Evaluation of USAID Political Party Programs: Ukraine

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Executive Summary

Ukraine lies at the geopolitical faultline between east and west, and post-Cold-War tensions constantly resonate in Ukrainian politics. While the country has made considerable progress over the last two decades toward a democratic political system and a market-oriented economy, weak formal institutions and the existence of powerful informal para-institutional structures have allowed strong actors to work ouside the institutional framework formally established in the constitution. Political institutions, including parties, are dominated by personalities and rule of law is fragile. That said, the Ukrainian party system is far stronger than was the case in the 1990s, and the dynamics of party competition are more stable now that centrist parties have taken over the political space. Contemporary political life is dominated by two broad groupings: the centre-left Party of the Regions and the centre-right 'Orange' parties, but 'left' and 'right' are better understood as competition between groups of powerful economic interests than different value systems. Parties are not the building blocks of Ukrainian politics the way they are in many states, however, and they play a relatively peripheral role in structuring political competition**.** They are instead institutional formulae used in a variety of ways for a variety of ends.

Political party assistance in Ukraine through CEPPS was intended to address many of the gaps or failures found in political parties, the party system, and governance generally. Both IRI and NDI have been involved in party assistance in Ukraine since the early 1990s. The time period of the last CEPPS programs by the party institutes was 2007-10, and the activities of those programs reflected the complexity of the needs of parties as well as the history of preceding programs. The NDI program has four broad components dealing with party-building, parliament, executive branch units, and civil society organizations. Meanwhile, IRI's program had six objectives addressing party-building, media and communication, pollwatching, citizen focus groups, government communication, and youth outreach.

This evaluation of political party assistance in Ukraine is a pilot application of a draft methodology, rooted in a conceptual framework of the relationship between political parties, the party system, and democratic development. Following the methodology, a table of indicators is created based on a matching of the actual program's activities to a list of typical activities and indicators; another table is created that re-organizes the activities according to the conceptual framework's party development goals. The set of indicators shapes the evaluation effort. For Ukraine, this was an *ex post facto* evaluation based primarily on semi-structured interviews, but also voting and public opinion survey data. The four-person team was in Ukraine for three weeks during July 2010, including two weeks in Kiev and one week when two-person teams were sent west (Ľviv and Ternopiľ) and east (Kharkiv and Poltava).

The evaluation faced severe limitations that affected the extent to which the analysis addressed the impact of the party institutes' programs. First, from the beginning it was clear that the sheer complexity and geographic dispersion of the NDI's and IRI's activities necessitated difficult choices about the best use of scarce evaluation resources. The end result was that only parts of the two programs were evaluated, this report does not and cannot address the entirety of the programs. This evaluation examined various party-building activities, youth outreach, strengthening the elected official-citizen connection, and improving party-faction relationships. Second, the nature of some activities made causal attribution nearly impossible; on a related note, the structure of Ukrainian political institutions rendered available voting and survey data useless as indicators. Finally, the timing of when the evaluation was in the field was such that many elected officials identified for interviews were unavailable.

Nonetheless, the team was able to gather a reasonable amount of information and materials to analyze the impact of the activities selected for evaluation. *Various party-building activities* were generally successfully, with some exceptions: individuals clearly benefitted from training on party management, campaign management, and voter mobilization; training to improve internal communication was quite effective; and monitoring of electoral processes demonstrated success. On the other hand, the impact of training on media, public relations, and new media technologies was partial, and the concept of permanent campaigns did not resonate; the team was unable to interview anyone who had taken part in or remembered training on opposition strategies. *Youth leaders* receiving training on organization structure, recruitment, and outreach remembered and valued the activity, but the largely instrumental relationship between parties and their youth wings was problematic for further effect. *Strengthening the official-citizen connection* demonstrated much more mixed success, due in part to Ukraine-specific contextual factors. Training to improve communication between MPs and citizens had modest success, but more intensive interaction activities below the national level had unclear results. The team was unable to evaluate activities to *improve party-faction relationships* at all due to the unavailability of key interview targets.

With respect to the broader party development goals laid out in the conceptual framework, it was clear that the organizational and technical capacity of parties had been enhanced, and fair and honest elections was strengthened; accountability, participation, and representation was more mixed, and the team was unable to address good governance as intended. At the next level of the party development conceptual framework, these activities acted more to improve representation, not governance; this is due in part to the nature of the activities selected for evaluation, not the NDI and IRI programs as wholes. It may be, however, that Ukrainian political parties and citizens would benefit more from technical assistance that prioritizes the supply of governance by officials and the demand for governance by citizens and societal organizations.

This pilot application of the draft methodology produced not just an evaluation of selected NDI and IRI activities in Ukraine, it also highlighted conceptual and methodological issues for party assistance programs generally and evaluation of those programs specifically. On the conceptual level undergirding political party assistance, the team highlighted questions about whether: training benefits individuals or their parties; programs aimed at political competition at an elite level are simply too vulnerable to political events; and the extent to which programs should be adapted to local context. With regard to the draft methodology itself, it was clear to the team that considerably more attention needed to be paid to the logistics of the evaluation effort, a conclusion stemming primarily from the complexity of these programs. Moreover, it was also evident that isolating a particular program at a particular time was not necessarily meaningful, nor would it have been possible to evaluate some activities due to the nature of the political system.

Context

Ukraine is a country of 46.2 million inhabitants and 233,100 square miles, stretching from the geographical centre of Europe in the Carpathian mountains in the West to the Donbass in the east. Following a brief period of independence in 1917-19, the territory of today's Ukraine was divided between the Soviet Union and various central European states until after the Second World War, when the country was again united and assumed its current borders in as part of the Soviet Union. Following the attempted putsch in Moscow in August of 1991, Ukraine declared independence.

In contemporary Ukraine, most people are bilingual, speaking both Ukrainian and Russian (though fewer than a fifth of the population classify themselves as ethnic Russians). Ukrainian is the preferred language of interchange of about half the population, including especially those living in rural areas and in the West of Ukraine. Russian is spoken most in cities (including Kiev) and in the eastern part of the country. Ukraine has small Tatar, Hungarian, Romanian, Polish and Jewish populations also.

Ukraine's 2010 Freedom House score was 3 for political rights and 2 for civil liberties; it is a democratic state, but there remain significant problems with corruption and rule of law.

Per capita GDP was $6,400 in Ukraine in 2009. The economy is dependent on heavy industry and the extraction of natural resources, though light industry and the service sector have developed since independence. Ukraine has suffered considerably in economic terms in the wake of the 2008 banking crisis and subsequent economic downturn, and it has been obliged to turn to the IMF for support.

Ukraine has expressed aspirations to join both the European Union and NATO, but these are both distant hopes. In May 2009, the EU and Ukraine concluded an Association Agenda, which is intended to prepare for and facilitate the early implementation of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement. Ukraine announced in May 2002 that it was seeking to join NATO, and in 2008 Ukraine requested a Membership Action Plan (MAP), but NATO has concluded that Ukraine has a considerable way to go before it will be in a position to join that organization. In May 2010, president Yanukovych stalled the NATO accession process as Ukraine moved to strengthen ties with Russia. Ukraine is a member of the WTO.

