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# EARLY WARNING AND RESPONSE DESIGN SUPPORT (EWARDS)

## FINAL REPORT



OCTOBER 2011

This publication was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development. It was prepared by Tetra Tech ARD.

Prepared for the United States Agency for International Development USAID Contract Number DFD-I-00-05-00248-00, Task Order No. 10, under the Instability, Crisis, and Recovery Programs (ICRP) (Conflict IQC)

**Prepared by:**

Tetra Tech ARD  
159 Bank Street, Suite 300  
P.O. Box 1397  
Burlington, Vermont 05402 USA

**COVER PHOTO:**

Cowry Shell Monument at ECOWAS Headquarters in Abuja. Photo by Robert Groelsema.

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## **DISCLAIMER**

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# ACRONYMS

|         |  |
|---------|--|
| AQIM    | Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb                              |
| AU      | African Union  |
| CDP     | <i>Congrès pour la démocratie et le Progrès</i>              |
| CENI    | Independent National Electoral Commission                    |
| CEPAN   | Center for Peace Advancement in Nigeria                      |
| CEWS    | Continental Early Warning System                             |
| CIDCM   | Center for International Development and Conflict Management |
| CMM     | Conflict Management and Mitigation Office                    |
| COP     | Chief of Party   |
| CO      | Contracting Officer  |
| COTR    | Contracting Officer's Technical Representative               |
| CSIS    | Center for Strategic and International Studies.              |
| CSO     | Civil Society Organization                                   |
| DCHA    | Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance              |
| DDR     | Disarmament, Demobilization and Reinsertion                  |
| DPA     | Directorate for Political Affairs                            |
| DTRC    | Dialog, Truth and Reconciliation Commission                  |
| EOP     | End of Project   |
| ECOWARN | ECOWAS Early Warning and Response Network                    |
| ECOWAS  | Economic Community of West African States                    |
| EPF     | EDWARDS Peace Fund   |
| EU      | European Union   |
| EDWARDS | Early Warning and Response Design Support                    |
| EWD     | Early Warning Department                                     |
| FACTS   | Foreign Assistance Coordinating and Tracking System          |
| GUCs    | Grants Under Contract  |
| IMF     | International Monetary Fund                                  |
| IEC     | Independent Electoral Commission                             |
| IMPACT  | Impact for Change and Development                            |

|          |   |
|----------|---|
| IncReps  | Incident Reports  |
| INEC     | Independent National Electoral Commission                 |
| IPCR     | Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution               |
| MEND     | Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta          |
| MFDC     | <i>Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance</i> |
| M&E      | Monitoring and Evaluation                                 |
| MOU      | Memorandum of Understanding                               |
| NCE      | No-Cost Extension   |
| NGO      | Nongovernmental Organization                              |
| NNC      | National Network Coordinator                              |
| OSIWA    | Open Society Initiative for West Africa                   |
| PACWA    | Peace and Conflict in West Africa Report                  |
| PCIL     | Peace and Conflict Instability Ledger                     |
| PMC      | Project Management Committee                              |
| PMP      | Performance Monitoring Plan                               |
| PPP      | Public-Private Partnership                                |
| ResReps  | Response Reports  |
| RFA      | Request for Assistance                                    |
| SIDA     | Swedish International Development Agency                  |
| SitReps  | Situation Reports   |
| SOPs     | Standard Operating Procedures                             |
| SOW      | Scope of Work   |
| STA/M    | Senior Technical Advisor/Manager                          |
| STTA     | Short-Term Technical Assistance                           |
| SVA      | Structural Vulnerability Analysis                         |
| UMD      | University of Maryland                                    |
| UNDEF    | United Nations Democracy Fund                             |
| UNOCI    | United Nations Operations in Côte d'Ivoire                |
| US       | The United States   |
| USAID    | United States Agency for International Development        |
| USAID/WA | USAID West Africa   |
| VRA      | Virtual Research Associates                               |



|       |                                       |
|-------|---------------------------------------|
| WACA  | West African Conflict Assessment      |
| WANEP | West Africa Network for Peacebuilding |
| WEP   | Women Environmental Program           |
| Y1    | Year 1                                |
| Y2    | Year 2                                |



# I.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report offers readers a summary of the Early Warning and Response Design Support (EDWARDS) program's accomplishments. EDWARDS was a 28-month, \$4.5 million project funded by USAID/West Africa to strengthen conflict early warning and response in West Africa. The main beneficiaries of the project were the Economic Community of West African States Early Warning Department (ECOWAS/EWD) and the West Africa Network for Peace Building (WANEP). This report provides an overview of conflict trends in the sub-region, EDWARDS' purpose and development approach, activities completed in the final quarter, overall program results, and project performance as measured by its indicators.

**Section 2** of the report examines conflict trends in West Africa over the two and a half years of EDWARDS, from May 2009 through September 2011. West Africa is extremely diverse and multi-cultural comprising 15 member states of ECOWAS. ECOWAS has divided the sub-region into four zones and equipped them with conflict early warning offices.

Currently only one conflict—the longstanding Casamance separatist rebellion—is active, but others such as the Niger Delta are simmering or latent. Observers are concerned by the influence of al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), drug smuggling, trafficking of small arms and light weapons, and insecurity. These problems are compounded by the pressures of nation-building, democratization, high unemployment, inadequate governance, and weak institutions.

EDWARDS conflict assessments documented many of these problems, and EDWARDS Peace and Conflict in West Africa Reports (PACWA) confirmed that structurally, the risk of instability or conflict among ECOWAS states is far higher than average. West Africa clearly is one of the most volatile areas of the world.

**Section 3** of the report describes the project purpose, background, start-up, staffing, organization, management tools, and development partners. EDWARDS goal—to strengthen conflict early warning and response in West Africa—was subdivided into three Intermediate Objectives:

- Strengthen the core functions of ECOWARN;
- Precipitate ECOWARN with structural warning and analysis; and
- Link warning and analysis to response.

EDWARDS measured progress toward achieving these objectives with 10 indicators.

Conflict early warning in West Africa is a decade or so young, and got its push from the Liberian and Sierra Leonean civil wars of the 1990s and early 2000s. In 1999, ECOWAS published its guiding protocol, “Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security,” which among other things called for a region-wide conflict early warning system. ECOWAS’s “Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance” reaffirmed this appeal two years later. Concurrent with these developments, WANEP embarked on its peace-building mission and began to formulate the outlines of its conflict early warning system.

EDWARDS contract began on May 11, 2009 and terminated September 26, 2011. In March 2011, the project received a four-and-a-half-month unfunded extension beyond the original two-year end date. Staffing consisted of a Chief of Party and Program Officer (key positions) supported by a Finance Officer/Grants Manager, an Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Specialist, an Administrative Assistant, and a Driver. Tetra Tech Home Office backstopping included a Senior Technical Advisor/Manager, a Project Manager, and support from specialists in contracts, M&E, and grants management. USAID/WA administered the project with technical support from the Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance Bureau, Conflict Management and Mitigation Office (DCHA/CMM) in Washington.

Work planning and PMP development were highly iterative, reflecting changes in client emphasis and needs. EWARDS operated for over a year without an approved Performance Monitoring Plan (PMP) and for 22 months without an approved work plan. A mid-term review conducted in the latter half of 2010 recommended a number of adjustments, which were reflected in the Year 2 work plan and realigned budget.

Much of the technical assistance to primary beneficiaries ECOWAS and WANEP was directed through subcontractors: University of Maryland's Center for International Development and Conflict Management (UMD/CIDCM) and Virtual Research Associates (VRA). VRA implemented activities under Intermediate Objective 1 (IO 1) while UMD/CIDCM was chiefly responsible for activities under IO 2. WANEP implemented IO 3 activities.


**Section 4** of the report reviews the activities from the final quarter, July-September 2011. EWARDS conducted 13 activities in this period, including the Ghana conflict assessment, a stakeholders' roundtable to vet the findings and recommendations of that assessment, conflict assessment response activities in Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire, and testing and completion of the Election Dispute Prevention Practice Guide. Robust participation in these activities contributed significantly to Indicators 3.1 and 3.2 measuring local participation and capacity building.

**Section 5** of the report illustrates EWARDS accomplishments over the life of the project (LOP). In all EWARDS conducted some 45 distinct activities, which contributed to achieving 23 of 25 milestones, results and deliverables. EWARDS met or exceeded eight of its ten indicators. Three of the notable project successes (one for each IO) include:

- IO 1 - Migration of the ECOWARN production server from the U.S. to West Africa where the system now is fully managed and operated by ECOWAS/EWD;
- IO 2 – Customizing a conflict assessment methodology for West Africa, conduct of five assessments and training of trainers (TOT) to lead and conduct conflict assessments;
- IO 3 – Creation of an Election Dispute Management Practice Guide for West Africa.

**Section 6** of the report covers performance management. This section describes the logic of the intermediate objectives, measures performance over the final quarter of the project, recaps movement on individual indicators, and provides a tracking sheet with baseline, Year 1 (Y1) and Year 2 (Y2) targets, actuals per year, and actuals at end of project (EOP). As noted, EWARDS successfully met eight of ten indicator targets—a ninth was preferably *not* met, and a tenth was beyond the project's control.

# EWARDS Activities in West Africa





## 2.0 CONTEXT: AN EYE ON WEST AFRICA

Over the two-and-a-half-year project period, West Africa experienced reversals and progress in peace and stability. Guinea-Bissau narrowly averted civil war following the assassination of then President Nino Vieira. Subsequently, the country conducted reasonably free and fair elections. Guinea experienced an attempted assassination of its military leader, but avoided ethnic bloodshed in its most free and fair election since independence. Niger staged a bloodless coup d'état, and managed a free and fair election that lifted sanctions imposed by the U.S., Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the African Union (AU). Côte d'Ivoire was plunged into political turmoil and violence following elections in November 2010, but emerged from a protracted post-elections crisis. In 2011, Burkina Faso experienced a massive wave of strikes, demonstrations, and mutinies. Nigeria, despite holding successful elections in April 2011, weathered bomb blasts and attacks from Boko Haram.

