



Final Report

May 2008 – May 2011

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

USAID's Northern Uganda Transition Initiative (NUTI) commenced May 2008 and concluded May 2011. The three-year program supported the voluntary return of northern Ugandans displaced by the decades-long Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) conflict. The objectives of the NUTI program were to increase access to information on peace, recovery, and development issues; raise the visibility of - and confidence in - all levels of the Government of Uganda (GOU) in the north; and support truth and reconciliation.

The USAID Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) obligated \$23,829,799 to NUTI through its implementing partner Casals & Associates, Inc., A DynCorp International Company, to award and manage small grants to accelerate the transition from conflict to stability. The program awarded 280 grants worth \$14,006,030.

The NUTI grants and complementary GOU- and donor-funded initiatives steadily improved northern Uganda's stability, creating an environment that allowed in excess of a million people to return to their traditional homelands.

The NUTI grant program came at a critical juncture when humanitarian assistance dwindled and long term development funding was delayed. Identifying and filling short-term gaps by investing resources into the rehabilitation of education, health, local government, water, justice, and civilian security infrastructures, NUTI effectively supported the transition to peace and recovery in northern Uganda.

NUTI quickly established itself as the fastest moving program in northern Uganda. The program rehabilitated buildings in record time, developed content for vital information campaigns and radio programming, and supported ground-breaking reconciliation efforts in areas where the displaced were returning. The speed and capacity NUTI demonstrated in responding to the fluid needs of the post-conflict environment in northern Uganda generated ever-increasing demands from the local government and partners. NUTI quickly became the go-to program.

As activities expanded and funding increased, the program struggled to say adequately and appropriately staffed. The NUTI team, however, overcame the daily operational challenges, which were compounded by poor basic services and infrastructure, by engaging a committed and dedicated team of Ugandan and expatriate staff. Having the staff based in northern Uganda meant they were in touch daily with the reality on the ground and could understand and respond to the context. The team built solid professional relationships with their partners including the local governments, central government institutions, donors, and civil society organizations. When gaps emerged, the NUTI team found short-term fixes as it sought longer-term solutions. For example, during the protracted absence of a full-time operations manager, Casals fielded support staff from its headquarters (HQ). Similarly, during a ramp-up of construction activities, Casals engaged a private engineering firm to strengthen its monitoring, oversight, and quality control capacity.

By hiring a committed team, building partnerships, and fostering open communication, Casals and OTI, succeeded in executing quick-impact interventions in alignment with Ugandan government priorities and US government foreign policy interests.

INTRODUCTION AND COUNTRY SITUATION

Security, Economic, Political, and Transition Situation

During the program's life, significant political events and security sector changes occurred in northern Uganda, Uganda generally, and the East Africa region that favorably impact the NUTI



program. Since 2005, there were no attacks on Ugandan soil by the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). Ugandans became more confident in the improved security situation and stability across the north. Improved security created an enabling environment for over a million internally displaced persons (IDPs) to return to their homes from 121 internal displacement camps.

The confidence in the government's ability to protect the population from LRA attacks took place just as the GOU lost confidence in the Juba Peace Process (JPP), which commenced in 2006. After years of negotiations, marked by progress but no final signature by LRA rebel leader Joseph Kony, the GOU abandoned its attempts to end the conflict peacefully and opted for a regional military solution.

In December 2008, the Uganda People's Defence Forces (UPDF) launched Operation Lightning Thunder (OLT), a joint military operation with southern Sudan and Congolese military support, backed by intelligence, logistical, and training support from the US. The OLT offensive dislodged the LRA from Garamba National Park stronghold in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), but sent LRA forces on the run with devastating consequences for remote villages and civilians in DRC, southern Sudan, and the Central African Republic (CAR). Relatively small groups of LRA fighters raped, pillaged, killed, and abducted their way across a wide swath of sparsely populated, remote areas of these three countries where security was minimal. Given the resumption of UPDF military operations against the LRA and in the failure to reach a final peace agreement, the United Nations (UN) suspended the assignment of its Special Envoy for the LRA-affected areas, Joaquim Chissano, effective 30 June 2009.

As the GOU and international community abandoned the quest for a peaceful end to the conflict, the LRA perpetrated a wave of massacres and abductions. Among the most brutal were the 2008 "Christmas massacres". In a matter of a few weeks, the LRA killed and abducted hundreds of people in remote areas of DRC and southern Sudan, forcing tens of thousands to leave their homes and seek refuge. The UN estimated that hundreds of thousands of people have displaced fearing LRA reprisals since OLT began. The civilian casualties and population displacements were staggering considering that the USG and UPDF estimate that only a few hundred LRA fighters remain spread across three central African states in small groups.

Continuing LRA attacks in neighboring countries, notwithstanding, the GOU views the agreements related to peace, recovery, and development outlined in the Juba Peace Process as the best way to help northern Uganda accelerate development and match economic progress achieved in the rest of the country.

The GOU's hallmark program to support this was the Peace, Recovery, and Development Plan (PRDP). It was officially launched on 1 July 2008, with government funding arriving a year later. The PRDP is a \$660 million three-year affirmative action initiative to help northern Uganda recover from conflict. International donors and the US committed to funding 70% of the PRDP. Four objectives of the PRDP are:

- Consolidation of state authority;
- Rebuilding and empowering communities;
- Revitalizing local economies;
- Supporting peace building and reconciliation activities.

PRDP implementation is slow, but the GOU lived up to its program funding promises. The Ministry of Finance (MOF) allocated resources for war-affected districts to implement PRDP projects. International donors supported development efforts in the north in line with the PRDP framework. The NUTI program was created to respond to PRDP developments, with compatible NUTI and PRDP objectives.



During the three-year NUTI program, important legislation passed related to the LRA conflict. Uganda signed the International Criminal Court (ICC) Act in early 2010, which formalized the War Crimes Division of the High Court. Uganda is a signatory to the Rome Statute and was the first African country to refer cases to the ICC. In May 2010, President Museveni assented to the ICC Act in the lead up to an international review conference on the Rome Statute, which took place in Kampala. The Uganda ICC Act is not retroactive so it is uncertain whether jurisdiction for ICC indictments against senior LRA commanders will be transferred to Ugandan courts. In the meantime, Uganda's War Crimes Division advanced its first case against LRA commander Thomas Kwoyelo, in custody since March 2009.

In May 2010, the US Congress passed and President Obama signed into law the LRA Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act. As part of the law, the US developed a strategy for putting an end to the LRA, but the strategy received limited funding beyond military assistance. Current budget cuts and US economic concerns are limiting the chances that the bi-partisan US legislation will result in increased resources for northern Uganda's conflict recovery.

While LRA activities in Uganda diminished, Al-Shabaab terrorist threats increased. The Somali Islamist Insurgent group targeted Uganda and Burundi in retaliation for their troop and equipment contributions for the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). In July 2010, Al-Shabaab conducted its first successful attack outside of Somalia in Kampala, killing over 70 innocent people and injuring hundreds watching a World Cup soccer match. In another Al-Shabaab incident a bomb exploded in a Kampala-bound bus in Nairobi.

