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FACTORS IN CARRYING OUT LAND REFORM: FARM ORGANIZATION AND PEASANT PARTICIPATION

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FACTORS IN CARRYING OUT LAND REFORM

FARM ORGANIZATION and PEASANT PARTICIPATION

by

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FACTORS IN CARRYING OUT LAND REFORM: FARM ORGANIZATION AND PEASANT PARTICIPATION

In this paper we shall examine how the farmers' relationship to the land and the national agricultural system have been changed through land reform; and whether and how farmers are able to participate and exert influence on land reform plus development. The crux of the paper is peasant participation, post-reform. However, some background information is needed on peasant participation before reform and on farm organization after reform.

1. Pre-Reform Peasant Participation

The authors of our country papers tend to feel that land redistribution produces peasant movements, not vice versa. Villagers' mute toleration of intolerable conditions has been documented by anthropologists throughout the world, including the important point that villagers believe they must remain mute until and unless there is leadership from above.

When there has been leadership from above, peasants have responded and tried to influence government policy in favor of reform.

In Eastern Europe farmer involvement was through political parties, the Peasant Parties that were significant between World Wars I and II. The process of land reform in Eastern Europe that began in the 19th century and was accelerated by the liberalism of the post World War I era followed the tradition of earlier land reforms in Western Europe - in the direction of the family farm. By the time of World War II small freeholds were the pattern of farm structure in most of Eastern Europe outside of

Prussia and Hungary. Primarily through cooperatives, the small farmers attempted to gain more control over credit and marketing. However, in a situation in which the traditional rigid social structures persisted after land redistribution, the state tended to dominate farmers' organizations. By limiting the functions of these organizations the state thus limited the benefits farmers were able to receive from the new pattern of ownership.

In Latin America, farmer involvement has been primarily in the form of trade unions through which tenants, sharecroppers and the agricultural wage labor force have been organized. Along the West Coast of South America these unions have been limited primarily to the wage labor group. The most skillful small farmers in these countries, the small freeholders and those tenants or sharecroppers who manage the land they rent, have been left out. The pattern of post-reform farm organization in these countries might be different if the campesino unions had included all small farmers regardless of their tenure status, as we shall see below.

The role of the farmer in land reform in Latin America has, of course, varied with each country's political situation. In Mexico farmers were mobilized to help carry out the revolution, in Bolivia to consolidate the revolution. [1/] In Chile, Venezuela, and Colombia the pattern is one more familiar to us - a combination of the campesino unions working with other groups, industrial unions, the intellectuals, sometimes Catholic priests, supporting a particular political party and using the ballot box to achieve the power needed to effect reform.

In contrast to Eastern Europe and Latin America, there has been little peasant participation before reform in Asia and Africa. Even in India, where abolition of the Zamindari system was closely tied in with the independence movement, there was little peasant organization in favor of land redistribution as such. [2/] In these two continents land reform was conferred upon the small farmers by central governments motivated primarily by the belief that the existing tenure system was a major obstacle to development.

Thus, peasant involvement has been strongest where the European liberal tradition is strongest and where most of the countries have been sovereign for a long period. Peasant involvement has been the least in countries where colonial powers restrained and sometimes repressed political activity until well into this century.

But in the first situation as well as in the second, farmers have had little influence on the design of land reform policies, on the extent of land redistribution, the speed of implementation, or the organization of a new agricultural structure in the post-reform period. Rather, the aims of peasant movements have been loosely defined, in the manner of slogans, such as "land to the tiller," with little definition of how the tiller should be related to the land or how the farmer should be given access to elements of a modern agricultural system other than the land. Thus, the campesino unions in Latin America did not lobby for the combination of temporary collectives and small freeholds known as asentamiento. Rather, officials adopted this approach on the grounds that the campesinos where inexperienced

in farm management and therefore needed to be trained before they could work efficiently as independent farmers.

2. Farm Organization

Farm organization is one of the most fundamental issues which governments must resolve in land reform programs. The issue is almost as simple as saying that there are two choices, large and small. The most common choice is the small farm. Although collectives have been tried on a pilot basis in many non-communist countries, most governments support the notion that ownership is itself an incentive for more work and higher production. Ownership is then combined with various types of group endeavor to achieve economies of scale.