With the exception of the Casamance, there were no active military conflicts in the sub-region. However, these examples illustrate why West Africa ranks as one of the most unstable areas of the world. Structurally, four countries—Mali, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau, and Nigeria—qualify as *highest risk*. Historically, countries in this category experience major conflict or political instability 22 times more often than *low risk* countries. Countries in the *high* and *moderate risk* categories experience major conflict or political instability ten and eight times, respectively, more often than countries in the *low risk* category (see Table 1).

As 2012 approached, a cautious optimism prevailed in the international community regarding peace and stability in the sub-region. However, concerns were growing over the rise in transnational crime, illicit drug trafficking, terrorism, and elections-related violence. Security in the sub-region remained tenuous, and peace fragile.

**Table 1: Future Risk of Instability or Conflict, ECOWAS States (2010-2012)<sup>1</sup>**

| Risk                                |               | Risk  | Confidence Range |      |
|-------------------------------------|---------------|-------|------------------|------|
| Category                            | Country       | Score | Low              | High |
| <i>Highest Risk</i><br>(18 or more) | Mali          | 22.6  | 14.3             | 34.8 |
|                                     | Sierra Leone  | 20.6  | 12.5             | 30.9 |
|                                     | Guinea-Bissau | 19.7  | 11.0             | 31.6 |
|                                     | Nigeria       | 19.4  | 11.7             | 28.6 |
| <i>High Risk</i><br>(12-18)         | Benin         | 13.8  | 9.3              | 19.9 |
|                                     | Liberia       | 13.8  | 6.7              | 24.4 |
|                                     | Burkina Faso  | 12.2  | 8.2              | 18.4 |
| <i>Moderate</i>                     | Senegal       | 10.0  | 6.2              | 14.9 |

<sup>1</sup> EDWARDS Peace and Conflict in West Africa Report, January 2010.

| Risk                     |               | Risk  | Confidence Range |      |
|--------------------------|---------------|-------|------------------|------|
| Category                 | Country       | Score | Low              | High |
| Risk<br>(7-12)           | Guinea        | 9.6   | 5.7              | 15.6 |
|                          | Côte d'Ivoire | 8.4   | 4.8              | 13.4 |
|                          | Ghana         | 7.1   | 3.8              | 11.4 |
| Some Risk<br>(4-7)       | Niger         | 6.3   | 3.5              | 10.9 |
|                          | Togo          | 6.0   | 3.5              | 9.5  |
| Low Risk<br>(4 or lower) | The Gambia    | 3.0   | 1.7              | 4.9  |
|                          | Cape Verde    | 1.4   | 0.7              | 2.5  |

## I.1 ZONE ONE: CAPE VERDE, THE GAMBIA, GUINEA-BISSAU, AND SENEGAL<sup>2</sup>

ECOWAS divides its member states into four zones. This section of the report offers a summary of conflict trends by zone over the EWARDS project period.

In August 2011, **Cape Verde** conducted free and fair elections marking another peaceful, democratic transfer of power. Cape Verde and Senegal are the only West African states not having experienced regime change by military takeover. However, drug-trafficking and criminality were on the rise, and under-employment and a general lack of opportunity characterize the economy. Thanks to EWARDS's institutional grant, West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP) established a national secretariat in Cape Verde. The office has begun to promote peace education primarily among youth. Given the historic and linguistic links between Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau, WANEP/Cape Verde is well positioned to assist the WANEP National Network in Guinea-Bissau.

Over the project period, **Guinea-Bissau** faced serious security challenges, which posed risks not only to Guinea-Bissau, but also to its neighbors. For this reason, Guinea-Bissau was chosen to be the object of an EWARDS conflict assessment. In April 2010, a mutiny led to the detention of the General Chief of Staff. Subsequently, the mutiny leader was appointed General Chief of Staff and promoted to the rank of Lieutenant General. This promotion was roundly condemned by ECOWAS, the AU, the European Union (EU), and the U.S.


The jointly conducted EWARDS/WANEP conflict assessment in May 2011 confirmed reports of deep divisions between and among demographic groups over issues of land, natural resources management, cattle rustling, pension plans for ex-combatants, and distribution of development resources. Social cleavages were exacerbated by corruption, lawlessness, drug-trafficking, impunity, and governance failures. The assessment noted the absence of services and state incapacity especially in rural areas.

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<sup>2</sup> The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has divided the region of its 15 member states into four clusters—Zone One to Zone Four—for the purpose of monitoring threats to peace and stability of the region.



**Figure 1: Guinea Bissau Risk Scores, 1995-2009**



Since 1982, the Casamance region of **Senegal** between The Gambia and Guinea-Bissau has been the object of a separatist rebellion. In 2010 and early 2011, the Senegalese army suffered heavy losses in several skirmishes. At times the rebellion has spilled over into Guinea-Bissau. Although Senegal has never experienced a coup d'état, there has been only one peaceful transfer of power to the opposition. If successful, President Wade's bid to lift the constitutional ban on a third term would delay a second transfer of power of any kind. He has also attempted to change Senegal's electoral rules to allow a one-round election and the winning candidate to have a simple 25 percent majority. On June 23, a violent demonstration in Dakar against these proposals forced Wade to withdraw the bill. Senegal will go to the polls in 2012 in a potentially volatile environment.

In **The Gambia**, a general intolerance for civil liberties and human rights prevailed. President Jammeh's government made numerous arbitrary arrests of journalists, activists, opposition politicians, and members of government considered to be a threat. In July 2010, the former Chief of Defense, General Lang Tombong Tamba, and the former Navy Chief, Sarjo Fofana, were sentenced to death for their alleged involvement in the 2009 foiled coup d'état. A former Minister of Communication, Dr. Amadou Janneh, was arrested and charged with treason for allegedly distributing anti-Jammeh literature. The Gambia was scheduled to conduct presidential elections on November 24, 2011, but there was no serious opposition to the incumbent.

## **I.2 ZONE TWO: BURKINA FASO, CÔTE D'IVOIRE, MALI, AND NIGER**

Over the project period, **Burkina Faso** ranked in the *high risk* category for major conflict (see Table 1). Deep rifts in Burkinabé society—sharpened by falling living standards—culminated in country-wide public sector strikes, student demonstrations, and waves of mutinies by army units during 2011. Despite being re-elected in November 2010, President Blaise Compaoré and his *Congrès pour la démocratie et le Progrès (CDP)* party faced violent public opposition in the streets.

One contentious issue was the CDP's initiative to lift the two-term limit on



Street fighting in Abidjan. Photo courtesy of AP


presidential mandates, which would permit Compaoré to stay in office beyond 2015. In response, 34 opposition groups demanded that Compaoré step down. Unrest also spread to more than 20 municipalities and local governments where disputes over land titles in unplanned neighborhoods resulted in burning municipal offices, blocking roads, and other forms of protest. The government formed a taskforce to consider reforms, and declared a temporary halt to land titling. As the country moved toward legislative and municipal elections in May 2012, the opposition appeared to be poorly organized and unable to generate public enthusiasm for its programs.

In May 2011, **Côte d'Ivoire** emerged from five months of national crisis. The French- and United Nations-backed offensive in support of the Republican Forces under Alassane Ouattara forcefully removed Laurent Gbagbo from power on April 11. In early May, the Constitutional Council reversed the November 2010 election results and swore in Ouattara as the country's next president. Gbagbo remained under house arrest in the north of the country awaiting trial.

Against the backdrop of hundreds of extra-judicial executions, Ouattara created a Dialog, Truth and Reconciliation Commission (DTRC), with former Prime Minister Charles Konan Banny as chair. At the EWARDS-sponsored national reconciliation forum in August 2011, civil society organizations (CSOs) formed a coalition to structure their partnership with the DTRC. EWARDS and WANEP presented the recommendations of the workshop to Minister Banny, and also met with the Minister of the National Human Rights Commission, and with the U.S. Embassy.

An extension of the United Nations Operations in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) and preliminary commitments from donors and the international community were expected to stabilize the country economically and politically. UNOCI will support the disarmament, demobilization, and reinsertion program and help compensate for the country's security deficit. Nevertheless, more than 100,000 refugees along the Liberian border had refused to return to their homes for fear of reprisals.

EWARDS conflict assessment, conducted in March 2010, identified insecurity, elections, and identity as the three main issues facing Ivoirians. Given the upcoming legislative elections, these issues remained salient across the country, particularly in the West where confusion over the 1998 land tenure law and ongoing disputes over property rights continued. During what will be a protracted period of political, economic, and social rebuilding, Côte d'Ivoire likely will remain highly unstable.



The new Côte d'Ivoire government poses with President Alassane Ouattara after a council, at the Presidential Palace in Abidjan June 3, 2011.

Photo courtesy of AP

Over the project period, **Niger** peacefully transitioned from military rule to democracy. President-elect Mahamadou Issoufou was sworn into office in April 2011. He allotted key ministries to several of his former opponents. The U.S. lifted targeted sanctions against the country, France reaffirmed its interest in establishing a military base to protect mining interests in the north, and given a positive assessment of the economic policies and prospects, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) was expected to renew a credit facility in late 2011. ECOWAS and the AU restored Niger's membership in their organizations. Nonetheless, Niger faced a number of stability challenges, including attacks by Tuaregs and by al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). The changes in Libya could also result in a flow of small arms and light weapons to Niger. Uranium mines and a major dam at Kandadji—Niger's first hydroelectric plant—represent potential terrorist targets.

Owing to low performance on security, social welfare, and economic growth indicators, **Mali** outranked West African states for risk of violent conflict. Like Niger, Mali faced threats from AQIM, which were complicated by AQIM's efforts to enlist the support of rebellious Tuareg groups. Evidence was growing that Malian politicians and businessmen were complicit in trans-Saharan smuggling and ransoms for hostages. Lapses in

security posed serious threats to rural development and were devastating the economy. Tourism in 2011 was down by two-thirds in Mopti. Fallout from Libya was also expected to disrupt investments in infrastructure financed by the Libyan government.

