of Program and Funding Agency	Funds Allocated	Operating Agency	Description/Comments
United Nations Institute for Namibia/Lusaka, Zambia <u>7/</u>	\$3,129,490 FY 1976 \$2,806,490 FY 1977 \$3,168,440 FY 1978 \$3,600,350 FY 1979 \$4,109,480 FY 1980 <u>\$16,814,250 Total</u> Funding comes from the U.N. Fund for Namibia, contributions by governments and institutions and approximately \$300,000 per year from the regular budget of the U.N.	A Senate consisting of 11 members and a management board of 6 members: The director of the Institute sits on the management board. The president of the U.N. Council for Namibia or his nominee, a member appointed by the govt. of Zambia, one appointed by OAU, two appointed by SWAPO & the U.N. Commissioner for Namibia or his deputy, and others comprise the Senate.	Inaugurated on August 26, 1976 the Institute has as its purpose to undertake research, training, planning and related activities for the Namibian struggle for independence. Also, to prepare and where appropriate publish memoranda, studies, draft legislation and report on various aspects of the research work undertaken. Furthermore, to prepare, on the basis of the research carried out, the basic documentation (statistics, memoranda, briefs and blueprints) that may be required by the government departments of an independent Namibia. The Institute is set up to operate, under U.N. supervision, for 5 years.

7/ The information on the U.N. Institute for Namibia was obtained from U.N. Commission for Namibia personnel in New York on December 15, 1976.

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SOUTHERN AFRICA PROJECT
INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE TO ZIMBABWE AND NAMIBIA (Public and Private)

Name/Location of Program and Funding Agency	Funds Allocated	Operating Agency	Description/Comments
Swedish Government assistance to National Liberation Movements <u>8/</u> Zimbabwe/ZANU Zimbabwe, ZAPU Namibia, SWAPO	\$ 72,000 1973/74 216,000 1974/75 \$ 12,000 1973/74 12,000 1974/75 \$ 120,000 1973/74 288,000 1974/75 720,000 1975/76 1,200,000 1976/77	The Swedish International Development Authority (SIDA) is responsible for the administration of most of the aid programme.	The government's assistance programme has been designed in accordance with the rules of international law and in accordance with recommendations and resolutions adopted by the U.N. Aid is granted for humanitarian assistance to NLM's, educational assistance to refugees and legal and humanitarian assistance to victims of apartheid. Aid to liberation movements was initiated in 1968 and the total amount thus far amounts to about 24 million dollars.*

8/ Swedish Assistance to Victims of Colonization and Apartheid in Southern Africa. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 1(4). The Ministry lists the contributions in Kronor. They were converted to dollars according to the interbank middle rate December 15, 1976.

*NOTE: Breakdowns in education for refugees and legal and humanitarian assistance to victims of apartheid for Zimbabweans and Namibians are not available at this time.

APPENDIX III
SOUTHERN AFRICA PROJECT
INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE TO ZIMBABWE AND NAMIBIA (Public and Private)

Name/Location of Program and Funding Agency	Funds Allocated	Operating Agency	Description/Comments
<p>United Nations High Commission for Refugees ^{9/}</p> <p>Botswana</p>	<p>Aid to Namibian refugees from Trust Funds:</p> <p style="text-align: center;">1976 Revised Alloca- tions/ <u>Estimates</u></p> <p><u>1975</u></p> <p>\$40,000 \$45,000</p>	<p>U.N.H.C.R.</p>	<p>\$45,000 has been committed for the care, maintenance and transportation of some 185 Namibians of whom 85 are being processed for resettlement. There has been a recent influx of refugees from Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe.</p>
<p>Mozambique</p>	<p>Aid to Zimbabwean refugees from the Annual Programme for local settlement:</p>	<p>U.N.H.C.R.</p>	<p>25,000 Zimbabwean refugees were located in Mozambique by mid-year. The figure today is estimated by U.N.H.C.R. at 30,000. The local settlement aid covers assistance to newly arrived or non-settled refugees, seed, tools,</p>

^{9/} U.N. General Assembly. Report on U.N.H.C.R. Assistance Activities in 1975-1976 and Proposed Voluntary Funds Programme and Budget for 1977. August 16, 1976. (A/AC. 96/526).

APPENDIX III
SOUTHERN AFRICA PROJECT
INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE TO ZIMBABWE AND NAMIBIA (Public and Private)

Name/Location of Program and Funding Agency	Funds Allocated	Operating Agency	Description/Comments		
<p>U.N.H.C.R. (cont'd)</p> <p>Mozambique (cont'd)</p>	<table style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <td style="width: 50%; vertical-align: top;"> <p>1976 Revised Allocations/Estimates</p> <p>\$500,000</p> <p>Aid to Zimbabwean refugees from the Emergency Fund:</p> <p>\$450,000</p> </td> <td style="width: 50%; vertical-align: top;"> <p>1977 Proposed Allocations/projections</p> <p>\$350,000</p> <p>1975</p> </td> </tr> </table>	<p>1976 Revised Allocations/Estimates</p> <p>\$500,000</p> <p>Aid to Zimbabwean refugees from the Emergency Fund:</p> <p>\$450,000</p>	<p>1977 Proposed Allocations/projections</p> <p>\$350,000</p> <p>1975</p>	<p>U.N.H.C.R.</p>	<p>tractors, pesticides and pumps for their agricultural integration, and any necessary administrative expenditure. Dispensaries and temporary schools could also be constructed from these funds.</p> <p>In December, 1975 the High Commissioner made this money available to assist Zimbabwean refugees in the provinces of Manica, Sofala and Tete. Initially, they needed transportation and immediate relief; subsequently they were given assistance towards their temporary settlement such as domestic utensils and agricultural equipment, seed and pumps. The influx from Zimbabwe is continuing.</p>
<p>1976 Revised Allocations/Estimates</p> <p>\$500,000</p> <p>Aid to Zimbabwean refugees from the Emergency Fund:</p> <p>\$450,000</p>	<p>1977 Proposed Allocations/projections</p> <p>\$350,000</p> <p>1975</p>				

9/ U.N. General Assembly. Report on U.N.H.C.R. Assistance Activities in 1975-1976 and Proposed Voluntary Funds Programme and Budget for 1977. August 16, 1976. (A/AC. 96/526).

APPENDIX III
SOUTHERN AFRICA PROJECT
INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE TO ZIMBABWE AND NAMIBIA (Public and Private)

Name/Location of Program and Funding Agency	Funds Allocated	Operating Agency	Description/Comments
U.N.H.C.R. (Cont'd)			
Zaire	Aid to Zimbabwean refugees from Trust Funds: \$5,793 1975	U.N.H.C.R.	Obligated by U.N.H.C.R. from funds made available by the Council of Namibia to assist a group of students in need of subsistence and support during studies or apprenticeships.
Zambia	From the Annual Programme for lower secondary education: <u>1977 Proposed Allocations/ Projections</u> \$174,000	U.N.H.C.R.	The government estimates there are 3,400 Namibian refugees out of a total refugee population of 36,000. There are Zimbabwean refugees but no figure for their number is available. \$150,000 of this sum is proposed to provide over 100 Namibian students with maintenance and scholarships.

9/ U.N. General Assembly Report on U.N.H.C.R. Assistance Activities in 1975-1976 and Proposed Voluntary Funds Programme and Budget for 1977. August 16, 1976. (A/AC. 96/526).

APPENDIX III
SOUTHERN AFRICA PROJECT
INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE TO ZIMBABWE AND NAMIBIA (Public and Private)

Name/Location of Program and Funding Agency	Funds Allocated	Operating Agency	Description/Comments
<p>United Nations Fund for Namibia (cont'd) <u>10/</u></p> <p>United Nations Fund for Namibia - Country Programs: <u>11/</u></p> <p>Scholarships and Stipends for 1975 in Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Zaire, and Zambia</p>	<p>Total allocations from the regular budget of the U.N.:</p> <p>\$700,000 1971-76</p> <p>\$144,194 1975</p>	<p>Joint Refugee Service of Kenya, the Aga Khan Academy, Nkumbi International College, Evelyn Hone College and others others.</p>	<p>For technical and vocational training, secretarial training, radio broadcasting, secondary training and remedial and English language training for 97 Namibians.</p>

10/ U.N. Commission for Namibia. Commission Personnel. December 7, 1976. (Total budgetary information.)

11/ U.N. General Assembly. Report of the United Nations Council for Namibia. Volume II - Thirty-First Session. Supplement No. 24. New York October 1976. (A/31/24). pp. 131-133.

APPENDIX III
SOUTHERN AFRICA PROJECT
INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE TO ZIMBABWE AND NAMIBIA (Public and Private)

Name/Location of Program and Funding Agency	Funds Allocated	Operating Agency	Description/Comments
<p>United Nations Fund for Namibia - Country Programs (cont'd)</p> <p>Scholarships and Stipends for 1975 in Canada, Liberia, Ghana, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, U.K. and the U.S.</p> <p>Farm Project/Zambia</p> <p>Health Clinic/Mukunda, Botswana</p>	<p>\$119,494 1975</p> <p>\$100,000 Proposed</p> <p>\$ 40,000 1975</p>	<p>UNETPSA</p> <p>SWAPO and the government of Zambia in consultation with the Fund.</p> <p>UNHCR in cooperation with the government of Botswana.</p>	<p>For 27 Namibians not covered by other programmes. The scholarships were for primary, secondary and university education.</p> <p>The location and administration of the farm project is to be agreed upon. Talks on this project have been in process for 3 years.</p> <p>The Clinic was established in the area where most of the Namibian refugees reside, to serve both them and the Botswana citizens in the area.</p>

11/ U.N. General Assembly. Report of the United Nations Council for Namibia. Volume II - Thirty-First Session. Supplement No. 24. New York October 1976. (A/31/24). pp. 131-133.

APPENDIX IV

IDENTIFICATION OF INSTITUTIONS WITH RESEARCH, EDUCATION, AND TRAINING CAPABILITIES RELATED TO SOUTHERN AFRICA

NOTE OF INTRODUCTION TO APPENDIX IV

The first portion of Appendix IV consists of profiles of institutions with programs related to Africa and with capabilities of mounting programs focused on the Southern Africa region. Information presented in these profiles was obtained through the administration of a questionnaire designed primarily with African Studies Programs in mind but to include other types of organizations as well. The selection of institutions for response to the questionnaire was determined mainly by the attendance of the Directors of African Studies Programs at the meeting of the Association of African Studies Programs in Boston in November, 1976. Others included represent organizations that have come to the attention of the Project by various other means. This presentation therefore does not represent an exhaustive search in any sense, due to the constraints of time and resources.

The second portion of Appendix IV consists of a more abbreviated description of organizations with operations in Africa considered to be particularly equipped to undertake programs related to Southern Africa. This list was compiled by the African Bibliographic Center in Washington, D.C., under contract with the Southern Africa Project. It is more indicative of the range of organizations, from churches to international agencies, that have interests in Africa.

The final portion of Appendix IV is entitled "A Catalog of Available Programs and Institutions" and refers to training in high-level management as well as high-level technical training.

APPENDIX IV

IDENTIFICATION OF INSTITUTIONS WITH RESEARCH, EDUCATION, AND TRAINING CAPABILITIES RELATED TO SOUTHERN AFRICA

NAME/ADDRESS OF INSTITUTION	CURRENT PROGRAMS	POTENTIAL CAPABILITIES
<p>African-American Scholars Council 1001 Connecticut Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036</p> <p><u>DIRECTOR</u></p> <p>Executive Director Dr. Constance B. Hilliard Phone (202) 785-4743</p> <p><u>INSTITUTIONAL AFFILIATION</u></p> <p>None</p> <p><u>PRESENT FUNDING</u></p> <p>AID and other sources</p>	<p>The African-American Scholars Council is a non-profit organization primarily devoted to research and programs which promote the economic, human, and social resource development of the African continent.</p> <p>The Scholars Council provides individual and team research grants, professional exchange grants, and conference participation grants to American and African scholars, researchers, and practitioners whose work and skills contribute to economic development in Africa. The Council provides consultants in various fields to assist African governments in solving their development problems and also organizes and supports conferences and other international meetings and workshops on a broad range of issues relating to Africa.</p> <p>AASC has established linkages with several African governments and institutions and is also engaged in development-related research activities which have been initiated by the Council itself. The Council is staffed by a team of social scientists who possess extensive knowledge and experience in African affairs.</p>	<p>The Scholars Council supports research and programs in areas dealing with agriculture, business, health and medicine, women in economic development, food and nutrition, rural development and education--particularly non-formal education. The Council also programs and supports exchanges between African and American institutions, individuals and organizations.</p> <p>The Council has the capability of linking individuals, institutions and universities in Africa with persons and institutions in the U.S. which have similar interests.</p> <p>There presently exists within AASC a mechanism for administering manpower training and development projects, through the grants program now operating. AASC has extensive ties with African institutions and education-ministries as well as with black and white educational institutions in this country. These resources could without administrative difficulty be extended to encompass the needs of Southern Africa manpower training programs.</p>

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IDENTIFICATION OF INSTITUTIONS WITH RESEARCH, EDUCATION, AND TRAINING CAPABILITIES RELATED TO SOUTHERN AFRICA

INSTITUTIONAL IDENTIFICATION	CURRENT PROGRAMS	POTENTIAL CAPABILITIES
<p>Africare 1424 16th Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036</p> <p><u>DIRECTOR</u></p> <p>C. Payne Lucas is the Executive Director of Africare. Joseph Kennedy is Secretary of the Board of Trustees.</p> <p><u>INSTITUTIONAL AFFILIATION</u></p> <p>Africare was created as a non-profit tax-exempt organization in 1972.</p> <p><u>PRESENT FUNDING</u></p> <p>Funding is derived from four major sources: large philanthropic foundations, religious and social organizations, AID, and private individuals through contributions. In 1975 Africare raised approximately \$3,000,000.</p>	<p>Africare is dedicated to improving the quality of life in rural Africa, especially in the areas of water resource development, agricultural/food production, and rural health services. A second goal is the creation of an understanding and awareness of the needs, problems and potentialities of the people of Africa on the part of the Americans, especially black Americans.</p> <p>Africare is a membership and chapter organization with annual contribution of \$1.00 and up. There are 19 chapters across the U.S.</p> <p>Africare's first program was a rural health program in Eastern Niger for the training of paramedics and nurses. In June, 1973, in response to the drought in the Sahel, the Africare Famine Relief Fund was launched to raise funds. Most of the funds collected came from people at the grassroots level in the form of small donations. With the drought coming to an end, Africare has begun to concentrate once again on intermediate and long term development programs.</p>	<p>The focus of Africare's programs has been on rural development, particularly in arid regions of the Sahel. It has 20 different programs operating in the six Sahelian countries, the Gambia, and in Ethiopia. Activities include well construction, small and large scale irrigated farming schemes, reforestation, expansion of rural health delivery systems, nomad resettlement, and integrated rural development projects.</p> <p>All of these areas will find immediate relevance in the development of Southern African countries under majority rule. They represent, in fact, the very areas most neglected under the present regimes. Africare's involvement in arid regions of the Sahel would be of particular relevance to Namibia, which shares a similar terrain and problems of agricultural development.</p>

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IDENTIFICATION OF INSTITUTIONS WITH RESEARCH, EDUCATION, AND TRAINING CAPABILITIES RELATED TO SOUTHERN AFRICA

INSTITUTIONAL IDENTIFICATION	CURRENT PROGRAMS	POTENTIAL CAPABILITIES
<p>American Graduate School of International Management Glendale, Arizona 85306</p> <p><u>DIRECTOR</u></p> <p>Karl Magyar Phone: 602-938-7665</p> <p><u>INSTITUTIONAL AFFILIATION</u></p> <p>The American Graduate School of International Management is a member of the American Management Association. There is also an association with other colleges and universities in the state, including Arizona State University and the University of Arizona.</p> <p><u>PRESENT FUNDING</u></p> <p>The International Studies Department of the Graduate School receives 90-95% of its funds from the Graduate School itself.</p>	<p>The American Graduate School of International Management was founded 30 years ago with the principal goal of preparing personnel for executive placement in world business or government service. Frequently known as Thunderbird Campus, the Graduate School has an enrollment of about 800 full-time graduate students. The faculty members include a mixture of academicians, business executives, and linguistics experts. Its 9,000 alumni hold executive or government positions in virtually every country in the world.</p> <p>The curriculum of Thunderbird is tripartite: modern languages, international studies, and world business. Its World Information and Training Service (WITS) is designed to "research and provide information on any problem or question you may have anywhere" relating to international business. In January 1977 a course on agribusiness will be initiated. Other courses include aspects of marketing and international business problems, as well as African economic development.</p>	<p>In addition to the management training offered at Thunderbird, there is available a network of development-oriented programs within the state of Arizona. Particularly worthy of mention in so far as Southern Africa is concerned, is the Department of Agricultural Economics at Arizona State University in Tempe. The faculty contact there is Professor Richard Chalquist. Courses offered include animal production in arid regions, crop production, and soil management in arid regions.</p> <p>At Arizona University Professor J. Hillman of the Agricultural Economics Department is the person to contact. Northern Arizona University in Flagstaff offers courses in anthropology and political science with Africa content. The Geography Department offers courses in arid lands and the tropics.</p>

APPENDIX IV

IDENTIFICATION OF INSTITUTIONS WITH RESEARCH, EDUCATION, AND TRAINING CAPABILITIES RELATED TO SOUTHERN AFRICA

INSTITUTIONAL IDENTIFICATION	CURRENT PROGRAMS	POTENTIAL CAPABILITIES				
<p>Boston University African Studies Center Brookline, Massachusetts</p> <p><u>DIRECTOR</u></p> <p>John R. Harris Phone: 617-734-4920</p> <p><u>INSTITUTIONAL AFFILIATION</u></p> <p>There is no affiliation with any consortium.</p> <p><u>PRESENT FUNDING</u></p> <table border="0"> <tr> <td>University</td> <td align="right">\$203,000</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Ford Foundation</td> <td align="right">74,000</td> </tr> </table>	University	\$203,000	Ford Foundation	74,000	<p>The African Studies Center at Boston was established in 1953 and was one of the first graduate programs in the U.S. to offer a multidisciplinary social science African studies curriculum. The three-year grant obtained from the Ford Foundation in 1974 supports new programs in rural development, health-service delivery, and population distribution. The Center has thus taken steps to focus on developmental problems and policy issues facing African nations.</p> <p>The Center is comprised of a staff of 24 faculty members, plus other research associates at other institutions. Program development, in addition to the areas mentioned above, include economic history, law and development, and art and anthropology. In each of these departments, research workshops have been formed, incorporating African graduate students.</p> <p>The Africana Library is well equipped in these areas. Center staff have visited Africa to identify institutions and scholars who are interested in developing research proposals.</p>	<p>From the information received, it appears that the Boston University Center has one of the most development-oriented programs in the U.S. One particular example of this is the Department of Economics Training Program on Finance in Developing Countries initiated this year.</p> <p>Through collaborative efforts, research proposals have been negotiated already with three ministries of the government of Botswana as well as a university group. A three-year project is expected to begin in 1977, given adequate funding. Other possibilities of collaboration have been explored in Zambia and Malawi as well as in other parts of Africa.</p> <p>The Center's objectives in these efforts are: to generate knowledge through research relevant to development needs, to strengthen African research institutions, and to provide the opportunity for junior African scholars to go to Boston for training as well as the exchange of senior faculty.</p>
University	\$203,000					
Ford Foundation	74,000					

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IDENTIFICATION OF INSTITUTIONS WITH RESEARCH, EDUCATION, AND TRAINING CAPABILITIES RELATED TO SOUTHERN AFRICA

INSTITUTIONAL IDENTIFICATION	CURRENT PROGRAMS	POTENTIAL CAPABILITIES								
<p>Center for Research on Economic Development Box 1248 Ann Arbor, Michigan</p> <p><u>DIRECTOR</u></p> <p>Elliot Berg Phone: 313-764-9490</p> <p><u>INSTITUTIONAL AFFILIATION</u></p> <p>CRED is a research center within the University of Michigan.</p> <p><u>PRESENT FUNDING</u></p> <table border="0"> <tr> <td>AID</td> <td align="right">\$600,000</td> </tr> <tr> <td>University</td> <td align="right">72,000</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Ford Foundation</td> <td align="right">58,000</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Rockefeller Foundation</td> <td align="right">4,000</td> </tr> </table>	AID	\$600,000	University	72,000	Ford Foundation	58,000	Rockefeller Foundation	4,000	<p>Program activities of CRED currently include cereals marketing in the Sahel, Mali Agricultural Development, Entente Livestock Project, Francophone Africa Project, Infant Mortality Study, and the Southern Africa Project of the African American Scholars Council. CRED has no teaching program but does assist foreign students in economics and other departments.</p> <p>The research staff of CRED consists of seven senior researchers, 14 teachers in the Francophone Africa Project, 10 students conducting dissertation research, six graduate fellows, six Francophone African graduate students, and eight African professional visitors.</p> <p>The Francophone Africa Project involves linkages with universities in many of the Francophone countries in teacher exchange.</p> <p>Although CRED has no technical assistance programs at present, it has been involved in the past in numerous programs with international agencies, including a planning team for the Moroccan Development Plan.</p>	<p>Through its participation in the Southern Africa Project CRED has developed a data base and familiarity with problems of economic development in Zimbabwe and Namibia.</p> <p>CRED is prepared to assist in special programs for training economists under the existing fellowship program. Of particular relevance is the masters degree program in applied economics.</p> <p>CRED also has developed extensive contacts with economic faculties and research institutions in Africa. There are faculty members and students interested in continuing research on Southern Africa and establishing contacts in the region.</p>
AID	\$600,000									
University	72,000									
Ford Foundation	58,000									
Rockefeller Foundation	4,000									

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IDENTIFICATION OF INSTITUTIONS WITH RESEARCH, EDUCATION, AND TRAINING CAPABILITIES RELATED TO SOUTHERN AFRICA

INSTITUTIONAL IDENTIFICATION	CURRENT PROGRAMS	POTENTIAL CAPABILITIES
<p>Development Alternatives, Inc. 1823 Jefferson Place, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036</p> <p><u>DIRECTOR</u></p> <p>Donald Mickelwait (President) Phone: 202-833-8140</p> <p><u>INSTITUTIONAL AFFILIATION</u></p> <p>None. DAI is a consulting firm.</p> <p><u>PRESENT FUNDING</u></p> <p>DAI currently has 95% of its contracts with AID. Other clients have been the Office of Economic Opportunity, USIA, and the Departments of Defense and the Army.</p>	<p>DAI is a Washington-based firm specializing in the identification, design, implementation, and evaluation of development projects. It has 17 researchers and analysts whose fields are economics, anthropology, and administration. Their particular capabilities include non-formal education, intermediate technology, small farmers, and women.</p> <p>In May 1975, DAI completed a two year study for AID to improve the design and implementation of projects to assist small farmers. The field research required visits to 36 projects in Africa and Latin America. DAI is under continuing contract to AID to implement the findings of the study, particularly in the field of regional development.</p> <p>During the six years since its founding, DAI has developed ties with the agricultural and financial ministries in several countries.</p>	<p>DAI has already conducted research in Southern Africa (Lesotho) in its seven-country study of the roles of women in rural development. Other projects have included farmer training in Tanzania, and development of local-level information systems in Kenya, maize production technology in Zaire, and intermediate technology in Upper Volta.</p> <p>DAI's capabilities are strongest in the design and implementation of development projects in rural areas.</p>

