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USAID/TANZANIA ASSESSMENT OF DONOR HARMONIZATION PRACTICES

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¹ Team members include Dale Gibb of Global Health, Adrian N'gasi of the Office of Development Partners (ODP), and Steven Pierce, of the Bureau for Africa (AFR).

Executive Summary

Objective

In response to a request from USAID/Tanzania in October of this year, a team from USAID/Washington conducted an assessment of the mission's donor harmonization practices. Specifically the team was asked to:

1. Document those actions that USAID is doing well to meet its obligations under the Joint Assistance Strategy for Tanzania (JAST) that should be communicated to the Government of Tanzania (GOT) and development partners, as well as other USAID Missions;
2. Identify and recommend further opportunities for USAID/Tanzania to more fully participate in donor harmonization efforts;
3. Identify internal and Agency-level resources and policy and procedural constraints that hinder USAID's ability to harmonize and provide recommendations on overcoming constraints; and
4. Review coordination mechanisms between USG agencies and departments administering U.S. foreign assistance in Tanzania, and provide guidance on coordinating with, and bringing in, other USG agencies into the JAST, the GOT's planning/reporting process, and participation at applicable Development Partners Working Groups.

Given Tanzania's strong focus on donor harmonization and in keeping with the five principles of the Paris Declaration—ownership, alignment, harmonization, managing for results, and mutual accountability—USAID/Tanzania requested assistance from USAID/Washington to evaluate current harmonization efforts and identify additional opportunities to further harmonize, as well as any constraints that hinder such efforts.

To carry out the assessment, the team interviewed a diverse range of individuals from development partner agencies, senior and technical staff from the GOT (from both central and line ministries), USAID/Tanzania, MCC, the U.S. Embassy, and other U.S. agencies operating in country. In addition, the team reviewed numerous documents designed to guide Tanzania's development policy and strategy and development partner behavior, such as the JAST.

To fully grasp the emphasis of this report, two caveats must be noted. First, while the focus of the study is USAID/Tanzania, harmonization efforts in the country necessarily overlap with and are affected by the activities and of other USG agencies operating foreign assistance programs in country and are thus included here, albeit in lesser detail. Second, due to the volume of funding and prominence of health programming in Tanzania, the report treats health as a tracer sector, though other strategic objective areas/sectors are included to a lesser degree. One further note: the report is, in large part, based on the perspectives of development partners and GOT officials, and not on a more objective set of criteria.

Context

Tanzania is widely considered an international leader in aid effectiveness and donor harmonization, with joint government–development partner (DP) commitments, initiatives, and activities dating back to 1997. The GOT received better-than-average marks in the recent Paris Declaration Monitoring Survey for its performance in improving aid effectiveness.

The Development Partners Group (DPG) was formally established in 2004 in order to build a coordinated DP response to the Government’s Tanzania Assistance Strategy of 2002 – 2005 (TAS) within the overarching framework of its first generation Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS). Since the formalization of the DPG, the DPs have moved towards increasingly close collaboration and improved internal coherence. The DPG aims to support national efforts to achieve Tanzania’s growth and poverty reduction goals, which today means promoting the implementation of the Paris Declaration Principles on Aid Effectiveness in Tanzania. The DPs continue to respond positively to the harmonization and alignment agenda, and have established Working Groups (WGs) to promote this agenda at sector and thematic levels.

In July 2006, the Joint Assistance Strategy for Tanzania (JAST) came into force. The JAST is a government-led, national medium-term framework intended to promote more effective external assistance, manage development cooperation, and help achieve national development and poverty reduction goals under Tanzania’s second generation results-based poverty reduction strategies (MKUKUTA for mainland Tanzania, MKUZA for Zanzibar). The JAST seeks to further enhance national ownership and government leadership of the development process and includes commitments on alignment, increased use of government systems, increased aid predictability, open dialogue between government and domestic stakeholders, improved division of labor, and a move towards the government’s preferred aid modalities.

Owing in large part to the efforts of USAID/Tanzania and the Mission Director’s work with the DPG in particular, a quality strategy was drafted that the United States was able to sign.

Major Findings

The major findings of this assessment generally fall into one of several categories, three of which can be characterized by significant “gaps” between optimal and current levels of performance:

- 1. Positive view of USAID officials’ participation in DPWGs:** DPs and GOT alike were uniform in their praise of USAID representatives’ participation in the DPG and WG activities and meetings. The general consensus was that USAID participation, led by the Mission Director, is active, professional, **transparent**, and instrumental in moving aid harmonization efforts forward. Several informants noted, however, that USAID participation seems to be constrained in many instances by USAID/Washington policy, Congressional influence, or the agendas of multiple U.S. agencies.
- 2. Gap in message/outreach:** In Tanzania, among other development partners and a majority of GOT officials, the United States is known more for what it does not

do, than what it does. In a highly-charged harmonization environment where peer pressure is a widely used tool, we are known as the DP that does not provide budget support and does not harmonize or align our HIV/AIDS (PEPFAR) funding.

3. **Gap in coordination:** There is uneven coordination of donor harmonization efforts both vertically within USAID and, more importantly, across agencies where very little coordination is taking place outside of HIV/AIDS and malaria. This is mainly due to severely limited human resource levels and a relative absence of facilitating structures and procedures, along with a lack of interagency coordination in Washington.
4. **Gap in policy guidance:** Policy guidance from USAID/Washington with regards to implementing Paris Declaration principles is sparse and is even more acute in other USG agencies. As a result of this policy vacuum, the Mission is unclear about what is expected and what is preferred by Washington in terms of complying with Paris. As is the case elsewhere in the sub-Saharan Africa, myth or “perceived” Washington policy and self-censure guide practice and decision-making.
5. **Negative perception of PEPFAR with respect to harmonization and alignment:** In general, the United States is perceived by some DPs and GOT ministries (line ministries generally hold a more positive view) as an outlier when it comes to harmonization and alignment. PEPFAR, in particular, is seen as a lone ranger initiative, neither aligned with GOT health policy and strategy nor harmonized with other DP programs. The more strident criticism claims that this lack of alignment is creating severe system-wide distortions in the health sector.
6. **Aid on budget and use of country systems:** Post is anxious to comply with Paris principles advocating increased use of country systems and putting aid on budget. However, it has had limited success in doing so, owing to a lack of GOT capacity to capture project assistance², internal “know-how” limitations within the GOT and USG agencies, and a lack of specific internal requirements mandating the practice.
7. **Lack of clarity regarding other USG representation in Tanzania:** Several DPs expressed concern about the multi-headed USG structure in Tanzania. For example, DPs noted that differentiating a lead USG voice when engaging USAID, MCC, and CDC is becoming increasingly difficult.