Institutional structure

In post-independence Ukraine, weak formal institutions and the existence of powerful informal para-institutional structures have allowed strong actors – including presidents – to successfully pursue strategies of unilateralism and co-optation rather than working within the institutional framework formally established in the constitution. Political institutions, including parties, are dominated by personalities and rule of law is fragile.

When the Soviet Union imploded in August 1991 and Ukraine declared independence, the republic was left with a parliamentary constitution dating from 1978 which defined it as a unitary state with a unicameral parliament. The 450-seat Verkhovna Rada was elected in March 1990 on a semi-competitive basis, but with no formally recognized political parties except the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The Rada was re-elected in 1994, a year before the end of its formal five-year term (and at this point its term was reduced from five to four years). The parliament was subsequently re-elected in 1998, 2002, 2006 and prematurely in 2007. In none of the parliamentary elections since independence has a single party won an absolute majority of either votes or seats.

The Rada is elected using a proportional representation system: the seats are distributed according to the largest remainders method (using the Hare quota), with a three per cent vote threshold for participation in seat allocation. There is a single nation-wide district for the distribution of seats, and

the lists are closed and blocked. The electoral system used between 1998 and 2002 was a mixed parallel system in which half the seats were filled through PR and half filled in single-member districts. The 2006 election was the first election to be held under the current proportional electoral system. This system was devised effectively by removing the single-member district element of the previous mixed system. The result was a single nation-wide electoral district that has the distinction of being the largest electoral district in the world.

Ukraine has a semi-presidential system in which there is both a directly-elected executive president and a legislatively-elected prime minister. The election for the first president took place on 1 December 1991, the same day as the referendum on independence in which 90 per cent of voters ratified the decision to withdraw from the USSR. It was not until June 1996 that Ukraine finally passed a new constitution. By this time the first post-Soviet president, Leonid Kravchuk, had been replaced by Leonid Kuchma, who was elected in July 1994 and again in November 1999. The presidential election is based on an absolute majority. If no candidate receives over half of the first-round votes, a second round is held between the two top-placed first-round candidates. In the second round, the candidate who receives the greatest number of votes wins.

The 1996 constitution retained a unitary form of territorial administration, made up of 24 regions (oblasti) plus the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the cities of Kiev (Kyïv) and Sevastopil. Officials at the sub-national level achieve positions in different ways: the oblast governor (regional executive) is appointed by the President, similar to the Russian practice, but regional councils and municipality mayors are elected.

The electoral law was not constitutionalized. Despite widespread agreement over most aspects of the constitution at the time of its passage, many in the presidential administration were not happy with the way it worked in practice. In the spring of 2004, the Rada passed changes to the constitution that would weaken the powers of the president, and strengthen those of the prime minister and parliament.

Political Context

Ukraine lies at the geopolitical fault line between east and west, and post-Cold-War tensions constantly resonate in Ukrainian politics. Contemporary political life is dominated by two broad groupings: the centre-left Party of the Regions and the centre-right 'Orange' parties. But 'left' and 'right' have limited meaning in Ukraine, as competition is played out more between groups of powerful economic interests ('oligarchs' and their organizations) than it is between different value systems or social groups. The Ukrainian party system is largely 'captured' by business interests which have significant influence over many state institutions. Parties have weak social bases, and their links to society are dominated by patronage- and clientelist-based relations rather than ideological affinity. Increasingly high barriers to electoral participation have been a contributory factor that has enabled business interests to dominate electoral politics, especially since 2002.

That said, the Ukrainian party system is far stronger than was the case in the 1990s, when the anchors were the Community Party of Ukraine and Rukh (a word meaning 'movement,' this is the party that grew out of the pro-independence movement in the late 1980s), and elections were won in the continually-shifting centre ground dominated by competing business interests. The Rada elected in March 1990 had only one formally recognized party (the Communists), in addition to a loosely-grouped Democratic Block with many progressive Communist Party members among its ranks that won approximately a quarter of the seats in parliament. Now that the centrist parties have taken over the political space, the dynamics of party competition are more stable and more coherent, if largely non-programmatic.

To the extent that programmatic, cleavage-based politics can be said to exist in Ukraine, the Ukrainian party system is structured by two overlapping political cleavages; the left-right ideological cleavage, and a cultural cleavage that divides the pro-Western Ukrainian nationalists who are strongest in the West of Ukraine, and the pro-Russian Russophone groups that are based largely in the east of the country.

Competition among political élites is organized primarily around personal networks and power bases created by individual actors; the former sometimes as political fronts for corporate interests, the latter for vanity or fanaticism. These may coalesce into parties, but they are for the most part not borne of parties. Parties are thus not the building blocks of Ukrainian politics the way they are in many states, and they play a relatively peripheral role in structuring political competition***. Instead they are institutional formulae that are used in a variety of ways for a variety of ends***; for all politicians they are mechanisms through which to identify current allies, they are means of legitimizing the leadership role of political actors who have no state position, and they are labels to which images and ideas can be attached prior to an election in order to attract votes. For some political actors they are also podia from which to propound their views; for others they are tools for trading economic for political power and using political power for personal economic gain; and for others still they appear to be little more than fashion accessories. In few cases are parties truly structures for articulating and aggregating the grass-roots preferences of their adherents as classical Western party theory would have it. This has been changing somewhat in recent years, as the Party of Regions has begun to establish a denser grass-roots network that more closely approximates a typical Western political party, but party politics in Ukraine remains under-institutionalized.

<u>1999-2004</u>

Twenty-two parties were represented in parliament following the 1998 elections, with the Communists having the largest number of seats (27 per cent) followed by the right-wing Rukh party (10 per cent) which had, as a social movement, led the way to independence. The balance of power was held, however, by a bevy of small centrist parties and 116 independent representatives, who made up a quarter of the composition of the chamber.

Starting in 2002, the Ukrainian party system began to polarize into two broad camps: the right-wing 'Our Ukraine' (*Nasha Ukraïna*) camp led by former Prime Minister Viktor Yushchenko, and a pro-government camp which contested the parliamentary elections of 2002 under the banner of 'For a United Ukraine' (*Za yedinu Ukraïnu*) and the presidential election of 2004 under the auspices of the Party of Regions (*Partiya rehioniv*). Nasha Ukraina won 25 of the parliamentary seats in the 2002 elections, "For a United Ukraine's 23 seats (see Tables 1 and 2 in the Appendix for full details of election results).

