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
# **SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT IN RURAL TURKEY: VILLAGE AND ELITE LEADERSHIP RELATIONS**

Report No. 10

Rural Development Research Project

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1967**

The field survey on the basis of which this series of reports was prepared was conducted in 1962 with the support of the Turkish State Planning Organization and the U.S. Agency for International Development Mission to Turkey. The role of these two institutions has been confined to this original support. The findings, interpretations and presentation in this and other reports in the same series have not been critically reviewed by either institution and are the sole responsibility of the author.

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## SUMMARY

### INTRODUCTION

In developing societies, the burden of leadership for rural development usually rests upon the government. Thus, an effective relationship between the ruling elites and the people is essential. However, two linkage points in the chain of influence and communication between elites and the masses are particularly fragile and susceptible to breakdown: 1) the link between villagers and the formal leadership of the village and 2) the link between local leadership and the lowest, most proximate level of the national bureaucratic hierarchy.

In Turkish society, these critical links are those between the villagers and the village headman, and between the village headman and the district governor or county prefect. This report examines the relationships and interactions among villager, village headman, and district governors, with an eye to their significance for rural development in Turkey.

### POSITION OF THE HEADMAN IN THE VILLAGE

Three-quarters of villager respondents designated the headman as the most "influential" villager. The major reason given by these villagers for their response was the fact that the headman occupied an "official" position, i.e., they felt that the headman was influential because of his formal role. Furthermore, peasants who saw the headman as prominent in one area (influence, for example), also tended to perceive him as prominent in other areas.

### NON-ATTITUDINAL VILLAGE CHARACTERISTICS AND THE POSITION OF THE HEADMAN

Four major findings emerged from an attempt to discover why the headman's position was more exalted in some villages and not in others. The more isolated the village (farthest from the nearest well-traveled road), the more influential the headman appeared to the villagers. Second, there was no evidence that visitations by the district governor affected the headman's prestige, general

influence, or farming leadership. However, the presence of an "aga" (traditional elite figure) notably weakened the headman's position in the eyes of the villagers. Finally, the presence of political parties in the village seemed to have little effect one way or the other on the headman's role.

#### VILLAGE ATTITUDINAL CHARACTERISTICS AND THE POSITION OF THE HEADMAN

Literacy and all forms of mass media exposure positively enhanced the villager's perception of the headman as influential. Personally modern patterns of opinion in the village were found to be positively associated with greater communal agreement in perceiving the headman as the major village leader. Furthermore, communities which perceived the headman as most influential also tended to see the community as run by a few men. Finally, no relationship seemed to exist between the nature and level of village consensus on main community problems and consensus on the role of the headman.

#### CHARACTERISTICS OF THE HEADMAN

Although the headmen tended to be older, more literate, and more affluent than their fellow villagers, there seemed to be no evidence of an "elite-mass" gap between the headman and the villagers. The villagers apparently would not fault the headman for troubles which they saw as more basically and globally dreived, i.e., in essence, they viewed the headman as "one of their own". One example of the common bonds between villagers and headman was the high degree of felt national inefficacy shared among peasants and headman alike. In general, although the headman seems to be slightly more enterprising and responsible than the ordinary villagers, his image of the village and his norms for its development were basically similar to those of most villagers.

Further evidence of the close ties between the headman and his village is the finding that headmen usually felt more pressure from their villages than they did from district governors or any bureaucratic superiors. Also, it was discovered that elected headmen

occupied a leadership position superior to that of appointed headmen. Basically, then, headmen were "downward" rather than "upward-oriented" and exhibited more similarities than differences in relation to the other villagers.

#### SIGNIFICANCE OF THE HEADMAN'S POSITION

In villages where there was a strong tendency to view the headman as most influential, there was also a strong tendency to display many other signs of communal modernity. Although there seemed to be a positive association between village perception of the headman as most influential and village perception of the community's power and wealth as being concentrated in the hands of a few men, the situation seemed to be a healthy one in which local power was concentrated enough for efficiency and yet reciprocal enough for human satisfaction. Peasant feelings of local efficacy and access to village leaders were greater in villages where the headman was seen as occupying a relatively strong leadership position.

#### THE PEASANT, THE HEADMAN, AND THE DISTRICT GOVERNOR

The role of district governor (kaymakam) is one of the most critical in Turkey's rural developmental effort since this position carries major responsibilities for both the maintenance of order and the initiation of change in rural Turkey. Thus, the attitudes of the district governor and his relationships with the villagers and their headmen are of prime importance in understanding developmental potentialities in Turkey.

#### ATTITUDES TOWARD RURAL PROBLEMS

A considerable discrepancy seemed to exist between the views of the national administrative elite and those of villagers and local leaders regarding rural problems. District governors and other administrators tended to stress the lack of education and general poverty as the villagers' major problems, whereas the villagers themselves tended to be more concerned about tangible needs such as water, roads and land. A major misunderstanding regarding responsibilities in these areas was also evident. The majority of district

governors tended to feel that the government should be solely responsible for meeting the villages' needs, whereas only 44 per cent of the headmen placed this responsibility on the government. The villager may be willing to assume more initiative than the elite is ready to give him credit for.

#### VILLAGER-BUREAUCRAT INTERACTION

For this section of the study, two sets of data were used; one emphasized the relationship between the district and the villages, and the other emphasized the relationship between the individual district governor and the villages under his jurisdiction. A comparison of the relevant data from both sets revealed the generally greater importance of the individual administrator, rather than the characteristics of the district in which he worked, as an influence upon the villagers. However, the survey results emphasized that the perception of village problems was very different between important sectors of the mass and the elite. There was no apparent association between the frequency with which villagers mentioned roads or water as their most important problem and the district governors' road or water development program. The lack of such a relationship clearly seemed to imply that development programs were not particularly keyed to the felt needs of the village populations.

#### LOCAL SOCIAL STRUCTURE

A matter of special concern is the personal relationship between the local leaders (headmen) and the government administrators (district governors). A favorable evaluation of the headmen by the district governors would suggest the possibility of a cooperative relationship which would benefit rather than hinder the development process. In general, the district governors' evaluation of the headmen's role was relatively favorable. District governors with a rural background and more rural experience seemed more prone to judge the headmen as helpful to development.

The attitudes of the village headmen toward the district governors was likewise relatively favorable. However, district governors who claimed to be very active -- touring villages, checking on subordinates, etc. -- seem to have had more impact on the village power structure than the more passive types. Villages under the jurisdiction of these "more active" governors reported a relatively stronger and more influential headman.

#### GOVERNMENTAL CONTACT WITH VILLAGERS

Peasant contact with governmental officials other than the district governors was greatest with the police and gendarmerie; postal workers and health officials also had relatively frequent contact with villagers. The relationship of these contacts to the role of the district governor was this: district governors who claimed more activity seemed to have subordinate officials who were likely to travel more frequently to rural areas. Two factors were particularly important in influencing the behavior of subordinate officials: the district governor's frequency of visitations and his interest in public works projects. District governors who satisfied these criteria seemed to have a significantly greater effect on the visiting behavior of their subordinates. Thus, it was evident that the district governor, by the nature of behavior and attitudes, could greatly influence the villagers' total contact with officialdom.

## INTRODUCTION

Rural development requires leadership. Few villages in any country have been able to forge their way into modernity without the guidance, direction and coordination produced by effective, informed leadership. In most instances, much of the burden for providing this leadership unavoidably falls upon the government. In fact, awareness of the problems of establishing effective relationships between government and people in developing societies has become so acute that some scholars and policy-makers even talk about a special field which they label "developmental administration."

A factor which is widely seen as compounding the problems of developmental administration is the pronounced gap between elite and mass sectors of the population. Lucian Pye, for example, has suggested that: "...to identify the central cause of political instability in transitional societies, we would point to the lack of an effective relation between the ruling elites and their peoples."<sup>1</sup> Breakdowns in what might be called the bureaucratic transmission belt are common. Decisions taken at the highest levels of government frequently turn out to be something quite different at the operational level of the village. Similarly, village demands often seem to become warped or lost in their upward passage through the bureaucratic chain of command. Moreover, it appears that these breakdowns in the bureaucratic transmission belt are not random; rather, they seem to occur regularly and predictably at certain

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<sup>1</sup>Lucian W. Pye, Aspects of Political Development (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966), p. 78.

critical points in the chain of influence and communication. Two of the most conspicuous and fragile linkage points exist at the very end of the chain: 1) the link between villagers and the formal leadership of the village and 2) the link between local leadership and the lowest, most proximate level of the national bureaucratic hierarchy.

In Turkey, these critical links are those between the villagers and the village headman (muhtar) and between the village headman and the district governor or county prefect (kaymakam). The purpose of this report is to use the data of the Rural Development Research Project along with data from other studies to examine these important relationships in Turkish developmental administration. Two previously submitted reports have presented general descriptions of village "Social Structure" and of "The Authoritative Village Elite: Muhtar and Imam."<sup>2</sup> This report proceeds from that base to an examination of the headman's leadership role in the village and aspects of the relationship between the headman and the district governor, the immediately superior representative of the national government and, usually, of the urban elite. We shall inspect the interactions among villagers, village headmen and district governors as they relate to rural development.

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<sup>2</sup>Rural Development Research Project, Preliminary Report (Cambridge: Center for International Studies, M.I.T., 1964), chapters IIG and IIIH.

The Headman and the Village

The "elite-mass" distinction must be used with care. As one draws closer to that presumably undifferentiated mass he perceives that its gross contours take increasingly particular shapes -- its uniformity disappears and is replaced by a rich variety of characteristics and relationships. The "mass" is no monolith. It can be regarded as an entity for certain purposes or through ignorance; but deeper analysis indicates that it too has a significantly articulated structure.

The concept of eliteness is also, by definition, relative. The notion has classically referred to persons possessing a highly disproportionate share of some value, such as power, wealth, or prestige. Thus, the definition of the elite depends on one's perspective -- upon the particular value and comparison group employed. The national elite in Turkey can be distinguished from the mass in terms of power, education, wealth and similar values. But such distinctions can be further applied within the mass group. There are wheels within wheels. The Turkish peasantry -- the major element of the Turkish masses -- is distinct from the national elite, but in turn has its own peasant elite of power, prestige, knowledge, wealth, piety, and so on.

Recognition of the intra-peasant elite is particularly important to the student of the elite-mass relationship at the societal level. Elite-mass contacts are not simply broadside. Most often, elite and mass grope toward each other through the specialized agents of each. Especially in a developing society, interaction

occurs through a fairly limited set of roles and persons, and the nature of that interaction depends critically upon the nature of these mediating roles and persons. We have chosen to investigate the official contacts between elite and mass in Turkish society and, hence, have focused on the elite and mass agents charged with the direct conduct of those relations -- the district governor and the village headman. In this section we now turn to a more detailed inspection of the position of the headman in the Turkish village. We shall be examining the first part of our three-way linkage among peasants, village headman and district governor -- namely, the interaction between the headman and his villagers. In so doing, we concentrate on a set of elite-mass relationships within the little community in order to improve our understanding of the classic set of elite-mass relations in the great community.

