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The Public Administration Institute for Turkey and the Middle East (PAITME) began in 1953 with the intention of training and educating civil servants. Very little was certain about its mission or its immediate future at that time. It was to teach, perform research, and furnish documentation in public administration, but beyond those points it had no doctrine or program. This document describes the origin of the institute, the working group, and the progress during the first eleven years. By 1954, the organization was in three sections: training, research and documentation. Training and educational activities had assumed a heavily academic cast with emphasis on large classes, lectures, examination, and a minor amount of contact with the real world of administration. The events of the decade from 1954-1964 are organized in terms of PAITME's leadership, resources, program, and external relationships. The report indicates that the challenge offered by the United Nations in the early fifties for Turkey to create its own explicit doctrine of public administration has not been fulfilled. It is concluded that the institute has not been a strong force in any search for such a doctrine or in disseminating norms in the wide field of public administration.

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AT A MODEST LEVEL:
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION INSTITUTE
FOR TURKEY AND THE MIDDLE EAST

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INSTITUTIONALIZATION AT A MODEST LEVEL:
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION INSTITUTE FOR TURKEY AND THE MIDDLE EAST

by

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with the assistance of

Sevda Erem

Syracuse, March 31, 1967

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PART I

Introduction

In 1951 Turkey and the United Nations agreed to set up a training institution for the public service in Turkey and neighboring nations. In March, 1953, the Public Administration Institute for Turkey and the Middle East (PAITME) began its first course in its quarters at the Political Science Faculty of the University of Ankara. Very little was certain about its mission or its immediate future at that time. It was to teach, perform research, and furnish documentation in "public administration," but beyond those points it had no doctrine or program. It was not clear who the student body would be. Indeed there was no more than temporary, part-time leadership, and there was no accepted legal basis for the new Institute. It was undecided where it fit into the structure of Turkish Administration.

Thus the United Nations conceived, created, and sustained PAITME during its first six years, 1953 to 1959. The U. N. investment in those years was about \$650,000, as compared with a Turkish investment of perhaps TL 1,250,000. From 1959 to 1964, the U. N. spent \$230,000 to Turkey's TL 5,152,000.¹

¹The official rate of exchange in 1952 was TL 3.2 to the United States dollar. In 1964, it was TL 9 to the U. S. dollar.

Up to 1959 the United Nations sent twenty-three "experts" to the Institute for a total of about twenty-nine and one-half man-years of consultantship. During those years Turkey provided no full-time senior persons for the staff, although six or seven junior employees were gradually attaining experience and status, including for several of them a year of education abroad. Since 1959 four United Nations "experts" have worked at the Institute a total of nine man-years. Meanwhile, beginning in 1960 several junior staff members at the Institute were promoted to senior positions. By 1966 there were ten full-time, Turkish, senior staff, although the General-Director remained a professor from the Faculty of Political Science working part-time.

The year 1959 was indeed a watershed year. Until then, the Institute had a more-or-less temporary basis in a brief law that merely anticipated the passage of a permanent law. Thus before 1959, when faults were perceived in the Institute, the observers tended to attribute them to this situation. There can in fact be little doubt that many characteristics of PAITME before 1959 stemmed therefrom-- e.g., uncertainty about where leadership lay and the resulting uncertain status in the Political Science Faculty. Since 1959, however, when the Institute became legally autonomous, this problem of leadership has not disappeared nor have many other important questions about its work.

The original intention was that the first function of the Institute would be the training and education of civil servants. This has indeed eventuated as the major activity. Several different courses of study and training have been established through the fourteen years. First,

a so-called General Course by 1965 had graduated about 590 students drawn from the regular government administration, public enterprises, and the military. For most of those years, it has been required that candidates for entry have five years of service with the government, pass an entrance examination, and since 1959 that they have a university degree. This General Course required two years at first, but soon it was reduced to nine months. It has remained at about this requirement since.

About 144 students have completed an organization and methods course that was first given in 1959. In 1964 the Institute assumed from United States AID a Management Improvement Training Program which subsequently has been given in four ministries and state enterprises. This "package program" comprises lectures and seminars once a week over a period of twenty to forty weeks at four different levels of organization in a given establishment. Yet another course carried out in 1954 and 1965 was the "Training of Trainers" course for a total of forty-one participants who were intended to become training officers in their own agencies. These have been the principal programs in the Institute, although from time to time both short and long-term courses of other types have been operated with varying degrees of success.

Research and documentation have also been carried out at PAITME from its inception, and they have been accented in about that order. For lack of a full-time head or of a clearly defined goal or for other reasons, documentation has not gone far. In a cooperative project with the New York

University group at the Faculty of Political Science, parts of seven public administration books were translated from English into Turkish before 1959. Throughout its life the Institute has also occasionally published translations of brief papers or of lectures given at the Institute by eminent foreign visitors and in some cases by Turkish experts. Nevertheless, the senior staff at the Institute in 1966 still commented on the shortage of technical materials usable in the various courses and programs they managed.

The research record is more positive. Up to 1959 under four successive United Nations research experts, over a dozen original studies were carried out. The major, lasting result of those years was the training of a small group of capable, but junior researchers. One of the junior staff trained during those years subsequently has become the Director of Research. That training further "paid off" in 1962-1963 when the Institute carried out, at the behest of the State Planning Office, the major research project in its history. This Central Government Organization Research Project (Merkezi Hukümet Teşkilati Araştırma Projesi-- better known as MEHTAP) was completed in 1963 and followed by a Government Organization Manual in 1965. In 1966 three senior staff members from the Institute were serving on a special administration committee to follow up these studies.

By 1965, then, PAITME had many of the outward signs indicating institutional status in Turkey or indeed almost any country. It did not have many clear linkages with other institutions in or out of the government. For this reason

and indeed for others it was easy to find critics in 1965 who emphasized the weakness of the Institute. These critics spoke of the large numbers of untrained civil servants and of the challenges faced by Turkey in its development effort in the coming years.

Judgments about the Institute's performance seem to range between two extremes. On one hand today are those critics who are impressed by the progress the Institute has made. They point to its ill-defined mission, its shaky leadership, and the task of gaining acceptance for its doctrine in the administration. These were indeed difficult circumstances within which it had had to operate, and in this sense its present programs and reputation are remarkable. On the other hand are those critics who point to the needs of the country for trained personnel in its development effort. They describe the goals of public administration training which were laid out at the Institute's beginning and have subsequently become somewhat better defined. They judge that the Institute has come nowhere near attaining these goals, and they do not believe that its programs today are aimed at their accomplishment. They call for other organizations or training ideas set up in competition with or in place of the Institute.

PART II

PAITME's Origin

Turkey by 1951 was more than a quarter century past her War of Independence.¹ Politically and economically, differentiation and growth had occurred. Thus development was underway, as that term is commonly employed today. For many Turks, however, development seemed too slow. Thus when Kemal Ataturk's successors in the government decided to relax controls over the 1950 elections, the opposing Democratic Party came to the power it was to hold for a decade. Change was in the air in 1951, although there is no evidence that Prime Minister Adnan Menderes or his cabinet were predisposed to accept ideas about drastic administrative reform or training for administrators. Of course, new parliamentary majorities usually offer the chance for new or different ideas to emerge.

In general Turks, or at least the fewer than one-tenth who were urban and literate, had long been receptive to suggestions that might help them along in their nation-building efforts. Turkey may be the classic case of this receptivity among developing countries. Even before World War I Turkish critics had noted the emergence of such an

¹Turkey's political and economic development has been chronicled by Kemal Karpat, Turkey's Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959); Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey (London: Oxford University Press, 1961); Walter F. Weiker, The Turkish Revolution, 1960-1961 (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1963); Malcolm D. Rivkin, Area Development for National Growth: The Turkish Precedent (New York: Praeger, 1965).

attitude, at times a rejection of all things Turkish and a blanket approval of all things Western.

The fallacy that everything seen in Europe can be imitated here has become a political tradition among us. For example--by simultaneously introducing Russian uniforms, Belgian rifles, Turkish headgear, Hungarian saddles, English swords, and French drill--we have created an army that is a grotesque parody of Europe.¹

Ataturk's leadership in the drive for Westernization perhaps heightened the condition. He often alarmed his close adherents. One of the leading women in Ataturk's political following, Halide Edib Adivar, wrote in 1946: "Total and slavish imitation of a model is the very opposite of the spirit of Western Civilization."² The general attitude may have been tempered by these earlier warnings, but it was still present in educational, political, and journalistic circles as the fifties began.

It does not seem that this climate for change had especially affected the government or those in authority with regard to public administration before 1950. Under Ataturk there were a few early instances of attempted reforms, mostly in the form of passage of laws. By the late forties, a number of foreign consultants had examined phases of the operations of regular governmental agencies or state

¹ Ismail Hami, as quoted in Lewis, op. cit., p. 231.

² Ibid., pp. 273-74.

enterprises.¹ In the context of this study, perhaps the most important public administration critic was Dean Emery E. Olson of the University of Southern California School of Public Administration who was a member of the World Bank's Barker Mission in 1951. Today it is difficult to establish any direct connections between these studies, surveys, and criticisms and reforms made in Turkish administrative organization or practices. The capacity of the government to follow-up a study, communicate its results downward, and gain some implementation of recommendations seems to have been very limited. The Menderes government never had a reputation for carefully charting out its actions over the long-term. Menderes himself was quoted several times as flatly opposed to economic planning, for instance. A latent capacity for implementing administrative changes had, on the other hand, emerged in connection with U. S. Point Four aid to the General Directorate of Highways after 1949, and shortly thereafter to other agencies including several state enterprises.

¹The Hines-Dorr Report of 1933-34; the Neumark Report of 1949; there are some comments in Max W. Thornburg, G. Spry, and G. Soule, Turkey: An Economic Appraisal (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1949); International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, The Economy of Turkey (Washington, 1951), commonly known as the Barker Report, after the head of the study mission, James Barker. Professor Leimgruber, formerly Vice Chancellor of the Swiss Confederation and President of the International Institute of Administrative Sciences, was in Ankara in the summer of 1952, "commissioned by the Turkish Government to conduct a survey on a reform of the public administration."

From the Turks themselves there was little or no systematic criticism of administration, neither from universities, government, or elsewhere. Among other things this means it is impossible to recapture the condition of public administration there in 1951, except through the eyes of foreigners. Turkish government and administration were similar in many outward aspects to French government and administration earlier in this century, in organizational, areal, and procedural terms. The climate of administration was legalistic. The letter of the law was the referent for every activity (Bir kanun var). Thus the details of administrative activity appeared in endless records. Other kinds of administrative controls were de-emphasized or non-existent, for it was widely assumed that adherence to the law provided control enough.

Turkish administration in 1951 was also fragmented. Central budget and personnel systems did not exist, although they were usual in the West by then. Each ministry and enterprise handled its own budget in a highly centralized fashion. The state enterprises themselves, a major organizational innovation of Ataturk's time, stood for devolution of decision-making from the center. There were, however, few coordinating devices below the level of the cabinet. The system thus led to numerous inter-ministerial squabbles on relatively low-level administrative matters. Observers at that period also reported poor communications within individual agencies and enterprises.

This lack of co-ordination leads to a certain hesitation on the part of otherwise conscientious officers to accept responsibility and this is further aggravated by the Turkish

system of financial accountability of individual officials. It is for these reasons that signature and responsibility are very rarely delegated in the Turkish civil service, and when the head of a service is absent, official decisions await his return.¹

At this time there were some 200,000 employees in the public service, excluding local authorities, PTT, railways, and airways. About half of these people came under regular civil service laws, while the rest served under less permanent arrangements in the state enterprises or temporary positions. Personnel administration for the regular civil servant was based upon a bareme law which vested rank permanently in the individual employee and not in a position. Although in principle recruitment to the service was by competition, in practice there were many exceptions. Graduation from the Political Science Faculty of the University of Ankara, for example, was a sure means of gaining entry to service with the Ministries of Finance or Interior. Once in the service, an individual gained promotion through a process in which education was a prime formal criterion and social status seems to have played an important but informal part.²

¹United Nations, Technical Assistance Programme, "Summary of the Reports of the Four Experts. . . ." in "Institute of Public Administration in Turkey." ST/TAA/M.6 (New York, January 19, 1954), p. 28.

²Emery Olson in his 1951 confidential report to the World Bank provides lengthy notes on his conversations with top managers from the public, semi-public, and private sectors. These notes, along with the United Nations, Technical Assistance Programme, "Institute of Public Administration in Turkey," ST/TAA/M.6 (New York, January 19, 1954), are by all odds the best English characterizations of Turkish administration at this time. Hereafter this United Nations publication will be cited as "Working Group Report."

Training for the administrator was confined to his pre-entry years. For persons who would eventually rise to high positions in administration, this meant the institutions of higher education. Of these, the University of Istanbul, dating at least from Roman times, was by all odds the most prestigious. Annually its Faculties of Economics and Law were a source of a few new recruits to government services. There were also a Technical University and two high schools (technical colleges) in Istanbul as well as a technical college in Izmir.

The Political Science Faculty of the University of Ankara was the most important of all, however, in terms of numbers of graduates passing directly into government service. This Faculty was created in 1950 from the old Mulkiye, a training school for would-be civil servants. The Mulkiye dated from 1859, indeed was one of the important institutions surviving from that early reform period, the Tanzimat. Making it a Faculty endowed it with substantially more academic respectability, although the University of Ankara had only been established after the Revolution of the twenties. The newness of both University and Faculty was the source of an attitude that observers remarked among some of the staff at the Political Science Faculty. Especially with regard to the University of Istanbul and its Faculty of Economics there was apparently a sense of competition. What weight this feeling may have swung in the life of PAITME is impossible to say. Observers reported some vestiges of the same attitude in the Ankara University of the 1960's.

The staff of 80 to 85 persons of professional rank at the Political Science Faculty accepted some 250 new students yearly to the four-year course. In his last two years a student specialized in one of three sections: Economics and Public Finance, Administration, or Diplomatic and International Relations. Here, however, as in Istanbul University, "administrative law" seems to have been the only academic subject closely related to what was known as "public administration" in the West. In 1951 the social sciences were weakly represented in the two institutions.

Many of the professors, highly trained men from the universities of Germany, Switzerland, France and elsewhere, recognized this situation. Shortly after the Political Science Faculty was established foreign aid was accepted to send younger staff abroad for training in fields like public administration, business administration and international relations. During the decade of the fifties as these young men returned they had a profound impact on the Faculty and its students, including also the PAITME.

These conditions and these institutions therefore comprised the environment within which PAITME was to be born. After surveying the setting in the summer of 1952, four U. N. experts asserted: "Turkey is ripe for the improvement of its administration through education, training, consultation and the interchange of information on modern methods of management."¹ These foreign critics did not report to New York that Turkey was ready to welcome

¹"Working Group Report," p. 37.

administrative reform in the guise of PAITME or otherwise. What they saw was a whole series of "problems" including training problems, all defined most generally in terms of Western concepts of administration, waiting to be solved.

In spite of what has already been said about the special problems of the Turkish administrative system, it should not be assumed that they are unique to Turkey. Experts coming from other parts of the world will recognize these problems as already familiar in the administrative organization of their countries.¹

A few persons in the government, well below cabinet level, and a few professors were concerned with a broad need for better administration and better training for administrators. Virtually no one however was seriously studying such problems, in or out of government. They perhaps sensed a climate of opinion conducive to change in the abstract but not particularly oriented to change in public administration.

The four United Nations experts indeed made a long jump from what they perceived as problems in Turkish administration to the body of concepts known as "public administration" that had been developed abroad. The purpose here is in no way to belittle the intentions or sophistication of these four men who were capable and experienced, or the many other persons who have faced similar situations in Turkey or elsewhere in subsequent years. They had a practical problem. The challenge they faced was: a) to convince Turkish authorities and scholars that there were "problems"; b) that the problems warranted serious attention by Turks, c) in ways suggested by students of "public administration" abroad. There was scarcely a framework of theory within which

¹ibid.

systematically to undertake the task. Even in 1966 we can only confirm or deny the existence of such "problems" at a general level. There was scarcely a suggestion however as to the pragmatic lines along which this doctrine might be related to this background through the instrumentality of the new institution, PAITME.

The United Nations and Public Administration

In the early fifties technical assistance to the underdeveloped world was an exciting new idea. Bilateral and multilateral support for a variety of undertakings were easily obtainable. When the United Nations set up the Expanded Programme for Technical Assistance in late 1949, public administration assistance was among the alternatives for which project ideas were solicited. In 1950 a Public Administration Division (PAD) was established in the Technical Assistance Administration. Dr. Hubertus Van Mook, former Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies, was appointed Director of PAD and served for five years until 1956. He and Mr. H. L. Keenleyside, Director-General of TAA, in the best sense were "shopping" for ideas and projects in 1950-1951, as indeed were officials from other U. N. organizations.

Public administration assistance was based upon doctrine that promised real help to countries like Turkey. It had of course originated in the West, as "public administration" in the United States, as "les sciences administratives" and "Verwaltungswissenschaft" on the European continent. In many Western governments problems of "efficiency," organization, budgeting, personnel, and planning had been attacked vigorously after World War II. From that source,

from academic research, and most fruitfully from combinations of the two had emerged a flow of specific studies, hypotheses, and on occasion even "principles." In 1951 however only the most uninformed or misguided persons pretended that the study or practice of public administration had assumed any concrete uniformity among Western countries. That is, only generalizations at very high levels could be made across national or cultural lines.

There were discrete corps of teachers and practitioners of the various doctrines from country to country. The knowledge or experience of a few individuals spanned two or more nations. One or two professional associations like the International Association of Administrative Sciences had begun speaking of or searching for universal concepts and ideas. Nevertheless, in numerous universities and governments there were capable professors and senior civil servants willing if not anxious to assume the mantle of missionary and spread to X or Y non-Western country the doctrine (gospel) of public administration with which they were familiar.

Genesis

The Public Administration Institute for Turkey and the Middle East began in a very ordinary way--in the conversations of high government officials. Doubtless a little staff work had been done, but the idea seems first to have cropped up in top decision-making circles when Director-General Hugh L. Keenleyside of the Technical Assistance Administration and Resident Representative for the Technical Assistance Board Milton Winn were in Ankara in 1951. They

discussed it with Foreign Minister Fatin Rustu Zorlu, General Director Haydar Gork of the Economic Section, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Professor Muhlis Ete, Minister of Economy. The group agreed on a permanent institute of public administration to be established in mid-1952 by the U. N. and Turkey at the University of Ankara, to train officials drawn from the area, Greece to Pakistan and Turkey to Somaliland. The initiative seems to have been exercised by the U. N. officials from the beginning. The idea of an institute was in this sense not autochthonous, and this fact has a bearing on virtually every part of its story.

For the next year the idea was developed in New York primarily. It is probable that it was examined in the Foreign Ministry or even by the Turkish cabinet, but no evidence of that can be uncovered today. In New York there was a long discussion. Director Van Mook of UNPAD was the chief negotiator for the U. N. and Ambassador Selim Sarper and Minister Plenipotentiary K. S. Waner, for Turkey. It was soon agreed informally that the U. N. would help initially for three to five years, sending perhaps six "experts" for preparatory work and five for the first year. Turkey would match this manpower and then the supply of U. N. personnel could taper off as Turkey strengthened its role. An organizer was to arrive in Ankara by May 1, 1952, to lay the groundwork for a working group of experts later in the summer. With the advice of the working group, the new institute was to open its doors on October 1, 1952.

Turkish representatives agreed to these details in early January, 1952, but no agreement was signed until May. There was slow communication between New York and Ankara, Turkish officials moved deliberately, and U. N. officials became impatient. Time was lost and no advance representative got to Ankara in May. Furthermore, it seems that no one there carried the news of these developments very far outside the walls of the Foreign Ministry. The Supplementary Agreement¹ that was finally signed on May 8 generally approved arrangements that were made orally before that time. Two or three points are notable, however. The United Nations was committed to provide help for only one year, although clearly the expectations of both Turkish and U. N. officials was for at least five years of cooperation. Affiliation with a university or any other institution in Turkey was not mentioned.

The purpose of the Supplementary Agreement was stated thus:

. . . to improve the training for the public service generally, and in particular to establish, in Turkey, an Institute of Public Administration . . . in order to provide improved training facilities for Turkey and the Middle East; . . .

Both parties to the agreement would provide fellowships and other expenses for participants at the new institute from other Middle Eastern countries. This regional component

¹This agreement was supplementary to the Basic Agreement for Technical Assistance between Turkey and the United Nations with its various organizations, signed September 5, 1951.

was indeed a principal interest of the Turkish representatives during the winter and spring discussions. They referred to the Brazilian institute the U. N. had recently established as having the kinds of intentions for regional cooperation Turkey should gain from its forthcoming venture. Apparently Turkish spokesmen were prepared to pledge large amounts of money behind this regional purpose, but there was reluctance among United Nations officials.

