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The concept of Institution Building is an approach to the understanding of induced social change. It is also an effort to identify operational methods and action strategies that will be helpful to practitioners, to persons actively engaged as change agents, particularly in cross cultural situations. Institution is defined as a change-inducing and change-protecting formal organization. The Institution Building approach has a social engineering bias. Its root proposition is that a very large proportion of the most significant contemporary changes, especially in the developing countries, are deliberately planned and guided and can be distinguished from those that occur through gradual evolutionary processes or as the consequences of political or social revolution. It was decided that the most effective and feasible test of the research approach would be through case studies of actual field experiences which would permit the gathering and analysis of empirical data according to the concepts developed by the Institute Building Program. The four cases selected were the College of Education of the University of Nigeria, the Central University of Ecuador, the Institute of Public Administration at Thammasat University in Thailand, and the Institute of Public Administration for Turkey and the Middle East. The results of these studies represent an important increment to the knowledge of the processes of induced social change, and a significant testing of the institution building research approach. This paper attempts to analyze and compare the more salient findings, to suggest implications for the program's general approach to the institution building process, and to indicate future development of theory, methodology and practical application.

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IN

INSTITUTION BUILDING

THE INSTITUTION BUILDING CONCEPTS—
AN INTERIM APPRAISAL
By
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THE INSTITUTION BUILDING CONCEPTS - AN INTERIM APPRAISAL

By

Milton J. Esman

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THE INSTITUTION BUILDING CONCEPTS - AN INTERIM APPRAISAL

By Milton J. Esman

Introduction

The concept of Institution Building, as developed by the Inter-University Research Program in Institution Building, is an approach to the understanding of induced social change. It is also an effort to identify operational methods and action strategies that will be helpful to practitioners, to persons actively engaged as change agents, particularly in cross-cultural situations. The Inter-University Research Program defines institution building as "the planning, structuring, and guidance of new or reconstituted organizations which (a) embody changes in values, functions, physical and/or social technologies; (b) establish, foster, and protect normative relationships and action patterns; and (c) attain support and complimentarity in the environment."[1] Institution is defined not as a set of sanctioned norms like marriage or contract, nor as a sector of action like business or religion, but as a change-inducing and change-protecting formal organization.

The Institution Building approach has a pronounced social engineering bias. Its root proposition is that a very large proportion of the most significant contemporary changes, especially in the developing countries, are deliberately planned and guided and can be distinguished from those that occur through gradual evolutionary processes or as the consequence of political or social revolution. It further presupposes that the introduction of changes takes place primarily in and through formal organizations. These organizations symbolize, promote, sustain and protect

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[1] Milton J. Esman and Hans C. Blaise: Institution Building Research - The Guiding Concepts, University of Pittsburgh, GSPIA, 1966, (mimeo).

innovations, and it is these organizations as well as the new normative relationships and action patterns they foster which must become "institutionalized", meaningful, and valued in the societies in which they function.

The achievement and maintenance of institutionality involves a complex set of inter-actions between the organization and its environment, the organization being required to accommodate to its environment in order to survive while simultaneously attempting to introduce and to guide significant changes in that same environment. Environments vary in terms of their change readiness and change resistance and these qualities may shift decisively over time.

The group of scholars which assembled in Pittsburgh in November, 1962, to explore the concept of institution building, found itself in basic agreement with these core ideas.[2] They felt that they were not only potentially significant as an approach to the process of social change, but might also contribute to the development of operational guidelines for technical assistance activities in developing countries in which many of them, as well as the university they represented, had active and long-standing interests. A group of the participants at that conference agreed to form a working committee to explore institution building in greater depth with the intention of developing a set of guiding concepts and a research format which could be used and tested by scholars from several universities. It was their hope that the cumulative findings of research activities disciplined by a common conceptual framework and ultimately a common set of research instruments could begin to build a valid theory and generate useful guides to action. In a series of week-end meetings extending over a period of several months, the working party hammered out a set of guiding concepts which were given wide circulation in the academic community and among interested practitioners. The formation of the Inter-University Research Program was made possible by a preliminary grant from the Ford Foundation in June, 1963, followed by a substantial grant in September, 1964. These grants

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[2]The original ideas were set forth by this author in a paper presented to this conference which was published in abbreviated form as "Institution Building in National Development" in the December, 1962, issue of the International Development Review.

permitted the financing of a large number of field research projects
disciplined by this common set of guiding concepts. The four cases
which are being transmitted with this report were sponsored by a
grant from the Agency for International Development on December 31, 1964.
This is the first group of studies under the Inter-University Program
which is ready for publication and for scrutiny by scholars and practitioners.

The research framework ,which has guided the Institution Building
Program to date and which was the point of departure for the cases which
are summarized in this report, contains the following basic elements.

1. A set of "institution variables" which attempt "to explain
the systematic behavior of the institution" as an organization. These
five clusters of institution variables are:

(a) Leadership, defined as "the group of persons who are
actively engaged in the formulation of the doctrine and
program of the institution and who direct its operations and
relationships with the environment." Leadership is
considered to be the single most critical element in
institution building because deliberately induced change
processes require intensive, skillful, and highly committed
management both of internal and of environmental relationships.
Leadership is considered primarily as a group process in
which various roles such as representation, decision-
making, and operational control can be distributed in a
variety of patterns among the leadership group. The leadership
group comprises both the holders of formally designated
leadership positions as well as those who exercise
important continuing influence over the institution's
activities. A number of leadership properties are identified
as variables, among them political viability, professional
status, technical competence, organizational competence,
and continuity. High ranking on each of these properties
is expected to correlate with leadership success.

(b) Doctrine, defined as "the specification of values, objectives,
and operational methods underlying social action." Doctrine
is regarded as a series of themes which project,both
within the organization itself and in its external environment,

a set of images and expectations of institutional goals and styles of action. Among the sub-variables which seem to be significant for the effectiveness of doctrine are specificity, relationship to (or deviation from) existing norms, and relationship to (emerging) societal preferences and priorities.

(c) Program, defined as "those actions which are related to the performance of functions and services constituting the output of the institution." The program thus is the translation of doctrine to concrete patterns of action and the allocation of energies and other resources within the institution itself and in relationship to the external environment. The sub-variables which were identified as relevant to the program or output function of the institution are consistency, stability, and contribution to societal needs.

(d) Resources, defined as "the financial, physical, human, technological, (and informational) inputs of the institution." Quite obviously the problems involved in mobilizing and in ensuring the steady and reliable availability of these resources affect every aspect of the institution's activities and represent an important preoccupation of all institutional leadership. Two very broad sub-variables are identified in the original conceptualization--availability and sources.

(e) Internal Structure, defined as "the structure and processes established for the operation of the institution and for its maintenance." The distribution of roles within the organization, its internal authority patterns and communications systems, the commitment of personnel to the doctrine and program of the organization, affect its capacity to carry out programmatic commitments. Among the sub-variables identified in this cluster are identification (of participants with the institution and its doctrine), consistency, and adaptability.

2. The second category of variables are the linkages -- "the interdependencies which exist between an institution and other relevant parts of the society." The institutionalized organization does not exist in isolation; it must establish and maintain a network of complementarities in its environment in order to survive and to function. The environment, in turn, is not regarded as a generalized mass, but rather as a set of discrete structures with which the subject institution must interact. The institution must maintain a network of exchange relationships with a limited number of organizations and engage in transactions for the purposes of gaining support, overcoming resistance, exchanging resources, structuring the environment, and transferring norms and values. Particularly significant are the strategies and tactics by which institutional leadership attempts to manipulate or accommodate to these linkage relationships. To facilitate analysis, four types of linkages are identified: (a) enabling linkages "with organizations and social groups which control the allocation of authority and resources needed by the institution to function"; (b) functional linkages, "with those organizations performing functions and services which are complementary in a production sense, which supply the inputs and which use the outputs of the institution"; (c) normative linkages, "with institutions which incorporate norms and values (positive or negative) which are relevant to the doctrine and program of the institution"; and (d) diffused linkages, "with elements in the society which cannot clearly be identified by membership in formal organizations".

3. "Institutionality" as the end state is an evaluative variable - a standard for appraising the success of institution building efforts. The concept of institutionality denotes that "at least certain relationships and action patterns incorporated in the organization are normative both within the organization and for other social units, and that some support and complementarity in the environment have been attained." Within this rather generalized definition a number of tests of institutionality are identified, among them ability to survive -- a necessary but not sufficient condition of institutionality; being viewed in its environment as having intrinsic value which in turn can be tested by the autonomy the institution has gained; the influence which it exercises; and the spread effect of its activities -- whether specific relationships

and action patterns embodied in the organization have become normative for other social units with which it interacts.

This very abbreviated summary of the guiding concepts indicates the social engineering and action oriented bias of this research enterprise. If the institution building man -- our counterpart to the classical economic man -- manages his internal relationships and his external linkages skillfully, then his prospect for building a new institution or restructuring an existing one, and for managing successfully the introduction and assimilation of changes in his environment, will be high. His main limitation, in this case, will be the degree of change resistance in his environment. One of the main propositions tested in these first four cases was the utility or the feasibility of this highly rationalistic model, in view of the varied circumstances, complex relationships, and continuous environmental changes under which institution building efforts were being attempted.

For those who may expect too much from this admittedly ambitious institution building approach, a word of caution may be useful: "The focus here is on the process of .... deliberate change. This conceptual framework does not lend itself to the analysis of the gradual adaptation of organizations to ongoing internal and external pressures and conflicts, nor to the problems of organizational maintenance over time." Thus while this analytical framework claims to be generic in that it can be used to analyze deliberate efforts to induce change through the vehicle of organizations in any culture and for activities in any sector, its utility is confined to the institution building process and it may be of only limited utility in analyzing processes of organizational maintenance or the gradual adaptation of institutions to changing circumstances.

Though the basic model does not deal explicitly with the role of external technical assistance in the institution building process, it is very much on the minds of those who designed it. Under current conditions a very large number of the most significant efforts at institution building are accompanied by an important external assistance element; this was specifically true of the four cases transmitted by this paper. The distribution of roles among insiders and outsiders, indigenous personnel and foreign assistance personnel, in the management of institution building efforts,is an explicit concern of this research

enterprise even though many important efforts at institution building involve little or no external assistance; and the external assistance, when it is available, is only one element influencing this complex process.

Because the concept of institution building has developed such currency over the past several years and because its own technical assistance activities are so closely tied to institution building objectives, the Agency for International Development agreed to finance these first four field studies, one by each of the members of the Inter-University Program. The purposes of this grant were to determine whether the conceptual framework developed by the Inter-University Research Program could be operationalized for field research; whether the basic concepts held up under empirical testing; and whether they could be further extended and refined. These field investigations would provide an opportunity to test different methodologies for data gathering and analysis and to develop research instruments, anticipating the possibility of future standardization. Finally, these case studies would refine and enrich the conceptual equipment of the program and generate hypotheses for future testing by scholars from the member universities and by others who might wish to draw on this research model. It was decided that the most effective and feasible test of this research approach would be through case studies of actual field experiences which would permit the gathering and analysis of empirical data according to the concepts developed by the Institution Building Program. Each of the member universities selected one experience in which its own faculty had been recently engaged or was still involved in a technical assistance role. This ensured ready access to data and the availability of the researcher's recent and first-hand knowledge of the field situation. Each of the four cases was related to a category of institution building activity which had been identified by the program for priority attention.

The four cases selected were the College of Education of the University of Nigeria with Professor John W. Hanson of Michigan State University as principal researcher; the Central University of Ecuador in which Professor Hans Blaise of the University of Pittsburgh was the principal researcher; the Institute of Public Administration at Thammasat University in Thailand, with Professor William Siffin of Indiana University as principal researcher; and the Institute of Public Administration for Turkey and the Middle East in which Professor Guthrie Birkhead of

Syracuse University was the principal researcher. In the fourth case, because of the outbreak of war between India and Pakistan, Professor Birkhead was required suddenly to shift from the Administrative Staff College at Lahore, West Pakistan, which he had originally planned to study, to the Turkish Institute with which he had been associated as a U.N. advisor a decade before.

It should be noted that each of these principal researchers is an experienced scholar and researcher of undisputed standing in his field. Blaise and Siffin have been working from the very beginning with the development of the institution building concepts and research schemes which guided all four studies. These field investigations provided them with the opportunity to test a research model which they had helped to devise. Hanson and Birkhead were co-opted into this program, but spent many hours at meetings of the Program's Executive Board as well as with colleagues at their own universities and at research headquarters in Pittsburgh. Both these newcomers report that the institution building approach proved to be a useful framework for conceptualizing and organizing their own investigations and both of them have made significant contributions to the refinement and further development of these concepts. Indeed their success in applying the institution building scheme has added an important measure of confidence in the utility of this approach.

The results of the first four studies are now available. Each one is a substantial, interesting, and skillfully analyzed case study of a recent institution building experience. Each of them could well stand on its own merits. In combination they represent an important increment to our knowledge of the processes of induced social change, and a significant testing of the institution building research approach. When the Executive Board of the Institution Building Research Program, reinforced by several research administrators and scholars from other universities, met at Albion, Michigan, on the week-end of April 28, 1966, to review in depth the preliminary findings of these four research studies, it was apparent that important work had been done. The combined effect of these four intensive studies, following the same basic set of concepts, but free to test and refine them, to introduce new variables, and to experiment with a variety of methods for gathering and analyzing

data, had demonstrated the power of the institution building approach. This set the stage for the next phase of this interdisciplinary, inter-university effort which will focus on the more precise testing of hypotheses, on cross-sectional studies of discrete groups of variables in the institution building process, and on the standardization of research methodologies.

