

SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHANGE AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

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of the
Agency for International Development

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Chapter One

INTRODUCTION

A. Development Priorities and Political Participation

This monograph discusses patterns of political participation in developing nations and the effects of economic and social modernization upon these patterns. It is based in part on a program of research conducted at the Center for International Affairs of Harvard University between July 1969 and December 1972. This study seems to us to take on added relevance to the concerns of development officials, as a result of recent shifts in development priorities.

The shift was clearly stated by World Bank President Robert S. McNamara, in his address in September 1972 to the Board of Governors of the World Bank Group:

It is becoming increasingly clear that the critical issue within developing countries is not simply the pace of growth, but the nature of growth. The developing nations achieved an overall average annual GNP growth rate of more than the targeted 5% by the end of the sixties. But the social impact of that growth was so severely skewed, and the numbers of individuals all but passed by so absolutely immense, that the simple statistical achievement of that target was misleading.

It is now widely accepted that earlier faith in rapid economic expansion as the key to overall societal development was misplaced. More equitable income distribution, fuller access for less privileged groups to education and productive employment, a balanced and healthy long-run pattern of urban development, and other goals of modernization do not

result automatically from increased GNP.

In most developing nations more equitable growth demands a re-orientation of social and economic policies and programs. This re-orientation is primarily the task of the developing nations themselves. It is in the first instance a political problem. In McNamara's words, "The developing countries must decide for themselves if they wish to undertake it. It will manifestly require immense resolve and courage." The difficulty, of course, lies in the fact that most of those who benefit from the status quo or hope to do so will resist reform, and they are usually powerful.

Not only a narrow wealthy elite will oppose reform. Opposition will come also from a much broader range of middle- and upper middle-class people. These people are not wealthy by the standards of the industrialized nations. They are usually aware of this and would resent being described as a privileged elite. Yet by comparison with most of their compatriots, they are privileged. While they support and often demand a variety of reforms, they are not prepared to go along with changes which would sacrifice their own aspirations, much less their current standard of living. Although the middle and upper middle class in most developing nations are a smaller part of the total population than is the case in industrialized nations, in many nations their numbers are substantial and their voice in politics still more so.

Political leaders, in power or aspiring to power, must overcome elite and middle-class resistance if they wish to reorient development policies. They can choose among or combine three basic strategies to this end. Some segments of the upper and/or middle classes can be persuaded to drop or

soften their opposition. Leaders (most of whom themselves are from elite or middle-class backgrounds) can appeal to ideological principles, nationalist fervor, or long-run enlightened self-interest. Sometimes they can bargain for support, offering individual or group compensations for concessions. The second possible strategy is simple repression. This obviously demands a loyal and efficient military and/or police force. The third strategy is political mobilization of previously passive, or active but ineffective, groups to counterbalance or override opposition. In other words, the reformer may seek support in broadened political participation.

By political participation we mean activity by private citizens designed to influence government decision-making. Participation may be individual or collective, organized or spontaneous, sustained or sporadic, peaceful or violent, legal or illegal, effective or ineffective.¹ Effective support for a substantial shift in economic or social policies is most likely to come from organized collective participation, but the range of variation is wide.

Neither persuasion nor pure repression is normally effective for more than a short time or on more than limited issues. Effective reform almost always requires broadened political participation, usually in combination with some degree of persuasion and/or repression. This holds in most political systems, including traditional monarchies attempting to introduce moderate reform, competitive parliamentary systems, and single-party development-oriented states. Economic and social reform in nineteenth century England was accompanied and largely generated by periodic expansion of the electorate. A modernizing monarch appeals to middle-class groups against conservative elites, and to loyal and traditional peasants against impatient

(and sometimes self-seeking) middle-class groups. A socialist revolution, whether by force or (as in Chile currently) through constitutional means, mobilizes urban workers and peasants on a massive scale to counterbalance and overcome resistance from the middle and upper classes.

The importance of participation extends beyond enacting of new laws or adopting new policies to implementation. In all nations, regardless of their level of modernization or their political system, programs designed to alter the distribution of income, services, or power can be subverted at the implementation stage. This happens sometimes by calculated political design or administrative collusion, but more often by the piecemeal but persistent pressure of the groups and individuals who stand to lose by change. These try to win back in the implementation stage at least part of what they have lost at the policy-making stage. Such pressure will come at the national level, but perhaps more often at the local level, where even a reformist central government often lacks political control, administrative effectiveness, and sometimes legal authority to impose its will.

A better understanding of political participation will not necessarily or even probably create capacity to intervene in the evolution of participation patterns and processes. Even were such intervention accepted as moral and desirable--which it is not--there are obvious and severe limits to the competence and influence of technical and professional specialists within a nation and still more binding limits on foreigners. But if development officials are serious about encouraging a reorientation of development priorities, their analysis should explicitly include current patterns of political participation in the countries with which they are concerned.

What groups are active, on what issues, through what channels? How will these patterns probably change as a result of on-going social and economic trends (the increase in literacy, the construction of rural roads)? How will they change in reaction to shifts in government policies and programs? Such analysis might be useful even with respect to many conventional development programs and policies. It is crucial to a realistic assessment of the prospects for and design of major reform. In other words, a fuller understanding of political participation will not place new policy or program instruments in the hands of development officials. But it may heighten their ability to promote fairer and more effective patterns of economic and social growth.

B. The Program of Research

This study is a brief integrated survey of political participation patterns as they relate to aspects of social and economic development.

More precisely, we consider:

- (1) the concept and dimensions (level, forms, and bases) of political participation;
- (2) the relationships between modernization (including socio-economic development, the distribution of income and status, governmental policy, social mobility, and group organization) and political participation;
- (3) the channels through which and issues around which low-income, low status groups are likely to be brought into the national political arena.

The final chapter summarizes findings and suggests some possible policy implications.

The monograph is based in part on a research program conducted at the Center for International Affairs of Harvard University. The program included

case studies of political participation patterns in four countries: Colombia, Kenya, Pakistan, and Turkey. It also included cross-national studies of participation patterns among selected socio-economic groups, the urban poor and the peasantry. These were supplemented by intensive, survey-based analyses of participation by these groups in particular nations, urban poor in Mexico and villagers in Vietnam. Finally, the program included partial support for the development of two theoretical models of participation. One of these was concerned with determinants of over-all participation, particularly voting, at the national and regional level. It drew on data from the Philippines and Turkey. The second model focussed on determinants of electoral participation at the individual level, and utilized survey data from a range of industrialized and modernizing nations.

This multi-faceted approach reflected our belief that many other studies of political participation had suffered from too exclusive a reliance on one or another methodology. Studies and models using aggregate data at the national level must confront the fact that national totals, percentages, or averages often conceal such vast variations within nations that they are almost meaningless. Moreover, cross-national comparisons tend to minimize attention to dynamic and developmental factors. The survey approach has different liabilities. It tends to become divorced from its social and institutional contexts; explanations for patterns of participation are often sought simply as a function of individual attitude and status characteristics. Case studies have obvious advantages of depth and appreciation of dynamic sequences. They provide rich material for, but cannot themselves offer, more general theories and explanations. By combining country studies, comparative sector studies, and aggregate modeling we hoped to draw on

the insights of each while not being restricted by the weaknesses of each.

Each of the studies in the program was conducted independently, but each scholar taking part was selected originally because his research related to aspects of the broader program. All participated in seminars held roughly once a month, to discuss questions of substance, theory, or methodology of common concern and to review sections of individual studies as these were drafted. In addition, of course, there was a good deal of informal exchange among members of the program. The discussions and exchanges of information and ideas have fed back into the individual studies.

As of early 1973, four of these studies are complete and have been published or are ready for publication. These are Ronald Brunner's theoretical model of participation¹ patterns in Turkey and the Philippines (undertaken jointly with Garry Brewer, with partial support from the Harvard program), Shahid Burki's analysis of social groups in Pakistan, Henry Bienen's discussion of Kenyan participation patterns, and Ergun Ozbudun's study of social change and political participation in Turkey. The remaining participants have manuscripts in varying stages of preparation. A brief review of the scope, methodology, status, and expected date of completion of each study can be found in the Final Administrative Report for the program.

This monograph draws upon the individual studies just discussed. It incorporates their major findings, to the extent that these are available as we write. But it does not attempt to summarize the content of the individual research projects. Even if all were complete, it would be almost impossible to summarize adequately such a large and varied set. Moreover, the components of the program were selected to complement each other, but

are not in any way an effort to "cover" the topics in a systematic or comprehensive manner. A simple summary would produce a disjointed and unsatisfactory product.

This monograph, then, is a survey and discussion of a topic--political participation patterns as these relate to aspects of social and economic development--rather than a summary of a research program. We draw upon both the individual studies and the seminars and discussions conducted as a part of the research program. We also make substantial use of recent research by other scholars. Some of this research has focussed on developing nations, some on industrialized nations. We have drawn from both, trying to ask as necessary, "Do these findings apply only in certain kinds of settings, or do they appear to have more general implications?" Where it seems to us appropriate or helpful, we have also drawn on the past experience of now-industrialized nations, which offer a valuable additional source of evidence on the long-run processes of expanding political participation.

Political participation is, of course, only a part of the much broader topic of political organization and evolution in the developing nations. Except as it becomes necessary in the course of our discussion, we will not deal with many important and fascinating aspects of this broader topic--for example, leadership patterns, the evolution of political parties, the dynamics of reform and revolution, ethnic politics in multi-racial states, the causes of stability or instability. Our topic is limited. However, it is a major element in the process of political modernization. It is also more relevant to economic development than may be generally recognized.

C. The State of the Art

Political participation has been a major concern of both democratic and Marxist theorists since the early nineteenth century. It has been the topic of many philosophic and political essays, and a key theme in studies of the political history of the Western democracies. Yet the systematic analysis and theory of participation are largely a product of the past two decades.

Survey research and computer technology are responsible for much research and major advances in our understanding of the determinants of individual political activism or passivity. But only very recently have such studies begun to take into account not only the individual characteristics which affect participation (such as age, sex, family status, education, occupation, income, rural or urban residence, fatalism, trust, etc.), but also the social and political context within which the individual finds himself (for example, the neighborhood, the larger political system, or the individual's ethnic relations in his country).

Improved national statistics, again in combination with the computer, are responsible for a second major approach to the systematic analysis of political participation. Here the IBM cards are for nations, not individuals. Studies compare voting turnout or the frequency of political violence in one society with turnout or with violence in another society, and attempt to explain the differences in terms of class structure, political institutions, rates of economic growth, the inequality of income distribution, or similar factors. Alternatively, changes in voting turnout or political violence over time are analyzed for one society and then related to major

changes in the alignments of social forces and processes of historical development in these societies. Like the survey-based research, these studies have also taught us a good deal. But the units are often not comparable in size, complexity, or other salient characteristics. And, as noted earlier, aggregate indices of political participation are usually limited to voting statistics and data on the incidence of certain kinds of violence. Both have obvious shortcomings as proxies for the broader concept of political participation.

Both survey-based studies of individual participation, and aggregate studies of national patterns/often neglect the group basis of political participation. Clearly a great deal of participation is collective in form and depends on a group context. Case studies of politics in developing nations provide rich material for analysis at the group level. Yet to date there has been little systematic comparative analysis at this intermediate level.

Regardless of whether it has been conducted at the individual, national, or group level of analysis, research on political participation has been handicapped by a problem which is more fundamental than the limitations of available data or the shortcomings of particular research methodologies. At the time the Harvard research program was begun, there was no consensus on an adequate definition of political participation, either within our program or among other scholars.² Definitions are, of course, arbitrary. But the choice of definitions determines the scope of research and affects the kinds of data needed and the methodologies which are appropriate. Lack of agreement on definitions means that the results of different studies are non-comparable, and cumulation of findings is difficult. A consensus on

some of the dimensions of political participation has begun to emerge in academic circles only during the last year or so. Our own conclusions are discussed in Chapter Two.

FOOTNOTES

1. See Chapter Two for fuller discussion of this definition.
2. See Irma Adelman and Cynthia Taft Morris, "Final Report and A.I.D. Grant CSD-2236, part II, a conceptualization and analysis of political participation in underdeveloped countries, February 12, 1971."

Chapter Two

THE NATURE OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

A. A Core Definition of Political Participation

Various scholars have used the term "political participation" to mean various things. Is political participation behavior only, or does it also encompass the attitudes and perceptions prerequisite to participatory behavior (for example, political information, perception of the relevance of politics to one's own concerns, a belief that one can influence governmental decisions and actions)? If political participation is behavior, does it embrace all politically relevant activity (for example, race riots, steel strikes) or only that designed to influence governmental authorities and decision-making? Are both legal and illegal activities to be viewed as political participation? Is any action directed to government decision-making to be regarded as participation, or only those actions which are effective? Do we include as political participation the action of individuals who contact government officials for help on individual or family problems (welfare, fixing a ticket)? Do we include activities organized by and supportive of the government? Actions taken out of fear or respect for someone on whom the actor depends (a landlord, village elder, union official, ward boss) or because he is paid, rather than because he seeks to influence governmental decision-making? Respected scholars differ on their answers to these questions.

In this essay, we define political participation simply as activity by private citizens designed to influence government decision-making.

Several aspects of this core definition should be noted.

First, it includes activity but not attitudes. Some scholars, in contrast, define political participation so as to include the orientations of citizens towards politics as well as their actual political behavior. We exclude this subjective component. Knowledge about politics, interest in politics, feelings of political competence and efficacy, perceptions of the relevance of politics, all these are often closely related to political action. But at other times they are not. Their study and measurement also require techniques which differ significantly from those needed simply to study behavior. In our analysis, we will be interested in the conditions under which various attitudes and feelings are related to various forms of political action. We will thus treat objective political activity and subjective political attitudes as separate variables.

Second, we are concerned with the political activity of private citizens or, more precisely, individuals in their roles as private citizens. We thus draw a distinction between political participants and political professionals. A political professional is someone whose primary calling is politics or government. Our concept of political participation excludes the activities of governmental officials, party officials, political candidates and professional lobbyists acting in those roles. (It would not, for instance, encompass the activities of a high-level civil servant in determining governmental policy within his agency; it would include the activities of the civil servant in voting in an election or speaking at a town meeting.) The political activity of participants is intermittent,

part-time, and usually avocational or secondary to other social roles. There is, thus, much political activity which is not political participation, including most of the activity of those who are most active in politics. The number, attitudes, and behavior of the political professionals and particularly the political elite in any particular political system will often drastically affect the scope and nature of political participation-- that is, non-professional activity--in that system. (See Chapter Three below.)

Third, we are concerned only with activity designed to affect governmental decision-making. Such activity is focussed on public authorities, those generally recognized as having the final legitimate decision on the authoritative allocation of values within the society. Much of what is often termed politics and much allocation of resources among groups in society may take place without intervention by government. Thus, a strike designed to influence the management of a private company to increase wages is not political participation by this definition; a strike designed to influence the government to increase ceilings on wages is political participation. And so also is a strike by sanitation men designed to influence a city council to pay higher wages. The amount of political participation in a society is thus, in some measure, a function of the scope of governmental activity in the society.

Efforts to influence governmental decision-making may involve persuading or pressuring existing authorities to act (or refrain from acting) in certain ways, as in the examples above. Or participants may seek to replace current decision-makers with others they expect to be more responsive to their preferences and needs. More rarely, political participation may seek to change aspects of the political system itself, or to alter fundamentally

the structure of the entire system, in order to make possible governments more responsive to the participants' desires. In short, political participation may be directed to decisions by current authorities, to replacing or retaining those authorities, or to changing or defending the existing organization of the political system and the rules of the political game. All are means of influencing the decisions and the actions of the government.

Moreover, we define as political participation all activities which have these ends in mind, whether they are legal or illegal according to the established norms of the political system. Thus, protests, riots, demonstrations, even some forms of insurgent violence, so long as they are directed to public authorities, are forms of political participation. To the extent that someone engages full-time, however, in illegal efforts to influence the government, he is one type of political professional--a professional revolutionary.

Fourth, we include all activity which is designed to influence the government whether or not it actually has that effect. This usage contrasts with that of some scholars who include only successful efforts at influence under the heading of political participation. In effect, they identify political participation with political power. For us, however, a participant in politics may or may not be successful and may or may not be powerful. A participant is successful to the extent that he actually influences those governmental decisions which he is attempting to influence. He is powerful according to the number and scope of the governmental decisions which he does actually influence and the degree of influence which he has over those decisions. In these terms, most participants in politics have little power and only some participants have a significant degree of success in politics.

Widespread participation in politics thus does not necessarily imply democratic, responsible, or representative government.

Finally, we define political participation to include activity which is designed by the actor himself to influence governmental decision-making and also activity which is designed by someone other than the actor to influence governmental decision-making. The former may be termed autonomous participation, the latter mobilized participation. The problem of intent, and the related question of motivations for political participation, are complex and controversial. We discuss them separately below.

B. Mobilized versus Autonomous Participation

Many of the people who vote, demonstrate, or take other actions which appear to be political participation do not act from an intention to influence government decision-makers. Voting rates are higher in traditional and rural Eastern Turkey than in more modernized Western provinces or in the Turkish cities. But many of the peasants who swell the turnout act because the local landlord tells them to do so, and may even threaten them with losing their land if they do not follow his instructions. Some may have virtually no understanding of their action, much less an intent to affect the personnel or decisions of the government. A worker in Mexico City may join a PRI-sponsored demonstration not because he wants to display his support for the government and its decisions, but because he does not want to be different from all the other men in his factory who are doing so. The nineteenth-century immigrant in America who put up campaign posters was not necessarily moved by clearly formulated views on the best candidate.

He acted because the ward boss who had gotten him a job asked to put up posters. In all these cases the immediate actor did not seek to influence government decision-making. But someone else--the landlord, the PRI union leader, the ward boss--did so intend. Through coercion, persuasion, or material inducements they were able to mobilize others in pursuit of their objectives.

Is mobilized participation to be regarded as political participation? Several recent studies have explicitly excluded mobilized or manipulated action from their definitions of political participation. Thus, Myron Weiner stresses the voluntary nature of the action, arguing that "belonging to organizations or attending mass rallies under government orders is . . . excluded" as is also voting in elections where citizens have no choice of candidates.¹ Another recent discussion of political participation does not attempt to define the term, but simply states the boundaries of the authors' interests. These explicitly rule out "'ceremonial' or 'support' participation where citizens 'take part' by expressing support for the government, by marching in parades, by working hard in development projects, by participating in youth groups organized by the government, or by voting in ceremonial elections."² In both cases the writers distinguish democratic or autonomous participation from government-sponsored, manipulated, or mobilized participation, and exclude the latter from their area of exploration.

We suggest that there are strong arguments for including both mobilized and autonomous categories in a broad-gauged exploration of patterns of political participation. First, the distinction between mobilized and autonomous participation is more clear-cut in principle

than in reality. While it is possible to identify many activities as clearly mobilized or clearly autonomous, border-line cases abound. Moreover, the criteria for distinguishing the categories are somewhat arbitrary. Is support activity sponsored by the government "mobilized," while action organized by opposition parties or organizations is "autonomous"? The individual's action is roughly equally voluntary or involuntary in the cases of the PRI-organized support demonstration, and the opposition-oriented labor union which demands campaign contributions from its members. Clearly much participation in democratic and competitive political systems contains some element of pressure and manipulation. Is the degree of real choice and the uncertainty of outcome in an election a reliable criterion? How then does one compare the Soviet citizen, proud of his country and his party, who casts his vote in a single-ballot election, with the American voter, moved by a sense of civic duty and perhaps by partisan loyalty, who casts his ballot for a state official virtually guaranteed of re-election (despite token opposition)? In short, mobilized and autonomous participation are not clearly distinguished, dichotomous categories. Rather, they form a spectrum. The point on the spectrum which divides mobilized from autonomous participation cannot be other than arbitrary.

Moreover, virtually all political systems include a mix of mobilized and autonomous participation. Of course, the mix varies from one system to another, and changes over time in any particular system. But we are dealing with matters of degree not only at the level of individual actions but also at the level of political systems.

We would agree with other scholars that it is worth trying to maintain a distinction between more and less mobilized or autonomous participation.

But precisely because the distinctions are arbitrary and the boundaries indistinct, we would argue that both categories should be included in a research design, rather than drawing an artificial line and excluding all data and evidence on the far side of the boundary.

A second reason for examining both mobilized and autonomous participation in a general study on the topic concerns the dynamic relations between the two categories. Behavior which originates as mobilized participation may become internalized, that is, largely autonomous. The immigrant who votes for the city machine initially because of gratitude to the boss may later become a convinced partisan of that party, and argue vehemently that it is the best party for his class and for the nation. Similarly, voting in authoritarian systems which was originally motivated by fear or external pressure may come to be a willing expression of civic duty, that is, as action designed to indicate support of the system and its leadership.

Conversely, initially autonomous participation may become mobilized or manipulated. Government and opposition parties and political leaders often try to infiltrate, "capture," and turn to their own interests initially autonomous local pressure organizations such as neighborhood improvement associations in low-income urban areas. The conditions under which this succeeds or fails, and the effects on members' participation patterns, can be explored only by including in the scope of one's research both the autonomous and the mobilized or manipulated phases.

A third reason for examining mobilized as well as autonomous activities is that both have important consequences for the political system. To say that a mobilized as distinguished from an autonomous actor does not participate in politics is like saying that a conscripted as distinguished from

a volunteer soldier does not participate in a war. The motivations of the two are clearly different and, in some respects, so also may be their behavior. But the great bulk of the activities of a draftee and a volunteer in a war will be indistinguishable from each other and will have similar consequences. So also will those of mobilized and autonomous participants in politics.

C. Levels, Forms, and Bases of Political Participation

The basic purpose of this study is to analyze the effects of social and economic modernization on political participation. Political participation is thus our over-all dependent variable. We will attempt to shed some light on how various changes associated with modernization affect patterns of participation: the level of various types of participation, the mixture of forms of participation, and the changing group bases for participation.

In all societies some people participate in politics. In some societies more people participate in politics than in other societies. In any society some people participate more than other people. Consider, for instance, the following figures on levels of political participation:³

(1) Percentage of adult population voting in a national election in the mid-1960's:

Bulgaria	100.0%	India	55.8%
Austria	88.9	Chile	54.1
Venezuela	78.8	Brazil	44.2
United Kingdom	72.4	Guatemala	25.9
Turkey	61.2	Switzerland	23.2
United States	56.8	South Africa	14.3

(2) Percentage of the population which engages in one or more political acts beyond voting:

	Number of political acts beyond voting					
	1	2	3	4	5	6
United States	64%	40%	26%	16%	9%	5%
Japan	62	35	19	11	5	2
Nigeria	56	30	13	2	1(5+)	-
Austria	52	41	17	8	4	2
India	36	18	10	6	4	2

(3) Percentage of population which is "political active," that is, discusses politics once a week or engages in more intense political activity:

United States	46%
Great Britain	45
Germany	40
Italy	27
Mexico	25

These cross-national data on participation levels reveal many similarities and differences. Voting is a widespread phenomenon in the most widely disparate societies. In many societies other types of political activity above and beyond voting are also widely engaged in: in industrialized countries 50% or more of the population are participant in ways other than voting; even in an underdeveloped country like India more than one-third of the population does more than vote. On the other hand, there are also significant differences among societies in voting rates and participation rates and in the meanings of those rates. There are also, clearly, major differences within societies. In each country, a minority of political activists can easily be distinguished from the bulk of the population. At the other extreme, in every society at least one-third of the population engages in no political activity beyond voting, and in some countries, such

as the United States, over one-third may not even bother to vote.

In analyzing levels of participation, it is necessary to distinguish between two sub-dimensions: (a) scope, or the proportion of a defined category of people who engage in a particular participatory activity; and (b) intensity, or the scale, duration, and importance for the political system of the particular activity. By and large, the scope and intensity of political participation tend to be inversely related. In a given society, large numbers of people will vote, an action of little intensity; smaller numbers of people will participate in campaign activities; and still smaller numbers will play a continuing role individually and through organizations in attempting to influence government decisions.

Political participation takes many different forms. Studies of participation use slightly varying classification schemes, but most recent research distinguishes among the following types of behavior.

(a) Flectoral activity includes voting, but also campaign contributions, working in an election, proselytizing on behalf of a candidate, or any other form of action designed to affect the outcome of the electoral process. Voting is much more widespread than other forms of political participation, and hence the factors associated with its incidence often distinguish it from other types of participation including other campaign activity.⁴ There is, nonetheless, an interrelated cluster of activity focused about the electoral cycle and voting, which is clearly distinguishable from other major forms of political action.

(b) Collective lobbying includes group efforts to contact governmental officials and political leaders with a view to influencing the content of their decisions on issues which affect a significant number of people.

Obvious instances are activity designed to generate support or opposition for a particular legislative proposal or administrative decision.

(c) Organizational activity involves participation as a member or officer in an organization which has as its primary and explicit goal the influencing of government decision-making. Such organizations may focus their efforts on highly specialized interests or may address a wide spectrum of public issues. Being a member of such an organization itself constitutes a form of political participation, whether or not the member himself takes part in the organization's efforts to influence government. This is, in a sense, participation by proxy.

(d) Contacting is lobbying by an individual which is not part of a broader collective or group effort. It may be designed to influence governmental decision-making which affects a substantial number of people and it can result from almost any combination of motives. But normally its purpose is to produce benefits for only a single person or a very small number of people. We thus group together what Verba and Nie have identified as "contacting officials on social issues" and "contacting officials on personal matters." Much of their survey work, as well as that of others, has focused on the latter type of contacting, that is, individual lobbying for particularized or personal ends.

Electoral activity, lobbying, organizational activity, and contacting all may take legal or illegal forms. Bribery, intimidation, and falsification of electoral results, to the extent that they are engaged in by private citizens rather than professionals, must be viewed as political participation as clearly as are voting, attending party rallies, or putting up campaign posters. Lobbying activities such as peaceful strikes, demonstrations, and

picketing are legal in some countries and barred elsewhere. Similarly, private contacting can be legal or illegal in itself, and may or may not be accompanied by bribery or other illegal aspects.

Crossing the boundary between legal and illegal activity involves greater risk, hence greater initiative by the participant. One might expect a screening effect similar to the contrast between those who vote and the smaller and less broadly representative number of electoral activists who engage in campaign efforts. But many kinds of illegal political participation are simply the extension of legal efforts to influence government decision-makers. In addition, the line between legal and illegal activity varies from one country to another and may change over time in any one country.

(e) Violence can also be a form of political participation, and it is useful analytically to define it as a distinct category: that is, as efforts to affect governmental decision-making by doing physical damage to persons or property. Except in certain instances where it is employed by police or law enforcement agencies, such action is illegal in every society. A resort to violence, consequently, usually reflects fairly intense motivations. Violence may be directed at changing the political leadership (coups d'etat, assassination), affecting governmental policies (riots, revolts), or changing the entire political system (revolution). Each of these goals, of course, may also be pursued by peaceful means. Hence a central issue concerns the conditions under which people resort to violence rather than to more peaceful forms of participation. To what extent does violent action tend to be a last resort, chosen only after opportunities for peaceful participation have disappeared? To what extent is violence a

more likely instrument of some social forces rather than others? Under what circumstances does its use tend to be closely associated with other types of participation?⁵

Most studies of political participation have focused on levels of participation and more specifically on the level of voting participation. Election statistics, census data, and sample surveys make it easy and interesting to compare the voting turnout of different groups and different societies in societies where there is a history of competitive elections. Voting participation, however, is clearly only one form of participation, even in societies where voting is frequent and meaningful. One should not, consequently, assume that because voting participation is less for one group than for another that, therefore, other forms of political participation of the one group are less than those of the other. They may be, but there is no necessary reason why this must be the case. Similarly, it would be erroneous to assume that because voting participation goes up in a society that therefore other forms of political participation have increased.

Nor is there any easy way to measure the scope and intensity of various forms of participation, weight them in some manner, and add them into a composite index which measures "total participation." Such an index would be meaningful only if all forms of participation had similar characteristics, in the sense that each increased or decreased in response to the same causal variables and had similar consequences for the political system as a whole. But all forms of political participation do not have similar characteristics.

Some types cluster together. Far more people vote than contribute funds or actively campaign for a candidate. Electoral activity as a whole

has some characteristics similar to lobbying. But particularized contacting displays rather different characteristics. In each of the several nations where it has been examined, the scope or incidence of contacting does not vary systematically with socio-economic level as do most other forms of participation. Moreover, the consequences for the political system (and indirectly for social and economic change) vary with different patterns of participation. A pattern where many people vote and contact but few lobby would have different effects than a pattern where voting turnouts are low but lobbying is widespread and intense. We cannot simply sum the incidence of different forms of participation and arrive at a meaningful number.

In other words, if we want to understand the causes and consequences of different patterns of political participation, we cannot think of it as a simple, homogenous variable. "Political participation" is an umbrella concept, a label for a whole set of variables, each of which fits the core definition, but has somewhat different causes and consequences and relates differently to social and economic trends. Only in the most general sense, then, can we speak of an over-all increase in the level of political participation in a society, or conclude that country A has a higher level of participation than country B.

In different societies political participation may also be rooted in different group bases. Except for contacting, most political participation involves some form of collaborative activity and has benefits for some form of collectivity. It is, consequently, possible to analyze participation in terms of the different types of collective organizations through which such participation is organized and which commonly form the bases for such participation. Among the more common bases are:

(a) class, that is, individuals of similar social status, income, and occupation;

(b) communal group, that is, individuals of similar race, religion, language, or ethnicity;

(c) neighborhood, that is, individuals in geographical proximity to each other;

(d) party, that is, individuals who identify with the same formal organization attempting to win or maintain control of the executive and legislative branches of government; and

(e) faction, that is, individuals united by sustained or intense personal interaction with each other, one manifestation of which is the patron-client grouping, that is, a faction involving the reciprocal exchange of benefits between individuals of unequal status, wealth, and influence.

Much of the discussion of political participation centers about the relative importance of these various bases for organizing participation and the way in which they relate to each other. Students of Africa, for instance, debate the relative importance of class and communal grouping in shaping political participation. In some societies class and party identifications closely correlate with each other; in others, they cross-cut each other.

D. The Causes of Participation

The most interesting and relevant questions for analysis have to do with the shifting patterns of participation. How do the major economic and social changes associated with modernization affect the scope or incidence of different forms of political participation in a society? Does the "mix" of

forms and of bases change in any systematic way? How do the forms and levels of participation directed to local levels of government relate to, and compare with, those directed to national government? How is this balance affected by social and economic change?

In theory the tendency for individuals and groups to try to influence the government is affected by their access to alternative means to pursue their goals. If non-political means are as or more promising than political channels, people may be expected to invest their time and energy accordingly. Some problems inherently point to the government as the sole or most obvious remedy. If a local or national government takes some decision which is viewed as harmful to the interests of certain groups, the most obvious course is to try to persuade the government to alter its decision. The government is the source of the difficulty, hence its most direct (though not necessarily most promising) solution. Where ethnic tensions focus on questions of relative status and power, they are likely to take a political form. Other kinds of issues--promoting individual and family welfare, improving neighborhood facilities, coping with the effects of a drought--may or may not prompt individuals or groups to turn to governmental action, depending on the perceived availability and effectiveness of this course compared with alternative means.

In the following chapters we will attempt to probe the relationship between social-economic change and changes in the levels, forms, and bases of political participation at three different levels. In Chapter III the focus is on the "macro" level: how the over-all economic and political characteristics of the society--its level of economic development, its degree of economic equality, and the nature of its governmental system--

affect political participation. In Chapter IV, we will shift to the "micro" level and explore the relative impact of social status, mobility opportunities, and organizational context on the choices of individuals to participate or not to participate in politics. Chapter V, in turn, shifts to what might be called the "macro" or group level and focuses specifically on the problems of participation by low-income groups. In the final chapter, we attempt to pull together the themes and conclusions which have emerged from our analysis and to summarize their implications for those whose goal it is to promote more widespread and meaningful citizen activity in politics.

