

October 1973
U.S. ISSN 0084-0793

LTC No. 95
THE LAND TENURE CENTER
310 King Hall
University of Wisconsin
Madison, Wisconsin 53706

THE PROSPECTS FOR COLLECTIVE FARMING

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All views, interpretations, recommendations, and conclusions expressed
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INTRODUCTION

The collective or cooperative farm exists today in many countries with different socio-economic levels of development, socio-economic and political structures, and cultural backgrounds. In many more countries, the interest in collective farming is growing, particularly in the so-called "developing countries." Governments, development agencies, political parties, and scientists working on socio-economic problems all consider the collective farm a good remedy for difficult problems and a good form for technological and socio-economic development in agriculture. It is not the idea of the peasants themselves.

The very fact that the collective farm has emerged under various socio-economic, political, and cultural conditions is often offered as an argument that this form of organization of agricultural production is the form of the future. But are we really speaking about the same phenomenon when we speak about collective farms in Israel, in the Soviet Union, in Tanzania, or in Chile?

Of course, all these forms do have something in common. They are all collective farms--farms operated by groups of producers who are not members of the same family and not workers hired by a manager, but who are members of a group organized on the principle of sharing among themselves property, work, and the results of work. But these traits exist

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in differing degrees, and all other sociological and economic traits are very often strongly dissimilar. In fact, the differences are so important that it is doubtful that anything of practical significance can be said about collective farming in general.

Many criteria are used to distinguish collective farms within and among countries. We have, for example, moshav, moshav-shitufi, and kibbutz forms in Israel; types I and Ib, II and III in Poland; and TOZ (association for joint farming), artel, and commune in the Soviet Union. We distinguish the Ujamaa village in Tanzania, cooperative ejidos in Mexico, Landwirtschaft Production Genossenschaften in East Germany, and collective farms in Hungary as different statutory types. Without question, this classification is not all-inclusive. First, not all collective farms have a legal status; second, the organizational principles are usually ideals, while the actual socio-economic and organizational patterns do not necessarily match the formal status.

In many socio-economic analyses, the criteria for classification of collective farms are very sophisticated. Most often in use are: the amount of land commonly owned and its proportion to the total area; the amount of cooperative work and its relation to work spent by members for private production; the size of farm, its production characteristics, number of members, and organizational principles; the link between family households and collective farms, and between the latter and the general economic system. All these classifications are useful, but no one of them is sufficient to cover the variety of existing socio-economic and organizational patterns of collective farms. Moreover, these classifications could be misleading. Organizational solutions emerged in response to different conditions and have socio-economic contents usually not expressed in a

legal status. The adoption of the same legal status in a given country can markedly change its actual form, e.g., the Hungarian, Bulgarian, German, Rumanian, or Czechoslovakian collective farms, which are very dissimilar among themselves and in comparison to Soviet kolkhozes though they all share the same legal status. Thus, a new typology of collective farms is needed.

THE BASIC TYPOLOGY

I want to distinguish here four types of collective farms. They are:

- Type 1) collective farms created by believers in an ideology which puts a higher value on the noneconomic than on the economic goals;
- Type 2) collective farms created by landless families who were able to acquire the land but not to start individual family farms;
- Type 3) collective farms organized by governments in order to reach national economic and social goals;
- Type 4) collective farms organized by farmers in order to get the advantages of a large operation--lower costs of production, more effective use of land, of manpower, and of capital, etc.--and consequently higher economic profits.

The first type includes: religious communes; collective farms created by believers in radical social ideas; communes or collective farms created by people who reject contemporary industrial civilization with its system of values; and farms created by groups of believers in a particular mission of their nation, class, or race. All these collective farms have one thing in common--they are not created for any economic reason, though their members might incidentally achieve some economic advantage, but to reach ideological goals. Some peasants or people of peasant origin might join such ideological groups but, in general, participation of peasants in ideological communes is negligible. Such communes are usually created by urban people, radical intelligentsia, industrial workers, or people who oppose the existing socio-economic system. They have their own vision of what

society should be and they set out to create an alternative to an unjust world or simply an escape from such a world.

The second type includes the collective farms created by new settlers on land which requires expensive investment, such as irrigation, before it can be used. The investment required may exceed the resources of a single family, or it may be much easier to overcome the difficulties in a group. In such a situation, the settlers are usually laborers who received the land from a land reform program. They have no agricultural equipment, or the equipment remaining on the farm is functionally related to the size of the farm and therefore difficult to divide, e.g., tractors, combines, buildings, etc. They are not prepared to start individual farming because they have had no such experience and are skilled in only one farming operation. The simplest solution for them is to operate the farm as it was operated before by a landlord or manager and to share the profits. What is common to all these groups is that they are created by landless families without extended experience of individual farming, that they are in new and difficult situations, and that they involve a group formally created for the purpose of settling the land. They may or may not believe in a special ideology, but they are in a situation which can be much more easily overcome by group farming.

The third type includes collective farms created not by peasants themselves but by governments. Peasants could oppose or not oppose the collectivization, but it is surely not their idea. To date no collective farms have been voluntarily and spontaneously created by peasants. The reasons for collectivization are usually goals of national development. In countries which do not have such means to industrialization as rich national resources, governments must extract these means from the many people of

the lowest economic strata. Collectivization allows control over production and consumption in rural areas and over prices for food; it allows the use of large masses of manpower for construction of industry and infrastructure; and at the same time, collectivization provides the means for administrative and political control over the masses of petty producers.

In some East European countries, however, like East Germany or Czechoslovakia, reasons for collectivization were different. These countries already had a highly developed industrial sector and further programs of extensive industrialization created difficulties for agricultural manpower. Lack of such manpower made necessary the organization of large holdings. Of course, large, private, business-oriented holdings could not be accepted in a planned economy, both because they could not be controlled and because of socialist ideological principles. Therefore, only two solutions were possible--state farms and cooperative (collective) farms. State farms were much more expensive, because they put all risks on government and gave less incentive for productivity; hence, collective farms were chosen as the cheapest and best form of large holdings.

The fourth type of collective farm is quite different. It exists where there are competitive markets; hence, all enterprises which have lower costs of production are more profitable. It is much easier to introduce new, usually expensive, technology on a large farm than on a small farm. Therefore, farmers join their resources of capital, land, and manpower in order to produce more cheaply and to gain higher profits on the market. The French GAEC (Groupement Agricole d'Exploitation en Commun) is the best example of this kind of collective farm. Cooperatives as a form of better adjustment to competitive market conditions have been known for a long time. But usually they did not enter the field of production,

limiting their activity to marketing, processing, and sometimes to production services. This is no longer sufficient, however, and new forms were created which have many intermediate stages, e.g., maschinenringe in Germany with joint ownership of mechanical agricultural equipment, agricultural circles in Poland with much broader goals, and cooperatives in Yugoslavia which operate on the principle of co-production with individual peasant farms.

Before going any further in explanation of our typology, we must make two important restrictions. First, in some countries we can find virtually all the types of collective farm distinguished above. In Poland, for example, ideologically motivated collective farms came immediately after World War II. During the period of land reform implementation (1945-48) collectivization ceased. Following the reform, however, collective farms were created by former agricultural laborers and this type of collective farming is still dominant in a few regions of Poland. Poland also saw an attempt by the government to collectivize peasant agriculture, but this was not successful and the third type of collective farm is hence nonexistent. In a planned economy, the fourth type has no opportunity to emerge, but there are in Poland a few farms oriented towards the market, created by farmers themselves in order to gain profit and other privileges. Soviet collective farms before 1927 were similarly structured, while communes are of the first type of collective farm and TOZ or the first artels of the second. The same is true of Israel: kibbutzim could be described as a good example of the first type and moshavim of the second.

The second restriction is that these are ideal types. In reality, very often we have two or more reasons for the organization of collective farms. For example, the kibbutzim could be regarded as farms founded by

groups of believers with their dominant goal being ideological. But at the same time, collective farming was created in Israel in order to settle people on new land, sometimes on the desert where expensive investments were needed and individual farming was not possible. Italian collective farms created by Christian-Democratic, Socialist, or Communist parties could also be regarded as groups of believers and classified as Type 1. But they could be classified as well in Type 2, because the reason for their creation was land reform and members belong to the social stratum of former agricultural laborers (braccianti). The typology proposed, therefore, does not presume that ideology be the only goal of Type 1 farms, but that such a goal be dominant and that it determine the character of the collective farm.

The usefulness of the typology consists, in fact, in the impossibility of analyzing the organizational differences or economic effects of collective farms without first taking into account the goal of the particular organization. An economic analysis of a collective farm could be irrelevant for its members if they created it in order to reach some religious, moral, or social goal. The organizational principle of kolkhozes would be absurd in a nonplanned economy, but can be understood if we know that the kolkhoz is a form which allows for extraction from agriculture of the means for extensive industrialization of the country. In each of the types we have, therefore, other organizational patterns, different types of conflicts, different problems to overcome, different criteria of success, different patterns of interpersonal relations, and different prospects for the future. To make this clearer, I will now analyze a few examples.

Examples of Different Types of Collective Farms

Kibbutz: The general reason for collective farming in Israel was the need to settle land not in agricultural use or in inefficient use. This was the basis for different forms of cooperative farming and Israel's experience with collective farming is carefully studied by specialists from countries where the need for settlement of new land exists and such land is available. But among the factors determining the Israeli success with agricultural cooperation, the ideological factor was perhaps the most important. Settlers in Israel were in fact in an "optimal" situation. They received substantial financial support; they were usually well-educated people; they had not been peasants in the past, so they had no attachment to individual farming or to private property in general; and they had a unifying, usually a socialistic, ideology. The kibbutz was therefore not just a unit of settlement on the new land, and not just a military unit; it was primarily a group of believers in an equalitarian utopia. I am speaking, of course, about the more extreme forms of kibbutzim. Each kibbutz is affiliated with or was created by a different political party and hence there are ideological differences between kibbutzim.