This paper cannot pretend to summarize the richness of experience reported in these four case studies or the insights and inferences produced by their analyses. What it attempts to do is to analyze and compare some of the researchers' more salient findings; to suggest implications for the program's general approach to the institution building process and to the basic concepts which were their common point of departure; and to indicate where these studies point for the future development of theory, methodology, and practical application. In other words, what have we learned from these first four case studies and what do they suggest for the future agenda of the Inter-University Research Program?

It would not be useful for me to merely summarize these
four cases. For a full appreciation one must read them individually;
indeed the reader should not embark on this evaluative summary until
after he has familiarized himself with the original data as reported
and interpreted by the four authors. There is substantial risk in
attempting to abstract from these four studies those findings and
judgments which will enable us to evaluate the main analytical cate-
gories by which we have ordered our basic research model. This, however,
is my assigned task, a preliminary effort to assess the contribution
of these case studies to institution building theory. In this process
I have been greatly aided by two factors: each of the authors attempted,
with almost complete success, to organize their own research and
analysis around the main analytical categories which comprise the
institution building research scheme; in addition, each of them pre-
pared a methodological appendix in which he identified the conceptual
and methodological lessons emerging from his own research effort. The
purpose of this paper, therefore, is not to summarize but rather to
analyze and evaluate; to draw inferences and hypotheses for future
research, for the development of theory, the application of methodology,
and the identification of action strategies, from the four cases which
provide the raw material for this paper. For the convenience of those
who are interested in the implications of these four studies for in-
stitution building theory, this paper will be organized according to
the categories of our guiding concepts.

The first of these is leadership. The key hypothesis that the
success of an institution building enterprise varies directly with the
competence and commitment of its leadership group appears to have
been substantiated in all four cases. This is a quite plausible pro-
position because of the energy and the skill required to build new
organizations or restructure old ones, and to initiate and manage a
set of complex relationships with a group of linked organizations which
may initially be hostile to or at least skeptical of the new organization
and the changes it is attempting to introduce.

The normative institution building model evokes the image of leadership which is operationally competent, committed to a change-oriented doctrine, and actively seeking to achieve programmatic goals by building a strong organizational base and extending its influence to other linked organizations. Such leadership, alas, was available in only one of the four cases in this group. While the leadership of the College of Education at the University of Nigeria was almost a perfect prototype of the institution building model, the leadership in Thailand and, during the first stage, in Ecuador was not committed to any fundamental change objectives, nor was it prepared to run any risk even on behalf of those changes to which it had a personal commitment. Its style was accommodative. In the case of Turkey, the leadership was entirely passive, uncommitted to any change objectives or even to the institution itself except as an object to be exploited. Indeed the leadership in Turkey was selected virtually by default. Both in Thailand and in Turkey, the heads of the institutions studied in these reports did not occupy their positions full-time, but instead held their primary positions and owed primary allegiance to older institutions whose established interests imposed severe constraints on the innovative propensities of the newer organizations. The leadership in Ecuador, in the first stage, was also strongly influenced by, identified with, and dependent on interests directly resistant to the main changes which had been proposed by a foreign technical assistance team and accepted by the governmental leadership in Ecuador in the name of the University. Only when new leadership was imposed by outside authority during a second stage in Ecuador did significant innovation become possible. Yet these innovations were imperiled because the institutional leadership which accepted them was imposed by a political authority which was considered illegitimate by interests both within and outside the University.

These cases thus confirmed the salient character of the leadership function, the prospects for success associated with competent and committed leadership, and the costs likely to be exacted by inept, uncommitted, and weak leadership. Little guidance was being given on the tactics available to innovators to compensate for inadequate institutional leadership. Yet at the early stages of institution

building there appears to be no substitute, no effective way of circumventing inadequate leadership, and the likelihood is that the venture will stall, be reduced to ineffectiveness, or even fail unless adequate leadership is forthcoming. The problem of coping with seriously inadequate leadership will be further explored in our section on change tactics.

The leadership properties stipulated in the guiding concepts, namely political viability, professional status, technical competence, organizational competence, continuity, and role distribution or compatability, each correlating positively with leadership success, tended to be confirmed by Professor Hanson's analysis. He added two other properties: commitment to doctrine and "exemplification of indigenous self-image" as significant and positively correlating with leadership success in the Nigerian case. There were no efforts in these cases, however, to develop scaling or other measurement devices to test these leadership properties against institutional performance, nor to estimate the consequences of deficiencies on any one of these properties, nor to suggest how deficiencies in one might be compensated by strengths in others.

While it was clear that leadership in these cases was a collective phenomenon, there were times when one individual appeared to gain a position of commanding importance within the leadership group. It was also evident that different circumstances or different problems in the institution's development called for different leadership skills. An exact test of effective institutional leadership is its sensitivity to these changing needs and its capacity to bring forth difficult-to-obtain skills when they are required. The pattern of role distribution and its responsiveness to changes was not fully analysed in these cases, but it appears that only in the Nigerian experience was this kind of resourcefulness, versatility, and sensitivity to changing needs apparent. While not focussing on the distinction between formal leadership and effective influence in the management of the institution, the studies produced compelling evidence of the effects of conflict in the leadership group on institutional performance. Both in Thailand and in Turkey the leadership function was virtually paralyzed for extended periods of time by serious disagreements over operating policies and leadership styles.

How competent and committed leadership can be recruited for institution building roles is one of the key questions emerging from these studies. This is especially important if one accepts the proposition that leadership is the critical determinant of institution building success. There is a dilemma in that leaders who may be politically viable and available within the society or within the institution which requires restructuring are likely to be committed profoundly to some of the base values of the society and to networks of personal relationships within the institution or to both, and are therefore reluctant or unable to act as change agents. On the other hand, persons with less political viability but greater change proness and greater professional capability may not be acceptable as leaders. In the Nigerian case this problem was overcome, despite the selection for leadership roles of men who were in some respects marginal to the system. Some of them were deviant in that they had received their higher education in the United States; the principal leader was actually not a member of the dominant Ibo group in Eastern Nigeria but was nevertheless highly respected for his competence. The choice of these somewhat marginal men was made possible by the strong support of the most powerful political leader in the region who, as the principal leader, was willing and able to protect his politically marginal but professionally, technically, and organizationally competent leadership group during the early and critical period of growth of the College of Education. This may provide one of a combination of possible formulas for recruiting and protecting innovative leaders in the early stages of the institution building process.

Nigeria is an example of the successful use of foreign assistance personnel in formal roles of institutional leadership, but this is inherently an unstable situation. While highly useful in the Nigeria case, it was viable only for three very important years in the history of that institution. It is not likely to be an option available in many other situations. In the more usual situation reported in the other cases, the technical assistance group is not part of the institutional leadership but consists of outsiders exercising a variable influence on the formal leadership group.

<u>Doctrine</u> - The concept of doctrine is perhaps the most elusive cluster of variables in the institution building scheme even though at least two of our four researchers considered it one of the most fruitful concepts in the institution building scheme and one of the most critical in evaluating the success in institution building efforts. The difficulties encountered in using this concept can be traced to the inadequacy of the conceptual equipment in modern social sciences for dealing with the influence of ideas on action. Under what circumstances and in what way are ideas spearheads to action, under what conditions do ideas rationalize action which has already taken place, and under what circumstances is there a long lag between actual changes in policy and their subsequent reflection in doctrine? There are subtle difficulties in defining doctrine, in distinguishing formal themes from those which are really operational, differentiating those which are expressed from those which are implicit, discriminating those which are highly generalized from those which are specific in their reference.

The institution building scheme has presupposed that when induced social change is attemped, statements of goals and of styles of action generally precede and indeed help to guide action. This tends to be confirmed by the one successful case reported by our researchers where success appeared to be associated with the clear expression and effective use of doctrine to influence action both within the institution itself and in its external environment. Where, as in Ecuador, there was a sharp clash of doctrinal preferences among actors who were able to influence the choices of a weak leadership, the result was paralysis.

These four cases suggest an apparent tendency to neglect the element of doctrine when technical assistance groups undertake institution building types of activities. In not a single one of these cases was an agreed doctrine enunciated at the beginning of the technical assistance effort which was sufficiently clear to serve as a guide to action. As long as agreement was possible in terms of overarching and therefore very vague objectives, there was little inclination to delay action and great apparent faith in the capacity of diverse groups of actors to arrive at pragmatic solutions to questions of goals, priorities, and styles of action, allowing doctrine to evolve with experience. Only in the case of Nigeria did a coherent and operationally effective doctrine

emerge in the early stages of the venture, primarily because the technical assistance party and the persons selected for leadership positions in the new organization agreed almost completely on fundamental goals and strategies.

In the case of Turkey no guiding doctrine or even elements of doctrine emerged in the fifteen years of experience reported by Professor Birkhead. In Ecuador, the elements of doctrine were hammered out in conflict, with disagreements on virtually every element of doctrine among major parties inside and outside the institution which were concerned with its management. It was not clear at the time of writing whether or not an agreed set of doctrinal themes emerged following the turmoil which had engulfed the University. In the Thai case, the technical assistance group attempted to impose an essentially radical American doctrine of public administration on the academic program of the Thai Institute but was not succesful, so that "the essential premise underlying the academic program is diffuse and largely inarticulate."[3]

It might be useful to report on the conclusions of two of the researchers regarding the role of doctrine. According to Professor Birkhead much of the failure of the Institute in Turkey ever to take off can be attributed to a muddled idea of doctrine. Thus the Institute became an organization in search of a rationale for existence. "Perhaps the most useful insights gained from this study were those related to the Consortium concept of 'doctrine'. So much can be explained about the Public Administration Institute for Turkey and the Middle East in terms of the confused, ill-defined, doctrinal goals that were assigned to it. The leadership and the staff to this day have not succeeded in making them operational to any significant extent. The obvious connections between doctrine and leadership also seemed to become clearer in this study. Possibly, if they had possessed stronger resources of a personal or intellectual nature, the leaders in this Turkish enterprise might have been able to operate better in the absence of clear-cut doctrine. That is a point for speculation. In this case, however, 1) doctrine was ambiguous; 2) it was not understood by Turks in the key positions; 3) none of them took the time or opportunity (perhaps even had the capacity) to make it better understood; 4) doctrine was never clearly related to any specific needs of administration; 5) it was never made

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[3]Siffin, p. 104

clear how to identify such needs and thus how doctrine might be adjusted to potential needs or new doctrine evolved." [4] Professor Birkhead then stipulates a series of hypotheses which associates success in institution building with a doctrine which is identifiable, related to actual and recognized conditions in the host country as perceived by persons in power, and is understood and supported by the leaders of the organization itself and its enabling linkages.

Professor Hanson makes the following judgment: "It was the function of doctrine to establish normative linkages between the old and the new, between establishment and innovators, such as would legitimatize innovations which came with the new organization. Doctrine, itself, could not perform this function; but it could provide connections which made organizational innovation less new, less threatening, and correspondingly more legitimate. It could tip the balance. It if could perform the function with the publics which ultimately either institutionalize or reject the innovation, it could also provide to leadership within the organization norms or standards which could guide the projection of programs in the establishment of priorities. This latter function would be served only to the extent that there was genuine <u>commitment</u> to doctrine by the leaders in the organization...

"The University of Nigeria was born in the womb of doctrine and had surrounding it, even before it saw the light of day, a full-blown slogan system which was to be its heritage and, as it proved, as significant in its institutionalization as the practical operations which accomplished its birth and weaning." [5]

"In this consideration of total university doctrine three factors stand out. First, the major doctrinal elements of the total university were matters of firm faith with the top Nigerian leaders in the faculty of Education. They had been influential in the delineation of doctrine years before the opening of the university; they were committed to the doctrine, they had eagerly sought positions at the university partly because they hoped to see this doctrine implemented, and in the interviews conducted five years after the opening of the university they reiterated their faith in the doctrine. Second, there was considerable agreement

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[4] P.XI of Methodological Appendix, Birkhead

[5] Hanson, pp. 146-147

between leaders of the university and its most numerous school-related
publics as to what the major innovations of the university were. In
particular, students and graduates in education identified the same
doctrinal elements as were enunciated by the leaders of the university
as its principal articles of faith. Third ... students and graduates
not only identified these doctrinal elements but in large part
identified with them. They had, in fact, internalized the doctrine and
were enthusiastic in viewing themselves as examplars of the type of
education which had been worked out to realize this doctrine."[6]

Hanson has identified several elements which he relates to success
in the use and manipulation of doctrine. Among them are a sense of
commitment to doctrine among the leadership groups of the institution;
a slogan system or a set of themes which express the "emergent values"[7]
in a changing society and which can also be further legitimized by
reference to other slogans stressing the same values as society-wide
goals or imperatives. The doctrinal themes should be vague enough
to attract support in a wide variety of publics, imprecise enough to be
capable of strategic manipulation, yet specific enough to sustain
credibility and to be effective guides to action. Moreover the doctrinal
themes should be internally consistent; they should be forcefully and
repeatedly articulated by influential people inside the institution and
outside it both to internal and to external audiences. Perhaps most
important of all, the doctrinal themes should appear to distribute
benefits widely, and these benefits should greatly exceed their costs.
I have taken the liberty of adding the last of these criteria because
I believe it was implicit but never precisely stated by Hanson himself.