As is well known, the proponents of collective farming believe the necessary economies of scale simply cannot be achieved on small freeholds. This argument is most frequently used with respect to mechanization, and especially tractors. Planners seem to have an almost romantic fascination with this machine, as if the science of agriculture consisted of the application of the internal combustion engine to various farm activities. In India, for example, the purchase of tractors for collective farms has been subsidized even though it is known the tractor will not increase productivity. It simply displaces labor. Yet irrigation has been ignored although it is known that water would not only increase productivity but would permit additional crops to be planted.

The truth is that there is no country in the world in which a single farm size is the "correct" economic size for all the functions of modern agriculture. Even the collective is too small for some purposes, such as sowing rice by airplane as in the Central Valley of California. As the English authority on land reform, Doreen Warmer notes, "There are different economics of scale for different functions . . . For some purposes Denmark is one big farm, for others it is one hundred thousand farms." 3/

Hence, except for the collective, which is almost universally opposed by peasants, there appears to be no relationship between the type and size of farm units created through land reform and changes in productivity. Rather, changes in productivity are the result of factors other than farm size.

Changes in farm organization introduced through land reform are commonly classified according to changes in ownership, farm scale, and farm management. Five categories cover nearly all land reform programs.

1. Transfer of ownership from the landlord to the cultivator with no substantial change in farm scale or farm management. This is the typical Asian pattern of the past two decades, as earlier it was the common pattern in Western Europe and later in Eastern Europe. In the pre-reform situation the tenant or sharecropper is the manager of the land he rents, which in size compares with a small freehold, or family farm. The actual size of the family farm varies widely from country

to country in accordance with the density of the rural population on the arable land. In the crowded Asian countries, where there is not enough land for every cultivator to own his own farm, land redistribution is usually accompanied by a 'tenancy reform', which is intended to give the renter almost the same opportunities and incentives as the new freeholder.

2. Wage labor to owner. In Latin America, and also East Africa following the departure of the British, the new owners were former wage laborers rather than tenants. Farm management was transferred from the previous owner, or his agent, to the new owner. In East Africa farm scale was much reduced. In several Latin American countries the asentamiento is commonly used. In Chile, Colombia, and Venezuela the initial farm organization is a combination of a large tract farmed cooperatively plus individual private freeholds. At the end of a training period, usually three to five years, the new owners decide how much of each estate they wish to continue farming collectively and how much through individual farms. According to this decision each farmer then receives two titles, one for the individual plot and one designating his share of the cooperatively--farmed tract. Since only a handful of the training periods have expired, it is too soon to know whether the new owners will show a marked preference for one or the other kinds of ownership. It is also too soon to know whether city-born Latin officials, many of whom seem to have a yen for collectives, will actually permit farmers to choose freely.

3. The collective, or cooperative, farm. Although cooperative farming is usually associated with communist governments, it has been tried in many countries, including Burma, India, Algeria, Tunisia, Ghana, Uganda, Ceylon, Tanzania, Mexico, Israel and the Latin countries mentioned in '2' above. Only in Israel are there large numbers of cooperative farms, the kibbutzim, which can be described as genuinely voluntary and also successful. A few other successful examples are mentioned in the country papers, but they are considered to be the result of unusual local leadership.

In the communist model there are two main types of large-sized, cooperative farms, the state farm and the collective. The distinguishing characteristic of the state farm is a wage labor force. The wage level is not necessarily dependent upon profits from farm operations although, in practice, this tends to be true in order to limit the amount of subsidies from state budgets. Cuba is the one communist country in which agricultural wages on state farms are approximately comparable to industrial wages.[4/]

The collective is a pooling of land and labor in which the profits (and losses) are divided among the workers according to a formula based primarily on the labor inputs of each member. Whether the land is actually owned by the state and rented to the members or owned by the members themselves, the system of managing these farms and the role of the cultivator are essentially the same. Of the two types of cooperative farming methods, the collective is the more common. Hence,

throughout the remainder of this paper we shall use the word "collective" to refer to all types of cooperative farming.

In Eastern Europe the collectives were formed by grouping small freeholds. In China and North Vietnam, however, the creation of small freeholds by breaking up the larger farms was the first step in their three stage progression from traditional agriculture to the "ideal form," the 'socialist cooperative.' 5/

Two countries, Tunisia and Algeria, used the collective as a way of continuing the farm organization vacated by the French. In effect, nothing was changed but the boss. The departing French owner was replaced by a government official.

