STRIKING THE BALANCE

Assessing the USAID Office of Military Affairs, Its Senior Development Advisors, and the Agency's Integration of Civilian-Military Relations

Johanna Mendelson Forman, PhD

Consultant

A Revised Version of a Report Previously Submitted to the US Agency for International Development

January 19, 2011

Contents

Executive Summary 4

Introduction 11

The Purpose of This Assessment 13

Methodology 17

Current USAID Policy on Civilian-Military Cooperation 19

The Office of Military Affairs 22

Where Does OMA Fit?—and Other Issues 45

Conclusions: The Future of Civilian-Military Relations at USAID 50

Recommendations 53

Appendixes

A: Persons Interviewed for This Report 58

B: OMA Training—An Overview 62

C: SDA Activities by Command 65

A Note of Appreciation 81

About the Author 82

Executive Summary

The May 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS) provides the mandate for how USAID, along with the Department of State and the Department of Defense (DOD), must form a strategic alliance to use and integrate the different elements of American power. USAID is one of three national security agencies that have been charged with securing the United States' national interests in the complex world of the early 21st century. According to this "smart power" approach, international development is a strategic, economic, and moral imperative for the United States. And this approach is reinforced by the Presidential Policy Directive (PDD) on development, which links security and development through the alignment of USAID's interests with those of other agencies.

This paper examines the progress of the USAID Office of Military Affairs (OMA) and asks how effectively OMA contributes to the implementation of the NSS and whether the work of Senior Development Advisors (SDAs), who are deployed at six US Combatant Commands (COCOMs) and at the Pentagon, contribute to the Agency's integration of development capacity in security planning.

This paper suggests that how USAID relates to DOD is a larger and even an existential question that goes far beyond the specifics of whether to have an OMA or whether to send senior Foreign Service Officers (FSOs) to the COCOMs. The underlying question is one of USAID priorities, and how USAID, an agency strapped for resources and personnel, can strike the appropriate balance in its relationship with the military.

How does USAID as an agency meet DOD's increasing appetite for development expertise? This is the question that must be answered, looking to the Agency's current constraints, but also looking to the future and how USAID can leverage this demand into a win-win for USAID.

Specific caveats precede any conclusions about OMA or SDAs:

- USAID must articulate what it wants from its relationship with DOD.
- The OMA's effectiveness depends on the ability of USAID's leadership to articulate clear boundaries between civilian and military actors within the development space and shaping the agenda.
- The final Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) may change the findings of this report if a significant restructuring of USAID is envisioned.
- Today, USAID works closely with military counterparts through many offices in the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA). Civilian-

military relations are central to the work of the Office of Afghanistan and Pakistan Affairs (OAPA) and the Office of Iraq Reconstruction.

- The challenge today is that beyond these offices and programs, USAID's work on conflict prevention and management in what the military call a "steady state" is increasing as conflict prevention is tied to sustainable development policies. The US military is deeply engaged with this question of prevention, but it lacks the expertise to address it. It has turned to USAID as the government agency best able to collaborate in this expanding mission.

Conclusions

In the last decade, USAID and DOD have had overlapping missions that share more space in the global commons arising from transnational threats. Even more important is the reality that in the next decade, after the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are over, USAID's development mandate to manage stabilization and reconstruction will continue to grow.

Development assistance will be needed to help support institution building with governments and nongovernmental actors, and USAID will remain front and center in the larger mission of helping countries make progress on poverty reduction, food security, and improving the health and well-being of people around the globe. There will still be a military dimension to these missions as long as vulnerable nations present a threat to US national interests.

There are clear areas of alignment in the equities that USAID brings to the table with its expertise in stabilization and reconstruction, its expertise in global health, and its humanitarian and disaster assistance planning and rapid response capabilities. Defining how to work effectively with the military in these three areas will also create the conditions for encouraging greater collaboration on defining and managing conflict prevention, the steady state that certainly integrates security and development, and where USAID enjoys a great advantage.

USAID is also in a good position to create new partnerships with DOD in the area of technical innovation. The investments in science and technology that have been made by DOD can be applied to the resources already available to USAID to help jointly address problems such as energy security, climate change, and agriculture. USAID has long experience in translating advances in technology to its development projects on the ground.

The presence of SDAs in the COCOMs, the center of gravity and resources for military engagement around the world, gives USAID a good starting point for defining the civilian space and provides an excellent platform for USAID to shape the civilian-military relationship to better support the US government's development objectives. Removing the positions of

Senior Development Advisors from the COCOMs would send a powerful negative signal to the military that USAID is incapable of working in the interagency at this time.

The military's growing appetite for development expertise is clear in visits to the COCOMs. If USAID will not fill the gap in providing leadership in the areas of focus it dominates, then the military will. USAID cannot oversell its capacity; it is still a small agency recovering from almost a decade of budget and staff cuts. USAID can mange DOD's expectations if it clearly identifies its priorities for shaping the agenda. The Agency can do this by identifying future areas of engagement that can yield important partnerships that will not only benefit national security but also help the world's poorest people gain a better life by leveraging DOD's investments in new technologies and innovation.

Making the decision to continue SDAs will signal a willingness not only to collaborate but also, and more important, to strike a balance about how a civilian development agency can contribute to the United States' national security interest with its soft power. Militaries work only with other governments. USAID has the advantage of knowing how to work not only with governments but also with people—civil society, the private sector, and international organizations—all of which are players in the development community. In collaboration with the Secretaries of State and Defense, USAID can demonstrate that the civilian space for development remains just that—part of US soft power and part of the expertise that only a civilian agency can apply to the world's most vexing problems in the 21st century.

Recommendations

Strategic Issues

1. Civilian-military relations at USAID must be elevated to a top priority. As articulated in the NSS and the PDD, being part of a three-dimensional (3-D) approach requires innovation in the way USAID works.

2. USAID must strike a balance in its relationship with the military by shaping the way the military engages in matters where security and development must be aligned.

3. The NSS and the PDD on development keep the window open for USAID to set the priorities and boundaries for how it works with the military. This window will not stay open for long. Taking advantage of the opening will require USAID to make decisions now about the future of the civilian-military relationship. The need for effective cooperation between USAID and DOD will endure long after the wars in Central Asia and the Middle East have ended. A failure to set the parameters of the relationship will

only further weaken USAID's leadership position in the development arena because DOD will continue to move into this space.

4. There is a high demand for USAID's expertise among the COCOMs. They value the knowledge and advice that USAID can offer as they plan to support their own security agenda around the globe. While USAID has neither the staff nor resources to match the US military, it does have the know-how to prevent their short-term actions and projects from harming the broader US development mission.

Relations between USAID and DOD

1. USAID must have an office that serves as a point of entry for DOD.

2. Decisions about OMA's future, however, rest on the broader strategic question of what USAID leadership wants from the DOD relationship in terms of other Agency priorities.

3. OMA's effectiveness will also depend on whether the Regional Bureaus and Missions consider the relationship with DOD a priority in their day-to-day work.

4. Senior Development Advisors are representatives of USAID. They do NOT report to the military when posted at a COCOM. They report to the Administrator of USAID through the Director of the Office of Military Affairs.

5. Senior Development Advisors are a small expense in the context of USAID's total expenditures. The total cost in fiscal year (FY) 2010 was under $1.5 million. If all the positions were filled, the cost would rise to $2.6 million. Of this amount, almost $500,000 is reimbursed to USAID.

6. USAID needs more Development Advisors at the COCOMs and in the Pentagon at the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Office of the Secretary of Defense / Policy to manage the variety of policy-related issues that are raised on a daily. They must hold a senior rank because COCOMs value rank and access to decisionmakers as essential for the job. Today USAID's SDAs are not all from the Senior Foreign Service.

7. To meet the COCOMs' interagency needs, USAID should recruit SDAs from the roster of retired Senior FSOs. Their salaries could be covered by the COCOMs that want these advisors. Some in DOD have expressed a willingness to pay for these individuals. Alternatively, a way to utilize program funding should be authorized.

8. Deputy Development Advisors (DDAs) are also needed at some of the COCOMs. These individuals should be recruited from the midlevel ranks of the Foreign Service. They work under the guidance of an SDA. Experience in one COCOM demonstrates that

these individuals provide useful service to the military in planning exercises, implementing programs, working with USAID missions, and assisting the SDA with all the demands made of USAID at the COCOMs. Not all COCOMs will need DDAs, but at CENTCOM, the hub of operations for Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, and the rest of Central Asia, the DDA provides support to USAID's offices that work with the military in the field. This post must be retained.

9. In order of priority, DDAs are needed most at CENTCOM, PACOM, and AFRICOM. These COCOMs also represent geographic areas where USAID has a large mission field presence. A DDA can serve as an action officer, in support of the SDA. The learning experience from working at a COCOM is invaluable in an age of interagency cooperation. USAID could more easily cover the salary costs of a more junior officer.

10. Development Learning Initiative (DLI) personnel should all be required to rotate through a COCOM. Recent experience with these newest entrants to USAID has proven positive when sent on a rotation to a COCOM. Serving some time at a COCOM is part of the future, and provides an important learning experience for the individual. The DLIs are supervised by SDAs.

Management Questions

1. USAID should change the name of OMA to the Office of Civilian-Military Cooperation to more accurately describe its function.

2. Senior Development Advisors are a relatively low-cost way to ensure that USAID's voice is heard in the regional COCOMs. Retaining these positions is important for coordinating activities with USAID's fieldwork and for leveraging the resources of DOD's COCOMs to USAID's field missions.

3. Senior Development Advisor positions are unconventional posts. They are therefore not as highly rated for promotion in the USAID personnel system. This bias against these types of assignments needs to be addressed by USAID as part of its wider review of civilian-military cooperation policies.

4. USAID should ask DOD to pay for SDAs if there is no way to support these positions with program funds. The Administrator can request this through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Defense Secretary Robert Gates's commitment to support USAID can be demonstrated by this small investment in personnel to provide development expertise at the COCOMs.

5. SDAs should be recruited from retired senior FSOs and paid for with program funds. USAID should seek a waiver to use such funds or alternatively ask COCOMs to reimburse all or part of their salaries and other support costs to conserve operations and engineering (O&E) funding.

6. Keeping military Liaison Officers (LNOs) is also essential to the work of USAID. The presence of these individuals is dependent on USAID's continued agreement to support FSOs in the COCOMs.

7. Ending the isolation of OMA is essential. This is part of a larger question of how the DCHA Bureau can reduce its stove-piped approach so that the Bureau's work is integrated to focus on stabilization and reconstruction, humanitarian assistance and disaster preparedness, democracy and human rights, and conflict prevention, as well as better integrate its efforts with those of the rest of the Agency.

8. USAID must decide where OMA fits in its organizational structure. The current location in the DCHA Bureau needs review, although the operational nature of OMA's work supports it remaining in that Bureau. However, if OMA is to remain as part of the DCHA Bureau, it must be fully supported by both USAID and the Bureau with funding and personnel so that it can effectively carry out its role. The recent history has been that rather than supporting the work of OMA, the DCHA front office has continued to cut OMA's budget and has made staffing vacancies very difficult.

9. OMA is part of a holistic approach to USAID's ongoing need for a rapid response mechanism, of which USAID's relationship with DOD is essential not only in times of crisis but also in times when the Agency must function in regions that are potentially unstable. If DCHA is to be successful in this area, then keeping OMA as a hub for planning, training, and education must be part of a plan that integrates an understanding of civilian-military cooperation into USAID's work. Furthermore, USAID's capacity to respond to crises will require that the military LNOs and the SDAs are able to reach out to the rest of the Agency from a bureau whose core capacities are those related to crisis response, capacity building, and humanitarian assistance.

10. Other options for the office include putting OMA in the new Policy, Planning, and Learning (PPL) Bureau. It would allow for greater policy coherence with respect to civilian-military engagement. But it would not have the operational reach back to the USAID missions, or to the geographic bureaus needed to achieve effective civilian-military cooperation throughout the Agency.

11. An independent OMA staff could work if it received adequate human resources and was supported as a priority by USAID leadership. However, this would likely exacerbate rather than solve the problem of OMA isolation, because being an independent office does not currently lend itself to integration with other offices throughout the Agency.

12. If OMA remains in DCHA, the position of a politically appointed Deputy Assistant Administrator (DAA) for Civilian-Military Relations should be created. It would send a powerful signal to DOD that USAID is committed to engagement with DOD. This DAA would also oversee the Office of Civilian Response Corps.

13. OMA's structure would include an Office Director and two deputies. A political appointee would serve as director. A Senior FSO would serve as one deputy. A senior military officer seconded from DOD would serve as the second deputy.

14. A restructured OMA would need a staff representative assigned to the new PPL Bureau.

15. A Senior Advisor for Civilian-Military Cooperation should be selected to work directly for the Administrator and Deputy Administrator to ensure the mainstreaming of USAID's evolving work with the military into all functional and regional bureaus. This individual would also serve as a liaison with the Agency Counselor and Counselor for Innovation.

16. OMA's training functions should become a priority. To do this, OMA must be funded so that all parts of USAID understand how to work with the US military. Training for the military about USAID, including training in using valuable assessment tools, continues to bring resources to USAID and greatly facilitates civilian-military cooperation.

Introduction

USAID is one of three national security agencies that have been charged with securing the United States' national interests in the complex world of the early 21st century. Along with the US military, international development is a tool that helps the nation manage threats, work with friends and allies, and prevent deadly conflict. According to the NSS of May 2010, the United States' engagement in this strategic environment "will depend upon the effective use of and integration of different elements of American power. . . . Our diplomacy and development capabilities must help prevent conflict, spur economic growth, and strengthen institutions of democratic governance."[1]

International development is also a strategic, economic, and moral imperative of the United States, and a core pillar of its national security mission, as the newly issued Presidential Policy Directive on development proclaims.[2] This message was made clear when Secretary of State Hillary R. Clinton noted that development, like diplomacy, "is central to advancing American interests—our approach is not, however, development for development's sake; it is an integrated strategy for solving problems."[3] This approach integrating development and diplomacy now defines how USAID should operate in a perfect world. The challenge of implementing this approach for USAID, however, is that its limited financial and human resources must be allocated in such a way as to leverage its most valuable asset—deep knowledge of good development practices, and capable staff members who can guide the interagency effort, but particularly DOD, on how security and development are intertwined.

This is an existential moment in USAID's 50-year history. The Agency has been challenged during the last decade in many ways. It has faced a depletion of senior development experts, and its mission has been chipped away by the creation of competing US government initiatives—the Millennium Development Corporation; the Global Fund for AIDS, TB and Malaria; the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief; and the Office of Conflict, Reconstruction and Stabilization at the Department of State—to name just four. The challenge for USAID is how it can strike a balance in its

---

[1] *National Security Strategy of the United States*, May 2010, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/rss_viewer/nationa_security_strategy.pdf. The document goes on to emphasize the need to educate and "train our national security professionals to equip them to meet modern challenges, reviewing authorities and mechanisms to implement and coordinate assistance programs" to what the future of integrated, whole of government is about."

[2] USAID Fact Sheet, "USAID and the President's Global Development Policy" September 22, 2010.

[3] Secretary of State, Hillary R. Clinton, Speech at Council on Foreign Relations, September 8, 2010, Washington, D.C., accessed at http://www.cfr.org.

relationship with the military. USAID can shape how the military engages in matters where the interests of both USAID and DOD align on security and development.

DOD is vital to USAID's long-term survival because our military engagement around the world has involved more interaction with local actors and communities. Cooperation between USAID field programs and those of each of the COCOMs will become a larger part of future civilian-military relations in the developing world. Resources for development-related activities will also be a component of each of the COCOM budgets. Beyond the work in stabilization and reconstruction DOD's growing emphasis on "steady state" environments intersects with USAID's mission of conflict prevention and support for democratic governance programs. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has been a strong ally in trying to restore the balance between civilian and military roles in international development. He reiterated the need to work together when he spoke of a greater commitment for the "soft power" tools of diplomacy, economic assistance, institution building and communications. "We must focus our energies beyond the guns and steel of the military, beyond just our brave soldiers, sailors, marines and airmen. . . . We must focus our energies on the other elements of national power that will be so crucial in the years to come."[4]

USAID has reached a historic opening in its relationship with DOD. As Secretary Gates and military commanders in the field all recognize, USAID is seen as the leader when it comes to having the requisite expertise in development in countries of strategic interest. However, if USAID does not assert its leadership in development at the COCOMs, at its field missions, and at its headquarters, it risks being marginalized by DOD's overwhelming resources. DOD is already supporting contractors with development backgrounds to supplement their personnel working in regions where stabilization and reconstruction programs are seen as an integral part of DOD regional strategies.[5]

How USAID engages with DOD's ever-growing demands for its skills and expertise in development will determine its future trajectory. OMA and the Senior Development Advisors and military liaison officers who serve the Agency are very much a central theme in this story of how to achieve an appropriate balance and align interests.[6]

---

[4] Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, November 26, 2007, speech at Kansas State University.

[5] Christian Hougen, *DoD Contractor Involvement in the Provision of Development Assistance: Driver, Trends, Commentary*, internal PowerPoint USAID Presentation, 2010.

[6] See Gerald Hyman, *Foreign Policy and Development: Structure, Process, Policy and the Drip-by-Drip Erosion of USAID* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2010).