Key Recommendations

1. **Develop a U.S. corporate message:** Post should proceed to craft a simple message describing what we do (major objectives and strategy) in Tanzania in positive terms. It need not be more than two or three key points. The Ambassador and other key officials (from all USG agencies) should repeatedly share these points at public events and meetings with key stakeholders. Ideally, the message

² The GOT is able to capture general and sector budget support, but seems to lack both the capacity and will to record project-based assistance.

would include a reference to the importance of complementarity, flexibility, and improving aid effectiveness.

2. **Hire a full-time employee to coordinate harmonization activities:** Demands on staff skills and time related to harmonization and other Paris Declaration principle activities are at an all time high and are increasing. This is straining human resources and taking time away from program management duties. A full-time position dedicated to coordinating harmonization activities would relieve this burden on staff, add specialized technical donor coordination (including financial coordination) knowledge to the Mission, bring coherence in harmonization efforts, and ensure relevant information is captured, filtered, and disseminated appropriately.
3. **Establish a USG/Tanzania Harmonization Coordinating Committee:** The Ambassador could convene a monthly Donor Coordination Working Group meeting, inviting senior officials from all USG agencies operating in Tanzania. While we hesitate to recommend yet another meeting, it would serve to disseminate needed information and form collective response to key issues. It might be organized and coordinated by USAID and pertinent information from all levels of development partner working group meetings (general, sector, and sub-sector) could be shared, discussed, and acted upon when relevant.

Note: It is our opinion that having a single USG representation will strengthen U.S. development policy coherence and message in Tanzania.

4. **Provide clear guidance on Paris Declaration:** USAID/Washington should give highest priority to the development of a Donor Coordination Toolbox, which would include, among other things, clear policy guidance on implementing Paris Declaration principles and good practice. USAID/Washington should also lead discussions with OGAC, HHS/CDC, MCC, and other agencies to develop uniform USG guidance on implementing the Paris Declaration in the field.
5. **Designate a limited portion of DA/ESF OYB for program-based approaches where appropriate:** USAID/Tanzania may wish to consider limited participation in basket funds. This would be seen as an act of good will on the part of the GOT and other DPs, and would gain USAID increased leverage in dialogue around policy and governance conditionality.
6. **Engage MCC/Tanzania in discussions about using country systems to participate in governance and policy dialogue:** As Tanzania is gearing up to sign the MCC compact sometime early next year, the timing is propitious to coordinate USG strategy to increase leverage on policy and governance issues, capitalizing on MCC/Tanzania's extensive use of country systems, gaining a broader seat at the table.
7. **Take steps to get USG/Tanzania on plan and on budget. (This would not require U.S. funding to flow into a basket.)** In depth consultation is needed with TACAIDS and the Ministry of Finance to integrate PEPFAR planning and funding plans in GOT planning to permit better use of government and donor resources. Adopting best practices of the PMI program and agreements with NGOS and local organizations should be posted on the web. Progress towards these goals should be well publicized in the GOT and DPG.

- 8. USAID should suggest that DPs detail aid management technical staff to Ministry of Finance to assist in building its capacity:** It is obvious that capacity at the Ministry of Finance, Directorate of External Finance to manage foreign assistance is weak and understaffed. DPs could propose that temporary or TDY technical staff be seconded to the GOT to assist in the review, management, and streamlining of multiple DP activities, legal language, aligning DPs' fiscal year with that of GOT, and other requirements.

Background

Paris Declaration Principles

Ministers and Donor Agency Heads from over 100 developing countries and donor institutions, including the USAID Administrator, endorsed the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness on March 2, 2005. The Paris Declaration commits donor and developing countries and institutions to continue and increase efforts in harmonization, alignment, and managing aid for results. USAID played an active role in the Paris Declaration negotiations, with USG interagency agreement, and the USG strongly supports its implementation. The Paris Declaration seeks to encourage locally developed action plans and coordinating processes based on a franker recipient-donor dialogue and more equal partnership, with a view to improving aid effectiveness and achieving better development results.

USAID Missions are encouraged to join other donors in endorsing local agreements to the fullest extent possible. If the agreements reveal inconsistencies with USAID policy or practices, particularly as specified in ADS Chapters 200 to 203, or if certain provisions within the agreements raise problems, Missions are encouraged to seek revisions that would allow for USAID support. If that is still not possible, then Missions are encouraged to provide a qualified endorsement rather than opt out categorically. Some USAID Missions have already endorsed local plans.

Missions are always advised to refer to the ADS (Chapters 200 to 203), consult with their RLA, and/or USAID/General Counsel prior to endorsing local agreements, and raise policy issues and problems with Office of Development Partners/Bilateral and Multilateral Division (ODP/BMD) and their Bureau's program office. Missions in countries eligible for the Millennium Challenge Account should consult with MCC field or headquarters staff.

U.S. Commitments under the Paris Declaration

The United States supports all 56 commitments in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. In general, the commitments are aimed at reducing the transaction costs to host countries of assistance and developing local capacity with particular reference to managing foreign assistance.

The most relevant commitments under the Paris Declaration are summarized below:

- Partner countries and donors commit to agreeing on assessment tools and standards for partner country public financial management and procurement.
- Partner countries commit to strengthening public financial management and procurement systems to meet standards.
- Development partners commit to use strengthened country systems and procedures to the maximum extent possible. Where use of country systems is not feasible, donors are to establish additional safeguards and measures in ways that strengthen rather than undermine country systems and procedures.

For 12 of the Paris Declaration commitments, indicators and targets were set as part of an agreement to monitor progress on the aid effectiveness declaration. The United States placed a reservation on the targets related to donor use of country financial management and procurement systems, pending resolution of an agreed method for defining and assessing quality systems. These are being developed in a DAC members-multilateral institution-host country partnership, which the United States is actively supporting in order to be able to remove its reservation.

One additional commitment under the Paris Declaration, with which use of country systems is often confused, is the donors' commitment to implement common arrangements and simplify procedures. This is most often referred to as participating in program-based approaches (PBAs), of which sector-wide approaches (SWAs) are a type.

PBAs share the following features:

- Leadership by the host country or organization;
- A single comprehensive program and budget framework;
- A formalized process for donor coordination and harmonization of donor procedures for reporting, budgeting, financial management, and procurement; and
- Efforts to increase the use of local systems for program design and implementation, financial management, monitoring, and evaluation.