The data used in this portion of the analysis have been basically described in Report No. 1 of this series. Another description is furnished in Appendix A to this report. They were gathered through interviews conducted in 1962 with approximately 8,000 Turkish peasants from 446 villages scattered across all 67 provinces of the country. Since we contemplated performing a contextual analysis of the type herein described (and for administrative reasons as well), the sample was designed to furnish a relatively constant number of interviews from each village, roughly 15-16 regular interviews and four elite interviews (headman, headman's wife, religious leader, and religious leader's wife). Our sample of villagers from any single village is small, but that sample was

drawn from more than four hundred separate villages, and we shall keep our distinctions rather simple and direct. We shall ordinarily be talking about types of villages comprising anywhere from fifty to one hundred and fifty cases each, so that one can contend, assuming within-type homogeneity, that we have in effect that many separate samples from the same kind of village.

The individual village samples have been used to estimate the percentage of peasants from each village who displayed a certain characteristic (such as literacy) or a certain attitude (such as perceiving it to be easy to talk about problems with village leaders). The 446 villages were then arrayed in terms of these percentages for each relevant attribute. Each array was trichotomized into subgroups of villages. The three subgroups were made as nearly equal as possible in the number of villages they contained. One subgroup is that third with the highest percentages for the given attribute, the second is the middle third, and the last is the third of the villages with the lowest percentages for that attribute. Thus, "low," "medium" and "high" levels we shall use later on refer to villages ranked according to the relative degree to which the villages possessed the attribute under discussion. For example, the percentage of respondents picking the headman as the most influential villager was calculated for each village. The villages were then arrayed in terms of these percentages and divided as nearly equally as possible into three groups. The "high" group consisted of 152 villages whose percentages of agreement on the headman as most influential were 83 per cent or higher. The "medium" group consisted of 151 villages

whose agreement ranged from 67 to 82 per cent, and the "low" group included 143 villages having less than 66 per cent agreement in selecting the headman as most influential.

Our analysis of the relations between the formally authoritative village elite, represented by the headman, and the ordinary villagers will focus on five major questions: 1) What is the position of the village headman in the local community? 2) How are certain non-attitudinal characteristics of the village, such as its distance from a regular road or whether it had political party organizations when they were permitted, related to the position of the village headman? 3) How are certain attitudinal characteristics of the village, i.e., the climate of village opinion, related to the position of the headman? 4) How do some of the personal characteristics of the headman himself seem to be related to his village position? and 5) What difference does the position occupied by the headman seem to make for village attitudes and behaviors?

#### The Position of the Headman in the Village

Five items on the survey were used to obtain a general idea of the prevailing village attitudes toward the headman. Three of these items asked the respondent whom he regarded as the villager most knowledgeable about what is going on in the world, whom he regarded as the person with greatest influence on village affairs, and whom he regarded as the most prestigious villager. The other two items referred to more specific scopes of influence, inquiring about whom most villagers looked to for leadership in farming matters and whom they looked to for leadership if the village got into a land dispute

with another village. The overall results for these items are displayed in Table 1.

Several features of these data warrant special comment. First, one is struck by the discrimination displayed in the responses. This is methodologically significant in that the survey researcher working in developing societies is always apprehensive about response set. However, in answering these items the peasant respondents clearly revealed a specific and understanding approach to the questions. Choice of the headman ranged from 35 per cent to 73 per cent. Choice of the District Governor ranged from one per cent to 36 per cent. Moreover, the choices are eminently plausible. The village teacher is a significant figure only in the most knowledgeable category. The District Governor enters most prominently with regard to land disputes. Another government official, namely the extension agent, enters conspicuously only with regard to farming matters. And even the Don't Knows portray the same meaningful patterns of response, being high only when the villagers were asked who in the village seemed to know most about what is going on in the world. About a quarter of the villagers apparently had so little confidence in their own knowledge of the external environment that they found it difficult to judge which villager knew most about such things. This is reflected in further analysis of the incidence of Don't Knows among various subgroups. For instance, the percentage of such replies among illiterate peasants was roughly twice the percentage among literates -- 30 percent versus 16 per cent. For female illiterates

Table 1. Leadership Orientations of the Turkish Peasantry

Person Seen As:	Head- man	Aga	Rel. Ldr.	Tea- cher	Dist. Gov.	Other Off'l	Other	No One	DK Ref.
Most Knowledgeable	35%	4%	3%	10%	na	na	19%	na	28%
Most Prestigious	46	7	7	3	2	na	15	13%	9
Most Influential	73	4	1	1	1	na	8	7	5
Farming Leader	51	2	-	1	13	18	5	-	9
Land Dispute Leader	47	1	-	-	36	7	3	-	5

( N = 6,433 regular respondents)

the percentage rose to 32 per cent. Similarly, men were more likely to make the required judgment than women, even after literacy was controlled.

More interesting than this methodological observation, however, is the substantive significance of the replies. Peasants seemingly discern various village elites, or at least tend to perceive role specialization among existing elite figures. The headman is seen as most influential twice as often as he is seen as most knowledgeable about world affairs. The District Governor is much more likely to be regarded as furnishing leadership in a land dispute than in farming matters. As we have noted, the village microcosm is clearly differentiated and articulated, and many of the villagers are far from indiscriminant interpreters of village patterns.

Most germane for our purposes is the question concerning the most influential villager. Nearly three quarters of all respondents designated the headman. In extremely few villages did less than a

majority see the headman as most influential. In more than two thirds of the villages, two thirds or more of our respondents selected the headman. The importance of the role can hardly be more strongly indicated.

Once again, subgroup variation provides additional insight. Sex and age differences in the propensity to see the headman as most influential were slight. On the other hand, the literates (controlling for sex) were more likely than the illiterates to view the headman as most influential. The tendency to see the headman as the person with greatest influence on village affairs increased according to the size of the village. Moreover, although the two specific leadership scopes we inquired about were chosen in part because they were areas where one might expect the headman's influence to drop off sharply, both probably falling within the domain of other officials such as the agricultural extension agent and the district governor, we see that the headman's influence, while reduced, remains appreciable.

The villagers were also asked why the person they named as most influential in village affairs possessed so much influence. The importance of his formal role for the headman's power is revealed by the fact that nearly two thirds of those peasants who had selected the headman referred to his official capacity as the reason for his influence. He was most influential because he occupied the role of headman. In other words, it seems that village social structure in Turkey formally and actually features this critical role. Our con-

cern now will be to try to understand the reasons behind this emphasis on the headman's role, and what difference it seems to make that the headman is so influential. We shall do this through comparison of communities varying in the importance ascribed to the headman.

Before proceeding, however, three additional points must be made. The first is that, as Table 15 will indicate, the headmen themselves share the ordinary villager's perception of the headman's relative influence, though they are less likely to see themselves as most influential in the specific areas of farming and land disputes. Not only do the headmen share the ordinary villager's view of the headman's paramount influence position, but so does the village religious leader. Seventy eight per cent of the headmen saw themselves as most influential, 73 per cent of all regular village respondents had a similar perception, and 75 per cent of all religious leaders corroborated this judgment.

The headmen were slightly less likely than ordinary villagers to see themselves as the most prestigious villager and more likely than ordinary villagers to see the religious leader in that role. Perhaps even more significantly, the headmen also somewhat downgraded themselves as most knowledgeable while sharply upgrading the village teacher. More than a fifth of all headmen saw the teacher as most knowledgeable about what is going on in the world. These bits of evidence hint at the complex intra-elite relations that exist in most Turkish villages. A figure like the village teacher may be too different from most villagers and their values to be frequently

designated as most influential, but he may nevertheless be quite powerful through differential appreciation of his talents by other members of the village elite, such as the headman.

Second, we must note the rather high correlation that exists among the five leadership items we have been inspecting. Peasants who see the headman as most knowledgeable also disproportionately tend to see him as most prestigious, most influential, farming leader and land dispute leader. The matrix of inter-item correlations is presented in Table 2.

Table 2. Matrix of Inter-Item Correlations for Five Leadership Items<sup>a</sup>

Select Headman As:	<u>Prestige</u>	<u>Influence</u>	<u>Farming</u>	<u>Land Dispute</u>
Most Knowledgeable	.500	.489	.408	.316
Most Prestigious		.706	.356	.325
Most Influential			.369	.306
Farming Leader				.678

<sup>a</sup> The entries are gamma coefficients. All responses were dichotomized into choice of the headman versus other replies.

Since these items were clearly correlated, we developed the notion of a consistent "headman orientation" which might be held by some villagers. The five items were therefore weighted equally and combined into an index with that label. The index scores were distributed approximately normally. Nevertheless, the index fails to yield results as significant as those produced by using alone the question regarding who is most influential in the vill-

age, but we shall report some of the findings nonetheless. The main substantive point at present is simply that there does seem to be a tendency for certain peasants who see the headman as pre-eminent in one area to see him similarly located in other areas. For example, such a predilection is more common among women than among men.

Non-Attitudinal Village Characteristics and the Position of the Headman

We now confront the question of why the headman's position seems to be more exalted in some villages than in others. One obvious hypothesis is that the position of the headman depends upon some of the basic objective characteristics of the village, such as its proximity to a regularly traveled road, the frequency of visits by the district governor, whether there is an aga (wealthy landlord) in the village, and so on. One might hypothesize that the headman would be more influential in relatively isolated villages where he could monopolize village contacts with important outside agencies. Against this, however, one might argue that such isolated villages had very few outside contacts that were important, so that their mediation by the headman would mean little. In such isolated villages the headman's position might be weaker because the headman would have little in the way of externally provided rewards to offer. Although our data are far from definitive, they do offer meaningful empirical insight into this long neglected problem.

Since we are dealing with the headman's position in the village, we shall now employ contextual concepts rather than unclustered individual relations. We used individual relations in the preceding section for the sake of economy since the contextual analysis led to exactly the same results. But now we shall cross-tabulate villages classed as "low," "medium," or "high" in their level of agreement that the headman was most influential, most prestigious, etc., against other village characteristics of the type mentioned above. First let us look at village differences in distance from the nearest regularly traveled road and see how these are associated with the headman's position. The necessary data are provided in Table 3.

With the exception of agreement concerning the headman as the village's leader in land disputes, these data seem to tell essentially the same story: the more isolated villages, in terms of distance from the nearest road with regular motor transport, tend to be those with greater perception of the headman as village leader. Not surprisingly, the greatest effect seems to hold regarding the perception of the headman as most knowledgeable. For the dimensions of prestige and of farming leadership, the differences seem to be restricted to those between villages which have a moderate tendency to look to the headman and those which have a high tendency. Distance seems not to effect the groups ranking low in headman orientation. But the directionality of the differences are everywhere the same for four of the five dimensions. The findings suggest the hypothesis that at least one

Table 3. Village Proximity to Regular road by Agreement on Headman's Leadership Position<sup>a</sup>

	<u>Distance from Nearest Road with Regular Motor Transport</u>	
Level of Village Agreement on Headman as:	<u>0-4 km.</u>	<u>5 or more km.</u>
Villager most knowledgeable about world --		
Low	40%	26%
Medium	33	34
High	<u>27</u>	<u>41</u>
	100'	100
Most prestigious villager --		
Low	27	29
Medium	45	32
High	<u>28</u>	<u>39</u>
	100	100
Most influential in village affairs --		
Low	37	28
Medium	33	34
High	<u>30</u>	<u>38</u>
	100	100
Farming Leader --		
Low	27	28
Medium	44	33
High	<u>31</u>	<u>39</u>
	100	100
Land dispute leader --		
Low	30	29
Medium	33	36
High	<u>37</u>	<u>35</u>
	100	100
N=	(82)	(137)

<sup>a</sup>These data are from one random subsample of our overall sample of villages.

form of increased contact with the larger world -- proximity to motorized road transportation -- may be corrosive of traditional formal leadership in the village community.

