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APPENDIX E  
to  
A Study of Some Key USAID Jobs

TRAINING SUGGESTIONS

American Institute for Research  
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## SUGGESTED TOPICS FOR ORIENTATION AND TRAINING

The majority of the interviewed incumbents expressed the belief that Agency orientation and training should and could be improved. Those who disagreed with this position tended to be long-term employees, "old hands," as it were, who felt that training could not benefit them. Several of the key incumbents had had virtually no orientation; a number reported specific instances where they felt errors could have been avoided if they had had adequate training. In some instances incumbents felt that the training they had had was almost wholly inadequate.

As a rule, there is relatively little in the experience of new incumbents who have come from industry, academic life, or other non-governmental jobs to prepare them either for the special duties and problems associated with work overseas or for the special requirements of work in a large bureaucracy. Thus, it is highly desirable that AID provide training that will realistically bridge the gap between a new employee's prior experience and the requirements of his new job.

The training recommendations in this report cover topics that are common to all (or most) prospective incumbents in a particular position. While the training is aimed at individuals who have had little or no prior overseas experience, many topics would also be appropriate for persons who have had extensive experience abroad. In general, the suggested training is designed to be given before an incumbent takes up his duties in the field, although some of the topics could also be covered on-the-job. An underlying assumption for training of this kind is that teaching the trainee what to do in a realistic environment of simulated job situations will lead to greater effectiveness on the job, particularly during the initial portion of a man's tour.

It is also assumed that realistic orientation would not only increase understanding and permit adjustments to be made in advance of arrival -- it would also provide a sound basis for self-selection on the part of the incumbent and his family. It is recognized that training is not a panacea. Recruitment and selection will have a considerable effect on the benefits to be expected from training, as well as on the extent of training necessary to achieve maximum benefits.

The training which all incumbents (regardless of job) should receive is discussed briefly in the section immediately below. Training specific to each of the four key positions is discussed subsequently.

1. All incumbents should be made familiar with AID organization, history, policies, regulations, standards, and operating procedures. There is a very considerable body of information about the Agency's structure and functions which would provide the reasons for the decisions and actions of other people, as well as guides to the behavior of each incumbent. The Agency's relations with the Congress, the State and Defense Departments, and the other government offices which serve as AID resources should be included. Careful study of such topics by all persons in key positions would probably reduce the number of errors made by the incumbents, would give many of them greater freedom of action, and would perhaps eliminate the need for some of the current activities of many key people who spend considerable time trying to ensure that they, their subordinates, and others have not violated Agency policy, procedure, or constraints.

2. All incumbents should be given a description of the organization of the mission to which they have been assigned. The primary functions of each element of the organization should be explained, and current and recent projects, both successful and

unsuccessful, should be reviewed. In addition to providing a necessary background for the topics that follow, this part of the training program should provide the incumbents with information about difficulties which the mission has encountered in the past and which they should try to avoid.

3. Each incumbent should be given realistic opportunities to learn the mechanics of a functioning AID Mission, and the relative position of each incumbent in the decision-making processes for each aspect of the mission's functions in which he participates. This is an extremely critical requirement for a candidate having little or no prior AID experience. The data indicate that one of the most difficult adjustments for AID field officers to make (assuming little or no prior AID experience) was to place themselves and others in the proper position with regard to lines of authority, areas of responsibility, and channels of communication. Incidents of people "bucking the system" or "going over heads" proved to be extremely disruptive to mission operation. These occurrences can be generated by a basic misunderstanding of the bureaucratic system or by pre-meditated attempts by individuals to follow a course of action guided chiefly by their own interests.

4. All incumbents should know how AID/W interacts with the field. It is a source of frustration not to have a basic understanding of such matters as where communications of various kinds go, what time factors are involved, what may be done to expedite replies, and the various reasons for delays in Washington regarding such matters as programming, contracting, and procurement. Incumbents must often explain or cover up for such delays in dealing with host government personnel or representatives of other agencies. Communication delays also become morale problems if the causes are not understood by field officers.

5. All incumbents should be made aware of the kinds of relations that may exist between the mission and the Embassy. There may be a lack of social contact, a lack of contact on substantive matters, or both. There is often a sense of competition between the Embassy and AID, or status rivalries between individuals. Such feelings may be irrationally based, but they are nevertheless held by some individuals in both agencies and constitute a not insignificant factor in the working environment.

6. All incumbents should be informed regarding necessary interactions with other agencies, such as USIS, the Peace Corps, U.S. military units, the diplomatic corps, and nationals from other countries. Problems in this area were frequent; many of them could have been prevented if advance orientation had been provided.

7. The incumbents should receive orientation concerning the government, history, and economic status of the country to which they have been assigned. Coverage of government operations should include such matters as the system of decision-making, accessibility of officials, competition for aid, philosophy of government, personalities, and bureaucracy. A knowledge of the history of the host country would provide information regarding the origins and development of certain customs, philosophies and attitudes, and would enable sounder judgments to be made concerning future trends. Information on the objectives and efforts of other donor countries should also be included. All incumbents should learn that the decision-making process takes place at very high levels in the host government and the reasons for this should be explored (e.g., the lack of qualified civil servants, politics, etc.). This condition may result in major bottlenecks which require special adjustments or special methods.

