

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT WASHINGTON, D. C. 20523 <b>BIBLIOGRAPHIC INPUT SHEET</b>		<b>FOR AID USE ONLY</b> <i>Bottle 39</i>
1. SUBJECT CLASSIFICATION	A. PRIMARY	TEMPORARY
	B. SECONDARY	
2. TITLE AND SUBTITLE A study of some key U.S.A.I.D. jobs: appendix A. the deputy director		
3. AUTHOR(S) (101) American Institute for Research		
4. DOCUMENT DATE 1964	5. NUMBER OF PAGES 154p.	6. ARC NUMBER ARC 353.1.A512
7. REFERENCE ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS AIR		
8. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES ( <i>Sponsoring Organization, Publisher, Availability</i> )		
9. ABSTRACT		

(Dev.--Development Assistance R&D)

10. CONTROL NUMBER PN-AAC-459	11. PRICE OF DOCUMENT
12. DESCRIPTORS	13. PROJECT NUMBER
	14. CONTRACT NUMBER Repas-10 Res.
	15. TYPE OF DOCUMENT

APPENDIX A  
to  
A Study of Some Key USAID Jobs

THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR

American Institute for Research  
Washington, D.C.

JUNE 1964



DEPUTY DIRECTOR

Outline of Functions

I. PARTICIPATES IN PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT

A. Obtains Information Relevant to Program Development

1. Confers with potentially knowledgeable people
2. Selects and reads documents
3. Observes host country conditions
4. Assigns USAID personnel to obtain information
5. Evaluates information
  - a. considers reliability of sources
  - b. deduces or infers errors or inconsistencies
  - c. verifies data
  - d. judges relevance of data

B. Participates in Development and Revision of Program

1. Provides guidelines, assistance, and information to others
  - a. reviews, or revises preliminary project plans
  - b. recommends priorities
  - c. suggest project ideas
2. Coordinates with others
  - a. Embassy, USIS, other U. S. Government groups
  - b. third country, international, private groups
  - c. host country officials
  - d. AID/W

C. Participates in Document Preparation

1. Reviews, edits, and evaluates
2. Prepares documents or rewrites documents prepared by others

## II. PARTICIPATES IN PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION

### A. Reviews and Edits Details of Project Implementation Documents

1. Checks plans for conformance to goals and regulations
2. Revises or suggests changes

### B. Conducts Negotiations With Host Country Officials

1. Negotiates details of development grant implementation documents
2. Negotiates details of loan applications

## III. PARTICIPATES IN PROGRAM MANAGEMENT

### A. Obtains Information on Project Status

1. Confers with U. S. personnel
2. Confers with third country or international agency personnel
3. Confers with host government personnel
4. Reviews project status documents
5. Visits project sites
6. Assigns others to observe field operations

### B. Evaluates Projects

### C. Corrects Project Deficiencies

1. Directs personnel changes
2. Motivates USAID personnel
3. Directs equipment changes
4. Persuades host government to honor commitments
5. Coordinates division activities
6. Coordinates division activities with host country efforts

### D. Accomplishes Other Program Management Functions

1. Reads and reviews correspondence
2. Keeps others informed about project status
3. Acts as Division Chief

#### IV. PARTICIPATES IN MISSION MANAGEMENT

##### A. Guides and Assists Staff Officers and Division Chiefs

1. Assigns tasks
2. Provides advice concerning mission administrative operations
3. Settles disputes
4. Provides information concerning mission administrative operations
5. Reads, reviews or edits administrative written materials
6. Consults on personnel needs, allocations, and appointments
7. Monitors and evaluates performance
8. Develops skills of subordinates
9. Rewards outstanding performance
10. Reprimands and disciplines
11. Provides advice about, or handles, special behavior problems

##### B. Serves as Acting Mission Director

##### C. Deals with Visitors

1. Provides briefings
2. Arranges itineraries and conferences
3. Accompanies visitors on tours

##### D. Maintains Social Relations with Personnel from Other U. S. Agencies, Other Donor Agencies, and the Diplomatic Corps

#### V. PARTICIPATES IN MISSION REPRESENTATION

##### A. Develops "Good" Relations with Host National Personnel

##### B. Represents Mission at Social Events

1. Attends and gives luncheons, parties, etc.
2. Attends or participates in ceremonies

##### C. Provides Information, Advice and Assistance to Host National Personnel

1. Provides information on policy or procedural changes
2. Advises host government on their operations



## USAID DEPUTY DIRECTOR

### I N T R O D U C T I O N

The Deputy Director's job varies considerably, based on the personalities involved, individual capabilities and interests, and local needs. In general, the Deputy Director is responsible to be ready to assume the role of Acting Director, at any time, which means that a principal part of his job is to stay informed about all phases of mission operations. This need to be informed, coupled with the fact that other mission personnel are responsible for substantive production, leaves the Deputy in an ambiguous situation. He must learn without really being involved, without permitting himself to become a bottleneck in the chain of command, and frequently, without an established procedure for doing so.

In some missions Deputy Directors are assigned supplementary duties, usually of an administrative nature. Examples include final clearance of routine correspondence, supervising technical divisions, and entertaining official visitors. Supplementary duties also tend to be ambiguous, resulting from unclear authority. For example, it is difficult to determine what correspondence is nonroutine. Even more frustrating for a Deputy Director, technicians under his supervision have the prerogative, which they tend to successfully use, of making direct appeals to the Mission Director.

Because of the nature of the relationship, the Deputy Mission Director needs to maintain close contact with the Director. Unfortunately, this is not an easy process. Some Deputies reported that technical and administrative personnel have no hesitation to deal directly with the Director, although the Deputy is supposed to be in the chain of

command, or, as a minimum, a participant in mission decisions. This problem is less critical when the entire mission is in one physical location, and more pronounced when the mission has two or more physical facilities, with the Directors in such situations prone to confer with personnel in other buildings without informing the Deputy. In other examples, the Deputies were assigned specific responsibilities for a function, and then learned that the Director was continuing his own involvement in the function. This type of situation not only undercuts the Deputy, but also affects the performance of the subordinate who in effect has two supervisors.

Because the Deputy is seldom directly responsible for substantive mission operations, the terminology used in this job description is qualified by using the phrase "participation in." For example, the Mission Director and the Program Officer shape the program and determine project details, while the Deputy participates by giving advice, revising written documents to conform with policy, procuring information, and coordinating. In addition, the description has been made very general, with the intention of providing an idealized format for the job in an effort to make this incumbent a more useful and more used member of the mission team.

In addition to the problems and obstacles which can be related directly to the specific functions, which will be discussed below, several problems were reported by Deputy Directors which affect all phases of their jobs.

The most frequently cited general problem involves personnel. As a rule Deputy Directors attributed the origins of this problem to the Agency for International Development/Washington (AID/W) personnel office. One Deputy reported that the Washington personnel office was so poorly organized that when appointed he had to "walk his papers

through" for processing because they were lying in in-baskets without receiving action. Another Deputy reported the need to visit Washington several times a year because of the personnel office bottleneck. A third Deputy reported that Washington personnel "has a large pool of people for whom they have no assignment and they are continually trying to peddle them to missions around the world." This procedure created a need for the Deputy to be on the alert to prevent unwanted and unnecessary personnel from being sent to the mission. Other Deputies reported similar problems: the arrival of two people to fill one job, being without a key executive for twenty-four months because of AID/W recruiting failures, the assignment of technicians to Division Chief positions, and the assignment of personnel who were clearly incapable of withstanding the physical strain of overseas life.

A related general problem frequently mentioned by Deputy Directors was that many mission personnel are either incompetent or so poorly selected or trained that they are unable to function properly. Technicians received the most frequent criticism from Deputies, based on their inability to visualize anything other than their own projects, inability to write, inability to cope with subtleties, lack of drive, inability to represent the mission among host nationals, inability to adjust to an overseas environment, inability to train others which is their major function, and possession of a pronounced air of paternalism or superiority. In one example, which is not an isolated case, a mission employee became drunk in the company of host country officials, accused them of being communists, and stated that the entire country could be bought for a small sum and that it would never be able to progress. This employee was quickly sent home, but the damage had already occurred.

Another pervasive problem is that agency operations frequently lack clarity, and that clarifications are difficult to obtain. One Deputy reported that his mission was forced to learn what could not be done by

trying something and then waiting to see if disciplinary action resulted. Another Deputy reported that AID/W was really an agent to supply money, personnel and materials, but that in addition AID/W tried to administer on the local scene, without adequate information. A third Deputy reported constant combat between the mission and AID/W because after submitting ideas based on locally available information, the ideas were disapproved by AID/W based on political news. A fourth Deputy reported that determining Washington's assistance policy was difficult. In this particular case the U.S. Ambassador favored "soft aid" while the mission favored "hard aid," but no one knew the official Washington view.

Difficulties in obtaining clarifications were frequently attributed to poor communications. Unclear messages, delayed replies, and inappropriate replies occur frequently enough to warrant correction. For example, one mission asked permission via cable to purchase some specialized equipment. After three weeks of waiting no answer had been received. In another example, permission to manipulate a Public Law 480 loan was requested, but no reply was received for several days. Other missions reported frequent cases of delays in the sending of travel orders from AID/W, and that many cables concerning such items were sent which AID/W simply failed to answer. In every mission there were reports of communication mismanagement, either extensive delays by AID/W in providing answers, or complete failure to answer.

In addition to incompetent mission personnel, host country personnel are often not effective; they lack training or initiative, or are corrupt. This handicap extends from high level ministry officials to workmen responsible for routine repairs. Obviously, negotiating with a corrupt or uninformed Minister is the more complex end of the scale, but mission work is also difficult to accomplish when typewriters and air conditioners can not be readily repaired.

A frequent complaint was that host country officials try to obtain favors from the AID mission or to pressure it for personal gain. For example, frequent attempts are made to send a relative to the United States under the participant training program. In another reported problem, a mission purchased property, but could not obtain possession because high ranking politicians were maintaining mistresses in the building. In this case, the mission was hesitant to risk the displeasure of the politicians by insisting on immediate possession. Mission Deputies, participating in the effort to solve such problems, are forced to spend countless hours searching for and carrying out solutions, using cautious methods. This not only requires time that could better be spent on development of the country, but also tends to bring the American into conflict with the host country culture, which, because of the necessity to judge negatively, leaves the American in the inherently displeasing role of critic.

Several Deputy Directors reported problems in mission-Embassy relations. It appears that the general feeling among AID personnel is that Embassy employees think of and deal with AID as a second class entity. For example, one Embassy was accused of reserving for itself contacts with Ministers, and leaving lower level contacts to AID. Other Deputies reported that, in general, Embassy-mission relations were "not good." One Deputy remarked that AID has a bigger operating budget while the Embassy had prestige and employee career status, so that a work damaging rivalry was to be expected. Regarding operations, a common complaint was that the Embassy's goal tended to be to win friendships, which in turn created a desire to conduct development programs of any kind so long as cordial relations were maintained. The AID mission, on the other hand, operated under the philosophy of undertaking only those projects which are believed actually to advance development; consequently certain projects proposed by host country officials had to be vetoed.

Such differences widen the gulf between Embassies and missions, and further complicate efforts to provide development assistance. The Deputy often becomes involved in such controversies in attempts to reduce the excess time needed to negotiate AID business with the Embassy.

The following sections contain descriptions of specific functions with descriptions of activities, complications and problems that were found to be associated with them.

## F U N C T I O N S

### I. PARTICIPATES IN PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT

This broad category includes all activities necessary to plan and produce a realistic assistance effort for the Agency's development operations in the host country. The Deputy is seldom a direct producer in this part of the mission's work, but instead "observes," "reviews," "suggests," or "coordinates," work created by other mission personnel.

#### A. Obtains Information Relevant to Program Development

In order to advise, review, coordinate, suggest, etc., a Deputy Director obviously must have information. Obtaining information occurs continuously, and by a variety of methods; information is utilized, for the most part, during the period of Country Assistance Program production.

##### 1. Confers with potentially knowledgeable people

The Deputy obtains information from others through formal and informal meetings, varying from attendance at a structured conference to conversation over cocktails. Sometimes an incumbent is seeking a specific item of information such as number of teachers being trained, and sometimes he merely learns a bit of interesting information which is mentally stored for possible future use. People from whom he obtains information vary as greatly as the type of information obtained; from the president of a country to a day laborer, and from host country official policy to a day laborer's desire for training.

One of the technical Division Chiefs suggested sending a team of counterparts to the U.S. to study a very specialized course. I asked him to explain his ideas and then I discussed it with the Program Officer who agreed that it was a good suggestion. However, a ranking official of the Ministry was not in favor of the plan. Then the technician went to Washington on consultation and his experience there led him to think that we should forego the idea and instead have a consultant come out, look over the situation, and recommend whether such training would be useful. I called the Program Officer for his opinion and we both agreed that it would be a good idea for the consultant to come. The consultant eventually came and recommended that we not send the group for specialized training, which I agreed to after reading his report.

\* \* \* \*

I do not take many notes, which has created problems. For example, at a meeting with a local Minister, the Minister gave me needed information which contained an amount of money to be donated by the Ministry for an AID project. I failed to write down the figure, thinking that I could easily remember it. However, I and the technician who attended with me forgot the exact figure, so the technician had to telephone later to find out what the figure had been.

\* \* \* \*

I met a Ford Foundation representative at a cocktail party. He mentioned that he was considering the possibility of establishing an agricultural center in a rural area. Since we are very active in this area, I talked to him about this possibility. We exchanged points of view which allowed us to learn about their plans which would be very complementary to our

work. Not only did I get reliable advance information, but I was also able to give him much encouragement regarding their plans.

\* \* \* \*

## 2. Selects and reads documents

Major sources of information are host country publications, third country and international agency materials, and a great deal of printed matter from the United States, including correspondence to and from AID/W, newspaper articles, and applicable government reports such as those from the Department of State. Because of the frequency of accomplishment and lack of immediate criticality, meaningful examples were not obtained.

The main problem reported for this task was that of time. With a full work day of participating in meetings, reviewing correspondence, coping with personnel problems, etc., there is little time remaining to read and digest a central bank report, or a Ministry publication discussing training needs. Many Deputies partly solve this problem by reading after hours, at home or at the office. A related problem is that some materials are in a foreign language, so that even with some foreign language ability reading is a laborious process for most Deputies.

## 3. Observes host country conditions

The Deputy Director travels throughout the host country for several reasons, to monitor projects, to represent the mission at ceremonies, to vacation, etc. This task includes the obtaining of useful development information, either for immediate use or for possible future reference, by means of personal observation. For example, while on vacation an incumbent might observe that building maintenance would

be a logical addition to the mission's educational assistance effort, or something more general such as need for a better diet.

Again the major problem is lack of time. Most Deputies reported that day-to-day activities were time consuming, and more necessary than field trips, with the result being that few field visits were made. This failure in turn created a handicap when programs were being considered and planned, i.e., the difficulty of making judgments about unseen facilities or operations.

4. Assigns USAID personnel to obtain information

Information in this instance refers to that which is not readily available by simply asking, but for which an effort must be made. Examples include making a survey, reading a document, or compiling statistics. Because of lack of time, facilities, or expertise, a Deputy Director sometimes assigns the obtaining of such information to a mission employee with the necessary skills or tools.

I wasn't satisfied with the justification given on a loan application which was submitted to me by the Program Office so I asked the Program Officer to get the details I felt would satisfy AID/W. Since he didn't have them he asked the technician to come and discuss it. When the technician arrived I chaired two meetings involving the Program Officer, the technician and myself. The result was a much better piece of work and it was accepted by AID/W.

\* \* \* \*

I recently received some reports from the host government concerning expansion of educational facilities. I have concluded that there is not much clarity about where they are going in this area. They are proposing buildings, courses of great size, and have made no provisions for

teachers, tuitions, getting students, etc. I brought the reports and my conclusions to the attention of the Director and suggested that I contact our technicians and ask them to do a serious assessment of the preliminary evaluation done by the host government. I proposed a great concentration on re-evaluating the feasibility of undertaking a project such as was described in the reports. The Director accepted my judgment so I assigned several technicians to obtain the needed data.

\* \* \* \*

5. Evaluates information

- a. considers reliability of sources
- b. deduces or infers errors or inconsistencies
- c. verifies data
- d. judges relevance of data

After or while obtaining information, a Deputy Director must complete the process of evaluation, with emphasis on applicability and correctness. Descriptive incidents of a mental process are, of course, impossible to obtain, and even a listing of types of information would be difficult because of the range of topics to be considered. However, this is an important part of a Deputy's responsibilities. There is frequently conflicting information, lack of information, and deliberately falsified information. For example, a Ministry of rural affairs might report the existence of a certain number of rural schools, with the Ministry of education reporting an entirely different number. Sometimes sources have reputations for accuracy or good intentions, so that selectivity of data is less of a problem. However, some data are so obviously inaccurate, and the facilities for verification are so limited that the Deputy must pass judgment using the criterion of what he himself thinks is realistic.

## B. Participates in Development and Revision of the Program

Normally the Deputy Director applies his knowledge by lending his services to program development to ensure that the policies of the Agency and the Mission Director are followed, and by using his authority, his personal qualifications, his close association with the Mission Director, and the information which he has obtained, to help ensure that the best possible projects are made available to be included in the Country Assistance Program. This section covers the preplanning necessary to decide what kinds or how many projects will be included. Detailed planning of specific projects is covered in a later section.

### 1. Provides guidelines, assistance, and information to others

There are a multitude of decisions to be made while producing the Country Assistance Program, with the Deputy Director's involvement closely related to the Director's mode of operations. The Director might assume responsibility for all decisions, assign some types of decisions to the Deputy, assign all decisions to the Deputy as a preliminary to his own consideration, or share all decisions with the Deputy. In some of the missions the Director had not made his mode of operations clear, so the Deputy was required to search for a proper degree of involvement in program development decisions. In some missions this problem was never satisfactorily resolved.

#### a. reviews or revises preliminary project plans

Deputy Directors reported that they participated in most planning discussions and that preliminary written materials such as memoranda were routed to them prior to or simultaneously with consideration by the Director. A typical sequence would be initiated

by a host country official suggesting a meeting to discuss assistance for a specific development effort. The Deputy Director would participate in such a meeting, which might lead to the future inclusion in the CAP of the proposal discussed. In short, such reviews as are accomplished by the Deputy under this heading are for the purpose of determining if a proposed project merits the detailed planning necessary for incorporation into the CAP, and are conducted with host country officials, with mission personnel, or with mission and host country personnel.

A significant problem for the Deputy results from USAID technicians not having a sense of objectivity. In many cases technicians are interested in expanding their own responsibilities, or they think of their technical specialties as being the only type of suitable assistance. Because of this frame of reference the technicians tend to present their plans, ideas, or proposals in emotional and selfish terms, without regard for other technical areas. The Deputy, usually untrained in the technical specialty, is required to make judgments concerning applicability, and at times, veracity. With highly persuasive Division Chiefs, with a natural instinct to stress their own specialty, a Deputy has the problem of assuring that technical areas with less persuasive leadership are not neglected. If one technical area does merit the largest portion of the budget, the Deputy has the problem of persuading technicians in other specialties to accept the unbalance and appreciate the reason for its existence. One particularly sly maneuver used by ambitious technicians is the enlisting of support from host country officials. This is exemplified by the technician who advised his counterpart Ministry official to insist to the AID Mission Director or Deputy Director that unless certain new projects were supported, current projects would be terminated, or that host country cooperation would cease. Therefore,

detection of suppression, distortion, or slanting of information by American technicians becomes a problem for the Deputy Director. Furthermore, the problem is complicated by the fact that host country officials spontaneously make the same kinds of threats, without prompting by American technicians, so that the Deputy may not know whether to trust his technicians or not.

The Deputy Director in such cases must cope with the sometimes subtle problem of what should be versus what has to be. To enable accomplishment of mission goals, and, quite often, to prevent a failure which would stigmatize a career, the Deputy at times is faced with the need to approve or to recommend the approval of an unrealistic project proposal. When a Deputy, with other mission officials, is faced with the choice of approving a specific project or terminating the AID mission, the choice could hardly be other than to approve the project. This, of course, allows the mission to "stay alive" in order to continue appropriate work. This issue is further complicated by the fact that many Deputies believe that their careers would be damaged if their mission programs are curtailed or eliminated at the behest of their hosts.

I read a preliminary loan application and was able to determine that the company was not viable and that they had no real basis for future profits. I pointed these things out to others present at a meeting to consider the application. By spotting the weakness of the company I saved myself and others involved from wasting time considering the loan.

\* \* \* \*

A local industry was built to produce 100,000 items per year. At present, it is producing only 50,000 items because of equipment limitations. They want to discuss a loan to increase production to total capacity. With this increase the company would

be able to pay off the new debt and make payments on a previous loan. However, they could not produce evidence of being able to sell their total output if production was increased to full capacity. During the discussions I recommended that they obtain more complete data and then approach us a second time with their idea.

\* \* \* \*

(From a colleague) When the new Director arrived, the Minister of Economics hauled out his pet project. The Deputy Director avoided involvement in the discussions because he suspected that the Minister would do a "snow job" on the Director, who was new to the job. The proposals included some project details which had previously been disapproved because of exorbitant costs. The Minister successfully convinced the Director, and soon a contract for a feasibility study was let. Suddenly AID/W became critical. They claimed that the consultants were going beyond the requirements of a feasibility study, so naturally gathering facts about this expansion of function slowed down progress of the study. The Minister began to exert strong pressure on the Director, claiming that the United States was not living up to commitments and was wasting time. He threatened to call the newspapers and denounce AID as a fraud. The Director, because of this pressure, was determined to get the project going without delay, and was ready to stake his job on it. Therefore, he returned to Washington and a couple of weeks later the project was approved. This entire controversy would have been avoided if the Deputy, who knew the situation, had rendered advice to the new Director about the original project proposal.

\* \* \* \*

The host government requested a grant to send representatives to a U.S. seminar in vocational counseling. The Director and I refused on the grounds that vocational counseling was unrelated to the goals and other programs of AID for this country.