It is important to note that participants in PBAs, including SWAs, need not use a single type of funding modality. In fact, many successful SWAs employ a broad range of funding mechanism—from projects to program assistance.

The target for 2010 is that 66 percent of all aid flows will be provided in the context of PBAs, starting from a baseline estimated at 43 percent when the Paris Declaration was endorsed.

Donor Harmonization in Tanzania

Since the early 1990s, the GOT has been carrying out comprehensive social, economic and political reforms, including those related to aid management. Aid management reform has brought the GOT and its DPs closer to achieving the commitments made under the Paris Declaration. In an effort to meet these commitments in Tanzania, in 2004 donors launched the Development Partners Group (DPG) to further develop and strengthen a coordinated response to the Tanzania Assistance Strategy (TAS)³ of 2002 – 2005, part of an integrated framework of Tanzania's first generation Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS). The TAS sets out the following practical steps with actions grouped in four priority areas:

- increasing the predictability of aid flows;
- Integrating external resources into the government budget and exchequer system;
- Harmonizing and rationalizing processes; and

³ The TAS served as a medium-term framework for development cooperation, aiming at strengthening aid coordination, harmonization, and alignment, as well as national ownership and government leadership of the development process.

- Improving national capacities for aid coordination and external resource management.

In 2006, Tanzania's Joint Assistance Strategy (JAST) was formulated with the purpose of outlining objectives, principles, and other broad arrangements of the country's development partnership. The JAST is complemented by an Action Plan that specifies concrete activities and timeframes for implementing the JAST, which includes a monitoring framework with indicators to measure government and development partner performance.⁴ The JAST is implemented at all levels of the government within the existing national, sector, and local processes for all aid relations with development partners.⁵ It is therefore anticipated that DPs will continue to adopt the JAST as a basis for guiding the management of their development cooperation with the GOT. It is further expected that bilateral agreements and (donor) country assistance strategies will be in line with the JAST while increasingly specifying concrete individual DP's plans in implementing the JAST.

Development Partners and the Implementation of the JAST

Overall, donor coordination and harmonization discussions in Tanzania are vibrant⁶ and continue to mature within the GOT and among DPs.⁷ Under the JAST, the DPs' role is to support the achievements of the results on the MKUKUTA/MKUZA by assisting in developing capacities through financial and technical assistance to the Government⁸ and other nonstate actors, as well as advising in the dialogue with the government and other domestic stakeholders. The JAST provides clear division of labor between DPs, the GOT, and other domestic stakeholders.⁹

In 2006, as a result of the continued working interaction between donors and the GOT, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on the JAST to implement the Paris Declaration was signed. It is important to note that the DP/GOT MOU is not binding, but declares the principles of implementing the JAST that are shared with the GOT and DPs.

The development policy implementation of JAST in Tanzania is channeled through various sectors and sub-sector working groups with strong and active participation from both the DPs and the GOT (both line ministries, such as the Ministry of Agriculture and lead ministries like the Ministry of Finance or the Ministry of Economic Empowerment and Planning).¹⁰ However, the new comprehensive framework to coordinate and harmonize assistance in Tanzania is becoming complicated and complex, not only among DPs, but also within the country's own aid management mechanisms.¹¹ For example, the biggest challenge among donors now is how best to integrate DPs' own aid policies and assistance in the GOT's national development goals and processes under a single guiding

⁴ Joint Assistance Strategy for Tanzania, December 2006.

⁵ There is a strong involvement of the USG at the district level planning with the GOT.

⁶ Relative to some countries, in Tanzania some donors describe the coordination as an "amazing machine."

⁷ However, some donors feel that the political level dialogue is very stunted and too technical.

⁸ For example, CDC has a co-operative agreement with the Tanzania's Ministry of Health

⁹ Donors' main complaint is on the amount of time devoted to meetings.


¹⁰ CIDA feels that it is no longer dealing with technically competent GOT staff. There is a need for a unique set of skills (i.e. managers and negotiators) to lead DPs in dialogue/discussion in Tanzania.

¹¹ Staff assigned to backstop DPs are overwhelmed, leading to delays in signing of SOAGs, for example. Furthermore, MOF staff admit that they, in most cases, do not understand SOAGs, how they are structured and their relationship to legislation guiding USG foreign assistance. In addition, there are additional complexities as a result of having 40 plus DPs with different fiscal years that are not aligned to that of the GOT which ends in June.

framework¹² for effective aid management. This challenge is further amplified by the fact that aid effectiveness and harmonization discussion in Tanzania is largely focused on aid modalities rather than improving the country’s aid management capacity. This narrow focus on “modalities” by DPs and the GOT erodes the effectiveness of other important and crucial complementary processes and mechanisms that could otherwise enable Tanzania, in the medium term, to achieve a sustained and successful development path. In addition, this has directly and indirectly started to show some considerable weaknesses in the GOT overall leadership in the development policy discussion in Tanzania.¹³ Because of the focus of the aid management discussion to aid modality, DPs seem to have the lead in the aid effectiveness and harmonization discussion in Tanzania.

Furthermore, a lack of resources, and most importantly, well-trained staff to guide the process has contributed to the GOT struggling to strengthen its aid management mechanisms.¹⁴ This decreased ability of the GOT to own and lead the aid effectiveness discussion in Tanzania seemingly has allowed a few donors (mainly those contributing to GBS) to set or strongly influence the development policy dialogue¹⁵.

However, it is interesting to note that although 14 donors contribute approximately 76 percent of GOT’s foreign aid budget, only one bilateral donor in Tanzania contributes more than 85 percent of its development budget (excluding the World Bank) directly to the government in the form of GBS. The rest of the donors contribute 40 percent or less of their development budget in Tanzania to GBS.¹⁶ As illustrated in the pie chart on Fig 1, the FY 2007/2008 GOT budget shows that 42 percent is foreign aid, of which 38



percent is in the form of GBS, and about 50 percent goes to project support. With such relatively low contributions via the GBS, one might expect that there would be an active mechanism that strongly supports and guides the GOT on project support planning and reporting¹⁷. In general, the GBS discussion in Tanzania has and continues to polarize the relationship

¹² The National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty, in Kiswahili, *Mkakati wa Kukuza Uchumi na Kupunguza Umasikini Tanzania* (MKUKUTA).

¹³ It is obvious that there are tremendous differences in capacity across the GOT.

¹⁴ Staff at Tanzania’s Ministry of Finance has indicated that it is very difficult to deal with the high number of donors who have varied fiscal years and complex legal and regulatory frameworks that guide bilateral agreements for effectively managing foreign assistance in Tanzania.