Mali will hold presidential elections in April and legislative elections in July 2012. President Touré, who will have completed his two terms of office, has said he will step down. Although the elections will be hotly contested, they are not expected to be violent.

### **I.3 ZONE THREE: LIBERIA, GHANA, GUINEA, AND SIERRA LEONE**

Peace and stability in **Liberia** continued to be fragile, although largely peaceful conduct of a national referendum in August and a national election in October 2011 were signs that the country may be consolidating its democracy.

Threats from neighboring countries included the post-elections crisis in Côte d'Ivoire and the influx of as many as 100,000 Ivoirian refugees. Liberian mercenaries from Côte d'Ivoire also posed serious concerns to the Liberian government. The National Police reported a huge cache of arms in Grand Gedeh County on the border with Cote d'Ivoire. EWARDS conflict assessment conducted in September 2010 found that the nation is far from reconciled. Key conflict issues included integration of ex-combatants, demarcation of governmental jurisdictions, and land tenure and property rights issues—especially the granting of large tracts of land to multi-nationals for plantations.

**Ghana** continued to be a beacon of stability in the sub-region. On the economic front, the country successfully began production of oil from the off-shore Jubilee oil fields. Politically, Ghana organized closely contested, but peaceful primaries preceding the 2012 national elections. The EWARDS conflict assessment in July 2011 unearthed concerns over high unemployment (especially for youth), a growing disparity between rich and poor, and rising levels of frustration over the high cost of living and lack of development dividends. Unmet expectations vis-à-vis oil revenues threatened to come to a boil in the Western Region and in Accra if ignored. The presidential election in 2012 was seen as a potential conflict trigger that bears monitoring and dispute preparedness.

**Guinea** struggled to overcome 50 years of autocratic rule, to strike a delicate ethnic balance in the 2010 elections, and to build civilian democratic institutions. In September 2009, Guinea witnessed a massacre of innocent civilians and abuse of Guinean women by security forces following a pro-democracy demonstration in the national stadium. However, the massacre earned international condemnation and became a rallying cry for democratic change in the country. In December 2009, Captain Dadis Camara, head of the ruling junta, was seriously injured in an attempt on his life. General Konaté assumed power and promised elections within a year.

In the run-up to elections, WANEP and its National Network in Guinea utilized the EWARDS institutional grant to organize a series of governmental and civil society consultations. One outcome was the establishment of a monitoring and response committee to promote dialog and mediation among divisive communities. The elections proved reasonably free and fair, although voting took place along ethnic lines. In an extremely close second round, the Fulani, numerically the largest group, failed to elect their candidate and, in some quarters, alleged fraud. An unsuccessful rocket attack on the night of July 18, 2011 on the residence of President Condé was widely condemned by the international community. The factionalized military has played a preponderant role in Guinean politics since 1984. Exerting control over the armed forces will be difficult, but necessary for stability.

Since the end of civil war in 2002, **Sierra Leone** has continued to consolidate peace. However, the country struggled with youth unemployment and had yet to fully reintegrate its ex-combatants. The country's porous

borders also allowed drug-traffickers to operate with few restrictions. In 2010, officials seized three tons of marijuana with an estimated street value of \$10 million. One border district won a competitive EWARDS small grant to assist it to strengthen its early warning system. Sierra Leone will conduct presidential elections in 2012, which based on early observations, were expected to be acrimonious.

## I.4 ZONE FOUR: BENIN, NIGERIA, AND TOGO

Despite its reputation for political wrangling, **Benin** has been relatively peaceful and stable. Its national conference in 1990 led the wave of democratic liberalization in Africa. In March 2011, the country organized a peaceful democratic transition with incumbent President Yayi Boni winning in the first round. EWARDS supported WANEP/Benin in promoting peaceful conduct of these elections through the institutional grant. WANEP/Benin also received a small EWARDS Peace Fund grant that permitted it to expand and strengthen the national conflict early warning system/network, which WANEP/Benin heads. The National Network also participated in the training and testing of the Elections Dispute Management Practice Guide, produced under EWARDS, specifically making a number of recommendations for electoral reform that were personally received by the President of the Republic.

Although Benin fares better than most of its cohorts in terms of future risk for violent conflict, there was some concern that piracy off the coast was disrupting the country's strategic position as a transportation hub for the transshipment of goods to landlocked neighbors Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. The Beninese economy is not deeply resilient and depends on this trade.

Although the **Nigerian** government nearly brought an end to violence in the delta, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) did not completely disband. MEND accused the Federal Government of failing to honor its agreements, and ordinary citizens saw little difference in terms of local development. In Jos, communal violence broke out in January and March 2010, and continued sporadically over the project period. Boko Haram, meaning "Western Education is Forbidden," unleashed a spate of bombings across the country. In July 2010, members of the sect attacked police stations and government establishments in four northern states—Borno, Yobe, Kano, and Katsina—leading to the death of some 400 persons and the displacement of 4,000 more before Yusuf Mohammed, the leader of Boko Haram, was shot dead by police. Bombers in Abuja hit national police headquarters, the parade grounds during Nigeria's 50<sup>th</sup> Independence Anniversary, and UN offices.

WARDS conducted several activities in Nigeria including a conflict assessment in Jos in February 2010, a stakeholders' roundtable/workshop on the conflict findings in July 2010, and several workshops and trainings at ECOWAS/EWD headquarters in Abuja. With EWARDS assistance, WANEP/Nigeria and the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution (IPCR) in Abuja initiated dialog with communal groups involved in the Jos conflict. The success of the process attracted support from UNDP and the Plateau State Governor.

WARDS also made two small grants to Nigerian NGOs. A grant to the Women Environmental Program (WEP) provided trauma healing to victims of the Jos violence, and a grant to IMPACT in Lagos State helped revitalize Lagos State's early warning network in the run-up to national elections in April 2011. Goodluck Jonathon emerged the winner of these elections, which observers rated as the most professional in the history of the country.

"My colleague read the EWARDS Jos Conflict Assessment and found it to be the single most useful document to help her understand conflict dynamics and issues in Jos."

- US Embassy Officer,  
Abuja, Nigeria



# 3.0 PROGRAM OVERVIEW

## 3.1 PURPOSE AND BACKGROUND

This section of the report offers a brief overview of the project and covers administrative and management aspects of EWARDS.

Early Warning and Response Design Support (EWARDs) program was a \$4.5 million 28-month project funded by USAID/WA with technical support from USAID's Conflict Management and Mitigation Office (DCHA/CMM) in Washington, DC. The project's goal was to reinforce sub-regional efforts to develop and strengthen a conflict early warning system for West Africa.

EWARDs roots date to the turn of the millennium when the sub-region was reeling from the effects of protracted civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Growing concern over the destabilizing effects of violent conflict in the sub-region led to a desire to establish timely and effective conflict prevention mechanisms and response actions. One expression of support for early warning was the 1999 ECOWAS *Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security* that explicitly called for establishing a region-wide system. Two years later, the 2001 *Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance* reiterated the value of early warning.

From 2002–2007, USAID/WA supported joint cooperation by WANEP and ECOWAS to build their capacity in conflict prevention and good governance. In 2006, a USAID-sponsored independent evaluation of early warning efforts noted a number of successes, including 1) the establishment and staffing of ECOWAS' Department of Early Warning; 2) the dramatic expansion of WANEP from 80 to 450 member organizations; and 3) the design and initial implementation of a region-wide events-data based early warning system, ECOWAS's Warning and Response Network (ECOWARN).

In October 2007, USAID conducted an internal review of ECOWARN and found that data collection instruments had been developed, a data collection system established, 30 country reporters trained and fairly regular submission of weekly Situation Reports. However, several areas required attention if the vision for an effective, well-functioning early warning system was to be realized—hence, EWARDs.



## 3.2 PROJECT START-UP AND STAFFING

Tetra Tech ARD signed the contract on 11 May 2009 and began implementation with a field launch in Abuja in June 2009. Stakeholders participating in the launch included the USAID/WA Contracting Officer (CO), the Contracting Officer's Technical Representative (COTR), Tetra Tech ARD's Senior Technical Advisor/Manager (STA/M), Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Specialist and Chief of Party (COP), representatives of the subcontractors, the Economic Community of West African States, Early Warning Department (ECOWAS/EWD) staff, and WANEP's Program Director. These key project stakeholders drafted a set of activities for the work plan, and notional ideas for the performance monitoring plan (PMP), which was further developed by the M&E Specialist afterwards in Accra, Ghana.

Following the Abuja launch, EWARDs held meetings in Accra with WANEP senior management to establish a memorandum of understanding (MOU) for an institutional grant to provide core funding to WANEP's regional headquarters in Accra, and to pay for salaries and recurring expenses for WANEP's

National Networks. This phase of the program also witnessed the acquisition of a project vehicle and preparations of scopes of work for project activities commencing in August.

EWARDS staffed up from June to September 2009. Prior to project launch, Ebenezer Asiedu resigned his position as Program Officer (a key position) to take a post with ECOWAS/EWD in Abuja. Over the life of the project, EWARDS twice replaced the Program Officer and also replaced the M&E Specialist and driver. A grants assistant joined the team for approximately two months before tendering her resignation to take a long-term job. The project team consisted of:

1. Robert Groelsema, Chief of Party;
2. Aiden Sabie and Roselyn Onyegbula, Program Officer;
3. Avril Kudzi, Finance Officer and Grants Manager;
4. Eric Sunu and Mike Sowah, M&E Specialist;
5. Joycelyne Alorwu, Administrative Assistant;
6. Edward Gorogah and Justice Ansah, Driver;
7. Gisele Vedogbeton, Grants Assistant.