8. All incumbents will receive a large volume of incoming and outgoing correspondence involving AID/W and the host government. Because of the volume of this task, it is viewed as burdensome and time-consuming. Training should be directed toward alleviating this burden, either by recommending effective systems of delegation, or by furnishing rapid reading training to key incumbents (if this has been found to be of value in the Agency's experience).

9. The incumbents will be required to forward many letters, reports, cables, and other correspondence to AID/W and to host officials. They must be able to transmit pertinent information in readable and concise form to prevent misunderstanding by the reader. AID should consider giving key incumbents some specific practical training in the preparation of the various types of documents they will need to prepare, e.g., airgrams, cables, and reports. It is likely that the costs of such training would be offset by a decrease in communication expenses and in the amount of time required in preparation and interpretation.

10. All prospective incumbents should be given a review of development theory. Such a review should include social and political as well as economic theory. Methods and examples of effective technical assistance projects, loans, and contract operations should also be covered. These matters should be presented in such a way that they serve as an introduction to the next topic.

11. All incumbents should be given a realistic picture of the programming cycle. It is impossible to over-emphasize the need for incumbents to have advance knowledge of programming. This cycle is currently the heart of assistance operations; lack of knowledge concerning it is a detriment to mission operations and, in a broad sense, to

United States foreign policy. With detailed programming instructions available from such sources as program guidance manuals, programming courses, and years of experience by many Agency officials, it is difficult to understand why problems should still exist in this area. However, major problems do exist, primarily because of lack of orientation and training. One of the most common complaints by mission administrative personnel was that incumbents and technicians, even those with years of experience, did not understand programming and were unable to produce satisfactory program documents. The study found, in almost every mission, that someone, usually from the Program Office, is required to edit, revise, correct, or create program documents because of incompetence in this area on the part of both technicians and higher-level administrative people. Such situations mean that efforts are duplicated, that responsibility is improperly shifted, and that an unequal workload is created. One of the most common complaints is that Division Chiefs and others do not know how to plan projects, while at the same time, AID/W requires specific and detailed plans. Specifically, all incumbents should know the role of each contributor in the development cycle, and particularly in the preparation of the CAP. If possible, prospective incumbents should be alerted to particular individual inclinations, strengths, and weaknesses of key people involved in the process at their assigned mission. At the very least, they should be alerted to determine these after arriving in the mission. To illustrate the results of faulty knowledge of the process: A Deputy Director reported that when he first arrived he became too involved in the programming cycle, thus failing to devote proper time to other duties. He did this because he did not have a clear picture of the workload and the personnel responsible for the various tasks. Later, after having misplaced his attention, this incumbent realized that he should have provided general supervision and allowed other personnel to cope with programming details.

12. Incumbents should be familiarized with such realities of the work situation as the probable workload and the probable caliber of U.S. and local personnel. Deputy Directors, Program Officers, and Executive Officers are frequently required to work many extra hours, often because of unforeseen developments, such as accidents, uprisings, arrests, etc. Extra hours are also necessitated because of personnel inadequacies. Training should include familiarization with management procedures designed to help develop the skills and capabilities of one's U.S. subordinates, counterparts, and local employees.

13. Incumbents should be well-informed about the relevant details of the culture and customs of the country to which they are assigned. Numerous examples could be cited in which lack of specific knowledge was reported to be detrimental to effective performance, or in which socio-cultural knowledge contributed to effective performance or to better understanding of specific events.

14. Emphasis should be placed on a knowledge of factors which often create difficulties between Americans and host nationals. Wherever possible, the factors which are most significant or prevalent in particular countries should be identified specifically. Some examples of factors mentioned by incumbents as sources of difficulty are:

- a. American attitude of superiority to local nationals.
- b. American distaste for local inefficiency.
- c. American expectation that work will generally be up to U.S. standards.
- d. Failure of Americans to realize that local nationals will usually not disagree or show lack of understanding.
- e. Prejudicial treatment of local individuals as members of an inferior group rather than as individuals.
- f. Rudeness, often through lack of tact, and sometimes through deliberate disregard for the welfare and feelings of local nationals.

15. All incumbents should be given information about geographic, climatic, and other physical characteristics of their assigned posts. While some of this information is readily acquired in the field, significant morale effects can and do result from the fact that one has or has not been forewarned.

16. All incumbents should be informed in detail on the conditions and availability of a variety of facilities. These would include transportation, automobile repairs, communication systems, housing and procedures for acquiring a home, furnishings, servants, shopping, education system and facilities, medical resources, and recreational opportunities. These and other similar items are all well-known orientation topics. However, it was discovered that many Agency personnel on overseas assignments received either no information or out-of-date information. For example, two secretaries shipped heavy china to their new post, thus using the bulk of their air-freight weight allowance. When they arrived at the post, they learned that the mission supplied dishes until sea freight arrived, so their own china was unnecessary. On the other hand, there were no dry-cleaning facilities available and clothing, including shoes, was very expensive locally. The secretaries were angry because they felt that if they had been properly informed, they could have brought the necessary surplus clothing instead of the unnecessary chinaware.

School facilities may be "available," but highly inadequate in parents' estimation. For example, officers in some posts learned there were school facilities to accommodate their children. Upon arrival, however, they learned that the curriculum was inappropriate, or that the teachers were unqualified. This became a negative morale factor for the families concerned and a serious one in two instances. Parents should be given an accurate picture of the

quality as well as availability of educational facilities in order that they may make appropriate arrangements to ensure proper education for their children. Being confronted with such situations with no prior knowledge has caused resentment towards AID on the part of arriving families.