A question raised by Hanson's group of propositions is how the
presence of some of these favorable elements can be used to counteract
deficiencies in others which might be evident in projects less favorably
endowed than the College of Education at the University of Nigeria
with elements associated with institution building success. Additionally,
how many of these favorable elements can be dispensed with before doctrine
ceases to be a positive contributor to the prospective success of an

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[6] ibid, pp 180-181

[7] Defined by Hanson in a letter to the author as "value expressions of
1) the more educated and influential members of the environment and
2) value expressions occurring with increasing frequency or prominence
in the environment."

institution building effort?

It is evident that these studies have pushed the concept of doctrine far beyond the rather primitive terms in which it is expressed in the guiding concepts. It appears to be a potentially fruitful area for further research and analysis. Much additional work is needed on such problems as: (a) the effectiveness of generality versus specificity, or of vagueness versus precision in the statement of doctrine or of individual themes, and how such choices serve to manage conflict within the institution and between the institution and linked organizations, as well as to guide innovative action; (b) how to adjust doctrinal themes to feedback from experience and choices between pure adaptation to signals from the environment or tactical adjustments (and what kinds of adjustment) to protect the institution while maintaining its innovative purposes or temporarily to soft-pedal sensitive or irritating themes; (c) where new values are not emerging rapidly in a society, is it useful to clothe innovative objectives in the language of traditional values in order to legitimatize them and to facilitate their acceptance; (d) how much disagreement or lack of clear consensus on basic goals and styles can be tolerated prior to launching in institution building venture without incurring risks that make the enterprise a poor proposition.

Program - This cluster of variables represents the major outputs of the institution. A number of problems emerge, among them how programs are formulated, priorities established, and resources allocated; how programmatic outputs can be modified or adapted in response to feedback from experience; and how the manipulation of outputs can affect the institutionalization of the organization or of its innovative purposes.

It would be useful to know, first of all, what primary stimulus or combination of stimuli contribute to program development. The rationalistic institution building model presumes that program is the translation of doctrine into action. Yet in only one of these cases, Nigeria, is this formula satisfied and can the program be considered a logical expression of institutional doctrine. In the first stage in Ecuador, the program reflected the very limited tolerance of the institution for the innovations propounded under the doctrine of the technical assistance group which the institutional leadership did not accept.. In Ecuador, the second stage of the program was a response to unanticipated opportunities resulting from a political crisis which

permitted the program to be a much more complete expression in action of the original doctrine than at first seemed possible. Both in Turkey and Thailand, in the absence of a well articulated doctrine, other bases for program development had to be found. They appeared to be based on probes for routine activities that would provide easy work for the staff, yet not be objectionable to any potential clientele groups. Both of them yielded programs which initially had little innovative thrust and attracted little interest, positive or negative. Later they summoned up the courage to attempt activities that offered useful services to external clienteles.

What are the effects of feedback from experience, that is of organizational learning, on program development and program management? There are a number of possible constraints or limitations on direct adaptation to environmental pressures or signals. Among them may be the inability of doctrine to legitimatize the kinds of demands which certain elements in the environment may make on the institution. Another may be the inability of the institution's resources to satisfy environmental demands or even the sluggishness and unresponsiveness of its leadership. Hanson points out several instances where institutional leadership, responding to negative feedback, soft-pedaled programmatic themes in order to protect other more salient areas of its program or to avoid jeopardizing long term linkage relationships. The Thailand case provides an example of an unanticipated reward for a modest experiment in programming. The Thai Institute evolved its executive development program hoping to "create" a demand for its services in its main clientele, the bureaucracy, a demand which would threaten no base value in the clientele group yet offered useful services and was not inconsistent with the innovative purposes of the technical assistance staff which retained some influence on the organization's programming. The program caught on far beyond the expectations of its founders. It was only Siffin's research that revealed that the benefits of this program perceived by the clientele group were not at all the same as those which the foreign assistance group, drawing on their own views of doctrine, had originally expected. Where the program planners had expected their clientele to respond to the productivity - efficiency values of Western management, the Thai administrators appreciated the course primarily as an opportunity to improve contacts with fellow administrators

from other departments of government. Should this be counted a success or a failure in institution building?

How organizations can vary their programs with evidence of support or resistance in the environment, reduce or defer perceived threats to important interests, satisfy demands for its services, without losing its options or its will to move ahead with program elements which incorporate its innovative purposes, is an area for more precise research and analysis. Much work in the description, analysis, and evaluation of institutional programs was produced in these four reports. These data need to be further exploited for generalized propositions or hypotheses which can be tested against other experiences.

Resources - This is the cluster of variables related to the recruitment and mobilization of the funds, the staff, and the information which are essential to the institution's capacity to function. It deals with the relationship between resource availability and the character of doctrine and program, and reciprocally with the effects of doctrine and program on the capacity of the institution to acquire resources. While these classical sets of relationships were implicit in these four cases, they were not the subject of intensive investigation or analysis.

The rationalistic model of institution building prescribes that an institution must vindicate its continued access to resources by producing outputs which respond to and satisfy significant needs within the society, and by cultivating favorable environmental linkages which, in turn, sustain its claim to scarce resources. This model implies continuous competition among institutional claimants for scarce resources, that resources must be earned by performance, admitting a possible grace period of indeterminate length after the initial establishment of an organization, when doubts about its claims for resources may be resolved in its favor. Ultimately, however, it must earn its resources by good works which satisfy an influential clientele.

In the Nigerian case, a version of this model appeared to hold true. The availability of dedicated core staff members and of ample funds encouraged the Nigerian leadership of the College of Education to push ahead vigorously with its program, with the full expectation that its performance would justify continued and even increased access to the

resource inputs which the institution required. The Institution Building hypothesis, however, proved not to be an adequate predictor of what would happen in Turkey or in Thailand. In these cases financial resources in ample amounts appeared to be available over extended periods of time, with no requirement for justification through performance. Instead, the financial resources seemed to be available as a matter of routine, not to be subject to tests of performance except perhaps that no significant interest should be threatened or embarassed by the institution. The modesty of the scope and thrust of the programs mounted by these two institutions were not caused by financial stringencies, but by negative performance. The modest but assured reward for playing safe far outweighed in motivation the benefits that innovative efforts would have yielded to the institutional leadership.

Though budgeting inertia ensured a steady flow of funds, the Thai Institute was not able to attract and hold its staff members in the absence of a doctrine that demonstrated the comparative value of a career in the Institute to a career in the bureaucracy. Thus, the Thai Institute and its foreign technical assistance supporters wasted valuable financial resources and training places on educating staff members, only one in three of whom chose to remain in the Institute. Yet despite this dismal record of performance, no sanctions were ever applied by any authoritative source to the Thai Institute as long as it kept out of trouble. In the Turkish case, the availability of only part time and therefore uncommitted staff members meant that the Institute for many years was in no position to control the substance of its own program. Yet this in no way appeared to affect its ability to claim scarce financial resources from the government. Indeed, if one accepts the findings from the Turkish and Thai cases that these institutions were not actually serving any significantly felt needs in their society, and that their disappearance would have caused little regret or sense of loss, one must then conclude either that financial resources were not so very scarce in these countries or that factors other than performance, perhaps international prestige, the desire not to hurt persons associated with the institutes, or willingness to wait a very long time for results, were more important in determining resource availability than performance tests or satisfying a felt need in the society.

In Ecuador it appeared that additional financial resources available from external assistance were essential to enable any of the innovative elements attached to that project to proceed even under the more favorable conditions of the second stage. Existing resources available to the University could not be redeployed without creating intolerable conflict and demoralization. Moreover, the judgment by all parties concerned that the external resources might be available only for a very brief period of time prompted decisions to push rapidly toward basic reforms at a rate which might not have appeared to be prudent if similar resources could have been guaranteed over a longer time span. In this case, the prospects for and timing of resource availability were clearly an important determinant of critical programmatic decisions.

One might expect to observe instances where the secure availability of financial resources at least for a short period of time might encourage radical program experiments and risk-taking, with the expectation that the program would generate its own domestic support. This indeed was the strategy followed in stage two in Ecuador. The classical problem to expect from this strategy is how to cope with the withdrawal symptoms when the external assistance is no longer available. Can the institution or its program develop sufficient domestic support to claim these resources in domestic competition? Prudent external assistance attempts to plan for this predictable eventuality as it phases out of a project. The evidence from Ecuador was not yet available when this case was reported.

Internal Structure - The internal structure and dynamics of an organization facilitate or limit program performance and must therefore be considered as an important group of variables in the analysis of the institution building process. The authors of these four cases touched on and identified a number of factors within this cluster of variables, though this was not the focus of their major concern. It was clear in the Nigeria case that the internalization of institutional doctrine to which the leadership alloted considerable attention and importance was an important factor in the cohesiveness of the organization, its effectiveness in carrying out the program, and in dealing with the opportunities and the resistances encountered in the external environment. In Turkey and in Thailand, internalization of doctrine in the staff of the organization was much less pronounced because

doctrine itself was ill-defined, and the leadership was only marginally committed in a clear set of ideas. Quite predictably, conflicts over operating norms which erupted both in Thailand and in Turkey were destructive of morale and of program effectiveness, but since neither organization was subject to significant external pressure, these conflicts did not threaten their existence.

It was extremely difficult and perhaps impossible to apply to the institution under investigation in Ecuador the concept of internal structure which had been postulated in the institution building model. The Central University in Ecuador was characterized by such extreme diffusion of power and was so penetrated by outside interests that, though it qualifies as a formal organization, it could not be considered the kind of coherent and manageable structure postulated in the institution building model. During the first stage, at least, there was such an equilibrium of diffuse interests interacting among themselves as well as with elements in the external environment that it could be manipulated only in the most marginal way by central leadership. Thus, inducing changes in so diffuse and institutionalized a structure as this, calls for strategies not contemplated in the original model and poses quite different sets of problems.

To move a structure which was in such a perfect state of equilibrium - internally and with politically significant forces in the environment - required a draconian strategy. What was attempted and, as far as evidence is available, initially succeeded was the consolidation of power by the direct intervention of an external change agent, in this case the military junta, which imposed a new leadership and invested it with extraordinary powers. This centralization of decision-making conflicted with the consultative norms which had become deeply institutionalized within the university. These structural changes permitted the flow of innovation which had previously been blocked - some of which seem likely to stick even after the new enabling linkage had itself been displaced in stage three.

This experience suggests that the extraordinary redistribution and centralization of power within an institution may facilitate innovations even though these be in violation of long standing norms of legitimacy. This centralization may permit changes to be produced and initially protected in the hope that they will be technically

irreversible or will accrue sufficient support to be self-sustaining
even when the extreme centralization has been released and supplanted
by other forms of authority. This strategy was attempted both in
Ecuador and, to a lesser extent, in Nigeria where the first vice
chancellor held a very tight rein over the College's staff in
violation of conventional academic norms until certain essential
principles of doctrine could be established in the University's
Governing Council.

The Nigeria case throws interesting light on the problem that
confronts many innovative institutions. This is its relationship
with the macro-organization in which it is embedded or to which it
is attached. Obviously, the super-ordinate organization, in this
case the University of Nigeria, was the significant facilitator or
constrainer of the effectiveness of the new institution. Actually,
the macro-organization becomes a special form of enabling linkage,
and whether or not the new institution should be completely independent
or should be put under the wing of a controlling organization is one
of the critical decisions for persons concerned with induced social
change. In the case of Nigeria, despite occasional frictions, relation-
ships between the two organizations were highly compatible, as the
College of Education shared the basic values of the new University of
Nigeria. This had a reinforcing effect and imposed few limitations
on the College as it attempted to build its own internal organization
and to reach out to influence its surrounding environment. Though it
was not necessarily the case in Nigeria, a well established macro-
organization can be a protector and even a fostering mother for the
new and relatively weak organization attempting to introduce innovations
in an uncertain or unfriendly environment. In that case, however, the
protecting organization must determine how much it will benefit and
how much of its own credit it is willing to extend in fostering its
new ward. Quite the opposite situation to that in Nigeria is reported
from the Turkish experience. There the faculty of political science
of the University of Ankara which controlled the new Institute of Public
Administration exploited it, thwarted its institutional development,
and denied it the opportunity to attempt to influence Turkish adminis-
tration even along moderate lines, despite many opportunities which
presented themselves. One might hypothesize that the more a macro-

organization shares the basic value orientation of the micro-organization, the more it is likely to facilitate and protect its operations. Therefore, new innovative organizations should be entrusted to existing institutions only when the leadership of the established institution clearly shares the values of the former.

What constituted institutionality was one of the main concerns of all of the researchers, particularly of Professors Hanson and Siffin. As a result of their analyses, the concept of institutionality which interested them largely for its utility in evaluating the effectiveness of institution building investment has been enriched and endowed with far more precision than was available in the original guiding concepts.