\* \* \* \*

A technician in charge of an agricultural project was striving to increase his responsibilities and, of course, to do a good job. He proposed that several new technicians be added to his staff. I vetoed his proposal because: 1) I knew that the technician could not supervise well enough to handle the additional staff, 2) the host government was not cooperating fully with the existing project, thus increasing work would also tend to increase frustrations, 3) there was probably already a satisfactory number of Americans here and new personnel might upset the balance, and 4) even if it were decided that new technicians were needed it might be possible to get TDY people for short periods, thus costing less money. The Director agreed with my reasons and with my decision.

\* \* \* \*

A Division Chief submitted a proposal calling for technical staff to be used in an outside advisory capacity to the host government. I favored placing staff directly in Ministry offices. In a program conference I asked questions that led the Division Chief to agree that internal placement of technicians would be more effective in relation to division goals. The proposal was amended to reflect this agreement.

\* \* \* \*

b. recommends priorities

Various mission personnel, principally Chiefs of Divisions, the Program Officer, and the Mission Director, are involved in seeking out or creating, or considering ideas to be included in the CAP. The Deputy, as a spokesman for the Director, an informed mission employee, and a senior executive, presents his own views of the various proposals and their comparative value in the overall development effort. Usually the Deputy does not have technical reasons for recommending a certain emphasis, but he may have special information not available to others. For example, he may have learned the development plans of a private foundation from having participated in social discussions and could thus recommend immediate attention to or postponement of a particular AID development goal.

With creative people and a limited budget, it is very easy for conflicts to develop. Technicians, eager for success, eager to provide assistance, and eager for increased responsibility, are prone to ignore the needs of other technicians. Cases were reported in which Division Chiefs demanded an unfair portion of a limited budget for their own projects. In such instances, the Deputy, either on assignment from the Director, or as a member of mission top management, becomes involved in working out compromise solutions.

Pressures also come from AID/W. Technicians write unofficial letters to AID/W asking their backstop offices to put pressure on Desk Officers to approve certain projects. Also, host country officials are able to apply pressure in Washington through their lobbying facilities. In addition, there are very real pressures from Congress. Congressmen who know very little about AID projects or problems, types of commodities involved, etc., sometimes make suggestions based on their own political goals. When such a suggestion is made to

AID/W, the essence of the suggestion often becomes AID policy. One Deputy reported that the Agency had no intention of losing Congressional support just to make a technician happy. Therefore, the Deputy's job was to convince technicians to accept illogical suggestions, without really explaining the real need for compliance. Therefore, recommending priorities means more than merely selecting what projects are most needed.

A technician recently arrived who wanted to get ahead. He proposed a program calling for expenditures of \$ \_\_\_\_\_. The Program Officer had earlier decided that AID should not be stressing the technician's specialty in this country and had made this suggestion to AID and had it approved. Therefore, to approve the technicians proposal would mean rewriting the CAP, and ruling against the Program Officer's decision. The technician thought he wasn't being appreciated, and the Program Officer had to be upheld, so I decided to work out a compromise. The technician had wanted a central demonstration center and several regional demonstration centers, so I said "complete" regional centers were out, but that limited-facility regional centers would be acceptable. The technician was happy and the prestige of Program Officer was preserved.

\* \* \* \*

The Chief of the Education Division was trying to sell a project. The Chief of the Agriculture Division was not enthusiastic about the project and the two Chiefs obviously did not agree. The Agricultural Chief wanted to have a statement in a report to the effect that the U.S. was not interested in the area of development being proposed by the Education Chief. I convinced both Division Chiefs that no statement about the disagreement was necessary.

\* \* \* \*

c. suggests project ideas

A Deputy Director has an overall view of the mission, frequently has high-level, well-informed friends, and reads most if not all of the mission's correspondence. He thus can be in a position to know everything that is succeeding, what is failing, what needs revision, stimulation, etc. This special position enables the Deputy to form educated opinions concerning assistance needs and operational abilities and limitations, making him a prime source of ideas and suggestions.

Usually the Deputy has no authority to order that projects be put into effect, therefore he must rely on persuasion. In addition, the Deputy seldom has specific technical knowledge, which hinders efforts to be persuasive to the necessary degree.

The project called for the host government and the U.S. to divide costs. I was not happy about this project because it called for bringing in U.S. contract personnel so I proposed to the host government that they establish and operate their own division to accomplish this kind of work. The mission would train local national technicians in the use of equipment and give them the necessary equipment. This means that the local nationals could continue the work after U.S. concern with the project had closed out. I circulated a memo to this effect to those in the mission whose divisions were involved. There were some questions raised by several of the divisions as to who was to do what. I revised the memo and finally got acceptance within the mission. We will now move forward to put the project into effect.

\* \* \* \*

I recommended a major construction project which would create a lot of interest and be good publicity for the United States because of its impressive size. It would create a need for U.S. workmen and engineers, who would not need to speak the local language since they would be working with other Americans. The idea was accepted by local officials as a "natural." Statutory requirements were such that cost estimates and a feasibility study must be accomplished before the U.S. can be committed to support a capital project such as this one. Events moved slowly so I had to stall the government but finally they insisted on an answer about U.S. intent. I replied that I could not provide an answer until the feasibility study was finished. The consultants arrived and spent several weeks making the study, then left and reviewed their findings for several months. In the meantime the host government was being friendly with other aid donors. AID/W was afraid to touch the project thinking that to do so would provide Congress with ammunition against the Agency because the proposal might be seen as running counter to the policy of stimulating assistance from other nations and other aid donors. AID/W finally sent a cable telling me the U.S. might be willing to go ahead providing that certain conditions were met, and that I could pass this information on to host government officials. My interpreter asked why I was bothering to transmit the information since the issue had already been settled. The host government had grown weary of waiting for the Americans and had signed an agreement with another donor agency. I had the translation completed anyway and took it to the Ministry. The Minister read the information then replied that the matter was already "settled."

\* \* \* \*

of the political implications of assistance, the Embassy and the AID mission frequently engage in policy coordination. The Deputy Director assists the Director in presenting the AID position either as a participant at a meeting, for example, the Country Team meeting, or, on request or assignment, the Deputy provides a formal briefing.

A common problem reported was that mission and Embassy officials have trouble agreeing about assistance philosophy due to different goals. Another problem is that AID personnel have trouble interacting with Embassy officials because of either not knowing the interests of the Embassy, or being forced to consent to Embassy instructions that AID feels to be unsound. A common complaint in this regard was that the Embassy tended to become involved in areas which should be reserved to AID.

Most of these contacts are with Embassy officials, but the Deputy also occasionally interacts with United States Information Service personnel. Typically, such a contact would be to discuss informational coverage of potential AID assistance projects. AID has infrequent contacts with military personnel, except for Country Team meetings. When these contacts do occur they are generally for a specialized purpose, e.g., to consider joint participation in emergency assistance to the host country. In such instances the Director would normally attend personally, often accompanied by the Deputy, but at times the press of business requires that the Deputy attend the joint meetings alone as the official USAID representative.

The State Department was "sorry" that negotiations started with the host government on the project without the approval of Washington, D.C. I was not clear as to whether negotiations should be broken off. I work for AID, not State, and I did not know whether or not this was an order for the mission not to negotiate with the host government

on this matter. It so happened that the host government approached me on this matter so I feel we have a right to negotiate. I am waiting for clarification.

\* \* \* \*

UNESCO is interested in a project currently being planned. However, the host government doesn't know who will put up how much money. I don't know the Embassy or Washington's position so I have to reach an understanding with the Ambassador about what the mission should recommend to Washington. However, I have to wait for the Ambassador to make up his mind.

\* \* \* \*

A project was planned for a remote area which neither the Director nor I felt was an especially worthwhile project. We felt the money could be spent to greater advantage by teaching the local nationals how to do their own construction and improvements, and in purchasing some equipment for them rather than using U.S. contractors. The Director and I talked with the Ambassador who was strongly in favor of doing the project using U.S. personnel. The Director and I finally agreed with the Ambassador in spite of the fact that we felt the money had a better use because we did not want to appear to be "pig-headed."

\* \* \* \*

I talked with the Embassy Economic Officer to determine how far we could go in the process of approving or disapproving a certain loan application. I wanted to avoid the error of speaking only for myself or for AID and to remain within the limits of U.S. policy. We talked for a short while and came to an agreement concerning what U.S. policy should be.

\* \* \* \*

The government has been reluctant to give thanks to the U.S. for its aid, but recently a beautiful ceremony was held in which the U.S. turned over an expensive building to the host government. The Ambassador gave a formal speech and received much attention. The Ambassador heretofore was disinterested in aid to this country, but he became enthusiastic and talked to me about how the host government's attitudes had improved. He spoke about recommending increasing amounts of aid to them. I must consider the Ambassador's attitude since my job depends on getting along with him, but my views must also reflect my own professional judgment and be in line with what is best for the Agency. In the present situation, for political reasons, I will not be able to recommend increased aid. At the same time, the Ambassador must be dealt with. I have no solution at this time so I am hoping that the Ambassador will get over his unrealistic enthusiasm.

\* \* \* \*

b. third country, international, private groups

This task involves coordination with a variety of agencies and is composed of two general types of activity. As an agent of the AID mission, the Deputy exchanges information and suggestions about proposed projects with other donor agencies. Secondly, he receives requests for assistance from private groups, such as universities, from within the host country. This task requires delicacy inasmuch as some AID information is classified, some is considered sensitive, and some is politically controversial, while at the same time there is a need to coordinate aid efforts. Similarly, care is necessary in coordinating with private groups, especially those from the host country, because of the likelihood of misunderstandings about intentions, procedures, and responsibilities.

This task is made difficult because of the lack of systematic coordination methods. In the last few years there has been a proliferation of assistance agencies, with few or no lines of authority. Thus, coordination tends to be accomplished on a personal basis. Also, the international agencies, in an effort to become involved and justify their existence, become embroiled beyond delivery capability. For example, in one country several international agencies promised skilled personnel to staff a planning board, which was agreeable to the host country. Unfortunately they have been unable to provide the personnel, and because of the agreement AID is powerless to furnish the required assistance. The Deputy in this case, in his role in program development, was helping to search for a solution to the stalemate.

Private groups from the United States, such as foundations, are included in this category as international groups. They are generally well-staffed, well-intentioned, and well-planned organizations, thus present few or no problems for the USAID mission. However, the private groups from within the host country, such as autonomous universities or businesses, do occasionally cause task difficulties. Representatives from these host country private groups are for the most part outside the established assistance system. Therefore, although they may be extremely deserving, they create an administrative burden for the mission, especially for the Deputy because of his role in dealing with visitors.

I got a call a few days ago from an AID technician explaining that he had been informally approached by a host country official for assistance in a specific specialty. The specialty deserves aid, so I told the technician that I would return his call the following day. I knew this specialty was supported by an international agency so I called my colleague there to ask if they might be interested in something like this. He replied

that they would be interested and that we should encourage the host country official to make a formal request to his agency. On the following day I relayed this information to our technician, who so informed the host country official.

\* \* \* \*

A host country university wanted to establish a special institute. On their own they had a consultant team out from the United States to conduct a survey concerning need, location, etc. The report from the consultants caused them to decide in favor of establishing the institute, so they came to us, hoping that AID would provide financing. It would be a worthy project, but it was too costly to add to our existing program. I knew that a private U.S. Foundation did this kind of work, so I got in touch with my contact there, asking him if they would be interested. He replied, "Yes," so I asked him for permission to refer the university officials to him, which was agreeable. Now university and Foundation personnel are working out complete details for this project.

\* \* \* \*

One of the universities is establishing a new curriculum and came to us for help. We agreed, but before assistance could be authorized, a number of clearance steps were necessary. We sent them the forms which included a requirements analysis. The form for this analysis was in their hands for months, but they couldn't seem to get it processed. After a long wait I made arrangements to meet with university trustees and the senior administrator. I explained in detail what was required and how important it was that it be thoroughly accomplished. At the end of our meeting they said they understood and would implement it immediately. I also sent a letter to the university's senior administrator reiterating the information needed, and enclosing a sample analysis to use as a guide.

In the same letter I told them we would be glad to send out a team of advisors to help them if they had trouble. Apparently they are still having trouble because after over a month we have had no response to my latest letter.

\* \* \* \*

A notice from the host government came across my desk the other day. It was a general inquiry about how the problem of the lack of housing available for technicians could be approached. I was somewhat puzzled at the intent of this and I thought it looked like a circular, so I called my U.N. colleague to ask what he thought of it and learned that he had also received the document. Together we came to a general conclusion about its intent and significance, and I formulated an answer accordingly.

\* \* \* \*

The problem of classroom facilities became acute so we recently negotiated an agreement with host country officials to make funds available for classroom construction to alleviate the problem. However, before the construction agreements were signed, they began construction on their own. This made all expenditures before signature legally invalid. The problem was what to do about the expenses incurred by the school, since they had put themselves in debt and were depending on funds from us. I recommended to the Director that we try to find some way of helping them in this situation without jeopardizing our position before Congress or the Government Accounting Office. He agreed that it would be advisable to find a solution so I then called the Executive Officer and told him to draft a letter to the host country officials describing the nature of their violation and why we were powerless to help them defray their costs. However, I told him

to propose that we build another classroom to add to theirs in which we would contribute all of our originally estimated funds, and to make an appointment to meet with a school representative to discuss implementation of this alternative. This is much better for our relations than to passively let them take the loss.

\* \* \* \*

The Dean of a department in the engineering school visited me to make a request for books and for laboratory equipment. Our policy has been to support viable, existing organizations in various education areas rather than to encourage new institutions. Therefore, the request might be considered very appropriate. However, in the interest of coordination the Chief Administrator at the engineering school had asked me to report any of his staff members making requests except through the Administrator's office. Although the Dean had attempted to violate the Administrator's system on several other occasions I had never reported him and didn't intend doing so on this occasion. Instead, I told him what fine reports I had been hearing about his school. Then I asked him if he had visited other mission officials as had been suggested to him on an earlier visit. He had not, so I immediately called in the Assistant Program Officer, who had some experience in obtaining books and equipment, and asked him to assist the visiting Dean. As they departed I made it a point not to invite the Dean back, in order to help enforce the Administrator's system without being harsh.

\* \* \* \*

My United Nations counterpart called last month and wanted to know the size of one of our proposed projects. I was not at all sure that I could or should provide him with these figures so I had to hesitate. However, in my position

I could not let him think that I had to check this out with somebody before I could say anything, so I gave him an approximation which was somewhat below the actual figure. I told him that this was an approximate figure and could be substantially off since I was stating it from memory. I think I caused enough doubt in his mind to cause him not to consider my figure very valid and, at the same time, put him off.

\* \* \* \*

A host country official called me to ask help in organizing a provincial sanitation improvement effort. They requested an adviser for a few days and we were considering the request. Then I got a call from an international agency colleague who had heard that what we were going to do would be in competition with their work. I explained in detail what we were going to do and it was determined that he had the wrong impression and that there would be no duplication.

\* \* \* \*

c. host country officials

During planning it is necessary to determine host country response to potential projects in order to learn such details as intended participation, contributions, and feasibility. Such determinations are made formally and informally depending on circumstances, and are made or attempted by most mission employees. Because of his high-level contacts the Deputy Director has valuable sources of information which should enable him to gain beneficial insights into host national motivations and intentions. To assist in carrying out this task the Deputy should cultivate contacts with host nationals, and encourage other mission personnel to provide assistance and support by interacting with host nationals at every appropriate opportunity.

In the process of carrying out this task the Deputy serves as a supplement to the Director. He occasionally attends meetings with the Director, in order to be informed, and at times substitutes for the Director when the workload is heavy, or if the Director lacks aptitude or interest in this type of activity. These meetings are difficult in that care must be taken to avoid leaving the impression of making commitments, when in actual fact speculation on a proposed project is the intention. Host country officials are prone to take any statement as a commitment, so this danger cannot be overemphasized. Such misunderstandings may occur because of such simple obstructions as language differences, or they may be based on a desire to embarrass the AID mission into giving more or different assistance than that which is planned. One Deputy explained that the only solution to this problem is to explain statements very carefully, and to repeat them for emphasis, hoping that misunderstandings do not occur. Another Deputy reported that he always took an assistant to a meeting not only to help translate, but also to help make points clear, and to provide background if misunderstandings seemed likely.

In addition, even if the Deputy thinks that a project is sound, and is likely to be attempted, he must still use care in discussing it with host country officials. Regardless of need, availability of money, and intended goals, AID/W may refuse to allow specific projects to be initiated because of political implications unknown to the mission staff. Therefore, to avoid embarrassment, the Deputy needs to use extreme caution when giving details, or encouragement, at these discussion stages.

A related problem is that many host country officials agree with everything suggested by mission personnel, perhaps without knowing or caring what is being said, or perhaps with the hope of acquiring additional assistance. A frequent result of such easy agreement

is that after project initiation the host nationals fail to fulfill their commitments. Therefore, the Deputy, in his conversations and meetings, must be able to make realistic appraisals of host national reactions to proposed projects.

Quite often host country officials do not understand or appreciate AID procedures. These procedures, e.g., a feasibility study, often require considerable time, thus creating an appearance of over-cautiousness. A Deputy Director bears much of the responsibility to combat this negative impression by explaining AID procedures to host country officials. One Deputy, although unable to provide a specific illustrative example, indicated that he always emphasized to host country officials that they should be very interested in proper preplanning, including time-consuming feasibility studies, because they are the ones who are mortgaging future budgets to pay for current projects.

The problems outlined above are made more serious because of the speed with which the CAP must be written. Because of deadlines and the amount of work involved, it is often necessary to prepare project plans without coordinating at any level with host national officials. Therefore, AID/W approved projects might prove impossible or difficult to implement.

Varied and frequent contacts at all levels are necessary to ensure proper coordination with host national officials. Such a burden cannot be carried only by administrative staff, because of the sheer volume and because technical materials need to be handled at many meetings. From the Deputy Director's viewpoint, the technical Division Chiefs should do a substantial amount of this type of coordination. Deputies reported, however, that the typical Division Chief does not become involved in this activity. Various reasons were

reported for this failure, including lack of ability or interest, inability to see the need, dislike of host nationals, and a jealous guarding of an "empire." Some technicians do coordinate with host nationals and in an acceptable manner, but the void exists often enough that several Deputies reported that their own workload within this task was unnecessarily, inappropriately, and excessively increased because technicians did not, could not, or would not participate in this type of coordination.

Deputy Directors themselves are not without personal shortcomings with regard to this task. Americans are a notoriously ingrown community when living abroad, and the AID Deputy Director, although perhaps well-intentioned, is not immune from error. The fact that Americans, even Deputy Directors, need schooling in how to interact within a foreign culture is demonstrated in the case of one Deputy who complained of the difficulty of becoming acquainted with host nationals because of their unexplained reluctance to associate with Americans. Host nationals in this same country remarked that "Americans are alright, but they are difficult to know because they are reluctant to mix with us." Another Deputy could not interact with host nationals because he did not know the locally accepted language. A third Deputy had stopped all but token associations because the host nationals continually asked for favors. A fourth Deputy lacked sufficient time to cultivate contacts, and so on.

Other evidence points to a lack of interaction with the hosts. Mission parties and other social events attended by interviewers were conspicuously lacking in host mission employees. Few Deputy Directors were able to list a friend from among the host national population. Yet interacting with local national personnel is generally believed to be crucial to the Deputy Director's job, especially during

program formulation, because it is essential to promote full cooperation with an appreciation for the AID program. The apparent deficiencies in this area should be a cause of grave concern to AID administrators.

The mission education division had been working with the Ministry of Education to set up a specific education program. The host government was not willing to contribute much, but wanted the program. I was not in on the original negotiations, but the Education Division Chief kept me informed. When I learned that the suggested commitments of AID were to be four times as high as that of the host government, I talked to Ministry of Education officials to learn precisely what they were willing to contribute. Upon finding out how small their contribution would be I recommended to the Mission Director that the program be disapproved. This made our Education Chief and the host country Ministry officials unhappy, but we must avoid approving a program when interest is so low that future success is doubtful. The Mission Director agreed with my recommendation, so I arranged a meeting with a host country education official and told him that they should forget the program if their contribution was to be so small. This official complained to the Minister, who in turn complained to the Mission Director. The Minister also wrote a letter to the Mission Director complaining even further, but in both cases the Director followed my advice. Thus we prevented wasting money on a project likely to fail because of lack of cooperation.

\* \* \* \*

The host government was negotiating a loan with a private business which will require excessively burdensome, but legitimate repayments. When they were in the process of negotiating I met the Deputy Minister of Finance at a cocktail party. The atmosphere was cordial and informal so I brought up this matter. We held a friendly

discussion and I indicated that possibly AID could have financed the project at less burdensome terms. I told him how much better off their treasury would be if they had approached us with the proposed project. Then I asked him if he would be willing to consider this, and he replied that he would. He will now, hopefully, discuss the matter with the Minister, citing the advantages of coming to AID. If we are able to do the project we will help the host country and increase our presence here.

\* \* \* \*

Negotiations for one proposed project had all been with the host country planning board, but there was another group, the Ministry of Finance, which wanted to become involved. The Ministry saw an opportunity to place their men on the liaison team since the head of the planning board had recently resigned. To prevent this I called on an outstanding and respected citizen who was closely allied to the planning board and told him what was going on. He then made arrangements to immediately place planning board personnel on the liaison team, as members, and as chairman. This private citizen was successful, which prevented the project from being controlled by the Ministry. With the planning board in control the proposed project will provide badly needed training for the board and is more likely to succeed since the board is more responsible than the Ministry.

\* \* \* \*

After considerable reading of available documents and personal observations, I came to the conclusion that educational development should be a top priority. Searching further, I learned that the previous Director had withdrawn most education projects because the host government failed to meet their commitments. However,

I felt very strongly about the need for educational development, so I invited several host country officials to a meeting to discuss needs, budgets, and priorities. This meeting definitely improved rapport, and there is now a good possibility for initiating a good, well conceived, cooperative program.

\* \* \* \*

In connection with one proposed project I felt that I should not discuss it openly with the Minister. However, I saw the Minister at a cocktail party and was able to discuss the study informally. I was primarily interested in learning if the Minister really wanted the study and if he would support it after the work began. Unfortunately the Minister would not reveal his thoughts, so we will have to plan the project without knowledge of its acceptance. It is impossible to solve this type of problem because the host nationals are simply not prone to reveal their motivations.