Tetra Tech ARD Home Office support consisted of technical backstopping from Lewis Rasmussen, STA/M. Mr. Rasmussen was replaced by Steve Snook in April 2010. Additional support came from Dimitri Obolensky, Project Manager; Karen Wingate, Contracting Specialist; Joe Le Clair and Sarah Wood, M&E Specialists; and Indeok Oak and Kelly Scarneas, Grants Specialists.

USAID/WA COTR, Moussokoro Kane, and Contract Officers (COs) Lawrence Bogus, Jennifer Crow-Yang, Martina Wills, and Victor Doka provided valuable support to the project. Rachel Locke, Kirby Reiling, and Andrew Sweet of DCHA/CMM made vital technical and management contributions to EWARDS.

### **3.3 WORK PLAN**

Work planning began with the launch in Abuja. The first version of the Year 1 (Y1) work plan was submitted to USAID in July 2009. EWARDS submitted revisions of that Plan in December 2009 and January 2010. However, none of those plans was formally approved and EWARDS operated on a one-off approval basis for individual scopes of work. EWARDS submitted Year 2 (Y2) work plans in June, with revised iterations in September and December 2010, and in January and March 2011. USAID approved the work plan in late March 2011 along with a no-cost extension of the project till September 26, 2011.

In early 2010, USAID had announced a mid-term review of EWARDS, which was partly the reason for delays in work plan approval. Pending results of the review, EWARDS first submitted a request for a no-cost extension in September 2010 followed by subsequent requests and revisions to work plan and budget as noted. Following the release of the mid-term report in October, the Project Management Committee (PMC) met in late November 2010. At that meeting, PMC members agreed to change aspects of the work plan. Some 20 discrete activities were conducted from April-September 2011.

### **3.4 PMP**

The PMP also underwent iterative revisions. Following the first submission in July 2009, the Y1 document was revised and resubmitted in December 2009, February 2010, and April 2010. USAID approved that version in June 2010, but changes to activities following from the mid-term review required substantial revisions to indicators. Thus, EWARDS submitted further revisions in December 2010 and January 2011. USAID approved the January version on April 19, 2011 making it the operable plan until project close-out (see Section 7).

### **3.5 METHODS OF ASSISTANCE – SUBCONTRACTORS, DEVELOPMENT PARTNERS, AND PMC**

Capacity building was a chief aim of EWARDS. Activities conducted by TetraTech ARD and its subcontractors, Virtual Research Associates (VRA) and University of Maryland, Center for International Development and Conflict Management (UMD/CIDCM), were designed to support the work of the principal project beneficiaries, ECOWAS and WANEP.

EDWARDS partners established a Project Management Committee (PMC) to oversee and guide project activity. Members of the PMC included USAID/WA, CMM, ECOWAS, WANEP, and Tetra Tech ARD. Over the life of the project, the PMC met five times. The last meeting was held on 30 November 2010.





## 4.0 ACTIVITIES COMPLETED JULY-SEPTEMBER 2011

From July to September, EWARDS conducted 13 activities. In mid-September, Dimitri Obolensky, Tetra Tech ARD Home Office Project Manager, assisted the field team with project close-out. Per USAID's guidance, the project vehicle and other property were disposed of by public auction.<sup>3</sup> The COP returned to the U.S. on September 28 where he completed submission of various reports.

Under IO 1, EWARDS continued to design the ECOWARN Response Reports (ResReps) feature, conducted beta testing on the feature in Abuja in July, and conducted a concluding workshop in September on how to maximize the use of ECOWARN analytical tools (integrated analysis training). The training reviewed indicators, graphs and maps, structural vulnerability analysis, and the ResReps feature. Over this period, Virtual Research Associates (VRA) continued to provide 24/7 remote operational support and backup of the ECOWARN server.

In July under IO 2, EWARDS completed the Ghana West African Conflict Assessment (WACA), conducted a stakeholders' workshop to vet the recommendations of the assessment in August, and revised and submitted the final report of the Ghana WACA in September. EWARDS revised the WACA toolkit and submitted the final version in September.

Institutional support to WANEP came to a close the end of August when the grant was terminated. Two WACA response activities were conducted in Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire, and two tests on the Elections Practice Guide were conducted in Benin and Nigeria. EWARDS edited and revised WANEP's version of the document and submitted it to USAID on October 18, 2011.

Table 2 below summarizes activity over the final quarter of EWARDS.

**Table 2: Final Quarter Activities of EWARDS**

| Activity  | Date           | Comments  |
|---|----------------|---|
| <b>EARLY WARNING AND RESPONSE DESIGN SUPPORT (EWARDS)</b>             |                |   |
| <b>General</b>  |                |   |
| Incremental funding received  | August 5       | Tetra Tech ARD submitted request for incremental funding on June 9  |
| USAID Review and Approval of Property Disposition and Close-out Plan  | September 8    | Guidance received from USAID - Tetra Tech ARD resubmitted close-out plan on July 21                                       |
| Close-out of EWARDS   | September 26   | No-cost extension end date  |
| <b>Intermediate Objective I</b>                                       |                |   |
| Activity Set #1 – Operational Support for ECOWARN & back-up of server | July-September | VRA continues operational support and back-up of the transferred ECOWARN server for lack of essential redundancy          |
| Activity Set #3 – Structural Integration of Data Analysis Tool        | September 22   | EWARDS revised and completed the Primer (users' manual) for conducting structural vulnerability analysis/assessment (SVA) |

<sup>3</sup> Official sale of the vehicle is pending authorization by the appropriate Ghana authorities.

| Activity  | Date                     | Comments  |
|---|--------------------------|---|
| <b>EARLY WARNING AND RESPONSE DESIGN SUPPORT (EWARDS)</b>                               |                          |   |
| Activity Set #4 – Beta test of ResReps and SMS feature                                  | July 4-9                 | Beta test and trial installation of the new ECOWARN ResReps feature in Abuja  |
| Activity Set #4 – Technical assistance for ECOWARN tools, applications and new features | September 5-10           | VRA technical assistance and training for installing the ResReps and SMS feature, and conduct of integrated analysis training |
| <b>Intermediate Objective 2</b>   |                          |   |
| Activity Set #5 – WACA TOT  | June 27-July 19          | In Ghana - co-led by UMD and WANEP  |
| Activity Set #5-Stakeholders Workshop   | August 22                | Ghana WACA stakeholders workshop  |
| Activity Set #5 – WACA Toolkit  | September 20             | Submission of toolkit to USAID  |
| <b>Intermediate Objective 3</b>   |                          |   |
| Activity Set #7: Response Design and Development – Liberia Response Activity            | July 13-14               | Organized by WANEP/Liberia for electoral disputes preparedness  |
| Activity Set #7: Practice Guide Testing in Nigeria and Benin                            | July 18-21; July 28-29   | Pilot testing – final step in preparation of the Practice Guide   |
| Activity Set #7: Practice Guide Publishing and Dissemination                            | September 28; October 18 | Submission to USAID for review; resubmission of edited/revised document   |
| Activity Set #7: Institutional Support to WANEP   | July-September           | Through the WANEP institutional grant   |
| Activity Set #7: Côte d'Ivoire Response Activity  | August 24-25             | National Reconciliation Forum   |

# 5.0 PROGRAM RESULTS

## 5.1 INTERMEDIATE OBJECTIVE I – STRENGTHEN THE CORE FUNCTIONS OF ECOWARN

The purpose of IO 1 was to refine and consolidate data collection, analysis, and reporting. IO 1 activities over the life of the project (LOP) included:

- Continuous ECOWARN Operational Support;
- On-site technical assistance, training, and tutoring to EWD;
- Two training/workshops on indicators development, calibration, and refinements;
- Three workshops on structural data integration;
- Two beta test workshops for structural data integration and the ResReps application;
- ResReps design and development;
- An integrated analysis training workshop; and
- Migration of the ECOWARN production server to ECOWAS/EWD.

EWARDS divided activities into four sets: 1) operational support; 2) calibration of Situation Report (SitRep) indicators; 3) integration of structural data analysis into ECOWARN; and 4) technical assistance in the use of tools. Besides improving the core functions of ECOWARN, the activities built EWD capacity to utilize the tool more fully to perform complex analyses. Transfer of the hosting of the server to ECOWAS significantly increased local ownership of the system.

Activity Set 1 ensured a continuous high level of performance of ECOWARN. Over the life of the project, VRA provided 24/7 remote technical support by telephone and email that included regular back-ups, diagnostics, debugging, correction of glitches, provision of patches, and general maintenance on the system.

Given the importance of sustainability and ownership of the system, EWARDS transferred the hosting of the ECOWARN server to EWD in the first quarter of 2011. Preparations for the transfer began in November 2010 and involved assessment of the computing environment, installation of the Lomé production candidate server with an English operating system (OS), and several tests on the production and backup servers. VRA ensured a smooth management and technical transition by providing overlapping hosting service for 120 days after transfer. EWARDS continued to provide technical assistance and support to EWD over the LOP for system stability.

### Over the LOP, EWARDS met 11 of 12 IO 1 deliverables:

1. ECOWARN server operational in ECOWAS Region.
2. Back-up hosting of migrated server for 120 days.
3. Continuous operations through timely server support throughout migration.
4. Sustained and continuous operation of migrated ECOWAS server.
5. Accurate diagnosis and timely resolution of issues – Secure data owing to regular back-ups.
6. Updates and patches as needed.
7. SitRep indicators list updated with operational definitions.
8. Structural data analysis tool integrated into ECOWARN.
9. EWD analysts able to use the Context feature in the application.
10. EWD analysts able to use field data to produce graphs.
11. Response Reports application functional (partially met).
12. EWD able to use ResReps feature (unmet).

Activity Set 2 focused on the calibration of SitRep indicators. The approach was participatory and consisted of two hands-on workshops with EWD and WANEP technicians to assess and define, and weight and scale the SitRep indicators. The technicians also assigned alert parameters and reviewed incident types and parameters as a result of the adjustments. They also reduced the number of indicators from 94 to 66. A noteworthy improvement to the tool was the addition of Portuguese language terms to ECOWARN menus. The tool now features menus in English, French, and Portuguese.

