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9. ABSTRACT

A language is proposed and used for describing recent evolution of parts of the socio-economic system of Lima and its hinterland. The basic concept, "plays", refers to courses of action an individual feels possible for himself in a given situation. Building upon that definition, the author describes institutions in terms of the frequency with which a particular play is chosen by a population in a given situation, and significant population segments are identified by the set of instructions they use. It is argued that migrants to Lima, by inventing certain plays and standardizing them, have created an array of alternative institutions for, among other things, housing, manufacturing, credit, and prestige. Through these institutions, the population using them have been able to "disengage" from counterpart institutions (e.g., banks, commercial builders, legal manufacturers, upper-class prestige symbols) participation in which is disadvantageous to them, giving themselves thereby an improved position in the socio-economic system as a whole. It is argued further that this system is, in turn, part of another system that encompasses the hinterland, encouraging further migration, which further strengthens the alternative institutions, creating a deviance amplifying feedback loop.

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From Play Lexicons to Disengagement  
Spheres in Peru's Urbanization

by

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Abstract

From Play Lexicons to Disengagement  
Spheres in Peru's Urbanization

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J. Douglas Uzzell

A language is proposed for describing recent evolution of parts of the socioeconomic system of Lima and its hinterland; and such a description is begun. The basic concept, "plays," refers to courses of action an individual feels possible for himself in a given situation. Building upon that definition, the author defines institutions in terms of the frequency with which a particular play is chosen by a population in a given situation, and significant population segments are identified by the set of institutions they use. It is argued that migrants to Lima, by inventing certain plays and standardizing them, have created an array of alternative institutions for, among other things, housing, manufacturing, credit and prestige. Through these institutions, the populations using them have been able to "disengage" from counterpart institutions (e.g., banks, commercial builders, legal manufacturers, upper class prestige symbols) participation in which is disadvantageous to them, giving themselves thereby an improved position in the socioeconomic system as a whole. It is further argued that this system is, in turn, part of another system that encompasses the hinterland, encouraging further migration, which further strengthens the alternative institutions, creating a deviance amplifying feedback loop.

From Play Lexicons to Disengagement  
Spheres in Peru's Urbanization

Jorge Maldonado's mother came to Lima from Apurimac in 1941, when Jorge was a year old.<sup>1</sup> She had been abandoned by Jorge's father. She had another son, slightly older than Jorge, by another man. She rented a shack in a corralón in Rimac near a sister and some other relatives and maintained herself and her sons by working as a seamstress. In 1969, Jorge was a thriving clandestine manufacturer of sweaters and blouses. He had several heavy-duty sewing machines and special equipment such as electric shears and a buttonhole machine. He marketed his clothing directly to shop owners, and by consignment to several friends and kinsmen, who in turn sold it directly on the streets of the city and in several pueblos jóvenes, as well as to owners of stalls in markets and to walking vendors.

Jorge's business was in his home in the same locality his mother had come to originally, although the place had been transformed from a corralón into a pueblo joven--the shacks being razed in 1968 and the locality being divided into lots with room for streets and public buildings. Jorge's half brother Esteban also lived in the pueblo joven in a three-story brick home, one floor of which housed the 23 machines on which Esteban's employees manufactured women's undergarments. Esteban's factory was legitimate.

Jorge's house was made of scrap wood and cane matting. It had a dirt floor. Electricity for the machines came illegally from the home of a

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<sup>1</sup>All names are fictitious.

relative outside the pueblo joven. There was no plumbing. Jorge's employees included several young women from the same or nearby pueblos jovenes, and at peak times, his mother, his aunt, and other relatives. The non-kin employees received about half the legal minimum salary. Earlier, relatives had constituted his entire work force.

Jorge's wife had been sent to the home of an "uncle"<sup>1</sup> in Lima from her natal vailage in Ayacucho to attend secondary school. She was unusually bright, and when it turned out that her relative intended to use her as a maid and not send her to school, she left his house, found a job, and continued her education. She completed ten years.

In 1970, Jorge declared his business to the government. At the baptism of his first child, he acquired a compadre by baptism, who was a certified public accountant with a large office downtown, although he lived in a pueblo joven adjacent to the one where Jorge lived. Now that Jorge needs an accountant, the compadre will serve him in that capacity. Also in 1970 Jorge hired an architect to design a new house. The house, which will be similar to Esteban's, will be on the same lot where the shack stood in 1970. Jorge had enough cash on hand in 1970 to pay for the house. At that time, he still did not use banks.