\* \* \* \*

I tried for a long time to convince host national officials that a planning board was necessary. When meeting with the President of the Central Bank, or with the Minister of the Treasury, I always mentioned the matter and asked about progress, stressing the need for setting priorities. For a long time I made insignificant progress, and then I indicated that little United States assistance would be possible unless a planning agency was created. Within a short time the planning board was set up. As it turned out, the planning board members were incapable, but at least it was set up.

\* \* \* \*

In a discussion at the Ministry I was asked about the likelihood of our helping to establish a series of agricultural experiment stations in rural areas. I said that we would be very much interested in helping in that area subject to AID/W's approval. The Ministry soon sent in a request, and only two weeks later I got a call from the Minister wanting to know why we didn't have a consultant or someone from the Agriculture Division out at the site to begin feasibility studies. He was rather impatient because the machinery was not yet in motion to implement the project. He assumed that my being so optimistic about his informal inquiry meant that I was going to go back to the mission and initiate the project immediately. I had to explain to him in detail the process that we had to follow in such cases before he was satisfied that I was not dragging my feet on the matter.

\* \* \* \*

d. AID/W

At the same time that the mission is determining project feasibility it is necessary to communicate with AID/W to procure approvals, provide information or to request assistance. Most material of this type is drafted and received by others, but the Deputy Director clears such correspondence, and perhaps suggests needs to personnel more directly involved.

The major obstacle to accomplishing this task seems to be that AID/W and the mission have different views concerning urgency of substantive matters. Most Deputies expressed appreciation of the fact that AID/W has a broader, overall view of world assistance efforts, but at the same time they tended to be critical of AID/W for not keeping missions informed, e.g., by the simple expedient of acknowledging the receipt of an important piece of correspondence which requires extensive consideration.

I requested that AID/W send an expert to assist us in considering an important project proposal involving a feasibility study. It was necessary for the expert to be present during a specific time of year due to weather conditions. AID/W had earlier informed us that the expert would be readily available, but forty-one days after sending my requesting cable the expert had not arrived, and AID/W had not even acknowledged my cable. Therefore, I sent another cable, which also has not generated an AID/W response. Now the entire project will have to be cancelled because of the AID/W delay.

\* \* \* \*

With one project which is being considered we have an opportunity to really assist the host country. Host country officials are really interested in the project, and it is desperately needed. I communicated complete details to AID/W via airgram several weeks ago, but no answer, or even confirmation of the airgram has been received. As a next step I will send a cable, hoping to prompt a reply of some kind so that planning can continue, or alternatives can be considered. However, I must be cautious in prodding AID/W because I have learned that officials there do not like to be pressured, especially by telephone, no matter how important the questions are.

\* \* \* \*

There was to be a conference held to consider a specific capital development project. Since we were invited to attend I recommended to the Director that we ask for a high-level official from AID/W to attend the conference. I have requested this type of Washington representative by airgram. We are unable to predict what will happen at the conference, but we may find opportunities to renew bids to the host government to allow initiation of various development projects. I felt that a representative from AID/W would demonstrate interest,

add prestige, and perhaps facilitate the presentation of our views concerning the capital development project.

\* \* \* \*

I had been here only six months when it was suggested to me by a host country official that a certain project would be desirable. I agreed and asked the Division Chief to write up an airgram for AID/W approval. AID/W did not approve. Instead, they asked a number of questions. Their questions convinced me that it was a poor idea, so I withdrew the proposal.

\* \* \* \*

#### C. Participates in Document Preparation

This section refers to the work involved in producing the formal Country Assistance Program. Planning is included in the sense that it is necessary to make final determinations about project details, e.g., how many teachers will be trained, or the feasibility of vaccinating the particular number of persons designated in preplanning. The Deputy Director is not usually involved in generating such details, but functions as a critic, reading all or most documents with the intention of improving project details and improving the entire set of project plans in order to provide an effective development program.

##### 1. Reviews, edits, and evaluates

The Deputy reads the various sections of the CAP, including the final version, and attends meetings to consider details of the CAP. His philosophy during this process is to ensure that the CAP conforms to policy, and that project plans are feasible, properly planned, and well presented.

When appropriate the Deputy requests document originators to revise materials, or, if necessary, requests revisions by more competent personnel, or personnel possessing special expertise.

Because of the highly specialized nature of some projects the Deputy Director cannot be expected to possess the knowledge necessary to judge each proposed project included in the CAP. Where expert advice is needed, and available, it is brought into play by the Deputy. For example, the Deputy might request an Education Advisor to review materials prepared to document an agricultural education project.

I did not read carefully a statement in the CAP prepared by a technician about the number of people to be trained. This statement proposed training a ridiculously large number of host nationals. This amount of training could not possibly be carried out, and if I had noticed the number and thought about it I would have realized it. This situation is not critical, and no drastic consequences will result, but it is embarrassing to have sent something like that to Washington.

\* \* \* \*

(From subordinate) AID/W was exerting heavy pressure on the mission to submit the CAP. We did not have a good document and many projects were poorly planned, but the Deputy, worried about the AID/W pressure, insisted that the document be forwarded immediately. Because of document inadequacy much useless work was required, explanatory cables were necessary, and special trips to and from Washington were made. The Deputy had been in the mission for a long time so he should have told AID/W that we needed more time because our document was poorly planned.

\* \* \* \*

A technical division was suffering from a lack of well-defined goals, and very poor communication among its staff. They were being very slow in their project planning and personal tensions were obvious. In order to ensure successful preparation of their section of the CAP, I began to follow closely the progress of their work. Since no progress was being made I called daily meetings of the technical division staff to evaluate proposed plans. I repeatedly asked for detailed objectives, justifications for the objectives, means of achieving objectives, and justifications for the means. After several reviews of each proposed E-1, there was finally something on paper and there was a notable increase in cooperation among the division staff. My main contribution was in demonstrating that someone was interested in their work, and that someone was ensuring that their work would be properly prepared before it was forwarded to AID/W.

\* \* \* \*

Last year we had a number of important visitors at the same time that we had to prepare our CAP. The result was that people had to work extremely long hours for several weeks. This naturally created dissatisfaction and was very hard on morale. I took every opportunity during this period to give pep talks to the people concerned. I told them how much their extra effort was appreciated, the importance of AID for the host country and how each of us was responsible for making a success of our program. Of course, it is impossible to measure the effect of my effort, but we did manage to meet all mission commitments.

\* \* \* \*

An E-1 prepared by a technical Division Chief and the Program Officer was routed to me for approval. I noted that it called for project completion within eight years. On the basis of my past experience here, and my knowledge of the project,

I thought this was too long. I felt that not much effort would be required to accelerate the project to enable completion within five years. I called a meeting of the Division Chief and the Program Officer and explained my point of view. I asked for a refinement of the E-1 on the basis of an earlier project completion date. They accomplished the refinement after agreeing with me that the work could be completed within five years.

\* \* \* \*

2. Prepares documents or rewrites documents prepared by others

The Deputy Director, like most executives, does not always have a qualified staff. Therefore, it is occasionally necessary to write or rewrite sections of the CAP personally. This activity, as a rule, is a last resort used only after attempts have been made to stimulate the mission staff to produce adequate documents. Personnel failures to this extent are uncommon, but do occur, and there is always the potential for such failures. The Deputy Director should be ready for such work, should the need arise, by learning as much as possible about details of proposed projects and capabilities of project staff.

A technical Division Chief is an authoritarian individual who does not communicate with his staff. In addition, the Division Chief's staff is very incompetent. The result of this situation is that I have had to assume leadership of this particular division. In one example, I made repeated efforts to explain how to prepare adequate materials for the CAP. They were unable to produce satisfactory documents so I personally prepared the necessary plans, based on what I knew of the host country situation, documents

from previous years, and technical advice from wherever it could be found. These plans were approved by AID/W, so my work was acceptable, but now it is unknown whether or not current technical personnel will be able to carry out the plans.

\* \* \* \*

## II. PARTICIPATES IN PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION

Project implementation refers to the preparation and negotiation of documents to legalize the AID assistance program, specifically, the project agreements, project implementation orders, and related materials. Other mission personnel are directly responsible for implementation, but the Deputy Director is involved as a member of management to ensure smooth performance and conformance to policy; he participates actively in planning or negotiation when the need exists.

The main problem to successful performance here appears to be the need to commit funds by a specific time. Many Deputies reported that such inflexibility was very unrealistic. Setting a specific deadline for implementation, i.e., the end of the fiscal year, is unrealistic because projects may be insufficiently planned, project status may have changed, or, it may be that a new project, although unplanned, could better use the allotted money. Unfortunately, with a deadline to meet, and the possibility of losing funds if the deadline date is not met, the mission tends to be unwilling to shift plans. Also, the missions feel that AID/W has the attitude that a mission is not doing its job if funds are not committed. Some Deputies believe that success for a mission seems to depend on the size of a program, more than on the way a program is conducted. They reported that a Deputy who is mindful of his reputation and career is not likely to return funds, even if a project is no longer necessary.

Another burden preventing smooth implementation stems from the fact that the Implementation Approval Document (IAD) frequently arrives at the mission late in the fiscal year. There are various strategies for alleviating this problem, the "continuing resolution" being the best known example, but still the administrative hardship is great, especially in missions with large programs. Updating plans, typing,

proofreading, discussions, signing ceremonies and the like require considerable blocks of time. Therefore, when the IAD is late in arriving, (this appears to be the rule rather than the exception) the mission is under a strain to accomplish all the necessary tasks by the 30th of June deadline. As a result, in the rush to complete the task, documents are likely to be poorly written, other work is likely to be neglected, and proper clarifications with host country officials are impossible to obtain. The indirect results of such an occurrence are more difficult to ascertain, but no less important. For example, a host country official would be likely to sign a Project Agreement or a Project Implementation Order (PIO) to avoid losing funds, even if he did not have time to fully understand the project. However, after learning project details at a later date, and judging it to be ill conceived, inappropriate, undesirable, etc., there is likelihood of non-cooperation.

A. Reviews and Edits Details of Project Implementation Documents

1. Checks plans for conformance to goals and regulations
2. Revises or suggests changes

The Deputy Director is involved in this stage of implementation to provide a management focal point to facilitate document production. He participates in discussions preparatory to the actual writing of documents, rendering advice concerning agency and mission policy, concerning details of project plans, and concerning document terminology to satisfy host country requirements and to help ensure host country support. The Deputy reviews the various documents and offers advice as appropriate to those mission personnel directly concerned with implementation.

A typical item which I advised about involved a Division Chief on home leave. The Division Chief on leave had left a list of what equipment to include in implementation documents, but no one knew where the list was. It was necessary to obligate the money before June 30, 1963, or it would be lost. The Acting Division Chief informed me of this, and I cabled the Division Chief at his home to learn the location of the list. The return cable said that some things were "probably" already on order, and that "tools" should be bought with the balance of the money. I realized that this information was inadequate, so told the Acting Division Chief to disregard this and to include the items he felt were needed.

\* \* \* \*

I observed the Deputy in a meeting with the Program Office staff in which he read a draft PIO, asked some critical questions and noted several areas which should be changed. The Deputy was able to do this because he stays aware of the Director's standards of performance and the details of the program which is to be implemented.

\* \* \* \*

I knew from experience that AID/W would soon be asking for a review of the obligation status of program funds. The Director apparently did not realize this, so I suggested to him that it would be a good idea to begin the review prior to receipt of AID/W's request, which would almost surely allow inadequate time. The Director agreed and announced the need at the next staff meeting. We were properly prepared by the time AID/W's request was received.

\* \* \* \*

AID/W had not specifically authorized the program, so the Program Officer had not prepared implementation documents. The Program Officer was busy on other work, but it was important that he start preparing implementation documents, even before notification from AID/W. I wanted him to begin working on them without directly asking him to, so I called him in and asked him to describe the various implementation documents that were to be accomplished. We discussed each document for a short while, talking of the details that were to be included in each one. The Program Officer took the hint, and began work on document preparation.

\* \* \* \*

I asked the Program Officer to see what he could do about speeding up obligation of funds for this year. He reported back that one of the problems was trouble in getting participants to use up the funds assigned for participant training because of host country hesitation to pay the travel costs for participants. This causes many difficulties: for example, the Ministries want to make the decision themselves about who should go for training; also very often participants are required to pay their own travel costs. In order to resolve this difficulty, I called a meeting of the Executive Officer, the Program Officer and the Controller. After discussing the problem, we decided that AID would pay the travel costs of participants. We also discussed new kinds of selection procedures to be instituted in order to protect AID since there is going to be a bigger investment in each participant.

\* \* \* \*

B. Conducts Negotiations with Host Country Officials

1. Negotiates details of development grant implementation documents

## 2. Negotiates details of loan applications

These negotiations refer to the discussions of details, explanations, or clarifications made necessary by host national misunderstandings. This process was found to vary considerably. For example, in a few missions the host national officials signed documents without question, relying on the reputation of USAID personnel to prevent irregularities. In other missions the documents were discussed in detail with host national officials, with the Deputy participating either as an on-the-scene adviser to the Director, or as a substitute for the Director.

One problem that occasionally occurs hinges upon the legality of final signatures. In some cases unformed or misinformed host officials begin project work before documents are finalized. In such cases payment for such work cannot be made, which creates ill feeling, resentment, and criticism of United States' administrative procedures as being hopelessly muddled. See the second example listed below for an illustration of this problem.

The Deputy is less involved with negotiations involving loans than with development grants because of the tendency to use a staff loan expert, or to obtain a loan expert from AID/W. However, the Deputy occasionally gets involved, usually in preliminary stages, in discussions with host country officials to discuss purposes, details, and approval procedures of loan applications.

On June 30 the mission was busy completing obligation documents for signature before the midnight deadline. While working late I received a telephone call from an official in the host Ministry of Education. The host Minister was upset because the obligating documents for his

signature specified repairs to schools about which he had not been consulted. I indicated that some mistake had been made, and was forced to switch to the host national language as the Minister himself came on the phone. I assured the Minister that his signature on the document would not prevent correction by amendment at a later date. After my repeated assurances the Minister appeared to be satisfied and the conversation terminated. Then I called in the Assistant Program Officer who had prepared this particular obligation document. After the Assistant Program Officer explained the situation, he realized that he had omitted a qualifying phrase, which would have made clear that the names of the schools included were only representative and final decisions would have to be made later. In this case no harm was done because the correction could be made later, and I had convinced the Minister to sign the document.

\* \* \* \*

A USAID technician had completed some phases of project work without proper authorization for expenditure of funds and without host country consent. When I met with the Minister to get approval of the project the Minister indicated that he would approve the already completed work only if the AID mission undertook a second project in which he was interested. There was nothing that I could do but agree.

\* \* \* \*

### III. PARTICIPATES IN PROGRAM MANAGEMENT

This task refers to that work necessary to assure that projects, once planned, approved, and implemented, are conducted in an orderly, efficient, productive manner. The Deputy Director's role varies from direct responsibility for all or some mission projects to that of coordinating work efforts in the name of the Director. Level of detail also varies, ranging from concern with such details as types and numbers of spare parts to complete delegation of authority to a subordinate. When the Deputy has been assigned direct supervisory control over a project or projects, he is free to determine his own level of involvement, based on his own interests and aptitudes, the abilities of project staff, and the working environment. However, when he is serving the Director as a coordinator, the Deputy's role is very unclear because he must not only be concerned with making projects a success, but also in determining his own role vis-a-vis the Director, e.g., the Deputy must decide what the Director would like to be personally involved in, what information to pass on to the Director, and how to obtain discipline, sometimes without authority.

#### A. Obtains Information on Project Status

Either as a part of the Director's office or as a direct supervisor, the Deputy Director is vitally concerned with projects. The Deputy needs to be informed about project details in order to be able to interpret information obtained, and to be able to take necessary action or to relay the information and his interpretations to appropriate officials.

Obtaining information is critical and most Deputy Directors learn to use all of the several available sources. Many Deputies develop routines for acquiring information, e.g., a daily reading of all

correspondence, or weekly reviews with project staff. Some Deputies indicated that they must keep as generally informed and alert to information as possible in order to maintain background for specific solutions to problems.

The reliability of information from both American and host sources is a problem. Concealing known personal inadequacies, furthering a career, dishonest conduct, desire to appear better informed than is actually true, and general lack of information are some of the reasons why Deputies get incorrect or falsified information. The Deputy's problems are to determine what situations require special attention to the accuracy of information, to judge the reliability of sources, and, if necessary, to find and follow proper methods for acquiring information. The problems are aggravated by the fact that ordinary cues or bench marks, i.e., those he is familiar with in the U.S., may be misleading.

1. Confers with U.S. personnel

The mission project staffs are a prime source of information. Knowledge is obtained via formal or informal meetings, question sessions, or social conversation, and although project personnel are the principal sources in this category, data are sought from other sources such as American businessmen, other American agency personnel, and private foundation employees.

I request individual conference when I want to be informed about the work, when I want to give instructions, when I want to raise specific questions about operations, or when I want to provide advice or a solution to a problem. In one case a technician was setting up a ceremony in which equipment was to be turned over to the host government. I called in this employee to give me a briefing

so that I, in turn, would be able to explain to the Ambassador what would occur at the ceremony.

\* \* \* \*

A technical Division Chief needed more money for project operations, but wanted a TDY expert to evaluate project operations before submitting a formal request to AID/W. I talked at length with the Division Chief, learning that host country cost estimates had been in error, and that the TDY expert was needed in order to determine precisely how much additional money to ask for. I agreed and cabled a neighboring USAID mission for assistance, which they provided. With the expert's advice, the Division Chief was able to draft a realistic request for additional funding, which I approved. The complete report was submitted to AID/W and the additional money was approved.

\* \* \* \*

2. Confers with third country or international agency personnel

This task covers the same type of activity as is described immediately above, but with a different set of conferees. This type of conferring is much less frequent, and refers especially to those occasions when the USAID mission is cooperating with another agency in a development project. In such cases, the Deputy would naturally want to inquire about the status of work being performed for the combined effort by the cooperating agency. However, there is a mutual hesitancy to discuss projects with foreigners. For example, one Deputy indicated that "I cannot push them for information or it will only spoil our working relationship and the same thing is true in reverse." No examples of this activity were obtainable, perhaps because of infrequency of occurrence.

### 3. Confers with host government personnel

This task is similar to the two immediately above, but again the conferees are different. Cooperation with host government agencies, typically Ministries, is more common than with international agencies, but specific examples of conferring for information about project status were impossible to obtain. The task appears to be done relatively infrequently, partly because there appear to be better sources of information available, partly because of language and cultural barriers, and partly because host sources are judged inadequate or undependable.

### 4. Reviews project status documents

Reviewing project documents is one of the most common methods used by the desk-bound Deputy to obtain information. However, even this method is not without problems because, by virtue of having to read many reports from several mission technicians, the Deputy has insufficient time to enable careful reading. In addition, Deputies claim that technicians in general do not have writing skills, and do not understand the importance of the documents they are writing, so they do a poor job of reporting.

One technician received some new equipment and supplies, but learned that much of it needed repair, one piece was lost, and one article was inoperable. At first, the technician did not write up the situation, but informed me orally, so I asked the technician for a complete written report so that AID/W could be informed of the situation. The technician wrote the report in a very pedestrian manner, listing only the damage and lost equipment. I asked for more details, but again the report was incomplete. The technician made no recommendations, offered no solution to prevent future occurrences, and made no provision to notify the equipment manufacturer. I finally wrote the report myself to ensure its adequacy.

\* \* \* \*

## 5. Visits project sites

Most Deputy Directors expressed the need to obtain personal, first hand information about the status of project work. However, most Deputy Directors also reported that lack of time prevented them from making more than a few, quick field trips, and some were unable to make any visits to project sites because of what was considered to be urgent other business. Poor transportation facilities and distance to project sites also tend to hinder field trips.

All levels of mission personnel commented on the need for members of the Director's office to visit project sites, in order to demonstrate interest, to acquire useful information, and to understand realistically the problems faced by the on-the-scene project workers.

On a regional field trip, I had drawn a preliminary conclusion that we were overextending in one technical area. This was merely a feeling I had from seeing and hearing about project work and problems in getting supplies from the central office. When I got back I communicated this to the Director who agreed that the matter should be studied in detail and that steps should be taken to correct deficiencies. I called the Program Officer into my office and explained my observations and theory. I asked him to undertake a review of project work and to consult with the Executive Officer and Division Chiefs. The Program Officer completed his review and consultations and reported to me that two jobs should be phased out due to the difficulty of supporting them, and that additional vehicles be obtained to speed up operations. I informed the Director of this recommendation and he issued the order for the change.

\* \* \* \*

(From Director) I had a "feeling" that a project supervised by the Deputy was not going well, so I asked for a briefing on the status of work. A technician accompanied the Deputy and presented a project briefing explaining how well the project was going, the progress thus far, and adding that everyone concerned with the project was pleased. Within a week, I learned that the actual situation was directly contrary to the information provided in the briefing. Host nationals called me asking what was going on at the project site, so I made a personal visit with the Deputy to see the work. Observation revealed that progress was not being made, that the briefing had been deceptive, and that the Deputy Director had never before been to the project site. I gave the Deputy instructions to provide a solution and to keep me informed of progress which he is currently trying to do. Hopefully, the project will now receive some personal attention.

\* \* \* \*

(From subordinate) Everyone in the mission feels that morale would be improved if the Director and Deputy Director could visit other offices and project sites more often. It is rare to see either of them anywhere except in their own offices or in the conference room. The Deputy has never been to the warehouse, and does not recognize many local national mission employees.

\* \* \* \*

On a field trip I did not see any progress being made or knowledge being spread outside the physical environs of our project. I sensed that there was a lack of contact with the people by project personnel. The result of this is that I have asked the Division Chief to initiate a complete evaluation of the project to make sure we are not spending money and wasting time for nothing. I will respond as necessary, based on the details of the Division Chief's report.

\* \* \* \*

## 6. Assigns others to observe field operations

Some Deputy Directors try to solve the problem of not being able to make personal visits to project work sites by assigning other personnel to carry out the task. This device is perhaps adequate when specific information is needed, or if a project problem is already obvious, but, because of personal biases, lack of adequate evaluation tools, or improper orientation, it often fails to provide information which would prevent problems.