EDWARDS Activity Set 3 focused on designing and engineering an application for conducting structural risk analysis. This feature is now available by clicking on the Context feature of ECOWARN. The application provides access to the *Africa Prospects* database, a tool utilized by the AU's Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) to conduct structural vulnerability assessments. The results of these analyses can be displayed in graphic form utilizing the ECOWARN Maps and Summaries features. The design process included a beta version, which VRA and EWD tested on site in Abuja. To enhance sustainability, EDWARDS subcontractors UMD/CIDCM and VRA co-produced a Structural Vulnerability Assessment (SVA) Primer, explaining the theory underlying SVA. The Primer also provides step-by-step instructions for utilizing *Africa Prospects*. During the May 2011 workshop, EWD analysts produced a SVA for each of the 15 ECOWAS member states.

The purpose of Activity Set 4 was to encourage analysts to more fully utilize ECOWARN features. Maps, summaries, SVA, and ResReps features represented powerful analytical tools, but required further training and tutoring to maximize their use. In addition to training, this activity set included design and engineering of the ResReps feature. The production process involved five months of remote and on-site design including numerous consultations with EWD systems division staff to ensure that the design responded to EWD needs and preferences. VRA delivered the beta version of the feature to EWD in July 2011, conducted a beta test on site, and armed with vital feedback, made final adjustments to the user interface. Training on the feature was not fully completed because EWD had not activated the in- and outbound SMS channels.



ECOWAS Early Warning Conflict Analyst Conducting Structural Vulnerability Analysis. Photo by Robert Groelsema

A summary of key outcomes/achievements under IO 1 include:

- Uninterrupted ECOWARN service for reliable incident and situational reporting;
- Enhanced accessibility to ECOWARN for Lusophones (Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde);
- Strengthened sustainability and ownership of ECOWARN owing to:
  - Installation of a test/demonstration server at ECOWAS headquarters. The demonstration server facilitates in-house training;
  - Addition of off-line capability permitting data input by field reporters during power outages;
  - Migration of the ECOWARN production server from Miami, Florida to ECOWAS Offices in Lomé, Togo;
- Enhanced risk forecasting owing to SVA skills acquisition and tool enhancement;
- Improved data quality owing to:
  - Increased skills and technical capacity of field reporters and Zonal Bureau personnel;
  - Revisions to indicators, parameters and associated alerts; operational definitions, new scaling techniques and recalibrated measures;
  - Strengthened capacity within the EWD for quality control and systems maintenance;
- Enhanced utilization of early warning data because of training and tutorials; and
- Addition of SMS capability within ECOWARN for real-time response, monitoring, and reporting across the sub-region.

## 5.2 INTERMEDIATE OBJECTIVE 2 – PRECIPITATE ECOWARN WITH STRUCTURAL WARNING AND ANALYSIS

The purpose of IO 2 was to augment events-based data and strengthen conflict risk analysis through assessments and SVA for more nuanced and robust risk forecasting. Assessing the structural profile of a country and making systematic comparisons to historical data permits measurement of a country's relative risk for future conflict. IO 2 Activities over the LOP included:

- Design of a conflict assessment methodology;
- Five West Africa Conflict Assessments (WACAs);
- Four WACA Stakeholders' Workshops;
- Two Peace and Conflict in West Africa (PACWA) reports;
- A workshop to build local capacity to produce the PACWA;
- A workshop on Structural Data utilization;
- A WACA Training of Trainers (TOT) workshop; and
- Production of the WACA Toolkit (including a trainers' manual).

**Over the LOP, EWARDS achieved 4 of 4 IO 2 milestones and deliverables:**

- 1. Holding the Structural Data Workshop;**
- 2. Conducting the WACA TOT;**
- 3. Conducting the WACA practicum with reports (collapsed into one practicum instead of two);**
- 4. Producing the WACA toolkit.**

EWARDS divided the activities into two sets. Activity Set 5 consisted of developing a methodological framework, conducting five WACAs, holding stakeholder workshops to vet assessment findings and recommendations, and producing a conflict assessment toolkit. Activity Set 6 consisted of producing two "Peace and Conflict in West Africa" (PACWA) Reports.

The WACAs began with a pilot assessment in Jos, Nigeria (January-February 2010), followed by a national-level assessment in Côte d'Ivoire (March 2010). These WACAs were experimental in the sense that they provided EWARDS with tests of the framework and logistical lessons. Because of active conflict in Jos,



Participants debrief during the Guinea-Bissau Conflict Assessment. Photo by Robert Groelsema

certain team members were not allowed to travel to Jos. Members of ECOWAS and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) therefore conducted field work in Jos, while others conducted interviews and data-gathering in Abuja. This arrangement provided a workable model for future WACAs where the principal team leader gathered data in the capital city and stayed in daily contact with team leaders in the field.

EWARDS conducted other WACAs in Liberia, Guinea-Bissau, and Ghana. EWARDS combined the Ghana exercise with a training of trainers (TOT) in which seven alumni of previous WACAs received

intensive hands-on instruction over five days that included organization of WACAs, leading teams, and supervising the analysis and reporting of results. WANEP's Early Warning Coordinator, Murtala Touray, an alumnus and field team leader of WACAs in Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia, and Guinea-Bissau, co-led the training. In all, EWARDS trained some 50 individuals from more than 20 NGOs in the applied WACA methodology. ECOWAS also received exposure to the methodology through its participation in the Jos assessment.



EDWARDS recorded the following lessons from the WACAs. First, the methodology is adaptable to active as well as latent or passive conflict environments, and is scalable for use at local and national levels (e.g., Jos versus Côte d'Ivoire). The methodology is replicable. It produced similar findings to those of other conflict assessments (e.g., InterPeace in Guinea-Bissau) and findings that complemented other types of assessments (e.g., Center for Strategic and International Studies [CSIS] conflict assessment in Ghana and the USAID Democracy and Governance Assessment in Ghana).

Second, a full-scale WACA requires two and a half weeks of in-country presence, and three months prior planning. Report-writing takes 30-40 days to produce a first draft. WACAs are time-intensive and require commitments that most NGO members find hard to make. However, the quality of results depends on such commitment.

Third, a stakeholders' workshop helps to vet findings, conclusions, and recommendations. These workshops can be held either at the end of the exercise or following the delivery of the first draft of the report. If the budget allows, the latter option works well because it generates more concise and refined recommendations.

Lastly, response workshops and response activities should be envisioned to follow up on the WACA recommendations. Response activities proved highly beneficial for Jos, Côte d'Ivoire, and Liberia.

The second activity set in IO 2 was designed to access and utilize structural data in conflict risk analysis. EDWARDS operationalized this objective by producing two Peace and Conflict in West Africa (PACWA) reports. PACWA methodology approximated UMD/CIDCM's Peace and Conflict Instability Ledger (PCIL), which ranks countries according to level of risk for future conflict based on structural features. The PACWAs consisted of two main sections: section one explained risk scores and section two contained individual country profiles for each of the member states. The profiles featured graphs and charts with analyses of hypothetical changes to structural characteristics.

Although the first PACWA was generally well-received, EDWARDS partners expressed concerns over the PACWA reporting format and the relevance of certain indicators to West Africa. Hence, EDWARDS *contextualized* the second PACWA report by including case studies and explanations of how indicators affected

risk scores. With the intent to hand the PACWA over to WANEP by end of project, UMD conducted training for select WANEP staff on structural indicators, rankings and risk scores, the data library, the analyses and use of graphs, and the development of country profiles.

USAID decided, however, to discontinue the PACWA and to replace it with a workshop whereby WANEP and ECOWAS would be trained to access, analyze, interpret, and utilize structural data. UMD led that workshop in May 2010.



Lantana B. Abdullahi participated in the Jos WACA, stakeholders' roundtable/workshop and the TOT.  
Photo by Robert Groelsema

*Lantana B. Abdullahi, Programme Officer (CEPAN)  
at the Jos Roundtable, July 12, 2010*

"This training was useful to me because I can relate well with people from the diverse ethnic groups in the state. Even though a Muslim, they don't see me as an enemy but someone passionate about peace in the state.

After the EDWARDS assessment, WANEP invited me to participate in their assessment which targets women and UNSCR 1325."

A summary of key outcomes/achievements under IO 2 include:

- Development of a West Africa Conflict Assessment (WACA) Methodology/Framework;
- Development of a WACA Toolkit and Training Manual for conducting WACAs;
- Conduct of five conflict assessments;
- Training of Trainers to strengthen capacity for conflict analysis;
- Production of two Peace and Conflict in West Africa Reports;
- Training on accessing and utilizing structural data for conflict risk forecasting;
- Increased capacity for structural vulnerability analysis; and
- A Primer to guide ECOWAS and WANEP analysts to conduct structural vulnerability assessments.

### 5.3 INTERMEDIATE OBJECTIVE 3 – LINK WARNING AND ANALYSIS TO RESPONSE

The main purpose of IO 3 was to bridge the gap between early warning signals and action, and to strengthen response capacity. Operationalizing this goal proved challenging because ECOWAS does not typically share reporting products and systemic response requires predictable and sustained funding. EWARDS's strategy was to support the WANEP/Regional office in Accra and its National Networks and affiliates throughout the sub-region with an institutional grant, and to provide assistance for targeted response activities. The Elections Dispute Management Practice Guide (Practice Guide) constitutes a prime example. IO 3 Activities over the LOP included:

- A Mediation and Response Workshop;
- A Consultative Meeting to launch the Practice Guide;
- Three WACA response roundtables/workshops in Jos, Abidjan, and Monrovia;
- Award of an institutional grant to WANEP/Regional;
- Competitive awarding of five small grants;
- Practice Guide Validation Workshop;
- Practice Guide training workshops in Abuja and Cotonou;
- Practice Guide testing in Cotonou and Imo State, Nigeria; and
- Production of the Practice Guide report.