Administrative malpractice is widely believed to have affected electoral processes in Ukraine during the post-independence period. Though the elections held in 1994 and 1998 are generally held to have been free and fair, doubt was cast on the probity of the presidential elections of 1999, the referendum of 2000, and (to a lesser extent) the parliamentary elections of 2002. Concerns about electoral integrity finally erupted onto the political scene at the time of the presidential election of 2004, when allegations of abuse led to mass protests that lasted until the election results were overturned by the Supreme Court. Since 2004, the quality of elections has improved considerably, and electoral conduct in the country is currently recognized as adequate, despite on-going problems with campaign financing and patronage, as well as a relatively high degree of popular mistrust of politic

<u>2004-present</u>

By 2004 the dividing lines that shape Ukrainian politics today had crystallized. The 2004 presidential election contest was a fight between on the one side Russophone Kuchma protégé Viktor

Yanukovych, and on the other suave pro-Western Victor Yushchenko along with his glamorous businesswoman ally Yuliya Tymoshenko of Batkivshchyna (also known as the Bloc of Yuliya Tymoshenko, BYuT). The competition was intense and mobilized the Ukrainian population to a greater extent than had been the case since the pro-independence drive of 1990-91. Eventually, the 2004 presidential election contest sparked the so-called 'Orange Revolution,' when fraudulent second-round results brought hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian citizens to the streets in protests. The second round of voting was ultimately overturned by the Supreme Court. The voting was re-held and the result reversed, bringing Victor Yushchenko to power.

Following the victory of the 'Orange' forces, Yuliya Tymoshenko assumed the role of Prime Minister, but cracks soon began to emerge in the 'Orange' coalition, and it was not long before Tymoshenko and Yushchenko began to fall out. The 'Orange Revolution' represented a turning point in mass mobilization in Ukraine, but this event - when severely rigged election results were overturned following a popular uprising - did not fundamentally alter the structure of the party system.

By the time of the 2006 parliamentary elections, the two were at virtual loggerheads and competed against each other. The result was that the Party of Regions gained a plurality of the vote in the 2006 parliamentary elections and Viktor Yanukovych formed a government with the support of the Communists and the Socialists. With Yushchenko as president and Yanukovych as prime minister, politics in Ukraine went through a difficult period. In the spring of 2007, Yushchenko dissolved parliament and called an early election for September.

The Party of Regions again won a plurality in the 2007 elections, but Yuliya Tymoshenko's eponymous block gained ground. Her party was unusual in being led by a woman, and in the fact that it gained significant support from across Ukraine, thereby breaking the mould of post-independence Ukrainian politics. The 2007 election was also notable in that it saw the entry into parliament of the centrist Lytvyn Block, and the Socialist Party's failure to secure any seats in parliament for the first time since independence.

Despite the strong showing of the Party of Regions, the 'Orange' forces held a bare majority of seats. Following lengthy and acrimonious negotiations wracked with accusations of manipulation and bribery, Yuliya Tymoshenko was elected prime minister. There followed a turbulent two-year period in which the government struggled to keep itself together.

The February 2010 presidential election marked the end of the hegemony of the 'Orange' forces in Ukrainian politics. President Yushchenko contested the election, but it was clear at a fairly early point in the campaign that he did not stand to gain enough votes to make it into the second round, and that the second round would be fought out between Yuliya Tymoshenko and Viktor Yanukovych. To many people's surprise, Yanukovych won the second round. Many in the West were dismayed, though the elections were generally acknowledged to be free and fair.

Following Tymoshenko's defeat in the presidential contest, her coalition government was forced out and Mykola Azarov of the Party of Regions became Prime Minister. There have been concerns in recent months over freedom of the press, suggesting that the authoritarian tendencies of the Kuchma years may be returning.

Evaluation Approach, Limitations

The evaluation was based on a draft methodology, *Evaluation Approaches for Political Party Assistance: Methodology and Tools* (1 June 2010 version), rooted in a conceptual framework of the

relationship between political parties, the party system, and democratic development (see the 1 June 2010 version). The nature and process of the evaluation followed Part 2 of the draft methodology, which covers conducting evaluations for non-random assignment or pre- and post-data analysis.

It was decided by the overall project team that the evaluation would focus on the IRI and NDI programs that ended in 2010, so the core documents for this effort were the final reports for those programs. The first component in the process is to identify the activities in the program, match them up against the draft methodology's list of typical activities and indicators at various levels, and then create a table of evaluation indicators based largely on the draft methodology's recommended measures. The second component creates a table using the same set of activities, but re-organizes them with respect to the party development goals laid out in the conceptual framework. The two tables were used along with known activity locations to provide guidance for selection of activities to be evaluated.

The evaluation was based on semi-structured interviews conducted by a team of four: Andrew Green (Georgetown University, DGMetrics), Sarah Birch (University of Essex), Sean Roberts (George Washington University), and Michael Henning (USAID/DCHA/DG/EPP). A total of three weeks were spent in-country, two weeks in Kiev and one week in other regional cities; Andrew Green and Sean Roberts travelled to Kharkiv and Poltava, while Sarah Birch and Michael Henning went to Ľviv and Ternopiľ. While the evaluation used the NDI and IRI final reports as evidence of outputs, the general evaluation approach was to consider demonstrable evidence of learning as outcomes and persistence of learning as impacts. Following the indicators recommended in the draft methodology, the evaluation plan also included the use of voting and public opinion data.

The evaluation faced some serious limitations. First, and perhaps most important, the evaluation faced severe limitations on causal attribution, beyond what is expected for pre- and post-data analysis. This issue will be discussed in more detail in the analysis, but it should be noted that common program activities like promoting political cooperation or training individuals are by nature difficult to evaluate due to confounding factors. Second, the complexity of NDI and IRI programs, as well as the geographic dispersion of activities across such a large country, forced the evaluation team to make difficult choices of what activities would and would not be analyzed. With a larger team and/or another work week, the evaluation could have examined more activities in more places. Third, the timing of the trip was not fortuitous, as the team could not begin the evaluation until a DG Strategic Assessment team finished in early July. Unfortunately, by that time the Verkhovna Rada was no longer in session, many people were out of town on vacation, and record-setting heat drove still more Ukrainians out of cities to the countryside or beaches. Elected officials were thus particularly difficult to contact, BYuT more so in the wake of their post-election downsizing and mobile phone cost-control efforts.

CEPPS Program Overview

Both IRI and NDI have had programs in Ukraine since the early 1990s that ran the gamut of potential programming. The evaluation looked only at the programming for the period 2007-2010, i.e., a period beginning with the breakdown of the 'Orange' forces and ending with the Party of Region's takeover of the executive and legislative branches. Both institutes' programs were complex in terms of both the number of activities implemented and the geographic dispersion of activities.

IRI's program had six objectives:

1. "*Assisting political parties to identify and increase opportunities for effective participation in the political process*" – This is more broadly a party building activity that provided training on party

management techniques, effective party activist relations with media, effective election techniques, and opposition party techniques and tactics

2. "*Strengthening the link between parties and their representation of citizens*" – This activity provided training for newly elected local and regional officials on working with mass media, the rights and duties of deputies, writing constituent questionnaires and engaging constituents more effectively, writing an effective press release, and managing budget expenses. A second part of this objective was promotion of public hearings on local issues in order to encourage citizen involvement and involve local administrators.