Taking as an example the kibbutzim created by MAPAM (Socialist party), we could say that the most important organizational principle was that of rigorous equality in access to all benefits---power (decision-making), education, prestige, means of consumption, etc.--and equal distribution of all unpleasant duties and work. Within the limits of material possibilities, the kibbutz was a realization of the communistic principle "to each according to his needs." Equality is not the single organizational principle of the kibbutz, but it is the most important influence on the general features of kibbutzim. Full socialization of ownership, production,

and consumption, rotation of all administrative positions after two years, the key role played by a general assembly of all members of a kibbutz in the decision-making process, the equal prestige of all kinds of work done in the kibbutz, the terminology of one family ("all daughters are our daughters"), etc.--all are the consequences of the dominant idea of equality.

Even the internal difficulties and conflicts of kibbutzim are expressed mainly in ideological terms. And there are many difficult problems. The idea "to each according to his needs" was formulated in opposition to a society where individual profit is the strongest driving force, where "greedy" individuals take fruits of work from others, where prestige is strongly related to money, and money is the means of access to benefits and privileges. The kibbutz is an "oasis" of socialism: money has no significance in interpersonal relations; it does not determine access to benefits. In theory, therefore, there is no place for money, for greediness, for exploitation of others, for desire to accumulate possessions, etc. But the kibbutz does not exist in isolation; it is involved in a capitalistic economic system based on the principles which its member rejected, but which the kibbutz as an organization must accept. The kibbutz must be competitive, market- and profit-oriented; in the market it must act in the same way as all other economic organizations. Hence, the kibbutz's best products go to the market and its members receive for consumption that part which is not accepted by the market. Even in the internal organization of a kibbutz, priorities are established which are not particularly desired by members, but which are absolutely necessary if the kibbutz is to be competitive.

This situation is not exactly what members of a kibbutz want. Generally speaking, members of kibbutzim have not reached the goals they desired.

After all, the principle "to each according to his needs" is realized only to a very limited extent. Only basic food is so shared. All other consumer goods are distributed according to the length of time an individual has spent in the kibbutz and to his "contribution," estimated in a very vague way. Neither prestige nor the distribution of power are equal either. The rotation of all leading positions is obligatory, but usually the same people rotate. This can be reasonably explained, but kibbutz members come to know that equality in distribution of power is nonexistent.

The result of all these necessary compromises creates very difficult problems for the new generation. It has been socialized in a different way and hence is not prepared to live in a capitalist society. But the ideas of its fathers are not its ideas; it did not create the kibbutz out of its own vision. Some of the young people find solutions by becoming experts, or managers, or technical specialists. They introduce the ideas of efficiency, rational organization of work, modern technology, modern marketing, and so on. Such individuals are highly appreciated by members of the kibbutz, but they have nothing to do with its original goal. Another group of youngsters leave the kibbutz to join the army or the civil service. In such organizations, they serve efficiently and with enthusiasm, but they are not prepared to live with unorganized individuals competing in a capitalist economy. A third group of young people may organize a new kibbutz, usually on the frontier. There they will try to put into practice their own vision of a just society, as their fathers did.

These remarks about kibbutzim should not be taken as criticism. The difficulties faced by kibbutzim derive from the fact that believers sooner or later realize that their ideals could not be reached. Striving to create an ideal form, they managed only to create a better form. In this sense.

kibbutzim are successful. They have shown that efficient and successful collective farms can be created if there are favorable conditions and, most important, if the desire to create such farms exists. It is very difficult to follow the patterns of kibbutzim, but ideological groups have shown that the creation and continuation of collective farming is possible.

Ejido: The emergence of cooperative ejidos in Mexico was related to land reform. Land was given to producers not as individuals but as group owners, and was combined with old communal forms of ownership. Traditional communal ownership of land did not imply collective farming: livestock was usually privately owned and the use of land was private. In general, production was organized on the basis of family farming, but there did exist some more or less developed forms of mutual assistance. With this basis, it was possible to organize collective farming after land reform. The land was given to landless families who had been living for a determined length of time on the land and working for a landlord. The decision as to whether the land should be operated in an individual or collective manner was left to the general assembly of members of the ejido. They were generally inclined to operate the land as a large unit, or at least to keep together part of the land and devote it to some kind of production, usually for market. The factors creating such an attitude were numerous: communal ownership of land; lack of individually possessed equipment; lack of skills needed to organize single family farms; awareness that the landlord was successful and that his profit could now be divided between producers themselves; and lack of accurate knowledge of any other form of agricultural production. Also, the government and its agencies were inclined to suggest the cooperative form. They were interested in the efficiency of governmental support and in full control over its use.

In many cases, agronomists feared that single family farming would destroy successful operation, as on sugar plantations and coffee plantations, and that productivity would decline.

The most important factor in creating collective farms, however, was the banks. Families who received land had no capital and no equipment. They had to borrow money from the very beginning. The banks needed some kind of guarantee, which land given to a group could not provide. The best solution was to organize a credit cooperative which could be controlled by the bank. In the legal agreements between banks and the members of the ejido, banks got full control over the most important economic decisions and particularly over the use of loaned money. In order to secure repayment, banks were interested in the results of production, in efficient and successful farming by debtors. Sometimes the banks sent their own specialists to help organize the most profitable production or to organize marketing of products and some money was advanced to producers. In fact, ejidos could be regarded as large holdings operated by banks.

Cooperative ejidos were most successful in regions of specialized and market-oriented agricultural production, where the former plantations were operated like businesses and could not be divided among families without damaging the whole operation. In the cotton producing region of North Mexico (La Laguna) and in the Yucatan peninsula, where the production for market was most developed, cooperative ejidos still exist. Their existence is influenced not only by banks but by marketing firms and processing industries which prefer to deal with large estates rather than with small commodity producers.

Of course, not all ejidos had such relations with banks as described above, and not all of them were created on the basis of specialized and

market-oriented plantations. The majority of the ejidos did not accept any collective forms of farming. In 1960, there were 18,699 ejidos in Mexico (with about 1.5 million members). Only 2.3 percent of them were collective ejidos (431, with 329,000 members). Even in cooperative ejidos, elements of collective farming were not very well developed and only in 281 (ca. 20,000 members) did collective farming include animal production. All cooperative ejidos had formal agreements with banks. Banks, of course, did have some contacts with ejidos where land was distributed among families and farming was individual. About 5,300 ejidos had relations with the Ejido Banco and in ejidos with individual farming, members were organized into credit cooperatives.

Since all cooperative ejidos were in fact subordinated to the bank, a simplified model of farming could be described in the following way: production plans were prepared by elected management, in collaboration with the bank or rather with specialists employed by the bank; the plans were accepted by the bank; the management organized the work, but the bank inspectors supervised the financial side of the operation. In ejidos where collective farming was not fully established, the collective work existed in only a few operations, like plowing or spraying the fields. Some mechanical equipment was, however, commonly owned and used. Sometimes land was consolidated for production of given crops and in such cases the work on the field was collective. In ejidos with a high level of cooperation, all the work on the fields was jointly performed, and animal production was also collective. A member of such an ejido held privately only his house and sometimes a small kitchen or garden plot, which was not used for production for the market.

Banks organized the marketing of the produce of these ejidos and banks paid the producers some money as an advance on their projected income. This money came to be regarded as a salary by members of ejidos. The results were computed annually. Part was paid to the bank; part was devoted to collective investment, with all such decisions about investment made by the general assembly; and the rest was divided among members in proportion to their contribution of work. In ejidos where collective farming was limited to one branch of production, this system was much simpler: there was no need to distribute common money or produce because there were no common results of work. In some cooperative or collective ejidos, only part of the income was divided according to the contribution of work, the remainder being equally distributed. In some cooperative ejidos, members sent hired workers to till collective fields and worked only on their private plots.

The process of disintegration of cooperative ejidos began some time ago and is still going on. In the 1930s the number of cooperative ejidos was much higher; government policy provided many privileges for collective farms; and banks were much more active in this field. The majority of ejidos eventually abandoned the principle of collective farming. Sometimes on a former large cooperative farm a few smaller group farms were established. The changes in the political situation, political differences between members of ejidos, conflicts between different groups united by family or neighborly ties, the dissatisfaction of most active members who did not like to depend on group work--all these phenomena influenced the decline in the number of cooperative ejidos. The most important problem was the problem of "just" reward for work and egalitarian tendencies which weakened the role of economic incentives and in consequence the productivity

of collective farms. Some elements of joint operation are, however, still existing. Credit groups, some group contracts with marketing firms and processing industries, some service cooperatives, etc., create new semi-organized production units, despite the fact that production is based on single family farming. Communal ownership of land, other elements of joint ownership, and collective work (or mutual assistance) still exist. In general, cooperative ejidos should be regarded as a stage in the transformation of semifeudal haciendas into new units composed of family farms unified by some cooperatives, such as credit and marketing cooperatives, but acting as independent producers. Highly specialized and market-oriented plantations which continued to operate as large units will probably remain as collective farms controlled by the state and by such large economic organizations as banks.