FOOTNOTES

1. Myron Weiner, "Political Participation: Crisis of the Political Process," in Leonard Binder et al., Crises and Sequences in Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), p. 164.
2. Sidney Verba and Norman H. Nie, "Political Participation," in Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby (eds.), Handbook of Political Science, no date, xerox typescript, p. 3.
3. Data sources are as follows: (1) Charles Lewis Taylor and Michael C. Hudson, World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2nd ed., 1972), pp. 54-56; (2) Sidney Verba and Norman H. Nie, draft chapter on "Political Participation," op. cit., p. 35a; (3) Norman H. Nie, G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Kenneth Prewitt, "Social Structure and Political Participation: Developmental Relationships, II," American Political Science Review, 63 (Sept. 1969), p. 824.
4. See Sidney Verba, Norman H. Nie, and Jae-On Kim, The Modes of Democratic Participation: A Cross-National Comparison (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1971), pp. 41-43, 57-59.
5. For a useful summary and analysis of political violence in terms of theories of relative deprivation, see Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970). For a brief, general discussion of violence in relation to development, see Samuel P. Huntington, "Civil Violence and the Process of Development," in Civil Violence and the International System: Part II: Violence and International Security (Adelphi Paper No. 83, International Institute of Strategic Studies, December 1971).


Chapter Three

DEVELOPMENT, EQUALITY, AND PARTICIPATION

A. Models of Development: Liberal, Technocratic, and Populist

Much of the earlier Western and particularly American writing about development implicitly or explicitly articulated what may be termed the "liberal" model of development. In this model, it was assumed that the causes of socio-economic inequality, political violence, and authoritarian government lay in the socio-economic backwardness of the society. The answer to these ills, consequently, was rapid socio-economic modernization and development which would increase the over-all level of economic well-being in the society and thus make possible a more equitable distribution of wealth, promote political stability, and provide the basis for broader political participation and more democratic systems of government. The most commonly assumed causal relationships underlying this model are diagrammed in Figure 3.1.

Figure 3.1.
The "Benign Line" of the Liberal Model



The empirical basis for the liberal model was found in the seeming correlations between socio-economic backwardness, on the one hand, and the evils of inequality, instability, and arbitrary rule, on the other. Gunnar Myrdal expressed the prevalent viewpoint with respect to the relation between socio-economic backwardness and inequality when he argued that, "It is, indeed, a regular occurrence endowed almost with the dignity of an economic law that the poorer the country, the greater the difference between rich and poor."¹ Robert McNamara succinctly summarized the lesson from the statistics of civil strife when he declared that "there is an irrefutable relationship between violence and economic backwardness."² Seymour Martin Lipset and Daniel Lerner presented comparative data to demonstrate the positive relation between economic development and democracy, in the one case, and socio-economic modernization and political participation, in the other.³

In the past decade the liberal model of development has been shown to be methodologically weak, empirically questionable, and historically irrelevant except under specialized circumstances. Three methodological weaknesses characterized the model. First, its assumptions about causal relationships were in large part derived from aggregate static comparisons between the most developed (i.e., Western European and North Atlantic) countries, on the one hand, and the great bulk of the less developed countries, on the other, without reference to the extent to which further differentiation among countries might invalidate the presumed linear relationship between socio-economic development and other variables. A second and related weakness was the extent to which the model ignored the impact which the processes of changing from one developmental level to another

might have on the "dependent" variables of stability, equity, and participation. A third general weakness was the extent to which a jump was often made from correlational data to presumed causal relationships. The "liberal" model in large part rested on what can only be described as neo-Marxist premises that the causal flow would be from economics to politics rather than in the reverse direction.

During the past decade several of the model's individual causal relationships have also been challenged and have been discarded or drastically modified. Political violence and instability have been shown to be more prevalent in societies in the midst of the process of modernization and development than of societies at the lowest levels of development.⁴ In a similar vein, it has now been accepted that with the notable exception of societies which have carried out extensive land reform programs, high rates of socio-economic development tend to increase inequalities in income and property in modernizing countries. Typical of the conclusions of economists on the relationship between these two variables are those of Adelman and Morris: "higher rates of industrialization, faster increases in agricultural productivity, and higher rates of growth all tend to shift the income distribution in favor of the higher income groups and against the low income groups. The dynamics of the process of economic development tend to work relatively against the poor; the major recipients of the rewards of economic development are consistently the middle class and the highest income groups."⁵ The connection between economic development and democracy has also been questioned in a lengthy series of both static comparisons and developmental studies. The general import of these studies is to shift the emphasis in explanation from simple affluence to

economic equality and to developmental sequences.⁶ In this chapter, we will focus on the two critical remaining causal relationships of the liberal model, that is, those running from socio-economic development and socio-economic equality to political participation.

Before reviewing the relationships between development, equality, and politics, it should also be pointed out that in actual practice during the past decade the experience of very few countries, if any, has approximated the liberal model of development. In practice, the evolution of societies has tended to approximate one of two other models. The technocratic model is characterized by low levels of political participation, high levels of investment (particularly foreign investment) and economic growth, and increasing income inequalities. This model assumes that political participation must be reduced, at least temporarily, in order to promote economic development and that such development necessarily involves at least temporary increases in income inequality. The unanswered question is: To what extent is increasing income inequality compatible with sustained low levels of political participation? Will not a widening gap between rich and poor combined with governmental efforts to repress political participation build up stresses and pressures leading eventually to a "participation explosion" which overthrows the existing political system and may alter fundamentally the social and economic structure? Does not depoliticization-development-inequality-repression constitute a vicious circle, the dynamics of which tend to shift initiative and power to those who want to carry the process to the extreme?

The causal sequence in the populist model of development is almost the reverse of that of the technocratic model. High and increasing levels

of political participation go with expanding governmental benefits and welfare policies, and increasing economic equality, but, if necessary, relatively low rates of economic development. The logic of this pattern of evolution leads towards increasing social conflict and the polarization of society, as more groups become participant and attempt to share in a stagnant or only slowly growing economic pie. Thus, while the technocratic model leads to governmental repression in order to prevent political participation, the populist model leads to civil strife as a result of political participation. In a comparable manner in both cases, the dynamics of the relationships among the critical variables tends to produce a vicious circle in which the dominant tendencies are toward the maximization of the value of each variable. While the strains generated by the technocratic model may eventually lead to a "participation explosion," those which arise in the populist model may eventually lead either to the total disruption of the society by civil war or to a "participation implosion" in which the military seize power and suppress participation by other social forces. If they remain in power, the military leaders may well attempt to redirect society into the technocratic pattern; if they withdraw from power, the society is likely to resume another cycle in the populist pattern.

While the populist and technocratic models seem to embody very different patterns of development, they do share certain common assumptions which are not present in the liberal model. Both the technocratic and populist models assume that there is at least a short-run conflict between economic development and economic equality and that consequently a choice has to be made as to which goal receives priority. They also assume the nature of this choice and the extent to which one or the other value does

Figure 3.2.
The "Vicious Circle" of the Technocratic Model





Figure 3.3.
The "Vicious Circle" of the Populist Model



receive priority will, in large part, be a product of the political participation patterns of the society. They also agree that, by and large, more participation means more equality, and less participation more development. For this reason, the political leaders in the technocratic system attempt to reduce participation, while those in the populist system attempt to expand it. In contrast to the liberal model, both these models see powerful causal relationships running from participation to the economic variables instead of only in the reverse direction.

These two models are, of course, ideal types. Some countries, however, have closely approximated one ideal or the other, and other countries have veered strongly in one direction or the other or from one direction to the other. In the ^{late} 1950's and early 1960's, for instance, Brazil evolved along classically populist lines, a pattern which was brought to an end by the military coup d'etat of 1964 and subsequent participation implosion which in due course transformed Brazil into a close approximation of the technocratic model. As such it today stands in dramatic contrast to Chile, which represents a close approximation of the populist model. Other countries tending in that direction are India, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, and Uruguay. In contrast to them, countries like Indonesia, the Ivory Coast, Kenya, and Pakistan under Ayub all moved in a technocratic direction.

The liberal model of development avoided the problem of choice by claiming that all desirable values could be maximized. But it itself turned out not to be a realistic or relevant choice for most modernizing countries. They are, instead, forced to choose between one variant or another of either the technocratic or populist models. The choice which a society's elite makes will, of course, reflect its own basic moral and political values and

either choice can be rationalized and legitimized in terms of political ideology, social theory, and economic analysis. The ways in which these differing perspectives can interpret the same experience have been well summarized by Henry Bienen in his discussion of Kenya.

Kenya together with the Ivory Coast have been to some observers signal "success stories" after independence. Kenya, like the Ivory Coast, has had more than a respectable rate of growth in gross domestic product. Both countries have had neighbors to contrast them to. Ghana and the Ivory Coast is already the title of a book. Kenya and Tanzania is sure to follow and the comparisons between the two East African countries are already many. And both Kenya and the Ivory Coast have opted for seemingly clear strategies of economic growth based on a determination to keep ties to Western countries and gain foreign aid and investment; both have concentrated on growth rather than redistribution. Both countries have been controlled by a "maximum leader" and a small group around him who have strong ethnic ties. Indeed, both countries could be characterized by an attitude among the ruling group of "benevolent elitism."

On the other hand, those committed to a populist model put a different gloss on the Kenyan experience:

Some observers would say that the elitism is not so benevolent. . . . They are seen to be countries where neo-colonial influence is strong and where a parasitical elite of top politicians and civil servants squeeze the rural areas for their ill gotten gains. They are seen to be without ideology. . . . Growth takes place at the expense of the poor: the rich get richer and the poor stagnate or worse. A privileged elite distributes the benefits of economic growth that it gains through alliances with Europeans and through expropriation of Africans and Asians to tribal clients unfettered by any of the formal mechanisms of control which reside in the Legislature and elections. . . . This same elite arrogates to itself the wisdom to choose a path for development on the grounds that people do not understand developmental problems and will, if left to themselves, allocate resources on a short run calculation for schools, clinics, roads and other immediate benefits. Thus curtailing effective mass participation is justified. Organized dissent is not allowed and the heavy hand of civil administration and if need be police and riot squads are used to put down opposition.⁷

One critical question for analysis is the extent to which there are necessary relationships among the various developmental variables which more or less force a society away from a middle course and towards either a

populist or technocratic extreme. In some instances, where societies have carried out a redistribution of landed wealth early in the process of development, it appears possible for them to achieve both high rates of economic growth and more equitable distribution of income. Taiwan and Korea are two cases in point. During the 1960's the Taiwanese economy had an annual growth rate of 10% and the Korean economy one of 9%. In Taiwan in 1953 the income of the top 20% of income recipients was fifteen times that of the poorest 20%; by 1969 the ratio between the two had declined to five-to-one, which has also been the ratio in Korea in recent years.⁸ Both countries seemingly have avoided the inverse relationship between growth and equity which economists now seem to think the common pattern. There is, however, as yet no sign that growth and equality are producing democracy in either country and only some evidence of the emergence of broader political participation patterns.

In Latin America there seem to be pressures at work pushing societies toward either the populist or the technocratic model. Consider, for instance, the following classification of societies according to whether they have high or low levels of democratic political participation and whether their governments give high or low priority to promoting economic equality:

Extent of democratic political participation	Government priority to economic equality	
	Low	High
Low	Brazil	Peru
High	Colombia	Chile

To what extent are the combinations represented by Peru and Colombia relatively stable? Or are there forces at work pushing those societies in

the direction of either Brazil or Chile. Recent history hardly provides a conclusive answer. But the extent to which the Peruvian junta has suppressed any significant movement toward broader participation, moderated its reformist policies, welcomed in foreign investment on terms it considers acceptable, and in actual fact done little to alter the distribution of social and economic power in Peru, all suggest that it may be moving slowly in the Brazilian direction. In Colombia, on the other hand, the efforts made by the National Front to eliminate political competition and to reduce political participation have broken down. The 1970/election saw a neck-and-neck race between the candidate of the Front and that of the very populist-oriented ANAPO, which received the overwhelming support of the urban poor (see below, pp. 3-34f). The dynamics of the Colombian situation would appear to be moving that country toward a closer approximation of the Chilean model. If these interpretations of Peruvian and Colombian politics are correct, they clearly underline the difficulties which any government will confront in trying to steer a middle course. Both logic and experience suggest that any given society is more likely to suffer from the alternation of both models than it is likely to be able to benefit from the moderation of either.

All three models assume certain relationships between political participation, socio-economic development, and socio-economic equality. In the liberal model, more development and more equality lead to more participation; in the technocratic model, less participation leads to more development and less equality; in the populist model, more participation generates more equality and less development. As was pointed out above, the liberal model's assumptions about the relations between development and stability and development and equality have been shown not to be well founded. The next

two sections of this chapter will explore in general terms the relations between development and participation and equality and participation. The evidence from the Harvard Project as well as other sources shows that the liberal model's assumptions on these relationships need not be totally discarded, although they do have to be considerably refined. Development and participation do in large measure go together, but the connection between them is more complex and ambiguous than it is often assumed to be. The connection between equality and participation is close, but the causal flow seems to be more from the latter to the former (as posited by the populist model) than from the former to the latter (as assumed by the liberal model). Moreover, in some phases of modernization, more participation means less equality (an assumption made by none of the models). In addition, in reviewing those aspects of society which affect participation, the liberal model appears to overemphasize social and economic factors. At least in the short run, the values of the political elite and the political policies of government are more decisive than anything else in shaping the participation patterns of a society. The populist and technocratic models thus come closer to reality than the liberal model in assigning more of an independent role to politics.

B. Socio-Economic Development and Participation

1. Participation Levels

"Traditional society," declared Daniel Lerner in 1958, "is non-participant. . . . Modern society is participant. . . ." ⁹ In the years since, it has become commonly accepted that the principal political difference between traditional and modern societies concerns the scope, intensity, and bases of political participation. In more wealthy, industrialized, urbanized, complex societies, more people become involved in politics in more ways than

they do in less developed, agricultural, rural, more primitive economic and social systems. "It comes as no surprise," commented one set of authors a decade after Lerner, "to learn that a nation's level of political participation co-varies with its level of economic development."¹⁰ The cross-national and longitudinal evidence to support this proposition is overwhelming, ranging from apparently global relationships between the distribution of employment in the primary, secondary, and tertiary sectors and levels of political mobilization, on the one hand, to the discovery that levels of voting participation among the fifty states "are a function of levels of economic development."¹¹ Socio-economic modernity and political participation seemingly march hand-in-hand through history. The higher the level of socio-economic development in a society, the higher the level of its political participation.

Why should there be this relationship between socio-economic development and political participation? At a broad level, several links are apparent.

First, within a society, levels of political participation tend to vary with socio-economic status. Those with more education and income and in high-status occupations usually are more participant than those who are poor, uneducated, and in low-status occupations. Economic development expands the proportion of higher status roles in a society: more people become literate, educated, better-off financially, and engaged in middle-class occupations. Hence a larger proportion of society is politically participant.

Second, economic and social development involves tensions and strains among social groups; new groups emerge; established groups are threatened; low-status groups seize opportunities to improve their lot. As a result,

conflicts multiply between social classes, regions, and communal groups. Social conflict intensifies and, in some cases, virtually creates group consciousness which, in turn, leads to collective action by the group to develop and protect its claims vis-a-vis other groups. It must, in short, turn to politics.

Third, the growing complexity of the economy leads to a multiplication of organizations and associations and the involvement of larger numbers of people in such groups. Business organizations, farmer associations, labor unions, community organizations, as well as cultural, recreational, and even religious organizations are more characteristic of more highly developed societies. In Turkey, for instance, economic development has been accompanied by a marked increase in the number of associations and the "population/association ratio is noticeably higher in the less developed provinces than in the more developed ones. Both findings suggest a positive relationship between socio-economic development and the intensity of associational activity."¹² Organizational involvement, however, also is generally associated with political participation.

Fourth, economic development in part requires and in part produces a notable expansion of the functions of government. While the scope of governmental activity clearly is influenced by the political values and ideologies dominant in the society, it is even more highly influenced by the level of economic development of the society. Highly industrialized societies run by governments devoted to free-enterprise capitalism typically have more highly socialized economies than agrarian societies run by committed socialists. The former simply require more governmental promotional, regulatory, and redistributive activity. The more governmental actions affect groups

within society, however, the more those groups will see the relevance of government to their own ends and the more active they will become in their efforts to influence governmental decision-making.

Fifth, socio-economic modernization normally takes place in the form of national development. The nation-state is the vehicle of socio-economic modernization. For the individual, consequently, his relationship with the nation-state becomes critical and his identity with the state tends to override his other loyalties. That identity is theoretically expressed in the concept of citizenship, which presumably overrides distinctions of social class and communal group and which furnishes the basis for mass political participation. All citizens are equal before the state; all have certain minimal equal rights and responsibilities to participate in the state. Socio-economic modernization thus implies a political culture and outlook which, in some measure, legitimizes and hence facilitates political participation. And this is the case in both democratic and communist societies.

Given the pronouncements of social scientists, the weight of the statistical evidence, and these seemingly persuasive causal relationships, one might well expect there to be a more or less one-to-one relationship between the level of socio-economic development in a society and its levels of political participation.

In fact, however, this is far from the case. While there is a general tendency for many forms of national political participation to increase with economic development, this is by no means a universal phenomenon. Other things being equal, economic development tends to enhance political participation. But other things are rarely equal, and many factors which are not necessarily shaped by economic development in themselves shape political

participation. Judgments as to the over-all level of political participation in societies are virtually impossible to make. When one does look, however, at particular forms of participation, one can see variations in levels which have no discernible positive relationship to socio-economic development.

(1) Socio-economic development normally increases more or less steadily with time. In many societies, however, levels of political participation fluctuate quite widely over brief periods of time. There may be sudden expansions ("participation explosions") and equally well marked declines in participation. "[I]n many countries that are still considered relatively underdeveloped," Brunner and Brewer have observed, "there are already very high levels of voting turnout, and there seems to be no clear secular trend toward increasing levels of turnout."¹³ In Turkey and Colombia in the years after World War II there were periods of substantial decrease in voting participation. Such figures may mean that voting rates do not reflect over-all participation levels. Conceivably, an underdeveloped country could have high levels of voting participation but low levels of other forms of participation. Conceivably, too, as it developed further, voting rates could decline, as other types of participation became more widespread. At least some evidence suggests, however, that the decline may not be limited to voting. In Uganda and other African states, political participation levels apparently peaked in the years immediately before and after independence and were then followed by significant "departicipation."¹⁴ Certainly the prevalent forms of participation change from time to time. In Kenya, for instance, an "independence style cluster" of political participation, emphasizing electoral activity, rallies, party membership, and dues

paying, was supplanted by a "post-independence style cluster," characterized by the acquisition of information about government and the presentation of views and demands to governmental decision-makers.¹⁵ Similarly, the participation levels of particular groups in the society may vary over time with apparently little relation to levels of socio-economic modernization. Changes at both the group and the society level are sufficiently sustained so as not to be written off as simply temporary aberrations from the socio-economic development model.

(2) Substantial differences in political participation exist among societies which do not correspond with differences in their levels of socio-economic development. The poor communist societies in Asia (particularly China and North Vietnam) clearly have had extraordinarily high levels of mobilized participation. Many societies which are much less economically developed than the United States have substantially higher rates of voting participation.

(3) Differences in participation rates among areas within societies do not necessarily correspond with differences in socio-economic modernization. In Turkey, India, and elsewhere, voting participation is significantly higher in less developed parts of the country than in the more developed parts. Even in the United States, where there is a strong correlation between voting turnout and economic development among the states, a state like West Virginia may deviate significantly from this pattern and have a high level of turnout despite its relatively low level of economic development.

What are the reasons for these variations from the otherwise prevailing relationship between development and participation?

First, many of those factors related to socio-economic development

or affected by it which in turn promote political participation may themselves have causes other than the process of socio-economic development itself. Group conflict and consciousness, organizational involvement, the expansion of governmental activities, all tend to be promoted by the processes of economic development. They may also, however, result from other causes. Migration, exploitation, war, aggression, political leadership, ideological and religious differences can all, quite independently of economic development, promote more group consciousness, organizational involvement, and governmental activity which, in turn, are likely to promote more political participation. The one factor promoting political participation which appears unlikely to vary independently of socio-economic development is the status structure in society. As societies become more developed, however, variations in political participation may be shaped less by status structure and more by political and organizational factors which are not necessarily determined by the level of economic development.

Second, some aspects of socio-economic modernization may have little direct impact themselves on political participation. This is most notably the case with respect to urbanization. Interestingly enough, Lerner, in his work in the late 1950's, assigned a primary role to urbanization. He hypothesized and his data seemed to support the proposition that urbanization led to literacy which led to media consumption, which, in turn, was related to political participation. Other scholars subsequently analyzed these presumed causal relationships and came up with somewhat different patterns, but still attributing a major primary role to urbanization. In fact, however, there does not appear to be any consistent global difference in the levels of rural and urban political participation. Many countries

have no real differences between urban and rural participation rates; in some countries, such as France, Turkey, Japan, the Philippines, and Pakistan rural voting rates are higher than urban ones.¹⁶ In some countries, such as Chile, the levels of urban and rural voting rates have changed significantly over time, with the relative decrease in the latter and increase in the former.¹⁷

In those countries where urban participation rates are higher, the apparent direct relationship is spurious, a result of differences in education and occupation. When these factors are held constant, locality size and length of urban residence appear to have no significant independent effect on political participation. In his comparative analysis of the factors responsible for "active citizenship" among working-class men in six countries, Inkeles found a mild relationship between length of urban residence and active citizenship in Argentina, Chile, and Nigeria, but much weaker relationships in India and East Pakistan. Once education and factory experience were controlled for, however, these relationships disappeared and, indeed, in Argentina and Chile became mildly negative.¹⁸ Urbanism thus had no independent effect on active citizenship. In another study of India, it was again found that when education was controlled for, "those who live in ^{the} cities vote slightly less frequently than those who live in ^{the} rural areas."¹⁹ In their reanalysis of the Almond-Verba data for the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, and Mexico, Nie and his associates came to a similar conclusion. Urbanization, in terms of size of place of residence, had no independent impact on overall political participation and in only one marginal instance (the United States) on national political participation. On the other hand, there were consistent weak negative correlations between size of locality and efforts to influence local governmental decisions. In no instance, however, did urbanization

explain more than two percent of the variance in participation.²⁰ In short, where urban political participation is higher than rural participation, this result is the product of differences in social status, education, and occupation.

In terms of aggregate voting rates, much of the difference between urban and rural residence has been due to the differences between the voting rates of women. Over time, as occurred historically in Europe and is occurring at the present time in India, the differences between rural and urban voting turnout tend to decline as the voting rates of rural women begin to approximate those of urban women.²¹

Third, there are some ways in which socio-economic development may tend to reduce political participation. The expansion of the scope of governmental activity, for instance, may have negative as well as positive consequences for the levels of political participation. People are likely to perceive government as more relevant to their own concerns, but this need not be accompanied by increased feelings of ability to influence government. The increasing concentration of governmental activities at the national level and away from the local level may well have just the reverse effect. So also may increased specialization in governmental activities, the professionalization of governmental personnel, and the increase in the proportion of complex and technical programs and policies within the total assortment of government activities. In traditional society, governmental decisions are more likely to deal with individual benefits or particularistic issues. Social-economic modernization is likely to promote the relative decline of particularistic decision-making, a marked expansion of more generalized decision-making dealing with collective benefits, and the development of more routinized

procedures for handling individual needs. The incentives for personal contacting and small-group lobbying, particularly by low-status individuals and groups, may consequently be reduced. Modernization may also increase the social distance between governmental officials and low-status citizens. The peasant who could appeal to and even negotiate with the village chief or local landlord may be totally incapable of dealing with the urban-trained Agrarian Reform official sent out from the capital city. Ozbudun, for instance, found the highest rates of political efficacy in the two least developed regions of Turkey. These, he suggests, "can be attributed either to the greater ease of contacting the locally elected officials (village headman and the Council of Elders) in the smaller and more tightly-knit village communities of Eastern regions, or to a lack of political realism usually associated with low levels of objective and attitudinal modernization."²²

The purpose of political participation is to affect governmental decision-making. Consequently, such activity has to be directed at and have an impact on the loci where decisions are made. In a traditional society, most decisions affecting villagers' lives presumably were made by the village chiefs and council, who were therefore the targets of whatever political participation the villagers engaged in. As society becomes more modern, however, an increasing proportion of the governmental decision-making which affects the villagers takes place not at the village level but at the national level. This shift in the locus of decision-making is likely to occur much more rapidly than the shift in the locus of political action by the villagers. Thus, in a traditional society perhaps 90% of the governmental decisions affecting a villager are made at the village level and 10% at the national level. As the society modernizes, the distribution

may rapidly approach fifty-fifty. In all likelihood, however, the bulk of the political participation of the villager, say 80%, still is focused at the village level. The amount of national governmental decision-making affecting society increases at a faster rate than the amount of political participation affecting national government. Thus, the ratio of political activity by individuals to governmental decisions affecting them actually goes down. In addition, of course, the inhabitants of any one village can expect to have only marginal influence on decisions which affect many villages. Hence, while the total amount of political participation may increase in society, so also may the feelings of alienation and political inefficacy.

Socio-economic development also tends to increase the functional specificity of relationships and organizations, including those related to politics. In a traditional agrarian society, the elite and mass are presumably related to each other through diffuse ties which encompass economic, social, religious, and political relationships. This multifunctionality of relationships makes it easier for the landlord or village chief to mobilize his followers for political purposes. In Turkey, India, Thailand, and elsewhere the highest voting turnouts are precisely in those traditional rural areas where the local leaders can capitalize on their social prestige, cultural superiority, economic incentives, and implied or explicit coercion to mobilize their supporters to the polls. In a modern society, political organizers attempt to create "parties of integration" designed to provide comparable diffuse multifunctional relationships and also high levels of political participation. Such parties combine social, cultural and welfare functions with purely political ones and also tend to be very successful in producing substantial turnouts for rallies, campaign work, and other

activities. Political organizations and leaders which are only political, in contrast, are not likely to produce comparable rates of participation. Organizational multifunctionality, in short, correlates positively with political participation. The overall tendency in modernizing societies, however, is toward more specific functional relationships. To the extent that this occurs in politics, that is, to the extent that organs of political participation become distinct and specialized purely in political participation, they will become less successful at it. The expansion of political participation leads, paradoxically, to the development of a professional political class which by segregating off political relationships from other relationships tends to reduce or to limit political participation.

Economic development also tends to multiply the opportunities for individual social and economic mobility, both horizontal and vertical. In the short run, individual social mobility is likely to decrease political participation. If individuals can achieve their goals by moving to the city, by shifting to higher-status employment, or by improving their economic well-being, these may in some measure be a substitute for political participation. More generally, in Hirschman's terms, the multiplication of the opportunities for and incentives to "exit" reduces the probability that people will resort to "voice." Confronted with increasing economic uncertainty and declining standard of living, a peasant is more likely to move to the city than to engage in corrective political action, provided (See Chapter IV below, pp. 4-26ff.) the costs of migration are bearable. / Economic development--communications networks, roads, buslines, urban job opportunities--reduces the uncertainties and costs of migration and hence keeps down the level of rural political

participation. Where migration is impossible or difficult, other things being equal, peasants are more likely to resort to politics, despite its uncertainties and risks. In a similar fashion, confronted with a neighborhood problem in a central city, whites, who have a choice between migration and political action, are likely to choose the former while blacks, for whom migration is presumably a much less real option, are consequently more likely to resort to politics.²³

The fact that by and large urban political participation rates are not higher than rural rates, once education and occupation are controlled for, would suggest that there may be compensating features in the urban environment which act to keep participation down despite the presumably more intense stimuli from mass media and interpersonal contacts. The broader opportunities for social and economic mobility--to achieve higher levels of education and occupational status--which, in the long run, will increase political participation may, in the short run, tend to reduce it. Economic development thus may produce greater pressures and stimuli to participate in politics but it may also, other things being equal, lessen the incentive to do so by opening up more appealing opportunities to participate in other things.

2. Mobilized and Autonomous Participation

The discrepancies in the relation between socio-economic development and higher levels of political participation may be explained in part by changes in the nature of that participation. In the most backward societies there is little mobilized or autonomous participation, particularly outside local politics. As socio-economic change takes place, however, first mobilized and eventually autonomous participation begins to expand. The

high levels of voting participation reported in rural as compared to urban areas of such countries as India, Turkey, Pakistan, and the Philippines are in large part produced by landlords mobilizing voters to the polls through patron-client ties.²⁴ In Turkey, for instance, voting rates are higher in the less developed villages and regions, and at the individual level voting is not significantly related to political information, national identification, desire for political participation, or other attitudinal aspects of participation except political efficacy. The latter characteristic, however, is primarily related to local government. It hence seems reasonable to conclude that there exists "a considerable amount of mobilized participation among Turkish peasants, especially in the less developed villages. In such villages, traditional notables (wealthy landlords, tribal chiefs, or religious leaders) are usually able to secure high turnout rates and high voting percentages for the parties they support."²⁵ The introduction of competitive elections into a traditional society thus provides a tremendous stimulus for mobilized voting participation.

In such societies in the early and intermediate levels of development, mobilized participation may also expand through other means and in urban as well as rural areas. In the absence of competitive elections, a strong single party may produce, at least for brief periods of time, substantial levels of mobilized political activity. In the cities, labor union leaders and local political bosses may be able to accomplish similar results. In due course, however, socio-economic development changes the distribution of statuses within society and increases the importance of autonomous as compared to mobilized participation. In general, the level of mobilized

participation in a society probably has a curvilinear relation and the level of autonomous participation a linear relationship to the level of socio-economic development.

The changing importance of autonomous and mobilized participation may also be reflected in the changing importance of different forms of participation. In the countryside where voting is largely a function of mobilization, rural voting rates in a country like Turkey may remain high and stable, despite changes in the national political scene. "In the urban centers," on the other hand, "voting is largely an autonomous act, a matter of individual decision," and "some voters may simply lack the motivation to vote." There is every reason to believe that urban residents are at least as well "politically informed, concerned, interested, and involved" as the villagers and associational and other collective activity related to politics is clearly more widespread in the cities than in the countryside.²⁶ Thus, the decline in

mobilized participation is reflected in the decline in voting rates; the rise of autonomous participation in higher levels of other forms of political activity.

3. Bases of Participation

As societies modernize, changes also take place in the bases of political participation. As with participation levels, however, there is no necessary one-to-one relation between these changes and socio-economic development. A simple theory of political modernization, for example, would suggest a clear displacement of more traditional bases (patron-client and communal group) by more modern ones (class and party). In fact, however, development does not necessarily do this. Instead, it is more likely to supplement traditional with other bases. In a more modern society, in short, the bases of participation will be more complex and diverse than they are in traditional society.