To Hanson, institutionality can be summarized by the concept of "prizing", and to Siffin by "meaningfulness." But institutionality, prizing, and meaningfulness, they believe, have little significance in terms of a society in general but only in relation to specific, relevant "publics" or clientele groups internal to the institution or within the environment on whom the institution and its activities directly impinge. A question then that deserves attention is whether institutionality is relevant in all cases only to specific publics, or whether there may be some organizations and services whose meaningfulness may be apparent diffusely, such as the Catholic Church or the American F.B.I. In these four cases it appeared that the more limited concept of institutionality as a function of specific clienteles rather than society at large was more relevant and useful.

The original statement in the guiding concepts identified institutionality with "intrinsic value" in its environment. This has been explicity questioned by Professor Hanson who feels that the insistence on "intrinsic" value places an unrealistic burden on the concept of institutionality. In modern and modernizing societies where change agents are concerned especially with functionally specific organizations providing services which can be judged according to their utility and their responsiveness to societal needs, he believes that institutionality should be associated primarily with instrumental values, i.e. the organization and its services should be prized for instrumental reasons because of the services they render to specific relevant publics. In my judgment, this is a less than useful distinction, for in modern societies institutions which are valued intrinsically by that very fact are also serving an instrumental purpose

for those who prize them. On the other hand, organizations which
may be accepted for purely instrumental reasons may not have the
quality of institutionality which evokes genuine commitment or
meaningfulness either to their internal publics or to those with
whom they interact and are linked within the environment. Selznick's
view that institutionality implies valuation "beyond the technical
requirements of the task at hand"[8] requires more than instrumental
appreciation, but rather a degree of continuing influence on behavior
which evokes automatic rather than purely calculated sympathy and support.
Hanson's own data appear to support this more "intrinsic" image of
institutionality.

There was no clear resolution in these reports of the continuing
problem of distinguishing between the institutionality of the organ-
ization and the outputs or services which it provides. Three of the
authors did not comment on this problem or feel that the distinction
was meaningful in the experiences which they were reporting. The
Ecuador case, however, raised this problem directly. There the in-
novations involved efforts to impose changes on an organization, the
Central University of Ecuador, which was already deeply institution-
alized with important publics. The problem was not to institutionalize
the organization but rather to institutionalize a new set of norms,
a process which required the major displacement of existing norms and
the substitution of new ones with the same publics which had a con-
tinuing interest in the University and regarded the enabling source
of the innovations as profoundly illegitimate. Sufficient time had
not yet elapsed to test the acceptance or the staying power of these
innovations. It seemed clear, however, that change strategies
indicated in efforts to reconstitute and redirect organizations which
are already deeply institutionalized are different from those appropriate
for new and functionally specific organizations.

According to Birkhead, Turkey is a case in which institutionality
was achieved only by the criterion of primitive survival, rather than
any of the other criteria enunciated in the guiding concepts. The
organization had not become valued by any significant public, nor

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[8] Selznick, Philip, Leadership in Administration, Row, Peterson
and Co., Evanston, Illinois, 1957, p. 17.

had there occurred any identifiable norm transfer. Neither, however, was the organization disvalued in a positive sense, nor had it encountered significant opposition. Instead it seemed to be ignored and not treated seriously, even among groups with whom it might have claimed influence and which appeared to be looking for guidance and assistance. Yet it has survived as a shell which might in the future become infused with the capacity to act in an innovative sense. While it has not been institutionalized, its bland style appears to have preserved for it the option to innovate, to become an active force in its environment, and to aspire to institutionality at some future date.

Professor Siffin attempted to determine how far the basic innovations which he identified as the objectives of the institution builders in the Thailand case became "meaningful" to key participants, especially to students and to members of the Thai bureaucracy at different stages of their association with the Institute. The instruments used were intensive questionnaires, purporting to measure the attitudes of key participants at different stages of their experience with various programs in the Institute. He found that a number of the norms propounded by the institution had rubbed off to some degree on many of the students and that the institution itself was favorably regarded by them. Most significant, however, was his finding that "meaningfulness" had developed in unanticipated ways, not through complete transfers of norms, but rather through a process of "accommodation" between the values propounded by the institution and its leadership and those which had been originally held by the student participants in the Institute's program.

In Siffin's words "The accommodation consisted of the establishment of a viable process or a merchandizable product - one which is not conceived in the I.P.A. as inconsistent with doctrine and broad goals; and one which is perceived by the customers as meaningful and useful, although not necessarily in terms of the substantive norms or doctrine presumably held by the I.P.A. Inservice Training Division management and the top-level of the I.P.A."[9] Thus the form of institutionality that was established differed somewhat from the intention of the innovators, differed from what they had originally planned, but met a need which was appreciated by the participants in the I.P.A.'s programs.

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[9]Siffin, p. 243

Institutional leadership did not complain; it was pragmatic enough, or opportunistic enough, to capitalize on this unforeseen opportunity and accept it as a welcome windfall. It did not compromise its original innovative purposes, but rather adapted them to genuinely felt needs among Thai administrators.

The most detailed and intensive effort to come to grips with the concept of institutionality and to evaluate the performance of his subject institution in these terms was attempted by Professor Hanson. Hanson built a new set of criteria for institutionality which departs somewhat from the initial criteria set forth in the guiding concepts but does not conflict with them. For each of these criteria he has developed a detailed set of indicators; for each of the indicators he attempted to identify empirical evidence and to measure it both by quantitative and judgmental processes. To appreciate the intensity of Hanson's scheme and the tests which he applied, it is necessary to refer to Chapter 7 of his study or to his methodological appendix.

Briefly, his main criteria are the following: (1) Use of services: The extent to which programs are willingly used or are requested by publics the organization is designed to serve. (2) Survival: The maintainance (and presumably also the expansion) of values and distinctive identity. These apply both to the institution itself and to its norms and include the concept of "innovation transferral " - innovations pioneered by the organization which have been transferred to other organizations which might more appropriately perform them. This might more usefully have been broken out as a separate criterion. (3) Support: The extent to which capital resources (perhaps Professor Hanson means all financial resources, capital and current income) are provided for initiating, maintaining, and expanding programs, and the extent to which other organizations mobilize influence behind the subject organization's leadership and programs. (4) Respect and Approval: The extent to which the programs and the personnel of the organization are judged to be serving accepted or emergent goals well or as being qualified to serve such goals well. (5) Normative Spread: The extent to which action and belief patterns incorporated in the organization

have become normative both within the organization and for other social units within or related to its sphere of operation. (6) <u>Autonomy</u>: The degree of freedom of an organization to set and implement programs. (7) <u>Innovative Thrust</u>: The capacity of the organization to continue to innovate.

It is evident from Hanson's analysis that by all the major criteria and most of the specific indicators, the College of Education at the University of Nigeria scored remarkably high in the achievement of institutionality. The author is convinced that Hanson has significantly enlarged, enriched, and increased the precision of the criteria of institutionality originally developed in the Guiding Concepts, has supplied specific indices for the more precise disaggregation of these criteria, and has suggested methods for measuring them both quantitatively and judgmentally. He has laid the ground work for a much more meaningful use of the concept of institutionality than had heretofore been available. Other researchers may wish to apply and improve his measuring instruments and also to determine what trade-offs are possible among the various criteria of institutionality or combinations of criteria. Are some more critical than others? Are some of these measures more suitable than others at different stages in the institution's experience? Problems such as these are now much more amenable to serious examination as the result of Hanson's work.

Environmental linkages and transactions

The interrelationships between organization and environment have become one of the most important problem areas in organization theory. It is obviously at the heart of the subject of institution building. The institution building model has developed the concept of <u>linkages</u> to identify relationships between the subject institution and definable organizations within its environment with which it transacts business. The concepts of environment, of linkages, of <u>transactions</u>, the problem of analyzing these concepts operationally, and the techniques of managing relationships between institution and linked organizations in its environment have been considerably enriched and clarified by these four research studies.

Any institution building analyst or practitioner is compelled to analyze the environment in which the institution is attempting to es-

tablish for itself a secure base of action and to introduce changes.
In analyzing environment, the concepts of change readiness and change
resistance seem to be helpful. One question that was addressed but
not resolved in these studies is whether the concepts of change readiness
and change resistance are meaningful as descriptions of the entire
society (the macro-environment) or whether they should be limited to
specific issues relevant to the activities of the institution under
study. Professor Hanson identified highly generalized change proneness
or eagerness in Ibo society particularly in the immediate post-indepen-
dence period when the College of Education was started which facilitated
the restructuring of relationships and action patterns in general.
This did not, however, preclude the necessity for a more refined assess-
ment of the change readiness of the environment in specific issues.

Can one speak of change readiness as a diffuse concept for the
entire society or must one confine analysis to particular organizations,
groups, or "publics" on whom the activities of the new institution
are likely to impact in a significant way? The first and the second
questions above are clearly related, the basic issue being to what
level of specificity it is necessary to disaggregate the environment
so that a set of specific tactics can be worked out for analyzing,
probing, and establishing patterns of transactions with groups which
will have salient relationships with the new organization. The weight
of evidence appears to point to the importance of evaluating the macro-
environment for change readiness or change resistance in order to
identify basic themes or symbols which might be used to project a
favorable and support-attracting image of the new institution and its
activities. On the operational level, however, it is essential to
identify specific organizations and groups which will be important to
the new institution's welfare, with which it will conduct a continuing
pattern of transactions, and for each of which a suitable set of tactics
must be worked out.

Hanson has raised the question of whether the statement in the
Guiding Concepts that linkages should be conceived primarily in terms
of formal organizations may not be too limiting a concept of the
linkage process. In a letter to the author, he makes the following
comment: "It appeared to me that institutionality ... takes place

within potentially identifiable or definable groups. I refer to
these as "publics," a term with which I was not always happy. If
I ever gather the heart to look at the data again, I intend to ex-
amine the dimension of institutionality among different publics more
carefully. Probably these can, albeit not with rigor, be categorized
as publics which have certain kinds of overt definable statuses with
respect to the organization (students, employers, ministry personnel,
etc.), and those which must be distinguished in ways not primarily
in terms of a functional relationship to the organization (age groups,
religious groups, tribal groups, etc.). Certainly, sound change strategies
will require rational calculations that differentiate between relevant
groups.

" ... I think that any attempt to limit normative linkages to
linkages with other organizations may be neat and orderly but may lead
to overlooking a whole range of linkages with equally 'real' but more
pervasive values and other elements in the environment. An entire
social class or a 'rising generation' may hold a set of values, and
yet these scarcely fit the notion of organization ... " While the
emphasis of the original Guiding Concepts was on linkages with other
formal organizations, it appears that this may be an unduly restrictive
concept and that relationships with such groups as Hanson mentions
which are somewhat more cohesive than those encompassed in the original
concept of "diffuse" linkages may have to be introduced in a revised
version of the institution building scheme. Such linkages may be less
"mappable," less subject to managed manipulation and perhaps less
stable than those with formal organizations, but may be important
enough in many institution building experiences to warrant explicit
treatment. Indeed the same may also apply to prominent personalities.
Once admitted as "linkages," however, their analytical treatment and
the operational tactics they evoke can readily be accommodated by the
Guiding Concepts.

It was clear to the designers of the institution building scheme
that an environment and the groups within it, with which the subject
institution must establish and maintain linkages, is not an inert
substance waiting to be manipulated. Each of these groups has its own

perceived interest which it will attempt with varying degrees of skill
and vigor, and through a variety of tactics, to protect in its relations
with the new institution. Many of these groups, in addition to setting
up defense mechanisms, will attempt to manipulate the subject institution
so that the flow of pressures and of influences may not only be a two-way
process, but may evoke coalitions and other complex forms of bargaining
and conflict management in which several interests and institutions
may be involved at the same time. The ability of the new or recon-
stituted institution to establish a firm position in its environment
and to begin to transfer innovative norms to linked institutions will
depend in large measure on its capacity to: (a) persuade these linked
units that it is supporting and enhancing their status and objectives
and distributing far more benefits (satisfactions) to them than costs
(dissatisfactions) measured in terms of the interests that are signi-
ficant to the linked institution; (b) convince them that they should
reconceptualize their view of what constitutes their own real interest;
(c) induce them by persuasion or by demonstration of real power to
accommodate their own behavior to the patterns of the new institution;
or (d) permit them to combine two or more of these possibilities.

Often, however, it seems prudent for the new institution, working
in an environment which may confront its leadership with more palpable
resistances than opportunities, to do more of the accommodating in order
to insure its survival, its access to resources, and its ability to
carry out at least some elements of its program. The obvious dilemma,
of course, is that efforts to achieve such mutual support and accommo-
dation with linked organizations may inhibit the achievement of norm
transfers; the survival patterns thus set up may first defer, then
eclipse the innovative goals of the new organization. This emphasizes
the fact that the environmental linkages and the transactions with them
must be actively managed at every stage of the institution building
process. This management obviously involves assessment of the congruences
and dissonances on significant transactions or potential transactions
between the institution and linked organization. The determination of
tactics for each significant linkage, the need to monitor and to adapt
these tactics to feedback from experience and to new circumstances in
the environment emphasizes the importance of timing, capacity to bargain,
willingness to adjust to changing situations, - the whole panoply

of the political arts of management - these determine the ability of
an innovative organization to make its way in an ambiguous environment
while protecting its main programmatic objectives.

