

Laletek Project Final Evaluation

Final Report



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Cover photo: Participant from Comoro Metin 04 Small Infrastructure Project, a community centre (Photo by James Scambary)

Executive Summary

The Laletek Project has continued its success since the last evaluation. In terms of impact, five out of six communities surveyed for this evaluation said that Laletek had helped bring peaceful change to their communities. Of those five communities surveyed, there were no reports of anything other than minor disputes, mostly of a domestic nature, in their community in the last six months. Only one of the communities surveyed, Fatuhada 02, has continued to experience conflict. Nevertheless, they also said that there has been a lot of progress towards peace in their community after years of conflict.

Overall, 107 people out of 115 (93%) focus group participants and nine out of ten key informant interviews with community leaders agreed that there are more positive relations between opposing groups at the end of the project. When asked if they had experienced conflict in the last six months, while 8 out of 11 people in Fatuhada 02 reported that there had been conflict, of the remaining 107 people in the other five communities surveyed, 98 per cent stated that they had been conflict free.

Two communities thought that peaceful change in their community was exclusively a result of Laletek's programs, while the others said that it was a combination of Laletek and Church, Government or other NGO supported projects or the community's own initiatives. The fact that some communities claimed the credit for peacebuilding in their aldeias, even though they had not shown the ability to resolve conflict until Laletek's intervention, is also positive as it indicates ownership of the process. All communities surveyed in this evaluation, however, acknowledged the crucial role of Laletek. As one community leader described it, "They showed us the path".

According to staff assessments, when compared to the mid-term evaluation, when Laletek staff estimated that there were only four communities out of 22 communities that they deemed as successful, with the remainder either showing some progress and about seven showing no progress, there are now 18 communities deemed as successful, with two in progress and only two communities viewed as unsuccessful.

The main activities cited as having been the most effective in facilitating this change were the ANV training, the Dahur competition and in particular, the Small Infrastructure Projects. While both the ANV training and the Dahur competition have had demonstrated impact, the Small Infrastructure Projects, in the places where they have been implemented, had the strongest impact through their dual role in bringing opposing groups together for a common goal and in resolving a source of community friction such as access to water. One staff member observed that the resulting structures also serve as a permanent reminder of what the community has built together. The resolution of the Metin 04 conflict in particular, possibly Dili's longest running and most bitter conflict, must be seen as an outstanding

achievement. The construction of a community centre there through the Small Infrastructure Project has played an integral part by bringing opposing groups together, providing a neutral communal meeting place, and encouraging the *Chefe De Aldeia* to become more consultative and inclusive in his approach. As confirmed by focus groups in non-beneficiary areas, the successes in these communities have had a flow on effect to a number of other communities both by providing access to much needed amenities such as clean water and through an end to conflict.

A key reason for the project's success and a factor in its future sustainability is the Laletek process which has carefully researched and identified community issues and dynamics and targeted them through a patient, long term, multidimensional and multistage approach, which has been both innovative and flexible in its application. This approach has ensured that the project is both highly relevant and appropriate to the communities in which it has been implemented.

Encouraging local groups to monitor and respond to local conflicts and mobilize their communities has been a significant element of this approach, as with empowering local leaders to address community needs, linking with the right entities and mentoring and supporting them through the process. Resisting communities' appeals for reimbursement and encouraging them to talk about their problems and resolve them themselves, while it is hard work, has ensured the future long-term success of this project where others have failed. As a consequence, a major outcome of this approach has been community ownership, both of the problem and of the solution and this will be the key factor in the sustainability of gains so far beyond the life of the project.

There is good reason to believe that in addition to the Dili Diocesan Justice and Peace Commission's (DJPC) integration of some of Laletek project activities into its ongoing programs, such as the ANV training, and the adoption of the annual Dahur competitions by the Secretary of State for Culture, the impact of the project will be sustained by a range of other activities and groups, from the community, the government and other NGOs such as BELUN, for example, which will continue the collection of incident reports.

A number of problems remain with community leadership. In one case this has perpetuated conflict; in others it has merely impeded project progress. In some cases there is lack of communication between community leaders, or between community leaders and their communities, or community leaders have become politicised and seek to claim project activities as their own party's achievements. While Laletek staff have shown great patience and ingenuity in resolving these issues in a number of seemingly intractable situations, in the end these issues will only be resolved through community initiative.

In terms of efficiency, there were few complaints about communication and coordination, and some of these related to the community's own internal communication issues. While some sources acknowledged that there had been problems in the first phase of the project, even the most vehement critic from the

mid-term evaluation agreed that project implementation had vastly improved. Early problems over implementation roles between CRS and DJPC also appear to have been resolved. Budget expenditure also appears to have largely conformed to planning, with funds transfers and financial reporting by both partners running smoothly. With regards to the small grants for the Small Infrastructure Projects, while there was some jealousy within communities over who should handle the funds, with a standoff between two community leaders in one target aldeia, there were no complaints over how the funds were spent, which is something of an achievement in itself.

Overall, Laletek Project has been well coordinated, popular with the community and has made a significant and lasting impact over a substantial geographic area, in some of the most violent areas of Dili, where many other agencies have tried and failed. This success has been achieved with an efficient utilization of a minimum of resources, staff and financial outlay. While the impact of upcoming national elections can be unpredictable, there are strong grounds for confidence that this impact will be sustained well into the future.

Introduction

The Laletek Project is a two-year project (March 15, 2010 – March 14, 2012), funded by the United States Agency for International Development's (USAID) Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation and Catholic Relief Services Timor-Leste Program (CRS/TL). It has been implemented by CRS in partnership with DJPC Dili, in 22 aldeias in six sucos in the capital district, Dili. The Laletek Project's primary goal is that opposing groups in targeted aldeias reduce violent conflict with each other, to be achieved through its two strategic objectives:

- SO1: Opposing groups in targeted aldeias develop healthy relationships with each other.
- SO2: Opposing groups in targeted aldeias collaborate non-violently to manage and maintain existing, new, or renovated local infrastructure.

The project uses three theories of change, which correspond to those found in the "Healthy Relationships" (third) family of theories of change¹ in support of achieving this overall goal:

1. If opposing groups learn more about one other's experiences, then they will be more willing to see each other as human beings rather than as enemies to be vilified.
2. If opposing groups see each other as fellow human beings, then they will be more willing to focus on what connects rather than what divides them.
3. If opposing groups are willing to connect and work constructively together on issues of collective interest, then they will be less likely to engage in acts of violence against one other.

Conducted over 19 days from January 30 to February 17, 2012, this final evaluation had the following objectives:

1. To evaluate the performance of Laletek Project based on standard evaluation criteria, i.e. its overall effectiveness and efficiency, its relevance and appropriateness re current context, impacts (the changes at personal, relational, structural and cultural dimensions), and sustainability of the interventions beyond 2012.
2. To contribute towards organizational learning through the documentation of best practices and lessons learned, and provide recommendations for future peace building projects for CRS, DJPC, USAID and other stakeholders.

¹ USAID/DCHA/CMM APS Solicitation #M/OAA/DCHA/DOFDA-09-857, pg. 30

Limitations of this evaluation

The context for this final evaluation is very different from the mid-term evaluation, when most of the preliminary, large-scale participatory activities such as the Dahur competition and the Active Non Violence Training had only recently taken place. Memories were still fresh, and participants were readily available. One year later, memories have faded somewhat, and in the interim, there have also been interventions in project areas, often similar to Laletek activities such as ANV training, by other agencies including the Ministry of Social Solidarity (MSS) (although often facilitated by Laletek staff) and Ba Futuru.

Nonetheless, these communities were well placed to be able to assess change at a community level and at a personal level. Also, much of the assessment of individual project activities had already been conducted shortly after their implementation at the mid-term evaluation. Therefore, while this evaluation assessed project performance against a number of criteria with specific reference to a number of project activities, this final report will mainly focus on impact under the criteria set out in Annex 1 of the framework of the Reflective Peacebuilding Manual, with a focus on impact, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability as set out in Objective 1 in the evaluation Scope of Work.

Acknowledgements

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Key Findings

1. Appropriateness/Relevance

As was observed in the mid-term evaluation, the intelligence gathered on each community in the preparatory Baseline Assessment has played a major part in its success and as with that evaluation, there was virtually unanimous praise for Laletek's activities and their strategy for working with communities. One common comment was that Laletek's methods and materials are simple and straightforward, tailored to the community's level and because they were interesting and innovative, they engaged the communities where other strategies had failed. A number of respondents made the comment that Laletek's approach was relevant to their communities as rather than implement strategies used overseas, Laletek identified the situation on the ground in each community and utilised East Timorese culture as a tool for change.