Patron-client relations provide a means for the vertical mobilization of lower-status individuals by the established elites in traditional societies. In purely traditional societies, patron-client relations may exist without any political dimension. The introduction of competitive elections gives the client one additional resource--the vote--which he can exchange with his patron for other benefits. Patron-client relationships remain a continually important feature of politics in India, the Philippines, Turkey, and Colombia. In these countries patron-client groups often form the basic local unit of party politics, with one leading local figure lining up with one party and mobilizing his followers for that purpose, while rival local leaders work through other parties. "Economic competition among the landholding elites in rural communities," Powell observes, "is what provides

the motive for political competition, or factionalism." This pattern of factionalism "does not seem to be confined to the most backward and traditional communities, but may persist for some time under the impact of economic modernization if intra-elite local competition revolves around a limited number of activities."²⁷

Eventually, however, the commercialization of agriculture and the socio-economic development of the countryside undermine the rural basis for patron-client politics. In a particular rural area, unlike a city, it is difficult for different bases of political participation to coexist side-by-side. In some instances, patron-client ties may prevail with respect to local politics and class-based behavior prevail in national politics. But "as economic modernization further proceeds, drawing local elites into what may be specialized roles which complement, rather than compete or conflict with one another, then local electoral patterns may shift away from elite mobilization of peasant dependents toward a class-conflict pattern." This will be more markedly the case if "traditional" landowners are supplanted by new, capitalistic owners who cease to perform the social, ceremonial, and welfare functions which traditionally were theirs in the patron-client relationship.²⁸

In the more traditional society, the patron might be associated with a national political party but he could also change his party allegiance and with his secure local rural base he could often afford to be relatively independent of party. The impact of external economic forces on the countryside compels the development of a more formalized political organization which can promote and defend the economic interests of the principal groups in the region in the conflicts of national politics. If there are

substantial numbers of subsistence farmers and small-scale capitalist farmers plus perhaps some latifundia, this political participation is likely to take the form of an agrarian populist party which cuts across economic class lines and unites these groups in terms of their common interests vis-a-vis urban society. If, on the other hand, there are large-scale capitalist farms or non-paternalistic latifundia with substantial numbers of sub-subsistence peasants and landless laborers, the latter are more likely to be mobilized into radical leftist parties. Such is particularly likely to be the case if the class polarization coincides with ethnic cleavage between owners and nonowners.²⁹

In the absence of conscious and assiduously administered government policies designed to promote greater equality in income and land ownership, the processes of economic modernization in the countryside normally tend to strengthen existing inequalities and hence to increase the likelihood of class-based politics. New owners, new capital investment, new technology all generally accelerate this process. In those areas in India and Pakistan, for instance, which were exposed most extensively to the "green revolution,"

traditional hierarchical arrangements rooted in norms of mutual interdependence and (non-symmetric) obligations give way to adversary relations between large landowners and the landless based on new notions of economic interest. Multi-caste/class political factions led by traditional landowning patrons and constructed with the support of low status landless groups are more difficult to sustain as viable political units. Instead, in areas most affected by the green revolution effective political mobilization depends increasingly on direct appeals to the aspirations of the poor peasantry.³⁰

Migration of peasants to the cities removes potential clients from the rural patron-client system. It also, however, may reinforce the stability of that system in the countryside by draining off surplus population which might otherwise lead to class and revolutionary politics.

Cityward migration also can lead to the introduction of patron-client patterns into the urban environment. This is especially likely to be the case where rural elites also move into the city, as has been noted in Brazil. Beyond that, the relations between the urban migrant and urban cacique or ward boss often resemble that of the rural patron-client. There are, however, two differences: (1) the urban cacique-client relationship is more explicitly and primarily political in character; (2) the status differences between cacique and client are likely to be less in the city.

In the urban areas patron-client relations tend gradually to lose their predominantly personalistic character and to evolve into more institutionalized machine politics. Even in societies at high levels of development, however, the underlying clientelistic patterns may remain. The Liberal Democratic Party in Japan, for instance, has maintained its voting strength, despite the migration of its rural constituents into the cities, by developing local associations (koenkai) about individual leaders which essentially involve complex patron-client exchanges. Some of these associations have 20,000 to 30,000 members and the entire system is appropriately called one of "organizational clientelism."

In cities, as in Africa, where a substantial portion of the urban migrants are only temporary urban residents, political organization, to the extent that it does take place, is likely to be based on the rural-rooted ties of tribe and village of origin. In other countries, such as Korea, where cultural traditions and political restraints are unfavorable, even permanent urban migrants may find little basis for organization in terms of either rural origins or urban residence. In Latin America, Turkey,

and the Philippines, on the other hand, the neighborhood is probably the most important base for urban political organization. This is

particularly true for new settlements within the city. Many of the most important services which city government provides are distributed on a geographical basis: water supply, sewage disposal, police and fire protection. Neighborhoods organize to demand these services. New settlements may also have to establish their collective or individual rights to land and to legal recognition. In rural areas the village may be a base for political organization, but except in some

circumstances (such as central Italy) the competition among villages is less intense than that among urban barrios. By and large, a higher percentage of urban barrios are organized for politics than are rural villages, and there is more collective demand-making by barrios than by villages.

In the initial organization of the barrio, a critical role will often be played by a personalistic local leader or cacique. "The emergence of caciquismo as a pattern of local level leadership in such areas," Cornelius has observed, is likely to "be related both to the illegality of their origins and the magnitude of the developmental needs and problems which they confront." It may also, as has often been argued, be the result of the "residual ruralism" of the urban migrants, that is, the "transference of leadership role expectations from life in the rural community to that of the urban squatter settlement." The waning of these attitudes, the diversification of the squatter community, governmental recognition of the claims of the community to land and legality, and the development of more complex and diverse relationships between the community and the urban society at large, all tend to weaken the role of the cacique and the patron-client relationships upon which his power depends. Hence it is probably accurate "to conceive of urban caciquismo as a transitory phenomenon restricted to a particular phase in the evolution of a low-income settlement zone and the urban assimilation of its population." With the passing of the cacique, his place is likely to be taken by governmental agencies, more formalized party structures, and by occupational or class based associations.³¹

Socio-economic development more often stimulates than reduces communal group consciousness, political activity, and inter-group violence. Urbanization,

Table 3.1. Principal Bases of Political Participation

Level of Development of Society	Sector	
	Rural	Urban
Low	Patron-client	Elite faction
Medium	Patron-client or Class	Patron-client (<u>cacique</u>) Machine Neighborhood Communal group
High	Class/party	Class/party Neighborhood Communal group/party

in particular, increases the likelihood of communal-based politics by intensifying relations among groups. These relations, in turn, reflect the number, size, location, and power of the groups. Different patterns of communal participation are shaped by the extent to which:

(1) There is a large number of small communal groups in the society or a small number of larger ones;

(2) Different groups have different sources of power (education, wealth, coercion, external affiliations, organization);

(3) The government is controlled by a majority, plurality, or minority communal group;

(4) Communal groups are geographically segregated in different regions or between rural and urban areas or are intermixed in close proximity;

(5) Some groups which have been viewed as "backward" or "traditional" improve their socio-economic status and threaten to produce a "status reversal" vis-a-vis traditionally dominant groups.

The structuring of politics on communal bases and the mobilization of people through communal appeals tends to produce higher levels of political participation than the structuring of politics in terms of patron-client relations, class, or neighborhood. It also, of course, can lead to a breakdown of cooperative relations among communal groups, increased communal hostility and antagonism, communal violence, and potentially serious threats to national integration. Hence governments may attempt to reduce both political participation and communal group hostility because of the close relationship between the two.

It is commonly assumed that socio-economic development leads to an increase in class-based political participation. To the extent that development increases participation generally, the bulk of that increase is among people of lower social-economic status, that is, each marginal increment in the number of political participants presumably has a lower average social-economic status than the previous increment. Hence the diversity of social-economic class increases with the expansion of political participation. In itself, of course, this is simply a necessary but not sufficient condition for class-based participation. People also either have to be mobilized on a class-basis or have to identify themselves with a class autonomously and consciously choose to participate in politics on that basis. In fact, however, it has been abundantly demonstrated that in most developed countries/voting participation is very largely class-based. The emergence of class-based voting patterns is clearly evident in the historical evolution of western European societies.

In the Harvard project, the country studies of Turkey and Colombia also produced signs of a tendency toward class-based voting in the late 1960's and early 1970's in the urban areas of both countries. In Colombia, in contrast to what appears to be the case in earlier elections, the "1970 Presidential election was marked by a very high degree of socio-economic class voting in the major cities."³² In upper class urban barrios, Pastrana, the "official" National Front coalition candidate, got about 75% of the vote and Rojas, the opposition ANAPO candidate, less than 10%. In lower class urban barrios, Pastrana's vote was about 25% and the Rojas vote about 65% of the total. (See Table 3.2.) This pattern of voting was directly the result of the Rojas candidacy which made a populist appeal to the urban poor and working class voters and which also threatened middle and upper-class voters.

In Turkey in the 1969 election the more conservative Justice Party lost votes in the more developed regions but increased its vote in eight of the twenty least developed provinces. The Republican Peoples' Party, on the other hand, increased its vote in the more developed regions of the country and suffered significant losses in the more backward regions. This has been explained by the new "left-of-center" policy which the RPP inaugurated in the mid-1960's. This policy "represented a significant shift from the party's earlier elitist attitudes and its ambivalent positions on socio-economic issues to a more populist political style and a more coherent, reform-oriented, social democratic program with special emphasis on 'bread-and-butter' issues." The increase in the RPP vote in the more developed areas is explained by its increased support by the lower classes in those regions. The decline in the RPP vote in the more backward regions is due

Table 3.2. Class Voting in Urban Areas, Colombia, Presidential Election, April 19, 197

Socio-economic level of barrio	Pesos/month Approximate income level	% of total vote	% voting for			
			Pastrana	Rojas	Betancur	Other
I. Bogota: Voting in 84 Selected Polls (of 117 Total Polls)						
Upper	Over 10,000	6.9	75.8	8.3	11.3	3.9
Upper-middle	5,001-10,000	7.3	67.0	11.9	17.6	3.0
Middle	2,001-5,000	19.5	56.4	19.5	20.9	2.4
Lower-middle	1,001-2,000	21.7	35.5	50.0	13.0	0.8
Lower and slum	0-1,000	44.6	26.9	64.0	8.0	0.3
Total at 84 polls		100.0	40.8	44.6	12.6	1.2
Total Bogota vote			39.9	45.0	13.0	1.2
II. Medellin: Voting in 24 Selected Polls (of 34 Total Polls)						
Upper		10.8	74.2	7.5	16.5	1.2
Middle		24.0	57.2	16.5	24.8	0.9
Lower		65.3	23.0	64.5	11.4	0.2
Total at 24 polls		100.0	36.7	46.9	15.2	0.4
Total Medellin vote			37.8	43.7	17.2	0.5

Source: Michael Brower, "Voting Patterns in Recent Colombian Elections," (Harvard University, Center for International Affairs, Unpublished paper, September 30, 1971).

to the alienation from the party of the local elites in those regions and the fact that in those regions "voting participation and party choices of the villagers are still largely guided and controlled by the traditional social elite." Paradoxically, the shift towards reform by RPP produced a decrease in its vote in those provinces where "the need for social reform remains most urgent."³³ Thus, in both Turkey and Colombia, class-based voting patterns appear to be emerging in the more developed and more urban areas of these countries.

The widespread prevalence of class-based voting in developed countries and in the more developed regions of less developed countries does not, however, necessarily imply that socio-economic development leads to the prevalence of class-based participation with respect to other forms of participation. It is quite conceivable that lobbying, organizational activity, and some forms of contacting may continue to be pursued more on a neighborhood, communal group, or specialized economic group basis than on the basis of socio-economic class. The evidence available on this issue is simply too fragmentary to reach a judgment one way or another. Hence, all that can be done at this point is simply to emphasize that the spread of class-based voting participation does not in itself mean that all forms of political participation become class-based as a result of socio-economic development.

In general, the prevalence of party-based participation varies directly with the extent of socio-economic development. In some instances, as with the Leninist party of professional revolutionaries, the political party may be a primary base of political identification and action. More frequently, the party is a supplementary overlay which serves as a vehicle of political

expression for some other type of group or serves as a way of coordinating and integrating the political activities of two or more groups. Other bases of political organization typically reflect more specialized motives and interests on the part of their members. The party, in some measure, is often different because it attempts to unite together for particular political objectives mobilized participants and autonomous participants and may in some measure combine a variety of other different bases of participation. In general, parties tend to be stronger and to play a more important role in fostering political participation to the extent to which they are tied in closely with either traditional patron-client groupings or communal groups or occupation-class groups like peasant syndicates and labor unions. The level of participation and to some extent its forms will be set by the extent to which the cleavages between two or more bases of participation coincide and thus appeals to one base are reinforced by appeals to other bases.

C. Socio-Economic Equality and Political Participation

1. Equality and Democracy

Socio-economic development thus does have the long-term effect of facilitating the expansion of political participation, diversifying the bases of participation, and substituting autonomous for mobilized participation. The validity of these assumed relationships in the liberal model is upheld, although the impact of development on participation is neither necessarily immediate nor necessarily direct. The liberal model also assumed a positive causal relationship between socio-economic equality and political participation. That there is a relationship between equality and democracy

is, of course, a familiar idea in the history of political thought, dating back to the Greeks. Great inequalities in wealth and status, it has been argued, are incompatible with a democratic system of government resting on the concept of political equality. This idea was perhaps most explicitly formulated by de Tocqueville in his observations of how the "general equality of conditions" in America furnished the social basis for democracy in America. This proposition has the persuasiveness of an intuitive truth. It is, however, a proposition which also presents some difficulties so far as its systematic validation is concerned. First, the presumed dependent variable has generally been defined only as democratic political participation, not participation generally. This is appropriate if the object is to explain the presence or absence of democracy but it is less useful if the object is to explain differences in overall levels, forms, and bases of participation. Second, the presumed independent variable is often left rather vaguely defined. Equality in what? Income? Wealth? Status? Equality of results or equality of opportunity? How can one measure equality and where can the data be found to construct indices of equality? Third, how can the presumed causal tie between the independent and dependent variables be demonstrated? How does one explain the relationship between these variables? Why should equality in one area of human life produce participation in another area? Is it not possible that the causal flow is from participation to equality rather than, as assumed, from equality to participation?

Perhaps because of these difficulties there has been relatively little systematic empirical comparative analysis relating equality and participation. There have, however, been some efforts to test the Tocquevillian assumption

of the relation between equality and democracy. Some studies suggest that there may be significant relationships between the distribution of income and land ownership, on the one hand, and the presence or absence of democratic government, on the other. While a global association between economic equality and political democracy seems relatively clear, both of these variables also correlate positively with levels of economic development. The question thus arises: To what extent is economic equality independently associated with political democracy? To determine this relationship, it is necessary to hold the level of economic development more or less constant.

(1) In 1964 Russett analyzed forty-seven countries in terms of their Gini index of inequality in land ownership and their classification in Lipset's categories of stable democracies, unstable democracies, and dictatorships. He found that: "Of the 23 states with the more equal pattern of land distribution, 13 are stable democracies, whereas only three of 24 more unequal countries can be classified as stable democracies." Hence, he concluded, de Tocqueville was right: "no state can long maintain a democratic form of government if the major sources of economic gain are divided very unequally among its citizens. . . . A 'sturdy yeomanry' may be a virtual sine qua non for democratic government in an underdeveloped land."³⁴

Russett points out that each of the three stable democracies (New Zealand, Uruguay, Australia) with greater than median inequality "is a fairly rich state where agriculture is no longer the principal source of wealth." The same, however, can be said to an even greater extent for ten of his 13 stable democracies with more than median equality. To some

degree, in short, the results he presents could reflect a correlation between development and democracy rather than equality and democracy. To correct for this, it is desirable to limit the analysis to less developed countries, that is, for this purpose, those with 30% or more of their labor force in agriculture. The results of this classification are presented in parentheses in Table 3.3. Of the four stable democracies, three (India, the Philippines, Ireland) have greater than median equality and one (Uruguay) has less; the unstable democracies are evenly divided; and the dictatorships (which comprise two-thirds of this sample) are necessarily tilted toward less equality. The overall relation between democracy and equality remains, although it is nowhere near as dramatic and sharp as it is in the broader sample.

(2) In 1967 Cutright analyzed the relationships among intersectorial income inequality, political representativeness, and economic development for forty-four non-communist countries in the early 1950's. Twenty of the 22 countries with greater than median equality in income had democratic political systems; seventeen of the 22 with less than median equality had non-democratic systems. Cutright's political representation index had a zero order correlation of -0.63 with his index in income inequality.³⁵ Economic development was even more strongly related to democracy, but the tie between economic equality and democracy still existed even when countries were divided according to levels of economic development. Three out of the four countries from the poorest category which had medium high income equality also had democratic systems of government, and all eight poor countries in the low-income-equality group had non-democratic systems.

Table 3.3. Inequality in Land Distribution and Form of Government

Gini Index of Inequality	Stable Democracies		Unstable Democracies		Dictatorships	
	Dem	Nondem	Dem	Nondem	Dem	Nondem
Greater than Median Equality	13	3	4	4	6	8
Median Equality or Less	3	1	8	4	13	11

Source: Russett, op. cit.

Table 3.4. Economic Development, Income Equality, and Democracy

Degree of Income Equality	Level of Economic Development						Total	
	High (pcGNP > \$800)		Medium (pcGNP = \$300-799)		Low (pcGNP < \$300)			
	Dem	Nondem	Dem	Nondem	Dem	Nondem	Dem	Nondem
High	5	0	5	1	0	0	10	1
Medium High	5	0	2	0	3	1	10	1
Medium Low	2	0	0	2	2	5	4	7
Low	0	0	2	1	0	8	2	9
Total	12	0	9	4	5	14	26	18

Source: Cutright, op. cit.

2. The Impact of Equality on Participation

The evidence so far presented shows that at the country level a broad correlation exists between economic equality and political democracy, a relation which generally holds up when economic development is held constant. This does not prove that there is a relation between economic equality and political participation in general. Nor does it show the direction of the causal flow between equality and democracy. The first step in establishing the validity of the Tocquevillian hypothesis has been taken; we now turn to the second, or causal proposition.

What grounds are there for thinking that economic equality furnishes an impetus to political democracy? One approach clearly is to look at historical sequences in the evolution of societies. Which came first: economic equality or political democracy? Little comparative work has been on this issue. The major exception is Sunshine's study of the relation between economic equality and the development of political democracy in nineteenth and early twentieth century Europe. His data suggest that the critical breakthrough in the introduction of democratic institutions took place after a society had evolved in the direction of greater income equality and that this breakthrough was then followed by an acceleration.

of this tendency toward economic equality.³⁷ In short, the assumptions of both the liberal and the populist models about the causal flows between these variables have been correct at different phases in the evolution of societies.

An alternative way of establishing causal links between economic equality and political participation (in a democratic or undemocratic society) is through the linkage of "objective" economic conditions to "subjective" attitudes which then affect "objective" political behavior. Economic development, for instance, has been shown to increase the diversity of socio-economic statuses in society and the proportion of higher status positions to lower status positions. At the individual level, in turn, higher status is associated with feelings of greater political efficacy and efficacy, in turn, leads to higher levels of political participation. Conceivably, greater equality in status in a society may also have a marked impact on the overall level of political efficacy and hence on participation. The literature analyzing the relation of efficacy to participation has generally left unresolved, however, the question of the relative importance of absolute political efficacy vis-a-vis the political system (that is, knowledge about politics, perceptions of the relevance of politics to one's needs, and the like) and relative political efficacy vis-a-vis other participants in the system (that is, feelings of superior or inferior interpersonal competence). Is it, in short, primarily the level of status or equality of status that produces the efficacy which leads to political participation? Education, for instance, promotes political efficacy and higher levels of political participation. But in which society would there be higher levels of political participation?

Level of education	Society A	Society B
None	0	0
Elementary	50	100
Secondary	25	0
College	25	0

Society A clearly has a higher average educational level than Society B. If one assumes that elementary education produces a certain general level of political participation and secondary and higher education higher levels of participation, then Society A obviously will have more participation than Society B. The political efficacy (and participation level) of that 50% of the population with an elementary education in Society A, however, could be significantly less than the political efficacy (and participation level) of the overall population in Society B. The elementary school educated of Society A might feel equally efficacious with respect to their knowledge and perceived relevance of the political system, but they might well feel less efficacious than their B counterparts because of the superior knowledge of the other fifty percent of the population with more education. Correspondingly, the twenty-five percent of the population in Society A with higher education might feel considerably more competent than, say, the total population of a Society C all of whom were college educated simply because of its superiority in education to the other three quarters of its society.

If the logic of this analysis holds up, a society with more equal but lower average levels of status might have higher levels of political participation than a society with less equal but higher average levels of status. This could be one explanation of why American cities with more highly educated populations have lower voting turnouts than those with

less well educated citizens.³⁸ It also ties in with Powell's interesting finding that high levels of voting turnout, as well as of solidarity in voting preferences, were prevalent in two types of villages: "when there is a high degree of inequality in landholding patterns and dominance by one or very few large landlords, and at the other extreme when there is a very low degree of landholding inequality, and the corporate village pattern is approximated."³⁹ In the villages with great economic inequality, the high turnouts are clearly the product of mobilized participation which "is an integral part of the patron-client exchange process." In the corporate village pattern, coercion may, as Powell stresses, play a significant role. But the high levels of participation also undoubtedly express an autonomous recognition of mutual interests flowing from equality of circumstances.

Status equality is thus most likely to lead to high levels of political participation when the perception of that equality is widespread and when there is a perceived threat to people in that status from people in another status, that is, in Marxist terms, under conditions of class consciousness and class conflict. Under these conditions, participation is the product of feelings of equal political efficacy among the members of the status group and of collective efficacy vis-a-vis the members of other status groups. These conditions, for instance, are likely to be present in an urban squatter settlement shortly before and after a successful land invasion: objective equality of condition would be supplemented by subjective perception of that equality, by the perception of a probable threat to their status, and by awareness of the possibilities of political action to secure that condition.

The liberal model of development assumed that economic development

had a positive effect on both economic equality and political participation and that economic equality had an additional independent positive effect on participation. It has, however, now been generally established that high rates of economic development have a negative effect on economic equality. The evidence presented in this and the previous ^{section} / suggests that in some measure the positive relationships between development and equality, on the one hand, and participation, on the other, may still hold. To the extent that this is the case, the question thus arises: What is the overall impact of economic development on political participation? Does the long-term positive result of development in terms of the broadening of political participation counterbalance in scope or supplant in time the perhaps shorter-term negative impact which economic development may have by reducing economic equality and thus reducing participation? What are the consequences for participation of a pattern of development which promotes more rapid economic development at the expense of increasing economic inequality as compared to a policy which gives first priority to insuring a more equitable distribution of the fruits of development at the price of a slower overall rate of economic growth? In terms of the distribution of statuses in society, will political participation best be promoted by status elevation or status equalization?

As the evidence presented above suggests, both variables have some positive effect on participation. Little if any work, however, has been done on their relative impact. Political democracy, as we have seen, however, appears to be more strongly related to economic development than to economic equality. Somewhat the same relation may prevail between these economic variables and political participation more generally. It is, for instance, recognized that economic equality and presumably equality in other status

variables is higher in societies at very low levels of economic development and at the highest levels of economic development than it is in societies at middle levels of development. Although there may be exceptions, as we discussed in Section B above, overall levels of participation also tend to reflect levels of socio-economic development through, in large part, the changes which development produces in the distribution of socio-economic statuses. The distribution of income in Chad, for instance, resembles in striking degree income distribution in the United States (except that the poorest fifth of the population is relatively better off in Chad). Income distribution in both countries contrasts with the much more unequal pattern in Colombia. Yet it would seem likely that there are higher levels of political participation in Colombia than in Chad and higher levels in the United States than in Colombia. Status level rather than status equality would appear to be the more decisive factor.

Table 3.6. Distribution of Income

	Chad	Colombia	USA	44 LDCs
Poorest Fifth	12%	3%	5%	6%
Next Fifth	11	6	11	8
Next Fifth	12	10	16	12
Next Fifth	22	18	23	19
Richest Fifth	43	63	46	56
Richest 5%	23	34	20	30

Source: Irma Adelman and Cynthia Taft Morris, "An Anatomy of Patterns of Income Distribution in Developing Nations," Part III, Final Report, Grant AID/csd-2236, February 12, 1971; Michael Brower, "Income Distribution in Colombia and Other Selected Countries" (Harvard University, Center for International Affairs, March 1971).

The U-shaped relationship between economic equality and socio-economic development contrasts with the relatively linear relationship between political participation and socio-economic development. To the extent that the causal flow is from the economic to political variables status level would appear to be more decisive than status equality in influencing political participation.

3. The Impact of Participation on Equality

So far we have discussed the strength of the relation between equality and participation and how, as is generally assumed, the causal flow might run from the former to the latter. The evidence on the causal relationship, however, is considerably less persuasive than the evidence on the degree of association (if, for the moment, it can be assumed that political democracy is a valid stand-in for political participation). An even more persuasive case, indeed, can possibly be made for a causal flow in the opposite direction. If economic development "naturally" tends to enhance economic inequality, strong governmental action will be necessary to counteract this trend. Such governmental action is likely either to be the product of the expansion of political participation or at least to require the simultaneous expansion of that participation if it is to be successfully implemented. More generally, widespread political participation means, in some measure, more widespread access to political power, and those who have access to power will insist that government act to promote a broader sharing in the economic benefits of society.

Cannot the political history of Western societies in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries be very largely written in terms of first the growth of democracy and expansion of political participation to the lower

classes and then the increasing role of the state as the promoter of economic and social welfare? As was pointed out above, Sunshine found that while the introduction of effective democracy in western European societies was preceded by a tendency toward greater income equality, the introduction of democracy was itself followed by the acceleration of the trend toward equality. In his analysis of income distribution, Cutright found that political representativeness was second only to level of economic development in explaining the variance among countries.⁴⁰ More directly in point, he also found the extent of a country's social security programs to be most powerfully related to its level of economic development. When the latter was controlled for, however, the evidence supported the conclusion that more representative governments provided earlier and greater social security coverage to their populations than less representative governments. In addition, in economically more developed countries, the innovation of new social security programs tended to follow positive changes in political representativeness. Consequently, holding constant the effects of economic development, the analysis generally supported the hypothesis that "governments in nations whose political structures tend to allow for greater accessibility to the people of the governing elite will act to provide greater social security for their populations than that provided by governments whose rulers are less accessible to the demands of the population."⁴¹ In a similar vein, Adelman and Morris conclude that "greater economic participation does not lead to greater political participation," but also that "there is some evidence that greater political participation tends to lead to a more egalitarian distribution of the national product."⁴²

Where competitive elections form one of the channels of political

participation, they also tend to produce a broader distribution of material benefits by the government. In Kenya, for instance, despite the government's use of both the carrot and the stick to limit participation, the fact that national leaders "had to fight elections meant that they overtly had to go to their constituents to renew support." Kenya's system of factional politics is "responsive to popular pressure" because it "can deliver goods and services which are highly valued and it can provide for turnover in the individuals who represent without actually altering the relationship between elites and non-elites."⁴³ Electoral competition may also furnish a means by which those in squatter settlements and others among the urban poor can induce governmental elites and ruling parties to respond to their material needs. In Turkey, legislation designed to cut back or to prohibit squatter settlements or gecekondus generally has little effect

since the ways in which the gecekondu laws are locally implemented are often determined by political considerations. Neither the national government nor the municipal authorities have shown much courage or inclination to enforce such laws strictly. It has often been observed that in the weeks preceding national or local elections, gecekondu-dwellers were given at least verbal assurances of legalization, and that such times were the most intense periods of construction. Political considerations also play an important part in the installation and funding of municipal services in the gecekondu areas. The mayor of one of the largest cities reportedly keeps a record of the votes for his party in each precinct and allocates the funds on the basis of their party loyalties.⁴⁴

In addition to collective benefits which voting can bring to particular neighborhoods, the vote can also be used to produce a broader distribution of economic rewards among individuals. In Izmir in Turkey, for instance, party leaders "more or less frequently performed for their supporters such services as obtaining credits, finding employment, and aiding in their dealings with governmental authorities." Fifty-three percent of the local leaders of the Justice Party said they often helped their constituents find

jobs while an additional 31 percent did so from time to time.⁴⁵ In Latin America in cities where competitive party politics prevails, urban squatters employ similar vote-trading tactics, but over time community leaders tend to shift to direct lobbying with governmental officials.⁴⁶ By and large, however, the evidence from recent studies reinforces that of older ones: political participation via the ballot is a potent weapon of the urban poor in achieving higher levels of ^{some kinds of} material benefits and thus in helping to reduce economic inequality.

All this suggests a high degree of validity for the assumption of the populist model that the degree of economic equality in a society is largely a direct function of the scope of the political participation in that society. The extent to which this proposition is true, however, varies with the overall level of development, economic and political, of the society. In fact, in the early stages of development, the expansion of political participation, contrary to the assumptions of the liberal, technocratic, and populist models, tends to have a negative impact on economic equality. The inauguration of the process of economic development itself increases economic inequality, particularly in the countryside as population densities increase and more peasants are displaced from the land. The growth of cities gives rise to a small but active urban middle class which eventually asserts itself politically and joins the traditional (usually rural-based) elite as participants in the political process. The urban middle class then employs its new weight in politics to improve its own economic position, and this consequently gives rise to a widening gap between urban and rural standards of living. In effect, during this period, both the process of economic development and the expansion of political

participation combine to increase economic inequality. Only subsequently, when the expansion of political participation reaches the peasantry and the urban working class does that expansion begin to have a more positive effect on economic equality. The assumptions of the populist (and implicitly of the technocratic) model on the relation between participation and equality are thus true for only a part of the developmental process.

The inverse relation between participation and equality in the earlier stages of development is clearly revealed in the conditions under which meaningful land reform is most likely to take place. While more competitive and participatory political systems are generally more likely to promote economic equality in later phases of development, the evidence is overwhelming that land reform--one of the most dramatic ways of enhancing both status equality and status level in rural society--is more likely to be introduced effectively by non-competitive and non-democratic governments.⁴⁷ Land reform, if it is to have a meaningful impact on development, must occur in the earlier phases of the developmental process. If it is to occur at that point, however, political participation must be limited. If participation has expanded to the point where medium sized landowners play an active role in politics, land reform becomes difficult or impossible. Parliaments are the enemy of land reform, and a modest body of political participants will have the interest and the means to obstruct the approval and implementation of such reforms. What is needed for reform in these circumstances is the limitation of participation and the centralization of power in an autocratic ruler.

Some further evidence of the impact of the modest expansion of political participation on economic inequality can be seen from the Adelman and Morris

data on income distribution in forty-four less developed countries. These countries can be roughly classified as pro-rich or anti-rich according to whether the richest five percent of their population gets more or less than thirty percent of the total income. They can also be classified as pro-poor or anti-poor according to whether the poorest twenty percent of the population gets more or less than five percent of the total income. If this breakdown of countries is then analyzed according to the nature of their political systems, it becomes clear that the non-democratic countries are more likely to be pro-rich and pro-poor while the democratic societies tend to be anti-rich and anti-poor. Sixty-nine percent of the democratic countries and forty-five percent of the nondemocratic ones have anti-rich income distributions, but sixty-one percent of the democratic countries also have an anti-poor income distribution compared to forty-five percent of the non-democratic systems. Thirty-eight percent of the democratic countries but only 10% of the nondemocratic ones have income distributions which are both anti-poor and anti-rich. In less developed countries, in short, democratic institutions enhance the power of the middle class and make the poor as well as the rich worse off than they are likely to be in nondemocratic societies.

The positive relation which we have suggested to exist between a modest expansion of political participation and increasing income inequality also receives support from Verba and Nie's analysis of the relationship between participation and responsiveness of political leaders in sixty-four American communities. They measured responsiveness in terms of the degree of concurrence between leaders and citizens on what were the major problems confronting the community. They also had a composite index of the level

Table 3.7. Income Distribution and Type of Political System

Poorest 20% share of income	Richest 5% share of income				Total	
	Less than 30% Dem.	Nondem.	More than 30% Dem.	Nondem.	Dem.	Nondem.
Less than 5%	5	3	3	11	8	14
More than 5%	4	11	1	6	5	17
Total	9	14	4	17	13	31

Source: Adelman and Morris

of political participation in the communities. One might expect that there would be a straight linear relationship between participation and responsiveness (or concurrence), but in fact this turns out not to be the case. The highest levels of responsiveness do indeed coincide with the highest levels of participation. But the overall relation is a curvilinear one with political leaders in communities with the lowest levels of participation being more responsive than the leaders in communities with slightly higher levels of participation. The communities in the next to the lowest quartile of participation have the political leaders least responsive to the overall views of the citizens. The reason for this, of course, is that political leaders are primarily responsive to political participants. If a relatively small and unrepresentative portion of the community is politically active, the views and presumably the actions of the political leaders will reflect the interests of that constituency. If, on the other hand, virtually no one is politically participant, political leaders are freer to adopt their own views on community problems which are more likely to have a greater degree of correspondence with those of the citizens at large.⁴⁸ They are able to think in terms of the whole community rather than simply a small part of it. A little participation, in short, is an unrepresentative thing.

To summarize: contrary to the assumptions of the liberal model, the flow of causal influence is more likely to be from political participation to socio-economic equality rather than in the reverse direction. In its early phases, however, the expansion of political participation tends to promote greater socio-economic inequality, thus reinforcing the effect of economic development. In its later phases, the expansion of political

participation tends, in accordance with the assumption of the populist model, to promote greater socio-economic equality through governmental action to redistribute economic income.