Let us examine another kind of contact between the village and the more urbanized world of the national elite -- contact with the district governor. How does the frequency of village visitation

by this official seem to be related to the headman's position? Does it enhance his leadership role, undermine it, or have no visible effect? Table 4 presents these data.

Table 4. Frequency of District Governor's Visits by Agreement on Headman's Leadership Position

Level of Village Agreement on Headman as:		District Governor Visits Village		
		At least monthly	Less than monthly	Never
Villager most knowledgeable about world --	Low	26%	30%	34%
	Medium	39	36	28
	High	35	34	29
		<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>
Most prestigious villager --	Low	28	28	32
	Medium	40	39	31
	High	31	33	37
		<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>
Most influential in village affairs --	Low	28	36	30
	Medium	34	33	35
	High	38	30	36
		<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>
Farming leader --	Low	30	30	29
	Medium	37	35	34
	High	33	34	37
		<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>
Land dispute leader --	Low	37	30	29
	Medium	30	34	36
	High	33	35	36
		<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>
	N =	(109)	(184)	(152)

The answer seems to be that it has no visible effect. It is very difficult to discern any regular patterns of any magnitude in these data. There is some indication that the more frequently

the district governor visits the village the more likely it is that the headman is regarded as the villager most knowledgeable about the world. Contacts with the external official may augment the headman's position, or, since we do not know anything of causal directionality, the district governors may choose more often to visit those villages where the headman is regarded as most knowledgeable about the world. Similarly, the last portion of the table relating to land dispute leadership suggests that the more the district governor visits the village the less the headman is viewed as the village's leader in land disputes with other villages. In this instance it is quite plausible that contact with the district governor would weaken the headman's position, since inter-village land disputes would be the official concern of the district governor. However, in both these sub-tables the magnitude of the differences is far from great, and the other three sub-tables reveal no regular associations. At best we can contend that frequency of visitation by the district governor seems to be associated with a relatively enhanced role for the village headman as the most knowledgeable villager concerning the outside world and with a reduced perception of him as land dispute leader. There seems to be no evidence that the frequency of visitations by the district governor affects the headman's prestige, general influence or farming leadership.

Perhaps it would be informative to examine the relationship between the headman's position and a different kind of actor on the Turkish village scene -- the aga. Does there seem to be any connection between the presence or absence of this traditional elite figure and the villagers' perception of their headman? The appropriate data are furnished in Table 5, and they indicate that the answer to our query is a resounding "yes." The presence

Table 5. Presence of an Aga (Wealthy Landlord) in the Village by Agreement on the Headman's Leadership Position

Level of Village Agreement on Headman as:	Aga in Village	
	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>
Villager most knowledgeable about the world --		
Low	39%	29%
Medium	29	35
High	<u>32</u>	<u>36</u>
	100	100
Most prestigious villager --		
Low	50	27
Medium	27	38
High	<u>23</u>	<u>35</u>
	100	100
Most influential in village affairs --		
Low	48	30
Medium	23	35
High	<u>29</u>	<u>35</u>
	100	100
Farming leader --		
Low	39	39
Medium	38	35
High	<u>23</u>	<u>37</u>
	100	100
Land dispute leader --		
Low	39	30
Medium	29	34
High	<u>32</u>	<u>35</u>
	100	100
N =	(56)	(390)

of the district governor may make little difference to the headman's position, but the presence of an aga in the village is associated with striking differences in the headman's position of leadership. In every examined respect, if there is an aga in the village the headman's position is weakened. The attrition seems to be greatest in terms of prestige and influence and, perhaps, farming leadership. In the first two areas it seems to work most strongly at the lowest level, that is, the presence of an aga seems to throw more villages into the group with low agreement on the headman as leader rather than making an equal shift of high groups into medium groups. In any event, the differences are striking and regular. The presence of certain traditional elite figures, in this case the aga, appears to undermine the role of the formally authoritative leader of the village. What such a reduction in the headman's position means for elite-mass contact and rural development can only be conjectured, but the inferences would not be favorable. Not least of the government's incentives for eliminating the agas might be the desire to support the official it recognizes as the authoritative village leader and with whom it is accustomed to work, the headman.

We have examined the association between village contact with what might be called the everyday flow of the larger society (proximity to motor transport) and the headman's leadership position, the association between official governmental contact (visitation by the district governor) and the headman's position, and the association between contact with a traditional rural elite figure

(presence of an aga in the village) and the headman's position. Now let us look at the impact of a different kind of contact with the elite world and inspect its association with the leadership position of the headman. We shall categorize our villages in terms of whether the village had at least one political party cell when such organizations in the villages were proscribed two years before our data were collected. What seems to have been the effect on the headman's position of this alternative conduit to governmental influence? Some have seen the development of local party leaders as undermining the headman's authority by eliminating his presumed monopoly of contact with the government. Indeed, in some cases it has seemed that local party leaders were more effective than the headman at getting governmental benefits for the villagers and at pleading their grievances before outsiders who could do something about them. Others, however, maintain that the headman usually captured or was the agent of one of the political parties in addition to being the representative of the official bureaucracy. In most villages the headmen are elected and the candidates compete as representatives of the national political parties. However, as we shall explain later, at the time of the 1962 survey more than half of the headmen had been appointed by the central government after the 1960 revolution. The relevant data are displayed in Table 6.

If one were to predict in which of the five leadership areas under investigation the presence of a political party cell

Table 6. Existence of a Political Party Cell in the Village by Agreement on the Headman's Leadership Position

Level of Village Agreement on Headman as:	Political Party Cell	
	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>
<b>Villager most knowledgeable about world --</b>		
Low	32%	27%
Medium	36	31
High	32	42
	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>
<b>Most prestigious villager --</b>		
Low	30	29
Medium	36	37
High	34	34
	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>
<b>Most influential in village affairs --</b>		
Low	30	36
Medium	34	34
High	36	30
	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>
<b>Farming leader --</b>		
Low	30	30
Medium	35	34
High	35	36
	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>
<b>Land dispute leader --</b>		
Low	30	35
Medium	34	32
High	36	33
	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>
	N = (297)	(149)

in the village might affect the headman's position he would probably have predicted the very result now found. A very weak but noticeable association exists in only two areas: the position of the headman as most knowledgeable and as most influential. But, when we inspect the directionality of those associations, one becomes more suspicious. Our personal prediction was that a

party's presence in the village would probably weaken the headman's position. So it seems to do when it comes to the villagers' perception of the headman as most knowledgeable. But the presence of a political party cell is, if anything, associated with a more influential role for the headman, contrary to our prediction. Since the differences are so slight, albeit regular, the directionality reversed and counter to the prediction, our conclusion would be that direct organizational contact with a political party cell in the village seems to have little effect one way or the other on the headman's role.

An analysis of variance was also performed using agreement level ranks as the non-interval variable and village population as the interval variable. Two of the five associations proved significant at the .10 level or better. The largest villages tended to be more likely to have a high level of agreement on the headman as the most prestigious villager and the farming leader. However, the equivalent correlation coefficients were low (.127 and .178, respectively).

#### Village Attitudinal Characteristics and the Position of the Headman

Just as the villages were grouped into three rankings in terms of the percentage of their residents agreeing on particular evaluations of the headman's leadership position, so we have also grouped the villages into low, medium, and high rankings in terms of their residents' responses to other items, such as whether they have ever been to the cinema or side with the "modern" group if there is inno-

vational conflict in the village. Each of the resultant rankings has been cross-tabulated against the ranking of villages in terms of their level of perceptual agreement on the headman as the most influential villager. An example of such a tabulation is given below in Table 7. It links the relative level of lit-

Table 7. Level of Village Literacy by Agreement that the Headman is Most Influential on Village Affairs

Village Rank on Perception of the Headman as Most Influential:	Village Rank on Percentage Literate:		
	<u>Low</u>	<u>Medium</u>	<u>High</u>
Low	45%	29%	23%
Medium	27	35	39
High	<u>28</u> 100%	<u>36</u> 100%	<u>38</u> 100%

eracy in the village with the relative agreement that the headman is the person with most influence in village affairs. Thus, we learn from the table that 45 per cent of those villages ranking in the lowest third of all villages in terms of literacy level also ranked in the lowest third in terms of their community's tendency to perceive the headman as most influential. Only 29 per cent of the villages with medium literacy levels and 23 per cent of those with high literacy levels fell into the same category. At the opposite end of the table, only 28 per cent of the low literacy level villages were ranked high in perception of the headman as most influential, in contrast to 36 per cent of the medium literacy group and 38 per cent of the high literacy group of villages which

ranked high in perception of the headman as influential. Such data reflect the positive association of the level of village literacy and relative agreement that the headman is the most influential villager.

This same type of analysis was performed for a total of 48 other variables, ranging from exposure to forms of the mass media, travel, use of governmental agricultural aid, language, and kind of plough used, through perception of the main problems facing the village, awareness of village projects, reaction to innovational conflict, and assignment of responsibility for village improvements, to ideas concerning village social structure, the stress placed on national loyalty, attitudes toward gossip, fatalism, and shame versus guilt orientation. The basic question under examination was, of course, whether the prevalence of certain practices or attitudes in the community was strongly associated with the perception of the headman held by the villagers. The major findings were as follows.

1. As with literacy, all three forms of mass media exposure available in rural Turkey were positively associated with enhanced perception of the headman as influential. Rather than attenuating the headman's position, the mass media are associated with augmented influence for this formal village elite figure. The greater the proportion of the village community exposed to the radio, the newspaper and the cinema, the greater the tendency in that community to see the headman as most influential. On the other hand, travel, as

manifested in having visited the nearest city over 50,000 in population, is not significantly associated with agreement on the influence role of the headman. In general, it seems that as the community's exposure to change through the mass media, literacy and travel increases, traditional local leadership need not be undermined and may even be strengthened if that local authoritative elite has been at least somewhat integrated with the developmental bureaucracy. Under suitable conditions such as seem to exist in Turkey, traditional local elites need not be threatened by modernization nor be an implacable obstacle to that modernization. The critical conditions would seem to be that the local elite have some non-sacrificial and significant role to play and that it receive both local and external support for so doing. The media exposed and literate sector of rural Turkey provides such support to the village headman who at least attempts to swim with the tide.

2. The nature and level of village consensus on the main problems confronting their community has no relationship to the consensus on the role of the headman. Nor is there any significant relationship between a tendency on the part of villagers to say that the central government must play the main role in solving that problem and the villagers' perception of the relative influence of the headman. In fact, when less general topics are broached, such as whose responsibility it is to improve the situation with regard to village drinking water (a chronic difficulty), there is a strong negative association between a communal inclination to

throw this off on the central government and agreement that the headman is most influential.

