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FINAL REPORT

PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF THE KABUL CITY INITIATIVE PROJECT (KCI)

JULY 2013

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
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I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. PROJECT BACKGROUND

Due to unprecedented and unregulated growth, Kabul City and its population of approximately five million people is under severe stress. The Kabul City Initiative (KCI) project was structured to train municipal governance staff to improve municipal service delivery to meet this increased demand.

The KCI was designed to provide city officials with the technology, expertise, and revenue sources necessary to manage and operate a major modern city. The KCI project had three primary objectives: (1) increase the capacity of municipal officials in the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA); (2) improve the equitable delivery of services to the citizens in Kabul; and (3) increase the capacity of the municipality to generate and account for revenue.

Tetra Tech, the implementing partner,¹ divided its activities into three categories according to Contract Line Item Numbers (CLIN). The objective of CLIN 1 was to increase the capacity of Kabul Municipality (KM) officials and staff to accomplish their core management responsibilities. Training was both managerial and technical. The objective of CLIN 2 was to assist the KM to deliver improved public services (highly visible and desired infrastructure) and to increase public awareness of city government. CLIN 3 was intended to increase the KM's capability to account for revenue and expenditures and to enhance revenue collection.

A significant program event occurred in project year two when the budget was cut from \$119,313,695 to \$45 million resulting in a major reduction in the planned infrastructure activities in CLIN 2. This funding reduction significantly affected the project design and implementation and resulted in considerable staff cuts for Tetra Tech.

Evaluation Questions, Design, Methods and Limitations

The purpose of this evaluation, as stated in the statement of work (SOW), is “to study and document the successes and weaknesses of KCI to provide recommendations to promote the effectiveness of municipalities in democratic governance at the sub-national level.” Findings, conclusions, and recommendations are focused on the three primary question areas each with specific evaluation questions:

¹At the start of the program, the implementing partner was known as Tetra Tech – ARD. It has since changed to Tetra Tech.

Sustainability:

- a. How well has the capacity building component of the project transferred the skills and knowledge needed by the KM administrators to continue their duties after KCI support has ended? Which trainings have been most important for sustainability? What aspects of these trainings were responsible for this sustainability and why?
- b. KCI helped KM develop an Administrative Policy Manual with a full set of municipal Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) and Terms of Reference (TOR) for all KM departments and districts. To what extent has the KM integrated these policies into its daily operations? Does any municipal entity 'own' the policies and enforce and update them when necessary? What are the motivations of the policy integration?

Project Performance:

- c. Some 50 municipal staff undertook project management training at the Project Management Institute (PMI) in the second year of the project. From this, have the officials demonstrated the knowledge and skills necessary to complete a full cycle of government project implementation? What are the KM's strengths and weaknesses in project management?
- d. During the period of KCI's intervention, what is the breakdown of the KM's revenue sources? How much came from one-off activities (land sales, property and business registration) and how much from recurrent revenue (taxes, *safayi* fees)? What are opportunities to sustainably expand revenue collection?

Future Assistance Considerations:

- e. What additional reforms have the highest likelihood of increasing economic growth in Kabul (streamlined business registration, improved zoning, service delivery improvements, etc.), and which KM can affect?

The impact of gender equality was assessed through all questions.

Summary of Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations

2. SUSTAINABILITY

a. Part A: Capacity Building Training Programs

Findings

The training programs can be divided into three general categories: programs aimed at municipality-wide participation; programs aimed at the managerial levels; and technical training aimed at the professional and technical level. The total number of municipal employees is about 7,000, including permanent civil service employees and contract employees. The project trained more than 6,000 women and men. Excluding technical safety training and technical training for greenery staff, KCI trained some 2,090 managers, technicians and administrative staff. Senior and middle level managers received managerial training; managers and administrative staff received basic computer training; and engineering, managerial and administrative professionals received specialized job-specific training. The Evaluation Team (the Team) observed the widespread use of computers by office staff and technical specialists where, according to informants, they had not been available or used prior to the KCI intervention. KCI provided management training to participants of a Future Leaders Program², facilitated training for middle level managers in a PMI program in Istanbul, and supported training in a Senior Executive Leadership seminar. The Team also observed financial and project management professionals using a Financial Management Information System (FMIS) introduced by the project.

As a result of KCI gender training for both women and men, and an active and dynamic elected Executive Committee of the Women's Council, greater workplace equity for women has been achieved. The installation of the first women's restrooms in the municipality was a direct result of this training as well as an increase in the number of women hired and promoted to senior and middle level management.

According to senior management and other informants, there has been a change throughout the KM from the improvement of individual professional skills to the efficiency and effectiveness of individual departments. Tangentially, this change has also been reflected in survey data that indicates that citizens recognize an improvement in public services since the project began.

Conclusions

The KCI intervention has made an important contribution to improving the management structure, the efficiency, effectiveness and competency of the KM.

Computer skills training, the training and adoption of an FMIS program and upper management training have had the greatest impact on improving the capacity of KM. The infrastructure design program, however, did not sufficiently engage and mentor KM counterparts in project design and management reducing a valuable capacity building opportunity.

²A training program targeting recently hired 350 Afghan college graduates. See Section A, "Capacity Building Programs," pp.10-11.

Recommendations

In the short project time remaining, KCI should target a cadre of the best students in the Future Leaders Program and train them to be Trainers of Trainers. These trainers can train current and future staff and help institutionalize and sustain a management culture of training and learning after the end of the project

KCI should provide follow-up training to reiterate and reinforce what has been taught in the short introductory programs, specifically those dealing with accounting, budgeting and financial matters.

The contract of subcontractor Adam Smith International should be extended through the end of the project to continue to train KM budget, accounting and revenue specialists and provide coaching to these individuals on using the FMIS.

b. Part B: Administrative Policy Manual (APM)

Findings

The APM is a priority of the senior management but needs to become law before it can be implemented. Less than 10% of the departments maybe using selected provisions, but in general, the document is not used. The Team did not find the APM in use consistently in any department or district.³

Conclusion

The Afghan Parliament has legislative authority over Kabul Municipality and must endorse, by law, any significant changes in KM operations, particularly with respect to human resources, revenue generation and operational structures and procedures. Accordingly, the APM and much of the SOPs and TORs require Parliamentary legislation before they can be fully implemented and integrated into the daily operations of the Municipality. This legislation has not been acted on.

Recommendation

In the project time remaining, KCI could assist the Mayor to determine which policies, SOPs and TORs can be implemented administratively without legislative authority. This will require that KCI rapidly develop a program to train managers and senior leadership how to use these tools effectively.

³One exception to this was the Deputy Mayor for Budget and Finance who had a hard copy of the APM and said that he was trying to implement all of the policies that he was legally able to implement.

3. PROJECT PERFORMANCE

a. Part A: Project Management

Findings

Before the KCI intervention, KM had a project implementation cycle, but it was inefficient and underperforming. KCI implemented a systematic training program targeting individual skills of professionals and building the capacity of small teams within various departments. As a result, the professionalism of the individuals and departments has increased. Planners are now better equipped to formulate projects; engineers are better at conducting assessments; managers are more capable of directing and implementing projects and activities; and the project document/project management cycle is considerably more thorough and professional.

The adoption and implementation of an operational FMIS program has considerably improved KM's ability to track revenue, control expenditures and develop budgets. This program has not only been integrated into all aspects of financial management but also into the operation of line departments such as Sanitation, Streets and Maintenance and is used for logistics, vehicle maintenance, materials inventory, as well as for budgetary and planning activities. While not operational in the districts, KM plans to roll out the FMIS to all departments and areas within the City.

Conclusion

The KCI training has increased the managerial and technical capacity of KM project directors to more efficiently and effectively complete a full cycle of project implementation.

Recommendation

All levels of management need more specialized training in skills such as leadership, team management, project management, time management and decision and strategy planning. Similarly, all technical specialists need more technical training, especially those dealing with financial aspects of city management. While there is not time for KCI to provide this, USAID could support advanced training and study of management at the AUAF and the Kabul PMI program. It could also provide funding for training in advanced civil engineering, project management, financial management, GIS, and urban planning for KM technicians.

b. Part B: Revenue Generation

Findings

The unreliability of data makes this question difficult to answer. The KM could not or would not provide an accurate breakdown on recurrent and non-recurrent revenue. Nevertheless, KCI's review suggests that non-recurrent revenue over the last four years range from a high of 35% (\$8.5 million) in 2009 to 25% (\$12.5 million) in 2012. Conversely, recurrent revenue comprised 65% (\$15.8 million) in 2009 and 75% (\$37.5 million) in 2012.

KM revenue collection system is seriously flawed. Due to its subordinate relationship with the national government, the City does not have the capacity to access normal sources of revenue.

Revenue collection targets are arbitrarily assigned from the Mayor's office, placing a burden on most districts at the cost of new or greater revenue sources. Revenue Officers are unsupervised and ill-trained, frequently underestimating assessment values and corresponding rates for buildings.

Kabul Municipality, however, is very proactive in searching for new revenue generation tools, strongly supported by KCI. Together, they are producing innovative White Papers based on best practice elsewhere, modified for the local context.

Conclusion

Revenue data reported by KM has been variable and unverifiable. As such, the Team is not able to precisely determine revenue collected by the municipality. However, the need to collect more sustainable revenue is universally recognized within KM.

With KCI support, KM is making revenue generation a priority. Any gains, however, are liable to be relatively modest until parliament grants the city regulatory authority to impose municipal taxation on par with other major cities.

As donor funding continues to erode, Kabul is unlikely to maintain its current level of services unless afforded the scope to raise its own revenue.

Recommendation

It is recommended that KCI re-double its efforts to establish an auditing regime within KM to ensure reported financial data and metrics are sound. The lack of reliable data is a major constraint to form an effective analysis of KM's revenue flow. While KCI's installation of an operational FMIS within the municipality will likely unify data sources and numbers, it is still subject to error or manipulation.

4. FUTURE ASSISTANCE CONSIDERATIONS

Findings

The evaluation team finds that the reforms with the most potential for contributing to economic growth are (1) city traffic reform; (2) business improvement districts; and (3) municipal land use.

Conclusions

Implementing new city traffic reforms could reduce gridlock on the city streets, which in turn, would have a positive effect on conducting business throughout the municipality and increasing city-wide commerce.

Business improvement districts already exist in Kabul, and they create highly visible improvements, which improve commercial activity and infrastructure.

Private sector initiatives could greatly benefit from the use of city land through municipal land reforms. One of the greatest immediate difficulties for public-private partnerships is the lack of legal and contracting skills in KM.

Recommendations

The Team recommends devolving the regulatory power of parking lots and traffic police back to KM to improve traffic flow, establish fee-paying parking lots, and raise revenue.

The KM should work closely with GIRoA to develop and implement a plan to develop business improvement districts in the municipality so the economic growth of the private sector can increase.

The KM should work with GIRoA and donors to improve legal and contracting capacity of KM in municipal land use so that public-private partnerships can be expanded.

II. INTRODUCTION

1. PROJECT BACKGROUND

As a result of the conflict and great social upheaval in Afghanistan, Kabul has grown exponentially from an estimated population of 1.2 million in 2001 to estimates of more than five million.⁴ This great increase in population has been uncontrolled and unregulated. City officials, for example, estimate that 70% of the residential buildings and nearly 50% of commercial buildings are illegally constructed. The infrastructure for the city was designed and developed for a population of only one million people.⁵ The lack of a water supply, electrical grid, sanitation, roads and maintenance systems reflects a great risk to sustainable development. While activities in Kabul account for nearly 50% of the national GDP, the city itself has a significantly under-sourced revenue base.⁶ The Kabul City Initiative (KCI) project was intended to assist Kabul Municipality (KM) to alleviate some of these conditions.

The KCI was designed to provide city officials with the technology, expertise and revenue sources necessary to manage and operate a major modern city. The purpose of the KCI project is to (1) increase the capacity of municipal officials in the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA); (2) improve the equitable delivery of services to the citizens in Kabul; and (3) increase the capacity of the municipality to generate and account for revenue.

The KCI program of deliverables is structured to operate within Contract Line Item Numbers (CLIN). CLIN 1 is focused on capacity building of the Kabul Municipality (KM) officials and staff to perform their functions more efficiently, effectively and responsibly. Training in CLIN 1 was both managerial and technical. CLIN 1 also included municipal outreach and communications and addressed gender mainstreaming and assistance to the Women's Leadership Council.

The objective of CLIN 2 was to assist the KM to deliver improved public services and to increase citizens' knowledge and appreciation of city governance. This CLIN intended to work with municipal officials to deliver more visible and desired infrastructure and service delivery projects. In addition to the physical infrastructure, the CLIN intended to provide on-the-job learning opportunities for city workers. CLIN 2's goal of municipal improvements was to demonstrate to the public that the municipality was functioning in the public interest.

The objective of CLIN 3 was to increase the municipality's capability to account for revenue and expenditures and to enhance revenue collection. The activities implemented under this CLIN were to support the growth and economic development of the city and to increase revenue

⁴ USAID – Afghanistan. Statement of Work: Performance Evaluation – Support to KCI, Contract No: EPP-I-00-04-00035-00.

⁵ Interview with Mayor of Kabul, February 23, 2013.

⁶ Interview with the Director of Revenue of KM, March 5, 2013.

generation, thereby increasing the city's ability to finance its service offerings and operating expenses.

The development hypothesis of the project is as follows: capacity building of municipal officials (CLIN 1) enables the officials to carry out, with assistance from KCI, service delivery programs (CLIN 2), which help the municipality generate more revenue (CLIN 3), and this, in turn, allows the municipality to build greater capacity and offer further service delivery (CLINs 1 and 2). Additional information for each CLIN can be found in the evaluation Statement of Work (SOW) in Annex I.

The project was initially designed as a three-year program (base year plus two option years) beginning in October 2010 with a budget of \$119,313,695. Half of this budget was allocated to building infrastructure and public service delivery reforms. After some months' delay in the beginning, the first year of the project was successfully completed and USAID exercised its option for a second year that ran through September 30, 2012. In June 2011, Tetra Tech was verbally notified by USAID of a reduced budget in the amount of \$32 million. In July 2012, the third option year was awarded and the budget for the three years will range between \$45 million and \$60 million.⁷ As a result of these budget cuts, KCI was forced to halt all major infrastructure projects⁸ to the frustration of the Mayor⁹ and others in the municipality. The end of project is scheduled for September 30, 2013.

Evaluation purpose & questions

As presented in the SOW, the purpose of the evaluation is "to study and document the successes and weaknesses of KCI, to provide recommendations to promote the effectiveness of municipalities in democratic governance at the sub-national level." United States Agency for International Development (USAID)/Afghanistan's Office of Democracy and Governance (ODG) may use the conclusions and recommendations from the evaluation to shape strategy for possible future interventions at the municipal level. Shared lessons will also benefit the larger USAID/Afghanistan Mission, donors working at the municipal level and the KM and other stakeholders who aim to improve municipal service delivery in Afghanistan.

USAID/Afghanistan is interested in three principle evaluation question topics with respect to the future of KCI: (1) Sustainability; (2) Project Performance; and (3) Future Considerations. The following is a summary of these questions found in the SOW (Annex I).

⁷At the time of writing this report, USAID/Afghanistan was still in the process of finalizing its FY 2013 Operational Plan and budget levels, so the final sub-obligation values to fund Option Year 3 of KCI were not yet known.

⁸ A major infrastructure project in this case is anything valued at more than \$250 million.

⁹As expressed by the Mayor in an interview with the Evaluation Team, February 23, 2013.

Sustainability:

KCI's success will be defined, in part, by how well KM carries out KCI activities after the project ends. KCI has provided training to KM staff and management to develop the knowledge and skills required to continue without KCI assistance.

- a. How well have the capacity building components of the project transferred the skills and knowledge needed by the KM administrators to continue their duties after KCI support has ended? Which trainings have been most important for sustainability? And, what aspects of these trainings were responsible for this sustainability and why?
- b. To what extent has the KM integrated and absorbed the policies, standard operating procedures (SOP) and terms of reference (TOR) of the KCI developed Administrative Policy Manual (APM) into its daily operations? Does any municipal entity 'own' the policies to enforce and update them when necessary? And what are the motivations of the policy integration?

Project Performance:

Many of these training programs also were intended to improve project performance. (1) KCI supported a Project Management Institute (PMI) program in the second year of the project. Over 50 KM officials attended, and the training included knowledge and skills to improve project management. KCI also helped KM develop an APM with a full set of SOPs and TORs for all KM departments and districts. (2) A corollary to this question concerns the doubling of revenue raised during the past two years of KCI's implementation.

- c. Some 50 municipal staff undertook project management training at the PMI in the second year of the project. From this, have the officials demonstrated the knowledge and skills necessary to complete a full cycle of government project implementation? What are the KM's strengths and weaknesses in project management?
- d. During the period of KCI's intervention, what is the breakdown of the KM's revenue sources? How much came from one-off activities (land sales, property and business registration) and how much from recurrent revenue (taxes, *safayi* fees)? What are opportunities to sustainably expand revenue collection?

Future assistance considerations:

- e. What additional reforms have the highest likelihood of increasing economic growth in Kabul (streamlined business registration, improved zoning, service delivery improvements, etc.), and which KM can affect?

As required by USAID regulations, the project's impact on gender was also evaluated.

Evaluation Methods and Limitations

The methodology employed by the Evaluation Team (the Team) follows USAID Evaluation Policy and includes a mix of qualitative and quantitative methods typical of performance evaluations (see Work Plan in Annex II for an Evaluation Matrix). Ongoing document review of key literature included monthly reports, quarterly reports, annual reports and the results of three surveys (see Annex III for Bibliography).

Using key informant interviews and focus group protocols, the Team interviewed more than 75 key informants in both group and individual settings. The list of informants includes the Mayor, three Deputy Mayors, 12 Director Generals of municipal departments, 11 District Managers, staff members of Tetra Tech, including embedded staff members in various departments and offices, and participants in the PMI training program and Future Leaders Programs.¹⁰ Group interviews were held with four middle level managers who participated in various KCI training activities, the three members of the executive committee of the Women's Council, five participants of the Future Leaders Program and seven graduates of the PMI training program.

Furthermore, the Team conducted telephone interviews with an additional 20 graduates of the Future Leaders Program and with seven other graduates of the PMI training. The Team also attended a session of the Kabul Municipality Donor Coordinating Committee meeting.

The Team made several site visits to observe completed infrastructure projects including two parks (Dehbory and Ferdawsi Parks), a major road rehabilitation (Balahesar Road) and coverings over drainage ditches in District 2. Other site visits were made to the Greenery, Streets & Maintenance and Sanitation Departments which are not located in the municipal center (see Annex IV for a full list of interviewed individuals, groups and sites visited).

Data was also collected and analyzed from a Citizen Perception Survey (CPS) of municipal services from 371 Kabul residents, administered as a part of a larger survey conducted by Checchi & Company Consulting for USAID/Afghanistan.

Limitations to the Evaluation

KCI is an ambitious and complex project that undertook the training of more than 6,000 people, out of a total of some 7,000 city employees, in a wide variety of activities including a municipality-wide, crosscutting gender program. Given the time constraints, the Team was not able to interview or reach all of the people who would have added insights and provided more facts about the project, their training, and municipal management. Nevertheless, the Team was able to reach a broad spectrum of Afghan civil servants and managers, as well as KCI staff and was able to make informed judgments in response to the evaluation questions.

¹⁰A training program targeting 350 recently hired Afghan college graduates. See Section A. "Capacity Building Programs," pp.10-11.

III. FINDINGS

1. QUESTION 1: SUSTAINABILITY

The extent to which KCI is sustainable depends on two critical components of the project's design: training and the adoption and effective use of a Financial Management Information System (FMIS). As a capacity building program, KCI utilized a series of training programs to impart relevant skills and knowledge to KM administrators and staff including the introduction of a FMIS program. The Team defines capacity building and training as an activity that improves skills, knowledge and attitudes of the staff to become more efficient and productive. Below, the Team presents key findings on each type of training presented during KCI and on the extent of integration of the FMIS in the KM.

a. Capacity Building Training Programs

Through CLIN 1, KCI sought to enhance the capacity of Kabul City officials, managers and technicians to perform their core municipal management responsibilities and improve their professional skills. KCI developed an extensive and ambitious training program for the management, staff and technicians. The training programs can be divided into three general categories: programs aimed at municipality-wide participation; programs aimed at the managerial levels; and technical training, aimed at the professional and technical level. The training ranged from short, one-off personal safety training for sanitation and street workers to intensive, one-on-one tutoring in FMIS applications with embedded KCI specialists. Specialized training also included a Future Leaders Training Program, a Senior Executive Leadership Training Program and three seminars in the Project Management Institute (PMI) in Istanbul.

According to KCI's records, the project has trained a total of 6,231 people (96% males, 4% females) over the life of the project. The bulk of municipal employees (67%) are sanitation and street maintenance workers and greenery (parks) workers. Sanitation and streets workers received a short, technical safety course and equipment (gloves, vests, boots and hard hats), while greenery workers received technical training in park maintenance and management. The remaining 33% of municipal employees received more professional training in their specialties, such as: budgeting; accounting; quality control and quality assurance; project management, urban planning, information technology (IT); and leadership for managers. Computer skills were also provided to all categories of professional employees.

Key informants from both KCI and KM noted that most decisions in the municipality from procurement to recruitment and planning to services are decided at the top. This makes the municipality an extremely centralized and hierarchical organization effectively managed by the Mayor.

The Mayor was appointed to his position by President Karzai and holds a ministerial position in the national cabinet. The Mayor has supported KCI; such support on a continuing basis is the key to the sustainability of all three training program categories of CLIN 1.

b. Municipal-Wide Trainings

Two training programs had an extensive impact and affected all offices and departments in the municipality: (1) computer training and (2) the support/instruction for the Municipality Women's Council.

c. Computer Training

A major component of the KCI capacity and training program has been to computerize the operations of the Municipality to bring it up to the standards of a major modern city.

Prior to the KCI intervention, the general management capacity of the KM was greatly underdeveloped. According to an initial assessment by Tetra Tech,¹¹ there was a notable lack of electronic communications infrastructure. The staff had no access to electronic mail, relied heavily on personal mobile phones, and written communication was produced with manual typewriters in hard copy and duplicated. Electronic record filing and retrieval systems were also absent with institutional memory and logistical information committed to individual memory or on printed or handwritten copies. Invoices were received and also recorded by hand, and records and files were kept in large ledger books. Construction, service techniques and management competencies were also limited and outdated. There were no vehicle lists or maintenance programs. Only a few senior managers and some highly educated professionals were able to use computers.

In January 2011, the project tested 1,458 municipal employees and found that none of them were able to pass a basic computer standardized test. In response, KCI established five computer training centers located at the Municipality Headquarters, the Greenery Department, the Sanitation Department, the Urban Planning Department, and Streets & Maintenance Department. To date, KCI reports these centers have trained approximately 370 staff, including 94 women.¹²

Of these, more than 250 municipal employees have passed the standardized test assessing basic computer literacy, the International Computer Driving License (ICDL). This test determines proficiency in the basic skills of Microsoft Office applications such as Word and Excel and Internet usage. A post-training survey by KCI noted that 63% of the participants strongly agreed that the training will help them improve their job performance.¹³ Computer training is on-going

¹¹USAID/Afghanistan. "Kabul City Organizational Assessment: An in-depth examination of Institutional Systems, Tools and Processes and Management Capacity." Tetra Tech ARD, 30 January 2011.

¹² USAID/Afghanistan (KCI). "Quarterly Report, January 1-March 31, 2012" p. 5.

¹³USAID/ Afghanistan.Kabul City Initiative (KCI). Ahmad MunirSaqib, "Training Evaluation Report". Tetra Tech, January 29, 2013.

at the Municipality and will be continued under the responsibility of the HR Department after the project ends.

In addition to the computer training and providing 200 laptops to ICDL for their graduates, KCI installed equipment and networking tools, fiber optic cable, Wi-Fi connections and distributed stabilizers throughout the municipality. All departments in the central municipality compound now have Internet connectivity. Graduates of the Futures Leaders program and the embedded KCI specialists report that an increasingly larger number of the staff has the capability of conducting their work via computers and the Internet. One DG is now refusing to accept hand written communications from his staff. Lastly, the program developed and supported an IT unit in the municipality to backup and maintains the electronic infrastructure.

Despite these advancements, there remains an uneven use of computers across the Municipality. The Greenery Department, for example, located in suburban Kabul, has only four laptops and no Internet connection. Accordingly, this department makes only the most basic use of computers for office-level work such as letter writing and completion of forms. They are not using computers to manage personnel records, inventory control, vehicle logistics or maintenance. In contrast, the Sanitation Department is working with three embedded KCI coaches to become fully computerized, digitizing inventory control records, invoicing, budgeting, installing FMIS, and keeping other records and databases. The Finance and Planning Departments are also highly computerized, as is the new Geographic Information Systems (GIS) department. The other departments' use of technology falls between these two extremes.