17. An incumbent and his family should be prepared for cultural isolation, i.e., the absence of theaters, music, art, or libraries. Most underdeveloped countries lack one or more of these cultural outlets, and even current news is at times difficult to obtain. (From a Post Report: "The principle recreation here is photography.")

18. Incumbents should be informed of the extent and type of social interactions that will be required at the assigned mission. A high degree of social activity may serve as a disrupting factor in family life, but must be adjusted to or, at least, tolerated.

Other types of social conditions which are unique to certain posts may prove to be significant factors affecting the adjustment of the incumbent's family, such as social activities for wives or availability of playmates for children. Families assigned to certain missions must be made aware of drastic environmental changes, so that suitable preparations can be made, if possible.

#### Position-Related Training Topics

The following section presents training topics which are chiefly of importance to each of the specific positions. There is one position-related topic, however, that applies to all of the incumbents. This pertains to the principal tasks and functions of each job.

Each prospective incumbent should be familiarized with the general responsibilities, functions, constraints, and major difficulties of his position. Although this idea is so well accepted as to be a truism, it is incorrect to assume that it is generally put into practice. Since local conditions, such as program and personalities, affect the specific job so heavily, highly detailed information about the job in the assigned mission would be inappropriate. Rather, emphasis should be placed on the variety of tasks, responsibilities, problems, and methods of approach which have occurred in many missions, in order to provide the incumbent with an awareness of the total possibilities inherent in his position. He would then have the widest possible latitude in evolving his unique job in the most appropriate manner. Specific information should also be provided if it is available, as indicated in preceding and subsequent sections. Orientation within the mission would obviously serve to fill in many details on the local situation.

#### Deputy Director

1. The prospective Deputy should be familiarized with the duties that are usually reserved to the Director, but which he will be called upon to assume in the Director's absence. The prospective Deputy should be made familiar with such important issues as interpretation of policy and goals, major mission administrative problems and program problems, personal characteristics of key employees and host contacts, interpersonal relations and problems, pending decisions, and other business with host officials, the Embassy, AID/W, etc.

2. Relationships between Directors and their Deputies vary widely. Prospective Deputies should be made aware of the range of such variation, including the authority assigned to Deputies. If possible, the Deputy should be told about the incumbent Director's "style" for dealing with key subordinates, Embassy and other Country Team members, key host officials, and other foreign nationals. Similarly, such matters as the inclinations, attitudes, or philosophy of the U.S. Ambassador should be discussed insofar as available information permits.

3. Expertise in international economics and finance may not be necessary, but some basic knowledge is required in order to facilitate management decisions. For example, technicians will propose development projects which may or may not be theoretically sound or practically acceptable. The Deputy Director may be assigned direct control over technical projects. As Acting Director, a position which the Deputy frequently must assume, he will have direct responsibility for the entire mission effort. The question to be answered is how much knowledge of development theory should any incumbent possess? As a minimum, he will need to know terminology, basic concepts and operations, and sources of information. For example, an incumbent should know which organizations are likely to lend money for specific purposes, types of loans possible and likely to be acceptable, and how foreign exchange affects development efforts.

4. The Deputy Director needs to have complete familiarity with AID policies. He must cope with, interpret, analyze, and explain policy almost every day, and, in some cases, every hour. AID attitudes toward dictators, nominal and actual democracies, operations through contract technicians, AID goals, knowledge of U.S. political aims vis-a-vis needs for economic development, and policies connected with the use of loans and grants are some examples mentioned.

A list of policies would be long, but not endless, and the Deputy Director must be aware of them. On frequent occasions he is required to represent the mission and the United States Government at conferences and meetings with other U.S. officials and with host national officials, and he is frequently assigned the task of final review of all outgoing mission correspondence. In both tasks he must assure compliance with policy. One incumbent stated that "knowledge of policy is basic to this job, and I must have intimate knowledge of all phases of policy in order to function effectively." Other Deputy Directors agreed with this attitude.

Policy is, of course, in constant flux, so any incumbent must work to stay informed. However, there are many policies that are relatively constant and should be learned in advance. For example, one Deputy Director was called upon to serve as Acting Director for an extended period within weeks after first reporting to his post. This incumbent reported that he was severely handicapped because of having been thrust into the job without knowing AID policies. A proper orientation, he reported, would have saved considerable time, money, and mistakes, and would have eliminated the need for frequent cables sent to clarify policy.

5. The Deputy Director should have a firm grasp of Agency standards and priorities. This includes the relative weight to be given to such factors as work, quality of personnel, costs, and schedules. For example, some incumbents reported lack of ability to judge project results because of a lack of information concerning the levels of success expected. The Deputy Director is often faced

with such questions as: "Should a mission make a supreme effort to complete a road construction project by an arbitrary date, even if the cost increases disproportionately?" or "Would it be feasible to accept a technician who does not meet every qualification but who is available immediately?"