3. Consensus on the role of the headman and on more general aspects of village social structure are strongly linked. Villages which differentially perceive the headman as most influential also tend to see their community as run by a few men rather than being one in which all have an approximately equal voice. We must add, however, that the more rapidly developing and modern villages are the very ones which display such an oligarchic view. And this is not translated into a perceived inability to communicate with village leaders or into feelings of inefficacy. For example, 41 per cent of those villages ranked high in perception of the headman as most influential in village affairs also ranked high in agreement that it is easy to talk to village leaders. The same figure for those villages ranked low in perception of the headman as most influential was 24 per cent. In short, our data suggest that a view of the village as run by a few men rather than by many, and a perception of the village headman as the most influential villager, are associated not only with each other but also with relative communal modernity and vitality. Perception of the headman as most influential is also linked with heightened communal consensus that the "good" headman is one who consults his villagers rather than acting on his own.

4. Finally, both the present type of analysis and another analysis of variance using the "headman orientation index" formed from the combination of all five dimensions of headman perception

(knowledge, prestige, influence, farming leadership and land dispute leadership) indicate that certain personally modern patterns of opinion in the village are associated with greater communal agreement in perceiving the headman as the major village leader. For example, relatively high consensus in expressed willingness to accept an innovational suggestion from one's son (something many Turkish peasants are loath to do) and a low incidence of shame orientation as opposed to guilt orientation are both associated with a high ranking on headman orientation. So is at least one manifestation of nationalism, as reflected in consensus regarding Ataturk as the person most admired, "living or dead in all the world."

#### Characteristics of the Village Headman and Their Relation to His Leadership Role

We have found that certain village characteristics, attitudinal and other, are related to the consensus that exists within the village regarding the role of the headman. Now we must ask what kind of man it is who occupies this role, how much does he resemble or differ from his constituents, and is his position in the village -- the sway he holds over the villagers -- seemingly related to his personal characteristics.

Table 8 contrasts the social backgrounds of village headmen with another elite actor in the village, the religious leader, and with a comparison group of all village males. On the whole, it reveals the general similarity between the headmen and their village brethren. The headmen tend to be older, more literate and

more affluent, but from the same roots. Actually, the single comparison group of all village males is not entirely appropriate. Were we to make a few finer distinctions within this "mass" we would see that the headmen rather closely resemble the more enterprising and successful peasants of their age group. For example, the literate males aged 30-50 differ from the group of headmen by only a few percentage points along most dimensions. The religious leaders, too, are clearly rural in their roots; but their very calling and its requirements, such as a little Arabic, necessitate their being "different" in more respects.

The percentage of headmen and religious leaders who claim to have become literate by their own efforts or, in the case of the headmen, through military service suggests the enterprise of some of these men. Even more suggestive for our purposes is the markedly greater communications activity of the headmen. Despite being less literate than the religious leaders, the headmen are clearly better exposed to all mass media. It would seem that the demands of their role are at least one factor inducing this greater media exposure. Moreover, such data make still more plausible the frequent designation by the villagers of the headman as most knowledgeable concerning what is going on in the world. Finally, the intimate contact between village elite and ordinary villagers within the confines of the little community is reflected in the fact that 95 per cent of the headmen stated that they knew every adult in their village and 60 per cent indicated they visited the main meeting

**Table 8. Characteristics of Headmen, Religious Leaders and Village Males**

<u>Selected Characteristics:</u>	<u>Headmen</u>	<u>Religious Leaders</u>	<u>Village Males</u>
Literate	68%	89%	49%
Attended School	43	52	39
Literates Taught by: self	25	25	22
teacher	49	45	60
religious leader	1	20	3
military service	21	6	14
other	4	4	3
Father Literate	28	47	23
Father's Occupation Farming	89	76	87
Age: under 30	5	26	33
30 - 49	59	28	39
50 and over	30	42	26
Lived Entire Life in Same Village	88	57	88
More than Two Rooms in Household	63	46	44
Seven or More Persons in Household	61	47	45
Family Suffered from Hunger in Past Year	14	17	35
Family Suffered from Lack of Fuel in Past Year	39	39	46
Family Suffered from Lack of Clothing in Past Year	26	27	44
Family's Economic Position Judged Better than Others	31	27	19
Exposed to Newspaper at least Weekly	64	45	34
Listen to Radio Daily	51	28	25
Have Attended Cinema	84	56	70
Leave the Village at least Weekly	70	31	41
Know Everyone in Village	95	87	94
Visit Coffee House of Guest Room Daily in Winter	60	47	49

N = (424) (335) (3,010)

place in the village every day during the winter. All in all, there seems to be very little isolation of the intra-village elite from its constituency.

Knowing these similarities and differences in social background characteristics and behaviors, let us compare the attitudinal profiles of the same people. Selected attitudes concerning the community are presented in Table 9.

The overall impression garnered from these comparisons stresses the similarity of opinions. The range of variation in the item percentages is less than ten percentage points in more than two thirds of the comparisons. The elite and mass actors at the village level seem generally to share the same perceptual world -- to have essentially similar interpretations of their community. Nevertheless, the differences that do exist are significant. The headmen are somewhat more inclined than ordinary village males, and even more inclined than the religious leaders, to see the village as egalitarian in structure. They tend to give slightly lower estimates of the concentration of power and wealth, although they are apparently rather candid in admitting their own relatively advantaged socio-economic position. The headmen also betray a slightly disproportionate inclination to see the village as independent and able to handle its own problems. Here, however, one's reaction might well be surprise at the meagerness of any defensiveness of parochialism on the part of the headmen. A major point of interest is the marked elite-mass consensus within Turkish

Table 9. Community Attitudinal Profiles for the Headman, Religious Leaders and Village Males

<u>Selected Attitudes Toward the Community:</u>	<u>Headmen</u>	<u>Religious Leaders</u>	<u>Village Males</u>
One man runs things in village	5%	10%	15%
Nearly everyone has an important voice in village affairs	51	44	47
No one in village is much wealthier than the rest	50	47	43
Wealth differences between village families are getting larger	31	35	36
Own family perceived as economically better off than most other village families	31	27	19
Own family's prestige deemed greater than it used to be	62	59	47
Village decisions seen as strongly influenced by outsiders	13	16	20
Village seen as able to handle all or most of its problems	16	13	12
The good headman asks villagers what they want rather than simply deciding himself	82	86	81
If the national government were doing something deemed harmful or unjust, respondent would or could do nothing	57	63	69
Prefer consultative national government over one that is strong and decisive	33	44	45
Responsibility for specified project assigned solely to the central government:			
-- building or improving village roads	21	19	28
-- providing good drinking water	24	28	30
-- building a new school	40	36	44
-- organizing a cooperative	38	43	46
-- improving villagers' houses	16	19	22
Assert village has undertaken a communal project in the past few years	78	72	72
Perceive much or some conflict in village over innovation	43	29	30
	N =(424)	(335)	(3,010)

villages regarding the perceived impotence of the village community in dealing with its crucial challenges. Perhaps the reason for the minimal degree of defensiveness on the part of the headmen lies in this very widespread sense of communal inefficacy among the peasantry; the villagers do not tend to fault the headmen for troubles which they see as much more basically and globally derived. Though they may or may not like him and approve his performance, they view the headman as one of their own. Little evidence of an "elite-mass gap" seems to exist in the relations among the village elite and its constituency.

The headmen appear to feel a little more nationally efficacious than the ordinary village male, although once again the striking finding is the high degree of felt national inefficacy among all peasants and even among village headmen. At the same time, perhaps for reasons connected with their own exercise of authority, the headmen are somewhat less likely than ordinary male villagers to emphasize a consultative national government. They prefer strength and decisiveness to consultation, two to one.

Finally, the headmen exhibit a very slim but consistent tendency to be more willing to accept communal responsibility for village improvements and to reject the common and discouraging predilection in rural Turkey to slough everything off onto the central government. As part of their village gestalt, the headmen are a little more inclined to assert that the village has recently undertaken a cooperative community project and are sig-

nificantly more likely to perceive some or much innovative conflict in the village. On the whole, however, one would have to characterize the headman's image of his village and his norms for its development as fundamentally similar to those of most other villagers, slightly more enterprising and responsible perhaps, but very much cut from the same cloth.

The attitudes just described concerned the community, and although the outstanding finding was one of attitudinal homogeneity among the village elite and mass, there were the slight but consistent and revealing differences which have been noted. The fact that the headman plays a unique role in that social structure presumably helped shape his attitudes in this realm. One wonders what the similarity of attitudinal profiles would be if we were to select more personal, less role-related items. How do the village headmen compare with religious leaders and ordinary male villagers in this area? Table 10 displays some of these data.

One clear difference between the village elite, especially the headman, and ordinary village males is the greater exposure of the elite to the agents and devices of the modern world. Such relatively great familiarity with things modern must also contribute to the headman's posture as being more knowledgeable in extra-village affairs than other villagers. Interesting in this connection is the greater use made by village headmen of the agricultural services of the government. They are much more likely than ordinary village males to have consulted with extension agents,

Table 10. Selected Personal Attitudes and Behaviors of Headmen, Religious Leaders and Village Males

<u>Selected Attitudes and Behaviors:</u>	<u>Headmen</u>	<u>Religious Leaders</u>	<u>Village Males</u>
<b>Experience with "modern" behavior:</b>			
Have sent a telegram	52%	40%	28%
Have spoken on telephone	74	61	46
Have consulted a doctor	75	74	69
Have consulted agricultural extension agent	77	29	23
Have secured government credit	63	45	46
Have obtained seed and fertilizer from government	47	34	34
Favor "modern" side in innovational conflict	73	53	67
If regular innovator in village is perceived, that person is said to be the headman	24	17	12
See rural-urban migrants happier in city	74	73	74
Young man needs university education	52	46	43
Loyalty to nation most important			
loyalty to teach a child	42	37	38
Ataturk is person most admired	54	29	36
Spanking is best way to handle disobedient boy	30	29	50
Would accept son's advice on innovation	63	58	62
Feel personal problems often unbearable	29	26	40
Personal future determined by outside forces, not by self	60	65	57
Feel religion should be stressed in raising child	15	36	22
	N = (424)	(335)	(3,010)

used government credit and received government seed or fertilizer. Our data do not permit a detailed examination, but more impressionistic experience in rural Turkey suggests that many headmen use their governmental contacts to secure personal advantages which in turn help them maintain their power in the village. Specific opportunities often come

to them first as the link between village and government. They can augment their own fortunes and enhance their own power by grasping these. The most recent example that has come to our attention is that of a headman who learned that the government was going to lease some land in his area for a very meager rent. The notice to this effect went no further than his hands, and he has made a tidy profit from subleasing the fields to other villagers. His increase in wealth helps solidify his position of power in the community. Control of the contacts between the village and important outside agents can be a mighty source of strength in many settings.

There is no need to recapitulate the data presented in Table 10. The main implications of the table would seem to be two. First, we again observe large areas of attitudinal similarity between the village elite and ordinary villagers, even though these items were selected so as to emphasize differences (i.e., we could have included many more items with scant variation among the three groups). Second, the headman seems to be, and to perceive himself to be, slightly more "modern" attitudinally than other villagers. For example, he favors the "modern" group in innovational conflict and tends to regard himself as a regular innovator to a greater extent than others see him in that role; he places greater emphasis on formal education, is more nationalistic and less religious. But these differences are usually small, and one of the key problems of rural development in Turkey may be that the village headmen are not sufficiently more modern than ordinary villagers in their orientations so as to exert real pressure for change.