A contract group is working with the mission to provide technical assistance to local nationals. Their contract calls for them to concentrate on specific assistance needs instead of the regular operational processes of the country. However, they recently started some assistance efforts unrelated to a specific host country need, so I explained to the contractor that he must follow the terms of his contract. The contract team did not move any closer to conformance to the contract terms so I assigned the Program Officer to study the work of this contract team and to provide a recommendation as to what should be done. He has not yet reported, so a solution is temporarily postponed.

\* \* \* \*

I asked a technician to obtain facts for me about a certain road which was being built which seemed to be requiring excessive time. I asked the technician to report back to me so that I could then discuss the matter with the engineer under contract to build the road. The technician never got the facts, but reported to me that he had talked to the engineer himself and that the engineer had agreed to build the road correctly. I was unhappy about this because it was a case of sheer nonperformance and misunderstanding of my request by the technician. Now I have no way of knowing whether or not the technician was able to give proper emphasis to the need for progress in his talk with the engineer. My only action now is to wait, perhaps wasting more time, to see if the engineer begins to make progress.

\* \* \* \*

## B. Evaluates Projects

The key feature of successful program management is the evaluation of projects. Unfortunately there appear to be no tools or guidelines in existence for determining if a project is actually proceeding effectively. It is possible to determine relatively simple issues such as whether or not a planned number of teachers are completing courses on the planned date. However, there appears to be no objective method for determining the status of more complex matters as, for example, whether projects are moving the assisted country forward, whether the people are really receiving benefits, whether project goals and objectives need alteration prior to completion, whether the proper quality of advice or service is being provided, whether changes should be made in project objectives, materials or personnel, whether host nationals support a project, or whether the project is necessary.

Some mission officials lack the overall view of the Deputy Director, and, therefore, could not fully evaluate projects even if adequate tools were available. The Program Officer has an overall view of mission work, but is usually so involved with planning that a realistic evaluation of projects is impossible for him. The Mission Director, with his multitude of responsibilities, may not have time for evaluation. Therefore, the task of serious, unbiased evaluation of projects often falls to Deputy Directors.

Several Deputies recognized that the minimal kinds of evaluation now being done are subjective and unsystematic. Almost all felt that the task was largely neglected. Some proposed that Deputies should have an established procedure for visits, reports, etc., plus the necessary criteria and measuring tools to assist in performing objective evaluation. In the absence of these, there is a tendency to become involved in routinized activities or in other activities which are less

difficult than evaluation. For example, Deputies were observed to attend meetings called to discuss minute project details. They indicated that unless standard evaluative procedures are instituted, the mission will continue operations lacking the knowledge to determine whether or not certain types of projects should be continued, whether assistance efforts should be shifted to other areas, or whether certain preventive measures should be taken to forestall crises and failures.

### C. Corrects Project Deficiencies

This task involves decisions about necessary changes, and initiation of changes either through direct action or by stimulating others to enforce the change. This task is much easier than the previously discussed evaluation of projects, which includes the detection of trouble and prevention of project deficiencies, because as a rule concrete events, persons, and materials are involved after a deficiency has become obvious. However, considerable complexity is involved because of the multitude of solution options that are available, and, again, because of inadequate machinery and tools for correcting deficiencies. For example, the procedure for replacing personnel is very burdensome, and excessive time is required to obtain project materials.

Deputy Directors are involved in this task to varying degrees. Some Deputies are explicitly assigned direct supervisory responsibility over all or some of the divisions. In other missions they possess supervisory authority only by virtue of being in the chain of command. Quite often a Deputy will be reluctant to correct deficiencies because of lack of authority, using instead the tactic of gathering facts to provide to the Mission Director who is then expected to make the necessary decision. In other typical operations the Deputy gathers information, makes his decision, and directs a change designed to correct the project deficiency. However, in many such cases the person who receives the direction to initiate a correction has the option of "going over the head" of the Deputy to the Mission Director, which, of course, undermines the Deputy's authority, creates duplication of effort, and further burdens the Director.

There are some matters that cannot be corrected locally, so communication with AID/W is frequently necessary. Every mission reported that AID/W was unreasonably slow in providing answers. The missions often do not know whether AID/W has received the communication, whether AID/W will provide an answer, whether AID/W will provide an answer in time to initiate effective corrective measures, or whether it should act without AID/W concurrence in the interim. In some such cases there reportedly is little or no harm done because of delays, but delays concerning important matters, or an accumulation of delays concerning seemingly unimportant matters, create troublesome situations. Such delays not only prevent mission personnel from acting or from acting confidently, but also create an unfavorable impression among host country personnel who have been led to believe that the United States bureaucracy is efficient.

A frequently heard mission complaint was that "front office" (Director's office) personnel tend to get involved in unnecessary project details, and to bypass skilled advisers. It was felt that because of this Directors and Deputy Directors were second guessing mission experts, and that because they did not solicit advice, they missed information which could prevent future problems. For example, one mission employee remarked that "I would feel much more useful if I were asked for advice within my specialty. However, I can't and don't want to push my services on them." The Directors and Deputies, however, sometimes fail to seek technical advice because they do not respect or trust their advisers.

1. Directs personnel changes

One important factor is ensuring smooth project operations pertaining to project personnel. Ensuring that proper personnel are available, that inadequate personnel are dismissed (or, more usually, transferred), and that personnel shifts within the mission are made is not usually a primary responsibility of the Deputy. However, as a member of the Director's office, and as a link in the chain of command, the Deputy often plays a significant role in project personnel matters. In most matters the Deputy is not free to act decisively, but must obtain approval from the Director. This, of course, hinders effectiveness because mission personnel are aware of the degree of authority possessed by the Deputy, and are able to gauge their own activities accordingly. It is not unusual for a Division Chief to appeal successfully to the Mission Director for changes in instructions given by the Deputy. Other cases varied from alcoholics and racially biased personnel, to people who were, in the judgment of the Directors, Deputies and other senior personnel, obviously unqualified to fill the positions to which they had been assigned. It was reported that often employees with no training experience, or with no inclination to train, were assigned to jobs requiring skill in training others. Not infrequently, technicians are sent to a country although they hate the nationals of that country. One Deputy was forced to cope with the arrival of three employees all expecting to be Chief of the same division. In other instances, technicians reported for duty and had no jobs to do.

One man was sent to this mission without his wife, and within a short time he completely went to pieces. This was perhaps because he missed his family, perhaps because of work pressures, or a combination of several factors. I procured a sufficient statement from a local medical doctor to provide the legal basis, and then sent the employee home as expeditiously as possible. This was an unfortunate case, but the action was necessary in order to remove a man who was unqualified due to personality problems. The Director was in complete agreement with my decision.

\* \* \* \*

One technician wanted elaborate equipment before he would work. He simply could not understand that in an underdeveloped country working conditions are not as smooth as they are in the United States. At the time this situation began, I went on home leave. Upon returning to the mission about two months later, the man still was refusing to work. After discussing the matter with the Director, and obtaining his approval, I cabled AID/W with a complete explanation and transfer orders for the technician were soon received.

\* \* \* \*

The Division Chief has not been successful in this mission. He has been rigid about the kind of program he wants, and has lost all the sympathy and confidence of his counterpart Minister. I had to decide whether to move him from this post before the end of his tour because of his ineffectiveness, or to wait until the end of his tour. In this case, I decided to let him complete his tour because he was close to finishing. I now have to deal with the Minister myself, whereas this should normally be performed by the Division Chief.

Also, I get involved with end of tour reports, which I must endorse. The Division Chief recently submitted his with a long description of what he would like to do next. The Division Chief thought he would like to be assigned to a research project, or to an assignment in AID/W. I had to decide whether to recommend that the Division Chief be given one of these assignments, or recommend that he not be given any assignment because he was ineffective here. I decided to recommend him for the research project because I felt that his ineffectiveness in establishing rapport here bore no relation to his qualification for a research job. Hopefully the Division Chief will be valuable to AID in his new position.

\* \* \* \*

The agricultural division wanted to recruit a livestock advisor to fill a vacancy, but I felt this to be unnecessary. I checked and learned that one of the men in the division knew livestock and had training in this field. Therefore, I suggested that this man serve duty, which the chief of the division agreed to allow. The Director thought the idea sound, so we prevented the need for another technician. So far our operations have not suffered, so our decision appears sound.

\* \* \* \*

Our largest division has personnel in several different locations. I knew from incoming correspondence and field trips how busy these personnel were and that closer supervisory control was necessary. I concluded that the present organization was inadequate to handle such widespread operations, and that there was a need for on-the-spot supervision. I went to the Division Chief of this project and discussed the matter with him. I told him that I thought we should have a senior technician in each geographic area who would act solely as a field liaison man

between the technicians and the mission and the technicians and their host country counterpart. The Division Chief agreed, so we presented the idea to the Director, who also agreed. The Division Chief is now putting the new system into effect.

\* \* \* \*

One project involved provision of equipment to the host government. No one on the staff knew how to handle the equipment, so a TDY technician was asked for, and received. This TDY man determined what equipment would be reasonable, and what quantity would be realistic. Then he returned to his own mission. The project was carried forward, but when the equipment arrived, it was realized that someone was needed to teach the local nationals to operate and maintain the equipment. A SPAR was immediately submitted for a direct-hire technician and after a delay, the technician arrived. The technician provided proved to be an excellent maintenance man, but lacked ability in the local language and lacked the ability to teach his skills to others. I discussed this with the Program Officer and we decided that with this technician we were not fulfilling our commitment to the host government. We decided to terminate the technician at the end of his tour and included this in the staffing described in the CAP. The Mission Director approved, but when the CAP reached the Ambassador for approval, this proposed staff deletion was noticed. The Ambassador pointed out that even though the technician was not providing the necessary training, it would be nearly impossible to get a replacement, or there might be a lengthy time lapse before a replacement would come. Without a skilled replacement, the United States-supplied equipment that would deteriorate, thus

embarrassing the United States. Therefore, the Ambassador felt that we should retain this technician. We complied with this view, which was reasonable. However, we are moving extremely slowly toward our real goal of providing training.

\* \* \* \*

A technician was assigned to a new project in our mission. He was well-trained, his family was friendly and liked the local nationals, and he and his family had already lived and worked in an underdeveloped country. Local nationals liked him and there was no problem of adjustment. However, the technician was shy, and although he knew the local language did not use it. I assigned an interpreter to work with him, but this reduced his effectiveness with the people. Then I sent him to travel throughout the country hoping that this would increase his contact with nationals and force him to use the local language. This did not work. The technician lacked initiative and although an expert would not move unless someone told him what to do. Then I realized that he had been successful in other missions because of working in structured situations, a luxury not available here. Therefore, we sent word to AID/W and a transfer was arranged for the technician to be sent to another post where his work could be in a definite pattern. The transfer was arranged and the technician is now happier and is performing satisfactorily.

\* \* \* \*

One project activity was being phased out, which meant that several technicians had to be transferred. However, some of these technicians had home leave due between the time the decision to phase out was made and the time for project termination. According to policy, they would not be allowed to return to the country after home leave for the project termination date, yet their services were needed during the crucial completion step. I solved this problem by calling in each technician and asking him to stay until the end of the project, rather than taking home leave. All the technicians agreed to this so we were able to phase out the project without being short of personnel.

\* \* \* \*

A technician served one successful tour here, then requested and received permission to stay for a second tour. There were indications that the second tour was prompted by a romance, but after being committed for the second tour the romance ended. In spite of this, the technician continued to perform well. However, unknown to me, someone in the mission sent a letter to AID/W describing indiscretions being committed by this technician. The Ambassador was notified by Washington, who ordered the mission to get the technician out of the country within 24 hours. The Director asked me to handle the problem, so I explained to the Ambassador that the procedure was irregular, since it was not yet proven if the accusations were true. I was unable to convince the Ambassador to investigate, but I did manage to get permission to wait one week before sending the technician home. I told the technician to be ready to leave in a week, then I sent a message to a friend in AID/W asking that authority be arranged to send the technician home under normal orders. This authority was returned to the mission only five hours before the technician would have had to depart using emergency authority. The

technician returned to AID/W and is working there with greater responsibilities than ever. He is performing well -- with an unblemished record.

\* \* \* \*

Two employees were in line to be named head of the division. The subordinate employee had a higher Foreign Service rating, but was supported by the Ambassador and the Director. The supervising employee has married a host national and wants to stay. The Director instructed me to inform the present superior employee that he will become the subordinate of his present subordinate in the division. The problem involved breaking the news so that effectiveness was maintained and general morale not reduced. I informed the superior that the mission needed a qualified Division Chief and that the background of the subordinate made him best available man. This discreet handling with absolutely no discussion of the affair with others prevented loss of face. The Director's decision was gracefully accepted, and work operations have not been noticeably interrupted.

\* \* \* \*

## 2. Motivates U.S. AID personnel

Convincing project personnel to work, and to work effectively, appears to be a major problem. The problem exists for several reasons, including the existence of incompetent personnel, an administrative system which allows incompetent personnel to perpetuate their employment within the agency, a lack of disciplinary controls, a faulty evaluation system, lack of measures to reward truly outstanding personnel, and a personnel system without adequate recruitment, selection, and training procedures. When the Deputy is faced with the

problem of an ineffectively producing subordinate, whatever the cause, he is handicapped further by his own lack of situational clarity. The Mission Director is typically of little assistance in clearing up this ambiguity. The Director, with either a strong desire to assure project success, or a tendency to adopt the least controversial method of operating, tends to ignore the Deputy on these matters. The Deputy in almost all cases must obtain the Director's approval before taking a personnel action, and often faces the possibility that a mission employee will ignore him and appeal to the Director. Without a clearly defined place in the mission's authority structure, the Deputy often resorts to being a trouble-shooter, looking for problems to be extinguished. This kind of activity produces the image of a trouble-maker, a block to project work, and reportedly tends to create a climate of tension and distrust.

AID/W cabled that one of our projects should be turned over to the host nationals and that work plans for the turnover should be submitted to AID/W immediately. The Division Chief in charge wrote an attempt to justify retaining the project and justifying his division's work. Of course, I disapproved this but the Division Chief's second effort was just as bad because he tried to explain why the host government was unqualified to take over the project. The Division Chief was so emotionally involved with the project that I had to ask him to draft a reply to the AID/W a third time, simply stating confirmation of instructions and informing Washington that we were working on a plan for the turnover. The Division Chief had been unwilling to comply with the AID/W request until literally forced to do so.

\* \* \* \*

A Division Chief was on home leave, and an Acting Chief was left in charge. Unfortunately, the Division Chief had not provided specifications or instructions which were necessary for one of the projects. The Acting Chief came to me to ask what should be done about obtaining the necessary instructions. The details were technical, so I was unable to explain exactly what to do. Instead, I told the Acting Chief to gather facts to ensure that he knew what he was doing, then to continue with the work, considering himself as the employee with authority and responsibility for conducting the project. Work was continuous in spite of the absence of a key Division Chief and lack of information.

\* \* \* \*

The Director asked all Division Chiefs to submit a list of program priorities, and all replied with one exception. The Director sent follow-up memoranda, which were also unsuccessful. The Director asked me to try to motivate the Division Chief to do the task. I also sent memoranda, but again to no avail. Therefore, I made up my own list of program priorities for this division, and submitted it to the Division Chief for approval or change. The list was returned to me unchanged, so I know that the Division Chief was still not bothering with the task. It had been impossible for me to convince the Division Chief to accomplish the task, but at last we had a workable list of priorities.

\* \* \* \*

Three technicians, all working on the same project, were in complete disagreement. I had been aware of this, but had been ineffective in not documenting the situation. The situation culminated when a local national complained to the Director that the Americans on the project

did not know what they were doing. The Director assigned me the task of handling the situation. At this same time, one of the three technicians came to me and reported that project work was not being accomplished. Contrary to project schedules and plans, no local nationals were being trained, tests were not being conducted, and the United States workmanship was obviously poor. I learned that each technician accused the others of sabotage, but I could not determine which technician was really causing the trouble. I could have sent the technicians home, stopped work, or replaced them with TDY or regular personnel, but all of these solutions would have required excessive time. Instead I threatened the technicians with transfers home, unless work was accomplished. I then made the Program Officer responsible to "bird dog" the project and ensure its effective completion, insisting that the Program Officer visit the project every day, observe work progress, and report back. The personality clashes ceased immediately, and work proficiency gradually began to improve. I was able to improve project efficiency to some extent, and routine transfers eventually solved the basic problem.

\* \* \* \*

A Division Chief was strictly honest, and had a high standard of personal conduct, but was very dogmatic in his beliefs. His host national counterpart was just exactly the opposite, so the two had trouble working together. The Division Chief explained his low opinion of the local to me and the host national Chief also came to me to explain that he was having trouble working with the Division Chief. I did not like the host national either, but I was of the opinion that it was impossible to cease dealing with him. I tried to persuade each of them to try to work together, but they continued their arguments. Finally, as a last resort, I took over all relationships with this host national, thereby preventing contact between the two who could not get along. This solution was the only possible way that work was able to continue.

\* \* \* \*

### 3. Directs equipment changes

Another important feature of successful project operations is proper equipment, supplied in a timely manner. A few Deputies complained of delays in equipment arrivals, with the most extreme statement being that equipment from the United States never arrived on time. For the most part other personnel, mainly technicians, are directly responsible for procuring and utilizing equipment. Deputies tended to be involved with equipment as an ancillary matter, as an activity noticed and dealt with when observed, but not of major concern.

A special truck had been bought for a specific project, but the project was not yet under way so the truck was destined to sit idle for at least two months. I was told about this by a technician at the project site while I was on a field trip. After hearing about the truck, I thought that it would be suitable for another project which was already in process. I checked with the Division Chief, who in turn checked with the project technician on the site. The Division Chief later informed me the technician felt that the truck would be very useful. Therefore, I told him we would transfer it to his project until it was needed on the original project. I was able to manage this transfer without complications, so the truck was utilized to full advantage.

\* \* \* \*

On a field trip I noticed a generator rusting. I asked about power to run the generator and learned that it had been promised long ago by the host government, but was still unavailable. I knew that a generator was needed on another near-by project, so I proposed to the Division Chief that this generator be moved to the other project until it could be used for its primary purpose. The Division Chief agreed so I told

him to see the Minister to provide the reason and to promise that it would be returned immediately when it could be made operative, and to get his permission to remove the generator. I also asked him to get in touch with the host government official having jurisdiction over the other project to ask for his permission to move the generator there, giving the reasons and the agreement of the former Minister. The technician agreed to this, and I formalized the request by reiterating the same suggestions in a letter. The technician acknowledged the letter, and carried out the directive, with the action proving to be very successful.

\* \* \* \*

A Division Chief explained to me that automobiles operated by the division were obsolete and dangerous and were not worth repairing. The Division Chief also displayed the cars to me, and explained that field work was being curtailed because of vehicular breakdowns. Then he submitted a request for more vehicles, which I approved without question because of having first hand evidence of need. I attached my observations to the request so that the Director would have access to the details without having to personally check. The Director approved the request, based on my recommendations and indications of need.

\* \* \* \*

Our mission staff began to grow rapidly, outstripping the arrival of automobiles. Finally, whoever received a vehicle looked upon it as belonging solely to his project, and tried to restrict usage. Many complaints regarding this situation began to come to me. I called a meeting of all senior mission personnel to put forth the vehicle problem, saying that a system of coordination of vehicles had to be established whereby

everyone could have equal access to vehicles until all required vehicles were on hand. I then turned the meeting over to those present and left, feeling they should arrive at a solution themselves because the problem directly touched all those present. Soon I received a report from those attending the meeting with conclusions and recommendations. Their plans were acceptable, so I drafted a directive embodying these conclusions and sent it to all mission employees, to be effective immediately. The plan was to make available all existing vehicles on an area basis by which everyone would be able to utilize the available vehicles at certain times. Everyone was pleased with solution, and, better, the system proved workable.

\* \* \* \*

One project involving considerable equipment was beginning to have trouble. For example, on a field trip I saw a considerable amount of undistributed equipment. I decided that distribution would be unmanageable unless a system was designed for receipts, transportation to sites, accounting, assuring proper use, etc. I took the initiative in that I gave this problem a sense of urgency. I explained to the Director that something had to be done immediately, and he agreed that I should handle the situation. I called together a working group composed of myself, the Controller, the Executive Officer, and the Program Officer. We met three or four times to pool our thoughts regarding how to solve the problem. After a few meetings, I drafted a revised order regarding procedures and responsibilities for equipment, which essentially insisted that all responsible employees name a staff member to assume personal responsibility for specific items of equipment. The system proved acceptable to everyone, and is now being put into effect.

\* \* \* \*

#### 4. Persuades host government to honor commitments

At various times and for various reasons the host government is unable or unwilling to meet commitments. The first determination of this failure is often made by project technicians, but could be made by any mission employee. For example, the Deputy Director could learn of inadequate progress by visiting project sites. A common method of discovering lack of host government compliance is through the Controller's office, which keeps the usual detailed records of receipts and expenditures of joint project funds.

Most Deputies cited the need to ensure that the host government met commitments in order to retain their interest in successful project completion, to help prevent host government bureaucratic and political obstacles, to promote a sense of responsibility, or to satisfy United States legal requirements. Because of the importance of this task, Deputies tend to be willing to become involved in this activity at any necessary moment. The typical procedure is for a technician to become aware of such a problem, to determine that higher level assistance is necessary, and then to inform the Deputy and to ask for his help. The Deputy then either provides advice, refers the problems to the Mission Director, or acts himself to solve the problem. The problems may range from minor misunderstandings through disagreements on interpretation of agreements to serious attempts by the hosts to manipulate host or international political issues.

The host government was committed to provide a building and related furnishings for an AID-financed project. The building was not completely ready at the time the project was to begin work, but work began anyway, in order to get the project going. Later the Division Chief called me to explain that such things as telephones, furniture,

and janitorial services were not being provided by the host government in accordance with the agreement. The Division Chief requested that action be taken to force the host government to meet commitments. Now I need to work out recommendations for the Director's approval. I know that the host government doesn't have a large budget, so how can they be asked to pay for telephones? Also, the building belongs to the host government, so perhaps it should be allowed to deteriorate so that they will learn how much less expensive proper maintenance is on a routine basis, by learning how costly it will be to put the building in order. I have no solution at the present time, so I recommend that we wait until a new annual host government budget is prepared which will clarify host government financial capabilities. Priorities can then be set up.