EWARDS grouped IO 3 activities into two sets with four main components: 1) the development of a Practice Guide containing strategies to prevent and mitigate elections-related conflict in the sub-region; 2) an institutional grant to support WANEP regional headquarters and National Networks; 3) competitive small grants to build early warning and response capacity; and 4) activities responding to WACA findings, conclusions, and recommendations.

Two activities in the original work plan were not conducted: 1) a case study/retrospective analysis of ECOWAS and civil society interventions in a post-conflict country, and 2) development of Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) to sustain WANEP activities. USAID did not approve the PPP activity, and the case study, which was intended for Côte d'Ivoire, became impossible when ECOWAS evacuated its personnel during the post-elections crisis.

The main component within IO 3 was the development of a Practice Guide to prevent and manage elections-related disputes. WANEP had provided elections monitoring and other electoral assistance to countries across West Africa for eight years. Over the course of its work, WANEP observed that the sub-region lacked a comprehensive handbook with practical guidance to prevent, mitigate, and resolve elections-related disputes. With EWARDS support, WANEP embarked on developing a Guide beginning with a consultative meeting in Accra, hiring a consultant to draft the Guide, a meeting to validate the Guide in Abuja, and training and testing on the Guide in Cotonou and Abuja. WANEP completed the Guide in August 2011.

Practice Guide meetings and workshops involved between 30-80 individuals representing government, military, NGOs, and donors. The Imo State, Nigeria testing of the Guide led to commitments by state officials to establish peace committees throughout the state to manage tensions between members of the two leading parties. A similarly encouraging result came from the Benin experience. Participants in that exercise identified conflict-prone deficiencies and weaknesses in the Beninese electoral system. Following the workshop, WANEP/Benin and a delegation of participants presented their findings and recommendations directly to the President of the Republic in a session covered by national media.

The second IO 3 activity set consisted of an institutional grant with core funding for WANEP/Regional and 14 WANEP National Networks. With top-ups, total grant funding came to more than \$580,000. The grant paid partial salaries of the Regional Secretariat's Executive Director, Program Director, Administrative Manager, and most of the Early Warning Coordinator's salary. It also paid for recurring costs at regional headquarters and covered travel for members of the Regional Secretariat to participate in EWARDS activities. EWARDS co-located its offices in WANEP's regional headquarters in Accra.

Importantly, the institutional grant extended WANEP's reach across the sub-region. First, it helped WANEP attract funding from other donors. WANEP/Regional reported that EWARDS institutional support enabled it to leverage three years of program funding from the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA). EWARDS institutional support also enabled WANEP/Gambia to obtain program assistance from the United Nations Democracy Fund and the EU, and it helped WANEP/Benin leverage assistance from the Open Society Initiative for West Africa (OSIWA). Second, the core funding enabled National Network Coordinators to develop their offices and to expand their networks of affiliates in their countries. Third, the grant paid the salaries of

**Seven of eight IO 3 milestones and deliverables were achieved:**

- 1. Holding the experts and practitioners Consultative Meeting on the Elections Practice Guide;**
- 2. Holding the validation workshop on the Practice Guide;**
- 3. Holding the training workshops on the Practice Guide;**
- 4. Conducting pilot interventions/tests using the Guide in Benin and Nigeria;**
- 5. Publishing and disseminating the Guide;**
- 6. Disbursing the WANEP institutional grants;**
- 7. Implementing the EPF small grants; and**
- 8. Conducting a case study on a post-conflict country (not met owing to violent conflict in Côte d'Ivoire).**



WANEP's Zonal Coordinators, who provided strategic early warning assistance to ECOWAS Zonal Bureaus. Fourth, the assistance permitted WANEP to establish two new National Networks in Cape Verde and Mali.<sup>4</sup>

A third component of IO 3 consisted of five small grants awarded to WANEP National Networks and NGOs.<sup>5</sup> These grants not only assisted NGOs to carry out conflict early warning and response activities, but because they were competitively awarded and required strict compliance with USAID rules for grants under contract (GUCs), the process proved a steep learning curve for offerors. For relatively modest amounts of funding, the grants produced significant results. For example, the grant to the Women Environmental Program (WEP) in Abuja provided trauma healing services to 270 clients in Bisichi community and 60 clients in Congo Russia community, far surpassing the combined target of 120. WEP utilized grant funds to hire a professional counselor to train 20 local counselor-practitioners, who conducted individual and group therapy sessions.

Impact for Change and Development (IMPACT) based in Lagos State, Nigeria also recorded significant success in implementing a small grant to revitalize a conflict early warning network in Lagos State. Lagos State had experienced violent conflict in the run-up to previous elections, and wanted to prepare to manage disputes in the campaign period preceding the 2011 presidential elections (in April 2011). The project succeeded in that respect, and also produced a handbook on Early Warning/Early Response to Conflict. Moreover, thanks to revival of the network, law enforcement agents were tipped off and intercepted a cache of arms hidden in a truck beneath a herd of rams.

The fourth and last component of IO 3 was the response activities to the Jos, Côte d'Ivoire, and Liberia conflict assessments. The Jos mediation workshop successfully brought together representatives of seven major ethnic groups on the plateau. In addition to opening channels of dialog, the various parties developed action plans listing their grievances and making specific recommendations to government and civil society on ending the violence there.



The Liberia Response workshop, attended by members of government, five political parties, and 35 CSOs proposed a number of concrete recommendations to prevent violent disputes from occurring during the country's national constitutional referendum and presidential elections. Thanks in part to EWARDS workshop, Liberia's national referendum on the constitution in August and its national elections in October 2011 came off peacefully.

The Côte d'Ivoire response featured a national-level workshop to promote national reconciliation in the aftermath of elections violence. More specifically, the workshop structured a partnership between civil society and the Dialog, Truth and Reconciliation Commission (DTRC). Following the workshop, WANEP, EWARDS, and select partners presented the findings of the workshop to the President of the DTRC, the President of the Human Rights Commission in Côte d'Ivoire, and the U.S. Embassy.

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<sup>4</sup> A third National Network was envisioned for Niger. However, U.S. sanctions against the government of Niger for the first three-quarters of the project made this assistance impossible.

<sup>5</sup> The grant to WANEP/Côte d'Ivoire was terminated because of insecurity in the western part of the country.

A summary of key outcomes/achievements under IO 3 include:

- Strengthening of WANEP's staff and peace-building mission across the sub-region via core support to WANEP/Regional and to 14 WANEP offices;
- Establishment of two WANEP National Network offices in Cape Verde and Mali;
- Recruitment of three zonal coordinators to provide technical and professional support to the ECOWAS Zonal Bureaus;
- Awarding of five small grants for conflict early warning and response across the sub-region;
- Participatory design and development of a Practice Guide to Prevent and Mitigate Election Disputes;
- Response interventions in Jos, Nigeria, Liberia, and Côte d'Ivoire;
- Technical skills capacity-building for 14 ECOWAS Early Warning staff and 4 WANEP/Regional staff;
- Capacity building for more than 500 individuals and strengthening of more than 170 NGOs across the sub-region participating in EWARDS conflict early warning and response program activities; and
- Creation of a West Africa Conflict Assessment Framework (WACA).



Billboard in the run-up to the Liberian 2011 elections. Photo courtesy of Bocar Thiam

# 6.0 PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT PLAN


## 6.1 EWARDS PMP

This section reviews the logic of the EWARDS program, activities conducted in the final quarter, movement on indicators, and the EOP indicator tracking sheet (see Table 3 at the end of this section).

EDWARDS performance indicators measure achievement of the program's Intermediate Objectives (IOs). Toward this end, Tetra Tech ARD and USAID adopted 11 custom and Foreign Assistance Coordinating and Tracking System (FACTS) performance indicators. As expressed in the Performance Monitoring Plan (PMP), the program hypothesized that:

- If events data collection, reporting, storage, and retrieval capacity of ECOWARN is consolidated, strengthened, and improved; and
- If analysis tools that identify longer-term structural risk factors and conflict dynamics are supported, strengthened, and improved; and
- If warning and analysis are more effectively and efficiently linked to response;
- Then an improved and strengthened regional early warning system that explicitly links warning signals to targeted responses by governments or NGOs will be in place.

As noted in Section 3.4 above, the Performance Monitoring Plan (PMP) evolved over the life of project to reflect changes in program emphasis and activities. Assistance in M&E was provided by Tetra Tech ARD Home Office specialists Joe Le Clair in June 2009 and in September 2010, and by Sarah Cohen Wood in July 2011. Ms. Wood tabulated and analyzed data for EWARDS 7<sup>th</sup> quarterly report, and reviewed EWARDS M&E files and systems as part of an in-house data quality assessment. Indicator 3.4 was not tracked because USAID did not approve the PPP activities.



Doug Bond of VRA explains indicator selection, weighting and compilation of data sets. Photo by Robert Groelsema

## 6.2 EWARDS PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT FOR THE FINAL QUARTER

Five EWARDS activities conducted in the Final Quarter (July-September 2011) contributed to the end of project (EOP) totals in the PMP and to achieving indicator targets under EWARDS Intermediate Objectives. The indicators affected by these activities included:

- Indicator 3.1: FACTS indicator - "Number of people trained in conflict mitigation/resolution skills with USG assistance FACTS P.S. 6.1."

- Indicator 3.2: FACTS indicator – “Number of Non-Governmental constituencies built or strengthened with USG assistance FACTS PS 6.6.”