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IDENTIFICATION OF INSTITUTIONS WITH RESEARCH, EDUCATION, AND TRAINING CAPABILITIES RELATED TO SOUTHERN AFRICA

INSTITUTIONAL IDENTIFICATION	CURRENT PROGRAMS	POTENTIAL CAPABILITIES
<p>Duquesne University Institute of African Affairs Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania</p> <p><u>DIRECTOR</u></p> <p>Rev. Joseph Varga Phone: 412-434-6037</p> <p><u>INSTITUTIONAL AFFILIATION</u></p> <p>Duquesne University is a member of the Pittsburgh Council for Higher Education (PCHE) which groups five universities in the Pittsburgh area.</p> <p><u>PRESENT FUNDING</u></p> <p>The Institute is presently funded solely by the University, although from 1960 to 1973 it received support under Title VI of the NDEA.</p>	<p>Duquesne University is a private Catholic institution and one of the first to be designated as an African Language and Area Center by the Office of Education. The Institute has been awarded a total of 122 NDFL fellowships and has granted a total of 80 degrees at the Masters level in African Affairs.</p> <p>The faculty of the Institute presently numbers six, most of whom have had extensive experience in Africa. Its primary focus in teaching and research has been in the field of languages. Most of the research and publication has been undertaken by individual faculty members rather than in projects.</p> <p>Informal but extensive contacts are maintained with several universities in East and West Africa. A program of assistance to Secondary Education is presently under negotiation with one of the state governments of Nigeria.</p>	<p>One of the members of the faculty within the Institute, Prof. D.J.M. Muffett, has written a detailed proposal for a "ZEBRA" Program at Duquesne. The proposal is to bring 200 black Rhodesians to the University for education and training in 9 different fields, including elementary and secondary education, business administration, economics, nursing, and other health related programs.</p> <p>The rationale for the ZEBRA Program is for the U.S. to show its good faith in support of African development in Zimbabwe in an area of particular importance: education and manpower training. It is argued that this program would be "a political gesture of the kind that may be essential before matters finally resolve themselves."</p>

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IDENTIFICATION OF INSTITUTIONS WITH RESEARCH, EDUCATION, AND TRAINING CAPABILITIES RELATED TO SOUTHERN AFRICA

INSTITUTIONAL IDENTIFICATION	CURRENT PROGRAMS	POTENTIAL CAPABILITIES				
<p>Howard University African Studies & Research Program Washington, D.C.</p> <p><u>DIRECTOR</u></p> <p>Robert Cummings Phone: 202-636-7115</p> <p><u>INSTITUTIONAL AFFILIATION</u></p> <p>Howard University is a member of the Washington Consortium, comprised of seven universities, and as such as responsible for languages and African regional studies.</p> <p><u>PRESENT FUNDING</u></p> <table border="0"> <tr> <td>Office of Education, National Institute of Drug Abuse grant</td> <td>\$115,000</td> </tr> <tr> <td>University</td> <td>362,000</td> </tr> </table>	Office of Education, National Institute of Drug Abuse grant	\$115,000	University	362,000	<p>Howard University has long had a keen interest in African culture and has had one of the largest African student enrollments of any university in the U.S. Research is currently being conducted on relations between Africans and Afro-Americans in the Washington metropolitan area. Other studies under way include Berber semantic systems and an experimental TV pilot series on the impact of Africa on world cultures.</p> <p>The African Studies Program presently has 12 full time and two part time faculty members and can draw upon scholars in a wide range of disciplines who have an interest in Africa.</p> <p>Howard University boasts a long history of relations with African institutions. Its faculty members have helped establish African universities (University of Ibadan) and served as consultants to medical schools, polytechnical institutes, and national libraries. The University has shown a particular interest in international development.</p>	<p>As a unit of the Graduate School of Howard University, the Program of African Studies is well placed to coordinate a university-wide effort related to Southern Africa. Its goal is to link African Studies with the various other schools interested in international programs: Human Ecology, Education, Allied Health, Engineering, Business Administration, Medicine, and others.</p> <p>The African Studies Program has submitted a document describing a program of development related to Southern Africa, emphasizing its interdisciplinary nature. Its focus is on two types of training: 1) special training to develop specific skills for immediate use in furthering transition, and 2) programs designed to address long-range development problems. Both programs would entail training of U.S. specialists for Southern Africa and selected personnel from the region both on site and in the U.S.</p>
Office of Education, National Institute of Drug Abuse grant	\$115,000					
University	362,000					

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INSTITUTIONAL IDENTIFICATION	CURRENT PROGRAMS	POTENTIAL CAPABILITIES
<p>Indiana University African Studies Program Bloomington, Indiana</p> <p><u>DIRECTOR</u></p> <p>Patrick O'Meara is the Director of the Program at Indiana. His phone: 812-337-6825</p> <p><u>INSTITUTIONAL AFFILIATION</u></p> <p>The University is a member of MUCIA, the consortium of midwestern universities.</p> <p><u>PRESENT FUNDING</u></p> <p>Indiana receives 35% of its funds from the Office of Education, 55% from the University, and 10% from other sources.</p>	<p>The African Studies Program at Indiana has a strong Southern Africa focus already, with a teaching/administrative staff of seven Southern African specialists, and a total of 31 who teach Africa-related courses full time.</p> <p>The Program has prepared a number of training projects for Africans in recent years, including a program for new registrars at African universities, the development of an African Studies Program, and various museum and multinational journalist projects.</p> <p>Institutional linkages have been established with Haile Sellassie I University in Ethiopia through a cooperative program of academic exchange involving staff recruitment. The program also involves training for libraries from Ethiopia under this agreement.</p> <p>A book entitled <u>Southern Africa in Crisis</u> is to be published soon by Indiana Press, an indication of the research activity being focused on the region.</p> <p>A conference on the Southern African crisis is being planned for April 1977, to which a noted Zimbabwe scholar has been invited. He is Nathan Shamuyarira, a professor at the University in Dar es Salaam.</p>	<p>Indiana has a substantial concentration of staff who are knowledgeable in Southern African affairs. Technical assistance programs could be linked to at least three centers within the University:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> School of Public and Environmental Affairs International Development Institute Schools of Law and Journalism <p>The IDI, in particular, through its affiliation with MUCIA, is well equipped to undertake training in public administration and management. Some of its staff has already had experience in training administrators in Botswana.</p> <p>The Southern Africa Archival Project, which is a collection of valuable primary sources on African nationalist movements, was originally based at Indiana and is being made available to the academic community.</p>

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INSTITUTIONAL IDENTIFICATION	CURRENT PROGRAM	POTENTIAL CAPABILITIES
<p>International Management Development Institute, Inc. One Dag Hammarskjold Plaza New York, New York 10017</p> <p><u>DIRECTOR</u></p> <p>Richard Roberts, Jr. (President) Phone: 212-759-7700</p> <p><u>INSTITUTIONAL AFFILIATION</u></p> <p>None. IMDI is a private, non-profit consulting firm.</p> <p><u>PRESENT FUNDING</u></p> <p>The total income of IMDI for 1975 was \$92,800.00 derived wholly from three program contracts.</p>	<p>The stated purpose of IMDI is to do research in and to conduct educational programs for the training of nationals in the developing world in the field of business management. It conducts seminars, conferences and courses on the subject of manpower development and prepares reports on these activities.</p> <p>IMDI has an academic staff of 22 members, most of whom are specialists in business administration and management.</p> <p>During the past year (1975) IMDI conducted a program for top level executives in the Sudan, two programs in French for managers of small and medium enterprises in Togo and Upper Volta, and laid the groundwork for other projects.</p> <p>The focus of IMDI's activities thus far has been in the francophone African countries although there have been programs in anglophone Africa as well. Usually its clients have been the ministries and para statal agencies of African governments.</p>	<p>IMDI has responded to an important need in all developing societies for skilled and efficient managers. Its philosophy is to effect real change in the overall quality of management. To achieve this goal, training must start at the top and work downward to develop a "critical mass" of managers with a common, modern management "culture". The role of IMDI is to complement and to contribute to this process.</p> <p>Industrial development and the replacement of foreign managers with local nationals creates growing demand for the type of training IMDI offers. This will be especially true of Southern Africa where there is already a substantial industrial base but a shortage of trained African managers.</p>

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INSTITUTIONAL IDENTIFICATION	CURRENT PROGRAMS	POTENTIAL CAPABILITIES
<p>Kalamazoo College African Studies Program Kalamazoo, Michigan</p> <p><u>DIRECTOR</u></p> <p>William Pruitt Phone: 616-343-1551</p> <p><u>INSTITUTIONAL AFFILIATION</u></p> <p>Kalamazoo College belongs to the Great Lakes College Association</p> <p><u>PRESENT FUNDING</u></p> <p>African Studies at Kalamazoo is entirely funded by the College.</p>	<p>The African Studies Program at Kalamazoo College is typical of the programs at small, private, liberal arts colleges in that it is not funded from either government or foundation grants and is limited in scope.</p> <p>The College has six faculty members who offer at least one course on Africa, courses that focus primarily on Sub-Saharan Africa. The Africana library has a good selection of current books on Africa. Some 35 students study in Africa each year.</p> <p>Kalamazoo College is affiliated with universities in Senegal, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Ghana, Nigeria, and Kenya. The Foreign Study Program offers Kalamazoo students the possibility of studying at an African university during their junior year.</p> <p>There are no training programs or technical assistance arrangements.</p>	<p>Because of limited facilities and staff, Kalamazoo College is not currently in a position to undertake substantial programs in Southern Africa. Its best role would be in continuing to do what it has done well: to offer a liberal arts course of study with African content and to provide the opportunity for American students to study abroad in an African university for one year.</p>

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INSTITUTIONAL IDENTIFICATION	CURRENT PROGRAMS	POTENTIAL CAPABILITIES										
<p>Michigan State University African Studies Center East Lansing, Michigan</p> <p><u>DIRECTOR</u></p> <p>J. M. Hunter Phone: 517-353-1700</p> <p><u>INSTITUTIONAL AFFILIATION</u></p> <p>Michigan State University is a member of MUCIA and administers a contract with Addis Ababa University to exchange faculty members and enrich curricula.</p> <p><u>PRESENT FUNDING</u></p> <table border="0"> <tr> <td><u>Office of Education</u></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>NDEA Title VI Grant</td> <td>\$ 95,000</td> </tr> <tr> <td>NDFL Fellowships</td> <td>54,000</td> </tr> <tr> <td>University</td> <td>140,000</td> </tr> <tr> <td><u>Action/Peace Corps</u> for recruiting activities</td> <td>7,000</td> </tr> </table>	<u>Office of Education</u>		NDEA Title VI Grant	\$ 95,000	NDFL Fellowships	54,000	University	140,000	<u>Action/Peace Corps</u> for recruiting activities	7,000	<p>There are a wide variety of program activities at Michigan State that include research, teaching, and technical assistance. A total of 44 faculty members in various departments are affiliated with the Center and teach Africa-related courses; another 55 have African interests. The Center has 16 program assistants.</p> <p>The Centers offers two interdisciplinary courses annually, one each on the graduate and undergraduate levels. This year both will be devoted exclusively to Southern Africa. The Center also publishes the Africana Monograph series, <u>Rural Africana</u>, <u>African Urban Notes</u>, and a Newsletter. The English Language Center of the University is an important facility where thousands of foreign students study English each year. The Agricultural Economics Department has a number of AID-sponsored projects currently under way in the Sahel region. The Committee on Ethiopian Studies publishes the Ethiopian Monograph Series.</p>	<p>The University has exceptionally strong departments in Agricultural Economics, Agricultural Engineering, Economics, Crop and Soil Science, and Secondary Education and Curriculum. All are important in development planning.</p> <p>The Center is particularly interested in establishing institutional linkages with Southern African universities. At present arrangements with the National University of Lesotho are being explored. There are four black South African students on campus pursuing undergraduate studies.</p> <p>The University has a number of departments with capabilities suited to educational development: Administration and Higher Education, Continuing Education, International Library, and Secondary Education and Curriculum.</p>
<u>Office of Education</u>												
NDEA Title VI Grant	\$ 95,000											
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INSTITUTIONAL IDENTIFICATION	CURRENT PROGRAMS	POTENTIAL CAPABILITIES
<p>Northwestern University Program of African Studies Evanston, Illinois</p> <p><u>DIRECTOR</u></p> <p>Abraham Demoz Phone: 312-492-7324</p> <p><u>INSTITUTIONAL AFFILIATION</u></p> <p>The Africana Library is a member of several organizations. Northwestern University belongs to the consortium of Big Ten campuses.</p> <p><u>PRESENT FINDING</u></p> <p>Office of Education NDEA Title VI \$100,000 NDFL fellowships, about the same University support through payment of salaries and library materials</p>	<p>Two major group research projects are currently under way at Northwestern, one on eco-stress in East Africa and the other on Asante collective biographies. Approximately 60 faculty members are associated with the Program, and 120 courses with Africa content are offered.</p> <p>The Program of African Studies has one South African on its faculty and until recently had an active research interest in Southern Africa under the former Director, Prof. Gwendolen Carter. The Africana Library collection at Northwestern is among the most comprehensive in the United States.</p> <p>Northwestern does not currently have any institutional linkages with African universities but there are numerous private and informal ties. Nor are there any training programs apart from the education of African students within the university. There is usually a sizeable number of African students enrolled, almost entirely in graduate programs.</p>	<p>University resources that would be particularly suited to development needs are housed in the Transportation Center, the Center for Urban Affairs, the Comparative Urban Studies Program, the Law School, and the Schools of Education, Journalism and Speech.</p>

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INSTITUTIONAL IDENTIFICATION	CURRENT PROGRAMS	POTENTIAL CAPABILITIES
<p>Phelps-Stokes Fund 10 East 87th St. New York, New York</p> <p><u>DIRECTOR</u></p> <p>Franklin Williams (President) Phone: 212-427-8100</p> <p><u>INSTITUTIONAL AFFILIATION</u></p> <p>The Phelps-Stokes Fund sponsors or works with several consortia, including the National Center for College and University Planning, the African-American Professors Exchange Program, and the African Student Aid Fund.</p> <p><u>PRESENT FUNDING</u></p> <p>The Fund receives funding from various foundations, the Office of Education, the State Department, and AID.</p>	<p>The Phelps-Stokes Fund is a non-profit organization devoted to the development of human resources in Africa and the U.S. The African Student Fund provides emergency and supplementary grants to unsponsored undergraduate African students in the U.S. when funding is available. The Aggrey Fellows Program provides up to two years of research and/or post-graduate study to senior scholars or government functionaries selected from all over Africa.</p> <p>The Fund also administers a professors exchange program between predominantly Afro-American institutions and African universities. It fosters contacts between developing institutions in the U.S. and Africa, currently involving over 100 colleges and universities in the U.S. and 30 institutions in Africa.</p> <p>The Fund enjoys wide contacts with persons in leadership throughout most of Africa. It fostered the founding of the Booker T. Washington University in Liberia and the Race Relations Institute in South Africa. Linkages are maintained with other universities as well.</p>	<p>The Phelps-Stokes Fund maintains a staff with broad experience in Africa. It is capable of assisting other agencies which have specialist potential but are lacking in experience and contacts in Africa.</p> <p>Its program potential for Southern Africa might include the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The organization of a series of seminars in the U.S. and Africa to bring together a wide range of persons at or close to policy-making level to examine key development questions and formulate suitable approaches to problems. - A pilot project in the training of African personnel, ranging from file clerks and mimeographers to executive secretaries, bookkeepers and office managers. - A training program for African personnel managers, community leaders, and counseling specialists for the management and upgrading of personnel. Emphasis would be placed on training specialists who in turn could train personnel managers.

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INSTITUTIONAL IDENTIFICATION	CURRENT PROGRAMS	POTENTIAL CAPABILITIES
<p>Rutgers, The State of University of New Jersey International Center New Brunswick, New Jersey</p> <p><u>DIRECTOR</u></p> <p>Richard Wilson Phone: 201-932-7263</p> <p><u>INSTITUTIONAL AFFILIATION</u></p> <p>The International Center is affiliated with the International Student Service and the Council on International Education.</p> <p><u>PRESENT FUNDING</u></p> <p>The Center receives \$5,000 from the University for its operating expenses.</p>	<p>Rutgers has a total of 47 teaching and research faculty among whom ten are from Southern Africa. A university-wide program for Southern Africa was established in 1973 which has both graduate and undergraduate students enrolled in it. Thus far the program has assisted in the planning and recruitment efforts of Southern African governments. Formal links have been established with the National University of Lesotho.</p> <p>The linkage with the National University is designed to facilitate student and faculty exchange, research, administration, and project implementation. Secondment of Rutgers staff to the National University is planned in the Faculties of Humanities and Science, Economic and Social Studies, the Department of Extramural Studies, and the University Library. An important aspect of the linkage is the proposal to bring National University faculty members and students to Rutgers for study and research.</p>	<p>With a very substantial presence of Southern Africans at Rutgers as well as a number of American faculty members with interest in Africa, the University is well suited to expand its operations in the region. The Committee for Southern Africa was established precisely for this purpose. It is one of the few American universities that has already established institutional ties with African universities in the region.</p> <p>Expansion of the number of Southern African students in the various degree programs of the University is envisaged as is the development of specific development projects such as the Teacher Training College in Lesotho. With adequate funding it is anticipated that programs will be established with other institutions and with other countries within the Southern Africa region in the near future.</p>

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INSTITUTIONAL IDENTIFICATION	CURRENT PROGRAMS	POTENTIAL CAPABILITIES
<p>State University College/ New Paltz Department of African Studies New Paltz, New York</p> <p><u>DIRECTOR</u></p> <p>Thomas Nyquist (teaching staff) Phone: 914-257-2307</p> <p><u>INSTITUTIONAL AFFILIATION</u></p> <p>The Mid-Hudson Valley association of colleges, and the State University College system.</p> <p><u>PRESENT FUNDING</u></p> <p>There is currently no source of funding beyond the university itself. Further funding is being sought.</p>	<p>Due to financial exigencies at the college, the Department of African Studies was "retrenched" in March of 1976. Only two faculty members remain within the Department, although there are nine who teach Africa-related courses. Two scholars have done extensive research in Southern Africa, primarily South Africa.</p> <p>SUC/New Paltz has the largest library on Africa within the State University system. Many of the courses taught before the "retrenchment" have been discontinued.</p> <p>New Paltz has a good reputation in international studies, primarily at the undergraduate level. There are normally between 25 and 50 African students enrolled on campus.</p> <p>The Masters program in African Studies was initiated in 1971, but has now taken on a professional orientation in the social sciences.</p>	<p>Because of the retrenchment in the Department of African Studies, the faculty members with African experience and training are "grossly under-utilized." Most would welcome the opportunity to retain their focus on Africa.</p> <p>New Paltz has a tradition as a teacher training institution which has also undergone a reduction in recent years. This tradition includes an emphasis on General Education on Africa. There are also several colleges within the Mid-Hudson Valley that are developing nursing and technical programs and could be linked to the State University. These private and community colleges could be utilized as training institutions and as a source for middle-level technicians, with New Paltz serving both as resource base for data on Africa and as coordinator.</p> <p>African materials recently collected by New Paltz scholars could be used in Namibia and Zimbabwe secondary schools.</p>

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INSTITUTIONAL IDENTIFICATION	CURRENT PROGRAMS	POTENTIAL CAPABILITIES
<p>University of California at Los Angeles African Studies Center Los Angeles, California 90024</p> <p><u>DIRECTOR</u> (acting)</p> <p>John Povey Phone: 213-825-3779</p> <p><u>INSTITUTIONAL AFFILIATIONS</u></p> <p>The University of California maintains an Education Abroad Program with study centers in various African countries.</p> <p><u>PRESENT FUNDING</u></p> <p>Office of Education NDEA Title VI (no figures available) University (no figures available)</p>	<p>The African Studies Center at UCLA was founded in 1959 and has been among the largest and most active centers in the U.S. Its administrative staff alone numbers nine, in addition to a large teaching and research faculty in various disciplines of about 60.</p> <p>Interdisciplinary research in recent years has focused on traditional religion, African military history, and on Portuguese Africa. The latter research program was initiated in 1971 and consisted of the collection and analysis of economic, political and social data related to Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau. Particular emphasis was placed on the development of new approaches to African rural and agricultural development.</p> <p>The Africana Library presently houses over 41,000 volumes and has a full-time African bibliographer. The center publishes numerous journals and periodicals, including <u>African Arts</u>, <u>Studies in African Linguistics</u>, <u>Ufahamu</u>, the <u>Journal of African Studies</u>, and <u>African Studies Center Newsletter</u>.</p>	<p>As has been noted under current programs, the African Studies Center at UCLA has recently been engaged in a sizeable research project on former Portuguese colonies. Its capabilities in Southern Africa are therefore quite substantial.</p> <p>However, in response to our questionnaire, the acting director of the Program has indicated that the UCLA faculty was disinclined to embark on other programs at this time. He states that: "The cautious recommendation was that there were so many vague and possibly dubious questions hovering around the personal arguments concerning reconsiderations of American policy towards Southern Africa, that we would be infinitely hesitant to stick our neck out at this stage."</p>

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<u>INSTITUTIONAL IDENTIFICATION</u>	<u>CURRENT PROGRAMS</u>	<u>POTENTIAL CAPABILITIES</u>
<p>University of Denver African Studies Program Graduate School of International Studies Denver, Colorado</p> <p><u>DIRECTOR</u> George Shepherd Phone: 303-753-2755</p> <p><u>INSTITUTIONAL AFFILIATION</u> The University of Denver belongs to a consortium with the University of Colorado</p> <p><u>PRESENT FUNDING</u> Funding in the past has come largely from the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations and a small grant under the International Program of the Office of Education. Current funding is mainly from the University.</p>	<p>Although the African Studies Program at Denver is relatively small, with only a half-dozen faculty members teaching Africa-related courses, it has several strong features. It publishes <u>Africa Today</u>, and the series, <u>Studies in Race and Nations</u>, and <u>Studies in Human Rights</u>.</p> <p>The focus of the Denver program is on the structure of human rights and basic inequities. The Denver University library has some 5,000 volumes on Africa and can draw upon other resources at the University of Colorado. There are about 50 undergraduate students specializing in African Studies and another dozen at the graduate level.</p> <p>There is also access to data in the mining and agricultural fields at nearby colleges and universities.</p> <p>The Program has an affiliation with the Institute of International Affairs in Lagos and the Arab-African Program of the University of Khartoum.</p>	<p>The Program of African Studies is currently proposing to undertake a two-year study of non-governmental and inter-governmental agencies which have been involved in education and training of Southern Africans. Professor Shepherd has already conducted some research on these agencies which is to be published shortly.</p> <p>These agencies include the International Universities Exchange Fund (IUEF), the International Defense Aid Fund (IDAF), and the UN Trust Funds. Their activities have been closely associated with the liberation movements and are therefore of special importance to the needs of the peoples of Southern Africa. In general, these agencies have not had sufficient funds from the U.S. although they have much experience and excellent contacts.</p>