3. "*Contributing to the development of a credible and competitive electoral process*" – Training for almost 8000 domestic pollwatchers and 25 teams of observers for the 2007 early elections, as well as training for lawyers on election law and adjudication.

4. "*Help Ukrainian public policy specialists and government officials more clearly understand the more effective ways of researching, deciding on and promoting public policy*" – In 2008, focus groups were held in six oblasts – Chernihiv, Kharkiv, Odesa, Cherkasy, Zhytomyr and Uzhhorod – to gauge citizen attitudes about the political atmosphere and trends, NATO membership, the current government, and inflation.

5. "*Improve communication abilities of government officials*" – Training for regional administrative staff on public communication.

6. "*Increase capacity of political non-governmental organizations to advocate for democracy and political reform issues*" – This activity provided training for members of party youth organizations on recruiting new members, motivating young people, developing organization structures, and developing coalition-building skills. IRI provided youth training around the country on a number of topics, but also established Youth Political Leadership Schools in twelve oblasts.

NDI's program had four components:

A. "*Strengthen parties' grassroots bases of support, internal communications systems and ability to form and maintain coalitions with like-minded parties; improve parties' ability to compete in presidential and parliamentary elections*" – This covers a variety of political party-building activities, primarily training on development of societal support bases, improving internal communication, training-of-trainers, maintaining coalitions of like-minded parties, and strategizing on competing in elections.

B. "*Strengthen ties between parliamentarians and their political parties and constituencies; promote coalition building among like-minded parliamentary factions*" – Effectively a parliamentary program, this provided training for MPs on outreach to constituents, how to use party offices effectively as a communication network, and the use of new communication technologies. In addition, NDI held informal discussions with leaders of various parties about building and maintaining political coalitions.

C. "*Promote intradepartmental communication and efficient policy formulation within the executive branch*" – A governance objective, staffers from various executive branch units were participants in consultations, discussions, and study trips related to inter-departmental communication and the value of unified messaging.

D. "*Promote the growth of a nationwide, effective, professional, and transparent domestic NGO election-monitoring capacity; strengthen the capacity of NGOs to build and mobilize grassroots public support for greater government accountability; and promote confidence to the degree*

warranted in the electoral process through election oversight and reporting by non-partisan international observers, including those familiar with post-Soviet political and electoral processes and culture" – This is a civic program that covers a lot of topics. First, NDI provided training to Opora on pollwatching, election law, and organization capacity-building. Second, a handful of NGOs received small grants and training to pursue specific local policy issues, and then worked closely with a coalition of groups to advocate for reform of housing ownership and maintenance. In addition, 'NGO Schools' were set up in three oblasts – Zhytomyr, Volyn, and Crimea – to train local NGO leaders on policy advocacy. Finally, NDI organized election observation for international and regional delegations.

CEPPS Activities Selected for Evaluation

Given the juxtaposition of scarce time and personnel resources against complex CEPPS programs, the evaluation effort needed to focus on activities that were amenable to evaluation, but also in locations that had multiple activities, preferably by both party institutes. Close examination of the final reports submitted by IRI and NDI yielded four clusters of activities in Kiev, Ľviv, Kharkiv, Poltava, and Ternopil':

- ***Various Party Capacity-Building Trainings*** – This covers party and campaign management (IRI Objective 1; NDI Component A); voter mobilization (NDI Component A); monitoring electoral processes (IRI Objective 3); opposition strategies (IRI Objective 1); internal communication (NDI Component A); media, public relations, new media technologies (NDI Component A). Note that different training events would mix different capacity-building topics, depending on the location and needs of the parties.
- ***Youth Training*** – This covers capacity-building for youth wings, as well as recruitment and outreach strategies (IRI Objective 6), but not the Youth Political Leadership Schools.
- ***Strengthening the Elected Official-Citizen Connection*** – This covers training for MPs on political communication (NDI Component B); professional development skills for local officials (IRI Objective 2); promoting the use of public hearings (IRI Objective 2); grassroots advocacy on housing issues (NDI Component D).
- ***Party-Faction Relationships*** – This covers training efforts with the Bloc of Yuliya Tymoshenko in the midst of serious political infighting among the 'Orange' forces in 2008 (NDI Component B).

As an *ex post facto* exercise, the evaluation would be based largely on semi-structured interviews. The team also planned to draw on voting data and available public opinion surveys in order to better gauge the effect of activities aimed at voter mobilization, communication, media, and citizen-official interaction.

Inevitable for an evaluation of such complex and wide-ranging programming, not all activities could be evaluated. Activities were left out for conceptual and logistical reasons. NDI's NGO Schools effort (NDI Component D) was considered to be conceptually more about civil society capacity-building than about political parties. Conversely, efforts to promote coalition-building and train MPs on political communication (IRI Objective 1; NDI Components B and C) are undeniably aimed at political parties, but the evaluation team concluded that such activities were limited in scope, would be severerly difficult to evaluation, and would be overwhelmed and obscured by political competition at the national level. The team's intention to gather and analyze voting and survey data did not come to fruition, as Ukraine's single nationwide district, proportional representation, party list system made it impossible to tie

individual elected officials or party leaders to data on a specific sub-national constituency or even region.

Practical considerations also played a significant role in activity selection. Programming related to domestic election observation (IRI Objective 3; NDI Component D), public communication training for regional administrators (IRI Objective 5), and discourse focus groups (IRI Objective 4) were left out because an *ex post facto* evaluation with finite time and resources could not come to grips with the geographic dispersion of activities. Indeed, the activities selected for the evaluation were as much about geography as their amenability to evaluation. Geographically, there was not a large enough concentration of various activities in such large and politically-important places as Dnipropetrovsk or Crimea. Finally, the evaluation did not include IRI's Youth Political Leadership Schools activities, due as much to geographic dispersion as to USAID/DCHA/DG's focus on these activities as a pilot of application of quasi-experimental evaluation approaches.

Analysis of Activities

Overall, the evaluation showed mixed success by the set of activities; it is quite possible, of course, that activities not selected, e.g., the NGO Schools and Youth Political Leadership Schools, had an impact that this exercise would not have uncovered. Some evaluated activities seemed to be quite successful, others not very successful, and still others that proved to be too difficult to evaluate under the circumstances. The shifting mixture of training topics by party institute, location, participating political parties, and year was especially challenging for evaluation, although the team gathered considerable oral evidence about effect. The evaluation would not have been meaningful without the constructive cooperation of NDI's and IRI's local offices; the latter was especially helpful in assisting with contact with former trainees and providing training agendas.

Various Party Capacity-Building Trainings

Generally, interviewees remembered the institutes' training, valued what they had learned, and could point to ways in which the training persisted in their own or their party's work. Moreover, the large political parties, i.e., BYuT, Party of Regions, Rukh, and Nasha Ukraina, have developed such training to deliver themselves. Because this type of training has been offered by NDI and IRI since the 1990s, the causal relationship to the 2007-10 programming is tenuous; it does appear, however, that the institutes have spurred parties to take on this effort in their own right since 2004.

