

Title Page

Final Report

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Project Management Coordination Cell Support Project

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Glossary of Terms

ARC	American Refugee Committee
CSC	Coordination Support Committee
DINEPA	Direction National de l'Eau Potable et de l'Assainissement (National Directorate on Potable Water and Sanitation)
DLA	Decreed Land Area
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
GoH	Government of Haiti
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross/Red Crescent
IHRC	Interim Haiti Reconstruction Commission
IOM	International Organization for Migration
MTPTC	Ministère des Travaux Publics, Transports et Communications (Ministry of Public Works, Transportation and Communications)
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (sometimes UNOCHA)
PAP	Port-au-Prince
PMCC	Project Management Coordination Cell
SEEUR	Service d'Entretien des Equipements Urbains et Ruraux (Service for the Maintenance of Urban and Rural Equipment)
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNOPS	United Nations Office of Project Services
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USEPA	United States Environmental Protection Agency
USGS	United States Geological Survey
WASH	water, sanitation and hygiene
WFP	World Food Program

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Parsons Global Services has prepared this report to document the Program Management Coordination Cell's (PMCC's) contribution to the Earthquake Recovery and Reconstruction efforts in Haiti during the interval from June 1, 2010 to March 26, 2011. Several partners, from the national government, the international relief and reconstruction organizations, and citizens of Haiti collaborated to ensure the success of the Program Management Coordination Cell's activities.

We are grateful to the office of the Deputy Special Representative to the Secretary General, Mr. Nigel Fisher, and the acting interim Director of the Program Management Coordination Cell, Mr. Michael Center, who provided ongoing support, technical direction, and advice to Parsons throughout the project. We appreciate the effective collaboration established with the relief and reconstruction agencies, including: International Organization for Migration (IOM), United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), International Federation of Red Cross/Red Crescent (IFRC), World Food Program (WFP), Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS), the United Nations' Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the Coordination Support Committee (CSC), the Government of Haiti (GoH) and its partner nations, and other United Nations organizations. We would have achieved little without the guidance, support, participation, and unique contributions of these organizations in Haiti.

We are also grateful to the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) for providing the opportunity and financial support to implement the Program Management Coordination Cell Support Unit project.

Introduction

On 12 January 2010, an earthquake of 7.0 magnitude (USGS) on the Richter scale struck Haiti. The earthquake happened 17 km south-west of Port-au-Prince (PAP), the capital of Haiti. Aftershocks measured 5.9 and 5.5 respectively in the first hours after the quake and continue to occur. The earthquake impacts were catastrophic for this poor nation, resulting in 230,000 deaths; 1.3 million displaced nationwide; 700,000 displaced within PAP; 600,000 people departing PAP; and significant structural damage to infrastructure and buildings. The needs of Haiti's earthquake victims are enormous. According to the Haiti Post Disaster Needs Assessment, the combined value of damage and losses is estimated at US\$7.863 billion, which represents approximately 120% of Haiti's 2009 gross domestic product.

To assist in meeting these needs, and per standard disaster assistance practice, the United Nations (UN) is serving as the lead international agency supporting the GoH to mobilize and coordinate humanitarian action. The UN has organized relief partners and resources by "clusters" that correspond to the principal needs of the Haitian people and government, i.e., Camp Coordination and Camp Management (IOM), Education (UNICEF), Emergency Shelter and Non-Food Items (IFRC), Food (WFP), Logistics (WFP), Nutrition (UNICEF), Protection (OHCHR with UNICEF for Child Protection and UNFPA for Gender Based Violence), Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (also known as "WASH" – UNICEF), Agriculture (FAO), Early Recovery (UNDP), Emergency Telecommunications (WFP), and Health (WHO/PAHO). Additionally, OCHA established the CSC - including the GoH, partner nations, and UN organizations - to strengthen relief efforts within and across of clusters. The CSC formed a Planning Task Force to provide strategic direction for priority recovery activities.

Specific Objectives of the Program

The PMCC Support Project is part of the USAID-Haiti's strategy for strengthening the capacity of the PMCC to support the rapid and effective implementation of humanitarian relief and reconstruction projects. Specifically, the PMCC Support Project is part of two USAID strategic objectives:

Strategic Objective 1: Strengthen the GoH's planning preparedness, and coordination among government sections and levels to carry out these kinds of management and coordination support functions post contract closeout; and

Strategic Objective 2: Support the rapid and effective implementation of humanitarian relief and reconstruction projects.