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INSTITUTIONAL IDENTIFICATION	CURRENT PROGRAMS	POTENTIAL CAPABILITIES
<p>University of Houston Center for International Education Houston, Texas</p> <p><u>DIRECTOR</u></p> <p>Stewart North Phone: 713-749-3211</p> <p><u>INSTITUTIONAL AFFILIATION</u></p> <p>The Center is a branch of the College of Education and acts as the program development and logistical agency for Departments within the College.</p> <p><u>PRESENT FUNDING</u></p> <p>Approximately 34% of the total operating expenses come from the University of Houston and 66% are generated from foreign based programs administered by the Center</p>	<p>The Center for International Education utilizes the facilities of the University of Houston in carrying out cooperative development programs. The main current programs include linkages with the following institutions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> the Autonomous University of Guadalajara, Mexico, Masters and Doctoral programs in educational administration and supervision; the National Center for Technical and Industrial Education in Mexico City, Masters program in curriculum and instructions; the Escuela Normal Superior de Toluca, Mexico, seminars in educational administration and English language training; the Department of Defense Schools System in Europe, seminars in health and physical education; the Near East/South Asia section of the Office of Overseas Schools, Washington, D.C., Masters programs in Foundations of Education in New Delhi and Pakistan. <p>Negotiations are currently under way for a Masters in Education program in Israel.</p>	<p>The Center has participated in the Southern Africa Project and has developed a substantial data base on human resources in the Southern Africa region.</p> <p>The Houston area has a growing commitment to international education and international affairs. Technical assistance programs could be linked with departments and faculties in addition to the present programs in the College of Education. These would include the Center for Human Resources (manpower assessments), the College of Technology (training programs overseas), the Department of Business Administration, and the Department of Psychology. The University also has active departments of Latin American Affairs and African Affairs.</p> <p>The University is currently undergoing an assessment by the administration of the potential role of international education, prompted by the growing number of multinational corporations in Houston.</p>

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INSTITUTIONAL IDENTIFICATION	CURRENT PROGRAMS	POTENTIAL CAPABILITIES										
<p>University of Wisconsin African Studies Program Madison, Wisconsin</p> <p><u>DIRECTOR</u></p> <p>Presently David Wiley is Director. He will be replaced by Fred Hayward in February 1977. Phone: 608-262-2380</p> <p><u>INSTITUTIONAL AFFILIATION</u></p> <p>The University is a member of MUCIA, the consortium of midwestern universities.</p> <p><u>PRESENT FUNDING</u></p> <p><u>Office of Education</u></p> <table border="0"> <tr> <td>Center Grant:</td> <td>\$115,000</td> </tr> <tr> <td>NDFL Title VI:</td> <td>60,000</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Fula Language Grant</td> <td>40,000</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Foreign Curriculum Consultant</td> <td>15,000</td> </tr> <tr> <td>University and Other</td> <td>38,000</td> </tr> </table>	Center Grant:	\$115,000	NDFL Title VI:	60,000	Fula Language Grant	40,000	Foreign Curriculum Consultant	15,000	University and Other	38,000	<p>The African Studies Program at Madison is currently involved in research on small urban centers in African rural development. It is multi-disciplinary and involves African colleagues in library and field work.</p> <p>There are a total of 33 teaching/administrative staff with expertise in African subject matter, six of whom have conducted field research in Southern Africa. A study of housing and urbanization in Zambia by six sociologists runs from 1973 through 1977.</p> <p>A variety of overseas projects have been staffed and administered in recent years, including: a program in agricultural education and research at the University of Ife and at Ibadan and Akure, Nigeria, funded by AID; a primary teacher education project for northern Nigeria, sponsored by the Nigerian government, AID, Ford Foundation, and the Peace Corps; teacher training and radio-correspondence education in Tanzania, sponsored by AID, the University in Dar es Salaam, and Tanzanian government.</p>	<p>With a large faculty and over 150 who have research and taught in Africa, the Program at Madison has potential for large-scale contributions to a wide range of AID projects. The strengths have heretofore been in the field of rural development, agricultural education, and teacher training, all important areas of development.</p> <p>The program has expressed a keen interest in expanding its field of activity to Southern Africa beyond the current project in Zambia.</p> <p>The primary contributions would best be made in long-term studies not requiring immediate project pay-offs. Occasionally various faculty are available for consulting and team evaluations.</p> <p>The program will be under new direction beginning in February 1977 when David Wiley becomes Associate Director at Michigan State University.</p>
Center Grant:	\$115,000											
NDFL Title VI:	60,000											
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INSTITUTIONAL IDENTIFICATION	PROGRAM CAPABILITIES	POTENTIAL CAPABILITIES
<p>Yale University Council on African Studies New Haven, Connecticut</p> <p><u>DIRECTOR</u></p> <p>William Foltz is Chairman of the Council on African Affairs Phone: 203-436-0253</p> <p><u>INSTITUTIONAL AFFILIATION</u></p> <p>None</p> <p><u>PRESENT FUNDING</u></p> <p>The Council's budget is derived mainly from a dwindling grant from the Ford Foundation. Most support for African studies comes directly from departmental budgets and research awards of individuals.</p>	<p>Although the Council on African Studies is not a center in the formal sense, teaching and research on Africa is carried on in virtually all departments in the Faculty of Arts and Sciences. Political Science, History, Anthropology, Art History, and Economics all have significant and continuing strengths. In addition, the Medical School, the Law School, and the School of Forestry and Environmental Studies have African interest.</p> <p>There are 24 faculty members associated with the Council and some 60 African students enrolled at both the graduate and undergraduate levels, including some members of the faculties of African universities.</p> <p>As a matter of policy, the University does not have formal links with African (or with other overseas) universities. Yale is the chief sponsor and headquarters of a research workshop on Southern Africa which brings together scholars from all over the Northeast as well as from Africa.</p>	<p>The Yale library has excellent African holdings, and its section on Southern Africa is probably second only to the Library of Congress in the U.S. Yale is very much an academic research and teaching institution. Only its professional schools regularly provide applied training, and that at an advanced level.</p> <p>Therefore, Yale's best capabilities for Africa will be in the training of good students and through the research of its faculty, particularly that done in some kind of association with scholars of the countries concerned.</p> <p>Yale is actively seeking additional funding to increase the frequency of its workshops on Southern Africa, to make its library resources available to more scholars, and to associate more African scholars with its program.</p>

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INSTITUTIONAL IDENTIFICATION	CURRENT PROGRAMS	POTENTIAL CAPABILITIES
<p>Zimbabwe Manpower Resources Center 792 Columbus Avenue New York, New York 10025</p> <p><u>DIRECTOR</u></p> <p>Christopher Mapondera Phone: 212-760-2566</p> <p><u>INSTITUTIONAL AFFILIATION</u></p> <p>None</p> <p><u>PRESENT FUNDING</u></p> <p>None</p>	<p>The Zimbabwe Manpower Resources Center is run predominantly by Zimbabweans in the U.S. The basis of this profile of the Center is a draft proposal entitled "Manpower Development Program for Rhodesian Africans", dated September, 1975.</p> <p>The proposal outlines a program of training for Zimbabweans in various technical fields which are vital for the development of Zimbabwe. It seeks to identify institutions in Africa, in Europe, in North America, and in other parts of the world where Zimbabweans may be sent for training in critical fields; to provide a mechanism for screening, processing and evaluating their potential; to identify and solicit funds from foundations, corporations, and individuals; and to coordinate the placement and travel of trainees.</p>	<p>The focus of the Manpower Development Program is thus on the identification of technical skills in which Africans have been totally excluded in the present regime in Rhodesia, as well as other technical skills critical to development.</p> <p>Those areas would include: health and allied health programs, general services (water, power, telecommunications, etc.), aviation technology, civil and industrial engineering, and agricultural and food technology.</p> <p>Training programs are to be non-degree and will have a duration of no more than three years and not less than six months. The program is to be administered by Zimbabweans.</p>

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<p>African Bibliographic Center 1346 Connecticut Avenue, N.W. Suite 901 Washington, D. C. 20036</p>	<p>The African Bibliographic Center would be uniquely capable of providing continuous information resources to a variety of organizational efforts to assist Zimbabwean and Namibian development during transition.</p>
<p>African Methodist Episcopal Church/Division of Domestic & Foreign Missions 475 Riverside Drive Room 1926 New York, New York</p>	<p>As the major Afro-American Methodist denomination with already established mission programs, the African Methodist Episcopal Church would be a fitting vehicle for mobilizing Black American church involvement.</p>
<p>African Training & Research Center in Administration for Development (CAFRAD) P. O. Box 310 Tangier, Morocco</p>	<p>The African Training & Research Center in Administration for Development would be a likely African institution for helping Zimbabwe and Namibia in a transition period by assisting the training of Zimbabweans and Namibians in economic development <u>planning</u> and administration.</p>

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INSTITUTIONAL IDENTIFICATION	PROGRAM CAPABILITIES
<p>Agricultural Aids Foundation 5240 Santa Monica Boulevard Los Angeles, California</p>	<p>The Agricultural Aids Foundation is a church-affiliated institution which could be of particular importance in providing agricultural machinery and technical assistance in Zimbabwe and Namibia.</p>
<p>American Friends Service Committee 160 North 15th Street Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19102</p>	<p>As a well established institution in the field of humanitarian assistance in developing countries, the American Friends Service Committee could serve an important role in transition regarding refugee relief activities and education for Zimbabweans and Namibians.</p>
<p>Association of African Universities P. O. Box 5744 Accra-North, Ghana</p>	<p>On the level of higher education, the Association of African Universities, a continental African institution, would be particularly useful in its Inter-Africa University Scholarship Program operated jointly with the African American Institute. The Association of African University's Documentation Center could also be useful in disseminating information of programs and innovations relevant to Zimbabwe and Namibia.</p>

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INSTITUTIONAL IDENTIFICATION	PROGRAM CAPABILITIES
<p>Association for the Advancement of Agricultural Science in Africa P. O. Box 30087-M.A. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia</p>	<p>This is a specialized African functional institution which would be valuable in promoting agricultural development in Zimbabwe and Namibia.</p>
<p>Black Economic Research Center 112 West 120th Street New York, New York 10027</p>	<p>The Black Economic Research Center is a competent Black American research organization which could serve in the area of economic development and planning during Zimbabwean and Namibian transition.</p>
<p>Catholic Relief Services - U. S. Catholic Conference 350 Fifth Avenue New York, New York 10001</p>	<p>The Catholic Relief Services of the U. S. Catholic Conference and its involvement in Zimbabwe and Namibia would make this a likely conduit for assistance during the transition period, particularly in meeting refugee problems.</p>

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<p>Emergency Fund for Southern Africa c/o Institute for Policy Studies 901 Q Street, N. W. Washington, D. C. 20009</p>	<p>Although still in its infancy, the Emergency Fund for Southern Africa would seem to be a likely mechanism for refugee relief assistance in Zimbabwe and Namibia during transition.</p>
<p>Interdenominational Foreign Mission Association of North America 54 Bergen Avenue Ridgefield Park, New Jersey 07660</p>	<p>The Interdenominational Foreign Mission Association of North America could serve as a coordinating, communications network function regarding American Church activities during transition.</p>
<p>The International Association of Economic & Management Students 52 Vanderbilt Avenue Suite 1110 New York, New York 10017</p>	<p>An organization such as The International Association of Economic and Management Students would have an obvious role to play in transmitting economic and management skills to Black Zimbabweans and Namibians during transition to assist them in assuming major responsibility for economy, etc.</p>

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INSTITUTIONAL IDENTIFICATION	PROGRAM CAPABILITIES
<p>International Society for Community Development 345 46th Street New York, New York 10017</p>	<p>The International Society for Community Development should be capable of assisting in community development during transition, particularly in the area of resettling those uprooted in Smith Government "Protected Villages" program.</p>
<p>International University Exchange Fund P. O. Box 348 1211 Geneva 11, Switzerland</p>	<p>The IUEF has become increasingly involved in Southern Africa, with programs for refugees and students, both in an advisory capacity and in providing scholarships. It is a prime source of information relating to educational opportunities and admissions procedures for students who are referred to it by other agencies with scholarship programs. Special efforts are already under way to promote training programs inside Southern Africa through consultation with liberation groups.</p>
<p>Lonrho Corporation Cheapside House 138 Cheapside London EC 2v 6 BL United Kingdom</p>	<p>Because of Lonrho Corporation's obvious economic interests in Zimbabwe and Namibia and involvement throughout Africa, north and south of the Zambezi, Lonrho would be a likely funding source for a variety of development projects.</p>

APPENDIX IV

IDENTIFICATION OF INSTITUTIONS WITH RESEARCH, EDUCATION, AND TRAINING CAPABILITIES RELATED TO
SOUTHERN AFRICA

INSTITUTIONAL IDENTIFICATION	PROGRAM CAPABILITIES
<p>Medical Assistance Programs 327 Gundersen Drive Box 50 Wheaton, Illinois 60187</p>	<p>Already operating in Zimbabwe in assisting missionaries in the medical field, the Medical Assistance Programs could play an important role in medical support services. Also it conduct educational surveys.</p>
<p>Midwest Universities Consortium for International Activities Michigan State University Office of the Executive Director 200 Center for International Programs East Lansing, Michigan 48823</p>	<p>The Midwest Universities Consortium for International Activities could play an important role in mobilizing technical assistance resources at the academic level for involvement in Zimbabwe and Namibia transition.</p>
<p>National Council of Negro Women 1346 Connecticut Avenue, N.W. Washington, D. C. 20036</p>	<p>In light of their experience in Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland in community-oriented technical assistance for women, the National Council of Negro Women could be relevant for similar operations in Zimbabwe and Namibia, although, reportedly, programming has been slow in getting off the ground in Botswana, Lestho, and Swaziland.</p>

APPENDIX IV

IDENTIFICATION OF INSTITUTIONS WITH RESEARCH, EDUCATION, AND TRAINING CAPABILITIES RELATED TO SOUTHERN AFRICA

INSTITUTIONAL IDENTIFICATION	PROGRAM CAPABILITIES
National 4-H Foundation 7100 Connecticut Avenue, N.W. Washington, D. C. 20015	Already functioning in Zimbabwe, the National 4-H Foundation could expand involvement in rural development in terms of promoting education, training and exchanges as well as furthering its work in Namibia.
One America 1300 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. Suite 205 Washington, D. C. 20005	One America is a Black American organization with capabilities in technical assistance and community development which could be applied in Zimbabwe and Namibia during transition in trying to cope with resettlement problems.
Opportunities Industrial- ization Center 1225 North Broad Street Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19122	Opportunities Industrialization Centers is the foremost Black American institution in the manpower training field which could play a useful role in Zimbabwe and Namibia during transition.

APPENDIX IV

IDENTIFICATION OF INSTITUTIONS WITH RESEARCH, EDUCATION, AND TRAINING CAPABILITIES RELATED TO SOUTHERN AFRICA

INSTITUTIONAL IDENTIFICATION	PROGRAM CAPABILITIES
<p>TransCentury Corporation 1789 Columbia Road, N.W. Washington, D. C. 20009</p>	<p>In case of "white flight", TransCentury could be useful for recruiting American expatriate talent for service in Zimbabwe and Namibia during the transition period.</p>
<p>Union Carbide 270 Park Avenue New York, New York 10017</p>	<p>Union Carbide would have an obvious interest in financing development projects and in assisting advancement of Africans in the economy in order to balance out its role in sanctions-busting.</p>
<p>U. S. Committee for Refugees 1625 Eye Street, N. W. Room 721 Washington, D. C. 20006</p>	<p>The U. S. Committee for Refugees would be important in assisting in refugee relief and resettlement during Zimbabwe and Namibia transitions.</p>

APPENDIX IV

IDENTIFICATION OF INSTITUTIONS WITH RESEARCH, EDUCATION, AND TRAINING CAPABILITIES RELATED TO SOUTHERN AFRICA

INSTITUTIONAL IDENTIFICATION	PROGRAM CAPABILITIES
<p>University of Zambia P. O. Box 2374 Lusaka, Zambia</p>	<p>Because of its proximity, the University of Zambia would be instrumental in assisting higher education needs for Zimbabwe and Namibia.</p>
<p>Volunteers in Technical Assistance 3706 Rhode Island Avenue Mt. Ranier, Maryland 20822</p>	<p>The Volunteers in Technical Assistance could serve to help mobilize technical assistance resources from a variety of sectors for service in Zimbabwe and Namibia during transition.</p>
<p>Whitsun Foundation P. O. Box 8274 Cause Way Salisbury, Rhodesia</p>	<p>With specific focus on economic development and planning for Zimbabwe's and Namibia's future, Whitsun would be an obvious indigenous institution for outside support for aiding local economy during transition.</p>

APPENDIX IV

A CATALOG OF AVAILABLE PROGRAMS AND INSTITUTIONS

I. High-Level Management Training

Africa. In the review of the literature, articles have been appearing about management training in the 1976 issues of African Management. One article describes the Kenya Institute of Administration, which is essentially the Civil Service Training College of Kenya. It is situated at Lower Kabette, which is about nine miles from the center of Nairobi. Students come here from all over Kenya for residential courses lasting from two weeks to one year at a time. There are seven academic departments specializing in different areas of public service training. Some students enter straight from school, and others straight from university and from post-experience in-service training. Other programs are currently being conducted in Kenya and other African countries. It may be possible to enroll some Zimbabwe students in these existing programs and use these programs as models for establishing similar institutes in Rhodesia.

Suggestions for other institutions are:

Institute of Public Administration, Zomba, Malawi.

Kivukoni College (a TANU institution), Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.

The National Institute of Public Administration, Lusaka, Zambia.

The United States and Europe. The utilization of United States and British resources and institutions may be particularly suited to the large numbers of university educated Zimbabweans that are exiled in these areas. Government agencies, private companies and universities could be used

for this purpose in emergency training programs. Indications are that exile political organizations can rapidly identify the personnel available for such programs. They could also be used as coordinating agencies for programs.

U.S. institutions that might prove useful are:

- Governmental Affairs Institute, 1776 Massachusetts Ave., N. W., Washington, D. C.
- African American Labor Center, 344 East 46th Street, New York, N.Y. (they already have operations in Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland).
- Opportunities Industrialization Center, 1225 N. Broad Street, Philadelphia, Pa. (existing African operations)
- International Executive Service Corps., New York, New York.
- U.S. universities with strong departments of management training, e.g., Sloan School of Management at MIT, the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, and the Harvard Business School.
- Action Programs International, 606 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 516, Santa Monica, California

British institutions include:

- The Civil Service College
- The National Coal Board Management Training Scheme.

European institutions:

- The Konrad Adenauer Institute, West Germany

In all of the above the importance of channelling assistance funds through multi-national agencies has been stressed by the knowledgeable and con-

cerne' Zimbabweans who were consulted.

II. High Level Technical Training. Given the relatively available supply of university graduates, Zimbabweans stand ready to take on responsibilities, although they lack practical, diversified training in the application of their scientific and commercial studies to business and industrial realities. Emergency training programs for these technocrats during the transition period may be required. Training could take place within Zimbabwe, in neighboring African countries, in Europe, and in the United States. The following list of critical areas has been compiled from information received from Zimbabweans as well as from consultants to this Project.

Critical Areas for Technical Training

1. Mining Eng. ering and Technology
2. Land Surveying
3. Agricultural Engineering and Agronomy
4. Hydrology and Soil Analysis
5. Business Management, Accounting
6. Computer Technology
7. Cost Analysis
8. Business Law
9. Mechanics of Export-Import Trade
10. Techniques of Personnel Management and Negotiation
11. Industrial Technology
12. Transportation Programming
13. Communications Technology

The major institutions likely to be able to impact training in the specific sectoral areas are listed below:

Zimbabwe. The University of Rhodesia has existing departments of Agriculture, Mining Research, Geology, Accounting and Computer Science. The essential effort here should be in reducing the theoretical orientation of present programs and introducing a greater emphasis on the practical application of science and technology.

Africa:

The University of Kenya, Faculties of Engineering, Commerce and Agriculture.

University of Dar es Salaam, Faculties of Engineering, Technology of Agriculture.

University of Zambia, Faculties of Engineering, Agriculture and Mines.

The eleven research institutes maintained by the East African Community in Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya.

United States:

The Wolper Organization Inc., 8489 West 3rd Avenue, Los Angeles, California 90048 (Communications, operating already in Botswana, Zimbabwe and South Africa).

The Battelle Memorial Institute, 505 King Avenue, Columbus, Ohio 43201. (Highly technical science and engineering fields).

California Polytechnic State University, San Luis Obispo, California 93401. (Agriculture)

African Technical Educational Consultant Service, 400 Central Park West, New York, New York 10025.

U. S. Government regulatory agencies, e.g. Civil Aeronautics Board, Securities and Exchange Commission, U.S. Customs Service.

Europe:

Friedrich Ebert Institute, West Germany.

SIDA, Sweden.

Huddersfield, Chelsea and Manchester Polytechnics, UK.

III. Middle Level Supervisory Management and Technical Training

The Trade Unions are seen as the logical coordinating agents for such programs. Harris has observed that:

The leaders of the skilled union groups have frequently stated that they are fully prepared to train and accept black apprentices. They prefer to see formal training of blacks in preference to an increase in the rate of job fragmentation. 1/

In November, 1974, a new united national trade union center was established, representing all African-led unions in Rhodesia. This organization, the National African Trade Union Congress (N.A.T.U.C.) 2/ has now been recognized both nationally and internationally as the only national trade union center which can truly claim to represent the majority of workers in the country.

1/ Harris, Peter S., "Black Industrial Workers in Rhodesia", Mambo Occasional Papers - Socio-Economic Series No. 1, Gwelo, Rhodesia.

2/ National African Trade Unions Congress, P.O. Box 63, Mpopoma, Bulawayo, Rhodesia.

As of March, 1976, there were nine registered unions in the NATUC. They comprise 36,418 members. There are also 11 non-registered unions with membership of 13,260. Distribution of union members may be seen below.

Registered and Non-Registered Union Members

	<u>Registered</u>	<u>Non-Registered</u>	
Rail	10,000	Food	2,000
Tailors	4,000	3 Transport	3,000
Bulawayo Municipal	6,000	2 End,Metal	2,000
Catering, Hotel	9,000	Building	1,500
Commercial	3,000	Leather	2,000
Brick	1,000	Postal	2,000
Asbestoes, Cement	1,000	Jewelry	500
Dry Cleaning	500	Concrete	500
Furniture	1,500		

The framework for teaching administrative and technical skills has been established in these unions.