The Nigerian case, once again, constitutes a basic validation of
the rational institution building model set forth in the guiding concepts.
Hanson's study is a chronicle of leadership endowed with a clear set
of purposes (doctrine) assessing, probing, cultivating, trading,
learning from its experience, and above all, maintaining initiative
in order to build and strengthen a network of significant clientele
support, in a variety of linked organizations and groups, and to diminish
or to dampen opposition and potential opposition. The energy of its
leadership, their sure sense of purpose, and their skillful management
of external relations had the effect of insuring the viability of
the new College of Education and of providing it with opportunities
to transfer its innovative norms with outstanding success to critical
linked groups in the educational environment of Eastern Nigeria.

The Thailand case demonstrated the overwhelming sensitivity of
the institution's leadership, within that authoritarian social structure,
to insure support from higher status political and bureaucratic sources,
i.e., from enabling linkages of the I.P.A. Any felt need to cultivate
functional linkages or to identify demands from elsewhere in the environ-
ment, or to build linkages with prospective clientele groups, were quite
subordinate to the cultivation and strengthening of enabling linkages.
Indeed the leadership, as long as it could sustain favorable enabling
linkages, had little inducement to build functional linkages or supports
in other groups in the society. Thus the problem of managing its
environment was not perceived as requiring any real effort from the
institutional leadership. It was necessary to keep the institution
out of trouble, to avoid threatening any interest which might create
problems in its relationship with its enabling linkages, and this it
could do by offering a low key program which provided useful unthreatening
services but made little direct effort at establishing and manipulating
relationship within the environment that would make innovational transfer
a real possibility. To an even greater extent, the Turkish case involved
a minimal sense of dependence on establishing useful transaction patterns
with external linkages. Indeed the survival strategy adopted by its

leadership precluded this search for linkages for fear, paradoxically, that such linkages with the rapidly changing bureaucratic clienteles in Turkey might generate pressures to initiate programs which were more innovative than the Institute's passive leadership was prepared to sponsor or to handle. The effect was to protect itself from being perceived as a threat to any other organization or to have to respond to environmental pressures, and to allow it to vegetate, bothering and being bothered by no one,but drawing funds sufficient to supplement the incomes of its part-time staff.

The Ecuador case was the most difficult to analyze with the conceptual equipment provided by the institution building scheme. One of the reasons was that in so diffuse a structure as the Central University, it is often hard to distinguish external or linked organizations from internal structural elements because the organization itself is so deeply penetrated by its environment that the distinction between an internal structural element and an external linkage is frequently no longer useful. Beyond that the Ecuador case, especially in stage one, demonstrates how the subject institution may itself be the object of attempts at manipulation by outside forces whose objectives may not be fully congruent among themselves and all of whom may differ in some respects from the value orientation and program preferences of existing institutional leaders. This complex situation in which the subject institution is more the target of others than the initiator of transactions and the manager of linkage tactics is a departure from the basic model. The basic conceptual problem in this case is that the proponents of change, the would-be institution builders, had little influence over the institutional leadership and were one of many parties attempting to influence the institution from the outside. It was only when the institutional leadership was displaced by the military government and a new leadership at stage two began to look upon its role as change managers that the experience fell readily into a focus provided by the institution building scheme. Even then an unexpected problem arose. Many of its critical linkages were not with formal organizations outside the university but with groups which already had a deep base in the university but which also enjoyed close ties with organized and unorganized interests outside the university.

The change oriented leadership in such a situation must perform the same analytical process of identifying key linkages, developing sets of tactics, and managing relationships with each of these key linked organizations or groups but the linkages in these cases are not entirely out there in the environment. Some of them may be partly or entirely within the rather diffuse formal organization itself.

Methodologically a number of issues arose in attempting to operationalize the concepts of linkages and management of transactions among linkages. While strongly supporting the concept of linkages, Birkhead queried the utility of any a priori classification of linkages since he had difficulty in some cases distinguishing among the enabling, functional, normative, and diffuse categories. Blaise and Rodriguez supported this position, finding in the prescribed classification "ambiguity and overlapping of meaning both at the conceptual and operational levels" with particular confusion between normative and diffuse linkages. The same linkage relationship may at different times or even simultaneously serve different purposes for the subject institution. They urge that further thought be given to the classification of linkage categories. The purpose of this classification, of course, was to order data in order to facilitate analysis, rather than to set up iron-clad categories. It may prove more useful to concentrate on clarifying and refining classes of transactions according to their major purposes and to abandon the classification of linkages, since these are the significant units of action by which relationships are managed. More study should thus be given to the classification of transactions in the Guiding Concepts.

We must conclude this section on "environment" with the admission that this concept was not fully enough framed in the Guiding Concepts. It proves on greater reflection and experience to be highly complex, ambiguous, and uncertain. The linkage and transaction concepts are critical to any ordering of those elements in the macro-environment that are relevant to the activities of the new institution. But the environment is likely to be highly ambiguous and even ambivalent in terms of the change readiness or change resistance of any linkage. It is the degree and kind of change readiness and change resistance and on what issues and divisions lurking within a linked organization or group, which are most significant both to the analyst and the practitioner.

The ability to cope with a high degree of complexity and uncertainty is the acid test of the practitioner, even though it defies the capabilities of a descriptive research model.

Moreover, environments in the macro sense may be subject to drastic and unpredictable changes, changes which fundamentally affect the prospects of an innovative institution. In Ecuador the breaking points between stages one, two, and three are violent regime changes that impact directly on the work of the institution builders. Likewise, the bloody coups and countercoups of 1965 and 1966 in Nigeria may affect the College of Education in ways that Hanson could not predict at the time he completed his research, yet not all regime changes have such effects. The Thai Institute survived the Sarit Coup of 1957 without any evident effect in the quiet pace of its activities, and the Turkish Institute weathered the Revolution of 1960 which might have offered it attractive opportunities for support and service with hardly a ripple to disturb its tranquillity. The concept of "critical incidents" which was included in the Guiding Concepts but was not elaborated or tested in these cases may offer a clue to the ordering and analysis of these macro and political changes.

We shall discuss at greater length, in the section on methodology, the concept of linkage mapping which was not attempted in an explicit way in any of these four studies. Yet the analytical process undertaken by the researchers, particularly by Professor Hanson, implicitly involved a rather elaborate mapping exercise. This reflects what must have been a similar process of calculation by the leadership as an aid to their own action strategies. However, it was not attempted as a technical exercise in any of these reports.

Technical assistance in Institution Building

The technical assistance relationship or the relationship between an institution and outsiders is not an explicit problem in the Guiding Concepts. Institutions are built to function within the indigenous societies with or without the participation of foreign technical assistance personnel. But foreign technical assistance has been an important element in the institution building process in recent years, both because the change models have been influenced by foreign and usually

Western experience and because foreign personnel have participated, sometimes as managers, but generally as advisors in these projects. The role of technical assistance in institution building is being studied explicitly in another major inquiry by Professors Lindeman and Duncan, sponsored by the Institution Building Research Program. Foreign assistance was also a factor in each of the four cases investigated in this series.

In many instances the foreign assistance personnel are the spearheads of change and are so perceived by themselves, by their counterparts, and by observers in the developing countries. That foreign assistance staffs provided the main models for change was true in all four of these cases, and in three of them they provided most of the impulse for action. But though they were deeply concerned and preoccupied with the goals and the tactics of change, in these same three cases they were not able to carry their counterparts with them on significant issues. Their local counterparts, disagreeing frequently among themselves, were often not committed to many of the specific changes endorsed by the technical assistance personnel. They often attached higher priority to protecting existing relationships from what they perceived to be the disruptive consequence of radical or too rapid changes; they often agreed with the goals proposed by their external advisors but professed a different sense of timing and a preference for different methods or tactics, the practical consequence of which may have been to change fundamentally the impact of the project. Indeed they may have had a keener sense of what was feasible than their foreign advisors. While foreign advisors are often the initial source of change goals and change tactics, the latter frequently become attenuated as they become more indigenous and brought closer to persons who are likely to be affected and who therefore will be inclined to weigh the costs as carefully as the benefits of the proposed changes.

In only two cases, Nigeria and stage two in Ecuador, were the doctrine and the timing of the assistance groups shared in sufficient measure by the institutional leadership to generate action which both were able to evaluate as satisfactory. In general, technical assistance personnel conceive their roles as promoters of change while the counterparts may view the technical assistance colleagues under different

perspectives. In Nigeria, where the two groups shared a common doctrine, their relationships throughout were essentially compatible. The institutional leadership in Nigeria regarded both the technical assistance personnel and themselves essentially as change agents working toward common purposes. In the other three cases, however, the technical assistance personnel were not valued by their domestic counterparts essentially as change agents. Indeed, to the extent they were regarded in that role, they were considered threatening. They were welcomed rather as suppliers of valuable physical resources or of teaching personnel, and to some extent of technical ideas which would help the existing system to do its old job better, but not as means for inducing new norms or action patterns within the institution itself nor in transactions with linked clientele groups. It seems clear that congruence among the technical assistance personnel and indigenous institutional leadership on the goals and the tactics, as well as the doctrine and the program of the subject institution, directly affects the effectiveness of foreign assistance. The absence of such congruence leads inevitably to frustration and even to conflict. It cannot be compensated for by support for change goals in the enabling linkages, for the latter are too remote from the sphere of action of the operating organization to influence its action fundamentally if its leadership is reluctant or uncommitted.

Does the holding of formal leadership positions contribute to the effectiveness of a technical assistance group, or is effectiveness primarily a consequence of the influence they can exert on the formal leadership group and on key linkages by their advice on doctrine, program, and tactics or by the valuable physical, financial or personnel resources they can supply? Except for a brief period in Nigeria, the outsiders in these cases did not hold positions of authority. Instead, they were change agents, sources of pressure and influence, working on indigenous holders of influence and power, sometimes with limited advisory instruments and at other times with somewhat more persuasive financial instruments at their disposal. While it was useful in Nigeria at the very initial stages of the College of Education for the foreign assistance group to hold formal positions of power, because of the organizational skills and the prestige they brought to the job,

more significant even at that time were the strong enabling linkages
which protected the new institution and the doctrinal compatibility
among the advisors and the local leaders. In Turkey, the official
position which the senior U.N. advisor occupied as co-director meant
little except to provide the institution with a manager of its routine
operations; he had little influence because there was little agreement
among the advisors themselves and between them and the indigenous
leadership on matters of doctrine. Indeed the Turkish experience
demonstrates the perils of a technical assistance group which lacks
doctrinal coherence in its own ranks and which leaves the resolution
of fundamental differences either to chance, to a hopeful future, or
to the recipients of aid who are unequipped to resolve these differences
among their advisors. This experience raises grave doubts in institution
building situations of the effectiveness of technical assistance groups
drawn from multi-country sources.

In Ecuador the role of the foreign assistance team shifted with
changes in the external environment which provided variable opportunities
for them to exercise influence. Beginning primarily as resource
suppliers with marginal influence on the indigenous leadership, over
doctrine, program, or change tactics, the technical assistance group
found itself, by virtue of events which it could neither predict nor
control but could capitalize on, in a position to influence directly
and fundamentally the institution's development during phase two.
Another change in the external environment which led to phase three
(all three phases occurring within a period of six years) may provide
still other opportunities and limitations on the role of the foreign
assistance group which could not be evaluated in this study. Changes
in the external environment of the subject institution may affect the
role of technical assistance personnel especially if the changes result
in new institutional leadership which is more compatible with the
objectives of the foreign assistance group; equally likely may be
negative effects of changes in the external environment on the capacity
of the external assistance group to function effectively vis-a-vis the
subject institution. Political stability is the friend of external
assistance groups (and of domestic innovations) working with compatible
institutional leadership (Nigeria), and it is the enemy of those working
with counterparts who do not share their objectives. Yet the Turkish

revolution of 1960 was not sufficient to produce a change in the leadership of the Institute of Public Administration.

Except in Nigeria where there was no problem of value dissonance between the technical assistance personnel and the indigenous institutional leadership, these cases seemed to demonstrate a tendency on the part of technical assistance personnel to use influence tactics which are mild and accommodative rather than tension or crisis producing, and to use technical rather than political methods of influence. These mild and accommodative tactics may result from several motives. The first may be a desire to protect the aid giving organization, its commitments to the local situation, and its opportunities to continue to function on this and other projects in the host country. They may also be convinced that stronger approaches to bring about changes in indigenous institutional leadership which they find unsatisfactory are not appropriate to their role as advisors and guests in the country in which they are working or that these are unlikely to be effective and indeed might result in the termination of the project or the end of their usefulness as advisors. They may also calculate that gradualism will yield results over time and that unanticipated breaks will make it possible in the future to move more directly toward their change goals. Actually the goals themselves may subtly shift to accommodate the advisor's estimate of feasibility, or their time horizons may be considerably extended. The case of Ecuador may be somewhat exceptional to these general observations which indeed need more substantiation. The technical assistance group in Ecuador used rather strong and persistent pressure even in stage one, attempting to trade highly welcome physical resources on rather hard terms for substantive programmatic changes. When the break came in stage two, they attempted to capitalize quickly on the favorable development to secure more compatible institutional leadership which would enable them to push forward more effectively toward their change objectives. The change in the external environment that introduced stage three required another change of tactics to accommodate the restoration to power of the interests which had been displaced in stage two.

Change tactics

As we have already observed, the institution building scheme

is a rationalistic model, a social engineer's approach. If the ideal type institution-building man were in a position of institutional leader-ship, what are the problems that he would have to deal with, and what are some of the tactics which he would rationally choose to employ in order to achieve his goals at a minimum cost? These goals are the building or restructuring of an organization which can survive in its environment, and to introduce new norms and action patterns in linked organizations and groups.