'CRS don't try to implement programs based on another nation's culture and implement it in the community. CRS programs are tailored to the actual situation in Timor-Leste. Their activities have relevance to Timor-Leste's true condition.' (Community Police Officer Domingos Maia)

One respondent claimed that other agency interventions had even caused conflict in his community through inadequate identification of community dynamics, and praised Laletek both for the rigour of its approach and its consistent engagement, claiming that other agencies' programs "were like a Christmas light: one twinkle and it's gone".

A number of respondents for key informant interviews noted that Laletek's strategies are appropriate as they have worked at an aldeia level where the problems actually are, and that they get people to work together to cement unity gained through other activities.

There was particular praise for the Dahur competition, and all informants who had been involved called for its continuation. A number of respondents described how the Dahur competition had, in an era of globalization, helped people remember their traditions and bring them closer to their own culture.

In terms of the way that Laletek communicates with communities, key informant interviewees and focus group respondents were almost unanimous with their approval of Laletek's communication strategy of working through both formal and informal leaders and groups. There were two dissenting voices however. One community claimed that Laletek staff had worked exclusively through the Chefe De Aldeia who did not pass on information, while another claimed the opposite; that Laletek, perhaps for this reason, had worked directly with the Dahur dance group, bypassing the Chefe De Aldeia, perhaps demonstrating different approaches by different staff members but also illustrating the challenges of working with communities.

2. Effectiveness

Program Implementation

Not all project activities had been completed in the six beneficiary communities surveyed. In Caceularan, there had been no progress there since the mid-term evaluation. According to Laletek staff, this is due to an impasse between the Chefe De Aldeia and the youth leader. This was most evident in the focus group meetings where men and women had received conflicting information on meeting times from these leaders. In Toko Baru, the Small Infrastructure project, a drainage system, had been completed at a Suko level, but no project had been completed at an aldeia level, due, according to staff, to an apparent lack of initiative on the part of the Chefe De Aldeia.

In Metin 04, however, where the Chefe De Aldeia had also presented an obstacle to further action, in what seemed at the time of the mid-term evaluation to be an intractable conflict, staff adopted two strategies, with a subsequent breakthrough. One strategy was to approach martial arts group leaders directly and another was to conduct a door knocking campaign with parents of martial arts group members. As a consequence, at the time of the focus group, members of both 7-7 and PSHT groups were engaged in building a community centre there. The Chefe De Aldeia has now endorsed the project and now allows the PSHT leader and other youth leaders to assist him in his work.

Monitoring and Evaluation Tools

Staff reported that the monitoring and evaluation tools had greatly assisted them in their work, proving straightforward and easy to use, allowing them to measure the effectiveness of their work, the number of beneficiaries, and to identify unresolved problems. One key informant interviewee remarked that the Laletek M&E system set them apart from other agency approaches, as Laletek had been the only one to follow up and monitor the impact of their work, mentor the community and their leaders and to seek solutions to any unresolved issues.

Incident Reports

While few of the focus group respondents reported any substantial involvement in either the Incident Reports or Conflict Maps, a number of key informant interviews confirmed the value of these monitoring tools. In all cases, the Chefe De Aldeia appeared to be responsible for completing them, although they also claimed that the community assisted them in providing information. All sources interviewed who were actually involved in utilising the Incident Report asserted that the tool had greatly assisted them in identifying problems so they could resolve them.

'This (Incident Report) is highly relevant in effectively responding to the community's situation to bring peace. The Incident Report really helps us identify the problems and record details of conflict as it happens within the community. Many times we have set an example for other communities to follow.' (Youth leader, Caceularan)

Conflict Maps

By all accounts, the conflict maps had also proven useful in identifying and resolving conflict, with a similar pattern of utilization by the Chefe De Aldeia but with community assistance. One respondent described how they used the map to identify and resolve problems in their community as follows:

'The Conflict Map is like a map or drawing that local authorities use to mark places where conflict has occurred. For example, if there has been a conflict we put a red symbol. If it's still in process of being resolved we put a smaller red symbol. When the house or people involved agree to resolve the problem we put a green symbol.' (FGD Terminal)

Coordination and Communication

The majority of feedback for coordination and communication was positive, from both the community and partners, and there were only three complaints, each demonstrating the challenges of dealing with communities. One community complained about frequent changes to meeting times, causing considerable inconvenience when community members had been organized to attend a meeting. Another complained about the lack of sufficient time given to prepare for the Dahur competition, while another complaint related to information only being provided to the Chefe De Aldeia. Other complaints related not to Laletek, but to the community's own internal communication processes. There was also one anomaly relating to information provided to the Laletek monitoring team, whereby the Chefe De Aldeia had sent a representative to meetings who had not communicated the fact that Fatuhada 02 was actually experiencing almost daily conflict, which came as some surprise to staff in the staff reflection workshop.

3. Efficiency

Division of Labour

Under the terms of their MOU, the DJPC is responsible for implementation of project activities in the target communities, with CRS responsible for management and monitoring support. Nonetheless, at the beginning of the project there appeared to be some misunderstanding about implementation roles between DJPC and CRS, with some staff unsure of whom exactly they were working for. However, in this final evaluation, all sources interviewed agreed that through discussions between staff and with the passage of time, this issue had now been resolved.

Staff at DJPC did identify, however, that the confusion now resided at the community level rather than at the partnership level, with a common misunderstanding that Laletek was an NGO, or confusion over whether Laletek was a DJPC or CRS program. While this confusion did not seem widespread in discussions for this evaluation with communities, a number of focus groups and key informant interviews did use the names of Laletek and the two partner organizations

interchangeably. Having two director positions at DJPC and CRS involved in the project also initially caused some confusion-both for staff at DJPC and the community, but this was also no longer cited as a problem.

Partnerships

Both JPC and CRS staff agreed that while Laletek's approach differed considerably from the Government's (principally, the Ministry of Social Solidarity), the partnership between Laletek and the Government was working well, that both Laletek staff and the Government always called each other to attend ceremonies or mediation processes, with the government often calling on Laletek staff to assist, as they did in Manleauana to help conduct the Tara Bandu Process there.

The respondents involved in the Peace Building Working Group also praised the leadership and regular participation of Laletek staff at meetings, and their willingness to share information. The partnership with BELUN on the Incident Reports also worked well, with Laletek complementing the BELUN suko level data collection process rather than replicating it, using BELUN's existing format and adding to it.

Financial coordination was also praised by both partners, including the smooth transfer of funds from CRS to JPC, with regular financial reports submitted to deadlines. JPC staff also received regular feedback and mentoring on financial reports, with regular monitoring to avoid any discrepancies. The budget was 90 per cent spent with outlay largely conforming to planning; some extra expenditure was occasionally necessary due to unexpected activities such as extra overtime to mentor new JPC staff after a sudden staff turnover there. Expenditure is also monitored through a monthly budget comparison so that spending can be adjusted if required.

While early staff turnover had caused some project disruption at the beginning, both DJPC, Laletek and partner respondents believed that with mentoring from CRS staff, DJPC staff had since gained increased confidence and competence and now had the capabilities to run activities themselves, including the organization and facilitation of the ANV training, the Dahur competition and also possessed the financial management skills required to run these projects. CRS staff involved in Laletek also reported feeling confident in a range of duties including facilitating meetings and training, community mobilization and grant management, and feel that their involvement in the project has tremendously boosted their capabilities and confidence overall.

Small Infrastructure Project Funds Management

Funding for the Small Infrastructure Projects also seemed to run smoothly. While no concerns were raised in the interviews or focus groups about transparency or budgets, Laletek staff believed that these funds had sometimes created jealousy between community members or leaders. One community also had met an impasse where the Chefe De Suko did not trust the Chefe De Aldeia with the money and so

the project had not gone ahead. Overall, it generally appeared that the Chefe De Aldeias were responsible for implementation. There was, however, some concern over the fact that some communities were still submitting project proposals when the deadline has long passed.

Of the sources interviewed who had been involved in submitting proposals, all expressed satisfaction with the support they received from Laletek. One source also praised Laletek for their support in linking them to a government agency when their project proposal exceeded Laletek's budget:

'The community put forward a Small Infrastructure Project proposal for a Youth Centre, which would cost \$14,000, but this wasn't realistic as CRS could only offer \$4000. As a solution, Laletek assisted us to meet the government to get support from the Cabinet of the Prime Minister's Civil Society Fund. Although the government replied that they have to wait until after the election, we have made the connection.' (Youth Leader, Caceularan)

4. Impact

In response to the question as to what the situation had been like before the Laletek intervention, with the exception of the non-beneficiary focus groups in Mate Lahotu and Culuhun, the difference in accounts between male and female focus groups was often quite marked, with male focus groups keen to portray a positive portrait of their community and deny problems existed before or now, while the female focus groups were considerably more frank. This contrast was most stark in Fatuhada 02, where the men denied there were any problems at all, whereas the Chefe De Aldeia, a woman, and the women's focus group claimed that up until the banning of martial arts group training in December 2011 there was almost nightly group conflict, pointing to a place less than twenty meters away and also indicating other hot spots around the neighborhood on the Conflict Map.

