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USAID/COLOMBIA IDP AND VULNERABLE GROUPS PROGRAM

PROGRAM ASSESSMENT AND FUTURE STRATEGY CONSIDERATIONS

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Assessment and Strategic Planning Exercise for USAID/Colombia

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CONTENTS

- Acronyms ii
- Executive Summary 1
- I. Introduction 1
- II. Purpose of the Assessment 3
- III. Methodology 4
- IV. IDP Program Assessment Findings..... 5
 - A. Income Generation 5
 - B. Food Security 9
 - C. Housing 12
 - D. Institutional Strengthening 16
 - E. Health and Education 22
- V. Toward a New IDP Program Strategy 29
- VI. Major Conclusions..... 45
- VII. Major Recommendations 50
- Annex A: Key Documents Reviewed 55
- Annex B: Assessment Team Schedule and Persons Interviewed..... 58
- Annex C: Assessment Scope of Work 71

ACRONYMS

CCAI	Center for the Coordination of Integrated Action
CDSI	Colombia Strategic Development Initiative
CHF	Cooperative Housing Foundation
EPS	Empresa Prestadora de Salud
EER	Effective Enjoyment of Rights
FUPAD	Spanish Acronym for PADF
GOC	Government of Colombia
ICBF	Instituto Colombiano de Bienestar Familiar
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IPS	Institución Prestadora de Salud
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
CSO	Civil Society Organization
PADF	Pan American Development Foundation
PAHO	Pan American Health Organization
PNC	Plan Nacional de Consolidación
PIU	Plan Integral Único
TEP	Territorio Étnico Productivo
UAO	Unidad de Atención y Orientación
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
USAID (AID)	United States Agency for International Development

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Background

USAID/Colombia's program to assist IDPs and other vulnerable groups began in 2001. The program was implemented through a variety of grants, cooperative agreements, and contracts. By 2005, the program was present in over 500 municipalities and was being implemented by hundreds of different entities. Activities included expanding access to healthcare, education, housing, food security and income generation opportunities. Complementary initiatives were carried out to strengthen the capacity of Colombian public and private sector organizations to meet the needs of these groups. Simultaneously, work was done to develop, implement and strengthen public policies related to vulnerable populations.

In 2004 the Mission conducted a management assessment and determined that the programs needed to be more geographically and strategically focused. The new grant supported strategic interventions and was limited to approximately 170 municipalities, where displacement and conflict were prevalent.

In 2007 USAID's program was again restructured to place greater emphasis on sustainable income generation and housing, shifting resources away from other social services that had more support from the state. Since GOC programs were primarily focused in urban areas, USAID made the decision to increase its presence in rural areas, with the goal of supporting the return or reintegration of displaced families before they reached receptor communities in large cities.

In 2008, the GOC and the U.S. government began developing a follow-on phase to Plan Colombia. The strategy is based on increasing the number of strategic foci managed through the Center for the Coordination of Integrated Action (CCAI)¹ with a view to reestablishing state presence, each located in regions where the government has reduced the presence of illegally armed groups. The U.S. Embassy's complementary program has been designated as the Colombian Strategic Development Initiative (CSDI) and has taken five of these CCAI zones for its programs.

Within this strategic framework, the new (draft) USAID strategy identifies three assistance objectives, one of which is "reduced vulnerability of populations affected by conflict." IDPs are certainly the great majority of population vulnerability due to conflict. However, USAID will continue to work with traditionally poor populations in receptor communities, Afro-Colombians, indigenous communities, women heads of households, and persons with disabilities.

Assessment Purpose

Before moving forward with a new IDP strategy within USAID/Colombia, an appraisal of the relative success or failure of past program initiatives is necessary. These initiatives have largely been in the following sectors: income generation; food security; housing; institutional strengthening; health; and education.

While activities in these sectors are expected to continue under the new IDP strategy, these must be folded into a focus on five CDSI consolidation zones. Since the bulk of IDPs have left these and other consolidation zones and reside in urban areas, some for up to 10 years, an IDP assistance program must also target the displaced population where it currently is.

This study draws conclusions and makes recommendations for a future USAID IDP program strategy within which there should be a clear strategic framework with objectives, results, outputs, and progress indicators. The development of this strategy in the months ahead will be able to draw on this assessment for concepts

¹ CCAI is a coordinating agency inside Accion Social which in turn is inside the president's office. CCAI has existed for some time. They run consolidation zones that have been in place again since early in the Uribe presidency.

and directions to pursue. The assessment will help USAID/Colombia in setting priorities, inform further strategy development, and guide procurement documents for new contracts, grants, and cooperative and international organization agreements.

Assessment Methodology

This study was carried out by a team of two international consultants and four Colombian experts. The team spent the period from January 11 through February 11, 2010 collecting documents, interviewing project implementers, key informants, and beneficiaries, and travelling to project sites throughout the country. At times the team split into three sub-teams to travel to as many sites as possible.

The methodology employed in this assessment relied on identifying a representative set of sectoral activities and field sites to examine. Since 2006 IOM and PADF have implemented hundreds of small projects nationwide in income generation, food security, housing, institutional development, health, and education. There are currently over a hundred of these still active, and a selection was made among them. Beyond these, there have been two major health programs carried out by PAHO and Profamilia and three minor health and food security projects implemented by CHF, Mercy Corps, and WFP. All of these programs were visited.

Interview methodology relied on semi-structured interview questions, in which key probing questions are posed and followed-up as necessary for greater depth. Formal questionnaires were not used. The assessment team sought to visit as many specific projects in as wide a set of representative areas as time allowed. Interviews in the field and in Bogota permitted the team to obtain general information about project design, management, beneficiaries, outcomes, and the typical obstacles encountered in the course of implementation.

Major Conclusions

Sectoral Projects

- Current IDP programming has successfully produced several hundred small project interventions over the last four years covering a wide variety of traditional sectors, ranging from food security, health, and education, through housing and institutional strengthening, to income generation. The scope has been countrywide, and implementing partners have been able to design, launch, and supervise these efforts through their regional offices.
- The current IDP strategy has been to intervene in both IDP receptor areas and in places where returns are occurring. This has meant program coverage of both urban centers and remote rural areas, resulting in dispersion of efforts and resources and in high operational costs for implementers. Program coverage and investment per component and household have been low compared to needs. Geographic focus has still been too broad.
- The principle of integrality is a basic postulate of the USAID/IDP program. While entirely valid, in practice it has not been easy to implement in a systematic manner. This is because integrality relies heavily on programmatic linkages with other governmental and donor efforts that are not the same in different locations. Another problem is the difficulty USAID implementers face in coordinating and harmonizing efforts given different contracting periods in the various public institutions with which the USAID program seeks to interact.
- USAID/IDP Office programs appear to alleviate the conditions of extreme poverty and vulnerability, but except in job placement they do not usually generate sustainable solutions to these conditions. Although most income generation projects do not result in economic stabilization, they do appear to have high impact on beneficiary empowerment.

- Vocational training and job insertion programs have had generally positive results. On the other hand, although entrepreneurial development programs seem successful in the short run, they do not result in significant changes in income.
- Food assistance in the course of projects does not ensure adequate nutritional levels, though it has proved an essential benefit. The many questions and concerns related to the nutritional status of beneficiaries and the quality of their food consumption cannot be answered without a targeted assessment of that aspect of the projects.
- The USAID/IDP housing programs are being successfully implemented. By September 30, 2009, the programs implemented through IOM and PADF cumulatively provided 3,873 households with housing out of a total target of 4,712 – 82.2%. At the same time, these partners also achieved an excellent level of leveraging of funds from outside entities, raising another US \$ 11,027,428 compared to the USAID contribution of US \$ 4,407,789 – a 263% increase. Although these are serious accomplishments, the level of unsatisfied demand is considerably higher. In 2006 a baseline study for the current IOM and PADF programs found that some 19,000 vulnerable and 55,000 IDP households needed some form of housing intervention.
- There are real risks for the sustainability of the housing programs, because of the weak linkage between housing and income generation. In a number of housing projects, there are beneficiaries who have not yet been assisted in income generation, or they are involved in projects that generate minimal income and/or are only just taking-off. This means that sustainability is still uncertain. In these cases, there is a clear disconnect between the level reached in income generation and the level sought in housing (individual ownership of a house).
- USAID and its implementing partners have a mixed track record with regard to institutional strengthening and need to establish a clearer approach to improving institutional performance. Strengthening efforts have been applied to local authorities, local implementing organizations, and communities, but efforts are dispersed, lack strategic vision, and are not achieving significant results.
- The health programs supported by USAID/IDP have functioned well and have provided specialized services to IDPs and vulnerable, isolated populations that the GOC has not been able to provide.
- The education programs engaged in by USAID/IDP through IOM and PADF have functioned well and are highly appreciated by beneficiaries, local authorities, and local community members. While focusing on infrastructure and equipment, they have also developed innovative models such as the Open Doors Schools.

New Strategy Development

- Measures for prevention of first time displacement must include: (1) analysis of local situational factors; (2) appreciation of problems related to physical safety, legal insecurity of land, family connections to illegal armed groups; threat of or actual appropriation of family property; absence of rule of law; and narcotics trafficking; (3) improved early warning mechanisms and the ability of local authorities to act on them; (4) improved personal documentation for men and women as well as of property; (5) existence of livelihood activities outside of drug-related activities, especially for youth.
- Prevention of secondary displacement depends on IDP access to an integrated package of assistance activities in places of first refuge in small towns and cities near original home areas. Integration and focus of these activities helps to strengthen community ties that include the newcomers. Assistance activities must be combined with mechanisms for protection and citizen security.
- International experience demonstrates that early warning mechanisms in the prevention of displacement are not reliable. While collective community responses to early threats are possible,

lack of rule of law and divided loyalties typically render them ineffective. This has also been the case in Colombia.

- IDP return programs are a delicate issue, since returnees are often confronted with situations of dubious security, weakened municipal institutions, local officials beholden to illegal groups, and lack of political will and resources to deal with an influx of returnees. Returns are really only possible where violence has disappeared and rule of law has returned. This implies that civilian authorities are back in charge, supported by a viable local police force.
- A large number of spontaneous returns without GOC sponsorship or assistance are likely to occur, if peace is effectively restored in CSDI zones. Populations that return in this way are in a considerably more precarious state than those supervised by the government.
- Impacts and results of USAID IDP programs cannot yet be assessed other than anecdotally, because the IDP Office and its contractors are currently lacking strategic plans and clear objectives, as well as Performance Monitoring Plans to track performance toward intermediate and final outcomes. Sectoral performance standards are also lacking.

Major Recommendations

Sectoral Projects

- USAID/IDP should focus its program on the generation of conditions for the recovery of the displaced population in a period of transition between emergency humanitarian aid and durable and sustainable socio-economic stabilization.
- The current IDP program attends the needs of both IDPs and other vulnerable populations, particularly when they are living in the same areas. It is also advisable to include some of the receptor population in community-level projects, generating spread effects in integrated community development that prevent the creation of IDP ghettos.
- The next phase of IDP-related income generation programs and projects should be focused on households stable enough to undertake serious economic endeavors. These households should already be in the phase of transition to sustainable livelihoods. The objective should be to assist these households in developing rational and profitable economic projects that take them to a stage where they not only meet basic needs but can save, reinvest, and even access micro-credit programs. Projects should last at least 18 to 24 months beyond start-up preparations.
- It is also important to focus now in many places on the second generation: youth (18 – 25) that have grown up in displacement and who are not likely ever to return to homes in rural areas they scarcely remember. Within this context, training and educational opportunities for working youth should be identified.
- The household should be taken as a whole unit in the analysis of its income generation potential. Its resources, income, and expenses should be examined at the baseline as a whole. What is important is that USAID programs set goals of raising household income by a certain percentage or specific amount and that this improvement should place households units as a whole in a stable economic situation.
- Success in the longer term for food production projects depends on land security and sufficient land for cultivation to accommodate a growing population. The agricultural projects have been in existence only a short time, and further monitoring would be useful.

- In the domain of housing solutions, prioritize access to households that exhibit sufficient, sustainable income to afford associated costs. In urban housing activities, coordinate with local authorities on a more flexible menu of lower-cost, alternative (but dignified), transitional solutions to IDP housing needs that can be offered to households as their income generation rises. Such transitional solutions can include rental subsidies, subsidized leasing of multi-family properties, transitional housing types in permanent locations, and prefabricated housing.
- Promote housing/habitat programs that generate impacts for both the IDP and vulnerable receptor populations. A more holistic approach to community development that integrates IDPs and previous inhabitants will avoid creating IDP ghettos inside other neighborhoods.
- Formally adopt in USAID/IDP programming a linkage between housing and household income generation. The type of solution in housing must be consistent with the generation of income necessary to afford its upkeep. Housing and income needs need to be addressed in tandem, applying solutions in a progressive and interactive manner over a long enough period to reach socio-economic stabilization.
- USAID should focus on strengthening municipal planning and technical capacity, as well as the local UAO.² Assistance in the development of and adherence to a PIU should be provided, wherever communities have been selected by USAID for integrated projects.
- Municipal and departmental strengthening should focus on three areas: organizational structure; human capital; and information systems. When operating sectoral projects in various municipalities, USAID should link these projects not only to sectoral institutional strengthening, but also develop and agree to an overall institutional strengthening plan with and for the local government. USAID should select its target municipalities from the 255 municipalities targeted by the GOC for priority institutional strengthening.
- USAID should provide consultants to develop the tasks necessary to put displacement on the governmental agenda and within strategic objectives, conduct training of regular staff, and provide the advisory and technical assistance necessary in the design, costing, budgeting, and monitoring of local initiatives for IDPs.
- USAID should carry out training of local administrative staff in: rights-based focus; differential focus; national-level public policy requirements; formulation, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of PIUs; design and implementation of feasible projects; and leadership, conflict management and resolution, and negotiation.
- USAID should provide support to local information systems by assisting in developing measurement tools and indicators for use in the development of PIUs; instruments to classify and characterize the displaced population within the local jurisdiction; procedures to match budgetary information against operational management information; and the adoption of management indicators to monitor the effective use of resources against benchmarks of success.
- USAID should support the development and implementation at the national and regional levels of a Unified Information System that optimizes IDP registration, description, and classification, evaluates IDP needs and monitors the aid provided, assists in preventing abuses in the system, and provides trustworthy information on the end of IDP status.

² The USAID CIMIENTOS and ADAM projects currently engage in strengthening municipal capacity. The new USAID combined livelihoods/municipal strengthening/citizen participation programs in areas such as Montes de Maria also engage in strengthening municipal capacity.

- USAID should continue to provide health services where provision by the GOC is weak or lacking and capacity is low. This implies continued support to Profamilia and PAHO, as well as the possibility of scaling-up the CHF and Mercy Corps projects focused on the handicapped.
- The objective of support to PAHO and Profamilia should not be their operational sustainability, although this may be advanced to some degree, but the provision of specialized medical assistance to vulnerable populations. Supporting PAHO and Profamilia to provide specialized services is a way to create models for reaching vulnerable populations that the GOC health system can eventually emulate. The way to reach sustainability in health coverage for IDPs, other poor populations, and remote ethnic groups will ultimately be through programs that extend and improve the governmental system.
- Expand programs in the construction and furnishing of daycare centers, schools, and vocational training centers in close coordination with local and departmental educational entities. Food for work on these projects should be included whenever possible.
- Convert support to community schools into a fundamental axis of psycho-social stabilization of IDPs and other vulnerable populations. Pursue innovative programs that integrate communities around their schools, involving IDPs and members of the receptor community in school-centered social and extracurricular learning activities and events.

New Strategy Development

- The future USAID IDP strategy should have four axes: (1) a program that operates in the five CSDI zones focusing on assistance to IDP returnees in consolidated areas and on prevention of renewed displacement in small and intermediates urban areas of these zones; (2) a national program of assistance to IDPs currently located in intermediate and large urban receptor areas with high levels of IDP pressure on receiving populations; (3) a national public policy support program focused on key institutions; (4) a nationwide program to strengthen the response capacity of selected departmental and municipal governmental entities to IDP needs and rights.
- Future IDP field programs should be geographically focused, fully integrated, community focused, and monitored for impact. The focus of these projects should be on the transition phase between emergency/humanitarian assistance and eventual socio-economic stabilization and integration of the displaced population. Projects should move IDPs into a situation of substantially improved welfare, but final socio-economic stabilization and integration will be the responsibility of the GOC.
- The length of sectoral projects within IDP field programs will vary by sector, but should be extended considerably beyond current levels in income generation and institutional strengthening. On the other hand, infrastructure projects, pilot programs, and housing projects may produce desired results in a year or less. Institutional strengthening and income generation results are most difficult to sustain, requiring projects of at least 18-24 months. In complex IG schemes, even longer periods will be necessary. In institutional strengthening, retraining may need to occur periodically over the full length of USAID assistance. Retraining after municipal and departmental elections is highly recommended.
- Integrated assistance packages targeted to IDPs are major tools for preventing first time and subsequent displacements. These must be combined with mechanisms for protection and citizen security. While it is the responsibility of the state to provide physical protection, integrated assistance packages also serve welfare protection purposes.³

³ The CIMIENTOS project works with municipalities and communities to strengthen citizen security.

- USAID should increase levels of technical support to entities that are key to IDP integration, including the Constitutional Court. In particular, it should strengthen the response capacity of public institutions in departmental and municipal governments and help place IDPs on the agenda of government entities at all levels, in all relevant sectors.
- An information system that can integrate assistance and avoid duplication of benefits to target groups will enhance the IDP operations of both USAID and government organizations. The strengthening of existing systems of information is of particular importance to resolve the ownership status of properties and to protect abandoned lands. USAID should examine options for upgrading information technologies at all levels.
- USAID involvement in land issues should focus on three key activities: (1) support to the GOC in the design and implementation of public policies; (2) development of specific support activities for national and local authorities in the CSDI zones; and (3) design of legal assistance programs for land and property loss victims.
- USAID support to formal and informal return movements by IDPs should be limited to the CSDI zones, or dispersal of efforts may occur. Integrated transition projects should reintegrate these returnees into local communities. Local institutional strengthening should be a central part of formal, large-scale returns, and verification of security conditions and land availability should precede return actions. USAID should assist municipalities in the provision of public infrastructure in return areas.

I. INTRODUCTION

USAID/Colombia's program to assist IDPs and other vulnerable groups began in 2001. The program was implemented through a variety of grants, cooperative agreements, and contracts. By 2005, the program was present in over 500 municipalities and was being implemented by hundreds of different entities. Activities included expanding access to healthcare, education, housing, food security and income generation opportunities. Complementary initiatives were carried out to strengthen the capacity of Colombian public and private sector organizations to meet the needs of these groups. Simultaneously, work was done to develop, implement and strengthen public policies related to vulnerable populations.

In 2004 the Mission conducted a management assessment and determined that the programs needed to be more geographically and strategically focused. As existing programs were concluding, the Mission conducted a procurement exercise, making a large award to the Pan American Development Foundation and the International Organization for Migration. The new grant supported strategic interventions and was limited to approximately 170 municipalities, where displacement and conflict were prevalent. Shortly after the award was signed, a study was done analyzing the status and needs of the target populations. The study showed that sustainable incomes and durable housing solutions were the two most pressing needs identified by vulnerable families.

From 2005-2007, three smaller complementary grants were added, including the World Food Program, Profamilia, and the Pan American Health Organization. In 2008 two further grants were made to Cooperative Housing Foundation and Mercy Corps to improve the access of persons with disabilities, including landmine survivors, to social and economic opportunities.

In 2007, the Mission conducted an assessment of the income generation activities implemented by both USAID and the GOC. The evaluation showed that although program beneficiaries were pleased with the psycho-social support, training, and other assistance they received, the goal of improved incomes was generally not met.

Once the assessment was complete and results were shared with the GOC and program partners, USAID's program was again restructured to place greater emphasis on sustainable income generation and housing, shifting resources away from other social services that had more support from the state. Since GOC programs were primarily focused in urban areas, USAID made the decision to increase its presence in rural areas, with the goal of supporting the return or reintegration of displaced families before they reached receptor communities in large cities.

In 2008, the GOC and the U.S. government began developing a follow-on phase to Plan Colombia. The new approach is known as the government's National Consolidation Plan (PNC).

The strategy is based on establishing a dozen or more Consolidation zones under the direction of Center for the Coordination of Integrated Action (CCAI), each strategically located geographically to return government functions and disrupt illegal groups and activities. The U.S. Embassy's complementary program has been designated as the Colombian Strategic Development Initiative (CSDI), and it has taken five of these CCAI zones for its programs.⁴

Within this strategic framework, the new (draft) USAID strategy identifies three assistance objectives, one of which is "reduced vulnerability of populations affected by conflict." IDPs are certainly the great majority of population vulnerability due to conflict.

⁴ These regions are: 1) Montes de Maria region; 2) Nariño/Putumayo Corridor; 3) Meta/Southern Tolima/Valle de Cauca Corridor (from La Macarena in Meta west through southern Tolima and Valle del Cauca to Buenaventura); 4) Southern Cordoba/Bajo Cauca/Catatumbo Corridor; and 5) Uraba/Northern Choco Corridor.

However, USAID will continue to work with traditionally poor populations in receptor communities, Afro-Colombians, indigenous communities, women heads of households, and persons with disabilities. Bringing these populations together to reduce stigma, foster trust and reconciliation, and address perceptions that one vulnerable group is receiving or due more than another.

II. PURPOSE OF THE ASSESSMENT

The present study is both an assessment of USAID/Colombia's current program of assistance to internally displaced persons (IDPs) and other vulnerable groups and a broad outline of a future strategy that will adhere closely to the U.S. Embassy Country Strategic Development Initiative (CDSI) and the Colombian government's National Consolidation Plan (PNC). Before moving forward with a new IDP strategy within USAID/Colombia, an appraisal of the relative success or failure of past program initiatives is necessary. These initiatives have largely been in the following sectors: income generation; food security; housing; institutional strengthening; health; and education. There have also been a few activities in support of studies, research, and events. There has also been a major attempt to integrate these sectoral interventions, particularly by complementing and leveraging government and other donor activities in program areas.

Based on this review of current and recently past programming, a number of sector-specific conclusions, lessons learned, and recommendations have been made. While activities in these sectors are expected to continue under the new IDP strategy, these must be folded into a focus on five CDSI consolidation zones. Since the bulk of IDPs have left these and other consolidation zones and reside in urban areas, some for up to 10 years, an IDP assistance program must also target the displaced population where it currently is. A number of future programming issues deal with the prevention of first or repeat population displacement, particularly within consolidation zones, IDP returnees to areas of original displacement, security of access to land, particularly restitution of ownership or reparation for land lost, and the effective reintegration or relocation of populations opting not to return. USAID programming in these and other aspects of resolving the problems of forced displacement in Colombia must clearly be coordinated with those of the Government of Colombia and international cooperation.

This study draws conclusions and makes recommendations for a future USAID IDP program strategy within which there should be a clear strategic framework with objectives, results, outputs, and progress indicators. The development of this strategy in the months ahead will be able to draw on this assessment for concepts and directions to pursue. The assessment will help USAID/Colombia in setting priorities, inform further strategy development, and guide procurement documents for new contracts, grants, and cooperative and international organization agreements.

III. METHODOLOGY

This study was carried out by a team of two international consultants and four Colombian experts in USAID programming or issues of internal population displacement: Philip Boyle, Team Leader; Patricia Fagen, International Consultant; Jaime Arteaga; Edgar Forero; Ana Maria Ibanez; and Patricia Luna. The team spent the period from January 11 through February 11 collecting documents, interviewing project implementers, key informants, and beneficiaries, and travelling to project sites throughout the country. At times the team split into three sub-teams to travel to as many sites as possible (see Annex B).

The methodology employed in this assessment relied on identifying a representative set of sectoral activities and field sites to examine. IOM and PADF have been implementing small projects nationwide in six major sectors: income generation, food security, housing, institutional development, health, and education. There are also two major health programs undertaken by PAHO and Profamilia and three minor health and food security projects implemented by CHF, Mercy Corps, and WFP.

Annex B contains the agenda of team visits and interviews with implementing organizations and many of their beneficiaries. Interview methodology relied on semi-structured interview questions, in which a key set of questions are posed and follow-up as necessary for greater clarity. Formal questionnaires were not used. The assessment team sought to visit as many specific projects in as wide a set of representative, but secure, areas as time allowed.

Each of the sector based reports in this section is the result of a combination of direct observations and information otherwise obtained by the evaluation team members. The field work undertaken permitted the team to view a representative sample of projects in a variety of sectors. Interviews in the field and in Bogota permitted the team to obtain general information about project design, management, beneficiaries, outcomes, and the typical obstacles encountered in the course of implementation. However, USAID has funded hundreds of projects over the past years, and a different selection might have modified somewhat the questions we have raised in these pages.

Each of the segments of this report has been prepared by one of the team members. While individual authors have written the different sections, the team has collectively discussed all the points, and has reached consensus on the conclusions. The team leaders have edited the overall report and merged some of the sections.