¹⁵ This is not to suggest that the GOT would not prefer GBS, merely that GBS donors now appear to have a monopoly in the policy dialogue.

¹⁶ PEPFAR, Global Fund, and World Bank account for approximately over 75 percent of the GOT health budget.

¹⁷ This could be an opportunity for the USG in Tanzania to leverage its resources to provide policy influence in Tanzania.

among donors and significantly continues to weaken the relationship with line ministries, which are the main implementers of the GOT's development policy and priorities.

Our analysis leads to the conclusion that the weakened relationship between DPs supporting GBS and line ministries has significantly eroded the quality and the importance and the role of project based support in Tanzania. In this context, it is important to note that, although 50 percent of foreign aid inflows to Tanzania is in the form of project support, there is no structure within the public finance system for line ministries to report additional resources to the MOF. Of course, there are obvious reasons for line ministries to directly or indirectly discourage such a reporting mechanism. But the lack of forward and backward linkages between central and line ministries further complicates the flow of information for on plan and on budget reporting mechanisms.

In addition, the GOT views the present DPG/GOT relationship as impeding the government capacity to manage aid. The government feels the DPG has created and uses more or less a parallel system that is increasingly donor-focused in structure and implementation.¹⁸ Despite these problems, all donors and other nonstate stakeholders continue to express their optimism that Tanzania is making progress and continues to show high potential for better results.

USG Engagement in the Implementation of the Paris Declaration in Tanzania

USAID attends most, if not all, of the donor working groups, though participation can vary from one SO area to another. In addition, the quality of participation varies and can be affected by external factors. For example, USAID's health¹⁹ and HIV/AIDS²⁰ teams participate fully. However, members of the two working groups remain as observers during policy dialogue discussions with the government. This is partly because USG in Tanzania does not contribute to either SBS or GBS funding mechanisms. In fact, this limited participation in the policy dialogue further limits U.S. ability to influence governance processes in Tanzania.²¹ The USG nonparticipation in the GBS and sector funding is perceived by the Ministry of Finance (MOF) as the USG's continued preference to work in isolation and not "close enough" to the GOT and other DPs. Although the GOT and DPs are currently in discussion and working on a new dialogue structure, the USG is unfortunately, a minor player in this discussion.

Even though there are administrative challenges for the USG to be fully engaged in policy dialogue in Tanzania, there are also significant operational challenges in the USG implementation of the Paris Declaration in Tanzania. For example, there is no or limited interagency coordination, translating to weakened USG standing among DPs and the GOT.²² In fact, to many DPs, this lack of a unified position has "significantly diluted" the USG's voice, creating an appearance of conflict among USG agencies in Tanzania.

¹⁸ The GOT and DPs are currently discussing a new working structure.

¹⁹ Inter-agency coordination is common among USG-health agencies. The health group is now working towards integrating its work among USG agencies in Tanzania.

²⁰ The DPG/AIDS was started by USAID. This year, USAID will chair the group.

²¹ DPs wonder why USG in general is not involved more and better coordinated.

²² DPs in Tanzania seem to think USG in Tanzania is uncooperative and an "outsider". In addition, the GOT refers to the United States as a "small donor" in Tanzania.

Furthermore, even though the USG participates in the highest-level donor/government forum discussions in the DPG, the outcome of these discussions rarely filters down to the USG agency team leaders and staff. It is also apparent that there is limited knowledge of the Paris Declaration among USG staff, or how the Paris Declaration affects their work in Tanzania. For the USG to be fully engaged in harmonization efforts in Tanzania at all levels, there is a need for resource allocation to address donor coordination issues including hiring an full-time employee to coordinate harmonization activities and training for staff to improve working understanding of the “what and how to” of the Paris Declaration. In addition, USAID/Washington should provide regular policy direction and technical assistance to help USG agencies further improve aid delivery mechanisms.

Overall, the USG, despite significant program resources in Tanzania, does not appear to be having the strategic impact on policy and governance commensurate with the volume of resources provided. This is especially clear when compared to small donors such as Irish Aid,²³ who appear to have a much more favorable seat at the policy dialogue table, perhaps because they allocate resources among different funding mechanisms including general budget support.

However, these challenges open a window to opportunities to explore additional strategic and creative ways to deliver effective U.S. assistance to Tanzania. In a dynamic policy engagement in a country such as Tanzania, where development dialogue is ripe, reform processes continue to evolve, and the political environment is stable, attempts should be made to utilize options available to strengthen our donor coordination and harmonization efforts.

A clear, shared menu of harmonization and alignment options, however, does not currently exist for U.S. officials. For example, USG staff at the Mission believe there are legislative and other restrictions impeding agencies from participating in basket or sector funding. While it is certainly true that some restrictions exist, limitations actually differ by account. Legislatively, the CSH account proscribes program assistance. In terms of policy, preferences vary by bureau and are not always clear.²⁴

The fact that there is no clear policy guidance from Washington on how to implement the Paris Declaration has, in part, led the government and donors to define USG assistance in Tanzania by what we do not do and not by what we do. There is a need for USG agencies in Tanzania to critically review tools available and to optimize the mechanisms, accounting, and reporting of resources to the GOT. It is also important to develop a medium and long-term plan to apply new delivery tools where such tools make sense from a development or policy perspective. At the same time, adjustments should be considered to “adapt and fit” USG foreign assistance policy in a complex political and economic environment such as that of Tanzania.²⁵ It is also an opportunity to take advantage of the soon to be signed Millennium Challenge Cooperation (MCC) compact with the GOT, which will significantly utilize government systems, to negotiate a more

²³ Irish Aid uses a mix of funding mechanisms, with 40 percent going through the GBS and the rest focusing on the five development issues. Although this brings benefit to a small aid program, it is of course accompanied with some challenges.

²⁴ See the Africa Bureau’s Paris Declaration Toolkit for more detailed guidance (currently in draft form).

²⁵ There are two governments, for example the autonomous Government of Zanzibar (where it is highly projectized and donors perceive it as having an easy working relationship) and that of the United Republic of Tanzania which includes the Mainland. In addition, there are 40+ donors with varied policy approach to aid, a lively parliament and civic groups each with its own complex constituent matrix.

significant role at the policy dialogue table with the GBS DPs and the GOT. However, in the short term, given the current donor coordination environment within the USG in Tanzania, the arrival of MCC brings additional complexities and confusion for DPs and the GOT, and these must first be addressed within a USG framework.²⁶

In sum, pending the formulization of clear policy guidance, we recommend the Mission explore the use of additional modalities—greater participation in baskets and SWAp, for example—through available mechanisms (such as PIO grants) on a case-by-case basis where this makes development and policy sense. AFR/DP, USAID/GC, and the RLA can assist the Mission should Mission leadership decide to pursue alternative funding arrangements.