Nonetheless, except for Fatuhada 02, no communities surveyed reported anything other than minor disputes in their community in the last six months. Five out of six communities said that while sometimes there were small problems, of a personal or domestic nature, Laletek had helped bring peace. The Dahur competition, ANV training and where it had been implemented, the Small Infrastructure Projects were cited as the project activities that had most contributed to this change. Two communities thought that peaceful change in their community was exclusively a result of Laletek's programs, while the others said that it was a combination of Laletek and Church, Government or other NGO supported projects or the community's own initiatives. Some also mistakenly attributed Laletek activities such as ANV training and the Conflict Map to other agencies such as Ba Futuru. Indeed, areas like Becora have become quite 'crowded' with donor attention, so it would be easy to confuse the programs by different agencies that have done similar training.

On a quantitative level, when asked if there are more positive relations between opposing groups at the end of the project than before, with the exception of

Fatuhada 02, the result was unanimously in favour. Overall, 107 people out of 115 (93 per cent) focus group participants agreed, as did nine out of ten key informant interviews with community leaders. Similarly, in response to the question “Have you experienced conflict in your community in the last six months?” only two (two per cent) out of 115 people reported any conflict, and this was a personal, not a community level.

The impact of the Laletek project can also be seen in these two diagrams, seen at Figure 1 and 2 below, produced at staff reflection exercises at the mid-term and final evaluation. In this exercise, staff were asked to identify, by a process of consensus, which communities were the easiest to work with and which were the hardest, which were showing progress and which were not. The categories of Cooperative and Getting Better do not necessarily signify that a community is free of conflict, but that the community is more amenable to working with Laletek and to resolving conflict. Criteria for these categories, identified during that first staff reflection, are as follows:

Cooperative

1. Strong sense of initiative shown by the Chefe de Aldeia and their community
2. Willpower and initiative to resolve conflict
3. Cooperative with Laletek Project staff and objectives
4. A strong voluntary ethic

Uncooperative

1. Lack of initiative and engagement from the community leadership or the community itself, including expecting money for involvement
2. Community or leadership claim they are too busy but do not deputise somebody else to assist
3. Leader has low legitimacy due to friction between them and their community
4. Lack of willpower to resolve conflict on the part of the community leader or their community
5. Lack of ability on the part of leadership to organize the community, which was sometimes attributed to the local leaders lack of legitimacy or popularity in their community

In the first diagram, there are only four communities in the top right quadrant that signifies they are more cooperative, with less conflict, and nine communities in the left quadrants that indicate less cohesion, cooperation and continued conflict. In the second diagram a year later, there are 18 communities in the top left quadrant and only four on the right. While this analysis is staff self-assessed, except for Fatuhada 02, the results for five other communities were verified in this evaluation and confirmed through the control sample of two non-beneficiary communities.

Figure 1: Laletek Impact at Mid-term Evaluation





Figure 2: Laletek Impact at Final Evaluation



4.1 Personal Dimension

A large number of respondents reported significant change at a personal level on a number of grounds. Some community members reported personal change through being able to walk through neighbouring aldeias they had previously never been able to, or simply through access to clean water due to the Small Infrastructure Project. Community leaders referred to new skills acquired such as conflict resolution skills from ANV training, on how to write a proposal, or new respect gained in the community through their participation or leadership in project activities such as by playing a leading role in coordinating the Small Infrastructure Projects, or leading a Dahur team, as described here by the Fatuhada 02 Dahur Coordinator, a young woman:

'I have experienced major change through the Dahur Competition, as I can understand more about the Dahur and also through the respect that I now have from youth and their parents through my role as Dahur Coordinator.'

Two gang members were also transformed through their involvement. One man, who had formerly been involved in setting up barricades at the bus terminal in Terminal Becora to extort money from bus drivers and their passengers, stopped this behaviour after ANV training and dissuaded others, and reportedly also stopped beating his wife. Another gang member had been involved in setting up checkpoints at night to identify rival gang members and was integral to that conflict in Metin 04, Faulara, had also reformed his behaviour through involvement in the Small Infrastructure Project, and played an active leadership role in conflict prevention.

The personal impact of involvement in this project by Laletek must also be noted, with Laletek staff gaining new skills in community mobilization and engagement, and greater self-confidence through their participation in this project. Their skills will prove to be a valuable asset for future peacebuilding projects.

4.2 Relational Dimension

The success in mediating the Metin 04/Faulara and Moris Foun conflicts is of particular note. Up until November last year, these had been possibly the two most intractable conflicts in Dili, with a number of houses destroyed and fatalities as recently as December last year. Indeed, an interview there for the mid-term evaluation had to be cancelled due to an eruption of fighting. Faulara interviewees directly attributed the success of mediation efforts to Laletek, to both the ANV training and Dahur competition, but most importantly, the Small Infrastructure Project that motivated former enemies to work together.

As described by staff, the success of this enterprise could largely be attributed to a change of tactics whereby staff both used parents to appeal to gang members and then after talks with the Chefe De Aldeia failed to bear fruit, directly approached gang leaders. As one source in Metin 04 described the result:

'The community and youth can now walk free in the daytime and at night and now work together to create this village centre-many different martial arts group members are involved in this construction effort.' (Antonio Soibada, PSHT leader, Metin 04)

Another focus group reported that they now organized sports activities with youth from a neighbouring village they had been in conflict with, sang together in Church and invited each other to wedding festivities.

Conflict resolution in some of these communities had a flow on effect, as proved by the focus group conducted with a non-beneficiary aldeia, Mate Lahotu. While according to focus groups there, this community continues to suffer internal conflict, they asserted that they no longer have conflict with three Laletek target aldeias of 20 Septembru, Metin 04 and Moris Foun. The Small Infrastructure Project to provide clean water to Fatuk Fransisco, a source of tension between the two aldeias, resulted in clean water for co-beneficiary aldeia Terminal, and non-beneficiary aldeia Buburlao.

Key informant interviews and some focus groups also reported a new willingness for their communities to resolve problems themselves, and a new initiative to work voluntarily on community projects rather than expecting money. Another community also reported that they felt they now had a cooperative connection between local authorities, the Church and the Government.

4.3 Structural Dimension

It was difficult to gauge from such a short-term evaluation how structural dimensions have changed. Laletek activities appear to have been generally inclusive of all marginalised or maligned groups such as women, youth and martial arts groups. One Chefe De Aldeia commented that Laletek was successful because they identified youth's potential. One woman Dahur coordinator, as described above, reported gaining new prestige within the community through the Dahur Competition. Otherwise power dynamics have remained essentially the same with traditional and formal authorities still wielding decision-making power within their communities. While that state of affairs is unlikely to change for a long time, it can certainly be claimed on the basis of focus group and key informant interviews that many of them have learned to be more consultative and inclusive in their approach to their communities. One Chefe De Aldeia reported that as a result of the project, while formerly he had always worked by himself, now he accepted assistance from other members of the community in his work, including local youth:

'The major change is that before I did everything myself, but together with Laletek we identified the potential of some of the local youth, for example, Antonio Soibada, Fernando and Adriano and now they all help me with my work.' (Chefe De Aldeia Metin 04, Faulara)

4.4 Cultural Dimension

As identified in the Reflective Peacebuilding Manual, cultural change is embedded in the three other dimensions and is difficult to isolate for evaluation purposes. As stated in the introduction, it was easier to discern changes to cultural perceptions in the mid-term evaluation where people had just participated in activities when the impact was most profoundly felt. Certainly though, there is evidence of a cultural shift away from entrenched cultural attitudes with at least one community reporting that it has moved away from East-West enmities and through the Dahur competition, have an enhanced understanding of what it means to be East Timorese rather than seeing themselves through a narrow prism of ethnicity or group.

The main activities cited as having been the most effective in facilitating this change were the ANV training, Dahur and in particular, the Small Infrastructure Projects. In some cases this was due the activity bringing opposing groups together, as in Metin 04, or in others, where the project itself resolved a source of community friction, such as access to water as in Terminal and Fatuk Fransisco.



Laletek Team and evaluation team with Comoro Metin 04 community at site of their Small Infrastructure Project, a community centre

5. Sustainability

Laletek cannot be expected to solve all ills and a number of deep structural issues such as access to employment, education and basic services will always have the potential to reignite old tensions. The coming elections are also expected to provide a potential flashpoint, but while a number of respondents expressed some trepidation on that front, all respondents in the key informant interviews and focus groups seemed confident that peace in their communities would last for a considerable time. Some were more confident than others:

'I give my guarantee that that there will be no more conflict here in the future.'
(Youth Leader, Terminal)

Certainly, those communities who have alleviated communal tensions through the provision of amenities as part of the Small Infrastructure Projects have a strong

chance of perpetuating the impact of Laletek. As well as addressing a source of conflict, these amenities, as one Laletek staff member claimed, also serve a symbolic value:

'They (the Small Infrastructure Projects) serve as a monument to their joint achievement as a community.'