IV. IDP PROGRAM ASSESSMENT FINDINGS

A. INCOME GENERATION

The objective of USAID/IDP Office programs in income generation has been to provide displaced households with sustainable income from entrepreneurial activities or employment opportunities. While these efforts have been targeted on socio-economic stabilization of beneficiaries, few of these projects have yet resulted in such stabilization. Economic stabilization may be defined as a point in which beneficiary households are fully self-sufficient from their own economic activities and can smooth income shocks and even grow their businesses by accumulating savings and acquiring productive and other assets in a sustainable manner.

Basic Accomplishments

The instruments employed to reach stable and sustainable income generation are diverse and include agricultural production projects, vocational training, job insertion, support to existing entrepreneurs, and new entrepreneurial development. In addition, some projects provide financing for the construction of houses, educational and health centers, recreation areas and other infrastructure. Finally, USAID program implementers promote complementary access to health, education, and other governmental and non-governmental assistance. While the intention has been to provide an integrated package of assistance to displaced and other vulnerable groups, this has tended to be uneven and of variable content. Phase II of this USAID program covers the period from 2005 to 2010 with a value of US\$ 58 million.⁵

The impact evaluation of USAID income generation programs carried out by the Universidad Nacional (2008) found a variable set of impacts. Vocational training and job insertion programs had positive results: 52% of the jobs held by beneficiaries were related to the USAID program; the employment level rose from 37% to 72% among beneficiaries; and income rose 11%.

On the other hand, the entrepreneurial development programs showed contradictory results. A high 87% of beneficiaries reported improving an existing enterprise or launching a new business as a result of participation in the program. Nevertheless, the evaluation did not find significant changes in income.⁶

The impact evaluation also identified two common factors in the successful job insertion programs. First, the existence of training designed in accordance with the beneficiaries' profiles and with the needs of labor markets, flexibility that permitted paid work during the period of training, and a long period of training. This combination improved the impact of the programs. Second, continuing support activities on the job appear to be fundamental to achieving employment after the end of training. In the entrepreneurial development programs, continuous technical support during the training and launch of the business is essential to ensure program success. Providing a subsistence subsidy for the full duration of the program proved fundamental to the success of the labor insertion and entrepreneurial development programs.⁷

The assessment team has found that USAID/IDP income generation activities appear to alleviate the conditions of extreme poverty or vulnerability, but they do not generate sustainable solutions to these conditions. In other words, they do not generally result in economic stabilization of beneficiaries. On the other hand, the program appears to have high impact on the psycho-social condition of beneficiaries. The successful undertaking of a productive project, entering into relations with strangers, and soliciting assistance from the government clearly contribute to beneficiary empowerment. Beyond empowerment, program

⁵ USAID (2009) Program Overview: Displaced and Vulnerable Groups Assistance Program.

⁶ CID (2008). "Evaluación de programas de generación de ingresos." Final report presented to USAID.

⁷ Ibid.

material benefits do not appear substantial or sustainable. The difficulty in producing sustainable solutions lies in both program design and implementation.

Program design should take into account the multiple dimensions that determine a person's ability to generate income. First, a displaced person is part of a household with immediate survival needs (food and health) and a variety of other household expenses (e.g., housing, transportation, and education). If its survival needs are not covered, it is probable that a beneficiary household will need to consume resources provided in an income generation program to cover these needs. Second, given the low educational levels of displaced households, economic competition in urban markets is severe. Third, the presence of public infrastructure is essential to the success of income generation endeavors. For example, a rural productive project in a fertile area but without access to good farm to market roads has a high probability of failure due to the high cost of marketing the produce. Fourth, displaced persons have normally suffered a high level of loss of productive assets. Reactivating productive activities requires a level of investment capital that usually exceeds the assistance provided through the USAID/IDP programs.

An income generation program that does not take into account the foregoing factors and other aspects of generating sustainable incomes, such as marketing channels, risks being limited to temporary assistance without sustainability. The lack of integrality in conceptual design and particularly in project implementation appears to be the major obstacle to generating sustainable solutions.

Problems Encountered

- Although project design usually includes a food security component, it is not clear how projects fulfill this obligation or to what degree the benefits reach family members. Given the strong pressures to cover their subsistence needs, beneficiaries tend to steer a part of their seed capital to these needs or abandon training courses to engage in work that generates needed income.
- Project implementers confront difficulties in establishing linkages with local and national authorities that facilitate beneficiary access to Government of Colombia (GOC) programs. Infrastructure and health and education services necessary to underpin productive processes are often lacking.
- Training programs are of short duration, and insufficient to compensate for the low educational levels of the displaced population. Once they finish their training programs, many of the beneficiaries are not prepared to compete in urban markets.
- Seed capital granted by the program, on average \$1.5 million (US\$ 750), appears to be insufficient to launch efficient and competitive productive enterprises. Beneficiaries often choose projects with low profitability and produce products with low market demand.
- Few projects are designed with sufficient entrepreneurial validity. This means that linkages with the private sector, essential to entering input supply and marketing chains and in identifying required labor profiles, are rather weak.
- Technical assistance that lasts for the full period of project launch and market positioning is weak and sporadic, especially in the case of entrepreneurial development.
- Selection of productive projects and beneficiaries seems to be determined more by pressure to increase results in coverage indicators than by strategic decisions. This often results in the selection of low return or non-sustainable projects.

Inclusion of Cross-Cutting Issues in Income Generation Projects

The USAID/IDP income generation projects have only a weak link to cross-cutting issues. The inclusion of income generation in a truly integral program is in many cases weak or even non-existent. There appears to

be no effort to establish preferential access in income generation projects for ethnic minorities and the handicapped. In a meeting in Neiva, representatives of the latter expressed their feelings of exclusion. There is a high percentage of women beneficiaries in the income generation projects, but this appears to be the result of a much higher demand for these projects on the part of women and not a deliberate focus. The gender concern in these projects has to do with involving greater participation by men, many of whom seem to be treating these projects as women's activities.

Quality of Monitoring and Evaluation Systems

The income generation programs have a system of monitoring and evaluation. Projects are evaluated with respect to their profitability and simple income and expense statements are generated. Larger productive projects generate a baseline, carry out a basic profitability analysis with calculations of internal rates of return and net present value, and report on basic process indicators. In addition, some rigorous evaluations of impact have been carried out.

Private Sector Participation

Strengthening alliances with the private sector will contribute to deepening income generation program impacts. The evaluation team feels that income generation projects can be made more realistic and sustainable if there is true private sector input, particularly in design and technical assistance. While business advisory services will likely come from local businessmen, corporate funding for social promotion activities is also possible.

- It is important in each of the regions to identify the labor profiles required by private sector enterprises and design training programs consistent with this demand. For example, the Granitos de Paz program in Cartagena trains youth in tourism skills required by local hotels and then inserts them as interns into these hotels. A variety of private sector donors provide support to this NGO program.
- The goods produced in entrepreneurial development programs are not selected according to rigorous market analysis. It is necessary to work with the private sector in each region to identify those products with highest demand and insert the products into appropriate marketing and distribution chains. This will involve acquiring assistance from socially-oriented business people, whether volunteers or consultants.
- It is possible to seek the collaboration of the private sector in proposals framed in market criteria and in keeping with social responsibility agendas of the private sector organizations. IRD, for example, has succeeded in linking the displaced population to shrimp production in Tumaco, demonstrating the feasibility of this approach. In this sense, it is crucial to develop flexible strategies based on points of common interest between the development agenda and that of the enterprise with concrete returns for both parties.
- With regard to private sector collaboration in remote rural places, it is common to find extractive sector companies (petroleum, mining) that have focused their agendas of social responsibility on local community development. This can certainly involve activities that focus on IDP job training and entrepreneurial development and may also include microcredit in association with a local NGO.
- Private sector entities often provide funding to credit schemes for poor micro-entrepreneurs, although they will normally not want to manage these programs directly. There are Colombian microfinance institutions that lend to very poor households, including displaced persons.

Recommended Program Adjustments

USAID/IDP income generation programs have a transitory impact on income level and job insertion of beneficiaries. The difficulty in reaching sustainability in program benefits is due to conceptual weaknesses in program design and implementation. Once these obstacles are reduced, the potential to produce sustainable impacts increases significantly. Some adjustments that can be made in the short run are:

- Income generation for beneficiaries does not depend only on the provision of seed capital and training. Displaced persons should have an appropriate and propitious environment within which to generate sustainable income. Given the high impact of displacement, a favorable environment depends on a number of complementary factors alongside those focused strictly on income generating processes. Primary and essential among these factors is true integration of income generating projects within a broader livelihood security. In order to ensure a favorable environment and integrality in assistance to beneficiaries, the following minimum conditions should be met before launching a project:
 - The household must be linked to the health system
 - Minors and youth in the household should be attending school
 - A minimal public infrastructure must exist to ensure input supply, produce marketing, and linkage to labor markets
 - For rural projects the following should be guaranteed: (i) physical security of beneficiaries; (ii) legal security in access to land, whether it be through formal rental arrangements, land restitution, or allocation of new properties.
- A food security component must be included in income generation programs. Although project implementers need not be directly responsible for the food security component, they should facilitate access to the food security programs implemented by the World Food Program. This can be made a requirement for implementers, while one program monitoring indicator could track this component.
- Psycho-social support has proven to be fundamental in the recovery process of the displaced population. The empowerment and confidence gained from psycho-social counseling and reinitiating productive activities helps to increase beneficiary commitment to the income generation project. A psycho-social component should always be required in income generation projects, both in job insertion and in entrepreneurial development.
- The time allocated for each income generation project and the capital invested per beneficiary are insufficient and should be increased. The displaced population has lost a large portion of its productive assets and, for the most part, has a low level of skills. A program of at most one year and with seed capital of \$1.5 million (US\$ 750) on average does not resolve these difficulties. Each beneficiary should count on support for at least 18 - 24 months, and it may be necessary to increase financial support in many cases. Complex IG schemes may require much longer periods of support.
- A longer period of technical assistance and business advisory services to income generation projects is needed. This includes linking beneficiaries to complementary services from the GOC. Those projects visited during the assessment demonstrated weak follow-through of support. This relatively simple adjustment could substantially improve project impact.
- The need to cover the costs of housing can generate pressures on the beneficiary and put his or her income generation project at risk of failure. It is important to provide beneficiaries with an integrated package of assistance that incorporates housing, whether it be through rental assistance, temporary housing, or permanent solutions.

- Even though it is advisable to extend the length of income generation projects, these should be flexible enough that beneficiaries undergoing training can also undertake parallel activities that allow them to generate resources. The training involved can be modular so that beneficiaries only take the modules required by their particular needs. For example, this strategy was adopted by the PODER program of CHF, which provided a degree of flexibility to its beneficiaries resulting in increased satisfaction with the program.
- Rural productive projects must be designed and implemented to incorporate attention to climate and the entire growth cycle from field preparation through harvest. Resources for the preparation of fields and purchase of seeds need to be available at the appropriate times. If this is not the case, harvests are likely to fail.
- Access to land is fundamental for rural productive projects. All such projects should guarantee legal security of access to land, which may include the possibility of land rental, restitution of properties following population return, or new land allocations. If projects are undertaken without legal security of access to land, they risk losing the investments realized during the initial productive process.

B. FOOD SECURITY

General Evaluation

There is consensus within USAID and throughout the humanitarian assistance system that food security is a critical component of activities carried out in the framework of attention to displaced persons (IDPs). Food security is a factor at four phases in the process of stabilizing the displaced population.

- In the emergency phase when food assistance is channeled for large groups of ten families or more through ICRC, Pastoral Social or local officials; and for individual families who register with Acción Social. In the latter case, Acción Social distributes checks for a three month period to affected families to cover basic needs, including food purchases.
- Within projects which commence sometime after initial displacement: These projects may be located in rural or semi rural areas or in medium or large towns and cities. USAID funded projects carried out by the major implementing agencies normally include food security components. Depending on the location and nature of the project, the food aid may be delivered through the World Food Program (WFP), the Institute of Family Well Being, ICBF (complementary feeding for pre-school and school children and mothers), or the Acción Social/RESA program. The World Food Program provides food-for-work through USAID implementing agencies while income generating projects are being created, food for periods during which workers are trained, and food for educational projects. In September 2003, USAID funded a three year US\$ 1 million program with WFP to alleviate hunger and improve the health and well being of displaced families in five departments, to motivate school attendance of displaced children through school feeding, and to support to schools and community kitchens. It included a small component of institutional strengthening through which women would learn food management. The program was renewed in FY2006-2008, and is deemed by WFP to have been successful.
- As a critical element in return movements: Acción Social affirms that the process of return requires support for food security, backed by national and international entities and local officials. (Acción Social, October 2009). USAID implementing agencies have supported return projects in which there are food security components. However, when IDPs return spontaneously (in *autonomos*), integral assistance projects are not in place, and it is left to local officials to ensure food.

- By means of income generation projects focused on agricultural production and livestock acquisition: These projects are usually in rural or semi rural areas and are aimed at improving food consumption levels of the affected communities. They are particularly important in TEP projects.

Progress Achieved

Food components are built into virtually all USAID projects, including those linked to income generation, health support, education, and sometimes housing. It was not possible either on the basis of the materials made available to the evaluation group or the interviews conducted in Bogota and during field visits to ascertain exactly how food deliveries are timed or for how long food is provided. All informants agreed that the food was vital, and most also agreed that the quantity and quality of food deliveries were almost certainly insufficient to meet basic nutritional needs of IDP families. The evaluation team cannot affirm the extent to which food security for participants in USAID projects is superior to that of IDPs who are not in the programs but assumes that the food programs have a positive impact. World Food Program plans an evaluation in the near future that promises to shed more light on the nutritional status of beneficiaries as well as on the implementation of its programs.

Data on the IDP population overall establishes that this population ranks lower in terms of food security overall as compared to the situation of other vulnerable groups. This contention is well documented in the ICRC/WFP *Informe de Ocho Ciudades* conducted in 2006-2007. Another study in February 2009 on by International Relief and Development, “Cerrando Brechas Humanitarias en Tumaco para Ayudar a la Poblacion Desplazada Afrocolombia,” (Funded by the US Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration) confirmed that despite food deliveries to IDP families, the general level of malnutrition among IDP families in the Pacific region was at a worrisome level.

The point to be made is that while we can confirm that USAID projects include food components, the implementing partners with whom we met were unable to specify to our satisfaction exactly how these are put into practice. With more time and perhaps conversations with different members of the Pan American Development Foundation (PADF) and International Organization for Migration (OIM) offices, we might have obtained that information, but the officials with whom we spoke had relatively little to say about food security. One of them did make the point that while he thought the food deliveries were inadequate for the nutritional needs of IDP families, there were concerns about creating dependency on food donations.

Levels of Inclusion and Cross-cutting Themes

Food coverage seems to reach project participants, although it is not necessarily clear that food amounts are gauged by family size, at least not in a consistent way. The apparently most egregious incidence of omission was the evident lack of food assistance furnished to the spontaneous returnees at Bajo Grande. The team found the residents to be suffering from acute hunger, and unable to derive income from the yucca production product introduced by PADF after they had returned. The yucca project, in turn, seemed most unlikely to produce significant income in the near or medium future for the community. The soil was poor and lacked adequate water, returnees did not own the land they farmed, and surrounding roads were in extremely bad condition, which virtually precluded efficient marketing. Because the return was not planned, it had not been treated as an assisted return by Acción Social, and local officials had not compensated the returnees. Local officials in Cucuta did report having assisted spontaneous returns with resources on hand and thereby providing at least some benefits. The team could not verify this contention. In such cases, and especially in CCAI areas, the local governments are supposed to supply food.

An interesting and encouraging aspect of food assistance and food security productivity is that USAID projects have made impressive efforts to adapt to the dietary preferences of the ethnic communities, namely Afro Colombian and Indigenous communities. This was described to the team during the Tumaco visit, but seen in the visit to the community of La Dorada, near El Dovia (Valle del Cauca). Here nutrition and health projects were joined. The IOM project officers had worked with doctors and nutritionists and with the

indigenous leaders to develop a diet that maintained traditional principles but also introduced nutritionally improved food. The problem anticipated in this project and many others is that the amount of land currently available is insufficient to provide continuing adequate cultivation for the community.

Quality of Monitoring Systems

In the opinion of the evaluation team, the near absence of monitoring of food security is a serious gap. The implementing agencies of USAID projects report only the numbers of beneficiaries of food aid. Reports indicate that food deliveries do reach the target population, and even surpass it at times. Yet, further monitoring should be undertaken in order to ascertain the nutritional status of recipients, of their families (since food is not necessarily evenly distributed within families) and whether at times there may be justification for extending food aid beyond the project period—while still avoiding dependence.

PADF and IOM report that their own monitoring of the agricultural projects designed to provide food for family consumption and improve community food stocks show success. These projects are especially prominent in the TEP areas, and they appear to be promising. However, the projects have been in existence only a short time, and further monitoring would be useful. As noted, it is not clear that land made available for these projects will be sufficient to enable cultivation for growing populations

Achievements and Problems

- Food is being made available.
- Productive projects in rural areas are promising, but it is too early to draw conclusions.
- The WFP program in Colombia is funded to only half its requested level, which is bound to have implications for food security.
- Food assistance in the course of projects does not ensure adequate nutritional levels, though it has proved an essential benefit.
- IDPs with extremely low salaries are spending most of their income on food.
- Food assistance as well as productive projects are essential in returnee areas. The yucca project in Bajo Grande has done poorly for reasons that should have been foreseen, i.e. lack of market access, lack of water, transport difficulties, absence of land ownership.

With regard to alternative development projects in coca growing municipalities, the efforts to promote legal cultivation, including food for local consumption, have not been satisfactory. Some farmers have complained that their productive initiatives have been destroyed by aerial fumigation, and this reduces the will to undertake alternative development as well as trust in authorities and USAID. Moreover, encouraging food cultivation where there are few if any farm to market roads is a recipe for failure. Campesinos inevitably will prefer to grow coca, take the money, and buy the food they need.

Promoting agricultural/small livestock projects is sensible, but such projects require land security as well, both for rented and owned land. There are a few, but very few, income generating projects that train people in food processing or food management, but these would seem logical for IDPs living in rural and semi rural areas. These options could be further explored in future projects.

Impact and Sustainability

Food assistance, by definition, is not meant to be sustainable. It is important to establish a balance that fills nutritional needs for an adequate time, but does not create dependency.

It remains to be seen if productive agricultural projects in rural areas shall prove sustainable.

Recommended Program Adjustments

The USAID implementing partners consider food deliveries to be components of projects, but not projects themselves. Therefore they are treated as “deliverables” and tracked only to ensure that beneficiaries receive what is due to them. The many questions and concerns related to the nutritional status of beneficiaries and the quality of their food consumption cannot be answered without a targeted assessment of that aspect of the projects. The planned WFP studies will be important and presumably the results will be shared with USAID.

Successful agricultural projects are linked to the degree to which these are based on land security and the marketability of surplus production which, in turn, are linked to infrastructure and local food supply networks.

Food insecurity is pervasive among IDPs, and has not been given adequate attention.

C. HOUSING

Current USAID/IDP housing programs fall under the IOM and PADF cooperative agreements. In general, these programs aim to provide durable housing solutions. Strategies employed to this end are variable: (1) providing households with access to public and private supply of new or used housing through a combination of complementary subsidies and assistance; (2) increasing the supply of solutions from local governments through project co-financing; and (3) consolidating and improving houses for families that already have a dwelling.

Basic Accomplishments

- The programs are accomplishing the established goals in an acceptable manner and have achieved a high level of resource leveraging with public entities and NGOs. Through September 30, 2009, IOM declared having achieved 87.3% of its goal in housing (2,072 out of 2,373 households with housing), while PADF declared achieving 77% of its goal (1,801 of 2,339 households). Both implementing agencies achieved an excellent level of leveraging with outside entities, which more than doubled the investment provided by USAID/IDP.⁸
- The greater part of housing investment is concentrated in urban programs.⁹ However, the urban-rural distribution of projects reflects the USAID/IDP program intention of reaching remote rural regions, particularly with respect to population return. In a number of projects in these areas, therefore, the population coverage is low.¹⁰ Carrying out this type of project generates very positive psycho-social and organizational impacts for rural communities, but also involves relatively high costs and important logistical and administrative efforts on the part of implementers.
- The implementing agencies IOM and PADF have managed to construct strategic alliances, gained leadership and recognition, secured cooperation and generated synergies, and established good coordination with other public and non-governmental agencies, both at the national and local levels. In general terms, IOM and PADF have generated positive impacts by strengthening public and private local institutions, an outcome sought throughout the USAID/IDP program.

⁸ According to assessment estimates, the IOM and PADF housing programs were able to generate contributions from partners of some US \$ 11,027,428 compared to the USAID contribution of US \$ 4,407,789, yielding a leveraging factor of 2.62 for each US dollar, or a total value of 262 % of the initial funding.

⁹ According to team estimates, approximately 62% of USAID contributions, 88% of partner contributions, and 81% of total resources have been invested in urban housing.

¹⁰ According to team estimates, there are approximately 10 programs and/or projects in urban zones and 12 in rural areas and approximately 62% of USAID contributions have been invested in urban projects and 38% in rural projects. Some 88% of partner contributions and 81% of total resources have been invested in urban housing.

- IOM and PADF have successfully implemented a strategy of “Colombianization” through their projects and through the linkages to officials in the regional and local institutions operating housing programs.
- These projects conform well to governmental policies. First, the provision of subsidies is carried out in complementary manner to the subsidies from the national and local levels (departments, municipalities). Second, USAID funds are also used to co-finance programs put together by local governments. Third, the identification, prioritization, and selection of these projects take place in the National Infrastructure Committee (Mesa Nacional de Infraestructure), within which the various national governmental agencies involved work together with various USAID programs, as well with as IOM and PADF. Initiatives are put forward within this group by the GOC.
- The quality of the houses provided to beneficiaries generally corresponds to standards established by the Constitutional Court for the Effective Enjoyment of Rights (EER) to a suitable house. These specify that the house has legal security in its ownership, access to public services, and durable materials in floors, walls, and ceilings. In the majority of cases these are individually-owned houses, although EER standards do not require homes to be owned individually.
- Housing programs are guided by the principle of integrated assistance to IDPs that leads to socio-economic stabilization. The housing provided is both dignified and durable. Thus, housing is linked to other sectoral actions in food security, income generation, psycho-social counseling, and access to health and education.
- The USAID/IDP program objective of 70% housing assistance to IDPs and 30% to other vulnerable populations has been achieved, according to IOM and PADF.

Problems Encountered

- Low level of coverage: The perception on the part of local authorities and the IDPs themselves is that program coverage is very low compared to needs.¹¹
- Lack of linkage with the income generation component: There are real risks for the sustainability of several of the projects, because of the weak linkage between housing and income generation. In a number of housing projects, there are still beneficiaries who have not been assisted in income generation, or are involved in projects that generate minimal income and/or are only just taking-off. This means that sustainability is still uncertain.
- Gaps exist in the application of the policy of differential focus: (1) the application of policy priorities according to sex, age, ethnicity, and handicapped status in the selection of households to assist in housing is conditioned by the distribution of the universe of households that receive the national-level subsidy;¹² (2) Although there are examples of ethnic considerations in housing, there are no systematic and uniform criteria or procedures for the prioritization of beneficiaries according to sex, age, ethnicity, handicapped status, or degree of handicap.

¹¹ This point was already made in the evaluation of Alianza Pilas carried out by Econometria in 2006, in which it was found that some 55,000 IDP households and 19,000 vulnerable households needed some form of housing intervention. Econometría S.A. “Diagnostico de las poblaciones desplazadas and vulnerables y estrategia de respuesta – Resumen Ejecutivo”. April 2006.

¹² In the IOM-Cali program, there existed a sufficient number of households (1,000) with a national-level subsidy, which allowed for a process of household selection using differential criteria to choose the 170 beneficiary households. This did not occur in the remaining projects visited, given that the number of households with the national subsidy was small.

- Relationship between house location and the productive enterprise: In urban programs, insufficient consideration has been given to the relationship between house location and the needs of the household production unit. In cases of new housing located in peri-urban locations far from usual markets, households tend to set up small retail and service businesses catering to inhabitants of the same sector. This leads to uncertainty about the profitability and sustainability of these commercial activities and sacrifices a part of the already limited living space. In cases of other types of businesses (production for wider sale, such as handicrafts, clothing, wood products, and furniture), where commercial success depends on an appropriate location near markets, convenient workshop space is frequently unavailable because the new houses are located in peripheral areas.
- Impact on the strengthening of local public institutions: Implementation of housing programs and projects has contributed to the institutional strengthening component of the USAID/IDP program through the strengthening of local and regional institutions in the domain of housing/habitat. However, good relations of cooperation and coordination with local public sector housing offices (department and municipality) have not been sufficient to improve local institutional response to high demand.¹³
- Monitoring and evaluation: The monitoring conducted is focused on achievement of quantitative goals, primarily centered on the number of households served and budgetary drawdown. There is also a degree of monitoring of qualitative information on progress and difficulties, relevance of the methodology, and lessons learned and recommendations. Monitoring does not track qualitative aspects of housing projects regarding the suitability of these solutions in terms of beneficiary participation in project design, fit with economic activities and needs, social and cultural characteristics of families, overall habitat needs, and impact on the vulnerable receptor population.

Impact and Sustainability

The perception of those beneficiaries interviewed and of the public sector entities receiving aid from USAID/IDP is highly positive with respect to the impact of housing programs, but they contend that these programs should be expanded given the magnitude of unsatisfied need among IDPs.