The Purpose of This Assessment

The purpose of this paper is to examine the progress of the Office of Military Affairs in achieving its goals and objectives and in carrying out its mandates and functions. In addition, it examines how effectively OMA contributes to implementing the new NSS and whether there are other, less costly, alternatives for achieving these objectives. This paper thus considers how effectively OMA is integrating the development capacities of the US government with security planning. As part of this exercise, the paper also reviews the work of OMA's field employees, the Senior Development Advisors who work for USAID at five Geographic COCOMs and one functional COCOM in the United States and Europe. Finally, it also addresses how SDAs and their military counterparts, the military LNOs, which USAID receives in exchange for these civilian development advisors, are operating inside the Washington headquarters.

Several caveats about this report need to be stated up front:

First, assessing OMA begs the larger question of what USAID wants from its relationship with DOD. If this question remains unanswered, it is difficult to evaluate how effectively OMA is achieving its goals. Over the years several offices of USAID have developed effective working relationships with the military. Specific policy guidance about the implications of these arrangements has not been available, nor has there been any evaluation of what USAID's equities are in working with DOD. Is USAID an enabler of DOD engagement in a region? Or is USAID working with DOD in order to leverage its own resources with those of DOD to advance regional strategies that articulate the development agenda. To date, there is no clear expression of USAID's expectations from DOD, except to note that the Civilian-Military Cooperation Policy of 2008 only suggests that the Agency embrace a "whole-of-government" approach to shared policy goals: humanitarian relief efforts, counterterrorism, and reconstruction and stabilization efforts.[7] OMA was created to respond to a growing realization that development skills were integral components of preventing and managing conflict, stabilizing and reconstructing countries during and after conflict, and ultimately helping nations achieve long-term development goals.

[7] USAID, "Civilian-Military Cooperation Policy at USAID," July 2008, PD-ACL-777.

Second, considering only OMA's effectiveness, as measured by whether it meets its stated objectives, fails to get at USAID's need to finally develop a cohesive approach to managing its civilian-military relationships. The real issue at USAID was identified in a report prepared for the new Barack Obama administration in 2009 that identified the unease that characterizes the Agency's relationship with DOD, in spite of almost a decade of closer working relationships in the field. Specifically, it revealed that many inside the Agency are unsettled about the civilian-military relationship and the changes it implies for USAID's responsibilities in development. It also discussed many legitimate concerns with the expanding role of DOD in humanitarian assistance and stabilization and reconstruction that have been voiced by international nongovernmental agencies (NGOs) and development specialists. It recommended that USAID would need to formulate clear boundaries between civilian and military actors within the development space and shape the agenda.[8] Defining these boundaries is essential; however, USAID is also limited by the asymmetry of resources—human and financial—that civilian diplomacy and development organizations have at their disposal in comparison with DOD.

Third, the name "Office of Military Affairs" does not reflect OMA's mandate, which is to engage and coordinate USAID's development agenda in areas where the interests of security and development coincide. A USAID office that promotes improved civilian-military relations to support improved interagency coordination is more than a place that engages only with the military. Thus, renaming OMA the "Office of Civilian-Military Cooperation" is essential to reflect the role it plays in providing expertise on the Agency's development mission to DOD and helping align the US government's security and development efforts.

Fourth, this review cannot answer the bigger philosophical question that USAID must face: whether its relationship with DOD becomes a priority throughout the Agency, or whether it is confined to those bureaus that are most heavily engaged in the space it shares with the missions of the military in humanitarian assistance, stabilization and reconstruction, dealing with criminal networks and their impact on governance, supporting global health initiatives through training missions and pandemic response and HIV/AIDS efforts, security sector reform, countering terrorism, dealing with violent

[8] USAID, *Civilian-Military Relations: An LTL Strategies Study Group, Consensus Report, 2009.*

extremism, conflict prevention, and collaboration with and support for NGOs in the field.[9]

Fifth, USAID's leadership must be clear that the main objective for the relationship is to help achieve the US government's foreign policy and national security goals as articulated by the NSS. If that is not the underlying assumption of the work USAID is doing, then looking at OMA in isolation does not resolve the initial question of what USAID thinks it wants from DOD now and in the future.

Sixth and finally, this report was completed before the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) was released. The QDDR, which included USAID participation, is expected to make many recommendations on how to reform civilian capacity at both the Department of State and USAID to meet current diplomatic and development priorities. Current and future global challenges will continue to require a mix of both DOS and USAID personnel. In developing a holistic approach to civilian power, the work already started by the placement of USAID Senior FSOs with COCOMs will certainly be part of any new design, as will the presence of military LNOs at USAID.

Today, OMA is the primary interface with DOD at USAID. But USAID lacks a consensus on how to shape its relationship with DOD because the within the development community there is still reluctance about how to put into practice the linkages between security and development. In addition, the Agency is also divided between those offices that work closely with DOD and those regional bureaus and field missions that are less familiar with the scope of military programs that are closely aligned to their own work in governance and socio-economic well-being. Thus, the work of OMA becomes more challenging in trying to serve as a point of entry for DOD. This review has concluded that:

1. OMA has been effective and successful in bringing a development perspective to the interagency table, especially by deploying Senior Development Advisors to six of the COCOMs and to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

---

[9] Interaction and the US Institute of Peace, *Guidelines for Relations Between U.S. Armed Forces and Non-Governmental Humanitarian Organizations in Hostile Environments, s/n.* This is an important effort to reconcile the needs of two different communities concerned with appropriate relationships in nonpermissive environments.

2. OMA continues to help identify and use USAID development expertise to influence the actions of the military through its participation in military planning, and its review of military policies that have direct consequences for USAID programming in the field.

3. The strong and collaborative relationship that has emerged out of OMA's work with DOD lays a foundation for deeper thinking by USAID's staff about the boundaries of this relationship.

4. OMA has reinforced the view among senior military leaders that USAID's expertise in development is essential to inform the work of DOD in its expanded mission of conflict prevention and stabilization and reconstruction around the globe. This is done through the SDAs and also by having the military LNOs present inside the Agency.

5. Some parts of USAID are already deeply engaged with military planners and with operations in the field through offices like OAPA, the Office of Iraq Reconstruction, the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI), the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), the Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM), and the Office of Democracy and Governance. In addition, key USAID missions around the world are working closely with DOD. For example, in Colombia, the Philippines, Indonesia, Yemen, Sri Lanka, Djibouti, Liberia, and Pakistan, there are ongoing working relationships whereby USAID staff work together with members of the US military on a daily basis. The most visible examples include the missions and Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan and Iraq, and also the District Support Teams in Afghanistan.

6. OMA is a starting place for the military when it comes to learning more about how international development works, and in particular, how USAID's programs and resources remain the most essential part of the United States' soft power tool kit. The Agency's record of institution building, finding economic-centric development solutions, and working with civil society groups, the business community, and national governments underscores the salience of development skills for ensuring success in a world where transnational threats present the greatest challenges to America's security.

Methodology

The research for this report was undertaken in a short time frame, from July to October 2010, and involved visits to each of the US COCOMs where USAID has or had a Senior Development Advisor. I was able to interview close to 100 individuals about the work of OMA and the SDAs (see Appendix A). Had I not traveled to all the COCOMs and met with the SDAs, my understanding of their job and its relationship to USAID's engagement with the military would not have included an important part of the story. This field experience informed my thinking about the relationships between headquarters and the field, and about USAID and DOD. These visits with SDAs and their colleagues underscored the important work they perform on behalf of USAID in the field. The visits also revealed the challenges these individuals face in performing their jobs in places where those involved in the civilian interagency effort are greatly outnumbered. Yet my interviews also yielded a sense of DOD's deep appreciation for the work performed by the SDAs and their impact on the daily decision-making that affected the development work of USAID.

For this report, I also reviewed materials provided to me by USAID: government reports, internal reports, and unpublished materials that discussed the work of USAID and its SDAs. Interviews at the COCOMs, at the Pentagon, at USAID, and at the Department of State all contributed to my understanding of the issues pertinent to OMA and its relationship with DOD. I was able to meet with all current SDAs, and I interviewed almost every individual who had served in that position during the last two years. I was not able to interview all former military LNOs. But I did meet with each LNO who is currently serving on the OMA staff in Washington and also several former LNOs.

At the COCOMs, I spoke with a large number of military officers who had daily interactions with USAID's representatives, and they provided me with a more specific picture of the work performed by USAID staff, and the value added to the work of the COCOM. Although the evidence collected is mostly anecdotal, the interviews conducted at each of the COCOMs presents a very concrete picture of achievements by SDAs. It also supports the view that, at this point in history, military commanders highly value the presence of expert advice on development. This high esteem for

development expertise can be leveraged by USAID to help the Agency gain greater support for its unique role in development at the interagency level.

Those 10 USAID Mission Directors that were contacted in the course of the research for this report who had experience working with the military, especially in Africa and Central Asia, also helped to inform the discussion about the value of Senior Development Advisors. Many of the USAID field missions already had civilian-military working groups that helped coordinate country development programs with the military group programs. These conversations were helpful in confirming the role that OMA played in leveraging DOD resources and providing guidance on how to respond to military initiatives from the various COCOMs.

Current USAID Policy on Civilian-Military Cooperation

USAID has come a long way in the last decade in working toward a policy that addresses civilian-military cooperation. The 2008 USAID policy is a step forward, but it leaves much unspecified. It does not include the specific setting of priorities. It mentions areas of programmatic intersection, but it does not spell out what USAID wants out of this relationship, except "coordination of both agencies." Without a clear vision of what USAID hopes to get from this relationship now and in the future, it will be hard to determine how USAID's role as part of the national security architecture is made a priority. Some key sections of this policy are noted in Figure 1.

Figure 1. "Civilian-Military Cooperation Policy at USAID," July 2008, PD-ACL-777

- **Purpose**
    - USAID is the "primary resource for expertise in international development."
    - USAID seeks to influence the development dimensions of DOD strategic plans and implementation activities.
    - Comparative advantage.
    - Field presence in 83 countries.
    - Skilled professionals in humanitarian assistance and development.
    - These assets must be better utilized to help further the overall national security objectives of the United States.

- **Guiding Principles**
    - Cooperating with DOD will not divert USAID resources away from its development mission.

- To ensure successful outcomes, USAID will "strive to ensure that solutions for short-term objectives are consistent with long-term goals."

- **<u>USAID Roles and Responsibilities</u>**
  - **Section 5.5 -** This policy recognizes that coordination with the DOD is one aspect of USAID's vital role in US national security, but it reiterates that DOD should not substitute for civilian capacities.
  - **Section 5.3 -** Discusses how civilian-military cooperation will take place at many levels, and it blesses the LNO and SDA concept:

    At a regional level, USAID will exchange officers with all appropriate Geographic Combatant Commands, and place Senior Development Advisors within the Combatant Commands to improve coordination and communication to promote program synchronization and effectiveness. In the field, USAID staffs collaborate with US military officials at post to develop integrated approaches to country-specific security and development challenges. At headquarters, USAID will coordinate with DOD representatives through Principals' Committees, Deputies Committees, or other regional and functional Policy Coordinating Committees, among other fora.

DRAFT
As of: 22 October 2010



The Office of Military Affairs

History

The Office of Military Affairs was created in 2005 as the primary point of contact with DOD. It is housed in the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance. It responds to the National Security Strategy's requirement that international development must be a strong partner with diplomacy and defense in achieving national security. It was established with four goals:

- Raising the profile of development and USAID in support of national security goals.
- Improving USAID's relationship with DOD.
- Making effective use of USAID and DOD funds and resources to help meet development goals.
- Encouraging the use of USAID's resources to improve civilian-military coordination and cooperation.

Former USAID Administrator Andrew Natsios was instrumental in establishing OMA. He recognized the need to synchronize military activities in nonpermissive environments like Iraq and Afghanistan with USAID programs that focus on stabilization and reconstruction. It was a logical manifestation of a growing reality: Security and development are two sides of a coin. Without security, there is no development; and without continued development, stability is not likely to be sustained. This reality was further brought home when Natsios noted that 60 percent of USAID missions were either in states recovering from conflict or on the verge of failing, or they were in fragile states that needed development expertise to prevent conflict. Many of these countries were home to what the economist Paul Collier has called the "bottom billion," the poorest part of the world's population, who have been condemned to living in countries where the internal cycle of conflicts undermines developmental gains.

Natsios chose a former military officer, Col. (ret.) Michael Hess, the DCHA Assistant Administrator, to set up OMA and help formalize relationships with DOD. OMA did not receive a wide vetting within the Agency. As one former employee recalled, many inside the Agency thought that OMA was a "bad dream" and would ultimately disappear. It was an outlier from the rest of the USAID regional bureaus and missions. Regional Assistant Administrators had little interest in OMA, and they looked at its leadership with suspicion. A retired colonel, Tom Baltazar, headed OMA from early 2006 until March 2009.

OMA was conceived to be more like a military office, starting with its name. Hess and Baltazar created three focus areas: Interagency Planning and Policy Development, Operations, and Training and Education. OMA still has these divisions today, although their functions have evolved during the past five years. The original staffing was not drawn from inside USAID but from outside the Agency. It included retired military and personal services contractors, and a political appointee. Col. Baltazar also reached out to the geographic COCOMs in 2006 to have USAID representatives working together with the military. The first personal services contractor to hold a Senior Development Advisor slot, William Anderson, was sent to EUCOM.

Inside USAID, the placement of SDAs at the different COCOMs and at the Pentagon was seen as a way to make sure that development interests around the world would be understood and supported in light of the military's expanding interest in linking their security mission with development, especially in countries where reconstruction and stabilization efforts were under way.

Military commanders saw a growing need to have development experts serve side by side with their planning teams to demonstrate that the military was thinking of how to build long-term capacity. The creation of the SDA position was a response to this need, but the exchange of military LNOs with USAID was something that was negotiated by USAID in 2006. Each COCOM had a separate arrangement with the Agency. Whether this need has actually been met still requires additional analysis since the USAID response to supporting DOD with development advisors is relatively new. Views in this report reflect the information garnered from interviews at COCOMs and with USAID staff. (See Chart on office organization and staffing.)

The SDA arrangements are generally based on formal memorandums of understanding with the COCOMs, although the early administration of these positions was more ad hoc than formal. Unfortunately, many of the early agreements made between the COCOMs and USAID were not always well executed. In one case, there is still no agreement in place, and this is symptomatic of the ad hoc fashion in which the office took shape. Interviews conducted with some of the first SDAs confirmed this management gap.

After the departure of Col. Baltazar in March 2009, the office suffered from a lack of leadership, and in fact it was run by an FS-3 for more than seven months. It was not until Elena Brineman, a Senior FSO, arrived in the fall of 2009 that OMA began to develop renewed direction and a vision of how to move forward. After a year of effort, she has started to set OMA on a path that makes it a more coherent part of USAID's coordination with DOD. She has also made progress in integrating OMA's work with that of the wider Agency community. She has been able to support the SDAs in the field, create a viable training program that reaches out to the military and has instituted training for USAID employees. She has also recruited staff to fill vacancies inside the Washington office. Because of her experience at USAID, she has ensured that the newest entrants to USAID, the Development Learning Initiative (DLI) personnel, have an opportunity to rotate through OMA, thereby educating them on civilian-military engagement.

Brineman has added the following objectives for OMA and USAID Civilian-Military Cooperation in support of development:

- Align US development objectives and US security objectives as appropriate to unify efforts and maximize synergies in support of higher levels of the US government's national interests.
- Ensure that DOD takes the development situation, challenges, and principles into consideration in military planning and operations.
- Ensure that US and coalition partner military operations enhance, rather than undermine, US-supported development, stabilization, or assistance efforts (both those of USAID and other agencies).

- Integrate US security assistance and USAID's stabilization and development cooperation programming as appropriate to support aligned objectives.

In the last year, there has been a vast improvement in the vision and understanding of how to better align USAID's and DOD's efforts and how to integrate the work of USAID into military doctrine and policy through OMA's efforts. Successes in this area include:

- Helping to define the space for USAID, thus presenting a unified application of the elements of national power as defined by the recent NSS.
- Reorienting the OMA vision and activities in fostering civilian-military cooperation to better support development.
- Participating in the establishment of the 3-D planning group with interagency representatives from the Department of State and DOD to further deepen a "whole-of-government" approach.
- Providing access to civilian skills by identifying how the nonmilitary tools that USAID has developed can be applied to the specific problems that all face in countries of strategic interest.
- Giving voice to development expertise by SDA reviews of projects proposed by DOD at the COCOMs that could compromise development efforts. The SDAs are the face of USAID at the COCOMs. The COCOMs are the first line of military strategic operational planning.
- Using military LNOs at USAID with their counterparts in regional bureaus and the SDAs in the COCOMs to help support country programs where the alignment of security and development opportunities are identified and implemented
- Ensuring that USAID a seat at the interagency table on policy issues that directly affect the civilian-military engagement in the field, such as the DOD Guidance for the Employment of the Force (GEF), the Theater Campaign Plan (TCP), the Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDACA) policy, and other policy and planning issues at the Pentagon and at the COCOMs.