While all communities expressed a desire for Laletek to continue or that they receive some kind of ongoing support, a number of communities already had plans to continue the work of the CPDGs, with one community planning to convene monthly meetings after the conclusion of the Laletek project. Another said that they would collect money from the community to put towards small infrastructure projects. One community, Terminal, also had a plan to maintain their new facilities.

'We have already prepared a youth leadership structure so that we can continue to work together after the conclusion of Laletek.' (Chefe De Aldeia, Metin 04)

The DJPC, who currently have two staff trained in ANV methodology, plans to continue the ANV training by integrating it with other programs. One avenue will be the TLPI workshops, held twice a year and the Youth Development Program, which has weekly and monthly meetings and works in three Parishes covering some of the Laletek areas. Participants for the TLPI training are drawn from all of Dili. There will also be a general assembly once a year where ANV training will be held and also possibly during the Christmas season Day of Reflection. Community dialogues will also be held under the auspice of the DJPC Human Rights Division.

The DJPC have also submitted a proposal to the government, accepted by the Minister of Culture, to continue the Dahur competition on an annual basis.

The DJPC currently have funding until 2013 but one or two funders are unsure beyond that, although both the UNDP and MSS have been asking for proposals. They will also look at the Prime Minister's Office Civil Society Fund but this only offers funding up to \$10,000. Staffing will also continue to present a challenge as trained, competent staff tend to get poached by other organizations offering higher salaries.

According to Laletek staff, project impact will continue through a number of avenues such through trained community groups and leaders holding regular meetings of the Conflict Prevention Network (RPK) at the sub-district level, the collection of incident reports by LNGO Belun; support for conflict resolution training needs, community development and engagement activities by the Department of Peacebuilding and Social Cohesion; dialogue and advocacy from the Martial Arts Group (FESTIL) and the Secretary of State for Youth and Sport.

6. Challenges

A staff reflection workshop was held where staff were asked to identify the issues they faced in each of the six beneficiary aldeias surveyed for the evaluation, and the strategies they adopted to deal with these challenges. While a solution was not found for every problem, here are some of the strategies staff used to address some of these issues. Given that some issues such as described above were common to most of the aldeias, and to the mid-term evaluation, they are summarised here:

1. *Problems with local authorities:* In a number of cases there was little or no coordination between the Chefe De Aldeia and Chefe De Suko, or between the Chefe De Aldeia and community, or local authorities refused to collaborate with Laletek staff. In other cases, community leaders were involved in politics, and claimed Laletek achievements as their own party's, which created difficulties for Laletek staff who don't want to appear to be endorsing any particular party.

While not always successful, Laletek staff tried to resolve impasses with local authorities by approaching alternative sources of authority, working through established groups, for example, such as the Dahur Dance Teams, the Theatre Groups or the Youth Development Groups, or by identifying other leaders with influence such as martial arts group or youth leaders. While this approach paid dividends in a number of cases, there was one complaint from a Chefe De Aldeia that Laletek staff had 'gone behind their back', illustrating the need to conduct such strategies with utmost sensitivity and tact. In the case of enmity between local authorities, Laletek staff offered to mediate between them, acting as a bridge, as one staff member described it.

In terms of communication, it was acknowledged that there are a number of different ways of communicating with the community and leaders, both informal and formal. People may know about an event, for example, if told informally through a sibling, friend etc. but may not attend unless informed by the 'appropriate' source e.g. a figure of respect or authority, or a Laletek staff member themselves. It was agreed that more attention would be devoted to addressing this problem in future to ensure clear lines of communication.

2. *Martial arts group conflict:* While in some cases martial arts group conflict represents communal conflict, in some cases it is separate, and despite a community's best efforts, such as in Fatuhada 02 or Metin 04, MAG conflict endures. In the case of Metin 04, Laletek conducted door to door visits to listen to the perspectives of families of youth involved in the conflict, and also utilised local Church leaders in dialogue. It was also suggested that in similar seemingly intractable situations, it was advisable to repeat the ANV training session to reinforce community commitment to resolve conflict, and encourage new community leaders to participate. This was also seen as a possible solution to hostility between formal community leaders.

3. *Lack of respect for community leaders:* Sometimes formal community leaders do not have the trust or respect of the community-in one case, as she is a woman. While it was acknowledged that sometimes there were deep rooted causes for a community leaders' unpopularity, it was suggested that community leaders be mentored, trained and supported to hold Tara Bandu ceremonies, both to raise the consciousness of the community about such traditions and at the same time, to increase the community's trust and confidence in their leaders.
4. *Community asking for much greater funding than is available:* In situations where the community's aspirations are beyond the scope of the Small Infrastructure Fund, staff responded that the community should be assisted in proposal writing and linked up with the relevant government authorities.
5. *Community or leadership are unmotivated or expect money:* Make people feel that they own the problem and the solution, so that the people involved in conflict become 'owners of peace'. Staff agreed that this takes a long time but this approach has clearly worked in a number of areas, such as Terminal, where people and community leaders were previously expecting payment in return for participation.

Lessons Learned in Summary

While not all problems were resolved and some communities continue to present challenges, the Laletek staff have shown through their responses to these challenges that they have adopted a creative and flexible approach to problem solving and community engagement strategies and an ability to reflect on their current strategies and adapt where necessary. Their patience and perseverance in the face of such challenges was also evident and the result in Metin 04 is a particular example of where this approach has shifted previously seemingly intractable attitudes, bringing remarkable dividends.

Not taking static formal leadership for granted was another central lesson, as the leaders are sometimes themselves the source of the problem. Alternative forms of leadership and influence should be sought, involving youth and women in particular, but done with sensitivity so that formal leadership is not undermined at the same time, as one leader complained in this evaluation.

Another strong message to emerge from the workshop, that marks the Laletek approach as different from other approaches, is community ownership. Resisting community and leaders' appeals for reimbursement and encouraging them to talk about their problems and take the initiative themselves, while it is hard work, has ensured the future long-term success of this project where others have failed. This was often pointed out in interviews for this evaluation in areas where there had often been multiple interventions, which had in some cases only brought more conflict than peace.

The main conclusion that can be drawn is that successful peacebuilding requires imagination, flexibility and a long-term approach, which have been lacking in many approaches in the past, where programs have been often implemented mechanically with little regard for the realities on the ground or for outcomes. As one informant for this evaluation described it, in the past there has been “too much emphasis on spending the money rather than resolving the problem itself”.

Conclusion

The Laletek project has been well coordinated, with sound methodology and effective use of funds, receiving overwhelmingly positive feedback. From the data gathered for this final evaluation, this project has brought about real change in most communities where it has been implemented. Even where project activities have not been fully implemented due to factors described above, there has still been at least a major reduction in conflict.

While a significant amount of communities now enjoy peace largely due to Laletek activities, the increased capacity and confidence of the staff involved is an achievement in itself. Laletek staff (and through their involvement with Laletek project, some staff of other agencies) now have considerable and enviable expertise in community engagement and mobilization strategies, and have learned new skills in a variety of other areas. Such human resources will provide a valuable resource for peacebuilding efforts in the future. The success of the project so far is a testament to their skills and ingenuity.

The project methodology, of course, has played a major part in this success for a number of reasons, but especially for its ability to implement long-term relational and structural change while also retaining the flexibility to be responsive to immediate concerns and new situations. As the case in Faulara demonstrates, the ability to engage 'spoilers' and informal groups in community projects and treating them as part of the community has also been a major contributing factor. Utilising an intuitive approach to peacebuilding through strengthening local conflict resolution potential and mechanisms, instead of imposing 'readymade' external models, has also clearly created a sense of community ownership of the process.

As with the mid-term evaluation, progress was not uniform across all aldeias, with some aldeias continuing to present challenges and so project implementation has stalled in those communities. While according to staff assessments, these communities themselves or their leaders are the obstacles to further progress, the example of Comoro Metin 04 has shown the dividends of persistence and creative thinking.

Nonetheless, as stated above, the data from this evaluation has shown that while not every aldeia has been a total success story, there still has been a clear reduction, or total cessation of conflict in most of its target areas. There is every reason to believe, an upcoming election notwithstanding, that the impact of this project will endure well beyond its conclusion. This conclusion is based on the belief that due to Laletek's long term, multifaceted approach, the innovation and novelty of its methods and sheer patience and perseverance, communities have been encouraged to take the initiative themselves and therefore take ownership, and this is the best guarantee of sustainability.