Trainees greatly appreciated the role-playing, simulations, and games as productive learning approaches, considering them a welcome change from standard training methods. Training that emphasized US experiences was viewed as fascinating, but not always applicable to the Ukrainian context. It was clear from our interviews that training participants often attend many training events, though, and consequently have difficulty distinguishing exactly what they learned from what event, which party institute organized the training, or even if the training were in the time period under evaluation. Indeed, the mix of topics covered in training differed depending on time, place, and party institute, which together presented a significant obstacle to evaluation of specific training topics.

Individuals clearly benefitted from training on party management, campaign management, and voter mobilization, and could readily identify what they had learned and how that had changed the way they work. One BYuT activist in Kharkiv noted that he was using ideas from IRI training on party structure in his new role on the organizing committee for a new political party. Another Kharkiv-based BYuT member noted that the party had adapted the interactive approaches from the training session for

their own internal party training on campaign management. Still others in Poltava, Ternopiľ, and Ľviv remembered the training; indeed, some had become trainers themselves as their parties adapted materials for ongoing training outside the auspices of the party institutes. It should also be noted that IRI makes extensive use of Ukrainians as trainers, often tapping people who underwent training in years past and have demonstrated learning persistence in their party positions.

As indicated above, parties themselves have made considerable progress in developing their own training capacities based on knowledge and materials from party institute trainings. Our evaluation was unable to verify that particular trainings in this time period had a causal impact for the major 'Orange' parties, because they had had similar training for years beforehand. The Party of Regions, though, did not take part in NDI or IRI training opportunities in previous years, but with their electoral losses in the mid-2000s decided that the party needed to be better organized for electoral competition. As a result, the Party of Regions was an active and enthusiastic participant in training during this programming period, which translated into not just learning, but the creation of a training department and the adaption of donor materials; the director of the training section even showed us all of the original training materials on her flash drive. The Party of Regions was able to increase their turnout in Odesa in the 2010 Presidential elections, according to the director. Party activists in Ternopiľ mentioned that they had received training from Party of Regions headquarters in addition to attending NDI training events. A party activist for Nasha Ukraina in Ľviv said that they adapted the training materials for their needs, conducted their own training, and organized meetings in villages throughout the oblast.

Other parties like Rukh and BYuT also have internal training departments, which is good evidence of the persistence of training. The coalition of Nasha Ukraina does not have a stand-alone training department, rather each party in the coalition relies on the expertise of individuals in its own or other coalition parties. Besides the Party of Regions, parties reported mixed results with voter mobilization strategies, with interviewees particularly questioning whether door-to-door efforts were appropriate for Ukraine. The Reform and Order party reported that they developed a database of members and activists after one training, which they used to help boost membership by 30%.

The concept of *permanent campaigns did not seem to resonate* with political party activists. This is likely due in part to: the nationwide district for Rada, which would force a campaign to focus on national issues only; appointed regional executives, which limits the ability of parties to pursue regional issues; and until recently the ever-looming threat of premature national elections, which forced parties to maintain a state of readiness for electoral campaigning. Some of the interviewees remembered the topic, most did not mention it at all despite attending relevant training events. A high-ranking member of Rukh noted that the party had no systematic approach to permanent campaigns, but recently conducted a long-running advocacy campaign on one of the party's foreign policy priorities. One regional council member in Poltava remembered the training, but felt it met neither the Ukrainian political context nor his personal campaign style well. No other interviewee recalled learning about permanent campaigns. Political experts at two thinktanks confirmed that no party conducts a permanent campaign.

We uncovered considerable evidence that *training to improve internal communication was effective*. The three largest parties reported enduring changes in communication structures within their parties. The Party of Regions training director stated that they changed their organization structure to enhance communication. Nasha Ukraina reported that it has people at the party headquarters dedicated to communicating with and responding to 2-3 oblasts each. Finally, BYuT interviewees noted that they had revised the center-oblast communication processes as a result of training. As of our evaluation effort, all three changes to improve internal communication persisted within the parties.

As with campaign management and voter mobilization training, the elements we evaluated for *monitoring electoral processes demonstrated success*. The training was again remembered and valued by participants, and has been incorporated by parties on a persistent basis for one or more elections. A lawyer with one of the Nasha Ukraina coalition parties emphasized how much the training on election law helped for the 2007 elections, and how they used that knowledge and experience in the 2010 Presidential election. Although he was absolutely confident that they were prepared for the October 2010 local elections, the lawyer strongly felt that updated materials based on changes in the laws were necessary yet difficult for most parties to do. The Party of Regions training director specifically mentioned how her unit was about to launch a nationwide rollout of training for the thousands of election commissioners needed for local elections.

The *impact of training on media, public relations, and new media technologies was partial*. Trainees recalled the material and valued the media and public relations topics, while viewing the new media information as not so relevant in the Ukrainian context. That said, however, training participants connected to party youth wings or civic organizations have moved to incorporate social media applications. For example, the head of Rukh's youth wing proudly showed off his website and discussed the use of email, Twitter, Facebook, and other interactive features. The Party of Regions includes these topics in its training materials, but it is not clear that they are being used by party activists.

The evaluation team was unable to interview someone who had taken part in or remembered training on *opposition strategies*.

Youth

Trainees remembered and valued the training they received on organization structure, recruitment, and outreach, but a largely instrumental relationship between parties and their youth wings prevents the training for being effective for broader party development.

The evaluation team spoke with a number of training participants from youth wings in Kiev, Kharkiv, Ľviv, and Ternopiľ. All interviewees were able to provide examples of what they had learned, though often a copy of the specific training agenda was necessary to help them remember clearly; it should be noted that interviewees also reported that they have had many training opportunities over the years, including those offered by other donor agencies or foreign political party institutes, so it is difficult for them to connect a particular training by a particular organization to their own development. A leader in Rukh's youth outreach effort emphatically stated how the training had shaped not just Rukh's activities, but his own professional career. One trainee in Kharkiv reported how lessons he learned helped him be selected as president of the All-Ukrainian Student Council. A BYuT youth wing activist reported that they were able to increase their grassroots youth support during 2007-09 in Kharkiv, and that the organizational changes persisted. Youth activists from Nasha Ukraina and BYuT in Ľviv said that they now conduct their own youth training based on adapted donor materials. Smaller parties, though, are unable to continue training on their own, according to one youth activist in Ternopiľ.

It was clear to the evaluation team that the youth training had demonstrable outcomes and impact for the individuals attending the sessions. However, while both BYuT and Party of Regions have developed large youth wings, there is no real connection between youth wing leadership and activism on the one hand, and later party activism and leadership on the other. Both parties provide some material assistance as requested by local youth wing organizations – Party of Regions even makes available discount cards for various goods and services as a recruiting incentive – but seem to view the organizations as not much more than a social organization to be tapped for election campaign labor. The youth activists felt that they were largely independent actors, not surprising given that party

membership is not a requirement for youth wing membership. The team heard from some interviewees that they were currently working for parties other than the one whose youth wings they had been in at the time of training. Several youth activists described their value to the parties as nothing more than "meat" or fodder for election campaigns. Although the training benefitted the individuals, it does not appear that the parties themselves obtained much benefit.