- Participating in annual planning exercises for the TCP, and programming DOD humanitarian and civic assistance—bringing others from the Agency to the COCOMs.
- Supporting requests from the COCOMs to USAID regional bureaus through outreach to these offices and their field missions and vice versa.
- Active participation in Haiti earthquake crisis response and capturing lessons learned.
- Training for the US military and civilians deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan, and using USAID-developed frameworks to educate civilian and military field work concerned with stabilization, conflict mitigation, and conflict drivers.
- Getting DOD resources to continue tool development for field-based stabilization assessments used to support planning and metrics.

Today, OMA's focus is driven by the complex strategic environment in which security and development are so intimately linked. It is organized to optimize the unique development expertise of USAID to shape cooperation in steady state, prevention, stabilization, transition, reconstruction, and humanitarian assistance activities to strengthen host nation effectiveness. To achieve this mission, OMA is still organized into four areas:

1. Policy: Assistance, Partnering, Roles, and Responsibilities
2. Planning
3. Operations
4. Training and Education.

However, today the OMA Office Director and her teams have also identified major lines of effort that integrate these four functional areas to support the achievement of US development and national security interests. For example, the Training and Education Team—which has facilitated training for the US Marine Corps, the US Army, and the US Navy—is also linked to OMA's Operations Teams, which connect the COCOMs and the SDAs. OMA's training component in 2010 leveraged $1.6 million in DOD funding to support Stability Operations training for DOD and for

USAID civilian teams deploying to Afghanistan. This suggests that the demand for training based on USAID products could generate even greater amounts of funds for OMA if there were more staff and the entire training operation received greater USAID internal support. (See Appendixes B and C for detailed information on OMA's training efforts.)

To better integrate OMA with the rest of USAID, OMA has formed teams assigned to support each regional bureau and its respective COCOM(s). The teams are made up of OMA Plans staff, the SDA and DAA in the COCOM, the LNO from the appropriate COCOM, and one or more representatives from the respective regional bureaus. Teams have also been formed to backstop the SDAs in Special Operations Command and the Joint Staff with representatives from OMA Plans, the SOCOM LNOs, and pertinent DCHA offices or the PPL Bureau, as appropriate, to deal with crosscutting issues or policy questions. This two-way exchange helps integrate the geographic COCOMs with their respective bureau, and also helps integrate crosscutting issues through this regular exchange of information and people. All this helps to connect OMA with the Agency's geographic bureaus, and it also links the military LNOs and the field-based SDAs to headquarters. This team approach has affected OMA's ability to attract DOD funds to USAID. For example, OMA has helped channel $200 million in Section 1207 funding to address priority unanticipated needs in reconstruction, stabilization, and security. OMA staffs at CENTCOM and in Washington have helped to develop some quality controls to guide the implementation of the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) in Iraq and Afghanistan. At CENTCOM, one colonel in the budget office told me that she would never go to a meeting on this subject without the presence of USAID's SDA to advise the COCOM on good development practices to use in programming rapid response funding.

Despite these efforts to work in teams over the last year, OMA remains isolated from the rest of USAID. Part of OMA's isolation reflects a wider disconnect between DCHA and the USAID regional bureaus. Also, this isolation is a reflection of how conflicted the regional bureaus are about working with the military, in spite of the NSS's mandate requiring a 3-D approach as a pillar of US engagement around the world. With so many in DCHA united only by what the USAID website describes as "crosscutting" issues, it is difficult for OMA to be seen as anything but another part of the mix of small and stove-piped fiefdoms—offices that want to have their own

relationship with DOD rather than working through a central operating point.[10] This is regrettable, because it is important for USAID to have a central point of entry for DOD at a time when DOD openly acknowledges its growing involvement in development programs and issues.

With USAID as its main partner in the field, DOD is supporting programs that really require the types of expertise that only USAID can now provide. An example is the DOD planning process, which now requires USAID's concurrence on major policy documents, such as the Guidance for Employment of the Force, a semiannual review of strategic employment of US military power. The SDA assigned to the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the Pentagon has played a significant role in giving USAID a voice at DOD, but especially by bringing USAID's assets to complement the mix of military capabilities.

Gaps in the Program

OMA faces both gaps and challenges in driving the coordination that is required of USAID in the ever-expanding shared space it occupies with DOD. There are gaps in staffing, funding, partnering, and planning. Administrative barriers further complicate USAID's effective relationships with the military. For example, it still needs a common vocabulary to understand how its work relates to the short-term interests of the military. There are issues to be resolved about the military's great need for secrecy versus USAID's more open and transparent manner of dealing with on-the-ground projects. Communications must be fluid. Coordination on the ground must be improved. Much depends on how USAID's missions engage with the military groups in their respective embassies. Many of these gaps in working with DOD are not new inside the Agency, but they become more apparent as OMA works to bring the interagency together:[11]

- The Agency must commit dedicated resources to OMA's training activities.

---

[10] Other offices include the Office of Transition Initiatives, Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation, Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, Food for Peace, Office of Civilian Response, and Office of Democracy and Human Rights. These offices all have relationships with DOD, but only OMA provides the Agency with an integrated approach to addressing specific elements of civilian-military cooperation.
[11] USAID, *USAID's Role in Civil/Military Cooperation in Asia and the Middle East: An Assessment of Programmatic Implications and Lessons Learned, Report on Phase I*, November 2009. In this report, the conclusions reveled that "the understanding of Agency assigned roles by civilian and military actors in development differ from those outlined in the Agency policies" (p. 11).

- The DCHA bureau must fill existing vacancies in Washington and the COCOMs.
- Military LNOs need training about how USAID works—that means "USAID 101," so they will be best able to contribute to the demands placed on the office by DOD and by other civilian agencies.
- OMA's outward-looking approach to providing support to DOD must be complemented by internal support for USAID that resolves conflicts over what offices do individually with their military counterparts. OMA has an important role to play in helping to coordinate and synchronize joint efforts between USAID and DOD so that there is a central entry point for military engagement.
- OMA's isolation within the Agency and within the bureau reflects a problem of a lack of integration of USAID programs that directly engage with the military, even in the DCHA bureau.
- OMA's lack of program resources is a disadvantage. It prevents OMA from being able to support civilian-military cooperation models at USAID Missions. For example, with program funds OMA could help USAID Missions establish and fund civil-military working groups that would receive training and have a small grants fund to leverage DOD resources at the country level.
- There is a growing demand from DOD for coordination with USAID, but there is insufficient capacity to respond.
- OMA's services must be integrated into USAID's geographic bureaus. This will require a mandate from the Administrator, but it will also require the will to make it happen.
- There is a need to gain support for OMA's work in each USAID regional bureau and in the DCHA bureau to enable OMA to become the face of USAID at the Pentagon and at the COCOMs.
- Standard administrative and classified communications systems need to be put in place that can function across agencies and facilitate working together, closing an important gap in civilian-military communication.

Finally, OMA can help USAID's new programs that are focused on innovation, science, and technology. DOD has huge amounts of research and development money.

USAID would benefit from creating a working partnership with those DOD offices that are engaged in creating new technologies for the field. Many of the projects being undertaken by these DOD offices have important applications for development—especially in the areas of renewable energy, health care delivery, and even agriculture. USAID should seek out these types of partnerships with the military that could lead to the creation of pilot projects to serve the citizens of many countries.

Senior Development Advisors

The Senior Development Advisors serve on the front lines of USAID's interagency relationship with the Geographic COCOMs. They are the field representatives of OMA. They report to the USAID Administrator through the OMA Director and not to the commanding officer of the COCOM where they are stationed. The FSOs who hold these posts (and the first incumbents who were personal services contractors but had served at the highest levels of USAID) are highly valued by the military. They are considered essential to the military's implementation of a 3-D national security policy.

The SDA position is new. It has had only nine incumbents, and most of the SDAs have been in place fewer than two years. On the basis of interviews and reports prepared by former incumbents, what is clear, however, is that the presence of USAID officers in the COCOMs has had an overall positive impact on the broader objective of having an interagency voice at the largest and best-resourced US government agency. The COCOMs are where the action is in terms of bringing together strategic and tactical planning. They need the advice of USAID officers to guide them in the nuances of development, and how USAID's planning processes, time frames, and metrics relate to those of the military. Table 1 reveals that USAID is not alone in having representatives at the COCOMs. Having civilian agencies at the COCOMs is now part of a growing trend called "partnerships" that DOD is developing to have a full spectrum of civilian capacity available as needed.

Table 1. Representatives of the Interagency Cooperation Effort, by Command

	# of Reps	# Paid for by Agency	# Paid by Command	Cost to Command
AFRICOM	38	Per agreement	Most paid by COCOM	n/a
CENTCOM	13	2	11	n/a
EUCOM	8	1	7	n/a
PACOM	9	8	1	n/a
SOCOM	11	2	9	n/a
SOUTHCOM	25	15	10	n/a

Note: The numbers shown in this table are in addition to the ongoing work of OFDA. They also exclude the intelligence agencies and the State Department's political advisors.
Source: Based on queries to each COCOM and interviews with inter-agency representatives.

From interviews conducted at all the COCOMs and at the Pentagon, it is clear that USAID's SDAs are valued assets who have the advantage of expressing an independent voice in programming military assistance that overlaps with development, thus preventing such assistance from interfering with USAID's country objectives. More important, these SDAs have been able to leverage funds that complement USAID's programming across the board, thus combining USAID's strengths in training, capacity building, and stabilization and reconstruction programs with the military's skills and resources.

When the first SDAs were deployed to the COCOMs in 2006, OMA did not provide these professionals with adequate backstopping or supervision. In part, this was because those who managed the office were not familiar with USAID and were either new political or career civil service appointees. This situation was reversed when new office management arrived and an experienced FSO took over OMA in 2009. Today, SDAs are supported through Washington.

The original job descriptions for the SDA positions are generic. Although the work of each SDA varies from COCOM to COCOM, all possess the following expertise to perform their job. They must understand the principal strategic and development issues in the region of the particular COCOM. They should also have some exposure to working with the military or have attended one of the military universities that provide

better insight into military culture. They also need to hold a rank senior enough to work alongside the commander; they must be entrepreneurial in selecting what areas of engagement on which to focus; they must be able to work independently; they must be able to reach out to USAID field missions; they must have good management skills to bring together resources across agencies; they must be able to handle a broad range of development issues; they must have an in-depth knowledge of how USAID operates; and they must understand USAID's strengths and capacities so as not to overpromise and to oversell. Most important, they must represent and defend the equities of USAID to prevent military programs from undermining the US government's development work.

SDAs spend their days working on a wide range of USAID-related issues. A suggested division of labor showed the following time allocations: liaison and public contact at 40 percent, advice and guidance 30 percent, and policy development 20 percent. These breakouts do not accurately reflect the complexities of tasks or responsibilities that these individuals perform on a daily basis. The reality is that SDAs work closely with their counterparts at the COCOMs. They perform an outreach role to USAID missions in their COCOM regions on matters of specific country programming. They broker meetings between the USAID mission and the embassy military groups to help increase communication between USAID and the local military team to find ways to align objectives and leverage DOD's resources SDAs often travel with military officials from the COCOMs to different countries to help bring together the interests of each agency in the field.[12] There is a growing list of examples of how an SDA was able to work with USAID missions to bring military support to specific projects in a given country. (See Table 2, which illustrates how SDAs spend their time, based on a staff survey.)

On the basis of interviews at all COCOMs, the roles of SDAs in humanitarian and disaster planning are highly valued. Although OFDA sends representatives to all the geographic COCOMs with SDAs, OFDA's representatives are frequently away from the COCOMs managing complex emergencies in the field. Their primary role is that of responding to emergencies. SDAs are considered planners, so the COCOM turns to them for advice. This is why when queried about a real-time division of labor, some

[12] SDAs do not receive a travel budget from USAID. They depend on the COCOM to support their regional travel needs.

SDAs said they spent up to a third of their time in some COCOMs on planning and exercises dedicated to humanitarian assistance activities. The high demand at the COCOMs for humanitarian assistance planners is an ongoing priority, so they should be given the opportunity to gain familiarity and experience with the relevant issues. Recently, the Center of Excellence of PACOM, based in Hawaii, has been sending its disaster assistance staffers to positions at EUCOM, with proposals to fill positions at SOUTHCOM and other COCOMs as requested. This trend may suggest that OFDA, though valued, is too often unable to fulfill the COCOM's demands for planning. SDAs have filled this gap and have ensured that USAID has seat at the table in this critical area of civilian-military engagement.

Table 2. Cooperation and Engagement at COCOMs: How SDAs Spend Their Time (percent)

	Humanitarian/ Disaster	**Stability/Recovery**	**Global Health**	**Innovations**	**Conflict Mitigation**
AFRICOM	30	20	20	15	15
CENTCOM	15	35	0	35	15
EUCOM	28	16.5	16.5	7	32
PACOM	20	10	30	25	15
SOCOM	10	40	0	10	40
SOUTHCOM	20	15	15	35	15

Source: From a survey of staff conducted by author in October 2010

Unlike the political advisors (POLADs) sent to the COCOMs by the Department of State to work as advisors to the Commander, SDAs are agents of USAID. POLADS do not speak for the Department of State. SDAs are representatives of the Agency and support the headquarters and USAID field missions through consultations and direct engagement in the field, and by contributing to the military theater planning processes. Although much of the work is advisory, SDAs would not be effective if they had to give their advice long distance. This is confirmed by the growing presence of other civilian agencies that have advisors located at the COCOMs to represent their Agency in an

effort to achieve a "whole of government" or comprehensive approach to civilian-military engagement.

The growing appetite inside the COCOMs for development expertise is greater than any one person can handle. But even in the face of this demand, an effective SDA can help shape the agenda of the Geographic COCOM in such ways as to maximize USAID's contribution to the overall military planning and operations. What is important to recognize is that the tempo of military planning and operations is very different from that of USAID. An SDA can be very effective in helping translate these different time frames into effective and actionable programs that do not sacrifice long-term development objectives to short-term engagement by military missions in the field.

It is also apparent from visits to all the COCOMs that SDAs work with their military and civilian interagency counterparts in the COCOMs to help program large amounts of resources that DOD uses in the field. These resources can be dedicated to infrastructure, health care, security sector reform, conflict prevention, or humanitarian purposes. Finally, SDAs also help backstop the OFDA advisor at the COCOMs. This is important because frequently OFDA's representative is traveling or responding to a crisis. Back at the COCOM, the SDA helps fill the liaison function and reach back to USAID to support planning efforts for a given disaster.

The SDAs' work at the COCOMs varies depending on the region: All work with USAID country missions and regional bureaus of USAID. For example, there is a greater amount of work on conflict management and global health in AFRICOM. A USAID officer programs HIV/AIDS resources, and also works on transition planning and food issues and supports the OFDA representative on disaster planning. Alternatively, the CENTCOM SDA manages questions regarding the disposition of CERP funding for Afghanistan and Iraq, and works closely with the OAPA staff to help manage this complex security and development agenda. SOUTHCOM manages issues related to Section 1207 funding from DOD to USAID on matters of stabilization and reconstruction and conflict prevention; PACOM works on humanitarian assistance issues and on conflict prevention and mitigation, but has also been developing innovative responses to environmental challenges such as coral reef protection and maritime traffic. Like other COCOMs, SOCOM's global focus requires the SDA to be in touch with missions, regional bureaus, DCHA bureau offices, and the policy bureau. At

the Pentagon, the SDA is engaged in helping to ensure USAID's input into plans, the creation of new policy implementation rules, and working with others inside the Agency to gather views about the impact of these policies on development partners. Table 3 shows the presence of SDAs, DDAs, and USAID missions in the COCOM.

Military Liaison Officers

The presence of military LNOs at USAID arose out of the original negotiations with the COCOMs to send SDAs to the field. They are part of OMA's "Operations" focus because they bring together the daily work of USAID and the COCOMs through their role as interlocutors between civilian and military agencies. Today, LNOs from each COCOM serve at USAID in OMA. (The Special Operations COCOM has two officers.) One gap is that there is no LNO from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, something that would bring added value to the ongoing formulation of civilian-military space that is so dynamic and comes from decisions taken at the Pentagon.

LNOs are collocated with the civilian OMA staff. In addition to their responsibilities to represent the interests of their COCOMs, they have responsibilities to the regional bureaus, the Executive Secretary of USAID, and relevant offices that work closely with the military such as OTI, OAPA, OFDA, and to a more limited extent CMM. These military personnel are often lieutenant colonels, and they provide an effective mechanism for reaching back to their COCOMs. The LNOs work with the OMA Planning Team to provide guidance to USAID staff and other military officers, and their overall performance adds significant value to USAID's relationship with the individual COCOMs. During the Haitian earthquake crisis, for instance, they were instrumental in helping to arrange military transport for the USAID Administrator and in facilitating enhanced communication with the Pentagon and SOUTHCOM.

LNOs do not have training in development or experience working with program staff. They are quick to learn, but most would benefit from more preparation to understand the internal workings of USAID. They report to the OMA Office Director, but they also report to their command liaison office at the Pentagon. Although most of these individuals come from civil affairs backgrounds and often are military reservists, this group needs greater direction and initial training. As a group, they are hard workers and perform a wide range of services. They help to bring issues from the COCOMs to the attention of USAID offices through OMA. Their presence at USAID is

part of a deal that was made between USAID and the COCOMs to have SDAs in return for LNOs, and there is no cost to USAID for these slots because the positions are fully funded as billets through the respective COCOMs that these officers represent.