However, risks to the sustainability of various projects over the medium and long term do exist because of the weak linkage between the housing and income generation components of assistance. This is due to the contradiction between the solution sought, i.e. permanent housing, and actual results obtained in most income generation projects (subsistence, transition). Inadequate sequencing of housing with income generation can result in the inability of beneficiaries to occupy new houses. Examples of this are provided by the El Minuto de Dios project undertaken by IOM in Cucuta and the IOM Cristo Rey settlement near Tumaco.

To adhere to an integral approach to IDP stabilization needs requires undertaking both housing and income generation activities, but the housing component should be conceived with household income generation needs in mind. This may lead to consideration of short-term alternatives in housing focused on transitional solutions until a sustainable, long-term solution is possible. The latter would then be largely determined by household economic capacity.

Recommended Program Adjustments

- Formally adopt a linkage in USAID/IDP programming between housing and household income generation. A fundamental postulate of the IDP program is that housing is one component of a

¹³ In this respect, two projects in institutional strengthening were identified consisting of support in the formulation of the Partial Plan for Geographic Expansion of the municipalities of Pasto and Apartadó, in order to prepare the ground for VIS housing for IDPs and vulnerable groups.

process of integral socio-economic stabilization. For this reason, the type of housing must be consistent with the generation of income necessary to afford its upkeep. Housing and income need to be addressed in tandem, applying solutions in a progressive and interactive manner over a long enough period to reach socio-economic stabilization.

- Develop alternative transitional housing solutions suited to income levels. In urban housing activities, reach agreements with local authorities for a more flexible menu of lower-cost, alternative (but dignified), transitional solutions to IDP housing needs that can be offered to households as their income generation rises. Such transitional solutions can include rental subsidies, subsidized leasing of multi-family properties, transitional housing types in permanent locations, and prefabricated housing.
- Sustainable income of sufficient level to afford ownership of permanent housing. In the domain of permanent housing solutions, prioritize access to households that exhibit sufficient, sustainable income to afford associated costs.
- Promote higher density programs in IDP settlements. Work with local authorities to increase the supply of housing units in already consolidated neighborhoods settled by large numbers of IDPs. Build upon the experience of Plan Terrazas of the BCH.
- Promote the process of clearing titles of rural properties. Within return and resettlement programs in rural areas, promote processes that clear and register titles to land and lots. This is a necessary step in qualifying returnees for subsidies and credits to improve existing housing or to build on already owned sites.
- Adopt a differential focus in a planned and proactive manner. Adopt explicit criteria for prioritizing population groups according to their degree of vulnerability (ethnic minorities, female heads of household, high household dependency ratio, senior heads of household, and handicapped household heads). Work with national and local authorities to adopt these priorities in future housing projects and selection of beneficiaries. Where possible provide some variety in housing design suited to vulnerability (e.g., the handicapped).
- Consider alternative designs to fit housing to cultural differences. Further develop experimental architectural and construction material designs that reduce costs without sacrificing safety, while increasing the living space and orientation of rooms to suit the cultural characteristics of end users.
- Develop programs that also generate impacts for the vulnerable receptor population. Promote housing/habitat programs that generate impacts for both the IDP and vulnerable receptor populations. A more holistic approach to community development that integrates IDPs and previous inhabitants will avoid creating IDP ghettos.
- Take into consideration the relationship between housing and existing economic units. In the design of urban housing programs, the relationship between the economic and housing needs of the beneficiaries should be taken into account. One possibility is to develop a model of productive housing, in which some housing types would include space for workshops as well.
- Promote institutional strengthening of local public housing institutions. Generate new initiatives to strengthen housing/habitat entities servicing IDPs. The desired result would be to improve their capacity to develop specific policies and programs for IDPs consonant with effective income generation solutions. Actions would be aimed at: (1) placing the theme of housing/habitat for IDPs firmly on the housing agenda; (2) improving coordination with other municipal or departmental offices to reinforce the integrality of aid programs; and (3) improving the technical capacity of local institutions through training, technical assistance, and technical know-how transfer. One can envisage actions to improve this capacity that are similar to the successful strategy of training,

technical assistance, and knowledge transfer currently implemented by PAHO in the health sector (e.g., in Huila department).

D. INSTITUTIONAL STRENGTHENING

Overall Evaluation

This component examines USAID project development from the perspective of institutional strengthening. As already noted, achieving successful projects often hinges on the presence—or absence—of a favorable institutional support structure. The team visited service providers throughout the country, focusing especially on the Unidades de Atención y Orientación (UAOs) —put in place specifically to orient and direct IDPs to the public services they need—and found the efforts of committed people to have been thwarted by major institutional deficiencies related to staffing, infrastructure, bureaucratic rigidities, and sometimes corruption. At present, newly arrived IDPs may or may not be able to receive the assistance to which they are due, depending on the will and organizational capacities of institutions in the municipalities they reach. Looking forward, only if strong municipal governments are put in place in CSDI areas will returnees be successfully incorporated.

The GOC has created an array of institutions at local and national levels, which function in a disjointed way. The entities that are most essential to IDPs, the UAOs, health and educational structures, and municipal-level Single Integral Plans (PIUs) warrant the support provided by USAID. However, further support in communications, databases, information sharing mechanisms, and staff training is also very important. These technical services should be strengthened in municipal governments and national entities.

The report stresses the challenge of strengthening institutions at the local level. Presently Colombia's institutions operate from the top down. Greater local institutional strengthening, however, is impeded by political and economic corruption, which continues to plague Colombia. Supporting municipal authorities is essential, but those officials helped must be carefully vetted. The institutions receiving support should be able to establish that their staff is technically competent and not politically tied. To the extent possible, institutional support should be geared to technical improvements that will outlast the term of any given official. This means assistance should focus on systems and procedures that become codified and internalized within local and national institutions dealing with IDPs. In this way, personnel changes are less likely to result in loss of institutional memory.

It appears that GOC and international cooperation policies have largely been in error. The great majority of receptor municipalities have neither the human nor financial capacity to deal with the growing inflows of IDPs. Moreover, mayors have no incentive to implement programs focused on the displaced population. The Single Integral Plans (PIUs) are largely ineffective, because their development has been converted into a means to conform with policies regarding IDPs without providing much in the way of efforts.

Continuing with training of local staff and support to PIUs can be sterile, if current legislation is not modified. USAID could provide resources for designing new legislation that puts order into the responsibilities of local authorities and creates a Compensation Fund to grant resources to those municipalities with high inflows of IDPs.

The following section analyzes the difficulties of strengthening national and local institutions, and makes recommendations for the direction of future approaches. USAID actions that strengthen Colombian government entities are at the heart of efforts to achieve programmatic goals of Colombianization of projects and an overall complementarity of national and international efforts. The analysis is based on information collected from documents, observation in the field, and meetings with managers of national-level institutions and organizations that are currently implementing institutional strengthening projects.

Defining Criteria

The USAID/IDP Office through its implementing organizations seeks to strengthen national and local institutions in order to improve the capacity of these institutions to deal with the multiple needs of the displaced population. However, it is difficult to define appropriate criteria for supporting institutional strengthening given the great diversity of projects with different foci and objectives that require institutional support. Adding to the difficulties of targeting support, Colombia has a vast array of organizations and entities at all levels addressing aspects of attention to displaced populations. This raises a number of key questions:

- Which institutions at what level should be supported and what should be the criteria for identifying target organizations and institutions?
- What is the most effective mixture of economic support, technical upgrading, human capital enhancement, logistical support and assistance in research and documentation?
- Should the focus be primarily on institutions at the national level, territorial level (departments, districts, and municipalities) or is it possible to find an appropriate balance that sustains both?
- On what basis should USAID determine the mixture of government and civil society organizations to be supported?

Institutional strengthening is not as tangible as sectoral support activities. Technical assistance to organizations and resource enhancements, both in support of operating projects in other sectors or stand-alone institutional projects, are less visible than support afforded to productive efforts, housing, and infrastructure. Yet, institutional strengthening is a cross-cutting theme in all sectoral projects and crucial to their success. Institutional support to organizations in the form of tools and training increases the potential sustainability of the projects these organizations create. Weak governance at the local, departmental and national level not only compromises confidence and programmatic sustainability, but may threaten the physical and economic security of beneficiaries and project organizers.

In the course of field visits, the assessment team was frequently made aware of gaps in local institutional capacities. Almost without exception, local authorities—governors, mayors, educational secretaries—complained of unfilled needs for technical and human capacities. The evaluation team learned about the institutional strengthening projects under Acción Social, Red Juntos in the national Planning Department, the Ministry of Interior PIUs project, and the Registraduría Nacional. Their alleged purposes are primarily to reinforce local services. However, with the partial exception of the last, these entities are based at the national level where decisions are made, and then implemented at intervals by means of local delegations or missions.

It is generally not clear what has been the degree of participation from local institutions and the impact these projects will eventually have on these local organizations. For example, a potentially important project for contingency planning (wrongly labeled as “prevention” but in fact a plan for IDP reception) anticipated plans by means of which communities would define roles and responsibilities of major actors in the case of an arrival of a large group of IDPs. The project was entirely conceived in Bogota, and the plans were locally validated on the basis of only one mission and a survey to verify possible preparedness. The plan was designed for large scale displacements which, in fact, are now infrequent. The full blown plan is to be presented in workshops that bring together the local actors who are expected to implement it.

In the view of the team, the success and relevance of institutional support projects depend on involvement from the beginning of local actors, who stand to benefit directly from the process of transfer of skills and knowledge. This is indeed the case in the Registraduría Nacional project which not only delivers a very important service—personal documentation to people in remote, conflict ridden areas—but is helping local jurisdictions to establish decentralized mechanisms for continuing documentation. However, the team is

skeptical as to how local participation has been brought to bear on decisions made by most of the Bogota based agencies noted above. Nevertheless, the team recognizes that local institutional needs are nearly inexhaustible, and USAID will be challenged to target its interventions to those entities most relevant for enhancing attention to displaced persons.

Current IOM and PADF Projects in Institutional Strengthening

Most USAID institution strengthening activities are implemented through the IOM and PADF umbrella programs. In a separate USAID program, PAHO also provides significant capacity and institutional strengthening to the health sector in areas where it operates. It is difficult to determine the content of the projects from the reports to which the team has had access, and some of them are likely to be counted, as well, in other sectors such as health or education. Of 48 projects currently active under IOM, 11 (23%) are classified as “institutional and community strengthening.” These include PIU assistance, municipal budget and administrative strengthening, construction of infrastructure for UAOs, assistance to the Registraduría Nacional, and support to departmental and municipal committees charged with integral attention to the displaced population.

Of the 54 currently active PADF projects on its Rolling List, 20 (37%) claim at least a component of institutional strengthening, although only two (4%) focus solely on this sector. The two projects both deal with support to PIU development. On the other hand, 49 of 118 completed projects (42%) claim activities in this sector, including 19 (16%) that are billed as solely focused on institutional strengthening. A majority of these (10 of 19, or 53%) targeted women and ethnic minorities, particularly Afro-Colombians.

In cases where institutional strengthening is given by PADF as one of several components of a project, strengthening may be seen as a subsidiary or indirect output, the result of involving local actors in an activity from which they gain increased organizational and personal capacity by doing.

USAID support to the Comisión de Seguimiento, presently backstopping the Constitutional Court, is a key example of support to a civil society organization. In this case, several donors have come forward to give support, but USAID is the largest to date.

While the assessment team in its travels saw few projects focused solely on institutional strengthening, conversations were frequently held with municipal government officials charged with dealing directly or indirectly with IDPs in their jurisdictions. Numerous conversations and interviews at the national level also touched on the subject of institutional strengthening, because of the clear disconnect between the findings and directives of the Constitutional Court and effective governmental action in favor of the displaced population. Beyond some cases of lack of political will, it was generally felt that departmental and municipal authorities simply lack the capacity or budget to achieve results.

Focusing of Institutional Strengthening Projects to Stress Coherence

A systematic attempt to establish a framework for projects in the institutional strengthening area might look like this:

- **Establish criteria to improve management in relation to:**
 - Mission of the institution (responsibility, vision, planning strategy, monitoring of progress)
 - Structure of the organization (processes and procedures, levels and ability in decision making, internal culture)
 - Resources (human, material, and financial)

- **Define intervention components**

- Technical support for the elaboration of instruments and tools for accurate planning, monitoring, program analysis and evaluation, and feedback mechanisms
- Technical assistance and advice in the formulation, design, and presentation of feasible projects (qualified human resources)
- Technical and logistical support in accord with programmatic intentions and goals
- Training processes that strengthen knowledge, skills, and the development of human resource skills (with a clear sense of which types, for whom, and what for)

Institutional strengthening projects or components of projects may be difficult to evaluate because the results, beyond delivery of outputs, cannot be clearly defined. Yet, precisely for this reason, indicators should be developed to address the qualitative aspects of project management, the achievement of results and objectives, knowledge improvement, and whether skills or systems have been strengthened through the project. Pre- and post-evaluations or comparison between project and control focus groups may prove useful alternatives to measure such outcomes. Unfortunately, the short time frame of USAID/IDP projects is especially problematic with regard to efforts to improve institutional preparedness and response. Institutions modify practices slowly and unevenly, and the impacts of changing patterns of response are difficult to measure in the short term. This is why USAID assistance should be highly focused, targeted, and well defined in terms of desired outcomes.

Strengthening of Local Institutions

As mentioned previously, USAID efforts to strengthen local institutions probably offer the most effective way to improve conditions for IDPs, but they are also confronted with a number of institutional and situational barriers. In the absence of additional funding, municipalities are unable to do much beyond drawing up their PIU. These “unfunded mandates” not only produce frustration, but tend to generate loss of political will. USAID may be able to target financial assistance to municipalities to fund specific mandates in key places to produce workable models of assistance to IDP populations.

There are three types of strengthening of local entities that need to be implemented through USAID programs: organizational structure and coordination processes; human capital; and information systems.

Development of codified systems and procedures, such as manuals for various municipal mandates, may have to be combined with periodic refresher training based on these manuals. This may need to be carried out following municipal elections in places where personnel has changed, but political will and funding for national mandates exist. Given the future emphasis on CSDI zones, intensive strengthening of municipal functions in these zones is a priority. IDPs in the intermediate or larger urban areas where they have accumulated are likely to benefit from much stronger institutions than in the small towns and departmental capitals of CSDI zones, where efforts to prevent further displacement will be focused.

Institutional strengthening also means strengthening of linkages between various entities. Within municipalities the various organizations that deal with IDP issues – IDP Committees, Red Juntos Committees, CCAI Committees, UAOs, Local Integrated Attention Committees (CLAIPDs) – need to be brought together in formal and sustained interaction.

Finally, several information systems need to be improved or developed at the departmental and municipal levels that can describe key aspects of the displaced population, track solutions proposed in PIUs, serve to link budget rubrics with program operations, and track the efficiency of use of resources (benefits versus costs).

Strengthening Indigenous and Afro-Colombian Community Organizations

The assessment team did not meet with any Afro-Colombian civil society organizations (CSOs) and met with only one indigenous local governing body (La Dorada, Valle del Cauca). As a result it has not had the opportunity to assess the level of institutional weakness of these organizations. Nor is it clear how, to what degree, and with what success CSO strengthening activities have taken place under the Productive Ethnic Territories program (TEP) of the last few years. The Afro-Colombian strategy recently approved also is mute with regard to what will be required to strengthen community organizations and ethnic NGOs. However, based on available materials and comparative experience, some suggestions for strengthening these institutions can be made:

- Literacy levels are likely to be low in CSOs, so that adult literacy and numeracy programs should be given in communities to all interested, but especially to members of community-based governing councils, civil society organizations, productive associations, and NGOs. Women must be included in these programs, as well as in organizational membership.
- Confidence levels are also likely to be low, so that local schools should be rehabilitated or constructed and provision made for increasing child and youth enrollment. Some provision for adult education should also be made.
- Training of CSO members in organizational management should be carried out and refresher training undertaken once yearly. The first priority of management training has to do with financial management, followed by logistics, planning, monitoring of resources and results, and leadership roles and responsibilities.
- Funding of these organizations should be organized under future USAID programs, with emphasis in the five CSDI zones.
- CSOs can be effectively used to prevent displacement from home areas, renewed displacement from sites of first migration, and return to original homes. They should be funded to assist in this function. This will be particularly important in CSDI zones, where IDP activities will focus on restraining displacement and encouraging returns as soon as the zones are effectively pacified and consolidated under permanent government control.
- Information systems should be set up to track financial operations of indigenous and Afro-Colombian community organizations and to compare these to their activities and accomplishments.

Summary of Assessment Findings

- Institutional strengthening has not stood firmly as a cross-cutting component in USAID projects. USAID and its implementing partners are unclear about what institutional strengthening means or what should be done to improve institutional performance. Strengthening efforts have been applied to local authorities, local implementing organizations, and communities, but efforts are dispersed, lack strategic vision, and are not achieving significant results. Institutional strengthening should be an objective in all projects.
- USAID is unclear about whether it wants to concentrate on strengthening national or regional institutions and ends up without a clear strategy for either. Projects at the local level tend only to provide infrastructure and equipment while ignoring management strengthening.
- There is probably little USAID can do to correct Colombia's structures of centralized, top down governmental decision making and program development, about which local governments complain. Yet, the consequence of these structures is that knowledge transfer to the local level and feedback to the capital are lacking. This top-down management interferes with the development of effective

local PIUs. Local governments to which IDPs have recourse have multiple entities that do not interact with each other and are poorly resourced. Donor projects should be presented and discussed by CLAIPD members, as well as local IDP committees. This is not generally done, limiting the development of complementarity.

- There are management and systems problems in local institutions with which USAID and its implementing partners deal. The personnel in the Attention and Orientation Units (UAOs) are often not prepared to carry out their duties. Routes of access to various services for IDPs are unclear, excessively bureaucratic, and fail to adequately orient the displaced population. While there are clear limits to how far USAID can go in rectifying these problems, training and technical assistance can be provided for personnel in UAOs and in those municipal offices that deal with IDPs, even though this may have to be repeated when a new mayor is elected. Development of systems and procedures that can be codified and internalized into institutions will help to reduce loss of institutional memory when personnel changes following elections.
- Available information does not provide much room for objective evaluation, and there is a dire need for investment in information systems. Monitoring and evaluation systems and indicators for the institutional strengthening sector, locally and nationally have yet to be established.

Recommended Program Adjustments

- Organizational development plans should be developed for key institutions with which USAID intends to interact in its integrated, community-level projects.
- USAID should focus on strengthening municipal planning and technical capacity, as well as the local UAO. Assistance in the development and adherence to a PIU should be provided, wherever communities have been selected by USAID for integrated projects. Part of any integrated package of assistance should thus be deliberate, targeted institution strengthening.
- When operating sectoral projects in various municipalities, USAID should link these projects not only to sectoral institutional strengthening, but also develop and agree to an overall institutional strengthening plan for the local government. USAID should select its target municipalities from the 255 municipalities targeted by the GOC for priority institutional strengthening.
- USAID/IDP should consider providing technical training for its local partners and probably also of its umbrella program partners.
- In providing technical training regarding institutional strengthening, USAID/IDP should take advantage of knowledge gained under municipal strengthening programs such as ADAM and CIMIENTOS.
- In the CCAI zones in particular mayors are not consulted in decision making. USAID should work to rectify this within and outside its CSDI zones.
- As part of its national-level public policy and institutional strengthening strategy, USAID should:
 - Provide technical support to the Constitutional Court to monitor public policy and the promulgation of measures to qualify and concretize it.
 - Provide technical advisory support to the GOC in the definition of criteria and procedures to determine the end of IDP status.
 - Strengthen the work of civil society actors in the monitoring of the appropriateness and results of public policies, in particular those that have been appointed by the Constitutional Court to this effect.

- Develop and implement at the national and regional levels a Unified Information System that optimizes IDP registration, description, and classification, evaluates IDP needs and monitors the aid provided, assists in preventing abuses in the system, and provides trustworthy information on the end of IDP status.
- As part of its local-level institutional strengthening activities, USAID support to institutions must be decentralized, flexible, and focused on the following:
 - Improve the political and financial commitment of departmental and municipal authorities resulting from the scant budgetary margin of these authorities and the inflexibility of local administrative structures. It is suggested common funds be established to encourage the concentration of administrative resources in fewer sources, greater control of spending, and to facilitate the cooperation of programs of other agencies.
 - Promote inter-institutional arrangements that provide sustainability to PIUs as the integrative axis of local policy implementation, so as not to weaken or delegitimize attention to IDPs at the municipal and departmental levels.
 - Provide support in the design of models of intergovernmental relations and mechanisms for programmatic and budgetary coordination.
 - Provide consultants to develop the tasks necessary to put displacement on the governmental agenda and within strategic objectives, conduct training of regular staff, and provide the advisory and technical assistance necessary in the design, costing, budgeting, and monitoring of local initiatives for IDPs.
 - Carry out training of local administrative staff in: rights-based focus; differential focus; national-level public policy requirements; formulation, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of PIUs; design and implementation of feasible projects; and leadership, conflict management and resolution, and negotiation.
 - Provide support to information systems by assisting in developing measurement tools and indicators for use in the development of PIUs; instruments to classify and characterize the displaced population within the local jurisdiction; procedures to match budgetary information against operational management information; and the adoption of management indicators to monitor the effective use of resources against benchmarks of success.

E. HEALTH AND EDUCATION

Overall Evaluation

Health and education are two fundamental components of integral attention to the displaced population under the USAID/IDP programs. These are basic services delivered to the public in most areas of the country by virtue of residence in a particular area or community and for which IDPs are legally eligible. The project beneficiaries interviewed in focus groups confirmed that the great majority of IDPs have gained access to government-supplied services in health and education and that project implementers have effectively filled the gaps where coverage is limited or non-existent. It is important to stress the fact that the IOM and PADF strategy of building upon governmental provision of these services has been effective in ensuring basic access to health and education for the IDPs involved in income generation and housing programs. The team agrees that these services are basic to positive outcomes in development efforts.

Health

The GOC has undertaken significant efforts to expand subsidized health care throughout the country, which has increased from 18 million members in 2006 to nearly 23 million at the end of 2009. This represents 97% of the government's goal for the period. The inclusion of the IDP population within the subsidized health system rose nearly 300%, rising from 273,738 in 2006 to a total of 813,976 in 2009.

The evaluation team was able to verify with communities, experts, and representatives of local governments that priority access is being given to IDPs to facilitate their participation in the subsidized health regime. However, it is important to note that the government only achieved 67% of its target goal with respect to enrolling the displaced population in the subsidized health system during this three-year period.

There is reason to think that the cause of this lesser enrollment of the displaced population compared to other vulnerable populations is due to the following:

- The enrollment process is complex and its very structure poses a serious challenge to the displaced population. One factor adding to difficulties of IDP enrollment is the fact that in most jurisdictions the rosters are adjusted to allow for new members only once or twice a year.
- There are disincentives to enrollment in the subsidized health system such as the fact that many IDPs who do not place their names in the national IDP registry cannot benefit from priorities accorded to IDPs in terms of health care coverage. Another obstacle is dealing with the competition between different governmental services offered to the vulnerable population.

Both experts and members of the displaced population gave the following reasons for difficulty in accessing health services:

- Deficient infrastructure and available resources in health service institutions.
- Lack of understanding on the part of IPS (Instituciones Prestadoras de Salud) and EPS (Empresas Prestadoras de Salud) employees of the coverage offered to health system members. In the past, the health card was valid in specific municipalities but, as a result of reforms passed in the last few years, the displaced population can now be covered by a single EPS (Caprecom) at the national level and is not limited to a specific regional level.
- The great distances that IDPs living in low density population areas have to travel to access health services offered through the current network of institutions

The evaluation team was able to visit USAID/IDP health programs targeted on IDPs operated through the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), Profamilia, CHF, and Mercy Corps. It is obvious to the team that the sustained presence of these organizations in the field has been accompanied by a productive working relationship with counterpart health institutions at the departmental and municipal levels. In many cases, this relationship has resulted in strengthening government institutions, as in the case of accessibility and use of statistical information for decision making in public health policies.

In interviews with beneficiary groups and experts at the local level, there was wide recognition of the impact that these programs have in providing health services in areas where governmental supply and capacity are virtually nil, as in the case of sexual and reproductive health and services to dispersed populations in remote locations. The latter is often called delivering health services "beyond the end of the road."

It is important to call attention to the very low coverage of the displaced population by psycho-social counseling services. For example, the major source of governmental psycho-social services to children and youth is the music training in Batuta orchestra centers, which have catered to fewer than 23,000 beneficiaries in the last eight years.

IOM and PADF have also implemented a few projects in the health sector. Currently, two of the 48 current IOM projects are in health, one of which was visited during the assessment and includes an important component of indigenous medical practices.¹⁴

On the other hand, PADF includes health as a component of multi-sectoral projects in 26 of 54 active projects (48%), but it has no health-only projects. However, including health in a mix of two to three other components does not mean the project is more than tangentially related to health. An example is the edible mushroom agribusiness project implemented in seven different municipal sites in Huila, one of which was visited by the assessment team. This is an extremely sophisticated and ambitious project that bears watching for sustainability, but initial signs are encouraging. Most of the other projects involving a health component appear to be considered partially health oriented, because participants are receiving food for work or training or because they are expected to generate new income and afford better food and health care.