More generally, it is possible to formulate the changing relations among the three variables of economic development, economic equality, and political participation in terms of the evolution of a society through three phases, with critical choices being open to it when it moves from one phase to the next. In Phase I, economic development gets under way, economic inequality also begins to increase, particularly in the countryside, and the socio-economic basis is laid for the expansion of political participation. At this point, the society is confronted with its first major choice as to whether priority should be given to the needs of the emerging urban middle class or to the needs of the economically declining rural peasantry. Basically, this comes down to the issue of whether the governmental authorities will employ the power of the state to impose an effective land reform on a traditional aristocracy which will oppose it, an embryonic urban middle class which is indifferent to it, and a peasantry which can do little to promote it. If the government is able to bring about such a reform, the trend towards economic inequality produced by economic development will be reversed, a substantial class of small rural landowners will emerge, and political participation by that class will expand either through functional, land-reform organizations and agrarian syndicates or through rural-based political parties. In some measure, the trends towards economic development, economic equality, and political participation (although not necessarily political democracy) will all be upward. To bring about this result, however, requires a concentration of

power and an effective bureaucratic implementation of policy which are normally beyond the political capacities of governments in most developing countries.

If the alternative choice is made, the society moves into a very different Phase II. The urban middle class emerges more fully, develops its political power, and utilizes that power to promote its interests. The expansion of political participation to that class thus further promotes the economic inequality already being encouraged by the process of economic development. In due course, both these tendencies, however, level off: the further expansion of political participation is limited to the growth of the middle class, but the middle class itself grows slowly as a result of the economic inequality produced by the economic development and the expansion of political participation. Phase II thus encompasses continued economic development, limited political participation, and increasing and then sustained economic inequality.

As economic development proceeds, however, the society eventually comes to a second major choice. The processes of development not only increase the social and political awareness of the poor in the countryside, they also bring into existence both urban poor and an urban working class. At this point, the political leadership of the society is confronted with a choice between the technocratic and populist models of development for Phase III. Either it acquiesces in or promotes the expansion of political participation from the middle to the lower classes, which will lead to greater economic equality and probably to a lower rate of economic development. Or it restricts political participation, promotes higher rates of economic growth, and increases socio-economic inequalities. And,

as was pointed out in Section A above, either of these choices tends to give rise to a reinforcing "vicious circle" effect which may eventually lead to a participation implosion or explosion in order to break out of that circle. Thus, at the first choice point, in moving from Phase I to Phase II, the society is, in effect, confronted with the choice of equality vs. participation; at the second turning point, in moving from Phase II to Phase III, the choice is between development vs. equality, with the expansion of participation being the means of achieving the latter and its repression the means to the former.

D. The Impact of Politics on Participation

The influences which socio-economic development and socio-economic equality have on participation are complex, indirect, and often ambiguous. In any given society at any given moment, the levels, bases, and forms of political participation are shaped to a far greater degree by politics than by anything else. Yet in the analysis of the factors shaping political participation, it is striking the extent to which politics has either been ignored or relegated to a secondary position in comparison with the extensive treatment accorded social, economic, and cultural forces. These latter obviously influence the general context and environment in which decisions about participation are made, but in the final analysis, the most decisive influences are those which stem from the political values and traditions of the society, the nature of its political institutions, the sources, nature, and goals of its political leadership. Most significant among these influences are: (a) the attitudes and goals of the political elites; and (b) the scope and nature of governmental policy.

1. The Impact of Political Elites

The attitude of the political elites towards political participation is, in any society, probably the single most decisive factor influencing the nature of participation in that society. Mobilized participation occurs only when political elites make efforts to involve masses of the population in politics. Autonomous participation can only occur at reasonable costs if political elites encourage it, permit it, or are unable or unwilling to suppress it. Over the long-term, changes in the social, economic, and demographic configuration of a society alter the nature of its political participation. The changes so generated, however, will often be effected through changes in the composition or goals of the political elites. The changes which occur within any given five-year period occur only because the political elite changes its attitudes towards political participation or because it is itself replaced or challenged by a different elite with different attitudes toward participation.

In most traditional societies political participation is not highly valued. Both elite and mass accept the inevitability, if not the positive desirability, of deference and hierarchy and of the existing order of people and things. Modernizing elites almost always publicly espouse and articulate the desirability of more widespread political participation, but the extent to which this general attitude is reflected in actions and policies varies greatly. Most political elites would like to have the benefits of widespread participation, in terms of support for themselves and their policies, but not to pay the costs for that participation in terms of limits on their power, the time and effort required to win

acquiescence, and the demands which participation produces for the allocation of scarce resources. For most political elites political participation is undoubtedly an instrumental rather than a primary value. Their attitude as to what constitutes desirable levels, forms, and bases of participation will be determined in large part by the effects which these have on their ability:

(a) to get into power and to remain in power; and

(b) their ability to achieve other social, economic, and political goals, such as national independence, revolutionary change, economic development, socio-economic equality, and the like.

Power and Participation. Political elites out of power are more likely to be interested in expanding political participation, changing its bases, and, at times, developing new forms of participation. Bringing new actors into the political arena is a classic way of altering the balance of power in that arena. Yet the ability of political elites who are not in control of the government actually to accomplish this is usually limited. The more decisive influences on political participation come from those elites who are able to command the offices and resources of government.

These dominant political elites normally are unsympathetic to the expansion of political participation. While they may be in a position to broaden the scope of political participation for their own benefit, they are much more inclined to see any shift in the participation pattern^a as a threat to the political status quo of which they are the principal beneficiaries.

In the interests of maintaining themselves in power, political elites may act to restrict competition and thereby lower the level of political

participation. Voting participation, for instance, is significantly affected by the intensity and nature of electoral and party competition in the society. In the United States after 1896, for example, a realignment of social forces led to a drastic decline in party competition as both southern and northern states tended to become one-party states. As a result, voting participation declined steadily from a high in 1896 of approximately 80% to less than 50% of the eligible electorate voting in 1924. Interestingly, voter turnout remained high in the border states where party competition remained close. In the 1950's the differences in voting turnout among American states (running from an average of 64.6% in Idaho to 4.2% in Mississippi) showed an extremely high correlation (Spearman rank order, .807) with the degree of party competition in the states.⁴⁹

The intensity of competition is affected not only by the distribution of support among competing parties but also by the number of parties. In a multiparty system, each party tends to mobilize its own constituency rather than to compete with another party to win the support of a wavering constituency. In this sense, direct competition among the parties is less than it would be in a two-party system and consequently voting participation rates should, other things being equal, also be lower. Evidence from state and national elections in India supports this proposition.⁵⁰

Political elites who wish to maintain themselves in power by reducing political participation thus may achieve this objective by limiting the intensity of political competition in their society. In Colombia, for instance, in 1958, after the ouster of the populist dictator, Rojas Pinilla, the leaders of the two traditional parties consciously attempted to lower the levels of political activity in their society by eliminating, so far

as possible, electoral competition. They agreed to form a National Front for sixteen years under which the Presidency would alternate between the two parties and the seats in Congress would be allocated between them. The result was a steady decline in voting turnout until 1970 when the presence of a strong anti-National Front candidate (Rojas Pinilla) produced both a close election and a marked increase in turnout.

Elites which are willing to use more direct and coercive methods can, of course, apply a variety of threats, administrative controls, and physical sanctions to lower participation levels. Such repression forms a necessary component of the technocratic model of development. This repression can, on the one hand, take the form of imposing illegal or semi-legal restrictions on the activities of opposition political parties and leaders. In Kenya, for instance, in 1968:

In 1968, Government refused to allow fair municipal elections to take place. The then existing opposition party, the Kenya Peoples Union, had its candidates barred through administrative procedures. It was claimed that they had made out their papers incorrectly when filing. It was the regional administration which acted as the agent for squashing the possibilities of free elections and a number of district commissioners were unhappy about the political use made of them.⁵¹

Table 3.8.
Colombia: Proportion of Adult Population Voting for President

1958	50.4%
1962	38.2
1966	34.2
1970	46.4

Source: Michael Brower, "Voting Patterns in Recent Colombian Elections" (Harvard University, Center for International Affairs, September 1971).

On the other hand, direct force and violence may be used against actual or potential lower class participants. Evidence from Mexico City and from Lima indicates that ruthless repression of protest activities by the poor tends to have a very substantial deterrent effect on the propensity of these groups to engage in subsequent protest activity and, indeed, to have much interest at all in politics.⁵²

While the normal tendency of political elites in power is to restrict political participation, there are circumstances under which governmental leaders may follow a different course and attempt to mobilize new groups into politics in order to bolster their power. Some of the most significant expansions of political participation have, indeed, taken place precisely under these circumstances.

Every political leader or group of political leaders, even in completely non-democratic systems, has to have some group or groups in society which are his source of strength and support, which are, in some sense, "his people," his constituency, those whom he can rely on because of mutual and reciprocal interests. The expansion of political participation most dramatically occurs when a political leader seizes upon the possibility of incorporating into the political arena some new group, not formerly participant, and thus creating a new base for his own power. The development of such a new political base or constituency is, indeed, one mark of an outstanding political leader.

A political leader may mobilize a new constituency before he comes into power and utilize that mobilization as the means of winning power. To do this, however, often runs the risk of directly challenging and frightening the established elite and provoking a confrontation and possible repression.

The successful "constituency creator" is more likely to come into power through accepted means and as a result of support from the accepted participants in politics. Once in power, however, he may then utilize his control of the machinery of the state to shift his basis of support and, usually, to broaden it by mobilizing and organizing one or more new constituencies. Thus, Cardenas came to power as the personal choice of Calles and the "revolutionary oligarchy"; once in power, however, he turned on his patron, disassociated himself from the older generation of revolutionary generals, and mobilized new sources of support for himself and the revolutionary party among workers and peasant groups. In similar fashion, Perón came to power as a result of a military coup, but then shifted his political base from the army to the urban workers and lower middle classes, organizing these groups as effective participants in the political arena. So also, in Turkey, Menderes was originally elected to office in large part as a result of urban opposition to the Republican Peoples Party but then directed governmental policies toward the rural sector in order to overcome the bifurcation which had existed in Turkish politics and mobilize the peasantry into politics as a solid base of support for his party. "What does it matter what the intellectuals in Istanbul think," as he put it, "so long as the peasantry is with us?"

In these cases, the political leaders were relatively successful in their efforts to mobilize new groups into politics and to create effective power bases for themselves. In other cases, the outcomes may be different, either because of the inherent difficulty in mobilizing a group politically or because the group may be already in part mobilized by other political leaders. Thus, the efforts of the Shah of Iran to use land reform as a

means of molding the peasantry into an effective constituency behind the monarchy have suffered from the overall low level of social mobilization of the peasantry and hence the difficulty in changing them into an effective political force. President Thieu's efforts to use land reform for the same purposes have, on the other hand, been restricted by the extent to which the peasantry had already been mobilized by the Viet Cong.

The introduction into politics of a new group and its effective use by a political leader as a power base normally involves action on four fronts:

- (a) the use of governmental policy to benefit the group;
- (b) the organization of the group through functional associations, political parties, or some other means;
- (c) the creation of new structural (often electoral) channels through which the group can be related to the political system; and
- (d) the cooptation into important positions within the political system of established group leaders and, if necessary, the development of such leaders.

The mobilization of a new group into politics often adversely affects the power and participatory role of other groups. These groups may typically respond either by withdrawing from politics, as has, for instance, been the case of landlords on Taiwan after the land reform, or by counterorganizing, changing the scope of the political arena themselves, or changing the techniques and the resources used in the arena.

One clear case of the political mobilization of a new constituency which illustrates many of these points is the role of Ayub Khan with respect to the rural middle class in Pakistan. Mohammad Ali Jinnah had previously mobilized a new constituency, the urban middle class, into

politics at the time of the creation of Pakistan. The organizational expression of this constituency was the Muslem League. "By organizing a political party on democratic lines, Jinnah was able to reach the apathetic Muslem middle class. In doing so he effectively by-passed the traditional leadership to which this class had hitherto responded. While Jinnah's tactics embittered and estranged the ulema and other traditional leaders, it won for him the following of the literate, urban, middle-class professionals of Muslem India." "Jinnah's charismatic leadership" made it possible for the League to liberate itself from control by the reactionary landlords and "reach the average, educated Muslim of urban India."⁵³

Ayub Khan "was able to perform the same function for the rural middle class" that Jinnah did for the urban middle class. Prior to his coming to power, "social stratification in the villages of West Pakistan made it impossible for the rural people, other than large landlords, to exercise any political influence." Ayub Khan consciously mobilized the rural middle class for participation in the Pakistan political arena by inaugurating governmental policies for its benefit and creating a structure of Basic Democracies through which its weight could become an effective political force. He aimed his appeal to "the millions of medium and small landholders and peasant proprietors, who inhabited the East and West Pakistan countryside. He understood the process of participation in strictly arithmetical terms. Up to 1959, the country's politics had been dominated by narrow but powerful groups. The system of Basic Democracies was a device for brushing them aside and replacing them with the vast middle class of rural Pakistan." The middle-class farmers played a major role in the elections for Basic Democracies in 1959 and then enlisted the cooperation of the civil bureaucracy to secure

the credit, technology, and other resources to increase substantially their agricultural output. Profiting from this expansion, the middle-class land owners significantly expanded their share of the total land ownership during the 1960's.⁵⁴ The combination of favorable governmental policy plus the reconstitution of the structures for political participation through the Basic Democracies brought a new set of participants into Pakistani political arena.

As with any expansion of political participation, there was, however, a price to be paid. Ayub's policy antagonized the traditional large landlords, but he was subsequently able to win back their support and cooperation. The growth of the rural middle class, however, also led to the dispossession from the land of the landless laborers and of the smaller landowners (that is, those who owned less than 25 acres). The former moved into the large cities. The latter emigrated to nearby towns, and it was in those towns, particularly in the Punjab, that the unrest originated in the spring of 1967 that eventually spread and led to the downfall of the Ayub Khan regime in the winter of 1968-69.⁵⁵ Thus, because Ayub's policies mobilized the rural middle class to participate politically through channels provided by the regime, they also in due course stimulated the smaller farmers dispossessed from the land to participate through protest, rioting, and violence which led to the overthrow of the regime.

Participation and Other Goals. Political elites usually have other goals in addition to simply the acquisition and maintenance of power. They often desire to bring about changes in their societies, to promote national independence, social welfare, economic development, revolutionary change, or other goals. Conceivably, the expansion of political participation or

changes in its bases and forms could be one such goal. In fact, however, this is rarely the case. Political elites are more likely to define their primary goals in social and economic terms and to view changes in the participation patterns of society as ways to achieve those goals. Thus, a political elite, in power or struggling to get in power, will attempt to expand participation if its goal is a fundamental revolutionary change in the society's institutions, values, and social structure. To bring about such change, it must dramatically expand participation, bringing new groups into politics through new and usually disruptive or violent forms of political activity. An essential characteristic of any major social-political revolution is a participation explosion which sweeps aside existing elites and institutions and, if it is successful, leads to the creation of new political-social institutions which provide for both more highly centralized power and higher levels of political participation. At the local level in Vietnam, for instance, Samuel L. Popkin has estimated that the takeover of a village by the Viet Cong normally expands the circle of people playing critical roles in village decision-making by five to ten times. Unlike traditional village leaders or those oriented toward the Saigon Government, the Viet Cong leaders attempt to strengthen their control over the village and to achieve their socio-economic goals by expanding participation in the village government which they dominate.

If an elite in power wishes to bring about fundamental changes in social structure and economic institutions, it will also be impelled to mobilize high levels of political participation for this purpose. In this situation, however, the elite may be cross-pressured. While mobilization of the masses may be necessary to social revolution, it may also contribute

to political instability. Hence elites who come to power with a commitment to fundamental change but without a prior expansion of political participation often follow somewhat indecisive social-economic policies. The military government of Peru provides an excellent example of this ambivalence. On the one hand, it has decreed several basic changes in social and economic policy. On the other hand, it has the typical military suspicion of widespread popular participation in public affairs. It has tried to reconcile these conflicting values by devising new forms of corporate representation and participation, but the history to date of these efforts suggests that they tend to become more means of management and control than channels of participation.⁵⁶ In this case, the goals of order, effective management, and the maintenance of a clear system of hierarchy have taken precedence over more sweeping reforms, and, as a result, participation has been downgraded.

As we have indicated in Section C, societies which have reached later stages of development are often confronted with the choice as to whether priority should be given to economic development or socio-economic equality. Elites which prefer the technocratic model will act to reduce political participation drastically in order to achieve rapid growth. Those which accord priority to equality will encourage higher levels of political participation to help to achieve this goal. The choices on participation strategies are essentially elite choices dictated by their preferences for other goals. At earlier stages of development, elites may also give priority to promoting rural equality, in which case they generally take a more negative view toward immediate efforts toward broadening political participation, or they may encourage the development of an urban middle

class which usually involves a more immediate expansion of political participation.

Societies which evolve from colonial to independent status also confront their elites with a sequence of choices among goals which are clearly related to the way in which they value participation. In the early stages of the nationalist movement in these societies, the leadership is often moderate and conservative with many ties to the traditional elites. Such leaders expect to achieve independence or autonomy for their societies through a gradual process of negotiations with and compromises by the colonial power. By and large, they do not see the need for mobilizing mass support behind the independence movement. At some point, however, these moderate Phase I leaders are displaced by more radical nationalist leaders who seek full independence immediately and who through a mixture of charismatic appeal and political organization attempt to mobilize the masses of the population into the nationalist movement in order to achieve this goal. These Phase II leaders are usually the ones under whom independence is achieved and who come to power with independence. They initially attempt to maintain the high levels of participation which characterized the period immediately before and after independence. Fairly quickly, however, the levels of political involvement and activity begin to decline, in part because the cadres who played a critical role in the nationalist movement expanding participation shift from the nationalist party to the governmental bureaucracy. Party organization declines and the nationalist leader often loses his mobilizing appeal as independence proves not to be a panacea for social tensions and economic problems.

At this point, the time is ripe for a shift to new leaders with still

different perspectives on participation. These Third Phase leaders may be of one of two types. The radical nationalist leaders may be displaced by a military (or in some rare instances, a civilian) coup d'etat which brings to power a more managerially oriented technocratic regime which gives priority to financial orthodoxy and planned economic development over the expansion of political participation. In fact, the achievement by these Phase III leaders of their economic objectives often requires substantial departicipation since it involves austerity measures which may adversely affect important groups in the population.⁵⁷ Alternatively, in those countries which maintain democratic political systems and competitive elections, the Phase II leaders may be displaced by more provincial and traditional political leaders who often combine communal appeals (ethnic or religious) with appeals to economic self-interest to mobilize more conservative rural and provincial majorities to oust the nationalist leaders whose support came primarily from the more modern sectors of the society. In these instances, political participation may expand, but the bases upon which it is organized may shift toward more traditional patterns.

2. The Impact of Governmental Programs

The scope of governmental activity expands with modernization. In part, this expansion may be the result of the growth of political participation and the demands which new politically conscious groups make on government. The political elites in developing countries today, however, do not need political pressures to persuade them that government has an active role as promoter, regulator, and operator in social and economic life. Many elites are committed to some form of socialism, and even those which are not, as in most states adhering to the technocratic model of development, fully

recognize that critical role which government plays in national development. In the second half of the twentieth century, no developing country expects to develop by laissez faire. As a result, the initiative in expanding governmental programs comes in large part from political leaders, economic planners, and high-level bureaucrats.

At times this growth of the administrative side of government and particularly of the bureaucracy has been criticized as leading to "unbalanced" political development in which the "output" side of government overpowers the weaker legislatures, parties, and associational groups on the "input" side of government. This does, indeed, often appear to be the case. The growth of governmental administration and the expansion of government programs may also, however, serve to stimulate political participation and in many cases become a locus for such participation. The way in which governmental programs are organized and administered can have extremely significant results on the nature and patterns of participation in a society.

At the simplest level, individual steps in the expansion of government (e.g., new taxes or regulatory activities) often provoke intense and at times violent reactions. Elite groups may protest policies which undermine their privileged position; lower-status groups may organize to take advantage of new opportunities, or may individually or collectively protest the intrusion of government into matters where traditionally they had run their own affairs. Landlords objecting to more equitable land taxes, urban squatters petitioning for water pipes, or market women protesting the Ministry of Health's attempts to make them protect meat stalls with screening all are responding to various extensions of the scope of governmental activity. In general, the more people affected by government and the more diverse and intense the impact of

government, the greater will be the propensity of people to attempt to influence the decisions of government.

In promoting development and social welfare, the government can take the attitude either that people should take the initiative in helping themselves or that they should rely on government to meet their basic needs. If a village or a barrio needs a new facility or service, will the inhabitants act to provide it themselves or will they act to attempt to bring pressure on the government to provide it? In a comparison of preferred responses among urban migrants in Mexico City and Lima, it has been shown that migrants in the latter city relied considerably more on self-help, while those in Mexico City were more likely to turn to the government. These differences in responses are explained as a result of governmental policies and programs. "In the case of Peru, most governments since the late 1950's have sought to stimulate and capitalize upon the self-help efforts of low-income city dwellers." As a result, "large and effective self-help projects were launched in many of the squatter settlements ringing large cities." In Mexico on the other hand, the reluctance of both urban and rural low-income citizens to resort to self-help "reflects the efforts of successive governments since 1940 to encourage a sense of mass dependence upon the regime for community improvements and other types of social benefits." In countries with competitive party systems, like Chile and Venezuela, governments have also felt the need to be responsive to the needs of low-income communities and hence the "residents of such communities have devoted most of their energies to petitioning activities rather than to self-help efforts." Thus, the extent to which low-income urban residents resort to self-help or to political action is a function of both the competitiveness of the party

system and "the presence or absence of overt governmental attempts to create feelings of dependence among the lower classes."⁵⁸

In Kenya, like Peru, the government also encouraged local self-help projects, particularly as exemplified in the building of the Harambee schools. It consciously "preferred local participation through concrete self-help projects to participation in competitive politics expressed electorally." Once the idea got started, however, each community wanted to have its own school. The spread of self-help projects thus led to the central government attempting to control their proliferation because of the extent to which they would generate claims for state aid. "The present regime, after first fostering local participation around the building of Harambee schools is now nervous about the consequences for its budget."⁵⁹ Thus, while self-help may initially be conceived of by government as a way of deflecting demands and pressures and, in effect, of depoliticizing issues, the spread of such projects may eventually lead to new, unplanned, and more diversified claims for governmental assistance. In the context of development, even activity purposefully designed to be nonpolitical cannot long remain isolated from politics.

More generally, peasants and other low-status groups in less developed countries can resort to a variety of different types of organization to influence government. These include self-help associations, which, however, normally do not outlast the particular project or projects which was responsible for their formation. Revolutionary organizations generally have little appeal if only because they can produce little in the way of immediate and direct benefits. Electoral organizations are dependent upon the existence of competitive elections and can serve only intermittently as

means of pressuring governmental officials. A more effective type of organization for low-income groups is, instead, what may be called "the overseer organization," which is directed to "the conspicuous supervision of the administration of the policies and programs of government."⁶⁰

This ^{clear} type of political organization is a response to governmental initiative rather than vice versa. The organization acts through collective lobbying, propaganda, and at times carefully orchestrated protest or direct action to counterbalance other interests and to insure that the governmental program is administered in a way consonant with the interests of the low-income group. In effect, it provides a way of hitching the growth of participant organizations to the growth of administrative bureaucracies and thus, in some measure, reducing the gap in institutional development between the input and output sides of the political system.

FOOTNOTES

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Chapter Four

MOBILITY, ORGANIZATION, AND PARTICIPATION

A. Participation at the Micro Level

The preceding chapter considered the relation between development, equality, and participation at the macro or societal level. In this chapter, attention is shifted from the overall characteristics of a society and the choices which it confronts as a society to the "micro" level of the individual and the group context in which he operates. The focus is on the choices which may or may not be open to individuals, singly and in groups, to choose political participation or other means of achieving their objectives. In some measure, the analysis in this chapter parallels on the individual level the analysis of Chapter Three on the societal level.

In Chapter Three it was argued that one assumption of the liberal model of development did remain generally valid. Increasing levels of socio-economic development were associated with broader, more diverse, and more autonomous patterns of political participation. In this chapter, we will explore how this interrelationship and presumed causal connection operates at the individual level. In what ways do higher levels of socio-economic development at the societal level give rise to higher levels of political participation by specific individuals and groups within the society? Development increases status levels and organizational complexity in society. Higher socio-economic status and more organizational involvement lead to more political participation. Indeed, in their reanalysis of the

Almond and Verba data, Nie and his associates show that the effects of economic development on political participation are entirely mediated through socio-economic status and organizational involvement.¹ Improvements in socio-economic status are normally the product of individual mobility; organizational involvement is the product of group consciousness and identification.

There are thus two channels which the socio-economic development of a society creates and which eventually lead to increased political participation: the mobility channel and the organizational channel. Our concern in this chapter is how each channel operates to increase participation, how it affects the nature of the resulting participation, and the extent to which movement through one channel preempts, encourages, or leads to movement through the other. We will thus consider first the mobility channel to higher socio-economic status, then the organizational channel, and then the relations between the two as alternative and sequential routes to participation.

B. Socio-Economic Status and Political Participation

More modern societies have higher levels of political participation than traditional societies in part because of differences in status structure. As was pointed out in Chapter Three, the socio-economic development of a society leads to a fairly linear increase in the status level of the society and to a curvilinear change in status equality in the society. More people in more economically developed societies have higher incomes, more wealth, better education, and more highly skilled occupations. These factors obviously correlate very strongly with each other. But studies indicate that each also tends to have an independent effect of varying strength in different societies on political participation. In general, income appears to

be very strongly related to political participation and education perhaps even more so. The following turnout figures for the 1970 Presidential election in Colombia are typical:²

Socio-economic level of barrio	Approximate income level (pesos/mo.)	% adult population voting by post-election survey
Upper	Over 10,000	85%
Upper-middle	5,001 - 10,000	94
Middle	2,001 - 5,000	76
Lower-middle	1,001 - 2,000	67
Lower & slum	0 - 1,000	59

In his six-nation study, Inkeles found education to have a consistently high relation to active citizenship when other variables, such as factory experience, rural or urban origin, media consumption, and length of urban residence, were held constant. Length of factory experience also had a consistent, if less strong, relationship to active citizenship in all six countries. On the average, each additional year of education added about 2.5 points to an individual's active participation score (rated from 0 to 100) while each additional year of factory work added about 1.25 points. Similarly, Almond and Verba concluded that: "Among the demographic variables usually investigated--sex, place of residence, occupation, income, age, and so on--none compares with the educational variable in the extent to which it seems to determine political attitudes." Education and other status variables are more clearly related to some forms of political participation than to others. In the Verba-Nie five-nation study, for instance, a strong relationship existed between education and both campaign activity

and communal activity, a weak relationship with voting, and virtually none with particularized contacting.³

Why do status variables tend to produce greater political participation? The overwhelming evidence from a variety of studies indicates that high status is associated with feelings of political efficacy and competence and that those who feel politically efficacious are much more likely to participate in politics than those who do not. The status variables, in short, are related to participation through attitudinal variables. Indeed, high-status individuals who do not feel politically efficacious do not participate significantly more in politics than similarly inefficacious low-status individuals.⁴ In addition, higher-status people, particularly more highly educated individuals, are more likely to feel that it is the duty of a citizen to participate in politics and people who have this sense of duty do, in fact, participate more.⁵

The extent to which the status model functions through subjective feelings of competence and efficacy is underlined by the apparent deviations from that model where high-status people do not participate as fully as they "should." On the basis of ecological analysis, for instance, a high correlation was found to exist between education (measured by percent literate) and voting turnout in Philippine presidential elections from 1953 to 1965. In 1953 the correlation was .707. In the 1949 presidential election, however, there was a negative relationship of $-.268$ between literacy and turnout. What accounts for this deviation from the norm? The explanation, it has been suggested, may lie in the extent to which in 1949 the more highly educated citizen believed that he could not be efficacious. The 1949 election was conducted in an atmosphere of seemingly massive fraud and corruption which

would lead the better educated citizen to believe that his vote would not be worth anything. "For any system of choice, the decision maker must perceive some purpose for his choice behavior. If the decision maker (in this case the citizen as voter) does not perceive any purpose to his activity he will cease to manifest that activity; only the obstinate or the ignorant repeat an activity which does not reward them."⁶

Similarly, an inverse relationship between level of education and voting turnout occurred among urban Chinese in the 1964 Malayan elections. This has been explained by the extent to which the "Malayan Chinese have been systematically discriminated against, disfranchised or otherwise reduced to a low level of political efficacy." As a result, "increased levels of education among Chinese in urban Malaya lead to an awareness that one's vote is meaningless."⁷ Less well educated Chinese, like the less well educated Filipinos in 1949, were less aware of the decreased efficacy of their vote and consequently maintained higher levels of voting.

In India polling data from 1961, 1964, and 1967 indicate that more highly educated people are more interested in politics, discuss politics more frequently, and more often make efforts to influence decisions by local or national governmental authorities, that is, more often engage in contacting or lobbying activity. The same polls, however, show that the more highly educated are much less likely to engage in voting or other campaign activity. The highest levels of electoral participation are reached by those with some elementary education, followed closely by illiterates and then by the high-school-educated, with the college-educated having the lowest rates of participation. In all three forms of electoral activity the college-educated participate less than the illiterates. Three explanations were suggested.⁸

First, voting requires time and effort which the more educated are less willing to spend than the poorly educated, for whom voting may be a festival occasion. Second, group pressures, group appeals to caste loyalties, and bribes may produce substantial mobilized participation in electoral activities by the less educated while not having the same effect on the more educated. Finally, other survey data suggest that the more highly educated may be more alienated from the political system and governmental policies (at least in the early 1960's). The more highly educated were more clearly in favor of Communism, authoritarian government, and army rule than the less educated who were more favorably disposed towards the existing democratic system dominated by the Congress Party. This alienation of the educated may be the result of the "provincialization" of Indian politics in the two decades after independence, the emergence of a mass political culture, and the extent to which politicians have found that "appeals to caste, communal, and provincial factors pay off at the polls."

The democratization of politics thus may lead to a withdrawal of higher-status groups from politics because their participation is a function of their feelings of efficacy and they feel inefficacious in attempting to influence politics dominated by low-status actors and low-status styles of behavior. One wonders, for instance, whether this relative failure of highly educated Indians to vote, attend political meetings, and contribute money to campaigns may not have had its parallel in the United States in the 1830's and 1840's when electoral participation expanded, populist appeals multiplied, and political leaders of lower-status backgrounds began to play more prominent roles. In many developing countries, the prospect of mass participation by the lower classes has led to military coups designed to

"veto" that development.⁹ In India, and the United States, this result was avoided but a price may still have been paid in the alienation and at least partial and possibly temporary withdrawal of higher-status groups from their normal participation in and support for the political system.

Most studies relating status to participation have focused on the role of income, education, and occupation. There are, however, scattered indications of a different and perhaps equally important set of factors focusing on economic independence and dependence. Important variables here may be ones related to home ownership vs. rental residence, land ownership vs. tenancy for farmers, and source of income from within or without the relevant political constituency. In their study of four Wisconsin cities, Alford and Scoble found home ownership to be a third major determinant of local political participation, along with social-economic status and organizational involvement.¹⁰ In rural Colombia political efficacy is not related to traditional forms of political participation as client in a patron-client relationship, that is, to what we would describe as mobilized participation. Nor is it related to exposure to the mass media. Instead it is related to land tenure. The "efficacious peasants are the small-holders," who own their own land, and who hence are "relatively more independent of the landlord and the agricultural resources he controls." Thus "the small holder is somehow insulated from the sense of powerlessness and resignation which infects other strata of the peasantry."¹¹ In rural areas land ownership is generally a prerequisite to effective political participation. In the words of one study of central Brazil, nonowners are virtually excluded "from social and political participation" and hence are dependent on the "more privileged community members to serve as brokers in their relations with the rest of

the system."¹²

The relatively high levels of orthodox political participation found in many urban migrant communities may also be related to the extent to which such migrants are squatters who through one means or another become at least de facto land and home owners. The need to legitimize this situation provides a major incentive for political action and the achievement of such legitimacy may then provide the basis for a sense of political efficacy and community involvement. In Turkish cities, for instance, the voting turnout rates in the gecekondu or squatter settlements do not differ significantly from those for better-off areas of the city. One reason may be that low levels of income are compensated for by high levels of home ownership. In Ankara, for instance, 72% of the residents of traditional central portions of the city ("old Ankara") were tenants as against only 31% of those in the gecekondu neighborhoods.¹³ For major Turkish cities generally, a majority of gecekondu residents are homeowners.