4. Two other types of farm organization should be noted even though they are not common. The first of these and the fourth in this list of five categories is the ejido lands of Mexico. These lands are owned by each Indian community. Although cooperative farming is permitted and has received some official encouragement from time to time, some 98% of the ejido lands are farmed individually. Further, the plots are assigned indefinitely so that the cultivator is confident he knows what land he will be farming in the future.

5. The second is the 'block' system in Egypt introduced on the distributed farms and now being extended to other areas. The 'block' system is also used in the Sudan. It was initiated in Egypt as a way of enforcing the system of crop rotation necessary to maintain the physical quality of the soil. Each of the former estates is divided

into three sections. Each farmer's holding consists of plots of equal size in each section. The basic rotation - wheat, cotton, clover (with suitable second crops) is the common one - is enforced by the officially appointed manager of each farm. Some farm practices, such as irrigation or deep ploughing, are carried out on the basis of the total farm, others on the basis of each section, others by the farmer on each of his plots. This combination of group and individual practices "may well turn out to be the most important contribution of the Egyptian experience. . ." 6/

3. Peasant Participation, Post-Reform

All governments sponsoring land reform pay lip service to the importance of creating a new set of functional organizations, conducive to economic growth, to replace the old set. Governments also generally pay lip service to the point that organizing and involving the farmers, especially small farmers, is an essential first step in building this new system. Both these senstences are based on the assumption that governments must take the initiative in building the new system. This is an assumption which tends to run against the grain of American faith in private initiative. Nevertheless, it appears to be valid historically.

In the typical pre-reform situation, initiative is controlled from above. The peasant is not only reluctant to express his own will. He fears that he may actually get into trouble if he does express his initiative. The literature on village societies is full of evidence on this point. The peasants' attitudes cannot be changed quickly by the simple act of transferring ownership on improving the condition of tenancy. Rather, as we all know, changes in attitude evolve slowly as circumstances change and as the peasant convinces himself that opportunities once limited to a few are now open to the many.

If governments leave peasants to their own devices following land redistribution, the traditional exploiters will try to maintain their position through control of the market, credit and other elements of an agricultural system. This situation is reported repeatedly in the country papers. Where, however, governments have intervened effectively on behalf of the small farmer, he can be transformed into a modern, prosperous farmer. The history of agricultural progress in Japan and Taiwan in this century, and in Europe somewhat earlier, is evidence of these fundamental changes in peasant attitudes. History also tells us how long it takes to change peasant attitudes.

Practically all governments appear to have recognized this fundamental problem of peasant psychology. Practically all governments have proposed to begin resolving it through local organizations in which the peasant can participate as a member of a group. There are, of course, a number of different local institutions - local governments, market towns, banks, etc. - through which peasants can be given access to all the elements of a modern agricultural system on terms which are competitive with all other farmers. Because of the limit on space we shall discuss only the two most common ones, the farmers' cooperative and the collective.

A. The Cooperative

Most non-communist governments have sponsored the organization of farmers' cooperatives, and for reasons familiar to us. Strength in numbers can give the individual farmer a sense of independence from the traditional exploiters. The co-op can be made an effective way of bringing needed supplies and services to farmers. It can be used to encourage small farmers in mobilizing their capital, and as a way of marketing the produce.

The authors of our country papers agree that the cooperative can be effective if it is organized in the right way and if it is relatively autonomous. Perhaps we should digress here for a moment to note that autonomy is a relative thing. By Western democratic standards the supervised cooperatives of Egypt can be described as government dominated. But through these cooperatives small farmers now have limited authority to make decisions. In the pre-reform situation they had virtually none at all. Thus, a measure of authority which seems limited to us is a new opportunity for them. The cooperatives organized in the land reform areas of Egypt initially covered only 10% of the cultivated area. The generally moribund cooperatives in the other 90% were re-organized on the same pattern.

The successful story of the cooperatives of Japan, Israel, and Taiwan is too well known to require repetition here.