Increased terrorist threats in Uganda came at a critical time leading up to and following the Ugandan elections, causing the GOU and security forces to limit public assembly. The electoral process transpired smoothly, from the nomination of candidates through the official registration and voting periods. International observers cited an uneven political playing field that provided an advantage for the ruling party. Opposition parties rejected election results, alleging massive use of state resources. They claimed the passage of a supplemental budget during the campaign's last weeks was designed to sway votes in favor of President Museveni's National Resistance Movement (NRM) party. With the exception of a few unruly incidents in Kampala and Eastern Uganda, the elections were largely free of violence.

For northern Uganda, the elections were historically significant, as polling stations were moved from displaced camps to areas where northern residents are now permanently living. This called for targeted and rigorous voter registration and public information campaigns to inform populations of the issues, and dissuade them from engaging in violence. NUTI actively supported civic education activities throughout the electoral process.

Preceding the elections, President Museveni continued to support the division and creation of new districts. The international community and political opposition criticized the president's gerrymandering policy as a political tool to increase NRM support. The GOU's creation of new districts resulted in public expenditure for recurrent costs spiraling upward, diminishing social and economic development funding.

In Uganda's Acholi sub-region, the GOU established three new districts. All three are represented by NRM members of parliament, suggesting that the redistricting helped the NRM consolidate party support in the north, which historically has been an opposition stronghold. Two of the seven presidential aspirants, Mr. Olarra Otunnu and Mr. Norbert Mao, hailed from Acholi and ran vigorous presidential campaigns nation-wide attempting to unseat president Museveni. Combined, the two candidates garnered only 4% of the vote.



In the East Africa region, Kenya passed a new constitution, the first major overhaul since independence. Rwandans went to the polls and overwhelmingly reelected President Paul Kagame. The most significant regional political event from Uganda's perspective was the Sudanese Referenda, which resulted in South Sudan voting for secession and independence July 2011. While South Sudan voted in favor of independence, a second referendum established by the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was scheduled concurrently to determine whether the oil-rich region of Abyei would remain part of North Sudan or become part of the South. Referenda Commissioners from North Sudan succeeded in derailing the Abyei referendum claiming the two sides disagreed on the criteria for establishing residency and voter eligibility. Demarcation issues continued and violence simmered after the January Referenda period, erupting as the 11 July Independence date approaches.

Economic stability in northern Uganda, Sudan's division, and expanded EAC regional cooperation accelerated trade, particularly between Uganda and South Sudan. In the geographic gateway to South Sudan, the LRA-affected areas and the Acholi districts saw commerce increase and local economies expand. There are notable infrastructure investments. For example, Gulu reportedly has the highest concentrations of banks outside of Kampala and these are among Uganda's most profitable bank branches. Over three years, the Acholi sub-region experienced marked increases in diurnal and nocturnal trucking hauls to deliver goods to the growing and increasingly accessible market in southern Sudan. South Sudan applied to join the EAC in 2011.

Deepening regional trade across East Africa contributed to economic growth in northern Uganda. This growth should accelerate now that Uganda possesses the largest on-shore oil deposits discovered in Africa in 30 years with significant deposits located in Acholi. Despite optimism throughout Uganda about its economic outlook, the discovery and confirmation of vast oil deposits simultaneously exacerbated old tensions over land ownership. Alleged land grabbing by powerful political elites increased in Acholi as IDPs returned to their original homelands. Land disputes were especially acute in the newly created Nwoya District, where significant oil deposits were confirmed.

Despite the positive economic news, during NUTI lifespan, the country experienced a sustained rapid depreciation of the Uganda Shilling, whose value dropped 50%, and resulted in inflation. Analysts attributed the depreciation to high dollar demand stemming from economic growth, expanding regional trade, high pre-election expenditures, and defense-related procurements of military equipment, including fighter jets.

After failing to win the presidential election, opposition parties seized spiraling inflation as their new cause for anti-government and NRM protests. They joined forces under the umbrella group Activists-for-Change launching the Walk-2-Work (W2W) campaign. GOU security forces responded to peaceful protests with force, injuring and jailing scores of protesters, including opposition leader retired Colonel Dr. Kizza Besigye. Besigye sustained serious injuries requiring medical evacuation to Kenya. Three people died during W2W protests in Gulu. As NUTI ended, there were signs of a general perception that President Museveni was intolerant to opposition after 25 years in power. Since February 2011, longstanding leaders were challenged and are falling across North Africa and the Middle East. It became clear to observers that countries considered to be generally stable are vulnerable when they have predominantly young disenfranchised populations, economies ill-equipped to employ youth, rampant corruption, and oppressive leaders.

Although slow to start initially, private-, public-, and donor-funded reconstruction of northern Uganda gained speed and saw improvements throughout the war-affected north. Regardless of



the achievements and important steps made toward stabilization, Uganda appears politically fragile in its current political, social, and economic contexts.

PROGRAM OVERVIEW

In line with the GOU's PRDP and based on a OTI internal assessment of northern Uganda in February 2008 (which led to OTI's Uganda country program award to Casals), the overall goal of USAID/Uganda's OTI program was to support the voluntary return of displaced northern Ugandans by increasing their confidence in the GOU and in the transition process. To support this goal, OTI and Casals implemented the NUTI program to fulfill the following objectives:

- Increase access to information on peace, recovery and development issues in northern Uganda through support to the media and strategic communication activities;
- Increase the visibility of, and confidence in, all levels of government through the delivery of targeted strategic interventions;
- Support Truth and Reconciliation processes.

USAID obligated \$23,829,799 to NUTI. The program cleared 280 grants, spending \$14,006,030 (approximately 60%) of the total contract funding obligations on grant activities.

Consolidated Program Timeline

Date	Activity
16 May 2008	USAID/OTI awards contract to Casals & Associates, Inc. (C&A) to implement the Uganda program.
21 May 2008	OTI and C&A launch start-up conference at Casals' Alexandria offices.
1-4 June 2008	Casals start-up team arrives in Uganda and sets-up temporary offices in Gulu at the Acholi Inn.
June 2008	OTI and Casals jointly execute initial plans and interview prospective staff.
July 2008	New USAID Mission Director, David Eckerson, arrives. His first trip out of Kampala is to visit NUTI projects.
16-18 June 2008	OTI and Casals facilitate Gulu orientation workshop.
29 September 2008	Casals receives \$1.9 million funding from the Uganda Mission, earmarked for truth and reconciliation activities.
15-18 October 2008	OTI and Casals facilitate first strategic visioning and review session (SRS) in Jinja.
2-4 December 2008	Michael Hess, USAID/Assistant Administrator, DCM, and Mission Director, travel to northern Uganda to visit NUTI projects.
December 2008	Chief of Party travels to Washington to present program to OIT and USAID.
19-21 January 2009	USAID and Casals travel to Kitgum to initiate first Kitgum grants cleared in FEB 2009 and introduce local Kitgum staff hire in MAR 2009.
February 2009	OTI conducts Program Management Review (PMR).
20 June-2 July 2009	OTI conducts first Program Performance Review (PPR).
July 2009	NUTI commences expansion to Pader, staff hired for field office in August 2009
August 2009	USAID supports US senate delegation to northern Uganda and Odek NUTI projects
18-21 August 2009	External consultant facilitates NUTI team-building session and 100th grant celebration in Entebbe.