The 22 district offices have inadequate computer capacity. While employees in nearly every district have had training, and some offices have laptops and desktops, the districts do not have Internet connections. Moreover, not all of the districts have reliable power. Despite these limitations, all of the 11 district offices that the Team visited had at least one computer and operator and were using the technology for basic, routine office uses and to digitize records, primarily those for revenue, property and land records.

d. Municipality Women's Council

Another program that addressed a wide range of workplace challenges was KCI's work with the Municipality Women's Council. The Council has two main objectives: to enable female employees in KM to achieve equality in their career and participation in leadership¹⁴ and to express the needs of female employees in the KM. There are currently 450 women working as staff of the Municipality, and of these employees, 250 are *tashkil*¹⁵ employees. The remaining female employees are contractors and are not beneficiaries of national regulations. According to female informants, prior to the KCI intervention, there was a women's council, but it was poorly

¹⁴USAID/Afghanistan. "Kabul Municipality: Women Council Annual Report" (October 2011-October 2012); p. 3.

¹⁵ Tashkil: Employees who have a permanent civil service position in the national system.

organized and was neither active nor effective in representing women's issues. KCI embedded a female advisor in the administration to work with women to help create a more active organization, able to represent all female staff members.

One of the first activities that the KCI advisor conducted in 2011 was to help organize elections for the Woman's Council. From eight candidates, the women voted to elect a three-person executive council consisting of a chairwoman and two deputies. The Mayor then appointed 12 other women to serve as ordinary members on the Council.

The Women's Council has developed its own charter, a set of bylaws, and a grievance system and it holds biweekly meetings to discuss the concerns of female employees. Quarterly meetings are held for the general membership to raise wider issues of concern to women to the Mayor and senior management.

An early issue that the Council addressed was the provision of uniforms to women that are culturally appropriate and suited to the work environment.¹⁶ Another Council activity was the establishment of two women's restrooms in the main KM building. Previously, women had to leave the building to use the restroom.

The Council has become increasingly active. In addition to its workplace activities, it has developed an outreach capacity for women's issues that extends into the wider community. It has surveyed the accessibility and quality of 37 public toilets throughout Kabul City with the intention of improving the public facilities for women in the greater community. Council members have taken a leadership role in addressing environmental issues in the community. Council members also provided leadership in a daylong, cleanup campaign in District 10 in partnership with the Ministry of Women's Affairs, the Red Crescent Society, and the Women's Network. Over 400 women participated in this activity, which helped highlight the role that women play in providing city services.

The Council has also been involved in a Women's Business Development campaign to provide local women the opportunity to market their handicrafts, jewelry, and other items and has sponsored and coordinated Business Promotion Days in six districts. Another major outreach activity with other women collaborators was the management and promotion of the 2013 International Women's Day in the city. The celebration brought thousands of women together in Babur Park. Cloth carrying bags were distributed as souvenirs of the event.

With the influence of the Council and the support of the Mayor the number of women in leadership positions has increased notably during the initial two years of the project. Through the Council's efforts, women were selected to serve on the Contracts and Evaluations Committee and Performance Evaluation Committee of the KM. There are now five women in municipal

¹⁶In Kabul, many if not most institutions such as governance provide uniforms for women workers.

leadership roles: Director Generals of Greenery and Culture; Deputy Director General of Urban Planning; Chairwoman of the Council; and the Recruitment Manager in the HR Department.

Lastly, an important element for the sustainability of the Council is the support and recognition of women’s equality and women’s rights by male coworkers. The Team observed, for example, women working equally with men in the same office doing similar tasks. Moreover, the younger participants in the Future Leaders Program indicated that they did not have any problem working alongside women. While not directly related but supportive of this KCI intervention, the Tetra Tech resident survey reported that Kabul City residents strongly supported equal opportunities for women in government.¹⁷

Managerial Capacity Trainings for KM Leadership

There were three training programs that specifically aimed at improving the managerial capacity of the KM leadership: the Future Leaders Program, the Senior Executive Leadership program and the Project Management Institute’s program.

e. Future Leaders Program

Soon after the Mayor was appointed in 2010, he implemented a policy for the Municipality to hire 375 recent university graduates (including nine women) from Afghan universities. This policy recognized the aging workforce in the municipality¹⁸ and acknowledged that in a relatively short period of time, these younger people would come to populate the ranks of middle-level professionals.

KCI provided management training to nearly half of these young people in what is called the Future Leaders Management training program. All of the people selected for the program have worked in the Municipality for at least a year. To date, there have been three training cycles for 50 participants each with 82 male graduates and one female graduate. At the conclusion of the Future Leaders Management training program, the top 25 students in the first two cycles were selected for an Advanced Future Leaders management course. The curriculum for the advanced course consists of eight modules on such topics as Organizational Development, Time Management, Leadership and Team Building, and Project and Contract Management. The course is eight weeks long and meets twice a week for two hours. The dates of these trainings as well as the attendance are listed below in Figure 1.

Period	Attendance
Oct 2011-May 2012	50/(46 men, 4 women) with 35 male/0 female graduates

¹⁷USAID/Afghanistan. “Kabul City Initiative: Baseline Resident Survey Results, January 2012.” National Research Center/Tetra Tech. January 2012; p. 7.

¹⁸ 67% of the managers are over 45 years old. USAID/Afghanistan. “Kabul City Organizational Assessment: An in-depth examination of Institutional Systems, Tools and Processes and Management Capacity.” Tetra Tech ARD. 30 January 2011; p. 19.

May-Oct 2012	50/(48 men, 1 woman) with 47 male/1 female graduates
Jan-May 2013	50/ (breakdown unknown as training is in progress)
Advanced Future Leaders	25/ (breakdown unknown as training is in progress)

FIGURE 1: FUTURE LEADER'S MANAGEMENT TRAINING PROGRAM AND ADVANCED FUTURE LEADERS ATTENDANCE

Future Leaders Management training program has demonstrated that it can support future leaders in gaining further career development opportunities.” In 2012, the Mayor promoted a female graduate of the Future Leaders Program to Deputy Director General for Urban Planning and Design.¹⁹ She is one of the highest-ranking women in the municipality.

In a telephone survey of 20 Future Leader graduates, 47% responded to an open-ended question that management was the most useful course in the program. The responses to other questions in this survey indicate that a high value was given to the training in general.

1	Do you use computer in your daily work?	67%
2	Was the FL instruction practical or of use to your work?	80%
3	How has the training improved your job skills?	86%
4	How able are you to use your FL training in your job?	85%
5	How well does your supervisor recognize the skills you learned in FL?	78%
6	How satisfied are you with FL (strongly satisfied)	95%
7	To what extent do you think this training will help your career in the future?	90%

FIGURE 2: TELEPHONE INTERVIEWS WITH FUTURE LEADERS

These responses were further confirmed in a small group meeting of four graduates who also noted that they were very satisfied with the Leadership Training, stating that it helped to develop a favorable working environment.

Senior Executive Leadership Seminar

KCI supported two cycles of training in a Senior Executive Leadership seminar. Each seminar was eight weeks long, with 2.5 hours of instruction and discussion per week. The syllabus included topics on strategic planning, revenue generation, municipal budgets, project management, leadership, municipal governance, public participation, and strategic communication. At the end of the seminar the recipients received a Senior Leadership Certificate from the American University in Afghanistan (AUAF).²⁰ For many, it was their first exposure to modern management practice.

The first seminar was held from May to July 2012 at the Municipality and comprised 25 DGs, 24 of who were male and one female. With the seminar held close to their offices, participants noted it was difficult to concentrate on topics as candidates were frequently distracted by their work duties.

¹⁹ Soon after her appointment, she left KM for a Japanese government scholarship to study urban planning in Japan.

²⁰American University of Afghanistan. “Senior Leadership Certificate,” November 2012.

In the next cycle, the venue was changed to AUAF. Twenty-two male and two female Deputy DGs attended the seminar from November 2011 to January 2012. According to the instructor, removing students from the distraction of their workplace improved the learning environment. In addition to the subject matter of the seminar, the course gave senior leaders an opportunity to learn from each other about their jobs and duties away from their daily work. Senior managers acknowledged that the training was useful, especially on the topics of leadership and management. The instructor thought that the seminar was well received, but next time he would narrow the focus and go into more depth especially on quality control and Information and Communication Technology.²¹

f. Technical and Professional Training

Financial Management Information Systems (FMIS) Training

Prior to KCI, KM controlled its finances through an obsolete system of book ledgers in which all revenue and expenditures, invoices, and receipts were entered by hand. This system was inefficient, cumbersome, prone to error, and open to abuse and corruption. The Director General (DG) of Revenue, for example, remarked that he would often have to wait five days for a response to a simple financial query, and often the answer would be inconsistent with other data. Moreover, according to the KCI staff, the management of the book ledger was filled with errors and the KM had a difficult time knowing how much money it actually had, or how much money it actually was spending. This often made budgeting difficult and inaccurate. A Deputy Mayor confirmed that this was a problem.

Through sub-contractor, Adam Smith International (ASI), KCI introduced a FMIS to the municipality. A FMIS is a powerful tool that can provide reliable and timely revenue and expenditure data making it an indispensable tool for the Municipality's total financial management system as well as for project cycle management.

The project targeted the key departments of Revenue, Policy, Planning, and the Mayor and Deputy Mayors' offices and installed the appropriate FMIS software and mounted a comprehensive training program that balanced formal training with informal mentoring. The program embedded national and international FMIS and finance specialists within the Municipality to provide constant support and coaching at all levels of the FMIS chain.

Through observation and key informant interviews, the Team found that FMIS is being used fully by the Revenue, Finance and Administration, Policy, Planning, Streets and Sanitation departments. It has also become a key tool of the Mayor and Deputy Mayors offices for budgeting, planning and data gathering. Other major departments, such as Sanitation, Streets Property, Acquisitions and Construction are gradually coming 'online.'

²¹ Interview with Prof. Rod Monger, AUAF, 7 March 2013.

Outside the central municipal offices (City Hall), the 22 districts have not yet been integrated into the main network and many of the districts lack reliable electrical power and access to the Internet. The districts are still printing hard copies and sending this data to the central office where it is re-entered into the FMIS.

A trail of nine receipts and other expenses was randomly followed through the office and the Team found all entries were eventually entered into the FMIS. Personnel trained in the use of the FMIS, particularly in the finance department, were observed to be proficient in operating the system though most request further training.

Management has reported an increased adoption and use of FMIS with a corresponding increase in efficiency and productivity. The Deputy Mayor for Finance and Administration told the evaluators that FMIS has increased his department's efficiency by at least 30%.²² The DG of Policy and Coordination said that the system has greatly facilitated the work of his department in drafting new programs. The DG of Revenue noted that the output of his department has greatly been improved. He cited one incident in which the World Bank "asked for a revenue report to be produced in ten days. I told them I can give it to them in ten minutes." This is the same DG, noted above, who previously had to wait five days for needed information.

g. Administrative Policy Manual (APM)

An early assessment made by KCI noted that the KM lacked a standard, comprehensive, written set of policies and procedures to guide managers in administering the management of offices and departments. In 2011, KCI with KM senior officials drafted an APM based on best practices found in US municipalities and adopted for Kabul. The Manual contains 51 policy papers, 42 Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) and 42 departmental and office TORs and is available in both Dari and English.²³ These administrative policies are intended to promote uniform and consistent guidelines for the management of personnel; to assist managers in the development of quality control in the workplace; to encourage and assist effective communication among managers and staff; and to ensure, protect and clarify the rights and responsibilities of the employee and the employer.²⁴ While the APM and associated SOPs and TORs have been approved by the Mayor, he is unable to implement them because they have not received the legislative approval of Parliament. Without this legal authority, they cannot be implemented. For example, the hiring and firing policy for *Tashkil* (civil service) employees is strictly regulated by national law. According to the Mayor, other senior staff members and KCI staff, the municipality requires legislation from Parliament to endorse any substantial change. Introduction of policies

²² The Team could not corroborate this data because no baseline was ever collected before FMIS was implemented. This impression was reinforced anecdotally by other key informants.

²³ USAID/Afghanistan. "Kabul City Initiative (KCI) Annual Report (Year Two) October 1, 2011—September 30, 2012." Tetra Tech ARD. October 15, 2012; p. 11.

²⁴ http://humanresources.vermont.gov/sites/dhr/files/pdf/policies_procedures/DHR-Policy_Manual.pdf.

and procedures for the City, such as systems that may have an impact on any financial issues (revenue collection, salaries, bonds and parking) all require this legislative act.

Members of the senior management are aware that the APM exists but none of them have fully adopted or integrated the policies and procedures into their daily operations. Some senior staff, however, has tried to adopt selected parts of the Manual which can be administratively implemented. While the Deputy Mayor for Finance and Administration had a hard copy of the Manual, SOP and TORs and said that the adoption of the manual is a priority, he claimed that he is blocked from fully implementing policies and procedures by the lack of legal authority. Others reiterated this view. The DG of Human Resources also said he knew about the new regulations but he was still using the old laws in the daily management of the HR department because the new policies had not been approved. Few people in the middle-level cadres, at the district level, for example, are even aware that such a Manual or procedures exist.

Only one District Manager acknowledged that he knew of the Manual, but he would not try to adopt it until it became part of the law. The KM Legal Officer also said that he has not been consulted about the Manual and he has not been consulted about the legal ramifications if the Manual and procedures become law. The DG of Sanitation has not adopted the entire Manual but has administratively adopted select procedures, allowing him to reduce the number of signatures required to hire a new employee from 16 to nine. He also said that he was able to significantly reduce the number of signatures necessary to purchase fuel for city vehicles.

2. QUESTION 2: PROJECT PERFORMANCE

a. Project Management Institute (PMI) Seminar

During the first year of the project, 54 senior municipal staff members, including one woman,²⁵ were selected to participate in a ten-day study tour at a Project Management Institute (PMI) seminar in Istanbul, Turkey. PMI is an internationally recognized institute that provides professional management training. This seminar was part of the overall KCI strategy of providing senior managers exposure to the most modern and contemporary management practices.

The participants in the seminar were senior civil servants with experience ranging from six to 23 years drawn from Engineering, Maintenance and Street Construction departments. Three different groups attended the seminars in July (20 participants), August (20 participants), and September (14 participants) 2011. Prior to departure, the participants had a three-week course in English and computer training. The participants followed the prescribed PMI course for

²⁵ Since all of the courses were conducted in English; one of the major reasons more women did not participate was their lack of proficiency in English. There also were cultural restraints about women traveling abroad.

management training and all received an international certificate in project management upon completion.

Senior management recognized the usefulness of these study trips. The DG of Policy and Coordination noted that the management and planning skills gained in the PMI training of his staff helped improve the policy and planning in his office, especially the ability to conduct overall analysis. The Mayor also noted that the PMI training was valuable for the top management of the municipality.

In a group interview with eight graduates of this training, and subsequent telephone interviews with other PMI graduates, respondents mentioned that courses in time management, project management, crisis management and planning were especially useful to them in their work. However, nearly all respondents commented that the limited time of the training (eight to nine days) was insufficient for substantive learning. There was general agreement that the exposure to the organization and management of a major modern city was the real importance of the trip. Participants commented on the professional value for them to meet with the Head of Planning for the city of Istanbul and to observe parking, traffic control and street maintenance in Istanbul. They also remarked on the organization of the tourist industry, the management of mobile phone towers and an effectively functioning system of rubbish collection. They all agreed that the opportunity to see and experience these systems in operation was the greatest value of the study trip.

An unintended consequence of the PMI training has been that KCI was able to obtain the copyright permission to translate the PMI's basic handbook, *Fundamentals of Project Management*, into Dari thus making this handbook available to other members of the KM staff. Additionally, as a result of this training program and assistance from KCI, Afghanistan has met the necessary requirements to be able to open an independent Afghan branch of PMI. With its own PMI franchise, KM will be able to use this institute for training its staff without having the expense of sending participants out of the country.

b. Project Management Strengths & Weaknesses

The project performance question enquires about the skills and knowledge of KM officials to independently and successfully complete a full cycle of government project implementation and the strengths and weaknesses of project management overall.

The KM has been managing and implementing infrastructure projects prior to KCI, but they were completed in a cumbersome and costly manner. In 2009, for example, KM implemented 33 basic infrastructure upgrades or repair projects worth \$16.3 million.²⁶ Observation of selected projects, discussions with donors and international aid agencies and KM informants indicated

²⁶Interview with KM finance department March , 2013.

that while roads were built, sewers repaired and basic services delivered, they were often lacking international standards of quality, efficiency, and management. According to informants, the highly-centralized structure contributed to inefficiency, while weakly-regulated procurement procedures and lack of quality control contributed to poor construction and costly overruns.

KCI sought to introduce modern project cycle management practices and to improve the efficiency and cost of new projects by institutionalizing international project management norms, such as those listed by the PMI and the ISO 93²⁷ series of engineering standards.

It is difficult to accurately determine the effect KCI has had on the municipality's ability to independently carry out a full cycle of government project implementation because the baseline study was not precisely framed for such an analysis²⁸ and data is not available. Indeed, the KCI Project Officer said the program has not been operational long enough for them to observe a fully implemented KM project cycle.

Without such institutional baseline data, or the opportunity to monitor a project from start to finish, the Team has assessed the municipality's capacity through extrapolating from the following:

- Assessing the change in project management through comparison of project documents prior to KCI and current documentation.
- Interviewing key informants at all levels on their changed/present capacity to participate in the project cycle.
- Determining the impact of computerization and specialist training on the project cycle.
- Evaluating the range and complexity of KM-commissioned projects before the program, current projects, and future projects.

KCI embarked on a wide array of technical training structured to improve the capacity of professionals and their teams and was designed to promote overall project management. KCI embedded over 30 national and international specialists in major KM offices and departments to provide formal and informal training and coaching on project management to help achieve this.

Two permanent engineers were assigned to the Streets & Maintenance Department by KCI and they rotated with other specialists. Both a KCI engineer and an architect provided informal training and coaching to counterparts during one Team visit. The program worked with the Sanitation, Greenery, Streets & Maintenance and IT Departments to improve or establish a viable work flow system, enabling better uses of people and resources. An effectively functioning GIS was established by KCI to provide up-to-date geographic digital data to the

²⁷International Organization of Standards (ISO).

²⁸USAID/Afghanistan. "Kabul City Organizational Assessment: An in-depth examination of Institutional Systems, Tools and Processes and Management Capacity." Tetra Tech ARD. 30 January 2011.

Municipality. A newly-adopted FMIS program was introduced that was compatible and interoperable with other relevant departments.

Through the Future Leaders Program and the Senior Executive Leadership training, KCI complemented the technical training with instruction on better management and leadership techniques. Additionally, a more extensive use of computers and appropriate software provided the basic building blocks for a more modern project cycle management system.

KCI also worked to enhance the inter-operability of departments and facilitated inter-departmental workshops in revenue, training, administration, and outreach. Communication systems between departments were also improved. Common training programs, as in the Future Leaders, provided a venue for people from different departments to interact, build bonds, and work together. The KCI Project Manager said the project placed maximum effort to get departments out of their departmental stovepipes, “We have pushed as much as possible to get the departments to work together,” he said, adding that progress was made.

A major component of KCI was the delivery of infrastructure improvement projects that would improve KM’s delivery of basic services through the construction and upgrade of roads, sewage canals, parks, the electrical grid and other similar activities. These infrastructure projects were also designed to serve as a training vehicle in which municipal staff would participate, engage and learn best practices in construction and project management. Approximately \$16.4 million of the infrastructure works were completed as of the evaluation.

KCI and KM senior managers disagree to the extent that KM professional staff were engaged or included in project design. One department director suggested KCI was not serious in involving KM staff; he reported to the Team that KCI would do the work and not involve KM closely in the work. A KCI member, on the other hand, said that they were rigorous in coordinating and consulting with KM, involving counterpart’s at all key stages of the project cycle. Overall, department heads interviewed gave strong reviews to KCI’s project management training. The DG of Streets and Maintenance complimented KCI’s aid to his department on complex projects. He also acknowledged the provision of heavy equipment to the department along with the relevant staff training. The robust activity of the Streets and Maintenance Department was observable to the Team as it traveled around the City.

The DG of Construction and Supervision, the manager agency charged with project quality control and standards, remarked that KCI activities had markedly strengthened his engineering team’s capacity to monitor construction. He singled out the newly created GIS office as a valuable input to the work of his team. He said that before KCI, “the staff was not able to do proper quality checking and proper controlling with documentation from the project side, for either construction or road renovation or park construction. Now they can do it.”

The Deputy Mayor of City Services said that overall the capacity of the municipality to implement projects has strengthened with KCI inputs. Taking the example of new park construction, he said that before KCI's intervention, it would take three years to build a park. He estimated that with current KCI professional support, it takes six months to complete the same work. He said when the program ends, and KM professionals are working independently, it will take a year to build a park. This is a useful indicator that suggests KCI intervention has improved the Municipality project management capacity. The Team directly observed documentation from the Deputy Mayor stating this information and confirmed in interviews with public works.

Key informant interviews, direct observation, and project documents show KM implementing construction projects more effectively and confidently. For instance, in March 2013, KM partnered with UN Habitat for a comprehensive road works project.²⁹ All of the standardized steps of project management from articulation of policy, needs identification and community engagement to project planning, implementation, financial management, and monitoring were followed in this project. As with all projects of this size and importance, there was a heavy influence of the central decision-making authority. KM staffs who participated in the project were confident in their roles in the project cycle and satisfied with the efficiency of other departments involved in the process.

Indeed, the Team was able to compare current project documents and pre-KCI documents and found them to be more professionally planned and executed. While lack of financial and professional resources often meant KM had to partner with international donors such as USAID, the World Bank, and the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), there is now a growing confidence in the City in its ability to implement projects directly and independently.

For instance, in the March 13, 2013 public newsletter of Kabul Municipality, the Mayor reported the launch of a KM-funded and managed project to repair or build 21 side streets in District 4 in central Kabul. The year-long \$13.4 million project was awarded to a local contractor.

c. Citizen Perception of Municipality Infrastructure / Project Management

The primary objective of CLIN 2 was to improve the delivery of city services and infrastructure development, and thereby demonstrate to citizens that the city was working on their behalf. According to a Citizen's Perception Survey of 276 city residents,³⁰ 75% of the respondents acknowledged that there had been improvements in infrastructure during the last three years, and only seven% responded negatively. Of those reporting improvements, 43% noted repairs in roads, and 24% noted that local parks had been renovated and upgraded. Moreover, 19% took notice that trash collection was more regular, and 11% acknowledged that sewers were being

²⁹ This project was randomly selected for review out of two dozen available projects.

³⁰ USAID/Afghanistan. Kabul City Initiative (KCI) "Citizen Perception Survey: Final Report." Checchi and Company Consulting, May 2013.

cleaned. Thus, the delivery of city services and improved infrastructure were positively recognized by the citizens.

People were not clear on who was specifically responsible for these improvements and attributed them to a range of actors from the central government to unknowns. In general, 74% of the total 276 did recognize that the municipality was responsible including the district administration and the Mayor of Kabul. This also is a positive reflection on the KM. Citizens ranked trash collection as the top priority for future attention followed by sewer cleaning and road improvements.

Overall, these generally favorable responses for specific infrastructure and service delivery, and the recognition that that the city was responsible for these improvements, suggest that the city has been making positive headway. Thus, 62% gave the municipality excellent to fair ratings in response to a question about how well the city was doing in providing public services. Twenty-two% noted that the city was doing poorly, but given that the city has such serious problems and the project has been working for a relatively short time with limited funds, this is not to be unexpected.

The Citizen Information Center that the municipality opened in October 2012 to help citizens with problems and information about city services did not receive a high recognition by citizens with only 11% (31 of all respondents) answering that they were ‘much’ aware of the center while 25% of the total (68 of all respondents) replied that they have only heard about the CIC but were not much aware of it. However, 45% (122 of all respondents) replied with a positive interest when they heard about the purpose of the center. Conversely, 30% of respondents (84 of all respondents) expressed rather negative attitudes and said that they would not use the center even when its function was explained to them. The reasons given for not finding the center useful were: the municipality service is poor (45% or 38 of all respondents); it was too far from home (18% or 15 of all respondents); they feared municipal employees (16% or 13 of all respondents); and that they had transport problems to reach the center (13% or 11 of all respondents).