USAID Sectoral Participation in Donor Coordination

USAID actively participates in sectoral donor coordination activities in Tanzania in support of the JAST's Memorandum of Understanding. The environment and natural resources (ENR), economic growth (EG), and democracy, governance, and education (DG) teams are members of various working groups including but not limited to governance, education, legal sector reform program (LSRP), local government reform program (LGRP), agriculture, private sector, environment, horticulture, and water. However, their participation consists primarily of attending meetings and networking, as described by some USAID staff.

As noted above, this limits USG agencies' participation in terms of policy dialogue with the GOT in some sectors, in part, because we are not a GBS, SWAp or basket fund donor. The democracy, governance, and education team points out that some donors appear to be reluctant to welcome USAID into broader discussions because we fail this perceived entrance test.²⁷ It is safe to conclude that USG/Tanzania's limited funding modality options seem to negatively impact its ability to influence development policy and governance direction as a member of the development community in Tanzania.

In general, USAID/Tanzania and other USG agencies have a good working relationship with other development partners and their respective sectoral ministries, departments, or government agencies (MDAs). Since 1997, the ENR team continues to influence wildlife, coastal management and the environment policies in Tanzania. USAID funding of the Wildlife policy in Tanzania (WPT) led to Wildlife Management Act (WMA) in 2004 and the Environmental Management Act of 2005 which further supported and enhanced Natural Resources Policy (NRP) for Tanzania. USAID continues to work closely with the Tanzania Coastal Management Partnership (TCMP) to strengthen and in 2002; the National Integrated Coastal Management Strategy (ICM) was implemented. Through these long-term technical and policy support efforts, other donors are now stepping in to support the Natural Resources Policy Act. The World Bank has stepped-in to fully support the implementation of the NRP with \$61 million to cover all districts (whereas USAID resources only covered three districts) in Tanzania. USAID/ENR is now leading efforts to establish a Horticulture Working Group, which a number of donors have shown significant interest in supporting.

²⁶ MCC together with USAID will participate in the DPG. Most donors find it troubling as it becomes murky as to who speaks on behalf of the USG.

²⁷ One example is the Media Fund where the Swiss have the lead.

Overall, these are tremendous achievements, but they seem to go unnoticed by GOT central ministries, in part because it appears that the GOT focus is on other large ticket activities such as health, education, and governance, and any budget item financed by budget support. This poses challenges to achieving sustained, long-term commitments from other donors as well as the GOT. DPs have established a strict code of conduct and terms of reference (TOR), which, in some cases, limits donor's direct and indirect policy engagement with the GOT.²⁸ In particular, this is the case for DPs who operate using project support mechanisms. Sector programs (SOs) with limited resources might explore allocating part of their funding into SWAp or basket funds to have optimal policy, governance, and development impact. In the case of ENR, while other donors in Tanzania now view USAID as leading with policy and technical assistance (TA), USAID might ensure long-term impact and voice with its limited resources in the sector by leveraging other DP resources through participation in a SWAp or basket fund. This recommendation applies to the democracy, governance, and education SO as well. However, the biggest challenge now for USAID/ENR program is to integrate and mirror these 1997 – 2005 successes into the JAST framework where the emphasis is in the alignment and harmonization of DPs and GoT development priority as stipulated in the MKUKUTA and MKUZA.

Harmonization in the Health Sector in Tanzania

More than 15 donors are active in the health sector in Tanzania. While the United States is the largest donor, assistance in the health sector is a priority for several development partners. Much of the external support is organized under a SWAp agreement, but several global health initiatives and our own large bilateral Presidential initiatives in HIV/AIDS (PEPFAR) and malaria (PMI) are outside the SWAp.²⁹ While these initiatives contribute to the national goals and priorities of MKUKUTA and the MDGs, questions have been raised regarding the degree to which they divert human and financial resources from other priorities, especially maternal health. The *Joint External Evaluation of the Health Sector in Tanzania: 1999 to 2006* discussed many of the accomplishments and the challenges facing the sector. The most significant issue is the need to improve the structure of cooperation in the health sector, critical to assuring quality coverage technically and demographically.

Although USAID and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) are the major U.S. players in the sector, PEPFAR and PMI also involve the Departments of State and Defense, the Peace Corps and, in the case of PMI, the White House. Under the direction of the Ambassador and the Office of the Global AIDS Coordinator (OGAC) in Washington, PEPFAR is managed on the ground by an Interagency Coordinating Committee, headed by the PEPFAR Coordinator, which provides oversight to multi-agency technical teams. PMI, also under the Ambassador's oversight, is led by USAID at the technical level, also operating through joint USAID-CDC technical teams.

²⁸ Code of Conduct for the Tanzania Health Sector-Wide Approach (SWAp) Between the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare (MOHSW), Prime Minister's Office - Regional Administration and Local Government (PMORALG), Ministry of Finance (MOF); and Development Partners.

²⁹ The USAID Health Sector, even without PEPFAR, is the largest sector program in Tanzania, obligating over \$42.5 million in FY 07, with a planned obligation level of 44.6 million in FY 08. PEPFAR FY 07 obligations totaled \$205 million and are budgeted at \$303 million in FY 08, of which \$138 million will be obligated by USAID. The enormity of these resources stands in contrast to the GOT's total health budget of \$300 million in 2008.

USAID/Tanzania's health sector program, particularly outside of PEPFAR, is credited as making a major effort to "harmonize" under the leadership of the Health Team and the Mission Director. The USAID Health Team participates actively in the Donor Partners Group/Health, shares yearly program budgets, and is an active participant in the Health SWAp with project funding. On the other hand, the magnitude of the whole program, especially that of the PEPFAR, and the segregation of PEPFAR resources from both GOT and donor budget planning, have led to resentment from other donors and implied or expressed criticism from GOT officials.

PEPFAR has announced a major effort to improve its alignment with GOT budget planning, but efforts to coordinate and harmonize to date have focused on sharing of planning and budgetary information by the country PEPFAR coordinator and USAID. In 2008 USAID heads the Donor Partners Group/HIV/AIDS, which should facilitate more open communication, a first step toward more effective coordination. Meanwhile, the PMI program has been praised by GOT officials and donors for its "efforts to harmonize" planning and resources from its launch in 2005. This reflects both a learning curve and the energetic efforts of the Mission Director to address some of the major questions that are a result of PEPFAR's earlier limited or nonexistent coordination plans.