\* \* \* \*

A host government coordinating agency had limited power, and was badly undermanned. We depended on this agency for services and information pertinent to USAID projects, but a history of poor performance had developed. I set up a series of meetings designed to orient the Director of the host government agency to the USAID mission efforts, to educate him concerning mission needs, and to establish a basis for continuing contacts. The meetings proved very effective in that the agency began complying with all of our requests.

\* \* \* \*

I had been pushing to get the host government to use some of their loan money to \_\_\_\_\_, but without apparent success. Then, at a cocktail party, I met the host government official responsible for the project. Having this official's support would greatly assist in the proper use of loan money so I got him aside and raised some of the issues. We had a fruitful discussion and arranged a meeting with him for the following day to solidify some of the issues which we discussed.

\* \* \* \*

A technician told me that his project was having much trouble convincing the host government to release government funds which had been appropriated for financing a joint project. It seemed to me that the trouble was caused by inertia on the part of the host government Ministry. I decided to go to the Ministry myself and talk to the key officials including the Minister. They apparently had not understood the project which was a short-coming on the part of the AID technicians. I made what I considered clear, detailed explanations of the project and they were apparently satisfied. When I left I told the Ministry I would follow up our meeting with a letter of confirmation. I also told the technician to follow up with the Ministry now that the host government seemed willing to cooperate. Soon the money was released for its purpose.

\* \* \* \*

The firm submitting the lowest bid on a construction project was partially owned by a host national. Shortly after the firm received the contract, the owner of the company was appointed to a senior official position in one of the Ministries. Legally, there was no barrier, but by our standards such a procedure is highly unethical. We felt that United States bidders, and Congress, might raise objections. I discussed the issue with the Director, who agreed that we should explain to the Minister and ask him to proceed. We were sure that if the problem were clearly stated, the Minister would provide advice. Luckily the problem solved itself. The Division Chief, reviewing project files, found that the men involved had sent a letter to the USAID mission stating that he had been appointed to a Ministry position, and thus felt it would be inadvisable for him to retain the building contract. This was an official letter to USAID so there was legal, binding authority. Shortly thereafter the official reconsidered and officially stated that he

wanted to retain the contract, but the Director and I felt that we should hold the man to his original renouncement of the contract, with an explanation of why this was being done. The host national accepted our decision and thus far there have been no adverse effects.

\* \* \* \*

The local government had not complied with its commitments for quite some time. AID/W cabled that partial payment was necessary immediately, and that a payment system must be worked out. I told this to the Minister the day the cable arrived. The next day another message came from AID/W stating that all host government commitments had to be met immediately. After clearing with the Director, I immediately set up a second meeting and carefully explained AID/W's position to the Minister. I did this in order that local officials could understand the AID/W position and in order that I might retain their trust for future transactions.

\* \* \* \*

Two cases occurred in which local nationals were indulging in dishonesty in financial matters. They were not only not meeting their commitments, but were also publicly misusing equipment supplied by the United States. I called a meeting with the local national officials and notified them that future United States assistance would be difficult to obtain unless agreements were constructed to preclude dishonesty, and to ensure their compliance with commitments. They cooperated with amazing rapidity.

\* \* \* \*

After much success during a pilot phase, the project was begun with full force. Plans called for the host government to construct and staff a building, and the AID mission to pay for supplies and equipment. I obtained a special technician on TDY to provide lists of appropriate supplies and equipment. I would like for the building to be ready and staffed by the time our equipment arrives. To ensure readiness, I made several trips to the project and learned that the host government was not proceeding. However, I will be unable to pressure the host government to expedite it because it is likely that they will complete their work before our equipment arrives since U.S. equipment is always months late in arriving. Therefore, I will wait until the equipment bill of lading arrives and at that time will begin to exert pressure on host government officials. This will delay the project because the time span from bill of lading arrival to equipment arrival does not allow enough time for building construction, but unfortunately this is the only solution possible.

\* \* \* \*

##### 5. Coordinates division activities

Successful program management implies that the various USAID divisions and offices work well together, that the various projects are not duplicative, and that project work is not prevented, mismanaged, or obstructed by virtue of the operations of other USAID projects. This task includes the coordination of efforts between staff offices and technicians and is considered to be an important part of the Deputy's job.

The Program Office and the Division Chiefs frequently need "coordination." Division Chiefs think that Program Officers "meddle" and require excessive paperwork, while Program Officers think that Division Chiefs and other technicians lack ability to plan, and cannot properly record or document project efforts. These two USAID officials, the Program Officer and the Division Chief, are frequently quite bitter about each other's shortcomings. Disputes often come to the Deputy Director for solution, either as a result of a complaint by one of the parties, or because of his own observation of the need.

Another basic difficulty is the need to keep sufficiently well informed about the mechanics of projects and about new developments to be able to note when two or more projects should or should not be involved with each other or with the same issue.

A technician arrived hopping mad. He had received a list of participant trainees which specified people he did not want, so he was working with a Ministry official on another list. The technician blamed the Program Officer for interfering. I did not know details of this situation, so I called in the Program Officer to discuss the situation. It turned out that the Program Officer, at the Mission Director's request, had asked the technician for a copy of the list but had not told him what he was going to do with it. The Program Officer and the Director were impatient with the slowness with which participant trainee nominations were going through, and had decided to expedite matters by taking the task out of the technician's hands. They had completely altered the list and the technician refused to approve it, explaining that the list was unsatisfactory. I agreed that the technician should prepare the list and explained my views and the reasons therefore to the Program Officer. The Program Officer was apologetic and agreed to work more closely with the technicians.

\* \* \* \*

There was disagreement in a technical division concerning training. Two technicians were at odds concerning the relative amount and type of training necessary for certain participants. I brought them together indicating the type of compromise which might be made in the training procedure. I knew the background of both of these technicians, so I was able to get them to agree. Now the training process is proceeding satisfactorily.

\* \* \* \*

(From a Division Chief) When the project ended, I wanted to keep my own Administrative Officer rather than have my technicians become dependent upon the USAID Executive Officer. The Deputy Director disapproved, so I appealed to the Director, who finally approved. The Deputy was very nice about it, saying, "O.K., I was overruled."

\* \* \* \*

I initiated a conference to bring in technicians from the field to discuss the overall program. Presentations were made by staff members such as the Program Officer, and technicians were asked to discuss their activities related to the overall program. This was an attempt to encourage better coordination, especially in relation to better project management. Hopefully, the projects will now demonstrate more satisfactory progress.

\* \* \* \*

A letter by a staff officer indicated that some participants should be investigated. They had gone to the United States for training, but upon returning had not engaged in the activity for which they were trained, and they had also changed jobs. A Division Chief was supposed to clear the letter, but would not do so. He felt that these participants should not be

singled out, and that if an investigation were to be undertaken forty to fifty per cent of the participants would be in the same category as the few to be investigated. I asked the staff officer to elaborate on his reasons for investigating these participants, and when the elaboration was completed the Division Chief was willing to clear the letter requesting the investigation.

\* \* \* \*

#### 6. Coordinates division activities with host country efforts

After all project plans and project documentation is completed, and project work is underway, there are misunderstandings to be clarified, details to be arranged, and information to be exchanged between the host government and USAID personnel. Much of this occurs at the technician level, without need for formal meetings or Director's office involvement. However, there are some matters of policy, or of substantive involvement which require Deputy or Mission Director involvement. The Director generally leads in such cases, either becoming personally involved or delegating responsibility to the Deputy.

This task generally occurs on a non routine-basis, usually in the context of a problem for which corrective measures must be taken. The usual problems of interacting with host nationals occur in this task. Deputies were reported to become over-sympathetic to host national viewpoints as a consequence of trying very hard to appreciate the hosts' problems. Although infrequent, cases were reported in which Deputy Directors allowed projects to continue for months which should have been phased out, because they were reportedly able to see only the host national point of view.

AID/W approved a sizeable loan to conduct a project. Unfortunately, the project site interfered with a small town. The town officials were opposed to our site selection because it would hurt the economy of their township. To change the site would have doubled the cost. We did not want to alienate the people, but we also could not jeopardize our position with Congress or the GAO by changing the approved plan for political reasons. I suggested to the Director that we take advantage of an AID/W visitor to improve relations, and to personify AID/W views. I suggested that the visitor meet with town officials to point out that Congress and the GAO would never allow us to amend the project. The Director agreed, so I arranged the meeting. It appears that the town officials were satisfied because their objections were dropped.

\* \* \* \*

A Division Chief was trying to convince a current graduating class of host nationals to serve in rural areas for the good of the country. He was trying to work through the School Director, but the Director was ill and apathetic and refused to comment on the idea. The students were very much opposed and threatened violence if ordered to rural areas. The Division Chief was thwarted so he brought the problem to me. I had no real solution, and could give no real advice, but I did serve as a sounding-board, talking with him freely about the problem, and helping him consider all the angles involved. For unknown reasons the students suddenly agreed to work in rural areas, so the problem, although not solved by us, was no longer bothersome.

\* \* \* \*

One of my subordinates wrote a letter to a host government official explaining a specific procedure. After reading the letter and determining that it was unclear, I called a meeting of this subordinate and two staff personnel to prepare a better reply. We worked together to produce a letter which all approved. Improved procedures were apparent almost immediately after they received the letter.

\* \* \* \*

On a field trip to a project I became aware that my host government counterpart did not understand what was going on, and that he had never been to the project. I decided this was probably a main reason for the lack of coordination between our project and the host government. I suggested that he visit the project at least once to get a better understanding of what was being accomplished, and how the project was being conducted, which he agreed to do. I called our technician and told him of my discussions and informed him that the host government official would probably visit. I learned later that my counterpart did visit the site and that good rapport had been established between our technician and the host government ministry. There is now a constant dialogue between project personnel and the host government.

\* \* \* \*

We were conducting one project in a rural area which was utilizing several host national personnel. They were storing equipment and supplies, furnished by AID, in town. This delayed work because of the unnecessary transportation time. The Division Chief informed me of the situation, so I asked the host government Minister to allow equipment and supplies to be stored at project sites. The Minister agreed, but apparently a misunderstanding occurred because the equipment and supplies warehouse was locked up. USAID technicians could not get the warehouse opened, and could not learn why it

had been locked. I met with the Minister again and offered the equipment and supplies to the host government as a gift, if they could be stored at the project site. This suggestion was accepted readily and the warehouse was soon opened. We lost control of the equipment and supplies, but work progressed, and host nationals were able to learn how to handle such items.

\* \* \* \*

I requested that a Ministry with a secondary interest contribute manual labor to assist us and the Ministry with primary involvement in a USAID project. I thought that this would demonstrate interest and cooperation, and save money. The Ministry with primary involvement disapproved the suggestion, using the reasoning that there would not be many people involved, so it would be better to do the work using the experienced personnel from their Ministry. I concluded that the answer was based on the desire to prevent the other Ministry from becoming involved in the project. I had to agree in order to get the project completed.

\* \* \* \*

(Observed incident) The Ambassador requested that the Deputy Director discuss four items with a host government Minister, and that a confirmation letter be obtained if an agreement were reached on a particular issue. When this issue was mentioned by the Deputy, the Minister agreed, remarking that the agreement was customary. The Deputy expressed gratitude and passed over the subject. Later, back in his own office, he explained to the Program Officer that the meeting had gone well, and that the Minister had been favorable to all items. However, he said that he could not tactfully ask the Minister for a confirming letter.

\* \* \* \*

The host government undertook an extensive project, on their own, with very little consultation with our technicians. This made me reflect on the necessity of having our people available since the government was not disposed to utilize them. I suggested to the Director that a reduction should be made soon, and that serious consideration should be given to complete phasing out in that area. The Director agreed with my suggestion so I requested that a serious review of this contract be made by the appropriate Division Chief in conjunction with the Program Officer.

\* \* \* \*

The host government had promised to provide equipment for some of our technicians. When they began to arrive, the host government realized that equipment was not available, so they proposed to share expenses with us in purchasing equipment on an "as needed" basis. This involved many considerations such as how much we should pay. When the Director and I received this proposal I suggested that we meet with all mission people who would have an interest in hopes of getting a group solution. The Director concurred so I called the group together. At the first meeting, I stated that we had to sort out the roles which each person would have in the area of equipment supply in relation to the host government. I gave my ideas regarding what areas each party should be concerned with. I had already thought about this, and so had it pretty well worked out in my own mind. Each point was discussed and a consensus reached. The roles assigned to each individual were close to what I had wanted and gave us a coordinated effort, well-defined relationships, and responsibilities with which to attack the problem.

\* \* \* \*

#### D. Accomplishes Other Program Management Functions

The Deputy Director has other responsibilities in the area of program management which occur infrequently, or which are less important than those discussed immediately above. These tasks are diverse, but are grouped within this miscellaneous category for convenience.

##### 1. Reads and reviews correspondence

The Deputy in all missions reads and reviews project related correspondence, both incoming and outgoing. In many missions the Deputy also is delegated authority to provide final clearance on all or some project communications. Keeping informed about projects by reading incoming and outgoing airgrams and cables is not considered to be complex, although some editing and revision is done. However, the amount of time necessary for this task was reported to be extensive, ranging at times to as much as three hours per day. Consequently, the Deputy has considerably less time to devote to other, sometimes more important, tasks. However, reading cannot be neglected because information is needed to perform other tasks properly. Some Deputies tried to solve this predicament by extensive reading after work hours but found that it interfered with other matters.

A subordinate prepared a cable which asked for two things, policy clearance and procurement authorization. I knew that cables received by AID/W require extensive coordination, and that by including two requests in a single cable excessive delays would occur. I advised the subordinate to rewrite his requests, putting each one in a different cable. The material was rewritten with the first cable asking for policy clearance, and the second asking for procurement authorization. Using this system I expect to get quicker replies.

\* \* \* \*

A Division Chief wrote a letter for the Ambassador's signature which I approved. The Division Chief had included a major error in his letter, which I did not discover. The Ambassador signed the letter and it was mailed. This created a costly, unintended commitment for us. I should have been more careful with this letter, and in the future I will need to be more concerned with communications details.

\* \* \* \*

(From Director) I wrote a long cable to AID/W justifying a specific action and included a statement that the mission would also send a lengthy airgram, with more complete details of the situation. I asked the Deputy Director to ensure that an appropriate airgram was prepared at the appropriate time. The Deputy asked the appropriate Division Chief to draft the airgram, and then reviewed and approved the Division Chief's work. When the airgram came to me I found it inadequate and in need of revision. Because time was now short I did the revision myself, and got the airgram out on time, but I should not have needed to become involved.

\* \* \* \*

## 2. Keeps others informed about project status

The Deputy is occasionally called upon to prepare a written report concerning the status of a project, but the more usual occurrence is an oral report. Reports may be given impromptu, at the informal request of an interested individual, or they may be carefully prepared in advance. Structured situations, such as briefing the Ambassador on project status, rarely involve difficulties. However, as a ranking American and a senior USAID official, the Deputy Director is occasionally asked provocative questions in public or private conversation. He must try to be cooperative and yet avoid revealing sensitive or classified information. As a further complication, such exchanges can occur in a foreign language.

The mission was invited to send a representative to a host government meeting to be chaired by a Minister. Upon request by the Mission Director, I agreed to be the USAID representative. During the meeting the Minister asked me several questions about details of mission operations and organization structure. This was a delicate situation because any inaccurate or inappropriate statements would be heard by some of the most influential personnel in the host government. I tried to keep my answers simple, and brief, but with enough detail to demonstrate a cooperative, willing attitude. My answers seemed satisfactory to those present.

\* \* \* \*

The Ambassador had to give a speech and wanted information about our total program to use in his speech. He used our CAP as a basic reference document, but many of the projects he did not understand, especially how they fit into our total program. The Director asked me to brief the Ambassador on the projects in terms of dollars spent vis-a-vis realized achievements. I had to give him both the overall picture and the relationship of results to invested capital. The Ambassador called last week and wanted to know what our expenditures and successes were since the beginning of the host country's development plan. I gave him a rough estimate in general terms on the spur of the moment without the figures at hand. I later checked these estimates for accuracy and found them to be satisfactory so I didn't go back to him about it.

\* \* \* \*

AID/W asked the mission for specific information about the status of some of our projects. The Director asked me to be responsible for the task, so I asked each Division Chief to provide technical information, and I wrote introductions, and justifications, and reviewed the technical contributions. Our information was reportedly well received in AID/W.

\* \* \* \*

### 3. Acts as Division Chief

The Deputy Director is occasionally required to function as a Division Chief. This is necessary when there is no competent technical employee available. For example, if a Division Chief without adequate staff personnel were to leave the mission for emergency reasons, leaving insufficient time to obtain a replacement, the Deputy would be likely to receive an assignment to fill this opening. This task appears to be required infrequently since a Deputy Division Chief or a senior technician is usually appointed to serve as Acting Division Chief. Also, in cases where the Deputy Mission Director does serve as Division Chief, the assignment is always considered to be temporary although it may last many months.

The Deputies who had been required to serve temporarily as Division Chiefs reported no difficulties because of lack of training in the technical specialty. This was true because they were already generally informed about projects. Because of the temporary nature of the assignment, the Deputies reported that they tried to avoid involvement in project details in order to concentrate on overall project management.

The main problem created by this task is the interference with other more "primary" duties. However, there is pressure to become more involved in division work than is thought desirable. The Deputy meets with division technicians, plans division work, and evaluates division progress. To the degree that division involvement is required, exactly that amount of time must be deducted from the Deputy's normal work day.

#### IV. PARTICIPATES IN MISSION MANAGEMENT

Mission management is that work done to ensure an efficient, well organized, presentable, happy mission, and for the most part is the major responsibility of the Mission Director. In the preceding section, PROGRAM MANAGEMENT, the Mission Director is assisted to a degree by various other people: the Program Officer, the Controller, the Executive Officer, senior technicians and the Deputy Director. However, in certain aspects of mission management the Deputy Director is virtually the only mission employee who is able to help the Director. In extremely busy missions, some mission management work was assigned to the Program Officer and to a lesser extent to other senior mission personnel. Although this was necessary because of the volume of work, it tended generally to create problems.

One obvious reason for such problems is that only the Director and the Deputy Director have sufficient authority to provide effective control. Since Program Officers generally have approximately equal status with other staff personnel and technicians, they find it exceedingly difficult to exercise control. Attempts to do so often result in status and morale problems. Division Chiefs indicated time and again during the course of the study, resentment of Program Officers for interfering in what was considered to be division business, even if the Program Officer was under direct instructions from the Mission Director.

General problems mentioned in the introduction to this position, i.e., unclear authority, incompetent mission personnel, inadequate backstop assistance, inadequate operational guidance, inadequate communications, and mission-Embassy conflicts, are particularly pertinent to this function.

##### A. Guides and Assists Staff Officers and Division Chiefs

This task covers all efforts necessary to ensure that mission business is properly executed and that personnel are operating efficiently. Mission business as here defined consists of providing goods and services to mission employees and their families, selection, upkeep, and utilization of office facilities and equipment, information

exchange between mission personnel and between the mission and AID/W, mission transportation, non-program reporting and planning, division of work, and other similar activities. Efforts to insure that personnel are operating efficiently include activities such as evaluating performance, providing discipline, recognition, or training, and creating an appropriate atmosphere for work.

To be effective in this task a Deputy must deal effectively with different kinds of people without incurring displeasure. He must stimulate subordinates, make objective judgments about performance, recognize and provide for informational or training needs, and discover and correct organizational malfunctions.

Management problems are magnified in the overseas situation. For example, minor items such as sofas or marketing are elevated to become major sources of difficulty which affect work output. General lacks of facilities, resources, training, and perhaps inclinations to meet United States standards of performance also create management difficulties. The Deputy must cope with many problems stemming from such general environmental paucity which few managers working in the U. S. ever encounter.

Cultural differences also create a need for unique management skills. For example, Executive Officers are generally responsible for providing and supervising recreational facilities, but the Director or Deputy Director generally must determine whether or not facilities are likely to create a bad impression among host nationals.

Management tools provided by the Agency also make this task difficult. Specific inadequacies are discussed below as applicable to specific tasks. Furthermore, there are general factors which hinder mission management and handicap the assistance effort. One frequent complaint in this general category was that missions were losing autonomy

and becoming increasingly under the control of AID/W. No one objected to major, substantive matters being decided in AID/W, but the general contention of Deputies was that decisions should be made locally if at all possible. A few Deputies took the view that the trend should be to greater mission autonomy, with AID/W becoming less involved.

Relations with the Embassies proved to be a controversial general problem; some Deputies held the opinion that the AID mission should be more closely associated with the Embassy. The majority of the Deputies interviewed, however, were of the opinion that the missions should be more independent of Embassy control than they are now. Several types of conflicts were mentioned to justify this viewpoint. Lack of uniform policy or procedure was a common complaint. Another common complaint was that the Embassy could and did dictate policy in matters which were thought to be more appropriately AID's concern.

Many mission personnel expressed concern about the lack of communication between the Director's offices and the mission rank and file. This lack is especially evident in relation to host national employees of the mission. These employees represent a potential wealth of information about host country conditions, attitudes and receptivity. Perhaps even more importantly, they represent a source of information for other host nationals. They are the groups which work most closely with Americans, and in this capacity are spreading their opinions about their employers. Yet, with minor exceptions, these employees have no link with top management. As a rule, they have no means for voicing complaints, opinions or suggestions. In one mission an incident was reported in which a host national employee, engaged in a chance conversation with an American, asked the American what work he did in the mission. The American was the Deputy Mission Director.

American personnel are also concerned with lack of communication between the front office and other echelons of the mission. Personnel felt that there was insufficient association between management and the other employees. For example, one employee said, "We senior staff personnel all feel that we should meet with the Director's office in a sort of senior staff management meeting. However, they don't want to bother with a meeting of this type so we meet without them to solve mission management problems." In another case the Deputy Director asked an American subordinate if he had been on leave, because he had not been seen for a long time. The subordinate had not been away from the mission for eighteen months.