Along similar lines, Lester Salamon has shown that Negro voting participation in Mississippi counties is related not to levels of economic development or to levels of Negro income, but rather to the extent to which Negroes have sources of income relatively independent of control by the local whites. Black voting participation was thus highest in those counties where there were substantial numbers of self-employed Negroes and in those counties along the state border where substantial numbers of Negroes worked in factories and other sources of employment in Louisiana.¹⁴ More generally, it could be that the early expansion of political participation in the United States in the 1820's and 1830's resulted not only from the extent to which the widespread ownership of land provided many with the property

qualification legally required in order to vote, but also from the extent to which it created the social-economic-psychological bases for voting. A population which was composed substantially (as it was) of "free farmers," in Dahl's sense of the word, should have been characterized by widespread feelings of political efficacy and should have had widespread political participation (as it did).

C. Group Consciousness and Political Participation

Individuals who are members of and participate actively in organizations are much more likely also to participate in politics. In Mexico City, for instance, urban migrants "who had participated in community improvement organizations were five times more likely to have engaged in [political] demand-making than the non-participants." Similar results are reported for low-income communities in Santiago, Chile, and Lima, Peru.¹⁵ In recent years, indeed, an increasing amount of evidence has suggested that organizational involvement may be a more important factor than social-economic status in explaining differences in political participation. A careful reanalysis of the Almond-Verba data for the United States, Great Britain, Germany, Italy, and Mexico showed that while socio-economic status explained roughly 10% of the variance in participation, organizational involvement explained roughly 25% of that variance.¹⁶ Other studies have suggested similar conclusions.¹⁷

If organizational involvement tends to increase political participation, the next question is: what produces organizational involvement? As suggested above, the increased participation of individuals in organized groups is, by and large, a function of economic development. How then does

economic development increase organizational involvement? There would appear to be two distinct routes: one via social-economic status and one more directly via group consciousness.

In most countries there is undoubtedly some tendency for people with higher education, income, and occupational status to be more involved in organizations than people less well endowed with these attributes. In some countries this relationship is much more striking than it is in others. This is particularly the case in the United States. In 1955 82% of those Americans in the highest of five socio-economic classes belonged to organizations as compared with only 8% of those in the lowest class. Erbe's study of three Iowa communities found social status and organizational involvement to be more closely related to each other than either was to political participation.¹⁸ Organizational activity varies directly with education in the United States but not in Norway.¹⁹ More generally, Nie and his associates found the following product-moment correlation coefficients between social status and organizational involvement in their five countries:²⁰

United States	.435
United Kingdom	.313
Italy	.304
Mexico	.227
Germany	.213

These results suggest there may be substantial differences among societies in the degree of association between social status and organizational involvement. A close relationship between organizational involvement and social status tends to reinforce class distinctions in participation. In societies where other factors such as class or group consciousness may be responsible for organizational involvement, such involvement may counterbalance the effects of social status on political participation. Thus, the


less rigid the class structure of a society, the more important are class and status variables in explaining differences in participation. The more rigid the class structure of a society and hence the greater the class or group consciousness of the lower status population, the less the extent to which political participation tends to be related to socio-economic status, provided that low-status group participation is not held down by either political repression or a "negative" self-image by the group that it "should not" participate in politics. Class rigidity thus leads to group consciousness and political participation only in societies where other conditions permit political activity by low-status groups.

The differences by occupational class in voting participation between the United States and Sweden are perhaps indicative of these relationships. In the United States there is a very strong relationship between occupational status and voting. In Sweden there is virtually no relationship. The group consciousness and organizational involvement of the lower classes counteracts the effects of socio-economic status on political participation.

Organizational involvement via group consciousness appears to affect political participation in ways rather different from those by which socio-economic status does. Social status, as we have indicated, promotes participation primarily through changes in attitudes about politics. Organizational involvement, on the other hand, tends to produce increased participation without any significant change in attitudes. In the reanalysis of the Almond-Verba data, 60% of the political participation resulting from social status was found to be by way of changes in attitudes: increased sense of duty to participate, more political information, greater perceived impact of government on individual interests, greater political efficacy, more political

Figure 4.1

PARTICIPATION RATES BY CLASS:
TWO NATIONAL SURVEYS



attentiveness. Sixty percent of the political participation resulting from organizational involvement, in contrast, was the product of a direct relationship without intervention of the attitude variables.²¹ In somewhat similar fashion, the mobilization of Venezuelan peasants into unions and political parties occurred before the peasants had developed feelings of political efficacy. This mobilization produced high rates of political participation which, in turn, led the peasants to develop feelings of political efficacy.²² Similarly, migrants to Mexico City were much more involved in "community-based political activity" and voted more often than native-born residents, although the latter scored much higher on cognitive involvement in the political process. The behavioral participation of the migrants in politics was "largely independent of high levels of political information, supportive psychological orientations or other kinds of traits or resources commonly assumed to be requisites for sustained political participation."²³ This is consistent with the findings of a variety of other studies which "have also shown that organizational involvement may lead to increased political participation in the absence of other personal attributes or attitudes such as high socioeconomic status, a sense of political efficacy, or a high level of political information."²⁴

The involvement of low-status people in organizations is likely to be the product of the development of a distinct sense of group consciousness. The group may be a class, a communal group, or a neighborhood. The more intense the identification of the individual with the group, the more likely he is to be organizationally involved and politically participant. In the United States, for instance, "blacks who identify as members of an ethnic community tend to participate more actively in most areas than do non-

identifiers. . . ." and hence "membership in a cohesive ethnic community does propel many individuals toward participation in a variety of social and political arenas."²⁵ Group consciousness among blacks, indeed, produced rates of political participation among blacks equal to those among whites, despite differences in average social-economic status.²⁶ In a similar vein, one would expect the empirical evidence to support Pizzorno's proposition that "political participation increases with the increase in class consciousness."²⁷ Similarly, on the neighborhood level, Cornelius found that the "single most important predictor or determinant of frequency of political participation among migrants is a general disposition to work collectively, i.e., a generalized preference for collectively rather than individually pursued solutions to salient personal and community-related problems." The latter involves "a high level of community solidarity, psychosocial integration into the community, and a generalized disposition to conform to community norms." This group identification, in turn, produces organizational involvement which then strengthens political participation: "Such a disposition enhances the level and quality of participation in community-based voluntary organizations, participation which, in turn, strengthens individual predispositions toward involvement in other forms of political activity."²⁸ Thus, class, race, and neighborhood consciousness all seem to have positive consequences for organizational involvement and political participation.

It is, consequently, less the characteristics of individuals than the group context in which they find themselves which shapes the participation patterns of low-status persons in both rural and urban areas. In particular the residential environment, either the village or the urban

barrio, constitutes an "important arena for political learning." As a result, "migrants possessing the same individual attributes may participate politically and evaluate the political system differently, depending on the proportion of those within their immediate residential environment who are politically active or who share some perception or attitudinal trait relevant to the political process."²⁹ In a similar vein, Powell has argued that the political implications of peasant organizational involvement must be found in the "concrete context of union participation. . . ."³⁰ The individual, in short, will tend to conform to the political norms of his community. Whatever his socio-economic characteristics, his behavior will be participant if the community generally is participant. Hence, "given sufficient opportunities for political learning, together with community-based organizational support, low-status people may participate more frequently than others located at considerably higher levels in the social hierarchy."³¹

The question then becomes: What generates the group consciousness that makes communities participant communities? Two factors seem to be most relevant.

First, experiences involving intense or sustained conflict or challenges to the group's existence may intensify group identifications and give rise to sustained patterns of political participation. Recent high voting rates in West Virginia, for instance, have been explained by the extent to which from the 1890's through the 1920's, "the state was an open battleground in the effort to unionize its miners. Contrary to what was taking place in other border and southern states, in West Virginia that group which was least likely to participate in politics--the lower socioeconomic status group, the 'working man'--was being motivated and 'organized' to participate."³² Similarly,

the disposition of urban migrants in Mexico City to work collectively "is largely a product of urban socialization experiences, particularly collective politicizing experiences such as land invasions, confrontation with the police, government agencies, landowners, or other authority figures, and other types of experiences culminating in 'negative sanctions.'"³³ Such collective experiences generating group consciousness may stimulate a political culture or style favorable to participation which may continue for years after the initial formative experience. In other circumstances, however, sustained high-level group identification and political participation may also require sustained external conflict. The political participation of squatters in new urban settlements, for instance, often declines after the community has become securely established and external conflicts have lessened. Similarly, in American cities, the greater the conflict among ethnic groups, the higher the rates of political participation by the members of those groups.³⁴

A second critical factor enhancing group consciousness and participation is the insulation of the members of the group from outside influences and contacts which might create competing affiliations and loyalties. It has been demonstrated in a variety of contexts that individuals subject to cross-pressures are less likely to vote or otherwise to participate politically than those free of such cross-pressures. Hence the more homogeneous a community and the more restricted the contacts of the members of a group are to other group members, the higher the rates of political participation. Manual workers participate much more extensively in community affairs in communities which lack middle-class residents than they do in more heterogeneous communities with significant middle-class populations.³⁵ Many years ago, Tingsten generalized this tendency into what he labeled the "law of the

social centre of gravity" to the effect that "electoral participation within a group rises with the relative strength of the group in the electoral district." A variety of evidence from several countries supports this proposition.³⁶ The more isolated and segregated a group is, the more politically participant are its members. The tendency of members of a group to participate in politics, in Lane's formulation of these relationships, depends on: the proportion of the group to the total population of the voting district (the proportion effect); the degree of concentration of members of the group in a voting district (the concentration effect); and the extent of the sense of differences between group members in a voting district and the surrounding population (the enclave effect).³⁷

In his analysis of village voting patterns Powell found a somewhat similar pattern. Evidence from a variety of studies shows "two contrasting patterns of voting behavior" in villages. In one pattern there is very high turnout plus "village-wide solidarity and homogeneity in turnout and voting preferences." In the other, there is lower turnout plus "great variation and factionalism in terms of participation and voting preferences." And, as was shown in Chapter Three, the high solidarity-high turnout syndrome could be found either where there was great inequality in landowning, with a single patron mobilizing his supporters to the polls, or in the corporate village pattern with high equality in land ownership, with a mixture of coercion and social pressure insuring compliance with group norms.³⁸

Participation in urban communities is shaped by similar variables. Greater socioeconomic homogeneity in a community facilitates the recognition of mutual interests and the development of cooperative political behavior. The isolation of the community from external political influences

also encourages higher levels of participation. On the other hand, when "supra-local interests and concerns become the dominant influence in community organizational activities, resident participation declines and the organizational structure itself may disintegrate."³⁹

In line with this effect of insulation and absence of cross-pressures on participation, participation will also be increased by the extent to which there is a more or less one-to-one relationship between political parties and social forces, that is, each major group expresses itself political through a party which exclusively or primarily represents its interests. This is true both for territorial and class or communal groups. Thus, while competition between parties increases voter turnout (see above, p. 3-59), voting turnout in competitive elections has also tended to be higher in districts dominated by one party.⁴⁰ Such districts tend, of course, to be socially and economically homogeneous. In such instances, lacking competition within the district, the party can more effectively mobilize voters against competition from outside the district.

A party system based on class or other distinct social groups is also likely to produce higher levels of voter participation. Thus, in the United States, with its system of heterogeneous parties composed of a variety of social groups, voting participation reflects status and consequently tends to be at relatively low levels. In Norway, in contrast, status (as measured by education) has no significant relationship to voting participation. Instead, a "class-distinct" party system through networks of related economic and other organizations produces high turnout and political activity rates among lower-status groups. "In the Norwegian setting, workers and farmers get activated for politics through strong economic organizations dominating

distinctive parties of their own: the trade unions in the Labour Party and the farmers' associations in the Agrarian Party. Family traditions certainly count in the recruitment of 'actives' among workers and farmers, but the decisive influences are organizational: the unions and economic associations create incentives for active participation in party politics and open up opportunities for promotion to positions of trust in the party organizations."⁴¹ This process leading to high participation rates is duplicated in Chile, Venezuela, and other developing countries where there is a close correspondence among political party, economic organization, and socio-economic group.

More generally, as we have suggested above in our discussion of the participatory effects of multifunctional structure, political participation will be increased by the extent to which all the various dimensions of human relationships and needs are concentrated in one group and are met through that group. Socialist and communist parties in Europe have historically aimed to do this by creating "an organized subculture which cuts workers off from the rest of the society." They have attempted

to organize completely the lives of workers by having them belong to party-controlled unions, live in workers' co-operative housing, belong to party-aligned sports and social clubs, attend cultural and musical activities sponsored by the party or the unions, and read party newspapers and magazines. Children are supposed to grow up belonging to party youth groups.


In Austria, Germany, and France, where working-class parties developed this multifunctional organizational infrastructure, they were often able to achieve voting participation rates of 90% or more in working-class districts, thus leading to situations in which "the usual class differential in voting turnout has been entirely eliminated or even reversed."⁴² In three out of the four states in India where rural voting turnout exceeds urban turnout,

there is a well-developed and active Communist Party.⁴³

D. Alternatives: Mobility vs. Organization

There are thus, in effect, two distinct channels to higher levels of political participation: the mobility channel and the organization channel. The path of the former leads from low socio-economic status to individual efforts at mobility to higher socio-economic status to increased subjective feelings of political efficacy, knowledge about politics, and perceptions of the relevance of politics to one's interests to higher levels of political participation and, incidentally, organizational involvement. The path of the latter, in contrast, leads from low socio-economic status to group (class, communal, or neighborhood) homogeneity and insularity and group conflict with outside forces to increased group consciousness and solidarity to organizational involvement and thence to political participation. These two channels are outlined in Figure 4.2.

Figure 4.2. Channels to Political Participation



The mobility channel produces political participation at a later date; the organizational channel at an earlier one. Participation derived from organization is likely to be in part mobilized and in part autonomous; participation derived from status is likely to be predominantly autonomous. Organization-derived participation may take the form of electoral action and collective lobbying, but it is more likely than status-based participation to involve extra-legal forms of direct action and possibly violence.

Mobility and organization offer contrasting routes to somewhat different results. The one involves individual effort, the other collective action. The route in the one case is from increased material well-being to subjective feelings of political efficacy and thence to political participation; the route in the other case is from subjective feelings of group consciousness to political participation and thence to increased material or symbolic well-being. For the individual, the engine of the one is education, of the other organization. For the society, the one route means a change in the social status of individuals but not necessarily in the political participation patterns of groups; the other route means a change in the political participation patterns of groups but not necessarily in the social status of individuals.

The polarity of individual mobility and collective action is a familiar one in sociological analysis. It has recently again come to the fore as providing a simple but useful paradigm for analyzing the social and political choices confronting individuals and groups. Landsberger has, for instance, reconceptualized the phenomenon of group mobility and applied it to movements appealing to peasants, workers, and other deprived groups. Such movements, he concludes, may confront fewer obstacles in the form of

repression than they did earlier, but they also have fewer chances of success; their future is "gloomy."⁴⁴ More generally, Albert Hirschman has analyzed responses to the decline in organizations in terms of the choice between "exit" and "voice" and then generalized this analysis to a variety of economic and political situations.⁴⁵ Here as elsewhere in the literature, individual socio-economic mobility and collective political action are seen as alternatives, practically if not logically mutually exclusive.

In due course, individual mobility leads to higher socio-economic status and thus to higher levels of political involvement. In the shorter run, however, an inverse relation may well exist between mobility and participation, and the individual confronts a choice between the two. As individual members of ethnic groups in the United States, for instance, rise in socio-economic status significantly above the group norm, they tend to become less politically participant. Hence, lower income members of ethnic groups often participate more politically than higher-income members of those groups.⁴⁶ Similarly, people in different occupational strata from those of their fathers tend to vote less than those who remain in the same occupational strata as their parents. The phenomenon of cross-pressures reducing participation is again at work. In Kenya as economic opportunities opened up after independence, many individuals who had been politically active abandoned politics and went into business and agriculture; economic success in these roles substituted for the political influence they had exercised earlier and, in some measure, was associated with the firm rejection of efforts to involve them in politics. On the other hand, for those who are upwardly mobile into upper-middle-class or upper-class positions, mobility

does not mean and often cannot mean a complete renunciation of political activity. In the province of Izmir in Turkey, for instance, some 63% of the local leaders of the more conservative Justice Party were upwardly mobile in the sense that they had higher status occupations than those of their fathers, while 63% of the reformist Republican Party Leaders and 81% of the radical Turkish Labor Party leaders were not upwardly mobile, and, indeed, 11% of the latter were downwardly mobile.⁴⁷ In general, someone in middle class or higher status will already be in some measure politically participant as a result of his status and hence is more likely to combine further upward mobility with more political participation than is a lower-income person who, lacking both, must make a choice of one. The well-off, in short, may be able to eat their cake and have it too; the poor cannot.

The paradoxical logic of the situation confronting lower income groups has been well summed up by Lipset: "the more open the class structure of any society, the more politically apathetic its working class should be; and, conversely, the more rigidly stratified a society, the more likely that its lower classes will/their own strong form of political activity."⁴⁸ In the United States, where class lines have been less rigid and the perceived opportunities for mobility into the middle class more extensive, working-class political organizations have been weak and working-class political participation has been low. The contrasting situation, common in Europe in terms of economic class, has, however, been notably present in the United States in terms of race. With their opportunities for socio-economic mobility limited, American Negroes, particularly lower-status ones, for decades also played little role in politics. They identified themselves as being in large part outside the systems of both economic

mobility and political participation. In the 1950's and 1960's, however, limited improvements in education and employment plus increased urbanization combined with the heightened political consciousness and activity of middle-class blacks (and whites on behalf of blacks) produced a dramatic change in the participation patterns of lower-status blacks. They are now more likely to vote, to join organizations, and in general to engage in political activity than whites of comparable socio-economic status.⁴⁹ Racial barriers produce among American blacks patterns of political activity and levels of political participation comparable to those which class barriers produce among European workers.

The inverse relationship with political participation holds for horizontal as well as vertical mobility. In other words, moving one's residence (and perhaps job) may be an alternative to staying put and organizing collectively, just as social-economic upward mobility may be an alternative to lower-class political organization. Thus, three patterns of response were found among those residents of a medium-sized American city who perceived the existence of neighborhood problems. High-status whites, reflecting undoubtedly the extent to which status induces efficacy, tended to respond as we have predicted both by taking political action to correct the problem and also, to a lesser degree, by moving away from the area. Low-status whites, on the other hand, lacking both the personal qualities and the group organization for political action, overwhelmingly preferred "exit" to "voice" and preferred to seize advantage of the existing opportunities to move away from the neighborhood. In contrast, both low and high status blacks, recognizing the realities of residential segregation by race, overwhelmingly rejected the exit option and instead indicated a strong prefer

for political action or some combination of exit and voice. The differences in the responses of low-status white and blacks were, in this respect, quite striking:⁵⁰

Response type	Low educated urban	
	Whites	Blacks
Exit only	40.0%	14.3%
Voice only	13.3	35.7
Exit and voice	13.3	28.6
Neither	33.3	21.4

These figures again underline the extent to which low-status blacks tend to be more politically participant than low-status whites.

Comparable options are open to peasants in developing countries but they are weighted somewhat differently. Confronted with deteriorating economic conditions as a result of changes in the man/land ratio stemming from demographic growth and increased inequalities in land ownership stemming from modernization, the peasant normally can find little opportunity for vertical socio-economic mobility within the rural sector. Even if his material conditions in the countryside do not deteriorate, the peasant is likely to be influenced by the appeals of urban life-styles--as a result of radio, highway travel, elementary education, reports from earlier urban migrants--and to develop aspirations which go beyond his current and prospective way of life. But again the opportunities for rural vertical mobility are few. The alternatives, consequently, are either collective political and economic action to better his condition in the countryside or migration from the countryside to the city. The latter, horizontal mobility, almost always involves an improvement in socio-economic status. In Turkey, for instance, migrants in urban squatter settlements typically own their own

homes, have three to four times the average rural income, and overwhelmingly express the view that they are better off in the city and do not wish to return to their villages.⁵¹ Collective action, on the other hand, means the formation of syndicates to bargain with landlords over rents, wages, and services, or to operate through political means or direct action (and possibly violence) to bring about land reform and a more equitable distribution of land ownership.

Scattered evidence suggests that migration and collective action are not only exclusive alternatives for the individual peasant but also do not tend to be found in the same area at the same time. In Italy, for instance, before World War I, peasants responded to economic hardship in the central provinces by organizing syndicates, conducting strikes, and generally engaging in collective militant activity. There was little out-migration from this area, except when the government suppressed strikes. In the Deep South, on the other hand, with equal or worse poverty, there was no collective action by the peasants, but instead high rates of out-migration.⁵² During the 1930's in South Vietnam, the economic conditions of the peasantry deteriorated seriously; migration into the cities was not, however, substantial, and social movements, the Cao Dai, Hao Hoa, and Communist Party, developed substantial strength in the countryside. More generally, Powell has shown that where the commercialization of agriculture and politicization of the peasantry occur before substantial urban migration, the results are usually agrarian reform or agrarian revolution. Where commercialization and politicization occur after substantial urbanization, they have little impact.⁵³ In general, thus once the processes of socio-economic change have begun in the countryside, the level of peasant political participation in rural areas

varies inversely with the rate of peasant out-migration from those areas.

To the extent that this relationship holds true, the question then becomes what factors influence or determine the choice between exit and voice, mobility and political participation. In general, an exit propensity seems to prevail among low-status individuals: confronted with a socio-economic challenge, they will prefer to respond by individual horizontal or vertical mobility rather than by collective political action. The reasons why this is normally a rational choice are obvious enough.

(1) Mobility promises an immediate escape from the deteriorating or unpleasant conditions.

(2) Individual mobility is perceived to be and usually is a much more direct route to the desired socio-economic gains than is political action.

(3) Political participation has little value in and of itself.

(4) Political action involves all the difficulties of any collective action: overcoming apathy, coordinating activity, assigning functions, exercising leadership.

(5) Political action may well involve risks from counteraction (repression) by landlords, employers, or the state; mobility involves few risks.

(6) Political action by peasants, if it is to be effective in ameliorating conditions, normally requires the collaborative efforts of outside groups, who may or may not be forthcoming, reliable, or trustworthy.

(7) Migration and other forms of mobility (e.g., factory employment) are familiar; relatives and friends have done it before and provide models to be followed; political action is normally unfamiliar behavior.

(8) The costs of failure in urban migration (i.e., if the socio-economic

rewards do not materialize) are small and/migration itself can be reversible; in some regions
 , the costs of political failure are indeterminate, but could be large and terrifying.

The exit propensity of low-status individuals is likely to be counter-balanced only when exit becomes virtually impossible or the obstacles to it become extraordinarily high. Southern rural blacks were faced with what seemed to be insurmountable obstacles to either upward mobility or political action. They consequently migrated north in large numbers during and after World War II. Northern urban blacks, as the figures above suggest, however, see obstacles to further horizontal mobility out of the central cities. Hence, they resort to political action. In the absence of that blockage, it seems likely that their behavior would approximate that of the poor whites confronted with the same problem. Similarly, rural-to-urban migration may often be greatly reduced or blocked entirely by the existence of different ethnic groups in the city and countryside. This was, in part at least, undoubtedly one reason why Vietnamese peasants in the 1930's and 1940's were slow to move into the French and Chinese dominated cities. In other instances, of course, vertical mobility will be blocked by ethnic, linguistic, or religious lines which reinforce class cleavages.

In most instances, it would appear that some form of mobility blockage is critical in inducing a choice of voice over exit. But apparently this need not always be the case. MacDonald, for instance, explains the differences between peasant responses in Central and Southern Italy by the differences in land tenure. In Central Italy land ownership was very unequal; society was polarized between a small number of large landowners and a large number of tenants and laborers; and the peasants were, as a result,

brought together into a collective class consciousness. In the Italian Deep South, on the other hand, landowning was fragmented; there were few large estates; and consequently there was no one against whom the peasants could organize. In the absence of this incentive to organization, they instead resorted to migration. In MacDonald's words:

The key to the labour movement among the cultivators in the Centre and Apulia lies in their class structure. The very unequal distribution systems of the Centre and Apulia, with their discrete classes, provided a structure within which a "class-struggle" could take place. . . .

The economic structure of the Deep South did not provide a context appropriate to labour militancy. The cultivators were placed in a competitive position with each other, and there was not a clear-cut division separating upper and lower class as in the Centre and Apulia. Economic responsibility and enterprise were passed to the individual cultivator and his family. Consequently the cultivators of the Deep South turned to migration instead of the socialist movement.⁵⁴

In the absence of any obstacles to migration in Central Italy, what needs to be explained more sufficiently is why the peasants there chose the normally more difficult and uncertain course of collective political action.

What we have referred to as the exit propensity of low-income groups obviously poses dilemmas for those interested in expanding political participation in general and that by low-income groups in particular. In the absence of counter-efforts, such groups when given the choice will tend to opt for individual socio-economic mobility rather than collective political participation. In due course, this should, of course, lead to higher levels of status-derived, autonomous political participation. But it can^o also be argued that such participation may be an unrealistic dream, and that once delayed in the development process, political participation may be indefinitely postponed. Just as the immediate beneficiaries of economic growth in society may act to impede subsequent movement toward economic equity, so also those who are politically participant in early phases may act to resist broader

sharing in the political process. Bureaucratic middle-class groups, for instance, like civil servants and army officers, may oppose the extension of participation to upwardly-mobile entrepreneurial and professional middle-class groups.

The alternative to this potentiality is to take active measures in the early phases of development to promote political participation as an autonomous and important goal. This could, logically, mean sharpening the cleavages in society, hardening the social structure, encouraging residential segregation, restricting horizontal and vertical mobility, intensifying group consciousness, and stimulating lower-class organizations. However unattractive these measures might appear to the well-meaning liberal, some combination of them would, in all probability, be the most expeditious way of rapidly increasing political participation in most developing societies. There is, in some measure, a trade-off between social harmony and political participation. This point is made not to recommend one course or another and to suggest that in fact any society will pursue the mobility channel or the organizational channel to its logical extreme. It is made rather to underline the extent to which the expansion of political participation itself can involve costs in terms of other values often thought to be desirable and to clarify the choices which individuals, groups, and governments may have to make among these values.

E. Sequences: Mobility and Organization

At any given time people unwilling to accept their current situation confront two alternative routes to improvement: individual mobility or collective organization. The opportunity and the need to make these choices, however, recur in the life

history of individuals, families, and groups. The choices made at these points determine the different sequences of social and political change which predominate in different societies. For the particular actor, they may also produce recurring patterns of preference for mobility or organization, or sometimes a pattern of alternation between these routes to progress. While it is often difficult and at times impossible to pursue both channels simultaneously, it is possible and often necessary to pursue them sequentially. Looked at over time in the history of individuals and groups, mobility and organization may interact with each other in almost dialectical fashion. Lack of success in mobility may lead to mobility efforts or if these have already been exhausted to resignation. But, in addition, successful collective action will create the basis for increased welfare and status and increased status normally leads to the political consciousness and the potential for political action. Both socio-economic mobility and collective political involvement may, in short, be discontinuous processes. Just as societies may alternate between the technocratic and the populist models, so also may individuals alternate between individual mobility and collective action.

The possibility of group-based political action derived from intergroup conflict and intragroup homogeneity arises only at certain points in the individual's encounter with social and economic change. In the absence of communal divisions within society, there is, in the evolution of society and of the individual, a more or less "natural" sequence of three opportunities for group-based political action, based respectively on the group consciousness of the peasant, migrant, and the worker. In the first and third instances, the consciousness is class consciousness; in the second migrants

may take group action on the basis of neighborhood solidarity or as a reflection of continuing identification with their places of origin. But the pattern of choice among migrants is more variable and less clear-cut than that for peasants and/or workers who have become fairly well-integrated into the urban industrial economy. Each of these bases for organizing involves different levels of challenge to the existing order and of demands against that order; in general the challenge tends to decline. In a sense, in each case a choice has to be made between group action and some form of individual mobility. In each case also, if the collective action is chosen and is successful, it has the effect of improving the status of the individual. Even when chosen, however, collective action may not be sustained for long. Status, once achieved, is normally retained for a lifetime and often transmitted to the next generation. It does, consequently, provide a relatively stable and sustained basis for political participation. Group action, on the other hand, depends on a favorable context of homogeneity and conflict; that context can shift rapidly as a result of socio-economic changes in the society.

Differences in mobility opportunities and in the group contexts permit a great variety of choice sequences. But the basic processes of urbanization and industrialization produce certain sequences more frequently than others, both in the lives of individuals and families, and for societies as a whole.

The first choice in the developmental sequence is made by the peasant. In some areas, population pressure, technological change, or shifts in land tenure may leave segments of the rural population worse off than in the past. Elsewhere, rural conditions are static or even improving slightly, but the gap between rural and urban opportunities is widening. The peasant then confronts several alternatives. He may choose a definitive move to the city, committing himself to a very different style of life. Where rural social and economic

conditions permit or encourage return migration, as in much of Africa and South and Southeast Asia, he may choose to go to the city on a temporary basis, for a few months or years, earning enough to make ends meet or to support a more comfortable rural life, but retaining his commitment to the countryside.⁵⁵ Or the peasant may decide to stay in the countryside and take collective action to improve his situation. While permanent migration is a clear alternative to collective action, temporary migration and rural political organization are not necessarily mutually exclusive, and indeed the former may encourage the latter under some circumstances.

For reasons outlined above, the peasant is more likely to choose migration than politics. If there are, however, mobility blockages and if conditions do exist (particularly in the form of potential urban allies) favorable to peasant organization, the path of collective action may be chosen. This normally involves a significant challenge to the existing social order; the targets of peasant political action are local landlords and officials; the goals of that action are usually drastic revamping of land tenure arrangements. In the absence of support from a significant element of the urban population--the military, intelligentsia, bureaucracy, or autocratic ruler--peasant collective action has great difficulty in achieving its goal. The failure of group action is likely to have a major deterrent effect on the likelihood of subsequent political organization and hence increases the probability of migration as a future response. The success of collective peasant action converts tenants and landless laborers into landowners and reduces overall inequality in land ownership. As few other government policies do, land reform thus contributes both to status elevation and status equality, and hence provides a continuing basis for status-derived political participation. To be effective, it also requires, of course, at least some continuing

forms of functional participation in the administration of the program by peasant and peasant organizations. There is thus a program participation imperative which is met in part by political efficacy derived from status improvements and in part by the organizational involvement derived from peasant group consciousness.

The overwhelming majority of peasants, however, are more likely to choose mobility over organization and to migrate cityward. The patterns of such migration, of course, vary greatly from country to country and from region to region. They may take the form of migration to provincial towns or metropolitan centers, of step migration, of back-and-forth migration, of migration singly or with families. Both the pattern of migration and the specific urban context affect the probability that the migrant will be drawn into collective action once in the city.

Where temporary (target, cyclic, or working life) migration is common, continued loyalty to the place of origin coupled with heightened group consciousness and political sophistication fostered by the urban setting may encourage home-place (provincial, tribal, home-town) associations. Such associations are usually multi-functional, but among their activities are often efforts to lobby for assistance to the place or origin. Thus temporary horizontal mobility may lay the basis for collective action among at least some migrants. ⁵⁶

Where permanent migration is the rule, individual and family efforts to improve status and livelihood normally absorb most migrants' full energies. As discussed in the next chapter, neither entry occupations common among migrants and the urban poor more generally, nor many types of residential arrangements provide a basis for political organization. Some migrants, however, do go directly or after some years into squatter settle-

ments. And such settlements sometimes furnish the context and need for collective political action.