Sustainability Issues

Under contract to USAID, Profamilia and PAHO are providing services to IDPs and other vulnerable groups that the GOC is either not providing or providing poorly at present. The assessment team feels strongly that such health care is worth supporting for the foreseeable future, because it provides a quality safety net to people in continued crisis and poverty. Profamilia needs support so long as the GOC health provision mechanisms are not adequately serving IDPs. The operation of the health services has improved, but there is a way to go. Furthermore, since Profamilia is specialized in reproductive health, women are clearly receiving benefits that would not otherwise be available. Profamilia is also working psychosocially with youth and has an outreach program, as well as numerous clinics throughout the country.

PAHO and Profamilia are not financially sustainable at present, and PAHO is not designed to be so. On the other hand, Profamilia claims to cover 87% of its operational costs, depending on donors for the remaining 13%. USAID's contribution to Profamilia represents less than 7% of its overall budget. Full sustainability of health service entities serving the poor is rarely achieved. The GOC will one day need to extend its services to remote areas and improve services in towns and cities. Sustainability of access to quality health services will be a GOC responsibility in the long run.

What is needed is an assistance program that strengthens the GOC capacity to provide quality health services and to send mobile health brigades into remote areas to treat patients that would never normally receive health care. This is especially important in ethnic areas, such as mountainous zones and the Pacific coast regions. In a modern country like Colombia, such improvement of the public health care system should be desirable, feasible, and affordable. Supporting PAHO and Profamilia to provide specialized services is a way to create models for reaching vulnerable populations that the GOC health system can eventually emulate. A program that links state health providers and Profamilia in areas where it operates will establish closer relations and promote mutual learning. At this point it seems the former has more to learn from the latter than vice versa. PAHO, Profamilia, and other health NGOs can continue to reach niche health needs, but the way to reach sustainability in health coverage for IDPs, other poor populations, and remote ethnic groups will ultimately be through programs that improve the governmental system.

Education

During the last four years the number of IDPs assisted by the national education system rose from 164,425 in 2005 to 526,044 in 2009. According to the Ministry of National Education this is 175% of the target goal set for the end of 2009. These figures indicate that the departmental and municipal authorities are providing educational services to the displaced population with resources from the national budget (via the Sistema General de Participaciones and Inversion). Educational indicators show increasing access, and this is

¹⁴ La Dorada indigenous IDP population health (and food security) project near El Dovio (Valle del Cauca).

consistent with responses given by beneficiaries and other representatives of the displaced population who report no significant obstacles in enrolling school-age IDP children into public education institutions.

However, in spite of the fact that educational coverage has significantly increased, the implementation of the national governmental program of construction, improvement, and equipping of educational infrastructure in zones of high risk for population displacement is still under 44%. The delays in making these improvements have had an important impact on educational quality as coverage is extended to the displaced population. A large portion of that population has had minimal education. In order to help mitigate the educational deficit and fill the gaps, USAID/IDP implementing organizations IOM and PADF have approached education through models focused on integrating the community, adults and children, as in the Open Doors Schools (Escuelas de Puertas Abiertas), and in improvement/construction and equipping of schools.

IOM and PADF Projects in Education

USAID/IDP education projects are implemented by IOM and PADF. They are frequently combined with infrastructure and institutional and community strengthening components. When community members are involved in construction activities, WFP food is provided to workers to replace lost income opportunities and bring food security of their families during the project.

USAID education projects appear to be highly appreciated by local populations and help to compensate for population increase from IDP inflow from rural areas (Campoalegre in Huila) or IDP returns (El Salado in Bolivar).

Of the 48 IOM projects currently active, 9 (19%) are in education. Of these projects two were visited by the assessment team.¹⁵

Of the 54 active PADF projects, seven (13%) are either education alone (2) or contain an educational component (5). Of the 118 projects completed by PADF, 29 (25%) are either education alone (5) or contain an educational component among others (24). Overall, since 2006 PADF has implemented 36 projects with at least a component of education out of a total of 172 projects (21%). The assessment team was able to visit three active PADF educational projects in its field trips.¹⁶

In some cases, IOM and PADF have striven to reorient educational processes toward training and the development of productive skills among students, as in the case of projects implemented by IOM local partner Proempresas and by the Diocese of Tibú (La Gabarra) in Norte de Santander. PADF has recently completed the rehabilitation and reorientation of a high school in El Salado (Bolívar department) which specializes in agricultural training for its students.

Members of the displaced communities complain about the deficient infrastructure and institutional capacity in the educational network and resulting poor quality educational offerings, but a larger concern is the poor attendance among children from displaced families. The school dropout rate among them is nearly 9%¹⁷ and the enrollment rate even lower. The reasons are related to the physical, economic and psychosocial consequences of forced displacement through violence, and also to the high mobility of IDPs, largely but not exclusively for economic reasons. Families frequently cannot pay the costs associated with attending school

¹⁵ Infrastructure Construction in the El Rodeo Educational Institution (Cúcuta) and the “Open Doors School” Educational Program of Exporcol School (Tumaco)

¹⁶ (1) Rehabilitation of the Agribusiness High School of El Salado (Bolívar); (2) Construction of Classrooms and Toilet Blocks in the Eugenio Ferro Falla Educational Institution of Campoalegre (Huila); and (3) Complementary (Music) Activities in Batuta Orchestra Centers (Huila).

¹⁷ Ibáñez, A.M. y P. Querubin (2004). “Acceso a tierras y desplazamiento forzado en Colombia”. Documento CEDE. 2004

(uniforms, books, supplies, etc.), which restrict the entry or maintenance of children in the school system. Finally, for the same reasons, they rely on youngsters for added income generation instead of school.

Cross-cutting Issues in Health and Education

Both PADF and IOM have had success in ensuring that their beneficiaries have access to education and health services by linking beneficiaries with the relevant local governmental entities. With respect to inclusion of ethnic minorities, assistance provided through USAID implementing partners has really made a difference in providing access for indigenous communities to health and education services. The PAHO program in particular has played a major role in providing health services to this population, which is dispersed across areas difficult to reach by the public systems.

With respect to gender issues, it should be pointed out that programs such as Profamilia have a direct, largely sustainable effect on the quality of life of women and children. Profamilia beneficiaries are extremely pleased with the services provided to them and feel there is little alternative. Through field interviews, it was also possible to verify that the Open Doors School programs not only are able to incorporate the educational needs of adults, but have provided a forum in which male as well as female parents participate in the educational process and become involved more actively in the care of their children.

Quality of Monitoring and Evaluation Systems

Through its meetings and visits with implementing partners in the health sector, such as PAHO, Profamilia, and CHF, the assessment team was made aware of monitoring and evaluation systems. In general, both PADF and IOM monitor their education and health projects, which are usually implemented by local partner organizations and involve the construction and equipping of classrooms. However, PADF and IOM do not follow school attendance or dropout rates within the beneficiary population. Nor do they report systematically on the levels of effective access and/or quality of education and health services. Yet, in a few cases, as in Tumaco, the availability of this information has allowed municipal and departmental government entities to make relevant public policy decisions.

Conclusions and Recommendations

In general, GOC efforts at both the national and territorial (departmental and municipal) levels have been successful in extending basic health and education services to the displaced population. This has increased the ability of USAID implementing partners to ensure incorporation of IDPs into the subsidized health system and enrollment of school-aged children, as part of a package of integral assistance to direct beneficiaries of their programs.

Nonetheless, educational and health infrastructure and service quality have not advanced at the same pace as coverage, affecting not only real access to these services but also differential access on the part of the displaced population. USAID/IDP programs have been instrumental in mitigating this impact, and its efforts are both amply recognized and appreciated by the beneficiary population.

Recommended Adjustments in Health

PADF and IOM contribute to integrated assistance for IDPs by orienting beneficiaries and linking them to local and departmental service entities. However, advances notwithstanding, the orientation and management of health service supply is limited with respect to the size of the target population, resulting in the failure to cover a sizable portion of this population.

Based on the findings of this assessment, it is recommended that USAID/IDP:

- Expand programs that have demonstrated success in the orientation of the displaced population, such as the production and dissemination of learning aids (e.g., routes to health developed by PAHO) in those areas prioritized by the future USAID/IDP program.
- Implement a process of intensive training for the employees of the EPSs and IPSs to ensure they have a clearer understanding that IDPs are eligible for national health insurance coverage. The most common reason given by public officials for denying service delivery to IDPs is that their health system cards have been issued in a different municipality from that where services are being sought.
- Continue to provide health services where provision by the GOC is weak or lacking and capacity is low. These services are critical for the stabilization of IDPs and include: reproductive and sexual health (Profamilia), orientation of IDPs and health assistance to dispersed populations (PAHO), and assistance to the handicapped displaced population (CHF and Mercy Corps).
- Integrate psycho-social assistance in a cross-cutting manner across all projects.

Recommended Adjustments in Education

It is noteworthy that USAID/IDP programs in general have meshed well with the public supply of educational services and provide value added through new education methodologies that are fully appreciated by beneficiaries. Projects of construction, equipping, and improvement of educational infrastructure in communities with a high percentage of IDPs also provide excellent incentives for receptor population involvement. In like manner, the agribusiness pedagogical models and the Open Doors Schools have demonstrated ample benefits for beneficiaries and have had significant impact on the psycho-social stabilization of students and beneficiary communities alike.

The following recommendations in education can be made:

- Give more emphasis to ensuring that educational facilities are available for both spontaneous and assisted returnees.
- Expand programs in the construction and furnishing of daycare centers, schools, and vocational training centers. These are effective vehicles for integrating IDPs and receptor populations, and encouraging close coordination with local and departmental government entities. Food for work on these projects should be included whenever possible.
- Support flexible education programs that can cater to mobile populations and with attention to overage children.
- Promote activities to slow the rate of school dropout by youth
- Use schools or add classrooms to give classes to youth and adults outside the formal educational system and/or give accelerated classes leading to a high school degree.
- Convert education processes into a fundamental axis of psycho-social stabilization of IDPs. Beyond attention to enrollments, USAID should place emphasis on the development and implementation of flexible educational models oriented toward the integration of communities (e.g., Open Doors Schools), adult education (e.g., Cafam Program), and agribusiness education for youth. Support to the expansion of the Batuta music project is also recommended, given its current small size but proven success and beneficiary enthusiasm.

- Ensure the provision of food supplements to IDP and other vulnerable students to level out the differences between their nutritional levels and those of non-vulnerable populations. To do this, it is important for USAID/IDP to link WFP food security assistance to all its educational programs. School lunch programs would appear to be the best means of achieving this objective.
- Provide support in transportation, school supplies, and uniforms for children of IDP families.

V. TOWARD A NEW IDP PROGRAM STRATEGY

A. Strategic Priorities of the Future IDP Program

The team believes that the future USAID IDP strategy should have four axes in order of priority: (1) a program that operates in the five CSDI zones focusing on assistance to IDP returnees in consolidated areas and on prevention of renewed displacement in small and intermediate urban areas of these zones; (2) a national program of assistance to IDPs currently located in intermediate and large urban receptor areas with high levels of IDP pressure on receiving populations; (3) a national public policy support program focused on key institutions; (4) a nationwide program to strengthen the response capacity of selected departmental and municipal governmental entities to IDP needs and rights.

1. **Field Programs within the CSDI Zones.** The program operating in the five CSDI zones should focus on assistance to IDP returnees in consolidated areas within these zones and, with greater attention than is now the case, to IDPs in primarily small and intermediate urban areas in these same zones. Assistance in the first instance would involve a package of interventions that consolidate the process of return to areas of origin, while in the second case it would seek to support the IDP population socio-economically to prevent renewed displacement and pave the way for local integration or return to rural areas. Current sectoral interventions will be pursued in a tightly-focused, integral manner in urban areas. Assistance to returnees in rural areas will include ensuring secure access to land and support in agribusiness endeavors. As discussed below in the section on Return, the USAID IDP Office will continue to face difficult decisions in determining when and under what conditions to implement assistance projects. Humanitarian considerations, i.e. the dire need of returnees and the local population, on the one hand, are necessarily balanced against judgments that prospects for sustainability appear unlikely.
2. **Field Programs outside the CSDI Zones.** This should be a national program of assistance to IDPs that are currently located in intermediate and large urban receptor areas characterized by high levels of IDP population pressure on receiving populations. The focus here will be to provide a package of integrated interventions focused on the transition of IDPs from emergency assistance toward socioeconomic stabilization, prevent further displacement, and promote integration with local populations. Programs will be strongly community-focused and will include some members of the receptor community alongside IDP and other vulnerable beneficiaries. The USAID implementing agencies will ensure an integrated approach. Current sectoral interventions should continue but need to be longer, more tightly integrated, and involving increased community participation in planning and implementation. Since the majority of IDPs presently reside in medium and especially larger cities, it is essential that USAID projects contribute to their eventual integration and stabilization in urban contexts. Many donors have projects in the largest cities; fewer are present in the medium and smaller urban centers. To the degree that USAID can work in coordination with other donors, an urban-based strategy for IDPs may emerge and could, at the same time, ease resource strains and security concerns for municipal authorities.
3. **Nationwide Public Policy Strengthening.** USAID has an opportunity to make a contribution to Colombian public policy nationally by providing technical support to entities that are key to IDP integration in the future.
 - Technical support to the Constitutional Court to enable it to assemble information relevant to its work and to disseminate public policy accurately to those responsible for implementing it.
 - Technical support to the GOC in the definition of criteria and procedures to determine the end of IDP status.

- Support for civil society actors engaged in monitoring the public policies related to IDPs, in particular those that have been appointed by the Constitutional Court for this purpose.
 - Development and implementation at the national and regional levels of a Unified Information System that optimizes IDP registration, description, and classification, evaluates IDP needs and monitors the aid provided, assists in preventing abuses in the system, and provides trustworthy information that can be called upon to ascertain when IDPs have achieved stabilization.
4. **Territorial and Local Governance Strengthening.** Strengthen the response capacity of departmental and municipal governments and place IDPs on the agenda of government entities at all levels, in all relevant sectors by:
- Supporting the formulation of Single Integral Plans (PIUs) and their articulation with Development Plans and Annual Operational Investment Plans.
 - Organizational strengthening and technical assistance and training of local-level public sector employees in the application of public policies and in the design and implementation of plans, programs, and projects directly through IDP programs or indirectly through other USAID programs that focus on municipal strengthening.

B. Programs Within and Outside CSDI/PNC Zones

IDP Program Focus: Transition

The extreme poverty and lack of economic opportunities faced by IDPs in Colombia, combined with the short-term nature of USAID assistance, means that assistance targeted to IDPs is not likely to result in final stabilization, defined as reestablishment of social and incomes levels equivalent to those before displacement. USAID should take responsibility for launching IDPs on the road to eventual social and economic stabilization. Realistically speaking, most USAID assistance activities are primarily palliative and can be deemed successful if they ensure basic subsistence and locational stability, while households develop the skills and strategies needed for long-term, sustainable livelihood strategies. This is why the assessment team recommends that USAID be clear that its activities lie in the transition phase between emergency assistance and final socioeconomic stabilization, a process likely to last considerably longer than the next phase of USAID assistance.

The evaluation team sees transition occurring more readily in communities where IDPs are concentrated and social service and economic options are more numerous. Just as relief can pave the way to subsistence, improved subsistence can be a transition to eventual socioeconomic stabilization that leaves poverty behind and fully integrates IDPs into Colombian society. This assessment proposes focusing on prevention of secondary displacement from small urban areas, return to areas of recent expulsion, and integration of long-term IDPs in communities where they choose to remain. It would be better for USAID IDP programs not to concentrate their resources in rural CSDI areas to prevent first time expulsion, except where this may politically and strategically outweigh the much higher unit costs involved. An important goal is to ensure viable economic projects, integrated services, and protection in small and intermediate urban contexts, so that further displacement is averted. To the extent that people do not have to move several times, they will more readily move through a period of transition toward final stabilization.

Project Length

Within umbrella projects that last up to five years, various sectoral sub-projects will be designed and implemented, as is now the case. Infrastructure projects, pilot programs, housing projects may produce desired results in a year or less. Their length is linked to a clear end point, usually the completion of construction. Income generation, health and education service provision, and any project that progresses or

evolves need longer periods of time during which outside support continues, gradually diminishing and changing in nature as the beneficiaries assume greater ownership. Sustainability of education and health services lie with public institutions, but income generation activities have few means to sustain themselves once the project ends. Institutional strengthening and income generation results are most difficult to sustain, requiring projects of at least 18-24 months. In institutional strengthening, retraining may need to occur periodically over the full length of USAID assistance. Retraining of key departmental and municipal staff is highly recommended following elections, since high rotation of employees occurs in most cases.

CSDI/PNC Zones

The Colombian National Consolidation Plan (PNC) is designed to improve security conditions, combat illicit cultivation, and promote governance and interagency actions under the leadership of the Center for the Coordination of Integrated Action (CCAI) in each PNC zone. A successful strategy would remove the major causes of forced displacement. The U.S. Embassy equivalent of the PNC is the Country Strategic Development Initiative, within which USAID will play a fundamental role.

The GOC consolidation strategy is focused on corridors that have been epicenters in the struggle between various armed groups and in the traffic of arms and narcotics. Because of the persistent violence in the areas now within the PNC/CSDI corridors, they have experienced major population expulsion. It is likely that there will be further conflict in these zones in the short term, not only because of Colombian military operations, but also due to struggles for control among various illegally armed groups (many of which are new bands emerging from the demobilization of paramilitary groups). At the same time, eradication practices within these consolidation zones will likely result in a short-term increase in population displacement for economic reasons.

Given the likelihood of renewed displacement, it is necessary to draw up a contingency plan that responds to this challenge and establishes measures aimed at mitigating or preventing new displacements. In zones identified as highly vulnerable, contingency plans should include sequenced actions specifically aimed at heading off possible displacements. The military strategy in these zones should be accompanied by an integrated assistance program that will have a favorable impact on the population of the region. Particularly with regard to crop eradication efforts, concrete geographic coordination mechanisms need to be established to avoid negative impacts on socio-economic development programs.

Common Operational Strategies in All Zones

In its future IDP strategy, USAID is urged to maintain its national focus as one axis of operation. While activities in consolidation areas will be limited to the five CSDI zones, outside of CSDI corridors USAID depending on resource availability should prioritize the places where high concentrations of IDP settlement are found, especially those intermediate-size cities with a strong need for institutional strengthening and high levels of IDPs relative to receptor populations (high pressure areas). It is fundamental that the principle of integrality of actions be maintained both in assisting displaced populations and in providing incentives so that people will be less likely to migrate.

In all zones, integrated field projects focused on departmental and municipal governments need to have a strong component of local institutional strengthening. This should be linked to an overall strengthening plan agreed with local authorities and renegotiated when authorities change following elections.

The contractual instrument for USAID/IDP programs has been the cooperative agreement. These agreements have worked well in terms of giving attention to victims, constructing flexible agreements with local partners, and averting possible negative responses to direct US assistance that may arise in zones where IDPs are still threatened by violence and threats. It is hoped that the new umbrella cooperative agreements or contracts awarded for operations in both CSDI corridors and in key municipalities outside these areas will be effective in contributing to a positive institutional and social environment in these zones and to processes of social and productive transition in the communities served. It is of greatest importance that USAID take whatever steps possible to modify present policy to ensure that longer term contracts with local implementing

partners can be put in place. Even well designed short-term income generation and institutional strengthening projects, more often than not, prove inadequate to achieve established objectives. Moreover, it is all but impossible to appreciate, much less measure, the impacts of such projects in such a short-term horizon.

To ensure effective coordination in those regions where USAID has IDP programs alongside a number of other major CSDI activities, solid monitoring is essential. For this purpose an information system that can integrate assistance and avoid duplication of benefits to target groups should be put in place. Efforts to increase inter-agency coordination among service providers will increase coherence and synergies in the overall programs.

International Comparisons and Precedents

In several respects Colombia's IDPs are in very similar situations to those experienced by a number of other countries that have faced protracted conflict and displacement: Afghanistan, Bosnia, Burundi, Cambodia, El Salvador, Georgia, Guatemala, Liberia, Nicaragua, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, and Sudan. The following holds true in all of them, and for Colombia as well:

1. It is often not the case, as commonly assumed, that either IDPs (or refugees) return to their places of origin. Some will not; many cannot. None of the governments in the countries named above have been adequately prepared for receiving people who return to their original homes in large numbers. Burundi and Liberia have newly created land commissions to resolve conflicts that are arising repeatedly between returnees and others. General lack of development in rural areas virtually precludes major return movements in Sierra Leone, Liberia and Sudan. In Sudan IDPs face strong pressure to return in order to vote in forthcoming elections, but have found dire economic conditions and increased violence. In El Salvador the returnees received significant international assistance, especially from private NGOs and European donors. Nevertheless, these were not always well planned for sustainability, and more returnee projects failed than succeeded. In Guatemala the hostility toward returnees was so strong and state protection so badly lacking that many had to flee again. When hundreds of thousands of refugees returned to villages in Afghanistan, they could not find viable livelihoods and largely opted for migration to cities or poppy cultivation. The choices for Colombian IDPs who contemplate return to places of origin still beset by conflict and illicit drugs are similar.
2. The incorporation of IDPs into urban life has become a major post-conflict problem. Every major city in a conflict and post conflict country is full of people who are not considered to belong there and who do not see themselves as part of the place they presently inhabit, e.g. Luanda, Monrovia, Guatemala City, and Kabul. Kabul has grown by 20% in the past 5 years, mostly because of refugee and IDP returns. Authorities associate the displaced with urban crime, civic unrest, and environmental threats.

Finding ways to assist IDPs without privileging them in relation to the stable poor is one challenge; the other challenge is dealing with the economic migration that inevitably follows the first wave of displacement as a result of violence. These twin challenges are central to USAID operations in Colombia. The incorporation of IDPs will need to be part of urban planning efforts encompassing the population as a whole. Yet, targeted IDP assistance in the short term is a prerequisite to viable urban planning. The difficulties experienced by municipal authorities in adapting to their needs and the vulnerabilities of the receiving population are daunting.

3. Donors have found it necessary to change the accepted wisdom that the best, and sufficient, solution for internally displaced persons is a return to the exact places from which they fled. Rethinking return policies is especially important for addressing alternatives for returnees from insecure and poor rural areas, whose lives have been transformed during displacement and who have no experience in farming. In Cambodia UNHCR reversed its policy of designating land and housing for

refugees returning after the peace accord and instead gave cash to the returnees so that they could make their own choices. This option was painful for many, but allowed the beneficiaries the mobility they needed to adjust to changing conditions.

IDPs from rural backgrounds typically desire that governments resettle them on designated land made available in or near their regions of origin. In Liberia IDPs sought support for turning the crowded and fetid places where they had been concentrated into livable communities with services provided and assistance in generating incomes. In a few cases, refugee returnees who cannot return and therefore become IDPs have been resettled on land set aside for them. In the case of Rwanda and Ethiopia, the resulting resettlements are highly controversial.

As in Colombia, governments have often settled people on available land lacking access to roads, markets, and water, and without adequate technical assistance. The results are predictable. USAID has supported rural projects in Colombia that accompany resettlement with long term support scheduled to diminish gradually but not cut off abruptly. Such projects are appropriate but expensive. Donors globally have tended to invest resources in a single promising solution, e.g. funding return movements. Resources should be allocated to a range of solutions where success is most promising. This appears to be the USAID/Colombia approach thus far, but the choices need to be regularly subjected to comparative cost-benefit analyses. The unit cost of appropriate accompaniment of returnees to rural areas is likely to be higher than that of integrating them where they are in urban areas.

4. Solutions for displaced and other uprooted populations into the national fabric should entail training them for different livelihoods than those they left behind. It is perhaps worth reviewing the projects in post-conflict Central America, Mozambique, Angola, West Africa, and elsewhere that have been put in place to retrain ex-combatants and adapt the methods to the needs of civilian IDPs. The training programs for ex-combatants have been much criticized over the years, but important lessons have been learned in the process. Reintegrating ex-combatants and the civilian displaced is a recognized part of peace building. Currently, aspects of “return and reintegration” are on the agendas of multiple organizational actors: international peace keepers, UNHCR, UNDP, IOM, UNHCHR, national defense ministries, planning ministries, judicial bodies, and financial offices. The corresponding tasks, however, seem to be a low priority for nearly all of them, because the core of their mandates is in other realms. Colombia has given considerably greater attention to civilian displacement than most other countries. The programs in the countries noted above generally fizzle out after flawed attempts to train and reintegrate former combatants.
5. While governments in all post-conflict countries encourage returning IDPs to their homes, they have in all cases underestimated the level of support and preparation needed to make returns attractive or durable. Over many years of conflict and displacement, people, landscapes, economies and power structures are vastly changed, so that the physical “home” of the past may no longer exist and the place of origin may be inhospitable to its previous residents. Returns have proved unsuccessful when national authorities have not prepared the ground and/or there is too little security oversight and international assistance. Too little civilian government presence and weak institutions in remote areas are also common problems. These are problems also to be addressed in the CCAI/CSDI zones in Colombia.
6. As is well documented in nearly all cases of return, women have been especially disadvantaged in recovering property and affirming rights. Women’s views on return movements and other options are by no means identical to those of men and need to be separately considered. In Colombia this is an issue that the presence of a high number of female-headed families clearly exacerbates.