#### 1. Assigns tasks

The responsibilities for most mission staff work are well-defined. Further, most senior personnel can communicate directly with the Director so that the Deputy does not need to become involved heavily in task assignment as a rule. In a few missions the Deputy was explicitly responsible for assigning tasks and insuring their completion; in other missions the Deputy assumed responsibility by thrusting himself into situations permitting control over the work of others; in a third type of mission there was no mission management of this type except that exercised by the (generally overworked) Mission Director.

In many cases, especially in the latter two types, the Deputy's attempts to exercise authority arouse resentment, perhaps because such action places the subordinate one additional step away from the top mission position, perhaps because it adds control where previously none existed, or perhaps because it violates earlier existing authority patterns.

Some comments were made about lack of skills in assigning tasks. For example, one Deputy was criticized for relaying instructions through a third party, which created the need for personal visits to clarify assignments. However, this type of problem is insignificant compared to the basic problem of authority relations.

Before one subordinate could finish a task, I learned of a new factor and realized that someone else should be doing the work. I took the work from the first employee and assigned it to a second, but, because of the heavy work schedule, there was no opportunity to provide a complete explanation. The employee to whom the task had originally been assigned brooded about it for several days.

\* \* \* \*

A new secretary came to work at the mission. I talked with her and found that she was uninspired, quiet, and seemingly with little vim and vigor. Because of this, I avoided giving her lengthy, detailed instructions during our first meeting, assigning her instead to routine work. After learning that she didn't care for social life, that she was diligent, calm, and could do detailed work, I assigned her to a job which required exact work, under pressure, where she excelled.

\* \* \* \*

(From subordinate) AID/W sent a circular airgram asking if missions would like copies of certain books. I considered the books acceptable, but not really essential; therefore I did not bother answering the airgram. Soon the Deputy called asking when and what reply was being made. Now, I must stop work, decide what books, if any, are desired and draft a reply. Such incidents lead me to believe that the Deputy has no faith in my judgment, and that he does not believe that I am capable of setting

my own priorities. In addition, the assignment has created a hardship for me because I must stop working on a project of more importance in order to deal with the Deputy's assignment.

\* \* \* \*

A technician liked to go on field trips, even though they were non-productive. I felt that I did not have time to listen to the purpose of every field trip this technician proposed making, so I delegated control to the Program Officer. This has worked very well because as technicians report to the Program Officer on any trips taken, the Program Officer keeps informed on project work and activities of technicians. In addition, the Program Officer is able to forbid any field trips he thinks will be non-productive. Thus, I saved valuable time and my span of contacts with subordinates was reduced to a manageable level.

\* \* \* \*

A capable employee was transferred to our mission. He was enthusiastic, had good ideas, was liked by locals and Americans, but got nothing done on the job. I did not want to get rid of him because he seemed so well-qualified. From conversations I learned that the man was interested in mechanics and knew about gears and motors, and was able to sell others on his ideas. The Director agreed to my suggestion that the man be transferred to an industrial phase of our operations. Now the man is happy in his work, and is productive, and has maintained his good relations with everyone. He is now a valuable Agency employee.

\* \* \* \*

There had been some general griping about the parking situation, so I suggested to the Executive Officer that he make some improvements, telling him one specific item that could be improved. The Executive Officer's reply was that the problem "should take care of itself." However, complaints about mission parking continued, so I then asked the Assistant Executive Officer to improve the situation. Whatever the Assistant Executive Officer did was apparently successful, because the complaints soon stopped.

\* \* \* \*

(From subordinate) The other day my secretary came in and said the Deputy wanted me right away. I was in the middle of a meeting which I had to drop. I went to his office and waited a few minutes. Finally, the Deputy called me in and asked, "What time does the Pan Am flight arrive tomorrow?" I answered, and then asked what he wanted to see me about. He replied, "That's all." This is not an uncommon occurrence.

\* \* \* \*

Acoustics and lighting seemed to be inadequate, so I asked the Executive Officer if corrective measures could be taken, and he replied that new lighting assemblies were already on order. At the same time we were getting new office drapes and rugs, so I asked the Executive Officer if anyone was considering the adequacy of the new lighting assemblies in relation to the new drapes and rugs. The Executive Officer was unable to answer, so I suggested that he meet with a staff engineer to determine requirements and cost estimates for proper lighting. I made this assignment because I felt that a complete appraisal of the lighting situation was necessary.

\* \* \* \*

(From subordinate) Last week a circular airgram came explaining the importance of getting financial reports in on time. The Deputy told his secretary to tell me to come to his office, which I did. He wanted to know why we were late in submitting these reports. I pointed out to him that this was a circular airgram which went to every mission and didn't specify us. He took up my time and got involved in a trivial matter in this case. It would have taken only a minute if it had been done by phone.

\* \* \* \*

The Executive Officer brought a contract requiring my signature. I examined the contract and found it incomplete, so asked several questions about contract details, e.g., leave arrangements, commissary privileges, provision of housing, etc. The Executive Officer had no information about these points, so I asked him to analyze past contracts, and examine regulations, and then to write up his recommendations for a consistent contracting policy. This assignment, when completed, will save the mission time in the long run, and will prevent morale problems caused by preferential treatment.

\* \* \* \*

Recently we received a request from AID/W to do a review of a certain aspect of our budget. This work normally would be done by the Executive Officer, but it was also pertinent to the Controller's office. Since I knew that the Executive Officer was very busy on a more important task, I assigned the job to the Controller.

\* \* \* \*

## 2. Provides advice concerning mission administrative operations

This category includes all Deputy Director efforts in such areas as setting work schedules, devising or revising mission structure, and establishing work priorities. Advice is rendered either to the Director, or to subordinates. Several Deputies had the time and the skills to become involved in such matters, and were able to produce effective changes by virtue of being ranking mission executives. For example, one Deputy reported being dissatisfied with the mission organization. The Deputy merely reorganized the mission into a more effective pattern, procured the Director's approval, and immediately put the changes into effect.

Other Deputies were more uncertain in their approaches. For example, one Deputy reported that "two technicians have such low morale that they should be removed, but I'm going to let the Director find out for himself." This Deputy added that one of the two technicians had been badly treated by the Agency and would be leaving at the first opportunity, and that the Director disliked the second technician to the point of refusing to see him. The same Deputy reported that although morale in the mission was low, morale in other missions was even lower.

Many mission personnel held the opinion that Deputy Directors were involved in mission operations at too low a level. For example, it was reported that Deputies concerned themselves with the house bidding system, and with transferring secretaries from office to office. The list of examples below contains several incidents of this type. The presence of this problem and its pervasiveness is not surprising when the status of the Deputy Director is considered. The Deputy's authority is often unclear, his responsibilities are often unclear or non-existent, and he is frequently bypassed by his supervisor as well as by subordinates. Thus, over-concern with minor details is understandable.

Our telephone operator had been providing very poor service, with many resulting complaints. I explained the situation to the Executive Officer, who offered to compose a set of instructions for her to follow. After a week we were still getting poor performance from the operator, so I told the Executive Officer that if I had to instruct her myself, we would look for a new telephone operator. With this, her performance improved considerably.

\* \* \* \*

After hearing many complaints about mission work hours, I wrote a memorandum to the Executive Officer suggesting different hours, or at least a study of the hours. The Executive Officer wrote back immediately with a copy to the Director, indicating that a change of hours would disturb mission operations, for example in the motor pool. I learned that the Director agreed with the Executive Officer, and I realized that the issue was not really important, so I dropped the problem from consideration.

\* \* \* \*

An employee was being transferred to another mission, but he was delaying his departure in every conceivable way. Finally, we were able to set a firm date for his departure, and notified AID/W and the receiving mission. However, the receiving mission cabled that the employee was urgently needed, so I tried to locate the employee, who was in the field, to discuss an earlier departure date for him. Since he could not be readily located I personally set his departure date, and told the Executive Officer to notify the employee as soon as he could be found, and to send immediate cables to AID/W and the other mission.

\* \* \* \*

One of our staff offices was not being properly utilized. No one knew what this office really did, or how the personnel in the office were to be utilized. I was sure that this office could best be used if certain of its operations were placed within the control of technical divisions. I talked to the head of this office, who agreed with my observations. I also asked him to talk to his staff, after which he informed me that his staff was agreeable to any change thought best. Then I called a meeting of Division Chiefs and the head of the staff office to work out specific plans. We agreed to place some people and some functions within the divisions and the executive office, and to abolish some positions which were unnecessary. The Director approved of our suggested changes, so we put the system into effect. These changes enabled us to utilize our available resources much more effectively, thus was an extremely beneficial reorganization.

\* \* \* \*

We recently had an investigation concerning one phase of our operations. To correct matters, the Director assigned me responsibility for the operation. I revised procedures, and consolidated offices to enable close coordination and easy control. The operation is now easily maintained, and production is satisfactory.

\* \* \* \*

I had to feel my way into the job, and it took a lot longer than I had thought it would. I tried to do some of the things that my predecessor had done, but this was not successful because the Director did not support me. Later I decided to try to talk with the Director about the job, in spite of the fact that the Director was very "cold" and hard to warm up to. The Director gave

me some tasks to do, but on the first one, he interfered before it was completed. I finally went to the Executive Officer who suggested that he and I write out a list of things that would be my responsibilities. We did this and I took them to the Director who approved the list.

\* \* \* \*

An Acting Division Chief had just taken over responsibility for a division. He came to me to complain that the division was doing a poor job of administering the payroll for host national workers, and some salaries were too high, and some were too low. I told the Acting Division Chief to meet with the Executive Officer to solve this problem. I could easily have solved the problem, but by my action I was able to give the Executive Officer an opportunity to perform a task rightfully his, and saved my own time for more important matters.

\* \* \* \*

For some unknown reason the Director was refusing to allow an important staff officer to come to staff meetings. I saw that this was damaging morale and that mission coordination was suffering. Therefore, I successfully convinced the Director that such an omission was very bad policy.

\* \* \* \*

I began to get complaints from technicians that they were not being informed regarding communications between the mission and the Ministries. Dissemination of information is very important, so I immediately took action. To boost morale immediately, I wrote that a new directive would be issued to solve this problem. I also announced it at our staff meeting next day, after clearing with the Director. I then wrote a draft memorandum

and sent it to the Executive Officer to circulate as a new memorandum of procedure. It directed that all correspondence to Ministries had to be forwarded through technicians, and that every communication was to provide copies for the technical offices. The complaints have now stopped and the system is working smoothly.

\* \* \* \*

During a recent expansion, the Executive Officer was having difficulty keeping up with logistic requirements. For example, technicians were making commitments with Ministries to receive technicians and not informing the Executive Officer of the arrangements. This reduced time available for the Executive Officer to prepare support arrangements. The Executive Officer came to me and complained. I could see that he was disgusted, discouraged and had very low morale. The Executive Office is critical in a mission and has to function efficiently so I therefore had to boost the Executive Officer's morale. I called a meeting with the Executive Officer and technicians and emphasized that the Executive Officer was being pushed into difficult positions by not being kept informed regarding logistic arrangements for new personnel. I said that technical divisions would be more useful to the extent that they cooperated with the Executive Office. I then clarified the responsibilities of the technical divisions in receiving new people.

\* \* \* \*

At a weekly staff meeting several technicians mentioned dissatisfaction with mission working hours. The Director and I discussed this and decided to let mission personnel decide what hours they wanted to work. At the next staff meeting I proposed new hours including a lunch break and asked technicians to sound out their staffs to see if they would like to adopt that system. At the next meeting the technicians

were all favorable regarding the proposed hours. I asked the Executive Officer to circulate a mission notice informing people of the official change in mission hours. As soon as the notice came out we got a terrific negative reaction. There were complaints to me personally, to the Director and to the Executive Office that we were being arbitrary. I concluded that the technicians collectively didn't do a good job. At the next staff meeting, I pointed this out to them and told them to go back and get a realistic appraisal of the desires of their staffs. This was done, and the new mission hours were dropped on the basis of majority rule.

\* \* \* \*

There were many requests that we acquire additional vehicles for the mission motor pool. The requests were somewhat disturbing because no one knew the status of our present vehicles, i.e., their use, operating costs, or depreciation. I suggested to the Director that an equipment survey be conducted before any more vehicle requests were considered. The Director agreed and asked the Executive Officer to conduct the survey.

\* \* \* \*

I was aware that much of the mission's business was being conducted by the Program Officer and the Director without the knowledge of the rest of the staff. I suggested to the Director, privately, that all mission memoranda should be circulated for everyone to read. This was begun at the Director's request, and, although some staff members ignored the memoranda, at least the information was available.

\* \* \* \*

### 3. Settles disputes

A wide variety of disputes come to the Deputy Director for solution. These disputes vary in content, in detail, in importance, and in participants.

This task differs from the one immediately above in that advising about administrative operations refers to correcting omissions, mistakes, or inefficient operations, while the present task refers to discord, which may or may not lead to mistakes or inefficient operations. Very real disputes, some quite heated, occur between mission personnel, between mission personnel and employees of other agencies, and between U. S. employees and host national mission employees.

At times the Deputy is sought as an arbitrator, because of his rank, because of management talents, or to prevent the issue from coming to the attention of the Mission Director. At other times, the Deputy learns of situations and exerts his authority, in order to preserve order, dignity and working effectiveness.

I received a telephone call from a Peace Corps official who complained that the AID Executive Office was mishandling the Peace Corps petty cash fund. This official is strongly supported by the Ambassador, so it was necessary to handle him carefully for more than one reason. First, I apologized for the difficulty and then asked for a description of the petty cash procedure which was causing the problem. I was able to suggest an alternate procedure while on the phone, and arranged a later meeting to work out specific details.

\* \* \* \*

The Executive Officer came in to discuss a problem he was having with a host national employee. This host national for a long time had been parking in a space reserved for visitors, and continued to do so in spite of polite warnings by the Executive Officer. The Executive Officer agreed with my recommendation to give the host national until noon to cease the illegal parking. Apparently the Executive Officer also talked to the Division Chief who supervised the host national, because the Division Chief called me that afternoon and said that the host national had still not moved the car, and that he would like me to talk personally with the host national to settle the dispute. I agreed to do so, and arranged a meeting. The host national had to be handled carefully because of the public relations implications, and because he had high-level host national political connections. During my meeting with the host national, I simply made a personal request for him to park properly, without making demands. The host national agreed to comply, not because he "had to," but as a personal favor to me. Under the circumstances this was the best solution possible. The prestige of the host national and the Executive Officer was saved, and the illegal parking ceased.

\* \* \* \*

Watchdogging United States loans is a responsibility assigned to the Program Office, which is the normal arrangement. However, one technician was very concerned about this, wanting his division to have a more active part in negotiating loans. He complained to me several times and was beginning to put some pressure on the Front Office. The technician had high qualifications and was very capable, so I couldn't overlook his point of view. I discussed the problem with the Program Officer, and learned that his views were in harmony with mine. Next, I presented the problem to the Director, including my

recommendations on the matter. He agreed with me that the Program Office should have responsibility for general loan negotiations, but that the technician should be considered as a standby section at all times available for consultation. My problem was to convey these decisions to the technician without blunting his enthusiasm. I simply give him the picture as it was and relied on his reasonableness to accept it. I pointed out to him the variety of non-technical considerations that had to be considered. I pointed out that many technical judgments were made by United States consultants, especially in matters of size, for example, about steel mills, bridges, etc. At the same time I assured him that the initial judgments would always be made by his technical division, and that they would be as important as any of the other factors coming to play in loan negotiations. The technician was reasonable and accepted the fact that the broader implications must take precedence.

\* \* \* \*

One of our staff officers is very energetic, and very bright. When he first came, and for some time thereafter, he wanted to expand his responsibilities. He specifically wanted to get in on all matters which came from the Program Office. He began pressing me to give him more authority in program matters. I knew that something would have to be done because I felt that the Program Office was extremely able to handle matters without increased consultation with this staff member. Besides there was personal friction between him and someone in the Program Office. I had already been working on a document discussing mission clearance procedures, encompassing the lines of authority and responsibilities, and I was going to circulate this as a mission order. The problem of the staff member pushing for more program authority gave this a greater sense of urgency, so I decided to get it out sooner.

I sent the draft I had to the Director for clearance and then to the Executive Officer, telling him to circulate it as a mission order. At the same time I told the Executive Officer to put out a mission notice defining the responsibilities and functions of the energetic staff member. The Executive Officer got the fundamental description from the Manual Orders and I drafted a supplementary description which I told him to work in with his. The two notices effectively defined operations and eliminated misunderstandings.

\* \* \* \*

A Division Chief and a contractor were getting along so poorly that no work was being accomplished. When I learned this, I started bringing the two together in my office every week for consultation and decisions about work efforts. I did this hoping to provide an atmosphere in which they could work together harmoniously. Unfortunately my efforts were unsuccessful because the two would explode again almost immediately after leaving my office. The problem was not really solved until one of the two was transferred.

\* \* \* \*

A Division Chief complained to me that the Controller had refused to pay host national employees who had already been hired to work in the Division. I asked the Controller to present his views, and he explained that he had refused to pay because the host nationals had been hired and put to work without security clearances, which was a definite violation of regulations. The new employees had to be paid to avoid creating a bad impression among host nationals, but finding a legal way to do so was a problem. The Controller suggested that perhaps the technician who had incorrectly hired the host nationals would need to pay them out of his own pocket. There was animosity

between the Controller and the technician, which did not facilitate solution of the problem. Therefore, I decided to wait for a few days to allow everyone to calm down, with the intention of arranging a rational solution after a more relaxed atmosphere was possible.

\* \* \* \*

Host nationals are very sensitive about the jobs for which they have been hired. One day I came to work and found workmen arguing about who was to lay brick around the driveway. Each workman thought someone else should do the work. I quietly picked up the tools and started laying the brick. This proved embarrassing to the workmen, so all of them began work.

\* \* \* \*

#### 4. Provides information concerning mission administrative operations

At times the Deputy is called upon to inform others about mission administration. This type of informing refers to all efforts to disseminate information, without intention to influence change. For example, the Deputy might be asked about the status of an intended move into new office spaces by the Ambassador, or might inform mission subordinates about an administrative policy decision made by the Director.

I obtained information about the legal disposition of certain AID property. Then I wrote a memorandum describing what I had learned and circulated it to the entire staff. This was effective in that the memorandum provided documentary information about legalities and policy. Now, the staff is well informed about this matter, and complaints about improper disposition of property have ceased.

\* \* \* \*

I conduct an orientation session with all new employees soon after their arrival. At this session I tell them what is expected of AID employees at this post. During the conversation I attempt to make judgments about the new employee's personality, give them a chance to make the same judgment concerning me, and I explain their role in the mission. For example, when a new secretary reported for duty I explained that I expected her to relieve me of the minutiae of running the office, that she was to learn office operations so well that she would be able to find things with only general information, that she would provide grammatical corrections to my paperwork, and produce rough drafts of letters from my notes. I gave her documents and files to run through, and then discussed them with her to learn how well she understood them. This system provides me with information about new employees, and provides them with information about how the mission is operated and what is expected of them.

\* \* \* \*

The previous Director was a fatherly type who talked nicely to everyone and let each person run his own shop. The new Director loves details, runs a taut ship, and is reorganizing the mission. People on the staff resent the change in personality and in procedure. I was on home leave during the changeover. Upon my return everyone in the mission began inviting me for dinner and cocktails, and pouring out their hearts about their feelings toward the new Director. They wanted me to be a buffer between themselves and the new Director. My response to this was the only realistic reaction possible. I informed everyone that the new Director was my supervisor and that I would support him and his policies fully.

\* \* \* \*

## 5. Reads, reviews, or edits administrative written materials

The Deputy in most missions reads all incoming and all outgoing administrative materials such as cables, airgrams, and special reports. Frequently the Deputy serves as an editor of outgoing correspondence, insuring that materials are grammatically correct, that they conform to USAID and mission policy, and that they provide an appropriate response. The Deputy also reads outgoing materials to obtain information, and reads incoming correspondence for the same purpose.

A few Deputies reported that the task of reviewing outgoing correspondence was also utilized as a supervisory tool. By virtue of reading these materials it was possible to judge subordinate performance, to become informed for purposes of later discussions, and to enable unobtrusive criticisms.

The major problem for the Deputy is lack of clarity in the written materials. It was reported that mission personnel were in general incapable of writing effectively, and that incoming materials from AID/W and other missions were often garbled, incomplete, or ambiguously written. This situation has created the need for special care in handling correspondence, in an effort to avoid mistakes and misunderstandings, and many Deputies have assumed the role of correspondence watchdog in an effort to correct this deficiency.

The mission cooperates with the Embassy in a certain administrative matter. When the Embassy refused to pay its share of the costs for this operation, I wrote AID/W about the situation, and requested guidance. AID/W sent back a reply which was such an enigma that it was impossible to determine the meaning. Then I sent a second airgram seeking clarification and guidance, but after several days, no reply has been received.

\* \* \* \*

I must read all outgoing correspondence very carefully because subordinates, even with advanced academic degrees and technically competent, are unable to write. Recently I found that a subordinate's airgram to AID/W made little sense. Before clearing the airgram, I summoned the employee, and explained how the airgram could be improved grammatically, and how it could be made more clear. The subordinate made two attempts before he had a clear piece of correspondence for AID/W. This type incident is a frequent occurrence, and constitutes a significant portion of my job.

\* \* \* \*

In doing my routine morning reading, I came across a memorandum regarding the possible appointment of a mission staff officer to a UN post in another country. I called the staff officer and asked him to drop into my office. When he arrived, I was reading the memorandum regarding the possible appointment, and he volunteered to summarize it for me because he had read it several times. We discussed strategies regarding a reply, and implications of specific approaches and appropriate modifications. When he was leaving, I asked him about the status of a report which he was preparing, which was unrelated to the memorandum we had been discussing. I was not familiar with the report, but asked about it to indicate that I was exercising supervision. The reason I did this was because of my own assignment from the Mission Director. The Director is trying to get rid of this employee, and thus assigned me the task of "riding" him about his work.

\* \* \* \*

#### 6. Consults on personnel needs, allocations, and appointments

The Deputy Director participates in the procedure for acquiring personnel. He participates in discussions regarding need for new personnel,

and qualifications of personnel needed to fill positions. Next, the Deputy becomes involved in the reviewing and editing of documents, SPARS, cables, etc., which are necessary to initiate recruiting procedures by AID/W. Then, when biographic data are available, the Deputy meets with mission officials to evaluate the data and participates in the final decision concerning whether or not to accept the proposed candidate.