Recommendations

- 1) As the Laletek Project nears its conclusion, it would be regrettable if this forward momentum was lost. While most communities involved in this project now enjoy peace, some of their neighbouring communities do not. Experience in Dili in the past has shown that just as peace can have a flow on effect, so can conflict. It is recommended here that the Laletek Project continue, but in a much abridged form, and be focused on two clusters of neighbouring communities that include a mix of past beneficiaries and new communities, both to reinforce past gains and extend these gains to new communities. Past beneficiary communities could also support and mentor new communities in the process, for example, as community members from 20 Septembru did in Metin 04. Two suggested areas are the communities surrounding the area of the bus Terminal, Becora, along the path of the river and also the aldeias in the Bebonuk area. At the very least, perhaps the non-beneficiary aldeias adjoining beneficiary areas could be targeted.
- 2) It is also strongly recommended that given Laletek's successes in Dili, that it be trialled in rural areas which have some of the worst and longest running conflicts in the country. One suggested area is Baucau city, where CRS already have a presence and there is a prominent Baucau Diocese. Another is Uatolari in Viqueque or Atsabe in Ermera. There is strong evidence to suggest that through constant circular and permanent rural urban migration, conflicts in these regions also affect conflicts in Dili.
- 3) After five years of intensive peacebuilding efforts, there is currently no accessible document or record that might be used to build on or inform future peacebuilding efforts. It is strongly recommended that the learnings from this project be distilled in a publically available report or manual that can be utilised by government peacebuilding departments and other agencies, local or international, for future peacebuilding projects.
- 4) Responses to the crisis of 2006-7 revealed a dearth of people qualified and experienced in community engagement and peacebuilding methodologies. It is recommended here that a detailed database of staff employed on this project be compiled, containing information about roles, experience, relevant expertise and training undertaken be maintained, so that this knowledge and expertise is available to other agencies for future needs and possible future emergencies.

Annexures

Annex 1: Methodology

The evaluation tools were developed in consultation with Laletek staff, designed to capture the five main criteria as set out by the CRS 'Reflective Peacebuilding Manual'² of:

1. Appropriateness/Relevance
2. Effectiveness
3. Efficiency
4. Impact (at personal, relational, structural and cultural level)
5. Sustainability

Sixteen focus groups were conducted (divided into men's and women's groups) in eight aldeias. Two non-beneficiary areas (formerly in conflict with beneficiary areas) were selected, along with four beneficiary aldeias seen as successful and two seen as unsuccessful (there were originally to be three of each; Comoro Metin 04 was originally deemed as unsuccessful but during the planning process for the evaluation it became a success story instead).

No.	Place	Status	No. Men	No. Women
1	Terminal, Camea	successful	7	11
2	Mascarenhas 06	successful	7	8
3	Toko Baru	successful	3	8
4	Comoro Metin 04	successful	26	0
5	Comoro Fatuhada 02	unsuccessful	3	8
6	Caqeularan, Becora	unsuccessful	7	4
7	Aldeia Mate Lahotu	non-beneficiary	7	6
8	Toko Baru II, Kuluhun	non-beneficiary	5	5
TOTAL			65	50

Co-facilitator Vital Barreto, accompanied by note taker Queizar Savio, conducted the women's groups, and the evaluator James Scambary, accompanied by note taker Altino Freitas, conducted the men's focus groups. All focus group discussion was conducted in Tetum without an interpreter.

There were 21 Key Informant Interviews (see Annex 2) with project stakeholders and partners.

²Lederach, John Paul, Reina Neufeldt and Hal Culbertson, 2007, 'Reflective Peacebuilding: A Planning, Monitoring and Learning Toolkit' available online at <http://www.crs.org> and <http://kroc.nd.edu>

A group interview was conducted with JPC staff at their office, and a full day staff reflection was held at the CRS office with combined JPC and Laletek staff participating.

Annex 2: Sources Interviewed

	Name	Role and Organization
1	Leonito Guterres	Head of Unity, Dialogue and Mediation Ministry of Social Solidarity
2	Carmen Ribeiro de Jesus	Assistant to Dialogue and Mediation, Department of Peacebuilding and Social Cohesion, Ministry of Social and Solidarity
3	Jose Belo	UNDP Program Analyst
4	Domingos Maia	Community Police, National Police (PNTL)
5	Maria Emilia	Dahur Coordinator Fatuhada 02
6	Serafim Mechado	Chefe De Aldeia Metin 04
7	Antonio Soibada	PSHT Leader Metin 04
8	Cornelio	CPDG leader Mascarenhas 06
9	Judit Dos Santos	Chefe De Aldeia Toko Baru
10	Eugenio Sarmiento	Secretary of State for Culture
11	Mateus Valenti	Chefe de Suku Mascarenhas
12	Manuel C. Freitas	Chefe Aldeia Terminal
13	Celestino	Youth Coordinator Bedois and Terminal
14	Ricky Gonsalves	Jesuit Relief Services
15	Fatima Sanches	Chefe Aldeia 02 Fatuhada
16	Into Parada	Youth Leader Caceularan
17	Cris Caetano	Trocaire Programme Officer
18	Sister Clare Garcillano	JPC Director
19	Agustinho G. da Silva	Finance Manager of CRS/TL
20	Florentino Sarmiento	CRS Head of Office Baucau
21	Catharina Maria	Director Laletek

Annex 3: Survey Tool

CRS designed a set of tools as set out below, which were further refined together with the consultant:

Table 1: Evaluation Questions and Tools

Evaluation Questions	FGD w/ beneficiary	FGD w/ non- beneficiary	Staff Reflection	KII w/ community & group leaders	KII w/ gov officials (incl. sub- district & line ministries)	KII w/ NGOs, PBWG
Appropriateness (relevance of objectives to community, needs assessment, gender participation, targeting criteria and selection methods, timeliness)						
Is the strategy adopted for given conflict situations appropriate and relevant?	X	x	X	x		x
Was participation from partner/stakeholder groups involved in planning, implementation and monitoring of project activities enough? Why/why not?	X		X	x		
Was the strategy to increase women's involvement in project activities appropriate? Why?	X		X			
Why project activities implemented considered appropriate for the targeted communities and context in Timor-Leste? If not, why not?	X	x	X			x
Was the communication strategy appropriate in utilizing groups in communities other than the aldeia chiefs contributed towards project implementation? E.g. parish priests and leaders of other existing groups in the community, including martial arts groups, ritual arts groups, and youth and women groups; especially in the aldeias where their chiefs are not very active.			x			
Was the accompaniment of CRS and partner staff to community leaders appropriate to minimize gaps between opposing groups?	x			x	x	x
Effectiveness (met planned outputs on time, M&E System, incorporation of learning from mid-term, enhancing partner capacity)						
What are the obstacles to program effectiveness? How can these obstacles be overcome?			x			

How effective have the incident reports contributed to monitoring peace in the aldeias? Have the youth/community shown ownership of the incident reports? If so, how?	x			x	x	x
How well was the M&E System worked during the life of the project? How to improve M&E for a similar project? Was our M&E system effective in informing project management decisions and identifying project impact?			x			
What is the success rate from the direct accompaniment of staff in proposal and budget development for community leaders in obtaining external funding for their local activities/ development?				x	x	
Has the community conflict monitoring improved since the start of the project? If so, what aspect of the project contributed to this improvement? If not, why not?	x		x	x		
Efficiency (cost per beneficiary, ratio of programming to admin costs, staffing structure, human resources, coordination)						
How efficient is the coordination of work between CRS, JPC and the Peace building working group members and the government officials and bodies?			x	x	x	x
Was the mechanism to ensure transparency in constructing the community-based infrastructure projects sufficient? If not, why?	x			x		
Have the project been executed efficiently in terms of the ratio between programming to admin costs? Why & why not?			x			
How efficient is the coordination and division of work between CRS and Partner staff in organization of events?			x			
Were there clear roles and responsibilities for CRS and Partner staff?			x			

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What could be improved in future projects in terms of coordination between CRS, Partner and the Government?	x		x	x	x	x
Impact (achievement of SO and IR impact indicators, positive and negative impact, planned and unplanned, differential impact on different community, HHs, individuals)						
Do opposing groups respect Peace Pact in their communities? Why or why not? What has Laletek attributed to this?	x	x	x	x	x	
What percentage of community members perceive positive relations between opposing groups at the end of the project?	x			x		
How many identified violent conflict between opposing groups are resolved at the aldeia level?	x		x	x		
Were some types of conflicts more successfully mitigated than others? If so, why?	x		x	x		x
Did the social contracts/traditional laws signed and disseminated contribute to the number of incidents resolved at the aldeia level? If not, what did?	x			x	x	
What has been the most significant change at personal level? Different impact on male and female (youth and adult)? How have Laletek project activities attributed to each of this change?			X	X		
What has been the most significant change in relationships between opposing groups? How have Laletek project activities attributed to each of this change?			X	X		
What has been the most significant change in structure and system? How have Laletek project activities attributed to each of this change?			X	X		
What has been the most significant change in cultural patterns? How have Laletek project activities attributed to each of this change?			X	X		
Percentage of citizens knowledgeable of their civic roles, rights and	x			x		