Where LNOs sit is important. They are really needed in two places: in OMA, but also in USAID's respective geographic bureaus. It would be very useful if those military officers assigned to USAID had two venues at USAID: one in OMA, and another in the front office of the geographic bureau that serves their COCOM. LNOs' presence in an Assistant Administrator's office suite would address some of the questions of the inadequate information about the work OMA is doing as it relates to USAID.

Table 3. COCOM Assets and USAID Representation

COCOM	SDA	DDA	USAID Mission/Rep Locations	USAID Non-Presence Nations
AFRICOM	YES	NO	Angola, Benin, Burundi, Central African Republic, Djibouti, East Africa (Kenya), Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Southern Africa (South Africa), Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, West Africa (Senegal), Zambia, Zimbabwe	Burundi, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Eritrea, Gabon, Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Lesotho, Mauritania, Mauritius, Niger, São Tomé & Príncipe, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Swaziland, Togo
CENTCOM	YES	YES	Afghanistan, Central Asian States (Kazakhstan), Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Middle East Regional Office (Egypt), Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Yemen	Iran
EUCOM	VACT	NO	Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Georgia, Kosovo, Lithuania, Moldova, Regional Services Center (Hungary), Macedonia, Romania, Russia, Serbia and Montenegro, Ukraine	
PACOM	YES	VACT*	Bangladesh, Cambodia, India, Indonesia, Mongolia, Nepal, Philippines, Regional Development Mission for Asia (Thailand), Sri Lanka, Timor L 'Este, Vietnam	Burma, China, Federal States of Micronesia, Laos, Papua New Guinea, Marshall Islands
SOUTHCOM	YES	NO	Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Central America Regional Office (El Salvador), Dominican Republic, Eastern Caribbean Regional Office (Barbados), Ecuador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti***, Honduras, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru	Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, Commonwealth of Dominica, Costa Rica, Cuba, Grenada, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
JFCOM	NO	NO		
NORTHCOM	NO	NO	Mexico	
SOCOM	YES	NO		
STRATCOM	NO	NO		
TRANSCOM	NO	NO		

* Position authorized but vacant; ** SOCOM forces operate in CENTCOM's area of responsibility. They are not allotted CERP funds anywhere other than Afghanistan or Iraq; *** Haiti, FY 2010, $455 million in Haiti Earthquake Response.

Source: Table prepared by OMA 2010.

The SDAs' Impact and Costs

For a relatively new position, the SDAs have made their mark as valued members of the interagency teams across all the COCOMs. The SDAs are viewed as individuals who have access to their leadership and can get things done or decided. For the military, whose operations tempo is much faster than USAID, getting answers quickly is highly valued. One consistent message I received when I raised the question about removing this position was best captured by a comment made by one flag officer I interviewed. He said: "If USAID abolishes such a position or an office, it will send the message that the 3-D approach advocated by the National Security Strategy is dead. . . . USAID will become a bureau of the Department of State." Although this may be hyperbole, the evolving role of the SDAs as important interlocutors between USAID and the military is well understood at the COCOMs.

The same sense of value for the position does not exist across the board inside USAID. Even though SDAs are doing an excellent job under the constraints of USAID's limited staff and diminished resources, the value added by those in this position is still misunderstood and underappreciated. There is a better sense of SDAs' worth at USAID's field missions, where they frequently help align the mission's interests with those of the military. In situations like these, the SDAs are very effective in bringing the civilian and military spheres together.

This report was commissioned because many inside USAID said that SDAs were an expense that was stressing an Agency already overwhelmed by so many demands on its resources. The real issue today is whether SDAs are a "luxury" USAID can ill afford to relinquish. What has emerged from weeks of interviews, discussions with in-house counsel, and with former assistant administrators, and other high-level USAID personnel is that the discussion of how to pay for SDAs in a period of tight budgets does not get to the more fundamental issue of what value added does USAID get for its investment in Senior FSOs working at COCOMs. As one former chief of staff told me, "it is only an issue of O&E if this is not a priority." For the record, the total annual costs of having six SDAs in the field are $1.5 million (FY 2010). (If all vacancies were filled, including both SDAs and DDAs, the total cost would be $2.6 million. This is quite a bargain. Specific examples of the value added that SDAs bring to USAID in each COCOM appears in Box 2.

Staffing Issues

There are three challenges to continuing these positions at the COCOMs. The first has been that those serving in the SDA positions are needed as Mission Directors in many countries because USAID faces a shortage of senior managers. The second has been about resourcing these slots from program funds, given the costs associated with sending individuals to COCOMs and the O&E that is required to support them in the field. The third has been whether the COCOMs would send military LNOs to USAID if the Agency were to remove funding for the SDA slots.

The first issue—that SDAs draw from the pool of senior managers needed to fill critical field mission posts—does not look to alternative ways to support senior-level advisors at the COCOMs. There is no reason why these positions could not be adequately filled by retired senior-level USAID officials who could easily serve advisory roles in COCOMs if funding were available. For the second issue, funding, finding the appropriate funds that could draw from program money would require a congressional waiver, but that does not seem as hard it sounds, given the primacy that the current presidential administration has placed on a "whole of government" approach to US national security interests. It is no secret that USAID lacks the resources to do everything it is asked to do. But in this area, there is a high level of interest in USAID playing a critical role in how the nexus of security and development are managed at the COCOM level.

If programmatic funds are not available at this time, at a very minimum, USAID could ask DOD to pay for the SDAs while some legislative waiver is created to help USAID fund these jobs at the COCOMs. A five-year waiver would allow USAID to regain some of its resources that are now being discussed as part of the QDDR. It would also allow for continuity of advisors without robbing different parts of the Agency's O&E. Because some might say it is almost impossible to get approval on such a waiver, a decision to continue SDAs using programmatic funding will require support from USAID's leadership, if it believes that these positions are vital to USAID's mission. It will need engagement from a wide range of actors on Capitol Hill who support the importance of civilian response to managing the rebuilding of countries like Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq after the US military draws down. These tasks will rely on civilians to manage stabilization and reconstruction efforts.

The third challenge USAID faces in making a decision about whether to eliminate SDAs relates to the negotiated agreements that the Agency has in place with the COCOMs for hosting military LNOs at the Agency. This quid pro quo arrangement is important in the development of operational civilian-military relations inside USAID. These LNOs are collocated with the civilian OMA staff, but their responsibilities are to support relations with the regional bureaus and relevant offices that work closely with the military, such as OTI, OAPA, OFDA, and, to a more limited extent, CMM. If USAID decides to eliminate the SDA positions, the COCOMs will withdraw their support for military LNOs.

The legalities of funding sources are issues best handled by the USAID Counsel. But it is also apparent that there has been a lack of political will and creativity to find alternative means to support such positions out of program funding. The USAID Administrator could request the funds needed to support an SDA in the field from DOD through the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Agency could also offer to share the costs by having DOD provide funds to cover non-salary O&E expenditures while USAID covers salaries. There are options.

Are there less costly alternatives to having an SDA at a COCOM? The final answer really depends on what USAID wants from the relationship with DOD. Until USAID identifies its comparative advantage—resources; field missions; knowledge of institutions; capacity building with civil society, the business community, and governments that complement the work of DOD—it will be hard to construct a short-term solution to a relationship that still requires greater vision and definition.

Finally, USAID must also consider how to treat SDA positions in terms of promotion inside the Foreign Service. Because SDAs are unconventional positions, they are not as highly rated for promotion in the USAID personnel system. This bias against these types of assignments needs to be addressed by USAID as part of its wider review of civilian-military cooperation policies.

Box 1. The SDA Value Added—What Does USAID Get for This Investment in Personnel?

The presence of Senior Development Advisors at the COCOMs and at the Pentagon is relatively new. Over the last two years these individuals have provided a service to USAID in terms of promoting and explaining USAID's core development mission to military planners who look to the Agency as a source of leadership in this field. Beyond mere advice, these USAID personnel are the interlocutors between the COCOM and USAID's field missions in each of the COCOM's area of operations. Specifically, SDAs perform the following functions:

- **Leveraging DOD resources in support of USAID projects around the globe by bringing together military assets to complement and enhance USAID development projects.**
- **Supporting planning for non-kinetic activities where USAID has assumed the civilian lead in supporting stabilization and reconstruction programs.**
- **Providing guidance to prevent DOD field operations – from medical missions, to infrastructure projects – from doing harm to ongoing development activities.**
- **Advising military commanders on how USAID's field work in social, economic and political/governance development contribute to the broader national security objectives that are also pursued by the COCOM.**
- **Operating at the highest level with COCOM Commanders to bring USAID's Missions into regional decision-making about security and development.**

Examples for the COCOMs

PACOM

- **Securing $7 million of DOD resources in support of our USAID Missions in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh for stabilization work.**
- **Overseeing implementation of a three-year USAID/DOD IAA which transferred $7.5 million to DOD for planning and training assistance in pandemic preparedness to militaries in the region. This assures synchronization with USAID pandemic preparedness activities focusing on the civilian side of host nation governments in the region.**
- **In Indonesia, coordinating DOD funding for construction of an IT training center where USAID support was provided to pay for teachers, training and equipment.**
- **Working with USAID and the Command to jointly support a Democracy Assessment in China.**
- **Preventing PACOM from constructing flood shelters on land where USAID had been developing land titling programs.**

SOCOM

- **Assisted USAID/Yemen to coordinate planning and implementation of complementary USAID/COCOM efforts in support of stabilization and economic development. Brokered SOCOM co-location of personnel with USAID to support the Yemen Mission's efforts in deepening coordination between Special Operations efforts and USAID programming.**
- **Brokered the sharing of SOCOM intellectual and technological resources to improve USAID frameworks for understanding illicit power structures and insurgencies.**
- **Contributed to Haiti post-earthquake response and recovery efforts by deploying the SDA to support civilian-military coordination on the ground for over two months as part of the larger US government disaster response.**

CENTCOM

- **SDA works as an advisor on the use of CERP funding, helping to navigate the planning and use of these funds in support of USAID's civilian mission in Afghanistan, Pakistan and previously in Iraq.**
- **The USAID Deputy Development Advisor oversees the J-3 "development support group" of 20-plus military and contract planners and "development advisors" engaged in programming and supporting development activities funded by DOD in Afghanistan.**
- **SDA is engaged with multiple US government agencies, USAID field missions and private groups as part of the "New Silk Road" economic development project, an interagency effort to promote stable conditions by enhancing regional investment and trade in the Afghanistan, Pakistan and Central Asian Republics region.**

EUCOM

- **Supported coordination between EUCOM and USAID Mission efforts in Serbia and in Kosovo to develop conflict prevention and stabilization activities.**
- **Supporting USAID Europe and Eurasia Bureau/EUCOM projects to coordinate measures of effectiveness in DOD – USAID programming and to align strategic planning.**
- **Brokered DOD construction money to enhance USAID teacher training efforts in Macedonia and to establish cooperative efforts on fighting corruption.**
- **Brokered direct DOD support to the USAID Mission in Azerbaijan to help pay for a water project that USAID was developing.**

AFRICOM

Note: The Command did not have a full time SDA from June 2009 to October 2010 because of delays in completing the last SMG process. A detailed USAID FSO has served as the AFRICOM Humanitarian and Health Activities Branch Chief over the past two years.

- **Helps Embassies and Missions bring military units (usually Special Operations units) together with USAID Mission staff to program DOD humanitarian and civic assistance activities in the region.**
- **Nigeria: USAID-funded interfaith and reconciliation center is being built with DOD resourced construction money.**
- **The trend this year has been for USAID Missions to push projects they want through USAID staff in AFRICOM and thus shape military construction and assistance in the field.**
- **USAID/Morocco's vocational education project is training trainers for youth unemployment and DOD is building the actual centers that will be equipped by USAID.**
- **Gender violence programming supported by USAID in the DRC is receiving DOD funds to help build clinics and safe houses for victims of sexual violence. Instead of the US military sending in medical teams for short-term work, the USAID advisor persuaded AFRICOM to do construction and let NGOs do the medium and long term care.**
- **AFRICOM funding for pandemic response is coordinated by USAID advisors in AFRICOM with the Global Health Bureau, USAID Missions in the region and the US military.**

SOUTHCOM

- **USAID ensured that medical ready exercises managed by the COCOM were sent to an area of high malnutrition and infant mortality in Guatemala, redirecting the military to a critical need.**
- **Ensures that Phase "0" military activities in the region do not undermine mission-related programs that have long-term development objectives**
- **Supports the ongoing humanitarian emergency in Haiti, and coordinates with the USAID Mission in Haiti to ensure that ongoing exercises support long-term vision of stabilization and reconstruction in Haiti.**
- **Ensures that the $400 million in counter-narcotics programming of SOUTHCOM is coordinated with USAID field missions to synchronize activities.**

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

- **Helped jointly develop DOD policy in the Pentagon which requires DoD to seek the concurrence of USAID Mission Directors on the use of DOD OHDACA (humanitarian and civic assistance) funding in the field, thus promoting coordination and preventing duplication of USAID field programs.**
- **Working on development of DOD implementation policy guidance for CERP funds in Afghanistan and Iraq.**
- **Supporting USAID policy work on the implementation of the National Security Strategy at the strategic level inside the Combatant Commands by reviewing guidance on interagency operations and frequently representing the Joint Staff on development related IPCs such as the one guiding development and implementation of the President's new Development Policy.**
- **Incorporated USAID input on DOD's highest level strategic planning policy document, the Guidance for the Employment of the Force, which provides each COCOM with end states and guidance for developing their Theater Campaign Plans (TCPs). The TCPs in turn guide programming of all military resources and assets used within the Areas of Responsibility of each COCOM.**

In sum, these specific examples reinforce the alignment of equities which USAID brings to the table in its expertise in stabilization and reconstruction, its expertise in global health, and its humanitarian and disaster assistance planning and response capabilities. Defining how to work effectively with the military in these areas, a role that each SDA does on a daily basis for USAID is essential to develop greater collaboration, resource leveraging, and civilian-military cooperation in the long-run. For a new program, SDAs have demonstrated that they not only represent the Agency at the COCOMs, but also provide much-needed resources to our field missions for development programs that support long-term goals.

Arguments to Continue the SDA Position

This report argues that SDAs serving at the COCOMs provide one essential piece of the engagement with the military that is laid out in the NSS. SDAs are independent of the military and receive their marching orders from the USAID Administrator, through OMA, and through close coordination with USAID Mission Directors and Regional Assistant Administrators. They act in the best interests of USAID. Here are additional reasons—pro and con—that lay out some of the ideas about how to evaluate any decision on this matter:

Pro:

- These SDA positions are established USAID policy:
    - SDAs and LNOs are codified in the 2008 Civilian-Military Cooperation Policy that also addresses the placement of LNOs at USAID headquarters.
- These positions do not have to be filled by SMG-eligible staffs that are needed to serve as Mission Directors:
    - Using retired Senior FSOs to fill these positions would solve the drain on senior officers needed to run missions.
- These positions could be resourced without using O&E:
    - Resources for these positions might come from the COCOMs if USAID asked for this to happen.
    - Resources could be found at USAID if this were seen as a priority and a waiver to use program funds for five years were achieved.
    - The legal impediments argued by in-house Counsel should be revisited in light of the new NSS and the PDD on development.
- These positions have an impact on USAID's interests at DOD and at the mission level:

    - Having USAID present at the table at the COCOMs affects the decisions of how the military works on development-related issues in a way that does not compromise sustainability or USAID country-specific programs or projects.
    - Connections between USAID missions and regional bureaus through the work of the SDA are essential to leverage resources and define the boundaries for USAID engagement with the military, especially in humanitarian response, stabilization, and development.
- These positions are part of the Agency's future missions:
    - SDAs are the face of USAID among military organizations and help demonstrate the expertise that USAID brings to the table in complex operations.
    - After the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, there will still be an ongoing need to have interlocutors with the COCOMs because their nonkinetic missions will not disappear; their missions related to managing the "steady state" will expand. USAID dominates this space, and the military knows it will need expertise that only USAID can offer.

Con:

- Removing the SDA position sends a powerful signal to the interagency cooperation team that USAID does not consider collaboration with DOD to be among its top priorities.
- Removing the SDA position will allow COCOMs to bring on their own development teams recruited through defense contractors that have no reach back to USAID missions or headquarters. (This is already happening at CENTCOM.)
- Removing the SDA position would also mean that the COCOMs would not send a military LNO to work with USAID regional bureaus or support the engagement with USAID.

- Removing the SDA position would create an information gap inside USAID and at the field level about ongoing issues of security and development that could adversely affect USAID programs.
- Removing the SDAs will mean that State Department's POLADS will speak for USAID at the COCOMs.

Where Does OMA Fit?—and Other Issues

What Is in a Name?