Lawrence reported that "Somewhere in the region of 4,000 trade unionists have gone through trade union training courses at Ranche House College in Sailsbury with every cooperation and encouragement from the Principal, Ken New and his staff. The college is a multiracial oasis." ^{1/} It is believed that the majority of the people who attended these courses were Africans.

Africa:

Malawi Polytechnic, Blantyre

^{1/} W.G.Lawrence, "A Decade of Free Trade Union Work in Rhodesia", Free Labour World, October 1974, pp. 5-7.

Kenya Polytechnic, Nairobi

Mombasa Polytechnic, Kenya

**Egerton College, Njoro (Agricultural
technology) Kenya**

Dar es Salaam Technical College, Zambia

**Evlyn Hone College of Applied Arts and
Commerce, Lusaka, Zambia.**

**Natural Resources Development College,
Lusaka, Zambia.**

Northern Technical College, Ndola, Zambia.

Zambia Institute of Technology, Kitwe, Zambia

Britain: The current estimate is that there are well over 1,500 Zimbabwean students in the United Kingdom (U.K.).

Mr. John J. Dube, President of NATUC recommends:

1. Establishment of a high powered committee comprised of Zimbabweans and officials of the Ministry of Overseas Development that will work in close liason in drawing up a taxonomy of key occupations to be derived from a sectoral breakdown of the Zimbabwe economy.
2. Delineating priority sectorial manpower requirements in terms of short-term development needs. Past and present employment opportunities and patterns in the African sector of Rhodesia to be considered as very critical factors.
3. Provision of more postgraduate grants for training in established scientific technologies and management courses and research programs for careers in industry and government. The following sectors, owing to their key place in the economy, ought to be given priority treatment:

Agriculture, food chemicals, metalurgy, transportation and utilities, manufacturing, trade, finance, construction and education.

4. The British Government to devise machinery that should enable graduates in such subjects as law, economics and accountancy to apply their professional skills in the manufacturing industry and commerce by topping up their original training with background understanding of the related science and technology and the organization and management of industrial concerns. 1/

Britain has a number of organizations that may be helpful in training. It is believed that the Trade Union Congress (TUC), the Ministry of Overseas Development (MOD) and the Federation of British Industries could provide trained personnel and assistance on-site. Huddersfield Polytechnic Institute and Chelsea Polytechnic Institute might also be able to absorb part of the teaching function. In view of the leading role of the United Kingdom at the Geneva Conference, these organizations may wish to assist manpower training efforts in Zimbabwe.

The National African Trade Union Congress (NATUC) not only can look to Britain for such assistance, but it can look closely at other countries' training programs. The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) 2/ has assisted in training through 1975. Seminars have been held by NATUC AND ICFTU for national leaders and regional officers on the role of the trade unions in the changing society in Rhodesia.

The International Trade Secretariat (ITS) has also been conducting educational seminars at all levels and for a number of individual unions.

1/ John J. Dube, "Education and Training Programme--Relevant to the Manpower Requirements of an Independent Zimbabwe", March, 1976.

2/ ICFTU Address: Rye Montagne aux Herbes Potageres, 37-41.

The specific ITS organizations which can be of greatest immediate help are the:

International Federation of Plantation,
Agricultural and Allied Workers, Geneva,
Switzerland (PTTI)

Miners International Federation, London,
England (Miners)

International Metalworkers Federation,
Geneva, Switzerland (FIET)

International Federation of Building and
Woodworkers, Copenhagen, Denmark (TRANSPORT)

Some of these organizations already have bases
in Africa. 1/

United States. These are major constraints for
training in the United States because of the
distance, cost and adaptability factors. Never-
theless, American based multinational corpora-
tions can be instrumental for such training func-
tions, both within Zimbabwe and elsewhere in
Africa. The African American Labor Center also
can work closely with the NATUC in program deve-
lopment.

<u>1/</u>	PTTI	Mr. Okoh	Based in Nigeria
	Miners	Mr. Foday	Based in Ghana
	FIET	Mr. Senkezi	Based in Kenya (Com- mercial and technical employees)
	Metal	Mr. Kenyago	Based in Kenya
	Transport	Mr. Udogwu	Based in Ghana

APPENDIX V

TABLE I - ZIMBABWEAN AND NAMIBIAN REFUGEES*/EXILES 1/

NUMBER OF ZIMBABWEAN REFUGEES/EXILES	LOCATION	NUMBER OF NAMIBIAN REFUGEES/EXILES	LOCATION
30,000	Mozambique	185 refugees of which 85 are being processed for resettlement	Botswana
An undetermined number out of a total refugee population of 36,000 with 34,350 accounted for	Zambia	3,400 - Refugees	Zambia
An undetermined number out of a total refugee population of 2,500 with 1,935 accounted for	Botswana	An undetermined num- ber out of a total refugee population of 510,000 with 508,000 accounted for	Zaire
An undetermined number out of a total refugee population of 4,000	West Africa	An undetermined num- ber out of a total refugee population of 4,000	West Africa
500 with an estimated 275 completing train- ing programs	U.S. ^{2/}	40 (including students)	U.S. ^{2/}

1/ U.N. General Assembly, Report on UNHCR Assistance Activities in 1975-76 and Proposed Voluntary Funds Programme and Budget for 1977, 16 August 1976, A/AC.96/526, pp. 7, 30, 64, 69 and 75. * A refugee is defined as a person who is outside his country of nationality and has well founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, ideology, religion, etc.

2/ The information on refugees and exiles in the U.S. was obtained from AAI personnel on Nov. 1, 1976.

APPENDIX V

TABLE IIa - ZIMBABWEANS AND NAMIBIANS STUDENTS

NUMBER OF ZIMBABWEAN STUDENTS	LOCATION OF STUDY	NUMBER OF NAMIBIAN STUDENTS	LOCATION OF STUDY
United Nations Education and Training Programme for Southern Africa <u>1/</u>		United Nations Education and Training Programme for Southern Africa <u>2/</u>	
7	Botswana	9	Canada (1b, 8c)
6	Canada	6	Congo
2	Ethiopia	2	Egypt (1b)
5	Ghana	2	Germany (b)
6	India	21	Ghana (2b)
5	Kenya	25	Kenya
36	Lesotho (includes 2 scholarships of the government of Lesotho as a voluntary contribution to the programme)	1	Losotho

1/ U.N. General Assembly, United Nations Education and Training Programme for Southern Africa, Report of the Secretary General, Covering the period from 1 Nov. 1975 to 22 Oct. 1976, A/31/268, pp.13-16, (Students currently enrolled in education institutions).

2/ Ibid, pp.6-7.

b/ Scholarship provided by the U.N. Fund for Namibia.

c/ Scholarships of the Government of Canada as a voluntary contribution to the programme.

APPENDIX V

TABLE Iib - ZIMBABWEAN AND NAMIBIAN STUDENTS

NUMBER OF ZIMBABWEAN STUDENTS	LOCATION OF STUDY	NUMBER OF NAMIBIAN STUDENTS	LOCATION OF STUDY
UNETPSA Continued:		UNETPSA Continued:	
3	Liberia	1	Liberia (b)
3	Mauritius	6	Mauritius
1	Netherlands	49	Nigeria
38	Nigeria (includes 10 scholarships financed under special arrangement with UNDP)	1	Papua New Guinea (b)
90	Sierra Leone	3	Sweden (2b)
2	Switzerland	2	Switzerland (b)
1	Sweden	1	U.K. (b)
1	Sweden	29	U.S. (2b)
10	Uganda	5	Zambia (1b)
		<u>5</u>	
		163 Total	

b/ Scholarships provided by the U.N. Fund for Namibia.

APPENDIX V

TABLE IIc - ZIMBABWEAN AND NAMIBIAN STUDENTS

NUMBER OF ZIMBABWEAN STUDENTS		LOCATION OF STUDY	NUMBER OF NAMIBIAN STUDENTS		LOCATION OF STUDY
UNETPSA Continued:			UNETPSA Continued:		
20		U.K.	Total		
2		Tanzania	<u>Scholarships</u> <u>2/Awards Completed</u>		
47		U.S.	70/71	67	3
79		Zambia	71/72	78	9
<u>363</u>	Total		72/73	81	21
	Total		73/74	73	25
	<u>Scholarships</u> <u>1/Awards Completed</u>		74/75	157	11
70/71	111	37	75/76	163	30
71/72	148	45			
72/73	191	41			
73/74	268	59			
74/75	389	52			
75/76	363	66			

1/ Information obtained from UNETPSA personnel, New York, N.Y., November 1, 1976.

2/ Ibid.



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SCHOLARSHIPS, FELLOWSHIPS, TRAINING AWARDS AND TRAVEL GRANTS

currently offered by

The African-American Institute

African Graduate Fellowship Program (AFGRAD): Fellowships are offered annually for postgraduate study in fields directly related to participating African countries' economic development priorities and universities' staff development needs. The fellowships are tenable in the United States for one academic year and are renewable subject to satisfactory academic progress until the approved degree is obtained. Nationals of African countries who possess a bachelor's degree (second class honors or higher), licence (mention assez bien or higher), or an equivalent qualification may apply. Candidates are, in every case, nominated by their governments. On completion of the degree objective, fellows are expected to return to their home country in Africa. The financial provisions include tuition and fees, round trip travel, and an allowance for maintenance, books, and personal needs. When necessary, English language training is also provided. There are no allowances for dependents of fellows. Applications are generally considered in October and November for awards which commence the following academic year.

Southern African Training Programs for Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa (SATP):

The Southern African Training Programs of the African-American Institute were developed in response to the critical need to expand the high level training opportunities for African nationals from Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa.

Under the Southern African Training Programs, awards are available for study at the university level and in post-secondary technical and vocational institutions. These awards will be offered in fields of study identified as priority development needs and will be tenable in the United States and in Africa. Individuals placed in the United States will be required to return to Africa upon completion of their study programs.

Awards will be given to individuals whose fields of study conform to the developmental priorities and objectives of their liberation movements. Emphasis will be given to training in agriculture, education, public health and population, rural development, administration and management, and economic planning.

Southern African Student Program (SASP): A modest number of awards each year are made to qualified candidates from the minority-ruled countries of southern Africa. These scholarships are for a maximum duration of two years to pursue specialized training or a masters degree at an educational institution in the United States. Awards may cover all expenses including international transportation. Candidates' proposed training must be directly relevant to future employment in Africa. Preference is given to candidates applying from independent Africa who need further training not readily available in Africa. Applications will be accepted from candidates outside Africa who have demonstrated strong academic ability and a keen commitment to work in Africa.

Southern African Refugee Education Project (SAREP): Study grants are available to qualified candidates who are refugees from the minority-ruled countries of southern Africa. These awards are available for study programs in Africa at the university level or in postsecondary technical/vocational institutions. Special consideration for these awards will be given to individuals in fields of study related to priority manpower requirements in Africa. Applicants should have the academic qualifications required to undertake the courses in which they are interested and should preferably have already gained admission to an educational institution.

Human Resources Development Program for Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde, Sao Tomé and Príncipe (HRDP): Development-related training grants are provided to candidates from the former Portuguese colonies in Africa for study at the postsecondary level in Africa or in the United States. These grants are for technical training or for university studies. Appropriate language training will be provided when necessary. Awards will be made in fields of study reflecting priority economic development manpower needs of the new countries. All candidates are nominated by their governments.

African Educators Travel Program: Short-term travel grants of up to sixty days provide an opportunity for African scholars, educational administrators, and educationists from Commonwealth-member African nations to broaden their professional perspectives through visits to North America and other African countries. Grantees visit American universities, research centers, schools and other related facilities, as well as attend major conferences or seminars in their fields of interest.

Starr Foundation African Scholarship Program: These awards provide for masters degree training in the United States in the field of actuarial science for candidates from selected African countries. Practical training experience is provided during long vacation periods, and students have the opportunity to sit the professional qualification examinations of the Society of Actuaries.

Further information on the above programs may be obtained from African-American Institute program representatives in 21 African countries, from relevant African ministries or universities, or from the AAI headquarters in the United States:

African-American Institute
833 United Nations Plaza
New York, New York 10017
U.S.A.

Ronald E. Springwater
July, 1976

APPENDIX V

TABLE II d - ZIMBABWEAN AND NAMIBIAN STUDENTS

NUMBER OF ZIMBABWEAN STUDENTS	LOCATION OF STUDY	NUMBER OF NAMIBIAN STUDENTS	LOCATION OF STUDY
African-American Institute Programs <u>1/</u> (Current Enrollments)		African-American Institute Programs <u>2/</u> (Current Enrollments)	
	<u>SATP</u>		<u>SATP</u>
28	U.S.	1	U.S.
3	Africa		<u>SAREP</u>
	<u>SAREP</u>	1	Africa
19	Africa		<u>SASP</u>
	<u>SACP</u>	3	U.S.
13	U.S.		
<u>63</u>	Total current enrollments U.S. and Africa	<u>5</u>	Total current enrollments U.S. and Africa

1/ Students enrolled in U.S. and Africa educational institutions. The information on AAI programs was obtained from AAI personnel and is valid to Nov. 1, 1976.

2/ Ibid.

APPENDIX V

TABLE IIe - ZIMBABWEAN AND NAMIBIAN STUDENTS

NUMBER OF ZIMBABWEAN STUDENTS	LOCATION OF STUDY	NUMBER OF NAMIBIAN STUDENTS	LOCATION OF STUDY
<p align="center">African-American Institute <u>1/</u> (Completed Scholarships)</p>	<p align="center">U.S. and Africa</p>	<p align="center">African-American Institute <u>2/</u> (Completed Scholarships)</p>	<p align="center">U.S. and Africa</p>
<p align="center">306</p> <p align="center">250-275</p>	<p align="center">Secondary training at Nkumbi Inter- national College and Kurasini International Education Centre</p>	<p align="center">46</p> <p align="center">250-275</p>	<p align="center">Secondary training at Nkumbi Inter- national College and Kurasini Inter- national Education Centre</p>

1/ Students who have completed their studies in the U.S. and Africa. The information on AAI programs was obtained from AAI personnel and is valid to Nov. 1, 1976.

2/ Ibid.

control over local authorities, health in the white sector, public works, minor tax levies and licensing.

South Africa has several strong reasons for wanting to retain control of Namibia. First, Namibia serves as a buffer zone between South Africa and hostile neighbors to the north in Angola. Second, ability to display its forces in Namibia gives it a better strategic posture with regard to Soviet-backed and Chinese-backed guerrilla forces in majority ruled countries. Third, South Africa does not want additional majority rule countries to have borders common with its own which would further fuel unrest at home and increase international pressure on it to allow majority rule in South Africa, and fourth, South Africa does not want to lessen the prospect of becoming a nuclear power by losing the uranium ore in Namibia.

Strategic Value of Uranium. South African mining legislation which has been extended to Namibia places the sole right to engage in all stages of uranium prospecting, mining, producing, selling, concentrating, refining and processing, as well as atomic energy production, in the hands of the State through the South African Atomic Energy Board (AEB).

The first uranium plant in South Africa was opened in 1952. Since 1969, South Africa has been selling highly purified uranium to a number of countries, and is now one of the three largest uranium producers (together with the United States and Canada). Only the United States has larger reserves. 1/

The implications are quite clear. Among other things, it means that South Africa will now be able to produce the type of material needed both for nuclear bombs and atomic power stations.

1/ U.N. General Assembly, Report of the United Nations Council for Namibia, Volume I, Thirteenth Session, Supplement No.24(A/10024), p.29.

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my. Despite the fact that world's richest countries, most of its black subject poverty. The UN estimate economy contributes t per annum to the total

e apartheid policies which d from South Africa to Namibia, a remains divided into two y, white-owned sector based tion of Namibia's natural ly mineral and human resources; bsistence sector, including ulation, which is forcibly ans and black townships in the

to the situation in many ss a dual economy and where ion fairly independently, the has continually maintained r by confining the Africans wing the boundaries of the way as to include all known lpal minerals. At the same sector supports the money f abundant cheap labor. , forced to leave the bantus- purpose of working as migrant areas, since the subsistence ans would be inadequate to ack population.

uster largely in the northern is significant that this area

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|

is without any known natural resources. In contrast, the white area incorporates the diamond fields, copper mines, rich agricultural lands and fishing ports and has a much better developed infrastructure.

The gross inequality in the standards of living is reflected in the per capita gross domestic product, which in 1972 was estimated to be US \$5,525 for whites and US \$325 for non-whites. 1/ As noted above, most black Namibians have a negligible share in the economy. Their level of income from employment in white-run businesses is adequate only for subsistence, and does not allow for the accumulation of capital. They cannot own land and cannot trade in the white zone. Commerce in the bantustans is handled by the South African State-owned Bantu Investment Corporation, whose management is entirely white. Africans are obliged to trade through this monopoly and, in this way, the sum total of African spending power is channeled back into the white-owned economy.

In recent years, the attention of world public opinion has been drawn to the working conditions and wage levels of the Namibian workers. A number of studies have been undertaken and pressure actions initiated by various public, research, church and non-governmental organizations throughout the world. The general conclusion drawn from those studies is that the wage levels of blacks in Namibia remain considerably lower than the level of wages in industry in South Africa.

1/ U.N. General Assembly, Report of the U.N. Council..., op.cit., p.33.

It was reported that since 1971 wages for black miners at Tsumeb have almost doubled from an average inclusive monthly wage of US \$63.95 (US \$29.79 in cash) to almost US \$120 (US \$64 in cash). At the same time, the average monthly cash wage for white workers has risen from US \$494.11 (plus free family housing and amenities) to about US \$750. This means that even with this increase in black wages, white workers are still receiving about 12 times more than their black counterparts. 1/

In order to earn a livelihood and to be able to pay taxes, Africans must leave their families for up to two-thirds of their married life and go to work in the white area. Generally speaking, migrant laborers on contract make up about 80 per cent of the labor force for the mining, agricultural, fishing and manufacturing industries in Namibia.

Viability of Homelands. The homeland or "bantustan" policy of South Africa stems from the "Odenaal Report" issued by the government in 1964. The 1964 report accepted that several of the "homelands" could never be economically fully viable: these were Tswanaland, Namaland, Kaokoveld and Kavangoland. The inhabitants would therefore have to survive by working as laborers on white farms and in mines and factories to supplement such subsistence farming as was possible. Even in "homelands" such as Ovamboland and Rehoboth, where prospects for economic development are better, there are problems of soil erosion through overgrazing and overpopulation.

1/ U.N. General Assembly, Report of the U.N. Council..., op.cit., p.34.

The availability of grazing land will not be significantly improved by the projected transfer of land. With the exception of the land purchased from white farmers, mainly for addition to Damaraland and Namaland, most of the new land for the "homelands" is desert or semi-desert, the better farmland having been occupied by white farmers in the period since 1919. One recent assessment by the UK Minority Rights Group of the useful grazing lands available to Africans within the "homelands" gives the percentage for Ovamboland as 50 percent, Kaokoveld 30 percent, and Okavangoland 30 percent. 1/ There is very little arable land left in the territory. The disproportion in the availability of land to whites and blacks is continuing to increase despite land transfers because of the higher rate of increase of the African population. On the basis of 1970 census figures, it appeared that whites dependent on farming had on average 65 times as much useful land per person as the African. In Ovamboland, 40 percent of the population are required to live in 7 percent of the land area. Because only 50 percent is useful grazing land, Ovambos have an average of 9.6 hectares per person, compared with 1,625 hectares per rural white, who thus has 170 times as much useful land, often of better quality, as the individual African in Ovamboland. 2/

A member of the opposition United Party in Namibia, Advocate Brian O'Lynn, has attacked the proposed "independence" of the "homelands" as ignoring their real situation with regard to economic viability. With the "possible exception" of Ovambo-

1/ Murray, op.cit., p.55.

2/ Fraenkel, op.cit., p.32 ; Murray, op.cit., p.56.

land, numbers were too low and their areas too small. Agricultural experts, he said, regarded a unit of below 2,500 hectares as uneconomical for cattle farming by whites. If this standard of 2,500 hectares and above were applied, the total "homelands" areas would be able to sustain a population of 26,000. If smaller units were used, a population of 77,000 would be able to make a living out of livestock-breeding. That still left 88 percent, or 534,000 people out of the total "non-white" population who could not make a living--without taking any account of the natural increase in population. Most of the inhabitants would have to work outside their "homelands", which would make migrant labor a permanent institution. 1/

The history of South African control shows the emergence of policies which led to this method of restricting African development.

The last stage in the process of land redistribution began in the early 1930's. That process may have begun simply to encourage white settlement. But by 1950 its continuation seems to have become part of a deliberate effort to make the African economically dependent. The consequence of restricting a growing population to increasingly smaller areas was to create a desperate need for the jobs offered in the Southern Sector. The white community appears to have been fully conscious of the desirability of cheap labor. Thus in 1960 the Administrator of the Territory announced:

"I want to make a very special plea tonight here to all our municipalities, industries, business concerns and private people: Do your duty for the welfare of the people in this country and do with

1/ Murray, op.cit., p.56.

as little non-European labour as possible. We must create a surplus of labour." 1/

If the goal was so plainly seen, it may be assumed that the white community knew what it was doing when it fashioned the laws and regulations which made the goal attainable.

The laws and regulations which are used to create the surplus of labor systematically debar the "Native" from doing or being anything but cheap labor. They prevent him from being a prospector an owner, an entrepreneur or an operator in any industry. They prevent him from taking part in any process for the settlement of disputes. They deny him technical, managerial or professional posts in any industry. They leave him almost no freedom of choice with respect to the type of employment, conditions of employment or place of employment. They deny him the protection and compensation which is given to white employees. They confine him, for all practical purposes, to unskilled labor in industry. In short, they deprive him of every freedom which is so highly prized in other countries.

The Contract Labor System. The white-owned businesses of Namibia depend on a labor force of about 60,000 Africans to keep them going. This figure compares with a total of 119,500 Africans and whites for the modern agriculture, civil and domestic service, commerce and finance, mining, and fishing work force given in the previous section

1/ Sean Gervasi, "The South West African Economy", South West Africa: Travesty of Trust, 1966, p.148.

on employment. Three-quarters of this labor, about 43,000 in 1971, are migrant workers who are allowed to enter the white areas only if in possession of a contract binding them to work for a specific white employer. No other country has such a high proportion of migrant workers in its labor force--even in South Africa only about 30 percent of the workers are migrants. The trend in Namibia is for the proportion of migrant workers to increase even further as more Africans are moved out of white areas and are forced to settle in the "homelands."

Table 6

CONTRACT LABORERS ACCORDING TO SECTORS
(1971) 1/

<u>Sector</u>	<u>Work Force</u>	<u>Percentage of Total</u>
Farming	10,900	25
Domestic service	2,700	6
Mining	12,800	30
Fishing	3,000	7
Government, commerce and industry	<u>14,000</u>	<u>32</u>
TOTAL	43,400	100%

As a result of a strike by 13,500 contract workers from Ovamboland in December 1971, the South African authorities introduced a revised labor system in January 1972. Although South

1/ U.N.,FAO, op.cit., p.20.