The city’s efforts to involve people at the ‘street level’ in the districts were also not very strong. Only three% (8 of all respondents) said that they regularly attended district meetings, and 17% (49 of all respondents) said they attended meetings, but rarely. Sixty-seven% (184 of all respondents) said they have never visited the district office for help with problems with the city. Thirteen% of the total respondents (35 of all respondents) refused to comment at all.

d. Revenue

It is difficult to determine revenue generated by the KM before KCI due to the unreliability of the ledger system previously described. As a result of KCI’s intervention, the Revenue Department rapidly and effectively adopted an FMIS program. Figure 5 indicates that over the last six years revenue has slowly climbed. The Revenue Department supplied data to the Team

that indicates income has risen from \$18.8 million in 2007 to \$38.3 million in 2012. Recently, the Mayor has presented revenue collection forecasts of \$50 million in 2013, a 33% increase over 2012,³¹ although KCI does not view this forecast as realistic.

KM Reported & Estimated Revenue - 1385 to 1391 2007 to 2013

Year	Afghani	USD	change	Source	Comment	
2007	1385	960,787,590	\$ 18,838,972	na	KM Revenue Dept	
2008	1386	1,335,050,237	\$ 26,177,456	39%	KM Revenue Dept	
2009	1387	1,418,256,630	\$ 27,808,954	6%	KM Revenue Dept	
2010	1388	1,798,556,204	\$ 35,265,808	27%	KM Revenue Dept	
2011	1389	2,387,079,964	\$ 46,805,489	33%	KM Revenue Dept	appreciable once-off, non-recurring sales etc
2012	1390	1,953,750,000	\$ 38,308,824	-18%	KM Revenue Dept	
2013	1391	2,550,000,000	\$ 50,000,000	31%	estimate - Mayor	KCI does not support estimate

As of 16 March, 2013 - 'Change' & 'Comment' column by Evaluation Team.

FIGURE 3: REPORTED AND ESTIMATED REVENUE, 2007-2013

There are numerous reasons why this data could be flawed, including uneven application of the Chart of Accounts (COA), lack of harmonization between the Ministry of Finance (MoF) and KM on accounting procedures, or just poor data entry causing input error. In June 2012, KCI conducted a detailed analysis of the blockages and vulnerabilities in KM's revenue collection system trying to determine the possible sources of error, listing numerous other impediments to accurate information in data collection.³² These figures are not subject to external review, so the validity or reliability of the data cannot be confirmed. In the same document, KCI presented a less-optimistic assessment of KM's revenue collection during the last number of years indicating that the increase in much of the revenue has been through once-off sales of properties, tax arrears, and other non-recurrent revenue. See Figure 6.

³¹Murtazaie, Shahla. "Kabul Municipality Revenues Up 33% Over Last Year." TOLONews.com. 21 February 2013.

³²USAID/Afghanistan. "Kabul Municipality Revenue Report 2012 (21 March 2011—19 March 2012)." Maarten de Zeeuw, Adam Smith International and Tetra Tech ARD, June 30, 2012.

KM REVENUE BY REVENUE SOURCE, 1387 - 1390
Analysis by KCI

	Actual figures (mln - Afs)			
Recurrent Revenue	1387	1388	1389	1390
Taxes	465	511	711	778
<i>Safay'i Charge</i>	231	285	443	438
City Entry Tax - Total Collected *	95	61	69	102
City Entry Tax, Received by KM **	82	106	115	121
Advertisement Tax	57	59	84	117
Fees	95	112	173	140
Business License	36	41	53	50
Market & Parking Fees	45	52	97	61
Construction Fees	17	18	23	29
Other Recurrent Revenue	257	389	485	967
KM share in Vehicle License Fees	0	0	0	390
Project funding from MoF	94	221	219	284
Rent of Municipal Property	123	138	170	214
Misc Recurrent Revenue	40	30	96	79
TOTAL RECURRENT REVENUE	817	1,012	1,358	1,885
Non-Recurrent Revenue				
Year	1387	1388	1389	1390
Land Sales	415	434	747	635
Areas of <i>tax amakin (place tax)</i>	18	7	0	4
NON-RECURRENT REVENUE	433	441	747	640
NET TOTAL REVENUE	1,250	1,453	2,105	2,525
City entry tax - collector share	195	200	275	409?
GROSS TOTAL REVENUE	1,445	1,653	2,380	2,934?

* City Entry Tax - Gross

** KM share of City Entry Tax - Net

Source: KCI Report, Pg 23 "Kabul Municipality Revenue Report 1390", pub June 30, 2012

FIGURE 4: REVENUE³³

KCI reports that the 2012 revenue appears to have climbed 20%, yet attributes the revenue growth to KM's share of vehicle license fees and not to conventional *safayi* property tax payments.

e. Recurrent and Non-Recurrent Revenue

In analyzing KM revenue, it is important to understand recurrent revenue that the City can depend on, and once-off, non-recurrent revenue that gives a one-time boost in funds. Using data

³³Note: previously, and as reported on this chart, a private company collected the City Entry Tax, deducting a share of the fees. Funds that went to the Municipality are listed as City Entry Tax, KM Share.

from the KCI report,³⁴ non-recurrent revenue accounts for between 25% and 35% of revenue since 2009. This seems an especially high rate of unsustainable funding, particularly in 2011 when non-recurrent revenue accounted for \$14.6 million. See Figure 7 and Figure 8 below.

KM Non-Recurrent Revenue as determined by KCI

Year	1387 / 2009	1388 / 2010	1389 / 2011	1390 / 2012
TOTAL RECURRENT REVENUE - USD	16,019,608	19,843,137	26,627,451	36,960,784
NON-RECURRENT REVENUE - USD	8,490,196	8,627,451	14,647,059	12,549,020
NET TOTAL REVENUE - USD	24,509,804	28,490,196	41,274,510	49,509,804
Percentage Non-Recurring Revenue	35%	30%	35%	25%

Evaluation Team Chart - Source: KCI Report, Pg 23 "Kabul Municipality Revenue Report 1390", pub June 30, 2012

FIGURE 5: KM NON-RECURRENT REVENUE AS DETERMINED BY KCI

Kabul Municipality Revenue - 1390
21 March 2011 to 19 March 2012
as reported by KM on March 15, 2013

USD

<i>Recurring</i>	\$ 27,062,794	71%
<i>Non-Recurring</i>	\$ 11,246,029	29%
Total	\$ 38,308,824	

FIGURE 6: KABUL MUNICIPALITY REVENUE – 1390SIC

	Recurring	USD
1	Safyee tax	\$ 8,512,794
2	working tax	\$ 1,673,529
3	working tax for laborers	\$ 1,471
4	parking and markets tax	\$ 948,529
5	KM owned shops rent	\$ 2,933,824
6	safayee notbook price	\$ 19,118
7	wood and burning equi	\$ 6,070,588
8	animals skin and other	\$ 188,235
9	cultural tax	\$ 1,567,647
10	transportation tax	\$ 5,147,059
	Total	\$ 27,062,794

FIGURE 7: RECURRING REVENUE BREAKDOWN – 2012 (1390), AS REPORTED BY KM REVENUE DEPT., 15 MARCH 2013SIC

³⁴Note: previously, and as reported on this chart, a private company collected the City Entry Tax, deducting a share of the fees. Funds that went to the Municipality are listed as City Entry Tax, KM Share.




FIGURE 8: KCI REVIEW OF KM REVIEW, 2012

It is instructive to contrast the KM collation of revenue data. The Municipality stated that it was not able to compile a report breaking down recurring and non-recurring income before 2010. However, using the new FMIS, they generated data for 2012 indicating less overall revenue but a greater percentage of non-recurrent funds. See Figures 9, 10, and 11.

Non-Recurring		USD
1	house last year taxes	\$ 113,235
2	contractual payment	\$ 3,676
3	pricing rent	\$ -
4	strcutural and archetect price	\$ 360,294
5	pricing forms for revenue	\$ 5,147
6	book price for KM property	\$ 2,206
7	land rent for business and living	\$ 7,279,412
8	1% property tax	\$ 1,710,000
9	sanitation revenue	\$ 176,471
10	salaries, bonuses & separation	\$ 1,352,941
11	foreign work tax	\$ -
12	markets coordination and fins	\$ 198,529
13	last expectation	\$ -
14	1% custom and other tax	\$ 44,118
total		\$ 11,246,029

FIGURE 9: NON-RECURRING/ONCE-OFF REVENUE BREAKDOWN – 2012 (1390), AS REPORTED BY KM REVENUE DEPT., 15 MARCH 2013

KM continues to place heavy reliance on the collection of non-recurrent, once-off revenue to offset, or compensate for low recurrent revenues. This is a concern because sooner or later the opportunity to sell land and generate funds through once-off revenue will dwindle. While KM supplies all revenue data, KCI and the Team differ, particularly in 1390 (2012) when our information shows \$38 million in revenue compared to KCI's report of \$57 million, a 50% difference. This difference is depicted in Figure 12.

Discrepancy between 1390 - Revenue Evaluation Team & KCI

Year		Eval Team	KCI	difference
2009	1387	\$ 27,808,954	\$ 28,333,333	1.9%
2010	1388	\$ 35,265,808	\$ 32,411,765	-8.1%
2011	1389	\$ 46,805,489	\$ 46,666,667	-0.3%
2012	1390	\$ 38,308,824	\$ 57,529,412	50.2%

1- Afghanis converted to USD 51/1


2- Evaluation Team source document, Recurrent & Non-Recurrent Revenue List, 1390 from KM on 16 March, 2013

3- KCI Source: Total KM (Gross) Revenue, 1387-1390, listed in Kabul Municipality Revenue Report 1390, pub June 20, 2012

FIGURE 10: DISCREPANCIES BETWEEN EVALUATION TEAM AND KCI, 1390 REVENUE DATA

The Team’s \$38 million figure is based on a detailed breakdown of revenues supplied by mid-level financial officers in the KM. The municipality, however, has also produced charts (see Figures 13 & 14) and other reports that state the KM revenue was at \$57 million for the same time frame. It is, of course, possible that the Team has incomplete or incorrect information, as supplied by KM. Another possibility is that the KM management may have inflated revenue. Either way, this discrepancy in 1390/2012 revenue illustrates difficulty determining the reliability of KM revenue reporting.

Recurrent & Non-Recurrent Revenue List, 1390 (apx 2012) from KM Rev Dept on 16



1,953,750,000 Afs, Total Revenue (current & non-recurrent)
Approx \$38,308,824

FIGURE 11: RECURRENT AND NON-RECURRENT REVENUE LIST, 1390 TAX

Revenue Graph from KM for Years 1383 to 1391 Source: Revenue Dept




Chart: Kabul Municipality Revenue Report, 1390- KCI

KM REVENUE BY REVENUE SOURCE, 1387 - 1390
Analysis by KCI

	Actual figures (m ln - Afs)			
	1387	1388	1389	1390
Recurrent Revenue				
Taxes	465	511	711	778
Safai charge	231	285	443	438
City entry Tax	95	81	89	102
City Entry Tax, KM Share	82	108	115	121
Advertisement Tax	57	59	84	117
Fees	95	112	173	140
Business License	38	41	53	50
Market & Parking Fees	45	52	97	81
Construction Fees	17	18	23	29
Other Recurrent Revenue	257	389	485	967
KM share in vehicle license fees	0	0	0	390
Project funding from MoF	94	221	219	284
Rent of Municipal Property	123	138	170	214
Misc Recurrent Revenue	40	30	96	79
TOTAL RECURRENT REVENUE	817	1,012	1,358	1,885
Non-Recurrent Revenue				
Year	1387	1388	1389	1390
Land Sales	415	434	747	635
Areas of tax amakon (plac...)	18	7	0	4
NON-RECURRENT REVENUE	433	441	747	640
NET TOTAL REVENUE	1,250	1,453	2,105	2,525
City entry tax - collector share	195	200	27	409?
GROSS TOTAL REVENUE	1,445	1,653	2,382	2,934?

Source: KCI Report, Pg 23 "Kabul Municipality Revenue Report 1390", pub June 30, 2012

2,933,539,949 Afs, 1390
\$57,520,391

A different KM documents lists 1390 revenue at 2.9b Afs, (\$57m)
This is the number used by KCI in its analyses of revenue..

FIGURE 12: REVENUE GRAPH FROM KM FOR YEARS 1383 TO 1391

f. Creating Greater Revenue in the KM

Since 2000, Kabul's explosive growth in population has created an insatiable demand for municipal services. While city revenue has climbed over the years, it has never been able to keep pace with growth. Using KM's own data, in 2012 the city was able to collect just \$7.15 in revenue per person, and this includes funds raised through sales of city property and Ministry of Finance transfers.

The potential municipal tax base is modest at best. There never has been the concept of a resident's obligation to pay taxes in order to receive better roads, parks or sidewalks, trash collection, and other public services. Surprisingly, the Tetra Tech survey notes that the percentage of people saying they are willing to pay an increase in fees for weekly, door-to-door trash collection rose from 5% in 2011 to 73% in 2012. Similarly, there was an increase in the number of people willing to pay for weekly street cleaning. In 2011, however, 44% of the respondents were willing to pay while in 2012 nearly 66% said they were also willing to pay an increase in *safayi* taxes for this service.³⁵

Most housing is unplanned and unregulated and thus not taxed. Large areas of the city, at least five of 22 districts, are controlled by warlords or bandits and are off limits to tax collectors. In the districts that do collect taxes, the revenue is much lower than it could be because of poor planning and corruption. The Tetra Tech survey confirms this by noting that more citizens acknowledged not paying the *safayi* taxes in 2012 (65%) than in 2011 (39%). The most common reasons given for not paying the taxes were that they never received a bill or that they lived in illegal housing without a *safayi* payment book.³⁶ Revenue targets are arbitrarily assigned from the main revenue office of KM to districts, placing a burden on revenue officers to increase tax collection. Usually, such targets are lump sums and do not account for the demographic or economic realities of districts. "This year, they just increased my target by 50% without discussion," said a District Manager, "there is no way I can collect that."

While the municipality is working on the digitization of housing units, which will eventually assist in assessment of taxes,³⁷ to date targets are arbitrarily assigned to districts without a rational approach. This affords revenue collectors the opportunity to receive bribes to reduce individual tax assessments, to the detriment of overall city revenue.

KM is an anomaly in Afghanistan because it is the only city in the country that is completely controlled by the national government. It has little autonomy to devise its own revenue collection

³⁵USAID/Afghanistan KCI. "Kabul City Initiative, January 2012 Resident Survey: Report of Results." National Research Center; p. 4. [May, 2012].

³⁶Ibid, p.6.

³⁷ KCI has supported KM in the digitization of housing and buildings in Kabul. To date some 85,000 records have been recorded, and it seems likely the target of 105,000 will be met before KCI program ends. This is a positive step, though the estimates are that there over 830,000 buildings in Kabul (roughly six persons per unit based on est. pop of 5m). Further, the evaluation team is not convinced that KM will have the technical capacity to manage and use this database/GIS system post KCI.

schemes, as the Parliament and/or the President must approve nearly all decisions.³⁸ This severely limits the City's ability to raise funds.

In some respects, however, KM and the national government spar over revenue generation. For example, the national government controlled the City Entry Tax, forwarding only a small portion to the Municipality. Yet in February, 2013 KM took over the collection of this tax.

The senior leadership of KM and KCI specialists focused on raising municipal revenue. KM and KCI have collaborated to research to write a series of 22 white papers that explore potentially new sources of revenue for the municipality.³⁹ Drawing on best practices from around the world, these papers cover a wide and comprehensive array of potential revenue sources for KM. The papers include revenue sources such as:

- Establishment of a Municipal Fund
- Inter-Government Transfer
- Replacement of Tax Amakin
- Reform of rates of safayi charges
- Business License Fees
- Occupancy Fees
- Advertising Revenue from Street Signs, Fixtures and Parks
- Assessment Districts
- Municipal Revenue from Recycling Waste
- Taxi and Minibus License Fees
- Revenue from Hazardous Waste
- Parking Fees
- Encroachment Fees and Trench Cut Cost Recovery Fees
- Billboards and other Street Advertising

Overall, the KM revenue collection system is seriously flawed. Revenue Officers are unsupervised and ill trained and frequently underestimate the assessment value and corresponding rates for buildings. This set of 22 white papers outlining possible new revenue sources for the city to expand its revenue base, to ensure a predictable and reliable cash flow and to grow revenue is nearly exhaustive for the current economic environment. A more financially secure city can provide more and better public services that in turn will help ensure a more stable economic and social climate for the growth of the private sector. Perhaps the greatest and most effective assistance that can be provided to the private sector is the continuance and support to the interventions that KCI has introduced in the municipality. The better functioning and increased reliability of the systems introduced by KCI, such as FMIS, GIS, the CIC, along with

³⁸ Source: Team discussions with KM legal officer and staff, Ministry of Justice, and KCI.

³⁹ USAID/Afghanistan KCI. "White Paper: Kabul Municipality New Revenue Review. Analysis of possible new revenues for KM." Kabul: KCI Project Kabul, 2/10/13. [www.solutionexchange-un.net/repository/af/mun/cr4-res4-eng.pdf].

the continued capacity building of municipal workers, will help create the conditions for a healthy growth climate for the private sector.

When asked about the greatest challenges in collecting revenue, the DG of Revenue Department pointed to the warlords or local tribes that effectively control five or more city districts, keeping funds that otherwise would revert to the municipality.⁴⁰ This real challenge is primarily security related and beyond the scope of this report. Beyond these ungoverned districts, most KM senior management suggest the structural relationship the city has with the national government is the most important single factor hindering increased revenue collection. For instance in 2005, the national government seized half of Kabul's revenue when it nationalized or absorbed the *tax Amākin*, a tax on commercial properties

QUESTION 3: FUTURE ASSISTANCE CONSIDERATIONS

The KCI project is essentially focused on capacity building of KM staff with limited infrastructure improvements, and promoting economic growth was not within the scope of the project nor did the project staff include an economic development specialist. However, the evaluation team finds that the prospective reforms with highest potential for contributing to economic progress are (1) city traffic reform; (2) business improvement districts; and (3) municipal land use reforms. Each of these opportunities is briefly discussed below.

a. City Traffic Reform

Kabul has a severe traffic congestion problem that inhibits the movement of goods, services, and people around the city. The city is often gridlocked by the great numbers of commercial, personal, taxis, and public vehicles on the streets. It is not unusual for a vehicle to take an hour to move a few city blocks. This congestion creates a great burden on commercial businesses and merchants in time and money.

The city is serviced by some 400 state-owned Millie buses (235 actually running) that crisscross the city on 52 routes. These buses also contribute to the congestion. Moreover, at times the use of Millie buses has been suspended because of the inability to stop at designated bus stops (street vendors at times block the bus stops).⁴¹ There are also a large number of private taxis and private mini-buses circulating in the city. These vehicles are unregulated and uncontrolled. In addition to often being unsafe, they contribute to the serious problem of air pollution in Kabul. Because of the special relationship between the central government and the municipality, the KM is not responsible for traffic enforcement or the control of the police, who are under the Ministry of the Interior.

⁴⁰ Admittedly, KM provides few services to these no-go areas.

⁴¹ Abdul Qadeer Siddiqui. "Crowded roads force Millie Bus to suspend 165 buses". *Pajhwok Afghan News*, Mar 1, 2011. [<http://www.pajhwok.com/en/2011/03/01/crowded-roads-force-millie-bus-suspend-165-buses>].

If the KM were to negotiate a degree of control with the Ministry of Interior's police this would assist the KM in establishing specific regulations for parking and sidewalk restrictions that may be coupled with business/commercial zoning reforms. Similarly, if the KM were to review and revise its city gate entrance fees for commercial vehicles, establishing fixed annual and transparent rates, the cost of goods being delivered into the city would be reduced and provide a stimulus for business and transporters within KM.

b. Business Improvement Districts

Commercial districts in Kabul are often chaotic and confusing; this inhibits the flow of goods, services, and customers. Business improvement districts are specific commercial areas that involve private sector initiatives in a cooperative effort to improve the appearance and operation of their business environment. The businesses in each district provide self-funding for the improvement of their district for such services as trash collection, security, capital improvements, marketing, and so on. There are historic areas as well as business areas in Kabul that would benefit from such local development schemes. These business improvement districts have had considerable success in developing and renovating business environments in other countries. The Bagrami Industrial Park is a successful, larger scale example of this type of improvement in Afghanistan. The renovations undertaken by Turquoise Mountain, located in the central market area are another yet smaller example.

As previously mentioned, establishing business and commercial zoning coupled with appropriate by-laws introduced by the KM would support the concept of business improvement districts.

c. Municipal Land Use Reforms

As noted above, the municipality owns a considerable amount of public land within its jurisdiction. With the growth of the city and the constant demand for commercial space, this land has considerable value. Long term leasing of municipal property for public-private partnerships would be beneficial for both entities. To achieve this, the KM needs to properly delineate the boundaries of property it owns with those of abutting landowners and establish and publish transparent rates for each district office to manage these properties.

The future of a robust and growing local private sector is dependent on the existence of a well-functioning municipality capable of providing basic public services.

VI. CONCLUSIONS

1. QUESTION 1: SUSTAINABILITY

a. Part A: Capacity Building Trainings

Computer Training

The computerization of the KM has been a significant intervention by KCI. The hardwiring of the municipality and the extensive training of operators has fundamentally changed the work habits of the bureaucracy and the way it functions. Computer training and knowledge is the basis of all future work in the Municipality. Furthermore, the ongoing digitization of most municipal records will provide the Municipality with an extensive electronic database for the analysis of taxes, demographics, city growth, and other essential sectors critical to the future functioning of the city. It is likely that the computerization of records will reduce the amount of duplicate entries, inaccurate information, and potential for corruption.

While KM management deems computerization a priority, the reality of the marketplace in which the private sector vastly out-pays local government jobs renders it uncertain whether or not the Municipality will be able to retain or recruit quality IT and database specialists to continue the process.

Municipality Women's Council

While the Council is still young and inexperienced, KCI helped it to develop a sound foundation to build on for the promotion and advocacy of equity for women. This will help insure the sustainability of the Women's Council in the KM.

With the assistance of KCI, the municipal women's council has gained the institutional and organizational competence and confidence to represent the rights of women in the municipal workplace. It has given individual women the confidence and support in promoting their professional careers. In addition to developing ties with the female members of parliament, the Council networked with NGOs and national and international women's organizations to prevent isolation from the global women's movement. There are now more women who know their rights in the municipal workforce, and they have an organization which can represent them.

KCI was fortunate to have the Mayor as a strong ally supporting the Women's Council. Through policy and example, the Mayor has promoted gender equity in the municipality. He has appointed dynamic women to the Council and supported the Council's activities, selected top performers for promotion and has improved the working conditions for all women in the Municipality. His efforts appear to be taking root in various departments. He has been in office less than three years, but his support for gender equity and opportunity has affected both men

and women in the municipality. KCI training activities with the Council have reinforced the Mayor's position. As such, it is likely that the improved gender equity and opportunity will be sustained after the end of the project. The more that women become an integrated part of the bureaucracy, the less likely it will be for the next Mayor to reverse the progress that has been made.

b. Managerial Capacity Trainings for KM Leadership

Future Leaders Program

The Future Leaders Program (FLP) already has begun to make a difference in the middle-level management of the Municipality. These younger civil servants enhance their university training by acquiring new tools, skills, and vision to help modernize the bureaucracy.

Both participants and senior management have acknowledged that the FLP has been professionally useful and contributed to the efficiency and effectiveness of the graduates in the workplace.

While of some temporary value, short training programs are not sufficient to bring about sustained change. Without follow-on or refresher programs to reinforce their management and technical capacities, the participants will not build on their acquired skills and they will tend to lose interest and momentum.

Senior Executive Leadership Seminar

The participants in this seminar were the senior managers of the municipality. The curriculum was too general. The technical courses, such as accounting, need more time and depth. The management courses on leadership and motivation were considered the most important. The exposure to new management terminology and concepts such as process re-engineering, strategic communication, organizational re-structuring methodologies, and techniques of delegation of authority were also considered valuable.

Financial Management Information Systems Training

KM is rapidly replacing its paper-based system with an operational FMIS. The establishment of FMIS dramatically raises KM's efficiency and promotes accountability and transparency, powerful tools to combat corruption. Once operating to full potential, the FMIS will provide a robust common platform that can be programmed to respond to different needs of the users.

The introduction of an FMIS program has had a profound effect on changing how the Municipality manages and controls its finances. The rapid adoption of the system is an outstanding achievement of both the City and KCI.