Kolkhoz: Collectivization started in the Soviet Union in 1927. Immediately after the revolution, particularly between 1917 and 1919, the dominant form of collective farm was the commune. Communes were ideological groups created by former agricultural laborers. As in kibbutzim, in communes ownership (land was nationalized during the revolution), production, and consumption were collective. After 1921, the number of communes significantly declined but on the eve of collectivization in 1927, 1,800 remained.

The other form of collective farm, which slowly increased in number, was the artel. They numbered about 8,000 in 1927. In the artel, the dominant parts of the means of production were collectively owned. Each member, however, kept his own house, a small plot of land, and a few animals. Each member was obliged to work for a given time on the collective land, but had time for working on his own plot as well. The results of work

in artels were distributed according to the quantity and quality of work. Usually produce, not money, was distributed. Only part of the production was sold in the market, more often going directly to the marketing cooperatives or to the state. Artels were created mainly by landless and poor peasant families, partly on their own land (ca. 30 percent of the land came from members) and partly on the land received from the state.

The third form of collective farm was the Association for Collective Work on the Land (TOZ). Means of production were owned individually; each family kept its land; some work was done collectively, particularly work with state-owned tractors, and part was done by the family on its own fields. Animal production was fully private. The results of production belonged to the families.

The reasons for the sudden decision to collectivize Soviet agriculture are today the object of discussion among economists, historians, and sociologists, even in the Soviet Union. There is no doubt that there was no single reason, but many, and that the political reasons probably directly influenced the decision. But the economic situation of the Soviet Union at that time is pointed out by some analysts as the most important reason. Underdeveloped to begin with and destroyed by war and revolution, the industrial sector was not able to meet demands; hence, there were no incentives for farmers to sell their products. They preferred to keep them as the best form of capital, or the best means of security. An ambitious program of industrialization, mass migration from rural areas to the industrial centers, and the needs of the export sector to buy modern technical equipment all required the strong control of prices (particularly of food) and other measures to supply the industrial and export centers with agricultural products. As agricultural producers were not inclined to sell their

produce, and it was not possible to extract the production via market exchange, it was necessary to use noneconomic measures to control the producers, their investments, their resources, and their consumption, and to extract all surplus from agriculture. Collectivization is seen by these analysts as the tool to control small commodity producers and to subordinate them to the program of industrialization which was needed not only for economic development of the country but also for creation of a military force sufficient to protect the country and to keep political power in the hands of its new holders.

Collectivization was enforced "from above" via economic, administrative, and political pressure. Continual aggressive political campaigns, high taxation of individual farmers, confiscation of crops, searches for hidden crops, etc.--all these means were used simultaneously and thousands of party members (industrial workers, officers of the army, etc.) were sent to rural areas with the task of collectivizing the peasants by any means. The peasants opposed collectivization, some in an active way via rebellions which were easily suppressed by the army, but the majority in a passive way by slaughtering livestock, hiding seeds, refusing to go out to work or working slowly. This resistance created serious economic difficulties and collectivization was stopped for a short period. Methods became more rational and less harsh, and collectivization was completed in 1931.

The artel was chosen as a model for obligatory collective farming and other forms (communes, TOZ) were transformed into artels, most often contrary to the wishes of members. The new form took the general name of kolkhoz, an abbreviation of kollektivno.j chazia.jstwo, or collective

economy. In general, the kolkhoz united small, individually held family plots, usually intensively cultivated, with collective holdings. The means of production were collectively owned, with the exceptions of the nationalized land, and of tractors and other heavy machinery, which until 1954 were in the possession of the state machinery stations (MTS). The kolkhoz was obliged to deliver a stipulated amount of production to the state; these products were sold at much lower prices than they could have commanded on the private market. Other portions of the production went to the MTS as a remuneration for the work of farm machinery. Money mainly went into obligatory investments. Portions went to special social funds, with a percentage of net production being set for each fund. What remained was distributed among members according to quantity and quality of work, measured in day/units--trudodien, a day of work. Managers usually received two such units for 8 hours of work, tractor operators about 1.6 for plowing a set area, etc. The economic plans were prepared by management but all important elements--obligatory delivery, payment for MTS, etc.--were determined by state agencies. All plans and all major decisions, in fact, required the approval of the state authorities, and the governmental bank had full control over the financial side of the activity of the kolkhoz.

The economic and organizational model of the kolkhoz is in the process of permanent change. The changes became very frequent after 1954. Kolkhozes received the right to possess heavy machinery, and the MTS are now just service stations. The economic incentives--prices, supply of attractive produce, etc.--have been increased. In the new (1969) model constitution for kolkhozes, a system of wages was introduced which changed the whole accounting system. Wages are now part of the costs of production, hence a minimal level of income is guaranteed, while before wages

as such did not exist at all and income depended entirely on what remained after all obligatory subtractions. In some experiments, kolkhozes were united into bigger agricultural-industrial units (agrorod); in others, they were allowed economic independence. In a few experiments, attempts were made to reduce the role of individual plots and to bring kolkhozes closer to the state farms (sovkhozes). In others, the role of self-management was stressed, and the family plot was declared a very important element of collective farming. In a few experiments, fields and mechanical equipment were given to groups (zveno) for longer periods and such groups were remunerated by a part of production, giving them an interest in the results of production. As such groups very often are, in fact, organized on the basis of the family (like in Hungary), this experiment means the introduction into collective farming of the principle of family farming.

There is now a wide variety of organizational forms of kolkhozes in the Soviet Union. They vary depending on region, on specialization of production, and on internal and external pressures, which differ sharply in different parts of the country. There are kolkhozes similar to state farms; kolkhozes with some tendencies to revert to communes; and kolkhozes which can really be described as aggregates of individual family farms. In this last case, intensive production is concentrated on family plots. Cash income is usually not very large, because the members prefer to take their salaries in kind. The members of such a kolkhoz could be regarded as part-time farmers: they possess individual farms, small but very intensive and important as a source of cash income, and they also work outside on a collective farm. (As part-time farming is now widely accepted by the government, industrial workers could acquire small plots of land and produce food for their families or for the market.)

The growing industrialization of the Soviet Union, and the necessary reorientation of industry towards consumer and agricultural needs, gives new opportunities to increase the significance of economic incentives. At the same time, such incentives are limited by the system of obligatory deliveries; without major changes in the general economic system, these incentives will not give satisfactory results. The rise of the cultural level of Soviet peasants, together with the rise of modern technology, will gradually increase agricultural production. But most important to such increases will be the emergence of peasants as an active force putting into practice the principles of self-management and demanding further changes in the socio-economic system.

Two forms of collective farm will probably emerge: the specialized farms, with structures very similar to state farms, operating under the direct supervision of governmental specialists; and the aggregate of small family farms unified by a collective farm producing raw agricultural materials. Without governmental and administrative pressure, however, no collective farms would exist. If policy were to change, the reemergence of family farming is very probable (this is not true in Czechoslovakia or East Germany where the revival of family farming is no longer possible). If policy remains the same, the state-farm type of kolkhoz will gradually become dominant in Soviet agriculture. In this type of farm some elements of cooperative organization remain, particularly the participation of workers in decision-making and the sharing of net income.

GAEC (Groupement Agricole d'Exploitation en Commun): In contrast to members of communes in the USSR and to ideologically motivated members of kibbutzim, French farmers were motivated to collectivism mainly by economic advantages of large operation. But political influence was not

without significance. GAECs were created by, or at least devised by, the organization of Catholic farmers (Jeunesse Agricole Catholique). The rise of competitiveness in French markets put many family farms in a very difficult position. In order to increase income, or even to keep the rural family's standard of living on the same level, it was necessary to modernize technology, lower the costs of production, and use capital in more efficient and rational ways. Such goals required enlarged scales of operation.

GAECs are not very numerous, but their number increased rapidly from ca. 60 in 1965 to about 2,000 in 1970. Usually a GAEC does not unify many farmers. About 90 percent of them are groups of two, three, or four farmers (46 percent unifying only two farmers) and members usually come from the same family (ca. 63 percent). Not all GAECs fully integrate two or more farms: nearly 15 percent unify only one branch of production, with the other branches remaining individually operated. In such collective farms, that part most specialized and market-oriented is usually integrated, while the other parts are oriented more towards subsistence needs of the family.

The members of a GAEC can only be farmers and their number may not exceed ten. According to the juridical prescriptions, all members should personally participate in the work. Owners may contribute by their possession of means of production and by labor, tenants by their labor and capital, and landless workers by their work. The contributions of members can actually be transformed into common ownership (usually of mechanical equipment) or can only be loaned to GAEC (e.g., land and buildings). Minimum capital to organize a GAEC is 10,000 francs (about \$US 2,000).

Income is distributed according to contributions of work, capital, and land. Wages of members working in the GAEC are included in the costs

of production; they can be neither lower than legal minimum wages, nor higher than six times the minimum wage.

All members participate in decision-making. As the number of members is limited to ten, the general assembly works in quite an informal way and members frequently discuss problems. One general assembly per year is legally required to elect the manager. Each member has a number of votes proportional to his participation in the GAEC as measured by capital, land, and work.

The GAEC is usually linked with other cooperatives--machinery services (CUMA), credit cooperatives, marketing and processing cooperatives, etc. In this respect, the GAEC is closely related to all forms of vertical integration in agriculture. Some support usually comes from agricultural organizations (e.g., consultation with specialists) and from the government.

As ownership of land in France is usually separated from the use of land, only 44 percent of land in GAECs came from members; the rest is rented from its owners. The average size of GAEC farms is quite large--ca. 137 ha. in 1970--and is still growing. Production is higher than on family farms of the same size and the average income of members is about half again as high as that of nonmembers. Usually GAECs hire workers only in the harvest season, but at least 10 percent of the farms have permanent workers as well, which is strongly criticized by ideologists of the movement.