Date	Activity
September 2009	Pader office opens.
7-9 September 2009	External consultants, with OTI and Casals support, facilitate SRS in Kampala, where NUTI team receives award as OTI's best-managed field program.
January 2010	NUTI receives \$3.6 million in DOD-1207 funding community justice centers rehabilitation in LRA-affected areas.
March 2010	Casals opens Kampala Liaison and Logistics office.
8-9 July 2010	OTI and Casals launch team-building session in Mbale.
25 Jun-5 Jul	OTI conducts second PPR.
15 November 2010	Casals submits draft closeout plan.
7-9 February 2011	USAID staff closeout NUTI retreat on Lake Victoria.
15 February 2011	Program closeout begins.
28 March-4 April 2011	Todd Christiansen, DOS Coordinator for Stabilization and Reconstruction, visits northern Uganda to monitor 1207-funded performance projects.
3-21 April 2011	External consultants conduct NUTI evaluation.
April 2011	Kitgum and Pader NUTI offices close.
7 May 2011	NUTI celebrates closeout, attended by 300 people including USAID Mission Director and DOS Uganda Desk Officer.
15 May 2011	Uganda operations close.
15 Jun 2011	Contract ends.

Contract Deliverables

Throughout the life of the program, Casals submitted all deliverables required by the task order to OTI on time. Below is a comprehensive list of the deliverables submitted to OTI.

Description of Deliverable
Phase 1 - Start-up
Pre-Deployment
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Final work plan for Phase 1, including operational setup ■ Startup Conference in Washington, D.C.
In-Country Startup
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Deployment of startup team to Uganda ■ In-country Strategic Planning/Team Building Workshop held. ■ Contractor in-country legal status established ■ Field staffing plan completed, approved and implemented ■ Administrative procedures established, approved ■ Financial responsibility guidelines established and approved ■ Security plan established, approved ■ Operational and Emergency Communications plans finalized ■ Field procurement guide approved ■ Grant making capacity established ■ Activities management guide produced



Description of Deliverable

- Small grant procedures/forms established, approved
- Environmental Compliance procedures approved
- Monitoring and evaluation system established
- Monitoring and Evaluation plan approved
- USAID/OTI Activity Database established and in use
- Programming on Country Objectives begun
- Inventory list of USG property established (including for in-kind grants)
- End of Phase I Review session held

Phase 2 – Full Implementation and Close-out Preparation

Full Implementation

- Work plan updated and approved on a quarterly basis
- Quarterly in-country strategic planning and team building workshops
- Assistance in Program Performance, Management, and other Reviews
- Weekly uploads of the fully maintained and accurate USAID/OTI Activity Database.
- Written requests, as warranted, of modifications
- Revisions, as needed, to all deliverables and plans
- Carry out full programming in all objectives
- Establishment, set-up and support of optional sub-office(s) outside of Gulu
- Evidence of continuing contractor capacity for program activities

Close-Out Preparation

- Contractor contribution to USAID/OTI exit strategy
- Contractor close-out plan developed, approved

Phase 3 - Close-Out

- Weekly uploads of the fully maintained and accurate USAID/OTI Activity Database
- Evidence of satisfactory execution of close-out plan
- Archive plan approved, implemented
- Property disposition as per USAID regulations
- Contractor participation in final evaluation
- Participation in After Exit Review (AER) in Washington, D.C.
- Final close-out report and performance report to TOCTO

Grants Summary

Description	May 2008–May 2011
# Of Grants Cleared	280
# Of Grants Implemented	276
Dollar Amount of Grants Cleared	\$14,006,030
# Of Cancelled Grants	4
# Of Rejected Grants	36




PROGRAM AND GRANT HIGHLIGHTS


Program Focus

NUTI supported a diverse portfolio of small grants, which were primarily awarded in-kind. Only six of the 280 cleared grants were cash awards. NUTI's main two objectives were to (a) improve the quality and quantity of information available to people in northern Uganda and (b) increase confidence in the GOU.

Type of Organization	Number of Grants Awarded	Percentage of Total Grants	Total Value of Grants	Percentage of Total Expenditure
Community Organization	3	1.07%	\$18,330	0.13%
Host Government Entity--National	27	9.64%	\$2,566,834	18.33%
Host Government Entity--Local	172	61.43%	\$7,819,424	55.83%
International Organization	6	2.14%	\$610,589	4.36%
Local Organization	64	22.86%	\$2,503,062	17.87%
Private Entity	8	2.86%	\$487,790	3.48%
Total	280	100.00%	\$14,006,029	100.00%

Percentage of Grants Awarded By Grantee Type





As IDPs took a great leap of faith and returned to their homes, they demanded solid information about the return process, government plans, security, and services available in return areas so families could make informed decisions about their future. NUTI financially supported radio content development reaching the displaced and newly returned. Radio programming ranged from talk shows on returnees' issues of concern to dramas highlighting issues about the return process.

NUTI employed various strategic communications underwrote and covered platforms including short text messages, music, dance, and dramas; it underwrote transportation costs for local government officials to meet with and reach out to the public throughout Acholi. NUTI provided direct support to key radio stations increasing their management and technology capabilities that enhanced the content relevance and expand the audience base.



NUTI commenced just as local governments began to take responsibility for providing basic social services to the population, humanitarian resources dwindled, and international NGOs--normally the IDP primary caretakers--were scaling back programs. Local governments had little effective presence in return areas as many civil servants and political leaders had abandoned their field posts seeking refuge in urban areas. NUTI provided support so district and sub-county governments could take credit for NUTI projects which restored basic social service infrastructure in return areas.



In September 2008, during the first quarter of grant implementation and attributed to NUTI's demonstration of results just a few months after starting up in Uganda, the USAID Mission provided NUTI with \$1.9 million to support truth and reconciliation activities. NUTI added the program's third objective. During the final 15 months, NUTI received \$3.6 million from DOD through its 1207 stabilization activities. With that funding, NUTI restored civilian police, judiciary, and public prosecutorial presence and infrastructure in war-affected areas.

Geographic Targeting

NUTI awarded grants to assist communities in many different ways, reflecting its flexibility to react to the evolving context affecting the transition. The grants' range initiated during NUTI's first four months was based on emerging priorities of the time. These included grants to: rehabilitate schools and local government offices; provide agricultural tools and storage facilities; focus on information and outreach campaigns to support IDP return; stem the deadly Hepatitis E outbreak; reduce violence over land ownership; sponsor sports activities promoting peace; mark the formal end of camp management leadership structures; celebrate the restoration of normal local government structures; invite journalists to a forum to discuss issues; and launch NUTI's first perceptions survey that assisted the monitoring and evaluation process. This entrepreneurial approach to grant making was deliberate and helped the team acquire an initial sense of feasible options as well as challenges NUTI would face implementing different activities.

During NUTI's first formal strategic review session (SRS) mandated by OTI in October 2008, it became clear that to have much of an impact with limited funding resources of unknown reliability to cover a wide operating area, with overwhelming needs, most NUTI activities needed to target specific geographical areas. If not, the program risked spreading itself thin and spending disproportionate resources and time merely to access sites.

After the SRS, NUTI targeted multiple interventions at the sub-county level. The team felt this approach, would concentrate NUTI-supported activities where beneficiary communities could see and appreciate them. NUTI established criteria for comparing and selecting sub-counties to include:

- Number and percentage of displaced population returns;
- Availability of sub-county development plans;
- Presence of an in-residence, regularly working sub-county chief;
- Beneficiary communities willing to contribute to change;
- Sub-county needs;
- Sub-counties with completed or on-going NUTI projects;
- Political and historical considerations;
- Active parish development committees;
- Active women participation in sub-county affairs.