To gain insight into certain limited aspects of the performance of the headman, the 1962 survey included a small supplementary schedule of questions addressed to the headman and focussed on his conception of his role as the formally authoritative leader of the village. For instance, we asked about elite unity within the village -- how easy it was for the headman to reach agreement with other village leaders on important issues. Two thirds of the headmen stated that agreement was easily reached and only six per cent indicated common and continuous disagreement. We also asked about the headman's perception of the role of the Council of Elders (Ihtiyar Meclisi), especially in terms of its posture regarding change. Over half the headmen replied that the council basically only reacted to matters brought to it -- or was utterly unimportant (4%) -- rather than taking the initiative by undertaking any new venture.

The headmen were asked about areas where their superiors were dissatisfied with the cooperation of the peasants and where their constituents, the villagers, were dissatisfied with the performance of the authorities. Interestingly enough, these turned out to be the same areas -- water resources and roads. Such a finding suggested a fundamental misunderstanding regarding responsibilities in these areas or else the general intractability of the problems, so that lack of progress is blamed by each on the other. In any event, some major communication breakdown seems to have occurred.

The headmen were also asked which of several approaches, varying in their directness, was likely to be best in obtaining the cooperation of extra-village authorities in dealing with a village problem. The answers would seem to deny the occasionally suggested picture of a high degree of deviousness in inter-echelon relations within officialdom at this level. Eighty-six per cent of the headmen replied that going directly to the authorities and discussing the problem was the best approach. Intimidation in the face of higher authority, an oft-suggested problem, does not seem to be very well reflected in our data, either in the case of the ordinary villager confronting the local elite or for the local elite confronting the lowest level of the national bureaucracy. The problems seem to lie much more in the cognitive area -- that is, in strikingly different perceptions of the world, the desirable, and the possible -- than in fear or intimidation.

Although the headman gives little indication of trepidation vis à vis the district governor, it is essential also to observe that he seems to be much more "down-oriented" than "up-oriented." In other words, the main pressures to which he seems to respond come from his village constituency and not from his bureaucratic superiors. We asked the headmen, "As headman, do you spend more of your time satisfying the demands of the authorities or the demands of the villagers?" Three of every four headmen reported that they spent more time catering to the villagers, a finding that adds credibility to the headmen's apparently consultative conception of their role. On the other hand, the headmen were also

asked about the readiness with which the villagers accepted their ideas and suggestions. Three-fifths stated that the villagers "nearly always" accepted their ideas, and another fifth indicated that the villagers generally accepted the headman's urgings, but that persuasive efforts were often necessary. Of course, if the headmen engage in a reasonably extensive amount of consultation prior to enunciating their ideas, and if conflict in the village is quite low -- both of which are suggested by the survey findings -- then a high degree of acceptance of the headman's suggestions might be expected.

A related matter is that of the headman's perception of the general source of those ideas which he finds useful. He was asked, "Do useful ideas more often come from the villagers or from the village leaders, like the religious leader, the aga, the teacher, and others?" Thirty-five per cent of the headmen point to the villagers as the more frequent source of useful proposals, 43 per cent designated the village leaders, and 14 per cent said both sources contributed equally. Thus, roughly half of all headmen regarded their constituents as a major source of useful proposals, another fact which sheds revealing light on the nature of the elite-mass relationship within the village. Certainly the rather consultative stance of many headmen is consistently portrayed in various parts of our data.

Lastly, we have correlated a few of the personal characteristics of the headmen against the degree of agreement in their villages that the headman was the most knowledgeable, most prestigious

or most influential villager, the farming leader or land dispute leader. The characteristics so tabulated were: whether the headman was elected or appointed, his age, his literacy and his experience as headman. A word about his manner of selection is required. Headmen are ordinarily elected in rural Turkey. However, after the revolution of 1960, many headmen were appointed -- in fact, about 60 per cent of our sample. These appointed headmen differed somewhat in several respects from their elected counterparts. Ninety-three per cent of the elected headmen had more than two years experience in contrast to but sixteen per cent of the appointed headmen. Seventy-three per cent of the elected headmen were over forty years old against 57 per cent of the appointed headmen. Sixty per cent of the elected headmen were literate as opposed to 75 per cent of the appointed headmen. Moreover, some of these differences are so acute that it is difficult to secure enough cases in some cells to permit a constant control for the manner of the headman's selection. Hence, we shall merely issue this caution and take as our first item of business the delineation of the relative leadership positions of elected versus appointed headmen.

In general, the situation is that the elected headmen occupy a leadership position in their villages that is superior to that of the appointed headmen in theirs. This advantage of the elected headmen is greatest in the area of farming leadership and, rather surprisingly perhaps, being regarded as most knowledgeable about the world. As one might have predicted, the difference was least

in the area of being generally most influential -- a finding which again seems to confirm the sheer importance of the role in most Turkish villages. However, we must again caution that being an elected headman is so strongly associated with differences in experience that these findings might well be due to the latter factor rather than the manner of selection.

On the whole, the results of the remainder of this analysis were as follows. A high degree of village agreement on the headman as most knowledgeable about the external world was significantly associated with the experience of the headman on the job, but, rather surprisingly, it was not significantly linked either to his literacy or to his age. Perceptual agreement on the headman as the most prestigious villager was also significantly associated with his years of experience in the role, but not with literacy or age. Another surprising finding was that high village consensus on the headman as most influential in village affairs was not significantly associated with his experience on the job, but was significantly correlated with his literacy and age. The literate headmen were more likely than the illiterate to be widely perceived as most influential, while age was curvilinearly related to the headman's influence position in his community. The headmen under thirty and over fifty were markedly less widely regarded as powerful than the headmen in their early middle age.

All three factors -- experience, literacy and age -- were significantly correlated with being viewed as the community's farming leader. Experience was positively associated with an augmented

leadership role and so was age. However, literacy was negatively associated with farming leadership, although the relationship was quite mild. On the other hand, literacy bore no significant relationship at all to the village's tendency to look to its headman as land dispute leader. Only the headman's age showed any such relation, the older headmen being more likely to possess disproportionate influence in this area.

#### The Significance of the Headman's Position

We have shown that certain village characteristics, attitudinal and other, as well as certain personal characteristics of the headman himself, are at least initially associated with variations in his leadership position in his community. Further analysis is necessary to control for interaction effects among these factors. Nonetheless, at least one crucial question ostensibly remains: what difference to the village or the villagers, let alone to the national political system, does it make that the headman has a stronger or weaker leadership image among his constituents?

Since we cannot unravel the snarled causal connections among these variables, our data are not adequate for providing a definitive answer to such a question. Nevertheless, the nature of the associational linkages thus far uncovered are suggestive of causal probabilities if not of certainties. Data presented earlier, for example, tend to show a positive relationship between various indicators of village modernity, both objective and attitudinal, on the one hand, and a relatively high level of consensus on the headman as village

leader, on the other hand. The village perception of the headman as most influential in village affairs was high when the village also ranked high along the following other dimensions: radio, newspaper and cinema exposure; speaking the dominant language; literacy; willingness to accept a son's innovational recommendation; belief that the village school teacher is doing a good job; emphasis on the importance of receiving more agricultural credit; reluctance to assign responsibility for improving village drinking water to the central government alone; awareness of a recent community project; and having consulted with an agricultural extension agent. Virtually all these relations associate relative strength in the headman's perceived influence with an indicator of relative modernity.

The main possible exception to this pattern lies in the area of the village power structure. There is a positive association between wide village perception of the headman as the most influential villager and wide village perception of the community's power and wealth being concentrated in relatively few hands. On the surface, such perceptions would seem to be unfortunate. However, other evidence casts doubt on that judgment. For example, heightened village agreement on the headman as most influential is also associated with increased agreement that it is easy to discuss one's problems with village leaders. Furthermore, perception that a few men run the village is positively related with an increased tendency to feel that the village is able to handle its pressing problems. Still

more to the point, the perception that the village is run by a few men, rather than by one man or by most residents, is associated with greater feelings of local efficacy -- of ability to influence the headman and the Council of Elders. One gets the impression that either the perception of the village as run by a few is merely a manifestation of a healthy realism lacking in the more traditional communities, or that such a concentration of power is congenial both to the villagers and to their quest for development. It might seem to reflect a situation in which local power is concentrated enough for efficiency and yet reciprocal enough for human satisfaction.

As we have said, it might be that the conditions which produce the various manifestations of modernity which we have found to be associated with an enhanced position for the village headman also were responsible for that enhanced position, rather than it being true that the headman in the enhanced position acted so as to produce the manifestations of modernity. Certainly relevant to an estimation of the causal directionality is the fact, as we have shown, that the headman tends to be attitudinally slightly more modern than the ordinary villagers. Thus, it takes some maneuvering to argue the case for a reverse flow. In other words, where there is a high tendency on the part of the village community to view the headman as most influential, there is also a high tendency to display many other signs of widespread communal modernity. It might be that there is something about consensual modernization which in-

creases the community's propensity to perceive the headman as leader. But the direction of attitudinal and behavioral change in the community is toward the position occupied by the headman. Perhaps the best example is in the admiration for Ataturk. Headmen display such admiration far more than ordinary villagers. And our finding is that where such sentiments of admiration for Ataturk are relatively widespread, there the village headman is generally more widely regarded as most influential in village affairs. It might be that the influence position of the headman, the community's admiration for Ataturk, and the headman's admiration for Ataturk are all the result of some other factor, such as education. But it may also be that the headman, through his position of enhanced leadership, significantly contributes to the increased admiration for the founder of modern Turkey. The extent of these relationships involving the headman and the fact that they all have the same character, which coincides with the personal orientation of the headman insofar as it is at all distinctive, make one entertain most seriously the hypothesis that he plays a significant causal role in all this.

#### The Peasant, the Headman and the District Governor

The position of district governor is an especially critical one in the Turkish provincial administrative system. He is appointed by and directly responsible to the Ministry of Interior. In his district, he directly supervises the provincial representatives of all other ministries (excluding those of the Ministries of National Defense and Justice) as well as all local and municipal organizations. A recent account of the district governor's role indicates the extraordinary responsibilities of this position.

Today, in Turkey, there are more than eight thousand laws still in force, and more than half of them pertain to the duties of governors and (district governors).\*

The district governor thus must play a key role in any developmental effort, and his interaction with the Turkish peasant is of fundamental importance for both the maintenance of order and the initiation of change in rural Turkey.

Through special processing, the data from the Rural Development Research Project on Turkish villagers have been linked with relevant data from two studies of Turkey's district governors (kaymakams). Most of the data on district governors are from a study conducted in 1965 with graduates of the Faculty of Political Sciences (Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi) of Ankara University, focused on the classes of 1946-1955 and 1958-1961. This study is of particular relevance because the central Turkish ministries have always recruited graduates of the Political Science Faculty for many of their top jobs. This is especially true for the Ministry of the Interior. Approximately eighty per cent of the district governors graduated from this faculty.

In addition to the 1965 survey of Political Science Faculty graduates, further information on Turkey's district governors is available from a 1956 study done by several Turkish and American scholars. This survey produced a large amount of data on the time budgeting, communication patterns, and activities of 306 district governors (about 62 per cent of the 493 district governors in Turkey at that time.).\*<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>3</sup>Turhan S. Sunel, "The Ministry of Interior and the Role of Kaymakam in Turkey," Ankara: Cerviri Yayınevi, 1965, (mimeograph) p. 20.