Activities Undertaken to Achieve Program Objectives

Parsons provided project management and technical support for several relief and resettlement activities. Initially, Parsons support was focused on debris removal, removing hazardous conditions from IDP camps, and establishing the peri urban transitional camp at Corail. Later, Parsons provided technical and engineering support for USAID's development of permanent settlements in Dumay, Vaudreuil, Roseberg, and along the Decreed Land Area (DLA) corridor.

Corail

Parsons provided critical synchronization of tasks executed by the coordination clusters during the construction of the Corail transitional peri-urban site. The Corail Community was planned in response to the need to relocate at-risk families, particularly from the Terrain de Golf Delmas camp, which was spontaneously created after the January 12th earthquake. Various organizations such as Oxfam, World Vision, and the IOM committed to providing services and/or infrastructure to accommodate the families in Corail. The PMCC assumed responsibility for coordinating relocation, construction, and development activities at Corail.



Figure 1: Corail Section 3, June 5, 2010.



Figure 2: Corail, Section 3, October 1, 2010.

During the ten-month term of the USAID-PMCC Task Order, the PMCC worked with the coordination clusters to transition the initial open field first to basic emergency shelter in tents, then to transitional housing for ten thousand persons with a supporting community infrastructure that included dedicated latrines, clean water, street lighting, security, schools, training facilities, and (soon) landscaping.

Parsons monitored the progression of ongoing activities at Corail, insuring proper communication and procedure between the participants and camp residents throughout all phases of the project.

Construction of an estimated two thousand transitional shelters, each shelter housing an average family of five persons, is expected to be completed by the end of April, and residents will be encouraged to self-govern their own affairs. The American Refugee Committee (ARC), which has been providing camp management services for the past year, will be winding down

their activities at the end of April, thus allowing the camp residents to set up their own governing bodies.

Caradeux

The Caradeux Internally Displaced Person (IDP) camp was hastily constructed on vacant land in the days immediately following the earthquake. To accommodate additional families, earthmoving equipment hastily cut benches into the hillside to provide adequate flat land for additional tents. Unfortunately, these benches created unstable cuts into the hillside that were prone to landslides during heavy rain events.



Figure 3: Caradeux Slope Stabilization, August 19, 2010.

Parsons commenced the project with a topographical survey of the Caradeux drainage area to establish slope gradients and drainage patterns, and hence to identify IDP tents at risk due to landslides. The survey enabled the UN Office of Project Services' (UNOPS') geotechnical engineers to establish existing storm water runoff drainage patterns, drainage requirements, and to propose a designed solution. The proposed mitigation measures required modification to the area's drainage pattern, which affects neighboring properties. Parsons then worked with adjacent property owners to obtain their permission to modify the drainage channels.

Once permissions were received and a drainage pattern developed, the Caradeux camp management personnel assisted with the relocation of tents and their occupants from the base and crest of the unstable slopes. Heavy equipment was then brought in to excavate the principal drainage channels and to re-profile the slopes. Finally, cash-for-work crews were used to construct the minor drainage channels.

As a result of these efforts, approximately 50 tents and 250 occupants were moved out of harm's way and benefited from the slope stabilization and drainage works.

Aviation Park - Park Olympic



Figure 4: Park Olympic Canal Rehabilitation.

Port-au-Prince receives an annual rainfall of approximately 54 inches, mostly during two rainy seasons, from April to June, and from October to November. Rainstorms frequently result in local flooding, which in turn is mitigated by a system of concrete lined canals and viaducts.

Many sections of the canals were damaged during the earthquake, resulting in additional silting of the canals, which caused additional flooding or longer flood durations. Such damage was caused to the

canal which drained the Aviation Park - Park Olympic IDP camp, a makeshift camp housing some 15,000 IDPs and managed by the International Federation of Red Cross/Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) and the Haitian Red Cross.

Parsons, working with UNOPS and the IFRC, developed a program for relocating approximately 25 IDP shelters during the repair phase, hiring and employing camp residents to complete the repairs to the canal walls, removing silt and other debris from the canal so that water could freely drain from the area, and replacing soils that had been washed away during the preceding rain events.

