Peace in East and Central Africa II Program

Final Report 2007 - 2012











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List of Acronyms

AI Appreciative Inquiry
AP Administration Police
AR Action Research

CAP Community Action Plan

CBO Community Based Organization

CEWARN Conflict Early Warning and Response Network
CEWERU Conflict Early Warning and Response Unit
CPMR Conflict Prevention Mitigation and Response

CPU Community Policing Unit
CSO Civil Society Organization
CWG Community Working Group
DC District Commissioner

DLMC District Livestock Marketing Council
DISC District intelligence security committee

DPC District Peace Committee

EPP Elections and Political Processes

FGD Focus Group Discussion
GOK Government of Kenya
MC Mediation Council

NGO Non-Government Organization

NSC National Steering Committee on Peace Building and Conflict Management

NCIC National Cohesion and Integration Commission
PEACE II Peace in East and Central Africa II program

PLA Participatory Learning and Action RRF Rapid Response Framework

TFG Transitional Federal Government (of Somalia)

TOT Training of Trainers

USAID/EA United States Agency for International Development/East Africa

USG United States Government

PSIC Provincial Security Intelligence Committee

WFP Women for peace YFP Youth for Peace

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1: Introduction

The Peace in East and Central Africa Phase II program - PEACE II - was a five year, USAID funded regional conflict transformation program that covered Kenya's border areas with Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan and Uganda. These are categorized by CEWARN as the 'Somali Cluster' to the east, and the 'Karamoja Cluster' to the west. The program builds upon previous regional USAID conflict programs by focusing on conflict affected communities who live across porous national borders. An additional USAID (EPP) grant has been used to help prevent election related violence in Kenya and South Sudan. A further USAID (CMM) grant during FY11 supported a program of action research to explore factors underpinning sustainability of peace building achievements.

At the regional level, PEACE II sought to contribute to the development of African leadership in the management of conflict in the Horn of Africa, while working at a grassroots level to improve the capacity of communities and community based organizations to respond to conflict - mostly by strengthening links between them, wider civil society, and government structures. As part of its analysis, assessment and capacity building work, PEACE II engaged stakeholders at several different levels, to help analyze the security situation and build consensus on peacebuilding approaches. Using this information, PEACE II supported activities designed to help strengthen local security mechanisms and reduce priority conflicts. PEACE II also invested in extensive capacity building for local groups to engage the government in democratic processes, on security issues, governance and conflict sensitive development in order to positively influence cross-border stability. Working closely with local peace committee networks, PEACE II has endeavored to foster links between them and local, national and regional conflict warning and response initiatives. Through this PEACE II contributed to the strengthening of the regional Conflict Early Warning Response Network, CEWARN, a secretariat of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) that monitors regional conflict. The program focused on two main objectives:

- 1. Strengthen cross-border security through local community security initiatives
- 2. Contribute to cross-border peace committees' ability to prevent, mitigate, and respond to conflict in focus border areas.

136 grants were issued to 70 local organizations, along with technical support and accompaniment. A number of key peacebuilding approaches were developed through the PEACE II program including community contracting for 'peace dividends,' trauma healing to deepen social reconciliation,' collaborative peace network strengthening to broaden peace committee networks, action research and appreciative inquiry to improve local capacities for learning and decentralized capacity building. As a result, stronger cross-border peace networks are leading local early responses to conflict. Peace dividend projects have strengthened inter-communal, and cross border relationships. The expansion of grass roots peace networks is led by local peace organizations building the capacity of others. Local peace processes continue to be followed-up with monitoring and support for sustained dialogue and national CEWERUs are stronger in Somalia and Uganda.



The PEACE II program has learned that community empowerment and consensus building are at heart of all approaches (community contracting, early warning systems, peace committee networks). Local peacebuilders are the key resource for local capacity building and facilitation. A diverse range of local peace organizations (sector response) are a key resource for a decentralized and sustainable peace committee network. Early response capacity is as important as early warning and peace advocates within the government are essential.

In the first year of the program (FY8) Pact and USAID East Africa agreed that owing to limited funding and the regional threats posed by instability in Somalia, the program would primarily invest in the Somali Cluster. A security assessment was commissioned which highlighted competition for control of commercial circuits replacing traditional natural resource competition as a source of tension and conflict as well as poor relations between communities and government and security officials on both sides of the border. A baseline survey was undertaken in 10 locations and an expert panel with five senior analysts from Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan, Kenya and Uganda then reviewed and analyzed the information. Local consultative meetings then produced implementation plans and the identification of 'peace corridors'. A request for applications was then launched with local CSOs for work within these corridors and following technical committee shortlisting, PEACE II staff undertook a further process of validating the shortlist of applicants with trusted analysts and community leaders to ensure project effectiveness, and local legitimacy and community ownership PEACE II also sponsored a regional women's networking meeting for over 60 women peace activists from Ethiopia, Somalia and Kenya and developed a strong working relationship with CEWARN.

In the second year of the program (FY9) the operating environment at the Kenya Somalia border became more challenging as AlShabaab took full control of the Somalia side and the Kenyan government officially closed the border, affecting freedom of movement and trade. AlShabaab threatened attacks inside Kenya if the government of Kenya offered support for the weak Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (TFG) inside Somalia. The increased suspicion of international NGOs and non-Somalis challenged operations and at one point staff were detained in Gherille until elders secured their release. Frequent changes of local administrators in towns on the Somali side of the border also posed a challenge as new officials need to be repeatedly sensitized on the program and new relationships built. The tense security environment in the Somali cluster has also led to the militarization, market-ization and increased militancy among youth, leading to several attempts by various groups within Somalia to recruit young men on both sides of the border. The program responded with the design of a youth specific component titled 'youth in violent conflict transformation. AlShabaab outlawed women's participation in public processes, dramatically reducing the space available for women empowerment initiatives. The program responded by creating separate initiatives for women to deliberate and participate in separate forums which has set an agenda for local women's leadership development. In Ethiopia, new civil society legislation titled the Charities and Societies proclamation was enacted, restricting NGOs from working on democracy, human rights, gender and peace-building. After a number of attempts, with the Ethiopia CEWERU to secure an exemption for cross border peace building, it was agreed with USAID that PEACE II would cancel plans inside Ethiopia.

In the third year of the program (FY10) PEACE II continued operations in Somalia and secured support for local cross-border freedom of movement, despite conflict in the Liboy-Dobley corridor, between Al Shabaab and Hizbul Islaam forces. Peace dividend implementation advanced significantly under the management of newly established community working groups Trauma healing methodologies have been rolled out through partners and have stimulated many new locally financed initiatives. Mandera based Religious leader mediation councils, livestock mediation councils women and youth for peace organizations, and community policing organizations have expanded their areas of operation and this created local demand for capacity building in other parts of the Kenya Somalia border, which in turn informed the design of the FY11 action research project. The Somalia CEWERU has strengthened linkages between peace committees and Mogadishu and received formal IGAD recognition and the PEACE II program began a sub-project on preventing election violence with the Kenya and South Sudan CEWERUs.

In the fourth year of the program (FY11) the TFG Somalia forces with their local allies and support from Kenya and Ethiopia engaged AlShabaab along the length of the Kenya-Somalia border. AlShabaab attacks inside Kenya increased and the operating environment became more insecure and unstable. PEACE II partners in Bellethawa secured agreement from Kenyan Authorities in Mandera that refugees fleeing the fighting would be welcomed in Kenya and peace committees managed to convince the armed groups to fight outside major towns to minimize civilian casualties. Intra-Ogaden political conflicts increased in Garissa and PEACE II partners brokered agreement on independent and unbiased investigations into assassinations and ensured clan elders kept their communities out of political conflicts. During the year the PEACE II program supported an extensive program of action research


involving 14 teams of local facilitators in the Somali cluster and challenged partners to expand their work and be more systematic in building sustainable capacities for peace and peace networks across the whole length of the border. A wide range of new local sector response groups were formed or strengthened during the year, especially at the Garissa Lower Jubba borders (in response to the findings of the mid-term evaluation). A series of 8 county conversations on election violence prevention were implemented with the Kenya CEWERU.

During the fifth year of the program (FY12), the Kenya Somalia border remained insecure as TFG and AlShabaab military engagements continued, though the TFG and their allies made progress in securing more territory from AlShabaab. AlShabaab attacks inside Kenya continued and new tensions emerged inside Kenya in relation intercommunal competition for control of new devolved county governments as the 2013 elections approached. In this final year of the program, the cross border peace network was expanded to southern most part of the border including two new cross border corridors, Amuma-Waldena and Raskomboni-Kiunga. In addition peace committees were supported to respond to the new context of Kenya Defense force military engagement with AlShabaab and the restoration of interim TFG local authorities on the Somalia side, as well as to lead a number of rapid responses. Youth sector response groups were supported to engage with at-risk youth and community policing groups in efforts to strengthen security arrangements in light of new AlShabaab threats inside Kenya and an increase in ex militia youth contributing to banditry. Religious leaders were supported to strengthen their nascent network of local mediation councils (Mandera, Elwak, Rhamu, Banissa, Wajir Garrissa, Liboi, Dhobley, Hulugho, Kolbio and Masalani) and consolidate sector response groups on the Somalia side of the border. Women for peace groups were also supported to improve networking and empowerment of women mediators at the grass roots level, as well as leading the consolidation of trauma healing and social reconciliation networks in both the Somali and Karamoja clusters The UGANDA and Somalia CEWERUs were also supported to strengthen their strategic plans and with key activities for coherent engagement of central government in partnership with local peace committees and officials at the borders. Media partners continued to inform and mobilize citizens for peace and peaceful elections, with an emphasis on youth.

Coordination with other USG Peace building programs: PEACE II has collaborated closely with the USAID funded, Pact implemented, Kenya Civil Society Strengthening Program (KCSSP). Peace II has also collaborated with the new USAID Transition Initiatives for Somalia program and offered training on advanced social reconciliation, community contracting and trauma healing. Exchange visits were organized from the USAID funded Institute for Peace of Hargeisa University in Somaliland and PEACE II advisors supported Interpeace forums for minority communities in Somalia.



Kenya - Somalia Border





2. Social reconciliation and trauma healing

Theory of change

Theory of change: Increased stakeholder understanding of broken relationships and trauma caused by conflict will increase stakeholder resilience and leadership in conflict transformation when faced with future violent conflict.

For meaningful social, economic and political development to occur in the aftermath of protracted violence, communities' capacity must be built in such a way that they can participate in constructive development. The high levels of distress conflicts cause, and lingering resentment and unresolved issues can generate a desire for revenge, prompting cycles of renewed conflict. Healing both individual and collective trauma is a concrete step towards reconciling warring communities. Trauma healing can help groups reflect on their own role in perpetuating narratives about marginalization and abuse where these narratives drive a hardline position by the community. Trauma healing contributes to deepening processes of dialogue, healing and the building of peaceful relationships between conflict affected groups. It also prevents traditional customary law, which often places community security needs over redress for victims, from being the only process in place. Customary law often does not deliver social justice to victims and therefore does not alleviate pain. In cases such as marriage disputes, rape and blood compensation, perpetrators are supported by their community elders to compensate victims and don't face harsh consequences themselves. In the Somali cluster trauma healing has been recognized for strengthening a sense of community justice (rather than a desire for revenge), reducing the stigma associated with trauma and reviving Somali traditions of compensation and community solidarity.

Working in groups, PEACE II trained facilitators train sub-sections of communities, drawing in participants from different clans and sectors. Trauma healing sessions helped transform many victims of violence, ex-militia members, drug addicts, into respected members of the community. There are many testimonies of victims who were intent on revenge, deciding to forgive perpetrators and move on with their lives, thereby reducing the momentum towards cycles of revenge and conflict. As a result, communities becoming more empathetic to those they are in conflict with to the extent that they are willing to cease viewing them as enemies. Trauma healing networks have continued to expand to grass roots communities, building a wider based of community facilitators able to manage disputes and contribute to longer term social reconciliation locally and there is now a pool of trained trauma healers located in all key locations. In FY 10, trauma healing made such an impact that there were many locally financed initiatives led by women for peace groups and religious leaders. A film documentary and training manual were produced. The USAID funded TIS program then used materials and trainers from the PEACE II to roll out trauma healing work in Mogadishu.

In El Wak, Kenya, a Garre community leader participated in a trauma workshop on community healing. At the start of the sessions he was outspoken about his anger at Murulle community following the recent killing of 22of his relatives. But since the trauma healing training session, he has been a vocal advocate for the return of Murulle IDPs to El Wak, the reopening of their businesses, and the sharing of natural resources like water and pasture with them. He said that the trauma healing sessions helped him understand the cyclical, intergenerational nature of the Garre-Murulle conflict and that, as a leader, he was in a position to stop the cycle and lead the community in finding a way to live in peace with their Murulle neighbors. El Wak trauma meeting, January 2009.

A total of 62,326 people participated in 553 social reconciliation activities conducted and completed with participation of two or more conflicting parties. An understanding of trauma and trauma healing has strengthened the role of local leadership in a wide range of social reconciliation processes including the effectiveness of rapid



responses to resolve disputes that could escalate into inter-communal conflict, as well as dialogue within and between conflicting groups to restore or strengthen community peace agreements.

Lessons Learned

Through the piloting trauma healing work, and the development of trauma healing materials based on the experiences of a strong local network on the ground, the PEACE II program has learned the following. Individuals and groups in chronic conflict contexts tend to function on 'survival mode' operating a day at a time such that long term conflict transformation work becomes difficult or perceived as irrelevant. Moreover, the fear of recurrence of the conflict significantly affects attitudes and behaviors and inhibits stakeholder interactions and attempts to build new relationships and networks. There are many profound impacts on the whole community from gender based violence, but these issues rarely come to light in routine discussions on peacebuilding, though they influence attitudes and behaviors and decision making in the community. Many young men feel powerless and vulnerable in the context of rapid social and economic change (and trauma healing work aims to enable a re-discovery of individual power for social change). Telling and re-telling of toxic narratives of new identities generates a justification for the use of violence, and reduce complex situations to a 'single story' that is hardly questioned or critically reviewed from generation to generation (and trauma healing sessions provide safe spaces for reexamination of narratives and how they shape group identities with emphasis on narratives that help individuals and groups break the cycles of violence. Competitive politics has become an arena for settling historical feelings of pain and shame. Groups build institutions and social formations that perpetuate structural violence through exclusion, marginalization and power politics.

The programs engage the leadership at all levels of society to break away from narratives of victimhood and enhancing a peace oriented political culture. Trauma healing sessions seek to provide space and opportunity for individuals and groups to constructively engage with narratives of pain and for both victims and perpetrators to be able to express feelings of vulnerability, shame, fear and anger. Trauma healing allows a free discussion and creates a space where experiences of abuse, impunity, corruption and exclusion of marginalized groups does not limit people's exploration of what change is needed and possible at the individual and group level. There is a need for action research to assess different types of trauma to design more focused interventions. Trauma healing should also be mainstreamed into institutions such as schools, police, and government departments is needed for holistic social reconciliation and forgiveness.

Trauma healing has engaged new actors in social reconciliation processes and broadened inclusivity and ownership. Many participants at trauma healing trainings have gone one to initiate and finance their own trauma healing and peace processes. Although local initiative is central here, external programs can appropriately engage to encourage and support this. Trauma healing can transform community dialogue which is often superficial and politicized (there are many example of politicians calling in instructions to their clan representatives during conflicts and peace processes). Trauma healing is also a vehicle for promoting women and other actors towards the forefront of peace initiative, as effective trauma healing requires understanding and facilitation skills, and therefore provides an opportunity for leadership based on these qualities (in contrast to assumed authority of elders).

Achievements and impacts

Increased stakeholder understanding of broken relationships and trauma caused by conflict

Γhe PE □	EACE II program has supported a range of trauma healing workshops with local partners, including With MWFP, WCC and GPC in the Mandera-Gedo region including workshops in Mandera, Rhamu, El Wak, Lafey in Kenya, and in Tulla-Amin, Unsi, Damassa, Gendondwahe, Laan Abeer in Somalia
	With WPDA and WASDA in the Wajir-Middle Jubba region in Diff, and Gherille, Makoror, Riba, Wajir Bor, Kutulo, Konton, Kutulo, Khorof Harar, Dadajibulla, Modogashe, Habaswein, Wajir town, and Lagdera.
	With IPAD, IWFP and AFREC in the Garissa-Lower Jubba region in Masalani, Ijara, Kiunga, Kolbio Masalani and Sangenlo in Kenya and Raskamboni, Hulugho, Amuma and Waldena in Somalia
П	With LOKADO and RWFP in Karamoja in Tapach, Rupa, Lomunyena, Kalobeyei, Nawountos, Kakuma,

Loreng, Letea, Lokipoto and Lorengippi, Nawountos, and Loima. The program also facilitated trainers

from the Somali cluster to train trauma healers in Karamoja.

As a result participants found courage to talk and express themselves freely, visit areas they had sworn not to go, shake hands and eat with previous "enemies" and most importantly recognized their own role in perpetuating conflict. A wide range of local community leadership was also reach. For example in Karamoja trauma healing workshops involved business women; women leaders; gold miners; government administration; village elders and opinion leaders; school teachers and pupils; reformed warriors and bicycle operators. A new generation of peace leadership is also emerging among sectors of the community as well as within government, and trauma healers are among the strongest of these facilitators, and have played a key lead role in the social reconciliation processes described below, demonstrating stakeholder resilience and leadership in conflict transformation.

Increased stakeholder resilience and leadership in conflict transformation when faced with violent conflict.

"I remember everybody complaining about military harassment. Sharing experiences of the crackdown by the state and the communal violence that preceded it, helped aggrieved parties find common ground. In this, women too played a particularly important role, impressing religious leaders with the fact that they were the first to offer honest personal testimonies of what they had done. Traditionally, Somali women give encouragement and support to husbands and sons when they fight. A Somali proverb reflects this – "a conflict that starts with women never ends." Another proverb countering - "in war, a son is dead but never born." Dekha Ibrahim Abdi

The Garre-Murule clan conflict at the Mandera-Gedo border between Kenya and Somalia

Since 2005 there had been intermittent violent conflicts between the Garre and Murale in the Mandera area over natural resources, trading routes, political constituencies and administrative boundaries. At the start of the program in 2008, a major conflict between the Garre and Murule erupted and Mandera town was divided into two. The 2008 conflict was more violent than in 2005 and started at Alango, when the sinking of a borehole by the government was perceived as a violation of the 2005 peace agreement brokered by SUPKEM. The Garre prevented Murule pastoralists watering their livestock at the well and the Kenyan army was posted to the site to enforce peace and disarm militias. Several chiefs and councilors from both clans were arrested while several armed Garre militia members were also arrested. Many were killed in the clashes.¹

PEACE II interventions began in July 2008 with support for a range of rapid response initiatives including support for joint teams of CSO representatives and security personnel to visit hotspots, a visit from 18 high ranking government officers and clan elders from Nairobi, initiatives by religious leaders through partnership with SUPKEM to visit affected schools and counsel traumatized students, and meetings of professionals, elders and key diaspora community representatives in Nairobi (with support from the Kenyan CEWERU). These efforts collectively led to a ceasefire, and district peace committees were able to support the return of stolen livestock

However, despite the ceasefire, tensions remained. In 2009, PEACE II supported trauma healing workshops in Lafey and Elwak, targeting chiefs, teachers, religious leaders, women leaders, and youth leaders, teachers and government officials, nurses, teachers, clergy, police, prison guards, and the local judiciary. Some participants of community meetings confessed funding youth militias in 2008 clashes. Trauma healing work led to a new momentum for deeper reconciliation and between 2009-10 PEACE II then supported WCC, MCPC and ESPC to conduct cross-border peace committee meetings and community dialogues in Lafey, Elwak, Damassa, Dadajibulla and Wargadud (involving also the Marehan) to review peace accords, and roll out trauma sensitization with directly affected communities.