Strengthening the Elected Official-Citizen Connection

This is another cluster of activities demonstrating mixed success, due as much to the lack of incentives common to elected officials in PR systems as to poor fit between program intention and Ukraine-specific contextual factors.

The *training to improve communication between MPs and citizens had modest success*. An MP from Reform and Order gave an example of working with citizens in some small towns in his home oblast to prevent cancellation of train stops. Another official with a small Nasha Ukraina coalition party reported that his party's MPs began doing quite a bit of case assistance for citizens. Despite this evidence, the evalution team was unable to interview more MPs about their experiences, and the possibility of selection bias cannot be discounted.

Below the national level, though, the *training at the local level had much more demonstrable impact*. A regional official from the Party of Regions in Poltava said that the local party office had adapted NDI materials and rolled out the training to others in the region, just as Nasha Ukraina has done in Ľviv. Another Party of Regions official in Kharkiv not only remembered the training, he brought the well-thumbed materials with him to the interview; after explaining that the local party office had adapted the materials for training of other local officials, he provided such examples of official-citizen interaction as an ongoing park renovation in the city.

Activities involving much more *intensive official-citizen interaction had mixed results*, due primarily to Ukraine-specific factors. The NDI program to improve official outreach to interest groups and citizens achieved notable success. The Ternopiľ Press Club held several events to focus attention and advocacy on the issues of unemployment and social service provision, thereby increasing public awareness of these issues and holding elected leaders to account for their election pledges. Not only did the Club host successive meetings beyond those supported by NDI, but their efforts were mentioned by other interviewees in the region as well. Even more successful were the roundtables in Kiev, Ľviv, and two other cities on housing issues, which also spawned follow-on meetings. Moreover, one result of the meetings was the development of coordination with MPs who were directly engaged in reforming housing laws (a new law passed Rada in July 2010). The public hearings program by IRI at the local level was more difficult to evaluate than anticipated. The hearings were held, but IRI reported that it was difficult to get officials to attend them. The main purpose of the hearings was to encourage citizen participation in local governance issues, but the lack of oblast-level survey data and insufficient evaluation resources for focus groups meant the team could not gather relevant data.

Party-Faction Relationships

The evaluation team was *unable to evaluate this program element*, as relevant BYuT MPs, e.g., Olha Bodnar, were either unavailable or unreachable. The informal nature and limited scope of this activity provided few avenues for gathering information.

Analysis of Party Development Goals

Overall, the CEPPS program activities implemented by IRI and NDI selected for evaluation had positive outcomes and impact: Organization/Technical Capacity was definitely enhanced; Accountability, Representation, and Participation was more mixed; and Fair and Honest Elections was strengthened. The evaluation, however, raised existential questions about the purpose of training, the ability to evaluate programs as stand-alone efforts, and the modalities and topics of training (see the next section).

Good Governance

The only program element related to this party development goal that was selected for evaluation was intended to improve the party-faction relationship, which, as noted above, *could not be evaluated*. Other program elements that were not evaluated could have had an impact on good governance.

Organization/Technical Capacity

With the exception of the Party of Regions, the major parties had extensive training experiences prior to the 2007-10 program period being evaluated. Previous training covered many of the same topics, too, which posed a serious challenge to our evalution. Despite such serious confounding factors, it is clear from the Party of Regions case that the training conducted during this time period had demonstrable outcomes and impact; in many ways, the Party of Regions caught up to the other parties by 2010. Nor is it clear that the prior training is causally connected to party capacity development during the evaluated time period. BYuT, Nasha Ukraina, Rukh, and smaller parties all reported organization changes, the development of training capacity, and adaption of donor materials stemming from trainings during 2007-10. This is particularly true of campaign management, voter mobilization, and internal communication, less so for media outreach, public relations, and new media technologies. While political parties in Ukraine are much less programmatic than would be desired, they are certainly capable of conducting sophisticated and organized election campaigns. *The CEPPS program positively impacted the organization and technical capacity of the political parties in Ukraine.* There is an open question about whether programming is or should be targeting capacity of parties or individuals, though (see "Conceptual Issues" in following section).

Accountability, Representation, and Participation

The primary impact of the 2007-10 programming was among youth activists. As above, *training of youth activists had demonstrably positive outcomes and impact*. Individual youth activists had learned, applied the lessons in their political activities, and helped strengthen their organizations. In the end, though, it is the Ukrainian political context of non-programmatic, oligarch-based competition for power that drives parties to devote all possible resources to contesting elections, which leads parties to use youth wings as nothing more than volunteer labor for campaigns. The connection between development of youth capacity and development of party capacity is currently broken, and may only be established over time as political generations change.

Programming to improve *the official-citizen connection was much more mixed*, depending on how well the activity considered Ukrainian context. The activity to promote advocacy of social policy reforms by tapping the energy of civil society organizations and interacting with relevant officials worked well. It was unclear whether public hearings involving officials had an effect on this connection; indeed, elected officials at the raion and municipality level have comparatively less power than the Presidential-appointed oblast governors and local ministry facilities of national ministries, which would

severely limit the number of issues that citizens could discuss with these officials. Given the nature of politics at the national level, programs to improve the official-citizen relation in pursuit of societal needs may indeed be much more effective at sub-national levels – or even sub-sub-national – once the structure and nature of power at those levels is taken into account.

Fair and Honest Elections

The evaluation did not analyze domestic election monitoring activities, only training for lawyers, party and activists on election law. As with other capacity-building activities, this activity was not new in Ukraine; indeed, one of the reasons for the success of the 2004 'Orange' revolution was that the opposition parties had election law experts and had trained party agents to monitor legal infractions in polling places. That said, the training under the evaluated 2007-10 clearly *produced learning that was replicated at the party organization level*, particularly for the Party of Regions.

Conclusion

This pilot application of the draft methodology produced not just an evaluation of some NDI and IRI activities in Ukraine, it also highlighted conceptual and methodological issues for party assistance programs generally and evaluation of those programs specifically.

Programs

Evaluation of the 2007-10 CEPPS program activities selected for evaluation shows that they clearly improved Organization/Technical Capacity, Fair and Honest Elections, and to some extent Accountability, Representation, and Participation. The extent and durability of impact, though, is largely a function of the broader Ukrainian political system, not the success or failure of a party assistance program.

At the next level of the party development conceptual framework, these activities acted more to improve representation, not governance; note that this is due in part to the nature of the activities evaluated, not the NDI and IRI programs as wholes. As a result of the evaluated activities, political parties should have been able to run better campaigns, mobilize voters, communicate more effectively with party activists and citizens, recruit youth leaders, and protect citizens' right to vote. Efforts to improve the citizen-official connection were more limited, at least with respect to the activities that were evaluated. It may be, however, that Ukrainian political parties and citizens would benefit more from technical assistance that prioritizes the supply of governance by officials and the demand for governance by citizens and societal organizations. Indeed, given a political structure at the sub-national level that is dominated by unelected officials or elected officials from the dominant party, there are serious obstacles to how representative such officials could ever be. It might be more effective to pressure officials at the oblast and raion levels through budget and planning transparency, civil society watchdog activities, and policy advocacy campaigns at the oblast level.