This brief document was to serve as the basis of discussions at the sessions in Ankara the following July and August for laying the substantive groundwork of the new institute. As it turned out, the Supplementary Agreement also was in effect the governing statute until 1958 when finally the Turkish Grand National Assembly passed a law providing a Turkish basis.¹ Needless to say, this was not a very substantial basis for implementing the high hopes for the Institute held by both U. N. and Turkish personnel on its full-time staff in its early years.

The Working Group

Both United Nations and Turkish officials had to move fast in the late spring of 1952 to bring together the group of nine educators and officials who met as a "Working

¹Law 6319, officially voting approval for the Supplementary Agreement, was passed March 3, 1954. This two-year delay seems to have been caused by no particular opposition, but it was an additional reason for Turks to look with suspicion or reservation upon the status of the new Institute.

Group" in Ankara from July 9 to late August, 1952. There had been little action on either side before the May 8 signing of the Supplementary Agreement, thus late May and June were busy days. Preparations for the Working Group were recognized on both sides as less than ideal.

The U. N. worked through its regular national channels to recruit three distinguished educators:

Emery E. Olson, Dean of the School of Public Administration, University of Southern California, was chairman of the delegation. Dean Olson had surveyed Turkey's public administration for the Barker Commission of the World Bank the previous summer. In addition, five younger faculty members from the Political Science Faculty had been studying various phases of public administration at his School during the preceding year.

Henri Bourdeau de Fontenay, Director of the Ecole Nationale d'Administration, the French government's training school for higher civil servants.

Professor Gerard W. J. Drewes, orientalist on the Faculty of Letters of Leyden University and a former official in the Netherlands East Indies.

A fourth U. N. representative was the new Assistant Director of the Public Administration Division, F. J. Tickner, former Director of Training and Education in the British Treasury. Mr. Tickner arrived late and participated only in the second of two months. It will be noted that three of these four foreigners had extensive experience in public administration training, but that only Dean Olson had previously had the opportunity to examine Turkish administration more than casually.

All but one of the Turkish members of the working Group came from the Faculty of Political Science:

Professor Tahsin Bekir Balta, a former minister in the pre-1950 government, designated by the Political Science Faculty as Chairman of the Working Group. His specialty was administrative law.

Professor Yavuz Abadan, Dean of the Faculty of Political Science and also a Professor on the Faculty of Law. His specialty was the philosophy of law.

Professor Suheyib Derbil of the Faculty of Law, a former high official of the Agricultural Bank, served on the Working Group after August 8.

Professor Hamit Sadi Selen of the Political Science Faculty.

Doçent (Associate Professor) Seha Meray of the Political Science Faculty, recently returned from a year at the University of Southern California. His interest was international relations.

In contrast with the U. N. members, there was among the Turks no experience of training for the public service or even of the field of public administration as known in the West. Professor Meray had studied a little administration the past year at the University of Southern California. He did not then and does not now consider himself a specialist in administration. Needless to say, that specialization was exceedingly scarce in Turkey in 1952.

How these professors came to serve on the Working Group is an anecdote of some significance. One can find no evidence today of any planning by the Foreign Ministry, where alone information about the U. N. proposals seems to

have existed. Mr. Van Mook made his own contacts outside governmental channels when he met Professor Balta, then acting dean of the Faculty of Political Science, at a conference in Belgium. Van Mook followed up this opening by writing to Balta on June 23, asking his assistance and cooperation with respect to the "forthcoming working-group for the design of a school of public administration, presumably as a part of the University," and enclosing a draft agenda for the meetings.

The first word from the Foreign Ministry to the Faculty came unofficially. Professor Yavuz Abadan, the new dean of the Faculty, remembers that sometime in late June a former student brought him news of the impending arrival of the U. N. team. This junior official in the Foreign Ministry had learned of it by chance, and he had taken it into his own hands to approach his old professor. The official vowed the matter should not go above his head, because no one in the Ministry knew anything about public administration. He returned however with a letter formally requesting the Faculty to handle the visit in behalf of the government. The Faculty in turn quickly nominated its four representatives (Professor Derbil was added later). This casually the connection with the Faculty, the cause of so much debate over the next decade, came about.

Meeting

The total life of the Working Group, from July 8 to September 6, comprised three phases. Until July 21 they educated themselves about administrative conditions by reading, by listening to statements from administrators

and educators, and by field trips. Attention was directed mainly at civil service conditions and educational institutions. For the next three and a half weeks the Group deliberated, primarily using the agenda prepared for them by the UNPAD. Dean Olson and Mr. Tickner then departed, and the remaining members spent three weeks in drafting a report. This document with a separate report of the four U. N. experts was later to serve as the "bible" of the Institute, and countless references were to be made to it over the next six years.

But the Working Group met on July 8 in an atmosphere of haste, and several other elements which set the tone of its deliberations deserve to be mentioned even if they cannot be weighted. Many of these continued well into the life of the Institute itself. The foreigners sensed an atmosphere of intrigue or conspiracy, and at least one believed his hotel room was searched. A Turkish member, on the other hand, recalls that in those days Turks were not used to foreign experts, "who were not, in most cases, received properly," and indeed few people knew what to do with them.¹ Language was a major stumbling block, and the Working Group worked with three: Turkish, French, and English.

Of equal importance perhaps was the lack of any common experiences among the members of the Group. Those

¹Another Turk early in the life of PAITME said: We Turks are suspicious. When we first meet foreigners we disbelieve everything they say, even when it is the truth. When we get to know them, we believe everything they say, even when it is a lie.

who knew training for public administration were all foreigners. The Turkish professors were oriented to academic as distinguished from practical or administration-related training. These conditions indeed led one Turkish participant to remark that everyone was "sometimes using the same words--never meaning the same thing." Each individual, in these early days of technical assistance, as later, spoke from and about what he knew best. The American spoke of training and education in public administration as a university activity. The Frenchman spoke of training managed by an "autonomous" institution somewhat apart from either university or government. The Turks spoke in terms of no experience in such training, but with emphasis on perceptions of their national needs and what needed doing in their administration. Thus frequently there were impasses, and the Turkish members found it expedient not to reply immediately to questions posed by their foreign colleagues. A common pattern was for the answer to one day's argument to be brought in the next day by the Turks, after what had obviously been an evening of heavy deliberation and probably consultation with others.

This small group of men were struggling to gain a picture of Turkish administration in a very short time, so that they could design a training institution in response to the major problems. There was virtually no scholarly literature for them to fall back upon. And Turkish witnesses often could not produce the information the foreigners thought necessary to speed up deliberations. The foreigners on their side seemed often to ask questions of little relevance to the Turks' perception of their "problems." Many

points never were clarified; e.g., what was the reservoir of potential students, what group would constitute the students, what specifically would be taught at the new institute. Interpretations varied considerably from day to day and minute to minute, and at times the whole affair took on the air of a comedy. The U. N. experts admitted frankly they had inadequate information to perform their mission.¹ At least one foreigner left, feeling that no real points of attack in the Turkish administration had been located.

This Working Group depended therefore upon its Turkish members and upon its own brief two-weeks glance at Turkish administration as a base of information upon which to make its recommendations. The point is vital, since the findings of the Working Group were to serve as the virtual constitution of the PAITME in its formative phases, that is until the passage of an organic law by the Grand National Assembly six years later.

The Report

Working Group discussions followed in broad outline the agenda that had been supplied by UNPAD. The minutes indicate that Olson, Bourdeau de Fontenay, and Balta were the principal discussants. A draft by Olson on the objectives and functions of the Institute provided the basis for meetings on these points. Discussions on curriculum were

¹The reports to the United Nations by these four envoys were published two years later. See "Working Group Report," pp. 21-37.

guided by a paper prepared by Bourdeau de Fontenay. In general Balta served to express the Turkish viewpoint, although there were divergent views among the Turks from time to time. Abadan attended meetings only irregularly, since he had the responsibilities of his deanship and he was ill for part of the time.

Discussion began at the first meeting as to what organizational form the new functions should be given. Witnesses from the Faculty of Political Science strongly urged that it simply be strengthened to do the task. It was, after all, still in its own formative phase, only recently turned into a Faculty of the University. Said Balta, ". . . if there is an institution which trains public servants, it would seem to me utterly useless to create a second institution. . . . It is no easy task to create a new institution." Olson seconded the idea, adding that what was mainly lacking at the Faculty was a pragmatic outlook toward the problems of management. But the French expert differed very strongly with this point of view, and after some days in argument he emerged the victor. The Group decided the new institute ought to be "autonomous," almost a "clearing house" midway between universities and administration. The major threat to any autonomy (decided the United Nations experts) would come from the administration-- PAITME would fit well the established pattern of the universities.

The Faculty of Political Science at Ankara will obviously be required to participate closely in the activity of the Institute, and will have a considerable influence on its work and its development. This is a matter for congratulation in view of the experience of the Faculty and of the quality of the results which, over a number of years, it has always achieved in the training of civil servants. . . .

There is no doubt that the Faculty of Political Science at Ankara will have a considerable authority within the Institute. It is probable (and indeed it would be desirable) for the Director to be chosen from amongst the professors of this Faculty. . . . The Faculty of Political Science at Ankara will play a large share in all the essential decisions which concern the operation of the Institute.

The experts were unanimously convinced that in the present state of affairs, this has neither inconvenience nor risk.¹

The nature of "the programs" for the new institute caused long discussion. There was little dissent from the position that undergraduate training should be left to the universities and that the mission of the institute should be that of training civil servants from the higher ranks. Disagreement arose over what to offer to such higher civil servants. Olson suggested degree and non-degree courses in the American university pattern. Bourdeau de Fontenay called for an immediate post-entry course for young civil servants, similar to that at his Ecole Nationale. Further, he suggested courses for civil servants with two years or

¹Ibid., pp. 29-30.

less of service, those with two to five years, and those more experienced bureaucrats from the very high levels. This format was adopted by the Group with only a few alterations. But the French expert further urged that training should be compulsory for certain groups of civil servants:

Unless a kind of automatism is given to the studies made at the Institute with respect to accession to the public function, I believe the Institute will stand emptied of that which should have been its essential content, or else we shall have to start from scratch all over again to make a simple Faculty out of the Institute.

Other members disagreed with him although his point was eventually won in the form of the extra year's seniority that was awarded to graduates of the Institute.

There was less discussion on the questions of what other countries ought to participate in the Institute and on the form their participation might take. Here it was apparent little serious thinking about the regional idea had been done, for the Group got little or no advice from the Foreign Ministry or from New York. The U. N. members, perhaps more than the Turks, foresaw language difficulties. Turkish is a difficult language, little spoken in neighboring countries. Nor in 1951 did most prospective students at the Institute speak English at a level sufficient for higher education. Nonetheless, the experts did not think an entrance examination to test language ability or any other preparation would be advisable.

Finally, the U. N. representatives envisioned trouble in finding adequate teaching staff in Turkey or outside, prepared to teach what the Group advised. Civil servants,

engineers, industrialists should be drawn upon, in addition to professors, and the staff generally should stay in close touch with practitioners. The courses, "should be related to the practical needs of the Turkish civil service, and should not be allowed to assume a theoretical or academic character."¹

In their written Report the Working Group made only very general recommendations. They were expecting that the governing body would make final decisions on most matters when the Institute was set up. They called for an "autonomous" institute organized, however, along the lines of a university faculty. Its object would be "to improve the functioning and operation of public administration in Turkey and the countries of the Middle East" by means of study, research, and the exchange of views and proposals about problems. Its training, "at a level higher than that of the universities," for selected promising young officials who had just entered the service, for persons who wish to study public administration more thoroughly in order to teach or for other reasons, and for selected groups of older officials. The course for most persons was to last two years. And the Group mentioned 58 different subjects that might be taught, ranging from "comparative private international law" to "modern economic policy" to "the office" to "multicopying," and asked that all should be "practical." Lacking consensus on who was to be trained or what subjects should compose the training, the Group seized the expedient of listing a range of possibilities, leaving the final decision in abeyance.

¹Ibid., p. 34.

The list of courses comprehended administration as taught in the United States and on the Continent at that time. (See Appendix I).

The delineation of "public administration" so far as Turkey and neighbors were concerned was expected to come primarily from the work of the Research Section recommended by the Working Group: studies throughout Middle Eastern governments, case studies, instructional materials, government surveys. A Documentation Section would disseminate "any worthwhile ideas" by promoting publications in several languages, translations, publishing periodicals, journals and bulletins, and organizing conferences and exchange of ideas.

The Working Group Report anticipated a need for the new Institute to promote relationships with the government, universities, and other existing institutions. They prescribed an advisory committee, pretty much as the Turkish members asked, "of well-known people selected on account of their work or their profession": seven from the three universities; directors from two of the technical high schools; four undersecretaries (the highest career rank in the civil service) from key departments in the administration; three director-generals from three major financial and public enterprise institutions; and three officers from the Institute itself.

The Report went further in recommending the promotion of outside linkages with training officers in each governmental agency and with committees to be established under the chairmanship of the governor in each vilayet (major

geographic subdivision of the country). The committees were to encourage candidates for the public service and "to modernize the administration." Through lectures, meetings, conferences the Institute might keep in touch with these outside contacts. Finally, with little fanfare, the Group stated "it would be possible and desirable for the Institute to be installed (in the Faculty of Political Science in Ankara), at least in its early stages." They noted they had been assured this could be done without jeopardizing the smooth working of either of the two institutions concerned.¹

The Working Group had been presented with a general commission, and its members rendered to the United Nations and Turkey a most general report. They raised or identified at least as many questions as they answered. "Public administration"---content, clientele, or training methods---was left unidentified. PAITME was to be an autonomous body, and its location in the hierarchy of administration was not mentioned. Categories of potential students were only broadly identified. All possible courses the new institute might teach were listed. One concrete recommendation was made in the report that the internal organization of PAITME be modelled after a "faculty." This was a wish of the Turkish members.

¹See "Working Group Report," op. cit., passim.

The First Year

In the Working Group Report the Institute had a charter blessed with no legal status at all. After the Group left, few Turks outside the Foreign Ministry paid much attention to its ideas for some months. In the fall that Ministry finally decided to ask the Faculty to draft a law and also appointed Dean Abadan to act as government representative in matters concerning the Institute. At about the same time Gunnar Heckscher, an Oxford-trained Swede, Rector of the Social Institute at Stockholm, arrived in Ankara as the first full-time United Nations expert. The officials in the Foreign Office in Ankara at this period wanted very much to have an American, Englishman, or Canadian (in that order) as chief U. N. representative or "Co-director." They felt that Anglo-Saxon and especially American administrative know-how and study were most pertinent to their problems, and this feeling was shared by several professors including Dean Abadan. The Foreign Ministry left these problems pretty much up to the Faculty to decide. The Faculty would not let Professor Heckscher be named as Co-director. Nor could a Turkish Director be appointed in the absence of a law!

It is impossible to gauge the extent to which this titular irritation hindered Heckscher, but there is no doubt he set hard to work both on external and internal problems of the new Institute. Dean Abadan was passive with regard to Heckscher, taking the attitude (as he recalled in 1966) that Abadan did not know administration, that Heckscher should manage the new program, and he, Abadan, would back him up. As time went on Abadan got more involved in the

external relationships. But his attitude from the very beginning was plainly that PAITME was a part of the Faculty of Political Science and should be managed as were the other three "institutes" there, without too much direct participation by the Dean.

Heckscher moved into the allotted quarters in a wing of the Faculty building, later brought in three administrative personnel provided by the U. N., and soon succeeded in getting two or three younger Faculty members to talk and work with. A doçent and two assistants worked hard and long hours with Heckscher, especially after in January he and the Dean decided to have a short "trial-run" course for administrators in the spring. They mapped it out and had the schedule prepared before other U. N. experts appeared on the scene: two Canadians and a Dutchman. Further, Heckscher and Winn cast around for support outside the Faculty. They found one or two sympathetic and influential friends for PAITME; e.g., Fethi Çelikbaş, Minister of State for Economic Affairs, and others in administration and in politics.

Heckscher recalls being very discouraged in his early weeks at Ankara. He had the impression the United Nations officials were rather lukewarm or discouraged about PAITME's future. "The whole prospect was dim," said Heckscher in 1966, as he recalled the suspicion with which he was received by many local people. Heckscher was also worried about languages. He was fluent in English, French and German as well as his mother tongue, and those three had long been important foreign languages in urban Turkey. Being able to use all three vitually tripled the number of persons one could communicate with in Ankara or Istanbul in

1952. How could the language situation be worked out in the Institute, especially if foreign students were to be handled in the courses?

The problem of finding a head for the documentation section of the new Institute became troublesome at this period. Such an expert would have to know the Turkish language in addition to having experience in documentation and translation. United Nations regulations forbade employment of a person as an expert in his own country. An available person who knew the language could not be found elsewhere and indeed never was before the termination of the original Agreement in 1958. Thus a Turkish Faculty member became head of documentation on a part-time basis. The general feeling through the years has been that production of materials through this section has been very low, and this is attributed to the nature of the leadership it has had.

The Opening

By early spring Dean Abadan and Heckscher had had moderate success in stirring up attention to the Institute, and then a fortuitous political circumstance helped them immensely. At this time there was a relaxation of tensions between the leaders of the two major political parties and the opening ceremonies at PAITME became an occasion for demonstrating it. Professors Balta and Abadan were long-time members of the minority party, the Republican Peoples Party, and its Secretary-General, Kasim Gulek, came to the opening on March 24. Interestingly enough, Dean Abadan also brought out the Prime Minister, Adnan Menderes, leader of the ruling Democratic Party. He seems to have come partly because of

the political détente and partly because Abadan had been trying to persuade him to push a law through the Assembly legalizing the Institute. Of course, when these two public figures appeared, many others appeared in their wake: President Refik Koraltan of the Grand National Assembly, two ministers, many deputies, four ambassadors, and so on. They were guests of the Institute at luncheon immediately after the ceremonies.

In his opening speech Heckscher stressed the "importance of adapting administrative reform to the traditions and needs" of Turkey.¹ The Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, Fuad Koprulu, were speakers. Menderes spoke briefly and called for "administrative reform," referring to himself as the "first student of the Institute." Later at lunch he told Heckscher the Institute could call on him for any assistance it needed. Newspapers carried the story of the ceremonies, perhaps the high point in the history of PAITME: open and enthusiastic support from the leaders of both parties and especially the Prime Minister. What more could be asked?

In retrospect, the whole affair seems to reflect more the rapprochement between the parties than any innate enthusiasm over the new training agency. It was still a smashing success, and the number of applications for the "trial-run" that immediately flowed into the Institute reflected it. The Faculty had sent out course announcements to the ministries, but everyone was astonished at the result:

¹Ibid., p. 39.

Actually, until the day before the beginning of the courses nobody had any idea of how many students would come and it was originally feared that there would be too few to hold any courses at all. After consideration, it was regarded as probable that the Institute would have 20 to 30 students, and teaching materials were prepared for 50. Shortly after the ceremonial opening of the Institute, the various administrations suddenly decided to send a much greater number of students. No less than 244 were formally nominated and the nominations came so late that there was nothing to do but to accept them all.¹

The trial-run lasted for three months, with instruction in four subjects only by the United Nations personnel. Table I indicates the results:

TABLE I

Course Title	Students		
	Passed	Failed	Total
Principles of Public Administration	149	11	160
Public Accounting	71	15	86
Organization and Management	80	24	104
Personnel Management	88	25	113

The comment through subsequent years has always been that the numbers and the quality of students in the trial-run stemmed directly from the apparent enthusiastic endorsement of PAITME by both parties. Coming from twenty-one different governmental organizations, many of the students held important positions: an under-secretary (the highest career rank),

¹Ibid., p. 40.

assistant general directors, an assistant superintendent of PTT. No students came from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or from the military. Those who did come were generally characterized as being from "high middle management." Absolutely no incentives were offered for taking the course. The demonstration of political support seems to have provided the main motivation to students.

Internal questions in the Institute were also eased by the quality of the opening, for Turkish faculty members and even the Dean paid more attention to its work now. Plans for organization were advanced and a provisional academic council or governing body was set up, including representatives from the Ministries of Finance and Interior. All nationalities at last began planning for courses to begin in the fall and budgeting expenditures from at least the United Nations funds they knew would be available. There was discussion of a program for training secretaries to be made a part of the Institute, but this project was postponed and eventually was created elsewhere with United States aid. Finally, during the summer of 1953 Heckscher directed attention to the need for foreign participation in the Institute. Immediately before his assignment terminated, he travelled with Dean Abadan to Iran to recruit students and to talk about possible Institute services for that country. This was the first of three trips that were made during the next two years.