This enabled in FY11 the reopening of the Alangu borehole and an initiative by stakeholders from Elwak, Kutulo, El Kala, Lafe, Fino Arabia and Damasa to speed up the return of IDPs to areas of Lafey and Alango. Blood compensation was paid (even AlShabaab paid US \$ 34,000 in one case) and peace dialogues and exchange visits gave some communities an opportunity to meet face to face for the first time since 2005 violent conflict that displaced them from their respective homes. Many displaced communities have returning to their land, houses and shops. Murule community members are now conducting businesses in Elwak and Garre community members are trading in Lafey.

Case study: Trauma healing and Garre-Murule peacebuilding

During Kenya's military engagement in the Garre-Murule conflict in 2008, the Kenyan military at one point crossed into Somalia unintentionally, and among the victims of the military advance was a Somali national who was severely tortured. While recovering in hospital he seemed to be losing his mind trying to understand why the Kenyan military had done this to him inside Somalia. After six months, he recovered but was permanently

disabled. He kept contacting the cross-border peace committee to ask what had been done about his case asking for compensation in Kenya. His request had been forwarded to the Kenyan administration but had received no response. His deep frustration and anger made him a very volatile and disruptive force in the community. He repeatedly said he was ready to attack any Kenyan military personnel that he encountered. During trauma healing training sessions in Damassa, he learned there were many people who had had experiences like his, and who had found a way to move on with their lives. He now participates in many peace activities and knows that his own experiences are generally understood. He is now our peace ambassador in Damassa, Somalia, and is the first person there receiving Kenyan delegations.

The Garre-Marehan clan conflict at the Mandera-Gedo border between Kenya and Somalia

The Garre-Marehan conflict flared in 2005 and a ceasefire was reached after extensive intervention, though many resolutions were not enforced and tensions remained. In Early 2011, AlShabaab were pushed from the Gedo region of Somalia by the TFG with assistance from their allied militia including the Garre militia from Ethiopia. This caused Al-Shabaab to start increase attacks inside Kenya. In March 2012, a number of prominent Garre leaders and businessmen were assassinated, increasing Garre-Marehean tensions which eventually led to a mob killing of a Marehan man suspected of being an assassin, which in turn led to Marehan demands for blood compensation. When a further Garre man was assassinated, this triggered widespread violence against Marehan property in Mandera town, and large displacements of Marehan to Somalia and a stand-off between the two communities.

The PEACE II program supported a response involving the whole cross-border network of community peace organizations (DPCs and councils of elders, religious leader mediation councils, community policing groups, women for peace groups, youth for peace groups and district livestock market mediators. All of these groups had been trained in trauma healing and social reconciliation and were able to separate the two communities and hold parallel processes on either side of the border until tensions had calmed and face to face dialogue could begin.

Belethawa Women for Peace in particular played a vital role through dialogue with youth, women and elders to ensure the prevention of potential revenge attacks on Garre in Mandera. The TFG were also requested to restrain any Marehan from crossing into Mandera. Following this a high level team arrived from Nairobi including politicians, businessmen and professional elites. On 28 March 2012, Garre and Marehan elders signed a peace accord, in the presence of other clans, local administration, politicians, religious leaders and business elites, and agreed to promote peace and investigate killings and looting of properties and to pay for blood compensation for the killed Marehan man; to explain to communities that the landmines were not laid by the Marehan community, to make token payments to directly affected families and to form a joint Garre-Marehan committee to investigate the root causes of the conflict, assess the properties damaged and persons displaced; and to establish community policing patrols along the border monitor, and respond and resolve any emerging issues. The business elites funded and supported the peace process for 3 days. They agreed to pay for all looted property and compensate blood money.

The Garre-Degodia clan conflict on the Mandera border between Kenya and Ethiopia (and in Wajir)

The Garre and Degodia communities have a long standing land dispute over land settlements and administrative boundaries along the Tana River in Ethiopia which feeds into community tensions over land settlements and administrative boundaries in Malkimara in Mandera, Kenya. Tensions between the Garre and Degodia increased in 2008 when a Degodia candidate became MP for Mandera Central, a traditional Garre stronghold. Intense conflict erupted in Banissa and Malkimara in January 2012, in advance of the Kenya 2013 elections, causing dozens of deaths and the displacement of thousands of people, as well as looting of property, burning of houses, closure of schools, road blocks, rumors and hate speech.

PEACE II supported the community peace network of Mandera, led by MMC and then later MCPU to intervene. MMC was selected as the lead owning to a history of work on trauma healing on the northern border of Mandera as well as religious leader networks that stretched cross border. MMC led a rapid response in early 2012 in Banissa and Malkimara which led to clan leaders agreeing a 'Banissa peace declaration' in the presence of an estimated 5000 people, which agreed to promote peace, condemn hate speech, support traditional dispute resolution mechanisms, and establish police stations in Banisa, Olla and Malkimara. MMC then led a team to disseminate the Banissa peace declaration to all affected areas, and beyond to Wajir. Following this the ministry of Northern Kenya and area MPs intervened to help implement resolutions on the resettlement of IDPs and schools were reopened. Between April and June regular monitoring found that the situation was calm and both communities had started implementing the peace resolutions and all public roads had re-opened, all affected villages in Rhamu,

Banissa and part of Takaba were accessible and some stolen camels had been returned. In May local chiefs and community leaders resolved that there would be no re-grouping of militias in Kenya, and that the ceasefire should be extended and compensation paid. In June MMC and the taskforce met elders of Degodia from Filtu and chiefs in Rhamu and agreed to expand peace dialogues cross border to connect the peace initiative to efforts by the Ethiopian government to resolve the Dawa river issue in Ethiopia

However, as the Kenyan election approached tensions re-emerged. In July 2012 the county commissioner held a crisis meeting at the Rhamu district commissioner's office where it was agreed to establish police posts in Malka Mari, Malka Roqa, Guba and Banissa, and increase security in Rhamu town and its periphery. Despite these efforts, in August 6 people were killed in Banissa and 5 in Rhamu, and dozens of families were displaced, properties destroyed and livestock raided. A ceasefire was again agreed and lasted until 4 November, when four Garre were killed in a gun ambush near Rhamu town. When the bodies passed through Mandera town more violence broke out. As the conflict escalated Shafshafey and Neboi became the worst hit hotspots. The livestock market and the abattoir were the epicentre of violence. There was widespread looting and destruction of properties and people from neighbouring Ethiopia and Somalia were reported to have participated. 7 more people were killed, several others injured, over 80 houses were burned and at least 500 people were displaced. The conflict also spread to Wajir in August when a dispute among two youth, led to one man being killed in Wagberi village. The Garre and Degodia both armed themselves with axes, machetes and arrows, and 15 persons from both warring communities were wounded, 45 houses were torched and many were displaced.

The good working relations between the different peace organizations in Mandera, enabled them to demonstrate resilience and leadership in the face of renewed violent conflict. Following attacks on the home of one of the leading religious leaders, stakeholders agreed that the lead coordination role should now be played by MDPC with input from other actors from August 2012.

MMC then conducted several peace dialogue meetings in Mandera town and Banissa
MWFP organized Garre and Degodia women forums and women response committees.
In Banissa joint committees moved from village to village preaching peace with support from the Minster
of Northern Kenya (in Doday, Shantoley, Rhamu, Giriza, Rhamu and Mandera) funded by business elites,
traditional leaders, religious leaders and politicians
The Rhamu DPC and others organized a Rhamu market security committee and it re-opened
MDPC facilitated the re-election and training of DPCs in Rhamu and Banissa in September
MMC supported a new third party mediation team with Murule, Marehan and Corner tribe leaders,
MDCP and partners also assisted in convening Garre and Degodia elders together in the presence of
government and security representatives where they agreed to a disarming of the Kenya police reserves
from the warring clans; an independent government inquiry into the murder of the four people killed in
Rhamu, a program of peace messaging through Star FM radio and support for IDP returns, and further
trauma healing and community dialogue.

Similarly in Wajir, the good working relations between the different peace organizations in Mandera, enabled them to demonstrate resilience and leadership in the face of renewed violent conflict. WPDA worked with the MP and County Commissioner and in discussion with fifty key elders from the AlFattah council and religious leaders from the Ajuran, Ogaden, Degodia, Garre and minority clans, formed a special committee of 25 to oversee the return of IDPs to their homes and promote peace, and to reach out to Garre IDPs at Wajir Police Station and assuring them of their safety. Local NGOs² in collaboration with the government then facilitated the reconstruction of the 45 houses and IDPs returned home. The government increased security patrols and surveillance. WWFP collected utensils from families and friends, food from the business people and cash for the displaced. In November the two communities clashed in Burmayo resulting in a spate of violence where two people lost their lives, and dozens were injured and hundreds displaced. PEACE II supported WPDA to facilitate two teams of elders and peace actors to visit the hotspots of Burmayo, Dunto Mansa, Ogorale, Kotulo and Sarman and then facilitate dialogue at Burmayo and at Kotulo where leaders agreed to mobilize chiefs for implementation, establish an administration police post to the settlement to restore law and order; engage with IDPs to encourage them to return home and mobilise a joint security team from the 3 neighbouring districts to enhance patrols and surveillance to monitor criminals, and ensure DPCs and CPUs report all cases of illegal small arms possession to the security agencies.

Intra-Marehan clan conflicts within the Gedo border region of Somalia

Tensions between Marehan sub-clans in the Gedo region of Somalia are also profound, but they were suppressed by the arrival of AlShabaab in the Gedo region. Despite the highly restrictive operating environment, in 2010 and 2011, the PEACE II program supported GPC to lead community social reconciliation processes in Tulla-Amin and

Unsi and trauma workshops in Gendondwahe and Laan Abeer. As AlShabaab was pushed back from the border in 2011-12, PEACE II supported partner GPC to map and analyze intra-Marehan community conflicts and begin consultations with key stakeholders on future social reconciliation priorities.

Many of the key informants consulted were emerging peace leaders who had been involved in PEACE II supported trauma healing workshops and demonstrated a new level of leadership in discussing these sensitive and suppressed conflict dynamics, while recognizing a need to proactively engage. The following reconciliation priorities were identified:

- o Rer Ahmed, Alidere, Horowsame and Faqayaqub clans in Belet Hawa, Dollo and Luq
- o Reh Hassan, Rer Garad and Rer Siyad clans in Garbaharey, Burdubow and Elade
- o Talha, Rer Ugaas Shamake and Bahaguled clans in Badere
- o Talha, Urmidic and Maqabul in Gherille
- o Sonfura, Urmidic and Wagardac in Elwak

Case Study Trauma healing in Gedo:

In 1991, militia groups overran BelletHawa. One night, they arrested 27 men in their homes and the following morning, they assembled them in an open field and mobilized all women and children out of their homes to view them being shot in cold blood. They said whoever was found crying would also be shot. The corpses were loaded on to donkey-carts and discarded into a nearby dumpsite, no-one was allowed near the site, and the bodies naturally decomposed without the ceremonial burial required by the Islamic faith. The militia's intention it was presumed, was to dehumanize, traumatize, and instill fear in their rival clan. Among the onlookers was a ten year-old boy who witnessed his father's death. As a result, he became withdrawn and determined to avenge the killing. At a GPC facilitated trauma healing workshop in Bellethawa, Somalia, this young man, now in his late twenties, attended the training session alongside one of his father's killers. On the last the last day of the training session, he opened up to narrate his experience: "Initially when I was invited to this workshop I felt it was pointless and I hated sitting in the same forum with some of you in this meeting. The topic on breaking the cycle of violence touched my heart the most. Avenging my father's death will neither bring him back nor heal my heart. I had thought I could relieve myself by inflicting the same pain on others. This explains to me why we Somalis continue to butcher one another. I've decided to forgive all the persons responsible for my father's death." 'One of his father's killers was also among the participants. He stood up and said: "Since the day I committed these awful acts I have not been able to sleep. Guilt has haunted me daily and I feel insecure all the time."

Degodia, Marehan and Ogaden clan conflicts at the Wajir-Middle Jubba border (Kenya-Somalia)

In the Gherille-Gherille corridor and the Diff-Diff corridor, seasonal tensions occur between the Degodia, Marehan and Ogaden over transborder natural resource use as well as trade disputes. Since 2011, the border has also become more insecure as the TFG forces have consolidated their positions in Bellethawa and Dhobley and the borders between Gedo and Lower Jubba regions in Somalia have become more prone to hit and run attacks from mobile AlShabaab units. Natural resource and trade disputes have been managed by DPCs and cross border peace committees with support from the Al Fattah Council of elders and WPDA, WWFP and WASDA. WPDA has also led peace organizations in managing the increased threats from AlShabaab and community policing systems have been strengthened and this has led to a number of occasions where firearms and explosives have been successfully located and destroyed by security forces.

The Awleihan-Makabul (Intra-Ogaden) clan conflict on the Lagdera (Wajir-Garissa) border in Kenya

The Lagdera border in Wajir South has been a source of tension between the Awleihan and Makabul sub-clans and PEACE II partners WPDA and WASDA from Wajir and GMC and GPDC Garissa have supported a number of attempts from 2011-12 to resolve the boundary dispute (consultations and workshops on mediation and resource management). In Mid-August 2012, a stalemate in the process, combined with rising tensions over the upcoming Kenyan elections (including anticipation of new devolved powers under county government) led to an attacked by an armed group and one person was killed, 12 people were injured and more displaced and properties destroyed. Peace building networks from both Wajir and Garissa, that had been strengthened in 2011 and 2012 demonstrated a new level of collaboration, resilience and leadership in responding to this conflict.

A three phase dialogue among traditional elders was facilitated by the GMC (Ogaden religious leaders including the Sultan) in collaboration with SUPKEM, and traditional councils of elders. Stakeholders from Wajir included Mohamed Zubeir, Makabul, Gheeri and Baa Gheeri while stakeholders from Garissa included Abudwak, Abdallah and Auleihan. This agreed on the three phases of 'Sabeen' compensation³ as well as agreeing a joint committee of

Ogaden clan elders to travel to the affected area to reduce tensions, and assess damages. The committee visited Agaal Aar and Abaq Korey and Shaanta Awaq villages along with county commissioners and security personnel. The Sultan promised to convene the government, parliamentarians and elders to resolve the boundary dispute. As with the Garre Degodia process in Mandera, religious leaders were brought in to break the deadlock among traditional elders, but at a certain point in the process the key religious leaders were not seen as impartial enough and the process was then led by third party elders (for non-affected clans). This constructive flexibility in the leadership of peace processes demonstrates increased resilience and leadership in peacebuilding.

The Abdalla-Abudwak (intra-Ogaden) conflict in Garissa

The Abwdak-Abdala have long been in local conflict over land in Garissa town, driven by a long standing boundary dispute involving Ijara district(which split from Garissa in 1999 but was reunited under the new counties of the new constitution in 2012). In October 2010 Tensions rose in Garissa over land settlements in Garissa town (in which four people were killed, 16 houses burned and 600 families displaced). In October 2010 PEACE II facilitated a rapid response initiative involving partners from Mandera and Wajir (including MMC, MCPU and Al Fatah Council of Elders) as Garissa's own DPCs were viewed as ineffective because various chairmen had sided with their clans and were unable to mediate impartially. This led to an agreement that land disputes would be thoroughly investigated and certain areas of land would remain vacant until this was done. This intervention in Garissa was led by peacebuilders from Mandera and Garissa, demonstrating a stronger inter-regional network among peacebuilders.

During the humanitarian crisis in 2011, famine IDPs started settling in and around Garissa and encroaching again on the land that the government had agreed would remain unsettled. On 7 February 2012 this triggered renewed violence, involving youth from both sides. The GMC dispatched a ten member group of religious leaders to the affected Nathir and Warable villages and held peace rallies and preaching in the mosques. Women in particular were reprimanded about inciting the youth to fight. The Abdwak took a hard stance demanding the Abdalla leave these villages. After a week-long negotiation, the two agreed to reconcile pay the burial expense, but not to visit each other and resume normal relations. The GMC continued with the negotiations until the community elders from each side agreed to meet by the roadside and the elders were given the opportunity to address the aggrieved parties. After a long discussion, they agreed to forgive each other and paid the "Sabeen" and burial expenses. The GMC demonstrated a new level of peace leadership in Garissa by using trauma healing methods to remain focused on dialogue and negotiation to the point of community forgiveness and reparation.

The Awleihan-Abudwak (intra-Ogaden) conflict in Garissa:

In October 2011, GMC held a series of emergency meetings in Garissa to respond to an eruption of violence between the Awleihan and Abudwak, and witnessed the payment of Ksh 50,000 of blood compensation to the families of victims and the resettlement of displaced families back to their land.

The Makabul-Sheikal conflict at the Garissa-Lower Jubba border

Conflicts between the Makabul and Sheikal focused around the Amuma Waldena corridor. Since the early 1990s the Shekhaal and Makabul clans have fought in the Badadhe district of Lower Juba for control of the strategic border town of Waldena and Warakh and many lives have been lost and properties destroyed. Waldena town remains deserted after the Sheikal raided and burnt everything down except the mosque. The Makabul are now settled in Warakh (also claimed by the Sheikal) and are investing in the town indicating of their intention to stay.4 PEACE II supported AFREC to facilitate a series of community dialogues in 2011-12 after extensive efforts to establish an acceptable mediation team and mobilization of communities (described in more detail in the action research report). Parties agreed to resolve their differences peacefully and agreed to Sheikal rights in Waldena, though they could not agree on a power sharing arrangement the town.

In 2012, Stakeholders identified that AFREC was insufficiently impartial as a mediator (given the senior Makabul individuals in the organization) and that Dagahley refugee camp was an inappropriate venue and that agreements to date had not been followed up, lowering confidence in the process. In November 2012 PEACE II therefore supported the Dadaab and Dhobley Peace committees with the Mohamed Zubeir and Aulihan elders to restart the stalled dialogue. Meetings were organized in Dadaab on 15-17 November. And the Sheikal and Makabul agreed to re-enter discussions and accepted the legitimacy of the new mediation team. In a larger community meeting on 17 November, a ceasefire monitoring committee of five from each community was formed and it was agreed that the mediation committee the chief of Amuma and chairman of Dobley peace committee would investigate allegations and accusations from both sides and finally that a larger reconciliation meeting involving communities from Hosingo and Warak and Badade would be held in Amuma and Dadaab in early 2013.