Africa hailed the settlement as a major step forward, the only real changes brought about in the settlement, which were all of secondary importance, were that: future contracts would be more specific about hours of work, overtime and conditions of service; home leave during the period of the contract would be permitted; free medical treatment would be provided; and, in theory at least, the worker acquired the right to change his employment. Owing to the continuing restrictions on residence and movement in the "white" area, however, a worker has exceptional difficulty in exercising this right.^{1/}

Despite the settlement the major inequities of the contract labor system still prevail. Africans are not able to negotiate with their employers on the question of wages and employment conditions, which are standardized in order to discourage competition for labor among employers. Furthermore, African trade unions are non-existent and to strike is a criminal offense; strikers may be jailed or fined several months' pay. Labor disputes between African workers and the white employer are referred to the all-white Central Native Labor Board, whose members are appointed by the South African Minister of Labor.

The Infrastructure

As noted earlier South Africa has a stake in the Namibian economy. It has invested heavily in providing the infrastructure necessary for the investments by South Africa in Namibia. Extensive road and railway investments were made to service the major mining areas and the areas of European population. Very little has been done to develop the African areas. Water

^{1/} U.N., FAO, op.cit., p.20.

resources were developed to assist white settler farming and ranching operations with little assistance for the African farmers. The Cunene hydro-electric project was begun with the intention of serving the mines and cities with lower cost electricity and to make investments more attractive; the uranium operation is especially dependent upon an adequate supply of water and electricity.

Road Network. The country's paved road mileage is 3,059 miles. Main roads stretch from the Ovamboland border to Windhoek and down to the southern border, with connections to Capetown in South Africa. Given the desert and semi-desert terrain and the low population density of the country, the cost of road construction and maintenance have tended to be high. A total investment of 17 million rand through 1972 was made in tarred road construction and plants for maintenance.^{1/} There is some indication that road construction costs may reflect use of capital intensive techniques by South Africa minimizing the use of labor in Namibian road construction.^{2/}

Most of the tarred road mileage in Namibia is of recent origin. Road construction investment has been concentrated in the years since 1968. This means that Namibia will enter the transition with a fairly new road system. If a minimum estimated design life of 10-15 years is assumed for recently constructed roads, the present network provides the initial base for a well-developed road infrastructure. However, the problem of providing for an adequate system

^{1/} Berg, op.cit., p.57.

^{2/} U.N., Security Council Official Records, S/9463, 1970, (As quoted in Berg, op.cit., p.57).

of road maintenance must be considered.

Railroads. Import and export demands of the modern sector have led to fairly extensive rail development in Namibia. The modern economy is almost totally dependent directly or indirectly, upon imports for consumption goods and also to supply inputs for the agricultural and mining industries. Cattle and mineral exports have required investment in rail transport. In 1970, the length of track with loops and sidings was 2,066 miles. All major centers are connected by rail.

The rail system connects southward with the South African railway network. Rail operations in Namibia are, in fact, run by the South African Railways & Harbours Authority. As of 1972 South African Railways & Harbours investment in rail transport in Namibia amounted to 220 million rand.^{1/}

The Authority owns all assets in the form of rolling stock, locomotive power and facilities for operation and maintenance of rails. At present, the effective outlets for Namibian rail shipment are through South Africa Territory.

Ports. Namibia has two ports, Walvis Bay, which is a natural harbor and, as mentioned earlier, is an enclave of South Africa, and Luderitz in the south.

Walvis Bay and Luderitz are important fishing ports with most of the pilchard catch being processed at Walvis Bay and most of the rock

^{1/} Berg, op.cit., p.57.

lobster catch being processed at Luderitz.

During 1972, a total of 1,171 ocean-going ships called at Walvis Bay. The cargo handled consisted of 174,156 tons landed, 450,517 tons shipped (including 272,346 tons of fish products and 143,590 tons of mineral ores and concentrates) and 30,707 tons trans-shipped.1/

Exports from Luderitz for the 12 months ended September 30, 1972, consisted of 265 tons of frozen rock lobster tails, 83 kg. of canned lobster, 6,142 tons of fishmeal, 351 tons of lobstermeal, 199 tons of greasy karakul wool, 586 tons of salted seal skins, and 197 tons of whale meat.2/

Power Development. Until recently, the level and distribution of economic activity in Namibia have not justified the establishment of country-wide power grid lines fed by a few large generating stations. Each local authority, mine and other consumer had, therefore, to provide its own supply. Small-scale generation, coupled with high fuel prices due to transport costs, resulted in high energy costs.

The demand for power has grown rapidly, particularly in Windhoek, in the coastal centers, and at the Tsumeb mines where new smelters and a refinery have come into operation. With the availability of cheap power, new possibilities for industries will arise and hitherto uneconomic mining ventures and expansions might also become feasible.

1/ U.N., FAO, op.cit., p.18.

2/ Ibid.

The Cunene River Basin Scheme, which concerns both Angola and Namibia, was originally embodied in an agreement signed in 1969 between Portugal and South Africa. This scheme, which is expected to cost an estimated R400 million, calls for regulation of the flow of the Cunene River, the generation of electric power and the construction of a number of irrigation works. The major part of the financing was to be provided by the Republic of South Africa.1/

In September 1972, it was reported that the first water to reach Ovambo from the Cunene River Basin Scheme had flowed into a reservoir dam. Although South African sources claimed that the Ovambo in particular would derive considerable benefits from cheap power and increased supply of water, it was reported that the African population would derive little benefit from the scheme.

Dams are to be built at Cove and Caluque and the power station is being completed at the Ruacana Falls; a transmission network will run to Tsumeb and from there to centers further south.2/

The reason why the transfer of political power is so critical to the Cunene project is that most of the dam project development (i.e., all diversions, weirs, and the reservoir) is in Angola with only the dam itself in Namibia.3/ Therefore, the flow of water to the generating

1/ United Nations. FAO. op.cit., p.19.

2/ Ibid.

3/ Roger Murray, "Cunene Dam: Key to the Wealth of Namibia", Financial Times, May 5, 1976, p.12 (As quoted Berg, op.cit., p.25).

facility is controlled by the Angolans. Nowhere in the planning or development of the project was there provision for Angola to receive water or hydro-electric power; the project was financed by South Africa and initiated while the Portuguese were still in Angola. Needless to say the MPLA of Angola is not pleased with the situation. The MPLA recognized SWAPO as the responsible political group of Namibia, and if SWAPO emerges from the transfer of power into a leadership role, the Cunene dam prospects are probably good.

The Mining Sector

Overview. Mining is the largest sector of the Namibian economy, comprising 60 per cent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), or an estimated R 370 million in 1973. The sector is dominated by diamond, copper and lead production.

Mining accounts for 60 percent of Namibia's export and 70 percent of tax revenue, 1/ while employing only 10 per cent of the total labor force.2/ Namibia ranks among the larger producers of minerals in the world. Within Africa, it is the largest producer of lead, the second largest producer of cadmium, and the third largest producer of zinc.3/ World-

1/ Trevor B. Jepson, Rio Tinto-Zinc in Namibia, Christian Concern for Southern Africa, London, 1976 (As quoted in Berg, op.cit., p.20).

2/ Francis Wilson, Present and Future Prospects of Namibia's Economy, Text transcribed from speech in Windhoek, Namibia, September 1, 1975 (From Berg, op.cit., p.20).

3/ Murray, op.cit., p.82 (From Berg, op.cit., p.20).

wide, it ranks seventeenth among major mining countries. In addition, Namibia seems to have large reserves of as yet untapped minerals (see the Namibia mining map which follows).

Mining as an engine of growth has a number of well-known deficiencies. It is not very labor-intensive; in Namibia mining is estimated to employ only 18,000 people out of a wage labor force of perhaps 120,000. As a result mainly of its capital-intensity it generates a relatively large stream of payments to capital, most of it foreign capital. This fact that 25 to 30 percent of GDP includes payments to foreign factors of production creates a large gap between gross domestic and gross national product.^{1/}

For these reasons, mining industries by themselves have rarely transformed underdeveloped economies. But they are nevertheless enormously useful, and particularly so in Namibian circumstances. Mining operations have a fundamental stability matched by few other industries. This stability has various dimensions. Mining activities tend to be relatively impervious to political instability and economic dislocation. Partly this derives from their very shortcomings as generators of general development. They are normally physically isolated often connected to the outside by independent transport and communication systems that they build and manage themselves. They depend on the secondary economy for relatively few inputs: they not only have their own workshops for maintenance, but their own forges for tools and die work, their own training facilities for skilled workers. They often provide for housing and feeding of their employees on a centralized basis.

^{1/} Berg, op.cit., p.16.

The basic autonomy of operations allows mining enterprises to survive and adjust to great political and economic stress. It explains why the Fria (and later, Halco) Bauxite and aluminum operations remain healthy in Guinea, despite the almost 20 years of severe economic disorder in the surrounding economy. It explains why Zaire's copper industry has persisted through a fifteen year period of economic breakdown and political turbulence. In Zaire agriculture has suffered grievously; its manufacturing sector has been ravaged for lack of spare parts and intermediate inputs; the country's transport system has suffered frequent breakdowns. But mining has gone on.

Other factors serve to make mining a stable sector in developing countries. The technology in most sub-sectors of mining is standardized, well distributed internationally and thus easily accessible. The mining multi-nationals have considerable experience in dealing with LDC governments under varied political conditions. Management contracts are commonplace in the industry. The threat of disruption following nationalization is therefore much smaller in mining than in other industries.

So whatever the nature of the transition in political terms, whatever the economic dislocation arising from white exodus or other factors during the transition, mining will undoubtedly persist, and this is no small benefit. It means that independent Namibia will have the budget resources and the foreign exchange to meet its administrative needs and its import requirements. The tax revenues and royalties generated by the mining industry can finance the creation of the new state.

Resistance to Mineral Exploitation. Black Namibians form 90 percent of the population

and their attitude to the presence of foreign mining companies has to be seen in the context of the conditions prevailing in their country. There is evidence that some of its mineral resources, like copper, have been worked by the African for generations, but as a result of colonial domination during the past ninety years, de facto control of these resources has passed into the hands of the occupying power. In the absence of political rights, the Namibian people have had no say in the exploitation of them nor do they derive much benefit from them, as all the profits accrue to the foreign owners.

This is the situation which led Clemens Kapuuo, Chief of the Herero, to write in a letter to London solicitors in 1971:

"I am deeply concerned, and so are my peoples, with the way the nature mineral resources of this country are being removed from it with the full knowledge and permission of the South African Government. . . . You may well know that apart from its mineral wealth which is substantial, South West Africa is a poor country. The Africans who will be brought to these mines under the contract labour system, who will work for period of twelve to eighteen months deprived of their natural family life, unable by current laws to negotiate their salary, and prevented under strict laws from bettering their conditions, benefit but little. This country, which is our country, is being exploited by greedy entrepreneurs, robbed of its wealth, and rendered barren

for the future. Our fear is that when freedom finally comes to this land, it will be returned to us with no minerals left. Thus, you will see the wonderful asset which we have for developing the land for the well being of all people will have been taken away from us. We deplore what the Government in Pretoria is currently allowing. We have not been consulted in all this. We wish you to take whatever action you may deem necessary to bring the matter to the highest international court of justice."1/

The continuing increase in the rate of exploitation of known mineral deposits has caused speculation that the main resources of gem diamonds and base metals at Tsumeb might be exhausted in a short space of time. The Odendaal Report estimated that these might last for only "another 25 years", while in 1971 the Tsumeb General Manager gave 12-15 years as the probable life-span of the mine under existing conditions. The report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Diamond Industry, published at the end of 1973, forecast a drop in total diamond production to 22 per cent of its present level by 1990, due to exhaustion of the reserves, according to partial details in the Windhoek Advertiser.2/

Production. According to the most recent figures available, Namibian base minerals in

1/ Lissner, op.cit., p.100.

2/ Murray, op.cit., p.43.

1973 have shown an increase of 54 percent over 1972. Diamonds were responsible for 64 percent of mineral sales, followed by copper and lead. According to reports, diamond production increased by 7 percent over 1972, while the value of sales rose by 66 percent. 1/

Minerals sales in 1973 amounted to \$ 230.0 million, compared with R65.1 million in 1963. At the same time, expenditures by mining companies increased from R42.7 million in 1963 to R60.4 million in 1973.2/ Of this production, the most important minerals currently produced are gem diamonds, although these are only expected to last for a further 20 years, unless new deposits are discovered. Similarly, the deposits at Tsumeb have a maximum life of 15-20 years. Apart from diamonds, the most important minerals are cadmium, copper, fluospar, iron ore, lead, lithium ore, manganese, sulphur, tin vanadium, wolfram (tungsten), zinc, with smaller quantities of silver, tantalite, beryl, bismuth and other semi-precious stones. The commercial production of uranium is scheduled to begin at Rossing in mid-1976, initially at the rate of 60,000 metric tons a day, with maximum production by 1980.3/

As shown by Table 7, diamonds constituted 62 percent of mineral production value in 1973. This contrasts with a 76 percent figure for

1/ United Nations General Assembly, Report of the U.N. Council for Namibia, op.cit., p.26.

2/ Ibid.

3/ See "Financial Times, SWA Uranium: New Dilemma for Labour," May 3, 1974 (As referred to in Murray, op.cit., p.79)

Table 7

NAMIBIA MINERAL PRODUCTION, 1973 ^{1/}

<u>Mineral</u>	<u>Percent of Production Value</u>
Diamonds	62%
Copper	20
Lead	8
Zinc	5
Others (Tin, Vanadium, Cadmium, Lithium)	<u>5</u>
	100%

diamonds as a percent of mineral imports for the source year. The UN is the source of both estimates (See Table 3). Table 8 shows the volume of mineral output for Namibia from 1965-1973.

Exports of Namibian mineral production are estimated in Table 9. Because of South African embargo on production figures, information is not available on the comparability of Table 8 on mineral production and Table 9

^{1/} Berg, op.cit., p.20.

TABLE 8
MINING OUTPUT

Product	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973
Diamond (Carats '000)	1,656	1,759	1,700	1,722	2,024	1,865	1,648	1,598	1,600
Copper-Production (Metal Content Metric Tons)	39,400	37,800	33,800	30,200	25,500	22,800	29,500	17,000	23,700
Copper-Smelted (Metric Tons)	n.a.	n.a.	31,700	30,200	28,000	27,300	28,100	25,600	n.a.
Lead--Minted (Metric Tons)	100,400	89,800	70,200	60,800	75,700	70,500	73,200	60,000	63,200
Lead--Refined (Metric Tons)	n.a.	n.a.	69,400	55,400	69,300	67,900	69,800	62,700	n.a.
Zinc - Production (Metal Content Metric Tons)	29,900	29,900	22,600	23,200	38,200	46,100	48,900	25,000	52,600
Tin - Production (Metal Content Metric Tons)	420	698	732	732	1,024	1,044	965	900	800
Cadmium - Production (Metric Tons)	n.a.	n.a.	181	156	238	205/ 315	159/ 266	190	n.a.

Sources: Southwest Africa - Statistical Survey, p. 800.
UN Summary of Economics, Dec. 1974, p. 3.
The Role of Foreign Firms in Namibia pp. 80-81.
UN General Assembly, "Reports of the Special Committee...", 1970-74 (from Berg, op.cit. p. 23).

Figures with slash indicate conflicting reports in the sources above for Cadmium.

TABLE 9
MINING EXPORTS

	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973
Diamonds (million Rand)	85	n.a.	80	90	75	80	90	127
Copper-(metric tons)	n.a.	3,976	7,468	8,440				
Copper ore-(metric tons)	288	7,805	9,173	12,285				
Lead ore-(metric tons)	85,861	39	n.a.	1,145				
Pig Lead-(metric tons)	3,296	7,312	1,865	1,109				
Lead refined to Bullion-(Metric tons)	15,281	14,406	13,025	12,660				
Zinc ore-(metric ton)	14,878	10,211	11,533	16,360				
Cadmium-(metric ton)	99.85	143.39	148.52	132.28				

Sources: U.N. Summary of Economics - Dec. 1974
World Metal Statistics - Dec. 1970
The Role of Foreign Firms in Namibia, (from Berg, *op.cit.*, p. 24).

Exports other than Diamonds not available after 1966.

Note: It is not clear the extent to which these data include trade within the South African Customs Union.

on mineral exports.

Diamonds are mined along the southern coastal Namib Desert. Consolidated Diamond Mines of South West Africa is responsible for over 90 per cent of the territory's total population. For the period 1969-1973, the production averaged 1,700,000 carats/year, of which 95 per cent were stone quality.^{1/} Most of the gemstones production goes to the parent company DeBeers Consolidated of South Africa.

Copper, the second largest mineral export (R 34.2 million in 1973), is mined almost exclusively from the large Tsumeb mine in north-central Namibia, which produces one of the highest grades of ore in the world. The volume of production for copper averaged 27,000 metric tons/year from 1966 to 1973. The taxes collected from copper mines comprised 25 percent of all revenue payments to the State from 1968 to 1971.^{2/} Considerable prospecting continues in Namibia, but the recent trend by South African business interests is to locate new refining and processing operations out of Namibia.

Namibia is the largest African producer of lead and the third largest producer of zinc. Both lead and zinc occur in the copper ore bodies and are mined by Tsumeb, as well as SWACO, which produce by and large most of the lead and zinc mined in Namibia.

^{1/} United Nations, General Assembly, Report of the U.N. Council for Namibia, op.cit., pp.27,28.

^{2/} Murray, op.cit., p.45.

The average refined lead production was 65,750 metric tons/year from 1967 to 1972, and the value of exported lead in 1973 was \$ 17.0 million. Most of the refined lead is exported to the United Kingdom.1/

The average zinc production was 35,800 metric tons/year from 1966 to 1973. The value of zinc production was R7.0 million in 1972. Most of the zinc ore is exported to the United Kingdom.2/

The Rossing uranium mine provides a major economic and strategic incentive for the South African occupation regime to refuse to withdraw from Namibia. Benefits from the project include foreign exchange from exports, the political control of a major financial investment in the occupied territory, an important element of the South African nuclear industry, and vital political support from the foreign governments with a stake in the Rossing mine.

It should also be borne in mind that the ore reserves at Rossing, estimated to be 100,000 tons, if added to the reserves already discovered in South Africa would bring the total uranium ore reserves currently under South Africa's control to 300,000 tons, which is enough to satisfy one-third of the anticipated world demand in 1985.3/ The strategic and political importance for South Africa of this resource is readily apparent, and is a factor which cannot be ignored in any discussions on independence for Namibia.

1/ Berg, op.cit., p.22.

2/ Ibid.

3/ Lissner, op.cit., p.97.

Foreign Investment. Ownership patterns in mining reveal a situation in which a few companies dominate the overall sector. This is largely due to the fact that only three companies (Tsumeb, Consolidated Diamond Mines and Southwest Africa Company, Ltd.) account for diamond, copper, lead and zinc production (95% of total mining). As a result, most mining output is in the hands of United States or South African firms who own the three companies listed above. Mining is very lucrative in Namibia, especially at the present tax and wage structures. Operations can recoup their initial investment from three to five years. New investments, however, have not progressed very rapidly, primarily due to an uncertain political future, and the refusal of the U.S. Overseas Private Investment Corporation to insure investments in Namibia.

U.S. mining firms feel particularly vulnerable because of this prohibition. The Overseas Private Investment Corporation has insured billions of dollars of U.S. corporate investments around the world. It paid out more than \$1 billion to expropriated firms in Chile, but Washington has bowed to U.N. sanctions and discourages U.S. investment in Namibia.

Most discouraging of all to investors, perhaps, is that unlike previous earnings, recent returns on investment in Namibia have not been as good as anticipated. Tsumeb Corporation, owned by Newmont Mining Corporation and Amax Incorporated reported disappointing profits in 1974. A Canadian firm, Falconbridge Nickel Mines, had its profits from a share in the Oamites copper mine cut by \$1 million to \$1.4 million. A consortium, dominated by Bethlehem Steel, in a tungsten mine, complains that high labor turnover, caused by the six month work contracts, cuts into profits.^{1/}

^{1/} Lissner, op.cit., p.102.

The only major investment program at present is the Rio Tinto-Zinc group from the United Kingdom who have made a major investment in uranium through their Rossing Mining Company, as noted above. A major find by a South African group represented by their Namibian firm of Otjihase Mining Company has made a significant find of copper, with proved reserves greater than those of Tsumeb. When and if this mine goes into production, Otjihase will become the second largest copper mining operation in Namibia, and possibly surpass Tsumeb in time. This has important significance for ownership patterns insofar as it further shifts the balance of ownership toward South African firms, and it makes the copper operation that much less sensitive to U.S. government pressure on AMAX and Newmont Mining.

It is apparent that South African firms are in control of over 85 percent of all mining production and over 60 percent of the mineral reserves on hand for the major production minerals. Their stake in Namibia is very high.

South African income derived from Namibia is heavily dependent on the mining industry, particularly the diamond sector, which pays most of the income taxes and special levies. More than one third of domestically generated revenue is received from the diamond mining companies. Since April 1966, tax revenue derived from the sales of diamonds and base minerals has been paid directly to the South African Government.

Table 10 below diagrams foreign investment in Namibia's mining operations by product and origin of parent company.

Table 10

MULTINATIONAL INVOLVEMENT IN MINING 1/

<u>Activity</u>	<u>Number of Namibian Companies</u>	<u>Parent Company by Origin</u>				
		<u>Total</u>	<u>SA</u>	<u>US</u>	<u>UK</u>	<u>Other</u>
Diamonds	5	8	6	1	0	1
Copper	13	22	13	4	1	4
Zinc	4	12	7	2	2	1
Lead	5	13	9	1	2	1
Uranium	2	9	4	2	3	0
Petroleum Prospecting	7	13	3	7	0	3
Other	<u>12</u>	<u>18</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>1</u>
Totals	48	95	54	20	10	11
Adjusted totals (less double counting of multiple activities)	42	55	27	14	4	10

1/ Berg, op.cit., p.29.

Future Prospects. Although, according to some sources, currently exploited areas which have yielded their vast mineral wealth may be approaching depletion, new areas of this vast territory and their subsoils may still offer prospects of continuing dynamism in this field. If the optimistic predictions of petroleum materialize, this should provide an important source of revenue for developing other sectors of the economy. This will of course depend on the policy that any eventual independent government follows, particularly vis-a-vis foreign interests which have been predominant particularly in this sector.

A deposit of natural gas was reported to have been found in February 1974 in the off-shore concession area held by the Chevron Oil Company, the Texaco Oil Company and the Southern Oil Exploration Corporation (South West Africa) (Pty.), Ltd. (SWAKOR), near the mouth of the Orange River.