"The General Course"

Professor Marshall Dimock, the first official Co-Director and a well-known scholar in the field of public administration in the United States, arrived in Ankara November 15, 1953. He did not get to see Heckscher in New York or in Ankara. Indeed, throughout this project the United Nations PAD failed to solve the problem of thorough exchange of experience and ideas between incoming and outgoing experts. There were never joint briefings in New York. Individual briefings took a few days for most outgoing experts, and de-briefings were short and casual at the end of tour. Final reports were ordinarily rendered but their effectiveness in Turkey depended almost entirely upon the impact they made directly on a successor expert.

Dimock and Heckscher only exchanged letters, but there were several similarities in their work in Ankara. Heckscher in his later months and Dimock through his tour served also as Resident Representative of the Technical Assistance Board. They were not able to give full attention to the Institute, although it was by all odds the largest U. N. assistance project in the country. For example, Dimock ordinarily spent his mornings at the Institute and afternoons in the U. N. office. This dual responsibility meant also that these experts were responsible to two different offices in New York, although this seems to have affected their work very little. In Ankara it meant that they had more occasion to make outside contacts than their successors (who were solely co-directors) were to have. And it is true that during the years of both Heckscher and Dimock for this reason or for others there was more interest evidenced by the

ministries in what PAITME was doing than in later times. Subsequent co-directors limited their activities to Institute affairs.

Dimock, as the American expert, from the first was on excellent terms with Dean Abadan. That official continued his former system of leaving virtually all affairs of the Institute to the Co-Director to handle. During this academic year the Dean primarily devoted his time for PAITME business to visiting high officials and urging passage of an organic law. He succeeded in continuing the occasional discussion meetings of high career officials and even cabinet members that he had kept going after the successful opening exercises. The Prime Minister himself came to one such meeting where Dimock served on a consultant basis, and relationships with Foreign Ministry top management continued good in the sense of friendly and accessible.

Dimock came prepared to discuss abandonment of the regional aspirations for the Institute, and he met a strong reaction. His new acquaintances in high officialdom immediately pressed him not to change the regional character. They were also perturbed that Van Mook in New York had proposed to cut the U. N. contribution to PAITME since its regional character had not operated. The interchange continued through the spring until the following June when the Turkish U. N. delegation refused to Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold to change the regional phraseology in the Supplementary Agreement.

Dimock left the internal affairs of the Institute pretty much to the other U. N. experts, although he taught one subject in the course that began in the winter. This was

the first of the so-called General Courses, which were to become the backbone of the teaching and training function. It was designed along the lines suggested by the Working Group, to take two years, with the first in classwork and the second devoted to individual and syndicate work. Twenty-nine different courses were grouped in four programs: central administration, local administration, economics, and public finance. The format was academic, including a semester system.

Students were not restricted to the categories suggested by the Working Group. In the first semester 160 registered, all working government servants with an average age of 35. Further, fourteen foreign students appeared, from four countries. Two-thirds of the courses were offered by Turkish professors and a few practitioners, although the U. N. experts carried the bulk of lectures.¹ The research function was launched when a U. N. Research Director joined the staff and initiated a series of studies. Several young Turkish professionals were hired for the staff, including interpreters, researchers, and a Secretary-General to manage personnel and finances.

Externally, Institute affairs were more uncertain. Abadan's many visits to the ministries paid off finally in passage of a law validating the Supplementary Agreement of May, 1952. The law incidentally made explicit that, until a complete organic law might be passed, the Working Group

¹Lashley G. Harvey, "United Nations Mission in Turkey," Boston University Graduate Journal, III (January, 1955), 63-65.

Report was the operating basis for PAITME and PAITME was in the Faculty of Political Science.¹ Furthermore, it was at this period that Dimock participated in discussions with U. S. and Turkish officials about American assistance for the Faculty of Political Science. To cap the year, in July the Faculty elected a new dean, Bedri Gursoy, a Professor of Economics. He claimed immediately to be the General Director of PAITME by virtue of his deanship. These incidents relate to two of the important chapters in PAITME's life: the struggle for leadership and the competition with the NYU team.

¹Assigning PAITME to the Faculty in the law seems to have been an afterthought brought about by Professor Balta's last minute phone call to a deputy prime minister.

PART III

1954-1964

The period from 1954 to 1964, about when this report ends, will be treated in terms of separate aspects of Institute activities. By 1954 those activities had assumed several patterns that would linger through most or all of the decade. United Nations experts had assumed leadership of day-by-day business and were also actively involved in external contacts. The organization was in three sections: training, research, and documentation. There was dependence on the professors of the Faculty as part-time teachers, and there was only a small, junior, full-time Turkish staff. Training and educational activities had assumed a heavily academic cast with emphasis on large classes, lectures, examinations, and a minor amount of contact with the real world of administration.

There were of course many changes through the decade to 1964, and those are the subject of the following pages. Events of the decade have been organized in terms of PAITME's leadership, resources, program, and external relationships.

Leadership

The identity of the Institute was fused with that of the older, larger Faculty for the first six years, 1952-1958. Under those conditions, selfhood was particularly hard to attain. A struggle to create a public image or an image among administrators was bound to be inhibited by the established image of the Political Science Faculty. That

highly respected institution could be traced back to the establishment of the Mulkiye (civil servant) school in 1859, one of the important reforms of that era. Furthermore, the Mulkiye became "an important intellectual centre and a forcing-ground of new ideas."¹ Many brilliant teachers, scholars, and literati served on its staff. Its reputation was still strong in 1939 when it moved from Istanbul to Ankara and in 1950 when it became the Political Science Faculty in the University of Ankara. In 1950 it was viewed as the major source of young bureaucrats, most of whom in the course of their careers gained high office, particularly in the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Finance, and Interior. It scarcely, however, kept abreast of the changes in the West in the training of civil servants, much less the growth of the social sciences.

In this perspective, it seems obvious that some professors felt their status threatened by a new scheme for training civil servants, even if the declared aim was to take persons after graduation from the Faculty. The very newness of that Faculty perhaps worked against the Institute's gaining stature, in that doubtless some members of the Faculty viewed the Institute as competition. Others saw it as a resource to be seized upon to strengthen the reputation and standing of the Faculty. In any event, one finds few examples of Faculty members pushing for a strong, separate PAITME. Dean Feyzioglu perhaps was one exception, but he lasted only a few months in office. Dean Arik, 1956-1965, is less clearly an example, but he was the Dean who

¹Lewis, op. cit., p. 177.

presided at the passage of an organic law and who then became the General Director (but still part-time for he actively kept up his professorship).

In their organization, the University of Ankara and the Faculty of Political Science followed the pattern of many European universities: power resided mainly in the professors. In the Faculty, for example, the eighty or so professors and associate professors comprised the Council. The Council elected the Dean for a two-year term, and he carried out the decisions of the Council on Faculty and then on Institute business.¹ Events in connection with Institute affairs give us no reason to doubt the accuracy of this formal description.

It was the dean however who personified the Faculty where the Institute was concerned, and there is no evidence of major dissension among the professors at the dean's actions there. The absence of a law or of a firm guiding hand in the government meant that there was conflict almost every time a new dean was elected. In 1954 the outgoing dean challenged his successor as to PAITME and in December, 1956,

¹One U. N. expert in the second year of the Institute speaks of the "general downgrading of the importance of administration [among professors]. The Faculty of Political Science in Ankara seemed to operate with a minimum of administrative procedure or routine. Routine procedures were matters for the secretarial staff not university professors. Turkish professors were not too different from our own. They liked committee meetings where they would discuss for hours, agree in principle on everything, retaining their own views, and no one wanted to implement decisions."

local U. N. personnel urged separation of PAITME from the new dean's control. In both cases, however, the Foreign Ministry stepped in to settle the conflict. It turned out that the new dean became the general director at each change, until the organic law finally went into effect in the spring of 1959. Then when the first general director was selected under the new law in the spring of 1959, the undersecretary of the prime ministry presided at the meeting of the Board of Administrators. Despite this competition for the deanship, however, once in office the dean seems to have had a relatively free hand at the Institute. There were always two or three professors working on the executive committee with him, and they apparently served reasonably well as additional linkages with the Faculty.

Both Faculty and dean viewed the Institute as an augmentation of the resources and the standing of the Faculty. The personal advantage to the dean was another title, a second automobile (which he rarely used), extra pay, occasional travel in and outside Turkey, and further reason to contact other officials in the government. Three or more professors after 1953 also drew extra pay for their work in the Institute and benefitted to a lesser degree from the other sources.¹

¹For example, in 1962 (a particularly well-paying year) faculty members drew the following amounts for their services to the Institute: General Director, TL 21,620; professor, TL 8,000; professor, TL 12,000; associate professor, TL 8,050; associate professor, TL 5,740; associate professor, TL 520. In several cases this pay was half or more of what they drew from the Faculty for their first jobs.

Housed in one wing of the Faculty until 1959, headed by the deans, depending on professors for teaching services and often for professional contacts, the Institute and its staff could scarcely have broken loose without great effort. Further, the power of the Foreign Ministry was always in the background during these first half dozen years. When a decision on Institute matters was forced from the Ministry the officials there took the side of the Faculty and the dean. The Institute in the showdown was simply an appendage of the Faculty.

In daily operations, however, so much depended upon the dean, the co-director, and their relationships. Thus the question of leadership is answered only by looking at the holders of these two offices and to a lesser extent at the other professional staff members. On most occasions all but the most important decisions about training, research, and documentation were left to the heads of sections to determine.

The General Directors

The first four deans came to the heads of PAITME without regard to the relevance of their training or experience. It was simply a part of their charge as deans. The third dean, Feyzioglu, was acquainted with the subject of public administration as studied in the West, but he lasted only half a year in office. The fifth head, Cemal Minçioğlu, was appointed the first Professor of Public Administration in the Faculty in June, 1963, and was elected General Director under the new law in March, 1965, without having been dean at all.

Yavuz Abadan, new Dean of the Faculty and Professor both of Political Science and Law, was asked by the Foreign Ministry to assume interim charge of the budding Institute's activities in the fall of 1952. That kind of authority satisfied him until the following fall when he got a Faculty Council decision he should head the Institute. For further assurance he also got confirmation from the PAITME Academic Council. He then kept the post until his resignation in November, 1954. Scholar and author in the philosophy of law, Abadan admitted knowing no public administration. He held frequent meetings of the unofficial Academic Council, and he left internal decisions to the U. N. heads. The tenor of arrangements in these first two years is indicated by the fact that at least three U. N. experts lectured to the undergraduates at the Faculty, and Dimock even accepted what was declared to be a newly-created chair in public administration. The duties were not onerous, but the gesture symbolized a pleasant relationship. This was before the arrival of the NYU team.

Abadan had been active in politics in the People's Republican Party, and had once served in the Grand National Assembly. He was well known, and he knew many high officials. On several occasions he was able to persuade ministers and once he persuaded Menderes to help in Institute problems. With all these contacts, however, he was not successful in gaining passage by the Assembly of a foundation law for the Institute. One guesses that his political persuasion (other professors also were outspokenly anti-Democratic Party) was a latent obstacle to passage of the organic law.

When Bedri Gursoy was elected Dean in May, 1954, Dimock expressed elation to New York in that Abadan could now be full-time head of PAITME. Abadan insisted the Academic Council could elect the General Director, and he reported then and again in 1966 that the offices both of the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister asked him to remain. Behind Gursoy on the other hand stood an apparent majority of the Council of Professors, including many younger faculty. Even in a direct confrontation in the Institute this contest stood at a draw in the summer. That confusion extended still to rather high levels is indicated by the August 3rd statement by a top Foreign Ministry official: "The Institute . . . is not subject to the overlordship of the Dean of the Faculty of Political Science. We will insist upon this, and I know that the other high officials of the Government feel as I do about the matter. If the necessity arises, we will not hesitate to intervene and to make the wishes of the Government known."

About one month later, the Council of Professors voted for the new Dean to be General Director, and Abadan resigned in November. Gursoy stated the following day that the Deputy Prime Minister told him he was to be PAITME head. When Resident Representative of the U. N., Charles Weitz, spoke the next week with Foreign Minister Zorlu, he said that by tradition the dean should be general director but he did not appear to Weitz to be forcing the matter. The impression was left with the U. N. experts that the Council of Professors was the deciding factor in the dispute. The new Co-Director, L. K. Caldwell, had little recourse but to accept Gursoy's leadership.

Bedri Gursoy was the symbol of Faculty domination of the Institute. He believed the Academic Council should comprise mainly professors, that there should be only one library, and that teaching and research as well should be combined for Faculty and PAITME. He wanted no civil servants making decisions in the Institute, for he understood autonomy as meaning independence from political and governmental pressures. On the other hand, like all the deans, Gursoy knew that many Faculty graduates stood high in career positions, and he must have considered them as potential supporting elements for any Faculty or Institute enterprise.

Party affiliations were not brought into the open with regard to the Institute. The closest to this eventuality was the March, 1953, ceremony where Dean Abadan, although a member of the opposition party, was able to profit from detente and bring in ranking members of both parties to bolster PAITME's prestige. Dean Gursoy had no direct recourse to party connections for that purpose. There is no record of any instance in which Gursoy was able to communicate directly with the Prime Minister about the Institute. Nor did Gursoy lobby elsewhere for an Institute law as hard as had Abadan. Perhaps Gursoy thought the Institute would leave the Faculty after passage of a law.

Gursoy was, as the saying goes, fiercely Turkish. He looked forward to a completely Turkish management and staff for the Institute. He did not try to work Turkish colleagues into its activities, however, but he took a closer interest in internal affairs than did Abadan. Gursoy for instance convened the academic council only four times in his two years, as compared with about 27 meetings in

Abadan's term. Gursoy depended more on a small executive committee consisting mainly of the foreigners. Paradoxically, however, he never had the close personal relationship with a co-director that Abadan had with Dimock.

Through these years, the attitude of the U. N. staff in Ankara may be put succinctly: the Institute needs a full-time Turkish head. New York headquarters supported this idea but did nothing positive to push it. The Ankara experts were very pleased, and in fact most Turks were also, when Turhan Feyzioglu became dean in May, 1956. No one resisted his also taking over the Institute. He had been associated with it most of the time since its inception. He and his views were known and liked by the staff. He had argued for an Institute separate from the Faculty, with a full-time head. This was music to the experts' ears. And Dean Feyzioglu was also known as highly competent, friendly, intellectual person. A talented political analyst as well as student of administration, he was an active member of the minority party, the People's Republican Party.

He did not last long in the deanship. At the opening ceremonies of the Faculty in the fall of 1956 he criticized the government's handling of a young professor's case. Shortly thereafter Dean Feyzioglu was removed from office by the Minister of Education, amid outcries from the press and academic circles. Criticism of the Manderes government was becoming widespread by 1956.

Immediately the new U. N. Co-Director, L. L. Barber, Jr., sought reassurances from the Faculty and the Foreign Ministry that the deanship and general-directorship were not

identical. Barber found little Turkish agreement and no active support for his case from his New York superiors, since the feeling lingered there that association with the Faculty lent the Institute important prestige. Nor was it clear to them where else the Institute might be attached to the hierarchy. But Barber's case was put well enough that again the Foreign Ministry entered the picture. The General Director of International Economic Affairs in a letter to the U. N. Resident Representative authorized Dr. Arik to act as head of PAITME. And the conflict diminished immediately in the face of increasing worry about the NYU program in the Faculty.

Professor Kemal Fikret Arik, specialist in civil law in the Faculty of Political Science, was to remain General Director of the Institute until his terminal illness forced him to leave in the winter of 1964-1965. There was a period of doubt about his status during the time after his term as dean ended but before the new organic law for the Institute went into effect. From October, 1958, to March, 1959, Arik argued for retention of his post at PAITME, and he claimed to have a letter from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs asking him to stay until the March election of a new head. New Dean Fehmi Yavuz seems to have been pressed by the Faculty Council of Professors to take over the job, but Yavuz was not an aggressive person. Thus Arik stayed at the Institute until March.

At the March meeting of the Board of Administrators¹ the presiding officer was the Undersecretary of the Prime

¹This governing body under the new organic law was to consist of a varying number of members, of which nine were to come from governmental agencies.

Ministry, A. Salih Korur, considered to be an extremely powerful individual in the administration. By a secret vote of 16 to 8, Arik was elected General Director over Fehmi Yavuz. Thus the position was separated from the deanship, but Arik remained a professor and a part-time General Director. In addition he continued to practice law to some extent.

Professor Arik was a pleasant and affable, soft-spoken and urbane, but secretive individual. United Nations personnel had rather smooth sailing in their relationships with him. Any adverse criticism related principally to his lack of motivation and his failure to push the Institute ahead. His closest relationship with the foreigners was perhaps that with U. N. expert Maurice Chailloux-Dantel.¹ Arik played his role as General Director quietly, with little consultation among his staff. He spent a lot of time in lobbying for the Institute in the Assembly and ministries. He did not identify publicly with a political party, nor is there any record today of open reference of Institute problems to higher officialdom in his time. Numerous instances are known in which he surely consulted with various ministries in support of his Institute policies.

He did not consult so frequently with his own staff, and a result was occasional unrest among them. There was finally a revolution. In the fall of 1963, on return from one of his frequent trips to Europe and England, Arik was

¹M. Chailloux-Dantel died in 1959.

confronted in his office by a delegation of half a dozen staff members. They demanded his resignation, for a number of reasons which (as reported in 1966) included: weak leadership in Institute matters; generally inadequate delegation of authority to staff; delaying promotions; refusal to send staff abroad for training; and more. On Arik's desk also was a letter from a Political Science Faculty professor, demanding his resignation (a copy to a deputy prime minister).

Arik wrote a letter of resignation that day and gave it to the Secretary General of the Institute. After what was said to be a weekend of string-pulling, Arik took the letter from the safe on Monday and destroyed it. His maneuvering went on for several weeks, during which morale was at a nadir. Then he instituted two measures which eventually eased the pressure: he arranged to send several senior staff members abroad for training and he got consent from his Board to appoint permanent heads of research and documentation from among the staff.¹ Previously these posts had been held by U. N. experts or professors. The persons who would benefit from both of these moves were among the revolutionaries.

At about this same period, Arik also encountered the only known instance of serious budgetary troubles when requested increases for 1964 were refused by the Prime Ministry. These pressures added up, and during the next few months may have helped to produce a worsening of Professor

¹In 1966 a Faculty professor was still Director of Training, the third section.

Arik's chronic illness. He left active work in the summer of 1964.

Professor Arik had numerous accomplishments during his seven and a half years at the Institute. He was instrumental in finally getting a law: his behind-the-scenes lobbying, combined with U. N. threats to cut off all funds at the end of the Supplementary Agreement, was quietly useful. Further, he moved PAITME from the Faculty building after the law was passed. Thus he took a big step toward establishing a public image of PAITME and creating staff esprit that had been sorely needed. If we may depend upon recollections by foreigners and Turks, he was an unbiased, workmanlike, likeable individual who however lacked "sweep of vision" and any strategic sense about development of the Institute.

No dean to this day has devoted his full time and attention to the Institute. Problem-solving, program-planning, internal decision-making have failed to hold their attention. No dean even spent much time physically in the Institute until it was moved in 1959. Only on a very few occasions was a dean motivated to accept and work for "public administration" ideas urged on him by U. N. personnel. And even these related mainly to the need for passing the law and improving the outside relationships of the Institute.

United Nations Experts

Internal leadership in the sense of day-by-day guidance as well as longer-term program planning was exercised primarily by the U. N. co-directors and some of the other experts. Their views and decisions were usually endorsed

by the dean and of course were occasionally carried to the Academic Council for discussion. Gunnar Heckscher, never known as co-director, carried the load almost single-handed in the early months. The dean was in a permissive mood and other Turkish professors were then unwilling to take responsibility in PAITME.

Dimock was allowed even greater latitude than was Heckscher. And he profited from his extra post as U. N. Resident Representative, as had Heckscher, by often keeping outside the area of potential control by the dean. Dimock left training, research, and other internal matters to his experts to lead. In the third year Professor Caldwell found the situation muddier. Arriving as replacement for Dimock in the midst of the Abadan-Gursoy conflict, his relations with the new dean remained problematic during his entire stay.