In 1970, Jorge's wife visited her native village to let her relatives there see the baby. When she returned to Lima the child was asustado<sup>2</sup> and had to be taken to a curandero in Rimac to be cured. She affectionately calls the son "cholo." She is a native speaker of Quechua and teases Jorge about his poor use of that language and his "impure" northern dialect. A

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<sup>1</sup>Tio, which I gloss as "uncle," is a term that means collateral male kinsman of ascending generation.

<sup>2</sup>Afflicted by fright sickness (see Uzzell, "Susto Revisited: Illness as Strategic Role," American Ethnologist, I, 2 (1974), 369-378.

younger brother of hers lives in the shack with them and attends secondary school. A cousin of Jorge's, a mathematics major at San Marcos University, visits them often. His parents live in another pueblo joven in Rimac District.

Moisés Beltrán came to Lima from Arequipa with his parents when he was a teenager, having been born in Cuzco and having lived in Chile, where his father worked as a miner. Beltrán is a name that his father assumed after fleeing Cuzco about 1940 to escape punishment for being a communist labor organizer and saboteur. The father came to Lima about 1942 and with mysterious financial backing successfully established himself as a wholesale merchant. Then he abandoned Moisés's mother and married another woman who, according to Moisés, divested him of his money and left him penniless and in poor health in the mid-1950s. At that point, Moisés and his mother, who had taken refuge in the home of an older half-sister of Moisés in a pueblo joven in Arequipa, came back to live with Moisés' father. The old man took a job as a hospital orderly and the three lived in the home he was building in a pueblo joven in San Martín de Porres until the father's accidental death about 1967. Moisés won a law suit brought by his father's wife for possession of the house, because he established that his father had married her using a false name.

In 1970, Moisés, his mother, his young wife and child and the wife's brother were living in the house in San Martín. Moisés had worked as a brick layer until he saved enough money to buy a car and become a colectivo driver. He added a second story to the house and divided it into two apartments, which he began renting in 1969.

Moisés has never lived in a peasant village. He speaks some Quechua because his mother does. Until her death in 1972, the mother used Quechua

in the house and kept a bag of coca leaves hidden in the pantry.

Most of the social activity of Moisés and his family is with relatives. (In fact, his wife is a distant relative. Her mother, by the way, is a live-in servant in Lima.) One cousin, in particular, is a frequent visitor. That cousin, Jaime, is a tailor now, although for fifteen years, he was part of a folk dance troupe. He is a member of an association of people from Cuzco and sponsored a mass and a fiesta for the group in 1970. Jaime, who lives in Zarate, is a very vocal exponent of "la cultura incaica" and encourages his guests to dance huainos.

Privately, Moisés calls himself a cholo, although he is thoroughly urban in background. Once, for example, he said to a group of folk singers in my house, "Frankly, we are all cholos. This pueblo joven was created by General Odria for us cholos."

Moisés and his mother own lots in a pueblo joven in Arequipa. The husband of his half-sister was president of the neighborhood association until his death. The half-sister still lives there in a comfortable house with servants' quarters and two maids. Next door to her is the three-story house of her daughter, who is married to the owner of a brick factory. In 1970, faced with the presence of squatters on their Arequipa lots, Moisés and his mother spent a month in Arequipa, making improvements on the lots to validate their claims to them.

Moisés and his family, and Jorge and his family, and Jaime and his family are cholos. There are at least one million--perhaps two--more or less like them in Lima. Some of their relatives are Indians. Some are not. The purpose of this paper is to discuss a way of understanding the dynamics by which the social system in Peru has modified itself to accommodate them.

Both Warnarian and Marxist models of class are inadequate for the analysis I intend--the Warnarian because it is no more than a stale and static categorization of populations on the basis of arbitrary characteristics; the Marxist because, though dynamic, it pits some of the wrong population sets against each other. Cholification involves a struggle for the means of production, but it also involves much more. It is as much like an ethnic struggle as a class struggle, and actually it is neither. On the other hand, the absence of systemic relationships between population sets in the Warnarian model seems designed only to perpetuate the Calvinist legacy in the United States wherein economic success was held to be a mark of divine favor. In scientizing our folk beliefs, we have substituted psychological explanations for theological ones, but the legacy remains. All that has changed is that instead of divine favor, we now speak of delayed gratification. (When Oscar Lewis proclaimed in the decade past that poor people are poor because they think and act like poor people--because they are poor--he was all but canonized in some circles.)