So far there have been no other finds. As a result of fruitless prospecting and of international pressure, five petroleum prospecting companies have withdrawn from Namibia: Continental Oil Company, Getty Oil Company, Phillips Petroleum Company, Regent Petroleum Company and Texaco, all of the United States. 1/

The Agriculture Sector

Overview. Agriculture, forestry and fishing contributes about 20 percent of Namibia's gross domestic product. As in the case of mining and

1/ United Nations, General Assembly, Report of the U.N. Council for Namibia, op.cit., p.30.

fishing, commercial agriculture and stockraising in Namibia are totally controlled by whites, with Africans employed as shepherds and farm laborers. As a result of the application of apartheid practices, most of the best farming land is reserved for white ownership. In the course of the last 60 years, Africans have been deprived of these lands and have systematically been confined to the generally unproductive and arid areas, still situated mainly in the northern half of the country, where they are dependent on subsistence agriculture and cattle raising. The total land allocations of the 10 bantustans constitute about 25 percent of the total land area of Namibia. 1/

One-third of the approximately 91,000 whites in the 1970 census were farmers, members of farm families or dependent in some other way on agriculture. More than 60 percent of these are of South African origin; the remainder are mostly of German descent.

There are some 5,000 farms and ranches constituting this commercial agricultural sector, most of them range-grazing herds of livestock or sheep. They are located along the railroad lines and paved highways which link the principal population centers of the country mostly in semi-arid areas. 2/ The only part of the country with high rainfall is in the northwest, in the Ovambo homeland. Karakul sheep do fairly well in these semi-arid conditions; the range-fed cattle are a more marginal proposition; both require large acreages per head. Water and fodder supplies have been serious problems in recent drought period (1973, most recently).

1/ United Nations, op.cit., p.31.

2/ Ibid.

Non-whites own about 25 percent of the Territory's 9 million head of sheep, cattle and goats. In 1971, there were 2.8 million head of cattle.^{1/} The inoculation campaigns in the northern bantustans have so far not succeeded in wiping out endemic cattle diseases, particularly foot-and-mouth disease, which handicaps commercial exploitation of livestock owned by non-whites.

The South African government has started implementation of a plan for establishing white farmers in "under-developed areas" in the Kavangoland and Ovamboland.

Table 11 summarizes the agriculture output for Namibia in 1974. Beef sales accounted for 55.4 percent of agriculture sales by value. Karakul pelts accounted for 28.8 percent, leaving only 15.8 percent distributed among several other products.

Table 11

AGRICULTURAL SALES - 1974 ^{2/}

<u>Product</u>	<u>Value (million rand)</u>	<u>Percent of total</u>
Beef	53.2	55.4%
Karakul pelts	27.6	28.8
Fresh milk	2.1	2.2
Wool	1.8	1.9
Agronomy	1.0	1.0
Other	<u>10.3</u>	<u>10.7</u>
	TOTAL	<u>96.0</u> <u>100.0%</u>

^{1/} United Nations, op.cit., p.31.

^{2/} Berg, op.cit., p.39.

Factors Limiting Development. The agricultural sector has so far been dominated by animal husbandry, namely, cattle and kai xul sheep farming on an extensive basis, and virtually completely run by the white population. A number of limiting factors in agricultural development are evident:

- The gross injustices of land allocation and agricultural services and training.
- Severe limitations of the semi-arid climate and low productivity of soils and vegetation.
- An overdependence on livestock and a tendency to over-exploit the resources of the environment.
- The overdependence on South Africa, both for the export of livestock products and for the increasing import of food grains, vegetables and fruit.
- The lack of appropriate technology and managerial skills.
- The lack of local administrative structures and associations and the continued total reliance on external aid for relief and for maintenance.
- The lack of reliable data on the social, economic and physical resources of the small farmer communities of the reserve areas.
- The susceptibility of herds to stock diseases.
- The inability of meat and dairy products to compete on international markets and the small internal market.

- Transport and marketing problems, aggravated by long distances between urban populations and scarcely populated rural areas.

According to analyses conducted by the FAO, the tendency to indulge in the mining type of farming activity practiced by many "white farmers" in Namibia and Botswana is extremely dangerous to long term production and should be strongly resisted. There is the potential for a greater degree of self-sufficiency in agricultural production given the conservation and careful use of resources. Overgrazing of pasture lands, for example, should be curtailed. This may mean a reduction in the economic value of the livestock industry for a number of years, but in the longer run such a strategy would benefit the majority of the people. Until detailed studies have been carried out on the interactions between grazing animals, vegetation and water supplies, appropriate systems of land management cannot be determined. The overriding commercial attitude of the white farmers and the excessive pressures by animals and humans on the land in the reserve areas make any rational discussion of long-term strategy for the whole country difficult.

The overriding constraint in all land use activities is the low availability and unreliability of water resources. 1/ The future development of water resources for livestock, for irrigated cropping and for human use requires careful planning and management if the mistakes made in other countries are not to be repeated.

1/ See Appendix II, Map 6, Agricultural Regions.

Still, even in areas in the south some cultivation appears possible, according to one research report consulted. ^{1/} The Swakop and Kuiseb Valleys appear to have considerable potential with abundant water just beneath the surface of the dry river beds. Dates, citrus fruits, avocados and other tropical fruits could be grown wherever topography permits along the lower regions of these streams. Such fruits could find a ready market in Walvis Bay, Swakopmund and, if the supply and quality are good, for overseas shipments. Furthermore, some of the area could profitably be devoted to raising alfalfa (lucerne) for fattening of beef cattle prior to slaughter at Walvis Bay. Many of these cattle currently suffer from long rail hauls from the interior causing considerable losses. Similar cultivation in other southern areas might be foreseen in connection with the increasing number of storage dams being built. Hardap dam is one example.

Livestock Production. Livestock has provided the majority of agricultural production and export. Export sales increased 283 percent from 1966 to 1973, as shown in Table 12 .

^{1/} Richard R. Logan, "The Central Namib Desert, South West Africa," University of California, Foreign Field Research Programmer sponsored by the Office of Naval Research, Report No.9, 1960, (as referred to in U.N., F.A.O., op.cit., p.46).

Table 12

LIVESTOCK EXPORTS - 1966, 1968-1971 (in current rand) 1/

	<u>1966</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>
Value Live- stock('000 R)	14,155	25,100	24,600	29,000	30,000	35,000	40,000
Value, Agri- cultural Sector ('000 R)	29,490	44,300	46,500	49,100	57,500	67,500	72,000
% Livestock of Total Agricul- tural Sector	48	57	53	59	52	52	56
% increase in livestock value 1966	--	77	74	105	112 .	147	183

1/ Berg, op.cit., p.40.

NOTE: Exports Outside the South African Customs Union.

There is an urgent need to develop a sound livestock management policy for the currently designated reserve areas where human and animal populations are high, veterinary and extension services are minimal and there is a danger of permanent damage to the vegetation and soil resources of the grazing areas. There is no doubt that the reserve areas are totally unable to support the needs of the present population and any long-term plan must include the more equitable distribution of land and grazing rights between the people.

The ranching industry, one of the pillars of the economy, is vulnerable to white exodus. It is argued in some quarters that the present large-scale organizations of sheep and cattle ranching require substantial inputs of skill and capital which African herders will lack in the short or medium-term. Thus, the decline of this industry which probably employs some 35,000 ^{1/} Africans may be projected. This turn of events, of course, is based on the double assumption that (a) the 6,000 white farmers will not wish, or will not be allowed to remain, and (b) that the ranching industry cannot be reorganized along lines amenable to African small-holder production.

There is another factor at work with respect to the cattle industry. South Africa is overwhelmingly the major market for Namibia cattle. So long as Namibia is within the

^{1/} This is the estimate of Wolfgang Thomas, cited by Frances Wilson, "Present and Future Aspects of Namibia's Economy", in an unpublished speech delivered before the Christian Center of Southwest Africa (From Berg, op.cit., p.15.) It compares with an estimated total modern agriculture work force of 36,000 estimated earlier.

South African economy, and a fortiori so long as the ranchers are South African citizens, there will be no problem of keeping the South African market. Once Namibia is on its own, South African cattle growers will probably set up pressures to exclude Namibian beef and cattle.

South African influence is direct in processing and marketing. Two South African firms, one known as Vleisenstraal, established as a cooperative, the other known as ASOKOR, a commercial corporation, control all the (limited number of) meat packing and processing facilities in Namibia. ASOKOR also has interests in cattle raising, while a third South African firm, Karoo Leendehave, Bpk., is also involved in cattle sales and marketing. 1/ There are no Namibian-controlled processing or marketing organizations.

Livestock is susceptible to outbreaks of disease, particularly from less well-treated homeland herds (which may be why these herds receive as much veterinary attention as they do). Routine stock treatment programs are handled locally, but large outbreaks, requiring large numbers of specialists, are dependent upon assistance from the South African extension services. This is South Africa's largest service, and Namibia enjoys the advantage of having it available practically upon demand; its personnel are already familiar with local conditions. The benefits of extensive South African agricultural research also accrue to Namibia.

1/ United Nations, Document A/9623 (Part V) Annex, pp.169-171 and United Nations, Document A/9023 (Part III), Annex, pp.131, 132, (As quoted in Berg, op.cit., p.35).

This foreign element is less important to Namibia now than it would be to a fledgling African majority government of the country. South African control and influence, direct and indirect, is nearly total. This sector would have extreme difficulty functioning independently of South Africa. It might be impossible.

Karakul Sheep Exports. This sector accounts for some 35-40 percent of agricultural sales and exports. Some 60 percent is exported to West Germany, 20 percent to Italy, France and Scandinavia, and the remainder to Japan, the United States and other countries. 1/

No pelts are sold directly to these countries, however, all output passes through one of three South African companies: African Karakul Auctions, Boere-Saamwerk, Bpk., and Kooperatiewe Wolmatskappy. Each of these companies is, in turn, the agent for one of three London auction houses who, in their turn, hold five-times yearly auctions of pelts, selling most of the world production. 2/ Thus, there is a strong United Kingdom and South African control over and influence in the Karakul market for Namibian pelts.

While the sales of both Namibia and South Africa are increasing, Namibia's proportion of the total sales is decreasing. In the event of disturbance in Namibia, South Africa might be able to make up some of the overall loss of production in a few years, while an

1/ United Nations, Document A/9023 (Part III), Annex, pp. 131-2 and United Nations, Document A/10024 (Vol.I), p.36, (As quoted in Berg, op.cit., p. 56).

2/ United Nations, Document A/9623 (Part V), Annex, pp.169-161 and United Nations, Document A.9023 (Part III), Annex pp.131,2, (As quoted in Berg, op.cit., p.36).

increased market share might not easily won back by an independent Namibia.

As with the livestock sector, Namibia is heavily dependent upon South African extension services for disease control. The sheep breeding is fairly sophisticated. Namibia's competitive edge in the world market could be eroded over the course of several years without continuing research and planned breeding programs, dependent again, upon South Africa's extension service.

The pelts are the primary product for what is by nature a volatile market; long-term price stability is not to be expected, and it is even possible that karakul could be replaced by some other more competitive wool. Pelts from South Africa and Namibia are jointly promoted by the Karakul Board, again, a South African based organization.

Namibia and South Africa together produce over half the world's supply of fur. The global total is estimated at 10 to 11 million pelts per year with Namibia taking roughly 70 percent and South Africa taking 30 percent of the joint share. The karakul herd in Namibia is now estimated to comprise 4.8 million head, with the biggest flocks in the deep arid south of the country. Normal yields are three lambs per ewe every two years, the lambs being slaughtered within three days of birth. 1/

The main markets for karakul fur are the Federal Republic of Germany, which takes

1/ U.N., F.A.O., op.cit., p.32.

about 60 percent of the combined Namibia/
South African output, and Italy, which takes
about 20 percent. In 1972, the Karakul Board,
which is responsible for marketing both
Namibian and South African pelts, launched
intensive sales promotions in Japan and Spain,
where a considerable market is believed to
exist. 1/

The increase in karakul exports from Namibia
and South Africa over 11 years ending 1971
is shown in the following table.

1/ U.N., F.A.O., op.cit., p.32.

Table 13

NAMIBIA AND SOUTH AFRICA: KARAKUL EXPORTS,
1960 and 1968-71 1/

	<u>South Africa</u> (million pelts)	<u>Namibia</u>	<u>Total(a)</u>	<u>Average price</u> <u>per pelt</u> <u>(Rand's)</u>	<u>Total value</u> <u>(Million R)</u>
1960	0.8	2.0	2.8	4.38	12.0
1968	1.4	3.4	4.8	5.58	27.2
1969	1.7	3.6	5.3	5.94	31.6
1970	1.8	3.3	5.1	5.78	29.8
1971	2.0	3.4	5.4	8.09	45.6

Note: Unofficial sources report that the number of 1972 and 1973 Namibian pelt sales are estimated at 3.5 million and 3.6 million, respectively.

(a) Rounded

1/ U.N., F.A.O., op.cit., p.32.

Crop Production. While livestock will continue to be of major importance, both as a source of revenue and food, a greater reliance on locally produced crops and processing is highly desirable. The southern part of the country may need to rely on imports of food from other areas and from South Africa, but it seems possible to develop the output of food and cash crops from the northern areas.

As in many other countries of Africa with similar climates, maize is continually grown in sub-marginal areas and crop failures are regular. Evidence from neighboring Botswana has shown that improved millet and sorghum varieties grown in sound farming systems and with minimum tillage techniques can regularly out yield maize. The combination of improved grain production coupled with the improvement of potential legume crops should greatly improve the food supply and nutrition of the majority of people living in the reserve areas.

The white farmers are centered around the main towns and concentrate on the production of wool, dairy products, meat and maize. The African farmers produce meat, maize, millet and groundnuts. Some are beginning to develop Karakul sheep farming. Large quantities of maize are imported from South Africa to supply the needs of all but the people living in the northern strip of the country. An improvement in the production of sorghum and millet and the better utilization of their products is one of the ways of reducing the annual dependency on these imports of grain.

Owing to lack of water, grain growing can play only a minor role in the southern sector. In good years, the northern African territories are self-sufficient in grains, but in bad years South Africa provides large quantities

of grains at heavily subsidized prices. The southern sector must thus regularly get the bulk of its maize from the Republic, while the north has to do so intermittently. About 75 percent of the southern sector's requirements of fruit and vegetables also comes from the Republic -- approximately 6,860 tons a year at a total cost of R 453,000. 1/

Table 14 which follows shows the increase in commercial maize and sorghum production.

1/ U.N., F.A.O., op.cit., p.34.

Table 14

COMMERCIAL MAIZE AND SORGHUM PRODUCTION, 1964-1972 ^{1/}

(thousands of metric tons)

	<u>1964</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971*</u>	<u>1972*</u>
Maize	9.0	10.0	10.0	10.0	12.0	12.0	12.0	12.0	14.0
Millet and Sorghum	14.0	15.0	15.0	15.0	15.0	15.0	15.0	15.0	16.0

*FAO estimates.

^{1/} United Nations, FAO, op.cit., p.47.

The recent development of water resources through large irrigation systems and schemes (Cunene River Basin Scheme for Ovambo) may give some ground for optimism for the future of irrigation agriculture in the northern areas. However, the scale of operations, the size and function of the large irrigation projects (cash crop oriented), the link with capital intensive agricultural research (Mahanene Research Station and C.S.I.R.O.) and the training of agricultural extension workers (Ovango Agricultural College) does not indicate that South Africa has much intention of helping the majority of small subsistence farmers. The drilling of numbers of boreholes and the construction of small dams makes the development of small, village or community centered irrigation schemes feasible. The key to the success of such schemes will be the degree to which local decision-making and administration of resources is encouraged. Whether such schemes will grow to benefit the majority of the population remains to be seen, but under the present administration it seems unlikely. Given the essential degree of independence--to identify priorities and develop socially appropriate organizations--the potential for the production of grain, vegetable and fruit crops is considerable.

The Fishing Sector. The production and export of fish is another important industry in Namibia. The industry began with the development of snoek, whitefish, and lobster fishing. The coastline of the Namib desert is chilled by the Benguela current and serves to attract seals, leading to development of a sealing industry. The expansion into the pilchard (sardine) market stimulated the development of processing industries for fish meal, fish oil and canning. Fish products are exported to South Africa (mainly canned fish) and the

United Kingdom, the U.S. and other countries of Western Europe. Exports have grown from 34 million rand in 1964 to 65 million rand in 1973. 1/ This has been due both to an expanded catch as well as higher market prices. The canning of pilchards is the industry's major activity. A forecast of a 16 percent increase in production in 1975 would have added considerable to the progressively better outputs observed since 1972. In 1974, 6.2 million cartons or 61 percent of total production was exported. In 1975, 54 percent of total production was exported. This decline in exports represents, in part, an anticipated increase in local consumption. 2/

In 1966, 14.5 percent of the investments in the fishing industry was of "foreign" origin. The balance was South African controlled. There are a large number of South African holdings in the fishing industry. Unlike the mining sector where only a few multi-national corporations control the assets, here numerous firms are found. 3/

During the latter part of the 1960's, Namibia's fertile coastal reserves became over-fished and abused by the fleets. Strict laws and licensing procedures were instituted to help avoid stock depletion. This led to a resurgence of the Namibian fishing industry between 1973 and 1974.

1/ United Nations, Summaries of Economic Data: Namibia, op.cit., p.11.

2/ Berg, op.cit., p.45.

3/ Ibid., p.46.

The primary center for the fishing industry is Walvis Bay. This port is a territorial possession of South Africa ceded to the Cape Province by the British in 1878, even though it is situated just about in the middle of Namibia's 900 mile coastline. This is the most active port feeding Namibia's fishing industry. Without Walvis Bay, the fishing industry would have little chance to continue as part of Namibia's economy.

The fishing sector represents an investment of approximately 42.5 million rand of South African capital in factories and equipment with a further 21 million rand invested in the fishing fleet. ^{1/} The profits from these investments accrue to shareholders in South Africa. Africans are involved only as migrant workers employed on contract as unskilled workers in the fish-processing factories, mainly at Walvis Bay. During the six-month fishing season, up to 6,000 Ovambo, Kavango and Damara migrant workers are employed at Walvis Bay where they live in a municipal compound. Some Coloured sailors are allowed to work on the fishing boats. The total number employed in the fishing industry is estimated at 7,500.

The fishing industry contributes about 20 percent of Namibia's total export earnings. Table 15 shows the growth in the industry's output through 1972.

Other Sectors

Manufacturing. The manufacturing sector of Namibia is small in scale, representing in 1966 less than 10 percent of GDP.

^{1/} Berg, op.cit., p.46

TABLE 15

OUTPUT AND VALUE OF PROCESSED FISH AND FISH PRODUCTS, 1964 - 1972
(Metric Tons in 000's; Millions of Rand)

Product	1964		1965		1966		1967		1968		1969		1970		1971		1972	
	Output MT	Value																
1. Canned Sardines	n.a.	10.0	n.a.	13.6	n.a.	14.0	4.5	17.8	54.2	8.4	60.6	9.6	50.0	12.4	45.0	n.a.	111.4	n.a.
2. Fish Oil	n.a.	5.6	n.a.	4.7	34.8	4.9	38.5	3.8	68.4	4.0	45.5	2.7	37.0	5.6	36.9	n.a.	27.9	n.a.
3. Fish Meal	n.a.	13.9	n.a.	19.7	162.8	22.4	178.4	18.0	237.2	18.5	203.9	15.5	160.0	16.4	133.1	n.a.	111.2	n.a.
4. Rock Lobster	n.a.	3.8	n.a.	5.6	n.a.	6.7	n.a.	3.9	n.a.	6.8	n.a.	6.2	n.a.	2.3	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
5. White Fish, etc.	n.a.	0.5	n.a.	0.6	n.a.	1.0	n.a.	0.8	n.a.	1.4	n.a.	1.4	n.a.	2.2	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
6. Seal Industry	n.a.	0.5	n.a.	0.7	n.a.	0.4	n.a.	0.6	n.a.	0.6	n.a.	0.5	n.a.	0.7	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.

Source: U.N.E.C.A., Summary of Economic Data: Namibia; 1974, p.7. (from Berg, op.cit., p.61)

In the mid-1960's it consisted of approximately 212 enterprises with a total employment of about 8,000. Manufacturing is primarily related to the processing of fish and fish by-products and the canning of these export goods.1/

A container manufacturing industry has also been developed. Tin cans are produced for processed fish and meats. A jute bag and casein industry exists at Walvis Bay.

While in the main the manufacturing industry is related to primary product exports, since the late 1960's there has been some expansion in manufacturing to serve home-demand and some efforts toward import-substitution have been observed. In the major towns such as Windhoek and Swakopmund, soft industries including soft drink bottling, bakeries, tanneries and grain mills have been established. In 1968, a local cement factory was set up utilizing lime deposits in the Karib Usakos area.

However, "import-substituting" efforts which involved expansion of the local slaughter and meat canning industry have failed, as local production costs made importation of meat products more economical. At prevailing prices, exports of live cattle and importation of processed meats have proved more efficient.

African Commercial Sector. In the "homelands", commercial activity is controlled by the South African-sponsored Bantu Investment Corporation (BIC). This is a retail monopoly of the major distribution outlets for commercial goods in the "homeland" territories. These operations are entirely white-managed, and it is claimed by some observers goods are sold at prices higher than those justified by cost differentials. Sugar, for example, which sells for 10 cents

1/ Berg, op.cit., p.60.

in Windhoek supermarkets and those in South Africa, sells for 15 cents at general stores in "homeland" territories. 1/ In any event, the operation of BIC certainly discourages the emergence of African experience in trade. Its monopolistic pricing policies may also be a factor discouraging savings and investment in the "homelands."

Human Resources 2/

As has been noted in the previous sections, the overriding reality for contemporary Namibia is its legacy of domination by and dependence upon South Africa. The ability of an independent Namibia to meet its human resource needs during the difficult period of transition, let alone for longer range developmental purposes, depends upon a unique set of circumstances related to its colonial past, its ecology and exploitation of natural resources, and its ability to cope with both internal and external political pressures for change in the fluid and volatile political context of southern Africa.


The harsh ecological environment and the wide distribution of its people reflect the realities of limited inhabitable acreage, harsh physical features, and the proposed settlement of Africans in the least favorable areas of Namibia. Table 16 shows the striking disparity of African population distribution to the "Native homelands" which reserves to Europeans the most productive and fertile lands of the

1/ Fraenkel, op.cit., p.39,(as quoted in Berg, op.cit., p.8).

2/ This section relies primarily upon the research efforts undertaken by Drs. Stuart North and Brian Wilks, University of Houston, Center for International Education; Health care and delivery system by Dr. James C. Watson, M.D., Baylor University; and Refugee-Exile and Students by Dr. Mabel Smythe of the Phelps-Stokes Fund.

TABLE 16
Namibia Homeland Areas

- | | |
|---|---|
| I. Physical Features | II. Population in 1900 |
| III. Population Distribution up to 1966 | IV. Redistribution Proposed Under Odendaal Plan |



Note: The South African government is currently trying to clear the last few areas of "hardveld" still occupied by Africans by moving them into newly proclaimed reserves or "Bantustans," variously known as "homelands."