Caldwell and his two successors took stronger positions about the independence of the Institute and the question of who should be general director than had the first two U. N. heads. A result (or a cause?) was a continuation with Mr. Evans-Vaughan and Professor Barber of a fairly distant relationship between General Director and Co-Director. All these three co-directors--Caldwell, Evans-Vaughan, Barber--were given good support by the Resident Representative, indeed worked closely with him. They did not however get strong action from New York. During Caldwell's tenure, communications with UNPAD began to deteriorate, and he often got no answers to his queries. In Evans-Vaughan's time, there were five and one-half out of eleven months with no letter at all from the Director of PAD.

In the years, 1955-1957, the U. N. experts came to feel particularly isolated from U. N. as well as from Turks. They wrote memorials both to the dean and to the U. N. concerning the serious state of affairs in the Institute, but they got little action. Faculty professors were personally friendly, but professionally they were apart from PAITME. The experts underwent some mental anguish, but not the Turkish professionals. Institute matters were simply low on their list of priorities.

The pathos of this situation is illuminated by looking briefly at the experts. Thirty specialists in public administration--29 men and one woman--spent varying lengths of time at PAITME during the period 1952-1966. Several of these had international reputations in the field--among them Olson, Bourdeau de Fontenay, Heckscher, and Dimock. Nearly all the others had high reputations as scholars, teachers, or practitioners in administration at home. If members of the Working Group are counted, 13 of these "experts" came from university teaching positions, and this included all the Americans. Fourteen of the total were practitioners chosen by the United Nations from operating positions in their home governments. Five of seven Englishmen and the three Canadians were in this category. Three came from borderline institutions between teaching and practicing administration: the Ecole Nationale d'Administration and the Administrative Staff College at Henley-on-Thames.

Nine of these persons may be characterized as interested in public administration broadly defined, while seven were specialists in O and M or personnel. Two were from the field of public finance and one each from the fields of local

government, accounting, and planning. Of the 30, eight were American; seven from the United Kingdom; three each from France, the Netherlands, and Canada; two from Sweden; and one each from Switzerland, Belgium, Austria, and New Zealand. In age, a few experts were in their middle or late thirties, but the majority were in their late forties or fifties.

Before coming to Ankara, most experts were briefed in a two-or three-day visit to U. N. headquarters, in the case of Americans and of at least two Europeans selected to be co-directors. Other non-Americans were briefed at Geneva or not at all. No expert went to Ankara with detailed instructions about his work at the Institute. Instead, in informal fashion they were told the thinking of headquarters personnel about PAITME's past and its possible future. It was not Van Mook's style to give strict marching orders to his "experts." He sent them to Turkey with general instructions and he bothered them little after they arrived. They got local assistance from the Resident Representative--only sympathy and advice from New York, at least after 1954.

Few experts stayed long in Ankara: eight spent two or more years there. The longest term was that of a British O and M expert who was completing his fifth year in 1966. The largest number--eighteen--spent one year or less on the job, and most of these came in the early years. Many Institute shortfalls may be attributed to these short terms--e.g., the attempts at a "counterpart" system never succeeded.

Professor Harvey of Boston University was the only expert to serve as Director of Training. After him a professor from the Faculty took that post as a part-time job. Harvey

found it necessary to spend eight full hours a day in the Institute, but apparently no Training head has done so since. During Harvey's time, of course, as well as later, one could cite numerous teaching experts who not only handled their classes well but also, by thinking and example, provided intellectual leadership in PAITME. There were talented scholars among the Research Directors sent by the U. N. from 1954 to 1959. In the case both of Training and research, the major ideas, the changes in methods, the pace-setting came mainly from these foreigners. This was, after all, the purpose of their going to Ankara. The story of the few misfits in the U. N. staff is not an important one and must be recorded elsewhere.

Resources

PAITME has suffered little through the years from shortage of resources, unless one thinks of leadership as a resource. The line between staff as leadership and staff as a resource seems always to be a thin one. Some Turkish personnel beside the deans displayed leadership ability and make material contributions of that nature to the organization. There was Arif Fayaslioglu, an Assistant Director of the Institute for a year who was brought in by Dean Feyzioglu in his short tour. After 1959 Ihsan Kuntbay, one of the few employees who has stayed ten years at PAITME became Assistant Director which post he still holds today. By 1964 there were experienced Turks as heads of three sections also.

Staff

Turkish professors first taught in the general course of 1954-1955, and after that time the remaining positions on the staff were gradually filled. Until 1958 Turkish professors and practitioners were employed as part-time teachers while the U. N. staff contribution was cut back, and even today part-time professors teach much of the general course. There has always been a sharp distinction between senior staff and junior staff who merely interpret, translate, or perform research under supervision. No Turk was a full-time senior staff member until after the U. N. Agreement ceased. During the first five years of PAITME, however, 17 persons served as junior professionals: five from the army or civil service, four direct from university graduation, two from teaching, four from private business (no data available for one). The only method of developing their capacities outside of daily work was the fellowship program. Only five of these 17 went abroad on fellowships, although nearly all who were qualified were recommended. Two of the five returned to work at the Institute. At the end of the fifth year, a system was instituted for contracting with such fellows to return for a given period of work at the Institute, as was done in many other administrative agencies. This record of retaining younger people after their education abroad improved somewhat in the next ten years so that in 1965 seven had returned to become senior staff members. As to senior staff, during the first five years only six active Turkish administrators had taught classes, out of a total of 40 teachers. Other

classes were of course taught by Faculty professors or by U. N. experts.¹

By 1966 the Turkish staff at the Institute consisted of ten full-time senior staff members, including the heads of sections and eight experts (the title was adopted from the U. N.). There were nine assistants (junior professionals) and the office staff. Of the ten senior members, eight are university graduates; three are War School graduates and ex-military officers; nine have studied in England, France or the U. S.; nine have had three or more years of civil service experience. Seven have worked up from lower-ranking positions in PAITME and a few have graduated from the Institute's own courses. These are impressive qualifications, even though there is no doctorate in the group.

Of thirty-nine persons who have joined the staff as professionals since 1952, twenty-two have since left for a variety of reasons. Only one was discharged. Of the remaining twenty-one, at least sixteen have left out of dissatisfaction or because they have found what they considered better jobs elsewhere. This attrition was especially noticeable in 1961 and 1962 when four senior staff members and five juniors departed. Six of these moved to other jobs. The general impression is that they have gained little sense of accomplishment from their PAITME work. The fact is that positions at the Institute are paid under the regular bareme law to this date, with only a minor supplement. This compares very unfavorably with other autonomous government agencies which are not limited by the bareme and with private consultants and other firms who employ the kinds of skills needed at the Institute. For

¹L. L. Barber, Jr., "The Public Administration Institute for Turkey and the Middle East, 1952-1957," (United Nations, 1958), pp. 47-55.

example, of the nine persons mentioned above, one went to the State Planning Office which almost tripled his Institute pay; two went to a consulting firm which increased their pay by about four times; and one went to the Faculty of Political Science as an assistant where he received two hundred liras less per month.

Finances

One chapter of the Institute's history that is singularly free from problems and disagreement is that of finances. There is no record of any big problem concerning finances since 1951, with the exception of discussions between the U. N. and the Foreign Ministry in the period 1954-1957 over whether the Institute was "regional" or not. The U. N. sought to cut its contribution, but in fact did not do so. Even after the original Supplementary Agreement ended, the U. N. continued to provide experts and other financial assistance.

There was never any shortage of money. On the dollar side and the lira side adequate amounts were freely available. Dollars have come from the United Nations primarily, although during the sixties some small amounts have been appropriated by U. S. AID. Liras in the early years came partly from the U. N. Expanded Programme funds and partly from Turkey. In those first years TL 300,000 annually was appropriated by Turkey. The excess expenditure over that figure during 1956-1958 was made up by the U. N. out of its Turkish liras. Table II shows the amounts expended by both parties:

TABLE II
PAITME EXPENDITURES
(1953-1965)

Year	Liras	Dollars
1953	40,893	122,812
1954	154,754	156,903
1955	294,108	185,000
1956	345,684	83,013
1957	313,402	52,241
1958	N.A.	50,735
1959	525,817	56,345
1960	654,006	46,244
1961	879,105	41,474
1962	886,868	22,722
1963	1,008,196	34,463
1964	1,198,113	29,421
1965	N.A.	19,400

N. B. For 1956 and 1957 the amount of liras over TL 300,000 for each year was probably paid by the U. N., otherwise lira expenditures are Turkish and dollar expenditures are U. N., U. S. and French expenditures could not be determined for this table. Lira figures are for Turkish fiscal years and dollar figures for U. N. fiscal years.

Sources: Public Administration Institute for Turkey and the Middle East; letter, 29 April, 1966, from Mr. C. Y. Wu, Head, Public Administration Branch, Bureau of Technical Assistance Operations, United Nations; and L. L. Barber, "The Public Administration Institute for Turkey and the Middle East, 1952-1957," unpublished draft, United Nations, February 6, 1958, Appendix C.

The table reflects the planned decrease in dollar expenditure. A regular decline was projected for five years to a phase-out. At the end of that time, however, the U. N. decided to continue contributions at a relatively high level. During the period, 1959-1965, there were as many as three U. N. experts at the Institute at one time. In 1965 one remained.

The United Nations originally agreed to cover half of certain Turkish lira costs. Among other things, this meant that costs above TL 300,000 came from Turkish contributions to the Expanded Programme. This arrangement ceased in 1957. The jump in expenditures from 1957 to 1959 reflects primarily the rent paid in 1959 for a building after PAITME moved from the Faculty. Until then their space was provided free in the Faculty building. In recent years, as the budget has increased, it has been possible for the Institute to lay aside excess revenues occasionally. The accumulated sum is intended for investment in a new building at a future date. The land for such a new building has already been presented by the government.

Until the 1958 organic law, budgeting arrangements for the Institute were unusually lax. Annual estimates were prepared by the Secretary-General and passed by the Executive Committee and the Academic Council when that body was active. It was indeed authorized to give final approval to the budget. In the early years, the national budget director lectured at the Institute and gave advice on budgetary matters. There seems to have been no central review of budget or expenditures in that period. Instead, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs placed aside TL 300,000 each year in a separate fund administered by the United Nations Technical Assistance Board office. Accounts were kept in the Institute where until late 1955 a United Nations administrative officer was posted. Records-keeping then passed into Turkish hands, those of Melih Bayulken, Secretary-General since 1954. These arrangements meant there was no effective review by the Ministry of Finance or the Assembly.

Funds were appropriated at an unchanging level, through a process that was almost automatic.¹

Since 1959 when the organic law went into effect, budgetary matters have been handled according to that law, in a fashion similar to those of other autonomous bodies in Turkey. Budget estimates are prepared by the Executive Committee, a body of about eight people headed by the General Director. The Board of Administrators then is empowered to "study and determine" budget estimates, but final authority rests in the Prime Minister's Office to which the Institute is formally "attached." PAITME's budget goes to the Grand National Assembly as a part of the Prime Minister's budget. Further, the law permits revenues from sources other than the budget. Small amounts in recent years have come from such sources as payments for services by directorates and state enterprises, fees for research work and other expert services, sale of publications, and the like.

The General Director and other officials attend budget hearings at the Assembly, but supposedly Institute budget details are almost never mentioned there. Comments have been made on the Assembly floor or in hearings, as for instance in 1963 during budget hearings the Institute was praised by a minority party legislator and advised by a People's Republican Party legislator to get some French experts. Members it is said often are confused about PAITME and consider it a university. This has apparently had some relation to its continued good standing in the Assembly.

¹Ibid., pp. 57-61.

Program

Description of PAITME's program falls into three parts, in line with the three functions which it has had ab initio: "training" programs, research, and documentation including publication. The greatest emphasis has always been upon the "training" and especially the general course which has remained academic in style and content. After 1959 several new, special-purpose courses were undertaken. An impressive record of research results is marred to some extent by long periods of time with no productivity. In documentation, however, results through the years have not measured up, at least to original hopes.

General Course

Until recently "training" has not been an accurate description of the general course, for it has had many academic features. Through the years there has been a trend toward subjects with both more Western social science content and more practical content in the sense of closer contact with operating agencies.

Fewer professors were involved in the 1965-1966 general course than in that of 1954-1955, although to be sure the number of individual subjects also has decreased. The second and third years of PAITME the staff attempted to follow the program lines devised by the Working Group and gave a wide selection of subjects in a two-year program. In 1955-1956 the staff judged that the student body was being overwhelmed by the curriculum, and the general course was telescoped into one academic year with the number of subjects cut drastically. (See Appendix I for sample course

offerings.) The year was divided into three parts. During October lectures in five subjects emphasizing Turkey were given and then an examination eliminated the grossly inadequate students. Next, until mid-March five survey courses were given, emphasizing Western public administration ideas. In a final three-month period group studies were undertaken on narrower problems often related directly to a specific agency. Changes in later years have been relatively minor and in the direction of fewer subjects. Of course, as U. N. experts were withdrawn, professors have usually taken their places. Reportedly the courses have very often resembled in content courses offered by the same professors in the Faculty of Political Science.

Students. In the early years no great importance was placed on identifying a narrow group of potential students for the general course. The Working Group idea of immediate post-entry training of young persons was not followed. No attempt was ever made to implement the idea, and indeed the decentralized nature of the personnel function in the early fifties would have probably made it impossible. Interestingly, most of the so-called "promising young men" in the career service came (and come) from the Faculty of Political Science and they would simply have met their old professors if they had attended the Institute.

The structuring of the civil service in Turkey did not lend itself easily to the solution of this problem. There were no clearly defined levels in the regular service or in the public enterprises, so whether a young recruit was intended for the lower or higher levels could not be known. There were no formally designated classes in the

service. The new personnel law was designed to remedy this situation, but its effectuation was expected to be delayed beyond the March 1, 1966, date it prescribed.¹

So the students in the general course as a whole may only be described by that vague phrase, "from lower middle-management." Most of them have come to PAITME through their own initiative. Recruitment efforts have often been desultory and have mainly consisted of announcements mailed to the various parts of the government. In some years the deans have made recruitment visits, as in 1956 and 1957. Those were years when the future at the Institute looked bleak, and there was no apparent rise in recruitment levels as a result of the deans' activities.

Beginning in 1955 entrance examinations were instituted. That year nine of 60 applications were turned away. In 1956 admissions were cut further, because the quality of applications was low. This spoke volumes about the standing of the Institute at that time as compared with the "trial-run" in 1953 where 244 students, some with high rank, had applied. That was a low point, at least in numbers, and total applications has since risen. Since 1959 the "seats" in the general course have been limited to 55. Such a number was selected in 1965 from over 300 applications.

¹Two rumors were in the air of Ankara in early spring, 1966: 1) that an administrative class along English lines might be established; and 2) its new recruits might be required to attend a one or two-year course at PAITME, designed along lines of the course at the Ecole Nationale d'Administration.

By the end of the 1965 general course 590 Turkish students had received diplomas. Once he has been admitted to the course, a student is assured of completing it. The effective policy has been to pass all students undergoing the course (with exceptions in 1955-1958 noted above). In this study we found no clear instance of a student being failed, although one person was expelled for misconduct. Table III shows the graduates by years.

TABLE III
DIPLOMA STUDENTS IN GENERAL COURSE
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION INSTITUTE FOR
TURKEY AND THE MIDDLE EAST

Year	Number
1955	69
1956	127
1957	24
1958	20
1959	56
1960	52
1961	35
1962	56
1963	50
1964	55
1965 (estimated)	46
Total	590

The large number of graduates in 1956 represents the spill-over from the time when the course took two years. The increase in graduates in 1959 over the previous two years lends credence to the view that passage of the law in 1958 did have some effect on recruitment or applications for admission.

Table IV indicates the organizations from which students came to the Institute. It will be noted that in virtually all cases the agencies did not initiate applications for admission. Indeed there have been several instances where a prospective student's immediate supervisor did not wish him to attend but was helpless in the face of the law.

TABLE IV
ORIGINS OF PAITME STUDENTS
(1955-1965)

Organization	Number of Graduates
Ministry of Defense	144
Ministry of Education	125
Ministry of Interior	70
PTT	26
Ministry of Agriculture	16
*State Railroads	16
Administrative Council	16
Highway Department	14
General Directorate of Gendarmery	13
Water Works Department	12
General Directorate of Security	12
Ministry of Finance	9
*Sumerbank	8
Ministry of Commerce	8
*Office of Soil Products	8
Municipalities	8
21 other government agencies (7 or less)	61
*9 other economic enterprises (6 or less)	19
Private concerns	3
2 University Faculties	2
Total	590

*State economic enterprises.

¹"Those who possess the . . . qualifications and who work in government offices . . . and who . . . pass the entrance examination shall be granted leave of absence for the duration of the academic year." L. 7163, art. 15.

By far the largest number have come from the Ministry of Defense--military officers usually below the rank of lieutenant colonel. Many of these men came to the general course in anticipation of civilian employment upon leaving the service. This source of supply was stopped in 1965 when the Ministry decided to deny permission henceforward. The Institute law is silent on the subject of attendance by officers. The next largest group of graduates, from the Ministry of Education, were mainly primary and secondary teachers and not administrators. This situation has long troubled the Institute, although little has been done about it. As the number of applicants increases, persons who are simply teachers are being eliminated from the student body by enforcing more rigid entrance requirements. The total of graduates from the Ministry of Interior, 70, is even higher if the General Directorates of Gendarmerie and Security are added to it.

The spread of graduates from so many parts of the government is rather impressive. It may even be wider than desirable when it includes 16 from the Administrative Council where the work offers virtually no opportunity to profit from the kinds of subjects taught at PAITME. These 590 graduates may be compared with estimated totals of 269,000 employees in regular government departments by a recent census.¹ What proportion of these might be called managers

¹Government of Turkey, State Institute of Statistics, "The Government Personnel Census I: Organizations in General and Supplementary Budgets, December, 1963," Publication No. 473. The total does not cover economic enterprises. The same census reported almost 17,000 employees in provincial governments.

or middle managers one hesitates to say. Ten per cent? By almost any measure, however, the general course at PAITME has hardly touched the problem.

Foreign Students. As a result of the attempt to build a regional component into PAITME, foreign officials attended as students beginning with the first general course in the late fall of 1954. Seven Iranians, two Ethiopians, one Greek, and later two Israelis attended with U. N. fellowships. By 1957 about 19 had received diplomas out of approximately 48 students from nine countries who had attended: Iran, 18; Afghanistan, 12; Iraq, six; Greece, three; Ethiopia, Israel, Lebanon, and Yugoslavia, two each; and Syria, one.¹ It seems no foreigners have attended as students since 1957 (see below, pp. 88).

The program was always complicated by the appearance of foreigners. For example, the two Israelis that came during the 1954-1955 academic year were far better educated and trained than the other students. Both U. N. and Turkish observers thought they would have been better placed as instructors than as students. Needless to say, they returned home disappointed. And languages also were always a problem. The 1955-1956 year may be taken as an example. The foreign students then tended to run lower in age but higher in rank in their own services than did the Turkish students. "The language difficulty made it necessary to hold separate classes

¹The records are especially confusing on these foreign students, a fact in itself indicative of the problem of making PAITME regional. The Syrian student is problematic, for example.

for most of the regional students, who were thus not integrated with the Turkish students."¹ A few foreign students could understand English or French lectures which were being translated for the Turks. Most foreign students studied and were taught separately from the Turkish students.

Other Courses

Almost from the start the Institute attempted to realize the Working Group's idea of developing a variety of courses. Only very slowly, however, have specialized offerings been added to the regular, accepted programs. In the first two years the dean organized consulting sessions with officials of ministerial rank and even succeeded in getting the Prime Minister to attend one. In 1954-1955 two series of lectures for senior civil servants were held. Individual staff members were occasionally involved in separate agency training efforts. In 1957 several of PAITME's personnel were involved in two training courses given by the Workers Insurance Agency. Turkish personnel participated in a Ministry of Education 1957 summer school for Administrators. Subsequently the Ministries of Finance and Interior have held in-service training programs in which the staff of PAITME have at times been the core. Again, one to three-day conferences were attempted with varying success, beginning in 1954. But none of these different attempts culminated in the creation of continuous programs.

¹UNPAITME, "Final Report of the United Nations Co-Director for the Academic Year 1955/56," (Ankara, July, 1956), p. 7. (Mimeographed.)

Longer-term results have come from a two-month specialized course in organization and methods, started in 1959. In that year and again in 1960 there were about 20 participants from eight to ten departments in the seminar. This has subsequently come to be considered an established part of the Institute's operations. By 1966 a substantial amount of staff expertise had been collected about it, and it was being offered more frequently. Since 1960 a final period of several weeks has been used to enable participants to undertake on-the-job assignments. In seven courses there had been 144 participants.