The requirement that all members of a GAEC participate equally in production is very often too difficult to fulfill because on a farm of typical size, structure of production, and level of technology, large amounts of manpower are only needed at peak seasons. Also, many members

of GAECs prefer not to participate in work, but to contribute their shares as rent for land and interest for capital. There is a tendency, therefore, for the transformation of GAECs into businesses with shared ownership of land and capital but with a single operator. In this sense, GAECs can be considered a way to larger, more rationally organized holdings, but they do not have much to do with a cooperative. In comparison to nonagricultural businesses or to family farms in agriculture, the GAEC is a very unstable form, sensitive to the equilibrium of such interpersonal relations as mutual trust, which is not very common in industrialized societies. The decision to withdraw land or capital is very common, particularly with changes of generation. Of course, GAECs have existed for too short a time to say anything definite about them, but without new organizational solutions which could secure them more independence from changing interpersonal relations, one may be very skeptical about their future.

The description of these four selected forms of collective farms has allowed us to reject the idea that collective farming is a homogeneous phenomenon. In fact, each form should be regarded as the response of a particular group to a particular circumstance. We cannot say that there exists one basic pattern for collective farms, nor can we say that each farm is so different that no generalization is possible. What is needed, therefore, is a typology of collective farms which will allow us to formulate hypotheses eligible for empiric verification. The typology presented here is an attempt to provide such a tool. As a starting point for this typology, we asked: who are the members of the collective farm and what were the goals of the organizers. We will try now to describe the different organizational models of collective farms.

ORGANIZATIONAL FEATURES OF COLLECTIVE FARMING

A number of different features could be taken as criteria for describing the different organizational models of collective farms. I have chosen two: 1) joint ownership or use of land and of other means of agricultural production, and 2) joint work or, more generally, joint farming because it includes both production work and decision-making.

Joint Ownership of Land

Access to land can be secured in a number of ways. One way is outright ownership by an individual or group (extended family, kinship group, tribe, community or local group, etc.). Another way is by lease from a private owner, group, organization, or the state, with or without payment. Collective farms may use either or both of these ways to acquire land. For example, a collective farm could receive part of the land from its members, part from the state with or without payment, and part from rental agreements. In effect, we are describing here forms of ownership. For example, a collective farm could acquire land from its members; the land was privately owned in the past, but it is transformed into collective ownership and can no longer be given back to the members who contributed it. All land to which a collective farm has access can be used in a collective way, while part could be given to members for individual use. All these forms of access to land create a large number of potential combinations, and in a particular country these features have different significance depending on regulations limiting the control of land. For example, land might be privately owned but without the power to alienate, or land could be legally nationalized though it had been used for centuries by peasant

families who, while they joined the collective farm, still regarded the land as their own.

All that can be said about land applies equally well to other means of agricultural production--buildings, machines and tools, livestock, irrigation, etc. Usually when collective farms have existed for a long time, all basic means of production are owned collectively if legal restrictions do not exclude some means (like tractors and combines in USSR until 1954) from communal ownership.

All forms of ownership of or access to land and other means of agricultural production are strongly influenced by the preexisting land tenure system and by the prevailing socio-economic system. In turn, the kind of ownership strongly influences the other organizational features of the collective farm--distribution of income, interpersonal relations within the membership, external ties with the state, governmental agencies, institutions, groups, etc. But we can rank all these forms on a continuum according to increasing socialization of ownership. At the beginning of the continuum, we would have the individual farmer along with some forms of collective ownership or use of land or other means of production; in the middle, we would have the situation where the major part of the means of production is jointly possessed or used, but part of the means of production are privately held; at the upper end, we would have the situation where all means of production are jointly possessed or used. Here, however, a problem arises concerning nationalized ownership. This can be regarded as the final or highest form of socialization, but as it is usually administered by the state or state agency, it is not regarded as "socialized" by the group of direct producers. Whether or not it can truly be called socialized depends

on the character of the state and on the extent of real democratic participation in decision-making by producers.

Socialization of Work

The second criterion for describing the different organizational models of collective farms is the degree of socialization of work. Here again, two questions arise. First, what percentage of the work potential of members of the collective farm is used on the collective farm, as opposed to the part which is used for individual production or work outside agriculture. Situations exist where the members work individually on their farms and only do some particular kind of work like plowing jointly; other situations exist where members of the collective farm work mainly on the farm but also on their individual plots (in some cases, e.g., Soviet kolkhozes, members are obliged to work 200 or more days on the collective farm in order to keep their membership rights) and sometimes also in industry or a village handicraft cooperative. The second question regarding the socialization of work concerns the percentage of work on the collective farm performed by members and that done by hired workers. Even in some kibbutzim (Gvat Brenner for instance), very specialized work or work in processing industries owned by the collective is performed by hired personnel. Sometimes in East European countries, in the Soviet Union, and in China special brigades are formed of urban dwellers, students, or soldiers to help collective farmers during harvest. The extent to which this is really voluntary work is not important in the context of this paper; the important thing is that it is work coming from the outside which can not be regarded as hired labor because it is not, legally speaking, paid for by the collective farm. The work of MTS was paid for by the kolkhozes and hence was really

hired work, but the work of outsiders during the harvest is not. This external work may be absolutely necessary for the continued functioning of collective farms, particularly in countries where there is a lack of manpower in agriculture and the agricultural age structure (Czechoslovakia, East Germany) is very unfavorable. Although managers of collective farms very often complain that such external workers cost much more than hired workers (work accidents, crop damage, etc.), the fact is that in some countries collective farms could not exist without external work.

Again we can propose here a continuum of individual and joint work in different forms of collective farming. At the lower end of this continuum, we will have different forms of mutual assistance, then a rising proportion of joint work in the whole production process, culminating in a situation where members of the collective farm are working only on it. Hired and volunteer work are not included in this continuum.

Work on the collective farm can also be seen from another point of view. The question is to what extent the work is organized on the collective farm as the work of families. The family is the basic production team on a peasant farm. The family is very often used as the unit of work on large holdings. For example, in feudal estates families worked together on the fields of landlords. On many collective farms, e.g., in Hungary, the family is the basic unit in the organization of production. A family receives a piece of land in the collective fields and works on its plot with collective equipment. The family keeps part of the results of production of this field and gives part to the collective farm. In opposition to such a traditional organization of work, we can use the example of a factory where it could happen that the husband, wife, and children are employed. The fact that they belong to the same family has nothing to do with their

production roles, which depend on their physical and intellectual abilities and skills. We can again construct here a continuum from work organized on the principle of family farming towards work organized as the specialized output of individuals.

We can say now that the two continua introduced--that of socialization of access or control over the means of production and that of socialization of work are strongly related to each other. A higher level of socialization of use, possession, or control of the means of production implies a higher level of socialization of work. We cannot describe one of these two variables as more important because the relationship between them is reciprocal. It is not only true that the socialization of the means of production implies or even requires socialization of work, but it is also true that socialization of work implies or more often requires the socialization of possession of means of agricultural production. There are two continua, but expressed as two lines they are coming closer and closer and eventually coming together in the "higher forms" of socialization, both of means of production and of work. Graphically the two continua can be represented as follows:

Socialization of ownership

Socialization of work

These observations apply as well to all fields of economic activity, not only production but marketing, processing, and transportation. All these economic activities, performed in the past by individual farmers, are today penetrated by the process of socialization in two ways: 1) they are absorbed by the general economic system, so that in many countries marketing or processing, for example, are now fully separated from the economic activity of farmers, who are more and more specialized producers; 2) what was formerly the task of individual farmers becomes organized as a group or cooperative activity, e.g., consumer and farmer cooperatives, credit cooperatives, processing cooperatives, storage cooperatives, and so on.

The socialization of farmers' economic activities does not, however, necessarily go together with collective farming. It depends on the extent to which these economic activities were separated from farming before socialization. In countries where marketing cooperatives or processing cooperatives existed, collective farms are usually in close contact with them and concentrate their own efforts on production. But in many countries such division of labor was not known or was not well advanced. Marketing, processing, etc., were among the activities performed by the peasants themselves. In such a situation, collective farms must perform all these functions, and joint economic activities or jointly organized services should be ranked in the continuum which is related to the socialization of work.

In speaking about these continua, one restriction is necessary. They are often regarded as articulations of a process of spontaneous social transformation. The mutual assistance groups, marketing cooperatives, and some forms of communal ownership are regarded as the first step in the transformation of traditional peasant agriculture into collective farming. In

general, the lower, or simpler, forms of agricultural cooperation are expected spontaneously to transform themselves into collective farms, i.e., into higher forms of agricultural cooperation. It is true that each form has its own dynamic mechanism or potential for transformation. For example, we might expect that the participation of hired or fully employed personnel in consumer cooperatives will grow, and that locally oriented cooperatives will transform themselves into larger, nationwide organizations, controlling or even monopolizing some field of economic activity. But spontaneous transformation of "simple forms" of cooperation into collective farms has never been observed. Quite the contrary, these forms of mutual assistance and of communal ownership of land are usually relics of traditional, precapitalistic farming based on the cohesion of local village communities and, with disintegration of such communities, these relics gradually disappear. It is true that in some countries all these simple forms were transformed into higher forms, but this was not a spontaneous process. TOZ in the Soviet Union, mutual assistance groups in China, communal property in developing countries--all these forms were used as the first step for collectivization. They facilitated collectivization and they were used to habituate farmers to the idea of collective farming, but they never transformed spontaneously into collective farms. Our continuum is not an articulation of a process, then, but is just a typology of existing forms ranked according to the increase of a certain variable.