During its program life, NUTI targeted 10 sub-counties. NUTI averaged about \$300,000 in each targeted sub-county with spread amounts ranging from \$150,000 to over \$400,000.

During NUTI, the GOU divided Amuru, Kitgum, and Pader Districts, adding new districts of Nwoya, Lamwo, and Agago. The international community, including the US, criticized Kampala for dividing districts, which it viewed as one of President Museveni's strategies for getting additional votes at great economic cost to the country. The recurrent costs of establishing and running additional districts reduced the availability of government funding for economic and social development. NUTI made a decision not to expand its work into the new districts, unless projects were already ongoing in those areas as part of the 1207-funded restoration of the justice and civilian police infrastructure.



US Mission Partnership and Funding

NUTI received two funding tranches from the USAID Mission to support joint activities, jump-start long-term USAID programs and provide complementary funding for important USAID activities that were ending. Below are key examples:

- The USAID Mission and NUTI jointly funded the Public International Law and Policy Group (PILPG) to provide the GOU with technical assistance to draft the ICC Bill and establish the High Court's War Crimes Division.
- NUTI provided complementary funding to the Uganda Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS) to carryout two high profile launches of a tourism investment opportunities plan for northern Uganda. USAID's WILD program developed the plan.
- NUTI provided logistical support for Amuru district education week, which the district local government spearheaded to seek consensus about what could be done to improve the quality of education. This activity was collaborated with the Mission's flagship education program entitled UNITY/Replica.
- NUTI rehabilitated five health centers in northern Uganda, where USAID's flagship health initiative, NUMAT, provided technical assistance and material support.
- NUTI restored functionality and expanded production at two wells serving Kitgum town to commence USAID's flagship water initiative in Acholi entitled NUWATER.
- NUTI advanced media development activities, previously implemented by Internews, with funding from USAID's Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM) office. These included the creation of a Ugandan-managed Northern Uganda Media Center (NUMC), which is the only production studio open to journalists and the public to create media content in northern Uganda.
- NUTI and the US Embassy Public Affairs Office (PAO) jointly funded a successful "peace journalism program". The program trained hundreds of journalists, radio station owners, and broadcast managers on ethical and effective journalism that does not inflame ethnic, social, or political tensions leading to violence.
- NUTI funded elections-related activities to complement USAID-funded International Republican Institute (IRI) and the National Democratic Institute (NDI) projects.
- NUTI collaborated with the US Military on two specific activities. In 2006, the Combined Joint Task Force for the Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) deployed Civil Affairs teams (CATs) to work in northern Uganda. NUTI transformed a library built by these CATs in Kitgum into an LRA war memorial and archive. A cafeteria renovated by a CAT at Kitgum High School was fully restored and equipped by NUTI to increase the USG's total impact on the 1500-student school in a region decimated by LRA rebels.
- NUTI provided surge training, equipment, human resource capacities, and logistical support for the District Engineering and Public Works Offices. This support is critical to the implementation of USAID's newest flagship infrastructure program in northern Uganda entitled NUDEIL.

The close working-relationship between NUTI and the Mission to Uganda enabled the USG to leverage limited resources through initiatives that built on and complemented one another. NUTI received tremendous support from Embassy Kampala and USAID staffs at all levels. The Ambassador, Deputy Chief of Mission, Political Officer, and USAID Mission Director and Deputy Mission Director (DMD) frequently visited NUTI projects to encourage and endorse the program. NUTI was consistently cited as a high profile example that increased indigenous awareness of how the USG writ large responds to immediate post-conflict needs in northern Uganda in line with the PRDP.



Casals & Associates

Partnership and Support from GOU Central Government Institutions and Local Governments

NUTI cultivated strong partnerships with the GOU at all levels. President Museveni, Ugandan ministers, and senior GOU representatives regularly attended NUTI events and inaugurations. Local government leaders, who were initially ambivalent about NUTI's in-kind grant approach, soon appreciated NUTI's capacity to quickly implement activities using this approach. Government offices at various levels became NUTI's supporters. Of special note is the close partnership NUTI cultivated with the Justice Law and Order Sector in implementing the restoration of civilian police and justice infrastructure as part of the US Embassy's Community Law and Order Project.

The US Embassy gave this special project to NUTI to implement based on the program's success in executing fast-paced infrastructure projects. In all, community justice infrastructure worth over \$2.5 million was built in 16 months comprising newly rehabilitated buildings for the Uganda Police, Directorate of Public Prosecutions (DPP), and Judiciary. Uganda's Chief Justice, Deputy Chief Justice, Deputy Chief of the Uganda Police, the Director of Public Prosecutions, and many senior police, judiciary, and DPP officials participated in inaugurations, demonstrating the government's appreciation for NUTI's support. Strong partnerships with local and central governments contributed to NUTI's success.

Coordination with Development Partners


NUTI led coordination with development partners to execute complementary initiatives in northern Uganda. Working with UN Agencies, UN cluster coordination groups, USAID programs, international donors, and NGOs, NUTI ensured its investments complemented the ongoing work and plans in northern Uganda in ways that avoided duplication.

Grant Summary and Illustrative Grants

Objective	Number of Grants Awarded	Percentage of Grants Awarded	Value of Grants Awarded	Percentage of Total Grant Funding Awarded
Increase Access to Information on Peace, Recovery, and Development Issues in Northern Uganda through Support to the Media and Strategic Communications Activities	60	21.43%	\$1,993,259	14.23%
Increase the Visibility of and Confidence in All Levels of Government through the Delivery of Strategic, Targeted Interventions	191	68.21%	\$10,208,712	72.89%
Support to Truth and Reconciliation Processes	29	10.36%	\$1,804,059	12.88%
Total	280	100.00%	\$14,006,030	100.00%



Number and Value of Grants Awarded by Objective



Objective 1: Increase Access to Information on Peace, Recovery, and Development Issues in Northern Uganda through Support to the Media and Strategic Communications Activities.

Many grants under Objective 1 were highlighted earlier, particularly information and outreach campaigns contributing to free and fair electoral processes or capacity-development programs for media organizations and journalists. But NUTI also carried out activities that supported accountability as to how the GOU was using public resources, information campaigns on the recovery process, and promotion of exchange and investment in northern Uganda. These activities were important because transparency and corruption issues are viewed leading reasons why Ugandans' faith in government programs are uncertain.

Under this objective, NUTI paid for newspaper supplements that published data about local government funding disbursements for development activities. This information increased public awareness about the GOU's progress in implementing the PRDP and how the local governments invested the funding in the recovery.

Under this objective, NUTI produced music, video, and radio content about the recovery process. A NUTI-funded documentary about the recovery aired throughout Acholi, as did a weekly radio soap opera. Based on a NUTI-funded population survey carried out by UCAL Berkeley (UCB)'s Human Rights Center more than 60% of the population in Acholi listened to radio programs funded by NUTI.

Performing artists from northern Uganda gave concerts across the sub-region celebrating the prevailing peace and return process while simultaneously spreading information about peace and co-existence. NUTI supported a re-branding effort to dispel negative perceptions about the northern region that are still prevalent throughout Uganda. This idea again came from UCB's perception survey that determined misinformation and the "north-south divide" are the leading causes of a weak





sense of national unity in Uganda. Through grants, NUTI created a logo for northern Uganda; photographed and displayed hundreds of visuals documenting the transition to peace; produced a coffee table book of photographs highlighting the recovery; and promoted tourism investment opportunities.