In 1964 the Institute took over a "management improvement training program" that had been originated by U. S. AID training officers, and four were completed in the next year and a half. Also termed the "package program," this series aims at covering a single ministry or agency from top to bottom. Four sets of seminars or sessions are planned, the first for up to 20 hours with top officials (on occasion even the Under Secretary). Forty hours are intended for middle management on topics such as work simplification. A third seminar of about 80 hours is designed for first-level supervisors, while the last seminar of some 80 hours duration is designed for O and M specialists in the ministry involved. This is a very practical sort of program, and most observers consider it a success with the exception of the supervisors seminar. It has proved hard to find qualified instructors in the numbers needed for that part of the package program.

Hopefully, a "training of trainers" course has become a part of the standard offerings of PAITME. Also

developed through cooperation with AID, this course had been completed three times by 1965. The approximately 60 trainer-graduates have been persons slated for in-service training posts in their home agencies, which were, in two of the courses, ministries and departments and in the third, economic enterprises. To date the courses have been experimental. The scarcity of teaching staff with first-hand experience in teaching and training administration is proving to be a handicap here also.

Research

The Working Group intended research as one of the three main objectives of PAITME, and they spoke of research in terms broad enough to encompass many kinds of social science studies, applied and more basic, and all kinds of methodologies, in Turkey and elsewhere in the Middle East and in the world. They spoke of the need to compare Turkey's teaching and practice of administration with that of other countries. They viewed research also in terms of the use of teams to survey administrative problems and the use of study groups with officials and university faculty, including those from neighboring countries. In short, they issued an invitation for someone to create a research function at the Institute, but they gave him no operational leads at all.

The U. N. did not get a "research expert" to Ankara during the first year. The four men who did come devoted time to educating themselves about administration through visits to agencies and field trips. They wrote a few brief cases for use in their classes. Their studies and cases

remained ephemeral and were not widely distributed, even in the Institute. A research director arrived in the fall of 1953 for one year, to be followed by three successive persons in that position. The first three, an Englishman and two Americans, served only a year apiece. The fourth, a staff member from the French Ecole Nationale d'Administration, served three years. There have been three Turkish research directors since 1959. After passage of the organic law the title of the position and the section was changed to "Research and Assistance" in the sense of research or study tied directly to felt needs of operating agencies. Beginning in its third year, PAITME was asked by departments and directorates to study some of their difficulties. Several requests are received each year now, far beyond the capacity of the small research staff even when it may be joined by other staff members occasionally.

A large amount of information was collected during the first six years under direction of the foreigners. An estimated two dozen studies and reports on public institutions and administrative practices, along with some analyses, were prepared. There were sporadic attempts to associate a counterpart professor from the Faculty with the United Nations research director, but the effort did not succeed and was soon dropped. In varying degree the four foreigners worked directly on research in addition to guiding the four to six Turkish research assistants.

Two points are noteworthy about these six years of United Nations leadership in research. First, there was freedom in selection of research topics and research methodology. With his much greater experience, however,

the research director ordinarily was the deciding voice in selection. This factor helps to explain why there are scarcely any sequences to be found in the research projects undertaken at PAITME. The process of selecting study topics was always one of discussion and usually friendly decision, but by and large the choice was that of an outsider and turned out to have little interest to Turks outside the Institute in most instances. Nevertheless, there is no memory of any attempt to stifle or otherwise redirect research activities against the wishes of members of the research section.

Second, during these six years a small but very talented group of Turkish researchers developed. Primarily young people who came to research directly from the university, they learned quickly, and two were educated further abroad. Eventually one of these researchers became head of the section, while the research director, 1962 to date, was also an assistant in that early period who originally however worked on the teaching side. When the last U. N. researcher left, several talented and experienced Turkish researchers were on hand. These people were the backbone of the MEHTAP project.¹

Research reports before 1960 were mimeographed or otherwise printed in rather small numbers. A large proportion of the distribution, furthermore, was to students in the Institute. By 1966 virtually all of these earlier

¹See the English translation of the volume produced by MEHTAP. "Mehtap" means "moon," and this was the source of a lot of humor in connection with the study.

studies were out of print. Since a printing program began in 1960, seventy-five separate publications have appeared under the Institute's imprimatur. Of these, perhaps 28 or three-eighths of the total may loosely be called research reports or papers. Primarily these 28 were authored by Political Science Faculty members, and it is a stretch of the imagination to relate many of them to the field of public administration, broad as that is. The subjects include, for instance, matrimonial practices in Anatolia, German political parties, and the conduct of university entrance examinations. Others among the list are creditable in subject and in execution.

Far the most impressive and probably in the long run the most useful research operation the Institute has conducted was the comprehensive organization survey of the government, excluding public enterprises. Produced during 1962-1963 by a total staff (including numerous part-time workers drawn in from the government and university) of about 100 persons, this MEHTAP study reflects the developing capabilities of the researchers at PAITME. It is noteworthy that the main pressure for this study came from the State Plan Organization in the immediate post-revolutionary period. Subsequent to the study (which is now available in English) an Organization Manual of the whole government was published. In 1964 a committee was established by the government to implement MEHTAP recommendations, and PAITME again was represented by three persons on a relatively small committee. The committee was not actually working by 1966.

Documentation

The Working Group attributed to this function a status and importance equal to training and research. UNPAD and U. N. experts in Ankara made serious efforts to follow these intentions, during the first few years of PAITME. Numerous obstacles were encountered from the start. The paramount one was utter inability to find a foreign professional with the proper qualifications, including especially facility in the Turkish language. After several false starts this function was given over to a Turkish professor where it languished until 1959. For months at a time only one or two junior staff were assigned to documentation full-time, to care for the small library.

Starting in 1953 one or two translators and a couple of professors were put to work translating into Turkish for use in Institute classes several short and long works from the literature of Western public administration. When the NYU group came to the Faculty, this translation program was expanded to include seven well-known texts, primarily American. Virtually all this task was sent out to professors or others outside the regular staff, and so far as could be determined in 1966 only one of the books was ever finished. Portions of several others were also completed, however, and have since been published by PAITME.

As with research reports, so publications for classroom use were only mimeographed in the first six years and were given little distribution outside the walls of the Institute. The small number of studies done at the request of government organizations has also always seen limited

distribution. Beginning in 1960 the publications program was started which had issued 75 printed documents by the end of 1964. A fifth of this total comprises five books and ten articles translated from other languages. Slightly less than a third of the total are conference notes from conferences held by or participated in by the Institute. The research proportion of publications was noted above. The remainder of the total consists of compilations of data and information and lecture notes. Lectures by a U. N. expert in the Principles of Public Administration course were still being used as major readings in 1966, ten years later.

Slowly then, but surely, materials for the study of public administration have appeared. A library was created at the beginning and financed largely by the United Nations for six years. After 1959 Turkish funds, UNESCO coupons, and some grants from U. S. AID have continued to supplement its holdings. Visual inspection of the English and French language holdings indicates that they are very spotty and scarcely adequate for research and training in the major aspects of public administration. The Turkish language holdings have been evaluated by several Turkish students of public administration as ranging from adequate to good.

An annual catalogue for FAIT/IE has been published since 1954-1955, and it has appeared in English at least three times. In 1965 a bulletin of about four pages and containing Institute news, short substantive articles, and notifications about administrative matters in the government began publication.

In 1966 the documentation and publications section still had not attained status comparable with that of training or research. This state of affairs is partly but only partly traceable to the difficulties of the Turkish language. It is also attributable to the lack of interest and attention through the years by U. N. staff and by Turkish staff.

Legal Standing

The tepid attempt to gain legitimacy by passage of an organic law was a tender topic through six long years of the Institute's existence. What was sought was not only a formal enabling linkage with legal and governmental institutions. It was a matter also of standing in the eyes of civil servants, possible students, potential faculty and researchers, and even (at least) the urban public. Turks will still say that a firm legal basis for an organization is particularly important in their country, where a government agency almost never exists without a law that spells out in detail the objectives, status, structure, personnel regulations, geographic location and relationships with other governmental instrumentalities. PAITME indeed did find it hard to hire qualified staff during those six years, and there is evidence the student body was not drawn from the reservoir of the most talented people in the service. Some blame for these situations may be laid to absence of formal, legal legitimacy. Further the U. N. personnel also thought that gaining a statutory basis was a way to make PAITME's future more certain. The United Nations co-directors always were more zealous in pushing for a law than were the Turkish General Directors.

In 1952 it was the pressure from the U. N. that launched the Institute. Technical assistance was available, the regional idea promised considerable international prestige, and the parliamentary wheels usually turned slowly. Thus the new institution was created first and only then was the Faculty asked to prepare a law draft. A committee of three professors did that expeditiously and submitted it to the Ministry of Education in January, 1953. So began a five-year game of bureaucratic hide-and-seek that only infrequently was played with any fervor. Sometimes the General Director would be the protagonist, visiting ministries, phoning friends in high places, seeking to short-circuit the whole process through the Prime Minister. More often the General Director acted under the urging of the Co-Director or Resident Representative. Occasionally these latter two would join the game directly and knock on doors in the ministries.

The first draft law was held up by Finance because the provisions for travel expense payments in it were too liberal and because rates of pay for lecturers were left to the Academic Council to determine. There is however no record that these points were seriously negotiated or discussed. No process of compromise seems even to have started. After a year Dean Abadan went to work and extracted promises from Prime Minister and Minister of Finance that the law would pass if re-drafted.

Thus in May, 1954, another committee was set up, comprising three professors and a member from the Ministry of Finance. Again they drafted quickly, depending heavily on the first draft, and remedying Finance objections with

relative ease. Abadan again fed it into the bureaucratic maw, simultaneously taking with Menderes whom he knew. It was thought to be too late that Assembly session, but passage was seen as certain next session.

It was in late 1954, especially after Gursoy became General Director, that the United Nations representatives began to let their impatience show. They saw negotiations for the NYU contract going on. They felt the new dean was trying to bring PAITME even further under Faculty control, and passage of a law appeared to be a good way to blunt that effort. When Professor Caldwell and Mr. Weitz visited the Minister of Education to complain, he asked Caldwell to draft a law also. Caldwell did this, but his draft died a quiet death in the ministries. While all this was going on in 1954, officials in New York and in Ankara were negotiating an amended Supplementary Agreement. On the U. N. side these negotiations were motivated by a desire to get Turkey moving on a law, to get a full-time general director, and to obtain more support for the Institute without regional pretensions. The Agreement was never signed, however.

The drafts were in limbo all through the next parliamentary session. Even when the Director of UNPAD visited Ankara to discuss this and other problems in the spring of 1955, no action occurred. The Co-Director wrote to New York in May:

All consideration of the new organic law has been laid over until the Autumn. . . . It is quite possible that our friends are merely biding their time for a change of U. N. personnel in the hope that the Institute may be integrated more closely with the FPS than could be the case under the present administration.

In the fall a new Co-Director instituted a new effort by going with the Resident Representative to call on the Minister of Education and a deputy prime minister. The Co-Director solicited the General Director of the Institute in writing (an unusual procedure) to work for action on the law, and the note had some effect. The Institute head went back to the ministerial merry-go-round and again was asked to submit a draft. In a further flare-up of governmental interest, President Celal Bayar asked the new Minister of Education to sponsor the Institute. This official went so far as to speak that winter at the first graduation ceremony, where he also promised to push the new law through the Assembly.

U. N. officials went back to the ministries. At the request of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs a new draft was prepared by a Faculty committee. It was cleared through Finance, laid before the Assembly, and the Assembly then recessed for the summer. The following February the Assembly Sub-Committee on National Education reviewed and amended the draft. This time the new General Director, Arik, went before the sub-committee several times. The Assistant General Director recalled in 1966 one hearing he attended in which members were puzzled even about the nature of the Institute and what its products might be. But the bill stalled in Finance Committee and summer adjournment again overtook it. Furthermore there were new elections at this point, and the old Assembly went out.

Meanwhile the United Nations announced in March, 1957, that it would terminate aid to PAITME on July 1, and base any further assistance on the normal country program.

We cannot know what behind-the-scenes negotiations ensued that summer and fall, for the two persons who could tell are both gone. What is known is that the National Education Sub-Committee asked for the bill in the spring of 1958. It was discussed by a joint committee, including Education, Finance, and Budget. June 5, 1958, it passed. The comedy of errors was ended.

The three draft bills submitted from Faculty committees during these six years were all based upon the Working Group Report, so far as the substantive side of the Institute was concerned. They defined its functions and laid out its internal organization along those lines, as indeed the law itself eventually laid out. The first two drafts called for almost all of the staff to be professors, part-time. The major differences among them lay in the way they would have related PAITME to the hierarchy and the Faculty. The first two drafts would have allotted a minimum of half the members of PAITME's governing body to the Faculty of Political Science, and even the third draft called for the Faculty to have about one-fourth of the members of the governing body. In the final event, representation was cut by the Assembly committee to what is about one-eighth of the total membership. Membership nevertheless is given to professors or doçents who teach at PAITME, therefore several Political Science Faculty members always are on the Board of Administrators from that source. This third draft however was changed little before becoming the law. It was drafted under Professor Feyzioglu in the Institute and represented his views about the need for Institute autonomy and for a strong, full-time staff.

In the early years, the impression was apparently widespread that the function of the Institute was education, in a broad sense. Therefore the early drafts called for the Institute to be a part of the formal organization for education--at one point under the Rectorate of Ankara University, at another time with the Minister of National Education as chairman of the Advisory Committee.¹ At some point in the final negotiations, however, this emphasis was removed from the law. It assigns the autonomous PAITME to the Prime Ministry only, for budgetary purposes. About nine ministries are represented on its Board of Administrators, one of them National Education.

Through these years of inertia and mischance the Institute languished in the Faculty for want of a law. The void in leadership is a notable feature of the story. The sequence of events may be thought of as the result of the decision by deans and Council of Professors to do nothing about the law in order to retain the Institute. The U. N. representatives fought hardest for the law, especially after the detrimental effects of association with the Faculty became clear, beginning in 1954. The Institute was originally conceived as almost a part of the Faculty.

"Autonomy" in the Working Group Report meant independence from government interference. "Autonomy" in the 1958 law meant freedom from the Faculty, at least to U. N. experts and some lawmakers. In reality, by 1966 autonomy in the second sense had not been attained, for a

¹For its first six years of course the Institute on occasion was also related closely to the Foreign Ministry.

professor was still part-time head of PAITME. The law seems to have passed, under the pressure of U. N. withdrawal and also as a result of Professor Arik's campaigning for it.

The interesting point is that nothing changed very quickly at PAITME after it gained a law. Gradually, it did increase its full-time staff; it did broaden its course offering, slowly; its budget has continued to rise; it has its own building; student applications to the general course have gone over 300 per year. Whether its reputation is enhanced by having a law is impossible to test. People say it is better off, just as they said before 1958 it was worse off. In 1953 the Minister of Finance told the Dean he would send only his good-for-nothing people until there was a law. Since the passage of the law however most applicants still come on their own initiative and are not sent by their ministry. Who is to judge whether what came after came because of? The logical problem is as old as philosophy.

Regionalism

The "M. E." in PAITME has always been a hope rather than a reality. It has represented a yearning for enabling and normative linkages in the field of public administration with Turkey's neighbors. A faint nostalgia for the halcyon days of Ottoman hegemony may or may not have underlain it, but some persons in the Foreign Ministry hoped to develop the Institute into a minor instrument of foreign policy. Through the years the only strong support for the idea among Turks came from that Ministry.

Turkish officials in Ankara and mission personnel at the United Nations strongly advanced the regional idea during the Institute's gestation period. Regionalism was a popular idea in the U. N. at that time, and Mr. H. L. Keenleyside, head of TAA, who negotiated the Institute idea in Ankara in 1951, is said to have favored regional institutes of public administration. The regional idea was associated with the Brazilian institute which was being created in 1951, and institutes were under consideration for Central America and South or Southeast Asia also. There was skepticism among the U. N. experts at PAITME that regional ties could become strong, but they devoted more actual effort to trying to make it a reality than did any other group.

One may argue that the idea was impossible from the start. Turkey's neighbors in 1951 had rather fresh memories of their Ottoman governors. Use of the Turkish language had virtually disappeared among the Greeks, Arabs, and Egyptians. Further, governmental and administrative systems of Turkey and adjacent states by 1951 were very different from each other. Even in this sense it was problematic to what extent they might profit from each other's assistance.

The Turkish U. N. delegation held this international aspect to be "the second main objective" of the new Institute,¹ and the draft scheme of September, 1951, called for the countries from "Greece to Pakistan and from Turkey to Somaliland" to be covered. The Supplementary Agreement

¹Mr. H. S. Vaner in a 1966 interview recalled that training public servants in "the management approach" was the first and this the second main objective.

on this topic was brief: it directed the forthcoming Working Group to plan for improving training of the public service in Turkey and the Middle East and offered to finance the attendance at the Working Group of 25 professionals from neighboring countries. Further, it provided for 40 United Nations and 10 Turkish scholarships for regional students to study at the Institute. It mandated that official languages of the Institute should be English, French, and Turkish. And finally the U. N. agreed to reimburse some lira expenses to Turkey to compensate for the regional arrangements. When the Turkish mission agreed to this document in January, 1952, they did so on the explicit assumption that the Institute would be a "regional center."

Officials in the U. N. Secretariat displayed skepticism about this proposition almost from the beginning. There was long discussion in New York of the various pros and cons: Turkey's standing in the Middle East; the barriers of language; the state of mind of leaders in Arab countries; the Arab-Israeli split. Probably this was transmitted orally to Turkish representatives. Indeed by the fall of 1952, before PAITME had opened its doors, many U. N. officials in New York were willing to allocate Expanded Programme funds to aid national schools of administration in the Middle East.

By then, of course, the Working Group had met in Ankara, with no Middle Eastern countries represented, apparently because of the haste with which it was summoned. The Group discussed regional problems at length. The nature of the discussion, however, is indicated by the query Group leaders dispatched to U. N. headquarters from Ankara: what

countries were to be included in Institute plans? The Working Group got no help from the U. N. or the Foreign Ministry. Participants remembered in 1966 no Group decisions on the point, and the Working Group Report indicates nothing.

U. N. members in the Working Group hit upon the language problem as the first and most important quandary facing the new Institute. Not only would students from other countries not know Turkish, but most Turkish students would not know either English or French. This regional dimension posed problems also for documentation--interpretation and translation would demand a very strong documentation section in the Institute. Their warning was seconded by the four U. N. experts who served at Ankara during 1953 and the "trial-run," even though no foreigners came to that session.

It was the United Nations which initiated recruitment efforts in nearby countries--we do not know that Turkey ever made any systematic try at attracting regional students. Mainly through the efforts of U. N. staff in Ankara, the resident representative of the Technical Assistance Board publicized the opening of PAITME and solicited applications in at least eleven nearby countries. This system was used until 1957 when the Foreign Ministry agreed to publicize the scholarships. No foreign students came that year, nor have any come since.¹

¹At any rate, Institute records show no foreigner in the one doubtful year, 1957-1958. This is another case where the institutional memory of PAITME has broken down.

But foreign students did come from 1953 to 1956. Among students in the first general course, in the winter of 1953-1954, there were seven Iranians, two Ethiopians, one Greek, and later two Israelis. In all about 49 came from nine countries (see, supra, p. 70). Egypt, Jordan, Libya, and Pakistan were included in the recruitment campaign, but either did not respond or produced no suitable candidates.

The types of problems arising once students arrived at PAITME underline the troubles in realizing this regional idea. For example, the two Israelis who came in early 1954 proved to have higher status and better educational backgrounds than most other students. They reportedly were of a caliber sufficient to have taught courses, and they seem to have gone home disappointed with their experience in Ankara. Furthermore, hardly any student appeared with a working knowledge of Turkish. Certain of the Afghan students were exceptions, but other students had to depend on English or French to get by. Up to 1957 French had been employed regularly in only one class during one year. This vastly complicated the Institute's teaching problems, particularly as more Turkish professors began to handle classes. Finally it seems at least debatable whether discussion of Turkish governmental and administrative problems was of great relevance to the needs of the foreigners. The U. N. experts of course were able to draw on their experience in the West, but most Turkish professors who lectured part-time in PAITME were bothered by the point. This was a clear case where the lectures they employed in the Faculty were inappropriate for use in the Institute.

In Ankara and New York opinions were leaning by late 1953 toward cancelling the regional dimension of PAITME. Arab representatives complained in New York in October, 1953, that they were not consulted when the Institute was established. Van Mook suggested to the U. N. Turkish delegation that PAITME's funds be cut, since it was not serving a regional purpose. Dimock arrived in Ankara prepared to push for abolishing the regionalism, but Turkish officials reacted strongly and began to press him to leave Institute finances alone. Little of this pressure came from the Turks associated with the Institute, however.