Collaborating first with the Tanzanian Commission on AIDS (TACAIDS),³⁰ the GOT's semi-autonomous AIDS agency, PEPFAR also worked with several GOT agencies, primarily the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare and many NGOs. However, the program is viewed as top down and largely isolated from GOT planning, and characterized often by conflict between implementing agencies. Adopting a "best practice" from other PEPFAR countries, a PEPFAR Coordinator in Tanzania was appointed in 2006 to improve implementation as well as coordination between U.S. agencies, the GOT, and other donors. The council and coordinator today oversee the work of three technical teams, now multi-agency, focused on the three main PEPFAR themes: clinical services, community services, and prevention and testing. These changes have improved implementation and coordination within the USG as well as with the Government of Tanzania and TACAIDS. Questions remain, however, as to the effectiveness of coordination with other donors in HIV/AIDS, especially at the district level.

A recent study to review the alignment of PEPFAR with the GOT's national Multi-Sectoral Strategic Framework found that although there is substantial "convergence" for 71.4 percent of total PEPFAR funding for Tanzania with NMSF strategies, significant differences exist, especially in prevention, the GOT's highest priority. Gaps, which seem to be closing, exist as well in the area of human resources or capacity building. Yet it is in the area of information sharing that the GOT and other donors are most critical of the lack of "harmonization" by U.S. agencies. They assert that the lack of prior consultation or at least information on programming plans and budgeting makes it difficult for the GOT and donors to use their resources to assure effective technical and demographic program coverage.

³⁰ TACAIDS, was established in 2001 to provide strategic leadership for a national multi-sectoral response to the HIV/AIDS pandemic. Each ministry has an AIDS focal point. Ministries in consultation with TACAIDS set guidelines regarding identification of priority HIV/AIDS activities. TACAIDS consults with the Ministry of Finance to establish mechanisms to harmonize sectoral plans.

Moreover, meshing of budget information with the GOT budget nomenclature seems to be a significant problem, although PEPFAR has increasingly tried to share budget information with the GOT.³¹ Ministry of Finance personnel note their inability to understand information provided on the program. TACAIDS personnel complained about a lack of information, especially on funding provided to NGOs. Furthermore, because the United States has not advised the GOT or development partners of how or how much PEPFAR nongovernmental partners are receiving, it is viewed as lacking in transparency. In turn, the United States is excluded from some relevant discussions on the overall funding for HIV/AIDS in Tanzania.

PEPFAR's role at the local level also has raised questions, given the number of partners anxious to engage. Each has required separate meetings and reports, and sometimes provided assistance or support different from what was requested or is needed to complement that of the GOT or other donors.

Similarly, the multiplicity of partners with separate reporting requirements has been criticized in the U.S.-assisted TB program, now managed under PEPFAR. Although information has been shared fully regarding the NGOs receiving funding under the program, the DPG/H says that the "Balkanization" of the program has meant that separate funding and results reporting are required for each of the partner agencies.

Finally, both the GOT and the DPG criticize the initiatives, especially PEPFAR, for their impact on other priorities, including maternal and child health, and the health system generally. Both PEPFAR and PMI insist that the training activities and logistics systems needed will eventually strengthen the underpinnings of the whole health system. To date, however, what is more visible is the erosion of the GOT bureaucratic capacity with the siphoning off of highly qualified personnel and other resources, primarily to nongovernmental organizations, to meet the needs of the initiatives.

In the case of the President's Malaria Initiative, as noted above, efforts continue to be made to ensure improved coordination with the GOT as well as with other donors. Although the PMI is also required to follow specific guidelines from Washington regarding partners, goals, and funding, PMI leaders in Washington and the Tanzania Mission have worked to avoid some of problems encountered by PEPFAR. USAID carried out a rapid assessment of the malaria situation before PMI was launched, including consultative meetings with donors, ministries, NGOs, and institutions of higher learning regarding current programs and proposed programming with additional resources. The overall malaria operational plan (MOP) was developed with the ministries in both mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar, and regular meetings continue to take place with the ministry and all partners. The MOPS and agreements are publicly available on the web in all countries, including Tanzania. Because of these steps, PMI is regarded generally favorably, although the U.S. reputation for being an outsider persists, both with the DPG/Health and with the GOT.

Health is characterized by a particularly active and strong sector working group. A troika of the elected past, present, and future chairs, from the World Bank, Irish Aid, and the Netherlands, respectively, is entrusted with all negotiations with the GOT in the sector in FY 2008. While exceptions are made for technical matters, the definition of these is

³¹ The information provided has yet to form a "user friendly" cross-walk between the PEPFAR budget categories and those of the GOT.

vague and often a cause for question.³² In an extended meeting to discuss problems with USAID and U.S. aid harmonization, the troika argued strongly that the massive resources of the United States, especially for AIDS, but also for malaria and maternal and child health, could be much better used if provided through the health basket or, to a lesser extent, through GBS. Yet in meetings with the donors individually, each agreed that the flexibility USAID and USG funding outside the basket and GBS provides is often useful where resources from the central government are short to meet specific or emergency local needs.

The flexibility of the U.S. government's and especially USAID's approach has enabled it to meet unexpected needs of the GOT and of other donors—to meet emerging concerns, such as avian influenza, provide tailored assistance, or to enable a donor to use funding for a specific purpose. For example, three years ago, when the GOT had not yet succeeded in providing a budget for contraceptives, the United States was able to provide \$3 million worth of contraceptives on an emergency basis, assistance that was very much appreciated by donors as well as the GOT. Similarly, this year, when the PMI program advised USAID that it could not continue funding a subsidy for insecticide treated bednets, the Netherlands, a strong GBS supporter, volunteered to provide the needed funding, thus continuing a role it had played as a silent partner in the malaria program. This kind of flexibility and complementarity of resources and modalities strengthens the whole sector, and provides a safety net for emergencies and special needs.

Findings

Strengths

- Other donors and the GOT collectively have indicated that **the Mission Director (MD) and other senior staff are collaborative, professional, and** generally provide information about U.S. programs in a **transparent** manner.
- The MD and other senior staff currently **occupy important leadership positions** on various development partner and sector working group committees.
- The **JAST is a well-designed framework for donor coordination.** USAID/Tanzania Mission Director signed the JAST and the Mission is making a strong effort to work within this framework. (Note: It does not appear that all USG agencies—MCC, CDC and the State Department—are equally familiar with and committed to its provisions.)
- **USG resources are responsive and positioned to complement GOT development priorities.** The volume and responsiveness of USG resources provide an opportunity to significantly influence GOT development policy and governance practices when directed strategically using a broad combination of resource delivery tools and mechanisms.
- In general, **USG resources are disbursed and applied in a timely manner,** especially when compared to other DPs.