The FMIS appears to have made a major foothold in the KM's financial operating procedures, under the tutelage of KCI. The Finance and Revenue Departments, the Sanitation, Street and Maintenance Departments, Management and Policy and Procedures Department and the HR Department have all adopted the FMIS, and it is becoming deeply integrated into the operating systems of these departments. With only two years' experience using the FMIS it is too early to know for sure how sustainable the system will be in these departments and in the municipality in general. However, there are a number of indicators that the FMIS procedures will be sustainable. Computer literacy, one of the bases of FMIS, is becoming increasingly widespread throughout the municipality. Moreover, official records must be kept, and as the departments have adopted electronic systems, the old paper systems have been abandoned and are unlikely to be revived. Managers and staff who have made the switch said that they appreciate the ease, the efficiency, the speed and the accuracy of the new system. Younger people, coming from university, are facile and versatile with the electronic world and are eager to learn new methods and programs and will fill the seats of older staff as they retire. Senior management is supportive of the FMIS, and will insist that the system be used because of its accuracy and efficiency. They also understand that an FMIS is essential not only for daily transactions but for long range planning and budgeting. Donors will also increasingly insist on data generated by FMIS procedures. The need for compatibility between the national government which is also using FMIS and the municipality will also require the sustainability of the FMIS. Lastly, the FMIS procedures will have the support of a dynamic, young IT support department. One of the biggest challenges to the sustainability of the FMIS will be maintaining the rigor of the system, such as accurate data entry and good troubleshooting assistance. These factors all suggest that with continual training, the FMIS procedures should be sustainable.

c. Part B: Administrative policy manual

While the Mayor has been supportive of the APM and procedures, he has not been able to integrate it into daily operations of the KM because the procedures lack the appropriate legal status which only can come from the Parliament. The APM and much of the SOPs and TORs developed by KCI are not being implemented as Kabul Municipality is obligated to have parliament pass enabling legislation.

If and when the APM procedures become law, there will be a need for an extensive education outreach to inform municipal civil servants about the reason, purpose, and use of the procedures.

2. QUESTION 2: PROJECT PERFORMANCE

a. Part A-1: Project Management Institute Seminar

Both management and participants have benefitted from the PMI training received during the PMI seminars in Istanbul

The ten-day study trip to Istanbul was a valuable professional learning experience for the participants, but it was too short for significant or in-depth learning to take place.

As with any training, in order to be practically useful it must be followed up with repetition and expansion. Much of the enthusiastic momentum to learn more management techniques and to use this training to improve the working of Kabul City will be lost if there is no continued education.

b. Part A-2: Project Management Strengths & Weaknesses

KCI improved the professional capacity of KM professionals through training that addressed general and highly technical topics. Managers exposed to best practices are better equipped to lead. Its professional staff are better trained and managers more confident in their roles according to KM professionals and KCI staff. Project documents are much more professional and include all the steps of the project cycle.

Computerization and digitization of documents markedly raised access to information for project planners and implementers to better enable project management. The installation and operation of an FMIS which provides planners, policymakers, and implementers with real time information on revenue and expenditures has dramatically benefited the KM capacity to manage projects with greater efficiency and accountability.

The key pillars of a project management cycle are people, information, and structures. KCI was particularly adept at identifying and mounting training initiatives to address shortfalls in technical and managerial capacity to better enable KM to strengthen these pillars.

KCI improved the project cycle structure focusing on the work processes of units, teams, and departments to better coordinate and participate. The Municipality is better able to embark on more complex, stand-alone projects.

KM is still plagued by an overly centralized decision making structure and professional staff at all levels could benefit from increased training and confirmation of skills.

c. Part B: Revenue

The major stumbling block for economic growth in Kabul is that given the relationship between the city and the national government, the city is presently unable to impose any new taxes, even on a par with other major cities in Afghanistan, without parliamentary authorization.

Revenue data reported by KM has been variable and unverifiable. As such, the Team is not able to precisely determine revenue collected by the Municipality.

KM's meager revenue is insufficient to keep the capital city operational, and if it were not for donor assistance from USAID, JICA, the World Bank, and other partners, the gains made over the years on infrastructure would likely crumble. The need to collect more sustainable revenue is universally recognized within KM.

3. QUESTION 3: FUTURE ASSISTANCE CONSIDERATIONS

As donor funding and support continues to decrease, the city faces a serious erosion of even its modest provision of public services. Conclusions related to three key areas are listed by opportunity below.

a. City Traffic Reform

The reduction of gridlock on the city streets would have a positive effect on business and commerce in the city. Because this problem touches nearly every citizen, it is a highly complex and difficult problem. Nevertheless, there is a cluster of reforms that revolve around the urban transportation problem that the KM has some control over.

b. Business Improvement Districts

Successful models of business improvement districts are present in Kabul and elsewhere. The districts create highly visible improvements which enhance commercial activity and improve infrastructure. Business improvement districts would require legislation to establish legal entities and impose costs/fees on all businesses within the specific area once they are established. The KM would have to be intimately involved in this process because the legal requirements and the many overlaps of city services.

c. Municipal Land Use Reforms

Under the right conditions, private sector initiatives could benefit greatly from the use of this city land. The private sector might be interested in a public-private arrangement to develop parking facilities, as mentioned above, but also bus terminals, public markets and even privately operated housing projects. Smaller scale projects would most likely not require major government approval, but any large scale developments would no doubt require central government approval. One of the greatest immediate difficulties for public-private partnerships is that the KM lacks the legal and contracting skills to implement such complex agreements that would be necessary to protect the rights and interests of both parties. This is not an insurmountable problem, however, and it would create a beneficial arrangement for both parties.

VII. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. QUESTION 1: SUSTAINABILITY

a. Part A: Capacity Building Training

Departments that have been dealing with budgeting, accounting, and revenue could still benefit from continued training and coaching from the accounting and financial management professionals from KCI. This is a critical nexus in the KM, and the more training and coaching the employees receive in FMIS applications and other financial and accounting systems and programs before the end of the KCI project, the higher the dividends in the future.

In general, the scope from FMIS to program-wide capacity building should be expanded. In the project time remaining, KCI should shift some resources into targeting the best students in selected training programs and train them to be trainers of trainers (TOT). This would help institutionalize a culture of training and learning in the Municipality. It will also help ensure the sustainability of training programs for current and future staff.

In general, in areas where TOTs would not be effective or appropriate, KCI should begin providing follow-up training to reiterate and reinforce what has been taught in the short introductory programs. Many people were exposed to a variety of training, and if there is no follow up they will forget the training and USAID will risk losing much of its investment.

KCI should work with the KM to establish a schedule of training for key middle and senior management, and candidates should be positioned to enroll in the Kabul-based PMI Center. Similarly, graduates of the PMI/Istanbul program other graduates of KCI management training programs should be selected to attend the graduate management institute established at the AUAF for graduate management degrees. These schedules could be prepared before the end of the project.

b. Part B: administrative policy manual (APM)

If the Administrative Policy Manual, the set of SOPs, and TORs are to become institutionalized and become an integral part of the bureaucracy, they need to be approved by Parliament. Short of this, KCI could assist the Mayor to determine which policies, SOPs and TORs can be implemented administratively, without full legislative authority. KCI will need to develop a program to train managers and senior leadership how to use these tools effectively. If these actions are not undertaken, it is likely that the APM will never be appropriately implemented.

2. QUESTION 2: PROJECT PERFORMANCE

a. Part A-1: PMI

The Dari version of the *Project Management Institute Handbook* should be made widely available for staff and management reference and use, and should serve as a basic reference book in the HR training unit.

b. Part A-2: Project Management Strengths and Weaknesses

Kabul Municipality, through the determined efforts of KCI, has made strong progress building the professional capacity of individuals, teams and departments to manage projects, though much more training and mentoring is required at all levels. In particular, the Team recommends that KCI focus on building the interoperability between departments.

c. Part B: Revenue

Increasing revenue remains a very difficult problem. Sources of revenue normally available to cities of Kabul's size and importance are denied because of the anomalous relationship with the national government. In the long run, the only solution for the city is to reach an agreement with the national government about legitimate sources of revenue. The digitization of all tax records and land and property holdings needs to continue and the creation of an accurate data base for increasing taxes needs to be established.

d. Operational Recommendations

FMIS Roll Out in Districts: KM should continue to roll out greater computer access and the installation FMIS in the districts in order to minimize fraudulent entry of revenue. Such an initiative will likely have to be financed through KM resources post-KCI.

Auditing: The Team recommends that KM increase the resources and activities of the Internal Audit Office. An increased number of field teams should randomly and frequently verify the revenue records of districts and evaluate the on-site assessment of buildings by Revenue Officers. To promote transparency, the external auditors should also assess revenues and expenditures in districts and KM departments.

District Revenue Targets: The Team recommends that the Revenue Department revamp its mechanism in determining district revenue targets. The revised approach would determine targets based on unique demographic and economic make-up of each district instead of arbitrarily assigned lump sum targets. In such a system, each district would have goals set

through a rational assessment of revenue sources based on the local demographic and economic composition. Such targets would be developed in coordination with district managers and use all of the new technology including FMIS, GIS, and all forms of digitized data.

Toll Tax: The City Entry Tax, which KM presently collects, taxes private vehicles as well as commercial heavy vehicles. The Team recommends KM replace the City Entry Tax with a more equitable user-pay system of a Toll Road Fee. This Fee would charge heavier commercial trucks, which affect the greatest wear on roads, a proportional higher charge to offset maintenance costs. If structured properly, the Toll Road Fee will raise greater revenue, replacing an arbitrary tax with a user-pay fee that residents can understand.

City Traffic Reform: The KM, in coordination with the national traffic department, should create a system of dedicated bus lanes for major routes. These lanes would only be used for Millie buses that could move in them unimpeded and thus reduce the time and hassle of bus transportation, and facilitate transportation around the city. The municipality and the national traffic police should also strictly enforce the control of vendors around the bus stops so that the Millie buses can stop without having to dodge vendor carts. A more rigorous regulation of taxis and mini-buses would also contribute to fewer accidents, the reduction of pollution, and a smoother flow of traffic.

e. Structural Recommendations

The KM needs to revise and update the traditional *safayi* tax system with a modern property tax law. Property tax is one of the city's major revenue sources, but as it stands, the system is outdated, inefficient and ineffective. In order to do this, however, the national government needs to relinquish some of its power and taxing authority to the municipality. Similarly, the municipality should revise its business permits system, advertisement 'tax' and other fee-paying structures, so that they are more effective and efficient, and reflective of the current economic conditions in Kabul.

The relationship between Kabul and the national government needs to be redefined to create a more appropriate demarcation line between the municipal and the national revenue authority. The municipality needs to be able to receive a more equitable share of the revenue raised in the city. A first step towards this would be for the KM to convene a working with the national government to discuss the revenue sharing issue. Currently, the city is unable to collect fees and taxes on activities and property that in other major cities are clearly in the domain of the municipality. Indeed, the national government has usurped significant municipal revenue sources, turning them into national revenue sources, thus denying the city of important revenue. If the city is able to achieve more control over its taxing authority, it will be in a better position to consider and implement the most practical revenue concepts suggested in the KM/KCI White Papers.

Establishment of a Municipal Fund: Creation of a Municipal Fund would regulate a fairer, more secure revenue sharing formula with the national government and permit the city to receive funds without having to pass through the national government.

3. QUESTION 3: FUTURE ASSISTANCE CONSIDERATIONS

The following recommendations should be conducted by KM directly to increase economic growth in the municipality.

City Traffic Reform: Kabul City is clogged by traffic and lack of parking space renders the congestion worse as driving lanes are used instead for parking. In the past, the KM owned parking lots, but the Attorney General instructed the City to sell the lots. By devolving the regulatory power back to the Municipality, and with it, control of the traffic police, KM could improve traffic flow, establish fee-paying parking lots, and raise revenue for parking fines.

Business Improvement Districts: The KM should work closely with GIRoA to develop and ultimately implement a plan for developing business improvement districts in the municipality. This will help to develop the private sector in Kabul for economic growth.

Municipal Land Use Reforms: The KM should work with GIRoA and international donors to identify opportunities for improving the legal and contracting capacity of KM in municipal land use so that transparent and accountable public-private cooperation in this area may be expanded. In recognition of the “learning curve” associated with this effort, it would be best for the KM to ensure that capacity improvements have been made, and subsequently to start with relatively small projects so that confidence may be built in the municipality’s ability to successfully manage this work.

ANNEX I: SCOPE OF WORK

OFFICE DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE (ODG)

OFFICE OF PROGRAM AND PROJECT DEVELOPMENT (OPPD)

STATEMENT OF WORK:

PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

SUPPORT TO KABUL CITY INITIATIVE, CONTRACT No.: EPP-I-00-04-00035-00

Introduction

Kabul City Initiative

Municipal governments typically account for the majority of citizens' interaction with their government. As such, this local government-citizen interface is critical to establishing citizen confidence in governance writ large. To strengthen this bond, Tetra Tech ARD, a US-based international development firm, is implementing the USAID-funded Kabul City Initiative (KCI). The project started on October 2010 and will end on September 2013. The total project budget is \$45 million. The objectives of this project are to create effective, responsive, transparent, and accountable municipal governance in Kabul Municipality (KM), which consists of a central administration and 22 administrative districts. The KCI provides technical assistance to KM to: (1) increase the capacity of Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) officials in KM; (2) markedly improve the delivery of municipal services and infrastructure development; and, (3) increase municipal capacity to generate revenue and to account for revenue and expenditures. It is anticipated that as a result of this assistance, Kabul's residents will receive improved services, understand the responsibilities of municipal leaders, play an active role in the municipal decision-making process, and see local governance structures as legitimate.

USAID's evaluation policy encourages independent external evaluation to increase accountability and inform those who develop programs and strategies to refine designs and introduce improvements into future efforts. In keeping with that aim, this evaluation will be conducted to review and evaluate the performance of the USAID-funded KCI program activities implemented by Tetra Tech ARD in Kabul. The evaluation will focus on assessing the effectiveness of the program's performance in achieving its program goal, objectives, and results.

I. BACKGROUND CONTEXT

Kabul, with over a fifth of Afghanistan's population and an estimated half of its national economy (GDP) plays a crucial role in the development of governance and service delivery

systems and in setting the stage for Afghanistan's future economic growth. The capital region is clearly the centerpiece in any calculus about the future of Afghanistan. Notably as a July 8, 2012 National Public Radio article warned, Kabul is "a city stretched beyond its limits." Mayor Yunus Nawandish and his deputy mayors exude a sense of urgency when discussing Afghanistan's future and the challenges facing Kabul Municipality. Kabul's skyrocketing population growth from around one and a half million to between five and six million in a little over a decade has far outpaced the growth of resources and the capacity of Kabul's municipal government. The Mayor estimates that up to 70% of the housing in Kabul is unplanned and illegally constructed, which adds significantly to the demand for essential services.

Most of the population growth reflects global urbanization patterns where rural populations seek greater economic opportunity in the capital city, and migration from conflict zones. The magnitude of the challenges facing Kabul's Mayor and his administration are further complicated by the ongoing efforts of anti-government elements to undermine the credibility and legitimacy of Afghanistan's government. Over the past year, KCI has faced implementation challenges in six of the 22 districts within the City where local actors have continued to exert inordinate control (acting as the governing authority) over resources and public administrative functions; these leaders are reluctant to relinquish control of authority, especially for collection of the safayi tax, to Kabul Municipality.

In response to the urgency of the situation in Kabul, USAID launched KCI and contracted with Tetra Tech ARD to implement the program as of October 1, 2010. KCI's long-term objective is to significantly improve the sustainable capacity of the municipal government to deliver services to the public. Accordingly, the central components of KCI's strategy include not only human resources development, public service and capital improvement plans but also initiatives to improve Kabul Municipality's capacity to raise revenue and manage its finances. Equally as crucial are KCI's set of strategies to build the municipal government's capacity to communicate with the public and media to encourage public participation in service delivery and increase public support and trust in government. Human resources development is particularly challenging in Afghanistan as indicated by Afghanistan's 172nd ranking in the (United Nations Development Program (UNDP) Human Development Index in 2011—well below the average for South Asia. Afghanistan's long tradition of authoritarian regimes further complicates the task of introducing modern governance practices and of fostering democratic interaction between the public and the municipal government.

To implement program activities, KCI draws on its relationships with the Mayor and his deputies, KM staff, local and international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and the U.S. military. Both KCI national and expatriate staff serve as "embeds" at the municipality, providing on-the-job training to municipal employees.

KCI implementing principles are:

- Afghan Ownership: KCI should be seen as an extension of GIROA, not as an increased foreign presence, and must work within Afghan structures.
- Afghan First: KCI will work using Afghan regulations and systems and ensure the project is using existing Afghan resources and assets to perform the stated objectives.

Demand Driven: KCI assistance will be deployed in accordance with the needs of KM.

- Long-term Capacity of GIROA: KCI will focus on institutional development of KM in the long term while helping the municipality deliver specific outcomes in the short term.
- GIROA Empowerment: KCI will report to both GIROA and USAID on the impact of its work. GIROA institutions will be the lead voice to guide programmatic activities.
- Learning by Doing: The best approach to capacity building of municipal officials, managers, and technicians is integrated training and on-the-job mentoring that provides the required follow-up support needed to avoid training disconnects. KCI will leverage classroom training with day-to-day, on-the-ground assistance to municipal staff to help solve real problems in the communities.

II. KCI PROGRAM GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

KCI activities are divided into three Contract Line Item Numbers (CLINs), described in further detail below, that utilize a circular development hypothesis: capacity building of municipal officials (CLIN 1) enables the officials to carry out, with assistance from KCI, service delivery programs (CLIN 2), which help the municipality generate more revenue (CLIN 3), which, in turn, allows the municipality to build greater capacity and offer further service delivery (CLINs 1 and 2).

CLIN 1 ~ Capacity Building of KM officials

Objective: Enhance the capacity of Kabul city officials, managers, and technicians to perform their core municipal management responsibilities.

Description: All activities under CLIN 1 will directly contribute to enhancing the capacity of municipal officials, managers, and technicians to perform their core municipal management responsibilities. Based on an empirical understanding of the skills, capabilities, and knowledge of municipal staff, KCI provides a combination of on-the-job mentorship, training, and advice to enable more visible, responsive and accountable governance at the municipal level.

Examples of training under CLIN 1:

- Project Management
- Human Resource Management
- International Computer Driver's License
- Future Leaders Training
- Senior Leadership Training

- Strategic Planning
- Urban Planning
- Proposal Writing
- Capital Improvement Planning
- Advanced English
- Advanced GIS
- Computer Maintenance
- Database Management
- Quality Control
- Logistic Management
- Advanced Forestry
- Technical Safety Training
- Advanced Internal Auditing
- Advanced Accounting
- Advanced Financial Management
- Advanced Budgeting
- Collection and Management of New Revenue Sources
- Coaching sessions for KM Women's Council on formal meeting methodology

Expected outcomes:

- Demonstrate a continuing quantifiable increase in women's participation in government decision-making.
- Demonstrate a continuing quantifiable increase in public awareness and participation in the City's budget process.
- Demonstrate substantial completion of the measurable milestones of the Municipal Management and Capacity-Building Improvement Plan.

CLIN 2 ~ Support KM to provide responsive, effective, and visible municipal service delivery programs

Objective: Assist Kabul to deliver improved services and enhance citizen perception of their city's governance.

Description: Activities carried out under CLIN 2 support KM in delivering visible, tangible, and desirable services to citizens in the form of municipal infrastructure and service delivery projects. These projects serve two purposes: (1) municipal projects provide citizens with marked improvements in daily life, helping them gain satisfaction with and confidence in their municipal government; and (2) in executing projects hand-in-hand with municipal officials, KCI builds capacity with a clear learning-by-doing approach, solidifying KM's capacity to sustainably deliver services to citizens in the long term.

Expected outcomes:

- Citizen satisfaction and trust in Kabul city will increase by at least 60% over baseline.
- Increase in citizen access to essential municipal services in Kabul by at least 60% over baseline.
- Infrastructure/service delivery projects are visible in Kabul, with the city officials taking credit for these activities.

CLIN 3 ~ Support KM to improve economic development and revenue generation:


Objective: Increase the city's capability to account for revenues and expenditures, and to enhance revenue collection.

Description: Activities implemented under this CLIN directly support the growth of local economic development and strengthening of revenue generation and, accordingly, the municipality's ability to finance its service offerings and operating costs. As KCI's activities under CLINs 1 and 2 strengthen municipal capacity and service delivery, activities under CLIN 3 use these improvements to facilitate business growth and job creation.

Expected outcomes:

- Increased revenue generation by at least 50% over base year.
- Increase the number of parcels added and/or characterized in land tax registry by at least 60% the over base year.
- Demonstrate substantial completion of the Comprehensive Tax, Financial, and Land Registration Improvement Plan.

The KCI objective and CLINs fall within three sub-intermediate results of the USAID/Afghanistan results framework:



III. PURPOSE OF THE EVALUATION

The purpose of this evaluation is to study and document the successes and weaknesses of KCI to provide recommendations to promote the effectiveness of municipalities in democratic governance at the sub-national level.

USAID/Afghanistan's Office of Democracy and Governance will use the conclusions and recommendations from this evaluation to shape strategy for possible future interventions at the municipal level. Shared lessons will also benefit the larger USAID/Afghanistan mission, donors working at the municipal level and, importantly, the Kabul Municipality and other stakeholders who aim to improve municipal service delivery and legitimacy in Afghanistan.

This evaluation should:

1. Evaluate the design, approach, implementation, and effectiveness of USAID's support for municipal capacity building, service delivery improvement, and revenue generation through KCI. The discussion should include the project's effectiveness in achieving the expected results; identification of strengths and weaknesses; and an assessment of the sustainability of individual activities after the project's end.
2. Distill lessons-learned on project design and implementation to guide revisions of the work plan and current program activities, as KCI will have several productive months remaining in its current contract. Lessons-learned will provide information on how existing programs can be improved.
3. Specifically examine each KCI intervention, such as the scope, depth, and effectiveness of activities in the following areas:
 - Training (both on-the-job and classroom)
 - Overall capacity building of KM
 - Improved service delivery (including infrastructure activities)
 - Citizen involvement in municipal governance (Note: this will be addressed in the citizen perception survey, which will complement this evaluation)
 - Economic development and revenue generation

IV. EVALUATION QUESTIONS

1. Sustainability:

- a. KCI's success will be defined, in part, by how well KM carries out KCI activities after the project closes out. KCI relies on capacity building (in the form of the trainings listed in the above description of CLIN 1) to convey the knowledge and skills needed by KM officials to continue activities without KCI assistance. Which of these trainings have the greatest impact on KM's ability to govern post-KCI? Are there any aspects or features of trainings explaining why they were helpful or not?
- b. KCI helped KM develop an Administrative Policy Manual, with a full set of municipal standard operating procedures and terms of reference for all KM departments and districts. KCI and KM implemented other policies, such as: Anti-corruption Policy, Construction Permit Policy, Building Standards Policy, Audit

Policy, Municipality Fee Policy, City Property Lease Policy, Budget Policy, Financial Management Policy, Fiscal Management Policy, Recruitment Policy, Human Resources Policy, Nepotism Policy, Revenue Collection Policy, and Municipal Equipment Use and Maintenance Policy. To what extent has KM integrated the policies listed above into its daily operations? Does anyone (or any office) actively “own” the policies, enforcing and updating them when necessary? If so, what are the drivers of this successful policy integration?

2. Project Performance:

- a. Over 50 KM officials attended a Project Management Institute (PMI) training in year two of KCI. The objectives of the PMI training were:
 - Adapting project management principles and techniques for use in actual project implementation.
 - Defining and managing critical roles in projects (customers, solution providers, project managers, upper management).
 - Defining implementation strategy according to a vision and structuring the strategy as an action plan.
 - Creating a methodology that is flexible, efficient, and replicable.
 - Developing usable, practical and multi-faceted project plans, and conducting: mission analysis, critical path methods, effort and cost forecasts, change control procedures, project status controls, and effective communication and documentation.
 - Planning quality management systems (reviewing, auditing, testing, and monitoring processes).
 - Accurate project planning and forecasting to avoid arbitrary deadlines and inaccurate budgets.
 - Integrated problem solving instead of politically driven decision-making and/or unsustainable quick fixes.
 - Evaluating technical and non-technical project risks.
 - Examining reasons for project delays.
 - Gathering project data efficiently to monitor and evaluate project implementation.
 - Efficient use of project management tools.
 - Preparing concise status reports.

In addition, many of the trainings mentioned above under CLIN 1 included skills helpful to proper project management. Have KM officials demonstrated the knowledge and skills necessary to independently and successfully⁴² complete a full cycle of government project implementation? What are KM’s strengths and weaknesses regarding project management?

⁴² “Successfully” should be understood in the context of Afghanistan. For the purposes of this evaluation, it can be roughly defined to mean: (1) the project was completed, with the end result being more or less what was originally intended; (2) the proper steps in project management and implementation were generally followed; and (3) corruption and delays may exist, however, they are better than commonly acceptable standards in Afghanistan.

- b. KM yearly revenue has increased greatly during KCI implementation, more than doubling in just two years. During the reform period to which KCI contributed, how much of KM's revenue has come from one-off actions, such as one-time business license fees or the Municipality selling land, and how much is reliable yearly revenue, such as safayi taxes? What are the most promising opportunities for KM to further expand revenue collection in a sustainable manner?

3. Future assistance considerations:

- a. What additional reforms have the highest likelihood of increasing economic growth in Kabul (streamlined business registration, improved zoning, service delivery improvements, etc.), and which KM can affect?