6. One of the most important orientation subjects for this incumbent is the review of project details in the country to which he has been assigned. For this incumbent, and for a prospective Program Officer, this review should be far more detailed than the overview which should be given other key personnel. The incumbent should learn about such details as project budgets, scope of work, and working conditions at field projects, in order to approve correspondence, judge work output, manage the mission, and to provide information for official high-level visitors. Ordinarily there is insufficient time to learn these details properly after reporting for duty and advance preparation is necessitated by the fact that decisions are apt to be required almost immediately after arrival. Errors and delays would be avoided by providing the information which is readily available from such sources as the CAP, the desk officer, project agreements, project implementation orders, routine correspondence, and periodic reports.

7. Some Deputy Directors will need to be skilled in dealing with key host officials -- particularly in gaining cooperation and in negotiating. It is admittedly questionable whether an individual who has not already acquired such skills, or at least an aptitude for them, can benefit from training. However, careful consideration of the variety, complexity, and sensitivity of the problems associated with interactions with host officials in any country, but more particularly

in the specific host country to which he has been assigned, would enlarge the Deputy's span of potential actions during his early months on the job, and could prevent some very costly errors. In spite of the many years of operating overseas, both by the Agency and the officers concerned, it appears that a well-liked American who is respected and trusted, and with whom host nationals are willing to work, is the exception. As one local national said, "Too often a newly arriving American is met by other Americans. The new American is immediately invited to the homes of his countrymen. They tell him about the local country and how to deal with the local people. The new American, therefore, is unable to get out and learn about local nationals in an unbiased way."

8. Coverage of the economic status of the prospective host country is crucial for this incumbent. For example, it would be important to know what, if any, economic planning facilities were in existence, including their effectiveness. Government control of the economic system, host national ability to meet international financial commitments, and willingness to participate in development via self-help measures, should also be covered in detail.

9. Finally, all prospective Deputy Directors need a careful and thorough schooling in the details of the types of problems they are likely to encounter in the subject areas cited above. Methods could range from a handbook of readings through discussions of realistic cases to situational gaming. The problems are many and varied; typical categories include communications, AID organization and policy, relations with others, coping with inadequacies of subordinates, host national policies and practices, effective use of men and materials, personal differences among staff members, motivation and morale. Typical examples are presented below:

- a. Considering ways to make a host country planning board more effective.
- b. Making program or administrative decisions when no response to an information request has been received from AID/W.
- c. Responding to unreasonable host government requests and/or pressures when the Director is absent.
- d. Maintaining mission morale in spite of an unusually heavy workload and inadequate facilities.
- e. Criticizing a valuable technician who has offended a host Ministry official.
- f. Organizing an effective system for exchange of information between AID officers and host country planning board officials.
- g. Delegating various administrative duties to subordinates.
- h. Smoothing conflicts or settling disputes between Division Chiefs or between a key officer and his subordinates.
- i. Resolving disputes over fund cuts between the Program Officer and Division Chiefs.
- j. Reviewing personnel evaluations.
- k. Preparing and delivering a briefing for the Ambassador.
- l. Briefing host country Ministers on AID policy.
- m. Evaluating the Program Officer's plans and opinions.
- n. Evaluating budgets submitted by the Executive Officer, the Program Officer and the Division Chiefs.
- o. Resolving different interpretations of Manual Orders or other regulations.
- p. Establishing or repairing working relations between the mission and a host Ministry.
- q. Preparing understandable written documents for host government officials.
- r. Establishing and chairing meetings of joint committees composed of representatives from various agencies.
- s. Explaining unexpected policy or program decisions from AID/W to host government officials.

### Program Officer

1. See Item 4 under Deputy Director.
2. See Item 5 under Deputy Director.
3. See Item 6 under Deputy Director.
4. See Item 8 under Deputy Director.
5. All prospective Program Officers should make an extensive study of the Manual Orders and receive practice in searching and interpreting them to answer a variety of procedural questions.
6. A detailed operational picture of a program cycle and the component parts of the CAP should be thoroughly examined. The Program Officer should study in detail AID/W directives concerning the writing and revision of an annual CAP. He should understand the chronological development of the CAP as governed by AID/W guidelines. He must have a basic understanding of the types of factors and conditions which contribute to the decisions concerning the specific programs to be pursued in specific countries. He should be made aware, in addition, of the types of considerations used by AID/W in approving or rejecting project proposals submitted by the field, including both AID/W and field factors. The Program Officer should also become familiar with the people in AID/W departments that become involved in passing on and amending specific country programs.
7. The Program Officer must be given a genuine understanding of the existence, significance, and effects of "political" decisions, i.e., policy decisions based on political rather than economic considerations. The Program Officer will be in a position in the field where he must justify such decisions to Division Chiefs and technicians, and perhaps even to host government officials.

8. The Program Officer must have a thorough working knowledge of the economics of a developing country. He must understand how the AID program as a unit and as separate projects can contribute to the development of a country. He must be able to view realistically the contributions which AID can make to a host country and be fully aware of the program's limitations.

9. The Program Officer will never have the kind of comprehensive, detailed, reliable, quantitative information he needs in order to develop a confident understanding of the economic situation in the country to which he is assigned. Such information is simply not available to him. The principal task for which he should be trained, therefore, is the collection, validation and interpretation of economic information which will help him approach the ideal level of knowledge.