³² Code of Conduct for the Tanzania Health Sector-Wide Approach (SWAp) between the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare (MOHSW), Prime Minister's Office - Regional Administration and Local Government (PMORALG), Ministry of Finance (MOF); and Development Partners.

Weaknesses

- **The United States in Tanzania is known more for what we don't do than what we do.** We are known as the donor that does not provide budget support and does not harmonize and align our PEPFAR program with other donors and the GOT.
- **There is little interagency coordination on donor harmonization issues and activities.** The working knowledge of what is happening on harmonization and broader Paris Declaration activities and issues is localized to a few pockets within the Mission, which do not seem to share information, discuss critical issues, or assume collective positions across sectors and agencies. With such spotty socialization of Paris Declaration principles among USG personnel, harmonization does not seem to be a major priority.³³
- **There are gaps in policy guidance from Washington.** It is clear that USAID/Washington has not provided adequate or clear implementation policy guidance on the Paris Declaration required by the Mission to effectively carry out its mission. At a minimum, policy should give clear guidance on what is expected. As a result of this gap, the Missions are filling these holes in the guidance with myth and opinion, and are not exercising the full range of tools at their disposal.

Opportunities

- **Engage the GOT around increasing capacity to capture aid flows and put them on plan and on budget.** There is a critical need to expand the recognized terms of engagement between DPs that provide project assistance and the GOT.
- **Explore opportunities to employ a broader range of funding mechanisms.** USAID is not currently providing assistance through baskets or pooled funds, or harmonizing through delegated cooperation and other forms of partnership that would reduce transaction costs for the GOT and increase U.S. leverage to influence development policy and governance practices. Note: with so much of the policy dialogue revolving around the PRSP process, governance conditionality should assume a much larger focus of DPs.
- **Assert U.S. leadership by stressing the concept of complementarity and USAID comparative advantages.** *Harmonization* should not be seen as *homogenization*. Other DPs and line ministries note USAID's important contributions provided by supporting projects. In addition, USAID might take the lead in building government capacity in the Paris principles of managing for development results and mutual accountability—principles which do not receive the same attention as harmonization and alignment, but which are key to improved governance.

³³ Several key staff members have a strong command of the Paris Declaration. It must also be acknowledged that staff work long hours just to carry out essential duties and struggle to find time to discharge additional work demands created by the Paris agenda. Nevertheless, as several people pointed out, fulfilling the Paris commitments is now the way we do our work.

Threats

- **Increased marginalization of the United States from donor coordination and policy discussions.** Being perceived as an outsider limits USG participation and role to influence and contribute to the GOT governance and policy reform efforts.
- USG is **considered a small donor** due to not coming in on plan and on budget in the GOT budget process, and because we do not provide budget support.
- Because project assistance is not recognized on the same level as program assistance, USG **diluted leadership** and position in development policy and governance dialogue in Tanzania means less credit for what we do best. Strategically, this reduces the overall impact on issues of national interest for the United States in Tanzania.

Conclusion

USAID/Tanzania is going to great lengths to implement the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. In many respects, this is an uphill effort. USAID is facing both internal and external challenges that constrain its ability to harmonize its support with other development partners and fully align funding with GOT priorities. Peer pressure from other DPs, the GOT's stated preference for budget support, a complex interagency environment, and a lack of policy guidance from USAID/Washington impact the mission's ability to effectively comply with Paris. Accordingly, the recommendations outlined here are designed to help the Mission address its most salient challenges.

1. **Develop a U.S. corporate message:** Post should proceed to craft a simple message describing what we do (major objectives and strategy) in Tanzania in positive terms. It need not be more than two or three key points. The Ambassador and other key officials (from all USG agencies) should repeatedly share these points at public events and meetings with key stakeholders. Ideally, the message would include a reference to the importance of complementarity, flexibility, and improving aid effectiveness.
2. **Establish a *USG/Tanzania Harmonization Coordinating Committee*:** The Ambassador could convene a monthly Donor Coordination Working Group meeting, inviting senior officials from all USG agencies operating in Tanzania. While we hesitate to recommend yet another meeting, it would serve to disseminate needed information and form a collective response to key issues. Convened by the Ambassador and coordinated by USAID/Tanzania, this committee would a) disseminate critical information throughout the mission, b) develop collective positions on country-level harmonization issues, and c) share good practice related to harmonization and alignment processes and practices in relation to other development partners and the GOT. Pertinent information from all levels of development partner working group meetings (general, sector, and sub-sector) could be shared, discussed, and acted upon when relevant. It is our opinion that having a single USG representation will strengthen U.S. development policy coherence and message in Tanzania.
3. **Hire a full-time employee to coordinate harmonization activities:** Demands on staff skills and time related to harmonization and other Paris Declaration principle

activities are at an all time high and are increasing. This is straining human resources and taking time away from program management duties. A full-time position dedicated to coordinating harmonization activities would relieve this burden on staff, add specialized technical donor coordination (including financial coordination) knowledge to the Mission, bring coherence in harmonization efforts, and ensure relevant information is captured, filtered, and disseminated appropriately.

This recommendation should apply to nearly every mission in SSA, but will be especially critical to USAID/Tanzania, where Washington is particularly complex and involved. The ideal candidate will have experience in financial aspects of aid effectiveness to be able to oversee the needed work on budget; it isn't just a public relations or meeting coordination task. The position might be filled by a foreign service national.