In a village near Isfahan in Iran "The aura of private ownership was soon tarnished because many of the smaller holdings could not be profitably cultivated by the individual farmers. This difficulty was alleviated in 1966 when a farm cooperative was established."[7/]

In Iraq our author writes that "where cooperatives are functioning they have brought new services and supplies." Where there are no cooperatives (which is still much of the country) or where cooperatives have failed, the new freeholders are still "exploited by former landlords and middlemen."[8/]

In Central Luzon where there are a few effective cooperatives, exceptions to an otherwise dreary national picture, the co-ops have helped to stabilize prices received by farmers.[9/] In Egypt, also, cooperatives have helped improve prices received by farmers.[10/]

In several African countries, among them Ghana, Uganda, and Kenya, farmers are receiving the same kind of benefits from cooperatives which American farmers receive.

In other countries not named above the cooperative has proven to be an effective technique for organizing small farmers following land and tenancy reform.

Yet, on balance, the record of farmers' cooperatives is unimpressive.

The continuing domination by traditional elites is one major problem of cooperative development. In Mexico, for example, in many areas large landowners "still have a firm grip on the affairs of the local community. This key position is checked mainly where the reform sectors have grown to the point of holding the large majority of all the land."[11/] Peasant cooperation is difficult when a landed aristocracy is present.

Sometimes officials allow, or even encourage, local elites to dominate the cooperative. Gunnar Myrdal concluded that at the local level in India "the power to elect the representative bodies of government that direct the preparation and execution of plans remains predominantly in the hands of privileged groups."[12/] Doreen Warriner writes that the effect of India's quais-reform was to substitute resident "squirearchs" for absentee "oligarchs".[13/]

The second major problem of cooperatives is basic deficiencies in their legal, institutional, and financial strcuture. Many of the farmers' organizations which bear that name are not cooperatives at all, but the organizational equivalent of a physically disabled person. Often cooperatives are not allowed to own property or mobilize and invest capital; they cannot earn enough income to cover costs, or cannot market their own products. Sometimes their legal liability is unlimited. Somestimes, "cooperatives become forms of official tutelage, useful as temporary expedients, but tending to perpetuate official control and keeping peasants as second-class citizens."[14/] A number of countries have organized cooperatives at the local level but not organized federations of cooperatives at the regional or national level. Yet, the wholesaling of production inputs, much of marketing and some other function are regional,or federation, in scope. They cannot be handled economically by local units. In fact, some experts believe that in organizing and developing cooperatives, the federation is even more important than the local units.

The problems of organizing cooperatives in cultures vastly different from our own, and among people who are poorly educated or illiterate, are manifold and well known. Under the best of circumstances, progress will be painful and full of error. But whatever the form of ownership, can a business

succeed if it cannot be organized and managed on business principles or if it is too small to be able to achieve the necessary economies of scale. Can a farmer be blamed for lack of enthusiasm about his cooperative if it is true, as an Indian once expressed it, "The cooperative lends and farmers borrow, but the merchants reap the profits."[15/]

B. The Collective

The proponents of collective farms argue their case in terms of economies of scale and mecahnization. In communist countries the collective has been used as a way of forcing food deliveries to the city. Those of us who live in theWest tend to think of the communist collective as an instrument of political control as well. Given the penchant of the officials of underdeveloped governments to try to manage everything from their desks in the capital city, this argument applies to some extent in the non-communist countries as well.

The collective farm is a way for officials to deny to small farmers the benefits land reform is supposed to bring them. Doreen Warriner describes the collective as a "modern contempt for the efficiency of the peasant."

Where the collective has been used in non-communist countries, the government generally asserts the organization is 'democratic' and in the best interest of the cultivator. The farm workers are organized (in what some governments call a cooperative) and elect some of their members to a Management Board. Legally and officially this Board is said to be in charge of the collective farm. In fact, however, collectives are usually dominated by government officials, "who see nothing wrong with farming by telephone."[16/] "In reality the 'Unites' (the cooperatives of Tunisia) are managed through a state hierarchy of organizations and technicians . . . The result is that

farm decisions are not made on time. The cooperative officials assume that thefarmers' knowledge is not important . . ."[18/] There are similar statements about collectives in other country papers.