With Parsons' assistance for the identification and coordination of tasks, the project was completed in less than two months. After all the work was completed, the IDPs were allowed to move back into the area. In addition to the residents of the 25 shelters benefiting from improved soil stability, a larger area of some 150 families benefited from reduced flooding or faster drainage of the flood waters.

Debris Removal Planning

The 12 January 2010 earthquake damaged or destroyed a quarter million homes, thirty thousand commercial structures, and generated an estimated 19 million cubic meters of debris. To manage the needed debris removal projects, Parsons established a debris management forum within the PMCC for disseminating information about where debris removal projects were occurring and how these projects were helping displaced people return to their neighborhoods, thereby allowing the reconstruction in earthquake devastated areas to begin in earnest.

By centralizing the debris management focus of the humanitarian community, the GoH, and the many donor nations and organizations, there is a concerted effort to bring greater resources to bear on a critical aspect of disaster recovery. The PMCC's data consolidation efforts provided all debris management parties with a centralized forum for discussions; and a location where information regarding previous, current, and future debris management projects can be shared.



Figure 5:Mechanized Debris Removal from Downtown Port-au-Prince.

The PMCC, with the financial support of USAID-Haiti, held weekly meeting for organizations engaged in debris management. From a modest beginning, the weekly meetings have grown to where they are currently recognized by 28 agencies and organizations, including the Office of the Prime Minister, the Ministère des Travaux Publics, Transports et Communications (MTPTC), and the World Bank as the centralized repository for debris information. In late November, 2010, Parsons and the PMCC commenced transition of the debris management activities to the Early Recovery Cluster, headed by UNDP. Then in early February, 2011, MTPTC agreed to permanently

host the debris meetings while UNDP and PMCC continued to manage the Agenda and take/distribute minutes. UNDP will continue collecting debris removal data and UNOPS will

provide printing support for GIS mapping. UNDP have also assumed responsibility for the debris database project.

In addition to the sharing of information, there has been a collaborative effort by the PMCC to help develop long-term solutions to the debris management issues through partnerships. Organizations, such as the World Bank and MTPTC, provide leadership in the management of the only public landfill at Truitier, which is essential in the proper disposal of earthquake debris. By communicating the positive aspects of Truitier’s operation, many of the implementing partners were made aware of the opportunity to choose a safe and environmentally friendly alternative site to dispose of their debris.

As of the writing of this document, the Early Recovery Cluster and PMCC were tracking over 34 debris removal projects and 28 dumpsites.

Support USAID’s Settlement Projects

In late October and early November, 2010, USAID requested Parsons to provide assistance with their plans to develop permanent relocation settlements to house up to 50,000 displaced persons. Specifically, USAID requested Parsons to provide topographic and boundary surveys, civil engineering site designs, soil and water analysis, and an Environmental Assessment of four sites previously selected by USAID’s Shelter Team. These four sites were located at Dumay, Vaudreuil, Rosemberg, and DLA Site 4.

Topographic Survey: Parsons subcontracted with its Haitian Teaming Partner, Entreprise Caraibeenne de Construction, S.A. (ECCO), for four topographic surveys. The original work was supposed to include the four selected sites; however, the ownership of the DLA Site 4 was in dispute and the survey crew could not gain access to the site. USAID then requested Parsons to survey the DLA Sites 3 and 5 in lieu of DLA Site 4. In addition to delivering electronic files of the five sites, Parsons delivered hard copy maps of each site. The following table summarizes the work performed.

Site	Size	Electronic Files Delivered to USAID	Hard Copy Maps Delivered to USAID
Dumay (compound)	7.78 Hectares	January 7, 2011	January 17, 2011
Dumay (settlement)	45.08 Hectares	January 7, 2011	January 17, 2011
Vaudreuil	39.02 Hectares	January 25, 2011	February 2, 2011
Rosemberg	26.22 Hectares	March 4, 2011	March 24, 2011
DLA Site 3	6.56 Hectares	March 3, 2011	March 24, 2011
DLA Site 4	Unknown, unable to obtain permission to access site.	(no maps generated)	(no maps generated)
DLA Site 5	11.36 Hectares	March 15, 2011	March 24, 2011

Civil Engineering Site Design: Parsons subcontracted with its US Teaming Partner, CEEPCO Contracting, an 8(a) Haitian Diaspora firm, for the civil engineering design of the four settlement sites. The Shelter Team generated Master Plans for each of the four settlements. Parsons' task was to provide the civil engineering drawings for the roads, drainage, water distribution system, etc. that was necessary prior to the construction of the permanent shelters. The major work was directed at ensuring the storm water ditches, drainage flows, and discharge points were adequate for the site.