The analytical myth I wish to develop owes much to Fredrik Barth (and perhaps to John Barth). I am interested in the optative qualities of social systems: in the constraints contextually imposed upon actions and the changes wrought in those contexts by the cumulative force of individual choices. And finally, I wonder how a population set which is not a group by any ordinary definition, and which makes no corporate decisions, can have group-like effects on other population sets in a social system, modifying relations between all elements in the system.

As I see it, cholification is renovating the social system of Peru far more profoundly than any government, civilian or military, could do. Though its roots go far back, it is convenient to place the beginning of the change about the mid-1930s. That is when the pioneers of the present generation of migrants began arriving in Lima.

Service, following Goldschmidt, distinguishes between social structure and social organization roughly as follows. Social structure is the groups in a society; social organization is social structure, plus statuses and roles of members. Both of these terms seem to connote static arrangements, so as to stress the nonstatic nature of social relationship, I shall speak of social systems where service speaks of social organizations, with the understanding that (1) the systems are mythical entities and (2) that they are open, and perhaps undirected.

We often assign the term "group" indiscriminantly to population sets and to social sub-systems. I prefer to distinguish between the latter two terms, and to reserve the term "group" for a societal sub-system in which membership is self-ascribed and ascribed at least by the other members and in which there is a distinctive pattern of relationships among members. Other sub-systems will be called "aggregates." Social sub-systems are ascribed to population sets by the analyst. The population sets themselves may be distinguished according to any criterion or criteria the analyst chooses. In a population, members may be assigned to more than one population set.

I must now briefly define a term that I have used in two previous publications.<sup>1</sup> The term "play" covers the notion that gives my analytical

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<sup>1</sup>Uzzell, "A Strategic Analysis of Social Structure in Lima, Peru, using the Concept of "Plays," Urban Anthropology III, 1 (1974), 34-46; and "Cholos and Bureaus in Lima: Case History and Analysis," International

myth its optative quality. One purpose of this paper is to expand the notion beyond what I have done previously--to include status and role. Thus, I shall have included all the elements of Service's "social organization" in one definitional system.

A "play" is the image of an action. It is something I think I might do in a given situation. I may have more than one play for a situation, or more than one situation for a play. If there is more than one play for a situation, I must select a play. How the selection is done need not concern us in detail here. Selection may be entirely capricious, or it may follow some logical process. I make only two ceteris paribus assertions about the mechanism of play selection:

1. Actors will tend to select plays that they think will have optimal payoffs
2. They will prefer plays about which they are knowledgeable to those about which they know little.

We may speak of an individual's lexicon of plays. It is convenient to think of a play lexicon as taxonomically ordered, so that the situation is always the next higher order of play. A possible partial taxonomy is represented in figure 1.

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Figure 1: Taxonomy of Part of Individual Play Lexicon

Get Shelter						
Buy a house			Rent an apartment		Live with kin	
Finance the house	find house	execute legal documents	find apartment	obtain money	find kin	get permission

If I am in the situation of getting shelter and opt for the play "buy a house," that play becomes the situation. In that situation I must find a house. Finding a house then becomes the situation and I must choose among ways of finding a house, and so on.

An advantage of thinking about plays, rather than behavior, is that such thinking leads us to consider informational and other constraints on choosing this or that play. If I do not have the money to buy a house or other ways of raising the money--for example, by selling rural property--and I do not know that it is possible to get a loan, then I shall not choose the play "buy a house." If I know that loans are available but do not know how to get a loan--or how to find out how to get one--I may choose not to buy a house. And, of course, loans may not be available, or may be available on unacceptable terms; or I may not be able to repay the loan. In any of these cases, I will choose another play.

So each situation is a play, which in turn is a set of plays, some or all of which may be alternatives to each other.

For me, the most intriguing aspect of play selection is in the option for this or that set of gestures, poses (if you will), identities, and the outcomes of such selections.