<sup>4</sup>The 1965 study was designed to provide trend and cohort comparisons and is discussed more fully elsewhere. See Leslie L. Roos, Jr. and Noralou P. Roos, "Secondary Analysis, in the Developing Areas," Public Opinion Quarterly, 31, (Summer, 1967), pp. 272-278. The 1956 study is described in Turhan Feyzioglu, Arif Payaslioglu, Albert Gorvine, and Mumtaz Soysal, Kaza ve Vilayet Idaresi Uzerinde Bir Arastirma (An Investigation concerning District and Provincial Administration), Ankara: Ajans-Turk Matbaasi, 1957.

We have already inspected many of the relationships between the formal village elite and the villagers -- between the headman and the peasants. Now we wish to add, insofar as possible, information concerning the next echelon of the developmental administration -- the district governor. We shall be particularly concerned with comparison of peasants, village headmen and district governors in terms of their perceptions of rural problems, the frequency and nature of their interaction, and their orientations toward local social structure.

Attitudes Toward Rural Problems

On both the 1965 elite survey and the 1962 village survey, a similar series of items dealt with problems facing the villagers and with what could be done about these problems. The initial question read: "In your opinion, what is the most important problem that faces the peasants (your village) today?" The respondents then were asked what could be done to solve this problem. If we compare the rural administrative elite's diagnosis of peasant problems with the peasants' own feelings on the subject, strong differences of opinion are present.

Table 11. Elite and Mass Perceptions of Most Important Problems Facing Villagers

Most Important Problem facing Villagers:	District Governors	Village Headmen	Male Villagers
Need for Education	29%	7%	5%
Poverty	31	8	10
Need for Roads	3	22	10
Need for Water	1	27	31
Need for Land	8	13	15
Need for Occupational Equipment	8	4	1
Need for Health Care	0	0	0
Their own faults	6	0	0
No problems	0	2	7
Other	15	5	6
No answer, Don't know	0	2	5
Number of Respondents:	80	434	3,022

It is perhaps not surprising that many administrators who have spent an important period of their life in the relatively advantaged urban areas of Turkey should find the poverty and low intellectual level of the villagers overwhelming. Education is the key to social mobility in Turkish society, and the elite apparently sees education as the key for solving rural problems. One district governor, for example, stated that villagers must realize their need to achieve a certain level of education if they are ever to raise their standard of living.

It is particularly interesting that, among elite respondents not in the district administration, identifying the villagers' most important problem with their need for education is associated with having a job or background which has led to little contact with peasants. District governors are less likely to mention education as the most important problem than are other elite groups. Lack of contact with the villagers is very evident in the highly prestigious Ministry of Foreign Affairs where 71 per cent of the graduates mentioned a need for education as the peasants' most important problem!

In contrast to the district governors and higher echelons of the Turkish bureaucracy, the villagers themselves relegate education and general poverty to low positions on their list of priorities. They stress more tangible needs--those of water, roads and land. Note also that the local leaders are very attuned to the wants of their fellow villagers, placing particular emphasis on the need for water and roads. Thus, a considerable discrepancy seems to exist between the views of the national administrative elite and those of local villagers and leaders regarding rural problems.

This discrepancy in perceptions of development priorities in rural Turkey is not necessarily related to the actual programs which administrators attempt to carry out. Administrators are asked to carry out policies formulated at higher levels, policies which are influenced by the political process. That the peasants

had communicated their desires to politicians, and the politicians had formulated relevant policies for the rural administrators seems to be reflected in the 1956 district governor study. The administrators were asked about the type of programs they were working on in their districts. More governors reported projects dealing with roads (45 per cent) and water (39 per cent) than with the educational needs of the districts (28 per cent).<sup>5</sup>

Even though the administrators are apparently under some pressure to concentrate on those programs which the villagers themselves think are most important, there still seems to be considerable conflict in administrator-villager relations. This is especially true in the area of expectations and obligations. [Thus 22 per cent of the village headmen were willing to admit that there were things which the authorities (extra-village--mainly the district governor) wanted done but with which the villagers refused to cooperate. They were also questioned as to whether there were things which the villagers wanted the authorities to deal with but which the authorities did not bother to attend to. Forty-two per cent of the village officials answered "yes." As we have shown, most headmen also reported that they spent more of their time satisfying the demands of the villagers (75% so reported), while only 25 per cent of the headmen reported spending more time satisfying the authorities' demands. This orientation of village leaders to their villagers rather than to governmental administrators undoubtedly frustrates some of the district governor's programs.]

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<sup>5</sup> Many of the district governors mentioned having more than one development program in their district.

For example, one official reported that he must spend much time inspecting the villages, since there is no village official who can be relied upon. He went on to say that "the efficiency with which a project can be carried out is directly proportional to the time a district governor spends in the village."

In a follow-up to the above questions the village headman was asked to name the most important of these matters where one actor viewed the other actor's lack of enterprise with disfavor. According to the headman's perceptions, the authorities are dissatisfied with village performance most strongly and frequently over the matters of roads and water supply. Sixty-three per cent of the headmen referred to these two areas as sources of official dissatisfaction, 47 per cent to roads and 16 per cent to water. At the same time, according to the headmen, the villagers are most critical of official performance by extra-village authorities in exactly the same two areas--roads and water. Fifty-five per cent of the headmen cited these two matters as the sources of greatest peasant discontent with "the authorities," 33 per cent citing roads and 22 per cent citing water.

A fundamental misunderstanding regarding responsibilities in these areas may be reflected here. From the previously cited comments of district governors, one might suspect that the difficulty lies in the implementation of programs --who is to do what.

The official had complained that he could not rely upon the villagers to carry out a project. From this, one might expect that district governors would prefer that peasants take more of the responsibility for village development upon themselves. However, the typical district governor is apparently committed--at least philosophically--to the need for the government's heavy and direct involvement in rural development. Following the question concerning the most important problem facing peasants both the district governors and the villagers were asked how this problem might be solved. Eighty-one percent of the district governors said that village problems had to be solved by the government, while only 15 per cent of the district governors said that the joint efforts of governments and villagers were needed.


[The village headmen were less prone than the ordinary villagers to assign sole responsibility for solving the village's main problem to the government; only 44 per cent of the headmen placed this responsibility on the government. Fifty-two percent of the male villagers said it was necessary to depend on the government, while 13 per cent of them thought that a joint effort by government and villagers could help solve the problems. The remaining villager responses were distributed among a number of alternatives; 11 per cent mentioned specific techniques and equipment while 17 per cent did not know or did not answer. The villager may be willing to assume more initiative than the elite is ready to give him credit for, at least in some areas. The elite's reluctance to grant the peasant self sufficiency may stem from this basic disagreement over priorities which were discussed earlier.]

#### Villager-Bureaucrat Interaction

Before presenting the data on the interaction between villagers and administrators, it is necessary to explain the methodology underlying this analysis. In general, a linkage is being made between data on district governors (collected in 1956) and data on particular villages and villagers (collected in 1962). Two types of linkages between the village and district governor studies will be used. The first type is an area linkage; the linkage is between village and district (Kaza or Ilce). The district in which a district governor worked in 1956 may have had certain characteristics--as reported by the administrator--which were associated with responses to the village survey in 1962. For example, in districts where the district governor reported considerable political interference with district administration, the villagers were likely to have noted the presence of an aga (powerful local landlord). For such questions, the important linkage is by area; data on the district is matched with the relevant information from the village study. Slightly over half of the

villages sampled on the village study were located in districts for which 1956 information from the district administrator was available.

A second type of analysis links the district governor as an individual to the villages and villagers under his jurisdiction; the basic linkage is between village and governor. This analysis uses data on the 1962 assignments of district governors who responded to the 1956 survey. For example, one possible question is whether peasants react differently to a district governor who says he spends a large portion of his time visiting his villages than to one who spends most of his time in the district center office. In this analysis the behavior of the district governor (as reported in 1956) is being associated with the reactions of the villagers under his jurisdiction in 1962. Approximately one fifth of the villages included on the village survey were under the jurisdiction of a district governor for whom data were available.



There are six linkages here, three each of two main types: when the district is important, the 1956 location will be used to match the data on his district furnished by the governor with the information on villagers, on local elites, and on village characteristics. Then, when the individual administrator is important, the 1962 location will be used to match the data for the governor's personal characteristics with the information on villagers,

on local elites, and on village characteristics.

It is by no means obvious whether the area or the individual linkage will be most important for any given item. If we consider the example used above, reported political interference might have been much more a function of a district governor's personality than of objective conditions in his district. In such a case, there would have been no relationship between the village study data matched by area with the district governor data, i.e. other reports would not have substantiated the perception of the governor. In the second example, a district governor's visiting behavior might well have been determined by characteristics of the district in which he was stationed, rather than by the governor's own personality. The condition of the roads, weather, the availability of transport, and so on vary greatly by district and may significantly affect the frequency with which the governor gets out of the district center.

The discussion of the rather complicated methodology employed should not obscure an important point. Namely, the separation of area and individual necessary for the matching process may prove advantageous. It would be difficult to untangle the relationship between personal and environmental factors if the data were collected from both the villagers and the bureaucrats at the same time. Since all the district governors had changed districts between 1956 and 1962, the meaning of any relationship between the district governor's responses and the village data can be clarified by knowing whether an area or an individual match was employed. If an area match was used, any relationship between responses would seem to be a function of the district administrator's personal characteristics. Both the survey data and official government policy indicate that a regular rotation of district governors from desirable to undesirable districts and vice versa takes place, so that biases involving the assignment of the most intractable administrators to the worst districts appear to be slight.

There is another way in which the limitations necessitated by the nature of the available data can sometimes aid in interpretation of the results. As was mentioned earlier, the basic district governor information was collected in 1956, while the village study material was obtained in 1962. This six-year gap between the studies greatly diminishes problems associated with causal interpretation of certain correlations between the district governor's responses and those of the villagers. Thus, for certain items, the linkage is for the individual district governor, it is possible to specify the direction of causality between bureaucrat behavior and villager attitudes. Although the relationship can be complicated by intervening variables, the fact that the villager attitudes were measured six years after the bureaucrats' reported behavior makes it difficult in some cases to argue that the villagers' attitudes led to the bureaucrats' behavior.

However, at least one question remains to be answered. Given the six-year gap between the times at which data were collected, can one have faith in the validity of any relationships which might be found? This work is based on the hypothesis that many of the Turkish district governor's attitudes and actions are consistent over time, regardless of the district in which he is stationed. Some data are available to support this, since 67 of the 1956 district governors were included in the 1965 survey of Political Science Faculty graduates. If a reasonable degree of attitudinal stability can be assumed, we would expect correlations between related items across the two surveys. To make the 1956-1965 item correlations meaningful, criteria for item selection were developed. First, the items had to be such that they could be readily grouped into categories of similar content; these categories involved attitudes and behavior with regard to land, education, political interference, and so on. Because the studies were designed for different purposes, identical items were not available. Secondly, there had to be at least ten respondents in each marginal category for the item to be included. Since there were only 67 individuals who answered both

questionnaires, all items were dichotomized to help provide an adequate number of respondents in each category. Whenever possible, cutting points were adjusted for each item so as to equalize the number of respondents in the two categories.