Other Organizational Features

Until now, we have been speaking about two organizational features--the relation of people to the means of production, and the relations between producers in the process of work. These are the basic features included

in the definition of collective farming. But the collective farm as an organization can be characterized from other points of view as well. There are at least three other organizational features which are of special importance: 1) the system of management and decision-making; 2) the system of distribution of output; 3) the system of organization of consumption.

In speaking of a system of management, I am not limiting the discussion to the participation of members in planning and decision-making. The most common contrast described is that between decisions made by a whole membership (general assembly) and those made by hired specialists or even by elected management, i.e., management which has become specialized in its organizational function and keeps its dominant position in decision-making. There are different ways to secure democratic management, e.g., obligatory rotation of all positions of management. But, as we saw in the example of the kibbutzim, a legal system itself is not enough to secure real democracy; the special preparation of members is necessary before they can participate competently, if at all. There are instances of legally constituted democratic management, like in Yugoslavia, where the producers are not competent to take part in decision-making. They sit silently in the general assembly, listening to what specialists say, sometimes even not understanding it. Thus, not only the degree of membership participation is important in describing the system of management. We must know as well the type of management--elected by members, nominated by authorities, hired specialists (sometimes depending on the external institutions)--and what kind of decisions such management can take. If the amount of obligatory deliveries, prices, system of marketing, financial control, etc., are decided by the state authorities, the management of a collective has no more decisions to make than the management of state-owned enterprises. Management can only decide how

to divide people into working teams, how to divide the general tasks into concrete production operations, how to control the performance of producers, and how to solve social tensions between members or between management and producers. We conclude then that existing systems of management cannot be placed on a single continuum, but must be viewed in conjunction with basic typology and basic organizational features of collective farms and with the connections to the general socio-economic and political systems. Systems of management do, of course, express the existing conflicts and difficulties in collective farms. If they are analyzed together with other basic features of collective farms and interpreted in the context of global socio-economic systems, systems of management are among the most important organizational features of collective farming.

Another important organizational feature is the distribution of output in the collective farm. There are systems of equal distribution among families or individuals, and of unequal distribution according to contributed land, capital, and work. The ideal of equality is present in all collective farms, but its meaning is different depending on the type of collective farm we are speaking about and the nature of its members.

The third idea of equality enlarges the meaning of contribution and can be expressed as "equal reward or remuneration for equal contribution," with contribution measured in terms of land, capital, and performance of work. This idea of equality corresponds to the social situation of petty commodity producers--farmers or peasants--and can be accepted as just if the membership of a collective farm is composed of such a group. Of course, this idea of equality accepts preexisting inequalities and continues them on the collective farm.

The extreme and most sophisticated meaning of equality is "to each according to his needs" but this idea usually cannot be put into practice because no collective can afford it. The realization of this ideal must, therefore, be limited to the benefits which are in abundance, or to equal access to benefits which cannot be distributed. For other benefits, equal distribution could literally mean that everyone gets the same portion (modified to some extent by needs) or it could mean "equal reward for equal work." This idea of equality, however, creates conflicts because it is quite impossible to say that one man's work is equal to another's. In effect, then, inequalities among members are created which can only be accepted by members who are oriented towards economic and not ideological values.

The last of the most important organizational features is the organization of consumption. In speaking about consumption, I have in mind material consumption only, but this concept could be extended to cultural consumption as well--organization of recreation, for example. All varieties of organization of consumption fall somewhere between strictly individual consumption in family households and organized social consumption, families living in the same building, preparing food for the group and sharing it, sharing individual property with or without any exceptions, organizing all recreational time, etc. This extreme form is very rare, but in many collective farms consumption as well as production is socialized. These kinds of collective farms are usually called "communes." Socialization of consumption affects, of course, the system of distribution. To the extent to which consumption is shared, distribution is not needed. Distribution affects only benefits which are consumed by single families (houses) or individuals (clothes). In the majority of kibbutzim, for example,

consumption is basically socialized, meaning that the common kitchen prepares food for the whole group and everybody comes to meals at the same place or carries his meals home. Houses are owned by the kibbutz but individually used by the families; clothes, or coupons for clothes, are distributed equally according to particular needs and are individually possessed.

Together with consumption, the fulfillment of some other individual needs could be organized in a social way--medical care, education, and general care of children and aged persons. In extreme cases, the commune acts like a family and all functions performed by the family are organized and performed by the group. Of course, those social functions important for all members of the group or connected with the ideology motivating such a group--religious ceremonies, political meetings, military training, etc.--are organized by the group, as are all other social events, weddings, holidays, etc.

We are speaking here only about the most important organizational features. Collective farms could be described in a more detailed way using many more organizational features or dimensions, but I am interested here only in basic socio-economic characteristics. To bring closer organizational variety of collective farming and the continuum of socialization proposed here, I will list some examples of different forms, mainly from East Europe, moving from more simple forms towards more complex, higher forms of collective farming.

Simple and Complex Forms of Collective Farming

The simpler forms are of two kinds. First, there are relics of traditional village life, forms of mutual assistance, forms of communal or village

ownership, and in some countries forms of ownership by the extended family. To such forms belonged Russian obshchina, a form of communal or village ownership of land which was periodically divided between families (ca. once every seven years) equally or according to the size of the family. In Yugoslavia, there was zadruga, which was a form of ownership by a kinship group. In Ethiopia and in parts of Africa, one finds desarist, a kind of communal ownership of land or extended family ownership of land which still exists. In Europe, these forms disappeared completely except for some remote parts of East European countries, particularly in the mountains, where communal ownership of grazing land, forest, etc., still exists.

The second kind of simple form of cooperation is that associated with technological development. Very often single families could not afford to buy tractors or other pieces of heavy mechanical equipment, so neighbor groups buy and use them in sequence or together with some kind of jointly organized work. Usually, all these forms are informal. They do not have any written status, but members know exactly what the rules are and how they change with the accumulation of experience. In a sense, it is possible to speak about a revival of group ownership and group work which has been stimulated by socio-economic and particularly technical development.

As the next step on the continuum, we may put the marketing, credit, or consumer cooperatives, which usually organize the services and economic activity of farmers, excluding production in an exact sense. It is interesting to note that quite recently some of these cooperatives (like those in Yugoslavia) have begun not only to perform important functions in vertical integration (contracts for production, processing, marketing) but are penetrating more and more into the area of production. I have here in mind so-called "coproduction"--cooperative use of the land of private farmers

who are paid in part by produce and in part by cash wages for their work. All kinds of production services--plant protection, spraying, sometimes work in plowing, cultivating, or harvesting--performed by cooperatives affect the individual producer. A more developed example of such a kind of organization is the Israeli moshav where the land is owned by the cooperative and distributed equally among members; basic production work is organized as group work or is performed by the cooperative; tractors, combines, and heavy mechanical equipment are owned by the cooperative; the cooperative markets all produce and, if necessary, also has some processing establishments; and all monetary transactions are performed by the cooperative, which also has its own bank. The moshav is supposed to be a successful economic organization of family farms integrated by cooperative relations to a larger group. Very close to this kind of organization are temporary cooperatives--land settlement cooperatives in England, collective or cooperative farms organized after land reform in Italy, settlement cooperative farms in Poland organized on regained territories after World War II, settlement cooperatives in Ceylon, etc. This kind of cooperative farming is supposed to last only for a determined period and to help new settlers, or people who receive land from land reform, to overcome the first difficulties and to prepare them for family farming. In such cases, some forms of group ownership may remain and some services may remain as organized by the cooperative, but the family works individually and even during its period of collective work is accumulating capital for its own farm.

To this kind of cooperative farming, though less developed than the Israeli moshav, belongs the TOZ in the Soviet Union, the so-called collective farms of type I and type Ib in Poland (where the cooperative helps only in private family farming), and collective farming in one field of

production united with individual farming in other fields of production. In all these kinds of cooperative farming, or partly collective farming, the principle of family farming dominates.

Next on the continuum are integral cooperative farms, the simplest forms of which are GAEC and former Bulgarian cooperative farms where profit is distributed according to contribution of land, capital, and work. Here collective ownership and work are dominant, but such farms can be treated as agreements between unequal partners who do not want to lose anything that they once possessed. Some organizational features of family farming can be maintained at this stage. Particularly in Hungarian cooperative farming, the principle of family farming is still maintained both in the form of an individual family plot and in the organization of production work.


As the next step on the continuum, we could put the kolkhoz. The level of socialization of ownership and work is much higher--the land is nationalized, the equipment is collectively owned, and collective work is supposed to be dominant. Some social services are organized by the kolkhoz but consumption remains individual and small individual farming remains in the form of individual plots. As we said before, the opposition between collective and individual farming within the kolkhoz expresses itself in intensified cultivation of the individual plot.

When speaking about kolkhozes, we must point out that the participation of a larger organization--the state--is very extensive, especially in management. Members of kolkhozes can be called on to perform some national or regional tasks--construct roads, help in construction of industrial plants, etc. This is even more true when we speak about Rumanian and Bulgarian cooperative farms, which are organized in larger units within the whole

administrative structure; they are much more subordinated to central administration and the sense of a collective is much weaker. It is difficult to say the same things about lack of collective attitudes in Chinese communes, but they are also organized into larger units and are called on to perform general industrial, construction, and military functions. The influence of the state is much more obvious in Cuban collective farms, which are subordinated to central planning and central administration. This problem, the penetration of collective farming by a larger organization, particularly by the central administration of the state, needs a separate analysis.