A friend and I once went into Lima to buy building materials. My friend had delayed buying the materials until I had gradually become aware that he wanted me to accompany him. We entered a store and made our selection--and then it was time to confront the salesman. My friend, who a few minutes before had been urbane, witty, articulate in a discussion of relations between the United States and Peru, suddenly became a shuffling, mumbling Indian with downcast eyes and comic opera deference for the clerk,

who played tyrant to his obsequiousness. My friend was left dangling while the salesman gossiped with associates, dawdled about the place, and finally condescended to ask my friend gruffly what he wanted. Eventually, there was a problem about some of the floor tiles that my friend was buying being damaged. The salesman said in effect to take them or leave them.

At that point I interceded, uttered several obscenities to the salesman, and generally took over the role of tyrant--whereupon the salesman became the obsequious shuffler with downcast eyes. As we were driving home, my friend said, "Now you see why I wanted you along."

As we discussed the event, it became obvious that we regarded store clerks very differently. My friend, who had spent some time doing construction work, saw the clerk as a powerful and prosperous personage who recommended craftsmen to customers in return for a kickback from the craftsmen.

Given the clerk's status, my friend had automatically responded as though seeking work from him. I argued that the clerk was actually dependent on my friend's money for the base of his livelihood, etc.

I took considerable pleasure a few months later in seeing my friend enter the same store for all the world like the lord of the manor. I smiled while the clerk (a different one) scurried about, doing his bidding.

That brings us to the connection between plays and status and role. Any action involving another person also involves assertions of identities by each of the interactants. The asserted identities may be negotiated. For example, on our second trip to the building supplies store, the clerk might have refused to act out the identity that was reciprocal to the newly asserted identity of my friend. In that case, they would have had to

negotiate some other kind of relationship. However it may be accomplished, social actions assert identities, and what follows in the interaction is partly determined by the identities that are established.

Now recall that I have said that a play is a set of plays. Let us consider a play P, a set whose elements are grouped into subsets A, B, and C. Let us say that the plays  $a_1, a_2 \dots a_n$  are those parts of play P that establish the actor's identity. Plays  $b_1, b_2, \dots b_n$  are the plays that are determined by the identity. And plays  $c_1, c_2, \dots c_n$  are the plays that are not determined by the identity.

I define "role" as the subsets A and B of any play that involves interaction with another person. Of course, if more than two persons are involved in the interaction, and if they have different identities, the first actor's role may be complex. That is, his subsets A and B may be further divided into subsets of plays determining and determined by his relationship to each interactant. For example, the situation among two parents and a child.

Status seems most usefully to be considered as a measure of the dominance of one actor over another in an interaction. Perhaps the best way to express that notion in the present language is to say that the status of a given role, relative to another role, is the difference between the relative proportions of the two subsets C in the two plays in question. If only half the elements of one person's play are determined by subset A, and two-thirds of the other person's reciprocal play is determined by his subset A, then we may say in that interaction the second person has the lower status.

In every society, there are patterned ways of acting in certain situations. Those patterned ways of acting are institutions. If we could ask an entire population in a complex society what they would do in a given

situation--for example, finding shelter--we would find clusters of similar responses. That is, a population's play lexicon would show clusters of the same plays appearing with different frequencies in different parts of the population. Some institutions are aided by conscious organization, personnel, and buildings in which to exist. Those we may distinguish by calling them formal institutions.

In Peru, or in any modern state, one finds formal institutions to facilitate commercial activities, housing, manufacturing, health care, education, and others. There are banks and government economic agencies, building contractors and governmental agencies to regulate and enhance the supply of housing, medical schools, private practitioners, and governmentally sponsored health care centers, public and private educational facilities.

In Peru, as in the rest of the world, plays involving formal institutions occur with different frequency in different sets of the population. For example, poor people in Lima very rarely use banks, either for loans or for checking accounts. Even if you have enough money to make a checking account useful, you have to submit letters of credit and, in general, go to a great deal of trouble; and then few businesses will accept a check from you. If you need a loan, it is difficult or impossible to obtain one; and if you should qualify for one, interest rates are so high that it is not worthwhile to borrow. That is generally true of non-governmental formal institutions for education, medical care, and housing.