The origin of the settlement often plays a critical role in shaping its members' political participation for at least the earlier phases of its existence. As Cornelius has observed,

a land invasion--whether organized or spontaneously initiated--may constitute a crucial unifying and politicizing experience for community residents. This is particularly true if the initial seizure of land is followed by repeated attempts by the government or private land-owners to forcibly remove the squatters from the occupied land. The illegal origins of squatter settlements also define their pattern of relationships with political and governmental agencies for many years to come, and create a highly salient community problem--insecurity of land tenure--upon which cooperative political activity among the residents may focus. . The old social-psychological maxim of "out-group hostility, ⁵⁶ in-group solidarity" appears to have considerable relevance here. . . .

Organized land invasions, while frequent in certain Latin American nations (particularly Peru, but also Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela) are rare or non-existent in other regions. The great bulk of squatter settlements are formed according to the "dribble-in" pattern, where a few pioneer huts are constructed and are gradually or rapidly joined by others, initially often relatives and friends, until the available space is filled. But even in such settlements, mutual co-operation and political activity may be high. In a manner somewhat reminiscent of what supposedly happened in pioneer settlements on the American frontier, between forty and sixty-five percent of gecekondu residents in two Turkish cities received or exchanged help with fellow residents. The associational ties of these migrants were also much more extensive than those of the rural population. About one-third of the household heads in the gecekondu areas of Ankara, for instance, belong to formal associations,

and the most important of the associations, the community associations or derneks, play a key role in relating individuals to the broader political system and in defending the interests of the settlement to the government authorities. 57

The peasant who chooses horizontal mobility over collective peasant (i.e., class-based) organization in the countryside may thus sometimes engage in collective migrant (i.e., neighborhood-based) organization once in the city. In both instances the stimulus to group organization is usually the perceived need for land and home ownership. Demands for changes in ownership are inherently more challenging to the established order than demands for changes in income allocation and hence are more likely to generate resistance, on the one side, and group consciousness, on the other. In each case, however, the goals are relatively concrete and their achievement brings an immediate improvement in status.

The degree of challenge and potentially revolutionary activity is considerably less in the city than in the countryside. The confrontation in the countryside between owner and tenant or owner and landless laborer is both in fact and in perception largely a zero-sum situation. In the city, the land occupied by migrants for squatter settlements is more likely to be either public land or land which private owners would be happy to dispose of. It is not normally land currently used for income-producing purposes. Once the migrants establish their community, moreover, they are likely to follow a relatively conservative political course. Migrants eschew involvement in political protests because they see little to be gained by such activity. Except in the case of land invasions, the migrant normally prefers to use conventional forms of political demand-making both because of a "commitment to abiding by the political rules of the game in his new environment" and because of the greater efficacy of such methods. 58

Among Pakistan cities Burki found that political violence correlated negatively with the number of refugees and persons born outside the city in the city and had no correlation with the rate of growth of the urban population.⁵⁹

Where competitive elections are held, migrants, with some exceptions such as the vote for ANAPO in Colombia, usually tend to vote for more conservative parties and to be less opposition-oriented than better-off groups within the city. In Turkey, the more conservative Justice Party got a disproportionate share of the gecekodu vote presumably due to the substantial social mobility demonstrated by gecekodu residents and to the extent to which the Justice Party dominated municipal governments and was therefore in a position to reward or to punish neighborhoods, a possibility most relevant to neighborhoods clearly in need of improvements in municipal services. In Latin America, migrants "have tended toward political conservatism, in the sense of not favoring drastic alterations in the socio-political status quo." This conservatism is "rooted in a deeply felt need to preserve the modest but nonetheless significant gains in income level, living conditions, and property conditions, and property accumulation (particularly in the form of a homesite on the urban periphery) which he has achieved." Also relevant are the migrant's view of "the opportunity structure in urban areas as being relatively open," and his continued "belief in the potential for future social and economic betterment for himself and particularly for his children within the ongoing system."⁶⁰ Thus, there would appear to be an overall positive relationship between individual socio-economic mobility (in this case in the form of urban migration) and propensity toward more conservative and intra- as distinguished from extra-system forms of political action.

Consistent with this tendency toward political moderation and emphasis on individual mobility, even that fraction of migrants who become involved in collective action through squatter associations do not continue this involvement very long. The highest priority goal among squatters is governmental recognition of land titles, or at least some indication of official acquiescence in their de facto tenure. Once this need is met, the needs for urban services provide additional stimuli of generally decreasing urgency. Next after security of tenure comes water, sewage systems, and electricity. In these virtually all residents of the community share an equal interest. Once these are met, demands will be advanced for such facilities as schools, public markets, health centers, and the like. These, however, represent less urgent and less universal needs. And once these "most acute developmental problems are resolved, rates of participation in community improvement associations and all other forms of cooperative political activity tend to decline sharply." Neighborhood-based political action is a means to an end; it will be sustained only if there exists "a set of problems which can be addressed most effectively through collective political action."⁶¹

The decline in neighborhood-based political organization is, presumably, accompanied by both additional efforts at individual mobility through self-help action in improving one's home and by increased attention to employment mobility. The status improvements which have been brought about by collective political action provide a base for further efforts at individual mobility. In this

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action provide a base for further efforts AT INDIVIDUAL

action provide a base for further efforts at individual mobility. In this respect, the children of migrants seem to be more highly oriented toward such mobility and away from politics than with their parents. As mobility opportunities open up, organization loses its appeal and political participation based on organizational involvement declines.

This common pattern among the population of squatter settlements can also be seen in other, comparable circumstances. The creation of a nation-state, like that of a squatter settlement, involves high levels of political participation by many groups in the population. If, after the state is established, opportunities for individual socio-economic mobility exist, there may well be a shift from the one to the other. In Kenya, for instance, as in other states, upwardly mobile individuals participated in the nationalist movement, used it to achieve access to economic advantages and opportunities, and shifted out of politics to pursue commercial and business careers. In Kenya, "active membership in KANU declined in many parts of the country after independence and . . . many people of talent and energy went elsewhere to pursue their interests." This shift was "as much or more a function of opportunities opening up in a commercial or agricultural and agricultural spheres as it was unhappiness with KANU."⁶²

In an early phase of social science urban research, it was frequently predicted that urban migrants themselves would be an explosive political force in the cities. This has definitely turned out not to be the case, as migrants have found it worthwhile to pursue fairly specific material goals within the existing political system. It was then argued, in a second phase of urban research, that while the upward mobility and continued rural values of the migrants might make them a relatively quiescent and even conservative political force, their children would be very different. Growing up in the city, they would have much higher aspirations and if these were not met, as inevitably they would in large part not be, the slums of the Third World would be "swept by social violence, as the children of the city demand the rewards of the city."⁶³

While the historical evidence from Europe and North America lends considerable support to this "second generation" hypothesis, it has not as yet been confirmed by evidence from the contemporary Third World cities. Indeed, in some respects, the slight evidence available tends to call it into question or demand its qualification. Cornelius's work on Mexico City shows the second generation to have higher levels of political knowledge and awareness than the first, that is, to have the attitudes which normally go with political participation more than their parents do. But they also "participate in politics significantly less than their parents." In addition, they "do not exhibit significantly more negative evaluations of the political system than their parents, nor are they significantly more dissatisfied with the government's performance, frustrated with their personal situation, ideologically radicalized, or politically involved."⁶⁴ This sustained acquiescence plus the decline in political participation is explained by the failure of the second generation to undergo the political learning experiences such as the land invasions and other confrontations which developed group political consciousness among their parents. The second generation does in fact have a significantly weaker disposition than the first to work together collectively. Its members want to get ahead individually, not to work together collectively. They are likely to "be more concerned with the requisites for individual social and economic mobility than with community needs and problems which can be addressed more appropriately through collective political action." Hence, to the extent that they do make political demands, these demands "will have a particularistic rather than a collective referent."⁶⁵

A concern with individual mobility also predominates among Turkish gecekond dwellers, particularly in terms of their aspirations for their children. Evidence from two cities shows that a majority of gecekond dwellers aspire to middle-class occupations and to middle-class living standards, rather than to some collective improvement within the working classes. The migrants want educational opportunities for their children and believe that their children could reach the high positions if they had ability. The prevailing myth is one of middle-class mobility, not working-class consciousness. On the one hand, as Ozbuden points out, this means that the migrants have clearly imbibed "modern," urban, middle-class values. Such values, on the other hand, clearly "present serious obstacles to the efforts of achieving collective mobility for the urban poor by way of class-oriented political action."⁶⁶

The critical test of the second generation hypothesis is likely to come in the extent to which second and third generation migrants are indeed able to realize their job-mobility aspirations. If, as seems highly probable in both Mexico and Turkey, as well as other developing countries, a substantial portion of them are not able to achieve the vertical mobility to which they aspire, then the stage will be set for a new turn to collective political action: "individualistic political attitudes may give way to more collective political orientation, and a radicalization of the urban poor may eventually take place."⁶⁷ Their political action, however, is less likely to take the form of a slum revolt than of employment-oriented or job-based economic and political action through trade unions and political parties affiliated with trade unions. The obstacles to effective union organization, however, are also great since so much employment is in relatively small firms and a major gap exists between such employees and the small number of relatively affluent unionized

workers in the large firms. Nonetheless, mobility blockage in the form of a shortage of middle-class employment opportunities could eventually give rise to working-class consciousness, organization, and political participation. This participation would also derive strength from the status-improvement which has already been achieved over one or two generations.

In summary, the opportunities and inducements open to the low-status individual involved in socio-economic change seem to suggest a model of recurring choices between mobility and organization. A common sequence, particularly in Latin America, is as follows: first, mobility in the form of urban migration; second, for those migrants who become squatters, organization in the form of neighborhood associations to secure home ownership and urban services; third, mobility in the form of the search for more skilled and higher paying jobs; fourth, possibility, organization in the form of working-class unions if middle-class mobility is blocked. Where many migrants are temporary, as in Africa and parts of Asia, different patterns will appear, particularly in the first and second phases. And where politics is organized largely on communal lines, issues and loyalties are likely to cut across both urban-rural boundaries and class differences, so that the categories of peasant, migrant, and worker are less likely to provide a basis for collective political action, although the interplay of opportunity for mobility and collective organization may still be salient.

For both the individual and society high levels of political participation generally and of organization-derived participation in particular are not likely to be sustained for long. Politicization is usually an intermittent and discontinuous process. To the extent that participation patterns do become institutionalized in organizations they may survive in form but lose their meaning and their political significance. For the individual, political participation in

general and organization-derived participation in particular is usually a means to an end, and that end is usually some form of improvement in his social and economic status. The individual also generally sees his own efforts at socio-economic mobility--through migration, education, job betterment--as more effective, less costly, more direct, and less risky routes to his goal than collective political action. Where the choice exists, as with the peasant contemplating urban migration or rural organization or the second-generation migrant contemplating middle-class employment or working-class organization, the first preference is normally for mobility. If mobility is blocked, then the turn is to organization. His involvement in politics largely occurs when he sees no alternative to it. This is particularly likely to be the case when his goal is ownership of land or a home and collective organization-derived and class- or neighborhood-based political action may be necessary. But once this goal is achieved there will be strong tendencies for a reversion toward nonpolitical means of personal advancement. In due course, the effects of mobility and organization alter the distribution of statuses in society and thus provide the basis for higher levels of political efficacy and higher levels of autonomous political participation. In this sense, high levels of status-derived political participation testify to the levels of modernity and development of the society. High levels of organization-derived participation testify to the blockages which exist to the mobility of the individual.

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Chapter Five

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AMONG LOW-INCOME GROUPS

The last two chapters have explored how aspects of modernization affect political participation in the society as a whole and at the level of the individual citizen. This chapter considers patterns of political participation at the intermediate level of socio-economic groups. More specifically, it examines the processes through which initially inactive groups become politically participant and break or are drawn into the national political arena.

In some ways these processes echo the experience of the industrialized nations of Western Europe and North America during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. A major--perhaps the dominant--theme of their political history during this period was the uneven but continuous spread of participation to middle-class groups, the working classes, specific disadvantaged groups such as blacks in the United States, and eventually to women. But the political inheritance and the social and economic characteristics of most of today's modernizing nations differ in important ways from Western Europe and North America in the nineteenth century, and to a lesser extent from Eastern Europe in the first third of the twentieth century. Therefore the patterns and processes through which less privileged groups became participant in contemporary Asia, Africa, and Latin America diverge from the patterns of earlier-developing nations.

A. Obstacles to Participation by the Poor

The very poor, both rural and urban, face major obstacles to participation. This was true historically in Western Europe and North America, and holds in today's developing nations as well.

By "the poor" we mean, in rural areas, subsistence and sub-subsistence cultivators and agricultural workers. We include those who own, rent, share-crop, or have access under communal traditions to barely enough land to sustain themselves and their families (subsistence farmers) and those with even less land or none at all, who must rely for part or all of their income on wage labor.¹ In urban areas we have in mind those with little or no education or skills, who are employed at insecure, low-paid, and dead-end jobs, most commonly in small-scale manufacturing and service establishments, domestic and custodial service, construction, loading and carrying or other forms of unskilled day labor, and those who eke out livelihoods by small-scale peddling, salvaging and selling or reworking scrap materials, petty services (shoe-shining, car watching) or small-scale illegal activities (stealing, prostitution, begging, beer-brewing, or the like). Such persons and their families constitute perhaps the bottom 40 or 50% of the urban income distribution in most developing nations. As discussed later, we do not include most workers with regular jobs in larger-scale modern manufacturing or service firms.²

The demands of day-to-day living leave the poor little time or energy for political pursuits. They lack information, contacts, and money for individual as well as collective action. While all newly participant groups risk reprisals from private (and sometimes public) interests threatened by

their self-assertion, those on the margin of subsistence are particularly vulnerable to threats from employers, landlords, or creditors. Moreover, the poor often expect requests on their part to be ignored or refused by the authorities, and their expectations are usually justified.

The obstacles to collective participation by the poor as a social and economic category are still more formidable. The most pressing problems of the poor call for individual and immediate solutions. It may be hard for them to see that joint action with others in similar positions will produce jobs, cash, or medical aid. Low-income strata are often divided by race, tribe, religion, or language; even where the cleavages are not obvious, they may draw distinctions on the basis of differences in sect, income, status, or place of origin which outsiders can barely perceive. Of course, more privileged groups also draw such distinctions, but often are more able to cooperate across such lines where joint economic or political interests are at stake.

Some years ago it was widely assumed that peasant political activity was hindered by deeply ingrained attitudes of fatalism and deference to social and political superiors. More recently this assumption has come to be questioned, in ways which are similar to the re-examination of assumed peasant conservatism towards new techniques of cultivation. It is now increasingly recognized that peasant resistance to technical and economic change often reflects objective circumstances--a very narrow margin for risk, or share-crop arrangements which reduce the returns of the innovation to the peasant--rather than innate attitudes or sheer force of habit. Similarly, political passivity often reflects the facts of peasants' life situations rather than deference or apathy. In many areas laborers, tenants, share-

croppers, and smallholders alike depend on one or a few landlords, who are the sole source of wage employment, assistance in emergencies, brokerage with government officials, and other benefits. Thus rural poor are often more vulnerable to informal sanctions for maverick political behavior than are their urban counterparts who have a wider range of alternative sources of employment, credit, emergency assistance, and brokerage.³

In urban settings, dependence is less concentrated and personalized, and urban poor may be better educated and informed than their rural counterparts. But organized political activity remains extremely difficult. Job turnover is high. Many, including domestic servants and employees in small manufacturing, repair, or service establishments, work face to face with their employers. Neither of these conditions fosters organization on the basis of shared economic interests. Neighborhood-based organization is an alternative. But many of the urban poor rent rooms or bed-space, and move frequently. Moreover, in Africa and parts of South Asia, much of the urban population consists of migrants who plan to return eventually to their home village.⁴ Neither renters nor non-permanent migrants have much incentive to take part in collective political efforts to improve their houses and their neighborhoods. Such efforts appear mostly among some of the newer squatter settlements in Latin American, Turkish, Philippine, and other cities where most migrants are permanent and many squatter settlements are comprised mostly of families seeking to establish long-term homes and a decent neighborhood. While such settlements house hundreds of thousands of people, in global perspective they represent only a small fraction of the urban poor.

In short, for most of the poor under most conditions, political participation

was and is objectively a difficult and probably ineffective means of coping with problems or advancing interests. Survey findings reflect these facts: comparatively small proportions of low-income, poorly educated people are interested in politics, regard politics as relevant to their concerns, or feel able to exert any influence on local or national authorities. Ignorance and strictly attitudinal obstacles--traditional sentiments of deference or fatalism, or a more modern but equally paralyzing "culture of poverty"--may buttress the objective difficulties. But the basic obstacles are imbedded in the facts of life, and not in the attitudes of low-income groups. Only where the specific life situations of segments of the poor are such that political participation is relevant or feasible or where effective organization overcomes the obstacles, will those on the lowest socio-economic rungs of the ladder become active political participants.

Of course participation is affected not only by the attitudes and characteristics of the poor themselves (or specific segments thereof), but also by the receptivity of already established political groups. Historically, at each step in the expansion of political participation, those groups already in the political arena (national or local) found it hard to accept as legitimate the demands of their social "inferiors" or economic dependents not only for a share in services and benefits provided by the state, but also for a voice in decisions on programs and policies affecting their interests. Certain forms of participation--especially the vote--were more readily recognized as legitimate than were other forms--for example, strikes or demonstrations. In general, the expansion of participation at the level of individuals was more readily accepted than the expansion of collective participation to previously non-participant and unorganized groups. Beyond acceptance of

legitimacy, of course, lay actual responsiveness to some of the demands of newly participant groups.

In most historical instances, increased politicization and participation by previously inactive groups forced elite acceptance and a degree of responsiveness. This was the pattern of events in the expansion of participation to middle-class groups, and later to upper-level working-class strata in England, in the fight for union recognition in the United States, and in the struggle for female suffrage, to cite only a few illustrations. In some cases elite acceptance of at least formal participation exceeded actual participation by group members. For example, until quite recently turnout among black voters even in Northern states has been low, although their right to vote was not disputed in those states. Changes in elite attitudes and responsiveness may, then, lag or lead changes in perceptions and behavior on the part of the newly participant group. The basic point is that they interact. The process of expanding participation cannot be understood by examining the newly participant group in isolation from the broader system.

At the level of abstract political culture and norms, all but the most conservative of today's developing nations are far more prepared to accept or even promote widespread political participation than were most European elites during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Universal suffrage is the rule. Most elites give at least lip service to the idea of broad popular participation in aspects of the governance of their countries, although views differ markedly on the range of issues on which participation is desirable. Those regimes sincerely committed to promoting economic and social development often (though not always) view broadened participation at local levels and on certain issues as important stimulants to initiative,

efficiency, and honesty. Most regimes, regardless of their dedication to development or lack thereof, feel a certain pressure from international norms to maintain at least the facade of broad popular support. Moreover, the revolutions of the twentieth century have created some awareness of the risks of postponing liberalization too long.

Not only acceptance of the concept of broad popular participation, but also aspects of the organization and machinery for such participation have been inherited or adopted by the developing nations. Many of the former colonies gained independence partly through the efforts of movements involving middle-class and some working-class and peasant support. In effect, these nations were born partially prepared for broad participation, although independence movements often disintegrated after independence. All modernizing nations, regardless of their colonial experience or lack thereof, can observe and learn from a variety of past experiences with political mobilization in other nations. While elites in early nineteenth century Europe could barely imagine procedures and institutions for mass participation, any more than they could visualize modern production techniques, today's political leaders can choose from or combine many patterns. A range of participation "technology," as it were, is already available, although it often needs adaptation to local conditions.

While broad political culture and aspects of political structure are more open to lower-class participation than was the case in nineteenth century Europe, most members of elites in Asia, Africa, and Latin America are certainly not eager to give up their traditional privileges, nor are upward-mobile middle-class groups prepared to mark time while the poor catch up. Precisely because the political culture is more receptive, the concrete

realities of resistance to broadened participation may produce even more bitter conflict than occurred in Europe and North America.

B. Patterns of Participation by the Poor

A random sample of cases where segments of the urban or rural poor sought to influence governmental decisions, on their own or others' initiative, would span a great variety of specific forms and combinations. No comparative or theoretical analysis can pretend to explain or predict these variations in detail. The short discussion which follows surely cannot attempt to do so. It can, however, suggest the major channels through which rural and urban poor are most frequently brought into the national political arena, the issues and forms of participation characteristic of each channel, and some of the conditions under which each is likely to be important. The research of the Harvard group has explored certain of these channels or patterns systematically and in depth, and has touched on others only in passing.

Table 5.1 is a schematic classification of the major patterns of political participation by low-income groups. The key characteristics which distinguish the patterns are the leaders and their basic goals. These in turn largely determine the issues on which participation focuses and its scale and forms. Where leadership is drawn from middle-class or elite strata, low-income followers may or may not share their leaders' goals and motives.

The first pattern, particularized contacting, is clear-cut and readily distinguished from the rest. The second, third, and fourth patterns all involve middle- or upper-class initiative and guidance, but the second and fourth are characterized by different goals on the part of both leaders

Patterns of Political Participation among Low-Income Groups

Name of Pattern	Leadership	Leaders' Goals	Goals of Low-Income Participants	Scale and Duration of Action	Form(s) of Action
1. Particularized Contacting	not applicable	not applicable	Solve specific individual problem	Individual only, episodic	Petitioning, bribery
2. Mobilized	Elite (usually rural) or middle-class (usually urban) landlords, traditional leaders, foremen, bosses	Protect or improve own political and economic interests	Loyalty, fear, or favors from leader(s)	Usually small or medium-scale episodic	Usually voting. Sometimes campaigning, demonstrations
3. Cross-class ethnic or other base	Elite and/or middle-class	Defend or promote nationalist, regional, or ethnic interests, or gain mass support on specific economic interests	Same as leaders'	Often large-scale, and sometimes sustained	All collective forms. Issues are emotional, therefore some tendency to violence
4. Externally-led class-based	Elite and/or middle-class	Ideological commitment and/or response to political competition.	Improve own and peers' circumstances	Medium or large-scale, sometimes sustained	All collective forms. Voting, campaigning, demonstrations most common.
5. Autonomous class-based	Low-income	Solve own and community problems, gain prestige, sometimes gain material benefits	Improve own and community circumstances, shot usually through better facilities. (Well, access road, electricity)	Small-scale, single	Collective self-help, petitioning, publicity. Occasional block-vote bargaining.

and followers. While the differences are clear in principle, the boundaries sometimes blur in reality. Specific parties or movements in particular countries may combine characteristics of two or all three of these patterns. The fifth pattern, autonomous or independent action by low-income groups to solve some of their own problems, is usually quite distinct from other patterns in terms of its leadership and its small size and limited goals. But where independent groups such as squatter associations are numerous, established or aspiring middle- or upper-class politicians often try to woo support from, infiltrate, or capture control of the autonomous organizations. To the extent that they become semi-dependent and partisan, such groups fall somewhere on the border between the fourth and fifth patterns in Table 5.1.

The patterns are not meant to characterize the political situation in entire countries. In any one country, several or all may be present. In particular, contacting usually occurs regardless of the presence and extent of other patterns. Any one area within a country usually shows less variety. To the extent that the low-income people in that area are politically active at all, their participation can usually be described in terms of contacting plus one or two of the other patterns.

Table 5.1 suggests, among other things, that not all political participation by low-income people is intended (by leaders or followers) to improve the conditions of the poor, individually or as a social category. Mobilized participation and cross-class participation are directed to quite different ends. Both may produce some limited benefits for some of the poor, either by design or coincidence. But neither is likely to produce a reorientation of policies and programs in favor of the less

privileged, nor is such re-orientation the major goal of the participant poor themselves.

1. Individual Contacting for Individual Benefits

Of all forms of political participation, individual contacting on particularized problems presents the most clear, direct, and (usually) immediate link between action and results. The results of all other forms of participation are often uncertain, deferred in time, and diffused in incidence. No individual participant can be certain whether his action will have the desired general results, nor whether or when he will personally benefit. Therefore, despite the fact that contacting may require substantial initiative and persistence, one would expect that low-income people might be more prone to engage in this than other forms of participation.

Survey data for the United States confirm this hypothesis. Contacting for particularized benefits has little overall relationship to socio-economic status. But citizens in the bottom third of the socio-economic scale are much more likely to engage in this than in other political activities. The bottom sixth of the population attempts particularized contacting a good deal less than the average, but the gap between the mean score for contacting among this most deprived group and the mean score for the population as a whole is much narrower than the gap with respect to other forms of participation. The group next to the bottom in socio-economic status, interestingly enough, actually scores slightly above the mean for the entire population with respect to contacting, although they score substantially below average on other forms of participation.

Low Status Participation in Particularized
Contacting Compared to Other Means

Mode of Participation	Group Average Relative to Mean for Total Population	
	Lowest sixth on SES Scale	Next-to-bottom sixth on SES Scale
Particularized Contacting	-14	+4

Overall participation scale	-46	-27
Voting	-34	-15
Campaign activity	-32	-17
Communal lobbying activity	-38	-31

Adopted from Verba and Nie, Participation in America (New York: Harper & Row, 1972). Chapter 8, figures 2 and 4, pp. 132-134.

The fact that those at the very lowest socio-economic levels do less contacting than the average citizen (at least in the United States, although more contacting than other forms of participation) reflects at least three factors. Many simply lack information on whom to contact on particular problems. Even given adequate information, many are scattered in isolated rural areas where it is difficult to reach the appropriate officials. Finally, many of the very poor undoubtedly are diffident or skeptical that officials will respond favorably. These feelings are particularly strong where low-income people are also members of a subordinated ethnic group or caste. In their case contacting requires approaching officials who are not only higher class, but are also probably members of the dominant ethnic group. Thus poorly educated U.S. blacks are roughly half as likely as whites with similar levels of education to contact officials for help with individual problems. Indian Harijans with no formal education also do substantially less contacting than uneducated caste Hindus.⁵

Ignorance, skepticism, and physical or social difficulty in reaching

officials limit contacting among poor people in all nations. In developing countries an additional factor reduces the incidence of particularistic contacting among poor people: the range of services and benefits available to them through government agencies is usually much narrower than in the more advanced nations with highly developed social security systems. Thus Wayne Cornelius found that among low-income migrants in Mexico City, only 3% of contacts with government officials dealt with personal or family needs. The bulk of the demands upon the government concerned neighborhood improvements.

This low frequency of particularistic contacting . . . reflects migrants' perceptions of what types of needs are most amenable to satisfaction through governmental action. Perhaps the most important reason why individual demands for housing and employment are not frequent objects of demand-making is that the migrant usually perceives the satisfaction of such needs as an individual responsibility.⁶

Parallel data from Lima confirm Cornelius' finding. Thus, despite the theoretically greater appeal to the poor of particularistic contacting as a form of participation, the actual volume of contacting by the poor depends heavily on the range of government services available to the poor, and on low-income citizens' perceptions of the extent of government responsibilities.

Where services are known to exist, but people believe that officials will not respond to them or will demand a substantial bribe, they may seek the mediation of a more influential or affluent person. Services perceived as relevant but inaccessible, in other words, divert contacting into patron-client channels, thereby enlarging the potential for mobilized participation.

2. Mobilized participation

The obstacles to participation by the poor outlined earlier apply more

properly to autonomous participation. Mobilized participation, in contrast, may be part and parcel of the systems which evolve because of the dependence of the poor on others. Political support is one of the few coins with which individual peasants or low-income urban workers can repay favors and assistance from those in a position to meet their needs. The aggregate effect, of course, is perpetuation of the power and control of the individual or institutional patron. For example, in rural Colombia,

Smallholders in the vicinity of large holdings, tenants, sharecroppers, day laborers and squatters alike have fashioned a modus vivendi with large landlords based to a greater or lesser degree on a patron-client relationship, or clientelist politics. Within this basic pattern, the local large landowner generally determined which party and candidates would be supported in his zone of influence, and in return, occasional benefits were provided for the peasantry. When the landlord's party was in power, government jobs, road repairs, and perhaps agricultural credits might be obtained. When the landlord's party was out of power, of course, the benefits tended to flow to the loyalists of the other party.⁷

That similar mechanisms are at work in those rural regions of Turkey least affected by economic and social change is strongly suggested by statistics on voting turnout in the elections of 1965 and 1969: the turnout in rural areas was negatively associated with indices of village development; moreover, the greatest drop in turnout during the decade of the 1960's occurred in the most advanced villages.⁸

As the Turkish data suggest, traditional relations between landlord-patrons and their clients tend to erode with modernization. Flexible leaders may be able to convert new elements of the rural situation-- government credit programs, agricultural extension, the spread of public schools--into new means to maintain their followers' dependence, by acting as brokers between these followers and public or private outside agencies. But often the domination of the single patron is fragmented. This does

not necessarily free the peasant for independent political action. He may find that he now depends not on one, but on several people--for example, the landlord, who still provides his land; the local party boss, who may control the flow of credit, and the storekeeper, who loaned him money when his child was ill or his daughter got married. If the interests of these three compete, the peasant may be paralyzed politically. The breakdown of situations which permitted widespread mobilized participation does not automatically mean that other forms of participation will occur.

In the cities of the United States in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, political machines played a similar role to that of the rural patron, offering assistance with employment, emergency aid in cash or kind, brokerage with city authorities, and other possible favors in exchange for votes and occasional campaign services. In most contemporary modernizing nations, parties are too centralized, resources too limited, and national control of revenues and expenditures is too strong to permit the evolution of urban political machines on the U.S. historical model.⁹ But modernizing parties in single or dominant party states may mobilize support among the urban poor for ideological reasons or to balance off opposition from other quarters. For example, the PRI in Mexico may provide a neighborhood with water pipes or street lights, send a medical team for several days to offer routine treatments, or extend emergency aid for fire or flood victims. In turn, the party expects a sizeable turnout at the next election, and a supply of volunteers to be bused into the center of town on special occasions to swell mass demonstrations in support of the regime. Usually a cacique--a local "boss vaguely analagous to the historical ward boss of American cities"--acts as political broker or middleman, working

for benefits (and the perpetuation of his own power) for the neighborhood, and taking informal responsibility for orienting and organizing his followers politically.¹⁰ More ideological parties may demand more sustained and active demonstrations of support.

As this example suggests, the boundary between mobilized participation and other patterns is blurred. Parties in competitive multi-party situations, peasant unions, and other organizations also exchange benefits and favors for support. In principle, the distinctions between mobilized participation and other types of externally-organized participation are fairly clear. The mobilized participant is not interestedⁱⁿ, and may not even be aware of the intended effect of his action on the government. He acts from respect, loyalty, or fear of the leader, or in exchange for past or future favors from him. In contrast, the participant who votes or demonstrates in response to cross-class appeals or on the basis of perceived class interests intends to influence the government on issues he views as important.

In practice, however, union organizers or party workers allegedly concerned with the welfare of their followers may capitalize on loyalty or fear to generate more intense action, or action directed to goals different from those which the participant himself would choose freely. Conversely, cases which appear to be clear-cut mobilization upon closer examination may turn out to involve some degree of autonomous self-interest. Thus landlords may be able to persuade tenants or sharecroppers to oppose land reform, if they believe that land will be distributed not only to present tillers but also to landless laborers, some of whom may come from distant regions and be viewed as outsiders. The hard fact that the poor must depend on the goodwill

and favors of the more privileged quite literally for their daily bread means that they are always vulnerable to manipulation. Simon-pure mobilization is the extreme end of a spectrum of participation patterns. It is as or perhaps more rare than purely autonomous action wholly free of manipulation or pressure. Most externally organized participation by the poor involves substantial manipulation.

3. Cross-class participation

Mobilized participation implies that the participants are directed to act so as to further the interests of the leader or mobilizer. But low-income people may also be encouraged to vote or take collective political action in co-operation with non-poor, to foster shared goals.