In sum, there is little or no research on the successes of returns and attempted returns over the long term in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Burundi, Cambodia, Central America, Colombia, Iraq, Namibia, Sudan, West Africa, and elsewhere, since UNHCR and other agencies with an interest in outcomes cover only the return

experience itself and its immediate aftermath. Colombia's difficulties in creating durable returns are far from unique. However, the situation in Colombia is exacerbated by continuing conflict, effectively lacking in most other return situations. As with most countries, the Colombian experience varies considerably depending on region and ethnicity.

C. Strategies Aimed at Prevention of Displacement

General Considerations

Displacement occurs in different settings and much, if not most, of the population which today comprises the category of victims of displacement has been obliged to move more than once. The IDP population is largely of rural origin, but now is generally located in urban areas. The report considers prevention alternatives in five situations:

- The initial displacement from the place of origin.
- Displacement from a first place of refuge, usually a small city in the region.
- Displacement from and within medium and large cities.
- Displacement following failed attempts to return.
- Displacements in the present CSDI regions, which may be a first time or secondary displacement, or may occur after failed attempts to return.

The evaluation team visited municipalities where first time displacements had occurred (e.g. Tibu, Tumaco, Neiva) but primarily visited communities that had been receiving large numbers of newly displaced persons. In three instances the team visited return settlements (Bajo Grande, El Salado, and La Gabarra). In all the places visited, conflict had occurred, in some coca production or transit of coca had been (and still is) prominent, and violence has been high, albeit significantly reduced from previous levels. The team also visited large cities with important concentrations of IDPs (e.g. Soacha [a suburb of Bogota], Cali, Cartagena). The IDPs had usually reached these large cities after other destinations had been tried. While these cities are not subjected to serious armed conflict and are not coca producing areas, the IDPs nonetheless report high levels of violence, threats, forced recruitment and criminality. Thus, future strategies should include measures aimed at avoiding secondary and tertiary displacement.

Actions aimed at the prevention of displacement must take into account: (1) the effects of direct conflict (2) the dilemma posed by opposing armed factions demanding peasant collaboration and taking reprisals when the collaboration is not seen to be forthcoming, (3) the effects of forced land purchases or outright land seizure and property theft, and (4) economic conditions that make it all but impossible for displaced families to build livelihoods and survive.

Preventing First Time Displacements

Measures for prevention must begin with:

- An understanding of the factors that have given rise to displacement in a given setting.
- An appreciation of problems related to physical safety; legal insecurity of land; possible family affiliations with armed factions or drug-related entities; the illegal appropriation of family property or threats of appropriation; absence of rule of law; and narco-trafficking.
- Improved early warning mechanisms that provide valid information over time from reliable sources and directed to appropriate authorities. The authorities, in turn, must be able to judge whether, when, and what form of action is needed and be prepared to respond speedily.

- Improved documentation for both men and women, as well as for property; registration of births. Land titles and cadastres are particularly important.
- The presence of opportunities for livelihoods outside of drug-related activities, with special focus on youth and youth education/training.

Notwithstanding the above, it is clear that in the presence of armed conflict and when faced with threats by armed parties, families will leave. Likewise, families whose properties are seized forcibly will leave. In a democratic system, victims of violence and threats or land seizures must, at the very least, have the option of flight and the possibility of being received and assisted elsewhere. The right of victims to leave and obtain assistance is at the heart of rulings of the Constitutional Court.

Land titling is a valid and important tool for prevention, but seizures of property occur even where titles exist. The presence of titles is probably most useful when people return. Unfortunately, the purpose of land titles is defeated when the title holders prove to be those who seized or forced its sale, rather than the original owners. This is the case in the region of Montes de Maria.

USAID Activities in Places of First and Subsequent Places of Refuge

USAID programs operate by and large in receptor towns and larger cities. This is appropriate, but the option of assisting people before they reach the large cities is worthy of consideration. Those who are able to remain in their region of origin are more likely to return to their original homes than those who move on to large cities. USAID can and should provide technical assistance to local government entities, including police to foster citizen security efforts. Improving information technologies for early alerts is likely to have a positive impact on prevention efforts. The integrated packages of assistance funded by USAID in the transition period shortly after displacement seem to have a strong preventive impact. Nevertheless, the evaluation team recognizes that while USAID interventions in very small communities and rural areas may produce positive outcomes, such interventions are costly in terms of the number of people they are likely to serve. Moreover, smaller communities offer far fewer options for employment, making transition toward stabilization more difficult. The implied choice here, between actions on behalf of people who have little or no other options for assistance, as against a reinforced focus on more concentrated IDP populations is difficult, and should probably be made on a case by case basis.

Whatever the choices made, USAID assistance packages must be combined with mechanisms for protection and citizen security. It is the responsibility of the state to provide physical protection. Nevertheless, it is the opinion of the evaluation team that the integrated assistance packages described in this report may also serve protection purposes. The assistance offered in many cases is designed to bring people together and thereby serves to strengthen community ties. The evaluation team has recommended that assistance in receiving communities be extended to the generally vulnerable population-- without sacrificing the differential attention due to IDPs. This will reduce hostility and will make it easier for IDPs to become part of the local social fabric. Our observations and interviews with local officials in the places visited lead us to conclude that:

- A number of local officials now assume and accept the fact that a very large proportion of the IDPs in their jurisdictions will remain there and can be incorporated into the local and regional social fabric, resources permitting. These officials affirm that they have benefitted from their association and collaboration with USAID implementing partners.
- The local officials who manifest this commitment to integration should have stronger roles to play in decision making related to attention to IDPs, and USAID can facilitate this process through its programs and overall influence with Colombian government entities.
- Resources and training for officials at the territorial level are essential if they are to be able to fulfill their obligations as dictated by the Constitutional Court.

- Resources for secondary and tertiary road construction, which are municipal responsibilities, are most important for enabling peasants to grow and market legal crops instead of coca.

Prevention of Renewed Displacement after Return

The majority of IDPs interviewed by the evaluation team and those reported by other Colombian and international sources do not contemplate returning to original areas of expulsion in the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, the Colombian government has been encouraging and promoting return movements. Some of these have proved sustainable, but many have not. It would be instructive to see systematic comparative evaluations of what factors in Colombia have enabled success, where successes have occurred. Anecdotally, the factors leading to displacement following return seem to be nearly identical to those promoting displacement in the first place, including: personal insecurity, the inability to ensure land holding, lack of infrastructure, violence, crop fumigation, and general conditions not conducive to maintaining livelihoods. Additionally, the knowledge that there are alternative places where they can go must certainly add to the unwillingness of returnees to remain in economically untenable, insecure, and poorly served situations.

Prevention Related to the CSDI Regions

The manifest intention of CSDI is to make former conflict or coca zones safer for Colombian citizens and to support the Colombian government in its commitment to bringing good governance and state services to the people who live in the regions assisted by CCAIs. CCAI resources and attention have been directed at rural and semi-rural areas where coca cultivation and violence were prevalent. Ideally, CCAI actions eventually will reduce displacement by removing the threats of conflict and coca cultivation and/or transit. Likewise, these actions, combined with good governance and services, will make return movements viable and attractive. However, military actions in the short run may actually promote rather than reduce displacement, while at the same time making returns problematic.

As noted above, most displaced persons live in medium and large cities. The team visited some of these cities within the CCAI/CSDI zones (Cartagena, Cucuta, Florencia, Tibu, Tumaco) and interviewed representatives from another (Ibague). In these cities, local authorities noted that while they were experiencing an increased level of security thanks to the larger military presence in the surrounding rural region, they had seen few if any of the promised benefits on the governance side and had received hardly any resources. Authorities in Florencia in the Department of Putumayo complained that the CCAI resources were almost entirely being devoted to the more violent rural and semi-rural areas and were all but ignoring the needs of the urban dwellers. Several authorities pointed out that Florencia contained the proportionately largest number of displaced persons in the country.

The issue of protection within CSDI areas needs to be addressed more forcefully. Military directed programs have impacts on vulnerable groups that are not taken sufficiently into account. While it is understandable that military operatives seek information from civilians, the civilians suffer major reprisals when they are perceived as associated with military strategies. Informants in all locations reported this phenomenon and affirmed that several families known to them had left town due to the threat of reprisals against them. Some of those who left were beneficiaries of USAID housing and other projects.

In CSDI areas, military actions and crop fumigation are important causes of displacement. The strong focus on achieving security goals and coca elimination does not necessarily serve to protect citizens who, rightly or wrongly, are often assumed to be *cocaleros* or associated with armed groups. While such citizens may indeed be engaged in some way with coca or have materially contributed to members of an armed group, the assumption ignores the pressures on vulnerable citizens from armed and drug related actors. In other words, ironically, people are treated as potentially part of the problem until they are actually displaced, and only at that time may they be treated as victims.

International Lessons in Prevention Strategy

International Humanitarian Law

In Section II of the *Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement*, Principle 5 is devoted to Protection from Displacement. “All authorities and international actors shall respect and ensure respect for their obligations under international law, including human rights and humanitarian law, in all circumstances, so as to prevent and avoid conditions that might lead to displacement of persons.” While the international standards in this respect are fully codified in Colombia, they are not respected in practice in many parts of the country. In this regard the work of the Corte Constitucional has been important to the goal of preventing displacement at all stages, from the first displacement at the place of origin through subsequent displacements. In the section on Institutional Strengthening, the evaluation recommends technical support to the Court.

Violence and Coca

Coca cultivation and insurgency are the major causes of displacement. In Colombia, counter insurgency and coca eradication often augment population displacement in the early phases. If military strategies take into account the consequences of their actions on displacement, consequences would be reduced. The analysis provided in the “USAID Assessment of the Implementation of the U.S. Government Support for Plan Colombia’s Illicit Crop Reduction Components” of 2009 fully reviews the opportunities and obstacles that have emerged in efforts to eradicate illicit crops, while clearly spelling out the linkages tying illicit crops to armed violence and displacement. Thus, where coca is reduced in one place (e.g., Putumayo), it increases in another (e.g., Narino). Armed groups are drawn in, and the population suffers increasing levels of insecurity. Government forces demand cooperation from the population in identifying insurgents, but the insurgents take reprisals against those who do report them or are suspected of doing so. The IDPs interviewed for the evaluation cited this scenario more frequently than direct conflict for their displacement.

Displacement also results from coca eradication policies. The state authorities maintain a “zero tolerance” for coca cultivation, but the alternative livelihood projects take time and have produced mixed results. Nevertheless, USAID is deeply committed to supporting alternative livelihoods projects. The 2009 USAID assessment cited above affirms that when these projects are productive, civilians both manage to maintain their livelihoods and are more willing to take the risk of passing on information about insurgents. When the projects do not bring desired results, farmers resort to coca cultivation for all or part of their income and remain tied to narcotics traffickers and/or other illegal armed groups. Farmers then lose all right to benefits, are criminalized by authorities, and must emigrate for economic and legal reasons.

This evaluation reiterates the conclusions and recommendations of the previous USAID evaluation on Illicit Crop Reduction, which urges more nuanced approaches. In Colombia, as in Afghanistan and Iraq, people living under the control of armed factions are frequently obliged to give material assistance to armed groups and narcotics traffickers or face dire consequences. Criminalizing such people obliges them to flee. Obliging them to become informants has the same effect, because it exposes them to reprisals. In Afghanistan where defeating the insurgency and promoting development now are primary objectives, poppy cultivation is being accepted to a degree. The assumption is that otherwise the population will turn against the government for undermining its major source of livelihood. The example is not a recommendation for nor is it fully relevant for Colombia. Acquiescing to an economy based on coca in Colombia is not acceptable and defeating the insurgency does not depend on tolerating coca. However, the understanding that coca production represents a major source of livelihood for Colombian peasants and that finding legal alternatives takes considerable time and resources is relevant.

From the perspective of displacement prevention, it is clear that alternative livelihood strategies are essential to allowing people to remain where they are, whether or not they have already been displaced at one time or another in the past. Both the 2009 Assessment and this report criticize fumigation practices that also damage or destroy alternative crops. This assessment is a concerted effort to ascertain what kind of alternative

livelihood strategies are most likely to succeed and how they should be implemented. Hence the repeated insistence on integrated assistance packages throughout the report and the recommendation that integrated assistance also be tied to ensuring citizen security.

Human rights and rule of law are essential for the prevention of displacement. Generations of Colombians have lived in rural poverty and have not fled. The loss of security due to violence, and the loss of property due to illegal actions, combined with impunity for those committing these actions make life impossible. USAID's programs in the human rights arena and its institutional support for local justice are highly relevant as tools of displacement prevention. USAID has a strong record of support to judicial institutions and rule of law. IDPs are well aware of the advantages of referring to the judiciary for obtaining what they consider their rights in a more efficient and timely fashion. The Constitutional Court has strongly defended IDP rights. However local judicial officers (fiscales), rarely defend IDP rights. As part of USAID's prevention portfolio, judicial support (institutional strengthening) could be more closely tied to areas where IDPs are concentrated and training offered to judges and judicial officers. This is already taking place to some extent with UNHCR support.

Early Warning and International Support

Colombia is in a similar situation to numerous other countries where early warning mechanisms are being expanded and strengthened, but responses to early warning are not reliable. One of the projects supported by USAID and briefly elaborated in the Institutional Strengthening section, is characterized as a prevention project. It foresees preparing local officials for displacement by establishing and clarifying roles and responsibilities. The concept is good, although the particular project is poorly framed. Displacement can be diminished by collective community responses to early warning threats before these threats are carried out. That said, it is difficult to uphold rule of law in a community under threat, and communities are typically divided in their political and military loyalties.

It must be reiterated that some population displacement in the face of conflict and armed force is inevitable. For example, the indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities have declared their political neutrality and sought to prevent all armed parties from entering their areas. NGOs and international entities have tried to buttress efforts to resist displacement among these groups. Nevertheless, they are repeatedly displaced despite their collective efforts. In this case, the state has to strongly back the community and assume responsibility for its security. Weak and corrupt governance precludes this from happening. USAID's strategy for indigenous people and Afro-Colombians is strong and well formulated. Its implementation should greatly contribute to the prevention of displacement, but displacement continues to occur where land is contested. The more successful aspects of the USAID strategy are the efforts to maintain collective identities and restore livelihoods with programs for those already displaced but still in vulnerable situations.

Land Titling and Documentation

USAID already supports land titling projects, as do other donors. Land titling, however, is not sufficient to prevent land seizures, as any number of wealthy Colombians will attest. Nevertheless, a strong titling project is essential not only to reduce displacement due to land seizure, but also for the institutional modernization of the nation. The same is true of documentation. Services ranging from education and health services to political rights and proof of land ownership depend on having personal documentation. The project which USAID is currently supporting is well worth expanding. Although not directly related to displacement, the documentation project now underway potentially helps people affirm the ownership of their property and/or acquire new assets.

Livelihoods

The areas of Colombia that have seen the greatest violence, given way to the greatest degree to illicit crops and, consequently have produced greatest displacement, are those where governance is weak and livelihoods outside of subsistence agriculture are lacking. Colombia's development plans include agricultural vitalization.

USAID's support to agricultural revitalization will have a positive impact on preventing future displacement, if the poor are incorporated into the plans underway, and afforded a positive stake in the economic results.

Citizen Security and USAID Projects

USAID assistance packages must be combined with mechanisms for protection and citizen security. Secondary and tertiary displacements are all too frequent, and averting them is critical to eventual stabilization of the IDPs and to the success of assistance projects designed for them. The implementing agencies are insufficiently aware of the frequent threats facing their beneficiaries. This is understandable, but possibly avoidable. If there is sufficient trust built—and in some cases it exists—the IDPs themselves can provide “early warning” when they become aware of threats to neighbors or are victimized themselves, and actions could possibly be taken. Some of the young people working with Profamilia reported having become aware of such situations, when they surveyed for health needs. It appears there have been a few timely interventions that brought support to threatened families.

Global Lessons in the Prevention of Displacement

Globally, long term displacement occurs in the wake of violence and conflict. Establishing peace, through military action against armed insurgency and/or peace negotiations or successful conflict resolution remove the need for people to flee their homes. Reestablishing peace is absolutely essential to ending forced displacement, although it does not necessarily result in a restoration of the pre-conflict *status quo*.

In the international literature, prevention of displacement is seen as a process that includes:

- Addressing needs of groups being targeted for discriminatory treatment economically and politically. For example the weak but visible efforts to improve the lives of indigenous communities in the Andes following the rise and defeat of Sendero Luminoso;
- Investing in agriculture and other economic activity that generates employment, especially for youth.
- Strengthening rule of law, governance and accountability.
- Promoting actions targeted against discriminatory practices and ethnic violence and encouraging reconciliation. A negotiated cease fire in Sri Lanka during the 1990s briefly but significantly reduced displacement. However, just as large-scale returns were about to begin, conflict reignited.
- Creating systems of early warning, backed by systematic reliable information to alert authorities to probable violence.

One example where such practices have produced positive results is in the new state of Kosovo. In this instance, the initial conflict produced a mass exodus of the non-Serb population, who returned upon peace. Following the establishment of an autonomous government in Kosovo, however, the minority Serb population fled in large numbers to Serbia, justifiably fearing reprisals. Concerted efforts from the international community to ensure safety to the Serb minority and guarantee safety to Serb citizens and their property produced a favorable response from Kosovo authorities. Confidence building measures ensued, which stemmed the outflow. There is still a Serb population in Kosovo, albeit sharply reduced and still fearful.

Displacement prevention in Kosovo occurred in the post conflict period, during the consolidation of the Kosovo government, but where ethnic tension endured. There was a strong international presence that constituted a virtual government for several years. In Colombia, conditions are decidedly different in all these respects, especially those related to government and ethnicity. Displacement has been sharply reduced where conflict has ended, although other factors continue to provoke population flight, particularly forced sale or appropriation of land for coca or commercial crops. IDPs have successfully returned to areas no longer in conflict, thanks to a decline in insurgency and the dismantling of the formal paramilitary structures.

Displacement has all but ended and IDPs have been returning to areas where coca is neither produced nor transported and where commercial export crops do not vie with traditional agriculture.

D. USAID Involvement in Land Issues

Programs for the displaced population cannot ignore the issues related to land. Access to land is most important in rural productive projects and in the promotion of returns to original areas of displacement. Secure access to cultivable land, whether through ownership or rental and other contractual agreements, is crucial to the success of agricultural projects. However, it is the GOC that has an obligation to protect or restore land ownership of displaced households.

USAID should concentrate on three key activities: (1) support the GOC in the design and implementation of public policies; (2) develop specific support activities for national and local authorities in the CSDI zones; (3) design legal assistance programs for land and property loss victims.

Protection of real estate, access to land, and recovery of properties all require the development and effective implementation of legal instruments. The GOC in its Working Group on Land (Mesa de Trabajo de Tierras) has been engaged in an important process to identify the basic objectives of a solid land policy for the displaced population and to define specific activities under each objective. In its future program focused on public policies, USAID might reach agreements with the GOC to support some of these land policy activities.

Support can be offered both in the design and implementation of legislation and programs and in the consolidation of existing systems of information. The strengthening of existing systems of information is of particular importance in resolving the ownership status of properties and to protect abandoned lands. To clarify ownership status, USAID should support the Oficina de Registros de Instrumentos Públicos and the Instituto Geográfico Agustín Codazzi (IGAC). Protection of abandoned land, however, requires better information systems with online connections in all regions of the country. The best path to this objective is support for the consolidation of the Single Registry of Abandoned Lands (Registro Único de Predios Abandonados).

In the context of its support to local institutions in the CSDI zones, USAID can also contribute to the protection of land. USAID could provide logistical support to municipal authorities in these zones to update municipal cadastres; it could finance topographical surveys and maps; and could assist in defining the legal status of properties. Beyond this, USAID could contribute to land titling programs for informal properties in CSDI zones.

In conclusion, the design of legal assistance programs that would help dispossessed victims to recover their lands could be an important contribution by USAID to GOC efforts to resolve this thorny issue. Thus far in Colombia, some models of legal assistance for reparations have been successful, e.g. by the Norwegian Council for Refugees and USAID-MSD. These may be replicable with a few adjustments. USAID support could concentrate on institutions providing technical assistance, resources for developing instruments, and legal training. At the same time, massive diffusion programs about reparation processes could be initiated for the displaced population, public servants, and employees in the judicial branch. Finally, USAID programs could provide legal assistance to those victims with scant economic resources, low levels of education, or who are in a serious situation of vulnerability.

E. Strategies for USAID Engagement in IDP Returns

USAID participation in IDP return programs is a delicate issue. Returns take place, almost by definition, in fragile zones with a history of recent conflict and where security can often rapidly deteriorate. Beyond this, municipal governmental institutions are weak and in many cases have been captured by or are beholden to illegal armed groups. At best, they have only a limited capacity to assist their vulnerable populations. Finally, the returnee population poses a challenge to both municipal authorities and to the receiving population by

potentially disturbing the local social fabric and creating distrust between returnees and receptors. Such distrust has been a constant in return programs in other countries.

Given these cautions, it would be appropriate for USAID to limit the development of its return programs to CSDI zones. However, even in the CSDI zones, support to GOC sponsored return action should only be given after verifying that adequate conditions for return do exist, in order not to expose the returning population to security risks and to avoid confronting returnees with economic conditions that are likely to provoke a new exodus of the same families.

Supporting returns in which the physical security of the returning civilian population is protected implies that the initial causes of the original displacement no longer exist and civilian authorities are in charge of governance. In other words, an adequate police force is now in place and illegal armed groups are no longer present in the area. Except in Montes de Maria (Bolívar), these conditions were not present in the return communities visited by the evaluation team. In La Gabarra, for example, individuals related to armed groups maintained vigilance over returnee citizens. Moreover, infrastructure was fragile and did not appear to have been rationally planned. Adults typically left the community to seek employment. Yet, the USAID supported school in the community was providing a valid and important service, and was said to have given hope to the community that it would see better times. In such circumstances it is hard to argue against assistance, even if that assistance is not likely to result in sustained progress for some time to come.

At present and certainly in the future, there will continue to be collective and unsustainable returns in the TEP regions, particularly in the case of indigenous groups whose land is highly valued commercially. The assistance afforded them when they have returned—multiple times—has helped them to survive but not to resist the factors that cause their repeated displacement. On humanitarian grounds, the argument for continued assistance is strong. Their communities will not be sustainable, however, unless they are protected from the powerful forces threatening them or unless, as in the case of the indigenous community of La Dorada (Valle del Cauca), the entire community relocates to a safer area.

Evaluations of USAID engagement in return programs raise, again, the question of land, discussed in the previous section. Legal security in access to land is a fundamental condition for return to former agricultural lands. About two-thirds of displaced families were originally engaged in agriculture on their own, rented, or sharecropped land. In most cases, however, landowning families did not have title to the land that they or their forebears may simply have colonized by clearing bush. Whether or not titles can be found, cultivable land and dwellings are the principal assets to protect for returnees. Returning without secure access to land can provoke conflict with those persons now occupying the land or cause the returning families to seek other lands to rent through a variety of formal or even informal mechanisms.

Before engaging in a return process, it is absolutely necessary to verify whether the returning families can recover ownership or right to usufruct of previous lands or whether the GOC will be providing new or replacement land. If none of these options is possible, returning families need to be assured that sufficient rental land remains for all. A recurrent problem has been that families have legitimately sold their lands after fleeing, so that they may be forced to rent back from new owners once they have returned. This is a common situation in the Montes de Maria region.

Legal security also involves the guarantee by the GOC of property titles to lands it has recently granted and of formal rental contracts for the rental option. Once the population has returned to its place of origin (municipal district), it is extremely important that the GOC design programs to protect lands for both the returned and receptor populations. While protecting lands is not USAID's responsibility, USAID can support the GOC and municipalities to design and undertake land protective actions, as well as pressuring for their implementation.

Return programs will need to benefit from institutional strengthening programs for municipal governments in the CSDI zones. The provision of public goods, such as secondary and tertiary roads, educational

infrastructure, health posts, water supply and sewerage, and crop collection points, are fundamental to the returned population's ability to recover its productive capacity and live a dignified life.

Transition programs described in other sections of this report also are relevant to returned populations. USAID can play a crucial role in the design of integrated programs combining income generation, access to housing, food security, and psycho-social counseling. To this end, USAID transition program implementers should provide assistance to households in accessing health and education services, as well as accessing production credits from institutions such as the Banco Agrario and the Banca de las Oportunidades, among others. These programs should not be centered solely on the returned population. In order to restore the social fabric and mutual confidence in local communities, it is important to bring together returnees and the receiving population in joint programs. USAID transitional programs should apply to both population groups.

The preceding description of USAID efforts applies to returns led by the GOC. However, it is possible that as the CSDI regions are pacified and consolidated under governmental control there will be more numerous spontaneous returns without any type of planned assistance. The population that returns in such an autonomous manner is usually in a much more precarious state than those that return accompanied formally by the government (e.g. La Gabarra, Bajo Grande, and towns and villages in the TEP regions). USAID programs in support of returnees should be flexible enough to assist this unpredictable and more vulnerable population, as well as those accompanied back by governmental entities.