It is evident that in many cases (three of the four in this small sample) we do not begin with such competent leadership committed to a clear set of change objectives and styles (doctrine). Instead the leadership is often uncertain of its goals, concerned more with main-taining existing patterns and protecting their own interests within the present system than in fomenting changes, unwilling to incur risks, and passive or inept in using the resources or the opportunities available. Under these conditions, change oriented persons inside the system or outside it must improvise whatever tactics they can to make effective use of the limited resources and opportunities available to them, or indeed, to discover or create new opportunities.

Because of the variety and complexity of changing circumstances in which institution building ventures occur, any institution builder must deploy a battery of survival tactics and service tactics as well as change tactics. The survival and service tactics may have to be used as preliminaries to change tactics, as complements, and sometimes as substitutes. The institution builder will have to cope with the cruel conflict that frequently arises between building the institution as an organization and promoting its innovational purposes, and he will have to estimate coldly the price he may have to pay in the latter for achieving the former. Survival tactics, change tactics and service tactics are always needed to some degree in the institution building process, but the question is one of emphasis and specific choice at any particular time. This section will deal with survival and service tactics, but because of our bias as institution building researchers our primary emphasis will be on appropriate change tactics.

It is important to recognize, far more than was the case in the original institution building scheme, the importance of the unplanned consequences of any act including carefully calculated actions, as well as the unanticipated contingencies that may prove to be setbacks or may

provide unexpected but welcome opportunities for the pursuit of institutional goals. The unplanned consequences were an important feature of the Thailand case, and the unanticipated contingencies of the Ecuador case. Greater emphasis on these uncertainties in human affairs underline the importance of alert and active management to cope with and to take advantage of these situations and to capitalize on possibilities for organizational learning, hopefully of the right institution building lessons. The institution builder must therefore be, par excellence, a manager who both adjusts to changes in his external environment and attempts to create opportunities to facilitate his program goals.

It may be useful to classify institution building situations for analysis roughly according to the following matrix:

Leadership \ Environment	L Favorable	L Unfavorable
E Favorable	1	3
E Unfavorable	2	4

The favorable or unfavorable quality of the environment, for the purposes of this exercise, is measured by the estimated difference between change readiness and change resistance among relevant publics to the objectives of the new institution (to develop measurement scales that might assist or complement analysts' and practitioners' judgments of these factors is a considerable challenge to the

Institution Building Program). If the result is positive, then the environment is considered favorable for the purposes of this rough analysis. If change resistance exceeds change readiness, the result is unfavorable. The four major classes of situations resulting from this matrix are not actually discrete, but could be placed on a continuum from one to four, from the most favorable to the least favorable, for institution building efforts.

For the classical institution building situation, type one, committed and competent leadership and a highly change-prone environment, Professor Hanson has identified five major change tactics all of which are implicit in the original institution building scheme.[10] All of them were used successfully in the Nigeria venture. These are "(1) enunciating a doctrine which linked itself ostensibly and visibly to emergent values, slogans, and belief systems in the environment; (2) establishing partnership or mutually supportive relationships with institutions which were already established within the educational environment; (3) employing the recognized channels of legitimization at all points which approached barriers to innovation in the environment; (4) addressing its initial programs to filling (in sufficient quantity to make a sizeable impression) those demand features which existed in the environment or meeting the 'felt needs' of the educational publics; (5) deferring implementation of those elements of its doctrine which would be most disruptive of the established education scheme (notably its doctrines of 'educational reconstruction') until such time as it had produced a sizeable number of members of the major educational publics (teachers, and administrators) and had proved its worth to other units in the existing educational system." These appear, in summary, to involve capitalizing on emergent change values and slogans, providing useful supporting services which met felt needs in sufficient quantity to be appreciated, working with and through existing linked institutions, and reducing the sense of threat to skeptical or uncommitted publics by deferring action and soft-pedaling themes which might turn them against the new institution. This was a skillful mix of survival, service and change tactics, the first two supportive of and instrumental to the dominant change objectives.

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[10]Hanson, p. 618

In none of these cases was there a combination of favorable
leadership and strongly unfavorable environment, cell(category) two
of the matrix. One might nevertheless speculate on what tactics might
be available in such a situation. They might involve a combination of
the following: (1) emphasizing the organization, building strength
within it and deferring efforts to introduce changes into the environment;
(2) searching for allies in linked or potentially linked organizations;
(3) attempting to gain environmental support by providing useful but
unthreatening services; (4) bargaining and trading resources or support,
promoting or deferring particular objectives in order to gain allies
or to achieve concessions by linked institutions, groups or individuals;
(5) looking for opportunities including creating tensions or capit-
alizing on unexpected crises from which the institution might benefit;
(6) using technological imperatives, i.e., providing resources and
services which are valued for service purposes and appear to be neutral
in terms of norms or action patterns but actually may force changes
in behavior or in the redistribution of power which might not be
apparent to the leaders of linked institutions when they adopt new
equipment or procedures. The main problem in this type of situation
is for the leadership to sustain its innovative purposes in face of
persistent discouragement plus many opportunities and pressures to
compromise, in order to secure a firmer position for the new institution
in its environment and thus to guarantee its access to resources and
its opportunity to become organizationally viable.

Two of the cases in this series are category 3 cases - reasonably
favorable environment with unfavorable, i.e., uncommitted or incom-
petent leadership. In the Thai and Turkish cases innovative personnel
within the systems followed what appeared to be the only tactic available
to them, one of patiently building an internal core of committed people
who might eventually be in a position to take over, i.e., to succeed
to leadership posts and ultimately turn it toward more innovative goals.
Other tactics which may be feasible in a category 3 situation would
be actively to work for changes in the institutional leadership,
or to seek opportunities to create a new and possibly competing organ-
ization, or to have the function and jurisdiction transferred to another
organization where innovation is more likely. Each of these is a risky

tactic where opportunities for more rapid achievement must be weighed against the heavy cost of failure and the difficulty of mobilizing sufficient resources and support.

A more patient and more feasible set of tactics might revolve around efforts to modify the goal preferences of conservative leadership, downgrade the expression of change themes, clothe changes in the language of traditionally accepted norms and styles of action, or, in terms of survival and service benefits, mount modest programmatic activities which demonstrate that these activities are welcomed by linked clienteles in this favorable environment - and thus are a credit to the institutional leadership. These tactics tend to keep the organization viable, cultivate some clienteles, and even create an external demand for services until it becomes possible to replace leadership (Turkey) or both to displace leadership and commit functions to a new larger and hopefully more innovation-prone structure (Thailand).

Ecuador qualifies as a category 4 case, unfavorable leadership and unfavorable environment. Tactics that would be workable under such conditions would have to be elements of a longer term strategy. These might include such measures as (1) building an internal core of change agents to capture the leadership sometime in the future; (2) soft-pedaling change themes in doctrine and stressing useful services and desired technologies internally in the organization and in relation to linked organizations; (3) protecting the function by entrusting it to an already well established and sympathetic organization or placing a new and precarious fledgling organization under the wing of a well-established and basically sympathetic institution.

In Ecuador the innovators were primarily outsiders attached to the technical assistance team. Their domestic allies were not influential in the original institutional leadership, and the balance of environmental forces was change resistant. Despite these initial handicaps, however, the innovators were able to capitalize on the opportunities derived from radical political change which created strong external pressures supportive of their change goals from the new enabling linkage, the military junta. This political change created also opportunities to displace at least temporarily the original uncommitted leadership, to substitute new leadership, and to introduce the changes to which

the innovators and their allies were committed. Without this unexpected break, the effects of which may still prove ephemeral, the innovators would have been compelled to rely either on very patient or very risky tactics.

The most generalized proposition that seems to emerge at this stage of institution building research on the question of change tactics is that the institution building leadership should attempt in its transactions with each linked public to distribute or appear to be distributing a far greater volume of benefits than of costs. The margin of benefits over costs must be substantial because costs (dissatisfactions or threats) in status, respect, security, finance, or scope for action are usually perceived to be far more critical, triggering defensive action, than are anticipated benefits triggering supportive action. Where a wide margin of benefits over costs cannot be distributed, or where the organization appears to be under attack from a major linked institution, it must not hesitate to defer some of its activities which might be threatening to an external group. In such cases it must attempt to deal with a few negative situations at a time, must focus enough bargaining energy and resources on the potential conflict, and must be able to deploy enough power in that situation to be reasonably certain of a satisfactory outcome. This is simply the strategy of keeping one's opponents divided and dealing with them separately rather than allowing an effective coalition to mobilize. The outcome of each such conflict should be one which protects both the survival goals and the change goals of the institution, which is also perceived as satisfactory to the linked institution and enables the two of them to maintain a mutually beneficial pattern of transactions. Even when it is necessary to administer a defeat to a linked institution or group, opportunities should be allowed for face-saving adjustments to minimize possibilities of future hostilities. This combination of tactics was pursued in Nigeria and represents a rational program for building an institutional base and inducing social change in a competitive environment.

On the interesting question of the choice between building a new organization or reconstituting an existing structure - one of the "strategic decisions" referred to in the institution building scheme - a series of propositions are suggested by the Ecuador case. An existing

organization which has clear jurisdiction over a functional area may already be deeply institutionalized and thus highly valued among important clienteles. Leadership will therefore be inclined to resist changes. If such an organization is relatively small the choices of innovators are either to capture its leadership's position and attempt to reconstitute the organization - and this process of capturing the leadership of a well-institutionalized structure either from inside or outside is a quite difficult task - or, alternatively, attempt to start a new organization to compete with the older one in its field of jurisdiction. The latter possibility is more feasible when the original organization is perceived by important groups within the society as discharging its functions inadequately or as neglecting activities which it should be performing, or when it is not catering to emergent needs or demands within its field of jurisdiction. Unless these circumstances prevail, it is unlikely that a new and competing organization can be successfully created.

If the existing organization is large, complex, and deeply institutionalized, if it has a widely diffused internal power structure, then efforts to work diffusely within the system are likely to be futile because of the broad base of opposition to change and the lack of a center of innovation within the existing institution. In this event, the most feasible strategy for the innovators is to set up a new unit within this organization which they can use as their own base of operations to gain control over critical resources or activities such as funds, staffing, programming, or significant environmental linkages. This tactic of extending their influence by capturing or building units which can exercise key control functions was attempted by the innovators in Ecuador. This bold yet rational course of action seemed at the time of writing likely to survive into stage three.

These cases also suggest a group of propositions concerning the time dimension in institution building. I state these propositions hesitantly because the problem of time requires considerably more conceptualization and analysis. While change readiness in the environment, institutional leadership, and all the other variables associated with this scheme are subject to continuous change processes, some planned, some unexpected, no clear patterns have yet emerged. There is no evidence in these cases of successive stages such as initiation, organization building, service emphasis, norm transfer, consolidation,

or any other deterministic pattern of sequences in the institution
building process. There is no evidence that any one stage must be
prerequisite to the next, although the possibility of some pattern
of sequences under certain limiting conditions is certainly worthy
of study. It does appear rational, for example, in situations where
both the leadership and environmental factors are favorable, to give
initial emphasis to building a solid and viable organization, than to
construct reliable linkages within the environment, and only when these
first two steps are well under way to attempt the riskier and more
difficult task of restructuring the environment and of transferring
norms to linked institutions. This was substantially the strategy
employed successfully in the Nigeria case and in the case of the teacher
training institution in Cambodia reported by Professor Blaise in 1964.[11]
All these activities may be occurring simultaneously, but the emphasis
of the leadership shifts gradually from one to the other in the indicated
sequence with the passage of time.

On the other hand, where the environment is especially receptive
to change that is demanded at a rate that precludes the more patient
sequence just outlined, it may be useful or even necessary to foster
changes within the environment even before linkages have been
firmly established and before the basic organization has been built
on a solid foundation. This is obviously a riskier strategy since the
innovations themselves will have no organizational resources to protect
them in the likely event that their enabling linkage withdraws support
or is displaced, and the innovations are attacked by groups which
regard them as hostile to their interests. It would be interesting
to examine a study of an institution building experience which followed
this bolder strategy.

Finally it is a prudent proposition that innovations should not
be pressed forward at a faster rate than the organization itself or
its linked institutions are able to assimilate them, for fear of the
consequences of negative feedback. Yet situations may arise, as they
did in Ecuador, where the availability of resources and of new leader-

[11]Blaise, Hans C., The Process and Strategy of Institution
Building in National Development, unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation,
University of Pittsburgh, 1964

ship provided by an unexpected development in the external environment
dictated a more radical strategy. In this case the innovators in order
to capitalize on these favorable opportunities (which might be
ephemeral) took the calculated risk of pushing changes during phase
two of the Ecuador case very rapidly, even though the internal or-
ganization was unprepared and many of the linked groups were unconvinced
of the benefits of the specific innovations and even positively hostile
to their political enablers, the military junta. How much of this
shock treatment survived the passing of these favorable opportunities
for change could not be accurately appraised when this research was
completed. On the evidence available, however, this type of tactic
appears to be justified when a favorable break occurs in the environ-
ment, where there is some support or receptivity to the changes in the
linkage groups, and where some of the changes introduced by new tech-
nological processes could be so far-reaching as to be practically
irreversible, even when dominant political power in the environment
shifts to a less favorable pattern.