Although middle-class groups usually take the lead on anti-colonial and nationalist issues, such issues obviously cut across class lines and prompt participation at all socio-economic levels. Thus overall levels of participation in many former African colonies dropped sharply after independence was achieved. Other issues may also crystallize cross-class collaboration. Inflation in general, and particularly increases in the prices of staple foods and bus fares are likely to arouse the ire of lower, lower-middle, and middle-class groups alike. Moreover, the same corrective actions can be sought by different classes. Under-employment and unemployment, in contrast, seldom provide a focus for cross-class cooperation, even though both lower and lower-middle-class groups are affected. Unlike inflation, unemployment takes different forms in different socio-economic strata. The truly poor, especially those with dependents, cannot afford to remain unemployed. Instead they accept insecure and badly paid jobs.

Open employment is disproportionately concentrated among young men with middle or even higher levels of education relative to the society. In Latin America and parts of Asia, this may mean high-school graduates; in Lagos or Nairobi it may mean those who have completed elementary school, the so-called "seventh standard boys."¹¹ The point is not merely that some groups are underemployed or badly employed and others openly unemployed, but that the kinds of jobs they will accept, hence the types of governmental action viewed as necessary, differ. Therefore a coalition built on issues of employment is more difficult to create than one focused on staple prices.

Political participation triggered by specific issues which cut across class lines tends to take the form of demonstrations. The demonstrations may be in support of the government, as is usually the case in nationalist crises, or in protest against rising prices or other issues. The latter may become violent. Such issues of course are also grist for campaign mills. "Populist" political leaders in particular are likely to campaign in low-income areas on issues of rising prices and the need for public works to generate employment, while appealing to groups a few steps higher on the socio-economic ladder with the same attacks on inflation, somewhat different proposals regarding employment, and additional issues such as inequitable patterns of taxation.

In nations where ethnic, religious, or linguistic ties are strong and cut across class lines, urban poor are likely to take part in politics not as a socio-economic category but as members of their various ethnic or other groups. Indeed, in such nations communal loyalties are likely to provide the main channel through which poorly educated and low-income groups

are brought into politics. Ethnic emotions can generate extremely high participation rates at all socio-economic levels. In Guyana, for example, tensions between (East) Indians and Negroes peaked in the early 1960's; the turnout for the general elections of 1961 was 89.4%; in 1964 the turnout reached 96.9% of the electorate!¹² Political participation based on ethnic identity is often very emotional, and is probably more violence-prone than other patterns.

Participation by the poor under such circumstances reflects a blend of mobilization, material self-interest, and communal loyalties. Political leadership, in divided no less than in homogeneous societies, is almost wholly in the hands of middle- and upper-class people. Within each ethnic community, poorer members are likely to depend economically as well as politically on their more fortunate co-ethnics. In rural areas, land, employment, and credit all are linked to ethnic ties; in urban areas jobs and often housing may be channeled virtually entirely through ethnic mechanisms. Particular government agencies or offices, specific private firms or whole fields of economic activity are the preserves of particular ethnic groups. Even if a "quota" system evolves in some fields or agencies, well-positioned members of each ethnic group control the allocation of their quota to less well-off co-ethnics.

Thus in societies where ethnic divisions cut across class lines, the low-income agricultural worker, subsistence farmer, or urban worker may be encouraged to vote or demonstrate by his co-ethnic landlord, employer, village elder, or ward boss, and may act largely or partly from respect for or fear of these individuals. But the same individual is also likely to feel a real sense of communal loyalty, of reluctance or anger at the

prospect of "the others" taking power. Moreover, while he may resent more fortunate co-ethnics and believe they are haughty and unresponsive to his needs, he probably identifies his own immediate material welfare and/or long-run prospects with communal political power. If his co-ethnic relatives and acquaintances lose their civil service positions, he or his sons or nephews lose the possibility of jobs as clerks or janitors. More broadly, policies which increase opportunity for his community are desirable even if the immediate impact on his own life is minimal or, perhaps, negative. The Malay rice cultivator is not likely to gain personally from a language policy which permits use of Malay for university entrance examinations. But his bright nephew may benefit; in any case the policy increases opportunity for Malays. Moreover, the issue has symbolic importance. The Indian laborer on a sugar estate in Guayana does not benefit from rice marketing board policies which raise the price of rice. Indeed, he may have to pay more for his staple food. But most rice farmers are Indian. Perhaps the sugar worker dreams of acquiring a few acres and becoming a rice farmer himself some day.¹³

In short, ethnic loyalty is a powerful factor activating low-income members of ethnic communities, even though their middle-class or elite leaders are not likely to focus on the special problems and needs of the urban or rural poor. As a corollary, leftist parties in general do extremely poorly among low-income groups in areas where ethnic ties are politically salient and cut across class lines.¹⁴

4. Externally-Led Class-Based Participation

The channels of participation most likely to encourage some revision

of development priorities in favor of the less privileged are, obviously enough, parties and other organizations which focus on the problems of low-income people as a social class. Indeed, the notion of "participation by the poor" is often used in such a way as to imply this kind of focus. In its extreme versions, such participation is the social revolutionary's dream and the conservative's nightmare. In its various Marxist variations, such participation in principle rests on growing class consciousness. Such consciousness, however, is not automatic: it calls for pervasive indoctrination, and is often a result rather than a cause of radical regimes' taking power. More moderate and less class-conscious versions of class-based participation are organized by peasant unions, occasional farmer-worker parties, and to a certain extent by labor unions.

Few sizeable political organizations or movements are primarily concerned with low-income people. Some (though not all) Socialist and Communist parties meet this description. Most, however, split their concern between low-income groups and the more secure and comfortable though still working class strata of organized industrial labor. Most labor unions are primarily concerned with the latter group, and only secondarily if at all with the problems of that large fraction of the urban working class which holds poorly-paid and often insecure jobs in construction, small-scale manufacturing and services, peddling and scavengering. Some non-Marxist parties, usually based largely on middle- or upper-class support, may be influenced by ideology or competition or both to broaden their appeal to encompass low-income workers or peasants. Examples would include the Chilean Christian Democrats, or Acción Democrática in Venezuela. The interests and objectives of such parties are clearly multiple and often inconsistent.

Peasant syndicates are often branches of parties which embrace a range of classes. Moreover, even within their own ranks some syndicates attempt to ally small and medium-sized independent farmers, subsistence farmers, and agricultural workers in a (usually uneasy) coalition. In short, improving the situation of the poor is rarely the sole or even the major goal of even those parties and unions which make a serious attempt to organize support among the poor.

Indeed, the most striking fact about lower-class-based participation in developing nations is its rarity. Since rural and urban poor constitute the great majority of the people of most developing nations, they would appear to be an obvious political resource. Yet until recently, with the exception of the less developed communist nations, there has been remarkably little effort to organize and capitalize on this resource except on the basis of cross-class appeals such as nationalism or ethnicity. And where attempts have been made to organize the poor, they have usually been short-lived and ineffective.

Why are effective class-based appeals to the masses so rare? The problems lie both in motivation and in organization.

The poor are difficult for outsiders to organize. Skepticism that political action is relevant or effective, internal divisions, unstable jobs and residence in urban areas, limited time and energy and funds in both rural and urban sectors all are serious impediments to parties, unions, and other organizers. Often, moreover, middle-class and elite biases and ignorance compound the problems. Party workers may believe that slums and squatter settlements are hotbeds of social disorganization, vice, and crime and may be correspondingly reluctant to work in such places. Rural

organizers must usually be recruited from rural or small town residents (some of whom may have had some urban experience), since urbanites are likely to regard rural assignments as tantamount to exile. Once in contact with the poor, attitudes of distaste, fear, or paternalism are difficult to overcome and to conceal. However, the most important questions an aspiring outside organizer of the poor must answer focus on resources and staying power rather than mannerisms. Before they will respond, low-income people must be convinced that the outsider has the contacts and the resources to accomplish something useful in their arena, and that he will stay long enough to follow through and protect them from reprisals.¹⁵

In pursuing new sources of support, established parties and other organizations must also take care not to alienate old supporters. Thus urban party organizations in the United States sought to mobilize black in-migrants from the 1940's and 1950's, but they have been most reluctant to elevate black politicians to positions of responsibility within the city hierarchy. The Democratic Party today is more generally torn between appeals to underprivileged groups and the imperative need to hold lower-middle-class and established working-class support. Church groups in the United States and elsewhere whose concern for poor and minority people has led them to advocate and encourage political participation by the poor risk antagonizing their middle- and upper-class members.

In modernizing nations this problem applies particularly clearly to the role of labor unions vis-a-vis the urban poor. In much of Latin America, Africa, and Asia the urban population is growing at rates of 5% to 8% per year or even more rapidly, while employment in modern manufacturing enterprises expands at roughly 3% to 4% annually at best. Unions are strongest

and best organized, in general, in those segments of manufacturing and services characterized by large, modern, and often foreign-owned units. Workers in such enterprises are more skilled, more secure, earn more in wages and fringe benefits, and are better protected through existing labor legislation than the much larger fraction of the urban working force employed in small-scale manufacturing, domestic or other personal services, construction work, day labor, or peddling, not to mention the large numbers of wholly unemployed. The unions, in other words, represent a labor elite. While this has always been the case to some degree, in industrialized as well as modernizing nations, the size of the labor elite relative to the total urban working force is smaller, and the gap in living standards between it and the lower stratum is wider in many developing nations than has been the case now or in the past in the industrialized nations. The interests of this labor elite clearly conflict with those of the less privileged majority on issues of wages and employment, though not necessarily with respect to other issues such as prices of staple consumer goods. Therefore unions and union leaders concentrate on preserving their favored position. They tend to be indifferent or even somewhat hostile to the interests of the urban poor.

One of the few instances where a party heavily dependent on support from industrial labor unions has also been active in mobilizing low-income urban migrants occurred in Northern Italy. In this case the Italian Communists may well have judged that, because of Northern Italy's spectacular industrial expansion, they could afford to revise their earlier, rather hostile position towards rural-to-urban migration and bid for support from the influx of rural newcomers to Northern industrial cities. In a dynamic

economic context, the wages and benefits of established workers were not seriously threatened by additions to the urban labor force.

In view of the difficulties of organizing either rural or urban poor on any substantial scale, and the risks of alienating established supporters in the process, powerful motivations are required to push parties, governments, or unions into a serious bid for sustained low-income support. The most common motivations are strong political competition and/or intense ideological commitment on the part of party leaders. In the absence of one or the other, there may be sporadic and superficial bids for support--campaign speeches in low-income areas, perhaps a party or the distribution of clothing or toys in an urban slum--but no sustained organizational effort or commitment in terms of policies and programs.

Thus the two nations in Latin America where parties have most energetically and systematically pursued the support of urban and rural poor (as distinct from organized industrial labor) are Venezuela and Chile. In Venezuela from the mid-1930's, the middle-class leadership of Acción Democrática worked hard to build mass support in urban as well as rural areas. Their period of control from 1945 to 1948 enabled them to consolidate rural support by providing rural benefits. During the period of Perez Jimenez's authoritarian rule, they were better able to maintain their rural than their urban cadres. After the fall of Perez Jimenez, both opposition parties and AD competed vigorously for control of municipal councils and the votes of the low-income barrios. Moreover, the Christian Democrats, impressed by the success of AD in the rural areas, began to press for rural support in the one region where they already had some strength; not only were they successful in this region, but later

moved to challenge the AD monopoly in other rural areas.

In the case of Chile, strong competition coupled with ideology led Marxist parties in the 1950's and early 1960's to systematically develop ties with low-income urban neighborhoods, and to seek similar influence among agricultural workers as well as among the organized mining and industrial unions which long had been their stronghold. The Christian Democrats followed suit in the 1960's, and more conservative parties also were pressed into bidding for poblacion votes.

In Italy a partly parallel pattern evolved. The Italian Communist Party was the first to perceive and respond to massive rural-to-urban migration. In the 1950's and earlier, they had supported legislation dating from the Mussolini era which restricted movement from the countryside into the cities. As Northern Italy's economic boom reduced the threat of in-migration to the wages of established workers who constituted a major part of their support, and as the dimensions of the migration began to become apparent, the party moved to revise its position. Conferences on migration were held as early as 1957; in 1962 the party organized "a highly effective campaign to aid the incoming migrants and to become the political party of the migrants a la Tammany Hall. The Communists became the major political force in the immigrant neighborhoods, with a practical monopoly of propaganda, organization, and initiative."¹⁶ Catholic organizations followed suit, recognizing both the scope of the new social problem and the political threat shortly after the Communist Party initiative.

The strategy of ANAPO in Colombia is similarly a product of severe competition and perceived opportunity, although the element of ideological commitment is at best much weaker. Legally banned throughout the 1960's,

ANAPO sought to break into a political arena monopolized by the two traditional parties of the nation operating within a constitutional arrangement shielding them from any save internal or splinter opposition. Despite a good deal of rhetoric, neither major party had moved effectively to relieve housing shortages, unemployment, and other problems, particularly as these bore on the bottom half of the urban population. From the late 1960's, ANAPO sought to capitalize on this situation by energetic organization and campaigning in the low-income urban areas. By 1970 the aspiring party had extended its efforts into smaller towns and, to a lesser extent, into rural areas.¹⁷

Given the desire to organize support among urban or rural poor, access to resources to win and hold their support clearly is an important asset, and lack of such access a serious handicap. In Venezuela, for example, the Provisional Government which replaced Perez Jimenez in 1958 launched a massive Plan de Emergencia to create jobs and channel resources to low-income urbanites, in part in order to meet high expectations for improvement after the dictator's fall. Opposition parties, strong in low-income neighborhoods, used the resources to consolidate their claim to leadership in the barrios. An elected government controlled by Acción Democratica took office early in 1959. While AD had strong rural support, it had run extremely poorly in low-income urban areas. In August 1959 the government terminated the Plan de Emergencia, and opposition-controlled councils were thereafter starved for resources. However, national control alone was not enough; in Caracas and other cities where the opposition controlled the municipal governments, efforts to substitute AD for opposition leadership at the neighborhood level ran into serious difficulties.¹⁸

Successful stimulation of political organization among low-income groups is affected not only by the commitment, skill, and resources of the non-poor organizers but also by the precise life-situations of the groups they seek to activate. In rural areas, several different types of circumstances may facilitate the organizers' task. One such set of circumstances is the absence of a stable rural social structure with established patron-client networks. For example,

In contrast to Colombia, where peasants live for generations in the same villages dominated by a local landowning aristocracy, Venezuelan peasants have characteristically been perpetual migrants. Most Venezuelan peasants were slash-and-burn cultivators (conuqueros) whose livelihood was gained from farming small plots of unoccupied land. Living in isolated villages and paying no fees for land use, the conuqueros would farm the land until it became exhausted and then move on to a new locality and repeat the process. The dimensions of this pattern can be seen from the 1963 survey data, which revealed that 43% of the peasants had lived in three or more different towns in their lives.¹⁹

Under these circumstances, the efforts of Acción Democrática from the late 1930's on to organize peasant syndicates not only met little resistance from entrenched local elites, but offered the peasants services and assistance for which there were no alternative sources.

A sharply contrasted situation--a polarized rural society where a few wealthy and absentee landowners farming on a modern capitalist basis confront a mass of wage laborers--also offers fertile ground not only for political organization of the poor, but also for specifically radical-leftist organization. This was the case, for example, in parts of rural Italy as early as the last decades of the nineteenth century.²⁰

Similar political results may flow from a third set of rural conditions: high population density combined with a high proportion of family-sized or slightly smaller sharecropper farms. This is particularly true

where the landowner is absentee. In contrast, where he is typically "a local resident farmer, firmly embedded in the community and actively engaged in and knowledgeable about the farm enterprise, the landlord-tenant relationship may well be a mutually supportive and harmonious one." Leftist radical organizations among categories of peasants in parts of Italy and India fit the requirements of population pressure, tendency arrangements, and absentee landlordism.

A fourth pattern may occur where there is a substantial community of free or independent peasants who own land enough to provide their basic livelihood. Where such a group exists, as in Germany and parts of Eastern Europe during the inter-war period and in some parts of contemporary Asia, it provides a reference group for other strata and a source of leadership for political participation which may lean either towards radicalism or conservatism.²¹

It is more difficult to identify particular conditions which facilitate externally-led political organization in urban settings. Employment and economic circumstances of the poor vary more within each city than do the circumstances of the rural poor in any particular area, but the overall picture probably varies less from city to city than it does in different rural areas. In particular, in few cities is it feasible to organize many of the poor on the basis of occupation, shared economic status, or workplace. Therefore parties or other outside organizers turn to neighborhood associations, or sometimes to caste associations or other pre-formed social groups which offer a handle for organization. In other words, in urban areas the specific economic situations of the bulk of the poor may be less important than in rural areas as determinants of receptivity to

outside organization, but social structure above the level of the family may play a larger role.

To summarize, in both rural and urban areas the probability of large-scale externally-led organization of the poor depends largely on factors other than the characteristics of the poor themselves--that is, factors such as the extent of party competition, the ideologies of one or more parties, and access to resources on the part of both government and opposition groups. But the economic circumstances and social organization of the poor themselves also affect their receptivity to outsiders' efforts to encourage political organization. In rural areas land tenure patterns, tenant-landlord relations, and population pressure are particularly important. In urban areas the extent of social organization among the poor above the level of individual families affects the feasibility of large-scale externally-directed organization.

5. Autonomous Political Participation by the Poor

If prospects for externally-stimulated and directed political participation by the poor are limited, so too in different ways are the possibilities for autonomous organization among the poor themselves. In theory, autonomous organization short-circuits the problems of coalition politics and ambivalent middle- or upper-class leadership. Moreover, the poor themselves should be better able than outsiders to define their own problems and determine their own priorities. In practice, however, the obstacles to effective organization and action are so formidable, and vulnerability to co-optation or repression so great that autonomous political organization is rare. Where it appears, it is limited in scale (the number of people

involved and the geographic area covered), modest in scope (the range of issues addressed and the extent to which the government action sought entails major commitments or drastic change), and of short duration.

Autonomous or self-led political participation by the poor is most commonly channeled through community development and cooperative organizations in rural areas, and neighborhood improvement associations in the cities, particularly in squatter settlements. These organizations can take hold only if certain conditions are met.

(a) There must be a recognized common problem which is felt to be of high priority. Priorities are determined largely by current life situations and plans for the future. Thus residents in a squatter community are likely to share a strong desire for piped water, electricity, and title to their lots. But if they already have water and electricity, many may care less about further community improvements--paved streets, a community center, a public telephone--than about other goals which cannot be promoted effectively through neighborhood-based collective action, such as placing a son in secondary school or achieving some job security. If many of the residents in the settlement are renters, or if many residents plan to move on to another neighborhood as soon as possible (because the settlement is inconveniently located, subject to floods or landslides, under threat of eradication, subject to high crime rates, etc.), then they may not be willing to invest time and energy in obtaining even basic services such as piped water. Similarly, migrants planning to return to their home villages in several years--as do many of the residents of African and South Asian towns and cities--will not give high priority to improving a

residential area they regard as temporary.

(b) The problem must be viewed as appropriate or plausible for prompt and specific governmental action or assistance. Many problems common to most low-income people are not so perceived. For example, surveys among such groups repeatedly find that unemployment and underemployment top the list of problems confronting the respondents, and many believe that the government should do something about the problem. Yet with the exception of sporadic and short-lived demonstrations by unemployed youths (often from lower-middle-class backgrounds, judging from their level of education), political participation among low-income groups is rarely organized around the issue of unemployment. One can surmise that despite the problem's urgency, pressure on the government is not viewed as a plausible way to find a job.

The problems most obviously appropriate for prompt and specific government action are those created by the government in the first place. Thus the threat of eradication of a squatter settlement commonly triggers protest by the threatened residents. A drive by the Government of Ghana to eradicate swollen shoot disease in its crucial export crop of cocoa by destroying diseased plants mobilized peasant protests and obstruction efforts on the part of farmers who had not previously been particularly active in politics. Similarly, acknowledged government responsibility for a particular task or problem causes residents to direct their appeals and efforts toward the government. In Seoul, Korea, squatters' associations are rare. But residents of low-cost "Citizens Apartments," built and maintained by the municipal government to house those dislocated from eradicated squatter settlements, have formed tenants' associations which

press the government actively for repairs and improvements.²²

(c) There must be some assurance that the benefits will be shared equally, or at least that no one individual or clique will reap most of the rewards. One means of providing such assurance is by the indivisible nature of the benefits sought. Alternatively, tight social cohesion may provide assurance that benefits will be fairly shared. Such cohesion may be encouraged by a variety of factors: small or moderate size; clear boundaries; homogeneity with respect to ethnicity, life cycle stage, and socio-economic status; low turnover; shared experiences such as initiation of the settlement by invasion; and/or traditional cultural patterns of community cooperation. Finally, trusted and respected leadership can also help to provide assurance that benefits will be fairly distributed. Conversely, suspicion of the leader's motives is one of the most common obstacles to collective action in low-income communities.

(d) Independent participation by the poor requires leaders with some idea of how to attempt to exert influence. In rural areas this frequently means persons with some exposure to urban experience.

(e) Finally, collective political action must be viewed as equally or more cost-effective than alternative means. That is, the chances of achieving the desired results through collective political action must appear as good or better, or the effort or risk required must appear less, than other means to the same end. The alternatives may be non-political or political, individual or collective.

In Seoul, Korea, individual political channels seem to provide a partial alternative to collective action in squatter settlements. Squatter associations are rare, despite the large numbers of squatters, their

comparatively high levels of education, and their ethnic homogeneity. The political climate does not encourage such associations. Equally or more important, incentives for associations are weak. The city has provided most settlements with water and electricity. Legal titles are the remaining high priority goal. Until recently at least some of the more affluent squatters could acquire title individually, by negotiating with (and undoubtedly paying) the appropriate authorities. This was a more direct and probably a less risky means of obtaining title than collective political efforts.²³

The contrast between patterns of activity by squatter associations in Santiago, Chile, and in Lima, Peru further illustrates the trade-off between independent collective political participation and alternative solutions, in this case non-political action. Neighborhood association activities almost always combine elements of self-help (in the form of labor and funds raised through dues or special contributions) with some degree of reliance on government or other external assistance (in the form of money, materials, technical aid, and necessary permits). But the mix of self-help and petitioning or lobbying varies tremendously. In Chile, where both government and much of the opposition have been highly responsive to pressures from the urban poor, the associations' activities in general stress lobbying and petitioning. In Lima before 1970, squatters were largely on their own (while benefitting from a tacit lenient policy towards establishing new settlements and from sporadic and unpredictable assistance from certain agencies). The extent of individual self-help (in housing) was unquestionably far greater, and communal self-help efforts appeared to be considerably more extensive than in Chile.

Still a third alternative to various means of improving local conditions is to leave the area and seek better residential and/or economic conditions elsewhere. This is of course the "voice" versus "exit" choice discussed in Chapter IV. In developing countries, lack of legal low-cost housing may pressure urban squatters into political action to improve their neighborhoods; were the supply of legal housing within their means greater, some would undoubtedly opt to leave rather than fight. Similarly, there is some evidence from rural Italy that out-migration and militant organization among farm workers were alternative routes pursued in different regions of the country.

To summarize: independent collective participation occurs only where such action seems to be a reasonable approach to a recognized, common, and high-priority problem; where the nature of the benefits and/or community cohesiveness inspire confidence that all will benefit; and where alternative individual or collective approaches do not appear more promising.

These conditions can normally be met only in small local areas. Organization over larger areas requires leadership and resources not normally available to the poor without external aid. Moreover, suspicions and internal divisions multiply as participation expands to include people who are strangers to each other. In small neighborhoods and communities, suspicions are to some extent dispelled by mutual surveillance.

Rural and urban areas differ with respect to the kinds of issues around which independent organization may coalesce. Rural participation may focus on community improvements or on the common concerns of those within the area who engage in specific economic activities (hand weavers, small coffee growers) or share an economic status (tenant farmers). Urban

efforts more frequently focus on physical improvements and services for the neighborhood, since the wider range and greater instability of occupations complicates cooperation organized around economic interests.

Rural and urban areas are similar, however, in the nature of goals sought by independent collective participation by the poor. Such participation almost always seeks concrete, often single-shot benefits--physical improvements like a well, road, or water-main; more rarely credit or a loan to start a cooperative or finance a communal facility; or specific concessions such as legal recognition and land titles for a squatter area. As noted earlier, independent collective participation may also be spurred by a threat to common interests from the government itself, from other private groups, or from natural forces such as flood or erosion. In all of these cases independent collective participation by low-income groups is the collective analog of individual contacting, seeking specific concrete benefits or emergency assistance.

Attempts to exert broader political influence are extremely rare. In other words, seldom does an autonomous group of poor people seek to alter government policies or to affect the design or scale of governmental programs. For example, squatters' associations may press for recognition for their neighborhoods, but almost never lobby, singly or in cooperation with other associations, for or against the provisions of a bill establishing criteria for legalizing settlements. Community groups may petition authorities to gravel an access road or arrange more frequent bus service for their area, but would not attempt to influence the size of appropriations or the criteria guiding road construction or bus service in general.

The logic of the situation limits the forms which independent

collective participation is likely to take. Most frequent is the petitioning of legislators and agencies at the local, state or provincial, and national level. In Chile, for example, the halls and anterooms of key officials in agencies responsible for housing, electricity, roads and sewers, education, health, and related services were crowded every afternoon during hours open to the public with delegations from various poblaciones.

Groups may also enlist the local press and radio to help their cause. The newspapers in many cities in developing nations run columns on "the neighborhoods" or "local news" which detail the problems of particular communities or the self-help efforts and appeals for help of specific groups. For example, in 1965 a small barrio in Ciudad Guayana, Venezuela, became aware that a large sewer was under construction nearby. The sewer would empty into the river close to the spot used by the barrio residents, as well as others, for bathing and laundry. The first appeal of the concerned residents was through the newspapers and radio. The barrio had no idea what agency or officials were responsible for the planning and construction of the sewer, but in this first stage aimed their protest at "the competent authorities." Their next step was a determined effort to locate and contact the appropriate authorities, that is, petitioning.²⁴ Where political competition makes even small numbers of votes important, associations or organizations may attempt to use the promise of political support to win the intervention of politicians. Such action has been described of squatter associations in Chile, Brazil (prior to 1965) and Venezuela among other places.²⁵ In desperate circumstances, groups may resort to demonstrations or to illegal or violent actions designed to

dramatize their plight and exert pressure on authorities to act. One group of squatters in Santiago, displaced from their original location, camped in the center of a major highway disrupting traffic for weeks, insisting that they be provided suitable land on which to settle. A few residents of the Venezuelan barrio described earlier, frustrated by their inability to persuade authorities to halt construction of the sewer fouling their stretch of river bank (or indeed even to pay any attention to their problem), poured sand into the carburetors of the construction machinery one night while the watchman slept. Such incidents, however, are rare, as one would expect in view of the small size and lack of political influence of such groups and their basic goals--persuading the authorities to provide a specific facility or service as a matter of good will, special favor, or at least non-routine procedure.

Not only are the goals of autonomous collective action usually quite narrow and the tactics moderate, but the effort is normally short-lived or sporadic. Many studies of community development as well as recent literature on neighborhood organizations and other forms of political action among the urban poor in the United States have analyzed the dynamics of starting and sustaining such efforts.²⁶ Given initial cynicism and apathy, internal divisions, and distrust of their own leaders, it is difficult to engage low-income people in collective action. Once engaged, they are easily discouraged. Paradoxically, even success threatens the life of the organization. Often authorities agree to take an action but fail to follow through, or do so only partially or after long delay. The initial concession deflates group pressure and momentum, while the failure to implement confirms earlier cynicism. Concessions from the authorities

sometimes entail the community's taking partial responsibility for implementation. This is especially true of on-going services such as cooperatives or schools. The skills required to manage a continuing operation are not the same as those required to mount a lobbying campaign. Maintaining and operating a facility or service often overstrains limited leadership capacity. Finally and most frequently, if the goal sought is specific and single-shot, victory destroys the raison d'être of the organization. Unless leaders can quickly transfer enthusiasm and momentum to new goals, the organization disintegrates. As a result, urban neighborhood associations have a distinct tendency to die as a neighborhood becomes established and basic facilities are provided.²⁷

In theory, federations of local independent associations at the municipal, provincial, or national level should be able to embrace more members and territory, address a wider range of issues, maintain greater continuity, and exercise greater autonomy than can individual associations. But the impediments to organization of federations are much the same as those which limit scale and scope at the local level--lack of resources and leadership, distrust and rivalry among localities, and the belief that collective action at the level of a federation is unlikely to produce more or quicker results than independent action by localities.

In the urban sector, settlements vary widely in their social and economic composition, and in the extent to which they have become established as part of the larger metropolitan community. The residents of higher-level and better established settlements or sections of settlements

tend to look down upon the poorer and more marginal groups. The very cohesion which sustains effective organization at the community level is often translated into rivalry among neighborhoods. A small poblacion in Santiago was determined to have a clinic on its territory, and regarded as irrelevant the fact that a new clinic had recently opened in the neighboring settlement, within easy walking distance. Moreover, settlements tend to operate on the assumption of scarce and static resources, so that one settlement gains only at the expense of others. This is a natural outlook in systems where benefits flow largely as the result of specialities, petitioning, or bargaining for political support.

Under some conditions joint action among urban low-income residents does occur. In the summer of 1968 thousands of barriada residents in Lima organized and carefully rehearsed a march on the Presidential Palace to demand that they be granted title to their land. The titles were granted. A strong and widely known leader had organized the demonstration. The issue of titles was not merely relevant but central for virtually all settlers. There was already a legal basis for providing title, but execution had been stalled for years. The problem looked like one which could be solved (or at any rate eased) by a stroke of the pen. Conditions, in short, were ideal. However, later efforts by the same leader to organize further demonstrations around other issues failed. The show of unity was a single-shot effort, more fragile than most neighborhood associations.

Stronger independent federations are likely to be repressed. In Rio de Janeiro, a Federation of Associations of Favela Residents of the State of Guanabara (FAFEG) was formed in 1964; by 1968 it represented at least 100 favelas in the city. FAFEG did direct attention not only to

state-wide but also to national issues affecting favela residents. In 1968 a powerful agency of the Federal Government adopted an active policy of favela clearance and relocation. FAFEG reacted sharply against the new policy in its state-wide Congress of that year, and also moved to block action against the first of the favelas threatened with removal. The officers of FAFEG were promptly arrested and held incommunicado for several days. They were released only after pressure from the more liberal wing of the Catholic Church in Rio. After the mass arrest, there were no further efforts to halt the eradication of favelas in the South Zone of the city.²⁸

Local organizations of the poor are a favorite focus for assistance from charitable or religious middle-class and elite groups, government agencies interested in promoting the welfare of low-income groups, and foreign benefactors. There are at least three reasons for this interest. First, from the point of view of those most concerned with increasing welfare, such groups potentially can improve living conditions and increase the incomes of some of the most deprived groups in the society. From the standpoint of private and foreign benefactors, funds can reach those they are intended to help more or less directly, without passing through (and being diverted by) echelons of bureaucrats. Second, from the standpoint of promoting development, the self-help component of independent collective action mobilizes labor, ideas, local managerial capacity, and savings not available for other forms of investment. In the economist's terms, the opportunity costs are very low. Third, small-scale organizations of the poor do not threaten the position of those presently in power (other than local patrons or bosses) or create pressure for substantial

reorientation of government priorities and programs. They do not seriously challenge the status quo.

An organization of low-income people which attempts to influence the government and is supported by encouragement, technical assistance, and/or resources from public or private sources outside of the community is in a position somewhere between autonomy and outside direction or control. If the poor themselves control the selection of goals and means, they remain largely independent. If the outside source of support is primarily responsible for choosing issues or goals and organizing action, the participants become semi-dependent. Where outside aid is available, there is a tendency to drift in the direction of dependence. Even if the supporting organization or group seeks only to help the poor and has no political goals of its own (as is the case with some philanthropic and religious agencies), the fact of dependency affects the goals and attitudes of the low-income participants.