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responsibilities? How have Laletek project activities attributed to this increase of knowledge?						
Did youth/communities adopt the promoted non-violent principles? If so, what are the evidences of a shift in the way communities deal with conflicts? What were the barriers to increase adoption of these principles?	x		x	x		
How has the infrastructure projects contributed in bringing peace to the targeted communities?	x			x		
How is the relationship between infrastructure work teams (involving opposing groups) and their communities after project completed? If they involved in conflicts after the project, why?	x		x	x		
Have there been improvements in communication and trust between community leaders and members (youth and women) as a result of Laletek project? If so, how? If not, why not?	x		x	x		
What are the main successes of the project?	x	x	x	x	x	x
What are the main challenges of the project?	x		x	x		
Was there any unplanned changes/impact resulted from the project? If so, what?	x	x	x	x		
Sustainability (capacity of community organizations and committees, value in community of continuing behaviors, other proxies of sustainability)						
What is the exit strategy at the end of the project? / Will project activities be continued by other entities?	x		x	x	x	x
What are the indications that the CPDG (and youth groups, <i>Grupu Manutensaun Fasilidade</i> , FOSKA, <i>Comunidade Igreja Base</i>) will continue to function (in support of Chief of Aldeia/Suco) after the project? If not, why not?	x		x	x	x	
What are the indications that youth in targeted communities will continue to show initiative	x		x	x	x	

and participate in their local community development?						
Is there any maintenance plans for the completed infrastructure projects post-Laletek? If so, what are the indications that the communities will adhere to these plans?	x		x	x	x	
What are the indications that the increase in partner's capacity will ensure sustainability of project results?			x			
What have you learned from this project that could be shared with CRS, DJPC, stakeholders and donor?	x	x	x	x	x	x

Table 2: Tool Outline and Methodology

Evaluation Tool	Information Needs: Questions/topics/indicators to be included	Who? Respondent(s)/comparison groups	How: # and strategy for random sample; # and perspectives needed for purposive sample.	Notes: for selection of respondents, etc.
FGD with beneficiary	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Is the strategy adopted for given conflict situations appropriate and relevant? 2. Was participation from partner/stakeholder groups involved in planning, implementation and monitoring of project activities enough? Why/why not? 3. Was the strategy to increase women's involvement in project activities appropriate? Why? 4. Why project activities implemented considered appropriate for the targeted communities and context in Timor-Leste? If not, why not? 5. Was the accompaniment of CRS and partner staff to community leaders appropriate to minimize gaps between opposing groups? 6. How effective have the incident reports contributed to monitoring peace in the aldeias? Have the youth/community shown ownership of the incident reports? If so, how? 7. Has the community conflict monitoring improved since the start of the project? If so, what aspect of the project contributed to this improvement? If not, why not? 8. Was the mechanism to ensure transparency in constructing the community-based infrastructure projects sufficient? If not, why? 9. Do opposing groups respect Peace Pact in their communities? Why or why not? What has Laletek attributed to this? 10. What percentage of community members perceive 	Male (72) and Female (72) beneficiaries, total 144 respondents (from 6 targeted aldeias).	The 6 targeted aldeias, i.e. 3 successful aldeias (Terminal, 06 Mascarenhas, & Toko Baru), and 3 less-successful aldeias (Fatuhada 02, Caqueu Laran, & Metin IV).	FGD should be limited to community members ONLY. Chefe Suco/Aldeia/other groups should not participate in any of the FGDs.

	<p>positive relations between opposing groups at the end of the project?</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 11. How many identified violent conflict between opposing groups are resolved at the aldeia level? 12. Were some types of conflicts more successfully mitigated than others? If so, why? 13. Did the social contracts/traditional laws signed and disseminated contribute to the number of incidents resolved at the aldeia level? If not, what did? 14. Percentage of citizens knowledgeable of their civic roles, rights and responsibilities? How have Laletek project activities attributed to this increase of knowledge? 15. Did youth/communities adopt the promoted non-violent principles? If so, what are the evidences of a shift in the way communities deal with conflicts? What were the barriers to increase adoption of these principles? 16. How has the infrastructure projects contributed in bringing peace to the targeted communities? 17. How is the relationship between infrastructure work teams (involving opposing groups) and their communities after project completed? If they involved in conflicts after the project, why? 18. Have there been improvements in communication and trust between community leaders and members (youth and women) as a result of Laletek project? If so, how? If not, why not? 19. What are the main successes of the project? 20. What are the main challenges of the project? 21. Was there any unplanned changes/impact resulted from the project? If so, what? 22. What is the exit strategy at the end of the project? / Will project activities be continued by other entities? 23. What are the indications that the CPDG (and youth groups, <i>Grupu Manutensaun Fasilidade</i>, FOSKA, <i>Comunidade Igreja Base</i>) will continue to function (in support of Chief of Aldeia/Suco) after the project? If not, why not? 24. What are the indications that youth in targeted communities will continue to show initiative and participate in their local community development? 25. Is there any maintenance plans for the completed infrastructure projects post-Laletek? If so, what are the indications that the communities will adhere to these plans? 26. What have you learned from this project that could be shared with CRS, DJPC, stakeholders and donor? 			
<p>FGD with non-beneficiary</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Is the strategy adopted for given conflict situations appropriate and relevant? 2. Why project activities implemented considered appropriate for the targeted communities and context in Timor-Leste? If not, why not? 3. Do opposing groups respect Peace Pact in their communities? Why or why not? What has Laletek attributed to this? 4. What are the main successes of the project? 5. Was there any unplanned changes/impact resulted from the project? If so, what? 6. What have you learned from this project that could be 	<p>Male(24) and Female (24) non-beneficiaries</p>	<p>Total 48 respondents from 2 non-targeted/neighborhood aldeias, i.e. Mate la hotu and Moru Berlin.</p>	<p>FGDs with non-target beneficiary are NOT limited to community members ONLY. Chefe Suco/Aldeia/other groups could participate in any of the FGDs.</p>

	shared with CRS, DJPC, stakeholders and donor?			
Staff Reflection	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Is the strategy adopted for given conflict situations appropriate and relevant? 2. Was participation from partner/stakeholder groups involved in planning, implementation and monitoring of project activities enough? Why/why not? 3. Was the strategy to increase women's involvement in project activities appropriate? Why? 4. Why project activities implemented considered appropriate for the targeted communities and context in Timor-Leste? If not, why not? 5. Was the communication strategy appropriate in utilizing groups in communities other than the aldeia chiefs contributed towards project implementation? E.g. parish priests and leaders of other existing groups in the community, including martial arts groups, ritual arts groups, and youth and women groups; especially in the aldeias where their chiefs are not very active. 6. What are the obstacles to program effectiveness? How can these obstacles be overcome? 7. How well was the M&E System worked during the life of the project? How to improve M&E for a similar project? Was our M&E system effective in informing project management decisions and identifying project impact? 8. Has the community conflict monitoring improved since the start of the project? If so, what aspect of the project contributed to this improvement? If not, why not? 9. How efficient is the coordination of work between CRS, JPC and the Peace building working group members and the government officials and bodies? 10. How efficient is the coordination and division of work between CRS and Partner staff in organization of events? 11. Were there clear roles and responsibilities for CRS and Partner staff? 12. What could be improved in future projects in terms of coordination between CRS, Partner and the Government? 13. Do opposing groups respect Peace Pact in their communities? Why or why not? What has Laletek attributed to this? 14. How many identified violent conflict between opposing groups are resolved at the aldeia level? 15. Were some types of conflicts more successfully mitigated than others? If so, why? 16. What has been the most significant change at personal level? Different impact on male and female (youth and adult)? How have Laletek project activities attributed to each of this change? 17. What has been the most significant change in relationships between opposing groups? How have Laletek project activities attributed to each of this change? 18. What has been the most significant change in structure and system? How have Laletek project activities attributed to each of this change? 19. What has been the most significant change in cultural patterns? How have Laletek project activities attributed to each of this change? 	CRS Laletek Staff (3) & DJPC Staff (5).		CRS Project Director and DJPC acting Director will be interviewed separately.