To perform this task, the Deputy utilizes his knowledge of the job to be done and the atmosphere in which it will be accomplished, the biographic data available about the proposed candidate, and his own management judgments. The Deputy will seldom, if ever, have ultimate authority in considering personnel, but his advice is frequently decisive.

It appears that the general procedure frequently breaks down. The personnel recruiting, selecting, and transferring effort is reported to be riddled with inadequacies, inconsistencies, and errors. The method is unbelievably slow. Every mission reported cases in which AID/W required excessive time, not only to recruit, but to deal with correspondence concerning recruiting. Most Deputies reported that they needed to step outside the regular channels of recruiting in order to obtain personnel within a reasonable time.

In addition to recruiting delays, AID/W seems unable to provide qualified candidates. This too has driven missions out of regular channels in attempts to obtain employees with acceptable qualifications. A minor but closely related problem is the amount of data about newly proposed candidates supplied by AID/W. Deputies reported that data were frequently too sparse to be meaningful, and that a frequent occurrence was additional correspondence trying to learn enough information about a candidate to permit meaningful judgments.

Another difficulty arises from the usual procedure of inviting mission staff to give personal opinions concerning any proposed candidate that they have known. This part of the system would perhaps work well if all employees were objective and gifted observers of human performance. Unfortunately, according to Deputy Directors, many mission employees lack these talents, so that jealousies, rivalries, personal dislikes, and vindictive attitudes are likely to be evidenced when opinions are solicited.

The fact that contract personnel must be considered further complicates the task of meeting personnel needs in that the contractor obtains his own personnel, who are scheduled to do work for which the mission will be responsible. One Deputy complained that this was particularly bad because whatever the contractor did badly, or wrong, would be blamed by the hosts on the USAID mission, not the contractor. Yet, the mission had no effective control over contract personnel recruited to work in the host country.

AID/W detailed a Division Chief position to us, without providing an employee to fill the position. I consider such a person of necessity as an adviser to the host government since one of their major difficulties is the lack of qualified personnel in this area. The Director was aware of my personal and professional interest in this area and asked me for suggestions regarding whom we could bring in for this job. I asked him to let me check with a mission where I had formerly worked to see if a person would be available from there. He agreed, and I wrote to this person. He said his assignment would be up shortly and he would be happy to come here if he were nominated. I conveyed this to the Director and suggested that he ask for this individual. The Director did ask for the recommended person, and we were able to get him assigned to us. He will arrive here after his home leave.

\* \* \* \*

I am seldom satisfied with candidates provided by AID/W personnel for mission positions. I solve this by going outside the AID personnel system. In one case I wrote to friends and acquaintances for recommendations, and then had the desired candidate contact AID/W. In this case my efforts enabled us to obtain a more qualified, preferred employee, and to get him to the mission much faster than if I had followed the regular system.

\* \* \* \*

We wanted a specific person to be Deputy Chief of one of our divisions. This man insisted on a certain grade, which we were willing to give, but the AID/W personnel office hesitated, being reluctant to give the desired grade. I sent a strongly worded justification for obtaining this man, but no reply from AID/W was received. I was afraid that we would lose the candidate if AID/W hesitated much longer, so I sent a second cable which was really a ringing criticism of AID/W Personnel. This cable did not endear our mission to AID/W, but it did stimulate them to hire the man we wanted, at the grade we wanted.

\* \* \* \*

I wrote to AID/W requesting a particular individual that I had known in another mission. I was sure that this person had the necessary qualifications, and that he would do a good job for our mission. AID/W complied with my request and had him transferred to us in a relatively short time.

\* \* \* \*

A Division Chief was recruiting for technicians, so I recommended a young, bright, imaginative Ph.D. The Division Chief refused my recommendation on the basis that he was making his own list of potential employees.

\* \* \* \*

A contract team from a United States University was doing an unsatisfactory job. The team did not have vision, and, although not complete failures, were not really achieving anything. The contract team leader was being replaced by a University employee even worse than those already present. Based on the proposed man's vitae, I concluded that he would have trouble gaining admission to a good graduate school. In addition, the contract team's home school did not really have the proper orientation for the program which we desired. We definitely did not want the proposed new contract team member, and wanted to award the contract to a different University. I informed AID/W of our views, but they answered to the effect that the proposed contractor was qualified. Meanwhile, I learned that the proposed contract was perhaps political, so, because of this possibility, and the fact that AID/W insisted on the acceptance, I cabled AID/W again, this time indicating that the proposed contractor would be acceptable. Fortunately, someone from AID/W reviewed the correspondence on this matter with the University officials, and they soon withdrew their bid for the contract.

\* \* \* \*

#### 7. Monitors and evaluates performance

The Deputy Director prepares efficiency reports, and occasionally serves as a personnel reviewing officer or as a member of a review panel. The system of efficiency reporting is well established within the Agency, so an explanation of task performance is unnecessary. However, there are several problems involved, which do deserve discussion, and which are very much in need of correction.

A common complaint among Deputies was that the efficiency report system did not allow objectivity. First, the Agency atmosphere is such that a rating of "3," or average, has come to mean unsatisfactory. Therefore, few raters assign a "3," even if the subordinate's performance is average, or even below average. This has, in effect, reduced the five point to a two point scale, with employees generally receiving either a "4" or a "5."

Another complaint is that many Agency employees have friends in AID/W or in political positions, and thus are able to exert pressure to keep ratings up, perhaps much higher than is deserved. It is a difficult task indeed for a Deputy Director to objectively rate a mission official who received an appointment based on the intercession of a Senator or Congressman.

Many Deputies thought that the mechanics of the rating scale were inadequate. For example, one Deputy stated that the 5-point scale was too narrow, because more shades of meaning are necessary. Therefore, greater importance is placed on the narrative section, which in turn depends on the writing skill of the rater. A ratee being evaluated by a supervisor with exceptional writing skills has a great advantage over his colleagues. Deputies attempt to solve this problem by being objective, but by doing so they report that it is impossible to know if they are actually aiding or obstructing subordinates, because they do not know the attitudes and performance of other raters.

Some Deputies reported that the task of efficiency reporting was routine, tedious, and time-consuming, and that their time could be better spent. They were especially resentful of having to review reports written by others.

Several Deputies reported that preparing efficiency reports was more difficult overseas than in the United States. This is because many different factors have to be considered that are not normally part of efficiency reporting in the United States. In this category are such factors as health, family, conformance to Agency policy, and adjustment to the environment.

One further point concerning performance evaluation deserves special note. By far the most commonly reported means of getting rid of incompetents, troublemakers, malcontents or otherwise undesirable employees was to have them transferred, from which it can be inferred that the problems are continued. Undesirables are often rated well and their transfers are arranged informally. In the relatively rare cases in which persons are rated low, they can usually only be transferred back to AID/W since most other missions would not accept them.

A secretary had worked for five different technicians during a reporting period, and the technicians took a cavalier attitude about writing an efficiency report for her. At first each of them said that someone else should write the report. Later, when I began to ask the technicians for the report their general tone was that if it had to be done they would write a poor one for her, to more or less punish her for creating a need to write the report. I could either force them to write the report, or write the report myself. In this case, I selected the latter course of action in order to ensure that a fair efficiency report was written.

\* \* \* \*

One technician is kind, pleasant to be with, and gets along well with fellow Americans. This technician's job is to teach his specialty to host nationals. Although this man is a nice guy, he is very poor at his designated job. I recently rated him a "3" overall, which is just short of his being questionable in performance. For the training category of his efficiency report, I rated him "2" which means that it is mandatory that he improve this aspect of his work within six months.

I discussed the efficiency report with the technician, explaining that the ratings being given were not personal, but were comments coming from a supervisor. The technician became very angry because of such low ratings, so I carefully went through all manual order definitions of terms, explaining to the technician the reasons behind each rating. I did this in order for the technician to learn the form of reference used, to calm his extreme anger, and to perhaps educate him sufficiently so that his performance would improve. The technician was not soothed, however, and he continued arguing, insisting that since he had received a "5" at his last post, that he deserved the same rating here. I know that if this technician had received a "5" at his last post, it was because his supervisor did not rate truthfully, but I did not argue with the technician. Instead, I told him that the ratings that I had given were firm, and that it would be wise for him to improve his performance before the next efficiency reporting period.

\* \* \* \*

A Division Chief was a problem for everyone. He was looking out for his own personal future, and the work of the mission came second. He simply discarded ideas and instructions that were not personally advantageous. He would never admit being wrong, and would continue with his own way in spite of specific orders to the contrary. I tried to persuade him to improve, and to devote his energy to mission work, but was unsuccessful. Therefore, I included all of these factors in the man's next efficiency report. The efficiency report apparently was effective, at least from the mission's point of view, because soon after its submission the Division Chief was transferred.

\* \* \* \*

I wrote an efficiency report concerning my secretary which I thought was favorable, but she did not think so. We discussed the report and she explained her point, which was sensible. I had obviously used an incorrect word to express a descriptive thought. I changed the wording to present a more accurate version.

\* \* \* \*

At a meeting to discuss efficiency report review panels, I realized that the review panel members were uninformed on the procedures and instructions. Therefore, I suggested to the chairman of the panel that he convene a meeting of all raters to instruct them carefully on procedures for making out efficiency reports. This was effective in reducing difficulties in preparing efficiency reports.

\* \* \* \*

#### 8. Develops skills of subordinates

Part of the job of any executive is to develop and upgrade the abilities of subordinates. For the Deputy Director this usually means Division Chiefs and Senior Administrative Personnel, but could apply to any mission employee.

Techniques of developing the skills of others vary according to need, aptitudes, and personalities, but the need to develop skills does not change. In some missions the upgrading of personnel becomes crucial because of the lack of availability of replacements, or the difficulty in replacing incompetent personnel. To the extent that the Deputy and others are successful in this function, the Agency can save the cost of replacements or further poor performance.

A technician works well in one context, but is in danger of losing his job because of incompetence. The technician was hired to be an adviser. He is kind, and spends his own money for books, food, and entertainment of participant trainees in his area. He speaks the local language well, and is well loved by the host national people. He is a friend of the Minister and is able to visit the Minister at any time of the day or night. He plans to visit participants in training in the United States, using his own leave and money. In spite of his extremely good attitude and motivation, his problem is very real. He can't use the language and structure of the AID bureaucracy and he doesn't know how to present information in a form usable to AID/W. Hired as an adviser, he cannot advise. I explained to him that he should develop AID/W contacts, and that to do this he should send cables and airgrams bearing his name so that AID would become familiar with him. The technician cannot bring himself to develop contacts, write properly, or be an adviser. The Ambassador realizes that this technician is not "pulling his weight" and occasionally asks how much longer he will be kept around. I agreed with the Ambassador in thinking that this technician was not as efficient as other technicians, but I have not acted conclusively yet. I have done everything possible to help this technician know where he is failing, but this has been unsuccessful. Unfortunately, it will soon be necessary to send this technician home if I am unable to teach him how to be a good adviser.

\* \* \* \*

Recently the Agency changed assistance philosophy from a function orientation to a goal orientation. The "old timers" in charge of functions view the change as a threat to their jobs, and as a method of losing prestige. When we began to change our mission structure to reflect this new orientation, the old timers really objected. First they tried to convince me that the new system would be unsatisfactory. When this failed they reduced to a

minimum all concrete efforts to produce the change. One Division Chief was particularly upset about the change. He soon developed the habit of visiting my office every day for a few minutes. He really had nothing significant to say or to report, but merely wanted to talk about the "good old days." In order to prevent him from feeling worse, to keep him productive, and to assist in convincing him to help effect the change, it was necessary to spend time talking with this Division Chief, and bolstering his ego by telling him how important he would be in the new organization.

\* \* \* \*

A whole new series of manual orders was put out describing program procedures to be followed and the United States legal requirements for documentation. These manual orders were complex and would take time to digest. At the same time, the Program Officer was busy, and seemed disinclined to make the effort to carefully read and digest the new instructions. I felt that it was important to begin learning what the new instructions were, before the time to apply them. However, I did not want to tell the Program Officer bluntly to read them, thinking it would insult him. To solve the problem I asked the Program Officer to present the main points of the new instructions to the rest of the staff, over two or three staff meetings. This would help them understand a difficult set of instructions, and would be a smooth way to get the Program Officer to immediately digest in detail the new instructions.

\* \* \* \*

A week after the Executive Officer went on leave, his secretary submitted a request for transfer together with a draft of her End-of-Tour report. In the latter she said that she felt that her secretarial capabilities were not being used and she was afraid that this would affect her

opportunities for advancement. She added that she was losing her initiative and her respect for the mission. I knew that she was one of the most effective secretaries on the staff, and I was also afraid that her last comment would do her more harm than good. During a conference with her I learned that she was constantly being left in the middle of difficult situations. For example, the Executive Officer never told her anything, although she was constantly being called for information or services. I offered her a position as my secretary because my current one was ineffective and was transferring. The Executive Officer's secretary declined the position I offered because she felt she could not stay in the mission. I was unable to salvage this extremely good secretary for the mission, but I was able to convince her to revise her End-of-Tour report.

\* \* \* \*

I decided that part of the reason for the low morale of the secretaries was partly the pressure of work, and partly that many of the officers did not know how to use their secretaries. There had been no attempt to orient them to the work, no explanations about what they were doing or why. This demonstrated a need for "in-service training" for the mission officers as well as the staff. I had not pushed for this before because I thought the Director and the Executive Officer were planning to do something in this area. However, it is increasingly clear that they are not planning anything, so I will decide what needs to be done. In-service training is always valuable, and will be particularly helpful here because of the lack of communication.

\* \* \* \*

The Executive Office is the most poorly organized and operated part of the mission. It is necessary for me to constantly supervise the Executive Officer in order to insure that minor but crucial tasks are performed. For example, I have had to remind him to set up chairs for a ceremony, to provide transportation from the airport for arriving technicians, and to provide substitute chauffeurs when absences occurred. I have tried providing reminders of job duties, but this does not seem to work. The Executive Office is a real problem in this mission.

\* \* \* \*

#### 9. Rewards outstanding performance

The Deputy Director participates in providing rewards, either directly or indirectly. He sometimes writes recommendations, or actually provides a reward, as was done in one incident below. At other times the Deputy advises others concerning procedures for providing rewards, and helps judge whether or not rewards are appropriate. For most cases the method of rewarding is thoroughly covered by regulations. However, there are flaws which prevent the system from working properly. These flaws, as the incidents listed below indicate, stem from erroneous or unethical personal judgments.

(From subordinate) A host national mission employee had committed an illegal act. Six months later he was up for promotion, which I refused. The Deputy overruled me, and approved the promotion. The Deputy's decision was unjustified, it made me appear ineffective, and it had a negative effect on my morale.

\* \* \* \*

(From subordinate) The Deputy recommended me for an award, but asked me to write the justification. I refused, on the basis that this procedure would be unethical, and because my view of myself could not be objective. Since I refused, the recommendation was never made, apparently because the Deputy was unwilling to do the work.

\* \* \* \*

(From subordinate) While I was in the United States the Deputy recommended one of my subordinates for a well-known award. At this same time I was writing an efficiency report on the same subordinate, but I had not been told of the Deputy's intention. I did not consider the subordinate worthy of the award, and had intended writing an average efficiency rating. With news of the special recommendation, I was forced to write what I considered a dishonest efficiency report because I could not afford to contradict the Deputy. It would have been only reasonable for the Deputy to consult me before recommending my subordinate.

\* \* \* \*

The Program Officer was just completing a period of difficult, complex work, in an effort to produce the CAP in time to meet the designated deadline. I knew that the Program Officer wanted to make a short trip back to the United States, and that someone should go to AID/W with our CAP presentation. Since I wanted to reward the Program Officer, I suggested that he be allowed to carry the CAP to Washington, and provide consultation as necessary. The Director agreed, so I asked AID/W to send orders for the Program Officer. The Program Officer returned to the mission after his trip feeling refreshed, and eager to return to work.

\* \* \* \*

A mission staff officer has been creative in non-job activities, producing some ideas with a strong impact potential. These originally brought him favorable attention from the Ambassador and from the Mission Director. Then, on a trip to AID/W, the Director learned that someone from this staff member's office had made embarrassing allegations, which were (probably falsely) attributed directly to the staff member. Now the staff member, with the Ambassador's support, is pushing for promotion. The Director refused to recommend the promotion, so the staff member appealed to me. There was really no substantive action for me to take, but I was able to see that nothing would be gained by denying the recommendation. It was obvious that the staff member's morale would be hurt badly if the recommendation was refused, and that his production would be negative for the rest of his tour. Therefore, I agreed to arrange for the staff member to personally visit with the Director, knowing that it would be harder for the Director to refuse a promotion recommendation if the confrontation was face-to-face. After this meeting, the Director did recommend the promotion, making my prediction correct.

\* \* \* \*

We tried to obtain a promotion for one of our outstanding technicians, but without success. Finally the Executive Officer found a way to reward him through the incentive award system, but it was small, so I felt that a new effort should be attempted. I sent a new recommendation to AID/W, providing plenty of details, but they asked me for even more details. I sent more details, but to no avail.

\* \* \* \*

## 10. Reprimands and disciplines

Imposing disciplinary measures is seldom a direct responsibility of the Deputy Director except in the few cases in which he has control over divisions or staff offices. The more frequent occurrence is for the Deputy to be sought out for advice concerning a disciplinary problem, or for the Deputy to discover a disciplinary problem and consult the Director about what action should be taken.

The manual orders to some extent provide for disciplinary action, but supervisors within the missions are allowed discretion, and are able to interpret regulations. Typically, the Deputy Director is consulted about a disciplinary problem, discusses it with appropriate officials, and recommends a course of action. In serious cases, the Deputy is likely to discuss all appropriate facts with the Director in order to ensure precise reflection of mission policy.

A staff officer was refusing to work, was griping, was bothering other people who were trying to work, and refused to take responsibility even to the point of not signing off on documents sent to him. This employee had apparently received an insult, real or imagined, and preferred to spend his time complaining and trying to arrange for other people to support his point of view. When I learned of this, I advised the Director that the staff officer should first be given a warning, and if the warning was insufficient, then a recommendation for immediate transfer should follow. The Director agreed, so I summoned the man and gave him a stern warning. However, his behavior continued so I explained his behavior in an efficiency report and recommended that he be transferred. Again, I cleared my intentions with the Director because of the delicacy of the situation. Later we learned that the man had performed in a similar way in his next two (!) assignments, so we were correct in not wasting time with him.

\* \* \* \*

A new employee arrived with extremely high qualifications. Soon after arriving, the supervisor of the new employee complained to me that the man was never on the job. The new man disregarded mission discipline and produced no work. It was learned that he had submitted an article full of mission gossip to a prominent magazine. The Director heard of this first and asked me to handle the situation. I called in the employee and told him he was not to discuss mission personnel or mission policy with non-mission people, and that he was to do his work. Otherwise disciplinary action would be taken. The employee again disregarded his job, so I called him in again only to learn that he had numerous personal problems. After hearing of these problems, I decided to give the man a third chance. This did not pay off, because the employee's unsatisfactory behavior continued. Therefore, with the Director's approval, I notified AID/W to transfer the man.

\* \* \* \*

(From a subordinate) A contract technician was temporarily placed in an AID apartment normally reserved for direct-hire AID personnel, but when a host government house became available the technician refused to move. Finally, after a long struggle, he moved to the house, which he claimed to be grossly substandard. The technician refused to sleep in the house, using it only for storage, and very untactfully made it clear that the housing was unsatisfactory to him. This, of course, was embarrassing to the mission because the house was supplied by the host government and everything possible had been done to make it habitable. The host government began to wonder what kind of technicians AID was bringing into the country. The situation revolved around a question of control. Every member of the contract group was asking the Deputy when he

would do something about the substandard housing being provided for contractors. They are slowly beating him down to the point where they will dictate to him the kind of housing they want, and what he should say to the host government on the subject. The technician continued to complain very publicly and the other contract personnel continued complaining too, but the Deputy would do nothing because he wanted to avoid hurt feelings. Instead, he is waiting for a contract team leader to arrive, and at that time intends discussing the situation.

\* \* \* \*

The Assistant Executive Officer had been acting Executive Officer for an interim period. Upon arrival of the new Executive Officer the Assistant Executive Officer became bitter, no longer wanted to work, and refused to associate with the Executive Officer. The Executive Officer brought this matter to my attention but because the Assistant Executive Officer's tour will be completed within a few weeks, and he will depart, I decided to take no action.

\* \* \* \*

A technician was planning to make a field trip which was unnecessary, and at a time when he was needed in the mission. I told him not to go on the trip, and the reasons for not going, but he went anyway. When he returned, I told him that if he repeated such disobedience, disciplinary action would result. Actually I was talking through my hat because I really have no effective method of disciplinary action. Even if I were able to write his efficiency report, I would have little control because of the pressure to rate everyone at the "4" level.

\* \* \* \*

11. Provides advice about, or handles, special behavior problems

A group of Americans living abroad must provide services for themselves which are usually taken for granted in the United States. For example, it is occasionally necessary to provide for the safety of the American community. When emergencies do occur, it is often necessary to cope with the problem, and in some cases, to avoid having host nationals become aware of the problem. For example, one Deputy was called upon to contend with a nervous breakdown by a visiting official. The Deputy Director is pressed into service to handle such emergencies, perhaps by chance, perhaps because of his position, perhaps because of his personality, interests or aptitudes.

Each involvement is a problem situation, and such problems vary considerably in scope, detail, and importance. Therefore, solutions must be provided on an individual basis, and there is little opportunity for advance warnings, although not all such emergencies are as serious or as dramatic as the two listed below.

An administrative employce was an ineffective worker, and was a suspected alcoholic. One day I received a telephone call from the man's wife. She explained that her husband was brandishing a gun, and threatening to kill her and the children. I immediately went to their home and discovered that the husband was very drunk and that he had completely lost control of himself. I quietly asked him for the gun, which he surrendered without argument. We were then able to calm him, and get him to sleep. Later we were able to get him transferred, and he was eventually dropped from AID.