Other conflicts at the border between Garissa and Lower Jubba border (Kenya-Somalia)

Community peace networks at the Garissa and Lower Jubba border have also shown increased resilience and leadership through their response to community tensions and conflict involving non-Ogaden and non-Somali communities, which were previously not a high priority for peace groups located in the heart of the Ogaden community, in addition to the work on the Makabul-Shiekal conflict described above, the following interventions deserve mention

Tana River conflict in Kenya: In response to high levels of election related political violence in Tana river Kenya in 2012 (between the Pokomo, Orma and Wardei communities) the PEACE II program supported networks of trauma healers to work with local district peace committees to conduct extensive trauma healing session with conflict affected and displaced communities in Garissa and rapid response work along the Garissa and Lamu county borders with Tana river to prevent the involvement of Somali communities.
Boni-Bajuni-Somali tensions in Raskomboni-Kiunga: Tensions between the Boni-Bajuni-Somali in Raskomboni-Kiunga, have reduced following the extension of peace dividends and community peace network strengthening to this corridor, and non-Somali community members are now represented in local government as a result
<i>Galjil-Awliehan in Dadaab refugee camp:</i> Between October-November 2012, the GMC initiated a Galjil-Awliehan peace process to respond to growing tensions in the Dadaab refugee camp involving community leadership from both refugee and host communities
Interfaith rapid response in Garissa: In 2012 Garissa became very insecure with increased attacks by AlShabaab targeting security agencies as well as religious centers to cause conflict between Muslims and Christians and between Somali and non-Somali Kenyans. In July, two bombs in Garissa churches claimed several lives including two administration police officers, and caused tensions despite the assurances by the government and the religious leaders. In November a rocket propelled grenade exploded into a church used by administrative police killed 1 and seriously injuring 14. In response GPDC trained local DPCs to strengthen their early warning and community policing functions in Sankuri, Central and Kora Kora and convened 25 Muslims and 9 Christian leaders, along with elders and police officials and formed the Garissa Interfaith Peace Committee and agreed a program of networking and preaching peace in mosques and churches as well as specifically expanding early warning networks in and around the refugee camps and registering all transport utilities such taxis and bicycle transport with the county council.

Social Reconciliation in the Karamoja

In the Southern Karamoja region along the Kenya Uganda border, the PEACE II program has supported trauma healing and social reconciliation processes between the Pokot, Tepeth, Turkana, Dodoth and Jei communities. The Karamoja region of north-eastern Uganda is defined by periodic, extended drought, sporadic, often brutal violence, cyclical cattle-raiding and chronic food insecurity. The Karamoja region has the lowest development indicators in Uganda, Kenya and South Sudan. Stakeholders at community peace meetings supported by PEACE II have identified a number of factors that drive persistent cycles of conflict including: communities' dishonoring of peace agreement, perceived biases against some communities in livestock recovery efforts, the commercialization of cattle raiding. PEACE II has supported various peace building interventions in Karamoja cluster with partners RWPL, NENAH FM, LOKADO, CBR, APAD and KISP, including extensive capacity building in trauma healing, expanding the role of women in community peacebuilding, promoting youth involvement in peace through sports, arts and media, In 2012, PEACE II embarked on an appreciative inquiry participatory research project to collect and document community perspectives on effective approaches to peacebuilding. In addition to extensive trauma healing work, PEACE II has supported the following peace processes:

Turkana and Toposa: In 2009, PEACE II and APFO supported a rapid response grant to RIAM RIAM
in Turkana to intervene in the conflict between Turkana and Toposa through meetings in Lokichoggio,
Nadapal and Kibish with councilors, chiefs, elders, kraal leaders, CBOs and security agents. Violence
decreased significantly and trade resumed.

Tepeth and Pokot and Turkana: In 2011, LOKADO facilitated a Pokot intra-community dialogue, Tepetl
intra-community dialogue, Turkana intra-community dialogue and a Pokot-Tepeth-Turkana inter
community dialogue to address periodic Tepeth-Pokot conflict with the Turkana and in 2012 continued

to support dialogue among the Tepeth, Porkot and Turkana.

- ☐ **Turkana and Matheniko and Jie:** In 2011, LOKADO intervened to bring together the Turkana, Matheniko and Jie in a peace process that involved extensive trauma healing and social reconciliation processes and led to the opening of the peace dividend market project at Lokiriama.
- ☐ **Tepeth and Matheniko and Pokot and Turkana:** During 2011 several social reconciliation and trauma healing meetings were held between the Tepeth, Matheniko, Turkana and Pokot in Loya (Turkana), and in Nakirolo and other locations in Uganda inhabited by the Tepeth and Matheniko.

Case study: Trauma healing in Karamoja

"My name is Lotun and I am 31 years old and I am always occupied and strategizing on how to revenge and harm my enemies. Even if I try not to, I find myself thinking more and more about when I will get the chance. When I was 9 years old I experienced something very bad. One day raiders came and attacked our village and took away all cattle. As the dust was settling, we found my little sister lying on the ground writhing in pain. "The enemy had speared her private part with an arrow. As I grew up, I never forgot my sister's experience. I longed for a time to revenge exactly the same act, they did to my sister. As a youth I joined a group of raiders and we planned to raider a neighboring community. One day we arrived at a village and I found a girl the age of my sister and did worse things to her and then the pain was even greater with no peace in my heart. The revenge did not offer me a final solution as I had thought - I still hated my enemy. It only hardened me to continue harming people. Today at this workshop I shed tears once again but this time it was different. I was choosing the path of forgiveness and learning to let go in front of my enemies". I have never experienced that before. I feel freed from something deep inside me. I wish more of our friends and warriors can come together like this and we shake hands. I have learnt a lot of things about trauma. When you are free and forgiven you can meet with your enemy and not fight, today I shook hands with people I vowed never to shake hands with.

Trauma healing and social reconciliation meetings in the Karamoja have brought together cultural leaders, women, youth leaders and government officials, and have helped to mitigate tensions and conflict. Local governments have better equipped border security officials now as a result of community advocacy, and there is a joint Kenya-Uganda mobile rapid response force at the border. The program has also supported the annual celebrations of the 37 year old Lokiriama peace accord which have addressed deteriorating relations and ensured renewed commitment and brought in other communities as witnesses. Ongoing community trauma healing and dialogue on natural resource management, especially between the Turkana, Matheniko and Tepeth have been essential to ongoing peace and there has been amicable sharing of the limited natural resources by these cross-border communities based on procedures outlined by elders and peace committees so that the Turkana from Lokiriama now seasonally migrate to grazing lands in Nakiloro, Uganda, leaving their arms behind and informing the Ugandan side well in advance of the migration.



















3. Peace dividend projects

Theory of change

Theory of change: Through co-managing and sharing tangible development projects, cross-border communities will develop strategic relationships and long-lasting peace networks. These relationships will provide the basis for a joint response when faced with violent conflict in the future.

The lack of schools, roads, water points, health facilities, and poor or limited governance structures in marginalized border areas enables crime, corruption and violence to fester. The PEACE II project uses peace dividends in the form of tangible, shared infrastructure as a key element in the peacebuilding process of increasing people's sense of security, promoting peaceful co-existence, prompting communities to resist violence and transforming the conflict economy by working with the private sector to implement development projects that address structural drivers of conflict. Peace dividend projects have served as a vehicle for emerging peace leadership to get involved in local governance and development and to organize in local cross-border peace committees. Peace dividends have made a highly effective contribution to uniting communities with a history of conflict and cycles of violence, and have reduced tension through increasing interaction and exchanges. They also serve as visible symbols of peace and development that embody the history of community peace processes. In total 45 peace dividend projects (made up of multiple individual buildings) were constructed with the support of the conflicting communities.

Through several consultative meetings and findings from the baseline survey, the PEACE II program selected priority cross-border corridors and then local partners through a localized request for application process. The program then gave technical assistance and 'social mobilization' grants to partnering DPCs and CSOs to support local communities to lead peace dividend projects. Social mobilization aimed to deepen community ownership and management of peace and development at the border and to improve local community leadership capacity to serve and mobilize all community stakeholders and work across conflict lines. Social mobilization involved participatory processes that produced cross-border community action plans that identified priority peace dividend projects, timelines, budgets and stakeholders roles. The social mobilization process also involved the establishment of community working groups (CWGs) comprising elected members from both sides of the border who are responsible for monitoring, follow-up, quality control, maintenance, and management of peace dividend projects. CWGs then received an in-kind grant for each peace dividend project and a transparent community contracting process was initiated to select a reliable local contractor (see the PEACE II community contracting manual), an approach that provide highly successful in tackling entrenched corruption and clan patronage systems 5, even in Somalia which had not had a functional government for over 20 years. The PEACE II program then provided technical assistance to CWGs to develop the necessary social infrastructure (school boards, health boards, community water committees, livestock market councils) to manage the project with high levels of local ownership. This social infrastructure formed a very legitimate local foundation for the regional conflict early warning and early response system.

'I remember in 2008 at the stakeholders' meeting in Mandera, I kept asking how will all these little projects and little money add up to any impact? While the projects are small, today I see visible public asset development, I can see human resource capacity, and I can see transformed individuals and organizations who are creative and innovative in one of the most complicated environments in the world.' Abdi-Wahab, Director of ASEP,



Lessons learned

The PEACE II program has learned that the success of community prioritized peace dividend projects depends on factors such as the availability of allocated land, reasonable distances between target groups and most crucially the relevance of the project and community ownership and utilization. PEACE II also found that the more balance between the communities in the management and supervision of the project, the better the inter-communal utilization and ownership. There is a huge demand for peace dividends but limited peace program resources, meaning that more collaboration with other partners such as the government, private sector and other NGOs is needed. There is also a need to keep investing in longer term planning for their sustainability and development (utilization, management, maintenance and security). Peace dividend projects that targeted specific marginalized sectors in society (i.e. women, youth) directly enhanced their visibility and role in society. To be effective peace dividend projects require a level of community peace agreement to be in place which can be consolidated by the project. The absence of agreement between the Makabul and Sheikal over settlement rights in Waldena, for example, meant that no peace dividend projects were possible in Waldena. Distances are also a major factor as project sites that involve long distance travel to be accessed are unlikely to be used. The markets in the Karamoja cluster faced such constraints. After the design consultations with CWGs, it was still very valuable to validate the prioritized projects with a wider range of local beneficiaries to mitigate the ability of elite individuals to have undue influence on the selection of projects through the CWGs (which could lead in extreme cases to underutilization or non-utilization of the project).6

In FY11 PEACE II supported a team of action researchers led by MWFP to work with cross border peace committees in the nine corridors of the Somali cluster to strengthen local peace dividend management. The team reviewed measures put in place for the sustainability of the peace dividend projects, changes in community relationships, and the roles of cross border peace committees in the wider CEWARN system, and developed a training manual, (including components on how to sensitize local stakeholders and ensure buy in, harmonize management structures and refine bylaws, and manage resource conflicts within the community). This team found, in summary, that a sense of collective ownership and responsibility was achieved and communication and sharing of information and resource sharing increased. Fear and insecurity between communities has reduced and the closure of the border did not limit movements. Better interaction among cross-border committees had developed and tracking of criminals and early warning information has steadily increased. The community contracting process and continuous community participation and monitoring (along with Peace II STAFF, site supervisors, CWGs and local CSOs ensured delivery of high standards from contractors. The contracting process was widely reported to be transparent, free from corruption, fair and competitive making the whole process free from malice and very conflict sensitive.

- A member of the development committee from El Wak, Kenya, said: "We had a mindset of supporting and giving the contract to our preferred candidate who is a well-established businessman. But when the bid evaluation was concluded, we were shocked to find him lose to a poor man...with no big business. We protested soundly. However, since we are all party to and participated in the entire process, we consoled ourselves, by saying...after all, our man lost in a fair process,'
- One community participant in the Wajir process joked: "This process is poisonous to those that traditionally win contracts in our area," meaning that if adapted by all actors, it would definitely kill cowboy contractors said to bribe their way into winning contracts.
- Mohamed Nur, a partner from El Wak Somalia Peace Committee, said 'this is the first time in 18 years that a contract has been awarded fairly and transparently in El Wak, Somalia."
- During the Mandera community contracting process, a Lafey councilor, said: "I wish our local County Council could see this... and buy into this idea and introduce it in our tendering systems."
- One of Pact's local partners from El Wak, Abdirahman Issack, said he had 'been a chairman of the governments Constituency Development Fund for five years and I wish I knew this process then. I realize we were very unfair to most of the bidders.'
- Khalif M. Ishmail stated that 'I constructed a girls' secondary day school within Mandera town. It is one of its kind. As a contractor I did not really benefit that much, but the community really benefited and for that I am grateful.'
- Adan Hussein Aberra of El Wak added: 'For the contractors there is a pride that we made a contribution to the community
 by working on a community project and doing a good job. It has also given us a good name by being associated with the
 development of the project.'

Achievements and impacts

Cross-border communities co-manage and share development projects

Schools have provided education opportunities, improved literacy levels, enabled girls from poor families to access education, and provided a conducive learning environment for pupils. They have enhanced community integration and collaboration through mingling of parents. 10 schools were constructed, 8 in Kenya and 2 in Somalia,⁷ and a total of 21 new classrooms were built in addition to one staffroom in Damasa primary Kenya. In total 3180 pupils were benefiting by 2012. Indirectly all these schools created employment for teachers, supporting staff and contributed to increased security.

Water projects have reduced water conflicts. They have saved hours of community time spent walking to collect water and have improved hygiene standards in homes. They have reduced water scarcity and enabled storage of rainwater during the long rains. They provide a source of water during dry spell-for both domestic and livestock use, and have encourages local business such as restaurants and kiosks and created employment opportunities.⁸ 7 water pans (which are easily managed by using traditional conflict management systems) were initiated by the PEACE II program, 5 on the Somalia side of the border and 2 in Kenya.⁹ In addition 6 water reticulation and piping projects were supported, 4 in Kenya and 2 in Somalia.¹⁰

Markets have increased cross border trade in foodstuffs, household wares, animals and farm produce. Trading of livestock has also become easier and more profitable. Markets have enhanced interaction among communities and have facilitated the gathering of early warning information on livestock theft and risky pasture zones. 5 market shelters were constructed, 2 in Karamoja, 2 in Somalia and 1 in Kenya. In addition 2 livestock markets in Mandera county and Elwak Somalia were improved. Improved markets have also enabled the expansion of livestock market mediator networks that regulate cross border businesses transactions and manage trade disputes.


Health dispensaries and maternity clinics have increased access to safe maternal and child health services, and reduced pressures on other limited service providers and reduced maternal mortality. At these centers health education counseling is conducted and they serve as a social gathering place for mothers to network. In some locations immunization coverage of children has increased 5 fold and the centers also facilitate the issuance of child birth certificates. 10 dispensaries and maternity centers were supported, 4 in Kenya, 4 in Somalia and 2 in Uganda.¹¹

Community Centers /Youth Resource Centers are used for cross border peace dialogue meetings and meetings of peace organizations and networks. They provide a space for youth who use them for drama, sports, library services, and income generating activities. They have also created jobs for youth and served as ICT centers for E-learning. 4 Community Centers were built including the CEPAR center in Waijr. All were in Kenya but communally shared by cross-border communities.

- In the **Mandera-Bellethawa** cross border corridor, the Garre, Marehan, Murule, Degodia and Corner Tribe communities are using the *Mandera community center* for cross border dialogue meetings. *The Buruburu primary school* in Mandera is used by children from all communities from both sides of the border and enhances mutual interaction and cooperation amongst the cross-border communities. *Khadija girls secondary school* in Mandera was initiated by Peace II and has now been expanded with new classrooms and due to affordable fees and the fact that it is the only girl's day secondary school in the region, girls from poor families are able to access education. In Bellethawa all communities use the *improved market facilities in the Golan Heights* district of Bellethawa town which has become a central part of the conflict early warning system as information is exchanged on a daily basis. Similarly the *improved market facilities Qansa Omane district* of Bellethawa has improved trade and interaction though it is periodically out of use due to insecurity in this sensitive location.
- In the **Damasa-Damasa** cross border corridor the Garre, Marehan and Murule communities are jointly managing and accessing the *Damasa primary school* which increased enrolment from 320 to 452 pupils from both sides of the border. The *rehabilitation of an elevated water tank and construction of 4 water kiosks* in Damasa Somalia also served all three communities and fosters collaboration and interaction and has reduced the recurrence of local resource based conflicts, such as between the Murule and Marehaan over pasture and water. The communities are also using the *new dispensary in Damasa Somalia* which has increased the accessibility of healthcare and reduced the time and costs of travelling to seek basic medical attention, which has improved maternal and child health care for cross border communities. Owing to the harmony created through peace dividends the two cross-border communities agreed to be called by one name the Damasa.