EDWARDS counted the following activities towards these indicators in the final quarter:

- Training on the Practice Guide led by WANEP in Abuja, Nigeria – June 17-18, 2011;<sup>6</sup>
- Liberia WACA Response Workshop led by WANEP - July 13-14, 2011;
- Practice Guide Testing in Imo State, Nigeria led by WANEP – July 18-21, 2011;
- Practice Guide Testing in Cotonou, Benin led by WANEP – July 28-29, 2011;
- Côte d'Ivoire WACA Response Workshop led by WANEP – August 24-25, 2011.<sup>7</sup>

### 6.3 PERFORMANCE INDICATOR TRACKING SHEET


- **Indicator 1.1: *Number of upgrades made to strengthen the ECOWARN tool.*** This indicator target was met. EDWARDS broadly defined this indicator to include training on upgrades so that new features would be utilized. The baseline of 7 derives from 7 improvements/upgrades to ECOWARN in Y1, namely:

1. Installation of a test/demonstration server at ECOWAS headquarters;
2. Introduction of off-line capability for ECOWARN users;
3. Enhancement of the summaries feature;
4. Orientation and training for ECOWARN users on these new features and upgrades to ECOWARN;
5. Recalibration of SitRep indicators;
6. Structural vulnerability analysis orientation and training; and
7. Assessment of hardware and software (infrastructure requirements) of ECOWARN.

Year 2 brought the following improvements:

1. Structural data analysis tool and database;
2. Portuguese language capability;
3. A revised list of SitRep indicators (pared from 94 to 66), calibrated with operational definitions;
4. A comprehensive ECOWARN users' manual with online help functions (includes the SVA Primer);
5. Updated SOPs;
6. Response Reports (ResReps) application;<sup>8</sup> and
7. Physical relocation of the ECOWARN server from the U.S. to Lomé, Togo.

The total number of improvements was 14, meeting the indicator target for the life of project (LOP).



Sean Yeo of VRA tutors Alice Akoji in ECOWARN integrated analysis. Photo by Robert Groelsema


<sup>6</sup> Even though the activity was conducted in June, the data was not available for tabulation in the previous quarterly report.

<sup>7</sup> ECOWARN integrated analysis training led by VRA from September 5-9, 2011 did not count toward these targets since the individuals trained were counted in previous trainings.

<sup>8</sup> The ResReps feature must be activated by ECOWAS (inbound and outbound channels) in order to utilize the application.



- **Indicator 1.2: Number of target ECOWARN users (disaggregated by sex, nationality, and type of user) with increased capacity to utilize the new features in the ECOWARN tool.** The target for this indicator was exceeded. The indicator attempted to gauge capacity within ECOWAS and WANEP to utilize the new features of ECOWARN. Over the LOP, EWARDS trained a total of 17 persons, including six ECOWAS systems division technicians (counting two recent GIS hires), eight EWD analysts, and three WANEP/Regional IT and early warning staff. EWARDS exceeded the target for this indicator by three.
- **Indicator 1.3: Number of difficulties tracked in using the ECOWARN tool.** This indicator target was not met, *but this was a target that EWARDS did not want to achieve.* The indicator was designed to gauge EWD capacity to track user complaints at various levels. EWARDS assumed that improvements and upgrades to the tool would create new difficulties for users. However, the number of difficulties reported was extremely small (7), well below the target of 34. Reasons for this result could be the effectiveness of training and technical assistance, efficient skills transfer, timely troubleshooting and quality of upgrades to the tool. It is also possible that there was under-reporting or lapses in tracking of reported difficulties.
- **Indicator 2.1 Number of organizations that receive EWARDS conflict analyses within two weeks of preparation.** This indicator target was not met. It was designed to measure timely and effective dissemination of WACA reports. The Year 2 target of 600 was based on circulation of four WACA reports to 150 recipients per report. The target was not achieved because the conflict reports for Guinea-Bissau and Ghana, which EWARDS submitted during the final two quarters of the project, had not been cleared by USAID for dissemination before the end of the project.
- **Indicator 2.2: Number of users (disaggregated by sex, nationality, and type of user) able to conduct structural vulnerability assessments (SVA) employing the ECOWARN data analysis tool.** This indicator target was exceeded by three. The indicator was designed to measure ECOWAS staff ability to employ the data analysis tool to analyze structural characteristics of states. EWARDS set a Year 2 target of 9, which represented the core users of the ECOWARN tool (EWD headquarters analysts and systems division staff). The actual number of ECOWARN users trained to conduct Structural Vulnerability Analysis/Assessments included 10 EWD staff and two WANEP staff for a total of 12.
- **Indicator 2.3: Number of stakeholder roundtables convened to plan responses to conflicts based on conflict analyses.** This indicator target was met. The indicator target was designed to measure efforts to engage local stakeholders and to stimulate actionable responses to conflict analyses. EWARDS set a Year 2 target of 5, which had to be lowered by one to reflect the decision to combine two practicum exercises into one. In the final quarter, EWARDS conducted the Ghana WACA Stakeholder Roundtable bringing the total to 4.
- **Indicator 3.1: FACTS indicator Number of people trained in conflict mitigation/resolution skills with USG assistance FACTS P.S. 6.1.** This indicator target of 198 was exceeded. Far more individuals participated in Practice Guide training and testing and in the WACA Response workshops than anticipated. The project trained 260 persons in the final quarter alone.<sup>9</sup> The total number of individuals trained over the LOP came to 516 - 356 males and 160



Nanténé Coulibaly, EWD Program Officer-Analyst, completing SVA steps. Photo by Robert Groelsema.

<sup>9</sup> The Nigeria Practice Guide Training conducted in June was not counted toward the indicator in the previous quarterly report and thus was added to the totals of the final quarter of the project.

females. Twenty-five males and 4 females attended the trainings, but either did not attend all days of training or did not sign the participant sheets, and were not counted.

Data from the following activities in the final quarter (July-September 2011) counted toward the totals:

- Electoral Practice Guide Training, Abuja – 19 Total (11 M/8 F);
- Electoral Practice Guide Testing in Cotonou - 34 Total (26 M/8 F);
- Electoral Practice Guide Testing in Imo State, Nigeria - 87 Total (73 M/15 F);
- Response Workshop in Liberia – 54 Total (41 M/13/F); and
- Response Workshop in Côte d'Ivoire – 65 Total (43 M/ 22 F).

- **Indicator 3.2: *FACTS indicator Number of Non-Governmental constituencies built or strengthened with USG assistance FACTS PS 6.6.*** This indicator target was exceeded by 111. It was selected to track capacity building by EWARDS. The target for this indicator in Year 2 was 60 and was surpassed by 101. In the final project quarter, 100 CSOs were strengthened through their participation in EWARDS workshop/training activities, bringing the total number of CSOs strengthened by USG assistance to 171 over the LOP. The following data contributed to these totals:

- Electoral Practice Guide Training, Abuja – 12 NGOs;
- Electoral Practice Guide Testing in Cotonou – 7 NGOs;
- Electoral Practice Guide Testing in Imo State, Nigeria – 18 NGOs;
- Response Workshop in Liberia – 35 NGOs; and
- Response Workshop in Côte d'Ivoire – 28 NGOs.

- **Indicator 3.3: *Number of USG programs supporting a conflict and/or fragility early warning system and/or response mechanism FACTS P.S. 6.1*** The target (1) for this indicator remained constant, and was achieved.

- **Indicator 3.4: *Number of NGOs that have a PPP plan in place to engage the private sector.*** This indicator was dropped because the activity to support it was not approved by USAID.

- **Indicator 3.5: *Number of response initiatives taken as a result of EWARDS products.*** The target for this indicator was exceeded. This indicator was broadly defined to include use by decision- and policy-makers. The Year 2 target of two was exceeded by eight for a total of 10 response initiatives in Year 2. The total EOP target of six was exceeded by nine, bringing the total number of response initiatives to 15 over the LOP. Among the responses counted toward this indicator were:

- Agreements by the Berea Foundation, the Conservation Foundation of Ghana and the Foundation for Positive Change (Liberia) to partner on comparing conflict analysis approaches used in the Ghana WACA. This was an early indication of the utility of the WACA framework for WANEP network members and constituencies;



Lindora Howard-Diawara, WANEP/Liberia National Network Coordinator, makes a statement during the WACA training. Murtala Touray, WANEP Regional Conflict Early Warning Coordinator, documents participant contributions.



Joseph Hewitt, UMD/CIDCM trainer, explains a point during the WACA Liberia. Laura McGrew, co-trainer, looks on. Photos by WANEP/Liberia.

- CMM reported that the DCHA/AA utilized EWARDS Côte d'Ivoire WACA Report as her primary briefing document to prepare testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (May 2011);
- U.S. Embassy/Nigeria reported that the Jos Conflict Assessment was the best analysis on the conflict;
- Jos mediation and dialog workshop led by WANEP (June 2011);
- UNDP/Nigeria reported that the Jos WACA Report was sent to UNDP Headquarters to quell rumors of genocide in Jos;<sup>10</sup>
- Liberia Elections Dispute Preparedness Workshop (July 2011);
- Côte d'Ivoire National Reconciliation Workshop (August 2011);
- WANEP/Gambia used content of the first PACWA report relating to The Gambia in developing a project proposal to the EU for funding. The proposal was successful; and
- WANEP Regional adopted recommendations in the WACA Côte d'Ivoire to organize a meeting in Monrovia for women across West Africa in a bid to put pressure on decision makers to seek mediated and negotiated settlement to the Ivoirian crisis.



DTRC President Charles Konan Banny (center) with WANEP and EWARDS delegation. Photo by the DTRC

<sup>10</sup> This testimony was included in this report because it was not captured previously.