The name "Office of Military Affairs" does not properly convey what OMA does. It is important to consider a name change that reflects OMA's mission of helping to coordinate civilian-military relations between USAID and DOD. If the goal is to better align civilian and military operations (as appropriate), then the office should be renamed the "Office of Civilian-Military Cooperation" or the "Office of Security and Development." USAID and development practitioners all understand civilian-military relations as an integral part of the Agency's programming. OMA's stated purpose is to help align these interests to the benefit of USAID's development mission. It should be noted that there is also an Office of Military Affairs at the Central Intelligence Agency. We should not be confusing these two offices inside the US government bureaucracy.

Options for the Placement of OMA

There are three options for the Placement of OMA that come together after reviewing the office and its mission. Keeping OMA in DCHA is one option; a second is to place such an office inside the new PPL Bureau; and a third would be to make OMA an independent office that serves as a focal point for USAID-DOD relations. There are compelling arguments for all three options. OMA's location, however, should depend on what value USAID places on its relationship with DOD, and what it wants from this relationship.

Option 1: Keep OMA in DCHA

Pro: The crosscutting functions in DCHA—ranging from stabilization and reconstruction to conflict mitigation, democracy and governance, and humanitarian assistance and disaster response—are areas where the interests of USAID and DOD intersect. It is also a bureau whose expertise can help shape the priorities and boundaries of USAID's evolving relationship with DOD. Especially as DOD tries to define its equities in working in "steady state" environments; it will need the help of DCHA's knowledge on such matters as civil society engagement, institution building, and creating viable partnerships between the government and citizens. DCHA is also

home to the Office of Civilian Response (OCR). This function—an expeditionary civilian force of officers who can fill in after short-term military missions are complete—is what DOD most wants from the development community. It would make sense to keep OMA in DCHA but to also include OCR's function as part of OMA's operations. With OMA being the main point of entry for DOD at USAID, having the office in DCHA would ensure that the requests from DOD were addressed to the right offices in the bureau. OMA would also be in a good position to draw from DCHA's expertise to help the military shape and manage its development-related agenda so it is compatible with USAID's long-term development role.

Con: DCHA is a bureau of many offices without the cohesiveness that is needed to ensure that USAID is responsive to the civilian-military cooperation needs of either the COCOMs or USAID. It is also isolated from the regional bureaus that control resources and outreach to USAID's field operations. DCHA's gap in its relationship with the regional bureaus and field missions has put OMA in a challenging position because its SDAs must work alone with the regional bureaus and field missions without any real backstops except for the military LNOs and overextended OMA planners. Finally, the offices in DCHA that have created their own relationships with DOD are not inclined to work through OMA, often leading to some disconnects between Washington and the COCOMs.

Option 2: Move OMA to the New Policy, Planning, and Learning Bureau

Pro: Placing OMA in the newly reconstituted PPL Bureau makes sense if USAID wants to use this office to define what it wants from its relationship with DOD. Putting OMA in PPL would also help advance an Agency's consensus on how to work with DOD. This would be a first step toward ending USAID's conflicting internal culture, which until now has not established a clear agenda to advance its role in support of an NSS that embraces development.

OMA's work to date has helped shape those DOD policies that have an impact on USAID's work on the ground. OMA's policy role has had an impact on how DOD does business in the field by requiring that USAID agree with how OHDACA funds are spent. USAID also needs to develop a more robust policy on civilian-military coordination that reaches down into the regional bureaus to create a more coherent approach to managing the military's growing appetite for development work. Finally, a

policy bureau that reaches the entire Agency would help end the isolation that OMA has experienced inside DCHA. Having OMA in a bureau that also identifies priority countries and USAID's strategies toward them would help integrate and synchronize military planning from the start, and better use the SDA's advisory skills toward this end.

Con: OMA has many operational functions that will not be addressed or supported by placing it in the PPL Bureau. Its training program needs to reach into USAID, but it is unclear that locating OMA in PPL would advance this important mission of the office. PPL would not be a good venue to house the military LNOs, who really need to be seated in the geographic bureaus of USAID, where they can better serve the interests of the AAs and provide support to the offices that have a need to coordinate with their respective COCOMs. However, scattering the LNOs among the various regional bureaus would make it difficult for the LNOs to adequately backstop one another during temporary duty assignments (which are frequent), and when they are needed to support the Agency in the case of an emergency such as the Haitian earthquake.

Option 3 Make OMA an Independent Office

Pro: USAID has several independent offices that serve the entire Agency. Making OMA one of them would signal a commitment by the current presidential administration that civilian-military relations are a high priority for USAID. It would also indicate that there is a central point of entry for DOD at USAID. OMA's functions would continue, with its focus areas of policy and planning, operations, and training and learning all under one roof and resourced as a stand-alone office. OMA would also have a senior advisor to the administrator who could help bring together the interests of the interagency cooperative effort and reach out to other USAID constituencies. As a true service bureau, an independent OMA would then have the reach down to the regional bureaus and also to USAID's missions. SDAs and LNOs would still report to the OMA Director, but they could spend substantial percentages of their time in the regional bureaus.

Con: A stand-alone office is likely to further isolate OMA's work. An independent office without adequate staff or resources would not demonstrate USAID's

commitment to working out what it needs from DOD or serve its needs and best interests.

Staffing for Civilian-Military Relations

If OMA remains in DCHA, at a minimum, the position of a politically appointed Deputy Assistant Administrator for Civilian-Military Cooperation should be established. This would help ensure OMA's role as a focal point for the military engagement throughout USAID. It would send a powerful signal to both the Department of State and DOD that USAID is prepared to elevate security and development as a priority in a bureau whose leadership in stabilization, reconstruction, conflict prevention and democracy building are core activities that are vital to U.S. national security.

A DAA would oversee the Office of Civilian-Military Cooperation and the Office of the Civilian Response Corps. Under a politically appointed DAA, the office structure for OMA or the Civilian-Military Cooperation Office would require at least an Office Director and a Deputy. A Senior FSO should serve as Director, and a senior military officer seconded from DOD as a Deputy. An active or retired military officer (a one-star general) with experience in civil affairs and work in stabilization programs would help better define the role of the military LNOs and also give this group guidance, oversight, and backstopping on a regular basis.

If a DAA is not an option than there is a need to appoint a Senior Advisor for Civilian-Military Relations, who would serve as the link between the Administrator and Deputy Administrator and the Agency. This Senior Advisor would advise and work with all of the key players—DCHA, OMA, PPL, the Agency Counselor, and the Counselor for Innovations and Regional and Functional Bureaus—to make sure that civilian-military cooperation is mainstreamed throughout USAID.

Alternatively, if the Office Director is a political appointee, the Office should have two Deputies, a Senior FSO and a general or flag-grade military officer. Under a restructured office, OMA would also need to have a staff representative to work with the new PPL Bureau and the SDA assigned to the Joint Chiefs of Staff to ensure that those DOD policies that have an impact on development do not adversely affect USAID's strategies. The SDA assigned to the Joint Chiefs would continue to serve as a liaison between headquarters policy, the OMA, and the SDAs at the COCOMs.

Although the QDDR is not yet public, there is discussion of USAID and DOS creating a joint operating framework and response plan that will allow for more effective integration of civilian response capacities.[13] OMA would play a significant role in this arrangement because any rapid response capacity will still require coordination of efforts with DOD. This is why it would make sense in a newly configured DCHA to include the activities of a civilian response corps under the mandate of OMA to manage civilian response needs in support of the military side of stabilization and reconstruction work, especially if a DAA position is not created for civilian-military cooperation.

[13] Hillary Rodham Clinton, "Leading Through Civilian Power," *Foreign Affairs*, November–December 2010, accessed at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66799/hillary-rodham-clinton/leading-through-civilian-power.

Conclusions: The Future of Civilian-Military Relations at USAID

During the last decade, USAID and DOD have had overlapping missions that share more space in the global commons arising from transnational threats. In addressing issues ranging from criminal networks and illicit trafficking to failed states, violent extremism, climate change, energy security, pandemics, and recurring conflicts, USAID will need to be even more engaged in how to frame its civilian-military relationship in the future. As one former senior USAID official noted"OMA may seem like a luxury in a time of tight resources, but it is a luxury that USAID cannot do without." Even more important is that in the next decade, after the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are over, USAID's development mandate—to manage stabilization and reconstruction, and to help support institution building with governments and nongovernmental actors—will remain front and center in the larger US mission of helping countries make progress on poverty reduction and food security and providing for the health and well-being of people around the globe. There will still be a military dimension to these missions as long as vulnerable nations threaten US national interests.

Today, USAID is still in a good position to shape its relationship with DOD at the interagency level. The presence of SDAs in the COCOMs, the center of gravity for military engagement around the world, gives USAID a good starting point for defining the civilian space and its relationship within it. Even with fewer staff members, USAID still has funds to engage in areas where its expertise is most valued—technical assistance in institutional building, working with civil society, and managing stabilization and reconstruction programs that move from short-term to sustainable programs. USAID will have to set priorities about how it wants to engage, and how it wants to integrate the requirements of working with the military into the balance sheet of its development agenda.

There are clear areas of alignment in the equities that USAID brings to the table in its expertise in stabilization and reconstruction, its expertise in global health, and its capabilities in humanitarian and disaster assistance planning and response. Defining how USAID can work effectively with the military in these three areas will also create the conditions that foster greater collaboration in defining and managing conflict

prevention—the steady state that certainly integrates security and development, where USAID enjoys a great advantage. USAID is also in a good position to create new partnerships with DOD to encourage technical innovation. DOD's investments in science and technology can be applied to the resources already available to USAID to help the two agencies jointly address problems such as energy security, climate change, and agriculture. USAID has long experience in translating advances in technology to its development projects on the ground.

Removing the SDA positions from the COCOMs would send a powerful negative signal to the military that USAID is incapable of working in the interagency cooperative effort at this time. Rather than not filling these positions, USAID should work with the Joint Chiefs of Staff to fund them, or alternatively get a waiver from Congress on using its program funds to support the positions. Getting this done also means that USAID's leadership must set clear parameters for the job SDAs perform so that these individuals are serving the Agency and its missions, irrespective of the source of funding used for their support.

The military's growing appetite for development expertise is clear in visits to the COCOMs. If USAID will not fill the gap in providing leadership in the areas of focus it dominates, then the military will. USAID is not capable of filling all the gaps. It is neither large enough nor rich enough to do this. But it does possess knowledge, experience, and an Administrator who seeks innovation as the future path for this Agency. In that, it has a great advantage and vision. Making the decision to continue the SDA positions will signal a willingness not only to collaborate but, more important, to define what USAID can do to ensure that good development decisions are made in countries where US national security interests are tested by instability, violent extremists, failing states, criminal networks, and other transnational threats that affect the nation's well-being. The balancing of resources in this Agency that has been stretched thin must not be done at the cost of sacrificing its future by eliminating critical positions like those held by the SDAs.

USAID cannot oversell its capacity; it is still a small Agency recovering from almost a decade of budget and staff cuts. It can, however, mange DOD's expectations if it clearly identifies its priorities for shaping the agenda and also identifying where future areas of engagement can yield important partnerships that not only benefit US

national security but also help the world's poorest people gain a better life through investments in new technologies and innovation.

These will not be easy decisions for an Agency already strapped for human and financial resources. The presence of strong, pragmatic, and knowledgeable leadership at USAID can achieve anything at a time when development is still a civilian skill. Militaries work only with other governments. USAID has the advantage of knowing how to work not only with governments but also with people—including those in civil society groups, the private sector, and international organizations—all of whom are players in the development community. In collaboration with the Secretaries of State and Defense, USAID can demonstrate that the civilian space for development remains just that—part of the United States' soft power and part of the expertise that only a civilian agency can apply to the world's most vexing problems in the 21st century.

Recommendations

Strategic Issues

1. Civilian-military relations at USAID must be elevated to a top priority. As articulated in the NSS and the PDD, being part of a 3-D approach requires innovation in the way USAID works.

2. USAID must strike a balance in its relationship with the military by shaping the way the military engages in matters where security and development must be aligned.

3. The NSS and the PDD on development keep the window open for USAID to set the priorities and boundaries for the way it works with the military. This window will not stay open for long. Taking advantage of the opening will require USAID to make decisions now about the future of the civilian-military relationship. The need for effective cooperation between USAID and DOD will endure long after the wars in Central Asia and the Middle East have ended. Failure to set the parameters of the relationship will only further weaken USAID's leadership position in the development arena because DOD will continue to move into this space.

4. There is a high demand for USAID's expertise among COCOMs. They value the knowledge and advice that USAID can offer as they plan to support their own security agenda around the globe. Although USAID has neither the staff nor resources to match the US military, it does have the know-how to prevent their short term actions and projects from harming the broader US development mission.

Relations between USAID and DOD

1. USAID must have an office that serves as a point of entry for DOD.

2. Decisions about OMA's future, however, rest on the broader strategic question of what USAID's leadership wants from the DOD relationship in terms of other Agency priorities.

3. OMA's effectiveness will also depend on whether the Regional Bureaus and Missions consider the relationship with DOD a priority in their day-to-day work.

4. Senior Development Advisors are representatives of USAID. They do *not* report to the military when posted at a COCOM. They report to the Administrator of USAID through the Director of OMA.

5. Senior Development Advisors are a small expense in the context of USAID's total expenditures. The total cost in FY 2010 was under $1.5 million. If all the positions were filled, the cost would rise to $2.6 million. Of this amount, almost $500,000 is reimbursed to USAID.

6. USAID needs more Development Advisors at the COCOMs and in the Pentagon at the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) / Policy to manage the variety of policy-related issues that are raised on a daily. They must hold a senior rank because COCOMs value rank and access to decisionmakers as essential for the job. Today, USAID's SDAs are not all from the Senior Foreign Service.

7. To meet the COCOMs' interagency needs, USAID should recruit SDAs from the roster of retired Senior FSOs. Their salaries could be covered by the COCOMs that want these advisors. Some in DOD have expressed a willingness to pay for these individuals. Alternatively, a way to utilize program funding should be authorized.

8. Deputy Development Advisors are also needed at some of the COCOMs. These individuals should be recruited from the midlevel ranks of the Foreign Service. They work under the guidance of an SDA. Experience in one COCOM demonstrates that these individuals provide useful service to the military in planning exercises, implementing programs, working with USAID missions, and assisting the SDA with all the demands made of USAID at the COCOMs. Not all COCOMs will need DDAs, but at CENTCOM, the hub of operations for Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, and the rest of Central Asia, the DDA provides support to USAID's offices that work with the military in the field. This post must be retained.

9. In order of priority, DDAs are needed most at CENTCOM, PACOM, and AFRICOM. These COCOMs also represent geographic areas where USAID has a large mission field presence. A DDA can serve as an action officer in support of the SDA. The learning experience from working at a COCOM is invaluable in an age of interagency cooperation. USAID could more easily cover the salary costs of a more junior officer.

10. DLIs should all be required to rotate through a COCOM. Recent experience with these newest entrants to USAID has proven positive when sent on a rotation to a COCOM. Serving some time at a COCOM is part of the future, and it provides an important learning experience for the individual. The DLIs are supervised by SDAs.

Management Questions

1. USAID should change the name of OMA to the Office of Civilian-Military Cooperation to more accurately describe its function.

2. Senior Development Advisors are a relatively low-cost way to ensure that USAID's voice is heard in the regional COCOMs. Retaining these positions is important for coordinating activities with USAID's fieldwork and for leveraging the resources of DOD's COCOMs to USAID's field missions.

3. Senior Development Advisor positions are unconventional posts. They are therefore not as highly rated for promotion in the USAID personnel system. This bias against these types of assignments needs to be addressed by USAID as part of its wider review of civilian-military cooperation policies.

4. USAID should ask DOD to pay for SDAs if there is no way to support these positions with program funds. The Administrator can request this through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Secretary Gates's commitment to support USAID can be demonstrated by this small investment in personnel to provide development expertise at the COCOMs.

5. SDAs should be recruited from retired Senior FSOs and paid for with program funds. USAID should seek a waiver to use such funds, or alternatively it should ask COCOMs to reimburse all or part of their salaries and other support costs to conserve O&E funding.

6. Keeping military LNOs is also essential to the work of USAID. The presence of these individuals is dependent on USAID's continued agreement to support FSOs in the COCOMs.

7. Ending the isolation of OMA is essential. This is part of a larger question of how the DCHA Bureau can reduce its stove-piped approach so that the Bureau's work is integrated to focus on stabilization and reconstruction, humanitarian assistance and disaster preparedness, democracy and human rights, and conflict prevention and better integrate its efforts with the rest of the Agency.

8. USAID must decide where OMA fits in USAID's organizational structure. The current location in the DCHA Bureau needs review, although the operational nature of OMA's work supports it remaining in that Bureau. However, if it is to remain as part of the DCHA Bureau, it must be fully supported by both the Agency and the Bureau with funding and personnel so that it can effectively carry out its role. The recent history has been that rather than supporting the work of OMA, the DCHA front office has continued to cut its budget and has made staffing vacancies in the office very difficult.

9. OMA is part of a holistic approach to USAID's ongoing need for a rapid response mechanism, of which USAID's relationship with DOD is essential not only in times of crisis but also in times when USAID must function in regions that are potentially unstable. If DCHA is to be successful in this area, then keeping OMA as a hub for planning, training, and education must be part of a plan that integrates understanding about civilian-military cooperation into USAID's work. Furthermore, USAID's capacity to respond to crises will require that the military LNOs and the SDAs are able to reach out to the rest of the Agency from a bureau whose core capacities are those related to crisis response, capacity building, and humanitarian assistance. It is also important that the SDA who serves the Joint Chiefs of Staff have a corresponding LNO stationed at USAID.