F. Program Complementarity USAID/GOC

There are two aspects to the concept of programmatic complementarity. First is whether the programs supported by USAID within a region or in a particular sector are complementary among themselves, as well as comprehensive and appropriately targeted. With sufficient clarity regarding programmatic goals, time frames and how projects should build on each other toward these goals, communities and service providers alike may be able to achieve sustainability of outcomes and avoid eternal assistance. USAID and its implementing partners have sought with some success to design complementary and integrated programs. There are to be sure major obstacles in the Colombian context to resolving displacement and its consequences that are beyond the ability of USAID to eliminate. However, this assessment has noted that complementarity and integration of actions have also been curtailed by the short-term nature of USAID projects, which makes it difficult to mesh complementary projects.

While complementarity of activities overseen by the IDP program is one issue, the concurrence of a number of USAID development activities within CSDI zones, many of them outside the direct purview of the IDP program, will mean that both the umbrella contractor in each zone and the various USAID offices will need to invest appropriate time in ensuring communication and harmony of efforts. Frequent meetings to discuss the progress of various complementary projects and their activities will be indispensable. A clear strategic framework for each CSDI zone and effective monitoring of progress toward various sectoral objectives can help to coordinate complementary activities. The key is having a clear vision of how various USAID activities should mesh through time. This in turn requires a great deal of effective communication within USAID/Colombia.

A final aspect of the concept of complementarity is the degree to which USAID actions complement and reinforce the priorities and actions of the Government of Colombia, at national and territorial levels and across all sectors. The USAID mission has remained closely associated with the larger goals of the GOC, and this relationship has yielded positive outcomes. On the question of complementing the government's multifaceted juridical, economic, and institutional approaches to assisting and protecting IDPs, the assessment team has advocated a continuation of the present overall USAID programs, which not only further the stated goals of government policies but fill many gaps where government service has been inadequate. However, looking toward the future, the team recommends greater emphasis on technical assistance to national and local institutions, with a stronger focus on strengthening local and departmental governance. As for complementary actions vis-à-vis the major issues affecting displacement and stabilization

of IDPs, (prevention, return movements, land issues) the assessment has addressed them as they apply inside and outside of the CCAI/CSDI zones. The team has emphasized that the USAID/IDP Office should continue to prioritize the well being of victims of displacement in its determinations concerning USAID participation in and support of government projects. The assessment has found that USAID integrated programs do serve a protection function, complementary to government efforts in the same direction.

G. Monitoring and Evaluation of Impacts

Problems in Impact Evaluation

The four major (IOM, PADF, PAHO, and Profamilia) and three minor (Mercy Corps, CHF, and WFP) programs carried out by USAID to implement its overall program to assist IDP populations and other vulnerable groups have not developed Performance Monitoring Plans (PMP). Moreover, the USAID/IDP Office is itself also lacking a strategic framework and PMP, within which implementing partner strategies and monitoring plans would logistically fit. On the other hand, the USAID Mission does have a new strategic framework, paving the way for programmatic definition. Development of these frameworks is not just an academic exercise; if done correctly, they are very useful in showing the logical linkages of various levels of results and objectives and how progress toward these may be measured. They can also assist in avoiding programmatic contradictions and promote complementarity, as previously discussed.

The following may be said of current USAID/IDP programs:

- Sectoral performance standards are lacking in current programs.
- Clear objectives and measurement of progress toward them are also currently lacking, and measurement of impact requires these.
- Measurement of impact also depends on establishing a baseline before undertaking programs. These should be kept focused on key changes sought through the programs.
- There are no strategic or monitoring plans by sector, region, or implementing partner regional office.
- Indicators of progress toward objectives have not been devised for programs or projects.

Recommended Adjustments

Each program or project in future should have a Performance Monitoring Plan (PMP) complete with objectives, outcomes, and benchmarks whose accomplishment can be measured by progress indicators to final outcomes. This should apply not only to umbrella projects in future in the CSDI zones but also to their subprojects and to national-level projects outside the CSDI zones. These monitoring plans should be kept simple and realistic and have a small set of indicators that can be measured and tracked without great effort or cost. Indicators in institutional strengthening will require particular care, but examples of these exist. Partner IDP programs and their PMPs should dovetail clearly with previously devised strategic plans.

Impact indicators developed should be USAID's own indicators, not taken directly from the Effective Enjoyment of Rights indicators adopted by the Constitutional Court. The possibility that Red Juntos indicators may be used or modified to establish minimum quality of life standards should be explored. Monitoring indicators should be developed for:

- Physical security
- Predefined level of desired income -- or percentage of income increase from the baseline
- Income needs to generate stabilization and sustainability
- Access to credits for investment and accumulation of assets

- Percentage of food destined to consumption and food security
- Access to education for children, youth, and adults
- Access to basic health services (including reproductive health)
- Access to legal assistance services
- Equal access to all quality of life standards by minorities and gender.

VI. MAJOR CONCLUSIONS

Overall

- Current IDP programming has successfully produced several hundred small project interventions over the last four years covering a wide variety of traditional sectors, ranging from food security, health, and education, through housing and institutional strengthening, to income generation. The scope has been countrywide, and implementing partners have been able to design, launch, and supervise these efforts through their regional offices.
- The current IDP strategy has been to intervene in both IDP receptor areas and in places where returns are occurring. This has meant program coverage of both urban centers and remote rural areas, resulting in dispersion of efforts and resources and in high operational costs for implementers. Program coverage and investment per component and household have been low compared to needs. Geographic focus has been too broad.
- The principle of integrality is a basic postulate of the USAID/IDP program. While entirely valid, in practice it has not been easy to implement in a systematic manner. This is because integrality relies heavily on programmatic linkages with other governmental and donor efforts that are not the same in different locations. Another problem is the difficulty USAID implementers face in coordinating and harmonizing efforts given different contracting periods in the various public institutions with which the USAID program seeks to interact.
- The administrative and budgetary structure of the USAID/IDP program has been sectoral, generating rigidities with respect to a proper implementation of integrality and preventing appropriate attention to unforeseen events that were not part of budgetary programming. There has also been inadequate coordination in some cases between distinct sectoral components within the same project.
- The contracting system used by USAID/IDP in its umbrella projects with IOM and PADF has resulted in overly short periods of project implementation (12 to 15 months generally) of which at least the first several months are lost during contractual negotiations and preparation. These project periods are generally too short to realize desired objectives, particularly in the case of sustainable income generation.

Income Generation

- USAID/IDP Office programs appear to alleviate the conditions of extreme poverty and vulnerability, but except in job placement they do not usually generate sustainable solutions to these conditions. Although most income generation projects do not result in economic stabilization, they do appear to have high impact on beneficiary empowerment.
- Vocational training and job insertion programs have had generally positive results. On the other hand, although entrepreneurial development programs seem successful in the short run, they do not result in significant changes in income.
- Two factors appear to improve success in job insertion programs: (1) training that fits beneficiary profiles and labor market needs, allow trainees to work during the training period, and is sufficiently long; (2) continued support during the process of job insertion. In entrepreneurial development programs, two factors also appear most important to success: (1) continuous technical support during the training and launch of the business; (2) provision of a subsistence subsidy for the full duration of the program.

- Program design does not take into account the multiple dimensions that determine a person's ability to generate income (1) a displaced person is part of a household with immediate survival needs and a variety of other household expenses; (2) given the low educational levels of displaced households, economic competition in urban markets is severe; (3) the presence of public infrastructure is essential to the success of income generation endeavors; (4) displaced persons have normally suffered a high level of loss of productive assets whose replacement normally far exceeds the assistance provided through USAID/IDP programs.
- An integral approach to household livelihood means covering immediate necessities and basic needs while the household concentrates on its economic project or projects. While the value of this approach is currently recognized, dispersion of IDP project activities means that such coordinated coverage is not often realized in practice.

Food Security

- Food assistance in the course of projects does not ensure adequate nutritional levels, though it has proved an essential benefit. The many questions and concerns related to the nutritional status of beneficiaries and the quality of their food consumption cannot be answered without a targeted assessment of that aspect of the projects.
- PADF and IOM report that their own monitoring of the agricultural projects designed to provide food for family consumption and improve community food stocks show success. The agricultural projects designed to provide food for family consumption and sale are promising, especially so in the TEP areas.

Housing

- The USAID/IDP housing programs are being successfully implemented. By September 30, 2009, the programs implemented through IOM and PADF cumulatively provided 3,873 households with housing out of a total target of 4,712 – 82.2%. At the same time, these partners also achieved an excellent level of leveraging of funds from outside entities, raising another US \$ 11,027,428 compared to the USAID contribution of US \$ 4,407,789 – a 263% increase. Although these are serious accomplishments, the level of unsatisfied demand is considerably higher. In 2006 a baseline study for the current IOM and PADF programs found that some 19,000 vulnerable and 55,000 IDP households needed some form of housing intervention.
- The greater part of housing investment is concentrated in urban programs (81%). However, the urban-rural distribution of projects (12 urban and 10 rural) reflects the USAID/IDP program intention of reaching remote rural regions, in particular with respect to population return, resulting in a number of projects in these areas with low population coverage. The realization of this type of project generates very positive psycho-social and organizational impacts for rural communities, but also involves relatively high transaction costs.
- IOM and PADF have managed to construct strategic alliances, gained leadership and recognition, secured cooperation and generated synergies, and established good coordination with other public and non-governmental agencies, both at the national and local levels. In general terms, IOM and PADF have generated positive impacts in the strengthening of public and private local institutions. However, good relations of cooperation and coordination with local public sector housing offices (department and municipality) have not been sufficient to improve local institutional response to high demand.
- The housing programs demonstrate a nice linkage with governmental policies. First, the provision of subsidies is carried out in complementary manner to the subsidies from the national and local levels

(departments, mayoralities). Second, USAID funds are also used to co-finance programs put together by local administrations. Third, the identification, prioritization, and selection of these projects take place in the National Infrastructure Committee (Mesa Nacional de Infraestructure), within which the various national governmental agencies involved work together with various USAID programs.

- There are real risks for the sustainability of these programs, because of the weak linkage between housing and income generation. In a number of housing projects, there are beneficiaries who have not yet been assisted in income generation, or they are involved in projects that generate minimal income and/or are only just taking-off. This means that sustainability is still uncertain. In these cases, there is a clear disconnect between the level reached in income generation and the level sought in housing (individual ownership of a house).

Institutional Strengthening

- USAID and its implementing partners have a mixed track record with regard to institutional strengthening and need to establish a clearer approach to improving institutional performance. Strengthening efforts have been applied to local authorities, local implementing organizations, and communities, but efforts are dispersed, lack strategic vision, and are not achieving significant results.
- Although institutional strengthening has been considered an important cross-cutting objective in all projects, it has not been given the attention, focus, or monitoring it deserves.

Health

- The health programs supported by USAID/IDP have functioned well and have provided specialized services to IDPs and vulnerable, isolated populations that the GOC has not been able to provide.
- USAID implementing partners in health have been successful in ensuring the basic health component of integral assistance to IDPs and other vulnerable groups through specialized service provision or orienting them into the subsidized health system.

Education

- The education programs engaged in by USAID/IDP through IOM and PADF have functioned well and are highly appreciated by beneficiaries, local authorities, and local community members.
- The Open Doors Schools is an innovative approach to involving community members in the education of their children through construction of classrooms, activities for adult education, community social events, and provision of a canteen for a supplementary lunch program.
- School structures and their education mission make school rehabilitation and equipping a very visible way to demonstrate governmental concern with local populations that may be feeling the pressures of overcrowding from IDP inflow. Schools will be a crucial part of attracting IDPs back to home areas or limiting further displacement.

New Strategy Development

- International experience demonstrates that prevention of displacement includes: (1) addressing the needs of groups being targeted for discriminatory treatment; (2) investment in agriculture and other economic pursuits that generate employment, especially for youth; (3) strengthening the rule of law, governance, and accountability; (4) promoting actions against discriminatory practices and ethnic violence and in favor of reconciliation; (5) creating systems of early warning based on reliable information.

- Lessons from international experience also indicate that: (1) IDPs often do not return to their places of origin; (2) incorporation of IDPs into urban areas is a major post-conflict problem; (3) return to areas of origin is not always the best solution for IDPs; solutions for reintegrating IDPs involve training them for new livelihoods; (4) return programs always underestimate the level of preparation and support necessary to success; (5) women are especially disadvantaged in recovering property and reaffirming rights; there is little or no international research on the long-term success of return activities.
- Measures for prevention of first time displacement must include: (1) analysis of local situational factors; (2) appreciation of problems related to physical safety, legal insecurity of land, family connections to illegal armed groups; threat of or actual appropriation of family property; absence of rule of law; and narcotics trafficking; (3) improved early warning mechanisms and the ability of local authorities to act on them; (4) improved personal documentation for men and women as well as of property; (5) existence of livelihood activities outside of drug-related activities, especially for youth.
- Prevention of secondary displacement depends on IDP access to an integrated package of assistance activities in places of first refuge in small towns and cities near original home areas. Integration and focus of these activities helps to strengthen community ties that include the newcomers. Assistance activities must be combined with mechanisms for protection and citizen security.
- While the GOC objective in PNC/CSDI zones is to remove the threats posed by conflict and coca cultivation, it is likely that military action and coca elimination will promote a short-term increase in population displacement.
- Respect for human rights and the rule of law are also essential to prevention of displacement. Loss of physical security and property, coupled with impunity of wrong doers, gradually pushes out the local population, even in the absence of large-scale violence. International humanitarian law is fully codified in Colombia but is not respected in practice in much of the country. The work of the Constitutional Court has been important in the prevention of displacement at all stages.
- International experience demonstrates that early warning mechanisms in the prevention of displacement are not reliable. While collective community responses to early threats are possible, lack of rule of law and divided loyalties typically render them ineffective. This has been the case in Colombia.
- Land titling can assist in preventing some displacement, but it is not sufficient to prevent land seizure or forced sale. It is probably more important in return actions. Possession of complete personal documentation is also important in holding a population in home areas.
- International experience indicates that restoration of peace is essential to preventing or rolling back forced displacement, although this does not always result in reestablishment of the pre-conflict socio-economic situation. In most areas, a durable peace has not yet been restored in Colombia.
- IDP return programs are a delicate issue, since returnees are often confronted with situations of dubious security, weakened municipal institutions, local officials beholden to illegal groups, and lack of political will and resources to deal with an influx of returnees. Returns are really only possible where violence has disappeared and rule of law has returned. This implies that civilian authorities are back in charge, supported by a viable local police force.
- A large number of spontaneous returns without GOC sponsorship or assistance are likely to occur, if peace is effectively restored in CSDI zones. Populations that return in this way are in a considerably more precarious state than those supervised by the government.

- Impacts and results of USAID IDP programs cannot yet be assessed other than anecdotally, because the IDP Office and its contractors are currently lacking strategic plans and clear objectives, as well as Performance Monitoring Plans to track performance toward intermediate and final outcomes. Sectoral performance standards are also lacking.

VII. MAJOR RECOMMENDATIONS

Overall

- The current IDP program attends the needs of both IDPs and other vulnerable populations, particularly when they are living in the same areas. It is also advisable to include some of the receptor population in community-level projects, generating spread effects in integrated community development that prevent the creation of IDP ghettos.
- IDP programming should seek ways to ease the rigid sectoral nature of projects in a way to make them more flexible, perhaps by introducing a type of “contingency fund” to deal with special situations or opportunities.

Income Generation

- A review of the specific experience of IOM and PADF in income generation over the past five years should be undertaken to identify which programs are most successful in generating significant income under what conditions and for how long. Results can be used to guide future programming in this sector.
- The next phase of IDP-related income generation programs and projects should be focused on households stable enough to undertake serious economic endeavors. These households should already be in the phase of transition to sustainable livelihoods. The objective should be assist these households to develop rational and profitable economic projects that take them to a stage where they not only meet basic needs but can save, reinvest, and even access micro-credit programs. Projects should last at least 18 to 24 months beyond start-up preparations.
- USAID income generation programs can increase their effectiveness, impact, and sustainability, if they are carried out in an integral manner with other key support interventions and by being concentrated in areas where the combination of interventions can achieve a critical mass of change that takes households into socio-economic stabilization from transition. Further focus on specific communities can assist this process of integrality.
- It is also important to focus now in many places on the second generation: youth (18 – 25) that have grown up in displacement and who are not likely ever to return to homes in rural areas they scarcely remember. Within this context, training and educational opportunities for working youth should be identified.
- The household should be taken as a whole unit in the analysis of its income generation potential. Its resources, income, and expenses should be examined at the baseline as a whole, an approach known as household livelihood security. The exact income objective in IG projects and its increase from the baseline will vary from place to place. It will also depend on family size and dependency ratio. What is important is that USAID programs set goals of raising household income by a certain percentage or specific amount and that this improvement should place households units as a whole in a stable economic situation.
- Access to land is fundamental for rural productive projects. All such projects should guarantee security of access to land, including land rental, restitution of properties following population return, or new land allocations. If projects are undertaken without security of access to land, they risk losing the investments realized during the initial productive process.

Food Security

- Success in the longer term for food production projects depends on land security and sufficient land for cultivation to accommodate a growing population. The agricultural projects have been in existence only a short time, and further monitoring would be useful.

Housing

- Formally adopt in USAID/IDP programming a linkage between housing and household income generation. A fundamental postulate of the IDP program is that housing is one component of a process of integral socio-economic stabilization. For this reason, the type of solution in housing must be consistent with the generation of income necessary to afford its upkeep. Housing and income needs need to be addressed in tandem, applying solutions in a progressive and interactive manner over a long enough period to reach socio-economic stabilization.
- In the domain of housing solutions, prioritize access to households that exhibit sufficient, sustainable income to afford associated costs. In urban housing activities, agree with local authorities a more flexible menu of lower-cost, alternative (but dignified), transitional solutions to IDP housing needs that can be offered to households as their income generation rises. Such transitional solutions can include rental subsidies, subsidized leasing of multi-family properties, transitional housing types in permanent locations, and prefabricated housing.
- Generate impacts in the institutional strengthening of local public housing institutions. Generate new initiatives of support to the institutional strengthening of housing/habitat entities servicing IDPs. The desired result would be to improve their capacity to develop specific policies and programs for IDPs consonant with effective income generation solutions.
- Adopt a differential focus in a planned and proactive manner. Adopt explicit criteria for prioritizing population groups according to their degree of vulnerability (ethnic minorities, female heads of household, high household dependency ratio, senior heads of household, and handicapped household heads). Work with national and local authorities to adopt these priorities in future housing and selection of beneficiaries. Where possible provide some variety in housing design suited to vulnerability (e.g., the handicapped). Develop some experimental architectural and construction material designs that can reduce costs without sacrificing safety, while increasing the living space and orientation of rooms to suit the cultural characteristics of end users.
- Promote housing/habitat programs that generate impacts for both the IDP and vulnerable receptor populations. A more holistic approach to community development that integrates IDPs and previous inhabitants will avoid creating IDP ghettos inside other neighborhoods.

Institutional Strengthening

- USAID should consider providing more technical training to its local implementing partners. It should be an objective in all projects.
- While not entering the political debate arising from the decisions of the Constitutional Court, USAID can and should support technical aspects of information gathering and dissemination.
- USAID should support the development and implementation at the national and regional levels of a Unified Information System that optimizes IDP registration, description, and classification, evaluates IDP needs and monitors the aid provided, assists in preventing abuses in the system, and provides trustworthy information on the end of IDP status.

- It is especially vital that more institutional support be afforded to authorities at the local and departmental levels, but equally important that there be careful vetting of aid recipients to maximize support for those who show commitment to means and places where benefits to IDPs will be greatest.
- USAID should focus on strengthening municipal planning and technical capacity, as well as the local UAO. Assistance in the development and adherence to a PIU should be provided, wherever communities have been selected by USAID for integrated projects.
- Municipal and departmental strengthening should focus on three areas: organizational structure; human capital; and information systems. When operating sectoral projects in various municipalities, USAID should link these projects not only to sectoral institutional strengthening, but also develop and agree upon an overall institutional strengthening plan for the local government. USAID should select its target municipalities from the 255 municipalities targeted by the GOC for priority institutional strengthening.
- USAID should provide consultants to develop the tasks necessary to put displacement on the governmental agenda and within strategic objectives, conduct training of regular staff, and provide the advisory and technical assistance necessary in the design, costing, budgeting, and monitoring of local initiatives for IDPs.
- USAID should carry out training of local administrative staff in: rights-based focus; differential focus; national-level public policy requirements; formulation, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of PIUs; design and implementation of feasible projects; and leadership, conflict management and resolution, and negotiation.
- USAID should provide support to information systems by assisting in formulating measurement tools and indicators for use in the development of PIUs; instruments to classify and characterize the displaced population within the local jurisdiction; procedures to match budgetary information against operational management information; and the adoption of management indicators to monitor the effective use of resources against benchmarks of success.

Health

- USAID should continue to provide health services where provision by the GOC is weak or lacking and capacity is low. This implies continued support to Profamilia and PAHO, as well as the possibility of scaling-up the CHF and Mercy Corps projects focused on the handicapped. PAHO will be moving its efforts in future into the Pacific coast region, where USAID is involved in supporting TEP projects. The partnership can continue there.
- While not likely ever to become financially sustainable, PAHO and Profamilia can provide specialized services that create models for reaching vulnerable populations that the GOC health system can eventually emulate. A program that links state health providers and Profamilia in areas where it operates can establish closer relations and promote mutual learning. PAHO, Profamilia, and other health NGOs can continue to reach niche health needs, but the way to reach sustainability in health coverage for IDPs, other poor populations, and remote ethnic groups will ultimately be through programs that improve the governmental system.
- Support training for employees of EPSs and IPSs to ensure they have a clear understanding of national health insurance coverage with respect to IDP populations characterized by high mobility.
- Psycho-social support and counseling have proven to be very valuable in projects and should be incorporated into all IDP-focused assistance projects.

Education

- Expand programs in the construction and furnishing of daycare centers, schools, and vocational training centers in close coordination with local and departmental educational entities. Food for work on these projects should be included whenever possible.
- Support flexible education programs and curricula that can cater to mobile populations with particular attention to overage children. Use schools to give classes to youth or adults that have dropped out of the formal educational system.
- Convert support to community schools into a fundamental axis of psycho-social stabilization of IDPs and other vulnerable populations. Pursue innovative programs that integrate communities around their schools, involving IDPs and members of the receptor community in school-centered social and extracurricular learning activities and events.
- Expand school lunch programs to more schools and subsidize transportation, school supplies, and uniforms for children of IDP and vulnerable receptor families.

New Strategy Development

- The future USAID IDP strategy should have four axes whose priorities are: (1) a program that operates in the five CSDI zones focusing on assistance to IDP returnees in consolidated areas and on prevention of renewed displacement in small and intermediates urban areas; (2) a nationwide program of assistance to IDPs currently located in intermediate and large urban receptor areas with high levels of IDP pressure on receiving populations; (3) a national public policy support program focused on key institutions of the central government; (4) a nationwide program to strengthen the response capacity of departmental and municipal governmental entities to IDP needs and rights.
- Future IDP field programs should be geographically focused on CSDI zones and key urban areas outside these zones, fully integrated, community focused, and monitored for impact. Projects should continue to be implemented under umbrella cooperative agreements in the same sectors as now. The focus of these projects should be on the transition phase between emergency/humanitarian assistance and eventual socio-economic stabilization and integration of the displaced population. Projects should move IDPs into a situation of substantially improved welfare, but final socio-economic stabilization and integration will be the responsibility of the GOC.
- The length of sectoral projects within IDP field programs needs to vary by sector, but should be extended considerably beyond current levels in income generation and institutional strengthening. On the other hand, infrastructure projects, pilot programs, and housing projects may produce desired results in a year or less. Institutional strengthening and income generation results are most difficult to sustain, requiring projects of at least 18-24 months. In institutional strengthening, retraining may need to occur periodically over the full length of USAID assistance.
- USAID should increase levels of technical support to entities that are key to IDP integration, including the Constitutional Court. In particular, it should strengthen the response capacity of public institutions in departmental and municipal governments and help place IDPs on the agenda of government entities at all levels, in all relevant sectors.
- An information system that can integrate assistance and avoid duplication of benefits to target groups will enhance the IDP operations of both USAID and government organizations. The strengthening of existing systems of information is of particular importance to resolve the ownership status of properties and to protect abandoned lands. USAID should examine options for upgrading information technologies at all levels.