- 4. Request clear guidance on Paris Declaration:** USAID/Washington should give highest priority to the development of a Donor Coordination Toolbox, which would include, among other things, clear policy guidance on implementing Paris Declaration principles and good practice. USAID/Washington should also lead discussions with OGAC, CDC, MCC, and other agencies to develop uniform USG guidance on implementing Paris Declaration in the field.
- 5. Designate a limited portion of DA/ESF OYB for program-based approaches where appropriate:** USAID/Tanzania may wish to consider limited participation in basket funds. This would be seen as an act of good will by the GOT and other DPs, and would gain USAID increased leverage in dialogue around policy and governance conditionality. (Current limitations in the CSH account are noted.)
- 6. Engage MCC/Tanzania in discussions about using country systems to participate in governance and policy dialogue:** As Tanzania is gearing up to sign the MCC compact sometime early next year, the timing is propitious to coordinate USG strategy to increase leverage on policy and governance issues, capitalizing on MCC/Tanzania's extensive use of country systems, gaining a broader seat at the table.
- 7. USAID might suggest that DPs detail aid management technical staff to Ministry of Finance to assist in building its capacity:** It is obvious that capacity at the Ministry of Finance, Directorate of External Finance to manage foreign assistance is weak and understaffed. DPs could propose that temporary or TDY technical staff be seconded to the GOT to assist in the review, management, and streamlining of multiple DP activities, legal language, aligning DPs fiscal year with that of GOT, and other requirements.
- 8. Take steps to ensure that USG assistance is captured by GOT on plan and on budget:** Working through the Ministries of Planning and Finance, and in coordination with line ministries, the Mission should make government officials aware of this shared objective, identify current obstacles to achieving this objective, and agree on specific procedures for making this a reality.

This is especially critical in terms of PEPFAR where the best practices of PMI in terms of planning and budgeting should be adopted, i.e., making information publicly available on the web, thereby improving transparency and use of GOT

and DPG resources. Additional staff for the PEPFAR coordinator may be needed to carry this out.

- 9. Assert USAID leadership by emphasizing the concept of complementarity and our comparative advantages:** The space for dialogue among DPs and with the GOT seems to be shrinking, and what remains appears increasingly polarized with GBS donors facing off against those providing project assistance. Using forums such as the Nordic+, USAID might stress even more the importance public-private partnerships and promote building GOT capacity around the Paris principles of managing for development results (MfDR) and mutual accountability.
- 10. Concentrate DPG focus on governance conditionality:** Much of the policy dialogue in African countries takes place around the poverty reduction strategy process, including sector levels. GBS donors have an increasingly prominent role in this dialogue. However, successful foreign assistance and development programs are more and more dependent on the quality of governance than on the content of policy. Though clearly constrained by budget allocation, USAID has considerable experience in improving governance systems that might be introduced to the DPG and sector working groups.
- 11. USAID/Tanzania Natural Resources Management/Economic Growth's Strategic Objective Team Charter could involve other development partners.** It is our opinion that the charter, by not including other DPs, runs contrary to the Paris Declaration and might rob the USG of opportunities to exert greater influence in the ENR policy dialogue in Tanzania. The charter is seen by other donors, as well as the GOT, as an additional burden/transaction cost to government. It might be useful to integrate the charter into the Sector Working Group where DPs and GOT discuss ENR policy implementation.

USAID/Washington stands ready to assist the Mission by taking any or all of these recommendations forward, or in whatever other capacity the Mission leadership might decide most appropriate for USAID programs in Tanzania. Should the Mission have questions or require additional clarification of any part of this report, the assessment team will be happy to comply.

List of Acronyms

AfDB	African Development Bank
CSH	Child Survival and Health
CSO	Civil Society Organization
DCF	Development Cooperation Forum
DfID	UK Department for International Development
DP	Development Partner
DPG	Development Partners Group
FY	Fiscal/Financial Year
GBS	General Budget Support
GOT	Government of Tanzania
HIV/AIDS	Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome
JAST	Joint Assistance Strategy for Tanzania
LGA	Local Government Authority
LGRP	Local Government Reform Program
LSRP	Legal Sector Reform Program
MCC	Millennium Challenge Corporation
MDAs	Ministries, Departments, and Agencies
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MfDR	Managing for Development Results
MKUKUTA	Mkakati wa Kukuza Uchumi na Kupunguza Umasikini Tanzania
MKUZA	Mkakati wa Kukuza Uchumi na Kupunguza Umasikini Zanzibar
MPAMITA	Mkakati wa Pamoja wa Misaada Tanzania
MTEF	Medium-Term Expenditure Framework
NGO	Nongovernmental Organization
NICS	National Integrated Coastal Strategy
NPES	National Poverty Eradication Strategy
NRP	Natural Resources Policy
NSGRP	National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OGAC	Office of the Global AIDS Coordinator
PAF	Performance Assessment Framework
PEPFAR	President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief
PER	Public Expenditure Review
PMI	President's Malaria Initiative
PMS	Performance Management Systems
PRS	Poverty Reduction Strategy
SWAp	Sector-Wide Approach
TA	Technical Assistance
TAS	Tanzania Assistance Strategy
TCMP	Tanzania Coastal Management Partnership
TOR	Terms of Reference
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
URT	United Republic of Tanzania
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development

WB World Bank
ZPRP Zanzibar Poverty Reduction Plan
ZSGRP Zanzibar Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty

List of People Interviewed for this Report

Baruti, Abihudi S.	Ministry of Planning, Economy and Empowerment
Bayer, Thomas	USAID
Bergeron, Monique	Canadian International Development Agency
Carlos, William	Irish Aid
Carson, Tracy	President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief
Crubaugh, Thomas	USAID
Dorken, Axel	German Technical Cooperation
Elikana, Balandya	Ministry of Finance
Jansen, Elise	USAID
Johannesses, Lars Mikkel	Royal Danish Embassy
Jovin, Johannes R.	Ministry of Finance
Kajuna, Gilbert	USAID
Kirenga, Geoffrey	Ministry of Agriculture
Laakkonen, Heimo	UNICEF
Llewellyn, Charles	USAID
Magonya, Ngosha S.	Ministry of Finance
Makino, Koji	Japan International Cooperation Agency
Mariki, Wilberforce A.	African Development Bank
Mtasiwa, Deo	Ministry of Health
Mazana, Issa Beng'i	Tanzania Commission for AIDS (TACAIDS)
McIntire, John Murray	World Bank
McLaughlin, Julie	World Bank
Moyo, Siphosiso	African Development Bank
Mushi, Paul S.	Ministry of Education
Neill, Juniper	USAID
Nyange, David A.	USAID
Peeperkorn, Rik	Netherlands
Rampolla del Tindaro, Gianluca	United Nations
Shapiro, Ian	UK Department of International Development
Sirrs, Reid	Canadian International Development Agency
Trivedy, Roy	UK Department of International Development
Turay, Sam	African Development Bank
Wainwright, Colleen	Irish Aid
White, Pamela	USAID

List of Attachments

1. SPA study on Putting Aid on Budget
2. Jim Barnhart paper on Implementing Paris Declaration
3. Glossary of Aid Effectiveness terminology
4. USAID/AFR Paris Declaration Toolkit (draft)