PEACE II program area on the Kenya-Somalia Border FY2011

Cross-bor Peace Corridor	der Action Research Activity 2011 developed the local capacity of the following:
	Community Policing Units District Livestock Market Council Cross-border peace committee strengthened to manage six (6) Peace dividends Mediation Councils Wediation Councils Women for peace group strengthened
2	- Social Reconciliation among Makabul-Sheikal - District Uvestock Market Council - Peace divident activities proposed for FY2012 - Women for peace group strengthened
3	Mediation Councils - Community Policing Unit - Cross-border peace committees strengthened to manage Four (4) Peace dividends - Women for peace group strengthened
4	Social Reconcilitation and the Lagdera boundry dispute Mediation Council Cross-border peace committees strengthened to manage mine (9) Peace dividends - Women for peace group strengthened
5	Community Policing Unit Women for peace group strengthened
	- Community Policing Unit - Cross-border peace committees strengthered to manage five (5) peace dividends - Women for peace group strengthered
1	- Cross-border peace committees strengthened to manage three (3) Peace dividends. Women for peace group strengthened.
	Mediation Council Youth for peace - Social Reconciliation among Garre-Murulle-Marehan - Community Policing Unit - Cross-border peace committees strengthened to manage 29 Peace dividends - Women for peace group strengthened
10	Women for peace group strengthened Youth for peace group strengthened Social Reconcillation strengthened joint elders council (Garre, Murulle, Marehan, Degodia, Corner tribes) Cross-border peace committees strengthened to manage 19 Peace dividends
11	- Proposed new corridor activities for FY2012
	Community Politing Units District Livestock Market Council Mediation Council
ijara.	Community Politing Units Women for Peace group strengthened Mediation Council
Wajir	- CEPAR (Center for Peace and Applied Research) managed three (3) peace dividends
	wak and Latey - Damassa (#8 and #9) have been combined for the of illustrating the action research activities for the FY2011
the project	r. This map is not drawn to scale but for the sole purpose of illustratin its activities, it is not intended to present the accurate locations of a galldaise for any errors or amnissions.




manag	Elwak-Elwak cross border corridor, the Garre and Marehaan communities jointly access and the a number of peace dividend projects along with members of other communities also present in the ridor, including Corner Tribe (Leysan, Asharaf, Watta), Degodia and Ogaden.
0	<i>Improvements to the ElKala primary school</i> in ElWak Kenya and <i>Elwak primary school</i> in Elwak, Somalia ¹³ have led to reduction of school drop-out rate and increase in enrolment to the schools with Elkala's population almost doubling from 190 to 356. Out of these, 60 boys; 40 from Kenya and 20 from Somalia, are using the boarding facilities. Elwak primary school acts as a feeder school to Elkala primary. As a result of this, the parents from both sides of the border are more vigilant about security and are active in peace initiatives.
0	The separate water points for livestock and domestic use in Elwak Somalia and Damasa improved hygine. The water management committee has an elaborate system of operations and maintenance of the facilities and now charge \$0.03 per 20L of water to collect resources for maintenance and repair.
0	In ElWak Somalia <i>improvement to drinking water systems,</i> including the installation of a submersible pump to a shallow well, construction of an elevated water tank and generator house with generator has increased the supply of water and reduced tensions and disputes at water points as well as reduced time and labor expended on water collection.
0	The improvements to the <i>livestock market</i> in El-Wak Somalia have increased livestock entrepreneurship (from approximately from 800 to 1200 animals traded daily) and increased interaction, harmony and mediation of livestock related disputes among cross border communities.
0	The <i>Youth Resource center</i> in El-Wak Kenya provides a training venue for youth and at risk youth as well as ICT and library services, a venue for meetings including social interaction activities for cross border youth and as neutral meeting points for community dialogues and reconciliation processes and income generation.
In the Khorof Harar-Elram-Ausquran cross border corridor the Degodia, Garre, and Marehan have jointly managed and accessed an <i>improved water supply</i> which included the de-silting of water pans in Khorof Harar and Ausquran and water piping from Elram B to Elram A which has reduced tensions at water points. The project is self-sustaining as all communities pay for the water (the project generates approximately \$2150 per month during the dry season)	
In the Gherille-Gherille ¹⁴ cross border corridor, the Ogaden and Marehan communities have jointly managed and accessed an improved <i>primary school in Gherille Kenya</i> , which has increased enrolment from approximately 120-220 pupils, including 40 new students from Somalia. <i>Water improvements</i> in <i>Riba</i> have included construction of two water kiosks and fencing of the pumping yard which has increased the water supply and also establishment of a local market. <i>10 shallow wells in WajirBor</i> have been capped improving the provision of clean water and enabling women to save time and start income generating activities. Currently there are more girls in schools and fewer cases of early marriages (which communities attributed to the long queues and endless waiting at borehole that exposed young girls to men). The underground water tank in Gherille Somalia greatly assisted storage of excess water during long rains and promoted water harvesting technologies in war-torn Somalia and facilitated new water trading centers and local markets. The <i>Gherille Kenya Dispensary</i> and staff quarters have been constructed and are awaiting provision of staff by the Kenyan Government as previously agreed.	
In Wajir town the program has supported the construction of an <i>office block and library and the renovation of training hall</i> for the Center for Peace and Applied Research (CEPAR) in the WPDA compound. The renovated hall is used for hosting peace dialogue meetings and trainings.	
In the Konton-Daresalam cross border corridor the Degodia, Marehan, Garre and Leysan communities have jointly managed and accessed a <i>dispensary unit</i> in Konton, Kenya including staff quarters which is awaiting registration from the Kenya ministry of public health and sanitation and a <i>de-silted water pan</i> in Daresaalam, Somalia which has improved water supplies and reduced tensions.	
In the	Diff-Diff cross border corridor, ¹⁵ the Mohamed Zubeir and Bah Geri communities have jointly

managed and accessed a *renovated primary school* in Diff, Kenya. A 6 bed *Maternity ward* was constructed which has enabled cross-border children born in the adjoining dispensary to get birth certificates, hence shortening the process of birth registration. Currently the maternity has a trained midwife/nurse. Provision of a *Borehole generator* in Dadajabulla, increased the volume of water available, reducing tensions at the watering points due to the previously long queues

- In the **Liboi-Dhobley** cross border corridor the Mohamed Zubeir, Awleihan, Makabul, and Bah Geri share the management and access of the *new maternity wing to Dhobley hospital*. The maternity wing has brought about a reduction in the cases of mother/child mortality. The new *Deg Elema Primary School*, is a feeder school to Liboi primary school. The *Deg Elema Water pan* on the Somalia side has reduced tensions among pastoralists.
- In the **Hulugho-Kolbio** cross border corridor the Makabul and Abdallah communities share management of and access to the a new *health facility in Kolbio* as well as a new *Primary school in Sinai* which hosts many at risk youth who have returned from militia involvement. The school enhanced interaction of children from previously conflicting clans, and is used for evening classes for adults, community meetings and as a polling center during elections. A new *water pan in Sinai* has increased the availability of free water to the approximately 25,000 residents of Sinai.

Case Study, from Child Soldier to School Head boy:

Ali Shakar Abdi is 15 years old and in Standard Two at Sinai Primary. Ali was a member of a local militia in Kolbio, Somalia, from the age of nine. In 2009, this militia was ousted by an armed Islamist group who took control of Kolbio . Ali left town to seek refuge in a neighboring village in Kenya called Sinai. In Sinai, Ali was received by the school headmaster who had been trained in trauma healing and recognized Ali's trauma. After counseling, Ali joined the local school established with Peace II support. Ali is now the school head boy and the best performing pupil in the school. This has encouraged other child soldiers from the area and there are now six ex-combatant children at the school.



- In the Amuma-Waldena cross border corridor the newly constructed market shelter aims to increase the interactions and improve the relationships between the Makabul, Mohamed Zubeir, Dhubulhante and Sheikal communities residing in the area. The market will commence operations once the on-going peace dialogue between the Makabul and Sheikal resolve the stalemate over the re-settlement of Waldena.
- In the Kiunga-Raskamboni cross border corridor the *dispensary in Raskamboni* and *maternity wing in Kiunga* have improved access to health care of Bajuni, Ogaden Boni and Wagosha communities. Pact partner AFREC has committed to supply of drugs and staffing to the dispensary at Raskamboni while the

	In the Loya-Kalemungole and Lokiriama-Nakiloro cross border corridors in Karamoja four peace dividends have been constructed including a <i>market in Loya</i> and a <i>dispensary in Kalemungole</i> which serve the Pokot, Turkana, and Tepeth, as well as a <i>market in Lokiriama</i> and <i>dispensary in Nakiloro</i> serving the Turkana, Tepeth, Matheniko, Pokot and Jie. Trade is now booming between the Jie and Turkana and the Jie and Matheniko.		
	Strategic relationships and long-lasting peace networks provide the basis for a joint response when faced with violent conflict.		
impact	FY12, PEACE II held a series of six review workshops with 241 key stakeholders to assess the outcomes, and challenges of the program from the perspectives of beneficiaries and implementing partners. The workshops found that		
	Peace dividends have reconciled warring cross-border communities and increased services and stabilized remotes conflict prone areas, including enabling new mixed settlements to be established (such as Elkala) and new business activity. They have all provided meeting places for regular interaction between communities		
	Trust has been built between communities and local government and freedom of movement has increased For example authorities on both sides of the border have released detained citizens when members of CWGs have verified that they are community members accessing cross border peace dividends.		
	Even AlShabaab was forced to tolerate peace dividends as they were highly defended by community leaders. For example in Elwak they agreed not to tax Kenyans who had crossed the border with livestock to access the livestock market peace dividend).		
	The CWGs continue to manage the operations of the peace dividend projects and are responsible for resolution of disputes related to the sharing of these facilities. Anti-corruption improved by community contracting. Attempted bribes were publically exposed and even losing vendors declared the process fair.		
	Cross border trade has also flourished, which is both an indicator of peace as well as a foundation for peace. For example in Hulugho-Kolbio, prior to PEACE II there was very limited cross border interaction but now Kenyans daily access Sanai water pan in Somalia and children from Somalia attend school in Hulugho in Kenya.		
	Community relationships have improved so that responses to incidents that could trigger conflict (such as rape cases) begin with inter-communal dialogue rather than spontaneous outbursts of violent anger. Relations have improved and inter-clan marriages are increasing in number. In Damasa for example, Marehan-Murule conflicts over natural resources have ceased. There has also been an increase in		
	communities returning stolen animals and delivering on commitments to pay blood compensation. The cross-border youth groups in Mandera and El-Wak are now using the resource centers constructed as centers for trainings of the youth in various peace building activities; with some youths already having registered in distance learning certificate courses in conflict studies. The centers are also a source of income for the youth groups and raise the much needed revenue for the youth groups as a response unit		
	during conflicts. Women and youth are much more visible and engaged in peacebuilding During rapid response meetings it is now very common for communities to begin with a reflection on their inter-dependence which leads to a quicker rapid response initiative and wider stakeholder engagement in mediation.		
	Inter/intra community tensions still arise, as the process of transforming community relationships permanently is a long term process, but peace dividend projects are clearly contributing to stronger relations.		

maternity is under the Government of Kenya.





























4. Community peace networks

Theory of Change

Theory of change: Through increasing capacity of local organizations to respond to conflict, a critical mass of peace actors is formed to proactively deal with conflict when it emerges.

Sector response groups

The PEACE II program has supported a wide range of local peace organizations to involve a large number of people from different sectors of society in peacebuilding. PEACE II names these groups 'Sector response groups' as they are locally organized sectors of society working for peace. The sector response groups PEACE II has supported include councils of elders, women for peace groups, youth for peace groups, religious leader mediation councils, district livestock market mediators, community policing units, trauma healing groups, local media groups and business associations. PEACE II has also supported the community working groups that were elected to manage peace dividend projects to become a local part early warning and early response. This network of sector response groups is an essential part of an effective (resilient, sustainable and diverse) grassroots peace network that can coherently mobilize a wide range of people as well as local resources to sustain grass roots peace initiatives.

Peace committees

Peace committees play a crucial role in coordinating information and interventions and to ensure collective analysis and action. Given the erosion of traditional governance systems and the minimally resourced and overstretched modern local government that operates in historically marginalized peripheral border areas, peace committees serve as a mechanism for cooperation, and trust and relationship building, a nexus where all stakeholders can come together to analyze, plan and act together to address conflict. Peace committees have served different purposes at different times in different contexts. In some cases they have primarily supported the restoration of the traditional authorities, in other cases they have primarily brought together communities with the government, in other cases again they have served as forum for highly divided community representatives to overcome their isolation, in other contexts their primary achievement has been to secure recognition and acceptance of the role of women and youth in society. Ideally peace committees do all of the above and more. However, peace committees can lose their dynamism and effectiveness in many ways. There are cases where peace committees have been utilized by clan leaders as a vehicle for pursuing their own clan's interests and other cases where the member ship and internal democratic processes of peace committees have waned until their chairperson becomes a one man show.

The legitimacy and effectiveness of peace committees follows from their ability to be inclusive and to sustain a dynamic level of activism (including peace advocacy and peace interventions) that cuts across the divisions within society, and enables new levels of engagement and partnership with the state. The PEACE II program has invested in strengthening peace committees through supporting them to be more inclusive and to better coordinate across sectors of society and across borders and to link with the regional CEWARN and national CEWERU systems, which rely heavily on them for early warning as well as early response. This has included supporting peace committee stakeholder meetings and elections. Peace committees have been involved in coordinating all rapid response interventions under the program and have been supported to build up localized peace committees in strategic hotspot areas along the border. CWGs have also become a strategic part of the cross border peace committee network, enabling community leadership in remote locations to emerge and participate in the early warning and early response system. For example the Diff CWG supported the recovery of a high-jacked vehicle in FY10.

Pact's local partners have conducted regular trainings with peace committees to ensure a strong understanding of roles and responsibilities, community ownership and empowerment and have facilitated peace committees to reach out to remote communities and include them in the peace committee network.¹⁶

Like fingers on a hand, every peace group in Mandera, needs other groups to help them function well,

Hassan MMC

Capacity Building

PEACE II has encouraged the replication of good practice and the systematic replication of promising community based approaches developed by local peace organisations. For example resource persons from established sector response groups and peace committees have been mobilized to facilitate and train stakeholders in new areas, from Mandera to the southernmost corridor of Raskomboni-Kiunga, and from Dhobley to the towns of Afmadow, Hosingo and Bilis Qokani in the interior of Somalia. By FY11 the program was working to support 130 community peace structures to engage conflict-affected citizens in peace/reconciliation processes.

The PEACE II program has implemented a wide range of capacity building interventions aimed at building the capacity of organizations and community leaders from technical areas such as trauma healing and social reconciliation, to operational areas such as community contracting and grant management. PEACE II worked at the local level to build a range of knowledge, skills attitudes and behaviors among key actors who make up the community peace network. Best practices, have been regularly reviewed and have informed the evolution of capacity building approaches. Local partners have been provided with tools and skills development to conduct their own impact assessments. Peace II staff and consultants continued to provide the hands-on accompaniment of their local partners throughout program implementation. Specific capacity building for partners undertaken by PEACE II has included:

Ш	Conflict sensitivity in peace programming training to enable CSO partners to systematically analyze
	conflict dynamics and identify and asses risks of conflict insensitivity
	Participatory Learning and Action (PLA) training: to enable CSO partners to assist communities to
	analyze their conflict context, identify resources for addressing conflict and mobilize cross-border
	communities for full participation in peace dividend planning, early warning and response.
	Reflection and visioning training to enable CSO partners to rollout periodic visioning and reflection
	sessions with communities for sustainable conflict transformation
	Community contracting training: to enable CSO partners and CWGs to lead the preparation of tender
	documents, advertising for community contractors, opening and evaluating bids, and awarding and
	monitoring contracts.
	Ethics, integrity, accountability, and local ownership training: to enable CSO partners to be
	systematically accountable for funds and programs to communities and donors, including training in
	financial management and mentoring, monitoring and evaluation, reporting and learning.
	Monitoring Evaluation Reporting and Learning (MERL) training with CSO partners to improve
	processes of information collection and analysis as well as documentation and reporting on activities,
	outcomes, impacts and lessons.
	<i>Trauma-healing and social reconciliation</i> training to enable CSO partners and a growing local network
	of trauma healers to engage more effectively with victims and perpetrators of violence and advance
	healing and reconciliation.
	Women in leadership training to enable active women peace-builders to improve their knowledge and
	skills in peace leadership.
	Community Based Early Warning and Early Response training for DPCs and their networks on CEWARN
	systems, best practice and policy processes (small arms and the Modogashe Declaration)
	Youth leadership training to assist youth leaders to closely examine and analyze their own theories of
	change within their programs, and introducing methods for promoting non-violence such as though role-
	plays on negotiation and mediation scenarios and participatory educational theatre.
	<i>Elections and Political Processes</i> workshops to develop local analysis and interventions for preventing
	election related conflict
	Regular cross border strategy workshops with local partners in each corridor to analyze conflict
	dynamics, map peace resources and review collective strategies
	Annual partners review meetings to report on impacts and learning and identify future priorities.

PEACE II partners have been lead trainers and facilitators building the capacity of other more nascent group and therefore developed from being CBOs implementing peace projects in their home towns to being capacity building resource organizations working to expand capacities in new areas. In FY12 PEACE II developed a 'capacity index' for assessing and planning capacity development interventions with individual peace organizations as well as local networks of peace organizations and tested this tool with MMC, leading to a detailed capacity building plan. This tool is recommended for planning future capacity building interventions. It aims to guide local groups to develop a clear constituency base and role and competency in peacebuilding and then to work with others to work on shared analysis and concrete actions for immediate violence mitigation, but also for structural drivers of

1. Capacity of Peace Organizations

PLEASE DESCRIBE 1) YOUR ACHIEVEMENTS AND STRENGTHS 2) YOUR FUTURE PROGRAM PRIORITIES AND 3) YOUR CAPACITY BUILDING NEEDS

PRIORITIES AND 3) YOUR CAPACITY BUILDING NEEDS		
1. IDENTITY, REPRESENTATION, PRESENCE AND PROFILE	Who are your members and who are your staff, and what are their roles? Which are the key groups represented, and why is this important? Where is your organization based and where do you work? Since when?	
2. CONSTIUENCIES, RELATIONSHIPS	Who do you work with in the community and in government. What are your most important relationships for peacebuilding?	
3. PEACE INTERVENTIONS AND CORE COMPETENCIES	What interventions have you have led, organized or supported the facilitation of (please specify when and where) – what are your most effective approaches? What would you say are your specific competencies – what are you particularly good at?	
4. CAPACITY BUILDING OF OTHERS	What knowledge, skills, methodologies have you used to build the capacity of others, including local mediation councils, please give examples?	
5. ORGANIZATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND PROGRAM MANAGEMENT	How are you structured as an organization and how, is information managed and decisions made? How are you registered? What are your organization's systems, staff and experience with delivering funded programs and accounting for funds?	
6. STRATEGIES FOR SUSTAINABILITY	How do you sustain key relationships for peacebuilding and local volunteerism and resource mobilisation?	

2. Collaborating in Peace Networks

PLEASE BREIFLY DESCRIBE IF YOUR ORGANIZATION WORKS WITH OTHERS ORGANISATIONS IN THE FOLLOWING AREAS OF PEACE WORK – INDICATING STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES ANALYSIS

- 1 To what extent does the network engage in regular conflict mapping? (Hotspots, actors, systems, driving factors,)
- To what extent does the network engage in regular peace resource mapping (Processes, initiatives, stakeholders, levels, locations)

RESPONSE STRATEGY

- To what extent is your network engaged in preventing violence and improving security (early warning, early response, crime prevention, rapid response) can you give examples in the last one year?
- 4 To what extent is your network engaged in addressing structural drivers of conflict (Social, economic, political, cultural, environmental)
- 5 To what extent is your network involved in peace agreement strengthening and advocacy with government

CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT

To what extent is your network deliberately developing itself (Levels, locations, horizontal and vertical gaps)

Lessons Learned

Strong cross border networks have allowed communities to cross the international border despite its official closure, and to manage numerous disputes that could have escalated into inter-communal, or even intergovernmental conflict. Coordination and collaboration of the various response sectors is key to effectiveness. Large grants to individual partners do not necessarily translate to more effectiveness in peace process. At times peace committee members and NGO directors have taken their own clan's side in a conflict, or are strongly perceived to have done so. There is still work to be done to ensure peacebuiders remain neutral and that their role is understood at times of heightened inter-clan politics. Uncoordinated international NGO efforts can cause confusion and conflict. DPC's are often micro-managed by respective district commissioners and their legitimacy and credibility with the community can be weakened by this. The balance of formally institutionalizing and recognizing peace committee roles while maintaining their independence and community based identity remains a long term challenge. While official recognition of peace committees is an important step forwards, their effectiveness is based on their independence and accountability and influence with communities and they must avoid becoming coopted by the state or by clan leaders.