The U. N. experts and two deans did try to expedite regional cooperation by visiting neighboring countries. Heckscher and Abadan visited Tehran in 1953; Professors Hanson, Harvey and Kingsbury went to Beirut in 1954; Guxsoy visited Baghdad in 1955; and Caldwell stopped at Cairo, Baghdad, and Tehran in 1955. Some critics complained that these were only sight-seeing trips. One positive sign of interest came from Iran which requested "extension lectures" in Iran by PAITME staff in late 1953. This nascent possibility was cut off by refusal of PAITME to allow its staff to go for the lectures, since the Turkish members of the Academic Council felt they were short-handed in Ankara.

Apart from PAITME the United Nations had abandoned the regional idea at the very time it was creating PAITME. Apparently the Central American school, ESAPAC, is the only one of these early cases which has continued with acknowledged success until today. By December, 1952, however, U. N. officials had agreed with Israel to a training center there for public

administrators.¹ In April, 1953, the U. N. was talking of possible creation of an institute in Egypt. In April, 1954, a U. N. expert went to Cairo to survey establishment of such an institute.²

By 1957 eight public administration training organizations with functions parallel to those of PAITME had been set up in neighboring countries. United Nations aid was going to institutes in Egypt, Ethiopia, Israel, and Libya. The United States was assisting Iran, Lebanon, and Pakistan. Yugoslavia was creating its own institute. In a sense these all undercut PAITME.

Then another idea had a brief career. In 1954 and 1955 U. N. headquarters officials hoped to build a staff college function at PAITME, similar to the training course at Henley-on-Thames for relatively senior officials. A Henley staff member was sent to Ankara as Co-Director for the academic year, 1955-1956. A clear motive was the hope that senior officials from neighboring countries might be attracted to Turkey for such a course. The last third of the general course at Ankara was run along staff college syndicate lines in 1956, but otherwise the idea went no further. The Turkish members of PAITME scarcely reacted to the idea at all.

¹Supplementary Agreement No. 2, December 30, 1952, between the United Nations and the Government of Israel.

²C. T. Salfors, "The Establishment of an Institute of Public Administration and Other Provisions for the Training of Civil Servants in Egypt" (United Nations, TAA/NS/EGY/2, 1 November, 1954).

Possibilities for regionalism had withered by 1957. There was a little talk that spring about making PAITME a local government center. But the creation of the other institutes made the writing on the wall very plain. In reality the Turks never gave regionalism a try. Like so many ideas for the Institute, it faded for lack of enthusiasm and active support, particularly from among Turks directly associated in the endeavor. Verbal support from the Foreign Ministry was not enough; somebody had to do some work. Today regionalism remains only in the name of PAITME.

NYU Project

The story of Institute-NYU team relationships is an odd one, only part of which can be told. From 1954 to 1959 American assistance provided for the NYU team to build up the Political Science Faculty. During all those years the U. N. experts and officials feared competition from the team in carrying out their assigned duties. Particularly during the years 1956 and 1957 this friction developed into a running feud, the outcome of which however was indecisive. In the sense that the NYU "threat" may have helped to keep the Institute from becoming stronger the fears of the U. N. people were realized, but in retrospect one sees the reverse may also have occurred. Two of the U. N. participants in this story were employees of NYU in New York by 1957. There is no evidence, however, of any connection between the Ankara problem and their subsequent employment.

U. S. aid had actually gone to the Faculty before PAITME was created. Several younger Faculty members studied public administration and other social science subjects under

University of Southern California auspices, beginning in 1951.¹ In 1952 and 1953 the United States Mutual Security Agency inquired about how they might aid the Institute. The Ford Foundation was also interested. No Ford Foundation help was arranged, but the United States inquiry developed into the NYU program at the Faculty.² During the Working Group meetings in August, 1952, Dean Olson, Mr. Winn, and Mr. Tickner conferred with Ankara MSA officials.³ They talked over several ideas, including U. S. support of study tours for Faculty members. It was revealed that the Political Science Faculty had asked MSA for two American faculty members, but it was agreed that in public administration the United States would play only a "supporting role."

In January, 1954, Professor Dimock was asked by the local FOA head to join a discussion of public administration aid to the Faculty, "supplementing" the Institute. The FOA representative proposed to emphasize undergraduate training not only in public administration but also in other social sciences. The Faculty had much to gain from such wide-ranging assistance, particularly to bring them up to date in the new

¹By 1955 about ten of these younger faculty had returned to teach, and before the end of the decade they became a dominant voice in the Faculty. Several worked in PAITME, and the General Director in 1966 was an alumnus of this program.

²For further information about this New York University contract, see W. Adams and J. A. Garraty, Is the World Our Campus? (East Lansing: Michigan University Press, 1960); E. W. Weidner, Technical Assistance in Public Administration Overseas: The Case for Development Administration (Chicago: Public Administration Service, 1964).

³The various names under which the United States foreign aid agency has gone are used in this manuscript as of the time of the reference in the text: MSA, FOA, EVA, ICA, AID.

fields and methodologies of the social sciences. Some U. N. experts saw the new contract idea as a way of undercutting the Institute, but their view did not prevail at that time. Co-Director Dimock stayed with the discussions and supported the aid idea enthusiastically. It was decided that one American university could best assist in the various fields, and the Turks were given a choice of three or four possibilities. When Abadan sought Dimock's advice, he chose NYU.

The October, 1954, contract with NYU called for a broad spectrum of assistance to be provided to the Faculty especially in the fields of public administration, statistics, accounting, and secretarial practice. Both undergraduate and graduate levels were included, but the contract stated: ". . . the program now being requested is meant to supplement the PAITME program."¹

In late 1954 and 1955 Dean Gursoy was attempting to absorb the Institute in the Faculty, and the NYU program seemed to U. N. personnel simply another threat to their status and functioning. Co-Director Caldwell wrote to Dean Gursoy in January, 1955, of "assurances by (FOA officials) that their NYU contract contemplated no activity in the area surveyed by the Institute." Later in June when there was still an undercurrent of uneasiness and when apparently FOA officials were uncertain as to Faculty intentions, the FOA asked for a conference on the problem. At that meeting, the

¹See Graduate School of Public Administration and Social Service, New York University, "Summary Report: Program of Technical Cooperation in Public Administration in Turkey" (New York: December 31, 1959). (Mimeographed.)

two foreign sides made clear their stands, much along the lines previously stated. They were seconded by Dean Gursoy, but they agreed they might in the future conflict in research or in-service training functions. In the end it was rather clear that neither side wished to compete with the other, at that time. Throughout the entire argument, in fact, with the exception of a few hot words in 1956-1957, relations between U. N. and NYU teams remained friendly.

Dean Gursoy seems from the record to have thought of the Institute and the NYU programs as simply parts of his Faculty. U. N. staff, with the exception of Professor Dimock, viewed the NYU program as a blatant intrusion on their territory. Even in U. N. headquarters there was some perturbation about FOA's going to Turkey with aid in the field of public administration.

NYU from 1955 on had a team in the Faculty that was often three or more times as large as the U. N. team. It comprised specialists from several of the social sciences and business subjects. And at first it stayed with undergraduate teaching primarily. The U. N. Co-Director in 1956-1957 wrote in 1958:

It was therefore natural that the professors provided by New York University or trained in the United States should remind the Faculty that its organic statute imposed a duty not only to teach university undergraduates but also to give technical advice to the Government as desired.

At this point, Institute and Faculty missions directly overlapped. In practical fact, no immediate difficulty arose. The area of desirable help to the Government was . . .¹ far beyond the capacity of both Institutions.

¹Barber, op. cit., p. 68.

A graduate course in public administration was not given until 1958-1959, although several graduate offerings were given earlier, beginning in 1956-1957.

The closest to conflict occurred over local government problems. In 1956 the Minister of the Interior asked the Institute to stage a four to six month course for kaymakams (field officials of the central government, roughly equivalent to the French prefet). After countless discussions and delays, this program was carried out by the NYU Team with Faculty professors. The result was considerable ill-feeling on the part of U. N. experts. In 1957, close on the heels of the first incident, both U. N. and NYU hired local government experts to work with central ministries and to teach in the training courses. Each group thought the Institute had asked it for approximately the same kind of man.

At a meeting of the two groups the Turkish viewpoint was expressed succinctly: ". . . the Turks had not thought of the Institute as an institution with a separate Faculty of its own." Their view of the problem was on a completely different plane from the views of the foreigners. The U. N. people wanted a clear line drawn between their work and that of NYU, but neither Faculty nor NYU representatives would permanently disavow teaching their graduates at in-service or other kinds of courses. So many officials were Faculty graduates that the professors felt they had a continuing responsibility for them even after their graduation. No agreement was reached, although everyone parted still friendly.

One senses that the arguments among the foreigners influenced events very little. The Turkish deans went ahead to make their program decisions. The U. N. continued to give aid, even after the 1957 end of the Supplementary Agreement. They did not settle on a single area, such as local government or fiscal administration which was a second possibility mentioned by the U. N. at about that time. Aid from the U. N. after 1957 was to be mainly in the field of organization and methods.

American Assistance

As early as 1952 United States foreign aid officials talked of financing public administration support for the Institute. The NYU part of this story is the unpleasant one, but there are more pleasant aspects.

The U. S. offered aid for foreign students to attend the Institute, and five Iraqis came under those auspices in the fall of 1955. Little else was done before the end of the NYU program in 1959. By that time, U. N. aid had tapered off considerably, however, and the United States in that sense had a freer hand.

In October, 1959, a project for assistance to PAITME and the new Middle East Technical University (METU) Department of Management (with secondary attention to public administration in three other universities) was initiated. The project was to last until 1968 and its objective was:

to help Turkey institutionalize administrative training capabilities in a way that will have multiplier results and, while pursuing this main goal, to expedite the actual training of administrative personnel as much as practicable. . . .

. . . The activity was designed to assist Turkish efforts in developing stronger and more effective specialized institutions and training programs that will provide an increased supply of trained executives.

ICA (later AID) officials thought the Institute had a "unique position in the field of post-entry training for government officials." It had not contributed enough to Turkey's development. "For one thing it needed to become less an in-house, academic institution and more an extension service agency and catalyst."¹ They saw PAITME as part of a package of institutions, including several universities, that would produce the trained manpower the country needed for improved administration. There is scarcely a way to determine how much the General Director and staff of PAITME shared these goals for their organization. Since 1959 however AID has offered far more money and other kinds of aid to PAITME than have been accepted.

The program was fully launched in 1962 when a public administration adviser was brought in to oversee it. Mr. Ivan Asay, an experienced American career civil servant, served in this capacity for three years. From his office in the Institute he consulted with the General Director, taught in

¹U. S. Agency for International Development, Ankara, "Technical Assistance Project History and Analysis Report, Project No. 277-11-770-331, Administrative Training Institutions, M. O. 1391.1," Ankara, September 7, 1965. (Processed.)

various programs, and generally advised as did the one or two U. N. advisers and a French adviser (also present under bilateral agreement). AID also had other training officers in Turkey who worked in a number of programs outside PAITME.

During the period, 1962-1966, seven PAITME staff members went abroad for training, of whom three were financed by AID and four through CENTO and U. N. channels. At one point AID proposed to provide help "across-the-board" to enable the Institute to increase regular course enrollment by 300 per cent. Progress in this regard and in other potential cooperation with AID officials by 1965 had been very slow. AID was often undermanned for training purposes, but even more important was the clear reluctance of PAITME to accept too much help or too many ideas from Americans. The Institute was still academically oriented, at least in its top management, while the Americans who worked with it were mostly experienced administrators. They wanted to institute training modelled after that in such U. S. agencies as the Departments of the Army and Navy. This contrast may or may not have been important, but American aid was increasingly frowned upon and Americans generally were under fire in Turkish newspapers by 1964 and 1965.

The operations-oriented training staff at AID did help PAITME with some new programs. The "package program" (noted supra, p. 72) was first developed by American and Turkish instructors in AID and later in 1964 transferred to PAITME auspices. The "training of trainers" course was also initiated through cooperation between AID and the Institute. In 1962 and 1963 six field seminars for municipal accountants and chief clerks were carried out for the Ministry of Interior

with some AID financial support. Since 1963 AID has worked on a course for Finance Inspectors, and has apparently had success with it. Finance Inspectors, in the French fashion, are officials with high responsibility as well as status throughout Turkey. PAITME has thus far refused to help with or take over the course.

Other aspects of the Institute's work have also been bolstered by American support and funds, e.g., documentation program and library. AID personnel in 1965 estimated the Institute library's public administration holdings had been increased 30 per cent by the AID program, and \$14,000 in communications equipment had been furnished. AID paid part of the cost of the MEHTAP study. AID also furnished funds to translate various textual materials into Turkish as well as to translate the MEHTAP report and the new Organization Manual into English. AID officials stated in 1966 that more funds were available in all of these categories than PAITME would use.

The adviser who had spent most of his working time at the Institute was withdrawn in mid-1965 and his replacement was able to devote far less time to its affairs. He had important responsibilities in other government agencies. The impression was that AID was drawing back somewhat from PAITME, in part if not entirely because of the Institute's cold reception of them. The international situation apparently threw any American program into the limelight of suspicion.

PART IV

Institutional Elements

This impressionistic account of the PAITME experience will be concluded with a summary along the lines indicated by the "guiding concepts" of the Inter-University Consortium: leadership, doctrine, program, resources, and linkages.

Leadership

The men who served as general directors of PAITME may be characterized in Daniel Lerner's term, as "Modern Turks." Western-educated scholars, urban intellectuals, they shared even other "cosmopolitan perspectives which identify the modern style everywhere." With specific reference to the doctrines of public administration as known in the fifties, however, they come closer on the Lerner continuum to being "transitional Turks." "They are persons marked by aspirations for a future which will be better than the past, but they have not yet acquired a comprehensive set of new values to replace the old."¹ Especially is this point relevant if by "acquiring" we mean "understanding," because "public administration" presented a confusing face to Turkey's intellectuals in the early years of PAITME. The reciprocal relationship between leadership and doctrine is shaped to a major extent by the leaders'

¹The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East (New York: The Free Press, 1958), pp. 154 and 160.

comprehension of doctrine. This idea will be further explored below (see the following section on "doctrine").

The formal, legitimate headship of the Institute was vested for six years in the dean of the Faculty of Political Science, and since 1959 a professor has remained in charge. This state of affairs came about, however, almost as an afterthought. PAITME drifted ever so casually into the hands of the Faculty, to be sure with the blessing of the Foreign Ministry and its Department of International Economic Affairs. On the two occasions that agency intervened in Institute elections, the purpose was to keep the Dean in charge. Doctrinal questions were not at issue; the motivating force appears to have come from hierarchical considerations.

The 1958 law separated PAITME formally from the Faculty, but the only serious candidates for the general directorship continued to be Political Science professors (one candidate came from the adjacent Faculty of Law). Before the law the general director was the Faculty's steward for Institute affairs, and since the law there has never been an overt threat of PAITME competition with the Faculty. Therefore one concludes, to this extent, that this is a case of an existing institution which succeeded in embracing a new institution to effectively suppress or at least control its development.

As the holders of Institute authority, the general directors for six years were motivated strongly by their loyalty to the Faculty and thus at least secondarily by the traditional academic disciplines it represented at that time.

There are many evidences of such motivation before 1959. Motivation derived from the new doctrines of public administration or from desires to accommodate the U. N. presence and experts were further down the list of pressures.

If any more self-serving motives existed, they are hazy to assess. General directors gained a minor amount of status from the administrative contacts that had to be cultivated in carrying on external relations for PAITME, as in urging passage of the law and in recruiting students. The post also brought them a bit more pay, travel, and expense money. Critics argued that these were the only reasons anyone wished to be general director in the early days. What is most plain is that no general director saw a vision of his status being elevated through pursuit of the doctrines of public administration in the Turkish bureaucracy.

One searches in vain for motivation of the general directors by any "needs" they perceived in Turkish administration or indeed any scholarly interest therein (with the exception of Feyzioglu). Except on rare occasions when they sought it, no leadership from above in the hierarchy was exercised. Nor was there any strong body of opinion in the Council of Professors as to the strengthening of Institute programs. Budgetary and personnel matters were mainly left to the U. N. staff and to the secretary-general who was a United Nations employee until 1954.

The energy the general directors expended was directed at external relations, and only one dean seems to have devoted substantial time to such problems. Arik was responsible for gathering much of the support that brought

passage of the organic law. Then after 1958 one finds no evidence that he searched aggressively after new ideas, new programs, or new research topics. Even the MEHTAP project did not come to PAITME via the efforts of the general director. It seems to have come partly as the result of one U. N. expert's work and partly from the wish by the new State Planning Office for a firmer basis for organizational planning.

We have found very few instances when outside authorities, superior officials, overtly made decisions for the Institute. Prime Minister Menderes lent his prestige to PAITME by attending the opening ceremonies. The effects of this act seem to have lasted only through the first year, however. At the elections of the second and fourth general directors the effect of intervention by high officials of the Foreign Ministry was simply to legitimize the claim of dean and Faculty to control of the Institute. Furthermore, when the Under-Secretary of the Prime Ministry stepped into the election controversy in 1959 his role was that of seeing that a peaceful election was held. There were other less visible cases of this exercise of higher authority over PAITME. Whether they typify "leadership" or strong "enabling linkages" is a moot point.

Could another type of leadership have been expected from the deans in the early years? Or indeed until quite recently? Each man was a scholar of the European school, selected for a two-year term as primus inter pares. The style of the deanship was always leisurely. His prestigious suite was only a few steps away from the corridor housing PAITME, and commonly PAITME personnel went there for business

discussions. The dean held office hours Turkish-style, with numerous visitors coming and going, sitting at coffee tables, demi-tasse in hand, mixing this business with that business. A highly respected dean like Yavuz Abadan would often have several persons in the easy chairs, discussing points of scholarly interest, while a male secretary wandered in and out with visitors bringing more mundane matters to his attention. To an American, this office procedure appears more suited to talking about things and less suited to doing things. When the Institute moved to less splendid quarters after 1958, the general director conducted business much in this same fashion, although on a smaller scale. Professor Arik did spend considerably more time in the Institute than in his other office at the Faculty.

The dean was the elected "doer" for the Faculty, the "executor of the decisions of the Council." This still left him "room for individuality," as one professor explained it in 1966. He was undoubtedly more free to follow his own dictates in Institute than in Faculty affairs, although several professors always taught part-time at PAITME and served on its governing bodies. We find that the professors rarely challenged him concerning Institute problems, although it is likely that Dean Gursoy was seeking to avoid contests with them when he convened so few meetings of his Academic Council. Making something of PAITME, however, developing and enlarging it, seem never to have infected his imagination or that of any other general director, before or after passage of the law. Not one tried to build an empire from the Institute. They were content with a minor kingdom.

Vigorous leadership by a general director, oriented to institutional goals, never had appeared at PAITME before 1965. There was little or no charisma between him and other members of the organization. So supine were these general directors on most aspects of Institute work that one palpably must look beyond the formal headship if the phenomena of leadership are to be understood. The initiative on internal matters was commonly wielded by the U. N. co-directors and staff, before Institute independence. When the position of co-director was abolished in 1957 and especially after 1958, General Director Arik seems more and more to have arrogated internal decisions to himself. Few, however, were the positive acts of leadership that he carried out. He alone represented the Institute outside and internally he confined himself to "not rocking the boat." Thus by 1960 or before the foreigners at the Institute had retreated to the teaching function, with the exception of Mr. Asay, the American A7D representative. By and large, however, the programs of teaching, research, and documentation were beyond his reach.

While they existed, the co-directors were doctrine-oriented, contrasted with the orientation of the general directors to the more traditional sub-culture of the Political Science Faculty. This was true, so far as this research reveals, of nearly all of the U. N. staff. Nevertheless, as will be further discussed below, doctrinal orientation meant (even less than may be usual) little agreement among them. The attitudes they held toward one another are best thought of as those among professors in a Western university faculty, but these men came from widely diverse national

backgrounds. There was a continuing dialogue among them and with their Turkish colleagues on professional matters, but there was never an overt resolution of the countless difficult questions raised. Furthermore, given the rather academic atmosphere, it is not certain that an outsider may say there "should" have been.

Junior staff members in the Institute and younger Faculty members who, so to speak, grew up with the Institute, were surely affected by their experiences, by varied lessons from U. N. experts, and by the education many received abroad. Perhaps also some more Turkish doctrine of public administration has begun to crystallize and mature through a decade and a half. At no time, however, has important authority or other leadership been exercised by junior staff, with the exception of the brief "revolution" of 1963.