10. Other options for the office include putting OMA in the new PPL Bureau. It would allow for greater policy coherence with respect to civilian-military engagement. But it would not have the operational reach back to the USAID

missions, or to the geographic bureaus needed to achieve effective civilian-military cooperation throughout the Agency.

11. An independent OMA staff could work if it received adequate human resources and was supported as a priority by USAID leadership. However, this is likely to exacerbate rather than solve the problem of OMA isolation, because being an independent office does not currently lend itself to integration with other offices throughout the Agency.

12. If OMA remains in DCHA, the position of a politically appointed Deputy Assistant Administrator for Civilian-Military Relations should be created. It would send a powerful signal to DOD that USAID is committed to engagement with DOD. This DAA and CMM would also oversee the Office of Civilian Response Corps.

13. Alternatively, if no Deputy Assistant Administrator for Civilian-Military Relations is created then USAID should appoint a Senior Advisor for Civilian-Military Cooperation to work directly for the Administrator and Deputy Administrator to ensure the mainstreaming of USAID's evolving work with the military into all functional and regional bureaus. This individual would also serve as a liaison with the Agency Counselor and Counselor for Innovation.

14. OMA's structure would include an Office Director and two deputies. A political appointee would serve as director. A Senior FSO would serve as one deputy. A senior military officers seconded from DOD would serve as the second deputy.

15. A restructured OMA would need a staff representative assigned to the new PPL Bureau.

16. OMAs training functions should become a priority. To do this, it must be funded so that all parts of USAID understand how to work with the US military. Training to the military about USAID, including training in using valuable assessment tools, continues to bring resources to USAID and greatly facilitates civilian-military cooperation.

Appendix A: Persons Interviewed for This Report

1. Susan Reichle, AA for PPL, then Acting AA DCHA
2. Jon Brause, DAA, DCHA
3. Chris Mulligan, DAA, PPL
4. Sarah Mendelson, DAA, DCHA
5. Julie Kunen, Senior Advisor, PPL
6. Tish Butler, DAA, PPL
7. Anne Ralte, Senior Advisor
8. Larry Garber, DAA, PPL
9. Robert Jenkins, Director, OTI
10. Julie Werbel, Democracy Advisor, Security Sector Reform
11. Neil Levine, Director, CMM
12. James Michel, former Counselor, USAID
13. Hilda Arellano, Counselor, USAID
14. Maura O'Neill, Special Advisor to the Administrator
15. Donald Steinberg, Assistant Administrator
16. Dirk Djikerman, Acting AA, DCHA, and Senior Counselor, DAC
17. Michael Yates, Acting AA, EGAT
18. Lisa Gomer, General Counsel, USAID
19. Jeffery Marburg-Goodman, Special Counsel, USAID
20. Gary Winter, Office of Legal Counsel, USAID
21. Tyler Posey, Office of Legal Counsel, USAID
22. Mark Feierstein, AA, LAC
23. Mark Lopes, DAA, LAC
24. Steve Catlin, MLO, OFDA
25. Craig Mullany, OAPA
26. Michele Schimpp, DAA, OAPA
27. Alex Their, Acting AA, OAPA
28. Paul Weisenfeld, Head, Haiti Task Team and DAA, LAC
29. Alan van Egmond, Senior Advisor, OAPA
30. Patrick Cronin, Center for New American Security, former head, USAID, PPC
31. Andrew Natsios, Former Administrator, USAID
32. Alonzo Fulgham, Former Acting Administrator, USAID
33. George Moose, former Ambassador, and AA for Africa, DOS
34. Gordon Adams, Stimson Center and the American University
35. Janine Davidson, DASDE, Strategy and Planning
36. James Shear, DASDE, Partnerships and Multilateral Affairs
37. Col. Mike Hess, former DCHA AA
38. Col. Thomas Baltazar, former Director of OMA
39. William Jeffers, Deputy Director, S/CRS
40. Bill Anderson, Former SDA, EUCOM

41. Fernando Cossich, former Development Advisor, EUCOM and currently in the E and E Bureau
42. Kent Larson, E and E Bureau
43. Kevin Armstrong, Benin Mission Director, USAID
44. Beth deGrasse Cole, USIP
45. Gerald Hyman, CSIS
46. Christian Hougen, PPL
47. Reuben Brigety, DAA, PRM, Department of State
48. Richard McCall, VP, Creative Associates
49. Clay Doherty, Acting Directory, Office of Public Engagement, USAID
50. Alan Van Egmond, Senior Advisor for Afghanistan and Pakistan, USAID
51. Col. Sean Ryan, Deputy Directory, Interagency Action Group, CENTCOM
52. Col. Lindsay Gudridge, Partner Outreach Branch Chief, Civil Military Division, CENTCOM J-5
53. Col. Edward McHale, Vice Director, Interagency Task Force, SOCOM
54. Col. USAF (ret.) August "Greg" Jannarone, YC-03, Future Plans, Environments and Behaviors, SOCOM
55. Lt. Col. Jimmy Christmas, SCSO-J51, Strategic Plans Officer, SOCOM
56. Col. Norberto Cintron, Command Engineer, SOUTHCOM
57. James Baumgart, Civil Affairs–Operations/Plans/Strategy, SOCOM
58. Lewis Elbinger, Political Advisor, CENTCOM
59. Col. Francis Donovan, J35, SOCOM
60. Dr. Leif Rosenberger, Economic Advisor, CENTCOM
61. Brigadier-General (Canadian Forces) Jim Ferron, Deputy Director, CCJ5, CENTCOM
62. Steve Roman, Social Development Specialist—Health, Non-Traditional Security Issues, SCJ9, Partnering Directorate, SOUTHCOM
63. Lt. Gen. (ret.) John Goodman, Executive Director, Center for Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance
64. W. I. "Ike" Clark, Division Chief, Civilian-Military Assistance, SCJ-7 CMA, SOUTHCOM
65. Lt. Gen. John Gardner, Deputy Commander, EUCOM
66. Rear Adm. Charles Martoglio, Chief of Staff, EUCOM
67. Maj. Gen. Punch Moulton, Director of EUCOM Plans and Operations Center, EUCOM
68. Katherine Canavan, Civilian Deputy to the Commander & Foreign Policy Advisor, EUCOM
69. Dr. Judith Reid, Chief, Public Private Cooperation Division, J9 Interagency Partnering Directorate, EUCOM
70. Howard (Rick) Kuenning, Chief, Theater Assessments and Analysis Division, Assessments and Analysis Directorate, ECJ7, EUCOM
71. Rear Adm. William A. Brown, ECJ4 Director of Logistics, EUCOM
72. Michael Ritchie, Director of Interagency Partnering, J9, EUCOM
73. Mike Anderson, Deputy Director Interagency Partnering, J9, EUCOM

74. Daniel Brownlee, ODASD Africa Policy Representative to Strategy, Plans and Programs Directorate, AFRICOM
75. Lt. Col. John Collison, Civil Affairs Branch Chief, SOCOM
76. Brig. Gen. Barbara Faulkenberry, Deputy Director of Logistics, AFRICOM
77. Doris Mariani, Senior Strategic Advisor, Strategy, Plans and Programs, AFRICOM
78. Trina Zwicker, Branch Chief, NGO and Interagency Partnership Directorate for Outreach, AFRICOM
79. Paul Trivelli, Civilian Deputy to the Commander & Foreign Policy Advisor (POLAD), SOUTHCOM
80. Gregory P. Marvil, Deputy Foreign Policy Advisor, SOUTHCOM
81. Caroline Ross, Legislative Liaison Officer, North American Aerospace Defense Command, NORTHCOM
82. Gen. Martin Dempsey, Commander, US Army Training and Doctrine Command
83. Lt. Col. Eric Lanham, Civil Affairs Branch Chief, J5, AFRICOM
84. Thomas Dolan, Partnering and Outreach, Center for Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance
85. Rear Adm. (ret.) Jim Hart, Director of Strategy and Plans, Strategy and Programs Directorate, AFRICOM
86. Lisa Samson, Deputy Director, J9-Partnering Directorate, SOUTHCOM
87. Dr. Michael Yates, Deputy Assistant Administrator, EGAT, USAID
88. Bruce Cheadle, Chief, Integration Division & Chief, Joint Interagency Coordination Group, Partnering Directorate, SCJ9, SOUTHCOM
89. Lewis Tatem, Economic Growth Officer, ENE Bureau, USAID and former PRT embed Iraq
90. Gen. Edwin Smith (ret.), Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies
91. Rear Adm. Sean A. Pybus
92. Dan Picutta, POLAD, PACOM
93. General Charles Hooper, J-4 PACOM
94. Gen. John F. Goodman (ret.), Center of Excellence, PACOM
95. Col. Eric Price, J-9, PACOM
96. Col. James Robinson, USARPAC, J-5

OMA Staff

1. Elena Brineman, Acting Director, OMA
2. Jonathan Freeman, AD Appointee
3. Edward Thomas, Program Support Specialist
4. Christine Dougherty Administrative Support Specialist
5. John Dunlop, Chief Planning
6. Richard Byess, Senior Planning specialist
7. David Bendana, Program Specialist
8. Robert Schmidt, Chief, Planning
9. Aubrey Eaton, Education and Training Specialist

10. Mike Carney, Education and Training Specialist
11. Gary Mitchell, Supervisory Program Analyst
12. Mary Margaret Dinnen, Civilian Response Corps
13. Jessica Wattman, Senior Conflict Specialist
14. Bruce Elliott, US Army Corps of Engineers,

Senior Development Advisors

1. Ted Gehr, SDA, PACOM
2. Mark A. White, SDA, AFRICOM
3. Diana Putman, AFRICOM Detailee
4. Peter Natiello, SDA, SOCOM
5. Marty Hanratty, SDA, CENTCOM
6. Cathy Niarchos, Deputy SDA, CENTCOM
7. Paul Tuebner, SDA, Pentagon
8. Kirk Dalhgren, SDA, SOUTHCOM

Military Liaison Officers

1. C. Gregory Jicha, Chief, Operations, SOCOM
2. Lt. Col. Todd Goehler, Milrep, Deputy
3. Lt. Col. Nancy Jean-Louis, Milrep, AFRICOM
4. Cmdr. Spencer Abbot, Milrep, SOUTHCOM
5. Lt. Col. Sam Webster. Milrep, CENTCOM
6. Col. John Hope, Milrep EUCOM
7. Cmdr. Stephen Sass, former Milrep EUCOM
8. Maj. Sean Wilson, Interagency Fellow
9. Maj. Erin Gilliam, Interagency Fellow

Appendix B: OMA Training—An Overview

OMA has become a source of training for the civilian and military audiences over the last few years. The Team supports the Agency's capability to respond to crises by improving the ability of USAID officers to effectively participate in stabilization operations in complex environments. Training is done in the United States for USAID mission staff and military units deploying. It is also done in Afghanistan (COIN Academy), Germany, and Tbilisi, Georgia. Training is also offered via online courses and through participation in interagency briefings. Since 2009, activities have expanded under the leadership of Acting Office Director Elena Brineman. Internal USAID training still lags behind the work OMA performs for DOD clients, mainly because USAID has underresourced this important part of the office's program.

OMA's current training portfolio includes:

- Stability Operations / District Stability Framework (DSF).
- Curriculum and database development.
- DSF Instructor Certification.
- Pre-deployment training for Provincial Reconstruction Team personnel.
- Materials development for USAID personnel on interagency issues.

Stability Operations Training:

- OMA has provided DSF training to the US Marine Corps, US Army, and US Navy personnel who have deployed to Afghanistan.
- OMA provides a biweekly training during the USAID bi-weekly New Employee Orientation for Afghanistan.
- Creation of a cadre of expert instructors (11) who have to date trained 75 military units and the US government's civilian employees and implementing partners.

Provincial Reconstruction Teams:

- DOD funding of this training brought in $250,000 to OMA.
- OMA and the 189th Infantry Brigade participate in formal classroom instruction and in joint training that puts civilians and military in a realistic scenario that mirrors the theater environment.
- All PRT's trained at Fort Atterbury, Indiana, receive the training provided by OMA.

USAID Internal Training:

- OMA provides a two-day training to new hire DLI personnel.
- Training covers such topics as OMA 101, DOD 101, Civilian-Military Operations and Planning, and a DSF Overview. During training, DLIs participate in a roundtable discussion with the SDAs serving in the COCOMs.

Civilian-Military/Interagency Briefings:

- OMA provides training through on-line modules to familiarize civilians from USAID, DOS, and USDA about DOD and military culture, DOD funding processes, and other types of civilian-military cooperation.
- OMA has developed a partnership with the US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute to develop training materials on the use of OHDACA guidance and funding.

Within USAID, OMA partners with OAPA, OTI, OCR, PPM, and Human Resources—Training.

It also has worked with the Foreign Service Institute, S/CRS, and the US military. Since 2009, OMA has received approximately $1.5 million a year from the Marine Corps Training and Operations Group in support of DSF training.

Box 2. Combatant Commands

A **Unified Combatant Command** (**UCC**) is a United States joint military command that is composed of forces from two or more services and has a broad and continuing mission. These commands are established to provide effective command and control of US military forces, regardless of branch of service, in peace and war. They are organized either on a geographical basis (known as "Area of Responsibility" AOR) or on a functional basis. **The COCOMs provide the money for all country level programs so their importance is not only in control of military assets, but they are sources of large amounts and personnel of funds that a Regional Combatant Command has at his disposal .** Each UCC is commanded by a Combatant Commander (CCDR), who is a four-star general or admiral. UCCs are "joint" commands with specific badges denoting their affiliation. As of January 2008, there were ten Unified Combatant Commands as specified in Title 10 and the latest annual Unified Command Plan (classified document describing the role of the Commander). Six have regional responsibilities, and four have functional responsibilities. The Goldwater- Nichols Act of 1986 clarified and codified responsibilities that Commanders in Chiefs or CINCs and their predecessors (theater or area commanders) had undertaken since World War II, and which were first given legal status in 1947. Under Goldwater-Nichols, the service chiefs (also four stars in rank) are charged with the responsibility of the "strategic direction, unified operation of combatant commands, and the integration of all land, naval, and air forces in an efficient "unified combatant command" force. Furthermore, the services' "civilian" secretaries are responsible to "organize, train and equip" forces for use by the combatant commands and do not exercise any operational control over their forces. Under Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld the COCOM Commander's title was changed to Combatant Commander.

USAID has Senior Development Advisors in the following COCOMs:

- SOCOM – Special Operations Command in Tampa, Fla.
- CENTCOM- Central Command in Tampa, Fla.
- SOUTHCOM- Southern Command in Miami, Fla.
- AFRICOM – Africa Command in Stuttgart, Germany
- EUCOM – European Command in Stuttgart, Germany
- PACOM – Pacific Command in Honolulu, Hawaii
- JCS - Joint Chiefs of Staff—Pentagon

Appendix C: SDA Activities by Command

Senior Development Advisor, Pacific Command (PACOM), Hawaii
Incumbent: Theodore Gehr, FSO 1
Cost: $166,449
Military Liaison Officer: Vacant
USAID Missions/Presence Countries: 11

Overview: US Pacific Command is located in Camp Smith, Hawaii. It covers a vast geographic area. Sixty percent of the world's population lives in its area of responsibility (AOR). The region is a "supermarket" for natural disasters, with cyclones, tsunami, and earthquakes, making it a center for humanitarian and disaster assistance coordination. It is a region of impressive economic growth, but also rife with ongoing conflicts and a political transition (Korea) that will have an impact on the AOR when a change in government takes place. This AOR has a potential for greater work by USAID in democracy and governance, conflict prevention and mitigation (Philippines, Indonesia), but also for helping to define the role of the military in "steady state" environments.

USAID/PACOM Objectives:

- Align USAID and DOD efforts to promote stabilization, conflict mitigation and prevention in selected countries, including Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Philippines, Cambodia, Nepal and Bangladesh.
- Link USAID programs for trafficking in persons and environmental protection, including forest conservation and coral reefs, promoting legal timber trade and halting natural resource and wildlife trafficking, with DOD efforts in regional maritime security, to include drug trafficking and violent extremists.
- Coordinate with PACOM on implementation of ongoing and future security sector and health programs including hospital ship visits, MEDCAPS, and other DOD health programs such as disaster and Pandemic Influenza preparedness to ensure the activities are building local capacity and supporting host government authority and US country strategies.

Other US Government Agencies at PACOM: The Department of State has eight Political Advisor and nine other agencies are located at the COCOM.

The **Impact of SDA:** The SDA works closely with the Special Operations Command Pacific, the Security Cooperation (J-4), and Training/Exercises Directorates (J-7) and is located within the Partnership Directorate (J-9). Planning is also a part of the SDA role, and the command values the onsite expertise. There is coordination with USAID missions in the AOR in supporting USAID. The SDA works with the OFDA representative at PACOM in helping to support

disaster relief. PACOM also has the Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance, which is a Direct Reporting Unit to the COCOM or train in disaster preparedness and to support planning for natural disasters in the region. The Center views itself as a competitor to OFDA and USAID in that many of their perceived mandates overlap with USAID authorities.