Conceptual Issues

The evaluation raises some questions about the intent and nature of political party assistance programming. First, training programs focus on improving the abilities of individuals, who are also party activists or leaders. The assumptions of this approach are that (a) the party is the ultimate and intended beneficiary of the training because individuals will transmit new knowledge to their party in some direct fashion, and (b) the departure of individuals does not affect parties necessarily. However, there is also a benefit to the individual, as well as to other parties indirectly as individuals shift political allegiances. Indeed, the approach of the team for evaluation of training was precisely to analyze the effect at both

levels: how the individual demonstrably learned from the training, and how the party incorporated the new knowledge in a systematic and persistent way. The team viewed the latter as the impact of training, the former as the outcome. But is this proper way to analyze training? Should impact only be seen at the individual level, i.e., if the training participant demonstrates active use of the gained knowledge some time after the event, is that impact? Or, should outcomes and impact only be viewed at the party level, i.e., how the party first used the individual's knowledge as a resource and then reproduced it over time itself? To complicate matters further, it is not clear how to evaluate youth training, given that the implicit assumption is that youth activists become party activists. Should evaluation focus in this programming case on the individual only, recognizing that there is a latent capacity that may or may not benefit a particular party? This evaluation used an approach in parallel to that for party capacity-building: individual demonstration of knowledge is an outcome, incorporation and persistence by the youth organization, not the party, is the impact.

Second, program elements that grapple with political competition at an elite level, e.g., promoting coalition-building by MPs, are so vulnerable to political events as to be impossible to evaluate at an impact level. Similarly, efforts to strengthen communication between elected officials and citizens may be very successful, but without identifiable constituencies below the national level, evidence of impact cannot be collected without prior planning and expense.

Finally, how well programs adapt to local context was an immediate and obvious aspect of programming design for 2007-10, which had an effect on program success. The most apparent example of this is the pedagogical approaches of NDI versus IRI. The latter prefer using indigenous trainers, often people who previously went through training. Interviewees almost unanimously reported that they preferred training from local experts. The disadvantage of IRI's approach, it should be mentioned, is that it places implicit limits on the diffusion of innovation, i.e., social media may not be key for Ukrainian party work now, but it may be in two years. NDI, on the other hand, tends to use US and other Western experts for training, even if the topics are perhaps not relevant for the training participants. Another example is seen in the attempts to promote advocacy for social issues with officials. In Ukraine, individual citizens cannot do much, but organized groups of citizens can; also, officials without power to effect policy change are not appropriate, but MPs and regional executives are. What this all points to is the need to think through program design vis-à-vis local context much more carefully in order to maximize the effect of programming.

Methodological Issues

The Ukraine pilot evaluation presented several important lessons that should be incorporated in the the evaluation methodology. Some stem from the logistics of conducting an evaluation, and others from the nature of political party assistance in particular contexts.

Logistical Lessons

The Political Party Assistance Project team has long recognized that the party institutes' program designs and final reports are woefully short of development hypotheses or even explicit goals above the output level; this is true despite the existence of explicit CEPPS goals. This has made evaluation and even assessment challenging exercises. For evaluation, though, the problem worsens as activities in reality often serve multiple goals, which complicates the process of creating the tables of activities and then party development goals *pace* our conceptual framework. Worse still, each of the party institutes may mix together different activities with different identifiable development goals in different ways depending on target party needs, location, or time.

First, for Ukraine we ended up developing *'clusters' of activities* simply because it was impossible to disentangle one specific activity from other activities. Thus, instead of examining just party

management, campaign management, internal communication, media/PR, etc., as separate training activities, these were grouped together as 'various capacity-building activities,' and evaluated more in terms of training than in the effect of specific new knowledge. This also created some difficulties in mapping to the conceptual framework's party development goals.

Second, it was clear from the very beginning of the evaluation that *far more prior preparation was needed*. In particular, an evaluation team should be in direct, interactive contact with NDI's and IRI's local offices in order to better understand the program, initiate the process of identifying interview targets and locations, and allay anxieties. The Ukraine evaluation would not have succeeded without the active cooperation of the local offices – IRI was especially helpful, providing the team with participation lists, contact information for past trainees, training agendas, as well as contacting elected officials, trainers, and other stakeholders; NDI was also quite helpful, but due to vacations by key people, we were unable to take more advantage of their goodwill.

Third, following from above, an *evaluation needs much more background material* than program designs or final reports. Using IRI as an example, the training agendas were invaluable for jogging the memories of interviewees, who generally have attended many training events over the years. More importantly, this sort of documentation is vital for not just arranging interviews, but also for deciding what locations to visit in the first place.

Fourth, the *timing of evaluations* should be an explicit consideration. We could not begin the evaluation in Ukraine until the second week in July because of conflicts between the time window for our academic-heavy evaluation team and the previously-scheduled time for the DG Assessment team. Unfortunately, by the point the evaluation team arrived, Rada went out of session and summer holidays began, which made it difficult to reach many people and almost impossible to interview elected officials. An unrelated timing issue was that BYuT was downsizing its organization in the wake of Tymoshenko's loss in the February 2010 Presidential election, so not all former training participants were even employed by the party by July; even worse, the party switched its mobile phone provider, which meant that even NDI and IRI did not have current contact numbers.

Finally, Ukraine has long had *programmatically and geographically complex party assistance programs*. For evaluation, then, the first planning task was deciding which programs would and would not be evaluated, and which few locations would be visited. Inevitably, an activity we anticipated for evaluation could not be done, and we left out noteworthy activities due to geography. Complex programs such as Ukraine and Indonesia warrant either a larger team or another week in-country.

The end results of the logistics problems we encountered were that (a) we could not evaluate some activities we had planned to evaluate (party-faction relationships) or as well as we would have liked to (public hearings), and (b) we never had enough Kiev-based interviews to make us split into two teams. With better information and prior preparation, we could have covered more activities, covered them better, and perhaps even have half the team travel to another city or two.

Meta-Evaluation Lessons

There are two meta-evaluation lessons to be drawn from the Ukraine evaluation pilot, one related to party assistance programs generally, and one related to particular political contexts.

First, the evaluation took as its subject the CEPPS program for 2007-10, which was *problematic and unrealistic* for multiple reasons. Most critically, it was difficult to isolate the effect of training to only that time period, given that many people had participated in different trainings even prior to 2007; this was especially true for activists and leaders from the 'orange' parties. In addition, many training activities were direct continuations of training activities in the prior programs. Thus, the evaluation team found it difficult to use the arbitrary 2007 date. In the future, evaluations should focus less on programming periods, and more on activities regardless of specific program period. Another time-related issue was that this time period was one of tremendous upheaval in the Ukrainian political system, a situation that limited our ability to analyze activities such as coalition-building and party-faction relationships meaningfully.