\* \* \* \*

An American administrative employee was involved in an accident in which he inadvertently struck a host national with his car. My involvement did not come until the host national had already been hospitalized and was well cared for. In order to be absolutely certain that bad relations did not develop, I visited the host national in the hospital several times. I did this in order to make sure that the host national was being properly cared for, and to help counter any adverse opinion that might be developing. Apparently my efforts were more successful than it had been possible to anticipate because I heard several host nationals remark that Americans certainly had respect for people.

\* \* \* \*

## B. Serves as Acting Mission Director

The amount of time that Deputies serve as Acting Director varies considerably from almost none to almost a full assignment. There is no accurate method for predicting just when and to what extent a Deputy will need to assume control. Consequently, the task of "staying ready" to assume control is of primary importance.

As a mission secretary expressed it, staying ready consists of "crawling inside the Director's head to learn everything inside." It is significant to note that most Deputies reported that their jobs did not change when they became Acting Directors. Instead, it was reported that they simply changed from being the next to last person to sign or verify, or decide, or review, to the last person to do so. However, it is exceedingly difficult to stay ready to assume responsibility without complete information, without complete access to information, without being in all ways and continuously the "next to last person" to sign, verify, decide, or review.

Several Deputies reported that the Director gave them a daily briefing of what had been done, and current thinking on work in progress. However, other Deputies reported just the reverse. The most severe criticism of this type was that one Director simply did not spend enough time with the Deputy, never sought out the Deputy to relay information, and that 99 per cent of all contacts were at the Deputy's initiative.

Deputies reported that problems also developed when they were serving as Acting Directors. The most usual problem of this type is that cooperation is difficult to obtain. Everyone, host nationals as well as mission staff, is aware that the deputy is in an "acting" capacity. Thus, there is a tendency to wait, or to delay action, until the Director returns to his post.

A similar problem is encountered both by Directors and Deputies acting as Chief of Mission. This problem is that mission authority is not clearly defined. It was reported that no one in AID really knew how much authority was possessed by an Acting Director. The only alternative is for them to try to learn by "feel" what they can and cannot do.

### C. Deals with Visitors

As a ranking mission official, the Deputy is pressed into service to care for mission visitors. Highest ranking visitors are entertained by the Mission Director, or by both the Director and the Deputy combined, but there are enough lower ranking visiting officials to keep a Deputy occupied for a significant portion of his time.

Visitors to a mission vary as to rank, nationality, and purpose, and are reported to come in a constant stream. Several Deputies reported this as a real hardship because of the frequency of occurrence, and because even one visitor requires considerable time.

Notification of the arrival of official visitors is almost always received in advance by the mission, so that a measure of preplanning is possible. However, there are also frequent visits by unannounced guests, frequently businessmen, who desire information, advice, or financing. For all visitors, no matter how inappropriate the visit may be, it is necessary for the Deputy to be polite, to provide as much information and advice as possible. All Deputies feel that they need to be concerned about the AID image, both at home and abroad. In the host country, it is necessary to possess a good image in order to create good working relationships, to ensure coordination, and to obtain respect and friendship. Americans from private business and government can, upon returning to the

United States, register complaints regarding real or imagined slights. Therefore, the Deputy tends to be helpful to the maximum limit possible within the framework of mission operations and security requirements.

1. Provides briefings

A main service provided to visitors is to brief them on the AID effort within the host country. This is often a picture of the total effort, but is sometimes a specialized briefing concerning a specific project, or a specific problem situation. Briefings of this type are generally provided for official United States visitors, and are generally done in a formal setting. In addition, either formal or informal briefings are given to businessmen, host country officials, third country nationals, and officials of international agencies.

Some Deputies reported that the necessity to give briefings was disruptive of normal work schedules, but most Deputies welcomed the opportunity to give briefings as a vehicle for "spreading the mission story." Some Deputies reported being handicapped by the volume of businessmen who came asking for information and for AID financing. This creates the necessity for repetitive and time consuming explanations, for example, of the qualifications necessary for a loan, and the procedure for applying for it.

An American engineer who represents a large construction firm in the host country dropped in without an appointment. I saw him immediately. The visitor indicated that his visit was to obtain information, so I gave him a thumb-nail sketch of current and potential AID projects, information regarding project financing, bidding factors, currency conversion problems, and then referred him to a host national mission employee for further information. The visitor commented favorably on the amount of information which he received.

\* \* \* \*

. . . .

A high level Department of State official came through the host country. An AID briefing was part of his itinerary. I gave the briefing concerning our program, giving particular stress to some of our problems, particularly the problem of conducting feasibility studies and the negative impression they create. In this way, I was able to use the briefing to stress an issue which was of concern to me.

\* \* \* \*

Several months ago the president of an American firm visited me. He had a contract with a firm having an AID contract here in the host country. The visitor arrived unannounced, seeking guidance. I gave him information, advice, and made appointments for him to see other people. Later he dropped in again, wanting AID financing for some work he wanted to do in the host country. I explained to him why AID could not finance work such as he proposed, and suggested that he deal directly with the host government, and that if he worked for them that he arrange for advance payment. On a third visit to my office, he stated that he had completed his work, and that he would now like to be paid by AID. I repeated that AID could not pay for his work and that he should visit the host government. This American businessman handled his affairs in a very poor way and took up my time needlessly.

\* \* \* \*

The day before yesterday the Director got a call from the Peace Corps Representative who asked the Director to give a talk to 30 new PCV's regarding what AID does. The Director was very busy preparing for a field trip so he asked me to give the briefing. He so informed the Peace Corps Representative and I delivered the speech, taking about 45 minutes.

\* \* \* \*

## 2. Arranges itineraries and conferences

For planned visits by officials the Deputy participates with mission personnel in the preparation of detailed schedules. It is frequently necessary to prepare these schedules without advance knowledge of the visiting delegation's interests or time requirements. Thus, the Deputy and his colleagues are required to make judgments concerning what they anticipate will be the visitors requirements. At times these judgments are incorrect, creating the need for haste.

(From subordinate) The Deputy always asks me to construct itineraries for visitors. I always comply with the request, but my work is duplicated because the Deputy constructs his own itinerary for the same visitor, and overrules what I have done. The Deputy does this with every visiting delegation coming to our mission so there is a considerable amount of wasted time.

\* \* \* \*

The Chief of State of the host country was planning a visit to the site of one of our projects. Knowing of the visit in advance, I arranged for the Chief of State's itinerary to include a personal greeting to every member of the project staff. By including this item in the itinerary, I built up the morale of both the host national and American project staff members.

\* \* \* \*

A cable arrived announcing an official United States visitor who wanted to see everything. The Director and I worked together to prepare a schedule for the visitor, including transportation schedules, stopover facilities, and a program of briefings by Division Chiefs. The visit went smoothly, so our careful planning was worthwhile.

\* \* \* \*

While on annual leave I received a telegram asking me to return to work because of the impending visit of a high-ranking Department of State official. I immediately returned to work, and spent long hours planning a program for the visitor. The visitor did not arrive on schedule, and we later learned that the visit to our mission had been canceled. I did not resent interrupting my leave, and working needlessly, but, after learning the facts of the case, it was obvious that a simple cable to us would have prevented the misunderstanding.

\* \* \* \*

### 3. Accompanies visitors on tours

It is occasionally necessary for the Deputy to accompany visitors on tours, especially if the visiting personnel are of high rank. A lengthy field trip removes the Deputy from important mission work and disrupts normal work schedules. Several Deputies complained of this, stating that such tours were non-productive and time-consuming. On the other hand, a few Deputies stated that they needed to make field trips in order to really know and understand what was going on in the field, and that tours with visitors were the only real opportunity to break away from office routine for first-hand observing.

While accompanying visitors on tours the Deputy is required to provide general and specific details of mission work and sometimes to serve as an interpreter.

I accompanied the visitor to the project site. While traveling, and while inspecting project work, I answered his questions about problems and progress, and explained project details

such as financing and supervision. A considerable block of my time was used up, but the visitor's requirements were adequately met.

\* \* \* \*

D. Maintains Social Relations with Personnel from other U.S. Agencies, other Donor Agencies, and the Diplomatic Corps.

It is necessary to maintain good relationships with other agencies and units operating in the host country. The bulk of non-mission working interactions are with Embassy personnel. Apart from working situations, activities help to ensure reasonable cooperation and coordination with the Embassy and with other units. The Director and Deputy, as ranking executives, participate most heavily in these activities. According to most Deputies, entertaining and being entertained is simply an integral part of the job, although, of course, occurring outside normal work hours.

A main problem with this responsibility is the volume of entertaining. Deputies expressed a taste for social activities except for the time involvement. For example, one Deputy reported that during his first year he attended a function of some type almost every night. During his second year at the post, job demands and time factors forced him to adopt the policy of attending only official functions. This solution permitted him to avoid giving offense by rejecting some while accepting other unofficial invitations. The quantity of invitations made it impossible for him to accept all of them.

My first meeting with the Ambassador had revealed him to be unpleasant and my relations with him continued to be unpleasant for six months. The Ambassador would not even speak to me for some time. Then the political officer informed me that it was thought in the Embassy that I was the protégé of two high AID officials who pushed the "hard" AID line. This was an important concept

because the Ambassador is an advocate of "soft"  
aid. I maintained a pleasant aspect and made  
only complimentary remarks concerning the  
Ambassador. The situation now is that the  
Ambassador is also saying complimentary  
things about me.

\* \* \* \*

## V. PARTICIPATES IN MISSION REPRESENTATION

The probable importance of this task justified considering it as a separate major function. Amounts of contacts with the hosts vary with differences in jobs and personalities. The USAID Deputy Director's position appears to be at the upper end of the scale, having working and social contacts with important host nationals, practically on a daily basis, and frequently involving important items of business. Since the Deputy Director is the second, and at times the first figure in mission representation, it is believed to be mandatory that he be able to develop and maintain successful relations with his hosts.

Communications difficulties were the most commonly reported obstacles to successful representation. It is, of course, virtually impossible to obtain a Deputy Director completely fluent in certain of the host languages. Even if the Deputy Director has a high degree of proficiency in the host national language, he is likely to be handicapped because of subtleties, colloquial usages, and slang. Further, many underdeveloped countries have several dialects. Even when English is an adopted official language, there are problems because host nationals and Americans often consider the host nationals to be fluent, when in fact, they are not. Most Deputies reported problems of one kind or another with language.

Other communication problems exist because of cultural differences. These difficulties are more subtle, and difficult to recognize. For example, several Deputies reported that it was impossible for them to know what the host nationals meant, or even whether they understood, when they replied "yes" to a question. One Deputy reported that a host national said to him, "you don't understand the system." Another Deputy, articulating what is probably well-known, said of host national-American relations, that "we have communications difficulty because we have no common heritage; we emphasize, observe, and are impressed by different things."

Other examples of obstacles will be listed below under specific tasks.

A. Develops "Good" Relations with Host National Personnel.

It is difficult to define this task and apparently even more difficult to perform it well. However, the need for good relations is unquestioned. "Good" relations in this context is a dynamic or perhaps fluid concept. Based on situations, personalities, and goals, "good" relations has meant anything from being considered a "nice" guy to being considered a hard headed, dictatorial American. The material presented here makes no attempt to define when, how, to what degree, and with whom, an American should attempt to mold an image of himself. However, it is intended to present some of the obstacles to such an effort, and some examples of effective and ineffective behavior.

One of the first obstacles that must be considered is that contacts are not always easy to make. One Deputy remarked that he considered himself lucky to be able to talk with a Minister because the Ministers travel a great deal, either on business or pleasure, and thus are hard to reach. Most Deputies reported that it was necessary to be on constant guard because host nationals are eager to obtain maximum benefits from United States assistance for their own personal advantage as well as for the good of their country. A third problem reported with some frequency was that host nationals with whom the Deputies needed to interact tended to consider themselves above the Deputy in status and were either inaccessible or unfriendly. Deputies also commented on pride or "face" as a factor in preventing good relations. For example, some Deputies felt that many host nationals, while eager to receive maximum benefits, are also sensitive about receiving aid. One Deputy said, "If you insult them about money matters, work is held up."

For some Deputies this task to a considerable extent consists of cultivating friendships. Among Deputies opinion was divided, however, between those who thought it necessary to cultivate and have friends among ranking host national officials, and those who avoided such friendships. One Deputy stated that friendships were very important and that without

them his job could not be accomplished. Other Deputies denied having friends among host national officials, and stated that such a situation would be improper. For example, one Deputy explained that after he had carefully established some friendships that the "friends" began clamoring for special favors. Consequently he began quietly to reduce his social contacts.

Regardless of which school of thought is correct concerning cultivation of friendships, the fact remains that an AID official, particularly at the Deputy Director level, must initiate and pursue contacts and establish and maintain some working rapport with host nationals. One group of host nationals reported to interviewers that "it is a tragedy that Americans won't mix. They are making themselves hated the world over." Another group of host nationals said that relations with Americans were good but that "the Americans have a hard job. They don't understand us, and we don't understand them. The worst thing that is creating this situation is that Americans won't mix." In these same missions, the Deputy, like other mission personnel, considers that the problem exists because the host nationals will not mix.

(Observed incident) In a meeting of several American AID officials and one local national official the Americans discussed a topic for 40 minutes. Finally, the Deputy called on the host national official. When the host national started to talk the Americans continued to talk among themselves and finally drowned out the host national's voice. The Deputy, who was seated next to the host national, continued to listen to him and finally called the meeting back to order.

\* \* \* \*

We were providing assistance in a specific project, but the project was failing due to lack of trained local national personnel, and insufficient local national interest in the work. After the decision was made to phase out of this project, it was my job to convince the host government to accept the withdrawal. I did this by visiting the appropriate officials and explaining to them in such a way that no feelings were

hurt. I had previously established rapport with several host national officials, so I was able to speak frankly and avoid resentment.

\* \* \* \*

Many million dollars were available for loans. A Division Chief received a quarter million dollar loan application for a company in which a host national Minister is a partner. Host national employees of the mission division advised the Division Chief of the situation and indicated fear that there might be pressure to deprive them of their jobs if things did not go well with the application. The Division Chief brought the problem to me so I told him to tell the Minister that the loan application fell under my final jurisdiction. With this the Minister insisted on meeting me. At our meeting the Minister indicated that everything was aboveboard and that other people were getting loans, that he might as well get his share. I indicated that the answer was "No" because the loans were set up for development in an area not appropriate to the Minister. The Minister then threatened to expose past graft, but I replied that the answer still had to be "No." I also explained that several other host nationals would see the loan application and therefore that it would be hard to conceal an improper loan such as the one the Minister was proposing. With this, the Minister calmed down somewhat, and we were able to continue loan negotiations in an acceptable manner.

\* \* \* \*

I met with a host national official on my last field trip. He had just spent four weeks in the United States. The only thing he would talk about was the ability of our elevators to go up so many floors, and the height of our buildings. I could not get him off this type of conversation. It was a wasted meeting from my point of view. This example points up the fact that we have to learn their environment and background in order to be able to live and work in this context.

\* \* \* \*

## B. Represents Mission at Social Events

The number of social events at most missions is very large. The Deputy Director attends social affairs given by host nationals, Embassy staff, international organizations, the diplomatic community and mission personnel. By far the most frequent comment concerning social events was that they were extremely time-consuming, but that they were so necessary a part of mission life that reduction was impractical.

For all contacts with host nationals, Deputies are guided by standard rules of conduct. In addition to rules of etiquette and protocol there are other considerations which govern contacts with host nationals. Deputies reported that they were required to avoid topics of conversation which fall within the realm of Embassy work, and that United States policy, for example, toward dictators, communism, or tariffs, must be kept in mind in order to avoid misunderstandings.

### 1. Attends and gives luncheons, parties, etc.

Entertaining appropriately, and with results, such as gaining rapport or learning useful information, seldom produces praise for a Deputy Director. However, if he fails or is lax at the same task, he is likely to be criticized. For example, one mission employee reported that "the Deputy Director's lack of entertaining is noted by many people. This failure hurts the mission, especially since the only host nationals who attend the few socials that he does give are already known to him."

This task is an important one for the Deputy Director. The Mission Director is obviously the principal AID person in the host country, but he is frequently occupied with pressing duties in program development, mission and agency policy, and strictly ceremonial affairs. This leaves the Deputy Director as the only USAID official with the time and the necessary rank to adequately

represent the mission socially. Objective judgment concerning successful entertaining is perhaps impossible. However, it was reported that, with one exception, Deputy Directors interacted socially with host nationals either very little or not at all.

I decided to give a reception to meet host government officials, but when the Ambassador heard of this, he instructed me to cancel the reception and to meet only with host nationals that I already knew, and that any contact would be made in the presence of an Embassy official. I prevailed upon my secretary, a host national who knows many people, to call certain host government officials and move the conversation in such a way that the host government officials would request my presence and in such a way that the call would come in with insufficient time to arrange for an Embassy official to go along. Therefore, I was able to meet host nationals on their own ground and at their request, and not contradict the orders of the Ambassador.

\* \* \* \*

At a party I was talking to a Deputy Minister. It had been very difficult to see this man since he was very busy. I made a kidding remark. This enraged the Deputy Minister who told the Director that I didn't understand the host nationals. The Deputy Minister also told a visiting United States official that he couldn't get along with me. Now I am persona non grata with the Deputy Minister, especially since I am also held responsible for cancelling certain programs which the Deputy Minister favored.

\* \* \* \*

## 2. Attends or participates in ceremonies

The Deputy often attends ceremonies with the Director, and sometimes attends them by himself. This type of ceremony includes those in which important documents are signed, in which equipment, supplies or buildings are transferred, anniversary ceremonies such as

those held on independence days and other important national holidays, the beginning and/or end of capital projects, such as dam or road construction, and other events which involve publicity. This activity often requires that the Deputy give a speech, either planned or impromptu, propose and reply to toasts, and perhaps participate in ceremonial events such as laying a cornerstone, or cutting a tape to permit traffic to pass.

C. Provides Information, Advice and Assistance to Host National Personnel

Most Agency officials, especially the Deputy because of his rank, encounter the need to provide advice, information and opinions to host nationals. Deputies have found that offering unsolicited advice or opinions is advantageous, even if not directly related to the job. Examples of this activity are given in the specific categories listed below.

1. Provides information on policy or procedural changes

Many host nationals are interested in the Americans who are working in their country, and the procedures under which the Americans operate. Also, more sophisticated host nationals realize that in most cases their country is contributing something, even if the contribution is minor or deferred, to the jobs being done by the Americans. Therefore, there is further interest in learning about the Americans and their effectiveness. For the Deputy Director this curiosity often takes the form of questions asked by host nationals, such as "why are the salaries of Americans so high," "why does the mission have such a large administrative staff," or "why must a feasibility study be accomplished"? From the American's viewpoint, especially the Deputy Director since he is part of the Director's office

and thus has negotiating and ceremonial duties, there is conflict between the desire to get a job done quickly, and the need to take the time to explain matters to host nationals.

A meeting occurred just prior to a host national election and many comments were being made about the United States not really helping the host government. I understood all of the remarks and in my own speech at the meeting emphasized what the United States had already done for the host country. This silenced some unwarranted criticism and informed some host nationals as to what the United States was doing for their country and therefore hopefully made relations better.

\* \* \* \*

I learned, late one afternoon, that there was to be a conference of a professional group from all parts<sup>of the</sup> of the host country the following day. This would afford a good opportunity for someone from AID to speak on the assistance program, to give the host nationals information, and to get publicity that would be spread by the professionals in their own remote areas of the country. The professional group was agreeable and asked that a talk be scheduled for the next day. I changed my mind about speaking because I decided that some of the professionals would be very sophisticated, and that I would have to give a very good speech. This would be tough because our mission is not really clear on several policies, so our attitude toward many issues is hard to define. Therefore, I decided that although the opportunity was a good one, it was necessary to pass it up because of inadequate preparation time.

\* \* \* \*

I received a call from a host national official immediately following an important United States foreign policy statement from Washington. There was to be a mass meeting at the host national's office and I was invited to attend. I found the meeting was really held in an auditorium, so I took a seat in the front row. The host national Ambassador to Washington was also attending. The official presented a fairly good speech to those present. Then he called on the Ambassador to Washington to make comments about the United States foreign policy statement. The Ambassador replied that he would reserve his comments until after hearing from the representative from AID. I was therefore forced into an impromptu speech. I have no idea whether or not I was effective, but I did try very hard to clarify any misunderstandings that might exist because of the foreign policy statement.

\* \* \* \*

2. Advise host government on their operations

Deputies reported that they occasionally found opportunities to provide advice over and above their basic job, with no direct benefit to the mission or to the United States except for the cementing of good relations, or the potential benefit of preventing obstacles. Advice of this type is usually unsolicited, and is made possible by the particular skills, training, and interests of a given incumbent.

I read in the newspaper that a new bridge was to be built by the host government. I realized that the new bridge was parallel to an already existing bridge, and was to be a short distance away from the old bridge. I took my Division Chief to see the old bridge and found it fairly adequate. We worked out comparative cost figures, one set for building the new bridge and one set for extensively repairing

the old bridge. Then I took the data to a meeting with the Ministers involved, and explained that it would be much cheaper to repair the old bridge. Still, they insisted they would go ahead and build the new bridge so I was unsuccessful. I later obtained a property map of the area and learned that some key officials had property in the area in which the bridge was to be built.

\* \* \* \*

One of the unreal features of the host national budget is that it does not include any of the grants or loans from AID. This not only eliminates public recognition of the contribution by AID, but makes host government budgetary planning and decisions quite difficult. The Director and I decided to persuade the host government to list AID contributions as income in their annual budget, but we were unsuccessful. I think that we were not familiar enough with host national values to be able to present it in such a way as to convince them.

\* \* \* \*

I obtained some information from businessmen about equipment which revealed that considerable money could be saved if ordering was done at a certain time of the year, and in the proper quantities. I knew that the host government was interested in acquiring this type of equipment, so I gave the information to a host national Minister. My information will save them a considerable amount of money.

\* \* \* \*

One of the main problems in this country is that there is no horizontal movement on the part of the government officials. For example, in negotiating an agricultural program you may be negotiating with the Minister involved with

agriculture, but to get him to cooperate and work with personnel involved with marketing is a major undertaking. I have been explaining coordination to the various Ministries and have finally gotten a committee appointed which will bring Ministries together. This will help us too because the Director and I will be able to negotiate with the Committee. It has just been formed, so I don't yet know how it will work out.

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