V. METHODOLOGY

The evaluation team will be responsible for developing an evaluation strategy and methodology that include a mix of qualitative and quantitative data collection and analysis approaches. The methodology will be presented as part of the draft work plan as outlined in the deliverables below and included in the final report. The evaluation team will have available for their analysis a variety of program implementation documents and reports. Methodology strengths and weaknesses should be identified as well as measures taken to address those weaknesses.

The suggested methodology should include, but is not limited to:

- a) Key interviews with USAID/Afghanistan's ODG Staff;
- b) Interviews with the Mayor and other municipal officials;
- c) Interviews with key KM staff;
- d) Interviews with KCI staff;
- e) Interviews and focus groups with selected constituents; and
- f) Consultations with other donors.

Kabul Municipality consists of a central administration and 22 administrative districts which KCI covered. The evaluation team is required to interview and conduct focus group discussions at central administration and in at least 50% of district administrations.

VI. EXISTING PERFORMANCE INFORMATION SOURCES

The consultants will review the following documents:

- a) Statements of work
- b) Work plans
- c) Quarterly reports
- d) Annual reports
- e) PMP and other M&E documents
- f) GIRoA performance data (if available)

All data collected and presented in the evaluation report must be disaggregated by gender and geographically, where applicable.

VII. TEAM COMPOSITION

The evaluation team shall consist of two independent international experts (with one serving as the team lead and primary coordinator with USAID) as well as two Afghan experts, one of whom can also serve as an interpreter. The international experts should be senior-level evaluation analysts specialized in areas such as public management with expertise and knowledge of Afghanistan’s local governance and political situation. The Afghan experts should have experience with governance programming in Afghanistan and monitoring and evaluation. All International experts must be fluent in English and have strong writing skills. The Afghan experts should also be proficient in English, Dari, and Pashto.

USAID requires all team members to provide a written disclosure of any possible conflict of interests.

VIII. EVALUATION SCHEDULE

This evaluation should begin o/a January 2013 and be completed by February 2013. The estimated Level of Effort (LOE) is 30 days for the entire evaluation, of which at least 26 days LOE should be spent in Afghanistan. The evaluation team is authorized to work six days per week while in country.

A presentation of findings will be delivered to USAID staff before the consultants depart Afghanistan and a draft report will be submitted to USAID for comment the day of the presentation. USAID shall have five days to provide comments to the consultants, who will incorporate responses into the final report.

Activity	LOE for Expat Team Leader	LOE for Expat Evaluation Specialist	LOE for two Afghan Evaluation Specialists
Document review, work plan, draft questions, data analysis plan, suggested list of interviewees, finalized questions for the survey	4	4	
Travel to/from Afghanistan	4	4	
Meetings with USAID	1	1	2
Interviews in Kabul	10	10	26
Data analysis, preliminary report and presentation to USAID	4	4	8
Draft final report	3	3	6

Exit brief and presentation	1	1	2
Final report	2	2	
One-page brief preparation	1	1	6
Totals	30	30	50 (25 each)

IX. USAID MANAGEMENT

The evaluation team will officially report to the Office of Program and Project Development (OPPD). From a technical management perspective, the evaluation team will work closely with Cael Savage, the Contracting Officer Representative, David Stonehill, the alternate Contracting Officer Representative, and Leslie Schafer, the USAID Governance Team Leader. In order to maintain objectivity, all final decisions about the evaluation will be made by OPPD’s M&E Unit.

X. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS AND DELIVERABLES

A. DESCRIPTION AND TIMELINE OF DELIVERABLES

1. **In-briefing:** Within 48 hours of arrival in Kabul, the evaluation team, will have an in-brief meeting with USAID/Afghanistan’s OPPD M&E unit and ODG for introductions; presentation of the team’s understanding of the assignment, initial assumptions, evaluation questions, public perception survey instrument (if required) discussion of initial work plan; and/or adjust SOW if necessary.
2. **Evaluation Work Plan:** Prior to their arrival in-country, the evaluation team shall provide a detailed initial work plan to OPPD’s M&E unit and ODG, and a revised work plan three days after the in-briefing. USAID will share the revised work plan with GIRoA for comment, as needed, and will revise accordingly. The initial work plan will include (a) the overall evaluation design, including the proposed methodology, data collection and analysis plan, and data collection instruments; (b) a list of the team members indicating their primary contact details while in-country, including the e-mail address and mobile phone number for the team leader; and (c) the team’s proposed schedule for the evaluation. The revised work plan shall include the list of potential interviewees, sites to be visited, and evaluation tools.
3. **Mid-term Briefing and Interim Meetings:** Hold a mid-term briefing with USAID on the status of the assessment including potential challenges and emerging opportunities. The team will also provide the Contracting Officer’s Representatives for SUPPORT II and KCI with periodic written briefings and feedback on the team’s findings. Additionally, a weekly 30 minute phone call with OPPD’s M&E unit and the ODG Governance Team Leader will provide updates on field progress and any problems encountered.

4. **PowerPoint and Final Exit Presentation** to present key findings and recommendations to USAID. To be scheduled as agreed upon during the in-briefing, and five days prior to the evaluation team's departure from Kabul. A copy of the PowerPoint file will be provided to the OPPD M&E unit prior to the final exit presentation.
5. **Draft Evaluation Report:** Shall be consistent with the guidance provided in Section XII below. Length of the report: not to exceed 50 pages, exclusive of Annexes in English, using Times New Roman 12 point font, 1.15 line spacing, consistent with USAID branding policy. The report will address each of the issues and questions identified in the SOW and any other factors the team considers to have a bearing on the objectives of the evaluation. Any such factors can be included in the report only after consultation with USAID. **The draft evaluation report per the below format will be submitted by the evaluation team leader to OPPD's M&E unit 24 hours in advance of the exit briefing for review and comments by USAID. USAID's M&E unit and ODG office will have ten calendar days in which to review and comment and OPPD's M&E unit shall submit all comments to the evaluation team leader.**
6. **Final Evaluation Report** will incorporate final comments provided by the M&E unit. USAID comments are due within ten days after the receipt of the initial final draft. The final report should be submitted to the OPPD M&E unit within three days of receipt of comments by the evaluation team leader. All project data and records will be submitted in full and shall be in electronic form in easily readable format; organized and fully document for use by those not fully familiar with the project or evaluation; and owned by USAID and made available to the public barring rare exceptions.
7. **One-page briefer** on key qualitative and quantitative findings for each municipality is included in the evaluation's scope—to be given to the appropriate municipal government, provincial government, and/or GIROA representative(s), so that they have the opportunity to review evaluation findings and share them with the larger community. Each briefer shall be translated in Dari and/or Pashto. Each briefer will be reviewed by the OPPD M&E unit and ODG prior to distribution.

A. FINAL REPORT FORMAT

The evaluation report shall include the following:

1. **Title Page**
2. **Table of Contents (including Table of Figures and Table of Charts, if needed)**
3. **List of Acronyms**
4. **Acknowledgements or Preface (optional)**
5. **Executive Summary (3-5 pages)**
6. **Introductory Chapter**
 - a. A description of the project evaluated, including goals and objectives.

- b. Brief statement on purpose of the evaluation, including a list of the main evaluation questions.
 - c. Brief statement on the methods used in the evaluation such as desk/document review, interviews, site visits, surveys, etc.
 - d. Explanation of any limitations of the evaluation—especially with respect to the methodology (e.g., selection bias, recall bias, unobservable differences between comparator groups, etc.)—and how these limitations affect the findings.
- 7. Findings:** This section should describe the findings, focusing on each of the evaluation questions.
- 8. Conclusions:** This section should include value statements drawn from the data gathered during the evaluation process. It should also reference how any limitations affect the conclusions.
- 9. Recommendations:** This section should include actionable statements for ongoing programming. It should also include recommended future objectives and types of activities based on lessons learned.
- 10. Annex**
- a. Evaluation Statement of Work
 - b. Places visited; list of organizations and people interviewed, including contact details.
 - c. Evaluation design and methodology.
 - d. Copies of all tools such as survey instruments, questionnaires, discussions guides, checklists.
 - e. Bibliography of critical background documents.
 - f. Meeting notes of all key meetings with stakeholders.
 - g. “Statement of Differences”
 - h. Evaluation Team CV’s

B. REPORTING GUIDELINES

- The evaluation report should represent a thoughtful, well-researched and well-organized effort to objectively evaluate what worked in the project over the given time period, what did not, and why.
- Evaluation reports shall address all evaluation questions included in the statement of work.
- The evaluation report should include the statement of work as an annex. All modifications to the statement of work, whether in technical requirements, evaluation questions, evaluation team composition, methodology, or timeline need to be agreed upon in writing by the OPPD M&E unit.
- Evaluation methodology shall be explained in detail and all tools used in conducting the evaluation such as questionnaires, checklists and discussion guides will be included in an annex in the final report.
- Evaluation findings will assess outcomes and impact on males and females, and data will be disaggregated by gender, age group, and geographic area wherever feasible.
- Limitations to the evaluation shall be disclosed in the report, with particular attention to the limitations associated with the evaluation methodology (selection bias, recall bias, unobservable differences between comparator groups, etc.).
- Evaluation findings should be presented as analyzed facts, evidence, and data and not based on anecdotes, hearsay or the compilation of people's opinions. Findings should be specific, concise and supported by strong quantitative and/or qualitative evidence.
- Sources of information, including any peer-reviewed or grey literature, will be properly identified and listed in an annex.
- Recommendations will be supported by a specific set of findings. They will also be action-oriented, practical, and specific, with defined responsible parties for each activity.

ANNEX II: SCHEDULE OF MEETINGS

No.	Date	Organization	Name	Title	Phone	Email
1	Feb-21-2013	Tetra Tech (KCI)	Brad Baxter	Chief of party	0798 302 262	bbaxter@kci-tetrattech-ard.com
2		Checchi	Hoppy Mazier	Chief of party	0797 324 412	hmazier@hecchiconsulting.com
3	Feb-24-2013	Tetra Tech (KCI)	George McDonald White	Deputy chief of party	0796 148 492	gwhite@kci-tetrattech-ard.com
4	Feb-25-2013	Tetra Tech (KCI)	Kevin Stupay	DCOP/Operation	0798 316 378	kstupy@kci-tetrattech-ard.com
5	Feb-23-2013	Municipality	Eng.MohamadAslamAkrami	Deputy Mayor	020 210 1352	akrami-ja@yahoo.com
6	Feb-24-2013	Municipality	Diploma.Eng.M.YasinNawandish	Mayor	0799 222 244	nawandish@km.gov.af
7		Checchi	Malcolm J. Odell	Team leader (LARA)	0790 270 319	malcodell@verizon.net
8	Feb-26-2013	Tetra Tech (KCI)	Mustafa Aslamy	Adviser to Chief of Party	0796 00 24 48	maslamy@kci-tetrattech-ard.com
9		Tetra Tech (KCI)	Jos Bokkelkamp RA	Municipal Finance Adviser	0793 206 038	jbokkelkamp@kci-tetrattech-ard.com

10	Feb-28-2013	Tetra Tech (KCI)	Mohamad Fahim Khalid	Management Analyst	0796 300 785	fkhalid@kci-tetratech-ard.com
11	Feb-25-2013	Tetra Tech (KCI)	Farkhonda Sammay	Gender Director	0799 571 023	Fsaamy@kci-tetratech-ard.com
12	Feb-25-2013	USAID/Afghanistan	Stonehill, David	Contracting Officer Representative		dstonehill@USAID.gov
13	Feb-25-2013	USAID/Afghanistan	Lubin, Zaks	M&E Officer		zlubin@USAID.gov.af
14	Feb-26-2013	Municipality	Mohammad Yasin "Hellal"	Deputy Director, Policy & Coordination		eng.yasin@yahoo.com
15	Feb-26-2013	Municipality	Abdul Ahad "Wahid"	Deputy Mayor/Technical		archwahid@hotmail.com
16	Feb-26-2013	Kabul municipality	Gh. Mohanad Noristani	District Manager(2)	0700 207 174	
17	March-3-2013	USAID contractor KCI	Mohamad Lateeftotakhil	Senior Revenue Support Adviser	0770 157 176	totakhil@gmail.com
18	Feb-28-2013	USAID contractor KCI	Seth Eden	Project Manager	0798 316 356	seth.eden@tetretech.com
19	Feb-27-2013	Municipality	Eng. Kishan Singh	District Manager (5)	0700 030 450	

20	Feb-28-2013	Municipality	Eng Rabani Paygham	District (5)	0700 180 624	
21	Feb-23-2013	Municipality	Eng Khoghmanulomi	Deputy Mayor of Kabul	0799 688 002	knulomi123@hotmail.com
22	March-2-2013	Kabul Municipality	Eng Mahdi	District Manager(6)	0799 472 415	
23	Feb-27-2013	Kabul Municipality	Eng Nasser	District Manager (2)	0700 030 450	
24	Feb-27-2013	Kabul Municipality	Eng Gh. Rabani Payman	District Manager (9)	0700 180 624	
25	Feb-25-2013	Kabul Municipality	Eng Wahdat	District Manager (10)	0772 928 275	
26	Feb-27-2013	Kabul Municipality	Eng Shenwari	District Manager (16)	0700 077 733	
27	March-2-2013	Kabul Municipality	Eng Hayatullah Rashedi	District Manager (15)	0700280713	
28	Feb-25-2013	Kabul Municipality	Sayed Hasanaqa Masomi	District Manager (1)	0799322697	
	March-2-	Kabul municipality	Eng Mohamadjan Sadiq	District Manager(7)	0799310493	

29	2013					
30	March-2-2013	Kabul Municipality	EngNawkhan	District Manager (12)		
31	March-2-2013	Kabul Municipality	EngArif	Property Department District (6)		
			EngMohamadNabi	Property Department District (6)		
			EngSediqi	Deputy District Manager (6)		
			Eng Mahdi	District Manager(6)	0799 472 415	
32	March-5-2013	Kabul Municipality	Najibuallah	Property Department District(16)		
	March-4-2013	Kabul Municipality	Eng Aziz Rahman	Pricing Department District(15)		
			EngHashmatullah	Construction Department D(15)		
			MohamadNeyazi	Revenue Department District (15)		
			SayedShafi	Admin Manager District(15)	0700280713	
33		Kabul municipality	EngMohamdHanif	Revenue Department District (15)		

34	Feb-27-2013	Kabul Municipality	EngNiazi	Property Department District(5)		
35	Fedb-26-2013	Kabul Municipality	MohamadNaser	Property Department District(5)		
36	Feb-26-2013	Kabul Municipality	EngMohamadShoja	Property department District (2)		
37	Feb-26-2013	Kabul Municipality	Hajji Amanullah	Property department District (2)		
38	March-2-2013	Kabul Municipality	RohullahNorzai	Policy Department District(12)		
			Mohamad Nor	Admin Department District (12)		
			Qodbuden	Property Department District (12)		
			Abdul Mir	Revenue Department District (12)		

39	March-7-2013	American University	Dr. Rod Monger	Spec Assist to President, AUAF		
40	March-10-2013	JICA	SosseinMohamadi	Human Resource Development	0778 777 738	Hossein.mohamadi@gmail.com
41	March-10-2013	Kabul Municipality	EngMohamadYasinHelal	Deputy Policy & Coordination	0799 331 085	
42	March-3-2013	Kabul Municipality	Dr. AhmadkamalQasimyar	HR Director General	0796 666 888	
43	March-5-2013	Kabul Municipality	AbdulWakilAtayee	Director of Revenue	0775 553 037	
44	March-5-2013	Kabul Municipality	EngAbTawabAhmadi	Director of Construction	0777 777 771	
45	March-4-2013	Kabul Municipality	Nesa Ahmad Habibi	Director of Sanitation	0799 025 099	
46	March-4-2013	Kabul Municipality	EngNasrinSabri	Director of Greenery	0202 203 523	
47	March-10-2013	Kabul Municipality	EngYasinNiyazi	Director of Planning	0700 222 797	
48	March-6-2013	Kabul Municipality	Abdul SatarAmini	Director of Internal Audit	0799 306 099	

49	March-6-2013	Kabul Municipality	Abdul QadirKhaksar	Legal Adviser	0700 212 390	
50	March-12-2013	Kabul Municipality	EngSayedHameedulah Miry	Director of Street		
51	March-11-2013	Kabul Municipality	Gh. JilaniHaidari	HR Department (FL)		
			MohamadMansor Aziz	ITC Department (FL)		
			MohamadDawood	Procurement Department (FL)		
			EngKhramuddinShahab	Architect (FL)		
			MohamadHanif	Investigation Department (FL)		
52	March-11-2013	Kabul Municipality	GhulamNabi Azad	Construction Department (PMI)		
			EngFaiz Ahmad Mirzada	Street and Maintenance Department (PMI)		
			MahtabudinAhmadi	District 17 (PMI)		
			MohamadMuzafar Pamir	Street and Maintenance Department (PMI)		
			Shah Rahimi	Engineering Department (PMI)		
			MohamadHanifBehbod	Engineering Department (PMI)		

			SayedMahmoodJawad	Policy & Coordination Department (PMI)		
53	March-11-2013	Kabul Municipality	EngZaki	Street and Maintenance Department		
54	March-11-2013	Tetra Tech (KCI)	MohamadQais	Electrical Engineer	0775 872 732	mqais@kci-tetratiech-ard.com
55	March-11-2013	Tetra Tech (KCI)	Abdu Bari Ibrahimi	Architect	0784 012 528	aibrahimi@kci-tetratiech-ard.com

ANNEX III: WORK PLAN; EVALUATION DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

This is an intermediate evaluation of the current three-year Kabul City Initiative project (KCI) that began in October 2010 and will end in September 2013. Tetra Tech ARD, a US-based development firm, is implementing the project. The project budget is \$45 million. The objectives of the project are to create effective, responsive, transparent, and accountable municipal governance in Kabul Municipality (KM), and provides technical assistance to the KM in order to: (1) increase the capacity of the Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) officials in the KM; (2) improve the delivery of municipal services and infrastructure development; and (3) increase municipal capacity to generate revenue and to account for revenue and expenditures.

This evaluation is part of the on-going United States Agency for International Development's (USAID) effort to increase accountability and to develop and define future new programs. This evaluation is intended to review and assess the current performance of the KCI program being implemented by Tetra Tech ARD in the KM.

Evaluation purpose

As noted in the Scope of Work (SOW), the “purpose of the evaluation is to study and document the successes and weaknesses of KCI, to provide recommendations, [and] to promote the effectiveness of municipalities in democratic governance at the sub-national level.”

More specifically, the evaluation should:

1. Evaluate the design, approach, implementation, and effectiveness of USAID's support for municipal capacity building, service delivery improvement, and revenue generation,
2. Distill lessons learned on project design and implementation to guide revisions of the work plan and current activities, and
3. Examine the scope, depth and effectiveness of all KCI interventions, particularly: training, overall capacity building, improved service delivery, citizen involvement in municipal governance, and economic development and revenue generation. This performance evaluation aims to review and evaluate the effectiveness of the program in achieving its goal, objectives, outcomes and expected results.

III. EVALUATION RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The SOW has specified three overarching questions to be investigated by the evaluation team:

1. Sustainability:

- a. How well has the capacity building components of the project transferred the skills and knowledge needed by the KM administrators to continue their duties after KCI support has ended? Which trainings have been most important for sustainability? And, what aspects of these trainings were responsible for this sustainability and why?
 - b. To what extent has the KM integrated and absorbed the policies, standard operating procedures (SOP) and terms of reference of the KCI developed Administrative Policy Manual into its daily operations? Does any municipal entity ‘own’ the policies and enforces and updates them when necessary? And, what are the motivations of the policy integration?
2. Project Performance:
- a. Some 50 municipal staff undertook project management training at the Project Management Institute (PMI) in the second year of the project. From this, have the officials demonstrated the knowledge and skills necessary to complete a full cycle of government project implementation? What are the KM’s strengths and weaknesses in project management?
 - b. During the period of KCI’s intervention, what is the breakdown of the KM’s revenue sources? How much came from one-off activities (land sales, property and business registration) and how much from recurrent revenue (taxes, *safayi* fees)? What are opportunities to sustainably expand revenue collection?
3. Future assistance considerations:
- a. What additional reforms have the highest likelihood of increasing economic growth in Kabul (streamlined business registration, improved zoning, service delivery improvements, etc.), and which KM can affect?
4. Gender:
- a. The evaluation will also review KCI’s capacity to coach KM into creating greater opportunity for gender mainstreaming in recruitment and service delivery.

I. EVALUATION METHODOLOGY

The evaluation team will be utilizing a mixed methodology approach, incorporating both qualitative and quantitative methods. For the former we will review pertinent KCI documents including, but not limited to, program design documents, grant agreement and its amendments, progress reports and other relevant documents. The team will conduct key informant interviews with KM staff, the KCI team, beneficiaries, focus groups, donors and other appropriate actors.

In addition, the team will participate in the Citizen’s Perception Survey that will assess the public’s perception to KM activities, awareness and effectiveness.

ANNEX IV: EVALUATION MATRIX

Evaluation Questions	Tools/Processes	Sources
Sustainability		
How well has the capacity building components of the project transferred the skills and knowledge needed by the KM administrators to continue their duties after KCI support has ended?	Document Review Key Informant Interviews Focus Groups	KCI, KM & other reports KM & other interviews Direct Observation
Which trainings have been most important for sustainability?	Document Review Key Informant Interviews Focus Groups	KCI, KM & other reports KM & other interviews Direct Observation
What aspects of these trainings were most responsible for this sustainability and why?	Document Review Key Informant Interviews Focus Groups	KCI, KM & other reports KM & other interviews Direct Observation
To what extent has the KM integrated and absorbed the policies, standard operating procedures and terms of reference of the KCI developed Administrative Policy Manual into its daily operations?	Document Review Key Informant Interviews Focus Groups	KCI, KM & other reports KM & other interviews Direct Observation
Does any municipal entity own the policies and enforces and updates them when necessary?	KCI, KM & other reports KM & other interviews Direct Observation	KCI, KM & other reports KM & other interviews Direct Observation
What are the motivations of the	Key Informant Interviews	KCI, KM & other reports KM & other interviews

policy integration?		Direct Observation
Project Performance		
Does the 50 KM staff who took PMI training have the skills necessary to implement a project through a full cycle?	Key informant interviews; document review	KCI, KM & other reports KM & other interviews Direct Observation
What are KM's strengths & weaknesses in project management?	KCI, KM & other reports KM & other interviews Direct Observation	KCI, KM & other reports KM & other interviews Direct Observation
During KCI, what is breakdown of KM revenue sources?	Document Review Key Informant Interviews	KCI, KM & other reports KM & other interviews Direct Observation
What is the breakdown between once-off and sustainable revenue modes?	Document Review Key Informant Interviews	KCI, KM & other reports KM & other interviews Direct Observation
What opportunities to increase sustainable revenue collection?	Document Review Key Informant Interviews	KCI, KM & other reports KM & other interviews Direct Observation
Future Assistance		
What additional reforms have the highest likelihood of	Document Review	All data sources

<p>increasing economic growth in Kabul (streamlined business registration, improved zoning, service delivery improvements, etc.), and which KM can affect?</p>	<p>Key Informant Interviews</p>	
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CONTACTS

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Tel: 0793-581-602

KCI EVALUATION DRAFT SCHEDULE

USAID/Afghanistan

KCI Evaluation

◀ Jan 2013 ~ February 2013 ~						Mar 2013 ▶
Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat
					1	2
3	4	5	6	7	8	9
10	11	12	13	14	15	16
17 Day1 Deploy	18 Day2 AR Dubai 1640h	19 Day3 Lv Dubai 1200h Ar 1515h	20 Day4 0900Checchi formalities 0945Checchi Security 1100 In briefing USAID w/RAMPUP 20+&3AID	21 Day5 1000h Meeting with ARD 1300 Team planning meeting	22	23 Day6 0900 Meeting with Mayor of Kabul, Asst Mayor, InfoCenter, ARD staff in KM Survey Ques. Due

24 Day7 1300 George/ARD 1500 Brad Baxter/COP	25 Day8 Meeting w/DGs inKM District 10 visit	26 Day9 AID call w/ Zack & Carlos Report progress	27 Day10 Fieldwork/data collection	28 Day11 Fieldwork/data collection	
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USAID/Afghanistan

KCI Evaluation

Draft Schedule

◀ Feb 2013 ~ March 2013 ~						Apr 2013 ▶
Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat
					1	2 Day12 Fieldwork/data collection
3 Day13 Fieldwork/data collection AID Meeting TBC	4 Day14 Fieldwork/data collection	5 Day15 Fieldwork/data collection	6 Day16 Fieldwork/data collection	7 Day17 Fieldwork/data collection	8	9 Day18 Fieldwork/data collection

◀ Feb 2013 ~ March 2013 ~						Apr 2013 ▶
Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat
10 Day19 Fieldwork/data collection	11 Day20 Fieldwork/data collection	12 Day21 Writing	13 Day22 Writing	14 Day23 Writing	15	16 Day24 DRAFT REPORT TO OPPD/M&E (24h before Exit)
17 Day25 EXIT BRIEFING	18 Day26 Revisions	19 Day27 Revisions	20 Day28	21 Day29	22 Day30 Deploy Dubai 0105h	23
24	25	26	27	28	29	30

ANNEX V: DATA COLLECTION INSTRUMENTS

EVALUATION QUESTIONS

4. SUSTAINABILITY:

- a. KCI's success will be defined, in part, by how well KM carries out KCI activities after the project closes out. KCI relies on capacity building (in the form of the trainings listed in the above description of CLIN 1) to convey the knowledge and skills needed by KM officials to continue activities without KCI assistance. Which of these trainings have the greatest impact on KM's ability to govern post-KCI? Are there any aspects or features of trainings explaining why they were helpful or not?
- b. KCI helped KM develop an Administrative Policy Manual, with a full set of municipal standard operating procedures and terms of reference for all KM departments and districts. KCI and KM implemented other policies, such as: Anti-corruption Policy, Construction Permit Policy, Building Standards Policy, Audit Policy, Municipality Fee Policy, City Property Lease Policy, Budget Policy, Financial Management Policy, Fiscal Management Policy, Recruitment Policy, Human Resources Policy, Nepotism Policy, Revenue Collection Policy, and Municipal Equipment Use and Maintenance Policy. To what extent has KM integrated the policies listed above into its daily operations? Does anyone (or any office) actively

“own” the policies, enforcing and updating them when necessary? If so, what are the drivers of this successful policy integration?