1/ Peter Fraenkel, The Namibians of South West-Africa, Minority Rights Group, London, 1974, p. 30.

central plateau bounded by both the Namib and Kalahari deserts. These realities, particularly for the agricultural sector, portend severe handicaps to development which are aptly described in a study undertaken by the United Nations as well as by Table 17 depicting the average annual rainfall in Namibia.

.....Namibia is a vast desert territory with scanty population.


.....Topographically, the Territory can be divided into three regions, the Namib, the Central Plateau and the Kalahari. The Namib is the western marginal area between the escarpment and the coast, a desolate strip of sand desert stretching along the entire coast-line and rising rapidly as one proceeds inland...the Central Plateau lies immediately east of the Namib...it offers a diversified landscape of rugged mountains, rocky outcrops, sand-filled valleys and gently undulating plains. It covers rather more than 50 percent of the territory...Finally the Kalahari covers the eastern, north-eastern and northern areas of Namibia. Its outstanding feature is its thick layers of terrestrial sands and limestone.

Most of the land is arid or semi-arid because of its geographical situation... Hot continental winds flow over the land with a predominant direction from the eastern sector...Only the north is tropical, with a short rainy season following a long dry season during which the continental winds blow, and the vegetation is a little thicker, with savanna and forest patches...1/

1/ United Nations, Food and Agriculture Organization, Namibia, A Preliminary Note Towards a Country Development Brief (Revised), March, 1976, p.1.

TABLE 17

Average Annual Rainfall, in mm



Note: Climatic conditions deteriorate progressively as one moves south and west, culminating in the almost waterless Namib desert along the coast. The Namib constitutes about one-fifth of the total area. The northeastern part of Namibia has a comparatively high annual rainfall and a longer, more regular rainy season, as well as perennial rivers.

Source: South Africa 1974: Official Yearbook of the Republic of South Africa, Department of Information, Johannesburg, 1974, p. 939.

Manpower

At the outset it must be emphasized that there are only superficial human resource parallels between nascent Zimbabwe and Namibia. This is in spite of the similarities in certain segments of the economic structures of the two countries. The geographical and demographic realities of the two regions being very different, there will have to be different approaches to human resources development both in the long term and in the possible crisis situations that might occur during the period of transition to majority rule.

In the case of Namibia, the extent of the manpower and educational problems to be faced by a new government, while perhaps quite difficult, is much less wide-spread than the situation confronting Zimbabwe. This is a reflection of the smaller population of Namibia and the nature of its economy, and in particular, the absence of a significant industrial and manufacturing sector.


The need to cope with the psychological as well as human infrastructure problems posed by apartheid will be an added burden. They are: the continuing presence of the Republic of South Africa in Namibia itself; the "homeland" policy; the existence of apartheid; the system of contract labor; repression (Terrorism Act, police torture etc.); and the draining of economic resources. 1/

1/ The Lutheran Council and the Johnson Foundation, "Namibia, Report on the Wingspread Conference," May 1976, p.19.

Appendix II, Table 8, shows the African wage labor-force by sector and job classification, indicating a total of 53,315 African men and women currently in the work-force. While these data emanate from South African sources, they are cited by knowledgeable manpower experts as reflective of the current work-force in the manufacturing, mining and other industrial sectors, however, excluding the agricultural and domestic service sectors. 1/ (See chart 4 on the next page.)

1/ See Appendix II, Table 8, African Workers in Namibia (excluding domestics in private service and persons engaged in agriculture and farming).

NAMBIAN LABOR FORCE ESTIMATE (early 1970's) ¹



TOTAL LABOR FORCE ESTIMATED AT 206,500

¹ The Table represents the best estimates delineated from Secondary Sources by the Southern Africa Project staff.

Migrant Contract Labor. As noted in the previous section, of the estimated 60,000 Africans employed by white-owned businesses in Namibia, about three quarters, or 43,000 in 1971, were migrant workers who enjoyed the unique status of temporary employees allowed into white areas only under binding labor contracts. ^{1/} Table 18 again shows the distribution of the migrant labor force by sector:

Table 18 2/

DISTRIBUTION OF MIGRANT LABOR FORCE

<u>Sector</u>	<u>Work-force</u>	<u>Percentage of Total</u>
Farming	10,900	25%
Domestic service	2,700	6
Mining	12,800	30
Fishing	3,000	7
Government, Commerce and Industry	<u>14,000</u>	<u>32</u>
Total	43,400	100%

There is evidence that strongly suggests that the migrant labor system is used to supply the white-dominated economy with its pool of labor. Contracts were introduced as a means to control the numbers of black individuals working in white areas. The Ovambo, who provide the majority of Namibian contract laborers,

^{1/} Fraenkel, op.cit., p.34.

^{2/} J. Kane-Berman, "Contract Labour in South West Africa," South Africa Institute of Race Relations, Johannesburg, May 1972, (As cited by Fraenkel, ibid. p.35).

are recruited at Ondangua, given a medical examination and classified as "A", "B", "C", according to physical fitness. They are then furnished with a contract and identity papers for service to white employers, while their wives and children must stay behind in the African "homelands." The overwhelming criticism levied against the use of the contract labor system is its dehumanizing and inequitable treatment of Africans. The Minority Rights Group, and an international consortium of critics of South Africa's administration of Namibia, concludes

...this system minimized the number of Africans living in areas favoured by the whites and cuts down on any outlay for black housing and other social infrastructure; an additional advantage of the system from the white point of view is that the rapid turnover of the unskilled black labour-force makes it difficult for them to organize themselves politically. ...Poverty caused by the overcrowding in their "homeland" forces almost all Ovambo men to leave their families at some time to work a contract in the south. It is common for a man to spend two-thirds to three-quarters of his married life away from his wife and children "ministering" to the needs of white men...The result reveals a tragic catalogue of unhappiness; men becoming drunkards during their lonely contract period, children growing up virtually fatherless and abandoned mothers quite unable to cope...1/

1/ Fraenkel, op.cit., p.35.

While migrant labor fulfills an economic needs, the new government will undoubtedly restructure the system to eliminate these abuses.

Sector Analyses of Manpower Needs. As in other African countries the attachment of the people to the land is very strong. This is why the inequity of the present distribution of productive land between black and white inhabitants of Namibia is so emotional and important an issue in African eyes. Professor Wellington has calculated that, while the white farmer has an average of 2,008 hectares, the average African has only 68 hectares. 1/ This situation is worsened when the usefulness of the land is considered. The Report of the Minority Rights Group puts the situation into perspective:

...only 10.3 million hectares of the "Native Areas", as proclaimed in 1960, could be counted as useful, compared with over 39 million ha. of generally better quality white farmland. Thus, the whites dependent on farming for a living--about 19,500 people--could use 60 times as much land per person as the indigenous black population. 2/

In Ovamboland, the most crowded area of Namibia, the situation is even more disastrous, with the average subsistence farmer having only 9.6 hectares per person. The results are dustbowl conditions and the perennial risk of drought and famine.

1/ J.H. Wellington, op.cit., p.387, (as quoted in Fraenkel, op.cit., p.31.).

2/ Fraenkel, Ibid., p.32.

Seventy percent of the country is so dry that intensive farming is impossible. "Water is scarce. The coastal desert region receives practically no rainfall; rains are very light in most of the territory. Long periods of drought are common, and agricultural and industrial development has been hampered by the limited water resources." ^{1/} Only in the north and northeast is there an annual rainfall of over 400 mms, an amount which is critical for crop cultivation. Consequently there are only two major agricultural areas: a) The pastoral ranches of the central plateau, which are largely alienated to settlers of Afrikaner and German origin, and b) the arable and pastoral subsistence farming areas of the Cunene Valley, the margins of the Koavango Swamp and the edges of the Kalahari Desert. Even in the relatively well watered regions the incidence of rainfall is capricious, and there are no known sources of underground water to compare with the substantial aquifer that underlies much of the southern plateau.

With regard to manpower in these two very dissimilar regions, the problems are a function of the differences in organizational structure of the farming and the differential pressures of population on the land. The European ranches specializing in beef production and karakul pelts utilize large numbers of migrant workers, particularly Ovambo. Although no precise numbers have been discovered, it would seem reasonable to suppose that between one third and one half of the estimated total

^{1/} United Nations Office of Public Information, A Trust Betrayed: Namibia, 1974, p.13.

of 75,000 contract workers are employed in this area. 1/ In the event of a partial or total pullout of white farmers there would still be a need for this manpower, but training for upper level management and upper-middle-level technical personnel would be critical, since "commercial farming is largely confined to the European farms." 2/

The problems facing the subsistence farming regions are those that are familiar throughout Africa, but have been compounded by the fact that "Africans in the northern reserves have not been permitted to sell agricultural products outside their areas." 3/ The main difficulties, however, are related to improving the productivity of the land by the introduction of better farming methods. Manpower training needs here involve increasing the supply of community development leaders and agricultural extension agents. Trained manpower will be required to fill upper-level posts in the policy making sector of the central government administration and in the various widely different geographical regions. The incidence of over-population in some areas and the possible need to introduce conservation practices adds another dimension to the problem.

It is extremely difficult to assess the future manpower needs of the commercial and subsistence sectors of the agricultural economy. Whites now occupy all decision making positions in government; therefore the prime need in the

1/ Ruth First, South West Africa, Penguin Books, 1973, p.581.

2/ United Nations, op.cit., p.15.

3/ Ibid.

immediate future will be to train selected Namibians in agricultural planning, organization and administration or find sympathetic European substitutes for those who leave.

Contract workers in the fishing industry are employed seasonally in the processing plants of Luderitz and Walvis Bay, and to some extent as laborers on vessels of the fishing fleet. Officially, white and Coloured crewmen on the South African-owned vessels, which constitute the bulk of the fleet, can hold certificated positions. Although most of the fishing boats operate out of Namibian ports, there has been growing competition from floating factory ships, based in South Africa. Based on this trend it is possible that in a post-independence situation there would be an almost complete withdrawal of fishing vessels from Namibia, if Walvis Bay becomes an integral part of the country.

The mining industry becomes most crucial as the move towards majority rule is contemplated. Blacks supply the unskilled and some of the semi-skilled workers in the mines, while the white foreign investors supply the initial capital and the management and technical personnel to operate the mines. Not only is there a disparity in the job classifications open to whites and blacks, but there is an acute wage differential, following racial criteria, for equal work performed.

The black male labor force which works on contract terms, mainly of Ovambo coming from the north to be employed in the southern areas have acted in their own interests. They have organized and struck against the mining industry before, with some success.

The critical shortage of manpower in the mining sector cannot be overemphasized. There is a need for planning and policy making within the central administrative structure.

There is also a need for trained manpower in the sector dealing with transportation and communications. Currently there are no Africans employed in high level positions connected with the SA Railways and Harbors. There will probably be a need to step up the already established training schemes for trackmen and bus drivers and to include a greater variety of necessary skills.

The importance of the road system for internal communication and travel is of special concern in the northern areas.

In as much as Africans can neither vote for nor serve as member of the territorial government it can confidently be assumed that all the senior posts and most of the middle level positions in the civil service are presently occupied by whites, many of whom are not permanent residents of Namibia. With majority rule Africans will undoubtedly be needed for the administrative sector.

Education

An objective analysis of the present effectiveness and future requirements of the formal educational system has been hampered by a serious lack of even the most rudimentary baseline education data. The following assessment can only be regarded as a review of the education function as administered by South Africa. A sectoral breakdown into elementary, secondary and higher education was found to be meaningless in the absence of reliable

information from RSA sources. 1/ In its place an assessment by educational system area was attempted.

Enrollment. Statistics for the non-European area of the educational system have to be interpreted carefully: for example the 1973 figures for total enrollment of Coloured and blacks gives no indication of distribution by grade, but it has been reported that at that time "almost two-thirds of all African children at school were in the lower primary classes; and 94 percent of all African children at school were in primary classes." 2/ Of the approximately 6,000 students in secondary school, no mention has been found of how many are indigenous blacks and how many belong to the numerically much smaller, but relatively more privileged, Coloured groups. 3/ It can be postulated that very few blacks do indeed survive into the secondary sector:

The most recent statistics reflect a horrendous drop-out rate in African schools. Although the number of African children who enroll at some time appears to be increasing, over 50 percent of all pupils are in sub-standards A and B, while only 2.1 percent are found in the upper five standards. In 1974 only sixty

1/ See Appendix II, Education in Namibia, for Tables 2-7 related to the following statistical data: Table 2, No. Students, Schools, Teachers for African and non-African groups; Table 3, School Attendance in Primary and Secondary Schools; Table 4, Public and Private Schools and Institutes; Table 5, Pupil - Teacher ratio; Table 6, Qualifications for African Teachers; Table 7, Training Institutes.

2/ Freda Troup, Forbidden Pastures: Education Under Apartheid, International Defense and Aid Fund, London, April, 1976, p.32.

3/ Department of Foreign Affairs, South West Africa Survey 1974, Republic of South Africa, 1975, p.65.

percent of the small group of elite students who reached the fifth form passed the matric. 1/

It is also known that, in contrast to the situation for the indigenous African, most of the Coloured pupils do go on to secondary schools, especially in the urban areas.

Given the accuracy of official population figures (the figures generally presented), and assuming that about half the population is under 16 years of age, the most optimistic assessment of the percentage of school age children actually in school is between 40 percent and 50 percent. Also it appears that only about 3-5 percent of the combined Coloured and black enrollment is in the secondary sector. Freda Troup has estimated that the proportion of African school children in secondary classes only increased from 3.5 percent in 1955 to 4.7 percent in 1971. 2/ The only positive comment on this situation is that educational opportunities for the indigenous black groups has expanded significantly since 1964 when the 5-year government development program was initiated.

Expenditures. South Africa has made some very big claims about educational improvement within its borders and also in Namibia. However, these claims are, in reality, very misleading. Comparative analyses of African and European education are nowhere more striking in the implications of imbalance between the systems, than in the statistical comparison area of

1/ Elizabeth S. Landis, "Human Rights in Namibia," prepared for the International Conference on Namibia and Human Rights, January, 1976, p.49.

2/ Troup, op.cit., p.34.

expenditures for education. One commentator has expressed this in the following terms: "Behind those misleading quantitative growth claims lies a sad picture of qualitative decline and cultural impoverishment." 1/

Elizabeth Landis has been able to abstract important information on educational expenditures:

The government spent an estimated 5-10 times as much per capita on the education of white children as it did on the education of African children. (1973 situation)

In 1973-74 this amounted to an estimated R375-750 per white child and R75.75 per African in Namibia, of the latter amount approximately R50 represented the cost of books, stationery and hostels while the remainder covered teachers' salaries, school buildings and equipment and administration. 2/

Instructional Staff. The number of practicing African and Coloured teachers, according to the official South West Africa survey is 3,453. The Minister of Bantu Education indicated that "there were 343 Africans enrolled in lower primary teacher's courses, 149 in primary teacher's courses and four in special courses for teaching the deaf and the blind. 3/ There is no mention at all of any Africans being prepared to teach at the secondary level, and the enigmatic statement that "bursaries are granted to all black and colored students

1/ Troup, op.cit., p.30.

2/ Ibid.

3/ Landis, op.cit., p.11.

qualifying for further studies after matriculation (senior School certificate) at a university or university college," does not answer the question whether or not any such teachers are under preparation. ^{1/} In addition it should be borne in mind that in Namibia blacks may enter teacher training with a Standard VI certificate. This allows individuals with very limited educational backgrounds to enter the profession, and this may affect their performance.

Curriculum. The curriculum of the elementary schools and the first three years of the secondary program for indigenous Africans are basically the same as that used in the African School System in South Africa. Freda Troup cites the strikingly pervasive reproduction of the South African apartheid model in Namibian schools:

In the African schools for example, there are marked weaknesses in the teaching of official languages, mathematics and science due to the shortage of equipment (it is said that some children have never seen an experiment), shortage of teachers and to difficulties caused by the environmental and cultural backgrounds. For instance at the primary school level, the curriculum of Africans appears to be designed with a bias against achievement in the sciences as well as the humanities. According to UNESCO, on the effects of apartheid

^{1/} Dept. of Foreign Affairs, op.cit., p.64.

on education, science, culture and information (92nd edition, 1972) roughly 25 per cent of the time is spent in religious instruction and health parades in the lower primary courses. 1/

What is evident is an emphasis on crafts and manual training, at the expense of academic subjects. Mother tongue instruction is strongly emphasized, especially in the early years of schooling. As a result, students are weak in the two official languages in which secondary education, advanced education and all examinations are conducted. 2/ In Ovamboland, for example, the first four years of the teaching program are taught in Ovambo. For the final two years of secondary schooling prior to matriculation, the same syllabus as that designed for the whites in South Africa is followed.

The curriculum system for the Coloured groups such as the Rehoboth Basters follows the pattern designed for the white and Coloured students of Cape Province, and is therefore significantly different than that used for the black population. For the fortunate Namibian black who does receive an education, the school books that he receives are not directed at positive development of his personality or his self-concept; "those blacks who do attend school receive an inferior education designed to keep them subservient to whites and locked into the exploiting colonial economy of the territory." 3/

1/ Troup, op.cit., p.43.

2/ Ibid.

3/ Landis, op.cit., p.49.

System Control and Administration. Until 1960 most of the schools for indigenous Africans and the Coloured groups were operated by missions, especially German and Finnish Lutheran societies and the Catholic Church. In that year the RSA government decided to take over more direct control. This was designed to "bring about an end to the mission schools, which were providing most of the education for Africans, by subjecting them to registration requirements and providing for refusal or withdrawal of registration at the government's discretion." 1/ The result was that most of the former mission schools were transformed into "community schools", especially in the north. Theoretically, there is a good deal of local decision making and supervisory input through parents' committees, following the apartheid philosophy of separate development and decentralization. 2/ In fact this autonomy is illusory since the government retains ultimate control through such machinery as a corps of inspectors. Another means of governmental control is through specifically designed laws, which are administered by different government agencies. Also the central administration of the "provincial" system centered in Windhoek sets all educational policy and standards, reinforced by the influence on curriculum exerted by the South African Universities and Education Departments, who set and monitor the school leaving examinations.

1/ Landis, op.cit., p.7.

2/ Dept. of Foreign Affairs, op.cit., p.63.

Three basic conclusions can be drawn from the above analysis:

1. Only a minority of children in the African category are receiving even a basic education. The number of schools, teacher and funds are minimal and inadequate to meet African needs.
2. The curriculum is an imposed curriculum, and does not reflect Namibian attitudes and needs. In particular, there seems to be no real attempt to train the African people in more advanced vocational technical skills beyond the level of crafts and manual training.
3. The whole structure and organization is reflective of apartheid ideals and objectives. This would hardly be relevant to any future Namibian national system of education.

Health Care

According to South African announcements, Namibia has one of the best systems for medical care of any country south of the Sahara. The lack of specific data for Namibia, separated from South African figures, makes it impossible to judge the accuracy of those announcements. There are impressive indications of a sophisticated use of modern technology in health care delivery. For example, the problems of distance between urban areas and the rural traditional territories are met by a network of radio receiving-and-transmitting sets between central, state hospitals and outlying clinics. Paramedical personnel in clinics can get instant help from doctors at the hospital with questions about diagnosis or treatment of clinic

cases, at times when the clinic's District Surgeon may be absent. In addition, surgical and medical specialists are flown into Ovamboland twice a month to treat cases or perform operations on patients whose illness requires specialized skills.

Hospital and clinic care is free for Africans and Coloureds. European patients are charged according to a fixed tariff based on income. There are 183 hospitals and clinics, 145 for Africans and Coloureds only, 21 for whites only, and 17 for all groups. They provide 6,300 beds for non-Europeans and 1,085 beds for whites. A sophisticated system of six branch laboratories is supported by a central laboratory at Windhoek operated by the South African Institute for Medical Research. 1/

In addition to the major State Hospitals, there are three classes of medical facilities:

Private hospitals and clinics are built and supported by private industry. Major mining camps all offer medical care to employees and to the families of white employees who live at the camp. Towns also have private maternity homes for white women only.

Mission hospitals are fully subsidized by the state. They are found primarily in African rural areas and serve the local population.

State-aided public hospitals and clinics

1/ Dept. of Foreign Affairs, op.cit., p.66..

are built and maintained by the communities in which they are located. They receive a 60 per cent reimbursement of their expenses from the state.

In 1973 there were 143 general medical practitioners and 19 specialists in the territory. 1/

In addition, there were four specialists and 28 Government Medical Officers who acted as District Surgeons for the southern sector.

Maintenance of educational and training standards is accomplished through the registration of all medical practitioners and para-medical officers with the South African Medical and Dental Council. Nursing personnel are subject to similar scrutiny by the South African Nursing Council.

There are indications that the South African government is concerning itself with public health education. Features on health are broadcast on a regular schedule over the state-controlled radio network. Special health campaigns are heavily publicized in all media. And a "mobile task force," established in 1972, responds to community requests for assistance in evaluation programs and educational planning.

External assistance is provided by the WHO for teachers and teaching supplies and for equipment to be assigned to national training institutions. A WHO coordinator is responsible for the management of the courses at the training institutions.

1/ Dept. of Foreign Affairs, op.cit., p.66.

Efforts are underway to obtain international cooperation in developing primary health care with community participation, communicable disease control, the promotion of environmental hygiene, family planning including maternal and child health, and training adapted to local realities.

CHAPTER III

TRANSITIONAL PROBLEMS AND DEVELOPMENT ISSUES IN ZIMBABWE

Introduction

Overview. With independence, Zimbabwe will be faced with two sets of problems (1) those which come immediately and directly from the transfer of political and governmental power; (2) and the requirements of the future growth and development of the country.

The problems related to the transition itself will focus on the advent of African migration to both urban and rural areas; on instability in the wage sector and expectation of unemployment; and on absorption of the refugees and exiles into an independent Zimbabwe. Outstanding issues to which the new government will need to respond are the elimination of blatant and invidious racial discrimination and policy development toward land usage and agricultural productivity to feed its people and earn export revenues. Africanization of the civil service and development of employment opportunities will also have to be addressed by the incoming government.

With regard to developmental problems an incoming government will have to consider longer range issues of creating greater employment, manpower and training opportunities; multinational corporations and international investments; domestic business subsidies; and, the reestablishment of a regional transportation system.

Various programmatic options and responses are delineated for consideration of U.S. assistance as well as for other donors.

Transition Problems

Movement, Unemployment and Dislocation

Increased Expectations. The greatly increased expectations of social and economic benefits for Africans with independence will generate demands for change. It is evident that internal pressures will develop from expectation and assumptions about an African majority government coming to power. These pressures will immediately focus on demands for equitable treatment in wages and opportunities for advancement, for Africanization of the public and private sectors, and in a call for sharing in the benefits of nationhood.

Maintenance of the large wage sector will be a primary concern with 995,000 Africans dependent on wage income as a main source of survival as opposed to 118,000 whites who will be affected in all sectors. 1/

Continued agricultural productivity and food production will be critical in supporting a largely rural population. Maintenance of the rail and road transportation system will also be essential for the distribution of food and products.

Immediate demands for Africanization of the civil service and the private sector will be made in view of the systematic exclusion of the Africans from positions of leadership.