Observations on methodology

These four studies were essentially retrospective analyses and
evaluations of recent - and indeed of still ongoing - experiences
of deliberate attempts to build new institutions or to restructure
old ones whose purposes were to introduce significant social changes.
In each such case there was a major technical assistance input in
which the authors of these case studies personally participated. The
focus in each of these case studies was a common set of problems.
The guiding concepts of the institution building scheme were used as
common points of departure for these four separate probes. It was
expected that the institution building scheme would discipline these
four studies by a common conceptual structure, but at the same time
allow sufficient leeway for modifying and especially for refining
these concepts or for improvising new ones which might be potentially
useful for this research program.

Quite deliberately it was decided that no effort would be made
to prescribe the methodologies for these first four cases. Selecting
well-trained and experienced social science researchers to conduct
these four investigations, and allowing them a maximum of freedom to
improvise and to experiment, would hopefully yield a series of instruments

for gathering and analyzing data which could later be evaluated and perhaps tested and standardized for future use in a much wider variety of cases. It was also expected that these four cases would generate a number of hypotheses which could be reviewed, refined, and subsequently tested on the data available from these cases, from other cases which are being simultaneously researched under the auspices of this Program, and by studies which would be performed in the future. Efforts to standardize methodologies seemed premature until the conceptual categories had been refined.

Left to their own resources, these four senior researchers and their associates developed a number of instruments and used a variety of investigative methods, all of them, however, representing the application of what have become standard and straightforward social science research techniques. They relied heavily for much of their basic data gathering on detailed questionnaires administered to participants in the subject institutions, consumers of institutional outputs, and observers of the institution's experience. Three of the researchers relied on interviews in depth to cross-check the data produced by the questionnaires and their documentary investigations, as well as to probe more deeply into the attitudes of those interviewed and into their interpretation of events. All of the researchers gathered and analyzed documents from a wide variety of sources, including those produced for public consumption by the institution itself, the output of the news media and of specific publics with which the institution maintained linkage relationships, and the reports and reactions of public bodies whose work was significant to the institution. Where possible, they had recourse to the internal records of the institution itself and to those of technical assistance organizations, but in some cases these internal records, as might have been predicted, were not available to the researchers. Finally they depended upon their own observations and the judgments they had formed, both as researchers and, at an earlier period, as active participants in the institution under investigation. The questionnaire data, and to a lesser degree the interview data, were in all cases ordered for analysis by simple statistical manipulation - in two cases with the help of a computer.

These methodological instruments were, of course, used experimentally, and since they were designed by each researcher for his particular case they were not standardized for the four cases. In the methodological

appendix attached to these reports is, however, a statement ᴏᴸ the methods attempted by each researcher to gather and to analyze data for each of the clusters of variables in the institution building scheme. In each case there is a commentary and evaluation of the utility of these methodological approaches, and the instruments used in each case are available at the headquarters of the Institution Building Program. A technical analysis of these instruments and their utility for more tightly structured and disciplined studies in the future is beyond the scope of this report. The availability of the instruments at the Program's headquarters, however, and the potential value of moving toward the standardization of research methods, suggest a high priority for the Institution Building Program. The time has come to invest significant resources in evaluating and, if possible, standardizing the research methods which have heretofore been used in these four cases as well as in the other projects being simultaneously undertaken by the Program.

The author confesses some disappointment in the failure of these first four cases to test two research methods which have previously been suggested and discussed by the Executive Board. The first of these is the technique of linkage mapping. As previously discussed, this could be an effort to actually chart or map the institution's relationships with each significant linkage in its environment, including useful, internal interests or units in the institution itself. The maps would indicate, at different points in time, the specific type of interdependency or transaction pattern between the institution and each of its linkages; the problems which are likely to be encountered in achieving a relationship which is satisfactory to the institution; and the tactics which seem to be indicated in managing these relationships. While Professor Hanson attempted to analyze these linkages and to trace the choice of tactics and their consequences over time, none of the researchers found it possible to experiment with linkage mapping in a more precise and technically rigorous sense. It is not certain that this method would yield enough to justify the effort either for the analyst or for the practitioner, but it seems sufficiently provocative to warrant some experimentation.

The second and perhaps even more far-reaching of the methodological experiments which proved impossible in these cases was the technique of

blue-print mapping proposed originally by Professor Nehnevajsa.[12]
Blue-print mapping, along with the subsidiary technique of image mapping,
would serve both as a planning and a monitoring device. It would be
helpful to managers of institutional change in evaluating progress,
analyzing feedback from experience, and adapting to new conditions; as
well as to scholars for studying institution building experience and
building theory. This technique however is most useful when it is
initiated at the time a project actually begins and is projected for-
ward at periodic time intervals. It deserves testing both as a
monitoring and as a learning device, but it involves a significant
and sustained investment in research time which the Institution Build-
ing Program has, to date, not been able to provide for itself or to
induce others to underwrite.

How to deal with the dimensions of time poses a major problem in
methodology for this kind of research. Most of it will continue to
be retrospective and it must attempt to chart changes over time in
which many variables are involved whose interdependencies are not fully
understood. Even if the time period is relatively short - in these
cases they range from five years (Nigeria, Ecuador) to ten years
(Thailand) and fifteen years (Turkey) - the researcher cannot be satisfied
with a single cross sectional study because it is necessarily static.
He must find ways of treating developments over time. Blaise and
Rodriguez state the problem this way in their methodological appendix:
"The Institution Building analytical approach is best applicable to
the understanding of the change situation as a cross section at any
point in time. This should be qualified, however, by the possibility
of examining each structural component: leadership, doctrine, linkages,
etc., particularly as each has changed in time. This approach, however,
tends to obscure the persistent and intimate relationship of structural
components at each point in time of the change process. The best methodo-
logical approach to the change process would unquestionably entail the
analytical examination of the change situation at strategic points in
time..."

The method of cross sectional panels for managing the time dimension

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[12] Nehnevajsa, Jiri, Methodological Issues in Institution
Building Research, A Working Paper. University of Pittsburgh, March 29,
1964 (mimeo).

was not employed in these four cases. The approach was rather to select individual programs, important relationships, or variables, and trace them over the period covered by the case, using conventional historical methods for reconstructing experience reinforced by questionnaire and interview data which probed attitudes intensively at a particular point of time. Given the costs, delays, and other methodological problems involved in administering similar instruments over future time periods, the combination of methods used in these cases may prove to be the most practicable but the problem requires more thought and experimentation in regard to both data collection and analysis.

It might be useful at this point to comment on a problem in methodology understood in the wider sense. What have these cases taught us about the problem of American social science researchers undertaking field investigations of sensitive and far-reaching efforts at social change in developing countries involving, as they frequently do, technical assistance relations and therefore problems in international politics? By the very careful selection of both projects and senior researchers, the Institution Building Program in these four cases was able to minimize the difficulties of access to data. Because of the network of contacts which they personally had developed and which were available to them and to their own universities, many doors were readily open to these researchers which an outsider might have had great difficulty in penetrating, and which, to him, would probably have remained completely closed. It was our deliberate judgment that any bias which might creep into the researcher's analysis of an experience in which he or his institution had a stake through previous involvement, was more than compensated for, not only by the quality of the researchers we selected, but also by the access they would have to persons and to records which might be unavailable to an outsider.

Even this careful planning, however, could not guarantee access to some classes of data. Professor Blaise, for instance, was unable to examine the minutes of meetings of the University Council of the Central University, containing as they do data which would have been enormously useful to him. Even more serious was the consequence of the outbreak of war between India and Pakistan which made it impossible for Professor Birkhead to carry out research on the Administrative Staff College at Lahore, Pakistan, which had been his intention and

for which he had carefully prepared. Instead he was forced on very short notice to shift to the Institute of Public Administration in Turkey. Similar contingencies have forced the shifting without advance notice, and at very great cost, of other institution building projects sponsored by our program.

In the Pakistan case, disruptions caused by the war were accompanied by strong anti-American feelings which alone would have been enough to preclude American-sponsored and American-managed field research. This indeed is one example of what appears to be a growing trend in the developing countries: an increasing resentment against being used as data to satisfy the research and publication interests of foreign and especially of American social scientists. This resentment has been aggravated by the naïvete, academic purism, and political insensitivity of many American social scientists working overseas. Indeed there are some allegations of Americans "picking the brains" of local persons and even pirating their data with a minimum of attribution. These charges, combined with the embarrassment resulting from the injudicious publication of findings which tend in the minds of persons in the developing country to embarrass or to humiliate them and with such sensational revelations as the Camelot case and the indirect subsidization of American researchers by the C.I.A., are certain to create increasing difficulties of access to field data for American social scientists.

It is worth mentioning that empirical field research is itself a major innovation in virtually all the less developed countries, not to mention many industrialized countries. In most developing countries, what passes for social science research, must draw from historical or other data completely in the public domain. Government agencies are clothed with official secrets acts, and government officials are protected by their status from the probing of outsiders. That organizations bound up with the political process, which implies power and touches the interests of important personalities and groups, should be subject to the intensive and critical scrutiny even of highly placed and highly trusted scholars from within the country, not to mention foreigners whose publications might feed the political opposition or bring highly placed and respected persons into contempt or ridicule,

evokes great suspicion in many countries. It is too threatening to too many interests and therefore not welcome. To improve the atmosphere for empirical and reasonably objective social science research is itself a major effort at social change which outsiders can greatly assist, but which will increasingly require the participation and sustained support of domestic scholars. It is they who will have to fight this battle.

This problem has been discussed by the members of the Institution Building Board. We have decided that our program must work toward three objectives each of which is more comprehensive and more far-reaching than its predecessor: as a minimum, each of our researchers should attempt to find some definite benefit which his research will bring to strategically placed personnel in the institution under study. In the Ecuador case, for example, Blaise and Rodriquez were able to induce the Sociology Department of the University to sponsor their questionnaire as part of the department's own research program; they will, of course, make their data fully available to the department for its own subsequent use. They were also able through their questionnaires to provide the authorities of the University and the Ministry of Education with the first reliable set of data about the origins, attitudes, aspirations, and current activities of their student body.

A second policy is to require, where possible, in all the institution building field studies significant participation by local personnel, and even, if feasible, a close collaboration between American and local scholars. In all four of these cases, there was some participation by local personnel, but the roles varied from research assistance to the genuine collaboration that was achieved in the Ecuador case where Dr. Rodriguez served as a junior colleague to Professor Blaise. Full collaboration, of course, is not an easy relationship among scholars, even among scholars of the same nationality and intellectual tradition; it is even more difficult across cultural barriers. Yet it will have to be attempted increasingly despite the costs in time and the strains that may be involved if American field researchers are to protect their access to field data.

Finally, it is the policy of the Institution Building Board to encourage, facilitate, and participate where possible in building indigenous research capabilities and research institutions in developing countries. In the long run social science research is far more likely to be promoted and safeguarded by building viable indigenous institutions devoted to this activity then by any other strategy. One of the purposes of each of the cases under study in this report was to build an ongoing research capability, to develop an appreciation of the values of objective research, and to build domestic interest groups committed to its values, even though this was not the major purpose of any of these activities. Once social science research has been institutionalized through organizations dedicated to this activity, a process that will be achieved through some of the same change tactics prescribed in the Institution Building scheme and subject to the same tests of institutionality, then the prospects will be favorable; not only for social science research itself, but for the access of American researchers to field data and for their working as visiting colleagues with scholars in institutions dedicated to the same intellectual values.

The Inter-University Research Program in Institution Building has itself been a minor experiment in institution building. Though the number has been growing in recent years, there are as yet very few instances of successful long term research collaboration among several universities. This group of scholars from four universities, committed as individuals and institutionally to a long term interest in the problems of social change in developing countries, joined together to develop a common conceptual structure and a research strategy. They have set up a continuing research organization under an Executive Board which has raised substantial funds to finance a world-wide research program. The members work within their own universities recruiting researchers, introducing institution building concepts into teaching programs in a number of different disciplinary fields and professional schools, encouraging and guiding the development of research designs among their colleagues. They evaluate each research proposal before it is accepted for support by the program, periodically analyze the implications of research findings, and in several cases personally

engage in extended field research designed to further develop
institution building theory. The Board Members from the four co-
operating institutions are supported by a central research head-
quarters which manages the ongoing business of the Program, maintains
a central data bank, briefs outgoing and debriefs returning researchers,
publicizes the program's concepts and findings within the academic
community and among interested practitioners, and provides continuing
leadership in the development of the conceptual structure and the
research methodologies for the program. Most but not all the research
financed by the program is undertaken by faculty members and graduate
students from the four member universities.

    With more than four years of close cooperation behind them, the
Program has maintained a remarkable continuity of participation among
the majority of the board members and has successfully sustained a
total change in Research Headquarters. The author who was the orig-
inal Research Director moved on after three and a half years to
participate himself in an institution building activity in Malaysia
while the Associate Research Director, Hans Blaise, moved to Ecuador
to direct the third stage of the Ecuador University assistance program
for which his own institution building research had so well prepared
him.