In all, NUTI awarded 60 grants under objective one worth \$1,993,259.



Objective 2: Increase the Visibility of and Confidence in All Levels of Government through the Delivery of Strategic, Targeted Interventions.

Objective 2 activities supported infrastructure rehabilitation, furniture and equipment support to government structures, and capacity building and logistical support for local governments. Under Objective 2, NUTI rehabilitated 584 structures including schools, health centers, markets, local government offices, agricultural stores, and civil servant housing¹. NUTI provided vital surge short-term human resource support to districts, notably via the engineering offices, an initiative that is being carried forward by USAID's infrastructure program, NUDEIL. Surge human resource support was identified as a critical need by district governments and other donors responding to the PRDP.



¹ A map summarizing NUTI's infrastructure investments is included as Annex B.



NUTI complemented its infrastructure investments with support for capacity building. NUTI supported six-week training programs for district engineering staffs in all Acholi districts. NUTI provided training for construction contractors working with the districts, civil servants, elected counselors, and district procurement staff.

In addition to the infrastructure projects NUTI carried out in target sub-counties, NUTI invested significant resources in signature rehabilitation projects in each of the four original Acholi districts. In Gulu and Kitgum, NUTI rehabilitated district offices where the Resident District Commissioners (RDCs)--the highest-level district political appointees-- sit. RDCs, employed by the Office of the President, are responsible for coordinating government programs and security. NUTI provided office space and a council hall for the Pader District Local Government; secured offices and staff housing for Amuru District; and completed the unfinished Gulu District Administration Block. At the sub-county level, NUTI renovated or rehabilitated government office buildings in 10 sub-counties. Markets, schools, health centers, and boreholes were other infrastructure projects executed by NUTI in response to community needs voiced by local officials under NUTI's sub-county approach mentioned above.

In addition to infrastructure, NUTI supported activities to increase public confidence in local governments. These activities gave the government greater visibility, encouraged opportunities for Ugandans to visit the north, and helped change negative perceptions. In one highlighted activity, NUTI supported Gulu District to host the national primary athletics competition. The event brought Ugandan primary students and their teachers from every district to Gulu. Many students, their families, and teachers were afraid to travel to the north and expressed surprise when they found a stable, safe, and rapidly growing region.

NUTI helped local governments develop physical plans by engaging Kampala-based university professors and students of urban planning. Urban planning and physical plans are a requirement by the central government to transition rural trading centers into formally recognized townships. This transformation was vital to accelerate development as IDP camps closed and people started residing permanently in small trading areas not originally intended for large populations. To develop the plans, the local governments worked with Makerere University's architecture school. The plans greatly benefited local governments and provided university students opportunities to visit northern Uganda. These students contributed to positive developments and were dissuaded from harboring negative perceptions and fears that northern Uganda was an unfriendly and unsafe place.



In all, NUTI awarded 191 grants under objective two worth \$10,208,712.

Objective 3: Support to Truth and Reconciliation Processes.

In addition to supporting the War Crimes Division of the High Court and population-based surveys on peace and reconciliation, NUTI received \$1.9 million from the USAID Mission in September 2008 to provide grants for a wide-range of activities supporting truth and reconciliation between and within communities.



NUTI awarded most of these grants to Ker Kwaro Acholi, the traditional cultural leaders of the Acholi people. With NUTI funding, Ker Kwaro helped local chiefs conduct traditional Acholi cleansing and reburial ceremonies as well as traditional Acholi ceremonies to teach children positive social and cultural traditions. Wang Oo, which means fireside chats in the Acholi language, are evening gatherings where elders pass on Acholi culture to the youth. These activities sought to promote reconciliation by restoring Acholi traditions that were weakened during the LRA conflict because IDP camps were not conducive settings for organizing such events.

The protracted LRA conflict created tension between Acholi clans and related Luo tribes in bordering regions, including West Nile. To promote healing, NUTI supported reconciliation activities between the Acholi and Alur tribes and helped two communities in Muchwini sub-county in Kitgum district to resolve longstanding grievances stemming from massacres committed during the LRA war.

Perhaps the most noteworthy investment that NUTI made under Objective 3 was to support the Refugee Law Project (Uganda’s leading organization advocating for human rights, transitional justice, and the plight of displaced populations) and to create the LRA War Memorial and Documentation Center in Kitgum town. This center serves as Uganda’s national first archive and research center on the conflict.



In all, NUTI awarded 29 grants under objective three worth \$1,804,059.

PROGRAM IMPACT/SUCCESS

It is difficult to quantify and attribute NUTI’s transition impact for many reasons, including the relatively short-term nature of OTI’s interventions; however, there are indicators of success. While NUTI cannot take full credit for many changes that occurred as northern Uganda transitioned from conflict to stability, the program clearly made important contributions. Over 90% of IDPs returned to their homes and 90% of the IDP camps were closed largely due to the prevailing peace and ongoing regional development. Basic public services are servicing returnee areas and NUTI-targeted sub-counties have some of the best public infrastructure, local government offices, schools, health centers, and markets in Uganda. The local governments are firmly driving development and foreign confidence in their capacity reached the point that the US and other donors transferred some resources directly to districts to conduct development projects unilaterally, rather than working under external direction. The returnee population is engaged in economic activity after decades of humanitarian aid dependency, which is largely phased out in the north. In general local people and communities are reconciling with their neighbors.

The above assessment was shared and documented by OTI evaluators who visited NUTI annually as part of OTI’s PPR process, by internal impact assessments, visits to NUTI program sites by GOU officials and USAID Mission staffs, and by a March 2011 comprehensive final evaluation carried out by the QED group. These reports are available on OTI’s website.



PROGRAM CHALLENGES OR SHORTCOMINGS

In an environment like northern Uganda, daily challenges confront a fast-paced, in-kind grants program. During NUTI, there were periodic disruptions in power and water supplies, but most had minimal impact on operations because NUTI invested in water storage systems, inverters and batteries, and solar power backup systems for its offices and expatriate housing. A few severe storms left the Gulu office and expatriate staff housing without power and water for protracted periods, requiring extra time and effort to find temporary solutions. Additional disruptions posed challenges to operations, Internet communications and phone services when fuel supply disruptions and shortages occurred with or without warning.

Keeping the program staffed with adequate numbers of skilled employees and consultants needed to support the implementation pace was a constant struggle. The program lacked an Operations Manager (OM) for eight of the first 18 months of operations due to the termination of NUTI's first OM and a near fatal bout of malaria experienced by the second OM. Although short-term support was provided by various Casals/HQ staff, not having a full-time OM for a protracted period adversely affected NUTI's capacity to develop and evolve finance, procurement, and administrative systems needed to operate at maximum efficiency. The lack of an OM put incredible demands on the Chief of Party (COP), who juggled program management, while doubling as the OM and or supporting short-term Casals staff who had limited operations-management experience.

When NUTI started, neither the OTI staff nor the COP fully realized the extent to which resources needed to be directed toward infrastructure rehabilitation. As NUTI's early pilot program successes demonstrated it, could quickly execute high-quality rehabilitation, local governments requested increased support for similar projects. At the time, few other donor-funded initiatives were investing in infrastructure, so NUTI quickly filled the gap to become north Uganda's largest infrastructure support program.