	<p>20. Did youth/communities adopt the promoted non-violent principles? If so, what are the evidences of a shift in the way communities deal with conflicts? What were the barriers to increase adoption of these principles?</p> <p>21. How is the relationship between infrastructure work teams (involving opposing groups) and their communities after project completed? If they involved in conflicts after the project, why?</p> <p>22. Have there been improvements in communication and trust between community leaders and members (youth and women) as a result of Laletek project? If so, how? If not, why not?</p> <p>23. What are the main successes of the project?</p> <p>24. What are the main challenges of the project?</p> <p>25. Was there any unplanned changes/impact resulted from the project? If so, what?</p> <p>26. What is the exit strategy at the end of the project? / Will project activities be continued by other entities?</p> <p>27. What are the indications that the CPDG (and youth groups, <i>Grupu Manutensaun Fasilidade</i>, FOSKA, <i>Comunidade Igreja Base</i>) will continue to function (in support of Chief of Aldeia/Suco) after the project? If not, why not?</p> <p>28. What are the indications that youth in targeted communities will continue to show initiative and participate in their local community development?</p> <p>29. Is there any maintenance plans for the completed infrastructure projects post-Laletek? If so, what are the indications that the communities will adhere to these plans?</p> <p>30. What are the indications that the increase in partner's capacity will ensure sustainability of project results?</p> <p>31. What have you learned from this project that could be shared with CRS, DJPC, stakeholders and donor?</p>			
<p>KII with community and/or group leaders</p>	<p>1. Is the strategy adopted for given conflict situations appropriate and relevant?</p> <p>2. Was participation from partner/stakeholder groups involved in planning, implementation and monitoring of project activities enough? Why/why not?</p> <p>3. Was the accompaniment of CRS and partner staff to community leaders appropriate to minimize gaps between opposing groups?</p> <p>4. How effective have the incident reports contributed to monitoring peace in the aldeias? Have the youth/community shown ownership of the incident reports? If so, how?</p> <p>5. What is the success rate from the direct accompaniment of staff in proposal and budget development for community leaders in obtaining external funding for their local activities/ development?</p> <p>6. Has the community conflict monitoring improved since the start of the project? If so, what aspect of the project contributed to this improvement? If not, why not?</p> <p>7. How efficient is the coordination of work between CRS, JPC and the Peace building working group members and the government officials and bodies?</p> <p>8. Was the mechanism to ensure transparency in constructing the community-based infrastructure projects</p>	<p>Total 11 respondents:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - MAGs: PSHT (1) - CPDG & other groups: Chefe CPDG 06 Mascarenhas (1), Leader of Dahur Group 02 Fatuhada (1), Member CPDG Youth Leader Terminal (1), Leader Juventude Caeu Laran (1), - Chefe Aldeia (4): Metin IV, Toko Baru, Terminal, 02 Fatuhada 		

	<p>sufficient? If not, why?</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 9. What could be improved in future projects in terms of coordination between CRS, Partner and the Government? 10. Do opposing groups respect Peace Pact in their communities? Why or why not? What has Laletek attributed to this? 11. What percentage of community members perceive positive relations between opposing groups at the end of the project? 12. How many identified violent conflict between opposing groups are resolved at the aldeia level? 13. Were some types of conflicts more successfully mitigated than others? If so, why? 14. Did the social contracts/traditional laws signed and disseminated contribute to the number of incidents resolved at the aldeia level? If not, what did? 15. What has been the most significant change at personal level? Different impact on male and female (youth and adult)? How have Laletek project activities attributed to each of this change? 16. What has been the most significant change in relationships between opposing groups? How have Laletek project activities attributed to each of this change? 17. What has been the most significant change in structure and system? How have Laletek project activities attributed to each of this change? 18. What has been the most significant change in cultural patterns? How have Laletek project activities attributed to each of this change? 19. Percentage of citizens knowledgeable of their civic roles, rights and responsibilities? How have Laletek project activities attributed to this increase of knowledge? 20. Did youth/communities adopt the promoted non-violent principles? If so, what are the evidences of a shift in the way communities deal with conflicts? What were the barriers to increase adoption of these principles? 21. How has the infrastructure projects contributed in bringing peace to the targeted communities? 22. How is the relationship between infrastructure work teams (involving opposing groups) and their communities after project completed? If they involved in conflicts after the project, why? 23. Have there been improvements in communication and trust between community leaders and members (youth and women) as a result of Laletek project? If so, how? If not, why not? 24. What are the main successes of the project? 25. What are the main challenges of the project? 26. Was there any unplanned changes/impact resulted from the project? If so, what? 27. What is the exit strategy at the end of the project? / Will project activities be continued by other entities? 28. What are the indications that the CPDG (and youth groups, <i>Grupu Manutensaun Fasilidade</i>, FOSKA, <i>Comunidade Igreja Base</i>) will continue to function (in support of Chief of Aldeia/Suco) after the project? If not, why not? 29. What are the indications that youth in targeted 	<p>- Chefe Suco: Mascarenhas (1) - Youth Organizer Bidau Santa Ana (1).</p>		
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	<p>communities will continue to show initiative and participate in their local community development?</p> <p>30. Is there any maintenance plans for the completed infrastructure projects post-Laletek? If so, what are the indications that the communities will adhere to these plans?</p> <p>31. What have you learned from this project that could be shared with CRS, DJPC, stakeholders and donor?</p>			
KII w/ gov officials (incl. sub-district & line ministries)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Was the accompaniment of CRS and partner staff to community leaders appropriate to minimize gaps between opposing groups? 2. How effective have the incident reports contributed to monitoring peace in the aldeias? Have the youth/community shown ownership of the incident reports? If so, how? 3. What is the success rate from the direct accompaniment of staff in proposal and budget development for community leaders in obtaining external funding for their local activities/ development? 4. How efficient is the coordination of work between CRS, JPC and the Peace building working group members and the government officials and bodies? 5. What could be improved in future projects in terms of coordination between CRS, Partner and the Government? 6. Do opposing groups respect Peace Pact in their communities? Why or why not? What has Laletek attributed to this? 7. Did the social contracts/traditional laws signed and disseminated contribute to the number of incidents resolved at the aldeia level? If not, what did? 8. What are the main successes of the project? 9. What is the exit strategy at the end of the project? / Will project activities be continued by other entities? 10. What are the indications that the CPDG (and youth groups, <i>Grupu Manutensaun Fasilidade</i>, FOSKA, <i>Comunidade Igreja Base</i>) will continue to function (in support of Chief of Aldeia/Suco) after the project? If not, why not? 11. What are the indications that youth in targeted communities will continue to show initiative and participate in their local community development? 12. Is there any maintenance plans for the completed infrastructure projects post-Laletek? If so, what are the indications that the communities will adhere to these plans? 13. What have you learned from this project that could be shared with CRS, DJPC, stakeholders and donor? 	Total 7 respondents, i.e. MSS – Dept for PB and Social Cohesion (2), Secretary of State for Culture (4), and Community Police (1).	When there are more respondents representing one government office, the KII can be done in group, with the respondent's consent.	Alternatives: Sec of State for Security – Nat. Directorate for Community Conflict Prevention, and Sec. of State for Youth and Sport. However, these respondents were not directly involved in project activities.
KII w/ NGOs, PBWG	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Is the strategy adopted for given conflict situations appropriate and relevant? 2. Why project activities implemented considered appropriate for the targeted communities and context in Timor-Leste? If not, why not? 3. Was the accompaniment of CRS and partner staff to community leaders appropriate to minimize gaps between opposing groups? 4. How effective have the incident reports contributed to monitoring peace in the aldeias? Have the youth/community shown ownership of the incident 	Total 3 NGOs, i.e. UNDP, Trocaire, JRS/BELUN, and 1 other group: Escravas Sisters in Bebonuk (Metin IV)		

	<p>reports? If so, how?</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 5. How efficient is the coordination of work between CRS, JPC and the Peace building working group members and the government officials and bodies? 6. What could be improved in future projects in terms of coordination between CRS, Partner and the Government? 7. Were some types of conflicts more successfully mitigated than others? If so, why? 8. What are the main successes of the project? 9. What is the exit strategy at the end of the project? / Will project activities be continued by other entities? 10. What have you learned from this project that could be shared with CRS, DJPC, stakeholders and donor? 			
KII with CRS Laletek Project Director	Same questions as for Staff Reflection.	Catharina Maria		
KII with acting Director of Dili Justice and Peace Commission (implementing partner)	Same questions as for Staff Reflection.	Sister Clare Gracilano		
KII with Head of CRS Baucau Office and Church Relations	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Is the strategy adopted for given conflict situations appropriate and relevant? 2. Was participation from partner/stakeholder groups involved in planning, implementation and monitoring of project activities enough? Why/why not? 3. Why project activities implemented considered appropriate for the targeted communities and context in Timor-Leste? If not, why not? 4. How efficient is the coordination of work between CRS, JPC and the Peace building working group members and the government officials and bodies? 5. What could be improved in future projects in terms of coordination between CRS, Partner and the Government? 6. What are the main successes of the project? 7. Was there any unplanned changes/impact resulted from the project? If so, what? 8. What are the indications that the increase in partner's capacity will ensure sustainability of project results? 9. What have you learned from this project that could be shared with CRS, DJPC, stakeholders and donor? 	Florentino Sarmento		
KII with CRS Financ	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Have the project been executed efficiently in terms of the ratio between programming to admin costs? Why & why not? 	Agostinho Da Silva		

e Manag er	2. Was the mechanism to ensure transparency in constructing the community-based infrastructure projects sufficient? If not, why? 3. Were there clear roles and responsibilities for CRS and Partner staff in terms of Financial Management? 4. What could be improved in future projects in terms of financial coordination and management between CRS, Partner and USAID?			
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Simplified Focus Group Questions

As there were 22 key informant interviews with considerably varying roles and interactions with the project, these tools were adapted according to each source, so the modified tools will not be individually listed here. For the focus groups, given often low education levels and time constraints, these questions were further adapted and simplified from the tool into a basic set of 18 questions, which were applied consistently across all focus groups. These are listed below.