Establishing trust is fundamental to effective peacebuilding. For community policing groups, for example, crime reduction relies heavily on the cooperation between the public and the security agents. Communities can play a major role in identifying suspected criminals in their areas and when they do crime levels have reduced. Relationships of trust are essential for effective information, owing to communities' fear of retribution. Among youth, for example, many of the most harmful risks to youth are only known to their peers and therefore peer mentoring is key to reducing the number of youth at risk. Among women, the program has learned that constructively transgressing conservative norms in order to empower women in Somali context requires that confidence among women be developed so that they can support each other to take on new leadership roles.

The action research process in the Somali cluster in 2011 found that Conflict is complex, ever evolving and long term. This requires that peacebuilding also be complex, ever evolving and long term. Peace is not an agreement but a process as it takes time and persistent work to strengthen relationships, identify common priorities among conflicting groups, and develop common solutions. For peacebuilding to be sustainable, capacity development must be directed at continuously broadening and deepening the participation of stakeholders in the context of conflict, including a wide range of civic groups in society and a wide range of local government officials and security actors. Local approaches that have been effective should be built on, replicated and refined. Local opportunities should be created so that local peacebuilders from all walks of life can grow to their full potential, 'graduate' to new levels, and use their knowledge and experience to stimulate and guide others. Collaboration and strong relationships are required, often involving managing competition between both individuals and groups within the peacebuilding community. Developing specific competencies among different peace groups is one way of creating diversity and the complementary roles of a growing network of peace practitioners. Horizontal networks are needed to make a collaborative peace system effective, building inclusivity and diversity into the system. This requires the active searching out of a wide range of potential peace actors in society and the state, and the harnessing of their competencies, legitimacy, and strategic relationships. Vertical networks are needed to ensure a macro level analysis and effective higher level support for grassroots peace efforts. It is important to expand both the agenda and influence that grassroots peace networks have, to create a conflict sensitive, concrete approach to addressing structural causes of conflict.

Impartiality is key to the success of peace negotiations. Even local NGOs working in peacebuilding can be perceived locally as forwarding the interests of specific dominant clans. Effective peace processes require legitimate conveners and locations and the support of a strong mixed facilitation team with understanding of effective approaches to dialogue in the local context and underlying issues. Effective dialogue requires preparatory analysis to ensure that the real issues that are the underlying drivers of conflict are addressed (even if unspoken or sensitive). Political competition between clans and interference of influential politicians is a greater threat to community peacebuilding efforts than the prevailing lack of written documentation of traditional community peace agreements, known as *Xeer*. How the external influence of such politicians is managed is critical. While it is not possible to get all political and armed groups represented by their leaders, it is possible to ensure their participation through their proxies in the community. Ensuring the representation of all political clan interests and former clan militia leaders through their proxies, is essential to help reverse a tendency for external actors to call in their instructions to participants by telephone, and have external actors on board through direct communication from participants instead.

Traditional elders retain extensive influence and authority in the Somali context generally, but there are many factors that have eroded their influence, including the proliferation of multiple clan elders allied with different politicians. To include more women in the peacemaking process, researchers realized that in future they needed first to approach men, making the mobilization of moderate men a key strategy. Structural marginalization also needs to be acknowledged, such as the caste system that keeps some groups disadvantaged (such as the Corner tribes/Somali Bantus, the 'Tumals'/blacksmiths and the 'Wataas'/'unseen'). Encouraging a spirit of volunteerism is essential to reducing dependence on the divisive influence of external funding, though conversely more government investment is needed to address the root causes of conflicts. Continuously broadening participation by, for example, including non-Somali traders in livestock market councils, or identifying and giving space to marginalized or minority groups, is a key factor for effective longer term peacebuilding. In some places, strained relations between youth and community elders undermine peace efforts, and an accelerating generational gap may lead to the loss of knowledge of traditional peacemaking knowledge unless it is transferred. The peacebuilding network could play a greater role in developing systems for identifying young combatants, demobilizing and reintegrating them. There is also a need for development of natural resource management peace groups focused on land issues. Finally, while the fact that trauma healing can profoundly affect individuals who have experienced violence is now well documented, its potential contribution to intra/inter-community peace processes is less

well studied. 'Sabassis' counseling in Somali customary law has not been fully explored as an existing means of trauma healing within the wider context of social reconciliation.

Effective conflict early warning and response requires a good understanding of how information moves through formal and informal channels. It is especially important to know how to use informal information and how to protect sources in order to encourage confidence and accurate information sharing. Peace committees on the Somalia side of the border have in recent years only operated in border townships but not much further inside. There are important opportunities emerging for cross border peacebuilders to support conflict resolution within Somalia. The Somalia context requires specific strategies for expanding peacebuilding work, including more documentation of good practice from traditional systems and traditional agreements reached in Somalia. In Kenya, the institutionalization of peace committees is progressive, but it needs to be emphasized that peace committees aim to bridge divides between stakeholders and interests groups and to mobilize mediation efforts to reduce local tensions. This becomes harder where peace committee elections are at times driven by clan interests and competition for representation and influence, and a review of how CEWARN guidelines address this is needed.

The Appreciative Inquiry process in the Karamoja cluster in 2012 found that resources for peace at the local level in the Karamoja could be better mobilized in pursuit of peace. More engagement is needed with traditional justice systems including the Kokwo community court that deals with communal issues at the village level and with key cultural and spiritual leaders and village councils. In the traditional justice system culprits are apprehended by the youths and brought before a community court for judgment. Charges and fines are pronounced and disciplinary measures carried out instantly. More documentation of peace agreements such as the Lokirama agreement is needed. Peace programs can improve the participation of women and youth in local decision making on peace, social justice and development issues. Engagement with youth should learn from initiation ceremonies where young men and women are prepared for leadership and responsible adulthood. Fundamentally, it is important to ensure project cycles do not establish and entrench a sense of dependency in a community, diverting the energy that could have been used to reinforce what is already working well from within. In cases where communities are moving towards agro-pastoralism, material support is needed. Increase support for already thriving trade. Expand joint grazing lands and general resource sharing and support merged settlements and livelihood ventures, and open crop farms in abandoned areas. Integrate action-oriented research particularly at the beginning of programming. Baseline surveys need to apply appreciative approaches so that the positive core of a people is used in program design. More emphasis on schooling and vocational training and loans for youth is needed. Regionally coordinated disarmament should remain a medium term priority. Programs should continue to strengthen community policing programs to build on positive steps in deploying security forces to the border and involving communities in arms control and early warning. Governments need to be lobbied to deploy more judges and police to the local level, and involve youth appropriately in provision of security.

Achievements and Impacts

Increased capacity of local organizations to respond to conflict

In the Mandera-Gedo region: The PEACE II program built on the foundations of the PEACE I program but was prevented from continuing work as planned along the Ethiopia border following legislation restricting NGO work on peacebuilding in Ethiopia. PEACE II continued support to key organizations such as the MDPC and MDLMC, as well as MWFP and YOPED. In Bellethawa, GPC remained a key partner and in Elwak, WWC and EWYFP. The program also supported the emergence and strengthening of new organizations such as the MMC and MCPU, which emerged from the 2008 response to the Garre-Murule conflict. Strategic partnerships with organizations inside Somalia continued with the SSG, SOMACTION, ASEP and peace committees in Bellethawa and ElWak Somalia. Along with community representatives and local peace committee members, all of these organizations were involved in capacity building for peace dividends and trauma healing in the early years of the program and then played a central role in community mobilization and capacity building, including peace networks strengthening and the engagement of clan elders in peace processes.

In FY11-12, the PEACE II program supported these organizations to be the capacity builders for local organizations and to strengthen cross border networks among these organizations. For example the MMC has developed local mediation councils in Banissa, Rhamu, Takaba, Elwak. Malkimara and BelletHawa as well as supporting the establishment of a GMC and six district mediation councils within Garissa district in FY11. The MCPU by the end of FY11 had established nine divisional CPUs in Mandera East district of Kenya and had supported the

formation of CPUs in Garissa town, Liboy and Raskomboni. MWFP had played a supportive role in strengthening BHWFP. WCC in Elwak supported the strengthening of the ElWak Kenya and Somalia DPCs, as EWKYFP supported EWSYFP. The MDLMC had supported the establishment of a DLMC in ElWak and then strengthened the mediation teams in Garissa and Liboy-Dhobley. In all locations these partners supported the establishment of community working groups to manage peace dividend projects and the participation of local groups in cross border peace committee networks and rapid response initiatives. Mandeeq and Star radio ensured that peace efforts were widely aired on local radio

In FY11 the program supported an action research team led by MDPC to strengthen the networks of peace actors within the collaborative cross border peace system of the Mandera-Gedo cross border area. The team worked to localize the coordination of peace actors so that the peace system is owned by communities at the border itself and to domesticate the early warning and early response mechanism and improve the inclusivity of collaborative peace actors and their networks. The team facilitated a series of meetings with cross border stakeholders including the provincial administration, chiefs, cultural elders, religious leaders, women, youth and pastoralist representatives, aimed at creating a collaborative framework to enhance cross-border interaction and set up early warning and early response desks in the Damassa, El Wak and El Ram/Awsqurun border areas. MDPC facilitated forums with peace actors, sultans, elders and representatives of the local administration. Support for the Lafey and Banisa district peace committees was prioritized and MDPC conducted conflict early warning and early response meetings in Damasa Kenya/Somalia, Elwak Kenya/Somalia and Awsqurun and Elram.

Stakeholders also agreed on the priority of forming a special inter-county and cross-border *Guurti* assembly in the geographical triangle that forms Kenya, Ethiopia and Somalia (to be piloted in the Upper North-Eastern region of Kenya and Gedo region of Somalia) with institutional recognition and support from different arms of the government. The special *Guurti* assembly will play an inter-state role in resolving conflict as well as amend and map out legalizations on the established social contracts (*Xeer*). They have also planned for the establishment of a Peace House that hosts peace discussions and jointly addresses emerging issues such as the clan-based political struggle that is replacing the traditional resource-based conflict ahead of the 2012 county system of government. The Peace House (community mediation center) will create opportunities for key groups from belligerent parties to interact in a neutral location to negotiate settlements to disputes. MDPC also participated in cross border forums with the Ethiopia CEWERU in Bur-Abor involving high level security officers from Dolo-Ethiopia and Mandera Kenya.

In the Wajir, middle Jubba region: the PEACE II program worked closely with WPDA, WWFP and WASDA to build capacities of local peace committees and rural women mediators for social reconciliation. The Wajir DPC, the Al Fattah Council of elders and local trauma healers also played a key role in the program. WPDA and WWFP led in capacity building support to communities in Gherille and Diff, and in Konton-Daresalam and KhorofHarar-Riba-Wajir Bor. In FY 11, the PEACE II program also supported WPDA to initiate the Centre for Peace and Applied Research (CEPAR) of the nascent Wajir Peace University and CEPAR played a role in coordinating the action research process of FY11.

Over the course of the program, Wajir based partners have strengthened local peace committees in Konton-Kenya and Darsalam-Somalia, Khorof-Harar, Elram and Ausqurun, Diff Kenya, Diff Somalia, Gherille Kenya and Somalia, Konton Kenya and Darsalam Somalia, who have managed numerous disputes between the Degodia, Marehan and Ogaden clans over natural resource use. In FY11 the program supported an action research team led by WPDA to strengthen the networks of peace actors within the collaborative cross border peace system of the Wajir-Jubba cross border area. The team aimed to develop capacities at the border (peace committees, youth groups, women's groups, pastoralist associations and government agencies and resources sharing associations), and to strengthen linkages between peace systems and actors in the region. The team established joint mediation and resource management teams in Gherille and Konton, and Diff through forums and trainings. The team found that internal factors limiting the development of CWGs into CBPCS include: lack adequate administrative qualities, poor coordination among CWGs, broken relationships with community, nepotism and clanism, lack of transparency, lack of governing bylaw and regular meetings, as well as marginalization of minority clans and ongoing tribal conflicts. The team also supported mediation in the Konton area between pastoral communities from the Diff and Gherille corridors to ensure peaceful sharing of natural resources, and facilitated with WASDA a team of elders to address the Wajir South-Lagdera boundary dispute and visit Mandera.

In the Garissa-Lower Jubba region: the PEACE II program began by working extensively with Partners AFREC inside Somalia, the GPDC and IPAD. GWFP and Ijara WFP and Dhobley WFP were also key partners. In Addition

to these partners' long term work on capacity building for community working groups managing peace dividend and local peace committees in the border towns and their cross border networks, from FY11 the PEACE II program also partnered with local organizations APD, CONTRASAD, TAWASAL and SPADE as programming in Garissa Lower Jubba expanded. The GMC also emerged as a key partner supporting work with youth and social reconciliation.

In FY11 the program gave a surge of support to strengthen a range of peace structures in the Garissa-Lower Juba region including religious leaders' mediation councils, livestock market mediators, community policing units, district peace committees and women for peace groups, as well as nascent cross-border peace committees in the Liboi/Dobley and Hulugho/Kolbio peace corridors. During the year the nascent Garissa DPC held several meetings with the aim of mapping and assessing the needs of peace actors, as well as documenting peace initiatives and facilitated training for local peace committees from Dadaab, Balanbale and Lagdera. During 2012, PEACE II supported AFREC, TAWSAL, MCP and IWFP to extend peace networks to the Amuma-Waldena and Raskomboni-Kiunga peace corridors at the southern end of the border. In Raskomboni-Kiunga, there is improved communication and relationships between the neighboring communities and Swahili speaking communities have become now involved in the local administration of Raskomboni. Business opportunities and livelihoods options are perceived locally to have significantly improved and enabled more open borders.

In Karamoja, the PEACE II program focused along the Kenya-Uganda border. Key partners included NENAH FM which focused on media and youth activities, RWPL which focused on enhancing the role of women in peace building, and LOKADO which focused on trauma healing and social reconciliation. Partners KADP, APAD and KISP supported social mobilization for peace dividend projects in the Nakiloro/Lokiriama and Loya/Kalemungole corridors, as well as supporting social reconciliation dialogues, trauma awareness and support for traditional elders mediation teams. CBR was also a key partner supporting the Uganda CEWERU and DPC networks in Uganda. The program has supported The Uganda CEWERU and CSO partners CBR, APAD, KISP, KADP, LOKADO, RWPL and NENAH FM to build the capacity of peace networks and specifically DPCs were strengthened in the Bukwo, Nakapiripirit, Kapchorwa, Moroto, Kotido and Kaabong districts of Uganda.

A critical mass of peace actors proactively deals with conflict

Peace Committees have continued to explore their role in connecting divided communities together, sharing information and fostering state-community partnerships for peace across borders. The growing number of sector response groups have been welcomed as additional capacity for the peace committee network, though peace committee members emphasize that peace committees are also structures in their own right. This has expanded participation by different sectors beyond elders and government. There is coordination of the peace networks in rapid response activities. In Mandera/Belet Hawa corridor, for example, all the sector response units have developed a collaborative framework where they all come together to intervene in rapid response activities with a common budget from which each group is assigned a task.

Cross-border relationships between communities and peace actors have enabled improved networking between the Kenya and Somalia government administrators (even informally when AlShabaab were in control of the border, and there were many local disputes that could have triggered conflict if not managed carefully, such as vehicle carjacking). The Somali CEWERU directly supported the establishment of district peace committees along the Somalia side of the border throughout 2011 and this has provided a foundation for work inside Somalia under the new government elected in 2012.

The establishment of cross border peace networks have developed constructive relationships with government security agencies who have then allowed people to cross the border to access basic services. In the event that people were arrested peace committees have intervened to facilitate their release. For example, in 2010 the Liboi peace committee secured the release of 10 people who were arrested by the police while crossing the border. They were to be taken to Garissa to be charged for being unlawfully in Kenya. After lengthy consultation with the security agencies in Liboi, the 10 were released unconditionally. The establishment of locational/divisional peace committee in Liboi, Dadaab and Korkora, Sankuri and Balambala has strengthened the networking of peace actors in the entire Garissa County.

Councils of elders have also become more effective in a number of places, such as the joint council established for the Mandera-Gedo region, and the elders of Garissa who led on the Lagdera dispute from the Garissa side while the famous AlFatah council of elders from Wajir led from the Wajir side. Cross border working groups

are developing as cross border peace committees by playing a greater role in conflict early warning. Traditional peace actors (such as the *Sultans* and *Ugaas*) were accommodated into the formal councils of elders which gave them a key role in electing more inclusive peace committees. This provides a stronger mechanism for ensuring monitoring and follow up to community peace agreements

Rapid responses have also improved in terms of improved conflict analysis reducing response times and improving conflict prevention, as well as improved local resource mobilization for rapid response. Community peace networks are demonstrating a better understanding of how conflicts can escalate and spread. They are also more able to mediate and negotiate among themselves without third party intervention and have a stronger collaboration with local authorities and improved engagement with elites and improved community procedures for the payment of compensation and documentation of agreements. Partners have also reported a better use of local neutral spaces for dialogue, rather than clan associated facilities, which has allowed more progress with community dialogue.

Religious leader mediation councils

The Mandera Mediation Council (MMC) came into existence as response unit in 2008, during the Garre-Murule conflict. Before this, religious leaders' role and function was confined to the mosques providing spiritual guidance to the faithful. Religious leaders were perceived by members of the community as being impartial and above clan politics., as the sheiks in MMC came from different clans, with existing skills in settling disputes. After successful intervention of the conflict with the support of PEACE II, their profile potentially grew from a response unit to a resource organization. Mediation councils have enhanced the unity of religious leaders in undertaking society reforms and peace building initiative thus developing the religious leader's collective response to conflict and their relationships with youth and women and the government, and they decentralized their work to very local levels.

In FY10. MMC formed a central part of the cross border peace strategy team which enabled dialogue with AlShabaab in Bellethawa and thus averted the escalation of a number of disputes. In 2011 MMC led the Garre-Degodia rapid response and developed the Banissa Peace declaration. They also support intervention in Ifo district in Garissa and the development of the Ifo peace accord. In FY 11, MMC initiated district MCs in Elwak, Takaba, Banisa, Malkamari and Rhamu, Lafey in Kenya and in Bellethawa, Damasa & Burhache in Somalia to respond to emerging conflict swiftly in order to limit the cost of transport, mobilization of human resource and response time. MMC then supported the formation and capacity development of the Garissa Mediation Council and local mediation councils in the districts of Liboi, Dhobley, Hulugho, Kolbio and Masalani, Ijara, Sangailu, Shantaabaq and Abaqkorey and Bura. In FY11 the MMC action research team identified a fragile relationship between youth and religious leaders and an un-supportive environment (cultural barriers, negative perceptions and stereotypes, restrictive government policies, insecurity) and poor coordination among religious leaders as key factors limiting peacebuilding impacts.