The co-directors carried out a leadership function through shaping of the programs of PAITME, and the research directors also shared therein when they directed research projects. In both cases the motivation was in part doctrinal and in part also based on desires to live up to norms they knew at home and less clearly, in international public administration circles, as they perceived them. From the first, the co-directors were delegated almost complete responsibility for internal affairs at PAITME. Dean Abadan was open in doing so, and his personal relationships with co-directors were friendly. Inter-personal relationships degenerated with the arrival of GURSOY, and yet he still left most internal policy and daily business to U. N. staff. This same delegation continued through the short tenure of FEYZIOGLU, and decreasingly through that of ARIK until 1959.

Co-directors went outside the Institute only when they tried to affect passage of the law and to secure a full-time general director. Caldwell, Evans-Vaughan, and Barber had to do this without the title of Resident Representative which Heckscher and Dimock had. Nevertheless, in all five cases, there were practically no long-range results, although their reception by higher officialdom was uniformly polite, as one might expect.

Doctrine

The modernizing element in this case is the Western doctrine of public administration. An initial hypothesis was the elementary one that the content of that doctrine, through the early years of PAITME at least, was so inchoate as to be highly ineffective. A recognizable bias underlies the hypothesis which dates from the author's experience at PAITME in 1955-1956. Nothing, however, has been found to undermine the hypothesis. "Public administration" was only a general area as it presented its faces at the Institute, and its more specific parts have never been divorced completely from the foreign environments where they were developed.

It has always been explicitly assumed that "problems" of administration were endemic in Turkish administration. Both foreigners and Turks have continuously perceived such problems, although only slowly has research in PAITME and elsewhere begun to clarify their nature. Such research was indeed among the first commissions given the Institute.

Furthermore, the many outstanding experts sent to Turkey by the United Nations saw the dangers of their being culture-bound. Dean Olson pointed out after his 1951 study

tour for the Barker Mission that "public administration" as known in the United States, England, or in Europe was not immediately relevant to the Turkish milieu. United Nations officials in New York were aware of the point, and it is reflected in the 1952 Working Group Report. Heckscher and the experts of his year echoed this formulation of the problem, as did Dimock and his colleagues, and so on. Most of these men believed that some kind of public administration doctrine could be evolved over the years, primarily through the medium of research.

Defining PAITME's Mission

To say that the Institute was to train government servants in public administration ideas and techniques was by no means to equip it with a doctrine. The several basic documents have never gotten far beyond that point, however. The term, "doctrine," in its commonly accepted meaning may be a misnomer as applied to the substance and techniques of the field. By "doctrine" we mean a theory based upon carefully worked-out principles. In 1952 as still today "public administration" was a bundle of disparate concepts, some contradictory, all somewhat vague, scarcely any completely validated in social science research.

The May, 1952, Supplementary Agreement called for creation of an institute "in order to provide improved training facilities [for the public service] for Turkey and the Middle East." Next, the Working Group spent over a week in attempting to discover what the nature of administration in Turkey might be. They did not look at teaching and training for there were none. They looked briefly at

the actual practice of public administration. And in their report the Working Group described three objectives for the new institution: "(1) to promote studies relating to public administration; (2) to conduct, propose and support research and surveys on administration problems; (3) to organize exchanges of views and proposals with regard to the solution of these problems." What they sensed was a series of practical needs. They proposed the study of those needs and the initiation of a process of remedying them. It turned out, however, that PAITME emphasized teaching and did not make such study the first item of its agenda. Only much later did a base of research and fact-finding begin to produce the substance on which its academic efforts might have been founded.

Foreign members of the Working Group are reported to have arrived at general agreement in their usage of the key term, "public administration," but they did not spell it out for their successors. And at various junctures over the following years when the current interpretations of aims or doctrine were stated, they remained brief and most general. Thus the draft law of January, 1953, repeated that the Institute was "to develop public administration by useful research and improve the professional training of civil servants. . . ." ¹ The first research program, for 1954-1955, specified that PAITME "aims to teach young administrators public administration in terms of Turkish experience." It was unstated whether this meant Turkish experience alone was to be taught, or Turkish experience was to be analyzed in

¹Draft law, January, 1953, Article 1.

terms of principles and precepts formulated abroad, or some third alternative.

Succeeding documents carry the matter no further. A report by a committee of the Academic Council in April, 1955, offered as the objective that the Institute "is to contribute to the improvement of public administration in Turkey and the countries of the Middle East. To this end the Institute should undertake: to offer instruction relating to public administration. . . ." ¹ So it follows that the 1958 organic law describes the mission thus: The Institute "trains personnel in the art of administration and aims at educating civil servants in the field of administration through constructive work designed to develop public administration according to modern concepts. . . ." ² And it is prescribed that Turkish practices shall be studied and materials about Turkish administration shall be prepared.

National Distinctions

The enigma of course went deeper than this definitional level. Public administration in 1952 was an accepted part of the technical assistance game. It would be foolish to assert that the sophisticated scholars and practitioners involved in this story were unaware of the pitfalls of their actions. United Nations officials and "experts" all assumed

¹"Report on the Program and Organization of the Public Administration Institute," April 27, 1955, Document A/4/54-55.

²Law 7163, June 25, 1958.

that Western study and teaching in public administration could offer improvement in the administrative concepts and workways of Turkey and other underdeveloped countries. But even at the conversational level they distinguished among the study of administration at the Continent, that in England, and that in the United States. It was stated that thinking about public administration in the U. S. was more affected by the social sciences, on the Continent was the realm of the administrative lawyer, and in England was dominated by administrators. Perhaps the viewpoint most often voiced by English commentators at that period was simply that administration in general could not be taught. In any case the doctrine was ambiguous and recognized as such by U. N. experts. This kind of difficulty was embedded in the endeavor by the international nature of the United Nations. That organization sent to Ankara experts representing different points of view toward the teaching of administration. They attempted in the Working Group to resolve their differences, but they left the hard task up to their successors and to the research operations in BAYRAK.

To the extent that Turkish scholars were interested in public administration, their thinking was shaped by their own education in French, German, Swiss and other European universities. Administrative law was taught in the Turkish faculties in 1952, and it was over the basis for one of the major organizational units of the Political Science Faculty. Nevertheless Foreign Ministry officials and some professors wanted either an English or an American chairman for the Working Group, not distinguishing between the study and training for administration in the two countries. The

subsequent discussions by the Working Group were pursued largely along American and French lines, while Turkish members tried to compromise the two schools. The curriculum agreed on by the Group mixes indiscriminately ideas drawn from Continental and from American institutions (see Appendix I). Thus administrative law was firmly established in the course offerings of the Institute until well after it became autonomous. The international character of U. N. experts until 1958 continued in practice this mixture of doctrines that had been carried through the planning stages of PAITME. We may indeed safely conclude that in the minds of Turks and foreigners as well as in the actual courses offered in those early years there were at least these three nationally-defined concepts of public administration.

Directly related to the foregoing is another common idea about the Institute: many people have always thought it an academic enterprise. Obviously this was an accurate idea in the early years because there was no information about Turkish administrative practices or strong connections with governmental agencies to provide a base for a practical course at the new Institute. Furthermore, it was dominated by the Faculty and staffed by professors and foreigners largely. Until very recently the various courses at any given time have not been at all closely inter-related in any real sense as to subject matter. Nor has there been any long-range plan for coordinating teaching and the products of the research operations. Each instructor simply taught what he knew best when he came to the Institute. Turkish professors employed Turkish materials in their lectures, although much of it was said to have been brought

in from their parallel classes in the Faculty. Foreign professors were able to incorporate only small amounts of Turkish materials, cases, or studies in their courses. This is clear, although from the first the experts said they tried to pull together practical information. In the first year Professor Heckscher and his colleagues collected case studies. Succeeding years witnessed similar attempts, and indeed a number of research studies were completed. But by no means were they integrated into anything resembling doctrine or were they used systematically in the classroom.

There was occasional opposition to the academic approach. Soon after his arrival in Ankara, Professor Dimock wrote to the Academic Council of PAITME that the aims of the Institute should be practical and not academic. "I think the Institute has a single purpose, that is to enhance the executive skills of middle managers. . . . The purpose of the Institute is the production of executive skills." In 1955 U. N. headquarters favored this concentration on middle management problems and suggested to PAITME the model of the Administrative Staff College at Henley-on-Thames. They did this by seconding a staff member from Henley, George F. Evans-Vaughn, to serve as co-director for the 1955-1956 year. The incident perhaps exemplifies the light touch U. N. executives always used with PAITME. One man alone was insufficient to reshape the purposes and training methods of PAITME, although a few features of the "syndicate method" were adopted and used during the next few years. The U. N. headquarters officials could see no way of exercising more leverage.

After the Institute became "autonomous" a few ex-kaymakams, operating officials from the ministries, and army officers gradually were added to the Institute staff. As instructors in the O and M course and the "package program" they have come into sustained contact with other officials on the job, and in the agency. Other programs have been managed for ministries and state enterprises which have doubtless had the effect of acquainting PAITME trainers with the practical problems of administrations. Furthermore, the MEHTAP exercise also gave them contact with the actualities of administration.

Since 1959 the United Nations has provided assistance mainly in the field of organization and methods. The small amounts of American aid that have been accepted since 1961 have also tended to be on the "practitioner side." Officials in Ankara AID who have worked with the Institute have been administrators by training and experience and not professors. The ideas they have offered have thus been drawn chiefly from administrative practices and training methods in the American national government. All of these factors have seemingly moved the Institute and its staff away from the original academic flavor and methods. Even in the general course, there has been an increasing emphasis on the use of case studies, on practical work, and on more and more Turkish materials in recent years.

By 1966 the ministries and public enterprises were asking for Institute help in training and surveys somewhat more than they did ten years earlier. This help was being given by Turks from the Institute, for the remaining foreign experts were confining their attention to the classroom.

There was in 1966 no evidence of an increase in scholarly attention to administration by Turkish academicians or practicing administrators. Nor had there been any noticeable refinement of the vague public administration doctrines that had been prepared to PAITME in 1952. If there has been any refinement, if there has been a clearer delineation of goals, it has come through a synthesis of ideas and practice, in the minds of the staff.

External Relationships

This Turkish organization has survived at well above any hypothetical minimum level, thus we are addressing here a question of degree of institutionalization. The descriptive approach thus far indicates that leadership at PAITME has never been vigorously doctrine- or program-oriented, as viewed from a Western or a Turkish perspective. Further, the doctrines have offered no strong weapon to potentially vigorous leadership nor have they been related intimately to the perceived problems of Turkish administration. Indeed, doctrines have been faulty throughout the Institute's history, even when measured from a Western perspective. These two elements, leadership, and doctrine, however, bear more immediately on internal strength of an organization. The primary meaning of "institutionalization" is to be found in the acceptance and indeed the effectiveness of norms by individuals and organizations in the environment of the subject organization. It is clear from the foregoing description that any Western model highlights the sheer paucity of PAITME's external relationships. It is the purpose of this section to explore external linkages further.

Table V gives a brief analysis of forty-four specific instances from September, 1951, through December, 1964, in which:

1. A substantial question concerning the Institute was at issue;
2. Individuals in authoritative roles outside PAITME were directly involved;
3. A transaction occurred in the form of a face-to-face discussion or series of discussions.

These examples were found in the files on PAITME in the United Nations archives, in the files at the Institute itself, and through interviews with key individuals associated with PAITME through the years. Purely ceremonial contacts with outsiders as well as contacts for recruitment of students have been eliminated from the list of examples.

Table V classifies the contacts first as to subject-matter under consideration. Fourteen different groupings of subject are included in the forty-four examples. On one subject, passage of the organic law, there were eleven different periods in which negotiations went on with individuals or groups outside the Institute. The Supplementary Agreement for U. N. aid to Turkey was the subject of external negotiations on nine known occasions, while seven times the choice of the director general was made the topic of discussion with outside officials. Budget negotiations with the Turkish administration are not included here because no record remains of any major discussion about the budget, with one exception in 1963. The details of that instance

Table V

PAITME
ANALYSIS OF 44 KNOWN EXTERNAL CONTACTS, 1951-64
(Ceremonial and student recruitment contacts not included)

OSTENSIBLE SUBJECT	Number of times raised	LINKAGES AGENCY OR PERSON INVOLVED								QUESTION RAISED BY				NATURE OF QUESTION				
		President	PAITME Staff	Prime Ministry	Foreign Ministry	Education Ministry	Business Ministry	Parliament	UN Headquarters	Other	PAITME Staff	President, Prime Minister or Ministry	UN Headquarters	Other or Unknown	Leading	Functional	Normative	Affuse
1. Passage of organic law	11	1	3	1	1	3	1	2		9			2	11				
2. UN Supplementary Agreement	9			1	1			1	8	1		8	1	9				
3. Choice of Director-General of PAITME	7		2	1	4	1				6	1				7			
4. Working Group business	3				2				1	2					3			
5. Concerning PAITME classes	3		1							2	1				3	2		
6. Formation of PAITME Academic Council	2						2			2				2	2			
7. AID assistance to PAITME	2			2	1					2			2	2	2	2		
8. Miscellaneous	7		1	3	4	1			1	3	3	1		4	4	3	1	
TOTALS	44	1	7	8	21	5	5	4	10	8	25	5	9	5	-	-	-	-

*Members of Working Group

Source: UN files, PAITME files, interviews

were too sparse to warrant its inclusion in the list. It is certain there were none but routine budget discussions until the year 1957, as has been explained previously. And the evidence indicates that at no point has the budget clearance within the administrative hierarchy been employed as the occasion for important decisions about program or personnel.

Table V further indicates the identity of the linkages under consideration. In twenty-one instances, or virtually half of those discovered, the Foreign Minister himself or high-ranking representatives of the Ministry were involved. This reflects the formal, hierarchical attachment of the Institute to that Ministry from 1952 through 1958. Through the Ministry PAITME conducted negotiations with the United Nations and later with U. S. AID. Before 1959 the Foreign Ministry also participated in the choice of directors general.

United Nations headquarters entered directly into discussions on ten known occasions, of which eight were connected with the problems of the Supplementary Agreement. Headquarters officials depended upon the Ankara TAB Representative and sometimes upon the local experts for most negotiations. The Office of the Prime Minister became involved eight times on seven different subjects. The Prime Minister himself is found to have been drawn into discussion on seven different occasions concerning four different subjects. The most flamboyant occasion was the opening ceremony, but his help was sought most frequently in gaining passage of the organic law. Neither in those cases nor when he was consulted about the post of director

general does it appear that he took the opportunity to make any clear decisions.

Table v indicates that the largest number of linkages have been established or employed on the question of the organic law--seven. Discussions of the Supplementary Agreement drew in five different agencies through the years, and the choice of the director general, four. On other questions there has been far less participation with the Turkish government.

Table V seems to mean what the narrative portion of this study also demonstrates: that few problems have ever been raised about the Institute other than by the Institute itself or by the United Nations. Thirty-four of the total of 44 instances were discussions initiated either by PAITME staff (25 occasions) or by the United Nations (nine occasions). Interpretation of this could run at least two ways: 1) that PAITME had a good reputation in the government and enjoys the confidence of higher officials; or 2) that higher officialdom are ignoring or forgetting it. In any case, the contacts located by this study have mostly been those raised by Institute officials. The United Nations contacts have mainly been attempts to change the regional character or the program. One infers that in at least half of these instances headquarters personnel were very dissatisfied with Institute operations but were unable, in final analysis, to do more than threaten the end of the Agreement or a stoppage in funds.

It is interesting that on only five of these occasions were questions about the Institute raised by

other Turkish government officials or agencies. In two instances the Prime Minister's Office intervened to question the propriety of U. N. actions with regard to the Institute. Once the Turkish government asked the United Nations not to publish a report by a former co-director, and the report was suppressed. So these instances of the exercise of initiative were specific in nature.

Finally, in Table V a rough attempt has been made to divide the 44 cases along the broad lines of the linkages suggested by the Esman-Blaise "Concepts" paper for the Consortium. In judging whether a particular case could be considered an enabling linkage, the question was posed: is the allocation of the authority or resources of the Institute at issue? In testing whether a functional linkage was present, the question was: are the Institute's inputs and outputs at issue? For the case of normative linkages it was asked, are norms and values of doctrine and program at issue? Finally, for diffused linkages, it was asked: are environmental or societal problems involved--public opinion, news media, etc.? Asked in this fashion, it soon became clear the subjects under discussion determined the nature of the linkage in each case.

In 21 of 44 cases, the linkage was primarily enabling in nature. In eleven instances, the linkage was primarily functional. In only one instance was the linkage primarily normative, and in one instance it could be called primarily diffuse. In the 10 remaining instances two or more linkages seemed to be indicated. In six of these cases two linkages seemed to be involved, while in four examples there appeared to be three kinds of linkages in view.

Normative and diffuse linkages were particularly difficult to identify in the cases examined here, and that is of course precisely what one might expect. It is easily possible that both underlie everyone of the 44 cases in latent form. Explicit questions about norms seem rarely to have been directed outside the Institute by its officials nor are outsiders asking such questions of the Institute. Fear and uncertainty about doctrinal norms may lie just below the surface of practically all external relationships, however.

Epilogue

The data collected in this study indicate that Turkish authorities and scholars may have been convinced, in the period since 1952, that there are "problems" with the public administration in that country. We cannot conclude that these problems were perceived as especially serious, if the training measures that have been taken to reduce them are any indication of the perceptions. It is of course obvious that training for public administration has not been taken as a principal means of attacking any problems top leadership has identified. At any rate we are forced by the data at hand to conclude that the challenge offered by the United Nations in the early fifties for Turkey to create its own explicit doctrine of public administration has not been picked up. One does not lay the blame for this condition on the PAITME doorstep alone, but one concludes that the Institute has scarcely been a strong force in any search for such a doctrine or in disseminating norms in this wide field of public administration.

Nonetheless the Westernization or modernization process has been going on, for one can identify changes that have occurred in the intervening years. There is a Professor of Public Administration at the Political Science Faculty and undergraduates there are pursuing courses in the field. The Faculty of Administrative Sciences in the Middle East Technical University¹ also is educating young people in this field at the undergraduate level. A number of other governmental organizations are working in the training of administrators today. Most ministries now provide pre-entry or in-service training for specific groups of their employees. For example, the Ministry of Interior has a school for district governors; the Ministry of Education trains teachers; several categories of personnel are trained in Ministry of Finance schools and courses; and there are other courses for the fields of navigation, agriculture, forestry, and more. Certain of these in-service as well as full-time courses are open to trainees from outside the public service. And in the private sector there is a Business Administration Institute within the University of Istanbul and an Interdepartmental Productivity Center. Both offer a variety of courses in which a sizable proportion of the participants come from the state economic enterprises.

Glaringly absent from all, however, are courses for general administrators and courses which cater to kinds of

¹METU was established in 1957 with United Nations, United States, and other assistance. The Dean of Administration is a former Assistant General Director at PAITME and doçent at the Faculty of Political Science.

personnel found in several different ministries or organizations. These two needs do not seem to be met by the work of the Institute of Public Administration, neither in scope nor in size of output. Recent legislation for public personnel administration includes provisions explicitly aimed at remedying this situation.

A State Personnel Law was passed on July 14, 1965, after more than a decade of efforts to gain its acceptance. The law provides for a general reform of the entire personnel system, and one may identify in its provisions ideas and influences drawn from American, English, French, and other practices abroad. If the law can be successfully implemented, indeed, we will have for the first time in many years some radical changes in administrative practices, changes which appear to the outsider to be aimed at Turkish problems identified by Turkish administrators and lawmakers. Individual staff members at PAITME were instrumental in preparing and criticizing some of the early drafts of this new statute. The final campaign for its drafting and passage was the responsibility mainly of the State Personnel Board that was created in the wake of the Revolution of 1960-1961. Two Institute staff members worked on the classification system that was to be effected in 1966. There has however been very little communication between PAITME and the State Personnel Board at any time since 1961, although both are sub-units of the Prime Ministry.

The State Personnel Department is required by the new law to develop a "general plan for training civil servants" upon the advice of several governmental organizations and ministries, including the Institute of Public Administration,

and subject to the approval of the Council of Ministers. Further, the law requires departments "to sponsor training programs for their civil servants in accordance with the . . . 'Training Rules and Regulations'" to be prepared by the State Personnel Department. Each department of government must create a "training unit" to organize, conduct and evaluate training activities, and they may open training centers to meet their own training needs. Inter-departmental training centers may be opened "at the suggestion of the State Personnel Department upon decree of the Council of Ministers." Indeed, all of these activities are to be under the coordination and supervision of the State Personnel Department.¹

The Western influence in these provisions for administrative training are patent, strong evidence of the increased effectiveness of norms from "public administration" as even an American knows it. The law describes devices and procedures for carrying out the kind of broad mandate that was available to the Institute of Public Administration as early as 1953. That organization will apparently, however, participate in the subsequent development of these new training programs only to the extent it gears into the plans of the State Personnel Department. Formal leadership in training from now on will rest in the Department. A rumor in early 1966 was that PAMTE would perhaps be assigned a new task for post-entry training of recruits in a new

¹See Government of Turkey, Prime Ministry, State Personnel Department "State Personnel Law," July 14, 1965, Part VII (English version from Sanat Matbaasi, Ankara, 1965).

administrative class that may be created along lines of the English Administrative Class. How the established programs of the Institute will be affected remains to be seen.