Table 12. Associations Among Items From 1956 and 1965 Bureaucrat Surveys

Issue Area	Number of 1956 items used	Number of 1965 items used	Number of Associations with absolute value of gamma greater than .20
Needs of Villagers:			
Education	2	3	5 (83% of possible associations)
Land	7	1	5 (71%)
Political Interference	4	2	4 (50%)
Opinion of Peasants and Local Politicians	4	1	3 (75%)

The percentages were derived by comparing the number of associations meeting the statistical criterion with the total possible number of associations across time (number of 1956 items used multiplied by the number of 1965 items used.)

These data indicate a reasonable degree of attitudinal stability among the district governors answering both questionnaires; moreover, this stability is found even though over half of the 67 respondents had left their positions as district governors by the time of the 1965 survey.<sup>6</sup>

As was mentioned previously, this report uses data on the Turkish peasantry and bureaucracy which were originally gathered independently. Because the process of matching the bureaucrats and villages uses only the bureaucrat-village sets which meet the specified criteria (individual or area match), the selection of a

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<sup>6</sup>This degree of attitudinal stability is in line with data from American elites. See Philip E. Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," in David Apter, ed., Ideology and Discontent, (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1964).

nonrepresentative sample of villages and/or of bureaucrats is a real possibility. Preliminary analysis of the village material indicates that the villagers represented in the individual and in the area linkages are both closely matched with those in the full nation-wide probability sample. As will be noted later in the paper, there is a slight bias in the elite data in that certain types of district governors are differentially likely to be promoted to other jobs in the Ministry or to leave the Ministry entirely. A slight bias in the selection of bureaucrats would not seem critically to affect the generality of the findings, since we can specify the dimensions along which this sample differs from the relevant population of district governors.

The material presented here will focus upon the set of linkages where the individual district governor is important. Preliminary work with both the district and individual linkages showed the generally greater importance of the individual administrator, rather than of the district in which he worked, as an influence upon the villagers. This discussion will be mainly concerned with the individual district governor-villager (and village) interactions.

Earlier in this paper data were presented showing the general lack of correspondence between peasant and elite opinions as to the greatest problem facing Turkish villagers. Despite these general differences of opinion between elite and mass, the behavioral data suggested that the actions of district governors might be reasonably well attuned to the desires of the particular district in which they were stationed. Our more specific data linking district governors to the villagers under their jurisdiction allows this hypothesis to be tested. Both types of linkages discussed above might be relevant. If a district governor had been aware of the felt needs of the villagers under his jurisdiction, the area linkage should show an appropriate correlation. If a district governor's actions had influenced the villagers' perceptions of their problems, the individual match should be significant.

As seen in Table 13, villagers' mention of roads as their most important problem and the district governors' road development program were associated for neither the area nor the individual match. For the area match, 15 per cent of the villagers in districts with road development programs mentioned the need for roads as their most important problem; an identical percentage in districts without road development programs emphasized the need for roads. For the individual match, the percentage mentioning the need for roads was quite similar (17 per cent versus 20 per cent) whether or not the district governor had been involved in road development projects. Similar results were obtained when the district governors' activities in water development were run against the villagers' judgment as to their most important problem. There were not enough district governors involved in education or the other programs to use the individual match material for these programs, but the area matches showed the same lack of relationship between the development programs and the villager attitudes as that presented in Table 3.

The interpretation of these findings should be relatively clear. The lack of relationship in the area match implies that the development programs were not particularly keyed to the felt needs of the village populations. It is very likely that the problems villagers mentioned in 1962 were similar to those which concerned them in 1956. Given this assumption, the data indicate that the administrators were probably not acting on the problems of the villagers in their district. If the bureaucrats had been responding to perceived villager needs, there should have been a higher percentage of villagers noting roads as their most important problem in areas with a road-oriented development program than in areas without such a program.

In similar fashion the individual match indicates that the emphases of the district governor did not seem to influence the judgments of the villagers under his jurisdiction. Since the 1956-1965 panel study data show the consistency of the district governors' orientations, the administrator probably instituted many of the same type of development programs in 1962 as he did in 1956. However,

these programs seem to have been generally unrelated to what the villagers saw as their greatest needs.

The material presented above has emphasized that the perception of at least one of the critical problems of modernization-- village development-- is very different between important sectors of the mass and the elite. Moreover, communication between villagers and administrators does not seem to lead these two groups to influence each other's attitudes. The elite emphasizes the need for education, that commodity which presents opportunities for mobility, status, and culture. However the villager's interest in education is less pressing. Better roads and adequate water supplies represent improvements which promise more immediate benefits to all the villagers.

**Table 13. Relationship between District Governor and Villager Attitudes Concerning Roads**

<u>Villagers' Perception of Most Important Problem facing them:</u> <sup>b</sup>	Area Match		Individual Match	
	Development Program Concerning Roads <sup>a</sup>		Development Program Concerning Roads <sup>a,c</sup>	
	Mentioned by District Governor	Not Mentioned by District Governor	Mentioned by District Governor	Not Mentioned by District Governor
Need for Roads	15%	15%	17%	20%
Need for Education	5	4	3	3
Poverty	13	15	12	9
Need for Land	10	12	15	10
Need for Occupational Equipment	1	1	0	1
Need for Water	28	24	26	27
Need for Health Care	1	1	1	1
No Problems	12	12	11	13
Other	5	7	5	6
No Answer, Don't Know	10	10	10	9
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>
Number of Village Respondents	1605	1570	451	852

<sup>a</sup>This item is taken from the 1956 district governor survey.

<sup>b</sup>This item is taken from the villager section of the 1962 survey; the number of respondents is calculated on this basis.

<sup>c</sup>It should be noted that, although 45 per cent of the total sample of 1956 district governors mentioned having development programs concerning roads, only about 35 per cent of the 1956 administrators matched with districts in 1962 mentioned these programs. It appears that district governors who are actively involved with development programs are differentially likely to get promoted or to leave the Ministry of Interior. For further support for this, see Roos and Roos, op. cit.

### Local Social Structure

Despite differences in priorities expressed by administrators and villagers, there are other areas of the development process where the two groups may more directly influence one another. This is especially true with regard to the relationship between village leaders and district governors. A crucial figure in the implementation of many rural development programs is the village headman. This official has obligations towards both the central government and his own villagers. How the district governor relates to this local figure, and how in turn the headman feels towards the central governmental representative is a matter of real concern. On the one hand, if the district governor sees the headman as a threat or a nuisance, he might avoid him and attempt to set up his own power structure in the village. Befu has suggested this process when he hypothesizes that in the modernizing state, "the government begins to affect more and more areas of life, gradually replacing the traditional political structure of the village with a structure of its own creation."<sup>7</sup> On the other hand, the district governor may decide to work through the local power structure, and thus strengthen the headman's position. Of course the headman also has at least two options; he can attempt to obstruct the district governor's efforts, refusing to recognize his authority in villager affairs, or he can cooperate with him, perhaps winning some patronage which will prove useful in his own intra-village affairs.

Although identical items from the various surveys are not available, a number of questions are relevant to the general problem of the administrator's impact upon village social structure. For example, one question was related to elite evaluation of the role of village leadership in national development: do the village

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<sup>7</sup>Harumi Befu, "The Political Relation of the Village to the State," World Politics, 29 (July 1967), pp. 601-620.

headman and the Council of Elders help or hinder the development process?<sup>8</sup> If a high percentage of the district governors felt that the village headman hindered development, it might be expected that these administrators would try to work around the headman in dealing with villagers. On the other hand, a favorable evaluation of the village headman would suggest the possibility of a cooperative relationship between administrator and headman.

The district governors' overall evaluation of the headman's role was relatively favorable. They considered village headmen to be more helpful to development than either foreigners or interest groups, and evaluated them only slightly less favorably than they did professionals. Differences among elite respondents in evaluating the headman seem related to the extent to which the respondent himself was familiar with rural problems. Thus, being in an occupation which presumably involves a great deal of contact with villagers--that of district governor--was associated with considering the village headman helpful to development. Fifty per cent of the district governors said the headman was helpful; the percentage from this one subgroup within the Ministry of Interior was considerably higher than that found in any of the other ministries. Most of the respondents outside of the Ministry of Interior considered village headmen unimportant to the development process. Experience as a district governor also seems to have been an important factor in determining the responses to this item among graduates now engaged in other work. Both former district governors promoted to other positions within the Ministry of Interior and individuals who left jobs as district governors for higher-paying work outside the central ministries had almost as favorable opinions of village headmen as did respondents who were district governors at the time of the survey in 1965.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>8</sup>The Council of Elders is generally agreed to be of minor importance in village decision-making.

<sup>9</sup>Another item was asked concerning the peasants' role in national development. This question, however, was essentially a "give-away", i.e., almost all the respondents said that peasants were helpful to national development.

A rural background was also associated with a district governor's having a relatively favorable view of village headmen, but this factor did not seem important for respondents outside the Ministry of Interior. Probably the best available indicator of being from a rural background is respondent's birth outside of a provincial capital, i.e., in a district center or smaller town. As is seen in the table below, other indicators of rural background such as region of birth and having a father whose occupation was that of farmer are also correlated with a positive evaluation of the village headman's role.

Table 14. District Governors' Views of the Role of Village Headmen (and Council of Elders) in National Development

District Governors' Birthplace	Help	Hinder	Unimpor- tant	No answer	No. of respondents
Metropolis or Provincial capital	43%	3%	54%	0%	36%
District center or village	56	0	37	7	39
Most developed regions	52	4	39	5	23
Intermediate regions	39	0	58	3	36
Less developed regions	65	0	30	5	20
Father's occupation					
Official	47	2	49	2	45
Businessman or Professional	39	0	62	0	13
Farmer	68	0	26	6	19

These findings are important because they indicate substantial differences within the Turkish governmental elite in its evaluation of the existing rural power structure. It is notable that the more experience an official has had in the countryside--whether by birth or occupation--the more faith he has in rural mores and institutions.

Just as district governors within the official elite, were relatively prone to evaluate the village headmen favorably, so were the village headmen relatively disposed towards acknowledging the power of district governors. [Both villagers and headmen were asked a number of questions concerning people who were influential with

regard to various local issues. Any individual could be named, and it is interesting to compare the local leaders self-images with the images held by other villagers. On a general question of influence over village affairs, the village headmen were not adverse to recognizing their own advantaged position. To a very slight degree, they are more likely than others to perceive themselves as the person with most influence in the village (78 per cent versus 74 per cent for ordinary male villagers.) But they discriminate more sharply than the ordinary villager between different kinds of power. The headmen are much less inclined to consider themselves as most influential in the area of farming leadership, viewing their villagers as more likely to turn either to the district governor in such matters (which seems unlikely and may simply illustrate the deference of the headmen to their administrative superiors, the district governors) or to a technical expert of the government such as an agricultural agent. Also, in the matter of leadership in a land dispute, the village headmen are less prone to see themselves as turned to for leadership and more likely to see the district governors being cast in such a role. Recall that these replies as must be considered in light of the headmen's expressed view of themselves as the most influential person in their village.