The last group of collective farms on the continuum, the extreme group, includes communes, where both production and consumption are socialized, and very often other fields of social life are organized as group activities. In these extreme forms we find the group family and in fact the transformation of single families into one large group family is the logical consequence of the ideal of collective life. This extreme form is, however, very rare because monogamic marriage and the single family have become over time a universal and basic form of social life. The full socialization of life in collectives requires that individuals sacrifice their individuality and only very strongly motivated individuals are able to do that. The experiences of recent generations, where many attempts have been made in order to secure the richest expression of individuality in collectives by means of extreme socialization of property, work, consumption, leisure, etc., should not be neglected. The idea that individuals can best maintain and express their own personality only in collectivity is very attractive and surely will not disappear in the future.

Continuum of Simple to Complex Forms of Collectives



The analysis of different organizational models is usually undertaken so as to be able to say which is most advantageous. But as we said before, the best model for reaching ideological goals of some kind is different from that needed to maximize profit or prepare for individual farming. The goals of collective farms must, therefore, be taken into account. Collective farms are placed within given socio-economic, cultural, and political systems, and in different natural conditions. The organizational model which is good for one set of conditions may be completely absurd in another: maximization of economic profit may be fine for collective farms set within a system of competitive markets; in a planned economy the idea of maximizing profit would make no sense at all. To speak of prospects for collective farming, therefore, we must have typologies of collective farms according to their stated goals, the various continua of organizational models of collective farms, and at least simplified typologies of social, economic, cultural, and political conditions as well.

COLLECTIVE FARMING AND GLOBAL STRUCTURES

I will speak here only briefly about natural conditions, because their influence on the emergence and organization of collective farming is evident. Some natural conditions can be very stimulating for collective farming, conditions, for example, which require large and expensive investments to start farming--irrigating desert land, draining swamps, clearing jungle, preparing virgin land for farming, etc. Some natural conditions may be favorable for collective farming because modern technology can be efficiently used (tractors on the plains) while in others the technology cannot be used at all, or at least not advantageously (mountains). Each structure of production, which depends partly on natural conditions, creates unique possibilities and/or difficulties for collective farming. In East European countries, for example, it is much easier to socialize production of crops which are produced only for market (oil plants, sugar beets, etc.) and not for individual consumption. It is usually easier to organize plant production than animal production and production of corn than that of grapes, especially if the farmer produces wine for himself as well. But the influence of natural conditions is only part of the explanation of these relative difficulties. Socialization of vineyards may be more difficult than socialization of corn fields because grapes are usually grown on small plots and require individualized care, which can more easily be done under family farming than under collective farming. But other factors are operating here too, like old production habits, family needs, etc. In these situations, cultural, social, and economic conditions are acting together with natural conditions and creating special obstacles to or a favorable setting for collective farming.

When I speak about social conditions, I am including a number of types. I am speaking first about socio-economic systems, which create different incentives for the economic activity of collective farming and different facilities or difficulties for that activity. Secondly, I am speaking about socio-political systems, which create different privileges for or obstacles to cooperative farming and subordinate it to various political doctrines. Thirdly, I am speaking about socio-cultural conditions, i.e., different systems of values and different norms of behavior and cultural habits.

Collective Farms and Socio-Economic Systems

It will be useful to distinguish two socio-economic systems, using as the criterion the relationship between consumption and production. We could call the first system an interactive system: the behavior of consumers directly rewards or punishes the producers. When the producer delivers products which are needed or desired by consumers, at prices which are acceptable to them, he will sell his products and be rewarded by profits. If his production does not meet the needs of a clientele and if the price is not acceptable in comparison to other prices or to the hierarchy of needs, he is punished by not being able to sell his products and get his profit. The behavior of consumers can be manipulated to some extent by producers. Commercials, monopolistic prices, creation of new needs, fashions, etc.--all these are different tools for manipulation of consumers. Even more important is the general system of values--consumption is seen as a symbol of social status or as the source of a universally accepted meaning of happiness. The system of values is an expression of an economic system which can function only by developing new needs. Manipulation of

consumers can be more or less efficient, but the general principle of such an economic system is based on the interaction between consumers and producers. This interaction operates via the market and the consumer is the central person in the whole functional relationship.

The second type of socio-economic system we could call a directive system. It has no direct interaction between producers and consumers. The distribution of goods can be via the market, or the goods can be distributed directly to consumers for a special bonus as happened during the war in many European countries. The basic element is that producers are rewarded or punished by the central steering body, planning committee, or state for their contribution to fulfillment of the national plan, not for the acceptance of their production by consumers. Basic goods could be sold to consumers for money, but some attractive goods could be distributed not for money but as a special privilege to people especially appreciated by the steering body--specialists, top managers and administrators, people fulfilling special important functions in the country like military officers or police agents. The degree to which producers are isolated from consumers depends, of course, on how the plan is constructed, i.e., whether it contains only quantitative measures or qualitative measures as well. But even if everything is planned--kind of production, costs, salaries and number of workers, standard quality, etc.--the whole system offers many possibilities to receive rewards for producing goods which were not accepted by the consumers.

The two systems described above are, of course, simplifications. First, each has been characterized by only one kind of relationship, and usually there are other important features as well. For example, in directive systems the production of such means of production as machinery,

new industrial construction, etc., could and usually does have priority over the production of goods for consumption, reinforcing the relative independence from the behavior of consumers. Of course, basic consumer goods must be produced and the consumer cannot easily refuse to buy something which he needs even if its quality is not satisfactory. But the main regulator of the directive system is the national plan, and in this plan the needs of the whole system have a decisive priority. Contrary to the interactive system, which is oriented towards increase of consumption, or to put it more strongly, whose basic condition for continued functioning is permanent increase of consumption, the directive system keeps consumer needs at the same level. The other characteristic not mentioned before is that in directive systems employment, like production, is usually planned and unemployment is unacceptable. The whole economy must use all potential manpower, which, if the level of general economic development is low, creates no incentives for further technical development. As salaries are kept low to maintain balance with the available supply of goods, there are no real incentives for increased efficiency. This is not necessarily the consequence of the basic traits of the directive system, but in reality usually accompanies them.

Further, both socio-economic systems as described above are ideal types. In reality, countries with directive socio-economic systems are introducing more and more elements of interaction between production and consumption, and countries with interactive systems are introducing, on the contrary, more and more elements of direction, especially via intervention of the government in economic life. We have called these systems directive and interactive, not socialist and capitalist. It is true that a directive system could be more easily and fully adopted by a country

where the means of production are nationalized. But, as we see in the example of Yugoslavia, planning could mean stimulation via the market rather than by directive orders to producers. The directive system is not particularly socialistic in itself. Rather, it is characteristic of underdeveloped countries which try to create the basis for heavy industry by rigorous control and governmental action. At the same time, the concept of a capitalist system, if it involves private ownership of the means of production, belongs partly to the past because ownership no longer gives one the degree of control over owned objects it once did. State control continues to grow and today economic life is more or less efficiently controlled by governments in their political or national interests. Private ownership can coexist with the directive system, and capitalist society is in fact organized in such a way during wars. Socialized ownership can coexist with interactive systems, on the other hand, but in general the directive system is more adequate to a socialized economy and the interactive system to an economy based on private enterprise.

Now when we speak of collective farms located in these two socio-economic systems, it is obvious that their real organizational patterns, systems of functioning, criteria of success and failure, main social conflicts, etc., must be different, and even those organizational models which look completely identical must somehow be different.

The collective farm in a directive system is included in the planned economy. The amount of production which should be delivered is decided by the central steering body and all investments or purchases of agricultural means of production are decided as well. The financial plans of collective farms must be in accordance with the global national plan as must be decisions about the amount of investment goods which will be

produced and how they will be distributed. The plan of a collective farm could include, for example, the purchase of new tractors for which it has the money. The purchase could even be approved by national planners, but if the output of tractors is not sufficient to cover all purchases or if the tractors were sent to another place, the plan of the collective farm could not be reached. If the country has an international agreement to exchange products for combines, it could very easily happen that the exchange will be based on an over estimate of needs so that the country will receive many more corn combines than were really requested by collective farms. Instead of the tractors which it needs, the collective farm could very easily receive corn combines which are of no use because no corn has been planted. Of course, it is theoretically possible to avoid such mistakes, but the examples are taken from current practice. If too many details must be decided by the central steering body, such mistakes are inevitable.

But what is important is that in the light of the planned economy a great many actions taken by collective farms are meaningless. The principle of self-management is granted to all types of collective farms. In a directed economy, however, all decisions are made centrally in accordance with the global plan and there is simply no place for self-management. The whole economic activity of collective farms depends on the fulfillment of plans of other enterprises. The collective farms could produce more and hence get more money from the government, but what can they do with this money when the production of other goods is limited? The whole calculation of input and output takes on a new meaning in such a situation, and it is purely a question of accounting whether the collective farm has a deficit or not. What is important is helping to fulfill the national

plan and all effort, all creativity, is devoted to one purpose--to write reports which will be accepted by authorities and will earn for the collective farm special rewards from national funds.

In interactive systems all is different. The collective farm must be competitive--lower its costs of production, increase production, find buyers, etc. Members must do business to survive. The field is much more open for economic decisions, but the market is competitive and the risk is much higher. It is much more difficult to decide what to do with manpower which is liberated from production by use of cheaper and more efficient technology. The economic conditions require quick effective decisions, and these requirements could create difficulties for really democratic decision-making processes. Subordination to the market requirements could create obstacles to truly democratic management.