Second, some *activities could not be evaluated as anticipated due to the structure of the Ukrainian political system*, which has some features found in other countries, too. Perhaps the biggest obstacle was the single nationwide PR district, which creates a disconnect between MPs and constituents in particular geographic areas. This meant that we could not use survey or election data as we had anticipated to gauge how MPs may have improved communication with citizens, electoral campaign management, or addressed social issues at sub-national levels. Such nationwide or even large regional PR districts are not uncommon around the world, and the evaluation methodology needs to recognize how they limit analysis. Another political system problem was that regional executives are appointed from the center, and they are much more powerful than elected regional councils or municipal mayors. This creates a different disconnect than at the national level, in this case elected officials have little room for manuever when it comes to pursuing social issues advocated by civil society and citizens, and cannot credibly take credit for any successes.

The effect of these meta-evaluation issues was primarily that we could not meaningfully evaluate the impact of specific programs. Building in such considerations into the evaluation planning process is critical for success.

Appendices

List of Interviews

Kiev

Irina Bekeshkina, Research Director, Democratic Initiative Fund
Viktor Chumak, Director, Institute of Public Policy
Virginia Dronova, Project Coordinator, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung
Vadym Halaichuk, Lawyer, Election Observation, European Party of Ukraine
Chris Holzen, Director, IRI
Mykola Katerynchuk, European Party of Ukraine
Natalia Kharchenko, Executive Director, Kiev International Institute of Sociology
Ivanna Klimpush-Tsynsadze, Director, Open Ukraine (Arseniy Yatsenyuk Foundation)
Svitlana Kononchuk, Politics Division Head, Ukrainian Center for Independent Political Research
Yuliya Kovalevskaya, Chief of Training Department, Party of Regions
Denis Kovryzhenko, Director of Legal Programs, Laboratory of Legislative Initiatives
Ivan Krulko, Deputy Head, Peoples Rukh of Ukraine
Vasyl Kuibida, Rukh
Nico Lange, Director; Project Coordinator, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung
Natalia Ligachova, Chief editor, Telekritika
Yuriy Mindyuk, Chief of International Department, Nasha Ukraina
Svetlana Mingaleeva, Deputy, Party of Regions
Vira Nanivska, Director, International Center for Policy Studies
Yevgen Poberezhny, Advisor to the Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine, OSCE
Viktoria Podgorna, Political consultant, UDAR (Klichko bloc)
Ihor Popov, Director, PENTA (Center of Applied Political Studies)
Tanya Soboleva, Political Party Program Officer, NDI
Taras Stetskiv, MP, Nasha Ukraina-People's Self-Defense
Volodymyr Stupak, Head, Chernigiv oblast UNP
Ludmyla Synnytska, BYuT
Borys Tarasyuk, Head of the party, Peoples Rukh of Ukraine
Yaremchuk Volodymyr, Head of Training Department, BYuT
Sarah Wines, Deputy Mission Director, USAID
Yuriy Yamymenko, Director, Political and Legal Programmes, Razumkov Center
Oleksandr Yarema, Chief, Kyiv Region Party Organization, Party of Reforms and Order
Viktoria Zahozhaia, Deputy Director; Kiev International Institute of Sociology

Kharkiv

Ludmila Dolya, Kharkiv Press Club of Reforms
Oleksiy Guivin, Party of Regions
Anton Herashchenko, Former Head of Rayon Administration
Pilip Kremana, Batkivschyna Moloda
Kirill Liatsko, Alliance of Youth in the Regions of Ukraine
Vitaliy Miroshnikov, Batkivschyna Moloda
Totevos Mushegyan, Batkivschyna Moloda
Oleksiy Navrotskiy, Party of Regions
Yuriy Proschyn, Former Chief, BYuT Rayon Party Organization
Oleg Sitalo, Batkivschyna Moloda

Oleksandr Shvets, Kharkiv Press Club of Reforms
Yana Sorokina, Batkivschyna Moloda
Hanna Ulanovska, Kharkiv City Civic Group ASSA

Poltava

Oksana Derkach, Party of Regions
Serhiy Kyva, Batkivschyna
Yaroslav Pocharskiy, UDAR (Klichko Block)
Petro Vorona, Nasha Ukraina

Ľviv

Oleg Bas, Head of Oblast Branch, Party of Reforms and Order
Taras Hatalyak, Expert on legal issues
Bohdan Ischuk, People's Party
Yuriy Lukashevskiy, Head, Ľviv City Council, Civil Partnership Section
Oleh Matsekh, Coordinator, Public Forum of Ľviv
Alexander Neberykut, Expert on local authorities, OPORA Ľviv branch
Andriy Parubiy, Verhovna Rada Deputy, Nasha Ukraine
Yaroslav Pocharskiy, UDAR (Klichko bloc)
Viktor Rogov, Party of Regions
Olga Shostak, Head, Ľvivskyi Press Club

Ternopiľ

Stepan Barna, Deputy, Ternopiľ City Council
Vasyl Derevyanyi, Deputy, BYuT
Yaroslava Pavlina, head of oblast branch, Party of Regions
Ihor Stsibayl, Regional Coordinator, OPORA
Oleh Syrotyuk, Leader of Oblast Branch, Party Svoboda
Tetyana Tarasenko, Head, Ternopiľ Press Clus
Sergiy Tsvyk, Head of Oblast Branch, Young Socialists Movement

Results of recent elections

Table 1: Parliamentary elections

Party	2002		2006		2007	
	Votes*	Seats	Votes	Seats	Votes	Seats
Our Ukraine (Nasha Ukraina)	24.5	24.8	14.0	18.0	14.2	16.0
Communist Party of Ukraine	20.8	14.8	3.7	4.7	5.4	6.0
For a United Ukraine	12.2	22.6				
Batkivshchyna, a.k.a. Bloc of Yuliya Tymoshenko (BYuT)	7.5	4.9	22.3	28.7	30.7	34.7
Socialist Party of Ukraine	7.1	4.9	5.7	7.3	2.9	
Social Democratic Party of Ukraine (united)	6.5	5.4				
Party of Regions			32.1	41.3	34.4	38.9
Block of Lytvyn					4.0	4.4
Other parties, protest votes, spoiled ballots	21.4	2.0	22.2	0	8.4	0

NB: All cell entries are percentages.
* Votes on the proportional component of the ballot

Table 2: Presidential elections

Candidate	1999		2004		2010	
	1st round	2nd round	1st round	2nd round*	1st round	2nd round
Leonid Kuchma (independent)	38.0	57.7				
Petro Symonkenko (Communist)	32.1	38.8	5.1		3.5	
Oleksandr Moroz (Socialist)	11.8		6.0		.4	
Viktor Yushchenko (Nasha Ukraina)			41.1	52.8	5.5	
Viktor Yanukovych (Party of Regions)			40.5	44.9	35.3	49.0
Yuliya Tymoshenko (BYuT)					25.1	45.5

NB: cell entries are percentages.
* This is the 26 December re-held second round.