    To sustain a high level of cooperation among scholars from four
different institutions, each of them with his own priorities and com-
mitments, is in itself both a continuing task of management and a labor
of love. The main problem which the author can report from his own
experience was that of maintaining pressure, not on the Board members
themselves who were more than faithful to their commitment to this
program, but on the field researchers many of whom could not be in-
duced to keep Headquarters informed periodically of their problems
and progress and who in many cases fell far behind in their commit-
ments to complete their studies. Though this is not a unique experience
in academic research, it was deliberately overlooked in the early stages
of this program in order to attract senior scholars who would be willing
to discipline their own research by our guiding concepts. To the extent
that they were prepared to do so it did not appear politic, nor might
it in any case have been possible, to demand of scholars of this quality
working with a highly experimental set of concepts to produce regular

progress reports, or to complete their research on tight schedules. In the future, however, as we standardize our methodologies and expand the scope of this program, it will be necessary to enforce more exacting reporting requirements in order to permit Research Headquarters and the Executive Board more closely to monitor the substantive findings and methodological experiments of researchers sponsored by this program.

The institution building program has proved to be viable in its own right and is a reproducible pattern. It might be attempted in similar areas of research where the scope of the problems greatly exceeds the capabilities of a single institution, but where substantive coordination in the development and testing of new concepts seems to be indicated.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The institution building research concepts have been found
useful by a group of experienced scholars from several disciplinary
backgrounds working in four countries on three kinds of activities:
public administration training, teacher education, and university
administration. Two of these researchers had worked closely on the
development of the guiding concepts, while two of them were new to the
group yet were able to use its concepts with equal facility and
effectiveness. They agreed that the approach is feasible as a point
of departure for serious empirical investigation. Professor Hanson,
after an exacting review of the problems he encountered in using the
institution building scheme, reported the following conclusion: "If
I was to attempt any amateurish assessment of the usefulness of the
conceptual framework for analyzing institution building overall, I
would point out that even in its current rough shape the schema provides
a series of lenses with which to examine a phenomenon. Many I found
in particularly sharp focus albeit they were crudely ground and still
unpolished ..."[13] Blaise and Rodriguez similarly report that "the
institution building concepts provide quite a complete set of working
elements on which to base and from which to derive the approaches and
the interpretations of the change situation," but that the conceptual
tools need more discrimination and refinement which must come by testing
for fit in a variety of situations.[14]

The original set of concepts was left deliberately simple at the
outset but has been considerably elaborated and enriched by the field
investigations. At the same time, the data which have been collected
and analyzed have paved the way for a considerable refinement of the
original concepts, for the identification of more precise hypotheses,
and for their ultimate testing, both against the data of these invest-
igations and of other data being gathered currently in research conducted
under the auspices of the Institution Building Program.

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[12] Institutionalization of the College of Education, The Univer-
sity of Nigeria, February 1967 (mimeo)

[14] Blaise and Rodriguez - Methodological Appendix

The basic rational model of institution building is being
deepened and made more precise and operational for those situations
where a combination of favorable environmental and leadership factors
make it applicable. This indeed was the main contribution of Professor
Hanson's Nigerian study. This model, however, will have to be relaxed to
accommodate circumstances which are less optimal for inducing societal
changes with deliberate speed through organizational strategies.
It has been demonstrated that in addition to change tactics, institu-
tional leadership needs a kit of survival tactics and service tactics.
These tactics must always be mixed, though their emphasis will shift
from time to time according to the commitments and dispositions of
the leadership group, their judgment of the operational capabilities
of their own organization, and their estimate of the opportunities and
resistances present in the external environment.

It is also clear that institutional leadership is not always
able to take the initiative in manipulating external linkages and may
frequently have to fend off unfriendly incursions from linked insti-
tutions and adopt accommodative tactics in order to protect itself and
enhance its opportunities to work effectively in a limited sphere, or
perhaps even to bide time. Since there is a much wider spectrum of
situations that innovators may face than those originally anticipated
in the schema, they must be endowed with a much more varied and richer
choice of tactics to deal with complex situations in a changing external
environment and even in the organization itself.

Institutional leadership must also be on the lookout for con-
tingencies, for the unplanned consequences of their own activities,
and for unanticipated developments - especially in the external environ-
ment - which may present threats to the institution or alternatively
may provide unexpected opportunities for the promotion of their change
objectives. Moreover there is a much greater variety of organizational
types than were originally contemplated. The basic schema anticipated
the need to distinguish between institution building problems of
different, functionally specific, kinds of organizations operating under
different environmental conditions, but it did not pay enough attention
to possible variations in the structure of organizations. The Ecuador
case demonstrated clearly that some organizations may be so diffuse in
their internal distribution of power, and so penetrated by elements

from their external environment that, unlike the more functionally
specific, cohesive, and centrally manageable organizations which were
contemplated in the model, they may require a wholly different set of
change tactics on the part of innovators attempting to influence their
behavior.

The results of the first four cases, as might have been expected,
are uneven and unbalanced due to the scale of the experiences they
reported and to the different emphasis and interests of the researchers.
They were particularly interesting and produced insightful results
with the variables of leadership, linkage relationships, and especially
with tests of institutionality. They devoted relatively less attention
to the variables of doctrine, program, resources, and internal struc-
ture, particularly the latter which relates.to the internal management
of the organization itself. A number of shrewd insights and propositions
were produced on change tactics, although the subject has barely been
tapped at this early stage in the development of institution building
theory.

A number of experiments in data gathering and data analysis methods
were attempted,all of which are variations of well-established social
science research techniques applied to the problems of testing a new
approach to the understanding of social change. A number of instruments
which were designed for these particular investigations are now avail-
able for more intensive technical analysis. From these analyses it
should, in the near future, be possible to develop instruments which
can be tested on a variety of structures and situations in the hope
that they may ultimately be standardized and be made available to any
researcher working on institution building problems.

With a very rich array of data now at our disposal, the program
is ready for cross-sectional studies of particular problem areas or
clusters of variables. These cross-sectional studies would permit
much more intensive development and testing of hypothesized relation-
ships and action strategies where these particular functions are the
starting point for study and the center of the researcher's attention.
The inquiry which Mr. Fred C. Bruhns is soon to launch, in which he
will attempt to deal intensively with the doctrine cluster of variables,
both in the study of a single institution and also by drawing data and

testing hypotheses against the information already available to the institution building program from these four cases and others on file at Research Headquarters in Pittsburgh, is a prime example of the type of cross-sectional study which seems appropriate and potentially fruitful for the next stage of the program.

The complexity and variety of environmental and organizational situations which may confront the practitioner as well as the analyst, and the pattern of available tactics, require not merely a set of general ordering concepts such as those developed in the original institution building scheme, but also a set of hypotheses which can be tested and refined when applied to the data already available and which are being rapidly added to the repertory of the institution building program. It is only by identifying and testing hypothesized relationships between variables that an institution building theory can be gradually developed to help explain, predict, and ultimately to control action at least in some of the circumstances that innovators face when attempting to build change-inducing and change-protecting organizations. In a personal message, one of the four senior researchers accused this author of "hypotho-mania" which he considers a dangerous and sometimes fatal intellectual disorder. The same charge cannot have been made against some of my colleagues whose able and in some instances brilliant work is reported in these cases. Of the scores of interesting and potentially fruitful hypotheses which lie scattered in their reports - and will have to be systematically extracted by staff members and other researchers at Institution Building Headquarters - relatively few were specifically identified. Indeed, I wish I were more guilty of hypotho-mania than my own modest efforts reported below would warrant because hypotheses are both guides to research and the building blocks of theory. These that follow are cited merely as examples of broad propositions which remain to be dredged out of the data already on hand and which should be made available to scholars and practitioners who are interested in institution building theory and research:

1. Institutional leadership must often choose between protecting the organization and promoting its change objectives.
    (a) Given this choice, they will act to protect the organization.
    (b) This is a rational choice, because the survival and

viability of the organization is a necessary (though not
sufficient) condition to the achievement of its change
objectives.

(c) Institution builders should first emphasize building the
organization, then promoting and propagating its change
objectives.

2. There is an inherent dilemma between (a) institutionalizing an
organization, and (b) ensuring its capacity to continue to innovate - its
"innovative thrust." Leadership in the organization and in linked organ-
izations and groups will inevitably prefer the former to the latter because
it tends to guarantee stability and predictability. Innovative thrust
can be achieved only when (a) it is an explicit and prominent theme in
institutional doctrine, and (b) it caters to interests and needs which
are perceived in linked organizations or which the subject institution
has helped them to perceive.

3. Specificity in doctrinal themes provides firm guides, high levels
of predictability, and "stable reference points" for leadership in making
program decisions and in managing relations internally and with linked
institutions. Imprecision in doctrine themes facilitates the mobilization
of support and provides options for adjusting programs to new situations
and to feedback from experience. Leadership will be under pressure from
normative linkages and from committed persons within the organization to
opt for specificity, but will tend to favor imprecision because of the
greater flexibility it affords.

4. Leadership will adapt program priorities and content to ensure a
steady and reliable inflow of resources, particularly of funds but also of
staff, information, and of other raw materials such as students for edu-
cational institutions. Though such concessions might imply adjustments
in doctrine, the latter will be resisted or delayed in the hope that
resource and program variables can eventually be made more consistent
with original doctrine. The longer this proves impossible, the more
likely that doctrine will accommodate to resource constraints.

5. Program content depends on (a) the doctrinal commitment of leader-
ship, (b) their estimate of the technical capacity of their organization
to sustain the program, (c) the estimated effects of alternative programs
on access to resources, and (d) the anticipated consequences of the

reactions of linked organizations and groups to particular program elements. The autonomy of leadership in program development varies inversely with commitment to doctrine and directly with favorable estimates to factors (b), (c), and (d).

6. Leadership normally places highest priority on cultivating and satisfying enabling linkages:

   (a) This, however, may reduce or weaken supports and complementarities elsewhere in the environment and jeopardize their survival and charge objectives if the enabling linkage is displaced or withdraws its support.

   (b) Therefore, prudent leadership will cultivate linkages and interdependencies widely in its environment in order to better stand the shock of unexpected changes.

   (c) Leadership may thus trade-off or postpone certain change goals even when supported by enabling linkages in order to protect their longer term relations with other linked organizations and groups.

   (d) The longer these trade-offs appear necessary to institutional leadership, the more it is likely that changes which have been deferred will be forgotten or abandoned as the pattern of compromise tends to become fixed.

7. The more an organization is diffusely structured and complex,

   (a) the more likely it will cater to a network of mutually reinforcing, self-serving vested interests with strong external links;

   (b) the more leadership autonomy and initiative are constrained;

   (c) the more difficult it is for new leadership to redirect the institution's doctrine and program.

New leadership, oriented to change objectives, must rely on hierarchical control and externally supported power more than on persuasion and bargaining and will tend to focus first on internal reforms before attempting to influence external clienteles.

8. In institution building situations, the development of effective and coherent doctrine varies directly with the value congruence, ease

of communication, and homogeneity of the technical assistance group, and inversely with the variety of national approaches represented in the technical assistance team. Therefore multi-national technical assistance teams tend to be ineffective instruments for institution building tasks.

9. In institution building situations, external technical assistance teams tend to be spearheads of change and the carriers and purveyors of change doctrine. These doctrinal themes tend to be pro-gressively attenuated as they become indigenized:

    (a) the greater the value and doctrinal congruence between the external technical assistance team and their indigenous institutional leadership, the more likely the realization of change goals;

    (b) the more resources (benefits) external assistance personnel have to trade for doctrinal or programmatic changes, the more effective they will be in promoting change objectives;

    (c) where there is little value congruence and few resources to trade, technical assistance teams must be satisfied with longer term payoffs and attempt to influence the perceptions of the existing leadership, working for leadership displacement or developing a core of innovators in the institution for positions of future leadership.

10. The receptivity of linked institutions and groups to the new institution will vary directly with their perception of the benefits they are likely to gain, minus the cost to them in any salient values. In establishing such linkages, the institutional leadership must attempt to probe and to estimate this benefit-cost perception.

    (a) Unless benefits seem to exceed cost by a wide margin, the linkage is precarious and even dangerous.

    (b) In this case the linkage should be deferred, or transaction patterns should be changed to incorporate more favorable proportions of benefits to cost to the linked institution, or a definite conflict strategy should be mounted.

    (c) Where conflict seems indicated, institutional leadership should avoid taking on more than one antagonist at a time; i.e., it should avoid fighting a two-front war.

These are but a few examples of the conceptually rich and operationally significant hypotheses which lie buried in these four cases. Others have been made explicit by the researchers in their texts as well as in their methodological appendices. These should be systematically identified, classified, and tested, since they are the building blocks of an eventual institution building theory and of a valid set of guidelines for practitioners. Such broad propositions and others more limited in their scope are important for the next stage of institution building research. We have gained confidence in our basic approach to institution building. It has been found useful as an orientation to the process of organizationally induced and protected social change, though the approach needs to be relaxed to accommodate the variety of circumstances under which deliberate change is attempted. Our conceptual equipment has been tested and it too has been found useful, subject to more precise definition and refinement. The number of variables that enter into institution building analysis, the variety of environmental conditions, the dynamic context in which action occurs create such a multiplicity of possible combinations as to defy efforts at comprehensive theory building at this time. At a more modest and immediately useful level, we can study how single variables affect one another under limiting but important conditions and thus build knowledge incrementally and cumulatively.

This introduction can not presume to summarize the material in these four cases. It does attempt to point out some of the interesting possibilities and problems arising from these reports, and their implications for the study of induced social change. It also attempts to identify change tactics that might be useful to the action agency that sponsored these studies.

Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia
March 25, 1967