- Integrated assistance packages targeted to IDPs are major tools for preventing first time and subsequent displacements. These must be combined with mechanisms for protection and citizen security. While it is the responsibility of the state to provide physical protection, integrated assistance packages also serve welfare protection purposes.
- Assistance in receptor communities should be extended to wider population within receiving communities -- without sacrificing the differential attention due to IDPs. This will reduce hostility and will make it easier for IDPs to become part of the local social fabric.
- USAID involvement in land issues should focus on three key activities: (1) support to the GOC in the design and implementation of public policies; (2) development of specific support activities for national and local authorities in the CSDI zones; and (3) design of legal assistance programs for land and property loss victims.
- Inside and outside of the CSDI zones, support for land titling and property protection is needed and should be expanded. Legal security in access to land is a fundamental condition for return to former agricultural lands, and equally fundamental to the success of income generation projects based on agriculture. USAID should support municipal updating of cadastres and topographical surveys, as well as determination of the legal status of properties.
- USAID support to formal and informal return movements by IDPs should be limited to the CSDI zones, or dispersal of efforts may occur. Integrated transition projects should reintegrate these returnees into local communities. Local institutional strengthening should be a central part of formal, large-scale returns, and verification of security conditions and land availability should precede return actions. USAID should assist municipalities in the provision of public infrastructure in return areas.
- To the extent possible, return to home areas by some indigenous and Afro-Colombian groups should be supported by USAID, even outside the CSDI corridors. It will be crucial to ensure the physical security of these populations in areas where land is of high commercial value.
- Many local officials now assume that a large proportion of IDPs in their jurisdictions will remain and must be successfully reintegrated there. Those officials that promote local IDP incorporation should be supported by USAID by receiving resources and training to help IDPs receive their full range of rights.

ANNEX A: KEY DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

1. Acción Social. 2009. “Protocolo para el Acompañamiento a los Procesos de Retorno de Población en Situación de Desplazamiento.” October 2009. Bogota.
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11. Econometría. 2008. “Evaluación del Impacto de los Programas en Vivienda Rural y Urbana para la Población en Situación de Desplazamiento.” Informe Final Definitivo. May 30, 2008. Bogota.
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14. Guevara, Ruben. n.d. “Desplazamiento, Derechos, y Organización.” Bogota.
15. Guevara, Ruben. n.d. “Las Políticas Públicas: Un Dilema para el Restablecimiento de los Derechos a la Población Desplazada en Florida, Valle del Cauca, Colombia.” Bogota.

16. Helo, Juliana et alia. n.d. “La Informalidad de los Mercados de Tierras en Colombia.” Universidad de los Andes. Bogota.
17. Ibáñez, Ana María and A. Moya. 2007. “La Población Desplazada en Colombia: Examen de sus Condiciones Socioeconómicas y Análisis de las Políticas Actuales.” Misión para el Diseño de una Estrategia para la Reducción de la Pobreza y la Desigualdad (MERPD). Departamento Nacional de Planeación. Bogota.
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32. Unidad Técnica Conjunta. 2009. “Propuesta de Marco General para el Análisis y la Formulación de la Política Publica de Retorno y Reubicación.” May 3, 2009. Bogota.
33. Unidad Técnica Conjunta. n.d. “Factores de Éxito en los Procesos de Retorno de la Población Desplazada: Evaluación y Recomendaciones.” Resumen Ejecutivo. Bogota.
34. Unidad Técnica Conjunta. 2009. “Parámetros y Áreas Críticas de la Política Publica de Atención al Desplazamiento en Colombia.” June 16, 2009. Bogota.
35. USAID. 2006. “Grant Award to the Asociación Pro-Bienestar de la Familia Colombiana (Profamilia).” November 21, 2006.
36. USAID. 2007. “Grant Award to the World Food Program.” January 19, 2007. Bogota.
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40. USAID. 2009. “USAID Assessment of the Implementation of the U.S. Government Support for Plan Colombia’s Illicit Crop Reduction Components.” Bogota, Colombia.

ANNEX B: ASSESSMENT TEAM SCHEDULE AND PERSONS INTERVIEWED

FIRST WEEK

Monday, January 11th, 2010	
BOGOTÁ	
REUNIÓN DE INTRODUCCIÓN DEL EQUIPO DE EVALUACIÓN Hotel Sofitel	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Philip Boyle • Patricia Fagen • Edgar Forero • Ana María Ibañez 	
Tuesday, January 12th, 2010	
BOGOTÁ	
10:00 am – 11:30	Debrief Lynn Vega
Wednesday, January 13th, 2010	
BOGOTÁ	
9:00 am – 10:30	USAID/HR Program With: Paula Cobo, Manager, USAID HR Program Manager MSI Team: Philip Boyle, Patricia Fagen Ana María Ibañez, Patricia Luna, Edgar Forero and Jaime Arteaga
11:30 am – 12:30pm	USAID/Afro-descendants Strategy With: Camila Gómez, AAD MSI Team: Philip Boyle, Patricia Fagen Ana María Ibañez, Patricia Luna, and Jaime Arteaga
2:00 pm – 4:00pm	PADF With: Henry Alderfer (Director), Bill Greenwood (Deputy Director) y Gloria Nelly Acosta (Directora IDP) MSI Team: Philip Boyle, Patricia Fagen Ana María Ibañez, Patricia Luna, and Jaime Arteaga USAID: Thea Villate
Thursday, January 14th, 2010	
BOGOTÁ	
10:00 am – 12:00pm	USAID/CSDI Briefing With: Nadereh Lee (Acting DMD) y Margaret Enis (AAD Office Director) MSI Team: Philip Boyle, Ana María Ibañez, Edgar Forero and Jaime Arteaga
11:30 am – 12:30pm	USAID/Afro-descendants Strategy With: Camila Gómez, AAD MSI Team: Philip Boyle, Patricia Fagen Ana María Ibañez, Patricia Luna, and Jaime Arteaga

2:00 am – 4:00pm	OIM With: Jose Angel Oropeza (Jefe de Misión), Fernando Calado (Sub-jefe de Misión), Martín Martorell (Director IDP) and Martha Yolanda Jómez (Subdirectora IDP) MSI Team: Philip Boyle, Patricia Fagen Ana María Ibañez, Patricia Luna, Jaime Arteaga USAID: Angela Suárez
2:00 am – 4:00pm	Logistics With: Lina Tole MSI Team: Philip Boyle, Patricia Fagen Ana María Ibañez, Patricia Luna, Jaime Arteaga
Friday, January 15th, 2010	
BOGOTÁ	
7:30 am – 9:30	PAHO With: Jorge Castilla Echenique, (Director Programa de Emergencias y Salud para Desplazados), Piedad Sanchez (Coordinadora Oficinas de Terreno) MSI Team: Philip Boyle, Patricia Fagen, Edgar Forero, Jaime Arteaga
9:30 am – 10:30pm	WFP With: Inka Imanen MSI Team: Philip Boyle, Patricia Fagen, Edgar Forero
1:00 pm – 3:00pm	USAID/Mission Director With: Ken Yamashita (Mission Director) MSI Team: Philip Boyle, Patricia Fagen Ana María Ibañez, Patricia Luna, Edgar Forero
1:00 am – 3:00pm	Profamilia and MSI (Cimientos) With: Andrés Quintero y Patricia Ospina (Profamilia) y Mauricio Casasfranco (MSI) MSI Team: Jaime Arteaga
Saturday, January 16th, 2010	
BOGOTÁ	
10:30 am – 2:00	PLANNING SESSION MSI Team: Philip Boyle, Patricia Fagen, Edgar Forero, Jaime Arteaga USAID: Lynn Vega, Thea Villate, Angela Suárez

SECOND WEEK

Monday, January 18th, 2010

BOGOTÁ

10:00 am – 11:30	<p>Acción Social Calle 7 # 6-54, SALA DE COOPERACIÓN INTERNACIONAL With: Juan Pablo Franco, Subdirector de Desplazados,(Cel 321-234-7159), Tatiana Zúñiga (Tel: 5960800/ext. 7327) MSI Team: Philip Boyle, Patricia Fagen, Ana María Ibañez, Patricia Luna, Jaime Arteaga</p>
11:30 am – 12:30pm	<p>Centro de Coordinación para la Acción Integral With: Pablo Ariel Gómez, Coordinador CCAI (3175021534) Calle 7 # 6-54 MSI Team: Philip Boyle, Patricia Fagen, Ana María Ibañez, Patricia Luna</p>
12:00pm – 1:00 pm	<p>Mercy Corps With: Diana Roa Calle 107 # 8 A 23 tel 215 0200. MSI Team: Jaime Arteaga, Edgar Forero</p>
4:00 pm – 5:00 pm	<p>CHF Calle 72 # 5-83 tel 313 85 00. With: John Forman, Director Nacional, Neyla Rubio, Subdirectora de Programas, y Diana Guzman, Coordinadora de Desarrollo MSI Team: Jaime Arteaga, Edgar Forero, Philip Boyle, Patricia Fagen USAID: Thea Villate</p>

Tuesday, January 19th, 2010

BOGOTÁ

10:00 am – 12:00 pm	<p>Corte Constitucional Calle 12#7-65 Piso 7. (Palacio de Justicia) With: Clara Helena Reales (Magistrada Auxiliar) MSI Team: Philip Boyle, Ana María Ibañez, Patricia Luna USAID: Angela Suárez</p>
3:00 pm – 4:00 pm	<p>State Department/PRM U.S. Embassy Con: Scott Higgins MSI Team: Philip Boyle, Ana María Ibañez, Patricia Luna USAID: Lynn Vega</p>

CÚCUTA

MSI Team: Patricia Fagen, Jaime Arteaga, Edgar Forero

8:30 am	<p>Airport. Departure at 9:10am, Avianca AV8456.</p>
10:22 am	<p>Arrival to Cúcuta</p>
11:30 am – 2:00 pm	<p>Mayor's Office, Cúcuta With: Maria Eugenia Riascos, Mayor <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Pilar Ramírez, Manager, Banco del Progreso • Héctor Leyva, IOM, Regional Coordinator </p>

3:00pm - 4:00 pm	Institución Educativa el Rodeo (IOM/Proempresas) With: Mónica Fonseca, Executive Director, Proempresas
4:30pm – 5:30 pm	UAO/Cúcuta With: Pedro Velandia, Coordinator UAO <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fabiola García Herrero, Acción Social • Paola Cuellar, Acción Social
6:30pm – 8:00 pm	Proempresas With: Mónica Fonseca, Executive Director, Proempresas <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ixi Solenny Rico Pabón, Program Coordinator, Proempresas

Wednesday, January 20th, 2010

BOGOTÁ

12:00 pm	Document and Partner Contract Review in USAID/IDP Office MSI Team: Philip Boyle
6:00 pm	Airport. Departure to Cartagena – Philip Boyle

CÚCUTA-TIBÚ

MSI Team: Patricia Fagen, Jaime Arteaga, Edgar Forero

8:00 am – 10:00 am	Governor's Office, Norte de Santander With: Maria Margarita Silva de Uribe, Secretary of Government
10:30 am – 1:30 pm	Travel to Tibu
3:00 pm – 4:30 pm	Mayor's Office, Tibu With: José del Carmen García, Mayor of Tibú
6:30 pm – 8:30 pm	Diócesis of Tibu With: Monseñor Camilo Castrillón, Bishop of Tibú <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mónica Fonseca, Executive Director, Proempresas

Thursday, January 21st, 2010

CARTAGENA

MSI Team: Ana María Ibañez, Patricia Luna, Philip Boyle

6:40 am	Departure to Cartagena – Ana María Ibañez and Patricia Luna
9:30 am – 12:30 am	Centro de Coordinacion para la Accion Integral With: Cesar Gavalo, CCAI (Prevencion, Emergencias, Retornos) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mabeth Gamarra, CCAI (Prevencion, Emergencias, Retornos) UAO de Bolivar (Accion Social) With: Maricela Rios, Profesional de Atencion Primaria, Accion Social <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Jhon Jaramillo, Profesional de Atencion Primaria, Accion Social Secretaria General de la Alcaldía de Cartagena With: Guillermo Pattigno, Coordinador <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Damaris Villareal, Coordinadora de la UAO (Alcaldia)
2:00 pm – 3:00 pm	Actuar por Bolivar Rosario Doria, Directora de Actuar por Bolivar Directora de Programas
3:30 p.m. - 5:00 p.m.	Centro de Desarrollo Productivo Comunitario, Barrio Nelson Mandela, Cartagena

With: Gilberto Castro, Director
Maricel Figueroa, Asesora de la Fundacion Mario Santo Domingo

LA GABARRA

MSI Team: Edgar Forero, Jaime Arteaga

6:00 am – 9:00 am	Departure to La Gabarra
9:10 am – 10:am	Pastoral Social With: Padre Alirio
10:00 am	Airport. Edgar Forero (Departs at 8:35pm AV9459)
10:30 am – 12:00 pm	Meeting with representatives from the community With: Professors, students and local leaders
12:00pm - 3:00 pm	La Gabarra-Tibú
3:00 pm – 5:30 pm	Tibú – Cúcuta

Friday, January 22st, 2010

SAN JACINTO & CARMEN DE BOLÍVAR

MSI Team: Ana María Ibañez, Patricia Luna and Philip Boyle

6:00 am	Departure to San Jacinto
9:00 am – 12:00 pm	Asociación de Desplazados de Bajo Grande With: William Sierra, Presidente de la Asociación (y otros 12 miembros mas) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Freddy Olivera, Director de la Unidad Municipal de Asistencia Tecnica Agropecuaria y Ambiental • UMATAA, Municipio de San Jacinto • Amaranto Zabaleta, Coordinador para Montes de Maria de FUPAD • Rosaura Ortega, Trabajadora Social de FUPAD
2:00 pm – 5:00 pm	El Salado With: Elsy Miranda, Secretaria de Planeación e Infraestructura, Municipio de Carmen de Bolívar <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Norelbis Guete, Asesora Fundación Montes de María • Nelly Posada, Arquitecta y Constructora del Colegio de El Salado • Leonel Mena, Docente del Colegio • Eneida Narváez, Líder Comunitaria de El Salado
5:00 pm – 9:00 pm	Return from El Salado to Cartagena

CÚCUTA

MSI Team: Patricia Fagen y Jaime Arteaga

8:00 am – 10:00 am	Instituto Departamental de Salud (PAHO) With: Maria Victoria Giraldo, IDS. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Piedad Sánchez, Paho • Carolina Carrero, Paho
10:30 am – 11:30 am	Casa del Migrante (IOM)
11:30 am – 2:00 pm	Norte de Santander's Secretary of Government With: Maria Margarita Silva, Secretary of Government
2:30 pm – 3:00pm	Urbanización Minuto de Dios, (IOM)

	With: Beneficiary
3:00 pm – 5:00 pm	Profamilia Cúcuta With: Laura Rodríguez, Local Director <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Patricia Ospina • Beneficiaries
7:10 pm	Departure to Bogotá
Saturday, January 23st, 2010	
CARTAGENA	
MSI Team: Ana María Ibañez, Patricia Luna and Philip Boyle	
8:00 am – 9:30 am	En casa particular With: Maria Claudia Paiz, Ex-Secretaria de Planeacion, Gobernación de Bolivar <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Hector Olier, Director de la Unidad de Desarrollo Territorial, Gobernación de Bolivar
9:30am – 11:30am	Fundación Granitos de Paz (Barrio Olaya, Cartagena) With: Elwin Cabarcas, Coordinador de Proyectos <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Melissa Velez, Apoyo psicosocial • Gicela Perez, Coordinadora del Proyecto FUPAD • Lilibet Lamadrid, Coordinadora de Trabajo Social • Beneficiaries
12:15 pm	Departure to Bogotá

THIRD WEEK

Monday, January 25, 2010

BOGOTÁ

7:30 am – 9:30	Breakfast with other Donors Hotel Sofitel (Carrera 14 con Calle 85) Confirmed guests: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ACNUR: Michele Poletto • OCHA: Maria Jose Torres Macho • CIDA-Embajada De Canada. Maria Paula Martinez • CONSEJO NORUEGO DE REFUGIADOS. Alberto Lara, Gerente del Programa de Acceso a la Justicia • JICA. Representante residente alterno Naofumi Takase y Mitsuoka Maki experta en formulación de proyectos • CODHES: Marco Romero
10:30 am – 11:30am	OTI (Office of Transition Initiatives, USAID) With: Miguel Reabold MSI Team: Philip Boyle, Patricia Fagen, Edgar Ana María Ibañez, and Patricia Luna
11:30 am – 1:30 pm	Mid-term Debrief to USAID With: Lynn Vega

CALI

MSI Team: Philip Boyle, Patricia Fagen, Edgar Forero and Jaime Arteaga
Hotel: Hotel Dann Cali
Avenida Colombia # 1-40

11:00 am	Airport – Departure to Cali (AV 8421 departs at 3:00pm)
4:20 pm – 6:30 pm	Colectivo de Mujeres del Valle del Cauca. (IOM) With: : Beneficiaries

Tuesday, January 26, 2010

CALI

MSI Team: Philip Boyle, Patricia Fagen, Edgar Forero and Jaime Arteaga

8:00 am – 9:30 am	Project Atención integral en fortalecimiento de vida independiente como preparación para generación de ingresos de personas con discapacidad en situación de desplazamiento. Cali-Aguablanca With: Gobernación del Valle, Secretaria de desarrollo social Beneficiaries
10:00 am – 12:00 pm	Event: Proyecto integral de complementación del subsidio para la compra de vivienda nueva o usada With: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Governor of Valle • Mayor of Cali • Departmental Inspector's Office • Departmental Ombudsman's Office • Acción Social • Cali's Ombudsman's Office

EL DOVIO

MSI Team: Philip Boyle, Patricia Fagen, Edgar Forero y Jaime Arteaga

Hotel: Hotel La Hoja

2:00 pm-5:30pm	Departure to el Dovio
5:30 pm-8:00pm	Round Table – Project Cañon de Garrapatas With: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Claudia Cano, Coordinator of IOM • Wilson Castillo, Secretary of Government of El Dovio • Emilse Panciv, AIC • Albeiro Guasira, Indigenous Governor • Wilmar Alexander S, Indigenous Teacher • Idaly Bews Alzate, Hospital Santa Lucía • Lina Maria Reyez, Municipal Ombudsman

Wednesday, January 27, 2010**EL DOVIO**

6:00 am – 10:00 am	Departure to the Reserve
9:00 am – 12:40pm	Meeting with beneficiaries and visit to the reserve
12:40 pm – 5:30 pm	Return to Cali

Thursday, January 28, 2010**TUMACO**

MSI Team: Philip Boyle, Patricia Fagen, and Jaime Arteaga

Hotel Barranquilla, El Morro

6:40 am	Airport - Departure to Tumaco (AV9419, departing at 7:38am)
9:30 am – 11:30pm	Laurel Foundation. Project: “Seguridad alimentaria, proyectos productivos y desarrollo comunitario para familias desplazadas y vulnerables, asentadas en la Urbanización Cristo Rey, vereda Inguapí del Guayabo – Tumaco (Nariño).
11:30 – 12:30pm	JAC – Asociación Cristo Rey. Project: “Mejoramiento de la calidad de vida de la población desplazada y vulnerable a través de la construcción e vivienda rural en sitio propio”
2:30 pm – 4:15 pm	Exporcol – Estrategia Escuela de Puertas abiertas EPA. Project: “ampliación de cobertura, mejoramiento educativo en zonas de frontera mediante la construcción, mejoramiento y dotación de infraestructura” With: EXPORCOL
4:30 pm – 6:30 pm	Mayor’s Office With: Mayor, Neptalí Correa Díaz Secretary of Government: Amanda Castillo Representative of the Governor’s Office: Jairo Cortés.

BOGOTÁ

9:00 am – 11:00pm	FUPAD – To learn about housing programs. With: MSI Team: Edgar Forero
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Friday, January 29, 2010**TUMACO**

MSI Team: Philip Boyle, Patricia Fagen, and Jaime Arteaga

8:30 – 10:30	UAO – ACCIÓN SOCIAL With: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Román Mora, Acción Social • Claudia Gil, Coordinator UAO
10:45 – 12:45	ICBF With: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Oscar Quiñones, Coordinador • Mónica Tarapues, Nutrition Expert
2:00 pm – 4:00 pm	IRD With: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Héctor Sepúlveda, Director Proyectos • Ana María Quirós, Coordinadora Apoyo Psicosocial • Ibeth López, Oficial de Programa
3:00 pm – 4:00 pm	Profamilia
4:30 pm 5:30 pm	PAHO With: Dr. Harold Mauricio Casas

SOACHA

MSI Team: Ana María Ibañez and Patricia Luna

BOGOTÁ

8:00 am – 1:00pm	Comisión Nacional de Seguimiento – Event on land, housing, income generation and National Fund for IDPs. With: MSI Team: Edgar Forero
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Saturday, January 30, 2010**TUMACO-BOGOTA**

8:10	Airport (Tumaco – Cali 9:10 am, AV9420) (Cali Bogotá, 11:15 am AV 9210)
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FOURTH WEEK

Monday, February 1st, 2010

NEIVA

MSI Team: Philip Boyle and Edgar Forero

USAID: Thea Villate

Hotel: Hotel Chicala

5:15 am	Airport . Departs at 6:05 – Arrives at 7:11 (AV 9285)
8:00 am	COVOLHUILA. Calle 2 No. 15 – 99 Barrio Ventilador. FUPAD/Project: “PLAN DE MEJORAMIENTO Y CONSTRUCCIÓN DE AULAS Y BATERIAS SANITARIAS EN LA INSTITUCION EDUCATIVA EUGENIO FERRO FALLA DEL MUNICIPIO DE CAMPOALEGRE – HUILA. Componentes: Educación y Salud. With: Beneficiaries
9:00 am	COVOLHUILA FUPAD/Project: “Actividades complementarias en centros orquestales BATUTA en 12 municipios de Colombia”. Componente: Educación. With: Beneficiaries
10:00 am	COVOLHUILA FUPAD/Project: “Proyecto Iniciativa Artesanal para el Tolima y el Huila IATH”. Componente: Generación de Ingresos
12:30 pm	Lunch
2:00 pm	WFP – FUPAD FUPAD/Project: “Fortalecimiento de las asociaciones de la población desplazada, que permita la participación activa en las mesas municipales, departamentales y que conlleven a la construcción e implementación del PIU para el departamento del Tolima”. Componente: Fortalecimiento Institucional With: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Governor of Tolima ‘s Office • ACNUR • Acción Social • FUPAD
4:00 pm	Pastoral Social – WFP FUPAD/Project: “Generación de ingresos mediante vinculación laboral y fortalecimiento/emprendimiento de unidades productivas, para 225 familias en situación de desplazamiento en la ciudad de Ibagué” With: Pastoral Social.

FLORENCIA

MSI Team: Patricia Fagen and Jaime Arteaga

USAID: Angela Suarez

Hotel: Hotel Caquetá Real

Calle 18 No. 9 – 49 Centro

7:30 am	Airport . Departs at 8:30 – Arrives at 9:43 (Aires 8090)
10:00 am	OIM With: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Alexis Sevillano – Coordinadora OIM Caquetá

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lina Perdomo – Monitora Regional OIM
12:00 pm	Lunch
2:00 pm	Florencia's Mayor With: Gloria Patricia Farfán, Mayor of Florencia
4:00 pm	Caqueta's Governor With: : Olga Lucia Vega, Acting Governor of Caquetá

Tuesday, February 2nd, 2010

NEIVA

MSI Team: Philip Boyle, and Edgar Forero

USAID: Thea Villate

Hotel: Hotel Chicala

8:00 am – 9:30 am	Public Health Local Authorities With: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Álvaro Hernán Prada – Departament's Secretary of Government • José Eugenio Carrera Quintana –Huila's Departmental Secretary • Sandra Milena López – Municipal Health Secretary. • Putumayo's Departmental Secretary of Health • Secretary of health of Mocoa • Mayor of la Plata • Secretary of Health of La Plata
9:30 am – 12:00 pm	Neiva's Mayor Office With: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sara Peralta de Ramírez –Gestora Social • Martha Eugenia Ortiz – Secretaria de Desarrollo Socia • Cantalicio Cárdenas –Secretario Gobierno Municipal • Teresa Penagos –Coordinadora UAO
2:30 pm	Municipality of Baraya ASOFUNGICOL Project: Fortalecimiento del proceso productivo y comercialización de hongos tropicales comestibles en los Municipios de Neiva, Palermo, Baraya, Rivera, Gigante, Campoalegre y Pitalito en el Departamento del Huila. Componente: Generación de Ingresos With: Luis Enrique Cardozo –Baraya's Mayor Adriana Alarcón Rodríguez –Municipal Ombudsman Beneficiaries
4:30	Tolima's Peace Commission With: Jairo Cardona

FLORENCIA

MSI Team: Patricia Fagen y Jaime Arteaga

USAID: Angela Suarez

Hotel: Hotel Caquetá Real

Calle 18 No. 9 – 49 Centro

8:00 am	Acción Social, Caquetá
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	With: Coordinator of Acción Social
9:30 am	Round Table With: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Pastoral Social • Comfaca
12:00 pm	Lunch
2:00 pm	Project: “Construcción de 200 soluciones de viviendas nuevas y atención psicosocial para familias desplazadas mediante la aplicación del subsidio de vivienda de interés social urbano”. With: Authorities and beneficiaries
4:30pm	Airport. Departs at 17:03 – arrives at 18:17 (Aires 8093)

Wednesday, February 3, 2010

NEIVA

MSI Team: Philip Boyle, y Edgar Forero

USAID: Thea Villate

Hotel: Hotel Chicala

8:00 am – 9:00 am	PROHUILA Project: Housing Project San Luis de la Paz With: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sandra Patricia Galindo – Secretary of Housing of Neiva • Luis Fernando Castrillón – FONVIHUILA • Beneficiaries
9:30am	Acción Social With: Milena Oliveros Crespo– Territorial Director for Huila
10:30 pm	Neiva’s Ombudsman Office With: Lina Maria Guarnizo Tovar – Personera de Neiva
12:00 pm	Lunch
2:00 pm	Fundación Alto Magdalena With:
4:00 pm	Meeting with No-Benefited IDPs
7:00 pm	Airport Departs at 20:30 arrives at 21:30 (AV9288)

BOGOTÁ

10:00 am – 11:30pm	National Planning Department – Red Juntos With: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Luz Stella Rodriguez, Head of Social Investment
2:30	Planes de Contingencia, Acción Social. Diana Barbosa
3:00	CODHES With: Marco Romero
3:30 pm	Ministry of Interior and Justice – PIUS With: Andrés Camelo
4:00 pm	Registraduría Nacional, Support to UDAPV With: Fanny Suárez

4:30 pm	National Planning Department With: Andrea Ramírez
Thursday, February 4, 2010	
3:00 pm	Briefing Session with Lynn Vega
5:30 pm	Comisión Nacional de Seguimiento Marco Romero

ANNEX C: ASSESSMENT SCOPE OF WORK

ASSESSMENT AND STRATEGIC PLANNING EXERCISE FOR USG ASSISTANCE TO POPULATIONS AFFECTED BY CONFLICT IN COLOMBIA

A. Summary

This Scope of Work is an assessment and strategic planning tool designed to help evaluate, refine, and better target USAID's work with vulnerable populations, particularly those who have been displaced and/or are at-risk of displacement because of the fluid Colombian conflict. Specifically, the assessment should review, analyze and evaluate USAID's past programming, Government of Colombia (GOC) initiatives, including the National Consolidation Plan, and planning vis-a-vis USAID's new draft strategic plan and the U.S. Embassy's Colombian Strategic Development Initiative. It should, as appropriate, identify opportunities and lessons learned and make recommendations for future programming.