Obviously, one thing I am driving at is that populations could be meaningfully divided into sets on the basis of the frequency of occurrence of plays for given situations. Such sets might turn out to be arrayed

vertically or horizontally or both. The infrequency in some population sets of plays involving those formal institutions which are frequent among people who are university professors, high level government officials and the like is referred to by the absurd locution "marginality." However, if we think in terms of nonformal institutions and of the frequency of plays involving them in the various population sets, it may turn out that in Peru it is those professors, bureaucrats, and foreigners who are marginal, and not the majority of the population. This is especially true in Peru, where many of the informal institutions have become or are becoming formal institutions.

Cholification has been discussed in the literature by Schaedel,<sup>1</sup> Doughty,<sup>2</sup> Cotler,<sup>3</sup> and others. There is no need to repeat them. What I hope to do here is to suggest a mechanism by which cholification may be understood to take place, and in so doing to show how it is changing Peru's social system. In so doing, I will assert that it is neither a rural nor an urban phenomenon; nor is its meaning to be found in migration or in changing identities from Indian to non-Indian, although both are involved. The two men with whose biographical sketches I opened this paper would be as alien in a Quechua village as they would be in the Revolver Club.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>R. Schaedel, Plan Regional Para El Desarrollo Del Sur Del Peru, VI-V (PS/B/8 and PS/B/9, 1959)

<sup>2</sup>Paul L. Doughty, "Behind the Back of the City," in Peasants in Cities: Readings in the Anthropology of Urbanization, ed. by William Mangin (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1970); and "Peruvian Migrant Identity in the Urban Milieu," in The Anthropology of Urban Environments, ed. by T. Weaver and D. White (Society for Applied Anthropology Monograph Series II, 1972).

<sup>3</sup>Julio Cotler, "La Mecanica de la Dominacion Interna y del Cambio Social en el Peru," in Peru Problema 1, ed. by Jose Matos Mar et al (Lima: Moncloa-Campodonico, 1969), 145-188.

<sup>4</sup>A prestigious voluntary association in Lima.

I use the term Cholo temporarily to denote a population set who have particular kinds of play lexicons. For the moment, I shall call a cholo any person who, for certain situations, tends not to have plays that involve formal institutions, such as banks, architectural firms, private schools, but who does have plays that involve informal institutions such as pueblos juvenes, savings cooperatives and public schools. Now, my terminology does some violence to folk classifications, because it includes ethnic groups and aggregates such as Chinese, Japanese, blacks and some blancos, creoles or whatever one wishes to call the various European and urban oriented sets of the population. But let's set that aside for the moment.

Formation of the key nonformal institutions begins, for analytical purposes with the arrival in Lima of what Browning and Feint<sup>1</sup> call pioneer migrants. These are people for whom the formal institutions were either unavailable or available on terms prejudicial to their best interests. (An outstanding aspect of the major non-cholo formal institutions is that they operate in such a way as to exploit cholos.) These pioneer migrants--such as Jose's mother and Moisés' parents--had to invent plays or to learn them from kin and friends.

Had the rate of rural-urban migration remained low enough that those coming into the city did not significantly increase the proportion of their population set, the system might have changed in other directions than it has. The rate of migration was high enough, however, and the development

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<sup>1</sup>Harley L. Browning, and Waltraut Feindt, "Selectivity of Migrants to a Metropolis in a Developing Country: A Mexican Case Study," Demography, VI, 4 (November, 1969), 346-357.

of alternative plays successful enough, that in two subsystems of the Peruvian social system a deviance amplifying feedback loop was generated probably by the mid-1940s, during the wartime prosperity and following the 1940 earthquake, which created a large number of construction jobs.

Recall that according to my myth, ceteris paribus, people tend to select those plays they know the most about and those which optimize pay-offs. Now, if you come to Lima and you find that certain plays are impossible for you or have undesirable payoffs, and if further there are associates of yours who have already figured out alternatives to those plays, chances are you will learn about and place in your lexicon those newly pioneered plays. In that manner, the alternative plays become institutionalized.

As that process continues, several things begin to happen. First of all, the strength of some of the new institutions begins to increase as the number of people involved grows, there being not only safety, but profit in numbers. Second, as the new institutions become more visible and more successful they become attractive for various reasons to the non-cholo formal institutions. Every Peruvian government since Odria's dictatorship has made overtures to the pueblos jovenes; and beginning with Belaund there have been forthright large-scale attempts at cooptation.<sup>1</sup> The problem with cooptation, though, is that if it is not absolutely successful--as it may have been, for example, in the case of the U. S. labor movement--half-way measures simply create new plays among the exploited population and encourage further elaboration of those plays.