5. Project Performance:

- a. Over 50 KM officials attended a Project Management Institute (PMI) training in year two of KCI. The objectives of the PMI training were:
 - Adapting project management principles and techniques for use in actual project implementation.
 - Defining and managing critical roles in projects (customers, solution providers, project managers, upper management).
 - Defining implementation strategy according to a vision and structuring the strategy as an action plan.
 - Creating a methodology that is flexible, efficient, and replicable.
 - Developing usable, practical and multi-faceted project plans, and conducting: mission analysis, critical path methods, effort and cost forecasts, change control procedures, project status controls, and effective communication and documentation.
 - Planning quality management systems (reviewing, auditing, testing, and monitoring processes).
 - Accurate project planning and forecasting to avoid arbitrary deadlines and inaccurate budgets.
 - Integrated problem solving instead of politically driven decision-making and/or unsustainable quick fixes.
 - Evaluating technical and non-technical project risks.
 - Examining reasons for project delays.
 - Gathering project data efficiently to monitor and evaluate project implementation.
 - Efficient use of project management tools.
 - Preparing concise status reports.

In addition, many of the trainings mentioned above under CLIN 1 included skills helpful to proper project management. Have KM officials demonstrated the knowledge and skills necessary to independently and successfully⁴³ complete a full cycle of government project implementation? What are KM’s strengths and weaknesses regarding project management?

- b. KM yearly revenue has increased greatly during KCI implementation, more than doubling in just two years. During the reform period to which KCI contributed, how much of KM’s revenue has come from one-off actions, such as one-time business license fees or the Municipality selling land, and how much is reliable yearly revenue, such as safayi taxes? What are the most promising opportunities for KM to further expand revenue collection in a sustainable manner?

6. FUTURE ASSISTANCE CONSIDERATIONS:

⁴³ “Successfully” should be understood in the context of Afghanistan. For the purposes of this evaluation, it can be roughly defined to mean: (1) the project was completed, with the end result being more or less what was originally intended; (2) the proper steps in project management and implementation were generally followed; and (3) corruption and delays may exist, however, they are better than commonly acceptable standards in Afghanistan.

- a. What additional reforms have the highest likelihood of increasing economic growth in Kabul (streamlined business registration, improved zoning, service delivery improvements, etc), and which KM can affect?

Core questions Training Program

1. Achieved Results

- a. What were the most important results that you received from your training?
- b. Was the training you received relevant to your work/job?
- c. Did your training help you improve your job performance? In what ways?

2. Targeted results not Achieved

- a. Was there specific skills/information that you needed that were not part of training?
- b. Were the trainings competent in their subject matter/skills to give the training?
- c. Did you have expectations from the training that were not met?

3. Critical Lessons Learned, challenges and Performance Highlights

- a. What was the most important skills/information that you acquired in the training? Any skills/ information that you did not receive and needed to improve your job performance?
- b. Would you have done the training defiantly? How so?
- c. Do you have any other comments that could help KCI future assistance programs, to improve its training performance?

Questionnaire for Director Generals

Date:

Time:

Name of DG:

1. How long he has been in DG position?
2. What are your main responsibilities?
3. How many people do you supervise?
4. Have you had training with KCI?
5. How have they helped improve your department? Example: holding weekly meeting planning, people are better coordinated in the department, working together better, etc

6. Do have a copy of administrative manual? The SOP manual? TOR manual? Have you used them, during the last week? For what issue? If you think these standard references are useful, how long do you think it will take for them to be adopted throughout your department? And in the municipality?
7. How many of your staff had KCI trainings like computer, leadership, management, technical (budget, accounting and safety)?
8. How has this training improved the work in your department? Examples
9. Describe what you can see as the most important improvement that has taken place in the municipality, as result of KCI intervention?

10. The project is ending soon what are your most important recommendations for future USAID activities in the municipality?

District Administrative Questionnaire

Date:

Name:

District number:

Administrative name and number:

Time in job:

Staff supervised:

Number if women:

1. Has computer or access to computer?
2. Computer training yes or no? describe training
3. Has received training with KCI yes or no?
4. Type of training, Date, Result describe?
5. Training documentation / grad certificate etc.
6. How would he rate training out of ten?
7. Does he have training he need?
8. What more training does he need?
9. Has his capacity to do his job improved since training? Yes / No how
10. What more training would he like?
11. How many other people with his staff had training with KCI?
12. How are they using the training? Evidence
13. Is the district supported (needs fulfilled) by the municipality?

14. What projects have happened before?
15. What are the biggest problems for administrative?
16. District interaction with KCI?
17. What is perception of public to KM?
18. What else should we know, and your recommendation

Future leader Interview

Date:

Location: City or District:

Male/Female

Department

Job

1. How long working for KM?
2. Do you use computer in your work?
3. FL class 1st, 2nd or 3rd?
4. How were you selected (KCI, KM, I volunteered)?
5. What were the best two subjects you have took in FL?
6. From 1 to 5 (being highest), was the FI instruction practical or use to your work?
7. From 1 to 5 (being highest), how has the training improved your job skills?
8. From 1 to 5 (being highest), how able are you to use your FL training in your job?
9. Give an example on how you are able to do your job better because of FL?
10. From 1 to 5 (being highest), how well does your supervisor recognize the skills you learned in FL?
11. How satisfied are you with FL (not satisfied, satisfied, very satisfied)?
12. From 1 to 5 (being highest), to what extend do you think this training will help your career in future?
13. What future training do you require?

Comment

PMI INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE

1. Date
2. Location: City or District
3. Male/Female
4. Department
5. Job

6. How long working for KM
7. Do you use computer in your work- yes or no
8. What did you learned in general in this course?
9. How were you selected(KCI, KM- I volunteered)
10. What were the best two subjects you took in PMI?
11. From 1 to 5(being highest), how has the training improved your job skills?
12. From 1 to 5(being highest), how able are you to use PMI training in your job?
13. Give an example on how you are able to do your job better because of PMI?
14. When was the course?
15. How long was the course?
16. When did you attend PMI in Turkey?
17. From 1 to5 (being highest), to what extend do you think this training will help your career in the future?
18. What was the name of the course?
19. What future training do you require?
20. Comments and recommendations

PMI Telephone Questionnaire

1. Date 13/03/13
2. When did you attend the PMI training in Istanbul? _____
3. Were you in “class” 1, 2, 3?
4. What do you think was the most useful subject in the PMI course for your work? ____
5. Can you give any examples of how you have used what you learned in the PMI course?
6. Do you think that your boss appreciates what you have learned in PMI?
7. Has he said anything to you to indicate this? What? (Good job, let’s try this in our office? Etc....)
8. What was the most interesting/useful thing that you did or saw that you would like to bring back for Kabul Municipality? (Better traffic management, better financial management practices? Better trash collection? Less road dust?)
9. If there were a follow up of the PMI, what more would you want or need to learn?

Women’s Council Questionnaire

Date:

Name:

Position:

Department:

1. How long have you worked in Kabul Municipality?
2. Current responsibilities?
3. What training have you had with KCI?
4. How are women selected for training programs?
5. What was the most useful training?
6. Are you using it in your daily work? Example?
7. There are many courses for leadership training. How were they? How did it help in your daily work?
8. Has KCI helped with coaching with the Women's Council? How, example?
9. What will the Women's Council do when the KCI contract is over? How will they continue their work?
10. Are you experiencing any kind of harassment on the job? What can you do about it?

Questions for women and men trained by KCI

Date:

Name:

Position:

Department:

1. What training did you have?
2. How long was the training?
3. Was the training what you needed to do your work better? Example?
4. Are you using the training in your work now?
5. What kind of training do you need more?
6. Are you able to use information from KCI after the project ends?
7. What do you think about the Women's Council?
8. Comments.

REVENUE

- 1 How long in position?
 - 2 Duties?
 - 3 Background?
 - 1 Describe pre-KCI revenue system of KM.
 - 2 What funding did KM collect from pre KCI?
 - 3 Did KCI try to modify the actual revenue collection system?
 - 4 Describe the way that KM managed the revenue, depts.?
 - 5 How did KM control the funds?
 - 6 What was the accounting system?
 - 1 Describe the Revenue strategy of KCI.
 - 2 Go over goals targets, from baseline, training etc.
 - 1 Describe training program.
 - 2 Describe individual training activities.
 - 3 How were these developed with KM?
 - 4 How were KM and KCI different in their approaches?
 - 5 Who were the target students?
 - 6 How were the students selected?
 - 7 What was the breakdown between KM city and District students?
 - 8 Who did the training?
 - 9 Where was the training done?
 - 10 How was curriculum modified?
 - 11 Did it include audits?
 - 12 Did it include procurements?
-
- 1 Pre KCI, what were the KM revenue sources?
 - 2 What are they now?
 - 3 How is revenue targets collected?
 - 4 What the breakdown of revenue is from centralized to district collection?
 - 5 Describe KCI's approach to increase revenue.
 - 6 How receptive was KM to these activities?
 - 7 Describe the increase in revenue over the years.
 - 8 What access do we have to the real data or books from KCI to give confidence to the figures?
 - 9 Differentiate different revenue generations, if once off vs. sustainable.
 - 10 What is the %age for
 - 11 Pre-KCI, how did KM determine revenue targets for districts?
 - 12 Have KM lose revenue collection opportunities during the program?
 - 13 KM said it increased revenue 33%. How accurate is this?
 - 14 Districts express resentment that they are mandated to collect revenue,
but say they do not see any of it returned.

- Is this a valid impediment/disinvite to revenue collection?
- 15 Describe how you came up with new revenue models.
- 16 Did KM participate? Were they receptive?
- 17 Does KM have the enabling authority to implement?
- 18 What is the likelihood of implementing?

- Describe the process that went from training in basic skills to coordinated FMIS.
- 1
- 2 How responsive were the students?
- 3 Detail the FMIS.
- 4 Was it installed?
- 5 Who uses it?
- 6 Is it being used effectively?
- 7 How deeply has the FMIS been absorbed within KCI?
- 8 Does DM use it? DGs? Line managers?
- 9 Is the KM system in line with the MOF system.
- 1 How has KM capacity to collect revenue changed since KCI?
- 2 How has KM capacity to manage finance changes since KCI?
- 3 What changed in KM's ability to manage budgets?
- 4 Is KM now able to draft annual budgets?
- 5 Is KM now able to draft departmental budgets?
- Are other departments able to stream in data / work with Finance to effect budgets?
- 6
- 7 By KCI end, will KM be able to continue to maintain FMIS?
- How has the finance/revenue work streamed or interacted with other departments?
- 8
- 9 What is the institutional change of KCI finance work?
- 1 What is the transparency of the finance department?

Citizen Perception Survey Statistics, KCI / Kabul Excerpt

Excerpt from research of USAID/Afghanistan. Kabul City Initiative (KCI) “Citizens Perception Survey” Checchi and Company Consulting Inc. for USAID/Afghanistan, Services under Program and Project Offices for Results Tracking Phase-II (Support-II). May 2013

Q1. In the last three years, have there been any infrastructure/service improvements in your area/neighborhood? (For example Park, road, sewer cleaning, trash collection?)

Any infrastructure/service improvements in your area/neighborhood?	No. of Respondent	% of Respondent
YES	208	75
NO	19	7
Don't Know	45	16
Refused	4	2
Total	276	100

Q2. If answer is 'YES' in Q1, please tell us what type of improvement has taken place?

Type of Improvement has Taken Place	No. of Responses	% of Responses
Park was built	50	24
Road was improved /repaired	90	43
Sewers were cleaned	23	11
Trash collected regularly	40	19
Others	5	3
Total	208	100

Q3. Rank the following services which are the most important for your neighborhood. (Put 1 for most important, 2 for second most important, 3 for 3rd important and 4 for 4th important, 5 for not important).

Services	Number of Responses according to Importance					Total
	Most important	2 nd most important	3 rd most important	4 th most important	No importance	
Trash collection	152	76	26	22	-	276
Sewer cleaning	59	153	52	12	-	276
Parks	21	22	80	153	-	276
Roads	44	30	113	89	-	276

Q4. Who was responsible for this improvement?

Responsible for Improvement	No. of Responses	% of Responses
-----------------------------	------------------	----------------

Central Government	35	13
Local Community/neighborhood organization	8	3
Municipality	36	13
The Mayor of Kabul	136	49
District Administrator	33	12
Other	3	1
Don't know	25	9
Total	276	100

Q5. In the last three years, have you ever visited a District Manager's Office or the Municipality to seek help in solving a problem or making a complaint?

Ever visited District Manager's Office or Municipality?	No. of Responses	% of Responses
YES	71	26
NO	128	46
Can't remember	52	19
Refused	25	9
Total	276	100

Q6. Have the authorities resolved this problem or complaint for you?

Have the authorities resolved this problem or complaint?	No. of Responses	% of Responses
YES	46	17
Rarely	63	23
No	101	36
Refused	66	24
Total	276	100

Q7. Are you aware of the Citizen's Information Center (CIC) in the Municipality?

Are you aware of the Citizen's Information Center	No. of Responses	% of Responses
YES, I am very much aware of CIC	31	11
YES, I have only heard about CIC but not much aware of	68	25
NO, I am not at all aware of CIC	157	57
Refused	20	7
Total	276	100

Q8. If you have an administrative problem in the future, do you think you will use this center for help?

Will you use this center for help in future?	No. of Responses	% of Responses

YES, I do	122	45
NO, I don't	84	30
Can't say at the moment	53	19
Refused	17	6
Total	276	100

Q9. If answer is No in Q8, please explain why not?

Explain why not use this center for help in future	No. of Responses	% of Responses
Transport problem	11	13
Afraid of municipality	13	16
Municipal service is poor	38	45
Too far	15	18
Others	7	8
Total	84	100

Note: No. of responses exceeded 271 due to multiple response.

Q10. Have you ever attended community meetings held through the WakiliGozarsin the district offices or municipality to inform citizens of the City's efforts to improve revenue collection and service delivery levels and to discuss the municipal budget, infrastructure projects, solid waste collection, women's councils, and Safay'i payments, or any other?

Ever attended communities meeting for improve revenue, service delivery, and municipal budget discussions?	No. of Responses	% of Responses
Yes, regularly	8	3
Yes, but rarely	49	17
No	184	67
Refuse	35	13
Total	276	100

Q11. If answer is YES in Q10, please tell us where was this meeting held?

Where meeting was held	No. of Responses	% of Responses
The district office	29	51
The municipality	9	16
Others (mosque, private home, elders home)	19	33
Total	57	100

Note: No. of responses exceeded 271 due to multiple response

Q12. In general, how well do you think that the Kabul Municipality is doing its job to provide public services to the city?

How well Kabul municipality doing its job	No. of Responses	% of Responses
Excellent (Outstanding)	22	8
Good (High Standard)	28	10
Fair (Acceptable standard)	120	44
Poor (non- acceptable)	60	22
Don't know	41	15
Refuse	5	1
Total	276	100

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ANNEX VII: MEETING NOTES

MEETING MINUTES

MAYOR AND DEPUTY MAYOR

Date: February 23, 2013

Location- Kabul Municipality

Notes by- ShabnamSayeed and Burhan Kamal

Subject: introduction meeting to mayor and his deputies

Participants: His Excellency Mohammad YounisNawandsih (Kabul Mayor)

Robert Brandstetter (EVALUATION TEAM LEADER)

DREW GILMOUR (EVALUATION MEMBER)

BRAD BAXTER (KCI CHIEF OF PARTY)

Mustafa Aslamy (Advisor to chief of party)

SHABNAM SAYEED (EVALUTION MEMBER)

BURHAN KAMAL

(EVALUATION MEMBER)

The delegation who as teamed by above people from KCI and evaluation team in mayor office around 9:00AM and after introduction to the mayor he has mentioned that KCI project is running good and have some nice programs and they mentioned that programs that they have designed with KCI projects. However, the program is good but not big as promised in the beginning of KCI project three years ago.

The project activities were including below:

- Capacity building to Kabul Municipality staff and districts
- Leadership training to both male and female
- Road construction what KCI was also involved in it.
- Building and construction 5 parks and planted tress
- KM planted around 2631000 trees that KCI was also playing a big part in it.

The mayor has also said that KCI has supported them in having a good computerized system of information about revenue and expenses and KCI has trained their staff on FMIS and project management that flew the staff to Turkey. Kabul municipality with his leadership has implemented 120 projects, 21 parks and 20 more are planned to be constructed this year and has built 340 KM of road all over Kabul and since he has joined the office the city pictures has changed and KCI has played a good rule in it. Kabul municipality has also built 5 new bridges in Kabul and has been evaluated and constructed according the need and the place requirements.

MEETING MINUTES

DEPUTY MAYOR, Finance

Date: February 23, 2013 Location- Kabul Municipality Notes by-
ShabnamSayed and Burhan Kamal

Subject: introduction meeting to mayor and his deputies

Participants: Professor Mohammad Islam Akrami Kabul Deputy Mayor

Robert Brandstetter Evaluation Team Leader

Drew Gilmour Evaluation Team

Brad Baxter KCI Chief of Party

Mustafa Aslamy Advisor to Chief of Party

ShabnamSayeed

Evaluation Team

Burhan Kamal

Evaluations Team

The delegation meet the deputy mayor professor Mohammad Islam Akrami just after the meeting the mayor and Mr. Brad did the introduction and started with the discussion from the trip, KCI has taken the deputy mayor and other staff to California and San Diego from a study tour and visit all other mayors and see their working environment and the day to day activity so that they could duplicate the same in Afghanistan if required. The DM mentioned regarding financial trainings for KM staff done by KCI that had good outcome and Kabul has never had such a system and is placed in their offices that could give them an accurate calculation for their outcome. By support of FMIS system trained and installed by KCI project, KM could calculate their revenues which started and grow gradually from 25 million\$ to \$64 million and now they can have specific quantities data from their system daily on their revenue and expenditure on a click which was not in placed 3 years ago. However, the deputy mayor was not satisfied with the revenue and said we will have soon 3-4 billion in a year from safiayee, Business fee, some other cultural fee.

The other main key factors that KCI supported KM was the municipality law and several other policy and procedures, regulations editions and modify however, it was present from the past updated to new Kabul environment. If, the cooperation and hard work continues, it will have from 30 to 80 million in the coming three years which could count on good achievements to them. Kabul municipality is paying 45% of the revenue as additional or bonus salary to the staff, do procurements, and purchase oil, administrative work and maintenance. On the other hand 55% of the revenue goes to the city services and maintenance. The system is in placed by KCI and whoever get KM leadership will run the same system accurately.

Recommendations from deputy mayor:

- Future corporation and continue assistance
- FMIS and Revenue improvement and need support for further support
- Capacity building outside the country

CITIZEN INFORMATION CENTER

After the meeting, the group visited the CIC (Citizen Information Center/Public information Center), which is responsible to lead people who have task to be done in each Kabul municipality department. They have a complete system for this working process that KCI have provided and as an example if anyone need to take pension of his father first he or she need to refer CIC than they will lead him to specific department. In each 3 month CIC have a short term of training for the staff of KM in their last training they had trained 13 persons for 3 months.

His team had successfully got the donors attention such as World Bank, USAID, Japanese and several others. at the same time USAID-KCI project started its work and had a good introductory meeting with 120\$M and the main objective of the project were capacity building, and beside that, there were other indicators such as construction of road, parks and sanitation activity and machinery hand over.

Brandstetter asked about KCI project success during the last three years and he replied that generally the project was very good and did a lot of capacity building trainings programs such as computer, database, management training, and future leadership trainings for 375 staff newly graduated student from university. At the beginning KCI has presented the project to KM and attract attention of KM management team and the project started with good cooperation between both parties.

The project also supported KCI to have a women council within the KC and it went successfully had gather around 15 female members and have did some small activity such as gathering and supported handicraft activities for females.

During the discussion, the DM was asked about the ability of KM to implement project cycles. He said that KM capacity has definitively improved. To aid discussion, the DM was asked to evaluated the timings it would take for KM to plan and build a park before the KCI project, now (during) and post KCI.

He said that before KCI, it would take up to three years to plan and build a park. He said that KCI's capacity building support and infrastructure funding has enabled his teams to accelerate the process to just six months. He says that once KCI leaves, it will take longer to build such a park, perhaps one year, and he attributes this mostly to the lack of financial resources as his team now has sharply improved technical capacity. KCI, he says, has had a permanent, positive effect on the ability of KM to implement projects.

The other answer that the deputy answer was, that KCI did a good project but was not sufficient as promised in the beginning and could have done more and more but day by day the interest of the KCI management got decreased slowly. KCI project has build 10 parks very well that KM is happy and thankful from but at the other hand, they planned and promised 10 more parks but now they are saying that due to fund luck will be able to build only 5 parks and will not be able to build it complete as other parks that did in Kabul city.

His recommendation was to do more and more capacity building project to the staff in central KM and also in districts and continue working with women council and request to have more

machineries such as for sanitation and garbage recycling and make green area as KM has a lot of lands for parks.

Notes by Robert Brandstetter

Meeting Notes

Deputy Mayor for Public works

26 February 2013 0800h

Public works

Prior to KCI there were no donors to the municipality.

Kabul very damaged

1st year of project had to show there was no corruption. Need a strong leadership in order to bring support of Intl Com. Build confidence in leadership of Kabul

JAICA has developed a 5 yr master plan for Kabul

They have planted more than a million trees.

KCI originally \$125k

375 recent graduates employed by muny. They know computers.

KCI gave out door play equipment for parks

Sanitation –taught how to drive

They can't completely do a development cycle by themselves.

Budget cut means they can't build all the planed parks, now only 5

KCI building credibility with the public; AID signs around, people appreciate that US has provide help for road, bridge etc.'

RECOS:

Capacity building,

Work with support of people?

Women's committee

Recycle plant for garbage

Assistance to parks

MEETING MINUTES

DEPUTY MAYOR (construction and technical)

Date: February 23, 2013 Location - Kabul Municipality Notes by – ShabnamSayeed

Subject: introductory meeting with deputy mayor responsible for construction and technical (Eng Wahid Ahad)

Participants: Eng Wahid Ahad deputy mayor, construction and technical

Robert Brandstetter evaluation team leader

ShabnamSayeed evaluation member

The delegation meets the second mayor after meeting the city service mayor. The meeting started with introduction and started explaining their activities. The project was interested in the beginning to infrastructure and capacity building and KCI was not able to provide the service as expected such as budget deduction and service quality provided by them not according the needs and wants of the staff.

The mayor has replied about how was KCI activity on capacity building, that was satisfactory and provided them with a good GIS center and also the project are designed by KCI are all good and now the employees are working now with computer and all the materials are digitalized. However, the 6 months trainings not sufficient as it is good only for introductive but would need more than one and half years for the trainings to have more knowledge and control of their tasks.

The mayor said that one of the road constructions was contracted with an unqualified private company that was then reconstructed with a good one by Kabul municipality.

Recommendations from him was as Afghanistan was destroyed completely, so the staff needs proper management trainings, Parks, and several other issues so that people of Kabul can have a good environment to live in. the trainings should all be high standard and long term so that staff could get full advantage of the trainings.