For the collection of information, he should learn how to develop as many sources as possible. One Program Officer, for example, obtained some useful commodity import data from the Public Safety Advisor who was assisting the local customs bureau. The Program Officer should be alerted to the possibility that sources of economic information may be located in obscure offices of the host government, and that low-level officials may have useful data that they have not passed upward. The Program Officer should be oriented toward seeking as many contacts as possible with visiting officials from the U.S. or other countries. These experts can frequently make useful quantitative estimates of resources or productivity for the Program Officer.

The Program Officer should be trained in the techniques of storing, validating and interpreting the information which he collects. The reliability of many sources can be tested over a period of time. For example, estimates of agricultural productivity may be obtained from several local sources as well as within the mission. These estimates can be re-examined for reliability at later dates, and the sources can then be evaluated appropriately.

10. He must be given an appreciation of his unique role in the mission organization. His status as "first among equals" with Division Chiefs must be functionally understood, i.e., he should know where he may assert authority over Division Chiefs and where not, how he relates to the Director and Deputy Director, and what role he plays in approving, amending, or rejecting proposals of Division Chiefs. If possible, he should be informed of his probable position in regard to these topics for the specific mission to which he is assigned. He should be alerted to the fact that staff people often do not follow organizational channels of communication, i.e., they seek out "persons" rather than "offices" for discussing, informing, or inquiring about program matters. Such breaks in communication make the Program Officer's job more difficult, since effective coordination of planning and operations depends upon timely receipt of accurate information.

11. To the extent that it is possible, the Program Officer should be trained to evaluate projects. He does not need a technician's knowledge of project implementation, but he must be able to question implementation procedures and requirements intelligently.

12. All Program Officers should receive practical experience in dealing with many of the operational and substantive aspects of AID/W programming. Such experience may be gotten by working at a country Desk for a two- or three-month period. Experience at any Desk will provide insight into the types of problems and considerations with which a field Program Officer must concern himself. However, the most applicable training would be received by working at the Desk of the country to which the Program Officer is assigned.

13. In addition to the foregoing topics, it may be advantageous to provide prospective Program Officers with information about the types of problems which other Program Officers have encountered. Training could range from a written handbook of examples through case studies to situational gaming exercises. One example of such a training case is given below. Following it are other topics for such training.

Following or during his work at the country Desk, the Program Officer can be given several project proposals which fit into the program of that country. The proposals could be ones which were actually submitted by the AID mission.

Given the history of the program in the country (to the extent that it is known) and the present conditions which apply therein (learned by specific orientation and Desk experience), the Program Officer should evaluate each project in detail, considering the budget, commodities, personnel, and feasibility. He should then draft a series of inquiries which should be made in order to provide the necessary information which would allow an accurate judgment of the acceptability of the proposals. Following his appraisal of the individual projects, he could assign priorities to the projects in terms of economic, technical and political feasibilities with appropriate justification.

Complicating circumstances can easily be added to the Program Officer's considerations, such as prevailing political conditions, technical competence of the division, AID/W budget allotment, or probable effects on existing staff and projects.

The Program Officer will have to recognize and consider the same basic programming factors which would confront him in the field. His thoroughness and perceptiveness could be thus realistically measured.

Many of the conditions present in the Program Officer's environment can be simulated through situational cases such as the following:

- a. Determining and locating the type of information which may be brought to bear on a particular issue discussed at a Country Team or Division Chiefs' meeting.
- b. Familiarizing an individual technician regarding his responsibilities and the requirements relating to operational effectiveness.
- c. Explaining and justifying mission activities to critical Ministers.
- d. Planning a smooth phase-out for an unsuccessful project.
- e. Developing guidelines for implementation of a project in a new area.
- f. Evaluating an on-going mission project with specific established criteria.
- g. Rewriting CAP narrative sections, in view of changing local conditions and new AID/W guidelines.
- h. Transmitting Mission Director's viewpoints on a project to an appropriate technician.
- i. Briefing visiting Congressmen on the advisability of initiating new programs, such as PL 480, or land reclamation, based on existing and predicted future economic conditions.
- j. Evaluating economic statistics in view of past reliability and presently known facts relating to conditions described by the statistics.
- k. Making judgments of the economic conditions in the host country based on diverse but unrelated and unevaluated information as well as known factors.
- l. Developing tools and criteria with which to measure the validity of government-released statistics.

- m. Identifying aspects of a division program which may reflect technicians' bias rather than technical feasibility.
- n. Evaluating the merits of a proposed project with an ineffective Division Chief.
- o. Documenting a project change to AID/W in terms of its feasibility, goals, desirability, need, risk, etc.
- p. Evaluating proposals from host Ministries on the basis of divisional capabilities as reflected by a realistic appraisal of past performance, and complicated by subtle host country political considerations.
- q. Communicating decisions concerning item(s) above to USAID and host government personnel.

#### Executive Officer

1. The prospective Executive Officer should make an extensive study of the Manual Orders, including their use and their importance as the basic operating document. Sections of greatest relevance to the type of post to which a candidate will be sent should be treated as a basic study textbook during orientation and training, and considerable practice should be provided in locating and interpreting all material pertinent to a given problem.

2. He should learn the special problems peculiar to his new post. For example, in one mission, it was extremely difficult to acquire housing for technicians in the field due to a housing shortage in the outlands and poor cooperation by appropriate host Ministries. In another post, the host government evicted host nationals in order to provide housing for U.S. technicians. Both cases provided special problems which were potentially serious. The Executive Officer should come to his post with a knowledge of these problems and with possible

solutions or approaches at hand. He should also be oriented with regard to the anticipated future course of the assigned mission, such as phase-outs, expansions, shifts to contract work, rate of change, etc. The specific implications of such changes could be explored, thus providing training with practical content.