In Iran it is reported that farmers are being coerced into joining collectives, even though the law states that at least 51% of the farmers in a village proposed for collectivization must vote for it. In addition, it is said some farmers have been forced out of the labor force after their land was pooled.[18/] Such an excess of control from above is too often an ingredient in the organization and management of collective farms.

Farmers' opposition to collectivization is too well known to need elaboration here, except to note that a number of the country papers confirm the point, e.g., Algeria, Tunisia, Mexico, Iran, India. In Tunisia and Ghana, where collectives were once extensive, they have been dissolved. In Yugoslavia, farmers have put only about 4% of the land into the so-called 'voluntary' collective, even though the pattern of investment, and hence theprospect of higher income, has been designed to induce farmers to join 'voluntarily'.

Nevertheless, the collective can be a route to progress, even if it may not be the most efficient route. The best record is generally considered to be in the 'socialized sector' of Yugoslavia.* Seventy percent of this

*Except for the Kibbutzim in Israel. However, the unusual circumstances surrounding the origin of these farms - the zeal of the Zionists, the high educational level of their founders, and the need for close-knit organization as a matter of self-protection - almost certainly make the kibbutzim unique in modern agricultural history.

sector consists of state farms with a wage labor force and thirty percent is 'voluntary' collectives. The two types together make up fourteen percent of the cultivated area of the country.

According to official Yugoslav sources production in the socialized sector has been increasing by 9% per year, roughly three times the rate of increase on individual farms. Output per man and per hectare is much higher in the socialized sector. On some of the state farms corn yields are as high as in theAmerican Mid-West, wheat yields as high as in the Netherlands, that is, they are among the highest in the world. Agricultural exports have increased more than four times since the middle 1950s. Much of the export increase has come from agro-industries built to process the bountiful harvests from state farms.

These results, however, were pre-ordained by the concentration of investment in the socialized sector. Fertilizer usage per acre is seven times higher in the socialized sector than on the individual farms. In the socialized sector there is one tractor per 125 acres, on individual farms one per 1800 acres. Statistics are not available on other production inputs, but presumably the same distortions exist. The socialized sector enjoys the maximum market opportunities, whereas the market outlets of the individual farmers are somewhat restricted. Even so, much of the produce used in the agro-industries comes from the peasant farms, not the socialized sector. Finally, the state farms are concentrated in the Danube Valley which is one of the most fertile areas in all of Europe, while many of the peasant farms are on medium quality or marginal land. As has happened in more than one country, the government ignores these differences in soil quality in arguing that large farms are more economic.[19/]

To some extent thepenchant of planners to capitalize collective farms

prematurely has been evident in Yugoslavia. In one year, 1962, the balance sheet of 106 state enterprises showed losses, 188 enterprises showed profits. The amount of capital per worker in the profit-making group was only about one-half the capital per worker in the loss group.[20/]

Because of the enormous difference in the volume and patterns of investment between the soialist and individual farm sectors in Yugoslavia, ProfessorDovring has attempted to evaluate the efficiency of investment in each type of farming. He found this difficult because the official record is designed (or distorted) to support the official doctrine that large farms are more efficient. However, Professor Dovring is satisfied that the returns on capital are higher on individual farms than on the state farms.[21/]

The authors of other country papers and also Doreen Warriner conclude that inefficient use of both capital and labor is an almost universal weakness of collective farms.

Too many planners in the LDCs are apparently unaware of the record of collective farms or else they choose to ignore it, perhaps because ... "Officials safeguard their own position by inducing collective farming."[22/]

C. So far as political participation is concerned, there is little to say because there is little participation. Even in the LDCs, which have adopted some of the forms of democracy, peasants are looked upon as so many noses to be counted on election day. "Once in a while some people come and ask for us for our vote and promise all kinds of things but never show their faces again."[23/]

The authority and resources of most local organizations, including local government, are so limited that political action at the local level lacks substance. When most decisions, including budget allocations, are made above the local community, there is little left for the community to decide and act upon. Thus, villagers are periodically mobilized to support a party, or a policy, or a politician. But they are not organized for sustained endeavor.

D. Measuring Participation

There is often an authoritative opinion (such as the country studies written for this Review) on whether and how peasant participation has been affected by land reform. But there is commonly a lack of statistical data that give some measure of whatever changes have taken place, or even a lack of consensus on how participation might be measured.