Not realizing at the outset the extent that infrastructure would be a focus meant NUTI was constantly playing catch-up with regards to technical staffing. The rate of clearance of new rehabilitation projects outpaced NUTI's capacity to engage sufficient numbers of consultant engineers to develop systems, refine designs, and manage construction contractors for quality control. A couple of contractors took advantage of the lack of adequate oversight and cut corners, resulting in quality that did not meet NUTI standards and specifications. NUTI terminated three subcontracts and engaged other firms to re-do and complete unfinished works.

Frequent rumors spread of corruption NUTI contracting and contract management. NUTI investigated all allegations with zeal, however, the protracted absence of an OM and the COP's lack of engineering expertise limited NUTI's internal capacity to provide technical oversight. In retrospect, NUTI should have engaged a full-time expatriate engineer. Having such a professional would have allowed contract modifications to be reviewed from a technical perspective rather than a purely administrative perspective. A full-time expatriate engineer would have provided consultant engineers and contractors with another level of technical oversight and support.

As a stopgap measure, when the quantity and pace of rehabilitation projects outstripped NUTI's capacities, the program engaged a private engineering firm, COWI, for surge engineering support. COWI provided valuable supervision of sub-contractors working on one of the 1207-funded community justice centers. COWI was less successful when asked to supervise repair contracts for several NUTI rehabilitation projects. COWI's engagement came at a significant program cost. In the Uganda context, where construction contractors have limited financial and technical capacities, and corruption and cost-cutting dodges are the norm, significant



investments had to be made for multiple levels of internal and external oversight to ensure quality and minimize corruption.

The program faced capacity constraints among its allies, notably NUTI's local government partners. In most cases, grantee partners went the extra mile to perform and fulfill or exceed obligations under their in-kind grant agreements. However, some local governments lacked capacity to meet NUTI's demands and keep up with the program's implementation pace.

NUTI and OTI's timeline expectations were not realistic in the northern Uganda context. OTI's pressure to implement quickly occasionally compromised the quality of end results. For example, more extensive initial engagement with community members about NUTI program and its potential grants might have improved local sense of ownership. Consultations with sub-county and district governments were sometimes conducted hastily and direct engagement between NUTI and community leaders was too limited in retrospect. This lapse resulted in the direct beneficiaries having insufficient knowledge about how NUTI and its local government partners selected projects or what to expect.

More time should have been applied in the technical design and costing phase of infrastructure investments incorporating additional review levels. Once OTI approved grants, engineers were expected to design and cost new infrastructure in a matter of days so the procurement process for construction contractors could begin. This timeline did not allow adequate cross checking of designs and costing. As mentioned above NUTI was not staffed to provide adequate internal technical review.

Monitoring and evaluation continued to be a challenge in NUTI's dynamic environment. This issue is not new to OTI programs and was faced by NUTI in Uganda. Adding to the challenge of capturing impact of a non-traditional stabilization and transition program that cherished its fast pace, NUTI struggled to find qualified managers to oversee the evaluation process and build a learning organization with program staff. Two senior M&E staff members left NUTI, which led to ongoing changes in the way that M&E was conducted between OTI and NUTI.

PROGRAM MANAGEMENT

Organizational Structure

NUTI maintained a flat organizational and management structure. Open and honest communication among all levels of employees, consultants, senior management, OTI, and partners was encouraged. The lack of hierarchy and bureaucracy enabled the NUTI team to respond quickly to emergent program needs and environmental changes. However, the lack of hierarchy was unnatural and thus uncomfortable for NUTI's Ugandan staff, consultants, and partners. Uganda has a highly formal hierarchical society and attaches great cultural significance to protocol and deference to authority. Some Ugandans working with NUTI complained about the lack of formality. Ultimately, however, most NUTI associates realized the lack of hierarchical formality enabled faster program speed and empowered Ugandan staffers and consultants to make decisions enabling smooth program implementation.

Based on the first strategic review in October 2008, and lessons learned from the initial months of operations and grant making, NUTI reorganized its staff. Initially, program and procurement staff worked as separate teams. That resulted in unproductive divisions between the teams. As the pressure increased on NUTI to accelerate programming the program and procurement teams each blamed the other for delays. To break the negative behavior pattern and improve efficiency, NUTI reorganized the staff into grant teams, comprised of a program development officer, procurement associate or officer, and associate program development officer. The new structure enabled the grant teams to work together for smooth program implementation. It also



allowed program and procurement teams to experience, understand, and appreciate the challenges and stresses each team member faced.

From NUTI's outset, OTI and Casals worked closely to identify employees who had the desired skills, experience, and attitudes to fit the program and teams. By recruiting jointly, OTI and Casals believed the individuals hired for NUTI were the right choices. NUTI had an extremely low turnover rate. Over NUTI's project lifespan only 13 staff separated amiably for better opportunities, resigned or were terminated for performance issues. Women were strongly encouraged to apply for NUTI jobs and comprised 50% of its employee base. Having an equal gender balance contributed to the program's high performance.

During NUTI, Casals established three sub-offices: one logistical and procurement office in Kampala and two field program offices in Kitgum and Pader. Program development officers headed the field offices, which employed procurement, finance and administrative support staff. The finance and administrative officer headed the Kampala office. The flat organizational structure was replicated in the field. Decision-making and problem solving were delegated to the field teams, but direct reporting lines were maintained. Program staff reported to the COP and procurement, finance, and administrative staff to the OM and Procurement Manager (PM), once these positions were filled. Casals equipped all offices with high-speed Internet connections and provided access to the server and shared files. Phone and email communication among offices were maintained throughout NUTI.

As program funding increased, the geographical area expanded, and staffing grew, OTI and Casals recognized the need to engage a third expatriate staffer. The addition of a full-time PM contributed to effective program management by accelerating and streamlining the procurement process. Procurement staff finally found a dedicated professional to support and mentor them to find solutions to the challenges of procuring a vast array of goods and services with minimal lead times.

The OTI-Casals Relationship and Communication

OTI and Casals worked together as one team. Both Casals and OTI relied heavily on each other's guidance and support. Daily, sometimes hourly, consultation occurred among Casals and OTI staff. OTI was encouraged to participate in Casals staff meetings, even when only internal matters were on the agenda. If OTI was not available, minutes were provided. These frequent consultations and professional relationships ensured both parties understood the program's status, challenges, and allowed for open discussions and joint problem solving. Activity, staff movement, and leave schedules were shared with OTI, so they knew where Casals staff physically were located and what tasks they were working. The open communication between Casals and OTI contributed significantly to the strong professional relationships built in the field.

Frequent direct communications between OTI and Casals had the potential to cause confusion. To avoid misunderstandings and ensure directives were known and understood throughout, both sides copied either the Casals COP or OTI Country Representative on all OTI-Casals email, correspondence and communication. If communication lapses occurred, all parties were reminded of this requirement.

NUTI field and headquarter teams respected and maintained OTI's "Four Corners relationship" throughout the program. During the final phase of the program, staff from the OTI/Washington and Casals/HQ corners deployed to Uganda. During this period, more open communication across corners made sense and was agreed to by all parties.