3. If the prospective Executive Officer is to be assigned to a small mission, he should be taught certain basic technologies (perhaps through reading of appropriate texts). At a small mission he must have at least superficial knowledge of some technical areas such as accounting, construction, or transportation, since he will have fewer experts to call on than he would have in a larger mission.

4. The Executive Officer should be given an overview of the programming cycle, and detailed orientation on development of the administrative budget, including practice in completing the necessary documentation. He should also be made aware of the relation between the administrative and program budgets and the types of situations which necessitate particularly close coordination in their formulation.

5. The prospective Executive Officer should be made realistically aware of the following characteristics of the job:

a. The diversity of his job, i.e., the many issues and tasks with which he may have to deal. This should include contingencies such as arranging for and implementing insurance payments to a local injured on the job, contracting with locals to do specific rush jobs, or negotiating personally with landlords in an effort to secure lower rentals.

b. The nature of the work environment. One of the basic conditions of the Executive Officer's job is that he must work with constant interruption, frequently on trivial matters. All Executive Officers are focal points for general inquiries, personal complaints, or suggestions. Since the Executive Officer deals with personal services, he must be available to anyone who has need of any of the functions of his office. In all missions, the number of daily personal and phone calls received by Executive Officers is very large. The Executive Officer is often employed as a general operations assistant by the Mission Director, and in effect he must be at the Director's beck & call, which may additionally complicate his schedule.

c. The Executive Officer must be prepared to eliminate sectors of his budget on short notice. This calls for the establishment of a realistic priority system of funding so that spending can be reduced or curtailed in the least critical areas of the Executive Officer's operations. It is to the Executive Officer's advantage to know, prior to going to the field, what areas he is most likely to assign low priority. The cuts he makes must be justified to those Division Chiefs directly concerned in a logical and diplomatic manner, since cutbacks are rarely viewed with sympathy by those who are immediately affected.

d. Especially at larger missions, he will often be interrupted by untimely visits of VIPs, or AID/W officials, for whom the Executive Officer is generally responsible. The amount of time required to prepare for, meet, escort, or entertain visitors may be considerable.

e. He will receive requests from AID/W, the Mission Director, or the Deputy Director to prepare reports, document a statement, or research a problem at very busy times. Such requests,

as in the case with visitors, will occur at peak work periods as well as slack periods. The potential Executive Officer should be given training in the planning and scheduling of work in his office, in the delegation of work, and in upgrading the capabilities of subordinate personnel.

f. He is subjected to criticism at all times. Since his office deals with services, he can be held responsible for virtually any negative aspect of post conditions. He may be blamed for crowded offices, poor plumbing in residences, vehicle scarcity, limited recreational facilities, or mission morale. The Executive Officer may, in fact, be partly or entirely responsible for such negative conditions. However, he must work under constant criticism concerning such areas whether the fault is his or not.

g. He is often suspected of taking advantage of his position to receive more and better personal services. This is an obvious source of resentment within the American AID community. Any appearance of such a situation must be carefully avoided. The Executive Officer must be able to tolerate this type of suspicion among the American community and to take steps to allay it.

h. He is often in a position in which it is advisable to explain orally or in writing to the AID community the legal terms which regulate benefits received by other U.S. agency personnel, such as USIS or the Embassy. Jealousy on the part of some individuals, especially wives, concerning what personnel in other agencies receive, is a typical source of resentment and a factor contributing to low morale. In several cases, mission personnel were not aware of the legal restrictions placed on the Executive Officer in disseminating personal services.

i. The Executive Officer must be resourceful in working with or around ineffective or incompetent subordinates while continuing to maintain good personal relations with them.

j. There is a need to be constantly on guard against a "superior" attitude on the part of American clerical and administrative staff which may lead them to treat locals superciliously in personal contact. Most missions have some staff members who exhibit such behavior quite frequently, contributing to low morale and resentment on the part of the local staff.

k. Technically qualified locals often are not available. Marginal ability is sometimes the most that can be expected of a new local employee. A period of time must be allowed for on-the-job training before efficient output can be anticipated. The Executive Officer should be prepared to plan his projects so that these extra efforts and delays fit into the schedule.

l. Executive Officers must be tolerant of the quality of available local services and the slowness with which they are rendered. These factors will influence his calculations of what and how much can be provided in the way of personal services for the AID community.

m. Close social contact encourages cooperation between the Executive Officer and his subordinates. Yet subordinates must be directed, corrected, disciplined when necessary, and honestly rated for efficiency. Friendships should not be allowed to interfere with efficient and objective operations.

n. There is the possibility that he may be put under political pressure to hire the relatives or friends of local officials. Such instances are common and require tactful and diplomatic handling.

o. Local national employees will often not question superiors. Local subordinates will, as a rule, tend to say "yes" to questions directed to them whether they mean "yes" or not. The question "Do you understand?" is seldom answered "no." It requires a perceptive Executive Officer to recognize a lack of understanding by locals and special skills to provide clear and concise directions. Furthermore, he should realize that continuous contact with an individual can lead to the unwarranted belief that communication is improving.

p. The attitudes of local employees concerning punctuality and organization may differ sharply from those of Americans. For this reason, local subordinates must often be closely directed and supervised. It should not be expected that the quality of their performance will equal that of American workers in similar positions.

q. Allowances must be made for individuals whose morale is low due to particular on-job or personal circumstances. It appears that receiving a special favor in the way of personal services sometimes prevents an individual from becoming completely dissatisfied or unhappy with his situation. The morale of U.S. secretaries poses a particularly difficult problem. Many secretaries, especially those on their first tour, become disillusioned by the realities which they encounter in overseas

life. The Executive Officer must attempt to promote and maintain high morale among secretaries, by being sensitive to their problems, and responsive to their requests.