The action research team engaged religious leaders in Garissa and the newly established Garissa Mediation Council (GMC) has since grown from strength to strength. Their most notable success was when in early September 2011 they helped resolve a seven year old conflict in the Dadaab refugee camp between the local Madrasa clerics, their financers and a section of disgruntled Madrasa teachers¹⁸ as well as supporting intra-Ogaden peace dialogues in Garissa, Daadab, Hargadere, Liboi, Ifo, Ijara and Masalani. In FY12 GMC worked with at risk youth, through volunteer youth mentors, especially in the Dadaab refugee camps, where there is a widespread perception that at risk youth are routinely recruited into AlShabaab or TFG allied militia in Somalia and then return to Kenya and lead armed gangs in north eastern Kenya. Also 2012 GMC supported Lagdera border conflict resolution.

Youth and community policing

Among the communities of North Eastern Kenya and South Central Somalia, as well as in the Karamoja, youth are traditionally expected not to question or challenge the decision making power of their elders and many feel disenfranchised and powerless. At the same time, youth are the main conflict actors, tending the livestock, recruited as fighters into militias in Somalia, and serving as 'foot soldiers' in cycles of inter-communal violence. In moments peace has prevailed, the elders have dominated the peace processes and peace committees. Building on the initiative and passion of young people in the region, PEACE II aimed to encourage the involvement of young people in leadership and in decision making in peacebuilding. ¹⁹ At start of Peace II, youth were engaged through public youth rallies which highlighted the risks and destructive effects of conflict. At the rallies the youth suggested a number of interventions and formed teams of youth leaders on both sides of the border to disseminate information and mobilize youth for peace in both urban and rural areas, developing a network

of constant communication and collaboration between them. The youth engaged their parents and family and mobilized youth from divided communities, as well as school-based networks. This mass youth mobilization led to a realization among youth of the roles they can play in peacebuilding. Young women have been supported within these activities and have challenged the male youth not to follow in the footsteps of the older generation and to reverse gender discrimination.²⁰ From FY09-10, PEACE II supported YOPED, SSG, EWYFP, EWSYFP and SPADE with the following activities²¹

Cross-border stakeholders' meetings with government, women, elders and religious leaders.
Monthly Cross-border youth discussions forums on youth and conflict, drugs, crime, unemployment,
tribalism, gender
Transformative leadership and peacebuilding skills training.
Formation of school peace clubs, sports for peace activities and participatory educational theatre
Training of peace mentors and cross-border youth exchange visits.
Youth-focused peace dividends, including resource centers in Mandera and ElWak
Specific work with at risk' youth (ex-militia, pastoral drop-outs, substance abusers).
Action Research on youth for peace methods in FY11 through EWYFP
Work with MMC and GMC (in Dadaab) to train youth in mentoring skills in FY12

Youth for Peace organizations have gained significant recognition over the last three years and have impacted on local capacities among youth leaders, facilitated inter-clan marriages, enabled increasing recognition of youth by community leaders and government. During FY11 and 12 youth for peace partners in Mandera, Elwak and Raskomboni-Kiunga²² have mobilized former drug abusers to campaign against drugs at marketplaces and provided social entrepreneurship and vocational skills by constructing and equipping of youth social halls in Elwak and Mandera. Drug abuse has drastically reduced in some areas and there are examples of successful employment initiatives. The Elwak youth resource center has become communal interaction point and youth transformation center and 15 youth have graduated in short online courses training. Increased cooperation between youth and religious leaders through the frequent convening of forums, has improved campaigns against drug abuse, against crime and against militia activity. It has also fostered relative peace along across border. Despite the deep-rooted culture of youth being subordinate to the elders, elders are beginning to consult or involve the youth in decision making on issues involving cross-border peace. A number of youth leaders have joined local councils of elder status while others were recruited as chiefs into the civil service.

Youth participation has increased in a wide range of peace activities, which has increased the community's sense of security, as youth who were previously feared as being militiamen or bandits are now ambassadors of peace. There is also an increased resistance to violence by youth and a change in the way local institutions – such as elders' councils and peace committees - manage conflict as youth are more active, more involved and made more accountable. Inter-group relationships between youth from different clans have improved. Youth have led peace secretariats and documented community peace agreements. Councils of elders have included youth grievances in the community on their agenda. Peace committees have increased the role of youth networks in conflict early warning systems leading to community policing initiatives to reduce crime. Religious leaders have worked closely with ex-combatants, school dropouts and ex-drug addicts. In the Karamoja cluster, a number of warriors have now reformed in Kotido, Amudat, Rupa, Lokiriama and Tapach and Nenah FM have extensive programs involving youth in radio talk shows.

'The town is more peaceful. We used to have many cases of fights and theft but now it is calm. Cases of highway robbery have reduced drastically. The youth have taken control ... they give information about youth elements who are bound to disrupt peace.' Suleiman Mohamed,

'Religious leaders have recognized the importance of acceptance and counsel of the youth as necessary partners in decision making on cross-border peacebuilding. Previously, most youth simply feared the religious leaders, but now increasingly have trust and belief in the guidance given by the religious leaders, though full cooperation between the youth (male) and women is hampered due to cultural/religious restrictions that make women unable to associate freely.' Sheikh Mohammed Abdi-Nur, MMC

'You will hear many youth say they would be better off joining Al Shabaab than sitting around with no opportunities. Through guidance we challenge them to think about their families, their future, those who lost limbs and died. We have succeeded in engaging some youth who had the intention of joining the group. We have former militia with us who have defected and are undergoing rehabilitation. The challenge of fully















The PEACE II program, has worked with local youth and officials on both sides of the Kenya-Somalia border to prevent or reduce crime, violence, and insecurity. 'Community policing' in the Somali East sub-cluster is solely a civilian initiative to encourage youth to interact positively with state security forces (including administration officials, police, immigration officials and the military) to support the prevention of crime and conflict through sharing information with the security sector and building trust and constructive relationships. Focused on the Kenya side of the border, community policing initiatives have been profoundly empowering for youth and have contributed substantially to the effectiveness of peace committee networks. Examples of effective community policing work include where corrupt police have returned confiscated money, or curfews have been lifted allowing access to essential services. Community policing meetings have involved the local judiciary and local authorities and often revolved around what approach and action the security sector should pursue in dealing with complex incidents that could trigger conflict, such as how detained nationals from Somalia are treated, how corruption and abuse by the security sector is tackled and how traditional community-based dispute resolution systems can be employed to reduce inter-communal or cross border tensions arising from local incidents.

Members of community policing units aim to address the chronic lack of trust between the public and security forces and participate in security meetings and encourage communities to surrender illegal arms and support peace committees in the recovery of stolen vehicles and identification of arms traffickers. They have managed to establish informal communication systems between authorities on either side of the border (even when the Somalia side was under AlShabaab control) and have led peace actors in bringing the issue of police harassment and corruption out into open discussions on conflict prevention. They have secured the release of Kenyan teachers and NGO workers detained by AlShabaab and accused of spying.

By FY11 regular community policing meetings were held in 40 locations.²³ MCPU was then supported with an action research grant to build capacities for community policing in Garissa town and at the southern border locations of Liboy-Dhobley, Amuma-Hosingo, Ijara and Hulugho-Kolbio. In Liboy, a dusk to dawn curfew had been in place – ensuring the only medical facility in the region remained closed after 6pm on weekdays and throughout Saturdays and Sundays. Liboy town had become even more insecure, as armed extremist groups crossed the border from Dobley at night and there were incidents of kidnappings by Al Shabaab, and looting of shops and even targeting of local police stations to steal firearms. The new Liboy CPU lobbied for the withdrawal of the curfew and organized town monitoring by local youth and women to increase information collection to be shared with police. The impact was almost felt immediately by the town residents and the local medical facility in Liboy is now open 24 hours a day, seven days a week with the CPU and security personal providing monitoring and security, thus significantly improving peoples' access to medical services. Incidences of Liboi town raids by AlShabab reduced from 3 times a week to zero for the 6 months since the formation of these CPUs.


During FY12 capacity building continued in the BelletHawa-Mandera and ElWak-ElWak corridors, Garrissa, Lamu, Kiunga and Raskamboni. Training centered on Community policing functions, Crime prevention, Early warning mechanisms, Identification of hotspots and transit point for criminals, small arms control and effective networking and management of sensitive information. Monthly or quarterly security meetings were encouraged. Follow-up meetings for stakeholders from identified hotspots were supported, and in Lamu a new community policing network was established. In the new corridor of Raskomboni-Kiunga TAWASAL led efforts to strengthen youth participation in peacebuilding and specifically community policing initiatives covering. A series of trainings with at risk youth were also conducted in Raskomboni-Kiunga as well as trainings with at risk youth mentors, and meetings between youth, government and police. Following an analysis of crimes (such as drugs trafficking, killing, robbery, terrorism, theft) by frequency and location, actors involved and causes and identified corrective measures and possible stakeholder responses per sector (Religious leaders, teachers, opinion leaders, women groups, youth groups, businessmen, farmers, fishermen and administration), the Kiunga/Raskamboni CPU was elected and tasked with supporting awareness raising through role-plays; intensifying patrols within the hot spots; create sporting opportunities for the youth; fund small scale businesses; initiate rehabilitation centers and recover Kizigithini youth polytechnic from the administration police.

From FY10 in Karamoja, Community policing meetings in Karamoja (Loima, Lokiriama and Lobei) APAD convened, and aimed at establishing arms control and joint border patrols. Fourteen guns were handed to the District Officer. In Karamoja, peace races held annually engage elders, chiefs and CBOs to mobilize warriors from the communities - Turkana, Pokot, Karamojong and Marakwet - to raise awareness and disarm the minds of warriors as well. Reformed youth warriors act as peace ambassadors to give testimony of their experiences,

renouncing violence and promoting peace and specifically renouncing the practice of cattle-rustling and promoting what alternative economic livelihood options there are. Reformed warriors have accessed rehabilitation programs to develop sustainable livelihoods and played a key role in encouraging voluntary community disarmament, gaining the confidence of youth leaders and encourage their peaceful participation. In FY11 partners facilitated meetings with the local administration and security forces that led to the formation of mediation teams to intervene in issues of livestock recovery. NENAH FM worked with youth in 7 locations (Karameri, Amudat, Camp Swahili Juu, Camp Swahili Chini, Nakadeli, Rupa and Tapach) to form groups that have interacted with the local administration personnel in both Kenya and Uganda on conflict and crime prevention.

There is general agreement that youth participation in crime reduced along with highway robberies and carjacking between 2008-11. Local authorities and partners reported a steady decrease in insecurity and armed roadblocks along the Elwak, Kenya, Elwak, Somalia corridor since 2008. According to community members, more youth in Bellethawa are now unarmed and going to school. The enrolment of students at Mandera Polytechnic has risen from 50 to 250 following campaigns. There is also an improved relationship between the police and the local communities and in 2010 a rogue police officer was forced to return USD 1200 stolen from a trader. Explosives have been recovered with community assistance. In Liboi in 2012 the Kenyan military joined community members in rehabilitating a building used as a Madarasa. However by the end of 2012, following the TFG's progress in securing the strategic port of Kisamayo in Somalia, AlShabaab sponsored attacks inside Kenya were increasing rapidly and community policing networks coming under a lot of strain.

Everyone thought that engaging the police and military would put oneself at risk and almost everybody avoided them. With community policing unit network we were able to reason and dialogue with them on security issues, and support them in resolving community conflicts and now there are improved civilmilitary relations and cooperation. Shukri Khalif, chair CPU, Liboi



During the start-up consultative stakeholders meetings in the Somali cluster only two of the sisxty CSO participants who attended were women. In response, Mandera Women for Peace and Development Mandera (WFPD) and PEACE II initiated a follow-up meeting specifically inviting women from Kenya, Somalia, and Ethiopia to strategize on the establishment of a regional response network for women peacebuilders. PEACE II also piloted a project in the Mandera-Bellethawa peace corridor to see if having women's organizations responsible for social mobilization processes would ensure women were not left out of peace dividend projects and achieve an increase in women's participation in the program as a whole. A series of meetings with local leaders on both sides of the border established an understanding with the authorities and male dominated community organizations. Monthly women's forums were established to discuss women's issues and strategies for their increased participation. Women peace initiatives in Bellethawa increased dramatically. MDPC also mobilized business community around strategies to enhance women's role in cross-border trade and to prevent police harassment of women traders.



In FY10, PEACE II with the Coalition for Peace in Africa (COPA) implemented a one year 'Women in Peace

Leadership' project based on methodologies developed by the Eastern Memonite University, which involved women's leadership training, mentoring, mobilization and capacity building for lobbying, advocacy and networking. Twenty-five women from across the Horn of Africa were trained. Five women from the Somali Cluster then went ahead and trained another 40 women who rolled out local workshops and in total some 520 women were involved. This has led to a stronger woman's network of contacts stretching from Mandera to Ijara and a visible increase in women's participation across the Somali cluster. Training was rolled out locally in Damassa, Wajir, Gherille, Khorof Hara, Garissa. Pact's partner, COPA published a 'journal' of the experiences of their core 25 women trainees. The program also gave grants to women's organizations in Elwak (WCC) and Ijara (IWF) and in Karamoja to RWLP in Kenya and KISP in Uganda to expand women leadership in social mobilization. At the PEACE II annual partners' meeting in Garissa, women gave numerous examples of increases in women's leadership and empowerment. They also recognized an increase in the support from men in partner organizations that has helped enable their work. For example, in the Hulugho/Kolbio corridor, women leaders trained by the 'Women in Peace Leadership' project mobilized women in the Hulugho/Kolbio corridor to participate in local planning processes, to improve on the PLA processes that has been male dominated and led to no proposals that PEACE II could fund.²⁴ In the Diff-Diff corridor women leaders trained by the 'Women in Peace Leadership' project have effectively engaged traditional elders in discussions to halt harmful traditional practices

In FY11, an action research team from the women for peace network, led by WWFP explored strategies for engaging rural women in a network of grassroots mediators. This involved overcoming the challenges of the local cultural context and strategizing on ways to sustain network with regular communication and minimal cost. Key impediments to rural women playing an active role in peace-building include


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- Psychological factors such as fear of victimization and lack of confidence (self-esteem)
- An un-supportive environment (discriminative cultural practices, authoritative spouses, huge family responsibilities, chronic poverty, poor coordination among women, negative perceptions of women-led peace processes)
- Lack of adequate resources (both financial and logistical)
- Inadequate opportunities to gain knowledge and skills in peace building.
- ☐ Minimal participation and representation in important community functions.²⁵

Sixteen workshops involved 180 participants were trained in mediation from Mandera, Belet Hawa, Elwak Kenya, Elwak Somalia, Kutulo Wajir and Kutulo Mandera, Gherille Kenya, Gherille Somalia, Konton, Daresalam, Diff Kenya, Diff Somalia, Liboi, Dhobley, Amuma, Waldena, Hulugho and Kolbio. Out of the 180, the team identified 60 rural women participants, to work as key mediators in their respective areas. The most important impact of this initiative is the remarkable transformation of the rural Women capacity to mediate grass root conflicts and transcends traditional value barriers in relatively conservative rural pastoralists Somali nomads. The rural women mediators of Dhobley Somalia, through their acquired mediation skills influenced the surrender of 42 local youths who initially were conscripted by AlShabab in to their militia. The women through their own initiative, managed to rehabilitate and reintegrate the youth in to the community.

In FY 12, the PEACE II program awarded six grants to women for peace groups to expand grass roots women networks and also trauma healing networks.²⁶ In the Mandera-Gedo region, MWFP trained women leaders in mobilizing communities for vetting and voting for credible leaders in the upcoming general elections, handling victimization and ensuring access for female children to formal education, they also expanded trauma healing networks to Damasa, Rhamu, Lafey with a focus on young females who have experienced forced marriage, divorce or rape). Both MWFP and BHWFP played a key role in responding to escalating Garre-Marehan conflict leading





a series of consultative meetings leading to a large peace meeting for women to reconcile women from the two communities. A localized trauma healing field manual was also drafted and an inter-district Rural Women Leadership network was established. In the Wajir region, WWFP held meetings to strengthen local rural women networks with new rapid response units in Diff, Wajir town, Gherille, Daresalam, Konton. In the Garrissa-Lower Jubba region GWFP and IWFP held trauma healing trainings in Kiunga, Raskamboni, Hulugho, Kolbio, Masalani and Sangenlo and workshops to strengthen rural women peace networks in Modogashe, Dadaab, Dujis and Balambala, Kiunga and Raskamboni (where two women promised to contest for women representatives in the upcoming elections).²⁷ In Karamoja, RWPL supported cross border stakeholders workshop in Kapenguria, and trained 50 women leaders in Amudat and Alale and 25 in Lorengipi, and also conducted trauma healing trainings in these locations (between the Pokot and Sabiny in Amakuriat and Turkana and the Jie in Lorengipi) and held a sports gala in Amakuriat in West Pokot District, Kenya


Women for Peace organizations and networks continue to evolve and expand. Previously women took up few if any roles in peace committees and did not complete in politics. With the support of PEACE II there has been change of attitude by communities as well as men currently allowing women's participation in all areas of development. Currently women are much freer to articulate their issues and are not shy to defend their interests. Peace dividend projects also motivated women to be involved in development and they took up roles in school committees, dispensaries and water users associations.

Following the Garre-Marehan conflict in Mandera in March 2012, Bellethawa women for peace played vital roles through conducting series of peace dialogue with youth and women to stop revenge attacks, and are credited with securing the implementation of the ceasefire. BHWFP and MWFP were involved in supporting the burial of the deceased and in contributing food to the displaced persons in Bellethawa and Mandera. While WWFP and local women assisted in re-building of the burned houses in Wajir following the Garre- Degodia conflict. Women for peace organizations have also led much of the trauma healing work implemented following outbreaks of violence (for example after the Garre-Murule conflict in 2008. In some cases this work is credited with ensuring that agreed blood compensation is paid. Following leadership training many grassroots women have taken new initiative. For example in Diff women built a guesthouse as an income generating activity. In May 2011 Dobley Women for Peace reacted to a call from the security agencies highlighting concerns in the increased number of youth joining militia and criminal gangs. DWFP identified the youth who joined the criminal groups and created a network of local youth who monitored their movements in and out of the town. They then organized series of mentoring sessions for the youth who had planned to enroll in terror groups. They managed to transform 45 youth out of the original 48 as the other three traveled out of reach. The women through their own initiative, managed to rehabilitate and reintegrate the youth in to the community.