Notes by – Robert Brandstetter

Meeting Notes:

RHB, Shahman

26 February 2013 0930h

Mr. Abdul Ahad“Wahid”, Deputy Mayor/Technical [construction/building]

Been on job for 4 years.

He appreciates the efforts of KCI, but raised issue again about KCI promising \$120k and cutting back to \$45k

He was very pleased with GIS center that KCI developed. There was short term training, but this isn't enough. His staff has been introduced to computers and GIS system and this is a great achievement but now they need more.

The country needs everything; it is difficult to prioritize the needs, but they need infrastructure first.

PMI classes with qualified & certified instructors. Afghans need more focused training.

[He is a technocrat]

MEETING MINUTES

Director General of Construction Control

Date: March 5th, 2013 Location- Kabul Municipality Notes by- BurhanKAmal

Participants: TawabAhmadi Construction Control Director General

Drew Gilmour Evaluation Team

Burhan Kamal Evaluation Team

DG was Responsible for construction, road and park supervision and control during the implementation process or construction process.

- 60 staff are working under his supervision that covers admin and also engineers

- The department has got training on revenue, ICLD and FMIS short training from KCI and generally they are happy from the training provided by them but the impact of revenue and FMIS training is not so much on his department as they are not dealing with financial issues.
- The training such as computer and English ones improved their capacity and now they can work on the computer and write their application via computer.
- The director was not aware of any policy manual that has been started implementation in KM, however, the new policy has brought good changes in Human resource section, especially in hiring section which has made it faster and less paper work.
- 6 staff of his department got training in ICDL and 2 staff got training in leadership and himself got training in FMIS introductory section
- The staff are good now as previous to the training the staff was not able to do proper quality checking and proper controlling with documentation from the project side either construction or road renovation or park construction but now they can do it in a%age. However, the staff does not have machinery and technical equipments to do the quality checking the sites and it was requested if USAID could provide them as it will not cost a lot. However, they need more and more trainings on quality checking and monitoring and supervision of the construction side with good standard according to the plan provided by policy and plan department.
- KCI has done a lot of good improvements with in KCI the staff are trained in English and computer and build some good parks but requested if KCI takes in consideration in the future to have a balance view to all districts as they did a lot in one district but not so much in another one.
- Again he has requested and recommended for more parks in Kabul with balance view to all districts and provide the KM with good quality machines for quality checking
- KCI should have a project on sanitation or cleaning departments such as that provide several pilot projects to each district. That provide with plastic or garbage bins to each house and send vehicle to each house with a specific date and time once in a week and ask them to provide the garbage with this the people will have facility and also the cleaning culture will come back to Kabul.
- The other project would be cleaning of Kabul River and make blockage for people to not throw garbage and waste materials to the river as it is getting dirty day by day. Or have garbage recycling system

MEETING MINUTES

Director General of HR Department

Date: March 3, 2013

Location- Kabul Municipality

Notes by- ShabnamSayed

Participants:	Ahmad Kamal Qasimyar	Director General of HR
	Robert Brandstetter	Team Leader
	Shabnam Sayeed	Evaluation Team

Questions and Answers:

11. How long he has been in DG position?

One year and 10 months

12. What are your main responsibilities?

- Hiring new staff
- Shifting workers from one department to other departments
- Salary and retirement pension
- Attendance
- Keeping records and etc

13. How many people do you supervise?

25 people

14. Have you had training with KCI?

Yes I had much useful training with KCI like, HR management, directors training in American University, communication and relation training with media. And HR staff had the ICDL, future leaders, meeting management, Gender awareness and some other training.

15. What can you do differently now that you couldn't do before the KCI trainings? (What have you learn from KCI training)?

As an example I can say that before KCI management training I was not able to held weekly meetings with my HR staff but now I am able to do this and I have learn that these kind of meetings are very necessary for a department to make weekly plans and finding solution for problems that we will face.

16. Do have a copy of administrative manual? The SOP manual? TOR manual? Have you used them, during the last week? For what issue? If you think these standard references are useful, how long do you think it will take for them to be adopted throughout your department? And in the municipality?

As a point of me they are very efficient and useful for municipality, according to these manual and policies we could establish HR department before this, HR was working under Admin and Finance departments, the interesting thing for me is this that these policies helped us to make short our work procedures. And yes if these manuals are approved from attorney generals it will be very useful for municipality.

17. How many of your staff had KCI trainings like computer, leadership, management, technical (budget, accounting and safety)?

All of my 25 staff had these trainings

18. What is being done differently now, after the training, that you didn't do before the KCI intervention? How has this training improved the work in your department? Example
The capacity building really helped our staff and it was something new for KM and our staff and also the ICDL before these training our staff weren't able to use computer but now all of them are using computers and hopefully that all our of HR department staff have computers that KCI and other companies have been provide for us.
19. Describe what you can see as the most important improvement that has taken place in the municipality, as result of KCI intervention?

I will you give two examples, one is establishing of women council and the second one is two years ago one of our sanitation employee died in an accident but after safety trainings that KCI provided for 3000 of sanitation staff now the level of accidents with sanitation is declined and that is a big achievement for us.

20. The project is ending soon what are your most important recommendations for future USAID activities in the municipality?
- Long term of education and training program, and they should select capable people for these trainings after an examination.
 - Continuing of their program for a year.
 -

MEETING MINUTES

Director General of Policy and Coordination Meetings

Date: March 9, 2013 Location- Kabul Municipality Notes by- Burhan Kamal

Participants:	Mohammad Yasin Helal	deputy to the policy and coordination dept
	Drew Gilmour	Evaluation Team
	Burhan Kamal	Evaluation Team

Questions and Answers:

21. How long he has been in DG position?
8 years in this position and have worked in several others department
22. What are your main responsibilities?
- Planning, projecting, coordination with internal and external that include the donor such as KCI, World Bank, JICA, Turkish and Abu Dabi. He was also involve in KCI proposal and then went for bid in USA and won by Tetra tec.

- The main activity that the department doing are that collects suggestions and request from the districts for the coming year and categorized it up to 100 and then give the recommendations to the mayor after doing all the assessment, analyze from different perspectives such as need and problem solving. The presentation is given and approval and a formal request for resources and approval. After the approval is granted by mayor they start working on cost estimation, capacity either to implement by KM or grant as a sub-contractor and does the scheduling.
- The implementation is supported and coordinated with planning departments such as procurement, RFP and budget control and also monitoring

23. How many people do you supervise?

32 staff and 8 are female staff

24. Have you had training with KCI?

He had got training in Turkey from PMI, media and communications

25. How have they helped improve your department? Example: holding weekly meeting planning, people are better coordinated in the department, working together better, etc?

The trainings that are provided by KCI such as PMI, management, and communication and a very good example from PMI would be that he has changed a lot in policy and planning in 1392 years planning and especially about how to analyze, monitor, categorized and do the overall analyzing.

26. Do have a copy of administrative manual? The SOP manual? TOR manual? Have you used them, during the last week? For what issue? If you think these standard references are useful, how long do you think it will take for them to be adopted throughout your department? And in the municipality?

He was aware of the policy manual which was drafted by KCI and approved by the mayor, but he was not satisfied about policy as advising on policy and coordination is their main activity. Leadership from KCI was only dealing with the top management such as mayor, and deputy mayors. Also, he said that top management is only to approve the policy but the depth is all with the policy and coordination department which KCI was ignoring.

27. How many of your staff had KCI trainings like computer, leadership, management, technical (budget, accounting and safety)?

4 of his staff got ICDL training and he got only one training which was PMI

28. How has this training improved the work in your department? Examples

Project management, involve all the training tricks they have learned in policy and coordination, and risk management.

29. Describe what you can see as the most important improvement that has taken place in the municipality, as result of KCI intervention?

He praised the activity implemented by KCI, but first parks, than roads and then the capacity building provided by the trainings. The FMIS system was programs very wrongly for the mayor staff as it was trained for those staff that were not even able to work in Microsoft word and excel but were thought about FMIS.

30. The project is ending soon what are your most important recommendations for future USAID activities in the municipality?
- Middle level management, more trainings

MEETING MINUTES

Director General of Sanitation Department

Date: March 4, 2013 Location- ProzhaTaimani Notes by- ShabnamSayeed

Participants: Nesar Ahmad Ghor	Director General of Sanitation
Robert Brandstetter	Team Leader
ShabnamSayeed	Evaluation Team

Questions and Answers:

1. How long he has been in DG position?
7 years and 5 months
2. What are your main responsibilities?
 - Cleaning of the city
 - Cleaning of roads and drainages
 - Supplying water for houses
 - Carrying of garbage and trashes out of city and etc
3. How many people do you supervise?
I supervise 127 official staff, 9 women 120 men and 1100 sanitation staff.
4. Have you had training with KCI?
Yes I had much useful training with KCI like, management, leadership, finance and ICDL, safety trainings for my staff.
5. How have they helped improve your department? Example: holding weekly meeting planning, people are better coordinated in the department, working together better, etc?
The ICDL training for my staff was really useful and improved my department like now they are digitalizing the data and all of our forms are computerized now.
6. Do have a copy of administrative manual? The SOP manual? TOR manual? Have you used them, during the last week? For what issue? If you think these standard references

are useful, how long do you think it will take for them to be adopted throughout your department? And in the municipality?

Yes I am aware of these policies some of them approved but some of the policies are under a legal procedure and will be approve soon, they are very useful and efficient for an example I can say that to before these policies to hire someone in sanitation I needed to sign 17 times in different papers but these policies declined the procedure and I just sign 9 times to hire a person if these policies are approved I am sure that KM will use it for many years because it is according to new system.

7. How many of your staff had KCI trainings like computer, leadership, management, technical (budget, accounting and safety)?
35 official staff had ICDL and English training and more than 1000 sanitation have got the safety trainings.
8. How has this training improved the work in your department? Examples
These training really improved the ability of my sanitation staff and also admin staff now they are using computer and they computerize all their documents and forms so it shows a big improvements in my department.
9. Describe what you can see as the most important improvement that has taken place in the municipality, as result of KCI intervention?
Before KCI the working procedure was based on, an old system but with digitalization and using computer in each department now the system is changed in to a new system, like FMIS for finance now they are able to give a accurate amount of revenue and budget.
10. The project is ending soon what are your most important recommendations for future USAID activities in the municipality?
 - Continuing of this project with Kabul municipality as we are a back warded country and we need help.
 - Providing equipments for sanitation department
 - Providing more professional trainings

Notes by- Robert Bardstetter

Meeting Notes_ Sanitation Department

Name: Nesar Ahmad Habibi

Date: 4 March 1030h to 1230h

7.5 years in position. He is an experienced and educated man.

Most important training, from his point was safety training for 2000 workers.

He has had training in leadership, media, finance in AmUniv.

He has overseen the digitalization of his staff. All in a data base now.

Sanitation will be the first department in KM to incorporate the digital ID system for attendance. This will be a major innovation.

DG going on study trip to US.

He gives hundreds of interviews and participates in many media events. He said he learned much useful information in the media training provided by KCI. How to reply to media? How to hold a press conference?

Municipal staff is 7,000; Sanitation staff is half of all employees—

3500 sanitation workers, 400 transport workers

127 permanent staff/9women; 11

He is aware of the Admin Policy Manual, TOR, SOP, etc. He has used some of the new procedures to pare down some past administrative procedures—for hiring and for purchase of fuel. Down from 16 to 9 papers/signatures.

He was on committee that wrote the Manual. 49 policy papers and SOPs, Tors. NO ONE SEEMS TO HAVE BOUGHT INTO THE IDEA OF IMPLEMENTING THE POLICY MANUAL.

More public information lessens corruption.

The budget he gets from AID is more than the gets from MINFN??

People need backup training lest they forget.

Sanitation has training center. We visited and it is in full operation. There were maybe a dozen people

DG insists that documents submitted to him by staff be written and copied on a computer. He showed us a request for something by hand and his note returning it telling the sender that it must be typed.

His sanitation staffs have received a lot of training and are becoming competent. He has digitalized the personnel records, they will be introducing the finger attendance record keeping, the department has a young MIS officer.

The department has received 20 laptops from KCI, all are being used.

There are 3 KCI embeds in Sanitation. All three are bright, young men. One has become an advisor to the DG. Teaches him English and computer. Sends him email to make him read English and become used to using computer. Very smart tactic.

Department is digitalizing finance and transport, as well as personnel.

Every Monday the department has a management meeting. All the districts send representatives.

Administration

Public Relations

Protocol Dept.

MEETING MINUTES

Director General of Policy and Coordination

Date: March 10, 2013 Location- Kabul Municipality Notes by- Burhan Kamal

Participants:	Eng Agha Khan Zakhil	Director General
	Drew Gilmour	Evaluation Team
	Burhan Kamal	Evaluation Team

Questions and Answers:

1. How long he has been in DG position? Since 3 years as admin, finance director
2. What are your main responsibilities?
He is dealing with all admin, finance, procurement and logistical work for all the districts and central office.
3. How many people do you supervise?
He is supervising 289 staff and 40 of the staff are female including some engineers
4. Have you had training with KCI?

They have got training on FMIS and ICDL and executive leadership training from AUAF.

5. How have they helped improve your department? Example: holding weekly meeting planning, people are better coordinated in the department, working together better, etc?

The director directly and specifically mentioned 30% improvement in FMIS systems and 20 in ICDL trainings and also got some capacity training and financial management training and requires more to be trained on the mentioned areas, so that deal with careful and a proper way.

6. Do have a copy of administrative manual? The SOP manual? TOR manual? Have you used them, during the last week? For what issue? If you think these standard references are useful, how long do you think it will take for them to be adopted throughout your department? And in the municipality?

The policy administrative manual is good but, as their terms of reference requires that all the manual should be dealt by them or at least consult with them is not done by KCI and he was not happy from this act of KCI. As KCI was only dealing with mayor and two deputy mayors and were not having consultancy or advice from that department.

7. How many of your staff had KCI trainings like computer, leadership, management, technical (budget, accounting and safety)?

They praised the ICDL and FMIS training and were happy 30% from FMIS system and lecturers and said that they also provide on the job training from KCI as well on FMIS system.

8. How has this training improved the work in your department? Examples

The work has been fast and improved a lot as all the documents are now computerized and can get any kinds of reports in hours.

9. Describe what you can see as the most important improvement that has taken place in the municipality, as result of KCI intervention?

The overall activities of KCI were good and did a lot on capacity building but had a lot of mistakes despite being international organizations and also there were not support on inventory system as they were handing over the equipments and districts without informing or hand over to the main office as his office. Also, they were not respecting the national language and provided some reports in English.

10. The project is ending soon what are your most important recommendations for future USAID activities in the municipality?

The recommendation from him are that should bring good experts who had good understanding of law and policy and respect the national law of the country and better knowledge of the specific field that he/she is hired. The national and international experts should have specific expertise in the field they are hired.

Yes I am aware of these policies but they are not approved yet so we are not using it in our department. And yes if these manuals are approved from attorney generals it will be very useful for municipality and departments.

7. How many of your staff had KCI trainings like computer, leadership, management, technical (budget, accounting and safety)?

All of my 50 official staff had ICDL and English training and 500 of greenery staff have taken safety training and some other agricultural trainings like drafting pruning.

8. How has this training improved the work in our department? Examples

These training really improved the ability of my greenery staff now they know how to draft trees better hoe to prune trees and how to take good care of planets and flowers for an example before we had problem with rats and tree's insects but with help of KCI and doctor Sabory we are able to make a kind of medicine for protecting these trees against rats and insects.

9. Describe what you can see as the most important improvement that has taken place in the municipality, as result of KCI intervention?

Before KCI training no one was using computer in their office but now most of them are using and also women council I am a member of women council and that is a big improvement in KM now there is a council which protects women's right and solve their problems.

10. The project is ending soon what are your most important recommendations for future USAID activities in the municipality?

- Long term of agricultural training for greenery staff.
- Providing some agricultural equipment.
- Continuing of this project with Kabul municipality.

Notes by- Robert Brandstetter

Meeting Notes_DG Greenery

Name: Eng. NasrinSabri

Date: 4 March 0900h

Lady DG/ Studied agriculture, only woman DG

52 permanent Staff; 700 contract

Training—staff had KCI technical forestry training—tree planting, pruning, watering, etc.

KCI supplied graduates of the course with a tool kit with supply of necessary tools, plus shoes, green uniform, goggles, etc.

DG has had training but was reluctant to talk about it.

Learned how to control staff, manage office, etc

She now has attendance lists in regulation books

Watering of plants is now kept with a computer record

Administrative Policy Manual DG is aware of the manual, but not using it. Until the manual is approved, she will not use it.

Staff training: 50 office staff has had training.

The department had 3 laptops given by KCI.—one was on desk of the DG, deputy had one, and the operator each had one. There was old computer that was from Habitat which being used by the operator. The operator was younger and computer literate before he started working.

DG was a member of the Women's Council. She was very supportive and happy that the council supported Women's Day and distributed roses to women. She did however, comment about the lack of toilets for women. The Council has supported women who have family problems, problems with their boss. Women can seek the advice of other women in the office. DG is happy with the council president and especially proud that the women elected the president and vices in a free, open and democratic election. This was a precedent for women.

She and one other woman are permanent employees. There are 17 contract women who are tailors, and sew the green uniforms for the greenery staff.

KCI also helped with CIC. She thought that this was a good innovation. Staff of CIC came to the department and met with employees to explain how to use the Center.

As a practical example of what she learned in a leadership class, she said that she showed her leadership by organizing the arrival of a department tanker truck to a market fire in 15 minutes. She was praised by the mayor.

She was not a very impressive or dynamic woman, although being the only DG is rather impressive.

MEETING MINUTES

Director General of Policy and Coordination

Date: March 10, 2013 Location- Kabul Municipality Notes by- Burhan Kamal

Participants: Engineer Mohammad Yasin Niazi Planning director

Drew Gilmour

Evaluation Team

Burhan Kamal

Evaluation Team

Questions and Answers:

1. How long he has been in DG position? The director have been working in Kabul municipality since 29 years such as running the planning department, master planning department and since one year as head of planning department/
2. What are your main responsibilities?
Planning, city services, survey field report, GPS system and mappings, master planning, planning implementations, building , structure, networking and engineering's, streets,
3. How many people do you supervise?
He is supervising around 152 engineers and 20 are females
4. Have you had training with KCI?
All of the staff has got trainings and the most important were the ICLD and AutoCAD trainings.
5. How have they helped improve your department? Example: holding weekly meeting planning, people are better coordinated in the department, working together better, etc?
KCI has did a lot in building the capacity of the Kabul municipality such as in GIS, and handed over some kinds of equipments which helped them a lot on it and they have build their relationships with other department which, there was but build it more strongly and made each ones activity more specific and clear. And the other main training and improvement have learned from KCI was how to do Topography, and they work are much faster and have more coordination mechanism with themselves.
6. Do have a copy of administrative manual? The SOP manual? TOR manual? Have you used them, during the last week? For what issue? If you think these standard references are useful, how long do you think it will take for them to be adopted throughout your department? And in the municipality?
They have the manual and it is working, however, the manual is made in a general way so that they should make it more specific according their department or sometimes they have added something which is not in their terms of reference and belong to other departments. The manual is not specific so it needs to be more specific and fit the departmental requirements.

7. How many of your staff had KCI trainings like computer, leadership, management, technical (budget, accounting and safety)?
All the staff have got either any kind of trainings from KCI as such that 14 of the staff have got leadership trainings but however they need long terms trainings than short terms to go more in details and depth so that staff knows how to do it sooner and clearly.
8. How has this training improved the work in your department? Examples
As example the KCI project has helped them doing the GPS, GIS survey and as before the structure and architectural work were by hand but now they are doing it by computers and doing it much fast then before.
9. Describe what you can see as the most important improvement that has taken place in the municipality, as result of KCI intervention?
In general the KCI project was good and did a lot of good capacity building work and trainings and also did a good donor coordination meetings organized and from 60% - 70% improvements in KM and building some parks and did some support to sanitations departments.
10. The project is ending soon what are your most important recommendations for future USAID activities in the municipality?
In recommendation he has mentioned that be they provide them more training on planning, and train the staff on how to do street work and plan and cost estimate the bridges as his staff is not able to plan the bridges. Technical Structure trainings to the staff, and as their normal activity they do get the request and involve that in annual plan and get the approval from the mayor or deputy mayors and then do the assessment, and then it goes to policy department which do financial and all other assessment and surveys and get the approval from the mayor for financial and starting. The planning department than do the technical and see if all is going according the master plan proposed at the beginning.

MEETING MINUTES

Director General of Revenue Department

Date: March 5th, 2013 Location- Kabul Municipality Notes by- ShabnamSayeed

Participants: AbdullWakilAttai Revenue department director

 Drew Gilmour Evaluation Team

 Burhan Kamal Evaluation Team

The major activities conducted by his department are to collect revenue, control the district offices revenue section and provide them with monthly planning. He has 54 staff of which 6 are female staff. The director has got revenue reporting system and future leadership training from KCI and felt to be a good training provided by them. 4 staff got FMIS training from KCI, and now they can do good management, accounting in their related departments and skilled the training as a very good training provided by KCI.

KCI has trained 12 staff in ICDL and provided them with 5 new laptops and also grade the training as the work impact is 30% improvement in their daily activity.

The director also mentioned that administrative policy manual is provided by KC with support of KCI which is 50% useful and need to be expanded by each department according their needs by 10 departments under his supervision. The team has increased their efficiency after training conducted and had good outcome especially in registering the revenue and reporting system. Now the team can provide you any kind of financial report on revenue within some minutes. He gave an example of World Bank that asked for a report within 10 days and the director replied that I will give you the report in 10 minutes. However, he did not clarify which kind of training they were interested in.

KCI has conducted good trainings such as English, computer, FMIS and leadership training and build in a level the capacity of the staff they we are happy from and also several by laws and procedure were updated or developed by his department with support of KCI.

As recommendation, he said that it would be good to provide more training on computers, English and management skills so that all the staff knows how to use computer in their professional life. He also mentioned that as it was expected that KCI install the FMIS system in the district level so that the main office keep track of revenue on daily bases. He requested that in future USAID should computerize all revenue system to both systems in district level. Public awareness should be raised so that people provide and transfer safyee money on due time and date. However, it was told by him that all the revenue money are collected by his department within a bank account and used according the municipality needs and wants. The government also support them with money on the project where they feel should be implemented. This was also confirmed by Mr. Mir Wais the FMIS specialist from ASI department that all the revenue money are collected by KM and used by them.

The revenue department has 48 revenue collections ways and now the mayor has added another one as well so that counts a lot in increasing the%age of revenue since 3 years and also the mayor has strong leadership skill and has stopped corruption as well.

MEETING MINUTES

Deputy Chief of Party

Adam Smith International

Date: March 3, 2013 Location- Kabul Municipality Notes by- Burhan Kamal

Subject: meeting with DCOP contracted by ASI –subcontractor (Revenue)

Participants: Maarten de Zeeuw Deputy Chief of Party-ASI contractor

Drew Gilmour Evaluation Team

Burhan Kamal Evaluation Team

Mr. Maarten introduced himself and joined KCI-ASI as short term consultant and then and from November 2010 as a long term Municipality Revenue advisor contracted with KCI. Mr Maarten was involved and written the last year 1392 revenue report to USAID-KCI project and has explained some parts of the revenue report and also sent via email to Mr. Drew for further details. All the money that are collected as revenue by the districts office for safayee and other kinds of taxes to Pashtani bank, but however, the advisor complained about the management and transparency of the bank and also Ministry of defense that is not giving more details and misreporting from Ministry of finance regarding the revenue collected by municipality in the district as well about Kabul municipality account. However, the details are provided in the report sent to us as mentioned above.

The advisor also complained and mentioned that within the KM there is no proper communication and even at district level there is no understanding and management skills. It was also discussed that how ASI advised KM for parking lot fee connections and vehicle license fee and how to make it legalized within the municipality system. He has also mentioned that how the revenue collection went up in the 2nd year but why it went down in the second year as it was due to land selling income and advertisement. It was also discussed that why municipal law is not passed yet and also all the policies and procedures and by laws and explained that within the government there is a conflict between the KM and ICDLO.

The ASI revenue section has given trainings to several stages and levels from KM such as from top management to local districts officers in revenue collection, computer and English studies,

revenue reporting as before it was only a quantities number and without any further explanation and now they are doing good reports. However, it was not explained properly which kinds of training in depth were given to the staff and what was the improvements and outcome from basic, intermediate to advance revenue trainings. No curricula issue was explained and who were the exact target beneficiaries for all training provided by KCI. On the other hand they said that Kabul mayor was involved in decision in all trainings. The KM staff does not have enough understanding of the system as even some staff does not know how to calculate revenue or percentage for each annual year. ASI has given 4 days revenue training to all district administration and also to revenue departments.