6. It is recommended that prospective Executive Officers be given detailed knowledge of the types of situations and problems with which they are likely to be confronted and that they be given opportunities to attempt to solve typical problems. Training procedures could range from consideration of problems presented in a written manual through classroom discussion of cases to situational gaming exercises. Below is one example of such a problem. Following it is a set of additional problem types which should be included in the training.

A technician phones the Executive Officer after midnight, informing him that his mother is dying and he wants to leave on the next afternoon's flight to New York. The technician requests that his home leave be given to him now rather than in two weeks, when it is officially due, thus allowing him to reach his family quickly without having to bear the cost of the trip. From the technician's point of view, this is perfectly reasonable, especially in the emergency situation in which he finds himself. A further condition: The Executive Officer is scheduled to meet some arriving dignitaries on an early morning flight. A problem of this kind confronts the Executive Office with many of realities of the job, such as time, availability of regulations, morale problems, conflicting tasks, reliance on one's own judgment, the necessity for justifications, the need for rapid decisions, etc. Thus, the candidate will be placed in a realistic, meaningful, and fairly typical situation.

The candidate should also be placed in face-to-face situations. For example, he may be given an efficiency rating form on which to rate his training course instructor realistically, using predetermined criteria. He should judge the instructor's effectiveness, numerically and narratively. The candidate would know his rating would have to be justified to the instructor. The instructor could challenge a low rating which the candidate would have to explain to the instructor's satisfaction. The candidate would be subjected to a situation similar to an actual circumstance. Not only would he have to rate honestly and with forethought, but he would be subjected to the same type of pressure he would find by low-rating a subordinate. Accuracy, importance, and difficulty of proper efficiency rating could be stressed.

7. Training in situational problems may be given in almost any area of the Executive Officer's concern. Some typical samples follow:

- a. Making a decision based on ambiguous information.
- b. Shifting work from an incompetent subordinate to one who is unfamiliar with the task.
- c. Determining the relevance of many communications in a relatively short period of time.
- d. Locating Manual Orders governing specific procedures.
- e. Determining alternative solutions or approaches to a mission-wide morale problem.
- f. Working with a complex set of facts while being constantly interrupted.
- g. Creating a better environment for an unhappy secretary.
- h. Conferring with an American who is dissatisfied with repair facilities.
- i. Drawing up itineraries for visiting Congressmen based on a busy mission schedule.

- j. Interpreting regulation changes by AID/W and circulating an appropriate memorandum.
- k. Scheduling the work of local mission mechanics during an especially busy month (accidents, overhauls, etc.)
- l. Receiving and rapidly digesting information which concerns numerous aspects of Executive Office operations.
- m. Explaining a complex directive to locals who speak poor English.
- n. Dealing with an American officer berating a local messenger.
- o. Assigning work of a departed staff member and of one who is ill to the remaining staff.
- p. Adjusting flexible regulations in favor of or against an employee's request for personal consideration.
- q. Discussing mission employment conditions with a local candidate who holds political "strings."
- r. Handling a request for special favors from a Deputy Director.
- s. Developing a cost-per-mile report on the efficiency of Motor Pool operations.
- t. Establishing a committee to discuss and act on a problem of inadequate education facilities for dependents.

Division Chief

- 1. See Item 3 under Deputy Director.
- 2. See Item 4 under Deputy Director.
- 3. See Item 5 under Deputy Director.
- 4. See Item 6 under Deputy Director.

5. See Item 7 under Deputy Director.

6. See Item 9 under Program Officer.

7. The Division Chief should be made familiar with the programming cycle, but perhaps with less emphasis on total mission efforts and priority considerations than the Program Officer. It is important that the Division Chief understand:

- a. The necessity for planning.
- b. The minimal requirements of an acceptable plan.
- c. The mechanics of documentation.
- d. The role of the Program Officer in programming.
- e. The role of host government officials during the several phases of the cycle.
- f. The necessities for and the realities of fund cuts and shifts affecting on-going or planned division activities.
- g. The relation between his specialty area and the entire mission program.

Understanding of these basic topics would not only increase the effectiveness of USAID activities in the host country, but would also diminish the workload of the Program Officer and eliminate many sources of interpersonal friction in the mission.

8. The Division Chief should be trained in methods for evaluating on-going projects in his specialty. Depending upon the information available to the Agency, this could range from merely making the Division Chief aware of the relevant cues to look for, to training him in the use of a standardized procedure with objective evaluation criteria. (A likely source of information on which such a procedure might be based is the mass of material on past projects which has been

accumulated over past years of U.S. technical assistance efforts). Sources and methods for obtaining reliable evaluative information in the assigned country should be included, along with indications of potential obstacles, biases, and other specific factors which would tend to make evaluation difficult. Practice in making inferences from incomplete data should also be provided, although it is likely that this ability can be more easily selected for than instilled by training.