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<sup>1</sup>David Collier, "Squatter-settlement Formation and the Politics of Cooptation in Peru" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1971).

Another example of the deviance amplification that occurs when a formal institution deals with an informal one involves banks and pueblos juvenes. A few years ago banks began opening branches in a few of the larger and better developed pueblos juvenes. Their relations with individuals remained essentially the same as before. Now, however, savings cooperatives, the local counterparts of the banks, deposited their excess funds in the branches, while loaning money to their own members at about half the current bank rates. The basic outcome of such transactions was to siphon capital out of the pueblos juvenes. However, the structure of the relationship had changed because, besides individuals, the banks were now engaged in transactions with cholo institutions.

One neighborhood organization in San Martin de Porres approached the banks in the late 1960s. The organization planned to pave their streets, and individual householders were to deposit a certain amount each month until there was enough money to begin the paving. That was a common enough arrangement, following the pattern set by the local savings cooperatives; but the neighborhood organization took matters a step farther. They visited officials of each bank in the area, pointing out that they would be depositing several million soles in the next two or three years. Then they invited the officials to submit bids on services and interest rates. The neighborhood leaders then turned the screw another round. They arranged for the bank representatives to meet at the same time on a particular day to present their bids orally. Of course, the presentations were tape recorded, but also those bank officials were allowed to wait in a room situated so that they could hear each other's proposals. As a result the neighborhood association received far better terms than the savings cooperatives were receiving.

The most visible systemic changes have been the interposition of cholo institutions between individuals and the non-cholo institutions. By providing alternative plays for the population set which I have been calling cholos, the new institutions allow members to disengage from the old institutions. Then when (or if) they choose to re-engage, it will be in terms more favorable to themselves. However, the presence of the new institutions allows individuals as well as groups to negotiate their new relationships.

Now I am in a position to stop playing so fast and loose with the term cholo. For those of you for whom cholo means provincial or Indian orientation, I return to you the term--with these caveats:

1. The identity cholo consists of a set of plays that establishes that identity.
2. The plays are subject to innovation.
3. What passes for rural or provincial orientation in Lima is in many cases a new, urban creation, including songs, dances, creation myths and the like.

I know of people who have taken courses in Quechua in order to carry off their cholo identities.

Now, coming to speak of individuals who relate to the non-cholo institutions from the protection of the new cholo institutions, I shall speak of the cholo sphere of activities. Basically, the cholo sphere is a disengagement sphere. Hence, I arrive at the second term in the title of this paper. Blacks, Chinese, Japanese<sup>1</sup> and others who would not have the

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<sup>1</sup>See S. I. Thompson, "Survival of Ethnicity in the Japanese Community of Lima, Peru," Urban Anthropology, III, 2 (1974), 243-261.

term cholo applied to them may, nevertheless, make selective use of the institutions. Likewise, actors may selectively be cholos and non-cholos depending on their goals of the moment. Both Moisés Beltran and Jorge Maldonado do that. Most clearly, Jorge dips in and out of the cholo sphere at will. He is a clandestine manufacturer, using his rural oriented kinship contacts only until it is to his advantage to declare himself to the Ministry of Economy. He maintains his residence in a pueblo joven, but he hires an architect to design and a building contractor to build it. Moisés probably comes closer to being a full-time cholo than the others, but he can adopt other plays. His cousin, Jaime, takes least advantage of the disengagement sphere of the three. Yet he, more than the others, works at being a cholo. Explanations of why that might be so would carry us farther into psychology than I am prepared to go. However, Doughty and Jongkind's work with regional associations<sup>1</sup> is most valuable concerning this question.

So far, I have concentrated on the systemic changes in Lima, but that provides only half the picture. A second (and perhaps third) deviance amplifying system is simultaneously in operation--this one not limited to the boundaries of the city.

If you are a provincial person and you do not know anyone in the capital -- do not know even how to catch a bus for the city, much less how to get a job, find shelter, etc., once you get there--then chances are the play "migrate

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<sup>1</sup>Paul L. Doughty, "Peruvian Migrant Identity in the Urban Milieu" The Anthropology of Urban Environments, ed. by T. Weaver and D. White (Society for Applied Anthropology Monograph Series II, 1972); and C. F. Jongkind, "La Supuesta Funcionalidad de los Clubes Regionales en Lima, Peru," Boletin de Estudios Latinoamericanos (Centro de Estudios Latinoamericanos; University de Amsterdam, 1971), 11.

to Lima" will appear rarely in your lexicon. When it does appear, it will be fraught with uncertainty. You likely will migrate only if you are deviant in your locality, either by having some special skill, or by breaking a rule, or by having so few resources locally that you really have no other choices.