In FY12, rural women networks in Dugis, Balambala and Modogashe resolved conflicts at a borehole in Jelango. After a series of meeting with the conflicting parties and the stakeholders which includes the government, the two parties reconciled and agreed to work together after a management committee was formed to run the borehole on behalf of the community. In Karamoja, through the network created by the RWPL, rural women of Alale, Amudat, and Loya have been empowered on their rights and are able to talk publicly and air their views and there is improved attendance in public meetings where women share their ideas.

District Livestock Mediators

The Mandera livestock market brings together daily livestock traders from Kenya, Somalia and Ethiopia and many cross-border issues and conflicts arise. The market is an inter-communal space and an important interface for communities. Disputes in the market place can trigger wider communal conflicts while conversely good relationships can consolidate peace and tackle crime. Livestock markets connect urban and rural populations and where information is shared, livestock theft can be countered. The success of livestock enterprises depends on the effectiveness of market management including the resolution of disputes and prevention of conflict. The Mandera District Livestock Marketing Council serves as a peace structure to resolve disputes arising between livestock traders as they conduct their business.²⁸ The DLMC collaborates closely with Mandera's peace committees and sector response units. Disputes in the market can trigger wider inter-communal tensions and violence, and therefore market based mediators need to rapidly gather accurate information and resolve disputes before they escalate. A constant dialogue between livestock keepers mitigates cross border conflict. Conflict triggers include livestock theft, the borrowing of livestock and failure to return them, cheating over prices by brokers or middlemen, and confusion over ownership caused by similar branding.²⁹



In FY 09, the PEACE II program supported the MDLMC to engage Somali livestock traders in discussions on how to enhancing cross-border trade in livestock and problems connected to drought, livestock health and livestock marketing and to recruit market monitors. Many traders disputes were also managed. In FY10 PEACE II funded the rehabilitation of the Elwak Somalia livestock market and supported MDLMC to supervise a management committee selected by the local community in El Wak, Somalia. MDLMC was also supported to expand the DLMC network across Mandera county and this network has been used to track thieves who have taken animals stolen from the Somali border area to sell in Moyale on Kenya's border with Ethiopia. PEACE II also supported MDLMC to train market monitors, develop by-laws for managing market disputes, engage with Mandera's Town Council, train cross-border livestock traders in Mandera Bellethawa and also Elwak, including training on cross border branding systems where symbols are agreed for use by different sub-clans, and facilitating meetings for livestock traders and peace committees to establish an information system (in Ethiopia, Somalia and Kenya) to provide daily updates on the going price for livestock on national and international markets.

In FY11, good practice was replicated in the Garissa- Lower Juba region. The Mandera DLMC supported the formation of a Garissa Livestock Market Mediation Council (a mediation team drawn from livestock traders, producers, brokers and livestock groups within Garissa county and the cross-border areas), through trainings, exchange visits and facilitation, and strengthened its links with other peace networks. The DLMC action research team found that the root causes of conflicts in Garissa Livestock Market include the lack of pricing regulations, branding disputes, hoarding by middleman/owners and livestock theft. They also found that the cross border issues that might de-stabilize the Garissa Livestock market include animal rustling, clan rivalry, movement of traders, drought and currency fluctuations.³⁰ They also found that the Garissa livestock market lacks the analysis, systems, structures and mediation capacity to manage and prevent a wide range of potential livestock related conflicts. The action research team supported the GDLMC and developed satellite market mediator councils in Liboy-Dhobley, Hulugho-Kolbio and Amuma.

District livestock mediators have transformed the DLMC institution beyond its previously economic functions to act as a key sector response peace organization with a strong early warning network among traders. An Internal assessment by DLMC of Peace II activities with 55 stakeholders concluded that cross-border livestock trade has increased, security and safety of the movement of livestock has improved, the facilities constructed in the livestock market are in use by both communities, and 16 disputes have been resolved within the market, with none of them referred to the courts. In El Wak Somalia DLMC where it was reported that livestock theft had been drastically reduced since the strengthening of the livestock market peace committee, now recognized by communities and administrations. The market mediation team has solved several cases of livestock thefts in Mandera, Bellet Hawa and Suftu.

Media

The PEACE II program has supported local radio stations to publicize peacebuilding initiatives, air peace messages and poems, produce radio dramas and conduct interviews and talk shows with a focus on peace actors and especially youth. At the start of the program, PEACE II supported Mandeeq radio in BelletHawa to reach 47,000 Somalis. Mandeeq aired live panel discussions, debates and interviews with Somali intellectuals, clan elders, and district officials, focusing on the triggers of conflict and ways of preventing conflict, and encouraged listening groups to debate on the topics aired. In November 2009, Al Shabaab in Belethawa forced the radio to close after it aired an interview with a rival militia and for two months Mandeeq was unable to function normally until elders from both Mandera and Belet Hawa successfully negotiated that the radio station be allowed back on air. In 2009, the Belet Hawa district commissioner, then an AlShabaab appointee, was interviewed and described peace dividend projects as like a river passing along this border, where everyone from both sides has equal rights to share in it. However by 2010 AlShabaab had forced Mandeeq radio to close for the remainder of the PEACE II program

PEACE II also funded Star FM to hold live radio panel interviews with key peace actors in North-Eastern province, and broadcast peace dramas, poems and interviews with the public. Star FM has also shared market information for use by traders and communities and set-up a hotline for citizens to share information on incidents of conflict across the region (including live reporting from peace conferences). Star FM conducted radio talk-shows with religious leaders on 'preventing youth radicalization" and also brought together youth and Islamic scholars to debate. Star FM also aired the peace messages from elders mediating inter-communal conflicts. Star FM also produced and aired comedies capturing the importance of peace and dangers related to violence and drug abuse. The radio dramas were in the Somali language, aired repeatedly and were very popular among the youth.

In the Karamoja PEACE II has supported NENAH FM to engage youth groups through drama to sensitize local communities. 1.2million listeners are reached by the Nenah FM in Karamoja. Reformed warriors are interviewed and share their experiences and dangers associated with raids to discourage active raiders. At one point Turkana youth apologized on air to Jie youth for recent violence. NENAH FM also supported inter-parish drama competitions and cultural exhibitions, airing peace messages, youth dramas, music festivals and playing peace songs. NENAH FM broadcast seven radio talk shows focused on peacebuilding in Karamoja, with participation from youth, government officials and security forces from the Jie, Dodoth, Pokot, Pian, Matheniko and Turkana. The major themes explored were jealously, poverty and cattle-raids. NENEH FM has hosted drama competitions, exchange visits and peace caravans among Jie, Dodoth and Matheniko youth. They also recorded folk stories and messages about peace





Business associations

In FY11, PEACE II supported the emergence of a new sector response group – associations of business leaders and elites. Pact facilitated ethics and integrity workshops with local businessmen and professional elites in the Somali cluster to review the role of business and trade on conflict dynamics and attitudes in society. Many business leaders have suffered from the restrictions on trade resulting from militia dominance of trade on the Somalia side of the border. There is also a growing recognition that all businessmen contribute to the character of the local economy and business practices that re-enforce clan politics and clan conflicts are a significant factor in perpetuating insecurity. Business and professional elites can play a key role in supporting local capacities for peace to respond effectively with less reliance of external support.



5: Regional peace frameworks

Theory of Change

Theory of change: Through strengthening vertical linkages between conflict management structures at the local, national and regional levels, a regional peace framework will be developed to reduce violence at critical border areas.

Lessons learned

Experience from PEACE II points to a number of lessons in strengthening regional frameworks. Early warning and rapid response systems should be developed to enable local capacities and locally managed resources to be rapidly deployed. Replication of good practice horizontally, using innovations and resource persons active at the borders, is also the most sustainable and effective way of expanding peace networks. Higher level coordination is most needed to ensure that financial and technical support to the ground is well coordinated and that policy level engagement, especially with national institutions such as the security sector (or influencing policy makers to address root/structural causes) take place and are informed by analysis and recommendations from communities themselves giving them voice and influence at higher levels.

Government recognition of community peace processes and institutions such as through recognizing the Modogashe declaration or the role of district peace committees can strengthen their effectiveness. CEWERUs and CEWARN can also generate greater levels of support for peacebuilding through their ability to identify and work effectively with locally based mediators. Promoting exchange and learning forums, and roles for grass roots peace-builders as resources beyond their own communities, has an empowering effect on local networks. It would be valuable to establish a number of representative regional (cross border) councils as provided for in the IGAD CEWARN protocol to follow up peace processes and conflict prone locations and to identify priority areas of policy making (addressing root causes/structural causes of conflict) for the regional council to influence as well as reviewing more systematically how alternative dispute resolution mechanisms can be strengthened coherently alongside modern law.

Achievements and impact

CEWARN

PEACE II has engaged with all actors within the CEWARN structure: the CEWARN secretariat, National CEWERUS, National Research Institutes (NRIs), CSOs, field monitors, DPCs and community leaders and networks. The PEACE II program held regular coordination meetings with the CEWARN secretariat over the life of the program, and staff attended many quarterly CEWARN review meetings. In FY09 CEWARN, PEACE II and USAID developed a memorandum of understanding, agreeing that PEACE II would build the capacity of the CEWARN mechanism through working with national CEWERUs and key cross border peace committee networks and that CEWARN and PEACE II would jointly support the development of a CEWERU in Somalia as a priority. It was also agreed that PEACE II would support the piloting the Rapid Response Fund with Kenyan and Ethiopian CEWERUs and joint peace committee assessments. However, work with the Ethiopian CEWERU was suspended as all parties acknowledged the national legislation restricting peace building work with civil society in Ethiopia was preventing the implementation of work-plans. In FY9, PEACE II supported a CEWARN Somali stakeholder's workshop in Garissa, which agreed the need for CEWARN field monitors, in the Gedo and Jubba regions of Somalia. During FY10, PEACE II and the CEWARN secretariat co-managed and co-facilitated a Karamoja Women leaders meeting in Eldoret, Kenya.³² The CEWARN secretariat attended the PEACE II Mombasa forum on managing and mitigating election conflict, the Nairobi workshop for Somalia CEWERU stakeholders, the PEACE II mid-term review, and was involved in planning for the Uganda CEWERU exchange visit. PEACE II provided CEWARN with technical assistance on community contracting for peace dividends.

The Somalia CEWERU

The initiation of the Somalia CEWERU took place during a time when central government in Mogadishu was weak and the Somalia side of the border with Kenya was controlled in its entirety by AlShabaab. In FY09 a meeting organized by CEWARN and facilitated by PEACE II staff aimed to identify a road-map for establishing a CEWERU structure in Somalia and tasked the TFG's Permanent Secretary for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to establish an Interim CEWERU and Secretariat and pilot areas for early warning and response activities. In FY10

PEACE II supported a series of consultations in Mogadishu and a first National consultative meeting of the Somali CEWERU in Nairobi. PEACE II's local partner, the Somali Youth Development Network (SOYDEN), supported the establishment of a CEWERU desk at the Ministry, translated CEWARN documents into the Somali language and supported a pilot rapid response mechanism on the Somalia side of the Kenyan-Somali border. The Permanent Secretary (PS) in the TFG's Ministry of Foreign Affairs visited the Kenya side of the border twice in 2010 and said Somalia as a whole needs to learn from and institutionalize lessons learned at the grassroots, and the center [of power] needs to learn from advances being made at the periphery. The Somali CEWERU then held consultations in Mogadishu, ³³ on the operationalization of the CEWERU structure inside Somalia.

In FY 11 the program supported a meeting in Nairobi of the technical committee and focal point at the TFG Ministry of Foreign Affairs, trained field monitors and initiated monthly meetings of the NSC in Mogadishu and participated in CEWARN meetings in Ethiopia and Djibouti. The Somalia CEWRU also led an Action research initiative involving a series of assessments, consultations, networking meetings and trainings, assisted by Kenya and Ethiopia field monitors, which considered approaches to capacity building of district peace committees inside Somalia and trained field monitors. Nascent Somalia based peace committees developed plans for their institutional development towards district wide peace committees. Field monitors were trained in CEWARN reporting and monthly meetings of the NSC continued in Mogadishu.³⁴ In FY 12, Peace committees from the Gedo and Lower Jubba regions were given more advanced capacity development support and expanded work into the interior of their districts.³⁵ The Somalia CEWERU also held its second Annual General meeting of the NSC in Mogadishu, involving senior TFG officials. Following this a national consultative meeting was held in Mogadishu with representatives from the CEWARN secretariat, TFG, MPs and CSOs and DPCs, which agreed that the CEWERU should focus on resolving land disputes, power struggles, resource conflicts and employment, specifically to: 1) Strengthen the existing early warning mechanism along the borders; 2) Set up a subcommittee along the borders to monitor pastoralist, IDPs and refugees, insurgent groups across the border; 3) the Somali CEWERU should lead in promoting conflict sensitive policies on movement of pastoralists, cross border trade and management of natural resources; 4) the Somalia CEWERU should play a key role in supporting the TFG national ministries to develop a harmonized plan for stabilization in the liberated border regions, and reducing the gap between national and local level actors. In May 2012, the Somalia CEWERU extended the conflict analysis of newly liberated areas of Somalia begun with Pact, into the Bay region of South Central Somalia. On 8-10 June the Somalia CEWERU held its mid-term review meeting in Mogadishu which involved the CEWERU national secretariat, government representatives from Internal Affairs, National Intelligences and Police, Civil Society Organizations (Pact partners AFREC and GPC and SOYDEN), traditional leaders, peace committee members and field monitors.³⁶

The Uganda CEWERU

The Uganda CEWERU has been undertaking initiatives aimed at preventing, reducing and mitigating pastoral and related conflicts in the districts of Amudat, Bukwo, Kaabong, Kapchorwa, Kotido, Kween, Moroto, Nakapiripirit and Napak which make up the Karamoja cluster on the Uganda side. The Uganda CEWERU has noted that over time, traditional pastoralist conflicts have metamorphosed from pastoral and agro-pastoral to land-related, ethnic-oriented, gender-based and climate change-induced conflicts. The result is that potential foreign investors, local investors, tourists and traders are scared away from the Karamoja. In FY09 PEACE II supported the Uganda CEWERU to establish and launch DPCs in the six districts of Bukwo, Kaabong, Kapchorwa, Kotido, Moroto and Nakapiripirit. Recognizing the need to work within the framework of existing structures at the district level, the District Security Committees (DSCs) formed the core of the DPCs and were then expanded to include representatives of local civil society organizations, elders, youth, women and religious leaders. In FY10 PEACE II supported workshops to restructure the CEWERU. Members proposed a new structure for the CEWERU which included a Working Committee comprising the CEWERU Head, the President's Office, Country Coordinator, Police, UPDF, Attorney General's office and Office of the Prime Minister. Members also suggested that a fullyfledged secretariat be supported within the National Focal Point on small arms and light weapons. Lastly, it was proposed that the steering committee include Ministry of Gender and also Ministry of Local Government. In FY 10 PEACE II also supported a number of visits to DPCs in Bukwo, Nakapiripirit, Kapchorwa, Moroto, Kotido and Kaabong, and workshops to discuss operational guidelines for CEWERU in Mbale.

In FY 11, PEACE II facilitated an exchange and learning visit to the Kenyan CEWERU which resulted in the Uganda CEWERU adopting operational guidelines for early response systems within Uganda. In FY 12, PEACE II supported the Uganda CEWERU to formulate a five year strategic plan, through involving a diverse group of people from Uganda CEWERU National Steering committee, government departments, civil society, academia, research and opinion leaders.³⁷ Also in FY12 the Uganda CEWERU held a series of traditional leaders forums aimed at establishing a regional forum (in Kotido, Kaabong, Napak, Moroto, Amudat, Nakapiripirit and

Kapchorwa districts). They collectively agreed that DPCs should coordinates all peace activities including cross-district/border initiatives and that INGOs should partner with them especially on community participation in disarmament programs and conflict resolution, as well as increasing peace programs that go beyond the work of DPCs. Training in trauma healing and social reconciliation was carried out in all 9 districts on the Uganda side, targeting senior level officials and using materials developed by PEACE II.

The South Sudan CEWERU

PEACE II has supported the South Sudan CEWERU with a few strategic initiatives, starting participation from the national and select state governments in the Mombasa forum on preventing election related conflict held in June 2010. The Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly adopted the Mombasa recommendations and this event was covered in the local media. The parliament then established the Ad Hoc Parliamentary Committee for the 2011 Referendum and members of the committee undertook a peace mission to the National Assembly in Khartoum where they met with the leadership of the Committee on Peace and Unity and held a press conference with Khartoum media houses. The Ministry of Peace and CPA Implementation then convened a meeting of its State Directors on implementing the Mombasa recommendations at the local level.

In early FY11, PEACE II facilitated a delegation from the Southern Sudan ministry of peace and SSLA to visit Kenya to learn from recent Kenyan experiences with referendum processes with a focus on hate speech, early warning and constructive media roles, prior to the South Sudan referendum on independence. Following this an early warning system involving legislative and executive members of the Southern Sudan government was strengthened. The South Sudanese team was most interested in how to hold government actors accountable for unlawful conduct, how MPs can deliver precise, clear and coherent referendum messages to the grassroots level, strategies for "cold spots", and strategies for post referendum negotiations and dealing with returnees and IDPs. On returning to Sudan, MPs and MPCPA stakeholders were involved in active peace messaging and early warning reporting. In FY 11 PEACE II also supported the South Sudan legislative assembly's (SSLA) committee on peace and reconciliation to conduct investigations into post 2010 election related violence in Upper Nile, Jonglei, Unity and Lakes states, which led to a series of recommendations to parliament and the cabinet on approaches to integration of 3 key militia leaders dissatisfied with the 2010 election results.