9. Division Chiefs should become familiar with the contracting system, particularly with the position of the Division Chief regarding supervisory responsibilities, "monitoring," and liaison activities. To many incumbents in the field, these are empty terms. One Division Chief stated that his job was to perform liaison with contract groups and to monitor them, but he did not know how frequent contacts should be, how deeply he should become involved in project details, to what extent he was supposed to participate in planning, or how much control was at his disposal. Guidance on these matters was not readily available in the mission.

10. The Division Chief should be instructed on the duties and responsibilities of a Program Officer, and the frequently anomalous position this Officer occupies in the mission structure. The most frequent type of friction among the key positions studied was between the Division Chief and the Program Officer. The typical difficulties are summarized in the following remarks made by a Program Officer:

"There is a good deal of difficulty around here in getting to understand who is responsible to whom for what. In general, the technicians consider the Program Officer, in doing his job, as getting in the way, by asking questions regarding their work, wanting things written, wanting them to clear everything with the Program Office, etc. They seem to minimize the importance of the planning process. They are oriented only toward simple implementation, and while implementing, they interpret the Manual Orders as hindrances.

"The Division Chiefs do not realize that there are distinct lines of authority between them and the Program Office. Grade and rank have nothing to do with it; it is the procedure which must be followed. A technician is responsible to the Program Officer even if the technician outranks him. That's just the way USAID has to operate. I don't want them to think they work for me, but through me, for the mission.

"These unclear relationships create day-to-day difficulties in that they interpret any request by me as being additional work for them which they don't consider necessary.

"People have a natural tendency to resent anyone else returning their work or making corrections in their work. This is compounded if they don't realize to begin with that the Program Officer has the right to do this and it is a requirement of his job. It's not a question of style but of content, clarity, and directness. But they don't see it that way. It becomes a matter of personality with them. I send things back and they are returned virtually unchanged. This is because they don't take seriously enough their responsibility to the Program Office."

11. The Agency's expectations concerning the Division Chief's role as an "advisor" should be clarified and communicated to prospective incumbents during training. Areas of uncertainty include such questions as:

- a. To what extent should a Division Chief attempt to pursue the advisory role?
- b. What are the limits in playing this role?
- c. Does it involve conflicting interests?
- d. Does one take active steps to become involved in this function or does one wait passively for requests for help?
- e. What are the appropriate techniques for advising?

Orientation or instruction on this topic would be most effective if it is based on the specific characteristics of the country of assignment.

12. This incumbent is the "line officer" and thus is likely to have more working contacts with host nationals than the other senior personnel included in this study. These contacts vary in frequency from country to country, but all are crucial. Relations with the host nationals can make or break projects and programs. An incumbent, therefore, should be supplied with extensive information concerning important host national officials with whom he will be working. For example, several incumbents reported that six to eight months were required before they were able to gain the confidence of counterparts and establish the degree of rapport necessary for project implementation. Such delays should be shortened if possible by providing adequate orientation and training. A newly assigned incumbent, especially someone new to the foreign service, may become frustrated and disillusioned if he is not aware of the importance of establishing effective contacts and the delays which may result from their absence.

The Division Chief should also be provided with orientation on the methods for establishing effective personal relations with host government officials and other influential host national individuals. In many underdeveloped countries, "the man makes the job," and host nationals will expect to deal with the Chief as an individual personality rather than with his office or his title. Several reports from Division Chiefs saying that they had been bypassed by host government officials may well represent a lack of understanding of this point.

13. The Division Chief requires more familiarity with the local language than other senior personnel. His contacts are more apt to be with host nationals who speak little or no English, and his knowledge of the language can have a significant bearing on the progress of on-going projects. It is suggested that basic instruction should be given during U.S. training and that intensive study should be continued overseas on a mandatory basis. Pre-arrival training should also stress the importance of language knowledge, using concrete illustrations.

14. Examples of problem situations that might be utilized in training are as follows:

- a. Explaining to a contractor the contractor's relationship to the division and his responsibilities to the mission.
- b. Explaining to an impatient host minister the reasons for delay in the arrival of equipment from the United States.
- c. Determining whether a slow-moving project should be phased out or pushed ahead by adding new staff or equipment.
- d. Estimating the staff and commodity needs of hypothetical projects having specific goals, in the context of specified country conditions.
- e. Justifying to a host planning board the high cost of U.S. technical specialists on a project.
- f. Developing ways to make U.S. presence felt in spite of host national hostility.
- g. Coping with a situation in which the economic or social needs of the host country demand one effort, while U.S. political considerations demand a different effort.
- h. Dealing with a Program Office staff which is trying to become over-involved with technical operations (e.g., demanding unnecessary paperwork).
- i. Evaluating a project's effectiveness with regard to host country development; determining whether it is really helping to move the host country forward; deciding if one project is more worthwhile than another (e.g., which is more valuable, teacher training or primary education).
- j. Supervising American staff ill-suited for overseas work (e.g., no desire to learn the indigenous language or culture, dislike of host nationals, desire to return to the U.S., physical handicaps, etc.).