Table 15. Perceived Leadership at the Local Level

Individual seen as:	In opinion of:	
	Village Headman	Male Villagers
<b>Most Influential in Village</b>		
Village Headman	78%	74%
District Governor	1	1
<b>Agricultural Leader in Village</b>		
Village Headman	18	48
District Governor	31	13
Other Government Official	41	28
<b>Leader with regard to Land Disputes</b>		
Village Headman	32	45
District Governor	53	42
<b>Number of Respondents</b>	<b>424</b>	<b>3,022</b>

This discussion has pointed to the relative mutual respect which the district governor and village headman seem to share, despite the apparent problems reported earlier. The nature of our data enable us to examine this relationship more closely. From the data on the time budgeting behavior of district governors, we obtained some idea of how the "style" of the individual official can affect his impact on the village social structure. Officials were asked how much time they spent on various activities such as touring villages, talking to subordinate officials and listening to people with various types of business. The amount of time said to be spent on such activities varied considerably from person to person. However, district governors who claimed to be very active--touring villages, checking up on their subordinates, or listening to petitioners--seem to have had a rather marked effect on the village power structure.

Villagers under the jurisdiction of a district governor with this self-reported active style had a stronger headman orientation than did villagers with a more sedentary paper-and-pen-pushing administrator. For a number of items concerning the influence of the headman, the differences between villagers under the jurisdiction of the relatively active governors and those under the more sedentary governors was about 10 per cent; these differences held up under controls for such variables as region and extent of village development. It should be mentioned, however, that the data are not completely clear. These differences in the headman's reported influence were not associated with the mere frequency of the district governor's visiting the village. There may be important stylistic differences among administrators which are reflected in the nature of their contact with villagers; the frequency of contact item does not always seem to be measuring the same thing as the other items.

### Governmental Contact with Villagers

The problem of governmental penetration to the village level is another important area which can be further studied with these data. Various officials of the state have, as part of their ordinary duties, activities which draw them into contact with the villagers of Turkey.

In addition to the district governor, police, tax collectors, teachers, agricultural officials, health officials and postal workers, all have duties which take them into the villages more or less frequently. How extensively their representatives travel in the rural areas is a matter of concern to many government agencies. Some workers are thought to prefer the comfort of their offices over the dubious attractions offered by which tours of remote villages.

In order to study this topic, in each village where interviews were conducted, the team leaders obtained information on how often various types of officials actually came to that village. They asked the headmen, the council of elders and others who were thought to be well-informed on these matters. A summary of the results is offered in Table 16 which presents the percentage of all respondents living in communities said to be visited by various officials at least once a month, less than once a month, or never.

Table 16. Frequency of Different Types of Official Contact with Villagers: Percentage of Villagers Living in Communities Visited at Various Intervals

<u>Official Type:</u>	<u>At Least Once/Month</u>	<u>Less Than Once/Month</u>	<u>Never</u>
<u>Dist'ct or Subdistrict</u>			
Governor	25%	41%	34%
Tax Collector	19	76	4
Educators: & Teachers(non-local)	7	60	32
Agricultural Officials	22	34	42
Health Officials and Doctors	54	27	18
Postal Workers	62	11	27
Police or Gendarme	91	6	2

It will be seen from Table 16 that the representatives of the government with whom the peasantry has the most contact are the police and gendarmerie; postal workers and health officials also have relatively frequent contact with the villagers.

The village study data, in combination with the material on district governor characteristics, permit us to consider variables affecting the frequency with which various officials come to the village. A straight correlational analysis indicates that such variables as village isolation and village development are associated with village governmental contact, but our particular concern will be how the district governor's orientation seemingly can affect the visiting behavior of his subordinate district officials.<sup>10</sup> As is seen in the following table, several items from the district governor survey are fairly good predictors of the frequency with which the administrator's subordinates visit the village.

Table 17 Public Works Activity, Time Budget, and Official Contact with Villagers

	<u>Public Works Activity of District Governor:</u>		<u>Per cent of District Governor's Time Spent Talking with Subordinate Officials:</u>	
	<u>Not Mentioned</u>	<u>Mentioned</u>	<u>20% or less</u>	<u>20% or more</u>
Percentage of Villagers Living in a Village visited by: <sup>b</sup>				
Agricultural Officials				
Monthly or More	17%	30%	14%	40%
Health Officials and Doctors				
Biweekly or More	15	23	23	17
Postal Workers; Weekly	23	38	22	50
Police or Gendarme				
Weekly	59	71	60	73
Number of Villagers (100%=)	(639)	(729)	(780)	(500)

<sup>a</sup>These items are taken from the 1956 survey of district governors. The individual match is used.

<sup>b</sup>These items are taken from the village information section of the 1962 survey.

<sup>10</sup>An index of governmental contact made up from the items presented in Table 16 was negatively correlated with an index of village isolation (Pearson product-moment  $r$  of  $-.21$ ) while an overall index of village development was correlated  $.35$  with the governmental contact index.

The data are quite consistent. District governors who claim to be more active in certain ways seem to have subordinate officials who are especially likely to travel out to rural areas.

The above data raise the important point of whether the differences associated with the district governor's activities might be accounted for simply by the frequency with which he visits the villages. The villager reports on the frequency of district and subdistrict governor visits allow this question to be examined.

As Table 18 shows, frequency of visiting is not solely responsible for differences associated with the district governor's public works activity. Similar findings were obtained for the items concerning the district governor's time budgeting practices.

**Table 18 Frequency of Visiting and Public Works Activity of District Governor: As Determinants of Official Contact with Villagers**

Percentage of Villagers Living in a Village visited by:	District or Subdistrict Governor Visited Village: <sup>a</sup>					
	Once/Month at Least		Less Than Once/Month		Never	
	Public Works Activity of District Governor <sup>b</sup>		Public Works Activity of District Governor		Public Works Activity of District Governor	
	Not Mentioned	Mentioned	Not Mentioned	Mentioned	Not Mentioned	Mentioned
Agricultural Officials Monthly or More	48%	53%	14%	33%	0%	0%
Health Officials & Doctors Biweekly or More	32	36	10	18	12	15
Postal Workers Weekly	12	64	33	12	9	7
Police or Gendarme Weekly	58	87	73	80	29	42
Number of Villagers (100%=)	(130)	(243)	(354)	(279)	(164)	(207)

<sup>a</sup>These items are taken from the village information section of the 1962 survey

<sup>b</sup>This item is taken from the 1956 survey of district governors. The individual match is used.

The regularity and magnitude of the relationships presented here demonstrate the significance of the two independent variables. It seems probable that the behavior of the district governor determines the frequency of visiting by his subordinate officials, rather than the other way around. The possibility that the correlation is the result of some third factor - like the poverty of the district - can be substantially ruled out by considering the time sequence in which the information was gathered. It should be remembered that the survey data were collected from the district governor while he was assigned to a district other than that which he supervised in 1962. Thus, the district governor's 1962 subordinates were different from his 1956 subordinates and could not have influenced the bureaucrat's responses to items asked in 1956. Since the governor's 1956 reports are associated with the behavior of his 1962 subordinates, the most likely hypothesis is that the district governor's 1962 behavior both resembled his 1956 behavior and influenced his subordinate's activities.

Table 18 clearly illustrates the importance of both frequent visiting and an interest in public works projects; the district governor who satisfied both of these criteria has a significantly greater effect on the visiting behavior of his subordinates than does the district governor not meeting these two criteria. These data also indicate that, when a district or subdistrict governor is reported as never visiting, there are relatively few differences associated with the district governor's mention of public works activities, his lack of interest in a particular village is reflected in the low frequency with which subordinate officials visit this village. The highly specific nature of local administration is revealed here; in order to motivate his subordinates to undertake certain duties, the district governor must be personally involved. If the district governor is not concerned with a given village, a mere verbal commitment to public works activities, or even an interest somewhere else in the district, will not affect the visiting activity of the other officials. Thus, the stance of the district

governor is particularly critical. Since the frequency of many different types of contacts with villagers seem to depend upon the district governor's behavior, it is possible for this single administrator to greatly influence the villager's total contact with officialdom. However, we must also point out that, after basic controls for village size have been made, there seems to be relatively little association between the degree of governmental contact a village has apart from schools, and most measures of its development. Mass media contact, for example, seems much more significant than contact with government officials.

### Conclusion

The "Summary" at the beginning of this report recapitulates the major empirical findings. Hence, we shall restrict this conclusion to a few very general interpretive comments.

The first part of the report was concerned with elite-mass relations within the village -- primarily the interactions between the village headman and ordinary villagers. These interactions were shown frequently to accord great apparent influence to the formally authoritative leader of the village, the headman. Much of this influence seemed to be due to the official role occupied by the headman. Moreover, although the headmen were revealed generally to be slightly more "modern" attitudinally and behaviorally than their village constituents, the differences were not great. However, we would also call attention to the fact that an enhanced leadership position for the headman in his village was significantly and positively associated with various aspects of rural development. In general, our data seem to us to suggest the critical role that the village headman might play in Turkish rural development if more conscious and informed use were made of his potentialities.

The data presented in the second part of this report, based on an analytic combination of data from the 1962 Rural Development Research Project and studies of Turkish bureaucrats, particularly the district governors (kaymakams), conducted in 1956 and 1965, provide a broader picture of elite-mass relations in rural Turkey. They reveal several salient areas of divergence in the perceptions of developmental priorities held by representatives from urban, national elite backgrounds and by the peasantry. Moreover, the further from direct contact with villagers one moves in the Turkish bureaucracy, the greater these divergences in developmental perspectives seem to be.

Viewed from the most general vantage point, our investigation suggests a basic hypothesis about elite and mass relations in Turkish village development. Essentially, we have inspected the most critical

linkages where elite meets mass in Turkish governmental administration. We have examined many facets of the connections between the district governor (lowest major post in the elite national hierarchy of the Ministry of the Interior), the village headman (official representative of the village to the government and the government in the village), and the people of the village (end point in the administrative chain). Two key links were involved: 1) the link between the district governor and the village headman, and 2) the link between the village headman and the village people.

Our findings suggest that critical breakdowns of the bureaucratic transmission belt may disproportionately occur in these two linkages. Put most simply, the hypothesis is that the district governor tends to be upward-oriented, concerned to rise in the national bureaucracy and sharing the perceptions characteristic of the elite urbanized-sector of Turkish society, while the village headman, on the other hand, tends to be downward-oriented, concerned with his position in the village and sharing the perceptions of the mass rural-sector of Turkish society. These perceptions and concomitant social pressures are quite different, leading to a frequent lack of effective communication and interaction between the district governor and the headman. The district governor is so different from the peasants that common understanding and mutual influence for development is unlikely, while the village headman is so similar to them that he really exerts relatively little pressure for change. The district governor and other agents of the central government may be sufficiently change-oriented to exert pressure for modernization, but their very difference from the peasant is so extreme that it undermines their ability to engage in direct communication and direct influence. The village headman is sufficiently "of the village" and occupies an appropriately established role so as to possess an excellent influence and communication position, but although he is slightly more modern in his orientation toward change than most other villagers, he is basically so similar to them in knowledge and attitudes that he is incapable of moving his villagers very far in a developmental

direction. Thus, the critical problems would seem to be how to establish more effective interactions between the district governor and the headman, and how to make the headman himself somewhat more development-oriented so as to get maximal autonomous leverage from his important position in most Turkish villages. Experience at handling such linkage problems in other social settings suggests that, if this hypothesis is correct, special attention should be directed toward both the district governor and the village headman, and perhaps even toward other administrative agents promoting rural development. But the rewards for such efforts promise to be great.