B. Background

1. History of the Conflict

For more than five decades, armed conflict between left-wing guerillas, right-wing paramilitaries, and government security forces has been waged in Colombia. The 2005 demobilization of more than 30,000 members of the United Self-Defence Force of Colombia (AUC) was a positive step forward; however, the emergence of new illegal armed groups, financed by the drug trade, has added a new and complicated dimension to the conflict.

Unfortunately, Colombian civilians have borne the brunt of the ongoing violence. More than three million Colombians have been forcibly displaced from their homes; over 240,000 have filed claims with the justice system as victims of major conflict crimes; and Colombia's cultural minorities, Afro-Colombians and indigenous, struggle to meet basic needs and have suffered dramatic usurpation of their collective lands. The roots of the Colombian conflict lie in extreme inequality and political exclusion, but narco-trafficking and drug-related profits pursued by illegal armed groups have dramatically exacerbated the situation.

Displacement is a grave consequence of this dynamic conflict, intimately linked to disputes over territorial control, access to strategic resources by illegal armed actors, confrontations between the State's Armed Forces and these actors, and related violations directed against the civilian population. Since 1995, a majority of those displaced attribute their displacement to fear, threats, massacres, direct attacks, and extreme pressure to join the ranks of the illegal groups.¹⁸

The precise number of IDPs is difficult to determine. The GOC's figure is 3.1 million while CODHES, a well regarded Colombian non-governmental organization, claims there are more than 4.6 million IDPs. Any of these figures is disturbingly large. Internal displacement statistics first peaked between 1998 and 2002, when 1,153,053 people were registered as displaced (418,257 in 2002 alone). Displacement peaked again between 2005 and 2007, when 834,772 people were registered as displaced.¹⁹

¹⁸ P.W. Fagen, Juan A. Fernandez, F. Stepputat and R.V. Lopez, "Internal Displacement in Colombia: National and International Responses". IIS/GI. Institute for International Studies, Copenhagen, June 2008; Boletín No. 11, Los Derechos Economicos, Sociales y Culturales: Un Mecanismo De Protección Para Las Comunidades Desplazadas Boletín RUT informa No. 11 de 2005, de Acción Social y Pastoral Social; and also the ruling of the Constitutional Court, T-025

¹⁹ Acción Social, <http://www.accionsocial.gov.co/contenido/contenido.aspx?catID=383&conID=556>

2. Legal and Policy Framework

In order to contend with one of the world's worst IDP problems, the country has passed some of the most advanced legislation on internal displacement. The 1997 Law on Internal Displacement (Law 387) anticipated many of the measures included in the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement²⁰, promulgated the following year by then U.N. Special Representative, Francis Deng. That same year, the GOC issued an invitation to UNHCR to establish a presence in Colombia to address IDP protection, resulting in the establishment of a UNHCR office in 1998. In the following years, measures were adopted to improve the legal instruments supporting the application of Law 387, and to strengthen civil society organizations dedicated to assisting IDPs.

Additionally, the country has enjoyed a century of competitive free elections, rule of law, and judicial review of legislation. Moreover, the generous human rights provisions of the 1991 Constitution have had a significant impact on the lives of ordinary citizens. Fundamental rights are enforced by all of the country's judges through the *tutela*, a special constitutional writ of protection of human rights.

In January 2004, the Colombian Constitutional Court concluded (in ruling T-025²¹) that the fundamental rights of all IDPs were being disregarded in a massive and iterative manner. These generalized violations were due to structural failures of the GOC, resulting in an "unconstitutional state of affairs". In other words, the Court pointed out a significant gap between legal guarantees for IDPs and the ability of the State to fulfill these guarantees due to insufficient dedicated resources and limited institutional capacity.

Having declared the existence of an unconstitutional state of affairs, the Court established minimum mandatory protections for IDPs, in accordance with the Guiding Principles, and ordered the following:

1. national and territorial entities must adjust their budgets and programs in order to close the gap between their legal obligations and their budgetary and institutional capacity to fulfill them;
2. authorities have to provide organizations comprised of or representing IDPs effective participation and voice in policy making processes.

The Court retained its jurisdiction over the case in order to supervise advancements related to the ruling.

Since then, the Court has issued more than 70 follow up decisions (Autos), evaluating periodic reports submitted by the GOC and assessing the opinion of civil society organizations, UNHCR, independent oversight agencies, such as the Ombudsman and the Inspector General and the *Comisión de Seguimiento*²². Through the Autos, the Court has ordered the GOC to improve the IDP policy framework, taking into account the distinct risks that displacement presents to especially vulnerable groups, including women, children, Afro-Colombian and indigenous communities, and persons with disabilities.

Since the T-025 ruling, there has been significant progress on issues related to displacement, including:

- the national budget for IDPs has increased 8-fold since 2004²³
- GOC policies are increasingly incorporating the protection of IDP rights.
- IDP access to health and education has improved – 79 percent are registered for state managed health insurance and 80 percent of IDP children attend school²⁴

²⁰ <http://www.unhcr.ch/html/menu2/7/b/principles.htm>

²¹ <http://www.acnur.org/biblioteca/pdf/2501.pdf>

²² The Commission is an independent, non-profit entity created in August 2005 to monitor the GOC's response to the Constitutional Court's ruling T-025.

²³ From 1995-2002, the GOC allocated COP\$620,000,000,000; from 2003-2006, it allocated COP\$1.95 billion and in the National Development Plan for 2006 - 2010 (Plan Nacional de Desarrollo, "Estado Comunitario: Desarrollo para todos"), it allocated COP\$4.2 billion. <http://www.minhacienda.gov.co/portal/page/portal/MinHacienda/haciendapublica/presupuesto/programacion/proyecto/2008>

- result indicators to measure policy impact have been adopted
- the capacity of IDP organizations has been strengthened and they have a greater voice in public policy development
- government accountability has improved at national, department and municipal levels.

Nevertheless, many challenges remain, including:

- the GOC's IDP registration system suffers from a lack of capacity and clear policy guidance, particularly at municipal levels
- there is no process to determine when an IDP is fully reintegrated and therefore “graduates” from the various GOC assistance programs
- IDP returns are often not conducted in accordance with Acción Social's Return Protocol.
- The last eight rulings issued by the Constitutional Court order the GOC to redefine key policies related to IDP land, housing and income generation; develop new policies related to prevention of displacement and reparation for victims; address the particular needs of displaced vulnerable populations (Afro-Colombians, indigenous and persons with disabilities); and develop a comprehensive and integrated approach to addressing displacement.

C. USAID's Role

Since 1990, the United States Government (USG) has made significant investments to help ensure that those who have been most affected by the conflict or are at-risk of being affected are provided access to the skills, services, and opportunities necessary to protect their families from violence or recover and reintegrate their families into Colombian society. This effort has been in support of the GOC's “Plan Colombia,” through which both governments agreed to work together to promote “peace, prosperity, and the strengthening of the state”. The primary objectives of Plan Colombia were to promote peace and economic development, and increase security. Addressing drug trafficking was considered a key aspect of these objectives.²⁵

After nine years and over \$6 billion in USG assistance, “Plan Colombia” has made important gains against many of its performance measures. Kidnappings, homicides, and terrorists attacks decreased by 83, 40, and 77 percent, respectively, between 2001 and 2007.²⁶ Colombia instituted a new criminal justice system nationwide. The AUC, peacefully laid down its arms through a formal demobilization process. Economic progress has been undeniable, as measured by Gross Domestic Product, unemployment, and foreign investment.

Nevertheless, Plan Colombia's record in protecting vulnerable groups from violence and responding to their social and economic needs is mixed at best. The magnitude of the challenge continues to outstrip the availability of resources and the GOC's capacity to respond.

1. Current IDP Programming

USAID's program to assist IDPs and other vulnerable groups began in 2001. The program was implemented through a variety of grants, cooperative agreements, and contracts. By 2005, the program was present in over

²⁴ Constitutional Court, Auto 08, January 2009.

²⁵ Congressional Research Service, “Plan Colombia: A Progress Report.” June 20, 2005.

²⁶ Government of Colombia's Ministry of Defense, “Logros de la Política de Consolidación de la Seguridad Democrática – PCSD,” http://www.mindefensa.gov.co/descargas/Sobre_el_Ministerio/Planeacion/ResultadosOperacionales/Resultados%20Operacionales%20Ene%20-20Mar%202008.pdf

500 municipalities and was being implemented by hundreds of different entities. Activities included expanding access to healthcare, education, housing, food security and income generation opportunities. Complementary initiatives were carried out to strengthen the capacity of Colombian public and private sector organizations to meet the needs of these groups. Simultaneously, work was done to develop, implement and strengthen public policies related to vulnerable populations.

In 2004/5, the Mission conducted a management assessment and determined that the programs needed to be more geographically and strategically focused. As existing programs were concluding, the Mission conducted a procurement exercise, making a large award to the Pan American Development Foundation and the International Organization for Migration. The new grant supported strategic interventions and was limited to approximately 170 municipalities, where displacement and conflict were prevalent. Shortly after the award was signed, a study was done analyzing the status and needs of the target populations. The study showed that sustainable incomes and durable housing solutions were the two most pressing needs identified by vulnerable families. With living-wage incomes and safe, healthy homes, families could, in general, access other social services and function as full citizens.

From 2005-2007, three smaller complementary grants were added, including the World Food Program (for the purchase and distribution of basic food staples), Profamilia (for the delivery of maternal-child health services), and the Pan American Health Organization (to improve IDP access to health services, improve emergency response and strengthen information sharing). In 2008, using special funding from USAID/Washington, two grants were signed to improve the access of persons with disabilities, including landmine survivors, to social and economic opportunities and to strengthen Colombian capacity to attend to their particular needs.

In 2007, the Mission conducted a full-scale assessment of the myriad income generation activities to assist IDPs that had been implemented by both USAID and the GOC. The evaluation showed that although program beneficiaries were pleased with the psycho-social support, training, and other assistance they received, at the end of the program, few were making significantly greater incomes than they were before the program began. While the non-monetary benefits of the programs were significant, the goal of improved incomes – the purpose of the interventions -- was generally not met.

Once the assessment was complete and results were shared with the GOC and program partners, USAID's program was again restructured to place greater emphasis on sustainable income generation and housing, shifting resources away from other social services that had more support from the state. Concurrently, the GOC expanded its interventions to assist IDPs, primarily through three different initiatives: Families in Action (a subsidy program that provides incentives for keeping children in school), Integrated Economic Assistance (income generation combined with a package of social services), and an effort to register displaced families in the national health care system. These programs were primarily focused in urban areas. USAID therefore made the decision to increase its presence in rural areas, with the goal of supporting the return or reintegration of displaced families before they reached volatile receptor communities in large cities.

2. USAID's 2009-2013 Draft Strategy

In 2008, the GOC and the USG began developing the follow-on phase to Plan Colombia. Analysis concluded that an integrated and geographically-targeted "whole of government" strategy would be the most effective way to consolidate security and development gains, reduce coca cultivation, decrease the efficacy of illegally armed groups, and help bring the full range of essential state services to targeted conflict regions in Colombia.²⁷ This approach has been identified as the GOC's National Consolidation Plan (PNC).

²⁷ These regions are: 1) Montes de Maria region; 2) Nariño/Putumayo Corridor; 3) Meta/Southern Tolima/Valle de Cauca Corridor (from La Macarena in Meta west through southern Tolima and Valle del Cauca to Buenaventura); 4) Southern Cordoba/Bajo Cauca/Catatumbo Corridor; and 5) Uraba/Northern Choco Corridor

The USG’s mutually supportive, complementary program has been designated as the Colombian Strategic Development Initiative (CSDI), in which the goal is to help the GOC reach a “tipping point” where state presence and positive perception of the government are sufficiently established so that communities decide to align with their government rather than with illegally-armed groups and proponents of the illicit drug economy. The new draft USAID strategic approach²⁸ involves working in the CSDI zones and at the national level. One challenge that the strategy will help address is that of helping Colombia overcoming the divide between the larger, urban, “institutionalized” Colombia, characterized by strong institutions, and the larger and predominantly rural conflict areas of Colombia.

The overarching goal of the new draft USAID strategy is:

- **To promote a licit economy through fostering governance, citizen participation, and permanent state presence**

Under this goal, two inter-related and mutually reinforcing sub-goals will be pursued.

- **To strengthen consolidation of state presence in critical conflict zones**
- **Colombian institutions better able to address priority national issues critical to sustainable economic development**

Finally, three Assistance Objectives (AOs), with strong cross-cutting linkages and synergies have been identified:

- **AO1: Reduced Dependency on the illicit drug economy through improved livelihoods**
- **AO2: Reduced vulnerability of populations affected by conflict**
- **AO3: Strengthened democratic governance and respect for human rights**

With these goals and objectives guiding USAID’s work, the anticipated end state is that inequity in Colombia will have been reduced and Colombians’ role in their own governance will have evolved so that they can demand a more accountable and responsive government. There will be greater participation by average citizens in determining their own futures. Colombia will have established a more effective and democratic state presence in critical conflict zones. There will be more effective and institutionalized coordination among all levels of government. Colombia’s conflict-affected populations will have achieved sustainable social and economic stabilization and reintegration and can exercise their full rights and responsibilities as citizens. Job creation and productive opportunities will have risen in target areas.

3. Vulnerable Populations

Within this overarching framework, IDPs are included within AO2. USAID will work within those areas identified under the CSDI and on a national level in areas where the indices of internal displacement and reception are the highest. USAID expects to continue programming related to expanding access to healthcare, education, housing, food security and income generation opportunities. We also expect to continue work to strengthen the capacity of Colombian public and private sector organizations to meet the needs of IDPs and to support the development, implementation and strengthening of public policies related to vulnerable populations. In addition to these efforts, USAID is contemplating an increased focus on safe and dignified returns and the prevention of displacement.

USAID will take an inclusive approach to the term “vulnerable population”. In addition to IDPs, we will continue to work with traditionally poor populations in receptor communities, Afro-Colombians, indigenous communities, women heads of households, persons with disabilities, etc. And, while past experience has

²⁸ Colombia’s Strategic Framework 2009-2013

demonstrated the need for a differentiated approach to distinct vulnerable populations, it has also highlighted the importance of bringing these populations together to reduce stigma, foster trust and reconciliation, and address perceptions that one vulnerable group is receiving or due more than another.

Within this broad agenda, USAID expects this assessment to assist in setting priorities, inform further strategy development and related procurement documents for new contracts, grants, and cooperative and international organization agreements.

E. Scope of Work

This Scope of Work to carry out an assessment and to develop strategic planning tools is designed to help evaluate, refine, and better target USAID's work with vulnerable populations, particularly Colombians who have been displaced and/or are at-risk of displacement because of the fluid Colombian conflict. Specifically the assessment must review, analyze and evaluate USAID's past programming, GOC initiatives, and planning vis-à-vis USAID's new draft strategic plan, the CSDI, and the PNC. It must, as appropriate, identify opportunities and lessons learned and make recommendations for future programming.

At the completion of this contract, the contractor will have responded to the following questions as well as others that may arise during the contract's implementation.

- Are the analysis and assumptions upon which USAID's current IDP programs based valid? What else should be taken into consideration?
- Given the broad range of issues involved, how should USAID establish priorities?
- To what degree should USAID be involved in land issues as they relate to displacement?
- What strategic adjustments should be made in light of the CSDI and PNC?
- How should USAID's IDP program function both within and outside of CSDI zones?
- Within the CSDI zones, the majority of USAID's efforts will be implemented through one instrument, to what degree should IDPs be differentiated from other populations affected by conflict (victims, demobilized, Afro-Colombian, indigenous, etc) and to what degree should they be included in general programming targeted at conflict-affected populations? What about outside of CSDI zones?
- How should USAID's programs be designed to complement GOC initiatives targeted at vulnerable populations? Where and how should these programs work together? Where and how should they work separately?
- To what extent and how should USAID's IDP program overlap with other programs supported by the Mission, such as demobilization and reintegration, victims assistance and human rights, as well as other programs supported by the Embassy?
- To what extent should USAID increase its focus on the prevention of new displacement, particularly within CSDI zones?
- What is the appropriate balance between the prevention of displacement and the provision of services to those already displaced (particularly in large urban receptor communities) given limited funds?
- What models, according to international best practices, should USAID refer to for prevention programs?

- To what extent should USAID pursue programs to return displaced families to their places of origin? What models should USAID use for return programs?
- Which of the existing gaps in public policy for IDPs and other vulnerable populations could be effectively addressed through USAID's assistance program?
- How can USAID be more effective in generating sustainable incomes for IDPs?
- How can the private sector become more engaged in assistance to vulnerable populations, particularly in remote, rural locations? And how can USAID be more successful in leveraging private funds?
- How can USAID's IDP Program more effectively measure program impact?

G. Proposed Assessment Methodology, Tasks and Deliverables

The contractor will do the following as part of the assessment/strategy exercise: (1) conduct a desktop review of current literature and other key documents related to displacement in Colombia, including USG program documents, the rulings of the Constitutional Court and related GOC regulations; (2) develop a detailed assessment methodology, workplan, and timeline including a notional list of meetings, site visits, and interviews; (3) conduct entrance, mid-term, and exit briefings with IDP team and Mission management; (4) conduct meetings, interviews, and site visits; (5) analyze data and compile key findings and recommendations into draft assessment report; and (6) submit draft assessment report to USAID for comments.

- Phase 1: Conduct a desktop review of current literature and other key documents related to internal displacement in Colombia (approximately 6 days)

The assessment team will review relevant documents related to internal displacement in Colombia, international lessons learned and successful strategies, USAID program planning and implementation, and other useful pieces. An illustrative bibliography is included in Annex 1, however the team will also be provided with the IDP program's assessments, quarterly reports, work plans, indicators, etc.

- Phase 2: Develop a detailed assessment methodology, workplan, and timeline including a notional list of meetings, site visits, and interviews (approximately 5 days) to be reviewed and approved by the Mission.
- Phase 3: Conduct entrance, mid-term, and exit briefings with IDP team and Mission management (approximately 3 days)
- Phase 4: Conduct meetings, interviews, and site visits (approximately 20 days)

The assessment team will conduct interviews with USAID staff, relevant GOC representatives (national, departmental and municipal levels), non-governmental organizations that focus on IDP/vulnerable population issues, private sector leaders, academics, other bilateral and multilateral donors, and representatives from the United Nations agencies and other international organizations. In addition the team will undertake field visits to conduct interviews with program beneficiaries and other stakeholders.

- Phase 5: Analyze data and compile key findings and recommendations into draft assessment report (approximately 15 days)

The team will analyze the data collected through the document review, field visits, interviews, and meetings, to prepare a draft assessment report. USAID will review and provide written comments on the draft report within 15 working days of receipt. This period of 15 days will not be considered working days.

- Phase 6: Submit final assessment report to USAID (approximately 5 days)

The assessment team will review the draft report, reflecting USAID's comments/suggestions, and submit a final report within 5 working days of receipt of the written comments.

The final report will be formally submitted, with the following suggested format, to USAID for final review and approval:

- Table of Contents
- Table of Figures and/or Tables
- Acknowledgements - optional
- Acronyms
- Executive Summary (Max. 5 Pages)
- Introduction (body of the report I-VII should be no more than 30 pages)
- Purpose of the Assessment
- Research Design and Assessment Methodology
- Findings
- Conclusions
- Recommendations
- Lessons Learned
- Annexes
 - a. Assessment Scope of Work
 - b. Description of the Assessment methodology used
 - c. Bibliography of documents consulted
 - d. Where appropriate, instruments used in collecting information, e.g., key informant interviews
 - d. List of persons contacted/consulted with dates of interviews

The final report should be submitted in English, no more than 30 pages (excluding attachments) Times New Roman 12 point, single space.

H. Proposed Assessment Team Composition

The following is an illustrative description of the team needed to complete this assessment. All team members must be fluent in written and spoken English and Spanish.

Chief of Party, Chief Writer

- This individual must have extensive experience with USAID assessments/evaluations.
- S/he should also be an expert in one of the technical areas mentioned below.

Social Sector Expert

- This individual must have knowledge of health, education, housing, and other social sector issues related to IDPs.
- S/he should have expertise in one of the technical areas listed below and should serve as the expert for that issue on the assessment team.
- The incumbent must have experience in Latin America and preferably in Colombia

Economist/Livelihoods Expert

- The incumbent must have a PhD in Macroeconomics
- This individual must understand the challenges associated with improving the livelihoods (writ-large) of vulnerable populations, opportunities within both the formal and informal economies, expansion of financial services to target groups, development of productive chains, formulation economic policy, etc.
- The incumbent must have experience in Latin America and preferably in Colombia

Public Policy Expert

- This individual must have in-depth knowledge of policy issues relevant to vulnerable populations, including land tenure and protection, financial services, protection and return, guaranteeing identification, among others.
- The incumbent must have experience in Latin America and preferably in Colombia

Expert in Internal Displacement, International Norms and Best Practices

- The team will require the services of an international expert in internal displacement issues who can provide the international perspective on IDP issues, including prevention of displacement, returns, best practices, etc.
- The incumbent must have experience in Latin America and preferably in Colombia

Institutional Development (civil society and public sector)

- The individual must have knowledge of the challenges to institutionalizing support for IDPs and other vulnerable families in Colombia, both within the public and private sectors. This will include enhancing institutional capacity at municipal, departmental and national levels.

The incumbent must have experience in Latin America and preferably in Colombia

The list above is illustrative. The contractor may propose a different team composition as part of the proposal/negotiation process.

I. Implementation and Management Plan

The Contractor will provide contract management necessary to fulfill all the requirements of this contract. This includes technical supervision, human resources management, and cost control.

J. Logistical Support and Government-Furnished Property

The assessment team will be responsible for arranging its own travel, air transportation, ground transportation, and accommodation requirements, though USAID and its implementing partners will support

the team as much as possible. The team is also responsible for providing its own computers, printers, and other administrative services. It is also responsible for organizing its own workspace during the assessment. USAID will provide assistance in arranging meetings with contractor and grantee staff, GOC representatives, program beneficiaries, and other key stakeholders. The Mission will also make available key documents upon award of the contract.

K. Security

The assessment team must have an approved security plan that is included in the assessment methodology/workplan. The team should have a briefing by the US Embassy Regional Security Office within three days of arrival in Colombia. The security plan may involve the submission of detailed travel plans, vehicle information and escort logistics information as appropriate.

ANNEX 1: ILLUSTRATIVE BIBLIOGRAPHY

Documents on FEDBIZOPPS.GOV related to USAID/Colombia's new draft strategy

<https://www.fbo.gov/index?id=6efe116075d8f030030699b9337fceb8>

Documents assembled on Colombia by the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center (<http://www.internal-displacement.org>)

Documents on www.vertice.gov.co produced by the Unidad Técnica Conjunta (UteC), including, "Parámetros y Áreas Críticas de la Política Pública de Atención al Desplazamiento en Colombia," UTeC. June 16, 2009

Rulings from Colombia's Constitutional Court related to Internally Displaced Persons

http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/publisher/COL_CC.html

Ibáñez, Ana Mariá and Andrea Velásquez. "Public Policies to Assist Internally Displaced Persons: The Role of Municipal Authorities", The Brookings Bern Project on Internal Displacement. October 2008

"Protocol para el Acompañamiento a los Procesos de Retorno o Reubicación de Población Desplazada", Subdirección de Atención a Población Desplazada, Emergencias y Retornos, Acción Social. May 9, 2006