After a number of people migrate from your locality, however, and come back permanently or on visits (and after the means for cholos to get along in the city, become institutionalized) the play "migrate to Lima" must begin to appear in many situations in many lexicons. If that is true, then the trend that Browning and Feindt found in Monterrey<sup>1</sup> and that I found in Lima<sup>2</sup>--for migrants to become less unlike their peers in their place of origin--is explained. So is the rapid increase in migration rates, once a certain critical mass is reached. Thus, neither migration nor the changing urban social system can be understood without reference to each other. The classical physics model of cause and effect that economists inveigh with their "pushes" and "pulls" is simply inappropriate here. What we are seeing is a complex system of simultaneous multiple mutual causation.

Unfortunately, my hypothesis about the systemic properties of the acceleration of migration cannot be tested now, because with the exception of a continuing study by the Salisburys in Port Moresby<sup>3</sup> I know of no other researcher who has looked at the whole locus of migration and reported

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<sup>1</sup>Browning and Feindt, op. cit.

<sup>2</sup>Uzzell, "Bound for Places I'm Not Known to: Adaptation of Migrants and Residence in Four Irregular Settlements in Lima, Peru" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Texas at Austin, 1972).

<sup>3</sup>R. E. Salisbury and M. Salisbury, "The Rural-Oriented Strategy of Urban Adaptation: Siane Migrants in Port Moresby," in The Anthropology of Urban Environments, edited by T. Weaver and D. White (Boulder: The Society for Applied Anthropology, 1972).

his or her findings. The best we have are studies set in cities in which we ask immigrants why they left home. Not only do we not have any way of interpreting the answers given in such studies, but more fatally, we do not know why those who remained at home did not leave.

One more tale now and my story will be told. There may be (or have been) a third subsystem that may be at work in the interstices of the other two. I have reference to a set of plays located exclusively in neither the city nor the hinterland that surely affects both the subsystems I have already discussed. Those plays may, in fact, be aggregated into yet another set of informal institutions, another shadowy disengagement sphere that may have made possible the creation of the cholo sphere.

I refer to the fact that many supposedly permanent migrants to urban places are permanent only in retrospect.<sup>1</sup> Whether purposefully permanent or not, many migrants maintain their rural resources--both in property and in rights and obligations. Although such information is extremely difficult to obtain, especially since the Peruvian agrarian reform, I know that many of the houses in the pueblos juvenos were financed by the sale of rural property. At the same time, a significant number of migrants invest whatever excess capital they may accumulate in land back in their places of origin. The multilocal nature of strategic deviance is seen in Moisés' keeping his Arequipa lots. Jorge's wife also maintains contact with her kin in the village.

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<sup>1</sup>See Scott Whiteford, "Bolivian Migrant Labor in Argentina: A Second Cybernetics Model," paper read at the 71st annual meeting of the American Anthropological Association, Toronto, n.d.; and S. Whiteford and R. N. Adams, "Migration, Ethnicity and Adaptation: Bolivian Migrant Workers in Northwest Argentina," in Migration and Ethnicity: Implications for Urban Policy and Development, ed. by H. Safa and B. M. Dutoit (The Hague: Mouton Publishers, 1974).

Clearly, such activities imply yet another set of alternatives to non-cholo institutions. Although they are available only to the population set that we normally call cholo, they also imply effects on both urban and rural populations--effects to which our neo-Redfieldian polarization of those populations and their social systems have blinded us.

In summary, I have proposed an analytical myth for understanding developments in Peruvian (or any other) society. The myth is distinctive because

1. it utilizes a system model and
2. it provides a way of incorporating individual decision making into analysis of social organization.

I have argued that the systemic operations are understandable only if we discontinue treating rural and urban as isolated poles and begin integrating them into one analytical system. There is much more to say on that subject. Finally, it may be suggested that disengagement of a population set from institutions controlled by another population set may be a necessary precondition for improvement of conditions of the former.

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