Nevertheless, the collective farm is in this system the private business of its members and it exists as long as its members find this organizational pattern advantageous. On the contrary, in a directive system collective farm members are much more dependent on the national economy in their decisions and in consequence feel much less responsibility for the results of production. The most common attitude is: if the government requires good results, the government must give all that is needed to produce them. The role of manager in such a situation, particularly when he is elected by members and not nominated by authorities, is very difficult. Of course, much depends on him. If he is very influential and can protect his collective farm from too demanding plans, if he can get better plans, if he can get more from the government and give less, and particularly if he can protect the collective farm from close control by authorities, he is a good manager.

The two socio-economic systems just described are external factors which determine the functioning of collective farms. In many countries, however, particularly in developing countries, peasant agriculture cannot be described in terms of directive or interactive economic systems. It is usually subsistence agriculture, not oriented towards market production at all. Both economic systems are for such agriculture something new and imposed from above. It could be that for peasants in a given country the interactive system is less familiar than the directive system if, for example, they were formerly obliged to give some part of their production to the landlord. The interactive system could seem too risky to them. They are not unwilling to produce for the government if they feel they are under the government's care. In speaking about the two systems, we should, therefore, see to what extent members of the collective farm derive from farmers oriented to producing for the market, or from peasants producing mainly for their own needs. Where the latter might be quite happy in a directive system, the former could find it difficult to adapt to. All their values seem inadequate within a system where there is no place for free market competition. The virtues which were formerly successful as norms of behavior--calculation of input and output, accumulation of money, saving, extending business, flexibility in response to market stimuli, etc.--are in the new situation meaningless, or at least less important.

An ideal situation for new collectives in a directive system occurs when the collective's members are former land laborers. For them, the directive system is easy to understand. They leave all economic decisions to the management and are really interested only in norms of work and in wages. But such experience and attitudes are not very good for the

conditions of an interactive system where the members of a collective farm take all responsibility for decisions. Of course, they could hire a good manager and trust him, but their situation would then be much the same as before, only their wages would be higher. Such a situation is, in fact, the case on some collective farms in Latin America where after land reform plantations were transformed into collective farms. But in such a situation, there exists only the potential for democratic management and it will only be realized by the generation of children who will receive more education and more understanding of business.

In an interactive system the best situation is when the collective farm is organized by former farmers oriented to market conditions and economic management. But this is possible only in small groups. The experience of GAECs shows that in such a case both successful collective farming and the full realization of democratic management can exist.

But the most common situation in developing countries with interactive systems is when former peasants, used to subsistence agriculture, are pressed to transform themselves into collective entrepreneurs. Commercial farming and the principles of collective life are both new to them. The only experiences they can bring to bear are the patterns of mutual assistance in the village and the existence of communal property. Without the help of specialists, they cannot take full advantage of collective farming. And it is rather difficult for them to accept the help of specialists, whom they regard as outsiders. When they do accept managers, they lose their own initiative, feel frustrated, insecure, alienated, and powerless. Collective farms with these problems are usually not very successful and it is difficult to turn them into really functioning businesses.

In describing the collective farms organized by different kinds of people in the two socio-economic systems, we did not mention our basic typology. There is, however, a link between this typology and the kind of socio-economic system in which collective farms are organized. Type 1 collectives could not be expected to exist in directive systems or rather could not be expected to exist for long. In directive systems the role of collective farms is defined by the needs of the national economy and not by the particular goals or beliefs of members. Only in a situation where the beliefs of members are identical with national goals as formulated by the government, would it be possible to expect the existence of the first type. If the members believe in national goals or if they believe in a kind of ideology which is accepted as official doctrine, they could be quite happy within the directive system. Such a situation apparently occurs in Chinese communes. Usually, however, a government is very pragmatic and does not necessarily follow the doctrine in which its citizens are required to believe. Unless the doctrine is one of pure nationalism, there are inevitable differences between it and the pragmatic behavior of the government. The principle of equality, for example, is usually sacrificed for that of efficiency. The ideology which exploded during a revolution cannot be maintained for long when the revolution reaches its goals. Even the most radical government will appreciate obedient citizens more highly than citizens who strongly believe in ideological dogma and may on this basis oppose government's decisions or argue about such decisions. Collective farms could be created by groups of believers, but they could not function for long in a directive system and might be even regarded as a possible source of deviations.

The fourth type of collective* also could not exist in directive systems because the idea of getting small farms together in order to achieve higher profit has no meaning in a planned economy. There is no competition between small and large farms; production is planned; prices and supplies to farms of seeds, fertilizers, construction materials, etc., are decided by the government. Large farms might, in fact, have lower costs of production and better economic results in general, but for the members of a collective farm this success is of secondary importance. They feel more alienated, more suppressed by management, etc., in larger collective farms. Even if some incentives to create or enlarge collective farms could be devised, they would not be considered sufficient reasons by peasants,

*If this type of collective farm, defined as a response to the competitive market, makes no sense in a directive economic system where the market is strongly controlled and competition is excluded, there is still a place for competition between small family farms and collective farms in such a system. This competition is, however, not on the market; rather it is expressed in the income of members of collective farms. If members' wages or income from collective farms are higher than the income possible from private plots, it is very probable that the members of collective farms will reject their individual plots or transform them into small kitchen-gardens. If, for example, a member of a collective farm receives a sufficient amount of milk from the collective farm, he would not bother to keep a cow for his family. If his salary is better than the income from vegetables produced on his private plot for the market, he would probably spend more time on the collective fields than on his private plot. If he could get enough meat from the collective farm or in the butchery, or if the market is well supplied and there is no private market for his products, he would certainly prefer to earn a good salary than to produce meat on his own. This competition is regulated by the constitution of the collective farm. Usually one is not allowed to produce more than is required to meet one's own needs, but this depends on the general economic situation in the country. Up to now, we have only had examples of countries with directive systems where there are permanent shortages in market supplies of food and consumer goods in general. It could be that the directive system in a country with an abundance of consumer goods will create different conditions for collective farming. The advantages of collective farming will become clear and in consequence the competition between individual plots and collective farms will make no sense. But at this time we do not know of such a country.

who only agree to join collective farms, or to unify existing farms because of external pressure.

As the fourth type of collective is not suited to directive systems, so the third type does not fit interactive systems where decisions of producers are influenced by the market and not by the government. The reasons for producers to organize collective farms lie in the advantages of the market and not the general interest of the national economy. The government in an interactive system could encourage collective farming or could grant special privileges for collective farms apart from economic competition, but it could not create collective farming on a mass scale without changing the whole economic system of the country.

Only the second type of collective could emerge in both the directive and the interactive economic systems. Of course, in the directive system collective farms will receive full economic support, will be likely to survive their internal crises, and usually will have a tendency to bring their organizational patterns closer to state farming. In the interactive system, the centrifugal tendencies will, after the first stage of collectivization, strongly manifest themselves, and most probably the collective farms will dissolve or transform themselves into a kind of corporation or cooperative composed of individual farms retaining some shared property or commonly organized services. The best situation occurs when the organizational patterns of the individual farms are similar, as in the moshav.

Collective Farms and Socio-Political Systems

The differences between directive and interactive systems imply the kind of political system. A directive system is possible only in a country with strongly centralized power. Ideology is not without significance

in such a situation, and usually we find a mixture of socialistic and nationalistic ideas. But the directive system has its own dialectic. Ideology can influence the secondary goals or the kind of arguments used to urge creation of collective farming, e.g., nationalization of the whole economy, and it has some importance for the organizational patterns which must implement the goals. Of course, the degree of centralized power in the socio-political system and the degree of directiveness in the socio-economic system have a very strong influence on the character of collective farming in the country---whether or not to collectivize, whether or not to allow the existence of ideologically motivated collective farms or collective farms created by commercial farmers to achieve better profit, etc. The organizational patterns of collective farms are influenced as well by the degree of governmental control implied by the degree of directiveness of the socio-economic system.

As the political structure in its basic characteristic---degree of centralized control by one party---is strongly associated with the characteristics of the socio-economic system, it is not necessary to speak at length about political systems. It is different with cultural systems.

Collective Farms and Socio-Cultural Systems

It is true that directive systems have emerged in underdeveloped countries which have some similarity in general cultural traits. These are usually countries with a large proportion of peasants in the population and with a dominance of peasant systems of values, norms of behavior, etc. There is, of course, no universal peasant culture, and peasants in Eastern Europe, Asia, Latin America, etc., differ strongly in their cultural patterns. But in all peasant cultures, strong value is attached to the family

and the community. The peasant "moral community" accepts different moral norms for those within and without the group, e.g., officials, urban dwellers, tourists, etc. The strong resistance to family plots in collective farms in Eastern Europe can be better understood if we remember that these are peasant countries. In fact, differences between Eastern European countries in this respect show us that in countries with higher levels of industrialization and lack of peasantry and peasant culture, like East Germany and Czechoslovakia, the individual family plot is not of such importance. The collective farms there are much more similar to sovkhozes (state farms) than to kolkhozes (collective farms) in the Soviet Union, despite the fact that a single organizational model was used at the beginning.

Passive resistance of members of collective farms to management (managers are regarded as outsiders and the attitude of members towards managers is the same as that of village dwellers towards the state officials who come to the village), strong "moral familism," the inability of members to think in terms of large enterprise, and so on, could be related to cultural determinants rather than to the organizational patterns or general traits of the national economy. It is true that in peasant agriculture the existence of some traditional forms of cooperation could facilitate the organization of collective farms, but at the same time, strong familism and old forms of using common property will create serious obstacles in the transformation of collective farms into efficient businesses.