Kenya CEWERU

The PEACE II program has worked closely with the Kenya CEWERU over the life of the program building the capacity of local peace committees and coordinating early response with the Kenya CEWERU nationally. In FY09, a number of consultative meetings were held with CEWARN and the Kenya CEWERU to develop a Kenya mechanism (with procedures, guidelines and processes) for rapid response, domesticating the proposed CEWARN Rapid Response Fund for support to grassroots CSOs. This rapid response framework - the first one of its kind in the region – was expected to serve as a model for other IGAD countries, with Ethiopia, Uganda and Sudan expressing interest in the Kenyan experience. Other development organizations also expressed willingness to contribute to the "basket" rapid response fund.³⁹ In FY10, the program supported an EPP regional forum on managing and mitigating election related conflict.⁴⁰

In FY11 Pact provided technical assistance to other Kenya CEWERU processes including facilitation of a review of the Modogashe declaration (including a detailed review of the Community Peace Agreements) and training sessions for Kenyan political party leadership in April, as well as national events in September. Pact also supported a process of 'county conversations' in 8 counties - Kisumu, Garissa, Bungoma, Lamu, Migori, Mombasa, Usian Gishu, and Isiolo. County stakeholders were supported to develop a plan for preventing potential election related conflict at the level of the new counties established by the new constitution. A national level validation workshop led by NSC involved participants from the eight counties as well as representatives from central and county government, civil society organizations, Agenda 4 commissions, media houses and county-based facilitators. 41 Among the key recommendation were: 1) awareness raising on county structures and resource allocation; 2) ensure effective participation of citizens by holding meetings in schools, churches and community halls; 3) approach youth issues holistically to reduce youth disillusionment and levels of violence; 4) formation of county based consortiums to provide for coordination; create safe spaces for communities to express and air their grievances (targeting the voices not normally heard in workshops. In FY12, Pact was invited by the Kenyan CEWERU to contribute to the CEWARN strategic plan for Kenya⁴² and in November, Pact supported a final EPP forum to update analysis and strategies for county election violence prevention.⁴³ At the end of 2012, Pact partnered with NSC to establishing summary county conflict profiles for all 47 counties in Kenya, based on a process of desk research followed by field consultations in all counties. This work will be carried forward under the KCSSP program from January 2013.44

10. Monitoring and evaluation data

	ANNEX 1: Indicator information	Description	FY '08	FY '09	FY '10	FY '11	FY '12	FY'13	Totals
1.3.7 - I	AW ENFORCEMENT RESTRUCTURING, REFORM A	ND OPERATIONS		1		1	1		
1.6	# of communities in USG-assisted areas using community policing methods	Number of communities using community policing methods as funded by USG.	5	29	70	40	21	1	166
2.1	# of USG-assisted facilitated events geared towards strengthening understanding and mitigating conflict between groups		59	0	208	0	0	0	267
2.2	mitigating conflict between groups # of people attending facilitated events geared towards strengthening understanding and mitigating conflict between groups 1.6.1 - CONFLICT MITIGATION		304	0	3759	0	0	0	4063
1									
1.2	# of people from at-risk groups reached through USG-supported conflict mitigation activities	Includes people reached through social mobilization and accessing PDs; and people directly reached through CEWERU, rapid response and sector response	8,800	23,403	145,698	55,656	5846	692	240,095
	# of people trained in conflict mitigation/ resolution skills with USG assistance	Includes number of people trained through Pact implemented training and capacity building activities and in kind grants. Not people trained by partners			0	386	713	85	1184
	# of groups trained in conflict mitigation/ resolution skills with USG assistance	Counting the number of groups in Kenya/Sudan trained to mitigate election/referendum related conflict			10	8	5	8	31
1.1	# of USG programs supporting a conflict and/or fragility early warning system and/or response mechanism	Peace II program (support for Somalia, Kenya and Southern Sudan early warning systems	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
1.3	# of USG-supported activities that demonstrate the positive impact of a peace process through demonstrating tangible, practical benefits 1.6.2 - PEACE AND RECONCILIATION PROCESSES	Total Peace Dividends supported and operational this financial year	1	19	57	21	3	0	101
2.3	# of peace building structures established/ strengthened with USG assistance that engage conflict-affected citizens in peace/reconciliation processes	Including CBPCs, DPC, Sector response units, peace CBPs/NGOs - especially those working on reconciliation processes	117	61	56	130	37	1	402
1.5	# of people participating in USG-assisted reconciliation activities conducted and completed with the participation of two or more conflicting parties	People participating in social reconciliation activities	9,838	19,383	23,258	2,125	2669	365	57,638
1.4	# of USG-assisted reconciliation activities conducted/completed with participation of 2 or more conflicting parties	Number of social reconciliation activities)	171	82	212	39	69	6	579

8. Annex List of PEACE II reports

FY	08
	RELPA baseline report
	PEACE II baseline report
	Security assessment
	FY08 annual report
FY	Λα
	COPA report: women in peace leadership
Ĭ	Trauma healing report
	FY09 annual report
	·
FY	10
	Community contracting manual
	Mid-term evaluation
	Video documentary: trauma healing
	FY10 annual report
FY	11
	Workshop report on preventing election related conflict in Kenya and Southern Sudan (EPP funded)
	Video documentary: youth in violent conflict transformation
	County conversations in Kenya report with the Kenyan CEWERU (EPP funded)
	Action Research report: reflecting on peace practice (CMM funded)
	Capacity index for peace organizations and networks
	FY11 annual report
FY	12
	Imagine Karamoja: Appreciative Inquiry report
	Conflict mapping of the Gedo and Jubba regions of Somalia 2012
Ĭ	Trauma healing and social reconciliation manual
	FY12 annual report

Endnotes

- 1. The Marehan in El-Wak, Somalia tried to help the Murale to graze and water their livestock in El-Wak, Somalia. However, the hosting of Murale by Marehan in El-Wak, Somalia started a conflict between the Marehan and the Garre. The Garre accused the Murale of committing crimes in Kenya, including highway robberies and ambushes, and then taking sanctuary in El-Wak, Somalia.
- 2. Kenya Red Cross, Oxfam GB, WASDA, ALDEF
- 3. The first stage is the 'Saben' which is an apology for the crime committed and to take responsibility of the fines imposed. The Awleihan agreed to pay this to the Muqabul in September 2012. Next was 'Rafisa' which is 40% of the overall compensation which was equivalent to Ksh. 400,000. This fee has already been paid directly to the families who lost relatives. The final portion of the compensation is called 'Maag' which is the remaining 60% blood price which is yet to be paid by the Awleihan clan. The elders indicated that progress is being made in raising the required KSH. 1.2 Million from the seven sub-clans of the Awleihan.
- 4. Historically the Sheikal came to Hosingo and were welcomed in Waldena by the Mohammed Zubeir because of their strong religious background that earned them great respect as educators, spiritual leaders and people with good virtues. As the Sheikal were consolidating their newfound gains the Makabul were expanding settlements from Badade towards Hosingo which was an upcoming center with booming business opportunities. As business grew the Makabul erected roadblocks which caused a lot of tensions in border towns. In 1992 Ogaden dominated forces took control of the Lower Juba region and pushed the Sheikal out of power and subsequently gave authority of the town to a Makabul, along with a force for the territory, which indicated support for Makbul claims to Walkdena and the Sheikal were increasingly marginalized.
- 5. In a few cases CWG members appeared partial, and had contractors they were supporting. However, the evaluation criteria did not leave room for manipulation and only contractors who qualified technically and financially were awarded the contract.
- In future potential bidders should be included in the training on community contracting so that they understand the evaluation criteria being adopted to gauge their technical capacity. Though this information was included in the bid documents, many had not read them and were only interested in pricing the BOQs.
- 7. 2 were new school (Khadija Secondary in Mandera and Deg Elema primary) while 8 were dilapidated existing schools
- 8. The proximity of the water sources reduced time spent by women and girl-child in search of water from 24hrs to 3hrs by a day. The idea of sinking water pans was quickly replicated by some households who dug theirs and sold water to their neighbours further reducing pressure on the community water pans. In one case the saved time was directed towards weaving of mats. Initially a woman will take several months to weave one mat but currently the take about a week. The mat is sold at ksh. 700. Some men are now supporting women to water the animals and fetching domestic water through donkey carts.
- 9. The distribution was guided by the presence of large grazing lands inside Somalia which lacked watering points. Additionally in Somalia maintenance of water pans was feasible (unlike for example school projects which required teachers and other resources from central government).
- 10. Cross-border communities opted to have boreholes on the Kenya side to be used in times of drought (given access to maintenance services)
- 11. The distribution was informed by PLA processes and scarcity/distance of these facilities to cross-border communities. For instance Damasa Somalia to Mandera district hospital is 120Km, Gherille to Wajir district hospital is 100km, and Diff to Wajir is 160Km. All these are earth roads which become impassable during wet season (The distances covered may not save a life during emergencies or delivery).
- 12. The Damasa health facility created a multiplier effect among other INGOs in the area with COSVI supplying drugs and two nurses
- 13. which included the construction and furnishing of a dormitory, kitchen, 3 classrooms and latrines
- 14. This corridor also benefitted from additional peace dividend support from the DFID funded BORDERs Project: Pan de-silting, Underground water tank and toilets at Gherille (S) (Ogaden, Marehaan)
- 15. This corridor also benefitted from additional peace dividend support from the DFID funded BORDERs Project: Rain water harvest system to Maternity Ward to Diff Dispensary and a Primary school in Diff, Somalia
- 16. For example, Peace committees in ElWak Kenya have trained local committees in the townships of Elgolicha, Lafey, Shimbir, Fatuma, Kutulo, Warqadud, and Kotulo.
- 17. MMC activities came to include regular dialogue with key stakeholders, as well as mediation and negotiation on disputes that can lead to violence at the border, preaching peace, engaging with both members of the local youth and with Kenyan security personnel, and leading peace caravans across Mandera District and has been called upon as a key resource organization in most Mandera conflict resolution activities including rapid response. The MMC has also mobilized local mediation councils in mosques across along the border and across the border into Somalia. A network of grass-roots, mosque-based mediators has emerged and regularly facilitates community discussions on Islamic perspectives on peace-building, mediation, the roles and rights of women, democracy and science, transparency and accountability, politics and governance, eradicating clan-ism, opportunities and challenges in peacebuilding programs post 9/11, and trauma-healing and social reconciliation. MMC has been involved in extensive work with youth, as well as roadside peace rallies and rapid response missions (in FY 10 alone they participated in rapid response work in Lafey and Wargadud, Omar Jillow, Libehia, Aresa, Gadudia and Khalalio locations of Mandera East)
- 18. They secured the closure of over 40 Madrasas in the camps of Hagadera, Ifo and Dagahle for two weeks to enable them to analyze the conflict to find a lasting solution. The Madrasas were reopened after the mediation council resolved all the contentious issues.
- 19. By helping youth acquire conflict transformation skills and transformative leadership qualities, PEACE II aimed that they would gain self-esteem and demonstrate leadership capabilities acceptable to their elders and in turn be given a place in decision making on matters influencing peaceful coexistence among cross-border communities.
- 20. In FY11, EWYFP lead an action research team to explore the contextual factors leading to youth involvement in crime and drug abuse and identified the following as key factors prevalent in the Somali cluster: weak parental care during early development and absent social codes of behavior; unemployment creating extreme stress and depression; lack of adequate access to quality education leading to students dropping out and resorting to drugs as stimulants; youth marginalization in decision making and in government structures and corruption in government institutions restricting opportunities for youth development (including that those without means cannot bribe their way to educational and employment opportunities); vulnerability of youth to drug dependency, HIV AIDS and recruitment of the youth in the Al Shabaab militia; Limited opportunities for leadership development and employment; challenges to effectiveness of government sponsored youth empowerment projects; high pastoral dropouts as a result of the effects of climate change; external influence from the radical Islamist groups who perfected their art of preying on the vulnerability of the Youth; negative perception of the community and the belief that youth are reckless and irresponsible to handle community programs; Exclusion of youth from taking part in the community representation on matters of importance.
- 21. PEACE II produced a video documentary of the 'Youth in violent conflict transformation' component of the program
- 22. YOPED and SSG, EWYFP and EWSYFP and TAWASAL
- 23. MMC, MCPU, and MDPC led this work in Mandera, while WPDA worked in Wajir, MCPU in Garissa and Nenah FM in Karamoja.
- 24. Increasing women's cross-border participation was very challenging, not only because of social and cultural restrictions but also because half the stakeholders were from Somalia and did not have ID cards to enable them to cross the border. Women leaders mobilized women to design a project proposal that really addressed priority community needs. They really woke up and started lobbying for improvements in access to education for young women. In particular they identified the high rate of girls dropping out of Hulugho school in classes Standard 4-5 (aged 10-11). The women advocated for improved boarding facilities to help retain female students. Community proposals were convincing and boarding facilities were constructed with support from Peace II. Seven months later there are 240 girls in the school, 40 are boarding and

seven of them are from Somalia. Lobbying by women has also led to the promotion of a local female primary school teacher to be the head teacher of a secondary school, the first in the region (previously of the six secondary schools in the region, four were headed by men and two by non-local women).

- 25. It is said to have been taboo in traditional Somali society for a woman to mediate in the presence of a man except on issues of domestic resource management. However, women mediate among themselves to reduce tension and avoid violence, and they recognize that their contribution to peaceful co-existence could be much greater than it is.
- 26. MWFP, WCC, WWFP, GWFP, IWFP and RWPL
- 27. GWFP on 19 March held a women peace building network workshop in Modogashe, followed by meetings in Dujis and Balambala on 27-29 February and 19-23 March respectively. The three areas now have a total of 70 trained women peace builders and established network. In Dujis the trained women were actively involved in solving the recent exam cancellation dispute.
- 28. It attracts people from across northern Kenya, southern Somalia and south-eastern Ethiopia, and from as far as the Somali capital of Mogadishu and the Somali port of Bosasso on the Gulf of Aden.
- 29. Disputes are all the more likely at a time of drought, when many locals keep livestock alive on portions of their own food aid, or buy bundles of under-ripe maize and sorghum in the market for animal fodder.
- 30. Severe drought and famine has increased the number of animals on sale which can cause conflict as pricing is lowered during this time which can create tensions between middle men and the livestock owners.
- 31. from Moyale, Nagelle and Dollo in Ethiopia; Mandera, Rhamu, Banisa, Wajir and Garissa in Kenya and Elwak, Lug and Bardere in Somalia
- 32. 55 women from Ethiopia, Uganda, Sudan and Kenya met in Eldoret, Kenya, under the mandate of CEWARN with Peace II support. The participants comprised CEWARN focal points from the governments of the four countries, NRIs, DPCs, CSOs and MPs, professionals and the media. CEWARN has made a series of decisions to improve on the participation of women in conflict management, including bringing on board female field staff and women committee members, and incorporating specific gender indicators in data collection. Women presented stories showing the success they had had so far, and highlighted the need for the Karamoja women's network to document and disseminate the impact of their work.
- 33. Progress with the development of the Somalia CEWERU was recognized by the CEWARN secretariat, which wrote to the PEACE II program on 30 August that delegates to the mid-term review conference noting "[Peace II's] very innovative approach of building the CEWARN system in such a hostile environment..... we are convinced that for the CEWARN system to work as a whole there is a need to focus on the development of the Somalia CEWERU'. CEWARN then committed to support the core operational and human resource costs of the Somalia National Research Institute (NRI) and CEWERU to help build their capacity and facilities for information sharing. It will also support an internship placement at CEWARN.
- 34. The CEWARN Technical Committee on Early Warning and Response involved the Somalia CEWERU in its meeting in Mombasa in May and agreed to 'take steps to operationalize Somalia CEWERU'.
- 35. Including the formation of District Peace Committees in El-Wak, Bellet-Hawa, Dollo and Luuq, Afmadow, Hagar and Badhadhe Districts and recruitment of FMs in El-Wak, BeletHawa, Dollo, Afamadow, Hagar and Badhadhe
- 36. The forum endorsed the following recommendations: 1) Conduct regular capacity assessments of district peace committees in Somalia; 2) Support capacity building of local and district peace committees in Somalia; 3) The Somalia CEWERU will nominate a five-member committee to carry out local identification of new areas of reporting, peace committee strengthening and field monitor recruitment; 4) Contribute to the harmonization of different administrations in Juba and Gedo regions: 5) Support social reconciliation and community peace dialogue meetings at local levels; 6) nitiate local, quarterly, and national peace forums; 7) Establish and strengthen regional women and youth for peace structures; 8) Enhance Conflict Early Warning and Early Response systems and initiate a National Rapid Response Fund; 9) Encourage local-national linkages and networking among the different peace actors; 10) Strengthen collaboration between peace committees and traditional/community structures (Council of Elders)
- 37. The plan included: 1) Systemize CPMR training in local and central government; 2) Train and equip local peace committees; 3) Address existing and emerging land conflicts; 4) Revive intercommunity socio-economic programs; 5) Resettle pastoral groups displaced by insecurity; 6) Rationalize Rapid Response Funds for timely intervention; 7) Establish a Regional Peace Forum for periodic review and monitoring; 8) Integrate traditional governance systems with modern governance systems; 9) Establish cross border peace committees and a regional leaders forum; 10) Support best practices like the Jie- Turkana Moruanayece peace accord.
- 38. The government of Uganda has a Ministry for Karamoja Affairs as well as policy papers that guide peace and development work in the region, and the Leadership Forum need to find its place within existing frameworks and the UGANDA CEWERU strategic plan.
- 39. During this meeting, a 5 member National Rapid Response Steering Committee (NRRSC) was formulated to include the NSC Secretariat (the chair), Africa Peace Forum (The fund host), PeaceNet-Kenya, PACT-Kenya and Arid lands as advisors
- 40. USAID's draft Elections Security Framework was used to guide the analysis of election and referendum related conflict dynamics, to map and learn lessons from existing interventions and strategies, and finally to identify priorities for enhancing integrated strategies among institutions at various levels throughout the election and referendum cycle. For Southern Sudan, this meant members of the South Sudan Peace Commission including their regional advisors from the southern states bordering northern Sudan as well as members of the South Sudan Legislative Assembly, Political Parties Council, Community Security and Arms Control Bureau, civil society networks and academic researchers from Juba University, as well as representation from the South Kordofan Reconciliation and Peaceful Coexistence Mechanism from the North. Participants from Kenya included representatives from the National Steering Committee on Peace Building, the National Cohesion and Integration Commission, the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission, and the Interim Independent Electoral Commission, as well as representatives from political party secretariats, provincial peace forums, district peace committees, local authorities, religious councils, traditional councils of elders, national media associations and academics, and representatives from civil society peace and democracy networks and partner organizations.
- 41. Ten main threats to a peaceful election were identified: 1) Fear by the Minority of Being Marginalized or Unrepresented; 2) Land Allocation, Ownership, and Use; 3) Insecurity, Crime and High Unemployment; 4) Lack of County Preparedness on the Devolution Process and Structures; 5) Ethnic Mistrust and Inter-communal competition; 6) Resource Allocation and Utilization; 70 Political Patronage, Rivalry and Incitement; 8) Women Representation and Cultural Stereotypes; 9) The Exclusion of Youth in Governance and Decision Making; 10) The Crisis of Legitimacy confronting the "Professional Groups."
- 42. Which prioritized 1) Election violence prevention and implementation of the constitution; 2) Land border dispute resolution; 3) Infrastructure development and natural resource management (including Lamu pipeline); 4) Migrations and refugees, IDPs and pastoralist conflicts; 6) Small arms control and; 7) Kenya Defense Force operations in Somalia.
- 43. Including: 1) Intimidation of Women candidates: 2) Unresolved boundary issues fueling tension: 3) Negotiated Democracy: 4) Voter Apathy: 5) Impacts of the timing of elections in March: 6) Informal Youth Formations/gangs; 7) Movement of populations and voters:
- 44. The content of the County Peace and Conflict Profiles will follow the 6 chapter headings described below: A mapping of ethnic and clan demographics; 2) A mapping of the Security situation context; 3) A mapping of the history of socio-political contestation; 4) A description of the key economic resources at the community level in the county in relation to access, control and ownership issues and their potential to drive conflict; 5) Inter-county/cross border conflict issues; 6) An analysis of peace initiatives, organizations and networks locally perceived to have had impact








































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