**Table 3: Indicator Tracking Sheet**

| Intermediate Objective 1: Strengthening the Core Functions of ECOWARN |   |                |          |               |               |               |               |            |              |  |
|---|---|----------------|----------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|------------|--------------|--|
| Indicator Number  | Performance Indicator   | Indicator Type | Baseline | Year 1 Target | Actual Year 1 | Year 2 Target | Actual Year 2 | EOP Target | Total Actual | Notes for Final Report and PMP   |
| I.1   | Number of upgrades made to strengthen the ECOWARN tool  | Output         | 0        | 7             | 7             | 7             | 7             | 14         | 14           | <b>Met Target</b><br>3 ECOWARN updates were added in final quarter: Users manuals with online help functions (and the SVA Primer); updated SOPs; and ResReps application.  |
| I.2   | Number of target ECOWARN users ( <i>disaggregated by sex, nationality, and type of user</i> ) with increased capacity to utilize the new features in the ECOWARN tool | Outcome        | 0        | N/A           | 3             | 14            | 14            | 14         | 17           | <b>Exceeded Target</b><br>Over the LOP 14 ECOWAS Headquarters Staff and 3 WANEP/Regional staff were trained on new ECOWARN features. EWD Zonal Bureau staff and WANEP Zonal Coordinators also received training in utilizing ECOWARN, but were not counted against this indicator.   |
| I.3   | Number of difficulties tracked in using the ECOWARN tool  | Output         | 11       | N/A           | N/A           | 34            | 7             | 34         | 7            | <b>Not Met</b><br>This is an indicator that EWARDS did <b>not</b> want to achieve.<br><b>Measurement Assumption:</b><br>The assumption underlying this indicator and its targets was that EWARDS upgrades to the tool and closer EWD tracking of user complaints re: operations and applications would raise the number of difficulties reported by ECOWARN users. EWD reported no new difficulties in the final quarter of the project. |



## Intermediate Objective 2: Precipitate ECOWARN with Structural Warning and Analysis

| Indicator Number | Performance Indicator  | Indicator Type | Baseline | Year 1 Target | Actual Year 1 | Year 2 Target | Actual Year 2 | EOP Target | Total Actual | Notes for Final Report and PMP   |
|------------------|--|----------------|----------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|------------|--------------|--|
| 2.1              | Number of organizations that receive EWARDS conflict analyses within two weeks of preparation  | Output         | 0        | N/A           | N/A           | 600           | 203           | 600        | 203          | <b>Not Met</b><br><br><b>Measurement Assumption:</b><br>The EOP assumed dissemination of 4 WACA reports in Year 2. However, 2 reports - Guinea Bissau and Ghana – had not been cleared by USAID at the time this Final Report was completed, and therefore EWARDS was unable to disseminate and count them toward the total. |
| 2.2              | Number of users ( <i>disaggregated by sex, nationality, and type of user</i> ) able to conduct structural vulnerability assessments (SVA) employing the ECOWARN data analysis tool | Outcome        | 0        | N/A           | N/A           | 9             | 12            | 9          | 12           | <b>Exceeded Target</b><br><br>Ten EWD headquarters staff and 2 WANEP staff were trained to conduct Structural Vulnerability Assessments exceeding the EOP target by 3.   |
| 2.3              | Number of stakeholder roundtables convened to plan responses to conflicts based on conflict analyses   | Output         | 0        | N/A           | 0             | 4             | 4             | 4          | 4            | <b>Met Target</b><br><br>The Ghana WACA Stakeholders' meeting was conducted in the final quarter. The original target of 5 roundtables was reduced to 4 given USAID's request that EWARDS combine 2 field practicums into one.   |

### Intermediate Objective 3: Link Warning and Analysis to Response

| Indicator Number | Performance Indicator   | Indicator Type | Baseline | Year 1 Target | Actual Year 1 | Year 2 Target | Actual Year 2 | EOP Target | Total Actual | Notes for Final Report and PMP   |
|------------------|---|----------------|----------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|------------|--------------|--|
| 3.1              | Number of individuals (disaggregated by gender, nationality, and organizational affiliation), who are trained in conflict management and mitigation skills relevant to conflict early warning and response (see FACTS indicator “Number of people trained in conflict mitigation/ resolution skills with USG assistance,” FACTS P.S. 6.1) | Output/ FACTS  | 0        | 0             | 55            | 20            | 461           | 128        | 516          | <b>Exceeded Target</b><br>Based on 2 response workshops, and Practice Guide Training and Testing, 260 people were trained during the final quarter – (66 Females and 194 Males).   |
| 3.2              | Number of CSOs (including NGOs and CBOs) with strengthened capacity for early warning and response (see FACTS indicator “Number of nongovernmental constituencies built or strengthened with USG assistance,” FACTS P.S. 6.6)   | Output/ FACTS  | 0        | 11            | 10            | 49            | 161           | 60         | 171          | <b>Exceeded Target</b><br>100 CSOs participated in activities in the final quarter. 63 of the CSOs were an unanticipated benefit of the response workshops and 18 CSOs in the Imo State Nigeria Practice Guide testing, reflecting a high level of stakeholder interest in conflict responses. |
| 3.3              | Number of USG programs supporting a conflict and/or fragility early warning system and/or response mechanism, FACTS P.S. 6.1  | Outcome/FA CTS | 0        | 0             | 1             | 1             | N/A           | -          | 1            | <b>Met Target</b><br>This number was a stabilizing indicator and an outcome of EWARDS intervention.  |
| 3.4              | This activity was not approved by USAID in the Year 2 Work Plan and therefore was not tracked.  |                |          |               |               |               |               |            |              | <b>Not Applicable</b>  |
| 3.5              | Number of response initiatives taken as a result of EWARDS products   | Outcome        | 0        | 4             | 5             | 2             | 10            | 6          | 15           | <b>Exceeded Target</b><br>Two response initiatives were added in the final quarter. EWARDS WACA products have had wide reaching influence that demonstrates their accessibility and utility.   |

# ANNEX I: REPORTS AND INFORMATION/ INTELLECTUAL PRODUCTS

## ADMINISTRATIVE

1. Work plan
2. PMP
3. 27 monthly progress reports
4. 7 quarterly reports
5. Final Report

## TECHNICAL PRODUCTS

6. EWARDS informational/Promotional Brochure
7. Calibration Workshop Activity/Trip Report
8. Zonal Bureau Infrastructure Assessment and Training on ECOWARN Features Trip Report
9. Jos WACA Report
10. Jos Stakeholders' Workshop Report
11. Jos WACA Success Story
12. Côte d'Ivoire WACA Report
13. Mediation and Response Workshop Report
14. Liberia WACA Report
15. First Person Account - Lantana Abdullahi
16. Consultative Meeting on the Practice Guide Report
17. Structural Data Workshop Activity/Trip Report
18. Snap Shot – WEP Small Grant on Trauma Healing in Jos, Nigeria
19. Structural Vulnerability Analysis Workshop Activity/Trip Report
20. Guinea-Bissau WACA Report
21. Validation of the Practice Guide Report
22. Snap Shot – IMPACT Small Grant for Conflict Early Warning in Lagos State, Nigeria
23. Jos Response Workshop Report
24. Beta Test of the Africa Prospects Activity/Trip Report
25. Beta Test of ResReps Feature Activity/Trip Report
26. Training and Testing on the Practice Guide for Elections Dispute Management - Cotonou
27. Training on the Practice Guide for Elections Dispute Management - Abuja
28. Ghana WACA Report
29. Testing on the Practice Guide for Elections Dispute Management – Imo State, Nigeria
30. Liberia Response Workshop Report

31. Integrated Training Workshop Trip Report
32. WACA Toolkit
33. Côte d'Ivoire Response – National Reconciliation Workshop Report
34. Election Dispute Management Practice Guide
35. Primer on Structural Vulnerability Analysis (SVA)

# ANNEX 2: RESULTS, MILESTONES, AND DELIVERABLES CHART

Of 25 results, milestones, and deliverables established for EWARDS, the program achieved all but two (see comments below).

## Results, Milestones and Deliverables

| #  | Item  | Quarter Achieved                        | Comments  |
|----|---|---|---|
| 1  | ECOWARN server operational in ECOWAS region   | January-March 2011                      |   |
| 2  | Backup hosting provided by VRA throughout the transfer of server and for 120 days afterward   | April-June 2011                         |   |
| 3  | Continuous operations through timely server support for the EWD throughout the migration  | January-March 2011                      |   |
| 4  | Sustained and continuous operations of the new ECOWAS server  | January-March 2011                      |   |
| 5  | Accurate diagnosis and timely resolution of issues related to the efficient usage of the system. Secure data owing to regular backups of the application and the data | Over the LOP                            |   |
| 6  | Updates and patches to ECOWARN as needed  | Over the LOP                            |   |
| 7  | SitRep indicators list updated with operational definitions   | April-June 2011                         |   |
| 8  | Structural data analysis tool integrated into ECOWARN   | April-June 2011                         |   |
| 9  | EWD analysts able to use the “Context” feature in the application   | April-June 2011                         |   |
| 10 | Response Reports application functional   | July-September 2011                     | Design completed and application delivered by VRA to EWD.               |
| 11 | EWD analysts able to use ResRep feature in the application  | July-September 2011                     | Not achieved - Inbound and outbound channels require activation by EWD. |
| 12 | EWD analysts able to use field data to produce graphs   | July-September 2011                     |   |
| 13 | Structural data workshop  | April-June 2011                         |   |
| 14 | WACA TOT  | April-June 2011                         |   |
| 15 | WACA Practicums (2) with reports  | April-June 2011                         |   |
| 16 | Experts/Practitioners Consultative meeting  | April-June 2011                         |   |
| 17 | Validation workshop on the Practice Guide   | April-June 2011                         |   |
| 18 | Publication and Dissemination of the Guide  | July-September 2011                     |   |
| 19 | Training on the Practice Guide  | April-June 2011                         |   |
| 20 | Intervention in Benin and Nigeria using the Guide   | July-September 2011                     |   |
| 21 | Conduct 3 WACA response roundtable/workshops  | April-June 2011;<br>July-September 2011 |   |

| #  | Item  | Quarter Achieved          | Comments  |
|----|---|---------------------------|---|
| 22 | Conduct case study on post-conflict country | July-September 2011       | Was not conducted owing to the post-elections violence in Côte d'Ivoire |
| 23 | WANEP Grant funds disbursed                 | On-track – being achieved |   |
| 24 | Small grants implemented (5)                | January-March 2011        |   |
| 25 | WACA toolkit                                | July-September 2011       |   |

**U.S. Agency for International Development**

1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW

Washington, DC 20523

Tel: (202) 712-0000

Fax: (202) 216-3524

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