Turnover of Casals/HQ Staff and Acquisition of Casals by DynCorp International

During program, Casals assigned three different senior technical advisors/task order managers and three program coordinators to the NUTI program. All HQ assigned staff provided superb support to the COP and were generous with their time, making frequent visits to the field to fill in when needed. In January 2010, DynCorp International (DI) acquired Casals. Initially both Casals/HQ and OTI/Washington staffs feared the change would negatively impact NUTI. While DI gradually introduced new systems and oversight levels, the impact on NUTI's performance was minimal and is to be commended. The fact that the acquisition of Casals by DI did not negatively affect ongoing programming in Uganda was cited by OTI's final NUTI evaluation implemented by the QED Group in March 2011.

Professional Development Fund

OTI/Casals realize that the Ugandan NUTI staff undertook professional risks by working with a short-term program that did not offer long-term job security. Northern Uganda's future rests with the professionals like the NUTI staff who will remain to guide Uganda's transition from conflict to stability. As a result, OTI established a fund for professional development for all Ugandan NUTI staff through its contract with Casals.

NUTI spent approximately \$59,000 on tuitions for professional development training programs and the engagement of a professional firm to provide group training and one-on-one advice to help NUTI staff find jobs after the program ended. The average tuition for each training cost about \$1,500. Travel, accommodation, and per diem costs varied depending on the location and duration of the training, but averaged \$1,350 per training with an overall cost of about \$41,000. Most NUTI staff chose training courses related to their NUTI work. The operations staff enrolled primarily in training related to finance, procurement, and administration. Program staff enrolled in courses on peace-building, monitoring and evaluation, and project management. The NUTI staff without exception were enthusiastic about the skills they gained during their individual training as well as the general training provided on job hunting. Most NUTI staffs hope to continue working in development both in northern Uganda and/or other parts of the country. All expressed confidence that their experience working for NUTI and specific knowledge gained during trainings would assist them in future assignments.

The program development fund was greatly appreciated by the NUTI staff and contributed to NUTI's retaining almost all employees who benefited from training through the end of the program. Although the training fund was discussed and approved in principal in July 2010, about mid-way through the contract, most NUTI staff did not begin accessing this support until the program's last six months. This resulted in many employees being absent from the program at the same time, particularly during the critical final closeout phase. Formalizing the professional development fund earlier and setting earlier schedules and deadlines for staff to access the fund could have enabled a phased approach for the actual trainings and avoided end-of-program staff absences.

Disposition of Property

As NUTI prepared for closure, it worked closely with the OTI and USAID Mission staff to determine the most appropriate beneficiaries for NUTI and IT non-expendable and expendable property or equipment. NUTI handed over all its property to 21 distinct entities including both USAID implementing partners and NUTI grantees. The actual disposition of property was completed during the final days of NUTI. This was not ideal, but understandable and even necessary. Staffs were preoccupied with numerous closeout tasks until May 15th's last day of active field operations and even a few days beyond that. The late disposition of property notwithstanding, the process went smoothly. For the most part, beneficiaries came to the NUTI



offices to collect their items. For those that could not, such as district local governments, NUTI hired a truck for direct deliveries.

The largest recipient of NUTI property was USAID's NUDEIL program. NUDEIL did a comprehensive review of all equipment received and provided NUTI with a detailed itemized list. Unfortunately, this process took NUDEIL longer than expected and as a result, NUTI had to wait until the last days of the contract to submit the final disposition of its inventory to USAID because it had to reconcile the list NUDEIL provided with its own lists. Ideally NUTI would have begun the disposition of its property earlier.

MONITORING AND EVALUATION

OTI and Casals jointly developed and implemented NUTI's monitoring and evaluation (M&E) plan, approved by OTI in Washington DC in November 2008. The M&E plan included an array of activities and instruments to monitor and evaluate NUTI's impact. They include 18 different steps targeting the strategic (political analysis), programmatic (objectives), and activity (grants) levels. Casals engaged a two-person M&E team comprised of the M&E manager, subsequently hiring an M&E officer when the manager took up a position with the USAID Mission, and a database coordinator. NUTI engaged partners to carry out two perception surveys, conducted regular three-month-after evaluations, piloted customer satisfaction surveys, and engaged COWI--a private engineering firm--to evaluate the value-for-money of NUTI's infrastructure investments. OTI staff and consultants frequently visited NUTI and, carried out one management review and two PPRs. The data and findings of these M&E activities informed NUTI program development and management. OTI engaged a firm to conduct an external final evaluation of NUTI.

Findings calling for changes and improvements in grant making were not always welcomed by NUTI staff, which often perceived the recommendations as direct criticisms. Some felt the findings pointed to management weaknesses in grant activities, procurement, work ethic, or finance handlings. Much of this rejection and sensitivity to M&E findings stemmed from personality conflicts. OTI and NUTI could have worked harder to re-frame the M&E function as a Learning Organization function. There is no guarantee that reframing M&E that way would have forestalled the sensitivities because these types of communications are not widely practiced in professional Ugandan work culture. That said, consistent reference to learning rather than M&E might have helped to dissipate the innate human sensitivity to perceived criticism.

Beyond internal learning, NUTI sought to share its lessons-learned and surveys with professional partner organizations. Given the scale and breadth of support NUTI provided toward infrastructure rehabilitation, NUTI helped USAID and UNDP to convene a workshop where donors and implementing partners shared lessons-learned concerning infrastructure development. NUTI's COP, consultant engineers, M&E Officer, and COWI consultants presented their experiences with participants from the World Bank, European Union, JICA, USAID, UNDP, Danida, UKAID, and other key donors supporting infrastructure. NUTI buttressed meetings by disseminating data findings, distributing surveys, and providing value-for-money audits to interested parties.

LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Multiple lessons were learned during NUTI operations. Listed below are significant findings that may assist the design and execution of future OTI programs:

- As OTI programs are rarely funded to the contract ceiling, OTI must be clear with its implementing partners that they are required to budget and to staff programs in line with incremental financial obligations rather than to the contract ceiling.
- OTI should consider employing full-time, in-house expatriate engineers on programs where rehabilitation work is a significant component.



- Community consultations are time consuming and may appear to mitigate against OTI's desire for immediate impact. To increase the chances for sustainability of big-ticket, high visibility OTI grants, direct community engagement is required to ensure that beneficiary communities fully understand the program and their role.
- OTI implementing partner visits by HQ staffs should serve as opportunities for oversight, field staff training, OTI and USAID staff meetings, and to experience the challenges of field operations. Such broad experiences would convey insights on how best to remotely support field programs.
- M&E should be referred to as organizational learning activity under the precepts of a Learning Organization.
- A field presence is essential to overall program impact. NUTI benefited from having a headquarters and a USAID field office in Gulu where an OTI staff member resided. NUTI's success would not have been possible if it were headquartered hours away in Kampala.
- More work needs to be aimed at developing M&E systems for stabilization programs that operate on short time frames and aim at quick impact. Much of M&E works, but mostly on the monitoring side. Evaluations suffer because the grant impacts often are unclear until months or years after a program concludes operations.
- Constant communication is key to success. Casals and OTI needed to communicate daily to properly implement the dynamic program. During start up, an agreed communication structure needs to be established, approved, and understood. OTI staff should communicate directly with implementing partner program staff. COPs need to be comfortable with open communication for grant management to work with maximum efficiency.
- Casals and OTI staff consistency is essential from start-up through closeout. NUTI benefited from having the same senior field staff members engaged from beginning to end. As a result, OTI and Casals generally did not require TDY management coverage.
- OTI should preclude grant-related activities during the program's final 45 days.
- Property disposition to multiple beneficiaries is complicated. If undertaken, the transfers should commence no later than 30 days before program conclusion, leaving on hand only property absolutely required for closeout processing.