Participation is not just a matter of organizations which farmers can join, though organizations are a part of the subject. More broadly, participation is considered to be the result of incentives and benefits flowing from a modern agricultural system in which all farmers can compete on approximately the same terms. Specifically, the larger farmer should not have incentives and opportunities, such as better access to markets, which are denied to small farmers because they are small.

The information in the country papers suggests two indicators which might be developed to give a more specific measure of how much farmers are actually involved. Both cover the entire agricultural area, not just land reform areas. The data in the country papers is skimpy, and some of it is opinion. But there is enough information to suggest what might be possible. The first measure relates to the amount of work done on a farm, the second to agricultural financing.

1. How Much Do Farmers Work. Common sense and the history of agricultural progress in the advanced countries tell us that farmers will work harder to increase their incomes - if they have the opportunity. Land reform is supposed to replace the ancient inhibitions with new opportunities. More work on the farm, increased rural incomes, and higher national production, should be the result. One observer reports that in Egypt "in areas where sugarcane land was distributed to former landless

tenants, processing records indicate a production increase per feddan (1.04 acres) of 20 to 30 percent above pre-reform levels. Since little change is reported in levels of fertilizer application or intensity of irrigation, the changed motivational structure seems to be the major explanation of the increase."[25/] This is, of course, just one example, but it illustrates the change in attitude that genuine land reform can induce.

The employment situation was reviewed in other country papers. Employment seems a fertile and obvious field for trying to develop measures of farmers' participation in the production process. Some data from Taiwan and the Philippines illustrate what might be possible. According to this information a Taiwanese farmer spends at least twice as much time in the field as a Filipino farmer. Considering that there are twice as many farm workers per 100 acres in Taiwan as in the Philippines, this means that in Taiwan the amount of work done on a farm may be somewhere around four times as much as the amount of work done on a farm in the Philippines. Such an enormous difference is a function of the total agricultural system in the two countries. A Filipino farmer, like his counterpart in Taiwan, could be a member of a cooperative and active in his local government or other local development activities. Clearly, some measure of the amount of work actually done by farmers would be a useful addition to the set of agricultural indicators now in use.

2. The Financial System. The second proposed indicator relates to participation in a system for financing agriculture. Assuming, of course, that such a system actually exists. In most countries there is no system in which small farmers can participate. It can be argued that subsistence farmers cannot pay their own way until development gets going because they are too poor to save now. In the beginning subsistence farmers cannot be

expected to save much, but it is equally true that farmers cannot pay their own way unless they learn financial discipline and become a part of a system for financing agriculture. This involves both individual and group participation in local institutions that are easily accessible to all farmers.

In Taiwan, for example, there are now two financial institutions per township. In most LDCs this statistic would be a tenth or a twentieth, or perhaps a fiftieth; that is, there is a private bank or two in the province capital, but none in smaller towns and no co-ops worthy of the name. In Taiwan the deposits held by the two agricultural cooperative financial institutions are one-fifth of the total deposits of the island country and more than enough to cover the annual requirements for production credit. In many countries this statistic would be zero because co-ops are not allowed to receive deposits.

How much of Taiwan's success can be attributed to Chines mores nobody knows. But it is obvious that farmers cannot save money without a place to save it and most farmers in the LDCs do not have a place. It is also true that in a few places where complete financial institutions have been established - Korea, Comilla, East Pakistan and the District of Ankole in Uganda are three examples - subsistence farmers have been induced to save money. Generally speaking, there is a gross shortage of private banks throughout the underdeveloped world and most co-ops are not allowed to set up personal savings accounts.

Cooperatives are too often used solely as an intermediary institution for extending credit. Interest is not retained by the local unit but returned to the national agricultural bank. Co-ops are not used for mobilizing capital and channeling investment. Members frequently are required to buy one or several shares in order to join, but this is the extent of their personal financial interest. Hence, co-ops really are not financial institutions

although teaching members the importance of "thrift", to use the 19th century word,has always been a cornerstone of successful cooperative development.

4. Conclusion

Three general conclusions can be drawn from this survey of peasant participation in land reform. The first, emphasized by Western authorities on the subject,is the importance of peasant participation in the new agricultural system that is supposed to replace the old one,and on terms that are reasonable to both the farmer and the economist.