CEEPCO initially worked with the Master Plans for Dumay and Vaudreuil, which were provided in JPEG file format and initially could not be converted directly to DWG files required for AutoCAD. After the site files were converted to DWG format, CEEPCO received the topographic surveys and recognized that the Dumay property was significantly different than the shape shown by the master plan. Also, with Vaudreuil, the owner of the property wanted the master plan changed, to place the 'owner's properties' on the outside of the development rather than in the middle. CEEPCO was therefore required to redo the Dumay settlement layout, and was unable to redo the Vaudreuil settlement layout as the property owner would not give his approval of the Master Plan. CEEPCO was also prevented from completing the DLA Site 4 civil engineering design as the topographic survey crew could not get permission to access the site.

For the Rosemberg settlement, the entire development was moved north east approximately 50 meters from the initial location, and the drainage system had to be reconfigured as the initial storm water runoff point was discharged into an old canal that did not connect to any other outlet.

At the conclusion of the project, CEEPCO delivered civil engineering drawings for two of the four settlement sites: Dumay (including both the compound and the settlement area) and Rosemberg. Final full size drawings (100%), specifications, and related electronic files for the Dumay settlement site were submitted to USAID on March 18. Final specifications and related electronic files for the Rosemberg settlement site were also submitted to USAID on March 18. Final full size drawings (100%) for the Rosemberg settlement and the Dumay Compound were submitted to USAID on March 26.

Soil and Water Analysis: Parsons requested five separate engineering firms to provide soil and water analysis. With each received quotation, Parsons reduced the needed scope of work until the work could be completed in a budget that was available and acceptable to USAID. The four firms that provided quotations were:

Firm	Submitted Quotation
EG&G	US\$325,125
LNBTP	US\$105,000
STEACI	US\$88,750
XtraConsult	US\$10,600

The University of Haiti was one of the five firms invited to submit a proposal and budget, but did not. Parsons believes the quotation, had the University of Haiti submitted a proposal, would have been around US\$10,000.

With USAID's approval of the Scope of Work and budget, Parsons subcontracted with XtraConsult for soil and water samples at the Dumay, Vaudreuil, and Rosemberg settlement sites. The soil and water samples were initially submitted to the national laboratory but then the national laboratory reported that it didn't have the reagents necessary to perform the analysis and that the reagents were on backorder, with no firm delivery date. XtraConsult then obtained a second set of samples from the Dumay, Vaudreuil, and Rosemberg sites and submitted these to a private laboratory. Water sample analysis results and an updated written report were received on March 24, and copies forwarded to USAID and the EA Reporting team. Soil samples were also reported as completed by the XtraConsult, but the results were not received as of March 26. Parsons will continue to pursue XtraConsult for the results and forward those to USAID should they become available.

XtraConsult also provided the precipitation data used in the Preliminary Environmental Assessment Report.

Environmental Assessment: Parsons invited both ECCO and CEEPCO to submit proposals to write an Environmental Assessment for the four settlement sites. CEEPCO's price (US\$225,745) was rejected by USAID as too high, and ECCO didn't submit a quotation. Parsons then used its reach back resources to engage environmental staff from its Denver Colorado office to write the EA Report on a cost plus basis within the Task Order budget, and with an estimated cost of US\$60,000 including a short fact finding trip to Haiti for the two principal writers.

The Scope of Work was defined in late December, 2010 and addressed the preparation of an environmental assessment (EA) per the guidance in Title 22 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 216 (22 CFR 216) USAID Environmental Procedures. The impact topics that were to receive the greatest scrutiny included waste management (both human and solid waste), potable water (supply, delivery, and storage), soils, and storm water drainage. Additional topics evaluated included health/hygiene/sanitation, lighting/electrical utilities, transportation options (focusing on new roads and paths), housing and housing materials (including sources of materials and impacts to material source areas), land use, sustainability, and disaster risk (fire, earthquakes, or hurricanes). Socioeconomic resources, including, but not limited to, social services, schools, community security, and jobs were also evaluated in the EA.

The fact finding trip was performed between January 10 and 13. A draft Scoping Statement was initially issued on January 14, and circulated to 15 stakeholders, but only one (the City of Croix des Bouquets) responded. Parsons met with representatives of the city and issued a revised text on January 31 based on comments received. A final version of the Scoping Statement was issued on February 10.