- SDA provides development perspective in planning, which helps to leverage resources to the field.
- SDA coordinates with both the USAID Regional Development Mission for Asia in Thailand, and also with specific bilateral USAID missions in developing joint projects that are resourced by OHDACA funding.
- SDA deconflicts security assistance programming, something that was new to the COCOM, including the synchronization of USAID planning cycles with that of the COCOM.
- Specific achievements include:
    - Securing $7 million of DOD resources in support of USAID's missions in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh for stabilization work.
    - In Mongolia, developed activity with DOD, USAID, and the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) to improve drainage structures in flood prone peri-urban areas where a MCC land titling program has identified easements along drainage canals. In Indonesia, help USAID mission support a training school for information technology by coordinating DOD funding for construction with USAID technical support for teachers and equipment.
    - Worked with USAID to support a Governance Assessment in China.
    - Implementation of three-year IAA with the DOD transferring $7.5 million to DOD, for PACOM to provide planning and training assistance to nations' militaries in their respective regions, in pandemic preparedness. USAID has integrated this military-to-military program effort into the larger pandemic preparedness program ("H2P") effort that it supports, which includes similar capacity-building efforts with developing countries' civilian sectors and NGOs, as well as regional and international health and disaster organizations.
    - Convincing Special Operations Command Pacific leadership to place civil affairs team within USAID offices and under the oversight of the Mission Director—in Sri Lanka and Maldives—resulting in increased staff and financial resources to achieve USAID's stabilization and reconstruction objectives.

Issues for the SDA and the Command:

- Rank is an issue at PACOM. An FS 1 is not part of the senior leadership at the COCOM. The SDA works within the interagency group, but most actively as an advisor on all OHDACA and HCA funding. At PACOM the SDA serves as both advisor and program officer. He works closely with the Special Operations Command Pacific (SOCPAC), and has traveled with the flag-officer to USAID missions in the AOR to help engage Mission Directors and the military concerned with proposed projects. He has leveraged funding and prevented many bad decisions by this type of engagement. This outreach to the field is vital because USAID's ability to work with organizations in the field and to connect the regional development agenda with COCOM planners is important.

- There is no military LNO staff person in Washington at this time. It makes it difficult to have the SDA rely solely on the staff in DC without a person dedicated to this role. PACOM must send someone to DC to replace the person that curtailed the position—preferably an active-duty uniformed officer.

Recommendations: Retain this position as it is not only cost effective but also leverages resources for USAID. A Deputy SDA would expand USAID's reach to cover all relevant Missions in the field and allow for influencing DOD assets addressing key common areas of concern such as the health sector. A Deputy Development Advisor would allow for increased focus on the Special Operations Command Pacific, which is at the forefront in pursuing whole-of-government approaches to countering and preventing violent extremism; strengthen USAID participation in selected bilateral and multinational civilian-military exercises and trainings that contribute to USAID objectives; and pursue opportunities to leverage PACOM funding authorities and activities in support of USAID development programs through close coordination with appropriate USAID staff both in Washington and in the Asia-Pacific region.

1. PACOM is an important theater for the future of USAID. It includes countries like China in the AOR. The eventual transition in Burma will also involve both the Agency and the COCOM. Keeping the SDA and an OFDA person in the COCOM is essential. PACOM will be the first one on the ground with capacity to respond quickly with resources in the Pacific. Natural disasters are frequent and take up time in planning and response. USAID is a major player in this part of the COCOM's work.

2. Joint planning for a North Korea transition is another strong reason that having an SDA work at the COCOM is very useful in terms of coordination and guidance for USAID strategies and policies

3. While many of the countries are in what is called a "steady state," it is precisely in those places where it is important to align USAID and DOD interests in the planning stage. SDAs work to make this happen.

4. There are many countries in the AOR that could move toward greater instability in the next few years. This makes it very important to work on prevention efforts through

USAID, in coordination with PACOM's Civil Affairs and SOCPAC teams who are actively engaged in some of these potential conflict zones.

Senior Development Advisor—Special Operations Command (SOCOM), (Florida)
Incumbent: Peter Natiello—1 Senior Foreign Service Officer
Military Liaison Officers (2): Lt. Col. Gregory Jicha and Lt. Col. Todd Goehler
Cost: $206,632
USAID Missions in AOR: All

Overview: US Special Operations Command has a global focus with several missions, including synchronization of DOD planning for operations against global terrorist networks. It is also responsible for training and equipping Special Operations Forces (SOF), including US Army Special Forces and Civil Affairs (CA) elements, whose work often brings it into contact with USAID. SOCOM supports Geographic COCOMs, which draw on SOCOM's regional, cultural, language and other expertise to support these geographic missions. USAID's expertise and leadership supporting what DoD and SOCOM refer to as "indirect approaches" to countering violent extremism, insurgencies and related national security challenges, provides the basis for the collaborative USAID-SOCOM relationship. SOCOM relies on a strong mix of interagency expertise and planners to address global transnational threats.

USAID/SOCOM Objectives:

- Organize and support joint research and development efforts to improve the body of knowledge and practice underpinning efforts to counter violent extremism (CVE) and counterinsurgency (COIN) planning, programming, and performance measurement.
- Synchronize defense and development approaches to CVE through ongoing structured engagements of the development, diplomacy and defense communities.
- In coordination with the Geographic COCOMs, strengthen SOF-USAID coordination in theater, and ensure that on-the-ground stabilization approaches are appropriate given the CVE and/or COIN challenges being addressed.
- Deepen, and eventually institutionalize, SOF-USAID professional development and training relationships to strengthen SOF-USAID field coordination.
- Bring SOF capabilities (CA, MISO, geospatial support) in support of initial USAID-led disaster response and humanitarian assistance efforts.

Other US Government Civilian Agencies at SOCOM: Nine other civilian agencies at SOCOM

The Impact of SDA: The SDA has helped to facilitate USAID-SOCOM collaboration for planning, operations, and R&D enterprises related to CVE and insurgencies, mitigating conflict and responding to natural disasters. He has:

- Contributed to post-earthquake civilian-military coordination (including with SOCOM CA elements) and military drawdown while deployed to Haiti in support of the US government's disaster response;
- Raised awareness within the COCOM about USAID's capacity to counter violent extremism and insurgencies, and to delineate areas of development expertise in working with governance and the security sector.
- Brokered the sharing of SOCOM intellectual and technological resources to improve USAID frameworks for understanding illicit power structures and insurgencies.
- Coordinated USAID/Yemen and SOCOM objectives by assisting USAID Mission Director, Jeff Ashley, in his work with COCOM planners to deepen the complementarities between USAID's stabilization efforts with the work of Special Operations in that country.
- The SDA is a highly valued member of the Commander's advisory team.

Issues for SDA at SOCOM: The global scope of the SOCOM mission provides USAID with a great opportunity to be part of civilian-military engagement worldwide. One of the biggest challenges for someone in this position is the connection back to all of the regional bureaus at USAID. The SDA works closely with OTI, CMM, and OFDA. The SDA has a strong relationship with selected USAID field missions where USAID-SOF collaboration is present.

Recommendations: Retain an SDA at SOCOM. A Deputy SDA would help expand USAID's reach within the COCOM and to USAID field missions, thus ensuring wider inclusion in planning for counter-terrorism activities. Civilian-military engagement is a centerpiece of SOCOM's operational mission.

- Provide opportunities for USAID staff from regional bureaus and missions to participate in planning exercises, and in seminars where USAID can brief and raise awareness of military counterparts on specific frameworks being developed to support USAID's fieldwork.
- Mission Directors from countries with SOF presence should be required to spend a day at the SOCOM to understand the COCOM's global programs and operations that directly affect development programs. The COCOM would support the costs for this training.

Senior Development Advisor, Central Operations Command (CENTCOM), Florida

Martin Hanratty—1 Senior Foreign Service Officer
Cost: $201,696
Katherine Niarchos—1 Deputy SDA, FS2
Cost: TBD (just arrived in September 2010)
Military Liaison Officer in Washington, Lt. Col. Samuel Webster
USAID Missions in AOR: 13 (includes Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq)

Overview: There are 13 Missions in this AOR. It is the nerve center for current military operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and is the home of stabilization and reconstruction activity for Iraq. USAID's Office of Afghanistan and Pakistan Affairs, OAPA, like OMA, has a daily working relationship with this COCOM, as do USAID Missions in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq. Established in 1983, CENTCOM's mission is to promote cooperation among nations, respond to crises, deter or defeat state and nonstate aggression, support development, and, when necessary, do reconstruction in order to establish the conditions for regional security, stability, and prosperity. This COCOM managed $2 billion in CERP funding in FY 2009.

USAID/CENTCOM Objectives:

- Coordinate an integrated approach for counterinsurgency, stability operations, security, transition, and reconstruction in the priority countries of Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, and Yemen.
- Develop and promote coordinated strategies to address conflict mitigation, rule of law, and countering violent extremism in Jordan, Lebanon, and the Central Asian countries.
- Align USAID and CENTCOM planning at the country and regional levels, to create more coherent US government strategies, policies, and programs.
- Ensure coordination for special initiatives across the region to address water and resource management, implications of demographic trends such as the youth bulge and counternarcotics.
- Coordinate USAID's and CENTCOM's efforts to enhance regional trade between South and Central Asia through Afghanistan, and to enhance Afghan public revenue and employment generation via enhanced trade flows.

Other US Government Civilian Agencies at CENTCOM: 13

The Impact of SDA: CENTCOM's highly integrated mission features short-term development objectives. Therefore USAID's role at the COCOM, as well as in the field in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq make this relationship among the most important proving grounds for the SDAs who are considered essential to the planning and synchronization of strategies that is part of US national security interests in Central Asia. The SDA's role is significant here because he or she uses their skills to help navigate the work at USAID missions in several conflict theaters. He or she has advised the COCOM on economic and trade matters, including the

implementation of the New Silk Road project. Given the high demand for USAID expertise at CENTCOM, OMA deployed a Deputy Development Advisor in September 2010. Her specific role will include supervising the "development advisors," DOD contractors, who are engaged in helping the COCOM use their CERP funding, and support other development-related activities with military civil affairs officers in the J-3 section. CENTCOM highly values civilian expertise and sees the USAID presence as essential in helping the COCOM leadership sort out matters of funding, programming, and providing guidance on how USAID Missions in the AOR are working on related objectives. For USAID, the challenge is really one of the Agency's capacities to provide sufficient on-the-ground skills to complement short-term military objectives. Without a robust civilian response corps in place, USAID is still challenged to fill all the civilian positions in the field, even though great progress has been made over the last year.

Issues for SDA at CENTCOM:

The COCOM's workload exceeds the capacity of two individuals. Coordination with USAID's OAPA is sometimes shortchanged, due to the daily demands on the SDA/DDA. There is growing evidence of the COCOM's desire to get more people from USAID to the field. The SDA/DDA engages with a wide range of DOD actors, and operates in the leadership of the COCOM. He provides much valued budgetary advice, and reach-back to USAID missions. What is missing is better communication and coordination inside USAID to ensure that the SDA/DDA's work is integrated into the efforts of OAPA and OTI. Finally, as the demand for civilian resources grows with the transition process in Iraq it will be important to find ways to supplement USAID's reach into the COCOM and to the field. The COCOM recognizes it is way behind in its planning for transition and needs help from USAID on this next phase.

Recommendations: Retain both positions at CENTCOM. USAID is essential to this COCOM given its work in two war zones, and in the Middle East.

- USAID must retain the SDAs and DDAs at this COCOM, given the high-profile countries that are part of the AOR. The presence of a Deputy Development Advisor is crucial in this large COCOM to manage relationships with the Mission and with USAID's OAPA office.

- Operational policy inside USAID is needed to use the SDA/DDA in a way that multiplies the efforts of the OAPA office. There is need for a seamless USAID team in the COCOM, and it is still under construction.

- USAID needs a better understanding of the role that non-USAID development advisors play at CENTCOM to ensure that their efforts are consistent with, and complementary to USAID country strategy work. There is a high risk in this COCOM of USAID losing its value added due to the tempo of military operations in this AOR.

- Opportunities for innovation in the area of economic development should engage the regional bureau and the OAPA task force in working out the different pieces of the "New Silk Road" strategy.

Senior Development Advisor, European Command (EUCOM), Stuttgart
Position Vacant (previous incumbent was an FS1)
Military Liaison Officer: Col. John Hope, who also covers NATO
USAID Missions in AOR: 17

USAID Objectives at EUCOM:

- Align USAID and DoD efforts to promote energy security for Western Europe and encourage development of energy resources in Eastern Europe
- Leverage DOD resources and contribute to overall US government efforts to promote transition of Eastern European countries to NATO and EU membership. Work to promote graduation of presence countries through promotion of stable democracies and rule of law.
- Conduct joint USAID/E&E (Europe and Eurasia Bureau) and EUCOM pilot study on establishing the Monitoring Country and Program Performance (MCPP) System and to allow the US government to assess the program's impact or development gains from the US government's interventions.

EUCOM Objectives for USAID:

- Support the Monitoring Country Performance Program for Targeted Countries (see bullet three above)
- Provide USAID/OFDA Support for Exercises Austere Challenge 11
- Establish Relationships & Promote Communications between USAID E&E Bureau and EUCOM
- Establish a Pilot Planning Initiative for mutually selected countries

Other US Government Civilian Agencies at EUCOM: 9

The Impact of SDA: USAID had a major impact at the COCOM in helping guide country programs in Albania, and also in Georgia and Kyrgyzstan. One flag officer explained the USAID contribution quite aptly when he noted "that you cannot surge trust!" Until his departure, the SDA was a central player in the planning operations, coordinating the use of OHDACA and HA funds with USAID field missions. Working with the OFDA representative, both USAID personnel worked with military planners to support disaster preparedness efforts.

In the recent case of the forest fires in Russia, it was USAID staff that helped the military understand that Russia did not need the assistance offered, given that country's capacity to manage its own natural disaster. This region has countries undergoing stabilization and reconstruction programs (Serbia, Kosovo) and also has places that are ripe for conflict prevention. This region poses a challenge of coordination as the US military tries to define its role in these "steady state" countries where USAID's programmatic capacities are more carefully defined.

Issues for SDA at EUCOM: The perception at EUCOM is that USAID is not engaged in this COCOM. In part it is a result of not having a senior level person in place. However, it also mirrors a more common problem that was evident at all the COCOMs: USAID is neither robust enough nor committed enough to support the EUCOM Mission. In an interview with the leader of the health section, he said, "If there is a lack of leadership we will fill it." The military can fill gaps, but without experienced USAID officers to guide and educate them, their success will be quite limited. In a region that has both stabilization and reconstruction projects, but also conflict prevention countries, it is important to have someone at the table to shape what DOD can do to support the USAID mission in the field. It is in these areas where USAID has the ability to use its funding, and also where coordination between civilian and military organizations is essential for a sustainable outcome. Right now, USAID is helping the COCOM gain a better understanding of USAID metrics from E&E Bureau economists. Recently, the USAID mission in Azerbaijan has worked with the COCOM to develop water projects and worked together on anticorruption programs. In Macedonia a joint USAID- EUCOM program helped with the construction of schools; USAID provided technical support for teacher training there. At one meeting of the COCOM, they also admitted a failed partnership in the Ukraine because USAID had not been adequately consulted about the construction of an HIV/AIDS clinic. The stigma connected with AIDS kept people in the community from using the clinic because everyone knew the new building's purpose.

Recommendations: Fill this position immediately. This COCOM offers some good opportunities for success in joint planning and implementation of "steady state" programs.

- The regional bureau AA must play a major role in support of the SDA's work in OMA because this AOR has many development issues that are best worked jointly by USAID and the COCOM.
- DOD sees EUCOM as a place where conflict prevention and development are essential to achieve greater stability. They value USAID's contribution and expertise in shaping this mission, starting with the planning process.
- Providing the COCOM with a basic USAID 101 course would benefit all those involved with planning and coordination, including those of the interagency.
- USAID should leverage its position in the field. It can disperse large amounts of funding in areas of high area of shared interest—anticorruption, stabilization and reconstruction activities, and conflict prevention.

- The COCOM hosts an annual USAID Mission Director conference. Representatives from the regional bureau must attend this meeting to help shape the vision from headquarters about USAID capacities, priorities and to set the boundaries of collaboration.

Senior Development Advisor, US AFRICOM, Germany
Mark A. White, Senior Foreign Service (arrived 10/10)
Cost: $236,141, plus post allowance TBD (reimbursed to USAID)
Diane Putman, FS1 Humanitarian and Health Activities Branch Chief (embedded with the COCOM)
Cost: $195, 132 and post allowance of $64,777 (reimbursed to USAID)
Missions in AOR: 29

USAID's Objectives for AFRICOM:

- Influence military-to-military activities to support foreign assistance objectives and enhance USAID health, education and humanitarian assistance programs targeting hard to reach and vulnerable populations
- Build closer coordination with AFRICOM on implementation of ongoing and future health programs including MEDCAPS and other DoD health related activities such as disaster and Pandemic Influenza preparedness and HIV/AIDS prevention to ensure they are building local capacity and supporting host government authority and US government country strategies.
- Use USAID's unique development expertise to inform US AFRICOM's efforts to build professional and accountable military forces that are subordinate to civilian-led institutions, respect human rights, and adhere to the rule of law in support of effective governance.
- Increase stability by aligning USAID security sector reform and defense reform goals, while supporting African efforts to stabilize current and potential zones of conflict through peacekeeping missions and the growth of robust peacekeeping capacity.
- Facilitate the coordination of field activities being implemented by the USAID Missions and those either being considered or currently implemented by AFRICOM.