1. Do you think Laletek activities are relevant to the situation in your community? To you personally? How and why are they relevant? Do you think that Laletek activities effectively targeted the sources of conflict in your community?
2. Are you happy with the way Laletek has been implemented by CRS and JPC partners? If so, why? If not, why not?
 - Communication
 - Coordination
 - Inclusion of all groups in activities?
3. Do you know about the incident report? Have the incident reports contributed to monitoring peace in the aldeias? Who is completing it? (If the answer is the Chefe De Aldeia or Chefe De Suko) are youth or other members of the community involved in it?
4. What about the conflict maps? Have they contributed to monitoring peace in the aldeias? Who is completing it? If the answer is the Chefe De Aldeia or Chefe De Suko-are youth or other members of the community involved in it? Have you learned anything from the maps about conflict in your community? (Ask them to give examples).
5. Were you happy with the process for the community-based infrastructure projects? If not, why? Did you understand the process? Were you happy with the support from CRS and JPC in the process? What could be improved?
6. Do people feel that they now know more about of their rights and responsibilities to maintain peace and participate in local development? How have Laletek project activities (ask them to name one) attributed to this increase of knowledge?

7. What was the situation in your aldeia like before the Laletek project (be specific- not 2006-7-in the year before the project).
8. (Show of hands) Have you experienced conflict in your community in the last six months? How many times? What types? Were they resolved now? If yes/ if no why?
9. (Show of hands) How many people think that there are more positive relations between opposing groups at the end of the project?
10. What was the most significant change in this community since the beginning of the Laletek project?
11. Do you think this change was a direct result of the Laletek project? Or outside factors? Or a combination of both?
12. If it is the result of Laletek project, which particular activity or aspect of the project approach contributed the most to this change?
13. What is the most significant change this project made in you personally?
14. Was there any unexpected changes/impacts, negative or positive, as a result of the project? If so, what?
15. Do you think that youth and the community will continue to work together to find ways to prevent conflict and help their community after the project finishes? If not, why not?
16. Do you think the community will continue the project activities e.g. CPDG? small infrastructure, mediation, mapping?
17. Are there some activities that you would like to see continued if they were supported? (Ask them to give examples and why?)
18. What have you learned from this project that could be shared with CRS, DJPC, stakeholders and donor or other communities outside your area? How could the project be improved?

Annex 4: Documents Reviewed

1. Fatuk Fransisco Press Release
2. Laletek's Achievements January 2012-02-22
3. Matrix of Activities April 2011-January 2012
4. Incident Report Data Base
5. Laletek Bulletin April 2011
6. Press release 'From Troublemaker to Peace Promoter: The story of Francisco Da Cunha Douthel'
7. Technical Assistance Report (Myla Leguro)
8. Peace Pact Process Template
9. Press release 'Projeitu Komunitade Kiikoan Hakbesik Grupu-sira-Terminal'
10. Press release 'Projetu Komunitade Kiikoan Hakbesik Grupu-sira iha Aimetilaran'
11. 'Building Peace and Unity through Traditional Dance'
12. Laletek Project Third Semi-Annual Report
13. Laletek Project Fourth Semi-Annual Report
14. Lederach, John Paul, Reina Neufeldt and Hal Culbertson, 2007, 'Reflective Peacebuilding: A Planning, Monitoring and Learning Toolkit' available online at http://www.crs.org and http://kroc.nd.edu

Annex 5: Scope of Work

Objectives of the Final Evaluation

The final evaluation has the following objectives:

1. To evaluate the performance of Laletek Project based on standard evaluation criteria, i.e. its overall effectiveness and efficiency, its relevance and appropriateness re current context, impacts (the changes at personal, relational, structural and cultural dimensions), and sustainability of the interventions beyond 2012.
2. To contribute towards organizational learning through the documentation of best practices and lessons learned, and provide recommendations for future peace building projects for CRS, DJPC, USAID and other stakeholders

Methodology

- All relevant project documents and materials will be made available by CRS Laletek Project Staff for the evaluator prior to the evaluation, including project proposal, baseline report, mid-term evaluation report, six-monthly reports to donor, bulletins, comic book, DVDs, etc.
- Participatory tools such as Focus Group Discussions (FGD) and Key Informant Interviews (KII) with project beneficiary and non-beneficiary will be used for data collection in 11 selected project locations, where project activities were implemented from March 2010 up to January 2012.
 - ✓ The target interviewees consisting of individuals with most significant change and those that contribute most to the project and 11 aldeias to be evaluated have been identified by Laletek project team.
 - ✓ Staff reflection and interviews will be conducted with identified CRS staff and partner staff (DJPC).
- During the evaluation, CRS Laletek Project staff will be assigned to support the evaluator in community organization and take part in participatory components.
- Presentation of preliminary findings will be done after field work by the evaluation to relevant stakeholders, including but not limited to CRS, USAID representatives, the Diocesan Justice and Peace Commission of Dili (DJPC), and other relevant stakeholders.
- Feedback and recommendation from the presentation will be incorporated into the Final Report by the evaluator. The report will be presented based on CRS evaluation criteria, i.e., relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability, along with recommendations for future projects.

Moreover, CRS/TL expects the evaluator to use the “Reflective Peace building – A Planning, Monitoring, and Learning Tool Kit”³ as reference in the design and the

³ Lederach, John Paul, Reina Neufeldt and Hal Culbertson, 2007, available online at <http://www.crs.orgwww.crs.org> and <http://kroc.nd.edu>

evaluation process to measure changes at the personal, relational, structural and cultural dimensions from the interventions of the project. Both quantitative and qualitative data collection methods should be used appropriately to complement findings.

While paying attention to the above points, the evaluator is expected to propose evaluation design that will be able to achieve the objectives of this consultancy using participatory methods.

Deliverables

The evaluators are expected to complete these following deliverables:

- 1) Review project proposal, baseline report, mid-term evaluation project, bi-annual reports, samples of training reports, field visit reports and meeting notes, and monitoring data, prior to data fieldwork.
- 2) Review the project materials produced like Active Non-Violence Training Manual, bulletins, *suku* profile, comic book, *dahur* competition and street theatre DVDs, and others prior to the evaluation.
- 3) In consultation with project team, select the 6 targeted aldeias for evaluation using best and worst case sampling for data collection activities from project beneficiaries and additional aldeias for non-project beneficiaries. Non-beneficiaries are people living at neighboring aldeias who have had conflicts with project beneficiaries in targeted aldeias
- 4) Develop and propose data collection tools and analysis methodologies for both beneficiary and non-beneficiary, based on final evaluation information needs to allow comparison with baseline data, covering quantitative and qualitative information needs, and project indicators. Note: baseline data included information from 192 respondents from 6 sukus. Project team will be assigned tasks to review tool design, participate in analysis and interpretation sessions, and also provide relevant information and documents to the evaluator.
- 5) Field-test and finalize all data collection tools and analysis components after consultations with respondents and other stakeholders.
- 6) Lead data collection activities directly at the selected respondents and locations, as well as from other stakeholders, and CRS and partner staff.
- 7) Lead a 2-day participatory analysis workshop and facilitation of a session to identify lessons learned with project team and CRS senior management
- 8) Present preliminary findings and recommendations to CRS, partners and stakeholders - including donor (USAID) and representatives from government offices.
- 9) Incorporate feedback and comments from CRS, USAID, partners and key stakeholders on the preliminary findings into the draft evaluation report.
- 10) Circulate draft evaluation report to CRS, DJPC and USAID for review and feedback
- 11) Submit the final evaluation report presenting an executive summary, background of the evaluation, methodology of the evaluation, findings under each evaluation criteria with reference to personal, relational, structural and cultural dimensions, followed by lists of lessons learned and best practices and also recommendations, in English to CRS no later than 14 days after the presentation.