The second is not only that governments can organize and involve farmers in an efficient agricultural system. More than this,governments can dominate and control such a system,and in ways that are highly unpalatable to Americans. Some of the best records in this century have been achieved by authoritarian governments. Pre-war Japan and Taiwan are two examples. Nasser's Egypt is another. In paradoxical contrast,a number of countries with a democratic form of government have not yet succeeded in extending the benefits of land reform to the mass of small farmers.

The third conclusion is that much of what needs to be done to make land reform effective is a kind of giant-sized organizational campaign designed, in part,for the very mercenary purpose of making money,especially for small farmers. Basic to such an organizational effort is the need to decentralize to the operators in the field the authority for day-to-day management decisions. This is true whether the operators are public officials,as in Egypt or Yugoslavia,or whether the operators are,as Americans would prefer,farmers,private businessmen and bankers,and cooperative businessmen.

It may come as a surprise to a people who are expert at organizing themselves in their own country and who are also expert at making money, namely, we Americans, to be told that we are part of the reason for the under-emphasis on organization and marketing in the post-reform effort to link reform with development. This is the opinion of Prof. Warriner, the English authority we have quoted several times. Prof. Warriner identifies both an American

and a socialist model of land reform that have influenced policy decisions in the LDCs. She identifies the American model as consisting of the family farm plus extension and credit. She grants that we recognize the importance of organization and marketing, but feels that in practice these things get left out. She believes there is too much emphasis on services governments can provide, a kind of farm welfare policy advocated by those who "do not expect that the recipients of aid will ever become independent farm producers." There is too little emphasis on building the economic base of farming. She concludes her discussion of what she calls 'rival conceptions of land reform,' by saying, "English common sense always suggests a compromise: grant individual ownership, but provide some form of organization to channel investment and market the produce, thus linking increased inputs with higher output and greater incentives to sell." An American feels impelled to say that here at home, at least, this is American common sense as well.

Professor Warriner summarizes her survey of twenty-five years of land reform that "there is a missing component: confidence in the people who are to gain from reform." How AID can help build up this necessary confidence, among officials of the various aid agencies as well as in the governments of the LDCs, is our challenge for tomorrow.

FOOTNOTES

1. Doreen Warriner, "Land Reform in Principle and Practice", Oxford, 1969, page 243.
2. G. Parthasarathy and B. Rao, "Implementation of Land Reform in Andhra Pradesh", Calcutta, 1969, page 81.
3. Warriner, op. cit., page 39.
4. Warriner, op. cit., page 255.
5. Christine White, Country Paper on North Vietnam (mimeo), AID Spring Review of Land Reform, Washington, 1970, page 43.
6. Kenneth Platt, Country Paper on the United Arab Republic (mimeo), AID Spring Review of Land Reform, Washington, 1970, page 82.
7. Kenneth Platt, Country Paper on Iran (mimeo), AID Spring Review of Land Reform, Washington, 1970, page
8. H. Charles Treakle, Country Paper on Iraq (mimeo), AID Spring Review of Land Reform, Washington, 1970, pages 80 and 86.
9. USAID, Philippines, Country Paper on the Philippines, AID Spring Review of Land Reform, Washington, 1970, page 67.
10. Platt, op. cit., page 71.
11. Folke Dovring, Country Paper on Mexico, AID Spring Review of Land Reform, Washington, 1970, page 54.
12. Gunnar Myrdal, "Asian Drama", New York, 1968, page 853.
13. Warriner, op. cit., page 139.
14. Warriner, op. cit., pages 402-403.
15. Reported in Warriner, op. cit., page 207.
16. Warriner, op. cit., page 371.

17. John L. Simmons, Country Paper on Tunisia (mimeo), AID Spring Review of Land Reform, Washington, 1970, pages 48, 53, 54.

18. Kenneth Platt, op. cit., pages 109-110.

19. Folke Dovring, Country Paper on Yugoslavia, AID Spring Review of Land Reform, Washington, 1970, pages 41-43.

20. Warriner, op. cit., page 424, footnote 1.

21. Dovring, op. cit., pages 43-46.

22. Warriner, op. cit., page 134.

23. Kusum Nair, "Blossoms in the Dust", New York, 1962, page 169.

24. Warriner, op. cit., pages 59-63 and 72-73.