Due to the number of changes being made to refine the settlement design, USAID and Parsons agreed that the settlement design evaluated by the EA would be per the design that existed on

February 23. Changes to the settlement design after February 23 would not be addressed in the EA Report.

The PDEA was submitted on February 28, with comments due back to Parsons by March 7. However, on March 6 Parsons realized that an incomplete version of the PDEA had been sent out. The complete PDEA version was distributed on March 6, and comments received from Jerry Erbach on March 7, Joe Torres on March 8, and Debra Allen-Reid on March 9. The COTR also requested a conference call to discuss the organization and content of the Final EA, the concept of options vs. alternatives, and other issues. On March 16, Parsons was instructed to respond to the organizational issues and other comments submitted in response to the PDEA reviews, but not to incorporate an Alternative C (biodigester kiosks in lieu of humanure composting for the IDP permanent homes).

The final submittal contained an incomplete Draft EA, its appendices, and a cover memo that describes where the document was in the revision process. No changes were made to the appendices that were originally sent on 28 February. The flood risk technical memo was inserted in the EA in the Drainage and Flood Risk section, although we did not have time to include a write-up for the EA. The technical memo and all the precipitation data were included on a CD that was sent to USAID-Haiti via FedEx.

Results Achieved According to the Performance Monitoring Plan (PMP)

The Performance Monitoring Plan identified three components and seven indicators. We achieved the indicator for Component A; achieved two of the three indicators for Component B while improving the third indicator; and achieved one of the three indicators for Component C while improving the other two indicators. Overall, the project contributed to improvements in relief and humanitarian activities, strengthened the technical abilities of the UN and GoH bodies; and improved Haitian capacity to provide technical supervision of relief and reconstruction projects.

Component A

This portion of the project measured the coordinated relief and humanitarian activities that CSC assigned directly to the PMCC rather than to the camp coordination committees. One indicator was used to monitor this component.

Indicator	Unit of Measure	Baseline Month	Baseline Value	Month 10	
				Target	Actual
1. Number of CSC assigned projects directly managed or supervised by PMCC.	# of projects managed or supervised.	May, 2010	9	0	0

Component B

This portion of the project strengthened the ability of the Project Management Coordination Cell to support the CSC or similar UN-GoH bodies with the high quality technical assistance, management consulting, planning, and related services as required. Three indicators were used to monitor this component. The Task Order identifies 14 Detailed Work Requirements. Of the 14 Work Requirements:

- Six relate to staffing;
- Six relate to specific task deliverables (daily and monthly reports; weekly meetings; work, security, and performance monitoring plans; etc.);
- One relates to use of Parsons reach back and teaming partner capabilities; and
- One relates to proving a Knowledge Management (KM) environment.

By staffing the PMCC with expatriate and Haitian experts, the Task Order assisted the UN position the PMCC for hand off to the GoH such that the GoH will have the capacity to carry out key relief and reconstruction functions in the future. Parsons used three indicators to monitor this component.

Indicator	Unit of Measure	Baseline Month	Baseline Value	Month 10	
				Target	Actual
2. Number of technical and professional staff assigned to assist the PMCC.	Total Number Technical Staff	May, 2010	2	14	4
	# Foreign Staff	May, 2010	2	4	2
	# Reach Back Staff	May, 2010	0	3	5
	# Haitian Staff	May, 2010	0	7	2
3. Completion of all Deliverables.	Yes/No	May, 2010	No	Yes	Yes
4. Establishment of a KM Environment.	Yes/No	May, 2010	No	Yes	Yes

Component C

This portion of the project built Haitian capacity to carry out management and coordination support functions post contract closeout by evolving the PMCC into the longer-term institutional architecture for Haitian reconstruction efforts.

Indicator	Unit of Measure	Baseline Month	Baseline Value	Month 10	
				Target	Actual
5. Engage the GoH in handling over PMCC functions to the state or an appropriate indigenous entity.	# Functions Coordinated with GoH	May, 2010	0	3	1
6. Establish linkages with appropriate units of the GoH to begin defining transition arrangements.	# of Linkages between PMCC and GoH	May, 2010	0	3	1
7. Pursue selected options through contract completion.	# Options Evaluated	May, 2010	0	1	1

Cost of Efforts

The PMCC Support Unit project operated under the initial Task Order from May 26 to November 25, 2010; and then from November 26 to March 26 under Mod 1 (a four-month no-cost extension). In total, Parsons worked in Haiti from June 1, 2010, through to March 26, 2011; a total of 298 days.