At the end we discussed about FMIS trainings provided by KCI-ASI and has explained that some of the staff is using it good and the Kabul municipality has increase their revenue and doing the digitalization process as well. The system was taught to all the revenue department and also to district administration who are responsible for revenue collections, however, they were also saying that whenever world bank comes will replace their FMIS with the own financial system, So, ASI staffs were not sure about the future usage of FMIS in KM.

Regarding the administrative manual it was discussed as it is a good tangible product by KCI and it is good but not yet widely used by KM staff and for further detail about digitalization and policy from Mr. Arif in Johns office. However, KCI has not done and not doing proper transformations to KM and nothing is working very well in details of transformations and also if KCI goes than nothing will work properly as there is no sustainability and transformations for the project.

MEETING MINUTES

Deputy Chief of Party /Tetra Tech

Date: February 24, 2013 Location- Kabul Municipality Notes by- ShabnamSayed
and Burhan Kamal

Subject: introduction meeting to mayor and his deputies

Participants: George McDonald White	Deputy Chief of Party
Robert Brandstetter	Evaluation Team Leader
Drew Gilmour	Evaluation Team
ShabnamSayed	Evaluation Team
Burhan Kamal	Evaluation Team

The meeting started with discussion about budget cut down from \$120 million to 45 million and how this cut down impacts the outcome of the KCI project in total and also had its effecting on the total project planning. The other issue that the DCOP talked about, how they have indirectly changed the project objective to do capacity building in a way to enhance the trust of the people and government started with renovation and constructions of roads and parks.

Mr. George was talking about long term project outcomes that are predicted to be within 3-5 years from now for KCI project. KCI teams has several other partners in KM whom they have to coordinator and stop duplications such as JAICA, World Bank, and etc. so the team of donors has divided the activities within themselves. To answer the question on revenue sources Mr. George replied with that the revenues are collected by KM but handed over to Ministry of Finance and the less amount of the revenues bounce back to KM for their operational usage.

Mr. Drew asked about what would be the project sustainability and examples from KCI project. The answer was that they have provided several trainings such as provided paid engineers to KM so that could advise the road construction staff and also provide teacher training from KM staff so that they could have someone in the future for their trainings and advise. He added that majority of the programs and projects are supported, advised and funded by KCI such as FMIS system in revenue department and some other trainings and software's provided to others departments so that, they could be sustained.

Mr. George respond to the project future sustainability was staff trainings such as engineers with support of American University of Afghanistan and some other institutes which he did not name for their future activities outcome. Also, the digitalization system is another example of sustainability for KM, as this system centralized and all staff can access and data and information can be provided sooner and works are processing much better than before.

Mr. George replied to infrastructure question that, they have provided computer trainings performance monitoring plans, sanitation uniforms, driving licenses, digitalizing records, and was always focusing on project good outcome if the extended for one more year.

Recommendation:

- Capacity development
- Management skills for each KM departments
- Provide future infrastructure according to the needs
- If less money than operation should be focused more than other departments
- Develop city plans
- Business development opportunities

MEETING MINUTES

DCOP/Operation

Date: February 25, 2013

Location- Green Village

Note by- ShabnamSayeed

Subject: Meeting with DCOP/Operation

Participants:	Kevin Stupay	DCOP/Operation
	Robert Brandstetter	Team Leader
	ShabnamSayeed	Evaluation Team

Mr. Kevin Stupay joined KCI in March 2012. He mentioned that he has worked with many other companies like NDI, IRD, MSH and American Service Corporation, but KCI was excellent. Between them, he was happy with the trainings which were provided by KCI. Mr. Kevin said that lack of budget had an effect in downsizing our programs. In this case, we fired many of our staffs and for now they have 7 experts whom are working like Mr. George, Mr. Brad and Mrs. Suzan. Some of them are going to work with us up to the end of KCI project, and they have 60 to 70 other workers. He said that over all his entire job was monitoring. He mentioned they have a problem with network and reference check of their staff and that is the source of corruption. The main problem is this, KCI is finishing and needs more 2 months to finish all their works and also he said that they have provided some materials like uniforms, pens and t-shirts but they had a problem with delivering that to Kabul municipality and subcontractors send them the less quality materials. Mr. Robert asked that was this project successful? He said yes it was really successful because Mr. Brad Baxter has a good relation with Mayor and Deputy Mayors, he was very disappointed that first KCI had enough budget but as the budget cut down it had an effect in their projects too, and he is hopeful that KCI should follow up this project, he added that KCI has held computer, financial, and management trainings and also helped sanitation department, like they have bought uniforms, shoes and took driving license for their staff.

Recommendations:

- Continuing and follow up of this program for 2 years
- Holding these kind of programs in major cities
- Holding some more training
- Better to have small projects to fight against corruption
- Back up support for institutionalization
- Collaboration and cooperation between contracts

MEETING MINUTES

Women's Council

Date: March 3, 2013 Location- Kabul Municipality Notes by- ShabnamSayeed

Subject: Meeting with women's council Kabul municipality

Participants:	ParwinSideqi	President of women's council
	NargisQayomi	Deputy of women's council
	Robert Brandstetter	Evaluation Team Leader
	ShabnamSayeed	Evaluation Team

The meeting started with the introduction from Mr. Brandstetter from USAID evaluation team and then Mrs. Parwin introduce herself and also the deputy for women's council and give a brave information regarding women's council and responsibilities, they were really happy from KCI project and appreciate what KCI have done for women in KM, and they start to answer our specific questions that we had:

1. How long worked in Kabul municipality?
It is around 16 years that I am working in KM.
2. Current responsibilities.
Defense and protection of women's right
Supporting women in their works
Settlement of disputes
Facilitating of a good work environment for women in women council
3. Had training with KCI?
Leadership, management, gender and ICDL computer and English training and the leadership training was really useful for us we learn how to lead a council, how to manage office works and increased our self-confidence and we are using it in our daily work.
4. Many courses for leadership training. How was it? How did it help in your daily work?
As I mention the most useful training for us was the leadership training, with help of these trainings now I am able to work as a good and succeed leader now I am able to held meetings very easily and it is my daily work.
5. Has KCI helped with coaching the women's council? How example
Yes Mrs. Farkhonda helped us regarding this issue, women's council was something new for us and we need support of someone whom have knowledge of these things and KCI

really helped us, for an example I can say that I was not able to held a meeting properly but when I took leadership and management training now I can do it very easily.

6. What will the women council do when KCI contract is over? How they will continue their work?

We are elected for 2 years and we are trying to make this women's council as a permanent branch in form or structure of Kabul municipality but unfortunately we do not know that what will be our future when KCI is over we just hope that Kabul mayor support us but surly we can't say anything.

7. Are you experiencing any kind of harassment on job? What can you do about it?

Yes we have experience of harassment in job and now it is responsibility of women's council to solve these problems and find a solution for it, we have a legal process for it like first we investigate and then we will talk with person whom harassed that women to explain for him that you did wrong and you need to apologize, if he did not accept his mistake than we will take a legal action against him even we are able to terminate that person with help of our collages and mayor.

8. Recommendations

We recommend for USIAD the continuing of KCI project and provide us English, computer, management, finance and leadership training and also they should motivate and influence the mayor to bring the women's council under municipal structure.

MEETING MINUTES

Gender Manager

Date: February 25, 2013 Location- Kabul Municipality Notes by- ShabnamSayeed

Subject: Introduction Meeting with Gender Manager KCI

Participants:	FarkhondaSaamy	DCOP/Operation
	Robert Brandstetter	Evaluation Team Leader
	ShabnamSayeed	Evaluation Team

The meeting started with the introduction from Mr. Brandstetter from USAID evaluation team and then Mrs. Farkhonda introduced herself and give a short information regarding his work, she is working as a gender manager with KCI in Kabul Municipality she said that KCI has initiated a gender department in KM to develop ability of women in Kabul municipality for supporting women the build a women council in KM and they organized an election to elect a leader for this council, 10 women were nominated for election and 3 of them got the highest vote one was elected as a chief of women council and two of them were elected as a deputies of women

council she added that the working system in KM is centralized to Mayor so 12 of other women council members were elected by Mayor and now the women council have 15 members. After election she was working with them as a coach to train them in each issue, to achieve this aim they had a leadership training for women council team for 6 months and teach them how to lead women council during this training they faced conflict of men and to solve this problem they lunched training with support of men as a trainers, and also provide gender awareness and gender equality. The second training was management training and some other short trainings but the allocated budget was not sufficient to hold other trainings so they talked with other donors like UNDP.

For sustainability and support of women council after KCI they build relation with Ministry of women affairs, Afghan women network and other civil society organizations, to support afghan women they helped women whom had small business at their homes and called them all in women garden and made a market place for 3 days and encourages them to take business license hope fully 60 women got business license from Kabul municipality and that is a good achievement for them. They also organized a day that 400 women came out of their office and cleaned roads to give idea for men that women can clean the city and many other housewives came out of their homes and helped them BCC and National media published this news in TVs, Radios and newspapers now they are working to add gender unit in KM structure, gender equality, anti-harassment, anti-violent , discrimination and they have write a manual for women council the departments are reviewing it than the will sent it to ministries cabinet. She said that I am happy and can see the changes we have good achievements in gender we starts from zero and now we have a good impact of it.

Her recommendations were to do more and more capacity building and trainings like leadership, administrative and management training.

ANNEX VIII: EVALUATION TEAM CVS

Robert H. Brandstetter

Team Leader

Mr. Brandstetter has over 25 years of experience working in the sectors of international development, humanitarian assistance, evaluation, civil society, democracy and government, monitoring and observation, project management and elections. He is trained as an anthropologist and political scientist specializing in Africa, the Balkans and the Middle East. Mr. Brandstetter has conducted and led a variety of evaluations throughout his career in international development for multiple donor agencies and governments. As team leader he has led USAID evaluations and assessments and is well familiarized with policies and procedures. He has extensive experience in report writing, evaluation deliverables, and managing teams. Throughout his evaluation experience he designed and developed strategic plans and relevant and measurable monitoring and evaluation indicators. Most recently he has been part of multiple evaluation teams in Armenia, Iraq, and South Sudan across a variety of sectors. Mr. Brandstetter has a Master's degree in Sociocultural Anthropology from Indiana University, a Master's degree in Political Science from Boston University and a Bachelor of Science in Foreign Service from Georgetown University.

SELECTED PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

Feb 2013-Mar 2013 **Team Leader, Kabul City Initiative, Social Impact, Inc., (Afghanistan)**

Lead team comprising of one TCN and one LCN to complete a performance evaluation of USAID's Kabul City Initiative for municipal capacity building. This evaluation assessed the on-the-job training and classroom training, overall knowledge management capacity building, improved service delivery (including infrastructure activities), citizen involvement in municipal governance, and economic development and revenue generation.

Nov 2011-Feb 2012 **Evaluation Specialist, AAEM-DC, International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES), IBTCL (Republic of Armenia)**

Member of a two person team to do the final evaluation of the "Advancing Armenia's Elections Management and Democratic Culture (AAEM-DC) project. The project supported the strengthening of electoral processes through the Central Election Commission and the Passport & Visa Department of the Police of the Republic (responsible for maintaining the Voter List). The project included 14 days field work in Armenia, and was under contract with IBTCL.

Jan-April 2011 **Evaluation Specialist, National Capacity Development Program, OED/PERFORM (Iraq)**

Member of a four person team to do the final evaluation of the National Capacity Development Program (NCD/Tatweer) for USAID. This was a four year, \$340k project, to improve the public administration capacity of national government institutions. The evaluation team evaluated the relevance, performance and success of the Tatweer Program.

July-August 2010 **Team Leader, Civic Participation Assessment, Management Systems International (MSI), (Southern Sudan)**

With MSI, conducted a Civic Participation Assessment in Southern Sudan and the Three Areas. Worked with three Sudanese colleagues to study and develop USAID's strategy to resume civic participation programming for the period after the 2011 referendum.

Mar-April 2009 **Evaluation Specialist, World Bank LICUS Trust Fund/Liberia Transitional Support Fund, UNDP (Liberia)**

Evaluated World Bank LICUS Trust Fund/Liberia Transitional Support Fund grant, comprising 16 small, urban and rural projects implemented by UNDP/Liberia. The objective of the grant was to support post-conflict rehabilitation.

Oct-Nov 2005 **Team Leader, Evaluation of technical assistance by the Consortium for Elections and Political Process Strengthening, USAID (Iraq)**

Evaluation of the USG/USAID technical assistance to the electoral, constitutional and government strengthening process implemented by the Consortium for Elections and Political Process Strengthening (CEPPS). The consortium consisted of the National Democratic Institute (NDI), the International Republican Institute (IRI) and the International Foundation for Elections System (IFES). The assessment evaluated the achievements, challenges, and opportunities for future USAID political development assistance to Iraq.

Sept-Dec 2003 **Civil Society/Local Government Specialist, Iraq Local Government Project (LGP), Iraq, Research Triangle Institute (RTI)/Chemonics Intl. (Iraq)**

Worked closely with British Military. Responsible for developing and working with local NGOs and civil society organizations in support of the rebuilding of Iraqi society in Al-Amarah, Maysan Governorate, Southern Iraq

Nov. 1999-July 2000 **Chief of Party, Referendum 2000 Monitoring Program, International Foundation for Election Systems (Uganda)**

Coordinated and managed six civil society organizations to monitor the progress of activities leading up to the June 29 national referendum on political systems. Helped maintain a network of 214 local monitors throughout the country, evaluated biweekly reports, wrote a monthly report on the status of the referendum process which was published in seven newspapers (4 local language papers).

June 1999-Sept 1999 **District Electoral Officer, East Timor, and United Nations Assistance Mission in East Timor (UNAMET)**

Evaluated the qualifications and registered 3,400 rural Timorese, conducted a public information program, planned, organized and managed local staff to conduct the popular consultation (referendum), supervised the election and tallied ballots determining the independence of E. Timor. Immediately, after the results were announced, was evacuated to Darwin under emergency conditions.

May 1995-June 1996 **Evaluation Specialist, OFDA Support Project, BHM, Intl. (Washington, DC)**

Provided technical expertise for evaluating humanitarian assistance programs in the Prevention, Mitigation, Preparedness, and Planning Division (PMPP) and the Disaster Response Division (DRD) of OFDA. Help design and develop PMPP's strategic plan, and relevant and measurable monitoring and evaluation indicators for the two divisions. Assisted with the review and evaluation of PMPP technical, granting and training assistance functions, reviewed emergency relief proposals, and assisted with the design and evaluation of special studies. Planned and participated in an evaluation of the U.S. Government's humanitarian assistance program in northern Iraq, and was team leader for the evaluation of U.S. humanitarian assistance to Angola.

Jan-Feb 1995 **Team Leader, Evaluation of Refugee/displaced persons program, World Vision International/SSI (Southern Sudan)**

Led a five person team to evaluate the effectiveness of a \$7 million refugee/displaced persons program in the Southern Sudan. The team evaluated and made recommendations to improve the efficacy of the five sectors in the program: health, food security, enterprise development, capacity building, emergency relief, and the overall management and structure of the program. Responsibility for writing the final report.

Sept-Dec 1993 **Chief of Party, Democratic Initiatives and Governance Project, World Learning, Inc. (Rwanda)**

Managed a \$9 million, four year, USAID funded project to support the democratic governance process in Rwanda. The project had four major components: development of a management support unit for the national assembly; creation of a national communications center for press and radio; assistance and training in democratic processes and procedures for local level administration; and development and assistance

for an NGO/PVO umbrella organization to support civic education and democratic processes.

June-July 1993 **Team Leader, Evaluation of Duke University Ranomafana National Park Project, Duke University (Madagascar)**

Led a five member team (biologist, agronomist, primatologist, and financial expert) to evaluate the first phase of the Duke University Ranomafana National Park Project, an integrated conservation and development project funded by a USAID grant. The team evaluated the five major components of the project: biodiversity; conservation; forestry; rural development; and the overall management and organization. Wrote the final report, making recommendations to be incorporated in the 2nd, five year phase of the project.

Oct-Dec 1991 **Team Leader, Mid-term evaluation of the PVO-NGO/Natural Resources Management Support (NRMS) Project (USAID), Chemonics, Intl. (Uganda, Cameroon, Mali)**

Led a two person team (a forester) for the mid-term evaluation of the PVO-NGO/Natural Resources Management Support (NRMS) Project (USAID) in Uganda, Cameroon, Mali, and Madagascar. The objective of the project was: to improve informational support for NRM issues; provide increased technical training; and increase institutional and management capacity in PVO/NGOs in the four countries. Measured the success of the project to date in achieving these objectives. The evaluation consisted of visits to the project offices in three of the four countries, field visits to sub-project sites, and review and examination of appropriate documents. Wrote the final report, making recommendations for future project direction for the overall project, as well as country specific.

May 1991 **Team Leader, Evaluation of the PVO component of the USAID Senegal Community and Enterprise Development Project, DATEX, Inc. (Senegal)**

Led a three person team for the final evaluation of the PVO component of the USAID Senegal Community and Enterprise Development Project. The project extended credit and training in credit management to 57 village groups; and provided support and training in rural development to six Senegalese and two American PVOs assisting the village groups. The evaluation consisted of researching project documents, interviewing AID and PVO participants, and extensive interviews of village groups participating in the project. Prepared the final draft report.

Sept-Nov 1990 **Team Leader, Mid-term evaluation of Agency, CARE International (Ethiopia)**

Led an international team of three rural development specialists for the mid-term evaluation of Agency. Team identified and measured progress of the project's goals of improving water resources for both humans and livestock, development of more

“Evaluation of the Consortium for Elections and Political Process Strengthening (CEPPS) Program in Iraq”.Prepared for USAID/Iraq. November 2005.

“Evaluation of OFDA Cash for Relief Intervention in Ethiopia.”Prepared for USAID/Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance. November 2004.

"Final Report", IFES/Referendum 2000 Project, Uganda. October 2000.

'Resettlement Program' section of "Evaluation of U.S. Humanitarian Assistance to northern Iraq." Prepared for the Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance, US Agency for International Development, 1995.

"Evaluation: Southern Sudan Emergency Response Program." World Vision International, 1995.

"Final Evaluation: Phase I, Ranomafana National Park Project. (Madagascar)" Duke University: USAID, 1993.

"USAID Debt Swap Project: Support to Ministry of Waters and Forests. (Madagascar)" World Wildlife Fund/USA: USAID, 1992.

"Andohahela Integrated Conservation and Development Project Evaluation (Madagascar)." World Wildlife Fund/USA, 1992.

"Montagne d'Ambre Integrated Conservation and Development Project Evaluation." (Madagascar) World Wildlife Fund/USA:USAID, 1992.

"Mid-term Evaluation of PVO-NGO/NRMS Project."Chemonics, International, 1991.

"Final Evaluation of USAID Senegal Community and Enterprise Development Project", DATEX, Inc., 1991.

"Mid-term Evaluation of Borana Rangelands Management Project-Ethiopia."CARE/Ethiopia 1990.

"Final Report: Analysis of Ethnographic Data on Infant Feeding Practices and Behavior in Niger." Nutrition Communication Project, Academy for Educational Development, 1988.

DREW GILMOUR

Technical Consultant

Mr. Gilmour has over 15 years' progressive experience managing, designing, implementing & advising on development programming in Afghanistan. An experienced evaluator, Mr. Gilmour has conducted evaluations for a range of organizations ranging from private donors and NGOs to the UN. Possessing extensive experience contracting with USAID, he has developed and

implemented M&E strategies and trained others in M&E planning and methodology in compliance with USAID standards. Mr. Gilmour's deep understanding of Afghan ministries and local government structures makes him a strong candidate for the KCI Mid-Term Evaluation. Additionally, his background at all levels of government will help this evaluation. Most recently, Mr. Gilmour worked on the USAID performance evaluation of Civilian Technical Advisor Program (CTAP) in Afghanistan. Mr. Gilmour worked and interacted with government officials and helped to develop assessment tools and instruments to carry out a successful evaluation. Mr. Gilmour served as Chief of Party of a counterpart technical advisory program of the Canadian government in Afghanistan, where he led capacity building efforts for Afghan governance. In this capacity, he developed and implemented program M&E plans and drafted reports for USAID and the Afghan Ministry of Justice. Mr. Gilmour holds a graduate degree in Post-War Recovery Studies and a bachelor's degree in Journalism.

SELECTED PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

Sep 2012 – Oct 2012 **Capacity Development Technical Advisor, Social Impact, Inc.**

Served as governance expert on a USAID-commissioned Evaluation Team assessing the Afghan government's Civilian Technical Advisor Program.

- Drafted report's observations and findings on transparency and developed evaluation instruments to assess the Civilian Technical Advisor Program across multiple government ministries.

Jan 2011 – Jan 2012 **Chief of Party, Governance Support Office, Canadem (Afghanistan)**

Led civilian advisor program in Afghanistan which placed experienced specialists at senior/deputy-minister level.

- Worked directly with government counterparts to develop policy, plans and resource intake/allocation at three ministries. Conducted seminars, workshops, tutorials and leadership training; facilitated curriculum development at related university & vocational facilities.

June 2003 – Present **Director, Development Works (Afghanistan)**

Managed programs of social enterprise consulting agency that builds agri-enterprise in developing countries; drafted program concepts and proposals, negotiated contracts, launched projects and managed implementation.

- Developed and implemented M&E plans using qualitative and quantitative methodologies; drafted reports in compliance with USAID requirements
- From 2007 to 2010, implemented successful multi-sectoral, fast-track \$5 million USD reconstruction and economic development project in Kandahar that doubled gross income per hectare of 13,100 farmers

- Managed USAID-funded \$5 million USD program that built capacity of local farmers to develop portfolio and expand market interest in goods throughout region
- Led capacity-building efforts of value-chain/market program training female entrepreneurs; consulted closely with Ministry of Justice
- Worked closely with farmers and communities to determine fair-use irrigation use

2006 – 2007 **Consultant, World Bank/IFC (Kabul, Afghanistan)**

Consulted on capacity-building activities for Kabul University through World Bank/IFC.

- Introduced modern business practice curriculum, the first of its kind in Afghanistan, to Kabul University through World Bank/IFC supported Business Skills Program. A wide cross section of entrepreneurs, civil servants and university students were taught modern business practices

Apr 2002 – Apr 2003 **Asst. Resident Representative, Field Programs, UNDP (Afghanistan)**

Managed field operations of nation-wide public-works reconstruction program employing over 23,000 people.

- Established program M&E plan and trained staff to implement
- Worked on water rights and usage issues in western Afghanistan

Dec 2001 – Apr 2002 **Team Leader, Cooperative Housing Foundation (Afghanistan)**

Launched agency in country, kick started market reconstruction plan funded by US State Department/BPRM. As one of the first American agencies to enter or re-enter Afghanistan, coordinated extensively with USAID. Evolved project into a multi-sectorial community recovery scheme to rebuild housing, markets and infrastructure.

Dec 1999 – Oct 2001 **Chief of Party/ Chief Technical Advisor UN-Habitat Northern Iraq**

Managed \$582 million resettlement and growth program featuring integrated construction of 23,000 houses, 450 schools, dozens of clinics and markets, a host of urban and pre-urban water/sanitation projects, sizeable road network.

- Launched economic development zone. Supervised 220 technical staff at four field offices. Served as senior UN field manager in Iraq.
- Responsible for the project development, contract management and logistical operation of program. Streamlined project review cycle from 42 to six days. Oversaw processing of 1,300 projects and tens of thousands of payments while establishing independent audit
- Set up GIS unit to help establish Cadaster map of project areas
- Worked with local authority to establish effective land title arbitration panel
- Worked with local justice system to promote and protect property rights

- Coordinated with the International Council of Monuments and Sites on the mapping, ownership and access to archeological sites

June 1998 – Dec 1999

Shelter Coordinator, CARE (Kosovo)

Launched and managed Kosovo's largest emergency shelter program servicing 12,500 families with 25 teams spread across the province. Developed and led the 'One-Warm-Room' concept, which delivered basic, life-sustaining shelter to thousands of families. This approach was adopted by USAID and its partners, the UN and most other shelter partners, and together, held off a cold-weather crisis. Coordinated extensively with US Govt. shelter coordinator contributing and adhering to donor strategy as well as ensuring contract and reporting compliance. Served as chair of the shelter committee. Raised/managed multi-donor shelter/infrastructure portfolio worth \$22 million USD, including USAID OFDA support.

Implemented shelter program servicing 1,100 families funded by USAID. Coordinated extensively with USAID, providing reports, ensuring deliverables, negotiating program expansion. Facilitated development of inter-agency survey & database. Conducted dozens of multi-sector surveys tracking displacement. Worked closely on resolving property and land title disputes in project areas.

EDUCATION

M.A. — Post-War (Disaster) Recovery Studies, York University, United Kingdom, 1997

B.A. — Print Journalism, Sheridan College, Canada, 1989

Cecchi and Company Consulting, Inc.

Afghanistan SUPPORT-II Project

Wazir Akbar Khan

Kabul, Afghanistan