Cemal Mihçioğlu, since 1963 Professor of Public Administration in the Political Science Faculty, became the fifth General Director of PAITME in March, 1965. He took over an organization stronger in budget and staff terms than at any time in its thirteen year history. The new State Personnel Law had scarcely touched the traditional programs of the Institute and it therefore seemed to be continuing on the course it had gradually assumed through the years. The vision of 1952-1953 had not however been realized. One concludes PAITME has become institutionalized at a much more modest level than its founders had hoped.

APPENDIXES

Appendix I

Course Offerings at PAITME for Selected Years

1952: Recommended by the Working Group

Once the programme has been drawn up, instruction will be divided into three categories:

- (i) Compulsory subjects of a general nature.
- (ii) Compulsory special subjects corresponding to the various sections of public administration.
- (iii) Optional specialized subjects.

These will be arranged as follows:

(i) General instruction

Comparative civil law (people and their duties)
 Comparative commercial law
 Comparative maritime law
 Comparative administrative law
 Comparative constitutional law
 Comparative public international law
 Comparative private international law
 Comparative social legislation
 Comparative economic legislation
 Modern economic policy (comparison of various systems)
 The idea of individual freedom in comparative law (policy, justice, penitentiary systems . . .)

(ii) Instruction on Turkey and the Middle East

History of Turkish and Middle-Eastern institutions
 Economic and human geography of Turkey and the Middle East

(iii) Instruction on the United Nations

The United Nations and its specialized agencies
 International technical assistance
 The international official

(iv) Instruction on financial matters

The State budget
 A thorough and practical study of the budget of a technical branch of the Administration (Posts, Telegraphs and Telephones, for example)
 Study of the budget of a State or State-controlled economic institution
 Study of the budget of a private enterprise (preparation and interpretation of balance sheet)
 Study of the budget of a foreign State and, possibly, of a People's Democracy
 Modern accounting (principles and application)

(v) Economic and social instruction

The budgets of public enterprises and the national economy
 Population and demographic problems
 Public health
 Environment (labour and rural problems)
 Public education
 Professional organizations (trade unions etc.)
 Settlement of people: displaced persons

(vi) Instruction on personnel questions

Staff management (public and private)
 Team work (principles and methods)
 Study of the status of officials in the different countries of the world
 The personal responsibility of the official
 The problem of output
 Great officials (lectures on well-known people who have brought their country renown in the public service)
 Appeal against the administration
 The use of psychotechnique
 Public relations
 Staff administration (comparative study)

(vii) Instruction on general administrative problems

Purchase and distribution of supplies and control of their use
 Negotiations for public works (examination and preparation of a specification---tenders---allocation . . .) studied from the point of view of the administration and of the enterprise in question

(viii) Instruction on organization problems and methods

Filing and classification, and records
 Multicopying (practical studies)
 Drafting of letters and reports---preparation of official documents---administrative style
 The office: organization and methods
 The establishment and use of statistics
 Distribution of responsibilities and work
 Delegation of authority and of signature
 Modern processes for the reproduction of texts
 The art of public speaking (principles, methods, exercises)
 Planning

(xi) Instruction on local administration

Local communities: administration and budget
 The staffs of local communities
 Their relations with the State and the public

(x) Instruction on diplomatic history

The foreign policy of a leading Power
 The foreign policy of a Middle-Eastern country
 The history of treaties

(xi) Instruction in foreign languages

1955-56:

Subject

PREPARATORY COURSES (October 3 - 26)

- Geography of Turkey
- Fundamentals of Economics and Finance
- Introduction to Political Structure of Turkey and the Middle East
- Introduction to Administrative Structure of Turkey and the Middle East
- Introduction to Legal Structure of Turkey and the Middle East

BASIC COURSES (November 1 - March 15)

- Principles of Public Administration
- Organization and Methods
- Personnel Administration
- Financial Management
- The Role of Law in Modern Administration

1959-60: First year under the organic law

<u>Subject</u>	<u>Preparatory Courses</u> <u>Hours</u>	<u>Basic Courses</u> <u>Hours</u>
<u>For Groups A and B (*)</u>		
Geography of Turkey	5	
Social and Cultural Structure and Problems of Turkey	15	
Social Security in Turkey	10	
Turkish Government (Including Administration)	20	
Economic Structure of Turkey (Including Financial Structure)	30	
Legal Structure of Turkey	20	
<u>For Group B only</u>		
Basic Legal Institutions	30	
Theoretical and Applied Economics	30	
Principles of Public Administration		30
Personnel Administration.		35
Human Relations in Administration		20
Financial Administration		40
Turkish Administrative Institutions (Comparative)		30
Organization and Methods.		50
Role and Law in Modern Administration		40
Administrative Contracts.		20
Statistics.		20

(*) Group A includes graduates of Academic Institutions granting an education in the political sciences, economics and law. Group includes graduates of the Technical University, Medical Schools, Military Academies, Teacher's Colleges and other institutions of higher learning which do not give sufficient training in political sciences, economics and law.

1965-66:

1. Semester (November 1 - January 15)

Principles of Public Administration
Organization and Methods
Personnel Administration

2. Semester (January 26 - May 7)

Managerial Accounting
Economic Problems
Administrative Problems
Social Problems
Statistics for the Administrator
Finance for the Administrator

Appendix II
FOREIGN EXPERTS AT PAITME
1952-1966

Name	Nationality	Teacher	Practitioner	Specialty	Known PA publications	Time in PAITME	Comments
E. E. Olson	U.S.	X		General PA	Yes	5 months	Includes study time in 51
H. Bourdeau de Fontenay	French	X	X	General PA	Yes	2 months	Director of ENA
G. W. J. Drewes	Dutch	X		Oriental St.		2 months	
F. J. Tickner	U. K.		X	Personnel		2 months	U. N. headquarters staff
G. L. Becksher	Sweden	X		General PA	Yes	1 year	Acting Co-Director
C. L. Lockman	Canada		X	O and M		1 year	
L. J. Rodger	Canada		X	Personnel		1 year	
J. H. Textor	Dutch		X	Accounting		1 year	
M. E. Dimock	U. S.	X	X	General PA	Yes	1 year	Co-Director
L. G. Harvey	U. S.	X		O and M	Yes	1 year	
J. B. Kingsbury	U. S.	X		Personnel	Yes	1 year	
A. Key	Dutch		X	Pub. Fin.		1 year	
E. Egli	Swiss	X		Planning	Yes	2 years	
A. H. Hanson	U. K.	X		General PA	Yes	1 year	Research director
L. K. Caldwell	U. S.	X		General PA	Yes	1 year	Co-Director
R. V. Presthus	U. S.	X		General PA	Yes	1 year	Research director
L. Talloen	Belgium	X		Personnel		1 year	Sole lady expert
E. Olsson	Sweden		X	O and M		1 year	
G. F. Evans-Vaughan	U. K.	X	X	Personnel		1 year	Co-Director
N. C. Angus	N. Zeal.		X	General PA		2 years	
L. L. Barber	U. S.	X		O and M.		2 years	Co-Director
G. S. Birkhead	U. S.	X		General PA	Yes	1 year	Research director
H. Peron	France		X	Pub. Fin.		1 year	
M. Chailloux-Dantel	France	X	X	Personnel	Yes	3 years	Research director
W. Jungwirth	Austria		X	Local Govt.		2 years	
T. W. Ellison	U. K.		X	O and M		1 year	
G. B. Crichton	U. K.		X	O and M		2 years	
D. M. Watters	Canada		X			2 years	
J. W. Foster	U. K.		X	O and M		5 years	Still at PAITME, 1966
Ivan Asay	U. S.		X	O and M.		3 years	Bi-lateral U.S. aid
M. R. P. Gregson	U. K.		X	Personnel		1 year	
Paul Bouteille	France	X	X	General PA		3 years	Bi-lateral French aid

Note: information as of each man's time at PAITME

Appendix III

COMMENT ON METHODOLOGY

This study was undertaken as a secondary effort by the Syracuse staff who started out to examine the Pakistan Administrative Staff College, with which they had an institutional connection. The only previous connection with the Turkish Institute was Mr. Birkhead's service there during 1955-56 as the United Nations Director of Research. When the Pakistan study was obviated by the September War of 1965, this Turkish endeavor became the only possibility for cooperating in the Consortium study. Authorities in Ankara were willing to allow the study if not to cooperate enthusiastically in it.

From the first an important dimension of the potential data-gathering had to be left up to the Turks. A study of the student graduates of the Institute began before this study did. Thus it was impossible to duplicate it, although we succeeded in getting agreement from the Institute that we could see their data which were scheduled to appear about December, 1965. Although that deadline was optimistic, it was not envisioned that they would still be far from completing collation of the data in September, 1966. But they are.

The Syracuse Staff planned a study of linkages by administration of a questionnaire to a random cross-section of agency heads in Turkish governmental and public enterprise administrations. As it was mailed to Turkey, a "scandal" was hitting the newspapers there. An entirely unrelated, American researcher's questionnaire aimed at top administrators was seized upon by the editor of Cumhuriyet, a leading newspaper, apparently as a way of hitting at the President and administration of the Middle East Technical University. A resulting directive from the Prime Minister made it patently impossible to administer our questionnaire.

This is therefore a second-best product. There is no pretense at methodological contribution, to our distress. There is possibly some substantive particular which will add insight to the analysis of institution-building problems.

I. A. Key Concepts	B. Disaggregation into sub-concepts, elements, properties.	C. Data collection methods, includ-sources, etc.	D. Data analysis methods, etc.
<p>vii</p> <p>Leadership</p>	<p>1. Persons: a. in roles of legitimate authority</p> <p>1) superior to subject organization</p> <p>2) in subject organization</p> <p>3) in related foreign organization (see, below, "enabling linkages")</p> <p>b. in other roles,</p> <p>all considered as to</p> <p>a. nature of role</p> <p>b. training, education, and experience</p> <p>c. nature of decisions taken</p> <p>d. display of loyalty to which organization?</p> <p>2. Organizations:</p> <p>a. superior in hierarchy</p> <p>b. subunits within subject organization</p> <p>c. other (see also "enabling linkages," below)</p>	<p>1. Examination of United Nations and PAITME files</p> <p>2. Depth interviews of estimated 65 persons, partly with questionnaire, 1/4/66, "UNAPITME Experts"; nos. 4-10, 12a.</p> <p>3. Mail questionnaire, same, to estimated 22 other individuals</p> <p>4. On "Leadership" the crux of the analysis was the question, "Who really decided _____?" So leadership in this paper is apparently coterminous with the employment of "power," loosely defined.</p> <p>5. Leadership as the promulgation or support of doctrine is thus subsumed under "Doctrine," below.</p>	<p>1. All these were narrative and factual questions, to extent used.</p>
<p>Doctrine</p>	<p>1. Doctrine was accepted in its general sense as theory composed of separate ideas or principles. In final analysis no clear doctrine existed here: instead we have the ideas of "public administration from the U. S., U. K., and Western Europe.</p> <p>2. Social science research methods (in PAITME research section)</p>	<p>1. Inspection of written and printed records, including research reports.</p> <p>2. Depth interviews.</p> <p>3. Questionnaire, 1/4/66, nos. 1, 3, 12b</p>	<p>1. Traditional</p>

A.	B.	C.	D.
Internal structure	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Formal 2. "Informal" (other) 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Published reports, laws. 2. Depth interviews as cited under "Leadership," above 3. Questionnaire, 1/4/66, nos. 2,6-9, 12d 	<p>A confidential questionnaire might have explored informal organization under other circumstances.</p>
Program	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Institution's own breakdown -- training courses (regular, O & N, etc.) research documentation 2. Student perception of program 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. General statements of program objectives 2. All curricula and some course outlines were available. 3. Observation also used 4. Interviews cited above 5. Questionnaire 345, part III, was intended to cover present and past student body 6. PAITME's own study instrument, nos. 17-21, vaguely hit this point 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Traditional 2. The two questionnaires were designed for simple statistical analysis.
Resources	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Personnel 2. Financial 3. Prestige, status, standing (see, below, "Diffuse linkages") 4. Formal authority might also be termed a resource, but this usage had no particular point in this case 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Records at PAITME and in UN. 2. Interviews 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Traditional
Enabling linkages	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Sources of authority wielded by subject organization: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. legal b. intellectual c. informal (power centers) 2. Sources of funds and personnel 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Laws, international agreements, orders and regulations. 2. Personnel and budgetary reports and analyses. 3. Questionnaire 1/4/66, nos. 1, 5-10, 12 d-c 4. Interviews described above 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Traditional

A.	B.	C.	D.
ix Normative linkages	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Sources of norms as to individual behavior 2. Sources of norms as to institutional (i.e., organizational) behavior, including also research techniques. 3. Both the above with reference to the Western doctrines of public administration and various statements about what might be desirable in Turkey 4. Acceptance by students of what they perceive as norms. 5. Opinions of employers of students as to adoption of norms. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. General knowledge about Western public administration. 2. Written statements about PAITME, and by its staff 3. Questionnaire 1/4/66, nos. 3, 12 4. Questionnaire 3/45, nos. 1-21, Part III. 5. PAITME questionnaire, nos. 18.1, 22, 24-32 5. Agency head questionnaire, generally. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Traditional. 2. Each question was designed simple static analysis.
Functional linkages	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Sources of funds and staff personnel, when total of either is not in question 2. Sources of students (organizations) 3. Employers of graduates (organizations or individual in authoritative role) 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Same general sources of information as noted under preceding two types of linkages. For example, we may speak of an input and output of norms. Further, money is not only enabling but is also functional. This comment underlines the uncertainty of distinctions among linkages, in retrospect. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Same as two preceding lin
Diffuse linkages	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Formal public relations program 2. Publications and publications program 3. Unforeseen ties (!) 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. So little press and public relations consciousness was found that this linkage was not really found important in this study. 	
Strategic decisions (in this case, <u>identifiable</u> decisions)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. See pp. 110 ff. of project report, where forty-four instances of "substantial discussions" were analyzed. This simple exercise underlined for the authors the utility of proceeding inductive to the classification of linkages. Further it seemed to indicate the impossibility in many cases of separating linkages into the four types included in the Consortium hypotheses as originally stated. In any event it taught us that the nature of any given linkage is determined more by the substance involved and less by the identity of the external person or organization involved. 		

A.	B.	C.	D.
<p>Time dimension</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Original conception of the basic idea of the institution (organization) 2. Agreement by those in authoritative roles on its creation 3. Provision of funds and staff 4. Establishment of legal and constitutional basis (organic law) 5. Changes in formal leadership 6. Changes in enabling linkages (organizational, funding, etc.) 7. Dates of effective operating of authorized functions 8. Status of subject organization as of various specific changes in environment 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. These all stem from as complete analysis of historical record, laws, environmental factors, as is possible. <p style="text-align: center;">In retrospect, one can find little about these problems that has been added by this study.</p>	
<p>Degree of institutionality</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Perceptions of: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. Persons in authoritative roles in the government, the institution itself, etc. b. Foreign staff c. Student output d. Employers of students e. Public 2. Legal status 3. Funding and personnel situation 4. Literature on public administration in Turkey 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. In retrospect, the chief conclusion about institutionality relates to perception. If our study had been successful, we would have gotten from the various questionnaire already listed here, perceptions as to role and importance of PAITME from the following: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. random cross-section of current agency heads, that is, employers of PAITME's graduates; b. student graduates 2. Investigation of general studies and critiques of public administration in Turkey, 1950-65. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Traditional. 2. We had expected some opinion analyses, to be our best contribution.

II. Conceptualization

A. Perhaps the most useful insights gained from this study were those related to the Consortium concept of "doctrine." So much can be explained about the Public Administration Institute for Turkey and the Middle East in terms of the confused, ill-defined doctrinal goals that were assigned to it. The leadership and the staff to this day have not succeeded in making them operational to any significant extent. The obvious connections between doctrine and leadership also seemed to become clearer in this study. Possibly, if they had possessed stronger resources of a personal or intellectual nature, the leaders in this Turkish enterprise might have been able to operate better in the absence of clear-cut doctrine. That is a point for speculation. In this case, however: 1) doctrine was ambiguous; 2) it was not understood by Turks in the key positions; 3) none of them took the time or opportunity (perhaps even had the capacity) to make it better understood; 4) doctrine was never clearly related to any specific needs of administration; 5) it was never made clear how to identify such needs and thus how doctrine might be adjusted to potential needs or new doctrine evolved

B. The following hypotheses are suggested as emanating from this study: a new organization in an environment like that of Turkey, 1950-65, has a better chance of succeeding if --

- 1) the doctrine it embodies is identifiable;
- 2) the doctrine relates to actual and recognized conditions in the host country, as perceived by persons in power;
- 3) persons in recognized roles of legitimate authority support the norms (doctrine) and the institution (support may of course be either overt or covert);
- 4) leaders of the organization (institution) understand and support the norms (doctrine);
- 5) its leadership are separated from roles in other institutions, at least roles related to the promulgation of the same doctrine;
- 6) possible competition from other institutions is at least explicitly recognized at every stage of development;
- 7)

III. Analytical methods

1. Linkage mapping was a subject directly relevant to our access to United Nations and PAITME files. We reluctantly did not attempt it, because we clearly saw that both sets of files were very incomplete. any conclusions would have been highly tenuous.

2. The analysis of discussion contacts made in Table V (following p. 117) is only most generally an analysis of decisions. We know it is incomplete. It may or may not be an accurate sample. Our guess is that it is. In such event, it may be a worthwhile technique.

INTERVIEW GUIDE
(STAFF MEMBERS OF PAITME)

Part I: Biographical Data:

1. Name
2. Date
3. Present position
4. Number of years in present position
5. Prior positions, dates held
6. Educational Experience
7. Other qualifications
8. How were you recruited to your position on the staff of this institution?
9. How long do you intend to stay in your present position?
10. What are your plans for the future?

Part II: Interview Data:

1. What subjects do you teach here?
2. What teaching methods do you use?
3. What do you perceive as the basic aims of the training program here?
4. Do these aims seem to you to be appropriate? Do they seem realistic?
5. How does your role here implement these aims?
6. How successful do you think you are in your work here?
7. How has the program changed since you have been here?
8. Are the resources at your disposal adequate to the tasks for which you are responsible?
9. What changes would you make in the program here, if you were free to make them?
10. How effective are the other staff members at your level?
11. How effective are those above you?
12. How effective are those below you?

1. Approximately how many persons whose duties are primarily managerial are employed by your agency? _____

2. What proportion of these positions is filled from each of the following sources:

_____ % are promoted from lower ranks.

_____ % are recruited from colleges, universities and other business and professional schools.

_____ % are recruited from other government agencies.

_____ % are recruited from private business firms.

_____ % are from other sources (specify): _____

3. Do you have excessive difficulty filling these positions with men who are qualified and competent? _____ Yes _____ No

4. How highly do you value training (other than on-the-job training) for middle level executives?

low value _____ 1 : 2 : 3 : 4 : 5 : _____ high value

5. Do you have, in your agency, any systematic training program other than on-the-job training for middle level executives?

_____ Yes _____ No

6. Have employees of your agency been sent to the training programs offered by:

_____ (0) The Turkish Management Association (Turk Sevk ve Idare Dernegi)

_____ (1) The Amme Idaresi Enstitusu

_____ (2) The Isletme Iktisadi Enstitusu of Istanbul University

_____ (3) Other (Specify): _____

7. If any of your employees has attended the General Course of the Amme Idaresi Enstitusu, is it your impression that his on-the-job performance improved as a result of the course?

_____ Yes _____ No

8. What is your impression of the quality of the men who are selected to attend the General Course at the Amme Idaresi Enstitusu?

low quality _____ 1 : 2 : 3 : 4 : 5 : _____ high quality

9. How often would you like to see personnel from your agency attend the General Course of the Amme Idaresi Enstitusu?

_____ (0) Two or more persons each year.

_____ (1) One person each year.

_____ (2) One person every other year.

_____ (3) Every few years.

_____ (4) Not in the foreseeable future.