Most private and much public support for independent organizations among the poor is channeled through community development programs. Traditionally, such programs shun not only partisan but all political activity. They rely as fully as possible on self-help with limited assistance, normally channeled through the supporting agency itself or provided by other public or private agencies at the request of the community development agency acting as coordinator. Governmental programs like Promocion Popular under the Frei administration in Chile and the Community Action Program of the Office of Economic Opportunity in the United States departed from traditional community development philosophy. They advocated organization among low-income groups not only to facilitate self-help, but also

to exercise greater influence on government decision-making. That is, they encouraged collective political participation. Promocion Popular originated as an arm of the Christian Democratic Party, and in its early stages was used rather blatantly to gain support for the Frei regime in poor urban neighborhoods. This partisan use of the program caused opposition members of the Congress to refuse to pass legislation designed to convert Promocion Popular into an official government program. In addition to the partisan motives for the program, however, Christian Democratic ideology strongly emphasized the importance of widespread popular participation. Moreover, support for a greater neighborhood voice in local government affairs was strong among all parties. Legislation to regularize and strengthen the position of neighborhood councils in both poor and non-poor neighborhoods (which had a history in Chile long pre-dating the rise of the Christian Democratic Party) was passed with support from all parties at the same time that Promocion Popular was denied legislative sanction.

In a larger number of countries private institutions concerned with the welfare of the poor, particularly church groups in some Latin American nations, increasingly regard political action by the poor as an appropriate and perhaps essential supplement to more traditional reliance on charity and self-help efforts. In this sense they have moved beyond traditional community development theory. However, such governmental or private efforts usually go along with the more traditional approach in avoiding partisan entanglement, at least in principle.

A variety of governmental measures may serve to stimulate local associations. The most direct and simple means is to grant legal recognition. In Rio, for example, most of the favela associations date from the

early 1960's, when the Directorate of Social Services for the new State of Guanabara undertook a program to create associations and grant full citizenship to all residents of Rio. Legal information and the services of lawyers were provided to assist in drawing up association constitutions.²⁹ Chile long had a procedure through which neighborhood councils could gain legal recognition, but the complex and lengthy arrangements discouraged all but a handful from gaining recognition. The procedure was substantially simplified by legislation passed in mid-1968.

Although legal recognition offers advantages (for example, in Chile, being able to borrow money from the banks), it usually also entails meeting certain criteria designed to ensure that the associations are representative and honestly administered. The Chilean law included minutely detailed requirements regarding nomination and election of council members, specifying, for example, the minimum number of posters to be posted announcing an election and the minimum number of days they were to be displayed in advance of the election. In Rio de Janeiro in the late 1960's the atmosphere toward neighborhood associations in low-income areas was as hostile as Chile's was supportive. Here regulations regarding recognition were clearly designed to control: favela associations were recognized only if they represented more than half of their residents, and each association had to file a list of all residents in the favela, as well as a quarterly financial report. Similarly detailed regulations and close supervision are typical of officially-sponsored rural cooperative programs.³⁰ Even with the best of intentions, such requirements may stifle the local initiative they are expected to encourage.

Beyond the problem of overregulation, whether in the name of assistance

or control, is the problem of co-optation. National and municipal governments, parties, and other institutions face tremendous problems in opening and maintaining lines of communication and information with low-income citizens in both rural and urban settings. Middle- and upper-income strata are more highly organized and conduct more of their business in recorded or otherwise accessible forms. More important, informal sources of information and two-way communication are readily available. In low-income areas, however, it is often hard to know what is going on, just as it is often extremely difficult for low-income people, individually or collectively, to get information from the authorities or to locate those responsible for particular programs.

Both problems are neatly illustrated in the account of "the great sewer controversy" mentioned earlier. The residents of the barrio had great difficulty discovering what agency and officials were responsible for construction of the sewer; talks with the men at the construction site, a visit to the office of the State Governor, and repeated inquiries in the offices of various agencies were necessary before the proper official was finally contacted. Moreover, once located, his response was high-handed and unresponsive. Shortly thereafter, however, he did attempt to meet with the barrio people to discuss the problem. He contacted the ostensible head of the barrio community council and asked that a meeting be called. Unfortunately,

the council was in this period more or less moribund, and its head, the agent of the dominant political party, was, despite his clearly party-politician role, a person of very minimal political skills who had been living outside of the barrio for a year. He was so out of touch with recent events . . . that he failed to gather together more than a handful of people for the meeting.³¹

The official, of course, had no way of knowing that he had entirely failed to get in touch with the concerned community.

Thus some sort of officially sanctioned and regulated local organization which represents its constituents is important as a means for municipal and higher government authorities to communicate with the people and execute policies, regardless of whether those policies are designed primarily to aid or to control. In Lima in 1961, legislation was passed to legalize existing settlements and to forbid the creation of further settlements. The procedures for legalization depended heavily on formation of barriada councils. In Rio in the late 1960's, favela associations not only had to submit a file of residents in the settlement, but were also responsible in theory for making cadastral surveys, controlling repairs on houses, and preventing new building! The temptation to co-opt the local associations and use them for governmental purposes can enter into even the most supportive program. In Chile, for example, the 1968 legislation included an option designed to help associations raise revenue by collecting rents or fees owed by residents to government agencies (for example, house rents owed to the Housing Corporation). The associations would retain a 7% commission. One cannot help but wonder what effect this function would have had on the councils' apparent, if not real, autonomy in the eyes of their constituents.

If co-option is an ever-present danger, powerful political antagonism is a threat which grows in direct proportion to the success and true autonomy of a local association. Experience with the O.E.O. Community Action Program in the United States makes plain that local authorities will not hesitate to exercise a variety of repressive measures aimed

directly at the offending association, and to appeal to higher levels of government to bring the trouble-makers into line. Few local associations have the resources to stand against such opposition.

In short, collective participation by low-income groups acting on their own initiative tends to be small in scale, moderate in tactics, focused on specific benefits, and short-lived. With rare exceptions, federations have not proved an effective device for broadening their scale and scope. When individual associations or federations have become a serious nuisance to the authorities in power, they have usually been repressed. Without the active support and protection of other segments of society, collective participation by the poor is unlikely to bring about any significant reorientation of government policies. Active coalitions between (usually externally organized) segments of the poor and other strata of society can bring major change. But intense competition and/or strong ideological commitment on the part of middle-class or elite groups is a prerequisite for such collaboration.

C. The Consequences of Political Participation by the Poor

Thus far we have discussed the obstacles impeding political participation by the poor, and the major channels through which they may be mobilized into action or engage in such action on their own. The logical sequel is a consideration of the effects of participation by the poor.

Such effects can be divided into two broad categories. First, what are the effects upon the poor of their efforts to influence governmental decisions? How does the experience of participation affect their attitudes toward the political system? Their propensity to continue active,

or to lapse into non-participation? What effect, if any, do various kinds of participation have on governmental programs and policies toward the poor, hence on their welfare?

Second, how does participation by the poor affect the political system as a whole? How does involvement by a previously inactive segment of the population affect the organization and style of local and/or national politics? The mix or combination of forms of participation? The output of the system, that is, governmental programs, policies, and the myriad smaller choices made in the course of implementation?

And how do effects on the system and the poor themselves interact? The attitudes and continued participation of the poor clearly depend in part on the success or failure of their attempts to influence governmental decisions. The responsiveness of government depends in turn in part upon the prospects for continued pressures by the poor.

These questions are much easier to ask than answer. The individual research projects undertaken in the Harvard program in general emphasized patterns of participation rather than their effects. Wayne Cornelius' survey-based analysis of low-income urbanites in Mexico City does devote considerable attention to the effects of participation on political attitudes. Other studies touch on this topic, although not specifically with reference to low-income groups.³²

Nor has research done by others devoted much attention to the effects of participation by low-income groups. However, one aspect of the topic has received some attention: the effects on attitudes of the participants themselves. This category of effects lends itself readily to survey research. Inquiry into the impact of participation on the welfare of the

poor or on the broader political system would require quite different research techniques. Moreover, both successful and unsuccessful efforts to influence governmental decisions may be expected to affect participants' attitudes towards the political system and toward further participation. In contrast, only successful participation can be expected to have noticeable effects on welfare, and only fairly large-scale or widespread participation (whether or not successful) can be expected to affect the broader political system. Successful participation and large-scale or widespread participation by the poor are rare. In other words, the universe of cases is larger for research on individual participants' attitudes than for research on the broader impact of participation by the poor.

Neither mobilized nor cross-class participation is primarily designed to channel benefits to low-income participants. But either pattern may do so to some degree. Some mobilizing leaders have a sincere if paternalistic concern for their followers' welfare. While such leaders will oppose policies or programs which would undermine their own authority or economic position, they may use their influence to win benefits for their people--for example, an improved road or well, or perhaps a school teacher for the village or neighborhood school. The organizers of parties or movements based on cross-class appeals such as anti-colonialism or ethnicity often appeal to low-income groups not only on the basis of shared patriotism or ethnic loyalty but also on the grounds that their opponents--the colonial or former colonial power, or rival ethnic groups--are denying their group its rightful economic and social opportunities. However, concrete policies and programs demanded by cross-class parties or movements usually benefit middle-class strata much more than the poor.

While similar in their chancy and limited benefits to low-income participants, mobilized and cross-class patterns probably have different effects on low-income participants' attitudes toward politics, and on the broader political system.

In the case of mobilized patterns, even where the leader is sincerely concerned for the welfare of his followers he seeks to preserve his role as the sole or primary source of benefits, so that his followers will view their ties with him and not their political participation as the essential element in their receiving benefits. For example, in low-income urban neighborhoods in Mexico:

. . . The cacique . . . seeks to monopolize all links between the settlement under his control and political and bureaucratic structures in the external environment. He will take pains to portray himself as the only officially-recognized intermediary between settlement residents and these structures; the only person who is in a position to work productively with the authorities for the betterment of the settlement. And he will actively strive to minimize the contact of individual residents with outside political and governmental agencies, except insofar as such contact is mediated by his own actions as broker.³³

The mobilization pattern thus perpetuates attitudes of dependence, deference, and passivity. In terms of impact on the broader political system, the effects of mobilized participation depend heavily on who the mobilizers are and what they want, that is, on their goals and tactics rather than on the characteristics or desires of the mobilized low-income groups. Landlords, village elders, or others in a position to mobilize substantial segments of the poor on the basis of traditional or quasi-modern ties of respect and loyalty, fear, or pay-offs are more often conservative than radical in orientation. Thus widespread mobilized participation is often a strong conservative force in the political system

as a whole.

Cross-class participation, in contrast to mobilized participation, does try to create among participants an active awareness of and interest in politics, and a belief in the potential influence and power of unified and determined participation. Ethnic parties in ethnically divided societies are probably more potent than any other form of political organization as a channel for politicizing the poorly educated and low-income segments of society. Evidence for this assertion comes not only from today's developing nations, but also from contemporary and past experience in the United States.

In ethnically divided societies, ethnic politics not only arouses widespread participation but also dominates the broader political scene. The extent to which this is true varies with many factors, including the number of groups, their relative sizes, and whether they are geographically segregated or intermingled. For example, where there are a great number of relatively small groups, national government is likely to operate largely above ethnic considerations, although local governments may be dominated by local ethnic rivalries. India is a case in point. Where two or three large groups face each other, as in Lebanon or Ceylon, all politics is permeated with ethnic questions. "A national leader in India can hardly afford to rely on the support of one or two ethnic groups; a national leader in Guyana, Zambia, or Malaysia can hardly do otherwise."³⁴ The involvement of low-income participants has a profound impact on politics in such situations, not because of their socio-economic class but because of their numbers.

Contacting is likely to produce some benefits for the poor. Indeed,

if it consistently fails to do so over a period of time the level of such participation would undoubtedly fall. Unless the aggregate volume of demands is extremely high, contacting by low-income individuals is not likely to have significant effects on the broader political system, either in terms of the reallocation of resources and priorities or in terms of the distribution of power. A system where most low-income participation is confined to contacting operates to maintain the status quo. Pressures which might otherwise take collective form, and be directed to earlier stages of policy formation or to the composition of the government itself, are diverted into discrete, separable and small demands which can be met in full or part or rejected one by one.

For similar reasons, autonomous participation by the poor is unlikely to have much impact on the broader political system. Local, especially municipal, governments may be more strongly affected. Even where the incidence of neighborhood organization is high, however, the sporadic nature of small-scale independent collective action means that only a fraction of all associations are likely to press for assistance at one time.

While independent collective action barely dents the larger political structure, it can win useful benefits which would not otherwise be available for segments of the poor. It can also have a substantial impact on the attitudes of the participants. Cornelius tested the effects of experience with trying to influence the government on the political attitudes of migrants in six neighborhoods in Mexico City. He examined these effects both for all of his respondents as a group, and for the residents of each neighborhood viewed as separate groups. Controlling

for the effects of age, socio-economic status, and length of urban experience, he found that among all of his respondents as a group, contacts with the government and receipt of personal services related positively and moderately strongly to feelings of efficacy, pride and identification with national political institutions and general support for the political system, and perception of the government as responsive to citizen pressure. However, as one would expect, negative contact with the government-- that is, unsuccessful attempts to gain collective or individual benefits-- related negatively to these political attitudes.³⁵

Looking at residents of the six neighborhoods as separate groups, Cornelius also found considerable variation in the proportions reporting various types of political activity and scoring high on various indicators of political involvement. These contrasts persisted even after controlling for variation among the neighborhoods with respect to average age, educational levels, length of urban experience, and general interest in politics. The differences were best explained by contrasts in each neighborhood's leadership, political history, and relations with the authorities. In other words, the neighborhood acts as an agent for political instruction. The lessons taught by well organized and effective neighborhoods confronting reasonably responsive authorities differ from those taught by poorly organized neighborhoods confronting unresponsive authorities.³⁶ Similarly, studies of four neighborhoods in Santiago, Chile, and Lima, Peru traced substantial differences in political attitudes to sharply varying political experiences in each neighborhood.³⁷ Related findings have been reported for a comparative study of Panama City, Guayaquil, and Lima, and for an extensive analysis of squatter settlements in Lima.³⁸

Survey data from three squatter settlements in Istanbul, Turkey, also suggest parallel findings, although the analysis itself does not focus on variation in attitudes among the three neighborhoods.³⁹

Successful experience with independent class-based participation clearly can heighten political efficacy. But the long-term effects on attitudes and behavior remain to be explored. The forms and goals of autonomous participation are limited, as discussed in the previous section. To what extent are attitudes shaped by successful experience with a neighborhood association, rural cooperative, or other small-scale local organization transferred to participation organized on different bases, using different techniques, and seeking different goals? To the best of our knowledge, no studies have yet addressed this question.

How does participation in externally-organized class-based parties or movements affect the political attitudes of low-income citizens? Standard theory argues that people must view politics as relevant and their own participation as potentially effective, as a prerequisite to political participation. However, survey research among Venezuelan peasants suggests that low-income people lacking such views may nonetheless join organizations focused on their problems, and that active membership in vigorous and effective organizations of this kind may create feelings of relevance and efficacy with respect to politics. The surveys found that many peasants joined peasant syndicates in the vague expectation that the syndicate might help to improve their conditions, but without any clear sense of capacity to influence government decisions. But peasants who had belonged to a peasant union for some time were much more likely than those who had never been members to believe that they could influence

the government. More specifically, those who had belonged to active and effective unions, and who took an active part themselves in union affairs, were likely to feel able to influence the political system. In other words, participation created a sense of efficacy rather than the other way around. But time spent as a member, without reference to the quality of the experience, did not relate to efficacy.⁴⁰

As in the case of squatter associations, it would be interesting to know to what extent such attitudes learned through one type of participation are transferable to other channels. For example, do peasants with union experience who later migrate to the cities tend to be more active in neighborhood and party organizations than migrants lacking such experience?

Externally-organized class-based participation is more likely than any other type (except cross-class patterns in divided societies) to have some real impact on the broader political system. Acción Democrática rose to power in Venezuela in large part through successful organization of the peasantry. The Christian Democratic victory in Chile in 1964 owed a good deal to support from low-income urban settlements. Moreover, unlike purely mobilized participation by the poor, semi-dependent participation generates pressure on the organizers to alter their own priorities and programs in ways responsive to the needs of their low-income supporters. This is true regardless of whether or not the organizers tend in that direction ideologically. Because large-scale class-based organization is usually attempted under conditions of intense political competition, organizers seldom can afford to jettison low-income support even after they have won power. Both the style and the substance of politics are likely to be modified in lasting ways.

FOOTNOTES

1. For a detailed discussion of the varying life circumstances of different economic categories of peasants, see John D. Powell, Peasants in Politics (forthcoming), chapters 2 and 3.
2. See Joan M. Nelson, Migrants, Urban Poverty, and Instability in New Nations (Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, Occasional Paper Number 22, September 1969), p. 35, for a brief discussion of definitional problems relating to the concept of the "urban poor." For an intriguing discussion of how many people get by in the cities of developing nations, see Keith Hart, "Informal Income Opportunities and the Structure of Urban Employment in Ghana," mimeographed, prepared for the Conference on Urban Unemployment in Africa, Institute of Development Studies, Sussex University, December 12-16, 1971. For discussions of the difficulty of defining unemployment in developing nations, and therefore the inadvisability of equating unemployment or "underemployment" with the problem of poverty, see W. F. Maunder, Employment in an Underdeveloped Area: A Sample Survey of Kingston, Jamaica (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1960), especially Chapter 2; David Turnham, The Unemployment Problem in Less Developed Countries (OECD, Paris, June 1970).
3. See the article by Gerrit Huizer, "Resistance to Change and Radical Peasant Mobilization: Foster and Erasmus Reconsidered," Human Organization, 29 (Winter 1970), pp. 303-12, and the replies of Foster and Erasmus in the same journal. For a somewhat parallel critique of the notion of "the culture of poverty" in urban settings, see Charles A. Valentine, Culture and Poverty (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968).
4. See Joan M. Nelson "Sojourners versus New Urbanites: Causes and Consequences of Temporary versus Permanent Cityward Migration in Developing Nations," forthcoming in John R. Harris and Myron Weiner, eds., Cityward Migration in Developing Countries: Determinants and Consequences (Cambridge, Mass: M.I.T. Press, 1973).
5. Verba, Ahmed, and Bhatt, Caste, Race, and Politics: A Comparative Study of India and the United States (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1971), Table 34, p. 165.
6. Wayne Cornelius, "Urbanization and Political Demand-Making: A Study of Political Participation among the Migrant Poor," forthcoming in the American Political Science Review; draft page 18.
7. John R. Mathiason and John D. Powell, "Participation and Efficacy: Aspects of Peasant Involvement in Political Mobilization," Comparative Politics 4 (Spring 1972), p. 310.

8. Ergun Ozbudun, "Participation Patterns in Rural Turkey: Some Preliminary Observations," paper presented at the Princeton University Colloquium on "Turkey: Integration and Modernization," May 19-20, 1972, Tables 5 and 6, p. 21.
9. For a fuller discussion of the tendency for urban political machines to be short-lived, or to fail to appear at all, see James C. Scott, "Corruption, Machine Politics, and Political Change," American Political Science Review 63 (December 1969), pp. 1156-58.
10. Wayne A. Cornelius, "The Impact of Governmental Performance on Political Attitudes and Behavior: The Case of the Migrant Poor in Mexico City," forthcoming in Francine F. Rabinovitz and Felicity M. Trueblood, eds., Latin American Urban Research, Vol. III (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1973), especially draft pp. 7 and 8; also "A Structural Analysis of Urban Caciquismo in Mexico," Urban Anthropology 1:2 (Fall 1972), pp. 234-61, especially p. 247.
11. The concentration of open unemployment among the somewhat better educated and more comfortable job-seekers is documented in David Turnham, The Employment Problem in Less Developed Countries (OECD Development Centre, Paris, 1971). Peter Gutkiad, discussing urban unemployment in Africa, notes that some job-seekers lower their expectations, "although for Primary School Leavers this is somewhat unusual. Junior Secondary Leavers tend to spend their time scanning the newspapers for advertisements and writing applications . . ." "The Energy of Despair: Social Organization of the Unemployed in Two African Cities: Lagos and Nairobi," Civilisations, 17 (1967), pp. 185-214 and 380-405.
12. Donald L. Horowitz, "Race and Politics in Guyana, Trinidad, and Jamaica" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1967), Table 5.1, p. 138. There is little reason to suspect that either coercion or falsified or inaccurate statistics account for these particular data, according to the author.
13. This summary is based on discussions with Donald L. Horowitz of the Brookings Institution, drawing on his extensive knowledge of patterns of ethnic politics in developing nations.
14. Donald L. Horowitz, "Multiracial Politics in the New States: Toward a Theory of Conflict," in Robert J. Jackson and Michael B. Stein, eds., Issues in Comparative Politics (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1971), pp. 167-72.
15. In this respect one could contrast the efforts of the Viet Cong and of Che Guevara in Bolivia to organize the rural poor. See Jeffrey Race, War Comes to Long An, for a graphic description of how the Viet Cong demonstrate their power in a rural province.
16. Robert C. Fried, "Urbanization and Italian Politics," Journal of Politics, 29 (1967), p. 525.

17. Lars Schoultz, "Urbanization and Changing Voting Patterns: Colombia, 1946-1970," Political Science Quarterly, 87 (March 1972), pp. 24-25.
18. Talton Ray, The Politics of the Barrios of Venezuela (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), p. 32, 115ff.
19. Mathiason and Powell, op. cit., p. 321.
20. J. S. MacDonald, "Agricultural Organization, Migration, and Labour Militancy in Rural Italy," Economic History Review, Series 2, 16 (1963-64), pp. 65-67. See also Sydel Silverman, "Agricultural Organization, Social Structure, and Values in Italy: Amoral Familism Reconsidered," American Anthropologist, 70 (February 1968), pp. 1-20.
21. For a more detailed discussion of the interplay of different life-situations of the rural poor and their responsiveness to different types of political organization, see John D. Powell, Peasants in Politics (forthcoming), especially draft Chapter IV, "Electoral Behavior among Peasants."
22. Joan M. Nelson, "Migration, Integration of Migrants, and the Problem of Squatter Settlements in Seoul, Korea" (Report on a Field Study for the Smithsonian Institution, mimeographed, July 1972), p. 24.
23. Ibid., p. 20.
24. Lisa R. Peattie, The View from the Barrio (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1968), Chapter , "The Great Sewer Controversy." On use of radio and press by local associations to generate support, see also Talton Ray, op. cit., pp. 96-97.
25. Nelson, unpublished field notes from Santiago, July 1969; Leeds and Leeds, pp. 13-19; Talton Ray, op. cit., chapter 7.
26. See, for example, Michael Lipsky and Margaret Levi, "Community Organization as a Political Resource: The Case of Housing," paper prepared for the American Political Science Association Conference, September 1970; James Q. Wilson, "The Strategy of Protest: Problems of Negro Civic Action," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 5 (September 1969), pp. 291-303; Mayer N. Zald and Robert Ash, "Social Movement Organization: Growth, Decay, and Change," in Joseph R. Gusfield, ed., Protest, Reform and Revolt (New York, 1970); Lee Rainwater, "Neighborhood Action and Lower Class Life Styles," in John B. Turner, ed., Neighborhood Organization for Community Action (New York, 1968); Saul Alinsky, Reveille for Radicals (New York: Random House, 1969).
27. For empirical evidence on this point, see Alejandro Portes, "Rationality in the Slum: An Essay on Interpretive Sociology," Comparative

Studies in Society and History, 14 (June 1972), pp. 273-74, especially Table 1. Similarly, a UNRISD study of cooperatives has found that the more economically successful the cooperatives, the less popular participation they promote.

28. Elizabeth and Anthony Leeds, "Favelas and Polity: The Continuity of the Structure of Social Control," unpublished manuscript, pp. 47-49.

29. Ibid., p. 20.

30. See John Powell's account of the detailed regulations imposed on Venezuelan peasant syndicates as a control device, in Political Mobilization of the Venezuelan Peasant (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 59-60.

31. Lisa R. Peattie, op. cit., loc. cit.

32. See Henry Bienen, "Kenya: Payoffs, Participation, and Control," draft manuscript, July 1972, pp. 124-31 for a discussion of Kenyan citizens' attitudes toward politicians, politics, and government, in the context of the particular characteristics of participation and governmental responses in Kenya.

33. Wayne A. Cornelius, Jr., "Local-Level Political Leadership in Latin American Urban Environments: A Structural Analysis of Urban Caciquismo in Mexico," October 1971, p. 29. Italics in original.

34. Donald Horowitz, "Three Dimensions of Ethnic Politics," World Politics, January 1971, p. 238.

35. Wayne A. Cornelius, "The Impact of Governmental Performance," op. cit., Tables 3, 4, 5.

36. Wayne A. Cornelius, "Political Learning among the Migrant Poor," Sage Professional Papers in Comparative Politics, No. 01-137.

37. Daniel Goldrich, Raymond B. Pratt, and C. R. Schuller, "The Political Integration of Lower-Class Urban Settlements in Chile and Peru," in Irving Louis Horowitz, ed., Classes in Latin America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970).

38. Thomas M. Lutz, "Self-help Neighborhood Organizations, Political Socialization, and the Developing Political Orientations of Urban Squatters in Latin America: Contrasting Patterns from Case Studies in Panama City, Guayaquil, and Lima" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Georgetown University, 1970); David Collier, "Squatter Settlement Formation and the Politics of Co-optation in Peru" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1971), especially chapters 5 and 6.

39. Kemal H. Karpat, "The Gecekonu: Rural Migration and Urbanization," unpublished book manuscript, spring 1972, especially Chapter 7, "Politics in the Gecekonu."

40. Mathiason and Powell, op. cit., pp. 319-23 and Tables 8 and 10.

Chapter Six

CONCLUSIONS

At the outset, we noted that a broad-gauged study such as this would not necessarily or even probably have any immediate implications for governmental action. It must, instead, aim primarily at different contributions.

It should, first, sharpen and deepen understanding of the nature of political participation and the variables affecting it. It can thereby contribute to better analysis of participation in specific situations where such analysis seems relevant: for example, an assessment of the prospects for and implications of specific reforms in a particular country.

Second, a broad overview of participation patterns and their dynamic ties with growth and with equality should help to place political participation in a broader context of multiple development goals, which are not always complementary nor even compatible with each other. There has long been disagreement within development circles over the importance and desirability of political participation. Some argue that it can contribute to more vigorous and self-sustaining growth as well as heightened equity. Others voice the fear that widespread and vigorous political participation is likely seriously to hamper growth, and may also under some circumstances interfere with movement toward more equitable distribution of the fruits of development. Our study suggests that both positions have some merit: the crucial question is the conditions under which each is valid.

Third, a study of this type can suggest the scope and limits of external influence on patterns of participation, should the exercise of influence be viewed as justified and desirable in specific instances. In other words, we

do not offer specific instruments or programs for development officials, but our findings do suggest the issues and problems which any specific proposed program or policy must address, and the boundaries within which it is likely to be effective.

A. Political Participation: Concept, Trends, and Consequences

The concept of political participation is much more complex and less clear-cut than appears at first glance. Political participation is not a single homogeneous variable. It is, rather, an umbrella label for a wide variety of forms of action, all designed to influence some level of government, but by no means all related to each other, varying in the same directions, or responding to the same pressures.

Crude indices such as voting turnout, the incidence of participation in demonstrations, or party membership can capture gross contrasts--a sharp or sudden expansion or contraction in participation within a country, or very wide differences in participation levels between two nations. But in most nations most of the time, trends in the level of political participation are more ambiguous. Certain forms of participation expand while others decline. Previously inactive groups become more politically involved, while other groups partially withdraw. Efforts to influence national authorities increase, but certain forms and channels of local participation atrophy. Changes in composition--the mix of forms and the types of group bases for participation--are as or more important than aggregate level.

In the long run, social and economic modernization clearly promotes a higher level of political participation among a broader spectrum of the population, as well as altering the forms and group bases of participation. The mechanisms at work are many: among the most important are rises in the average socio-economic level of the population and of particular groups

within it, increased organizational involvement, heightened group consciousness (and, often, heightened inter-group conflict), expanded government activities impinging on more and more of the population, and the gradual acceptance among elites and non-elites of the idea of citizen responsibility and participation as a concomitant of the modern state. All of these forces are at work in both competitive and non-competitive political systems. But the relationship between modernization and broadened participation is neither steady nor uniform. Communal tensions unrelated or only peripherally related to modernization, the attitudes and policies of political elites, contingencies such as drought or border disputes, and many other factors affect the level and forms of participation in a society during any period, and may produce far greater or far less participation than the country's degree of social and economic modernization would lead one to expect. Within nations, isolated and backward groups may show high levels of (mobilized) participation while better-educated, less dependent, and more affluent groups may be politically quiescent, because they are absorbed in non-political endeavors or become alienated from or cynical about politics.

There are two major determinants of the extent to which individuals participate in politics: socio-economic status and group consciousness. In general, better-educated, wealthier, and higher-status people feel more able to influence the government, perceive more clearly its actual or potential relevance to their own interests, and are more likely to believe that it is a citizen's duty to participate in politics. Where high-status people

withdraw from politics, it is usually because they feel ineffective. Sometimes the very process of democratization--the extension of participation to previously inactive and parochial groups--alters the balance of power and the issues and values of politics in ways which alienate educated and Westernized elites. Greater economic independence, even when associated with only very modest economic and social status, also seems to promote participation: for example, land ownership, home ownership (or its functional equivalent, urban squatting which is accepted by the authorities), and self-employed status above the marginal level of petty vendor or odd-job man.

Still more powerful than socio-economic status in explaining (and increasing) political participation is organizational involvement. Modernization proliferates social and economic organizations of all types, some based on new interests and identifications, others reflecting pre-existing communal (tribal, religious, regional, caste) loyalties, which are often altered and heightened by modernization itself. Such organizations may coincide with or cut across class and status lines. High status people everywhere are likely to be involved in organizations, which reinforces the effects of status in encouraging their political participation. Low-status people become involved in organizations to the extent that they have a sense of ethnicity, neighborhood, or class. Such consciousness among poor people is in turn likely to spring from conflict--with other social groups or with the authorities--and from insulation from competing affiliations and loyalties.

The development official is likely to be as interested in the effects of broadened political participation as in its determinants. More specifically, he is likely to be particularly concerned with the links between political participation, on the one hand, and growth and the distribution of income and services, on the other. These relationships are different at different stages of development. In early stages, broadened participation normally means increased activity and influence by the very small urban and rural middle classes. These groups will use any opportunities for increased influence to increase their share of income, services, and other benefits, and their voice will become louder as their absolute and relative numbers increase. Expanded political participation at early stages of development thus normally intensifies the economic forces which produce greater inequality in traditional economies than in either traditional or highly advanced ones.

At later stages, expanded political participation normally means including in the political arena the previously excluded urban and rural poor. These categories are still the majority of the population, though less overwhelmingly so than at earlier stages. Substantial influence on their part is likely to badly strain still-limited economic resources. It is also likely to produce a head-on collision with middle-class groups which, though much better off than the poor, by international standards still lead very modest lives and are eager to improve their own and their children's positions. Governments are then posed with alternative choices. (i) They may prevent the expansion of participation or repress already participant groups, promote growth vigorously, and accept continued (or perhaps increased) income inequality, or (ii) they may accept and encourage broadened participation, expand benefits, and reduce inequality, and accept a reduced rate of economic growth. Both

courses carry clear dangers of mounting political tension and conflict. Only in the most fortunate of countries, then, do economic growth and political democracy go hand in hand. In most, the technocratic or populist models are more accurate descriptions of the links between participation, growth, and equity than is the "benign line" of the liberal model.

For many, if not most, countries the expansion of political participation requires some sacrifice in other developmental goals. In the early phases of modernization, the expansion of participation promotes economic inequality, in later phases, it slows economic growth. While these tensions are real, some nations have been able to resolve or contain them for periods of time, and a few have long records of reasonably successful progress on all fronts. At times, there is leeway to expand participation among some groups without generating unmanageable pressures. And in a fair number of cases we and other outside observers might believe that ruling groups place too much emphasis on stability and economic growth, and too little on social integration and economic equity: in other words, if broadened participation meant some degree of political instability, that might not be a bad thing. But such judgments are liable to slip into the misconception that in most developing countries broadened political participation is simply a matter of removing institutional and political constraints and releasing a potential for participation which is ready at hand. In fact, ordinary people in developing countries (not to mention elites) may place much less value on broadened participation than our own background and political culture would lead us to assume.