CONCLUSION

With limited resources, NUTI's dedicated and hard-working team impacted positively the lives of northern Ugandans in LRA conflict areas. NUTI built strong partnerships with grantees, communities, local governments, central government institutions, the US Mission, USAID programs, and development partners. NUTI's profound legacy is highly visible in the rehabilitated infrastructure it created. Many local leaders credited NUTI with restoring their faith in the US's capacity to be humble, listen to priorities, and respond to their needs. Donors lauded NUTI for its ability to coordinate their support, maximize investment impact, and avoid duplication of effort. The program achievements exceeded internal and external expectations. NUTI's success was due to its ethos defined by hard work, humility, respect, team building, and partnerships.



LIST OF ANNEXES

Maps for Northern Uganda Transition Initiative

Annex A—Elections

- NUTIElection_2011-04-21
- PresidentialResults2011_Subcounty

Annex B—Infrastructure

- NUganda_OTI_1207Infrastructure_2011-4-18
- NUganda_OTI_Infrastructure_Final

Annex C—Objective

- Delivery of Services_2011-4-21
- Media and Strategic Comms_2011-4-21_Format2
- NUTIAreasofImplementation
- NUTIPRDP_2011-4-21
- PeaceandReconciliation_2011-04-21

Annex D—Survey


- CaresaboutAchoi
- DeliveryofServices
- EnsureFreeandFairElections
- HeardofPRDP
- IsPeacePermanent
- NUTIFundedPrograms
- NUTIFundedRadioStations
- ProvisionofSocialServices
- QualityofEducation
- QualityofHealthServices
- QualityofPolice
- UnitingNorthandSouth

Annex E—Youth

- NUganda_OTI_YEP_2011-5-13
- NUganda_OTI_YOUTH_2011-4-21




PROMOTING PEACE AND PARTICIPATION IN 2011 ELECTIONS OTI NORTHERN UGANDA





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
VOTES FOR NATIONAL RESISTANCE MOVEMENT IN 2011 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS






USAID
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SUPPORTING PUBLIC SERVICES: RENOVATED INFRASTRUCTURE OTI NORTHERN UGANDA





PROGRAM OBJECTIVE #2 NORTHERN UGANDA TRANSITION INITIATIVE (NUTI)





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NORTHERN UGANDA TRANSITION INITIATIVE (NUTI)

PROGRAM OBJECTIVE #1


PROGRAM OBJECTIVE #1: INCREASE ACCESS TO INFORMATION ON PEACE, RECOVERY AND DEVELOPMENT ISSUES IN NORTHERN UGANDA THROUGH SUPPORT TO THE MEDIA AND STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION ACTIVITIES.

TOTAL
59 Activities
for \$1,996,604.43
(14.2% of Total Program Funds)

Documentary on Peace, Recovery and Development



Peace, Development and Electoral Journalism Training



LEGEND

Media

- ▲ Capacity Building
- ▲ Radio Station Support

Strategic Communications

- Cultural Revival
- Elections
- National Unity
- Peace, Recovery and Development
- Return Process
- Youth

Data as of: 4.21.2011
Date of map creation: 4.22.2011

DISTRICT-WIDE ACTIVITIES*

	▲	▲	●	●	●	●	●	●
Agago	7	1	1	4	1	4	2	1
Amuru	6	1	7	1	4	1	2	
Gulu	10	1	6	2	6	1	2	
Kampala	2			5	1			
Kitgum	9	1	1	5	1	6	2	2
Lamwo	7	1	1	5	1	5	2	1
Nwoya	4	1	7	1	4	1	1	
Pader	9	1	1	4	1	4	2	2

*District-wide activities are NUTI activities, such as radio spots, that occur throughout entire districts rather than in specific locations. These activities do not appear on the map.

*District-wide activities are NUTI activities, such as radio spots, that occur throughout entire districts rather than in specific locations. These activities do not appear on the map.

KEY


- District
- Subcounty
- Parish
- River

Source: District-Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBOS) 2010, Subcounty and Parish-UBOS 2006.

OTI
GEOGRAPHIC INFORMATION UNIT
USAID/DCHA/OTI

NORTHERN UGANDA


The boundaries and names used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the U.S. Government.





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NUTI FOCUS SUBCOUNTIES AND OTHER IMPLEMENTATION AREAS






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UGANDA'S PEACE, RECOVERY AND DEVELOPMENT PLAN (PRDP)

USAID/NUTI'S ACTIVITIES BY PRDP OBJECTIVE AND FUNDING AMOUNT






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PROGRAM OBJECTIVE #3 NORTHERN UGANDA TRANSITION INITIATIVE (NUTI)


PROGRAM OBJECTIVE #3: SUPPORT TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION PROCESSES.






NORTHERN UGANDA TRANSITION INITIATIVE PERCEPTION SURVEY 2010:

I BELIEVE THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT CARES ABOUT ACHOLI PEOPLE






NORTHERN UGANDA TRANSITION INITIATIVE PERCEPTION SURVEY 2010: DO YOU THINK THAT THE GOVERNMENT IS USING RESOURCES FOR SERVICE DELIVERY APPROPRIATELY?




NORTHERN UGANDA TRANSITION INITIATIVE PERCEPTION SURVEY 2010: TO WHAT EXTENT IS THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT ENSURING FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS?






NORTHERN UGANDA TRANSITION INITIATIVE PERCEPTION SURVEY 2010:

HAVE YOU HEARD OF THE PEACE, RECOVERY AND DEVELOPMENT PLAN?



NORTHERN UGANDA TRANSITION INITIATIVE PERCEPTION SURVEY 2010:


IS THE CURRENT TRANSITION TO PEACE PERMANENT OR TEMPORARY?






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
NORTHERN UGANDA TRANSITION INITIATIVE PERCEPTION SURVEY 2010: HAVE YOU HEARD OF THE FOLLOWING NUTI-FUNDED OUTREACH PROGRAMS REGARDING PEACE, RECOVERY AND DEVELOPMENT?




NORTHERN UGANDA TRANSITION INITIATIVE PERCEPTION SURVEY 2010: WHAT RADIO STATION(S) DO YOU MAINLY LISTEN TO?




NORTHERN UGANDA TRANSITION INITIATIVE PERCEPTION SURVEY 2010: TO WHAT EXTENT IS THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT HANDLING THE PROVISION OF SOCIAL SERVICES?




NORTHERN UGANDA TRANSITION INITIATIVE PERCEPTION SURVEY 2010: HOW DO YOU FEEL ABOUT THE QUALITY OF YOUR HEALTHCARE SERVICES?



NORTHERN UGANDA TRANSITION INITIATIVE PERCEPTION SURVEY 2010: HOW DO YOU FEEL ABOUT THE QUALITY OF POLICING IN YOUR COMMUNITY?




NORTHERN UGANDA TRANSITION INITIATIVE PERCEPTION SURVEY 2010: TO WHAT EXTENT IS THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT UNITING NORTH AND SOUTH UGANDA?



Annex E—Youth



NORWEGIAN REFUGEE COUNCIL-MANAGED VOCATIONAL TRAINING CENTERS & NORTHERN UGANDA TRANSITION INITIATIVE-SUPPORTED FURNITURE PRODUCTION





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