USAID committed US\$1,697,925 to the PMCC Support Unit Task Order, 58% of which was set aside for labor, 30% for other direct costs, and 12% for overheads and fee.

As of November 26, 2010, (the end of the initial Task Order), Parsons had invoiced USAID for US\$836,500 (a little less than 50% of budget). The majority of the savings, or approximately US\$600,000, was due to lower than proposed in-country staffing levels.

As of March 26, 2011, (the end of the no-cost extension, Mod 1), Parsons estimates the project will have spent US\$1,574,007 (or 93% of the budget). The exact expenditure will not be known until the financial close out of the project, approximately 90 to 120 days after all work has ceased. Parsons estimates approximately US\$123,000 of the original US\$1,697,925 remains in the budget and will be retained by USAID.

Recommendations Regarding Unfinished Work or Program Continuation

The USAID has a program to continue with the settlement projects, which will require a number of tasks initiated by Parsons to be completed. Those tasks include:

1. Obtain geotechnical data for the soils in each of the settlement sites prior to construction of the permanent shelters.
2. Complete the Final EA Report (Parsons only had sufficient time to provide the Draft Environmental Assessment Report).
3. Finalize the permanent shelter design. We believe not enough input has been obtained from the eventual residents who will occupy the permanent shelters. While the demonstration site at the Dumay compound will be beneficial for soliciting comments, there are likely many small details that can be improved at little or no cost to the final design that will make the shelters more desirable to IDPs.

Lessons Learned and Recommendations for Other Programs

Parsons makes the following observations and recommendations for continuation of relief and reconstruction activities.

1. The situation in Haiti changed significantly between the issue of the RFP and the start of the project. During the development phase for the RFP, the PMCC was an extremely active and understaffed organization that was critical for coordinating cluster activities with CSC requirements. However, as the RFP was being bid and the task order awarded, the management of CSC changed, which caused the role of the PMCC to change, and the role envisioned for Parsons to support the PMCC changed. Rather than support the PMCC with a range of technical and program management staff, the project shifted to supporting three specific activities: construction of Corail; developing a strategic approach to removing debris; and developing mitigation measures for hazards found or identified at the IDP camps.
2. The project envisioned transitioning projects from PMCC to the GoH in less than six months, and the PMCC did have some modest success. The PMCC hosted debris committee initially started as a committee of NGOs and private firms, with an invitation issued to the GoH to participate. As the meeting matured, the GoH started to attend regularly, and eventually agreed to host the meeting at their facilities.

Transitioning non-government programs to the government is a multi-year process rather than a number of months. If a similar project is undertaken again, more time needs to be given to identifying the government's long term needs, obtaining the government's input on what the organizational structure and skills required to meet those needs might look like, and fill the support unit with staff that can help the government meet their requirements.

3. There was a language barrier between government officials and the PMCC, resulting in miscommunication or no communication. Either the Chief of Party or the Deputy Chief of Party needs to speak the native (or official government) language.
4. Project staff encountered examples where NGOs provided relief and rehabilitation services to a small population, but in doing so, undermined private Haitian enterprises or GoH activities in other areas. For example, in an effort to promote recycling of debris, several NGOs provided IDPs with free debris crushers and training on how to make concrete masonry units (concrete blocks or CMUs). These start-up firms would then compete with established Haitian block makers, and could frequently undercut their prices because they were being given free equipment and assistance in starting up their recycling firms. Better coordination between the NGOs and the host government is needed, and NGOs need to be accountable to the host government and the local economy in the delivery of their programs. All relief and reconstruction agencies need to be more aware of the negative impacts their programs can have on the existing economy and infrastructure, and take steps to either support or protect existing local enterprises.