The Impact of SDA: This COCOM did not have a full-time SDA from June 2009 until October 2010. An FSO was detailed to the COCOM to serve full-time as a Humanitarian and Health Activities Branch Chief. She heads a branch that has oversight and action on all humanitarian, health and civic assistance funded projects that have an impact on the Africa region. USAID has MORE resources to program in Africa than DOD. As one staff member said, "USAID is the voice of reason in the middle of projects. They help embassies and missions bring the military

group and the development staff together." Because USAID worked to incorporate policy language at DOD, which requires that USAID review and concur on OHDACA projects, this office helps educate country teams, but also the military groups in country. USAID's presence at the COCOM has been important to educate the military about how USAID works with development. The presence of a USAID person is "uniquely valuable and their absence would set things back" according to one general who manages the logistics for the COCOM. Specific direct examples of collaboration and leveraging funding include:

- Morocco: USAID vocational training project; military is doing the construction and USAID is supplying trainers for the school.
- Nigeria: A USAID-funded interfaith and reconciliation center is being built with US military funds and local contractors, who help get the workers to the site.
- The trend this year is for USAID missions to push projects they want and shape military construction and assistance in the field.
- Women's clinic in Democratic Republic of Congo to provide a safe haven and medical care was built with US Military funds, but is used by international NGOs who supply medical workers. This was part of USAID's implementation of a program to address sexual violence against women. Instead of the US military sending in medical teams for short term work, the USAID expert persuaded them to do construction and let NGOs do the medium and long-term care.
- Pandemic response is coordinated by USAID in AFRICOM with the Global Health Bureau and the US military.

Issues for SDA at AFRICOM:

- Interagency at AFRICOM is not coordinated by the COCOM. It is a "learn-by-doing" experience that does not effectively support a comprehensive approach to the unique developmental issues in Africa.
- Great opportunities exist for pilots on conflict prevention and mitigation, but these must be proposed by USAID's Africa Bureau in coordination with the Department of State and DOD.
- USAID has the larger funding base at the COCOM, and thus is in a good position to help leverage USAID managed assistance in the region to achieve specific support for infrastructure and other types of contributions from the COCOM.
- AFRICOM needs a better engagement plan with USAID missions given the number of them in the AOR. The regional bureau AA has a great opportunity to shape the COCOMs work.

- Having an experienced Africa expert at the COCOM also requires better support and coordination from USAID, given the priorities of food security, poverty reduction, and HIV/AIDS prevention.
- AFRICOM, as the newest COCOM needs training to understand how USAID's capacities in the AOR can help the COCOM achieve its mission. Of all the interagency represented at the COCOM, USAID is the most active and best integrated.

Recommendations: The two positions, SDA and the Humanitarian and Health Activities Branch Chief detailee are critical positions for USAID engagement in the region. AFRICOM relies on the advice and programming capacity that these individuals provide for integration of development needs to the regional security agenda.

- AFRICOM can be a laboratory for all kinds of partnerships and innovation.
- The COCOM should help with resources to support the application of technology to development problems in Africa.
- Africa is a focus of the Food Security Initiative. USAID's presence at the COCOM can help facilitate support for this important initiative.
- Given the importance of the Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo as major challenges of security and development, the Africa Bureau should use the SDA and Humanitarian and Health Activities advisor to support policy coordination for humanitarian assistance, stabilization and reconstruction, and also in understanding the military equities in these countries.
- The Humanitarian Advisor position represents one of the best examples of civilian-military synchronization of interests and its record to date should be used as a model for having others in different regions.

Senior Development Advisor, US SOUTHCOM, Florida
Kirk Dahlgren, FS1
Cost: $ 210,294
Military Liaison Officer: Cmdr. Charles Spencer Abbot
Missions in AOR: 16

Overview: SOUTHCOM's area of responsibility covers Latin America and the Caribbean, excluding Mexico and the Bahamas. The combat threat in the region is minimal, but development challenges pose threats to stability and security. SOUTHCOM programs approximately $100 million annually for humanitarian assistance, particularly health-related programs, and an additional $400 million for counternarcotics activities.

USAID/SOUTHCOM Objectives:

- Cooperate with SOUTHCOM to develop integrated programs aimed at stability and insecurity related to illicit trafficking, gangs and illicit power structures that undermine democracy (Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Guatemala, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Honduras, Panama, Jamaica, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic.)

- Improve strategic targeting of medical readiness exercises and other DOD medical activities to align with USAID health objectives. Support increased integration of Continuing Promise missions with USAID health sector capacity building goals (Guatemala, Nicaragua, Panama, Colombia, Guyana, and Haiti.)

- Integrate Haiti Theater Security cooperation and activities with the US government's foreign assistance objectives. Provide support for USAID DOD disaster contingency planning and readiness in Haiti.

The Impact of SDA: The Haitian earthquake underscored the value of USAID presence at the COCOM. Both the SDA and the OFDA representative played critical roles in advising SOUTHCOM on its appropriate role in supporting the US response during a time when DOD at times demonstrated tendencies to overreach given the large number of troops and assets engaged in the operation. USAID's role in Haiti elevated the visibility of the Agency at the COCOM so that both the SDA and the OFDA representative are now a permanent part of the commander's advisory board. In a region with many USAID programs that have graduated from foreign assistance, the SDA is also valued for helping identify targets of support with USAID missions in Central America and the Caribbean and in nonpresence countries. The SDA has helped create successful partnerships in health. In Guatemala he successfully made the case that a MEDRETE should be redirected to an area where USAID had initiated a public-private alliance to address critical health needs among 200,000 needy coffee workers (almost purely an indigenous population). He also leveraged USAID technical assistance in the design of Continuing Promise ship visits to increase local capacity building.

Issues for SDA at SOUTHCOM:

- Opportunities for working in "phase 0" or steady state countries should be pursued with the regional bureau

- Haiti will remain a continuing factor in the SDA job. It may be necessary to have a deputy SDA to help address all the issues where the COCOM needs USAID's advisory role.

- USAID needs to sign the memorandum of understanding with SOUTHCOM that was negotiated and signed by SOUTHCOM but requires final execution.

- SOUTHCOM's mission is one that blends security and development. USAID should be an integral partner in helping to shape the COCOM's mission. With the exception of

counternarcotics and counterterrorism missions, much of the challenge in the hemisphere is about economic growth and inequality. The two issues are closely related.

- SOUTHCOM's AOR does not include Mexico, which complicates interagency coordination on illicit trafficking and other security and stability operations, to include US-Mexico border security and development issues affecting the U.S-Mexico relationship.
- The SDA function is especially important in preventing DOD from driving the agenda, but also in identifying opportunities for partnerships through the use of HCA and OHDACA funding sources.
- SOUTHCOM can be a partner for innovation so USAID and DOD funds can be leveraged for joint projects on energy security, climate change, and application of science and technology investments for civilian use in the Americas.

Recommendations: Retain this position at SOUTHCOM given the region's need to support Haiti, the Caribbean, Colombia, and the increased transnational threats that have challenged Central American stability.

- USAID can leverage the support of SOUTHCOM to find creative ways to combine resources and share knowledge about common issues. Latin America has been the original laboratory for USAID's work over the last 50 years.
- With fewer USAID Missions in the AOR, the regional bureau should look to find ways where the COCOM could help support programs in nonpresence states.
- USAID should educate SOUTHCOM in Partnerships 101. USAID has the experience in working with communities and NGOs that could help the COCOM gain a clearer understanding of how to engage broad sectors of society. This is a big gap in the knowledge base of the COCOM, even if it is part of their mandate.

Senior Development Advisor, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Pentagon
Paul Tuebner, Senior Foreign Service
Military Liaison Officer - Vacant
Cost: $194,445
Missions in AOR: All

Overview: The Joint Chiefs of Staff is a policy-coordinating body that guides the work of all the uniformed services. The Joint Staff assists the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs in accomplishing his responsibilities for: the unified strategic direction of the combat forces; their operation under unified command; and for their integration into an efficient team of land, naval, and air forces. The Joint Staff is composed of approximately equal numbers of officers from the Army, Navy and Marine Corps, and Air Force. In practice, the Marines make up about 20 percent of the

number allocated to the Navy. While USAID maintains an SDA at the JS, there is not a concomitant detailing of a JS LNO to USAID. As the primary representative to the DOD on a daily basis, this SDA position has the potential for tremendous influence and arguably requires the most senior and experienced representation from USAID. Paul Tuebner is the current SDA and holds a rank of Minister Counselor.

USAID/JSC Objectives:

- Promote dialogue and develop clear guidance on DOD foreign assistance policies including CERP guidance for Iraq and Afghanistan (but also potentially for Mexico, Pakistan), OHDACA, HCA, etc.
- Develop and expand executive-level policy dialogue on public-private partnerships—NGOs, private sector.
- Develop joint USAID/DOD guidance and approaches to capacity building.
- Promote ongoing dialogue on roles and responsibilities between USAID and DOD.
- Develop guidance and increase level of coordination for interagency planning and participation in country development strategy processes.
- Ensure coordination of high-profile disaster and crisis response like Haiti, Afghanistan, and Pakistan floods.

The Impact of SDA: The SDA has been highly effective in this position by helping to define the equities that USAID brings to the table in the implementation of the US National Security Strategy. This can be clearly seen in the DOD's Guidance for the Employment of the Force, the DOD's highest level strategy document which now requires consultations with USAID as a part of the overall process of Theater Campaign Plan development.[14] Moreover, the SDA has been able to insert directives for interagency coordination into official DOD policy, including new OHDACA policy that requires USAID Mission Director concurrence on the field use of OHDACA funding, work on the security sector, and in aligning overall policy and planning to reflect USAID concerns. The SDA presence at the JCS has been invaluable in preventing applications of funding that could undermine USAID field projects. The JCS-SDA is in regular communication with his counterparts in the regional COCOMs in terms of getting policy input and collaboration on USAID-related questions. He is more isolated, however, from USAID Regional Bureaus.

[14] The GEF now defines one of its objectives as "effective, legitimate, interoperable, self-sustaining partners" which derives from the 3D Statement on Security Sector Reform, as does the emphasis on predeployment assessments, the development of plans in partnership with the Interagency and host nation, the recognition of other elements of the security sector (to include criminal justice and civilian governance), and the need to balance engagement across the sector.

Issues for SDA at the Pentagon: The Joint Staff is a large operation. USAID's SDA sits in the partnership section of the office, of J-5. It may not be the best place in the Joint Staff for USAID to sit. The J-7 Operational Plans and Joint Force Development would be a place where the 3-D coordination planning is taking place. The SDA also interacts regularly with OSD/Policy staff. Many senior managers at USAID are unaware of the Agency having an SDA at the Pentagon. If USAID is to continue the placement of a senior person in the Pentagon, it will need to consider where the best location is to effect the coordination of defense, diplomacy and development.

As USAID builds up its policy bureau it will need to coordinate its ongoing policy work with the SDA. This type of relationship will help ensure that USAID's development vision, its country strategies, and its evidence based planning are communicated to those at the Pentagon. The Joint Chiefs of Staff is the first point of entry for USAID policy coordination as envisioned under the QDR and the soon to be released QDDR. Thus, getting the civilian-military policy right will be very important in supporting USAID's work with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Recommendations: Retain the Joint Chiefs of Staff SDA as it gives USAID a vital entry point for policy decisions at the Pentagon. It also provides the Agency with access to many other DOD programs.

- USAID needs a policy planning process to address the interface of civilian-military relations as they affect development. This will ensure that USAID has a voice and can shape the Pentagon's agenda. It is critical that the JS SDA be considered as an integral part of the PPL Bureau's senior staff. This will ensure that PPL has up to date information on issues evolving at the Pentagon and that the SDA is effective as a direct conduit for the communication of Agency priorities and strategic initiatives into the DOD.
- An SDA co-located with the JCS should be moved to the J-7 operation or higher, or a second individual is needed to work with the Joint Staff to help connect the dots between the policy planning process and the USAID field missions.
- The SDA needs a military liaison counterpart in the new Policy, Planning and Learning Bureau of USAID to help communicate USAID's development focus and connect it to military planning.
- USAID should continue to work with OSD Policy on getting a policy directive to jointly program CERP funds, similar to the concurrence it now has on OHDACA

A Note of Appreciation

This report would not have been possible without the support of Elena Brineman, Director of the Office of Military Affairs, DCHA Bureau. Her tireless briefing and response to questions, and most important, her enthusiasm for moving USAID forward in this critical mission of security and development issues made this report a better product. My special thanks also go to Larry Garber, DAA for Africa. Larry's tireless efforts to include me in the policy process and seek out my advice brought me back to USAID for this study. Susan Reichle, AA for the new Policy, Planning, and Learning Bureau, offered unflagging support.

I also want to thank the entire OMA staff for their willingness to have an outsider join their ranks, ask probing questions, and still take it all in with good humor. Special thanks go to Edward Thomas, Christine Dougherty, and Gary Mitchell for ensuring that everything I needed was available to support the administrative components of this report. I also want to acknowledge some very special people who also helped educate me about the office and its mission: John Dunlop, David Bendana, Richard Byess, Jon Freedman, and Aubrey Eaton. The military LNOs also made my field visits to their COCOMs very useful experiences: Lt. Col. Greg Jicha, Lt. Col. Nancy Jean-Louis, Cmdr. Spencer Abbot, Col. John Hope, Lt. Col. Samuel Webster, and Lt. Col. Todd Goehler must be singled out for their support.

Finally, special thanks must go to all the Senior Development Advisors in the field. These talented and dedicated Foreign Service Officers provided me with a window on the critical work they are doing, and also opened so many doors at their respective COCOMs so that I could see, first hand, how integrating USAID's development expertise into the daily work of the COCOMs is not only possible, but also essential. To Theodore Gehr, Peter Natiello, Diana Putman, Marty Hanratty, Catherine Niarchos, Kirk Dahlgren, Paul Tuebner, and Mark A. White, you are the best! And I dedicate this work to you. Of course, the views expressed in this paper are those of the author. They do not represent those of USAID or its Office of Military Affairs.

About the Author

Johanna Mendelson Forman is a Senior Associate with the Americas Program and with the William E. Simon Chair in political economy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. As a senior policy expert and practitioner with more than 25 years of experience, she has worked extensively on security and development issue, pioneered post conflict reconstruction theory and practice, engaged in fieldwork on civilian-military relations and democratic transitions, served as a program officer for UN and other multilateral organizations, and more recently developed extensive working experience with renewable energy as a development tool. With her broad understanding of transnational security issues and current threats, she is working on projects related to cross-border arms transfers between the United States and Mexico. As an attorney, she clerked at the Executive Office of Immigration Review in the Department of Justice on employment-related immigration matters.

She has done fieldwork in conflict states in Latin America, Eastern Europe, and Africa. With demonstrated success as both a policy expert and a field-based practitioner, she has combined a career of public service with teaching and mentoring graduate students and intern scholars. She was formerly co-director of the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project, and she has written extensively on security-sector reform in conflict states, economic development in postwar societies, the role of the United Nations in peace operations, and energy security. In 2003, she participated in a review of the post conflict reconstruction effort of the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq as part of a CSIS team.

She also brings experience in the world of philanthropy, having served as the director of peace, security, and human rights at the UN Foundation, managing a multi-million-dollar grants portfolio. She has held senior positions in the US government at the Agency for International Development, the Bureau for Humanitarian Response, and the Office of Transition Initiatives, as well as at the World Bank's first Post-Conflict Unit. She has been a senior fellow with the Association of the United States Army and a guest scholar at the US Institute of Peace, where she worked on issues related to livelihood creation in nation-building exercises. Most recently, she served as a senior advisor to the UN's Special Representative to Haiti in 2005 and 2006.

An educator, she has had extensive experience in the academic world. She directed the Democracy Project at the American University, a pioneering effort to engage civilians and military leaders to transform the security sector across Latin America at the end of the Cold War. She also managed the Washington Semester's Foreign Policy Program at the same university. She has lectured often at the Foreign Service Institute's program on Latin America and on stability operations. She is a frequent lecturer at the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies and the Army War College. She currently serves as professorial lecturer in the Conflict Management Program at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University and has taught at Georgetown University's Center for National Security Studies. She held a research faculty appointment at American University in Washington. She has published extensively on a broad range of security-sector policy issues and is a frequent editorial contributor and commentator in both the national and international media.

She is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. She also served on the advisory boards of Women in International Security and is currently a board member of the Latin American Security Network, RESDAL. She holds a JD from Washington College of Law at American University, a PhD in Latin American history from Washington University, Saint Louis, and a master's of international affairs, with a certificate of Latin America studies, from Columbia University in New York. She is fluent in Spanish and Portuguese.