1/ Peter S. Harris, Black Industrial Workers in Rhodesia, Mambo Press, Gwelo, Rhodesia, 1974, p.11.

Africans have been excluded from training for skilled and middle management positions as well as from executive level positions in the mining, industrial, manufacturing and commercial sector. These combined sectors account for the largest contribution to the Gross Domestic Product (59 percent of the total GDP for 1975). 1/

Immediate demands for terminating racial discrimination in its blatant and invidious forms will be made. While legislative and executive action alone may not eradicate institutionalized discrimination, highly visible action and policies will become an imperative for an incoming African government's public image.

Equality in wages in similar job classifications between white and African workers may be difficult to achieve immediately. Availability of supplemental financial resources for the public sector, greater pressures for creation of more employment, and the current shortfalls of middle-management, supervisory and other essential technicians, will affect attempts to equalize wages in the short term.

Maintaining Jobs. White flight and the elimination of sanctions with the resumption of international trade will have a significant effect on the African wage sector. The new government will need to deal immediately with increased expectations of Africans in the wage sector, demands for technical and managerial training, competition from returning exiles,

1/ Southern African Project Data Baseline, (As indicated in Ministry of Finance, Economic Survey of Rhodesia 1975, Salisbury, April, 1976, p.12).

and a possible simultaneous shrinkage of sales to a decrease in product demand.

The wage sector, be it in agricultural or other fields is crucial, for it provides people with a stake in the system and its success. Unless wage sector adjustments and expansion are made, individuals cannot become economically self-sufficient, and the resultant social costs (in terms of welfare costs, social dislocations and possible disorganization, leading to increased costs for police, health services, and welfare programs) become prohibitive and can contribute to discontent, political instability and the creation of conditions that undermine continued development. These factors are of particular current interest since the wage share of GDP was 51 percent in 1974. ^{1/} This is a high figure for a less developed country, but it is the lowest figure for Zimbabwe in 20 years.

There can be no doubt that Zimbabwe will inherit a large, growing, and flexible manufacturing sector which is providing increased opportunities for skilled jobs. Whether it will prove efficient when the country is once again opened to the post-sanction winds of trade is not so certain. But there are hints that it will be viable. The recent growth is not sudden, but is part of a longer-term trend. Some exporting eastward and southward has been occurring despite the sanction-induced encouragements to prefer the internal market. The "industriousness" of Rhodesia, while well above "normal"

^{1/} Central Statistical Office (CSO)
Monthly Digest of Statistics, September
1976, p. 41.

for such an economy, has not drastically diverged from its long-run proclivities during the sanction years. 1/

Much of the post UPI upsurge in Rhodesian industry has been the result of economic sanctions, and is consequently not only dependent on government support and tariff protection but is likely to be under-competitive in world markets in the post-independence period. It is also highly geared to supplying the local European market, which will probably shrink drastically in the future. Although some capital has been drawn from non-Rhodesian sources, the bulk has been generated within the country. With the exodus of Europeans, much of this financial resource will be denied to Zimbabwean industry, as will the entrepreneurial and managerial skills of the white community. At the middle management level of supervisors and trained technicians, there can also be envisioned a short-fall in personnel after the achievement of majority rule. Considering all these factors, therefore, it is highly likely that there may be a noticeable decline in industrial activity in Zimbabwe. This could come at a time when there will be great pressures from African urban workers to be given the opportunity to take over middle level supervisory and skilled jobs from whites, who hitherto have been "protected" by trade union job reservation policies and government labor laws.

To maintain its current level of production, Zimbabwe will thus need to maintain its export markets while replacing skilled whites who

1/ Richard C. Porter, "Rhodesian Manufacturing and UDI," 1976, Center for Research on Economic Development, University of Michigan, p.14.

leave during the transition period. The extent to which the economy will remain productive will depend on the extent of white flight, the success of training programs to develop skilled African manpower, the integration of local and returning exiled Zimbabweans into appropriate managerial and supervisory positions and most critically, the ability of the new government to maintain political stability.

Within manufacturing as a whole, only a few industries will probably suffer seriously from loss of non-African staff given a minimal amount of white flight. Whether these limitations will be of a short-run or long-run nature, and to what degree they will affect overall output and productivity is something which cannot be accurately determined from the information at hand. There has been an increase in the ratio of Africans to non-Africans over the past ten years, but it is likely that this trend reflects the increased hiring of African workers at jobs of relatively low skill requirements and the supervision of these new employees with skilled non-Africans.

Those industries with many, well paid non-African workers include beer, wine, and spirits; fertilizer, insecticides and pesticides; iron and steel industries; and machinery and engineering except chemical engineering. 1/ These industries undoubtedly comprise management personnel and skilled workers in sectors where there is a great degree of dependence upon a skilled work force. These firms would be hardest and longest affected by the

1/ David Fasenfest, "Observations on the Labor Force in Zimbabwe," Center for Research on Economic Development, University of Michigan, December, 1976, p.10.

departure of non-Africans.

As noted earlier, racial discrimination has kept African wage-earners in low skill jobs, but the growth of manufacturing and other sectors has created pressure to move Africans into high skilled jobs despite the government's desire to reserve these jobs for whites.

Under majority rule, assuming an exodus of some skilled whites, there will be many openings for skilled Africans, pressure for training programs to teach these skills, and the immediate need to temporarily staff those vacant positions that can't wait for this training.

One impetus to upgrading the skill levels of Africans has been industry growth. This unprecedented growth required increases in the quality and quantity of labor. This was provided in a number of ways. White labor which had gone to Zambia during the federation returned after UDI. There was a reasonable number of white skilled and unskilled immigrants from Europe and especially Britain over the period. More importantly, in spite of the racially oriented policies of the white worker-agrarian coalition which had taken power and which was now pushing for the rapid industrialization program, the sheer demand for skilled positions was so great that African workers were given on-the-job and some apprenticeship training. As a whole their skills improved tremendously as they came to fill a lot of the semi and high-skilled positions with white workers increasingly taking on more supervisory and management posts. This process has been increased within the last two years when, as a result of white manpower requirements for fighting the escalating guerrilla war or as a result of the stepped-up white emigration, the African worker has become about the only dependable work force on the industrial site.

During the transition period, however, whites who had been drawn away from the wage sector by the guerrilla war and chose to stay in Zimbabwe under a new majority government would compete with Africans for existing skilled jobs.

Absorption of Exiles and Refugees. By December, 1976, the United Nations High Commission on Refugees indicated that there were approximately 30,000 individuals officially classified as refugees in Mozambique; another 2,500 refugees are reported to be in Botswana. 1/ Therefore, preparation for the return of refugees and exiled Zimbabweans and their possible impact in the employment sector as well as upon limited resources will have to be faced by an incoming government.

A newly established government will have responsibility for making appropriate arrangements with respect to Zimbabweans who are refugees, exiles or living abroad; these arrangements would most likely include the following:

- Repatriation and assistance for resettlement with cooperating multinational organizations, including the United Nations High Commission on Refugees, church organizations, and other private groups;
- Implementation of a survey and census

1/ U.N. General Assembly, Report on UNHCR Activities in 1975-1976 and Proposed Voluntary Funds Programme and Budget for 1977, A/AC. 96/526, August 16, 1976, p.31. For statistical data and training programs for the exiles available as of November, 1976, please consult Appendix V, Table 1.

of nationals living abroad both in Africa and overseas for identification of manpower and talent resources;

- Arrangements to absorb these nationals within the limits of the employment sector and development of special health and social services necessary for their settlement.

Eliminating the Effects of Racism. To eliminate the practice of racial discrimination will be more difficult than readily apparent because it has been institutionalized within the structure and operations of Rhodesian society, including the employment sector, training and mobility; health services; education; in the industrial-manufacturing sectors and in tax policies relating to agriculture and marketing. Current inequities based on racial discrimination and specific remedies are clearly delineated in the Quénet Report. 1/ With over a million citizens in the total work force, the continuing disparity in wages between white and African workers is well documented 2/ and acknowledged by the current government as an inequity in need of remedy.

1/ During 1974 the African wage income was R\$ 360 while the average European wage income that year was R\$ 3,900. (Cited in Elliot Berg, "Growth, Structure and Prospects in the Zimbabwe Economy", Center for Research on Economic Development, University of Michigan, 1976, p.11).

2/ The "Quénet Report" is the Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Racial Discrimination, 1976 (Presented to the President on April 23, 1976), which was commissioned by the current Rhodesian [cont.]

The Quénet Report acknowledges inequitable discrepancies between white and African employees in education, in the railway system and in the judicial system, yet it concedes that without supplemental financial resources, no relief will be possible in these sectors. ^{1/} Additionally, it is clear that the systematic exclusion of Africans from managerial and technical and other supervisory positions has left a large pool of untrained and inexperienced Africans in taking their places in the private sector; training and vocational apprentice programs have also supported this exclusion of individuals on the basis of race.

Apprenticeship programs under white led unions during the past ten to fifteen years have particularly resulted in discrimination against Africans which have been further supported by favorable governmental regulations and incentives to white immigrants, both skilled and unskilled. Gross inequities are evident in the present marketing arrangement for Africans with a 10 per cent tax on only African products, price discrimination between African and white farmers, and the exclusivity of services offered to the white farmers.

Migration and Adoption of Land Reform Policy

An incoming government will face the serious question of developing policy toward land usage,

[continued from preceding page]

Government; the Commission made broad legislative and executive recommendations which have been accepted by the Government.

^{1/} The "Quénet Report", op.cit. Press Statement of December 17, 1976, issued by the Ministry of Information, Salisbury, Rhodesia.

resulting in a two-fold set of problems: (1) relieving population pressures in the densely African populated Tribal Trust Lands (TTLs); (2) increasing the productivity of current arable land for food production and export revenues.

While the land reform issue is related to the problem of increasing African agricultural productivity and increasing the quantity and quality of land available for African farmers (for both commercial and subsistence usage), it has become heavily laden with emotion stemming from a traditional attachment to the land and therefore is a politically volatile issue. While the question of equity, ownership and compensation will evolve from the negotiated settlement to which an African government will be committed to follow, this section will not deal with the political development of such a settlement.

Increasing Agricultural Productivity and African Ownership of Land. The agricultural production policies of the new government will reflect political pressures brought by African farmers who have been largely excluded from the agricultural cash economy. This pressure will center on access to better land and government support for an improved marketing system for African products.

Under minority rule, government taxes and other regulations had been used to restrict African agricultural productivity and provide a surplus of cheap labor. Analyses of the allocation of lands to Europeans and Africans indicate that:

- European farms comprise the most desirable, arable land and are highly productive;
- European farmers produce the bulk of agricultural products in comparison

to the African Purchase Areas and the Tribal Trust Lands;

- Large European farms are reflective of a highly mechanized agro-business; Tribal Trust Lands support largely subsistence agriculture and are heavily populated. 1/

There is little doubt that an incoming African government will be faced with immediate pressures for instituting substantive changes in the Land Tenure Act and opening up productive acreage to African settlement and purchase. The maintenance of agricultural productivity and the continued distribution of food and support for agricultural stability will probably remain high priorities of the Zimbabwe government during the transitional period. Several options will be available in pursuit of increasing African productivity and assuring greater land usage and government support. These options include the following:

- (1) Assume that it is far more efficient to move the African population from the marginal Tribal Trust Areas into the current European areas, which then are subdivided into smaller units.
- (2) Assume (1) is too expensive, but opt for an improvement of productivity in the current Tribal Trust Areas while at the same time opening up the European Areas to settlement by those

1/ See Appendix I, Tables 22-24, for delineation of current land distribution, production rates and European farm size in Rhodesia.

who can finance large-scale agriculture (including Government finance).

(3) Some combination of (1) and (2). 1/

The implications of resettling African subsistence farmers could greatly change the use of large tracts of land in Zimbabwe.

Assuming that the total population of the Africans in the Tribal Trust Lands is about 2/3 of the entire African population of 6 million, about 4 million people live in the Tribal Trust Lands. The average size of an African family is about 6 people. Approximately 700,000 families may need to be resettled. At the rate of about 25 acres per family about 17,500,000 acres are required to resettle all the African families presently living in the Tribal Trust Lands. This figure does not include grazing lands which must be distributed at the rate of 12-15 acres per head of cattle. A communal grazing ground could be set aside in each resettlement area; this would require an additional 8 million acres for grazing purposes. Thus of the total of Zimbabwe's 96 million acres about 25 million acres may be used for resettlement of African peasant farmers. 2/

1/ Mudzuiriri Nziramasanga, "The Agricultural Sector in Rhodesia", Center for Research on Economic Development, University of Michigan, 1976, p.35.

2/ William A. Shack, "Land Reform in Zimbabwe: Problems and Prospects", University of California, Berkeley, 1976, p.39.

Finally, the preparation of legislative and executive action needed to follow up with such policy adoption will undoubtedly have to be formulated by the transitional African government.

External Relations

The political transition will bring about external pressures to reestablish regional transportation, normalize trade relationships with multinational corporations and others holding investments in Zimbabwe. Although the new government will be called upon to indicate its policies in these areas, the issues are more properly developmental than transitional, and are therefore, discussed in the section on development issues in this chapter.

Africanizing the Civil Service

Another critical imperative for an incoming African government will be the replacement of whites in key governmental jobs with Africans. This will be particularly essential for those positions of visibility and sensitivity with respect to government policy making. If the current system of appointing high level Cabinet officials along side civil service or ministerial secretaries prevails, Africanization of the policy making and ministerial posts can be carried out more rapidly.

As noted earlier, white civil servants constitute a formidable group in the wage sector of the economy and a substantial political bloc. In the early 1970's there were some 24,000 whites in central government service who, with their spouses, comprised one-third of the white electorate. Together with the members of the military and police, they constituted a majority of the white electorate.^{1/}

^{1/} Harold Nelson et al., Area Handbook for Southern Rhodesia, prepared by American University (FAS), DA PAM 550-171, 1975.

Africans have been systematically excluded from the middle and higher ranks of the civil service. The Government List of 1967 indicated that only one African held senior rank. 1/

In 1972, it was estimated that only 829 Africans held one or another of 13,000 tenured positions. Only three of these could be considered of senior rank. 2/

It is clear that Zimbabwe leaders will face demanding tasks of reordering the priorities of government and national administration, and also formidable tasks of Africanizing the civil administration.

Institutional Policy Changes

Demands will also be made during transition for reordering the priorities and goals of both private and public institutions. An example of the latter will be the assured elimination of subsidies to tobacco farmers. Changes in the rate and types of taxation, voting procedures and other policies will be called for. These issues, including issues of business subsidies and other related development issues, are discussed in the development section.

1/ International Commission of Jurists, Racial Discrimination and Repression in Southern Rhodesia, London, 1976, p.10.

2/ Nelson, op.cit., p.156.

Development Issues

Establishing Foreign Investment Policy

The role of the multinational corporation in the Rhodesian economy is dynamic and pervasive. Foreign exchange earnings, most wage sector jobs and the overall degree of economic sophistication depend to a large extent on these investors. A concern of the new government will be its relationship to these corporations and the role it believes they should play in the future Zimbabwe.

As noted in Chapter 1, larger firms (those with more than 100 employees) produce over 80 percent of Rhodesia's manufactures and most of these are probably multinationals, integral parts of the world economy. Multinationals are, therefore, very important in the manufacturing economy.

These corporations seem to concentrate in certain sectors. On the assumption that numbers indicate importance, those sectors which contain the greatest number of multinationals are examined (metals and metal products, chemicals and petroleum products, and transport equipment and workshops).

The non-Africans in these industries do not earn significantly more than elsewhere in manufacturing.1/

1/ Fasenfest, op.cit., p.15.

Table 1 below ranks manufacturing industries by the number of multinationals in that industry.

Table 1

Number of Multinational Firms in Manufacturing Industries. 1/

<u>Industry</u>	<u>Number Of Multinationals</u>
Transport equipment and workshops	22
Chemical and petroleum products	21
Metals and metal products	20
Non-Metallic mineral products	12
Beverages and tobacco	10
Paper and printing	8
Clothing and footwear	6
Foodstuffs	4
Textiles, including cotton ginning	1
Wood and furniture	1
Others	0

1/ UN General Assembly, Report of the Special Commission on the Situation with Regard to Implementation of the Declaration on Granting Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, New York, 1976 (As noted in Fasenfest, op.cit., p.14).

The mining sector of the Rhodesian economy is completely dominated by foreign economic interests which have been attracted by the huge profits to be derived from these activities. Since the imposition of economic sanctions reduced the significance of tobacco and sugar as foreign exchange earners, the importance of minerals to the Rhodesian economy has increased.

The activity of foreign multinational corporations in Rhodesia largely accounts for the dramatic expansion of the mining industry and the ease with which mineral exports have slipped through the United Nations sanctions, first imposed in 1965 after the UDI. The multinational corporations are at once investors, producers and consumers. An important government policy in this period has discouraged the outflow of profits from foreign firms operating in Rhodesia. In 1973 the government instituted a 15 percent tax on profits taken from the country. As a result most industrial firms found themselves with considerable funds in trust and have chosen in time to re-invest those monies, thereby diversifying industry. 1/

The result with regard to the mining industry has been that mine profits have been invested in mineral processing operations. Therefore, now instead of exporting all chrome, copper, nickel, and tin in their crude ore states, much is processed into products such as ferrochrome, copper electrical cable, electrolytic nickel cathodes and tin solder. Most of these products

1/ Anthony R. Black, "The Mining Sector of the Rhodesian Economy", Center for Research on Economic Development, University of Michigan, 1976, p.1.

are exported to world markets where they compete successfully. Some are utilized as feedstocks for Rhodesian industry. 1/

Assuming the new government's willingness to accept foreign investment, the potential inflow should be considerable. New mineral discoveries have been made in the past decade. While the mining multinationals have not been willing to exploit some of these discoveries, the political uncertainty existing in Rhodesia constrained their willingness to undertake large commitments. Under majority rule, some political uncertainty is of course sure to remain, but it should be less pervasive. The manufacturing sector too will not be without attraction for foreign investors, though the likely deflation of the internal market will probably make this less appealing than mining. 2/

Domestic Business Subsidies

The removal of sanctions will open Zimbabwe to international competition. Some post-UDI companies that depended on internal markets may be unable to compete. With bankruptcy and the resulting loss of jobs as an alternative, the government may be pressured to provide questionable subsidies.

A large number of small firms have sprung up since UDI to provide products blocked by sanctions. Sixty-five percent of products sold in 1970 were monopoly products protected from foreign competition. When sanctions are removed, the viability of the firms which pro-

1/ Black, op.cit., p.1.

2/ Berg, op.cit., p.31.

duce these products will be a potential source of instability for the new government.

The number of enterprises almost doubled and the number of locally manufactured products increased from 1,059 to 3,837 between 1966 and 1970 as indicated by the register of the Association of Rhodesian Industries (ARNI). About 2,500 of the 3,837 products in 1970 were monopoly products and this has been reinforced by the rigid import controls which effectively outlaw foreign competition. ^{1/} Therefore, even if the overall industrial legacy of Zimbabwe is sound, it would not be surprising if particular plants, and even sectors, proved unviable. It is here that the new government must be careful; while it may be sensible to support such firms during the transition period, their ultimate demise must be planned if they are not to become permanent parasites to Zimbabwe's budget.

It is likely that the new Government would not support the current level of agricultural subsidies, nor would it be economically desirable to do so, because they have not proved to be efficient nor have they substantially improved the position of the African farmer. Under those circumstances the current mix of agricultural products would not last and some crops that flourished under subsidized prices would become uneconomic to produce. There would most likely be a reduction in the level of beef, wheat and soybean production, and most likely increased production of flue-cured tobacco by

^{1/} J. Kombo Moyana, "The Political Economy of Sanctions and the Future of Zimbabwe" (unpublished manuscript), 1976, p.30.

those farmers remaining on tobacco land. Urban areas could face an uncertain supply of maize because production from soils in African areas is more vulnerable to fluctuations in the rainfall. If maize producer prices were allowed to increase, the short fall would not necessarily be crucial, but there would be a substantial, if not complete, decline in exports, not only of maize but of beef as well. Since citrus fruit, sugar and tea are produced on irrigated corporate estates, it is unlikely that they would be affected. 1/

Re-Establishing Regional Transportation

Since sanctions have pressured Rhodesia's neighbors as well as itself, transition will bring an immediate demand to open closed frontiers and re-establish regional transportation. The dropping of sanctions will have several major effects. It will generally lower the cost of inputs and outputs in the Zimbabwe economy. It will remove artificial constraints on the country's pursuit of its comparative advantage, as in the possible case of tobacco production and export. It will open up more fully a range of export markets now either closed or restricted, for example, in Zambia and other neighboring African countries. It will remove, finally, the acute constraints which have emerged in the transport sector. Specifically, it will reduce dependence on the South Africa route, allow more economic considerations to come into play in choice of export shipments, and perhaps permit the Rhodesian Railways to resume at least some of its role in transit trade, with positive employment

1/ Nziramasanga, op.cit., p.35.

and balance of payments effects. 1/

The land-locked, mineral-exporting countries of the southern Africa region have invested heavily in rail transport. Rail is the principal mode of transport for exports. Because of its location, Rhodesia served as a transit route for the regional trade in mineral exports. The country's primary rail system ran west-eastward to seaports in Mozambique.

Since UDI external trade has been the major emphasis of transport policy with the following consequences: 2/

- (1) Railways have received a disproportionate amount of resources in comparison with other forms of transport.
- (2) Railway capacity has been built up in areas where it is not certain that the quantity and type of freight hauled after removal of sanctions will make recent investments profitable.
- (3) The interior transport system has been affected by inadequate funds for maintenance and replacement. Road transport, particularly in rural areas, has been underfinanced.

1/ Berg, op.cit., p.30.

2/ Annette Pinckney, "A Preliminary Survey of the Transport Communication's Sector," Center for Research on Economic Development, University of Michigan, 1976, p.11.

In general the removal of sanctions should permit shorter, more efficient routes to be utilized for external trade, lowering transport costs of imported and exported commodities. The lifting of sanctions, however, does not guarantee that physical facilities formerly used will be available. While an incoming government will give first priority to internal needs and development of its transportation system, Governmental studies will have to be implemented to determine the feasibility of regional cooperation during the post-transition period.

Possible Government Response

An African government's options may be severely limited in achieving more equitable benefits at the outset of its coming to power. Long term developmental processes and priorities will have to be established with deferred benefits while more urgent transitional problems are addressed. Nonetheless, there are short-term responses available.

Transition Problems. Highly visible action can be taken in certain policy areas as overviewed below:

- Termination of blatant racial discrimination through pronouncements and executive actions;
- Africanization of governmental positions of leadership and visibility;
- Stabilization of the economy and financial institutions;
- Migration and initiation of a land reform policy;
- Governmental intervention to provide emergency services to urban and rural residents: health services, food distribution, transportation, etc.;
- Initiation of limited public works programs in urban and rural areas where unemployment remains a critical concern;
- Initiation of training and job upgrading programs both within the