The cultural norms associated with land laborers are quite different. They can much more easily accept the appointed managers and follow their orders. They are much more habituated to the separation of family and work, therefore, the division of labor is much clearer and work can be better organized. They distrust, of course, all regulations about work and tend

towards equal distribution of work and income, much more so than peasants who are more careful about rank differences between families. This attitude could be an obstacle to the effectiveness of material incentives but, in general, the type of sub-culture characteristic of agricultural laborers is much more favorable for the creation of collective farms.

Neither group, however, and neither kind of sub-culture, is the most receptive to the principle of cooperativeness, for both peasants and land laborers are unable to think in terms of common enterprise. They can accept the manager as landlord or patron, they can more or less obediently follow his orders, but they cannot act as real co-owners. This kind of ability is much more characteristic of commercial farmers who are used to thinking in terms of production for the market, can understand and accept economic arguments, and can really participate in decision-making.*

As we said before, peasant culture can only be described in very general terms; in fact, we have no universal peasant culture. Pre-revolutionary Russia and pre-revolutionary China were countries with predominantly peasant populations, but their peasant cultures were very different. It might be true that the feeling of community was much stronger for Chinese peasantry and that hence organization of collective farming in China was much easier and the functioning of collectives is much more successful. But there are so many factors involved--differences in socio-economic systems (e.g., the existence of market relations in China), different ideological involvement

*I am not speaking here about collective farms created by non-agricultural populations--radical intelligentsia or industrial workers--like kibbutzim, for instance. But the cultural norms characteristic to such groups enable them to act as real participants in decision-making and at the same time ideological goals have much higher importance for them.

of peasants in the revolution; different degrees of internalization of ideology proclaimed by the government, dependence on big irrigation systems and therefore on collective work in China, much less stratification of Chinese peasantry, etc.--that it is difficult to say that the differences in the ease of collectivization and in the functioning of collective farms are consequences of cultural traits. It is possible only to say that the cultural values of Chinese peasantry were much more favorable to collective farming than those of the Russian peasantry, at least in the European part of Russia.

We could not expect that the arguments used in the creation of GAECs in France or of Israeli kibbutzim would be adequate to convince African or Asian peasants. Such arguments would not be adequate in directive socio-economic systems, or for peasant families living in the framework of their own local cultures where individual economic success is of much less importance and prestige is gained by other kinds of behavior. Even comparing cultural norms in Indian villages in Latin America with those in villages where settlers are of European origin we can see that the arguments used to encourage collective farming must be different and that even organizational patterns (at least in the beginning) must be different because of variations in culture. The argument that all members of the village have some rights to land and that they should use the land as a group, produce the food for themselves as a group, and that everybody should participate in the benefits would be much more convincing for Indian villagers in Latin America. Arguments relating to such economic advantages as profit, market competition, etc., would be more convincing to villagers of European origin. Thus, even within the same socio-economic system in the same country, arguments in support of and actual organizational patterns of collective farming

must be different if we have to deal with groups of different culture, with different emphases on market values, and with different community and family values.

Let us now consider the prospects for collective farming in the world and the role of such organizational forms of agricultural production in socio-economic change.

SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND THE PROSPECTS FOR COLLECTIVE FARMING

In speaking about the role of collective farming in socio-economic development, we should talk first about existing collectives and then about prospects for the future. In other words, we want to know, first, what role collective farms have already played in the socio-economic development of some countries, and, second, what role different kinds of collective farms could play in the socio-economic development of countries where, at the moment, collective farming does not exist.

It is not possible to say what would have happened if countries which now have collectivized agriculture had developed without it, but we can say what advantages and disadvantages collective farming offered for their development.

Roles Played by Collective Farming in Current Economic Development

Collectivization in the Soviet Union made it possible to gain full control over agricultural production, to dispose of the results of production, and to supply growing industrial centers with cheap food. Enforced collectivization had, however, many disadvantages. During collectivization, the existing production potentials were destroyed. Soviet agriculture has found itself since that time in a state of permanent crisis. Despite technological modernization, the previous level of productivity has only very recently been regained. The production of collective farms was unable to meet the needs of the country. In many fields of production--eggs, meat, fruits, vegetables, even potatoes--the significant part, even the major part of production came from individual members' plots and not from collective farms.

Collective farms played a similar role in economic development in other underdeveloped Eastern European and Asian countries. In these countries, however, there were several reasons why it was possible to avoid such an enormous loss in agricultural production as was suffered in the Soviet Union. First, collectivization was not the main source of industrial development. These countries had other sources as well, and more connections with the international market. Therefore, the obligatory deliveries were never so high and the consumption of the rural population, rather than dropping so sharply, even increased in comparison to the previous level. Second, the percentage of land taken in land reform was higher and the contribution of peasants to the emerging collective farms was much lower than in the Soviet Union. For their contribution of land, tools, mechanical equipment, livestock, etc., peasants were rewarded and for a few years income was distributed not only according to work but according to the contribution of land and capital as well. The potential for productivity did not drop, therefore, as in the Soviet Union, and the state gave much more financial and production support to emerging collective farms. Third, in some countries, the level of enforcement was much lower and the participation of peasants in the transformation of agriculture was much higher. These elements gave at least initial incentives for agricultural development, particularly in Asian countries. And fourth, the level of industrialization was much higher than in pre-revolutionary Russia and, therefore, the market relationships and market incentives were operating on a larger scale. In addition, in some countries new organizational solutions were found which preserved family farming and incentives for work to a larger extent (Hungary), or brought collective farms closer to state farming and state-owned industry (East Germany, Czechoslovakia).

Another example of the role played by collective farming in socio-economic development can be seen in Israel. Collectives and cooperatives were the main form of agricultural settlement in that country and hence crucial to its very emergence and existence and to its further development. We must remember several factors, however. First, individual settlement was not possible: in order to overcome the natural difficulties, collective effort was absolutely necessary. Second, collective farming had all the financial support it needed. And third, members of collective farms had relatively higher levels of education than those of average peasants, had the feeling of national mission, and accepted all organizational requirements for that mission. Success of Israeli collective farming could hardly be repeated in other conditions and in the face of changing conditions in Israel itself, the collective farms may not last there for long, at least not in their current organizational patterns.

We should also mention the role that collective farms played in some countries during land reform. In Mexico and in Italy as well, collective farms played a role as a transitional stage preparing for family farming on the land received from land reform. Even if the majority of collective farms were dissolved after a short period of existence, their emergence and temporary existence played an important role in changing the agricultural structure without heavy losses in productivity of land. In addition, some forms of cooperation remain and serve as a driving force in the development of family farming and as an integrating force in new agriculture. The modernization of technology, the participation in the market, and the processes of vertical integration in general are now facilitated to a large extent by the experiences of collective farming and by the remnants of it in the form of cooperative services.

Roles Collective Farms May Play in Future Economic Development

Future agriculture will most probably be agriculture of large holdings or production units. As forms of future agriculture we can suggest large private commercial farms, agricultural corporations, collective or cooperative farms, and state farms. The first form is similar to industrial organization, meaning large production units with skilled personnel, modern mechanical equipment, division of work and wages, separation of production work and the family household, etc. On such a farm, workers could be producers only or, at the same time, co-owners. But socialist or capitalist in its character, the farm would be organized as one big unit, a modern version of existing plantations and commercial farms. It may be that with a very high level of mechanization, such a farm could be operated by the family.

The second ideal type is the corporate farm. Family farms are integrated by one production plan. They could be supplied with raw materials and perform one stage in the production process. Processing, marketing, even some production functions like plowing or distribution of fertilizers, spraying, etc., would be performed by specialized units--cooperatives, state or private. Again, such a kind of organization could be socialist or capitalist, but it remains as the aggregate of individual family farms functionally linked by the division of work in the total production process. Most probably, this form will be dominant in the future. We could expect that corporate farming will be dominant in developed countries like the USA and Western Europe. Of course, the variations of general forms would be very numerous, with different levels of cooperative features, specialization of farms composing such units, and functions performed by integrating units. It is very probable that in Yugoslavia and in Poland the direction

of change will be the same, but of course all integrating units will have the character of cooperatives or state agencies and will be subordinated to the planned economy.

In other Eastern European countries, we could expect that both tendencies would be present. In some countries, we would expect state farming with some elements of participation of workers in the production decision and stronger elements of the interactive system in the global economic model. In other countries, existing collective farms will probably split in different directions. A smaller part of them will be transformed into some kind of big unit, very close to state farming in their organization. In the largest number, the individual plots will probably be extended and the principle of the family as the production group will be more conscientiously adopted. In consequence, the collective farms will change in the direction of the Hungarian model which is, in fact, very close to the model of the moshav.

In developing countries, most probably we will have a large number of state farms or cooperatives organized in the same way as state farms, particularly in countries where we already have or we will have in the future revolutionary changes of socialist, or partly socialist and partly nationalist character. In other countries, family farms may be integrated for a long time by cooperatives with the participation of governmental agencies or the state as co-owner or co-manager, but it is difficult to expect high levels of such integration. The form of corporate farming, or "manufacture-type" farming, is most probable in developing countries, but we could expect that those corporations would be cooperatives. The forms of transformation of production organization in agriculture will certainly be of a large variety, despite the same general direction of

change. Collective farming has its role in these transformations as a preparatory stage for private farming with strong beginnings of integration into large, corporate production units, as advanced forms of such units, and as transitional forms to industry-like farms, state or cooperative. In such cases, even if collective farms are to be transformed into state farms or "share stock businesses," they will keep some elements of their former organization, like democratic control, self-management, or participation of producers in decision-making. In this sense, collective farms are not only an important transitional stage of the transformation of peasant and family farming into modern, large-scale farming, but they introduce the general elements of the future organization of agricultural production.