5. Parsons recommends measures be identified and implemented that would empower the GoH to govern. The project would start with just one government activity; MTPTC and the Service d'Entretien des Equipements Urbains et Ruraux (Service for the Maintenance of Urban and Rural Equipment, SEEUR) for example, have a mandate for cleaning the streets and canals. In theory, the NGOs are here to help the government, but in practice, the NGOs are focused on their own projects. Because the Non-governmental organizations NGOs don't follow the government's debris removal plans, the government is left to its own resources to address their problems. Parsons is recommending a study be undertaken to develop specific practices that promote NGOs to work with GoH and respond to the GoH's street cleaning and debris removal priorities. The study needs to monitor how NGOs respond to the government's priorities, and then establish specific procedures, possibly through trial and error, which will put the GoH in charge of the NGOs such that the NGOs are addressing the government's priorities rather than their own. Getting the GoH to the point where it is in charge of debris removal might take five or more years, but we should be able to identify the tools, equipment, skills, staffing, and management systems that are needed for the government to take control of street cleaning and debris removal. The lessons learned with MTPTC and SEEUR could then be applied to NGOs supporting other government organizations, and to NGOs in other countries where USAID is supporting an ineffective government.
6. Parsons believes the Interim Haiti Reconstruction Commission (IHRC) requires substantial technical assistance. The initial concept was for IHRC to identify priority reconstruction projects and then direct donor money to those projects. In reality, what seems to be happening is that NGOs with money take their funded project to the IHRC, and the IHRC adds the project to a list of approved projects. We believe IHRC has too many submittals and inadequate resources to determine if the project supports the government's reconstruction priorities.
7. USAID (and perhaps some other NGOs) are preparing Environmental Assessments and environmental projects that are submitted to the Ministry of the Environment for approval. The Ministry doesn't have the resources to review these documents, so they rubber stamp them so that the projects can proceed. Parsons recommends USAID consider providing the resources, tools, and management systems necessary to ensure the Ministry of the Environment is capable of reviewing the submittals in a timely manner.
8. Parsons is recommending USAID support the GoH in the development of their settlement sites (planning, environmental assessments, sanitation, water distribution, storm water drainage, etc.) in the same fashion as Parsons has been helping USAID with design of their peri-urban sites. A project plan needs to be developed that supports the GoH doing this design work without doing it for them.

Other Issues Addressed at Request of COTR

On March 17, the COTR requested Parsons to address issues identified in the rubble meetings and the WASH meetings that are pertinent like excreta pit needs and dump sites etc. in the Final Report.

Parsons documented issues identified in the rubble meetings in the minutes that recorded the discussions at the PMCC hosted debris meetings. The primary issues were that debris was not being removed fast enough and there was not enough managed debris dump sites.

Debris Removal: Resettlement cannot commence until building and other debris has been removed. At the start of Parsons project, debris removal was focused on clearing roadways and demolishing single buildings rather than entire neighborhoods or districts. Cash for work was, and continues to be a common form of debris removal as it put cash back into the economy and provides livelihoods for many of the Internally Displaced Persons. This method, however, was very slow and inefficient. In early July, various organizations including the GoH estimated the total debris removed in the six months immediately following the earthquake was approximately ten percent of the total.

Parsons staff working at PMCC developed a different approach to debris removal based on the use of specialized mechanized equipment, four different debris removal problems (multi-story, accessible residential, in-accessible residential, and street), project safety, and accountability. In early July, PMCC presented their systematic, cost-effective, and efficient debris removal approach to the Coordination Steering Committee. PMCC's approach would remove approximately ten percent of the estimated 15-19 million cubic meters of debris created by the earthquake within 90 days, which would have allowed reconstruction to commence sooner. Despite support for the concept from Mr. Nigel Fisher, the co-chairman of the CSC, PMCC's proposal was ultimately not accepted; but a very similar proposal created by the Interim Haiti Reconstruction Commission in November 2010 was approved by the Government of Haiti in December of 2010.

Dump Sites: Most dumping locations are informal or vacant land. The Truitier dump site is the only dump site that meets US EPA requirements. All debris that is disposed of at a dump site using USAID funds must be sent to a site that meets US EPA standards. The Truitier site is a few miles North of Port-au-Prince and the distance between the debris collection sites and the Truitier site increases the cost of debris removal. The Truitier site is too far away from Leogane and Carrefour to be of any value to debris dumping operations in those communities.

PMCC was represented at several WASH meetings held at Direction National de l'Eau Potable et de l'Assainissement (National Directorate on Potable Water and Sanitation – DINEPA).

Excreta Pits:

Truitier is also used for disposal of excreta from desludging of camp latrines, without any treatment. Construction started on excreta stabilization basins at Titanyen but was stopped because of land title issues.